# Churchill, Borden and Anglo-Canadian Naval Relations, 1911–14

Martin Thornton

# Churchill, Borden and Anglo-Canadian Naval Relations, 1911–14

*Also by Martin Thornton*

ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND OTHER CANADIANS (*co-edited with Roy Todd*)

NANCY ASTOR'S CANADIAN CORRESPONDENCE 1912–1962 (*ed.*)

SIR ROBERT BORDEN: Canada (Makers of the Modern World series)

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF POLISH RESETTLEMENT IN CANADA, 1943–1947

TIMES OF HEROISM, TIMES OF TERROR: American Presidents and the Cold War

# Churchill, Borden and Anglo-Canadian Naval Relations, 1911–14

Martin Thornton
*Senior Lecturer, University of Leeds, UK*

palgrave
macmillan


Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-30086-7



First published 2013 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries

ISBN 978-1-349-45330-6 ISBN 978-1-137-30087-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137300874

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.



Robert L. Borden and Winston S. Churchill leaving the Admiralty, 1912
*Source*: Library and Archives Canada, reference C-002082.

*This page intentionally left blank*

*'When I resided in Halifax, Nova Scotia, I was one thousand miles nearer to London than to Vancouver on our western coast. If you could pivot Canada upon its eastern seaboard it would cover the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the British Islands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the northern part of France, the entire German Empire and a considerable portion of European Russia.'*

(Speech by Prime Minister Robert L. Borden at the Royal Colonial Institute, London, 10 July 1912)[1]

*This page intentionally left blank*

# Contents

# List of Illustrations

# List of Tables

# Preface

Sir Robert L. Borden (1854–1937) was Canadian Prime Minister from October 1911 to July 1920 and was knighted in 1914. With a number of senior colleagues, Robert Borden went to London in 1912 to discuss naval policies that the Canadian and British Governments hoped would be suitable for and help secure the defence of the British Empire and deliver a new naval policy for Canada. A very specific plan was coined from the discussions in London and the Canadian Government and Parliament were subsequently faced with difficult decisions concerning the acceptance of the proposals.

The year 1912 was a year of considerable pessimism about the future security of European states and the safety of the British Empire, particularly with regard to naval matters. Sir Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) was First Lord of the Admiralty for the first time from October 1911 to May 1915 and was Prime Minister of Great Britain on two separate occasions and knighted in 1953. Winston Churchill encouraged a naval policy for Canada in 1912 that led to Robert Borden promoting a Naval Aid Bill in Canada that suggested Canada invest $35 million Canadian dollars in three Dreadnought battleships ('Super-Dreadnoughts'); the battleships to be at the disposal of the British and to be used for the defence of the Empire, a position firmly accepted by Borden. What was the naval emergency that required the Prime Minister of Canada to sail for Great Britain and accept such a scheme? Why did Borden, a man with hitherto limited interest or knowledge of naval strategic issues, embark on a very controversial policy for Canada?

Democracy in Canada was healthy to the extent that the Naval Aid Bill had to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. The nature of the Bill caused much bitterness, disagreement and heated debates in the Canadian Parliament and the country. Members of Parliament and Senators in Canada understood the wide interest that the Naval Aid Bill 1912–13 created throughout Canada, but also the interest within and consequences for Great Britain and Germany. Within the Canadian bicameral legislature, the House of Commons passed the Bill, but the Canadian Senate rejected it in 1913. Robert Borden and most of his Conservative party believed Canada's defence was significantly weakened and for some it was a 'national disaster'. Why was it

considered such a national disaster and so controversial? If there existed a national naval emergency for Great Britain and an international emergency, the response by Canada did not assuage the emergency. Despite the promotion and the prominence of the Conservative Government policy over emergency naval support to Great Britain, Canada rejected this specific policy that was inherent to the Naval Aid Bill. This in turn meant that Canada prevaricated over its response and the role it was to play in naval matters within and outside the Empire.

Although a Prime Minister of Canada might be expected to have received a lot of academic interest, few historians of Canada have shown a detailed interest in Sir Robert Borden and his policies. Yet, within Canada, Robert Borden is remembered for being Canada's Prime Minister during the First World War, appears on high denomination Canadian currency and has a prominent statute on Parliament Hill in Ottawa. In historical literature, Borden is also acknowledged as having contributed towards a greater international recognition of Canada and working for a greater autonomy for Canada within the British Empire. Although Borden may have amended his political views towards the Empire during his lengthy career, the naval debates of 1912 and 1913 set an early tone and direction for Robert Borden's views and philosophy on the Empire. Further, the debates highlight anomalies and difficulties for Canadians in reconciling the costs and benefits of ambitious foreign policy attitudes.

With the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 a whole new set of debates and concerns about the adequacy of Canada's response to an international emergency were set in motion. The Canadian Conservative Government managed to avoid the riposte towards the Liberal party of 'I told you so'. Of course, highlighting the inadequacy of a Canadian Navy advantaged neither of the main political parties in Canada, particularly since both main parties had failed to deliver an adequate naval service for the nation.

Winston S. Churchill was instrumental in attempting to configure a substantial financial contribution from Canada for an expansion of the Royal Navy in the service of the British Empire. He both influenced and was influenced by Robert Borden in the development and presentation of a new naval programme, albeit one that would not come to fruition. In 1912 and 1913 Winston S. Churchill's name and ideas were evoked in positive and negative ways in the debates in the Canadian House of Commons and Canadian Senate. Controversy surrounded much that Churchill undertook, and this was no different. His first tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty had greater controversies and

losses of a greater magnitude associated with it than the Canadian Aid Bill of 1912, but it was nevertheless a failed policy for Churchill. His substantial efforts to secure naval support from Canada are set against a background of an Anglo-German race in building naval armaments that is the prelude to the First World War.

The events in this book are either over 100 years old or at the time of writing approaching that anniversary milestone. Many issues and events will warrant personal and political academic reflection as major anniversaries of the First World War pass. Many political failures are associated with the years approaching the First World War, and many political and military anxieties can be attributed to the prelude to the War, but what is also of interest is that argument and debate, pessimism and optimism, and democratic decision-making are reflected in Anglo-Canadian naval relations of the period.

Sir Robert Laid Borden has a two-volume set of published memoirs attached to his name, although they were edited by his nephew and published in 1938.[1] *Letters to Limbo* (only published in 1971) is a collection of Borden's letters to his own invented newspaper the *Limbo Recorder and Guardian*.[2] This was a slightly odd way of him expressing his political views in his own privately chosen format. Borden has only a few biographers and mainly that of Robert Brown, who produced an excellent two-volume history of Borden's life, published in 1975 and 1980; but also John English, *Borden: His Life and World* from 1977.[3] An article by Gilbert Norman Tucker in *The Canadian Historical Review* in 1947 on 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 1912–14' provided a review of Borden's Papers on the controversial naval policies of Borden during the period before the First World War.[4] It is a stout explanation of why a Canadian Navy did not materialize to provide a substantial contribution to winning the First World War at sea. Tucker went on to produce the official history of the Canadian Navy in *The Naval Service of Canada* in two volumes in 1952, of which volume one is the most relevant to the naval debates of 1912 and 1913.[5] Chapter eight 'A New Government and a New Policy' and chapter nine 'The New Policy Miscarries' from volume one were, as acknowledged by the author, partly the product of the previous article from 1947. Canadian naval issues were also more widely contextualized in the framework of the Dominion navies by Donald C. Gordon in an article on 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies 1902–1914', in 1961 in the *Journal of Modern History* and his book, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870–1914* in 1965.[6] In 1940, Robert MacGregor Dawson, made a study of Churchill at the Admiralty, 'The Cabinet Minister and

Administration: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–15', but it was not concerned with Anglo-Canadian relations.[7] A book titled *Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars* by Tim Cook is self-evidently about the conduct of two prime ministers during the First and Second World Wars.[8] The view that Robert Borden contributed little that was dramatic in Canadian politics before the First World War is evident in Cook's book and understandable given the cataclysmic events of the First World War that followed. Tim Cook briefly acknowledges a difficult role for Borden with regard to pre-First World War naval matters. Patrice Dutil and David Mackenzie also capture some of the controversial naval matters and a considerable amount about the domestic politics of Canada immediately prior to the 1911 general election.[9] My study is concerned with the debates generated by Borden, Brown, English, Tucker, Dawson and Gordon and all these authors have been used with selective interpretation in the genesis and content of this work.

In contrast to Sir Robert L. Borden, Sir Winston S. Churchill does not have a shortage of biographers or academic interest in the details of his career, and the bibliography attached to this text is testament to the large number of biographies and published volumes of his papers and speeches – notably by Sir Martin Gilbert. Winston Churchill has left us with published accounts of his recollections on his own contribution to major events and his detailed knowledge of world affairs. Winston Churchill believed himself to be an expert on world affairs and would very much prove this in his published volumes on *The World Crisis, 1911–1918* (first published as five volumes in six parts between 1923 and 1931).[10] However self-serving Churchill's published writings happen to be, the eloquence of the prose and the ability to capture the drama of historical events should make them the first port of call for scholars interested in examining his contribution to international affairs. Thomas Edward Lawrence ('Lawrence of Arabia'), no slouch in his own literary historical endeavours, was an admirer of Churchill's *The World Crisis*.[11] With regard to Anglo-Canadian naval issues, Churchill says very little in his volumes on *The World Crisis* and this in itself is of interest.

Winston Churchill as a man and political animal can be explained in the context of his working and personal relationships with his contemporaries. Historical debates on Churchill can be contextualized in how he saw and worked with others. In his own writing he produced profiles of 21 prominent figures, published in 1937 as *Great Contemporaries* and he added to the number of profiles in later edi-

tions.[12] No Canadians were included, but Churchill worked with a number of eminent and famous Canadians including Prime Minister Robert Borden, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King and Lester Pearson during his diplomatic career. Mackenzie King was born in the same year as Churchill, 1874, but Lester Pearson born in 1897 was 23 years younger than Churchill and Borden was 20 years older than him. Winston Churchill's political career was so long that it spanned several political generations. Robert Borden although substantially older than Churchill fits the definition of a contemporary, *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* defines contemporary: 'contemporary adj 1: happening, existing, living or coming into being during the same period of time'.[13] In his published accounts of a number of his contemporaries, *Great Contemporaries*, Churchill described his own interest in specific individuals, suggesting that they would: '… perhaps be the stepping stones of historical narrative'.

# Acknowledgements

The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NA) and the Library and Archives Canada (LAC) have been extremely helpful in providing appropriate material on the Admiralty and Robert L. Borden respectively. Sir Robert L. Borden's Papers held in Ottawa consist of a very large collection of material covering his political career that was made available in 1952 and subsequently reproduced within the Library and Archives Canada on microfilm. Documents and correspondence between the Canadian Government and the Admiralty of the United Kingdom are held at the NA in Kew, London. Both archives have had personnel who have been extremely helpful and knowledgeable in academic and practical matters.

Holdings of the Archives of Ontario include a large collection of the cartoons of [Elishan] Newton McConnell who lived from 1877 to 1940. His cartoons were originally published in the *Toronto Daily News* and are now available on the Archives of Ontario, Canada website. I am appreciative of the fine cartoons produced by McConnell and the copyright permission that has been acknowledged. This is equally true of the photographs provided courtesy of the Library and Archives Canada.

At the University of Leeds, the Brotherton Library has been a designated regional depository of Canadian material and the University has had a Centre for Canadian Studies since 1979. This Centre has recently been financially supported by the Foundation for Canadian Studies in the United Kingdom and previously by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Library of the London School of Economics and Political Science has copies of the *Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada* (DHCC) and *Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada* (DSC) for the period of this study.[1] Further, a number of dated Canadian texts in their archives have proven to be very valuable resources.

Churchill College at the University of Cambridge is the major depository of Winston Churchill's private papers and the archive has provided valuable research material for this work, and I am grateful for their excellent support. Since August 2012, the 'Churchill Archive' has been available from Bloomsbury Academic in an on-line published form at www.churchillarchive.com. Material from the Churchill

Archive has been reproduced with the kind permission of Curtis Brown, London on behalf of the Estate of Sir Winston Churchill, Copyright © Winston S. Churchill.

The idea for this book developed out of a more general book on *Sir Robert Borden*: *Canada* dealing with the background to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, but it more significantly developed from a conference paper given at the British Association of Canadian Studies (BACS) annual conference held at Murray Edwards College at the University of Cambridge in April 2010. BACS conferences have always provided a useful opportunity to discover the Canadian historical interests of a large number of international scholars.

No archive, library, foundation, institution or other individual is in any way answerable for the comments within this book. The views and information enclosed are entirely the responsibility of the author.

My family's patience and support with my academic interests have been significant in the completion of this book and I thank Eileen Marie Quane Thornton, for her indomitable and continuous help and support. Sean Lawrence Quane Thornton and Ethan David Quane Thornton have had academic interests in contemporary political science and economics respectively, but have shown more than polite interest in their father's work. Their inquisitive and scholarly enquires are never a distraction. Mark Twain inscribed advice in a book given to Winston Churchill that we might like to think is true: 'To do good is noble; to teach others to do good is nobler, and no trouble.'[2] Whether or not Mark Twain was trying to be ironic or put Churchill down is not entirely clear. Taken at its face value the comments might still be easy to disagree with and my wife (a teacher) and my children will have their own views on this.

# 1

# Anglo-Canadian Imperial Relations in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

> 'Daughter am I in my mother's house,
> But mistress in my own.'
> (*Our Lady of the Snows* by Rudyard Kipling)[1]

Rudyard Kipling, who lived from 1865 to 1936, was like Winston Churchill winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature and he is particularly famous for his short stories and poems and a literary canon that is associated with covering issues of British imperialism and colonialism, especially accounts of British soldiers. Kipling did manage to capture some political and economic issues of imperial relations, and one successful attempt at this for Anglo-Canadian relations was his poem *Our Lady of the Snows*, published in *The Times* (London) on 27 April 1897. The words 'Daughter am I in my mother's house, But mistress in my own.' were carried in the first and final stanzas of the poem and cleverly defined the relationship between Canada and the 'mother country', Great Britain, towards the end of the nineteenth century. However, the more particular reason for the poem was Canada's favoured trade policy with Great Britain and a more obscure border dispute in South America, where Canada favoured Great Britain and support for British Guiana, over that of the United States and Venezuela. French-Canadian Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada from 11 July 1896 to 6 October 1911, was to use the above lines from Kipling's poem in the Canadian House of Commons on more than one occasion, particularly in discussions on the British Empire and to suggest there was Canadian autonomy in relations with Great Britain.[2]

The *Lady of the Snows* was quoted by Laurier in the House of Commons at the time of the Naval Service Bill of 1910 and it particularly reflected a view that was also held by many of his Liberal party

supporters, but it was also largely the view of Leader of the Opposition, Robert Laid Borden, and the Conservative party in Canada.[3] The country was happy to show allegiance to Great Britain and the British Crown, but also proud of its independence, an independence that Laurier referred to on 29 March 1909 as a 'local independence'.[4] Canada's independence was particularly the case because the confederation of Canada in 1867 brought about an internally self-governing federal Canada with responsible government. The Constitution Act 1867 (formerly known as the British North America Act of 1867), an Act of the British Parliament, famously produced a written constitution for Canada. Confederation brought together three colonies in North America as the four founding Provinces of Canada in 1867: Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. It was not long before these Provinces were joined by Manitoba in 1870, British Columbia in 1871 and Prince Edward Island in 1873. During the Wilfrid Laurier Administration, in the early twentieth century, Saskatchewan and Alberta became part of Canada and the nation constituted nine Provinces and two Territories (Yukon was added in 1898 and Northwest Territories in 1905).[5] In the early twentieth century, Canada was still a new nation building on the political foundations provided by Great Britain and France. With the existence of the Province of Quebec, the Canadian Government had to take into consideration potential internal divisions because of a French-Canadian population and this further qualified Canada's relationship with Great Britain. The internal relationship of Quebec to the national Government seemed fairly stable while the French-Canadian Laurier was Prime Minister; he was born and educated in Quebec and had his political constituencies there.

Despite the self-governing nature of Canada, in foreign policy matters Canada was not formally independent from the British Government. Confederation created a new nation state, but did not completely severe Canada's recognized links with the British Government. A British Empire continued as a collection of self-governing nations and colonies. Great Britain strove for a common centralized foreign policy emanating from Westminster for the countries with Dominion status, but Britain could not take this for granted with regard to Canada. The Anglo-Canadian imperial relationship will be seen to be one driven by negotiations, compromises and arguments rather than domination.

Historians Jack Granatstein and Norman Hillmer expressed the significant and dramatic point that: 'Canada was born in ambiguity'.[6]

The ambiguity and confusion for Canada was that, early in its existence, it took the description of the 'Dominion of Canada' to be an expression of independence and self-assurance, and accordingly Canada worked particularly hard to define its own national identity. However, given that Canada did not have direct control over its own foreign policy and the word 'Dominion' became prominent in defining the relationship of Canada to Great Britain; Dominion status took Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland and the Irish Free State into a position away from being colonies, but still having formal ties with Great Britain. At the Colonial Conference of 1907 (known as Imperial Conferences after this conference), Canada and Australia were referred to as Dominions. Canada's pre-First World War policies within the British Empire over naval armaments, other defence matters, international diplomacy and international trade can be thus shown as ambiguous. This ambiguity will be highlighted accordingly in Anglo-Canadian naval relations and the ability of the Canadian Parliament to reject a naval programme promoted by the British Government and negotiated with the Canadian Government. If Canada was voting to support a British Empire foreign policy, was that domestic or foreign policy? This dilemma illustrates the true depth of Canadian independence from Great Britain and the limitations of Dominion status within the British Empire before the First World War.

Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1897 were imperial celebrations that Canada entered into with enthusiasm and ceremony. A stability within the Empire appeared to be evoked with the Queen's 60 years on the throne and imperialists in Canada were given further encouragement in that Britannia still ruled the waves. As diplomat Oscar Skelton put it:

> In the gorgeous pageants of the Jubilee year, in the business discussions of the Colonial Conference, and in their sequel in participation in the Boer War, Canada seemed to the world to have committed herself indefinitely to the laudation and support of the new imperialism which was dominating the policy of Britain …[7]

An ethno-linguistic link of Anglo-Saxons between Canada and the mother country was reinforced with a spiritual support evoking expansionism on Christian grounds. However, the Catholic identity of a French-speaking population in Quebec did not quite fit the picture of Anglo-Saxon superiority that would qualify Canada's relationship to

the British Empire. The promotion of French-Canadian nationalism can be associated with the countervailing drive for Anglo-Canadian cooperation, but it was not a drive that over-rode that cooperation.

A new imperialism describes the protectionist approach to the economic and political interests within the British Empire of the early twentieth century. A pride in the Empire very much suited the British and was cultivated, but it also suited some Canadians. If a federalist structure were possible for the British Empire, even through a fairly informal use of conferences and councils, then a fiscal responsibility might follow from the Dominions. For Great Britain, the resources of the Empire could be used as a command feature to retain the British Empire. Canadians could support the Empire because the Canadian position in the world could be promoted through the advancement of the British Empire. This view will be evident amongst many senior Liberals and Conservatives in the debates pursued in Canada, particularly debates about Canadian responsibility over the maintenance of the British Empire and the contribution and support to be made in military matters.

Yet Canada did not contribute directly to imperial naval defence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but it will be shown to have benefitted from a large British naval expenditure in the North American and Pacific stations. As Canada's geographical expansion after confederation shows, there was a large inward expansion that was coupled with the building of the trans-Canada railway between 1881 and 1885. For Canada, this railway reflected the importance of transport and travel, and in turn the economic and financial attributes of the British Empire and a Canadian nation. Canada did not need to build large ships they had built a very long railway. Canadian money was directed internally and Canada's size was its defence.[8] Canada's westward expansion and economic growth, despite the much smaller population was not unlike that of the economic development of the United States. Also, being next to the United States helped Canada feel relatively safe against external enemies and as a consequence could concentrate on its own internal development. Also, there were a number of shared values of the two democracies based on the nature of their European immigrant settlement.

In contrast to a view that there was a harmony of interests with the United States, is the rather strong perspective amongst Canadians that the defining feature of Canada after confederation is that Canada is not the United States. Canadians in certain periods become wary of the relationship with the United States, particularly the threatened eco-

nomic, political and military autonomy of having the powerful United States as a neighbour. Canada did not have the revolutionary struggle that defined the creation of the United States or the Civil War that almost tore it apart and Canada adopted and retained through the early twentieth century a strong British Empire relationship. This Anglo-Canadian relationship manifested in different ways, often influenced by the type of prevailing crisis that existed within or towards the British Empire.

The issue of Canada's contribution to a military support of Great Britain became a serious issue with the Boer War of 1899 to 1902 in South Africa. In a move that fell short of the Canadian Government exactly sending troops to South Africa, they permitted in excess of 7,000 troops to participate in this war. Carman Miller examined the circumstances surrounding '… some 7,368 restless, adventurous young Canadians who served in the South African War – the men who assisted Britain paint another portion of southern Africa red'.[9] However, it can also be argued that the Boer War did much more for Canada and defined Canadians ambivalent attitudes towards Empire in much that followed, setting strong differences between English and French-Canadian nationalism that would run through the naval debates of the early twentieth century. For historians, the South African War and the debates over a Canadian Navy have sat awkwardly with explanations of Canada's rise to national identity and unity. In fact, the drive for Canadian nationalism appeared to be subsumed within issues of imperialism as Canada involved itself in imperial crusades like the Boer War and the later First World War.[10] Miller argues:

> Most Canadians regarded imperialism simply as a means to 'mature nationalism,' a half-way house between the dangers of independence and the humiliation of continuing colonial dependency. Some shrewdly viewed it as a sound investment, an insurance policy, and cheap form of collective security. In short, they saw imperialism as a highway to a larger world. By sharing the responsibilities of empire they expected to help shape those imperial policies which affected Canadian interests. In their mind, 'Canadianism' was but the extension of imperialism.[11]

Sir Wilfrid Laurier was still Prime Minister at the time of the South African War and was reminded in later naval debates that he permitted troops to go to South Africa rather than sending them and it was the British Government that paid for the largest portion of expenditure on

Canadian troops during that particular War.[12] The Laurier Government was responsible for what was described as the 'despatch of a contingent'.[13] Lord Strathcona (Donald Alexander Smith, 1st Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal), the Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1896 to 1914, paid the cost of providing nearly 600 mounted men for a regiment (Strathcona's Horse), and although the Canadian Department of Militia recruited for the South African War, the cost was largely covered by the British Government. The Canadian Government paid out $2,800,000 towards the Boer War, but had no say in the particular decision-making related to it.[14]

Not until the Statute of Westminster of 1931 did the creation of a Commonwealth of nations actually define a clear autonomous role for Canada and other Dominions in foreign policy matters. This had derived from the Imperial Conference of 1926, with both a definition propounded by Arthur James Balfour (Chairman of Committee on Co-ordination of Imperial Relations) and the influence of Leopold Amery (Colonial Secretary) being important. In many ways, this was legislation and international law catching up with reality. Canada had already spent time during the First World War and the Paris peace negotiations that led to the Versailles settlements arguing the case for Canadian sovereignty in foreign policy matters. Theory (inherent to international law) was in many ways slow to catch up with what was already being practised by the Canadian Government.

If Canada did not have a clear foreign policy of its own during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has it had a clearer relationship to the sea and naval matters? Given the geographical dimensions of Canada, the land locked nature of the Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan and the geographical remoteness of a large number of Canadians from the oceans throughout the country it would appear that some Canadians did not necessarily have an affinity with the sea. However, seven of the nine Provinces (in existence in this period) did have direct access to salt water.[15] Also, the fact that Canada borders three oceans, the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic (making Canada the country with the longest coast in the world), that it includes the very large Hudson Bay and comprises a number of sizeable lakes has made maritime issues of some considerable importance to Canadians. International trade and fishing have also made the protection of trade routes and security for Canada's coastal waters of paramount importance. Nevertheless, Canada for a long period of its history was a maritime state without a serious navy.

Direct naval operations were carried out on the Great Lakes by Great Britain in pre-confederation Canada in the war of 1812–14 with the United States. Britain did increase the numbers of naval personnel involved in its North American and West Indian Squadron before the confederation of Canada, but this was a consequence of the British response to the American Civil War of 1861–65 and Fenian disturbances of 1865–67. The Fenian problem was produced by the 'Fenian Brotherhood', anti-British Irish Republicans crossing from the United States to attack Upper Canada and New Brunswick in British North America. The significance of naval power for the Great Lakes led to the conclusion in Canada that the Royal Navy was in general terms necessary for its defence.[16]

Canada's naval development in the 1880s was rather slow and largely geared to the issue of fisheries protection, and this drove the creation of the Department of Marine and Fisheries. Canada's concern was directed towards the protection of the coastline from fishing vessels from the United States. The Department of Marine and Fisheries undertook important work alongside fisheries protection work, including: hydrographic studies, wireless telegraphy and tidal surveys.[17]

An early foray into naval issues for the Canadian Government was an attempt to have a ship provided by Great Britain for training personnel in Canada. Between 1880 and 1882 Canada had the *Charybdis* on loan, although the British Government were happy to provide it as a gift, it was a gift that Canada ultimately did not want. Although, now marginalized in Canadian history, it would technically appear that 'The *Charybdis* was the first warship that was ever owned by the Dominion Government'.[18] Although some six ships have held the name HMS *Charybdis*, the name seemed a bit of an omen for Canada. 'Between Scylla and Charybdis' is a well-known expression, derived from Greek mythology and associated with being between two impossible positions, the Scylla of a sea monster and a monstrous whirlpool, Charybdis. The Canadian Government found the cost of refitting and finding personnel for the ship *Charybdis* prohibitive and returned the ship to the British Government to be decommissioned in the naval base at Halifax, Nova Scotia.[19]

A connected issue to that of a Canadian Navy was the ability of Canada to effectively build and maintain ships. Dockyards became an issue in the naval debates in the Canadian Parliament in 1910 and 1912–13 and in many discussions with the British Government. The expansion and development of the Halifax dry dock from 1889 contributed to the efficacy of the Royal Navy. The city of Halifax paid a subsidy to the British Admiralty for warships to be docked there.[20] The

other major dockyard developed in the nineteenth century that served the North Pacific region was Esquimalt in British Columbia, opened in 1887. Both the British Admiralty and the Canadian Government contributed to the cost of its development.

Colonel Sir Percy Girouard, a Director of Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, provided for Sir Francis Hopwood, Privy Councillor and Civil Lord of the Admiralty, who had been Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1907–11, an 'Interim Report on Canadian Naval and Ship-Building Policy' on 24 October 1912 and commented on the policy of the Laurier Government.[21] Although subsidies for shipbuilding had been promised for companies establishing yards, these new yards had not materialized under the Liberal Government of Laurier. Although tenders had been sought for constructing ten vessels in Canada, again no decision materialized. It was, however, noted: 'The Vickers Company claim a verbal promise from the late Government [Laurier's] for the construction of any war-ships to be built by the Canadian Government, presumably in Canada or elsewhere.'[22] Given that the close ties were with the Laurier Government, Vickers had no real grounds for claiming exclusivity with the next Conservative Government of Robert L. Borden.

A number of political developments in international affairs were to ultimately affect Great Britain and in turn the development of Anglo-Canadian relations. The further growth of nationalism and imperialism in the late nineteenth century was evident in Europe with the growth to Great Power status of Germany. The advent of a Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary in 1882 was worrying to Great Britain, Russia and France, but Europe did not divide itself quite this way.

What also concerned the British Committee of Imperial Defence in 1888, alongside worries about Germany, was a possible French invasion of Great Britain.[23] Naval issues were particularly discussed in the context of how to embark, transport and disembark military forces for service on continental Europe, if Britain was at war with France. Further, by 1891 British military concerns included the worry of Russia advancing upon India via Afghanistan.[24] On this matter, the naval concerns included how Britain might protect India by blockading Russian ports and accessing the Black Sea with the support of Turkey. By 1901, the Military Intelligence Division of British imperial defence believed that states like Canada and Australia might contribute to imperial defence by helping to garrison India.[25] The Committee of Imperial Defence, in the same year, discussed a paper on 'Military Needs of the Empire in a War with France and Russia'.[26] Ports of the

British Empire were classified in terms of importance in various categories: Halifax (Nova Scotia) was considered a 'principal naval base' capable of repairing and replenishing ships; Esquimalt on the west coast was a naval base where 'minor' repairs could take place; and Quebec in the east was categorized in terms of 'coaling stations, ports of refuge or defended commercial ports'.[27]

Further afield to Europe, both Japan and the United States also developed into Great Powers and influenced the international system. As a consequence, Great Britain clearly had old and new rivals, but largely put faith in naval supremacy and the political and strategic advantages that came with it. The existence and development of the British Empire was closely linked in many British minds to the success of the Royal Navy.

From 1889, Great Britain's naval wishes were set according to a two Power calculation that set the needs of the Royal Navy to be equal in power to the next two major naval Powers put together. Great Britain was not very worried about the United States as an enemy, and was not too flustered about the Russian and French navies, even if combined.[28] However, once Germany started to expand its naval production, Britain had to consider whether or not Germany would ally with other Powers to cause major military and political problems for the British Empire.

With regard to Canada, Gilbert Tucker points out: 'Prior to the year 1909, the Dominion of Canada had never undertaken either to contribute toward the cost of the Royal Navy or to provide a naval force of its own.'[29] It was thus Great Britain that had funded the cost of its naval dispositions in Canada. Robert Borden as Prime Minister put the cost of naval and military defence for Great Britain during the nineteenth century as at least $400,000,000.[30] It was very difficult for the Admiralty to estimate the exact cost to the British Government of maintaining naval support for Canada given that money was not spent on a geographical region but under more general headings of supply, including ammunition, stores, pensions, personnel wages and ship construction. Nevertheless, the British Government did attempt to measure the financial cost of maintaining ships at North American and North Pacific Stations.

The Admiralty did a rough estimate that about a twelfth of British Navy personnel were stationed in Canadian waters in the 20 years of the nineteenth century from 1870–90, but only a twentieth between 1890 to 1900.[31] Again, as a rather rough calculation, it was believed by the Admiralty that the British Government probably spent between £25 million to £30 million in keeping British Navy squadrons in Canadian waters during the 50 years prior to 1910.[32]

**Table 1.1 British Expenditure on Ships at North American and Pacific Stations, 1870–1900**

| | Complements of Ships on North American and Pacific Stations | Total Personnel of Royal Navy | Total Naval Expenditure in £s |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1870 | 5,558 | 60,770 | 10,102,641 |
| 1880 | 5,191 | 57,471 | 11,004,394 |
| 1890 | 4,367 | 64,207 | 14,514,183 |
| 1900 | 5,870 | 108,595 | 32,131,062 |

*Source*: 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of the Dominion of Canada During the Nineteenth Century', compiled at the Admiralty and printed at the Foreign Office, October 1912, ADM 116/3485, NA.

If the British Admiralty needed further arguments for a naval debt that the Canadians might owe the British, they found it in the expenditure on the development of dockyards. Halifax Dockyard in Nova Scotia was established in the eighteenth century but British building costs were also registered in the nineteenth century, amounting to £160,000.[33] The British building costs of Esquimalt Dockyard in British Columbia in the mid-nineteenth century were put at £115,620.[34] Kingston Dockyard, in what became the Province of Ontario, proved difficult to estimate, the dockyard having been transferred to the War Department in 1853 and to the Canadian Government in 1877.

What the Admiralty could estimate was the expenditure on the maintenance of ships in the above dockyards over a 50 year period:

**Table 1.2 British Expenditure on the Maintenance of Ships on the North American and North Pacific Stations, 1851–1901**

| Maintenance of Ships on the North American and North Pacific Stations. Years | Estimated Expenditure in £s |
|---|---|
| 1851–52 to 1860–61 | 4,310,700 |
| 1861–62 to 1870–71 | 5,349,500 |
| 1871–72 to 1880–81 | 3,899,950 |
| 1881–82 to 1890–91 | 3,793,530 |
| 1891–92 to 1900–01 | 4,642,970 |
| Total | 21,997,000 |

*Source*: 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of the Dominion of Canada During the Nineteenth Century', compiled at the Admiralty and printed at the Foreign Office, October 1912, ADM 116/3485, NA.

This above total of nearly £22 million did not include the cost of building the ships or the cost of incorporating the original armaments, or for that matter, the training costs or eventual pensions to which service personnel serving on these naval stations would be entitled. Alongside producing these estimates the Admiralty would further crow that it was the British that were funding the defence of Canada and would further establish a view that Canada had a debt of responsibility to Great Britain. Trying to equate British expenditure on the protection of Canada was not really possible and the true value of British support for Canadian security did not fit within a cost-benefit analysis model.[35] The Admiralty's expressed view in October 1912 was that: 'This truth should never be darkened by detail.'[36] At least the British Government had no war operations costs with regard to Canadian waters, there had not been a major problem with the United States since before the confederation of Canada.

The relationship that Canada had with Great Britain over naval matters was taken into the Colonial Conference of 1907 in London, where Canada was represented by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Frederick William Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, and Louis Philippe Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries. The conference was addressed by the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth (Edward Majoribanks) and his perspective on the British Empire was rather one dimensional:

> There is one sea, there is one Empire, and there is one Navy, and I want to claim in the first place your help, and in the second place authority for the Admiralty to manage this great service without restraint.[37]

Laurier was to respond in a negative and forceful way to the suggestion that the 'colonies' should be contributing more in a general financial way to naval defence. His opposition to this general proposal was adamant and based on the belief that you could not easily have a uniform policy and such a policy would include an intolerable tax on the Canadian population. Given that Canada and other Dominions had to develop new public works, in many cases the shipbuilding infrastructure from scratch, put them in a different financial and investment position to that of Great Britain. Laurier felt that Canada could do no more than it was currently doing.[38] Laurier showed more pleasure in the notion of local forces, with the Fisheries Protection Service being upgraded for coastal defence.[39]

At an emergency 'Imperial Conference on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire' in 1909 the representatives sent to London by Canada were the familiar figures of Sir Frederick William Borden and Louis Philippe Brodeur. These two individuals had also been present at the Colonial Conference of 1907. Two advisers on the Canadian delegation were Major General Sir Percy Lake and Rear Admiral Charles Kingsmill. The Admiralty adopted the position that a single navy was appropriate for Great Britain and the Dominions, but it was also aware that each Dominion might contribute in very different ways to naval defence. Local conditions would help determine the disposition of resources and the individual circumstances of each Dominion would help to determine the naval force they would have of their own, but the needs of the 'Crown' would also be a significant factor. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, who had succeeded Lord Tweedmouth, was cognizant of the desire of the Dominions to develop their own navies. It was ambitiously suggested that the Dominions might have navies of their own that would comprise: '… a big dreadnought battle cruiser, three Bristol-class cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines'.[40] As far as the relationship with the Dominions was concerned, the emphasis of the Admiralty was being put on the Pacific and long term exposure from a Japanese fleet. The German threat was close to home for Great Britain, but the Dominions could help in the Pacific. Further suggestions included a common training strategy (now often known as standard operating procedures) and compatibility of weaponry with Great Britain would make forces mutually useful in time of any major conflict.[41] Sir Frederick Borden presented the developed ideas of George Eulas Foster, and was happy to follow guidelines produced at the 1907 conference and clearly wanted naval units on both the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts that were Canadian. Sir Frederick Borden promoted the ideas of local forces, a unity of command during war and co-operation during any transitional stages. He stated that:

> One objection put forward was that if a serious war came, forsooth, some particular navy, Australian or Canadian, might refuse to act. Surely it is only necessary to present that view in order to see how absolutely necessary it is that there should be individual navies.[42]

Canadian recommendations that were made during the conference were that: submarine construction would be delayed due to the large expenditure related to training submarine personnel; the Admiralty

could lend Canada two old cruisers (manned by the Royal Navy) for training purposes, but also training to take place in Great Britain; and for Canada to provide useful dockyards to repair warships. As Gilbert Tucker was to acknowledge, the modern navies of both Canada and Australia originated at this conference of 1909.[43]

Ideas relating to imperial defence changed in the decade ending in 1910. Separate Dominion naval forces were a prominent issue as Great Britain looked to defend its home waters. This led to Canada accepting provisions that they had acknowledged as important at the Imperial Conference of 1907. However, a confusion over agreements on the exact conditions of the transfer of authority for dockyards led to a delay in the formal transfer of authority under the Naval Establishments in British Possessions Act, passed in London in October 1909. The advice of the Treasury and Admiralty led to this Act that meant the dockyards of Esquimalt and Halifax that had previously been in British possession for naval purposes were transferred to Canadian ownership in the succeeding year.[44]

Canada's naval position was factored into the debates in Great Britain about the perceived threat from the German Navy. Britain's naval limitations against Germany had become apparent by 1909 and Imperial Germany was seen as a direct threat to Britain's maritime interests. First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, during a budget debate in the British House of Commons on 16 March 1909, posited the scaremongering view that the Royal Navy would be outnumbered by German Dreadnought battleships by 1912, ushering in the 'Dreadnought crisis'. It was actually an issue of proportions, the British wanting a 2:1 ratio of Dreadnought battleships against that produced by Germany. However, the proposed building program by Germany for 1909 made it more like a ratio of 12:10, but still in favour of Great Britain. What may have been intended as a domestic debate by McKenna took on international considerations, and even if Britain and the Empire were unlikely to be out-produced by the acceleration in shipbuilding by its imperial rival, the seeds were sown for a world-wide consideration of this possibility. New Zealand, the Federated Malay States, New South Wales and Victoria believed there was a crisis and were fairly swift in offering to contribute towards supporting the Royal Navy in emergency measures.[45]

The Anglo-German naval arms race largely became defined by the production of large Dreadnought battleships. These battleships with propulsion by steam turbines and large guns became symbolic of national power and status. This investment in a new and heavily

armed British class of ship was brought about by Admiral Sir John 'Jacky' Fisher, First Sea Lord (later Lord Fisher of Kilverstone), when HMS Dreadnought was completed in 1906. Further Dreadnoughts were produced in 1909, and in the next year the British undertook a programme to construct eight new ships by 1913. It can be argued that the British implementation of these new developments in battleships put Britain at the forefront of a new arms race and were even largely to blame for it. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1908 to 1915, reflected in 1914 that the development of the first Dreadnought battleship had been 'ostentatious', and that it seemed to be the pursuit of bigger and faster ships with larger guns, had occurred because that is what was possible at the time.[46] However, the opposite view and defence of British Government policy has been that the new developments would have been inevitably undertaken by competitors, particularly Germany and a margin of security had to be maintained. New Dreadnought ships developed by the British with improvements in speed and increased firepower were planned over a lengthy time period and were finished as different types of ships in subsequent years. In the year 1909, three ships of the Bellerophon class were commissioned in Great Britain. These battleships were succeeded by further Dreadnoughts becoming available in the St Vincent class between 1909–11, the Colossus class in 1911, in the following year the Orion class and by 1912 and 1913 the King George V class.[47] Further Dreadnought classes were commissioned before, throughout and after the First World War, although some had been programmed years before their ultimate completion.[48]

Great Britain's imperial rival, Germany, produced comparable Dreadnoughts in a number of different classes from 1909.[49] The early Nassau class of Dreadnought ships, programmed in Germany between 1906 and 1908, included the Nassau, Westfalen, Rheinland and Posen battleships. This production appeared to reveal, together with the British production of battleships, that the naval arms race had emerged speedily after the British introduction of the first of these powerful new battleships and perhaps Great Britain was to blame for that. Nevertheless, the British Admiralty felt that German Dreadnought production was not a necessary and direct response to British naval expansion during this period and that the Germans had their own imperial and industrial rationale for developing new ships.[50] The British Government felt that Great Britain's friendship with France from 1904 and improved British relations with Russia from 1907 were relevant to German naval expansion. It was further believed, in Britain, that the

support for the development of new battleships in Germany was largely determined with German public support from a much earlier date than that which was officially announced.[51]

The Admiralty by 1912 had become alarmed by the five successive German Fleet Laws instigated in 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. Great Britain's early response was to become concerned about the good quality and potential striking power of German battleships being produced for what was assumed to be a concentration in the North Sea and North Atlantic. Thus Great Britain pressed ahead with more substantial increases of their own from 1909, and this appears to be a pivotal year. 'In that year, eight capital ships were laid down in Great Britain, and two others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively …'[52]

Did the Canadian Government have a strong attitude towards these naval developments between Great Britain and Germany? One of the people to help develop the role of the Canadian Department of External Affairs (now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) and biographer of Sir Wilfrid Laurier was Oscar Douglas Skelton. He believed that neither the Liberal nor Conservative parties of Canada embraced the imperial question very significantly in 1908. In the year that followed, some harmony existed between the Canadian political parties on questions of imperial defence. Yet by the years 1910–11 rather strong divisions appeared between French nationalists and British imperialists as they began to develop strong views on naval matters.[53]

In 1909, the naval worries for Canada largely concerned how it could best contribute towards imperial defence. The naval rivalry that existed between Germany and Great Britain focused on the building of capital ships. Canada had been trying to decide whether or not to have its own naval service and place Canadian ships at the disposal of an imperial navy or contribute in financial terms to an imperial navy. French-Canadian politicians queried the level of support that Canada should be giving to Britain's imperial defence and French-Canadian nationalism had to be born in mind by both the Liberal and Conservative political parties. Naval issues were debated between and within the Canadian political parties. The defence of Canada was made a priority with a determination evident from the Government's standpoint that Canadian ships, however limited, should be stationed off the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. These ships would be available to Great Britain should a major war break out.

This was all a prelude to establishing a Canadian Navy and the 'Dreadnought crisis' produced by the debate in the British House of

Commons of 16 March 1909 was the direct reason for the adoption by Canada, for the first time, of a clear naval policy.[54] A resolution by Conservative and Unionist Member of Parliament for the constituency of North Toronto, George Eulas Foster was introduced in the House of Commons in Ottawa on 29 March 1909, related specifically to coastal defence and was his drive towards Canada obtaining self-respect. As Dutil and MacKenzie have pointed out, the speech took up ten pages of *Hansard* and promoted a Canadian solution to imperial naval matters.[55] Foster's conclusion was that it was time for Canada to protect its own seaports and coast line and take on the financial burden for this protection.[56] Skelton captured the dilemmas for Foster in that French-Canadians in the Conservative party had been making it difficult to present a naval resolution to Parliament, but this Foster eventually did. He promoted a gift of a Dreadnought rather than the 'tribute' of an annual payment to the British Navy.[57] Prime Minister Laurier largely supported the Conservative position and spoke of Canada being a 'daughter nation' of the British Empire and in turn put forward an amendment that prompted minor criticism and discussions with Leader of the Opposition, Robert Borden, that led to a resolution acceptable to both sides of the House of Commons:

> The House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the self-governing dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence.
>
> The House will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last imperial conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world.
>
> The House expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honour of the empire.[58]

Whether or not the resolution, despite cross-party support, could satisfy those who favoured the Empire over autonomy and vice-versa,

had to be yet seen, but Canada was suddenly in pursuit of a naval policy and it was in the next year that Canada's Naval Service was established.

The strong critics of Laurier's resolution were to hail from Quebec, with particularly strong criticism appearing in the opposition from Henri Bourassa and Frederick Debartzch Monk. Bourassa wanted the Canadian public to be directly consulted on the proposal and Monk had an uncompromising approach in the context of his own nationalistic views and also wanted a plebiscite on these naval matters.

On 12 January 1910, the Naval Service Bill was introduced to the Canadian House of Commons, where impressive speeches were made by Prime Minister Laurier and Leader of the Opposition, Robert Borden. The Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Louis Philippe Brodeur, who might have been expected to contribute, was not present due to ill-health. Although Borden had limited experience in naval matters, the military details came to interest him, particularly since he had to verbally spar with Wilfrid Laurier. Over the period of the reading of the Bill, the Prime Minister made some famous pronouncements, including that he was '… a Canadian, first, last and all the time'.[59] Laurier was to also express the robust and famous comment that:

> If England is at war we are at war and liable to attack. I do not say that we shall always be attacked; neither do I say that we would take part in all the wars of England. That is a matter that must be determined by circumstances, upon which the Canadian Parliament will have to pronounce and will have to decide in its own best judgment.[60]

Borden in his *Memoirs* recorded Laurier's response to a question from Conservative Member of Parliament, Thomas Simpson Sproule (constituency of Grey East, Ontario), about whether or not war meant everywhere or just Canada. Wilfrid Laurier's reply was: 'War everywhere. When Britain is at war, Canada is at war; there is no distinction'.[61] Although in Laurier's defence, he was later to make a significant qualification to his statement, claiming that Canada would not necessarily participate in all the wars that Great Britain might be involved in.[62] Tucker reports Laurier's view as delivered in a speech in Montreal on 10 October 1910 as being that Canada would not automatically go to war if Great Britain was at war, but would judge whether or not to do so, and that Laurier concluded this particular argument and speech with the view that if the British Empire's naval supremacy was under threat, it would be the responsibility of Canada to go to the aid of Great Britain.[63]

The Canadian Prime Minister's robust naval proposals prompted a number of areas of criticism in Parliament. Conservatives in particular dubbed the proposals as the promotion of a 'tin-pot navy', a previous jibe attributed to Premier Roblin of Manitoba against Laurier's naval plans, and a taunt that would stick to the Canadian naval service beyond even the First World War.[64] Further, other contemporary critics of the Naval Service Bill of 1910 posited a number of views: that a small Canadian Navy would be no match for German Dreadnoughts, that Canada could effectively await any attack before responding, that the proposal was too militaristic, and that Canada was unlikely to be attacked.[65] Monk put an amendment for a plebiscite that was defeated 175 votes to 18, Borden's amendment on emergency aid to build two battleships of the Dreadnought type was defeated 129 votes to 74, and an amendment to delay the Bill was defeated 119 to 78. The Bill itself was passed by 111 votes to 78 (18 paired Members of Parliament).[66]

Although it was not to amount to much in terms of the number of ships possessed by the Canadian authorities, the Naval Service Act of 4 May 1910 established a Naval Service for Canada and the Department of the Naval Service.[67] This Department would operate under the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, and this Minister would also be the Minister of the Naval Service. Despite the logic of having fisheries and a naval service dovetailed together, it seems surprising in the elevated position of the armed services within a nation's government that this was accepted. This congruence of Naval Service and Marine and Fisheries suggests the limited context of Canadian naval interests up to this point. The Minister of Marine and Fisheries and Minister of the Naval Service happened to be Louis Philippe Brodeur, whose Deputy was George J. Desbarats from Quebec. The first Director of the Naval Service was Rear Admiral Charles Kingsmill, who was born in Guelph, Ontario and had a long career in the Royal Navy and also served on the Canadian delegation to the emergency Imperial Conference in 1909.

Of course, Canada had a history of building wooden sailing ships and a system of coastal defence and fisheries protection. It would appear that the development of a Canadian Navy had its own Canadian rational that was coincidental with the British naval crisis, and that this 'Dreadnought crisis' at the very least determined the nature and direction of the naval debate within Canada. The debates were often between those in favour of coastal defence and those who wanted to establish what is often called 'blue water' power.[68] Some Canadian naval historiography has tried to redress the balance away

from seeing Canadian naval history as a poor sub-field of military history and to even give it a more substantial profile in maritime history.[69] There have also been academic approaches that avoid just considering imperial concerns as a driving force of Canadian naval policy.[70]

Whatever the exact causal considerations, a Naval Service of Canada was created by the Liberal Government that took the title of the Royal Canadian Navy in January 1911 and formally existed by this name until 1968. However, the development of a large independent Canadian Navy under Laurier did not exactly materialize, Canada acquired two British cruisers, *Rainbow* and *Niobe*. What thus became His Majesty's Canadian Ship (H. M. C. S.) *Niobe* was a cruiser with both six inch and four inch guns, launched in 1897, and was a ship developed for training Canadian seamen and based at Halifax dockyard. H. M. C. S. *Rainbow* based at Esquimalt dockyard was an Apollo class cruiser that was six years older than the *Niobe*. Esquimalt and Halifax dockyards both passed to Canadian ownership shortly after the passage of the Naval Service Act. Alongside the *Rainbow* and *Niobe* was the Canadian Government Ship (C. G. S.) and fisheries protection cruiser, named C. G. S. *Canada*. With these decisions and acquisitions Canada had a navy. This choice had been made rather than Canada building its own small or large navy or contributing in a substantial way to the Dreadnought building programme of Great Britain; a compromise choice that may have amused the Germans whose navy were known to scout the American and Canadian coasts and even visit Canadian docks through invitation.[71]

The rhetorical question might have been asked: who would attack Canada? By implication this question suggests that Canada was a 'fire proof house', as French-Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand expressed in 1924.[72] However, the important point is that imperial navies were a corollary to painting the map red for the British Empire; control of the seas also defined imperial greatness, and German attitudes could be seen as stopping Great Britain and its Empire operating freely around the world. Canada and Germany contrast dramatically over naval attitudes as a significant navy for Germany helped to define its power and prestige, whereas Canada appeared to restrict its interests to coastal defence. Ships nevertheless, as stated previously were symbols of power. A Canadian Navy was a qualified act of naval independence, an independence set in the sea of rather substantial navies. Canada's new statute defined Canada's Navy as '… those naval forces organized for the defence and protection of the Canadian coasts and trade, or

engaged as the Governor in Council may from time to time direct'.[73] Richard Gimblett argues this situation satisfied neither the imperialists who were in favour of Dreadnoughts nor French-Canadian nationalists who saw an imperial policy being forced upon them. 'In the end, the "tin-pot" fleet was one which no one wanted.'[74] Robert Borden, in Opposition, presented the option of a Canadian Navy and the ability of Canada to offer financial assistance for Empire resources should a naval crisis materialize. His view in Government would change in favour of a much stronger arrangement with Great Britain.

The last Imperial Conference before the outbreak of the devastating First World War was held in Great Britain in 1911. Wilfrid Laurier, still in Government, took Sir Fredrick Borden and Louis Philippe Brodeur with him to the conference. British Prime Minister Asquith and his Colonial Secretary were concerned with the management and control of imperial forces.[75] As Gilbert Tucker emphasized in his account of the Conference, the Australians and Canadians wanted there to be clarity about the status of Dominion navies and how these navies would integrate with land forces of the British Empire. The Dominion governments expected that they would control their own military forces.[76] How all this would exactly work was not entirely clear to Canadians at the Conference, but expectation was that each Dominion would keep the Admiralty informed about the movement of its ships. Protocols and communication between Dominion warships and the British fleet would be largely determined by seniority. During a war, if a Dominion provided ships for service, they would be put under the control of British Admiralty and be part of the British fleet.[77]

The naval issue for Canada and Great Britain should be set against the other issues that defined their relationship and influenced their policies towards each other at this time. Trade was of paramount importance within Anglo-Canadian imperial relations and this issue also defined Robert Borden's opinions on the significance of the Dominions within the British Empire. One of the large imperial economic and political issues of 1897 was the issue of Canada's preferential trade with Britain and Borden presented his views in debates in the Canadian House of Commons. The issue of treaties within the British Empire and the Dominions became an important issue because the Liberal Government introduced a tariff allowing preferential treatment for Great Britain, believing they could give this as a special preference to Great Britain alone.

Confusion arose over the issue of preferential trade because Great Britain had treaties with Belgium and Germany that determined that

their goods would not be subject to higher tariffs from the colonies and possessions of Great Britain in those products that had import duties established with Britain.[78] Rather awkwardly, Belgium and Germany believed they were entitled to the preferred tariffs from Canada that Canada offered to Britain. Given the peculiarities of this arrangement, it was then assumed that favoured nation clauses of treaties mentioning British possessions would mean that Canada might have to give trade preferences to other countries in the world. Robert Borden accepted the legal rationale of this argument and the logical conclusion that this trading relationship had then to be changed.

Eventually, at a Colonial Conference, there was strong opposition to this type of linked trading anomaly, and as such: the representatives of the Dominions '… unanimously recommend the denunciation, at the earliest convenient time, of any treaties which now hamper the commercial relations between Great Britain and her Colonies'.[79] Although, within a year the trade treaties of Britain with Belgium and Germany were brought to an end, Canada continued to tax German imports until the situation of German trade with Canada was fully clarified.[80] This particular problem of the legal position and international ramifications of Canadian preferential trade with the 'mother country' was captured within Kipling's *Our Lady of the Snows* in 1897: 'The gates are mine to open, As the gates are mine to close'.[81]

An important issue of 1910 that had ramifications for the British Empire was trade reciprocity between Canada and the United States. The Canadian Liberal Government of fifteen years tried to eliminate customs duties on many agricultural and manufactured products traded between the United States and Canada. This policy appeared to be immediately popular among farmers in Western Canada. In response, the best the Conservative party could do was play the imperial card and claim that it was an abandonment of the Empire in favour of North American continentalism. Businessmen in Canada tended to believe protectionism within the British Empire had been in their interests and Conservative politicians played to these views and cleverly launched a strong campaign against the trade arrangement.

The Liberal Government's election campaign was to be fought largely over the question of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States and not the naval issue. President William Howard Taft of the United States (President, 1909–13) promoted the idea of establishing tariff preferences between the United States and Canada, and the Liberal Government responded as an interested party. In turn, the Canadian

Parliament was dissolved on 29 July 1911, and Laurier expected the electorate to support his position that favoured reciprocity.[82]

Information provided to the Imperial Conference of 1911 by the British Board of Trade suggested that between 1909–10 the average value of overseas trade for Canada was £72,000,000.[83] The overall value of overseas trade for Canada in 1911–12 was approximately $100,000,000, much of it carried by Canadian ships or Canadian vessels registered in Great Britain.[84] Thus the security of the seas and protection of Canadian sea going vessels by the Imperial Navy was not entirely lost in political debates in Canada and fitted with the rather public pro-Empire stance of the Conservatives.

In the general election of 1911 the issue of free trade and business interests dominated with representatives of the banks, railroads, agriculture and manufacturing contributing to the eventual result. Reciprocity was rejected as Canadian business worries about being dominated by the industrially larger United States prevailed. The Conservatives played the 'King and country' card very well and were victorious, a majority of parliamentary seats were won by the Conservative Party with 132 seats to the Liberals 86.[85] General elections are rarely simply decided on single issues, and this election was largely no different and certainly the reciprocity issue was complicated in Quebec by the attitudes to the naval question. Monk campaigned against reciprocity, but he was united with Bourassa in continuing to ask for a plebiscite on the naval question. Borden's view in the election that would later resonate through the naval debates of 1912 and 1913 was for Canada to flourish as a self-governing nation, but a nation happy to be associated with the British Empire.

Member of the Canadian Parliament, Mr William Melville Martin (constituency of Regina, Saskatchewan), was to suggest in February 1913 that there were two types of imperialists in Canada. One school reflected an 'old Tory' policy of centralization. It was argued by Canadians who liked this idea, that it reflected the centralization that existed throughout most good business practices, and as such this should be applied with enthusiasm to an Empire Navy.[86] It could also be added that a further attribute of this type of imperialist was that they tended to want a greater say in the administration of the Empire.

The second school of imperialists suggested by Martin was a group that he believed was occupied by the majority of Canadians. They believed the Dominions could work out their own destiny within the Empire and a Dominion like Canada would invest in its own military but be prepared to support Great Britain when the need occurred.[87] It

will be shown that this type of imperialist, despite wanting to assist Great Britain, put Canada first and foremost and consequently was less likely to support a large commitment of financing three Dreadnoughts for the British Navy. They would have to be convinced that there was an overriding need for Canadian financial support for Great Britain.

By the early twentieth century, Anglo-Canadian military and economic relations had not become entirely clear or reconciled in mutual understanding. The British Empire and Canada's position within it was in a state of uncertainty. Naval concerns and the specific support that Canada could give to a Dreadnought production programme in support of an imperial fleet was brought into the broader debates of how Anglo-Canadian relations functioned.

# 2

# The Rise to Eminence of Winston S. Churchill and Robert L. Borden




*Illustration 2.1* Robert L. Borden and Winston S. Churchill as sailors
*Caption*: 'What we have we'll hold'
*Source*: Newton McConnell Collection, reference C 301, item 3747, Archives of Ontario, Canada.[1]

It always seemed appropriate that Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill was born at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire on 30 November 1874 whilst his parents were guests at the impressive stately home. The house and estate derived from a gift by the nation to John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough, developed in the early eighteenth century. Winston Churchill's father, Lord Randolph Churchill, was the second son of the seventh Duke of Marlborough and the first Duke of

Marlborough, was Winston's ancestor, a great hero and the subject of a monumental four volume biography by him.[2] Despite his family name and aristocratic associations, Winston had no considerable inherited wealth and had to make a number of careers for himself. His careers were never entirely mutually exclusive and he managed to be a soldier, journalist, politician and historian with considerable talents for leadership, oratory, statesmanship and writing. Although held in significant national esteem, his stated views on industrial relations, women, prohibition, Ireland and decolonization make him a controversial figure with many contentious views and actions. His first tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty ended in 1915 with criticism over the disastrous Gallipoli campaign (also referred to as the Dardanelles campaign) in Turkey. Of course, despite Churchill's many setbacks his national and international esteem stems from an unequivocal opposition to Nazism and a steadfast leadership as Prime Minister from 1940–45 during the Second World War. Memorable and significant speeches were made by Churchill after the Second World War; and his second stint as Prime Minister from 1951–55, although against a Cold War background, saw Churchill involved in concerted efforts for peaceful international diplomacy.

Winston Churchill had a self-confessed unhappy childhood and was educated at St George's School from 1882 (a boarding school near Ascot), Harrow School from 1888, followed by the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, which culminated in him passing out in 1895. He was a much better student than he normally suggested, but his witty ruminations on examinations have always been greeted with much enthusiasm from students with a dislike of answering examination questions.[3] Fortunately for Churchill's readers, his love of English stayed with him; whereas his inability in Latin and his dislike of paper qualifications was evident from his entrance examination into Harrow when he was 12 years old. Churchill famously recounted in *My Early Life*:

> I wrote my name at the top of the page. I wrote down the number of the question '1'. After much reflection I put a bracket round it thus '(1)'. But thereafter I could not think of anything connected with it that was either relevant or true. Incidentally there arrived from nowhere in particular a blot and several smudges. I gazed for two whole hours at this sad spectacle: and then merciful ushers collected my piece of foolscap with all the others and carried it up to the Head-master's table. It was from these slender indications of

> scholarship that Mr. Welldon drew the conclusion that I was worthy to pass into Harrow.[4]

This rather dysfunctional student as a child, became a serious journalist, historian and orator and like Rudyard Kipling, but unlike Mark Twain, a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953.

Winston Churchill took an interest in the parliamentary affairs of his father and although there was limited personal contact between them, it was at lunches and dinners that he met his father's contemporaries: '… Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain [Joseph], Mr. Edward Carson, and also Lord Rosebery, Mr. Asquith, Mr. John Morley and other fascinating ministerial figures'.[5] These connections became very useful to him in his future political career, particularly that of Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith.

Commissioned into the 4th Hussars, Winston used the good contacts of his mother (Lady Randolph, previously Jenny Jerome) to obtain attachment to units in active service and new opportunities that might advance his military career. His contemporaries strove to experience active military service, and Churchill was no different.[6] This was first achieved through unofficial service with Spanish forces in Cuba in 1895, and then service with the Malakand Field Force in India, and as a 'supernumerary Lieutenant' with the 21st Lancers at Omdurman in the Sudan.[7] In the South African War against the Boers he acted as a correspondent for the *Morning Post* and managed to get himself taken prisoner and to escape from captivity in 1900. Overall, in both periods of war and peace he found military service on three continents in different forms, and even managed to be with the 2nd Grenadier Guards and the Royal Scots Fusiliers for a short period during the First World War whilst between ministerial posts.[8]

Opportunities for self-advancement rarely passed Winston Churchill by and he made useful contacts while in military service, including the Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin, for whom he would later work as Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office. Churchill's reputation and celebrity status were enhanced by his published accounts of his adventures in India, the Sudan and the Boer War. This self-publicity not only advanced his career in British politics, but also earned him money and made him a known figure within the British Empire. Through his strong connection to the Boer War and his accounts of his adventures in South Africa published as despatches to the *Morning Post* newspaper and then published as two books in 1900 as *London to Ladysmith* and *Ian Hamilton's March* he was to become famous in Great Britain and

abroad.[9] These two books were published in print runs of 10,000 and 5,000 respectively in London and 3,000 and 1,533 in New York. Canadian copies were published in hardback and paperback by Copp, Clark of Toronto.[10] Churchill was thus a well-known figure in Canada at the start of the twentieth century.

The publishing of Churchill's *The Malakand Field Force* led to him meeting Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative party, Lord Salisbury (Third Marquess of Salisbury, Prime Minister 1895–1902), who appeared to admire the book. Churchill's war record and family history made him a fairly obvious candidate for a military career, and also to stand as a Member of Parliament for the Conservative party, even before his heroics in South Africa. However, he was unsuccessful in contesting the parliamentary seat in Oldham in July1899. Mr Arthur James Balfour, successor as Prime Minister to his uncle Lord Salisbury in 1902, was kind enough to write to Churchill on 10 July 1899, offering sympathy for Churchill's election loss at the by-election in Oldham and encouraging him to continue to strive for a seat in the House of Commons despite the difficult political issues that were prominent:

> At by-elections the opposition can safely entrench themselves behind criticism and are not driven to put a rival programme in the field. This is at all times an advantage; it is doubly an advantage when the rival programme would have to include so unpromising an item as Home Rule. Moreover opposition criticism falls just now upon willing ears. The employers dislike the compensation bill; the doctors dislike the vaccination bill; the general public dislike the clergy, so the rating bill is unpopular: the clergy resented your repudiation of the bill: the Orangemen are sulky and refuse to be conciliated even by the promise to vote for the Liverpool proposals. Of course those benefited by our measures are not grateful, while those who suppose themselves to be injured resent them. Truly unpromising conditions under which to fight a Lancashire seat! Never mind, it will all come right; and this small reverse will have no permanent ill effect upon your political fortunes.[11]

Balfour was to be proved correct and the political ambitions of Churchill were advanced by this type of support and his much publicized South African adventure; helping him win the same parliamentary seat the next year and to subsequently represent Oldham for over five years. Before taking up his seat in the House of Commons, he had to fulfill some speaking obligations in North America in the winter of

1900–01, where he found Americans lukewarm and Irish-Americans hostile about the South African War. His lectures were advertised as: 'The War as I Saw It'. It was while in New York that Mark Twain introduced Churchill to a lecture audience and in inscribing his own books for Churchill's benefit, wrote in the first volume: 'To do good is noble; to teach others to do good is nobler, and no trouble.'[12] Churchill took this as a mild reproach of the views he had been expressing on the South African War during his lecture and in discussions with the respected elder of American literature.

Across the border from the United States, and on his first visit to Canada, he found the population exuberant and excited and spent ten happy days talking to Canadian audiences.[13] Newspapers in Canada gave him very respectful reviews, surprised at the youthfulness of the twenty-six year old, impressed with the slides (lantern show) and Churchill's command of an audience.[14] The *Ottawa Journal*, *Ottawa Evening Journal*, *Globe* (Toronto), and the *Winnepeg Free Press* all commented favourably on Churchill's lectures.[15] The *Montreal Gazette* was lacklustre in its coverage of Churchill's lecture in Windsor Hall, Montreal, but then the population of Quebec was less supportive of the South African War than the rest of Canada. Like other newspapers, the *Montreal Gazette* was duly impressed by the delivery and descriptions provided.[16] It appears that Churchill was mildly disappointed with his lecture tour in North America, or at least disappointed that he did not make as much money from it as he had hoped.

The early speeches of Churchill in the House of Commons had the confidence of a man familiar with public speaking and the language and resonance of a man with sweeping foreign policy interests. Some of his early foreign policy comments seem equally prophetic for later periods of time. In his first year in the House of Commons in May 1901 Churchill spoke eloquently on behalf of a strong British Navy. He extolled the strategic virtues of the British Navy over the British Army believing that the Navy was Britain's most significant weapon and rather important to the future of the nation:

> This is what the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant calls 'trust to luck and the Navy' policy. I confess I do trust the Navy. This new distrust of the Navy, a kind of shrinking from our natural element, the blue water on which we have ruled so long, is the most painful symptom of the military hydrophobia with which we are afflicted. Without a supreme Navy, whatever military arrangements we may make, whether for foreign expeditions or home defence, must be

> utterly vain and futile. With such a Navy we may hold any antagonist at arm's length and feed ourselves in the meantime, until, if we find it necessary, we can turn every city in the country into an arsenal, and the whole male population into an army.[17]

Churchill was capable of making enemies during big and powerful speeches and attention-seeking speeches, but at the same time he was also making a reputation for himself, making friends and influencing people. He was a member of a dining club of a small parliamentary group of the Conservative party known as 'The Hooligans'. The members besides Churchill were Lord Hugh Cecil, 4th Marquis of Salisbury; Lord Henry Percy; Mr Arthur Stanley; and Mr Ian Malcolm.[18] In an arrogance that might be admired, but would not go unnoticed, they often invited influential people as dinner guests and saw their own opinions as of value to others.

Churchill found himself at odds with the fiscal policies of his Conservative party and bravely or opportunistically defected from the Conservative party in May 1904, standing as a Liberal candidate for North-West Manchester in the 1906 election. Liberal Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman had rewarded Churchill with the position of Under-Secretary of the State for the Colonies in 1905 and Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith made Churchill President of the Board of Trade in 1908. Despite losing an election in the Manchester by-election in 1908, he was successfully elected an MP for Dundee. In an illustration of Churchill's national prominence, the *Daily Mirror* of 11 May 1908 devoted its front page to a large photograph of Churchill with the heading 'Mr. Winston Churchill finds "a safe seat" at last: rejected in Manchester, he is elected M.P. for Dundee.'[19]

Churchill was clearly ambitious and talented, but not all of Churchill's pursuits were business related, and he did find time to propose to Clementine Hozier and marry her a month later in September 1908. Both the proposal and the beginning of the honeymoon took place appropriately at Blenheim Palace. Clementine Churchill was a great personal support to her husband and was a great correspondent with him when he was on ministerial duties as First Lord of the Admiralty and in his later darker moments.

In 1910 Churchill became Home Secretary and found further notoriety the following year at the Sidney Street siege. Three policemen were killed by 'anarchists' situated in a house on Sidney Street. Churchill oversaw the siege to its conclusion as the house caught fire killing the occupants. That he felt it necessary to supervise the siege and put

himself in danger made him appear rather reckless, a trait that does not always sit comfortably with ambition, but it was also a trait that made him definitive in his decision-making.

After serving as Home Secretary, Churchill was made First Lord of the Admiralty and was one of the key figures responsible for Britain's naval preparedness for the outbreak of the First World War. Prime Minister Asquith and Churchill discussed the possibility of Winston going to the Admiralty as early as March 1908. Despite the fact Churchill felt the position of First Lord was the most 'glittering post in the Ministry' he was to accept the Presidency of the Board of Trade on 10 April 1908.[20] He appeared to talk himself out of the post in the Admiralty in 1908 by alluding to the fact he had strong views about the finance, the organizational machinery and the professional service provided by the Admiralty. He clearly wanted to stamp his authority on the Admiralty and felt he could not do this at that time. He held rather parsimonious views towards naval expenditure that would change on eventually becoming First Lord of the Admiralty.

The choice for First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 had been reduced to two eminent persons by Asquith, Winston Churchill or Robert Haldane, Secretary of War. As Donald Gordon's work on the Dominion navies mentions there were very strong differences in approaches to modern warfare by the War Office and the Admiralty.[21] One particular difference was about the use of the navy in the event of a European war, the navy was marginalized in importance in strategic thinking by the army, sometimes seen as a carrying force for personnel to get to continental Europe as the army required. As a consequence of the Agadir crisis (also known as the Second Morocco crisis) of 1911 the relationship between the British Army and the Royal Navy and their preparedness for war came under scrutiny. Haldane, among others wanted the Admiralty structure to be more organized like the War Office Staff, who were seen as more scientifically trained.[22] Haldane's accomplishments at the War Office included saving them a lot of money.[23]

Churchill's account of his appointment in *The World Crisis* makes it sound like he was the first and largely the only choice for the position of First Lord of the Admiralty. Whilst staying with Asquith, at a rented country house with a golf links at Archerfield in Scotland, Churchill remarks:

> The day after I had arrived there, on our way home from the links, he [Asquith] asked me quite abruptly whether I would like to go

> to the Admiralty … I accepted with alacrity … He said that Mr. Haldane was coming to see him the next day and we would talk it over together. But I saw his mind was made up.[24]

Haldane's autobiographical account is a slightly different version of the same occasion, making it sound like Churchill wanted to be First Lord quite badly and talked Asquith into accepting him because he was a serving Member of the House of Commons rather than Haldane who was by then in the House of Lords.[25] Churchill accepted the position of First Lord of the Admiralty with a robust determination to make a difference to the Royal Navy and the place of the navy within the British Empire. Many ministers are ignorant of the technical nature of their new positions, the thirty-seven year old Churchill was less ignorant than most.[26]

A great contrast can be drawn between the early background and rise to eminence of Winston Churchill and that of Robert Laird Borden, who lived from 1854 to 1937. Borden was the eighth Prime Minister of Canada; leading a Conservative Government from 10 October 1911 to 12 October 1917 and a Unionist Government from 12 October 1917 to 10 July 1920. His tenure as Prime Minister may be most remembered for its concurrence with the tumultuous events of the First World War, but his more than nine years as Prime Minister saw the introduction of income tax, universal female suffrage in federal elections for women aged 21 and over, and an important Canadian participation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Even after his tenure as Prime Minister he was an important figure at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921.

It is not very surprising that the circumstances of Robert Borden's birth and early development might contrast with that of Winston Churchill. Born in Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, before the confederation of Canada, Robert Borden's influences were that of a farming community and the Presbyterian Church. Despite being born in the maritime Province of Nova Scotia, and despite an affection for the sea he was not that knowledgeable about maritime matters. Also, despite Borden's childhood and early legal career in Nova Scotia and also representing the constituency of Halifax, Nova Scotia as a Member of Parliament, he had no precise associations with naval matters. The arrival of ships in Halifax made the town a lively area of leisure activities for ship personnel, activities that the rather conservative and serious Borden did not approve and suggested: 'The influence of the garrison and the navy upon young men was not wholesome as they were led to emulate the

leisure of military and naval officers.'[27] With this reservation, he was nevertheless aware of the importance of the naval and military forces and the contracts that went with shipping for the local economy of Halifax. However, Borden, in contrast to Churchill, never developed a passion for military matters and love of naval military detail.

Borden did become an assistant teacher before he was even 15 years of age and taught both classics and mathematics, at first in Nova Scotia, and then in New Jersey in the United States. Unlike Mark Twain, Borden did not hold teaching in the highest esteem and found it rather unsatisfactory as a career. The legal profession appeared to be more lucrative and suited to his slightly stern and serious personality and even his high-minded moral character. He overcame the difficulty of not having a degree by working conscientiously for a law firm in Halifax and his law qualifications at the same time. He was then successfully called to the Bar in 1878.

The only direct and personal military experience that Borden is associated with derived from this time in Halifax whilst working for a law firm. In his leisure time he joined the Halifax Volunteers, 63rd Battalion of Rifles, and went to an evening class on military instruction, largely drill and rifle instructions, at the Military School.[28] This again contrasts with Churchill's military training and career and his interest in most things military, including armaments. Borden only had a brief brush with direct military training and his views never reflected the emotional enthusiasm that Churchill had for both the training and details of warfare. At least Borden obtained fifty dollars for graduating with a 'second class certificate' of commission.[29] The commission also provided some personal associations that were to become politically significant. An officer in the regiment of the Halifax Rifles was Charles Hibbert Tupper, son of Sir Charles Tupper, a previous Premier of Nova Scotia and Prime Minister of Canada for ten weeks in 1896. Borden established a friendship with Charles Hibbert Tupper, who became Minister of Marine and Fisheries in 1888 in Sir John A. Macdonald's Government.

Through his legal associations, Borden developed close associations with the Conservative party, a very strong political party in Nova Scotia, having two Prime Ministers hail from the Province, Sir John Thompson and Sir Charles Tupper. Borden's legal and political associations made him an inevitable and successful candidate for the federal Parliament in 1896. Although a Liberal Government was formed, Borden's time as a backbencher served him well and he found himself to be in the right place at the right time to be Leader of the

Conservative party from 1901. He was proposed as Leader of the Conservative party by Charles Hibbert Tupper and was initially very reluctant to take the appointment and certainly did not expect to stay in the position for very long.[30] Although he lost his seat in 1904, he was quickly re-elected in 1905 and with a Conservative party victory in 1911, became Prime Minister of Canada at the age of 57.

Robert Borden served as Leader of the Opposition for ten years and although this was a long period without holding a ministerial office, it gave him the kind of experience in the rough and tumble of parliamentary politics that would serve him well throughout his political career. In many ways he rose to public prominence without the more taxing concerns of governing the nation. Robert Borden's style of political leadership was to adopt rational legal arguments rather than rhetorical flourishes and this rather gave him the image of being pedantic and unexciting. Both his memoirs and biographies of him have few memorable anecdotes and show him to have a high degree of self-control. This characterization of Borden, again contrasts with the very colourful life of Churchill and his rather remarkable wit.

During his tenure as Leader of the Opposition, Robert Borden did not argue for any dramatic changes in imperial relationships. When Canada joined in the Boer War in South Africa from 1899 to 1902, Borden understood the limitations of Opposition and the premature nature of some national political strategies. Borden's main biographer, Robert Brown, considers that Borden only exhibited marginal incremental growth of his imperial attitudes, and even for Canada the progress to that of a mature nation was a slow evolutionary development. When imperial issues arose for Canada to consider, each event would be closely monitored by Canada, 'There would be no sudden change, force-fed by the elaborate theories and plans of Imperial centralists.'[31]

The overall attitude of Borden to the Empire issues was the belief in self-government, and Borden adopted the outlook that imperial relationships rested heavily on this principle of self-government. Particularly with regard to the issue of the foreign policies of the Dominions he believed Canada should have an ability to strongly influence its own affairs. Nevertheless, Borden also felt that Canada should help in defining foreign policy of the Dominions, where there might be an agreed single foreign policy.

Although both Borden and Churchill were born in the reign of Queen Victoria (a reign from 1837 to 1901), Borden was twenty years older than Churchill, and yet to some extent, Borden reflected more of

the Edwardian era (reign of Edward VII, 1901–10) and Churchill remained stuck in the Victorian era. Churchill's imperialism reflected many Victorian attitudes, particularly a confidence in the tutelage that Great Britain could provide to the world. The Edwardian era that is often extended to the First World War reflected the rise of labour interests and women's suffrage. Further, although British imperial attitudes were prominent in the early twentieth century they were increasingly challenged by the rise in importance or competition from Germany, Russia and the United States. Canadian historian, John English suggested Borden's image late in life reflected an earlier period of history: 'In photographs of wartime and later, Borden seems to belong to an earlier age: he wears Edwardian suits and watch chains and parts his hair in the middle.'[32] However, as the cover photograph from 1912 exhibits, very little at the time separated the formal fashion senses of Churchill and Borden or the rather strident formal appearance of both. It is still, nevertheless, conceivable that Churchill was Victorian in political and social attitudes and Borden, despite coming from a Dominion and being older than Churchill, was more Edwardian in attitudes.

# 3
# Winston S. Churchill Fears the Worst

> 'The spectacle which the naval armaments of Christendom afford at the present time will no doubt excite the curiosity and the wonder of future generations.'
>
> (Winston S. Churchill, 18 March 1912)[1]

German naval expansion in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century down to the outbreak of the First World War was delivered by a number of German naval laws and the enthusiasm of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II (Emperor from 1888–1918). Not unlike members of the British Government, Tirpitz and the Kaiser saw a navy as promoting national industrial and economic development. Tirpitz, as Secretary of the German Imperial Navy from 1897, promoted a large German fleet from the start of his tenure in office and he believed that with modern ships, efficient training and sensible deployment the German Navy could even threaten the supremacy of the Royal Navy. This programme also depended on how the British would respond and the technical developments they were capable of producing, but at best the German position was still very optimistic and had the strategic assumption that an Anglo-German naval conflict would largely be confined to an area between the River Thames estuary and Heligoland in the south-eastern edge of the North Sea. An interpretation of this position is that Tirpitz wanted the German Navy to serve as deterrence to the British rather than for Germany to necessarily go to war with them in the North Sea. This new German approach was 'kick started' with a German Naval Law in 1898 and followed by another in 1900 and after 1906 they appeared to respond to the British lead in building Dreadnoughts. These laws meant Tirpitz could avoid going to the Reichstag each year for money

for ship construction and set up a legal establishment for naval armaments construction.[2] In a more straightforward way, Tirpitz can be seen and has been interpreted as just a rather strong militarist, seeking military solutions to broad political problems.[3]

The complimentary British figure to von Tirpitz was the previously mentioned First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher. The British Government with the enthusiasm of individuals like the reforming Fisher created its own impressive shipbuilding programme. The British Government also became suspicions that Germany was ahead of its own publicly stated programme and was secretly preparing more ships than was publicly being stated. Being wary of the accuracy of the published German naval building programme, a climate of mistrust developed in Anglo-German relations.

First Lord of the Admiralty in 1909, Reginald McKenna, was very worried about the expansion of the German Navy, but Winston Churchill, as President of the Board of Trade, was not as concerned about the German naval threat at this time. McKenna was demanding an increased production of six new Dreadnought battleships before a crisis point would arrive. It was believed the crisis point was 1912 – the so called 'danger year'.[4] McKenna was speaking against the tide of much Liberal party opinion that wanted Government money spent elsewhere, but he was increasingly winning over the support of Winston Churchill. From Churchill's own recollections, he believed four new ships would be sufficient for production in 1909 and two more might follow. Nevertheless, the wider fear of the German threat promoted the situation of a compromised decision about the expansion of British ship production. As Churchill saw the compromise, it was six ships being promoted by the Admiralty, economists supported four and the Government went for eight but could not deliver all of them before the end of 1912.[5]

On 16 March 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty requested in the naval estimates put forward in the British House of Commons, that four new ships be produced, intimating that four more might be required in the near future.[6]

The dominant perception prevailing in the British Government was that the Royal Navy could not afford to fall behind Germany in battleship production or Germany would soon be a very serious threat. Churchill chronicled his recollections of his feelings on this in *The World Crisis* in his own grandiloquent way that the 'Prussians meant mischief' and were jealous of the British Empire and demeaning about the British spirit:

> Moreover, it began to be realized that it was no use trying to turn Germany from her course by abstaining from counter measures. Reluctance on our part to build ships was attributed in Germany to want of national spirit, and as another proof that the virile race should advance to replace the effete over-civilized and pacifist society which was no longer capable of sustaining its great place in the world's affairs.[7]

Winston Churchill's more famous view was that Germany wanted a great navy and it was impossible to look at the battleship production figures for the German and British Governments for 1905–07 without drawing the conclusion of '… the presence of a dangerous, if not a malignant design'.[8] That Germany was trying to catch up with British naval production as the opportunity arose seemed obvious to Churchill. Further, some of his analysis derived from being President of the Board of Trade, led him to believe that the German economy had been put under considerable strain by their naval expansion programme and the heavy taxation that had become necessary could create domestic social and political unrest, particularly as agrarian and industrial rifts developed. These views by Churchill, described by him as a 'sinister impression' of the German financial position were put in a minute to the British Cabinet on 3 November 1909.[9]

The downside of this analysis for Great Britain was that the German Government might wish to alleviate the domestic economic and social situation by encouraging foreign adventure. It has not been unusual in history for a national government to exploit the issue of external enemies to unite a nation state in a nationalist cause, alleviating some domestic criticism. A rather cyclical argument is that Germany's expensive naval expansion could be seen as aggravating some of the problems that the expansion was in turn trying to address, producing a self-fulfilling prophecy. Churchill ruminated on the sort of political strain that was being put on Germany by its increased taxation and national debt that was the product of a very large naval expansion.[10]

Great Britain had a broad policy of making sure that of the other Powers on continental Europe the strongest Power did not threaten Britain's national interests. It then followed that the concerns of Russia and France about Germany also became British apprehensions. Both France and Russia enlarged the size of their armies while Great Britain developed its navy. The British Government improved relations with France and Russia, since all three Powers perceived Germany to be a menace. Churchill's fears had become particularly pronounced on this

matter of the German threat and he believed that a clear tension existed in Anglo-German naval relations and this tension was creating a condition not far removed from war.[11]

Anglo-German naval competition quickened in 1910–11, and with both Britain and Germany building battleships and the Germans instituting a German Naval Law in 1912 that promised a fleet of 33 battleships of various forms, the British started to believe they might be outnumbered in home waters and at the very least needed to give priority to the protection of home waters. As a consequence, if Britain had to withdraw from the Mediterranean, the world influence of Great Britain would be seriously brought into question. Great Britain was particularly afraid of having to relinquish a control of important communication routes like the Mediterranean Sea, routes that sustained the Empire trade and the British economy.

It was in the Mediterranean that a crisis related to Anglo-German relations occurred during the summer of 1911 as events on the North African coast made it appear that a war between Germany and France was a serious possibility. The French Government made claims to parts of Morocco where they believed Germany had few interests, the French believing that the Germans would at least be satisfied with colonial compensation in the Congo. Unanticipated, the German Government sent the *Panther*, a gunboat, to protect its interests in the port of Agadir in Morocco. The surprise to Germany was that Great Britain was not the disinterested country they believed it would be and the British Government made it clear that they supported France during the crisis. This very much showed that British Cabinet members were particularly worried about mercantile interests and wished to protect trade routes and also British naval interests in the Mediterranean. As such, Britain made it clear that any war between Germany and France would see Great Britain supporting France. Fortunately, the Agadir crisis did not escalate and diplomatic accommodation with France was made possible as France agreed to concessions. However, all of this diplomatic tension occurred against the backdrop of increased naval investment. This incident in Agadir suggested that if France and Germany were to behave in a similar rash manner a major conflict could take place in Europe.

> On July 21, at the bankers' annual banquet in his honour as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George plainly warned Germany that if Britain were to be forced into a position where she had to choose between peace and the maintenance of her vital

> interests, she would choose the latter. Germany backed down, and peace was preserved for a while longer.[12]

Given that Churchill had been appointed Home Secretary in 1910 he had very little direct association with the Agadir crisis, but there was rarely a case in international affairs of the day that he did not take a personal interest or have a strong opinion about.

Prime Minister Herbert Asquith eventually moved Churchill into the ministerial post that suited his interests and personality, and in October 1911 he became First Lord of the Admiralty. As shown in chapter two, Churchill had rivals for the post, including the Secretary of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane. Whether or not Churchill was the more obvious choice, is open to debate. What is clear is that different Cabinet ministers took an interest in naval matters and the notion of a more 'scientific' approach to the integration of military cooperation existed at the time. Churchill would very much come to champion the British Navy in all its perceived glory and work for a strong imperial connection with the navy, and if possible, a British Empire Fleet.

When Churchill took office as First Lord in 1911 the naval estimates for expenditure and the building programme for 1912–13 were well advanced, but he believed that further counter-measures needed to be introduced to act as a deterrent to Germany. In a rather obsessive way he strengthened his own view of an 'ever-present danger' of Germany by keeping posted on the wall in his office an updated map of the North Sea with the positions of the German Fleet on it.[13]

When Churchill went before the British House of Commons on 10 November 1911, he espoused naval supremacy in a way that showed the grand emotion he often brought to international affairs.

> Upon it stands not the Empire only, not merely the commercial property of our people, not merely a fine place in the world's affairs; upon our naval supremacy stands our lives and the freedom we have guarded for nearly a thousand years.[14]

Interestingly, it was not Churchill who was sent to discuss a détente in German and British naval relations from 8–12 February 1912, but the Secretary of War, Haldane. Given the secret nature of the broad political discussions and the fact Haldane spoke German made him a suitable choice. The Haldane Mission to Berlin was not successful, but then the British were not in a mood to declare a neutrality in advance of any prospective conflict between Germany and France.

At exactly the same time as the Haldane Mission, Churchill appeared to be 'stoking the fire' of Anglo-German rivalry. In Churchill's first major speech as First Lord of the Admiralty to the Clyde Navigation Trustees in Glasgow on 9 February 1912, Churchill obtained considerable publicity, not only for the content of the speech, but because Annie Grieg of the Suffrage Union smashed a car window thinking that Churchill was the occupant. *The Times* carried the speech in full, that included the controversial comment that; 'The British Navy is to us a necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury.'[15] As Paul Addison records it was a comment which created much annoyance in Germany.[16]

A new German Naval Law was reported in *The Times* on 15 March and Churchill announced to the House of Commons on the 18 March that Germany was considering building two more Dreadnoughts above that year's initial programme. Also, it very much seemed that Germany would have a fleet of ships prepared to do battle at any time of the year.[17] The early emphasis of his speech was positive and confident about Britain's position, emphasizing that Britain at that point in time did retain superiority over any two other Powers in the world.[18] Austria Hungary and Italy were also building Dreadnoughts and Churchill and the Admiralty were closely watching these developments.

The British naval expansion that Churchill put forward was based on the considered German building programme, and this meant for him: 'Sixty per cent in Dreadnoughts over Germany as long as she adhered to her present declared programme, and two keels to one for every additional ship laid down by her.'[19] Here was a very strong commitment from Churchill to construct two battleships for every one that Germany could construct, a potentially rather expensive policy for the Liberal Government.[20] This he presented as part of the naval estimates delivered to the House of Commons on 18 March 1912.

In a more flamboyant gesture that contained a considerable amount of logic, even if it did not dovetail exactly with the previous pronouncements on the future of British naval policy, Churchill floated the idea of a 'naval holiday' with the Germans for the year 1913 (i.e. not building any ships in 1913). Three ships planned by Britain would be cancelled if the two ships planned for construction by Germany were stopped. If Germany did not build three ships this would stop the building of five super-Dreadnoughts by Britain, saving Germany between £6–7 million. The other interesting 'carrot' for Germany was the thought that they might not achieve the same level of destruction of British ships in a successful naval action of their own. Further,

Germany could have been advantaged by British modernization programmes being shelved. Naval historian John Maurer concludes that Churchill was disappointed by the way Germany perfunctorily dismissed his proposal: 'Kaiser Wilhelm sent Churchill a "courteous" message that a naval holiday "would only be possible between allies"'.[21] However, to his immediate associates, the Kaiser was much less polite: he registered Churchill's proposal as 'arrogant'.[22]

In terms of comparative advantage, a 'freeze' in naval building, had it come about, would have clearly favoured Britain's position in terms of the existing balance of naval power. Nevertheless, it was presented as a policy that would not further disadvantage Germany. It still seemed unusual that it was the First Lord of the Admiralty who was promoting naval expansion forcefully and juxtaposing this with a major arms limitations policy. It is a possibility that much of Churchill's approach was for domestic consumption and this general proposal of a 'naval holiday' combated in an open way some of his opponents within his own Liberal party.[23] At the same time, Churchill was promoting naval expansion to guarantee the security of Great Britain, and the olive branch of arms control to show all avenues of rational negotiation were also advanced. Whichever policy was pursued, Churchill could sanctimoniously claim he had done his best.

In stark contrast to this naval arms limitation proposal, Churchill sought further support from France and approval from the British Cabinet for an expansionist naval programme. A new consensus had been created in Government for an expansion in naval armaments, a possible ambition all along. This policy Churchill also hoped to achieve with the support of the Dominions, although he did not highlight the importance of the Dominions in his presentation to the House of Commons on 18 March.[24] This was picked up by Sir Gilbert Parker, who was not only a Conservative party MP but also a novelist concerned with Canadian subject matter. After Churchill concluded his speech Parker raised the issue of the Dominions and although he believed the Dominions would contribute to naval supply by building their own small navies and understood this had been the policy of the previous Government of Canada he was unsure what the policy of the incumbent Government happened to be. He posed the question of what was the policy of Canada and the Prime Minister of Canada at this juncture, but the question was rather lost in a number of other points. It was in fact his own Conservative party colleague, John Norton-Griffiths that took up answering the general question posed and clearly had prepared information on Canada. Having recently

been in Canada he referenced the *Montreal Daily Star*, *Winnipeg Daily Telegram*, *Victoria Colonist* and the *Toronto Daily Mail and Star* to suggest Canadians wanted to know how Canada could contribute to the security of the British Empire, but based on an assumption that should Canada be asked to contribute, they would share in the authority that went with the control.[25] Griffiths seemed to be well-informed:

> … it has been stated publicly that we shall have one if not two of the Ministers in the new Canadian Government in England within a few weeks. The Minister of Marine, and I believe the Minister of the Interior, are visiting this country to confer with the Government, and if they come, as I am sure that they are coming, with a firm intention of co-operating effectively – some of their papers have said even to the extent of three 'Dreadnoughts' – if they could be sent back with a message that the Government of this country, the Board of Admiralty, want their co-operation and would give them some representation, it would make it much easier for them among their own people to get the whole country behind them to support them in contributing in the manner described.[26]

Churchill's approach to the building programme with regard to the Dominions was not to count any ships potentially provided by them. Any ships provided by individual Dominions would then be additional to British production of battleships and as far as Churchill was concerned not factored into an Anglo-German naval 'arms race'. This was despite the fact that the efforts of the Dominions would clearly add to Britain's naval strength. On 14 April 1912, Churchill looked for guidance from Prime Minister Herbert Asquith to support a naval policy for the Dominions or rather a naval policy for Great Britain that would include the Dominions.[27] Whatever the disposition of a British Empire fleet in peacetime, Churchill wanted protection from the 'big dog' (Germany) in British home waters during any war; the fleet could then be redistributed again after a major conflict.[28] Churchill said in his opening sentence in a hand written letter to Asquith: '… have of course been casting about for a naval policy for the Dominions. Canada is soon coming to ask advice …'[29] The thoughts of the First Lord of the Admiralty were that Great Britain needed to concentrate its navy in the decisive theatre where the 'supreme issue' would be settled and this meant the potential abandonment of other oceans and seas in favour of protecting home waters. The specific theatre where the great battles would take place was not specified, but Churchill expected a

British fleet to be concentrated in home waters and in later memoranda referred to the North Sea as the vital theatre of conflict with Germany.[30] After decisive victories in any significant conflict he expected the fleet again to be then available for other areas of the world. In the meantime, alongside the concentrated British Fleet, Churchill wanted a joint movable Dominions and British Empire squadron as a first and necessary step, comprising from the Dominions:

> Battle Cruisers – Australia 1, New Zealand 1, Canada 2, Total 4
> Light armoured Cruisers – South Africa 2, India 2, Total 4.[31]

All administration including discipline and training of naval recruits would be controlled by the Admiralty, and Churchill expected, in the early years of the programme, that the bulk of service personnel would be provided by Great Britain. The extent to which he had thought this through included paying officers and men at colonial pay rates and they would be appointed for a maximum of two years spending most of the time abroad, three or four months in each designated station – the time period spent at each station would depend on the contribution made by the Dominion. The extra compensation would be for the whole squadron and not affected by local conditions. His idea was that a Dominion Squadron would proceed to waters where they were needed and could call upon docking facilities as required, at for example Vancouver, Simonstown or Sydney.[32] The Dominions themselves would more generally provide for their own coastal defence. Churchill felt that Australia and New Zealand were doing a great deal already and Botha of South Africa would be very compliant. However, the Canadians would need convincing and this might be done by a Dominions conference in Canada where the Admiralty could prevail on a Canada that would be led to believe it was part of their show, Churchill believing this would. '… clinch the whole thing'.[33] Things did not quite pan out in this way, and Borden was to go to Churchill rather than Churchill to Canada and Winston did not get his immediate intended display of imperial greatness in Canada that he thought would impress them.

Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, gave on 15 May 1912 what was an annual address at the dinner of the Shipwrights' Guild. It was essentially a banquet attended by representatives of business, politics and the military from throughout the country that had an interest pertaining to naval matters, including: the sea lords, civil

lords of the Admiralty, Members of Parliament; and representatives of all the significant British shipbuilding firms. Although Churchill could claim to be speaking unofficially, he was invited there in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty. The issue that Churchill had warmed to recently was the idea of the Dominions protecting their own trade routes whilst Great Britain protected home waters. The idea of a division of labour between the 'Mother country and her daughter states' was one that he felt would facilitate the ability of the British Empire to deal with all comers.[34] He clearly had come to believe that the sea surrounding Great Britain and particularly the North Sea would be the decisive theatre of a potential war in the future. He did confirm, however, that he did not wish the Empire to be unprotected in its outer reaches.

By July 1912, Churchill wanted to combat a large active German fleet; active in the sense that it maintained a high proportion of the fleet as fully sea worthy. Churchill provided supplementary naval estimates on 22 July 1912, a response to German Navy Laws. He changed the production of Dreadnoughts from three, four, three, four, three in successive years to five, four, four, four, four; maintaining his desired 60 per cent superiority over Germany.

With an active German fleet, the strategic decision that Churchill was forced to take was to concentrate the British Fleet in home waters and remove battleships from the Mediterranean, putting the burden on France to command the Mediterranean with heavy ships. This tied the British more closely to French strategic decision-making. As Churchill put it to his Prime Minister on 23 August 1912: '… we have the obligations of an alliance without its advantages, and above all without its precise definitions'.[35]

It was against this background of ideas and debate that the Canadian Prime Minister and entourage visited Great Britain between 4 July and 29 August 1912. Robert Borden was in the gallery at the House of Commons to hear Churchill's pronouncements on the necessity for supplementary estimates on the 22 July 1912.[36] What the March and July 1912 British House of Commons debates achieved in a supplementary way was to reinforce Robert Borden's belief that Canada should directly help Britain and it can be argued that this was crucial to the introduction of the Naval Aid Bill of 1912 in Canada. Winston Churchill in his *The World Crisis* only devotes half a paragraph to the Canadian situation and the negotiated Canadian promise to provide Dreadnoughts, although he spent a considerable amount of time and

effort on this complicated negotiated policy at the time. As Churchill comments in an understated summary about the naval situation:

> Moreover, the issue was complicated by the promised three Canadian Dreadnoughts. The Canadian Government had stipulated that these should be additional to the 60 per cent. standard. We had formally declared that they were indispensable, and on this assurance Sir Robert Borden was committed to a fierce party fight in Canada.[37]

# 4

# Robert L. Borden, Canadian Naval Issues and His Visit to Great Britain of 1912

*Illustration 4.1* Robert L. Borden leaving Whitehall Gardens after attending the Imperial Defence Committee, 1912
*Source*: Library and Archives Canada, reference C-002083.

Robert Borden had an interest and involvement in imperial naval affairs that was largely forced upon him with the introduction into law in Canada of the Naval Service Act of 1910. This Canadian legislation was introduced against a background of changing international naval issues. Borden's interest was heightened by a perceived international naval crisis derived from analysis of the British Government that began in 1909 but developed in the years 1911 and 1912. Winston Churchill's pronouncements as First Lord of the Admiralty in this period and in particular his increasing interest in the role of the Dominions in issues related to an imperial navy brought Borden to further consider detailed naval matters.

Eminent Canadian military historian Charles Stacey suggests that it was the naval issue that particularly developed Borden's views on the position of the Dominions within the British Empire.[1] Although it could be argued that Borden had a strong interest in broad Dominion issues rather than imperial naval issues, he took the opportunity to advance the position of Canada with regard to its political influence within the British Empire that the naval issue brought forward. Which came first, Borden's interest in the legal position of the Dominions with Great Britain or an interest in British Empire naval matters? The answer to this might not be entirely clear, although both issues do become related and strongly linked in Borden's negotiations with the British Government over the possibility of Canada providing finance for three Dreadnoughts.

In the debates over the Naval Service Bill in 1910, Robert Borden was a match for Laurier's eloquence in the House of Commons debates surrounding the Bill. The Leader of the Opposition evoked sentiments concerned with the evils of war and he spoke in wide-ranging terms, but he was clearly in favour of an Imperial Defence Committee that he believed should consult the Dominions before any great war. However, his conclusions were not unlike those held by his political rival Laurier, and Borden was to point out in an unambiguous and moving way:

> When the battle of Armageddon comes, when the empire is fighting for its existence, when our kinsmen of the other great dominions are in the forefront of the battle, shall we sit silent and inactive while we contemplate with smug satisfaction our increasing crops and products, or, shall we pauper-like seek fancied but delusive security in an appeal to the charity of some indefinite and high-sounding political doctrine of a great neighbouring nation? No, a thousand times no.[2]

It was difficult for the Conservative party leader to counter the Prime Minister's pronouncements on supporting Britain in the face of war since this was also the Conservative party view. Where Borden could differ with Laurier was in the fact he was keen on immediate and effective aid to Great Britain and wanted an Empire relationship organized in a more structured way. The Conservative party criticized the details of the Navy Service Bill without offering alternative strategies. Borden had previously argued for a Canadian Navy, but was to move in favour of an 'emergency contribution'.[3] As has been seen, the resolution in the House of Commons of Conservative, George Eulas Foster helped develop the naval debates that led to the Liberal Government's legislation.

On 29 July 1911, whilst beginning a round of golf in Ottawa, Borden learnt that Parliament had been dissolved. In the general election campaign he did formally mention the naval question, but it was not a substantial issue during the election period. On 14 August in an electioneering stance he suggested that the naval plan of the Laurier Government had been an 'unfortunate blunder'.[4] His more detailed comment on the Government's naval policy was less than flattering:

> The policy adopted was not debated before the people during that election and it bears all the earmarks of a hasty and ill-considered scheme. In my judgment our duty to the Empire cannot be properly or effectively fulfilled by such a measure. I hold that the plan of the Government contemplates the creation of a naval force that will be absolutely useless in time of war, and, therefore, of no practical benefit to Canada or to the Empire. It will cost immense sums of money to build, equip and maintain. It will probably result in time of war in the useless sacrifice of many valuable lives and it will not add one iota to the fighting strength of the Empire.[5]

This general criticism was the approach of Borden during the election campaign. Some future Conservative Ministers did suggest during the campaigns that a plebiscite of the electorate might be appropriate on naval policy. This would cause the Conservative party problems in later debates in the House of Commons.

After the September general election of 1911 Borden was Prime Minister of Canada with 133 Conservative constituency seats to 86 Liberal seats and two independents.[6] Borden was rather delighted by the fact that the Conservatives had won the majority of the popular vote. This could be considered a success story on a number of levels but particularly because he united and restructured a Conservative

party that still had strong provincial differences and was at times seen as comprising of a coalition of political factions into a strong centralized political party.

The issue of free trade rather than the naval issue is often seen as the most prominent issue of what is sometimes called the reciprocity election. In Quebec, the further growth of French-Canadian nationalism was another product of the election. French-Canadian and anti-imperialists leaders like Henri Bourassa did not approve of Robert Borden or the Conservative party, but they felt badly betrayed by Wilfrid Laurier. Frederick Debartzch Monk, Conservative Member of Parliament for the constituency of Jacques-Cartier in Quebec, worked with the nationalist Bourassa for the defeat of the Laurier Government and this helped Borden win the general election. Nevertheless, the Liberals still won more parliamentary seats than the Conservatives in Quebec, but the growth of French-Canadian nationalism was evident and needed to be taken seriously. From now on, Quebec could not be ignored when imperial adventures were promoted or when an issue like conscription had to be considered, as it would in both the First and Second World Wars. However, at this juncture, the new Conservative Government set about addressing reforms for the civil service, financial support for farmers and looked closely at naval problems.

During the autumn of 1911, Sir William Henry White, an accomplished British naval architect in charge of naval construction at the Admiralty from 1885 to 1902, visited Ottawa as part of his duties as a Director of the Grand Trunk Railway.[7] Unsurprisingly, on a visit to Sir Robert Borden the issue of naval policy in Canada was discussed, but given that White had retired from working from the Admiralty in 1902, his naval views were essentially those of an independent person. Nevertheless, White was an ideal source for information and opinions on naval issues. White later corresponded with the Prime Minister on the same topics they had discussed in Ottawa and they addressed the feasibility of arming merchant ships at short notice for protection of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Canada, specifically the major ports, although these converted ships could be used at a considerable distance from the ports. White's views are relevant to later discussions and debates in Canada and Great Britain, in that he saw Canada being able to have a shipbuilding industry but expected obstacles to Canada building its own warships and was even slightly dismissive of the idea of the Dominions having battleships.[8] Most pertinent of all, White suggested a financial contribution to Great Britain as the best option for the Dominions, and it has been speculated that Borden's own naval

policy for Canada derived from this suggestion of White who believed that battleship construction would be retained within Great Britain for a long time: 'Any assistance in that direction which may be rendered by Dominions beyond the Seas will best take the form of financial contributions to necessary expenditure on building and maintaining such a fleet.'[9]

Gilbert Tucker speculated that this advice given to Robert Borden by White might be the kernel of Borden's project of Canada financially contributing towards the building of Dreadnoughts in support of the British Empire.[10] Even Gilbert would acknowledge that the idea of a Canadian contribution to the British Navy had existed for a number of previous years, but the discussions between Borden and White were leading to the presentation of a more specific Anglo-Canadian naval policy. The strong idea being discussed was that with regard to battleships, the production of these could remain for some time within the realm of Great Britain, with Canada, like other Dominions, contributing in a financial way. The attraction of this broad policy for Borden was the distinction that was been drawn between what appeared to be a temporary policy and considerations of a more permanent policy. If Canada was to contribute to temporary or expedient measures without abandoning a more permanent naval policy for Canada then Borden felt he would have a solution to Canada's naval shortcomings. Or at least, that is what he hoped. Given that Canada did not envisage being at war with the United States, the issue of a German naval threat to the British Empire was very much the key issue being addressed at this time.

William White was to reappear again on Borden's radar, when the Prime Minister visited Great Britain in 1912 and sought further advice in terms of both a temporary and permanent naval policy for Canada.[11] White's views were not unlike his previous ideas and he emphasized his solution for Canada's naval problems to be that of arming merchant ships. These ships could support the British Royal Navy from existing dockyards in Canada, dockyards it was believed that could be easily defended. It was felt that some British provision needed to be made for training Canadian naval service personnel. These suggestions were seen as more than a temporary measure by Borden, but he believed, if an emergency existed because of a German threat at sea, Canada could offer financial and a connected moral support and help in a substantial way by building two to three battleships.[12]

Policies often develop through the lucky juxtaposition of mutual acquaintances, and this was much the case when the Conservative

Premier of British Columbia, Richard McBride in January 1912 conveyed the naval views of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty to John Douglas Hazen, Minister of Marine and Fisheries and of the Naval Service, and this was separately forwarded to Prime Minister Borden. The upbeat message on the Canadian Government's naval situation that Churchill conveyed to his friend McBride was put in a letter:

> They can consult the Admiralty in perfect confidence that we will do all in our power to make their naval policy a brilliant success; and will not be hidebound or shrink from new departures provided that whatever moneys they think fit to employ shall be well spent according to the true principles by which sea power is maintained.[13]

It was after a trip to Britain and before returning to British Columbia that McBride visited Prime Minister Borden in Ottawa. As a consequence of this meeting Borden wrote, in a business fashion, to Churchill on 30 May 1912 telling him that he would, along with Mr Hazen and two colleagues, be travelling to Great Britain on 26 or 28 June and would be arriving in England early in July, stating further: 'There are several questions which we shall find it necessary to discuss with the members of the Imperial Government; and not the least important is the naval question which I hope to take up with you immediately after our arrival.[14]

Both Borden's *Memoirs* and Gilbert Tucker's book on *The Naval Service of Canada* convey the point that no substantial naval policy had been effectively developed by the Canadian Conservative Government for Canada before they set sail for Great Britain. Borden appears to have wanted Canadian involvement in the decision-making of imperial affairs linked to any understanding on imperial naval defence, but was unsure of the views of other Dominions. Borden was otherwise rather vague over what might replace the Canadian Naval Service Act of 1910.

On 1 June 1912, Robert Borden sought the naval views of the combative Premier of Ontario and ally, Sir James Pliny Whitney. Borden sought views from Whitney on a number of issues, including the membership of his Cabinet. Whitney's opinions were not unlike the views and principles developed by Borden when he visited Great Britain. Whitney's conclusions were that he was very much in favour of a substantial sum of Canadian money being put at the disposal of the British Government for at least two battleships of the Dreadnought

class. This was with the understanding that they would be under the control of the British Admiralty.[15] It becomes less surprising that Borden sought this policy, since his close confidant James Whitney, and a naval expert, William White, were suggesting it was a reasonable policy.

Robert Borden, in April 1912, also became the Secretary of State for External Affairs alongside his position of Prime Minister of Canada. Not only did Robert Borden have Joseph Pope as his able Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, but also Loring Christie as a rather competent personal adviser on foreign policy issues.[16] Christie was known as being '... well equipped to turn Borden's firm but general notions on policy into pungent, closely argued memoranda'.[17] Precise and lucid memoranda became an expectation of Borden's and would lead to a minor embarrassment with Winston Churchill, when Churchill was accused of being negligent in this regard.

The naval situation became a prominent issue in March 1912 as Borden considered a new programme for Canada and the British First Lord of the Admiralty presented a new construction programme for the Royal Navy. The Canadian Government pursued the intention of discussing a naval plan suitable for the Empire and Canada. Only through this type of involvement was it believed by Borden and his advisors that Canada could take a more respectable position on the world stage and be involved in imperial decision-making. Thus Borden and a number of his colleagues (Honourable J. D. Hazen, Minister of Marine and Fisheries and Naval Service; Honourable L. P. Pelletier, Postmaster General; Honourable C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice; Admiral Kingsmill and Sir Joseph Pope as advisers; and A. E. Blount, secretary) sailed on 26 June on the S. S. Royal George to Bristol and immediately travelled on to London on 4 July. Pelletier was the French-Canadian representative because Mr Monk (Minister of Public Works) was disinclined to go on the trip.

Borden's close companion on his trip was his wife since 1889, Laura (Bond), also from Nova Scotia. They both shared a pleasure in travelling and first visited England together in 1888. They travelled throughout Europe on trips in 1891, 1893 and 1895, the last being a shared trip whilst Robert appeared before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England.[18]

Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Donald Smith, 1st Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, met the Prime Minister, his wife, Canadian ministers and civil servants on their arrival at Paddington Station in London. Borden's stay in London was accorded much respect

*Illustration 4.2* Robert L. Borden and Laura Borden aboard the *S.S. Royal George* en route to Bristol, England, 1912
*Source*: Library and Archives Canada, reference C-017778.

from British politicians and he was also met with enthusiasm from the public, with cheering on the street of London from excited crowds. He was described in flattering and mildly unflattering terms by *The Times* (London). Borden was described as weighing 'over 14 stone' and 'lacking the picturesque personality of Sir Wilfrid Laurier', but the newspaper praised his articulateness and 'power, reserve and dignity'.[19]

Over the next two months the Canadian visiting group attended '… conferences, dinners and weekends with leaders of the Asquith government, prominent Unionists, and some British members of the Round Table movement'.[20] Borden was taken by the views of the group associated with *The Round Table* journal, particularly since they espoused a policy of imperial federalism and that the Empire would benefit through federal integration.[21] Academic and politician, John Richard English, has suggested that Borden was much taken by Edwardian England and perhaps because he was a country boy from Nova Scotia, also taken by the surroundings of the aristocratic families he met,[22] although, it should be added that Borden was not entirely comfortable with social formality and did not normally succumb to excessive flattery.

Borden was happy with the arrangements for him and the Canadian party in England, that included meeting the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George. However, his most noteworthy work was undertaken with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. On 5 July, Churchill did not waste time in getting to the significant reason why Borden had travelled so far and suggested to Borden at their first meeting on the first working day in London (and only the day after his arrival in London) that immediate financial support and relief were needed from Canada. On the same day Borden travelled to Spithead, an area of the Solent, Hampshire, to admire the fleet and socialize with Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and Winston Churchill.

*The Times* newspaper of London had its own correspondent in Canada and reported to its readers on what the reaction was in Canada to the visit of Canadian ministers to Great Britain and how the developing policies in Anglo-Canadian relations were being perceived in Canada. On Friday 12 July, *The Times* took it upon itself to report on the press reports in the newspapers in Canada under the headline 'Canadian Press and the Navy', and on Wednesday 17 July, 'Canadian Ministers in London. Deep Interest in Canada.'[23] The brief review of Canadian newspapers included mostly provincial newspapers of Quebec and one from Ontario: the *Montreal Witness*, *Montreal Herald*, *Montreal Star*, *Le Devoir* and the *Ottawa Free Press*. Despite the liberal credentials of the *Montreal Witness*, the *Montreal Herald* and the *Ottawa Free Press* they supported Borden's declarations for an imperial navy, although it was rather general support. Mr Bourassa wrote an article for *Le Devoir* pointing out that Prime Minister Borden was being rather reserved in what he was saying about an emergency contribution of

Dreadnoughts for the imperial authorities, but more vocal in the right of Canada to involvement in the decision-making within the Empire. Bourassa did not think this decision-making view of Borden's would appeal to the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith.[24] The second piece in *The Times* focused more on the speculation that was taking place in Canada, highlighting the confused information that was being sent from London.[25]

Asquith was to preside at the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on 11 July, but it was Churchill who made it quite clear that the expanding German navy was considered a serious menace; and he pointed out the fact that Austria-Hungary and Italy were now building Dreadnoughts and this complicated the British position and rendered it much more serious. With Great Britain needed in the Mediterranean, Churchill believed Britain would find it difficult to police their home waters, in and around the North Sea. There was an immediate need, and '… if it is the intention of Canada to render assistance to the naval forces of the British Empire, now is the time when that aid would be most welcome and most timely'.[26]

Churchill's strong point was that a small increase in the construction of ships by Great Britain alone would encourage the Germans to follow suit, but an increase in the defence of the British Empire by Canada providing ships would not necessarily lead to the same comparisons by Germany. Churchill clearly believed it would not put as much pressure on Germany to react as that of following a British expansion. Borden was receptive to Churchill's suggestions and the idea of a further meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence to discuss them. In the interim, Borden had a conference at the Admiralty with Churchill, Admiral Francis Bridgeman (First Sea Lord) and Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge (Chief of War Staff at the Admiralty) on 13 July, but it was on 16 July that Borden had a private conference with Churchill, whom he still found to be both 'frank and friendly'.[27] Churchill was happy to provide detailed accounts of the perils facing Great Britain and the need for Dominion cooperation, and he was happy to put these circumstances in writing. Having had a good reception in Canada on his previous lecture tour of 1900 he was more than happy to offer to go to Canada again and to give his personal support to the Canadian Prime Minister.[28] At this meeting, Churchill promised that an irrefutable case could be made for an emergency contribution from Canada and he would provide Borden with memoranda on the issue – a publishable memorandum on the issue and a secret memorandum. This was intended as a general promise by Churchill, who became later irritated

by the fact that Borden appeared to treat this general conversation as if they had entered into a treaty.[29]

Three days later Borden conferred with Churchill, but it was Churchill who cleverly sought advice on the speech he would give to the House of Commons on 22 July, a speech responding to Germany's changing naval laws.[30] Borden was in the gallery of the House of Commons when Churchill and Asquith spoke, both emphasising the desire for a permanent naval policy, but this more permanent development would be, for the time being, left out of the equation in favour of a more immediate solution to the naval problem that faced Great Britain. Churchill did not press the Canadians to make a decision on the help they could offer until they were able to discuss the issues with colleagues in Ottawa, particularly a deeper discussion of all the issues aired in London. It was slightly more difficult for Herbert Asquith to make any concrete promises about what the future decision-making role might be for the Dominions. He would not promise what administrative decision-making machinery might be put forward in the future, or in what timescale that would take place. A rather vague partnership was alluded to.[31]

Before travelling to Paris on 27 July, Borden had conversations with Prime Minister Asquith, Sir Edward Grey (Foreign Secretary), and Lewis Vernon Harcourt (Secretary of State for the Colonies) about the nature of imperial foreign policy. Borden continued to be a strong advocate for a greater say for Canada in the determination of policies that were affecting the Dominions and the Empire. At this point in time Robert Borden was hoping that Asquith and Churchill would travel to Canada in the near future for continued discussions and the finalization of Canadian support. He was also mindful of the fact that no Prime Minister of Great Britain had visited Canada. In a hand written note to Churchill, written from the Hotel Meurice, Rue de Rivoli, Paris, Borden expressed this view and invited Asquith and Churchill to make a formal visit to Canada.[32] Churchill made it clear that Asquith could not absent himself from Great Britain in the immediate future, but offered to go himself, going so far as to suggest that Prince Louis of Battenburg and two War Staff officers accompany him to Canada. It was intended by Churchill that he inspect the docks at Vancouver and Esquimalt and that a Cruiser Squadron could visit Montreal and Quebec and some fine cruisers be sent from the China station to Vancouver.[33] He was later to repeat the offer to go to Canada to assist Borden, but this was not to happen. Churchill had been in Canada in 1900 and was not to return until 1929, when he visited as a private citizen for a holiday.

Writing from Paris, Borden explained to the Governor General of Canada how things stood:

> In the matter of cooperation in defence by active aid we have sharply distinguished between present grave conditions demanding temporary assistance and permanent policy. We have been promised a statement which will present 'an unanswerable case' as to immediate temporary assistance …[34]

Borden would not let go of the fact that there could be an unanswerable case and that he would be provided with it. He did have time for relaxation and even felt comfortable enough to make some personal observations in his pocket diary. Borden privately recorded his visit to Versailles on Sunday 28 July and was rather more critical of a diplomat, than he was normally known for:

> Went to Versailles with Roy Carnegie [Sir Lancelot D. Carnegie] of the British, Embassy. Clever man who rather looks like an ass. Went through Palace. Then excellent luncheon.[35]

On returning to London from Paris, Borden was accompanied by Hazen and Doherty to the Committee of Imperial Defence meeting on 1 August that had been promised. Borden compared the democratic structure of Canada to that of the United States, making the point that the United States has control over all matters of its governance including foreign policy, but this was not true of Canada.[36] Some of the Canadian preoccupation was still over Canadian and other Dominion representation on the Committee of Imperial Defence and how this might be achieved. However, Borden wanted to discuss this further with colleagues in Canada and Doherty felt a commission should look into the procedures for further Dominion involvement in the decision-making machinery of imperial defence.[37] The two things that continually preoccupied Borden at these meetings in England were the case for an immediate and temporary approach to naval issues that currently affected the Empire for which Canada might provide immediate help and the other was how a permanent policy might be introduced for Canada. He wanted these two things kept very separate.[38]

In a lengthy interview with Winston Churchill on 7 August the issue of naval cooperation was continued and Borden expressed his strong position: '… everything depended upon the cogency of the statement which he [Churchill] would put forward as to the emergency. He

promised to give the subject his closest personal attention.'[39] The next day Borden continued with the same topic in a meeting with Prime Minister Asquith, who had the utmost faith in the talents of Churchill: 'Asquith observed that Mr Churchill was extremely capable and would be forceful in the preparation of such a statement as we desired.'[40] Borden was looking for his 'unquestionable' answers to arguments for the Canadian Government providing emergency financial support for the British Navy; arguments that he could successfully put before Canadians and in particular the Canadian Parliament.

Borden's social engagements included dinner with Mr Arthur James Balfour (Prime Minister July 1902–December 1906, who also succeeded Churchill at the Admiralty in 1915) and a weekend spent at the Cliveden, home of Waldorf and Nancy Astor. For Saturday 3 August Borden wrote in his pocket diary: 'Motored then to Cliveden. Beautiful home. Both Mr and Mrs Astor charming. Latter unique. Wonderfully vivacious and witty. An unmissable mimic.'[41] Borden also got time to play his favoured sport of golf on Wednesday 7 August at Coombe Hill, Kingston-Upon-Thames (Surrey) and recounted:

> Parliament expected to prorogue today. Played golf on Coombe Hill links with Bona Law and Aitken. Very good links. In afternoon focused [on] naval question with Churchill and told him everything depended on strength of his statement. He promised to give personal attention.[42]

Churchill played the fairways and greens of Coombe Hill Golf Club (opened in 1911) and was an early member of the Golf Club, but he did not get a mention in the Borden golf party.

By 13 August, Laura and Robert Borden had left for Scotland and the north of England for visits to Durham Cathedral, Vickers' shipbuilding yard at Barrow-in-Furness, the Elswick production facilities at Newcastle and John Brown's shipyard at Clydebank. Along with their Canadian entourage, the Bordens saw the recently completed battle cruiser the *Princess Royal* (launched on 29 April 1911), while it was still at the shipbuilding yard of Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness. Any permanent policy for the development of the Canadian Navy had implications about future shipbuilding in Canada. It was in the realms of possibility that a Canadian shipbuilding programme and a permanent naval policy could be dovetailed together. These shipbuilding tours in Britain provided valuable information about what might or what might not be possible in Canada.[43]

While in Scotland, Borden awaited his unanswerable memorandum from the Admiralty, only to be initially disappointed. The reaction was recorded in Borden's *Memoirs* as:

> … so entirely inadequate as to justify belief that it had not received reasonable attention from Mr Churchill. In returning it, I wrote to him that if this contribution was the best we could expect it would be idle for him to anticipate any results whatever from the Government or the people of Canada.[44]

Borden was rejecting this supposedly publishable version of a memorandum that had previously been promised by Churchill. Circumstances were much improved by Churchill's swift reaction in remedying the situation, in producing a much more acceptable memorandum for Borden on 26 August. Churchill wrote:

> I wish to check it in its final form, to show it to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey, and to hold a formal meeting of the Board of Admiralty upon it, so that it can be in the highest degree authoritative. I will then have it printed together with some useful appendices and will send you a dozen copies for use in your Cabinet and among confidential persons … If I could be of any use by coming over you have only to send for me and, if it rests with me, I will come at once. If there is any matter in which the Admiralty can assist you we are at your service.[45]

Borden was placated by Churchill's additional efforts and views on the topic and recounted in his *Memoirs*: 'I received from him [Churchill] a confidential memorandum respecting the naval situation which had been prepared with great care and illustrated his wonderful ability.'[46] However, at the time Borden did not sound so generous and felt he did not have adequate arguments for emergency action and legislation. In a letter from Borden to Churchill on 28 August from the Savoy Hotel (Borden had only received Churchill's memorandum the night before), he reminded the First Lord of the Admiralty that he and his colleagues had been given assurances on 16 July that two memoranda would be produced, one for the Canadian Cabinet that would remain confidential and one that would be more general for parliament and the public. The Prime Minister of Canada sounded rather ungracious in his communications with Churchill, still suggesting that a convincing case that he could present to his Cabinet had not been provided to

him. A further regret existed in that he had postponed his departure from Britain from 23 to 29 August in the hope that he would receive from Churchill all that had been promised.[47] In turn, he did not believe a case for emergency action had been put forward and he even bemoaned the absence of convincing arguments for a permanent policy, although he admitted these were not urgent. Borden wrote on the importance of a permanent policy:

> No doubt you will deal in subsequent memoranda with the other questions raised such as the importance and value of docks and harbour fortifications from the Admiralty standpoint, the best methods of harbour and coast defence, the arming of merchant steamships, the practicability of aiding the establishment of ship-building in Canada by the method suggested.[48]

The next day, Borden returned the rough draft of the 'memorandum' that had been supplied on the agreed policy between Borden and Churchill that would continue to be the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1).[49] Borden was happier about this and made minor amendments on the copy he returned. He continued to press Churchill for a second memorandum, what will become the 'public memorandum' (Appendix A.3) and later presented before the Canadian House of Commons.

In a slight quandary and embarrassment because of Borden's lines of argument in some of his very recent correspondence, Churchill felt on 30 August he should inform his Prime Minister. He notified Asquith, of the developments and felt he should defend himself against the Canadian criticism of his efforts, as well as seeking guidance as to how to move forward. In his own defence, Churchill, after getting the War Staff to prepare a memorandum six weeks previously, and despite a heavy work schedule, had worked on his own memorandum for three days. As he noted to Asquith: 'If Mr Borden does not think this sufficient as a basis of action for the Canadian Cabinet it can only mean that he does not desire to take any specific "emergency measures".'[50] Churchill was sounding slightly disconsolate because Borden did not appear to see that the Admiralty policy as presented in the recent memoranda should have been interpreted in the context of other public statements; in particular, Churchill's own comments in the House of Commons on 18 March and 22 July, and Lord Crewe's comments in the House of Lords in July.[51] Churchill went further in suggesting that both the comments of Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey,

on behalf of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty views presented in the Committee of Imperial Defence should have been taken into account by Prime Minister Borden.[52] In short, Churchill believed Governments like Canada should amend the confidential information they received and present their own best case to their own Parliament and the Canadian public. What should be publicly revealed was always a matter for further discussion between Britain and other Governments and reflected sensitive issues. Information on German naval preparations in building battleships had to be sensitively dealt with, not least because it might alarm Great Britain's allies. Churchill was fearful that he could be accused of not keeping Britain safe, when naval security was exactly the policy he was trying to achieve. Lastly, he felt strongly that he could not say that Canada should be helping Britain over the policies currently being contemplated but not yet approved by Cabinet because he did not want to say that for Canada not to do so would mean additional provision by the British Government.[53] It might be an obvious conclusion to draw, but Churchill was again sensitive over what might be approved and the awkward position he might be in if these proposals had to be substantially changed. As Churchill summarized: 'He [Borden] would have had far more latitude in stating the case than the Admiralty can permit themselves.'[54] In one sense Canada should not release information that affected national security, but on the other hand, they could put the case for supporting Great Britain in a stronger way than Churchill felt he officially might do.

Robert Borden left Liverpool for Canada on 29 August, after the previous day was spent with suffragette and anti-suffragette delegations. It was followed by what was to be an uneventful sea voyage home, but he was feeling optimistic about a Canadian role in Empire naval defence. He was pessimistic about the future state of Europe and had taken it upon himself to become familiar with how the Imperial Defence Committee would function if war broke out. This allowed Borden to make similar arrangements in Canada.[55] 'During my visit to England in 1912, I had reached the conclusion that war was probably inevitable; but European conditions had seemed peaceful.'[56]

The Germans had been keeping a watchful eye on the negotiations between the Canadians and the British and the German Ambassador in London, Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, was doing his job by sending back to the Chancellor in Germany, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, commentaries on the Anglo-Canadian relationship that had been developing during the recent visit of Robert Borden. On 5 August, a rather condescending tone was developed towards the way

Great Britain presented itself as 'the motherland is in peril' and Borden was not seen as being satisfied with an advisory role on the Committee of Imperial Defence, but whether more could be achieved was doubted.[57] At the least, German diplomats were keeping a watchful eye on Anglo-Canadian relations.

# 5
# Policy Developments and the Two Memoranda of 1912

> 'Destroy by fire all previous drafts and copies.'
> (Winston Churchill to Secretary of the Admiralty, William Graham Greene, 17 September 1912)[1]

By 5 September 1912, Robert Borden and his party of travellers docked successfully in Canada at Rimouski, eastern Quebec. It may be appropriate to say successfully since the famous passenger ship the R. M. S. *Titanic* did not fare so well on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was sunk by an iceberg on 14 April 1912. Borden arrived back in Ottawa on 8 September, but took time out to travel to Montreal on 21 September to give a banquet speech reporting on his trip to Great Britain and his support for defending the British Empire. Another banquet given in honour of Borden by the Toronto Board of Trade was held on 23 September. Borden made it clear in Montreal that he was going to seek support in parliament and announce the naval policy in the House of Commons. To not have done so would have been considered disrespectful of the parliamentary system, but also there appeared to be an early euphoria from Borden about this policy being successfully carried through the Canadian Parliament. It was also becoming very clear from Borden that no popular plebiscite would be offered on any new naval policy.

The correspondent of *The Times* (London) in Toronto on 23 September predicted that both Quebec politicians and the Senate might cause problems for the Conservative Government in any new naval programme.[2] However, it was expected that only one of Borden's immediate colleagues from Quebec would make a serious fuss. The colleague was unnamed, but Mr Monk would appear to fit that role. The Senate could stop a Bill, but that was only considered a tactic for the

Opposition if Wilfrid Laurier believed he could negotiate a redistribution of constituencies and also force a General Election. Journalists are allowed predictions and to get them wrong and *The Times* proclaimed: '… it is exceedingly doubtful if the Government can be hopelessly embarrassed by any action taken by the Opposition'.[3]

An interesting side story to Borden's arrival back in Canada and his reception was that a German armoured cruiser, the SMS *Viktoria Louise*, was in Halifax, Nova Scotia at the time of Borden's early speeches. The German ship was on a cordial two week visit, capturing easy information on the state of the Royal Canadian Navy and its installations. The captain of the ship reported back to Germany's Imperial Naval Office on Canadian press reports, that included by then the observations that the Canadian Government wanted to contribute three Dreadnoughts to the British Empire 'as defence against the German threat'.[4] Much of the information could have been picked up in earlier newspaper reports, but the SMS *Viktoria* would have also detected a lot more about the existing nature of Canadian naval facilities.

Following the criticisms that Churchill felt he had received at the hand of Borden over the production of an early draft memorandum on an emergency naval policy, Churchill showed a determination to get things right in the eyes of Borden. There had also been a rather rushed organization of material for Borden before he left Britain and Borden had implied further criticism of Churchill in this matter. As such, Churchill made sure that the amendments to the draft memorandum for public consumption should be given professional attention. In this regard, he was a whirlwind of organization and involved the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman; Second Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg; Secretary to the Board of Admiralty, Sir William Graham Greene; Chief of Staff at the Admiralty, Sir Henry Jackson; and Director of Dockyards, Sir James Marshall, telling them they could not be 'dilatory'.[5] Churchill wanted all Borden's points considered by the senior staff and the War Staff to provide the appendices. It was at this date, 1 September 1912, that Churchill sought intelligence information that he could put into the 'secret memorandum'. He ordered Masterton-Smith (Private Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty) to obtain 'from the safe' opinions expressed by Sir Charles Matthews (Director of Public Prosecutions) on the evidence of 'espionage' in Great Britain.[6] The lawyer who became famous in 1913 for prosecuting the suffragette leader Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst, Mr A. H. Bodkin K. C. was also consulted. This espionage information became a very secret matter within Section 10 of the 'secret memoran-

dum' when advice, independent from the Admiralty, accepted that there existed in England and Wales extensive machinery of the German secret service collecting British defence information (Appendix A.1). Further, Churchill would get the First Sea Lord to hold a Board meeting to approve the statements of naval policy of the two memoranda and he intended to send the final copies to Canada within ten days.[7] The First and Second Sea Lords did approve the naval arguments incorporated in the two documents.

Winston Churchill was clearly not going to countenance any accusation of dilatoriness on the part of the Admiralty in the production of the public and secret memoranda for the Prime Minister of Canada. To the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Herbert Asquith, Churchill recounted that he had the main 'very difficult and laborious' burden in preparing the memoranda and sought his final comments on the two papers.[8] However, he was to acknowledge that the Prime Minister also revised the 'public' document and cut down a lot of what Churchill had included. The difficulty for Churchill with the public memorandum had been threefold. Churchill had to make a public case for an emergency contribution from Canada without making Britain sound exceptionally weak. He did not want to dwell upon the details of German naval construction. Lastly, Churchill had the dilemma of not saying what he would do if Canada rejected the emergency assistance programme.[9]

Churchill took immense care over the clerical arrangements for producing the final copies of the publishable and secret memoranda. He ordered the Secretary of the Admiralty William Graham Greene on 17 September 1912 to reprint 20 copies of each and to; 'Destroy by fire all previous drafts and copies.'[10] Churchill gave instructions that ten copies of each memorandum should be sent to Canada and dictated the type of packaging they were to receive and how they would be addressed. A meticulous amount of care was taken by Churchill over the delivery of this material.

On the 17 September 1912, Churchill produced a letter to be accompanied with the two memoranda. One was secret and supplied in ten copies so that reproduction would not be required in Canada (Appendix A.1). At this point the 'secret memorandum' was in 27 paragraphs or sections. The ten copies were sent from the Colonial Secretary, Lewis Harcourt, to the Governor General of Canada, Duke of Connaught and Strathearn, for Robert Borden. Minor adjustments were made to the two memoranda in October and Borden stated clearly to Churchill via the Colonial Secretary on 2 November 1912 that the

form and substance of the publishable and secret document had been settled.[11]

The 'public memorandum', dated 20 September, was so that Borden could use information to present a case to Parliament in formal papers (Appendix A.3).[12] Rather sensitively the titled 'Draft Memorandum for Publication' stated that it was not putting pressure on the Canadian Parliament or public.[13] As stated, the support Canada might supply was to be exclusively a decision belonging to Canada. A lot of the information was in the public domain, including laws enacted in Germany (Naval Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912) and statements in the British House of Commons by Churchill on 22 July 1912. This allowed the Admiralty and Churchill to point out the development of the German fleet and the intended expansion. In 1898, Germany had a fleet of: '9 battleships (excluding coast defence vessels), 3 large cruisers, 28 small cruisers, 113 torpedo boats, and 25,000 men', and by 1920 this was due to be: '41 battleships, 20 large cruisers, 28 small cruisers, 144 torpedo boats, 72 submarines, and 101,500 men'.[14] These raw figures did not reflect the qualitative nature of this expansion and there was a clear worry that new technological advances gave great advantages to the new German vessels over the older British ones. Repair and maintenance were more significant issues and inherent costs for an older navy than a new one. Alongside this, the number of ships that Germany could keep in full-time commission had increased, as had the striking force of the German Navy all year around. It was acknowledged that the German fleet was concentrated in home waters, close to the German coast and consequently an issue for the British coast and the direct security of Great Britain. German battleships were not dispersed all over the world and the British Government had to take this into consideration in developing its own naval strategies.

The Admiralty view that was very much for public consumption was that the German expansion had not been produced by a British naval expansion. The argument presented was that the British were not responsible for the naval arms race, Germany had its own rationale for the development of a modern navy and they themselves declared it was not a direct response to British expansion. The production figures for capital ships between 1905 and 1908 showed that the rate of expansion had moved in Germany's favour.[15] By 1909 Britain had responded more forcefully to the rate of expansion and Britain produced eight capital ships and obtained one each from Australia and New Zealand.

Despite an acknowledgement that Britain had largely concentrated a fleet in home waters and this was still a major issue because of the

proximity of the German fleet to the British, it was suggested that the greatest protection for the Dominions was the general naval supremacy of Great Britain and an ability to defeat any 'combination of hostile navies wherever they may be found'.[16] Greater naval security in British waters meant a further ability to secure the safety of the Dominions. This, it was believed, was a major deterrent to any hostile action that might be prejudicial to the policy or protection of the Dominions. The direct safety of the Dominions did not appear to be suggested, but the fate of the British could dramatically affect the position of Canada. Here, an economic argument was also pertinent because Canada needed protection of its sea-going international trade.

> On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade of the Dominion of Canada in 1909–10 was not less than 72,000,000*l.* [sterling], and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing.[17]

The conclusion drawn from this was that Canada had been dependent and was still dependent on the navy of the British Empire without having had matching or significant costs. Canada had a lot of benefits from the British Empire including the protection of communications throughout the world. A very clear benefit was being established for Canada, if the safety of Britain and the Dominions could be assured.

Although the North Sea was seen as the vital theatre for any possible war between Great Britain and Germany, the British Government would also not ignore its Mediterranean commitments and had to keep a watchful eye on the increased navies of Austria and Italy. By 1915, it was expected that the Austrian Navy would have four Dreadnought battleships and Italy six.[18] What was also being evoked was that in the future a combination of navies could weaken the position of the British Navy and the ability of the British to preserve and protect all the interests of the Empire. Safety, integrity and commerce were presented as the general reasons as to why Canada might and should make a major contribution to the defence of the Empire.

Churchill wrote about the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1): 'The document is one which, as you will realize, might do harm to international relations if it were to leak out or to get mislaid.'[19] Borden provided a copy of the 'secret memorandum' to Leader of the Opposition, Wilfrid Laurier, with an understanding that he could

communicate the substance of the document to some of his colleagues, notably privy councillors. This was undertaken three weeks before Borden went to Parliament with his Navy Aid Bill (Appendix A.2) and Churchill was informed of these arrangements.[20] The copy of the 'secret memorandum' given to Laurier was returned as promised.[21] Permission was also sought by Borden from Harcourt and Churchill that he could send a copy to Sir Richard McBride, an earlier vague suggestion mooted by Churchill himself.

The 'public memorandum' (Appendix A.3) carried a preamble that made it clear that the Board of the Admiralty was responding to a request from the Prime Minister of Canada for information on the immediate naval requirements of Empire. This derived from the recent visit of the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Canadian Parliament to the United Kingdom. This was not required in the secret memorandum since it was largely gloss for public consumption.

Borden did seek further explanation from the Admiralty of a paragraph within the 'secret memorandum' (paragraph numbered 21 of Borden's copy, number 20 in Appendix A.1):

> Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, impart a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons and enable the flag to be again flown confidently in the distant seas.[22]

His concern was that Canadians were not directing their attention towards the North Sea and the Mediterranean, which is what he interpreted the words 'superiority at home' to mean. The response from the Admiralty was lengthy. Churchill had used the word superiority to merely suggest vital theatres of British interest which had shifted over the years. The Admiralty further explained that there had to be a rigid and strategic policy to protect the vital interests:

> … of which the minor issues of the war or extraneous interests in peace are left to mere containing forces, or even abandoned until such time as a happy issue in the vital theatre enables the Admiralty, as the First Lord says, 'to impart a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons, and enable the flag to be again flown confidently in the distant seas'.[23]

Naval forces of the Empire, once they had been successfully moved closer to the 'mother country' (North Sea or the Mediterranean), could

then be moved to the more distant theatres of the Empire when required. A 'flag' of deterrence could effectively be flown in peace and to promote economic harmony. It was believed that an enemy of Britain would be unwise to send a fleet to distant waters of the Dominions because they would be pursued by a superior British force.[24] In short, the more strategically obvious defence of Britain was the defence of the Empire.

The general tenure of both memoranda are the same, but the force of the German threat is acknowledged further in the secret memorandum and figures like Admiral von Tirpitz named as the guiding light of German naval expansion (Appendix A.1). Although the anti-British nature of German expansion was acknowledged, the previous decade also illustrated the view that German expansion was a more direct response to British foreign policy. In this context, international relations were significant, but clearly the Admiralty stressed the existence of the German Navy Law of 1900, predating improved Anglo-French relations from 1904 and Anglo-Russian relations from 1907. In essence, the delivery of new understandings in British foreign policy was not to blame for German naval actions. The ratio of capital ships built between 1905 and 1908 moved in Germany's favour leading to the conclusion: 'A man must be very anxious to prove Great Britain in the wrong if he seeks to found any charge of naval provocation against her upon the above figures.'[25]

Great Britain, it was unsurprisingly argued, was clearly not to blame for antagonizing Germany, whereas the Germans were aggressive and promoting offensive action. In an unequivocal way, it was suggested that the training of German naval personnel and the strategic practice that was evident '… leave no room to doubt that the idea of sudden and aggressive action against a fleet of great power is the primary cause for which they have been prepared'.[26] In a further sensitive part of the secret memorandum the British Government acknowledged the existence of German intelligence agents in Britain. Although it could be seen as scaremongering it also evoked an image of a rather devious and underhand enemy, particularly for 1912. The secret service of Germany, as previously mentioned, was deliberately highlighted as an important issue by Churchill and he accepted evidence that German 'agents' were very active in both England and Wales.[27]

The general conclusions of the two memoranda are very similar and despite the emphasis put on the problem of home waters for Great Britain, the issue of common strength and united action were the conclusions that were presented. Nothing would be more effective from

Canada than large capital ships for the service of the British Empire was the ultimate conclusion of the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1).

Borden assumed there were two major areas that were relevant for him in the 'secret' document. It included discreet information, but nevertheless important information that would be useful in presenting a case to the Canadian Parliament. Secondly, there was information that should not be used. In the first category was information about the naval expansion of Germany under Admiral von Tirpitz. Germany had not only moved into second place in terms of the ranking of significant naval fleets in the world, but also had impressive naval training facilities and arsenals. Accompanying this argument was the view that Great Britain had not been provocative in producing naval armaments and had even tried to reduce the cost of naval estimates and the construction of capital ships, working to control the increase in ship construction. It was further believed and appropriate to publicize that Germany did not need a fleet for the defence of Germany. Germany was effectively defended without these naval increases, it had mines, submarines, fortifications and an army with the mobilization potential of four million men.[28] What was being portrayed here was an offensive German strategy and a defensive approach of the British Empire, although as military strategists would tell us, governments do undertake offensive action for defensive reasons. The pre-emptive military strike and policies of arms procurement are often driven by the logic of a defence strategy.

Despite the rather strict terms attached to the secrecy of the memorandum it was ultimately agreed that some of the information might be used in the public forum. Churchill was keen to draw a distinction between information on naval expenditure used by ministers of the Dominion with their own Parliament and the more direct views of the British Admiralty which they would not want exposed as a State Paper. Given that Great Britain was much closer to continental Europe than Canada, the offence that might be caused with Germany would be a much bigger issue for Britain. As Churchill advised:

> These arguments have been prepared by me and my advisers to enable you to educate public opinion, and we have full confidence that you will be able to make use of them without embarrassing us or ruffling the German susceptibilities more than is necessary.[29]

Both memoranda were presented to the Canadian Cabinet. What in particular concerned the Cabinet was whether or not the naval issue

should be before the Canadian public in the form of a plebiscite. The Minister of Public Works, Frederick D. Monk took the very strong position that a plebiscite should be held. He made such a strong issue of it, that when the Naval Aid Bill was carried forward to Parliament, he felt obliged to resign from the Cabinet. His letter was dated 18 October 1912 and addressed to the Right Honourable R. L. Borden:

> I regret to find I cannot concur in the decision, arrived at by the Cabinet yesterday, to place on behalf of Canada an emergency contribution of $35,000,000 at the disposal of the British Government for naval purposes with the sanction of Parliament but without giving the Canadian people an opportunity of expressing their approval of this important step before it is taken. Such a concurrence would be at variance with my pledges, and the Act proposed is of sufficient gravity to justify my insistence. It goes beyond the scope of the Constitutional Act of 1867.
>
> Holding this view, as a member of our Cabinet, I feel my duty to place my resignation in your hands. Permit me to add my decision has been reached with regret on account of my agreeable relations at all times with yourself.
>
> Yours sincerely,
> (Sgd.) F. D. Monk[30]

Monk clearly felt that the Bill went beyond the spirit, if not the letter of the Constitution Act of 1867 that defined many of the powers of the national government within confederation. In reality, Canada was not unlike Great Britain in accepting conventions as precedents for Government policy and the procedures adopted by the Conservative Government and Parliament had a number of sources.

There were a number of difficult areas that were not resolved by the memorandum (Appendix A.3) or the Bill put before Parliament, and one of these was the position of Canadian shipbuilding as a consequence of this emergency naval contribution. The Prime Minister tried in a letter from Ottawa (3 October 1912) to influence the First Lord of the Admiralty into accepting a shipbuilding programme for Canada for the three new ships that were being discussed. Borden had in mind trying to sweeten the decision that the Canadian Parliament faced in spending such a large sum of money by suggesting that some of the money should be spent in Canada. The way that Borden hoped things might work, is that the shipbuilding firms that benefitted from the contracts to build three Dreadnoughts in the United Kingdom would in turn

invest in the shipbuilding industry in Canada. At least one and maybe two geographical parts of Canada might benefit, Borden having in mind Halifax in Nova Scotia and Montreal in Quebec. As a consequence he might keep some of the population in the Maritime Provinces and French-Canadians in Quebec happier.[31]

Newly developed dockyards in Canada could be both an asset for Canada and the Empire, but the existence of naval bases would be a major contributor to the maintaining of battleships during periods of crisis. Docking facilities were a necessary feature for an efficient fleet, but these facilities largely needed to be in reasonably close vicinity to the conflict so that repairs to ships could be easily delivered. However, large scale naval operations were unlikely to take place very close to Canada. What Canada thus largely offered were docks that were not easily attacked, merchant shipping that could be maintained in periods outside of war and the relatively safe access to some materials.[32]

If small cruisers and destroyers could be built in Canada, Borden hoped that the cost might be shared between Canada and Great Britain. Borden continued to Churchill that should the Bill not be passed in Canada because of local prejudice, 'the moral effect upon the whole Empire will be disastrous'.[33] Clearly, Borden saw himself in a bargaining position with Churchill. Yet, the First Lord of the Admiralty in Whitehall was a fish that was not so easily netted and suggested in a reply that Canada did not have the expertise to build such modern warships and might wish to concentrate on 'light cruisers, oil tank vessels and small craft for auxiliary services'.[34] Churchill's rather general encouragement for shipbuilding in Canada was merely to recommend Canadian firms submit competitive tenders for new contracts. Canadian firms would have to make reasonable financial quotations, but also they would have to cover any extra cost that would accrue between completing the ships in Canada against that of the cost of building similar ships in Great Britain. 'No fixed scale or proportion of orders could be guaranteed to Canadian firms.'[35]

Churchill's approach in a private letter to Borden in October 1912 was to appeal to the more jingoistic concept of Canada providing vessels that would be at the front line of any war effort.[36] Many ships could contribute to a war effort, but Churchill believed that the only really powerful vessels for a naval war were Dreadnoughts and submarines. Interestingly, it was believed by Churchill that although submarines were a great naval asset, they would not be very acceptable to Canadians. This was because submarines were not a very visible asset, not only for the obvious reason that they spent a lot of time under the

surface of seas, but also because they would need to be in the North Sea, they were given numbers not names which hardly invoked public enthusiasm, and the Canadians did not have the specialized knowledge to build them.[37] Dreadnoughts that could be named after Canadian Provinces or historical regions remained very much the preferred option. The carrot that Churchill attached was that orders for medium sized warships might be placed in the future with Canadian shipyards, thus advancing the Canadian shipbuilding industry at some unspecified point in the future.[38]

Although Winston Churchill had presented Admiralty policy as being that five battleships would be built, his true intention was to cash in one of the battleship building programmes to build submarines instead, i.e. spending the proposed British expenditure in a more secret way, giving Great Britain advantages over the enemies of the British Empire.[39] Churchill was contemplating building four battleships rather than five and spending the saving on as many submarines as this would allow. Churchill did not want to be accused later of misrepresenting the situation so he was honest with Borden about his plan. Churchill told Borden, very confidentially, that he might still announce the five battleships proposal to the British Parliament, thus hopefully deceiving foreign powers. The Canadian aid would remain additional to the British programme, but if he changed the British programme he could be seen to have misled the Canadians and did not want any future misunderstandings.

An issue that Borden pressed the Colonial Secretary to convey to Churchill on 2 November 1912 was the arrangement for maintaining the ships that Canada might fund. 'It is not proposed to retain ownership in Canada but I desire authority to inform Parliament that His Majesty's Government will if desired return the ships to the Canadian Government whenever Canada is prepared to maintain them.'[40] Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary was to seek clarification on behalf of the Admiralty that the vessels would not be quickly withdrawn from their stations.[41] Robert Borden merely wanted assurance that Canada would have ownership of the ships since he was trying to offset potential criticism in Canada that naval organization within the Empire was unfair to Canada.[42] Borden made it clear to Churchill that he wanted the appearance that Canada could in the future recall the ships they intended to pay for. However, Borden saw no specific practical case where that would actually happen.[43]

It was a view held by the Canadian Government that the battleships that Canada would provide would carry Canadian names, that of

Acadia, Quebec and Ontario – a clear attempt to win political support or reward political support from the electorate in the eastern Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and the Maritimes (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick). Acadia was an older name for an area that included the Maritimes and had French roots. Overall, the approach to naming the ships was a blatant attempt to get public support, and it reflected a deliberate sentimental approach on the part of the Canadian Government.[44] Over the next couple of weeks and by 18 November 2012, Borden did not want to be seen as premature in his policies and made sure that the names of the ships did not go forward to His Majesty the King. Borden wanted to claim further consideration was being given to the naming of the three ships and he felt he could not yet promise a date of announcement in Canada.[45]

This naming proposal was not seen as a problem for the Admiralty, although the issue of whether or not Canadian seamen and cadets could serve on the said ships could not be promised. The Admiralty hoped it would be possible for Canadians to serve on the ships that Canada provided.[46] For the other Dominions the situation was that cadetships were provided for the training of cadets from Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. The British proposal for Canada was that eight cadetships would be provided on an annual basis. Under similar arrangements, Australia had eight, South Africa three and New Zealand two.[47] Churchill promised Borden that arrangements would be made to allow Canadians to be officers in the fleet, although whether or not that meant the three ships financed by Canada was not made clear.[48]

To strengthen his case with Churchill about the naval expenditure being spent in Canada, Borden supplied him with a resolution from a commercial part of the city of Montreal, the municipality of the town of Maisonneuve. The council believed that a contribution by Canada would benefit the labouring classes in Canada and part of the unanimous resolution of the town council read:

> That the Council of the Municipality of the town of Maisonneuve recognises the protection that has been afforded to Canada by Great Britain in the past, and that the time has now come when the Dominion should liberally contribute towards the strength of the Navy of the British Empire; and further, that the present international situation demands that a very substantial contribution should be made by the Dominion forthwith.[49]

This might appear run of the mill, except Borden chose to forward it to Churchill and it supported the views that Churchill and Borden had been promoting. It served Borden well by indicating support in Quebec for the increased naval expenditure to buttress the defence of the British Empire and reinforced Borden's argument and desire that this large outlay of government expenditure would have economic benefits within Canada for both business and 'labouring' classes.

# 6

# The Naval Aid Bill and the Canadian House of Commons: The Long Debate Begins

> I grew so rich that I was sent
> By a pocket borough into Parliament.
> I always voted at my party's call,
> And I never thought of thinking of myself at all.
> I thought so little, they rewarded me
> By making me the Ruler of the Queen's Navee!
> (*HMS Pinafore*, Lyrics by Sir William S. Gilbert and music by Sir Arthur Sullivan)[1]

The London trip of Robert Borden and subsequent deliberations of the Canadian Cabinet culminated in the presentation to Parliament of Canada's Naval Aid Bill which was introduced on Thursday 5 December 1912, in the Second Session of the Twelfth Parliament (Appendix A.2). It was to become an acrimonious and lengthy debate, or as Gilbert Tucker put it '… one of the longest, most implacable, and most famous debates since Confederation was under way'.[2] Before the formal presentation of the Bill (No. 21), Borden gave notice to Parliament of his intentions and also found it necessary to have a consultation with Members of Parliament from Quebec. This he did on 27 November, explaining that he was also hoping to repeal the Laurier Naval Bill from 1910 and institute a more permanent naval policy for Canada. Borden believed and argued he was introducing emergency measures, which by definition would be for the short term. He appeared to have six Members from Quebec that supported his policies.[3]

Robert Borden considered presenting the Bill in different forms, including the description of 'An Act to authorize the granting of a subsidy for increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire,' short-

ened to 'The Naval Subsidy Act, 1912', or 'An Act to authorize a grant to His Majesty for increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire', shortened to 'The Naval Aid Act, 1912'.[4] As Appendix A.2 shows, the latter was closest to the final presentation with the word grant dropped from the draft, and the Act thus becoming: 'An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective Naval Forces of the Empire', to be known as 'The Naval Aid Act'. The proposed Act of Parliament was the planned development of three Dreadnoughts, costing some CAD$35 million, to be at the disposal of the British for the defence of the Empire in the event of war. Borden's introduction in the House of Commons was an emotional appeal to support Great Britain in a developing crisis, a crisis caused by the pressures inflicted on the British people by increasing strength of the other European Powers:

> That burden is so great that the day has come when either the existence of this Empire will be imperiled or the young and mighty dominions must join with the Motherland to make secure the common safety and the common heritage of all.[5]

The protection of the 'High Seas' was presented as the key to the safety of Great Britain and the British Empire. International affairs in Europe were seen as grave and warranting emergency assistance. The immediate timing of Borden's request had been driven by the circumstances of the new Canadian Government assuming office in October 1911, but also the product of the trip to Great Britain to consult on these great matters after the session of the Canadian Parliament concluded.

At the time of the presentation and first reading of the Bill, 5 December 1912, Borden presented the memorandum prepared by the British Admiralty on the 'General Naval Situation' – designed for public consumption (Appendix A.3). As previously noted, Borden had received a draft of the 'secret memorandum' whilst in Britain and the 'public memorandum' was prepared at a similar time with subsequent deletions from Asquith. Winston Churchill had expected that Robert Borden might embroider the public memorandum from other information in the public domain, but Borden did not add information directly to either document. The presented memorandum, which is a much shorter version of the 'secret memorandum', was tabled with its ten major sections, these sections matching parts from within the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1). Sections numbered 1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the 'secret memorandum' appear in the text, largely verbatim, as ten sections for the 'public memorandum'

that was put before the Canadian House of Commons (Appendix A.3). These ten sections with a different preamble and final paragraph were approximately 2,576 words as presented to the House of Commons (Appendix A.3), as compared to the 7,097 words of the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1). Borden acknowledged to Parliament that some material information was withheld because it was of a confidential nature.[6]

The safety of the seas and oceans was the major approach taken by Prime Minister Borden but not the only worrying image evoked by him in the House of Commons. Given the size of continental European armies, both numbered by millions and largely protected from British interference, they could be an international problem and cause of instability in Europe. In a dramatic picture painted by Borden, it was implied that a major defeat for Great Britain at sea would both submit Britain and the Dominions to potential invasion from another military power, although the exact enemy nation was not specifically mentioned. Under these circumstances, the destiny of the British Empire and the Dominions would thus be transformed.[7]

Borden did not want to discuss the possibility of the imminent outbreak of a major war. Further, he was careful in his presentation of the Bill to deny that Canada had aggressive or warlike attitudes; rather Canada was concerned with responsibilities. The Conservative Government would emphasize that they were less concerned, at this stage, with a policy and more concerned with a contribution. It was a financial contribution to a difficult naval situation that was being requested and not a permanent naval policy.

Despite Great Britain increasing its naval expenditure over the previous ten years, the British Navy was increasingly being confined to the North Sea and for example, no longer prominent in the Mediterranean. Britain's dilemma was that it could not ignore the Mediterranean Sea because it needed to maintain and protect the trade routes to Egypt, the Suez Canal and India. This strategic shift by Great Britain to prioritizing home waters was the consequence of the expansion of the German Navy. This potential confinement of a British fleet was problematic for the protection of trade routes across the Atlantic Ocean and through the Mediterranean Sea. Cleverly, Borden referred to 'Our navy' as once being paramount everywhere.[8]

It may have been slightly injudicious of Borden to suggest that the time was not right to build a large naval organization in Canada, he believed it could not be built in 25 to 50 years and even then it could not be a substitute for the organization of a navy of the British Empire.

Borden went on to open up the older question of what sort of navy Canada should have. In a rhetorical flourish, he queried:

> Is there really any need that we should undertake the hazardous and costly experiment of building up a naval organization especially restricted to this Dominion when upon just and self-respecting terms we can take such part as we desire in naval defence through the existing naval organization of the Empire, and in that way fully and effectively avail ourselves of the men and the resources at the command of Canada.[9]

On shipbuilding, and this would generate some considerable opposition within Parliament, the Dreadnoughts would be constructed in the United Kingdom, because they could not be built in Canada at the same price. It was estimated to cost an additional $12,000,000 to try to build them in Canada.[10] Shipbuilding facilities that could deliver Dreadnought battleships needed to be advanced and organized in a way that was not the case in Canada and if the country was going to have an effective shipbuilding industry then it needed a more humble approach.[11]

What Borden felt he had won as a major concession from Great Britain was that no significant foreign policy moves be made in London without consulting a Canadian representative, a representative regularly summoned to the Committee of Imperial Defence. Prime Minister Herbert Asquith appeared to state so much in the British House of Commons:

> Side by side with this growing participation in the active burdens of the Empire on the part of the Dominions, there rests with us undoubtedly the duty of making such response as we can to their obviously reasonable appeal that they should be entitled to be heard in the determination of policy and the direction of Imperial affairs.[12]

Borden, believed he had achieved as much, but in reality this was not to take place, but as long as he could say this had been achieved he was in a good domestic position. As with normal procedure, the first reading of the Bill was passed without debate and formalized on 12 December; it was moved by the Prime Minister and seconded by Mr George Eulas Foster (constituency of North Toronto, Ontario).

On the same day, in moving for a second reading, Borden rather strangely read two letters he had sent to Winston Churchill on 3 and

5 October 1912 and a letter from Churchill on 4 November 1912. The content of Borden's letters illustrated that he had pressed on Churchill the ambition to have the shipbuilding contracts that would derive from the Canadian contribution of three Dreadnoughts to be tied to a shipbuilding industry in Canada. This stimulation of a shipbuilding industry in Canada was important for Borden, who had a further expectation that the cost of producing future destroyers and small cruisers might be shared between Britain and Canada.

Borden also read out Churchill's reply:

> Admiralty, Whitehall,
> 4th November, 1912
>
> My dear Mr. Borden,
>
> I have given careful consideration to your two letters about the encouragement of the ship-building industry in Canada. I recognize the importance of such a policy on general grounds not less from the immediate Canadian standpoint; and any practical scheme for Admiralty co-operation would command my support. The main difficulty to be surmounted is to obtain that high degree of expert knowledge and experience which modern war-ships require for their efficient construction.
>
> We might, however, in the first instance agree upon certain classes of vessels with which it may be considered that competent Canadian shipyards would be able to deal. The most suitable classes of vessels with which to inaugurate the system would be light cruisers, oil tank vessels and small craft for auxiliary services. We should, if it would meet your views, be prepared to invite tenders from approved Canadian firms for the construction of some vessels of such classes in the near future.
>
> It would be understood that progress with this policy would have to depend on the price quoted being reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances (including the fact that Canada will be prepared to share any extra cost) and also on the time required for construction not being excessive as compared with the dates fixed for completion of similar ships in England. No fixed scale or proportion of orders could be guaranteed to Canadian firms. We would begin by giving some orders at once, and further progress would depend upon the development of the industry and the extent of our programme.
>
> The Admiralty would, of course, remain wholly responsible for the design of all vessels, and for the supervision of the construction

> of those building in Canada. Arrangements for this could be worked out in detail and should not present any difficulty.
>
> Winston S. Churchill[13]

Churchill appeared to suggest that battleships could not be easily built in Canada and required a rather large amount of British interference, should this proceed. Borden was brave in reading this out because he was also declaring that the Canadian Government would have to bear some of the extra cost of producing ships in Canada compared to the United Kingdom.[14]

Much of this information provided 'indirectly' by Churchill allowed Wilfrid Laurier to take an alternative view and he suggested that a Canadian Navy could be built in Canada. Laurier was wary of the accusation that this would be a 'separatist navy', separate from Great Britain, so he was at pains to clarify this in the House of Commons and made comments reminiscent of his pronouncements at the time of the 1910 Naval Service Bill, 'When Britain is at war. Canada is at war; there is no distinction.'[15] In 1912 he stated in familiar tones:

> When England is at war, we are at war; but it does not follow that because we are at war, we are actually in the conflict. [Some hon. Members: Oh, oh.] We can be in the conflict only through two things, namely, actual invasion of our soil, or, the action of the Parliament of Canada.[16]

Mr John Douglas Hazen, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, was to make light of Laurier's remarks:

> It takes a master of the English language, a master of finesse, a master of adroitness and skill in debate to utter a sentence of that sort, which sounds well, but the moment it is analysed, the whole idea behind it falls to pieces. My right hon. friend has perhaps read what Louis Botha, who commanded the Boer forces in the South African war, and is now Prime Minister in South Africa stated when the words attributed to my right hon. friend were read to him, and he was asked what he thought of them. He said: 'I for my part cannot comprehend how the Empire can be at war without every portion of that Empire being at war.'[17]

Yet Laurier reminded the Conservatives on 12 December that there had been a 'unanimous conclusion' in 1909 that a Canadian Navy was

a better choice than a financial contribution overseas.[18] Borden was accused by Laurier of criticizing the Australian Government back in 1909 for making contributions to Great Britain and Laurier had heard that the subsequent Australian flotilla of torpedo boats and submarines, that Australia was left with, had been described as a 'tin-pot navy'.[19] The irony was that it was a phrase that had been used earlier by Conservatives about the Navy created by Laurier in Canada, but since Borden was accused of not advancing the conditions of that Navy at home, he was by implication subjected to the same general criticism.

Certainly Robert Borden seemed very pleased with his own early parliamentary performance and on 6 December 1912 sent Winston Churchill an unrevised early copy of his speech of the previous day as recorded by House of Commons Debates (*Hansard*). He did not really need to send the speech since *The Times* (London) published the full speech on 6 December.[20] Borden did comment, rather vaguely that: 'The speech was received even more favourably than I had anticipated.' Whether or not he meant inside or outside the House of Commons is unclear, but the debates had hardly started at that stage.

The main position of the Conservative Government was that there was an immediate threat to the Royal Navy and that Canada's best defence was to enter into an arrangement that strengthened the Royal Navy as soon as possible. The development of an independent Canadian Navy could not be created in the same time and was a policy that needed to be determined in the future, it was not for now.

The Liberal party under Wilfrid Laurier took a position captured by Oscar Douglas Skelton in his 1921 biography, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier,* that the Liberals wanted a permanent Canadian Navy even larger than the one introduced in 1910. A caucus of the Liberal party met on 6 December 1912 and decided to oppose Borden's contribution policy.[21] Sir Wilfrid Laurier saw the Naval Aid Bill, which included the $35 million for the defence of the British Empire, as expedient rather than an emergency.[22] He did not believe there was an emergency, and in particular he claimed there was no emergency between Great Britain and the Great Powers of Europe. He would offer more than the $35 million, if that were the case.[23] Borden's visit to England earlier in the year was portrayed by Laurier as a visit determined always to offer emergency aid from the beginning. Whether or not 'emergency' was the appropriate word and what it might mean became part of the debates. The Liberal party, in contrast to this Conservative approach saw no immediate threat to the shores of Canada and saw the funding of new Dreadnought ships as paying

some kind of 'tribute' to Great Britain and that a plebiscite should be held on the matter in Canada. The problem in Europe could be seen as one of excessive armaments rather than too little. Laurier referred to the Admiralty memorandum that had been tabled and believed there was nothing there that they did not already know, but his interpretation was different to that of the Prime Minister. Laurier acknowledged that Britain was redrawing the strategic balance of armaments towards Britain and Europe and away from its distant seas.[24] What Canada needed, in Laurier's view, was local protection. If Britain took ships from faraway places to defend home waters in Europe a replacement ship should then be built by and for the overseas nation affected by the loss, i.e. Canada or Australia. In a rather sarcastic manner Laurier suggested that the few Canadians serving on these ships (because they would be manned and maintained by the British), meant little and implied that the only thing Canadian about the suggested three new Dreadnoughts was their names and Canadians expected more. Laurier believed that the policy presented by Borden was not the permanent solution that was required and was effectively a hybrid policy:

> It is a hybrid policy, it is a cross between jingoism and nationalism. Unless I mistake the spirit of the Canadian people, if they are true to their ideals, if they are true to their own blood, no matter to what province they belong, they will not be satisfied with this hybrid policy, but they will insist that their contribution of money and of men as well, as was provided in our resolution of 1909.[25]

In direct response to Laurier's hybrid accusation, Foster later retorted with a slightly unusual analogy to hybrid fruit. Foster said that if the fruit was good in flavour and quality, the type of soil it came from mattered little.[26]

Laurier could not resist an attack on Borden's view that with this financial support for ships Canada was demanding a greater say in the Empire policies and would provide a permanent representative of Canada in London to confer with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Borden had played the card that the control of foreign policy was an important issue. This was also relevant to the point that Borden mooted later on 27 February that '... if we are to remain an Empire we cannot have five foreign policies and five separate navies. We say, a just voice of all the Dominions in foreign policy and the concerns of the Empire and a united Empire to face every peril.'[27]

If the Dominions provided a multitude of advisers for the British Government, Laurier had been unable to see what particular use they would all be, especially over British foreign policy towards Persia or Afghanistan or rather rapidly developing crises exemplified by the previous crisis over Agadir. An Anglo-German problem in North Africa because of gunboat diplomacy might interest Canada, but to what degree should they be consulted. Borden thought this needed a lot more consideration and was hardly straightforward.[28] The broad point that was elaborated further was that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was unlikely to have much assistance from a multitude of sources (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland) that might not agree.

Laurier moved an amendment that there should be a permanent naval policy and two fleet units should be created on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, inherently the policy deriving from the Naval Service Act of 1910. This of course muddied the waters of Government policy and the Government stuck to the view that there was an immediate and pressing danger to Great Britain from Germany and Canada had a debt of gratitude to repay Great Britain.

Minister of Marine and Fisheries, John Douglas Hazen made a lengthy reply to Sir Wilfrid Laurier on 12 December 1912. As is common to these occasions in the House of Commons, if blame or neglect could be attached by the current Conservative Government to another Government it would be duly attached to the previous Liberal Government. This became possible with the Liberals pressing for a more substantial shipbuilding programme in Canada. Hazen was happy to point out that the Laurier Government had authorized the tendering of contracts for the building of four cruisers and six destroyers (having only the two cruisers *Niobe* and *Rainbow*) and a five month window of opportunity existed for them to accept the tenders, whereas the new Government declined to accept them. The Government's view was that the type of vessels being commissioned would be near obsolete by the time they were produced.

In contrast, a Dreadnought was a great modern warship, but it could not in any reasonable time be built in Canada. The cost of construction in Great Britain for an individual Dreadnought was $11,500,000.[29] Even if Canada had a shipbuilding industry, Hazen argued that the armaments and armour plate would still have to be manufactured in Great Britain. The Conservative policy was thus presented as driven by commonsense and excellent business practices.[30] Hazen continued to explain that support for Great Britain was necessary for five major

reasons: the Empire needed protection from invasion; the Empire also needed to protect garrisons overseas and protect interests in these areas; a large navy was required to blockade the enemy; it was needed to protect commerce across the sea; and fifthly, Great Britain helped to deny the high seas to enemy mercantile ships.[31] So that all of this did not sound too aggressive it was presented in the context of preserving the peace, not looking for overseas conquest. However, the picture painted of Britain's naval position was one of being comparatively on the defensive and this was an awkward position for a navy – largely because it was difficult to maintain ships in a persistent position of readiness. It was suggested by Hazen that the only way to preserve safety and security was to be better prepared than your potential enemies, even at your lowest point of efficiency and their maximum point.[32]

In contrast, George Perry Graham, of the constituency of South Renfrew, opposed the Bill and supported the amendment. He did so for five reasons: the first was rather principled, suggesting this emergency policy put other people in the firing line, rather than Canadians, assuming that Canadians did not provide personnel for the three Dreadnoughts; personal sacrifice was a test of devotion, in this case towards the Empire; it was a backwards step in constitutional relations between Canada and Great Britain; it was only an expedient undertaking and not the permanent policy that was required; and finally, Graham believed that the Bill was not a solution to naval defence that had any lasting significance. In summary, his appeal was for 'dignity', a proper Canadian shipbuilding industry and for a strong commitment for Canadians to be involved in fighting when necessary.[33] His speech appeared to be misinterpreted by the Postmaster General, Louis-Philippe Pelletier as advocating a Canadian desire for bloodshed.[34] George Eulas Foster was to later interpret it as an accusation of paying others for a job that Canadians were not prepared to do, as if the Government was being criticized for supporting cowardice.[35]

In the continuing debate on Friday 13 December, Mr Pelletier was sarcastically pointing out that the Opposition had not done a great job in manning the *Rainbow* and the *Niobe*. One of the previously unmentioned difficulties was that Canadian rates of pay were greatly in excess of rates of pay on board British warships. This might, particularly if British seamen were induced to serve on Canadian ships, put an obligation on the British Navy to raise their pay scales and budgets, although the spectre of Canadians having their rates of pay reduced was also alluded to.[36] The sarcasm became more rife as Mr Pelletier

**Table 6.1 Total Costs of the *Niobe* and *Rainbow***

| | |
|---|---|
| Total cost of the *Niobe* to 31 August 1911 | $1,134,830.23 |
| Total cost of the *Rainbow* | $263,049.98 |

*Source*: *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CV11, c.1102.

**Table 6.2 Annual Costs of the *Niobe* and *Rainbow***

| | |
|---|---|
| *Niobe* – Upkeep and maintenance | $373,183.63 |
| *Niobe* – Special expenditure for stranding | $145,705.20 |
| *Niobe* – Total | $518,888.83 |
| *Rainbow* – Upkeep and maintenance | $163,472.01 |
| *Rainbow* – Special expenditure for armament | $102,118.18 |
| *Rainbow* – Total | $265,590.19 |
| Total Annual Cost, *Niobe* and *Rainbow* | $784,479.02 |

*Source*: *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CV11, c.1102.

introduced the costs of the *Niobe* and *Rainbow* describing them as '… these two magnificent relics of the statesmanship of our Hon. friends on the other side …'[37]

Although Tables 6.1 and 6.2 do not seem to be large sums of money, particularly compared with the amounts being asked for Dreadnoughts, the point being made was that they had been a waste of money. The argument derived from the above statistics as presented by Pelletier was that the proposals by the Government in office for three Dreadnoughts were value for money in comparison with the policy initiated by the previous Liberal Government. The policies of both Governments did not make for easy comparison, particularly because the Laurier Government had also anticipated maintaining six destroyers, six cruisers and a naval training college.

Eventually, a Member of Parliament, Liberal party member, David Arthur Lafortune (constituency of Montcalm, Quebec) suggested the money might be better spent elsewhere, entirely away from defence; for example, for farming, cheese or butter factories, canals or irrigation.[38] The opportunity cost comparisons could have been nearly endless and the point was perhaps obvious in a period where government budgets were often expected to be balanced. A fairly straightforward point was being made that Government expenditure could have been directed elsewhere.

For the Liberals, the British panic over naval estimates put forward in 1909 was believed to have passed. They were happy to argue that the British Government, including Churchill, appeared to have a naval programme that had things under control. The Liberals were keen to suggest that there were no crises that required emergency aid. Further, as Henri Sévérin Béland (a previous Liberal Minister of Marine and Fisheries) stated a view that the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey was associated with: 'The status of Canada is that of a sister nation and not that of a daughter nation.'[39]

In foreign policy matters, particularly with prominent issues of national security it can sometimes be assumed that important and sensitive information has had to be withheld, and a number of MPs were happy to accept this. In the prearranged defence of the Canadian Conservative Government there was the 'secret memorandum' (Appendix A.1) that was not presented to Parliament. Some MPs were happy to assume that the Government would not have made such a request for emergency aid without that case having been surrounded in London with confidential information. Herbert Brown Ames (constituency of Montreal, St Antoine) was to say exactly this on 17 December 1912. In a rather considerable act of faith, he suggested that given the responsible nature of the Canadian representatives that had travelled to London, they must have information of a 'grave character' that needed to be acted upon.[40] This rather serves as good example of the problem that besets democratic legislatures making decisions based on confidential information held by the executive. In the making of decisions relating to foreign and defence policies this executive-legislature dilemma over the use of confidential information relating to national security matters recurs in legislatures throughout the world.

Although the debate would have contributions from a Mr Cruise and a Mr Power perhaps the most appropriately or inappropriately named contribution came from a Mr German. William Manley German (constituency of Welland, Ontario) took a contradictory view to the Government believing the Canadian Government's policy to be based on sentiment: 'It is simply, and solely, and only sentimental – nothing else but pure sentiment.'[41] In consideration of this view he suggested there was no evidence to support the Government position and in defence of this view he suggested that Great Britain's relations with Germany were in fact good. He quoted from Sir Edward Grey, Prime Minister Asquith and Mr Bonar Law from the previous July in the British Parliament. They either said nice things about Germany,

suggesting amity and friendliness between the two nations or denied there was a danger from Germany.[42]

Intriguingly, Winston Churchill was evoked for both sides of the debate and Mr German put him on the metaphorical 'witness stand' on behalf of the view that Great Britain did not require money for ships. This was because Churchill had said about naval estimates on 18 March 1912 in the British House of Commons that Great Britain possessed enough Dreadnoughts according to their own two-Power standard and if all the Dreadnoughts of the world were sunk at once Britain would still have naval superiority. Churchill also did not believe that Great Britain had to match Germany in a two keels to one standard, that he suggested was not necessary.[43] Mr German's conclusion from this was that Britain did not need further ships, and equally important he believed Churchill had said they were not wanted. In the same speech, Churchill had continued in another major point:

> … it is wrong and wasteful to build a single ship for the navy before it is wanted … What I might venture to call the 'more the merrier argument' is as detrimental to efficiency as to economy. The only safe rule which the British Admiralty can follow is to maintain the minimum consistent with full security.[44]

Again, the rather particular conclusion drawn by Mr German about the three Dreadnoughts, was that Churchill did not want them. This is a selective use of evidence and takes the brief comments made out of the broader context of the speech, but it made for interesting observations. From Churchill's words he could further suggest that the Canadian Government was burdening Great Britain with the 'dead weight of increasing maintenance charges', because Churchill had said that Germany had yet to experience the great difficulties of high maintenance costs in looking after such a considerable fleet. Yes, the German Navy had a lot of expensive new ships, but as these got older, keeping them in good order could also prove expensive.[45] This was a clever use of Churchill's comments since he was the person who recommended the plan for a Canadian financial contribution for three ships.

Within the Canadian House of Commons an interesting debate also developed over what would be the possibility of protecting Canada should Britain be defeated by a European Power or Powers. This did not entirely help crystallize the debate because it was suggested that on the one hand Great Britain needed help to prevent such a defeat, and

on the other hand Canada needed more of its own protection should this happen. Mr Pelletier tried to draw the issue to a rational conclusion, but only muddied the waters. Pelletier believed that the logical conclusion to be drawn from a German victory over Great Britain in the North Sea was that Canada would then need a navy of a large enough size to defeat a naval Power that had just defeated the Royal Navy.[46] No MPs had been previously suggesting this and the prospect of future defeat had not been entertained. What position either victor or vanquished nations would be in after a major conflict was not evaluated.

Foster produced an eloquent defence of Government policy on 18 December 1912 and parried the idea of a hybrid policy and accusations of Tory jingoism. He reflected the Government position that they could not reveal all the Admiralty views that they had been provided with and denied the suggestion, even if it had not been made, that the Admiralty memorandum (Appendix A.3) that had been tabled was 'made to order'. Clearly, the preamble to the document stated it was an invitation of the Dominion of Canada to have a statement on naval defence for the Canadian Parliament, but Borden had gone further in looking for an 'unanswerable case' from Churchill and correcting an early draft. Although a fine distinction might exist here, this did not stop Foster saying that Laurier knew that a British Government would not on the orders of a Dominion Government prepare a memorandum for that Government's political opportunity.[47] This is a thorny issue of whether or not national Governments intervene in the party politics of another nation state. Churchill was careful not to be party political in his statements, but the British Government was clearly supporting a policy they wanted implemented by the Conservative Canadian Government. The 'public memorandum' and the 'secret memorandum' had both been prepared to help Borden deliver a specific policy. As politics is concerned with how decisions are made, why decisions are made and where decisions are made, the British Government were clearly involved in the decision-making process.

Two Members of Parliament from the Canadian House of Commons representing two out-of-the-way areas on the shores of the River St Lawrence of the Province of Quebec took it upon themselves to write to Churchill on 20 December 1912. Louis- Philippe Gauthier (constituency of Gaspé, Quebec) a Conservative and Joseph Girard an Independent Conservative (constituency of Chicoutimi and Saguenay, Quebec) were French-Canadians and supporters of Borden's Navy Bill. They had found the 'Memorandum for Publication' delivered in the

Canadian House of Commons (Appendix A.3) to be '… eloquent and conclusive, though very prudent and diplomatic …'.[48] Their worry, however, was that the speeches of Mr German and Mr Oliver had been leading astray French-Canadians and they provided Churchill with a copy of the Canadian *Hansard* with the highlighted passages. Much of this was put before Churchill as if a rather false impression of Churchill's views were being created in Canada.

A three week adjournment for the Christmas holidays did not help the Government, although both sides had time to marshal further arguments in their favour, it was the Opposition and opponents of the Bill that could dwell on the information they had been provided with and research more material for detailed criticism. A season of good will did not emerge in the House of Commons and for some the issue of naval aid was the harbinger of war rather than peace. Hugh Guthrie (constituency of Wellington South, Ontario) concentrated on the tabled memorandum from the Admiralty. Like other speakers, Guthrie assumed that Prime Minister Borden had 'inside' and unrevealed information from the British Government that the Leader of the Opposition did not have. This was not entirely the case since the 'secret memorandum' was also shown to Wilfrid Laurier, but Laurier could not draw upon this and Borden could have more knowledge collected on his trip to Great Britain, but the whole situation seemed slightly unpalatable to Guthrie in that Laurier would have had less than perfect knowledge of the situation. On the nature of the peril facing Britain, Guthrie fell into the camp of disbelievers. His conclusion was that even if the British fleet had 18 Dreadnoughts in 1912 and the rest of Europe 19, given that Britain would not be fighting all of Europe, then Britain did not have a problem of supremacy.[49] He also disliked the fact that the figures for naval armaments were given up to the year 1915 for Great Britain, but extended to 1920 for Germany.

The issue of what exactly the Prime Minister of Canada was asking the Admiralty for in London on his visit was queried by Guthrie. In his view it was not what scheme should Canada undertake, but as point 10, the concluding point of the memorandum stated, it was: '… in what form any immediate aid Canada might give would be most effective,' (Appendix A.3), implying the decision to support a scheme had already been made. The adjournment of Parliament had allowed Guthrie to do his homework and he discovered eight or nine weeks before the London visit of Borden, the speech by Winston Churchill to the annual Shipwrights' Company banquet on 15 May 1912. Yet in this speech there are parts that reappear in the memorandum '*verba-*

*tim et literatim*'.[50] Of course, it might be concluded that the points made by Churchill in one speech served the cause of answering a request for information from Canada, not necessarily that the arguments were prearranged and Churchill already knew what was the best policy for the Dominions and Borden had not prompted this view. Guthrie's conclusion about the best policy for Canada was for it to build its own Dreadnoughts; he could not see why this was not possible.

An interesting topic area that was raised briefly was that of German-Canadians. Some of the public speeches by politicians, including the Minister of Defence was perhaps not unsurprisingly anti-German in tone. Yet, there were Canadians from Germany who were very loyal and nothing more or less than Canadian. This added an interesting dilemma to the debates. Eventually, Guthrie concluded with the issue of a referendum, throwing himself on the side of those in Canada supporting this policy.

Not unlike other Conservatives, William Sora Middlebro (constituency of Grey North, Ontario) managed to make a collection of points: there was an emergency; the $35,000,000 was not part of a permanent contribution; the proposals did not affect Canadian constitutional autonomy; that the memorandum did warrant the providing of three Dreadnoughts; and lastly, Canada would not be best advised to build a separate and independent navy in line with the Naval Service Act of 1910.[51] Also not unlike others he used words of Winston Churchill to support his own case and felt the quotations used from Churchill's speech at the Shipwrights' dinner that took place before a relevant amendment to the German Naval Law passed in 1912 were redundant. This was repeated by others, but shown by Beland (constituency of Beauce, Quebec) to be a problem because *The Times* referred to the new German estimates on 15 March and Churchill made an allusion to the amendments on 18 March and his Shipwrights' speech was on 15 May and thus could be considered relevant because Churchill did appear to know about the new German amendments to their Navy Laws and thus Churchill's words could be relied upon. Churchill by 22 July 1912 was stating in the British House of Commons that he had recognized the existence of an emergency: 'Well do we understand the truth of Mr Borden's words: The day of peril is too late for preparation.'[52]

William M. Pugsley (constituency of the city of St John, New Brunswick) was to enter into this debate in a more general way, by suggesting a number of speakers, including Mr Foster, Minister of Trade

and Commerce, were suggesting that the German people did not desire peace and could not wait to attack Great Britain or the British Empire. He would also not accept that Canada could not build warships and was unimpressed with Churchill's view that the number of light cruisers or oil-tankers that might be built in the future cannot be guaranteed. A clear permanent policy was required, in the view of Pugsley, and he felt this was required for contracts of this sort.

After a two week adjournment, the naval forces debate resumed on 31 January 1913 (resumed from 17 January). The issue of emergency was still being debated alongside the issue of investment in a Canadian Navy. The problem of having tabled the Admiralty memorandum was the ability of Liberal opponents to continually take issue with it, particularly the suggested point within it about the movement of Great Britain to defend its home waters. Emmanuel Berchmans Devlin (constituency of Wright, Quebec) noted:

> I infer from the memorandum that England requires her navy at home, that we are safe for the immediate future on account of combinations which may be made in times of necessity, and that the overseas stations are inadequately protected.[53]

Rather strangely, it was argued that there could not be an emergency because the debate had been delayed a long time. That the House of Commons might have talked itself out of a period of emergency was rather intriguing.

The Independent Conservative, William Findlay Maclean (constituency of York South, Ontario ) felt that the issue of a referendum had been neglected, but he did not want a referendum on this particular matter, considering Members to be 'poltroons' if they were not willing to make the decision themselves.[54] Although not entirely worried about German expansion, the comments exhibited a more racial dimension:

> There may be an issue, not the issue of a German peril, but the issue of a yellow peril, or even whether the white race is to maintain its own on the North American Pacific coast.[55]

Mr Béland did not want Canada involved further in the foreign policy of Great Britain, he thought they were involved enough and should avoid further decision-making arrangements. It was believed that Canadian involvement in European politics could only be consid-

ered 'retrograde'.[56] He warned against the movement of Canada towards an entanglement with British foreign policy, the very carrot that Borden had thought would buy him support from parliamentary colleagues.

The Member of Parliament for Gloucester, New Brunswick, the Liberal party member with the lovely French first name of Onésiphore, his full name being Onésiphore Turgeon, also evoked the image of Canada as the great sister nation of Great Britain, but believed the Prime Minister and Minister of Marine came back from their trip to the Admiralty and British Government in the previous year with no policy. It was a prelude to a permanent policy that implied centralization of the Empire and this sort of centralization ultimately led to the disintegration of empires.[57]

Turgeon became at least the third person to use quotations from the speech by Winston Churchill at the Shipwrights' banquet of 15 May and evoked the points that promoted sister nations from the Empire working together. Turgeon's quotations from Churchill were largely those related to the Dominions, but they were not specific to Canada. The Dominions according to Churchill should have control of their naval forces in periods of peace; once a margin of superiority was achieved in home waters related to Great Britain, squadrons could be sent to support the Dominions as required and in response to threats to their vital interests.[58] This all led to Turgeon's point that the Liberal Government's naval policy should have been carried out by the current Conservative Government in Canada. On 22 July Churchill suggested 'Now Canada has come forward' which suggested to Turgeon that it was only during the trip to England that the Prime Minister and Minister of Marines and Fisheries developed the idea of offering support. Another issue raised by Turgeon, that evoked the name of a significant figure, was the defence of the Pacific from a Canadian point of view. Here, the Premier of the Province of British Columbia, Sir Richard McBride, was mentioned as a defender of the Pacific coast. McBride had been an advocate of a strong Pacific fleet to serve as protection from any potential problem caused by the Japanese or Chinese.[59]

Edward Mortimer Macdonald (constituency of Pictou, Nova Scotia) on 6 February 1913 accused the Prime Minister of going to England with the intention of supporting the British Government and working against any notion of local naval forces in Canada. Although the Liberal party member seemed to think that Borden was also taken in by the shipbuilders of Belfast, Newcastle-on-Tyne and Glasgow it is not

clear what that meant. The views of Macdonald were rather contradictory; on the one hand he believed Churchill was going to give Borden what he wanted, because Churchill knew what Borden wanted, and on the other hand and in contrast to this, Churchill acknowledged uncertainty and a view that Canadian policy towards the defence of the Empire had yet to be formulated.[60] With this context, Macdonald sarcastically added with regard to Borden:

> … he declared in England – whether it was an excess of hospitality that caused his frankness I do not know – that he believed in the proposition that there should be only one navy – no local navies for him.[61]

He also used an excerpt from *H. M. S. Pinafore*, changing a lyric from 'Queen's' to 'King's Navee'. He referred to the Government: 'I can only assume they have taken the admiral's advice in Pinafore: Stick close to your desks and never go to sea, and you all may be rulers of the King's navee.'[62] The change was relevant to the reign of George V (reigned from 1910 to 1936) and encompassed rather poignant criticism, if also a little light-hearted. The comments did appear to reflect Borden's limited naval experience and rather nicely equated with Borden's attempts to influence the British in decision-making and Empire policy.

William Melville Martin (constituency of Regina, Saskatchewan) felt that the important part of the tabled memorandum was a passage dealing with the 'margin of our common safety'; he along with other Members of Parliament felt that British Columbia should be protected from the 'yellow peril'. Further, a past speech of Churchill was used to suggest there was no emergency.[63] All of this had gone before in speeches, but his note of originality was to introduce the proposition that Great Britain had put more fighting power (broadside fire) onto its ships than Germany. His statistics below, showed a clear Dreadnought superiority of Great Britain over Germany and in particular a 71.4 per cent superiority in broadside fire.

With 160 British Dreadnoughts to Germany's 100, this gave Great Britain a fighting power superiority of 87.2 per cent.[64] Clearly, the British fighting potential in Dreadnoughts was far superior to the Germans. Martin could also prove that British finances were in an excellent condition and as the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George stated: 'We have in the last five or six years wiped out more debt than any administration that ever existed in this country.'[65]

**Table 6.3 British and German Dreadnought Strength at the Beginning of 1913**

| | Britain | Germany | British Superiority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completed ships | 22 | 13 | 69.2% |
| Tonnage | 446,950 | 276,760 | 61.5% |
| Broadside Fire – No. of guns | 192 | 112 | 71.4% |
| Weight of fire | Lbs 191,100 | Lbs 96,612 | 97.7% |
| Average broadside per ship | 8,696 | 7,432 | 16.3% |
| Average broadside per 1,000 tons | 427.5 | 348.8 | 22.6% |

*Source*: *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CV111, c.2851.

**Table 6.4 Financial Position of Great Britain, 1911–12**

| | |
|---|---|
| Revenue | £185,000,000 |
| Expenditure | £178,545,000 |
| Surplus | £6,540,000 (Can $ 32,725,000) |
| **National Debt** | |
| 1911 | £733,072,609 |
| 1912 | £718,406 |
| Reduction | £14, 666,181 (Can $73,330,905) |

*Source*: *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CV111, c.2861.

The conclusion of this was that Great Britain had all the money it needed to cover the costs of the British Navy and there was not a desperate or emergency financial position that Canada had to respond to.

Martin's objections to the Bill from the Opposition benches were eight fold: he did not like providing three empty ships for Britain; manning and maintenance costs would affect the British taxpayer; the defence of Canada was shifting too far in being the responsibility of Great Britain; in turn, it was reversing the policy approach of previous Canadian Governments; no permanent policy had been made provision for; shipbuilding in Canada was not being developed as it could be; both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts would not be equally protected; and finally the changes should be put to the Canadian public in some form, for their approval (which would appear to be a referendum or general election). This is another good illustration of how despite the

number of points made, the debates were largely kept relevant to the significant issues related to the Bill.

Hugh Havelock McLean (constituency of Sunbury and Queens, New Brunswick) appeared to think that all coasts of Canada were threatened by a German fleet that could sail anywhere, but he was happy to acknowledge there was a danger zone in the North Sea. On the issue of shipbuilding he appeared to believe that Canada was assuming Germany was undertaking harmless activity:

> … as though Krupp's works, with its thousands of workmen were busy making plough shares and bathing machines; as though the great shipbuilding yards of Germany were engaged in building racing yachts.[66]

Churchill was yet again cited in his worries about Germany because of its war preparedness, with four-fifths of the entire German Navy maintained in full permanent commission.[67] Churchill's speech of 18 March 1912 was also quoted in terms of the British risks of defeat at sea being far greater than Germany or France. Great Britain did not have the kind of armies of Germany or France, as such a defeat at sea could not be contemplated.[68]

For McLean the material issue was not important, but the moral contribution of Canada providing three ships was felt to be prominent. Here, the existence of an emergency was also not important, but duty was. The possible defeat of the Royal Navy, unfortunately described as the 'great white squadron', was seen as meaning Canada would be left defenceless, with threats from Germany, Japan and even 'billions' of Chinese.[69] In contrast to this defenceless position, he believed:

> If Germany hears that Canada is in the fight to stay, and she is building in England three of the finest warships in the world, which will be in the fighting line in the North Sea, it may have a tremendous effect on her future action.[70]

An inflated and rather overblown view of Canada overtook Liberal party member McLean:

> Canada will become the greatest English speaking nation in the world, with the possible exception of the United States. We have room for so many millions of people that we hesitate to fix a limit. England and Scotland could be drowned in one of our great lakes.

> Allied with Great Britain, we will be the most potent power in the world. Australia must ever be on the fringe of a nation; South Africa is burdened by a black problem and lacks our climate and land.[71]

Yet, his point was that other Dominions and colonies, that he was rather dismissive about, had contributed financially to Great Britain. It was the bottom line of Canada contributing nothing that stood out and remained embarrassing.

McLean was given permission of the House of Commons to lay before the House for publication in the Canadian *Hansard*: further statistics on the naval powers of the world; Dreadnoughts in Germany and Great Britain; situation in world Dreadnoughts by October 1912 (see Appendix A.4); naval powers in March 1913 (see Appendix A.5), production of the fastest warships; tonnage of armoured warships and

**Table 6.5 Financial Naval Contributions of the Dominions to Great Britain**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **New Zealand** | Contribution of $200,000 a year from 1902–1907 | $1,000,000 |
| | Contribution of $1,000,000 a year from 1907–1912 | $5,000,000 |
| | Presented the Royal Navy with a battle cruiser and three destroyers | $13,000,000 (estimate) |
| | New Zealand total: | **$19,000,000** |
| **Australia** | Contribution of $1,000,000 a year from 1902–1912 | $10,000,000 |
| | Building a fleet unit | $20,000,000 (estimate) |
| | Australia total: | **$30,000,000** |
| **South Africa** | Contribution of $425,000 a year from 1902–1912 | **$4,250,000** |
| **Newfoundland** | Contribution of $16,000 to $24,000 a year from 1902–1912 | **$200,000** (estimate) |
| **India** | Maintenance of warships in Indian waters – $500,000 for ten years | $5,000,000 |
| | Other naval vessels – $330,000 for ten years | $3,300,000 |
| | India total: | **$8,300,000** |
| **Canada** | Nil | **Nil** |

*Source*: *Debates of the House of Commons of Canada*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CV111, c. 2917.

personnel numbers.[72] The British Empire was still the dominant power in terms of the number of Dreadnoughts projected for 1915, but Appendix A.4 shows that alongside the increasing numbers in commission for Germany were increased numbers for the United States and France, and impressive production programmes for Russia, Japan and Italy. The international system as reflected in 'The World's Dreadnoughts' was becoming more complicated than just that of an Anglo-German naval rivalry. Further, the diversity of types of ships being produced by the major powers, evident in Appendix A.5, made British strategic thinking about naval matters a complicated qualitative process as well as a quantitative process.

Much repetition was evident in the speeches until the motion was put to the House of Commons for a second reading. A second reading was passed on the session beginning on 27 February 1913, but was not adjourned until 2 am on Friday 28 February. These were to prove to be just the opening salvos in the long debate.

# 7

# The Naval Aid Bill Reaches Closure in the House of Commons




*Illustration 7.1* Two statesmen (background) arguing whether or not they shall contribute Dreadnoughts to Britain or build a Canadian navy
*Caption*: 'Invading General: "What are those two men doing up there by those Parliament Building ruins?"
Officer: "Two statesmen, General, arguing whether they shall contribute Dreadnoughts to Britain or build a Canadian Navy."'
*Source*: Newton McConnell collection, reference C 301, item 568, Archives of Ontario, Canada.[1]

The Naval Aid Bill moved for discussion into a committee of the whole House of Commons and caused much anger and bitterness within the Canadian Parliament. Robert Borden and Wilfrid Laurier disagreed over what exactly should be discussed at this stage of the Bill, Borden felt the details of the clauses should only be dealt with. Issues of finance

were scrutinized further and the majority of the debates were repetition of what had gone before, something that Borden was trying to avoid. Michael Clark, the Liberal party member of Red Deer, made thirteen arguments against the Bill on 4 March 1913. His anti-militarism took the approach of accusations against what might now be described as 'masters of war'. It was his eighth reason for opposing the legislation that took up the line of argument:

> Who are asking for the armaments in Germany, in Great Britain, in France? It is not the farmers, the scientists, the workmen, the religious leaders, the musicians or the business men. It is the men who live by fighting, who love the frills of the thing, the wearing of peacock feathers after they have grown to be men, and the people who make money by selling arms.[2]

This was an unusual line of argument for its time, out of step with the normal male jingoism that accompanied debates on defence and matters of war. His thirteenth point was a little premature, but he warned that future wars could be the wars of airships. He believed that these scientific advances might end wars because the people who make wars could be directly shelled – an over optimistic view of the future, but an interesting view of deterrence.

Optimism appeared to be in the air and the Opposition within the House of Commons were taken by reports that Britain and Germany might be avoiding naval competition and approaching accommodation. The argument that was also advanced was that the development of 'Colonial' Dreadnoughts could be causing a problem. George William Kyte (constituency of Richmond, Nova Scotia) cited an article in the *Ottawa Citizen*, taken from the *London Daily News and Leader* asking 'Is Naval Emergency Over?'[3]

The gist of the article that was read out was that the Governments of Germany and Britain would be involved in extreme stupidity if they did not attempt to work together and achieve better Anglo-German relations. Admiral von Tirpitz captured in speeches in Germany that the British Government and Churchill in particular were trying to usurp the stated ratio for the British and German fleets of sixteen to ten. Tirpitz had suggested that he had no objection to this ratio. The repeated newspaper interpretation of this was that Germany was not disputing British domination of the sea and that the Germany Navy were happy with the implications of the ratio for their own self-defence. The analysis was developed further:

> There is only one real difficulty – that created by the Colonial dreadnoughts … If the Colonial dreadnoughts are direct additions to the British fleet, available and used for precisely the same purpose as ships built out of British money then we can hardly dispute the justice of Germany treating them as raising the ratio beyond 16 to 10.[4]

That newspapers had hit upon this situation tends to set back Churchill's early rationale for these naval developments that the ships supplied by Canada would not factor into the ratio of battleships that existed between Germany and Britain.

William Frederic Kay (constituency of Missisquoi, Quebec) presented seven objections to the Naval Aid Bill. These can be summarized to the effect that: good Anglo-German relations existed and an anti-German naval strategy was not required; Great Britain still enjoyed superior sea power in the North Sea and did not need reinforcements; a superiority of British naval strength would be assured until at least 1916; the British Government had produced naval estimates that, without a Canadian contribution, were designed to protect Britain's national interests; the additional expansion suggested would be counter-productive; 'haste would effectively bring about waste'; and finally, that there was no alarm or emergency that needed an immediate response.[5]

Discussions never seemed to get very far in the Canadian House of Commons before the words of Winston Churchill were being used to support a side of the debate and as had already been seen utilized separately to support both sides of the Naval Aid Bill debate. Levi Thomson (constituency of Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan) was happy to use Churchill's May Shipwrights' dinner speech to support the Liberal party side of the House and suggest Churchill's views were the opposite of Conservative policy. Although a number of paragraphs were quoted, the crucial point made by Churchill that was laboured by Thomson was that whatever naval forces were brought into existence by the Canadian Government, in peace time they would most certainly be controlled by the Canadians and in periods of war would operate in theatres beyond the home waters of Great Britain and by implication most likely be closer to Canada.[6] This might have suited either side but the implication being drawn was that Canada should protect its own coasts. A Liberal who had spoken at length before, Hugh Guthrie was also to make the point that although elements of Churchill's speech appeared in the Admiralty memorandum that Borden presented to Parliament, the part relating to the self-governing dominions protecting themselves was omitted.

Robert Borden's forays into the debates were largely to clarify previous statements, but like others on both sides of the House of Commons, Churchill figured prominently in the defence of his policy. In entering the fray on 10 March 1913, he wanted to make it clear that he had sought and received advice from the First Lord of the Admiralty. Borden read out an abbreviated version of a letter he sent to Churchill on 18 December 1912. Borden left out much of the letter including the following introduction and conclusion.

Introduction:

> As anticipated, there is an attempt to question and attack the policy of the Government in providing for the construction of the proposed battle-ships in the United Kingdom, and the contention is made that they could be built expeditiously in Canada, although at increased cost.[7]

And the conclusion:

> It does not appear that the counter proposals of our friends on the other side of the House are taken very seriously in the country. However, it is probable that they will continue the debate for a considerable time in January and February.[8]

The rest of the Borden's brief letter was a request for information on the costs of attempting first time production of battleships. Whether or not the lengthy replies of Churchill to Borden (of 23 and 24 January), that were read to the House of Commons, helped matters, could be considered rather debatable.[9] Clearly, Borden had underestimated the length of the debates in the House of Commons and with the introduction of the Churchill correspondence he further struggled to truncate the discussions.

On agreeing to the publication of the two letters, Churchill amended some of the language, but was at pains to make sure 'We must support him [Borden] & tell the truth.'[10] The First Lord was particularly concerned about protecting the Admiralty from any accusation that they were interfering in Canadian political decisions, particularly as related to the Canadian Parliament. The request to publish these letters had to clearly come as a product of requests from the Canadian Prime Minister.

What was presented to the Canadian Parliament was Churchill's analysis of the problem of setting up advanced shipbuilding in Canada,

and this was fairly detailed. In general, the number of qualified specialist riveters for building battleships could be difficult to find. Further, heavy plant, furnaces and rolling mills would be necessary and they also required specialist staff, particularly for:

> … the manufacture of guns, plant consisting of heavy lathes, boring and trepanning machines, wire winding machines, as well as a heavy forging plant, and oil-tempering baths with heavy cranes, all capable of dealing with weights up to and over 100 tons are required. The men for this class of work are specially trained, and could not be obtained in Canada. For the manufacture of gun mountings, which involves the use of castings of irregular shape from 80 to 100 tons and which require special armour treatment, a special armour plate plant is required.[11]

Churchill's view was that even shipbuilding works in Great Britain found it difficult to produce such specialized operations. Engine manufacture was somewhat easier, but prone to developmental changes. Elswick shipyard, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, had taken over two years to prepare for shipbuilding. Austria-Hungary provided a good example of this protracted problem; despite planning a plant at Fiume in 1909, laying down two ships in 1911, the ships still had a completion date of July 1914. The example of Japan was also an interesting one in that it had taken nearly 20 years for Japan to build up their shipbuilding industry and it often took them three years to deliver a battleship from start to finish. Even with this substantial investment, Japan still ordered ships to be built in Great Britain.[12] Churchill's conclusion was that it would be inadvisable for Canada to undertake major shipbuilding at this moment in time, the cost of creating the plant could be $15,000,000 and take four years.

**Table 7.1 Cost of Creating a Shipbuilding Plant**

| | |
|---|---|
| Shipyards | £2,000,000 |
| Gun factories | £3,000,000 |
| Gun mounting factories | £3,000,000 |
| Steel works | £3,000,000 |
| Engine factories | £2,000,000 |
| Armour plate factories | £2,000,000 |
| Total | £15,000,000[13] |

*Source*: ADM 116/3485, NA.

The second letter of 24 January was also lengthy and read by Borden to the House of Commons. Churchill was convinced that his previous letter made it very clear that it was impractical to build capital ships in Canada. Churchill in his second letter concluded with the expressed hope that it would not be necessary to use his letter, but Borden sought permission to do exactly that. He had previously selected two paragraphs from the letter, before he presented the full account to Parliament on 10 March 1913. Churchill and Borden endeavoured to prove that the costs (both first costs of building, then manning and maintaining) of a small fleet of one battle cruiser, three 'town' cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines were prohibitive. Churchill had been kept informed about the debates in the Canadian House of Commons and also responded to the point that rates of pay in the Canadian Navy (taking figures from the *Rainbow* and *Niobe*) were much higher than in the Imperial Navy, estimated at being approximately two-thirds higher. Churchill put the estimated initial 'first' cost at January 1913 of $25,109,078 and the annual maintenance costs at $2,829,655.[14] These figures did not include depreciation or rather ominously a sinking fund.

These communications from Winston Churchill did not have quite the effect that Borden had intended and Opposition member John Gillanders Turriff (constituency of Assiniboia, Saskatchewan) was quick to claim this was a determined effort to stop Canada having its own navy and Churchill and Borden were merely doing each other favours.[15] Other MPs seemed to find Churchill's remarks insulting, Liberals, Frank Broadstreet Carvell (constituency of Carleton, New Brunswick) and Rodolphe Lemieux (constituency of Rouville, Quebec) double teamed to express their revulsion of some of Churchill's remarks. The first retort was by Carvell and he claimed that Churchill had said that Canadians had not the brains to build ships. A sarcastic addition and support to his colleague by Lemieux was that Canada clearly had brains enough to send the money to England.[16] Hostile to the content of Churchill's letters, Carvell warmed to the idea that Churchill was duped into these views and was merely repeating what he had been told by the Canadian representatives of the Government that went to Great Britain the previous summer. There is no evidence of this, but it is suggested that Churchill had been told that Canadians should not be put onboard ships or made targets by the Germans.[17] The suggestion was that Borden and his colleagues had slandered Canada and Churchill was just repeating this, although he had not actually said this either.

The next day George William Kyte (constituency of Richmond, Nova Scotia) was drawing differences between the present case put by Churchill against his views in Glasgow at the Shipwrights' dinner where Churchill argued for naval development in the Dominions for a true protection of the British Empire. Edward Mortimer Macdonald (Pictou, Nova Scotia) was more scathing towards Churchill's argument that rates of pay for the Canadian navy would have to be considerably in excess of British rates of pay and very competitive with wages in Canada, producing the view that these opinions: '… only show the gross ignorance and egotism of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who does not know what he is talking about'.[18]

It always appears mischievous when an MP starts a speech with praise of his victim, and David Bradley Neely (constituency of Humboldt, Saskatchewan) was exactly doing this when he considered that Churchill needed to be given 'deference and respect'.[19] This, of course, was the prelude to Neely accepting the views of Mr Turriff proclaiming disparagingly:

> … when the Prime Minister reads a statement from Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, first lord of anything, or first lord of anywhere, deprecating the ability of Canadians to help themselves, to look after the defence of their own coasts and denying them the same spirit and genius as that possessed by British peoples the world over …[20]

Still on 11 March, the offence caused by the views of Churchill that had been presented was brimming over. Emmerson believed Churchill had been saying that Canada cannot build battleships because it never has built battleships. Although the premise of Churchill's argument might sound logical, the point was taken to a more extreme level: 'In other words, a boy should be warned not to learn his alphabet because he cannot read … He [Churchill] seems to think that "Canadian" is a synonym of "Colonist".'[21] Even acknowledging Churchill's reputation as a great British statesman, Emmerson found Churchill's approach to be an insult, even a gratuitous insult and an impertinence to Canada. It was a humiliation Emmerson could almost not endure.[22]

As the historian Donald Gordon suggested, it seemed at times in the Canadian House of Commons that the Conservative party naval programme seemed less under attack than Winston Churchill himself.[23] The Prime Minister of Canada became worried that reports to and

subsequently in the British press about Liberal party criticism of Churchill's letters of 23 and 24 January 1913 may have reached Churchill. On 23 March, Borden telegraphed Churchill to play down the criticism in the Canadian House of Commons. He reported with a degree of understatement that really no major criticism had been made of Churchill and that it was only '… two or three men of minor importance in the House of Commons whose opinions count for little and who will probably disappear from public life after the next general election'.[24] As has been seen, seven MPs criticized Churchill's letters rather strongly, not the two or three mentioned by Borden. Due to the First World War, the 12th Parliament proved to be the longest in Canada and the next general election was not held until 1917, but three of the seven MPs (Turriff, Carvell and Lemieux) were re-elected for the 13th Parliament.

The *Ottawa Free Press* was to attack the letters from Churchill to Borden that were made public via the House of Commons. They wrote that it was surprising that the Canadian Government and Downing Street might share information and discussions in the future since Churchill exhibited such 'amazing ignorance' of Canadians. The Dreadnought programme that might require Canada working closely with the British Government was abounding with difficulties.[25] Readers were reminded that Churchill paid a visit to Canada after the Boer War, suggesting that the Canadian public had not warmed to Churchill and his reception might have been hostile if he had come in the summer of 1912 to lecture Canadians on Empire.

Over the Canadian border, the *Minneapolis Journal* on 31 March 1913 had a very reasonable perspective on the naval issue: it captured Borden's rather definitive choice of funding the building of three battleships to support Britain, and Laurier's vaguer solution of a Canadian Navy more associated with the defence of home waters.[26] However, the newspaper addressed the issue of what it might mean for Britain not to count battleships from the colonies and concluded that the Admiralty would favour the Laurier position. If Great Britain and Germany accepted a ratio of 16 to 10 Dreadnoughts, then the Admiralty would want a clear and separate Canadian Navy, but Churchill had assumed that he could keep a Canadian contribution separate from British ships and continued to favour the policy he had created with Borden. The *Minneapolis Journal* captured the dilemmas for Borden since he had to persist in a policy that was looking to be politically disadvantaged.

The only Labour party member sitting in Parliament was Alphonse Verville (constituency of Maisonneuve, Quebec), and from 1908 the

Liberal party did not run a candidate against him and he could be seen as a 'Liberal-Labour' Member of Parliament. His background of having been a plumber and trade unionist gave him an interesting perspective on issues before Parliament. On his third contribution to the naval debate on 14 March 1913 he felt that the electorate should be directly consulted about naval policy and made an astonishing seventeen objections to the Bill. These objections in a general summary were that: the Bill would effectively transform the economic policy of Canada; the Bill would result in Canada giving jurisdiction of some industries to Great Britain; it did not help the prosperity of the 'means of transportation' in Canada; it would have the effect of restricting immigration; it would help financial interests in Great Britain that might not be in the interests of the Canadian population; that 60 per cent of the Canadian population are farmers, and their livelihoods would suffer; the workingmen of Great Britain opposed the extra burdens put upon them; the electorate in Canada did not want the policy being delivered in this Bill; opposition to this Bill in Canada was particularly strong from the working classes; it did not serve the interests of financial institutions, retailers and wholesalers in Canada; natural resources in Canada would suffer; coast protection policy in Canada would be weakened; the cost of living in Canada would rise; it was a move towards imperial federation; if a 'yellow peril' existed, the policy inherent to the Bill did not protect the Pacific coast of Canada; it would mean a tax of five dollars per head in Canada; and finally, proper representation had not been made in the Canadian House of Commons.[27] It was a lengthy exposition and an extensive list by Verville and he was attempting to evoke what he believed were the attitudes of the 'masses' in Canada. He was also trying to claim on more dubious ground that working people in Great Britain would not want the burden of building three more ships. Most MPs had proffered the alternative view that the Canadian Government were merely proposing a policy that helped British workingmen.[28] Also, the exact circumstances of a future tax burden for Canadians was not established by Verville, so it was difficult to confirm or reject his conclusions. Taxes had not been a significant issue for other MPs. The speech was more a delivery recognizing faith rather than evidence, but then Verville saw himself as representing working class people, and he was rather a lone voice in the Canadian Parliament that expressed this kind of view.

By 12 March 1913 and by the time Alexander William Chisholm a Liberal (constituency of Inverness, Nova Scotia) spoke during the

committee stage of the whole House of Commons, the debates over the Naval Aid Bill had been taking place for 170 hours. In his *Memoirs* Borden recounts the strain on members of the House of Commons and that many appeared to lose 'self-control'. The House was meeting on Saturdays and the Deputy Speaker had to retire and be replaced because of exhaustion; the scene being '… the most strenuous and remarkable that had ever occurred in Canadian Parliamentary history'.[29] The only relief for MPs occurred with the Easter break from 19 to 25 March. Also, to the credit of MPs, and as has been shown, the debates were kept relevant and Members did not give the impression of wasting time with completely irrelevant comments, a high degree of personal commitment was put into the speeches. However, the Liberal party made no attempt to hide the fact that it was obstructing the Bill to the best of its ability. Oscar Skelton summarized the process as amendments were voted down and naval figures from 'Noah to Nelson' were mentioned.[30]

Robert Borden admitted in his *Memoirs* that on 2 March 1913 he discussed with other colleagues the possibility of having to introduce closure.[31] Closure is the parliamentary mechanism by which parliamentary debate is brought to a close so that a division can take place on a Bill. It was a controversial issue at this time because the rules allowing for closure in the House of Commons had not been applied previously. The exact and complicated rules that existed for the mechanism of closure to be applied were:

> 17. When two or more Members rise to speak, Mr. Speaker calls upon the Members who first rose in his place; but a motion may be made that any Member who has risen "be now heard", or "do now speak", which motion shall be forthwith put without debate.
> 44. The previous question, until it is decided, shall preclude all amendment of the main question, and shall be in the following words, "That this question be now put". If the previous question be resolved in the affirmative, the original question is to be put forthwith without any amendment or debate.[32]

The debates or speeches would continue, but the delaying tactics of the Opposition annoyed the Government to the extent that they would employ the 'new' tactic of closure. Wilfrid Laurier would not commit himself to a time limit on the debates over the Bill, so Borden felt he had no choice but to introduce closure. Given that it had not been introduced before, the Conservatives were not entirely sure how to deliver it, worried that the Liberal party might, if forewarned, be able

to introduce numerous amendments and technical questions about the rules of the House of Commons. What Borden was to follow was 'Rule 17' and Gilbert Tucker summarized the events after Borden introduced the motion for closure, and Laurier and Hazen stood up together, with Laurier actually recognized by the Speaker:

> Thereupon a Conservative Member moved under Rule 17 that the Minister of Marine and Fisheries 'be now heard', and the Speaker put the motion which was agreed to by 105 to 67. Hazen then moved the previous question. Although the end of this extraordinary debate was more than a month away, it was now in sight. On April 23 both Hazen's and Borden's motions were passed, each by 108 to 73. The debate was resumed on May 6; on May 9 closure was introduced; the bill went through committee next day …[33]

On Saturday 10 May the Naval Aid Bill was passed through 'Committee' and its third reading on 15 May 1913 by a majority of 101 to 68 (Appendix A.6). There had been very heated scenes of bad temper in the House of Commons towards the end of the Bill's consideration, but the end did arrive.

As the debates in the Canadian House of Commons were approaching closure, Churchill was thinking about how he might form an 'Imperial Squadron' and the presentation of this in his naval estimates. In writing to Borden on 19 March 1913, Churchill proposed that the three 'Canadian' Dreadnoughts would be put alongside the *Malaya* and the *New Zealand* and form a five ship squadron to be called the 'Imperial Squadron'.[34] He would base the squadron in Gibraltar and this would be only five days from Halifax, Nova Scotia and six from Quebec.[35] He promised Borden with a large amount of ambiguity that Canada would be brought into consultation 'on all movements not dominated by military considerations'.[36] What would not be a military consideration for a Dreadnought could be considered unclear, but Borden was happy to telegraph back his support for a 'great Imperial cruising squadron'.[37] Borden also had in mind significant developments in Canadian defence, including; dry docks that would have a commercial and military use; naval bases and fortified harbours; repair plants for shipbuilding; naval colleges and training ships; subsidized merchant ships with guns; and the addition of new vessels for the fisheries protection service.[38] This was quite a programme for a Prime Minister who had been hesitant on committing to a new permanent naval policy.

The long debate in the House of Commons had exposed the Conservative Government and Borden in particular to accusations of shifting attitudes towards a Canadian Navy over a previous three year period. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration was when Michael Clark (constituency of Red Deer, Alberta) suggested the Conservative policy had undergone a number of changes at the Prime Minister's whim and managed to liken the Prime Minister to the tragic figure of Hamlet. It was suggested that Borden was getting servile support from his Conservative party members for what had been a naval policy that had been subject to considerable change. Borden was Hamlet and the Conservative party members Polonius. Although Hamlet was going insane he had the skill to recognize the servile support of the Lord Chamberlain, Polonius.

Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?
Polonius: By the mass and 'tis like a camel indeed.
Hamlet: Methinks it is like a weasel.
Polonius: It is back'd like a weasel.
Hamlet: Or, like a whale.
Polonius: Very like a whale.[39]

# 8

# Rejection by the Canadian Senate, 1913




*Illustration 8.1* Senate rejection of Naval Aid Bill
*Caption*: 'Three Party cheers and a tiger in preference to three Dreadnoughts and the British lion.' [The reference to a 'tiger' derives from previous Canadian cartoons of 1911 that saw reciprocity with the United States as being the 'tiger cub' of annexation of Canada by the United States. By implication the McConnell cartoon was illustrating the Liberal party policy as having chosen annexation of Canada by the United States over a naval policy with Great Britain.]
*Source*: Newton McConnell Collection, reference C 301, item 3119, Archives of Ontario, Canada.[1]

The Upper House of Canada, the Senate, had its own role in the process of parliamentary decision-making for Canada and its structures and procedures were neither exactly the same as the House of Lords in Great Britain or the Senate in the USA. In 1913, the Conservative party

had a minority of seats in the Canadian Senate due to the fact that Senators were appointed for life and chosen by the political party in government at the time. The long tenure for Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal Government of fifteen years meant the Senate was dominated by Liberal party supporters. Oscar Douglas Skelton in his biography of Laurier, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, posits the view that this Liberal advantage did not dramatically reduce the optimism of the Conservative Government over the Naval Aid Bill.[2] Skelton suggests the Conservatives believed the Senate would avoid being reckless and anti-imperialist and 'unpatriotic'.[3]

Although the Senate did not normally discuss matters before the Canadian House of Commons that were reported in *Hansard* in a current session, similar matters often appeared in newspapers and these occasionally became part of Senate discussions. Even when this was accepted by the Speaker in the Senate, the representatives of the Government in the Senate often declined to respond and there was no immediate debate on the topic. Although private discussions and correspondence would take place, the Naval Aid Bill largely went without discussion in the Senate until it was formally introduced as a Bill for their consideration.

Senator from Alberta and Minister without portfolio in the Borden Government, James Alexander Lougheed (Calgary), Government Leader in the Senate, introduced the Bill in the Senate towards the end of the session on 20 May 1913 – 'Bill (21), An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire'.[4] On 26 May Lougheed moved the second reading of the Bill, giving his own potted history of Canadian naval history of recent years and the memorandum from the British Admiralty dated 25 October 1912, that had been presented to the Canadian House of Commons (Appendix A.3). Lougheed, in an impressive performance, lasting nearly three hours, reviewed Canadian naval policy, but also emphasized the emergency nature of the aid requested within the Bill. He was aware that opponents of the Bill did not consider there was an emergency, and this was despite the view of the Admiralty, the British Government and the British press. He felt it would be very difficult to satisfy those that did not believe in an emergency:

> … they would require rival fleets to be in the line of battle, they would want to hear the booming of the guns, the tearing noise of shot and shell, the swish of the torpedo, the crash of colliding ships and the agonized cry of the wounded. Nothing less would satisfy the carping critics of an emergency.[5]

Lougheed evoked the importance of Great Britain to overall Canadian defence and the pressing issues of security from Germany, Italy and Austria, but he also suggested a high degree of responsibility for imperial defence should fall to Canada. This policy was presented as important for Canada's national self-respect and as an issue that might determine the destiny of Canada.[6] The logic of his argument, led to his opinion that if Canada did not support Great Britain then it would need to stand alone in its defence in the future. Canada would in turn lose the protection and defence by the British Empire.

The Senator did not shy away from the issue and position that the Government had adopted that suggested battleships could not be built in Canada in any reasonable time. Some Members in the House of Commons had found this a contentious and insulting point, but it did not stop its repetition. It was suggested again that Canada did not have the right size of docks, the foundries or the ancillary manufacturing industries to support such an endeavour. Eight million Canadians, it was argued by Lougheed, could not accomplish this.[7] Whether wisely or not he also referred to the two letters from Winston Churchill of the 23 and 24 January 1913 that enclosed financial information (first cost and annual costs of maintaining two fleet units) requested by Borden. These financial comparisons concerning the price of producing two fleet units in Britain and Canada (in Canadian dollars) illustrated that the Canadian cost would be 40 per cent higher than the British cost. All in all, Churchill made it sound like the production of battleships was outside the capabilities of Canada. What was becoming difficult for the Conservatives to sell to Parliament was that their emergency aid programme did not preclude a more permanent policy. However, Winston Churchill's stated views as mentioned in the Canadian House of Commons and Senate appeared, whether inadvertently or not, to be putting forward arguments against the notion of Canada producing battleships in the near future.

Lougheed's Opposition number, Sir George Ross (Middlesex, Ontario), a previous Ontario Premier, led the Senate debates for the Liberals. Although Ross made some eloquent contributions, he was seriously unwell at the time of the presentation of the Bill and died less than a year later in March 1914. He was a known imperialist, had been in private communication with Lougheed and thought he would be able to deliver the support of Liberal Senators for the Bill if there was a compromise. Robert Borden made much of this in his *Memoirs*, giving the impression that compromise had been clearly possible. Senator Ross spoke personally with Senator Lougheed before the Bill came

before the Senate, and also put his proposals to Lougheed in a letter addressed from Toronto on 20 April 1913:

> My dear Senator: Confidential
>
> Reverting to our conversation yesterday the Navy Bill presents itself to my mind as follows:
>
> (1) A contribution to increase the strength of the British navy while indirectly an advantage to Canada is not in my opinion sufficiently comprehensive to warrant the support of the Senate. I have no objection *per se* to a contribution nor to an amount proposed, but to strengthen the Imperial navy, that shows no sign of weakness, without any expenditure or proposed expenditure near or remote, for a Canadian navy is one-sided, incomplete and un-Canadian.
>
> (2) A contribution pure and simple exhausts all the Canadian sentiment it contains the moment the Bill is passed, whereas a comprehensive scheme for the development of a Canadian navy would make a fresh appeal to the people of Canada in every annual estimate taken for its maintenance, in every ship-yard built for its construction and in every ship launched for national defence. The Navy Bill is a half-measure with the more important half being omitted.
>
> The dangers I see in passing the Bill as it now stands are as follows:
>
> (1) It invites Canadians to lean upon the Imperial Government for defence instead of providing for their own defence. This is not the way to make a strong nation and is contrary to all the processes of development which have characterized Canada since Confederation.
>
> (2) It establishes a cleavage in the public mind on a question on which there should be the utmost unanimity. I do not simply mean the political cleavage which in a question of this kind is bad enough and should be avoided if possible, but I mean that sentimental cleavage which exalts British protection as against Canadian self-reliance, the outcome of which will be that a Canadian spirit will grow up to assert its entire independence of imperial support and thus weaken imperial connection.
>
> (3) A cleavage as between a contribution and a Canadian navy may arouse an anti-navy sentiment in regard to both policies which might work infinite mischief in the development of national character …
>
> Yours truly.
> (Sgd.) George W. Ross.[8]

What George Ross believed should be undertaken was to put forward, at the next Parliamentary session in the House of Commons, both a Canadian contribution to the Admiralty at the existing amount of $35 million, but also support for a Canadian Navy to the sum of $20 million for shipyards and production costs so that a Canadian fleet could be established. Further amounts of money would be provided on a year to year basis. He believed this was the only way to win support in the Senate.

Of course, Borden was aware that for this to be an official Liberal party proposal, it had to carry the support of Wilfrid Laurier. This Laurier was unprepared to do and Ross's proposals floundered. The Liberals in the Senate were to follow their counterparts in the House of Commons. The closure of debate in the House of Commons, the attack on Laurier's Naval Act of 1910 had offended a number of Liberals in the Senate. Coupled with Laurier's influence, the Naval Aid Bill was subsequently discussed under an amendment presented by Ross at the second reading of 28 May 1913:

> That all words after the first word 'that' be struck out and the following inserted: That this House is not justified in giving its assent to this Bill until it is submitted to the judgement of the country.

Sir George Ross claimed with some benevolence that both sides in the Senate had the same purpose in mind and disagreed only on the mechanism of obtaining the same result. He argued that existing legislation was good enough to achieve the current naval requirements of Canada. However, he also produced the argument that the Conservative Government would do well to discard the Bill in favour of a construction of battleships in Canada as quickly as possible. It would be enough for $10 to $15 million dollars to be put forward in supplementary estimates in Canada and this could be alongside a yearly grant, the actual sum to be decided. This made Bill 21 sound like an unnecessary and lost cause.[9]

Ironically, the Government Leader in the Senate, Lougheed, had opposed Laurier's Naval Service Bill in 1910 in a similar way, arguing for a national referendum on the topic at the time. The Senate Liberals would adopt a similar approach in 1913. These new debates in 1913 swirled around the same issues presented in the House of Commons for Bill 21, the Bill to undertake measures to increase the effective force of the Empire. Besides Lougheed and Ross, the key speeches and remarks included those from Senators Belcourt, Bolduc, Bostock, Casgrain, Choquette, Cloran, Dandurand, Daniel, Davis, Edwards,

Gordon, Legris, MacKeen, Mackenzie Bowell, McKay, Pope, Roche and Smith.

Joseph Bolduc (Lauzon, Quebec), a Nationalist Conservative who had supported the Laurier Government's Naval Service Bill of 1910, criticized the Liberal party's suggestions that compared the Canadian position to Japan as if they expected Canadian naval expansion to expand in similar ways. Bolduc pointed out that in contrast to Canada, Japan had fifty million people and cheap labour. He had a strong point, since Canada had a population of slightly more than 7,600,000 people in 1913, with approximately a 3 per cent growth in the size of the population since 1912. Bolduc was to suggest in an exhibition of British Empire loyalty that the British Admiralty could do no wrong in their recommendations because it was the duty of Canadians to respond favourably to the expert and wise counsel from Great Britain.[10]

Another Senator suggested that no 'wise counsel' had appeared from Great Britain. Hewitt Bostock (Kamloops, British Columbia) born in Surrey, England, and a Liberal, felt it was the only counsel that had been provided and added further that it would be an impossibility for Canada to be represented in such a way as to influence the foreign policy of the British Empire. In the rather alternative conclusions of Bolduc and Bostock the views of the British Government were seen to prevail, one considering the views wise and the other unwise.

Napoléon Antoine Belcourt (Ottawa, Ontario), a Franco-Ontarian, produced essentially three arguments to justify the amendment and not giving assent to the Bill: the Bill was contrary to the spirit of the Canadian constitution and consequently Parliament had no right to enact such a law; it would involve Canada in quarrels outside the new world; and lastly, Canadian and British Empire unity would also be affected.[11] On the unconstitutionality of the Government proposal, Belcourt believed that the British North America Act had not provided for any duty on the part of Canada to act for the defence of the Empire and although the Act authorized Canada to make laws 'for militia, military and naval service and defence', he believed this was confined to the territory of Canada.[12]

Liberal Senator, Joseph Hormisdas Legris (Repentigny, Quebec), put forward seven reasons as to why he was opposed to the $35 million contribution: Canada had no need of a navy; because the policy was unconstitutional (along the lines of Belcourt's argument); it was dangerous to give finance to Great Britain without control over how it would be spent; the money spent on militarism could be used elsewhere in Canada; the financial contribution would not necessarily

secure the defence of Canada; there was no plan to provide for the control of Empire policy; and lastly, it did not directly ask the Canadian people what they wanted.[13] In rather bold terms, Legris had seen the Bill as both a criminal act and a threat to international peace.

Henry Joseph Cloran (Victoria, Quebec), also a Liberal, evoked the issue of tribute that had reared its head earlier in debates in the House of Commons. The problem of tribute was compared with when Gaul paid tribute to Rome and '… the unenlightened Carthaginians and the philanthropic Athenian had to pay tribute to Rome'.[14] In essence he believed he was speaking on behalf of 'free-born Canadians' who did not deserve to be slaves and took the proposals as an affront to his and their manhood.[15]

Ernest D'Israeli Smith (Wentworth, Ontario) lived up to his rather British Conservative middle name and his Canadian Conservative party background by speaking in favour of the Bill. He was a very recent appointment to the Senate by Robert Borden (on 26 May 1913), and was clearly showing his loyalty to his patron. As a businessman, the freshman to the Senate saw the $35 million as little more than a small grant, although it was not clear what he was comparing it with.

Those who opposed the Bill included Laurent Olivier David (Mille Iles, Quebec), who spoke on the same day as Smith, 29 May 1913. A lawyer, journalist and author, David forcefully opposed the Bill and in a nutshell, his views were: 'There is no urgency, no emergency, no pressing need, and if there was, the scheme now before us would be ineffective …'[16]

Others like William Roche (Halifax, Nova Scotia), although a Liberal party member, argued for a modified proposal on which the whole of the Senate might agree. He found previous references to imperialism in speeches as vague and sentimental and his own analysis of Europe would appear relevant when he spoke of conflicts over territory and prestige with little nations confronting one another and alliances prone to shifts. However, his conclusion that Russia was a bigger threat to world peace than Germany (because of Russian ambitions in Asia) was not unfair given Great Britain's earlier worries about having to protect India from Russia, but that Britain and Germany did not harbour enmity to each other did not appear entirely accurate in May 1913 or prove to be the case in 15 months time. It was more a speech of economic hope, a hope that Germany and Great Britain would see the value of working together in unison.[17] He certainly underestimated the warmongering of European Powers.

The Liberals in the Senate largely felt that the naval situation could be dealt with under existing legislation and the defence of the Empire was covered under the Naval Service Act of 1910. New Canadian Government estimates could be added that would see the building of battleships and some $10 to $15 million would be more appropriate. In short, a new Bill was not necessary. The question was also being raised of how best a proper Canadian Navy could come about.

The Naval Aid Bill was rejected by the Senate on 29 May 1913 in a vote of 51 to 27 in favour of an amendment that nullified the Bill (Appendix A.7).[18] Senators accepted the amendment to the Bill and considered that they would not give assent until the country expressed a view on it. Robert Craig Brown points out that the message sent to the House of Commons was curt: 'This House is not justified in giving its assent to the Bill until it is submitted to the judgement of the country.'[19] Borden in his *Memoirs* gives the impression that he had been optimistic for the passage of the Bill, expecting the Senate to attach some reasonable or acceptable amendments.[20] As pointed out previously, the political party structure of the Senate had been set by 15 years of previous Liberal Governments that had allowed a majority of Liberals to be appointed to the Senate and this always made the passage of the Bill problematic. Senators took the risk that reform of the Senate would be mooted as a consequence of rejecting such a firm Government Bill, but they did not waver in their independence. The *Montreal Star* had stated on 10 January 1913, that if the Senate opposed the Government over this Bill they would be taking their political life in their hands.[21] Sir Richard McBride suggested Senate reform and that a birthday gift of three Dreadnoughts should be sent to the monarch, George V.[22]

Why did Borden not call for the dissolution of Parliament and the instigation of a general election? Besides the obvious unpredictability of a general election, Borden had a number of reasons for not dissolving Parliament. These reasons included: the economic effects on Canada at a time of business difficulties; the Senate could still defeat the Bill in the future; and there was resentment that Liberals in the Senate could be seen to have forced such a general election.

Why did Borden not have a referendum? A referendum had been the clarion call of a number of French-Canadians at earlier stages of the proposals and Borden having strongly rejected this call would be in an embarrassing position to accept it. At the time, Canada as a parliamentary democracy did not favour referenda as a solution to political issues. Lastly, Borden thought there was still some hope for Canada in financing three Dreadnoughts.

Borden was in an unsatisfactory position, but he seemed determined to look on the bright side. The Prime Minister of Canada did not immediately give up on his proposals and he sent a cable (via Governor General and Colonial Secretary) to Churchill on 1 June 1913 that sounded very positive in terms of Canada financially supporting three Dreadnoughts and encouraged Churchill to go ahead in advance of the Canadian Government producing the requisite authority.

> Confidential, private and personal.
> We appreciate most thoroughly unfortunate situation arising from action of Senate and assure you of our desire and intention to retrieve that situation as speedily and as effectively as possible. Please consider practicality of having construction of three ships undertaken immediately by your Government under assurance of Canadian Government that on or before their completion we will introduce a bill authorising Canadian Government to pay for them and take them over under same conditions and for same purpose set forth in Naval Aid Bill. I am prepared to make an early statement to Parliament that, we shall give this assurance to your government. We would in ordinary course have majority in Senate before completion of ships and thus be enabled to fulfil our engagement to take them over and pay for them. Public opinion in Canada is overwhelmingly in favour Naval Aid Bill but we cannot hold general election until after redistribution and probably not before autumn of 1915.[23]

It was Winston Churchill who seemed more in touch with the reality of the situation and in reply reported on his discussions in the British Cabinet, discussions that felt the formal decision of the Canadian Parliament should not be usurped.[24] The British Cabinet felt there was no reason to believe that the vote in the Canadian Senate would be overturned. Winston Churchill by 4 June 1913 was passing on the view of the British Cabinet to Borden that they felt they could not go forward with Borden's proposal for the Canadian Government to take a later financial responsibility for the three Dreadnoughts. This possible solution to the situation appeared to invite too much criticism in Canada and Great Britain. A blatant attempt to ignore the decision of the Canadian Senate was not a position the British Cabinet was willing to pursue.

Yet, Borden found it difficult to relinquish the argument that it had been the Liberal party majority in the Senate under the control of the

Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, Wilfrid Laurier, that had prevented Borden's naval proposals. Borden would repeat that 'technically' the Parliament of Canada had rejected the plan, but had enormous problems accepting that the partisan rejection in the Senate meant an end to the policy. He felt the way forward, and to make things right, was for Britain to build three ships of the character previously discussed. In the future, and in an unspecified political solution, Canada would pay for and own these three ships, and he was still determined to put them at the disposal of His Majesty the King and more obviously the British Empire.[25]

Robert Borden also appeared to surprise Wilfrid Laurier in the House of Commons by suggesting that Canada could still make a contribution to ships laid down by the British Government. As Borden put it: 'The announcement came as a surprise to Laurier and it obviously disconcerted and nettled him.'[26] With modified proposals, Borden hoped to get a programme accepted by the Canadian Senate and felt that a compromise was possible between Senators Lougheed and Ross. James Lougheed wrote to Robert Borden on 1 October 1913 intimating as much; having had conversations with Sir George Ross Lougheed felt that Ross had a preference for an investment in two capital ships and perhaps smaller ships alongside these.[27]

Ross went on in a private letter to Lougheed (not for Cabinet consumption), on 26 December 1913, to reaffirm his belief that the Bill had been rejected by Liberals because the proposals had confused the issue of a permanent policy and a temporary contribution and had tried to keep them apart. As he stated to Lougheed, 'Do not drive tandem any longer', and what he meant by this was that the Canadian Government should get away from the language of a contribution and make it clear that the policy is an investment in a permanent navy.[28] In essence, he expected Borden to abandon the Navy Aid Bill in favour of getting approval for the proposals from a Committee of Supply. Ross felt that even if the amount of money required was not reduced, but the political principles were taken away, then the programme stood a chance of acceptance. However, this compromise was not supported by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and a Senatorial compromise did not materialize. By 31 December 1913, Robert Borden had to tell Winston Churchill that the situation for imperial defence interests was 'prejudiced', and the Liberal opposition seemed determined to stop the naval measures in what he termed the 'irresponsible Senate'.[29] Although Borden clung to a hope that the Senate might move in his favour in the future, and he might be able to raise the

policy in future considerations of 'naval estimates,' Borden decided not to reintroduce a formal Bill or have any reference to it in government policy in his 'Speech from the Throne'.[30]

The German newspaper response to the Canadian Senate decision was collected by Hugh Watson, Naval attaché in Berlin on behalf of Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador to Germany. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* on 5 June 1913 felt that the Senate decision on Borden's Bill proved a large number of Canadians wanted nothing to do with the policy. It was considered that Borden had three options: have a general election, deprive the Senate of its power and thirdly a referendum. The conclusion the newspaper drew was to play up the apparent loss to the British Empire for this decision. The attempt by Canada to deliver a policy that promised the financial support for three Dreadnoughts and the Admiralty memorandum supporting this had received coverage and criticism in Germany. The German press were happy to heap criticism on Churchill for the policy and gloat that its failure reflected that Britain did not have support of the Dominions.[31] *Deutsche Tageszeitung* took the opportunity on 7 June 1913 to attack the sincerity of Churchill, complaining that his policy was not for the protection of the colonies and did not intend to keep British ship production within suggested proportions (ten to sixteen) with German ship production and was responsible for diminishing Anglo-German cooperation.[32] The fact that Churchill was going ahead with the production of three ships, irrespective of the Canadian decision, produced the argument that Churchill never intended keeping to the proportions of ten to sixteen. The newspaper continued that there was now a transparent diversion between the plans and actions of Winston Churchill: 'Perhaps now also those Germans who liked Mr Churchill's holiday year will resent it.'[33]

On the same day, *Kreuz-Zeitung* reported that despite the Canadian Senate decision, Britain would continue with its building programme. It was rather scathing of Churchill's approach, particularly that Churchill having lost the supply of Canadian funding for three Dreadnoughts was still going to build replacements as British ships. Here Churchill was accused of 'loopholes' to obtain the same result.[34] The conclusion the German newspaper drew was that Germany should make sure they execute their existing Fleet Law.[35]

As historians Hilmer and Granatstein point out, the $35 million had ultimately seemed exorbitant against the background of total Canadian Government expenditure of $144 million for 1912.[36] Marc Milner suggests that a compromise in the Senate had only been fleeting since

Laurier had not wanted to see his own Naval Service Act overturned.[37] Ultimately, and it is surprising that it was not entirely foreseen by Borden, it was the imposition of Liberal party discipline within the Senate that effectively brought an end to the Naval Aid Bill.[38]

# 9

# Aftermath: Canada, Great Britain and Developments in International Affairs, 1913–14

Germany assumed rather quickly that the failed Churchill-Borden programme to deliver three Dreadnoughts at a cost of CAD$35 million was a definite position that the Canadian Government could not reverse. Both the German chargé d'affaires and the naval attaché in London reported back to Germany that Canada was left with a continuing debate about its naval future.[1] Great Britain to the satisfaction of Germany was not going to get the 'windfall' of Dreadnoughts that Churchill and Borden had worked hard to achieve. It was also possible for German reports to suggest that Canada had not responded to the warmongering of Winston Churchill or the heralded threats to world peace that Churchill had promoted.[2] Not all Canadian newspapers were taken in by Churchill's jingoism or the 'handmaiden' role that Borden appeared to have put himself in. Also the future Canadian Prime Minister and Liberal, William Lyon Mackenzie King, was publicly critical of the Borden's Government naval strategy and wondered out loud whether or not an emergency had actually existed.[3]

In Canada, the decision not to make a contribution to build Dreadnoughts left Canada's naval position in abeyance. Robert Borden did not seek a plebiscite and Canada did not deliver an emergency contribution to naval resources for Britain. Canada had little in way of a navy of its own to speak of and was not an active participant in a British Empire Navy. There also appeared to be indecision on what the Canadian Government should do and where they should do it. If they were just left with a small local defence navy, could this protect the Atlantic or the Pacific coasts? The mood in Canada about a German threat to the British Empire assuaged for a short period of time.

For the short term, imperialism appeared weakened and Dominion nationalism strengthened by the rejection of a $35 million Canadian

programme to build Dreadnoughts. It was not long before the British Empire faced a greater challenge than that of just a naval arms race between Germany and the British Empire. The advent of the First World War would require an emergency approach to Empire issues that had been argued against so strongly by the Liberal party of Canada in the two years that preceded the conflict. That a major World War breaking out provides support for the positions of Winston Churchill and Robert Borden was hardly a justified cause for any rejoicing, although the irony of the situation would not have been lost on Churchill. Fears about German militarism and naval warfare in the North Sea, English Channel and the North Atlantic that seemed so speculative in 1912 were to all materialize in a melancholic roll call of destruction.

Churchill found the situation embarrassing when Naval estimates were discussed in the British Cabinet and his battleship programme was at risk because of the Canadian situation. In a paper; 'The Three Canadian Ships' of June 1913, Churchill brought to the attention of Cabinet that the rejection of the Canadian Aid Bill meant the three Canadian ships would not be available for 1915 or early 1916.[4] A statement was also given by Churchill to Parliament on 5 June. The parliamentary correspondent of *The Times* (London) felt Churchill's announcements were met with apathy within the House of Commons, whereas Churchill's previous statements on naval matters over a number of years had generated excitement and criticism.[5] Churchill's favoured solution was a speeding up of the construction of those ships that were already approved. It would be a temporary increase in the Navy estimates for the year, but the cost would be taken out of future years. There would be a future opportunity for Canada to rectify the situation, but a more permanent addition to the British Naval programme might be required if the Canadian support did not materialize. His language concerning Canada was interesting, in that he felt he could support the Canadian Government by showing '… the reality of the need they have failed to meet'.[6] If he meant that the Canadian Government could shame its opponents in Canada to change their mind, this was optimistic.

Winston Churchill explained in detail his position to Robert Borden on 30 June 1913.[7] There was a leeway for the British to press ahead with ship production because Parliament approved a programme well in advance of the time of production, leaving room to act should emergencies arrive. Churchill was treating the situation as such an emergency.

> We [British Government] have not added to the number of ships under construction, nor to the total commitments of the Admiralty; but we have begun 3 of our ships now instead of in March next. The effect of this is to secure the position for a further six or seven months, during which there is still time for Canada to act.[8]

What Churchill had to further explain and rectify was Borden's misconception that Canada might take over responsibility for ships that had been begun by Great Britain, and which were part of a British production, but merely 'antedated'.[9] If Canada acted within a few months, Canada could take over responsibility for these ships because Britain would be able to lay down three more ships before March 1914. What would not be authorized by Churchill or the British Cabinet was the situation where Britain would embark upon the production of three ships with a vague commitment from Canada to take over financial responsibility at an unspecified point in the future. One of the main problems Churchill had with Borden's view was that it would look very much like a British interference in what was a Canadian political issue. It might look like a British involvement in specific concerns of Canadian party politics and Churchill had tried to avoid this in the past.

Rather strangely, Churchill then raised with Borden a proposal that he could not actually recommend.[10] A company like Vickers and Armstrong could take on construction of three ships that the Canadian Government would later have the wherewithal to purchase. The risk to such a company was limited because the British Government could not reasonably allow such ships to fall into enemy hands should the Canadian support not materialize. Since there would not be a contract upfront, Churchill realized this irregular programme might also be uneconomical for those concerned.[11] This potential policy was not pursued. In his book The *World Crisis*, Churchill briefly reflected on the situation with Canada, his battleship programme and Naval Estimates, and also the implications for his career. The British Cabinet was clearly not impressed with the way things had turned out and Churchill recollected that criticism was so strong and serious that: 'By the middle of December [1913] it seemed to me certain that I should have to resign.'[12]

Winston Churchill did not resign and instead went ahead with his plans for naval construction without Canada.[13] As early as March 1913, Churchill had had some additional thoughts about a new 'imperial squadron' that could operate with short notice throughout the

Empire.[14] Although, how this arrangement could function swiftly in the Atlantic and the Pacific was not entirely clear, but by June 1913 Churchill was considering more torpedo vessels for the comparatively narrow North Sea and Mediterranean Sea, releasing larger ships for broader imperial service.[15] Donald Gordon may sound a bit harsh in his conclusion that it was Churchill's 'single-mindedness' that led to the collapse of carefully developed plans for the Dominions.[16] If true, and this may be the point being made, it was an unintended result of Churchill's otherwise passionate attachment to Royal Navy expansion and a strong Dominion contribution that were his own plans. Churchill's concerns for the security of the British Isles did not make him lose sight of the importance of the Dominions, or the nature and 'obligations' of co-operation with the Dominions.[17]

Yet in 1913, Churchill still had ambitions of a 'naval holiday', even if this had been dismissed by the German press as a rather false proposal. As stated to Borden on 30 June 1913, Churchill hoped for a halt in the current building of capital ships.

> This idea of a 'naval holiday' is not at all visionary but quite practical, and personally I have real hopes that, what with the heavy demands of army expenditure in Germany and the resolute and rapid advance of the British naval power through the simultaneous action of Great Britain, Canada, and other Dominions, together with developments in the technical sphere, Germany may next year or the year after feel it her interest to enter into an agreement with us to suspend for a fixed period the construction of capital ships.[18]

It was hoped by Churchill that this move might be coupled with other countries being encouraged to follow suit. This affected Canada in that they, as a self-governing Dominion, might choose to follow the policy, but hopefully only after they had helped to start the financing of three ships in the financial year of 1913–14. This intended expansion of naval forces was being presented by Churchill as a policy that might deliver in subsequent years a suspension in building new capital ships. It was the unsettled nature of Canadian ship production that had made an agreement with Germany unlikely. Churchill bemoaned the fact that Canada had not been able to deliver the promise of financing three Dreadnoughts because he thought the three Dreadnoughts would have impacted on German thinking and encouraged further bargaining, even if that was a limited prospect. It may seem strange that Churchill clung to this vain hope, but he thought Germany would see

the futility of the naval rivalry that Great Britain and Germany had embarked upon.[19] Although this argument was part of a letter by Churchill to Robert Borden to impress upon him that any fruitful action needed to be produced immediately, if it was to be of any use; Churchill's 'naval holiday' idea for improving Anglo-German naval relations as expressed to the third party of Borden, appear sincere. A 'naval holiday', as mentioned earlier would have still left Great Britain in a position of strength over Germany. The Prime Minister of Canada publicly supported the idea of a 'naval holiday' which was also being discussed in the House of Representatives in the United States. Borden added that he hoped an international 'tribunal or authority' might be created to help preserve the peace.[20]

It is not surprising that the debates about naval and military spending that continued in Britain through 1913 and 1914 were overtaken by the events that led to war in August 1914. The First World War rather dominates international affairs, Canadian and British domestic politics and Anglo-Canadian relations. Rather ironically, Canada's human losses on the battlefields of Europe afford Canada the kind of status and prestige that Borden had been looking for in a pre-War naval policy. The naval problems could then be considered an issue of the past. It was rather obvious to all that Canada could not substantially contribute to winning the First World War through its sea power.

Charles Stacey describes the failure over the Naval Aid Bill as a 'national disaster' and it is clear that the Conservative Government did not have an alternative domestic naval strategy to fall back on.[21] It was a disaster for the Royal Canadian Navy that Canada did not manage to conjure up the $35 million contribution to the British Royal Navy and consequently did not have a substantial force of ships with Canadian names and serving personnel to attach pride and prestige to. Wilfrid Laurier's Naval Service Act of 1910 remained *in situ* and defined that there was a navy in Canada, but it was a navy of limited means, but a grand title, the Royal Canadian Navy. Canada did have the *Niobe* and *Rainbow*, but these two ships were not respected domestically or externally to Canada.

One of the embarrassments to Canada was that at the outbreak of the First World War Canada had only six vessels. The C. G. S. (Canadian Government Ship) *Canada* was a coastguard patrol ship launched in Barrow-in-Furness in 1904, with a displacement of 557 tons, and with a potential crew of 60.[22] Another coastguard vessel was the C. G. S. *Margaret* with a displacement of 756 tons, which became His Majesty's Canadian Ship (H. M. C. S.) *Margaret* when it transferred

from the Department of Customs to the Department of Naval Service. The H. M. C. S. *Rainbow*, an Apollo class cruiser with a displacement of 3,600 tons, and a potential crew of 273.[23] The other cruiser, H. M. C. S *Niobe* had a displacement of 11,000 tons, with a potential crew of 677.[24] Both the *Niobe* and the *Rainbow* have been described in 1914 as rather neglected and undermanned.[25] The fate of the navy in Canada seemed to be the product of a policy of neglect, even if unintended neglect. By the middle of 1913 the number of personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy was falling rather than increasing and accusations were made that the *Rainbow* and *Niobe* went through periods where they did not have enough trained personnel to actually go to sea.[26]

The two new and unusual additions to Canadian defence in August 1914 were two submarines the H. M. C. S. CC-1 and the H. M. C. S. CC-2. These came courtesy of Premier of British Columbia Richard McBride who was opportunistic in purchasing two submarines when he believed the Pacific coast might be vulnerable to attack. The two submarines had been newly produced in the United States for the Government of Chile, but were never bought by them. This allowed McBride to use funds of the Province of British Columbia to advance enough money to acquire the submarines from a shipyard in the State of Washington.[27] It was all rather audacious on the part of McBride and he managed to advance the Canadian Navy almost 'overnight'; whereas, the Borden Government failed to advance it at all over two years. McBride paid more than Chile was supposed to for the submarines and spent more than the budget of the Royal Canadian Navy for 1913–14 on them.[28] He did manage to sell them on to the Canadian Government at cost.

The Borden Government named or rather numbered the vessels CC-1 and CC-2, and as Churchill had previously suggested it was difficult to get passionate about numbered submarines. With the exception of these submarines the naval situation for Canada had not especially changed, except that Canada depended even more for the defence of her coasts upon British, and to Canada's embarrassment also Australian and Japanese ships.[29] As Great Britain concentrated its fleet increasingly close to home, the Pacific theatre was left to the protection of Japan. Early in the War two efficient German cruisers were spotted off the west coast of Mexico. They clearly could disrupt shipping in the Pacific, attack Canadian fishing fleets and even attack Canadian harbours, if they so desired.[30] Canada looked particularly unprepared for naval conflict, the naval debates of 1912–13 having not advanced Canadian security. The failure to secure a policy by the

Borden Government over a three year period between 1911–14 can be seen to have made Canada's naval situation worse.

By 11 August 1914 Churchill felt it was propitious to publish the 'secret memorandum' of 1912 (Appendix A.1). A few omissions were made from the original copy and it was printed with the intention of publication, although it was not released at this time. The first thought of Churchill was that it very much showed how the Admiralty foresaw the crisis that had arrived and the thinking of the British and Canadian Governments had been correct and were now proven right. Robert Borden was reluctant to have it published until the current parliamentary session concluded, Borden's war proposals were being supported by the Opposition at the time and 'I told you so' would have been an unnecessary point, but he believed it would show that Canada had been consulted on important strategic matters and publication would help him with the Canadian war effort. As such he gave approval for publication on 23 August 1914 and further wrote to Churchill on 9 September 1914:

> While public sentiment respecting our participation in war quite satisfactory in all parts of Dominion except in one quarter, I feel convinced that publication of secret memorandum would have an important influence upon those who feel that Canada should have been consulted. Memorandum would show that two years ago all facts were laid before Canadian Government without reservation, and exact conditions revealed which inevitably resulted in struggle now forced upon Empire.[31]

As Gilbert Tucker points out it was Prime Minister Asquith and the Colonial Secretary, Lewis Harcourt who were opposed to the release of the 'secret memorandum' for publication and the document was not published during the First World War and remained unpublished until 1952 and its appearance in Gilbert Tucker's *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History*, Volume 1.[32]

There are a number of conclusions and lessons that can be drawn about Robert Borden, Winston Churchill, and the development of Anglo-Canadian naval relations during 1911–14. The conclusions and observations on the period have an added resonance since this particular period of history concludes with the First World War. Some longer term consequences can also be derived with regard to the sovereignty of Canada, the role of Canada in international affairs and the fortunes of Churchill and Borden, the main two personalities planning, and supporting the failed Naval Aid Bill of 1912–13.

Why Prime Minister Robert Borden ran headlong into support for purchasing Dreadnoughts that were essentially for a British Empire fleet is odd. Why attach himself so closely to the success of a policy in an area in which he had such limited experience? Perhaps the answer is that Borden failed in this arena of naval policy because he had no great naval knowledge and no passion for ships or broad naval matters. He had no military experience to speak of and only very limited military army training in Nova Scotia at a time of peace. Also, Borden had not exhibited any substantial military strategic interests throughout his life. This may not be entirely unusual for a lawyer with an interest in the classics moving into politics, but even while he was in politics he had no passion for big military issues. On occasions he would admit that he had not sufficient knowledge of naval organization to know how some naval policies might be achieved.[33]

What appeared to attract Robert Borden to the 'naval crisis' of 1912 was the issue of proportions. He found logic and reason in the argument, particularly put forward by Winston Churchill, that Great Britain and the Empire needed to maintain a sound ratio of battleships and battleship production over Germany. The necessity for big battleships, Dreadnoughts, was a second issue of proportion that he accepted. The Royal Canadian Navy as it existed was disproportionately small in terms of the development of navies in Europe. One way to rectify this dysfunction of the Canadian position was to be part of a greater fleet.

As a political relationship, the gap between a British Liberal party member and a Canadian Conservative party member would not be too severe. Of course, Churchill would be a member of the Conservative party in Great Britain until 1904, and officially moved back to the Conservative party in an official way in 1925. Although a direct corollary will not exist between the same named political parties in Canada and Great Britain, Churchill would have felt ideologically comfortable with Borden. As seen earlier, Borden came across as mildly more Edwardian than the rather Victorian Churchill. In international affairs, Robert Borden sought a clearer political autonomy for Canada, but he shared a belief in the importance of the British Empire and British imperial interests with Winston Churchill. In personal relations, Borden and Churchill would be very business-like with each other, but then Borden was serious with most people. Churchill often sounded serious and efficient when communicating with others on ministerial or prime ministerial matters, an exception being his more relaxed cordiality with President Franklin Roosevelt, whom he much admired.

Churchill did find it embarrassing in 1912 that Borden was not impressed with his early draft memoranda on the justification for Canada financing Dreadnoughts. One of the things that Churchill could be most relied upon to produce was an eloquent memorandum. In turn, Borden was embarrassed that Churchill would not continue with the programme when the Canadian Senate rejected the Bill. Churchill understood the ramifications of the defeat in the Senate and looked to Borden to deliver a solution in the short term but could not countenance a long term strategy that could not be guaranteed.

Robert Borden was clearly keen on Canadian sovereignty and during the naval debates in Britain and Canada during 1912 and 1913 he argued for more decision-making for Canada. However, the awkward contradiction was that he was pursuing a naval policy that gave considerable control and authority in naval matters to the British Government. Wanting a greater say in Empire decision-making was the goal, but he only ever received vague promises about the eventuality of achieving that goal and policy. In time, and partly as a consequence of the First World War, Borden was involved in the developments to give the Dominions a greater say on the Committee of Imperial Defence, at the table of the Imperial War Cabinet, at the Paris Peace Conference that produced the Versailles peace settlements, and in providing a strong identity for Canada in the League of Nations. In 1912–13, Borden's achievements in international affairs were limited and his naval policy a failure. The impression and evaluation of Robert Borden is improved if the naval debates of 1912–13 are seen in the context of a developing democracy. Since a confederated Canada only existed since 1867, the negotiations for a naval policy 45 years later and the commitments that would eventually follow the First World War can be seen as part of the same process, a process of democratization for Canada. On balance, Dominion autonomy became a more prominent and successful cause for Canada than imperial centralization, but then a centralization of naval policy was not achieved.

The ultimate difficulty for Canada and the Borden Government in 1911–13 was that the policy of the Government on most naval matters was inextricably tied together with imperial political matters. This was evident in Canadian Government policy towards the financial contribution towards ships for an imperial navy, it was part of the debates in the Canadian House of Commons and Senate, it was evident in discussions and correspondence between Borden and Churchill and it was visible in the concerns about building ships or developing docks in Canada.

It has be shown that Robert Borden between 1911–14 was not cowed by the reputation of the younger Winston Churchill and was for a time happy to play the elder statesman to the First Lord of the Admiralty. However, it became the case that Borden felt he needed the public support of Churchill for his naval policies and evoked the eminence of Churchill to help his case in the Canadian Parliament. Churchill's views became a strong part of the debates and were more controversial than Borden intended. With some considerable irony, Borden's irretrievable political position over the naval question was recognized by Churchill before Borden.

Winston Churchill was happy as First Lord of the Admiralty, taking at times a boyish interest in the British Royal Navy. His enthusiasm was coupled with a lot of knowledge and appointing well-informed subordinates. MacGregor Dawson cited the constitutional author Walter Bagehot as suggesting that ministers lived on a 'mountain', thinking it was like no other 'mountain'.[34] Churchill treated his various ministerial positions as if they were unique 'mountains' and whilst at the Admiralty argued that it needed special treatment. Any previous criticism by Churchill of expenditure on the Royal Navy was lost in full blown support for the Admiralty. He was also very happy to be in control of Admiralty matters; it was his 'mountain'.

It would be very unfair to say that Winston Churchill wanted war, he wanted to be prepared for war. As with others, at the outbreak of the First World War Churchill was extremely patriotic but also had felt the world had gone mad.[35] Nevertheless, his preparations meant that Great Britain had more Dreadnought battleships, Dreadnought battle cruisers and armoured cruisers than Germany. It was only modern light cruisers that saw a superiority of numbers for Germany.[36] Churchill had worked continuously and with some attempted innovation to achieve a sound naval policy for the British Empire. He was exhilarated by the level of decision-making he was involved in once the First World War broke out.

Churchill's career at the Admiralty came to a difficult end in May 1915. The Gallipoli campaign was a military disaster and a political failure for Churchill. Although the Inquiry on the Dardanelles was to relieve Churchill of much of the blame, there was much blame to be shared around. Churchill would accept a demotion and become Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for a short period until serving as an officer on the Western Front, returning to be Minister of Munitions in 1917. Churchill stayed in the office of First Lord of the Admiralty until 24 May 1915, when his forced resignation over the Dardanelles

campaign brought his first period as First Lord to a conclusion. The military failures at Gallipoli with the loss of British, Australian and New Zealand forces in a coordinated attack of the army and navy was not as severe as Western Front losses, but being alongside them did not help. The failure of the campaign could be attributed to complicated decisions made by military and political leaders, but Churchill's advocacy of the campaign caused him to be heavily criticized at the time. He was further criticized for not allowing subordinates to voice their opinions enough, but the conclusion of MacGregor Dawson still looks apt: 'The responsibility of the Dardanelles failure rests by general consent on many shoulders, but one of the lightest burdens is that borne by Mr Winston Churchill.'[37] Although devastated by his demotion in 1915, by 1917 Churchill was back involved with wartime decision-making as Minister of Munitions. His passion for military matters, in particular naval matters would serve him well in due course.

Winston Churchill is not remembered for a failed naval policy with Canada that was part of the prelude to the First World War. Churchill's involvement in Anglo-Canadian relations was unlikely to destroy his political career and of course did not, even though he briefly felt he might need to resign. Winston Churchill is perhaps still remembered for the disastrous Dardanelles campaign during the First World War, and perhaps unfairly. The military failure that was the Dardanelles campaign nearly did end his political career. The inquiry into the failures at Gallipoli exonerated Churchill from a lot of personal blame when it was published in 1917.

Whilst Robert Borden continued as Prime Minister of Canada until 1920, Churchill set about other experiences until he was brought back to a serious post in the Government. Churchill did satisfy his desire to be involved more directly in the War when he commanded the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers in Belgium. His friend David Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1917 and appointed Churchill as Minister of Munitions. After the end of the First World War he was appointed Secretary of State for War (and Air). Churchill's credentials as an anti-Bolshevik were advanced by him as he organized support for the White Russians in the Civil War in Russia.

The importance of Winston Churchill in the debates in the Canadian House Of Commons on the Naval Aid Bill were evident from early on. Views of the First Lord of the Admiralty in previous speeches seemed almost as important as the financial request inherent to the briefly worded proposed Bill (Appendix A.2). The 'public memorandum' (Appendix A.3) delivered to support the position of the Canadian

Conservative Government was from the Admiralty and clearly the responsibility of Churchill. If that was not enough the communications between Churchill and Borden that were read out in the House of Commons in January 1913 meant that Churchill was pilloried by opponents of the Naval Aid Bill. Rather than serving as 'ammunition' for Borden to get what he wanted it reinforced the Opposition in Parliament and the opposition in Canadian newspapers to the naval programme.[38] Churchill had produced decidedly honest views about the difficulties of creating a fully-fledged shipbuilding programme in Canada. Canadians did not have the experts or the infrastructure for the building of battleships. A large number of Members in the House of Commons and Senators found the views expressed by Churchill as insulting to Canada. Churchill would forge a much more sympathetic relationship with Canadians by the end of the Second World War and his 'indiscretions' about Canadian shipbuilding from 1912 and 1913 would be ultimately overlooked.

Professor Richard Preston has cited Mahatma Gandhi as saying; 'A nation that has no control over her own defence forces and over her external policy is hardly a responsible nation.'[39] Canada had moved a long way from the status of a colony and was a self-governing and proud nation between 1911 to 1914 and it had some control over its defence and external policies. Although it was still a gradual process Canada would evolve its foreign policy independence though the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, recognition in the League of Nations, the creation of the Commonwealth and an independent entry into the Second World War. By the end of the Second World War, the Royal Canadian Navy did not look too shabby, but a lot of large navies had been destroyed and the world entered a nuclear age with maritime powers increasingly marginalized in importance.

In the postscript to this story for Robert Borden, he would most probably not be remembered as an accomplished Prime Minister of stature, if his tenure as Prime Minister ended in 1914. The First World War with its associated horrors and difficult military and political decision-making forged a very different role for Borden. At home he had the difficulties of creating a Unionist Government and the conscription crisis that made his tenure as Prime Minister controversial. Abroad, the involvement of Borden in the Imperial War Cabinet and the Paris Peace Conference elevated him to a position of an international statesman and a politician associated with the development of Canada's sovereignty in the foreign policy arena. That he becomes associated with the development of foreign policy autonomy for

Canada is not something that would have been easily predicted in the period 1911–14.

It is also a slightly strange irony that Robert Borden who had an early career devoid of naval matters, exhibited no great passion for military and strategic naval matters in his career to 1911, failed to deliver a naval policy for Canada between 1911–14, should, after his retirement from being Prime Minister of Canada, be appointed the Canadian representative on the British Empire Delegation to the Washington Naval Conference. The conference that ran from November 1921 to February 1922 was largely concerned with the limitation of naval armaments and problems associated with the Pacific and Far East and delivered a number of historically important treaties. By 1921 Borden had a lot of knowledge of naval armaments, shipbuilding, proportions and ratios as they applied to large capital ships, and much of this knowledge derived from the period 1911–14. Borden was also associated with the type of decision-making that he believed the Dominions should be involved in within the British Empire. Another legacy of the 1911–14 'national disaster' for Canada was that Canada still gave no meaningful contribution to the British Empire naval forces, although Borden by 1922 was helping to set the quotas for battleship production and the calibre of guns on battleships as part of naval arms limitation.

The immediate postscript of events for Winston Churchill from the Anglo-Canadian naval relationship of 1911–14 was not too alarming in the face of the fact that the Royal Navy was largely prepared for war. All of Churchill's fears and worries were justified with the outbreak of the First World War, but because of those fears and worries Churchill's preparations for naval warfare had been excellent. It can be seen that deterrence as a naval strategy had clearly failed, a 'naval holiday' in Anglo-German building of battleships was not achieved and the Anglo-German naval arms race is associated with an approach that escalated into conflict. The First Lord of the Admiralty had been doing his job. Churchill was as fearful as other Cabinet Ministers at the events of August 1914, but he was prepared.

The ultimate postscript to Churchill's relationship with Canada is that of a long term sentimental attachment. Despite the invitation and the willingness of Churchill to go to Canada to support Anglo-Canadian relations in 1912–13, events conspired to keep Churchill away from Canada until 1929. As Professor David Dilks has highlighted, Churchill made nine trips to Canada between 1900 and 1954 and grew to have abiding affection for Canada.[40] The good work that

Churchill and Borden achieved in Anglo-Canadian relations in trying to have more centralized decision-making in the British Empire that the Dominions contributed towards was almost undone by the Chanak crisis of 1922. Churchill as Colonial Secretary and Prime Minister Lloyd George were keen to prevent the spread of Turkish power in the Near East. In rather poor communications, Churchill called for British Empire unity before he had consulted with Canada, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King was embarrassed to learn of the British Empire policy from the press. Fortunately, the Chanak crisis dissolved before it became serious, but it suggested all was not entirely well in Anglo-Canadian relations.

Over time, Churchill developed a similar relationship with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King that he had with Prime Minister Robert Borden. Both Borden and Mackenzie King had a seriousness and sagacity about them that Churchill could admire and respect. However, for all of Borden's wisdom and prudence and Churchill's determination they could not deliver the Canadian Naval Aid Bill of 1912–13.

On 10 July 1912, in London at the Royal Colonial Institute, Robert Borden felt it necessary to explain to his audience just how large Canada was, in case they were ignorant of this fact.

> When I resided in Halifax, Nova Scotia, I was one thousand miles nearer to London than to Vancouver on our western coast. If you could pivot Canada upon its eastern seaboard it would cover the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the British Islands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the northern part of France, the entire German Empire and a considerable portion of European Russia.[41]

In the context of Borden's description, his trip to Great Britain from Canada does not then seem quite so far, the North Atlantic does not seem quite so wide or European affairs quite so irrelevant. Also, the ability to achieve consensus in such a large democratic country as Canada, with all its disparate elements and party political rivalry, would on occasions not be achieved.

# Appendices

## Appendix A.1 Admiralty's Secret Memorandum

MEMORANDUM ON THE GENERAL NAVAL SITUATION
(Prepared by the Admiralty for the Information of the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, K.C., M.P., in August 1912*)*

I. GENERAL POSITION

1. THE power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the sea which is essential to its security must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other Naval Forces of the world, and such a comparison does not imply anything unfriendly in intention, or in spirit, to any other Power, or group of Powers. From this point of view the development of the German Fleet during the last fifteen years is the dominant feature of the Naval situation today. That development has been authorised by five successive legislative enactments, viz., the Fleet Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912. These laws cover the period up to 1920.

Whereas in 1898 the German Fleet consisted of:

9 battleships (excluding coast-defence vessels),
3 large cruisers,
28 small cruisers,
113 torpedo-boats, and
25,000 men,

maintained at an annual cost of – £6,000,000, the full Fleet of 1920 will consist of:

41 battleships,
20 large cruisers,
40 small cruisers,
144 torpedo-boats,
72 submarines, and
101,500 men,

estimated to be maintained at an annual cost of £23,000,000.

These figures, however, give no real idea of the advance, for the size and cost of ships has risen continually during the period, and, apart from increasing their total numbers, Germany has systematically replaced old and small ships, which counted as units in her earlier Fleet, by the most powerful and costly modern vessels. Neither does the money provided for the completed law represent the increase in cost properly attributable to the German Navy, for many charges borne on British naval funds are otherwise defrayed in Germany; and the German Navy comprises such a large proportion of new ships that the cost of maintenance and repair is considerably less than in Navies which have been longer established.

Even if no further increases are made by Germany in the interval, the Fleet possessed by that Power in 1920 will be far stronger than the British Navy of

to-day. Already, by 15 years of scientific effort, Germany from having practically no Fleet at all has raised herself to what is indisputably a second place among the Fleets of the world. The whole of this extraordinary evolution – comprising as it does not only the building of ships of all kinds and of the most powerful types, but the formation and training of great numbers of officers and men of every specialist grade and rating; the development of a naval science and of naval tactics of their own; the provision of colleges and training schools, of vast arsenals for the supply of guns, ammunition, torpedoes, armour plate, and every kind of naval equipment; of naval harbours, docks, dockyards, and of marine fortifications on an unexampled scale, has been achieved under the guidance and during the tenure of a single Minister, Admiral von Tirpitz.

2. The cause which has led Germany to create and develop this Navy is still a matter of dispute. The debates in the British Houses of Parliament for the past 10 years reproduce with monotonous fidelity two antagonistic views: While the one points to the inherent anti-British nature of German increases and the necessity for Great Britain to reply from time to time with larger programmes, if she be determined to maintain her naval superiority and consequently her national existence, the other insists that German Naval expansion is due to the naval or the foreign policy of Great Britain.

With foreign policy this memorandum is not concerned: it is sufficient to observe that the great German Law, that of 1900, was passed with national assent before the friendship between England and France rendered the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility, and while we were still on bad terms with Russia. It is therefore impossible to regard the good relations which have prevailed since 1904 between Great Britain and France, or since 1907 between Great Britain and Russia, as the cause or reason for German naval expansion, much of which had been publicly determined on in periods anterior to these dates.

3. Again, the naval policy of Great Britain has certainly not been provocative. On the accession of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's administration to power at the end of 1905 a deep and earnest desire prevailed throughout the dominant political forces in Great Britain to check and mitigate the rivalry in naval armaments. The expression of this desire and the hope that the Hague Conference of 1906 might be productive of some reasonable scheme for the limitation of armaments were not well received by the German Government. They declined to discuss the matter at The Hague, or between the Sovereigns, and proceeded to the passage of their new law of 1906, which had already been projected during the tenure of Mr. Balfour's administration in the preceding year. Great. Britain, however, did not relinquish her efforts to check the rivalry of armaments, and in order to support words by deeds and precept by example, the British construction in capital ships and the cost of the Naval Estimates were substantially reduced. The following figures are instructive:

In 1905 Great Britain was building 4 capital ships and Germany 2.
In 1906 Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships and Germany increased to 3.
In 1907 Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3.
In 1908 Great Britain reduced to 2 capital ships and Germany increased to 4.

The year 1906 was signalised by the passage of the 3rd German Naval Law, which provided among other things for the addition of 6 large cruisers, the greatest ships in the world, to that Fleet. It is noteworthy also that whereas prior

to the year 1906 the Germans were building only 6 torpedo boat destroyers a-year, they have since built double that number annually.

A man must be very anxious to prove Great Britain in the wrong – if he seeks to found any charge of naval provocation against her upon the above figures. It cannot be contended with justice that Germany has been compelled by British naval rivalry and British naval increases to expand her naval establishments.

It has, indeed, been made a matter of reproach in many quarters that the reduction in British naval construction in the 3 years 1906, 1907, and 1909, encouraged the German Navy to a sudden and more rapid exertion in the hopes of overtaking the naval power of Great Britain. This is not the Admiralty view, as will be shown later; but it is necessary to state that it was not until the efforts of Great Britain, to procure the abatement or retardation of naval rivalry, had failed for 3 successive years that in 1909 upon a general review of the naval situation we were forced to take exceptional measures to secure against all possible hazards the safety of the Empire. In that year 8 capital ships were laid down in Great Britain and 2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively a total of 10. The German new construction continued at 4.

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German Navy Law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers, it will in the near future consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German Navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war. Such a proportion is without example in the previous practice of modern naval Powers.

So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached 66,000. Under the previous Navy Laws, and various amendments which have preceded this one, Germany has been working up to a total in 1920, according to Admiralty calculations, of 86,500 officers and men, and they have been approaching that total by increments of approximately 3,500 a year. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men, and makes a total in 1920 of 101,500. The new average annual addition is calculated to be 1,680 of all ranks, but for the next three years, from 1912 to 1914, by special provision, 500 men extra are to

be added, and in the last three years of the currency of the law 500 less will be taken, making the total rate of increase of the German Navy personnel about 5,700 men a-year for the first three years.

The new construction under the law prescribes for the building of 3 additional battleships – 1 to be begun next year, 1 in 1916 – and 2 small cruisers, of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which are in view. The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 spread over that period above the previous estimates.

The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on the 22nd July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

5. The effect of the new German Navy Law is to produce a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the law from 21, the present figure, to 33 – an addition of 12, or an increase of about 57 per cent.

The new fleet will, in the beginning, include about 20 battleships and large cruisers of the older type, but gradually as new vessels are built the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels.

This full development will only be realised step by step; but already in 1914 2 squadrons will, according to Admiralty information, be entirely composed of what are called Dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the "Deutschlands" and the "Braunschweigs", together with 5 Dreadnought battle cruisers.

The organisation of the German Fleet will be 5 battle squadrons and a fleet flagship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines.

This great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of commerce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts, and has been organised and designed at every stage and in every particular with a view to a fleet action on a large scale in the North Sea or North Atlantic with the navy of some other great naval Power.

Attention must be drawn to the explicit declaration of the tactical objects for which the German Fleet exists as set forth in the preamble to the Naval Law of 1900 as follows:

> In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great Naval Power will not be "in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

6. When in 1900 Germany commenced the building of her Fleet, the well-known preamble to her Naval Law fully defined the objects and determination of that law. The development of the law by the various amendments is perfectly consistent with the preamble, and the Admiralty do not believe that the naval programmes or general policy of Great Britain have had any effect whatever on the German Naval Law or its amendments. Although the German Law has been developed in stages, and each stage has afforded opportunity for political recrimination in this country, it is more likely that the full scope of the Naval Law was clearly foreseen by the rulers of Germany in 1900, and that its announcement in instalments was merely accommodated to the capacity for digestion of the German finances and of their naval organisation at the moment of announcement. Harbours had to be designed and constructed for the new Fleet; docks to be provided; personnel to be entered and trained; the Kiel Canal to be deepened, and fortifications everywhere to be designed and established. Neighbouring nations that could not take umbrage at the more modest proposals of the earliest period might well have been shocked had the whole scheme been announced at once. A close study of the Naval Law of 1900 and its amendments and a careful consideration of the strength of our Fleet at that time compared with its strength to-day, leads the Admiralty to the conclusion that the law as we know it to-day was in the mind of the author of the law of 1900, and that it was reasons of policy and method only that caused the successive announcements of its development to be spread over a decade. What more there is to come cannot be known, but there are already signs, similar to those which have appeared on former occasions of increases, that even the mighty fleet which Germany will possess in 1920 is no final limit to her naval aspirations.

7. The purpose of German naval expansion is also a subject of doubt and controversy. We have often been assured that the German Navy is intended simply for the defence of Germany's overseas possessions and her growing seaborne commerce and mercantile marine. If this were the true object, we might have expected to see a Navy of numerous and powerful cruisers distributed widely all over the world, showing the German flag in distant seas and aiding German commerce and colonial developments by their presence and influence. Instead of this, we are confronted with a very strong fleet of battleships concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German shores and our own.

Next we have been informed that the German Fleet exists for the defence of Germany against an attack by a naval Power, presumably Great Britain. If this be a sincere apprehension, it is singularly ill-founded, and becomes increasingly ill-founded as the march of naval science progresses. Germany has a very small coast-line and few great harbours in the North Sea. It would be difficult to find a more unpromising coast for a naval attack than this line of small islands, with their dangerous navigation, uncertain and shifting channels and sand banks, currents, mists, and fogs. All the difficulties of nature have been developed by military art, and an immense front of fortifications crowned by enormous batteries already covers and commands all the approaches to Germany from the North Sea. With every improvement in the mine, the torpedo, and the submarine-boat the German coasts become more effectually protected from a naval attack. The total military force which Great Britain could provide for an invasion of Germany would not exceed at the most 150,000 men. The German Army attains on mobilisation a strength of over 4,000,000.

Although, no doubt, the scare of a British invasion has been used in Germany to delude the vulgar, it is impossible that it can have any basis in the minds of the powerful naval and military classes in Germany, or of the men who direct the policy of that Empire.

8. The whole character of the German Fleet shows that it is designed for aggressive and offensive action on the largest possible scale in the North Sea or the North Atlantic. The structure of the German battleships shows clearly that they are intended for attack in a fleet action. The disposition of their guns, torpedo tubes, armour, the systems of naval tactics which the Germans practise and the naval principles which they inculcate upon their officers, leave no room to doubt that the idea of sudden and aggressive action against a fleet of great power is the primary cause for which they have been prepared.

Their "torpedo-boats," as they call them in contrast to our term "torpedo-boat destroyers," by their high speed and general characteristics, show themselves to be designed with the prime purpose of making an attack upon the great ships of the Navy they may be opposed to. The British torpedo-boat destroyers, on the other hand, are designed primarily for the purpose of destroying the torpedo-boats of the enemy and thus defending the British Battle Fleet from attack. Gun power for defence is the main characteristic of British torpedo craft: speed for closing to effective torpedo range that of the German.

No class of vessel yet designed belongs more naturally to the defensive than the submarine; but the German development of the submarine, from all the information we can obtain, tends to turn even this weapon of defence into one of offence by building not the smaller class, which would be useful for the defence of their limited coast-line, but large submarines capable of a sudden and offensive operation at a distance from their base across the sea.

The Admiralty feel it impossible to resist the conclusion that the German Fleet, whatever may be said about it, exists and has been created for the purpose of fighting, if need be, a great battle in the North Sea or the North Atlantic both with battleships and all ancillary vessels against some other great naval Power. The weapon which has been so patiently and laboriously prepared is fitted for that purpose, and that alone.

9. We have further been assured from German sources that, even if this were so, the Germans have no expectation of obtaining a victory over the strongest naval Power, and that all they seek to achieve is a standard of strength that will leave the greatest naval Power so seriously weakened after the battle is over that she would hesitate before embarking on a quarrel. This explanation is scarcely respectful to the sagacity of the German Government, and to the high degree to which they carry their studies of the military art both by land and sea. Whatever purpose has animated the creators of the German Navy, and induced them to make so many exertions and sacrifices, it is not the foolish purpose of certainly coming off second best on the day of trial.

10. Reference must here be made to a very secret matter. During the last few years we have become aware of the development in the United Kingdom of an extensive system of German intelligence agents. The materials at the disposal of the Admiralty on this subject were submitted by the present First Lord in November last to the Director of Public Prosecutions (Sir Charles Mathews), and to Mr. A. H. Bodkin, K.C., in order to obtain a perfectly cool and dispassionate

opinion from persons unconnected with the Admiralty and accustomed to weigh evidence. The following is an extract from their report:

> We have carefully examined and considered the material with which we have been furnished, and have come to the following conclusions:
> (a) That as far as England and Wales are concerned there is already established therein an extensive and systematic machinery of secret service, kept in motion and controlled by one or more persons in the secret service of Germany.
> (b) That agents in this country are employed and controlled "from Germany in collecting information relating to land and naval defence of this country, and in communicating such information to one" or more members of the German secret service.
> (c) That such agents are distributed over various parts of England and Wales, chiefly at places near to the sea coast, where information upon such matters would more probably be obtained.
> (d) That such agents in this country are principally, it would appear, of German nationality, but in some cases English in one or other of the services.

11. The purpose which governs the creation of a weapon may be unconnected with any intention to employ it. It would not be fair to draw from the character of the German Fleet the conclusion that the German Government, or still less, the German people, have formed any conscious intention of attacking the British Empire; and so long as we maintain a good and sufficient superiority in naval power it is unlikely that they will ever do so. It is permissible to believe that Germany wishes to be powerful at sea, simply for the sake of being powerful and of obtaining the influence which comes from power without any specific danger to guard against or settled purpose to employ the power. Still, the German Empire has been built up by a series of sudden and successful wars. Within the lifetime of many she has carved a maritime province out of Denmark, and the Rhine provinces out of France. She has absorbed half the ancient Kingdom of Poland; she dominates Austria, Italy, and Sweden. Her policy has been such as to place her in a position to absorb Holland with scarcely an effort. Her military strength renders her alone, among the nations of Europe, free from the fear of invasion. But there is not a State on her borders, nor a small State in Europe, but has either suffered at her hands or lies under the impression of her power. From these anxieties Great Britain, and the British Empire, sheltered by the Navy of Great Britain, have hitherto been free.

12. In this connection the disparity of the naval risks of the British and German Empires must not be overlooked.

Great Britain can never violate German territory even after a defeat of that Power at sea, her Army not being organised or strong enough for such an undertaking. Germany with her large Army could, however, if she chose, invade and conquer Great Britain after a successful naval campaign in the North Sea. Germany has no overseas territory desired by Great Britain. Great Britain has overseas territories, the cession of which might be demanded by Germany after a successful war. A decisive battle lost at sea by Germany would still leave her the greatest Power in Europe. A decisive battle lost at sea by Great Britain would forever ruin the United Kingdom, would shatter the British Empire to its

foundations, and change profoundly the destiny of its component parts. The advantages which Great Britain could gain from defeating Germany are nil. There are practically no limits to the ambitions which might be indulged by Germany, or to the brilliant prospects open to her in every quarter of the globe, if the British Navy were out of the way. The combination of the strongest Navy with that of the strongest Army would afford wider possibilities of influence and action than have yet been possessed *by any* Empire in modern times.

## II. SITUATION IN 1915

13. In Home Waters:

In the spring of the year 1915 –

Great Britain will have 25 Dreadnought battleships and 2 Lord Nelsons.

Germany will have 17 Dreadnought battleships.

Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.

Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

The Admiralty have decided upon a certain margin of superiority in Home waters which they consider to be absolutely necessary to secure the safety of our shores. This margin has been broadly fixed for that year at a ratio of 3 to 2 in Dreadnought battleships apart from other vessels.

Consequently, when Germany has –

2 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 17;

Great Britain will have –

3 battle squadrons of Dreadnoughts and 1 fleet flagship; total, 25.

It will be noted that, owing to the dispatch of 4 battle cruisers to the Mediterranean, Great Britain and Germany will each have an equal number of these vessels in Home waters, viz., 6.

14. These standards in new ships are sober and moderate. No one can say that they err on the side of excess. The reason we are able to content ourselves with them for the present is that we possess a good superiority in battleships and especially armoured cruisers of the pre-Dreadnought era.

In this are included 8 King Edwards (3rd Battle Squadron), which are more powerful than any other pre-Dreadnought ships; 8 Formidables (5th Battle Squadron) and 5 Duncans (6th Battle Squadron), which are as good as the ships of the 3rd German Squadron; and 8 Majestics (7th Battle Squadron); 6 Canopus, and 2 Swiftsures (8th Battle Squadron), which are superior to the 4th and 5th German Squadrons as they will be in 1915. There are, besides, 22 armoured cruisers, some of which are very good ships, against which the Germans have 7 of similar strength. There is also a preponderance in torpedo-boat destroyers and a good margin in submarines.

This reserve of strength will steadily diminish every year, actually because the ships of which it is composed grow old, and relatively because the new ships are more powerful. It will diminish more rapidly if new construction in Germany is increased or accelerated. As this process continues, greater exertions will be required by the British Empire.

15. The margin above prescribed in new ships has been decided upon after a consideration of many factors, including the individual power of the ships on both sides, and the British preponderance in older vessels to which reference has been made. Attention is directed to the necessity of our being prepared at our average moment for an attack by Germany at her selected moment.

*[Although not included in the later printed copies of The Secret Memorandum, in a copy printed by Gilbert Tucker an additional point is made here and was included in copies sent to Canada in September 1912:*

*With regard to this:*

*In the North Sea Germany has about 140 miles of coast line. Approximately one-half of this is north of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal which, 40 miles in length, communicates directly with Kiel, the largest German naval station. This northern coast is protected by the Frisian islands, which are being fortified, but it comprises no harbours or naval stations. The southern and western half includes the entrance to the Kiel Canal with a coast line of approximately 75 miles, contains the naval stations of Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Emden, and is protected by a long line of islands strongly fortified, Heligoland being an outlying fortified post. It follows that, without any variation of routine conditions, the whole German Navy can be concentrated within a narrow compass at any moment without exciting any attention.]*

16. It here becomes necessary to allude to the German pre-Dreadnought forces.

In addition to the 17 Dreadnought battleships and 6 Dreadnought cruisers above mentioned, Germany will have in permanent commission by 1915 a 3rd squadron of 8 ships, bringing the total numbers in full commission up to 25, or 3 squadrons of 8 and 1 Fleet flagship. She will also have from 12 to 14 battleships in reserve, of which under the new law 4 will be in permanent commission. The numbers thus available at any selected moment in battleships alone are:

29, of which 17 are Dreadnoughts and 12 pre-Dreadnoughts, with 6 battle cruisers; and, without attracting any attention whatever, these ships can, by reason of the conditions of the coast-line and harbours above alluded to, be concentrated for war at any moment 300 miles from the entrance to the River Thames.

17. Great Britain, average moment. – In 1915, according to the present arrangements (which may have to be reconsidered in the light of German progress), we shall have in permanent full commission

4 battle squadrons and 1 Fleet flagship, of which 3 squadrons or 25 ships will be Dreadnoughts. One of these four squadrons (King Edwards) may at an average moment be at Gibraltar, leaving 25 ships, or 3 squadrons in British waters.

In addition, there will be a squadron of 8 ships (Formidables) and 5 Duncans manned permanently as to 50 per cent of their crews, the remaining 50 per cent being at the various schools of torpedo, gunnery, etc., available at the shortest notice provided the ships are at their ports. An average moment may find them away from their ports exercising, and at all moments it will be necessary to embark the balance crews before they can be put in the line of battle.

Further, as regards the three fully commissioned squadrons numbering 25, ships in full commission, the possibility of concentration which has been alluded to in the case of Germany does not exist for us at our average moment. There is in effect no harbour where such an assemblage of ships could lie at an average moment without causing a great disturbance of organisation; the exigencies of their practices in tactics, gunnery, torpedo, etc., actually compel their dispersion among the various ports and harbours of the British Isles.

There are not very many harbours convenient for these purposes. The necessity of non-interference with commerce, fisheries, etc., practically limits the

normal exercising positions to the east and west coasts of Scotland, Berehaven on the south-west of Ireland, and Portland on the south coast of England. It will, wherefore, be noticed that at an average moment our whole active Fleet may be dispersed, as to one squadron as far as Gibraltar, as to 3 squadrons over the whole coast-line of about 2,000 miles of the British Isles, as to the 5th and 6th (not yet formed) at a distance measured in time for mobilisation of anything up to 48 hours, and as to the 7th and 8th up to, say, 5 days.

Although after the Reserves have been mobilised the British forces will be superior, unremitting vigilance is required; and anything which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and augments our security and our chances of being left unmolested.

18. Mediterranean Station. – Four battle-cruisers and four armoured cruisers will be required to support during the years 1913 and 1914 the interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and the important food supplies and Oriental trade which pass through that sea. By keeping this squadron in the Mediterranean we reduce our superiority in battle cruisers in Home waters, leaving us a bare equality in this important class. During these years the Navies of Austria and Italy will gradually increase in strength, until in 1915 they will each possess a formidable Fleet of 4 and 6 Dreadnought battleships respectively, together with strong battleships of the pre-Dreadnought types and other units, such as cruisers, torpedo craft, &c. It is evident, therefore, that in the year 1915 our squadron of 4 battlecruisers and 4 armoured cruisers (maintained, be it remembered, at the cost of our superiority in the former vessels in Home waters) will not suffice to fulfil our requirements, and its whole composition must be reconsidered. To maintain a force that will secure consideration for our interests from Mediterranean Powers we should have at least 6 Dreadnought battleships with 2 battle-cruisers. The maintenance of such a force may well be the factor that will determine Mediterranean Powers to hostility or amity with Great Britain.

It is not that with inferior forces our officers and men would fear to meet an enemy: no doubt they would do so, and with good heart; but it is the duty of the citizens of the Empire, upon whom the actual fighting cannot devolve, to furnish those upon whom it might devolve with such forces as will give them fair prospects of victory.

The policy of keeping upon foreign stations ships of which the strength is less than that of the ships of foreign Powers whom they may expect to meet in battle proved disastrous to this country in the American War of 1812, when, owing to the policy of expecting our 32-gun frigates to fight with success the American 44-gun frigates, many mortifying reverses attended our arms.

19. Overseas. – *Within* a decade the paramount duty of ensuring our preponderance in Home waters (at present the decisive theatre of a possible war), has compelled Great Britain to abandon her policy of maintaining at great expense in men and money squadrons in every distant sea, and to concentrate the Fleet mainly in Home waters.

Thus in 1902 there were 55 pennants in the Mediterranean; to-day there are 19. There were 14 pennants on the North America and West Indies Station; to-day there are 3.

There were 3 cruisers on the south-east coast of America; to-day there is 1.

There were 16 pennants on the Cape of Good Hope Station; to-day there are 3.

There were 8 pennants on the Pacific Station; to-day there are 2.

There were 42 pennants on the China Station; to-day there are 31.

There were 12 pennants on the Australian Station; to-day there are 8. These will eventually be increased by the formation of the Australian Fleet unit to 10.

There were 10 pennants on the East Indies station; to-day there are 9. Or a total of 160 pennants on foreign stations against 76 to-day.

On the other hand, there has been a substantial accession of strength at home. Whereas in 1902 the Channel Fleet had 13 ships in full commission, while 25 were under the orders of the Admiral Superintendent of Naval Reserves and 24 destroyers were attached to the Home ports for instructional purposes, to-day the 1st Fleet numbers 56 ships, while 11 ships and 66 destroyers in full commission are attached to it. The 2nd Fleet, with 50 per cent crews embarked, comprises 21 ships; and 13 ships with 66 destroyers and 24 torpedo-boats, also 48 submarines with 4 attached ships, are within its organisation.

The 3rd Fleet, which represents all remaining effective vessels required upon outbreak of war, comprises 16 battleships and 38 cruisers, all of which have a small number of men embarked in order that they may be effective on mobilisation. (These last would greatly need a short period in which to develop their efficiency.)

Neither the 2nd nor 3rd Fleet existed in 1902, vessels not in full commission being kept in dockyards with no men on board of them.

Heavy and increasing as the strain has been, the Admiralty cannot admit that up to the present it has not been met, or that there is not time to provide for the future.

*III – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS* [*sub-title not in Tucker publication*]

20. From this comparison it will be seen that the growth of the German Navy has compelled us to concentrate our Fleet at home. Money has not been stinted by Parliament. Estimates of £31,000,000, which were sufficient in 1902, have risen to £45,000,000 in the present year, and will rise again substantially next year. The enlistment of men, the training of officers, the steady and methodical development by every possible means of British naval strength and efficiency have been and will be untiringly pursued. But in spite of this largely increased expenditure and these exertions the fact remains that the Admiralty have been compelled by the pressure of circumstances to withdraw or diminish various forces which in time of peace were a symbol of Empire and the visible link which united all the subjects of the Crown and citizens of our race.

Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, impart a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons, and enable the flag to be again flown confidently in the distant seas.

21. Naval supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas the strongest hostile Navy or combination of hostile Navies wherever they may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time to, or maintain permanently in, some distant theatre forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary defence for the safety and interests of the great dominions of the Crown, and which for all these years has been an effective deterrent upon possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of the policy and the security of Canada.

22. The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade and the immense value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade (imports and exports) of the Dominion of Canada in 1909–10 was not less than £72,000,000, and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing. For the whole of this trade wherever it may be about the distant waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended, upon the Imperial Navy without contribution or cost to her of any kind.

23. Further, at the present time and in the immediate future we still have the power by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of our reserves to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective Fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. And these communities are also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken.

24. This power both specific and general will be diminished with the growth not only of the German Navy, but by the simultaneous building by many Powers of great modern ships of war. Whereas, in the present year Great Britain possesses 18 battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought class against 19 of that class possessed by the other Powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures in 1914 will be 31 to 33, and in 1915 only 35 to 51. The existence of a number of Navies all comprising ships of high quality creates possibilities of adverse combinations being suddenly formed against which no reasonable standard of British naval strength can fully guard. And the development of British naval strength has to be accompanied by a foreign policy which does not leave us without friends in Europe and Asia, and relieves us from the impossible task of building against the whole world.

25. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present serious juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and the greatest military Powers; and she has not lost her capacity, even if left wholly unsupported, of being able by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire. The Admiralty will not hesitate if necessary to ask next year for a further substantial increase beyond anything that has at present been announced, with consequent extra additions to the burden of the British taxpayer. But the aid which Canada could give at the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. It will have a moral value out of all proportion to the material assistance afforded. The failure of Canada at this moment, after all that has been said, to take any effective step would produce the worst impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action on the part of Canada to increase the power of the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be recognised everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any time be

minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend with the united strength of the whole.

26. On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is desirable that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply.

It is true that the forms of naval architecture change and are changing as the years pass; that great ships are not the only units in which decisive naval power can be measured; and that new weapons and new conditions may modify their influence.

It is after a full consideration of these aspects that the Admiralty record their opinion as above. They are satisfied that no step which Canada could take at the present time would be so helpful to the British Navy, or so likely to put a stop to dangerous naval rivalry, as the provision of capital ships for general Imperial service. Admiralty, 26 August 1912

[Printed copy from 1914 and antedated. Tucker's copy from Borden's Papers is listed as Admiralty 20 September 1912 and had 27 'sections'. Appendices are omitted] *Source*: Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA. Also Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/18/9.

## Appendix A.2 Naval Aid Bill, 1912–13

BILL 21
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA
An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.
HIS MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
1. This Act may be cited as *The Naval Aid Act*.
2. From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.
3. The said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.
4. The said ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the Governor in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire.
5. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied and the said ships shall be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government.

*Source*: Bill introduced by Borden, 5 December 1912, *DHCC*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CVII. cc. 676–694. Also see G. N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Appendix IX.

## Appendix A.3 Admiralty Memorandum put before the Canadian House of Commons, 5 December 1912

MEMORANDUM

Prepared by the Board of the Admiralty on the General Naval Situation and communicated to the Government of Canada by His Majesty's Government.

1. The Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada has [*invited His Majesty's Government through*] the Board of Admiralty to prepare a statement of the present and immediately prospective requirements of the Naval Defence of the Empire for presentation to the Canadian Parliament if the Dominion Cabinet deem it necessary.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are prepared to comply and to supplement, in a form which can be made public, the confidential communications and conversations which have passed between the Admiralty and ministers of the Dominion Parliament during the recent visit to the United Kingdom.

The Admiralty set the greatest store by the important material, and still more important moral, assistance which it is within the British naval supremacy on the high seas, but they think it necessary to disclaim any intention, however indirect of putting pressure on Canadian public opinion, or of seeking to influence the Dominion Parliament in a decision which clearly belongs solely to Canada.

The Admiralty therefore confine themselves in this statement exclusively to facts, and it is for the Dominion Government and Parliament to draw their own conclusions therefrom.

2. The power of the British Empire to maintain the superiority on the sea which is essential to its security must obviously be measured from time to time by reference to the other naval forces of the world, and such a comparison does not imply anything unfriendly in intention, or in spirit, to any other Power, or group of Powers. From this point of view the development of the German Fleet during the last fifteen years is the most striking feature of the naval situation today. That development has been authorised by five successive legislative enactments, viz., the Fleet Laws of 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912. These laws cover the period up to 1920.

Whereas in 1898 the German Fleet consisted of:

9 battleships (excluding coast-defence vessels),
3 large cruisers,
28 small cruisers,
113 torpedo-boats, and
25,000 men,

maintained at an annual cost of £6,000,000, the full Fleet of 1920 will consist of:

41 battleships,
20 large cruisers,
40 small cruisers,
144 torpedo-boats,
72 submarines, and
101,500 men,

estimated to be maintained at an annual cost of £23,000,000.

These figures, however, give no real idea of the advance, for the size and cost of ships has risen continually during the period, and, apart from increasing

their total numbers, Germany has systematically replaced old and small ships, which counted as units in her earlier fleet, by the most powerful and costly modern vessels. Neither does the money provided by the estimates for the completed law represent the increase in cost properly attributable to the German navy, for many charges borne on British naval funds are otherwise defrayed in Germany; and the German Navy comprises such a large proportion of new ships that the cost of maintenance and repair is considerably less than in navies which have been longer established.

3. The naval expansion of Germany has not been provoked by British naval increases. The German Government have repeatedly declared that their naval policy has not been influenced by British action and the following figures speak for themselves:

In 1905 Great Britain was building 4 capital ships and Germany 2.

In 1906 Great Britain reduced to 3 capital ships and Germany increased to 3.

In 1907 Great Britain built 3 capital ships and Germany built 3.

1908 Great Britain reduced to 2 capital ships and Germany further increased to 4.

It was not until the efforts of Great Britain, to procure the abatement or retardation of naval rivalry, had failed for 3 successive years that the Admiralty were forced in 1909, upon a general review of the naval situation, to ask Parliament to take exceptional measures to secure against all possible hazards the safety of the Empire. In that year 8 capital ships were laid down in Great Britain and 2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively – a total of 10.

4. In the spring of the present year the fifth German Navy Law was assented to by the Reichstag. The main feature of that law is not the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though that is important, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which will be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

A third squadron of 8 battleships will be created and maintained in full commission as part of the active battle fleet. Whereas, according to the unamended law, the active battle fleet consisted of 17 battleships, 4 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 12 small cruisers, it will in the near future consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers; and whereas at present, owing to the system of recruitment which prevails in Germany, the German Fleet is less fully mobile during the winter than during the summer months, it will, through the operation of this law, not only be increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Ninety-nine torpedo-boat destroyers, instead of 66, will be maintained in full commission out of a total of 144; 72 new submarines will be built within the currency of the new law, and of these it is apparently proposed to maintain 54 with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the law will be that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy will be maintained in full permanent commission; that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war.

So great a change and development in the German Fleet involves, of course, important additions to their personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German Navy amounted to 25,000. To-day that figure has reached 66,000. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men, and makes a total in 1920 of 101,500.

The new construction under the law prescribes for the building of 3 additional battleships – 1 to be begun next year, 1 in 1916 – and 2 small cruisers, of which the date has not yet been fixed. The date of the third battleship has not been fixed. It has been presumed to be later than the six years which are in view. The cost of these increases in men and in material during the next six years is estimated as £10,500,000 spread over that period above the previous estimates.

The facts set forth above were laid before the House of Commons on the 22nd July, 1912, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

5. The effect of the new German Navy Law is to produce a remarkable expansion of strength and efficiency, and particularly of strength and efficiency as they contribute to striking power. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers which will be kept constantly ready and in full commission will be raised by the law from 21, the present figure, to 33 – an addition of 12, or an increase of about 57 per cent.

The new fleet will, in the beginning, include about 20 battleships and large cruisers of the older type, but gradually as new vessels are built the fighting power of the fleet will rise until in the end it will consist completely of modern vessels.

The complete organisation of the German fleet, as described by the latest law, will be 5 battle squadrons and a fleet flagship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliaries of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines.

This full development will only be realised step by step; but already in 1914 2 squadrons will, according to Admiralty information, be entirely composed of what are called dreadnoughts, and the third will be made up of good ships like the "Deutschlands" and the "Braunschweigs", together with 5 dreadnought battle cruisers.

This great fleet is not dispersed all over the world for duties of commerce protection or in discharge of Colonial responsibilities; nor are its composition and character adapted to those purposes. It is concentrated and kept concentrated in close proximity to the German and British coasts.

Attention must be drawn to the explicit declaration of the tactical objects for which the German Fleet exists as set forth in the preamble to the Naval Law of 1900 as follows:

> "In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such a strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great Naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

6. It is now necessary to look forward to the situation in 1915.

In Home Waters.

In the spring of the year 1915 –
Great Britain will have 25 "Dreadnought" battleships and 2 Lord Nelsons.
Germany will have 17 "Dreadnought" battleships.
Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.
Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

These margins in new ships are sober and moderate. They do not err on the side of excess. The reason they suffice for the present is that Great Britain possess a good superiority in battleships and especially armoured cruisers of the pre-dreadnought era.

This reserve of strength will steadily diminish every year, actually because the ships of which it is composed grow old, and relatively because the new ships are more powerful. It will diminish more rapidly if new construction in Germany is increased or accelerated. As this process continues, greater exertions will be required by the British Empire.

Mediterranean Station.

Four battle-cruisers and four armoured cruisers will be required to support British interests in the Mediterranean during the years 1913 and 1914. During those years the navies of Austria and Italy will gradually increase in strength, until in 1915 they will each possess a formidable Fleet of 4 and 6 dreadnought battleships respectively, together with strong battleships of the pre-dreadnought types and other units, such as cruisers, torpedo craft, &c. It is evident, therefore, that in the year 1915 our squadron of 4 battle cruisers and 4 armoured cruisers (maintained, be it remembered, at the cost of our superiority in the former vessels in Home waters) will not suffice to fulfil our requirements, and its whole composition must be re-considered.

Overseas.

It has been necessary within the past decade to concentrate the fleet mainly in home waters.

In 1902 there were 160 British vessels on the overseas stations against 76 to-day.

7. Naval supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas the strongest hostile Navy or combination of hostile Navies wherever they may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time to, or maintain permanently in, some distant theatre forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary safeguard of the safety and interests of the great Dominions of the Crown, and which for all these years has been the deterrent upon any possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of their policy and safety.

The rapid expansion of Canadian sea-borne trade and the immense value of Canadian cargoes always afloat in British and Canadian bottoms here require consideration. On the basis of the figures supplied by the Board of Trade to the Imperial Conference of 1911, the annual value of the overseas trade (imports and exports) of the Dominion of Canada in 1909–10 was not less than £72,000,000, and the tonnage of Canadian vessels was 718,000 tons, and these proportions have already increased and are still increasing. For the whole of this trade wherever it may be about the distant waters of the world, as well as for the maintenance of her communications both with Europe and Asia, Canada is dependent, and has always depended, upon the Imperial Navy without corresponding contribution or cost.

Further, at the present time and in the immediate future Great Britain still has the power by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of our reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective Fleet of battleships and cruisers to unite with the Royal Australian Navy and the British squadrons in China and the Pacific for the defence of British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand. And these communities are also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength is unbroken.

8. This power, both specific and general, will be diminished with the growth not only of the German navy, but by the simultaneous building by many Powers of great modern ships of war.

Whereas, in the present year Great Britain possesses 18 battleships and battlecruisers of the dreadnought class against 19 of that class possessed by the other powers of Europe, and will possess in 1913 24 to 21, the figures in 1914 will be 31 to 33, and in the year 1915 35 to 51.

The existence of a number of navies all comprising ships of high quality must be considered in so far as it affects the possibilities of adverse combinations being suddenly formed. Larger margins of superiority at home would, among other things, restore a greater freedom to the movements of the British squadrons in every sea, and directly promote the security of the Dominions.

Anything which increases our margin in the newest ships diminishes the strain and arguments our security and our chances of being left unmolested.

9. Whatever may be the decision of Canada at the present juncture, Great Britain will not in any circumstances fail in her duty to the Overseas Dominions of the Crown. She has before now successfully made head alone and unaided against the most formidable combinations and she has not lost her capacity, by a wise policy and strenuous exertions to watch over and preserve the vital interests of the Empire.

The Admiralty are assured that His Majesty's Government will not hesitate to ask the House of Commons for whatever provision the circumstances of each year may require. But the aid which Canada could give at, the present time is not to be measured only in ships or money. Any action on the part of Canada to increase the power and the mobility of the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margins of our common safety, would be recognized everywhere as a most significant witness to the united strength of the Empire and to the renewed resolve of the overseas dominion to take their part in maintaining its integrity.

[*10. The Prime Minister of the Dominion having inquired in what form any immediate aid that Canada might give would be most effective, we have no hesitation in answering after a prolonged consideration of all the circumstances that it is desirable that such aid should include the provision of a certain number of the largest and strongest ships of war which science can build or money supply*.]

*Source*: *DHCC,* Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Volume CVII, columns 679–684 With the exception of the text in italics, the copy read out in the House of Commons is the same as the 'Draft Memorandum for Publication' provided by the Admiralty, 20 September 1912, ADM 116/3485, NA. Also available at Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/18/2. It was also published in *The Times*, London, 6 December 1912.

## Appendix A.4 The World's Dreadnoughts – October 1912

A, in commission; B, completing afloat; C, on the stocks; D, ordered or projected with projected date of commissioning:

| | A | B | C | D | Total | Date of Completion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British Empire | 20 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 36 | March 1915 |
| Germany | 12 | 5 | 6 | – | 23 | March 1915 |
| U.S.A. | 8 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 13 | Spring 1916 |
| France | 6 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 17 | January 1917 |
| Japan | 3 | 2 | 4 | – | 9 | Unknown 1916 |
| Russia | – | 4 | 3 | 4 | 11 | Spring 1917 |
| Italy | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 8 | Unknown 1916 |
| Austria | 1 | 1 | 2 | – | 4 | March 1915 |
| Brazil | 2 | – | 1 | – | 3 | Unknown 1914 |
| Spain | – | 1 | 2 | – | 3 | March 1915 |
| Argentine | – | 2 | – | – | 2 | Unknown 1913 |
| Chile | – | – | 2 | – | 2 | March 1915 |
| Turkey | – | – | 1 | 1 | 2 | Unknown 1915 |

*Source*: 7 February 1913, *DHCC*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CVIII, c. 2926.

## Appendix A.5 Situation of Naval Powers in March 1913, in Ships Built, Building and Projected

Capital-Ships: A – Modern Ships of 15,000 tons or over; B – Battleship-Cruisers; C – Modern ships of over 10,000 and under 15,000 tons; D – Older ships fitted for subsidiary services or modern craft under 10,000 tons displacement.
Armoured Cruisers: A – Ships steaming 21 knots, and mounting at least four heavy guns of 9.2 in. calibre or over; B – Ships of 6,000 tons or over not included in Class A; C – all other armoured cruisers.
Protected Cruisers: A – Modern ships of over 5,000 tons; B – Modern ships of over 2,000 and under 5,000 tons; C – Vessels fitted for subsidiary services not included in classes A or B.
Destroyers: A – Ocean-going craft of 500 tons or over; B – All other destroyers.
Torpedo-Boats: A – First-class boats of less than eleven years of age; B – All other boats.

| | | *British* | *USA* | *Germany* | *France* | *Japan* | *Russia* | *Italy* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Capital-Ships | A | 44 | 19 | 17 | 17 | 9 | 9 | 8 |
| | B | 10 | – | 6 | – | 8 | 4 | – |
| | C | 22 | 16 | 20 | 14 | 7 | 6 | 6 |
| | D | – | 7 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Armoured Cruisers | A | 9 | 4 | 1 | – | – | 1 | 4 |
| | B | 25 | 11 | 8 | 18 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
| | C | 8 | – | – | 3 | 1 | – | 1 |
| Protected Cruisers | A | 46 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 6 | – |
| | B | 43 | 11 | 32 | 2 | 12 | 1 | 7 |
| | C | 7 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 2 |
| Torpedo Gunboats | – | 13 | – | – | 3 | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| Destroyers | A | 152 | 34 | 85 | 21 | 16 | 34 | 18 |
| | B | 80 | 16 | 48 | 62 | 54 | 70 | 28 |
| Torpedo Boats | A | 49 | 22 | 41 | 48 | 23 | 29 | 79 |
| | B | 60 | 5 | 51 | 18 | 33 | – | 38 |
| Submarine Boats | – | 87 | 39 | 36 | 89 | 15 | 37 | 20 |

*Amended from source*: 7 February 1913, *DHCC*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, Vol. CVIII, cc. 2929–30.

## Appendix A.6 Votes in the House of Commons on the Third Reading of the Naval Aid Bill

Third Reading – 15 May 1913
Yeas (101): Ames, Armstrong (Lambton), Armstrong (York, Ontario), Arthurs, Baker, Ball, Barker, Beattie, Bennett (Calgary), Bennett (Simcoe), Best, Blain, Blondin, Borden, Bowman, Boyce, Bots, Brabazon, Bradbury, Broder, Burnham, Burrell, Chabot, Clare, Clarke (Wellington), Cochrane, Cockshutt, Coderre, Crocket, Cromwell, Crothers, Currie, Davidson, Doherty, Donnelly, Edwards, Elliot, Fisher, Forget, Fowler, Garland, Gauthier (Gaspe), Girard, Green, Hartt, Hazen, Henderson, Hepburn, Hughes (Victoria), Jameson, Kemp, Lalor, Lancaster, Lavallée, Lesperance, Lewis, Macdonell, Maclean (York, Ontario), McKay, McLean (Queen's, Prince Edward Island), McLean (Sunbury), Marshall, Merner, Middlebro, Morrison, Munson, Nantel, Northrup, Osler, Paquet, Paul, Pelletier, Perley, Rainville, Reid (Grenville), Rhodes, Robidoux, Rogers, Schaffner, Sevigny, Sexsmith, Sharpe (Lisgar), Sharpe (Ontario), Shepherd, Smith, Smyth, Stanfield, Stevens, Stewart (Hamilton), Stewart (Lunenburg), Sutherland, Taylor, Thoburn, Thornton, Walker, Wallace, White (Renfrew), Wilson (Wentworth), Wright.
Nays (68): Achim, Barrette, Béland, Bellemare, Boivin, Boulay, Bourassa, Boyer, Broullard, Buchanan, Bureau, Cardin, Carvell, Charlton, Chisholm (Antigonish), Chisholm (Inverness), Delisle, Demers, Devlin, Douglas, Ethier, Fortier, Gauthier (St. Hyacinthe), Gauvreau, German, Graham, Guilbault, Guthrie, Kay, Kyte, Lachance, Lafortune, Lanctot, Lapointe (Kamouraska), Lapointe (Montreal St. James), Laurier, Law, Lemieux, Loggie, Macdonald, McCoig, McCrea, McKenzie, Marcil (Bonaventure), Marcil (Bagot), Martin (Montreal St. Mary's), Michaud, Murphy, Neely, Oliver, Pacaud, Papineau, Pardee, Power, Proulx, Pugsley, Reid (Restigouche), Richards, Robb, Seguin, Thomson (Qu'Appelle), Tobin, Turgeon, Verville, Warnock, White (Victoria, Alberta), Wilson (Laval).
Pairs: 44 members were paired. Ministerial: Murphy, Steele, Meighen, Thomson (Yukon), Weichel, McCurdy, Bristol, Aikens, Barnard, Clark (Bruce), White, Wilcox, Nickle, Nicholson, Webster, Foster (Kings), Foster (Toronto), Alguire, Tremain, Elson, Fripp, Roche. Opposition: Champagne, Nesbitt, MacNutt, Sinclair, Clark (Red Deer), Maclean (Halifax), Bickerdike, Turiff, Martin (Regina), McCraney, Emmerson, Cruise, Ross, Hughes, Lovell, Cash, Clarke (Essex), McMillan, Knowles, Brown, Gordon, Molloy.
The Bill was read for the third time and passed.

*Source*: *DHCC*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, Vol. CXI, cc. 10061–3.

## Appendix A.7 Vote in the Senate on an Amendment to the Naval Aid Bill, 29 May 1913

The Senate divided on the amendment, 'That all words after the first word 'that' be struck out and the following inserted: That this House is not justified in giving its assent to this Bill until it is submitted to the judgement of the country.' It was carried:
Contents (51): Bélque, Beith, Belcourt, Bostock, Boyer, Casgrain, Choquette, Cloran, Coffey, Costigan, Dandurand, David, Davis, Derbyshire, Dessaulles, DeVeber, Domville, Douglas, Edwards, Farrell, Fiset, Forget Frost, Gibson, Gillmour, Godbout, Kerr, King, Lavergne, Legris, MacKay (Alma), McHugh, McSweeney, Mitchell, Montplaisir, Power, Prince, Prowse, Ratz, Riley, Roche, Ross (Moosejaw), Ross (Middlesex), Talbot, Tessier, Thibaudeau, Thompson, Watson, Wilson, Yeo and Young.
Non-contents (27): Baird, Boldue, Boucheville de, Boswell, Corby, Curry, Daniel, Denis, Donnelly, Ellis, Girroir, Gordon, Kirchoffer, LaRiviére, Longheed, Mackeen, Mason, McCall, McKay (Cape Breton), McLaren, McMillan, Murphy, Poirier, Pope, Ross (Middleton), Smith and Taylor.

*Source*: *DSC*, 1912–13, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, p. 916.

# Notes

## Frontispiece

1 H. Borden, editor, *Robert Laid Borden: His Memoirs*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), pp. 357–8.

## Preface

1 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1.
2 R. L. Borden, *Letters to Limbo* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
3 R. C. Brown, *Robert Laird Borden, A Biography*, Vol. 1, 1854–1914 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1975), Vol. 2, 1914–1937 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1980); J. English, *Borden: His Life and World* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977).
4 G. N. Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 1912–1914', *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1947), pp. 1–30.
5 G. N. Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History*, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952).
6 D. C. Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902–1914', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1961), pp. 407–22; *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870–1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).
7 R. MacGregor Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: Winston S. Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–15', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 1940), pp. 325–58.
8 T. Cook, *Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012).
9 P. Dutil and D. MacKenzie, *Canada 1911: The Decisive Election that Shaped the Country* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011).
10 W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911–1918*, variously published, but first published as five volumes in six parts (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923–31).
11 Thomas Edward Shaw (T. E. Lawrence), 10 August 1927, MS. Eng. d.3338, fols 31–47, Department of Special Collections, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
12 W. S. Churchill, *Great Contemporaries* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1937).

## Acknowledgements

1 *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1967), p. 180.
2 W. S. Churchill, *My Early Life* (London: Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd., 1974, first published 1930), p. 376.

## Chapter 1 Anglo-Canadian Imperial Relations in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

1 The full poem can be found in *The Times* (London), 27 April 1897 and M. Thornton, *Sir Robert Borden: Canada* (London: Haus, 2010), p. 24.
2 Thornton, p. 23.
3 Borden in his *Memoirs*, edited by his nephew, cites the Kipling poem as delivered by Laurier in 1910. Borden, *Memoirs*, p. 275.
4 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 120.
5 Newfoundland joined the confederation in 1949. The patriation of a new constitution to Canada in 1982 and the creation of Nunavut in 1999 have subsequently changed these early twentieth-century arrangements.
6 N. Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994), p. 1.
7 O. D. Skelton, *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, Vol. II, 1896–1919 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, reprint 1971, first published 1921), p. 27.
8 P. P. O'Brien, 'The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy Before the First World War', *Past and Present*, No. 172 (August 2001), pp. 150–1.
9 C. Miller, *Painting the Map Red; Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. xi.
10 Miller, p. xii.
11 Miller, p. 5.
12 *Documents of House of Commons of Canada* (hereafter *DHCC*), Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, Vol. CVII (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1912–13), p. 1048.
13 Skelton, p .39.
14 Skelton, p. 41.
15 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 3.
16 M. Milner, *Canada's Navy; The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, second edition), p. 7.
17 S. J. McNaught, 'The Rise of Proto-nationalism: Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Founding of the Naval Service of Canada, 1902–1910', in M. L. Hadley, R. Huebert and F. W. Crickard, editors, *A Nation's Navy in Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 109.
18 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 63.
19 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, footnote 7, p. 63.
20 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 78.
21 'Canadian Naval Policy, 1 January 1912–31 December 1914', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, National Archives, Kew. London (hereafter NA).
22 'Interim Report on Canadian Naval and Ship-Building Policy', 24 October 1912, ADM 116/3485, NA.
23 'A French Invasion', 22 June 1888, Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1/1, nationalarchives.gov.uk
24 Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1/2, nationalarchives.gov.uk
25 Military Intelligence Division, 31 May 1901, Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1/6, nationalarchives.gov.uk

26 Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1/6, nationalarchives.gov.uk
27 Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1/6, nationalarchives.gov.uk
28 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 60.
29 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 1912–14', *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1947), p. 1.
30 5 December 1912, *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 691.
31 Compiled at the Admiralty and printed at the Foreign Office, October 1912, 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of the Dominion of Canada During the Nineteenth Century', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
32 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of Canada', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
33 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of Canada', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
34 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of Canada', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
35 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of Canada', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
36 'British Naval Expenditure in Aid of Canada', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
37 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 109.
38 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 110.
39 G. R. Tweedie, 'The Roots of the Royal Canadian Navy; Sovereignty versus Nationalism, 1812–1910', in M. L. Hadley and R. Sarty, *Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880–1918* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p. 99.
40 S. J. McNaught, in Hadley et al., *A Nation's Navy*, p. 107.
41 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 112.
42 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 115.
43 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 117.
44 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 104.
45 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', pp. 411–12.
46 Lloyd George made these remarks in 1914 when he reflected on the laying down of the keel of the first Dreadnought in 1904. Cited by S. McKenna, *Reginald McKenna, 1863–1943: A Memoir* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), p. 64.
47 R. K. Massie, Dreadnought. *Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), Appendix, pp. 909–10. Massie provides a very helpful collection of data relating to the displacement tonnage and the size of the main armaments of the British and German Dreadnoughts.
48 Massie, Appendix, pp. 909–10.
49 After the Nassau class came the: Helgoland class 1911–12 and the Kaiser class, 1912–13. Massie, Appendix, p. 911.
50 20 September 1912, 'Draft Memorandum for Publication', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
51 'Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', 26 August 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
52 'Draft Memorandum for Publication', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
53 Skelton, p. 121.
54 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 92.

55 Dutil and MacKenzie, p. 42. See chapter 2, '"Grasping for Neptune's Trident": The Naval Service Bill', pp. 39–71.
56 Tucker, p. 119. Also, R. H. Gimblett, 'Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909 and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy', *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 35–53, p. 47.
57 Skelton, p. 122.
58 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 125; Gimblett, p. 48; Dutil and MacKenzie, pp. 44–5.
59 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 131.
60 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 131. Also Dutil and MacKenzie, p. 54.
61 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938), p. 268.
62 Borden, *Memoirs*, p. 276.
63 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, footnote 14, p. 131.
64 R. D. Francis, R. Jones and D. B. Smith, *Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation* (Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1988), p. 138. Dutil and MacKenzie, p. 51. See also, Hadley et al., *A Nation's Navy*.
65 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, pp. 132–3.
66 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 134.
67 Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, p. 30.
68 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 412.
69 M. Milner, 'The Historiography of the Canadian Navy; The State of the Art', in Hadley et al., *A Nation's Navy*, p. 23.
70 Gimblett, p. 48.
71 M. L. Hadley and R. Sarty, *Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880–1918* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p. 29.
72 J. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 3–4.
73 B. Morton Gough, 'The End of Pax Britannica and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy: Shifting Strategic Demands of an Empire at Sea', in B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock, editors, *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993), p. 22.
74 Gimblett, p. 50.
75 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 166.
76 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 169.
77 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, pp. 169–70.
78 Thornton, pp. 22–3.
79 Borden, *Memoirs*, p. 50.
80 Thornton, pp. 22–3.
81 *The Times*, 27 April 1897 and Thornton, p. 24.
82 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 173.
83 'Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', 26 August 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
84 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1051.
85 H. Macquarrie, 'Robert Borden and the Election of 1911', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1959), p. 273. See also Dutil and Mackenzie.
86 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2865.
87 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2866.

## Chapter 2 The Rise to Eminence of Winston S. Churchill and Robert L. Borden

1 Archives of Ontario, Canada, dated the cartoon as between 1911 and 1914.
2 W. S. Churchill, *Marlborough, His Life and Times*, four volumes (London: George Harrap Ltd., 1933–38).
3 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 29.
4 Churchill, *My Early Life*, pp. 29–30.
5 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 48.
6 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 89.
7 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 182.
8 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 163.
9 Both these books were published much later in one volume as W. S. Churchill, *The Boer War* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989).
10 Foreword in Churchill, *The Boer War*.
11 Churchill, *My Early Life*, pp. 240–1.
12 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 376.
13 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 376.
14 D. Dilks, Chapter 1, 'Young Man in a Hurry', *The Great Dominion. Winston Churchill in Canada, 1900–1954* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2005), pp. 9–28.
15 Dilks, *The Great Dominion*, pp. 13–26.
16 Dilks, *The Great Dominion*, pp. 16–17.
17 'Army Organisation', 13 May 1901, *Hansard*, Vol. 93, cc. 1574–5. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com
18 Churchill, *My Early Life*, p. 383.
19 *Daily Mirror*, Monday, 11 May 1908.
20 Churchill wrote to Asquith on 14 March 1908 about their previous discussions concerning the Admiralty. On the 10 April 1908, Churchill wrote to Asquith accepting the Presidency at the Board of Trade. Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 11, fols 10 and 59, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.
21 D. C. Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902–1914', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1961), p. 407.
22 R. MacGregor Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration; The British War Office, 1903–16', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (November 1939), pp. 451–78.
23 Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration', p. 456.
24 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. 1, p. 49.
25 R. B. Haldane, *Richard Burdon Haldane: An Autobiography* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931, first printed 1929), pp. 230–1.
26 Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration', p. 325.
27 Brown, *Borden*, Vol. 1, p. 15.
28 Borden, p. 15.
29 Brown, *Borden*, Vol. 1, p. 20.
30 K. Saunders, *Robert Borden* (Don Mills, Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1978), p. 11.
31 Brown, *Borden*, Vol. 1, p. 150.
32 J. English, 'Political Leadership in the First World War', in D. MacKenzie, *Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 77.

## Chapter 3 Winston S. Churchill Fears the Worst

1 W. S. Churchill, speech in the House of Commons, 'Navy Estimates, 1912–13', *Hansard*, 18 March 1912, Vol. 35, c. 1573.
2 P. J. Kelly, *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 6.
3 Patrick Kelly, cites Gerhard Ritter as a source for this view. P. J. Kelly, *Tirpitz*, p. 6.
4 W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 24.
5 W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 24.
6 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 92.
7 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 24. See also M. Thornton, 'Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, 23 October 1911–24 May 1915', www.churchillarchive.com
8 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 25.
9 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, pp. 25–6.
10 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, pp. 25–6.
11 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 26. Thornton, 'Winston Churchill as First Lord'.
12 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 95.
13 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 53.
14 M. Epkenhans, 'Was a Peaceful Outcome Thinkable? The Naval Race Before 1914', in H. Afflerbach and D. Stevenson, *An Improbable War* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), p. 115.
15 *The Times*, London, 10 February 1912, Churchill Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge, CHAR 9/43/41-42.
16 P. Addison, 'Churchill', www.oxforddnb.com
17 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 414.
18 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4859.
19 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 83.
20 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 98.
21 J. H. Maurer, 'Churchill's Naval Holiday: Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race, 1912–1914', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 1992), p. 105.
22 Maurer, p. 105.
23 Maurer, p. 110.
24 'Navy Estimates, 1912–13', *Hansard*, 18 March 1912, Vol. 35, cc. 1549–618.
25 'Navy Estimates, 1912–13', *Hansard*, 18 March 1912, Vol. 35, c. 1614.
26 'Navy Estimates, 1912–13', *Hansard*, 18 March 1912, Vol. 35, c. 1615.
27 Churchill to Asquith, 14 April 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
28 Churchill to Asquith, 14 April 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA
29 Churchill to Asquith, 14 April 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
30 Memoranda in October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
31 Memoranda in October 1912, Admiralty papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
32 Memoranda in October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
33 Memoranda in October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
34 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 415.
35 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 87.
36 'Additional Number of Men and Boys', 'Navy Estimates', *Hansard*, 22 July 1912, Vol. 41, cc. 817–914.
37 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 138.

## Chapter 4 Robert L. Borden, Canadian Naval Issues and His Visit to Great Britain of 1912

1 C. P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 1*, 1867–1921 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977), p. 153.
2 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 273.
3 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 415.
4 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 174.
5 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 174.
6 K. Saunders, *Robert Borden* (Don Mills, Ontario: Fitzhenry & Whiteside Limited, 1978), p. 28. E. Beaulieu and J. C. H. Emery argue that '… in the absence of opposition from pork packers, particularly in Quebec, Laurier would have retained his majority mandate', in 'Pork Packers, Reciprocity and Laurier's Defeat in the 1911 Canadian General Election', *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2001), p. 1083.
7 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 24.
8 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', pp. 24–5.
9 White to Borden, 28 December 1911, Borden Papers, cited in Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 208.
10 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 208.
11 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 208.
12 White to Borden, 4 September 1912, Borden Papers, cited in Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 208.
13 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 3.
14 Borden to Churchill, 30 May 1912, ADM 116/3485, NA.
15 Borden Papers, O. C., cited in Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 5.
16 Brown, *Borden*, Vol. 1, p. 231.
17 Stacey, p. 166.
18 Thornton, *Sir Robert Borden: Canada*, p. 20.
19 *The Times*, London, 4 July 1912, p. 9.
20 Brown, *Borden*, Vol. 1, p. 237.
21 P. G. Wigley, *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations 1917–26* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 42. The founders of the academic journal, *The Round Table* were Lord Milner, Geoffrey Dawson, Phillip Kerr and Lionel Curtis.
22 English, *Borden*, p. 96.
23 'Canadian Press and the Navy', 12 July 1912, *The Times*, London, p. 6; 'Canadian Ministers in London', 17 July 1912, *The Times*, London, p. 8; *The Times Digital Archive*.
24 'Canadian Press and the Navy', 12 July 1912, *The Times*, London, p. 6.
25 'Canadian Ministers in London', 17 July 1912, *The Times*, London, p. 8.
26 Stacey, p. 157.
27 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 181.
28 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, pp. 181–2.
29 '… and interprets my general statement in conversation on the 16th July as if it were a clause or a treaty …'. Churchill to Asquith, 30 August 1912. Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 161.

30 'Additional Number of Men and Boys', 'Navy Estimates', *Hansard*, 22 July 1912, Vol. 41, cc. 817–947.
31 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', pp. 7–8.
32 Churchill Papers, CHAR 2/57/4-5.
33 Churchill to Borden, letter, 25 July 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
34 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 8.
35 Borden Papers, OC series, microfilm C-1864, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC).
36 Committee of Imperial Defence, 1 August 1912, CAB 38/22/33, nationalarchives.gov.uk
37 Committee of Imperial Defence, 1 August 1912, CAB 38/22/33, nationalarchives.gov.uk
38 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 9.
39 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 364.
40 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 364.
41 Borden Papers, OC series, microfilm C-1864, LAC.
42 Borden Papers, OC series, microfilm C-1864, LAC.
43 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 183.
44 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 365.
45 Churchill to Borden, 26 August 1912, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/18/2.
46 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 365.
47 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
48 Borden to Churchill, 28 August 1912. Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 10. Also in MS Asquith 24, fol. 161.
49 29 August 1912, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/18/2.
50 Churchill to Asquith, 30 August 1912, Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 166.
51 Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 166.
52 Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 166.
53 Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 166.
54 Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 24, fol. 166.
55 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 453.
56 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 451.
57 Tucker, *The Navy Service in Canada*, p. 201.

## Chapter 5 Policy Developments and the Two Memoranda of 1912

1 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/75-76.
2 From Toronto, 23 September 1912, 'Canadian Naval Policy. Question of Emergency Contribution. Parliamentary Prospects', *The Times*, London, 24 September 1912, p. 4.
3 'Canadian Naval Policy', *The Times*, London, 24 September 1912, p. 4.
4 M. L. Hadley and R. Sarty, *Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880–1918* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p. 68.
5 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/3-6.
6 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/3-6.

7 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/3-6.
8 13 September 1912, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/3-6.
9 Churchill to Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 September 1912, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/64-66.
10 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/13/75-76.
11 Secret message for Churchill from Borden, sent as a telegram from the Governor-General's Office to the Colonial Secretary, 2 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
12 Stacey, p. 157.
13 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
14 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
15 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
16 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
17 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
18 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
19 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 11.
20 Borden to Churchill, 6 December 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
21 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 12.
22 'The Secret Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
23 'Note on Secret Memorandum Prepared for the Information of the Right Hon. R. L. Borden, K.C., M.P.', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
24 'Note on Secret Memorandum Prepared for the Information of the Right Hon. R. L. Borden', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
25 'The Secret Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
26 'The Secret Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
27 'The Secret Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
28 'The Secret Memorandum on the General Naval Situation', Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
29 Churchill to Borden, 15 October 2012, Admiralty papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
30 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4874.
31 3 October 1912, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (hereafter *DCER*), *Volume 1, 1909–1918* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967), p. 271.
32 'Importance of Dry Docks on Canadian Coasts for Meeting Imperial Requirements in War', October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
33 *DCER*, *Volume 1, 1909–1918*, p. 271.
34 Churchill to Borden, 4 November 1912, *DCER*, Vol. 1, 1909–1918, p. 274. Also Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
35 Churchill to Borden, 4 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
36 Churchill to Borden, 14 October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
37 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
38 Final remark of Churchill's letter to Borden, 14 October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.

39 14 October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
40 2 November 1912, *DCER*, Vol. 1, 1909–1918, p. 273. Also ADM 116/3485, NA.
41 6 November 1912, *DCER*, Vol. 1, 1909–1918, pp. 274–5.
42 7 November 1912, *DCER*, Vol. 1, 1909–1918, p. 275.
43 Borden to Churchill, telegram, 'Private and Personal. Secret', 14 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
44 Borden to Churchill, 'Private and Personal. Secret', 2 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
45 Borden to Churchill, telegram, 18 November 2012, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
46 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 13.
47 Churchill to Borden, telegram, 'Private and Personal. Secret', 15 November 2012, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
48 Churchill to Borden, telegram, 20 November 2012, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
49 M. G. Ewement, Secretary-Treasurer, Town of Maisonneuve, resolution passed on 23 October 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.

## Chapter 6 The Naval Aid Bill and the Canadian House of Commons: The Long Debate Begins

1 HMS Pinafore was first performed in 1878 under the reign of Queen Victoria. On 6 February 1913, Mr Edward Mortimer Macdonald (constituency of Pictou) used an excerpt from HMS Pinafore, *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2757.
2 Tucker, 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden', p. 13.
3 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 403; Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 191.
4 Borden to Churchill, 2 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
5 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 192.
6 *DHCC*, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament, 1912–13, Vol. CVII, c. 678.
7 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 684–5.
8 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII c. 687.
9 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 194.
10 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 689.
11 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 689.
12 Saunders, *Robert Borden*, p. 31.
13 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1021. Also Churchill to Borden, 4 November 1912, ADM116/3485, NA.
14 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 194.
15 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 268.
16 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1034.
17 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1047.
18 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1029.
19 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1030.
20 'Mr Borden's Speech. Full Text', 6 December 1912, *The Times* (London), p. 8.

21 O. D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier*, Vol. II (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965, first published 1921), p. 149.
22 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 428.
23 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, cc. 1028–9.
24 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1025.
25 Skelton, p. 151.
26 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1384.
27 Skelton, p. 153.
28 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1037; also Skelton, p. 152.
29 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1046.
30 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1046.
31 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1051.
32 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1052.
33 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1092–3.
34 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1093–4.
35 18 December 1912, *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1393.
36 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1099.
37 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1102.
38 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1133.
39 Skelton, p. 154.
40 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1294.
41 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1312.
42 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1314.
43 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1317.
44 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1318.
45 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1319.
46 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1344.
47 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1385.
48 Written from the House of Commons, Ottawa, 20 December 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
49 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1418.
50 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1422.
51 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1442.
52 *DHCC*, Vol. CVII, c. 1443.
53 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2515.
54 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2521.
55 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2530.
56 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2562.
57 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2572.
58 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2660.
59 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2665.
60 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2791.
61 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, cc. 2791–2.
62 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2757.
63 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2847.
64 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2851.
65 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2861.
66 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2908.
67 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, cc. 2909–10.
68 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2910.

69 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2912.
70 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2912.
71 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, c. 2913.
72 *DHCC*, Vol. CVIII, cc. 2923–34.

## Chapter 7 The Naval Aid Bill Reaches Closure in the House of Commons

1 The Newton McConnell cartoon is listed by the Archives of Ontario as c. 1910, which may relate to the Naval Service Bill of 1910, but it is rather illustrative of the debates that took place in Parliament in 1912–13, and the caption reflects the exact debate of this later time.
2 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4528.
3 *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 March 1913, cited by George William Kyte (constituency of Richmond, Nova Scotia), *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4576.
4 *Ottawa Citizen*, 4 March 1913, DHCC, Vol. CIX, c. 4576.
5 4 March 1913, *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4617.
6 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, cc. 4688–96.
7 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
8 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
9 Two similar letters in Admiralty Papers are dated as 22 and 23 January, listed in the Canadian *Hansard* as 23 January.
10 Handwritten note of Churchill's attached to draft telegram with suggested changes. 5 March 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
11 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
12 Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
13 Estimated figures, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
14 Admiralty papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
15 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5215.
16 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5220.
17 10 March 1913, *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5223.
18 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5240.
19 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5317.
20 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5318.
21 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5336.
22 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5341.
23 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 416.
24 Handwritten report of a telegram from Borden to Churchill, 23 March 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA. Also typescript Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/24.
25 Quoted by John Angus McMillan on 12 March 1913 in the Canadian House of Commons, *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5397.
26 Cited by Onésiphore Turgeon in the Canadian House of Commons, *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 5434.
27 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, cc. 5746–7.
28 Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 416.
29 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 414. See also Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 198.
30 Skelton, p. 154.

31 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 413.
32 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 413.
33 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 199.
34 Churchill to Borden, 19 March 1913, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/24.
35 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/24.
36 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/24.
37 Borden to Churchill, 23 March 1913, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/24.
38 Churchill Papers, CHUR 13/23/24.
39 *DHCC*, Vol. CIX, c. 4916. W. Shakespeare, *The Tragedy of Hamlet*, Act III, scene 2.

## Chapter 8 Rejection by the Canadian Senate, 1913

1 The cartoon is listed by the Archives of Ontario as ca. 1913.
2 Skelton, p. 156.
3 Skelton, p. 156.
4 *Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada* (DSC), 1912–13, Second Session, Twelfth Parliament (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1913), p. 593. Unlike the Canadian and British volumes of Hansard, the DSC has page numbers rather than column numbers.
5 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 718. See also Sir James Alexander Lougheed, *Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online*, www.biographi.ca
6 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 718.
7 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 725.
8 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 419.
9 Tucker, p. 200.
10 *DSC*, 1912–13, pp. 763–4.
11 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 814.
12 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 814.
13 *DSC*, 1912–13, pp. 869–70.
14 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 871.
15 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 871.
16 *DSC*, 1912–13, p. 894.
17 *DSC*, 1912–13, pp. 772–3.
18 Saunders, *Robert Borden*, p. 33.
19 Brown, Vol. 1, p. 243.
20 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 421.
21 Senator Choquette referred to this newspaper on 29 May 1913, DSC, 1912–13, p. 880.
22 Patricia E. Roy, 'Sir Richard McBride', www.biographi.ca
23 Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
24 London, 4 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
25 7 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
26 Borden to Churchill, 25 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
27 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 423.
28 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 425.
29 Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/30/12.
30 Telegram from Borden to Churchill, 11 January 1914, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/30/12.

31 5 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
32 7 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
33 7 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
34 7 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
35 7 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
36 Hillmer and Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, p. 48.
37 Milner, p. 28.
38 Milner, p. 28.

## Chapter 9 Aftermath: Canada, Great Britain and Developments in International Affairs, 1913–14

1 Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 202.
2 Kuhlmann to Bethmann Hollweg, 21 October 1913, cited in Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada*, p. 202.
3 R. Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (London: Macmillan, 2010), p. 128.
4 Paper printed for the British Cabinet, June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485/C430387, NA. Also Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/25.
5 'The Three Ships. Statement by Mr Churchill. A Provisional Measure. British Sea-Power in 1915–1916', 6 June 1913, *The Times*, London, p. 8.
6 Admiralty Papers, ADM116/ 3485, NA. Also Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/23/25.
7 Churchill to Borden, 'Pray treat this letter not only as confidential, but as personal to yourself …', 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
8 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
9 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
10 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
11 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
12 Churchill, *The World Crisis*, p. 138.
13 Brown, p. 243.
14 Toye, p. 130.
15 Churchill to Borden, 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/ 3485, NA.
16 Gordon, p. 407.
17 Douglas Gordon concludes that Churchill as First lord of the Admiralty did '… become indifferent to the obligations of imperial co-operation'. Gordon, 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies', p. 422.
18 Churchill to Borden, 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
19 Churchill to Borden, 30 June 1913, Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, NA.
20 Reported in *Morning Post*, 21 January 1914, Churchill Papers, CHAR 13/31/6, Churchill College Cambridge.
21 Stacey, p. 160.
22 See illustrations and details of C. G. S. *Canada*, R. H. Gimblett, editor, *The Naval Service of Canada* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009), p. 8.
23 See illustration and details of the H. M. C. S. *Rainbow*, Gimblett, p. 15.
24 See details and illustrations of the H. M. C. S. *Niobe*, Gimblett, p. 28.
25 Stacey, p. 160.

26 www.navy.gc.ca/project_pride
27 P. E. Roy, 'Sir Richard McBride', www.biographi.ca
28 www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org
29 Stacey, p. 160.
30 www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org
31 Admiralty Papers, ADM116/ 3485, NA.
32 Tucker, p. 210.
33 Borden to Churchill, 2 November 1912, Admiralty Papers, ADM116/3485, NA.
34 Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: The British War Office', p. 476.
35 'But the world is gone mad.' Churchill to his wife, Clementine, 2 August 1914, R. S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901–1914: Part 3: 1911–1914* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1997.
36 Churchill memorandum circulated to the coalition government, 'The Naval Situation at Home', 30 May 1915, M. Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914–1916: Part 2: May 1915–December 1916* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), p. 965; Thornton, 'Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty'.
37 Dawson, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: The Admiralty', p. 358.
38 Skelton, p. 154.
39 Preston, *Canadian Defence Policy*, p. 1.
40 Dilks, *The Great Dominion*.
41 Borden, *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, pp. 357–8.

# Bibliography

## Manuscript sources


Admiralty Papers, ADM 116/3485, National Archives, Kew, London.

Asquith, Herbert H., Herbert Asquith Papers (microfilm), Bodleian Library, University of Oxford.

Borden, Robert L., *Sir Robert L Borden Papers*, OC series (microfilm reels C-1864, C-4345) Fonds (microfilm reel C-444), Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

Cabinet Office: Miscellaneous Records, CAB 1/33/5, National Archives, Kew, London.

Churchill, Winston S., *Winston S. Churchill Papers*, Churchill College, University of Cambridge.

Committee of Imperial Defence, CAB 38/1–CAB 38/29, National Archives, Kew, London (nationalarchives.gov.uk).

Grey, Edward, Viscount, Private Office Papers of Edward Grey 1905–1916, FO 800/40-113, National Archives, Kew, London (microfilm, Brotherton Library, University of Leeds).

Lloyd George, David, *Lloyd George Papers* in the House of Lords Record Office, London.


## Published official documents


*Debates of the British House of Commons*, *Hansard*, 1803–2005, http://hansard.millbanksystem.com

*Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada*, *1912–13*, Vol. CVII, Vol. CIX, Vol. CX, Vol. CXI (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1912–13).

*Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada*, *Second Session 1912–13* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1913).

*Documents on Canadian External Relations*, *Volume 1*, *1909–1918* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967).

*Naval Intelligence From Germany: The Reports of the British Naval Attachés in Berlin*, *1906–1914* (Aldershot: Ashgate, for the Navy Records Society, 2007), edited by Matthew S. Seligmann.


## Published diaries, documents, letters, memoirs and speeches


Borden, Henry, editor, *Robert Laid Borden: His Memoirs*, *Volume 1 and 2* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1938).

Borden, Robert L., *Letters to Limbo* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).

_____, *Canadian Constitutional Studies*: *The Marfleet Lectures University of Toronto*, *October 1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922).

_____ and Smuts, Jan, C., *The Empire and the War: The Voice of the Dominions* (London: The Empire Parliamentary Association, 1917).

Churchill, Randolph, S., *Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II, Part 2, 1907–1911* (London: Heinemann, 1969).
_____, *Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II, Part 3, 1911–1914* (London: Heinemann, 1969).
Churchill, Winston S., *My Early Life* (London: Hamlyn, Publishing Group Ltd., 1974, first published 1930).
_____, *Never Give In! The Best of Winston Churchill's Speeches*. Selected by his Grandson Winston S. Churchill (New York: Hyperion, 2003).
_____, *The Boer War* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989, first published as two books in 1900).
Fisher, Lord, John, *Memoirs: Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919).
Gilbert, Martin, *Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III, Part 2: May 1915–December 1916* (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972).
Grey, Edward, *Twenty-five Years 1892–1916, 2 volumes* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925).
Haldane, Richard B., *Before the War* (London: Funk and Wagnall's Company, 1920).
_____, *Richard Burdon Haldane: An Autobiography* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., popular edition, 1931).
Hughes, William M., *The Splendid Adventure* (London: Ernest Benn, 1929).
McKenna, Stephen, *Reginald McKenna, 1863–1943: A Memoir* (London: Eyre Spottiswoode, 1948).
Soames, Mary, editor, *Speaking for Themselves: The Personal Letters of Winston and Clementine Churchill* (London: Doubleday, 1998).
Williamson, Philip, editor, *The Modernisation of Conservative Politics. The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904–1935* (London: The Historian's Press, 1988).

## Secondary Sources: Books

Afflerbach, Holger and Stevenson, David, editors, *An Improbable War The Outbreak of World War 1 and European Political Culture before 1914* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007).
Alldritt, Keith, *Churchill the Writer: His Life as a Man of Letters* (London: Hutchinson, 1992).
Addison, Paul, *Churchill: The Unexpected Hero* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Bacon, R. H., *The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone: Admiral of the Fleet* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929).
Bardens, Dennis, *Churchill in Parliament* (London: Robert Hale, 1967).
Bates, Stephen, *Asquith* (London: Haus, 2006).
Bell, Christopher M., *Churchill and Seapower* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
_____, *The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
Bennett, Geoffrey, *Coronel and the Falklands* (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1962).
Berger, Carl, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867–1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).

_____, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986, 2nd edition).
Blom, Philip, *The Vertigo Years: Europe 1900–1914* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
Blyth, Robert J., Lambert, Andrew and Ruger, Jan, editors, *The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).
Broad, L., *Winston Churchill, 1874–1945* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1945).
Brooks, David, *The Age of Upheaval: Edwardian Politics 1899–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
Brown, Robert C., *Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, Volume 1, 1854–1914* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1975).
_____, *Robert Laird Borden, A Biography, Volume 2, 1914–1937* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1980).
_____ and Cook, Ramsay, *Canada 1896–1921: A Nation Transformed* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974).
Buckner, Philip, editor, *Canada and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Bush, Eric, *Gallipoli* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975).
Cannadine, David, *In Churchill's Shadow* (London: Penguin Books, 2003).
Cook, Tim, *Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King, and Canada's World Wars* (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2012).
Churchill, Randolph S., *Winston S. Churchill: Volume 11, Young Statesman, 1901–1914* (London: Heinemann, 1967).
Churchill, Winston S., *Great Contemporaries* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1942, first published 1937).
_____, *The World Crisis*, 5 volumes, 6 parts (London: Thornton Butterworth, first published 1923–31).
Colville, John, *The Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981).
Dilks, David, *The Great Dominion: Winston Churchill in Canada, 1900–1954* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2005).
Donaghy, Greg and Carroll, Michael K., editors, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909–2009* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011).
Douglas, Francis; Jones, Richard and Smith, Donald, *Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation* (Toronto: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1988).
Dutil, Patrice and MacKenzie, David, *Canada 1911: The Decisive Election that Shaped the Country* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011).
Eade, Charles, editor, *Churchill By His Contemporaries* (London: Hutchinson, 1953).
Eayrs, James, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
Eldridge, Colin C., editor, *Kith and Kin. Canada, Britain and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997).
English, John, *The Decline of Politics: The Conservatives and the Party System, 1901–20* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
_____, *Borden: His Life and World* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977).
Gimblett, Richard H., editor, *The Naval Service of Canada* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009).
Gordon, Donald C., *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence, 1870–1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).

Granatstein, Jack L., *The Ottawa Men, The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935–1957* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
_____, *Towards a New World: Readings in the History of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1992).
Grimes, Shawn T., *Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887–1918* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2012).
Hadley, Michael L.; Huebert, Rob and Crickard, Fred W., editors, *A Nation's Navy in Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996).
Hadley, Michael L. and Sarty, Roger, *Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders 1880–1918* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991).
Hall, David J., *Clifford Sifton, Volume 2: A Lonely Eminence, 1901–1929* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985).
Hamilton, Charles I., *The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making, 1805–1927* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Hickey, Michael, *Gallipoli* (London: John Murray, 1995).
Higgins, Trumbull, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanells* (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1963).
Hilliker, John, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909–1946* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).
Hillmer, Norman and Granatstein, Jack L., *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994).
Hindsley, Francis H., editor, *British Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
Hough, Richard, *Winston and Clementine: The Triumphs and Tragedies of the Churchills* (London: Bantam Books, 1991).
_____, *First Sea Lord: An Authorised Biography* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969).
Hunt, Barry D. and Haycock, Ronald G., editors, *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993).
Hutchinson, Bruce, *Mr Prime Minister, 1867–1964* (Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1964).
Jenkins, Roy, *Churchill* (London: Macmillan, 2001).
_____, *Asquith* (London: Colllins, 1964, revised edition 1978).
Joll, James and Martell, Gordon, *The Origins of the First World War* (Harlow, England: Pearson, third edition, 2007).
Kelly, Patrick J., *Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001).
Kennedy, Paul M., *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 1988, first published 1980).
_____, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Fontana, 1991, 3rd edition).
Koss, Stephen, *Asquith* (London: Allen Lane, 1976).
Lambert, Andrew, editor, *Naval History 1850–Present, Volume 1* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
Lambert, Nicholas A., *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1999).
MacGregor Dawson, Robert, *William Lyon Mackenzie King, A Political Biography, Volume 1, 1874–1923* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958).

_____, *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900–1936* (London: Frank Cass, 1965).
_____, Dawson, W. F., revised by Ward, N., *Democratic Government in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, fourth edition, 1971).
Macleod, Jenny, *Reconsidering Gallipoli* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
Mackay, Ruddock F., *Fisher of Kilverstone* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
Mackenzie, David, editor, *Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
Mansergh, Nicholas, *The Commonwealth Experience* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
Massie, Robert, K., *Dreadnought. Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992).
Maurer, John H., editor, *Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
_____, *The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making and Deterrence Failure* (London: Praeger, 1995).
Miller, Carman, *Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).
_____, *A Knight in Politics: A Biography of Sir Frederick Borden* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).
Miller, John D. B., *Britain and the Old Dominions* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966).
Milner, Marc, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
Morton, Desmond, *A Military History of Canada* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1985).
Mowat, Charles L., editor, *The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume XII, The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
Mulligan, William, *The Origins of the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Murray, Gilbert, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey 1906–1915* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1915).
Neilsen, Keith and Kennedy, Greg, *Far Flung Lines* (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
Ollard, Richard, *Fisher and Cunningham: Study in the Personalities of the Churchill Era* (London: Constable, 1991).
Omissi, David and Thompson, Andrew S., editors, *The Impact of the South African War* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002).
Page-Hennessy, *Lord Crewe, 1858–1945* (London: Constable, 1955).
Preston, Richard A., *Canada and Imperial Defence* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967).
Purcell, Hugh, *Lloyd George* (London: Haus, 2006).
Rasor, Eugene L., *Winston S. Churchill, 1874–1965: A Comprehensive Historiography and Annotated Bibliography* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000).
Rhodes James, Robert, *Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900–1939* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970).
Robbins, Keith, *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon* (London: Cassell, 1971).

Saunders, Kathleen, *Robert Borden* (Ontario: Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, 1978).
Seligmann, Matthew S., *The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901–1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in War Against Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Sharp, Alan, *David Lloyd George: Great Britain* (London: Haus, 2008).
Skelton, Oscar, D., *The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. II, 1896–1919* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, reprint 1971, first published 1921).
Stacey, Charles P., *Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 1, 1867–1921* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1977).
Steinberg, Jonathan, *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet* (London: Macdonald, 1965).
Steiner, Zara S., *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy 1898–1914* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
_____ and Neilson, Keith, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
Stevens, Paul, editor, *The 1911 General Election: A Study in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970).
Stevenson, David, *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
Toye, Richard, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (London: Macmillan, 2010).
____, *Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness* (London: Macmillan, 2007).
Toynbee, Arnold J., *British Commonwealth Relations, Proceedings of the First Unofficial Conference at Toronto, September 1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934).
Thornton, Martin, *Sir Robert Borden: Canada, Makers of the Modern World* (London: Haus, 2010).
Trevelyan, George M., *Grey of Fallodon. Being the Life of Sir Edward Grey* (London: Longmans Green, 1937).
Tucker, Gilbert N., *The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History, Volume 1* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952).
Wester-Wemyss, Lord, *The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1924).
Wigley, Philip G., *Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations 1917–1926* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
Wilson, Keith M., *Empire and Continent: Studies in British Foreign Policy From the 1880s to the First World War* (London: Mansell, 1987).

## Articles

Baker, William M., 'A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English-speaking Canada: The Election Campaign of 1911', *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1970), 426–49.
Beaulieu, Eugene and Emery, J. C. Herbert, 'Pork Packers, Reciprocity and Laurier's Defeat in the 1911 Canadian General Election', *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (December 2001), 1083–101.

Brooks, John, 'Dreadnought: Blunder or Stroke of Genius', *War in History*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2007), 157–78.

Cole, Douglas, 'Canada's "Nationalistic" Imperialists', *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (August 1970), 44–9.

Cook, George L., 'Sir Robert Borden, Lloyd George and British Military Policy, 1917–18', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (June 1971), 371–95.

d'Ombrain, Nicholas J., 'Churchill at the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1911–1914', *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, Vol. 115 (March 1970), 38–41.

Ekstein, Michael, 'Sir Edward Grey and Imperial Germany in 1914', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1971), 121–31.

Gimblett, Richard H., 'Reassessing the Dreadnought Crisis of 1909 and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy', *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January 1994), 35–53.

Gordon, Donald C., 'The Admiralty and Dominion Navies, 1902–1914', *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1961), 407–22.

Johnston, Richard and Percy, Michael B., 'Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment, and Party Politics in the 1911 Election', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1980), 711–29.

Kennedy, Paul M., 'The Development of German Naval Operations: Plans Against England, 1896–1914', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 89, No. 350 (1974), 48–76.

Langhorne, Richard, 'The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912–1914', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 1971), 359–70.

MacGregor Dawson, Robert, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: Winston S. Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–15', *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1940), 325–58.

_____, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: The British War Office, 1903–16', *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1939), 451–78.

_____, 'The Cabinet Minister and Administration: Asquith, Lloyd George, Curzon', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (1940), 348–77.

Macquarrie, Heath N., 'Robert Borden and the Election of 1911', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1959), 271–86.

_____, 'The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1957), 90–104.

Maurer, John H., 'Churchill's Naval Holiday: Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race, 1912–1914', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992), 102–27.

McDougall, David J., 'The Origins and Growth of the Canadian Customs Preventive Service Fleet in the Maritime Provinces and Eastern Quebec, 1892–1932', *The Northern Mariner*, Vol. V, No. 4 (October 1995), 37–57.

O'Brien, Phillips P., 'The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the First World War', *Past and Present*, No. 172 (August 2001), 146–69.

Offer, Avner, 'Morality and Admiralty: Jacky Fisher, Economic Warfare and the Laws of War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1988), 99–118.

Skelton, O. D. 'Canada's Rejection of Reciprocity', *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 19, No. 9 (1911), 726–31.

Teigrob, Robert, 'Glad Adventures, Tragedies, Silences: Remembering and Forgetting Wars for Empire in Canada and the United States', *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vols 45–6 (2012), 441–65.
Thornton, Martin, 'Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, 23 October 1911–24 May 1915', www.churchillarchive.com
Tucker, Gilbert N., 'The Naval Policy of Sir Robert Borden, 1912–1914', *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1947), 1–30.

## Pamphlets

Page, Robert, *The Boer War and Canadian Imperialism*, The Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 44 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1987).
Preston, Robert A., *Canadian Defence Policy and the Development of the Canadian Nation*, The Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 25 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1970).
Soward, Frederic H., *The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899–1939*, The Canadian Historical Association Booklet No. 7 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1956).
Outis, pseudonym, *Mr Churchill, the Admiralty, and the Self-Governing Dominions* (London: National Press Agency, 1912).

## Additional websites

Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, www.biographi.ca
King, William L. M., 'The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King', http://king.archives.ca
Library and Archives Canada, http://collectionscanada.gc.ca/pam_archives
McConnel, Newton, 'Newton McConnel Fonds', The Archives of Ontario, http://www.archives.gov.on.ca
Parliament of Canada, www.parl.gc.ca
Royal Canadian Navy, www.navy.gc.ca/project_pride/history
*The Times*, London, *The Times Digital Archive, 1785–2006*, http://find.gale-group.com/ttda

# Index