



COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONFLICT

*Imperial Encounters from the
Seven Years' War to the Cold War*

EDITED BY DINA GUSEJNOVA



Cosmopolitanism in Conflict

Dina Gusejnova
Editor

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palgrave
macmillan

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University of Sheffield
Sheffield, UK

ISBN 978-1-349-95274-8 ISBN 978-1-349-95275-5 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95275-5>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948288

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Cover illustration: Vasily Vereshchagin, Apotheosis of War (1871, oil on canvas, 127 x 197). Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

The registered company address is: The Campus, 4 Crinan Street, London, N1 9XW, United Kingdom

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As editor, I would like to thank all the authors in this volume for their patience, dedication and inspiration in working on this book. It grew out of work undertaken during my Leverhulme Early Career fellowship at the Centre for Transnational History at UCL (2011–2014), at Queen Mary University of London (2014–2015) and at the University of Sheffield. During my fellowship—and beyond it—I benefitted greatly from the mentorship of its director, Axel Körner, who co-hosted a reading group on Cosmopolitanism with our colleague Simon MacDonald. Other contributors to the reading group included colleagues from UCL, especially Avi Lifschitz and Nicola Miller, as well as visitors, including Alexander Schmidt and Alexander Etkind. The informality as well as the relatively small size of the group enabled us to engage in a convivial manner with some of the key texts loosely identified with ideas of ‘cosmopolitanism’. At UCL, I also wish to thank Stephen Conway for his active endorsement of these projects, and Claire Morley and Charlotte McElvaney for administrative support. At the University of Sheffield, I wish to thank Phil Withington, Julia Hillner, Máirín MacCarron, Julie Gottlieb, Eirini Karamouzi and Sarah Miller-Davenport for enabling me to develop the manuscript in a range of ways, from copy editorial support to reading parts of the manuscript and helping me think about the themes of internationalism and the cultural aspects of the Cold War.

The inspirations for exploring ties between Enlightenment ideas and the imperial dimension of conflicts initially came from a range of sources, including Alexander Etkind’s research centre dedicated to *Memory at*

War, which was based at CRASSH in Cambridge in 2010–2013, as well as his book, *Internal Colonization* (2011); a conference on ‘Negative Cosmopolitanism’ in Edmonton (Canada) in October 2012; the event series on ‘Global Citizenship’ at Tate Modern (2013), curated by Olga Smith and Nora Razian; and the conference on ‘Empire—Community—Self’, convened by Svetlana Natkovich and her colleagues from the Simon Dubnow Institute in Leipzig, in 2016.

Together with the authors in this volume, I wish to thank the Leverhulme Trust for providing us with generous conference funding for ‘Postwar Cosmopolitanism’, which took place on 1 and 2 May 2014 and brought together the authors represented here, participants also included Susan Morrissey, Avi Lifschitz, Daniel Laqua, Dominique Reill, Alexander Schmidt, Lea Ypi, Sarah Snyder, Natan Sznajder, Coşkun Tuncer, Venkat Mani and Kathy Burke. Their ideas continued to feed into subsequent drafts of the manuscript. Further contributions in a panel on the Digital Enlightenment, technology and cosmopolitanism, featuring John Agar and Simon Werrett (UCL), Jeffrey Schnapp and David Weinberger (Harvard) and David Clark (MIT), were made possible thanks to a grant from Ceelbas and editorial support from the Russian-based educational company Postnauka/SeriousScience. At the time, our perception of the ties between technology, cosmopolitan sensibilities and music was sharpened by a performance of war songs by David Owen Norris and Joseph Spooner. Recorded and curated by Richard Bland, it took place at the Warburg Institute using the piano belonging to the Gombrich family, with Gombrich’s grandson Carl Gombrich reading selections from his grandfather’s *A Little History of the World* (1936). To follow in the cosmopolitan spirit, this event was broadcast via a community radio station at the University of Illinois, as part of Craig Koslofsky’s radio show at WEFT 90.1 FM. As it turned out, our recreation of these cosmopolitan moments took place around the time when a new Cold War-style conflict began to unravel, involving new confrontations between Russia and the ‘West’, and new kinds of uncertainty about cosmopolitan ideas. While we continued working on the themes arising from the conference in subsequent years, the scope of common interest shifted from ‘postwar’ to wartime and other conflict situations.

Last but not least, we wish to thank the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, particularly Maria Ivanova, and Natalya Zhukova from the Moscow State Historical Museum, their assistance with the images for this

volume. At Palgrave and Springer, we are deeply grateful to Oliver Dyer, Molly Beck, Ramesh Kumaran and their teams for their careful support throughout the production process. We owe a special debt to an anonymous reviewer, whose exceptionally insightful and encouraging comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript have allowed us to bring out some of its core themes more clearly than before.

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On the Impact of Cəlil Məmmədquluzadə's *Anamın Kitabı*', in *Novel and Nation in the Muslim World. Literary Contributions and National Identities*, eds. Elisabeth Özdalga and Daniela Kuzmanovic (2015).

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Mill on Nationality (Routledge, 2002), and *Victorian Political Thought on France and the French* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). He is currently writing *The West : The History of an Idea* for Princeton University Press.

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Introduction

Dina Gusejnova

In his essay ‘What is Orientation in thinking?’ (1786), Immanuel Kant analyses the concept of ‘orientation’, conjuring up the image of a person who is looking for direction.¹ He says: ‘To orientate oneself [...] means to use a given world region—and we divide the horizon into four of these—in order to find the others.’ Orientation happens by external markers—by relying on the certainty that the sun always rises in the same spot, which we call the Orient. Surprisingly, Kant then undermines his own picture by suggesting that all this may be fine, but such a person who would take only external markers of orientation would be helpless at midday, and even at night constellations of stars might become invisible. Thus, says Kant, we ought to discard the geographical image as an incomplete approximation of what actually happens when we orientate ourselves. Provisionally, he proposes another mental image to replace that. In a dark chamber, he says, he can still feel ‘a difference concerning

¹Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, in idem, *Political Writings*, Hans Reiss (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 237–250.

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my own subject, namely, that between my right and left hands'.² At this point, however, he invites his listeners to recognise that this model is not sufficient for explaining what orientation really is, either. Orientation does not happen in seeing or bodily feeling of 'sides'. We are only orientated when we are able to project from this sense of handedness or the perception of stellar constellations to a moral ordering of our actions. Ultimately, Kant concludes then, orientation is a function of thinking. True orientation is not derived from geographical knowledge or bodily senses; rather, our senses of space, and even, therefore, of ideas of left and right, are products of reason alone.

The aim of this volume is to follow Kant's model in reverse: rather than seeking to find a spatially and historically agnostic notion of cosmopolitan order, we look at the way in which ideas of world order developed in specific historical and geographical situations. Cosmopolitan theory as a type of political imagination sees the ideal political order in terms of a congruence between good laws and the good life, whilst projecting this vision on a potentially global as well as universal scale. But this ideal typical construction is, arguably, itself a kind of projection. As Kant's own reflections on orientation suggest, not only do ideas of a global political orientation emerge in particular settings, but the very notion of a global orientation is necessarily tied to subjective positions. We hope to reconstruct the kind of disorientation which Kant himself had described when imagining how constellations of stars or objects in a dark chamber can change or be rearranged. It is the confusion and the rearrangement of desired norms and expectations, not the imagined order, that we are interested in exploring further.³

²Ibid., 238–239.

³Kant's own ideas of a cosmopolitan order are most clearly expressed in Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden: ein philosophischer Entwurf* (Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1795), but also in his 'Über den Gemeinspruch: das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis', in *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (September 1793), 201–84. To my knowledge, the text on orientation has not been discussed in conjunction with Kant's ideas of cosmopolitanism. However, my framework for thinking about the connection between Kant's critical writings and his political theory was inspired by the discussion of Kant in the context of European colonialism, especially in John Zammito, *Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002); Alexander Etkind, *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); and Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (eds), *Kant and Colonialism. Historical and Critical Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Kant's name looms large in ideal-typical lineages of cosmopolitanism. Without wishing to diminish his significance as one of the authors who gave the idea of cosmopolitanism a new status in modern political thought, we hope to draw attention to the politically varied and unstable historical contexts within which cosmopolitan ideas developed—including, but not restricted to, Kant's own.⁴ The term 'cosmopolitanism' has its own fortune history: it became popular in the European Enlightenment, even though the word *κοσμοπολίτης*, formed from 'cosmos', or universe, and 'politēs', or citizen, had been initially associated with a type of personal attitude rather than a political theory, and dated back to classical Greece—at least according to the 3rd century biographer of Diogenes the Cynic, Diogenes Laertius. Seen more broadly, the concept of 'global citizenship' or, more loosely, universal politics, can also be legitimately connected to the history of other periods, and to wider geographical regions. This volume concentrates on the period in which cosmopolitanism became a contested concept by placing it in different contexts through case studies reaching from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. A fuller representation of ancestry—which should not be confused with a complete representation—should include those forebears which do not intuitively appear related to, let alone liked by their progeny.⁵ Cosmopolitanism was neither a unified tradition of thought, nor was it ever bound by a common purpose.

Seeing conflicts as a type of contact zone between previously disconnected communities seemed to us to be a fertile ground for the study of cosmopolitanism. Surprisingly, this connection has only recently received

⁴Comprehensive overviews are available in *The Cosmopolitanism Reader*, Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (eds) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); see also Gerard Delanty (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2012); Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, *The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

⁵For the original narration of Diogenes the Cynic's worldview, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, "Diogenes", trans. R.D. Hicks (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 6.63. For a compelling interpretation of the famous statement as a critique of the city, see John L. Moles, 'Cynic Cosmopolitanism', in *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, eds. R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 105–21. On genealogy in a critical sense, see Raymond Geuss, 'Genealogy as Critique', in idem, *Outside Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 153–160.

scholarly attention from historians.⁶ Focusing on conflicts between some of the large European powers, including, notably, Britain, Russia and Prussia, we identify some of the eyes around which the storms of global conflicts as well as ideas of global world order revolved. There are plenty of approaches to the history of the globalisation of conflicts themselves, including studies in the fields of new international and transnational history, which we could build on. The present volume does not aim for geographical completeness in its representation of cosmopolitan thought in the context of conflict. However, new critical and global perspectives on cosmopolitan ideals have served as important springboards for this book.⁷ The ‘international turn’ in intellectual history has sensitised scholarship to the globalisation of ideas in a way that allows to get away from a Eurocentric understanding of cosmopolitanism without neglecting the European history of the concept.⁸ To use David Armitage’s expression, some of the ‘transformative’ historiographical movements of the later twentieth and early twenty-first century, such as a transnational approach to the history of ideas, along with new cultural histories of conflict, were harnessed to explore in more detail how a variety

⁶On cosmopolitanism in war, see Cécile Fabre, *Cosmopolitan War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), and David Armitage, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Civil War’, forthcoming in John-Pau Rubiés and Neil Safier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), which explores the connection in more detail than the more recent *Global Civil War. A History In Ideas* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Michael Ferguson, ‘Unsocial Sociability: Perpetual Antagonism in Kant’s Political Thought,’ in Elisabeth Ellis (ed.), *Kant’s Political Theory: Interpretations and Applications* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2012), 150–169; and, in the context of imperial interests, Lauren Benton, *Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2017).

⁷Among the new histories of global conflicts which offer critical new readings of Enlightenment thought, see especially Bill Kissane, *Nations Torn Asunder: the Challenge of Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). For new perspectives on cosmopolitan ideals, see René Schérer, ‘Cosmopolitisme et hospitalité’, in *Communications*, 65 (1997), 59–68; Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For an analysis of conflict as an aspect of national as well as cosmopolitan ideology, see Istvan Hont’s ‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind’, in *Political Studies*, XLII (1994), 166–231.

⁸See Samuel Moyn and Andrew Sartori, *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

of cosmopolitan conceptions emerged in the increasingly global conflict zones.⁹

In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a conceit particularly among liberal political philosophers that cosmopolitanism was an ideology of peace.¹⁰ In the 1990s, the millennial sense of a ‘new epoch’, in Gerard Delanty’s words, renewed the status of Kant’s 1795 treatise as a seminal text for European political thought, just as a new era of democracy and world peace seemed to beckon.¹¹ After all, Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* contained propositions for dealing with what he calls humans’ paradoxical nature, consisting in their unsocial form of sociability that enables just regimes of law as a means to overcome conflict.¹² As subsequent critical readings of the cosmopolitan tradition and cosmopolitan ideals today have shown, however, the image of cosmopolitanism as exclusively an ideology of progress—and of Kant as its dogmatic progenitor—which early post-Cold War interpreters have projected, is rather self-serving.¹³ Echoing the late Ulrich Beck, we can

⁹David Armitage, ‘The International Turn in Intellectual History’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 232–253, 233.

¹⁰For a succinct summary of this widespread view, see Jerry W. Sanders, ‘Cosmopolitanism as a Peace Theory’, in Nigel J. Young (ed.), *The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace*, 4 vols. (Oxford, 2010), I, 497–501. On cosmopolitanism as a progressive theory, see David Held and Daniele Archibugi, *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). See also Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (eds), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, in Martha C. Nussbaum, Joshua Cohen et al., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 2–17 (original in *Boston Review* in 1994); Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, transl. and ed. M. Pensky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) (German original in 1998).

¹¹Gerard Delanty, ‘Introduction. The emerging field of cosmopolitanism studies’, in idem (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*, 3.

¹²As discussed in Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* [Towards Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch] (1795), in Kant, *Political Writings*, H.S. Reiss (ed.), H.B. Nisbet (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 93–130. See especially the introduction by Hans Reiss, pp. 1–41, who argues that Kant, writing in an age of revolutions, wanted to provide a ‘vindication of representative constitutional government’ to ‘guarantee the political rights of all individuals’ (p.4).

¹³Criticism of a narrow and Eurocentric view of cosmopolitanism has come both from postcolonial perspectives, and from the point of view of critical theory. See Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds), *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*

differentiate between the globalisation of ideas and the ‘cosmopolitanisation’ of political theories, a process which has eventually led to the development of more critical perspectives on the cosmopolitan ideal in its distilled form.¹⁴ This more critical engagement with the cosmopolitan revival of the 1990s has subsequently led to what David Inglis has described as a ‘flourishing and diversification of the cosmopolitan intellectual field’.¹⁵ Cosmopolitan memory and theory itself can now also be problematised as an aspect of the global culture industry.¹⁶ Recently, Alexander Etkind and others have shown the extent to which the very tradition of ‘theory’, including cosmopolitanism, has been biographically embedded in social and political conflicts.¹⁷

The turn towards critical and more diverse reflections on cosmopolitanism has frequently revolved around new, more contextually sensitive readings of Kant as well as other Enlightenment thinkers. According to Reinhart Koselleck’s formula, their ideas had become too *ideologisierbar* [susceptible to ideological modification], and in order to transcend these ideological shadows around the Enlightenment, it became necessary to shed new light on the original bodies of text.¹⁸ The resulting newer readings are more sensitive to varied historical contexts and less partisan with respect to anachronistic political expectations. These approaches put different aspects of Kant in the spotlight, presenting him as a theorist of ‘political judgment’, in Richard Bourke’s reading of his critical essays, or as an agonistic political realist, according to Istvan Hont’s interpretation

Footnote 13 (continued)

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); and Eddy Kent and Terri Tomsy (eds), *Negative Cosmopolitanism. Cultures and Politics of World Citizenship after Globalization* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2017).

¹⁴Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies’, in *Theory, Culture & Society*, 19: 1–2 (April 2002), 17–44.

¹⁵David Inglis, ‘Alternative histories of cosmopolitanism. Reconfiguring classical legacies’, in Gerard Delanty (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 11–25, 12.

¹⁶Cf. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in a Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006).

¹⁷Cf. Uilliam Blacker, Alexander Etkind and Julie Fedor (eds), *Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

¹⁸Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Liberales Geschichtsdenken’, in idem, *Vom Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), 198–228, 220.

of his idea of ‘unsocial sociability’.¹⁹ Criticising reductive readings advanced by philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum, who pinned Kant to the idea of democracy and individual rights, Mark Mazower insisted that the new ‘post-Cold War Kant looked rather different from the Enlightenment original’, who had been more suspicious of the capabilities of commerce and international institutions to safely guide us towards world peace than modern liberal political theorists want to concede.²⁰ In this more sceptical model of history, instead of Kant we see Metternich as the real architect of European peace. Sankar Muthu, Lea Ypi and Karin Flikschuh have shown in a range of studies how Kant’s ideas were implicated in imperial and colonial contexts before they were sanitised by subsequent readers into the shape of a dogmatic moralism.²¹ Several contributors to this volume, including Maria Mayofis, Alexander Etkind, Olga Sezneva and myself, develop these ideas in other contexts. One of the striking features of the changing credit rating of cosmopolitanism through the ages is its dependence on a rather stable view of eighteenth-century ideals of peace, justice and progress, which were often connected to a typified view of Immanuel Kant. Does a theory of perpetual peace fail if peace cannot be obtained by implementing it in practice? When does a theory fail? Kant thought that this way of posing the question was logically flawed.²²

¹⁹On Kant as a theorist of judgment rather than a dogmatic moralist, see Richard Bourke, ‘Theory and practice: the revolution in political judgement’, in Richard Bourke and Raymond Geuss (eds), *Political Judgement. Essays for John Dunn* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 73–111; for a view of Kant as a realist, see Istvan Hont, ‘The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind’, in *Political Studies*, XLII (1994), 166–231. Earlier, the idea of Kant as an agonistic thinker had also been prominently expressed by Hans Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg zum Frieden*, 2 vols. (Munich: Piper, 1967), esp. vol. 1, 1–24, on antagonism. This book is discussed favourably by Hannah Arendt in her *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 7.

²⁰Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (London and New York: Penguin, 2012), 17.

²¹See Sankar Muthu, ‘Productive Resistance in Kant’s Political Thought: Domination, Counter-Domination, and Global Unsocial Sociability,’ in Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 68–98.

²²Immanuel Kant, ‘On the common saying: “This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice”’, in Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 61–93.

This volume seeks to historicise the different articulations of political recursions to cosmopolitan ideals through specific themes. Each theme conveys the types of conflict within which the recourse to the cosmopolitan ideal became attractive.

WARS AND CONFLICTS AS ‘COSMOPOLITAN MOMENTS’

As I have already indicated, much of the new scholarship on cosmopolitanism and its critiques grew out of reflections on the Cold War, as well as on the effect of globalisation on political ideas and norms. Using a variety of disciplinary approaches and sources, we hope to account for this teleology without succumbing to it. Rather than unmasking cosmopolitan aspirations as something like ‘hollow hegemony’, the authors of this volume hope to flesh out the extent to which these remain implicated in global conflict.²³

The first type of context within which we place the rise of global consciousness and a cosmopolitan agenda is that of war. The ideas of Emer de Vattel and even of Carl von Clausewitz may not seem as far removed from those of Immanuel Kant as the twenty-first century theorists of cosmopolitanism would have it, especially considering, as Reinhart Koselleck had once remarked, that Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* was in fact an echo of the Treaty of Basel (1795), one of several separate peace treaties signed during the French Revolutionary Wars.²⁴ From the War of the Spanish Succession, the Seven Years’ War and the War of American Independence in the eighteenth century, to the Napoleonic and later the extra-European colonial wars in the nineteenth, followed by the two World

²³The concept is used in David Chandler, Wendy Varney, and Richard Gosden, *Hollow Hegemony: Rethinking Global Politics, Power and Resistance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).

²⁴Cf. Emer de Vattel, *Les Droits des Gens*, ed. and with an introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008); and Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and transl. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). On Koselleck’s reading of Kant in this respect, see Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Die Verzeitlichung der Begriffe’, in *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006), 77–86, 83.

Wars and the Cold War in the twentieth century, each moment in the intellectual development of cosmopolitan thought can be linked to a series of increasingly global conflicts which also had profound repercussions for the political imagination. The Seven Years' War marks the conceptual start of the volume because this conflict had made clear that European inter-imperial conflicts could no longer be viewed from one or two sides, as confrontations between national realms, but demanded a global perspective both from their participants, and from subsequent interpreters. What initially was a conflict between Britain and France escalated into a war of global proportions in which previous loyalties were caught in the vortex of two international coalitions involving most of the great powers, with Prussia on the British and Austria, Russia and Spain on the French side, and reaching colonies and dominions from Bengal to Quebec. The new realities of interimperial conflict were a product of global colonial interests, along with a rise in regional aspirations to sovereignty. In the twentieth century, concepts of warfare took the form of 'total war' in the age of Goebbels. While new forms of warfare made the separation between military and civilian combatants and targets less significant, the Cold War challenged the very distinction between wartime and peacetime through a growing expansion of conflict into the sphere of culture, or what Joseph Nye has termed 'soft power'.²⁵

'The connection between cosmopolitanism and war, we may be tempted to think, is merely sequential,' Stephen Conway (Chap. 1) points out in his contribution on transnational aspects of eighteenth-century European warfare. But looking at the practices of conducting war and peace in the War of the Spanish (1702–1713), Polish (1733–1738), Austrian (1740–1748) and Bavarian (1778–1779) succession, and the Napoleonic wars, his chapter shows how cosmopolitan

²⁵ On the Seven Years' War as the first 'global war', see Daniel Baugh, *The Global Seven Years War, 1754–1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2011). On the cultural implications of this globalisation of conflict, see Frans de Bruyn and Shaun Regan (eds.), *The Culture of the Seven Years' War: Empire, Identity, and the Arts in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). On total war, see Joseph Goebbels' speech on Total war of 18 February 1943 (also known as the *Sportpalastrede*), especially as analysed in Richard Evans, *The Third Reich at War: How the Nazis Led Germany from Conquest to Disaster* (London: Penguin, 2008). On cosmopolitanism and global violence, see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). On 'soft power' and the idea of culture in the Cold War, see Joseph S. Nye, 'Soft Power', in *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), 153.

ideas not only could, but did arise from within these incidents in the form of social practices, changes in etiquette and reflections on solidarity. The increasingly global deployment of military officers and mercenaries, which became prominent in eighteenth-century European wars, changed the relationship of people to places, as well as stretching the boundaries between ‘reason of state’ arguments and imperialist expansion.²⁶ At the same time, growing commercial connections and information networks increasingly invited societies to think of global aspirations as a social reality rather than as a utopian aspiration, even though these connections remained unevenly spread across the globe.²⁷

Four areas are examined: first, the alliance systems that brought different governments and armed forces into cooperation; second, the supply and finance of armies and navies, which often relied on complex transnational networks; third, the composition of supposedly national armies; and finally the legal framework that sought to define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in war and the values that underpinned its conduct. In this new light, the cosmopolitan dimensions of war can be uncovered, focusing on sympathy for the sufferings of others—outside one’s own local, national or ethnic community—among those engaged in the fighting.

Returning to the historical situation of being caught between Prussia and Russia in which Immanuel Kant finds himself at the time of the Seven Years’ War, Alexander Etkind, in his contribution (Chap. 2), is concerned with the question of Kant’s silence during the years of

²⁶For a critical reflection on the challenges and opportunities of this aspect of globalisation, see Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

²⁷For an earlier, more Eurocentric manifestation of connected and entangled history, see Michel Espagne and Michaël Werner, ‘La construction d’une référence culturelle allemande en France: genèse et histoire, 1750–1914’, *Annales*, 42:4 (1987), 969–992. For a more recent and global application of this model, see James L. Gelvin and Nile Green (eds), *Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010). On transnational history, see Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad, and Oliver Janz (eds), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). On global history, see Bruce Mazlish, ‘Comparing Global to World History’, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 28:3 (1998), 385–395.

the Russian occupation of Königsberg. Like other authors in this volume, he deploys the new critical readings of Kant's biography in order to identify the manifold character of cosmopolitan ideas in the mind of this supposedly dogmatic and normative thinker. Kant's so-called silent period following his appointment to a professorship in Königsberg and his discovery of David Hume are drawn upon in this context. Etkind emphasises that it was these ten years of silence, during which Kant was a subject of the Russian occupation, which formed the intellectual backdrop for his 'cosmopolitan writings'.²⁸ In his study of Russian imperial thought, Etkind has previously emphasised the importance of the frontier location between Prussian and Russian imperialism for Kant's political thought.²⁹ In the present context, he engages Kant's early work in a broader dialogue with postcolonial dichotomies, distinguishing between hegemonic imperialism and the subaltern voice of the colonised subjects. In his reading, Kant emerges as a compromised author caught between the Prussian burghers of Königsberg and the Russian forces occupying his home city, but also influencing their own notions of political order.

Cosmopolitan ideas were also deployed in ideologies of conflict. Continuing the theme of wars as occasions for transnational solidarity, Maria Mayofis (Chap. 3) looks at the Napoleonic age from a Russian perspective, identifying an intuitively unlikely connection between pan-Russian conservatism and the reception of Kant east of East Prussia. It is a widespread notion that the Holy Alliance as a vision of international order was diametrically opposed to the more radical, republican genealogy of global order, such as is usually associated with Immanuel Kant's Perpetual Peace. This chapter shakes up this view by analysing the importance of Kant's ideas for the intellectual formation of the most influential Russian imperial political thinker of this period, the apologist of modern Russian autocracy, Sergei Uvarov. Behind this reputation of a cultural conservative and political isolationist hides another Uvarov, Mayofis shows, a person who had presented his readers and his tsar with an alternative vision of European order. Mayofis's chapter draws on Uvarov's unpublished and little known works in contextual perspective,

²⁸See Eva Piirimäe and Alexander Schmidt, 'Between Morality and Anthropology—Sociability in Enlightenment Thought', in *History of European Ideas*, 41:5 (2015), 571–588.

²⁹Alexander Etkind, 'Philosophy under Russian rule', in idem, *Internal Colonization*, 171–249.

showing that his reliance on Kant's work, even if he ultimately presented a distorted account of the Prussian philosopher, was in fact greatest in the period of Franco–Russian conflict.

The section on wars invites scholars to rethink the anachronistic attachment of texts such as Kant's *Perpetual Peace* to twenty-first century models of democracy and post-conflict reconciliation. The seemingly isolated lineages separating Kantian republicanism from 'Uvarovian' conservatism, or the rules for drawing up peace treaties from the rules of war, can then be seen as forming part of the same genealogy.

THE IDEA OF COSMOPOLITANISM IN IMPERIAL CONTEXTS

A second major theme of this volume concerns the imperial context in which the conflicts as well as the ideas developed. Most nineteenth-century ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism and nationalism, revolved around ideas of the state and statehood. Yet for the nineteenth and significant parts of the twentieth centuries, many of these languages and their speakers in fact remained imperial subjects. As new, quasi-imperial states such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union gained control over territories formerly associated with the dynasties they had succeeded, these older mentalities remained significant. In trying to relate the changing appeal of cosmopolitanism to these imperial and colonial contexts, we were able to build on the recent revival of studies of imperial situations in global intellectual contexts.³⁰

Cosmopolitan thought, often expressed in the form of articles and conventions, echoed the changing modes of conducting conflicts. For some thinkers, the compromised outcomes of interimperial conflicts such

³⁰On Enlightenment critiques of colonial practices and the radicalism of Burke's 'conservatism', see Richard Bourke, 'Collision with the Colonies' and 'A Revolution in Ideas', in idem, *Empire and Revolution. The Political Life of Edmund Burke* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 280–357. For an excellent analysis of this process of classification in the Russian empire, see Marina Mogilner, *Homo Imperii. A History of Physical Anthropology in Russia* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2013); Ilya Gerasimov, Sergey Glebov, Jan Kusber, Marina Mogilner, Alexander Semyonov (eds), *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2009); on Britain and France, see Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). On empire and the Muslim world, see Cemil Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World. A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017).

as the Crimean War led to new intellectual synergies, while for others, it produced a separation between internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Falling within the strand of recently revived scholarship in new international and global intellectual history, but also, significantly expanding its geographical and conceptual remit, Cemil Aydin's contribution (Chap. 4) explores the emerging linkages between imperial, racial and religious visions of Muslim-ness from 1815 to 1878. These ideas are set against the background of less well-studied conflicts such as the Acehnese–Dutch War (1873–1906). The recent growth of interest in non-European perspectives on seemingly well-studied theatres of war such as the Crimean War is another important context. At the centre of Aydin's attention is the idea of the Muslim world, which emerged by the 1880s as an alternative vision to the European traditions of cosmopolitanism. Concentrating on the Protestant black intellectual in West Africa, Edward Blyden, and his influential article titled 'Muhammedanism and the Negro Race' (1875), Aydin explores the emergence of a conversation and connection between pan-Islamism and pan-Africanism which persisted into the twentieth century. The term 'cosmopolitanism' is applied to Muslim experience in the long nineteenth century not as a derivative discourse, but as a kind of anti-colonial aspiration to hegemony which is unique in its own right.

The rise of cosmopolitan aspirations in the extra-European world and among non-Christian populations presents a marked contrast to the paradoxical relationship between British liberal internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The fraught relationship with the concept as well as the word in British international political thought is a subject which has not been covered in much detail in the recent revival of international history.³¹ Looking at the late period of British imperial and international political thought, Georgios Varouxakis (Chap. 5) explains why the British tradition of international thought associated with John Stuart Mill, as well as with Victorian intellectuals such as Alfred Zimmern, constituted a retreat from cosmopolitan thought, despite Britain's continued global imperial ambitions. Contrary to widespread belief, Varouxakis argues, it was not

³¹See Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*; see also Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

only in continental Europe and not as late as the First World War that 'cosmopolitanism' acquired negative connotations.

The words *kosmopolites*, *cosmopolite*, *kosmopolit*, despite significant changes in connotation, remain identifiable as brands of an appropriated ideal creating an arc from the supposedly global modern *Weltbürger* to the imagined philosophical subjectivity of an ancient polis.³² The Greek concept had initially emerged as an attribute of charismatic mavericks such as Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic, whose oral teachings were immortalised in the hagiographic writings of their contemporary devotees such as Plato, or criticised by modern critics such as Nietzsche.³³ The ambivalent appeal of Socrates and Diogenes had to do with their disregard for the received habits of their time, which some thought to be a subaltern gesture against hegemony, while others interpreted as callousness in the face of morally binding grammars of behaviour.³⁴ In the modern era, such characteristics were revived in the figure of the modern cosmopolite, such as Fougeret de Monbron, Casanova, but also, the modern flaneur such as Walter Benjamin, who becomes a fugitive from several dictatorships at once. In Jeremy Waldron's words, the cosmopolitan as a modern type is 'a creature of modernity, conscious, even proud, of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self'.³⁵

³²See the detailed discussion of this history in Lea Ypi, *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11–35. On translation and the translatability of these concepts, see Barbara Cassin, *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles* (Paris: Seuil, 2004); and Xavier Landrin, 'La sémantique historique de la Weltliteratur: genèse conceptuelle et usages savants', in Anna Boschetti (ed.), *L'espace culturel transnational* (Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2010), 73–134.

³³Plato, *The Republic*, G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), Tom Griffith (transl.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Plato, *Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus*, Harold North Fowler (transl.), Loeb classical library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1914); On Plato's construction of Socrates, see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, §190, §191, §202 (Leipzig: Naumann, 1886). See also Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Problem des Sokrates', in idem, *Nachgelassene Fragmente* (Spring, 1888), in *Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Giorgio Colli and Maurizio Montinari (eds) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), 59.

³⁴On the eighteenth-century reception of Diogenes's relationship with and effect on society, see Michael Sonenscher, *Sans-culottes: An Eighteenth-century Emblem in the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 69, and ch. 3.

³⁵Jeremy Waldron, 'What Is Cosmopolitan?', in *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8:2 (2000), 227–243, 228.

One might have expected the liberal thinkers of the British empire to assume a positive stance towards the cosmopolitan ideal. Yet, as Varouxakis shows, throughout the nineteenth century, British political thinkers, including those with an internationalist outlook, were sceptical of the airy doctrines of world improvement associated with cosmopolitan personalities. The features that intellectuals like Mill and Zimmern associated with the cosmopolitan ideal were remarkably similar to what Soviet ideology would later call ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’, yet in the British context, the caricature had a different social group in mind: instead of Jews or socialists, as it was done on the Continent, here, the cosmopolitan caricature referred to Giuseppe Mazzini and his followers. A common caricature of the cosmopolite in English parlance was the figure of the ‘Gasmabaleet’, a dandy with a continental accent, probably inspired by the gregarious Mazzini, whose elite status was more visible than the intelligence of their proposals. Thus the longest surviving European empire appears to have left a legacy of largely anti-cosmopolitan and only cautiously internationalist orientation.

But Britain in this period was not only noted for its conspicuous rejection of cosmopolitanism. Its entanglements in global conflicts such as the two World Wars also contributed to the emergence of the world’s perhaps most successful institution of ‘cosmopolitanisation’ in the form of the BBC. Marie Gillespie’s and Eva Nieto McAvoy’s contribution (Chap. 6) turns to the role of the BBC as a cosmopolitan institution in wartime, showing how imperial ideology could coexist with, and be contradicted by, the social experience of transnational and diasporic encounters in the process of production. This optic explains how the corporation could become simultaneously a setting for emergent diasporic forms of identity, and an instrument of imperial and then postimperial British strategic interests. With George Orwell’s wartime programme *Voice* as their chief example, they show how metropolitan broadcasters joined forces with newcomers from the imperial periphery in what they perceived as a common fight against fascism. As a contact zone for concrete social encounters, the BBC’s World Service gave rise to what Gillespie describes as a corporate but still identifiably British form of cosmopolitanism. As such it was often in conflict with its paymaster, the Foreign and Colonial Office, and indeed the British Foreign Office funded its operations until 2014. Aside from broadcasting British identity outward, translation of foreign voices for British audiences was another activity at the heart of the service.

What characterises the imperial situation within which the engagement with cosmopolitan legacies occurs is the presence in them of multiple and often conflicting ideas of the frontier. Thus local conflicts such as American racism and the rise of pan-Islamism could give rise to new, anti-colonial forms of cosmopolitan aspirations. Conversely, imperial subjects who appear to represent the establishment of their societies seem to be threatened by foreign nationals who are simultaneously perceived as nationalist and as cosmopolitan ‘Gasmabaleets’. Finally, the BBC, an institution which is expressly instructed to broadcast to the enemy and to demonstrate national unity, is revealed to have consisted of multiple voices speaking, simultaneously, both for democracy and for empire, advocating solidarity and the ideals of world literature whilst remaining socially divided along racial and ethnic lines.

CITIES WITH COSMOPOLITAN LEGACIES

This brings me to the final context within which we examine cosmopolitanism, which concentrates on the faint memory of the ancient polis in the context of modern cities located in empires. The common attributes of the ‘cosmopolitan’, an urban dweller of the world, are naturally associated with cities, and thus it seemed fitting to continue with a section on the urban environment. But while urban studies of modern cosmopolitanism have used the term interchangeably with ideas of cultural hybridity in metropolitan contexts, this volume attempts a kind of ‘defamiliarisation’ in its approach to urban contexts. It does so by highlighting the jarring contrast between ancient ideals of citizenship which were linked to cities, and the modern experience of exclusion, partition, obliteration, and the persistence of social memory in peripheral cities on the frontiers of interimperial conflicts.³⁶ Located in empires and in the context of global capitalist societies, the cities in which cosmopolitan subjectivities emerge can be simultaneously sites of violence and exclusion, and be the places where new ideas and theories about global order emerge. In fact, the seemingly paradoxical combination of the ‘universe’ and the ‘city’, particular violence and universal aspirations, can be found in the imperial architecture of representative classical buildings in the ancient

³⁶On the term ‘defamiliarisation’ in its application to critical historical studies, see Ilya Gerasimov et al., Introduction to Gerasimov et al. (eds), *Empire Speaks Out*, 3ff.

world, too, like the Acropolis, but also in the neo-classical buildings of the eighteenth-century academies of France, Prussia and Russia, in the destroyed medieval city walls throughout nineteenth-century Europe, which turned into fashionable promenades, and in the twentieth-century palaces of administration in Geneva and New York. This contrasting quality makes the city such an important ‘setting’ of cosmopolitan mythologies, allowing figures like Socrates and Diogenes to set themselves apart from the communities in which they live. In the modern era, the link between cities and cosmopolitan cultures remains important, but was construed altogether differently. In the nineteenth century, it was not the sans-culottes but the modern well-to-do flâneurs, the strangers or the political exiles who could claim cosmopolitan aspirations, as Walter Benjamin famously described in painting the image of Paris as *Capital of the 19th century*. This image of the modern city as a site of cosmopolitan flâneurs has also been applied to cities such as London and New York, albeit often at the cost of losing Benjamin’s self-critical and ironic perspective.³⁷

The chapters you will find here will leave the reader with an uncomfortable picture of cities. Here, military garrisons and citadels fulfil a disabling function, preventing the emergence of true citizenship. Instead, the authors problematise the relationship between cities on Europe’s imperial periphery and the legacies of cosmopolitan thought. My own chapter on the peace of Brest-Litovsk (Chap. 7) takes its cue from the metaphor of the ‘citadel’ which Isaiah Berlin uses to introduce his model of liberalism. Looking at the metaphor in its social and political context of eastern European history, I discuss the reasons why Cold War liberals such as Berlin had such difficulty relating to the historical experiences of eastern Europe and particularly, to Jewish history in this period.

Concentrating on works of literary fiction, Zaur Gasimov (Chap. 8) looks at another city on the periphery of the Russian empire, Baku, which saw a brief ‘cosmopolitan moment’ associated with Russian-speaking literature produced by local, culturally Muslim but often secular

³⁷Walter Benjamin, ‘Paris, Hauptstadt des 19. Jahrhunderts’, in idem, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Rolf Tiedemann (ed.) (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 45–59, 46. On cosmopolitanism and cities, see also Richard Sennett, ‘Cosmopolitanism and the social experience of cities’, in Steven Vertovec et al. (eds), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*, 42–47; and Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

authors of literary fiction. At the centre of attention is a novel by Kurban Said, the pen name of the Jewish author Leo Nussimbaum, whose novel, *Ali und Nino* (1937), written in exile in Austria, depicted a multinational Baku torn along ethnic and religious lines during the civil war of 1917–1920. A love story between a Shia Muslim and a Georgian Orthodox in the classroom of a Russian gymnasium encapsulates the last years of Azerbaijani culture in the late Russian empire before the Bolshevik occupation. The geography of Ali and Nino encompasses the whole region of the Caucasus, involving Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, Turks and Persians, who no longer think of themselves as ‘Asians’ but as cosmopolitan Europeans. This brings the Caucasus in comparison with other peripheral regions of empires, where, as Dominique Kirchner-Reill put it, cosmopolitanism emerged in a kind of negative form of ‘nationalists who feared the nation’.³⁸ The idea of world literature as an organised, but increasingly Anglophone endeavour, has attracted criticism from literary scholars.³⁹ This chapter provides a very different perspective on the cosmopolitan genealogies of Goethe’s project, albeit through the nostalgic gaze of a very local worldliness.

Given what Michael Rothberg has called a ‘multidirectional memory’ which connects different forms of dehumanisation in a suitably comparative manner, the traumatic memory of the Holocaust can now be compared with, without being equated to, the memory of colonial situations.⁴⁰ In her visual ethnography of Kaliningrad, Olga Sezneva (Chap. 9) explores in detail how this might work in Kant’s birthplace, Königsberg. This site of problematic encounters between Soviet newcomers, German expellees and uprooted survivors turned from the symbolic ‘capital’ of cosmopolitan thought into a dystopian site of destruction and spy-mania associated with the official Soviet rejection of western ideals. A specially curated photographic archive gives this piece its ethnographic poignancy, as the city’s inhabitants and administrators

³⁸Dominique Kirchner-Reill, *Nationalists Who Feared the Nation. Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

³⁹Emily Apter, *Against World Literature: On the Politics of Untranslatability* (London: Verso, 2013).

⁴⁰Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009).

continue to look for a middle path between the city's cosmopolitan pedigree and its fear of 'bowing low' before westernising influences.

In his afterword, Axel Körner picks up the theme of historical orientation, suggesting ways in which paying attention to the institutional and cultural history of the passions can contribute to a finer understanding of the relationship between global conflict and the globalisation of emotions. Looking at the production and consumption of operas, some of which we have encountered in earlier chapters such as Cemil Aydin's discussion of Verdi's *Aida* in Egypt, he also insists, however, that we ought to resist facile conclusions from the observed reality of the globalisation of art forms.⁴¹

A few final words are due about our volume's cover image, Vasily Vereshchagin's painting, *The Apotheosis of War* (1871), which was based on this artist's travels to Central Asia at a time when Russian hegemony over the region was particularly precarious. Having originally started his career as a battle painter, Vereshchagin had grown into a passionate critic of the interimperial Great Game. He used his capacity for painting near-photographic representations of battle and post-battle scenes to condemn war, and rose to prominence at international art fairs, particularly in places like Chicago.⁴² He dedicated this painting was gloomily to 'all conquerors, past, present, and future'.⁴³ A witness to the atrocities of the imperial armies of Russia as well as Britain in Central Asia and in India, Vereshchagin in this painting stayed away from an indictment against any political power in particular, however. Instead, he presented in the most powerful form available the crude realism of death as an outcome of an increasingly global conflict. Yet this generalised indictment of the inhumanity of war—symbolically cast into the shape of a pyramid as a memento to the imperial Great Game—is also visibly located in a historically specific landscape. Its 'alien' ruins of an exotic-looking citadel demarcate the global range of Europe's violent frontiers. In this way,

⁴¹This critique is particularly directed at Akira Iriye, *Global Community: the Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2002).

⁴²See, for instance, Vasily Vereshchagin, *Second Appendix to Catalogue of the Vereshchagin Exhibition: Realism* (Chicago: The Art Institute, 1889). See also his memoirs, Vassili Vereshchagin, *Souvenirs. Enfance—Voyage—Guerre* (Paris: Albert Savine, 1888).

⁴³For details of the image, see https://www.tretyakovgallery.ru/ru/collection/_show/_image/_id/183, accessed 17 July 2016.

it also makes visible this volume's aspirations to identify the multiple relationships between specific conflicts and universal cosmopolitan sentiments.

Rather than providing cosmopolitanism with yet another set of pedigreed typologies, we hope to draw attention to the variety of ways in which conflicts inspired cosmopolitan thinking. Cosmopolitan ideas have been expressed in biographies and dialogues, in memoirs, travelogues, works of fiction, as well as in treatises and conventions, but also in photography and on the radio. Wars produce literary genres and cultural forms of their own; they not only destroy, but also create new connections between ideas and people; in retrospect, they provide a reservoir of traumatic memories from which new ideas of political order arise. The authors of this volume offer an unfamiliar account of the close relationship between cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism, a portrayal that is both less flattering to the present and more inclusive of the extra-European fortunes of the concept.

To return to a question which had already plagued James Joyce's Stephen Dedalus in his search for orientation: 'But was there anything round the universe to show where it stopped before the nothing place began?'⁴⁴ We found that cosmopolitan aspirations emerged when and wherever ideas about the universe collided in conflict. The wastelands created by war and many of the imperial 'nothing places'—peripheral cities, border areas, and, metaphorically speaking, minor literary genres—turned out to be important sites of cultural production and sources of historical insight. Looking at universal ideas through a variety of social and intellectual portraits can expand our world picture without forcing anybody to nail it to any particular ideological wall.

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PART I

Conflicts as Cosmopolitan Moments

Transnational and Cosmopolitan Aspects of Eighteenth-Century European Wars

Stephen Conway

If by transnational we mean ideas, actions and actors that cannot fully be comprehended by reference to national boundaries, considerations and sentiments, then war is in many senses transnational. This claim may come as a surprise: war between states and peoples generates fear and hatred, heightens perceptions of difference and de-emphasizes commonalities. Not only does international armed conflict entrench national feelings; it can also encourage a retreat into even narrower insular senses of belonging, as local feelings are intensified when communities are threatened by external dangers, or the same local feelings are deliberately promoted by governments seeking to appeal to established local identities to serve the national purpose of recruitment into the military.¹

¹From 1782, the British army's infantry regiments were nearly all given county affiliations to encourage local enlistments. The French army's infantry had been organized on a provincial basis since its creation as a standing military force in the seventeenth century.

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Even more surprising might be the second claim advanced in this paper: that war contains important elements of cosmopolitanism, defined here as a belief in the essential unity of humankind and in the values and sympathies that underpin that unity. The connection between cosmopolitanism and war, we may be tempted to think, is merely sequential; the horrors of armed conflict bring forth a postwar cosmopolitan reaction. Wars in the early modern and modern periods have been followed by attempts to promote international understanding and avoid future struggles. We can see these attempts in the realm of civil society, as in the forming of peace organizations in Britain and the United States and then continental Europe after the end of the long, bloody and destructive Napoleonic War in 1815.² More often, they took the form of government initiatives, with international congresses or even the establishment of permanent international machinery to settle disputes and promote harmony. Examples of this tendency are the Congress system to keep the peace in Europe established by the major powers that defeated Napoleon in 1814–1815;³ and, most familiarly, perhaps, the forming of the League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations after the Second.⁴ Yet a case can be made for cosmopolitanism as part of the experience of war-making, and not simply a postwar reaction to war's large-scale suffering.

The purpose of my paper is first to sketch out the transnational dimensions of wars involving eighteenth-century Europeans, and then to explore the ways in which we can see the armed struggles of the time as embodying cosmopolitan features. Most of this account relates to war on land rather than at sea, as for most European states armies were more important than navies. Many of the examples are British, for the

²See W.H. van der Linden, *The International Peace Movement, 1815–1874* (Amsterdam: Tilleul, 1987) chs. 1–5. For the British case, see Martin Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730–1854* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), esp. ch. 6.

³See, e.g., Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harper, 2007); Mark Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013); Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

⁴See, e.g., Martyn Housden, *The League of Nations and the Organization of Peace* (London: Pearson Longman, 2012); Kate Seaman, *Un-tied Nations: the United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Global Governance* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).

simple reason that I know the British material best; but from my more limited knowledge of non-British sources, I am confident that many of my British examples could be replicated by similar testimony relating to other Europeans. Under the transnational heading, we will consider the ends for which wars were fought, or at least the ways in which they were legitimized by governments. We then turn to the means. Four areas will be examined: first, the alliance systems that brought different governments and armed forces into cooperation; second, the supply and finance of armies and navies, which often relied on complex transnational networks; third, the composition of supposedly national armies; and finally the legal framework that sought to define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in war and the values that underpinned its conduct. Once these transnational aspects have been considered, we can go on to explore the cosmopolitan dimensions, focusing on sympathy for the sufferings of others—outside one's own local, national or ethnic community—among those engaged in the fighting.

*

Accustomed as we are to seeing the European states system as inherently competitive, and armed conflict as an expression of national or state rivalries, we naturally tend to think of war aims as reflecting the interests of states and their rulers. It would be foolish to deny that states entered wars to improve their own position. In the eighteenth century, many of Europe's wars began as a result of a disputed succession to a throne—hence the wars of Spanish (1702–1713), Polish (1733–1738), Austrian (1740–1748), and even Bavarian (1778–1779) succession—behind which lay a desire on the part of particular states to acquire more territory or increase power and influence at the expense of others. Yet for all the evidence of the pursuit of national or state interest, some of the language used to explain and justify eighteenth-century European wars was much wider in conception.

In the British political lexicon, eighteenth-century wars might be described as struggles to resist 'universal monarchy', or the dominance of one particular state over all others. France was seen as aspiring to 'universal monarchy' under Louis XIV in the first decade of the century, and again under Louis XV in the 1740s, '50s and early '60s. The same ambition was attributed by British commentators in the 1720s and again in

the 1780s to the Austrian Habsburgs.⁵ Closely related to resistance to ‘universal monarchy’ as a justification for war was ‘defence of the liberties of Europe’, or the securing of the political independence and territorial integrity of all states threatened by an over-mighty power. The European dimension of the ‘liberties of Europe’ deserves emphasis; it was not the liberties of any one country that were being invoked, but the liberties of all European states. Examples of the British use of this concept can be found throughout the eighteenth century, from the War of the Spanish Succession at its start to the French Revolutionary War at its end. They appear, furthermore, in a great variety of sources: public material, such as parliamentary debates, political pamphlets and newspapers, but also private letters.⁶

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, when memories of the Ottoman siege of Vienna were still fresh, wars against the Turks were similarly explained in many European countries not by reference to national or state interests, but by the need to defend ‘Christendom’. We can even see signs of the same perspective in criticism of the aggrandizing tendencies of Louis XIV, who appeared in some British accounts as a French version of the ‘Grand Turk’, who posed a similar challenge to Christian values across Europe.⁷ The threat to Christian civilization was again invoked by many European governments in the 1790s, when the danger came not from the Sultan but from the atheistic and republican regime established in Paris. No one used the language of Christendom

⁵ See, e.g., Stephen Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Similarities, Connections, Identities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) ch. 2.

⁶ See, e.g., [Anon.,] *Reasons Prov'd to be Unreasonable: or, An Answer to the Reasons against a War with France* (London, 1702) p. 4; [Anon.,] *Reasons for a War; from the Imminent Danger with which Europe is Threatened, by the Exorbitant Power of the House of Bourbon*. 2nd edn. (London, 1734) p. 22; National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh, Hamilton Dalrymple of North Berwick Muniments, GD 110/929/2 and 5, Earl of Stair to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 26 Jan., 4 Feb. 1742; William Cobbett and John Wright (eds) *The Parliamentary History of England*, 36 vols. (London, 1806–1820), xiii. 1317 (Lord Ilchester, 1745); *Monitor, or British Freeholder*, 13 Jan. 1759; Thomas W. Copeland (ed.), *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, 10 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958–1978), vi. 344.

⁷ See, e.g., [Anon.,] *The Most Christian Turk; Or, A View of the Life and Bloody reign of Lewis XIV Present King of France* (London, 1690) p. 101. See also Tony Claydon, *Europe and the Making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 152–192.

more readily at this time than Edmund Burke, for whom ‘the community of Europe’ was not just Christian, but defined by its Christianity. To him, and many who thought like him, the French Revolution threatened to destroy that Europe, and it was imperative that all Christians, regardless of their denomination or country, united to defend what they held dear.⁸

A less ecumenical but still transnational religious appeal was made in Britain in the middle of the century to ‘the Protestant Interest’, or solidarity among Protestants of all countries against menacing Catholicism. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, meeting at the height of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745–1746, welcomed the arrival of Dutch troops to help defend the Protestant Hanoverian dynasty from the Catholic Stuart threat. Indeed, the General Assembly looked forward to further reinforcements from other Protestant states—Danish, Hessian and Swiss—on the grounds that ‘as this seems to be the last effort to overthrow the protestant religion; is it any wonder protestant powers should join together to defend us? Our interest, as to religion, is the same with theirs; and the preservation of it depends upon the defeat of this wicked design’.⁹ Similarly, British intervention on the Continent appears in some contemporary accounts as necessary to defend the Protestant Interest in Europe; government-supporting newspapers made this point to explain the commitment of British military resources to western Germany during the Seven Years’ War.¹⁰

Scepticism about some of these claims to be acting in the wider interest seems appropriate. British commitment to the apparently selfless concept of the European ‘balance of power’, for instance, often seems to have been no more than a screen for the more parochial defence of British commercial interests on the Continent. A persistent British government fear appears to have been that if the French or some other power dominated Europe, British merchants and manufacturers would sell fewer goods in continental markets. Government-supporting pamphleteers, seeking to justify British military deployments on the Continent, were rarely coy about stressing the economic benefits of preventing the French from blocking British access to European

⁸For more on this, see Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe, 180–187*.

⁹*Gentleman’s Magazine*, 15, 1745, 633.

¹⁰See, e.g., *Monitor, or British Freeholder*, 10 March, 12 May 1759.

customers.¹¹ We might also reasonably doubt the sincerity of the message regularly conveyed to the British public during the Seven Years' War that their country was engaged in an essentially religious struggle, with Protestant Britain, Prussia and Hanover ranged against Catholic France and Austria, joined in the war's final stages by equally Catholic Spain. Closer inspection reveals that there was much more to the war than religious animosity. Lutheran Sweden was an ally of Catholic France, and the British government sent an expeditionary force to protect Catholic Portugal against its Catholic Spanish neighbour. Russia, a major player in the war until its last year, was neither Catholic nor Protestant. Frederick the Great of Prussia, lauded in Britain as the defender of the Protestant cause in Germany against the threat from menacing Catholicism, was an unlikely Protestant hero, as anyone who knows anything about his views will be aware.¹²

But if caution about the transnational claims of belligerent states is entirely appropriate, we should not dismiss those claims too readily. The use of expansive language tells us much about politicians' perceptions of what would encourage their publics to support conflicts. Frederick the Great was portrayed as a Protestant hero for good reason. Both he and British ministers wanted to persuade the British public to back a commitment of British manpower and resources to Westphalia, where a multi-state German army was protecting Frederick's western flank. That British ministers encouraged their press supporters to use the language of Protestant solidarity to promote British military intervention in Germany suggests that they believed the British public would respond positively to such an appeal.¹³ Just as importantly, from our current perspective,

¹¹ See, e.g., [Anon.,] *The Conduct of the Government with regard to Peace and War, Stated* (London, 1748), p. 5; Malachy Postlethwayt, *Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved* (2 vols., London, 1757), ii. 511; [Anon.,] *The Occasional Patriot: or, An Enquiry into the Present Connections of Great Britain with the Continent* (London, 1756).

¹² See, e.g., Walther Hubatsch, *Frederick the Great of Prussia: Absolutism and Administration* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1975), p. 190; Theodor Schieder, *Frederick the Great*, ed. and trans. Sabina Berkeley and H.M. Scott (London: Longman, 2000), p. 18; David Fraser, *Frederick the Great: King of Prussia* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), esp. 57–60.

¹³ They seem to have been right, judging by the seemingly autonomous expressions of support for the Protestant cause in Germany. In November 1759, for instance, an Edinburgh club formed to celebrate the principles of the Glorious Revolution included among its toasts 'To the downfall of Popery and Tyranny. To the preservation of the Protestant religion and civil liberties of Germany: A speedy deliverance of such of our Protestant brethren abroad as are groaning under the yoke of their cruel enemies': *Edinburgh Chronicle; or, Universal Intelligencer*, 14–17 Nov. 1759.

whatever motives lay behind the use of appeals of this kind, such expansive language helped to promote transnational views of why wars were necessary. The arguments, in other words, even if retrospective rationales for decisions taken on different grounds, acquired a momentum of their own.

If the justifications for armed conflicts might conjure up different kinds of wider belonging, so too could the means by which they were fought. Wars are rarely bilateral affairs; they are usually waged between sets of states, or by a set of states against a powerful and potentially dominating enemy. Alliance systems were a feature of all major European conflicts of the eighteenth century. In its first decade, the threat posed by Louis XIV inspired a grand coalition of European powers; and in the 1790s, the revolutionary regime in Paris similarly provoked the formation of a series of international alignments designed to check French expansion and influence. Less extensive but still impressive alliance systems directed against Louis XV's ambitions emerged in the War of the Austrian Succession of 1740–1748 and, as we have seen, were a feature of the Seven Years' War of 1756–1763. These international coalitions had important transnational consequences.

True, frictions and tensions undoubtedly existed within the different alliances. Indeed, allies often accused each other of bad faith or pursuing narrow state interests rather than working for the common cause. Proximity, rather than improving relations, could make them worse. The diary of Joseph Yorke, a British staff officer in Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession, reveals his intense dislike of the Austrian generals with whom he was obliged to work at allied headquarters. Uncomplimentary comments on the Austrians punctuate Yorke's record of the campaign of 1744; so great was his hostility that at one point he came close to celebrating Austrian setbacks in Italy and Bohemia inflicted by the common enemies of both the British and the Austrians.¹⁴ But these frictions and tensions, unsurprisingly, were most obvious when the enemy was doing well and the allies were failing to make progress. In such circumstances, the cracks in carefully constructed alliances almost inevitably widened as the partners blamed each other.

¹⁴British Library (BL), London, Hardwicke Papers, Diary of Joseph Yorke in Flanders, 1744, Add. MS 36, 250, fos. 3, 6, 7, 21, 26, 39, 65.

But we can see transnational as well as national responses to international alliances. Allied victories, or victories to which allies contributed significantly, usually elicited generous sentiments towards foreigners. In the War of the Spanish Succession, Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Habsburg general, received much praise in Britain for his role as Marlborough's co-commander at the battle of Blenheim, and continued to enjoy a celebrity status after the conflict was over.¹⁵ The British public followed the fortunes of Maria Theresa's Austrian generals with great interest during the German campaigns of the War of the Austrian Succession.¹⁶ A few years later, they cheered on Frederick the Great of Prussia and his armies in the Seven Years' War.¹⁷ Likewise, in the 1790s, Archduke Charles of Austria, who bettered a French army in western Germany when no one else seemed to be able to check French progress, emerged as an unlikely—and decidedly transient—British hero.¹⁸ Eighteenth-century Britons, as these examples demonstrate, particularly lauded their allies when their own military was failing to achieve very much. Paradoxically, then, positive sentiments about allies could be just another sign of the fundamental importance of the national perspective; foreigners' successes were used as a means to criticize the failures of British generals and admirals, and as a spur to greater national effort.¹⁹ But praise for allies can also be seen as an expression of inclusiveness, as an enthusiasm for those beyond the national community who are helping to combat the threat posed by a common enemy.

¹⁵See, e.g., James Cartwright (ed.), *The Wentworth Papers, 1705–1739* (London, 1883), p. 260; BL, Journal of James Thornhill, 1711, Add. MS 34,788, fos. 47, 50; J.J. Bagley (ed.), *The Great Diurnal of Nicholas Blundell of Little Crosby, Lancashire* (3 vols., Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, Liverpool, 1968–1972), i. 91.

¹⁶See, e.g., *The Family Memoirs of the Rev. William Stukeley*, i (Surtees Society, lxxiii, Durham, 1880), pp. 332–333.

¹⁷See, e.g., Brian Fitzgerald (ed.), *The Correspondence of Emily, Duchess of Leinster* (3 vols.) (Dublin: Irish Manuscripts Commission, 1949–1957), i. 182; Hugh Owen (ed.), *Additional Letters of the Morris of Anglesey (1735–1786)* (Hon. Society of Cymmrodorion, xliix, pt. i, London, 1947), 314; Donald Gibson (ed.), *A Parson in the Vale of White Horse: George Woodward's Letters from East Hendred, 1753–1761* (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1982), p. 105.

¹⁸See, e.g., *Oracle, and Public Advertiser*, 22 Sept. 1796; British Museum, Department of Prints and Drawings, BM 8835, *The Arch-Duke*, 15 Nov. 1796.

¹⁹See Bob Harris, *Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 136–138.

As English gentlewoman Margaret Heathcote wrote of Frederick the Great in December 1757, ‘May Providence finally grant Success to him, & all those who fight for the Common Cause of Europe’.²⁰

To conceptualize distant allies in a positive way is one thing; to forge personal bonds, as Yorke’s experience shows, was quite another. Yet relations between allied soldiers on campaign together could be friendly. The experience of facing danger together brought military men from different nations to see clearly what they had in common. After the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, a private in the British foot guards wrote of his regret that an ‘abundance of good old experienced souldyers belonging to the severall countryes concerned in this confederacy dyed in this engagement’.²¹ In the Low Countries in 1744, at the same time as Yorke was complaining in his diary about the Austrian generals, Hanoverian and British troops found it easy to establish fellow feeling. They would drink together, and, according to one source, ‘talk and sing a vast deal without understanding one syllable of what they say to one another’.²² The following year, another report tells of British soldiers who were so impressed by the Hanoverians’ perseverance at the battle of Fontenoy that ‘they were willing to divide a Loaf with them’—a deeply significant symbol of a willingness to be inclusive.²³

Armies were able to come into the field only as a result of the efforts made by a great many people beyond the political boundaries of the states concerned. The largely German army that held back the French in Westphalia in the Seven Years’ War was paid almost entirely by the British government. When it was joined by a British contingent from 1758, it started to draw more of its provisions from the British Isles, too, as local German sources had become seriously depleted. But Britain and Ireland were not the only external providers. The so-called Combined Army relied on oats from the nearby Dutch Republic and further supplies

²⁰ Bedfordshire Record Office, Bedford, Lucas Collection, L 30/9/56/35, Letter to Lady Grey, 16 Dec. [1757].

²¹ John Marshall Deane, *A Journal of Marlborough’s campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession, 1704–1711*, ed. D.G. Chandler (Society for Army Historical Research, Special Publication No. 12, np., 1984), p. 94.

²² Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Stopford Sackville MSS* (2 vols., London, 1904–1910), i. 290.

²³ John M. Gray (ed.), *Memoirs of the Life of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik* (Scottish History Society, xiii, Edinburgh, 1892), 191.

shipped from as far away as Riga, on the Baltic coast. In 1762, the army may even have consumed rice from South Carolina and coffee from newly conquered French Martinique. Such geographically dispersed sources of supply were possible only because the merchants who provided the goods were involved in established transnational commercial networks, often based on family, kinship or religious connections, which gave them ready access to large quantities of credit.²⁴

If armies were like cities that consumed vast amounts of food but produced very little of their own, the same was true of navies. As avaricious as armies in their appetites, they were often similarly supplied from sources from beyond the territories of their governments. The eighteenth-century French navy, for instance, relied heavily on Irish beef and butter. The British state unsurprisingly disapproved of this trade, and sought to stop it, but Irish provision merchants were usually shrewd enough to avoid direct contact with their French customers, preferring to use Dutch middle-men to facilitate their transactions.²⁵ The British navy, at least when it was serving in European waters, was mainly supplied with foodstuffs by domestic producers; indeed, some historians see its demands as providing a vital stimulus to agricultural and commercial developments in eighteenth-century Britain.²⁶ But the Royal Navy's ships were able to put to sea only thanks to timber, hemp and tar provided by countries on the Baltic shoreline. Even the weapons on battle-ships often came from foreign sources: the Spanish navy's cannons were as likely to have been made in France or Scotland as in Spain itself.²⁷

Money to pay navies and armies, and fund national war efforts more generally, was organized by merchants and financiers with close contacts in commercial centres across Europe. The British national debt, which underwrote a good deal of British military and naval activity, was

²⁴See Stephen Conway, 'Provisioning the Combined Army in Germany, 1758–1762: Who Benefited?', in Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri (eds.), *The Contractor State and its Implications, 1659–1815* (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012), 81–102.

²⁵See, e.g., Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast, Bedford Papers, T 2915/5/34, Richard Rigby to the Duke of Bedford, 5 Sept. 1758.

²⁶Christian Buchet, *Marine, économie et société: un exemple d'interaction: l'avitaillement de la Royal Navy Durant la guerre de sept ans* (Paris, 1999).

²⁷See Agustín González Enciso, 'Buying Cannon Outside: When, Why, How Many? The Supplying of Foreign Iron Cannons for the Spanish Navy in the Eighteenth Century', in Harding and Solbes Ferri (eds.), *The Contractor State*, pp. 135–157.

supported by a significant number of foreign investors, mainly Dutch but also Swiss and German. In the middle of the eighteenth century, some fifteen percent of the British national debt was held by Dutch bondholders.²⁸ Though the proportion declined during the last two decades of the century, even in the 1790s foreign holdings were far from negligible.²⁹ Dutch and Swiss investors also put a good deal of money into French funds, which were less secure but therefore carried higher rates of interest; Swiss financiers, perhaps encouraged by the Genevan origins of Jacques Neckar, the French finance minister, enthusiastically bought French annuities during the War of American Independence.³⁰ British investors, for their part, supported the loans taken out in London by the Habsburg government in the wars against Louis XIV, during the War of Polish Succession in the 1730s, and again in the 1790s, when revolutionary France was the common enemy.³¹

Even the recruitment of armed forces depended to a considerable extent on transnational actors. Nearly all armies had identifiably foreign units in their service. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the French army contained several German, Irish, Swiss, Italian and even Scots regiments. Foreign units in fact comprised about a fifth of the whole.³² The Dutch army included a large German contingent, and employed a Scots brigade until 1782, the officers of which remained almost exclusively Scottish right to the end.³³ The Spanish service likewise relied on Irish, German, Swiss and Walloon regiments. The British army was different only in as much as its foreign component served as wartime

²⁸P.G.M. Dickson, *The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public credit, 1658–1756* (London: Gregg Revivals, 1967), 322.

²⁹J.F. Wright, 'The Contribution of Overseas Savings to the Funded National Debt of Great Britain, 1750–1815', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, 50 (1997), 657–674.

³⁰See Robert D. Harris, 'French Finances and the American War, 1777–1783', *Journal of Modern History*, 48 (1976), 233–258.

³¹P.G.M. Dickson, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740–1780* (2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), esp. ii. 4012–4013; Karl F. Helleines, *The Imperial Loans: A Study in Financial and Diplomatic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

³²Lee Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967), 74.

³³See Joachim Miggelbrink, 'The End of the Scots-Dutch Brigade', in Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop (eds), *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience, c.1550–1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 83–105.

auxiliaries, rather than permanent parts of the military establishment. In every one of Britain's eighteenth-century wars, German troops served alongside home-grown soldiers, mainly in Europe, but also in imperial theatres: Hessian and Brunswick soldiers—as well as smaller contingents from other German states—fought in America during the War of Independence, while in the same conflict the British state employed Hanoverian troops in India.³⁴

Armies were even more cosmopolitan than these examples suggest. Mixing of soldiers of different national backgrounds occurred at the micro level of military units as well at the macro level of armies. The Irish regiments in Spanish and French service, for instance, from the middle of the century drew increasingly on soldiers of many other nations as well as native-born Irishmen. In 1774, a British officer who observed the nominally Irish regiments in the Spanish army described them as full of 'deserters and vagabonds from every country in Europe'.³⁵ A letter in an English newspaper suggested that by 1786 the Irish brigade in French service was largely made up of 'Germans, Hollanders, Flemings, Liegeois, Spanish, and French'.³⁶ In wartime, the rank and file of the regular British regiments were often brought up to strength by enlisting men raised where the army was campaigning—so often in the Low Countries, or western Germany—or by contractual arrangements with foreign military entrepreneurs, who agreed to raise a stipulated number of soldiers, usually in Germany, for the use of British units. German recruiting agents found significant numbers of men in the Holy Roman Empire for the Royal American Regiment during the Seven Years' War; inspection returns suggest that in one of the Royal American battalions, twenty two percent of the rank and file were foreigners enlisted in Europe, the vast bulk of whom were almost certainly German.³⁷ In the War of American Independence, the Royal Americans, and many other British regiments serving across the Atlantic, benefited

³⁴See Stephen Conway, 'Continental European Soldiers in British Imperial Service, c.1756–1792', *English Historical Review*, 129 (2014), 79–106.

³⁵William Dalrymple, *Travels through Spain and Portugal in 1774; With a Short Account of the Spanish Expedition against Algiers, in 1775* (London, 1777), 65.

³⁶'J.D.', in *St James's Chronicle; or British Evening-Post*, 12–14 Sept. 1786.

³⁷Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755–1763* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 318. See also, for an example of German recruits joining the regiment in America, Huntington Library, San Marino,

from the efforts of an Hanoverian officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Georg Albrecht von Scheither, who raised nearly 2000 soldiers in Germany, receiving a cash payment for every recruit he delivered to the embarkation port of Stade, near Hamburg.³⁸

Officers, and to a lesser extent the common soldiers, not infrequently moved from army to army. Sometimes they went abroad because their religious beliefs or political views made service in their own state's army impossible. In the British case, Catholics of military inclination had little choice but to leave their country; they were unwelcome in the British army as common soldiers before the Seven Years' War and debarred from acting as officers until 1793.³⁹ Supporters of the restoration of the House of Stuart were also excluded; after the 1745–1746 rebellion, Henry Lloyd's Jacobitism meant that he was obliged to pursue a military career in the Spanish, French, Austrian, Prussian and finally Russian armies.⁴⁰ Yet mobile officers were often not religious or political refugees, but rather professionals in search of better opportunities to climb the military ladder. A far from unusual example is Harris Power, an Irish Protestant, who had served as a British army officer during the later stages of the War of American Independence. When the war ended, Power's regiment, newly created during the conflict, was disbanded, leaving him facing the prospect of years of struggling on the paltry retainer known as half-pay. He preferred to pursue his career elsewhere, and sought a commission in the Russian army, which he hoped to obtain by asking the British ambassador at St Petersburg to use his

Footnote 37 (continued)

California, Loudoun Papers, LO 1607, 'List of Recruits under the command of Herbert, Baron de Munster embarked the 4th of June near Hamburg and arrived the 27th of August at New York. 1756.'

³⁸For Scheither, see Stephen Conway, 'Entrepreneurs and the Recruitment of the British Army in the War of American Independence', in Jeff Fynn-Paul (ed.), *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 120–123.

³⁹For attempts to remove 'Papist' recruits from British regiments in the 1740s, see Derbyshire Record Office, Matlock, Wilmot Horton of Catton Collection, D 3155 C 657. For the admittance of Catholics from the Seven Years' War onwards, see Thomas Bartlett, '"A Weapon of War Yet Untried": Irish Catholics and the Armed Forces of the Crown, 1760–1830', in T.G. Fraser and Keith Jeffery (eds), *Men, Women, and War* (Historical Studies, xviii, Dublin, 1993), p. 66–85.

⁴⁰See Patrick J. Speelman, *Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Westport, CN: Westview Press, 2002).

connections with Prince Potemkin, the influential Russian nobleman.⁴¹ Francis Maclean was not satisfied with one move to secure promotion. As a young man he served as an officer in the Scots brigade of the Dutch army, distinguishing himself during the fighting in the Low Countries in the War of the Austrian Succession. Then he joined the British army with a commission in a newly raised Highland regiment during the Seven Years War (when the Dutch were neutral and the chances of promotion therefore very limited). At the end of that conflict, when the regiment in which he was serving looked likely to be disbanded, he decided to enter the Portuguese service, where he made rapid strides, becoming a senior officer and provincial governor. Finally, Maclean re-joined the British army in the War of American Independence, dying in 1781 at Halifax, Nova Scotia, as a general.⁴²

Even some of those who were less peripatetic still came to see soldiering as an experience that transcended national boundaries. Ambitious young officers from many different armies saw much advantage in attending a foreign military academy, usually French or Italian in the first half of the century, more often German in the second. So, in the late 1740s, it seemed natural to the father of Robert Carr that his son, who much later rose to become a lieutenant-colonel, should study for a year at Caen in Normandy.⁴³ Two generations later, to the father of Thomas Hawkins it seemed equally natural that his son should go to Brunswick academy before becoming a British cavalry officer.⁴⁴ The Hanoverian connection also promoted German influence; several British officers who served in the War of American Independence had spent time at the university established by George II at Göttingen.⁴⁵ Nor should we forget that British military men, despite their reputation as anti-intellectuals,

⁴¹BL, Leeds Papers, Egerton MS 3500, fo. 15.

⁴²See Stephen Conway, 'Scots, Britons, Europeans: Scottish Military Service, c.1739–1783', *Historical Research*, 82 (2009), 126–128.

⁴³Tyne and Wear Archives, Newcastle upon Tyne, Ellison MSS, bundle A30, Henry Thomas Carr to Henry Ellison, 24 Sept. 1749.

⁴⁴For Hawkins at Brunswick, see Cornwall Record Office, Truro, DD J 2245, Diary of Thomas Hawkins. See also BL, Althorp Papers, Add. MS 75,571, Anna Maria Poyntz to Countess Spencer, 11 Oct. 1766. [John Moore,] *A View of Society and Manners in France, Switzerland, and Germany*: with Anecdotes relating to Some Eminent Characters (2 vols., London, 1779), ii. 74, refers to British students at Brunswick.

⁴⁵See Gordon M. Stewart, 'British Students at the University of Göttingen in the Eighteenth Century', *German Life and Letters*, 33 (1979–1980), 24–41.

read military literature, often French, but sometimes German or Italian. Earl Percy, a British officer based in Boston, Massachusetts, just before the War of American Independence, asked for a copy of the *Memoirs* of the French general the Marquis de Feuquières to help him pass the time during the winter of 1774–1775.⁴⁶ Those who felt ill-equipped to read foreign languages could benefit from English translations; the version of the Prussian cavalry regulations produced by Captain William Faucett (or Faucitt) in 1757 appeared in print thanks to the financial help provided by more than two-hundred serving officers.⁴⁷ Perhaps these officers never read Faucett's work, but at the very least we can say they were keen to be associated with the transnational transmission of military knowledge that it exemplified.

Armies, then, were not just transnational in their composition; they were transnational in their ethos and values. A common professional etiquette linked officers in all European armies in a kind of military fraternity. Irrespective of their own national military traditions, they had a shared set of values and ideas, which underpinned relations between allies, auxiliaries and even enemies. Like all professional codes, this pan-European military etiquette was clear and logical to insiders, and bewilderingly arcane to the excluded. European officers knew what was expected of them in particular circumstances. They understood the need to resist when garrisoning a besieged fortification for as long as honour required, but to surrender when further resistance was futile; they appreciated the importance of defending the regimental flags from enemy capture; they knew that non-combatants, in return for their non-involvement in military operations, should be protected from the awfulness of war. This professional etiquette owed much to the lived experience of army life, passed on to young officers by their elders, but it was buttressed by the laws of war, part of the law of nations, or what we now call international law.⁴⁸

The purpose of the laws of war was to establish the limits of violence; identifying legitimate and illegitimate targets and acceptable and

⁴⁶Boston Public Library, Letters of Hugh, Earl Percy, MS G 31.39.4.

⁴⁷*The Regulations for the Prussian Cavalry* (London, 1757). The alphabetical list of subscribers occupies nine pages.

⁴⁸For the concept of 'military Europe', see Stephen Conway, 'The British Army, "Military Europe", and the War of American Independence', *William & Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 67 (2010), 69–100.

unacceptable behaviour. Codified by public law writers, the most notable of whom in the middle of the eighteenth century was surely the Swiss Emmerich de Vattel,⁴⁹ the laws of war were based partly on custom and practice, but also on principles supposed to be universal, or at least shared by Europeans.⁵⁰ Christian morality and medieval ideas of chivalry were reinforced by a more modern Enlightenment emphasis on restraint and proportionality. We might reasonably doubt whether eighteenth-century warfare, even in Western Europe, was as ordered and humane as Vattel and his fellow public lawyers suggested. But it would be wrong to dismiss the laws of war as idealistic fantasy. Even if professional soldiers deviated from their tenets, they recognized the laws of war as a guide and appealed to them as an authority. More than anything else, perhaps, their influence—even their very existence—justifies our seeing war and war-making as in many ways transnational.

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We can see the cosmopolitanism of war at the basic level of human sympathy for the suffering of others. To feel for the sufferings of those within one's own subset of humanity may simply be a demonstration of the strength of sentiments based on geographical communities, local or national, rather than evidence of a more general sympathy; but where we can see evidence of feeling for those beyond the group to which the sympathizer belongs, we are surely witnessing the putting aside of particular loyalties and the embracing of a universalist or cosmopolitan perspective.

Soldiers might seem unlikely cosmopolitans. Central to their role is the use of violence to advance or secure the interests of the state that employs them. They have to be prepared to kill, injure and destroy. Suffering is an inevitable consequence of their activities in wartime, even when they are engaged in the less bloody aspects of their work, such as collecting provisions from the local population. Soldiers exposed to violence can, of course, become so accustomed to it that they cease to see the suffering it causes as awful and distressing. But it would be a mistake to assume that all soldiers are desensitized and therefore unaffected by the violence and suffering that they see or even inflict. Those who experience the sufferings of others at first hand, rather than through reports of

⁴⁹ Author of *Les droit des gens* (Neuchatel, 1758).

⁵⁰ See Stephen C. Neff, *War and the Law of Nations: A General History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pt. II.

eye-witnesses, can be the most keen to avoid war and its attendant miseries. If we focus on soldiers as compassionate cosmopolitans, two categories of human sympathy can be identified most readily: the fellow feeling of soldiers for their enemies, when those enemies have been vanquished; and the humanitarian concern of soldiers for non-combatants exposed to all the horrors and sufferings of war.

A famous incident at the battle of Dettingen, during the War of the Austrian Succession, would seem to exemplify the way in which suffering in war could evoke cosmopolitan sympathy for the enemy among military men. The battle, fought in south-west Germany in June 1743, was a contest between an allied army—British, Hanoverian and Austrian—and their French opponents. The twenty-two year-old William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, second son of George II, the British king, was injured in the lower leg by French musket fire. Taken to the rear, where surgeons were treating the casualties irrespective of their nationality, Cumberland insisted that a French officer, lying nearby and more badly injured than he was, should be helped first. News of his generosity to a stricken foe, soon transmitted far from the battlefield, elicited much praise; Cumberland's humanity was even lauded by Vattel in his influential work *Les droit des gens*.⁵¹

Consider also the reaction of the French and Spanish besiegers to the defenders of Fort St Philip, at Port Mahon, Minorca, during the War of American Independence. The fort's commander, General James Murray, agreed terms of surrender only after a siege lasting more than five months. The British and Hanoverian garrison at first believed itself safe; the enemy siege was described by Murray in early October 1781 as no more than a loose blockade: 'the Harbour as far as our Guns Command is free and open'. But in late December scurvy broke out.⁵² By February 1782, the defenders' food supplies were low and their sick list was growing longer every day. Murray had fewer than 700 men fit to defend the fortifications against 14,500 enemy troops. After making one last effort to dislodge the besiegers, Murray began to negotiate, and the French and Spanish offered him the full honours of war. The British and

⁵¹Vattel, *Les droit des gens*, bk. III, ch. x, § 165. See also Rex Whitworth, *William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland* (Barnsley, 1992), 32–33.

⁵²The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew, Colonial Office Papers, CO 174/13, fo. 141, Murray to Lord Hillsborough, 4 Oct. 1781, CO 174/14, fo. 19, Murray to Hillsborough, 10 Dec. 1781.

Hanoverians were permitted to march out of their defences with their flags flying and to return home on condition that they played no further part in the war. A contemporary account of the surrender leaves little room to doubt that at this moment of great emotion the besiegers felt sympathy for the garrison. 'As they lay down their arms and unbuttoned their cartridge belts', a Spanish observer noted, 'there was no one present but felt a lump in his throat'.⁵³

But in both of these instances, we may be witnessing something more complicated than unadulterated cosmopolitan sentiment. Cumberland's selflessness was much applauded by those who knew of it, but we should probably interpret it as evidence of a narrower form of solidarity than cosmopolitanism. After all, his subsequent career suggests that he was no undifferentiated lover of humanity. He was soon after to show that he had no scruples about inflicting the most terrible punishment on defenceless enemies who fell into his hands. He commanded British troops during the Jacobite rebellion of 1745–1746, ordering the execution of Jacobite prisoners when Carlisle was retaken, and then, after the final defeat of the Jacobite forces at Culloden in April 1746, presiding over the brutal suppression of the vestiges of rebellion in the Scottish Highlands, where his troops burnt homes, stole livestock and killed inhabitants without compunction.⁵⁴ Cumberland would no doubt have defended his actions by pointing out that his victims were rebels, who by custom were exempted from all the protections afforded by the laws of war. Even so, his sobriquet 'Butcher' is difficult to square with the idea that he was a humanitarian with fellow feeling for anyone who was suffering. At Dettingen, Cumberland was responding to the misfortune of a particular individual. The object of his generosity was the Comte de Fenelon. While not the son of a king, Fenelon was of a similar social background to Cumberland. The duke's benevolence, in other words, was influenced by his sense of class solidarity. His recognition of the ties between military men of different armies might also have been important. A prince who took his military duties very seriously, the duke was

⁵³W.N. Hargraves-Mawdsley (ed. and trans.), *Spain under the Bourbons* (London: Palgrave, 1973), 162.

⁵⁴See W.A. Speck, *The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the '45* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 164–170; Jeremy Black, *Culloden and the '45* (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1990), pp. 177–178; Christopher Duffy, *The '45: Bonnie Prince Charlie and the Untold Story of the Jacobite Rising* (London: Cassell, 2003), 528–534.

helping a fellow professional soldier as well as a fellow member of the European elite.

Military solidarity almost certainly played a part, too, in the reaction of the French and Spanish besiegers to the surrender of the British and Hanoverian garrison of Fort St Philip. We can surmise that the victors empathized with the defeated because their enemies were soldiers at least as much as because they were human beings. The Spanish and French admired as well as felt sorry for their vanquished and suffering enemy, for the British and Hanoverians had acquitted themselves well; hence the willingness of the besiegers to give the defeated the full honours of war. As we have seen, an unofficial transnational military fraternity existed in eighteenth-century Europe, linking soldiers of different armies through shared experiences and values, even when those soldiers fought against each other. We may, then, be seeing something less inclusive than an expression of human sympathy for the suffering of others when we consider incidents when both the sympathizers and the objects of sympathy are military personnel.

Perhaps a less compromised form of cosmopolitanism can be discerned when we consider occasions when soldiers expressed sympathy for the sufferings of non-combatants living in or near the fighting. Examples of such sympathy are not hard to find, though some of them turn out on closer inspection to be less pure than they seem at first. In December 1776, as the British called a halt to their advance across New Jersey in pursuit of Washington's disintegrating army, Captain William Leslie wrote home to his mother that the 'Desolation that this unhappy Country has suffered must distress every feeling heart'. He seems to have been moved by the great damage done to the property of the local inhabitants, and the associated terrors that they had experienced as the British forces plundered and pillaged their way to the Delaware River. Yet Leslie went on to say that 'the Inhabitants deserve it as much as any set of people who ever rebelled against their Sovereign'.⁵⁵ In this instance, then, Leslie's belief in the sinfulness of rebellion clearly eclipsed his humanitarian concern for the local people. But the War of American Independence was an unusual conflict, more a fratricidal civil war than a

⁵⁵National Archives of Scotland, Leven and Melville Muniments, GD 26/9/513, Leslie to Wilhelmina Leslie, Countess of Leven and Melville, 25 Dec. 1776.

struggle between two separate states or peoples, and so we should not be surprised that its sufferings created complex reactions.⁵⁶

More straightforward were the views of British officers on the experiences of non-combatants in the traditional European theatres of war with which they were familiar, namely the Low Countries and Germany. Sometimes, admittedly, even in these locations, other considerations influenced reactions to the sufferings of the local population. The horror expressed by Richard Davenport, a young British cavalry officer, at the terrible plight of the inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands in the autumn of 1745, for instance, was undoubtedly informed by his fears that a marauding enemy might soon inflict the same sufferings on his own country (a realistic concern at that time, given the advance of the Jacobite rebels from Scotland and the possibility of their being assisted by a French landing in southern England). Even so, the spur to Davenport's reflections was the 'misery of a country, which is the seat of war', and his starting point was sympathy for the suffering of the people of the Low Countries.⁵⁷

Unalloyed humanitarian sentiment was far from unusual. In August 1758, shortly after the arrival of the British army in western Germany, Lieutenant-Colonel James Adolphus Oughton wrote of how the mere presence of the troops, and their need for food, meant that 'the poor Peasants are reduced to the utmost distress'. While Oughton justified to himself seizures from the local population on the grounds that his men had to be fed, and that by taking the food, the British forces were denying it to the French, his sympathy for the inhabitants is unmistakable.⁵⁸ Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Hall wrote to his brother from western Germany at the beginning of 1759 in terms that leave little doubt that he was moved by a cosmopolitan revulsion at the sufferings experienced by other human beings. 'May I die', he told his brother, 'if it would not make your Heart bleed to See this Poor Country ... a fine

⁵⁶See Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

⁵⁷C.W. Frearson (ed.), *'To Mr. Davenport', being Letters of Major Richard Davenport (1719-1760) to his Brother* (Society for Army Historical Research, Special Publication, no. 9, London, 1968), 57.

⁵⁸Stephen Wood (ed.), *By Dint of Labour and Perseverance ... A Journal Recording Two Months in Northern Germany Kept by Lieutenant-Colonel James Adolphus Oughton* (Society for Army Historical Research, Special Publication No. 14, Chippenham, 1997), 50.

Country so terribly foraged, the Trees so cut down, I don't believe the Farmers have Sav'd their Seed, & besides we are not done with them'. More than three years later, as the war in Germany was drawing to a close, his exposure to the suffering of the local people had not dulled his sensibilities. Again, Hall tried to convey to his brother the awfulness of what he had witnessed, but confessed that 'the Misery and Desolation that reigns in this fine Country is unexpressible'.⁵⁹

Feeling for the afflicted was certainly not confined to officers. Very few accounts of common soldiers survive for the mid-eighteenth century, but we are lucky to have a detailed diary, recently published, composed by William Todd, a rank and file British soldier, and later corporal, who served with the army in western Germany during the Seven Years' War. Todd showed himself to be patriotic and moved by national sentiments at times: when he was briefly captured and offered promotion to sergeant in the Irish Brigade of the French army, he declared that he 'would not serve no Other Nation but my Own'.⁶⁰ Even so, Todd also showed himself to be a cosmopolitan. He sympathized deeply with the sufferings of the people of the parts of Germany in which he campaigned. On 16 June 1761, he wrote that he had gone out with a foraging party from the British camp at Benninghausen, near Lippstadt, and had come across a house, in which a girl was cooking the family dinner while everyone else was at Mass. Todd's reference to the family's attending Mass suggests that they were Catholics, which would have made them even more different and foreign in Todd's eyes. Yet his diary reveals his compassion for the vulnerable girl—a compassion that we can only describe as cosmopolitanism in action. Todd and his colleagues ate the meal, despite the girl's protests, but Todd prevented the other soldiers from taking anything from the house, and protected the girl from the unwelcome attentions of her unexpected military guests. The girl, in Todd's account, was grateful for his timely intervention. 'I told her', Todd wrote, 'I thought we had made them suffer too much by taking their Victuals without doing to them any more, but as I told her we had been in great

⁵⁹National Archives of Scotland, DunglassMuniments, GD 206/2/495/9 and 20, Hall to Sir John Hall of Dunglass, 5 Jan. 1759 and 11 Nov. 1762.

⁶⁰Andrew Cormack and Alan Jones (eds), *Journal of Corporal Todd, 1745–1762* (Army Records Society, xviii, Stroud, 2001), 229.

wants of Victuals as we came out sooner in the Morning, Otherwise we would not a taken theirs from her'.⁶¹

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War, so often associated with community solidarity and hostility to outsiders, encourages and promotes perspectives that go beyond the local or the national. In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate that eighteenth-century European wars had important transnational aspects, both in the ways in which they were justified to the publics of belligerent countries and in the ways in which they were conducted. While we can readily identify the pursuit of state and national interests, and see clear evidence of national sentiments, war was in many ways a transnational business, bringing together—as well as dividing—different states, peoples, armed forces and individuals. More ambitiously, I have sought to show that cosmopolitan sentiments—particularly fellow feeling for other human beings in distress—are not limited to pacifists, or conspicuous only in the aftermaths of international conflicts. Soldiers, unlikely though it may seem, could show themselves to be cosmopolitan in their sympathies, both for fellow soldiers in difficult circumstances and, more importantly, for those we would now describe as non-combatants or civilians. ‘War’, as William Sherman, the famous American Civil War general, reminds us, ‘is hell’. Soldiers, who see its hellish qualities at close quarters, are perhaps especially well placed to recognize this eternal verity and respond to it with compassion.

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⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 147–148.

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Kant's Subaltern Period: The Birth of Cosmopolitanism from the Spirit of Occupation

Alexander Etkind

Is cosmopolitanism ideological or utopian in character? Was it created by the winners or the losers of history?¹ These issues have preoccupied and divided scholarship for decades. Sympathetic interpreters have emphasized the prophetic and progressive character of cosmopolitan projects such as Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.² For the postcolonial critics

¹I am using here Karl Mannheim's classical definitions of ideology and utopia, combining them with Walter Benjamin's tragic contrast between the winners and losers of the historical process; see Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Harvest, 1955); Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in *Illuminations* (New York: Harcourt, 1968), 253–265.

²See *Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideas*, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); *Kant's Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*, eds. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty and James Schmidt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gerald Delanty, *The Cosmopolitan Imagination. The Renewal of Critical Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); David Held, *Cosmopolitanism. Ideals and Realities* (Cambridge: Polity,

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of cosmopolitan thought, Immanuel Kant and his many followers represent imperial hegemony.³ On this reading, Kant was the proverbial ‘dead white man’, someone who was very much at home in eighteenth-century European imperialism and made a decent career of it. As an apologist for empire, scholars such as Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak have argued, he defended colonialism, racism and sexism.⁴ In a conciliatory move, Dutch historian Pauline Kleingeld proposed to treat these two positions as stages of Kant’s life and work. Focusing on his texts of the 1780s and early 1790s that predated *Perpetual Peace*, she demonstrated that in these mid-career lectures and critiques, Kant had indeed endorsed racist hierarchies and colonial polices, which European empires pursued in their Asian and African domains. However, prompted by his enthusiasm for the revolution in France, by the mid-1790s, Kant changed his attitude towards the colonies, switching from endorsement to indignation and from imperialism to cosmopolitanism.⁵

The main problem with cosmopolitan and postcolonial readings of Kant is not their symmetrical one-sidedness but rather their limited timeframe, which largely ignores Kant’s early period. Jürgen Habermas insisted that Kant developed the idea of cosmopolitanism ‘using the concepts drawn from the debates concerning modern natural law and the specific historical experiences of his time’.⁶ For several reasons that I will

Footnote 2 (continued)

2010); Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideas of World Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Georg Cavallar, *Kant’s Embedded Cosmopolitanism* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015); and *Global Political Theory*, eds. David Held and Pietro Maffettone (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).

³On Kant’s cosmopolitanism and the Stoics, see Martha Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Cosmopolitanism’, in: *Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideas*, 25–58; Susan Neiman, *Moral Clarity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁴Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory* (Harlow: Pearson, 1994), 66–112; Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); see also Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, Introduction to: *Kant and Colonialism*, eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.

⁵Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thought on Colonialism’, in *Kant and Colonialism*, eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi, 45.

⁶Jürgen Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’, in *Perpetual Peace. Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideas*, eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, 114.

try to untangle, the debate among contemporary scholars of Kant has led them to downplay the political range, extraordinary character and tragic immediacy of Kant's historical experiences. Another reduction has emerged due to the fact that Kant has traditionally been placed within a largely German-speaking intellectual context.

Though I do not seek to take issue with the well-established view that the distant revolution in Paris played a central role in the transformation of Kant's mature thinking, I propose that an earlier, immediate political experience of the Seven Years War was formative for Kant's intellectual trajectory. In paying insufficient attention to the imperial conflicts of the period, cosmopolitan and postcolonial readings of Kant have equally ignored his own, highly relevant experience as a colonial subject of a foreign imperial power. In what follows, I hope to achieve three things: extend the timeline of historical contextualization further back to Kant's early experiences and writings; take into consideration the Russian occupation of Königsberg (1758–1762) and add more texture to our understanding of this less-known event; and advance the hypothesis that this immediate, formative experience profoundly influenced Kant's political thought. Pauline Kleingeld's two-step scheme distinguishes between the midlife, imperialist Kant and the late, cosmopolitan Kant. Extending the timeline one step backward, I emphasize Kant's early, 'subaltern' period.⁷

FROM THE OX TO THE REINDEER

'The subject as such in Kant is geopolitically differentiated', writes Spivak.⁸ In fact, this differentiation might include different latitudes which postcolonial scholars have not yet taken into account. In picturing Kant as a hegemonic voice of European imperialism, Spivak and other postcolonial scholars of Kant have concentrated exclusively on the global

⁷Introduced by Antonio Gramsci and developed by Fernando Coronil, Homi Bhabha and others, the term 'subaltern' denotes a combination of political domination, economic exploitation and cultural oppression that occurs mainly, though not exclusively, in colonial situations (including the situations of internal colonization). For helpful reviews, see Prakash, Gyan. 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism', *The American Historical Review*, December, 1994, 99:5, 1475–1490; Marcus E. Green, 'Rethinking the Subaltern and the Question of Censorship in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks', *Postcolonial Studies*, 14:4 (2011), 385–402.

⁸Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, 26.

South, a traditional focus of postcolonial studies, which meant that the Northern nerve of Kant's geopolitical inquiry remained invisible to them. Due to his political experience and ethnographic interests, Kant was more sympathetic to the subalterns which Spivak and other postcolonial scholars have not identified.

'Grass is needful for the ox, which again is needful for man... but then we do not see why it is necessary that men should exist', Kant famously wrote in *Critique of Judgment*.⁹ He addressed this striking question to humanity as a whole, whose general reason for existence would logically surpass the differences between the special reasons for the existence of men and women, rich and poor, civilized Europeans and barbarians from the distant lands. Right at this point in his argument, Kant cast his thoughts in an unexpected direction—not to the African or American colonies but to the geographical North of Eurasia. Kant addressed his questions concerning the reasons for human existence to 'the Greenlander, the Lapp, the Samoyed, the Yakut, etc.' By Kant's logic, living in places like Königsberg, being sociable and making use of their reason, men could realize the purpose of their existence. But in places such as Yakutsk, unsociable men could not understand themselves and therefore, had no purpose. 'It is not clear why people should have to live in there at all. [...] It could only have been the greatest unsociability among men which thus scattered them into such inhospitable regions.'¹⁰ But of course, the question 'Why men should exist?' is very different indeed from 'Should men live in Greenland, Lapland and Siberia?'

In the sophisticated text of the *Critique*, this sliding down from the universal to the particular reveals a problem that is both historical and logical. During Kant's lifetime, ethnographic interest in the Eurasian North was an established area of interest for scholars working at Prussian universities from Königsberg to Göttingen. The most notable example of this trend was the historian and journalist August Schlözer, Kant's contemporary and probable partner in their joint project of Universal History. It was Schlözer who had developed 'Northern History' as a sub-discipline that embraced the Russian Empire, the Arctic and the Baltic.¹¹

⁹Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. G. H. Bernard (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 155–161.

¹⁰Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 155–161.

¹¹August Schlözer, *Allgemeine nordische Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Halle 1772), and for some details, my *Internal Colonization*, chap. 1. For a comparison between Kant's and Schlözer's projects of universal history, see Thomas Sturm, 'What Did Kant Mean by and Why Did

Kant himself maintained a steady interest in this area, returning to his speculation about distant lands and the little peoples of the North in *Perpetual Peace*. It is nature rather than law that guarantees perpetual peace, wrote Kant in the First supplement to his treatise.¹² Nature has enabled men to live in all parts of the world; nature scattered men all over these parts by the means of war; and nature compels men to enter into commercial and other 'more or less rightful' relations with one another. For example, 'in the cold, icy wastes around the Arctic Ocean there grows the moss which the reindeer digs from the snow in order to make itself the prey or the conveyance of the Ostyak or Samoyed'. Moss is needful for the deer and deer is needful for the Samoyed, but this time Kant saw clearly why it was necessary that the Samoyed should exist. Such peoples live in those inhospitable lands, Kant asserted, not because of their own inclination but because of the war that had pressed them out there. In these Northern examples, Kant discussed his newly-found idea of Nature that he considered to be more convincing than the Protestant notion of Providence. Nature created war in order to scatter peoples around the earth; nature compelled them to enter commerce with each other; and nature supplied them with resources for distant trade—fur and grain, salt and iron, deer and rifles.

Indeed, there were people who had migrated to places like Yakutsk because they were nomads, prisoners of war or exiles; but there were also people who travelled there in search of furs or diamonds, or as they do now, in search of oil. For Kant, war and commerce are intrinsically related. The road to peace is paved by war; the road to commerce is paved by nature. 'The facts that come here into view are truly wonderful', Kant wrote, providing more examples from the lives of Finns, Lapps, Mongolians and the Eskimo. Living in inhospitable climates and conflicts, these peoples developed their own sociality.

Still, thinking about this Nordic conundrum of nature, war and commerce as the justification of man, it is hard to abstain from further questions. If the tribes of the North developed their own ability

Footnote 11 (continued)

He Adopt a Cosmopolitan Point of View in History?' <http://openanthcoop.net/press/>, <http://openanthcoop.net/press/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Sturm-Working-Paper-12.pdf>.

¹²Maria Maiofis, *Vozzvanie k Evrope. Literaturnoe obshchestvo Arzamas i rossiiskii modernizatsionnyi proekt 1815–1818 godov* (Moscow: NLO, 2008), 74.

of judgement that was different from their sociable peers in the South, does it mean that they were exempted from general reason, or does this notion of reason entail different types, levels and hierarchies? Nature's loving care created and blessed trade among the natives, but white merchants forced them to barter fur and fish for beads and vodka. Could that be used to justify the purpose of the natives' existence? Could the Ostiak and the Samoyed communicate with the Königsbergian and the Berliner? Would they have their place in perpetual peace? Were they expected to create their own republics? Finally, what made those cold lands and strange peoples relevant for Kant's major texts in the first place?

YOUNG KANT'S KÖNIGSBERG

As Dina Guseinova argues in this volume, cosmopolitanism developed in the borderline peripheries of great empires, precisely in those points of geography and moments in history at which their age-long expansion and confrontation came to a political stalemate. And it was definitely not accidental that among many such borderline places around the globe, cosmopolitanism developed in some of the most provincial, losing parts of Europe. More specifically, it developed in the lands, towns and ghettos of Middle Europe in which the colonial endeavours of Austria, Prussia and Russia met their dead ends. It was this shaky, local balance of power that generated the new teachings of peace, dialogue and pluralism in diverse and obscure places such as Prague, Lvov, Riga, Saloniki, Baku—and Königsberg.

In Königsberg, this confrontation between the great imperialisms of continental Europe morphed into an eye of the cyclone—a region of mostly calm weather that found itself at the centre of ceaseless political storms. Also known as Kaliningrad, the city remains a subject of a closed but unresolved political conflict—one of the most long-living hotspots on the political map of the world. Changing hands through centuries, this ever-losing province of Eastern Prussia or Western Russia provided the source and the context for the most important western teachings on individual autonomy and political cosmopolitanism.

Founded by a monastic order of Teutonic Crusaders, the city became the centre of hostilities between the Germanic, Baltic and Slavonic peoples. War and commerce ruled the day until the Russian fur—the 'gold of the North'—went out of fashion in Europe. With the end of the fur

trade, the Northern Crusade and the Hanseatic League collapsed as well. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russia emerged triumphant from several Northern wars and dominated the Eastern Baltic coast. Military conquests of this area had implications at many levels, from the ruling dynasties to the universities. More than anywhere else, Russians engaged in military conquest of this area along with the absorption of local elites. Starting with Peter I, the Romanovs recruited their spouses and successors from the Baltic German lands. In the early years of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which opened in 1725, four out of five of its presidents came from the University of Königsberg.¹³ But Königsberg remained a jewel in the Prussian crown, the coronation city of the Brandenburg dynasty.

During the Seven Years War (1756–1763), bizarre things happened to Eastern Prussia. In 1757, the Russian troops camped near the gates of Königsberg, before retreating for no apparent reason. It could be the poor health of the Russian Empress that saved the city, or an intrigue, maybe even a bribe among the Russian military leadership. Whatever happened remained secret; the Königsbergians had no explanation for the events other than rumours and gossip. While the Eastern Prussians celebrated their salvation, Empress Elizabeth recovered, arrested the top Russian commander, Stepan Apraksin (he conveniently died during the trial), and sent the troops back. With the Russian troops at the gates of the city and the Prussian king, Frederick the Great, under siege in Berlin, Königsberg accepted surrender. To escape massacre, the city became a part of the Russian Empire. On 22 January 1758, Russian troops entered the city. All the bells rang, guilds formed a guard of honour, and the keys to the city were shipped to St. Petersburg. Two days later, the city officials took an oath to the Russian Empress. Annexing Eastern Prussia, the Russian Empire turned it into its province ‘forever’.

Winston Churchill called the Seven Years’ War the very first world war. Its imperial context is well established. Starting with the attack of the young George Washington on a fort in French Canada in 1754, the war extended into the Old World. While England and France were fighting over colonies overseas, Austria, Prussia and Russia were struggling for colonies in Europe—Silesia, Baltic lands, parts of Poland and the

¹³Kostiushkev Iu. V., and G. V. Kretinin. *Petrovskoe nachalo: Königsbergskii universitet i rossiiskoe prosveshchenie v XVIII veke* (Kaliningrad: Iantarnyi skaz 1999).

contemporary Ukraine. A true product of the Empire, the Russian army featured many Baltic Germans in its leadership. Its infantry was mostly Russian, and its omnipresent light cavalry included the Kalmyks, Bashkirs and Cossacks, who fought under their native commanders. Frederick the Great explained the power of the Russian assault by ‘the number of Tartars, Cossacks, and Kalmyks that they have in their armies’.¹⁴ Later, Kant considered the ‘Kalmuckians’ as a separate race along with Negroes and [Native] Americans, a highly unusual racial classification based on his personal experience with the Kalmyks in Königsberg.¹⁵ If Kant’s immediate geographical experience was defined by his famous trail around the city, his personal anthropological observations were largely limited to the exotic subjects of the Russian Empire—those very ‘Tartars, Cossacks, and Kalmyks’, and the Russians of course, who stayed in the city during the Seven Years’ War.

Even the Russians perceived these Oriental regiments as exotic and fearsome. The young officer Andrei Bolotov was shocked to see the ‘strange’, ‘half-naked’, ‘horse-eating’ troops massacring German villages for the sake of the Russian crown.¹⁶ The Kalmyks were allowed to loot the old Prussian arsenals; armed with medieval helmets and sabres, they probably looked ridiculous. Those were the last years of their service to the Russian Empire; in 1771, the Kalmyks left the Russian Steppes for China in a mass exodus.¹⁷ The Cossacks were equally unhappy; in 1773, they started a large anti-imperial mutiny in the Urals, which was led by Emelian Pugachev, who fought as a Cossack in Eastern Prussia. The Russian commander who finally defeated Pugachev, Johann von Michelsonen, also started his career there in combat in Eastern Prussia, as did the most famous of Russian generals, Aleksandr Suvorov, whose father served as the General Governor of the annexed Eastern Prussia in

¹⁴Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 171.

¹⁵Immanuel Kant, ‘On the Different Races of Human Beings’, in idem, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, eds. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92.

¹⁶Andrei Bolotov, *Zhizn’ i priklucheniia Andreia Bolotova, opisannye samim im dlia svoikh potomkov*, ed. Arsenii Gulyga (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1986), 124 (later cited with page reference in the text).

¹⁷Michael Khodarkovsky, *Russia’s Steppe Frontier. The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 182.

1861–1862. In fact, the Russian campaign in Eastern Prussia during the Seven Years' War worked as a boot camp for the aggressive and brilliant generation of Russian military commanders who defeated Napoleon. During Kant's lifetime that was coterminous with what some historians call the 'Second Hundred Years' War', armed hostilities in Europe continued almost without a break, and in all but few of them the Russian Empire was an active side and often a winner.¹⁸ Whenever Kant wrote about war and peace, the Russian Empire remained in his focus, usually as an adversary.

Like most eighteenth-century wars, the East Prussian campaign was brutal; the advancing troops seized food, occupied houses and confiscated horses. The local resistance was suppressed by public tortures and executions. Andrei Bolotov saw the summary execution of Prussian non-uniformed combatants who were captured shooting the Russians. Two were hanged publicly; eleven had their fingers cut off by Russian soldiers (125). Bolotov blamed 'our Cossacks and Kalmyks'; for him, orientalizing a part helped to rescue the whole. In his later memoir, criticizing the barbarity of his own troops was a way of asserting his civilized, European identity:

Everywhere was devastation, arson, and burglary [...] The cruelty and barbarism of our Cossacks and Kalmyks was against all the rules of war... All these places saw nothing but fire and smoke, coupled with the greatest ferocity and dishonour to the female sex [...] These actions of our Cossacks and Kalmyks gave us little honour because, having heard of their barbarity, the European nations imagined that our entire army was like this. (123)

As Frederick refused to surrender, Berlin was taken and massacred by Russian and Austrian troops in 1760. Bolotov heard that journalists in

¹⁸The Austro-Russian-Turkish War (1735–1739), the Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743), the Seven Years' War (1754–1763), the Russo-Turkish War (1768–1774), the Partitions of Poland (1772, 1790, 1795), the Russo-Swedish War (1788–1790), the Russo-Turkish War (1787–1792), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802), the Russo-Persian War (1796), the Napoleonic Wars (1797–1815). The Russian Empire did not take part in the wars for Spanish secession, Austrian secession or American Independence (though it was invited to interfere in the latter on the British side). On the continuity of these eighteenth-century wars, see Francois Crouzet, 'The Second Hundred Years War: Some Reflections', *French History*, 10 (1996), 432–450.

Berlin were supposed to run the gauntlet for writing ‘bold and hurtful things’ about the Russians, but they received an eleventh hour reprieve. In any case, the capital suffered more than Königsberg; Frederick was on the verge of suicide. With the fall of Berlin, the Königsbergians lost any hope of their emancipation. Nobody doubted that since the Russian crown had annexed Eastern Prussia, it would remain a part of the Empire, and locals would have to adjust to the new order. The new regime was so abrupt and unusual that the historians depicted it in vague and unstable terms. Some called it ‘occupation’, which embraces only the military perspective on the events. Others called it ‘annexation’, which is fair from the legal point of view. I believe that the proclamation that the Russian appropriation of Königsberg and of the adjacent lands would be ‘eternal’, as well as consistent efforts to impose there the new imperial law, currency, taxation, migration policies, conscription, censorship and festivities, reveal the colonial nature of the regime. Colonization was the far-reaching plan of the Russian Empire in respect to Eastern Prussia as well as other Baltic lands and available parts of Poland. The Russian imperial regime in Eastern Prussia was brief but as long as it continued, it was construed as ‘colonization’ both by the invaders and by the locals.

Russian colonization of Königsberg ended as abruptly as it started, with the death of Empress Elizabeth in January 1762. Her heir, Peter III, adored Frederick the Great and all things Prussian. Pulling Russia out of the Seven Years’ War, Peter III signed a separate peace with Frederick on 5 May. Moreover, he changed sides and provided Frederick with a significant number of troops to fight against the Austrians. The scale of the change in St. Petersburg surprised the diplomats all over Europe. For the Königsbergians, there was no explanation to these life-changing events, again. And it was not the end of the story.

In early July 1862, the Prussians replaced the Russian guards in the Königsberg castle and at the gates of the city. By a special order of 8 July, the new governor, Feodor Voeikov, relieved the Prussians from the Russian oath and transferred power to the Prussian king. While the Russian troops were packing up and leaving the city, the burghers parted and honoured Frederick. But it so happened that Peter III was dethroned (and soon murdered) the next day in St. Petersburg, by a conspiracy that was led by his wife, the future Catherine the Great. The special courier brought the news to Königsberg on 18 July. Voeikov immediately issued a new declamation in which he annulled his previous

order, announced his return to power, and stopped festivities under the threat of 'the cruelest punishments'. Ready to start new hostilities, he returned the guards to the castle, distributed ammunition to troops and summoned them to gates of the city.

Indeed, Catherine was unwinding many decisions of her late husband; in her initial Manifesto, she cited his 'evil-doing' peace with Frederick as one of the reasons for the coup. But her grasp on power was still unstable, and she decided against a new war with Prussia. Another courier brought a new order to Voeikov. On 16 July 1762, the bewildered Königsbergians read the latest declamation signed by their Russian governor. Again, he annulled his previous order, this time to give Eastern Prussia to Frederick.¹⁹

After the long and victorious war, Russia had made no gains. The bloody series of events turned out to be entirely senseless. Frederick famously called the withdrawal of Russian troops from Prussia the 'miracle of the House of Brandenburg'. Detesting his Eastern subjects who betrayed him and lived with the enemy, Frederick never visited Königsberg after the war.

As if mirroring Frederick's feelings, the historians who saw world history through a German lens equally shunned the episode, dismissing the Russian occupation as an insignificant chapter in local history. In his magisterial *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (1907), Friedrich Meinecke, an expert in the history of German thought, whose ideal was Bismarck rather than Frederick, did not mention Königsberg, and all but ignored Kant. 'Since the German culture has taken on a clearly universalistic character', Meinecke stated, 'the Prussian state also admitted these supra-national, universalistic elements when it used the impulses of culture to renew itself'.²⁰ The deepest problem with Meinecke's assessment was that he associated cosmopolitanism with the victorious, progressive nation. In fact, the opposite was true, both in Germany and

¹⁹G.V. Kretinin, 'O vozvrashchenii prusskoj provintsii Fridrikhu II v 1862 godu', *Voprosy istorii*, 6(2002), 139–143; see also M.Iu. Anisimov, *Semiletniaia voina i rossijskii diplomatiia v 1756–1763 гг.* (Moscow: KMK publisher, 2014).

²⁰Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, 33. It is instructive how deeply these thoughts about Kant, Prussia and cosmopolitanism differ from contemporary ones. Isaiah Berlin wrote that the German intellectual revival was 'in complete harmony' with Prussian nation-building. See Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment* (London: Pimlico, 2000), 263.

elsewhere: cosmopolitanism was rather the utopia of the losers. Later, the Cambridge historian, Herbert Butterfield, saw in the Seven Years' War 'intrigue and melodrama', which were more intense than anytime else in European politics, 'the last two decades excepted', he wrote in 1955. Butterfield believed that Russia was the main culprit of the conspiracy against Frederick the Great, but the philosopher-king did not understand this fact even after the war ended, and nor did historians: 'The attention of historians suffered a lapse in regard to those things which related to Russia.'²¹ Writing about the Seven Years' War in 1968, German historian and theorist Reinhart Koselleck retained a sense of shock. Koselleck compared the start of the war with the German–Soviet pact of 1939 but characterized its end as an 'historically matchless' illustration of the role of chance in history.²²

It was the historic Königsberg, the city of Kant and Arendt, which defined the 'universalist impulse' in German thought; but this peripheral, doomed place could not be more different from Berlin, the triumphal capital. From Frederick II to Bismarck to Merkel, Berlin has united them all—Prussia, Germany and Europe—all but Königsberg-Kaliningrad. Cyclically returning but never accomplished, East Prussian dreams of perpetual peace and *vita activa* renewed German and Western culture but did not help Königsberg to partake in Germany and Europe. But it was Kant, the probable author of the term *Fortschritt* (progress), who fiercely opposed the thesis that, as he once put it, 'things would always remain as they were'.²³

ABORTIVE COLONIZATION

If later generations have ceaselessly debated the causes and results of the mid-eighteenth century events that shaped Europe, for those who observed the war from within Königsberg, it was stripped of any understandable meaning. If historians are still running out of metaphors when confronted with these events in Prussia, what could the citizens of Königsberg, who did not know about their war a fraction of what

²¹ Herbert Butterfield, *Man on His Past: The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 162, 158.

²² Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 118, 124.

²³ Cited from Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time*, 267.

we know about it today, think about this war and about their ability to understand it? It was this dramatic, incomprehensible situation that was the launching pad for Kant's critical thought.²⁴

The Russians in Königsberg struggled with cultural and political problems that were typical for any colonial regime. Troops were stationed in the city, a Russian governor took over the administration, and Russian currency was introduced. The burgers of Königsberg became Russian subjects, and Elisabeth promised to respect their traditional rights, including religious liberty. But the burghers were ordered to provide the Russian soldiers with accommodation, food and supplies. Fearing treason, the Russians did not recruit any Prussians into the imperial army. Instead, they raised taxes to a level that the locals deemed unbearable. A delegation of the city's nobles went to St. Petersburg to negotiate a tax relief, returning with partial success. But then, Baron Nicolai von Korf, the General Governor, changed the policy and ordered a recruiting campaign. In response, Frederick promised capital punishment to every Prussian who joined the enemy. In a series of orders, von Korf demanded the Prussians show 'humility' towards the occupants; clearly, he expected insurgencies against the troops that were stationed in the city and the country. The General Governor confiscated rifles and pistols from the entire population of Eastern Prussia; even collections of antiques were seized and deposited in the Arsenal. In response, von Korf's chancellery was flooded with complaints from the locals who could not control bandits, bears and wolves. Portraits of Frederick II were prohibited along with Prussian eagles; von Korf personally censored newspapers, printers and booksellers. Prussian currency was outlawed, but Russian silver remained in short supply. Soon, the trade came to a halt because of the disorder of the monetary system, and the locals were ordered to pay their taxes in kind, supplying grain, hay and horses to the central authorities in Königsberg, on top of providing for the locally stationed troops.²⁵ One of the Lutheran churches of the city was turned into Russian Orthodox, and the Orthodox priests often joined the military for parades and festivities, as they did in Russia. Various projects streamed from St. Petersburg;

²⁴In this and two following sections, I use the materials from my *Internal Colonization* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

²⁵Francine-Dominique Liechtenhan, 'Königsberg, capitale de la Nouvelle Russie? La Prusse orientale sous l'occupation russe (1758–1762)', in *Histoire, Économie et Société*, 2 (2013), 75095.

by a special decree, citizens of Eastern Prussia were invited to re-settle in Russia, though nobody did.

From 1757 to 1762, Eastern Prussia and its capital, Königsberg, was a colonial domain of the Russian Empire, as Livonia had been before (from 1710) and Eastern Poland would be later (from 1772). Nobody in the land could know what we know now, that the Russian regime in Königsberg would end in less than five years, any more than they could know that it would be re-established centuries later. The annexation was there ‘forever’, and so was the local atmosphere that combined hope, collaboration and much bitterness.

The colonization of Königsberg encountered silent resistance on the part of the natives, who were convinced of their superior culture but complied with Russian rules and rulers, and detested them in their quiet way. Annexing Eastern Prussia, the Russian Empire established there a ‘dominance without hegemony’, a typically colonial situation in which the rulers practised coercion without managing to persuade the natives of their right, or even their ability, to rule.²⁶ For want of a better explanation, intellectual historians have simply disregarded this dramatic, incomprehensible situation. Yet, as I argue, it was this situation, the actual background of Kant’s critical thought, that prompted deep questions about power, reason and humanity.

Politically gruesome, the result of the Russian–Prussian war was intellectually explosive. The Russian attempt at colonizing Königsberg served as an entry point into modernity, a prototype of the condition that has been re-enacted myriad times later. It was as if, in a micro-model, in five fateful years, Kant’s Königsberg had experienced the whole cycle of imperial invasion, colonial regime, emancipation and postcolonial nationalism, which we tend to associate with twentieth-century processes of decolonization. Indeed, it was Herder, a student of Kant, a dweller in occupied Königsberg, and later a clergyman in Riga, who pioneered nationalist thought in the postcolonial environment that emerged after the Russian withdrawal from Königsberg—though not from Riga, which remained a part of the Russian Empire for another century and a half.

²⁶Ranjit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony. History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

KANT'S SILENCE

To understand the connection between this political context and Kant's intellectual agenda, we need to look in more detail at his career during the Seven Years' War and the Russian occupation. In 1755, Kant defended his dissertation and became a university lecturer. His major work of this period, *Universal Natural History*, began with a dedication to Frederick II, 'the mightiest king and master', from his 'most humble servant'. In the same formula, he promised to serve his king 'with the utmost devotion until my dying day'. Scholars do not doubt that he was sincere; 'Kant's identification with the king's program has long been recognized.'²⁷ But only two years later, Kant had to take an oath to Frederick's mortal enemy, Elizabeth, promising her to be 'loyal and true to the Illustrious and All-powerful Empress of all the Russias [...] and to her heir'; moreover, if anything were undertaken against them, not only would he 'inform the authorities forthwith, but also try to thwart the deed'.²⁸ In 1758, Kant submitted to Elizabeth his application for professorship, calling her 'the most enlightened, the most autocratic Empress'; of course, he saw an oxymoron here. Kant signed this letter, 'with deepest humility', 'the most faithful subject and slave' of Her Imperial Greatness. Separated by three years, these ritual constructions promised perpetual service to two mortal enemies. Frederick had some reasons for his resentment. Later, Kant would call such flip-flopping people 'turn-spits'. As he wrote in a letter from 1766, 'the loss of self-approval would be the greatest evil that could ever happen to me'.²⁹ It was precisely this lack of autonomy that was the target of the great critical offensive that Kant later undertook.

²⁷ John H Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 58.

²⁸ Arsenij Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant. His Life and Thought*, trans. Marijan Despalatovic (Boston: Birk, 1987), 31. More recently, A.N. Kruglov has disputed this conjecture as ungrounded. See Kruglov, *Filosofia Kanta v Rossii* (Moscow: Kanon 2009, 35). It could be someone else in the Russian Governor's office who acted in Buck's favour, but Kant clearly blamed the Russian authorities for his academic failure. Applying for the next academic opening, Kant wrote in an official letter from 16 March 1770 that in 1758, Buck could have obtained the professorship 'only because of the support of the Russian administration' (Kruglov, op.cit., 35).

²⁹ Quoted from Hannah Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 20.

Kant's application to the Russian Empress failed, and the professorship was given to a rival, the philosopher and mathematician Friedrich Johann Buck, who was clearly supported by the Russian administration. A Soviet scholar of Kant believed that the reason for Kant's failure was the interference of a Russian officer, Andrei Bolotov.³⁰ A translator who worked for the Russian governor of Königsberg, Bolotov brought a small group of Russian students to lectures at the university. Having discovered philosophy among the other pleasures of Königsberg, Bolotov preferred Pietism to what he perceived as the spoiling, even criminal influence of the Enlightenment. For many months, Bolotov attended lectures on philosophy that a colleague of Kant's named Daniel Weymann was offering at the university. On top of the university course, Bolotov took private, 'almost daily' lessons with Weymann. The professor refused to accept fees for these lessons, but on his departure from Königsberg, Bolotov left his teacher of philosophy an eminently Russian present—'a Kalmyk fur coat'.³¹

Together, Bolotov and Weymann read the works of philosopher-theologians such as Christian August Crusius; under Russian rule, these religious conservatives had come into vogue again. Bolotov felt that their moralistic philosophy helped him to discipline his mind, to keep his morals and to resist the seduction of gallant balls and the commercial sex that were booming under Russian rule. One can understand that he responded better to this instruction than to the dry exercises in natural history that were Kant's interest at the time. As for Kant himself, his personal enmity with Weymann was rekindled by their publications on optimism, a crucial issue in a city under occupation. 'Why, I ask in all humility, did it please Thee, Eternal Being, to prefer the inferior to the superior?', Kant wrote in 1759, formulating the ultimate question of the subaltern. Trying to find a response, he reverted to the Stoics: 'To all creatures, who do not make themselves unworthy of that name, I cry, "Happy are we—we exist. And God is well pleased with us."' ³² This is indeed an earthly optimism of the oppressed, whose source is not the wisdom of God but solidarity with all existing creatures, including

³⁰Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant. His Life and Thought*, 36.

³¹Andrei Bolotov, *Zbizn' i priklucheniia Andreia Bolotova, opisannye samim im dlia svoikh potomkov*, ed. Arsenii Gulyga (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1986), 382.

³²Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy*, ed. David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 71, 76.

animals or slaves. Developing in later works and combined with a tragic notion of radical evil, optimism became a crucial element of Kant's political philosophy.³³ According to Hannah Arendt, for Kant, evil is generally self-destructive, and this is the ultimate source of his optimism.³⁴

Refusing to participate in a public debate on optimism in the occupied city, Kant called the organizer of this debate, Weymann, a 'Cyclops'.³⁵ In the *Odyssey*, the giant and unreasonable Cyclops locks Odysseus and his men in a cave; Odysseus blinds Cyclops, but when he begs for help, his fellow Cyclopes think he is possessed by divine forces and tell him to pray. With subaltern bitterness, Kant mocked Weymann, who had good connections in the Russian administration; but Kant—a disinterested spectator in his *Critiques* rather than in his life—also had important friends among the pro-Russian wing of the Königsberg elite. Biographers do not fail to mention Countess Caroline von Keyserlingk, a good friend of Kant's; he taught her children, frequented her dinners, and called her the 'ideal of a woman'. Bolotov's memoir leaves no doubt that in 1759–1760, von Keyserlingk was a mistress of the Russian governor of Prussia, Baron Nikolai von Korf, and that their liaison was public knowledge in the city.³⁶ Von Korf was a Baltic German aristocrat who spoke but did not write in Russian. He was close to the Empress; he was so important in Königsberg that Bolotov called him Viceroy. After his service in Eastern Prussia, von Korf was appointed chief of the St. Petersburg police, later to become chief of all Russian police. A rich and flamboyant bachelor, von Korf used every occasion to throw balls or masquerades to honour the Countess von Keyserlingk. Luminaries attended these dazzling events, including Gregory Orlov, a hero of the Russian–Prussian war who would soon become a powerful favorite of Catherine the Great. It is tantalizing to imagine a conversation between Kant and Orlov, whom one Englishman described as 'colossal in stature

³³Howard Williams, 'Kant's Optimism in his Social and Political Theory', in *Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Howard Williams (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1992), 1–15.

³⁴Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 18.

³⁵Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 123.

³⁶Bolotov, *Zhizn' i prikliucheniia*, 289.

but totally unimproved by reading'.³⁷ Kant was then in his 'gallant phase', worldly, fashionably dressed and always in demand, if not at balls then at dinner parties. Table-talk frequently addressed Russian plans, secrets and gossip; divisive issues under occupation, they remained important decades later. Kant's friend recorded a dinner conversation at Keyserlingk's manor, which showed that those present continued to be preoccupied with Russia even thirty years after its troops had left the city:

There was a political discourse in which the officers were very active. Kant, as did I, declared that the Russians were our main enemies. [...] The Countess [was] of a different opinion [...] 'If my husband was still alive, he would certainly have made clear to the king by means a concrete deduction that his best ally is Russia' [...] Still I did not believe that they did not have any interest in Eastern Prussia.³⁸

In the summer semester of 1756, Kant started to give regular courses on physical geography. It was a new subject, with no appropriate textbook in existence. In Kant's version, it combined geography with what he later would call anthropology (he separated these courses in 1772). Contemporaneous with the start of the Seven Years' War, these lectures were supposed to be 'useful and pragmatic', which at that moment also meant suitable for the war efforts. It was also a worldly course, with which Kant distinguished himself from his theology-oriented colleagues, and Kant continued teaching it long after the war ended—for forty years without a break. 'There is more to the knowledge of the world than just seeing the world,' Kant said in these lectures. Though the course seems to be brief, somewhat longer discussions addressed China, Arabia, the 'Russian territory' and Africa. There were separate sections about Siberia, with an interesting statement that 'the laziness in these lands is astonishing', and about religion in Russia.³⁹

Collaborating with the occupants, Kant taught geography, applied mathematics and pyrotechnics to the German-speaking Russian officers, people like Orlov and Bolotov. It is assumed that he accepted payment

³⁷Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment, 234.

³⁸Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography*, 337–338.

³⁹Robert B. Loudon, *Kant's Human Being. Essays on His theory of Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 121–130.

for this service. After the Russians left the city, Kant continued to give similar lessons to Prussian officers. Indeed, during those early years Kant developed a kind of scholarship that he could teach equally well to the Prussians and the Russians. As myriads of colonial, socialist, postcolonial and post-socialist scholars knew all too well, this kind of epistemological minimalism was the secret of professional survival in a hostile environment.

Kant's published research during the seven years of war was very scant. First, at the start of the war, he published a few essays, all of which focused on a rather special theme, earthquakes. This interest was clearly boosted by the Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Geographically, earthquakes were very distant from his experience of Königsberg; but metaphorically, these inexplicable, senseless disasters were close to Kant's world. Voltaire, who spent some time in pre-war Berlin, later combined the same crucial themes: the Lisbon earthquake, the Seven Years' War, and a critique of theodicy, in his major novel, *Candide* (1759). However, for Voltaire, the seven years of the European war that he observed from his peaceful estate in France made up his most productive period. It was different for Kant, who spent those years in the midst of bitter occupation and inexplicable liberation. Apart from his essays about earthquakes and optimism, during the seven years of war he wrote almost nothing—just a few minor texts of technical character.

Scholars have noted Kant's discontent with philosophy and intellectual life, a midlife crisis of a sort, which occurred during and immediately after the Russian occupation. Hannah Arendt noted Kant's 'haphazard, contingent melancholy that he never forgot; when he was dealing with history, its crooked progress and radical evil.'⁴⁰ Historian Anthony La Vopa discerns 'an element of self-caricature, and indeed of self-hatred' in Kant's lectures and writings of this and later periods.⁴¹ I would like to venture an explanation which combines the historical and the psychological lenses, paying more attention to Kant's historical and political situation at the time of his silence. Kant's partial silence coincides with the years of the Seven Years' War and the Russian occupation of Prussian

⁴⁰ Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 8.

⁴¹ La Vopa, Anthony J., 'Herder's Publikum: Language, Print, and Sociability in Eighteenth-Century Germany', *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 29:1 (1995), 5–24, 17.

Königsberg. Living and working in a city occupied by a foreign power, Kant was a subaltern, and he did not speak.

Under a colonial regime, the local intellectuals often feel internally divided, attesting to feelings of doubling and even self-hatred. Much of twentieth-century moral thought and existentialist literature came out of these subaltern situations, whether it is in colonial Ireland and Algeria, in occupied Paris and Prague, or in postcolonial India and Ukraine. Reinstating Kant in the annexed Königsberg helps us understand his relevance to this great tradition. As it later happened to the thinkers and authors as diverse as Johann Gottfried Herder, Nikolai Gogol, James Joyce, Joseph Conrad, Franz Kafka, Vasily Grossman, Albert Camus and Jacques Derrida, the painful experience of growing and living in an imperial colony opened to Kant a magisterial road towards the critical thinking about the modern world.

Whether the reason for his wartime silence was anxiety or trauma or both, the fact is that the occupation created a writing block in Kant. By the fall of 1762, he came up with the idea of categorical imperative, although he had not yet coined that name for the concept. Suggesting that Kant's concept was essentially the 'formalization of the idea of putting oneself into the shoes of others', Paul Guyer sees here a development of Adam Smith's idea of the impartial spectator (even though, Guyer acknowledges, there is no evidence that Kant knew Smith's texts in 1762).⁴² An alternative—or rather complementary—suggestion is that the categorical imperative was just another reflection on the barbarity and senselessness of the Russian occupation. The occupant does not put himself into the shoes of others; the colonizer does not act so as to see in his own action a universal law, equally applicable to himself. Hannah Arendt made it clear when, entering into 'a devil's race' with Kant's formula, she said that the political devils are those who are 'secretly inclined to exempt themselves' from the universal law that they establish themselves.⁴³

After the abrupt end of Russian occupation, in 1762–1763, Kant's publications burst forth. It is 'striking that Kant should have published

⁴²Paul Guyer, 'Freedom as the Foundation of Morality: Kant's Early Efforts', in *Kant's Observations and Remarks. A Critical Guide*, eds. Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 77–98.

⁴³Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 17.

so much in so short a time, in light of rather spare publications of the preceding six years', writes John Zammito.⁴⁴ It is no less striking that Zammito and other scholars have failed to attribute this dynamic to the most obvious reason: the Russian occupation and its end. During the war and under Russian rule, Kant was a subaltern and he did not speak. To be more precise, he did not speak publicly about anything but earthquakes and optimism.

From Isaiah Berlin to John Zammito, the research literature on Kant is of very high quality. I see two reasons for these fine scholars' failure to detect the formative impact of the Russian rule in Königsberg on Kant, one ideological and another empirical. Many of these authors studied, and some worked, during the decades of the Cold War. During this and later periods, it was difficult for liberal, left-minded intellectuals to blame the Soviet Union for its aggressive intentions towards the West. Sometimes, this fellow-travelling with the Soviets also transferred to the Russian Empire. Ideologically biased scholarship of the GDR and Soviet historians grounded the idea that the Russian annexation of Eastern Prussia was a friendly takeover and that the Prussians welcomed the Russian troops.⁴⁵

Many western scholars of Kant have neglected an important Russian source of the period, the memoir of Andrei Bolotov, which bore almost unique witness to the events of the occupation. Many biographers of Kant mention Bolotov, though he has not been translated; they know about Bolotov from the only English-language biography of Kant written by a Russian author, Arsenii Gulyga. A major Soviet philosopher, Gulyga, glossed over the Russian occupation of Königsberg, preferring to ignore the continuities between the imperial and the Soviet elements

⁴⁴Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, 61.

⁴⁵A.N. Kruglov, *Filosofia Kanta v Rossii*, 26–29. Having reviewed this historiographical tradition, the Russian philosopher Kruglov joins it with much enthusiasm; moreover, he accuses of 'Russophobia' everyone who wrote about the cruelty of Russian troops in the Seven Years' War. The idea of an unusually benevolent character of the Russian occupation of Eastern Prussia was probably launched by Kurt Stavenhagen, a philosopher from Göttingen who taught in Latvia, held Kant's chair in Königsberg from 1940 to 1941, and later fled to Hamburg. In his pamphlet, *Kant and Königsberg* (Göttingen 1949), Stavenhagen alleged that the occupation shuttered 'the pedantic prudery' of Pietism, destroyed social barriers and emancipated women. Zammito in his *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (p. 100) refers to Stavenhagen uncritically.

of Russian occupations.⁴⁶ As a result, for different reasons, both western and Soviet scholars have misconstrued Kant's ambivalent interactions with both the Russians and the Prussians during the occupation. Considered from a postcolonial perspective, such ambiguities make much more sense; yet postcolonial scholars have not identified Kant's situation in Königsberg as that of a colonial subject. With this in mind, I propose to look again at Andrei Bolotov, the officer who has previously attracted attention mostly from Russian scholars.

THE UNSOCIABLE PRUSSIANS

Bolotov was a typical figure of the Enlightenment: a modest officer, a dilettante naturalist, a prolific author and a successful administrator who later in his life managed many thousands of the crown peasants near Moscow. His father, also an officer, commanded Russian regiments that were stationed in the occupied Baltic countries. There Bolotov learned his German, which in Königsberg sounded near-native. Mediating between Russians and Germans, collecting philosophical books and drawing aquarelles, Bolotov was eager to become a good European, a feat that few Russian authors presented to their readers. He was in despair when his superior ordered him to return to Russia. Writing about his time in Königsberg decades after it ended, he recognized the Germans' advantage over Russians in fashions, haircuts, cuisine, bookstores, schools and much more. These feelings did not prevent him from being a loyal officer abroad and an ordinary master of his serfs at home. Filling many pages with exalted words about the Prussians, about the Russians he wrote with the impersonal brutality of an aristocrat: 'the stupidity and the extreme unreasonableness of our mean folk was all-too-well-known to us' (604). Deeply influenced by his tenure in Königsberg, Bolotov imposed his new skills and ideas on the peasants whom he owned or managed. In the estates in central Russia, he created Prussian-style ponds and gardens, some of them surviving until now and many

⁴⁶Gulyga, *Immanuel Kant. His Life and Thought*. Bolotov's memoirs have been published in two versions, both of them incomplete: Andrei Bolotov, *Zhizn' i prikliucheniia Andreia Bolotova, opisannye samim im dlia svoikh potomkov*, vols. 1–3. Moscow: Academia. 1931; Bolotov, *Zhizn' i prikliucheniia Andreia Bolotova, opisannye samim im dlia svoikh potomkov*, ed. Arsenii Gulyga (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1986) (the latter edition will be quoted in the text with referring to the page number).

known from his own aquarelles; he was one of the first to introduce potatoes as an agricultural product in Russia. Experimenting on his peasants, he subjected fifteen hundreds of them to electric treatment, with unknown results.

Bolotov was proud of his German language skills, but he soon learned that the natives did not accept him as their peer. In the Governor's office he worked together with the Prussians and felt alien:

It was unthinkable to engage these Germans in conversation. Not only these colleagues but, in general, all the best dwellers of Königsberg felt some kind of revulsion towards all of us Russians [...] Though I was courteous with them in all possible ways so that I would become somehow closer to them, all my efforts were in vain. They were as polite as I was, but that was all I got (221).

Hurt by this attitude, and ever interested in the Prussians, Bolotov analyzed their response to the Russian occupants with Kantian clarity:

My surprise disappeared when I began to understand the Prussians and the Königsbergians better. I learned not to ascribe their responses to their unsociability but began to discern a general indisposition towards Russians among them. Behind their respect, internally, the Prussians thought of the Russians as their enemies (221).

Every Sunday he spent in Prussian cafés and beer gardens, which he loved for their 'orderliness, calmness, and decency'. Shy and always concerned about his chastity among Russians, he was never bored in Prussian company. Everything there was 'polite', 'courteous' and even 'timid'; these were all the features of character that Bolotov presented to his readers as his own. He also realized that these places, all entirely new to him, worked as the centres of local community life and popular information. The Prussians were right to be wary. As a representative of Russian interests, Bolotov was eager to assimilate among the Prussians. He worked hard and gradually his cultural skills had improved. He was a good spy:

At first, the Prussian gentlemen shunned and avoided me as a Russian officer. But as soon as I began to speak to them, softly, in German, they in turn softened towards me and treated me as a natural German. They eagerly brought me into their company and entered into various

speculations with me, even political conversations sometimes. And as I eagerly allowed them to be deceived and to think that I was a German, and sometimes purposefully encouraged them in this error, so it happened not infrequently that I learned much of what one could not find out and learn otherwise, particularly in those matters that concerned the current military events. They were all very well informed in those matters, which greatly surprised me; [...] often I learned things from them two or three weeks before the newspapers wrote about them.⁴⁷

Once, the governor asked Bolotov to arrest a Prussian aristocrat whose anti-Russian sentiment was denounced by his servant. Armed with his knowledge of German and a team of Cossacks, Bolotov accomplished the mission. The count had to go to a trial in St. Petersburg together with his denouncer (370). Simultaneously, Bolotov frequented a bookstore in Königsberg, maybe the same one in which Herder started to work a little later. Bolotov loved German books and believed that they improved his character:

By reading novels, I formed an idea about the customs and mores of various peoples and about everything that they have there, good and bad [...] I developed an understanding of the life of different classes, from the masters of the earth to the very lowest [...] I started to look at all events in the world through different, nobler eyes (280).

Trained by Weymann, Bolotov came to believe that personal aggression was a character flaw. An officer of the occupying army, he did not like manifestations of aggression in himself or in others; his boss, Governor von Korf, was particularly aggressive and Bolotov genuinely detested his explosions. Unlike Kant with his developing ideas of nature operating through war and of war guaranteeing freedom, Bolotov believed that aggression might be suppressed and eliminated. In Königsberg, Bolotov became more reserved; he felt he had now mastered himself. He could control his response even when a servant had stolen his money! With pride, he attributed this civilizing process to his reading of German novels and philosophy:

⁴⁷ Bolotov, *Zhizn' i priklucheniia Andreia Bolotova* (1931), v. 1, 462.

I tried to observe those very rules that were prescribed in my books and I should say that I succeeded in refashioning myself during that one summer so much that I ceased to look like myself and many were truly surprised about that (304).

This refashioning under the influence of the culture that Bolotov was supposed to control is still surprising. While exercising political power over the Prussians, he found himself in a deep dependency on them. Domination was his; hegemony was theirs; both parts were out of balance. Sophisticated imperial administrators like Bolotov did perceive their regime as a colonial situation.

Kant did not pursue meaningful relations with the Russians after they withdrew from Königsberg. In contrast, August Schlözer profitably commuted between Göttingen and St. Petersburg, and Alexander I granted him Russian nobility in 1804. One of his students at Göttingen, Sergei Uvarov, later became the Imperial Minister of the 'Enlightenment', as they put it in Russian. In 1813, Uvarov rewrote Kant's *Perpetual Peace* as a project for the post-Napoleonic arrangement of Europe that would be led by the Russian Empire.⁴⁸ Despite Uvarov's clout, his treatise did not gain much success in the Russian court or among international allies. Kant's utopian construction of the future federation of states, close and distant, would be based on the prohibition against any state appropriating parts of another state. In fact, a European peace was realistic if it was based on the balance of power, a British principle that Russian rulers mostly disliked, and also on the outward expansion in the high seas, an imperialist caveat to the *Perpetual Peace* that they would applaud.⁴⁹

A century and a half later, in August 1914, Russian troops were approaching Königsberg again. 'The Cossacks are coming', went the cry in the city. Surrounded by a panicky crowd, the very young Hannah Arendt fled Königsberg with her mother. In Berlin, Hannah suffered from homesickness; they returned to her city ten weeks later, after German troops defeated Russian forces at the battle of Tannenberg. Hannah developed a recurrent ailment, a fever that occurred every time

⁴⁸Maria Maiofis, *Vozzvanie k Evrope. Literaturnoe obshchestvo Arzamas i rossiiskii modernizatsionnyi proekt 1815–1818 godov* (Moscow: NLO, 2008).

⁴⁹Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth: In the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum* (New York: Telos, 2003).

she had to leave Königsberg.⁵⁰ This early experience had its effect on Arendt's life and ideas in exile. Kant claimed universality without leaving the city that changed hands between the Prussians and the Russians. Arendt traversed the world haunted by statelessness, the banality of evil and the German–Russian symmetry in totalitarianism. In her lectures on Kant's political philosophy she insisted that, just as Arendt did herself, Kant 'repeatedly' articulated the 'notion of how necessary war, catastrophes, and plain evil or pain are for production of "culture"'. Moreover, she read the title of Kant's *Perpetual Peace* as 'ironical': the place for eternal peace, she wrote, is the cemetery, and political philosophers never take their subject, politics, 'too seriously'. Quoting from Pascal, she wrote that when philosophers wrote on politics, 'it was as if laying down rules for a lunatic 'asylum'.'⁵¹ Applied to Kant, whose longing for perpetual peace has been 'too seriously' perceived through centuries, these astonishing statements betray a highly unorthodox vision of cosmopolitan politics, as if she still saw it from the subaltern – in her case, the Nazi-occupied—Königsberg, even though she gave these lectures in New York. The lectures started with a wonderful citation from Cato, an epigraph to her understanding of the subject: 'The victorious cause pleased the gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato.'⁵²

The cosmopolitan ideas of these two worldly philosophers, one of whom never left his home town, while the other remained homesick for decades, were anchored in their local experiences of Königsberg with its striking contrast to the global world. Built to colonize yet intermittently colonized, cursed by its own king, this failed city proved a fertile ground for critical thinking about cosmopolitan modernity.

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⁵⁰ Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 23.

⁵¹ Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 26, 52, 22.

⁵² Arendt, *Kant's Political Philosophy*, 5.

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After the Napoleonic Wars: Reading *Perpetual Peace* in the Russian Empire

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Russia's ambitions under Emperor Alexander I to establish a new political order in Europe in 1813–1815 have been widely discussed by historians.¹ Assessments of this new order itself, as it was finally implemented in the wake of the Congress of Vienna, vary markedly. While some

¹E. Mühlenbeck, *Etude sur les origines de la Sainte Alliance* (Paris; Strasbourg, 1887); F. Vieweg. V.K. Nadler, 1886–1892. *Imperator Aleksandr i ideia Sviashchennogo soiuza* [*The Emperor Alexander I and Idea of Holy Alliance*]: 5 vols. (Riga: U. N. Kimmelia, 1886–1892); Andrei Shebunin, *Evropeiskaia kontrrevoliutsiia v pervoi polovine XIX veka* [*European Counterrevolution in the First Half of the 19th Century*] (Leningrad: Sciattel', 1925); Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812–1822* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946); Francis Ley, *Alexandre I et sa Sainte-Alliance (1811–1825)* (Paris: Editions Fischbacher, 1975); Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace: the Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

The editor wishes to express thanks to Peter Kovalsky for his copy editorial work on this chapter.

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have expressed scepticism, others praised its makers for having established a ‘balanced’ European political system that has since been lost.² The Congress’ accomplishments have been credited at various times to Metternich, Kapodistrias, and Alexander I. Despite this diversity of ideological influences, what seems to be beyond controversy is that this post-war system was the fruit of interactions between several participants who represented Europe’s old regimes in an age of revolution. Thus, it is generally believed that the Holy Alliance as a vision of international order was diametrically opposed to the more radical, republican imagining of global order such as that associated with Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*. This chapter shakes up this view by analysing the importance of Kant’s ideas in the intellectual formation of one of the most influential Russian imperial political thinkers of this period, Sergey Uvarov. The degree of indebtedness to Kant’s work in his vision of international order, though it ultimately conflicts with the spirit of Kant’s work, was strongest in the period of Franco–Russian conflict.

YOUNG UVAROV: *PERPETUAL PEACE* AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL INSPIRATION

Those who do not specialise in nineteenth-century Russian history will know Sergey Semenovitch Uvarov primarily for his role of Minister of National Education and as the author of the infamous triadic doctrine, ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality’.³ Widely implemented in the 1830s and 1840s, the political ideology he had helped to shape considerably increased political, cultural, and intellectual isolation of Russia.

However, behind this reputation as a cultural conservative and political isolationist hides another Uvarov—one who, in the early years of his administrative career, was by all appearances a bright cosmopolitan. Despite his important role in Russian political and intellectual life from the 1810s to the 1840s, during the Soviet period, Uvarov was not the

²Shebunin, A.N. Op. cit; Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Ideology* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1949).

³Andrei Zorin, *By Fables Alone: Literature and State Ideology in Late Eighteenth- and Early Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Transl. from Russian by M. Levitt, N. Monnier, and D. Schlaffy (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014), pp. 325–358.

object of any serious research in Russia. His early works, as well as his later views as Minister of National Education, only started to be considered worthy of academic attention in the 1990–2000s.⁴ The first annotated volume of his essays was published only in 2008.⁵ It was a modest attempt to translate into Russian (largely from French, partially from German) and republish works that had been published in the author's lifetime, between the late 1800s and 1855. But the majority of Uvarov's corpus remains available only to specialists in manuscript form.⁶

My chapter is based both on his published-but-relatively-unknown works and on letters and drafts which I contextualised in my 2008 monograph, in which I discuss the history of Russian literary cosmopolitanism, among other subjects.⁷ In what follows, I shall try to describe the main features of Uvarov's cosmopolitan worldview and to discuss some of the factors that may have influenced the shift in his politics and ideology in the early 1830s.

In 1813, when Russian troops were approaching the western borders of the country to drive out the Napoleonic army, Uvarov—who was then the curator of the St. Petersburg educational district—anonously published an extensive treatise that was entitled, *Pensées sur ce qu'une Grande Puissance Unie à une Grande Moderation peut effectuer pour le Bonheur*

⁴Cynthia Whittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984); Andrei Zorin, 'Ideologiia "pravoslavliia—samoderzhavliia—narodnosti" i eio nemetskie istochniki' [Ideology of 'Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality' and Its German Sources], in idem ed., *V razdumiakh o Rossii: XIX vek [Contemplating of Russia: The 19th Century]*. (Moscow: Arheograficheskiy tseñtr literaturnoe obozrenie, 1996); Andrei Zorin, 'Ideologiia "pravoslavliia—samoderzhavliia—narodnosti": Opyt rekonstruktsii' [Ideology of 'Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality': An Attempt of Reconstruction], in *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie [New Literary Observer]*, 26 (1997), pp. 71–104; Maksim Shevchenko, 'Sergei Semionovich Uvarov', in *Rossiiskie konservatory [Russian Conservators]*. (Moscow: Russki Mir, 1997), pp. 95–136; Richard Pipes, *Serguei Semionovich Uvarov: Zhizneopisanie [S.S. Uvarov: A Life]*; published only in Russian]. (Moscow: Posev, 2013).

⁵Sergei Uvarov, *Izbrannye Trudy [Selected Writings]*. Ed. by V. Parsamov, S. Udalov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010).

⁶Hundreds of folders are preserved in Uvarov's collection in the Family Archival Fund of Uvarovs (Fund 17) in the Manuscripts Collection, State Historical Museum, Moscow.

⁷Maria Mayofis, *Vozzvanie k Evrope: Literaturnoe obshchestvo 'Arzamas' i Rossiiskii Modernizatsionnyi Proekt 1815–1818 [Appeal to Europe: 'Arzamas' Literary Society and the Russian Modernization Project of 1815–1818]* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008).

de l'Humanité [Thoughts on what a Great Power joined with a Great Moderation can make for the happiness of Humanity]. This treatise was devoted to the problem of perpetual peace that, Uvarov thought, had to be established after the end of the pan-European war with France. This work was published anonymously, and not until the mid-1970s did the Russian historian Vladlen Sirotkin establish Uvarov's authorship based on an honorarium received for this publication bearing Uvarov's signature, which he found in the archive. Further evidence of Uvarov's authorship lies in the writing displaying clear textual parallels with works that are uncontroversially attributed to Uvarov.

Uvarov's treatise should be read as a very particular message addressed to Alexander I and all other European monarchs in order to inspire them to 'share the feelings of our August Sovereign'.⁸ Uvarov refrains from putting his name on the cover of his brochure in order to avoid the appearance of lobbying for particular interests. According to Uvarov, the only way to achieve a stable and lasting peace was to create an association of European peoples (*'association des peuples'*). This association would help to bridle the ambitions of powerful states and protect the interests of weaker ones. It would also curtail the excesses of the free market and establish a much-needed commercial equilibrium.

In this image, published by the Russian Foreign Ministry's journal *Conservateur Impartial* [The Impartial Conservative], which had been edited by Uvarov, we can see Napoleon's ideas of global conquest, of English trade, of India, and the siege of Russian cities such as St. Petersburg and Kaluga, bursting like soap bubbles. The association of Napoleon—not Kant—with lofty dreams of world power can be gleaned from contemporary Russian caricatures, as in this one by Ivan Terebenev. The secretary asks: 'Do you wish to write all this in the bulletin?' Napoleon replies: 'Wait, let me blow another one' (Fig. 4.1).

The main source of inspiration for Uvarov's work was Kant's *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* (1795). Uvarov quotes from this text often and extensively, appealing to Kantian ideas directly.⁹ In the last pages of his

⁸ *Pensées sur ce qu'une Grande Puissance unie à une Grande Moderation peut effectuer pour le Bonheur de l'Humanité*. 1813. Saint-Petersbourg. For attribution, see: Sirotkin, Vladlen. 1976. Russkaia pressa pervoi chetverti XIX veka na inostrannykh iazykakh kak istoricheskii istochnik [The Russian Foreign-Languages Press of the First Quarter of the 19th Century as an Historical Source]. *Istoriia SSSR [The USSR History]*, 4, 77–96.

⁹ *Pensées*: 71–77.



Fig. 4.1 Ivan Terebeny, *Soap bubbles* (1813–1814). Source A. K. Dzhivelegov, S. P. Mel'gunov, and V. I. Pichet (eds), *Istoricheskaya Komissiya Uchebnago Otdela* [Education Department Historical Commission], vol. V (Moscow: Tovarishestvo Ivana Sytina, 1912), 274

anonymous work, Uvarov quotes several lines from the work of this 'new Northern oracle', as he calls him—lines easily recognised as a fragment from Kant's treatise. Uvarov's conception of the future of global politics can be understood only through a detailed comparative analysis of his work in parallel with Kant's text, carefully identifying which ideas he directly borrowed from *Perpetual Peace* and which he transformed or simply ignored.

It is evident that Uvarov found in the Kantian treatise an appropriate compromise between the cosmopolitan ideas of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which he saw as the legacy of the French *ancien régime*, and the new ideas of nationalism, which became more and more popular in the anti-Napoleonic European intellectual circles of the late 1800s and early 1810s.

Born in 1786, Uvarov was educated and brought up by a French émigré, Abbot Mangen; he soaked up French literature and philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps much more ardently than his French contemporaries. French was, in fact, his first language, and he even wrote his own poems in French. His friend Alexander Turgenev said of Uvarov's poems that they 'were no worse than those of Delille'.¹⁰

Uvarov entered civil service in the early 1800s, and in 1807 he was sent to the Russian embassy in Vienna, where he got acquainted with both the representatives of the old regime (including the Prince de Ligne and the Duchess de Lorraine) and the supporters of the newly fashionable ideological trends (including Madame de Staël, Friedrich Schlegel, and Baron von Stein).¹¹

As one historian pointed out, Vienna was in 1807–1808 the centre of the European reaction against Napoleon, and the only place where this reaction could manifest itself unmasked.¹² This reaction was led by both the old French aristocracy and the nationally-minded German patriots, who were thinking of future liberation and unification. Despite significant differences of opinion and divergence of interests, these groups had to find common ground in order to unite, under Austrian protection, against Napoleon's invasion. The following years proved the weakness and ineffectiveness of this tactical union. However, in its early steps, Uvarov found valuable experience in ideological and historiosophical synthesis.

'PATRIOTISM' IN THE COSMOPOLITAN FRAMEWORK

The first thing of note in Uvarov's brochure is the very notion of *association des peuples*. Its meaning becomes clearer when examined in terms of the Second Article that Kant proposed for the future perpetual peace treaty:

¹⁰[Turgenev, N. I.] 1936. *Dekabrist N. I. Turgenev. Pis'ma k bratu S.I. Tugenevu* [Decembrist N. I. Turgenev: The Letters to His Brother S. I. Turgenev]. Ed. by N. G. Svirin and A. N. Shebunin. Moscow; Leningrad: Izdatelstvo AN SSSR: 182.

¹¹Durylin, S. 1939. Gospozha de Stal' i eio russkie otnosheniia [Madame de Staël and Her Russian Relationships]. *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo*, 33–34: 217–218, 225–263.

¹²Durylin, S. *Op. cit.*, 217.

Peoples, as states, can be judged as individual human beings ... each of whom, for the sake of his own security, can and ought to demand of others that they enter with him into a constitution, similar to that of a civil one, under which each is guaranteed his rights. This would constitute a federation of peoples, which would not, however, necessarily be a state of peoples.¹³

Here we see how the ‘European republic’ imagined by Henry IV and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre is transformed into an association of independent states, as declared in the Second Article: ‘As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition... to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and to thereby form a state of peoples (*civitas gentium*), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world.’¹⁴

The Kantian project of the future global political structure is quoted in a small passage, which Uvarov presents as ‘a prophecy of a new Northern oracle’.¹⁵

This requires (a) an internal constitution for the individual state, based on pure principles of right, and (b) a constitution uniting this state with others, near or far, for the legal settlement of their differences (analogous to a universal state).¹⁶

The second item of note is the Kantian notion of republicanism. Kant defines it as ‘the principle by which the executive power (the government) of a state is separated from the legislative power’,¹⁷ and this definition is the main underpinning of the concept of ‘internal constitution’ in the quotation given above. Kant understands republicanism not as a democratic way of ruling the country but writes, on the contrary, ‘the smaller the personnel exercising state power (the number of rulers), and

¹³Immanuel Kant, ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’, in Kant, I. *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, Ed. and with an Introd. by Pauline Kleingeld, translated by D.L. Colclasure with essays by J. Waldron, M.W. Doyle & A.W. Wood. (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2009), 78.

¹⁴Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 81.

¹⁵*Pensées*, 101.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁷Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 76.

the greater its representativeness, the more the constitution of the state tends toward republicanism, and the more it can hope to raise itself to republicanism through gradual reforms'.¹⁸ Further, he proclaims that the only possible republican state is a representative monarchy.

As Kant's Second Article lays out the sovereignty of nation states, the Third Article re-establishes European (and, indeed, global) cosmopolitanism by redefining it in new terms: 'Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.'¹⁹ For Uvarov and his associates in Russia, this was a suitable model, as it created a space for France and Frenchmen who had lost their pre-Napoleonic prestige and authority in Russia and its culture. This system was conceived as a direct descendant of the Republic of Letters as it was imagined in pre-revolutionary France, with Paris as capital and French as the common language, and proved increasingly vital in 1812 and 1813. After Russian audiences learned about the devastating consequences of Napoleon's invasion, many writers and publishers demanded that France be forever excluded from the Russian cultural space. Uvarov vehemently opposed this tendency and complained in one of his letters to Baron von Stein that his countrymen have 'put French armies and French books in one pile'.²⁰

Uvarov also appropriated Kant's notion of 'world citizenship' and proclaimed that true patriotism could be established only after the effecting of perpetual peace; that is, a 'patriot' of one country who blames and slanders another country cannot be considered a patriot. When peoples and nations are disconnected by permanent wars, 'a patriot of one country is the scourge of another'.²¹

Developing the Kantian notion of hospitality, Uvarov criticised the governments and elites of the countries that support what he called the 'spirit of extreme patriotism', because as soon as patriotism goes beyond the limits of temperance, it starts to unfairly despise and even hate the other peoples.²²

¹⁸Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 77.

¹⁹Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 82.

²⁰Uvarov, S.S. 1871. Pis'mo baronu Shteinu [A Letter to Baron von Stein]. *Russkii Arkhiv [The Russian Archive]*, 2: 0130–0131.

²¹Pensées, 80.

²²Pensées, 84.

Thus, Uvarov does not deny the very possibility of patriotism. Moreover, he aspires to the establishment of a 'true' patriotism based on mutual respect, understanding, and acceptance of differences.

As we see, both Kant and Uvarov paradoxically join nationalism with cosmopolitanism, finding room for patriotism in an internationalist framework. Cyrus R. K. Patel, working from Bryan Turner's ideas, has recently shown the profound connection between these two doctrines which appear to be polar opposites. Patel suggests that cosmopolitanism can be understood as a kind of co-existence of different 'nationalisms':

A viable cosmopolitanism must find a way to explore not only the interplay of sameness and difference but also the interplay of the global and the local; it must find a way to enable local attachments to serve as the models for global attachments. ... Having emerged as an alternative to nationalism, cosmopolitanism thus becomes a way of rethinking nationalism.

According to B. Turner, what is required is not complete 'exile' from patriotism and love of country but the ability to put those sentiments in a global perspective.²³

ADVOCATING AN INTERNATIONAL WAR OF LIBERATION

Uvarov's treatise radically differs from the works of all his predecessors who wrote on the problem of perpetual peace in its orientation towards immediate implementation and assertions of the timeliness of doing this in that particular moment in history. Uvarov ardently argued that the perpetual peace, previously understood as a utopia or chimera, had become possible in reality, as stable and attainable as many other achievements of the human spirit: 'Why should we hold this great day! Why should we pass this honour to our descendants if it can glorify our age! Who is against that? Only contemptible passions which could be always triumphed over by the great souls!'²⁴

The answer to the question of why that particular moment in history was mostly favourable for implementing the project of perpetual peace

²³Cyrus Patel, *Cosmopolitanism and the Literary Imagination* (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 14–15; Patel's footnote to this fragment: Bryan Turner, *Rights and Virtues: Political Essays on Citizenship and Social Justice* (Oxford: Bardwell, 2008).

²⁴*Pensées*, 16, 84.

is given in the very title of Uvarov's treatise: the whole course of historical development and gradual improvement of civilisation had led to the situation where 'the Greatest Power' was 'unified with the Greatest Moderation'. That is, the major features of the policy prevailing at the time would make it possible to eradicate the greatest evil—war.²⁵

It is important to define the exact moment in history to and from which Uvarov is speaking. The text of the treatise contains many internal contradictions and paradoxes which raise questions regarding its dating. The censorship approval for publication, according to the lines on the reverse side of the title page, was given on 10 January 1813. And at the very height of the Franco-Russian War), when St. Petersburg was mourning the Great Fire of Moscow and cheering the first victories over the French army, Uvarov's brochure mentioned neither Napoleon nor France's breaking of the Treaty of Tilsit. The war itself is referenced only a handful of times. Moreover, considering the situation of late 1812—Russia had just signed a treaty with Great Britain—Uvarov characterises Englishmen too harshly, calling them one of the main proponents of war (not any particular war, but war in general).²⁶

This suggests that Uvarov's treatise was written in the epoch of the Treaty of Tilsit, when Russia still had friendly relations with France and was forced to maintain a continental blockade of Great Britain. As a former member of the anti-French coalition and partner of Austria-Hungary and Prussia, Russia could become a mediator between Great Britain and France and lay the groundwork for perpetual peace.

However, it would be a mistake to consider Uvarov's work as belonging only to the end of the Tilsit period. It is strongly tied with the internal Russian politics of late 1812 and its international aims during those months. It seems likely that the work was initially conceived and drafted in 1810–1811, then had to be urgently rewritten in the last months of 1812 to account for the emerging geopolitical climate.

In late 1812 and early 1813, high-ranking officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to solve the task of quickly organising a propaganda campaign spanning the territory of the German states. These lands would have naturally become the place where the French army had to go in their retreat from Russia. In order for the Russian

²⁵ *Pensées*. 18.

²⁶ *Pensées*. 37.

counteroffensive to be successful, it would need to receive a friendly welcome in those lands, which had been occupied by France for several years. The plan involved organising permanent German corps and partisan detachments. Uvarov may have prepared his work precisely for this campaign. In the second part of his treatise, discussing the future of the European states, Uvarov pays particular attention to the German principalities, writing the following:

An honorable statesman of this country says: 'We ceased to be Germans, as we had separated, willing to be Bavarians, Hannoverians, Saxons, etc. Germany's power transcends from the whole body to its particular members, as she lacks the force of spirit to make them obey her. Jealousy, envy of one part to the other, was greater than vigilance against intrigue; the German peoples were more concerned with not ceding something to each other than with preserving German independence.'²⁷

The 'honorable statesman' is the prominent Prussian political figure, Baron von Stein. He had come to Russia in spring of 1812 by Alexander I's invitation and corresponded regularly with Uvarov. In 1813, he followed the Russian troops and went to Germany, where he became the main organiser of the anti-French propaganda and advocate for the unification of national forces.²⁸

Uvarov's haste could be explained by the other reasons. He prepared his publication during several weeks after the retreat of the French army and before it finally crossed the Russian border. It was just in December of 1812 that Emperor Alexander I had to decide whether to continue the war beyond the Russian territory or to stop at the border, satisfied with reclaiming lost Russian land. The most active proponent of the latter approach was Secretary of State Alexander Shishkov, who insisted that further military actions, perforce sending Russian troops beyond Russia's historic borders, could 'infect' them with the negative European influence and that it would therefore be better to isolate Russia from Europe. Among his main opponents, arguing for Russian military expansion, were his deputy in the State Council; the director of the Public Library, Alexei Olenin; and one of the most authoritative church figures,

²⁷ *Pensées*, 91.

²⁸ For details, see: Pertz, G.H. 1851. *Das Leben des Ministers Freiherrn von Stein*. Bd. III. Berlin; von Wallthor, A.H. 1992. *Der Freiherr vom Stein und Rußland*, Köln.

archimandrite (future metropolitan of Moscow) Philaret (Drozdov). That January, Philaret, commissioned by Olenin, wrote a work entitled *Discourse on the reasons of our immense success in the war with the French in 1812*, where he advocated continuing the war and dethroning Napoleon, with the overarching goal for the whole Russian nation being to establish true Christian order in Europe. According to Philaret, Russia's role was to remind the European nations of their lost virtues, which would then lead them to the well-being and prosperity they were lacking.²⁹ Establishing perpetual peace was no less ambitious an aim than instructing the European nations, and would give Alexander I the trump card in the debate with the isolationists.

RUSSIA AS A WOMAN OF PEACE

While developing Kantian ideas on perpetual peace, Uvarov makes an interesting ideological turn in his treatise: he reimagines perpetual peace in a way that would put Russia in the role of main initiator and guarantor of the future political regulation.

First, Uvarov takes up Saint-Pierre's notion of sovereigns (not nations!) as initiators of perpetual peace: 'Is war an unavoidable trouble? Yes, and it will continue to be one, as it has been from the beginning of times, if the leaders of the most powerful nations of the world do not put an end to it. Their union could become such a good deed for the entire world as no hero has ever done for his nation!'³⁰ Uvarov then returns to Kant's explanation that the first nation to establish a republic proper will lead the others by example, acting as lynchpin in the formation of the new geopolitics:

if fortune so determines that a powerful and enlightened people can constitute itself as a republic (which according to its nature necessarily tends towards perpetual peace), then this republic provides a focus point for other states, so that they might join this federative union and thereby secure the condition of peace among states in accordance with the idea of international right and gradually extend this union further and further through several such associations.³¹

²⁹For details, see: Zorin, A. *Op. cit.*: 248–257.

³⁰*Pensées*, 10.

³¹Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 80.

The same idea is developed in J. Fichte's discourse on the Kantian project. Fichte simply argues that after the republican order had been established in one particular state, the others would like it so much that they would certainly follow its exciting example:

It can therefore be expected with certainty that some nation will finally succeed in devoting itself in reality to that problem that is so easy to solve in theory, namely, the problem of discovering the only state constitution that accords with right, just as it can also be expected that the spectacle presented by the happiness of this nation will entice others to copy it.³²

A more colourful picture is given in one of the last and most well-known fragments of J.G. Herder's *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* named after Kant's *Perpetual Peace*.³³ Herder introduces the extended metaphor of the Friedensfrau, or Peace-Woman, taken from the history of the Iroquois and Delaware tribes. According to Herder, the Native Americans chose one nation from among themselves to become the Peace-Woman, to serve as mediator in their disputes, and to preserve the peace among them all. Although Herder refused to recognise any contemporary nation as his 'Peace-Woman', he defines 'her' with a remarkable combination of qualities: 'universal fairness, humane-ness, active reason'. While we now know that Herder's account was different from the Iroquois original, it doubtless remained in the memory of his readers.³⁴

Evidently referring to this long tradition of speculatively 'predicting' the nation that would become the initiator of the perpetual peace, Uvarov presents Russia as the most likely occupant of the vacant place of the peace-maker state. According to his 'Thoughts', Russia is worthy of taking up this mantle only because of the exceptional moral qualities—'universal fairness, humaneness, active reason'—of Emperor Alexander I:

³²Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Review of Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: a philosophical sketch* (Königsburg: Nicolovius, 1795). Transl. by D. Breazeale. *The Philosophical Forum*, XXXII, 4 (Winter 2001), 321.

³³Johann Gottfried Herder, *Briefe zu Beförderung der Humanität*, Bd. 10. (Riga: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1797), pp. 113–119.

³⁴See Karla Lydia Schultz, 'Herders indianische Friedensfrau', in *Monatshefte*, 81 (1989), 413–424.

If in the past all powerful sovereigns passionately aspired to the glory of Alexander the Great, those of our age will aspire to that of Alexander the First.³⁵

When an overwhelming storm threatened him with shipwreck, he managed to overcome his personal interests and sacrificed them in order to save suffering humanity from the horrors of war.³⁶

According to Uvarov, the path to peace lay in moderation—the capacity for sacrifice—and not in power (*puissance*). And the Russian Emperor, of course, was the best example of such moderation: ‘To sacrifice one’s power, one’s fortune, one’s life for the general good of humanity—what heroism! What patriotism!’³⁷

As Martha Nussbaum points out, the Roman stoics had connected the idea of cosmopolitanism with the notion of curbing one’s passions, without which living in peace becomes impossible.³⁸ Kant’s views on the nature of passions substantially differed from those of the stoics; moreover, the stoics were not able to imagine, let alone describe, the idea of the perpetual peace, as for them the imperial border *was* the border of the whole world. Nevertheless, the stoics arrived at the connections between world citizenship, the peaceful co-existence of citizens and curbing one’s passions—and Kant only further developed their ideas.

Uvarov appears descendent from this tradition of ‘moralistic cosmopolitanism’. Moreover, this tradition was actively developed in Russian poetry of the last years of the war, mainly in Vasily Zhukovsky’s verses dedicated to Alexander I.

Uvarov’s views on the future of Russian literature have much in common with his political doctrine. He was rather successful in combining ideas of European cosmopolitanism and national idiosyncrasy [*natsional’naya samobytnost’*] within his own cultural and literary programme, which he developed with his colleagues at the ‘Arzamas’ literary society in 1813–1818. This programme was strongly tied to his ideas

³⁵ *Pensées*, 11.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁸ Martha Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, in *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5: 1 (1997), pp. 1–25.

about the future development of the Russian humanities, particularly Oriental Studies, Archaeology and History.

Being enamoured with the legacy of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French literature, Uvarov was constantly experimenting with introducing to Russian literature the traditions of other nations. He was an attentive reader of Mme de Staël's book *Germany* and sought an unusual synthesis of the Southern (Greek and Italian) and Northern (Germanic) traditions in Russian poetry. In one of his articles, published in French in the weekly journal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he described the most famous Russian poets of that time—Konstantin Batushkov and Vasily Zhukovsky—as representatives of these two traditions: the former, hedonistic and oriented towards Greek Antiquity, and the latter, mystical, very lyrical, and sometimes even obscure. It seems fair to suggest that this dualistic model for understanding Russian poetry was used very soon thereafter in the creation of the image of Alexander Pushkin as a national genius, who succeeded in absorbing and unifying the European poetic traditions.

At the same time, Uvarov praised Germany and the German language as the best mediator in interpreting Greek and Roman Antiquity, and insisted that Russia should aim to become the new leader in this academic field. He also suggested that Ancient Egypt was a fruitful model of cultural transfer between the East and the newly born Greek civilisation, and considered this model worth reproducing in Russia. Finally, he still believed that French had to remain the language of international academic communication and predicted the revival of the European '*republique de lettres*' even from the ruins of Napoleonic tyranny.

FROM COLONIAL RULE TO THE MORAL WORLD OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

What should a peaceful Europe do under these new conditions? According to Uvarov, the best way for each nation to preserve its identity and strengthen its power was to civilise 'savage' countries, to disseminate European morals and laws:

Almost half of the globe consists of deserts, of savage lands; although they are united into societies, their societies are barbarian. These societies would become different, they would be reconstituted anew, and in their new existence—without striving to diminish the life of the other, to build

their own prosperity on destroying the prosperity of the other, without national discord—they would become suitable for human society.³⁹

At first glance, it could seem that Uvarov was suggesting that the European powers swap their ‘continental’ ambitions for colonial ones, but his proposal did not have an exact ‘colonial’ origin. Earlier, in discussing economic conflicts between Great Britain and France, as well as the threat that the United States could present for the European economies, he argues that the major threat results not from any particular state, but from the very doctrine of mercantilism, which demands that nations heavily exploit their colonies and maintain a morally reprehensible and inhuman serfdom in their territories. Uvarov insists rather that all European states should simultaneously renounce their overseas dominions, keeping only monopolies on trade with their former colonies. He warns that if these measures are taken, the colonies will follow the ‘Anglo-American’ example, i.e., they will rebel against their mother countries.⁴⁰ Thus, Uvarov stands for abolishing slavery and colonial expansion, and dreams of a ‘better’ world where European countries behave as civilising philanthropists, not merely preoccupied with enhancing their own political system, but committed also to assisting the whole world to become ‘moral’ and ‘peaceful-minded’.

It is well-known that in his *Treatise on Perpetual Peace*, Kant condemned European colonial policies, characterising them as a violation of the principles of law.⁴¹ Nevertheless, he does not assert that these unjust approaches should be replaced with a mere imposition of the norms of European law onto ‘uncivilised’ territories. This idea was more characteristic of Kant’s earlier writings, such as ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’ (1784), where he did not criticise the European colonial system and even suggested that some colonies were better off under the direct rule of a mighty European sovereign.⁴²

³⁹Ibid., 102.

⁴⁰Ibid., 60.

⁴¹See: Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 83.

⁴²This ideological development is well described in the recently published works: Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism’, in Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi (eds), *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives* (N.Y.; London: Oxford UP, 2014), pp. 43–67; Howard Williams, ‘Colonialism in Kant’s Political Philosophy’, in *Diametros*, 39 (2014), pp. 154–181.

After reconsidering his view on colonial politics and subaltern nations, he immediately rejects the idea of imposing European law on non-European nations.⁴³ The cosmopolitan right which he introduces in his work as the base of interaction among humans of all continents is a new concept, novel to both European and non-European peoples (however, we might point out to Kant that strictly speaking, since he—a European—was the first to suggest this system, its origin was clearly European).

Setting aside Kant's earlier thinking, as he himself did, a clear and curious contradiction emerges between the major points of *Perpetual Peace* and Uvarov's image of the deserts and 'sites of savages' which ought to be 'reconstructed anew'. As far as I can discern, this image is directly borrowed from Kant's treatise, where it is used in a rather different sense. In the section where Kant discusses his Third Article of *Perpetual Peace*, introducing the notion of 'universal hospitality', he reminds his readers that in order to reach remote lands one has to travel through the 'uninhabitable parts of this surface, the sea and the deserts' which 'separate this community' (i.e., humanity as a whole). Kant argues that both 'native inhabitants' (e.g., those who live on the Barbary Coast) and European colonisers (e.g., those who 'plunder' the nomadic tribes) tend to manifest their inhospitality, which is clearly 'contrary to natural right'. He strongly warns the Europeans that the right of hospitality 'pertains... only to conditions of the possibility of *attempting* interaction with the old inhabitants'.⁴⁴

Therefore, we see that Uvarov manages to skilfully borrow from both Kant's earlier and later views on the very possibility of colonial politics, staking out a position of his own: humanistic and hostile to slavery and mercantilism on the one hand, and steeped in the deep feeling of European superiority on the other. Given our current knowledge of Uvarov's previous and subsequent writings, we can assume that this hybrid theory was his favourite 'know-how' both in the fields of international politics and humanities.

The first parallel with the theory of perpetual peace emerges in Uvarov's Project of the Asiatic Academy, an ambitious treatise which

⁴³See: 'he defends the normative ideal of the state as a republic, a self-legislative, self-determining union of citizens, and he no longer argues that other races are incapable of achieving this'. Kleingeld, *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁴⁴Kant, I. *Op. cit.*, 82.

Uvarov published at the end of 1810.⁴⁵ In it, he ardently advocated the establishment in Russia of a new institution, the Asiatic Academy, which would make his country a leader in both Oriental and Classical Studies. From his point of view, the rich cultural heritage of Persia, Turkey, the Arabic world, etc. could become the basis for a deeper comparative study of Ancient Greece and Rome. He sent his recently published book to J. W. Goethe, who responded with his approval and even some new thoughts concerning the dissemination of Oriental Studies in the Russian empire.

Several years later, in 1815, Uvarov attempted to introduce his ‘moderate’ view on Russia’s Eastern politics in his unpublished essay, ‘On Persia’, which he probably submitted to Emperor Alexander I.⁴⁶ Working together with the British ambassador in Persia, Sir Gore Ouseley, and the director of the Imperial Public Library, Alexey Olenin, he proposed an ambitious international project. He considered Russia and Great Britain equal partners who both had to lessen their pressure on Persia and reject their territorial claims. He even thought that some territories which had recently been incorporated into the Russian empire, such as Georgia and Armenia, could become independent ‘buffer’ states. In so doing, they would serve as a natural barrier between the powerful states and, at the same time, be an exploitable territory of extensive archaeological and ethnographical research. The latter perspectives were amply developed in a book which Olenin wrote and even published; however, he had to promptly burn its entire print run after Sir Gore Ouseley was declared *persona non grata* in St. Petersburg.

Finally, in 1818, Uvarov succeeded in promoting a less ambitious, but still impressive project. Being the curator of the St. Petersburg educational district and having been recently elected President of the Academy of Sciences, he established two new departments within the St. Petersburg Pedagogical Institute, History and Oriental study, holding an official ceremony dedicated to this event. He opened the ceremony with a speech, well-known to all historians of Alexander I’s reign for its clear references to the future ‘age of liberty’, advocating primarily

⁴⁵Uvarov, S.S. 1810. *Projet d'une Académie Asiatique*. St. Pétersbourg: Pluchart.

⁴⁶Uvarov, S.S. 1815. *Mémoire sur les relations politiques de la Russie et de la Perse*. Manuscript. State Historical Museum, Moscow. Section of the Written Sources. Fond (Stock) 17. Opis (Inventory) 1. Edinitsa khraneniia (Document) 108.

the abolition of serfdom and secondarily the passing of a moderate constitution. Leaving aside this call for social policy reform, the speech is also important as a declaration of Russia's international ambitions.⁴⁷ Returning to his 1810 idea of Russia's leadership in Oriental Studies, he recalls the role of Ancient Egypt as a bridge between the Eastern and the Classic World (implying by analogy his motherland's future mission). In my view, this text is less moderate than it first appears, considering as it does the possibility of colonial acquisitions and describing, albeit vaguely and indirectly, the possibility of future military expeditions to the East.

Thus, we can conclude that Uvarov reinterprets Kant's treatise in (using the anachronistic term) a geopolitical way. He applies the universal principles of moral philosophy explored in *Perpetual Peace* to certain political and military conditions as a way of demanding 'fair play' in relationships between the European powers.

1820–1830: LEARNING DIFFERENT ETHICAL MODELS

Neither the Acts eventually adopted at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, nor the Act of The Holy Alliance signed by the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian monarchs in September 1815, had any clear references to the system described in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*. However, subsequently, various publishers, philosophers and writers identified the new system with Kant's project. Thus, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who was a strong opponent of the idea of perpetual peace, in his 'Philosophy of Right' (1821) referred to Kant's project as a parallel to the Holy Alliance.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Uvarov, S. S. 1818. Rech' Prezidenta Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, Popechitelia Sankt-Peterburgskogo Uchebnogo Okruga, v torzhestvennom sobranii Glavnogo Pedagogicheskogo Instituta 22 marta 1818 g. [A Speech Delivered by the President of Emperor's Academy of Sciences, the Curator of S.-Petersburg Educational District, at the Solemn Meeting of the Main Pedagogical Institute, March the 22nd, 1818]. S.-Petersburg: Typography of the Department of People's Enlightenment. For detailed analysis of this speech, see: Whittaker, C. H. 1984. *The origins of modern Russian education: An intellectual biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855*. DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois University Press. C. 57; Mayofis, M.L. 2008. *Vozzvanie k Evrope... [Appeal to Europe...]*.

⁴⁸'Kant proposed an alliance of princes, which should settle the controversies of states, and the Holy Alliance was probably intended to be an institution of this kind.' (Hegel, G.W.F. 2001. *Philosophy of Right*. Transl. by S.W. Dyde Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 259).

Meanwhile, Uvarov and several of his colleagues and associates, such as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kapodistrias,⁴⁹ were constantly devising ways to transform the Viennese system into something closer to the Kantian model. These plans were to become political reality after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, where Alexander I was expected to suggest that his August Collaborators adopt an international constitution and promise internal constitutions to the whole of Europe. This was to be preceded by the grant of a constitution to Poland in March 1818. The constitution was eventually granted, an occasion on which Alexander gave a speech through which he acquired fame as a liberal across Europe. Kapodistrias described this change as a move from the Quadruple Alliance between Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, to a General Alliance that would invite and take into account the interests of minor states. Unfortunately, the Russian Emperor did not dare to make such a proposition, and Kapodistrias' project was never brought to life.

Three years later, in 1821, Uvarov resigned from his high post of curator of St. Petersburg educational district in protest against the new policy of state pressure on Russian universities. He was soon engaged by the Ministry of Finance, where he worked until 1826. However, looking at the history of his dramatic resignation, we can guess that it was a crucial time for his philosophy of history and his entire worldview. His opponents were ardent and unpredictable followers of the model of transnational religious modernisation proposed by the Russian Bible Society. Uvarov was very frightened by their eagerness to radically reform public education based on principles of mystical and spiritual transformation, despite their complete ignorance of intellectual and institutional aspects of the educational system. From this moment, he obviously came to associate the ideas of democratisation and religious rebirth, which were very alien and even hostile to him, with the projects of uniting

⁴⁹Strong evidence of the common political ground that united Uvarov with Kapodistrias can be found in one of the passages of his 'Thoughts...', where he convinces his enlightened readers that the true interest of the great powers consists in preventing the medium powers from worsening their situation, and this is the foundation of a true 'moral' politics. It is well-known that Kapodistrias was a staunch advocate of 'medium' and 'small' states.

Europe (and the whole world) under the banner of ideas he called 'strong' and 'exciting'.⁵⁰

The later period of Uvarov's biography, when he served as a Deputy Minister and then Minister of Public Education (1832–1849) is notable for his almost complete rejection of his previous projects and ideals. In 1832, Uvarov suggested that the new Russian ideology should be founded upon the principles of 'orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality', regarding them as the key elements of state-building.⁵¹ He believed they could inoculate Russia against the chaotic and immoral turmoil that Europe had recently experienced during the French Revolution of 1830. He might have sincerely considered himself a defender of the last bastions of 'true', non-aggressive nationalism, in opposition to radical nationalist movements which became dominant in Europe after 1830.

It is worth noticing that Uvarov rejected cosmopolitanism not only because it was strongly tied with republican principles, which Uvarov dismissed as the 'dreamy systems' of 'Saint-Simonian administrators'.⁵² Rather, Uvarov proclaimed that the other European countries had lost their moral, religious, and political foundations, and that Russia remained the only nation which had escaped these diseases and thus had to be further preserved in its 'healthy' and 'pure' condition.⁵³

Nevertheless, he never spoke of complete isolation. In a private note addressed to Emperor Nicholas I, Uvarov explained that he had developed the whole framework in order to answer the question: 'What rule should we follow concerning the European Enlightenment and

⁵⁰See for details: Maria Mayofis, 'Ot idei 'edinoi Evropy' k idee 'osobogo puti': S. S. Uvarov v 1819–1821 godakh' [From the idea of a 'United Europe' to the idea of a 'special path': Serguei Uvarov in 1819–1821], in Emil' Pain (ed.), *Ideologiya 'osobogo puti' v Rossii i Germanii: istoki, sodержanie, posledstviia* [The Ideology of 'Special Path' in Russia and Germany: Origin, Content, and Consequences] (Moscow: Kennan Institute; Tri Kvadrata, 2010), pp. 49–69.

⁵¹[Uvarov, S. S.] 1995. Doklady Ministra narodnogo prosvshcheniia S.S. Uvarova imperatoru Nikolaiu I [Reports by the Minister of Public Enlightenment S. S. Uvarov to Emperor Nikolay I]. Ed. by M. M. Shevchenko. In: *Reka vremion*. Vol. 1. Moscow: 70–72; [Uvarov, S. S.] 1997. Pis'mo Nikolaiu I [A Letter to Nicholas I]. *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie*, 26: 96–100.

⁵²[Uvarov, S.S.] 1997, 98.

⁵³[Uvarov, S.S.] 1995; [Uvarov, S.S.] 1997.

European ideas—those without which we cannot manage, but which threaten us with inevitable death if we cannot skilfully bridle them?’⁵⁴

The doctrine of ‘orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality’ put distinct limits on the functioning of such important institutions as universities, literature and journalism. The new cultural politics established on the basis of this doctrine is often characterised as very suspicious of any manifestation of open-mindedness, regardless of the subject discussed or depicted. However, the major departure from the Kantian cosmopolitan system did not lie exactly in the isolationist politics.

First, Uvarov radically reinterprets the very nature of ethics: where in *Perpetual Peace* and in his own ‘Thoughts...’ of 1813, ethics is understood as a set of universal principles, the documents which justify the ‘triadic doctrine’ regard ethics as a local phenomenon.

The second radical divergence from the Kantian cosmopolitan doctrine lies in the character of the unity which would support the new moral and political order. Both Kant in *Perpetual Peace* and Uvarov in his earlier years insisted that the new political system could be established only after all nations had decided to adopt the posture of the perpetual peace; moreover, this unanimity of will defines the very nature of law (Kant calls this ‘the *collective* unity of the general will’),⁵⁵ and the expression of that will had to be intentional and rational.

In his earlier work, Uvarov often refers to the rational process of bringing about the benefits of perpetual peace, and uses only rational arguments in defending its feasibility. However, the doctrine of ‘orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality’ demands that the whole nation exert its will as a collective expression of loyalty, devotion, and cordial love to its monarch, reigning dynasty, and motherland. In his publications and confidential papers of 1832–1848, prepared for the emperor and high-ranking officials and discussing state affairs, Uvarov consciously avoids any differentiation in his depiction of the collective emotions experienced by the ‘national body’.⁵⁶ Moreover, he asserts that a person who is unable to feel and perform these emotional patterns does not belong

⁵⁴[Uvarov, S.S.] 1995, 70.

⁵⁵Kant, I., *Op. cit.*, 95.

⁵⁶Maria Mayofis, ‘Chemu sposobstvoval pozhar? Antikrizisnaia rossiiskaia publitsistika 1837–38 godov kak predmet istorii emotsii’ [What did the fire foster? Russian ‘Anticrisis’ political journalism of 1837–1838 as a subject in the history of emotions], in *Novoe Literaturnoe obozrenie*, 100 (2009), pp. 156–183.

to this ‘body’ or to the Russian nation. Thinking back to the key traits of the cosmopolitan worldview, it becomes clear that this sort of mandatory emotional solidarity patently contradicts the main cosmopolitan virtue: to be able to see, understand and accept the entire spectrum of differences that exist between nations, cultures and individuals.

The most interesting thing is that Uvarov’s later manuscripts show that in the 1830s and 1840s, in the period when he became the staunchest advocate of political and cultural isolation, on a personal level he still held to his cosmopolitan ideas and was a member of the European *republique de lettres*, a correspondent and colleague of many famous writers and scholars.⁵⁷ Even while denouncing progressive reforms for mankind and particularly for Russia, he still believed in the possibility of individual progress and self-improvement. Conservative nationalism adopted for the imperial environment as the ‘only way’ for the nation, and liberal cosmopolitanism for its loyal, educated elite—this dual model is probably the best summation of Uvarov’s later worldview.

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⁵⁷ Ouvroff, S. 1843. *Études de philologie et de critique*. S.-Petersbourg.

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PART II

Between Empires

Modern Muslim Cosmopolitanism Between the Logics of Race and Empire

Cemil Aydin

In 1873, the Sultan of Aceh in Southeast Asia, Mahmud Syah, sent a delegation to Sultan Abdulaziz in Istanbul, requesting the Ottoman Empire's protection and military aid against Dutch military attacks. Aceh's diplomatic delegation, led by Aceh's Hadrami-Arab foreign minister Sayyid Habib Abdurrahman al-Zahir, arrived in Istanbul on 27 April, and stayed at Ozbek Tekke, a sufi order guest house frequented by pilgrims and guests from Central Asian cities of the Russian Empire. Aceh's demand for Ottoman diplomatic protection against the Dutch attacks, just on the eve of the protracted Acehese–Dutch War (1873–1906) relied on at least two decades of previous correspondence and exchange between this Muslim Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire, which was considered a member of the concert of civilized European empires since the end of the Crimean War in 1856. Istanbul was an imperial capital ruled by a Muslim king, but it was a highly cosmopolitan city with half of the population non-Muslim, both Ottoman subjects as well as European citizens with extraterritorial consular protections. Thus, an Aceh delegation from faraway Southeast Asia was exposing Istanbul's

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Muslim public to trans-imperial cultural diversity of Muslim languages and cultures, while the Ottoman domains themselves were experiencing the golden age of Tanzimat cosmopolitanism.

From May to December of 1873, Aceh's diplomatic initiative led to conversations in Istanbul not only on the role of religious ties in inter-imperial diplomacy, but also on the political role of public opinion created by print media and communication technologies. Some of the Ottoman newspapers began to advocate an Ottoman mission to protect weaker Muslim states and help them raise their level of civilization, almost like a civilizing mission with a fez. An exaggerated press account of Istanbul sending a fleet of military advisors was picked up by the Reuters agency, and when the news reached Southeast Asia, it led to excited expectations.¹ The Ottoman government responded to the demands of the Aceh Sultanate with an offer of a diplomatic arbitration between Dutch and Acehnese sides, an offer that was immediately rejected by the Dutch Foreign Office. Why should the Dutch Empire recognize any role for the Ottoman Sultan in this issue, given that the Dutch East India Company had been in Southeast Asia for two centuries?

What did it mean for an Ottoman Sultan who ruled over millions of Christians to have religious ties to a Sultanate far away from his territorial domains? Why were Muslims of Southeast Asia making an unprecedented move to request the support of the Ottoman Muslim Sultan in the name of a notion of Muslim solidarity? In order to answer these questions, we need to revisit the imperial re-structuring of the world from the Napoleonic wars onwards. What was important about the Aceh delegation's request for help from the Ottoman Empire against Dutch forces was its utilization of a new emerging global Muslim world identity in conjunction with imperial cosmopolitanism. The Aceh delegation to Istanbul was marking a crisis in the relationship between imperial cosmopolitanism and religious-racial identities that have been gradually evolving since the Napoleonic wars.

Even though the political map of the world was determined by the primacy of empires, which were becoming increasingly more cosmopolitan spaces from 1815 onwards, a new geopolitical conception about dividing the world into racial and religious blocks was also becoming

¹Ismail Hakkı Gökay, 'Ottoman-Aceh Relations as documented in Turkish Sources,' in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, ed. KITLV Press (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 65–96.

visible by the 1870s. Just when the Aceh delegation was requesting aid from Istanbul, a Protestant black intellectual in West Africa, Edward Blyden, wrote an influential article titled 'Muhammedanism and the Negro Race' (1875).² In it, he discusses the future destiny of Muslims and black-skinned people all over the world, indicating the early seeds of a geopolitical vision that would soon turn into a debate on pan-Islamism and pan-Africanism. In other words, just when Sultan Abdulaziz was claiming to have religious ties to Aceh Muslims via arguments for spiritual caliphate, Edward Blyden was seeing this connection as both racial and geopolitical, using the term Muhammedanism in a way comparable to the Negro race. The alliances, tensions, and synergies among imperial, racial, and religious visions of Muslimness from 1815 to 1878 became the most important background for the reflection on Muslim political thought and cosmopolitan experience in the mid-19th century. Educated Muslim publics ended up embracing and defending both the imperial and pan-Islamic cosmopolitanism at the same time until WWI, partly to balance and tame one with the other. It was only in the early 20th century that these two visions of cosmopolitanism began to be seen in contradiction, leading to political choice of creating homogeneous sovereign national states that denied both forms of cosmopolitanism in the 20th century.

Although scholarly and non-scholarly writings on the mid-19th century retrospectively see this era's Muslim cosmopolitanism as a remnant of the past that is doomed to fail against the forces of nationalism and racial thinking, we need to rescue this period from the teleology of nationalism and clash of civilizations associated with WWI and its aftermath. Throughout the 19th century, imperial units remained the main agents of political history, with a majority of Muslim societies dispersed under the rule of various Christian monarchs. There were also Muslim kings and rulers who ruled over more than one third of the world's Muslims in the 1870s, the most prominent of which was the Ottoman dynasty. Ottoman Muslim elites' vision of the future of the empire could be described as cosmopolitan and inclusive of multiple faiths that did not include making a distinction between the Muslim world and the Christian West.

²Edward W. Blyden, 'Mohammedanism and the Negro Race', *Fraser's Magazine* (November 1875).

Towards the end of this period, during the 1870s, the main challenge for Muslims in India or Africa was not a theological question of the viability of life under a Christian ruler. Experience of Muslimness within each European empire differed according to location, governing practices, and the historical context of a particular empire. Yet, educated Muslim elites imagined an inclusive cosmopolitan empire, be it British, Russian, Dutch, or French, that could respect their religious beliefs and local customs while giving them opportunities for economic and social mobility. However, Muslimness became gradually racialized in a global context in a drawn out and gradual process from the 1810 to the 1870s. Imperialization and racialization could coexist in uneasy and paradoxical relationships and they could both be cosmopolitan. For example, the global connections among Muslim populations from West Africa to the Middle East and South Asia and to China was a result of imperial globalization, but pan-Islamic linkages created an intra-Muslim cosmopolitanism, making Muslims aware of their diversity. This chapter will focus on the paradoxical experience of cosmopolitanism among Muslim publics, as an older, imperial cosmopolitanism was being challenged by the logics of racialization and nationalism. The term 'cosmopolitanism' is applied to Muslim experience in the long nineteenth century not as a derivative discourse, but as a decolonial application of the contemporary analytical concept to a set of boundary-transgressing experiences that cannot be simply traced back to a European centre.

THE AGE OF FEZ COSMOPOLITANISM

Many contemporary accounts of the relationship between Muslim societies and Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century utilize a simple model of a militarily and economically powerful West imposing its will and values on a subaltern, weak, and declined Muslim society, thus prompting an anti-Western pan-Islamism. This Western imperial challenge versus an 'Islamic world' response paradigm assumes the presence and political consciousness of a victimized and united Muslim world, as well as a collective Christian-European political identity. Perhaps on the eve of WWI, there were intellectuals, politicians, and journalists who perceived as well as imagined a world order based on the civilizational division between the Muslim world and the Christian West. Yet, such a depiction of civilizational world politics and the idea of the Muslim world would have been incomprehensible for the populations and elites of various empires a century before WWI, just around the time of the

Congress of Vienna, which dealt with the results of the Napoleonic wars. On the contrary, from the 1810 to the 1870s, imperial units across European and Islamicate regions had governing practices and diplomatic visions that are impossible to characterize within a framework of Islamic world versus the Christian-Western world, as best seen in the complex imperial alliance in the Crimean War between the Ottoman, British, and French empires against the Russian Empire in 1853.

From the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Ottoman–Russian wars in late 1877–1878, the overall global political trend was the triumph of the self-strengthening of the existing dynastic states, as well as the persistence of imperial Muslim cosmopolitanism, rather than any rigid embrace of geopolitics of civilizational identity. We have to capture the imperial context and legacy of a series of events from Greek independence from Ottoman rule, France’s colonization of Algeria to the Crimean War and the Great Indian Rebellion of 1857 to better understand the forgotten episode of imperial Muslim reformism. This retrospective evaluation and lost future of imperial universalism could also help us see reasons behind the growing politicization of Christian and Muslim identities in the same period, and the eventual racialization of the Muslimness on a global scale in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This historical trajectory could also show the seeds of the intensifying ties among Muslim populations across Eurasia and Africa, and the gradual formation of the idea of ‘the Muslim world’ as a geopolitical, racial, civilizing, and religious project.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the ideal of a civilized empire had the potential to create an inter-imperial world order that included Muslim monarchs ruling over Christian populations as well as Christian-European monarchs ruling over Muslim populations. The possibility of universalized imperial visions became most obvious during the 1867 visit of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz to Europe, who was welcomed with the utmost ceremonial respect by the monarchs of the French, British, and Austrian-Hungarian Empires, as well as the Belgian and Prussian Kingdoms. Wearing the official hats of the Ottoman bureaucracy (the *fez*) and tight European-style clothing, the attire of the Ottoman Sultan and delegation represented the modernization of the empire. The *fez*, initially associated with Greeks, was introduced and made compulsory for the Ottoman bureaucracy by Abdulaziz’s father, Sultan Mahmud, and soon became a symbol of Ottoman reforms before it became a marker of Muslim identity in the late nineteenth

century. During Abdulaziz's visit to London, there were rumours of intentions about matchmaking between the Ottoman Crown Prince Murad and a British royal princess on the part of Queen Victoria, to cement the strong ties between the two empires.³ On June 13 1867, Sultan Abdulaziz accepted membership to the Order of the Knights of Garter in a ceremony at St. George's Chapel, and Queen Victoria agreed to make several exceptions to the ritualistic requirements of this Knighthood for Abdulaziz, such as wearing a wig and submitting his sword to the priest. Ottoman Crown Prince Murad danced in public, with his younger brother Prince Abdulhamid (future sultan of the empire) present in the celebratory ball while their uncle, Sultan Abdulaziz, engaged in conversations with Queen Victoria on the topic of Christian–Muslim misunderstandings on the issue of polygamy. There were other Muslim monarchs visiting Europe in the long nineteenth century, asserting an inter-imperial cooperation based on mutual respect and recognition. In 1846, Ahmed Bey of Tunis went to Paris as the first Muslim ruler to do so; Egypt's Khedive Ismail made a visit in 1867, accompanying Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz to Paris, while Qajar Shahs made trips in 1873 and 1878. In 1879, the Maharaja of Johor, Abu Bakar, made a visit to England, the centre of the empire that was protectorate over his Sultanate. Similar to Ottoman sultans, Persian Shah Nasiruddin also received membership to the Most Noble Order of the Garter in London, confirming the presence of a world order composed of emperors who contribute to each other's global legitimacy by bestowing medals and honours. Some of the Muslim monarchs would proudly wear medals decorated by crosses given to them by European monarchs, without any inhibitions. In fact, the early twentieth-century civilizational duality of '(Muslim) Crescent versus (Christian) Cross' did not exist in elite or popular imagination in the first half of the nineteenth century.

During the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Egyptian Khedive Ismail hosted more guests from European royal houses than Muslim dynasties and could later declare that Egypt, then an autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire, was becoming part of European imperial order, thanks to easier and faster transportation connections created by the Suez Canal. Khedive Ismail commissioned a European opera, Guiseppe

³Cemal Kutay, *Avrupa'da Sultan Aziz* (Sultan Aziz in Europe) (Istanbul: Posta Kutusu Yayınları, 1977).



Fig. 5.1 Cairo, Khedivial Opera House (1 January 1869)

Verdi's *Aida* (first performed in Cairo in 1871), to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal.⁴

It was in 1869 that Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, one of the most influential reformist Muslim intellectuals of the Indian subcontinent, visited London as part of his efforts to strengthen his commitment to a British-Indian Muslim identity.⁵ Sayyid Ahmad Khan introduced the Ottoman fez to his Indian Muslim students at Anglo-Muhammadan College, because for him, an Ottoman Muslim monarch ruling over mixed Christian-Muslim populations could be a good ally of the British Queen ruling over equally diverse populations of Muslims, Hindus, and Christians (Fig. 5.1).

⁴For Ismail's speech at the Opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, see Pierre Crabitès, *Ismail: The Malignant Khedive* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1933) For *Aida* Opera, see Katherine Bergeron, 'Verdi's Egyptian Spectacle: On the Colonial Subject of "Aida",' *Cambridge Opera Journal* Vol. 14, No. 1/2, (Mar., 2002), pp. 149–159

⁵Aziz Ahmad, 'Sayyid Ahmad Khān, Jamāl al-dīn al-Afghānī and Muslim India,' *Studia Islamica* 13 (1960): 55–78.

A de facto Ottoman–British alliance in international affairs could mean that Indian Muslims such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan could be loyal to Queen Victoria while having respect for the Ottoman Sultan for protecting the Muslim holy cities in Arabia, and for carrying the title of caliph. The Ottoman delegation in London in 1867 likewise noted the presence of Indian Muslims loyal to the Queen in a reception hosted by the East India Company in their honour, but did not find this abnormal.⁶ After all, the Ottoman Sultan’s own ambassador in London and one of his favourite bureaucrats, Musurus Paşa, was a Greek from an Orthodox faith tradition.⁷ We can see the primacy of imperial identities even in Muslim observations on Latin America. When the Ottoman traveller Abdurrahman Efendi, an Ottoman religious scholar, visited Brazil in 1866 for a three-year stay, in his memoirs he compared the Brazilian ‘empire’ under the Portuguese ruler Dom Pedro II (1831–1889) and the Ottoman Empire under the rule of Sultan Abdulaziz (1861–1876). He found the level of the Ottoman Empire higher than the Kingdom of Brazil in world order of empires.⁸

The time from the 1810 to the 1870s represented a period of imperial self-strengthening in the political history of Muslim societies. The imperial cosmopolitanism of Ottomans, or its Tunisian and Egyptian province during the 1860s, should not be seen as pro-Western illusions of alienated Muslim elites. There was no questioning of the Muslim credentials of the Ottoman Sultan, Tunisian Dey, Seyyid Ahmad Khan of India, or the Egyptian Khedive. They were not weak or non-practising Muslims who diverged from their faith, nor were they misled or misguided by any promises of membership to the European imperial club. Even though there could be opposition and critique of self-strengthening reforms of Muslim kings at that time, these critiques were not challenging imperial

⁶Ottoman observations of the Indian Muslim loyalty to Queen, see Cemal Kutay, *Avrupa’da Sultan Aziz* (Sultan Aziz in Europe) (Istanbul: Posta Kutusu Yayınları, 1977).

⁷For Musurus Paşa and other Greeks serving the Ottoman Empire, see Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford University Press, 2012) and Christine Philliou, ‘Communities on the Verge: Unraveling the Phanariot Ascendancy in Ottoman Governance’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 01 (2009), 151–181.

⁸Bagdath Abdurrahman Efendi, *Brezilya’da İlk Müslümanlar: Brezilya Seyahatnamesi*. (First Muslims in Brazil: Travel Accounts in Brazil). Translated from Arabic to Ottoman and then Turkish by Mehmet Şerif, and N. Ahmet Özalp (İstanbul: Kitabevi Publishers, 2006).

legitimacy and Muslim kingship, nor they were assuming a binary distinction between Islamist opposition against secular pro-Western reforms.⁹ The emergence of a vision of the West as a Christian and anti-Muslim imperial centre that would occur from the 1880 to the 1920s as well as later nationalist narratives of Muslim victimhood in the face of European imperialism led to an amnesia about this period. Yet, developments in this period needs to be understood in their own context, partly to revise current dominant notions of Western expansion and Muslim response, and partly to better grasp the complexity of the process that led to the later emergence of the racialized Muslim world identity.

When conflicts among and within empires tested imperial cosmopolitanism from the 1820 to the 1870s—as happened during the Greek War of Independence, the French invasion of Algeria, the Crimean War, and the Indian Rebellion—the great powers retrenched further, reformulating imperial logic in still-more universalistic terms. That such retrenchment occurred, though, speaks to the crisis facing the imperial world order being built after the 1820s.

Initially, Muslim empires and kingdoms did not interpret their conflicts from the perspective of an inevitable conflict between a Muslim world and the West. The Ottoman Empire's Gülhane Imperial Edict (Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu) of 1839, declared in Istanbul by Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Paşa, became the primary text of a Muslim imperial imagination and its legitimizing discourse of universal civilization. It later inspired similar reforms in Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran. When the Tanzimat proclamation text assured the freedom and equality of all subjects from different faith traditions and guaranteed their fair treatment under the rule of law, it also noted that these principles were harmonious with both Muslim religious tradition (Shariah) and existing civilized norms.¹⁰

The reference to the return to noble principles of Shariah in the primary text of the Ottoman self-civilizing Tanzimat reforms of 1839 should be read against the background of the fact that the Ottoman rule had always included the Mongolian imperial cosmopolitan tradition. This

⁹For a broader discussion of Muslims in various European empires, see David Motadel, 'Islam and the European Empires', *The Historical Journal* 55, No. 3 (2012), 831–856.

¹⁰For the process of the nineteenth-century Egyptian reforms, see Kenneth Cuno, 'Egypt to c. 1919', in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 5: The Islamic World in the Age of Western Dominance, ed. Francis Robinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 79–106.

Mongolian tradition is referred to as Kanun in the Ottoman context, and it assumed a governing law that encompassed the multiplicity of religious communities and political necessities. This reference also indicated a confidence that Muslim legal and political tradition would be harmonious with the pragmatic decision of governing a large empire in the face of new challenges. The Ottoman elites continued the practice of social and political mobility for its non-Muslim subjects in this new framework of civilized empires. Russian, French, Dutch, and British empires similarly insisted on the inclusion and tolerance of their Muslim subjects with different strategies and patterns of rule. This ideal of imperial inclusion and universalism was never perfect, and there were varying degrees of discrimination, privileging, and exclusion, but the ideal itself allowed subjects and citizens of empire to make appeals to these texts and principle in demanding their rights and to negotiate with the imperial centre. Successive Ottoman governments included prominent and influential ministers and bureaucrats with Greek and Armenian backgrounds. Christian Arabs' loyalty to the empire, for example, increased during this period. Maronite Lebanese Faris al-Shidyaq (1804–1887), who converted to Protestant Christianity, could be a loyal Ottoman bureaucrat in the 1860 and 1870s. Al-Shidyaq published a pan-Ottoman Arabic journal, *al-Jawāib*, in Istanbul after a long career away from empire that included translation of the Bible into Arabic from English and involvement in a socialist movement in Paris.¹¹

Imperial reform of various Muslim polities had intellectual foundations based on a Muslim interpretation of the idea of a 'singular' world civilization. The European term 'civilization' began to be used by Ottoman elites during the 1830s as distinct from the term that was inherited from writings from earlier Muslim scholars such as *Ibnī Khaldūn*. Ottoman bureaucrats coined a new term, *medeniyet* to correspond to the idea of civilization in French. By the 1850s, all the meanings of the term had been well established through references to 'the civilized nations', 'the civilized world', and 'the progress of civilization'. Both the Ottoman bureaucrats and Muslim defenders of civilizational

¹¹ Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, 'Ottoman Arabs in Istanbul, 1860–1914: Perceptions of Empire, Experience of the Metropole through the Writings of Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, Muhammad Rashid Rida and Jirji Zaydan', in *Imperial Geographies in Byzantine and Ottoman Space*, ed. Sahar Bazzaz, Yota Batsaki and Dimiter Angelov (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 159–182.

visions were aware of the controversial international politics of this term and embraced it self-consciously. Munif Paşa, who was part of the 1860s' Ottoman bureaucratic elite, noted that it was the Chinese Empire's lower level of civilization that led their big army to lose battles against the small forces of the British Empire in the Opium Wars. Namik Kemal, in his 1871 article on 'civilization', asked: 'Are these uncivilized (*gayri-mütemeddine*) nations able to preserve their freedom against so many civilized nations?' Namik Kemal added that, by resisting the adoption of the 'Lessons, teachings, machines, progresses, [and] innovations' as the Indians or Algerians, for example, did, 'one would lose his freedom and come under the authority of a foreign power—something that is in no way suitable for human dignity'. The generation of Namik Kemal also decoupled the universal civilization from the critiques of European imperialism by noting that:

Just as we do not need kebabs in Chinese fashion to be civilized (*temeddün*), we need not imitate blindly European dance or marriage principles.' 'Thus our hope is this: That if appropriate action is taken, given the salvific principles of the Islamic *Şeriyat* and the situation and our people's extraordinary ability that we have to hand, in the Ottoman lands, which in the times of the Ancient Egyptians, and Chaldeans and the Jews and Iranians and Arabs, and Greeks were six or seven times greater in terms of places of intellectual instruction and were centers from which progress was transmitted—through our illustrious deeds it will be possible to bring about a civilization in a way that will evoke the world's admiration.¹²

Namik Kemal's vision of world is aware of how this term is used to justify both conflict and cooperation in an inter-imperial world, and avoids making a distinction between the civilization of the Muslim world versus the civilization of the Christian West. The Ottoman Empire could easily empower its empire and exemplify the benefits of embracing the merits and achievements of the virtues of a singular world civilization.

¹²Cemil Aydin, *Mecmua-i Fünûn ve Mecmua-i Ulûm Dergilerinin Medeniyet ve Bilim Anlayışı* (Istanbul University, Institute for Social Sciences, MA Thesis, 1995); Kevin Reinhart, 'Civilization and Its Discussants: *Medeniyet* and Turkish Conversion to Modernism', Denise Washburn and Kevin Reinhart, eds, *Converting Cultures: Religion, Ideology, and Transformations of Modernity*. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 267–290.

Thus, what is remarkable about the post-Napoleonic expansion of European empires in Muslim societies of Africa and Asia was not the rise of ethnic nationalism or pan-Islamic or Pan-European regionalism, though seeds of some of these ideas could be seen, but rather the formulation of an imperial universalism culminated in ideas of ‘civilized empire’ as the new global norm. The Crimean War in 1853, which involved an alliance between the Ottoman, British, and French empires against the Russian Empire became a symbol of this imperial universalism. Several years before the Crimean War, the Ottoman Sultan gave protection to the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries of 1848, including Lajos Kossuth, and gained the respect of the liberal public opinion in England, which seemed more Russophobic than Islamophobic during the late 1840s. Most of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries must have shared a common discourse of civilization in Tanzimat-era Istanbul before they eventually ended up moving to London. There, they were welcomed by liberal groups around John Stuart Mill and Giuseppe Mazzini, confirming a climate of public opinion in favour of supporting the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire. And so when the Indian War of Independence occurred in 1857, the Ottoman imperial elite would not hesitate to support the British Empire against the Muslim and Hindu rebels without considering any notion of pan-Islamic solidarity. It is important to go through the details of the key events such as the Greek War of Independence and the Indian Revolt against British rule to clarify its significance in order to understand the global intellectual history of Muslim political thought before the rise of racial categories of geopolitics in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The Ottoman Empire was not an exception in Islamicate societies in envisioning a world of kingly self-strengthening and inter-imperial cooperation. In Egypt, the seat of the second most powerful autonomous Muslim polity under Istanbul’s sovereignty, Muhammad Ali Paşa could make drastic reforms based on an eclectic repertoire of rule combining both European fiscal and military methods with examples from Muslim and Ottoman experiences.¹³ With stronger military power, for example, Muhammad Ali managed to expand Egyptian rule in the south, and in 1822 he put Sudan nominally under the rule of

¹³P. J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Sadat* (John Hopkins University Press, 1980); Khaled Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).

the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ In addition to Egypt's expansion into Sudan, another Muslim dynasty in Oman expanded into Zanzibar in 1829, illustrating the fact that there was still no single pattern of Western domination in the early nineteenth century. The Abu Saidi rulers of the Sultanate of Muscat in Oman, parallel to Muhammad Ali's Egypt, exhibited their own imperial ambitions and incorporated Zanzibar Island and the coastline of Mumbasa into their kingdom. Until his death in 1856, the Omani Sultan travelled back and forth as the actual Sultan of Muscat and Zanzibar.¹⁵ Zanzibar's Sultan Barghash bin Said (r. 1870–1888) followed the world news very closely by asking his personal assistant to summarize the content of British newspapers for him on a daily basis. During his trip to Europe in 1875, he also visited Khedive Ismail in Egypt. His self-strengthening projects were in line with Tanzimat Muslim reformist visions, and included telegraph stations, public clocks, and a tram system. Zanzibar established the Sultanate Press in 1880, and later on promoted publications of a journal in Arabic, thus contributing to the connection between the Zanzibari Muslim public and other Muslim populations, as well as global public opinion.¹⁶

Tunisia showed remarkable reform initiatives, including a constitutional contract, under the leadership of the Circassian-born Grand Vizier Hayreddin Paşa.¹⁷ He implemented liberal reform ideas with the strong conviction that a parliamentary government and modern European ways were compatible with the Islamic tradition.¹⁸ Muslim legal tradition had been reinterpreted by reformist actors in harmony with the reforms

¹⁴For racial and colonial aspects of Egyptian rule over Sudan, see Eve M. Troutt Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

¹⁵Beatrice Nicolini, *The First Sultan of Zanzibar: Scrambling for Power and Trade in the Nineteenth-Century Indian Ocean* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2012).

¹⁶Jeremy Prestholdt, 'From Zanzibar to Beirut: Sayyida Salme bint Said and the Tensions of Cosmopolitanism', in James Gelvin and Nile Green (eds) *Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print* (University of California Press, 2014), pp. 204–226.

¹⁷Khayr al-Dīn Tunisi, *The Surest Path; the Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-century Muslim Statesman*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). See also Carl Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837–1855*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).

¹⁸For a recent reassessment of Khayr al-Din Tunisi, see Syed Tanvir Wasti, 'A Note on Tunuslu Hayreddin Paşa', *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 1–20.



Fig. 5.2 Persian Shah Naser al-Din kisses Queen Victoria. *Source* Cover of the *Illustrated London News* (13 July 1859)

implemented by various political actors.¹⁹ It was in Tunisia that slave trade was abolished, combining Muslim legal arguments with globalizing anti-slavery discourses and setting an example for other Islamicate societies. Similarly, Persia under the Qajar dynasty initiated its own reforms under Qajar Shahs. The Moroccan dynasty, as well as the Central Asian khanates and Indian princely states, were involved in various self-strengthening projects, often aware of what was happening under the reign of other Muslim monarchs and in Europe (Fig. 5.2).²⁰

Azfar Moin's study of Muslim kingship in the early modern period illustrates the power of the idea of the sacred monarch in relation to the universalistic and inclusive imperial projects.²¹ In all of the self-strengthening reforms led by Muslim kings in the nineteenth century, we can see the logic of two bodies of monarch and its kingdom.²² On the one hand, there was great attention given to the symbolic greatness of the kings and kingship, respect, and honours given to him by other kings, the ceremonial values of a king's dress, as well as adornment and pageantry. The exchange of honorary medals among kings, in addition to diplomatic letters, were meant to confirm the spiritual body of the king and the legitimacy of kingship both among his subjects and in the eyes of other kings. In the context of the nineteenth century, however, the military or economic power of the kingdom as an entity in a globalizing world order became equally important. Thus, with the help of their bureaucrats, monarchs had to pay more attention to their kingdom's physical body,

¹⁹This term is borrowed from Jennifer Pitts' account of Hamdan Khoja in Pitts, 'Liberalism and Empire in a Nineteenth-Century Algerian Mirror', in *Modern Intellectual History*, 6:2 (August 2009), 287–313.

²⁰For reforms during the nineteenth-century Qajar rule in Iran, see Nikki Keddie, 'Iran Under the Later Qajars, 1848–1922' in *Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From Nader Shah to the Islamic Republic*, ed. Peter Avery, Gavin R. G. Hambly and Charles Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 174–212; Abbas Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For reforms of Morocco during the nineteenth century, see Amira K. Bennison, 'The "New Order" and Islamic Order: The Introduction of the Nizami Army in the Western Maghrib and Its Legitimation, 1830–1873', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 36 (2004), pp. 591–612.

²¹Azfar Moin, *The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

²²For a classical account of this argument, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

trying to create wealth and prosperity for their subjects with roads, telegraph lines, and modern educational institutions. Even when the physical body of a kingdom seemed poor and weak compared to other kingdoms and empires, the spiritual and symbolic body of the monarch as well as the proper performance of kingship and sovereignty was highly valued. Persian Qajar monarchs, for example, had a great reputation internationally as well as domestically, even when the economic well-being of Iran lagged behind the Ottoman realms or Egypt. Nizam of Hyderabad and Khedive of Egypt ruled over very wealthy countries and were capable of collecting large sums of taxes, but they did not have prestigious kingship status in relation to European emperors due to their dependence on other monarchs. As Azfar Moin illustrated, loyalty to a king has primacy over loyalty to a land or even religious community, and this conception continued until the second half of the nineteenth century. It was only in the late nineteenth century that new Muslim populations began to compare and critique the symbolic and physical bodies of their empire as well as the Muslim world in relation to Christian Europe and the West when they discuss the 'decline' of Islam in relation to the Christian world, but we should note that such geopolitical comparisons are a product of the late nineteenth century, not earlier decades.

Muslim rulers of the era of self-civilizing imperial reforms did not see themselves as the Muslim 'victims' of European expansion, but as beneficiaries and active agents of new practices of political governance in the nineteenth century. The results and the speed of reforms varied in each case, but it was clear that these Muslim kingdoms and monarchies were aware of the need to revise their political systems according to the new demands of the globalizing age and mostly according to refashioned adaptations of new European practices. The Ottoman Empire was ahead of other Muslim kingdoms in terms of its reform achievements and its diplomatic prestige in world affairs and it was also setting an example for other existing Muslim dynasties to emulate. Thus, the Ottoman fez, as well as the crescent in its flag, began to be adopted as symbols of a modernist Muslim identity in a large geography.

The primary concern of various Muslim kingdoms, empires, and amirates was still their own self-strengthening and legitimacy in the eyes of fellow monarchs and diverse subjects. The internal diversity and cosmopolitanism of each political unit was taken for granted. When the Ottoman government reformed its legal system to abolish *jizya* tax on non-Muslims, for example, Muslim public opinion did not see this as a

betrayal of the Islamic legal tradition. Muslim elites saw the Ottoman Reform Edict's declaration of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish equal citizenship as a legitimate interpretation of Muslim law in harmony with the changing conditions of the time and the needs of the Ottoman Empire. There were disagreements with the content and direction of the Tanzimat and Reform Edict by some Muslim scholars or populations, but these critiques were not made in the name of the destiny of the Muslim world. The polyvocality of Muslim intellectual tradition has been taken for granted for about a millennium. More importantly, a wide ranging set of Ottoman reforms that included abolishment of slavery and *jizya* were implemented under the rule of a Muslim sultan, who also carried the title of caliphate. In the political theology of the Ottoman Muslim public, the sultan could take the initiative to re-interpret the legal system on behalf of the safety, security, and common good of his subjects. Introducing elements from European legal traditions or even extraterritoriality that put European imperial subjects under a separate legal system also did not seem offensive to Muslim populations and imperial elites. Legal pluralism was an accepted practice in early modern and modern imperial governance, and did not offend Muslim religious sensibilities. In Tunisia, for example, reformist rulers allowed their subjects recourse to diverse legal practices, ranging from embassy courts to Jewish Talmudic law and Shariah, depending on the merits and parties of each case.²³ Muslim elites visiting Europe emphasized the imitable and universal aspects of European progress and civilization and did not doubt the compatibility between their faith tradition and modern progress. Thus, many educated Muslims found it acceptable to cooperate with European empires that ruled over them as long as their communities had religious and personal freedoms. After all, there were Muslim dynasties ruling over non-Muslim populations, and the reverse could also be acceptable.

Muslim political elites of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Tunisia were not imagining that they would enter into a European society from a position of an outsider; they were themselves contributing to the imagination of a new Euro-Mediterranean imperial order. This imagination

²³For the Tunisian legal system in the nineteenth century, see Julia Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans in North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration*, c. 1800–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

of a European imperial order among the Ottoman elites did not mean abandoning their ties to Muslim cultural and political networks. The ambivalence of the geopolitical, religious, and imperial identities in the 1840 and the 1850s preceded the formation of a rigid European Christian identity in contrast to a Muslim identity. For example, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston supported the Tanzimat reforms, confidently asserting that ‘there is no reason whatsoever why [Turkey] should not become a respectable power’ within ten years of peaceful reorganization and reform.²⁴ Despite the fact that Prince Metternich of the Austrian Empire championed a conservative European system while Lord Palmerston was a liberal, they both agreed on treating the Ottoman Empire as part of the European imperial system. Both of their statements may have contained opinions on Christian superiority over Islam or other religions and they may have imagined a future Christian Europe, but it is clear that, for them, there were no hardened borders between empires ruled by Christian dynasties and those ruled by Muslim dynasties, such as the Ottoman Empire, as part of a European imperial society.

As a natural result of their imperial vision, and despite their Muslim credentials, the Ottoman elites were not concerned about the Afghani Muslim’s war with the British Empire during the early 1840s, and would not necessarily support Indian Muslim revolt.²⁵ Even in the 1870s, the Ottoman sultans did not and could not respond to the request for help from Sultan Ali Raja of Malabar, or Tipu Sultan of Mysore. They also did not accept the 1819 unilateral oath of allegiance by the Khan of Bukhara (Haydar Shah). In the discussion among Ottoman rulers in 1819, it was noted that acceptance of this oath from a Central Asian monarch would jeopardize an Ottoman relationship with Russia. If the Bukharan king just meant a religious protection, he would not need to express it in such

²⁴H. L. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, 3 vols. (London, 1870–1874), 2:298, quoted in M. E. Yapp, ‘Europe in the Turkish Mirror’, *Past and Present*, No. 137, (November, 1992), 155. For the connection and comparisons between Metternich and Ottoman reformists, see İlber Ortaylı, ‘Tanzimat Bürokratları ve Metternich,’ in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İktisadi ve Sosyal Değişim: Makaleler*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2000). Ortaylı rightly emphasizes that Tanzimat reformists were less reactionary and conservative than Metternich.

²⁵William Dalrymple, *Return of a King: Shah Shuja and the First Battle for Afghanistan, 1839–1842* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).

a political oath because the Ottoman sultans, as protectors of Mecca and Madina, were already spiritual refuges for all Muslims.²⁶ Even though the Ottoman government affirmed the principle of the separation and primacy of imperial allegiances over religious ones, in response to an oath by Bukhara Amir, they had to reflect on the question of Muslim–Christian identity in the context of their relationship with Russia. During the resistance of Caucasian Muslims against the Russian imperial expansion during the 1840 and the 1850s, which was happening just across the Ottoman–Russian borders, there was no direct Ottoman support for the Muslim forces. Ottoman public opinion would know more about the Caucasian Muslim resistance than the Afghani war due to their networks. Upon his defeat by Russian forces and his consequent surrender, Caucasia’s Muslim leader Shaikh Shamil asked to be exiled to Ottoman territories to live in holy cities in Arabia. More than half a million followers of Shaikh Shamil also immigrated to Ottoman-controlled territories en masse after the military defeat of their leader and Caucasia’s incorporation into the Russian Empire.²⁷ This mass migration of Muslims was a tragic event that should be considered as one of the first modern cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide. But there continued a long period of Muslim integration into Russia within an imperial framework. Even as late as the mid-1870s, it was accepted that the Russian Tzar could rule over Muslims (and give them their religious rights) as the Ottoman sultan could rule over Christian subjects. By the 1870s, cosmopolitan reformism of Muslim elites across multiple empires seemed to show important achievements and became well entrenched.

The Ottoman elites were in favour of a diplomacy based on the inter-imperiality principle, not on any religious solidarity.²⁸ Even the leader of Muslim resistance in Algeria, Emir Abdelkader al-Jazairi, would be a firm believer in Tanzimat reforms and principles of civilization in his post-surrender life, spent mostly in Ottoman Damascus. French imperial

²⁶ Azmi Özcan, *Pan-Islamism*, page 25–26. See also, Azmi Özcan, ‘Attempts to Use the Ottoman Caliphate as the Legitimater of British Rule in India’, in *Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 71–80.

²⁷ Thomas Sander, Ernest Tucker et al., *Russian-Muslim Confrontation in the Caucasus: Alternative Visions of the Conflict between Imam Shamil and the Russians, 1830–1859*. (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).

²⁸ Sadik Rifat Paşa, *Müntehabat-i Asar* (Istanbul: Takvimhane-i Amire, 1858), 1–12.

forces did not see Abdelkader as an irrational jihadist intent on killing all Christians. On the contrary, in a local riot among the Christians and Muslims of Damascus in 1860, for example, Abdelkader intervened to protect the Christian populations in the name of civilized principles of administration. Abdelkader received honours from both the French Emperor and the American President Abraham Lincoln as a person of tolerance. The Freemasonic Association of France praised him on behalf of the ‘civilized world (*al-alam al-mudamaddan*)’,²⁹ a term that indicates common values shared by Muslim and Christian populations on both sides of the Mediterranean.

BALANCING THE RACIALIZED PAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITY WITH IMPERIAL LOYALTIES

If one considers the balance sheet of Muslim–Christian encounters from the 1810 to the 1870s, there may not appear to be a consistent pattern of alliance or conflict. Each context seemed different from the other. What was significant was the linkages and simultaneity of the interpretations. With improvements in transformation and communication technologies, these linkages became stronger, and the narratives that explain the events became as important as the events themselves. Until the 1870s, there was no clear pattern of global Christian solidarity against an imagined Muslim geopolitical bloc, even though some Europeans wanted to create such a bloc. Imperial elites often had to balance the logic of inclusive empire with the forces and arguments of racialized Christian and Muslim identities. Even the most imperial of all wars in the mid-nineteenth century, the Crimean War, was started due to the Russian demand for its recognition as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and request of additional privileges for Orthodox churches in Ottoman Jerusalem. In addition to the rising number of Russian Orthodox pilgrims to Jerusalem in the nineteenth century, Russia’s demand upon the Ottoman government ruling over Jerusalem on behalf of all Orthodox Christians reflected a long-term Russian

²⁹ Amira K. Bennison, ‘Muslim Internationalism Between Empire and Nation-State,’ in *Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750*. Ed. Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene (Palgrave, 2012) (163–185), p. 169. See also John W. Kiser, *Commander of the Faithful: The Life and Times of Emir Abd El-Kader* (Rhinebeck, N.Y.: Monkfish Book Pub, 2008).

vision of expanding the empire at the expense of Ottoman territories. After the initial Russian naval victory against the Ottomans in 1853 at Sinop, Britain and France (with the Italian kingdom of Sardinia joining them later on) declared war on Russia in March 1854, in support of the Ottoman Empire.³⁰ The Russian naval base of Sevastopol was captured by the allies after a year-long siege in September 1855. This long war, which produced a great number of human casualties due to improvements in military technology, ended with Russia's defeat, and revealed its relative weakness. There was great Ottoman pride in the achievements of the Crimean War, during which the Ottoman army never utilized the concept of jihad. Both the British and Ottoman elites saw this as a war between civilization and barbarism, and considered Russia outside of European civilization, not Istanbul. Yet, there were contending minority opinions that saw this alliance as a mistake, some in reference to a Christian–Muslim duality, against the overarching argument for imperial alliance to advance the cause of civilization. For example, prominent pro-Ottoman and Russophobe intellectuals such as David Urquhart contributed to the legitimacy of British–Ottoman alliance. At the end of the war in 1856, the Paris Peace Conference redefined the European international order in reference to the idea of civilization, not to Christianity as the Holy Alliance tried to do, and declared the Ottoman Empire to be a part of it. Meanwhile, it was its defeat in the Crimean War that partly convinced Russia to turn its expansionist desires towards Muslim-majority territories of Central Asia rather than towards the Ottoman South.

Just a year after the conclusion of the Crimean War, the Indian War of Independence further tested ambiguous relations between the principles of empire (inter-imperiality) and religious identities during the integration of European and Islamicate regions. Yet, this event also confirmed the triumph and appeal of the logic of empire over the increasing importance of religious identities. The British Empire's expansion in India, which was still nominally under the rule of a Muslim Mughal Emperor in Delhi, was piecemeal, with various princely states either challenging or cooperating with them. The British model of indirect rule and tributary alliances with Indian princely states was extended to other areas in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, creating a network of British

³⁰Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853–1856*. (Boston: Brill, 2010).

allied royalties in the Indian Ocean area. During the expansion of the British East India Company's rule in India, there were great numbers of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikh subjects, including religious scholars and military officers, cooperating with them.

Despite the success of the British East India Company's expansion in India, this imperial control was almost ending in 1857 with the outbreak of the Indian War of Independence.³¹ After a rebellion broke out on 10 May of that year, the first major act of the revolutionaries was to restore the elderly Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah, which shows the continuing power of the Mughal Empire's lingering imperial legitimacy.³² There were many Muslim scholars who issued a call for jihad, while there were many Hindus who also justified their revolt with reference to Hindu religious ideals. The fact that the Muslim scholars' call for jihad was only limited to the British and did not involve animosity to the Hindus shows an inclusive vision of a different kind of empire that was respectful of both Hindu and Muslim religious traditions. Hindu-Muslim unity during the 1857 rebellion was impressive in its success and showed the historicity of later Muslim-Hindu communalist divisions. While there were calls for Muslim and Hindu religious solidarity under the banner of the Mughal Emperor, the 1857 Indian war did not attract the support of other Muslim dynasties. The Ottoman Empire, for example, supported the British Empire and the Ottoman government sent aid to the British victims of the rebellion. The British ambassador in Istanbul was heartened by a Sunni caliph's support for his empire fighting against other Muslims. Given the spirit of the Ottoman-British cooperation during the Crimean War, this inter-imperial cooperation and vision should not be surprising. In fact, there were frequent British efforts to utilize the British Empire's friendship with the Ottoman Caliph to justify their rule in India.³³ In the aftermath of the British suppression of the rebellion, India was declared to be under the full jurisdiction and rule of the central imperial government, and in 1876, Queen Victoria was declared the

³¹William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar and the Fall of Delhi, 1857* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).

³²William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal*.

³³Azmi Özcan, 'Attempts to Use the Ottoman Caliphate as the Legitimator of British Rule in India', in *Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia*, ed. by Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan (Routledge, 2007), pp. 71–80.

Empress of India. This was the first time that the British monarch was formally described as the head of an empire.

Despite the attempts of existing Muslim monarchs and dynasties to prioritize their self-strengthening and to try to be a member of a Eurocentric imperial world order, there also emerged a debate on Muslimness both within and across empires during the 1870s. The first major debate started in India about the Muslims, now categorized as a distinct religio-political unity in relation to the British imperial project and as a civilization in decline. Coinciding with the imperial categorization of 'Muslim' and 'Hindu' in India, there was also the beginning of a conversation on Muslim education's decline or reform, as Muslim families were relatively less inclined to send their children to British-run colonial education institutions. A more important question for the British Empire and its Indian subjects was the reconciliation of the religious, cultural, and racial identities of England and the people of India. British colonial officers themselves asked if 'Mohammedans' could be equal and loyal subjects of the British Empire. Muslim intellectuals debated the same question. The association of the 1857 Rebellion with Muslims by the majority of British newspapers led to books such as William Wilson Hunter's, *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen?* (1871),³⁴ and sustained a strain of colonial thought radically suspicious of Muslim loyalty.

It is in this context that Sayyid Ahmad Khan emerged as one of the most influential Muslim leaders in India, formulating a modernist Muslim identity that embraced the British imperial rule in India. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's attempts were partly about making the British Empire a universalist empire like the Mughals by allowing the incorporation of Muslims into the administration without any racial distinction. Even though Sayyid Ahmad Khan is rightly remembered as the voice of Muslim loyalty to the British Empire, one should also note that his intellectual efforts were partly directed against the anti-Muslim discourses of British missionaries and colonial officers. In some ways, Sayyid Ahmad Khan was trying to make the British Empire in India more inclusive and universal by re-asserting his Muslim identity under the umbrella of a Christian monarch.

³⁴Sir William Wilson Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel Against the Queen?* (London: Trübner 1871).

In the 1880s, when the geopolitical interests of the British and Ottoman empires began to diverge, Sayyid Ahmad Khan noted that if there was a conflict between these two empires, Indian Muslims were bound by their religious duties to obey their Christian rulers, not the caliph in Istanbul.³⁵ This was the kind of loyalty the Ottoman elites could understand in the logic of inter-imperiality and expected from their Orthodox Christian subjects during their conflict with the Russian Empire. In 1875, Sayyid Ahmad Khan established the first Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College to help create a new Muslim-Indian generation loyal to the British Empire. The college's Muslim students, mostly children of Muslim provincial elites, would then be able to serve the British Empire in India in different bureaucratic posts while empowering the Muslim communities they belong to. The majority of Sunni scholars in British India also found ways to organize, institutionalize, and disseminate their vision of Orthodox Islam, while seeing and depicting British rule as legitimate with reference to the vocabularies and values of the Muslim legal tradition.³⁶

It is in this context that non-military encounters, especially those provoked by Christian missionaries, gained new meaning in the competing narratives of the changing imperial and global order. The mid-nineteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in the Christian missionary activities for Muslim populations, which naturally produced an exchange of ideas, polemics, as well as political tensions. In that process, rebuttals of Christian missionary claims about the Muslim faith, and the dissemination of several polemical arguments across regions of the Islamicate societies, initiated a novel tradition of talking about Islam as a universal and global religion that could respond to the challenge of missionary Christianity. The dissemination of a set of modern arguments developed in response to missionary claims of Christianity's superiority over Islam and gave birth to talk about Muslim theology and faith as a world religion in a discursive tradition that would accompany

³⁵Aziz Ahmad, 'Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muslim India' in *Studia Islamica* (No: 13) 1960, pp. 55–78. Reference to pages 71–72, where Aziz Ahmad is quoting from Sayyid Ahmad Khan's article titled 'Truth About Khilafat'.

³⁶Ali Altaf Mian and Nancy Nyquist Potter, 'Invoking Islamic Rights In British India: Mawlana Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi's Huquq al-Islam', *Muslim World*, 99 (April 2009), pp. 312–334.

the geopolitical ideas of the Muslim world and the West. Muslims were becoming more interconnected and mobile thanks to the common usage of telegraph communication, cheap postal service, and steamship travel. In this context, various local Muslim public spheres began to interact, to cooperate and articulate their discontent with European empires or Christian missionary polemics, and they were becoming more aware of developments in other parts of the world. An awareness of the diversity of Muslim practices across multiple oceans, empires, and regions also facilitated a desire to find commonalities within Islamic textual tradition that would sustain a united response to the Christian missionary challenge.

The story of an Indian Muslim scholar's travel to Mecca and Istanbul illustrates these new connections. There were many Indian Muslim scholars who had to leave India after 1857 due to their involvement with the rebellion, and they often settled in Ottoman-ruled Mecca. One of these Indian Muslim scholars, Rahmatullah Kairanwi, was well-known for his religious debates with Carl Gottlieb Pfander (1803–1868), a German evangelical missionary, in Agra and Delhi, before the 1857 rebellion. Kairanwi's arguments against Pfander were observed and supported by both Sunni and Shia scholars in Delhi, as well as by Catholic missionaries. Kairanwi was able to rely on modern biblical criticism in Europe to argue for the corruption, divergence, and deviation of Christian texts, while reiterating broader Muslim rejection of the Trinity. He could successfully merge earlier Muslim polemics against Christianity with modern textual criticism of the Bible.³⁷ Pfander withdrew from the debate after two days of discussion, not being able to respond to Kairanwi's questions. Yet, a decade later in 1864, when Pfander came to Istanbul and began to claim that he had won the debate against Kairanwi in India, the Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz became interested in the story and invited Kairanwi to Istanbul to tell his version of this polemic. At that point, Kairanwi was living in Mecca, an Ottoman-ruled city, as a scholar-exile that escaped from British-ruled India after 1857, running a *madrasa*

³⁷A. A. Powell, 'Maulânâ Rahmat Allâh Kairânawî and Muslim-Christian Controversy in India in the Mid-19th Century', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 20/1976, pp. 42–63. See also Schirmacher, Christine, 'The Influence of German Biblical Criticism on Muslim Apologetics in the 19th Century.' From the *Festschrift for Rousas John Ruschdoony*. Accessed at <http://www.contra-mundum.org/schirmacher/rationalism.html>.

funded by Indian Muslims. He was soon invited to Istanbul to meet the Ottoman sultan. Even though Sultan Abdulaziz was the monarch ruling over millions of Christians in the Balkans and Anatolia, he would not want to see a Christian missionary claim that he conclusively defeated Muslim scholars of Delhi in polemic argument. Thus, with Ottoman royal encouragement and funding, Kairanwi wrote the book *Izharul Haq* to clarify his arguments for the superiority of Islam over Christianity and Judaism. During his meetings with Sultan Abdulaziz, Kairanwi also reported to him about the state of the Indian Muslims after the 1857 rebellion. Once Kairanwi published his book in Istanbul in Arabic, the book became widely circulated. For example, pan-Africanist Edward Blyden noted in his 1875 essay that the ‘West African Mohammedan at Sierra Leone’ was reading and commenting upon this book, and Blyden urges his audience to get to know the important arguments of the book, though the book did not have an English translation yet.³⁸

Would Kairanwi have come to live in Mecca, and then Istanbul, if he had felt it safe to go back to British-ruled India after the 1857 rebellion? Would Sultan Abdulaziz have been interested in Kairanwi if a certain Christian missionary in Istanbul had not bragged about his polemical superiority over Muslims in Delhi a decade earlier? Was it not inappropriate for the Ottoman Sultan to sponsor a Muslim polemic against Christianity, given that one third of his subjects were also Christian at that time? Would Kairanwi’s travel to Istanbul have been that convenient without steamships? And could we tell this episode of a Muslim polemical book against missionaries without noting the boom of Muslim publishing during the second half of the nineteenth century?

Steamships, telegraph lines, a cheaper means of publishing (thanks to reductions in the cost of the printing press), and cheaper postal services led to the emergence of more active Muslim public spheres that could connect each other. Yet, it took time for these interconnected public spheres to mobilize around common causes and debate similar political and religious questions in relation to each other. The early emergence of a Muslim international and public sphere seemed to be less anti-European than is assumed.

³⁸Edward W. Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (Edinburgh University Press, 1967), p. 3.

CONCLUSION: OVERCOME BY GEOPOLITICS AND RACE (1873–1883)

There seems to be a gradual transition to a new set of transnational Muslim modernist discourses and anti-imperial sensibilities over a decade from 1873 to 1883. We see the signs of this change in Ottoman press debates in 1873 about the request of the Acehnese delegation for the Ottoman Sultan's protection and support against Dutch attacks. In that year, the Sultan of Aceh sent Abdurrahman al-Zahir, the Hadrami-Arab emissary, to the Ottoman capital to deliver his request for protection.³⁹ The Ottoman Sultan, who had previously taken the side of the British Empire in the 1857 response to the Muslim-led Indian War of Independence, could not easily support the Dutch Empire against the resistance in Aceh, as he had to face an active Muslim press in Istanbul and he himself liked the idea of his increasing prestige among Muslims in faraway geographies.⁴⁰ Beyond Aceh, the elites of other smaller Muslim sultanates tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman government in order to receive the protection and support of the Ottoman Empire. When the Aceh delegation was in Istanbul, they met representatives of the Kashgar Emirate of Eastern Turkistan and the Central Asian emirates of Khiva and Bukhara in this city. In fact, Yakub Bey in Kashgaria sent a diplomatic mission to Istanbul to get diplomatic recognition and military support for its project of an independent Muslim kingdom between Russia and Qing China. The Ottoman Sultan gave Yakub Bey's envoy a state medal, diplomatic recognition, and financial aid while advising him not to get into military quarrels with neighbouring countries,

³⁹İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, 'Ottoman Aceh Relations as Documented in Turkish Sources', in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, edited by Michael Feener et al., (KITLV Press, Leiden, 2011), 65–96.

⁴⁰On the Aceh ruler's demand for aid from the Ottoman Empire, see Anthony Reid, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia,' *Journal of Asian Studies* 26:2 (February 1967) 275–276. Reid's article demonstrates the role played by pilgrims, students, scholars, and merchants who connected Indonesia with Mecca, Cairo, and Istanbul and revived the notion of Islamic solidarity during the 1860 and 1870s. For the broader context of Indonesian–Ottoman links during the colonial era, see Engseng Ho, *Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility in the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

namely China, Russia, and the British Empire in India.⁴¹ Here, one must emphasize that both Acehnese and Kaghgar delegations asked for the support of the British Empire as well, not just the Ottoman Empire, in their struggle against the Dutch or the Chinese empires. The British officers supported the Ottoman aid to Kashgar due to their fear of Russian expansion in that area. But they did not endorse an Ottoman aid to Aceh against the Dutch. Meanwhile, the Aceh and Kashgar debates increased Ottoman curiosity about Muslims in different parts of the world and helped create a trans-state Muslim identity. The Young Ottoman intellectual Namik Kemal noted with a hint of irony that, during the 1870s, the Ottoman public began to ask for solidarity with the Muslims of Western China, in whom they had little interest twenty years earlier.⁴²

Another example of a perception of an interconnected Muslim world in the mid-1870s can be seen in the article on ‘Muhammedanism and [the] Negro Race’ by pioneering pan-Africanist intellectual Edward Blyden.⁴³ This article was written before the traumatic Russo–Ottoman Wars of 1877–1878, when the optimism about the future of self-strengthening Muslim monarchies was still high. In fact, Blyden starts his essay by noting the impact of the ‘visits, within the last ten years, of Oriental rulers to Europe, the Sultan of Turkey, the Khedive of Egypt, the Shah of Persia, and the Seyyid of Zanzibar’.⁴⁴ He also references the English language writings on Islam and Muhammad by Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Syed Ameer Ali (1870 and 1873, respectively) as important Muslim corrections of prejudiced views of Islam. Thus, Blyden seems to be aware of the new imperial identities, including the British imperial identity of loyalist Muslims such as Ameer Ali and Syed Ahmad Khan, and notes their efforts to correct the anti-Muslim prejudiced public opinion in London with English language writings.

It was in the mid-1870s that the British Foreign Office, in correspondence with the Dutch officials, tried to gather information about the religious and political revival among Muslims under their imperial rule, and inquired if there was any systematic instigation by the Ottoman

⁴¹Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877* (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 146–150.

⁴²Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu* (Ankara: Lotus Yayınları 2003), p. 143.

⁴³Blyden, ‘Muhammedanism and the Negro Race’.

⁴⁴Blyden, *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race*, page 1.

caliphate in Istanbul for that purpose. Based on almost thirty reports collected by consulates in various Muslim-majority cities, the Foreign Office concluded that there was no organization by a pan-Islamic movement. Yet, the same report noted that there was a rising international awareness of Muslims, as they could follow the news about the conditions of other Muslims while being more informed about the rest of the world.

Just five years after the Muslim solidarity debate caused by the Aceh delegation in Istanbul, an Ottoman–Russian War in 1877–1878 witnessed a full mobilization of Muslim and Christian identities globally, and made the racial distinction between Muslims and Christians overshadow the imperial logic of the world order. Throughout this war, both the Ottoman and Russian empires mobilized religion-based—Islam and Christianity respectively—identities in the recruitment of soldiers and in war propaganda, even though both sides also had to perform as religiously inclusive empires. Russia had Muslim soldiers and had to protect the Muslim populations in newly conquered areas, but it appealed to Christian Orthodox solidarity and the ideal of saving the Hagia Sophia from the rule of Muslims, while it presented the war as a battle between Islam and Christianity. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire mobilized Muslim symbols in the war, including the idea of jihad, even though the war was actually about keeping the Christian Balkan populations within the empire in a constitutional framework that accepted the diversity and autonomy of each religious and ethnic community. While the Russian Empire claimed to liberate Balkan Christian populations, it was ruling over the Polish nation and suppressing its nationalism.

At the end of the 1877–1878 war, the Muslimness of the Ottoman Empire almost became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Once the Ottoman Empire lost the war, and all the Christian-majority Balkan provinces of Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Montenegro gained independence, a Muslim-majority Ottoman Empire began to emphasize the Muslim identity of the Ottoman Sultan as a more viable option to consolidate its internal solidarity, and made Islam a core national identity of the empire, parallel to the nationalization of European empires. In the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in the Balkans, the ratio of Christian populations of the empire was down to twenty percent.⁴⁵ During 1881–1882,

⁴⁵Eric D. Weitz, 'From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions', *American Historical Review* (December 2008), pp. 1313–1343.

when two major Muslim areas of North Africa, Tunisia and Egypt, came under the imperial rule (in the name of protectorates) of the French and British Empires, the global unevenness of Christian empires versus Muslim subjects became more openly discussed in the Muslim public sphere and the press. Eventually, the empires gained the upper hand and by the turn of the twentieth century, various Muslim societies were more or less settled in their lives under the rule of European empires. Yet, following the invasions of Egypt and Tunisia by the British and French empires, global consciousness of Muslim populations subjugated by Christian empires created a new vision of pan-Islamism outside of the Ottoman Empire as well.⁴⁶

In summary, despite the assertion of an imperial vision throughout the nineteenth century, the nature of imperial globalization in the Muslim societies of Africa and Asia led to a modern form of racialization of Muslims by the early 1880s, giving birth to the idea of 'the Muslim world'. This idea of the Muslim world represented the cosmopolitan entanglement and linkages among different Muslim experiences in disparate imperial contexts, forming a simultaneity of ideas and identities significantly different than the religious networks and imperial imaginations of Islamicate societies in the mid-eighteenth century. The theatres of the otherization of Muslims and their racialization patterns seemed to be in disparate parts of the globe. Russia had its Muslim subjects with varied legal status from Tatar inlands to Caucasia and Central Asia, yet all were defined and treated as Muslims. Dutch and French empires also put legal distinctions between white metropole citizens and Muslim imperial subjects and made the full equality of a Muslim imperial subject almost impossible to achieve. The British Empire practically gave a modern name and legal status to forty percent of the world's Muslim populations within its imperial domains in South Asia. All of these imperial practices were contested by Muslim actors and populations, in relation and observations with each other. In this context, the Ottoman Empire's reforms and membership into the European concert of empires, as well as its response to the rebellions of its Christian populations in Europe became ironically relevant to British, Dutch, French, and Russian-ruled imperial Muslims' lives, equality, and destiny. Even though the Ottomans

⁴⁶Nikkie Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

were representing as much of a Mongolian and modern European imperial universalism, their image became identified with racial Muslimness both in European metropolises and Muslim colonies.

Double cosmopolitan Muslim experience of the 1880, namely the reformist imperial and the pan-Islamic one, both tried to resist the logic of population transfers and clash of civilizations, especially the idea of an essential clash between Islam and modern civilization, or the Muslim world and the West. Pan-Islamist Muslims of India wanted both to tame the British Empire to make it more inclusive, and benefitted from the British imperial grid in the Indian Ocean in the age of steam and print to link with Muslims in Ottoman Arabia and Egypt. The Ottoman Muslim elite wanted to keep the cosmopolitan citizenship project, while emphasizing the importance of the caliphate to make a case that the Muslim world would be a glue to create peace among various European empires and the Ottomans. Neither imperial nor the pan-Islamic visions surrendered to the power of ideas of racial and religious conflict, and in fact refashioned its cosmopolitan content to resist the logic of nationalism. Thus, we need to see the period from the 1850 to the 1890s not as a tragic period of the defeat of imperial cosmopolitanism under the forces of pan-Islamism and nationalism, but rather as an era of re-asserting a cosmopolitanism that is in alliance with pan-Islamic global consciousness.

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Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism in Modern British Political Thought: Continuities and Discontinuities

Georgios Varouxakis

WHAT WAS 'INTERNATIONALISM'?

This volume focuses on ideas of cosmopolitanism and their particular relevance in postwar situations. Thus the following words of Alfred Zimmern, written during the Great War, seem to be particularly relevant to our concerns here: 'The war is being waged about ideas, and the settlement at its close will be determined by ideas. Yet those ideas, and the words in which they are embodied for current discussion, are often vague, confused and even contradictory: so that different words are used to express the same meaning, and the same word used to express several different meanings.'¹ Given the confusion he was identifying,

¹ Alfred E. Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government' [delivered 30 November 1915, first published January 1916], in: Alfred E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government with Other War-Time Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1918), pp. 32–60, at p. 32.

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Zimmern proposed to begin by examining 'certain prevalent phrases or catchwords which have lately passed into common currency among the public, without perhaps receiving their due share of criticism and cross-examination'. And the first word which he wished to scrutinize was the word 'international'. He was, he wrote, constantly meeting people who professed what they called 'international sympathies', belonged to 'international clubs', promoted 'international causes' or studied 'international relations'. A Briton descended from German-Jewish and Huguenot refugees, Zimmern could not help reminding people of his personal stake in such discussions: 'Being international myself, in a precise sense of the word, I am anxious to know what they mean.' He noted that the word 'international' had around seven different meanings. But he attempted to lump them into two groups. Half of the people who used the word 'international' were 'thinking of something which concerns one or more nations' and the other half were 'thinking of something which concerns one or more Sovereign States.' ² Thus, he explained that when people were speaking of an English 'international' footballer they meant 'a man who has represented England against Wales or Scotland or Ireland'. They were meanwhile not concerned with 'the purely political question' whether Scotland, Ireland or Wales were sovereign states. The same applied to talk of a writer as having 'an international reputation', by which people meant that the author's books were 'read by people of many different nations' and had possibly been translated into many different languages. And 'an international movement' was mentioned when people meant that it had 'taken root in many different countries... irrespective of the question whether these countries form part of one or more Sovereign States'.² Now, there was another meaning of the term: 'But when we talk of "international law" or "an International Concert of Powers" on the other hand, we are using the word in quite a different sense.' When using the term in such contexts people were 'thinking of the world as consisting, not of nations, but of States'. From the point of view of the international footballer, 'Canada, South Africa, and Australia would all be separate units, while the various Central American States, if they wanted to produce a team, would probably have to club together to do so'. On the other hand, from the point of view of the international lawyer, 'Canada, South Africa, and Australia are merged in the British Commonwealth, Bohemia merged in Austria-Hungary, Syria in the

²Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', pp. 33–34.

Ottoman Empire and Finland in the Russian, while Nicaragua, Bolivia, Montenegro, and Liberia are classified separately as Sovereign States, ostensibly on a level with the Great Powers'. That distinction that he was drawing between nationality and statehood was, Zimmern claimed, 'so simple that it seems strange that it should be necessary to call attention to it at all'. Scotland was a nation but not a state. The same was true of Poland, Finland or Australia. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary was a state but not a nation. And the same was true of the Ottoman Empire or of 'the British Commonwealth'. ('So is the United States,' he opined.) Though it may not be easy to define exactly what a state was or what a nation was, 'at least it ought to be easy to perceive that there is a difference between the two'.³ 'Yet', Zimmern exclaimed, 'how many current catchwords there are which have acquired their vogue by slurring that difference over!' If people had been using the word 'inter-state', instead of 'inter-national', when talking of matters which affected two or more states and if the word 'international' had been 'confined to its strict sense', then, opined Zimmern, 'some of those who have the word most often on their lips would discover, perhaps with a shock, that much of what they are pleading for is already embodied in contemporary life. We are in fact living in what is, in the strictest sense, an international society'. The modern world was 'in fact international to the core'. And that was not a value judgement either way, he stressed: 'Its internationalism lies in the nature of things. It is neither to its credit nor to its discredit. *Internationalism is neither good nor bad in the abstract: it depends on the nature of its manifestations.*'⁴ Zimmern was pointing

³Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', pp. 34–35. Compare another complaint on such confusions, written a few years later: 'It [the League of Nations] is neither universal nor even an international organization. If the German word for international is used correctly and honestly it must be distinguished from interstate and applied instead to international movements which transcend the borders of states and ignore the territorial integrity, impenetrability, and impermeability of existing states as, for example, the Third International. Immediately exposed here are the elementary antitheses of international and interstate, of a de-politicized universal society and interstate guarantees of the *status quo* of existing frontiers.' Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (expanded edition, trans. and with an Introduction by George Schwab, with a Foreword by Tracy B. Strong, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 56.

⁴Emphasis added. As Zimmern elaborated: 'The German Wolff Bureau is international; so is the White Slave traffic; so is the Anti-Slavery Society. It rests with men and women of goodwill to see that the good manifestations prevail over the evil.' Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', p. 36.

towards an important feature of the uses of the term 'internationalism': Its multiple and confused meanings. As Casper Sylvest has put it (referring to the period 1900–1930), 'internationalism' was a flexible concept that embraced many (not always compatible) progressive ideas which, of course, only heightened its ideological attraction.⁵

Nor had that internationalism, understood as 'inter-communication between the families of mankind', been abruptly cut short by the war then raging, according to Zimmern, but it had rather been 'immensely extended'. As he remarked, 'Was there ever a more international expedition than the army at the Dardanelles?'⁶ In other words, Zimmern was asserting that internationalism in the first sense he had identified was *a fact* already. Given that fact, he argued that the frequent complaints of 'a certain school of idealists', who 'consider themselves a small group of internationalists in a world that will not listen to their doctrine' should be read as a different complaint. He thought that what the people in question really meant was 'not that the modern world is not international in many of its habits and ways of thought, but that, in spite of its internationalism, it is still a tragically mismanaged place'. What they were actually complaining about was, why couldn't the different communities of the world 'sit down and cultivate the arts of Peace?'⁷ Zimmern argued that the criticism in question was in fact a twofold criticism: 'It is one thing to say that the world is wicked. It is quite another to say that it is badly organized.' He thus argued that the school of thought to which he was referring actually combined 'two quite separate lines of policy'. On the one hand, there was the policy 'directed towards making the world better', and on the other hand, 'the policy directed towards making the world better organised, irrespective of the fact whether or not that organisation is based on moral principles.'⁸

Taking the former policy first, Zimmern explained: 'The policy which seeks to make the world better aims at promoting internationalism in its better, and at counteracting it in its worst, manifestations.' It sought 'to promote Anti-Slavery Societies and to counteract the

⁵Casper Sylvest, 'Continuity and change in British liberal internationalism, c. 1900–1930', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31 (2005), pp. 263–283, at p. 266.

⁶Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government,' p. 36.

⁷Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government,' p. 37.

⁸Ibid.

White Slave traffic'; it sought 'to promote happier and friendlier relations between nations and to counteract the international phenomenon that has become known as "Prussianism" in whatever quarter it originates and over however many countries it may spread.' It sought, in other words, 'to serve humanity by raising its moral level'. Zimmern then passed to the second line of policy: that which was 'directed not towards making men better (that, it is recognized, is too lengthy a process to meet the immediate emergency), but rather to averting war 'by making the world better organized—by improving the efficiency of the world's political machinery'.⁹ This line of policy aimed at 'the setting up of what is called an international or supernational organization to ensure the peace of the world'. Zimmern identified some of his immediate targets. They included Sidney Webb and J. A. Hobson.¹⁰ Zimmern came back to his attempt at conceptual clarification of the term 'international' and its two different meanings: 'A pedant might criticize Mr. Hobson's title' [*Towards International Government*]. Had Hobson called his book 'Towards Inter-State Government' his proposal would have been clearer. But then Zimmern had an even more serious criticism: For then Hobson 'would have been convicted of working for a contradiction, *for there is no such thing as inter-State government*'.¹¹ This was because, '[i]f a government cannot give orders and secure obedience to them, it is not a government: but the essence of a State is that it is sovereign and takes orders from no one above it. Inter-State government therefore involves a contradiction.' The crux of the matter was, then, that what Hobson really wished for was 'a World-Government'. Now, according to Zimmern, the establishment of a world-government was feasible: 'The real difficulty is to establish free world-government—to ensure universal peace without the universal sacrifice of liberty.'¹² Zimmern could see 'no technical objection' to the practicability of schemes like the one proposed by Hobson. The problem was that they involved 'the surrender of British, French, American and other sovereignties into the hands of a body in which the nominees of Russian, German, Hungarian, and Turkish

⁹Emphasis added.

¹⁰See J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1915).

¹¹Emphasis added.

¹²Emphasis added: Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', pp. 38–39.

autocracy would have a proportionate voice'. But Zimmern was confident that Englishmen would 'include liberty as an indispensable element in that "good life" which it is the sole object of politics to promote'. This would lead them to reject Hobson's and all other similar schemes.¹³

There are two important themes characteristic of British debates on 'international organization' and 'internationalism' during the Great War (and then pursued during the Inter-War period) to note here. One is the distinction Zimmern drew between attempts to make the world a better place by improving the morality of people and nations on the one hand, and the attempts to make the world a better-organized place by improving the *machinery* through which international relations were organized, on the other. The dilemma was not new and versions of it had already been debated in the second part of the nineteenth century. The philosopher Henry Sidgwick had referred to something approaching the former aspiration as the 'internal method' and called the latter 'the external method'.¹⁴ As Casper Sylvest has shown, the distinction between *moral*

¹³Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', pp. 39–40.

¹⁴Sidgwick distinguished between two different methods of trying to prevent war, which he called the 'external' and the 'internal' method respectively. Those who believed in the external method thought that war could be prevented by referring disputes between states 'to the judgment of impartial—and, if possible, skilled—outsiders'. Sidgwick, 'The Morality of Strife', *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1890), pp. 1–15, at p. 13. He explained that he called this an 'external' method, because it did not require 'any effect to be produced on the intellects and consciences of the disputants; they are allowed to remain in their onesided and erroneous convictions.' Thus, 'the practical—or, perhaps I may say, the technical—problem comes to be how to get a wise and impartial court of international arbitration'. Sidgwick argued that the external method could not be relied upon to offer 'a complete and final removal of the evils of strife'. That is why Sidgwick was advocating the employment of the internal or spiritual method: 'Where, then, the sphere of the *external or political method* of attaining international "peace with justice" ends, the special sphere of the *internal or properly moral method* begins; if we must be judges in our own cause, we must endeavor to be just judges.' [Emphasis added both times.] There were three stages in such an attempt (reminiscent of the impartial spectator ideal). See Henry Sidgwick, 'The Morality of Strife', *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1890), pp. 1–15, at p. 13; reprinted with some modifications in: Henry Sidgwick, *Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays* (edited with an introduction by Sissela Bok, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1898]), pp. 47–62, at pp. 57–60. For an excellent analysis of Sidgwick's approach to international morality, see Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism*, pp. 121–139. See also Duncan Bell and Casper Sylvest, 'International Society in Victorian Political Thought: T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and Henry Sidgwick', *Modern Intellectual History*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2006), pp. 207–238.

arguments and *institutional* arguments or solutions was a very important one during and following the Great War. According to Sylvest, during the war, under the influence of the theory of anarchy in international relations (most influentially enunciated by G. Lowes Dickinson in *The European Anarchy*, in 1916), the appeal of institutional arguments increased significantly.¹⁵ However, as Sylvest put it, ‘the distinction is far from absolute’ and, ‘[f]ew if any internationalist arguments are purely moral or purely international; mostly, they reflect a particular mix that gives priority to the moral or the institutional.’¹⁶

In one of the best recent works on the history of British international thought, Casper Sylvest has argued that ‘there has been a tendency, particularly in IR, to overemphasise the (self-professed) originality of inter-war liberal internationalists, which is arguably related to the beginnings of the discipline in the post-1918 period and a corresponding lack of interest in pre-war ideas’.¹⁷ I agree with Sylvest in drawing more attention to continuities that have been neglected in the majority of works that emphasized instead the rupture with the pre-Great War world during the Inter-War period. As Sylvest argues, ‘the mantras of internationalist ideology—the possibility and importance of achieving progress, order and justice in international politics and concomitant beliefs in the applicability of public morality to this domain, as well as the compatibility of nationality and internationalism—remained fairly stable in the beginning of the twentieth century. But this does not mean that there was no change’. The distinction between moral and institutional arguments is an important focus here:

¹⁵G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916). See also Jeanne Morefield, ‘The Never-Satisfied Idealism of Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson’, in: Ian Hall and Lisa Hill (eds), *British International Thinkers from Hobbes to Namier* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 207–225; and Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the origins of the modern state to academic international relations* (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 160–164.

¹⁶Sylvest, ‘Continuity and change’, p. 268.

¹⁷Casper Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 198.

From the late nineteenth century through to the inter-war years, a gradual change took place within British liberal internationalism from (primarily) moral to (primarily) institutional arguments. This development was markedly accelerated during the Great War, when traditional explanations of war – which interweaved and variously stressed the lack of moral development, the flawed and dangerous doctrines of ‘practical men’, imperialism, capitalism or insufficient transparency in the conduct of foreign policy – were accompanied by a diagnosis holding that the fundamental cause of war was to be found in the anarchic nature of international politics.¹⁸

¹⁸Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism*, pp. 198–199. Another, less pronounced but different, distinction was that between economic arguments and moral arguments. Concluding his survey of political thought in England from 1848 to 1914 (first published in 1915) with an analysis and then criticism of Norman Angell’s emphasis of economics and financial interdependence, Ernest Barker argued: ‘The fact of international economics, so much emphasized by Norman Angell, is in many respects, if not so absolutely as he conceives, a fact of vital importance. The fact of national politics, which he seeks to eliminate, is equally, or even more, a true and vital fact. Economic progress has outrun political structure. We cannot, however, bring the two into line at the cost of suppressing one of the elements. *We must all seek to be internationalists, because that is the highest ideal which we can discern.* [Emphasis added] A true internationalism, however, must perhaps differ from that of Norman Angell in two fundamental respects. In the first place, it must recognize the existence of the State in all its fullness, and it must seek to comprehend states in its fold without any derogation from the fullness of their being. In the second place, it must base itself not on the economic appeal to the individual, and on the argument that it pays, but rather on the moral appeal to national conscience, and on the argument that it is right to conceive the relations of States as comprehended in the sphere of a common and public law of the nations. There is...a sense of right common to civilized nations. It is in the explication of that sense, and in its translation into a concrete legal embodiment, that the hope of internationalism lies. Internationalism must pursue a legal development, not based on (though it may be aided by) economic facts, but based on (as all legal development is based on) a sense of right inherent in a common conscience—the *common conscience of the civilized world*. [Emphasis added] An extension of extradition treaties; an extension of the Hague Tribunal and the reference of disputes between States to that Tribunal; and extension of international treaties to include limitation of armaments—such are the ways which international development may be expected to take. ... And it is on such a development, taking a legal form, and resting ultimately...on the *Sittlichkeit*, or sense of a common ethic, of a group of allied nations, rather than on a development issuing from any economic factor, that we must fix our hopes. *Not the abolition of national political structure, but the evolution of forms of international political structure, must be our aspiration and endeavour.* [Emphasis added] Despite his criticisms, however, Barker concluded that gratitude was due to Norman Angell, because he belonged ‘to the cause of internationalism—the greatest of all the causes to which a man can set his hands in these days’. Ernest Barker, *Political Thought in England 1848 to 1914* (Second Edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1959 [1915]), pp. 218–220.

The other important feature of British debates during (as well as following) the Great War, that Zimmern's comments discussed above exemplify, is the disagreements about the scope and the speed of international organization. Zimmern was clearly sceptical about any proposals for 'world-government' because he saw them as bound to sacrifice the liberty he valued in Britain if the British were to be absorbed in a supra-national organization where it would be outvoted by the representatives of other numerous nations or states who valued liberty much less. He had a rigid conception of sovereignty and insisted that a state either was fully sovereign or was not a state. We already saw who the main target of Zimmern's criticisms in 1915 was. And that is not surprising, given how his target has been described by a later historian: 'Hobson...was a maximiser. For him a League of Nations was the first step towards a world federation, which would alone wield enough power to guarantee peace.'¹⁹ Hobson believed that 'nothing short of a representative international government, involving a definite diminution of sovereign rights of the separate states will suffice'.²⁰ Hobson was joined by people such as H. N. Brailsford and—up to a point—L. T. Hobhouse.²¹ On the other side, there were thinkers such as Leonard Woolf and Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, with whom Zimmern was much closer, though not identified.²² Though most liberal internationalists were in agreement soon after the outbreak of the Great War on the need for the establishment of an international organization charged with the task of preventing war, they differed on the extent of that organization's powers as well as on whether it was the moral or the institutional aspects that had to take priority.²³ Woolf and Dickinson were almost as reluctant as Zimmern to accept anything approaching world-government. In a review of Hobson's *Towards International Government*, Woolf took

¹⁹Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 178–179.

²⁰J. A. Hobson, 'The International Mind', *The Nation* (14 August 1915), p. 639; quoted in: Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', p. 281.

²¹See Henry Noel Brailsford, *A League of Nations* (London: Headley Bros., 1917); L. T. Hobhouse, *The World in Conflict* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915). See also Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', pp. 278–282; Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats*, pp. 178–179.

²²Leonard Woolf, *International Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916); G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1916); Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', pp. 278–288.

²³See Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', p. 278.

issue with Hobson's proposals for international machinery: 'Machinery cannot create mind. ... The only way to build is from the bottom, whether you are building a house or a democracy. And so it is no good in international affairs beginning with your supreme International Council.'²⁴ In his own more modest proposal, in the Fabian-commissioned and influential *International Government* (published in July 1916), Woolf advocated an international authority that would establish international arbitration and argued that the already existing institutions of international cooperation, many of them voluntary, offered a platform on which to build such an authority.²⁵ No wonder that Lord Robert Cecil, who 'incorporated virtually the whole of Woolf's ideas into the British Draft Covenant which he gave to Woodrow Wilson in Paris' in 1919, also 'gave Leonard—privately—a cogent criticism of *International Government*. ...it seemed to Cecil that a lot of what Leonard advocated had more to do with international cooperation than with international government'.²⁶ No surprise either that the British Draft that Lord Robert brought with him to Paris (and which was in such agreement with Woolf's moderate proposals) had been drafted by Alfred Zimmern.²⁷ Zimmern was to make his approval of 'the masterly analysis of Mr. Woolf' in *International Government* explicitly public two decades later.²⁸

Zimmern was to continue trying to clarify the meaning of true internationalism during the inter-war years. In 1923, writing in the US magazine *Foreign Affairs*, he insisted again on the need to disentangle 'the problems of nationality' from 'the problems of statehood and citizenship', given that it had been 'from their century-old confusion that so much mischief and bloodshed have arisen, whether in the insane German design to base the dominion of the world on the "culture", that is, the intimate expression of a single people, or in the futile and suicidal efforts, now

²⁴Leonard Woolf, 'The International Mind', *The Nation* (7 August 1915), 614; quoted in: Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', p. 280.

²⁵See Sylvest, 'Continuity and change', pp. 278–282. For a different categorization among the thinkers he calls 'liberal socialists' in the Inter-War Period, see Ashworth, *A History of International Thought*, p. 161.

²⁶Victoria Glendinning, *Leonard Woolf: A Biography* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 211.

²⁷D. J. Markwell, 'Zimmern, Sir Alfred Eckhard (1879–1957), internationalist', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²⁸Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 170–171.

happily discredited, of the straitest sect of “Americanizers”. The discrediting of such ill-conceived ideas was clearing the way, Zimmern thought, ‘*for a real internationalism, in the truest and purest sense of the word*’.²⁹ He explained what that real internationalism consisted in:

For internationalism, properly understood, is not contact between states; nor is it contact between super-nationalists and cosmopolitans who have torn themselves loose from affiliation with their nation. It is at home neither round the green table of the diplomatists nor ‘above the mêlée’ with the minority minds. True internationalism is contact between nations in their highest and best and most distinctive representatives and manifestations. The true contact between the West European national triangle which is so disquieting the world must be a contact, not between trust-magnates or labour-leaders or even statesmen from the three countries, but, so to speak, between Shakespeare, Molière and Goethe. It is the most characteristic figures of a national literature who are also the most international, and it is through them that understanding must come. Our efforts at internationalism have failed hitherto because they have followed the line of least effort. Any fool can book a ticket for a foreign country, just as any fool can learn Esperanto. But contacts so established effect nothing. They tell us no more than that the German or the Frenchman is a human being, a father, a workman and a lover of beer or coffee, which we knew before. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment of the intimate treasures of the world’s nationalities, *by men and women whose vision has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound up with a nation of their own*,³⁰ that an enduring network of internationalism will some day be knit and a harmony of understanding established in a world of unassailable diversity.³¹

I have deliberately focused on Zimmern at some length, because I agree with Mark Mazower that ‘Zimmern is one of those men whose ideas, with all their idiosyncrasies, can provide a way into guiding assumptions of an era.’³² A more technical reason for giving Zimmern prominence is that he

²⁹ Emphasis added.

³⁰ Emphasis added.

³¹ Alfred Zimmern, ‘Nationalism and Internationalism’, in: Alfred Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy and Other Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929), pp. 76–94, at pp. 92–94.

³² As Mazower continues, ‘Perhaps the preeminent theorist of internationalism between the two world wars, he was a man who crystallized in his writings and life the intimate connection between Victorian readings of the ancients, the moral ideology of British global leadership, and the new liberal internationalism.’ Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace*:

became the first professor of International Relations in the world (as the first occupant of the Woodrow Wilson chair of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, between 1919 and 1921).

WHAT DID 'COSMOPOLITANISM' MEAN AND WHY WAS IT RATHER UNPOPULAR FOR SO LONG?

In this section I wish to address the complex relationship between 'internationalism' and 'cosmopolitanism' and to assess the continuities or discontinuities in the uses of the latter term in modern British political thought. In her brilliant recent study of the different 'moments' of twentieth-century internationalism, Glenda Sluga has remarked: 'By the end of the [Great] war, as the discursive fields of both internationality and nationality were busily tilled, the conceptualization of nationalism and internationalism, and the relationship between them, sprouted clarifications.' Thus: 'Good nationalism was patriotic and sociological in origin. Bad nationalism was racist. Good or... "true internationalism" was the complement of nationalism. Bad internationalism was antinationalist and took the specific name of cosmopolitan internationalism.'³³ And Sluga continues:

The changing fortunes of the term 'cosmopolitanism' is another useful marker of what had changed after the war. In the pre-war world of the Belle Époque, cosmopolitanism was a concept celebrated by transatlantic student clubs that practiced race-mixing sociability, and whose members, like the Wisconsin-based editor of the *Cosmopolitan Student*, moved in the circles of the Universal Races Congress. Cosmopolitanism made a brief appearance in the political mainstream in the 1940s through the language of 'world citizenship' and the cultural ambitions of UNESCO. In the interim decades, cosmopolitanism conventionally served the antithetical purpose of identifying a bad internationalism. [...] Even Ellen Kay, like Tomas Masaryk, was careful to distinguish between cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and internationalism anchored in national patriotism, on the other. Hobson distanced

The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 68.

³³Glenda Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), p. 43.

his international man from a 'shallow cosmopolitan.' Cosmopolitanism was not only out of favour, but, during the war and after, it returned as code for Jews – as a race without a nation – and for the proletarian class-based internationalism perpetrated by revolutionaries everywhere.³⁴

I intend in the following pages to show that these remarks have to be qualified as far as the suggestion of a break with the pre-war period is concerned. My reading of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century [pre-GreatWar] political thought makes me think that the negative associations of 'cosmopolitanism' were there long before the Great War and did not arise as a result of responses to it.

'Cosmopolitanism' is not an easy term to pin down. As Catherine Lu has noted, '[d]espite its long history, an uncontentious account of the implications of a cosmopolitan ethical perspective still eludes political and moral theorists.' Part of the problems arising with any attempt at 'understanding the precise nature of cosmopolitanism, as well as its relationship with other perspectives, lies in the myriad ways it has been understood, or perhaps more accurately, *misunderstood*'. Thus: 'A plethora of images, many inconsistent if not altogether contradictory, confronts students of cosmopolitanism. Critics target its various alleged manifestations—as political visions, ethical commitments, and economic agendas—without being entirely clear about how these disparate expressions of cosmopolitanism cohere under a single paradigm.'³⁵ It may be somehow circular to blame the ways the term has been misunderstood and it may be better to remember Nietzsche's famous warning that 'only something which has no history can be defined'.³⁶ It is therefore more legitimate—at any rate for historians—to study the different *uses* of the concept and to analyze their different meanings, and chart the concentrations of meanings, the transformations and the continuities or discontinuities, rather than scold

³⁴Sluga, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism*, p. 44.

³⁵Catherine Lu, 'The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2000), pp. 244–267, at p. 244.

³⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality* (ed. by Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. by Carol Diethe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 53 [Second Essay, 13].

different users for misunderstanding the true meaning of cosmopolitanism, as if there were one given such true meaning.³⁷

In the last couple of decades there has been an explosion of writing on 'cosmopolitanism', 'cosmopolitan citizenship', 'global citizenship', 'global justice', and related concepts in political theory. But what does 'cosmopolitanism' or 'cosmopolitan' mean? Many different definitions and articulations have been identified.³⁸ If one looks at conceptions and definitions of 'cosmopolitanism' historically, in the long run, there is a lot of truth in the remark that 'the form which cosmopolitanism assumes is in general conditioned by the particular social entity or group ideal from which it represents a reaction'.³⁹ The London-based Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini said more or less the same thing in the middle of the nineteenth century, when he argued that cosmopolitanism in the eighteenth century had developed as a reaction to what he called the 'old nationality' of the monarchic dynasties.⁴⁰ In accordance with this tendency, much of the recent discussion of cosmopolitanism is related to a reaction to John Rawls's conception of the appropriate field of justice as being within each nation-state, rather than directly applying to individuals at a global level (global justice). Critics have tried to apply Rawls's principles of justice to the global level to which he himself did not apply

³⁷ For the classic methodological warning against the latter enterprise, see Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', in Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 57–89.

³⁸ See, e.g., Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds.), *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Scheffler, 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism', *Utilitas*, 11:3 (1999), 255–276; Vertovec and Robin Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); David Held, 'Globalization, Corporate Practice and Cosmopolitan Social Standards', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 1 (2002), pp. 63–68; Jeremy Waldron, 'What Is Cosmopolitan?', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8:2 (2000), 227–243; Catherine Lu, 'The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism', *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 8:2 (2000), pp. 244–267; Timothy Brennan, 'Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism', *New Left Review*, second series, 7 (January–February 2001), 75–84.

³⁹ Max Boehm, 'Cosmopolitanism', in: *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), Vol. IV, pp. 457–462, at p. 458.

⁴⁰ See Giuseppe Mazzini, 'Nationality and Cosmopolit[ism]' (1847), in: Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds.), *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings On Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 57–62.

them and have offered various arguments in favour of large-scale redistribution of resources on the basis of Rawls's own premises—e.g. Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz or Brian Barry.⁴¹

But cosmopolitan thinking does not refer only to debates about justice. More than a long book is needed in order to begin to offer an account of the different meanings of cosmopolitanism. However, a useful brief road-map has been contributed by David Held, who has identified 'three broad accounts of cosmopolitanism which...contribute to its contemporary meaning'. The first account was that of the Stoics, whose main point was the idea 'that they were, in the first instance, human beings living in a world of human beings and only incidentally members of polities'. The upshot of this idea is that '[t]he individual belongs to the wider world of humanity; moral worth cannot be specified by the yardstick of a single political community'. The second account of cosmopolitanism was that introduced in the eighteenth century 'when the term *[W]eltbürger* (world citizen) became one of the key terms of the Enlightenment'. The central figure was Immanuel Kant who 'linked the idea of cosmopolitanism to an innovative conception of "the public use of reason", and explored the ways in which this conception of reason can generate a critical vantage point from which to scrutinize civil society'.⁴² Finally, the third conception of cosmopolitanism is a contemporary one and expounded in the work of Beitz, Pogge and Barry, among others. As Held has maintained, '[i]n certain respects, this work seems to explicate, and offer a compelling elucidation of the classical conception of belonging to the human community first and foremost, and the Kantian conception of subjecting all beliefs, relations and practices to the test of

⁴¹See Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*, 2; see also Joseph Carens, 'Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders', *Review of Politics* (1987), Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 251–273.

⁴²In accordance with that conception, '[i]ndividuals can step out of their entrenched positions in civil society and enter a sphere of reason free of "dictatorial authority" ... and can, from this vantage point, examine the one-sidedness, partiality and limits of everyday knowledge, understanding and regulations.' David Held, 'Globalization, Corporate Practice and Cosmopolitan Social Standards', *Contemporary Political Theory*, Vol. 1 (2002), pp. 59–78, at p. 64. For some important comments on the significance of Kant, see also Jeremy Waldron, 'What Is Cosmopolitan?', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2000), pp. 227–243; April Carter, *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 33–50.

whether or not they allow open-ended interaction, uncoerced agreement and impartial judgment.⁴³

But many of the recent writings on cosmopolitanism do not display as much conceptual clarity or historical contextualization as one would have hoped for. Most of the debates involve quite partial accounts of what 'cosmopolitanism' is supposed to mean. Straw-man arguments abound in the writings of cosmopolitanism's many critics. Also frequent are autobiographical accounts on the part of supporters of 'cosmopolitanism',⁴⁴ or attributions, on the part of critics of cosmopolitanism, of autobiographical shortcomings to the supporters of cosmopolitanism—or, to be more blunt, it is a standard argument among their critics that cosmopolitan theorists are blinded to the realities of the world because they are ivory-tower academics who spend too much time with people like themselves and fly all the time to international conferences and the like.⁴⁵ It has been said for example that, 'cosmopolitanism springs from a comfortable culture of middle-class travelers, intellectuals and businessmen'.⁴⁶ Thus, it is no surprise that 'cosmopolitanism' has come to be referred to as 'that tainted term'.⁴⁷

A very common conception of cosmopolitanism is the following: 'Understood as a fundamental devotion to the interests of humanity as a whole, cosmopolitanism has often seemed to claim universality by virtue of its independence, its detachment from the bonds, commitments, and affiliations that constrain ordinary nation-bound lives. It has seemed to be a luxuriously free-floating view from above.'⁴⁸ The problem with such an attitude to the world and to one's allegiances was made clear already in the eighteenth century with Jean-Jacques Rousseau's memorable admonitions, in different works and formulations, to beware of

⁴³Held, 'Globalization', p. 64.

⁴⁴See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 93–119.

⁴⁵See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, 'Family and Friends First?', *Times Literary Supplement* (27 December 1996), pp. 8–9.

⁴⁶Timothy Brennan, 'Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism', *New Left Review*, second series, 7 (January–February 2001), pp. 75–84, at p. 77.

⁴⁷Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (eds), *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. vii.

⁴⁸Cheah and Robbins, *Cosmopolitics*, p. 1.

those cosmopolitans who go in search of someone to love in places like Timbuktu in order to avoid the necessity of loving their neighbours, or to beware of those cosmopolitans who search far and wide in their books for duties that they scorn to observe where they are.⁴⁹ This must have been also the meaning the poet Ugo Foscolo attributed to the term a bit later, if it is true, that ‘whenever he heard anyone declare himself a Cosmopolitan, [he] got his hat and left’.⁵⁰

A related meaning was given to cosmopolitanism by a theorist who accepted and advocated it, Jeremy Waldron, in the early 1990s.⁵¹ As he summarized it himself in a later article:

I spoke of someone who did not associate his identity with any secure sense of place, someone who did not take his cultural identity to be defined by any bounded subset of the cultural resources available in the world. He did not take his identity as anything definitive, as anything homogenous that might be muddled or compromised when he studied Greek, ate Chinese, wore clothes made in Korea, worshipped with the Book of Common Prayer, listened to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori diva on Japanese equipment, gave lectures in Buenos Aires, followed Israeli politics, or practiced Buddhist meditation techniques. I spoke of this person as a creature of modernity, conscious, even proud, of living in a mixed-up world having a mixed-up self.⁵²

⁴⁹The full passage in this version, in *Émile*, reads: ‘The smaller social group, firmly united in itself and dwelling apart from others, tends to withdraw itself from the larger society. Every patriot hates foreigners; they are only men, and nothing to him. This defect is inevitable, but of little importance. The great thing is to be kind to our neighbours. Among strangers the Spartan was selfish, grasping, and unjust, but unselfishness, justice, and harmony ruled his home life. Distrust those cosmopolitans who search out remote duties in their books and neglect those that lie nearest. Such philosophers will love the Tartars to avoid loving their neighbour.’ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Émile* (trans. by Barbara Foxley, London: Dent, 1974), p. 7. Similar admonitions occur in other works by Rousseau.

⁵⁰Giuseppe Mazzini, ‘Nationality and Cosmopolit[ism]’ (1847), in Steffano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (eds), *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings On Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 57–62, at p. 57.

⁵¹Jeremy Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative’, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 93–119.

⁵²Waldron, ‘What Is Cosmopolitan?’, p. 228.

This is the conception of cosmopolitanism as consisting in an individual experience characterized by ‘a bit of this and a bit of that’, as Salman Rushdie has put it.⁵³ This is the understanding—very common from the eighteenth century to the twentieth—of cosmopolitanism as involving a detached attitude, of cosmopolitans as ‘rootless’, ‘elitist’ and even ‘parasitic’, or at the very least mixed up.⁵⁴ Although there are (and have been in history) very different conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism, this one has been the most prevalent. It has been controversial, to say the least, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, not least in Britain.

The best known apostle of ‘nationality’ in the nineteenth century, Giuseppe Mazzini, had already been living in Britain for years when he wrote in 1847, ‘We are all Cosmopolitans, if by Cosmopolitanism we understand the love and brotherhood of all, and the destruction of all barriers that separate the Peoples and provide them with opposite interests.’ However, such aspirations were not enough: ‘But can that be all? Is it sufficient just to proclaim these sacred truths, in order to secure their triumph over the obstacles that the league of unlawful powers present to them in Europe? Our work aims at transforming ideas into reality; we have to *organize*, if I may say so, not thought, but *action*.’ According to Mazzini, ‘every organization that is to concretely affect reality requires a starting point and a goal. To operate effectively, every lever needs both a pivot on which to rest and an object to be raised or moved.’ That being the case, here is how Mazzini described his difference from the Cosmopolitans: ‘For us, the end is humanity; the pivot, or point of support, is the country. I freely admit that for Cosmopolitans, the end is also humanity; but their pivot or point of support is man, the isolated *individual*. Therein lies almost all the difference between us and the Cosmopolitans, but it is a major difference.’⁵⁵ According to Mazzini, the cosmopolitan, with his focus on individual rights, soon despairs of changing anything, and either migrates or resorts to simple individual charity: ‘He either develops or simply adopts from others the idea of a social Utopia, and he thinks that by relying on logical deduction and a priori reasoning alone, he can lead humanity towards this goal. Now, by

⁵³Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981–1991* (London: Granta Books, 1991), p. 394; quoted in Waldron, ‘Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,’ p. 93.

⁵⁴See Carter, *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship*, pp. 8–13.

⁵⁵Mazzini, ‘Nationality and Cosmopolit[ism]’, p. 58.

relying on exactly this type of reasoning, Saint-Simonianism and communism have reached the following conclusion: namely, that the liberty of each should be violated in the name of the well-being of all.'

And Mazzini had another complaint: 'Several French political and philosophical schools have recently attained the same conclusion: they began by denying the mission of peoples, by disdainfully shrugging their shoulder at the very word *Nationality* or *country*; and so, as soon as a plan of action was demanded from them, they ended up placing *their own* country, and even *their own* town, at the cen[tre] of their theoretical edifice.' Such schools of thought, Mazzini opined, 'do not destroy Nationalities; rather they condemn all the rest for the sake of a single one. Each of them has its own chosen people, a sort of "Napoleonic" people; and so while formally negating the very idea of Nationality, in fact their own Nationality ends up usurping all the others, if not by arms...then certainly with the pretentious claim of a permanent and exclusive moral and intellectual leadership'.⁵⁶

This latter complaint brings us to a more general problem: that of evoking Humanity to promote one's own national or selfish ends. Thus, a different version of Rousseau's complaint that we saw above was articulated in the nineteenth century by James Fitzjames Stephen (1873): 'Humanity is only I writ large, and love for Humanity generally means zeal for MY notions as to what men should be and how they should live. It frequently means distaste for the present. He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen is peculiarly apt to suppose that he loves his distant cousin whom he has not seen and never will see.'⁵⁷ The complaint had also been raised in the eighteenth century by Herder, who expressed his suspicion of 'love of humanity' that skipped the necessary intermediary stages, where 'ideas of universal love for humanity... are exalted, while warm feelings of family and friendship are allowed to decay.'⁵⁸ And as people were reminded by Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century, another version of that mistrust had been formulated in the

⁵⁶Mazzini, 'Nationality and Cosmopolit[ism]', p. 59.

⁵⁷James Fitzjames Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (ed. by Stuart D. Warner, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1993 [1873]), p. 180.

⁵⁸Johann Gottfried Herder, *Yet Another Philosophy of History for the Enlightenment of Mankind* [1774], in Frederick Barnard (ed.), *Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 200.

nineteenth century by Proudhon: ‘whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat’.⁵⁹

There was a group of thinkers who did evoke ‘Humanity’ *par excellence*, and were included in the complaint voiced by Mazzini already in 1847, and were also the main target, next to John Stuart Mill, of James Fitzjames Stephen’s attack in 1873. I am referring to the Comtists. Mazzini was probably including Comte himself along with the Saint-Simonians in his onslaught in 1847. Fitzjames Stephen’s targets were the British Comtists.⁶⁰ What makes the Comtists a striking example of the unpopularity of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ in the nineteenth century is that they were, in terms of the moral theory they subscribed to, what we might call today quintessential cosmopolitans. Comte had elevated ‘Humanity’ (in its present, past, and future) as the supreme object of adoration, the object of a religion, ‘the Religion of Humanity’. The British Comtists insisted on the equal moral worth of all people all over the world and passionately castigated the crimes of empires such as the British Empire.⁶¹ And yet, they avoided using the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ for what they stood for and advocated.

According to the leading British Comtist, Frederic Harrison, speaking from the pulpit of the Church of Humanity in 1880, ‘[i]n the religion of humanity there are no distinctions of skin or race, of sect or creed; all are our brothers and fellow-citizens of the world—children of the same great

⁵⁹Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (expanded edition, trans. and with an Introduction by George Schwab, with a Foreword by Tracy B. Strong, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 54. On the Comtists’ vociferous anti-imperialism, see Gregory Claeys, *Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire 1850–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 47–123.

⁶⁰On the British Comtists, see T. R. Wright, *The Religion of Humanity: The Impact of Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For a few words on Frederic Harrison on patriotism and cosmopolitanism, see Georgios Varouxakis, ‘“Patriotism”, “Cosmopolitanism” and “Humanity” in Victorian Political Thought’, *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2006), pp. 100–118, at pp. 110–114.

⁶¹See H. S. Jones, ‘The Victorian lexicon of evil: Frederic Harrison, the Positivists and the language of international politics’, in Tom Crook, Bebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe (eds), *Evil, Barbarism and Empire: Britain and Abroad, c. 1830–2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 126–143.

kith and kin.⁶² Thus the Positivists were bound to be in strong sympathy with the victims of British imperialism in Asia and Africa. This, however, did not make the devotees of the religion of Humanity disrespectful of 'patriotism' and nationality; exactly the contrary was the case:

No! It is not that we have outlived the spirit of patriotism and care nothing for the bond of country. It is that we earnestly cling to the idea of country, and honour to the utmost the brave men who so nobly maintained that sacred trust. Those who have wantonly crushed the Zulu nation and broken up the Afghan kingdom are they who have trampled under foot the duty of patriotism. *It is for us to insist how precious to the life of the world are these growing aggregates of people when the lofty conception of nation first comes to supersede the narrower idea of clan or tribe.* It is we who defend the sacred name of country; it is the invader and the conqueror that drag it in the dust.⁶³

The implication is that the Positivists were not selective in their defence of 'the sacred name of country'; they respected all patriotisms, not just that of their own countrymen or a few pet European nations.

In an article characteristically entitled 'The True Cosmopolis', published in 1896, Harrison declared, 'We are as true patriots as any: we will suffer no man's hand to be raised against our Fatherland, nor endure a word against its honour. But there is something more than Fatherland and wider than Patriotism. The supreme development of Humanity in all forms of civilisation needs the joint cooperation of many countries, and would languish under any narrow type of national self-sufficiency.' But, having said that, he did not want his message to be misconstrued: 'I for one claim to be as fervent a patriot as any of my neighbours. To pretend to be 'Cosmopolitan' and superior to Country is a puerile affectation for which I have neither sympathy nor mercy.'⁶⁴ Moreover, Harrison went on in the same breath to equate patriotism with nationalism: 'As a Nationalist by conviction, I hold that Governments and States cannot be too entirely national for all political purposes, or too absolutely capable of defending their own nationality.' That was not all, however. In his own version of 'patriotism is not enough', Harrison

⁶²Emphasis added: Frederic Harrison, 'Empire and Humanity' [1880], in Frederic Harrison, *National and Social Problems* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), pp. 237–257, at p. 247.

⁶³Emphasis added: Harrison, *National and Social Problems*, pp. 247–248.

⁶⁴Emphasis added.

explained: 'But the interests of intellectual Progress are not confined within any boundaries of nation, and will assuredly be atrophied by any such narrow limitations.' That was why, '[i]t deeply concerns all those who have at heart the true interests of intellectual Progress to strive to counteract the tendencies towards national jealousy and deprecation fomented by an age of gigantic preparations for war and the passion for commercial and political supremacy.'⁶⁵

Thus, Harrison rejected what he termed 'cosmopolitanism', in the shape of people who 'pretend to be "Cosmopolitan" and superior to Country' in an article that otherwise was arguing the case for overcoming national narrowness and embracing intellectual and cultural openness and cooperation, in ways that many people today would call 'cosmopolitan'. In fact the title of Harrison's article may not be unrelated to the fact that it appeared, in 1896, in the third issue of a new magazine bearing the title *Cosmopolis*.⁶⁶ If the magazine's fate is anything to go by though, it is one more indication that the terms related to cosmopolitanism were not particularly popular. *Cosmopolis* ceased publication at the end of 1898. Be that as it may, Harrison went on using the term in a negative sense and during the Boer war he was castigating the doings of Cecil Rhodes and other such 'cosmopolitan gamblers'.⁶⁷

The picture is not completely black and white of course. The differences in the uses of the term cosmopolitanism that I observed regarding late twentieth-century and contemporary theorists were clearly there in the nineteenth century as well. Thus, Henry Sidgwick used 'cosmopolitan' in the sense of the paramount allegiance to humanity characteristic of utilitarianism, a sense that, as he went on to stress, by no means clashes with particular national or patriotic attachments, provided the latter are seen as derivative or instrumental and never lead to behaviour at odds with the paramount allegiance to humanity. And the major

⁶⁵Frederic Harrison, 'The True Cosmopolis' [1896], in Frederic Harrison, *Memories and Thoughts: Men—Books—Cities—Art* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1906), pp. 202–218, at p. 205, pp. 210–211.

⁶⁶*Cosmopolis: An International Monthly Review* was published between January 1896 and November 1898. For more, see Julia Reid, 'The Academy and Cosmopolis: Evolution and Culture in Robert Louis Stevenson's Periodical Encounters', in: Louise Henson et al. (eds), *Culture and Science in the Nineteenth-Century Media* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 263–274.

⁶⁷Frederic Harrison, 'The Boer War', in Frederic Harrison, *National and Social Problems* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), pp. 219–222, at p. 222.

utilitarian thinker of the previous generation, John Stuart Mill, though he routinely used ‘Humanity’ for praise and exhorted adhesion to the Religion of Humanity, did occasionally use the term ‘cosmopolitan’ with positive connotations, as for example in a speech that he gave as a Member of the House of Commons in 1867, when he rested his case ‘on the broadest cosmopolitan and humanitarian principles’.⁶⁸ At the turn of the century, John M. Robertson was even more emphatic in his advocacy of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and defended it as an indication of a more advanced stage in the evolutionary process. As he put it, ‘Certain patriots of the wilful sort are wont to flout reason in these matters, blustering of “false cosmopolitanism” and “salutary prejudice”.’ Robertson’s answer was that all such rhetoric was ‘false passion’. Those who indulged in it elected ‘wilfully to enfranchise from the mass of detected and convicted animal passions one which specially chimes with their sentiment, as if every other might not be allowed loose with as good reason’. He retorted that, ‘Ordinary observation makes us aware that the most commonplace and contracted minds are most prone to the passion of national and racial pride; whereas the men of antiquity who first seem to have transcended it are thereby marked out once for all as a higher breed.’ In other words, ‘It is in fact the proof of incapacity for any large or deep view of human life to be habitually and zealously “patriotic”.’ And Robertson went on to claim that, ‘The ideal of cosmopolitanism is at the other end of the psychological scale from that of the ignorance which has gone through no political evolution whatever; its very appearance implies past patriotism as a stepping-stone; and its ethic is to that of patriotism what civil law is to club law.’⁶⁹

Others, however, used ‘cosmopolitan’ to mean a stance opposed to any national or local attachment. Obviously it was such an understanding of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that Harrison was rejecting. Instead, he referred to the object of his (and the Comtists’) supreme allegiance as ‘Humanity’,

⁶⁸See John Stuart Mill, ‘England’s Danger through the Suppression of Her Maritime Power’ (Speech to the House of Commons, 5 August 1867), *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 223). For more details, see Georgios Varouxakis, *Liberty Abroad: J. S. Mill on International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 14, 171–179. For an earlier positive use of “cosmopolites” [in French] by Mill see: *Collected Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 692.

⁶⁹Emphasis added: John M[ackinnon] Robertson, *An Introduction to English Politics* (London: Grant Richards, and New York: New Amsterdam Book Company, 1900), 254–255.

‘the ever-present idea of Humanity as a whole’.⁷⁰ In this preference for ‘Humanity’ as opposed to ‘Cosmopolitanism’ to express the object of supreme universalist allegiance, Harrison was far from alone. One major reason why ‘cosmopolitanism’ was a tainted term and most people preferred to avoid using it was made clear by F. D. Maurice, who was sufficiently explicit in *Social Morality* (1869): ‘The cosmopolitan aspect of the French Revolution has seemed to some its most characteristic aspect.’ The epithet was supposed to indicate ‘a contempt for national distinctions’. On the other hand: ‘The title human...is open to no such objection.’ And ‘Humanity’ had been ‘accepted as their favourite watch-word’ by the followers of Auguste Comte. Thus, in rejecting ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ in favour of ‘human’ and ‘Humanity’, the Comtists (including, prominently, Harrison) and liberal Anglicans like Maurice or J. R. Seeley were agreed.⁷¹ Meanwhile ‘cosmopolitan’ was more often a term of abuse in the political battles of the time. During a speech at Crystal Palace at Sydenham in 1872, Disraeli developed his version of the Conservative party’s ‘national’ theory. Moreover, ‘No less than five times Disraeli asserted the ‘cosmopolitan’ character of Liberalism in contrast to the natural patriotic party.’⁷²

Thus Robertson was in the minority by the turn of the century. Most British thinkers in the early twentieth century were critical of the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ and what they took it to stand for and took clear distances from it. Here is what Alfred Zimmern was telling his audience during the Great War, in June 1915: ‘In Europe the worst enemy of Nationality is a bad idealism: in the Americas its worst enemy is materialism pure and simple. In Europe Nationalism, whether swollen with too much feeding, as in Germany, or suppressed and embittered by persecution, as in Poland, becomes hypertrophied, and is perverted into a disease: in the non-national States of the outer world it is in imminent danger of atrophy: *there it is not Nationalism but Cosmopolitanism which is the disease.*’⁷³ Zimmern went on to praise a travel book by Sir Mark Sykes, noting that ‘the author gives a diagnosis of this disease, in a

⁷⁰See, e.g., Harrison, *National and Social Problems*, p. 256.

⁷¹F. D. Maurice (1893) *Social Morality* (A New Edition, London: Macmillan, 1893), pp. 15–17, 105–107, 205–206.

⁷²Richard Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865–1915* (St Albans, Herts: Paladin, 1976), p. 53.

⁷³Emphasis added.

description which any one who has travelled on the confines of civilization or mixed with an immigrant population will understand and appreciate. He has invented a name of his own for it—Gosmabaleet—and here is his diagnosis:

Gosmabaleet: This word is descriptive of that peculiar and horrible sickness which attacks a certain percentage of inhabitants of interesting and delightful lands. The outward symptoms in the East are usually American spring-side boots and ugly European clothes. Internally it is productive of many evil vapours which issue from the lips in the form of catchwords such as ‘the Rights of Man’, ‘Leebarty’, ‘Civilisations’, ‘Baleetical Offences.’ The origin of this disease is to be traced to an ill-assimilated education of American or European type; the final stage is that in which the victim, hating his teachers and ashamed of his parentage and nationality, is intensely miserable.

It was, commented Zimmern, ‘a disease with which we are all familiar.’ It was ‘the problem arising from the contact of races and nations and social groups at different levels of civilisation and social influence and with different standards of life and conduct.’ What was wrong about ‘the snob, or the cosmopolitan, or the degenerate type of native Christian’ was ‘not his ideals but his personality. ... Their failure is due, not to wrong ideals, but to wrong methods of pursuing them: it is a failure of education. In reaching out after something which they feel to be higher they have *lost themselves*: they have severed their links with their past: and with that past has gone a portion of their own soul and strength.’ As a result, ‘[f]eeling weak and helpless and foolish, cast suddenly into a new world, of which they know nothing in detail, they have no resource but to imitate those great ones whose ideals they share. So they become parasites, pale ghosts of those whom they have selected for their exemplars.’⁷⁴

Zimmern identified the particular fault with the education system which made its victims hate their teachers, feel ashamed of their parents, and end up becoming ‘intensely miserable’ themselves: ‘The defect is that it is an individual education and not a social education. It takes each man as an individual and flings him alone and unaided into a new environment. It fails to use, for the purpose of fitting him for his new life,

⁷⁴ Alfred Zimmern, ‘True and False Nationalism’ [Address to the Inter-denominational Conference of Social Service Unions at Swanwick, 28 June 1915], in Alfred E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government with Other War-Time Essays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1918), pp. 61–86, at pp. 74–76.

that corporate spirit which, in some form or other, was his mainstay in the old.' And yet, opined Zimmern, 'We all owe far more to society than we shall ever know till we are cast ashore on a desert island. The types that I am speaking of, the de-classed, de-localised, uprooted individuals who form a large and increasing proportion of modern communities, *are* cast ashore on a desert island.'⁷⁵ It was for exactly this problem of 'the man without roots' that 'Nationality provides a solution', according to Zimmern: 'Nationality is the one social force capable of maintaining, for these people, their links with the past and keeping alive in them the spark of the higher life and that irreplaceable sentiment of self-respect without which all professions of fine ideals are but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal.'⁷⁶

Zimmern was against world-government, as we saw, and thus his rejection of the language of cosmopolitanism may not be altogether surprising. But 'cosmopolitanism' was rejected and criticized even by people who did subscribe to some form of world-government and stood on very different ground from that of Zimmern. Here is what Bertrand Russell was writing during the Great War: 'But neither tariffs nor financiers would be able to cause serious trouble, if it were not for the sentiment of national pride.' Of course national pride could take different directions: 'National pride might be on the whole beneficent, if it took the direction of emulation in the things that are important to civilization. If we prided ourselves upon our poets, our men of science, or the justice and humanity of our social system, we might find in national pride a stimulus to useful endeavours.' But such matters played a very small part in his time, he lamented: 'National pride, as it exists now, is almost exclusively concerned with power and dominion, with the extent of territory that a nation owns, and with its capacity for enforcing its will against the opposition of other nations.' Russell's admonition was in favour of changing that dramatically: 'Men must learn to be conscious of the common interests of mankind in which all are at one, rather than of those supposed interests in which the nations are divided.' Having said that, he elaborated:

It is not necessary, or even desirable, to obliterate the differences of manners and custom and tradition between different nations. These differences enable each nation to make its own distinctive contribution to the

⁷⁵Zimmern, 'True and False Nationalism', p. 77.

⁷⁶Zimmern, 'True and False Nationalism', pp. 77–78.

sum total of the world's civilization. What is to be desired is *not cosmopolitanism*,⁷⁷ not the absence of all national characteristics that one associates with couriers, *wagon-lit* attendants, and others, who have had everything distinctive obliterated by multiple and trivial contacts with men of every civilized country. *Such cosmopolitanism is the result of loss, not gain. The international spirit which we should wish to see produced will be something added to love of country, not something taken away.*⁷⁸ Just as patriotism does not prevent a man from feeling affection for his own country.

Russell went on to explain more what the international spirit he was proposing would look like:

But it will somewhat alter the character of that affection. The things which he will desire for his own country will no longer be things which can only be acquired at the expense of others, but rather those things in which the excellence of any one country is to the advantage of all the world. He will wish his country to be great in the arts of peace, to be eminent in thought and science, to be magnanimous and just and generous. He will wish it to help mankind on the way towards that better world of liberty and international concord which must be realized if any happiness is to be left to man. He will not desire for his country the passing triumphs of a narrow possessiveness, but rather the enduring triumph of having helped to embody in human affairs something of that spirit of brotherhood which Christ taught and which the Christian churches have forgotten. He will see that this spirit embodies not only the highest morality, but also the truest wisdom, and the only road by which the nations, torn and bleeding with the wounds which scientific madness has inflicted, can emerge into a life where growth is possible and joy is not banished at the frenzied call of unreal and fictitious duties. Deeds inspired by hate are not duties, whatever pain and self-sacrifice they may involve. Life and hope for the world are to be found only in the deeds of love.⁷⁹

Such statements show that there were some remarkable continuities in thinking about nationality and cosmopolitanism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The kind of international spirit Russell was proposing, with noble emulation between nations in terms of their contributions to mankind and its civilization, was remarkably reminiscent of the

⁷⁷ Emphasis added.

⁷⁸ Emphasis added.

⁷⁹ Bertrand Russell, *Political Ideals* (London: Unwin Books, 1963 [1917]), 85, 89–90.

attitude of his godfather, John Stuart Mill, as well as of other Victorians (Matthew Arnold comes to mind).⁸⁰ I have also argued in this paper that there were remarkable continuities on the main preoccupations of internationalist thinkers, as well as in the language most of them used, and that the Great War did not lead to a cataclysmic change in internationalist thinking. The most remarkable continuity is that the majority of internationalists of different hues tried hard to take their distances from the strong negative connotations of the terms associated with ‘cosmopolitanism’ and that the Great War did not make much difference in that respect.

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⁸⁰See Varouxakis, ‘“Patriotism”, “Cosmopolitanism” and “Humanity” in Victorian Political Thought’; and Georgios Varouxakis, ‘Cosmopolitan patriotism in J. S. Mill’s political thought and activism’, in Nadia Urbinati and Alex Zakaras (eds), *J. S. Mill’s Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 277–297.

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The BBC's Corporate Cosmopolitanism: The Diasporic Voice Between Empire and Cold War

Marie Gillespie and Eva Nieto McAvoy

In 1942, George Orwell edited *Voice*, a poetry magazine radio series for the BBC Eastern Service. In one of the programmes, the contributors included poets and writers renowned in different parts of the world, such as Venu Chitale, J.M.Tambimuttu, T.S. Eliot, Una Marson, Mulk Raj Anand, Christopher Pemberton, Narayana Menon, George Orwell, Nancy Parratt and William Empson. This poetry programme brought together diasporic and non-diasporic broadcasters and writers in the fight against fascism—and the shared belief in the power of the pen over the sword. Many of the participants, as well as most of those who became translators, editors or monitors of the BBC's wartime foreign language broadcasts, had arrived in Britain as refugees. Through their work for the BBC's Overseas Service, they contributed to forging the corporation's cosmopolitan ethos. Out of horrors of war and the fight against fascism,

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how did one of Britain's foremost cosmopolitan institutions emerge? This chapter attempts to answer this question.

Launched in 1932, the Empire Service was first and foremost 'His Master's Voice'—the voice of the British Empire.¹ During the Second World War, its role expanded and changed, as did its nomenclature—from Overseas Service to External Services, and then only in 1965 to the World Service. The chief driving factor in the increase to 44 language services was the need for wartime propaganda. With this shift, the Service brought about the global expansion of the BBC's model of public service broadcasting, and defined the editorial principles that continue to underpin it and established its reputation for cosmopolitan impartiality.² Radio as a medium had a unique capacity for fostering cosmopolitan practices, as 'radio waves don't respect national borders and so have potential to interrogate nationalism' and, in turn, to engender cosmopolitan sensibilities – but not automatically.³ The 'right kind of diasporic voice'—the ultimate mediator—contributed hugely to establishing a relationship of trust with global audiences—a role that is rarely acknowledged and which this chapter seeks to explain.⁴ Combined with the BBC World Service's editorial ethos, the diasporic and cosmopolitan cultural capital of the staff at Bush House (home of the World Service until 2012) helped build its credibility as an international broadcaster, and its significance for British public and cultural diplomacy.⁵

The World Service has variously been described as a geostrategic weapon, a vital adjunct to the UK's political and economic interests, an asset to British international prestige, a core element of foreign policy, an agent of public and cultural diplomacy, but also as 'Britain's gift to the world'. A connecting if unacknowledged thread in discourses about the World Service has been 'the diasporic sensibilities and cosmopolitan

¹Hill, Andrew, 'The BBC Empire Service: The Voice, the Discourse of the Master and Ventriloquism', in *South Asian Diaspora* 2: 1 (2010), 25–38.

²Marie Gillespie and Alban Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism: Diasporas and Diplomacy at the BBC World Service, 1932–2012', in *Diasporas and Diplomacy Cosmopolitan Contact Zones at the BBC World Service*, ed. Marie Gillespie and Alban Webb (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1–20.

³Susan Smulyan, 'Live from Waikiki: Colonialism, Race, and Radio in Hawaii, 1934–1963', *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, 27, no. 1 (2007), 63.

⁴Ruvani Ranasinha, 'South Asian Broadcasters in Britain and the BBC: Talking to India (1941–1943)', *South Asian Diaspora*, 2, no. 1 (1 March 2010), 57–71.

⁵Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 2–3, 5.

cultural capital of the BBC's foreign language staff whose daily interactions with their British-born counterparts created a "contact-zone" where British and multi-national imageries intermingled'.⁶ Our research has focused on the World Service as a diasporic and cosmopolitan contact zone, in which the fusion of editorial practices with the capacities and sensibilities of its diasporic workforce allowed it to cement its credibility with audiences across the globe. In this chapter, we hope to expose the invisible and inaudible yet vital presence of the World Service not only in the BBC's history but also in British history and culture, which remains largely unrecognised even to this day. Capturing this cosmopolitan history and culture has not only been a very important recuperative exercise for us as Open University researchers committed to publicly engaged research, but our research has also contributed to ensuring a sustainable future for the World Service via our evidence-based submissions to the UK's House of Lords Soft Power Committee.

This chapter discusses the wartime transformation of the BBC from Empire Service to OverseasService, when dissident and diasporic multilingual intellectuals, writers, artists and linguists helped forge its cosmopolitan ethos. First seen as 'mere translators' who voiced and creatively adapted centrally produced news material attuned to the local sensibilities of overseas audiences, they slowly gained creative and editorial autonomy. They acted as cultural, political and identity mediators between Britain and their (former) home countries.⁷ The chapter examines how intellectuals working for the World Service enabled the emergence of a new cosmopolitan consciousness that charted an ambiguous space between imperialism and post colonialism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and precipitated by the Cold War, the corporation developed its well-known ethical creed of independence from the government. In this way, wartime experiences and subsequent developments contributed to the emergence of what Gillespie calls 'corporate cosmopolitanism'.⁸

First, we explain why and how the World Service can be analysed as a diasporic contact zone and define corporate cosmopolitanism as a form

⁶Ibid., 4.

⁷Marie Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity: Refugee Intellectuals, Exiled Poets and Corporate Cosmopolitanism at the BBC World Service', in *Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities*, ed. Kim Knott and Seán McLoughlin (London: Zed Books, 2010), 7.

⁸Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity'; Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism'.

of critical cosmopolitanism.⁹ Second, we examine its transformation from a diasporic empire broadcaster to a potential global ‘umpire’ during the war and postwar periods. Third, we explore its everyday politics and practices of translation and transformation—central to critical cosmopolitanism—in several language services, focusing on particular broadcasters as study cases. By analysing cosmopolitan practices and their transformational potential, using a critical and socially situated approach—based on techniques of organisational history and ethnography—we hope to get closer to explaining the paradox of the World Service: its reputation for cosmopolitan impartiality despite a historical relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its role as an agent of public diplomacy.

FROM DIASPORIC CONTACT ZONE TO CORPORATE COSMOPOLITANISM

The BBC World Service was set up as an intra-diasporic contact zone for Britons in 1932 (as the ‘Empire Service’), and in 1938 its first foreign language services started. During the war, it later developed into a cross-diasporic contact zone, broadcasting in up to 45 foreign languages (known then as the ‘External Services’ which comprised the ‘Overseas’ and the ‘European Services’). When we speak of the World Service as a diasporic ‘contact zone’, we mean that it provides sites of intra-diasporic contact and dialogue, and spaces for cross-diasporic creativity, representation and translation.¹⁰ However, contact zones are also marked by historically forged asymmetric power relations (colonialism, imperialism, globalisation, war), and inequalities of gender and class.¹¹ These power relations were negotiated not only through the interactions between British and diasporic broadcasters and their audiences, but also through the web of professional and personal exchanges, friendships, working relationships and rivalries among broadcasters at Bush House.¹² As such,

⁹Gerard Delanty, ‘The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’, *British Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 1 (2006), 25–47.

¹⁰Mary Louise Pratt, ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’, *Profession*, 1991, 33–40; Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (Routledge, 1992); James Clifford, *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Harvard University Press, 1997).

¹¹Pratt, ‘Arts of the Contact Zone’, 34.

¹²Gillespie, ‘Diasporic Creativity’, 239.

the World Service is an agent and a product of conflict and transgression, as well as a space of cultural translation and innovation.¹³ Conversely, diasporic identities are themselves co-shaped by media representations.¹⁴

Analysing the World Service as a diasporic and cosmopolitan contact zone enabled us to partially explain the paradox of it being an international broadcaster funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with an explicit obligation to serve British interests, and an implicit remit to support foreign policy objectives abroad, yet having a long established reputation for cosmopolitan openness, fairness and impartiality.¹⁵ We argue that its employment practices and editorial and translation activities, enhanced by its diasporic staff, have been central to its functioning in the mediated space of the global public, and to its potential to contribute to an emergent global civil society. As a state broadcaster, the World Service was funded through a parliamentary 'grant-in-aid' administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) until 2014. This meant that the FCO dictated where the service broadcasted, but editorial control rested with broadcasters, except at times of war. It nevertheless retained—and still does—an 'aura of cosmopolitan objectivity', albeit limited by corporate interests and British geopolitical priorities.¹⁶

¹³This approach to contact zones aims at locating 'transnational and diasporic subjects—their embodied interactions, activities, networks and spaces—in rooted institutions and delineated spaces. This understanding of contact zone contrasts with post-colonial approaches which emphasize hyper-mobility, rootlessness and transience' Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 9.

¹⁴Marie Gillespie, *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change* (Psychology Press, 1995); Karim Haiderali Karim, *The Media of Diaspora* (Psychology Press, 2003); Annabelle Sreberny, 'Media and Diasporic Consciousness: An Exploration among Iranians in London', in *Ethnic Minorities & The Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries*, ed. Cottle Simon (McGraw-Hill Education (UK), 2000), 179–196; Annabelle Sreberny, 'Collectivity and Connectivity: Diaspora and Mediated Identities', in *Global Encounters: Media and Cultural Transformation*, ed. Gitte Stald and Thomas Tufte (Luton: University of Luton Press, 2002), 217–234.

¹⁵Of course, the BBC's impartiality is bought-into by some users but not by others, who believe the World Service to be a state-paid propaganda machine. However, audience research repeatedly reports that audiences around the world trust the BBC, often more than other international broadcasters and believe that it tells the truth. Graham Mytton, *Global Audiences: Research for Worldwide Broadcasting* (John Libbey, 1993); Richard Sambrook, *Global Voice: Britain's Future in International Broadcasting* (London: Premium Publishing, 2007).

¹⁶Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity', 236.

However, one must not assume that diasporic contact zones automatically generate cosmopolitan cultural capital and competences, or 'that diasporic or cosmopolitan practices are inherently politically progressive, culturally innovative or socially cohesive'.¹⁷ Despite the positive valence accorded to these terms in much of the literature on diasporas and cosmopolitanism, it is worth reminding ourselves that dictators and mass murderers, too, can be diasporic, and indeed cosmopolitans. If there is a link at all between the history of the World Service as a diasporic contact zone and as a forum of cosmopolitan thinking and practices, then that link must be theorised.

Basing this study on a foundational definition of the World Service as a diasporic and cosmopolitan contact zone, we have made some theoretical choices. One of these concerns is the concept of 'diaspora'. Rogers Brubaker critiques that 'the application of the term diaspora to an ever-broadening set of cases: essentially to any and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed in space'.¹⁸ Yet probably, the argument merely echoes three decades of social scientists questioning whether concepts like ethnic group or cultural community can be used as units of analysis.¹⁹ The consensus among all students is that ethnic, religious or national terms cannot be used in such reifying ways. Diasporas are best understood, not in substantial terms as discrete, bounded cultural entities, but as involving a stance, a claim and a category of practice.²⁰ Diasporas are neither mere hypothetical constructs, nor are they self-evident and self-enclosed unanimous collectives.

The dialectical understanding of diasporas proposed here seeks to analyse the relationship between real people who claim and implement a diasporic identity as a common banner (an emic perspective), and institutions such as the World Service that recognise and legitimate and/or undermine and contest such claims (etic perspective). These negotiations might prove to be more complex than not. For example, despite

¹⁷ Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 9.

¹⁸ Rogers Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (1 January 2005), 1.

¹⁹ Gillespie, *Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change*; Gerd Baumann, *Contesting Culture: Discourses of Identity in Multi-Ethnic London* (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Waveland Press, 1998).

²⁰ Brubaker, 'The "Diaspora" Diaspora', 10–12.

their central role at the World Service, diasporic staff have mostly been in lower hierarchies at the BBC, in terms of promotion, editorial position and pay.²¹ Ultimately, 'The term diaspora can only be shorthand for successive displacements and complex movements',²² which this chapter seeks to trace in order to consider if the diasporic contact zones at the World Service can be described as cosmopolitan, bearing in mind these and other contradictions that are inherent to contact zones.

The concept of cosmopolitanism is equally ambiguous. Here, we draw on and develop the notion of 'critical cosmopolitanism'.²³ Critical cosmopolitanism is committed to three main objectives: first, to a critique of methodological nationalism which presumes the unit of analysis to be the nation; second, to the historical and comparative analysis of the 'cosmopolitan condition'; and third, to the development of 'methodological cosmopolitanism', opening up new fields of enquiry to expose the principles and practices of transformative cosmopolitanism in a wide variety of social institutions, past and present.²⁴ Methodological cosmopolitanism seeks to go beyond established dualisms of the national and the foreign, the global and local, centre and periphery, and to investigate the ambiguities of these categories.²⁵ So in researching the World Service, we examine how the 'centre' (Bush House) shapes but may also be redefined from the 'peripheries', and how new voices, interests and practices may come to the fore in this process.

The diasporic contact zones at the World Service foster and force encounters between cosmopolitanisms of various kinds: hegemonic, elite, metropolitan versions of cosmopolitanism at Bush House are entangled with vernacular, demotic, multi-centric and rooted cosmopolitanisms in the myriad regional outposts in the peripheries.²⁶ Of course, the

²¹Jadzia Denselow, Andrew Taussig and Marie Gillespie, *Career trajectories at the BBC World Service: managing diversity. Confidential report for the BBC World Service*. (The Open University & BBC World Service, 2010).

²²Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity', 241.

²³Delanty, 'The Cosmopolitan Imagination'.

²⁴Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, 'Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda', *The British Journal of Sociology* 57, no. 1 (March 2006), 3, doi:10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00091.x.

²⁵Beck and Sznaider, 'Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences'.

²⁶M. Gillespie, 'Security, Media and Multicultural Citizenship: A Collaborative Ethnography', *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 10, no. 3 (1 August 2007), 275–293, doi:10.1177/1367549407080731.

distinction between different kinds of cosmopolitanisms is one of degree, not of a black-and-white dichotomy between hegemonic as opposed to mutual, metropolitan as opposed to reciprocal. These polarities, however, indicate one possibility, at least, to link the World Service's core activity, translation in the very widest sense, with its core aspiration and widespread reputation, the creation of a global public sphere of cosmopolitan exchange.

Both diasporic and cosmopolitan claims and practices are dialectical processes worked out in and through power relations and structures within and beyond the walls of Bush House and the Foreign Office. They are also, necessarily, intimately linked to translation activities at the World Service. Translation is as central to the World Service as it is to critical cosmopolitanism. Unlike political and moral approaches to cosmopolitanism, which emphasise a world polity or a universal culture, critical cosmopolitanism insists on cosmopolitanism as a socially situated process and 'a form of cultural contestation in which the logic of translation plays a central role'.²⁷

Beyond the fact that most broadcasts were originally scripted in English and translated into other languages, translations in a broader sense included other transactions such as transporting, transposing and transmitting, all of which are central practices of 'critical cosmopolitanism'. 'Transporting' signifies the flows of communication to and from between Bush House and its regional desks and correspondents, stringers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the foreign governments of those languages and countries in which it broadcasts, and perhaps between regional production centres. 'Translating' in this more specific sense describes activities concerned with primarily linguistic matters, but also with cultural translations. Related to the latter, 'transposing'—which in musical terms means playing the same notes in another key—refers to the adaptation and re-versioning of a programme or a genre for a different audience.²⁸ 'Transmitting' refers to the decisions about which audiences, where, get what, when, why and how. In this chapter, we will focus on translating and transposing as the

²⁷Delanty, 'The Cosmopolitan Imagination', 25.

²⁸For an example of transposing, see Andrew Skuse, 'Voices of Freedom Afghan Politics in Radio Soap Opera', *Ethnography* 6, no. 2 (6 January 2005), 159–81, doi:[10.1177/1466138105057547](https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138105057547).

central activities in which diasporic broadcasters in the contact zone were involved, and which fostered cosmopolitan practices.

These interacting choices about transporting, translating, transposing and transmitting allow the World Service to do its work of transforming. From its beginnings to now, it has always had to transform intra-diasporic contact zones into cross-diasporic ones, and then infuse these with BBC-style cosmopolitan convictions and/or global civil society concerns and a sense of 'world citizenship'. Practices of cultural translation are intimately linked to social transformations in a global world. Relations between self, other and the world may be transformed through local encounters with the global. Such encounters depend on the existence of the 'global public', or globally mediated communication processes, through which discursive spaces are opened up. The global public, as materialised through global news institutions like the World Service, can, and sometimes does, play a critical role in catalysing processes of social and political transformation. 'Global conversations' across cultural and linguistic boundaries can activate moments of 'openness', mobilise the cosmopolitan imagination and trigger a learning process.

Diasporas at the World Service highly contributed to the cosmopolitan practices of translation and transformation with their cultural and cosmopolitan capitals. But far from straightforward translating practices (if such even exists), the range of activities gave them agency as cultural as well as political mediators that would show in their choice of vocabulary and voice for their audience at home. Partial or selective translations, translations among languages other than English are among the practices that might explain that the broadcast was not really a 'mere translation' at all, but a new artefact. It was usually based, or at least sourced from stories produced at the imperial centre with more or less explicit as well as implicit political and ideological content that projected Britain and British institutions and democracy in a good light, but it was now tailor-made to serve the purposes of the broadcaster as well as of the audience.

Much of the politics of transformation aimed at attracting and influencing audiences overseas positively towards Britain but also in projecting values that Britain sought to promote (e.g. the rule of law and democratic institutions) happened informally and certainly off-air (e.g. in the canteen and local coffee shops). The Bush House canteen was indeed a diasporic and cosmopolitan contact zone if there ever was one, most probably as it gave the staff a chance to interact on a daily basis cross-diasporically and with their British counterparts. As Canadian journalist Stanley Maxted put it in a *London Calling* article of 17–23 January

1943, the canteen was ‘a sort of an All-nations Hall of Fame with sandwiches and coffee thrown in’.

However, this performative cosmopolitanism as enacted in socially situated everyday practices of translation and contestation, was conditioned not just by cultural sensitivities, but by corporate imperatives (not least its key role in Briatin’s diplomatic infrastructure), as well as journalistic interests (promoting impartiality, objectivity and balance as key journalistic values).²⁹ Even the greatest claim to cosmopolitan brokerage can thus never play an innocent game of reciprocity among all parties involved. Choices in transporting, translating, transposing and transmitting are the inevitable mortgages imposed on any centre that claims an objectivist cosmopolitan voice, but also needs culturally sensitive and world-regionally adjusted services. In searching for a bridge between the World Service’s diasporic roots and transnational routes, and its reputation of cosmopolitan impartiality, the transactions between regional production centres and Bush House (periphery and core), and the selections, techniques, practices and personnel involved in these, need to be tracked. These transactions comprise decisions about commissions, translators, re-translations, re-versions of genres and texts, editorial structures and what to do or not do with the products. These institutional practices contribute to a form of critical cosmopolitanism that can be best described as ‘corporate cosmopolitanism’.³⁰

The BBC World Service corporate cosmopolitanism’s origin can as we suggest above and will argue below be traced to the very beginning of the BBC, in the shift from private to public service corporation, which became global soon after. This expansion of overseas services, and the encounters between diasporic broadcasters at home and the audience abroad, contributed to the redefinition of the World Service editorial practice and cosmopolitan ethos.

FROM EMPIRE SERVICE TO WORLD SERVICE

This section traces how the BBC World Service was set up as an intra-diasporic contact zone to connect British citizens and subjects overseas in intimate anonymity to the ‘mother country’, and later developed into

²⁹ Gillespie and Webb, ‘Corporate Cosmopolitanism’, 10.

³⁰ Marie Gillespie and Gerd Baumann, ‘Diasporic Contact Zones at the BBC World Service’, *Tuning In Working Paper Series*, no. 14; Gillespie, ‘Diasporic Creativity’; Gillespie and Webb, ‘Corporate Cosmopolitanism’.

a cross-diasporic contact zone, where competing goals and conflicting interests had to be negotiated on a daily basis. The emergent corporate cosmopolitanism can be traced in these early editorial practices, rapidly enhanced by the contributions of the diasporas in Britain, which soon became an essential part of the service. There is, however, a profoundly contradictory nature of the World Service as an institution in which cosmopolitan practices emerged organically, empirically and ethnographically in response to the demands of international broadcasting. There is therefore a need to see national/nationalist and cosmopolitan thought and practice in dialectical relationship at the service.

The World Service has been a diasporic contact zone from its beginnings. Even the Empire Service had a diasporic mission statement, if selectively so. From the moment of its foundation in December 1932, the BBC short-wave Empire Service pursued two diasporic goals at once. Its founder and first director general, Sir John Reith, announced the diasporic missions of the BBC Empire Service with an uncanny ambiguity: this worldwide British radio network would provide 'a unique opportunity to foster bonds of understanding and friendship between the peoples of Britain's scattered dominions and the mother country, and to bring to Britons overseas the benefits already enjoyed by the British public at home'.³¹ The latter could be easily identified as British-born administrators, soldiers, settlers, experts and ill-assorted expatriates. Yet a worldwide radio service for 'Britons overseas' made no economic sense, so Sir John, later Lord Reith, set out to target an alternative, and politically more opportune, diaspora for his foundational argument: 'the peoples of Britain's scattered dominions'. We may safely assume that the Empire Service was not meant to provide a global diasporic forum for, say, the descendants of indentured labourers from British India scattered from the Caribbean to Eastern and Southern Africa. The diasporic audience of Britons overseas was obvious, yet millions of non-obvious listeners, too, were styled as a diasporic community of loyal 'peoples' eager to listen to the Empire Service.

The Empire Service broadcasting to the dominions and colonies could be seen in Lacanian terms as 'the voice of the master', aiming at reinforcing the British Empire at a time in which the dominions were

³¹ Gerard Mansell, *Broadcasting to the World: Forty Years of BBC External Services* (BBC, 1973), 1.

seeking independence.³² As Andrew Hill argues, the image of a lonely listener in the Bush was far from accurate and only served the purpose of justifying the need for a voice from metropolitan Britain that would strengthen links with and among the British diaspora. One of the objectives of the Empire Service was to “project” England overseas: to define “Englishness” before other countries took the initiative. Such a projection of the nation, its politics, society, culture and belief systems, would be essential, [...] for the maintenance of “peace itself”.³³

However, a unified idea of ‘Britishness’ was soon challenged by class, gender, race and centre-peripheries—national and transnational—tensions. Radio, and in particular the BBC, helped imagine and re-imagine the notion of Britishness at home and abroad; Britishness as constructed not just within national borders, but in dialogue with the greater world and shaped by the interactions between the broadcasters and their audiences, both British and non-British.³⁴ In this sense, it could be argued that, already from its origin, the objective of the Empire Service to reinforce its imperial claims—at least invoking a common identity by way of an imagined community—was destabilised by voices from abroad.

This tendency to incorporate dissident and foreign voices that underscored the cosmopolitan ethos of the World Service became essential with the inauguration of the languages services in 1938, even if the main objective was still considered in national terms—i.e. projecting Britain, this time to peoples scattered around the world.

The failure of Empire, together with the failure of Britain’s appeasement policy vis-à-vis European fascists, meant that foreign language services became a political and diplomatic priority. The BBC’s overseas services were therefore conceived in political terms as a response to Britain’s geopolitical needs, even if it fought from its very inceptions for its editorial independence.³⁵ This was particularly so because the FCO decided to fund the new service, which inaugurated a long and complex system of

³²Andrew Hill, ‘The BBC Empire Service: The Voice, the Discourse of the Master and Ventriloquism’, *South Asian Diaspora* 2, no. 1 (1 March 2010), 25–38, doi:[10.1080/19438190903541952](https://doi.org/10.1080/19438190903541952).

³³Emma Robertson, “‘I Get a Real Kick out of Big Ben’: BBC Versions of Britishness on the Empire and General Overseas Service, 1932–1948”, *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 28, no. 4 (2008), 460, 459.

³⁴Robertson, ‘I Get a Real Kick out of Big Ben’, 460–468.

³⁵Gillespie and Webb, ‘Corporate Cosmopolitanism’, 5.

financial accountability. Foreign language broadcasting was deemed essential to counter the propaganda efforts of fascism. Its main goal was to put forward the British interpretation of events in a competitive international broadcasting context in which Germany and Italy were already ahead.

The first language services to be inaugurated were the Arabic service (January 1938) followed a few months later by the Spanish and Portuguese service to Latin America. The former was a response to Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia, while the latter was as a strategy to counter Nazi propaganda in Latin America. The Munich crisis (September 1938) gave birth to the German, French and Italian language services, when the BBC was given short notice to provide news in these languages to accompany an 'Address to the Nation' by the appeasement Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. Soon after, it was decided that the new European Services should continue indefinitely.³⁶ By 1942, the BBC broadcasted in over 45 languages. Galvanising opposition to European fascists gave the External Services its moral credentials as a globalising voice for civil rights; 1930 s' anti-Stalinism further updated its global authority as a cosmopolitan voice for 'democracy'.

Much of the World Service's attraction and intelligence has been and remains engineered by diasporic intellectuals, writers and artists who had no 'natural' part in the British-born imperial diaspora that Lord Reith had imagined. The credibility brought about by the diasporas at the BBC depended on their transcultural capital; on their ability to translate between languages and cultures, acting as intermediators between the corporation and the audiences, between Britain and the world.³⁷ The BBC employed and emancipated many prominent members of post-independence political and artistic elites, with examples ranging from India 1947 to South Africa now. Diasporic individuals, especially exiled or asylum-seeking intellectuals from continental Europe (1933–1989) played key roles at the World Service. There was a pervasiveness of diasporic, national, ethnic or religious 'outsiders' inside Bush House, but also in London's wider intellectual circles—London School of Economics and the School of Oriental and African Studies are just a few minutes' walk from Bush House.

³⁶ Gerard Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told: 50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 57.

³⁷ Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 7–8.

During the Second World War and the years leading up to it, London was not short of diasporic intellectuals, many of them eager to continue their fight against fascism.

Encounters and cultural exchanges were taking place also off-air and outside of the BBC, where translation and transculturation were also at the centre. Through their participation in magazines, publishing houses and institutions such as the World Service, these intellectuals fed into and from a public sphere at the intersections of the national and the transnational. T.S. Eliot became a key figure in facilitating encounters through his work as an editor at Faber, as did Orwell as literary editor of *Tribune*. Both were among the many cosmopolitan literary brokers in London who fostered cultural encounters on and off air. The Austrian exile and BBC monitor George Weidenfeld started his publishing house Weidenfeld & Nicolson in 1948; Sri Lankan Tamil poet and contributor to the BBC programme 'Talking to India', Meary James Tambimuttu, founded the magazine *Poetry London* in 1939 and Editions Poetry London in 1943, while his colleague Mulk Raj Anand helped shape London's literary modernism by injecting anti-imperial and cosmopolitan perspectives.³⁸

Most of these writers, intellectuals and artists came together once again at the BBC, whether as monitors or broadcasters for the World Service. The BBC institutionalised the diasporic and cosmopolitan contact zone that their literary and intellectual endeavours had catalysed as the 'stages' of these encounters.³⁹ From the late 1930s to now, the World Service provided a creative 'home away from home' for many exiled and refugee writers, intellectuals, artists and poets. In turn, these writers enhanced the cosmopolitan practices at the service, transforming the diasporic into a cosmopolitan contact zone, through their everyday practices of translation, transnationalism, transformation and cultural encounters.

THE RIGHT KIND OF (DIASPORIC) VOICE

If nowadays the tone and idiom of the diasporic voices enables the World Service to create a sense of intimacy and connection, as well as a relationship of trust, with global audiences, this wasn't always the case.⁴⁰ On the

³⁸Ranasinha, 'South Asian Broadcasters in Britain and the BBC'.

³⁹Carlos Reijnen and Marleen Rensen, *European Encounters: Intellectual Exchange and the Rethinking of Europe 1914–1945* (Rodopi, 2014), 28.

⁴⁰Ranasinha, 'South Asian Broadcasters in Britain and the BBC'; Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism'.

contrary, the early Empire Service projected a metropolitan and declarative voice that told listeners how the world was; it was the voice of authority and of a truth teller, aimed at reinforcing its imperial message. The early success of transmissions in English for all those 'who think of the United Kingdom as home, wherever they may be' was based on a nostalgic evocation of Britain as a spiritual and symbolic homeland. If the Empire Service reminded people of home, King George V's Christmas message made them *feel* at home. Britons at home and abroad were imagined as bound together in one global imperial family through the means of radio.

The linking function of radio was acknowledged by its founder, Sir John Reith, from the very beginning, and the voice that facilitated it played an essential part. As Andrew Hill argues, the political function of the Empire Service—in particular its identification with Lacan's discourse of the master—can be explained not only by its linking function, but by the unilinear, godlike and even supernatural attributes associated with the voice.⁴¹ The relationship between broadcasters and listeners becomes one of uneven power, reinforced by the fact that the voice can be heard, but the body behind it remains unseen.⁴² But from the very beginning, different obstacles impaired the Empire Service's dissemination of the discourse of the master, not least of all, the fact that the voice of the motherland itself—its tone, idiom and accent—was not always appreciated by the Britons abroad.⁴³

Hill's interpretation of the Empire Service leaves little room for audience's agency. In contrast, Emma Robertson and Simon Potter argue that the audiences also contributed to the making of the Empire Service and its future incarnations as the External and later World Services.⁴⁴ Emma Robertson has argued that through letters to the BBC, the public could engage in intra- and often cross-diasporic encounters and hence participate in an air mediated cosmopolitan contact zone.⁴⁵ Potter suggests that the audiences not only determined the content of the programmes, but also the voices they wanted to hear. The early BBC Empire Service's distinct metropolitan voice might have

⁴¹ Hill, 'The BBC Empire Service'.

⁴² Ibid., 29.

⁴³ Ibid., 30–32.

⁴⁴ Robertson, 'It Is a Real Joy to Get Listening of Any Kind from the Homeland: BBC Radio and Empire Audiences in the 1930 s'; Simon J. Potter, *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922–1970* (OUP, Oxford, 2012), 40.

⁴⁵ Hill, 'The BBC Empire Service', 5; Emma Robertson, 'It Is a Real Joy to Get Listening of Any Kind from the Homeland', 24.

seemed 'to some a marker of cultural quality and authority, but to others it evoked privilege, hierarchy, and the narrow interests of Britain's elite'.⁴⁶ For that reason, it was felt from early on that diasporic Britons would enhance the credibility and reach of the service. The practice would intensify and be consciously adopted during the Second World War and, as we have seen, include diasporic subjects from beyond the British colonies and dominions in order to speak to the world at war. The resulting diasporic contact zones were not only contributing to projecting Britain abroad, but 'colonised' the BBC in turn, by which it was 'influenced by forms of feedback from its overseas target areas'.⁴⁷

During the war, the choice of voices who would speak to the world became then central for the BBC languages services. As Footitt and Tobia argue, in an occupied Europe in which the official language had been co-opted by the occupying authorities, broadcasting in foreign languages was an opportunity 'to reposition the language, liberating it from its hostile enemy environment'.⁴⁸ The fact that the language would act as a vehicle for the British/Allied message meant that in order to be credible it needed to be delivered not only in the right language but with the right voice. Accent, tone and cadence were essential to conveying a British perspective, without compromising the BBC's reputation for impartiality.⁴⁹ It would be best achieved if the broadcasters were native speakers of the language. Wartime exiles in Britain, as well as other diasporic communities, were among the many foreign language speakers who were eager to contribute to the war of words against fascism. But, as they started working for the BBC and constituted the diasporic contact zones, it was obvious that there was a 'clearly asymmetrical linguistic relationship of power' also among the staff at the BBC.⁵⁰

The role of the diasporic broadcasters has therefore been described as that of the puppet of a ventriloquist.⁵¹ One of many cases of

⁴⁶Potter, *Broadcasting Empire*, 11.

⁴⁷Ibid., 2.

⁴⁸Footitt and Tobia, *WarTalk*, 71.

⁴⁹Ranasinha, 'South Asian Broadcasters in Britain and the BBC'.

⁵⁰Footitt and Tobia, *WarTalk*, 78.

⁵¹Hill, 'The BBC Empire Service', 35–36.

'ventriloquism' was the working relationship between George Orwell and Zulfiqar Ali Bokhari. Orwell was a Talks Producer (1941–1943) for the Indian Section, writing scripts for 'Talking to India', which were later 'ventriloquised' by Bokhari and other diasporic Indians.⁵² Orwell's newsletters raise important questions of translation and transposition, authority and rhetoric, genre and medium. According to Douglas Kerr, Orwell's newsletters exhibit 'rhetorical habits of judiciousness, restraint, and a gentlemanly tone, a commitment to verifiable facts, and an unwillingness to exhort or browbeat the listener'.⁵³ But to the listener the texts were spoken as if by an Indian to Indians.

However, Bokhari was not only a 'mouthpiece' for Orwell—and for the British government at war—but an experienced journalist who had come specifically to Britain to set up the Indian Section of the Eastern Service, becoming its Programme Organiser (1940–1945) and later, the head of Pakistan Broadcasting Services. Bokhari was in fact instrumental in bringing Orwell over to the Indian Service, and through him, in convincing Mulk Raj Anand to join the BBC in 1942, who until then had refused to do so (Making Britain).⁵⁴

A friend of Orwell, Louis McNiece, T.S. Eliot, E. M. Forster and Virginia Woolf, Anand was a key figure in London's intellectual and cultural scene. Well known for his anti-imperialist Indian nationalist rhetoric, his novel, *The Sword and the Sickle* (1942), raged against the exploitation as 'cannon fodder' of the two million Indian soldiers who fought under the British flag in the First World War. However, to the BBC, dissident diasporic voices would increase the Indian audience's confidence, and the credibility and influence of broadcasts. Anand 'ventriloquised' Orwell's scripts but also authored his own. If Orwell's commitment to anti-fascism sustained him in his work for the BBC, even though it sometimes compromised his equally fervent anti-imperialist

⁵²Douglas Kerr, 'Orwell's BBC Broadcasts: Colonial Discourse and the Rhetoric of Propaganda', *Textual Practice* 16, no. 3 (1 January 2002), 473–490, doi:[10.1080/09502360210163435](https://doi.org/10.1080/09502360210163435); Hill, 'The BBC Empire Service', 35–36; Sharika Thiranagama, 'Partitioning the BBC: From Colonial to Postcolonial Broadcaster', *South Asian Diaspora* 2, no. 1 (1 March 2010), 39–55, doi:[10.1080/19438190903541994](https://doi.org/10.1080/19438190903541994); Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity'.

⁵³Kerr, 'Orwell's BBC Broadcasts', 483.

⁵⁴<http://www.open.ac.uk/researchprojects/makingbritain/content/mulk-raj-anand>.

stance, in his contributions to the 'Open Letters' series, Anand condemned Nazism and fascism as vociferously as he did British imperialism, combining a cosmopolitan internationalism with Indian nationalism.⁵⁵

As the Orwell–Bokhari–Anand relationship suggests, the assigned role of the diasporic voice as the British ventriloquist's puppet was not always straightforward. For instance, the requirements set by the BBC for diasporic staff were quite demanding, which suggests that they were regarded as more than just 'mouthpieces'. They had to speak 'adequate English as well as their own language', be highly literate and 'capable of translating accurately and fast', to have a 'natural flair for the subject matter they were dealing with', to be able to work with tight deadlines and to have a 'reasonable broadcasting voice'.⁵⁶ The importance of the right translator—and the right translation—was essential to appear to the audience as an authentic voice and not just a ventriloquist of British propaganda. As Footitt and Tobia explain, for the native broadcasters,

the production of more culturally appropriate texts, or the inflection of the original English material with stylistic nuances from their own language, were a vital means of asserting that the imagined community being broadcast was actually being created in the image of an independent entity, rather than in that of an allied foreign power.⁵⁷

However, as much as native speakers were thought to be the most credible, '[n]ot all accents were acceptable'.⁵⁸ For example, German Jews worked for the BBC but during the early stages did not broadcast, as it was believed that the accent would be recognised by the listeners in Germany. If the BBC was concerned with appealing to their global public in a way which nuanced the Allied message, they also wanted to avoid giving the impression that the foreign language services 'were run by émigrés and were pursuing émigrés rather than British objectives'.⁵⁹

As a consequence, it happened that the role of ventriloquist was sometimes reversed, and the message written by a diasporic writer was

⁵⁵Kerr, 'Orwell's BBC Broadcasts'; Ranasinha, 'South Asian Broadcasters in Britain and the BBC'.

⁵⁶Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told*, 106–107.

⁵⁷Footitt and Tobia, *WarTalk*, 80.

⁵⁸Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told*, 107.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

broadcast by someone of 'impeccable British ancestry'.⁶⁰ In the German Service, news commentaries were broadcast by mostly English speakers such as Richard Crossman, journalist Sefton Delmer or Hugh Greene—who later became director general of the BBC—but were written by Germans and often by German Jews. The famous 'Colonello Buona Sera' of the Italian Service was former Assistant Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Rome, Colonel Stevens, who 'spoke English with a slight foreign intonation and Italian with a distinct Neapolitan accent with English overtones'.⁶¹ The writer behind his very popular voice was the Italian Jewish journalist, Aldo Cassuto. How foreign—or British—could a foreign language service be, or whether the BBC represented a national or cosmopolitan ethos, were among the issues at stake for the BBC External Services at war. Much of its credibility depended, and still does, on the transcultural capital of the diasporic staff, as working in dialogue, conflict and negotiation within the diasporic—and cosmopolitan—contact zones; translation is at the centre of this BBC corporate cosmopolitanism.⁶²

THE TRANSLATION ZONE

The cosmopolitan zone that the BBC was transforming into during the war can also be understood as a 'translation zone', a site that is 'in-translation'.⁶³ The most important way in which diasporic voices could destabilise and therefore enrich the potentially unilineal 'discourse of the master' was in fact in their engagement in practices of translation, transposition and transculturation. True, whether the script was written by a British or a diasporic writer, the final word on the message to be delivered rested with the BBC. For example, foreign staff worked in teams that reported directly to language supervisors and switch censors—'linguists of British nationality and known dependability whose job was to ensure both accuracy of translation and a faithful reading of the text

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 7.

⁶³Emily Apter, *The Translation Zone: A New Comparative Literature* (Princeton University Press, 2011), 6.

at the microphone'.⁶⁴ The exilic intellectuals had therefore an ambivalent status and were closely monitored. Even so, translators and announcers had an agency in acting as cultural and linguistic interpreters and a bridge between producers and audiences.⁶⁵

As new language services were inaugurated, coordinating the messages to be voiced would become a major operation for the BBC. During the war, all the news material and most of the news commentaries and talks were written in English first and then translated into the target language to be broadcast by native voices. But this chain of events was not so straightforward. The complex relationship between the agencies involved in psychological warfare, the BBC and its different language services made it difficult to establish clear guidelines. Furthermore, the tensions around what message was the right message to convey were complicated by the role the governments in exile expected to play in broadcasting to their own countries.⁶⁶ The BBC wartime operation had to balance these several wartime and national interests, liaising with national and international governmental agencies and appealing to a heterogeneous audience with different worldviews, expectations and relationships with Britain.

Nonetheless, for the BBC one thing was clear, the 'same truth must be told to everyone'.⁶⁷ This was the more important as many listeners often tuned into broadcasts not necessarily aimed at them, 'cross-listening was inevitable'.⁶⁸ This was particularly true in central Europe, where listeners often spoke several languages, as well as in the Middle East and North Africa, where educated classes often understood French and English as well as Arabic.⁶⁹ However, the same truth could be conveyed in different packaging, and translation became as essential to the External Services as was composing the original message. In fact, translation practices, such as transposing, had been felt to be vital from the early days of the Empire Service. Exclusive 'Empire talks' were required as well as adaptations of home programmes, which were not always regarded as

⁶⁴Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told*, 81.

⁶⁵Gillespie and Webb, 'Corporate Cosmopolitanism', 7.

⁶⁶Footittand Tobia, *WarTalk*, 73.

⁶⁷Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told*, 91.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 24.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 91.

suitable for the Britons overseas and vice versa: 'Tulips growing in Hyde Park would hardly be considered as a subject for a topical talk in the home programme', noted the Empire Programme Director J.B. Clark in 1934.⁷⁰

The possibilities of adapting the same text for different publics reinforce the fact that translation practices are never straightforward. The 'translation zone'—the space between the original text and the translated one—is problematised by different translatory choices; for example, whether to exoticise—which reinforces the otherness of the source text—or naturalise—to make the otherness disappear, and render the source texts invisible and inaudible.⁷¹ The decisions made by the translators contributed, among other things, to constructing and recreating different versions of Britishness, from within and without the nation, rendering Britain both exotic and natural for the listener abroad. Ultimately, translation involves transformation, and as such it becomes 'a significant medium of subject re-formation and political change'.⁷²

Translating is at the centre of the BBC cosmopolitan practices, but translating into other languages was just one side of it. Translating Britain to the world was accompanied from the very beginning by listening and translating the world for Britain. The BBC soon realised the importance of tuning into their international competition on air. The BBC Monitoring Service had started in 1939 before the war, and its main objective was to listen, translate and transcribe foreign broadcasts.

On the one hand, the Monitoring Service was an inestimable open source of war intelligence, which was regarded as essential to win the 'ether war'.⁷³ On the other hand, it brought other voices from around the globe that would further contribute to shaping the BBC's own voice. For instance, the perceived credibility and authority of Orwell's newsletters derived from their unrivalled access to news from around the world through the Monitoring Service, challenging and relativising a British-centred view of events. The 'Ears of Britain' was and still is an invaluable

⁷⁰Robertson, 'It Is a Real Joy to Get Listening of Any Kind from the Homeland', 29.

⁷¹James S. Holmes, *Translated!: Papers on Literary Translation and Translation Studies* (Rodopi, 1988), 47–48.

⁷²Apter, *The Translation Zone*, 6.

⁷³Footittand Tobia, *War Talk*, 33–34; Olive Renier and Vladimir Rubinstein, *Assigned to Listen: The Evesham Experience, 1939–1943* (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1986), 7.

journalistic resource that, according to Douglas Kerr, ‘underwrites the authority with which the strategic gaze of Orwell’s newsletters to his Indian audiences sweeps the globe, for the ears if not the eyes of the BBC were everywhere’.⁷⁴ This omniscience enabled Orwell to assert that his newsletters reported the truth (verifiable facts) rather than propaganda. Even if the newsletters masked the process of their production and translation and so naturalised a British view of the world, Orwell was no government lackey, and nor was the BBC.

The Monitoring Service was a diasporic, translation and cosmopolitan contact zone in its own right. It was first set up in Wood Norton, Evesham. As the shifts were intense and around the clock, most monitors lived in Evesham, which became yet another cosmopolitan contact zone in which the diasporic and British staff interacted with the town’s neighbours and billets—the landladies who took in the monitors under wartime regulation. According to one monitor’s recollection, it is hard to imagine nowadays ‘just how much of a shock the BBC’s cosmopolitan invasion must have been’ for the people of Evesham.⁷⁵ On his first day at the Monitoring Service, Martin Esslin had been told that he would recognise the bus stop ‘from the weird people waiting there’.⁷⁶ On arrival, he saw ‘A grim looking figure wearing a large Russian fur cap [who] stood there in the snow: it could have been none other than one of the weird foreigners populating Wood Norton. It was, of course, Anatol Goldberg, who became a lifelong friend’.⁷⁷ Anatol Goldberg monitored in Russian, German and Spanish—among his many languages were Chinese and Japanese—, and later became a broadcaster and Head of the Russian Service. Martin Esslin (Pewreszlenyi) was a Hungarian-born Jew who had made it to England fleeing the Nazis in 1938. After being interned in a detention camp in the Isle of Man with many other intellectuals arriving from Nazi-dominated countries, he came to work for the Monitoring Service, later as a scriptwriter and broadcaster of the European Service and ended up as head of radio drama until 1977, when he became Professor of Drama at Stanford. During his time at the BBC, Esslin had an important role in hiring other exiles. He contributed to

⁷⁴Kerr, ‘Orwell’s BBC Broadcasts’, 480.

⁷⁵Renier and Rubinstein, *Assigned to Listen*, 27.

⁷⁶Ibid., 97.

⁷⁷Ibid.

the BBC's support of intellectual European refugees in Britain, who in turn 'inseminated the normally ingrown culture of Britain with wide-ranging new ideas and an introduction to literatures of which probably few would otherwise have had any knowledge'.⁷⁸ Other German speaking exiles included art historian Ernst Gombrich, publisher George Weidenfeld and Ilsa Barea, an Austrian journalist and translator married to Spanish writer Arturo Barea.

Despite the diversity of the people employed by the Monitoring Service in terms of age, nationality, upbringing and experience, the monitors also had a lot in common: their linguistic skills, political awareness and commitment to their job.⁷⁹ The BBC required that the monitors would learn at least two other languages aside from their mother tongue. The Central Europeans spoke enough languages that most of them were monitoring different international broadcasters. Ilsa Barea, for example, spoke 'five-and-a-half languages, writes five, and translates from seven'.⁸⁰ Like Anatol Goldberg and George Weidenfeld, she was hired to monitor in Spanish, which she learned as a result of her participation in the Spanish Civil War, a cause to which she would remain committed throughout her life. An accomplished linguist, she later became a professional translator and her role as cultural mediator continued in her literary translations of many Spanish-speaking writers, not least of all her husband.

Above all, the Monitoring Service—and the same could be said of the BBC World Service as a whole—was a 'learning community':

Non-linguists among the editors and administrators had to learn that 'verbatim' translations aren't just word for word translations, with the translator being no more than a walking dictionary [...] Typists had to learn to understand (in every sense) and accept us odd foreigners [...] But the foreign language monitors had to learn most of all.⁸¹

⁷⁸John Calder, 'Esslin, Martin Julius (1918–2002)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2006; online edn, Sept 2013 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/76703>, accessed 10 Aug 2016].

⁷⁹Renier and Rubinstein, *Assigned to Listen*, 91.

⁸⁰R. B., 'Latin-America Hears of Topics Discussed in Faringdon Pubs', *Evening Advertiser*, 19 February 1952.

⁸¹Lux Furtmüller as cited in Renier and Rubinstein, *Assigned to Listen*, 92.

Translating like ‘a walking dictionary’ was not enough either in the Monitoring Service or in the External Services. Translators also had to be cultural interpreters and have a ‘sound background in one’s mother’s tongue’ and of traditions of the country concerned.⁸² This was particularly important when the matter involved was directly concerned with wartime intelligence. Gombrich was reported as having a fit of rage when reading a translation of a famous passage of Goethe’s *Faust*, ‘Vom Eise befreit sind Strom und Bäche’, as ‘Weather report: The Reich is free of ice’.⁸³

The translators’ reports were distributed in the form of a publication—*The Digest*—to the news editors of the different language services at the BBC, as well as to the different agencies involved. Many of the translators’ insights were then included in the outgoing broadcasts, proving to the audiences that the BBC kept abreast not only of the latest international events but of ‘fashions in their country’.⁸⁴ As such, even the centrally composed messages in English might have originated with a translation, highlighting the transnational origins even of wartime British broadcasts to the world. Such was the case of the symbiotic relationship of Ilsa and Arturo Barea. The latter wrote weekly broadcasts for the Latin American Service, many of them based on Ilsa’s work as a monitor and her notes on foreign broadcasts.

TRANSCULTURATION

The diasporic ‘gifted amateurs’ that joined both the BBC Monitoring and language services were therefore first seen as ‘mere translators’ who voiced, but also creatively adapted, centrally produced news material attuned to the local sensibilities of overseas audiences.⁸⁵ But slowly, during and after the Second World War, they gained creative and editorial

⁸²Ibid., 82.

⁸³Ibid., 93.

⁸⁴Ernst Gombrich as cited in Renier and Rubinstein, *Assigned to Listen*.

⁸⁵Mansell, *Let Truth Be Told*, 96.

autonomy becoming 'professionals in their own right'.⁸⁶ One of these writers who produced his own material from 1940 was Arturo Barea.⁸⁷

Barea arrived in Britain in February 1939, one of many victims of the Spanish Civil War. With hardly any previous experience as a writer, he soon published the first volume of his autobiographical trilogy, *The forging of a Rebel* (1941), edited by T.S. Eliot. Barea also contributed an essay to Orwell's Searchlight Books series and contributed articles and short stories to Cyril Connolly's *Horizon* and *Tribune* among others. Barea could never return to Spain, but his exile gave him international recognition during the 1940s and 1950s as a writer and as a broadcaster for the BBC Latin American Service under the pseudonym of 'Juan de Castilla'.

During the 17 years he worked at the BBC from 1940 until his death in 1957, Barea wrote around 850 scripts about '[a]nything considered typically English: the local Christmas Club; Faringdon's Festival of Britain celebration, or a political harangue over a pint in the local is turned into "man in the street" commentaries' for his Latin American listeners.⁸⁸ Barea therefore contributed to project and construct an image of Britain overseas; a Britishness with a Spanish flair. Despite his Spanishness, Barea's literary and radio work was the result of cosmopolitan encounters and cultural exchanges in Britain, not least of all by the translational and transnational practices in which he was involved at the World Service.

Barea explained in 1955, that he enjoyed his talks for the World Service 'because I continually discover new things about this country that I want to tell to the people of my own language as friends'.⁸⁹ While this was true, Barea's work for the BBC was about more than casually sharing his everyday British experiences with his audience. Barea started broadcasting for the BBC Latin American Service during the Second World War, when its main objective was to counter Nazi and

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Luis Monferrer Catalán, *Odisea En Albión: Los republicanos españoles exiliados en Gran Bretaña 1936-1977*. (Ediciones de la Torre, 2007); Eva Nieto McAvoy, 'A Spaniard Discovers England', in *Wasafiri*, 68 (2011), 8-10.

⁸⁸R. B., 'Latin-America Hears of Topics Discussed in Faringdon Pubs'.

⁸⁹Quoted in Michael Eade, *Triumph at Midnight of the Century: A Critical Biography of Arturo Barea: Explaining the Roots of the Spanish Civil War* (Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 159.

Italian propaganda, and to indirectly continue the fight against Spanish Francoism.

In writing within a translation zone, in which different national interests were at stake, Barea had to balance and negotiate a culture about which he had previously known very little. The resulting transculturation can be seen as a consequence of the contact zone, and central to the World Service corporate cosmopolitanism. Diasporic translators and writers could not avoid working within the framework of British national and wartime discourses as filtered by the BBC, but they had a certain agency in deciding what to adapt and how.⁹⁰ The work of the exiled and diasporic writers and broadcasters—as well as the contributions and responses of the audiences—are also the result of the processes of transculturation. Barea's scripts are a good example of the selection, recreation and the negotiation practices that took place in the cosmopolitan contact zone that was the BBC language services. However creatively productive, we cannot forget the asymmetries of power of the contact zone. The tensions between the hegemonic centre and the peripheries were going to become even more challenging, as after the war the BBC had to redefine its relationship to the soon to be ex-colonies.

A COSMOPOLITAN CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SPACE BETWEEN IMPERIALISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM

As we have already argued, many diasporic broadcasters were caught up in the contradictions posed by the war: the paradoxes of fighting fascism and imperialism at the same time. For Una Marson, balancing her anti-fascist and anti-imperial battles would prove to be more difficult. Marson was a Jamaican journalist and poet and a leading figure in the Caribbean section of the BBC who believed in the power of literary expression as a tool of cultural and social development. During the war, Marson began to receive short stories and essays which would form the basis of *Caribbean Voices*, a weekly programme in which poets, playwrights and prose writers showcased their writing. But while working for the BBC and contributing to the anti-fascist struggle, Marson often felt conflicted because of her campaigns for independence of colonial rule. Living in

⁹⁰Pratt, 'Arts of the Contact Zone', 36.

London and moving in its transnational political, intellectual and literary networks, she became committed to pan-Africanism and in 1945 she returned to Jamaica.

Caribbean Voices continued and was central in the launching of the careers of writers such as V.S. Naipaul, George Lamming and Derek Walcott. Nonetheless, it remained a source of colonial and postcolonial conflict. On the one hand, the BBC was legitimising new writers and imposing in turn its metropolitan standards on their work; on the other, the programme embraced the local dialects, idioms and syntax which transgressed the conventions of standardised English.⁹¹

Following on Hill's figure of the ventriloquist, the languages services of the BBC can also be seen as a splitting of the Empire Service that sought to avert the fragmentation of the British Empire.⁹² But with the implicit recognition of the colonised voice as the carrier of the imperial message, the diasporic 'puppets' took a life of their own, as seen in the example of Una Marson and *Caribbean Voices*. It was the diasporic voices of the colonised that would become central during the postwar de-colonisation, and finally break with 'the discourse of the master in its imperial form'.⁹³ They enabled the emergence of a new cosmopolitan consciousness in the space between imperialism and postcolonialism.

CONCLUSION: POSTWAR COSMOPOLITANISM

The British Empire ceased to exist between 1947 (India, Pakistan) and 1962 (almost all African colonies). Could a British World Service apparently liberated from its colonial past now broadcast in a guilt-free voice, claiming and proclaiming a global impartiality? During the postwar period, as a public service broadcaster, its editorial independence and managerial semi-independence remained guaranteed. Admittedly, as financially dependent and accountable to the FCO, it had periodically to re-earn its privileged grant by translating British international policy objectives into objective-sounding news. The consolidation of its broadcasting ethic of independence from government was precipitated by the Cold War imperatives of broadcasting beyond the Iron Curtain.

⁹¹Gillespie, 'Diasporic Creativity', 239.

⁹²Hill, 'The BBC Empire Service', 36.

⁹³Ibid.

With the advent of its online services, new audience configurations are coming into being.⁹⁴ Diasporic and refugee, mobile and migrant groups are increasingly using online Anglophone and foreign services as an arena of transnational debate.⁹⁵ The new media landscape, technological convergence, an increasingly competitive global media market, institutional change and geopolitical shifts, especially the UK and USA's declared 'global war on terror', are now forcing the World Service to redefine itself. Despite these challenges, its current role of fostering a 'global conversation' has reinforced its corporate cosmopolitan practices.

The cosmopolitan contact zones at the BBC have been a site of different struggles that have defined the BBC World Service corporate cosmopolitanism. The agency and creativity of the diasporic staff has been at the centre of the translation practices that define it. Today, diasporic creativity is still essential for the World Service as a state broadcaster in order to maintain its aura of impartiality—crucial for its role in public diplomacy in the increasingly complex media ecology. Central to all this are the World Service diasporic staff. Their talents transformed Britain's culture of international broadcasting, literary networks and intellectual horizons. The 'gifted amateurs' that during the 'ether war' came together at Bush House to fight fascism had to negotiate in the diasporic contact zone their loyalties and interests with those of other staff, audiences and British discourses of national projection. In doing so, they engaged in practices of translation, transculturation and transformation which ultimately contributed to defining the corporate cosmopolitanism of the BBC World Service.

Acknowledgements We are very grateful to Dr Gerd Baumann, Marie's close friend and fellow anthropologist, now sadly deceased. Gerd worked with

⁹⁴Today, the World Service targets cosmopolitan audiences specifically. BBC audience research identifies 'cosmopolitans' as being over 21 years old, in the top 10 percent income bracket, with above average levels of education. They also regularly consume and discuss international news media. The 'cosmopolitan' category was introduced as a target market category in 2001 in order to meet the requirements of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who see the main aim of the World Service as reaching people of influence or 'multipliers'. Cosmopolitan status involves more than internationalist outlook. It defines practices that can be measured. Consuming and discussing international news media is one such measurable behaviour. Other target market categories used are 'aspirational', 'crisis' and 'lifecycle' audiences.

⁹⁵Gillespie, 'Security, Media and Multicultural Citizenship'.

Marie on the Tuning In project – his very last project – for several years and co-authored many articles with her. We hope that we have been able to do justice to his inspiring contributions to the project and will always remember him with love and fondness. We dedicate this chapter to him.

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PART III

Cosmopolitanisms in the City

Brest-Litovsk as a Site of Historical Disorientation

Dina Gusejnova

In February 1945, Isaiah Berlin, then employed by the British Foreign Office in information warfare, found himself on a trip from the United States to Mexico. He was staying at the villa Casa Mañana in Cuernavaca, a house belonging to the family of a former US ambassador and collector of Mexican folk art. Berlin was in the company of John Wheeler-Bennett, a journalist who had worked for the League of Nations before joining the British information service. An awkward moment at the US–Mexican border check ensued when Berlin could not give a straightforward answer to the question which country he was from. He was from Riga, but depending on the context, this city could be located with equal validity in Russia, Latvia, Germany, or the Soviet Union. To explain this peculiar circumstance, Berlin apparently ended up giving a mini lecture on recent European history:

My thanks are due to Saul Dubow, Svetlana Natkovich, Marina Mogilner, Alexander Semyonov and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I am especially indebted to Richard Bourke for his generous discussion of a later draft.

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My native country of Latvia, when I was born in it in 1909, was indeed part of the Russian Empire. However, during the First World War it was annexed, along with other Baltic States, by Germany under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but only, as you doubtless recall, for a short time. At the Peace Conference the Independence of these States was recognized and they remained in this happy state until re-annexed by Russia in 1940. However, they were re-occupied by the Germans in 1941.¹

This interaction, a mere anecdote in Wheeler-Bennett's memoir, could be viewed simply as a moment of biographical comedy: here, Berlin demonstrated how he had become an involuntary cosmopolitan, an Oedipus seeking to pose a riddle to the Sphinx. Perhaps Berlin's words were actually intended for Wheeler-Bennett, whose book about the Peace of Brest-Litovsk in 1938 he may have read.² Here they were, crossing an international border between two states, employed by a third, reflecting on their ties to violent conflicts involving other world powers, four of which—the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire—were now defunct.

However, I would argue that this episode could also be used as a springboard for exploring a more serious problem arising from Berlin's political thought in its wider Cold War context. This problem could be described as historical disorientation, a type of alienation from historical experience which was characteristic of many twentieth-century liberals. Contextualizing Berlin's work as a political philosopher with biographical and autobiographical writing, we can uncover a double sense of estrangement: From recent historical experience on the one hand, and from eighteenth-century political ideals, on the other. Berlin himself described what happened in the first half of the twentieth century as 'violent aberrations of the recent European experience', from which humanity had to recover by means of the 'common notions of good and evil, which reunite us to our Greek and Hebrew and Christian and humanist past; transformed by the Romantic revolt, but essentially in reaction to it'.³ The second level of estrangement was reflected in the sense of a lost connection to these values as such, as the Enlightenment ideals themselves appeared damaged. What he saw in his world was the presence of

¹Discussed in John Wheeler-Bennett, *Special Relationships: America in Peace and War* (London: Macmillan, 1975), 197.

²John Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1938).

³Berlin, 'European Unity and its Vicissitudes' in idem, *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, Ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 186–219, 217–218.

‘implacable Kantians’ appearing to be ruthless advocates of supposedly positive ideas of liberty, proceeding ‘with sword and axe’ to ‘dig up the soil of our European life’.⁴

This experience of the historical past as disorienting was typical for the ideas of other Cold War intellectuals as well.⁵ In recent years, intellectuals like Berlin, Raymond Aron, and others, have been described with the term ‘Cold War liberals’.⁶ This position, which could be described as an historically specific variant of realism, negotiated ‘inherited liberal dilemmas’ of the nineteenth century, such as citizenship and liberty, individual and minority rights, against the background of totalitarianism. The most ideal typical representatives of this direction shared essentially negative convictions, such as an equal distaste of fascism and Soviet communism. Another commonality was their Jewish family background. Not all Cold War Jewish intellectuals were ‘Cold War liberals’, nor were all Cold War liberals Jewish, but a certain interpretive attitude towards Jewish history was characteristic of many leading liberal thinkers of Berlin’s generation. A further characteristic of ‘Cold War liberals’ thought was their preoccupation with Immanuel Kant, whose view of history and politics became an object of critique and an emblem of their disenchantment with the present. This concerned particularly the relationship between Kant’s moral and his political theory, expressed in his conviction that the historical progression towards a ‘lawful *federation* under a commonly accepted *international right*’ was a reasonable expectation, even if, in specific historical epochs, empirical evidence might suggest the opposite conclusion.⁷ Cold War liberals—or realists—no longer thought this assumption

⁴ Isaiah Berlin, quoting from Heinrich Heine, in ‘The Bent Twig. On The Rise of Nationalism’, in *ibid.*, 253–279, 257.

⁵ This he shared with other contemporaries, of course, including Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Schocken, 1951), and Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (New York: Social Studies Association, 1944).

⁶ See, for instance, Malachi Haim Hacohen, “‘The Strange Fact That the State of Israel Exists’: The Cold War Liberals Between Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism”, in *Jewish Social Studies*, 15: 2 (Winter 2009), 37–81; ‘Lionel Gossman, “Cold War Liberal?”’, in *The Journal of Modern History*, 74: 3 (September 2002), 538–572; Amanda Anderson, ‘The Case of Cold War Liberalism’, in *New Literary History*, 42: 2 (Spring 2011), 209–229.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in *Political Writings*, 90.

held in theory, let alone in practice. The historical experiences of the first half of the twentieth century left them, in this sense, disoriented, alienated or disenched.

Berlin, too, argued that in the 1920s and 1930s, ‘totalitarians of both the right and the left affected to reject humanistic values as such’. Despite this, the realism of Cold War liberals like Berlin always retained elements of the cosmopolitan dreams of the eighteenth century. Thus, after the Second World War, he saw the world returning to ‘normal health’, including the ‘common notions of good and evil’.⁸ This was visible in the progression towards an ‘international order, based on the recognition that we inhabit one common moral world’.⁹ Generally, the idea of ‘normality’, and a distinction between normal and deviant paths of history, preoccupied Berlin as well as other liberals of his generation.¹⁰

More recently, intellectual historians have begun to identify the reasons for this estrangement from witnessed history as a Cold War pattern of thought, and while the reification of such notions as a Cold War ‘mentality’, or even ‘liberalism’, can not always be avoided, some have persuasively recovered the biographical and theoretical basis for such forms of estrangement.¹¹ What remains to be clarified, however, is when historical disenchantment had first emerged as an element of liberal political thought, and to what extent this development was causally linked to the Cold War. There was a peculiar pattern of speaking as well as being silent about some historical conflicts, especially the presence of anti-semitism, which had a much longer prehistory, reaching back as far as Jacob Burckhardt’s work on Europe, as Lionel Gossman has argued.¹² Another, more recent history of liberalism suggested dating this moment

⁸ Berlin, ‘Vicissitudes’, 217–218.

⁹ Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959) (based on the Reith lectures of 1957).

¹⁰ On this point, see, for instance, Hachon, ‘The Strange Fact That the State of Israel Exists’, 52–53.

¹¹ For a biographical approach to a critical history of liberalism and social democracy, see Joshua L. Cherniss, *A Mind and Its Time: The Development of Isaiah Berlin’s Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. ch. 3 on Cold War politics.

¹² On the silence about anti-semitism in nineteenth-century Europe, for instance, see Lionel Gossman, ‘Cold War Liberal?’, 552–553. Although he does not use the term ‘Cold War liberal’, in his account of Hersch Lauterpacht’s formation and the intellectual contexts of postwar ideas of international right, Philippe Sands also frequently resorts to the concept of silence concerning his own family’s fortunes in the Holocaust. In Philippe Sands, *East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity* (London: Weidenfeld, 2016), 105, 299 and *passim*.

to the Second World War and the Holocaust as the apotheosis of ‘damaged ideals and broken dreams’.¹³

In what follows, I want to propose dating the beginning of the kind of historical alienation that is typically associated with ‘Cold War liberalism’ to a moment between the nineteenth century and the 1950s, particularly, to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, a treaty that the aforementioned John Wheeler-Bennett had appropriately called the ‘forgotten peace’. As a separate process of peace-making, the treaty excluded a number of key belligerent powers, notably, Britain, France, and the United States. Its principal object was to seal Russia’s defeat, and to divide its lost territories between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As Richard Bourke has identified, it was this quality of the treaty which gave rise to the term ‘Balkanization’ as a derogatory concept in political thought and public policy.¹⁴ (Fig. 8.1).

If we are to understand at which point modern political liberalism retreated from its earlier confidence in historical progress, the international reception of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (1917–1918) between Russia and the Central Powers is a good place. Its history draws attention to the ‘shatterzones of empires’ and the point at which liberalism became disorientated vis-à-vis its own past ideals and future commitments.¹⁵ Looking at the reactions of contemporaries and witnesses to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (1918), we can also develop a better understanding of the fraught relationship between Enlightenment ideals and twentieth-century political practice.

The form of the peace had shaken up a number of received principles of European political culture, which themselves dated back to Enlightenment ideals of the political. It was a treaty signed between

¹³The phrase, ascribed more to the Anglophone thinkers, is used by Edmund Fawcett in *Liberalism: the Life of an Idea* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 198.

¹⁴See Richard Bourke, ‘Nationalism, Balkanization and Democracy’, in *Schleifspuren: Lesarten des 18. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Anke Fischer-Kattner et al. (Munich: Dreesbach Verlag, 2011), 77–89, 77.

¹⁵Cf. Julia Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, ‘Shatterzones of empires’, Introduction to a special issue of *Contemporary European History*, 19: 3 (2003), 183–194; on Brest-Litovsk as an unjust peace, see also Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916–1931* (London: Penguin, 2015), 108–141.




Fig. 8.1 Map of the new borders drawn up at Brest-Litovsk, by Unknown. Published in George H. Allen, *The Great War, Volume 5: The Triumph of Democracy* (Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons, 1921). <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=33976203>

states which soon after ceased to exist in this form—a particular problem for those traditions of liberal political thought which concentrate on the state as their main object. As this chapter will make apparent, a fresh look at Isaiah Berlin's ideas of history could return our awareness to this important moment through biographical and situational contexts.¹⁶ This chapter begins by identifying the metaphor of the 'citadel' as a central concept through which Isaiah Berlin's abstraction from historical experience can be explored in reading his discussion of 'negative' liberty, before discussing the implications of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk for ideas of liberty in the contexts of German liberal and historical thought of the same period.

'NEGATIVE' LIBERTY AND THE RETREAT FROM COSMOPOLITANISM

The negative conception of liberty which Isaiah Berlin developed in his *Two Concepts of Liberty*, drawn from his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1958, provides the most influential account of the reasons why modern liberalism had to abstract from particular historical experience. Criticizing positive conceptions of liberty, which, in his view, risked becoming dogmatic and totalitarian, Berlin insisted that under his conception, the subject had to maintain the capacity to 'retreat into the inner citadel', a space which he associated with the Stoic and Epicurean roots of the Enlightenment idea of reason.¹⁷ In speaking of a 'retreat', Berlin described it as a space where the subject has freed himself—and it is nearly always a he—not just from pain, but from the source of pain; where power in the kingdom whose 'frontiers are long and insecure' is ensured by eliminating the 'vulnerable area', a process he likened to a wounded leg that is being amputated in order to save the living core. He called this metaphorical citadel 'my own sect, my own planned economy'. In other writings, Berlin also argued that people wanted to be free from 'dictation or coercion from teachers, masters, bullies and persuaders

¹⁶For a variety of critical approaches to the past and future of intellectual history, see Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Annabelle Brett, 'What is Intellectual History Now?', in David Cannadine (ed.), *What is History Now?* (Basingstoke, 2004), 113–131.

¹⁷Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in idem, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118–172, 135–136.

and dominators of various kinds'. What was needed, in his view, were 'natural units of human size', not cosmopolitanism or other dogmatic doctrines of history.¹⁸ The purpose of his moderate vision of liberty was to create a model which would safeguard individuals from manipulation by political ideologies which claimed to emancipate them on their behalf.

Berlin's anti-radical world picture also involved a very conscious turning away from eighteenth-century languages of cosmopolitanism, which Berlin associated with the figure of Immanuel Kant as a moral dogmatist whose ideals, despite potentially good intentions, could evidently lead to totalitarianism. In his place, he favoured Kant's former disciple and outspoken critic, Johann Gottfried Herder, whom Berlin construed as a theorist of cultural pluralism, having rescued him from a more *völkisch* reading by Nazi ideologues. A further characteristic of Berlin's relationship to history was an interest in figures from the history of ideas who could be clearly mapped as either 'pro-' or 'anti-Enlightenment'.

Berlin's interpreters have discussed this passage to emphasize the importance of a positive notion of freedom within Berlin's demand for its negative conceptualization.¹⁹ In these interpretations, however, his choice of metaphor—the citadel—remained out of focus. It was a type of space bridging military and civilian, exceptional and regular experiences of citizenship. The citadel, which we might also translate as fortress, or *krepost* in Russian, *acropolis* in Greek, *zion* in Hebrew or *Kasbah* in Arabic, is an element of defence architecture within which a certain form of life continues in war as well as in peacetime alike, with some, but ideally, only minimal restrictions in wartime. The Russian word for serf—*krepostnoi*—is derived from this concept. Max Weber has emphasized the hybrid nature of this structure, combining elements of a market with elements of a city, but without quite being identical with cities.²⁰ Although often discussed by the same authors of classical antiquity who left us an account of cities as sites of political representation, citadels are not conspicuous by this function; they serve the purpose of protection in a state

¹⁸ Isaiah Berlin, 'The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will', 275–278.

¹⁹ Eric Nelson, 'Liberty: One concept too many?', in *Political Theory*, 33: 1 (2005), 58–78; Quentin Skinner, 'A Third Concept of Liberty', in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 111 (2002), 237–68.

²⁰ Max Weber, *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Hinduismus und Buddhismus* (1916–1920), Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer and Karl-Heinz Golzio (eds) (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1996), 163.

of emergency in which notions of internal political organization, justice, and political representation are pushed to the side.²¹

Discussing who in particular would be retreating to the citadel, Berlin named the example of ‘quietists, not only individual sages—Stoics, Buddhists, Jews, Christians, and indeed individuals dedicated to no religion’, but generally, ‘men who liberate themselves from the yoke of society or public opinion by a process of self-transformation’.²² A second draft expanded the list of these ideal types, speaking of ‘Stoics, or Buddhist sages, Jews, Christians, Moslems who have fled the world, and equally of individuals dedicated to no religion’.²³ But the final published version strikingly omitted the Jews, Christians, Moslems, and atheists, leaving only the ‘self-emancipation of ascetics and of stoics or Buddhist sages’ as an example.²⁴ Berlin’s humorous use of the terms ‘planned economy’ and ‘sect’, as if these were interchangeable, calls for a more historically grounded contextualization in order to understand how his estrangement from the historical experiences of eastern Europe occurred.

If we put the metaphor in a more historically grounded context, citadels also had a much more specific place in the history of eastern Europe. There were, to be precise, three types of citadels in this part of the Russian Empire. The oldest and most prominent was the citadel as a site of the, usually oppressive and centralized, government power, embodied, variously, by the Moscow Kremlin—as site of government—and the Peter and Paul fortress in St. Petersburg.²⁵ The latter was a symbolic foundation of the new capital of the empire under Peter, following the Swedish defeat in the Great Northern War (1700–1721), later a burial place for the emperors but also a site for the internment of political prisoners.

²¹ See the biblical account of Jerusalem and the citadel of Zion in Isaiah. A brief search for the concept of ‘citadel’ in classical texts (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/search_results?page=5&q=citadel) reveals hundreds of results, including historians, philosophers and geographers such as Flavius Josephus, Titus Livius, Aristotle, Plato and Pausanias.

²² Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Original dictation, 15. http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/tcl/, accessed 25 July 2016.

²³ Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 19. First corrected draft. http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/published_works/tcl/, accessed 25 July 2015.

²⁴ Berlin, ‘Two Concepts’ (1959), in *Four Essays on Liberty*, 135.

²⁵ On the history of the Kremlin, see Catherine Merridale, *Red Fortress: The Secret Heart of Russia’s History* (London: Penguin, 2014). For a wider context in the history of European fortifications, see Marina Dmitrieva, *Italien in Sarmatien. Studien Zum Kulturtransfer Im Ostlichen Europa in Der Zeit Der Renaissance* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2008).

The second type of citadel can be identified in the fortifications of the numerous smaller principalities of the empire, which some social theorists have associated with an alternative history of Russian republicanism.²⁶ These older fortresses, however, had been superseded by new urban communities shaped by global commercial links, such as the Hanseatic League. Riga was a prime example of this kind of citadel which had been eclipsed by a commercially orientated, modernizing city, with civic pride shaped by intellectuals such as Garlieb Merkel and Johann Gottfried Herder—Berlin's idol. Like Königsberg, where, as Natan Sznajder has shown, Hannah Arendt discovered her philosophical vocation, Riga's cosmopolitanism was predicated on its particular location close to the frontiers separating the Russian and the Prussian empires.²⁷ In the age of a new Soviet imperialism and the Third Reich, the memory of cities like Königsberg or Riga also served as a repository for a kind of European golden age, before and without the Holocaust. The memory of this location enabled Berlin to switch almost seamlessly from speaking about the particular experience of Jews to the more universal ideas of freedom which his negative model allowed to imagine. In a journal from 1810, edited by the patriotic Latvian intellectual Garlieb Merkel, for instance, Riga's citadel was praised as a place where the city's proud citizens came together regardless of their religious faith or language, like members of 'one large family'.²⁸

But there was also another kind of citadel in eastern Europe, which was connected to the history of Russian imperialism in the region. The prime example of this was the citadel at Brest. Following the third partition of Poland (1795–1797), in which Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom out of existence, Brest-Litovsk

²⁶Donatella Calabi, Dominique Colas, Oleg Kharkhordin, Turo-Kimmo Lehtonen, Quentin Skinner and Sergei Troianovskii (eds), *The Materiality of Res Publica: How to Do Things with Publics* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009).

²⁷On Hannah Arendt's early biographical background in its eastern European context, see Natan Sznajder, 'Hannah Arendt: Jew and Cosmopolitan', in *Socio: La Nouvelle Revue des Sciences Sociales*, 4 (2015), 197–221.

²⁸On Riga's civic pride, see, for instance, 'Nachlese einiger allgemein interessanter Züge zur Charakteristik des in diesem Jahre in Riga in Liefeland gehaltenen patriotischen Festeä', in *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*, 290 and 291 (4 and 5 December 1810), 1157–1158 and 1163, respectively; and Karl von Löwis of Menar, *Riga. Kurzer geschichtlicher Führer. Mit 7 Bildern und einem Plan* (Riga: Jonck & Poliewsky, 1918).

became one of the Russian Empire's westernmost frontier posts for over a hundred years. It saw important military action during the Napoleonic invasion. In 1836, having violently crushed a Polish uprising, the Russian imperial government had marked this spot by ordering the construction of a new citadel, the *Brestskaia krepost*. This neo-medieval fortress turned Brest-Litovsk into a kind of inverse ghetto. The majority of the city's population was Jewish. But most Jews, who were artisans or tailors, were not allowed to enter. The construction of the citadel, equipped with its own recreational and cultural institutions, had created a city. Around the city belt was the so-called *gorodok*, a shanty town settled by poor textile producers who emerged in an industry catering for the Russian military during the Turkish wars, but this was dismantled in 1906.²⁹

Unlike cities like Moscow, but also unlike Riga, which saw the emergence of an educated middle class of citizens and burghers, the majority of Brest's inhabitants lacked political representation. Despite forming a majority of the city's 53,300 inhabitants in 1909, Jews had only 3 out of 20 representatives on the municipal council. Two Orthodox churches, two synagogues, and 32 Jewish prayer houses complete the picture. By contrast, the space around the city had the opposite constitution, with 83% Orthodox Peasants, and a cultural landscape of farmland, and factories producing flour, brick, butter, and glass.³⁰

In considering Berlin's use of the citadel as a metaphor, it seems important to specify which type of citadel we are retreating to: to the community of citizens, as in Riga, or to the safe place admitting a select group of a city's residents. Characteristically, Brest's leading intellectuals were not philosophers like Berlin and Arendt, and they had no 'negative' liberty to retreat to. As the first historian of eastern European Jewry, Simon Dubnow, had written, back in 1905, that the Jewish communities had been indignant not only with the police and those tsarist authorities sanctioning the pogroms, but also those who made demands for a liberal constitution in the empire: 'In the proposed scheme of popular representation, we Jews, a cultured nation of six millions, were placed below the semi-savage aliens of Eastern Russia.'³¹ According to the newspaper

²⁹Kh. Zonenberg, *Istoria goroda Brest-Litovska. 1016–1907, etc.* [History of the city of Brest-Litovsk] (Brest-Litovsk: Tipografia Kobrin, 1908).

³⁰Brockhaus & Efron, voliv, entry on 'Brest-Litovsk' (St. Petersburg: I.A. Efron, 1894).

³¹Simon Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, transl. Israel Friedlaender (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1920), vol. 3, 121.

Voskhod [Sunrise], '[n]ow the Jew has the right to be a popular representative, but he has no right to reside in the place in which the Imperial Duma assembles—in the capital'.

In an infographic from 1912, Nikolai Roubakine, a social scientist sympathetic to the ideas of the 1905 revolution in Russia, who had also been promoting literacy among the Jews of the Pale of Settlement, had made clear that the Jews did not fit the estate model of Russian imperial society very neatly. Instead they formed a kind of estate of their own between 'peasants', the 'middle class', the ethnically others [*inorodtsy*] and the clergy.³² His statistical model gave a quantitative and visual representation of this group which highlighted the difficulties in their political representation (Fig. 8.2).

Indeed, alienated from political life in the Russian Empire, (Fig. 8.3) the main spokesmen of the Jewish community hailing from Brest itself were people like rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik and his son Joseph, who had developed the so-called 'Brisk' method of reading scripture esoterically which discouraged references to external materials in its interpretation.³³ Before this, Joseph Soloveitchik had come into contact with the Neo-Kantian school of philosophy associated with Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, but used its methods to juxtapose the western Enlightenment project of reason with his own more inward-looking conception of a *homo religiosus* who remains faithful to his Jewish roots.³⁴ But the rabbi Soloveitchik died in 1918, and his son emigrated to France and later to the United States.

³²N. A. Rubakin [Nikolai Roubakine], *Rossia v tsifrakh. Strana. Narod. Soslovia. Klassy* [Russia in numbers. Land. People. Estates. Classes] (St. Petersburg: Izdanie "Vestnikaznaniya", 1912), 35. On the scientific study of the Jews of the pale, see Marina Mogilner, *Homo Imperii. A History of Physical Anthropology in Russia* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), chapter "Jewish Physiognomy," the "Jewish Question," and Russian Race Science Between Inclusion and Exclusion," 217–250.

³³On Rabbi Soloveitchik and the Brisk method of hermeneutics, see Rabbi Joseph Baer Soloveitchik, *Halakhic Man*, transl. Lawrence Kaplan (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1983). For the context of the European and the Jewish enlightenment, see Dov Schwartz, *Religion or Halakha. The Philosophy of Rabbi B. Soloveitchik*, transl. Batya Stein (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

³⁴Cf. Josef Solowieczyk, *Das reine Denken und die Seinskonstituierung bei Hermann Cohen* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1932).




Fig. 8.2 The quantitative representation of ethnic groups in the Russian Empire, featuring, from left to right, Russians, Turks and Tatars, Poles, Finnish tribes, Jews, Lithuanians, Germans, Caucasians and Cartvelians, Mountain peoples, Armenians, and Others. From Nikolai Robakine, *Rossia v tsifrakh. Strana. Narod. Soslovie. Klassy* [Russia in numbers. Land. People. Estates. Classes] (St. Petersburg: Izdanie 'Vestnika znaniya', 1912), 35.

When Berlin engaged with his own family's Jewish past, he sought to avoid fetishizing his own Jewish roots. What is startling is that against this light, both the idea of full assimilation, and the idea of seeking separate representation, seemed unavailable. 'Russian Jews', Berlin argued, were a 'community within a community', with an 'inner life of their own'. In his view, this gave rise to 'imaginative, free, unbroken Jewish personalities who, even today [1951], compare so favourably with the



Fig. 8.3 The quantitative representation of estates in the Russian Empire, featuring, from left to right, Peasants, Burghers, Other peoples, Cossacks, Gentry, Clergy, Honourable citizens, Others. From Nikolai Roubakine, *Rossia v tsi-frakh. Strana. Narod. Soslovie. Klassy* [Russia in numbers. Land. People. Estates. Classes] (St. Petersburg: Izdanie 'Vestnika znaniya', 1912), 35. Public domain

better educated, but, at times, less spontaneous and morally and aesthetically less attractive Jews of the West'.³⁵ In other words, for Berlin, it was only acceptable for communities to liberate themselves with their own national ideals or by means of voluntary assimilation, not to liberate others by means of emancipation or liberation.

As he explained in a letter, 'there has to be a central culture and a central language, to which the minorities must adjust and adapt themselves, and not cut themselves off from—otherwise things disintegrate and hatreds are bred'.³⁶ Instead he looked for a middle ground between the creation of a mythology of Jewish roots advanced by Benjamin Disraeli, whom he called an 'alienated Tory', and the self-hating alienation of the radical revolutionary Karl Marx.³⁷ This search went as far as claiming that there was no general history of Jews, since the histories of eastern and western European Jewry were so radically different. The western Jews could seek emancipation by becoming almost indistinguishable from the histories of the nations and empires within which they lived; the eastern Jews of the Pale of Settlement, on the other hand, had nothing but 'martyrology', a point on which he agreed with Lewis Namier, as well as with Hannah Arendt.³⁸

This differentiation between the history of the Jews in western and eastern Europe is important for understanding Berlin's political thought. He argued that the western Jews of Germany and Britain were more nationalist than the Germans and the British: 'Such passion surely often derives from a feeling of insufficient kinship'. This gave rise to the unnecessary martyrdom of Jews such as Walter Rathenau, Germany's foreign minister who was assassinated by a paramilitary group in 1922. If he had not been so 'self-blinded' as to ignore the fact that he could never become a German, Berlin argued, then he could at least 'have fallen as a martyr to a clearly pursued cause, and not as a victim to his own delusions'.³⁹

³⁵ Berlin, 'On the Jews of Russia and the Triumph of Zionism', in *Jewish Quarterly*, 45: 1 (1998), 14.

³⁶ Letter to Geert van Cleemput, 22 April 1996, 331.

³⁷ Isaiah Berlin: 'Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx, and the Search for Identity', in *Transactions & Miscellanies (Jewish Historical Society of England)*, 22 (1968–1969), 1–20. On Berlin and Judaism, see Arie Dubnow.

³⁸ Ibid., 1. See also Hannah Arendt, 'The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition', in *Jewish Social Studies*, 6: 2 (Apr, 1944), 99–122.

³⁹ Berlin, 'On the Jews of Germany', in *Jewish Quarterly*, 45: 1 (1998), 16.

We can see how Berlin's anti-cosmopolitanism and his endorsement of nationalist tendencies such as Zionism was linked to a turning away from eastern European history. This had a more complicated context, however, which had to do with the particularly negative connotation of cosmopolitanism in Soviet ideology. In a long excursus to an essay on nationalism, Berlin demonstrated awareness of the existence of an anti-cosmopolitan agenda in Soviet Russia, despite the early Bolsheviks' anti-nationalism, a new anti-cosmopolitanism had struck root. On his reading, this had begun with Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Karl Radek, all of whom vied against what they described as 'rootless cosmopolitanism'.⁴⁰ To this analysis, Berlin added a long reflection on the languages of anti-semitism in Soviet public discourse, which concentrated on the first appearance of this term in the Soviet journal *Ogonek* in 1948, and an article in *Pravda* from the same year, which associated cosmopolitanism with the work of 'internal enemies'. The fact that Berlin was aware of the Jews association with 'rootless cosmopolitanism' in Soviet ideology makes it even more remarkable that he went to great lengths to express his own anti-cosmopolitan agenda.⁴¹

Berlin's 'realism' regarding the prospects of Jews in the modern world was grounded in reflections on the historical experiences of eastern Europe, but also, the present-day experiences of Jews in the supposedly emancipatory Soviet Union. As Berlin conceded, therefore, rather than the pursuit of an ideal, which might make '[r]evolutions, wars, assassinations' necessary in 'desperate situations', there was instead a 'public obligation' to 'avoid extremes of suffering'.⁴² What is striking, however, was that ultimately, that recognition of a middle path still could not be articulated without a reference to Immanuel Kant. As 'even' the rigorous moralist Kant said ('in a moment of illumination', according to Berlin), 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.'⁴³ Berlin cited the same passage—drawn from *Perpetual Peace*—in a different essay, where he put the same idea like this:

⁴⁰Berlin, 'Bent Twig', 266.

⁴¹On Soviet kosmopolitizm, cf. Caroline Humphrey, 'Cosmopolitanism and *kosmopolitizm* in the political life of Soviet citizens', in *Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology* 44 (2004), 138–152.

⁴²Isaiah Berlin, *The Pursuit of the Ideal*, 18.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 19.

Immanuel Kant, a man very remote from irrationalism, once observed that ‘Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.’ And for that reason no perfect solution is, not merely in practice, but in principle, possible in human affairs, and any determined attempt to produce it is likely to lead to suffering, disillusionment and failure.⁴⁴

Yet, typical for mid twentieth-century uses of cosmopolitan elements in political thought, in Berlin’s text, just as in the international political practice of peace-making that emerged at Brest-Litovsk, the Jews were frequently either omitted from conversation, or spoken about in a purely ethnographic manner. Just as in Hannah Arendt’s writings, this meant that even in the writings of Jewish liberal intellectuals, the ‘cosmopolitanism’ of the region’s Jews was beginning to disappear.⁴⁵

Thanks to the publication of his letters, edited by Henry Hardy, we can learn some more details about Berlin’s exposure both to the history of the treaty, and the global situation of the Jews in the 1940s, from a letter to his parents. In 1940, we learn that Berlin had also met a Dr. Schüller from Austria, a ‘typical Austro-Jewish imperial bien pensant official’, who had been negotiating in Brest-Litovsk on behalf of Austria.⁴⁶ Between 1940 and 1942, as already mentioned, Berlin went on to work for the British Information Services in New York. Until 1946, he remained in the US to work for the British embassy in Washington, with some visits to Moscow during this time. In his job at the British Press Office in New York, Berlin had been charged with communicating with ‘Labour and Jewish interests’.⁴⁷ His task was to ‘supply details of the British war effort to the press and other media connected with various social groups and religious minorities, such as labour unions, Jews, and some of the smaller Christian denominations’.⁴⁸ The aim, as he recalled, was to ‘induce some of the “minority” groups in the United States for

⁴⁴Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West’, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, 21–51, 50.

⁴⁵Natan Sznajder, ‘Hannah Arendt: Jew and Cosmopolitan’, in *Socio. La Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales*, 4 (2015), 197–221.

⁴⁶Isaiah Berlin, letter to his parents (16 July 1940), in Isaiah Berlin, *Letters, 1928–1946*, ed. Henry Hardy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 317.

⁴⁷FO 371/30667, A/701/399/45, OEPCC 1126, Appendix B, Plan III.

⁴⁸Isaiah Berlin, Volume 1: Letters, 1928–1946 - Volume 1 - 317 and 656, dispatches from Washington.

example, the Jewish press, some of the smaller Protestant sects—to include in their publications some information about the British war effort, and to counter the anti-British or isolationist trends among some of them. Catholics, blacks and the rest of the “hyphenated” American press were left to others’.⁴⁹ If we look back at the various groups which are described as retreating into the ‘citadel’ in Berlin’s ‘negative’ concept of liberty, it is striking how many of the above would be among them. Yet knowing their specific history would give a very different idea of their position in relation to the other inhabitants of this imagined city.

Berlin’s separation between political philosophy and witnessed history had a profound influence on liberal attitudes to the historical past, yet they were formed in response to historical circumstances which preceded the Cold War. Though they are not typically classed as ‘Cold War liberals’, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, for instance, have also been visibly agnostic vis-à-vis the historical experience of the twentieth century in terms of conceptualising norms of justice and publicity.⁵⁰ The abstraction from history acquired normative connotations in a way that was particularly salient in the philosophy of John Rawls, as he sought to re-establish the foundations of ideal theory in a way which would be unfettered by historical experience.⁵¹ His very influential contractual model of justice probably gave the clearest justification for a divorce of political thought from history. It required readers to imagine a ‘veil of ignorance’ concerning their true historical and economic position, which frees up participants in a social contract to abstract from any particular passions or experiences and tunes them to seek out universally valid terms of justice. Realism in international relations was also characterized by a highly selective curation of historical evidence, as expressed in the doctrine of Hans Morgenthau, who argued that ‘[h]istory shows no exact and necessary

⁴⁹ 663, 664.

⁵⁰ Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). See also Martha Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice*. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). I use the term ‘discontents’ in the Freudian sense in which Raymond Geuss introduces it in ‘Das Unbehagen am Liberalismus’, in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 4 (2001), 499–516.

⁵¹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*; see also his *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). On Rawls’s detachment from history, see Raymond Geuss, ‘Neither History nor Practice’, in *European review*, 11: 3 (2003), 281–292.

correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy'.⁵² On this model, the idea of a national interest, the modern variant of the imperial reason of state, was a safer guide to political behaviour than the ideological or legal framework within which these were legitimated.⁵³ In the last section of the paper, I want to propose how a different, more historically grounded engagement with past 'crooked paths' might actually provide less conclusive insights about the relationship between historical experience and future commitments. As will be seen, this emerged from German engagements and responses to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, particularly, in the work of Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, and later, Reinhart Koselleck.

CONTINENTAL LIBERALS AND THE HISTORY OF SEPARATE PEACE TREATIES

By contrast to Anglophone liberal thought, in continental European contexts, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk has been linked differently to the Enlightenment past. This was based on a view of Kant which saw him not as a theorist and dogmatist of peace, but as a critical analyst of war and conflict. Some German intellectuals, including, notably, Hans Saner and Reinhart Koselleck, have provided examples for such an approach.⁵⁴ Speaking about the temporal qualities of historical concepts such as republicanism, they outlined that Kant's model of *Perpetual Peace* was as much built around a projected ideal, as it was prompted by the non-ideal circumstances of the Treaty of Basel (1795) – a set of three separate treaties signed during the French revolutionary wars between republican France on the one hand, and its 'old regime' opponents, including

⁵²Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Chicago: McGraw Hill, 2005), 6. (First published in 1948).

⁵³Morgenthau's doctrine was also explicated in works such as *Scientific Man and Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946) and *In Defense of National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951). On realism, see Michael Joseph Smith, 'Hans Morgenthau and the American National Interest in the Early Cold War', in *Social Research*, 48: 4, Special issue on Politics: The Work of Hans Morgenthau (WINTER 1981), 766–785.

⁵⁴Hans Saner, *Kants Weg vom Krieg zum Frieden*, 2 vols. (Munich: Piper, 1967). Winfried Baumgart und Konrad Repgen (eds), Reinhart Koselleck und Rudolf Vierhaus (series eds), *Historische Texte Neuzeit 6. Ausw.*, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969).

Prussia and Spain, on the other. Just as at Brest-Litovsk, the signatories in Basel held different conceptions of justice, yet in some respects, the peace between them conformed to Kant's ideas of a republican international right: after all, for Kant, a republican constitution was neither necessary, nor sufficient for the principles of right to classify as contributing to a cosmopolitan purpose.

According to Koselleck, Kant's goal was the 'possibility of seeing the Treaty of Basel between republican France and monarchical Prussia as a foundation for a possible League of Peoples' [or League of Nations, as it is now usually translated]. Incidentally, Koselleck added, this was a term which Kant himself had coined. As he argued, the 'inequality between these two forms of rule' was undercut in Kant's model by the fact that after the Peace, the Prussian king 'now had to govern in such a way, as if it were already a republic (like the French one, which all citizens would agree to)'. In this sense, a peace treaty could become the foundation of 'republicanism' even if it was not signed exclusively by republics.⁵⁵

Looking at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the light of the Treaty of Basel from 1795 is illuminating in this respect. In fact, German liberals had already done as much in the 1920s, when analyzing the implications of the unlawful style of German peace-making in Brest-Litovsk. A professorial committee investigating Germany's role in the war, which included Max Weber alongside other intellectuals such as Max Montgelas and Hans Delbrück, examined Germany's conduct in the signing of peace along Kantian principles.⁵⁶ Max Weber, notably, concentrated his critique of Germany on the Peace of Brest-Litovsk as a *Gewaltfrieden*, a violent peace, which held in store more profound problems for Europe's post-war legal and moral order than the necessarily compromised and exceptional actions in wartime.⁵⁷ The process of peace-making made visible that the two central concepts in the history of liberalism, representation and recognition, were susceptible to manipulation.

⁵⁵Reinhart Koselleck, 'Die Verzeitlichung der Begriffe', in *Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2006), 77–86, 83.

⁵⁶Cf. Max Montgelas, *Leitfaden zur Kriegsschuldfrage* (Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1923).

⁵⁷Max Weber, 'Zum Thema der Kriegsschuld', in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 43 (17 January 1919), 1, in MWG I/16, 179–190.

As Koselleck was aware, however, it was arguably this quality of an unjust peace, which set a precedent for the kind of international order which prevailed in the interwar period and later in the Cold War. In this connection, one particular detail is worth drawing attention to in reading the treaty in the light of its temporarily world-historical status. It came across in the introduction to a series edited by Koselleck, in which a detailed study of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk appeared alongside the publication of secret pre-negotiation talks in the German cabinet. Koselleck introduced the Peace of Brest-Litovsk as a moment which inscribed the ‘desire to deceive the contemporary public’ into a new standard of political practice which, he argued, had ‘grown in the twentieth century to the same degree to which the process of political will formation and the diplomatic exchange had been stripped of its traditional mantle of intimacy and secrecy’.⁵⁸ Indeed, this treaty silenced not only the subaltern populations like Jews and Ukrainians—the speechless subalterns, to use Gayatri Spivak’s terminology—but also establishment powers, like the German negotiator Richard von Kühlmann.⁵⁹ In his memoirs, he articulated a feeling of losing control because the Bolsheviks disseminated what was being spoken before they had the time to reformulate and abridge it, as had been the diplomatic tradition in Europe:

The spoken word was captured stenographically and then telegraphed out into the world in such a way that the speaker was not given even the slightest opportunity, as it is otherwise general practice in all parliaments, to read over the stenogram once again and, if necessary, to correct or to improve it.⁶⁰

In this sense, at Brest-Litovsk, some of the old powers felt as speechless as unrecognized populations like the Jews.⁶¹

⁵⁸Reinhart Koselleck, series editor’s introduction to *Brest-Litovsk*, Winfried Baumgart und Konrad Repgen (eds), Reinhart Koselleck and Rudolf Vierhaus (series eds.), *Historische Texte Neuzeit 6. Ausw.*, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), 7–8, 7.

⁵⁹Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg’s *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 66–111.

⁶⁰Richard von Kühlmann, *Erinnerungen* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1948), 523.

⁶¹*Brockhaus & Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary*, voliv, entry on ‘Brest-Litovsk’ (St. Petersburg: I.A. Efron, 1894). On radical Jewish activism, see E. Mendelssohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers’ Movement in Tsarist Russia* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970). On the Pale and internal colonization, see

The terms of peace were being dictated by Germany. But the conditions of speech and publicity were determined by more factors, including the open diplomacy of the Bolsheviks, but also the actions of other state representatives which considered themselves representatives of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires, or their successors.⁶² The Bolsheviks undermined familiar and traditional forms of international relations, and yet this peace treaty also established their validity. Unlike Berlin, Wheeler-Bennett appeared much more comfortable in his role as a civil servant working on the—still imperial—British foreign policy. Retrospectively, he occupied an interesting transitional role between that of an imperial civil servant and an agent in the Cold War.

Seen in this light, the Bolsheviks could be seen as having governed in such a way *as if* they were a recognized international power, even though their own political thought had made it public enough that they were enemies of what they considered bourgeois and liberal values. Likewise, the peace could be read *as if* it satisfied the criteria of publicity stipulated by Kant, even though in the end, we know that the deal was made elsewhere. Given the civil war in Russia, even by Kantian standards, the international community was entitled to seek negotiations at will with any of its supposed successors—thus leading to a secret treaty to establish Ukrainian and Finnish sovereignty under German auspices, for instance (which succeeded in the case of Finland and failed in the case of Ukraine). Committed internationalists of previous generations, such as former Russian Senator, Mikhail von Taube, saw the treaty as a cynical twist on international relations: ‘[to] speak of a union of states today is as ridiculous as if flies offered to make a union with spiders’.⁶³

Footnote Continued

Etkind, *Internal Colonization*, 147 ff. On the consequences of internal colonialism for the development of tolerance towards cultural difference, see Hans-Heinrich Nolte, ‘Internal Peripheries: From Andalusia to Tatarstan’, in *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 18: 2 (Spring, 1995), 261–280.

⁶²On the Ottoman perspective on Brest-Litovsk, see Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For the central European perspective, see also Avieli Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Unraveling of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London: Routledge, 2001).

⁶³A quotation attributed to the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, in Prof. bar. M.A. Taube, *Vechnyi mir ili vechnaia voina?* (Mysli o „Ligi Natsii”) [Perpetual peace or perpetual war? (Thoughts on the League of Nations)] (Berlin: Detinets, 1922).

At closer sight, however, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk—signed between the temporarily victorious Central Powers and the disintegrating Russian Empire—was reminiscent of the kinds of separate peace which authors like Immanuel Kant had witnessed at the time of the revolutionary wars, and in which secret purposes hid behind visible outcomes. In this sense, it was also the epitome of injustice. This gave this treaty its peculiarly disorienting quality for contemporaries and other twentieth-century commentators. But, as Reinhart Koselleck indicates, that disorientation itself had a history in the way Kant's contemporaries dealt with the representatives of France in situations such as the Treaty of Basel.

For instance, the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk supported Kant's anti-aristocratic political ideas, showing that it was no longer obvious by which criteria new elites would be formed in Europe. The diplomats of the old empires now had to share the negotiating table with representatives of states that had recently seceded from them. At Brest-Litovsk, the old diplomats faced the Bolsheviks as a challenge.⁶⁴ Should the diplomatic staff of a Count Tisza of Hungary or Count Czernin of Austria really acknowledge a sailor from the defunct Russian navy, who did not even have a surname, let alone a passport, as rival partners in negotiation? Did Bolshevik mean 'maximalist' or 'majoritarian', and what was the democratic basis for the support they enjoyed among Russia's former imperial subjects? Could they be trusted to sign a conventional peace treaty about territorial rights if they refused to accept private property in land in their own state? Would aristocratic privileges survive in the other European states? In the absence of a traditional aristocracy, what would constitute the foundations for a new European elite? If Europe became post-aristocratic, how would that affect the uniqueness of the US?

Another effect of the treaty was the public exposure of both the Russian and the German empires as rogue states. In 1908, the historian Friedrich Meinecke had argued in his *Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-State* that it was Germany's special destiny to be shaping world history, a special role which not all nations and not all states had the fortune to

⁶⁴Oleksander Sevryuk, *Beresteiskii mir (9–11–1019) (Urivki si spominiv)* (Paris: Les Nouvelles ukrainiennes, 1927); John Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918* (1938) (New York: Norton, 1939); Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Chudenitz, *In the World War* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1920).

play.⁶⁵ After Brest-Litovsk, Germany remained a leading player but it was no longer clear whether any one nation would recover such moral high ground again. Germany came to be seen as a rogue state by the 'international community', represented by Britain, France, and the US. The forms of misconduct, such as atrocities against civilians in Belgium and the extension of the U-boat warfare, constituted a breach of the Geneva Convention on war.⁶⁶ This diminished moral standing was, of course, dramatically augmented in the wake of the Second World War and what would later be called the Holocaust.⁶⁷ It was also comparable to the shifting prestige of the French revolutionary regime in the eyes of the global liberal public in the early 1800s. The history of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk therefore provide a fascinating insight into the human capacity for peace in the face of unjust historical experiences.

One more striking aspect of the way the treaty was conducted was the fact that the relations between majorities and minorities were irrelevant to its progress. Kant himself, after all, had never insisted on the democratic principle as the norm for republican principles of peace-making. What is of interest, given the history of Jewish exclusion in the region, is how exactly the Jewish majority of Brest was made irrelevant in historical contexts. It was certainly 'visible' to the international public eye, as artists using the war as an occasion for ethnographic exploration have shown.⁶⁸ Newspapers also often concentrated on the Jewish features

⁶⁵Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaates* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1911). On Meinecke, see also Istvan Hont, 'The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: "Nation-State" and "Nationalism" in Historical Perspective', in idem, *Jealousy of Trade* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 447–529. On Meinecke in the context of 'special path' conceptions of history, see Richard Bourke, 'Nationalism, Balkanization and Democracy', in *Schleifspuren: Lesarten des 18. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Anke Fischer-Kattner et al. (Munich: Dreesbach Verlag, 2011), 77–89.

⁶⁶See Isabel Hull, *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

⁶⁷On Germany's diminished standing in the twentieth century, see, for instance, David Reynolds, *One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945* (New York: Norton, 2001), and, most recently, Philippe Sands, *East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity* (London: Weidenfeld, 2016).

⁶⁸Mogilner, op.cit. See also Natalya Goncharova, *Mezhdu vostokom i zapadom* (Moscow: Tret'iakovskaia galereia, 2013), and the work of Emil Orlik as a caricaturist at the conference, in <http://www.artnet.com/artists/emil-orlik/trotzki-brest-litowsk-1-ii-1918-pW5Dvf7J8xgV7CpGMvcvMQ2>, accessed 25 July 2016.

of key Soviet negotiators like Leon Trotsky, Lev Kamenev, or Adolph Joffe, whom John Wheeler-Bennett described as ‘a Jew recently released from Siberian prison’.⁶⁹ The Tsarist censorship curtailed the representation of the Jews in the press.⁷⁰ Indeed, some Jews spoke at the negotiations—but of course, figures like Trotsky and Joffe never spoke in a capacity which would reflect their Jewish background. Brest-Litovsk and the political groups which gathered there were very far from the ‘cosmopolitan’ ideals. The majority of its inhabitants were without representation, but they had never enjoyed such representation under the previous regimes either.

The Bolsheviks endorsed the abolition of the Pale of Settlement which had been legislated by the Provisional Government, and included some prominent Jewish representatives in their midst. But the Peace of Brest-Litovsk did not change much for the effective status of the Jews in those parts of eastern Europe which remained outside Soviet control.⁷¹ In Bolshevik rhetoric, Jews were not expressly addressed as one of the colonized groups, in the way that Lenin, for instance, addressed the Muslim ‘peoples of the East’, in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. Besides, while Jews became the objects of anti-Bolshevik propaganda, the Bolsheviks, too, continued to suspect Jews collectively of counter-intelligence and the subversion of the revolutionary cause.⁷²

Jews were not fully represented in the documents of the treaty either, or mentioned irregularly in some versions of the document. The American summary of the peace treaty signed with Ukraine had the following version:

The Ukrainian people, which has fought for many years for its national freedom and now has won it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities existing in Ukraina. [sic] Therefore, we announce that to the Great Russian, Jewish, Polish, and other peoples of Ukraina we recognize national personal autonomy for the security of their

⁶⁹ John Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, March 1918 (New York: Norton, 1939), 113.

⁷⁰ Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*.

⁷¹ Appeal of the Council of People’s Affairs.

⁷² Cf. ‘Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune Fevral’skoi revoliutsii’, in *Krasnyi Arkhiv* 4: 17 (Moscow, 1926), 17, p. 23.

rights and freedom of self-government in questions of their national life, and we instruct our General Secretary for Nationality Questions to draw.⁷³

By contrast, the official German version of the Ukrainian peace treaty omitted the explicit mention of the equality of Christians and Jews, explaining the omission in an addendum:

In the final protocol the following changes deserve attention: 1. in Part I of the final protocol to Article 12, the agreements hitherto come to concerning the equal footing of Christians and Jewish commercial travelers have been stricken; this was done, however, only because the constitution of the Ukraine makes no difference in faiths. On the part of the Ukraine negotiators it has been expressly stated that through this commission, no differential treatment, in whatever manner between Christian and Jewish commercial travelers can be made.

When it comes to the negotiations involving Rumania, by contrast, the equality between the different faiths were mentioned once again:

Equality of Religions Roumania.

ARTICLE XXVII.

Equal freedom is granted in Roumania to the Roman Catholic, to the United Greek, to the Bulgarian Orthodox, to the Protestant, to the Musselman, and to the Jewish faiths, and each shall receive the –same juridical and official protection as that accorded the Roumanian Orthodox faith. Especially, they shall have the right to establish parishes or communities of faith, as well as schools which are to be regarded as private schools and may not be interfered with except in the case of a violation of the national security or of public order. In all private and public schools, the pupils may not be compelled to attend religious instruction unless it is given by an authorized teacher of their faith.⁷⁴

⁷³*Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. The Peace Negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers, 21 November 1917–1923 March, 1918* (Washington: Government printing office, 1918), 59. For the German version, see *Brest-Litovsk*, Winfried Baumgart und Konrad Repgen (eds), Reinhart Koselleck and Rudolf Vierhaus (series eds), *Historische Texte Neuzeit* 6. Ausw., (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969).

⁷⁴*Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference*, 28.

Reading these documents as aspects of an unjust treaty might distract our view from the fact that the treaty of Brest did ultimately contribute to a ‘cosmopolitan’ progression of European society – at the very least, with respect to time itself. Baron Kühlmann of Germany, Count Czernin of Austria-Hungary, Leo Trotsky of Bolshevik Russia, and their Ottoman and Bulgarian colleagues had neither a common language, nor a common time. In Russia, December 1917 was still November. For the Ottomans it was the year 1333. Nonetheless, some connections emerged in the process of negotiations. In their spare time, Count Czernin and the Prince of Bavaria, for instance, decided to go hunting in a nearby forest. Russia was not on global time when the negotiations began. Within a few years of signing the peace treaty, however all powers concerned—including Soviet Russia and modern Turkey—had entered what Vanessa Ogle has recently described as ‘global time’.⁷⁵

Speaking with Hegel, one might say that in 1917, Brest-Litovsk, this peripheral city, became a site of world history, even if a number of cosmopolitan principles were violated in the text of the treaty itself. If you were to choose an imaginary capital of Europe in the 1910s based on the geographical centrality of its location, then Brest-Litovsk would easily beat the candidatures of Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, or Frankfurt/Main. Not far north of Brest-Litovsk lies the city of Białystok, the birthplace of Ludwik Zamenhof, the inventor of Esperanto; Polish Krakow, Bronisław Malinowski’s hometown, and Ukrainian Berdychiv, that of Joseph Conrad, are some 400 km away. It was on the crossroads of major waterways and railways from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and railways connecting Moscow and Warsaw and further afield. As the main interchange of the Russian telegraph line running from East to West—a consideration which the Bolsheviks took particularly seriously—Brest could also be seen as a kind of nervous centre of East–West relations. It regulated the succession of political regimes to some of Europe’s failed empires which were seeking accreditation from the surviving powers, and from a global public.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Leon Trotsky, *From October to Brest-Litovsk*, *Authorized translation from the Russian* (New York: The Socialist Publication Society, 1919), 6. On time, see Vanessa Ogle, *The Global Transformation of Time* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015).

⁷⁶Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1805–1819), Eduard Gans (ed.) (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1837).

Pace liberals like Berlin and Morgenthau, who explicitly distanced themselves from past idealism and associated this idealism with Immanuel Kant, more historically grounded interpretations such as those of Saner and Koselleck thought that Kant himself was closer to a realist view. Like other commentators, he would have found unjust elements in the treaty, but he would have certainly found it worthy of attention: the peace treaty eventually got the job done, despite the heterogeneity of the signatories, their heteronomy, and the arbitrary exclusion of entire groups from the event. In the final version, the German and Hungarian signatories had signed a typed text, the Ottoman section was written in classical calligraphy, and two more columns in Bulgarian and Russian were written in plain Cyrillic.⁷⁷ As already mentioned, the treaty was also publicly communicated, and journalists and informants working for Britain, France, and the US, whose delegates were not at Brest-Litovsk, were following the proceedings attentively. As Borislav Chernev has recently argued, despite its association with injustice and brutality, the Treaty also served as a catalyst for national liberation movements. Even for the representatives of political communities whose status remained uncertain because they could not send delegations, including the Kingdom of Serbia, the Croats and Slovenians, Czechs, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians, and the Transcaucasian Republic, the treaty provided a welcome occasion to make visible their aspirations to postimperial sovereignty in an international context.⁷⁸

What the treaty of course did not satisfy was the highest cosmopolitan value, which was humanity itself. But the fact that large swathes of populations remained unrepresented would not have particularly concerned Kant. The haphazard inclusions or omissions of different ethnic groups were particularly evident when it came to the Jewish

⁷⁷Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 3 March 1918. Facsimile at http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_ru&dokument=0011_bre&cl=de, accessed 5 July 2015.

⁷⁸Borislav Chernev, 'Ukrainization and Its Contradictions in the Context of the Brest-Litovsk System', in Eric Lohr, Vera Tolz, Alexander Semyonov and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *The Empire and Nationalism at War* (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2014), 163-189. I am grateful to Alexander Semyonov for pointing me to this article. On the Yugoslav perspective, see Anton Korošec, *Les Yougoslaves et la Conférence de Brest-Litovsk* (Geneva: Chaulmontet, 1918); on the US perspective, see US Department of State, *Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. The peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers. 21 November, 1917—3 March, 1918* (Washington, 1918).

majority resident in the city. That, too, had repercussions, since, after the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of 1939, German troops withdrew from the city following the agreement (*'pacta sunt servanda'*), which was then followed by the start of another Soviet–Polish war. But to this, too, Kant would have had an answer in a paraphrase from Seneca: *'fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt'* [fate guides the willing, but drags the unwilling].⁷⁹

In the end, time and history did move on in 'crooked' ways. Writing in 1940 in an article titled 'From Brest-Litovsk to Brest-Litovsk', John Wheeler-Bennett, the journalist who accompanied Berlin to Mexico, admitted as much when he described the Peace of Brest-Litovsk as 'a treaty unequalled in modern times for its unashamed brutality'. Yet it was also, 'with the exception of the Treaty of Versailles', an agreement whose consequences were 'more important and far-reaching than any other peace settlement since the Congress of Vienna'. More than this, even in 1940, 'at the very moment of writing', it continued to affect European politics. He also added:

HERE is something fascinating, and at the same time almost frightening, in the completeness of the pattern woven by the Fates about the two sets of Russo-German negotiations which took place at Brest-Litovsk twenty years apart, in 1918 and now again in 1939. Almost all the elements of great drama are presented – tragedy and betrayal, irony and fleeting sardonic wit, and the inevitable Nemesis of knaves. There lacks, however, the crowning glory of a third act in which virtue is rewarded. For the element of virtue was ever absent from Brest.⁸⁰

Having been part of a geographic region covered by the non-aggression pact of the Soviet Union and Germany, by 1941, this city became one of the first sites of conquest of the German Wehrmacht in breach of the

⁷⁹Immanuel Kant, 'On the relationship of theory to practice', in idem, *Political Writings*, 92. Kant uses a less emphatic paraphrase of Seneca's original (Ep. 107), which is *'ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt'*. An 18th century (English) edition of Seneca, who was widely read by Kant's English and Scottish contemporaries as well, renders this phrase like this: 'With gentle hand Fate leads the willing mind/But drags along the stubborn, and the blind'. In *The Epistles of Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, ed. and trans. Thomas Morrell, 2 vols (London: Woodfall, 1786), vol.2, 260.

⁸⁰John Wheeler-Bennett, 'From Brest-Litovsk to Brest-Litovsk', in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1940).

Hitler–Stalin pact. Following the German occupation, the Jewish community of Brest-Litovsk was destroyed. But it was the Soviet town planners of the 1950s who erased the cultural memory of Jewish presence by using the headstones of Jewish cemeteries as building material for post-war reconstruction. In 2014, community activists for the protection of cultural heritage in Brest discovered over a thousand gravestones which had been used to build up some of the city's streets and buildings in the 1950s.⁸¹ These headstones came from the old cemetery of the city, built in the late 1830s. While the destruction of the Jewish population of Brest in the Holocaust had been the work of the Nazi regime and its collaborators, the destruction of its cultural memory was undertaken by the region's new Soviet authorities. The recovery of this particular past can only form part of a cosmopolitan memory in the fractured sense in which Nathan Sznajder has spoken of it.⁸²

Beyond Brest, new frontiers were being drawn not only in 1917–1919 but also in 1948 and in 1961, in India, Palestine, Germany, and elsewhere. The very idea of partition—such an important Cold War trope—became part of a seemingly pragmatic, realist agenda, rather than a radical intervention. In statements made in later years, Isaiah Berlin asserted that in cases of 'intolerable friction', such as 'between Norway and Sweden, in Cyprus (whatever either side may say), certainly in Palestine', partition rather than assimilation was the only way forward. He even added that there was 'justice' in cutting off the West Bank because the 'Arabs who choose to live among Israelis do tend to learn Hebrew, and do not marry the Jews'.⁸³ In places like Germany, meanwhile, instead of neatly separating the sides of the Iron Curtain, the divided parts of Germany's formal capital began to form divisive citadels without any cultural rationale. Only three years after Berlin's lecture on 'negative liberty', Soviet Marshall Ivan Konev as head of the Warsaw Pact forces oversaw the construction of the Wall in the city of Berlin, turning its western part into a western citadel, as if indeed the western 'sects' and the eastern 'planned economies' could exist in one city.

⁸¹<http://www.thetogetherplan.com/heritage-projects.html>, accessed 3 July 2016.

⁸²Natan Sznajder, *Jewish Memory and the Cosmopolitan Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

⁸³Isaiah Berlin, Letter to Geert van Cleemput (22 April 1996), in Henry Hardy (ed.), *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 327–333.

The contrasting levels of engagement with the history of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk among Anglophone and continental Cold War intellectuals provides important insights for understanding the evolving character of liberal political doctrines in this period. The progressive exclusion of some participants, including Jews and Ukrainians, ‘From Brest-Litovsk to Brest-Litovsk’ and beyond, appeared increasingly normal, or could be hidden behind a Rawlsian veil. Far from deciding the bleak futures of these particular groups only, however, the international acceptance of these exclusions also established the idea of partition and exclusion as an acceptable state of affairs for the post-idealist Cold War world at large. In the end, both Berlin’s estranged attitude towards recent history, and Koselleck’s perception of Kant’s attention to the imperfect justice of his own time, highlight the link between Cold War political thought and earlier periods of compromised cosmopolitanism. As Kant himself had been aware, disorientation itself has a history that is worth remembering.

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The Languages of Caucasian Cosmopolitanism: Twentieth-Century Baku at the Crossroads

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Empires forge unique urban spaces at their conquered peripheries. Populated by different ethnic groups, they enable numerous encounters between people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Empires are also multi-ethnic and multi-confessional entities: throughout their existence, their complex stability rested not only on a fabric of complex relationships and agreements between very different kinds of community, but also, on a rich cultural production leading to what historians and anthropologists have described as processes of cosmopolitanisation.¹ Nowhere do these complex interrelationships and the languages

¹Cf. Walter Mignolo, 'De-colonial cosmopolitanism and dialogues among civilizations', in Gerard Delanty (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies* (London: Routledge, 2012), 85–101; For a longer view, see Myles Lavan, Richard E. Payne, and John Weisweiler (Eds.), *Cosmopolitanism and Empire: Universal Rulers, Local Elites, and Cultural Integration in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

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of self-description which reflect this complexity stand out more clearly than in urban spaces.² Wars, revolutions, and civil wars tend to bring out these tensions and relationships even more clearly. In the modern era, imperial urban societies gave rise to two contradictory but interwoven mentalities: nationalism and cosmopolitanism, both of which thrived on the new intellectual opportunities which presented themselves in conflict situations. Urban intellectual communities developed new ideas of their own cosmopolitan constitution, which can be usefully analysed through the notion of the ‘cosmopolitan moment’, as used by Ulrich Beck and Martha Nussbaum.³

This paper focuses on the place of writers in fostering cosmopolitan moments in the city of Baku, throughout the twentieth century and in the post-Soviet era. Comparable with other peripheral imperial port cities like Thessaloniki the case of Baku provides a fascinating case study for the way writers and intellectuals have contributed to a ‘self-cosmopolitanisation’ of their community. Unlike Thessaloniki, however, Baku also stood out with its unusual level of industrial development, as the centre of the Russian Empire’s oil industry. Along with other Muslim feudal principalities north of the river Araxes, Baku, a city on the shore of the Caspian Sea, had been incorporated into the Russian Empire in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, giving rise to a military conflict with Persia. These principalities were administratively reorganised into provinces: Baku became the local centre of the ‘Bakinskaia gubernia’ or Baku guberniate. Due to the aggressive centralisation of the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century, the local Shia population of Baku formed an absolute majority of the city’s residents at that moment. During the oil boom at the turn of the century, this

²On cosmopolitan cities in imperial peripheries, see Caroline Humphrey and Vera Skvirskaja, *Post-cosmopolitan Cities. Explorations of Urban Coexistence* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2012), especially Panos Hatziprokopiou, ‘Haunted by the Past and the Ambivalences of the Present: Immigration and Thessalonica’s Second Path to Cosmopolitanism’, 194–216. Another impressive overview on urban cosmopolitanism, its failures and re-emergences can be found in Pnina Werbner, ‘The dialectics of urban cosmopolitanism: between tolerance and intolerance in cities of strangers’, in *Identities*, 22: 5 (2015), 569–587.

³For the term ‘cosmopolitan moment’ in the context of global society, see Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in the world risksociety’, in *Economy and Society*, 35: 3 (August 2006), 329–345, 331. See also Marilyn Fischer, ‘A Pragmatist Cosmopolitan Moment: Reconfiguring Nussbaum’s Cosmopolitan Concentric Circles’, in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 3 (2007), 151–165.

traditional population then experienced amass immigration of Russian, Ukrainian, and Armenian families from other parts of the Empire to Baku—a change which was not always welcome. Within several decades, Baku had undergone a transformation from provincial town with almost no industry at all to the leading source of oil, both within the Empire and internationally, with the city's streets transformed from an ancient citadel into an Haussmanian modern city modelled after Paris. The number of Baku's residents grew rapidly; the oilboom went hand in hand with galloping urbanisation. The infrastructure necessary to service the oil industry emerged first. Perhaps unusually, it was the oil industry which gave the first push for the emergence of multi-confessional spaces, leading to the establishment of Russian schools and Russian Orthodox, German Lutheran, and Armenian Gregorian churches. The oil boom and the imperial setting brought different cultures, religions, languages, and lifestyles into one space. In this way, Baku became not just a microcosm of the Russian Empire, but an experimental area where traditional and modern societies were confronted with a unique mixture of cultures.

While Baku's cultural cosmopolitanism had formed as a result of long-term economic and political trends in the Russian Empire, therefore, the revolution and civil war provided their own impulses for a cosmopolitisation of the city—albeit not without violent conflict. Before the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, the Shia intellectuals of Baku, Karabakh, Shirvan, and other khanates had been an integral part of the Persian and Ottoman intellectual spheres. But during the turmoil years of the Russian Revolution, Baku briefly turned into a communist *polis* in 1917, witnessing significant clashes between its Armenian and Muslim populations by March 1918. By May 1918, it had become the capital of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic and opened the first European-style university in 1919, with Russian as the main language of instruction. Among this university's lecturers was Mammad Amin Rasulzade, the first (and only) president of the Democratic Republic.

What brought the cosmopolitan community of Baku into a state of decline was, therefore, a cumulative set of factors: World War I, the following years of political turmoil and first post-imperial statehood (the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, 1918–1920), followed by the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan (April 1920). As a result of these upheavals, the cultural plurality that had been so characteristic of its imperial urban space had been greatly reduced. However, several decades later, a renewed, post-war cosmopolitanism emerged in Soviet Baku.

Just as at the turn of the century, forged by the Empire, 1950s' Baku regained its cosmopolitanism, albeit Soviet in character. Post-war Baku became the birthplace of the supra-national and supra-confessional Russophone subculture of *Bakintsy* (Bakuvians). Bakuvians steadfastly defined themselves as cosmopolitan.⁴ While Russian had become the *lingua franca* of Baku-based nobles and Muslim, Christian, and Jewish high society by the turn of the century, the 1950s saw it become the common language for almost all Soviet residents of Baku. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Russian became the language not only of labour and of the emerging proletariat, but also of higher education. The Muslim elites, both Sunni and Shiite, were obliged to express their loyalty to the Empire by mastering its language and sending the own children to Russian high schools and universities. The imperial enculturation of the offspring of the Azerbaijani nobles happened quickly, especially in the context of the accelerated Russification of the Russian Empire during the late Romanov period.⁵ This process was made possible by

⁴Largely ignored by the international scholarship of cosmopolitanism, Baku became a topic of research of US-American anthropologist Bruce Grant. He titled his work 'Cosmopolitan Baku' and interviewed numerous current and former residents in Baku. Grant focused on the Bakuvites' views on the cosmopolitan essence of their city, which most of them praised as a special and an open-minded space, a real multinational and multi-confessional area. See Bruce Grant, 'Cosmopolitan Baku', in *Ethnos*, 75: 2 (June 2010), 123–147. The research of Baku-based historian Anar Valiyev demonstrates the chronology of Baku's demographical and architectural change over the decades. See Anar Valiyev, 'City profile Baku', in *Cities*, 31 (2012), 625–640. Noteworthy is the recent research of German ethnologists and anthropologists Melanie Krebs and Tsypylma Darieva. See Melanie Krebs, 'Negotiating Cosmopolitanism in Baku', in Voell, Stéphane and Keteven Khutsishvili (eds) *Caucasus Conflict Culture: Anthropological Perspectives on Times of Crisis* (Marburg: Curupira Workshop, 2013), 225–242; see also Melanie Krebs, 'From cosmopolitan Baku to tolerant Azerbaijan – Branding "The Land of Fire"', in *Identity Studies* 6 (2015), 110–129; Tsypylma Darieva, 'Sterilizing the Public Space? The Baku Waterfront as History's Promenade', in *Russian Studies in History*, 55: 2 (2016), 163–179. The research of Bruce Grant and Anar Valiyev is of particular significance due to the authors' ability of using Azerbaijani sources.

⁵Russification was a strategy conducted by the Tsarist authorities as well as later on by the Soviet authorities under Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev aiming at the homogenisation of the multi-ethnic and multicultural population of the empire. The Tsarist government supported the spread of Russian language and Orthodox Christianity throughout the country. For more on Russification see Zaur Gasimov (ed.), *Kampf um Wort und Schrift. Russifizierung in Osteuropa im 19–20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).

the extremely rapid urbanisation of Baku, by the Russification and Christianisation of its public sphere.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian–Azerbaijani war over Karabakh (1988–1994), and the emigration of Armenian and most Russian residents of Baku throughout the 1990s, the Bakuvian subculture transferred itself into cyberspace.⁶ Being based nowadays throughout a vastly varied geography from Israel to Europe and Russia, former Bakuvites launched a large number of paperback publications, internet forums, and blogs reminiscing about their ‘cosmopolitan Baku’. I argue that the cosmopolitan moments which Russian and Soviet Baku enjoyed were both of an imperial character and emerged as a result of a post-war and post-violence search for normality and stability. However, driven by the state-backed homogenisation strategy of both the 1900s and the Soviet period, the imposition of the Russian language had an enormous alienating impact on the non-Russian ethnic groups residing in the city, including Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Jews.⁷

Cosmopolitanism seems to have an additional meaning, too, as personal, rather than political identity. Indeed, reading Azerbaijani narratives, cosmopolitanism appears to be a key element of their self-description, particularly in the memories of the older generation of Baku’s population. Further, the state of Azerbaijan has been using the image of its ‘cosmopolitan capital’ in its attempts to attract tourists to Baku, inviting them to enjoy the ‘European charm of the Orient’.⁸ In this paper, I will try to look at narrated, recalled, and affected cosmopolitanism from the perspective of post-colonial theory, by focusing on Baku and by paying attention to Azerbaijani and Russian discourses in and about the city, as well as literary accounts of it. I will examine

⁶For more on the background of the Armenian–Azerbaijani war over Karabakh, see Heiko Krüger, *The Nagorno–Karabakh Conflict. A Legal Analysis* (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2010); Thomas De Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War* (New York: New York University Press, 2nd edition 2013); Jafarova, Esmira, *Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus. Challenges to International Efforts* (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books, 2015).

⁷A similar process could be observed in post-Ottoman Alexandria and Cairo. See the paper of Sami Zubaida (1999) quoted by Pnina Werbner, ‘The dialectics of urban cosmopolitanism’, in *Identities*, 575.

⁸This seems to be a semi-official slogan of ‘AZ of Azerbaijan’, an internet portal maintained by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Tourism. <http://www.atoz.az/map-item/european-charm-orient> (accessed 25 July 2015).

Baku's cosmopolitan moments as reflected in the fictional memoir genre espoused by Baku-born writers of different ages, starting with Kurban Said (Leo Nussimbaum) and Umm-el-Banu Assadulaieff (Banine) who wrote at the time of the revolution and the early Democratic Republic, and ending with the late twentieth- and twenty-first century authors Ali Akper (Alekpër Aliyev), and Olga Grjasnowa, published in German, French, and Azerbaijani between the 1930s and 2014.

COSMOPOLITAN INTELLECTUALS

According to the British historian of the Near East, Sami Zubaida, cosmopolitanism in the Near East was shaped by diverse persons, places, milieus, ideologies, and religions.⁹ By this token, a person who is 'multilingual, multicultural, at home in different milieus and who has wide interests across cultural and national boundaries',—such a person is, according to Zubaida, cosmopolitan.¹⁰ And indeed, at the turn of the century, Azerbaijani Muslim intellectuals, as well as Armenian merchants and the clergy of Baku, were multilingual. And their interests were spread wide, both across and far beyond of the borders of the Romanovs' empire.

But beyond the importance of language and common interests, the Azerbaijani intelligentsia at the turn of the century also developed awareness of discourses taking place in neighbouring Persia and the Ottoman Empire over the issue of legitimate rule in former imperial areas. Meanwhile, what it meant to be an Azerbaijani intellectual had changed dramatically during the Soviet period. Persian and Arabic were less often studied as foreign languages at schools in Baku after the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan. The displacement of the Persian-Arabic alphabet from the Azerbaijani language at the end of 1920s and again in 1930s damaged both personal and cultural bonds between Azerbaijani intellectuals and the Near East. Competence in Persian and Arabic had almost disappeared by the 1960 and 1970s. The Russification, imposed from the early 1930s and backed by Khrushchev's notorious school reforms in the

⁹Sami Zubaida, 'Cosmopolitanism and the Middle East', in Roel Meijer (ed.), *Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Authenticity in the Middle East* (Mittcham: Curzon, 1999), 15–17.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 15.

1960s, resulted in the new generation of Azerbaijani intellectuals, mostly residents of Baku, having quite poor knowledge of the Azerbaijani language. In Baku, where the Azerbaijanis were outnumbered by the Russian and Armenian communities taken together until the 1970s, Sovietisation made Russian the dominant *lingua franca*. During Perestroika, fully bilingual Azerbaijanis were few and far between, even within the intelligentsia of Baku. The rest of the Azerbaijanis, whose academic and even vernacular Russian was much better than Azerbaijani, were called *russkoiazychnyi* in Russian or *rusdilli* in Azerbaijani, both meaning ‘Russophone’. The sizeable Armenian community of Baku shared a similar fate and became almost totally Russified. Most of Baku’s Armenians graduated from Russian schools and used Russian as their inter- and intra-communal language. Those Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Iranian-speaking Talysh people from the provinces of Azerbaijan who moved to Baku but spoke Russian badly were pejoratively called *chushki* by the Bakuvians. *Chushki* is originally a Russianised plural form of *chushka*, an Azerbaijani word for ‘piglet’.¹¹ In the Baku context, however, *chushki* was a label of backwardness and boorishness. Russian-speaking Azerbaijani families, residents of Baku in the second or third generation who spoke Russian at home, considered the newcomers from the provinces to be backward. The level of Russian proficiency often played a greater role in determining belonging to the Bakuvians than did ethnic affiliation.

Occurring simultaneously, the acculturation, homogenisation, and integrationist tendencies of each empire are aimed ultimately at the elimination of deviation and difference. Neither the Ottomans nor the French or the British had planned to create cosmopolitan milieus in Alexandria or Beirut. Similarly, Russia had no intention of prolonging cosmopolitan moments in the cities under its control—like Baku, Tbilisi, or Riga. Functional and symmetrical multilingualism is a litmus test of any form of cosmopolitanism. In imperial cities, different ethnic, religious, and even social groups, develop encounters with each other which build up a more polyphonic fabric of society than in the centres. Yet it is enough for these polyphonic voices of the multi-ethnic urban community to become unified by a single enforced language to bring about a decline in cosmopolitanisation.

¹¹ The Russian original is *чужка*, Azerbaijani: *çoşqa*.

MAKING THE BAKUVIAN GOLDEN AGE

The journalist and doctor Ali Bey Hüseynzade (1864–1940) was born close to Baku, then attended a Russian school in Tiflis; afterwards he studied medicine at the University of St. Petersburg and at the Medical Institute of Tıbbiye in late-Ottoman Istanbul. He was the translator of some fragments from Goethe's *Faust* into Azerbaijani, which he had published in his journal *Füyuzat*, founded in Baku in 1906. Hüseynzade wrote extensively in Ottoman Turkish for Istanbul-based journals and translated from German literature.¹² He had returned from Istanbul to Baku after the Russian Revolution of 1905. He enjoyed the liberalisation in the Russian Empire and undertook various journalistic activities. The headquarters of his publishing house were quite close to the neighbourhood in which the Jewish writer Lev Nussimbaum was born in 1905. While Hüseynzade was focused on reporting on political and cultural processes in the Ottoman Empire and understood the education of Caucasian Muslims as his main task, it was Nussimbaum who delivered a fascinating account of Baku years later. Hüseynzade learnt German in St. Petersburg and in Tiflis. By translating Goethe and Schiller, Hüseynzade was eager to popularise European culture among his compatriots. Nussimbaum mastered German in Baku and wrote extensively on the Caucasus, in German, for a European audience. Nussimbaum, who converted to Islam in interwar Austria and published under the penname Kurban Said, depicted a multinational Baku in his novel *Ali und Nino* (1937), where the interacting communities thought primarily in ethnic and religious categories. A love story between a Shia Muslim male, the Azeri Ali, and a Georgian Orthodox female, Nino, began in the classroom of a Russian gymnasium (Kaiserlich russisches humanistisches gymnasium), a unique place of imperial character where the offspring of upper-class families of Muslim, Jewish, Armenian, Georgian, and Russian background were brought, and educated, together.¹³ Nussimbaum's book looked back on the years before, during World War I, as well as the years of Azerbaijani independence. The Bolshevik occupation caused the tragic end of the narrative; Ali was killed by the

¹²His translations of German romantic poets were published in Persian, which was an acknowledged literary language throughout Middle East, Central Asia, and even parts of India.

¹³Kurban Said, *Ali und Nino* (Munich, Berlin: Ullstein, 2003), 5.

Bolsheviks during the defence of the city of Gandja, while Nino managed to escape to Georgia with their new-born daughter. The geography of *Ali und Nino* encompassed the whole of the Caucasus and beyond. It involved Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Dagestanis, Turks, and Persians. Along with Baku as the locus of the initial encounter and the most essential *mise-en-scène*, Tiflis and Karabakh, as well as Tehran and Dagestan, are points of interest on the novel's map. Ali and Nino, born into wealthy families and educated in Russian, spoke it with each other. For Ali, Azerbaijani was the language of emotions and of his father. Nussimbaum stressed several times that Nino could speak Azerbaijani only poorly and that she communicated in Georgian only with her relatives in Tiflis. Kurban Said depicted the Baku of Ali and Nino as a place outside of any definite cultural or civilisational belonging. Notably, he described the identity-shifting of the new generation of Azerbaijani Muslim nobles—born into pious Shiite families but socially integrated into the Russian Empire. Ali confessed at the end of the novel: 'Ich selber war kein Asiat mehr' ('I was not an Asian anymore').¹⁴

Ali and Nino enjoyed the cosmopolitan moment during which their story begins, but their parents still cherished, respectively, Georgian authenticity and Islamic virtues. Seweryn Baryka, an agent of the Tsarist authority, was ordered to Baku around 1905; the voyage of the Polish diplomat and his wife, Jadwiga, from the imperial capital St. Petersburg to Baku was magnificently described by the prominent Polish novelist Stefan Żeromski in his last novel *Przedwiośnie* ('Early Spring', 1925). Jadwiga Barykowa spoke Russian poorly; born in Siedlice, she dreamt only of her Polish environment. Żeromski wrote with more than a hint of irony that for Jadwiga, everything was better and more colourful in Siedlice. In Baku, like Ali's and Nino's parents, Barykowa tried to insist on her native context. Barykowa, Ali's wealthy father, and the noble family Kipiani—Nino's parents—were at least literary residents of Baku at the turn of the century. They belonged to the generation born in the middle of the nineteenth century. All of them lived in a multi-ethnic but not cosmopolitan Baku.

But aside from these elite perspectives, the main oil centre of the Russian Empire also became one of the birthplaces of the Russian, and later the Soviet, proletariat. Workers made up the core of the city's

¹⁴Ibid., 191.

growing population. Organised ethnically, the Armenian, Russian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, and other groups clashed regularly. Interestingly, while various nationalistic projects—particularly the Armenian and Azerbaijani—competed with each other by supporting national cultural activities, the Empire was quite successful in driving integration among the young generation of urban elites. Through the boost of primary and secondary education at Russian and mixed schools at the turn of the century, after a decade of notorious Russification under the Tsar Alexander III, the Russian language started to displace non-Russian languages at the Empire's periphery. The Russianness of the non-Russian nobles became dominant as soon as they commenced to communicate with each other in Russian, even within their own ethnic groups. The imperial 'come-together' of disparate groups briefly gave rise to a cosmopolitan moment, but the imperial homogenisation strategies that quickly followed just as quickly extinguished it. The memoirs of Baku-born female intellectual Banine on her childhood and youth in Baku of the 1900–1920s reflect these developments.

BANINE'S 'CAUCASIAN DAYS'

While Nussimbaum's and Żeromski's novels are important literary accounts of Baku at the beginning of the twentieth century, Banine's memoirs are an essential autobiographical narrative and offer insight on high society cosmopolitanism in 1910s' Baku. 'Banine' was the penname of Umm-El-Banu Assadoulaieff (1905–1992). Born to a wealthy family of oil tycoons Musa Nagiev and Shamsi Assadoulaieff, she received an excellent education in Baku. During the short-lived independence of Azerbaijan between 1918 and 1920, Umm-El-Banu's father became Azerbaijan's Minister of Commerce. After the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan, Banine left for Paris. In France, she joined the Russian émigré intellectual milieu and hobnobbed in literary salons in Paris. She was in touch with Russian emigrant poets such as Ivan Bunin, and many other European intellectuals. Ernst Jünger was among her close friends. Jünger wrote the foreword to her autobiographical account, *Jours Caucasiens* (1945). In this, Assadoulaieff described her childhood in Baku, just after the Russian Revolution of 1905. Being a scion of an extremely wealthy Azerbaijani family, Banine and her three sisters were raised by a Riga-born German nanny who shaped a 'Central European

microcosm' for the kids by celebrating Christmas and reading a lot from European literature for them. Fluent in German, French, and Russian, Banine reflected the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Caucasus and the Armenian–Azerbaijani clashes of 1905 and 1918 in Baku, as well as the political turmoil after the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the first half of 1918, the Assadoullaieff family moved temporarily to Enzeli (Persia) and was able to return to Baku only after the Ottoman troops re-captured the city in autumn of 1918. Banine described the British occupation of Baku as well as its short-lived period of independence from 1918 to 1920. Though the Republic of 1918–1920 embodied the political success of the Azerbaijani nationalism, and the new government in Baku led by the nationalist 'Musavat' party intended to nationalise the social and cultural life in the country, Banine sympathised and identified herself with the newly founded nation-state. After the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan in April 1920, Assadoullaieff stayed shortly in Baku, then moved to Tiflis and, via Batumi, she made it finally to Constantinople. At the Bosphorus, Umm-El-Banu applied for a French visa in order to join her sisters, who had left for France right after the Bolshevik coup. She described in detail the Russian émigré community in Constantinople in the early 1920s, as well as the historic downtown of the metropolis. The narrative ended with a four-day voyage from Constantinople to Paris on the Orient Express.

Baku's cosmopolitan moment at the turn of the century was restricted to the lives of these aristocratic circles. The Empire's annexation of neighbouring territories had given rise to a new kind of nobility, which was cognisant of its non-Russian background but also fluent in Russian as well as in the important upper-culture languages of the region. For the Caucasian intellectuals in general, and for Azerbaijani intellectuals in particular, the supra-confessional cosmopolitan moment began shortly before the Transcaucasian Teachers Seminary in Gori was closed and lasted until World War I. Banine can be considered a shining example of this kind of cosmopolitanist. Baku's imperial cosmopolitanism arose in a city still deeply torn on religious and cultural grounds and by ethnic tensions. It remained an 'oriental town', a backward and dangerous space not only for Russian and European observers, but also for Baku-born noble cosmopolitans. Both Nussimbaum (Kurban Said) and Banine described the Shiite ceremonies of Shakhsey-Vakhsey as an

embodiment of oriental backwardness.¹⁵ For Banine, Baku still remained ‘une ville encore tout orientale’, a city still altogether oriental.¹⁶ Both authors repeatedly noted that Baku had a European and an oriental quarter. In writing about her childhood, Banine devoted several pages to the description of the Novruz (an Azerbaijani celebration of the New Year),¹⁷ and Christmas festivities, as well as Shiite religious ceremonies in downtown Baku. About her family and its milieu, Banine wrote: ‘les Russes nous avaient colonisées depuis longtemps déjà; leur influence s’infiltrait partout, et avec elle le désir de culture, d’européanisation’ [‘The Russians have colonised us for a long time; with their infiltrating influence came the desire for culture, for Europeanisation’].¹⁸ As a child, she was aware of the Russian colonisation of the Eastern Caucasus, but understood her culture exclusively in the Russian context. The deep and century-old cultural ties between Baku and Persia were mentioned by Banine only on the margins. Indeed, she mastered neither Persian nor Azeri. Banine confessed: ‘l’aziri sonnait brutal et saccadé: je ne l’aimais pas et pour cette raison sans doute, je n’ai jamais pu le parler correctement’ [‘Azeri sounded to me abrupt and coarse: I never liked it, and for this reason was never able to speak it properly’].¹⁹ As her work shows, the process of alienation from the local culture—of self-exotification, of self-abnegation, among the indigenous nobility at the peripheries of the Empire—had already begun in Baku long before the Soviet period.

Banine’s youth in Baku prepared her, to some extent, for a later cosmopolitan life in Paris. Fluent in French, German, and Russian, she gradually moved between the numerous clubs of Russophone intelligentsia in Paris, finding herself similarly at home in French and German intellectual

¹⁵Shakhsey-Vakhsey is a notion for chants accompanying the mourning rituals of Shia men. During Ashura, the tenth day of the month Muharram, the Shias commemorate the martyrdom of Hussein in 680 in the city of Karbala (Iraq). Hussein, the son of Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali, was killed at that date and this murder deepened the schism between Shia and Sunni. Annually, the Shiites recall and mark the death of Hussein by passion plays in public and other mourning rituals. Some Shia men flagellate themselves with iron chains.

¹⁶Banine: *Jours Caucasiens*, Paris 1945, 16.

¹⁷Besides Azerbaijan, Novruz has been celebrated in a large geography throughout Iran, eastern Turkey (predominantly by Kurds and Alevis), Central Asia, and Afghanistan.

¹⁸Banine, *Jours caucasiens*, Paris, 1945, 18.

¹⁹Ibid., 38.

environments. She was a prolific writer and translator, and therefore wandered easily between the different *aires culturelles*. As an admirer of European-ness and connoisseur of French, German, and Russian cultures, a Baku-born female intellectual of Muslim origin, Banine felt completely out of place in Near Eastern Baku. Her preoccupation with Europe lent itself to steady opposition toward the local Muslim and Azerbaijani cultures, but not to integration or mutuality.

Kurban Said and Banine both spent decades in exile. They both had to leave Baku after the end of the World War I and the following political turmoil, in order to escape violent outbreaks in the region. Being far from Baku, and culturally quite well integrated into the societies in which they respectively found themselves, both underwent profound personal metamorphoses by rediscovering their own 'Orientalness'. Lev Nussimbaum converted to Islam, assumed the name Kurban Said, and adopted a demonstratively orientalist style of dress in his everyday life in Berlin.²⁰ Banine looked for every possibility to get in touch with Azerbaijani immigrants in France. In the conclusion of her *Jours Caucasiens*, Banine wrote about her dreams of 'returning' to the land of her ancestors.

Banine, enjoying a rigorous private education with a German nanny in her palace in Baku, was in many ways a microcosm of Russified Azerbaijani elites. The ties between Muslim intellectuals and Persian civilisation, as well as the Ottoman Empire, were diminished but not destroyed after the Crimean War and particularly in the 1880–1890s; Tsarist Russia was not modernised enough to exert efficient control over its southern borderlands. These circumstances gave birth to a sort of Muslim cosmopolitanism.

MUSLIM COSMOPOLITANISM

Rasulzade was the head of Parliament at the time, and was in many ways very characteristic of Baku's Muslim elites. Born in 1884 to a family of clerics in a village close to Baku, he graduated from the so-called Russian-Tatar school and wrote extensively for Russian and Azerbaijani

²⁰For more on this issue, see Tom Reiss, *The Orientalist: Solving the Mystery of a Strange and Dangerous Life* (Random House, 2005). In German: *Der Orientalist. Auf den Spuren von Essad Bey* (München, 2010).

newspapers in Baku in the early 1900s. Fascinated by the Russian revolutionary writer Maxim Gorkii, he translated his novel *Mat'* (Mother) into Azerbaijani and identified as a socialist. Facing pressure from the Tsarist authorities, Rasulzade had to leave the Tsardom. He migrated to Tehran, where he edited the first Persian socialist paper, *Iran-e-nou* (The New Iran), and then he moved to late-Ottoman Istanbul. The circulation of people and ideas between Baku, Tehran, and Istanbul at the turn of the century was not so surprising. One key feature that distinguished the Azerbaijani Muslim intellectuals from the intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire and Persia was their competence in Russian, in addition to Ottoman Turkish and Persian. The education of Russian-Tatar schools and socialisation in a Russified environment caused a certain awareness of Russian literature and culture among Azerbaijani Muslim intellectuals. Moving between Baku, Tehran, and Istanbul, Rasulzade—like Hüseyinzade—did not complain of Shiia and Sunni tensions, but rather advocated for socialist development as the main source of progress.

This type of a multilingual intellectual emerged at the peripheries of the Empire such as the post-Ottoman and post-QadjarCaucasus under Russian rule, where multinational urban spaces like Baku and Tiflis provided a very fruitful framework for multilingualism and for Russian—and therefore European—education. Children of Muslim families could attend the Russian schools, or traditional *madrasa* and *mekteb*, or both. The Arabic-Persian script facilitated contact with the neighbouring countries. Since the 1930s, however, the situation has changed dramatically. The Latinisation, and a decade later the Kyrilisation, of the Azerbaijani language under Joseph Stalin; the state-enforced curtailment of cultural and personal contacts between Soviet Azerbaijan and both Turkey and Iran; as well as the introduction of Russian, German, and French as the first, second and third foreign language at the secondary schools in Azerbaijan drove a cultural wedge between that generation of Azerbaijani intellectuals of Muslim origin, and Turkey and Iran.

Soviet Baku

The Azerbaijani intellectuals born and socialised in the 1930s and during World War II were still quite familiar with Near Eastern cultures, even though they lacked competence in Persian and Arabic. Writers like Anar Rzayev (b. 1938) and Chingiz Guseinov (b. 1929) exemplify this generation. Born and raised in Baku, both studied in Moscow and went on

to write in Russian and Azerbaijani. Deeply familiar with both Russian and Azerbaijani literature and intellectual discourse, Anar and Guseinov wander between the two cultures, being at home in each of them.

The shift within the Azerbaijani intelligentsia occurred at the time when the second cosmopolitan moment was taking place. During the Brezhnev era, the majority of secondary schools in Baku were still taught in Azerbaijani, and the Azerbaijani language—unlike in Central Asia, Ukraine, and the Baltics—became the second official language of Azerbaijan after Stalin's death. Simultaneously, during the Brezhnevite stagnation, a new social stratum emerged in Baku, the so-called *Bakintsy* (Bakuvians). It comprised the Russophone residents of Baku of Azerbaijani, Armenian, Jewish, Ukrainian, Lezgian, and other ethnic descent, as well as ethnic Russians who made up a quarter of the city's entire population. Bakuvians communicated, read, and wrote primarily in Russian. The subculture of *Bakintsy* flourished during the Brezhnev era. This culture resulted in the emergence of Azerbaijani bilingual chanson from Muslim Magomayev (1942–2008) and Polad Bülbüloğlu (b. 1945), ethnojazz from Vagif Mustafazade (1940–1979) and his daughter Aziza (b. 1969), and Baku-based Russophone literature and journalism. Interestingly, the majority of those Azerbaijani journalists, born mostly in Baku of the 1950–1970s, possessed a marvellous knowledge of Russian, but were somewhat deficient in Azerbaijani. While Magomayev, Bülbüloğlu, and Aziza Mustafazade performed the majority of their songs in Azerbaijani, they preferred to give their interviews in Russian. Despite having been socialised and having pursued their professional careers at the Empire's periphery, this generation of intellectuals had almost completely assimilated to the Russian *Leitkultur*.

According to the research of Bruce Grant from 2010, when asked about the cosmopolitanism of Baku, residents between 30 and 70 years old often recall the 'good old days' (mostly the Brezhnevite period) and talk a lot about the multinational common life.²¹ In reality, it was a very one-sided cosmopolitanism in which inclusion (and exclusion) was a function of one's knowledge of Russian and often being at least a second-generation Bakuvian. Newcomers to Baku from the rest of Azerbaijan spent decades in Baku's suburbs dreaming of being accepted.

²¹ See the contribution of Bruce (2010).

On the one hand, the *Bakintsy*, who intellectually produced fascinating pieces in the field of Russian-Azerbaijani bilingual song-writing and music culture, included individuals who had different confessional, ethnic, and professional backgrounds. The unifying feature was the mastery of Russian with a distinct Bakuvian accent. The integration of numerous Azerbaijanis, Jews, and Armenians into the *Bakintsy* community meant their partial or complete linguistic and cultural deracination. Educated at the Russian schools of Baku, Armenians and Azerbaijanis had immense linguistic and cultural problems when communicating with their compatriots from Azerbaijani or Armenian provinces. The Bakuvian subculture lent itself to elitist thinking, excluding everyone who spoke Russian poorly. Thus, while late-Tsarist Baku at the turn of the century enriched the cultural and linguistic competences of Azerbaijani Muslims and Armenian intellectuals to some extent, Soviet Baku brought the demise of its traditional multiculturalism.

Post-Soviet Baku

During the Armenian–Azerbaijani war over Nagorni Karabakh in 1988–1994 and during the first post-Soviet decade, almost the entire Armenian community of Baku, as well as two quarters of Baku’s Russian and Ukrainian residents, left the city. Hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from the provinces migrated to Baku in search of jobs and better futures. At the same time, Baku became the most important destination for thousands of Azerbaijani refugees from Georgia during the presidency of the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–1992), and for hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azerbaijanis and Kurds from Armenia and Armenian–Azerbaijani borderland. The war over Karabakh and the collapse of the Soviet Union damaged the Bakuvian subculture, which had emerged partly in reliance on the Soviet policy of so-called *Druzhiba narodov* (friendship of peoples). The collapse of the USSR terminated the ideological bias. After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the war over Karabakh, the Bakuvian subculture largely left Baku and spread to Russian cities, Germany, Israel, USA, Turkey, and to the internet. The internet project OurBaku.com, ‘a meticulously curated and edited online encyclopedia which aims to catalog and commemorate Baku’s past’,²² has

²²Lassin, Jacob (2015) ‘The Digital City in Post-Soviet Identity Formation: The Case of OurBaku.com’. *Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media*, 13, 149–150.

hosted Bakuvian's discourses for several years. The portal www.baku.ru is another example of Bakuvians' refuge in virtual space. It hosts an enormous message archive of former and current Bakuvians hoping to stay in touch and reminiscing about old Baku again and again. Partly, the Bakuvian subculture underwent a certain nationalisation.

If we can imagine the Baku of today as a house, around half of its residents were born outside of it. Russian media, Russophone literature, and Russian theatres remained in Baku, which became the nationalised capital of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. The country itself became a prominent space of competition between Turkish and Iranian soft powers. Turkish television has been transmitted since the early 1990s throughout Azerbaijan. The new generation of Baku'd downtown—socialised with the modified Latin alphabet—is fluent in modern Turkish, aware of Turkish pop culture and politics, but remains competent in Russian.

This post-Soviet cosmopolitan moment gave birth to the multicultural intellectual interaction that might be best exemplified by the young writer Alakbar Aliyev. Born in Baku in 1978, Alakbar attended a prominent Russian school, Nr. 134, in central Baku. In the early 1990s, shortly after the collapse of the USSR and liberalisation of the border regime, his family decided to send Alakbar to Istanbul to complete his education there. Aliyev was enrolled into a conservative secondary school, Imam Hatip Lisesi, with much of Islam-related disciplines in the curriculum. Afterwards, Aliyev studied journalism at the state-run Marmara University and worked as a Russian and Turkish translator in Istanbul. After a decade in Turkey, he returned to Baku in the early 2000s, and became famous through his gay romance novel *Artush and Zaur* (2009).²³ Published under the penname Ali Akbar, the novel explores a love story between two fictional Bakuvians, an Azerbaijani young man named Zaur and an Armenian named Artush. Both of them were born in Baku and attended the same Russian school at the end of 1980s. Their parents often visited each other and celebrated holidays by cooking Azeri, Armenian, and Russian cuisine together. The start of the Armenian–Azerbaijani confrontation over Karabakh drove Artush's family to emigrate from Baku to Armenia. After the war, both Zaur and Artush worked for local NGOs in Azerbaijan and Armenia, respectively.

²³Eli Ekber: *Artus ve Zaur. Mehebbet efsanesi* (büyükler üçün konfliktologiya dersliyi), Ulaanbaatar, 2009.

Years later, they met again at a conference in Tbilisi, rediscovered their feelings, and fell in love once again. The author described the Bakuvian milieu as a part of a bygone world: 'Even scattered across four continents, they remain Bakuvians. Bakuvians make up a nation that possessed a unique culture born from the intersection of two tremendous and completely different geographies of East and West.'²⁴ The author touched the Bakuvian narrative by invoking its supra-national, supra-ethnic, and even supra-racial elements. His considerations and reflections concerning Bakuvians sound to some extent like an autobiographical account. As mentioned above, the writer himself attended a prominent Russian school and grew up within a highly Russified late-Soviet Baku.

Alakbar highlighted the ideological divisions inside the ethnic Azerbaijani population of Baku in the late 1980s, during the Armenian–Azerbaijani war over Karabakh—and therefore at the end of the cosmopolitan moment. Some Azerbaijanis assisted the Armenians of Baku and defended them from attacks by Azerbaijani refugees who, ousted from Armenia, sought asylum in Baku. Others quickly accepted the nationalistic rhetoric, advocated for the nationalisation of Azerbaijan, and shared the anti-Armenian mood. Alakbar's novel has no happy ending. Artush and Zaur—both oppressed by belligerent, homophobic, and mutually opposed nationalisms—committed suicide. Post-Soviet Baku seemingly is not a place that can tolerate a love between an Azerbaijani and a former Bakuvian, an ethnic Armenian, let alone a love between two men.

Ali Akbar's novel embodied a critique of the authoritarian regime of the current President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev (since 2003). The author was forced to leave Azerbaijan for Switzerland in 2012. His novel was banned in Azerbaijan, but was made available on the internet shortly after its first publication in Mongolia's capital. Meanwhile, the novel has been translated into German and Dutch. A former Bakuvian himself, Akbar embodies the post-Soviet generation of Baku-born Azerbaijani intellectuals. Like Anar Rzayev and Chingiz Guseinov, he is fluent both in Russian and in Azerbaijani. It was Russian gay literature that inspired him to write the novel. Unlike Guseinov and Anar's generation, however, Akbar studied not in Moscow but in Istanbul, the new centre of intellectual attraction for many of Azerbaijan's post-Soviet intellectuals.

²⁴Ibid., 51.

The publication of *Artush and Zaur* caused a wave of heated debates on literature, homosexuality, and Armenian–Azerbaijani antagonism in Azerbaijan as well as in Armenia. Chingiz Guseinov, who himself left Azerbaijan for Moscow during the Brezhnevite period to escape persecution by the Soviet Azerbaijani leadership, gave a glowing review of Akbar’s novel.

The plots of *Ali and Nino* and *Artush and Zaur*, novels exploring Baku’s multi-ethnic and supra-religious love stories, were mirrored in the 2014 novel of Baku-born German writer Olga Grjasnowa. Titled *Die Juristische Unschärfe einer Ehe* (*The Legal Haziness of a Marriage*), the novel follows the homosexual and lesbian relationship of two Bakuvians, Altay and Leyla, and the young Israeli Jonoun, between Berlin and Baku. The author was born in Baku into a Russian-Jewish family in 1984 and left for Germany in 1996. The plot of her novel deals with post-Soviet Baku, which she had experienced herself. Grjasnowa writes:

Baku was an old and beautiful city, and one which has undergone a gradual resurrection: before the last war, it was a metropolis *par excellence*, with its intermingling peoples and languages, its bustling boulevards and stylish pedestrians, its cafes and colleges and libraries and concert halls. During the war, it was increasingly desolate. Life in the city was stricken by brutality, mass emigration, and crime. Now, life has returned to the city [, ...] and yet it has become another city altogether, with alien residents and alien customs and an alien language. But there is a remaining longing for the old, the only ‘true,’ Baku, especially in the households of the Bakuvian diaspora in Los Angeles, Moscow, Berlin, Yerevan, Seoul, and even in Baku itself.²⁵

²⁵ Olga Grjasnowa: *Die Juristische Unschärfe einer Ehe* (München 2014), pp.164–165. ‘Baku war eine alte und zudem schöne Stadt und eine, die allmählich wieder zum Leben erwachte: Vor dem letzten Krieg war sie eine Metropole par excellence gewesen, mit einem Gemisch aus Völkern, Sprachen, belebten Boulevards und dandyhaften Flaneuren, Cafés, Hochschulen, Bibliotheken und Konzertsälen. Während des Krieges war sie zunehmend verödet. Brutale Gewalt, massenhafte Emigration und Kriminalität erstickten das Leben in ihr. Nun kam es wieder zurück [...] Und doch war es eine andere Stadt geworden, mit anderen Einwohnern, anderen Sitten und einer anderen Sprache. Was blieb, war die Sehnsucht nach dem alten, vermeintlich einzig wahren Baku, vor allem in den Wohnzimmern der Emigranten in Los Angeles, Moskau, Berlin, Jerewan, Seoul und sogar in Baku selbst.’

Grjasnowa points out that the war and exodus of non-Azerbaijani ethnic groups caused the end of multi-ethnicity. Even though life in the city eventually returned to the routine, Baku became 'another city altogether, with alien residents and alien customs and an alien language'. And indeed, the end of the Soviet era, together with the Latinisation of the alphabet of the Azerbaijani language, caused a rapid de-Russification in almost all spheres of social and cultural life in Baku. Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia and Karabakh, mostly from rural areas, moved into the apartments of Armenians who had hastened to leave the city for Russia or Armenia. Many of the refugees and internally displaced persons were settled in the buildings of schools and sport halls. Baku lost at least a quarter of its urban residents and saw an influx of hundreds of thousands of villagers. However, it is debatable whether the shift from Russian to Azerbaijani as Baku's lingua franca made the city less cosmopolitan than Baku has allegedly been. In reality, one *Leitkultur* was substituted for another. After the collapse of the USSR (1991) and as a result of the war over Karabakh (1988–1994), Baku became less multinational and less Christian. The Armenian–Azerbaijani war in particular damaged the cosmopolitan moment of the Soviet era and even overshadowed Armenian–Azerbaijani cultural exchange dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Russian conquest of Baku at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and discovery of its oil wealth in the second half of the century, transformed a tiny, predominantly Shia town into an industrial melting pot of the Empire. As the result of modernisation, forced industrialisation, and demographical boom, a cosmopolitan bohemia emerged in Baku at the turn of the century. Undermined by the ethnic clashes of 1905 and 1918 and by World War I, a cosmopolitan community of Bakuvians appeared paradoxically as a result of World War II and the large-scale Soviet internal migration process. Bakuvians consisted of ethnic Azerbaijanis, Russians, Armenians, Jews and other nationalities, and used Russian when communicating within their own ethnic community and with other Bakuvians. In the 1970–1980s, Bakuvian became a supra-national and supra-confessional identity with a setting of certain identity-building folklore such as anecdotes, songs praising Bakuvians and Baku, and even a specific Baku accent of Russian. The demise of the USSR in 1991, the restoration of the Azerbaijani nation-state, as well as the bloody military conflict with the neighbouring Armenia over Karabakh caused the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Baku's Russians,

Jews, and Armenians and the immigration of ethnic Azerbaijanis from the rural parts of Armenia, territories around Karabakh, and from eastern Georgia throughout the 1990s. These processes diminished the alleged cosmopolitan atmosphere by damaging the milieu and changing the framework.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: A LIFE IN BAKU

Tofiq Asadullayev was born in 1942 in Baku to a family of Azerbaijani emigrants from the northern Iranian city of Ardabil, not far from the Soviet–Persian state border. He was the fifth child of two poorly educated parents, a taxi-driver Seyfi and a housewife Shafa. The Asadullayev family received a plot of soil in a suburb of Baku, close to the century-old Muslim cemetery of Keshlia. The quarter in which they lived was called simply *posiolok*, Russian for ‘settlement’. Their neighbour to the right was an Armenian family, and to the left, a Russian-Azerbaijani couple with three children. The Asadullayevs sent their elder children and Tofiq to an Azerbaijani school in the centre of *posiolok*. While Tofiq completed his primary and secondary education, his parents got five more children. Tofiq grew up among the Armenian and Russian teenagers of his *posiolok* until he turned eighteen and was recruited to the Soviet Army. Tofiq conducted the military service in the Russian Karelia and then studied sport at the Institute of Physical Education and Sport in Baku and fell in love with an ethnically Russian classmate, Taisiya Polezhaeva (b. 1945), whose parents had moved to Baku from the small Russian town of Labinsk in search of work, approximately at the same time as his own parents left Ardabil. The sportsmen’s milieu of Baku was traditionally multinational and Russophone. Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Jews, and Azerbaijanis, as well as Lezgins and Talysh, came together as students at the Institute, as well as numerous summer camps during the so-called *sbory* (collective training). Tofiq and Taisiya married in 1970 and had a son two years later; they named him Ruslan, after Pushkin’s famous *Ruslan and Liudmila*, in an effort to find a name rooted in both Russian and Caucasian culture. Taisiya taught sports at a Russian secondary school. Tofiq worked as a wrestling trainer in a sports school in downtown Baku. Both Taisiya and Ruslan took Tofiq’s surname, Asadullayev, and Russian was spoken at home. Both parents being quite secular, Tofiq did not insist on Muslim circumcision. Ruslan graduated from a Russian school and entered the

Russian sector of the Institute of Physical Education and Sport, just like his parents did. Ruslan focused on fencing and finished his university education during the early years of the Perestroika. During the Perestroika, issues like official language began to matter. Ruslan was in his early twenties, born to an Azerbaijani–Russian family in Baku, but had poor knowledge of Azerbaijani. Ruslan belonged to the last post-Soviet generation of Bakuvians. He spent his childhood in Russophone Baku, in a neighbourhood inhabited by Russians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians; he regularly read the Soviet daily paper *Sovetskii Sport* and watched only Moscow-based television. The gradual Azerbaijanisation of the street names in Baku throughout the early 1990s seemed ridiculous to him. However, mastery of Azerbaijani became important for pursuing a career of any type after Azerbaijan gained its independence in 1991. Additionally, unlike wrestling and boxing, fencing failed to become a popular sport in Azerbaijan. Throughout the 1990s, thousands of Bakuvians—cosmopolitan remnants of the bygone Empire—left the urban space of Baku. Israel, Germany, the United States, and especially Russia became the destinations for many, including Ruslan and many of his former classmates. The Baku of his childhood and youth had been vanishing; in Volgograd, he got married and had children. His daughters have Russian names and Ruslan himself changed his surname to that of his mother, becoming Ruslan Polezhaev—both post-Soviet Baku and post-Soviet Russia seem less hospitable to anyone of a different national and confessional background. The paternal grandparents of Ruslan were from Ardabil and were fluent only in Azerbaijani; until their deaths in the 1990s, they could not communicate in Russian. Ruslan’s father, Tofiq, is bilingual, fluent in both Azerbaijani and Russian. Ruslan himself can be understood as a regular product of the Russification of 1970s. This demands that we rethink the cosmopolitanism of urban spaces, like Baku, at the periphery of the Empire. The Russophone community of Baku after World War II made it possible for thousands of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians to come together, marry inter-ethnically, share everyday life, and enrich each other. Russian, being the lingua franca of the Bakuvian community, became the mother tongue of Ruslan’s generation. Like Ruslan, the majority of Baku-born Armenians, Ukrainians, and Azerbaijanis considered Russian their mother tongue. In turn-of-the-century Baku, and in the 1920s and 1930s, the Armenian press flourished in Baku; Georgian was taught at the Baku State University; Azerbaijani intellectuals were fluent in

Persian and Russian, as well as in the Azerbaijani language. After World War II, the new wave of gradual Russification of the city began, and the Karabakh war and the post-Soviet search for identity caused the Azerbaijanisation of the urban space.

Taisiya died of cancer in 2011. Since then Tofiq has been living alone. He hosts his son when he comes to visit him once a year. Almost every evening, he checks his account on *odnoklassniki.ru*, a large Russophone Facebook-like internet portal, which he uses to chat with his son and his former colleagues. Both Tofiq and Ruslan are members of the portal's mailing group *Korennnye Bakinsty*—True Bakuivians.

Tofiq, now 75, is retired and tries to visit his sisters still living in Baku. Once a month, he goes to his former *posiolok* to see his childhood friends. They reminisce. In that reminiscing, numerous Armenian and Russian names may be heard. They speak Azerbaijani with each other, but they often switch to Russian, mostly repeating jokes they have heard before. In the era which is simultaneously post-imperial and post-Soviet, Baku's cosmopolitan golden age has once again retreated into personal memory.

From Kantian Cosmopolitanism to Stalinist Kosmopolitizm: The Making of Kaliningrad

Olga Sezneva

In his review of a biography of Hannah Arendt, the late Ernest Gellner noted that Königsberg, the city of Arendt's childhood, could serve as a parable, 'not just of our age, but several centuries of European thought and experience'. It was in Königsberg, he wrote, 'that the torch of the Enlightenment burnt with its fiercest flame, in the thought and person of Immanuel Kant', and it was from Königsberg that the pioneers of the Haskalah movement had endeavoured to transmit their secular beliefs to neighbouring shtetls. The acceptance of Enlightenment ideals implied that the social and cultural fusion would be followed by political emancipation. And indeed, it seemed that progress had been made in that direction: by the early twentieth century, the Jews of Königsberg, like other Prussian Jews, began to enlist in the army and to occupy academic positions in Germany's leading universities. Yet in the longer term,

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Fig. 10.1 Königsberg in 1945. Ruination. From the archive of Yulia Mikhailovna Profilatova

the historical events that succeeded the Enlightenment turned out quite different from this promised cosmopolitan trajectory: the city itself was nearly obliterated between 1944 and 1949, first in the great fires in the wake of the British aerial bombings, and later as a result of occupation by the Soviet Army. By the end of the war, not just its physical structure, but also its citizens were no longer the same. Between the years 1938 and 1944, Königsberg's Jewish minority was expelled and annihilated, while the ethnic Germans who remained in the city at war's end were deported after the Soviet occupation. Renaming the city 'Kaliningrad' completed its progressive destruction (Fig. 10.1).¹

This volume deploys the analysis of war and immediate post-war periods as a particular kind of optic, a distinctive lens through which to approach a changing world order. War comes here in the image of

¹Ernest Gellner, 'Accounting for the Horror', *The Times Literary Supplement* 4140, (6 Aug. 1982): 843.

creative destruction, productive of new and unexpected cultural forms, literary genres, and connections between ideas and people. The reservoir of traumatic memories in Königsberg gave rise to new political ideals and everyday experiences of a new international order. Locating the clichéd memory of the Königsberg Enlightenment in the post-war reordering of Kaliningrad might serve as an emblematic case study for this approach. With the physical destruction of Königsberg, the birthplace of Immanuel Kant, as well as the transfer of East Prussia to the Soviet Union, and the annihilation and deportation of some of its historic residents, history brought to this spot on the Baltic shore a new cast of characters, new ways of life, a new language, and, quite literally, new building blocks. But what kind of life was it? On what principles did it rest and what political repertoires did it engage?

These questions should not be read as a suggestion to revive some idyllic cosmopolitan order of Königsberg and then juxtapose it to war-time disruption. The multicultural and multiconfessional composition of the city was never free from tensions and conflicts, even before its capture by the Soviets. In particular, the city had a long history of anti-Semitism, which spanned the time period from the eighteenth-century, when Jewish thinker Moses Mendelssohn was alive, up to the night of the torching of the synagogue in November 1938. However, building on Ernest Gellner's emplotment of Kaliningrad as the most 'conspicuous' symbol of 'the explosive power of the ideals of the Enlightenment', I argue that the cosmopolitan ideal was inverted in Königsberg's twentieth-century post-war history in a way that deserves special attention. The Kaliningrad of 1945–1953 was a peculiar kind of contact zone in which new principles for intercultural encounters emerged, just at the time that the Soviet authorities launched an official campaign against 'cosmopolitanism', or *kosmopolitizm*. This campaign cast the celebrated attitude of 'openness to the world' in a negative light. In that period and this place, Soviet officials were beginning to link most blatantly nationality, loyalty, and administrative territories, creating human subjects that were self-policed in the face of the 'culture' that was 'abject'. Yet, the critical potential of 'negative cosmopolitanism', as the Stalinist outlook on the philosophy thus may be called, was often undermined and frequently disrupted by the daily encounters of its targeted recipients, the Soviet resettlers, with the city's foreign origins and its peculiar place in the history of the European Enlightenment. To control spontaneous responses and unsanctioned reactions born in these encounters required

additional resources from the local administrative structures of the Soviet state, making 'weeding out' *kosmopolitizm* in the city of Kant an ever more costly and taxing task. The making of Königsberg into Kaliningrad tells a particular kind of story of fear of the cosmopolitan encounter during times of a vengeful peace that brought new waves of violence in the name of progress and justice.

UNCERTAIN CITIZENRY

In order to take power and to wield it decisively in the land of the recent enemy, the Soviet state drew heavily on the precedent established by the international history of border changes, population exchanges, and the treatment of internal threats in the earlier part of the twentieth century. As soon as Germany had signed its capitulation, the resettlement of the province under the temporary military government began. Official sources suggest that between 1945 and 1950, nearly 200,000 Soviet citizens arrived in the annexed region from places as different as the city of Leningrad and the town of Smolensk, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Ukraine, some following orders, others voluntarily.² The Russian-speaking newcomers gradually replaced the roughly 110,000 remaining German-speakers who had survived the war and were slated for expulsion to West Germany. Within a short time, the area of the city turned into a 'regime zone', with entry-exit checks and close monitoring of movement.

What happened to the population of Soviet-occupied Königsberg was by no means unprecedented, neither by Soviet nor by international standards. A script for transforming territories and people into new polities and units of the national kind was quite established in the Stalinist Soviet Union, often conducted under the guise of such terminology as '*korenisatsia*' or the 'rooting' of populations. In the interwar period, territories along the border had become a critical marker of the Soviet ethno-national landscape, embodying a unique conjunction of political and administrative practices. In these territories, negative concepts of the political, such as the 'suspect' and the 'enemy', collapsed into a more basic political division by nationality. This gave rise to the

²Yurii Kostyashov, 'Zaselenie Kaliningradskoi oblasti posle Vtoroi mirivoi voiny' [Repopulation of the Kaliningrad Region After World War II], *Gumanitarnaya Nauka v Rossii* 2 (1996), 82-88.



Fig. 10.2 Königsberg civilians in 1946. From the archive of Yulia Mikhailovna Profilatova

category of ‘enemy nationality’ or ‘suspectnation’—terms which were also familiar in Western European countries at war with the concept of the ‘enemy alien’. Between 1935 and 1944, the label of a ‘suspect nation’ was applied to a number of Soviet nationalities, who were collectively suspected of potential treason against the Soviet state: Poles, Germans, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Koreans, Crimea Tatars, Chinese, Chechens, Kurds, and Iranians, all of whom were displaced during the war.³ These displacements provided the model for what happened in East Prussia after 1945. Like these ethnic groups, Königsberg’s native Germans were deemed susceptible to the influence of Germans abroad, rendering the territory in which they resided ‘unsafe’ for Soviet rule.

A critical feature of the emerging world order that was being made through these policies was an ongoing redefinition of the criteria of belonging. Take the status of the Königsberg Germans: the Potsdam Conference imposed no rules on the treatment of Germans in Soviet-occupied territories. These Germans had no rights to repatriation and the Soviet government officially owed them nothing. There was no

³Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, *Journal of Modern History*, 70, no. 4 (December 1998), 813–834.

oversight by the Allies with respect to this population's living conditions or the timeframe and methods of their impending deportation. Germans were not eligible for Soviet citizenship, but were bound by Soviet criminal and civil codes and could be tried for crimes and misdemeanours under Soviet law (Fig. 10.2).

In addition to this legal limbo, the native residents of East Prussia faced the suspension of certain rights of citizenship and, more notably, of mobility—sometimes simultaneously with the compulsion and disruption of various civic duties. Once the decision to deport ethnic Germans had been made, relocation (*raspredelenie*) and recruitment (*verbovka*) became the two main strategies for bringing in new settlers to displace them.

Compared to recruitment, relocation left very little up to its subjects. Most liable to it were military personnel and unmarried men, who were merely 'dispatched' to Königsberg for service without consent. This was often done in an abrupt way, subjecting the previously unsuspecting employee to every kind of inconvenience. This is how an accountant from the city of Kuybyshev made his way to Kaliningrad:

At a meeting, we were told that the Königsberg province will be repopulated by us. We were told that specialists in different professions will be needed. It was just a conversation. About one week later, I received an official note: to report to the regional Department of Finances (*FinOtdel*) with a change of clothes—and no explanation. Only upon arrival did I learn that this was in relation to moving to East Prussia. I never returned home, but went as I was, straight from the office to Königsberg.⁴

Military personnel were not the only ones who had little choice over the decision of whether to move or to stay. High-ranking Communist Party officials were also 'seldom in control of their lives'.⁵ Upon receiving instructions, they moved their families, many of whom were reluctant to give up their established lives elsewhere.

Recruitment allowed for more freedom, although it by no means implied complete personal choice. It relied on volunteering. The primary pool of those recruited for resettlement was composed of individuals and

⁴Quoted in: Yurii Kostyashov, S.P. Gal'tsova, A.N. Gedima, M.A. Klemesheva, and A.N. Popadin. *Vostochnaya Prussiya glazami sovetskikh pereselentsev* [East Prussia Through the Eyes of Soviet Settlers.], 2d ed (Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University, 2003), 31–32.

⁵Yurii Kostyashov, 'Izgnanie Prusskogo dukha' [Exiling the Prussian Spirit.] *Terra Baltica* 3 (2003): 7–80.



Fig. 10.3 Königsberg Russian settlers in 1946. From the archive of Yulia Mikhailovna Profilatova

families who were already dispossessed and uprooted. They were invited to assess their opportunities for rebuilding their lost homes, and were showered with promises of new homes, farms, and city apartments that they would receive, should they agree to move to Königsberg. As they worked their way through the trains carrying the wartime evacuees back to their homes, the recruiters who made their rounds in the provincial towns and villages of the Soviet ‘heartland’ made all kinds of promises to these people. The most common was the offer of subsidies, free transportation, free housing, tax breaks for three years and up to two tons of livestock per household. Agents carrying out the *verbovka* did not shy away from selling the city as a ‘Western bounty’, no matter how politically questionable such an association was: in Königsberg, they said, there was an unlimited supply of canned spam and powdered milk. What now appears to be a modest offer was nonetheless effective at the time. Poverty was so severe in the regions where recruitment took place that a can of milk and an extra reel of yarn represented meaningful wealth (Fig. 10.3).⁶

⁶Kostyashov, *Vostochnaya Prussiya glazami sovetskikh pereselentsev*, 48.

Conventional theories of socio-political community-building rely on certain binaries in examining the components, properties, and boundaries of a given community. The language of 'us' vs. 'them' is regularly used to describe the process and the identities underlying community-building. 'Insiders' vs. 'outsiders' is the spatial counterpart to this conceptual vocabulary, while 'old-timers' and 'newcomers' underscore the role of time and history in such constructions. Post-war Kaliningrad allows us to see something different. Behind the official rhetoric of collective unity forged by war, of the heroic 'us', hid a motley assembly of individuals, many of whom were in the city against their will, strangers in a strange land; the image of the model Soviet city was superimposed like a mask over a multi-ethnic enclave full of zones in which the rights to citizenship were unevenly distributed or suspended. What they also created, I venture to argue, was a state of unnerved sociality, fear, and suspicion, directed at everything and everyone.

THE AUTONOMY OF FEAR

Shliapentokh and Matveeva write in their book, *Strakhi v Rossii* [Fears in Russia], that the Soviet Union was marked by a 'catastrophe consciousness', rooted in the trope of Western counter-revolution threatening the future of communism. This social imaginary revolved around the themes of famine (particularly among peasants), espionage (predominantly among low-educated urbanites), nuclear apocalypse, and foreign currency speculation.⁷ Catastrophic consciousness played a particularly destructive role in the state's programme of repopulation of East Prussia and that it needed not to be grounded in an actual state of affairs is beyond the point: fears arise in social organization itself; they have a social basis in the state of uncertainty, which presents a breach in the familiar order of things and daily life.⁸ Kaliningrad of the second half of the 1940s had such an organization.

⁷S. Ia. Matveeva and Shliapentokh, V. E., *Strakhi v Rossii v proshlom i nastoiashchem* [Fears in Russia in the Past and the Present] (Krasnoïarsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 2000).

⁸Similar to a famous case of mass hysteria provoked by Orson Welles's radio adaptation of *The War of the Worlds*. See Joanna Bourke's *Fear: a Cultural History* (London: Virago 2005).

In the spring of 1946, something unusual, something inconceivable was going on in the newly annexed Western borderland of the Soviet Union that our contemporary thinking fails to grasp. Without official permission, the men of a newly established *kolkhoz* (collective farm) left for Belarus. When interrogated by a military patrol, they spoke about recent bombings of its capital city, Minsk: 'Fifteen of our airplanes were shot down over there, while here we sleep tight at night and live in ignorance.' They resolved to form a guerrilla battalion and marched eastward 'to defend the Motherland' (the men were natives of Belarus).⁹ In another *kolkhoz*, exactly the opposite had occurred: news had arrived that 'Turkey, together with England and America, declared a war on the Soviet Union', but instead of taking up arms, the male villagers fled into the woods in fear of conscription, leaving the fields and livestock to their female co-workers.¹⁰ The mood was no calmer in the province's capital city. Letters were sent to relatives of the volunteer settlers in other provinces, speaking of decapitations committed by Germans, as well as poisoning and arson. The nightmares of the collective imagination were echoed in internal memos that circulated between different departments of the local government.

These newly crystallizing fears reflected the uneasy circumstances of everyday life that awaited those settlers who arrived in the province in 1946, misled by the recruiting agents: the vast majority had to get by in half-destroyed tenement-like buildings, with several families in one room, or in barracks, without electricity or water, and move cautiously between the corroded and mined tram tracks in debris-filled streets.¹¹ The city's resources were stretched so thin that the dead were often left in the open for days before being removed.¹²

These disappointments accentuated further already-existing, deep-seated political divisions between Germans and Russians. Newspapers, both central and local, made a point of skilfully disseminating a vivid

⁹State Archive of the Kaliningrad Oblast' (GAKO), Fond 121, Opis 1, Delo 7, List 52–53.

¹⁰Centre for Preservation and Studying Documentation of the Newest History of Kaliningrad Oblast (TcKhIDNIKO), Fond. 121. Opis 1, Delo 7, List 36.

¹¹Kostyashov, *Vostochnaya Prussiya glazami sovetskikh pereselentsev*, 59.

¹²Yurii Kostyashov, 'Zaselenie Kaliningradskoi oblasti posle Vtoroi mirivoi voiny' [Repopulation of the Kaliningrad Region After World War II]. *Gumanitarnaya Nauka v Rossii* 2 (1996): 82–88.

image of death. As the Red Army pressed westward in March and April of 1945, the central press had begun a campaign of depicting Germans as the ‘off-spring of the Teutonic dogs’, ‘blood-sucking aggressors’, and ‘fascist predators’. The daily *Izvestiya* wrote, ‘It is joyful to see the dead Prussian in his own land—at Tilsit, near Königsberg, on the road leading to Berlin. The war has returned to the land that bore it. Crowded are the dead Prussians in Prussia, one dead body piling up on top of another’.¹³ This imagery situated the arriving settlers within a framework for how to understand their encounters with the recent enemy. Local party leaders, however, wrote about the remaining Germans as ‘people who are extremely aggressive’: ‘[e]spionage, sabotage, anti-Soviet propaganda, the spread of harmful rumours and religious superstitions—these are the main acts of the German enemies here’, reported a first secretary to the Politburo in 1946.¹⁴

At the time of the creation of their ‘exemplary Soviet community’, Kaliningraders were far from anything resembling a reflexive stance, from displaying any kind of competence about cultural differences. Quite the opposite: they seemed to resort to kinship—*zemlyachestvo*—as a basis for social bonding, and saw in Germans a source of labour waiting to be deployed. Against this background, the nationwide campaign of identifying and ‘weeding out’ ‘rootless’ (*bez-rodnyi*) cosmopolitans fell on fertile soil, and imbued ideas of spatiality, movement, and citizenship with a special configuration of value and emotions.

¹³ *Izvestiya*, 1 February 1945: 1. In 1946–1947, coverage underwent a considerable change, largely as a result of, as Norman Naimark explains, the need to improve the image of the ‘Soviet liberator’ that was rapidly declining in Europe (Naimark 1995). The need to be frugal also played a role. If, for reporters in Moscow, a ‘dead Prussian’ was an abstraction that represented Russia’s military victory, to regional administrators it represented a challenge to basic hygiene, the threat of epidemic, and additional costs for the city’s meagre budget.

¹⁴ TcKhIDNIKO, Fond 1. Opis’1. Delo 62. List 4. The opposite was also true, although it went unreported in state archives: Russian-speaking settlers befriended Germans, helped them to obtain identification papers, which sometimes required a change in national identity (from German to Lithuanian was the most common), and shared food when possible.

‘CULTURE UNDER SIEGE’

Caroline Humphrey offers an insightful commentary on the implicit complexity of the Soviet ideology of internationalism, which she juxtaposes to the European idea of cosmopolitanism.¹⁵ She calls Soviet internationalism ‘the contradictory structure of affect and desire implicit in the state constructions of cosmopolitanism’.¹⁶ Historically comprised of a multitude of ethnicities, and later, standing strongly with the banner of the internationalist workers’ movement, she argues, the Soviet Union had ‘an amplitude that might in theory seem to approach the notion of cosmopolitan society’—except, it did not.¹⁷ The Stalinist state of the late 1940s and its ideological apparatus were busy instigating public hatred against cosmopolitans—a pejorative title, ‘a poisonous accusation’, a label the regime gave to those it suspected of sympathizing with foreigners. Building on Foucault’s discussion of Galileo, Humphrey proceeds to draw a line between internationalism and cosmopolitanism as ideologies. ‘Nationalism and internationalism align with one another’ from the point of view of the relationship that a modern state has with the idea of ‘infinite openness’; to it, the emplacement and the known relations between placed entities are imperative. Neither nationalism nor internationalism may align with cosmopolitanism precisely for the reason that the latter does not localize.¹⁸

In Kaliningrad-in-the-making, however, the idea of the infinite openness of the Soviet project and the immediate goal of building a local life—that is, of transcendence and of discrimination—came together. The co-presence of these two philosophies resulted in something I describe as a peculiar structure of collective affect that combined fear and desire. The post-war state expansion and redrawing of borders reanimated the vision of the ‘infinite openness’ of the world, at least to the worldwide proletarian revolution.¹⁹ How else could a future of new territories be imagined if not from the position of their malleability? Securing the new territory

¹⁵Caroline Humphrey, ‘Cosmopolitanism and *Kosmopolitizmin* the Political Life of Soviet Citizens’, *Focaal, the European Journal of Anthropology* 44 (2004): 138–152.

¹⁶Ibid., 139.

¹⁷Ibid., 141.

¹⁸Ibid., 142–143.

¹⁹Susan Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).

and making it permanently ‘ours’, however, put into practice a very different vision; one in which the nation was preserved as a basic unit, cultures anchored in specific places, and limits set on their contact with others. The result was a situation in which the Soviet government was simultaneously engaging specialists and workers from the local population, and demoting and degrading their economic and cultural achievements, their history, built environment, and customs. Despite the overwhelming negativity of its public manifestation, however, Soviet anti-German sentiment could not but bring to life actually existing, cosmopolitan relations. Let us consider how these contradictory desires were put into practice.

As a territory, former Königsberg was characterized by a certain ambivalence:

Comrades! Our oblast was born, thanks to a decision of historical significance, on the ruins of the Prussian aggressor state, forever erased from the face of the Earth. [...] It is our duty and joy to realize in life the mandate of Comrade Stalin to affirm and defend the Soviet way of life and the Soviet state on this new Soviet land!²⁰

This rhetorical framing gave an additional dimension, traction, and flavour to the government’s call to be vigilant in preserving cultural purity. One of the concerns of the young administration in 1946 was *zapadnichestvo* (Westernism) and *nizkopoklonstvo* (obsequiousness [towards the West]). While these highly charged ideological terms were used throughout the entire Soviet Union, though in the abstract, in Kaliningrad they denoted an actually existing attraction to a very concrete material culture of the so-near West. This was particularly visible in the common appreciation of German material culture, as represented by repossessed German household goods, entire houses, and even the overall city environment, insofar as it had survived wartime destruction. A teacher named Smirnova, for example, instead of cultivating in her students ‘the spirit of Soviet patriotism’, openly admired the comfort of German apartments in their presence and, in particular, German kitchen appliances. Komsomol member Petrov spoke with positive zeal about the local German architecture, comparing it favourably to the buildings in Stalingrad and Komsomolsk—although, as the report underlined, he himself had never been to either city. To decorate the walls of their ramshackle dwellings, settlers gathered cheap prints

²⁰ *Kaliningradskaya Pravda* (Kaliningrad), 2 December 1947.

and postcards found among the debris of the abandoned buildings. They traded the food they could spare for crystal glasses and porcelain dishes sold by Germans in the city's black markets. What the reports emphasized with a particularly sound disdain was the artwork favoured by Kaliningrad's residents: it was often of a religious nature—angels and Madonnas—and romantic kitsch, including countless knights, castles, and swans. These growing lowly tastes were subject to public reprimand: 'We observe how some of our citizens worship the glossy veneer and the domestic comforts of the former bourgeoisie, which threaten to elevate the junkers' backyards into the ranks of high culture.'²¹

The identity of residents was of central importance in 1945–1949 Kaliningrad. At the same time, the visual differences between the Russians and the Germans, the citizens and the non-citizens, were blurred. The smallest detail in dress could be amplified to become an overpowering symbol of political difference. In this context of social disintegration, the cosmopolitan idea was likened to the spread of a dangerous contagious disease: difficult to detect at first, the authorities feared it could soon affect the entire fabric of their new society in the making. As with an epidemic, different living bodies are affected by the same danger to different degrees. In the case of *kosmopolitizm*, women and children were considered to be particularly susceptible, as they deftly mimicked 'Western' gestures and styles of dress:

In our oblast, the environment is conducive to the growth of uncritical attitudes, opening up the child's consciousness to alien influences. Our children live in a German land. There are buildings, streets, homes, and Germans themselves often working as nannies; their appearance, their behaviour—all this has an influence on the formation of a child's consciousness. No wonder therefore that in the N* High School, girls imitate Western European models and fashion. They have German-style hair-dos; their skirts are much too high above their knees. One walks into the classroom and can hardly discern who is in front of him, a Russian child or a German one.²²

²¹ *Letopis' Kaliningradskoi Oblasti* [Chronicle of the Kaliningrad Region] (Kaliningrad: Yantarnyi Skaz, 2006), 49. There were, of course, offenders of an altogether different kind: large-scale speculators in antiques and cultural masterpieces. But it was not they who primarily concerned the ideological work offices and committees.

²² Minutes of the Extended Regional Party Committee Meeting, 27 September 1947, TcKhIDNIKO Fond 1, Opis'1, Delo 34, List 12–17.

Such spaces of cultural overlap emerged out of practical, everyday engagements, and materialistic desires. As a result, the initial lines of demarcation separating Russian settlers from German natives—drawn ‘naturally’ by mutual animosity, as well as by official policy—began to blur. This unravelling started at the hems of girls’ skirts, but it did not stop there. When political functionaries drew up detailed descriptions of school children’s appearances and inclinations, they were really expressing a concern about the adults, whose loyalty to the Soviet state was at stake (Fig. 10.4).

The replacement of undesirable ethnic groups with reliable ones was underscored by a specific understanding of Soviet subject hood as a guarantor of political loyalty. Soviet officials saw the native population as lacking ‘the ability of citizens to carry out the formal requirement necessary to get things done’.²³ In this regard, the settlers became the executors of the Soviet political will to social order. However, as they made their way into the region, sometimes sanctioned by official permits but often times not, and through their experiences of settlement and cohabitation, their subjectivities became altered. For some patriotic communists, relocation created a sense of duty and political membership, but for many others—their embittered wives, disappointed young families, and soldiers who were stuck in Kaliningrad after its occupation—it produced a sense of victimhood. Encountering the Germans of old Königsberg, observing their bodies and the ways that they moved, spoke, dressed, and laboured, led to a certain ‘cultural intimacy’ with the other.²⁴

To correct the politically incorrect attitudes, the local media extolled examples of ‘model’ patriotic behaviour. On one occasion, when a settler chose to build his own house instead of settling in a repossessed German one, the regional radio reported:

No one would pass by without stopping and taking a careful look at this new house; without paying respect to its intricately carved wooden rim running along the roof, to the delightful blue of the shutters. Here, among the standardized dwellings erected in the uniform Prussian style, this traditional Russian house looks vivid and buoyant.²⁵

²³Tim Edensor, ‘Reconsidering National Temporalities: Institutional Time, Serial Spaces and Synchronicities’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 9 no. 4 (2006): 525–545; 530.

²⁴Michael Herzfeld, quoted in Edensor (2006): 532.

²⁵Kostyashov, *Izgnanie Prusskogo dukha*, 23.



Fig. 10.4 Young Russian woman-migrant at Bismarck (1946). From the archive of Yulia Mikhailovna Perfilatova

A newspaper article titled, 'Cultivation of Soviet Patriotism in the School' used different methods for instilling national and class pride in students.²⁶ Maths teacher N. failed to fulfil his educational duty when he 'did not give one talk in 1948 about the great Russian mathematicians', and 'could not cite one contemporary leading Soviet scientist'. N. was demoted. In March 1948, in the same series, *Kaliningradskaya Pravda* published an 'update' on the state of contemporary Soviet music: 'The Central Committee sharply condemned the symphonic and operatic creations of such composers as Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturyan, Shebalin, etc., in whose work are especially strong the formalist perversions, antidemocratic tendencies foreign to the Soviet people and their tastes.' Echoing the anti-formalism debate, which marked the start of a new wave of cultural repression in the post-war Soviet Union, Kaliningrad public lecturer R. unwisely said to her listeners that the Russian composers of the late nineteenth century were influenced in their invention of the national musical style by their Western contemporaries. She lost her job.

It was not only party apparatchiks that jumped onto the bandwagon of criticizing *kosmopolitizm* and disciplining their subjects into proper sensibilities. Many reports came from ordinary residents about their neighbours' 'suspicious behaviour'; they too observed 'obsequiousness' to German material culture and its everyday components. There were burning questions of how to relate to and how to treat this German place and its environs: 'What relationship should we, the Russians, have with the German culture?' Appearance became increasingly significant; style of dress, hair-dos, makeup—all became cues with which to detect foreignness. Yet, attitudes towards this foreignness were much more complicated than what might have been expected, given the historical moment. The very terms in which the phenomenon was 'packaged' and presented for public attacks—obsequiousness, idolizing, blind worship—reveal the presence and the strength of desire, while at the same time disowning and condemning it. The critique of *kosmopolitizm* was indeed adopted effectively as a response to the question of difference in a city undergoing a profound change, but it also exposed a layer of aesthetic preferences among Soviet citizens who did not belong to the canon of

²⁶Yurii Kostyashov, *Krasnyi karandash tsenzury*. Kaliningradskiy Oblit v 1947–1956 gg. [The Red Pencil of Sensorship. Kaliningrad Literature Department in 1947–1956.]. In journal: Kaliningrad Archives. Publisher: Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad). pp. 129–138. Page referenced: 136.

proper socialist desires. Drawing the limits of the new collective self, this government-led campaign in the defence of culture acquired additional legitimacy and penetrated the most intimate spaces of life in Kaliningrad because of its international context at the end of World War II. But it was that very same context which stimulated curiosity and desire for the foreign, which, in Kaliningrad, was at the same time intimately familiar and quotidian, like a porcelain plate.

SECRETS AND SPIES

The battle for ‘culture’ was one way in which Soviet leaders sought to safeguard its borderland. The protection of state secrets was another. The importance of the concept of a ‘state secret’ for the Stalinist authoritarian state has already received some attention.²⁷ In Kaliningrad, this obsession with secrets and the threat resulting from their dissemination reached an extraordinary scale. By a directive issued in September 1946, after transitioning from military to civilian governance, the entire Kaliningrad Oblast was classified as a ‘closed zone’. This meant that settlers coming to Kaliningrad received an additional stamp in their passport. Visits by outsiders were limited, any photography or filming was outlawed, and any detailed reference to public sites and locations, particularly associated with new industrial construction, was censored; the city maps were classified, and homing pigeons were strictly prohibited.²⁸ These measures were deemed necessary to safeguard the city from the imperialist and hostile capitalist states, which were regarded as predators who threatened the new world order. One response to this aggression was to render unknown the capabilities of the socialist economy and Soviet military might:

Imperialists invest hundreds of millions of dollars in disruptive work against the camp of socialism and democracy. The capitalist encirclement is

²⁷Yoram Gorlitzki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle: 1945–1953*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Harrison, Mark. 2004. ‘Why Secrets? The Uses of Secrecy in Stalin’s Command Economy’, University of Warwick. PERSA Working Paper No. 34.

²⁸The fact about pigeons is curious, as the last time pigeons were used was in the Franco–Prussian war of 1870–1871. One would expect that with the advance of airmail and other forms of wireless communication, the technologically modern state would not find much threat in the pigeon post.

dispatching its agents to our country to look for persons willing to join the ranks of foreign intelligence agencies and thus to betray the Motherland. [...] Even inside the Party, there can still be found individual chatterboxes and scatterbrains openly bragging about their insider knowledge. [...] We must convey to [young communists] that [sensitive information] is not a subject for conversation even with the most intimate person in their life.²⁹

Information does not become 'secret' if there are no others from whose purview it is concealed, and no 'initiated' to whom it can be revealed. The spy provides precisely the needed purveyor for information to obtain its protected status. Spies turned out to be particularly 'sticky' in Kaliningrad.

The minutes of a city administration meeting in December 1946 acknowledged that there was an 'urgent need to communicate to the population that we live and work in a land surrounded by the enemy, among its spies'. 'Increasing vigilance' was set as a critical task for the ideological workforce.³⁰ The historian Yurii Kostyashov quotes a statement by a factory worker delivered at a public meeting in July 1946: 'The enemy spreads its spies among us, at our factories, plants, offices. He tries to steal our party identifications, membership cards, other documents, to steal anything that might strengthen him in his destructive anti-revolutionary activity.'³¹ 'Heightened vigilance' was promoted in the party press as 'the quality of a genuine Russian', interweaving concerns about espionage with those about *kosmopolitizm*.³² By 1950, the slogan 'Vigilance is integral to the Soviet person' became intimately familiar to all Soviet citizens, Kaliningraders included.

But truly remarkable was the work of the Regional Department of Literary Works (*OblLit*), which, in 1948, in Kaliningrad employed twenty-eight professional censors to edit all printed materials, from announcements and advertising to concert invitations and playbills. The office covered the local press, radio, and TV, as well as public events and celebrations. Its main task was to ensure that no classified information

²⁹Extended Regional Party Committee Meeting, 27 September 1947, Fond 2, Opis' 1, Delo 1, List 13.

³⁰TcKhIDNIKO Fond 2, Opis' 1, Delo 1, List 13.

³¹Kostyashov, 'Izgnanie Prusskogo dukha', 22.

³²I draw this conclusion from having surveyed all of the 1947–1948 issues of the regional daily, *Kaliningradskaya Pravda*.

was inadvertently made public. A brief survey of what was crossed out of many newspaper reports, books, and radio programmes suggests an enormous scope of deployment of the secret as a socially organizing form.

Most commonly ‘intercepted’—that is, stopped from being published—was information about the military. Merely mentioning the military, even without any numbers or location, was a violation. This restriction applied even to sports events if they involved army or navy teams. In 1951, *OblLit*’s officers removed from a local newspaper an essay about country life in the province because of the following sentence. ‘The head of the farm looked over a tall figure in a military overcoat’. The ‘military overcoat’ could be evidence that the Soviet Army was indeed present in the oblast. Another item under inspection was weather forecasts, closely followed by the various industries operating in the regional economy. An incident took a serious turn, and was even reported to the main office in Moscow, when data about the planned milk output almost made it into a newspaper. In 1951, the office prohibited the regional historical museum from displaying maps, as well as to-scale models of heavy machinery produced in the region. It also warned against displaying paintings depicting city streets, photographs of the city infrastructure, and economic data on regional industrial output.

Two related policy directions came to shape the informational field in Kaliningrad: one was the intensified production of classified information described above; another was identifying and detaining ‘spies’, the alien bodies who allegedly infiltrated even party cells. Together, they were part of an escalating goal to fortify the ‘border zone’; they connected the international politics of the advancing Cold War with the most intimate areas of daily life; they turned the motile multitude into a self-policing collective subject. The following incident was recalled by a former militia officer in a book of recollections recently published.

On a summer day in 1952, a girl was riding a bicycle on a remote country trail when a woman dressed in what was she later described as ‘a conspicuously colourful dress’ stopped her to inquire about the whereabouts of a certain village. In response, the girl smiled amicably and pointed the way. Then she appeared to take off on her own business but stopped again down the road to see whether the woman was following her directions. The girl knew that the directions she provided were wrong, and she planned to go directly to the nearest militia detachment to report the stranger. We learned all this from the narrator, then a

private in the military detachment that received the information about a suspicious stranger. The private was the first to learn about the ‘woman in the suspicious dress’. A special patrol with a trained dog was sent to look for the woman, found her, arrested her, interrogated her, and pronounced her guilty of espionage. She was sentenced to twenty years in a labour camp.³³

Which part of the story are true and which make-believe is difficult to ascertain sixty years after it happened. But the overall narrative is just one of a whole slew of similar incidents reported in Kaliningrad between 1945 and 1953. What interests me is the interplay between the moral superiority of the Soviet settler asserted against the material achievements of her opponent. With the figure of the seductive intelligence agent, we enter a realm of state politics reminiscent of the Soviet reformers’ civilizing mission, but in reverse: here, the builders of a modern, ‘cultured’ society (*kul’turnost’*) look in embarrassment at the far more advanced material and technological culture repossessed from Germans; and the more this material culture came to be appreciated in this region, which remained economically poor, the more Soviet leaders saw the region as susceptible to foreign subversion. It may also be that the very existence of such a woman in the social imaginary of Russian settlers in the repossessed border city suggested the presence—even if only glimpsed through the detail of style—of a cosmopolitan space in which denigration of the foreigner went hand-in-hand with the enchantment associated with her privileges, including her economic freedom, mobility, and, not least, the freedom to engage in intimate affairs with European men. Suspicion was mixed with attraction.

CONCLUSION

Königsberg’s transformation into Kaliningrad gave rise to a form of political subjectivity that contrasted sharply with the celebrated ideal of Enlightenment thinkers, while also entering into a peculiar, distorted dialogue with its legacies. In the immediate post-war period, the Soviet state hijacked cosmopolitanism and used the concept only in the derogatory sense of *kosmopolitizm*, a set of ideas and practices based on

³³A. I. Lekhcer, in *Kaliningradskaya Militsiya: Ocherki, vospominaniya, dokumenty* [Kaliningrad Militia: Essays, Remembrances, Documents], ed. Kushnerov. (Kaliningrad: Yantarnyi Skaz, 2001), 221–226.

instigated suspicion towards, and the careful weeding out of, outsiders. Official Soviet policy moulded sociality and political sensibility, and in so doing, cast cosmopolitan ideals of the European Enlightenment in a deeply negative light. In the city of Kant of the 1940–1950s, with a population stripped of rights and slated for deportation, the phrase ‘world citizenship’ took on the meaning of disenfranchisement, statelessness, and abjection.

This was certainly true in the political sphere, but the everyday culture of the new community presented a more contradictory and controversial trend. To be sure, the political project and the social practice of repopulation did not always align neatly. Although the Stalinist struggle against ‘rootless kosmopolitizm’ was indeed an ideology of repression, it could do little to control the individual existing desires for the ‘European’ and the ‘Western’ in the daily life of the city’s inhabitants. A new set of people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds repopulated Kaliningrad—a ‘multicultural admixture’, the official sources labelled it, united by a shared political identity as Soviet. This kind of admixture, however, stood at odds with the cosmopolitan mosaic presented in the writing of the Enlightenment thinkers. Yet, as internationalism was exalted and *kosmopolitizm* condemned, the desires of regular Soviet individuals for better foreign goods and advanced Western technologies were exploited as a motive in attracting settlers to their destination, Königsberg. Amidst the practical realities of this irregular and ad-hoc campaign emerged lived experience of cultural inferiority and envy, a reverie for the city’s past, which was more concrete and at least as powerful as the official [missing word?]. While international politics in the period shaped the consciousness of new Kaliningraders in the doctrine of the negative cosmopolitanism, their everyday lives were filled with the intercultural encounter of another cosmopolitan. Amidst the practical realities of an irregular and ad-hoc campaign launched by the new administration emerged lived experience of cultural inferiority and envy, and a reverie for the city’s past, which became a constant, albeit not unproblematic, fixture of the regional society for the seventy decades to come.

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Transnational Emotions in Times of Conflict: An Afterword

Axel Körner

As the authors of this volume have shown, the entanglements between cosmopolitan sentiment and political conflict call for a transnational perspective, an approach which invites us to question the explanatory value of methodological nationalism without at the same time losing sight of the interests and motives of authors and agents rooted in a particular historical context. In concluding this volume, I return once more to Immanuel Kant's definition of 'orientation in thinking', examined in the introduction to this volume. For Kant, cosmopolitanism seems to serve as a moral compass; and as such it remains a driving force for humanity as a whole. An inherent element of cosmopolitan sentiment is passion, a dimension that goes beyond pure reason and one that is communicable across national boundaries. One way to give expression to passion is through aesthetics, where the context of a transnational idiom seems especially relevant. Aesthetic cosmopolitanism becomes *Sinnstiftung*, understood as an attempt to make the experience of changing times meaningful.

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In recent decades, much has been written on music as a sphere of national cultural production in nineteenth-century Europe; a perspective which has often been based on thin empirical evidence concerning music's perceived semantic content or function, where theoretical and historiographical parameters seem to have dictated the agenda of research.¹ In order to illustrate how aesthetic cosmopolitanism works in a transnational context, I wish to stay in line with this volume's central theme of war and conflict, using the example of composer Giacomo Meyerbeer's experience of international crisis during the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the public expression of cosmopolitan sentiment generated by his death in 1864.²

Meyerbeer was the Prussian father of French *grand opéra*, a German Jew with an italianised first name, equally at home among the social elites of Paris and Berlin, director of music at the Prussian court with residence on the Pariser Platz, just next to the Brandenburg Gate.³ Commenting on Meyerbeer's capacity to combine German techniques of orchestration with Italian vocal tradition through French melodramatic stage works, his contemporaries regularly remarked upon the cosmopolitan language of his works, which had the capacity to communicate across different national cultures.⁴ Undoubtedly, some critics and composers did not like this aspect of Meyerbeer's success, most famously Richard Wagner and

¹For a critical response see *Opera and Nation in Nineteenth-Century Italy*. Special Issue: *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 17/4, September 2012. Also Axel Körner, 'The Risorgimento's literary canon and the aesthetics of reception: some methodological considerations', *Nations and Nationalism*, 15/3 (July 2009), 410–418.

²On Meyerbeer's response to political events, see in particular Anselm Gerhard, 'Religiöse Aura und militärisches Gepräge: Meyerbeers Ouvertüren und das Problem der rein musikalischen Form', in: Sieghart Döhring/Arnold Jacobshagen, eds, *Meyerbeer und das europäische Musiktheater* (Laaber: Laaber, 1998), 201–230, 203. On the international reaction to Meyerbeer's death, see Axel Körner, 'From Hindustan to Brabant: Meyerbeer's Africana and Municipal Cosmopolitanism in Post-Unification Italy', *Cambridge Opera Journal*, 29/1 (2017), 74–93.

³For an overview of his social milieu in Paris and Berlin, see in particular Sabine Henze-Döhring and Sieghart Döhring, *Giacomo Meyerbeer. Der Meister der Grand Opéra* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2014), 93–119, 154–170.

⁴For a particularly influential assessment of his music's alleged cosmopolitanism, see Eduard Hanslick, 'Meyerbeer', in *Die moderne Oper: Kritiken und Studien* (Berlin, 1875), 138–173.

Robert Schumann, but also Felix Mendelssohn Bartholdy.⁵ Meanwhile, Meyerbeer's *grands opéras* were the works most frequently performed on the stages of nineteenth-century Europe, leaving a lasting legacy on techniques of orchestration, conducting and dramatic form.

In December 1863, while completing his opera on Vasco da Gama, *L'Africaine*, Meyerbeer wrote to his wife that the new year was unlikely to bring peace.⁶ At the time, the entire world was following the events of the American Civil War, shocked to see a nation of brothers killing each other in the hundreds of thousands. In Italy likewise, national unification had resulted in civil war, with the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies still under the siege of Piedmontese troops. Civil war also raged in Mexico, where Archduke Maximilian of Austria would assume the imperial throne, only to be executed three years later. Closer to Meyerbeer's home in Berlin there were uprisings against the Russian imperial government in Poland and a standoff between Prussia and Denmark about Schleswig-Holstein, that within weeks would result in another major European war. In this sinister atmosphere, in May 1864, the composer suddenly died, leaving his greatest operatic project incomplete, the opera on which he had worked for over 30 years. 'Music is without its master,' the *Ménestrel* of Paris commented, a master who had succeeded 'in writing cosmopolitan art'.⁷

Against the background of these conflicts involving numerous global powers, the composer's death became a world event, reported across the globe. Thousands of people attended the procession from Meyerbeer's Parisian home on the Champs-Élysées to the Gare du Nord, from where his body was transferred to Berlin. French National Guards and their corps de musique headed the march. Black horses pulled the carriage, accompanied by the Prussian ambassador Robert Heinrich Ludwig von der Goltz, the Minister of the French Emperor Marshall Jean-Baptiste Philibert Vaillant, the composer Daniel Auber, as director of the Conservatoire, and Émile Perrin, director of the Opéra, followed by family and further delegations of France's cultural institutions. The Gare du Nord was covered in black draperies showing the composer's initials.

⁵For Wagner's changing attitude towards Meyerbeer, see in particular Henze-Döhring/Döhring, *Giacomo Meyerbeer*, 143–153.

⁶See Reiner Zimmermann, *Giacomo Meyerbeer. Eine Biografie nach Dokumenten* (Berlin: Parthas, 1998), 319.

⁷Quoted in Zimmermann, *Giacomo Meyerbeer*, 321.

Extracts from his operas were played and the Rabbi of Paris spoke. When the coffin arrived in Berlin, the funeral procession from the station to the opera house Unter den Linden, and from there on to the Jewish cemetery on Schönhauser Allee, was greeted by the Prussian King and the Queen, and joined by several other members of the royal household. The streets were again flocked with mourners. Presumably an extremely rare occasion, two countries, France and Germany, granted the composer of cosmopolitan music official state exequies. Meanwhile, similar to the examples presented in some of the other contributions to this volume, these cross-national reactions to Meyerbeer's death also serve as an example of urban cosmopolitanism, where not the nation but the city becomes the site to articulate cosmopolitan sentiment.

Commenting on the strong emotional response evoked by Meyerbeer's death, the future French Prime Minister Émile Ollivier wrote in the *Revue et Gazette Musicale* that the composer had created a 'harmonic connection' between France and Germany, and that his name stood for an ever-lasting bond between 'sister nations'.⁸ Within less than a year, the world-premiere of *L'Africaine* took place in Paris and was attended by the French Emperor and the Empress, with many of the nineteenth-century's greatest musicians in the audience, including Liszt, Verdi, Gounod and Anton Rubinstein. After the last act, the curtains went up once more to show a bust of Meyerbeer and the audience honoured the composer with fifteen minutes silence, not an easy task after having sat through a monumental opera in five acts. Everywhere in Europe the premieres of *L'Africaine* assumed a similar function, uniting people to commemorate the master of a cosmopolitan aesthetic. Audiences and politicians across the continent articulated their strongly felt need to be part of these events.

Meyerbeer's death and the posthumous premiere of *L'Africaine* became France's last cultural manifestations of international significance before the Second Empire disappeared, five years later, in the Franco-Prussian War. Émile Ollivier, who by then had become the Empire's last Prime Minister, was proved wrong about the harmonic connection between France and Germany. By now he supported France's party of war, instrumental to the escalating conflict with Prussia.

⁸Quoted in Heinz and Gudrun Becker, *Giacomo Meyerbeer. A Life in Letters* (London: Helm, 1989), 14.

Cosmopolitanism had once more proved an illusion. But Meyerbeer's supporters remained convinced that the deeply felt humanity of his music had the capacity to overcome frictions between nations. His work was understood as an aesthetic response to the experience of crisis and conflict, a point of reference that offered people orientation in the dark.

In much of the scholarship on nineteenth-century music, opera in particular has been reduced to the product of an age of nationalism, where the nation is used as almost the sole prism to make music meaningful. This approach often mistakes later readings of a particular work of art as evidence for a presumably self-evident, ahistorical and perpetual semantic content. An especially prominent example is Giuseppe Verdi's *Nabucco* of 1842, credited with patriotic meaning to the extent of having anticipated the Revolution of 1848 in Milan, despite the fact that not a single contemporary source offers evidence that the 'Va pensiero', the famous chorus of the Hebrew slaves, was understood at the time of the opera's premiere as a reference to Italy's national liberation from the Habsburgs.⁹ Similar examples from different European contexts are easily added. What does nationality explain if Bedřich Smetana, as director of a theatre specifically created for the Czech nation, conducted less than of a handful of works of Slavonic origin, using instead the international repertoire to show that the Czech nation was one with the family of European nations? Where national style in music served to affirm identity within a deliberately multi-national political setting?

Since the 1980s, a renewed interest in nationalism has encouraged historians to read too much nationality into culture, pressing almost every act of social behaviour or symbolic representation, every piece of literature, art or music into national categories. Transnational history also means questioning the categories of analysis that form the basis of this approach. Amartya Sen's book, *Violence and Identity*, provides a powerful critique of this way of thinking. Offering a reflection upon its

⁹The main work criticising this approach is Roger Parker, *Arpa d'or dei fatidici vati: The Verdian Patriotic Chorus in the 1840s* (Parma: Istituto di studi verdiani, 1997). Also, Mary Ann Smart, 'Liberty On (and Off) the Barricades: Verdi's Risorgimento Fantasies', in Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg (eds), *Making and Remaking Italy. The Cultivation of National Identity around the Risorgimento* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 103–118. For a summary of the debate, see Axel Körner, 'Oper, Politik und nationale Bewegung. Mythen um das Werk Giuseppe Verdis', in *Themenportal Europäische Geschichte* (2013), <http://www.europa.clio-online.de/2013/Article=673>, accessed 1 March 2017.

author's experience of the violent division of the Indian subcontinent, the book also serves as a comment on the emergence of more recent ethnic and religious conflicts, to show how people suddenly kill neighbours with whom they had previously lived peacefully together.¹⁰ Sen criticises the reduction of human experience to single identities based on religion or nationality, arguing that we are made of multiple overlapping identities—political, cultural, social, sexual identities—which connect us across national or religious boundaries through a humanitarian and cosmopolitan dimension. We often forget about the possibility of consensus across differences. Sen's passionate plea for the recognition of shared identities also critiques a form of multi-culturalism where different communities live next to each other without ever crossing the boundaries between them.

Investigating how art and culture assume meaning across different contextual settings is not to say that the same music sends one message across different boundaries, in the same way as Richard Hoggart has demonstrated that the same artefact might assume different meanings according to the social context in which it is read.¹¹ Instead, culture works as an anthropological tool for what Germans call *Sinnstiftung*, or what Kant described as offering 'orientation in thinking': making sense of the world depending on a specific contextual reading. Painting, gestures, symbols, art and music are all about interpreting the world. They are read through experience and a priori knowledge, and this experience differs according to social and cultural context; but this context does not need to be national, because there is never just one meaning to a cultural artefact. The fact that the context does not need to be national offers the possibility of a transnational reading, a reading across borders.

This emphasis on a transnational reading of artefacts brings us to the core of aesthetic cosmopolitanism. In his *Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale* (1902), Benedetto Croce compared aesthetics to language, arguing that art has an expressive function and serves as a means of communication between human beings. As the product of individual artistic intuition, art enables others to follow its aesthetic force. Literature communicates at least on one level through content, and only in its fuller understanding through content as well as form.

¹⁰ Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny* (London: Penguin, 2007).

¹¹ Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957).

Music, however, operates on a more abstract level, where content and form cannot easily be separated. This is not to suggest that musical aesthetic does not involve a process of translation, or that music therefore automatically communicates the same message across different cultural contexts.¹² But it includes the possibility of communication across linguistic and national boundaries. For a long time the idea of communication across boundaries has inspired philosophers and, on a different level, has resonated with political actors.

What I wished to add to this collection of essays in terms of an afterword is to foreground the importance of affective communication in generating cosmopolitan sentiment during times of conflict. Cosmopolitan sentiment is generated by means of reason as well as affective communication. This process itself occurs in specific temporal and local situations, just as with each example of cosmopolitan thought discussed in this volume. As the introduction has argued, cosmopolitanism frequently evolved in a functional relationship with war and conflict, a situation that gave rise to transnational connections while also reinforcing partisan perspectives on social and political order. Within such situations cosmopolitan ideas offered a sense of certainty during periods of international conflict. Most chapters in this collection encourage readers to endorse a sceptical reading of Kantian cosmopolitanism, exercising caution concerning the capacity of a universal philanthropic attitude to bring about international justice and peace.¹³ But they also show that times of conflict facilitated the emergence of cosmopolitan ideas and sentiments, which cut across national boundaries, generating new, hybrid forms of subjectivity.

¹²In this respect I wish to distinguish my approach from the idea that shared appreciation of cultural artifacts creates global or transnational communities, as suggested by Akira Iriye, *Japan and the wider world: from the mid-nineteenth century to the present* (London: Longman, 1997), 48. On the notion of global community, see also Akira Iriye, *Global Community: the Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, Calif/London: University of California Press, 2002). Also Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), 3.

¹³When referring back to texts discussed in the introduction or the preceding chapters, this afterword abstains from repeating details of bibliographic references.

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