


BRITAIN AND THE WORLD

BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL MUSE

The Classics, Imperialism, and
the Indian Empire, 1784–1914



C. A. HAGERMAN



Britain's Imperial Muse

BRITAIN AND THE WORLD

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
Britain's Imperial Muse

The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian
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To Michelle
My alpha and omega

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Series Editors' Preface

Britain's Imperial Muse: The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian Empire, 1784–1914 is the eighth book in the *Britain and the World* series, edited by The British Scholar Society and published by Palgrave Macmillan. From the sixteenth century onward, Britain's influence on the world became progressively profound and far-reaching, in time touching every continent and subject, from Africa to South America and archaeology to zoology. Although the histories of Britain and the world became increasingly intertwined, mainstream British history still neglects the world's influence upon domestic developments and British overseas history remains largely confined to the study of the British Empire. This series takes a broader approach to British history, seeking to investigate the full extent of the world's influence on Britain and Britain's influence on the world.

Chris Hagerman's book explores how the culture of the Greco-Roman classics influenced the way in which the British elite viewed their Empire. Many senior British officials in India and the wider Empire shared an extensive education in the ancient classics that endowed them with a common frame of reference. As a result, traces of Ancient Greek and Roman civilization – language, literature, art, philosophy, history – permeated elite British culture to a remarkable extent. This 'classical discourse' served as both a source and support for an important nexus of imperial ideas in the metropole: empire's magnificence, the civilizing mission, the causes of imperial decline, the character of imperial peoples, and the nature of India. Colonial officials in India made frequent use of Latin or Ancient Greek in their correspondence and conversations, connecting their beliefs and actions to the ideas and events of the classical world. One of the most famous examples of this is Sir Charles Napier's attributed despatch notifying his superiors of his unauthorised conquest of Sindh in 1843: *peccavi* (Latin for "I have sinned"), an epigram that also made justifying reference to Julius Caesar's celebrated conquest of Gaul. As obvious as the influence of the classics has been on the culture of British imperialism in India, this is the first book to examine the subject at length. It is based on exhaustive research in periodicals, government publications, histories, editions of ancient sources, diaries, letters, poems, novels, and material culture (coins, sculpture, architecture, painting, and commemorative monuments). *Britain's Imperial Muse* is a fascinating and compelling read, and we highly recommend it to you.

Editors, *Britain and the World*:

James Onley, University of Exeter

A. G. Hopkins, University of Texas at Austin

Gregory Barton, The Australian National University

Bryan Glass, Texas State University

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Finally, thanks to my family and friends for their patience and unflagging support. To Michelle, for whom it is utterly insufficient, merci.

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Introduction

Pondering the University of Oxford, humourist Bill Bryson once wrote ‘... I’m not entirely clear what it’s for, now that Britain no longer needs colonial administrators who can quip in Latin.’¹ The joke plays on the link between Britain’s elite educational institutions, with their prominent classical curricula, and the empire during its ‘heyday’. To present day sensibilities it is – at risk of understatement – remarkable that the ability to dispense witticisms in a dead language was a distinguishing characteristic of those who ‘ran’ the British Empire. And yet, through the long 19th century the Greek and Latin classics constituted the central intellectual element in the education of Britain’s imperial elites. Bryson got his laugh by exploiting his audience’s awareness of the gulf between attitudes to education, empire, and classical antiquity current in the summertime of Britain’s imperial power during the 19th century, and those current in the depths of its terminal winter at the close of the 20th century.

In playing to simplistic popular understandings of complex historical phenomena, Bryson inevitably presents a one-dimensional impression of classical education (showy but pointless) and colonial administrators (showy and pointless). Even so, it draws attention to an important but under-appreciated facet of British imperial history: the role played by classical discourse in the perception, representation, justification, and even the experience of empire. I should note that throughout this study ‘classical discourse’ carries three distinct but interrelated meanings. First, and most familiarly, it refers to the body of texts in ancient Greek and Latin that survived classical antiquity. Second, it refers to the ideas, artefacts, and literary, artistic, and architectural styles originating in the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome. Finally, it refers to the overburden of images, representations, adaptations, and reproductions that have accrued to these texts and artefacts since antiquity.

The classics and classical discourse were an integral element of elite culture in Britain until at least the middle years of the 20th century. The ability to make an appropriate ‘quip in Latin’, to comprehend a line of Greek poetry, or to identify an allusion to ancient history signified elite

social status.² Classical discourse likewise contributed to the cultural and intellectual development of individual members of Britain's elites thanks to classical education and the pervasiveness of classical references in political discourse, poetry, literature, painting, sculpture, and architecture.³ This classically steeped and classically conscious elite stood at the helm of Britain's imperial ship of state – to the extent that such a metaphor can be applied to the British Empire.

Here the utility of Bryson's statement ends. For, while it evokes the connection among classics, status, and empire, it denies the Latin quip any real significance. But where the humourist is content to mirror the convictions of his audience for comic effect, the historian ought to dig deeper. For the long 19th century between the loss of the American colonies and the outbreak of the First World War, such an excavation reveals something much more complex, problematic, and profound than can be compassed by Bryson's epigram. *A priori* there is reason to suspect that by virtue of its privileged position at the heart of elite culture, classical discourse made some meaningful contribution to British imperialism. By this I mean to the specifically imperial component of elite identity, to their understandings of empire, their attitudes to so-called 'subject peoples', and the interpretive frameworks they applied to imperial questions and experiences – something akin to a mentalité or what Robinson and Gallagher labelled the 'official mind'.⁴

Anyone who has spent serious time with British writings about empire from the later 18th through the early 20th centuries will be aware of numerous manifestations of this connection. Two examples from mid-19th-century India will suffice as introduction: George Trevelyan, aka George Broughten, aka The Competition Wallah, and Lieutenant Quentin Battye. When the former arrived in India in 1862, he was, like so many of his countrymen before and after, both fascinated and flummoxed by what he encountered. Not that he was completely ignorant of India. He had close family connections to the subcontinent. His father, Charles Trevelyan, had started his career there, eventually rising to the rank of Governor and Finance Minister. His uncle, Thomas Babington Macaulay, famously served on the Supreme Council of India 1834–8. He himself had studied India in preparation for the competitive examination that won him a place in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) – and the 'competition wallah' moniker. But no mere family connection, however deep, no course of study, however rigorous, could have prepared him entirely for the reality of India. As a result, that reality, which he called a 'mighty maze', frequently left him agape.

On one such occasion Trevelyan woke to the raucous bruit of a procession outside his chambers. Informed by a servant that it was part of a religious festival, he hurried down to observe. He could not believe his eyes:

I seemed to have been transported in a moment over more than twenty centuries, to the Athens of Cratinus and Aristophanes. If it had not been

for the colour of the faces around, I should have believed myself to be on the main road to Eleusis in the full tide of one of the Dionysiac festivals. The spirit of the scene was the same, and at each step some well-known feature reminded one irresistibly that the Bacchic orgies sprung from the mysterious fanaticism of the Far East. It was no unfounded tradition that pictured Dionysus returning from conquered India, leopards and tigers chained to his triumphal car, escorted from the Hyphasis to the Asopus by bands of votaries dancing in fantastic measure to the clang of cymbals. It was no chance resemblance this, between an Hindoo rite, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and those wild revels that stream along many a Grecian bas-relief, and wind round many an ancient Italian vase; for every detail portrayed in those marvellous works of art was faithfully represented here.⁵

Trevelyan's palimpsestic coping strategy is not especially helpful to modern, non-specialist readers of the sort Bryson addressed, to whom classical antiquity is very nearly as alien and exotic as India was to callow civilians in 1862. But of course the classics and their parent civilizations were familiar territory for Trevelyan, who had been educated at Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge.

But why should classical antiquity intrude on a description of contemporary India in the first place? Several possibilities come to mind. There is an undeniable whiff of ornamental social display about Trevelyan's turn to the classics. But it also seems that the classics shaped the way he interacted with the world. In the case of the procession, they helped him understand what he saw, or rather to interpret it in a way that was meaningful to him. At the same time 'making sense' of such rituals, having 'knowledge' of their origins, empowered Trevelyan, providing him a sense of control and mastery vis-à-vis India and Indians. Indeed, given his emphasis on the antiquity of contemporary India, its 'fanaticism', and the Dionysian precedent for European conquest, it seems likely that Trevelyan exploited classical discourse to represent India in a manner that supported notions of British superiority and thus justified Britain's imperial presence. On the other hand there is the possibility that classical knowledge predisposed him to see and represent India in a particular way. He elsewhere mentioned Arrian, a Greek author of the 2nd century AD, whose best-known works included a history of Alexander the Great's campaigns and the *Indica*, a sort of history-cum-ethnography of ancient India.⁶ Might youthful encounters with such classical descriptions of India and Asia more generally have shaped Trevelyan's expectations?

This only scratches the surface. Trevelyan's words open further avenues of interpretation. For instance, the classics' power to 'explain' aspects of the 'mighty maze' in which Trevelyan found himself, suggests that they helped palliate some of the anxieties inevitably brought about by the environmental and cultural alienation of his situation. Similarly it seems likely that

engagement with classical discourse would have helped him preserve his sense of cultural identity, while simultaneously reinforcing his cultural solidarity with other elite Britons in India. We might even wonder if classical images of conquerors such as Alexander the Great, and of imperial peoples such as the Romans, had influenced Trevelyan's views of himself as imperial servant, and of Britain's empire in India.

If this last seems too much of a stretch, consider the example of Quentin Batty. A junior officer in the Corps of Guides, he fell mortally wounded by a round shot beneath the walls of Delhi in June 1857. He lingered long enough for friends and brother officers to gather and hear his final words. He chose Latin, more particularly the most (in)famously patriotic line in the poet Horace's oeuvre: '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*'.⁷ This was not ironic. Batty was no Wilfred Owen, decrying Horace's words as 'the old lie'.⁸ For him they were words to live and evidently to die by. Nor were those present sufficiently disillusioned to ridicule the sentimental patriotism of his final utterance. Instead they made approving notices of his speech and conduct in their letters and memoirs.⁹ Latin offered no impediment to these men; they understood the words, and more importantly the deeper message they conveyed. Like Batty they knew that the phrase in question was part of an elaborate exhortation to the youth of Rome, instructing them to gird themselves for the harsh duties and sacrifices of empire, to do what their ancestors had done in the service of the state. For someone such as Batty, who wished to be remembered as a heroic patriot, and for whom it was not enough simply to make a corner of that foreign field forever England, Horace made a powerful ally. With seven words he wrapped himself in the mantle of the Roman patriots he and his contemporaries believed had made the Roman Empire such a force in world history.

This is not to say that the quotation was all sanguine memory management. If anything, the reflexive ease with which Batty invoked Rome, even *in extremis*, suggests that the Roman example had influenced the formation of his own imperial identity and sense of imperial duty. To put it another way, donning the mantle of Roman imperial patriotism was more than fancy-dress fantasy. It fell so naturally about his shoulders because it had been an integral part of his inner moral and intellectual ensemble for years, shaping his views on heroism, masculinity, patriotism, duty, and empire. The enthusiasm with which contemporaries accepted Batty's identification with Rome, took up his words, and even, like G.A. Henty, projected them on their countrymen, suggests that he was anything but an outlier.¹⁰

We will return to these and other possibilities suggested by the experiences and words of Batty and Trevelyan below and in subsequent chapters. For now it is enough that they illustrate the nexus among classical discourse, classical education, Britain's imperial elite, conceptions of empire, and British India. It is the aim of the present study to unpack this nexus, to explore some of classical discourse's specific contributions to Britain's

imperial history during the long 19th century. In doing so, I aim to show how and what classical discourse contributed to the culture of imperialism among Britain's elites and to the specific interpretive frameworks they applied to the empire, whether surveying it from the Olympian serenity of the metropole or caught up, like Battye and Trevelyan, in the hurly-burly of affairs in India.

Students of British imperialism have made a habit of pointing out the nexus among the classics, elite status, and the empire. This includes the authors of general imperial histories, such as Galbraith, Morris, Porter, Mansergh, and Hyam, and students of the intellectual foundations of empire such as Thornton, Semmel, Kiernan, Metcalfe, and Greene. This list is easily extended to historians interested in the imperial role of women, or science and technology, or architecture, such as Burton, Headrick, and Nilson and Metcalfe respectively. Likewise scholars interested in race and culture such as Curtin, Said, and Hourani, as well as those, like Pratt, Coates, and Dewey interested in reconstructing the mind-sets and daily lives of British soldiers and civilians employed in the empire, have drawn attention to the imperial significance of the classics.¹¹ However with the notable exception of Steven Patterson's recent discussion of ancient Rome's contribution to British conceptions of themselves as an imperial people in *The Cult of Imperial Honour in British India*, such notices incline to the superficial, oblique, or fleeting.¹² They are mere asides in arguments focused elsewhere. As such they highlight the deep divide that long existed between serious work on classical reception and on British imperialism. Taken as a body, however, such references suggest the startling number and variety of ways classical discourse contributed to empire and imperialism. It is all the more surprising then that it took so long before concerted attempts were made to illustrate the broader pattern they signify.¹³ The simplest explanation for this oversight might well be that an earlier generation of historians took largely for granted the connection between the classics and the British Empire. This in turn may explain why the first sustained attempt to investigate an aspect of this connection, a 1971 article by Raymond Betts, garnered so little attention in the field.¹⁴

Nevertheless Betts' article remains an important milestone in the field. Naturally some of his arguments overlap with the more casual observations of the historians of empire just noted. He too elaborated on the tendency of British elites to identify with the character of the ancients, especially in terms of their capacity to rule and their historical greatness. He too noted the common conception that the ancients brought peace and civilization to Europe, which supported Britain's civilizing mission. He too emphasized the negative examples presented by Rome, particularly the corruption that led to its decline and fall.¹⁵ However in other respects he broke important new ground, establishing some of the parameters and preoccupations that have shaped studies of the subject ever since. First, Betts focused on the period from 1870 through 1914; that is, the period of heightened imperial

consciousness sparked by increased competition and insecurity surrounding the 'Scramble for Africa'. This and his exclusive focus on Rome set a powerful precedent for subsequent scholars; it persists for instance in Patterson's book. Most crucially, he also concluded that while comparisons between the British Empire and antiquity were relatively secure on general terms, they became harder to sustain as specificity increased. Rome was at most a *general* point of comparison for British imperialists, a source of inspiration and rationalization in the great age of European imperialism, but one that was insignificant in terms of offering specific strategies or policies to be emulated. In sum, 'Imperial Rome was turned to British advantage and made to serve as a heuristic reinforcement, a magnificent historical reference in a historically conscious age.'¹⁶

Betts' model of the classics' contribution to British imperialism found a parallel in the work of F.M. Turner, an exceedingly important and influential commentator on what used to be called Britain's classical tradition. 'The most striking feature of Victorian Hellenism,' Turner argued:

was the tyranny of the nineteenth-century European experience over that of Greek antiquity. The same situation prevailed in regard to the Victorian appropriation of Latin antiquity. The Greek and Roman experiences and cultures exercised little or no tyranny (and I am tempted to say little or no independent influence) over nineteenth century writers, scholars, and commentators. Exactly the opposite was the case. Victorian writers repeatedly imposed their own categories, values, and political and religious anxieties onto the historical, philosophical, and artistic remains of Greek and Roman antiquity.¹⁷

While both Betts and Turner acknowledged a vague sort of inspirational power inherent in the classics, they did so reluctantly and with serious qualification. Working on different periods and subjects, they concluded that the inclination to manipulate aspects of classical antiquity in order to appropriate it for contemporary purposes was much more important in the 19th century. This interpretation drew increased strength from the changes in theoretical perspective and methodology that swept both British imperial history and classical reception studies in the years following the publication of Said's *Orientalism*.

Martin Bernal took the first significant step in this direction in *Black Athena*. He argued that the need to maintain a clear separation between themselves and the African and Asian 'others' they colonized, led the British to reconstruct ancient history in such a way that classical Greece became the sole source of Western civilization. This meant eliding the Egyptian and Phoenician (i.e. 'African' and Asiatic or Semitic) contributions to Hellenic civilization acknowledged by the ancient Greeks themselves and widely accepted by later Europeans – at least until the acme of imperialism in

the 19th century made such associations uncomfortable. The resulting gulf between European civilization and those of Asia and Africa became essential, in Bernal's formulation, to discourses of European supremacy, which supported the 'civilizing mission' that justified Britain's empire.¹⁸

Specialists in a variety of fields have dismantled Bernal's methodology and much of his argument.¹⁹ Even so, as Barbara Goff recently noted, some of his general insights remain instructive.²⁰ His was the first large-scale work to suggest that understandings of classical antiquity were in fact shaped by the ideological imperatives of imperialism and that by extension classical discourse must be seen as an agent thereof. This perspective has been particularly popular among the collection of classical reception specialists from diverse disciplinary backgrounds who have turned their attention to the British Empire in recent years.

This includes archaeologists such as Richard Hingley, scholars of literature such as Javed Majeed and Norman Vance, and of course classicists and ancient historians such as Mark Bradley, Catherine Edwards, Victoria Larson, and Phiroze Vasunia to name just a few.²¹ In general terms they all advance variations of Bernal's argument, in which Britain's imperial present shaped appreciations and therefore representations of empire in classical antiquity. The resulting 'imperial' elements of classical discourse were then pressed into service by Britons hoping to justify their beliefs and actions through the deployment of classical authority. In some cases the emphasis rests on the second stage of this process, but they all share a fundamental belief in the primacy of the present in classical reception. In the context of the British Empire at least, this translates into a fixation on the present-minded exploitation of the classics and classical antiquity. Vasunia is perhaps the most articulate and thorough proponent of this approach, linking 'cultural reproduction, the politics of knowledge, and modes of colonial domination'. He argued, for example, that British representations of the Emperor Augustus shifted in response to changing conceptions of contemporary imperialism. As a result: 'Rome functioned as a figure of empire, and it was available to those who wished to transfer *imperium* to themselves and claimed the authority to speak for empire in their own time.'²² It was, to use a phrase employed by Judith Hallet and Christopher Stray in their Introduction to *British Classics outside England*, an 'analogical justification'.²³

While this perspective on the classics' imperial significance dovetails very nicely with the trend toward perspectives and methodologies informed by post-colonial theory in British imperial history, the issue has yet to spark much substantive comment – favourable or otherwise – from scholars who make the empire their primary area of research. It went almost entirely unmentioned in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, for example. Nevertheless the larger body of work on exploitation of the classics has inspired considerable commentary, especially from classicists, who bridle

at suggestions that ancient history and archaeology have been not simply implicated in imperialism, but fundamentally shaped by it, almost from their origins as academic disciplines. Philip Freeman, for instance, questioned the tendency to project a loosely defined 'popular mentality' concerning something like empire, on to the 'non-specific outpourings' of the 19th-century classicists.²⁴ Those who take such a position, or indeed those who do not go forcefully or far enough in the other direction, run the risk of being characterized as imperial apologists.

Maria Wyke and Michael Biddiss evoke the spirit of the debate in the Introduction to *Uses and Abuses of Antiquity*:

Many classicists and cultural historians have recently sought to disclose the various misogynies, ethnocentricities, elitisms, and imperialisms evident not only within antiquity but also within its subsequent appropriations – and have done so even to the point where the New Right has been provoked into condemning their efforts as signs of a conspiracy led by cultural anarchists.²⁵

The authors' sympathies clearly lie with the former group. As far as they are concerned there is no question that '...classical antiquity, however protean in its modern manifestations, has been most regularly deployed to bolster a supposed cultural elite of white males and to marginalize or silence whatever that imagined community came to fear as its Other.'²⁶ This statement, which should call to mind Trevelyan's references to classical antiquity in his description of contemporary India, is fair – as far as it goes. But it does and should not lead inevitably to the conclusion that the classics and classical discourse need *only* be understood as instruments to be used and abused. There is an entirely different dimension to the classics' contribution to Britain's culture of imperialism.

Barbara Goff framed the issue this way in her Introduction to the 2005 volume, *Classics and Colonialism*:

Much work on the classical tradition envisages the classical object – Greece or Rome and their various cultural products literary and artistic – as *pushing* its way through time to a contemporary period, under its own steam. Another way to look at the process is to imagine the object *pulled*, by forces not itself, which deploy it – the classical object – for their own purposes.²⁷

The 'work on the classical tradition' is of the older variety noted earlier: celebrations of the classics and their contributions to British arts, culture, and history. She points to Jenkyns' 1980 volume, *The Legacy of Rome*, as a particular example.²⁸ Goff herself clearly leans in the other direction. She states that those interested in the 'intersections between the classics and

colonialism' ought to privilege the 'pulling model', and follows Turner to assert that Victorian 'critics who acclaim their subjects ability to "push" are in fact themselves doing the "pulling".²⁹ This is a fair reading of Turner's general position on the issue, even if he was only 'tempted' to deny the classics any 'independent influence'. His analysis, like Goff's, ultimately marginalizes the influence of the classics (pushing) to the point of insignificance. The same could be said for Bernal, Edwards, Hall, Hingley, Majeed, Vance, and Vasunia. Just as the opposite could be said for Jenkyns or Vivenza and even more strongly for earlier students of the classical tradition in Britain such as Highet, Larabee, or Ogilvie.³⁰

We appear to be left then with a binary opposition between old-fashioned, uncritical valorizations of classical 'influences' and more critical, post-colonial analyses of classical knowledge as a calculated construction originating in and supporting unequal power structures, i.e. social, racial, and/or imperial hierarchies. But this is misleading particularly in terms of the secondary literature dealing with the classics and empire. Even Jenkyns' work does not fall quite as easily into these categories as Goff suggests. He may have lacked the fashionable language of discourse analysis, and the 'constitutive' influence he stressed fits Goff's 'pushing' model very well. However he also argued an 'auxiliary' influence, which is very close to Goff's 'pulling' model. It presents the classics, as, to borrow Goff's own words, affording 'support and coherence' to outside works and ideas.³¹ In other words, he acknowledged that the classics were exploited by those seeking authority for their own beliefs or productions. The issue is really a matter of emphasis. In striking a balance between the classics' power to influence on one hand and people's tendency to exploit them on the other, Jenkyns inclined (albeit dramatically, as Goff detected) toward the former. He may well have gone too far in that direction. But there is some reason to think that the near total dominance of what Goff described as the 'pulling model' has tilted the field too far in the opposite direction.

A few of the more recent commentators on the nexus between the classics and British imperialism have voiced similar concerns – and not simply out of a reactionary concern to shield the classics from the slings and arrows of philistines. In a 1996 article entitled 'Cromer and the Classics', Donald Reid explored how the classics functioned in Britain's colonial experience with Egypt. In the course of his argument he says much that accords with the relationship between the classics and 19th-century Britain (and the empire) preferred by Betts, Bernal, Goff, Turner et al. He noted in particular the propensity of British officials including Cromer, Milner, and Allenby to deploy classical examples in order to make the case for their preferred system of administering Egypt.³² But he also suggested that the classics might well have influenced British attitudes to the 'East' as much as contemporary attitudes to the 'East' influenced readings of the classics. As he put it, no British administrator 'arrived [in Egypt] as a *tabula rasa*, the question is which

preconceived filters one used and how these clarified or distorted encounters with Egyptian realities.³³ The classics, needless to say, were one of the filters Reid had in mind.

Reid is not alone in adopting this more balanced approach to the classics and empire. David Armitage and Nicholas Canny have done so for eras prior to that which concerns this study.³⁴ The latter argued, for example, that Tacitus' account of Britain's pacification under the Roman legate Agricola was both a model the British sought to emulate in their colonization of Ireland in the 17th century and a rationalization for their aggression. Still more recently, in a rebuttal of the conventional position that 19th- and early 20th-century British conceptions of Roman Imperialism were shaped, consciously or unconsciously, by enthusiasm for contemporary British Imperialism, Eric Adler asked: 'Why must we conclude that this was inevitably the case? Why not the other way around?' He went on to suggest that understandings of Roman expansion may have 'compelled formerly apolitical students to adopt particular views on British imperialism, supportive, critical, or otherwise.'³⁵ What sets scholars like Adler apart from earlier advocates of the classics' ability to inspire and influence is the much more judicious way they apply the notion. Thus Adler closed his article with the statement that his convictions about the classics' power to influence notwithstanding, it is nevertheless impossible 'to gainsay' the power of contemporary realities such as the British Empire to shape understandings of antiquity.³⁶

Mark Bradley was even more explicit on this point in the Introduction to his edited collection *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire*. He stressed the importance of both models: 'the impact of classical ideas, literature and art for formulating, shaping, and understanding British imperial culture, *and* the effect of British imperial culture on the transmission, expression, and interpretation of the classics.'³⁷ Some contributors to his volume, especially Rogers and Hingley, Reisz, and Vlassopoulos embraced this approach; others, such as Challis and Mantena resisted it, preferring the more conventional emphasis on the present and therefore exploitation.³⁸ This nicely highlights the state of play within classical reception studies, where, as recently as 2006, William Batstone's reasonable assertion that 'it is not a contradiction to say, on the one hand, that all understanding is self-understanding, made possible only by the foreknowledge and prejudices of our being in the world, and, on the other, that a text can change one's life' could be considered deliberately provocative.³⁹

In advocating an approach to the classics' imperial significance similar to that of Reid, Adler, and Bradley, I have no desire to diminish the work of those who have focused on how the classics have been appropriated, manipulated, and deployed to entrench notions of racial difference and/or justify imperial domination. This post-colonial perspective on classics and empire is indispensable, and the collective contribution of those who have adopted

it exceedingly important. My aim is to find a better balance between the interpretive poles of 'influence' and 'exploitation' – pushing and pulling. Like Batstone I cannot accept that they are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, I consider them inseparable.

Appropriation and exploitation easily and naturally shade into influence. This is simply the extension of post-colonial discourse analysis to its logical conclusion. What happens once a 'classical' discourse or narrative or body of knowledge favourable to empire has been erected and comes to dominate a particular intellectual landscape? Whether it arose from a simple encounter with a classical text, from innocent (mis)interpretation, or from deliberate distortion, such a discourse might be expected to influence the imperial attitudes and interpretive frameworks of people who were exposed to it, particularly if that exposure came during an individual's formative years, or during that passage of life where he or she first became aware of or encountered the empire.

The oft-cited example of the long-term imperial influence exerted by Benjamin Jowett's interpretation of Plato in late 19th-century Oxford provides a perfect illustration of this phenomenon.⁴⁰ Let us assume for the sake of argument that contemporary imperial circumstances deeply coloured Jowett's famously influential reading and teaching of Plato. Does this mean that the classical element was without 'influence'? Plato's works remained the starting point for Jowett's interpretations. And for many, perhaps most of his pupils, Jowett's interpretation and analysis would have been indistinguishable from what Plato actually wrote or intended. As far as they were concerned, the notions of responsibility to 'subject peoples' they brought to Milner's kindergarten or Cromer's staff, or the ICS, were Platonic and classical as much as 'Jowettian' and contemporary. This point may be generalized. Discourses based on ancient texts were in a sense absorbed into the classics themselves, or rather that larger classical cultural monument comprising text, material remains, *and* interpretations that figured so large in Britain during our period. It is no coincidence that Philip Mason, barely a generation removed from Jowett's Oxford, subtitled his second volume on the ICS *The Guardians*. No doubt this was calculated to make the ICS, of which he had been a member for two decades, look good – burnishing its image with a little classical polish. But it also seems to reflect a deeply and long-held belief in the partially classical roots of the ICS ethos, which had subsumed any specific contribution by Jowett.⁴¹

Having said this, I think it important to acknowledge that in some instances readings of particularly powerful classical texts unmitigated by anything more specific or sinister than the general cultural milieu that shapes all readers, could inspire ideas about the nature of empire, its world-historical function, or likely dangers, not to mention the qualities of imperial peoples, or indeed, 'subject' peoples. As Reid suggested, ideas borrowed from Herodotus might have influenced British encounters with the 'Orient' as

much as preconceptions about the 'East' influenced readings of Herodotus.⁴² Likewise Quentin Battye's internalization of Horace's exhortation to imperial service and sacrifice testifies to the classics' powers of influence. Moreover, as I have tried to show elsewhere, ideas derived from classical descriptions of India helped shape British perceptions of the subcontinent and its peoples.⁴³ Recall Trevelyan's use of Arrian – as well as his knowledge of ancient Greek civilization – as a point of reference for contemporary India. Of course, these very same descriptions were also appropriated – sometimes verbatim, sometimes distorted – and exploited by figures such as James Mill to support particular representations of Indian civilization, which in turn justified his vision of Britain's proper relationship to India.

It is this inescapable duality that gives the current project its title. Muse, in this instance, is not meant to evoke simplistic notions of inspiration from a higher authority. The invocation of a muse by an ancient author was, after all, as much a deliberate, self-serving assertion of legitimacy as it was a request for artistic succour or acknowledgment of a debt. The classics may fairly be characterized as an imperial muse only in this more complex and ambivalent sense: as a cultural monument susceptible to distortion and exploitation but one with the capacity to influence and inspire. No single study can hope to present the whole of this intricate and expansive picture. Beyond articulating a new approach to classical reception in imperial contexts, I hope to modify some of the more specific assumptions common in the field while also addressing some important lacunae. The time frame is the first point to note. In imperial terms the period between 1784 and 1914 makes sense. The unprecedented shock of the American Revolution, coupled with the realization that the East India Company had acquired a vast territorial empire in India, encouraged the dawn of widespread imperial consciousness in Britain in the closing decades of the 18th century.⁴⁴ On the other hand the First World War vastly accelerated Britain's imperial decline, even if it resulted in the addition of new territory. The social changes it likewise accelerated contributed to the removal of compulsory Greek in the Oxbridge matriculation exams in 1918. This is a potent symbol of the decline of classical education within Great Britain. Similarly, if Wilfred Owen's rejection of the 'Old Lie' originating in Horace and embraced by Battye, is any indication, the patriotic nostrums rooted in classical discourse that had supported a particular imperial identity, were starting to break down.⁴⁵

In terms of the classics and empire, however, the period is something of a departure from the more common emphasis on the period 1870–1914. This was indubitably an era of increased imperial consciousness and one that spawned numerous comparisons between the British Empire and classical antiquity. But it is misleading to focus so intently on the age of 'New Imperialism' that we lose sight of the classics' role in earlier periods, when empire exercised the minds and energies of Britain's elites, even if it did not inspire a great deal of popular enthusiasm. The broader chronological

frame has a knock-on effect vis-à-vis the relative importance of Greece and Rome. Singular attention to the later period alone gives the impression of a particular preoccupation with Rome, just as a focus solely on that part of the century in which elite culture displays a certain 'hellenomania' would doubtless privilege Greece. While it is true that at certain times one of the classical civilizations cast a longer shadow than its complement in imperial discourse, at no time did one completely occlude the other from view.⁴⁶ The point is to take a broad enough swath of Britain's imperial history to get a sense of the consistencies and changes in the classics' contributions.

More specifically I hope to provide a clearer and more detailed explanation of the process by which classic discourse became such a significant element in the imperial identity and imperial thinking of Britain's elites. With the notable exceptions of Majeed, Vasunia, and Larson most commentators have simply attributed this to the prevalence of classical education without exploring the connection in any detail.⁴⁷ This is a natural and logical assumption; and yet it contradicts the work of prominent students of classical education, such as Christopher Stray and James Mangan, who argue, from very different perspectives, that such education had negligible intellectual impact on the majority of those who endured it.⁴⁸ As we will see in the next chapter, negotiating this impasse is largely a matter of acknowledging continuity as well as change, of realizing that classical education was not insignificant simply because a majority of students loathed it, and of substituting the obsession over whether classical education created excellent classical scholars with a focus on its contributions to broader and more flexible concepts such as patriotism, identity, empire, and the like. Such a view of classical education's outcomes is central to my overall view of classical reception, admitting as it does the possibility of young minds – more or less of the age – being shaped by the classical discourse they encountered even as they acquired the skills and knowledge that enabled them to exploit that discourse.

Building on this re-evaluation of classical education I will seek to illustrate some of the more salient ways that classical discourse contributed to the culture of imperialism among Britain's elites. The key here is a tangle of imperial ideas rooted in classical discourse. These include notions about empire's potential greatness as a source of world historical progress via the civilizing mission, the character and virtues of great imperial peoples, the connections between empire and decline, and perceptions of so-called 'subject peoples'. Each of these themes has been dealt with by others. Betts touched on all of them in his ground-breaking article. Canny and Armitage both made important points regarding imperial identity and the civilizing mission, as with varying amounts of detail have Vance and Majeed.⁴⁹ Dowling, Edwards, Rogers and Hingley, Reisz, and Turner have all stressed the empire–decline connection, while Bernal, Challis, Mantena, and Vasunia have been especially vocal in terms of classical discourse's contribution to representations

of the colonized Other.⁵⁰ Some of what I have to say in these connections will be a matter of elaborating and amplifying those important insights, albeit with the addition of new primary source material. But my attention to both influence and exploitation will ensure a fresh take on these themes, and, I hope, a clearer sense of their role as both source and support of British imperialism.

The final and most original contribution of the present study will be to follow the classics from the metropole to India, where they travelled in the minds and often in the possessions of men like Battye and Trevelyan. Until recently the imperial significance of the classics has been treated as a quintessentially metropolitan phenomenon. But, in keeping with the recognition that the empire and imperialism can only be understood by taking into consideration the interplay between centre and periphery, scholars have begun to look at how the classics travelled in the empire. Reid's study of Cromer broke important ground in this respect. He identified the British practice of using classical accounts of a colonial region as a point of reference for its present condition. He was also the first to note the prevalence of classical reading among British colonial officials, and to consider how colonial realities may have shaped interpretations of the 'classics'. And finally, he was the first to consider how colonized peoples reacted to the classics. Did Egyptians take ownership 'of the West's classics along with its firearms, railroads, law codes and Louis XV chairs'?⁵¹ Felix Budelmann, Abhishek Kaicker, and especially Emily Greenwood have picked up on this last point in the context of West Africa, North India, and the West Indies respectively, showing how the classics were quickly recognized as a symbol of authority and power, which repelled some and attracted others among the 'colonized'.⁵²

In terms of India more specifically, Majeed, Larson, and Vasunia have each commented on the extent to which classical knowledge was a passport to power in the imperial administration of India, on account of its association with elite status and the classical elements of the competitive exams that granted access to the ICS from 1856.⁵³ Majeed and Vasunia have further shown how the classics were used in 'the construction of idioms in which cultures [races] could be compared, contrasted and criticized'.⁵⁴ My aim is to develop these themes further, deepening our understanding of classical discourse as a foundational element of British belief in their cultural superiority vis-à-vis India. Classical discourse offered Britons such as Trevelyan a first encounter with India, just as it did with empire. This encounter provided 'knowledge' of Indian geography, flora and fauna, cultures, and history, which naturally predisposed civil servants and officers to particular ways of seeing India and its peoples. This in turn contributed to the responses of the 'man on the spot' confronted by imperial responsibilities, opportunities, and crises. Of course the images of India contained in classical discourse also proved very useful for those like Trevelyan, who wished to portray Indian civilization in a negative light or at least in a light that excused or flattered

Britain's domination of the subcontinent. At the same time, first-hand experience of empire sometimes led to re-evaluations of ancient history and thus to renovations of classical discourse. In Trevelyan's case, for instance, it is difficult to imagine that the sights, sounds, and smells of the procession he witnessed in Calcutta did not somehow integrate into his understanding of ancient Greek rites and rituals.

On a more prosaic level I will seek to show for the first time the extent to which the classics constituted a living element of British culture in India. I will argue that the classics offered a means of coping with alien physical and cultural surroundings as they did for Trevelyan, as well as the stresses and dangers of imperial service, as they did for Battye. I will also argue that classical discourse constituted a vital intellectual and cultural meeting ground for Britons in India and, as such, helped define the British elite community there (those who understood Battye's final words) and link it to the metropolitan elite (as in the case of Trevelyan's letters home). Finally, applying Stray's analysis of the classics' social functions in Britain to this community, I will argue that classical discourse played a role in the struggle of Britons such as Battye and Trevelyan to display and negotiate status among themselves, while simultaneously separating them from the Indian masses.

The attentive reader will have identified already some of the problems inherent in such a task. The very concept of 'elites' presents problems for instance. Does it refer to political, intellectual, economic, social, or cultural elites? For present purposes it signifies those whose social and economic backgrounds gave them access to the best (i.e. classical) education and, not coincidentally, favoured their access to important civil, military, and political posts in later life. In this group, which grew considerably during the latter half of the 19th century, we find not only those individuals who debated and decided imperial policies, administered the empire,⁵⁵ and fought over its true character, but also the majority of those who made the study of classical antiquity their profession or avocation.

Then there is the rather more technical issue of coming to grips with the constantly evolving, always multiple, often ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory British understandings of the classics and classical antiquity during the period. With this in mind I have taken to heart Turner's enjoinder that 'The content and substance of Victorian classicism – its very universe – exists between the covers of literally hundreds of books, journals, and pamphlets written about the ancient world.'⁵⁶ In my attempt to recover, reconstruct, and understand the dominant images of ancient empires and imperial peoples in Britain during the long 19th century I have consulted scholarly and 'popular' histories of Greece, Rome, Civilization and the World, reviews of these histories, articles and reviews in the periodical press, school texts, editions and translations of the ancient authors, novels, plays, poems, speeches, diaries, and private correspondence. Tracing these images

is obviously a vital first step in understanding classical discourse's potential contributions to elite conceptions and experiences of empire.

But the most significant problem for a study such as this might be lingering antipathy toward cultural approaches to empire and imperialism, particularly when the emphasis is on elite culture among the colonizers. When, in the mid-1990s, Andrew Porter attacked interpretations that present 'the ideological or cultural dynamics of imperialism [as] uniquely powerful and of primary significance'⁵⁷ he singled out for special criticism the idea that forces such as '[i]deas of benevolence and obligation, beliefs in racial superiority, educational fashions, and martial enthusiasm' were linked to one another or even very deeply ingrained either in 'classes or populations'.⁵⁸ Yet even he allowed that cultural factors 'contributed to the broad outlines of Europe's expansion overseas [and] assisted in creating the general circumstances within which specific instances of imperial domination, annexation, and direct rule'⁵⁹ eventuated. Or, to paraphrase A.P. Thornton, the British Empire may have been built by individuals, but the ideals they shared came from a common source.⁶⁰ Such a formulation does not deny the importance of other factors and forces in imperial history. Nor does it offer the sort of general, totalizing explanation of imperialism that rightly irritated Porter.⁶¹

I make no claim as to classical discourse's ability to offer a complete explanation for British imperialism or the nature of the British Empire. I do not argue that elite culture was the only important determining factor in British imperialism, any more than I would claim that the classics were the sole determining components of elite culture. I am, however, unapologetic in asserting that classical discourse contributed to elite conceptions of empire's promises and dangers and to their imperial identity, just as it contributed to individual reactions to India's cultures and environment, to British life there, and inevitably to the lives of some Indian subjects of the Raj.

1

Classical Education and Britain's Imperial Elite

A.P. Thornton once described Kennedy's *Latin Primer*, a standard public school text for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, as 'one of the winding sheets of empire'. This was hyperbole, meant to underscore his assertion that Britain's elite educational institutions had lost their vitality by the 1920s and 1930s, and were no longer instilling the proper imperial spirit in graduates. By implication these same institutions – and the classical curriculum symbolized by Kennedy's *Primer* – had been very successful at instilling that spirit during the empire's 19th-century heyday. Elsewhere Thornton was even more explicit. He referred to elite education in Britain's public schools and universities as an 'elixir of empire': a powerful cultural force inculcating particular imperial ideas and values in Britain's elites, albeit in a sometimes mysterious, often uneven, and entirely unscientific manner.⁶²

This belief in an important connection between education and empire has been taken largely for granted in imperial history, especially among those interested in the 'official mind' or imperial *mentalité* of Britain's elites. P.J. Rich for instance borrowed Thornton's figure for the title of his book tracing how the 'secret curriculum' of the public schools – the rituals and secret societies that created a cohesive corporate identity and provided a degree of social control – were carried out to the colonies and replicated by old boys in imperial service.⁶³ J.A. Mangan took a different tack, illustrating in detail how games, so much a part of public school life, developed qualities of character essential to Britain's imperial success, and how and with what effect this ideal was exported through the empire. Though interested in different aspects of the connection between elite education and imperialism, Rich and Mangan agree that such a connection existed. They also appear to agree that the classical curriculum was one aspect of elite education that had little to no meaningful impact on students and by extension the empire.⁶⁴

There is no debate on the extent to which that curriculum pervaded elite education in Britain throughout the long 19th century. Private tutors, grammar and public schools, private academies and the great universities all drew from the same classical well.⁶⁵ Hence M.L. Clarke's claim that the

19th century was 'the golden age, if not of classical scholarship, at least of classical education.'⁶⁶ For Britain's 'elites' – the upper, professional, and increasingly the upwardly mobile among the middle classes – it was all but inescapable, occupying a significant portion of their intellectual life between the ages of six and twenty. The real question of course, is not who got a classical education, or even where they got it, but what, if anything, it conveyed and to how many students?

For the majority of those who make the history of education their primary area of study the answer is unequivocal. With the exception of a few older works such as Clarke's *Classical Education: 1500–1950* (1959) and V. Ogilvie's *The English Public School* (1957), the literature on 19th-century education, exemplified in monographs by Mack, Bamford, Barnard, Sanderson, Honey, and Chandos, tends to privilege the powerful 19th-century voices ranged against classical education.⁶⁷ Dismissing the spirited and tireless defenders of the classical citadel as reactionaries, most scholars invoke eloquent critics and reformers such as Sydney Smith, F.W. Farrar, T.H. Huxley, Herbert Spenser et al. These men deplored classical education as inappropriate and or ineffectual and are credited with inaugurating the transition from an ancient ad hoc education 'system' dominated by the outmoded classical curriculum, to a more modern curriculum and increasingly 'national' system of education. It is easy to see the attraction of this interpretation – from the somewhat constrained perspective of modern scholars focused on the development of Britain's national public education system. It is far less satisfactory with respect to the broader significance of classical education in elite culture from the late 18th through early 20th centuries.

Christopher Stray is certainly the most important recent commentator on the subject. In an influential body of work centred on his landmark book, *Classics Transformed*, he has stressed the essentially social function of classical education in the public schools and universities.⁶⁸ Classical education was traditionally the preserve of the elites.⁶⁹ Like so many 19th-century and later commentators, Stray characterized classical education as a 'grammar-grind', a particularly uninspiring and odious form of grammatical instruction in Greek and Latin based on repetition, rote learning, translation, composition, and corporal punishment. While he acknowledged that this system produced a small number of highly accomplished and passionate classical scholars, in his estimate, the vast majority loathed it and took nothing from it but the ability to display enough classical knowledge to proclaim their membership of the social elite. That is to say, classical education had no meaningful intellectual outcomes for the overwhelming majority of students.

This view, taken also by Mangan and Rich it must be said, obviously stands very much at odds with the connection sketched by Thornton at the outset of this chapter, and by other historians of empire such as V.G. Kiernan and P.J. Marshall, and even more deeply involved commentators such as

Clive Dewey, Richard Symonds, and Judith Plotz.⁷⁰ It is likewise contrary to the opinions of a significant subset of scholars who have made classical reception their primary area of study. M. Bradley, C. Edwards, P. Freeman, R. Jenkyns, and N. Vance all credit classical education with a meaningful intellectual and cultural impact on a relatively wide cross-section of Britain's elites.⁷¹ More specifically, A.A. Markley saw classical education as the key both to the Victorians' interest in ancient Greece and their capacity to remake 'the Greeks into an image agreeable to them'.⁷²

Still other recent writers on classical reception, such as Goldhill, Hurst, Larson, Mantena, Reisz, and Vasunia, predicate their arguments on classical education providing something more substantial than the ability to deploy artful classical tags at socially beneficial moments.⁷³ How else could Britain's elites so effectively exploit the cultural authority of the classics to buttress various political ideologies, to justify empire, and to convince themselves and others of their right to rule? These arguments also imply that this deeper, though not necessarily profound, knowledge extended to a significant fraction of those who had a classical education. For some reason, however, those most active in this area of classical reception studies have had relatively little to say on the subject of classical education per se. And so the image persists of the intellectually inconsequential grammar-grind, producing 'mentally negligible' quantities of the Wooster, Glossop, and Fink-Nottle ilk.

This apparent impasse between scholarly perspectives dissolves if we admit the inadequacy of an epigram such as 'grammar-grind' to describe the complex and uneven reality of classical education or its outcomes in the long 19th century. The term is misleading shorthand that masks simplistic, one-dimensional understandings of classical education behind a veil of alliterative charm. One can be convinced by Stray's compelling assertion that classical education served very important and very specific social functions and even concede that this was its most significant outcome through much of our period, without denying that it had other important outcomes for many students, including that subset whose lives became entangled with the empire.

What follows is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of classical education in its myriad settings and forms throughout Britain during the long 19th century. Nor is it intended as an argument for its systemic success in creating passionate, knowledgeable classical scholars. It is instead a selective foray among these varied settings, institutions and personalities, intended to reduce the grammar-grind to its proper place as an element of classical education rather than the definition thereof. Only then will it be possible to speak in a constructive way about its intellectual outcomes for different types of students and by extension its potential significance for British imperialism and the Indian Empire.

Contemporaries believed that classical education conferred certain concrete moral and intellectual benefits in addition to the tremendous and

very practical social advantages so masterfully revealed by Stray.⁷⁴ Though the weight of inherited tradition no doubt played a part in the attraction of classical education to the established elites and those with social ambitions, classically educated fathers saw and stressed these other attractions, even if the educational choices they made for their sons had as much to do with the old school tie as with its curriculum. So too did a majority of educators, whatever their eventual concessions to the games mania and demands for more modern and 'useful' subjects.

In the most quotidian sense, classical education was attractive because newspapers, parliamentary debates, literature, art, and architecture, not to mention polite conversation, abounded with classical quotations and allusions, which only those in the know understood.⁷⁵ It is fair to say that the classics constituted a sort of 'secret knowledge' that held great attraction to those who were not among the initiated, such as the Devon tradesmen who wanted their sons to learn Latin because it was so common in newspapers during the 1860s.⁷⁶ Moreover, classical attainments were the prerequisites of study at the great universities, where Greek remained a matriculation requirement until after the First World War. Indeed, as John Massie wrote in an 1890 retrospective on the role of the classics in 'professional' education:

The classics have always been, more or less the handmaids to the faculties of theology, law and medicine; they have held the key to the church, the bar, the diploma, the civil service, the schoolmaster's desk, and the college fellowship. To a very considerable extent they hold the key still.⁷⁷

In an only slightly more ephemeral sense, contemporaries believed that classical education offered valuable mental training. Such thinking appeared in the works of 18th-century educational critics such as Vicesimus Knox and continued through the 19th century.⁷⁸ In 1888 the future Bishop of London, Mandell Creighton, could still write to his son and claim that 'learning these languages is the best exercise in carefulness, attention, accuracy, quickness of perception and such like qualities.'⁷⁹ There likewise persisted a widespread belief that the classics afforded valuable lessons in morality, restraint, service, self-sacrifice, and honourable conduct.⁸⁰ From William Rose, a frequent contributor to the *Monthly Review* in the 1780s, to Edward Copleston, Oxford Professor of Poetry in 1810, and Dr Thomas Arnold of Rugby, and Eton Assistant Master Oscar Browning in the middle of our period, through John Stobart in 1912, commentators repeated this argument.⁸¹

All this seems to suggest an important and clear connection between classical education and fitness for public life and leadership in the minds of commentators throughout our period. It is not too much of a stretch to argue for a widespread notion that classical attainments were essential characteristics of a 'Gentleman'.⁸² In laying out the regulations for Fort William

College in 1800, Wellesley made just such an assumption. As a condition of admission to what he envisioned as a sort of finishing school for members of the ICS he stipulated that each student must 'produce a testimonial ... and to pass an examination in Greek, Latin, and arithmetic, before the principal and professors, sufficient to ascertain his having previously received the usual school education of a *gentleman*.'⁸³ Thomas Babington Macaulay felt that a gentleman – including those ruling India – must have a sound grasp of Greek, which presupposed a command of Latin.⁸⁴ It is no coincidence that when admission to the ICS shifted from patronage, administered via places in Haileybury College, to open competition in the mid-1850s, he helped ensure that the new system favoured products of the public schools and universities, that is, classically educated gentlemen.⁸⁵ Classical education was, to quote a Harrovian writing in the school paper in 1870, the best training, without which it was 'impossible to become a perfect gentleman fitted to shine in private life, or attain any measure of political success.'⁸⁶ In the same year, the famous historian and accomplished classicist J.R. Seeley drew a similar connection between the classics and Britain's gentlemanly social, intellectual, cultural, and political elites.⁸⁷ For these elites the classics provided or ought to provide both standards of taste and models of social, intellectual, cultural, and political action in the present.⁸⁸ Indeed, as Terrie Romano has argued, Oxford MDs considered their classical education the essence of their gentlemanly status through at least the 1880s.⁸⁹ This social benefit is what Stray identified as the mainspring of classical education's rise in popularity during the period. But it should be clear by now that it was but a part of a larger, more complex attraction.

Outsiders duly noted the widespread belief that classical education imbued a student with this heady mixture of philosophical and political knowledge, literary style, moral refinement, and social status. Charles Astor Bristed, an American who spent five years at Cambridge in the 1840s, drew a detailed portrait of what generations of Britain's elites believed a classical education could achieve in his description of the best men – the 'reading men' he encountered. In short, these men first made him wonder if 'there might not be more of this practical quality than I had ever yet given [classical study] credit for.'⁹⁰ Bristed described these outcomes in terms remarkably consistent with the members of the Clarendon Commission of inquiry into the great public schools:

As literature [the classics] supply the most graceful and some of the noblest poetry, the finest eloquence, the deepest philosophy, the wisest historical writing; and these excellences are such as to be appreciated keenly, though inadequately, by young minds, and to leave, as in fact they do, a lasting impression. Besides this, it is at least a reasonable opinion that this literature has had a powerful effect in moulding and animating the statesmanship and political life of England.⁹¹

This may have been a somewhat utopian vision of classical education. As Stray reminds us, Bristed's circle at Cambridge was very, very select and by no means represents the typical undergraduate.⁹² And the Clarendon Commissioners carefully qualified their remarks: 'inadequately', 'reasonable opinion'. Even so, it is an image worth bearing in mind. For it was the image of the ideal product of classical education – cultured, prepared for leadership, stylishly eloquent, impressed with the best knowledge – that loomed in the minds of contemporaries who sent their sons to institutions that were dominated by the traditional curriculum or that argued the benefits of classical education. They clearly believed that the classics could shape the moral character and intellect of students.

Of course, establishing what people hoped classical education would do is one thing; establishing the extent to which it lived up to their expectations is another matter. Those who simply dismiss the expectation of contemporaries as naive or reactionary, insist that the grammar-grind made it impossible for classical education to make much of an impact on moral or intellectual development. From this perspective, which simply elaborates the arguments of 19th-century critics from R.L. Edgeworth and Sidney Smith in 1809 to Roundell in 1903,⁹³ the grind was such a pedagogical disaster that it failed to impart any real grammatical knowledge to the vast majority of students, much less an understanding of ancient literature, history, or culture sufficient to shape character or worldview.⁹⁴

Examples abound of boys who apparently took nothing – or the next thing to it – from the classical component of their education. Darwin famously avowed that such had been his lot and Farrar cited similar criticisms from Gladstone, J.S. Mill, and Benjamin Jowett as evidence for his assertion that the current system of classical instruction was 'a complete and disastrous failure'.⁹⁵ The Reports of both the Clarendon and Taunton Commissions provide further – if less famous – examples.⁹⁶ This evidence is not as conclusive as it first seems. It says nothing of the standard by which eminent intellectual figures with unquestionable classical bonafides judged success or failure. The accounts of outsiders such as Bristed, which are perhaps most useful to the non-specialist observer, suggest the exceedingly high standards of contemporaries. Nor does this evidence account for the indisputable classical attainments of the critics themselves,⁹⁷ or indeed of boys with similar educational experiences who displayed a love of classical learning in addition to prodigious classical attainments. Connop Thirlwall, Conington, Frederick Harrison, Macaulay, and the future Lord Selbourne could read both Latin and Greek at ages that range from astonishing (four) to merely remarkable (twelve).⁹⁸ Lord Saye memorized the *Aeneid* and a substantial chunk of Homer; Charles Merivale could recite Virgil's *Ecllogues* and *Georgics*, all of Catullus and Juvenal, and most of Lucan; Charles White Benson could still recite between five and six books of Virgil later in life.⁹⁹ Such men are obviously exceptional, the question, of course, is how exceptional? Where is

the balance between such products of the system and those who made that same system seem a 'complete and disastrous failure'?

We have already seen where most modern scholars would draw the line. They stress boys' antipathy towards the classics, the pedagogical obsession with composition and memory work, poor teaching, large class sizes and their inevitable corollaries, indolence, distraction, and widespread cheating. Each of the specific criticisms has merit. Yet each can be answered, at least to the point where it is necessary to qualify the representation of classical education as completely disastrous, with the result that those for whom it constituted a truly formative experience assume a more prominent place in our overall understanding of classical education.

It is first important to note that the classics were not the object of universal loathing, or even indifference, among schoolboys. E.T. Burney, a student at Haileybury in the mid-1850s just before it was replaced by competitive examination as the passage to the ICS, wrote an extended essay on 'The Enjoyment of the Classics', published in the school magazine. He argued that even prior to entering university, he and his contemporaries had enough knowledge to turn the classics 'into a sort of light reading, which can be taken up both for relaxation and mental improvement.' By that point all the unpleasantness, the torment of the 'ponderous lexicon', and the 'mental treadmill' of grammar had become 'pleasant memories', transformed by the labour that unlocked the wonders of the classics.¹⁰⁰ Most might not have gone so far as to use words like 'pleasant' or 'enjoy', but even *Tom Brown's Schooldays* – hardly an objective perspective on the intellectual business of public schools – portrays a sizeable portion of boys at least applying themselves to lessons. The character Arthur may have been the only one moved to tears by Homer, and other aspects of fictional school life – sports, interpersonal conflicts – were doubtless more important to most of Hughes' characters. But this is not to say that the classics were considered utterly inconsequential even in this fictional world. Tom Brown, the archetypal games-crazed schoolboy, wanted to learn enough to get him through Oxford respectably.¹⁰¹

There are numerous historical examples of school populations as well as cliques and individuals thoroughly engaged with the material they studied. There is the wonderful anecdote of a M.R. James sitting under a tree reading Aristophanes at Eton when he should have been watching cricket. The really interesting point here is that neither the other boys nor the masters seemed to consider this at all remarkable or strange.¹⁰² Charles Wordsworth, a Harrovian in the 1820s customarily read several chapters of Thucydides and Herodotus, or perhaps part of a Greek play, not to mention some Juvenal, Livy, or Tacitus, in addition to his regular schoolwork – every day.¹⁰³ Gladstone was part of a famous clique of dedicated scholars at Eton in the 1820s.¹⁰⁴ For students of this sort, the 'reading' types, classical accomplishment was a point of personal and school pride, as one Etonian made clear

in a defensive response to perceived criticisms levelled by Matthew Arnold. After enumerating the long list of classical honours recently attained by Etonians at Oxford and Cambridge, this boy concluded: 'It would do well to remove the impression, that Eton boys learn nothing, which seems to be a fixed conviction on so many minds.'¹⁰⁵

School magazines provide further evidence of schoolboy investment in the classics, as do the literary compilations published by some of the great public schools. The collections of essays, poems, and reviews published under the title 'The Etonian' in the early 1820s reveal an unquestionable intellectual involvement with the classics.¹⁰⁶ The 'private language' of the school, shaped by the boys themselves, had also been infected by the classics: 'Kappas' were dunces who did not study Greek, the masses were the 'oi polloi', and 'vale' was the composition written by boys on leaving the school.¹⁰⁷ Ever the keen observer, Kipling gave the inhabitants of his fictional version of the United Services College, *Stalky & Co.*, the same classicized argot, suggesting that it was still common in his schooldays.

From the perspective of the Indian Empire, there is no more suitable example of this penetration than the school papers of the East India Company's training college: *The Scrutator* and *The Haileybury Observer*. Classical material adorned their pages. It ranged from prose and poetry translations into English, through original verse compositions in Greek and Latin, to essays on language and classical history.¹⁰⁸ The tenor of exchanges between the contributors and editor on one hand and respondents on the other, make clear the high esteem for classical knowledge and the equally high standard applied to it. Evidently irritated by the standard of quotation in *The Scrutator*, one indignant reader attacked the editor: 'You, sir profess yourself to be a Classical Scholar, by the infinite succession of quotations with which you crowd your unmeaning pages. But forsooth you might exclaim with honest Casca "it's all Greek to me!"'¹⁰⁹ This was meant to sting. And, fair or not, it provides eloquent testimony as to the status and power of classical scholarship among the students who created and consumed these publications.

The frequency of classical pseudonyms such as Perseus and Satiricus suggests that respect for scholarship was coupled with an admiration for antiquity in general and that this admiration sometimes shaded into identification with the ancients themselves.¹¹⁰ But whatever the origins of these identifications, whether amusing or affected, light-hearted or serious, they are all significant. They betray the classics' pervasiveness in schoolboy culture, even at a school with an unusually intense focus on non-classical subject matter. For some students at least, the classical studies were more than a meaningless grind, they were a living, breathing part of school culture.

Broadly similar trends appear at the universities, where much of undergraduate intellectual life centred on preparation for prize competitions often in classics (original poetry and essays) – a considerable number of which reached a standard worthy of publication.¹¹¹ Bristed's account of Cambridge

in the 1840s certainly gives the impression that a significant fraction of students were seriously engaged and working at what he considered a high level. His claim that his tutor Tom Taylor, a freshly minted BA, would 'astonish a room full of Yankee Professors' on matters Greek is an illustrative example. His descriptions of a 'Trinity Supper Party' liberally strewn with classical matter, 'The Cantab Language' with its plenitude of ancient Greek words, and 'reading sets' amusing themselves with Ovid or Aristophanes likewise suggest just how far the classics penetrated the extracurricular lives of serious students.¹¹² If anything the classics played an even more significant part in undergraduate culture at Oxford. Bristed's near contemporary William Tuckwell provides an account of a mock-Homeric epic poem – the *Uniomachia* – occasioned by a brief split in the Oxford Union between Whigs and Tories in the 1830s. The Greek original, which was later translated into English, came complete with notes and commentaries, and much of the fun for readers (and presumably authors) was in the simultaneous parodies of classmates and the well-known features of classical epic. Apparently this satirical juxtaposition of ancient forms on contemporary issues was so absorbing and effective that it successfully diffused the conflict and ended the schism in the Union.¹¹³ Even toward the end of the 19th century, when Mathematics, Modern History, English, and the Sciences had made inroads at Oxford, the classics continued to be a key part of university culture. Latin remained the language of ceremonial, and the classics constituted a sort of common ground for undergraduates thanks to the examination structure. As Symonds noted, everyone read classics, no matter their speciality.¹¹⁴

If, as it seems, the classics were woven through the fabric of school and university culture to a far greater and presumably more meaningful extent than representations of the grammar-grind typically allow, then there is good reason to interrogate the assertion that the grammar-grind failed utterly from a pedagogical perspective. Engagement and interest among boys, and thus their success or lack thereof in successfully navigating the grammar-grind naturally depended much on teachers. We are not accustomed to view 19th-century educators as particularly effective or inspirational. The common image appears in the reminiscences of an early 19th-century product of classical education in a grammar school. 'When a boy, I was whipped at the pleasure of a little sneaking, half begotten pedagogue, whose maxim was to teach *musa, musae* and *amo, amas*, by a constant example of the active voice of the verb *to flog*.'¹¹⁵ But not all classics masters were distant, grammar-obsessed, birch-wielding tyrants unable to reach students. Good teachers held boys' attention and applied rigorous standards. The teaching of a Parr, a Butler, an Arnold, a Lee, a Temple, a Kennedy, or a Vaughn could not be construed as unremittingly boring, breezily unexacting, or utterly inadequate.¹¹⁶

Keate, headmaster of Eton (1809–34) comes off particularly well in descriptions of his sixth-form despite the relatively low opinion of Eton

scholarship in that era and his reputation for fast and frequent resort to the birch. J.C. Hornbury, a sixth-form pupil in 1824, remarked that 'in school the gain which the sixth-form brings with it is incredible, for, from getting up each lesson with care, and hearing in part, and bringing out in part, the information which each conveys with it, the quantity of knowledge which one gets in a day is ten times what it used to be and it is imparted lastingly.' Butler of Shrewsbury was generally thought to be ahead of Keate in this regard.¹¹⁷ One of Butler's pupils, W.G. Humphry, went so far as to claim that he possessed the power to convince his students 'that Latin and Greek were the only things worth living for.'¹¹⁸ Even when the school had come to be dominated by the ethic of 'Muscular Christianity' in the closing decades of the 19th century under the former oarsman, Edmund Warre, there remained a strong cadre of intellectually engaged students. Warre's teaching was apparently of the worst, grinding sort, but a select group of masters and tutors simultaneously pursued an effective and inspiring Socratic style of instruction that had a significant impact on students, including the future Indian civil servant, Malcolm Darling.¹¹⁹

Even Haileybury, with its unusual curriculum, provides further evidence of engaging and successful classical pedagogy. The Reverend J.A. Jeremie, later Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, was classics master at Haileybury between 1838 and 1850. On his departure from the college the senior form recognized his contributions with a gift and a speech by the senior scholar, Mr Currie. After the requisite praise for Jeremie's classical acumen, Currie adverted to Jeremie's 'unabated diligence' in classical instruction and acknowledged 'the success which ... attended [his] efforts in making that subject popular.'¹²⁰ The possibility that this speech belongs to the genre of dutifully adulatory retirement speeches draws support from the memoirs of R.N. Cust, who attended Haileybury in Jeremie's day. He considered the standard of classical scholarship there rather low. But, having been at Eton for six years, he was a particularly mature and advanced student.¹²¹ In any event further corroboration of Jeremie's engaging and passionate pedagogy balances Cust's testimony. As another of his students wrote later in life: '[i]t may be confidently affirmed that few surpassed him in the power of interesting those he taught, and in stimulating their attention.'¹²²

This brief survey of the grammar-grind in action should cast some doubt on simplistic accounts of its nearly absolute failure. But even if we discount this evidence as too selective, too partial, or in any other way inadequate, there is no reason to assume that disinterest, the inability to compose elegant verses, copybooks, cribbing, short-term memory purges, and the sedulous preservation of a low profile in brimming classrooms superintended by over-extended masters, negated any possibility of learning something important about or from the classics. This assumption is a vital weakness in many modern assessments of classical education in the long 19th century. Combined with confusion about just how high the grammatical standards of the day

were, the assumption that obvious pedagogical weaknesses rendered the grammar-grind utterly ineffectual contributes materially to the conception that classical education had no meaningful impact. Consider Cecil's claim that after 'twelve to fourteen years tuition in the classical languages [he] was unable to read even the easiest Latin authors for pleasure'. His words would seem to support the conventional criticisms of grinding classical education: boys hated it, it instilled no love of classical literature, and most fundamentally it failed to teach the ancient languages.¹²³ But Cecil could clearly read Latin, perhaps quite sophisticated Latin, even if doing so would not have been a pleasant experience. It is obviously misleading to conclude that boys took nothing away from classical education, even in its most purely grammatical form, just because they did not apply themselves to it with anything approaching gusto, or look back on the experience fondly. A boy might, like one of the heroes of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, compare lessons to a war between master and boys, but he too would ultimately have to admit that there was no escaping the field of battle, or its scars.

But what of criticisms that the grammar-grind, even when 'successful', was missing the proper point of classical education entirely – that boys ought to learn the valuable lessons offered by ancient history and culture instead of focusing on the petty superficialities of literary taste and style. Consequently, students' understanding of classical antiquity was scanty, superficial, and restricted to purely stylistic and literary issues.¹²⁴ This judgment, which has proven so attractive to modern commentators, needs to be taken seriously. Pre-occupation with grammar did tend to marginalize the study of classical history and civilization/culture, i.e. the subjects that seem most likely to inspire particular views on empire or imperial values among students later in life. However it is easy to push this judgment into the realm of caricature. Several very important countervailing factors urge restraint in this regard.

It is first necessary to recall that texts were commonly read and re-read, pored over line-by-line, syllable-by-syllable until they were virtually, and, as we have seen, sometimes literally committed to memory.¹²⁵ It is hard to believe that even an average boy could pursue this course of study for years on end without formulating some impression of ancient history and civilization. After all, they began at the earliest stage with translations of easily digestible history and mythology, and moved on to poets and playwrights whose work was highly allusive and steeped in contemporary mores, and on to historians and philosophers, especially later in the period and at university.¹²⁶ The assumption that some kind of osmotic process was at work, through which even a strictly grammatical focus would necessarily impart a familiarity with the key aspects of classical antiquity, underpins most 19th-century defences of classical education. Price gave explicit form to this assumption in the late 1870s:

The education of Greek and Latin is something immeasurably broader than this single accomplishment of refined taste and cultivated

expression. ... Think of the many elements of thought a boy comes in contact with when he reads Caesar and Tacitus in succession, Herodotus and Homer, Thucydides and Aristotle: how many ideas he has perforce acquired; how many regions of human life – how many portions of his own mind – he has gained insight into... See what is implied in having read Homer intelligently through, or Thucydides, or Demosthenes; what light will have been shed on the essence and laws of human existence, on political society, on the relations of man to man, on human nature itself.¹²⁷

That this was not wishful thinking, even in earlier eras dominated by grammatical instruction, may be seen in an example from Eton in the 1820s. One of Keate's students, having been rebuked for the way he insisted on construing a particular line, explained his choice with a sophisticated appreciation of the author's cultural context.¹²⁸ Then there is Robert Lowe, educated at Winchester and University College Oxford in the 1820s and 1830s. He purported to be appalled that 'irretrievable years of [his] life [had been] spent in reading the wars and intrigues and revolutions of these little towns, the whole of which... would not make a decently-sized English county.'¹²⁹ His education may have been primarily grammatical, but the content of the texts he studied clearly made an impression.

Nor should we forget that the classical curriculum, even in these early days, extended beyond purely grammatical work. References to 'extra' reading litter period accounts of education. Some of this reading was for pleasure; some was merely suggested by masters and tutors; some was required and might be the subject of interrogation. In the case of late 18th-century Eton, recommended reading extended to 'Middleton's [life of] Cicero, Tully's [i.e. Cicero's] Offices, Ovid's long and short verses, the Spectator, Milton, Pope, Roman History, Graecian [sic] History, Potter's Antiquities and Kennet's and all other books necessary towards the making of a compleat [sic] scholar.'¹³⁰ These requirements still stood during Cust's sojourn there in the 1830s.¹³¹ Contemporary accounts of student life suggest that recommendations of this sort were not always hopelessly optimistic. Recall Gladstone's clique at Eton in the 1820s, which exceeded the recommended course of reading by a considerable margin.¹³² And during his visit to Eton in 1845 Bristed found the boys there 'well read in Ancient History'.¹³³

It would be naive to assume that all boys at all schools were so diligent as to complete the entire corpus of suggested readings and then move on to even more esoteric materials. But a comment from Wilson, at Sedbergh in the 1840s indicates that a considerable number of boys felt compelled to make it through a goodly amount of extracurricular reading during their schooldays, some of which was focused on classical antiquity.¹³⁴ And, during his time as headmaster of Shrewsbury (1798–1836), Samuel Butler encouraged his pupils to undertake an extensive course of 'Private reading'. Benjamin Hall Kennedy, when a student under Butler had taken this advice

to heart and gone through 'all Thucydides, all Tacitus, all Sophocles and Aeschylus, much Aristophanes, Pindar, Herodotus, Demosthenes and Plato besides Cicero.'¹³⁵ In Kennedy's opinion, this 'Private reading' was the key to the widely recognized successes of Shrewsbury students, himself included, in the Butler era.¹³⁶ Presumably he enjoined his students to follow a similar practice during his very successful turn as a housemaster at Harrow and after he succeeded Butler in 1836.¹³⁷

The number of students doing so may well have waned with the advent of the games craze in the middle decades of the 19th century, but we should recall that by then the Arnold factor had come into play. Scholars often credit Dr Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby (1828–41), with ushering in a new era of elite education. Though most often associated with an emphasis on the development of Christian moral character in students, Arnold did not neglect the classical curriculum.¹³⁸ Sir J. Fitch called Arnold the 'first Englishman who drew attention in our public schools to the historical, political and philosophical value of philology and of the ancient writers, as distinguished from the mere verbal criticism... of the preceding century.'¹³⁹ This is something of an overstatement but, once publicized, Arnold's curricular innovations at Rugby quickly became widespread in existing public and grammar schools.¹⁴⁰ So when the major expansion of the public school system occurred from the 1860s the new foundations naturally featured a classical curriculum that emphasized historical and cultural issues.

Indeed from a pedagogical perspective, it is hard to imagine serious masters and tutors, most of whom were distinguished classical scholars in their own right, refraining from illustrative digressions on points of interest – even in the era before the reforms attributed to Arnold. Maxwell-Lyte's account of Eton in 1760 indicates that such expository sidebars were relatively common: fifth- and sixth-form boys had to take notes on them.¹⁴¹ Not surprisingly, given what we have already seen of his pedagogy, the Reverend Jeremie of Haileybury displayed similar predilections. One of his students, Monier Monier-Williams – who later beat out Max Müller for the first Chair of Sanskrit at Oxford – recalled Jeremie's propensity to illustrate key historical, cultural, and literary points in the classical authors by comparison with one another or with English authors. 'In this way he would contrast Demosthenes with Cicero, or with Erskine or Brougham; Homer with Virgil, or with Pope or other English poets.'¹⁴² In the wake of Arnold's reforms such expository asides must have become more frequent and more formal. Thus although Vaughn of Harrow was not widely renowned for an interest in matters historical or philosophical, one of his students from the 1850s made a point of describing his precise instruction on the 'Legal process at Athens'.¹⁴³

Similarly, curricular changes at Oxford in the 1850s offered opportunities to pursue ancient history and civilization as specific courses of study.

By the end of the century, the fact that Aristotle was taught and studied as a source of 'practical lessons', immediately struck the French visitor Jacques Bardoux.¹⁴⁴ Questions from the 'Greats' (classical honours) school at Oxford highlight the importance of the historical element: 'Describe the relations of Rome with Numidia at different periods of History'. Relate the 'History of the African province from the Roman conquest'.¹⁴⁵ According to Bristed, one major function of the tutors engaged by Cambridge undergraduates to help them prepare for examinations was to direct them through the 'vast heap of collateral and illustrative reading' required for a good performance on the question or 'cram' paper, i.e. the non-linguistic portion of an exam. He noted that for a paper on the fourth book of Thucydides in one of the first year exams this meant researching 'everything you can about everybody mentioned in Thucydides generally, and this book particularly, taking in much Thirlwall, and Bockh, and Müller's *Dorians*, and the like.' If Bristed is to be trusted the tutors themselves had mastered this historical and cultural material during the course of their studies, and took seriously their responsibility to convey it to students. Success may not always have attended their efforts, but the performances of some of their students were such as to amaze 'grave divines and professors' in America.¹⁴⁶

Significantly, from the perspective of the Indian Empire, the examination papers set at Haileybury and later for the ICS open competition are equally telling when it comes to the historical and cultural dimension of allegedly grammar-based classical education. Even before Arnold's 'revolution', the outline for the examinations in classics made special mention of the collateral reading in ancient history, geography, and philosophy that would be incorporated into the various papers dealing with particular classical authors. This interest in content and historical/cultural background positively leaps off the examination papers. The November 1844 examination asked the following in connection with a translation from Book One of Tacitus' *Histories*: 'To what historians does Tacitus refer? To what other sources of information had he access? In what order were his Historical works written: What subject did he reserve for his old age?'¹⁴⁷ In the Easter exam of 1851 students had to deal with this in the question on Livy:

'Cum Carthaginiensibus foedus ictum.' (vii.27.) What is the earliest treaty on record between Rome and Carthage? What evidence does it afford of the then power of Rome? In what author is it found? How does Livy's mention of the treaty with Carthage in Book IX convict him of having omitted the first? Why should he have omitted it?

They were then asked to 'Enumerate the Gallic wars occurring in Book VII.' There followed: 'What remarkable circumstances distinguish any of them? What account is given by Livy in Book V. of their first migration into Italy?

How does Arnold comment on it?¹⁴⁸ In December of that same year the examiners set a question with an Indian connection:

What circumstances made Alexander anxious to commence his expedition to India? What was the extent of his views? Quote any passages of Quintus Curtius that bear upon this point? Examine the statement of this author with regard to Alexander, that he was 'semper bello quam post victoriam clarior'. What judgment on his character, and the nature and results of his expeditions, is given by Schlegel and Humboldt?¹⁴⁹

On this evidence it would seem that Jeremie's successors carried on his pedagogical tradition and were not content to grind away at texts without investigating and elucidating their content. And, however students performed, the papers themselves give a sense of the approach taken to the study of ancient authors such as Tacitus or Livy, even at a school where the academic focus lay outside the European classics. Evidently some knowledge of ancient history was considered important for future members of the ICS. The competitive exams that ultimately replaced the system of patronage appointments to Haileybury in the mid-1850s reflected this expectation, favouring those with a classical education.¹⁵⁰ The exams also exhibit a concern with more than just grammatical niceties. The 1879 paper, for example, required students to answer a series of follow-up questions after translating a portion of Plato's description of Socrates' death: 'What were the charges on which Socrates was condemned? How is his teaching traduced by Aristophanes? Give an account of his last days and of his death, with the date.'¹⁵¹

Admittedly much of the evidence presented in the preceding survey can be countered with evidence of classical education's undoubted shortcomings. However I think it makes it difficult to sustain simple and sweeping assessments of classical education as nothing more than an ineffectual grammar-grind, which completely neglected ancient history and culture. On the contrary, it seems that classical education provided students a real opportunity to acquire some knowledge of ancient history and civilization throughout the period, especially if they attended university. This was probably more emphatically the case after the 'Arnoldian revolution' than before, but that seems a difference in degree rather than kind.

Perhaps the strongest evidence in support of this re-assessment exists outside the contemporary debates on classical education. To my way of thinking contemporary expectations expressed in elite intellectual culture provide an especially good way to assess the general outcomes of classical education. Public discourse throughout the period abounded with allusions, references, and quotations illustrating the extent to which authors, critics, playwrights, poets, and politicians took a relatively high standard of classical knowledge for granted among their audiences. This included cultural and historical as well as grammatical and literary knowledge. Sometimes

commentators revealed their expectations with offhand but telling statements about what 'everyone knows'.

Toward the end of the 18th century, for example, Lord Alexander Woodhouselee wrote of the 'chief republics of antiquity, whose liberty we so frequently hear extolled with boundless encomium, and whose constitution we are taught from our childhood to admire'. Significantly, he concluded that 'this may fairly be ranked among the prejudices with which ingenuous youth can scarcely fail to be tinctured, from a classical education'.¹⁵² Woodhouselee's comments suggest that the sort of historical knowledge and understanding imparted to innocent schoolboys was fairly general and superficial by the standards of a historian – certainly not all that sophisticated or critical. But the question is not necessarily how sophisticated a schoolboy's understanding of ancient history was, but whether anything of the sort came of classical education. Woodhouselee was in no doubt. Similarly, in a commentary on Haygarth's *Greece, a Poem* in 1815, William Hodgson noted that modern Greeks might be ignorant of famous events in their own history, such as the Spartan stand against the Persians at Thermopylae, but to 'every Englishman' such stories were well-known.¹⁵³ A dozen years later, an anonymous contributor to the gentleman's periodical *The Monthly Review* offered a clear assessment of the origins of this familiarity: 'In a country, where classical education is so general as ours' he wrote, 'few persons are to be found totally unacquainted with the leading features of Grecian history, manners and religion.'¹⁵⁴ 'Few persons', that is, among his intended audience – Britain's classically educated elite. George Grote had emphasized the very same connection the previous year during an extended review of Mitford's *History of Greece*. For him it was 'the extraordinary interest which the classical turn of English education bestows upon almost all Grecian transactions' that made a review – and eventually a revision – of Mitford's *History* both vital and interesting to the *Westminster Review's* readers.¹⁵⁵

The popular *Comic History of Rome* published in 1852, made similar assumptions about the classical learning of its audience.¹⁵⁶ The publication of a comic work, in which the jokes turned on a relatively sophisticated understanding of Roman history, presupposes a reasonable degree of classical learning in a considerable portion of Britain's reading public. J.A. Froude found the extent of such learning almost ridiculous by comparison with ignorance of English history. As he put it:

the Greeks and Romans are the only nations whose literature is studied, or whose histories are recognised as having an existence; men are made familiar with the constitution of Servius Tullius, who know nothing at all of the constitution of the British Islands, and trust to rumour for Runnymede and Magna Charta, while they labour in patient lecture rooms over the revolution of Clisthenes.¹⁵⁷

Trollope's remarks in the Introduction to his *Commentaries of Caesar* show that this situation had not changed by 1870. He 'presumed that most of our readers know how the Roman Republic fell, and the Roman Empire became established as the result of the civil wars which began with Marius'.¹⁵⁸

These authors may well have flattered themselves and their audiences, but even so, they did not exist in a vacuum. They were in a position to understand the experiences and knowledge of their peers; to some extent the success of their works depended upon such comprehension. Their honest expectations with respect to their audience's classical knowledge deserve respect. What they intuited, and what is so hard for most of us to comprehend, is the degree to which classic discourse permeated elite culture.¹⁵⁹

This is not to say that everyone who had a classical education acquired a deep and thorough understanding of or love for Greek and Latin, much less classical antiquity. Classical education had a wide range of outcomes, which depended on a host of personal, institutional, and historical factors. The period produced remarkable scholars and pathetic 'grindees', so to speak.¹⁶⁰ As we have seen, most scholars would agree with this judgment, albeit usually with the proviso that there were hardly any 'scholars and very, very many 'grindees''.¹⁶¹ But the centrality of classical discourse to elite culture, not to mention the fallacy of conflating classical education with the grammar-grind, should highlight the problem with such a lopsided conclusion. There is simply no need to conclude that if the systematic and cumulative process of classical education spanning twelve to fifteen years did not create a polished classical scholar, it had no impact whatsoever. By contemporary standards only the 'reading sets' and 'high men' Bristed socialized with could be considered truly accomplished students. But there was a wide gap between such men and the downtrodden dunce who learned nothing during his schooldays. The majority must fall into this gap and a good many of those may have been closer to scholars than dunces.

In this connection it is useful to recall the spirit of Price's argument in favour of classical education:

The test of educational success is not solely or even chiefly in the amount of positively accurate and complete knowledge which has been acquired; but the extent to which the faculties of the boy have been developed, the quantity of impalpable but not the less real attainments he has achieved, and his general readiness of life, and for his action as a man.¹⁶²

In Price's 'impalpable attainments', we encounter what might be called the residual value of classical education. Though taken out of context, an expression of Honey's sums this up neatly: 'All classical learning tells on a man's speech; it tells on a man's writing; it tells on a man's thoughts; and though particular facts go, they leave behind a certain residuum of power.'¹⁶³

Kipling knew this from personal experience. He claimed to loathe Horace and to have forgotten the Roman poet's work entirely in the middle years of life as a result of excessive exposure during his days at the United Services College. But, as Stephen Medcalf has admirably shown, Kipling's later work was laden with Horatian and other classical allusions. And he ended life with a profound respect for Horace.¹⁶⁴ His hated classical education *had* made an impression on him. He addressed this process explicitly in the last of the Stalky stories, *Regulus*.¹⁶⁵ The story begins with a fifth-form classics lesson conducted by the housemaster, King, in a manner that initially appears to conform to our worst images of the grammar-grind. In turn boys are asked to stand and translate lines from Horace's ode on the fate of the Roman hero, Regulus, while enduring King's scathing and often *ad hominem* criticism. The class proceeds haltingly at first, as students and master navigate the grammatical niceties of the poem. But soon enough King begins to diverge into the serious lessons to be drawn from Horace's description of Regulus' patriotic self-sacrifice during the First Punic War. The class ends, after additional translation from the students and exegesis from King, with a further moral lesson on the respect for authority taken from Horace's next ode. But not before one of the middling students displays an uncanny ability to apply lines from an ode studied the previous term to an occurrence in the class.

The really remarkable thing though, is the extent to which the students – the famously boisterous, games-obsessed, anti-intellectual, and brutal students of the Stalky stories – had absorbed the moral lessons offered by Horace and illumined by King in the course of a translation exercise. The rest of the story follows one of the boys, Winton, as he comes to understand and embrace the lesson taught by Horace, that the moral authority of those who command derives from their own humility before properly constituted authority and that even the most powerful must embrace the same severe discipline forced on the lowliest members of a community in the interest of the greater good. The connection thus drawn between classical antiquity and the present lives of the students – as well as their future lives in imperial service – was absolutely explicit; the participants described themselves, their roles, and the key lesson to be learned in terms literally borrowed from Horace. Most tellingly, Stalky ends the tale by bidding goodnight to 'Regulus', i.e. Winton, who had selflessly insisted on being punished for his 'transgressions'. Overhearing this most significant of associations, King was moved to say 'It sticks. A little of it sticks among the barbarians.'¹⁶⁶

There is no missing the imperial moral that Kipling wanted to convey. Yet his success in conveying it depended on a portrayal of boys integrating lessons into their lives that felt plausible and authentic to his audience. With this in mind it is tempting to hear Kipling's voice in this passage, to hear him describing the outcomes of his own classical education in a school that was hardly distinguished in that regard.¹⁶⁷ We will return to the imperial moral of the story in a later chapter; for now it is enough to note Kipling's

apparent conviction that a not terribly distinguished or advanced classical education impressed even mediocre students with some specific knowledge of classical antiquity and a general – though sometimes subconscious – sense of its significance and relevance to their lives.

This sense of the classics' importance did not depend solely on students' direct interaction with the classics in or out of classrooms. It grew out of subtler cultural, and institutional cues as well. Classical education bombarded students with explicit and implicit signals as to the importance of the classics (and thus classical antiquity) from childhood through adolescence to early adulthood and beyond. We have already seen examples of this in schoolboy slang and the prevalence of classical material in school publications. But it is equally important to remember that during schooldays intellectual distinctions were primarily classical. Respected or detested, authority figures were men for whom classical learning was a defining characteristic.¹⁶⁸ Nor did the games mania that swept the public schools and universities in the latter half of the 19th century change matters all that much; classics still enjoyed intellectual and social pride of place into the 20th century. As Honey noted, the classics were more important and more firmly entrenched as the 'best' education in 1900 than they were in 1800.¹⁶⁹ The upshot, as even Christopher Stray acknowledged, was that 'Classics became an atmosphere to be breathed in without thinking.'¹⁷⁰ An atmosphere, we should recall, explicitly sanctioned by parents and the vocal party of intellectuals who supported classical education.

If we compound all these factors – the classicism of elite intellectual culture, society's esteem for classical education, and, crucially, the classical atmosphere of most elite educational institutions – the result is, to return to Thornton's metaphor, 'a potent elixir'. This powerful draught appears to have impressed a significant portion of Britain's elites with some sense that, as Kipling clearly felt, the classics and their parent civilizations were valuable, important, and relevant. Such a general impression may seem rather banal, but it is absolutely vital to understanding how classical education contributed to elite attitudes and behaviour. It explains the habit among Britain's elites of comparing themselves to the ancient Greeks and Romans. When combined with specific knowledge of antiquity – even the limited knowledge acquired by Stalky & Co. – it explains their ability to find in antiquity inspirational exemplars and cautionary tales applicable to themselves and their world, including the empire.

This process finds no clearer expression than in the early career of that 'most superior person', George Nathaniel Curzon. On the eve of his investiture as Viceroy of India, Curzon gave a speech to a meeting of old-Etonians. Encouraged by the camaraderie of school chums, Curzon laid bare the origins of his imperial 'calling':

I think it was while I was at Eton that a sense of [the vice regal office's] overwhelming importance first dawned upon my mind. There we were

perpetually invited by a body of assiduous and capable mentors... and we responded with greater or less reluctance to the appeal, to contemplate the pomp and majesty, the law and the living influence, of the Empire of Rome.¹⁷¹

This speech underscores the essence of my attempt to re-assess the outcomes of classical education by questioning and complicating the prevailing image of the grammar-grind and its outcomes. By modern standards Curzon's classical education was very much grammatical. And the anecdote implies a certain 'reluctance' to engage on his part. Yet he became an accomplished classicist and certainly knew his ancient history, despite his disappointing second-class degree at Oxford. More importantly, his education imbued him with a belief in classical antiquity's 'living influence'. This ensured that the specific knowledge of antiquity he had acquired would be applied to his own life, to the way he saw himself and the world, and, ultimately, to the decisions he took. At a minimum, his classical education gave him his first insight into the significance of the British Empire in India, and as he made clear later in the speech, inspired his sense of imperial duty. This is a powerful type of influence, not to be discounted.

My point is that throughout the long 19th century, classical education, as flawed and uneven as it was, succeeded in making the classics part of the mental furniture of a significant portion of Britain's educated elites, the very people who shaped the discourse of empire in Britain and ruled the empire in India. It gave them the capacity and – vitally – the inclination to draw on classical discourse when contemplating their empire from a distance and when confronting its realities in person.

2

Classical Discourse: Imperial Dimensions

If there is abundant reason to believe that classical education engendered in Britain's elites a sense of the importance and relevance of classical antiquity to contemporary life, there remains the matter of tracing how such general sentiments contributed to specific conceptions of empire during the long 19th century. The necessary first step is to sift classical discourse for themes and trends with an imperial dimension. It is easy enough to find period representations of antiquity containing 'imperial' elements, but somewhat more difficult to determine with certainty which ones best exemplify the common, or dominant, understanding of antiquity. It is even more difficult to determine exactly how particular understandings, and the representations they spawned, came to be. Did they spring full formed from the hoary brows of ancient sources? Were they a palimpsest of contemporary concerns and values over ancient texts? Or did they emerge from a process that slid to and fro on the spectrum between these poles?

A passage from F.W. Newman's 1878 article on the moral aspects of Rome's conquests illustrates the complexities of coming to grips with the origins and significance of particular representations of antiquity. In it he quotes from Elder Pliny's *Natural History*:

I grieve to touch so lightly on a land which is at once a nurseling and parent of all lands; elected by the fiat of the gods to make heaven itself more illustrious, to consolidate scattered dominion, to soften religions, to bring together by intercourse of speech the discordant and wild languages of so many peoples, to give to man interchange of thought and humanity, in short, to become the single Fatherland of all the races in the whole globe.¹⁷²

Pliny appears to offer a straightforward encomium of Rome's empire. The parental metaphor suggests Rome's civilizing mission: making peace among peoples, softening religion, and providing a common language to dispense ideas and 'humanity'. This mission had been determined by divine will and

it was, of course, the key to Rome's world historical significance as an agent of progress. And all this depended on Rome's ability 'to consolidate scattered dominion', i.e. to build and maintain a unified empire. At least, this is the way that Newman, who had taken a double First at Oxford, interpreted Pliny's words. According to him this complex of ideas was a common place among his countrymen: 'we are taught from our youth up, that the military successes of Rome [i.e. the conquest of the empire] were a great blessing to the world.'¹⁷³

In pointing to classical education as the breeding ground for the 'modern panegyrist' of Rome, Newman suggests that authors such as Pliny, who studied at school or university and perhaps re-read later in life, were often taken at face value. Indeed he implies that such texts provided the basis for contemporary understanding of the Roman Empire's nature and historical significance. But at the same time, Newman's treatment of the passage indicates that not everyone passively accepted the authority of ancient authors. He offered a sustained and intense critique of the immorality of Roman militarism and conquest – one could say, imperialism, though the famously crotchety Newman did not deign to use what was in 1874 a new-fangled word – for which Pliny simply served as a counterpoint. What he did not mention, though it is implied by his own rhetorical exploitation of the passage, is the possibility that Pliny and other ancient authors offered a convenient (and potent) bit of rhetorical ammunition for individuals more interested in Britain's empire than Rome's. Newman's apparent disinterest in the present state of the British Empire should not blind us to the possibility, argued extensively by Freeman, Edwards, Markley, Martindale, Turner, and Vasunia among others, that some conceptions and representations of ancient empires may have been shaped as much by concerns with the present as by an objective reading of the historical evidence.¹⁷⁴ To sum up, in terms borrowed from Barbara Goff, if Newman is any indication, Pliny had both *pushed* his way forward through history, shaping opinions by the force of his words, and *been pulled* forward to do rhetorical service in present-minded arguments, including those pertaining to Britain's own empire.

I think it is safe to say that most of those just named would agree that the understandings of classical antiquity manifest in classical discourse emerged from a complex and variable interaction of ancient evidence, existing scholarship, personal experiences, and personal inclinations. All but the most naive of 19th-century commentators on antiquity had to make choices. They chose whether to accept, reject, or qualify the statements of ancient authors. They weighed the relative merits of inconsistent or biased ancient testimony and of equally inconsistent and biased modern authorities. And on questions where ancient evidence and modern scholarship offered no explicit answers, they were forced to erect interpretations of their own. With every choice and interpretive intervention they admitted the present into their understanding of the classical past. And some, like Newman and the

panegyrists he ridiculed, deliberately tailored their representations of antiquity to suit contemporary agendas.

Yet, whatever precise combination of factors produced them, such understandings could take on a life and power of their own that not only reflected contemporary mind-sets but also had the power to shape the thinking of those – like the youths Newman identified – who encountered them. With this in mind I am more interested in illustrating dominant imperial tropes within classical discourse than in unravelling the connection between their precise origins and contemporary ideologies. I think these dominant tropes fulfil what Ambirajan labelled ‘the ultimate criterion of influence’: the passage of an idea ‘into the general currency without a specific attribution.’¹⁷⁵ There can be no question of providing a comprehensive account of these tropes. Instead I will outline a few prominent points in this expansive constellation: empire’s centrality to the world historical significance of classical antiquity, the civilizing mission, the imperial character of the Greeks and Romans, the dangers of imperial success, and the fundamental differences between Europe and Asia.

The first of these took as its predicate the belief that Greece and Rome were the fountainhead of European civilization. Greece played the part of originator, particularly with respect to literature, philosophy, arts, architecture, free political institutions, and civil society. Rome’s main contribution to world history lay in absorbing Greek civilization, spreading it, and passing it down to posterity.¹⁷⁶ As the poet and renowned philhellene Shelley put it while haranguing ‘the rulers of the civilized world’ for their ‘apathy’ toward ‘the descendants of that nation to which they owe their civilization’:

We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in Greece. But for Greece – Rome the instructor, the conqueror, or the metropolis of our ancestors, would have been savages and idolaters; or what is worse, might have arrived at such a stagnant and miserable state of social institution as China and Japan possess.¹⁷⁷

There is no reason to consider this a cynical distortion; it was a perfectly conventional assessment. Suffice it to say that this remained the common view of European civilization’s origins through out our period, as demonstrated by its presence before Shelley’s time – in William Russell’s late 18th-century *History of Ancient Europe*, and the work of a landed man of letters and sometime Tory MP such as William Mitford, shortly thereafter, in the work of the philosophical radical George Grote and that of an amateur historian such as George Cornewall Lewis – and right through to the end of the 19th century, where it appears in such landmark works of classical scholarship as R.C. Jebb’s *Greek Poetry* and J.B. Bury’s *A History of Greece*.¹⁷⁸

According to most 18th- and 19th-century accounts, the triumphs of Greece and Rome over threatening rivals were at least as important as

Greece's foundational contribution to Western civilization. Such triumphs prevented the torch of European civilization, as contemporaries might have put it, from being extinguished, and ensured that it could be carried across the Mediterranean world and passed on to posterity. Even after the shift toward 'scientific' or professional history undermined such simplistic providential models, individuals with well-developed historical sensibilities routinely and reflexively drew lines connecting Greece and Rome to modern Europe via the Renaissance.¹⁷⁹ Moreover they interpreted this chain as part of a divinely ordained scheme of improvement in which great peoples, history's chosen peoples, were called upon to fulfil a specific destiny as the agents of progress.¹⁸⁰

The links in this chain were a series of ancient 'turning points', thanks to which European civilization proceeded along predestined lines, and thanks to which modern Europe was secured the heritage of classical antiquity. Two pivotal episodes in particular stand out: the Persian Wars and the Punic Wars. We will have occasion to discuss the former at greater length below. For now, let us focus on the latter. Commentators presented the Roman triumph over Carthage in the Punic Wars as central to the development and expansion of European civilization, despite periodic bouts of sympathy for Carthage – presumably occasioned by its status as a maritime and commercial empire.¹⁸¹ So construed, Rome's success offered another powerful example of how great peoples who strove for empire stood in relation to history.

Oliver Goldsmith, the prodigiously prolific essayist, novelist, historian, poet, and dramatist¹⁸², provides a clear sense of late 18th-century opinion on these wars. Of the final battle of the Second Punic War, he wrote that, 'never was a more memorable battle fought, whether we regard the generals, the armies, the two states that contended, or the empire that was in dispute.'¹⁸³ In this case 'empire' was not simply to be understood as territorial dominion or political sway but as an historical agent 'that instructed the world'.¹⁸⁴ Rome's imperial triumph meant that Europe would receive a particular kind of instruction: the Greco-Roman civilization of classical antiquity. Europe in turn would instruct the world. There is little to choose between Goldsmith and Dr Arnold on this issue, despite the generation that passed between them. Arnold's *History of Rome* (1838–43) noted simply that '[b]eginning her career of conquest beyond the limits of Italy [i.e. the First Punic War], Rome was now entering upon her appointed work... The conqueror and the martyr are alike God's instruments'.¹⁸⁵ This vision of the Punic Wars as contest not just for empire but for the future of civilization remained popular through the remainder of the 19th century, as may be seen in the writings of Edward Creasy of *Fifteen Decisive Battles* fame, Charles Merivale, the onetime Haileybury boy and Cambridge *senior optime*, and historians W.T. Arnold and J.C. Stobart.¹⁸⁶

This image took additional strength from the work of foreign scholars, most notably Theodor Mommsen, the titan of 19th-century Roman history.¹⁸⁷

Were it not for Mommsen, representations of the Punic Wars as a vital turning point in history and a shining example of the historical agency allotted to a great people, might easily be dismissed as the creation of Britons, whose view of conquest and empire had been shaped by their own imperial circumstances and projected backward onto Rome. Though he may have been sympathetic with contemporary European imperialism in general, Mommsen was not implicated in it to the extent of his British contemporaries. Moreover his assessment of the Punic Wars' significance, like those of his British colleagues, was little more than a paraphrase of Polybius and Livy. In Livy's estimate the outcome of Zama determined 'whether Rome or Carthage should give laws to the world; and that neither Africa nor Italy, but the whole world, would be the prize of victory'. And Polybius could conceive of no 'other occasion on which the prizes proposed by destiny to the combatants were more momentous. For it was not merely of Libya or Europe that the victors in this battle were destined to become masters, but of all other parts of the world known to history.'¹⁸⁸ In this case ancient testimony and modern representations line up precisely. However likely it is that circumstances and worldview predisposed these authors to a positive view of imperial conquests, they certainly did not need to twist ancient evidence to suit this perspective; and the possibility remains that for some authors such notions originated in early exposure to the classical sources. Again, the vital point is how ancient evidence and present-mindedness combined to create a powerful and pervasive discourse on the world historical significance of Rome's imperial triumphs.

Crowned with laurels, Greece and especially Rome had still to fulfil their destinies by spreading what Merivale termed the 'highest moral advance and material culture'. Here we come to the 'civilizing mission'. Rome's unparalleled empire made her the ultimate purveyor of classical civilization and eventually Christianity to 'barbarians' and to posterity. Gibbon painted a vivid picture of Rome's success as a civilizer and preserver of Greek wisdom, somewhat reminiscent of the poet Claudian.¹⁸⁹ 'The true principles of social life, laws, agriculture, and science,' he wrote:

which had been first invented by the wisdom of Athens, were now firmly established by the power of Rome... with the improvement of arts, the human species was visibly multiplied. They celebrate the increasing splendour of the cities, the beautiful face of the country, cultivated and adorned like an immense garden; and the long festival of peace¹⁹⁰

Dr Arnold built on this image in his *History of Rome*, stressing Rome's capacity:

to receive and consolidate the civilization of Greece [and] by its laws and institutions bind together barbarians of every race and language into an

organized empire, and prepare them for becoming, when that empire had dissolved, the free members of the commonwealth of Christian Europe.¹⁹¹

Note the echoes of the Elder Pliny in the second and third lines. Indeed, Newman probably had Arnold and his like in mind when criticizing modern panegyrists of Rome who taught schoolboys to venerate Rome's imperial conquests. If Arnold's *History* is any indication of his pedagogy, Newman probably had a point. The generation of schoolboys and university men Arnold trained to seek lessons from the past so that they could apply them to the present, can hardly have failed to take his point that the Roman Empire's role as a civilizing force was seminal to the subsequent course of 'European' and, by extension, world history.¹⁹² According to Turner, 'all Victorians more or less followed Arnold' in this.¹⁹³

Indeed for the remainder of the 19th and into the 20th century, hardly a representation of Rome appeared which did not stress its imperial civilizing mission in one form or another. J.R. Seeley, C. Merivale, E.A. Freeman, J.A. Froude, H.F. Pelham, and T. Hodgkin all emphasized Rome's role in spreading some combination of peace, law, good government, prosperity, arts and sciences, roads, aqueducts, and to an extent Christianity.¹⁹⁴ William T. Arnold's prize-winning essay on *The Roman System of Provincial Administration* (1879) offers the perfect summary example. He saw a compelling connection between the peace that existed 'everywhere within the charmed circle of the Roman dominion' and 'progress' (impossible to 'countries distracted by petty wars') via the institution of 'Roman law, constitutional and civil', which was, of course, key 'to civilising and organising the subject races'. This constituted an 'uneffaceable' mark 'on later history'.¹⁹⁵ Arnold et al naturally differed in matters of detail, but, aside from the odd dissenting voice such as Newman, there was no serious argument over the larger issue of empire's upside when handled properly, i.e. as the Romans apparently handled it.¹⁹⁶

Though they may never have really rivalled Rome in this respect, authors from the Scot Gilles in the 18th century through Mitford, Thirlwall, Grote, Fyffe, and Abbot in the 19th century, put significant stress on the civilizing effects of Greek colonization and of Alexander's empire in Asia.¹⁹⁷ Unsurprisingly perhaps, given Britain's colonial past and present, there was no question as to the propriety of colonization in these representations. The dominance of the progressive or providential model of history likewise ensured that the rights of the less 'civilized' were of no moment. Similarly Alexander's career of conquest commonly appeared in civilizing guise through the balance of our period.¹⁹⁸ Ancient sources such as Plutarch's essay on the *Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander the Great* provided a key source for portrayals of Alexander's imperial conquests as civilizing mission from Mitford, Woodhouselee, and John Gillies at the beginning of our period through the very influential Connop Thirlwall, to Percy Gardiner and J.B. Bury at the end.¹⁹⁹

Not everyone agreed on the positive outcomes of Alexander's conquests as described by Plutarch. George Grote argued that to 'view him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind, [was] an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence.'²⁰⁰ In the end, however, the dominant image was clearly that presented by Thirlwall: Alexander's empire in Asia was the first that 'opened a prospect of progressive improvement, and not of continual degradation, to its subjects; it was the first that contained any element of moral and intellectual progress.'²⁰¹ A general sympathy with Britain's imperial project may have nudged Thirlwall's assessment of Alexander further into positive territory, but there is no evidence that such feelings exercised any kind of tyranny over his historical analysis of the extant sources.

Interesting as it is to parse the origins of Grote's and Thirlwall's contrasting positions for insights into the process of classical reception, the power of Thirlwall's representation is really what matters. And crucially, for Thirlwall and those who adhered to his views, the question of Alexander's greatness turned not simply on the speed, genius, or extent of his conquest but on what he did with the empire they won him. So long as it seemed his empire had imposed peace, given laws, good government, common language, and regular commerce – in a word, civilization – Alexander appeared a truly great agent of historical progress.

In this formulation, empire as a phenomenon was neither inherently good nor inherently evil. An empire drew its character from those who built and ruled it. In the eyes of Britain's educated elites no ancient nation stood higher in this regard than Rome. This owed something at least to Roman statements about themselves, filtered to varying degrees, as always, by the present. Virgil's assertion of a link between Roman character and Rome's special imperial destiny from the sixth book of the *Aeneid* was a particularly popular point of reference throughout the period.²⁰² An 1863 review in *Blackwood's Magazine* by the distinguished Scottish jurist Charles Neave, Lord Neaves, provides a perfect example:

Possibly, however, it was [Virgil's] true object ... to enforce the more strongly his emphatic assertion, not merely of the superiority of the Romans in the arts of ordinary government, but of their exclusive or peculiar possession of the powers and faculties fitted for attaining and preserving a mighty empire. It is certain that he has justly and vividly described the great characteristic of that people, and the chief source and secret of their influence in the history of the world when he makes the patriot exclaim, – 'Tu regere imperio populos Romane, memento; Hae tibi erunt artes.'²⁰³

As Catherine Edwards has demonstrated, 19th-century Britons like Neaves saw little reason to quibble with Virgil on this point.²⁰⁴

The special qualities and characteristics that won the Romans their empire and their place among history's great peoples extended beyond a gift for government and administration. They included military virtue, patriotism, honesty, and selfless devotion to duty and the state. These aspects of Roman character find especially powerful expression in popular painting, poetry, and fiction. Poynter's 1865 *Faithful unto Death*, which depicts a Roman soldier standing his post in Pompeii amidst the chaos and destruction of Vesuvius' eruption, is an especially fine example. The painting owes more than a little to E. Bulwer-Lytton's *The Last Days of Pompeii* (1834), in which two characters pass a sentry as they flee the doomed city.²⁰⁵ Though his portrayal of the soldier's decision betrays a certain condescending superiority, the message that appears to have come through clearest to audiences was the tremendous discipline and fidelity of the Roman soldiery. According to Bulwer-Lytton's footnotes, the scene took inspiration from sensational archaeological finds interpreted as the remains of soldiers manning their posts.²⁰⁶ Recently archaeologists have cast doubt on this analysis.²⁰⁷ That British commentators accepted the story without question into the closing decades of the 19th century suggests that they were unlikely to look too closely or critically at representations of Roman virtues consistent with their preconceptions. As a result they produced similar representations, which helped perpetuate a very specific set of positive beliefs about Roman character.²⁰⁸

Among poetry, Macaulay's wildly popular *Lays of Ancient Rome* (1842) must be the best example of such imagery.²⁰⁹ The first of the poems, *Horatius*, offers an archetypal representation of the virtues that made Rome great. Taking his stand between Rome and an invading army, Horatius Cocles does not hesitate to hazard his life:²¹⁰

Then out spake brave Horatius,
The Captain of the Gate:
To every man upon this earth
Death cometh soon or late.
And how can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers,
And the temples of his Gods²¹¹

Macaulay's poem is perfectly sincere. True, in his introduction to the *Lays*, Macaulay noted the absence of 'Christian charity and chivalrous generosity' in Roman character, not to mention the 'devastation and slaughter' that won the Romans their 'empire and triumphs'. But ultimately, he left the reader in no doubt that whatever their undoubted shortcomings, the Romans' 'great virtues... fortitude, temperance, veracity, spirit to resist oppression, respect for legitimate authority... ardent patriotism' made them and their empire great.²¹²

Dowling would have us believe that the virtues Macaulay stressed, which she summed up nicely with the shorthand ‘republican ideal of martial and civic virtues’, became far less significant in classical discourse in the later 19th century, having been pushed aside by an ascendant ‘Victorian Hellenism’.²¹³ And yet the list of prominent works presenting this image of Roman character in the later 19th century is extensive. It includes the paintings noted above, but also Kipling’s *A Centurion of the Thirteenth* from *Puck of Pook’s Hill*, in which the title character, Parnesius, is a paragon of devotion and loyalty to the state.²¹⁴ It includes as well Kipling’s treatment of the ‘Regulus Ode’ in *Stalky & Co.*, discussed in the previous chapter. Charlotte M. Yonge’s *Book of Golden Deeds* (1864) offered a rather more generic account of Regulus’ life for youthful readers. She noted approvingly ‘how much more a true-hearted Roman cared for his city than himself’.²¹⁵ Several of the Reverend Alfred J. Church’s many volumes of classical children’s books present a similar picture. Church did not go out of his way to lavish praise on the Romans, narrating events with minimal editorial commentary. Moreover he presented numerous morally instructive caveats based on darker episodes of Roman history. Even so, the cumulative effect of his accounts of the famous early Roman heroes such as Brutus, Horatius, Cincinnatus, Camillus, Manlius, and Curtius was to reflect and reinforce the long-standing conception that Rome’s military and imperial successes ultimately derived from the bravery, fidelity, devotion, patriotism, and prowess of her soldiers and statesmen.²¹⁶

For instance, Church’s account of Marcus Curtius’ decision to sacrifice himself – as a symbol of Roman military virtue – in order to secure the eternal survival of the state, must be considered as part of an on-going, multi-faceted discourse. This discourse may ultimately have rested on Livy’s version of the story, but it included all the other versions present in elite culture: public disputes over the propriety of comparing contemporary figures such as Wellington to the Roman hero, open letters to Victoria signed with the pseudonym ‘Curtius’, B.R. Haydon’s energetic and striking painting of *Curtius leaping into the Gulf*, numerous narrative and graphic parodies of his leap in *Punch* and *The Tomahawk*, and earnest poetic adaptations of the sort that appeared in a 1900 number of the *Calcutta Review*.²¹⁷ Each author exploited Curtius’ story: to make a political point, to massage an individual’s public image, to get a laugh, to provide a lesson in patriotism, or simply to illustrate Roman culture. Yet the success of such exploitation depended to some extent on a general awareness not only of the story, but also of a consensus on what it said about the origins and nature of Roman greatness, and a belief that it was relevant to the present.

Much the same could be said of 19th-century representations of the virtues and character that made the Greeks such significant contributors to world history.²¹⁸ The Greeks were no more perfect than the Romans, even in the view of the philhellenic 19th century. Nevertheless commentators routinely tended to present the great figures of Greek history and legend as exemplars

of virtue. Church attributed the outcome at Marathon, which he described as 'The Battle-field of Freedom', to the daring stratagem of the Athenian general Miltiades, the superior individual strength of the Greeks and to their collective bravery.²¹⁹ And while his account of the fighting at Thermopylae acknowledged the Greek capacity for treachery and cowardice, the real heroes of the piece, the 300 Spartans under their King Leonidas, appear in wholly positive light. Following Herodotus very closely, Church noted that 'Honour forbade them to fly from an enemy.'²²⁰ Charlotte Yonge's account of Thermopylae presents an identical portrait of the Spartan King and his men.²²¹ Both Church and Yonge, like many others who described the battle, made sure to include Simonides' evocative epigrams on the fallen Greeks as passed down by Herodotus. Yonge rendered the more famous of the two as:

Go, traveller, to Sparta tell
That here, obeying her, we fell.²²²

In choosing to emphasize this particular episode of Greek history in a way that mirrored Herodotus' emphasis on Spartan valour and patriotism, Yonge and Church reveal contemporary beliefs about the link between these elements of the Greek character on one hand and the greatest successes of the Greeks on the other. That they did so in such obviously didactic works hints at the extent to which they and their contemporaries, like Macaulay before them, believed that the values and behaviour of the ancients provided valuable instruction on citizenship for present-day youth.²²³ Whether their works managed to imprint 'ancient' values on contemporary youth, is a subject for later chapters. However it seems safe to conclude that their work, in conjunction with the ancient sources themselves and popular histories, alongside other artistic representations of the Greeks, from Kingsley's discussion of Perseus and Thesus, through Flaxman's illustrations of the Homeric epics to Aubrey de Vere's *Alexander the Great: a dramatic poem*, made a particular image of Greek character a dominant trope in classical discourse.²²⁴ That character, needless to say, lay at the heart of their manifold contributions to European civilization.

Generally speaking, so long as empire rested with peoples of such character, it was a positive, progressive force and could be excused all manner of sins. We saw as much in the case of Alexander, whose apparently brilliant imperial vision blotted out his dubious qualities and decisions. Yet educated Britons were well aware that there was another, darker side to empire even in antiquity. In fact, ancient Roman sources contain some statements to this effect, perhaps most famously in the speech of the British leader Calgacus, recounted in Tacitus' *Agricola*.²²⁵ Bradley recently demonstrated the impressive reach of this passage within classical and imperial discourse, concluding that it had an ambiguous role in imperial debate. This is a useful reminder of the ambivalence toward empire we have already seen in classical discourse

during the long 19th century. For all that we have seen Gibbon presenting the positive image of empire as the key to Rome's world historical civilizing mission, he also admitted that it brought 'occasional suffering', 'from the partial abuse of delegated authority' over conquered peoples.²²⁶ Merivale and J.R. Seeley also acknowledged the negative side to Roman imperial rule,²²⁷ while Keightley struggled to reconcile himself to Athens' dominion over its erstwhile 'allies' in the Delian League.²²⁸

For the most part, however, educated Britons were quick to excuse the unjust imposition of outside authority over a free state or people when it meant the advance of civilization. Thus Gibbon ultimately decided that the good Roman domination achieved in terms of 'civilization' was adequate compensation for its unfortunate side-effects.²²⁹ And neither Seeley nor Merivale could bring himself to condemn the Roman Empire, whatever they wrote about its dark side. The historical necessity of spreading civilization usually trumped the physical violence inherent in the construction and maintenance of an empire. 'The humane reader of history' wrote Anthony Trollope, introducing his translation of Caesar's commentaries, 'execrates, as he reads, the cruel, absorbing, ravenous wolf. But the philosophical reader perceives that in this way, and in no other, is civilisation carried into distant lands. The wolf, though he be a ravenous wolf, brings with him energy and knowledge.'²³⁰ Lupine metaphors aside, this is precisely how Mitford, Thirlwall, and all the rest had excused the violence attendant to Alexander's conquests.²³¹ The world historical ends of the civilizing mission justified the imperial means of conquest and domination. Whether this narrative derived in whole or part from the desire of commentators to excuse the violence of Britain's imperial system, it was so deeply entrenched in classical discourse, even by the late 18th century, that commentators contradicted it at peril of public excoriation. Owen discovered this when a reviewer attacked him for having the gall to condemn Rome's conquests and the spread of Roman government in his European travelogue.²³²

In the eyes of many 19th-century commentators, history's imperial instruments did not always consciously pursue such grand ends. In the case of Rome's expansion, those less willing than Trollope to acknowledge the Republic's naked aggression, commonly introduced the concept of defensive or accidental imperialism. Strains of such thinking appeared in the late 18th- and early 19th-century representations of Roman imperialism, but only became widespread during Victoria's reign.²³³ Mommsen's *History of Rome* made the 'providential' explanation of Roman expansion a dominant discourse. He offered this summary of his argument:

If, in conclusion, we glance back at the career of Rome from the union of Italy to the dismemberment of Macedonia, the universal empire of the Romans, far from appearing as a gigantic plan contrived and carried out by an insatiable thirst for territorial aggrandisement, appears to have

been a result which forced itself on the Roman government without, and even in opposition to, its wish.²³⁴

J.R. Seeley's *Roman Imperialism* and W. T. Arnold's *Roman System of Provincial Administration* show how widely accepted Mommsen's argument had become by the 1870s, and Stobart's popular work indicates that it was still going strong as the First World War approached.²³⁵

Only with such background in mind is it possible to understand the gentle treatment Rome's conquest of Greece received in most accounts of ancient history. Of any act in Rome's long career of expansion, the subjection of Greece might be expected to excite the strongest condemnation – particularly in the 'hellenomaniacal' middle years of the 19th century. Yet most presented it as 'historical necessity'.²³⁶ Freeman glossed this notion by weaving together Horace's familiar epigram on Greek civilization captivating its Roman captors and Virgil's commentary on the relative strengths of the Greeks and Romans, which stressed Rome's imperial destiny as rulers par excellence.²³⁷ This was all a matter of first principles to classically educated Britons, who would have been conscious not only of Virgil's debt to Homer, but of the much wider and deeper debt Roman civilization owed the Greeks. As much as this perspective drew on ancient authors, it must also have owed something to the present. The Victorian understanding of history as linear progress toward some providentially pre-ordained goal doubtless contributed to the view that Roman expansion was a historical necessity for the progress of civilization. Likewise, as scholars from Raymond Betts in 1971 through to Vasunia in 2009 have argued, conceptions of Britain's own benevolent imperial mission certainly pushed some representations of empire in classical antiquity in a direction that tended to minimize or even elide its malignant aspects.

But there was one negative aspect of empire in antiquity that could never be entirely elided. I refer, of course, to the debilitating impact of empire on the metropole. Classical discourse suggested that the need to pacify, control, and administer conquered territories might introduce despotic and militaristic tendencies to the centre. Moreover because empire necessitated close and prolonged contact with other cultures, alien vices and manners might infect the 'imperial' people. Degeneration of morality and liberty inevitably followed, with decline and fall advancing in train. Recall Gibbon's musings on the greatness of Rome's imperial accomplishments. He may have sanctified the Roman Empire as the work of heroes and a timeless example to posterity when he noted that 'the footsteps of heroes, the relics, not of superstition but of empire, are devoutly visited by a new race of pilgrims from the remote, and once savage, countries of the North.'²³⁸ But both he and his audience could never forget that only 'relics' and ghostly footsteps remained of Rome's imperial greatness.

Many scholars have stressed the pre-occupation with decline in representations of ancient, and especially Roman, history at various points from

the later 18th century through the present.²³⁹ In one way or another they all follow in the footsteps of Gibbon. Wildly successful from the moment of publication in 1776, Gibbon's *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* quickly became a classic and ensured that the spectre of decline linked to empire still haunted Seeley's *Roman Imperialism* and Bury's *History of Greece* a century later.²⁴⁰ Gibbon was not solely responsible for this persistence. Later scholars who followed him added force to the connection, as did the fact that ancient sources such as Thucydides, Xenophon, Sallust, and St Augustine all made some connection between 'empire' on one hand and moral or political decline on the other.²⁴¹ At the same time, awareness of the potential for 'blowback' from their own empire, especially in times of expansion and crisis, made historical precedents and analogies very compelling to Britain's elites. This fluctuating confluence of ancient sources, 'modern' historical interpretations, and contemporary reality created and sustained yet another key imperial trope in classical discourse.

In its various permutations through the long 19th century this trope presented three distinct but related factors to explain imperial decline. Firstly, the military values and force required to take and hold an empire presented significant threats to liberty at home as well as abroad. Ferguson, Thomas Dyer, and Seeley all made this a major theme in their works on Rome.²⁴² Similarly, the moral impact of arbitrary or despotic dominion over subject peoples could corrupt the ruling population, as Keightley and Mommsen both noted.²⁴³ Secondly, historians and other commentators from Goldsmith forward pointed to the luxury derived from foreign conquest and dominion as one of the most significant causes of decline in classical antiquity. Goldsmith applied this to Rome, while the popular historians Woodhouselee and Samuel Maunder applied it to the Greeks.²⁴⁴

The final factor was increased contact with the supposedly degenerate civilizations of the East, which caused the decay of the traditional virtues that had made the imperial populace great. This was not simply a matter of importing Eastern luxury; it was also a matter of adopting customs and 'manners'. Thus Grote explicitly blamed Asia for Alexander's apparent moral collapse in the six years following his invasion of the Persian Empire. He argued Asia had stripped away the veneer of civilization and 'Greek civic feeling' instilled in Alexander by Aristotle, leaving him a 'savage Illyrian Warrior, partially orientalised'.²⁴⁵ In like vein Froude found the ultimate explanation for Roman decay and decline in the 'East'. He wrote that, '[w]hen natural pleasures had been indulged in to satiety, pleasures which were *against nature* were *imported from the East* to stimulate the exhausted appetite.'²⁴⁶ Seeley shifted focus from implications of sybaritic debauchery to systems of government. He argued that the introduction of 'Oriental sultanism' by Diocletian in the late 3rd century AD destroyed 'the classical view of life' replacing it with 'the Asiatic view, which rests upon unalterable necessity, and elevates government into a divinity, teaching the subject to

endure whatever it may inflict, not only without resistance, but without even an inward murmur.' As a consequence, 'the deep distinction that had so long existed between Greeks and Romans on the one hand, and the Orientals on the other, was effaced.'²⁴⁷

The contagion of 'Oriental sultanism', or 'Asiatic despotism' as it was more commonly termed, appeared to be a more serious threat to liberty among the Greeks and Romans than even imperial militarism. Gibbon for one made great play with the 'slavishness' of Asian civilization, which he equated with despotic government.²⁴⁸ Nearly a century later the association of Asia with despotism had not changed, as shown not just by Seeley, but by the works of Creasy and Keightley, not to mention influential German scholars such as Ernst Curtius.²⁴⁹ But it took its starkest form in connection with the Persian Wars. Goldsmith, Grote, Creasy, Cox, Freeman, and Bury all stressed the world historical import of these conflicts between two apparently distinct and incompatible ways of life.²⁵⁰ In Bury's words, the Greek 'defense of Europe against the barbarians of Asia, the discomfiture of a mighty oriental despot by a league of free states, the defeat of a vast army and a large fleet by their far smaller forces... [was the] victory of Europe over Asia.'²⁵¹

The upshot of this talk of Western liberty and oriental despotism was a much broader, more general sense of – to paraphrase Seeley – the 'utter difference' between Asia and Europe. To anyone familiar with the work of Edward Said, this must seem like a case study of constructing the ideal self in opposition to an equally artificial inferior 'other'. The gleaming columns of simple austerity, manly military virtue, civic patriotism, republican government, and personal liberty on the European side appeared all the more glorious and uplifting by contrast to the grim gallows of excessive luxury, military weakness and effeminacy, oriental despotism, and slavish subjection on the Asian side. Though he traced the origins of such thinking back to Aeschylus, Said would have emphasized the importance of the imperial present in this connection. His work stands – figuratively at least – at the head of the stream followed by Bernal, Hingley, Reid, Majeed, and Vasunia, who have all shown how the classics were used to create and/or rationalize the cultural and racial distance between the British and the peoples they subjected in Africa and Asia.²⁵² Vasunia identified Gibbon as an instance of such present-mindedness on account of his investments in East India Company bonds. In light of this, his portrayal of ancient Asia as 'slavish' could be explained as a self-serving justification of the Company's actions by denigrating Asia and perhaps even an attempt to instruct his contemporaries and future generations in similar views.²⁵³

Two countervailing factors complicate attempts to reduce his representation of this aspect of antiquity to a 'presentist' polemic rooted in cupidity and/or ethnocentrism. First there is the fact that his view of classical antiquity cannot be reduced to a simple Europe–Asia dichotomy, where everything European was wonderful by comparison with the 'horrors' of Asia. Gibbon

explicitly excluded 'barbarian' Europe from the 'charmed circle' of civilization as defined by the limits of the Roman Empire.²⁵⁴ Then there is the matter of Gibbon's devotion to the ancient evidence. Though willing to criticize and question ancient texts, as Christopher Kelly showed, he nevertheless read them closely and took pride in his fidelity to their testimony.²⁵⁵ With this in mind it is at least possible that he had Aristotle's claims about the servile nature of Asians in mind when penning his description of ancient Asia.

These factors can be generalized to a certain extent. Unflattering representations of the 'uncivilized' West persisted. Goldsmith, Woodhouselee, Arnold, Maunder, Seeley, Trollope, Gardiner, Freeman, Merivale, Pelham, Froude, and Jebb all contrasted the barbarous peoples of northern and western Europe with the classical civilization that eventually overtook many of them.²⁵⁶ Similarly, even in the so-called era of New Imperialism at the end of the 19th century, precisely when the imperial present would seem most likely to impose itself most forcefully on conceptions of antiquity, respected professional scholars such as R.C. Jebb and J.B. Bury gave some indication of ancient authors' contributions to the 'difference' between Asia and Europe that marked their writings. The former wrote that 'Aristotle expresses the difference in Greek terms when he describes the Asiatic monarchy as a constitutional tyranny, tolerated by Asiatics because they were, in his phrase "more servile by nature".'²⁵⁷ Bury painted the difference between Europeans and 'Asiatic' in colours equally stark.²⁵⁸ But, like Jebb, he drew these images directly from Aristotle. These were the views of the Greeks as he understood them from a Greek source. Even if they struck him as hitting quite near the 'truth' as he already understood it, there is no reason to conclude that involvement in or sympathy with Britain's imperial enterprise determined his representation of Greek opinion.

None of this is to suggest that Jebb or Bury or any of the other authorities cited in this chapter somehow divorced him or herself entirely from the present when contemplating and representing the past. Each of the imperial tropes discussed above was a complex tapestry of past and present, in which ancient evidence, 'modern' historical narratives, and contemporary reality combined in more or less constantly shifting proportion. Such combinations are contingent; they coalesce in a way that accords to no particular formula. From the perspective of classical reception studies nothing is more interesting or important than picking apart the weave of particular representations of antiquity to reveal the precise combination of past and present therein. From the perspective of British imperialism this is also important. It says a great deal about the extent to which matters imperial permeated British culture, supporting MacKenzie's argument regarding the pervasiveness of such material.²⁵⁹ It also illustrates again how colonial and/or imperial ideologies transformed and co-opted ostensibly unrelated bodies of knowledge.

However it is no less important to consider the imperial tropes within classical discourse in their own right, regardless of origins. These tropes – encountered

in youth via classical education and children's literature, then reinforced in adulthood by newspapers and periodicals, speeches, popular and scholarly histories, literature, art, and polite conversation – reinforced a particular view of empire, of imperialism, and of imperial peoples in classical antiquity. In an age where classical antiquity was so widely considered germane to the present, there is reason to expect that such views had some impact on the way educated Britons conceived of empire with all its glories and dangers, and of their role as an imperial people.

It is not even necessary to leave classical discourse to see this process at work. So far we have seen only subtextual links between the classical past and Britain's imperial present, but the connection frequently became explicit. An offhand remark in 1909 from Francis Haverfield, then Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford, in a letter to Lord Cromer about his *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, suggests how commonly the British Empire intruded on discourse ostensibly focused on antiquity. He noted that British India figured prominently in his lectures outlining the history of Rome's imperial administration.²⁶⁰ Haverfield's relationship with the classics is the subject of debate along familiar lines, with Hingley arguing that Britain's imperial status shaped his views of ancient history and Adler refusing to dispense with the possibility that Haverfield's understanding of the Roman Empire may have influenced his views on Britain's empire.²⁶¹ Either way there can be no doubt that Haverfield considered the comparison between imperial Britain and imperial Rome and, by extension, Britons and Romans, appropriate.

A rich seam of such comparisons runs through classical discourse, including many of the sources discussed earlier. A few examples will have to suffice. Robertson's 1791 *Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India*, paired Britain's contemporary opportunity to rediscover ancient Indian knowledge with Alexander's 'discovery' of ancient India.²⁶² Dr Arnold linked Romans and Britons in point of politics, history, and spirit.²⁶³ George Cornwall Lewis' 1850 review of no less a pillar of classical discourse than Grote's *History of Greece* took a different but no less suggestive tack. 'In general terms,' he wrote, 'it may be said that the great chain of universal history, so far, at least as the political state of the world is concerned, is formed of three links, – of which the first is Greece, the second Rome, and the third England with her colonies.'²⁶⁴ By any standard this is a breath-taking distortion; but it speaks to the habit of pairing the peoples of classical antiquity with modern Britons. To Froude the golden age of Rome 'was an age in so many ways the counterpart of our own... when the intellect was trained to the highest point which it could reach, and on the great subjects of human interest... men thought as we think, doubted where we doubt, argued as we argue, aspired and struggled after the same objects.' Likewise, 'The early Romans possessed the faculty of self-government beyond any people of whom we have historical knowledge, with the one exception of ourselves.'²⁶⁵

And in 1912 J.C. Stobart expounded the similarities in 'history and character' as well as imperial greatness and responsibility between ancient Romans and modern Britons, in his popular history of Rome.²⁶⁶ This small sample provides only the slightest, most superficial sense of how frequently works supposedly focused on ancient history paired the peoples of classical antiquity with modern Britons. To my way of thinking such comparisons suggest not only a high degree of familiarity with classical antiquity, but also a degree of close identification between those making the comparison and the objects thereof. The extent and significance of this identification becomes even clearer when we turn from classical discourse to its close cousin, what Richard Hingley called 'imperial discourse'.

3

Classical Discourse and British Imperial Identity: The Nature of Empire

Because classical discourse and imperial discourse overlapped to such an extent – being in many cases created and consumed by the same people – it will come as no surprise that close comparisons between classical antiquity and Britain’s imperial present were as common in the latter as the former. Nor is it surprising to find the same pre-occupation with the present and exploitation in the literature comprising the imperial annex of classical reception studies. No one has done more to advance this perspective in recent years than Vasunia. His recent essay tracing Virgil’s place in British imperial discourse offers an extended and trenchant discussion of the ‘*translatio imperii* [...] at the heart of the comparison between the Roman and British empires’ and in which ‘Rome functioned as a figure of empire... available to those who wished to transfer imperium to themselves and claimed the authority to speak for empire in their own time.’²⁶⁷

Notwithstanding the popularity of this perspective, as we have seen, existing scholarship offers some encouragement for the contrary – or rather, complementary view that acts of identification with ancient Greeks and Romans reveal classical discourse as a formative influence on elite identity. This idea has been articulated most thoroughly in the context of elite culture as a whole rather than empire. Jenkyns noted the Victorian tendency to worship historical heroes, including those of ancient Greece, and argued that such figures provided an influential standard for contemporary Britons.²⁶⁸ Dellamora suggested that classical reading contributed to the way gay men conceived of their sexuality and of themselves, i.e. their identity.²⁶⁹ Goldhill noted the fundamental role of Greek in shaping ‘the cultural identity’ of some elite Britons, such as the essayist and famous opium eater, Thomas De Quincey.²⁷⁰ Leoussi illustrated the extent of Lord Leighton’s personal and professional identification with the Greeks and his belief in the ‘Greek identity of the English’.²⁷¹ Other examples from elite culture in general come quickly to mind. The poet Shelley’s hyperbolic assertion that ‘We are all Greeks’ is one.²⁷² His enthusiasm for Greek independence might have led him to overestimate the extent to which his readers identified with the

ancient Greeks, but a great deal of material and textual evidence suggests his general assessment was not too wide of the mark.

Take Richard Westmacott's Wellington Monument, commissioned by the grateful wives and mothers of the Iron Duke's soldiers, and dedicated in 1822. This colossal bronze statue of Achilles armed with sword and shield linked the modern hero to the familiar paragon of Greek military masculinity. Westmacott clearly counted on that particular image of Achilles immediately leaping to viewers' minds. In fact the success of his attempt to project Wellington as the unrivalled military hero of the age depended not just on familiarity with Achilles but also on a fairly widespread identification with the values and qualities he was believed to embody.²⁷³ Jumping ahead to the closing decades of the 19th century, to H. Rider Haggard's most famous and successful novel, *She*, we see something very similar. Both the youthful protagonist Leo Vincey and his mentor, Cambridge don, L. Horace Holly, represent close identifications with the peoples of antiquity. The former, called a 'youthful Apollo' turns out to be the reincarnation of his Greek ancestor Kallikrates. The latter is named for the Roman Poet 'Horace' by which name his intimates call him, though his enemies dubbed him 'Charon' after the ferryman of mythology.²⁷⁴ Like Shelley and Westmacott, Haggard used these comparisons to project a particular image of his countrymen, but in so doing he revealed the significance of ancient models as sources of inspiration for aspects of elite identity.

Haggard's final juxtaposition brings us back to imperial discourse; while interrogating Leo about his homeland, *She* links the British with the Romans in explicitly imperial terms: 'tis a great people, is it not? With an empire like that of Rome?'²⁷⁵ Here too, recent scholarship suggests there was more going on than simple exploitation of classical discourse. Freeman has argued that classical education implanted particular 'moral' lessons about empire in Britain's elites.²⁷⁶ Symonds likewise remarked on the tendency of British officials to conceive of themselves and their countrymen acting in 'classical roles' throughout the empire.²⁷⁷ In point of fact, a surprising amount of the secondary literature ostensibly espousing the primacy of the present and the tendency to exploit antiquity reveals classical discourse as an important source of models and standards that shaped British conceptions of empire and of imperial peoples. Even Betts saw the classics 'teaching lessons'. He added that while imperial Rome may not have been an example they wanted to follow in any specific sense, it was nevertheless 'a source of inspiration' to 'British imperialists' in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.²⁷⁸ In arguing (albeit in different ways) that the Victorians eventually rejected the Roman concept of republican civic virtue, Dowling and Prettejohn at least imply that it had once provided a standard, which many elite Britons aspired to equal.²⁷⁹

Vasunia himself suggests that prominent Britons from Burke to Seeley sought to foster genuine identification with the Romans. The upshot being

their belief that 'Roman conceptions of virtue, liberty and law were models to be defended and upheld by the British as they sought to extend and maintain their own empire.'²⁸⁰ He even notes that Virgil offered a source of '*inspiration* and support' to imperialists.²⁸¹ Granted the emphasis remains on the latter, on the mediation of Virgil's words by present-minded concerns. But where did such exploitations come from and what effect did they have? Might the inclination to foster such identification in others originate in a personal sense of identification? And if successfully fostered, might esteem for Roman virtues contribute to a particular sense of imperial identity among Britain's elites? It is at least plausible, for example, that the dominant interpretations of Virgil's imperial statements, introduced to Britain's elites in their youth, in some way contributed to their understanding of empire's possibilities and the characteristics of a great imperial people. If so, it stands to reason that they passed similar understandings of empire on to subsequent generations either by parroting what they had been taught or by exploiting their knowledge of classical antiquity and its cultural power. This by no means translated into complete uniformity of imperial identity or even of views on empire – even among a group with as strong a shared background and ethos as the ICS. However it did contribute to the predominance of certain general beliefs about empire and imperial peoples. It is on this level of 'generalized imperial vision' as MacKenzie put it, that classical discourse appears significant.²⁸²

The remainder of this chapter and the two that follow explore how classical discourse provided both a source and support for the generalized visions of empire and imperial character central to many elite Britons' imperial identity through the 19th century. The key here is the now familiar constellation of imperial ideas rooted in classical discourse, which typically intrude on imperial discourse in the form of direct comparisons between classical antiquity and modern Britain. To recap, this constellation featured the idea that empire had the potential to be a magnificent and benevolent enterprise. This in turn depended on the notion that it could be an agent of progress and improvement, spreading peace, order, good government, infrastructure, education, arts, knowledge – in a word, civilization – rather than just an outlet for greed, ambition, and lust, or the cause of moral decay among the imperial populace. Ultimately, the question of an empire's quality turned on the character of the people who built and maintained it. Those endowed with the requisite imperial vision and virtues built the right kind of empire. They were history's great peoples, charged by providence with the advance of civilization. Empire was the instrument through which they fulfilled their destiny, sometimes intentionally, sometimes absent-mindedly, and not always with happy results for themselves. Nothing in this nexus of ideas demanded a completely positive view of empire in classical antiquity, or the present. The essential point is the possibility it presented: that in addition to the harm empire might wreak among both those who suffered

it and those who built it, it could also lift up the former, in which case it would mark the latter as a great people of destiny.

Rarely does this entire constellation of ideas appear in a single source. It is more common to encounter one or two specific elements treated in detail; but even then, the ideas were so tightly knit and so familiar, thanks to classical discourse, that the whole fabric was almost inevitably called to mind. As a preliminary example consider the comparison drawn by the barrister and historian Archibald Alison in the May 1833 issue of *Blackwood's Magazine*. Inspired to reflect on Britain's Indian Empire by the spirited debate surrounding the renewal of the East India Company's charter and revocation of its monopoly over the China trade, Alison comes closer than most to articulating fully this important web of imperial ideas:

During the plenitude of its power, the Roman Empire never contained above an hundred and twenty millions of inhabitants, and they were congregated round the shores of the Mediterranean, with a great internal sea to form their internal line of communication, and an army of 400,000 men to secure the submission of its multifarious inhabitants. Magnificent causeways, emanating from Rome, the centre of authority, reached the farthest extremity of its dominions; and the Proconsuls... rolled along the great roads with which these indomitable pioneers of civilisation had penetrated the wilds of nature. Their immense dominions were the result of three centuries of conquest, and the genius of Scipio, of Caesar, and Severus, not less than the civic virtues of Regulus, Cato, and Cicero, were required to extend and cement the mighty fabric.

Having used classical discourse to trace a connection among the magnificence of empire, the civilizing mission, and imperial character, Alison immediately projected this very nexus onto the Indian Empire:

But in the Eastern World, an Empire hardly less extensive or populous, embracing as great a variety of people, and rich in as many millions and provinces, has been conquered by British arms in less than eighty years, at the distance of 8000 miles from the parent state. That vast region, the fabled scene of opulence and grandeur since the dawn of civilisation... has been permanently subdued and moulded into a regular Province by a Company of British Merchants, originally settled as obscure traffickers on the shores of Hindostan²⁸³

The Indian Empire is just as vast and varied as Rome's. Moreover it too brought the benefits of civilized administration, having 'moulded' India 'into a regular Province'. The link did not stop there. All comparisons of this sort indicate a degree of identification between the two objects. And though he does not say it outright, Alison implies that the Britons and Romans

behind these empires shared certain qualities – '[military] genius' and 'civic virtues'. These qualities both suited them for empire and ensured that their respective empires assumed positive characters: Roman civilization 'penetrated' the wilderness, and under the Company India was 'moulded into a regular Province'.

Alison clearly had a contemporary axe to grind in all this. The passage amounts to a defence of the East India Company's position in India, or rather a eulogy on its performance to 1833. This is clear-cut exploitation. But it required no manipulation of the accepted understanding of Rome's empire. Alison simply trotted it out, confident that a majority of his readers would accept it without quibble. It would hardly have been useful to him otherwise. The fact that Rome was Alison's default point of comparison also suggests that classical discourse was a source for his conception of empire's possibilities and of proper imperial character.²⁸⁴ How far classical discourse could slide from providing a source of general ideas about empire and imperial character, and yardstick for judging them, to inspiring a particular imperial identity among Britons remains to be seen. As the first step in illuminating that important connection, I want to explore its role as a source of the idea that empire could be a magnificent and benevolent world-historical force.

The renowned man of letters Horace Walpole provides a nice baseline from which to begin our survey of the long 19th century. In 1762, at the height of Britain's naval and military triumphs in the Seven Years' War, he declared that 'I shall burn all my Greek and Latin books; they are the histories of little people. The Romans never conquered the world, till they had conquered three parts of it, and were three hundred years about it; we subdue the globe in three campaigns; and a globe let me tell you, as big again as it was in their days.'²⁸⁵ There is more than a hint of sarcasm in Walpole's words, but not enough to hide his sense of the momentousness of recent events. Nor is it possible to miss the reflexive resort to classical antiquity in his attempt to comprehend the significance of Britain's newly extended imperial power. Only one age offered a parallel for Britain's successes. As Walpole put it later the same year in a letter to his friend Conway:

For, as this age is to be *historic*, so of course it will be a standard of virtue too; and we, like our wicked predecessors the Romans, shall be quoted, till our very ghosts blush, as models of patriotism and magnanimity. What lectures will be read to poor children on this era! Europe taught to tremble, the great King humbled, the treasures of Peru diverted into the Thames, Asia subdued by the gigantic Clive! for in that age men were near seven feet high²⁸⁶

Too sophisticated an observer of ancient history and current events to be comfortable with simplistic glorifications of either the Roman or the British imperial venture, Walpole nevertheless realized that his countrymen tended

to embrace both images. Moreover he seems to have believed that they relied on the Roman example (i.e. classical discourse) to bolster their own imperial identity. This clearly irked him and so he deliberately subverted the prevailing image of Roman imperial character in order to undermine uncritical assessments of the heroic character that had won Britain its 'magnificent' empire.

Walpole's letters reveal the complex ambiguity of classical discourse's contribution to British conceptions of empire. For one, they provide an important reminder that there was never a completely monolithic view of empire in antiquity among Britain's educated elites. That said, the fact that Walpole found himself swimming against the general intellectual current on these matters reinforces our sense that certain understandings of empire in antiquity did predominate at particular times. Indeed his comments provide oblique evidence that classical discourse was fundamental to the idea that empire equated with greatness and that it was the preserve of history's great peoples. And because classical discourse provided a framework for understanding Britain's imperial situation and its repercussions, it also served as an important element in the construction of British imperial identity – at least for those more given to imperial enthusiasm than Walpole. What his letters cannot reveal for certain is the extent to which classical discourse may have inspired his contemporaries' vision of what they wanted their empire to stand for, or how they felt they should conduct themselves as an imperial people. The most we can say is that while he had not been taken in by positive representations of empire and imperial peoples in classical discourse, his letters imply that many of his countrymen had.

Although Walpole noted Clive's conquest and the fame it earned him, he wrote in a time when most of his countrymen had no inkling that India would someday become the crown jewel of the empire. Only visionaries made pronouncements such as Charles Davenant's claim that triumph over her European rivals in the Indies might make England, 'like Rome, the head of a vast dominion, the fountain of law, the spring of power, honours, and offices throughout an immense territory.'²⁸⁷ As H.V. Bowen, L. Colley, J.P. Greene, and P.J. Marshall all point out, the British only gradually became conscious of their imperial position in India during the era bracketed by Plassey (1757) and the Hastings Trial (1788–95).²⁸⁸ An image of empire's upside had, therefore, already permeated elite intellectual culture before any awareness of the need to rationalize or justify Britain's presence in South Asia could call it into existence. And because nothing in Britain's own imperial history or that of its rivals offered a suitable point of comparison to the empire then coalescing in India, classical discourse, with its prominent imperial themes, was a natural touchstone for elite Britons increasingly aware of events in the subcontinent.

The series of measures proposed to regulate the East India Company's actions in India, beginning with Chatham in 1767, continuing through North

in 1773, Fox in 1783, and culminating with the younger Pitt in 1784, indicate India's increasing profile in the period. Although these measures focused largely on financial considerations, they also revealed a concern with monitoring the activities of the Company. The tone of the Report tabled by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Affairs in India (1782), with its accounts of 'disorders and abuses of every kind', betrays such worry.²⁸⁹ But, if it was not acceptable for Britain's empire to be characterized by 'cruelty and avarice', by 'abuse' and 'disorder', what were the alternatives?²⁹⁰ Within classical discourse, Rome, the bringer of peace, prosperity, and progress, offered the great example of empire's potential as a benevolent force. Influential authors such as Dr Goldsmith and Gibbon presented precisely this Roman Empire in their writings. To the former, the Roman Empire was 'the noblest [undertaking] that ever employed human attention' and the 'great empire that had conquered mankind with its arms, and instructed the world with its wisdom'. For his part, Gibbon asserted that 'the tranquil and prosperous state of the empire was warmly felt, and honestly confessed, by the provincials as well as Romans. They acknowledged that the true principles of social life, laws, agriculture, and science, which had been first invented by the wisdom of Athens, were now firmly established by the power of Rome'.²⁹¹

In the next chapter we will return to the civilizing mission. For now, let us focus on the prevailing image of imperial greatness and magnificence. In that connection we would do well to recall that virtually no member of Britain's elites could avoid exposure to this image through classical discourse, whether at school, or via popular culture, or when actively seeking answers to questions posed by their newly realized imperial stature and responsibility in India. Little wonder then that through the 1770s and into the early years of our period, classical discourse continued to appear, implicitly and explicitly, when commentators sought to convey a sense of empire's magnificence. In 1773, the publisher and editor of the *Monthly Review*, Ralph Griffiths, reviewed a new publication examining 'the Rise, Progress, and present State of the English Government in Bengal' by Harry Verelst, former Governor of Bengal. Griffiths' commentary revealed both the rising concerns over the historical significance of Britain's empire and the contribution of classical discourse to the resulting debate. He took care to focus his review on passages dealing with the grand issues of Britain's link to India – a timely subject thanks to Lord North's proposed Regulating Act. Both Verelst and Griffiths – and the *Monthly Review's* readers, if the latter is to be trusted – were interested in the future of Britain's empire in India. Verelst wanted to impress upon his readers an image of the empire's ideal character. As he put it – rather hopefully and naively as it turned out – 'If happy in giving peace to millions, some enlightened minds should watch with parental care over a growing empire; posterity may behold with admiration a noble monument of national humanity'.²⁹²

Echoes of the common understanding of the Roman Empire's salutary effect on Europe ring rather loudly through Verelst's emphasis on 'peace'

and on paternal empire as both a manifestation of national character and a signifier of historical greatness. The allusive connection present in Verelst's narrative became explicit in a review of an anonymous contemporary's 'General Remarks on the System of Government in India' in the same volume. Frustrated with what he perceived to be North's vacillation over Indian policy at a critical moment, the author wrote that the 'minister at present may command the cards, the game is in his own hand, but irresolution and delay, continued much longer, will lose the nation as great a stake as Rome ever played for out of Italy.'²⁹³

This simple and seemingly casual comparison between Britain's present position vis-à-vis India, and Rome's position with respect to its *imperial* possessions, depended on a very specific view of the Roman Empire as a hugely significant force in history. And despite its simplicity it was calculated to evoke that very same historical formulation among readers. The author drew attention to the widely acknowledged 'decisive moment' in Rome's rise to imperial greatness, when the Senate chose to intervene in Sicily, sparking the Punic Wars and thus setting Rome on the path to empire and with it, almost unparalleled historical significance. Putting India in the scales opposite Rome's provinces underlined the 'stakes' at play with an instantly comprehensible analogy. The point, of course, was to push readers to conceive of India as a field of imperial endeavour of the very first order, and hopefully to embrace the opportunity presented to them. To do so he played on popular conceptions of and willingness to identify with Rome. With this in mind classical discourse appears to have factored in the construction of imperial identity among educated Britons and perhaps even what Katherine Wilson recently characterized as the 'imposition' of such identity.²⁹⁴

Looking forward into the 19th century, we will see the notion of empire's potential magnificence become so deeply entrenched that it was more or less taken for granted. This certainly owed something to the fact that the empire itself grew remarkably during the 19th century. As news of British arms subduing ever greater swaths of the world streamed home to fill the pages of the growing number of newspapers and periodicals read by a growing percentage of the population, as talk spread of Britannia ruling the waves, of a *Pax Britannica*, and of an empire upon which the sun never set, it became impossible for any reasonably well-informed Briton to remain ignorant of the tremendous scope of Britain's empire.

A handful of additional examples will demonstrate classical discourse's continuing role in this connection. An anonymous author addressing 'The British Empire' in the *Monthly Review* (1826) and the Orientalist and historian J.C. Marshman, whose *History of India* appeared more than forty years later (1869), both began their attempts to gloss the import of the British Empire with an example from classical discourse. The former waxed enthusiastic over the 'immense magnitude of the Roman empire'. 'It covered a million and a half of square miles of the finest portion of the globe', he wrote; 'it

was the seat of all the choicest fertility, beauty, and wealth of earth.²⁹⁵ With this image of the Roman Empire's magnificent size and historical significance fresh in the mind of his readers, the author turned immediately to the British Empire. He summed up 'our empire in India' very simply: it was 'the most important foreign possession ever ruled by an European power'.²⁹⁶ Marshman made do with a single statement of relative imperial magnificence. He asserted that the Company 'transferred to the Crown, on relinquishing its functions, an empire more magnificent than that of Rome.' Marshman did not elaborate on Roman magnificence. Strictly speaking no elaboration was required – though many authors chose to offer it. Even a reference as brief as Marshman's would have evoked a fairly elaborate image of Rome's imperial greatness.

Similar comparisons appear through the remainder of our period. When, during the debate over empire surrounding the Imperial Titles Act and calls for Home Rule in Ireland, the journalist Edward Dicey sat down to contemplate the empire more generally, Rome was the most useful parallel when trying to understand the grandeur of Britain's empire and the global consequences should it ever fall. To his mind, 'no similar event could ever have produced so great a cataclysm throughout the inhabited globe, unless Italy had suddenly been swallowed up in the days when the Roman Empire was at the greatest of its power.' For 'England, like Rome, is the corner-stone of an imperial fabric such as it has fallen to the lot of no other country to erect, or uphold when erected.'²⁹⁷ A decade later an anonymous contributor to the *Westminster Review* noted that 'the British dominions exceed fourfold those of ancient Rome' and quoted the American statesman Daniel Webster's claim that 'for purposes of foreign conquest and subjugation, Rome, in the height of her glory, is not to be compared [with Britain]; a power which has dotted over the surface of the whole globe with her possessions and military posts, whose morning drum-beat, following the sun and keeping company with the hours, circles the earth with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of England.'²⁹⁸ Indian statesman, poet, and historian, Alfred Comyn Lyall, likewise linked Rome and Britain in terms of imperial grandeur: 'the English have accomplished the building up, after the high Roman fashion, of an immense polyglot empire.'²⁹⁹ For his part New Zealand born Charles R. De Thierry used Rome to make the British Empire seem all the more glorious, arguing that 'Rome was never mistress of territories to be compared to the British Empire, nor able to command the allegiance of races so diverse as those who people it.'³⁰⁰

These juxtapositions will not answer to the name coincidence. Authors understood the popularity and the power of the positive image of empire in classical discourse and exploited it boldly to encourage their readers to discern the same pattern of magnificence and historical significance they had seen. Marshman and Lyall for instance both clearly believed that British involvement in India had been 'benevolent'; they also appear to have

shared an interest in fostering a greater sense of imperial pride and involvement in their countrymen. Juxtaposing the Roman Empire and British India impressed upon readers the magnificence of *their* Indian Empire in terms both of size and historical significance. The circumstances and thus the specific aims of all these authors naturally differed somewhat. But in each case classical discourse served up an image of empire that encouraged Britons to embrace their empire in ways that the authors in question already had, to make it – or rather a particular vision of it – a key part of their identity.

Circumstances made classical discourse's role as a source of ideas about empire's potential especially important to late 19th-century commentators. While roughly the first third of the century had experienced a period of remarkable imperial good news, events in the middle third of the century might have been expected to dampen imperial optimism rooted entirely in current events or recent history among the following generation. Notwithstanding the ultimate success of the abolition movement, the apparent victory of the Anglicists in securing a more interventionist approach to Indian culture, the infrastructural improvements in the subcontinent supervised by Dalhousie, and victories in many small colonial wars, the rebellions in the Canadas, the Afghan debacle of 1839–42, the events of 1857, the Morant Bay rebellion, struggles with the Maori, the second Afghan debacle, and of course the appearance/resurgence of imperial rivals in the 1870s, might have made it difficult to focus on the magnificence of empire. Nevertheless a clear sense of its potential persisted among a significant portion of Britain's intellectual and imperial elite in the later decades of our period. It is no coincidence that this elite grew up in the much expanded public school system dominated by headmasters with broadly imperialist agendas such as Ware (Eton), Welldon (Harrow), Thring (Uppinham), Moss (Shrewsbury), and Rendall (Winchester).³⁰¹ There they would have encountered images of empire's potential magnificence in classical discourse, most likely before they had any real sense of Britain's empire. No wonder then that so many commentators turned to classical discourse to convey the message of empire's magnificence to their countrymen. They knew it would have the desired rhetorical impact among their classically educated peers. But this did not necessarily entail the manipulation of classical discourse; in most cases it was simply a matter of repeating the conventional wisdom that had helped shape their view of empire's potential. And with every repetition this notion of empire's magnificence and its classical associations became more deeply entrenched in elite culture.

The same goes for what at first glance appears to be the most explicit case of exploiting classical discourse: the theory of defensive or reluctant imperialism. J.R. Seeley of course offered the most famous statement of this theory when he claimed that Britain had 'conquered and peopled half the globe in a fit of absence of mind'.³⁰² Coming from a prominent Briton in the early 1880s, with British armies expanding the empire's frontiers in Central Asia

and Southern Africa, and British Chartered Companies penetrating West and East Africa, this looks like a classic case of justification. At a deeper level, however, such statements reflect attempts to understand the dynamics of imperial expansion within an overall concept of history as progress, where, presumably, not all of providence's agents were irredeemably ambitious, grasping, and bloody-minded. Because imperial questions provoked a reflexive turn to classical discourse in search of answers, and because it contained examples of defensive and providential imperialism, it proved essential to those who sought understanding as well as those seeking to justify Britain's imperial behaviour. It did so not just from the time of Seeley's Lectures on the *Expansion of England*, but from the late 18th century.³⁰³

In those early days notions of defensive imperialism were very closely linked to India, where the expansion of British power proceeded under unique circumstances. To many participants and interested observers, such expansion seemed counter to the wishes of Government and Company alike, no matter how grand and exciting it appeared when represented as manly military adventure in exotic lands. However when confronted with the force of circumstances – real and supposed threats to their commercial assets and interests – they saw expansion through conquest, annexation, or diplomatic agreement as necessary, even unavoidable.

The divergence between Clive's words and deeds in the years between Plassey and the assumption of the Diwan illustrated the divide between theory at the centre and practice on the peripheries.³⁰⁴ So did the continued British expansion in India through the 1780s, 1790s, and into the 19th century despite the terms of Pitt's India Act (1784), which stipulated that the East India Company should only make war when 'hostilities should have been commenced, or preparations actually made for the attack of the British nation in India, or of some of the states and princes whose dominions it shall be engaged by subsisting treaties to defend.'³⁰⁵ Ironically, this offered ample cover to those with an eye to expansion, whether for personal or political reasons. Predictably, Warren Hastings, whose expansions while Governor-General provoked more than passing concern in London, put the defensive nature of British expansion in India in no uncertain terms: 'We have been wantonly assailed – we have conquered the unprovoked enemy – we have retained the possessions wrested from him, not only as a legitimate compensation for the peril and expense forced on us, but also on considerations of self-defence.'³⁰⁶ In 1807 William Tennant, late chaplain in the Royal forces in India, generalized this to the long view of Britain's expansion in India. Joseph Conder, a travel writer, and Peter Auber, Secretary to the Court of Directors of the Company, rehearsed the same narrative in 1828 and 1837 respectively.³⁰⁷

As noted in the previous chapter, Roman, and to a lesser extent Athenian, expansion frequently wore similar sheep's clothing throughout our period. The association of the ancients with defensive or reluctant imperialism was

never universal, particularly in the early decades of the century, but it was the preponderant interpretation.³⁰⁸ From the appearance of Mommsen's account of Roman expansion in the early 1860s it became dominant.³⁰⁹ In any event, both before and after the appearance of Mommsen's opus, the examples of 'reluctant imperialism' present in classical discourse no doubt confirmed what many Britons believed or wanted to believe was the nature of British expansion on the subcontinent and elsewhere. The rationalizing cry 'they posed a threat to us' hardly required a classical inspiration; but as scholars such as Hingley and Mattingly point out, the Roman precedent made a handy rationalization for conquest and annexation.³¹⁰ On the other hand, Adler reminds us that we should not too readily or unequivocally ascribe the conclusions of such authors to concerns with the present.³¹¹ At the very least, it seems we must acknowledge that classical discourse offered foundational examples of reluctant or defensive imperial expansion.³¹²

Certainly the Roman example of defensive imperialism occupied a prominent place in imperial discourse from the 1860s. In a prolonged debate regarding India and the Empire conducted in the periodical press by Goldwin Smith and a series of respondents, Roman imperial expansion appeared unintentional, circumstantial, even providential:

Rome did not mean to conquer the world, but once launched on her career she came perpetually into contact, and coming into contact she came into collision, with comparatively barbarous and comparatively lawless powers. One after another they provoked her or sorely tempted her to attack them. One after another she conquered them.³¹³

Likewise Britain, according to Goldwin Smith, 'did not mean to conquer India. The conquest was not a national design.'³¹⁴ Instead, like its Roman predecessor, the British 'Empire went on eating into the native sovereignties without any formed design, by the mere tendency of strength to grow amidst weakness.'³¹⁵

The Greeks figured in such discussions as well. William Smith dismissed notions that 'the English empire in the East [wa]s the result of a well-laid scheme of imperial aggrandisement.' Instead, he asserted that '[c]ircumstances have controlled the destinies of nations and individuals, and have suggested to them lines of conduct, courses of policy.' For him the Athenian Empire provided the analogy on which to rest his belief concerning the accidental and predestined expansion of British power in India. 'There is a tendency,' he wrote, '...to suppose that, because Athens subsequently exercised a real empire, she aimed at it from the beginning.'³¹⁶ Needless to say, he disagreed.

Evidently then, Seeley walked a well-worn path when he made his famous statement about England's absent-minded expansion. But it is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of the imperial destiny ordained for the British, or one better designed to draw support from contemporary understandings

of antiquity. It was his avowed intention for the *Expansion of England* 'to pursue a practical object' and 'to modify [the reader's] view of the present and his forecast of the future.'³¹⁷ And he understood as well as anyone how effective classical discourse could be when it came to persuading his contemporaries, which is why his lectures are laden with detailed references to the history of colonization and empire in classical antiquity. Indeed given Seeley's prolonged and profound encounter with classical discourse as student and scholar, it is tempting to see it as a foundational source of his understanding of empire, notwithstanding Mantena's recent claims that he 'rejected classical analogies'.³¹⁸ At the very least we should note that he formalized his thoughts on Roman imperialism long before he produced his lectures on England's expansion and would have been familiar with the classical examples of defensive imperialism before he applied the very same concept to the expansion of England.

Lyall and Lord Cromer repeated not only the standard line about the potential magnificence and historical significance of empire but also the formulation of defensive or reluctant imperialism, applying the Roman example as an illustration of the forces behind Britain's rise.³¹⁹ Lyall cited none other than Mommsen as his main source.³²⁰ Like Seeley, these authorities on imperial affairs sought to reinforce the idea that providence had bestowed Britain's empire, that it had not been built up according to some conscious design inspired by aggressive cupidity or base lust for conquest and domination. Given the extent to which each man's identity was bound up with empire, their deployment of the Roman precedent in this connection has to be seen as self-serving. Lyall had served in a variety of capacities in India. Cromer too served in India, but much more famously as Britain's proconsul in Egypt between 1883 and 1907.³²¹

The general turn of events in the later 19th century – the outburst of competitive expansion associated with the 'Scramble for Africa', not to mention specific issues ranging from frontier disputes with Russia, through Irish Home Rule, to imperial federation and the South African War – posed some troubling questions for such men. Their self-image and legacy were at stake in the face of new criticisms of empire spawned by accounts of brutal conquests in the name of geopolitics and economic advantage. That they should choose an element of classical discourse to defend their vision of the empire and of themselves as imperial servants under such circumstances, ought to be anything but a surprise. Though Cromer came later to his classical education than Lyall, whose experience at Eton and Haileybury was more typical, both men maintained a strong interest in classical antiquity through their working lives. And they assumed classical discourse would strike a chord with their audiences. It was simply a matter of reminding readers of something they already knew – that the Romans had been called on to imperial greatness by threats and circumstances beyond their control – and encouraging them to apply that paradigm to Britain's imperial present.

Indisputably this meant the exploitation of classical discourse; but again, I cannot help thinking that their certainty derived as much from their own relationships with classical discourse as from rhetorical expedience. That is to say, a belief that classical discourse showed how historically significant empires grew would have made it the logical point of comparison when addressing Britain's imperial expansion.

So on one hand we have seen classical discourse acting as the source and support for notions of empire's potential magnificence and on the other hand for the idea that historically important empires grew according to some grand providential design beyond the ken of those involved. But these are just two of the lesser lights in the constellation of imperial ideas rooted in classical discourse. In fact their power depended on other more prominent elements of this nexus. As should be clear, British conceptions of empire's potential magnificence turned not just on size but also on character. For an ancient or modern empire to be great – in a world historical sense – it had to be a force for progress and improvement. It had to advance 'civilization'. And only those endowed with singular imperial virtues built such empires. They did so, to follow generations of Britons in paraphrasing Virgil, because that was their calling. This is just what the journalist S.J. Owen's commentary on the build-up to the Mahratta Wars revealed. He claimed that it was impossible for:

Englishmen, being what they were, to endure such a state of things, so offensive to their better nature, so provocative of their combative temper, and their characteristic unwillingness to go to the wall- or be pushed into the sea. *Venimus, vidimus, vicimus*. We dominated elements of confusion, and appeased the angry storm. We disarmed the combatants, and enforced the *Pax Britannica*. But in so doing we were further and further entangled in the interior.³²²

Here it is the innate character of Britons that leads them to don the classic mantle – suggested overtly by Owen's play on Caesar's *veni, vidi, vici* and implicitly in the Virgilian undertones – to conquer, to quell chaos, and to bring peace, i.e. to take up the civilizing mission. More than any other elements of classical discourse this mission, and the character required of those to whom it was ordained, helped shape British imperial identity, both as 'organic' inspiration and as rhetorical tool. It is to these themes that we turn in the next two chapters.

4

Classical Discourse and British Imperial Identity: The Civilizing Mission

To find the earliest connections between the civilizing mission of empire as described in classical discourse and that claimed by the British in connection with their empire, we would again need to look far beyond the chronological parameters of this study. Nicholas Canny has shown how individuals such as T. Smith, E. Spenser, and J. Davies deployed the image of Rome's civilizing mission to Britain, as a justification for their actions in colonizing Ireland in the Elizabethan period.³²³ But as we have seen, the notion of empire as a vehicle of civilization was much older than this: it sprang full grown and girded from the hoary brow of antiquity via the works of Virgil, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Claudian for example. Thus Thomas Smith attributed his belief in the ability of colonization and imperial expansion to spread law and order, the essential prerequisites of civilization, to the success of Rome in Britain.³²⁴ In short, classical discourse had suggested a way of conceiving of conquest, colonization, and empire that included the spread of civilization.

Little had changed by the late 18th century. Classical discourse continued to factor in British understandings of empire and colonization as vehicles for spreading civilization. On one hand it appears still to have provided the source for such ideas. In 1795 an anonymous reviewer of an 'Essay on Colonization' castigated the Swedish author, C.B. Wadstrom, for paying insufficient attention to Greek precedents in trying to uncover the dynamics of colonization. To his mind it was impossible to understand colonization without reference to antiquity. It was equally impossible for him to contemplate the effect of British colonial expansion without reference to classical discourse. He took for granted the inevitability of a great philanthropic mission in Britain's 'nascent provinces', where British administration, 'like a new Orpheus', 'draw[s] within the pale of culture, religion, and government, idle savages'.³²⁵ Belief that classical discourse proved beyond question the power of empire and colonization to spread civilization was so common that even bitter opponents could agree on it. This was just the case with the University of St Andrews professor, William Barron, and the former Whig

politician and Privy Councillor, Sir William Meredith. They disagreed violently over the proper course Britain should adopt vis-à-vis the rebellious American colonies; they even disagreed over how to interpret Thucydides' description of colony-mother-country relations in ancient Greece; but they agreed implicitly on the issue of colonies' capacity to spread civilization.³²⁶

This agreement among commentators on the empire persisted well into the 19th century. It appears, for instance, in McCulloch's Introduction to the 1838 edition of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Comparing ancient and modern colonization, he argued that the success of colonizing peoples always rested on their superiority in 'the arts of civilised life' and therefore always meant the expansion of civilization.³²⁷ Similarly, in his 1841 *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, the imperial statesman and author Sir George Cornwall Lewis saw colonization as 'one of the best means of advancing and diffusing civilization'. 'On reviewing the history of the Greek colonies, the conquests of Alexander and of the Romans, and the settlements of the modern European nations in Asia, Africa, America, and Australia,' he wrote, 'it will be seen that the advancement of mankind is to be expected rather from the diffusion of civilized nations than from the improvement of barbarous or half-civilized tribes.'³²⁸ Revealing a frame of mind similar to that of the ambitious antipodean schemes of his contemporary Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Lewis felt that colonization should proceed not haphazardly but by a concerted effort.³²⁹ His primary concern was to persuade contemporaries of directed colonization's excellence, and to advocate the formation of what Charles Dilke later called *Greater Britain*.³³⁰ Classical discourse provided potent ammunition for his point of view. It is nonetheless clear that the Greeks, Alexander, and the Romans provided the foundational examples of colonization as a vehicle for civilization.

Lewis mapped the civilizing mission as a forked road with one path leading to success – 'the diffusion of civilized nations' – and one to failure – 'the improvement of barbarous or half-civilized tribes'. Thus far we have focused on the former, but in fact, long before Lewis' day, the second path inspired much interest and many comparisons to classical antiquity. For this group the improvement of indigenous populations, the 'idle-savages' of the *Monthly Review's* anonymous writer, was the very essence of the civilizing mission and nowhere were the stakes higher than in India. This is the classic image of Britain's civilizing mission in India – that is as a project of engineering the social, economic, political, and cultural 'improvement'. As we would expect, this particular sense of mission was not clearly enunciated until quite late in the 18th century, when the remarkable crisis surrounding the loss of the Thirteen Colonies spurred a gradual realization that Britain's imperial destiny now lay in India. Awareness that East India Company's administration had largely failed India led to the legislation of 1773 and 1784, by which Parliament assumed superintending powers over the governance of the Company's possessions.³³¹ A series of crises, culminating in

the former Governor-General Warren Hastings' famous impeachment before the House of Lords in 1788, only heightened awareness of Britain's role in India and its potential long-term significance.³³²

The unique circumstances of the British in India made this nascent sense of duty distinct from that which related to Britain's colonial empire in America. For one, India was not a suitable venue for colonization – at least in the sense that that term had previously applied to Britain's empire. Bengal, where the British were most deeply involved, was densely populated and inhabited by a people whose rich and ancient civilization had long been acknowledged by the Company's servants and Europeans more generally. Moreover the climate was deemed utterly unsuited to British colonists. Most important of all, the East India Company wanted no part of British colonists come to complicate their commercial supremacy. In short, late 18th-century commentators on empire in India could not easily apply the existing paradigm of civilization through colonization to India.

Nevertheless there were those in India, at the Company's headquarters in Leadenhall Street and elsewhere, who felt that the present state of the 'country' left much to be desired. There was a widespread belief that the arc of civilization in India had passed its acme; that the country was now backward and disorderly, given to internecine conflict, borderline anarchy, and, most troubling to contemporary opinion, 'barbaric' rites. It was obvious to any interested observer that this state of affairs was inimical to Britain's reputation. Yet the 'Orientalist' sympathies of the time, Parliament's resolutely arms-length involvement in the government of India, and worries that interference would jeopardize commercial success, prevented the development of any policy aimed at combating these supposed 'evils' by cultural engineering and interference. However there was a limited sense in which commentators could apply the civilizing mission to India without contemplating drastic modifications to Indian society. Peace and law – two principles bound up with the civilizing mission and world historical significance of the Roman Empire – provided the key building blocks. The at once self-interested and principled imposition of peace and law to a region where neither existed – at least not in any form recognizable to contemporary British observers – was the first step in the development of Britain's civilizing mission in South Asia.

The importance of peace in even the earliest discussions of Britain's mission to India we have seen in the work of Verelst, who was content with the idea that Britain had, even by proxy, given 'peace to millions'.³³³ Any mention of peace in connection with empire necessarily evoked images of Rome thanks to the prominence of the *Pax Romana* in classical discourse: for example, Rose's claim that the Roman Empire 'received those improvements which are the ordinary attendants of opulence and peace'.³³⁴ The same might be said for law, which was also a prominent element in conceptions of the civilizing mission of Rome, as Rose again proved when he noted that

‘the obedient provinces of Trajan and the Antonines were united by laws, and adorned by arts.’³³⁵ Perhaps contrary to expectations, late 18th-century invocations of peace and law as a key part of Britain’s civilizing mission were not simply justifications for imperial domination. A legitimate desire to protect British India from the depredations of neighbouring powers and the Company’s own servants, motivated such talk as much as the need to justify conquest, economic exploitation, and political subjugation.³³⁶ In brief, expectations about empire’s potential as an agent of peace, law, and civilization derived from classical discourse cast a harsh light on the Company’s failure to live up to its responsibilities.

The work of Sir William Jones in some ways provides the ultimate expression of the early focus on law as the key to Britain’s mission in India. Consider the memorial to Jones in the chapel of University College Oxford. The classical composition paled beside the inscription, which characterized him as the ‘Justinian of India’ busily collating his ‘digest of Hindu and Mohammedan laws’. Interestingly, Jones himself established the comparison with the Roman emperor who sponsored the codification of Roman law in the 6th century AD.³³⁷ This says a good deal about his vision of his work and indeed Britain’s work in India. And it is surely significant that his admirers took to this comparative identification so wholeheartedly. Both Jones and the Oxonians who erected the monument to his memory felt that part of Britain’s role in India must be the provision of a workable and consistent code of law that would be to Indian jurisprudence what Justinian’s code had been to its European counterpart. Such a code would bring order, which was good for British interests, but would also be a boon for India and Indians. In short, it would be a significant contribution to the progress of civilization.

‘Oriental Jones’ as he came to be known, was no disparager of Indian civilization. Despite his position, he was not engaged in a deliberate attempt to remake or undermine Indian culture. He saw his work as a process of compiling, organizing, and rationalizing existing Hindu and Islamic/Mogul laws. Yet, as shown by his choice of epithet, he understood this process and its likely legacy in terms borrowed from classical discourse. Given his background with the classics at Harrow and Oxford, it is likely that classical discourse provided him with the framework for understanding the civilizing mission: its nature; its potential; its significance. This in turn suggested the possibility that with respect to the spread of law, and therefore civilization, Britain’s empire must be to India what the Roman Empire had been to the nations under its dominion. Of course it also provided him with a way to cast his own work in the best, most glorious, and historically significant light imaginable.

Some naturally disagreed with the specifics of Jones’ approach. An anonymous contributor to the April 1810 issue of the *Edinburgh Review* criticized him for relying on ‘the lights of a people still semi-barbarous, – to compile a body of laws from the crude materials of old sayings, old poems, old

practices, and old maxims, regarded as laws, – when it was in his power to have applied all the mental powers of European knowledge and civilisation.’ But even such critics agreed that Britain had a duty to ‘give laws to India’; the dispute was over the source and character of those laws and how they would advance Britain’s civilizing mission in India.³³⁸

John Gillies placed similar stress on giving laws to India in a review of Nathaniel Brassey Halhead’s *Grammar of the Bengal Language* in 1780. In fact, he made an even clearer statement of its correlation to ‘the great work’ already begun in India and to the ‘duty of a good citizen’ to contribute in every way possible to its completion.³³⁹ More interesting still, is the direct comparison Halhead made between Rome and Britain in which he sought to suggest a course of action for the British that would aid them in their civilizing mission. Gillies paraphrased Halhead as follows:

The Romans, says Mr. Halhead, a people of little learning, and less taste, had no sooner conquered Greece, than they applied themselves to the study of the Greek: they adopted its laws even before they could read them, and civilised themselves in subduing their enemies. The English, who have made such a capital progress in the polite arts, and who are masters of Bengal, may, with more ease and greater propriety, add its language to their acquisitions; that they may explain the benevolent principles of that legislation whose decrees they enforce; that they may convince while they command; and be at once the dispensers of laws and of science to an extensive nation.³⁴⁰

In his desire to convince his audience of the value of the Indian languages he placed beside the classical languages of Europe, Halhead turned to classical discourse. He found there the familiar, Horatian imagery of captive Greece making a slave of her Roman captor through her arts, and adapted it to his purpose.³⁴¹ Indeed it became the foundation for his argument in favour of British administrators learning the language of Bengal, the better to disseminate their system of laws, and thus civilization.

Yet there was a problem with the details of his attempt to exploit classical discourse. His equation of Rome with Britain was not the issue. That was a commonplace. However the logical extension of Halhead’s comparison of Britain and Rome, a near equation of India with Greece, roused the ire of his reviewer. In Gillies’ view, Britain actually equated to both Rome (conqueror) and Greece (instructor in the arts of civilization) vis-à-vis India. After peevishly deflating Halhead’s unflattering assessment of Roman civilization, he pointed out that while the Romans embraced Greek language and culture they did so only to an extent. For the Romans, Latin remained ‘the language of legislation, policy, [and] even of common intercourse and conversation’; indeed, ‘The Romans were peculiarly attentive to the diffusion of the Latin language.’ Gillies then dispensed with the notion that ‘the example of

the Romans in learning the Greek can, with any propriety be urged as an argument with the English for learning the Bengalese language.' Instead England should 'follow the policy of Rome'; in which case 'she would be at the utmost pains to extend the knowledge of the English language over her Oriental dominions'.³⁴²

Gillies accepted the possibility that there were important books in Arabic and Sanskrit and so betrayed a modicum of sympathy with the Orientalists, such as Halhead, then exploring Indian culture and history with such delight.³⁴³ Yet his insistence on the expansion of English and its absolute primacy as the medium of political communication placed him firmly in what has come to be known as the 'Anglicist' camp. This debate between Halhead and Gillies again underscores the degree to which the specific application of classical discourse to contemporary issues depended on the perspective of the individual commentator. But it also gives a fair impression of how deeply contemporaries believed in a link between the civilizing mission of empire in antiquity and in the present. Like Barron and Meredith, Gillies and Halhead disagreed over particulars, but neither disputed the existence or relevance of the connection between past and present. For both men classical discourse showed the civilizing potential of empire and offered a useful support for their particular vision of this mission in India.

Even though peace and law, with their classical substructures, remained key elements in the intellectual foundations of Britain's civilizing mission in India into the 19th century, Gillies' approach reveals a different emphasis: improving Indians, raising their level of civilization, and modifying their culture and society.³⁴⁴ This constituted an elaboration of the earlier realization that empire brought responsibilities as well as prerogatives. It was no longer enough simply to impose peace, institute laws, and then await the eventual (perhaps inevitable) amelioration of Indian civilization. This amelioration required active intervention. Though only in its infancy and barred by the administrative inertia of the Company as well as prevailing 'Orientalist' sympathies from having much impact on India in the first two decades of the 19th century, the willingness to consider fundamental change steadily gained momentum. With the virtual 'triumph' of Anglicist sentiment in the ranks of the Company and among Britain's ruling elite in the 1830s, the classic 19th-century variety of Britain's civilizing mission in India appeared. Obviously, classical discourse on its own lacked the power to drive policy in this area. Otherwise we might have expected a more thoroughly interventionist policy from the outset. A whole congeries of forces and factors came together to shift the emphasis from Orientalist to Anglicist policies and even then it was a slow, uneven process fraught with disagreement. But classical discourse remained an influential source of ideas about the civilizing mission and of rhetorical authority for disparate representations of that mission during this complex and controversial transition.

Given the new emphasis on raising the level of civilization in India, visible as early as 1780, it is not surprising to find the University of Glasgow, in 1807, instituting a £100 prize essay 'on the best Means of civilising the Subjects of the British Empire in India, and of diffusing the Light of the Christian Religion throughout the Eastern World'. Nor does it come as a shock to find Jonathan Mitchell's winning effort reviewed in the periodical press, or that the reviewer would present the civilizing mission as 'unquestionably... required by a sense of duty'.³⁴⁵ The same certainty about the propriety of the civilizing mission stands out in another work from 1807 by William Tennant, past Chaplain to His Majesty's Troops in Bengal. For Tennant the only issue of import with respect to British policy in India was establishing 'the best means of civilizing and instructing that country'.³⁴⁶ Pondering Britain's empire and its potential as an agent of progress and improvement – of civilization – Tennant's thoughts turned to classical antiquity. 'That the Romans civilized the world by conquest,' he wrote, 'is a remark within the reach of every schoolboy; it is not, however, the less certainly true.' This specific example led to the more general conclusion that 'no nation can carry its conquests to any great distance, without carrying also the useful arts'.³⁴⁷ Tennant's naivety on this point ought not to blind us to the connection he drew among classical education, Rome's imperial civilizing mission, and the proper path of the Indian Empire. It suggests that his own belief in empire's capacity to spread civilization took root in his schooldays and retained considerable force into his adult years. His example in turn begs the question of how far the phenomenon could be generalized. What impact might generations of schoolboys imprinted with such convictions have had on the empire as they grew into manhood and entered public life?

In Tennant's case at least the impact of classical education and discourse went deeper than general ideas about the civilizing mission. He also employed it to outline the priorities thereof. After peace, agricultural improvement was at the top of his list. He wanted to convince his audience that famine did not have to be endemic to India; that under careful tutelage India had the potential not only to feed her own people but also to export substantial amounts of food. To make his point he offered an analogy to Britain before and after the Roman conquest. Before the Romans arrived, Britain 'only produced small quantities of corn on her coasts' and agriculture was unknown in large expanses of the country. But, 'under the dominion of that enterprising and great people, [Britain] soon became, in fact, the granary of the western empire: it exported immense quantities of corn for the subsistence of the legions in Germany and Gaul.' Tennant felt that under a similarly civilizing imperial people, India's potential was even greater. As he put it: '[w]hat Rome actually accomplished in favour of one of her distant dependencies, who will assert the impossibility of Great Britain effecting for hers? Her means are more various, while her subjects are not

less tractable.³⁴⁸ Tennant thus called on his countrymen to take up the improving, civilizing mantle of empire worn by their Roman predecessors. In this, we see a fascinating combination of personal experiences in India and conceptions of ancient history shaping a commentator's view of the British Empire's potential as a civilizing agency.

Even as commentators like Tennant emphasized active intervention to improve India, others continued to invoke peace as the mainstay of Britain's civilizing mission there. Thus in 1811, John Malcolm's 'Sketch of the Political History of India, from the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill in 1784' advanced the following proposition:

There would hardly appear to be a greater, and more noble object for the exercise of human wisdom: or one more worthy of all the attention of a great state, than that of establishing and maintaining, through the action of its influence and power, union and tranquillity over a considerable portion of the globe: and of bringing to nations, whom it found involved in continual discord and war, the blessings of harmony and peace.³⁴⁹

In a single sentence Malcolm spun a veritable web of imperial ideas. Linking Britain's power in India to her greatness as a state, and both of these to the peace she imposed, he managed to elide the harsh realities of imperial domination and present the empire as a purveyor of blessings to India.

Not everyone viewed Britain's involvement in India with the Olympian confidence of prominent Anglo-Indian officials like Malcolm. Some found it difficult to see how the Company's continuing expansion in India equated to the spread of peace and the progress of civilization. One reviewer in particular was profoundly sceptical and used classical discourse to subvert Malcolm's glowing assessment of Britain's involvement in India:

[W]e will confess that we can scarcely refrain from smiling, to find him thus repeating the ordinary formula, in which ambitious conquerors have in all ages proclaimed their love of their Brethren. When Alexander had subdued the world, and, after annexing what portions of it he thought fit to his own dominions, parcelled out the rest to tributary sovereigns, it was doubtless his intention that a long period of peace and uninterrupted tranquillity should ensue.³⁵⁰

Conjuring the spirit of Walpole, this reviewer fought fire with fire. He detected Malcolm's subtle invocation of '*pax*', and by extension of the common image of Rome as pacifier and civilizer. He chose to combat it with an analogy of similarly authoritative pedigree. Yet he had to choose carefully. Such was the strength of the *pax*-empire connection among his contemporaries that he seems to have shrunk from confronting it directly. Instead he struck upon the example of Alexander. This too presented problems. Readers

will recall that most characterized Alexander's conquests in Asia as a kind of civilizing mission. Despite the prevalence of such views, there remained just enough ambiguity about his career within classical discourse that it was at least possible to present him as an unprincipled military conqueror without any civilizing aims. Further, the evanescence of Alexander's empire meant that even if he had intended to spread peace and Hellenic civilization, his successes in this regard remained open to debate. The reviewer rounded out his rejection of Malcolm's position by pairing Alexander with Napoleon, then the great imperialist and threat to contemporary peace. 'Why,' he asked, following his remarks on Alexander, 'do we complain at this moment of the turbulent ambition of Buonaparte?'

The point of all this was simply to expose the common exploitation of 'peace', and in a larger sense the civilizing mission, as justification for the Indian Empire. While classical discourse's presence on both sides of the argument appears to suggest that it exercised little in the way of influence over contemporary conceptions of empire, that would be an oversimplification. It obviously lacked the power to determine *all* views of empire. On the other hand, it is essential to bear in mind the reviewer's reluctance to dispute directly the image of the '*Pax Romana*' hovering behind Malcolm's invocation of peace. He clearly recognized the power of that image, not only as an element of Roman history, but also as an element of his contemporaries' conceptions of empire.

The civilizing mission remained a point of contention between imperial enthusiasts and critics of empire through the remainder of our period. On the enthusiast side of the debate, representations of the civilizing mission stressed the familiar tropes of the responsibility incurred by Britain to raise the level of civilization in places like India (and to a growing extent Africa) by imposing peace and giving laws. But from the second quarter of the 19th century, it increasingly came to include ideas of stamping out 'barbaric rites', providing modern education, improving infrastructure, and on occasion encouraging the export of Christianity. In India this was a key part of the aforementioned shift from an Orientalist to an Anglicist idiom in British administration, i.e. from a position that stressed peace and law but respected the foundational elements of Indian society and culture to one that embraced significant interference in fundamental areas.

Nowhere were this change and its consequences for the civilizing mission clearer than in approaches to education. In 1838 the deputy secretary to the Calcutta government, Charles Trevelyan, couched Britain's civilizing mission to India in terms already familiar.³⁵¹ Like the Orientalist Halhead, he turned to the impact of Greek civilization on Rome so memorably encapsulated by Horace. The upshot of his comparison was 'that an intellectual revolution similar to that which is now in progress in India, actually took place among the Romans.'³⁵² Trevelyan's point was that before the introduction of Greek influence, Roman knowledge was primitive and

superstitious. 'This sort of knowledge – very analogous to the knowledge which is contained in the Sanskrit books,' he wrote, 'was considered as the most valuable learning, until an increased acquaintance with the Greek language produced a complete change.'³⁵³ The fact that traditionalists had very likely railed against such change had not halted progress. Nor should resistance on the part of Indians or 'Orientalists' inhibit the introduction of the English language, and with it the benefit of European knowledge, to India. Trevelyan's desire to pair Greece with Britain, even though their relations with the peoples they 'civilized' were diametrically different, reveals a remarkable historical flexibility, to put it charitably. And while his argument depended on a philhellenic willingness on the part of his audience to identify with the Greeks, it also reflected a desire to use the most authoritative example available to deflect the criticisms of the vocal minority opposed to the 'Anglicist' position.

Trevelyan's brother-in-law, Thomas Babington Macaulay, an even more renowned commentator on education in India provides another example. Given his lifelong classical interests, which included extensive reading in the classics during his service in India in addition to his imaginative reconstruction of the Roman Republic in his *Lays*, Macaulay's understanding of Britain's role in India naturally owed something to his understanding of antiquity.³⁵⁴ During his infamous disparagement of Asian literature he took care to link Britain's relationship to Indian civilization directly to classical antiquity's place vis-à-vis modern European, and especially British civilization. 'Had our ancestors acted as the Committee of Public Instruction [for India] has hitherto acted,' he wrote, 'had they neglected the language of Thucydides and Plato; had they neglected the language of Cicero and Tacitus; had they confined their attention to the old dialects of our own island... would England have been what she now is?'³⁵⁵ Macaulay knew his audience well enough to be sure that their veneration for classical antiquity and understanding of its historical role made this a rhetorical question. He understood the willingness and, in some cases, the desire of his contemporaries to identify with the ancients because he too saw Britain's role in India in the light of classical antiquity's contribution to modern European civilization. From his perspective Greek and Latin had been the engines of civilization – the impetus behind a vital step in Britain's progress toward its present greatness. Thus he felt constrained to argue that: '[w]hat the Greek and Latin were to the contemporaries of More and Ascham, our tongue is to the people of India.'³⁵⁶ That is to say, English was to be a catalyst of India's progress and improvement.

Although his philosophy of history told him that progress was, in a sense inevitable, he nonetheless sought to urge his countrymen to embrace the opportunity to superintend India's improvement. To this end he was happy to exploit the element of classical discourse that had clearly inspired his sense of the civilizing mission and its relationship to empire. Hence the

unmistakable and perhaps unconscious classical imagery in his definitive pronouncement on that mission:

To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of misery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of *citizens* would indeed be a title to glory – all our own. The sceptre may pass away from us. Unforeseen accidents may derange our most profound schemes of policy. *Victory* may be inconstant to our arms. But there are *triumphs* which are followed by no reverses. There is an *empire* exempt from all natural causes of *decay*. Those *triumphs* are the *pacific triumphs* of *reason* over *barbarism*; that *empire* is the imperishable *empire* of our *arts* and our *morals*, our *literature* and our *law*.³⁵⁷

Classical discourse played a similar role in the experienced India hand, Dr John Crawford's 1853 discussion of the introduction of English education to India. Irked at what he considered the timid, even negligent policy of the Board of Control towards education policy, he urged for a more aggressive implementation of the policy Macaulay first articulated two decades earlier:

All civilised conquerors have, when in sufficient numbers, used their own language, and never, when they could help it, had recourse to the rude dialects of the conquered. Thus Rome spread her own language over Gaul, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula... We ourselves certainly do not adopt Irish in Ireland, or Welsh in Wales, in preference to English...³⁵⁸

Despite Crawford's Orientalist *bona fides* – he had published a grammar of Malay in 1852 – he was a thoroughgoing Anglicist on matters of educational policy. Neither he nor Macaulay needed classical discourse to convince them of the value of English education. Even so, both men relied on it to drive their points home. Clearly they both recognized its rhetorical value, which depended on a widespread and largely uncritical acceptance of specific elements of classical discourse: the central place of the classical languages and literature in European civilization and the link between imperial greatness and the civilizing mission. Yet there is no reason to think that Macaulay and Crawford callously manipulated classical discourse and then sniggered up their sleeves at readers' gullibility. It seems likely that they simply stated the 'truth' as they understood it, which suggests classical discourse was central to their respective understandings of the civilizing mission and its significance.

The millennial atmosphere of the events of 1857 highlighted for all interested parties the monumental historical significance of Britain's mission in India. Henry Reeve, former writer for *The Times* and then editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, spoke for many in 1858 when he characterized the

'Mutiny' as a struggle 'against the progress of civilisation'.³⁵⁹ Thomas James put the same thought in more elaborate and colourful terms:

No doubt the bigoted Moslem and even the supine Hindoo saw symptoms of advancing light... The railroads, the electric telegraph, the gas, all told of innovation and strange power. The abolition of suttee – of infanticide – of Thuggee – of self-immolation – of Juggernaut abominations – the discontinuance of grants to heathen temples, and of salutes in honour of their idolatrous services – the permission of widows to marry – the preservation of their property to converts – all moral conquests from the strongholds of superstition and injustice, and each of itself in the eyes of old Indians sufficient to create a revolution³⁶⁰

Similarly troubled by the situation in India, but more inclined to look for long-term solutions than simply to denigrate the Hindu and Muslim inhabitants of the subcontinent, Charles Hamley turned to classical discourse in a contribution to *Blackwood's Magazine*. He was sure that the Romans had 'struck the right key' when they 'adopted as the polity of their conquests, the incorporation of the conquered with themselves, according them rights and privileges and granting them an heritage in the power and glory of the nation in which they were absorbed.' Moreover the Roman example had taught him that the:

only principle on which conquest can be consolidated, is by that of a government which shall aim at *raising* the governed to the state of the governors; which shall respect their customs and religions; which shall rule them intermediately by *laws* made sacred through time-honoured usage; which shall *inculcate civilisation* by contact; and shall, by giving them community and individual interest in the welfare of the State, involve them in its prosperity and *progress*.³⁶¹

He found in Rome an example of 'inclusive' empire, where the conquered could be civilized and integrated into the imperial populace, eliminating any cause for rebellion. While this may have been the presentation of a long-standing opinion dressed up with classical garnish, it is no less likely that he fell back on what he considered to be a historical truth to find a solution to a pressing problem. In any event the comparison underscores not only authors' confidence in classical discourse's resonance with their readers, but also its prominence in the more specific link between the civilizing mission and empire. No doubt many would have been uncomfortable with the logical implications of Hamley's comparison: that Indians might someday be the equals of Britons and that such equality might be the prerequisite for true stability. But so long as the period of uplift remained indefinite, they could focus on the intermediate period and so on the familiar and comforting image of the Indian Empire as an agent of civilization like unto Rome.

This image retained its relevance in the wake of the Uprising. It helped some commentators explain the apparent ease with which certain areas of British India weathered the crisis of 1857. They considered such successes the ultimate vindication of their civilizing mission. One such observer wrote that 'among the marvels achieved by Englishmen in India, there is nothing equal to the *pacification* of the Punjaub.' Flush with pride at this thought, he leapt from the specific to the general. 'The genius of our country for dominion,' he wrote, 'was never more strikingly demonstrated. The history of the Punjaub proves how just a title we hold the place of the ancient Romans as the true *Domini rerum*.'³⁶² This smug inclination to bask in the reflected glory of antiquity masks an undertone of insecurity not all that different from what James' and Reeve's comments reveal. And, as in Hamley's case, invoking the similarities between Britons and Romans in terms of the civilizing missions they carried out and their imperial characters doubtless afforded a certain psychological solace during a period of lingering doubt and crisis. Such similarities suggested that, like Rome, Britain could overcome such challenges. The key was to focus on the civilizing mission, which would ensure that Britons continued to be the modern Romans: masters of all they survey.

So, despite the inevitable doubts about the civilizing mission's success in India resulting from the 1857 Uprising and its violent suppression, it continued as a main theme in imperial discourse. In 1869 the historian Marshman characterized Britain's task in India as the 'suppression of barbarous rites, and the introduction of the blessings of civilization and knowledge', in brief, the greatest contribution any European power could make to Asia.³⁶³ The allusion became explicit when he offered an encomium of the engineer Sir Robert Napier, 'to whose skill and energy the Punjab was indebted for all those great material improvements which gave it the appearance of a Roman province.' His enumeration of the '100 great bridges, and 450 of smaller dimensions', the 'six mountain chains' penetrated, and the embankments surmounting 'the marshes of two great rivers' along the road that 'united Peshawur with Lahore' reads like an account of one of the great Roman Roads or aqueducts.³⁶⁴ As we saw in Chapter 3, such structures figured prominently in contemporary understandings of Rome's civilizing mission.³⁶⁵ Roads and bridges, but also canals, telegraph lines, and, above all, railroads played an analogous role in Britain's civilizing mission. They were concrete improvements to India. Like Roman feats of engineering they proclaimed the permanence of Britain's civilizing legacy, which in turn guaranteed her a certain indelible historical greatness – to Marshman's obvious delight. And he did not neglect the opportunity to draw this to his readers' attention by means of a comparison to Rome.

Indeed there had been an inclination to make such an association at least since the re-opening of the canal from the 'Yamuna' river to Delhi in 1820 by Charles Metcalfe.³⁶⁶ But this particular facet of the civilizing mission

naturally became more prominent from the 1850s with the foundation of the Public Works Department and the beginning of large-scale telegraph and railway construction.³⁶⁷ In 1863 G.O. Trevelyan, writing as 'The Competition Wallah', emphasized the 'colossal viaducts', stations, and officials of the railways, rather than canals, but his pre-occupation with the tangible 'symptoms of civilization' was entirely consistent with his predecessors and with classical discourse, which his work deliberately evoked. Indeed, he contrasted such 'unmistakable signs of England's handiwork' with their uncivilized surroundings, which he described as 'scenes that Arrian might have witnessed'.³⁶⁸ The implication was that Indian civilization had stagnated since the days of Alexander, whose invasion of Asia Arrian chronicled, leaving it for the British to usher in an age of progress.

A final comparison, this from Robert W. Frazer's *British India*, nicely sums up the significance of classical discourse to the civilizing mission's material dimension. This former member of the ICS, and lecturer in Tamil and Telugu at University College London, took the position that in India 'the diffusion of knowledge and changes of material environment are acting steadily on mental habits and that future historians will have a *second* remarkable illustration of the force with which a powerful and highly organized civilization can mould the character and shape the destinies of many millions.'³⁶⁹ The first example of this phenomenon goes unmentioned in the text, but it is nonetheless obviously Rome. Any classically educated contemporary would have taken the point – so powerful was the image of Rome's civilizing mission. In this case any doubt disappears on consulting the footnotes, where Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire* appears as the authority for this interpretation of the material impact of the civilizing mission. Frazer quoted the Preface to the seventh volume, in which Merivale admitted that his 'own imagination [wa]s most powerfully excited by the visible connexion between moral influence and material authority which is presented, to an extent never realized before or since, by the phenomenon of the Roman empire.'³⁷⁰

Frazer intentionally used the authority of Merivale, i.e. classical discourse, to cast Britain's role in India in a favourable light. At the same time it appears that Frazer genuinely believed in the importance and inevitable success of Britain's civilizing mission and that this belief owed something to the example provided by the orthodox view of Rome's civilizing function. And it was this example that led him to the optimistic conclusion that 'whatever may be the ultimate destiny of our Indian empire, we shall have conferred upon the Indians great and permanent benefits, and shall have left a good name for ourselves in history.'³⁷¹

Even with all this in mind, it would still be unreasonable to claim that classical discourse inspired the myriad infrastructural projects undertaken in India during the 19th century. Specific improvements and general programmes such as Dalhousie's had compelling economic and political

logic independent of classical precedents – just as the shift to English education had contemporary political and cultural impetus. However it is clear that for many Britons the belief in the interdependence of material improvements, the spread of civilization, and empire, originated in classical discourse. This nexus may have most frequently manifested itself in attempts to burnish Britain's imperial image, but that does not mean it lacked influence or inspirational power. Classical discourse could be manipulated only so far without triggering serious reactions. The key to using it successfully was to employ tropes familiar to and accepted by most readers. The civilizing potential of empire was one such trope.

Classical discourse continued as both a source and support for dominant understandings and representations of Britain's civilizing mission through the remainder of our period. Thus, when the India Office's secretary for public works, William T. Thornton discussed 'National Education in India' in the *Cornhill Magazine* in 1871, he sketched an approving picture of 'The Roman missionaries who crossed over by whole armies to our shores'. Their approach to education seemed to him the only sensible policy for an imperial power: 'it was plain that if the Britons were to learn to read, they had better learn in a language in which there was already plenty of legible material, than in one in which all such material had still to be composed.'³⁷² Betraying no discomfort whatever with Britain's own colonial past under the Romans, he happily appropriated it to make his point about Britain's civilizing mission in India. Similarly, in his 1900 monograph *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain*, professional historian J.A. Cramb used classical discourse to emphasize the world historical significance of Britain's civilizing mission. He claimed that 'like all *great* empires Rome strove not for herself but for humanity, and dying, had yet strength, by her laws, her religion, her language, to impart her spirit and the secret of her peace to other races and to other times.'³⁷³ 'Britain', he continued, 'is laying the foundations of States unborn, civilizations undreamed til now, as Rome in the days of Tacitus, was laying the foundations of States and civilizations unknown.'³⁷⁴

While it seems clear that Cramb's general sense of the civilizing mission's import derived in part at least from his understanding of antiquity, it would certainly be going too far to claim that classical discourse shaped Thornton's specific views on education in India. No doubt his specific thoughts on the topic arose from a combination of his personal experiences and the ethnocentrism with respect to 'Indian' culture pervading elite culture at the time – though that too owed something to classical discourse as we will see. Even so, it is tempting to wonder if Thornton's unquestioning belief that education was an imperial responsibility owed something to the element of classical discourse that flowed so easily from his pen, in addition to the ethos of East India House or, as seems even more likely, discussions with his close confidant, J.S. Mill.³⁷⁵

Scholars from Betts forward have seen an increase in the number of classical comparisons within imperial discourse in the period loosely bracketed by

Thornton and Cramb. They typically point to the so-called New Imperialism of the era as cause of this surge. The almost unprecedented speed and extent of imperial expansion in these decades, so the interpretation runs, made rationalizations and justifications all the more necessary. It goes without saying that the civilizing mission was a mainspring of such rationalizations and in this respect classical discourse was especially important. Though I hope it is clear by now that such deployments were nothing new to imperial discourse, there is something to the claim that they became more frequent in this era. The fact that more people with a classical education were having more conversations about empire in more places than ever before goes some distance toward explaining this phenomenon, but other factors contributed as well. These include, in addition to the simple desire to justify Britain's continuing imperial expansion, genuine satisfaction with the progress and prospects of the empire, the attacks of an increasingly vocal minority opposed to empire or the idea of a civilizing mission, and the re-appearance of powerful and aggressive rivals, who threatened Britain's imperial primacy.

Victoria's Olympian proclamation on assuming the title of Empress in 1877 nicely represents the persistent strain of more or less naive and uncritical representations of the civilizing mission supported by classical discourse:

Now, under laws which impartially protect all races and all creeds, every subject of her Majesty may peacefully enjoy his own. The toleration of the Government permits each member of the community to follow without molestation the rules and rites of his religion. The strong hand of Imperial Power is put forth, not to crush but to protect and guide; and the results of British Rule are everywhere around us in the rapid advance of the whole country and the increasing prosperity of all its Provinces.³⁷⁶

At first glance, classical discourse seems conspicuous by its absence. But, as E.A. Freeman noted less than a decade later, even so general a term as 'empire' immediately evoked images of Rome among his classically educated countrymen.³⁷⁷ In the case of the proclamation, the emphasis on peace combined with terms such as 'Imperial Power' and 'Province', not to mention the stress on the civilizing mission, would have had a similar effect on audiences, creating an unmistakable link to the common image of the Roman Empire. The resulting impression was of a great historical mission not just well begun, but well on its way to completion. This was special pleading of course, but that is beside the point, which is how thoroughly ideas rooted in classical discourse had permeated thinking and speaking about Britain's imperial mission.

Critics of empire and imperialism naturally continued responding to such representations with attacks on the discourse surrounding the civilizing

mission – perhaps the most effective rhetorical weapon of the imperialists, especially those of liberal mind-set. In an attempt to illustrate ‘The Seamy side of “Imperialism” in 1879, Wallace did his best to debunk the doctrine of civilization: ‘You simply go, conquer, take possession, and utilise as you like,’ he wrote, ‘paying your way, of course, with “civilisation”. But the misfortune is that the Liberal British civiliser, in the given circumstances, cannot pay the price, because he cannot impart a Liberal British civilisation, the primary element of which is that a man is free and can call his soul his own.’ To reinforce his point Wallace drew an analogy between contemporary Indians under British rule and Roman slaves, who ‘had no standing in the normal and recognised civilisation of the time.’ This was the springboard to a direct assault on supporters of empire, who relied on the civilizing mission as their rationalization. ‘I say to the Liberal Imperialist,’ he wrote, ‘You are not making a civilised man of the Hindoo.’³⁷⁸

Other aspects of classical discourse, such as the British leader Calgacus’ emphatic rejection of Roman civilizing claims – ‘they make a desert and call it peace’ – offered useful ammunition to opponents of empire, as Bradley recently demonstrated.³⁷⁹ But Bradley, unlike Mantena, who argued that imperial naysayers such as Wallace and his much more famous successor, J.A. Hobson, made the analogy between the Roman and British civilizing missions unpalatable, grasped the ambivalence of British reactions to statements such as those Tacitus put in Calgacus’ mouth.³⁸⁰ I would go even further and argue that the voices denying both Rome and Britain any real civilizing mission tended to be drowned out by the chorus of imperial supporters then holding forth. Yet, perhaps because of contemporary criticisms, even ardent supporters of empire and the civilizing mission in this period seem to have been more cognizant of empire’s dark side than their predecessors. This did not lead them to abandon the civilizing mission or its classical associations. If anything it made them all the more central to positive conceptions of Britain’s empire. The Indian civil servant Henry Beveridge, moved by the anniversary of the Patna Massacre to reflect on the work done by the British in India, wrote a piece for the *Calcutta Review*. In trying to reconcile positive views of the early ‘Anglo-Indian Nawabs’, so many of whom ‘had died in the morning of their lives’, with their violent conquest of India, Beveridge referenced classical discourse: ‘Caesar’s unprovoked aggression upon Britain led to the civilisation of the country, and Clive and Hastings’ spoliations have resulted in British India.’³⁸¹ He made no attempt to mask the aggression and cupidity of the great 18th-century figures who built the Indian Empire, or indeed of the Roman proconsuls who built Rome’s empire. But, having emphasized the cruelties of all imperial expansion with the link between Caesar and Clive, Beveridge proceeded to rationalize such actions with a similar link stressing what the empires thus established brought with them: civilization.

Lyall likewise used classical discourse to expiate the original sin of the Indian Empire in 1891. From his point of view the civilizing mission was an

unquestionable imperial responsibility. Yet, like an increasing number of his countrymen, he found the prerequisites of the civilizing mission, conquest and domination, distasteful. In order to resolve this dissonance, he turned to St Augustine. He thought Augustine's answer to 'the question whether it is fitting for good men to rejoice in the expansion of empires, even when the victors are more civilized than the vanquished, and the wars just and unprovoked,' a veritable last word. His paraphrase says it all: 'to carry on war and extend rulership over subdued nations seems to bad men felicity, but to good men a necessity.'³⁸² Thus from the pen of a Christian saint surveying the Western Roman Empire in its death throes, a late 19th-century historian and imperial statesman found a compelling answer to the apparent paradox troubling his contemporaries. Violence and brutality went hand in hand with imperial expansion and domination, as Lyall knew from first-hand experience of the 1857 Uprising. Yet in certain cases empire also brought progress and civilization, or so classical discourse had instructed him.

For Lyall and many of his contemporaries, just like Tennant eighty years earlier, the relationship between empire and the civilizing mission was part of the intellectual baggage they carried from schooldays into adulthood, and in many cases from the centre to the periphery. Their experiences of empire and also of contemporary imperial discourse inevitably complicated understandings of empire and of the civilizing mission originally derived from classical discourse. Nevertheless it proved rich and flexible enough to help palliate the complexities and contradictions presented by empire in their own age and of course to assist in attempts to spread particular images of empire and the civilizing mission.

In this vein the civilizing mission understood and projected through the lens of classical discourse provided a way to counteract worries over Britain's place in an increasingly competitive imperial world. As we saw in connection with the events of 1857, a close association with the civilizing mission linked to classical antiquity offered comfort in a time of crisis. Although the last four decades of our period witnessed no great imperial crisis on the scale of the 1857 Uprising – at least until Khartoum and the Boer War – increased overseas competition, a series of relatively minor regional crises, and the growth of colonial nationalism, especially in India, created an atmosphere of imperial insecurity. Presented in a certain way the civilizing mission offered a way to distinguish Britain from its competitors, to reinforce the sense that Britain's empire was special and therefore favoured by providence. The key was to show that the scale of their successes in spreading higher civilization put them beside Greece and Rome in the pantheon of great civilizing nations and set them apart from upstart rivals such as Germany or old imperial foes such as Russia.

There are hints of this in the work of no less a contributor to imperial discourse than J.R. Seeley, who, readers will recall, wrote about the Roman Empire long before he turned his attention to the British Empire. Seeley

used the image of the civilizing mission carried out in classical antiquity to stress the uniqueness of Britain's empire among its contemporaries. He first described the special qualities of the classical empires:

A great conquering race is not usually advanced in civilisation... Such is the ordinary rule, but when an exceptional case does occur, when high civilisation is spread by conquest over populations less advanced, the Empire thus formed has a very peculiar interest. Of such a nature for instance was the conquest of the east by Alexander the Great, because the Macedonians through their close relationship with the Greeks brought all Hellenism in their train... Still more remarkable, because it lasted much longer and because it is much better known, was the effect produced upon the nations of Europe by the Roman Empire. In fact this great phenomenon stands out in the very centre of human history, and may be called the foundation of the present civilisation of mankind.³⁸³

With this foundation firmly in place, Seeley turned to the present. He felt that 'it would make all the difference if the English conquest of India [were] to be classed along with the Greek conquest of the East and the Roman conquest of Gaul and Spain, and not along with those of the Great Turk and the Great Mogul.' Because it belonged to the former class, because it was an 'Empire similar to that of Rome, in which we hold the position not merely of a ruling but of an educating and civilising race', Britain's empire in India ought to be placed 'among the transcendent events of the world.'³⁸⁴ Setting Britain apart from potential rivals was as simple as linking her empire to the greatest of history's civilizing and improving empires. But this whole strategy arose in part from the baseline understanding of the civilizing mission and empire Seeley had acquired through long experience of classical discourse.

For those who saw some potential in empire but were less enthusiastic and sanguine than Seeley about the extent to which Britain's place in history had already been secured, thanks to her civilizing efforts in India, classical discourse helped suggest new directions. The socialist J.M. Robertson's 1899 *Patriotism and Empire*, for instance, drew a fairly conventional link between the imperial and civilizing ventures of the Romans and the British. Rome's utility as a model ended there. For Robertson, Rome's mission, as laid out by Virgil's '*Pacis imponere morem*' had not gone far enough; for, 'not one of the protected subjected races was made fit by Roman rule to rule itself.' Instead, 'Rome itself was by the process made unfit; and that said, all is said. For if the would-be civilizer does not raise his subjects to worthy manhood, he himself infallibly falls below it.'³⁸⁵ Thus in order for Britain to avoid Rome's collapse it had to go further than Rome had ever gone in civilizing its subject peoples. His 'ideal' was the 'loyal development of [subject] peoples towards freedom and self-government.'³⁸⁶ This was a common opinion among those with similar visions of the British Empire.³⁸⁷

Nowhere in the ancient sources does self-government appear as the goal or effect of an imperial civilizing mission; but this does not mean that Robertson's reference to Rome was simply and entirely exploitative. The dialectic between past and present suggested both the extent of the challenge facing imperial Britain and a way forward. The combination of his political ideology, his sympathy with Indian nationalism, and his understanding of Roman history, led him to the conclusion that British imperial policy faced a critical crossroads. By framing the problem, these factors also in a sense framed his solution. What had the Romans done? What had they left undone? These were not the only, or necessarily the most significant questions he asked himself when considering British imperial policy, but they were without doubt part of his intellectual process.

Not surprisingly Lord Cromer recoiled from forward thinking *à la* Robertson. Though a firm believer in the civilizing mission, there was no question in his mind of Britain rushing to hand over the reins of government in India to Indians, any more than that of Egypt to Egyptians during his long tenure there. In his *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* he wrote that the continued progress of civilization in India depended on 'the steadfast maintenance of British supremacy'. In this respect he advised his countrymen to 'adopt something of the clearness of political vision and bluntness of expression which characterized the Imperialists of Ancient Rome'. Though he elsewhere noted the failures of Roman imperial policy, he whole-heartedly embraced their general imperial character and especially their notion of the civilizing mission. Even so, he was prepared to acknowledge that after a suitable period of close supervision by the British, things might change. Leaving aside the obvious question as to what had been going on during the century of British domination of India, it is fascinating to find him offering a classical authority for his sense of Britain's civilizing mission. 'It may be', he wrote, 'that at some future and far distant time we shall be justified, to use a metaphor of perhaps the greatest of the Latin poets [Lucretius], in handing over the torch of progress and civilization to those who we have ourselves civilized.'³⁸⁸ This is not the contradiction that it seems. By extending the timeline of Britain's occupation indefinitely, Cromer could retain the flattering and inspirational association with Rome's civilizing mission without introducing the spectre of Roman decay into his encomium of British rule in India. Cromer, who had worked very hard to acquire his own classical education relatively late in life, doubtless understood the power of classical discourse among his readers and used it accordingly. Yet it is clear from the overall concept of his book and from its contents that for him, like so many of his countrymen, classical discourse constituted an essential and foundational frame of reference for imperial issues, including the civilizing mission.

By way of summary then, we have seen the classical discourse used in an impressive variety of ways in connection with the civilizing power of

empire: to rationalize conquest and domination in territories inhabited by uncivilized peoples; to argue for the adoption of a particular policy such as Anglicization; to assuage insecurities in times of crisis or change; and to both marshal and deflect criticism. The fact that present circumstances shaped the specific ways classical discourse was employed to support the idea of the civilizing mission suggests its subordination to the concerns of the present. So too does the extreme flexibility that allowed it to support practically any conceivable take on the civilizing mission. While this flexibility was at times the result of manipulation in the service of present-minded goals, it also reflected the sheer variety of perspectives included both in the ancient sources themselves and in the associated mass of secondary literature.

All this might seem to argue against any kind of influence or inspiration with respect to classical discourse's contribution to Britain's civilizing mission, especially since there is no irrefutable evidence that it determined any particular civilizing policies – the provision of particular laws, infrastructural improvements, English education, and so on. Yet throughout this chapter we have seen evidence of a widespread and consistent belief among Britain's elites that the best and most historically significant kind of empire was one that fulfilled a civilizing function, and thus contributed to human progress and improvement. Classical discourse was the source of this idea. It provided the original examples of Western civilizing empires, ones that made all of Britain's and Europe's accomplishments possible. Classical education ensured that Britain's educated elites were familiar with such notions by the time their own empire became a concern to them. And they repeated these notions in both imperial and classical discourse, ensuring their widespread circulation in elite literary culture and their passage to subsequent generations. Of course, individual experience and perspective coloured commentators' perceptions and representations of the civilizing mission, particularly as it pertained to specific policies. But this does not change the fact that the general connection between great empires and the spread of civilization was part of the cultural baggage most classically educated Britons brought to considerations of their empire, its place in history, and, as we will see in the next chapter, their own imperial identity. It pushed some of them at least toward a conception of empire that included responsibilities as well as rights, duties as well as privileges, a sense of calling as well as a system of outdoor relief.

5

Classical Discourse and British Imperial Identity: The Imperial Character

In 1877 Edward Dicey wrote 'England, like Rome, is the corner-stone of an imperial fabric such as it has fallen to the lot of no other country to erect, or uphold when erected.'³⁸⁹ This is familiar territory, where the comparison to Rome establishes or confirms the special magnificence of Britain's Empire. But that was only the first step. Dicey continued, revealing still more of the conceptual imperial constellation bound up with classical discourse. Having acknowledged the role of naked self-interest in the foundation and maintenance of Britain's rule in India, he came to the crux of the issue. He claimed that the real reason the British, as opposed to another equally avaricious rival, held India was that 'to us has been given a mission like to that of ancient Rome'.³⁹⁰ This too is familiar territory: Britain's civilizing mission, so similar to Rome's, made the Indian Empire special and historically great. But the conclusion of Dicey's thought carries us onto new ground, revealing the final element in the imperial nexus derived from classical discourse. As he put it 'we too might well be bidden to remember that *regere imperio populos* is the talent committed to us.'³⁹¹ Romans and Britons shared the same rare and innate capacity for imperial rule, inimitably described by the immortal and apparently irresistible genius of Virgil.³⁹² Everything followed from this essential similarity in character. Without it there could be no talk of a magnificent and durable 'imperial fabric' or of an imperial civilizing 'mission'.

It is no coincidence that Dicey introduced Virgil's words to support his representation of British imperial character. He naturally understood their universal familiarity among his audience and hoped to use Virgil's authority to persuade readers that Britain's empire was also a magnificent enterprise doing the work of providence, thanks to the inborn imperial talents of Britons. From Dicey's perspective this meant that propositions such as Home Rule for Ireland must be defeated. Granting such concessions would be tantamount to abrogating Britain's imperial responsibilities. In this sense his use of Virgil's lines fits perfectly with Vasunia's analysis of the Roman poet's role in *translatio imperii*, where commentators exploited Rome, as represented by Virgil, to support a particular vision of the British Empire. Yet

Vasunia also acknowledged Rome's power to inspire 'promoters of empire'. It is worth considering the possibility that the whole notion of an imperial national character defined by a specific set of virtues derived in part from early encounters with Virgil's statements (and other less famous examples) via classical education and classical discourse more generally.³⁹³ In fact, this is more or less what Patterson recently argued in his fascinating investigation of the way Britons in India constructed and maintained an imperial identity consistent with prevailing conceptions of honour.³⁹⁴

Sir James Stephen, writing just a few years before Dicey, having recently stepped down from his post as legal member of the Colonial Council of India, offered a somewhat clearer example of this inspirational power. He too constructed a comparison to Rome while trying to explain both the significance of Britain's empire and its organic connection to British character in his *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*. He began from the premise that as Roman power expanded, 'Roman Law was taking root in all parts of the world under the protection of Roman armed force, and all the arts of life, literature, philosophy and art were growing by its side.' The sequel is predictable. He continued: 'An Englishman must have cold heart and a dull imagination who cannot understand how the consciousness of this affected a Roman governor.' Stephen had something of an advantage in this respect thanks to his experiences in India. He too had seen – or believed he had seen – the positive impact of laws imposed on a subject people and he clearly identified with that hypothetical Roman governor. To an extent this identification depended on his personal experiences in imperial service, but it also appears that his whole conception of empire's upside, when governed by a people with the proper character, owed a great deal to his classical education at Eton, King's College London, and Trinity College Cambridge.

He was not the sort of Englishman who could look without a rush of patriotic emotion and imperial enthusiasm upon the great monuments of Britain's empire: 'the scarred and shattered walls of Delhi or the union jack flying from the fort at Lahore'. To him, such sites 'irresistibly' recalled 'lines which no familiarity can vulgarize: *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, Memento, (hae tibi erunt artes), pacisque imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos*'.³⁹⁵ In this passage the contemplation of British imperial sites sparks thoughts of Virgil's characterization of the Roman Empire. But there is little doubt that Virgil's familiar lines, certainly memorized at Eton, had imprinted this particular notion of imperial character on his mind and that it had contributed to his own sense of what an empire should stand for and how an imperial people should behave. It required only an imperial stimulus of some sort – on-the-spot experience in his case, but for others simply contemplating empire would do – for this notion and the imagery so closely associated with it to surface. Once there, it could be used, as Stephen shamelessly used it, to inspire in others a sense of imperial enthusiasm, as well as a specific sense of the type of imperial character they should aspire to embody.

The absence of shame, in either Stephen's deployment of classical discourse or his promotion of empire, bears consideration. The insistence of some commentators that classical discourse functioned solely as a rationalization for imperial bad behaviour conveys the impression that many British imperialists felt guilty about the empire and their role in it. Outsiders and anti-imperialists often generalized from specific defects to dismiss the empire entirely. But it is a mistake to interpret all appearances of classical discourse in the works of imperial actors and commentators as attempts to draw a classical fig leaf over imperial pudenda. Notwithstanding prominent instances of imperial disaster, such men felt no need to justify the general concept of empire by dressing it in toga and mantle. Sometimes identification with the Roman Empire and Roman imperial character was just that, a genuine belief in the similar qualities and, by extension, empires of ancient Romans and modern Britons.

An interesting encounter between Stephen and G.N. Curzon shows how classical discourse could foster a real and powerful sense of imperial identity and destiny. Recall how the image of the Roman Empire first made Curzon conscious of the Indian Empire's significance during his time at Eton. This consciousness was reinforced when the old-boy Stephen returned to address current students, including the young Curzon:

Sir James Stephen came down to Eton and told the boys that listened to him, of whom I was one, that there was in the Asian continent an empire more populous, more amazing, and more beneficent than that of Rome; that the rulers of that great dominion were drawn from the men of our own people; that some of them in future might, perhaps, be taken from the ranks of the boys who were listening to his words.³⁹⁶

Stephen's many accomplishments notwithstanding, it is clear that his resort to classical discourse was the key to his remark's forceful impact on Curzon. The connection to ideas already clear in his mind thanks to Eton's classical curriculum – the scope of Rome's empire and its 'beneficence', both of which arose from the imperial character of the Romans at their best – was the key; it opened new vistas for Curzon, sparking in him a real sense of himself as a member of an imperial nation and with it his imperial calling.

Dicey, Stephen, and Curzon bring us to classical discourse's contribution to elite conceptions of 'the imperial character' and so to the core of their imperial identity. After all, the character of the imperial people determined the character of an empire and decided the immortal question of whether it would be a magnificent, civilizing force on the right side of history or something else entirely. The potential for classical discourse to be exploited in this regard is obvious. As Attridge pointed out in reference to the Boer War, an imagined 'national character' was a key source of support for believers in Britain's 'imperial mission'.³⁹⁷ Donning the imperial

purple of the Romans for example, or throwing it around the shoulders of their countrymen past and present, helped Britons proclaim that theirs was the right kind of empire, that their national character suited them for empire. Its potential for influence in these connections is less obvious, but the examples we have seen suggest some interesting possibilities. At minimum it appears to have instilled a sort of baseline understanding of the qualities essential to a successful imperial people, just as it provided a similar baseline for conceiving of empire's magnificence and the civilizing mission. This could make ancient Athenians, Alexander, and of course the Romans, 'aspirational' exemplars of proper imperial attitudes and behaviour – though, as we will see in the next chapter, other aspects of classical discourse simultaneously made them caveats, whose example was to be avoided in certain respects.

This is not to say that these commentators or indeed any lucid members of Britain's elite saw themselves simply as Greeks and Romans reborn. Nor is it meant to give the impression that classical discourse was *the* source of imperial identity or most important contributor to imperial character. Other elements of metropolitan culture made profound contributions as well: the Hastings Trial, religious enthusiasm, Abolition, the 1857 Uprising, the spread of self-government in the colonies of settlement, Social Darwinism and scientific racism, the Berlin Conference, the death of Gordon, the Boer War, and so on. The point is that classical discourse was a constant part of the cultural milieu that fostered and maintained British imperial identity – the nucleus of attitudes and qualities believed to be the root of imperial success and which interested Britons sought to emulate and to inculcate in future generations.

We have already seen numerous instances of Britons who identified with the peoples of antiquity, including at least one group with a significant imperial connection: Haileybury boys. Recall the common resort to classical pseudonyms such as Perseus and Satiricus among the contributors to the *Scrutator* and *Haileybury Observer*. Taking classical or classicizing pen names – a habit common in elite culture at the time – constitutes a deliberate act of identification with the ancients, one rooted in admiration for certain qualities and values associated with them.³⁹⁸ The same could be said of the many occasions on which contributors to these magazines juxtaposed daily events and familiar personalities with episodes and figures known from their classical studies. This poem from an 1850 number of the *Haileybury Observer* reveals multiple levels of identification:

Ill-luck attends these tasteless ladies, who
 Prefer half-witted captains to civilians,
 Those who destroy, to those who govern millions.
 Although a noble Roman somewhere says,
 And truly, 'Cedant Arma Togae,' yet

The Robe to Scarlet yields, and now-a-days
The tattered gown is gone, its glory set.³⁹⁹

Here Cicero's admonishment that soldiers must give way to statesmen serves as a contrast to contemporary Britain. Civilian resentment toward public adulation of soldiers aside, there is no denying the author's perception of a community of spirit between the ICS and Romans of Cicero's stamp, or that it suggests an important role for images of ancient virtue in the formation of a particular identity among Haileybury boys.

So too a town-gown brawl in 1821, which occasioned a positively Homeric description. The brawny leader of the town forces was described as the son of Cyclops; his opposite among the Haileyburians played the part of Diomedes. Then there was 'Lilliputian Hercules, son of Maro' of whom it could only be said that 'Alas! 'twere luckier for those azure eyes had they been satisfied with Horace, on that day of bunging up.'⁴⁰⁰ The playful humour of the piece, with its casual juxtaposition of ancient and modern, underscores the extent to which boys identified with ancient heroes. Later in the century a much more sombre event triggered a much more serious instance of identification. In a eulogy for an old-Haileyburian killed during the first Anglo-Afghan War, a student wrote that '[n]ever since the days of Leonidas and Thermopylae were numbers more unequally unmatched, never did soldiers show more determined intrepidity, more desperate resolution.'⁴⁰¹ The analogy holds, so long as one ignores the imperial dimension. The Spartans' resistance to imperial invasion presents a stark contrast with the British position as imperial aggressors. However this only underscores the power of the impulse toward identification with the ancients. Positive associations with the 'intrepidity' and 'resolution' of the Spartiates so prominent in classical discourse simply overwhelmed niggling inconsistencies as to who invaded whom. Generalized visions of shared spirit and mettle inspired the analogy rather than the specific political context, much less the desire to draw a veil over an episode of imperial turpitude – Haileybury being an unlikely locus of imperial shame.

Needless to say such instances of schoolboy identification had the effect of projecting a favourable individual and/or corporate identity. But there was more to this than simple exploitation. Ancient figures such as Cicero or Leonidas embodied certain characteristics that these classically educated boys valued. Naturally these young men wanted others to see these attractive characteristics in them as individuals, as a 'ruling caste', as a nation, and perhaps even as a race. The identity based in part on these qualities may well have been 'imposed' on them from without, by the institutional strictures of elite schools, by society, and by intellectual culture.⁴⁰² But, and this is crucial, there is no reason to doubt that they genuinely aspired to attain such apparently 'classical' qualities themselves and therefore that classical discourse had some meaningful role in the organic growth of their

imperial identity, as well as in their later attempts to project that identity to the world.

Kipling seems to have captured this very process in his *Regulus*. As we saw earlier, after much hard work and apparent frustration on the part of their classics master, Stalky & Co. internalized a particular vision of Roman character. It became more than a dead historical fact or nugget of knowledge to be deployed for social gain; it became a standard, which, in conjunction with a host of other factors such as the moral influence of the headmaster, popular culture, family experiences, and peer pressure, shaped the boys' sense of what kind of men they should aspire to become. In Stalky's case this element of classical discourse provided a key pillar of his sense of himself as a servant of empire – what we might call his imperial identity – and ultimately shaped his actions on the periphery.

Stalky's arc, like Kipling's own experience with classical education, reminds us that 'the boy is the father of the man.' Boys who habitually identified with the peoples of antiquity turned into men who did the same and for the same reasons. Pseudonyms such as 'Caius', 'Britannicus', 'Ritortus', and 'Anglicus'⁴⁰³ were often allusive and intended to convey a specific meaning or to broadcast social status. But they also indicate how natural it was for adults to see themselves – and to be seen – as the modern equivalents of the ancient Greeks and Romans. This in turn suggests a real desire to resemble them in some specific respects. Even something as apparently innocuous as applying the term 'proconsul' – the title of the Roman magistrates who governed important provinces – to the leading figures of the Indian administration carried a weight of meaning and significance. The former Indian civil servant, Sir Richard Temple, entitled one chapter of his memoir 'Dalhousie The Great Proconsul'.⁴⁰⁴

It goes without saying that the image of a Roman proconsul or governor Temple had in mind was not the infamous Verres, who was prosecuted for his depredations in the province of Sicily by no less a figure than Cicero and who in turn provided a model for the prosecutors of Warren Hastings.⁴⁰⁵ The general sense of the dignity and grandeur of the office was the point of attraction for men like Temple. By association the title bestowed similar grandeur on both the individual in question and the larger imperial project he served. This in turn supported Temple's own sense of identity. After all, he too stood to benefit from such associations by virtue of his service in India. Through the application of classical discourse, virtual despots, such as Indian Governors-General and viceroys, could become icons of a positive imperial identity available to all educated Britons. This was particularly easy with someone like Dalhousie, famous for his material 'improvements' of India. But Curzon also happily applied it to all his predecessors when he took the time to reflect on the history of British India.⁴⁰⁶ Of course, in doing so he linked himself to that same class of idealized Romans. Given what we have already seen of Curzon's relationship with classical discourse, his use

of 'proconsul' provides yet another glimpse of its role as both a source and support of his imperial identity.

This conclusion can be applied generally to the frequent juxtapositions of specific classical figures and Britons noted for their imperial activities. The Greeks offered points of comparison with imperial connotations. Westmacott's Wellington monument is a case in point, one where the connection between the subject of the monument itself, Achilles, and the man to whom it was dedicated centred on the military virtue and heroism underpinning empire. Similarly, Tennyson linked Alexander the Great to none other than Gordon. But he did so in a very subtle fashion, using the same opening phrase in an early poem on Alexander – 'Warrior of God' – as he did in his much later epitaph to Gordon.⁴⁰⁷ In this case the identification again focuses on military virtue, but adds a sense that military prowess served a higher purpose in both cases: the divine providence implicit in imperial success.

Bearing these Hellenic examples in mind, the pantheon of Roman heroes must be acknowledged as the most significant point of imperial identification through the balance of the long 19th century. Limiting the field only to comparisons with Scipio Africanus we still find numerous examples spanning the period. An anonymous contributor to the *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1800 established a link between the 'late Governor-General of India' Hastings, and Scipio, the hero of the Hannibalic – Second Punic – War. His immediate goal was to cast Hastings, still under something of a shadow despite the outcome of his impeachment before the Lords, in the best possible light. Though the author clearly understood the rhetorical power of a favourable comparison with Scipio, it seems he saw a genuine similarity in their situations. Both men had met crises with 'those strong measures which it may be only imperious necessity can vindicate.'⁴⁰⁸ Not surprisingly, he also saw similarity in the character they displayed in rising to meet the occasion: a 'high-spirited indifference' to the opinions of lesser mortals, who did not understand their imperial vision.

A half-century later, Sir William Francis Napier launched a thinly veiled attack on Dalhousie's administration, *Defects Civil and Military of the Indian Government*, using a comparison with Scipio to depict his younger brother Charles as a hero neglected by Parliament perhaps, but celebrated by a higher court: the public. 'Living, his spirit yearned only for the grateful praise of his countrymen – and living and dead he received it – in that happier than Scipio!'⁴⁰⁹ Napier used the link to the renowned Roman military hero to propel his younger brother into the pantheon of Anglo-Indian heroes. This had the incidental benefit of emphasizing the heroic character shared by Britons and Romans, which in turn emphasized the similarities between their imperial ventures. Though a clear case of exploitation, Napier's reflexive resort to classical discourse also highlights its role as a source of standards for imperial military heroism.

The mature Curzon provides a final example. During his second term as Viceroy of India he compared Scipio to none other than Napier's rival, Dalhousie. Searching for a way to do justice to Dalhousie's 'place among the British rulers of the Indian Empire' Curzon offered Juvenal's estimate of Scipio as a comparison: that put in the scales of leadership, he outweighed Hannibal.⁴¹⁰ At once a rhetorical flourish and a flattering association, Curzon's familiarity with classical discourse provided a frame for understanding and representing the character and feats of his imperial predecessors and, perhaps more importantly, for encouraging his countrymen to aspire to similar standards. In this he followed the path Stephen had taken to inspire him and his classmates at Eton. We cannot know if any success attended his efforts, but his intent remains obvious.

As interesting as such specific identifications are, they were rather less common than more generalized comparisons highlighting shared characteristics and virtues. Relatively abstract comparisons made it easier to blur the annoying details that so often ruined precise analogies between past and present – as with the Haileybury boy's appropriation of the Spartan defenders of Thermopylae. But this is not cause to characterize all such comparisons as simply manipulative or exploitative. As noted in the preceding chapters, generalized notions of classical history and culture, with a certain amount of specific knowledge, usually anecdotal, was the most likely/consistent outcome of classical education and exposure to classical discourse for those who were not serious scholars. Even when all the details did not line up, these general notions carried significant weight, for they were part of the larger intellectual and cultural context in which conceptions of empire and of imperial identity took shape.

We can see this from the very outset of our period in the image of Britannia. Though long since distanced from her specific origins on Roman coins dating from the reigns of the emperors Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, she nonetheless retained her classical garb and thus her Roman associations.⁴¹¹ And far from automatically inspiring images of Britain's conquest and colonial status in antiquity, these motifs were intended to call up images of Britain's imperial power and greatness when deployed in imperial discourse. The frontispiece to James Rennell's *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan* provides a perfect example. Published in 1782, it showed Britannia receiving the spoils of her Eastern empire from three supplicants, clearly Indians.⁴¹² The overall impression is of India's subordination to Britain. The classical elements in the picture combined with contemporary elements to enhance the sense of an unequal, imperial relationship. These include a British ship, the Union Jack, and a statue of a British Lion bestriding a globe. There are also palm trees and temples suitably evocative of a romanticized 'India'. Britannia's classical costume, the classical motifs framing the etching, and the laurel wreath surmounting the scene called up images of the Roman Empire. The artist encouraged viewers to see the Company's empire in India

through a classicizing frame that put British India on a par with Rome, and transfigured Britons into neo-Romans, distinguished from other peoples by their special imperial character and destiny. He was not the first to deploy this strategy. Two similar scenes of Britannia receiving the riches of the East already adorned the East India House by then.⁴¹³

If not by the late 18th century then very soon thereafter, the image of Britannia had been domesticated to the point that it carried a specifically contemporary meaning for all Britons regardless of their relationship with classical discourse. However those familiar with classical antiquity were privy to an additional level of meaning, a specific connection between their empire and that of Rome, between themselves and the Romans. This was true whether she appeared in the pages of *Punch* or any other popular publication, or in high art such as William Dyce's *Neptune Resigning the Empire of the Seas to Britannia* (1847), which resided in Osborne House, or Sigismund Goetz's *Britannia Pacificatrix* (1922) in the Grand Staircase of the Colonial Office.⁴¹⁴ Each work had a specific context, which determined its specific origins and meanings. In Goetz' case, for instance, the choice of classical iconography stressed imperial power and permanence at a critical moment when those able to see through the veil of Britain's final great imperial expansion perceived the crumbling foundations of her power. Yet each example shows that the artist/commissioning body felt it was appropriate to link Britons with the Romans in imperial terms, and that audiences' willingness to accept such identifications made classical discourse useful.

Returning to the late 18th century we find numerous similar cases of generalized identification with the Romans. Only a few years prior to the publication of Rennell's *Memoir*, Adam Smith made just such a comparison. Assessing the fitness of his countrymen for the demands of imperial rule in *The Wealth of Nations*, he turned to Rome for an illuminating comparison. Having roundly criticized the East India Company for its many transgressions against his view of empire, Smith took pains to forestall any interpretation of his comments that would imply a criticism of British national character. 'It is the system of government,' he wrote, 'the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to censure; not the character of those who have acted in it.' Indeed, he asserted that in 'war and negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta have upon several occasions conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive wisdom which would have done honour to the Senate of Rome in the best days of that republic'.⁴¹⁵ Whatever Smith's view of the East India Company, or of Rome in days other than its 'best', he nonetheless saw a similar imperial character among the best of his countrymen and those Romans he respected most.⁴¹⁶

Statues of Clive, Cornwallis, and Jones commissioned later in the 18th century similarly created deliberate links between these renowned imperial heroes and Roman exemplars. Clive and Cornwallis both appear in the costume of Roman generals, which naturally stressed their military virtue.⁴¹⁷ Jones on the other

hand appears in modern dress, writing at a table with his Indian helpers at his feet, but, as noted earlier, with an inscription that linked him directly to the Roman emperor Justinian – famed for ordering the production of a Digest of Roman laws.⁴¹⁸ The word ‘digest’ sent a very specific message about Jones’ work in India, and by extension the character of the Britons who governed the Indian Empire. Classically educated observers could hardly miss the point, even if ignorant of Jones’ stated desire to do for Indians what Justinian had done for his ‘Greek and Roman subjects’.⁴¹⁹ Between Clive and Cornwallis on one hand and Jones on the other then, we see two specific elements of British imperial identity supported by representations of British imperial character rooted in classical discourse: their military virtue and their commitment to making empire an engine of progress and improvement.

The latter appears also on the headquarters of the East India Company in Leadenhall Street, renovated in 1800. The building featured a classical facade, complete with pedimental sculptures, including personifications of Liberty, Order, Religion, Justice, Industry, and Integrity. No doubt the choice of classical motifs owed something to contemporary fashion. Classicism – or rather neo-classicism – was all the rage. But just as certainly, these choices reveal an attempt to project a certain positive image to the public and to posterity. With the scandal of the Hastings trial still fresh in the public’s mind, the Directors of the Company had an interest in proclaiming their commitment to benevolent rule in India. Classical architecture suggested permanence, stability, and greatness; whereas classical iconography helped convey the impression of benevolent rule by calling up images of antiquity, where virtuous Romans in particular made imperial rule progressive and benign. As with deployments of Britannia or the use of Roman costume, these instances of identification reveal more than Britons’ desire to see and present themselves as a certain kind of imperial people. Classical discourse by no means defined the whole of their imperial identity – else the Company would not have included Industry or Religion, and perhaps Liberty among their guiding ideals. However I would again argue that these connections suggest classical discourse acted as the source for basic understandings of what it meant to be a great imperial people. That being the case it was only natural to return to the source, so to speak, when seeking to convey positive messages about Britain’s empire and those implicated in it.

Despite changing imperial circumstances, not to mention developments in classical education, this relationship remained remarkably consistent through the middle years of the 19th century. Alison’s 1833 contribution to *Blackwood’s*, which we have already encountered, is a case in point. Reviewing the prospects for India, as the Company’s Charter was debated, he wrote with great confidence and not a little self-satisfaction:

From the boundless mines of energy and vigour contained in the mid-
dling ranks of England, is derived the undecaying youthful activity and

resolution with which its orders are executed; from the sober and uncontrolled decisions of the wisest men in India, the councils by which they are directed. It is in this extraordinary combination of patrician wisdom of council with plebeian vigour of execution, as in the similar junction of firmness with energy in the proceedings of the senate and people of Rome, that the real cause of the splendour of the Indian Empire, unprecedented in the modern, as the Roman was unexampled in ancient times, is to be found.⁴²⁰

Alison wilfully exploited the common conception of Roman imperial greatness and Roman imperial character – and the link between the two – to remind readers of the Indian Empire's significance and what engendered it. Specifically, he sought to convince them that the empire's success depended on the concerted efforts of Britain's equivalent of the plebeian and patrician orders, whose respective virtues mirrored those of their Roman predecessors. Alison's feel-good retrospective can only have reinforced, just as it represents, the already widespread tendency among Britain's elites to identify with the Romans in terms of the virtues and qualities that led to imperial success.

Alison's contemporary, T.B. Macaulay, displayed an identical willingness to seek out examples of inspirational behaviour and character in classical discourse and use them to instruct his countrymen about proper imperial conduct. His *Lays of Ancient Rome* make no explicit comparisons between Britain's imperial present and Republican Rome, yet he clearly intended them to instil a particular conception of self-abnegating patriotism, or civic republicanism in youthful Britons. And of course, contemporaries believed these qualities had been essential to Rome's imperial greatness. The lesson for the imperial present was plain to see. Macaulay's essays show that this inclination to use classical discourse extended beyond fictional recreations of antiquity intended for youths. Reflecting on the Hastings Trial he put himself in the position of Edward Gibbon (present for parts of the lengthy proceedings) and drank in with delight the spectacle of his countrymen revealing the true greatness of their character by putting justice before national sentiment. The scene reminded him, as he assumed it must have reminded 'the historian of the Roman Empire', of the days 'when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of Africa'.⁴²¹ That the accused in both cases had fallen from the highest standards of conduct and that the outcomes differed substantially – Verres for instance abandoned his defence and went into exile voluntarily – concerned Macaulay less than the fact of Hastings' prosecution, which revealed his countrymen as equal to the best examples of Roman probity and virtue in dealing with subject peoples.

This variation on the theme revealed in representations of Jones as a giver-of-laws also confirmed Macaulay's beliefs about the nature of his

countrymen and the nature of their empire. And we must not forget that the famous historian and poet was himself a player in Britain's imperial drama. Flattering comparisons to Cicero and Tacitus inevitably propped up his personal imperial identity, confirming that he and his colleagues had been involved in an imperial project on the right side of history. The fact that contemporary understandings of Roman character provided his 'gold-standard' of imperial character further suggests that they had also played some significant part in the formation of the sense of imperial identity he used them to support. As Edwards reminds us, 'Macaulay saw classical writers as fundamental to his own political and cultural outlook.'⁴²²

Of course, his use of classical discourse in this connection was also intended to foster similar sentiments among his readers. This brings to mind Catherine Hall's recent analysis of Macaulay's *History of England* as a contributor to 'the construction of British Imperial identities'.⁴²³ For present purposes her arguments offer two important insights. First, she notes Macaulay's habit of using ancient historians such as Thucydides for reference points on the historian's mission and craft, which provides further evidence of his habitual reliance on antiquity for inspiration and guidance. Second, her argument that Macaulay's *History* shaped perceptions of British national character by describing his 'imagined nation' in terms calculated to resonate with the public, reinforces the suggestion offered here that his use of classical discourse to describe his 'imagined empire' might likewise have helped to shape the imperial identity of elite Britons.

Macaulay's foray into classical discourse occurred in a period of relative calm, when there was time for leisurely rumination on the imperial past, present and future. But it was just as likely to appear in imperial discourse in moments of profound crisis, such as the 1857 Uprising. To some, it afforded reassurance that despite present circumstances the British really did possess the imperial spirit: what an anonymous author called 'the genius of our country for domination'. Amid the chaos of the rising he focused on the relative serenity of the Punjab and saw there proof of 'how just a title we hold to the place of the ancient Romans as the true *Domini rerum*'.⁴²⁴ Here the shared character of ancient Romans and modern Britons acted as a powerful balm, soothing worries over the 'wisdom and beneficence' of British rule and their natural position as lords and masters wherever they found themselves.

Our familiar confidant G.O. Trevelyan likewise saw his countrymen as the modern embodiment of the character displayed by the ancients in their best moments. The conduct of his countrymen during the Uprising offered Trevelyan the chance to enlarge upon these common qualities of character. He began with the claim that 'Arrah is emphatically the Thermopylae of our Race', and continued in an even more evocative vein:

There is much in common between Leonidas dressing his hair before he went to his last fight, and Colvin laughing over his rice and salt while the

bullets pattered on the wall like hail. Still, as in the days of old Homer, 'Cowards gain neither honour nor safety; but men who respect themselves and each other for the most part go through the battle unharmed.'⁴²⁵

Here examples from the story of Thermopylae and the *Iliad* provided reassurance regarding British martial spirit, leading Trevelyan to conclude 'that trade and luxury, and the march of science, have not unnerved our wrists and turned our blood to water.' Simultaneously, his comparison constituted a powerful admonition to hold to the values of self-respect, loyalty, and honour that were the essence of both Greek and British martial character.

As we have seen, this was a common function of comparisons between the classical past and the imperial present. If anything it became even more familiar in the decades between 1870 and the First World War, by which time, according to Markley, it 'had become a commonplace'.⁴²⁶ This owed something to the expansion of publishing and even more to the increased reach of classical education, which combined to make more people familiar with classical discourse and provide them more outlets to display this familiarity. At the same time of course, as MacKenzie et al argued in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, Britain's empire took on new prominence in the public mind – at least if public discourse is any indication. Increased competition from imperial rivals, the massive additions to Britain's imperial holdings in Africa, great imperial victories on one hand and a series of imperial military disasters on the other, and the appearance of powerful anti-imperial voices at home and abroad, all had consequences for British perceptions of empire and for their identity as an imperial people.⁴²⁷

Though not without its detractors, MacKenzie's notion that these decades saw the growth of a new nationalism with a particularly imperial flavour is generally persuasive.⁴²⁸ Three chapters in *Imperialism and Popular Culture* argue that the new public school ethos of the second half of the 19th century played a key role in inculcating an ideology of imperial nationalism among students. J. Springhall follows Z. Steiner in arguing that schools sought to foster patriotism and military spirit, while J.S. Bratton accepts Newbolt's assessment of the public schools' ideals as essentially the virtues of 'ancient patriotism'.⁴²⁹ Mangan takes much the same line, though he prefers to see sports rather than curriculum as the key agent of this indoctrination.⁴³⁰ While all three authors touch on classical discourse none of them assign it much significance in the creation or maintenance of what is essentially an imperial identity among British public school boys. Yet if popular art, as Springhall argues, or children's literature, as Bratton argues, or the ideals associated with sports, as Mangan argues, could shape and/or support boys' sense of their nation's imperial character and thus contribute to their imperial identity, why not the classical discourse that was also such a significant element of school life and popular intellectual culture?

Bradley for one seems sympathetic to such views, building on MacKenzie et al to argue that classical education contributed materially to national identity and notions of duty among British youth in this era.⁴³¹ And in fact, while Bratton dismisses the influence of Roman examples in school texts, she argues that once fictionalized in children's literature, as in Kipling's *Puck of Pook's Hill*, the Roman Empire had the power to move. And Mangan notes the influence of classical ideas over those who played such an active role instilling in schoolboys a particularly imperial style of masculine identity: the headmasters. 'Theirs', he wrote, 'was the Homeric view that battle provided the most searching test of a man – his strength, courage, resource, decisiveness.' More specifically, he noted that J.E.C. Welldon of Harrow espoused an ideology based on 'the Aristotelian axiom: "to serve the State, to honour the state, to live, and, if need be, to die for the State – that is the office of a good citizen."' ⁴³² In light of such statements it is easy to imagine the sort of imperial indoctrination that took place in public school classrooms when lessons centred on Homer or Aristotle.⁴³³ With all this in mind, it is tempting to speculate that this sort of teaching, which had reached ever larger numbers of Britons as a result of the dramatic expansion in public school numbers from the 1860s, was a significant contributor to the outburst of imperial enthusiasm among the public in the 1870s, 1880s, and beyond.

Speculation aside, it is important to note that the apparent increase in imperial indoctrination at schools during the later decades of the 19th century was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the content of classical education and the imperial themes within classical discourse do not appear to have changed in significant ways – except perhaps in the most rarefied academic circles where fine details really mattered.⁴³⁴ Certainly we have seen numerous examples of classical education's impact on conceptions of empire and imperial identity more specifically in the earlier part of our period. That said, the nexus of changes in school ethos, popular culture, and, of course, imperial events probably made elements of classical discourse relating to imperial character all the more powerful in this era, both as inspiration and as rhetorical ammunition.

Certainly comparisons between the imperial character of Romans and Britons suggestive of identification continued to be very popular in this period. Recall Dicey's discussion of Britain's position in India: 'to us has been given a mission like to that of ancient Rome, because we too might well be bidden to remember that *regere imperio populos* is the talent committed to us.'⁴³⁵ His contemporary, Owen, drew a similar connection between the talents and character of the British and the Romans and their respective imperial destinies in explaining Britain's destruction of Tipu Sultan. As we saw previously, he adapted Caesar's summary of his Gallic Campaigns, to Britain's successes declaiming: '*Venimus, vidimus, vicimus*'.⁴³⁶ Beyond the specific analogy of a great victory and imperial conquest, these words, translated as 'we came, we saw, we conquered', evoke an image of impressive

military virtue, and also of the simple gravitas characteristic of a great imperial people.

Joseph Chamberlain, no mean classical scholar or imperialist, more subtly inserted classical discourse into his comments on the British imperial character. Speaking to the Royal Colonial Institute at its annual dinner on 31 March 1897, the archetypal Liberal Imperialist put it this way:

In carrying out this work of civilisation we are fulfilling what I believe to be our national mission, and we are finding scope for the exercise of those faculties and qualities which have made of us a great governing race... I do say that in almost every instance in which the rule of the Queen has been established and the great *Pax Britannica* has been enforced, there has come with it greater security to life and property, and a material improvement in the condition of the bulk of the population.⁴³⁷

The nexus of imperial concepts created by Chamberlain linked to the classical monument via his reference to the *Pax Britannica*. This allusion to Rome evoked the dominant image of the *Pax Romana* and its corollaries, which in turn supported his picture of the nature of Britain's empire and, more specifically, his belief that the British were 'a great governing race'.

Chamberlain went even further when discussing the ability of history's 'great governing races' to employ any means necessary to achieve the world historical ends of empire:

You cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs; you cannot destroy the practices of barbarism, of slavery, of superstition... without the use of force. In the wide dominions of the Queen the doors of the *temple of Janus* are never closed, and it is a gigantic task that we have undertaken when we have determined to wield the sceptre of empire.⁴³⁸

Chamberlain introduced a Roman precedent for continual warfare in the service of imperial necessities through his reference to the Roman temple of Janus, the doors of which were only closed when Rome was at peace (i.e. infrequently).⁴³⁹ The way he did so elided the chronological distance between Romans and Britons and rendered them identical in terms of their stomach for the hard work – we would say cruelty – of empire, even a great progressive empire.

From our perspective, Chamberlain assumed a great deal from his readers, certainly more than Dicey or Owen. Yet we must bow to his understanding of his audience. He clearly assumed not only that they would get his allusions, but also that the majority would not be put off by such a close identification with the Romans in imperial terms. Indeed his arguments, like those of Dicey and Owen, and so many others we have encountered in this and the preceding chapters, depended on the audience already feeling

a close imperial kinship with the Romans, or at very least believing that the Romans' imperial 'faculties and qualities' warranted emulation. This in turn suggests once again that classical discourse was an important source of British understandings of what it meant to be an imperial people.

Cecil Rhodes' favourite aphorism, '*civis Romanus sum*' reminds us that it was also of use in projecting a particular image to the world.⁴⁴⁰ Rhodes used this saying very much as Lord Palmerston had used the original when defending his government's handling of the Don Pacifico affair in 1850.⁴⁴¹ In both instances there was an appeal to the notion that modern Britons were the equivalent of ancient Romans and that wherever they went in the world they should be immune from indignity on account of their innate superiority. Both Palmerston and Rhodes sought to exploit this point of identification, though for different reasons. Rhodes hoped to use it as a way to lever support from the centre for the fulfilment of his Cape to Cairo dream: the idea being that when he or his minions inevitably got into trouble with rival powers as they tried to connect the two cardinal points of Britain's holdings in Africa, they could call on the mother-country for help by deploying what Salisbury called 'the *civis Romanus* doctrine'.⁴⁴²

Notwithstanding this callous attempt to exploit classical discourse for his own imperial ends, it is clear that Rhodes genuinely identified with the Romans. 'Remember always that you are a Roman', was apparently one of his favourite sayings while at Oxford.⁴⁴³ Betts further informs us that Rhodes enjoyed being told of his 'facial resemblance' to particular emperors. The poet A.G. Butler indulged these pretensions, linking Rhodes to Caesar in an 1895 sonnet.⁴⁴⁴ Apparently Rhodes' understanding of ancient history, however shaky, was a mainspring – along with his Christianity of course – of his imperial identity even as it provided him with valuable rhetorical ammunition in his attempts to shape current imperial policy.

Palmerston on the other hand needed a *post facto* justification for an episode of gunboat diplomacy that very nearly went wrong, and very certainly sparked a political storm. In a clear proof of the flexibility of classical discourse the opposition, in the person of Gladstone, attempted to fight fire with fire. He disputed Palmerston's characterization of current events and more particularly his use of classical discourse.⁴⁴⁵ He did so not because he rejected close identification between the ancients and his countrymen in imperial terms, but to score political points. Elsewhere Gladstone linked Britons to the ancients in point of their 'innate' 'sentiment of empire'. For him the explanation for Britain's success in India lay 'in comparative force of manhood and faculties of action alone... which not only bring the British supremacy within the limits of the possible, but invest it with a humane and beneficial aspect'. And in this, he concluded 'it presents a resemblance to the old sovereignty of Rome over the Hellenic races when their active powers had sunk below the level necessary for their independence'.⁴⁴⁶

General character was the key. British men, like the Greeks and Romans before them, displayed not only the vital imperial mind-set but also a special capacity for manly action. Lifelong classical scholar that he was, Gladstone easily found appropriate ancient authorities to support his points, or indeed to undermine those of his political opponents. It does not necessarily follow from this that the classics were nothing more to him than a rhetorical armoury. Certainly he saw aspects of antiquity worthy of emulation, the timeless example of the Roman capacity for manly action, for example. It is impossible to do more than speculate as to precisely how far this or other classical exemplars had shaped his sense of imperial identity. However there is no question that Gladstone added his authoritative voice to the chorus declaiming to the public the similarities between themselves and the peoples of classical antiquity in terms of imperial character. The constant repetition of this theme in different media from authoritative sources of all ages and political stripe must have reinforced the predisposition implanted during schooldays to find in classical discourse not just frameworks for understanding imperial character, but also guidance and inspiration for imperial conduct.

Cromer's *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, offers one final example and conceptually it takes us right back to where we began this discussion of imperial character and identity. 'There is in fact', he wrote, 'a good deal of similarity between the Roman and British character. Both nations appear to the best advantage in critical times.' He went on to recount Polybius' claim 'that the Romans were most to be feared when their danger was greatest', which put him in mind of the 'slight effect produced in Egypt by our early reverses during the recent South African War'. As strong as this identification between Britons and ancient Romans was, the relationship became even clearer as Cromer completed his discussion of the quality displayed by both Romans and Britons in a crisis. He claimed that all the British subjects in Egypt 'were convinced that we were the inheritors of that proud motto which laid down as a principle of policy that Rome should never make peace save as a victor'.⁴⁴⁷ This is a presumptuous claim, and one that displays more than a trace of bravado, perhaps masking a growing insecurity. Even so there is no reason to doubt its general accuracy. At the very least it shows that Cromer himself saw more than just a coincidental similarity between British national character and that of the Romans. He put himself and his fellow-subjects in Egypt in the position of heirs to the Romans, and not simply in respect of their imperial domination of Egypt. He implies that they had learned how to meet a crisis from the Romans, that the Roman example shaped their sense of how a great imperial people ought to behave, and that when the crisis came they behaved that way.⁴⁴⁸

The preceding survey of classical comparisons in imperial discourse through the long 19th century gives an impression of remarkable consistency. Time and again, in different media and in different imperial circumstances,

men of different ages, imperial experience, and political perspective – but generally similar educational background – drew favourable imperial comparisons between themselves and the peoples of classical antiquity. On the simplest level these comparisons reveal a remarkable degree of comfort and familiarity with classical discourse on the part of Britain's educated elites. Because the prevalence of classical discourse made antiquity so familiar and because it contained numerous powerful examples of empires rising and falling and of imperial peoples great and not so great, it made a natural point of comparison. While this is particularly clear in the last four decades of the period, it is also discernible in the closing decades of the 18th century and through the early and middle years of the 19th century. Of course, such comparisons rarely came without some sort of baggage. Generally those who made them did so with the intent of making a particular point about the present state of Britain's imperial venture: that the British Empire demonstrated the qualities of greatness; that it was an agent of progress and civilization; that this or that policy was the right thing for the empire; that the British displayed quality A or virtue B, which explained their imperial success, and so on. Exploitations of this sort generally aimed either to create or buttress a positive view of British imperial character and Britain's empire. This in turn helped to rationalize, or justify, or simply distract from the exploitation and oppression that goes hand in hand with empire in any age. In this, classical discourse functioned as vital support for the construction and maintenance of a positive British imperial identity. This is exactly what we would expect based on the growing body of scholarship highlighting conscious and unconscious deployments of classical discourse for various imperial ends.

However, as I have attempted to show in this and the previous two chapters, classical discourse appears to have operated on a deeper level as well. First and foremost there seems little room to dispute the argument that the constellation of imperial themes rooted in classical discourse set the parameters for conceptions of empire and its possibilities, as well as the characteristics of imperial peoples. In other words classical discourse was a key source of the preconceptions Britain's elites brought to fundamental questions of empire and of imperial character. As the source of such conceptions it offered benchmarks against which Britons judged themselves, but also standards some aspired to emulate. In this sense it inspired a particular mind-set with respect to empire and a particular imperial identity.

And this brings us right back to exploitation, from which inspiration is inseparable. Those inspired to see empire a particular way by classical discourse – in concert as always with a variety of cultural and intellectual forces as well as contemporary events – used it to inspire as well as confirm similar views in others. Attempts at this are easy to detect; it is less easy to gauge their impact. But on some occasions that impact is undeniable, as with Curzon, whose views on empire's possibilities and the character

of imperial people were shaped by the way his Eton masters and Stephen wielded the classical discourse that was such a significant part of his intellectual universe. It is impossible to say for certain exactly how widespread this phenomenon was. But it seems unlikely that Curzon was alone. Influence of this sort is nothing like the 'tyrannical' or determining influence rightly dismissed by most students of classical reception. It operated only on the most general, conceptual level. But that level too is important.⁴⁴⁹ General concepts derived in part from classical discourse such as empire's potential magnificence, empire as a vehicle for civilization, and the special character of great imperial peoples – provided the general context in which specific ideas about empire, not to mention forms of imperial identity, imperial callings, and even imperial policies took shape. For this reason influence remains an important component of classical discourse's contribution to the culture of imperialism among Britain's elites; enough so to dispense with notions that we need only consider exploitation when examining its significance.

We will see remarkable confirmations of this premise in the next chapter, which examines classical discourse's foundational contribution to the notion that, for all its potential magnificence as a civilizing force in the right hands, empire might lead even a great people to corruption, decay, and decline. One might expect this contradictory caveat to cancel out the positive imperial imagery derived from classical discourse. Indeed, some commentators employed it to that end. Ultimately and rather paradoxically, however, the narrative of imperial decline and fall derived from classical discourse did as much to shore up the culture of imperialism among Britain's elites as to undermine it.

6

Classical Discourse and the Decline and Fall of Empires

Toward the end of his *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Gibbon confidently opined that ‘attention will be excited by an history of the decline and fall of the Roman empire; the greatest, perhaps, and most awful scene, in the history of mankind.’⁴⁵⁰ This was not a hopeful fantasy. His immensely popular opus became a historical classic before his eyes and stood as a key element in understandings of empire in antiquity from the publication of the first volume in 1776, through the remainder of our period. As we have seen, while he said a great deal on the positive side, particularly with respect to the peace and prosperity of Rome’s golden age and the civilization spread via Rome’s imperial conquests, decline and fall was of course Gibbon’s central theme.

Like the other imperial elements of classical discourse, the narrative of imperial decline originated in familiar ancient sources. Sallust and St Augustine spoke explicitly of Rome’s decline; Thucydides and Xenophon wrote of Athens’ imperial ruin; Arrian addressed the corrosive effect of imperial success on Alexander’s character.⁴⁵¹ Though working in differing periods and on distinct historical episodes these ancient authorities all agreed that in one way or another imperial success ultimately led to decline. Unsurprisingly then, Gibbon was hardly the first student of ancient history to put the question or offer an answer. Montesquieu and Hume preceded him by forty years and Machiavelli by nearly three centuries.⁴⁵² It just so happened that Gibbon’s treatment of the issue largely superseded those of his predecessors and became a starting point (and often the last word) for generations to follow, thanks to its style, scope, and historical situation. The fact remains, however, that his assertion of the link between empire and decline in antiquity was part of an exceedingly long tradition, which his work simply amplified.

In light of everything discussed so far it would be a great surprise if this element of classical discourse failed to make an impression on British writing and thinking about their own empire. One would expect some degree of concern over the empire’s future during our period given its importance

to Britain's material prosperity and international prestige, especially in moments of crisis. This would have been the case with or without classical discourse. But a remarkable number of contemporary sources incorporated classical narratives of decline. The most straightforward explanation for this is the influence of classical discourse via education and intellectual culture. It taught Britain's elites to see decline and fall as the pre-eminent danger and perhaps inevitable corollary of empire and therefore ensured that anxieties about corruption and decay were every bit as central to British conceptions of empire as happier tropes of magnificence and civilization.⁴⁵³

With a handful of exceptions such as D. Armitage, P.J. Cain, N. Dirks, W.R. Louis, P.J. Marshall, and most recently S. Patterson, empire specialists have all but ignored the origins of the decline fixation and in particular its links to classical discourse.⁴⁵⁴ Scholars of classical reception have naturally had more to say on the subject. For instance, J.G.A. Pocock argued that while contemporaries did not apply Gibbon's interpretation as a historical law, it still factored in their attitudes to empire.⁴⁵⁵ Linda Dowling argued that for much of the Victorian period, the works of historians from Gibbon through Niebuhr to Arnold (not to mention the ancient sources themselves) made the example of Roman imperial decay and decline a powerful warning to Britain's educated elites.⁴⁵⁶ Adler F. Furet, Larson, R.W. Rhodes, Roberts, D. Skilton, Vance, and Vasunia have all made broadly similar points.⁴⁵⁷

It is worth emphasizing this scholarly consensus. Practically no one disputes that classical discourse made decline a factor in any serious consideration of empire, whether by a thoughtful supporter, supportive critic, raging jingo, or vehement anti-imperialist. Ironically, this popularity highlights the fairly circumscribed power of classical discourse over Britain's educated elites. Though real, its influence extended only to suggesting general ways of conceiving the dangers attendant to empire – just as it suggested general ways of conceiving of empire's glories, the civilizing mission, the qualities of imperial peoples and so on. This is where influence again gives way to exploitation. Classical narratives of imperial decline and fall were powerful rhetorical tools. They were also flexible. Classical discourse may have ensured that those with a stake in the British Empire had to confront decline, but their individual reactions naturally varied depending on a host of personal and contextual factors. Commentators therefore applied classical narratives of imperial decline to the empire they knew in varied and sometimes contradictory ways.⁴⁵⁸

Dowling provides a useful starting point with her stress on the warning provided by classical discourse. The idea that decline followed empire presented a profound challenge to supporters of the empire throughout our period, especially those whose rosy views depended in part upon classical discourse. Confidently naive or intellectually dishonest imperialists could, of course, simply ignore any disquieting aspects of classical discourse that appeared to contradict their views of the empire. But a surprising number

of imperial enthusiasts avoided this craven and intellectually bankrupt path. Honest searchers for imperial insight within classical discourse had to take the rough with the smooth so to speak. They had to confront the trope of decline and fall intimately and irrefutably linked with the empires, of Rome, of Athens, and of Alexander the Great. Powerful, civilized, and sophisticated, each of these empires had fallen into ruin. The fact that these same empires, as presented in classical discourse, acted in some respects as supports for British imperial identity only made it worse. The unavoidable implication was that Britannia's imperial magnificence might well be transitory, that she too might have the *vitali lampada* wrested from her and fade into history.

The dominant reaction to the threat thus posed by classical narratives of imperial decline during the long 19th century was an attempt to show that Britain and the British Empire was or could be immune to the forces that had laid low the empires of antiquity. To exorcise the demon of decline, commentators had to create some distance between Britain and antiquity. But not too much, else the positive associations with other imperial elements of classical discourse would fail. Commentators dealt with this problem in two ways. The most obvious, noted by both Larson and Vance in connection with Rome, was a matter of finding a point at which the analogy with antiquity – and also therefore identifications – could be safely abandoned.⁴⁵⁹ One had only to claim that as much as Britain and the British had in common with the ancient empires and peoples, they were also unique. In this way imperial enthusiasts had their cake and ate it too throughout the period.⁴⁶⁰

The second, rather more convoluted way of squaring this circle was to embrace the prospect of Britain's (future) imperial decline. According to David Skilton this could bolster the positive associations with antiquity so important to British imperial identity. He recently traced the remarkable prominence of a very particular image of imperial decline in Britain during the century between 1770 and 1870, namely that of future visitors to the ruins of imperial London. Think of Macaulay's famous prophecy that 'some traveller from New Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's.'⁴⁶¹ Similar conceits appear throughout the century. This 'rhetorical device', Skilton argued, 'associates the fall of the metropolis and the loss of empire with the decline and fall of Rome, establishing by its classical associations... the transfer of empire (*translatio imperii*) from ancient Rome to modern London, and by the same device the eventual *translatio imperii* from Britain to the next great imperial power.'⁴⁶² The final point seems to negate the possibility that such close identification with the ancient empires could be positive. However it is no coincidence that Macaulay's 'next great imperial power' was an offshoot of the present British Empire. Even if ethnically Maori, the New Zealander's presence in London and his interest in sketching St Paul's speaks of a direct and profound cultural

connection to Britain. The fact that 'New Zealanders' had been 'civilized' to the point where they had mastered history and assumed the imperial mantle in their turn could only enhance positive views of the British Empire. In this guise the empire was, indubitably, a force for progress and civilization, impermanent perhaps, but the agent of an imperishable contribution to world history.

There is a distinct and very important subset to these constructive or positive uses of the 'classical' decline narratives that covers our entire period: those who exploited the worries aroused by classical narratives of imperial decline in hopes of shifting public opinion on matters of policy. Manipulating general fears of decline inspired in part by classical discourse and encouraging insecurity over particular imperial problems allowed commentators to offer their own solutions as prophylaxis against decline. Invariably these solutions served the author's personal agenda, advancing a specific policy or supporting a certain vision of the British Empire. Adopt this or that strategy, such commentators insisted – Free Trade, open competition, colonial self-government – and the British Empire would be proof against the doom that overtook the empires of Athens, Alexander, and Rome.

The obverse to all these positive or constructive deployments of such narratives, is their use by anti-imperialists as an argument against empire. With a few exceptions, this particular strain of exploitation only really became prominent in the debate over the New Imperialism during the closing decades of the 19th century. As Adler and Larson in particular have argued, 'classical' narratives of imperial decline offered a real boon to anti-imperialists, who needed something to counter the positive imperial imagery emerging from and supported by other elements of classical discourse.⁴⁶³ That this was a rather obvious line of attack does not make it any less significant. It got the wind up among supporters of empire. Classical narratives of imperial decline, presented by Thucydides or Sallust as well as modern authorities such as Gibbon, in a sense remained their Achilles heel, despite their long habit of creative circumlocution. They responded, for the same reason that anti-imperialists had no choice but to exploit this element of classical discourse, or to dispute the other classical analogies or anecdotes used to support positive views of empire. Failure to do so would be to yield a very powerful rhetorical weapon to their opponents.

These then are the salient points of the following, broadly chronological, survey of classical narratives of decline and fall within imperial discourse. Classical discourse ensured that the conceptual framework educated Britons applied to their empire included a narrative of imperial decline. Commentators typically applied this narrative to the British Empire as a warning – though with widely different agendas. Most commonly, it took the guise of a general historical warning, which could be dismissed by showing that Britain had learned the lessons of the ancient empires; though it was also used to draw attention to particular shortcomings, especially

as groundwork for suggested remedies. Later in the period the narrative featured prominently in the debate over empire, where pro-empire thinkers continued to exploit it much as they had earlier in the century, while anti-imperialists put it to the obvious use of dooming the British Empire to the scrapheap of history.

At the beginning of our period the spectre of imperial decline in particular seemed to loom over the crisis in America.⁴⁶⁴ Though not the emphasis of the present study, it is worth taking a quick look at the place of classical narratives of imperial decline in this context. For events in America, as much as the baseline of classical discourse or climacteric interventions such as Gibbon's history, made imperial decline a major issue at the very time when the empire's centre of gravity shifted irrevocably toward India.

Scottish man of letters, William Barron, made extensive use of the classical decline-empire link in his revealingly titled *The History of the Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity, applied to the present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies* published in 1777. Barron saw grave dangers for Britain in the American war. Writing near the beginning of the war, he had no great worries about the imminent loss of the colonies, but he feared that the conflict might lead to domestic corruption and decline. His understanding of Roman history told him that the concessions granted Rome's recalcitrant allies and colonies through the Julian Law(s) in the early 1st century BC led to social and political corruption in Rome and ultimately to the fall of the Roman Republic:

It appeared to provide full security for all the interests of all the allies and colonies of Italy; while it provided security only for the interests of faction. It appeared to exalt the authority of reason and justice in the government of Rome; but it banished forever both reason and justice from her assemblies. It appeared to establish peace and tranquillity in the state; but it gendered only convulsions, assassinations, and civil wars, and, after a few paroxysms, terminated in despotism.⁴⁶⁵

Having made his argument that concessions to colonists had brought the best era of Roman history to an end, Barron asked an ominous question of his contemporaries: 'What power will prevent Great Britain from sharing a similar fate in similar circumstances, with the republic of Rome?'⁴⁶⁶ The balance of his text makes his answer amply clear. If we avoid the imperial mistakes of the Romans, we will avoid their domestic fate. If we refuse to make concessions to the American colonists, we will be able to maintain the institutions and the character that made us great.⁴⁶⁷

At least one of Barron's contemporaries wished he had put his classical caveat in stronger terms. To John Symonds, professor of modern history at Cambridge, the example of the Athenian Empire offered a potent example of the dangers inherent to empire and thus a useful object lesson for his

contemporaries. Responding to Barron's commentary on Athens, Symonds argued:

Had our Author consulted the benefit of his readers... he would have shewn, that the ruin of Athens was owing to her cruel and restless ambition; and that her history should serve as a sea-mark to caution all states to avoid those destructive rocks, upon which she herself had split.⁴⁶⁸

While Symonds used classical discourse much as Barron had, he sought to make a very different point and so cast the relationship between decline and empire somewhat differently. He made no claim that empire was the special cause of moral decay at the centre. Empire was a danger only in so far as it amplified and reflected the existing flaws of the imperial people. In the case of the Athenians, successful first steps along the road to empire had awoken inordinate expectations of ever wider and more glorious travels, the results of which were disastrous. To round out his cautionary tale Symonds mustered Thucydides, Xenophon, and Isocrates. He did so with the intent of nudging opinion, and ideally policy, toward conciliation with the American colonists.⁴⁶⁹

If we compare Symonds and Barron, we find an interesting mix of similarities and differences. Both considered classical antiquity a suitable point of comparison with the present. Indeed, both appear to have been in the habit of using elements of classical discourse to sharpen their thinking on contemporary problems as well as their rhetoric. More specifically they both proceeded from the premise that a general link existed between empire and decline. At the same time, fears that the American war could be a sign or cause of British decline, that is, fears grounded in the present, sent both men to classical discourse in search of analogies. Both had the future strength of Britain and the empire as their primary interest, and both used narratives of imperial decline within classical discourse to communicate their fears and their suggestions to contemporaries. Nevertheless they came to very different conclusions as to the specific dangers facing the empire as well as the specific solutions to the problem of decline. Barron wanted the strongest possible confirmation of central authority over the colonies, whereas Symonds wanted a moderate stance that would eliminate the colonists' most serious grievances without severing the imperial tie. The intellectual and political baggage each man brought to the question doubtless explains their distinct takes on ancient history and on Britain's best policy toward her revolting colonists. For this reason it is impossible to claim that classical discourse imprinted a specific understanding of the precise relationship between empire and decline on all educated Britons at the time of the American Revolution. However it does seem fair to say that it imprinted many educated Britons with the notion that such a link existed.

Fears of imperial decline did not drastically inhibit the habit of identifying with the Greeks and Romans even at that time of crisis. Nearer the end of the American Revolution, one anonymous contributor to *The Gentleman's Magazine* adopted the revealing pseudonym 'Caius'. This was more than a casual identification via the adoption of a common Roman *praenomen*. It was calculated to demonstrate a progressive or reformist political sensibility as well as solidarity with the colonists by reference to Caius Gracchus, the Roman Plebeian Tribune renowned for his attempts to reform taxation, society, and politics.⁴⁷⁰ This was a subtle warning to his countrymen of the need to reform in order to avert disaster. The text of his piece drew a much more explicit connection between ancient Roman decline and Britain's imperial present. Addressing the editor of *Gentleman's*, Caius began with an intentionally chilling comparison. 'Mr. Urban', he wrote:

The affinity between the Roman government in its decline and the present condition of the British Empire, must be obvious to every political observer. A Briton who traces the course of events with an attentive eye will be apt to start back from the image, and to tremble for his country.⁴⁷¹

He continued with an illustrative analysis of Roman decline:

The revolt of the Roman provinces may be pronounced both a cause and an effect of the decline of Rome. Enervated by luxury and corruption, she was equally incapable of affording protection to the loyal, and of inflicting punishment on the rebellious.⁴⁷²

No supporter of government policy toward America, he used the familiar case of Roman decline as a warning to his contemporaries. Once again the decline-empire link (not to mention the 'affinity' between ancient Rome and modern Britain) is taken for granted. However, Caius understood and expressed the specific warning of Roman imperial decline in terms somewhat different than either Barron or Symonds. Luxury had corrupted Roman virtue and politics just as it was currently corrupting the 'civil government' and 'public councils' of Britain, resulting in the present 'cruel' colonial conflict fought solely 'to still the clamours of the people.'⁴⁷³ What Caius did not bother to explain – what he assumed his audience would know thanks to classical education and discourse – was the role empire, especially empire in the 'East', played in introducing 'luxury and corruption', and therefore decline, into metropolitan society.⁴⁷⁴

The prominence of this narrative made translating it to the present relatively simple. It helped that Britain – or at least a British proxy backed by the Crown – had recently made its own conquests in the East. By the early 1780s specific concerns had begun to surface over the exotic luxuries imported to Britain from India and the rest of Asia.⁴⁷⁵ Horace Walpole for instance saw

the East as the source of grave dangers. Writing to his friend Mann concerning imperial corruption, his thoughts turned to the Tanjore Affair. Early in 1781 he wove his friend a tapestry of woeful aspect, the central figure of which was the Roman Empire. He enjoined Mann to 'look into the Roman history, just before the fall of the Republic; you will find orations for King Deiotarus, and of proconsuls pensioned by tributary sovereigns – in short you will see how splendid and vile the ruins were of a great empire!'⁴⁷⁶ For Walpole, the problem with empire was the Pandora's Box it inevitably threw open. In Rome's case, the fabulous wealth of the East had turned the victorious citizens and officials of the Republic, formerly so jealous of its freedoms, into minions of the 'Asiatic Despots' whose realms they had subjected.

Events suggested that similar forces were at work thanks to Britain's successes in India. Walpole was among the vocal group that believed the Nawab of Arcot had co-opted one Mr Benefield, a servant of the East India Company, who had in turn acted as the Nawab's agent in bribing a number of MPs. The affair led to the formation of a Secret Committee of Inquiry and culminated in the prosecution of Sir Thomas Rumbold.⁴⁷⁷ The point to bear in mind is that Walpole and many of his peers felt that Eastern empire, Roman or British, brought not only Asiatic scales of wealth but 'Asiatic' ideas, morals, and practices. The elder Pitt epitomized this worry early in 1770, while speaking in the House of Lords. 'The riches of Asia have been poured in upon us, and brought with them not only Asiatic luxury, but, I fear, Asiatic principles of government.'⁴⁷⁸

While empire scholars such as H.V. Bowen have noted the pre-occupation with this frightening narrative among Britain's ruling elites in the late 18th century, it has rarely been related to classical discourse.⁴⁷⁹ Consequently, scholars have missed a key point in understanding why Britain's elites continually linked empire to decline, or to paraphrase Bowen, empire in the East to moral and political degeneration at home.

Consider Pitt's comments in this light. Although he made no explicit mention of antiquity, his concept of Asiatic infections – riches, luxury, and despotism – and empire as the artery through which they corrupted society's elite, derived from prominent elements of classical discourse.⁴⁸⁰ As much as contemporary experiences and accounts of the 'Orient' made riches, luxury, and despotism ('Asiatic principles of government') bywords when it came to Asia, classical discourse was the first point of connection between Asia and these ideas for Britain's classically educated elites.

Burke was more explicit than Chatham in this regard. Speaking in opposition to a Bill designed to restrain the Company from appointing Parliamentary supervisors over affairs in India, Burke built an elaborate connection between Eastern empire and corruption at home:

What, then, shall become of us, if Bengal, if the Ganges pour in a new tide of corruption? Should the evil genius of British liberty so ordain it,

I fear this House will be so far from removing the corruption of the East, that it will be corrupted by them. I dread more from the infection of that place, than I hope from your virtue.⁴⁸¹

He left his audience in no doubt as to the origins of his dread. 'Was it not the sudden plunder of the East that gave the final blow to the freedom of Rome? What reason have we to expect a better fate?'⁴⁸² Burke obviously felt this classical reference would be of value in arguing for restraints on the Company's patronage. But his rhetorical exploitation of classical discourse does not mean that he, any more than Chatham, was immune to its formative influence over his general conception of empire.

As I have been at pains to stress, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive phenomena. Sometimes the most natural historical analogy is one that actually contributed to an author's understanding of the issue in question. It seems just as likely that Burke's understanding of Roman decline informed his understanding of the dangers inherent in Britain's interaction with the 'East', as for the latter to have inspired the former. This is more emphatically the case, if we remember that a version of the 'Orient as the seat of corrupting luxury narrative' was present in classical discourse long before it became part of contemporary imperial discourse. Indeed, it is remarkable to find so much concern over decline and decay when the Indian Empire was still in the first bloom of youth. No doubt the experience of the American Revolution cast something of a pall over empire, though not as we have seen, a pall sufficient to dim more positive views of empire's potential. That in mind, we are left with little to explain the general fixation on imperial decay or the specific notion of 'eastern empire' as a corrosive agent beyond extrinsic factors such as classical discourse.

We will have much more to say on classical discourse's contributions to conceptions of the Orient, and especially India, in the next chapter. For now, I want to consider at least one example where the self-serving exploitation of classical narratives of decline is obvious. Such was the case when Willem Bolts put classical discourse to work in his *Considerations on India Affairs* in 1772. Dutch-born Bolts attempted to score a point in his long-standing battle with his former employer, the East India Company, with a pointed analogy to Roman decadence. He declared that the situation in India reminded him of nothing so much as 'Rome, the seat of universal empire; *during the last, luxurious, corrupt, and rapacious stages of that once glorious, but then degenerated and sinking commonwealth.*'⁴⁸³ His spite led him to attack the East India Company's administration; his familiarity with the British led him to use a familiar and authoritative element of classical discourse as his instrument. This was a clever and insightful exploitation of classical discourse, but one that depended almost entirely on its influence among his audience. Bolts took something they were already certain they knew – how empire sparked Rome's decline – and used it to make his point. Despite his profoundly

self-interested perspective, Bolts' arguments registered with Stuart, editor of the *Monthly Review*, who quoted him approvingly. Resentment toward Company Nawabs factored significantly in Stuart's reaction.⁴⁸⁴ But so too, I suspect, did the power of the familiar 'classical' narrative Bolts deployed and Stuart took pains to quote.

Through much of the 19th century little changed in respect of classical discourse's contributions to British conceptions of imperial decline. As in the closing decades of the 18th century, commentators eagerly exploited it in various ways: for rhetorical effect, to warn of the dangers presented by empire in general and by particular policies, to suggest means of avoiding decline. This exploitability in turn depended on the continued power of classical discourse to make a general (and sometimes even specific) link between empire and decline a part of the interpretive framework educated Britons applied to their empire. Gibbon's continuing influence helped in this respect, even if it did not reach its acme until the end of the century.⁴⁸⁵ So did the prominence of classical education and classical discourse. And of course, the on-going growth of the empire and its generally rising public profile provided ample scope for drawing warnings and lessons from classical discourse. Moments of imperial conquest, crisis, or debate – of which the century provided many – inevitably intensified this habit.

In 1805, with Napoleon's Army of Invasion menacing Britain, the author William Playfair made *An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations...: Designed to shew how the prosperity of the British Empire may be prolonged*. The source of Playfair's belief in these 'permanent causes' appeared early in his Introduction. Roman decline was the historical episode from which he extrapolated the 'causes that invigorate or degrade the human mind, and thereby raise or ruin states and empires.'⁴⁸⁶ But he did not neglect Greece. 'After the conquests of Alexander,' he wrote, 'the wealth and luxury of Asia were introduced to Greece'. This had dire results: 'shews and theatrical representations were after that more attended to than the military art; and cabal, intrigue, and corruption were introduced in the place of that manly, pure, and admirable love of their country, for which, in less wealthy, but in better times, they had been so highly distinguished above every other people.'⁴⁸⁷ Having established a paradigm of imperial decline via classical discourse, he turned to his primary task: convincing his countrymen that the best way to avoid decline was to rely on commerce rather than conquest for enrichment.⁴⁸⁸

Nor did circumstances have to be as ominous as the pre-Trafalgar days of the Napoleonic Wars to inspire a concern with decline that sent commentators to classical discourse for answers and analogies. In George R. Gleig's 1835 *The History of the British Empire in India*, the very success that had attended Britain's imperial ventures sparked just such a reaction. Gleig found the Roman precedent particularly disturbing because the East India Company had surpassed Rome in the speed with which it erected a massive

imperial edifice by a factor of ten.⁴⁸⁹ Rather than giving him cause to rejoice, this state of affairs worried him to the point where he asked:

Is it contrary to the laws which regulate human affairs in general, to presume, that an edifice which is run up, as it were, in a moment, must contain within itself the seeds of rapid decay, much more abundantly than a structure in the consolidation of which hundreds of years have been expended?⁴⁹⁰

Gleig plainly hoped that the image of Roman decline and decay would jolt his countrymen from their complacency toward India and give its administration the attention and care it required. From his perspective the recent renewal of the Company's charter, albeit without the old monopoly on the China Trade, was no cause to ignore the subcontinent and assume it would take care of itself until the time came to debate the Company's status once again. If Gleig's agenda is obvious, the source of his fear over what might become of this huge, relatively youthful empire without due care and attention is no less clear. It is easy to see how awareness of the Roman Empire's fate, despite its slower growth, contiguity, and more manageable overall dimensions, nudged his desire for the Indian Empire's success into worries over decay and decline – even when no immediate threat presented itself.

A far more compelling case of outright exploitation appears in the fierce debate over Free Trade with all its imperial repercussions. Archibald Alison's contribution to the June 1846 number of *Blackwood's*, entitled 'The Fall of Rome: Its Causes at Work in the British Empire', used Roman decline to attack very specific policies. Preparing the groundwork for his assault, the author began with a purple evocation of Roman imperial degeneration:

The Rise and Fall of the Roman empire is by far the most remarkable and memorable event which has occurred in the whole history of mankind... Less interesting to the soldier, less animating to the citizen, less heart-stirring to the student, [the annals of the Fall] are more instructive to the philosopher, more pregnant with warning to the statesman. They contain the only instance yet exhibited among men of a nation sinking from no external shock, but from the mere influence of internal decay⁴⁹¹

In support of his view Alison cited Sallust, who saw 'the corruption of public morals, and the selfish vices of the patrician classes of society, as being the chief source of the decay'.⁴⁹²

However, as the article proceeded, the author's real target hove into view. In a single sentence, he connected the familiar 'classical' narrative of decline to his own very particular interests in the dangers Free Trade presented to the home economy. 'It was the commerce of the East,' he wrote, 'which first

induced [the] destructive drain upon the metallic treasures of the empire.' He continued:

it was neither the superior military power of the barbarians, nor the diminished skill and courage of the legions, which occasioned the overthrow of the mighty fabric, but the *wasting away of its internal resources* – which was the real cause of its decay.⁴⁹³

This was the great caveat Alison wanted his readers to take away and apply to the present debate over Free Trade. It matched perfectly the take of his near contemporary, Edward Thornton, whose *History of the British Empire in India* attributed Roman decline to the exact same root: 'The growing demand for Eastern commodities consequent on the progress of the Roman empire', which drained it of its wealth.⁴⁹⁴

But Alison had one more bolt to spend and it took the form of a more elaborate comparison between Rome and Britain. He stressed 'the increasing luxury of the rich' and 'that very great importation of grain', which 'necessarily and unavoidably forced [a] calamitous contraction of the currency upon the Roman empire.' And, much to his distaste, he was forced to conclude that 'British policy has adopted the same principles, and done the same things'.⁴⁹⁵ He feared the results would be the same. This had not changed since Playfair's day; nor had it changed by the time W.W. Hunter, President of the Royal Asiatic Society, quoted Pliny's discussion of the negative impact of the Indian trade on Rome's economy, as an authority for identical fears fifty years later.⁴⁹⁶

Through the second half of the 19th century, a series of imperial crises kept the makers and consumers of imperial discourse mindful of classical narratives of decline. The Uprising of 1857, the Morant Bay Rebellion, growing competition from imperial rivals in the 1870s and 1880s, the Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Zulu Wars, the conflict with the Mahdi, the Boer War and so on, made decline a pressing concern.⁴⁹⁷ Classically educated Britons – more numerous and with more historical knowledge than ever before – did what so many of their predecessors had done. They looked to the first place they had encountered narratives of imperial decline, to classical discourse, for a better understanding of the issue and for useful anecdotes and analogies. As always, what they found often had as much to do with their own interests and biases as with antiquity; but this detracts not a bit from classical discourse's foundational role in their conceptions of imperial decline.

The events of 1857 obviously inspired some very specific fears. Writers in the periodical press drew on narratives of decline based in classical discourse to make sense of what was happening and to determine what it might mean for the future of the Indian Empire. Most, like Smith, Hamley, and Layard, dutifully sifted Roman history in hopes of finding the vital clue that would

spare Britain Rome's fate.⁴⁹⁸ The famous reformer and free trader, Richard Cobden, revealed his fears in a letter to his friend George Combe in 1858. 'I am afraid', he wrote, 'our national character is being deteriorated, and our love of freedom in danger of being impaired by what is passing in India.'⁴⁹⁹ This is a remarkable discursive convergence with the narrative of moral decline arising from imperial entanglements based in classical discourse. Cobden elsewhere made the connection explicit. His fear regarding the debilitating moral effects of imperial power only grew with the brutal efficiency of British (and Indian) arms in suppressing the 1857 Uprising. And by 1860 he had to entertain the real possibility 'that we may become corrupted at home by the reaction of arbitrary political maxims in the East upon our domestic politics, just as Greece and Rome were demoralized by their contact with Asia'.⁵⁰⁰ Cobden's primary concern was not with the fate of the empire but with what empire might do to Britain. His political philosophy put him on the alert for any and all threats to British liberty. But only through the application of classical discourse did his concerns coalesce around the notion of the domestic consequences of overseas empire. The corruption that apparently infected Greece and Rome on account of imperial contact with Asia helped him see how the toxic combination of enforced contact with 'Oriental despotism' and the exercise of *imperium* – might corrode the moral, social, and political fabric of Britain.

Between Cobden's comments and the flurry of empire–decline connections in discourse on the Boer War, authors such as Goldwin Smith, G.O. Trevelyan, Thomas Hughes, Robert Lowe, Frederic Seebohm, J.R. Seeley, A.C. Lyall, and W.W. Hunter introduced 'classical' narratives of imperial decline into their work.⁵⁰¹ Some, such as Goldwin Smith and Lowe, stressed the debilitating impact of *imperium* abroad on *libertas* at home in much the same terms used by Cobden.⁵⁰² Some, including Trevelyan and Hughes, focused more on the role of luxury in corrupting traditional mores.⁵⁰³ Others, such as Lyall, advanced vague accounts of central decline that could accommodate a variety of more specific explanations.⁵⁰⁴ Still others, such as Seebohm and Hunter, focused on those very explanations. The former argued that relying on provincial soldiers while not spreading democracy would mean the end of empire.⁵⁰⁵ The latter, like his predecessors Playfair and Hamley, worried at the economic drain caused by desire for luxury goods from the empire.⁵⁰⁶ But whatever precise form they took, classical narratives of imperial decline continued to appear in imperial discourse even in the period when Dowling claimed that new methodologies emphasizing epigraphical research caused professional historians to abandon didactic comparisons between past and present.⁵⁰⁷

Dowling's focus on the 'cutting edge' of the discipline explains this apparent contradiction. The rather less 'professional' realm of imperial discourse, and elite intellectual culture more generally, neither immediately nor completely embraced the philosophical revelation so pithily expressed

by J.B. Bury that '[o]ne day tells not another day, and history declines to repeat itself.'⁵⁰⁸ Many commentators continued to find useful lessons and examples in classical antiquity. As J.M. Robertson, author of *Patriotism and Empire*, wrote in 1899, the connection between decline and empire 'is the lesson read to us in age after age, in civilization after civilization, by empire after empire that has left only its ruins behind to warn us against the errors by which it perished.'⁵⁰⁹ Indeed, the decline–empire link became something of a fetish in imperial discourse during the increasingly intense debate over empire that gathered steam during the closing decades of the century.

This debate, which emerged in the 1870s, again highlights the fascinating and fundamental tension in classical discourse's application to Britain's imperial present. How did so many members of Britain's educated elites accommodate their desire and inclination to identify with the ancients in imperial terms, with the disturbing narratives of decline inseparable from empire in antiquity? As we will see below, empire's enemies had no such issues. They gleefully exploited classical narratives of imperial decline, which provided ready-made arguments from an authoritative source.⁵¹⁰ For many whose material prosperity and perhaps identity depended on the empire, such arguments were profoundly upsetting. Some ignored the uncomfortable consequences of identifying themselves with the ancient archetypes of imperial decay, decline, and fall. But others employed impressive rhetorical artistry to show that despite their cherished similarities with the peoples of antiquity, decline did not need to be the destiny of their empire.

Thomas Hughes, author of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, did precisely this in a piece entitled 'Problems of Civilisation' that appeared in *MacMillan's Magazine* during 1873. He tried to show that whatever similarities existed between imperial Rome and imperial Britain, there was a vital difference that could spare Britain from the fate that had befallen Rome. In his mind, Britain had reached a crossroads. Due to its imperial successes, a vital decision was in the offing:

whether we shall flounder on under the weight of increasing riches, till our vaunted civilization has brought us to utter anarchy, and so to the loss of courage, trustfulness, simplicity, manliness... or whether we shall rise up in new strength, casting out the spirit of Mammon in the Name which broke in pieces the Roman Empire, subdued the wild tribes which flooded that empire in her decay, and founded a Christendom on the ruins – which in our own land has destroyed feudalism, abolished slavery, and given us an inheritance such as has been given to no people on this earth before us⁵¹¹

It is no coincidence that Hughes began with a description of decline borrowed directly from classical discourse. By now it should be clear that such connections were virtually inevitable. Yet for Hughes, predictably,

Christianity was the talisman that distinguished Britain from Rome and made imperial Britain proof against decline and fall in the Roman idiom.

Former Joint-Secretary of the Board of Control, Home Secretary, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Lowe, identified a very different charm against Rome's curse only five years later. He noted that in the Roman Empire 'conquered provinces were plundered without mercy'.⁵¹² But, he continued:

[t]he way to grow rich is not to plunder and ruin other people, but to assist them in becoming rich themselves. The Roman Empire perished because the subjects were unable to endure the weight of taxation. England flourishes because her peaceful industry can supply the demands of her Government⁵¹³

Since the British Empire embraced the principles of Free Trade, the central government did not need to demand tribute of the provinces. Sparing her colonies the burden of such taxes and the abuses of peculating 'praetors and proconsuls' who collected them, Britannia had eliminated what Lowe considered the primary cause of Rome's decline and fall.⁵¹⁴

Speaking specifically of the British Empire in India, J.R. Seeley offered yet another way to distance Britain from decline while maintaining a positive connection to Rome in his fifth lecture on the *Expansion of England*. After justifying Britain's presence in India via comparisons to Rome's unparalleled civilizing mission he had to confront the issue of decline.⁵¹⁵ 'Every historical student', he wrote, 'knows that it was the incubus of the Empire which destroyed liberty at Rome. Those old civic institutions, which had nursed Roman greatness and to which Rome owed all the civilisation which she was to transmit to the countries of the West, had to be given up as a condition of transmitting it.' Yet Britain had never transformed itself into a military state for the purposes of conquest. The East India Company had done the dirty work. This insulated British civilization against contact with 'lower civilizations' and by extension the negative moral and political consequences of imperial conquest. Whereas contact with 'lower civilizations' had killed 'the Roman Empire [and] the Greek Empire' even as they raised the level of civilization in the East, Seeley held that 'England... is not weakened at all by the virtue that goes out from her.' Granted, the attempt to 'raise India out of the medieval into the modern phase... incurs dangers'. However, thanks to the East India Company, Britain faced 'no risk whatever of being drawn down by India towards the lower level, or even of being checked for a moment in her natural development.'⁵¹⁶ By these means Seeley managed to reconcile his imperial identification with the ancients to the inevitable worries about decline such identification raised.

Writing in *The Quarterly Review* in 1884, W.H.P. Greswell aimed at the same mark, but from a different vantage. He began by situating himself within the

on-going debate over empire – and incidentally revealing how far classical discourse penetrated that debate. ‘It is the fashion for pessimists’, he wrote, ‘to say that England, like the Empire of Rome, “*mole ruit sua*”; that she cannot bear the burdens and responsibilities of governing one-fourth of the population of the world; that even now there are tokens that she is tottering to her fall.’⁵¹⁷ He immediately took measures to undermine such arguments. ‘Such is not the case, and the analogy of Rome is not in point. Rome had no colonies in the sense England has now.’ Instead, he claimed ‘England’s colonies rather resemble Rome herself in her early beginning, nay, even in her mythical origin, when Aeneas led his comrades from Troy to Latium. The fate and subsequent history of the descendants and successors of those who sailed in the “Mayflower” are not unlike that of the exiled Trojans.’⁵¹⁸ For Greswell, eliminating the narrative of decline from comparisons of Britain and Rome was a simple matter of stating that the Roman Empire and the British Empire were different even while they were similar. He retained the favourable association between Britons and Romans by the simple expedient of turning to the heroic age of Rome’s foundation.⁵¹⁹

Writing in 1901, Bernard H. Holland, who was inspired to contemplate Britain’s imperial future by recent events in South Africa, deployed classical discourse in much the same way. He too began with a classical statement of imperial overstretch, this time St Augustine’s assertion that having grown to such an extent that she was not able ‘to carry herself, [Rome] may be said to have broken herself by her own greatness.’ But he quickly stepped back, offering an interpretation still based in classical discourse but not explicitly mentioned in the ancient sources. He took his lead from the ‘modern historians [who] have thought that the Roman Empire perished not from over-greatness but from over-centralisation, and the destruction of the provinces in favour of the metropolis’. Then, he made the crucial point, the point implicit in all attempts to distance Britain from Rome in terms of imperial decline. The ‘failure of the Roman experiment’, he noted, ‘does not prove that an empire which avoided... peril might not beneficially endure for a much longer period.’⁵²⁰ With notions that Rome’s fall necessarily foreshadowed the demise of the British Empire safely banished, Holland proceeded to argue that Britain had *already* taken vital first steps down an alternate path. ‘In the British Empire, apart from India,’ he wrote, ‘we have learned, taught by a most costly experience, to concede to the Colonies the fullest liberty consistent with the maintenance of a common tie.’⁵²¹ Self-government within an imperial framework was the key. This was the way to ‘avoid... over-centralisation, the disease which killed Rome’.⁵²²

Careful use of classical discourse enabled Holland to reduce the cause of imperial decline to ‘over-centralisation’. This in turn offered him the opportunity to distance imperial Britain from imperial Rome, at least in terms of decline. He did so by reconciling *imperium* with *libertas*, though that required the significant exclusion of India and some of the more recent

colonial acquisitions in Africa from his argument.⁵²³ Self-government not only exorcised the spectre of decay but ensured it would remain an impotent shade so long as Britain continued to embrace both *imperium* and *libertas* – or rather, use the former to promote the latter. So a ‘classical’ narrative of imperial decline became the basis for a positive representation of Britain’s empire.

It is remarkable how often those with pro-empire sentiments put classical narratives of imperial decline to this sort of use. This is perhaps the best evidence for the suggestive power of classical discourse in terms of empire and decline. It made the connection between these concepts so prevalent that those who wanted to believe their empire could be the exception to the rule simply had to address it. That they interpreted the specific causes of decline so differently and therefore offered such widely disparate solutions to the problem indicates once again the flexibility and malleability of classical discourse under the pressures of current events and individual interests. Clearly it lacked the power to impart a specific understanding of imperial decline to all educated Britons, even among those who could agree on the benevolent nature of the British Empire. Both the power and the limitations of classical discourse in this connection become even clearer when we turn to the other side of the imperial debate.

By the time of the Boer War a small but vocal anti-imperial chorus was well-established within imperial discourse. The origins of the war and its more or less disastrous conduct provided them with ample opportunity to exploit narratives of decline supported by classical discourse.⁵²⁴ In 1899 one such commentator, calling himself ‘Ritortus’, responded to the jingoism dominating much of imperial discourse with a finely drawn and purposeful comparison to antiquity:

We are usually proud to compare ourselves with the Romans of old, as well as compare our Empire with theirs, boasting that ours is even more magnificent and boundless. We confess that the England of to-day reminds us rather too much of the Roman Empire when it had expanded over the boundaries of Italy and made tributary a large part of the then known *orbis terrarum*. It was the time when, under the weight of tributes from the provinces, by the influx of African corn, and by the inroads of Oriental manufacture, the agriculture of Italy declined and Italian industries showed signs of decay; but when, notwithstanding all this, the wealth of the Empire pouring in from the provinces increased by leaps and bounds, and Rome was driven by elementary forces to ceaseless new conquests.

In good, and more still in evil, we should learn from this history. In vain in those times did Cato lament the beginning dissolution of the economical fabric of Italy under this new strain. The rising plutocracy of Rome, the Roman Imperialists, fattening on the profits drawn from the provinces, hated the inopportune warner, and called him the ‘Little Italian.’⁵²⁵

Alarmed by the connections he saw among empire, domestic economic decline, and the pressures exerted by those whose fortunes depended on empire to adopt an aggressive imperial policy, 'Ritortus' hoped Britain could avoid or correct these dangers if warning came soon enough. Roman history was the most powerful and thus the most useful lever he could find, given his countrymen's propensity to identify with the Romans in imperial terms. And while his primary concern was indubitably the present, Cato, who had railed against the debilitating effects of imported luxury, was still his oracle, an example for all those who believed in the existence and mendacity of Britain's own imperial plutocracy.

Hobson exploited classical narratives of imperial decline to the same end. Having proposed and pursued his famous argument through some 360 pages, he concluded with an elaborate and extended comparison between Rome and Britain. It was an informed choice. As a former classics tutor, he understood the importance of classical discourse in shaping and maintaining favourable perceptions of empire. So he turned it on its head, stressing the negative elements of classical discourse's representation of empire: especially the connection among 'imperialism', the decline of metropolitan society, and the collapse of empire. He argued that Rome's very success in expanding had contributed to the 'rise of a money-lending aristocracy' or 'moneyed oligarchy', which lost interest in 'military and civil service' and 'filled the high offices of State with their creatures.' The result was ugly:

themselves sapped by luxury and idleness, and tainting by mixed servitude and licence the Roman populace, [the moneyed oligarchy] so enfeebled the state as to destroy the physical and moral vitality required to hold in check and under government the vast repository of forces in the exploited Empire.⁵²⁶

Hobson then shackled the British Empire to the Roman, claiming that the 'new Imperialism differs in no vital point from this old example.'⁵²⁷ It too constituted a:

social parasitic process by which a moneyed interest within the State, usurping the reins of government, makes for imperial expansion in order to fasten economic suckers into foreign bodies so as to drain them of their wealth in order to support domestic luxury.⁵²⁸

Hobson located the problem at the heart of the empire, among a subset of the imperial people rather than contact with the East. But he retained the nexus of empire, luxury, moral degeneration, and decline so prominent in classical discourse. Just like Ritortus, he wanted to make the analogy between Britain and Rome unbreakable, to deny the branch in the road that imperialists argued would spare the British Empire from decline despite its

many similarities to the fallen empires of antiquity. His point was that nothing could spare Britain Rome's fate so long as it pursued empire.

Hobson's contemporary, J.M. Robertson, put this in even clearer terms. He deplored the:

uncomprehending way in which the British imperialist always scans the story of ancient Rome. Noting the decadence which is the upshot of the whole, he seems to suppose that somehow Christianity will avail to save later empires from the same fate, though Rome was Christianized during the decline or that the happy elimination of chattel slavery will avert decay,... or that industrialism will avail⁵²⁹

Having dismissed attempts to distance Britain from the forces of decline active in antiquity, Robertson naturally restated the anti-imperial position. In doing so he made a most explicit attempt to wrest classical discourse back from the imperialists. He went on to contend that military expansion – imperialism – had the following outcomes in the ancient world: 'decay of public spirit in Athens; decay of the Spartan ideal in Sparta itself; decay of vigour in the post-Alexandrian empires; decay of class cohesion in Rome; decay of the whole Roman system under the autocracy.'⁵³⁰ Ultimately, he concluded, 'the special cause of decay is just empire.'⁵³¹

It would be folly to claim that classical discourse determined entirely the way these men conceived of imperialism's specific evils and dangers. But their masterfully calculated exploitations of classical discourse show three things beyond doubt: it was a key factor in positive conceptions of empire among their countrymen; it impressed upon their countrymen the connection between empire and decline; and they believed it had the power to influence opinion. Though never more than a vocal minority, there is reason to conclude that their efforts to appropriate classical narratives of imperial decline met with some success. However cleverly imperial enthusiasts had contorted these narratives into something like support for positive views of empire, the ineffable connection between decline and empire in classical discourse always left them vulnerable. Indeed, if J.A. Cramb's *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* is any indication, the failures and frustrations of the war, in conjunction with the rhetoric of the anti-imperialists, had made it somewhat harder to turn 'classical' narratives of imperial decline to the support of empire.

But Cramb, past professor of modern history at Queen's College London, was game to try. Happy to compare Britain with various past empires including Islam, he reserved his closest comparisons for Athens, Macedon, and Rome. Here is a sample on the subject of imperial disaster:

The defeat of Athens, the downfall of Imperial Athens, after the Sicilian expedition, was a disaster to humanity. The spring of Athenian energy

as an empire was broken, and the one State, the one people which Hellas ever produced capable at once of government and of a lofty ideal, intellectual and political was a ruin[...]. A disaster in South Africa would have been just such a disaster as this, but on a wider and more terrible scale – the whole earth would have felt that decline!⁵³²

He tried to trump the negative implications of this kind of close identification in the same old way, with the assertion that despite certain important similarities in respect of imperial character and mission, Britain had broken from ‘thralldom to the past’.⁵³³ The British ‘empire’, he wrote, ‘is built upon a design more liberal even than that of Athens or the Rome of the Antonines. Britain conquers, but by the testimony of men of all races who have found refuge within her confines, she conquers less for herself than for humanity.’⁵³⁴

Cramb returned to this formulation repeatedly, revealing a certain defensiveness, not just about empire, but about the classical comparison-cum-identification.⁵³⁵ Indeed, though apparently strong in his conviction that analogies from the past could not predict Britain’s imperial future, he had to admit that the British Empire might well fall, which speaks to the power of the empire–decline connection. But even this could not undermine his confidence in the empire or his desire to identify the British Empire with the empires of antiquity. He took solace in the belief that if Britain fell, ‘it will at least be as that hero of the *Iliad* fell, “doing some memorable thing.”’⁵³⁶ This is reminiscent of Skilton: with the potential for future decline and fall enhancing the connection to antiquity in the present. Moreover, the ‘memorable thing’, pacifying, civilizing, and unifying the world through empire, only served to amplify identification with the classical civilizations, if not in every little detail at least on the level of world historical significance. As he noted, whatever its fate, Britain would do for the world what Rome had done for Europe.⁵³⁷

With this we have come full circle. Cramb’s relationship with the narrative of imperial decline based in classical discourse represents the dominant trend throughout the long 19th century. Attempts by imperialists to co-opt particular narratives of imperial decline may have taken on a rather more defensive tone in the period bracketing the Boer War in response to anti-imperialist claims that such narratives applied to Britain, but they had not become any less common. This was, as it had been at least from the time of the American Revolution, the default strategy of those in favour of empire. Few contrary voices were heard, and those mostly in eras of real crisis, especially toward the end of the 19th century. But regardless of whether individual contributors to imperial discourse sided with or against empire, they had all started in the same place at least when it came to understandings of imperial decline and fall. Classical discourse made both the general empire–decline connection and specific narratives of imperial decline part

of the conceptual framework they brought to empire. During times of imperial worry or even in quiet moments of reflection on the imperial future, these ideas naturally bubbled to the surface. But individual politics, personal experiences, self-image, and perspectives on empire – perhaps influenced by other elements of classical discourse – combined to shape the specific ways they used it.

Exploitation of one sort or another factors in virtually every appearance of a 'classical' narrative of imperial decline in imperial discourse during our period. This did not require – though it certainly admitted of – calculated manipulation. Ancient testimony and modern historiography contained variety enough to permit a range of interpretations. And yet, with the exception of a few notable anti-imperialist voices, 'classical' narratives of decline and fall within imperial discourse consistently worked to enhance a positive image of Britain's empire. Sometimes this was a matter of embracing the inevitability of imperial decline (albeit put-off to some indeterminate future date), which drew Britain closer to the admired empires of antiquity, and thus supported a positive imperial identity. More often, it meant claiming that Britain and the British could avoid the fate of those same ancient empires by avoiding their mis-steps, that is, by adopting different policies. Paradoxically this did not jeopardize the link between modern Britain and the classical civilizations. Careful compartmentalization allowed commentators to stress positive qualities such as the civilizing mission, world-historical significance, or character that Britain's empire shared with certain ancient predecessors, even when arguing that Britain had a distinct destiny. In either case the upshot was an imperial identity still thoroughly bound up with understandings of empire in antiquity. On that note, it is appropriate to turn to classical discourse's contribution to another aspect of British imperial identity, namely British views of subject peoples, especially in India: what some would define as the definition of the self by the construction of an opposite, an inferior 'other'.

7

Classical Discourse and British Conceptions of India

Considering only the narratives of decline discussed in the preceding chapter, it would seem that classical discourse contributed to a rather negative image of Asia. Whether we take Gibbon's link between 'Oriental traffic', the taste for luxury and moral decline, Cobden's fear that Asia would infect Britain with decay as it had Greece and Rome, or Seeley's assertion that contact with eastern civilization had killed the higher civilizations of Greece and Rome, Asia and Asians appear as dangerously different. Whether derived directly from ancient sources, the works of modern historians, or a combination of the two, with some contemporary prejudice thrown in, such negative imagery naturally tinged British attitudes to India.⁵³⁸ Other elements of classical discourse made similar contributions – not all of them strictly negative or leading inevitably to the entrenchment of 'difference', though in the end this seems to have been the most common result of applying it to the study and representation of India during the long 19th century.

No doubt most readers will find the notion that educated Britons exploited a body of knowledge to represent the 'Orient' as 'different' and inferior relatively banal. We are all familiar with Said's argument, glossed here by Prakash, that 'Orientalist textual and institutional practices created the spiritual and sensuous Indian as an opposite of the materialist and rational British, and offered them as justifications for British conquest.'⁵³⁹ Classical discourse can be seen in just this light. We have already seen it exploited to bolster aspects of British imperial identity. Why might it not also serve in representations of India designed to justify British imperialism? Though not focused on India in particular, Bernal's work certainly suggests that classical discourse did have some role in maintaining the rigid cultural divide between Europeans and the peoples they colonized.⁵⁴⁰ Whatever one thinks of the specifics of Bernal's famously inflammatory argument, it reinforces the invaluable general point that contemporary culture and circumstances did influence the way Europeans constructed and deployed classical discourse in regards to 'subject peoples'.⁵⁴¹ Problems arise, however, when what should be sophisticated discussions of mutual influence and interplay

between past and present shade into claims that the present entirely determined interpretations of the past.

As we have seen repeatedly, the complex, various, and sometimes contradictory form of classical discourse was not simply a product of present-minded and self-serving construction. For starters, extreme manipulation of classical discourse was difficult to carry off given the concentration of excellent classical scholars among Britain's educated elites. Just as important, certain stark images of Asia and of the relationship between it and Europe existed in classical discourse long before Britain had any meaningful or widely acknowledged stake in India, much less power over it. Even after India had clearly become the crowning jewel in Britannia's imperial diadem, most elite Britons would still have been exposed to 'classical' images of Asia (including India) earlier than contemporary representations of the 'Orient'. As Said himself acknowledged, these classical images could imprint certain preconceptions or expectations regarding Asia.⁵⁴² In short, while bearing in mind the familiar caveat that classical discourse was not all-powerful, we would also do well to remember that Sir William, 'Oriental', Jones and N.B. Halhead were classicists before they were 'Orientalists' and that Wellesley, Hastings, Cornwallis, Elphinstone, Mill, Stephen, Macaulay, Dalhousie, Trevelyan, Seeley, Curzon Cromer, and their peers had all studied the classics before they went or turned their attention to India.⁵⁴³ As ever, we must adopt a position that encompasses the poles of crass exploitation and tyrannical influence, as well as everything in between.

There is no better place to begin than with Sir William Jones, founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, philologist, botanist, poet, comparative linguist, jurist, historian, and high-court judge in Bengal. An exceptional man in any age, even one distinguished by polymaths and geniuses, Jones is nonetheless representative of classical discourse's contributions to British conceptions of India. Educated at Harrow, where he was known as 'the Great Scholar', as well as University College Oxford, where his abilities proved so prodigious that he was excused from the regular course of lectures and spent his time reading a remarkable portion of the Greek classics on his own, Jones was an accomplished classical scholar.⁵⁴⁴ But his engagement with classical discourse did not end when formal education ended. Classical comparisons, anecdotes, and allusions grace some of his most influential works and classical works provided models for works he hoped to write but never did.⁵⁴⁵ Moreover he identified very closely with the ancients, as suggested by his self-styled affinity with Justinian. Earlier he had modelled his life on that of Cicero, his favourite Latin author, and according to his intimates, read the entire corpus of Cicero's works each year.⁵⁴⁶ Quite simply, classical discourse was part of his fundamental intellectual framework. As such it bore on every topic to which he turned his mind, including Indian history, language, law, and civilization. The consequences for his conceptions and representations of India were significant. Moreover as *the* authority on matters 'Oriental' for

much of our period, Jones' work legitimized classical discourse as a source of knowledge about India. It also projected very specific images of Indian civilization, derived in part from classical discourse, to future generations of scholars, civil servants, soldiers, and statesmen.

The 'philologer's paragraph' of his *Third Anniversary Discourse to the Asiatic Society* contains the most famous appearance of classical discourse in his work. The 'Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity,' he wrote, 'is of a wonderful structure, more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either'.⁵⁴⁷ His subsequent remarks illustrate his equally famous belief in the common ancestry of Indian and European languages and ultimately their civilizations. To his way of thinking, Sanskrit bore Greek and Latin 'a stronger affinity, both in the roots of the verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source'.⁵⁴⁸

Approaching this claim from the perspective of classical discourse, the first point that strikes is Jones' comparison of the European classical languages with Sanskrit. Setting aside his desire to find the 'common source' that could explain the similarities among these tongues, the nature of Jones' comparison suggests that classical discourse had set the parameters he used to evaluate languages. Greek and Latin, in a sense provided the scale against which he judged all others.⁵⁴⁹ If, as seems likely, this was a reflexive comparison, we must also acknowledge that it was awfully well calculated to improve the status of Sanskrit among Jones' classically minded contemporaries. At the root of his respect and his desire to inspire similar sentiments among his peers was Jones' conviction that Sanskrit was to Indian civilization as Greek and Latin were to European civilization. It was the classical language of India, or, more accurately, of Hindu India. It opened the way to the literature and history at the core of Indian civilization, just as Greek opened the way to the literature and history at the very core of European civilization.

Jones developed the analogy between Sanskrit and Greek still further in a letter to his former pupil, Lord Althorp:

To what shall I compare my literary pursuits in India? Suppose Greek literature to be known in modern Greek only, and there to be in the hands of priests and philosophers; and suppose them to be still worshippers of Jupiter and Apollo: suppose Greece to have been conquered successively by Goths, Huns, Vandals, Tartars, and lastly by the English; then suppose a court of judicature to be established by the British parliament, at Athens, and an inquisitive Englishman to be one of the judges; suppose him to learn Greek there, which none of his countrymen knew, and to read Homer, Pindar, Plato, which no other European had even heard of.

Such am I in this country, substituting Sanscrit for Greek, the Brahmans, for the priests of Jupiter, and Valmic, Vyasa, Calidasa, for Homer, Plato, Pindar.⁵⁵⁰

Beneath the obvious attempt to provide a context for his current work that any classically educated Briton would immediately understand, and the equally clear strain of self-congratulation at revealing a previously 'unknown' body of knowledge, lurks something more interesting. Jones' excitement seems to have derived in part from the belief that he had discovered India's classical core, analogous to Europe's classical period.

A similar idea runs through his treatment of Persian in the Introduction to his *Grammar of the Persian Language*. Although 'the excellent writings of Greece and Rome are studied by every man of a liberal education, and diffuse a general refinement through our part of the world,' he wrote, 'the works of the Persians, a nation equally distinguished in ancient history, are either wholly unknown to us, or considered as entirely destitute of taste and invention.'⁵⁵¹ Together, Sanskrit and Persian formed a pairing almost perfectly analogous to Greek and Latin as far as Jones was concerned. They were the classical languages of India and so offered access to the core of Indian civilization. For, 'classical', as Jones and his contemporaries understood it in relation to European history, meant an essential or defining moment as much as a golden age of high attainment in the arts of civilization.⁵⁵² To understand classical antiquity via the Greek and Latin classics was to understand the essence of Europe. By analogy – and Jones was a great fan of such analogies – to understand 'classical' India through its classical languages, Sanskrit and Persian, was to understand the essence of India. There cannot be much doubt that Jones' understanding of classical antiquity's place in European history combined with his comparative instincts to make the discovery of a classical India all but inevitable.⁵⁵³ It helped that Jones made extensive use of *pandits* who were familiar with the great, the representative, the essential Sanskrit texts, as teachers and research assistants.⁵⁵⁴ Yet, that takes nothing away from the preceding point. Jones' historical sensibility predisposed him to seize upon their suggestions and apply them to a framework for understanding language, literature, and civilization borrowed from classical discourse.

Classical discourse's contribution to Jones' work did not end with his 'discovery' of this Indian corollary to Europe's classical moment, or its utility as a way of marketing Sanskrit and Persian to contemporaries. It was also absolutely essential to his research on India's history. To Jones' way of thinking India had no literary creations of the sort that suited his or his contemporaries' definitions of 'history'. The problem was that so much of India's ancient history was 'involved in a cloud of fables'.⁵⁵⁵ Jones found the absence of real history and pervasiveness of fable particularly galling in his work on Indian law, and claimed that the 'Pandits care so little for

genuine chronology, that none of them can tell... the age of Culluca', whose commentary on Menu's *Ordinances* Jones found enthralling.⁵⁵⁶ Given the methodological limitations of the day, this meant that much Indian history had to be reconstructed through outside sources such as the European classics.⁵⁵⁷ Jones may have lamented that 'neither the Greeks, who attended Alexander into India, nor those who were long connected with it under the Bactrian princes' had left more detailed and accurate accounts of India, but he eagerly used what had been preserved in classical sources to fill out his understanding of ancient India.⁵⁵⁸ He took 'the Grecian writers' at their word when trying to estimate the likely sophistication of ancient Indian philosophy, accepting their claim 'that the Indians were the wisest of nations'.⁵⁵⁹ In this instance, classical discourse provided a very positive image of India as the home of an advanced civilization in antiquity – in some ways more advanced even than the Greeks. Jones went so far as to say that the Greeks learned a great deal from 'the sages of India'.⁵⁶⁰

Many contemporaries echoed Jones' disappointment at the shortcomings of 'native' history.⁵⁶¹ Indeed, even his predecessors had relied on classical European sources as substitutes. For instance, J.H. Grose, who travelled in India in 1750, lamented the fact that 'we have no native writers of the country, who have given a succession of their ancient kings'. He had no choice but to turn to Pliny, 'who had before him different relations,' for an idea of how many kings had ruled in India between the invasions of Bacchus/Dionysus and Alexander.⁵⁶² Others, such as John Gillies, historian and frequent contributor to the *Monthly Review*, and the historian William Robertson, drew the same conclusions and likewise turned to classical discourse for specific information on ancient India.⁵⁶³ Inspired by James Rennell's *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan*, which relied heavily on Arrian, the latter composed an entire monograph on the subject entitled *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India*.⁵⁶⁴

In addition to all this valuable information about India in antiquity, classical discourse provided useful interpretive strategies. When Jones needed to untangle the chronology of various Indian law codes, he turned to familiar examples from Roman history:

The Sanscrit of the three first Vedas (I need not here speak of the fourth), that of the Manava Dherma Sastra, and that of the Puranas, differ from each other in pretty exact proportion to the Latin of Numa, from whose laws entire sentences are preserved, that of Appius, which we see in the fragments of the Twelve Tables, and that of Cicero, or of Lucretius, where he has not affected an obsolete style: if the several changes, therefore, of Sanscrit and Latin took place, as we may fairly assume, in times very nearly proportional, the Vedas must have been written about 300 years before these Institutes, and about 600 years before the Puranas and Itihasas⁵⁶⁵

However suspect the assumption underpinning this interpretation, it clearly depended on Jones' knowledge of ancient European history and more importantly, his belief that it provided the paradigm for linguistic and cultural development.⁵⁶⁶ On an equally technical level, classical discourse offered specific historical fixed points upon which to hang the chronology of ancient India. Thus Jones' identification of Chandragupta with the Sandracottus mentioned in the classical accounts of Alexander's life allowed him to establish a sketch chronology of ancient Indian history.⁵⁶⁷

Taking all these points as a group, we get a fair sense of Jones' reliance on classical discourse in his attempts to understand specific elements of India's past. Nor, as we have seen, was he the first or only one to use classical discourse in this way. Beyond Grose, Gillies, and Robertson we can point to Jones' near contemporary, the antiquary and naturalist, Thomas Pennant, who relied on ancient sources for everything from the etymology of 'Sind' and 'India', through ancient trade between India and Europe, ancient piracy in India, ancient Indian linen and pepper production, and the ancient state of Ceylon, to the navigability of the Ganges in ancient times.⁵⁶⁸ The famous surveyor James Rennell likewise preferred the classical authors Arrian, Megasthenes, and Pliny, to what he considered Indian fable, when estimating the antiquity of Indian cities such as Benares. Such was his authority, further buttressed by classical discourse, that contemporaries did not dare quibble with his conclusions.⁵⁶⁹ In sum Rennell, Pennant, Robertson, Grose, and Jones would all have agreed with the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, when he wrote:

We must still refer our first knowledge of India to Grecian sources rather than to any other; for, whatever the contents of the Indian records may finally be found to have preserved, the first mention of India that we have is from Greece, and to the historians of Greece we must still refer for the commencement of our enquiries⁵⁷⁰

The practice of looking to classical discourse for knowledge of ancient India and paradigms of historical development was not necessarily prejudicial, in the sense of entrenching 'difference' and constructing India as Britain's inferior 'other', even if it was indisputably ethnocentric. Indeed in some specific cases, classical discourse contributed to representations of ancient India as the equal, and on occasion superior, to ancient Europe. The linguistic and literary similarities suggested by Jones' 'discovery' of India's classical moment not to mention accounts of India's positive impact on classical Europe tended to bring India and Britain closer together. On the other hand, the absence of chronologically framed narrative 'history' from India's literary canon and the resulting need to rely on outside, usually classical European histories and commentaries, worked in the opposite direction. Absent a tradition of historical writing from deepest antiquity,

contemporary India was in a sense without history. Or rather, it was adrift on the sea of history, unable to fix its position much less chart and keep a course. This drew attention to significant cultural differences between Indian and British civilization, which seemed to suggest the inferiority of Indian civilization not only in antiquity, but also in the present.

This is a crucial point. Identifying the tendency among Britons to rely on classical discourse for ways to approach and understand ancient India is really only the first step in tracing classical discourse's complex contribution to British conceptions of India. We must also consider how the images of ancient India that Jones and his colleagues found there informed their understanding of contemporary India. And in this regard, 'difference' takes on a much greater significance. This is precisely what we would expect given the tenor of virtually all recent scholarship on European representations of the 'Orient', though it is by no means clear how far this was a deliberate strategy on the part of men like Jones.

At first glance the notion that classical discourse on ancient India might be a valid source of knowledge regarding *contemporary* India seems preposterous. But in view of all we have seen it was almost inevitable. Again, Jones provides a starting point. He could not resist comparing the ancient India he had 'discovered' with the India he experienced. The significant discrepancies and important similarities he noted led him inevitably to the conclusion that Indian civilization was at best stagnant and at worst retrograde. As he put it, India's ancient:

sources of Wealth are still abundant even after so many revolutions and conquests; in their manufactures of cotton they still surpass all the world; and their features have, most probably, remained unaltered since the time of Dionysus; nor can we reasonably doubt, how degenerate and abased so ever the Hindus may now appear, that in some early age they were splendid in arts and arms, happy in government, wise in legislation and eminent in various knowledge.⁵⁷¹

Even the best case scenario, stagnation, had serious implications not just for British attitudes to India but also for the ways they tried to understand it. In his 1787 letter to Lord Althorp, Jones compared contemporary Indian religion to classical European religion.⁵⁷² This led a recent biographer, T.R. Trautmann, to claim that 'Jones treats Hinduism as the living representative of the ancient paganism of Greece and Rome'.⁵⁷³ Trautmann got this right, yet he neglected what is for our purposes the essential point: in making this connection Jones implied that Indian religion had not changed since ancient times. He conflated ancient and modern India. And if they were more or less identical, then classical discourse was as reliable a source of knowledge for contemporary as for ancient India. Jones thus argued that familiarity with the four ages of time conceived by the Greeks in antiquity

fostered understanding of the four *yugs* central to contemporary Indian conceptions of the past.⁵⁷⁴ His countrymen leapt to similar conclusions. Grose drew on Roman parallels in his effort to comprehend the striking 'Indian' practice of cremation.⁵⁷⁵ The story of Zarmonochagas, a native of Barygaza (Bharuch), who accompanied Alexander back to Greece and immolated himself at Athens, helped make sense of contemporary Indian practices remarked for their exoticism.⁵⁷⁶ Another traveller of note, William Hodges, used Greek parallels to help his readers grasp the Muslim practice of burying their dead along the roadsides in India, stating blandly that the 'manners' of the Indians he observed were 'more than 3000 years old'.⁵⁷⁷ Robertson made an identical connection – give or take a millennium – in his compendium of ancient European knowledge of India:

in a country where the manners, the customs, and even the dress of the people are almost as permanent and invariable as the face of nature itself, it is wonderful how exactly the descriptions given by Alexander's officers delineate what we now behold in India, at the distance of two thousand years.⁵⁷⁸

Each use of classical discourse to explain some aspect of contemporary India reinforced the notion that while Europe had advanced from antiquity, building on the accomplishments of Greece and Rome, India had either remained in stasis or declined. So, notwithstanding Jones' indisputable respect for Indian languages and literature, his willingness to make favourable comparisons between elements of Indian and European civilization, and his thesis that they shared a common ancestor, he saw and publicized certain fundamental differences between the two. The most significant of these was India's apparent lack of progress, which opened a yawning chasm between it and Britain.

But there were other important points of difference based in part on classical accounts of India. Mastery of history we have already seen. Government, in particular the contrast between 'Oriental despotism' and European constitutionalism, was a third.

The *Second Anniversary Discourse* offers a perfect example. There Jones applied examples drawn directly from ancient European sources to the question of the proper relations between Europe, with its imperfect but 'happier governments', and Asia, with its traditions of despotism, known for 'benumbing and destroying all those faculties which distinguish men from the herd that grazes'.⁵⁷⁹ Though he could not 'agree with the sage preceptor [Aristotle] of that ambitious Prince [Alexander] that the Asiaticks are born to be slaves', he did agree that 'the Athenian poet [Aeschylus] seems perfectly in the right when he represents Europe as a sovereign princess and Asia as her handmaid'.⁵⁸⁰ In siding with the poet over the philosopher, Jones rejected what amounted to racial divisions in favour of a milder but still strict distinction based on essential cultural characteristics.⁵⁸¹

This is a perfect point at which to stop and consider the relationship between classical discourse and British conceptions of India's 'difference' on a more abstract level. Most have approached the issue with a Manichean mind-set. *Either* classical discourse inspired notions of India's 'difference' *or*, much more popularly, it was exploited and even manipulated to project such images. As a case study, Jones suggests that such approaches are insufficient unless linked. In the first instance, it is clear that classical discourse was part of the interpretive framework he brought to the consideration of India and its civilization. That is, certain images of Asia imprinted via his early classical studies predated his 'Asiatic Researches' and his personal experience of India. Certainly he would have been exposed to the ideas of 'Oriental despotism' and of Asia as a source of luxury and corruption during the course of his education. No doubt this predisposed him to look for – and find – such phenomena in contemporary India. Likewise Jones' familiarity with classical antiquity made it a natural recourse when in search of analogies and even data with which to illumine India's history. This habit inevitably opened the door to the present. Consulting classical discourse on any issue meant making choices – as when Jones chose Aeschylus' characterization of Asian traditions of servility and governance over Aristotle's. Present circumstances, conventional wisdom, and personal agendas inevitably informed choices of this sort. But at the same time, asking questions of classical discourse opened a path for it to influence the answers one found.

Such influence was not always simple and direct; nor was it necessarily incompatible with exploitation. The parallels Jones saw between ancient and modern India depended on accounts of ancient India contained in classical discourse, on Jones' research into Indian languages and history, his observation of contemporary India, and, of course, contemporary beliefs about Asia. Taken together these forces led him to conclude that Indian civilization was stagnant or retrograde, despite some great achievements in antiquity. The inevitable sense of difference between India and Britain following from this conclusion worked to support British belief in their superiority and thus in the validity of their imperial mission in India. But this does not necessarily mean that Jones had consciously set out to engineer or entrench representations of India's difference. It would be naive to think that Jones came to India and his research carrying no baggage as it were. For starters it is quite clear that he believed in the necessity of Britain's imperial mission in India. But, mindful of his identification with the law-giving Roman Emperor Justinian, it would be equally naive to deny that at least some of his baggage was 'classical'. The depictions of Asia and Asians offered by Aristotle and Aeschylus, not to mention Herodotus, Arrian, and Plutarch, are as likely to have inspired his apparent preconceptions of European superiority as the attitudes of his countrymen, whose views may also have depended in part on classical discourse.

Stepping back from Jones' relationship with classical discourse and considering its contributions to British conceptions of India during the later

18th century as a whole, several general trends have come into focus. We have seen classical discourse providing the paradigm for discovering India's classical moment; we have seen it offering foundational 'knowledge' of ancient India; we have seen that knowledge provide the basis for flattering representations of ancient India and the unflattering notion that since antiquity all aspects of Indian civilization – agriculture, government, literature, religion, and so on – had remained stagnant or declined; and we have seen how that notion could make classical discourse seem like a valuable source of knowledge about contemporary India. There is another trend, about which Jones had little to say, but which we have already explored at length: the danger posed to an imperial people by the Orient, including India.

There is no need to revisit this theme in any great detail. The reader will recall how Chatham, Cobden, and 'Ritortus' used such narratives to draw contemporaries' attention to real, potential, or imagined dangers to Britain and the Empire; or how Seeley sought to soothe imperial insecurities and encourage imperial enthusiasm by defusing this particular danger. In my opinion none of these figures sought to use the classical narratives of decline through Asian corruption for the specific purpose of creating difference. Indeed, the caveats they hoped to provide would have fallen flat had their audiences not already associated the 'Orient' with concepts like 'Asiatic luxury' and 'Oriental despotism'. But there was no danger of such failure; their audiences were well acquainted with such concepts in part thanks to classical discourse. Specific intentions aside, the fact that prominent commentators deployed this narrative so regularly would have had the side effect of reinforcing stereotyped views of India, emphasizing luxury, despotism, danger, and therefore difference. This did not necessarily lead to a positive view of the empire or Britain's presence in India, but it sent an unequivocal message about the status of Indian civilization relative to European/British civilization.

With Cobden, Seeley, and 'Ritortus', we have already carried our discussion into and indeed through the 19th century. In broad terms, continuity rather than change is the watchword throughout the period. The trends in classical discourse's contributions to British conceptions of India first apparent in the closing decades of the 18th century, especially in Jones' work, proved remarkably long-lived. For instance, the influence of Jones' scholarship led subsequent generations to take for granted the existence of a classical India, wherein the essence of Indian civilization could be found. A single example from the later 19th century will suffice to make the point.⁵⁸² Commenting on 'Classical Studies in India' in an 1871 issue of the *Contemporary Review*, the influential anthropologist and adoptive Briton, Max Müller, wrote that 'Sanskrit is the classical language of [India], the source of the spoken vernaculars, the key to the ancient literature, the background and backbone of the whole intellectual life of the country.'⁵⁸³ With this in mind it is no surprise to find Müller waxing enthusiastic about the relative demise of Anglicist

prejudices in Indian education. He was thankful that 'in all [Indian] university examinations Sanskrit now occupies the same place as Latin and Greek in Europe.' For, 'Sanskrit is the Latin of India, and, in an Indian university, it might fairly claim even a more prominent place than the classical languages of Italy and Greece'.⁵⁸⁴

This emphasis on the 'classical' was itself a British pre-occupation deeply embedded in beliefs about the proper education of an English gentleman. More common among Orientalists of Jones' vintage than Anglicists in the intervening years, it naturally resurfaced as Anglicization lost some of its appeal following the Uprising of 1857. Yet even if inspired by current events such policies were predicated on the existence of a classical India, upon which to erect such an educational edifice. And the paradigm for classical India was classical antiquity. In short it is possible to draw a straight line back from Müller's call for 'classical studies in India' to Jones' 'discovery' and popularization of a classical India. Moreover although Müller clearly aimed to cement opinion behind a new policy with which he agreed, there is no reason to think that he somehow manipulated classical discourse to create a useful comparison between it and ancient India. He was simply trotting out a nonagenarian notion, albeit one with the potential to exert a powerful influence over contemporary understandings of India.

None of this, least of all Müller's comments, should give the reader the impression that because the British decided classical India ought to constitute a vital element in elite Indian education it was considered the province of Indians. Classical India was in Müller's view the veritable possession of Europeans. It seemed perfectly sensible to him that European professors occupied the majority of posts at Indian Universities. He believed 'the foreign scholar is far better qualified to discover what is really important in the literature and history of ancient India, really worth knowing, really useful for educational purposes, than the native Pandit'.⁵⁸⁵ This idea traces its lineage not to Jones, but to the utilitarian political economist James Mill, whose 1817 *History of British India*, helped to usher in a much harsher attitude toward Indian civilization than that which subsisted in Jones' day.

Had Jones harboured such sentiments, he would never have learned Sanskrit in the first place. Pandits were his guides to ancient India, his facilitators in discovering and describing classical India for Europeans. Nonetheless, Jones' triumphs contributed to the notion that Europeans were better suited and better trained to sieve the remains of India's past, organizing, classifying, interpreting, separating important from unimportant. His monumental success was the prerequisite for the opinions advanced by 'friends' of Indian civilization such as Müller and enemies such as Mill. Even Mill, who vehemently disagreed with Jones' claims that Sanskrit was the equal of Greek and Latin and that classical India equalled or surpassed classical Europe in certain respects, accepted the notion of a classical India without quibble.⁵⁸⁶ Whether or not everyone agreed with the image of ancient India that Jones

painted, his virtuosity proved Europeans capable of mastering India's past as the servants of the Company had mastered its present. And so, ironically, Mill felt qualified to write a history of India without visiting the subcontinent, or even knowing any of its languages. He was content to rely on '[t]he meritorious researches of the modern Europeans, who have explored the institutions, the laws, the manners, the arts, occupations and maxims of this ancient people'.⁵⁸⁷

Continued reliance on classical European texts as the key sources for ancient Indian history helped sustain such imperious self-confidence. This brings us back to classical discourse's contribution to understandings of ancient India. The material culture of the Carnatic and Mysore reminded Bishop Reginald Heber so much of Greek ruins – then very much the vogue in Britain – that he concluded 'there must have been a time when these regions were, like ancient Greece, the nurseries of the fine arts.'⁵⁸⁸ In 1832 the authors of the *Historical and Descriptive Account of British India from the Most remote Period to the Present Time* relied on classical sources for much of their discussion of ancient Indian civilization.⁵⁸⁹ Nearer the mid-point of the century, Colonel Sleeman, formerly the East India Company's point man on *Thuggee*, turned to Greek and Egyptian comparisons to understand the origins of certain Indian gods and cited Arrian and Diodorus Siculus as the best sources on ancient Indian warfare.⁵⁹⁰ Dr Nolan's *Illustrated History of the British Empire in India*, published in 1858, drew on classical sources for everything from ancient Indian costume to character and stated outright that the Greeks were as important to understanding Indian history as the Indians.⁵⁹¹ In the mid-1870s the theological author and editor Charles Eden, found accounts of ancient Indian 'superstitions' and 'religious orders' in the Greek classics.⁵⁹² The historian Edward Stafford Carlos simply stated that Alexander's invasion was the earliest known fact of Indian history.⁵⁹³ Finally, there was Sir Edwin Arnold, poet, translator, and editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, who published a reflective account of his post-retirement return to India in the late 1890s. In it he provided a remarkable source for the antiquity of 'satti': the Latin poet Propertius.⁵⁹⁴

Beyond making the point that classical discourse was an important source of information on ancient India throughout the 19th century, the preceding list and even the tendency to see a classical moment in India's history might seem rather insignificant. On the contrary, the representations born of these habits of mind projected important messages about India and its status relative to Britain. It is still possible to see classical discourse contributing to a relatively positive image of Indian civilization – as with the two civilizations' parallel classical moments. On the other hand, the fact that so many commentators continued to consult classical European sources for knowledge of ancient India encouraged the belief that India really had no 'history' of its own. This in turn reinforced the idea that Europeans were the only ones capable of mastering India's history and by extension its present.

At other times of course, commentators like Mill made a conscious, indeed malicious, effort to convey this particular image of India's inferiority. Convinced that Halhead had been overcome by 'a love of the marvellous' in giving credit to 'the chronology of the Hindus', Mill lamented that 'the incredulous historians of Greece and Rome' had not left accounts of Indian chronology.⁵⁹⁵ For him it went without saying that such accounts would have been more reliable than any originating in Indian sources. In this he was hardly to be distinguished from Jones or any of the other authors cited above. Where he differed was in generalizing the specific point and applying it to the *present*.⁵⁹⁶ As the sole possessors of true historical knowledge of India, the British understood India's eternal essence better than Indians and were therefore justified – to Mill's way of thinking – in dominating its present and deciding its future.

With Mill, we have broached a different era in British conceptions of India, one where the imperatives of British imperialism play a much more explicit part in the study and representation of the subcontinent and its peoples. In his case an interest in justifying a version of the civilizing mission consistent with his utilitarian philosophy, led him to construct an image of India as uncivilized and backward. Many others did the same. Classical discourse remained a key point of reference and source of powerful rhetorical figures in such projects, as it did in the parallel stream of study and representation, akin to the earlier work of Orientalists such as Jones, in which the creation of difference between Britain and India seems more bi-product than primary objective.

To understand those who deliberately used classical discourse to construct negative representations of India, we must take a deeper look into Mill's work. His *History of India* was so influential through the 19th century, thanks in part to its position on the required reading list at Haileybury, that Ronald Inden characterized it as the prototypical 'hegemonic text'.⁵⁹⁷ Inden's characterization holds in respect of Mill's use of classical discourse. This took several familiar forms. A comparison of ancient India as described in classical discourse with contemporary India, was one method. 'From the scattered hints, contained in the writings of the Greeks,' Mill wrote, 'the conclusion has been drawn, that the Hindus, at the time of Alexander's invasion, were in a state of manners, society, and knowledge, exactly the same with that in which they were discovered by the nations of modern Europe.' And Mill had no high opinion of India in antiquity or the present. As he put it when discussing Hindu astronomy, 'the state of knowledge and civilization among the Hindus... bears clear, concurring and undeniable testimony to the ignorance of the Hindus and the low state of civilization in which they remain.'⁵⁹⁸ Here Mill connected ancient and modern India with iron links, all in the interest of portraying India as timelessly, eternally inferior to Europe.

Mill employed comparisons between current Indian beliefs and institutions and those of the classical European civilizations to the same end.

Struck by the severity of Hindu laws, for example, he compared them to the early laws of the Greeks and Romans. The upshot of his comparison was a claim that whereas the laws of the Greeks and Romans had gradually but surely evolved to a more civilized state, culminating in modern European Law, those of the Hindus had not.⁵⁹⁹ Therefore Indians continued to live by laws no more evolved than those draconian codes that had governed classical Europe more than two millennia before.

Turning to Mill's comments on Hindu rights of inheritance, we see him exploiting classical discourse to stress the inferiority of Indian civilization in yet another way. This right:

was first introduced among the Athenians by a law of Solon, and among the Romans, probably, by the twelve tables. The Hindus have, through all ages, remained in a state of society too near the simplicity and rudeness of the most ancient times, to have stretched their ideas of property so far.⁶⁰⁰

Not only had India failed to advance from ancient times, it had never come close to the level of civilization enjoyed by Greece and Rome in antiquity. The idea of property so important to contemporary Britain, and so manifestly absent from Mill's India, had been established at the very birth of Western civilization.

He used the same tactic when he turned to 'Hindu superstition'. He found it remarkable that anyone could forget 'that superstition necessarily gives way, as civilization advances.' His proof of this maxim rested in classical discourse. 'Powerful at an early age, among the Greeks and Romans, [superstition] finally ceased to have almost any influence.'⁶⁰¹ In a single paragraph Mill linked contemporary Indian beliefs to the most primitive stages of ancient European thought, denied Indian civilization the capacity for progress, and drew a rigid distinction between India and Europe based on this capacity. Each of these elements worked to the common end of creating an image of India distinguished by stagnation, backwardness, primitiveness, despotism, and superstition.⁶⁰² What is more, they reveal Mill's guiding pre-occupation with Britain's position in India: his desire to convince his contemporaries that India needed improvement along utilitarian lines and that Britain's responsibility was to effect this improvement.

For Mill there was no question as to the profound and ineradicable differences between India and Britain. He did not need classical discourse to suggest these differences, though it certainly confirmed them for him. Indeed, in his case classical discourse served primarily as a source of authoritative support for certain of his beliefs about India. His attitude toward it was quite simply mercenary. Whenever classical authorities presented evidence out of sync with his preconceptions and the needs of his argument, he readily parted ways with them. So, though he noted 'the reports of a high state

of civilization in the East... common even among the civilized nations of ancient Europe', he happily disputed the authority he elsewhere exploited. The 'acquaintance of the Greeks and Romans with any of the nations of Asia, except the Persians alone,' he wrote, 'was so imperfect, and among the circumstances which they state so many are incredible and ridiculous, that in the information we receive from them on this subject, no confidence can be reposed.'⁶⁰³

Mill's motives are transparent. He could not reconcile classical claims of a high civilization in India during antiquity with his own conviction that 'a system of law' was the only great political blessing which [Indians] are as yet capable of receiving' and that Britain was the only force capable of overcoming the 'formidable resistance' to progress presented by 'the moral habits left in Indian minds by despotism and superstition'.⁶⁰⁴ Others came closer to squaring this circle; but they appear to have been less extreme than Mill and more flexible in melding their somewhat milder preconceptions about India with classical discourse.

Take Mill's contemporary, Mountstuart Elphinstone, a prominent Indian civil servant who rose to be Governor of the Bombay Presidency from 1819 to 1827. Though less sweeping in scope than Mill's *History*, and rather less influential, Elphinstone's 1833 *History of India* nevertheless enjoyed a considerable audience, particularly among those members of Britain's elites destined to enter the ICS.⁶⁰⁵ Although he did not rely overmuch on classical discourse in the portions of his text narrating ancient Indian history, he made it a point of focus in the Appendices. There he discussed the sources for his interpretations and drew conclusions regarding the connections between ancient and modern India.

For Elphinstone, awareness of these connections arose from the intersection of classical discourse with his own observations of Indian civilization. He made special note of Greek accounts of the caste system and asserted that the:

arts of life seem to have been in the same state as at present. The kinds of grain reaped at each of their two harvests were the same as now; sugar, cotton, spices, and perfumes were produced as at present; and the mode of forming the fields into small beds to retain the water used in irrigation is described as similar.⁶⁰⁶

Even the 'dress of the Indians, as described by Arrian, is precisely that composed of two sheets of cotton cloth, which is still worn by the people of Bengal, and by strict Brahmins everywhere. Earrings and ornamented slippers were also used, according to the fashion of the present day.' And Aristobulus indicated that the 'practice of self-immolation by Widows was already introduced' in antiquity.⁶⁰⁷ The overwhelming impression is familiar: timelessness, stasis.

None of this prevented Elphinstone from noting that in some respects ancient India had enjoyed a relatively high level of civilization. In so doing, he contradicted Mill. Elphinstone remarked that the 'numerous commercial cities and ports for foreign trade, which are mentioned at a later period [of antiquity] attest the progress of the Indians in a department of which more than any other shows the advanced state of a nation.'⁶⁰⁸ Moreover, he paid close attention to the classical European accounts of the physical appearance and manners of Indians:

The Indians are described as swarthy, but very tall, handsome, light, and active. Their bravery is always spoken of as characteristic; their superiority in war to other Asiatics is repeatedly asserted, and appears in more ways than one. They are said to be sober, moderate, peaceable; good soldiers; good farmers; remarkable for simplicity and integrity; so reasonable as never to have recourse to a lawsuit; and so honest as neither to require locks to their doors nor writings to bind their agreements. Above all, it is said that no Indian was ever known to tell an untruth.⁶⁰⁹

Close attention to such descriptions did not necessarily translate into uncritical acceptance. Elphinstone took the unusual step of refuting certain aspects of classical accounts of ancient India by reference to 'the ancient writings of the Hindus themselves'. These texts showed 'that the alleged proofs of their confidence in each other are erroneous.' But this did not lead him, as such discrepancies led Mill, to reject out of hand all classical European testimony regarding Indian mores. He concluded that the classical description of Indian manners remained important 'since it shows what were the qualities of the Indians that made most impression on the Macedonians, and proves that their character must, since then, have undergone a total change. Strangers are now struck', he concluded, 'with the litigiousness and falsehood of the natives; and, when they are incorrect in their accounts, it is always by exaggerating those defects.'⁶¹⁰

In the end Elphinstone deferred to the overall image of ancient Indians preserved in classical discourse. Indeed, if the final clause is any indication, he felt some of his countrymen would do better to pay the classical sources closer mind, even though he disputed certain of their statements himself. But this more positive view of ancient Indians did not necessarily reflect any better on the India Elphinstone knew. The phrase 'total change' is crucial. Even if things in the present were not as bad as 'exaggerators' made out, the 'fact' that Indian manners had degraded since antiquity meant that decline even more than stagnation characterized Indian civilization. Thus though less vehement than Mill, more respectful of classical discourse, and rather more generous with Indian civilization in antiquity, Elphinstone ended up in more or less the same place in terms of India's present and therefore Britain's presence in India. By virtue of its progressive civilization Britain

occupied the salubrious air of the heights. India, not just stagnant but retrograde, languished in a malarial mire. Its only hope of escape was Britain, more particularly the Company (providing it enacted the sort of active educational policies Elphinstone favoured during his career).

The agreement between Mill and Elphinstone on the larger point of Britain's superiority and civilizing mission suggests that they approached India with a broadly similar set of preconceptions despite their vastly different experiences of empire. Elphinstone entered the Bengal Civil Service when still a teen in 1796, serving in a variety of military and civil capacities before retiring as Governor of Bombay in 1827. Mill made his contribution to the Company's regime in London and he famously had no first-hand experience of India. Given what we have seen in previous chapters, classical discourse probably contributed to their preconceptions about empire, though it is unlikely to have determined them. Certainly it did not determine their views of India; they could not even agree on which aspects of the classical accounts to trust.⁶¹¹ The influence it exerted derived from its status as an authoritative source of foundational knowledge of ancient India and its inhabitants. Even in that respect it proved both fallible and flexible: individual experience and perspective inevitably coloured the way that knowledge informed views of contemporary India.

Broadly speaking individual responses to classical discourse's testimony on India formed two parallel streams within imperial discourse through the remainder of the long 19th century.⁶¹² One follows roughly from Mill and the other proceeds from Jones through Elphinstone. Both ultimately reinforced the notions of India's difference and inferiority, which had already become part of intellectual culture as so many modern scholars have noted. But in the case of Elphinstone, this result seems almost incidental, the unintended consequence of honest attempts at understanding the apparent similarities between ancient India, as described in classical discourse, and contemporary India. The former, on the other hand, exploited classical discourse in a way that suggests a premeditated desire to justify Britain's imperial domination of India. The distinction between them is thus rather fine, a matter of nuance and tone rather than essence. But it is worth registering, if only to avoid a monolithic representation of Britons, their views of India, or their relations with classical discourse.

Gleig's 1835 *History of the British Empire in India* was very much in line with Elphinstone. He began with a positive appreciation of India's level of civilization from antiquity reminiscent also of Jones and Hodges. He wrote:

that the Hindoos were not only inhabitants of the country which they still hold, at a very early period in the world's history, but that long before they became objects of inquiry to European investigators, they had made considerable advances towards a state of high comparative civilization.⁶¹³

But he followed this respectful appreciation of ancient Indian civilization with additional information drawn from Diodorus of Sicily and Arrian. These classical authors confirmed that whatever heights Indian civilization had reached in antiquity, it had remained stagnant thereafter. For ancient Greek travellers through the regions equivalent to modern Bengal, Bihar, and Oudh, 'found a people resembling in every important particular the present possessors of these regions.'⁶¹⁴

A generation later W.N. Lees' discussion of the relative merits of Indian civilization proceeded on broadly similar lines, though to a somewhat different end. Lees' interest in advocating an 'Orientalist' educational policy akin to that expressed by Müller gave him no cause to issue a general condemnation of Indian civilization. Unsurprisingly, he too stressed India's high achievements in antiquity. Nevertheless by introducing the classics – Strabo and Megasthenes – to make his point about the greatness of India in antiquity, he drew attention to the degeneration of Indian civilization from ancient to modern times. That done, he could make the argument that providing Indians a classical *Indian* education would constitute a material improvement, by bringing them back up to the level they had reached in antiquity.⁶¹⁵

For all that Gleig and Lees may not have intended to use classical discourse in a way that contributed to notions of India's difference and inferiority, they too were in one way or another involved in the Indian Empire and very much invested in its success. Their co-ordinates on the map of the unequal imperial relationship between Britain and India inevitably coloured their attempts to make sense of India via classical discourse. If, as noted above, there remains some distinction between the work of such figures and the parallel stream of more calculated representations beginning with Mill and flowing through the 19th and into the 20th century, it does not extend to the outcomes of their writings. In terms of impact on attitudes to India, the two streams flowed together, the gentler one originating in Jones being subsumed in the torrent that Mill set loose.

It mattered little that Mill's perverse refusal to acknowledge the positive elements in the classical descriptions of Indian civilization revealed a profound bias. The British predisposition to look for and find connections between what they encountered and what the classical sources described proved especially potent when combined with the power of Mill's representation of Indian civilization as eternally static. It ensured that classical discourse, in a sense ended up permanently shackled to a representation of India that served a particular view of Britain's imperial mission there. With this in mind, it is not surprising to find so many echoes of Mill in subsequent deployments of classical discourse that worked to the same end. Such representations naturally stressed elements of classical discourse indicative of Asia's inferiority to Europe, as well as 'the immemorial conflict between the East and the West, which dyed red the waves of Salamis and brought Zenobia captive to Rome.'⁶¹⁶

The crisis of 1857 spurred present-minded imperialists to exploit classical discourse in this way.⁶¹⁷ The 'Mutiny' as they saw it, cast serious doubt on the civilizing mission's track-record and potential for success. At the same time it confirmed some Britons' worst suspicions about their Indian subjects. Thus in a remarkably quick-off-the-mark history published in 1858, the historian Sir Charles Ball portrayed the 'Mutiny' as barbarian resistance to a civilized state, much as Rome had faced. He followed this with the classically based claim that 'the Asiatic races have been unchanged from the beginning of their existence as a people... in point of habits and feelings, dissimulation and cruelty.'⁶¹⁸ To him it was just Indians being Indians, resisting change as always, preferring the languid inertia of barbarism to the discomfort of progressive civilization.

Still in 1858, Henry Reeve used his position as editor of the *Edinburgh Review* to call for the continuation of Britain's mission in India. He stressed the antiquity of Indian civilization and its timelessness: 'Deep in unrecorded ages, beyond the reach of tradition itself, lies the source of this mysterious and unchanging race.'⁶¹⁹ Such 'were the tribes whom Alexander met with when he crossed the Indus; such are the men whom it has been the fate of this country, for the last hundred years, to hold in subjection.'⁶²⁰ Note his direct conflation of present day Indians with those of the 4th century BC, but also the more subtle identification between his countrymen and the great conqueror, his triumphant armies, and, by implication, the progressive spirit of the West. These parallel conflations offered a salve to wounds still raw from the 'Mutiny', while simultaneously supporting the idea that Britain had a vital role to play in giving India what history proved it could not give itself.⁶²¹

As we saw in the introduction, Reed's contemporary, G.O. Trevelyan, used classical discourse to decode a variety of things he encountered in India. This habit almost inevitably drew attention to India's difference as may be seen in otherwise unremarkable asides on matters as banal as provincial railway stations:

Keep to the line, and you see everywhere the unmistakable signs of England's handiwork. There are colossal viaducts, spanning wide tracts of pool and sandbank, which the first rains will convert into vast torrents. ... Stroll a hundred yards from the embankment and all symptoms of civilization have vanished. You find yourself in the midst of scenes that Arrian might have witnessed; among manners unchanged by thousands of years – unchangeable, perhaps by thousands more.⁶²²

Britain builds; its handiwork tames the natural world, brings progress, whereas India is stagnant, unchanging, unchangeable, as demonstrated by the descriptions preserved in Arrian. In sum, Trevelyan presented a historical justification for Britain's domination and transformation – via 'English

handiwork' – of India. In this, he was perfectly in-line with Mill and the others whose interpretations of classical discourse led them to conflate ancient and modern India. This is hardly surprising given his position in the ICS, his training for that position (which included reading Mill's *History*), and his arrival in India shortly after the events of 1857–8, in a climate increasingly poisoned by mistrust and racism.

Twenty-five years on from Trevelyan we see an anonymous essayist on 'The Development of India' using classical discourse to make the same basic point about Britain's responsibilities in India.⁶²³ The author took pains to paint Indian civilization as utterly stagnant and completely without hope of advance in the absence of British superintendence:

When Alexander the Great was in the Punjab, tribes and dynasties were in existence which have not yet passed away. The Hindu Law was followed in the days of Lycurgus. The Hindu Scriptures are coeval with the Pentateuch. The churn, the mill, the wagon, the plough are as they were when the Aryans first learned the arts of rural life.⁶²⁴

Ancient India lived on in the present, unchanged from the days when Alexander and Lycurgus represented the acme of European civilization. But, of course, Europe had progressed since then; it had advanced in all the areas where India had remained stagnant. And this was the ultimate rationalization for maintaining Britain's position in India. Happily, from our author's perspective, the 'Zeitgeist of modern Europe is inspiring a society that still loves the ways of the ancient world.'⁶²⁵

Lyall echoed these sentiments in the last decade of the 19th century. He too looked to antiquity for proof that 'since the Roman Empire began to decline civilization has not been spreading eastward. On the contrary in Asia it has distinctly receded.' As far as he was concerned, 'the exceedingly slow advance of new ideas and social changes among the Oriental races prove[d] the strength of resistance possessed by barbarism entrenched behind the unchanging conditions of Asiatic existence.'⁶²⁶ Happily, for Lyall and his more sanguine countrymen toward the turn of the 20th century, the process of change appeared to be well underway. As he put it, 'the only important ground in Asia recovered for centuries by civilization has been won in India by the English.'⁶²⁷ This is a fitting place to conclude our survey of classical discourse's contribution to British conceptions of India. The civilizing mission – itself intimately linked to classical discourse – so central to British commentators' view of the empire as far back at least as Jones, was predicated upon there being something to civilize, i.e. upon India's inferiority. Classical discourse helped establish a historical case for that inferiority on account of its content and, more importantly, the interpretations that could be erected upon it.

In summing up classical discourse's contributions to British conceptions of India, we must as always consider not just influence and exploitation, but

the way they slid into one another. As a first principle it seems fair to say that classical discourse was a constant and foundational element in Britons' literary and – as we will see in greater detail in the next chapter – actual encounters with India. It was an important source of 'knowledge' concerning ancient India throughout our period. It provided a chronological frame for organizing Indian history. It also contributed to the notion that India too must have had a 'classical moment', an era wherein an observer could descry the essence of 'Indian civilization' not just in the past but in the present as well. But what of the consistent appearance of classical discourse in representations of India's difference and inferiority centered on the notion that Indian civilization was stagnant or degenerate?

It seems that on occasion such images grew out of benign or at least disinterested realizations of the apparent coincidences between classical descriptions of India and certain contemporary 'Indian' practices, manners, beliefs, and institutions. Familiarity with these descriptions may have predisposed Britons to look for and find similar things in the India they observed. However the widespread tendency to work around the more positive elements in the classical accounts of India, especially after Mill's *History* appeared, reminds us that the influence of classical texts was not without very real limits. Under pressure from the present, aspects of classical discourse sometimes took a form that did not correspond to the testimony of ancient authorities. Put another way, because ancient texts were open to interpretation and selection, classical discourse could be co-opted to support contemporary imperial agendas. Mill did so with ruthless efficiency to represent India's contemporary antiquity and thus justify Britain's civilizing mission there. Indeed, his hegemonic history appears to be an almost perfect manifestation of the common assertion that classical discourse was constructed to sustain Britain's imperial position and by extension that the colonial system encouraged the creation of bodies of knowledge designed to buttress that system. This is still something of an oversimplification, but there is no denying Mill's manipulation of classical discourse or its impact on generations of Britons. To find rather more compelling instances of influence and inspiration we have only to turn to the place of the classics and classical discourse on-the-spot as it were, in British India.

8

Classical Discourse in British India I: Coping with Life in India

Among the remarkable collection of Mountstuart Elphinstone's papers in the British Library, there is a tiny traveller's edition of the collected works of Virgil. It carries two inscriptions: 'M. Elphinstone Benares' and 'This book was given me by my mother in 1794; it once belonged to my uncle, Capt. Ruthven'.⁶²⁸ The book, so perfectly suited to travel, so evocative of family, and, as we will see, so in tune with Elphinstone's abiding passion for the classics, was the perfect present for a much loved younger son about to embark on an Indian career. That he carried it to India we know from the presence of 'Benares' in the inscription. That he kept it close through his thirty-two years in India is clear from his journals, which regularly mention him reading it. Indeed, Elphinstone's journals preserve a remarkable record of reading and study, much of it classical. The apocryphal story that Elphinstone went nowhere without his copy of Thucydides is of course hyperbole, but not in the way that might be expected. The exaggeration lies solely in the claim that it was always Thucydides. His Virgil, for one, was just as likely to be with him, along with any number of other books. On one occasion, he recorded the theft of fifteen to twenty books from his tent, including multiple volumes of Thucydides, Herodotus, and Cicero.⁶²⁹ And on his famous mission to 'the Kingdom of Cabul' in 1808–9, two of the five chests in his baggage were filled with books, including Quintus Curtius.⁶³⁰ These classics were neither ornaments nor paperweights. Like the Virgil, they were read, re-read, pored over, often, as we will see, in truly remarkable circumstances and with remarkable outcomes.

Elphinstone, who rose to be Governor of Bombay after distinguishing himself in peace and war was hardly exceptional in this respect and so serves to introduce the essential point that the classics made the journey to India. They did so, like Elphinstone's Virgil, in concrete form: in thousands of volumes carried across the seas and throughout the subcontinent in chests, boxes, saddlebags, trunks, and valises, coming to rest in the libraries of barracks, bungalows, clubs, hill stations, homes, and residencies. But they also came in non-corporeal form: in the classical discourse that was

part of the mental furniture that Britain's educated elites carried with them wherever they went.

Classical education was of course the foundation for both types of presence. In Chapter 2 we saw how pervasive it was among Britain's elites and had occasion to note its role in the Company's training school, Haileybury. Before the Company formalized the education of its civil servants with its own academy, classical education was not an explicit requirement; but it would still have been common among Company servants from the upper echelons of society.⁶³¹ As a product of this system Elphinstone provides an idea of what the typical standard of education was for an elite petitioner. Mr Stark, a minister of the Church of Scotland, tutored him at home until the age of twelve, after which he spent somewhat less than two years at Edinburgh High School.⁶³² He completed his formal education at Dr Thompson's school in Kensington, where he remained more than two years until leaving for India early in 1795. The results of this education are somewhat murky. According to those who knew him in his youth, Elphinstone was clever but not particularly studious. His uncle William, apparently only half in jest, called him 'an idle dog'.⁶³³ But in another letter written not long before Elphinstone's departure for India, he provides an important hint as to both the nature of Thompson's curriculum and his nephew's interests. He advised Elphinstone in no uncertain terms to stop wasting time translating Greek and instead focus on more strictly utilitarian subjects like writing and arithmetic.⁶³⁴ This is significant, for in addition to enabling him to join the Company as a writer, Elphinstone's rather undistinguished education inspired a lifelong passion for the classics.

The Company became more explicit regarding educational standards for prospective members of the ICS after establishing Haileybury between 1805 and 1809. The advertisement that ran in the *Gentleman's Magazine* to publicize the school indicated that: 'candidates for admission are expected to be grounded in arithmetic, and qualified to be examined in Caesar and Vergil, the Greek Testament and Xenophon.' According to the Court of Directors the goal of the school was to 'perfect as much as possible in classical and liberal learning and thoroughly ground [pupils] in the Religion, the Constitution and the Laws of their Country'.⁶³⁵ Among other things this meant serious classical teaching and study. Recall the testimony of students on the teaching of J. Jeremie and the searching questions on ancient history that appeared in examinations that we saw in Chapter 2.⁶³⁶ Recall as well how some Haileybury students at least came to identify themselves and their peers with the ancients.

If anything, the standard of classical training among the members of the Indian Civil Service improved after competitive examination supplanted Haileybury as the portal to the ICS in 1858. As both Vasunia and Larson have convincingly shown, the examination system was quite literally designed to attract and privilege English gentlemen, distinguished among other things by

their classical education.⁶³⁷ Of the eleven subjects in which candidates could choose to be examined, only English equalled the classics in the total number of marks available: 1500 as opposed to 1250 for mathematics and 1000 for the sciences, the next most rewarding subjects. The results were impressive. In 1860, seventy-five of the eighty successful candidates in the competitive examination chose to be examined in the classics; of those, seventy sought the maximum number of marks available.⁶³⁸ In 1869 at least forty-one of forty-eight successful candidates had received a classical education. No fewer than seventeen of them had received classical distinctions of one sort or another at school or university.⁶³⁹ And in 1875, 85% of those who took the examinations opted for the classics.⁶⁴⁰ Indeed despite periodic changes to the precise allocation of marks on the examination papers, the classics, including ancient history and philosophy, remained a very important path to success.

On the military side classical education was somewhat less extensive. At the Company's military seminary, Addiscombe, only basic Latin such as Caesar and Virgil was part of the regular curriculum in the early 19th century.⁶⁴¹ Yet it was still common for officers to have had a typical gentleman's education – particularly at grammar and public schools – before entering Addiscombe or going directly into a Company or Crown regiment in India. Even in the irregular Guides Cavalry, it was not uncommon for officers to have attended one of the great public schools and/or universities. Two officers in the unit at the time of the 1857 Uprising, William Hodson and Quentin Batty, had been at Rugby together; the former had also taken a degree at Trinity Cambridge.⁶⁴² And because Britain's socioeconomic elites dominated the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and Royal Military College at Sandhurst, which trained Indian Army officers after 1860, the majority of officer candidates had received some degree of classical education in their youth.⁶⁴³

All this classical training had a variety of traceable outcomes. For a goodly number of future civil servants and military officers it inspired the sort of lifelong interest that drove Elphinstone to tote his Virgil across the seas and then to and fro across the subcontinent. Even with its manifold failings, classical education convinced many Britons that the classics were delightful, entertaining, stimulating, improving, and useful. Consequently they featured prominently in the private collections of Indian civil servants, despite the comparative expense of books in India.⁶⁴⁴ Elphinstone's classics collection ran from Aeschylus through Virgil, with stops at Anacreon, Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer, Horace, Phaedrus, Pindar, Suetonius, Sophocles, Theocritus, and Thucydides to name only the better known. Macaulay too had access to a remarkable variety of classics while in Calcutta. Williams reconstructed his reading list over thirteen months. It included Aeschylus (twice), Sophocles (twice), Euripides, Pindar (twice), Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Quintus Calaber, Theocritus (twice), Herodotus, Thucydides, most of Xenophon and Plato, and Aristotle's *Politics*.⁶⁴⁵ A.C. Lyall's collection

appears to have been equally impressive, even if we dismiss as exaggeration his claim that the 'Mutiny' saw the destruction of a *hecatomb* of classics along with his other personal possessions. Happily for him, his father made good the loss with his own collection.⁶⁴⁶

Further evidence for the prevalence of the classics in India abounds in journals, letters, and memoirs of less prominent men, who recorded what they were reading or remarked on books they encountered. The soldier, deserter, adventurer, spy, and antiquarian Charles Masson (born James Lewis) found his first opportunity to consult Quintus Curtius' description of Alexander's campaigns in India and Afghanistan in the personal collection of Wilson, Resident at Bushir in eastern Persia.⁶⁴⁷ Clive Dewey noted that Malcolm Darling, an Eton boy and product of the competitive system, kept a substantial personal library while in India. It included such classical authors as Aristophanes, Aristotle, Horace, Plato, Plutarch, and Virgil.⁶⁴⁸ Volumes of the ancient classics circulated on steamboats and even garnered special mention in the advertisements for estate sales in the Presidency capitals.⁶⁴⁹

A brief survey of classical scholarship on the career of Alexander, created by Britons in India, provides further evidence for the physical and cultural pervasiveness of the classics in British India. Lieutenant William Pottinger, who served with the 6th Infantry Regiment in the 1830s wrote 'On the Present state of the River Indus, and the Route of Alexander the Great'. Alexander Burnes, whose death famously sparked the First Anglo-Afghan War, took on the same subject offering 'some Conjectures on the Route of Alexander the Great'. James Abbot focused on describing the terrain of the battle between 'Alexander and Porus' and locating the cities Alexander founded to commemorate the victory. Major W. Anderson, on the other hand, used the classical accounts of Alexander's campaigns in his discussion of 'the Geography of western Afghanistan'; so too did the founder of South Asian archaeology, Alexander Cunningham.⁶⁵⁰ Needless to say any Briton participating in classical discourse in this way must have had ready access to the classics.

The frequency with which the classics turned up in truly remarkable circumstances is even more indicative of just how widely available they were in India and how much a part of Britons' daily lives. Elphinstone again provides a telling introduction. We know for instance that he continued his intensive course of classical reading on his first long journey in India, from Calcutta to Pune, where he took up his position as the Assistant to the Resident at the Peshwa's court.⁶⁵¹ We know also that he carried the classics on campaign during the Second Maratha and Pindari Wars.⁶⁵² But one incident in particular, during his expedition to the then exceedingly remote and wild Kingdom of Kabul (i.e. Afghanistan) in 1808-9 stands out. On the banks of the river Jhelum in the Punjab, surrounded by the distinctive red hills looming over the island-dotted waters, he and the other British members of the expedition, gathered together to read Quintus Curtius'

description of Alexander the Great's campaigns in the region. To their great delight, the scene before them matched 'precisely' Curtius' description of the point where Alexander had crossed the river Hydaspes and defeated King Porus in 326 BC.⁶⁵³ Presumably he had consulted the same source ten days earlier, when bad weather called a halt to the progress of their baggage. Elphinstone, with four of his colleagues, had used the delay to undertake a taxing day's ride in search of the ruins of Taxila: the city where Alexander the Great had found his first ally among the Kings of India.⁶⁵⁴ His Curtius must also have gotten some attention on the outward journey, when Elphinstone had found himself on the banks of another river made famous in the chronicles of Alexander's career. The published account of the expedition preserves his description of the moment:

After crossing a small canal, and passing through some fields, we left the woods, and at length reached the banks of the Hyphasis [Beas]. I was much disappointed in the breadth of the river, as well as with the appearance of its shores; but it was impossible to look without interest on a stream which had borne the fleet of Alexander.⁶⁵⁵

All in all Elphinstone must be considered one of the most astonishingly peripatetic readers of the classics in history – certainly a rival to Alexander the Great, whose copy of the *Iliad* accompanied him throughout his conquests.⁶⁵⁶ But he and his colleagues were by no means the only ones to lug their ancient sources into remote corners of the subcontinent and through dark and dangerous days. William Hodson was also in the habit of carrying volumes of the classics (and other works) with him on his peregrinations with the Guides. One of his letters suggests that this was more or less typical behaviour. In it he describes the distress of the officers – in a flying column of regular forces advancing on Peshawar during the Second Anglo–Sikh War – at the absence of books, suggesting that under all but the most extreme circumstances officers were accustomed to travelling with books – including the classics – close to hand.⁶⁵⁷ Colonels R.A. Wauchope and Sir Harold Deane certainly appear to have had their classics to hand in the North-West Frontier Province.⁶⁵⁸ And eight decades after Elphinstone's excursion to Taxila, the civil servant George Elsmie and his party took a similar detour, classics in hand. They 'halted at Sukheki, from which we proposed to visit the rocky hill of Sangala, some thirteen or fourteen miles distant, believed to be the ancient capital of the Kathaeans, the scene of one of Alexander's great battles.' The cost was a six hour round trip by mail cart and horseback. Elsmie considered it well worth the effort on account of the 'many traces of old brick buildings [and the] *palus* or marsh near the base was just as described by Arrian.'⁶⁵⁹

There is an element of tourism in Elsmie and Elphinstone's actions, something like a South Asian appendix to the Grand Tour, albeit one especially laden with fantasy and romance. But they nevertheless reinforce a very

important point. The classics were not simply gathering dust; they were being read. Once again Elphinstone instructs us. Unable or unwilling to heed his uncle's advice about wasting his time with the classics, his journals, letters, and published writings of Indian vintage show an almost insatiable passion for the classics – and for reading more generally. If Choksey's assessment is correct, and I see no need to dispute it, the seed planted by his education germinated during Elphinstone's posting to Benares between 1796 and 1800. Elphinstone's journals from this early period have not survived, though certain letters along with later references to his days in Benares and Mirzapore indicate a busy routine of classical study to fill the hours his miniscule responsibilities left free.⁶⁶⁰ Certainly from the time his journals pick up again in January of 1801, just before his brief sojourn in Fort William College,⁶⁶¹ daily classical reading had become the norm for Elphinstone.

As an example, consider his activities on 3 August 1806. On that day Elphinstone had sufficient leisure time from his duties as Resident at Nagpoor not only to read substantial chunks of books II and III of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, but also to reflect on what he had read and record his thoughts.⁶⁶² That was routine. His journals frequently record sustained bouts of intense study. Between January of 1801 and March of 1802, his journal shows that he read portions of Homer, Horace, Virgil, Hesiod, as well as some of Anacreon, and Herodotus, Museus, Phaedrus, Sappho, Theocritus, and Pindar – the last in translation. The most revealing piece of evidence in this particular journal is not the variety and volume of classical authors he read, but the fact that most of the Horace and Homer and all of the Virgil, Hesiod, Pindar, and Theocritus he studied during this period, were read *after* a solemn undertaking on 21 April 1801, to read only Persian classics from that point forward. Nor was his reading superficial. There is considerable evidence for very active and critical reading of the classics, as when, during his long journey to Pune he took special care to mark the 'excellent, very good, and good passages' in Horace's *Odes*, or when he took the time to analyse what inspiration might be derived by modern patriots from Tyrtaeus' elegies.⁶⁶³ A similar story is told in his later journals and one could go on at length tracing the catalogue of classical reading by Elphinstone throughout, and indeed beyond his Indian career.

Numerous others appear to have maintained a broadly similar relationship with the classics and classical discourse in India, at least if Heber, Macaulay, Alexander Burnes, A.C. Lyall, William Hodson, Herbert Edwardes, G.O. Trevelyan, R.N. Cust, and R. Temple, or any other of the Anglo-Indians mentioned above (and below) are an indication.⁶⁶⁴ But if it is clear that the classics and engagement with classical discourse remained a significant part of elite culture and experience even after the long journey from the metropole to the periphery, there remains the rather more interesting question of what it meant to read the classics, to engage in classical discourse,

in India. I trust we have already seen enough to dispense with notions that they were being read in a way dissociated from daily life, from what Britons saw, thought, and did in India. In its Indian iteration, classical discourse constituted a dynamic, captivating cultural phenomenon – with the power to evoke, excite, inspire and inform – not to mention a source of precedents to be mined, refined, and deployed to justify specific facets of Britain's imperial project in India. In this I agree entirely with Vasunia, who noted recently that the classics 'were not just part of a Victorian national culture in Britain but also of the colonial experience in places such as India.'⁶⁶⁵ These two streams were never entirely separate of course. They intersected throughout the century, but there were significant differences as well as similarities between them.

In India, the classics and classical discourse made a varied, complex, and surprisingly intense contribution to British attitudes and experiences. Taking Elphinstone as a paradigm, engagement with classical discourse seems to have served no fewer than four distinct but interconnected functions. First, it provided entertainment and relief from boredom. Second, as we saw in the last chapter, it was a storehouse of 'knowledge' about ancient and modern India. Third, it served as coping mechanism against the manifold stresses and anxieties of his professional responsibilities, of his physical and cultural dislocation, and even of combat. Fourth, it constituted a body of 'secret knowledge', mastery of which helped an individual make connections with his countrymen, demonstrate his conformity with the dominant corporate identity of the imperial elite, and simultaneously advertise his membership and status within that august group. Inevitably this simultaneously deepened the gulf between imperial agents and imperial subjects, reinforcing the sense of difference and thus of British superiority. There were probably very few men for whom engagement with classical discourse was all of these things all of the time; but taking the century as a whole, and the Anglo-Indian elite as a whole, these same themes appear again and again. The remainder of this chapter focuses on points one through three: classical discourse as recreation, as coping mechanism, and as source of knowledge.

The first of these, recreation, is very straightforward. Quite some time ago Hutchins argued that 'English diversions from work' tended to be 'strenuous' and 'masculine' things like 'riding and pig-sticking'.⁶⁶⁶ This is a little misleading. Sporting pursuits were of course very popular – Elphinstone for one appreciated both riding and pig-sticking. But physical outdoor pursuits, including cricket, by no means excluded interests in other pastimes. Gambling and debauchery no doubt did for some. Worship, 'Oriental' scholarship, numismatics, mess-life, music, painting, and/or poetry did for others. Elphinstone largely filled his free time with literary pursuits – especially the classics. He had a close circle of friends – Jenkins, Kennedy, Davis, Malcolm, Munro, Shingle, and Steele – with similar inclinations.⁶⁶⁷ We have already seen others whose interest in the classics was at least somewhat recreational – Macaulay,

Hodson, Lyall, and Darling among them. To these we can easily add N.B. Halhead, whose contributions to classical discourse bracketed his Indian career, G.O. Trevelyan, who found amusement in writing parodies of Horace's *Odes*, and Edward Lear and Lord Cromer, who passed their free time talking Greek literature among other things.⁶⁶⁸

While recreation is sometimes just that, there are deeper currents at work in virtually all of the cases just mentioned: everything from attempts at self-improvement and social climbing, through tightening important social networks, to dealing with the many stresses of work and life among the imperial elite. This notion of a classical coping mechanism, as it were, is a good a place to begin our exploration of these deeper and ultimately more significant currents. Elphinstone again provides a point of departure. Recall the inscriptions in his *Virgil*. We can safely conclude that he made them during his first posting in India, Benares, where from 1796 to 1800 he was assistant to the magistrate, Samuel Davis. Though his first impression of India was positive, and his letters home indicate that he was happy, the transition from schoolboy to junior civil servant must have been stressful.⁶⁶⁹

The environmental-cum-cultural transition from West London to Benares alone must have been staggering. The 'Rome of India' as it is sometimes known was still described by Reginald Heber, Bishop of Calcutta, a generation after Elphinstone's arrival as 'a very remarkable city, more entirely and characteristically Eastern than any I have encountered.'⁶⁷⁰ It is easy to imagine the callow sixteen year-old Scot's reaction to the 'narrow' streets and 'lofty' houses 'richly embellished with verandahs [and] galleries', the many temples, 'the beautiful and elaborate carvings of flowers, animals, and palm branches', the crowds of sacred bulls and monkeys, of fakirs, beggars, and pilgrims, 'the unceasing tinkling and strumming of *vinas*, *biyals* and other discordant instruments', and the 'paintings in gaudy colours of flower-pots, men, women, bulls, elephants, gods and goddesses in all their many-formed, many-headed, many-handed, many-weaponed varieties.'⁶⁷¹ Suffice it to say that the scene must have seemed every bit as exotic to the young man with the volume of *Virgil* in his pocket, as it did to the Bishop. No doubt it was very exciting but it must also have been dislocating and on some levels perhaps even disturbing.

It appears as though retreat to the familiar world of the classics provided a temporary escape from the stress of his alien surroundings as well as a wealth of comforting images he could project onto those surroundings. It helped Elphinstone 'tame' exotic India, or more accurately, manage a variety of emotional stresses arising from his situation as an exotic in India. To be frank, this notion of a classical coping mechanism is one of the more speculative, but also I think more novel and interesting possibilities suggested by Elphinstone's engagement with the classics. Two psychological concepts are central to this line of analysis: stress and coping. The psychological sciences have not provided a precise definition of stress, but there is an abundance

of work outlining a great many familiar causes thereof.⁶⁷² There is more consensus among specialists on the concept of coping, which is commonly defined, following the work of Richard Lazarus as 'what an individual thinks and does in an effort to deal with demands that tax or exceed resources.'⁶⁷³

Viewing Elphinstone's engagement with the classics through the lens of coping need not lead to simplistic conclusions that he was psychologically damaged: quite the opposite.⁶⁷⁴ Though he did struggle on occasion with 'the blue devils' and with various kinds of stress, he always retained the ability to function socially and professionally. Like most people he had developed a variety of conscious and unconscious strategies to deal with stress. His personal constellation of strategies included classical study, which seems to have functioned as what specialists call emotion-focused or palliative coping. Simply put, it made him feel better when under stress.⁶⁷⁵ Three examples will suffice to make the point.

In March of 1801, Elphinstone began an eleven-month odyssey from Calcutta to Pune to take up his new post as assistant to the Resident in the Peshwa's court. Early in the journey, at the end of a day's march, Elphinstone and his travelling companions made a picturesque camp where Chilka Lake met the sea. His journal describes the evening. It began with 'some of the 9th book of Virgil, the battle at the Trojan Wall'. Later he set aside the ever-present Virgil and chatted with his companions, who then joined him in walking down to the seaside. After his companions took their leave, Elphinstone went alone 'to bathe in the lake'. His evening concluded with a long constitutional on the seashore, which in a sense brought him full circle, as the sight of the sea brought to mind 'the descriptions and figures taken from it in Homer and Virgil.'⁶⁷⁶

It is speculative, but not entirely unreasonable to think that projecting familiar metaphors upon this unfamiliar scene, seeing in the Bay of Bengal a 'wine-dark sea', so to speak, made it and the whole situation seem somehow less alien and therefore less disconcerting. There is no reason to think that Elphinstone was suffering from any kind of acute stress brought on by his physical surroundings, given his leisurely ablutions and ambles. He had grown enough during his five years in Benares that fascination rather than fear characterized his approach to the countryside and its people. Indeed the chance to see 'new people and new manners' was a primary attraction of the Pune posting.⁶⁷⁷

Nevertheless he had reason to feel a general sense of unease. He had left behind the now familiar cocoon of Benares and was embarking on a new stage of his career in unfamiliar surroundings, under uncertain leadership.⁶⁷⁸ Moreover he was then in the early stages of an epic journey through parts of the subcontinent almost entirely unknown to him, great swaths of which were prey to bandits.⁶⁷⁹ And notwithstanding his undeniable excitement about turning a new page in his life, such transitional moments bring great stress.⁶⁸⁰ A closer look into this particular passage reveals signs of emotional

turmoil. We read of earnest discussions with colleagues on the topic of professional challenges and options, and we learn of his regrets at not having read more deeply in the classics, and at his failure to apply himself more diligently to ‘Persian and Hindee’[sic], i.e. the languages he had briefly studied at Fort William College before being assigned to Pune.⁶⁸¹ It is a portrait of a man in the midst of a minor personal and professional crisis. As the world shifted beneath his feet, the routine of classical study, by then a well-established part of his life, offered an anchor of stability, while projecting classical scenes on his surroundings palliated the unfamiliar.

Turning to the battlefield, where violent injury or death were the very real threats that inspired stress, both the routine of study and the content of the classics again combined to help Elphinstone cope. In 1803 he found himself on the staff of Arthur Wellesley in the midst of some of the hard-fought battles of the Second Anglo–Maratha War: Assaye, Argoan (Ardoan), and Gawilghur. This was Elphinstone’s first experience of warfare proper.⁶⁸² Judging from his journals and letters, he found it at once exhilarating, exhausting, and terrifying. Despite the turmoil, when time permitted, Elphinstone continued his classical studies. He read and discussed the classics when off-duty, in moments of idleness between bursts of staff work,⁶⁸³ and most interesting of all, on the eve of battles and in the quiet that followed engagements: that is, at moments of great emotional stress and periods when terrifying and perhaps traumatic experiences had to be assimilated.⁶⁸⁴ Between the battle of Argoan (Ardoan) and the assault on Gawilghur, he toiled away at Cicero’s *On the Nature of the Gods* and over breakfast on the morning of the final assault, mere hours before joining the storming party in trenches, he discussed classical Latin and Persian poetry with his colleague Kennedy. It is tempting to see this behaviour as an attempt to cope with the strain of his situation by creating an illusion of normalcy and control through adherence to routine, or perhaps escaping into a happier world.

Elphinstone’s account of the siege of Gawilghur presents an especially detailed picture of how his classical reading and knowledge integrated with dramatic and emotionally charged experiences. Scouting the fortress as the British siege guns unleashed salvo after salvo, Elphinstone noted how ‘The echo at this ground was favourable to the sound of the guns, which made a deep rolling noise like thunder.’ The scene called to mind an image of Mount Aetna in mid-eruption drawn from Virgil’s *Aeneid*:

Aetna’s throat
 With roar of frightful ruin thunders nigh.
 Now to the realm of light it lifts a cloud
 Of pitch-black, whirling smoke, and fiery dust,
 Shooting out globes of flame, with monster tongues
 That lick the stars⁶⁸⁵

Exposed to snipers and artillery fire from the fortress and confronted by the fury of the bombardment, Elphinstone apparently turned automatically to the classics, to a passage so familiar that it could be recalled from memory. He was again projecting classical imagery onto his present. Doing so could not make the reality any less violent or awful, but it appears to have palliated Elphinstone's emotional response to the situation, i.e. his fear.

The climax of the siege provoked a similar response. In a letter to Strachey a few days after the battle, Elphinstone revealed what was going through his mind as he passed through the trenches and toward Gawilghur's walls with the storming party:

When we went on to the breach I thought I was going to a great danger; but my mind was so made up to it that I did not care for anything. The party going to the storm put me in mind of the eighth and ninth verses of the third book of Homer: -

'The Greeks went in silence, breathing strength,
Resolved [in] their heart[s] to support one another.'⁶⁸⁶

Just when his fear and excitement must have reached critical levels, preparing to storm the breach in the raging heart of the battle, Elphinstone's mind turned to the *Iliad*.

In the passage in question, Homer contrasted the Trojans, who clamour, screech, and scream as they go to war, with the Greeks. There is no doubt which group Elphinstone considered the more worthy of praise and emulation in this instance. The Greek example of resolve, quiet strength, and fidelity was what Elphinstone held on to amid the thrill and terror of the assault. Those were the qualities he sought to emulate, and of course what he hoped his comrades would embody. On this occasion, he appears to have been engaging in what psychologist Melanie Klein called 'introjective identification': taking on the admired qualities of others that are considered beneficial in stressful circumstances.⁶⁸⁷ It did not hurt that the conflation of his comrades with the Greeks likewise offered the comforting suggestion of ultimate and inevitable victory, not to mention immortal renown for both survivors and those who fell.

As a final example of how the classics helped Elphinstone cope in a period of significant personal and professional change, I offer another quotation from his journals. The Greek passage in question was the postscript to Elphinstone's description of his valedictory tour of the Deccan prior to becoming Governor of Bombay in 1819. For one who frequently professed his desire for greatness and glory, he was strangely reluctant to leave. Despite the great honour of the much-desired promotion, the idea of change as usual unsettled him. The Deccan had rewarded him in recent years with action and responsibility and he had grown comfortable there. He summed

up his feelings with lines from Theocritus' first *Idyll*, which recounts the story of how the herdsman and poet Daphnis died. The passage describes Daphnis' farewell to his beloved Syracuse. In translation it reads:

Ye wolves, ye jackals, ye bears lurking in the mountains, farewell
The herdsman Daphnis no more (will wander) in the woods, nor oak
groves, nor glades
Farewell, O Arethusa, and ye rivers.⁶⁸⁸

The juxtaposition with the doomed Daphnis is pure melodrama. But that only reinforces the weight of emotion Elphinstone felt as change caught him up once again. The link to the 'herdsman' clearly buttressed his self-image as a dedicated and masterful administrator-cum-Guardian.⁶⁸⁹ At the same time, engagement with the pathos of Daphnis' story seems to have been important on an emotional level in that it provided a way to unburden himself of feelings which he otherwise struggled to express. Doing so by no means eradicated the stress associated with the changes underway in his life. However it does seem to have made him feel better about the dislocation and loss he experienced as he departed the familiar region where he had become so comfortable.

This quotation similarly underscores the environmental component of the classical coping mechanism, and brings us back to where we began between Chilka Lake and the sea. By 1819 Elphinstone was very much at home in the Deccan and India more generally. Indeed he prefaced this quotation with his regrets 'at having to leave the 'fine picturesque country' and 'romantic scenes' as well as 'manly sports' of 'the Dechan[sic]'. So why conflate Ancient Greece with contemporary India? To my mind the practice of projecting classical descriptions of Greece onto the realities of India had become automatic – another characteristic of oft-used coping strategies.⁶⁹⁰ Put another way, after twenty-five years in India, Elphinstone had in a sense come to terms with its reality. In a manor he had tamed India, but only by a combination of long experience and repeatedly re-imagining it as a tableau of classical antiquity to the point where the two were thoroughly conflated and India no longer seemed so exotic, threatening, or hostile.⁶⁹¹

Elphinstone by no means had a monopoly on this coping strategy. Macaulay's classical reading in Calcutta carries the hallmarks of a similar function. Edwards in fact argued that the studies he used to 'compensate' for the dullness of his life in India, served 'as a consolation, when he was devastated by news of the death of his favourite sister.' She concluded that 'his immersion in classical literature [might be seen] as a form of escapism both from grief and also from life in India which he saw as a kind of exile.'⁶⁹² Put a little differently, his classical reading palliated the emotional difficulties presented by the combined stress of cultural dislocation and personal tragedy.

Then there is Sir Charles Napier. He was so ill and overwhelmed with correspondence on his march through the Punjab in January 1850 that he had to give up journal writing, except for 'some notes on the supposed site of the great battle between Alexander and Porus.' For even '[s]ickness could not wholly subdue curiosity to see that famous field.'⁶⁹³ Surely rest would have done him more good, and yet he clearly considered his touristic excursion into ancient history a pick-me-up of sorts, a welcome relief from the burdens of work and the equally troubling anxieties that accompanied any serious illness in India. The classical discussions between Cromer and Edward Lear, which display a desire to push away, even for a short time, the stresses of 'shop', i.e. work, have a broadly similar flavour.⁶⁹⁴

Hodson's classical reading, amid the manifold stresses and physical dangers of a military campaign, recalls Elphinstone's studies and reflection under similar circumstances. He left no detailed account of his readings in the manner of Elphinstone, so it is impossible to link his studies to particular events, but the coincidence is significant. Similarly, it is tempting to conclude that among other things the classical associations inspired by exotic Indian landscapes and practices in the writings of travellers such as Bishop Heber, Alexander Burnes, and G.O. Trevelyan, reveal a process similar to Elphinstone's manner of managing the stress of exciting but alienating new environments.

In R.N. Cust's case the connection is especially clear and significant. Educated at Eton, Cambridge, and Haileybury, he began his Indian career in 1844, rising through the ranks to become Home Secretary to the Indian government in the mid-1860s. His memoir records a remarkable conjunction between his nascent awareness of daunting new responsibilities and a significant classical recollection:

When gradually, though not yet thirty years of age, I found myself helping to rule Millions in their hundreds of towns and thousands of villages, the lines of Virgil came back to me,

'Tu regere, imperio populos Romane, memento:
Hae tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos'⁶⁹⁵

It is a passing remark in a memoir written long after the events described and evinces no great stress on Cust's part, at least on the surface. Yet ruling over millions must have been an anxiety-inducing proposition, even for someone with his training. It is one thing to contemplate such duties as an academic exercise, another thing entirely to take them up. And we know that administering his first District, Ambála, was a Herculean labour: he referred to it elsewhere as 'an Augaeon [sic] stable'.⁶⁹⁶ Under these circumstances reflecting on Virgil's famous lines could be interpreted as a deep,

calming breath, which helped Cust push past the stress and get on with the job. It was simply a matter of re-affirming his affinity with Romans, whose great talent had been to rule, and who, by ruling, had built an empire that bettered the world.

This is a limited pool of samples, but as a group they suggest that 'coping' was a key element of classical discourse's contribution to the British experience of empire. Further, it draws attention to an often overlooked dynamic of the British experience of empire: how is it that Indian civil servants and officers were able to cope with the unique stresses and anxieties arising from their situation in India and thereby manage to execute their duties? We are not accustomed to contemplating the vulnerabilities of the imperialist, focusing instead on the bewildering variety of cultural, economic, social, and personal oppressions suffered by those they subjected. Most studies of Anglo-Indian society and culture focus on the ways that particular cultural phenomena worked to create a sense of community, exacerbate racial and or cultural divisions, or promote social control, rather than the enabling functions they possessed on the individual level.⁶⁹⁷ However we must consider their anxieties if we wish to penetrate the facade of self-confident mastery they projected to the world and understand how they functioned. It is surely insufficient simply to write them off as so Olympian – so arrogant, insensitive, capricious, selfish, and chauvinistic – that they were incapable of feeling emotional distress or anxiety as a result of what they saw, experienced, and did in India.

This brings us to the next significant theme, the tendency to use the classics and classical discourse as a source of knowledge when trying to understand India and its peoples. In many cases this is very close to 'coping' in the vein just discussed. Classical discourse was sometimes a compensatory device, filling in the gaps in British knowledge left by ignorance of Indian languages, limited access to Indian sources, methodological naivety, inexperience, and/or outright chauvinism. But it was a conscious reaction to general life in India rather than an unconscious strategy for managing the emotional consequences of acute stimuli. In this connection, there is little to add to the last chapter's discussion of how travellers such as Grose and Orientalists such as Jones relied on classical discourse. In Jones' case it should suffice as a reminder to note that classical antiquity provided him both general paradigms for understanding the development of Indian languages and civilization, and specific factoids: chronological fixed points, information regarding Indian religion, government, and the like.⁶⁹⁸ A look at his contemporaries, who made *Asiatick Researches* such an important periodical, shows the prevalence of this habit. Taking only volume eight, published in 1805, we see Mr J.D. Patterson of Dacca relying heavily on the testimony of classical sources for his discussion of 'The Origins of the Hindu Religion'; to which H.T. Colebrooke added several more classical references in his 'Remarks'; and Captain F. Wilford, whose attempt to show that the

Hindu 'Sacred Isles in the West' made much use of classical authors such as Apollonius, Apuleius, Cicero, Pliny, Plutarch, Ptolemy, and Strabo.⁶⁹⁹

Despite the ground-breaking research of Jones et al, the classical descriptions of India continued to serve as valuable troves of 'knowledge' about India throughout the 19th century. Reid made this very point with respect to Cromer's day.⁷⁰⁰ This habit, as much as recreation or antiquarian tourism, explains the presence of Curtius in the equipment of Elphinstone's expedition to Kabul. Elphinstone's inclination to use the ancient Greek names for the great rivers of the Punjab arose directly from the belief that Curtius, Arrian, Plutarch, and Diodorus contained valuable knowledge of India's natural history useful for understanding *contemporary* India. While on this topic it is useful to recall the December 1851 examination paper from Haileybury, where students were asked to 'Collect the remarks of Quintus Curtius on the natural history of India under the separate heads of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms'.⁷⁰¹ Such a question in such a context reveals the systematic way classical discourse was mined for information. It also validated the tendency to see the classics as a source of knowledge relevant to contemporary India. After all, Haileybury existed to provide a practical education for India's rulers.

Habits of mind inculcated at Haileybury took reinforcement from public discourse. For instance, the journalist, professor, government historian, and statesman Sir James Talboys Wheeler asserted that the Greeks:

accurately described the face of the country, the numerous towns and villages, the abundant harvests, the variety of fruits and vegetables, the cotton shrubs said to produce wool, the sugar-canes said to yield honey, the pillared shades, the banyan trees, the alligators, the elephants, the monkeys, the large serpents, the small cobras, the scorpions, the lizards, the ants, and all the numerous strange sights which meet the eye of every Indian traveler.⁷⁰²

Note the ease with which Wheeler slipped from an ancient description to modern reality. For him there was not the slightest question that the ancient Greeks had encountered, and thus described, the same India he knew. We see this conviction put to practical use in British discussions of India's historical forestry patterns, particularly in the Punjab. H. Cleghorn's 1865 'Report upon the Forests of the Punjab and the western Himalaya' is one example, which, as G. Barton noted in his work on forestry in British India, could be generalized across a significant swath of officialdom.⁷⁰³

But the contemporary value of classic discourse extended well beyond 'natural history'. It shed light on practical strategic considerations as well. Historians T.O. Lloyd and D.R. Headrick long ago noted how the example of Alexander's march from the Middle East to India via Afghanistan amplified British fears for the security of India in the face first of Napoleon and

later Russia.⁷⁰⁴ Even more interesting is the extent to which British officers, civilians, and scholars also found useful knowledge of India's peoples and cultures in the classical European sources available to them. An anecdote from Kipling suggests that even a rather general familiarity with classical antiquity provided useful knowledge of contemporary Indian religious beliefs and practices. Lord Dufferin once told Kipling that he had taken little from his education beyond the existence in antiquity of people 'who didn't talk our tongue and who were very strong on sacrifice and ritual... whose gods were different from ours and who had strict views on the disposal of the dead.' *But*, he concluded 'all that is worth knowing if you ever have to govern India.'⁷⁰⁵

Bishop Heber regularly employed classical discourse as a framework for making sense of what he encountered during his survey of his Indian diocese in 1824–5. The appearance of the native sailors along the Ganges drew out a comparison to antiquity in his journal: 'The crew were chiefly naked, except a cloth round the loins; the colour of all was the darkest shade of antique bronze, and together with the elegant forms and well-turned limbs of many among them, gave the spectator a perfect impression of Grecian statues of that metal.'⁷⁰⁶ Likewise the folk songs and tales he heard along the riverbanks on his journey to Delhi left him convinced of the similarities between classical and 'Brahminical' myths.⁷⁰⁷ He even understood the popularity of songs about Radha and Krishna by comparison to classic stories of Daphne and Apollo.⁷⁰⁸ Finally, strange customs, such as the young women who walked fully dressed into the river at five in the morning and again at noon in order to cool themselves, also evoked classical connections with explanatory value.⁷⁰⁹ In each of these cases Heber reflexively projected elements of classical discourse onto what he saw. This had the effect of making the strange, exotic, and incomprehensible, rather less so. It is debatable whether doing so gave him any profound insight into Indian culture, but that is almost irrelevant. Classical discourse was a key part of his imagined India, because it was one of the lenses through which he interpreted what he encountered.

The famously tragic explorer and political agent Alexander Burnes advertised the benefits of applying classical discourse to contemporary India with special verve. In his opinion, knowledge of Alexander's career in India was 'productive of the most solid advantages to [contemporary] history and science'.⁷¹⁰ 'In Arrian's description', he wrote, 'I see the existing population: - "The inhabitants are strong built and large limbed, and taller in stature than all the rest of the Asiatics."⁷¹¹ And:

In our search for the remnants of Alexander's cities, we are led into reflections on the state of the country in those days; and it is curious to compare them with our own times. We are informed that Porus, with whom Alexander fought on the banks of this river, maintained a force

of 30 000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, with 200 elephants and 300 war chariots; and that he had subdued all his neighbours. Now, if we change the war chariots into guns, we have precisely the regular force of Runjeet Singh, *the modern Porus*.⁷¹²

While this could be interpreted as nothing more than Burnes taking note of a coincidence, his whole approach indicates that classical discourse had in a sense suggested to him what he would find in India. He duly 'found' just what he expected to find.

For his part Malcolm Darling hardly seems to have been able to look at any of the more exotic elements of his surroundings in India except through classical lenses. In Clive Dewey's words:

A Baluche minstrel playing at a tribal feast, while the tribesmen sat round fires roasting sheep, reminded him of Demodocus playing to the Phoenicians; Tukoji's wedding party at Kolhapure was as desperate to get home as the Greek host in their tenth year before Troy; an old bulldog lying on a heap of foul straw looked like Argos, the hound of Odysseus.⁷¹³

But there is no more evocative record of the educated Briton's propensity to turn to classical discourse when confronted by Indian realities than Trevelyan's description of the religious procession in Calcutta discussed in the Introduction. It bears repeating:

I could not believe my eyes; for I seemed to have been transported in a moment over more than twenty centuries, to the Athens of Cratinus and Aristophanes. If it had not been for the colour of the faces around, I should have believed myself to be on the main road to Eleusis in the full tide of one of the Dionysiac festivals. The spirit of the scene was the same, and at each step some well-known feature reminded one irresistibly that the Bacchic orgies sprung from the mysterious fanaticism of the Far East.⁷¹⁴

The sheer strangeness of what he saw set his wondering mind in search of something with which he could make sense of the scene confronting him. He found it in classical discourse:

It was no unfounded tradition that pictured Dionysus returning from conquered India, leopards and tigers chained to his triumphal car, escorted from the Hyphasis to the Asopus by bands of votaries dancing in fantastic measure to the clang of cymbals. It was no chance resemblance this, between an Hindoo rite, in the middle of the nineteenth century, and those wild revels that stream along many a Grecian bas-relief, and wind round many an ancient Italian vase; for every detail portrayed in those marvellous works of art was faithfully represented here.⁷¹⁵

Here we come back almost full circle to 'coping'. In this case, classical knowledge mediated India's exoticism, rendering the otherwise strange and incomprehensible, familiar and intelligible. Because classical discourse had imprinted certain expectations regarding India (and Asia more generally) it was natural for men like Heber, Burnes, Trevelyan et al to apply it to what they encountered. Of course doing so meant that what they 'saw' was not a pure, unfiltered image of modern India, but a sort of palimpsest or collage of that reality, classical descriptions of India, and contemporary British ethnocentrism.

This is a significant phenomenon in its own right, in that it offers a glimpse into a key interpretive strategy/framework that Britons commonly applied to India. But, its implications are even more interesting. Using classical discourse to understand Indian peoples and cultures in the mode of Heber, Burnes, and Trevelyan, even more than using it to understand India's natural history or strategic vulnerabilities, reflected and reinforced notions of the profound difference between Indians and Britons. Trevelyan's connection between contemporary Indian religious practices and the most alien and exotic elements of ancient Greek religion – rituals that had long-since been abandoned in the West (or subsumed and sterilized by Christianity) – gave the impression that Indian civilization was timeless and unchanging. More specifically it presented India, indeed all of Asia, as the seat of 'mysterious fanaticism'.

It is impossible to determine the precise ratio of exploitation to influence in such applications of classical discourse. Trevelyan's knowledge of the origins and details of the Dionysus cult almost certainly exerted some suggestive power over his expectations, predisposing him to 'see' certain things in contemporary India. At the same time, prevailing wisdom – some of it based on earlier applications of classical 'knowledge' to imperial discourse – as to India's stasis would have encouraged him to use his classical acumen in this fashion, with predictable results. His personal investment in Britain's imperial 'mission' further predisposed him to find and report 'evidence' of India's difference and inferiority, which could and did lead him back to what he already 'knew' about India from classical discourse. To blur the lines between influence and exploitation even further, Trevelyan's classically founded representation of India's 'otherness', itself became part of the prevailing wisdom that influenced Britons to adopt a particular view of India. This not only supported Britain's imperial domination of India, but encouraged the belief that classical discourse on India was relevant to the imperial present.

This is all very familiar and dovetails perfectly with the prevailing trend in imperial discourse noted in the last chapter, in which the combination of classical discourse and contemporary circumstances almost inevitably contributed to the impression of India's inferiority. But this did not depend solely on repeating tropes found in classical sources or exploiting them to

denigrate Indian civilization. The corollary of such representations of India and Indians was a positive view of Britain and Britons as active, conquering, and progressive. Dionysus could, after all, be considered the ultimate forerunner of the British, the first in a line of dominant European conquerors who inscribed their will on India. This may not be our usual image of the god of wine and revelry, but it is the image offered by Trevelyan.⁷¹⁶ With this in mind, the time has come to take a closer look at how, by constituting a body of secret knowledge, classical discourse in India served both to inspire and enhance a particular corporate identity among the British and to maintain an unbridgeable cultural divide between them and the vast majority of their Indian subjects.

9

Classical Discourse in British India II: Secret Knowledge

During the siege of Lucknow in 1857, Sir James Outram sent a message recounting the desperate plight of the outnumbered and encircled defenders to Sir Hope Grant, leader of the approaching relief column.⁷¹⁷ The Indian courier hid the message in a quill, which he then secreted inside his walking stick. Unsatisfied with this level of security, Outram added another: ancient Greek script. This was not an uncommon ploy. Commenting on the parlous state of communications in the summer of 1857, William Hodson claimed that “[w]e get none even from Agra, and of course not below it, except by “*Kossid*,” [Indian courier] and they but little scraps, written half in Greek characters, to mislead or deceive, if the unfortunate bearer is stopped.”⁷¹⁸

On the simplest level this was a mere expedient. Ancient Greek script provided a ready-made cipher, familiar to any British gentleman but unintelligible to their enemies. Yet this practice also reveals a previously unacknowledged dimension of classical discourse’s role in India. Outram and his colleagues exploited a body of secret knowledge, possessed only by the educated elite of British civilians and officers. Because it was theirs alone, because it drew distinct lines between them and lesser Britons, and even starker lines between them and Indians, this knowledge had much broader and deeper implications than securing communications. The shared ability to practise classical discourse reinforced the cultural solidarity and collective identity of the imperial elite. At the same time it enhanced the notions of cultural difference so central to the subordination and subjection of India. Not that the British made any great effort to hide the classics from Indians. The point is that the cultural and social power classical discourse commanded remained, like Outram’s message, inaccessible to those who lacked the key to unlock it. And hardly any Indians could access the instruction or texts required to fashion one. At least not until the second half of the 19th century, by which time the power of classical discourse made it an object of interest to Indian elites eager to accommodate themselves to the imperial establishment or to undermine it.

Christopher Stray has demonstrated how the ability to display classical knowledge, as an essential characteristic of the English gentleman, offered a passport of sorts to elite status in Britain.⁷¹⁹ The inability to make such displays therefore constituted a substantial social barrier to the uninitiated. In a society where social status was so intimately linked to political, economic, and cultural power this was no insignificant matter. Bowen underscored this point, arguing that the classics 'served an essentially mystifying function, since the express purpose of arcane learning is to exercise domination over the uninitiated.'⁷²⁰ This metropolitan analysis provides a useful paradigm for understanding the classics' power as a symbol of elite status and solidarity in India and also as an agent of social and cultural exclusion. Strangely no one has made this precise connection, though it is perhaps implied by Reid's assertion that certain Egyptians recognized the social and cultural power of the classics and so tried to exploit it, and also by Emily Greenwood's work on classics in the West Indies.⁷²¹

In one respect we can apply Stray's paradigm directly to India. Notwithstanding the different social and cultural circumstances on the periphery, classical knowledge continued to serve as a mark of social distinction and was thus used to display and claim status. Elphinstone is a perfect example. In addition to relieving boredom and helping him cope with the emotional stresses of his life in India, Elphinstone's nearly obsessive interest in classical studies often assumes the character of compensatory behaviour both internally, as a self-improvement project, and externally, as a display of his gentlemanly status. Again and again he wrote about his 'plan of acquiring a sound and solid acquaintance with Greek'.⁷²² This is a testament to the prevailing image of the gentleman as absolute master of the classical languages and it betrays his consuming desire to live up to this image. So, while *aide-de-camp* to Arthur Wellesley in the Second Maratha War, Elphinstone carried on his studies in public, displaying his *Selecta Graeca* at his writing table. Such behaviour would have trumpeted his gentlemanly intellectual credentials, while simultaneously playing to masculine ideals of cool-headedness and emotional detachment in a crisis. If that was his goal, he succeeded, for he caught Wellesley's attention and engaged the great man in a discussion of the Latin language.⁷²³

I am inclined to see an attempt at humour by Alfred Lyall during the 1857 Uprising in much the same way. As he stood on a rooftop one evening watching the city of Bundelchur burn, he suggested that his superior, the local Magistrate, 'send for his fiddle, as his Rome was burning'.⁷²⁴ Apparently the jest was not particularly well received, as Lyall probably would have expected under less surreal circumstances. Clumsy or not, Lyall doubtless intended the joke to display his gentlemanly qualities: his sangfroid, his wit, and his command of the classics. Without question a similar element of social display factored in a significant majority of the classical references, analogies, and asides scattered through Indian newspapers and periodicals

and indeed the correspondence of individuals. The deserter and vagabond-cum-antiquarian Charles Masson surely hoped his writings on, and references to, Alexander would gain him some credibility with the superiors whose patronage he required to continue his research.⁷²⁵ Sir Richard Temple did not need classical discourse to acquire status, yet he too garnished his speeches to British audiences with classical matter that confirmed his social and intellectual status for anyone who may have harboured doubts. In none of these cases is it a stretch to see the classics acting as a body of shared 'secret knowledge' possessing the power to claim or confirm membership in the elite, which is very much how Stray saw them working in Britain. But, and this is where the present study parts ways with Stray's model, social display was only one among several significant outcomes of British deployments of this secret knowledge in India.

I would argue that the classics also offered an intellectual and cultural meeting ground, where the imperial elites could re-affirm their shared knowledge, experiences, and values, that is to say, their corporate identity. If anything, the journey from metropole to periphery seems to have magnified the power of classical study and discourse in this regard. In this it was much like any other emigrant pastime or institution, whether field sports or cricket, horseracing or whist, club-life or scholarship. And like these other pastimes, classical study was not exclusively a solitary affair; it was often a social activity pursued by groups of like-minded Britons. The classics clearly helped Elphinstone connect intellectually and culturally with colleagues such as Close, Jenkins, Jeffreys, and Kennedy, not to mention the men with whom he journeyed to Afghanistan and even, as we just saw, with Wellesley. They did so in a way that not only reinforced his sense of belonging to the elite, but also re-affirmed their sense of corporate or collective identity.⁷²⁶

In this light Lyall's brash remark amid the apocalyptic chaos of the Mutiny takes on added significance. So too does something as simple as the salutation '*vale*', with which Elphinstone customarily concluded letters to intimates such as Strachey and Colebrooke.⁷²⁷ Though clearly a reflexive usage carried over from schooldays, it nevertheless affirmed the shared experiences, knowledge, and values that signified their membership in the elite. Likewise the classical matter dotting the correspondence of Lord Cromer and that among Alfred Lyall, his father, brother, and Bulwer-Lytton must have reinforced their shared identity.⁷²⁸ Bulwer-Lytton apparently made a habit of this, ending one of his letters to the doomed British envoy at Kabul, with '*and now my dear Cavagnari, vive, vale et macte virtutis esto!*'⁷²⁹ Even Herbert Edwardes, who was described by his close friend, the Reverend Cowley Powles, as an indifferent student of the classics during his days at King's College in the 1830s, left numerous traces of his classical training and interests in his letters to friends and colleagues, his memoir *A year on the Punjaub Frontier*, as well as his political diaries. The latter contain offhand

classical tags in addition to detailed discussions of Alexander's route, the material remains of the Hellenistic presence in the region, and a discussion of Quintus Curtius' qualities as a source.⁷³⁰ The inclusion of such material in documents meant to circulate among his peers could be chalked up to social display; but even if that were his sole intent, it would still have reinforced cultural solidarity and corporate identity, just like the Greek ciphers used by Outram and others during the Uprising.

Sir Richard Temple's speeches to elite audiences provide particularly suggestive examples of the classics' role in maintaining this sense of shared identity and unity. Whether he addressed the members of the Byculla Club gathered to honour the new Viceroy Sir Philip Wodehouse in 1872, or a gathering of luminaries honouring the Prince of Wales in 1875, a meeting of the Volunteer Movement in 1877, or of the newly formed Bombay Volunteers later that same year, or ultimately the audience at his retirement dinner in 1880, Temple was always ready with a classical quotation, quip, anecdote, or analogy.⁷³¹ In truth, he seems rarely to have neglected an opportunity to display his classical learning in an ostentatious way. This kind of preening no doubt burnished his public image, but it must also have sustained a sense of community with and among his audience.

The first point to note is that each of these occasions marked a gathering of Bombay's imperial elite. As such they were ideal places to introduce classical discourse. Such an exclusive audience could be counted on to understand, relate, and respond to classical allusions. Thus there were cheers when Temple mentioned the Latin motto of Bombay (*Primus in Indus*), cries of approbation when he drew a comparison between the patriotism of Roman citizens and that of his fellow Britons, and laughter when he translated the old saw '*si vis pacem, para bellum*' as, 'if you wish for peace, prepare for a row'.⁷³² The timing and strength of these reactions – there is no reason to think that the reporters were embroidering much less fabricating – indicate that the audiences took Temple's references in the way he intended. But, more than that, they appear to have been actively involved in what one could call a ritual expression of a body of shared secret knowledge, which helped define those present as a distinct group with a common culture, ethos, and mission.

It is essential to note that this sense of a special collective identity was often reinforced by the content as well as the performance of such rituals. The frequency of flattering associations between the British Empire in India and the empires of Athens, Alexander, or Rome, or indeed between Britons and ancient Greeks or Romans, generally seems to have upheld elite convictions that they were, to borrow Philip Mason's characterization, akin to a class of Platonic Guardians especially suited to the role of imperial overlords. Temple for one frequently compared the British Empire to the Roman, and British officials, such as the Viceroy Sir Philip Woodhouse, to the heroes of antiquity.

Before the aforementioned meeting of the Bombay Volunteers in November of 1877, he declaimed that:

[t]he most eloquent of our English historians has told us that our modern empire surpasses even that of Ancient Rome. The Roman Empire was maintained by the strong right arm of a limited body of citizens, always ready to fight for the common wealth whenever called upon; and it is the old Roman sentiment which animates the modern army of Volunteers.⁷³³

Five years earlier he had honoured the newly arrived Woodhouse with the following comparison: '[h]e is indeed the type of that class of men who have never failed England in the hour of need; who are the pioneers of English influence everywhere; who are the pillars of that fabric of British power which beneficially overshadows so many portions of the civilized and the uncivilized globe. He is a man, in short, trained and destined, like Aeneas of old – *tot volvere casus, tot adire labores*.'⁷³⁴ Note the emphasis on destiny and the labours of civilization in this link between the mythical progenitor of the Roman Empire and the new Viceroy of British India.

Temple's manner of expressing what made the British special on these important occasions reinforces our sense of classical discourse's role in identity formation on both the personal and community levels. It clearly contributed to his concept of proper imperial character and he just as clearly believed it had a similar significance for his Anglo-Indian audiences. Flattering connections of the sort he favoured buttressed British confidence, not just in the cohesion of their cultural community, or their shared imperial character, but also in their superiority. It was a source, furthermore, that could easily be exploited to enhance such notions – and in a fashion virtually immune to challenge from without the relatively small circle of the imperial elite for most of the long 19th century.

As ever, examples may be found in Elphinstone's writings. His conviction that he and his countrymen were now following in the footsteps of Alexander, politically and culturally as well as geographically, is one instance. His claim that his recently deceased superior Sir Barry Close's qualities of strength, clear-headedness 'vigorous understanding, fixed principles, unshaken courage, contempt for pomp and pleasure, entire devotion to the public service, joined to the utmost modesty and simplicity' marked a character 'one would rather think imagined in ancient Rome than met with in our own age and nation' is another.⁷³⁵ But for a change of pace let us consider Alexander Burnes. The second-ranking political officer in the expeditionary force that ousted Dost Mahomed from Afghanistan in 1839, with famously disastrous results, Burnes provides a perfect introductory case study. For him Alexander the Great was the essential point of comparison between antiquity and the present. Like so many of his countrymen Burnes was profoundly interested in his ancient namesake. By his own admission

this interest had its roots in the 'romantic achievements, which I had read of in early youth with the most intense interest.' As a result his three-volume opus *Travels in Bokhara* abounds with references to Alexander's exploits in the region, including a great many paraphrases from Arrian and Curtius, and he openly acknowledged the romantic excitement that 'inflamed' his imagination whenever he glimpsed Alexander's shade.⁷³⁶

He naturally employed imagery similar to Elphinstone's once he too arrived on the scene of Alexander's Indian exploits. Burnes described his pleasure at having 'trod the routes of Hyphestion and Craterus, and sailed on the stream which had wafted the feet of Alexander'.⁷³⁷ The extent of Burnes' excitement and enthusiasm suggests that he identified quite strongly with Alexander. For one, he believed that their respective travels created a strong tie between himself and the last European known to have accomplished such a similar journey through the Oxus–Indus heartland.⁷³⁸ But following in Alexander's footsteps was only one element of Burnes' identification with his Macedonian predecessor. The connection deepened each time Burnes saw echoes of stories recorded in the histories of Alexander in his own experiences. So something that should have frustrated him immensely – finding two of the boats in his flotilla grounded by the extreme tides in the lower reaches of the Indus – in fact inspired a frisson because Alexander's fleet had been severely damaged by the same tides and currents.⁷³⁹

Two additional anecdotes will chart the extent of Burnes' personal identification with Alexander. Anchored in the Indus delta, he proudly recorded the awe his presence inspired in the local inhabitants, who called him 'a second Alexander, the "Sikander Sanee", for having achieved so dangerous a voyage as the Indus'.⁷⁴⁰ Earlier, during his caravan journey through Turkmenistan, Burnes described how a group of caravan guards gave him the nickname 'Meerza Sikunder' or 'the Secretary Alexander'.⁷⁴¹ It is impossible to reconstruct the guards' intent with any certainty, but it probably fell somewhere on the spectrum between benign teasing and sarcastic insult. The point of emphasis was the contrast between the bookish behaviour of the modern Alexander and the martial character of his rather more daring and illustrious predecessor. Far from being disturbed or insulted, Burnes seems to have enjoyed the comparison. If anything, the jibe over his incessant scribbling seems to have struck him as yet another sign of his connection to Alexander – for Alexander had made a point of collecting ethnographical and geographical data about the lands through which he travelled.⁷⁴² Burnes plainly took the guards' ignorance of the larger purpose behind Alexander's military exploits as a manifestation of his superiority. They had but small and imperfect knowledge of Alexander, derived from folktales; whereas Burnes had mastered the secret knowledge, the sound historical knowledge derived from the classical European sources on Alexander. This deepened his sense of identification with Alexander and therefore his sense of superiority. It did not matter that where Alexander had conquered, Burnes merely travelled, researched, and

negotiated. Like Alexander, he and his countrymen operated on a level and toward a goal beyond the comprehension of the peoples they encountered in the course of their imperial mission in India. Or so an understanding of the Indian Empire arising from the interconnected threads of classical discourse, prevailing attitudes toward India, and personal experience told them.

The goal of the British Empire in India, as most Britons believed it had been for Alexander's empire, was the spread of civilization. This is what Burnes was getting at when he claimed that 'while we gaze on the Indus, we connect ourselves, at least in association, with the ages of distant glory.' The distant glory in question was not simply military.⁷⁴³ He made special note of the Hellenistic kings who took over after Alexander's death and despite their distance 'from the academies of Corinth and Athens, had once disseminated among mankind a knowledge of the arts and sciences of their own history, and the world.'⁷⁴⁴ The implication, meaningful only to those privy to the secret knowledge of classical discourse, was that Britain, and individual Britons such as Burnes, were not simply walking the same ground as Alexander, but playing an identical historical role. They explored; they conquered; they civilized. This was an inspiration to Burnes, as he hoped it would be to other Britons.

Of course, it was also an exploitative rationalization. This darker side of Burnes' identification with Alexander manifested itself on two levels. The first was self-aggrandizement. He clearly believed that publishing links between himself and Alexander would enhance his personal prestige. He also probably thought that some of his readers might be flattered by the classical parallel, perhaps to the point of looking more favourably on the imperial project in which he was so thoroughly involved. At the same time, of course, identification with Alexander the conqueror and civilizer was yet another avenue leading almost inevitably to a belief in the fundamental difference between British and Indian civilization, which in turn justified the civilizing mission embraced by so many of Burnes' compatriots.

Trevelyan's 'Competition Wallah' letters contain numerous examples of close comparisons between the ancient Greeks and British 'civilians', which confirm this analysis. In one particularly evocative instance he recounted a conversation with the Maharaja of Kishnagar, who expressed disgust at the sight of an English magistrate bathing naked during a shooting expedition. Trevelyan could not help but recall 'that the free and hardy customs of the ancient Greeks produced much the same effect upon the effeminate subjects of Darius and Artaxerxes.' He continued:

The Persian, whose every action was dictated by a spirit of intense decorum and self-respect, could not appreciate the lordly indifference to appearances displayed by the Spartan, accustomed to box, and run, and wrestle without a shred of clothing, in the presence of myriads of his brother Hellenes. Herodotus tells his countrymen, as a remarkable piece

of information, that, 'among the Lydians, and speaking loosely, among barbarians in general, it is held to be a great disgrace to be seen naked, even for a man'.⁷⁴⁵

Going beyond Trevelyan's use of classical discourse to make sense of an 'alien' sensibility he encountered in India, we see something more interesting. The contrast he drew between the 'lordly' 'Hellenes' and the 'effeminate' 'barbarians' of antiquity worked to unify and uplift Britons, even as it differentiated and subordinated Indians. Couching his argument in the secret knowledge of classical discourse emphasized the cultural solidarity of the British elite while excluding virtually all Indians from the conversation. Presenting Indians as a latter day iteration of the ancient Persians, the West's original 'other', not only burdened them with qualities the Greeks had found puzzling or abhorrent in their Persian neighbours, but also introduced the familiar trope of India's timelessness. Presenting his countrymen as a latter day iteration of the Hellenes, sharing certain of their core values, might seem to lock Britons in a similar historical vice. But this was not the conclusion Trevelyan drew. He and presumably most of his readers focused on the implication that the best Europeans had always been superior to Asians. From there it was but a short step to the conclusion that the same qualities that had made the Greeks superior to the Persians explained the progressive nature of European civilization. Thus Britons like Trevelyan could take confidence from the belief that they shared certain qualities and values with the peoples of classical antiquity without being limited by those peoples' intellectual horizons or historical accomplishments.

As we saw above, the comportment of his countrymen during the 1857 Uprising offered Trevelyan the chance to enlarge upon the qualities they shared with the Greeks. He linked the siege of Arrah to Thermopylae and his countryman Colvin to Leonidas of Sparta, then threw in an exhortation on bravery against terrible odds drawn from the *Iliad*.⁷⁴⁶ He aimed to show that prosperity and easy-living had not weakened the British, that they still embodied the values of the Greek heroes, values that helped define the imagined community of the Anglo-Indian imperial elites. However satisfying he found the situation in the present, Trevelyan also sought to admonish his contemporaries to retain these values in the future, and exploited their shared knowledge of classical discourse accordingly.

It is difficult to overstate the likely impact of Trevelyan's introduction of Homer's *Iliad* and Herodotus' account of the Spartan stand at Thermopylae. Suffice it to say that whatever they contributed to his concepts of masculinity and honour, these elements of classical discourse were very well calculated to move the classically educated men for whom he wrote. As he knew from experience, the values and characteristics stressed in the Homeric epics and the story of Thermopylae, and of course the early history of Rome, were precisely those stressed in the public schools and universities and held in

such esteem by society. The inseparable concepts of masculinity and martial spirit found concrete support in, when they were not actually inculcated by, the early and prolonged encounter with classical ideals of masculinity and military valour.⁷⁴⁷ This explains not only Macaulay's choice of setting for his parables – inspired by his time in India – but also Trevelyan's introduction of Leonidas and the 'Homeric hero'.⁷⁴⁸ It also explains the classical composition and iconography of heroic paintings depicting the key episodes and great heroes of Britain's Empire, such as Benjamin West's famous *Death of General Wolfe* or Robert Home's, *The Death of Colonel Moorhouse at the Storming of the Pettah Gate at Bangalore*.⁷⁴⁹ It was not by accident that West and Home replicated the composition of the Hellenistic sculpture, the *Dying Gaul*. All such deployments of classical discourse confirmed a particular form of British imperial identity, truly understood, as it could be embodied, only by those familiar with classical discourse.

The 'classical' architecture the British erected in India gives much the same impression. A temple of 'Fame', erected on the grounds of the Government House at Barrackpore in the second decade of the 19th century, carried a very specific weight of meaning. Dedicated to 'The Memory of the Brave' who fell at Java and Mauritius in 1810–1, this Roman Corinthian 'temple' reflected contemporary fascination with classical architecture. But it also indicates a belief that the best way to honour the 'heroes' who lost their lives in Britain's service was through a building that evoked images of the ancient heroes so familiar to educated Britons.⁷⁵⁰ And since only they really understood its significance, the building would have reinforced their sense of community. Buildings in a 'classical' style erected in Calcutta by Bentinck, Hastings, and even Wellesley, sent less heroic, but still significant messages. The Government House erected by the last was of course in a style then popular in London and might thus lead the reader to wonder whether it carried any specifically imperial meaning. Beyond the clear statement of British authority made by constructing such an imposing building in a European style, there is reason to believe, as Sten Nilsson, R.G. Irving, and Thomas Metcalfe have argued, that the classical style was meant to evoke the sense of grandeur and permanence then associated with the remains of classical buildings.⁷⁵¹ Of course such messages really only reached those with sufficient knowledge of classical antiquity to 'read' the secret language of the buildings. But that too reinforced the special, shared identity of the imperial elite.

Returning to heroism, but staying in the realm of material culture, we might consider campaign medals bearing Latin inscriptions, Britannia figures, and classicized personifications of India, issued by the Indian Army.⁷⁵² It is difficult to imagine what the common soldier, British or Indian, made of such classical iconography. Probably they invested such artefacts with suitable meaning of their own. But that is beside the point. The elites who decided on the composition of the medals and who officered the army felt that such

iconography represented their ideals. Their choices say a great deal about the origins of their concepts of heroism, duty, and commemoration.

Standing 'beside the massive obelisk which shoots up seventy feet from the tomb of the two young officers' (Vans Agnew and Anderson) killed at Múltán during the opening salvo of the Second Anglo-Sikh War, the Indian civil servant Sir William Hunter took a moment to reflect on those very same concepts. He mused on the long list of conquerors 'beginning with Alexander the Great, who was wounded in the Assault on Múltán,' that had swept down the Indus valley. He decided 'that it was indeed a noble place of sepulchre' for the two young Britons. 'All around were the memorials of a long, heroic past.'⁷⁵³ It is surely significant that the only one of the successive conquerors of the region he mentioned by name was Alexander. Conscious or unconscious this choice elided those other conquerors and created a bridge linking these heroically deceased Britons directly to the 'heroic' Macedonian conqueror, whose blood had stained the same soil. From Hunter's perspective this was the most fitting commentary on the heroic sacrifice of lieutenants Vans Agnew and Anderson. It neatly linked the young officers to arguably the most famous and successful military leader in European history. It also invested their sacrifice with an additional layer of meaning. They had died in the service of a higher, indeed world-historical cause linked to Alexander in classical discourse by many contemporaries: progressive empire. It is almost impossible to determine the impact of this connection on readers, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it would have been inspirational, particularly for those whose sense of imperial identity was already bound up with classical discourse.

The memorial to one William Jenkyns, killed on the retreat from Kabul in 1879 and buried in the Punjab, takes a very different form in a very different place, but accomplishes much the same thing.⁷⁵⁴ Erected at the University of Aberdeen, it bears a lengthy Latin inscription, outlining Jenkyns' life, education, position in India and death, 'AD CABVL', which self-consciously imitates Roman inscriptions. The aim is obvious, to link Jenkyns to the *idea* of Roman heroism, self-sacrifice, greatness, and, perhaps, permanence. This might seem a stretch, but his friends, who erected the tombstone and composed the inscription, chose Latin for a reason. It was timeless and eternal; it was the language of still famous Roman heroes and legends such as Brutus, Cincinnatus, Regulus, and Scipio, who had put the interests of the community ahead of their own. Their desire to link Jenkyns to these antique heroes and values suggests that they saw or wanted to see themselves in similar light. The monument and inscription, and the image of Jenkyns they projected to the world, comprised a coded statement of the ideals and values shared by the imperial elite in India and in Britain. It would have inspired an immediate sense of kinship among those who could read it. In a sense it also protected Jenkyns' memory, and the ethos to which he had subscribed, from those ignorant of Latin.

Ultimately, however, there is nothing more evocative of how the shared secret knowledge of classical discourse inspired and confirmed a particular

ethos of imperial service, heroism, and sacrifice than the habit of quoting Horace's words on the sweetness of dying for one's country. Early in 1799, for instance, amid fears that Napoleon might invade India from Egypt using Alexander's route, the Reverend Arnold Burrowes addressed the paraded members of the Bombay Voluntary Association. Moved by the danger and the excitement of the situation, he professed a temptation to lay aside his habit and join the congregated militia 'in every glorious and honorable danger, that the whole world may confess that, however distant from the parent country, the true motto of Britons is *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*.'⁷⁵⁵ Then, of course, there was Quentin Batty, whose contribution to this phenomenon we saw in the Introduction. Contemporary and subsequent accounts of his last moments record him murmuring the same 'old Roman saying'.⁷⁵⁶ As noted earlier, there is compelling evidence to see this as more than just a highly cultured way of ensuring he was remembered in the right light. One of his first acts on joining the Guides, had been to inscribe the same words under a heroic mural of the unit charging into action. The painting, which he had done himself, decorated one wall of the billiards room in the officers' mess at Hoti Mardan. This was a powerful statement of his personal values – and one source thereof. It was also a means of inscribing the private communal space of the officers with a physical symbol of their shared identity – one that would be meaningless to interlopers ignorant of classical discourse, but instantly comprehensible to other members of the imperial elite.⁷⁵⁷

Moreover, what Wilfred Owen would later characterize as the 'old lie', appears to have been a profound truth for Batty's colleagues. Herbert Edwardes wrote of Batty's dying words to the former commander of the Guides, H. Lumsden. The current commander, H. Daly, mentioned it in his memoirs. Batty's erstwhile colleague, Hodson, included the anecdote in a letter to his brother. Historians and commentators, from Kaye and Malleson through Martin to Henty duly repeated it. The profound pathos with which they described Batty's final moments suggests that they saw in him a reflection of their own ideal, which is to say, the spirit of self-abnegating and explicitly imperial patriotism eulogized by Horace. Evidently they too had been inspired by the patriotic ideals contained in classical discourse. They most certainly hoped to inspire their readers with a similar devotion to duty and willingness to sacrifice by repeating Batty's dying words, which in a sense proclaimed all those who understood them, to be the embodiment of the ancient virtues they referenced.⁷⁵⁸

Moving beyond heroism, military virtue, patriotism and so on, it is easy to find instances of classical discourse inspiring or confirming other aspects of corporate imperial identity among elite Britons, such as the civilizing mission and general character. Observing the excavation of building material from an ancient site he believed to be associated with Alexander, Herbert Edwardes drew a link between the overall imperial ventures of the British

and the Macedonians under Alexander. He found it 'startling to be one's self the instrument of building up a New World dynasty, on the ruins of one of the Old.'⁷⁵⁹ Startling it may have been; but his awakening to the connection between his work supervising infrastructural 'improvements' and Alexander's city foundations was obviously agreeable. A spontaneous realization of this sort cannot have inspired him to join the ICS, or even to have undertaken the project at hand; however, it seems to have confirmed his convictions as to the importance of his work, and more generally that of his countrymen. That is, it helped him conceive of and represent his mundane duties in the wider, much more inspirational context of the civilizing ethos so central to the imperial identity shared by his peers.

In a more general vein, the anonymous reviewer of E.A. Schwanbeck's 1846 *Megasthenis Indica* in the June 1857 issue of *The Calcutta Review* drew numerous parallels between his countrymen and Alexander – as well as the Greeks who succeeded the Macedonian king in India. He noted in particular the essential similarities between the Greeks and the English – their practical genius, their 'pride', even 'conceit' with regard to their national reputation and accomplishments. He went so far as to remark on their shared cultural arrogance, i.e. their natural capacity when visiting foreign parts to let all and sundry know they were something special.⁷⁶⁰ Assuming the author understood his readers, the deliberate conflation of ancient Greeks and modern Britons suggests that many of his peers saw, or wanted to see, such a connection in terms of their character.

Classical discourse's ability to uphold a positive corporate imperial identity held even on occasions when we might expect 'right-thinking' Britons to have shrunk from contemporary actions and classical precedents that seemed too brutal to reconcile with notions of guardianship and the civilizing mission. General Neil's punishment of the 'rebels' captured at the Relief of Cawnpore presents just such an occasion. Trevelyan told the story in one of his letters. To the apparent amusement of those present, the General 'had forced high Brahmans to sweep up the blood of the Europeans murdered at Cawnpore, and then strung them in a row, without giving them the time requisite for the rites of purification'. What struck Trevelyan about Neil's actions was not the brutality or the sacrilege but 'that he imitated in every particular the conduct of Telemachus towards the maid-servants who had lent too kind an ear to those suitors who were content to fly at low game, with a view, I presume, to keep their hands in during the intervals of their more ambitious courtship [of Penelope].'⁷⁶¹ Evidently, Trevelyan could count on his audience to know the particulars of the Homeric episode to which he alluded – but that is beside the point.⁷⁶² The key issue is Trevelyan's implication that Neil had consciously imitated Telemachus, that Homeric ideals had conditioned the General's revenge.

We could interpret this as Trevelyan simply using the authority of antiquity to justify an uncomfortably barbarous act committed by his countrymen.

Yet such a conclusion runs contrary to the tone of his piece. He recounted the episode with a decidedly approving air: there is no trace of defensiveness. Moreover if Trevelyan is to be trusted, the general reaction to Neil's actions was favourable – especially among Anglo-Indians. Whatever our feelings about such calculus, the prevailing opinion among contemporaries seems to have been that this epic level of retribution was entirely appropriate to the epic betrayal of British trust. It is tempting to conclude that an otherwise civilized British gentleman, like Trevelyan, considered Neil's retribution appropriate in part because of its antique precedent. Trevelyan at least seems to have taken comfort in Neil's actions in part because the act of decoding the classical precedent-cum-inspiration for this signal act of vengeance, confirmed both his desire for there to be a real community of values between Britons and the heroes of classical antiquity, and his desire for there to be a community of values and purpose among his peers in India.

The widespread inclination to see and proclaim such intersections did not mean that all attempts to link ancient and moderns were tolerated, much less embraced. Lord Keane's immodest comparison of his relatively insignificant Afghan campaigns with those of Alexander inspired a cutting editorial in *The Friend of India*.⁷⁶³ Disputes of this sort centered on the propriety of the particular comparison, rather than the general notion of drawing them. So extensive was the knowledge of ancient history among British officers and civil servants in India, so important was it to their identity, that they appear to have been unwilling to let their peers deploy its symbolic power in ways that threatened their image of the ancients or of themselves. Criticism was particularly quick and harsh when, as in Lord Keane's case, overtly self-serving deployments of classical discourse appeared to cheapen it, rendering it less effective as inspiration and/or confirmation of imperial identity.

All these comparisons between modern Britons and Ancient Greeks or Romans amounted to attempts to claim, construct, or project a favourable imperial identity. But it does not follow, even if they were all self-serving, that they were also consciously calculated. In some instances, I believe, such comparisons actually expose classical discourse as a key source of shared values and viewpoints. In this connection I think there is something to Dewey's claim that '[t]he members of one of the most powerful elites the world has ever known, the Indian Civil Service at the high noon of empire, were the prisoners of the values they absorbed in their youth.'⁷⁶⁴ Prisoners is certainly too strong a word. But the general notion that Britons carried the values and attitudes imprinted by classical education and discourse – among a host of other cultural factors – to India and that once there this intellectual baggage helped shape their experiences and behaviour seems very sound indeed.

Just as important, the use of classical discourse in such comparisons offered a special opportunity for identification and sympathy between creator and consumer, author and reader, speaker and audience, architect and observer – providing the latter was privy to the secret knowledge. By the same token, all

such uses of classical discourse were, like Outram's Despatch, classical ciphers. They had the effect of excluding the uninitiated, even as they sent very clear messages as to the cultural solidarity and shared identity of elite Britons taking part in the grand imperial project. This brings me to my final major point with regard to classical discourse as secret knowledge: its power to exclude the vast majority of Indians from the intellectual and cultural citadel of the imperial elite, like some great cyclopean wall. It did so primarily by encouraging the sense of difference between Britons and Indians, but not only, as we have been accustomed to see, by basing negative representations of India on classical discourse. At times difference also arose from Indians' inability to participate in classical discourse and, by extension, their inability to challenge a significant intellectual and cultural foundation of British domination. This is the essence of the 'mystifying' or excluding function of secret knowledge.

At first glance such claims might seem rather incredible. Anglo-Indians were already clearly distinguished from Indians by colour, dress, language, religion, and a host of other factors. Classical discourse seems far too subtle to have been a meaningful marker of ruler and ruled. Nonetheless there are good reasons to see it at least as a contributor to the inequalities inherent in the imperial system. As we have already seen, classical knowledge was exclusive. Vasunia discussed this at length in his study of the classics and the ICS, making a number of unimpeachable points. He noted that the classical bias in the exams guarding the entrance to the ICS constituted a significant disincentive to Indians, helping to ensure that only 84 Indians made the grade between 1855 and 1913. Just as important, he made the fundamental general point that the classics were a locus of 'continuous and highly charged negotiations of imperial power.'⁷⁶⁵ In sum, the cultural power invested in them made the classics a point of contention between Britons and Indians.

As we have seen repeatedly, the classics themselves tended to appear in contexts dominated by or accessible only to the British/Anglo-Indian population. Needless to say, the circles of classical study and conversation, centred on men like Elphinstone or Lyall, included only Britons. Even Temple was far less likely to introduce classical discourse in circumstances where his audience was not primarily drawn from the imperial elite. So when he addressed the public meeting on a proposed memorial to the famous philanthropist Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy in August of 1877, or the University of Bombay in February of 1878, Temple almost entirely avoided the kind of familiar classical references that adorned his contemporary speeches to more homogenous and homosocial audiences. Indeed the one exception to this, which came on the latter occasion, comprised a rather clumsy and unfortunate link between the members of his audience and the ancient rulers of Persia, Darius and Xerxes, who 'fell ingloriously before the Greeks and before other Europeans'. This must have marred his apparently sincere attempts to flatter his audience with reference to Cyrus the Great and other more successful Asian rulers.⁷⁶⁶

The limitations on Temple's classical discourse may have been the result of a practical realization that classical references could be lost on an audience lacking the appropriate background, rather than a more selfish desire to preserve the territorial integrity of an exclusively British intellectual province. In either case the end result was the same from the perspective of the uninitiated outsider. Classical discourse remained almost exclusively the preserve of the British, revealed to the uninitiated only through mystifying glimpses, which deepened the divide between ruler and ruled. This must have been the case with Temple's references to the Persian Wars, which both reinforced his mastery of the ancient past and suggested a continuum of European domination over Asia. The latter may have been a Freudian slip of sorts – but, intentional or not, it proclaimed the British certainty of their superiority; founded even if it did not originate in classical discourse.

This brings me to my final point. The ultimate vindication of the argument that the classics constituted a body of powerful secret knowledge seems to come from the actions of those that it had most thoroughly excluded: Indians. Here it is useful to bear in mind both Stray and Bowen's arguments about the expansion of classical education to the middle classes in the second half of the 19th century and Hurst's work on how Victorian girls viewed the classics. The latter has shown that her subjects viewed classical knowledge as a means of empowerment – precisely because it had been used to exclude women from intellectual pursuits and institutions traditionally the preserve of men.⁷⁶⁷ The former have made much the same point with regard to the increasingly numerous and influential professional and upper-middle classes, who saw classical education as a key step in enabling their sons to climb the social ladder and be accepted by the traditional elites as true English gentlemen.⁷⁶⁸ Again, the fact that classical discourse had been used to create and maintain a status gap between the classes was a key point of attraction. In India as in Britain, the very exclusivity of the classics, the aura of mystery surrounding them, their pervasiveness among the ruling elite, and the fact that they had been tools of exclusion eventually made them attractive to certain members of various Indian elites interested in improving their status vis-à-vis the British ruling elite.

On the whole, Indian opinion on the classics is difficult to ascertain, particularly in the early 19th century. It is all but impossible to know what the Indian subordinates, domestic or professional, of men like Elphinstone or Lyall, made of the sahibs' interest in the Greek and Latin classics. They recognized it as something peculiar to the British, though the analogy to Persian and Sanskrit classics might have made it at least somewhat comprehensible to those with an 'Indian' education. Nor is there any reason to think that Indian princes or the commercial elites in Calcutta or Bombay had any better sense of what the classics really meant to the British until the middle years of the 19th century. Even those who began to clamour for access to 'European Education' in the early 19th century made no explicit

mention of classical education. In 1815 the citizens of Calcutta petitioned explicitly for an English School, as did 'the enlightened citizens of Mumbai' when agitating for the foundation of Elphinstone College between 1827 and 1835. And when Ramohun Roy and others of like mind protested against the foundation of the Calcutta Sanskrit College in 1824, their hope was that an English school would replace it.⁷⁶⁹

Macaulay and those who followed him offered hardly any encouragement to the introduction of European classical education to India. Despite his infamous contempt for non-Western literature and his desire to bring European education to India for the purpose of training up a sympathetic and useful Westernized elite, Macaulay made no arguments in favour of importing classical education precisely as it was practised in Britain. For him, and those who sympathized with his position, English, not Greek and Latin, was to be the vehicle by which Indians were to be educated.⁷⁷⁰ Again, it is not clear that this was the result of any deliberate design to maintain the sanctity of the classics as a British preserve. Nevertheless that was the inevitable consequence – for a time.

Their very exclusivity eventually made the classics and classical discourse an object of interest to some Indians. Certainly by the middle years of the century there is good evidence that various sectors of the Indian elite had discovered the potential power of classical discourse. An encounter between Edwardes and the Sikh potentate, Sirdar Shunshere Sing, Sindhanwallah, at the end of the 1840s shows an Indian prince not simply recognizing but brilliantly exploiting the British tendency to identify with Alexander the Great. 'We had a long discussion,' Edwardes began:

about the Macedonian invasion, and the points at which Alexander crossed the several rivers. The Sirdar's ideas on the subject are, if possible, more imaginative than the history of Quintus Curtius, but he was more felicitous in applying his traditions to modern times, for he adroitly compared the policy of Alexander in restoring countries to their conquered kinds, to the late generous forbearance of the British Government in not annexing the Punjab after the battle of Sobraon. 'What before we had only heard with our ears,' said he, 'we have now seen with our eyes.'⁷⁷¹

Some, more amenable to the forces of Anglicization, or quicker to realize the potential benefits of classical knowledge, gained an even deeper understanding of classical discourse and its significance to the British. Samuel Satthianadhan, the son of a Hindu convert to Christianity, who attended Cambridge in the 1860s, certainly understood the classics' connection to elite status. His memoir reveals his conviction that the classics were a valuable source of knowledge, particularly well suited to the ruling elite. He remarked that through classical study, '[t]he student becomes acquainted with the thoughts of the greatest intellects of the world, and constantly

reads discussions on questions of philosophy, politics, &c., expressed in the most perfect forms of speech.' Moreover they gave 'style and polish'. But most important was the social advantage they conveyed to those who had been let in on the secret. As he put it, 'At Cambridge one often hears the statement made that Mathematical studies, as a rule, do not fit one for society and that only Classical men know how to get on in society.'⁷⁷² As was entirely to be expected of one so thoroughly assimilated, Satthianadhan had penetrated the mystery of the classics and seen to the core of their contribution to elite status.

He was not alone. As early as 1852, Nobichunder Das, a student at Hooghly College, wrote an essay advancing the popular British image of themselves as the new Romans, come to give great blessings to India. There was an element of flattery in this portrait, but it was predicated on Das' understanding of what such comparisons meant to British imperial identity. It was also calculated to claim the status he knew came with mastery of classical discourse.⁷⁷³ Vamadeva Shastin, an English educated Brahmin, who frequently contributed articles on Indian subjects to British periodicals, demonstrated his intellectual parity with Britain's best-educated sons in an article published in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1885. In it he alluded to his reading of Herodotus and deftly deployed elements of Greek and Roman history in his discussion of Britain's position in India.⁷⁷⁴ In both *Lake of Palms* and *The Civilization of India*, the former civil servant and politician R.C. Dutt likewise revealed his understanding not only of the content of classical discourse, but of its power.⁷⁷⁵ Not all attempts by Indians to use the Classics were so successful. D.R. Bhandarkar sought to gain authority for his interpretation of ancient Indian history via a reference to the Elder Pliny. Sadly for him, he described Pliny as a Greek, which would have undermined his credibility with any classically educated Briton.⁷⁷⁶ Even so, his attempt confirms that whatever their precise knowledge of classical discourse, educated Indians were thoroughly conversant with its power and keen to turn it to their purposes.

The timing of the realization traced in the preceding paragraphs is easy to understand, although it might seem somewhat tardy given the early appearance of the classics in India. The reason the classics did not become a point of interest or contest in the first half of the century was of course the more pressing interest among the urban elites of India to first gain access to English education discussed above. Only when this battle had been won through the work of the Indian elite in cities like Bombay and Calcutta – and, ironically, the unapologetic ethnocentricity of figures such as Macaulay – would the true power of the classics as a body of secret knowledge have become apparent.

From the 1860s there is cause to see the classics and classical discourse as one point in the constellation of factors that enabled elements of the Indian elite and the British imperial elite to find a middle ground of sorts. This calls to mind in a loose sort of way the argument presented by David Cannadine

in *Ornamentalism*.⁷⁷⁷ For it seems to indicate that accommodations between British and Indian elites were possible, based on perceptions of analogous social backgrounds, in this case evinced by common knowledge of classical discourse. The key difference is in the level of interpretation. Here the key is the classics' role in helping to create the sense of social identification and sympathy that made political and economic accommodations possible. This meant the slow unravelling of classical discourse's status as secret knowledge, which seems to have proceeded more or less in parallel with the gradual elimination of other obstacles to Indian membership in the imperial elite, such as the opening of the ICS to Indians. But, as in that case, it was a very slow process, glacial if put in the context of India's total population. And of course, the cultural origins of the classics ensured that any accommodation based on them was asymmetrical, in so much as it demanded that Indians embrace and adopt a foreign cultural artefact dominated by the British.

That said, access to classical discourse also offered Indians the opportunity to turn it against the British. Reid traced a similar bifurcation in Egyptian responses to classical discourse, one branch of which saw nationalists using it against the British.⁷⁷⁸ Budelmann and Greenwood have noted similar phenomena in West Africa and the West Indies respectively.⁷⁷⁹ Dutt's work offers an Indian example. Notwithstanding his use of classical discourse to display his intellectual status, he also found in it a powerful rhetorical weapon with which to express his discontent with the status quo of British domination. In the novel *Lake of Palms*, Satya Charan, an Indian lawyer, confronts the Commissioner of 'Burdwan'. He begins by claiming that 'You [British] denounce ancient Rome for impoverishing Gaul and Egypt, Sicily and Palestine, to enrich herself'. He then points out that 'England scarcely perceives that she is following the same practice in India, and that the gold she withdraws will do her no more good than it did ancient Rome'.⁷⁸⁰ This argument, which played on both the British tendency to identify with Rome and the strain of classical discourse employed by anti-imperialists in Britain, was specially calculated to resonate with a British audience.⁷⁸¹ In effect Dutt co-opted a body of secret knowledge that helped define the British elite culturally and intellectually, and that confirmed their sense of corporate identity; a body of secret knowledge that helped to exclude the vast majority of Indians from the closed world of the imperial elite and therefore from influence and power in their own homeland.

Such a cursory survey of Indian responses to classical discourse can offer little in the way of concrete conclusions. However it does suggest that further research into ways that Indians co-opted classical discourse, either for accommodation or resistance, and British reactions thereto, will pay dividends. More importantly, it highlights in stark terms the cultural significance of classical discourse in India as a body of secret knowledge with the power to unite, inspire, (mis)represent, and divide.

Conclusion

In December 1803, during construction in Leadenhall Street, just opposite East India House, workers discovered a 'beautiful Roman tessellated [sic] pavement', depicting Dionysus/Bacchus riding a tiger.⁷⁸² The scene, like all scenes featuring Dionysus' feline familiars, alluded to the god's triumphal return from his conquest of India. That this classical image of India's first imperial conqueror should be found at the East India Company's figurative front door, must rank as one of the great archaeological coincidences of all time. For, as I hope to have made clear by now, the classics and classical discourse were a key feature of empire and imperialism in the British idiom through the long 19th century. Indeed, if this book has done nothing more than impress upon readers the existence and extent of the very real conjunction of class, education, culture, imperialism, and the experience of empire in India, I will count it a modest success. Of course, I hope that it will have cleared a somewhat higher bar, both in terms of classical reception studies and British imperial history. And that brings me back to the mosaic.

We cannot know what thoughts it might have inspired in a classically-educated passerby with business in East India House. Images of Britain's colonial history as part of the Roman Empire? Or of that empire's apparent successes in spreading Greco-Roman civilization – including things like 'tessellated pavements' – through the known world? Musings on empire's impermanence and perhaps even its role in the decline and fall of civilizations? Reflections on the exoticism of Indian fauna, or on the luxury, sensuality, and mysticism of India more generally? An inspirational confirmation of the classical precedents for British domination of India? Nor can we know for certain how such thoughts might have informed or reflected our imaginary observer's view of 'imperialism' or the Indian Empire. Given all we have seen, however, it seems safe to conclude that the coincidence of the mosaic would have provoked some sort of connections along these lines. But what would they mean? Would they indicate that classical discourse had a formative influence on our observer? Or would they indicate

conscious or unconscious manipulation of classical discourse to conform to our observer's presentist and probably imperialist preconceptions?

This dichotomy lies at the heart of this book and of classical reception studies. When I first began this project more than a decade ago, the vast majority of recent scholarship took the latter position and tended to dismiss any manifestation of the former as hopelessly old-fashioned. This had much to do with the diffusion of post-colonial theory, which provided a fresh and fashionable perspective on the cultural history of the classics. A great deal of important work resulted as scholars decoded the manifold ways that the classics had been manipulated and exploited to serve various oppressive and exclusionary systems. Collectively this work moved classical reception studies beyond nostalgic valourization into much more vital, though sometimes uncomfortable, regions. But it had the effect of reducing the classics to virtually impotent lumps of rhetorical clay and classical discourse to the aftermath of classist, racist, sexist, and/or colonialist ideologies run amok among the classics, of interest only in so far as it could be deconstructed to reveal those ideologies at work. In the last decade, however, there has been a subtle softening of this singular perspective. An increasing number of scholars such as Adler, Batstone, Bradley, Goff, Rogers and Hingley, and Vasunia have at least acknowledged the need to consider both 'influence' and 'exploitation' – or, as Goff put it, 'pushing' and 'pulling' – when examining the link between the classics and empire. The balance is still inclined toward exploitation and I do not foresee a day when all interested parties agree on the precise relationship between the two, but the overall trend is encouraging.

It also makes the present study less of an outlier vis-à-vis classical reception studies than I originally expected. For I remain convinced that classical discourse was (and is) a dynamic cultural artefact incorporating ancient meanings and modern agendas, open to exploitation and manipulation even as it retained the power to inspire and instruct. The Leadenhall Street Mosaic is a useful metaphor for this approach. It is an ancient artefact of unquestioned cultural and chronological provenance. Yet it was also 'restored' to a high gloss by Victorian conservators, whose work, however well intentioned, inevitably altered it in ways determined by their particular circumstances and experiences. As a result it became, like classical discourse, a palimpsest of past and present, uneven and fluid in meaning.

My particular perspective on reception notwithstanding, all claims that the classics or classical discourse had real cultural and or intellectual significance in Britain during the long 19th century face a common obstacle. To wit, the prevailing image of classical education as an intellectually stultifying grammar-grind hated by boys and useful only for social display. But the evidence admits of a much more positive assessment of classical education's outcomes, providing we recognize the very high standards of contemporary critics and question stereotypes of birch-wielding teachers,

grammar obsessed pedagogy, and anti-intellectual school culture. So, while classical education in the period was not a resounding success, nor was it an abject failure. It produced first-rate classicists like Jones, Burnes, Macaulay, Trevelyan, Lyall, and Seeley, in impressive quantities. It also succeeded in conveying to many of those who loathed it, such as Kipling, or performed indifferently, such as Edwardes, concrete notions of classical history and civilization, and most important of all of antiquity's continuing relevance to the present.

As a final word on the outcomes of classical education, at least among those most likely to play some significant role in discussions of empire or indeed its realities, I offer Sir Edward Cook's comments on the habit of classical quotation among his countrymen:

It may serve to illuminate a modern problem by an instance of ancient wisdom. It may hand on some flame of enthusiasm and inspire to lofty thought by relevant remembrance, such as the subject-matter of the present moment will suggest to a well-stored mind. On the other hand, the habit of classical quotation may be merely a literary fashion and be cultivated for rhetorical display.⁷⁸³

The imperial implications are plain to see. What imperial problems could find illumination via the ancient wisdom available in the classics? What imperial thoughts and inspiration might be kindled by the combination of contemporary stimuli and knowledge of empire in antiquity? To what use might classical discourse be put in the service of a particular imperial identity, or indeed of corporate social or cultural identities in imperial settings?

Such questions are of course central to the two 'imperial' components of my argument: classical discourse's contributions to the culture of imperialism among Britain's elites and to the life of the Indian Empire. A survey of classical discourse in the period reveals a constellation of prominent imperial themes: the world-historical significance of empire, the civilizing mission, defensive imperialism, the threat of decline, the imperial character of the ancients, and Asia's 'difference'. It is possible to follow each of these into imperial discourse, i.e. writing about Britain's empire, where they commonly appear in comparisons between Britain's imperial present and the empires and peoples of antiquity.

Analysis of the first three such ideas – the nature of empire, the civilizing mission, and the special imperial character of great peoples – leads to very similar conclusions. In each case classical comparisons were very common in imperial discourse throughout the period. Thus among other aspects of classical discourse, Virgil's words about the imperial calling of the Romans '*tu regere imperio populos, Romane, Memento, (hae tibi erunt artes)*' were quoted up and down the century, emphasizing the world-historical significance of the British Empire, its civilizing mission, and even the special imperial character

of Britons. Not everyone accepted such connections. But they were so common, so easy, and so comfortable that classical discourse appears to have provided Britain's elites with a common core of ideas central to their understanding of empire and even to the general imperial identity, as revealed in the works and deeds of Macaulay, Quentin Batty, Alfred Lyall, George Trevelyan, Kipling, and Curzon. Of course, their very prevalence made these classically-founded ideas extremely useful in attempts to justify or rationalize particular policies, or the empire in general. And with every repetition, claims that ancient civilizing missions explained, justified, or should inform Britain's work in places like India became more deeply entrenched and made classical discourse even more powerful in imperial terms.

The same general pattern appears in connection with narratives of imperial decline. Thanks to authorities from Thucydides to Gibbon, classical discourse made this phenomenon a constant concern throughout the period. Even in times of relative peace and security, British observers came back to this narrative time and again, suggesting that it was a foundational element in their general understanding of empire. For this reason it was also a useful stick for anti-imperialists such as 'Ritortus' and Hobson, especially in the closing decades of the century. It proved equally attractive for those like Archibald Alison who hoped to frighten their countrymen into setting a new imperial course around the shoals of moral decay, decline, and collapse outlined in classical discourse. Significantly, the power of these narratives did not imperil British identifications with the peoples and empires of classical antiquity. Like Seeley, commentators had merely to claim that kinship went only so far – far enough to maintain the link so essential to positive British imperial identity, but not to the point of making imperial decline an inevitability for Britain. This highlights the 'rich ambiguity' of classical discourse and its dual role.⁷⁸⁴ It was exploited on both sides of the same debate; but it was also the ultimate source of narratives of imperial decline.

It likewise provided a source of knowledge regarding India via ancient works such as Arrian's *Indica*, and more modern compilations of ancient testimony on India such as Robertson's *Disquisition*. For Jones and other Orientalists such knowledge proved essential to understanding ancient India. Sometimes this contributed to favourable views of Indian civilization, but more frequently it contributed to representations of its stagnation and/or degeneracy. Elphinstone's example shows that the latter did not necessarily entail present-minded exploitation of classical discourse; but such manipulations did occur, as in the case of James Mill's influential *History*. In sum, representations of India within classical discourse (some direct from ancient sources, some mediated by modern authorities) constituted many Britons' first exposure to India and notions of its 'difference' and inferiority. Because of its formative impact and general cultural authority, it offered a starting point and rhetorical arsenal in many discussions of India.

These factors likewise help explain classical discourse's contribution to the experience of empire in India. The classics travelled to India in considerable numbers making classical discourse a significant cultural presence among elite Britons serving there. Among its many roles in India, classical discourse acted as a coping mechanism and as a body of secret knowledge. My understanding of the former builds on the notion that Britons used various forms of knowledge to make sense of India, its peoples, and civilizations, rendering them knowable and thus controllable. From this perspective, engagement with classical discourse can be seen as a sort of coping mechanism, which helped Britons deal with the anxieties of service in India. In Elphinstone's case this covered everything from boredom and isolation, through cultural and physical alienation, to general professional or personal anxieties, and acute, mortal fear. In this light, analysis of classical discourse humanizes British imperial agents to some degree, stripping away a layer of the masterful confidence they typically projected to the world.

By adapting a function of classical discourse in the metropole thoroughly documented by Stray, such analysis also helps us understand how the closed community of the imperial elite defined and maintained itself in India. Reading together, sharing books or even the exchange of classical quotations strengthened social networks among members of the classically educated elites. More significantly, engagement with classical discourse also reinforced the cultural solidarity and shared identity of the initiated, as it did for Temple and some of his audiences or those who obsessively wrote and read about Alexander's route through India. The seamy side of this sort of self-definition is always exclusion. Perhaps even more dramatically than in Britain, the secret knowledge of classical discourse erected a massive wall between the elite and the masses. Inevitably this provoked a response from the excluded. Attempts by Indian elites to unlock the secret knowledge of the classics – so central to British conceptions of empire, to their collective imperial identity, and of course to the image of India that 'justified' their domination of the subcontinent – provide most eloquent testimony of classical discourse's cultural power on the subcontinent. For Indians, it provided a way to breach the walls of the elite social and cultural citadel: either to demand entrance and membership or to put a torch to it and everything it represented.

There remains much more to be said of Indian reactions to and appropriations of classical discourse – and of British counter-reactions. For instance, did it ever constitute a real 'middle ground', where some Britons and some Indians could meet as equals? In fact, there remains much more to be said about classical discourse in the Indian Empire full stop. Can it be linked to particular imperial policies? How did it function during the struggle for independence? How did it shape the art and literature of the Raj? And what of gender? What did it contribute to conceptions of masculinity among Anglo-Indians? Did memsahibs have greater latitude in engaging with classical

discourse than their sisters at home? Hopefully scholars will take up these and other questions in the context of South Asia, just as scholars such as Greenwood have begun to examine the classics' significance in colonial and post-colonial societies elsewhere. Hopefully too, scholars will continue to examine the classics' contribution to Britain's culture of imperialism, before during, and after the period addressed here. I hope this book will be of some use to those who do so, and become a minor muse in its own right, providing a paradigm for approaching classical discourse or at least a frustrating foil that provokes further research and new and better interpretations.

Notes to Text

Introduction

1. Bill Bryson (1995) *Notes from a Small Island* (London) p. 56.
2. On this issue see especially C. Stray (1998) *Classics Transformed: Schools, Universities and Society in England, 1830–1960* (Oxford).
3. Martin Weiner considered the public school and university education essential in the amalgamation of the aristocracy and the professional classes. Martin Weiner (1981) *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850–1980* (Cambridge) pp. 16, 18, 20–4, and 158.
4. R. Robinson, and J. Gallagher with A. Denny (1961) *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London).
5. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) p. 246. See Arrian, *Indica* 7.
6. Trevelyan, *Competition Wallah*, p. 26.
7. 'It is sweet and proper to die for the fatherland.' Horace, *Odes* III. ii. 13 in (1861) *The Odes of Horace*, translated by T. Martin (Boston).
8. On the use of Horace's phrase by British First World War poets and its import for classical reception studies, see E. Vandiver (2011) *Stand in the Trench, Achilles: Classical Reception in British Poetry of the Great War* (Oxford) pp. 393–404.
9. E.g. P.S. Lumsden and G.R. Elsmie, (1899) *Lumsden of the Guides: A sketch of the life of Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry Burnett Lumsden, K.C.S.I., C.B* (London) p. 196. H. Daly, (1905) *Memoirs of General Sir Henry Dermot Daly, G.C.B., C.I.E., sometime commander of Central India Horse, Political Assistant for Western Malwa, etc. etc* (London) p. 366. G. Hodson (1859) *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India: Being Extracts from the Letters of the Late Major, W.S.R. Hodson* (London) p. 202. R.M. Martin (1858) *The Indian Empire* (New York) vol. 2: p. 118. E.F. W.H. Fitchett (1901) 'The Tale of the Great Mutiny' *Cornhill Magazine*, N.S., vol. 11, p. 529.
10. G.A. Henty (1881) *In Times of Peril* (London) p. 108.
11. J.S. Galbraith (1963) *Reluctant Empire; British Policy on the South African Frontier 1834–54* (Berkeley) pp. 223, 224 n. 42. J. Morris (1968) *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire* (London) pp. 23, 129, 499 and 512. B. Porter (1968) *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914* (London) p. 13. N. Mansearh (1969) *The Commonwealth Experience* (London) 254 and 5, 7–8 and 398. 36. R. Hyam (1976) *Britain's Imperial Century 1815–1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion* (London) p. 67. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and its enemies: a study in British Power* (1965) pp. 105, 123, 148, 212, 293 and *Doctrines of Imperialism* (New York) pp. 27, 29–32, 34. B. Semmel (1970) *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750–1850* (Cambridge) pp. 7, 28, 31, 41, 91, 95, 126, 150, 216. V.G. Kiernan (1982) 'Tennyson, King Arthur, and Imperialism', in R. Samuel and G.S. Jones (eds) *Culture, Ideology and Politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm*, History Workshop Series (London). T.R. Metcalfe (1994) *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge) pp. 3, 4, 13, 14, 54, 57, 60–1, 86, 90, 196. J.P. Greene (1998) 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth*

- Century* (Oxford) pp. 217, 223. A. Burton (1994) *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (Chapel Hill) 86. D.R. Headrick (1981) *Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford) 54. T.R. Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 51 and (1989) *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj* (Berkeley) pp. 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 16, 26, 41–2, 178, 184–5, 198 & 146–8. S. Nilsson (1968) *European Architecture in India, 1750–1850*, trans. E. George & E. Zetersten (London) pp. 25–31. P.D. Curtin (1964) *The Image of Africa* (Madison) pp. 249, 375–6. E. Said (1978) *Orientalism* (New York) 21 and the 'Afterword' to the 1994 edition of Idem. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism* (London) p. 16. A.H. Hourani (1980) *Europe and the Middle East* (London) p. 146. E.J. Pratt (1978) *Britain's Greek Empire* (London) pp. 110, 145–6. P.D. Coates (1988) *The China Consuls* (Oxford) 73 & 90. C. Dewey (1993) *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London) pp. 5, 120–5.
12. S. Patterson (2009) *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York) especially pp. 129–68.
 13. Metcalfe alone called for further investigation of the classics' imperial role from a historian of empire and even that was hidden away in a footnote. Metcalfe, *Imperial Vision*, p. 378.
 14. R.F. Betts (1971) 'Allusions to Rome in British imperialist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries', *Victorian Studies*, vol. 15, pp. 149–59. Betts cites Richard Faber as the only previous author to address this connection in any detail. R. Faber (1966) *The Vision and the Need: late Victorian Imperialist Aims* (London). We might also add P.A. Brunt (1965) 'Reflections on British and Roman Imperialism' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7, no. 3, pp. 267–88.
 15. Betts, 'Allusions', pp. 155–6.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
 17. F.M. Turner (1982) 'Antiquity in Victorian Contexts' *Browning Institute Studies* vol. 10, pp. 3–4. See also (1981) *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (New Haven) pp. xii.
 18. M. Bernal (1987) *Black Athena: the Afro-Asia roots of Classical Antiquity* (New Brunswick) and (1994) 'The Image of Ancient Greece as a tool for colonialism and European hegemony', in G.C. Bond and A. Gilliam (eds) *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power* (London) pp. 119–127.
 19. For the full range of responses to Bernal's work see M.R. Lefkowitz and G. Maclean Roberts (eds) (1994) *Black Athena Revisited* (Chapel Hill). Bernal riposted with (2001) *Black Athena Writes Back* (Durham). For a more recent discussion of the issue see D. Orrells, G.K. Bhabra, and T. Roynon (eds) (2011) *African Athena: New Agendas* (Oxford).
 20. B. Goff, 'Introduction' in B. Goff (ed.) (2005) *Classics and Colonialism* (London) pp. 15–16.
 21. R. Hingley (2000) *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen* (New York) pp. 6–11. J. Majeed (1999) 'Comparativism and references to Rome in British imperial attitudes to India' in C. Edwards (ed.) (1999) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) p. 90. Vance (1997) *Victorians and Ancient Rome* (Oxford) p. 222, and 'Decadence and the subversion of empire' in C. Edwards (1999) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) pp. 110–24. C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge) pp. 70–87. V. Larson (1999) 'Classics and the acquisition and validation of power in Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914)', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 6, no. 2,

- p. 222. P. Vasunia (2003) 'Hellenism and Empire: Reading Edward Said' *Parallax*, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 88–97, and (2009) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', in J. Hallet and C. Stray (eds) *British Classics Outside England: The Academy and Beyond* (Waco).
22. Vasunia (2009) 'Virgil and the British Empire, 1760–1880', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 155, p. 109.
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 25. M. Wyke and M. Biddiss (1999) 'Introduction' in *The Uses and Abuses of Antiquity* (Bern) p. 13.
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. Goff (2005) 'Introduction' *Classics and Colonialism* (London) p. 13.
 28. *Ibid.*, citing Jenkyns (1992) *The Legacy of Rome: A New Appraisal* (London) p. 2.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 14, following Turner, *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain*, p. 189.
 30. Gloria Vivenza (2001) *Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought* (Oxford). G. Highet (1949) *The Classical Tradition* (Oxford). S.A. Larrabee (1943) *English Bards and Grecian Marbles* (New York). R.M. Ogilvie (1964) *Greek and Latin: A History of the Influence of the Classics on English Life from 1600 to 1918* (London).
 31. Goff, 'Introduction', *Classics and Colonialism*, p. 23, n. 26.
 32. D. Reid (1996) 'Cromer and the Classics', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 7 and 10.
 33. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2.
 34. D. Armitage, 'Literature and Empire' in (1998) *OHBE*, vol. I, *Origins of Empire* (Oxford) pp. 105–7, and (2000) *Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Oxford) 125. N. Canny (1998) 'The Origins of Empire' in *OHBE*, vol. I, *Origins of Empire* (Oxford) p. 32, and (1973) 'The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America', *William and Mary Quarterly*, third series, vol. 30 (1973) pp. 575–98.
 35. E. Adler, 'Late Victorian and Edwardian Views of Rome', p. 210.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
 37. M. Bradley, 'Introduction' in M. Bradley (ed.) (2010) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 18. Emphasis added.
 38. E. Reisz (2010) 'Classics, Race, and Edwardian Anxieties about Empire' in Bradley, *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 211–28. A. Rogers and R. Hingley, 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield: The Traditions of Imperial Decline', in *idem.* K. Vlassopoulos, 'Imperial Encounters: Discourses on Empire and the Uses of Ancient History during the Eighteenth Century', in *idem.* pp. 30–52. D. Challis, 'The Ablest Race': the Ancient Greeks in Victorian Racial Theory' in *idem.* pp. 94–120. R.S. Mantena, 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire' in *idem.* pp. 54–72.
 39. W.W. Batstone, 'Provocation: The point of Reception Theory' in C. Martindale and R.F. Thomas (eds) (2006) *Classics and the Uses of Reception* (Oxford) p. 17.
 40. For example, Turner, 'Antiquity in Victorian Contexts', pp. 12–3. S. Goldhill (2002) *Who needs Greek?: Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism* (Cambridge) p. 232, and especially Symonds (1986) *Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost Cause?* (Oxford) p. 296.

41. R. Olive (1999) 'Obituary: Philip Mason', *Independent*, 2 February 1999.
42. Reid, 'Cromer and the Classics', p. 2.
43. C. Hagerman (2009) "'In the footsteps of the 'Macedonian conqueror': Alexander the Great and British India', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, nos. 3–4, pp. 344–92.
44. For the imperial significance of the period: C.A. Bayly (1989) *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World* (London) pp. 2–3. P.J. Marshall (1998) 'Introduction' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 7. J.P. Greene (1998) 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 22–5. D. Armitage (2000) *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge) p. 7.
45. Reisz has recently emphasized the continued importance of the classics through the Edwardian period. Reisz, 'Classics Race and Edwardian Anxieties about Empire', p. 211. See also Vandiver, *Stand in the Trench, Achilles*, pp. 2–5. She underscores the continuing power of the classics in representations of heroism and patriotism.
46. A point admirably made by recent scholarship that turns the usual framework on its head. See especially J. Sachs (2010) *Romantic Antiquity: Rome in the British Imagination, 1789–1832* (Oxford).
47. Betts, 'Allusions', pp. 150–1.
48. J.A. Mangan (1981) *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: the emergence and consolidation of an educational ideology* (Cambridge) pp. 111–12. Idem. (1998) *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (London) pp. 21–3. C. Stray, 'Schoolboys and Gentlemen', in Livingston N. and L.T. Yun (eds) (1998) *Pedagogy and Power: Rhetorics of Classical Learning* (Cambridge) p. 37, n. 11. Stray's recent edited collection (with J. Hallet) *British Classics outside England* suggests a softening of this position. See also, P.J. Rich (1989) *Elixir of Empire: the English Public Schools, Freemasonry, Ritual and Imperialism* (London) pp. 103–4.
49. N. Vance, *The Victorians and Ancient Rome*, and J. Majeed, 'Comparativism and references to Rome', p. 90.
50. L. Dowling (1994) *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (London) p. 31. Edwards, 'Introduction', *Roman Presences*, p. 12, Rogers and Hingley, 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield', pp. 189–209. Reisz, 'Classics, Race, and Edwardian Anxieties', pp. 211–12. F.M. Turner (1989) 'Why the Greeks and not the Romans in Victorian Britain', in G.W. Clarke (ed.) *Rediscovering Hellenism* (Cambridge) pp. 69–70. Challis, "'The Ablest Race'", p. 118. Mantena, 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire', pp. 54 & 72, and Vasunia, most recently in 'Envoi', in M. Bradley (ed.) (2010) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 288.
51. Reid, 'Cromer and the Classics', pp. 7, 11, 13–15, and 2.
52. F. Budelmann, 'Greek Tragedies in West African Adaptations,' in B. Goff (ed.) (2005) *Classics and Colonialism* (London) pp. 118–46 and E. Greenwood, 'We Speak Latin in Trinidad' in idem., pp. 65–91. Now superseded by (2010) *Afro-Greeks: Dialogues Between Anglophone Caribbean Literature and Classics in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford). A. Kaicker, 'Visions of Modernity in Revisions of the Past: Altaf Hussain Hali and the "Legacy of the Greeks"', in M. Bradley (ed.) (2010) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 232–47. Vasunia too has noted the varied reactions of colonized peoples to the classics. See Vasunia, 'Greater Rome and Greater Britain', pp. 55–6 and 'Envoi', p. 289.
53. P. Vasunia (2005) 'Greek Latin and the Indian Civil Service', *Cambridge Classical Journal: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, vol. 51, pp. 35–71.

54. Majeed, 'Comparativism and references to Rome', p. 90. For Vasunia, 'Hellenism and Empire', pp. 88–97 and idem., 'Alexander and Asia: Droysen and Grote' in H.P. Ray and D.T. Potts (eds) (2007) *Memory as History: the legacy of Alexander in Asia* (New Delhi) p. 89.
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56. Turner, 'Antiquity in Victorian Contexts', p. 6.
57. A.N. Porter (1994) *European Imperialism* (London) p. 28.
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63. P.J. Rich (1989) *Elixir of Empire: the English Public Schools, Freemasonry, Ritual and Imperialism* (London), p. 31.
64. See J.A. Mangan (1998) *The Games Ethic and Imperialism* (London) pp. 21–3.
65. N. Hans (1951) *New Trends in Education in the Eighteenth Century* (London) Table. III.
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71. M. Bradley (2010) 'Tacitus' *Agricola* and the Conquest of Britain: Representations of Empire in Victorian and Edwardian England', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 127–8. R. Jenkyns (1992) The Legacy of Rome: a new appraisal (Oxford) p. 2. C. Edwards 'Introduction' in C. Edwards (1999) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) p. 8. P. Freeman (1996) 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire,' in J. Webster and N.J. Cooper (eds) *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives*

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72. A. Markley (2004) *Stateliest Measures: Tennyson and the Literature of Greece and Rome* (Toronto) p. 16.
 73. P. Vasunia (2005) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', *The Cambridge Classical Journal: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, vol. 51, p. 63. See also I. Hurst (2006) *Victorian women writers and the classics: the feminine of Homer* (Oxford) pp. 12–13. S. Goldhill (2002) *Who Needs Greek?: Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism* (Cambridge) pp. 181, 193–4. R. S. Mantena (2010) 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 54. E. Reisz (2010) 'Classics, Race, and Edwardian Anxieties about Empire' in Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 211.
 74. Especially C. Stray (1998) *Classics Transformed: Schools, Universities and Society in England, 1830–1960* (Oxford). Also J.R. de S. Honey (1977) *Tom Brown's Universe* (London) p. 134.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 33. See also E. Mack (1938) *The Public Schools and British Opinion: 1780–1860 an Examination of the Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution* (London) p. 59.
 76. The anecdote is recounted by M.L. Clarke (1959) *Classical Education in England* (Cambridge) p. 86. J. Bowen also noted 'the mystifying function' of the classics. See his (1989) 'Education, ideology and the ruling class', in G.W. Clarke (ed.) *Rediscovering Hellenism* (Cambridge) p. 183. See also V. Larson (1999) 'Classics and the acquisition and validation of power in Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914)', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 225, and C. Hagerman (2008) 'Secret ciphers, secret knowledge and imperial power: the classics in British India' *Victorian Newsletter* no. 113, Spring 2008, pp. 1–21.
 77. J. Massie (1890) 'Middle Class Education', *Westminster Review*, vol. 133, p. 159.
 78. V. Knox (1781) *Liberal Education: Or a Practical Treatise on Acquiring Useful and Polite Learning* (London), vol. 1, p. 4. Quoted in Mack, *The Public Schools and British Opinion: 1780–1860*, p. 178. Rothblatt also notes this element of classical education in the 18th century, though he argues that it was not nearly as common then as it became in the 19th century. See S. Rothblatt (1976) *Tradition and Change in Liberal Education* (London) p. 44.
 79. Quoted in N. Vance (1997) *The Victorians and Ancient Rome* (Oxford) p. 13. Vance himself followed M. Craze (1972) *King's School Worcester* (London) p. 286. See also Alfred Milner's defence of compulsory Greek: R. Symonds (1986) *Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost Cause?* (Oxford) p. 18.

80. Rothblatt, *Tradition and Change*, p. 44. See also Mack, *The Public Schools and British Opinion, 1780–1860*, p. 182, and J. Gathorne-Hardy (1978) *The Old School Tie: The Phenomenon of the English Public School* (London) p. 139. See also V. Knox (1781) *Liberal Education: Or a Practical Treatise on acquiring Useful and Polite Learning* (London), vol. 1, p. 11.
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81. J.C. Stobart (1912) *The Grandeur that was Rome. A Survey of Roman Culture and Civilization* (London), p. 3. Stray, *Classics Transformed*, p. 183, points out there were critics who considered classical education particularly unsuited to an imperial people. They were in the minority, however.
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85. See especially P. Vasunia (2009) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service,' in J. Hallet and C. Stray (eds) *British Classics outside England: the academy and beyond* (Waco) p. 69. Also Larson, 'Classics and the acquisition and validation of power', pp. 201–4.
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88. See also: J. Sutherland (1868) 'Our Grammar Schools', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 225, p. 311. H. Nettleship (1890) *The Moral Influence of Literature & Classical Education in Past and at Present. Two Popular Addresses* (London) pp. 59–60. G. Combe (1830) 'Public Schools of England', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 51, pp. 65–80. A. Bain (1879) 'The Classical Controversy', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 35, p. 832.
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90. C. A. Bristed (2008) *An American in Victorian Cambridge: Charles Astor Bristed's Five years in an English University*, ed. C. Stray (Exeter) pp. 36–8.

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92. C. Stray, 'Introduction' in C. A. Bristed (2008) *An American in Victorian Cambridge: Charles Astor Bristed's Five Years in an English University* (Exeter) pp. xx–xxi.
93. S. Smith (1809) 'Professional Education', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 15, pp. 40–53 and (1810) 'Public Schools of England', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 16, pp. 326–34. Roundell, C. (1903) *The London Times*, 11 April 1903, p. 5. See also A. Smith (1776) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London) p. 344. Emphasis added.
94. D. Newsome (1961) *Godliness and Good Learning* (London) p. 62, J. Chandos (1984) *Boys Together* (London) pp. 156–9.
95. F.W. Farrar, (1868) 'Public School Education', *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 92, pp. 34–49.
96. Clarendon Commission (1864) *Report of the Public Schools Commission: General Report*, vol. 1, p. 44.
97. For evidence of John Bright quoting Homer (Odyssey 22.412), see Sir E. Cook (1919) *More Literary Recreations* (London) p. 37. See Stray, *Classics Transformed*, pp. 67–8, and Goldhill, *Who needs Greek?* p. 207, for another critic, Henry Sidgwick, engaging in a drinking-game involving completing quotations from Horace.
98. Thirlwall was four, Connington eight, Selbourne, nine, Harrison eleven, and Macaulay twelve. Clarke, *Classical Education*, p. 83.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 55. Newsome, *Godliness and Good Learning*, p.106.
100. E.T. Burney (1856) 'The Enjoyment of the Classics', *Haileybury Observer*, vol. 8, pp. 292, 375.
101. T. Hughes (1989) *Tom Brown's Schooldays* (Oxford), pp. 59, 285, 313. Arthur represents the type rather more interested in his classical studies.
102. Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire*, p. 26.
103. Clarke, *Classical Education*, p. 54. For boys memorizing passages of ancient authors on holiday see Newsome, *Godliness and Good Learning*, p. 106.
104. Mack, *The Public Schools and British Opinion Since 1860*, p. 29.
105. 'Etonian' (1864) 'Mr. Matthew Arnold and the Great Public Schools: Eton', *Macmillan's Magazine*, p. 176.
106. For example, *The Etonian*, ed. W Blunt and W. Praed. Contributions with obvious classical links in Vol. III, no. IX, included: 'Paestum', '*Horae Subfuscae*', 'Essay on the Poems of Homer and the manners of the age in which he lived', and 'The Wedding: A Roman Tale'. There were of course frequent classical allusions and references in other contributions, such as 'Fragments on an address to the Spirit of Poetry'.
107. Andrew Sinclair 'By their speech you shall know them' in (1977) *The World of the Public School* (London) 183. For 'vale' see A. Le Blanc (1824) 'The King of Clubs', *The Etonian*, vol. III, no. VIII, fourth edition, pp. 1–12.
108. Consult *Scrutator*: a series of weekly papers addressed to the students of the Hon. E.I. College and edited by one of their number: nos. 1–46 (Hertford, 1820–1): no. 1, p. 1 no. 2, p. 16; no. 4, p. 29; no. 19, p. 146; no. 23, p. 193; no. 24, pp. 209, 212. no. 25, p. 230, 232; no. 29, p. 263; no. 34 p. 320; no. 39, p. 376; no. 40, p. 395; and no. 42, p. 416 . For poems, essays, etc. with classical subjects in a random example of the later *Haileybury Observer* see, for example, vol. VIII (Hertford, 1856) pp. 1, 13, 34, 64, 83, 103, 112, 180, 181, 216, 219, 228, 290,

- 370, 376, 393, 444. This list does not include classical references or allusions in contributions on other subjects.
109. *Scrutator*, no. 7, Hertford, 1820, pp. 70–1.
 110. For example in 1856, volume 8 of *The Haileybury Observer* contained the following classical pseudonyms/initials: Scotus, Nemo, ω, Φ, Vale, κ.τ.λ., γ, Tristis Amator, and Justitia.
 111. Newsome, *Godliness and Good Learning*, p. 11. See (1807) *Oxford Prize Poems: Being a Collection of such English Poems as Have at Various Times Obtained Prizes in the University of Oxford* (Oxford), and (1830) *Oxford English Prize Essays*, 4 volumes (Oxford) vol. IV, which included: Plumer 'On Public Spirit among the ancients' (1823). Churton 'Athens in the time of Pericles, Rome in the time of Augustus' (1824). Sewell 'The domestic Virtues and Manners of the ancient Greeks and Romans compared with the most refined states of Europe' (1828). This is in addition to works on more modern philosophy, literature and history.
 112. Bristed, *Five years at an English University*, p. 53. See 'Trinity Supper Party', pp. 56–8. 'Greek in the Cantab Language', pp. 27–8. 'Reading sets', p. 112.
 113. W. Tuckwell (1900) *Reminiscences of Oxford* (London) pp. 94–5. For the English translation, see T. Jackson & W. Sinclair (1833) *Uniomachia, or the Battle at the Union, a Homeric fragment*, translated by Archdeacon Giles (Oxford).
 114. Symonds, *Oxford and Empire*, p. 1.
 115. This was in contrast to the author's situation at Haileybury, which suited him. *Scrutator* no. 26 (1821) 259: IOR, P/P/6151/ad.
 116. For example, see Sir H.C. Maxwell-Lyte (1911) *History of Eton College* (London) p. 382. Keate shows up particularly well in this account. For Vaughn, see E.W. Howson and G.T. Warner (1898) *Harrow School* (London) p. 109.
 117. Maxwell-Lyte, *History of Eton College*, p. 394.
 118. G.W. Fisher (1899) *Annals of Shrewsbury School* (London), p. 305.
 119. O. Browning (1910) *Memories of Sixty Years at Eton, Cambridge and Elsewhere* (New York) p. 66. excerpted in P.H.J. Gosden (1969) *How they were Taught* (Oxford) pp. 83, 87. Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service*, pp. 122–3.
 120. *Presentation of a Testimonial to the Rev. James Amiraux Jeremie by the Students of Haileybury College. Reprinted by Stephen Austin* (Hertford 1850) pp. 2–3.
 121. P. Penner (1987) *Robert Needham Cust, 1821–1909: A Personal Biography* (Lewiston) pp. 45, 49.
 122. Monier Monier-Williams (1894) *Memorials of Old Haileybury College* (Westminster) p. 7.
 123. Gathorne-Hardy, *The Public School Phenomenon*, p. 143.
 124. For example E. Bulwer-Lytton (1831) 'Spirit of Society in England and France', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 52, 73 ff. For further examples, see E. Mack (1938) *The Public Schools and British Opinion: 1780–1860 An Examination of the Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution* (London) p. 60, and idem., (1939) *The Public Schools and British Opinion since 1860: The Relationship between Contemporary Ideas and the Evolution of an English Institution* (London) pp. 64–5.
 125. Clarke, *Classical Education*, pp. 53–5.
 126. E. Burney (1856) 'The Enjoyment of the Classics', *Haileybury Observer*, vol. 8, p. 75.
 127. B. Price (1879) 'On the Worth of a Classical Education', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 34, p. 805.

128. Maxwell-Lyte, *History of Eton College*, p. 385.
129. Quoted in Goldhill, *Who needs Greek?*, p. 202. See also I.G. Smith (1868) 'Lowe and Huxley on the Classics', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 9, p. 42.
130. Maxwell-Lyte, *History of Eton College*, p. 311.
131. This was before Eton was reformed to come more in line with the standards Arnold had established at Rugby. Similar reforms came to Eton under E.C. Hawtrey (1834–53) and C.O. Goodford (1853–62).
132. Mack, *The Public Schools and British Opinion since 1860*, p. 29. See also C.T. Metcalfe's list of amusement reading. Maxwell-Lyte, *History of Eton College*, p. 368.
133. Bristed, *Five Years in an English University*, p. 242. He was less impressed by the official classical curriculum, which he described as 'obsolescent and defective' – though he also acknowledged that it produced many good scholars with particular strengths in Latin composition. *Ibid.*, p. 241. No doubt students' knowledge of ancient history owed much to the institutionalized practice of tutors remedying 'the deficiencies' of the regular curriculum via 'Private business'. Browning, *Memories of Sixty Years at Eton, Cambridge and Elsewhere*, p. 66.
134. In this case all of Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles, Virgil, Horace, Catullus, Euripides, and Lucan. Clarke, *Classical Education*, p. 82.
135. G.W. Fisher (1899) *Annals of Shrewsbury School* (London) p. 326.
136. *Ibid.* p. 305. On the high quality of Shrewsbury scholarship, see Bristed, *Five Years in an English University*, pp. 251–2.
137. Fisher, *Annals of Shrewsbury School*, p. 330. Kennedy also introduced modern languages and mathematics as regular elements of the school curriculum, though classics remained dominant.
138. M. McCrum (1989) *Thomas Arnold Head Master: A Reassessment* (Oxford) p. 92. T. Copley (2002) *Black Tom, Arnold of Rugby: the Myth and the Man* (London) p. 153.
139. Quoted in H.C. Barnard (1947) *A History of English Education from 1760* (London), p. 78. See also A.P. Stanley (1860) *The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold* (London) pp. 188–9 for Arnold's interest in history, confirmed of course by his multi-volume *History of Rome*.
140. Noted as early as 1897 by Sir Joshua Fitch (1897) *Thomas and Matthew Arnold and Their Influence on English Education* (London) pp. 152–5.
141. *Ibid.*, pp. 380–2. Keate's predecessor Goodall was also considered an inspirational teacher by some senior boys. Maxwell-Lyte, *History of Eton College*, p. 365. For anecdotes of the more negative variety, see R. Nevil (1911) *Floreat Etona, Anecdotes and Memories of Eton College* (London) pp. 230–40.
142. Monier-Williams, *Memorials of Old Haileybury College*, p. 7.
143. Howson and Warner, *Harrow School*, p. 109.
144. J. Bardoux (1899) *Memories of Oxford*, trans. by W.R. Barker (London) p. 10.
145. J. Plotz (1993) 'Latin for Empire: Kipling's *Regulus* as a Classics Class for the Ruling Classes', *The Lion and the Unicorn*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1993) p. 162, following J. Morris (1978) *The Oxford Book of Oxford* (Oxford) p. 296 and A.P. Stanley, *The Life and Correspondence* vol. 2, pp. 360–1.
146. Bristed, *Five Years in an English University*, pp. 68–9.
147. East India College Examination Papers: November 1844. India Office Records (IOR) SW 186.
148. East India College Examination Papers: Easter 1851. IOR/SW/186.
149. East India College Examination Papers: December 1851. IOR/SW/186.

150. P. Vasunia, (2009) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', in J. Hallet and C. Stray (eds) *British classics outside England: the academy and beyond* (Waco) p. 63. Larson, 'Classics and the acquisition', p. 197.
151. See Civil Services Commission Open Competition, Examination Paper 1879. IOR L/PJ/6/8: file 382.
152. Lord Alexander Woodhouselee (1783-1801-1839) *Universal History from the Creation of the World to the Beginning of the 18th Century* (London) vol. 2, p. 73.
153. Wm. Hodgson (1815) 'Greece: a Poem in Three Parts ... by Wm. Haygarth' *Monthly Review*, N.S., vol. 77, p. 280.
154. Anonymous (1827) 'Walsmouth's Hellenic Antiquities', *Monthly Review*, third series, vol. 4, p. 458.
155. G. Grote (1826) 'Fasti hellenici', *Westminster Review*, vol. 5, p. 280. Also quoted in I. Morris (1994) 'Archaeologies of Greece', in Ian Morris (ed.) *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies* (Cambridge) p. 30.
156. 'Caesar's proceedings in Gaul are sufficiently familiar to enable us to treat them with a sort of contempt...' G.A. A' Beckett (1852) *Comic History of Rome* (London) p. 299.
157. J.A. Froude (1855) 'Suggestions on the best Means of teaching English History', *Oxford Essays 1855* (London) p. 48. He still supported classical education, providing that it did not lead to the exclusion of English literature and history. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
158. A. Trollope (1870) *Commentaries of Caesar, Ancient Classics for English Readers* (Philadelphia) p. 9.
159. Goldhill, *Who Needs Greek?*, p. 244.
160. Clarke, *Classical Education*, p. 17.
161. E.g. see Mack, *The Public Schools and British Opinion since 1860*, p. 33. Also Clarendon Commission (1864) *Report of the Public Schools Commission: General Report*, vol. 1: 31 ff.
162. Price, 'On the Worth of a Classical Education', p. 807.
163. Honey, *Tom Brown's Universe*, p. 133. Also Newsome, *Godliness and Good Learning*, p. 12.
164. S. Medcalf (1993) 'Horace's Kipling,' in C. Martindale (ed.) *Horace made new: Horatian influences on British writing from the Renaissance to the twentieth century* (New York) pp. 217-39.
165. First published in periodicals during the spring of 1917 and later that year in *A Diversity of Creatures* but was written, according to Kipling, in 1908. See J.A. Plotz, 'Latin for Empire' n. 1.
166. Horace, Odes iii.5 in (1861) *The Odes of Horace*, translated by T. Martin (Boston). R. Kipling 'Regulus' in (1917) *A Diversity of Creatures* (New York) p. 134. See Medcalf, 'Horace's Kipling', p. 225. R. Jenkyns (1992) *Dignity and Decadence* (London) p. 2.
167. Plotz, 'Latin for Empire', pp. 152-3.
168. Mack, *The Public School and British Opinion since 1860*, p. 34, following the Report of the Clarendon Commission.
169. Honey, *Tom Brown's Universe*, p. 128.
170. Stray, *Classics Transformed*, p. 47, following H. Nevinson (1912) *Between the Acts* (London).
171. G.N. Curzon (1900) 'Speech given on 28 October, 1898', *Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston*, vol. 1, 1898-1900 (Calcutta) p. iv.

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172. F. W. Newman (1874) 'The moral character of Roman conquest', *Fraser's Magazine*, vol. 89, O.S., p. 588. Pliny, *Nat. His.* 3.39.
173. Newman, 'The moral character of Roman conquest', p. 588.
174. P.W.M. Freeman (1996) 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire', in J. Webster and N.J. Cooper (eds) *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives* (Leicester) pp. 22, 26. C. Edwards (1999) 'Introduction' in *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) p. 3. A. Markley (2004) *Statelists Measures: Tennyson and the Literature of Greece and Rome* (Toronto) p. 16. C. Martindale and R.F. Thomas (eds) *Classics and the Uses of Reception* (Oxford) p. 3. F. Turner (1986) 'British Politics and the Demise of the Roman Republic', *The Historical Journal*, 29, p. 577. P. Vasunia (2009) 'Virgil and the British Empire, 1760–1880', *Proceedings of the British Academy* 155, p. 84.
175. S. Ambirajan (1999) 'John Stuart Mill and India', in M. Moir and L. Zastoupil (eds) *J.S. Mill's Encounter with India* (Toronto) p. 222.
176. For these dominant interpretations see F.M. Turner (1981) *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain* (New Haven) pp. 16–17. Edwards 'Introduction' p. 8.
177. P.B. Shelley (1821) *Hellas* (London). Consult Shelley (1839) *Poetical Works* (London) p. 447.
178. W. Rose (1756) 'Blackwell's *Memoirs of the Court of Augustus*', *Monthly Review*, vol. 14, p. 228. W. Mitford (1816) *History of Greece* (London) vol. 1, p. 10 and vol. 2, p. 47. For Mitford and Grote's disagreement over Athens see J.T. Roberts (1989) 'Athenians on the Sceptered Isle', *Classical Journal*, vol. 84, no. 3, p. 193. Wm. Russell (1793) *History of Ancient Europe, from the Earliest Times to the Subversion of the Western Empire, with a Survey of the Most Important Revolutions in Asia and Africa, in a Series of Letters from a Gentleman to his Son, Intended as an Accompaniment to Dr. Russell's History of Modern Europe* (London) p. 3. In the 1780s and 1790s, see Anonymous (1754) 'A dissertation upon the nature and intention of Homer's fables relating to the gods', *Monthly Review*, ser. I, vol. 9, pp. 97–102. E. Moody (1790) 'The Antiquities of Athens...by Stuart and Revett', *Monthly Review*, N.S., vol. 2, p. 316. R. Griffiths (1789) 'The Rudiments of Ancient Architecture by 'Athenian' Stuart', *Monthly Review*, vol. 81, p. 493. Later, see G. Cornewall Lewis (1850) 'Grote's History of Greece', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 91, pp.119–20. R.C. Jebb (1893) *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry: lectures delivered in 1892* (London) p. 35. J.B. Bury (1900) *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great* (London) p. 5. Also J.C. Stobart (1912) *The Grandeur that was Rome. A Survey of Roman Culture and Civilization* (London) p. 1.
179. A.L. Rowse (1987) *Froude the Historian: Victorian Man of Letters* (Gloucester) p. 97. T.W. Heyck (1982) *The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian Britain* (London) p. 123. F. Furet (1977) 'Civilization and Barbarism in Gibbon's History', in G.W. Bowersock, J. Clive and S.R. Graubard (eds) (Cambridge) p. 159. Armitage (2000) *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge) p. 173. See also K.E. Knorr (1968) *British Colonial Theories* (London) pp. 247, 366. More cautiously P. Burroughs (1999) 'Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire', *OHBE*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 172–4. See also A.P. Thornton (1965) *Doctrines of Imperialism* (New York) p. 159. Finally, W. R. Louis (1999) 'Introduction', in *OHBE*, vol. V, *Historiography* (Oxford) p. 7.

180. J. Mendilow (1985) 'Merrie England and the Brave New World', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 6, no. 1, p. 50, for Carlyle. On the similarities between T. Arnold and E.A. Freeman see De Sanctis (1990) *Freeman and European History* (Farnborough) p. 93. For more contemporary examples see T. Keightley (1845) *History of Greece* (London) p. 472. T. Keightley (1848) *History of Rome* (London) p. 190. C. Merivale (1876) *A General History of Rome* (London) p. 690, first published between 1850 and 1864. A. Alison (1838) 'Arnold's History of Rome', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, vol. 44, p. 141. See also E.A. Freeman (1863) *A History of Federal Government in Italy and Greece* (London) p. 174.
181. M. Bernal (1994) 'The Image of Ancient Greece as a tool for colonialism and European hegemony', in G.C. Bond and A. Gilliam (eds) *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power* (London) p. 123, citing Gladstone.
182. On Goldsmith, see P. Dixon (1991) *Oliver Goldsmith Revisited* (Boston).
183. O. Goldsmith (1781) *Roman History from the Foundation of the City of Rome to the Destruction of the Western Empire* (London) p. 98. Where Publius Cornelius Scipio (subsequently 'Africanus') defeated Hannibal in 201 BC.
184. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
185. T. Arnold (1838–43) *History of Rome* (London) vol. 1, p. 45. And 'Providence, which designed that Rome should win the Empire of the world.' *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 406–7. See also Keightley, *History of Rome*, p. 190.
186. See for example E.S. Creasy, (1879) *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World* (London) pp. 83–4. Merivale, *A General History of Rome*, p. 127. Published between 1850 and 1862. W.T. Arnold (1879) *The Roman System of Provincial Administration* (London) p. 8. J.C. Stobart, *The Grandeur that was Rome*, p. 44.
187. T. Mommsen, *The History of Rome* (Berlin, 1854–6, first English translation, by L. Schmitz 1862) p. 31.
188. Livy, *AUC* 30.31, trans. C. Edmonds (London, 1850) vol. 3. Polybius *Histories* 15.9, trans. E. S. Shuckburgh (London, 1889) vol. 2.
189. Claudian, *Stilichonis* iii, pp. 150–9. T. Hodgkin (1898) 'The Fall of the Roman Empire and its lessons for us', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 73, p. 60. In his translation: 'Rome alone has found the spell to charm/ The tribes that bowed beneath her conquering arm,/ Has given one name to the whole human race,/ And clasped and sheltered them in fond embrace;/ Mother, not mistress, called her foe her son/ And by soft ties made distant countries one./ This to her peaceful sceptre all men owe...'
190. E. Gibbon (1776, 1781, 1788) *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London) vol. 1, p. 35. See also W. Rose (1775) 'The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by E. Gibbon', *Monthly Review*, vol. 54, p. 190. Jebb (1893) *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry: Lectures Delivered in 1892* (London) p. 29. For Gibbon and the Roman Empire compare J. Robertson (1997) 'Gibbon's Roman Empire as a universal monarchy', in R. McKitterick and R. Quinalt (eds) *Edward Gibbon and Empire* (Cambridge) pp. 247–69, and R. Quinalt (1997) 'Gibbon and Churchill' in *idem.*, pp. 317–32.
191. Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. 3, p. 65.
192. See M. McCrum (1989) *Thomas Arnold Head Master: A Reassessment* (Oxford) p. 92. T. Copley (2002) *Black Tom, Arnold of Rugby: the Myth and the Man* (London) p. 153.
193. Turner, 'British Politics and the Demise of the Roman Republic', p. 577.
194. Nowhere was Rome presented as an evangelizing power, bent on expansion for the sake of spreading Christianity. See Edward Caird (1866) 'The Roman

- Element in Civilization', *North British Review*, vol. 44, o.s., p. 143. Charles Kingsley (1864) *The Roman and the Teuton* (London) p. 11. Merivale, *A General History of Rome*, p. 690, and H.F. Pelham (1893) *Outlines of Roman History* (London) p. 521.
195. Wm. T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, pp. 29, 38–9.
196. J.R. Seeley (1871) *Roman Imperialism and other lectures and essays* (Boston) pp. 42, 8. He referred to Caesar's conquest of Gaul. Seeley was Professor of Latin at University College London, 1863–9. Merivale, *General History of Rome*, p. 681. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, p. 16, 29, & 38–9. J. A. Froude (1879) *Caesar, A Sketch* (London) p. 341. H.F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, p. 462. Hodgkin, 'The Fall of the Roman Empire and its lessons for us', p. 60. See also J.A. Symonds (1866) *Sketches in Italy and Greece* (London) p. 76. R. Burn (1876) *Rome and the Campagna* (London) p. lxxix, and S.R. Gardiner (1874) *A Student's History of England from the Earliest Times to the Death of King Edward VII* (London) p. 12.
197. J. Gillies (1855) *A History of Greece: Its Colonies and Conquests till the Division of the Macedonian Empire* (New York) pp. 35, 81, 140. First published in 1786. G. Grote (1846–58) *History of Greece* (London) vol. 3, p. 367. C. Thirlwall (London, 1835–44) *History of Greece 2*, p. 95. C.A. Fyffe (1875) *History of Greece* (New York) p. 36. E. Abbott (1888) *History of Greece* (London) p. 342.
198. For an extended discussion of 19th century conceptions of Alexander's career see C. Hagerman (2009) "In the footsteps of the 'Macedonian conqueror': Alexander the Great and British India", *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, nos. 3–4, pp. 44–392, especially pp. 366–79. See also P. Vasunia, (2007) 'Alexander and Asia: Droysen and Grote', in H.P. Ray and D.T. Potts (eds) *Memory as History: The Legacy of Alexander in Asia* (New Delhi).
199. J. Gillies, *A History of Greece*, vol. 4, pp. 301–2. See also A. Woodhouselee (1854) *Elements of General History* (Boston) pp. 186–7, 193–5. First published in 1801, based on lectures dating to 1780. For the original portrait consult Plutarch *Moralia: De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute*, especially 1.5. Mitford, *History of Greece*, vol. 10, pp. 212, 354, 357, quoting Arrian, *Anab. Alex.* 7.30. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol. 7, p. 110. For examples of Thirlwall's influence see E.A. Freeman (1880) 'Review of Grote's History of Greece vol. XII', reprinted in *Historical Essays* (London) p. 210. William Smith (1850) *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (London) 118–22. George Carrington, 'Historical Sketches' (1869) *Aunt Judy's Magazine*, 7, no. 41, p. 273. and A. De Vere (1874) *Alexander the Great: a dramatic poem* (London) p. vii. For later historical assessments see Percy Gardner (1880) 'The successors of Alexander and Greek civilization in the East', *Quarterly Review*, vol. 149, p. 128 and Bury, *A History of Greece*, p. 492. J. Williams' *Life of Alexander the Great* first published in 1829 had a very long life. See the 1902 edition, pp. xi and 220.
200. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 12: pp. 83, 87. He left the door open to the possibility that Alexander's successors had been more successful in Hellenizing his conquests. Grote 12: 90. See also G. Cox (1876) *A General History of Greece from the Earliest Period to the Death of Alexander the Great* (London) p. 646. K.N. Demetriou (1999) *George Grote on Plato and Athenian Democracy: A Study in Classical Reception* (New York) argues that Grote's radical sympathy for democratic Athens ensured his antipathy toward its Macedonian overlords.
201. Thirlwall, *A History of Greece*, vol. 7, p. 110.
202. On the intricacies of how interpretations of Virgil were influenced by Britain's imperial present, see Vasunia 'Virgil and the British Empire' pp. 83–116. He

- argues that Virgil was not very popular in the first half of the 19th century and only recovered his prominence in the wake of Connington's edition of his works and translation of the *Aeneid*. *Ibid.*, p. 99. However, Virgil remained a staple of classical education and a search of the British Library's catalogue reveals several hundred items (editions, translations, and commentaries in various modern European languages) with Virgil listed as author and published between 1784 and 1858, when the first of Connington's editions appeared.
203. C. Neate, Lord Neaves (1863) 'Lord Mackenzie's Roman Law', *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 93, p. 314. Emphasis added. He was also Rector of St Andrews University and later published *The Greek Anthology* (London, 1870). Connington's translation (1866) rendered the whole of this passage as follows: 'Yours Roman, be the lesson to govern the nations as their lord. This is your destined culture, to impose the settled rule of peace, to spare the humbled and to crush the proud.' Quoted in Sir Edward Cook (1919) *More Literary Recreations* (London) p. 58.
 204. Edwards, 'Introduction', *Roman Presences*, p. 13.
 205. E. Bulwer-Lytton (1834) *The Last Days of Pompeii* (New York) vol. 2, p. 180.
 206. *Ibid.*, n. 1.
 207. J. M. Deem (2005) *Bodies from the Ash: Life and Death in Ancient Pompeii* (Houghton) p. 25.
 208. See e.g. W.B. Scott's painting, *Building the Roman Wall* (1856).
 209. Hurst notes that by 1912, 293,000 copies had been sold over seven editions. Hurst, *Victorian Women Writers and the Classics*, p. 41.
 210. Macaulay follows Livy's version, in which Horatius survives. In Polybius' version, Horatius defends the bridge alone and drowns when he plunges into the river. See p. 37 of the 1856 edition.
 211. T.B. Macaulay (1856) *Lays of Ancient Rome* (Boston) 50. 'Horatius' 27. 217–24. Written in India and published in London in 1842.
 212. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
 213. L. Dowling (1994) *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (Ithaca) pp. 30, 61.
 214. R. Kipling (1906) *Puck of Pook's Hill* (Toronto) 137 ff. For painting in general, see G. Landow (1984) 'Victorianized Romans: Images of Rome in Victorian Painting' *Browning Institute Studies* vol. 12 pp. 29–52.
 215. C. M. Yonge (1864) *A Book of Golden Deeds* (London) p. 67. She also offered an epitome of Macaulay's version of Horatius' story.
 216. A.J. Church (2008) *Stories from Livy* (Chapel Hill) pp. 56–8, 65–7, 99–103, 132–3, 165–8, 170–1. First published in 1882.
 217. Anonymous (1832) 'The Modern Quintus Curtius – worshipping the Rising Sun', *Liverpool Mercury*, issue 1100, vol. 22, 1 June 1832.
176. 'Sir Robert's inappropriate reference to Quintus Curtius', *The Morning Chronicle*, issue 22862, 28 February 1843, p. 5. Curtius, 'To Her Majesty the Queen', *The Age*, 23 July 1837, p. 237. 'Curtius Outdone', *Punch*, 10 July 1847, p. 2. 'Marcus Curtius or a Leap in the Dark', *Punch*, 25 July 1868, p. 37. 'The Leap of Quintus Curtius', *Punch*, 9 April 1870, p. 138 (either the author has confused the hero Marcus Curtius with the later Roman historian Quintus Curtius, or this is a joke at the expense of those who make such slips). 'Churchillius', *Punch*, 12 February 1887, p. 78. 'The Empire is War, or a modern Curtius', *The Tomahawk: A Saturday Journal of Satire*, issue 74, 3 Oct. 1868, p. 140. D.H. Parry 'Under the Shadow of Night', *Chums*, issue 60, 1 November 1893, p. 156–7. 'Curtius', *Calcutta Review*, issue CCXXI, 1 July 1900, p. 174.
 218. Dowling, *Hellenism and Homosexuality*, p. 61.

219. A.J. Church, *Pictures from Greek Life and Story* (Biblio-Moser No date) p. 37. First published in 1893.
220. *Ibid.*
221. Yonge, *A Book of Golden Deeds*, pp. 39, 44.
222. *Ibid.*, 44. Church, *Pictures from Greek Life and Story*, pp. 48–9.
223. Hurst, *Victorian Women Writers and the Classics*, pp. 39–40.
224. C. Kingsley (1880) *The Heroes* (New York, 1880) p. 21. First published 1855. John Flaxman (1805) *The Iliad of Homer* (London). Aubrey de Vere, *Alexander the Great*.
225. Tacitus, *Agricola*, p. 30. Though Tacitus overall image of Roman imperial expansion in Britain undermines Calgacus' arguments.
226. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 1, p. 18.
227. Seeley, J.R., *Roman Imperialism*, p. 8. Merivale, *A General History of Rome*, p. 127.
228. Keightley, *History of Greece*, p. 283. Compare Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 5, pp. 155–60, 261–6.
229. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 1, p. 32.
230. A. Trollope (1870) *Commentaries of Caesar, Ancient Classics for English Readers* (Philadelphia) p. 29.
231. Mitford, *History of Greece*, vol. 10, pp. 212, 354. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol. 2, p. 234; vol. 7, p. 49.
232. Anonymous (1796) 'On Owen's travels into different parts of Europe...', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 66, p. 933.
233. Goldsmith, *Roman History* (abridged) pp. 80, 88, 261, 275. Woodhouselee, *Universal History*, 3: 32. See also Keightley, *History of Rome*, p. 190. Arnold, *History of Rome*, vol. 1, pp. 563–4. Twiss (1837) *Epitome of Niebuhr's History of Rome* (Oxford) p. 243. B.G. Niebuhr (1837) *Roman History*, translated by Julius Hare and Connop Thirlwall third edition (London) vol. 4 p. 165.
234. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, p. 312.
235. Specifically Jugurtha, King of Numidia, the Cimbri, Teutones, and Helvetii, Pirate Fleets, and Mithridates of Pontus. J.R. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 16. W.T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, p. 29. See also, Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, pp. 103–4, 113, 485–6. Stobart, *The Grandeur that was Rome*, p. 3.
236. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, p. 473.
237. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, p. 174.
238. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 12 p. 431.
239. R. Betts (1971) 'The Allusion to Rome in British imperialist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries', *Victorian Studies* vol. 15 p. 152. Dowling, 'Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography', p. 581. C. Edwards, 'Introduction', *Roman Presences*, p. 12. Furet, 'Civilization and Barbarism in Gibbon's History', pp. 159–66. J.G.A. Pocock (1977) 'Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as Civic Humanist and Philosophical Historian' in G.W. Bowersock, J. Clive, and S.R. Graubard (eds) *Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge & London) pp. 103–20. Roberts, 'Athenians on the Sceptered Isle', p. 198. A. Rogers and R. Hingley 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield: The traditions of Imperial Decline', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 189–209. N.Vance (1999) 'Decadence and the subversion of empire', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) pp. 110–124.
240. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 33, 35, 78. Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 338, discussing the fall of the Athenian Empire. In the intervening years see: Goldsmith, *Roman History* (abridged) pp. 304, 311. Anonymous (1820) 'On Nougarde's

- History of the Roman Revolution', *Monthly Review*, n.s., vol. 93, p. 510. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 5, p. 266. Woodhouselee, *Universal History*, vol. 3 p. 52. S. Maunder (1851) *The Treasury of History* (London) p. 43. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, p. 337. In later years see Stobart, *The Grandeur that was Rome*, pp. 3–4.
241. Thuc. *Hist.* III.82 (as interpreted by Gilbert Murray at least). Xenophon, *Poroi*, 1.1. Sallust, *Bell. Cat.*, 32. St Augustine, *CivDei*, iv. 15.
242. A. Ferguson (1844) *History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic*, abridged edition (Cheapside) pp. 2–3. e.g. Thomas Dyer (1867) *The Ruins of Pompeii* (London) p. 113. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 22, 31.
243. E.g. Keightley, *History of Rome*, p. 287. He stressed the example of Verres, who was impeached for his rapacious administration of Sicily in the first century BC. Mommsen, *History of Rome*, p. 337. At the end of our period, see, J.M Robertson (1900) *Patriotism and Empire* (London) pp. 154–7. Cited in N. Vance (1997) *The Victorians and Ancient Rome* (Oxford) p. 235.
244. Goldsmith, *Roman History* (abridged), pp. 104, 311. Woodhouselee, *Universal History*, vol. 2, pp. 22, 82. Anon. 'Nougarde's History of the Roman Revolution', p. 510. He quotes Juvenal (*Sat.* vi. 292). Gilbert Ramsay's 1918 translation for the Loeb Classical library renders this passage as: 'Luxury, more deadly than any foe, has laid her hand upon us and avenges a conquered world.' S. Maunder (1851) *Treasury of History* (London) p. 43.
245. Grote, *A History of Greece*, vol. 12, p. 39. vol. 12, pp. 22, 85–7. See also, Maunder, *Treasury of History*, 43. Woodhouselee, *Universal History*, vol. 2, p. 22.
246. J.A. Froude, *Caesar, a Sketch*, pp. 18–19.
247. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 62, 72.
248. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 1 p. 27.
249. Creasy (1848) 'The six decisive battles...', *Bentley's Miscellany*, vol. 23, p. 53. See also, Keightley, *History of Rome*, p. 287. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 12, p. 22. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, p. 33. E. Curtius, *History of Greece*, p. 302.
250. O. Goldsmith (1774) *Grecian History: From the Earliest Date to the Death of Alexander the Great* (Dublin) p. 53. Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 5, p. 321. E.S. Creasy, *The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, p. 30. G. Cox (1874) *History of Greece* (London) vol. 1, p. 242. My emphasis. See also C.A. Fyffe (1875) *History of Greece* (New York) p. 60. E.A. Freeman (1893) *Studies of Travel, Greece* (London) pp. 53, 58. Emphasis added.
251. Bury, *A History of Greece*, p. 265.
252. M. Bernal (1994) 'The Image of Ancient Greece as a tool for colonialism and European hegemony', in G.C. Bond and A. Gilliam (eds) *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power* (London), p. 126. Hingley (2001) 'Introduction' *Images of Rome* (Portsmouth) pp. 7, 9. J. Majeed, 'Comparativism and references to Rome', pp. 90, 104–6. Reid, 'Cromer and the Classics', pp. 1–2. See also, M. Wyke and M. Biddiss 'Introduction' in Wyke and Biddis (eds) *The Uses and Abuses of Antiquity* (Bern) p. 13. P. Vasunia (2003) 'Hellenism and Empire: Reading Edward Said', *Parallax*, vol. 9, no.4 pp. 88–97.
253. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 1, p. 27. For Gibbon's investments, see Vasunia, 'Virgil and the British Empire', p. 86. For Gibbon's conviction that history should instruct, see C. Kelly (1997) 'A Grand Tour: reading Gibbon's Decline and Fall', *Greece and Rome*, vol. 44, no. 1, p. 41.
254. Gibbon, *HDFRE*, vol. 1, p. 32.
255. Kelly, 'A Grand Tour', pp. 40–1.
256. Goldsmith, *Roman History*, p. 37. Woodhouselee, *Universal History*, vol. 4 p.1. Dr Arnold, *History of the Later Roman Commonwealth*, vol. 1 p. 33. Maunder, *Treasury*

- of *History*, p. 103. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 8, 35, 42. W.B. Donne (1869) 'Caesarian Rome', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 129, pp. 92–3. Trollope, *Commentaries of Caesar*, p. 29. S.R. Gardiner (1874) *A Student's History of England from the earliest times to the death of King Edward VII* (London), pp. 12, 19. F.W. Newman (1874) 'The moral character of Roman conquest', *Fraser's Magazine*, vol. 89, o.s., p. 588. Merivale, *A General History of Rome*, p. 679. Fyffe, *History of Greece*, p.1. W.T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, p. 16. Froude, *Caesar, a Sketch*, pp. 341, 363. Jebb, *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry*, p. 29. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman History*, p. 462.
257. Jebb, *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry*, p. 19.
258. Bury, *A History of Greece*, p. 785.
259. In general see J.M. MacKenzie (ed.) (1986) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester, 1986). For a contrary view see B. Porter (2007) *The Absent-Minded Imperialists* (Oxford).
260. Haverfield to Cromer, 3 February 1909. FO 633/12. Noted by M.E. Chamberlain (1972) 'Lord Cromer's 'Ancient and Modern Imperialism': A Proconsular View of Empire,' *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 84.
261. See R. Hingley (2001) 'Introduction' Images of Rome: perceptions of ancient Rome in Europe and America in the modern age (Portsmouth) pp. 145, 162. He acknowledged that Haverfield's use of classical discourse may have been 'unconscious'. See also E. Adler (2008) 'Late Victorian and Edwardian Views of Rome and the Nature of "Defensive Imperialism"', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 208, 210.
262. W. Robertson (1804) *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India* (London) pp. 256–7.
263. Arnold, *The History of Rome*, vol.1, p. vii.
264. G.C. Lewis (1850) 'Grote's History of Greece', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 91, p. 121.
265. Froude, *Caesar, a Sketch*, pp. 5–6.
266. Stobart, *The Grandeur that was Rome*, p. 3.

3 Classical Discourse and British Imperial identity: the Nature of Empire

267. P. Vasunia (2009) 'Virgil and the British Empire, 1760–1880', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 155, pp. 113, 109.
268. R. Jenkyns (1992) *The Legacy of Rome: a new appraisal* (Oxford), p. 19.
269. R. Dellamora (1990) *Masculine desire: the sexual politics of Victorian aestheticism* (Chapel Hill) pp. 24–7.
270. S. Goldhill, (2002) *Who Needs Greek?: Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism* (Cambridge) p. 183.
271. Leoussi, *Nationalism and Classicism*, p. 160, following Leighton's Presidential Address to the Royal Academy in 1888.
272. P. B. Shelley (1839) *Poetical Works* (London) p. 447.
273. Anon. (1822) 'Statue to the Duke of Wellington', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 92, no. 2, n.s., vol. 15, pp. 70–1. The reaction of this author confirms the success of Westmacott's vision. See also L. Colley (1992) *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven) p. 258.
274. H.R. Haggard (1887) *She: a History of Adventure* (London) pp. 12, 124. For insight on the significance of Leo's apparent physical perfection, see D. Challis (2010) "'The Ablest Race": the Ancient Greeks in Victorian Racial Theory' in M. Bradley (ed.) *The Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford), pp. 112–13.

275. *Ibid.*, pp. 191–2. She and Holly had earlier discussed the Roman Peace; both understood that it came at a cost but appear to have considered it worth the price. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
276. P.W.M. Freeman (1996) 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire', in J. Webster and N.J. Cooper (eds) *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives* (Leicester) p. 26.
277. R. Symonds (1986) *Oxford and Empire: The Last Lost Cause?* (Oxford) p. 32.
278. R. Betts (1971) 'Allusions to Rome in British Imperialist thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' *Victorian Studies* vol. 15, pp. 149, 159.
279. L. Dowling (1994) *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (Ithaca), p. xv and E. Prettejohn (1996) 'Recreating Rome in Victorian Painting', in M. Liversidge and C. Edwards (eds) *Imagining Rome* (London) p. 54. See also A.S. Leoussi, *Nationalism and Classicism: the classical body as national symbol in nineteenth century England and France* (Basingstoke), p. 172.
280. Vasunia, 'Virgil and the British Empire', p. 93
281. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
282. J.M. MacKenzie (1986) 'Introduction' in J.M. MacKenzie (ed.) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester), p. 9.
283. Archibald Alison (1833) 'The East India Question', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, vol. 33, p. 776. See also: Anon. (1826) 'The British Empire', *Monthly Review*, third series, vol. 1, pp. 402, 404.
284. In other circumstances Macedon, or Greece (usually Athens) might be introduced. See e.g. Wm. Barron (1777) *History of the Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity: Applied to the Present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies: With Reflections Concerning the Future Settlement of these Colonies* (London) pp. 130, 134.
285. Walpole to Montague, 22 March 1762. See Walpole (1937) *Horace Walpole's Correspondence* (New Haven, 1937) vol. 10, p. 22.
286. Walpole, to Conway, 29 October 1762. Correspondence vol. 38, p. 188. Emphasis added. See also *idem.* Walpole to Stratford 13 September 1759; to Mann 12 June 1767; and to Mann 9 June 1768.
287. A.C. Lyall (1893) *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London) p. 52; quoting Sir C. Davenant (1697) *Essay on the East Indian Trade*.
288. H.V. Bowen (1998) 'British India, 1765–1813: The Metropolitan Context' in *OHBE* vol. II *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford), pp. 538, 545. See also, P. Lawson and J. Phillips (1984) "'Our Execrable Banditti": Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain', *Albion*, vol. 16, no. 3, p. 240. L. Colley (1992) 'Britishness and Otherness', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 325. J.P. Greene (1998) 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 225–6.
289. Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, VI 53. Quoted in Bowen, 'British India', pp. 538–40. There were four such commissions between 1767 and 1783. Lawson and Phillips "'Our Execrable Banditti'", p. 232.
290. P.J. Marshall (1998) 'Britain without America – A second Empire?' *OHBE* vol II *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford), p. 583.
291. O. Goldsmith (1781) *Roman History from the Foundation of the City of Rome to the Destruction of the Western Empire* (London) pp. vii, 311. E. Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London), vol. 1, pp. 30–2, 35. For other examples see *idem.* vol. 12, p. 431 and header quote on p. 180. See also,

- W. Enfield (1782) 'The History of the Legal Polity of the Roman State ... by Th. Bever' *Monthly Review* vol. 66, p. 197 and W. Rose (1783) 'On Ferguson's Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic', *Monthly Review*, vol. 69, p. 343.
292. R. Griffiths (1773) 'General Remarks on the System of Government in India: A view of the Rise, Progress, and present state of the English Government in Bengal...' by H. Verelst', *Monthly Review*, vol. 48, p. 91.
293. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
294. K. Wilson (2004) 'Introduction' in K. Wilson (ed.) *A New Imperial History* (Cambridge) p. 5.
295. Anon. (1826) 'The British Empire', *Monthly Review*, third series, vol.1, p. 402.
296. *Ibid.*, p. 404.
297. E. Dicey (1877) 'Mr. Gladstone and Our Empire', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 2, p. 295.
298. Anon. (1887) 'The Federation of the British Empire', *Westminster Review*, pp. 484–5.
299. A. C. Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion*, p. 398. Educated at Eton and Haileybury, Lyall entered the Indian Civil Service in 1856. After service during the uprising of 1857, he became Commissioner of Berar, then secretary to the Indian government (Home and Foreign departments), Lieutenant-Governor of the Northwest Provinces, and member of the Council of India.
300. C. De Thierry (1897) 'Imperialism', *New Review*, vol. 17, p. 318.
301. J.A. Mangan, (1986) "The Grit of our Forefathers': invented traditions, propaganda and Imperialism", in J.W. MacKenzie (ed.) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester) p. 118.
302. J.R. Seeley (1883) *The Expansion of England* (London) p. 3.
303. Such exploitations of classical discourse had appeared in crystalline form at least by the mid-18th century in reference to the danger New France posed to Britain's settlements in North America. Anon. (1755) 'Douglass's Summary of the British Settlements in North America', *Monthly Review*, vol. 13, p. 269.
304. Public General Acts 1783–4, 24. Geo. III. c.25. Quoted in Marshman (1869) *The History of India from the earliest period to the close of Lord Dalhousie's administration* (London) vol. 1, p. 311.
305. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 433.
306. There is an echo of Virgil in this. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 346.
307. W. Tennant (1807) *Thoughts on the Effects of the British Government on the State of India: Accompanied with Hints Concerning the Means of Conveying Civil and Religious Instruction to the Natives of that Country* (Edinburgh) pp. 12–3, 19, 25. J. Conder (1828) *A Popular Description, Geographical and Political of the Countries of the Globe: India*, vol. III, *The Modern Traveller* (London) p. 26. P. Auber (1837) *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India* (London) p. 660.
308. See, for example, G.R., Gleig (1835) *The History of the British Empire in India* (London) vol. 4, p. 216. Gleig used Roman aggression as a foil to Britain's defensive mind-set during the conquest of India.
309. T. Mommsen (1862) *The History of Rome*, trans. L. Schmitz (London) p. 312.
310. D. Mattingly (1997) 'Introduction', in D. Mattingly (ed.) *Dialogues in Roman Imperialism* (Portsmouth) p. 8. R. Hingley (1991) 'Past Present and Future – the study of the Roman Period in Britain', *Scottish Archaeological Review*, 8, p. 92. *idem.* V.G. Kiernan (1993) 'Attitudes to Roman Imperialism', in E. Scott (ed.) *Theoretical Roman Archaeology: First Conference Proceedings* (Aldershot) pp. 23–4.

311. E. Adler (2008) 'Late Victorian and Edwardian Views of Rome' and the Nature of "Defensive Imperialism" *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 189–93.
312. Particularly in the well-known episodes of the First Punic War, the Second Punic War, the war against Philip V, Trajan's Dacian Wars, etc. In addition to the sources noted in chapter three see W. Collier (1872) *History of Rome* (London) p. 47 and H.F. Pelham (1893) *Outlines of Roman History* (London) pp. 102–4, 113, 485.
313. Smith was Professor of Modern History at Oxford. G. Smith (1863) *The Empire* (Oxford and London) p. 259. This monograph comprises a series of letters to the *Daily News* and the replies they inspired in 1862–3.
314. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
315. *Ibid.*, p. 261. Also, L. Pelly (1865) '*British India*' *Fortnightly*, vol. 2, pp. 31–2. He reprised Smith's perspective on British expansion. See also J.C. Marshman (1869) *The History of India from the earliest period to the close of Lord Dalhousie's administration* (London), vol. 1, p. 232; vol. 2, p. 346.
316. W. Smith (1856) 'Grote's History of Greece', *Quarterly Review*, vol. 99, p. 93.
317. Seeley, *Expansion of England*, p. 1.
318. R.S. Mantena (2010) 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford), p. 69. Seeley's classical bona fides are such that such a rejection seems unlikely and in any case runs contrary to much of his oeuvre.
319. Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion*, p. 334. E. Baring (Lord Cromer) (1910) *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (London) pp. 19–20.
320. Lyall, *Rise and Expansion*, p. 334. Citing T. Mommsen (1886) *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, trans. William Purdie (London) vol. 2, p. 51.
321. After an early military career Cromer went to India in 1872 and subsequently to Egypt in 1877, where he served as Britain's first Controller-General in Egypt, before serving for three more years with the government of India, after which he returned to Egypt as Consul-General in 1883. See R. Owen (2004) *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul* (Oxford).
322. S.J. Owen (1878) 'The Stability of Our Indian Empire', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 31, p. 517: 'We came, we saw, we conquered' vs. Caesar's 'I came, I saw, I conquered'.

4 Classical Discourse and British imperial identity: the Civilizing Mission

323. N. Canny (1973) 'The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America' *William and Mary Quarterly*, third series, vol. 30, pp. 588, 590.
324. *Ibid.* pp. 588–9.
325. Anon. (1795) 'An Essay on Colonization by C.B. Wadstrom: Part. I', *Monthly Review*, n.s., vol. 16, p. 375.
326. W. Barron (1777) *History of the Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity: Applied to the Present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies: With Reflections Concerning the Future Settlement of these Colonies* (London) pp. 1, 31. W. Meredith (1778) *Historical Remarks on the Taxation of Free States, in a Series of Letters to a Friend* (London) pp. 22–4. Similarly, W. Rose (1778) "Dr. Symonds' Remarks upon an Essay, intituled, 'The History of the Colonization of the Free

- States of Antiquity, applied to the present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies', *Monthly Review*, vol. 59, p. 208.
327. See also J.R. McCulloch (1838) 'Introduction and Notes' to Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (London) p. 157. Also Anon., 'Wadstrom's Essay on Colonization Part. I', p. 375.
328. Sir G. Cornewall Lewis (1841) *Essay on the Government of Dependencies* (London) p. 138. Lewis was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. He had experience in Ireland, Malta, and India where he was Secretary to the Board of Control. He maintained an active interest in the classics throughout his career, publishing a review of Grote's *History of Greece* in *The Edinburgh Review* vol. 91 (1850) pp. 118–52, and a monograph: *Enquiry into the Credibility of the Early Roman History* in 1855.
329. Wakefield's key pamphlets were published in 1829–30. E.G. Wakefield (1829) *A Letter from Sydney* (London). (1829) *Sketch of a Proposal for Colonizing Australasia* (London). (1837) *The British Colonization of New Zealand: Being an Account of the Principles, Objects, and Plans of the New Zealand Association: Together with Particulars Concerning the Position, Extent, Soil and Climate, Natural Productions, and Native Inhabitants of New Zealand: With Charts and Illustrations: Published for the New Zealand Association* (London). (1849) *A View of the Art of Colonization: With Present Reference to the British Empire: In Letters between a Statesman and a Colonist* (London).
330. Charles Dilke (1868) *Greater Britain* (London) and (1890) *Problems of Greater Britain* (London).
331. Eric Stokes saw this realization and its significant impact as an early 19th-century phenomenon. E. Stokes (1969) *The English Utilitarians in India* (Oxford), pp. xiii, xiv. Yet, he like Bowen, Greene and Marshall, feels that there is evidence for its origins well back in the 18th century. E.g. Gilbert Stuart (1772) 'Bolts' Considerations on India Affairs', *Monthly Review*, vol. 46, p. 241.
332. H.V. Bowen (1998) 'British India, 1765–1813: The Metropolitan Context', in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 540–2.
333. R. Griffiths (1773) 'General Remarks on the System of Government in India: [review of] A view of the Rise, Progress, and present state of the English Government in Bengal... by H. Verelst', *Monthly Review*, vol. 48, p. 91.
334. W. Rose (1783) 'The Conclusion to Dr. Ferguson's History of the Progress...' *Monthly Review*, vol. 69, p. 119.
335. W. Rose (1775) 'The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by E. Gibbon', *Monthly Review*, vol. 54, p. 190.
336. Bowen, 'India: the Metropolitan Context', pp. 540–2, 545.
337. Jones, Letter to Cornwallis, 19 March 1788. Quoted in S.N., Mukherjee (1968) *Sir William Jones: a Study in Eighteenth-Century British Attitudes to India* (Cambridge) pp. 130–1. See also D. Ludden (1993) 'Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge', in C.A. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds) *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia) p. 256.
338. Anon. (1810) 'Affairs of India', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 16, April 1810, pp. 156–7.
339. J. Gillies (1780) 'A Grammar of the Bengal Language by N. Brassey Halhead', *Monthly Review*, vol. 62, p. 342.
340. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
341. Horace, *Epistles*, 2.1.156.
342. Gillies, 'A Grammar of the Bengal Language...', p. 344.
343. *Ibid.*

344. For peace, Anon. (1812) 'Malcolm on India' Review of his 'Sketch of the Political History of India, from the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill in 1784', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 20, pp. 51–2. Anon. (1821) 'Mill's History of British India', *Monthly Review*, n.s. vol. 95, p. 157. Sir J. Malcolm (1811) *Sketch of the Political History of India, from the Introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill, A.D. 1784 to the Present Date* (London) and A. Alison (1833) 'The East India Question', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, vol. 33, p. 780, quoting a recent pamphlet on Indian Affairs by one Mr Sinclair. Also W.H. Sleeman (1844) *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official* (London), pp. 476–7. For Africa see: Anon., 'An Essay on Colonization by C.B. Wadstrom', p. 375.
345. W. Jones (1807) 'An Essay on the best Means of civilising the Subjects of the British Empire in India, and of diffusing the Light of the Christian Religion throughout the Eastern World; to which the University of Glasgow adjudged Dr. Buchanan's Prize, By. Jn. Mitchell...', *Monthly Review*, n.s., vol. 53, p. 46.
346. W. Tennant (1807) *Thoughts on the Effects of the British Government on the State of India: Accompanied with Hints Concerning the Means of Conveying Civil and Religious Instruction to the Natives of that Country* (Edinburgh) p. 69.
347. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
348. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
349. Sir John Malcolm, *Sketch of the Political History of India*. Quoted in Anon. (1812) 'Malcolm on India' Review of his 'Sketch of the Political History of India, from the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill in 1784', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 20, pp. 51–2. By this point in his career Malcolm had been in the Company's service for nearly three decades.
350. *Ibid.*
351. Trevelyan was Macaulay's brother-in-law and had already served as a writer, as Charles' Metcalfe's assistant, and as commissioner at Delhi.
352. Charles Trevelyan (1838) *On the Education of the People of India* (London) p. 37.
353. *Ibid.*
354. This interpretation is supported by C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge) p. 82.
355. T.B. Macaulay (1835) *Minute Recorded in the General Department by Thomas Babington Macaulay, Law Member of the Governor-General's Council, 2 February 1835*, IOR Boards' Collections F/4/1846 No. 77633, pp. 127–46. See also M. Moir and L. Zastoupil (eds) (1999) *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist–Anglicist Controversy, 1781–1843* (Richmond) pp. 166–7.
356. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
357. My Italics. A sense of Macaulay's influence within imperial discourse relating to the civilizing mission in India appears when we encounter this passage quoted a half century later in a fierce debate among Samuel Smith and Sir M.E. Grant Duff and others over Britain's record in India. See D. Naorojit (1887) 'Sir. M.E. Grant Duff's Views about India', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 52, p. 225.
358. J. Crawford (1853) 'The Nations of India and their Manners', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 98, p. 42.
359. H. Reeve (1858) 'Prospects of the Indian Empire', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 107, pp. 38–9, 50.
360. T. James (1857) 'Indian Mutiny', *Quarterly Review*, vol. 102, p. 568.
361. C. Hamley (1857) 'Our Indian Empire', *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 82, p. 643. Emphasis added. Hamley frequently contributed to *Blackwood's* in the 1850s and early 1860s, writing on topics as varied as the French Navy, Christmas, and Burma.

362. Anon. (1858) 'Indian Heroes', *Westminster Review*, vol. 70, o.s., p. 360.
363. J.C. Marshman (1869) *The History of India from the earliest period to the close of Lord Dalhousie's administration* (London) vol. 3, p. 98. He stressed the 'prohibition of human sacrifices at Saugor, the abolition of Suttees, and the extinction of Thuggee...'. Similarly, W. Macpherson (1842) 'Human Sacrifices in India', *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 52, p. 183.
364. Marshman, *The History of India*, vol. 3, p. 358. See also pp. 437 and 439 for more on the role of material improvements in the civilizing mission in India.
365. See S. Nilsson (1968) *European Architecture in India, 1750–1850*, translated by E. George & E. Zetersten (London), pp. 28–30.
366. Reginald Heber (1971) *Bishop Heber in Northern India: selections from Heber's Journal*, ed. M.A. Laird (London) pp. 225–6. For the original, see R. Heber (1826) *Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India, from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824–1825 (with Notes upon Ceylon): An account of a Journey to Madras and the Southern Provinces, 1826; And Letters Written in India* (London).
367. D.A. Washbrook (1999) 'India, 1818–1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism', OHBE vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 417. See Dalhousie (1910) *Private Letters of the Marquess Dalhousie*, ed. J.G.A. Baird (London) p. 327. And also R.H. Patterson (1856) 'Our Indian Empire', *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 80, p. 652.
368. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) p. 26.
369. R. W. Frazer (1896) *British India* (London) p. 355. Emphasis added. In the interval see e.g. L.J. Trotter (1870) 'British India Under the Crown', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 15, p. 118. and H. Taylor (1881) 'The Future of India', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 39, p. 467.
370. C. Merivale (1850) *A History of the Romans under the Empire* (London) vol.7, p. xiii.
371. Frazer, *British India*, p. 355.
372. W.T. Thornton (1871) 'National Education in India', *Cornhill Magazine*, vol. 23, p. 282.
373. J.A. Cramb (1900) *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* (Toronto), p. 185. Emphasis added.
374. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
375. See Mark Donoghue (2004) 'William Thomas Thornton's Career at East India House: 1836–1880', *History of Political Economy*, vol. 36, no. 2, p. 295–322.
376. Queen Victoria's Proclamation to the people of India, 1 January 1877: V.R. (1998) 'Proclamation to the people of India, 1 Jan. 1877', in P.N. Chopra *Secret Papers from British Royal Archives* (Delhi) p. 49.
377. E.A. Freeman (1885) 'Imperial Federation', *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. 51, p. 431, recalling his youth and implying that the word had become rather less arcane and archaic in the interval and had therefore become less evocative of Rome. Yet he and many of his contemporaries continued to make the association. Moreover as the succeeding pages of his article makes clear he could not arrive at a suitable definition of empire without extensive comparisons to antiquity.
378. R. Wallace (1879) 'The Seamy side of 'Imperialism'', *The Contemporary Review*, vol. 75, p. 793. See also E. Dicey (1877) 'Mr. Gladstone and Our Empire', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 2, p. 300 and H.H.M. Herbert (1878) 'Imperial Administration', *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 30, o.s., p. 764.
379. M. Bradley (2010) 'Tacitus' Agricola and the Conquest of Britain: Representations of Empire in Victorian and Edwardian England', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 137, 140.

380. R.S. Mantena (2010) 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 67–72. See also B. Porter (1968) *Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914* (London) pp. 1–2. Bradley, 'Tacitus' Agricola', pp. 131, 137, 146–8, 157. S. Patterson (2009) *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York) pp. 153–5 is also strong on this ambiguity.
381. H. Beveridge (1884) 'The Patna Massacre', *Calcutta Review*, quoted in William H. Beveridge (1947) *India Called Them* (London) p. 370.
382. A.C. Lyall (1893) *The Rise and Expansion, of British Dominion in India* (London) p. 355. St. Augustine CivDei, iv, 15. See also H. Hyndman (1880) 'Bleeding to Death', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 8, p. 157.
383. J.R. Seeley (1883) *The Expansion of England* (London) pp. 276–7.
384. Ibid.
385. J.M. Robertson (1900) *Patriotism and Empire* (London) p. 195.
386. Ibid., p. 203.
387. E.g. B. Holland (1901) *Imperium et Libertas: A Study in the History of Politics* (London) p. 12.
388. Lord Cromer (1910) *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (London) p. 127. Here he paraphrased *De Re. Nat.* 2.79. Translated by his contemporary C.S. Calverley as: 'Burgeons one generation, and one fades. Let but a few years/Pass, and a race has arisen which was not: as in a racecourse,/One hands on to another the burning torch of Existence.' *The Complete Works* (London, 1902) p. 278. Cromer's use of Rome in this connection runs contrary to Rogers and Hingley's claim that the link between India and Rome was severed late in the 19th century. See, (2011) 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield: The Traditions of Imperial Decline', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 200.

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389. E. Dicey (1877) 'Mr. Gladstone and Our Empire', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 2, p. 295.
390. Ibid., p. 306.
391. Ibid.
392. Virgil, *Aeneid*, 6.851–3.
393. P. Vasunia (2009) 'Virgil and the British Empire, 1760–1880', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 155, p. 109, 93.
394. S. Patterson (2009) *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York) pp. 132–3, 141, 146, 167.
395. Sir James Stephen (1873) *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (London) pp. 98–9.
396. G.N. Curzon (1900) 'Speech given on 28 October, 1898', *Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston*, vol. 1, 1898–1900 (Calcutta) p. iv.
397. S. Attridge (2002) *Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture* (Palgrave) pp. 8–9.
398. Volume 8 (1856) of *The Haileybury Observer* contained the following classical pseudonyms/initials: Scotus, Nemo, ω.Φ., Vale, κ.τ.λ., γ., Tristis Amator, and Justitia.

399. (1850) 'Togae v. Arma', *Haileybury Observer*, vol. 6 (Hertford) p. 210. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.77.
400. Anon. (1821) *Scrutator*, no. 30, p. 282. For a similar formulation, see *Scrutator* no. 43, p. 403, where episodes from the classics provided satirical counterpoints to the romantic misadventures of a student.
401. Anon. (1862) 'A Soldier's Death', *The Haileybury Observer*, vol. 1, p. 14. This work was a compilation of contributions to the *Observer* by various students spanning the years 1839–42.
402. K. Wilson (2004) 'Introduction' in K. Wilson (ed.) *A New Imperial History* (Cambridge) p. 5.
403. For an example, see 'Anglicus' (1798) 'Letter to the Editor' *Calcutta Gazette*, 23 August 1798, pp. 147–8. This contained a Latin ode on the theme of Britain's imperial greatness.
404. Richard Temple (1882) *Men and Events of My Time in India* (London) pp. 102–3. See also William Wilson Hunter (1890) *Rulers of India: The Marquess of Dalhousie* (Oxford) p. 54.
405. See H. V. Canter (1949) 'The Impeachments of Verres and Hastings: Cicero and Burke', *Classical Journal*, vol. 44, pp. 199–211.
406. Marquis Curzon of Kedleston (1925) *British Government in India: The Story of the Viceroy and Government Houses* (Toronto) vol. 2, p. 252.
407. V.G. Kiernan (1982) 'Tennyson, King Arthur, and Imperialism', in R. Samuel and G.S. Jones (eds) *Culture, Ideology and Politics: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm*, History Workshop Series (London) p. 131.
408. Anon. (1800) 'The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea. Part the First. Containing an account of the navigation of the Ancients from the Sea of Suez to the Coast of Zanguebur. With Dissertations. By Dr. Wm. Vincent', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 70, p. 857.
409. Sir W.F.P. Napier (1977) *Defects Civil and Military of the Indian Government* (Ajmer) p. 362. First Published 1850. Elaborated in his (1851) *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde, and Campaign in the Cutchee Hills* (London).
410. Juvenal, *Sat.*, X. 147. Curzon, *British Government in India*, p. 216.
411. Consult H. Mattingly et al. (1962–8) *The Roman Imperial Coinage* (London) pp. 577a, 742, 743, & 744.
412. James Rennell (1782) *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan*. With an introd. illustrative of the geography and present division of that country. *To which is added an appendix, containing an account of the Ganges and Burrampooter rivers* (London).
413. A bas-relief chimney-piece, executed by Michael Rysbrack between 1728 and 1730, and a ceiling painting by Spirodone Roma from 1778. Mildred Archer (1979) *India and British Portraiture* (London) plates 1, 3.
414. Anonymous (1842) 'Punch's Pencilings No. Liii'. *Punch*, vol. III. M. Dresser (1989) 'Britannia', in R. Samuel (ed.) *Patriotism and the Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, vol. II (London) pp. 26–8. L. Colley (1992) *Britons: forging the nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven) plates 3, 41, 61, 70 (p. 311), 76 for a variety of Britannia figures. See also N. Ferguson (2002) *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (London) p. 165, for a particularly fine reproduction of Dyce's *Neptune Resigning the Empire of the Seas to Britannia*. He later discusses *Britannia Pacificatrix*, though with little explicit attention to the choice of iconography: *Empire*, pp. 312–3.

415. A. Smith (1776) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London) pp. 280, 289. See also Wm. Rose, 'Dr. Symonds' Remarks upon an Essay', 211.
416. For an earlier example in the context of the Seven Years' War, see Anon. (1757) 'To the Author of the TEST', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 27, p. 267: footnote.
417. See M. Archer (1979) *India and British Portraiture* (London) plates 148 and 123 respectively.
418. See D. Ludden (1993) 'Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge', in C.A. Breckenridge and P. van der Veer (eds) *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia) p. 256.
419. Letter to Cornwallis, 19 March, 1788. Quoted in S.N. Mukherjee (1968) *Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth-Century British Attitudes to India* (Cambridge) pp. 130–1.
420. A. Alison (1833) 'The East India Question', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, vol. 33, p. 787.
421. T.B. Macaulay (1841) 'Warren Hastings' *Essays and Lays of Ancient Rome* (London) p. 658.
422. C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge) p. 82.
423. C. Hall (2006) 'At home with history: Macaulay and the History of England', in C. Hall and S.O. Rose (eds) *At Home with Empire* (Cambridge) p. 36.
424. Anon. (1858) 'Indian Heroes', *Westminster Review*, vol. 70, o.s., p. 360.
425. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) pp. 78, 111.
426. A. Markley (2004) *Stateliest Measures: Tennyson and the Literature of Greece and Rome* (Toronto) p. 24.
427. For example, Abyssinia (1867), the Ashanti campaign (1874), Afghanistan (1879), Zulu War (1879), the First Anglo–Boer War (1880–1), Egypt and Sudan (1882, 1884–5, and 1896–8), the Jameson Raid (1895) and the Second Anglo–Boer War (1899–1902). For a discussion of the relationship between these events and popular interest in empire, see J.M. MacKenzie (ed.) (1986) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester) p. 2.
428. See B. Porter (2007) *The Absent-Minded Imperialists* (Oxford) p. ix.
429. J. Springhall (1986) "'Up Guards and at them!'" British Imperialism and popular art, 1880–1914', in J. MacKenzie (ed.) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester), and S. Bratton (1986) 'Of England, home and duty', in J.M. MacKenzie (ed.) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester) pp. 50, 74–5 respectively. See also M.D. Kutzer (2000) *Empire's Children: Empire and Imperialism in Classic British Children's Books* (New York) p. xv.
430. J.A. Mangan (1986) "'The Grit of our Forefathers': invented traditions, propaganda and Imperialism", in J.W. MacKenzie (ed.) *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester) p. 120.
431. M. Bradley (2010) 'Tacitus' Agricola and the Conquest of Britain: Representations of Empire in Victorian and Edwardian England', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 127–8.
432. *Ibid.*, pp. 129–30. For the original quote from J.E.C. Welldon see (1910) *The Early Training of Boys into Citizenship' in Essays on Duty and Discipline*, fourth edition (London) p. 3.
433. For Homer, and martial epic more generally as a source of 'imperial attitudes', see S. Dentith (2006) *Epic and Empire in Nineteenth Century Britain* (Cambridge) p. 3.

434. For the contrary view see F.M. Turner (1982) 'Antiquity in Victorian Contexts' *Browning Institute Studies* vol. 10, p. 13, and E. Prettejohn (1996) 'Recreating Rome in Victorian Painting', in M. Liversidge and C. Edwards (eds) *Imagining Rome* (London) p. 54.
435. Dicey, 'Mr. Gladstone and Our Empire', p. 306. See A.C. Lyall (1884) 'Government of the Indian Empire', *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 159, p. 32, for a similar echo of Virgil.
436. S.J. Owen (1878) 'The Stability of Our Indian Empire', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 31, p. 517.
437. Joseph Chamberlain (1897) 'The True Conception of Empire', delivered at the Annual Royal Colonial Institute Dinner, Hotel Metropole, 31 March 1897. Transcribed in C. Boyd (ed.) *Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches* (London, 1914) p. 3. Emphasis in the original. See B.M. Gough (1990) 'Pax Britannica: Peace, Force, and World Power', *Round Table*, vol. 314, p. 168, discussing Sir George Bowen's use of the phrase, following the Elder Pliny. *Nat. Hist.*, 27.1.
438. Chamberlain, 'The True Conception of Empire', p. 4. Emphasis added.
439. Augustus boasted that before he came to power the doors of this temple had only been closed twice, a score he claimed to have surpassed by one. *Res. Ges. Aug* 13. See R.T. Ridley (2003) 'The Emperor's Retrospect: Augustus' *Res Gestae* in Epigraphy, Historiography and Commentary', *Studia Hellenistica*, vol. 39, pp. 114–15.
440. 'I am a Roman citizen'. Borrowed from Cicero, *Ad. Ver.* 2.5.57 and more famously, St Paul Acts 22:25.
441. Palmerston (1850) *Speech delivered before the House of Commons, June 25, 1850*. HANSARD CXII [3d Ser.] pp. 380–444.
442. Lady G. Cecil (1921) *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury* (London) vol. 2, p. 313. Related also in J. H. Park (1970) *British Prime Ministers of the Nineteenth Century Policies and Speeches* (New York) p. 153.
443. 'Remember always that you are a Roman' was one of Rhodes's favourite sayings. J.C. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse (1963) *Rhodes* (London) p. 31. Recounted also in Betts, 'The Allusion to Rome', p. 151.
444. *Ibid.* For Butler, see R. Symonds (1986) *Oxford and Empire: the last lost cause?* (Oxford) p. 13.
445. N. Vance (1999) 'Decadence and the subversion of empire', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences: receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) p. 213.
446. W.E. Gladstone 'England's Mission', *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 4 (1878) pp. 560–84. Reproduced in P.J. Cain (1999) *Empire and Imperialism: The Debate of the 1870s* (South Bend) p. 253.
447. Cromer (1910) *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (London) p. 34.
448. In similar vein, see James Bryce (1913) *The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India* (London) pp. 55–6 on shared imperial character and pp. 66–7 on Virgil as 'the national poet of the empire'.
449. P.W.M. Freeman (1996) 'British Imperialism and the Roman Empire', in J. Webster and N.J. Cooper (eds) *Roman Imperialism: post-colonial perspectives* (Leicester) pp. 334–5; his claim that classical education taught 'moral, organizational, and judgmental' lessons but that these did not extend to conceptions of empire is difficult to accept. R. Hingley (2001) 'Introduction' in R. Hingley (ed.) *Images of Rome: perceptions of ancient Rome in Europe and America in the modern age* JRA Supplementary Series 44 (Portsmouth) 148.

6 Classical Discourse and the Decline and Fall of Empires

450. E. Gibbon (1788) *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (London), vol. 12, p. 431.
451. Sallust, *Bel.Cat.* 32 & *Bel. Jur.* 4.59 & 4.95. St Augustine *Civ.Dei.* 3.15. Arrian, *Anab. Alex.*, IV.8 & 14, VII.6.
452. C. Montesquieu (1735) *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (Paris).
453. He remains central to understanding the historiography of the British Empire according to no less an authority than W.R. Louis. See (1999) 'Introduction', in *OHBE*, vol. V, *Historiography* (Oxford) pp. 3–5. Historians who stress his contributions to conceptions of imperial decline include: J.G.A. Pocock (1977) 'Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as civic humanist and Philosophical Historian', in G.W. Bowersock, J. Clive, and S.R. Graubard (eds) *Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge & London) pp. 103–120. L. Dowling (1985) 'Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography', *Victorian Studies* vol. 28, no.4, pp. 579–608 and N. Vance (1999) 'Decadence and the subversion of empire', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) pp. 110–24. Most recently A. Rogers and R. Hingley (2011) 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield: The Traditions of Imperial Decline' in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 207.
454. Armitage (2000) *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge) p. 125. Cain, *Empire and Imperialism*, p. 15. N. Dirks (2006) *The Scandal of Empire: India and the creation of imperial Britain* (Cambridge) pp. 281–2. P.J. Marshall (1998) 'Introduction' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 7. Louis, 'Introduction', pp. 3–4.
455. J.G.A. Pocock (1977) 'Between Machiavelli and Hume: Gibbon as Civic Humanist and Philosophical Historian' in G.W. Bowersock, J. Clive, and S.R. Graubard (eds) *Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge & London) pp. 103–20. S. Patterson (2009) *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York) pp. 130–1.
456. Dowling, 'Roman Decadence and Victorian Historiography', p. 581.
457. E. Adler (2008) 'Late Victorian and Edwardian Views of Rome and the Nature of "Defensive Imperialism"', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 207–8. F. Furet (1977) 'Civilization and Barbarism in Gibbon's History' in G.W. Bowersock, J. Clive, and S.R. Graubard (eds) *Edward Gibbon and the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge & London). V. Larson (1999) 'Classics and the acquisition and validation of power in Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914)', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 221. R.W. Rhodes (1995) *The lion and the cross: early Christianity in Victorian novels* (Columbus) p. 48. J.T. Roberts (1989) 'Athenians on the Sceptered Isle', *Classical Journal*, vol. 84, no. 3. D. Skilton (2007) 'Tourists at the ruins of London: the Metropolis and the Struggle for Empire', *Cercles*, vol. 17, p. 96. N. Vance (1997) *The Victorians and Ancient Rome* (Oxford) p. 233, and 'Decadence and the Subversion of Empire', p. 110. P. Vasunia (2009) 'Virgil and the British Empire, 1760–1880', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 155, p. 88.
458. Among recent commentators Rogers and Hingley strike the best tone on this issue. 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield', pp. 208–9.

459. Vance, *The Victorians and Ancient Rome*, p. 233. See also, Larson 'Classics and the acquisition', p. 221.
460. For a contrary view see Adler, 'Late Victorian and Edwardian views of Rome', p. 207.
461. T. B. Macaulay (1851) *Ranke's History of the Popes* (London) p. 5. First published 1840.
462. D. Skilton, 'Tourists at the ruins of London', p. 96.
463. Larson, 'Classics and the acquisition', p. 221. Adler, 'Late Victorian and Edwardian views of Rome', pp. 207–8.
464. The idea was well established long before Gibbon. See P. Armitage (2000) *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge) p. 125. N. Canny (1998) 'The Origins of Empire: an Introduction' *OHBE* vol. I *The Origins of Empire* (Oxford) pp. 1–34. J.P. Greene (1998) 'Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution' in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 226. Pocock 'Between Machiavelli and Hume', pp. 109–15. See also N. Vance (2000) 'Imperial Rome and Britain's language of Empire 1600–1837', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 26, nos. 3 & 4, pp. 211–24. For an example see Courtly Grub (1735) 'National Poverty a Blessing' *The Gentleman's Magazine* vol. 5, p. 717.
465. W. Barron (1777) *The History of the Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity, applied to the present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies* (London) p. 150. Understandably, considering his point of view, he chose to play down the fact that concessions were granted to all allies and colonies because of the armed rebellion undertaken by some of them.
466. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
467. *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 137, 151. Following Thucydides account of Mytilene's suppression he made virtually the same argument with respect to imperial Athens. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
468. J. Symonds (1778) *Remarks upon an Essay intituled The History of the Colonization of the Free States of Antiquity, applied to the present Contest between Great Britain and her American Colonies* (London). See also W. Rose (1778) 'Dr. Symonds' Remarks upon an Essay...' *Monthly Review* vol. 59 p. 208.
469. *Ibid.*
470. See for example H. Last (1960) 'G. Gracchus', *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 9, pp. 40–92.
471. 'Caius' (1780) 'Mr. Urban', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 50, p. 406.
472. *Ibid.*
473. *Ibid.*
474. For example, W. Rose (1783) 'The Conclusion to Dr. Ferguson's History of the Progress...' *Monthly Review*, vol. 69, p. 119. Or more explicitly, O. Goldsmith (1781) *Roman History from the foundation of the City of Rome to the Destruction of the Western Empire* (London) p. 104.
475. Pocock, 'Between Machiavelli and Hume', p. 112.
476. Walpole to Mann, 18 Jan. 1781, *Correspondence* 25:118.
477. He was acquitted. See J. Phillips (1988) 'Parliament and Southern India, 1781–3: The Secret Committee of Inquiry and the Prosecution of Sir Thomas Rumbold', *Parliamentary History*, VII, p. 84.
478. *The Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham* eds W.S. Taylor and J.H. Pringle (London, 1838–40) vol. 3, p. 405. Quoted in H.V. Bowen (1998) 'British India, 1765–1813: The Metropolitan Context', in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 542.

479. H.V. Bowen (1998) 'British India, 1765–1813: The Metropolitan Context' *OHBE* vol. II *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 543. Also Pocock, 'Between Machiavelli and Hume', p. 112.
480. Chatham *The Correspondence of William Pitt*, vol. 3, p. 405.
481. Edmund Burke (1848) 'Speech in Opposition to the Bill to restrain the East India Company from appointing Supervisors in India', 18th December 1772, transcribed in *The Modern Orator*, vol. 1 (London) vol. 1, p. 486.
482. *Ibid.*
483. Quoted in G. Stuart (1772) 'Bolts' Considerations on India Affairs', *Monthly Review*, vol. 46, p. 241. Emphasis in the original.
484. P. Lawson and J. Phillips (1984) "'Our Execrable Banditti": Perceptions of Nabobs in Mid-Eighteenth Century Britain', *Albion*, vol. 16 no. 3 pp. 225–40.
485. A. Rogers and R. Hingley, 'Edward Gibbon and Francis Haverfield: the Traditions of Imperial Decline' in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 190, 207.
486. W. Playfair (1805) *An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations, Illustrated by Four Engraved Charts: Designed to Shew How the Prosperity of the British Empire May be Prolonged* (London) p. viii for Rome; p. xiv for the quote.
487. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
488. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–3, where Carthage provides a positive role model. See also p. 194, where he argues for Britain's continued prosperity and greatness on the basis of its distinctness from Ancient analogues.
489. G.R. Gleig (1835) *The History of the British Empire in India* (London) vol. 4, p. 220.
490. *Ibid.*
491. A. Alison 'The Fall of Rome. Its Causes at Work in the British Empire', *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, vol. 59, p. 692.
492. *Ibid.*, p. 693. Sallust, *Bell. Cat.*, p. 32.
493. Alison, 'The Fall of Rome', p. 716.
494. E. Thornton (1841) *The History of the British Empire in India* (London) vol. 1, p. 11.
495. Alison, 'The Fall of Rome', p. 716.
496. See also Sir W. W. Hunter (1899) *A History of British India* (London) vol. 1, p. 42. Quoting from Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* vi. 26. 'The subject [of trade with India] is one well worthy of our notice, seeing that in no year does India drain our empire of less than five hundred and fifty millions of sesterces, giving back her own wares in exchange, which are sold among us at fully one hundred times their prime cost.'
497. The Crimean War inspired such worries among Haileybury's students. For examples see the *Haileybury Observer* (1855) no.10, pp. 299–300; and (1856) no. 3, p. 110. In the last three decades of the century the appearance of vital new imperial powers such as America and Germany inspired fears that Britain had already undergone a relative decline. See P. Burroughs (1999) 'Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire', *OHBE*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 321–2.
498. See: Goldwin Smith (1857) 'Imperialism', *Fraser's Magazine*, vol. 55, p. 494. Charles Hamley (1857) 'Our Indian Empire', *Blackwood's Magazine*, vol. 82, p. 643. A.H. Layard (1858) 'British India', *Quarterly Review*, vol. 104, p. 275. Anon., 'Indian Heroes', pp. 60, 373.

499. Cobden to George Combe, 16 May 1858. Quoted in K.E. Knorr (1968) *British Colonial Theories* (London) p. 359. Following J. Morley (1883) *Life of Richard Cobden* (London) p. 680.
500. Cobden to Wm. Hargreaves, 1860. Also quoted in Knorr, *British Colonial Theories*, p. 359, and following Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, pp. 436, 532.
501. See also the influential American scholar, Brooks Adams, whose (1896) *The Law of Civilization and Decay* (New York) was widely read in certain intellectual circles in Britain.
502. G. Smith (1863) *The Empire: a collection of letters to the Daily Mail and the responses they engendered* (Oxford) p. 286. R. Lowe (1878) 'Imperialism', *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 30, p. 456.
503. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) p. 59. T. Hughes (1873) 'Problems of Civilisation', *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. 28, p. 95.
504. Lyall (1893) *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London). p. 287.
505. F. Seebohm (1880) 'Imperialism and Socialism', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 7, pp. 726–36.
506. Hunter, *A History of British India*, vol. 1, p. 42.
507. Dowling, 'Roman Decadence', pp. 604–5.
508. J.B. Bury (1896) 'The British and the Roman Empire', *Saturday Review*, 27 June 1896, p. 645. Quoted in Dowling, 'Roman Decadence', p. 604. Though as we have seen elsewhere, Bury too had a habit of making comparisons that elided the historical distance between past and present.
509. J.M. Robertson (1900) *Patriotism and Empire* (London) p. 204.
510. See *ibid.*, 147, 151, 154 & 204.
511. Hughes, 'Problems of Civilisation', p. 95.
512. Lowe, 'Imperialism', p. 456.
513. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
514. *Ibid.*, p. 456. Lowe too saw the wealth that derived from such exploitation as a major cause of moral decay at the centre.
515. J.R. Seeley (1883) 'Mutual Influence of England and India', in *The Expansion of England* (London) p. 285. He called Rome the 'mother-city' of European civilization. For an alternative view of Seeley's relationship with classical discourse see R.S. Mantena (2010) 'Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain's Indian Empire', in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) pp. 65, 69.
516. Seeley, *The Expansion*, p. 284 (first two quotations), 287.
517. From Horace *Odes*, 3.4.65. Translated by T. Martin in 1861 as 'Unreasoning strength by its own weight must fall. To strength with wisdom blent'. Martin (1861) *The Odes of Horace* (Boston).
518. W.H.P. Greswell (1884) 'England and her Second Colonial Empire', *Quarterly Review* vol. 156, p. 161. Greswell was another prolific contributor to the periodical press in the 1880s and 1890s, primarily on imperial subjects.
519. See also J.A. Cramb (1900) *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* (Toronto) p. 195.
520. St Augustine, *Civ.Dei.*, iv. 15. Quoted in B. Holland (1901) *Imperium et Libertas: a study in the History of Politics* (London) pp. 13–14.
521. *Ibid.*
522. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

523. Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, p. 125, claims that reconciling these apparent opposites had been a guiding concern of British imperial ideology since the late 16th century.
524. B. Porter (1968) *Critics of Empire: British Radical attitudes to colonialism in Africa, 1895–1914* (London) pp. 1–2.
525. ‘Ritortus’ (1899) ‘The Imperialism of British Trade (No.I)’, *The Contemporary Review*, vol. 76, p. 295. Emphasis added.
526. J. A. Hobson (1902) *Imperialism* (London) pp. 365–6.
527. Adler, ‘Late Victorian and Edwardian views of Rome’, p. 207, identified this as a rhetorical mainstay of anti-imperialists.
528. *Ibid.*, p. 367.
529. Robertson, *Patriotism and Empire*, p. 151.
530. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
531. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
532. Cramb, *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain*, pp. 138–9.
533. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 195.
534. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
535. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 49, 262, 271–2, 310.
536. *Ibid.*, pp. 273, 312.
537. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

7 Classical Discourse and British Conceptions of India

538. Noted by H.V. Bowen (1998) ‘British India, 1765–1813: The Metropolitan Context’, in *OHBE*, vol. II, *The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford) pp. 342–3. Bowen does not consider the origins of the Asia–decline link, but nevertheless makes a strong case for its presence and impact in the later 18th century.
539. G. Prakash (1992) ‘Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World’, in N.B. Dirks (ed.) *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor) p. 355. See also Edward Said (1978) *Orientalism* (London) p. 1, 3 and S. Wahliia (2001) *Edward Said and the Writing of History* (Cambridge), pp. 23–35.
540. M. Bernal (1987) *Black Athena: the Afro-Asia roots of Classical Antiquity* (New Brunswick). Also (2001) *Black Athena Writes Back* (Durham). (1994) ‘The Image of Ancient Greece as a tool for colonialism and European hegemony’, in G.C. Bond and A. Gilliam (eds) *Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power* (London) pp. 119–27. And most recently D. Orrells, G.K. Bhambra, and T. Roynon (eds) (2011) *African Athena: new agendas* (Oxford).
541. For representations of the link between Ancient Greece and Egypt that run counter to his interpretation see: E.H. Nolan (1858) *The Illustrated History of the British Empire in India and the East: from the Earliest Times to the Suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1859* (London) p. 365. J.M. Robertson (1900) *Patriotism and Empire* (London) p. 92. For reactions to Hingley see E. Adler (2008) ‘Late Victorian and Edwardian Images of Rome and the Nature of Defensive Imperialism’, *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 15, no. 2 pp. 190–1 and P.W.M. Freeman (1996) ‘British Imperialism and the Roman Empire’, in J. Webster and N.J. Cooper (eds) *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives* (Leicester) p. 30.
542. E. Said (1978) *Orientalism* (London) pp. 57–8. See also (1993) *Cultural Imperialism* (London) pp. xviii, 16.

543. G. Cannon, and K.R. Brine (eds) (1995) *Objects of Enquiry: the Life, Contributions, and Influences of Sir William Jones: 1746–94* (New York) p. 12.
544. Cannon and Brine, *Objects of Enquiry*, p. 12. R. Fynes (1998) ‘Sir William Jones and the Classical Tradition’, in A. Murray (ed.) *Sir William Jones 1746–1794* (Oxford) p. 47. S.N. Mukherjee (1968) *Sir William Jones: a Study in Eighteenth-Century British Attitudes to India* (Cambridge) p. 31.
545. E.g. ‘A Letter to a Patriot Senator’ (1783: Works I: xci–cxxx) and ‘A fragment of Polybius’ (1782 Works: I: cxxxvii–cxliv): Cannon and Brine, *Objects of Enquiry*, p. 8. His prospective classical works included: a heroic poem entitled *Britannicus*, after Homer, speeches after Demosthenes, Dialogues after Plato, and a history of the American War after Thucydides and Polybius. Fynes, ‘Sir William Jones and the Classical Tradition’, p. 16.
546. Mukherjee, *Sir William Jones*, Jones to G.J. Spencer. February 1775.
547. Jones, ‘Third Anniversary Discourse’ (2 February 1786). Published in *Asiatic Researches* I. See S.S. Pachori (ed.) (1993) *Sir William Jones: A Reader* (Delhi) p. 175.
548. *Ibid.*
549. W. Jones (1771) *A Grammar of the Persian Language* (London). Quoted in Pachori (ed.), *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 60.
550. Letter to Lord Althorp, 2nd Earl Spencer, August 1787. Jones, *Letters*, vol. II, no. 464, 742–61. See also Fynes, ‘Sir William Jones and the Classical Tradition’, p. 60.
551. Jones, *Grammar of the Persian Language*, in *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 158.
552. See Mukherjee, who stresses Jones respect for the ‘ancient wisdom’ based in antiquity but still relevant in his day. Mukherjee, *Sir William Jones*, p. 25.
553. Jones, ‘Third Anniversary Discourse’ in *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 174.
554. See R. Rocher (1995) ‘Weaving Knowledge’ in G. Cannon and K.R. Brine (eds) *Objects of Enquiry: The Life, Contribution and Influences of Sir William Jones, 1746–1794* (New York) and (1993) ‘British Orientalism in the 18th Century: the Dialectics of Knowledge and Government’, in Breckenridge and van der Veer (eds) *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia) pp. 215–49.
555. Jones, ‘Third Anniversary Discourse’, *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 174.
556. Jones, ‘Menu’, *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 202.
557. Jones, ‘Third Anniversary Discourse’, *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 174.
558. *Ibid.*, p. 175. Here he was particularly interested in the ancient vernaculars of India, of which he could find no record.
559. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
560. Jones, ‘On the Mystical Poetry of the Persians and Hindus’ (read as paper in 1791 published in *As. Res.* 4 1794), *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 144.
561. Jones, ‘On Asiatic history’, *Asiatick Researches*, vol. 1, pp. 7–8.
562. J. H. Grose (1766) *A Voyage to the East Indies Began in 1750 With Observations continued till 1764* (London) p. 355. See also pp. 208–9 and pp. 228–9. For similar attitudes see: Anon. (1793) ‘Review of Travels in India’ of Wm. Hodges’, *Gentleman’s Magazine*, vol. 63, p. 339. Anon (1800) ‘The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea. Part the First. Containing an account of the navigation of the Ancients from the Sea of Suez to the Coast of Zanguebur. With Dissertations. By Dr. Wm. Vincent’, *Gentleman’s Magazine*, vol. 70, pp. 857–8; and T. Pennant (1798) *The View of Hindoostan* (London) vol. 1, p. 64. Pliny is *Nat. Hist.* 6.96–111.
563. J. Gillies (1792) ‘An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients had of India... Wm. Robertson D.D.’, *Monthly Review*, n.s., vol. 6, p. 11.

564. Robertson (1804) *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients Had of India* (London). J. Rennell (1782) *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan* (London). The first to note this connection was P. Briant (2005) 'Alexander the Great and the Enlightenment: William Robertson (1721–1793), the Empire and the road to India', *Cyber Review of Modern Historiography*, vol. 10, pp. 1–9.
565. Jones, Menu, *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 200.
566. Jones' contemporary and fellow 'Orientalist', Halhead, made a similarly significant connection in his *Grammar of the Bengal Language* (Hooghly, 1778). See J. Gillies (1780) 'A Grammar of the Bengal Language by N. Brassey Halhead', *Monthly Review*, vol. 62, p. 342.
567. T.R. Trautmann (1998) 'The Lives of Sir William Jones' *Sir William Jones: 1746–1794* (Oxford) p. 111.
568. T. Pennant, *The View of Hindoostan*, vol. 1, pp. 2, 26, 104–5, 132–3, 184–5 and vol. 2, p. 148.
569. Anon. (1793) "Review of Travels in India' of Wm. Hodges', *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. 63, p. 339. Arrian for instance appears no fewer than 33 times in Rennell's *Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan*.
570. Anon. 'Dr. Wm. Vincent's The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea', p. 857.
571. Jones, 'Third Anniversary Discourse', read to the Asiatic Society, February 1786, published in *Asiatick Researches*, 1. *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 174.
572. Letter to Lord Althorp, 2nd Earl Spencer, August, 1787. Jones, *Letters*, no. 464, ii., pp. 742–61. Fynes, 'Sir William Jones and the Classical Tradition', p. 60.
573. Trautmann 'The Lives of Sir William Jones', p. 109.
574. Jones, *Asiatick Researches*, vol. 1, p. 236.
575. Grose, *A Voyage to the East Indies*, vol. 1, pp. 228–9.
576. Pennant, *The View of Hindoostan*, vol. 1, pp. 69–70.
577. W. Hodges (1793) *Travels in India during the Years 1780, 1781, 1782, & 1783* (London) p. 28. See also Anon., "Travels in India' by Wm. Hodges', p. 339.
578. Robertson, *An Historical Disquisition*, p. 7.
579. Jones, 'On Asiatic history', *Asiatick Researches*, vol. 1, pp. 7–8.
580. Jones 'Second Anniversary Discourse', *As. Res.*, vol. 1, p. 405. Quoted in Mukherjee, *Sir William Jones*, p. 120.
581. For a contrary interpretation, see Rocher 'Weaving Knowledge', pp. 53–4.
582. In the interval see, Bishop Reginald Heber (1826) *Narrative of a Journey through the upper provinces of India, from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824–5...* (London) p. 164 and W. Nassau Lees (1871) 'Indian Musalmans: Being three letters reprinted from the Times with an Article on the late prince consort and Four Articles on Education reprinted from the 'Calcutta Englishman', BL IOR/8023 ee 49, p. iii.
583. M. Müller (1871) 'Classical Studies in India', *Contemporary Review*, vol. 18, p. 151.
584. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
585. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
586. J. Mill (1817) *History of British India* (London) pp. 210, 215, 218.
587. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
588. Heber, *Narrative of a journey*, vol. 2, p. 7.
589. H. Murray, J. Wilson, Professor Jameson, W. Ainslie, W. Rhind, Professor Wallace, and C. Dalrymple (1832) *Historical and Descriptive Account of British India from the Most Remote Period to the Present Time...* (New York) Harper's Family Library, no. XLVIII, vol. 1, pp. 211, 213, 258 & vol. 3, pp. 285–6, 308.
590. W.H. Sleeman (1844) *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official* (London) pp. 61, 470.

591. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, vol. 1, pp. 465–6, 565. Lees, ‘Indian Musalmans’, p. 44.
592. C. H. Eden (1876) *India Historical and Descriptive* (London) p. 30.
593. E.S. Carlos (1889) *A Short History of British India* (Cambridge) p. 15.
594. E. Arnold (1906) *India Revisited* (London) fourth edition, p. 78 referring to Propertius *Elegiae* 3.13.18.
595. Mill, *History of British India*, p. 31.
596. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
597. R. Inden (1990) *Imagining India* (Cambridge) p. 45.
598. Mill, *History of British India*, p. 213. Though he admitted the excellence of Indian astronomy in this connection, he later took great pains to demonstrate that even in this area they had been inferior to the Greeks, upon whom they relied for their astronomical knowledge. Mill took this opportunity to castigate Jones for claiming otherwise. *Ibid.*, pp. 215–18.
599. *Ibid.*, p. 80. See p. 159 for a similar comparison in the area of religion.
600. *Ibid.*, p. 88. See also p. 153, for a similar point with respect to Hindu concepts of divinity.
601. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
602. *Ibid.*, p. 539.
603. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
604. *Ibid.*, pp. 535, 539.
605. In its ninth edition by 1905.
606. Mountstuart Elphinstone (1833) *History of India: The Hindu and Mahometan Periods* (London) Appendix III, pp. 254, 260.
607. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
608. *Ibid.*, p. 259
609. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
610. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
611. This is especially true of Elphinstone, who basically grew to manhood and completed his classical education in India.
612. R.S. Mantena, (2010) ‘Imperial Ideology and the Uses of Rome in Discourses on Britain’s Indian Empire’, in M. Bradley (ed.) *Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire* (Oxford) p. 56, noted this ambiguity in the application of classical discourse.
613. G. Gleig (1835) *The History of the British Empire in India* (London), p. 4.
614. *Ibid.*
615. Lees, ‘Indian Musalmans’, pp. 46, 50.
616. W.W. Hunter (1899) *A History of British India* (London) vol. 1, pp. 1–2.
617. For earlier examples, see H. Murray (1850) *History of British India* (London) pp. 52–3, first published in 1832. C. MacFarlane (1852) *History of British India from the Earliest English Intercourse* (London) pp. 2–3.
618. Charles Ball (1858–9) *The History of the Indian Mutiny: Giving a Detailed Account of the Sepoy Insurrection in India and a Concise History of the Great Military Events which have Tended to Consolidate British Empire in Hindostan* (London) p. 644. See also E.H. Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, vol. 1, pp. 465–6, 565.
619. For the despotism connection see Henry Reeve (1858) ‘Prospects of the Indian Empire’, *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 107, p. 8.
620. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
621. For other examples see R.M. Martin (1858) *The Indian Empire* (New York) vol.1, p. 541 and Nolan, *The Illustrated History*, vol. 1, pp. 465–6.

622. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) p. 29.
623. In the interval see, J.T. Wheeler (1874) *History of India from the Earliest Ages* (London) pp. 167, 180, 204 n.77, and J.R. Seeley (1883) *The Expansion of England* (London) pp. 278–81.
624. Anon. (1888) 'The Development of India', *Westminster Review*, vol. 129, p. 343.
625. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
626. A.C. Lyall (1893) *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (London) p. 353.
627. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

8 Classical Discourse in British India I: Coping with Life in India

628. British Library (BL) MSS EUR/F88/ 473.
629. During his time at Nagpore. BL/MSS EUR/F88/ 361, pp. 101–3.
630. BL/MSS EUR/F88/361 p.132. Odds are that some or all of Arrian, Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch and perhaps Justin were part of the collection. A slightly later document in his personal papers demonstrates his familiarity with all the relevant ancient sources. Elphinstone, *Notes on Bactria and Alexander's marches* BL/MSS EUR/ F88 /49 no. 8.
631. H. Danvers (1894) 'An Account of the Origins of the East India Company's Civil Service and of their college in Hertfordshire', in *Memorials of Old Haileybury College* (Westminster) pp. 7, 11.
632. M. McLaren (2001) *British India and British Scotland, 1780–1830: Career-Building, Empire-building, and a Scottish School of Thought on Indian Governance* (Akron) p. 25. Though the classics were less dominant in Scottish education than English at the time, Elphinstone's education was still classical. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–4.
633. Letter from Mrs Thompson to Elphinstone's Mother, quoted in R.D. Choksey (1971) *Mountstuart Elphinstone: the Indian years, 1796–1827* (Bombay) p. 23.
634. T. E. Colebrooke (1884) *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone* (London) vol. 1, p. 9.
635. J. Morduant Crook (1964) *Haileybury and the Greek Revival: The Architecture of William Wilkins* (Leicester) p. 9.
636. E.g. East India College Examination Papers: BL/IOR/SW 186, December 1851. Alexander typically received some attention on these papers.
637. See P. Vasunia (2009) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', in J. Hallet and C. Stray (eds) *British classics outside England: the academy and beyond* (Waco). See also V. Larson (1999) 'Classics and the acquisition and validation of power in Britain's Imperial Century (1815–1914)', *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 6, no. 2, especially pp. 197–207.
638. BL/IOR/L/PJ/2/12.
639. BL/IOR/PJ/2/25 3/186–7. Counting only candidates from universities and recognized public schools, or private schools with classical awards. Candidates educated at home would have had a classical education from tutors.
640. BL/IOR/L/PJ/2/27 3/205.
641. BL/IOR/L/PJ/1/92/28.
642. G. Hodson (1859) *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India: Being Extracts from the Letters of the Late Major, W.S.R. Hodson* (London) pp. 4, 32. G.A. Henty (1881) *In Times of Peril* (London) p. 108.

643. See G. Harries-Jenkins (1977) *The Army in Victorian Society* (London) pp. 98, 104, 113–14.
644. Quoted in H.M. Durand (1913) *Life of the Right Hon. Sir Alfred Comyn Lyall D.C.L.* (Edinburgh) p. 50.
645. W. Williams (1993) 'Reading Greek like a Man of the World: Macaulay and the Classical Languages', *Greece and Rome*, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 202. See also C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge). V.G. Kiernan (1995) *Imperialism and its contradictions* (New York) p. 41, quoted by Vasunia 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', p. 68.
646. BL/ MSS EUR/ F132/3 p. 188. An ancient Greek sacrifice of 100 oxen.
647. BL/MSS EUR/ E168 p. 67.
648. C. Dewey (1993) *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: the Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London) p. 120.
649. S. Mahmood (1895) *A History of English Education in India* (Delhi) p. 232, following C. Trevelyan (1838) *On the Education of the People of India* (London). For an estate sale See R. Jenkins letter to his agent Mr G. Stevens dated January 28, 1811, in which he requests a number of books about to be auctioned from the estate of Mr Falconar. Jenkins, *Letters*, BL/ MSS EUR/E111, p. 135.
650. W. Pottinger (1834) 'On the Present state of the River Indus, and the Route of Alexander the Great', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1, pp. 199–208. Alexander Burnes (1835) 'Memoir of the Eastern branch of the River Indus, giving an Account of the Alterations produced on it by an Earthquake, also a Theory of the formation of the Runn, and some Conjectures on the Route of Alexander the Great', *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3, pp. 550–66. James Abbot (1848) 'Some Account of the Battlefield of Alexander and Porus', *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, 17, pp. 619–34 and (1852) 'On the Sites of Nikaia and Boukephalon', *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, vol. 21, pp. 214–68. Major Wm. Anderson (1849) 'Notes on the Geography of western Afghanistan', *Journal of the Asiatic Society* vol. 18, pp. 553–87. Alexander Cunningham (1871) *Ancient Geography of India I: The Buddhist Period, Including the Campaigns of Alexander and the Travels of Hwen-Thsang* (London). See also Colonel Todd: see J. Prinsep (1833) 'On the Greek Coins in the Cabinet of the Asiatic Society', *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, vol. 2, pp. 27–43. For Colonel R.A. Wauchope, see Marc Aurel Stein (1929) *On Alexander's Track to the Indus: Personal Narrative of Explorations on the North-West Frontier of India* (London) p. 3.
651. BL/ MSS EUR/ F88/ 368 p. 35. The gentlemen in question were Strachey, Macartney, Fraser, and Fitz.
652. M. Elphinstone (1815) *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India; Comprising a View of the Afghaun Nation, and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy* (London) pp. 80–1, BL/MSS EUR/F88/3612. 80–1. BL/MSS EUR/F88/3612 p.334. For his reading during the Second Maratha War see Elphinstone *Journals*. Nov. 28 1803 and Dec. 1 1803. BL/MSS EUR/F88/360, pp. 5–7. Elphinstone continued reading Polybius after the Pindarees descended in the spring of 1808 as well. BL/ MSS EUR F88/ 361, page 48 ff.
653. M. Elphinstone, *Caubul Diaries*, BL/MSS EUR/ F88/362, p. 347.
654. Quintus Curtius, *Hist. Alex. Magni*, 8.7.7–16. Elphinstone, *Caubul Diaries*, BL/ MSS EUR/F88/362. p. 334.
655. Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul*, p. 17. James Atkinson (1842) *The Expedition into Afghanistan: Notes and Sketches Descriptive of the Country*

- (London) pp. 66–7, who took part in the First Afghan War, claimed Elphinstone had confused the precise route of Alexander's fleet.
656. Plutarch, *Alexander*, 8.2
657. Hodson, *Twelve Years*, p. 93.
658. This is based on Stein's comments about their interest in Alexander and the work they had done to pinpoint prominent sites in Alexander's campaigns. Stein, *On Alexander's Track to the Indus*, pp. 2–3. This book drew on work beginning in 1887, at which time he knew Wauchope. Deane later (1904) proved especially helpful in Stein's research on Alexander's route.
659. G.R. Elsmie (1908) *Thirty-Five Years in the Punjab: 1858–1893* (Edinburgh) p. 351. See Arrian, *Anab. Alex.* 5. 22–4.
660. Sept 24. BL/MSS EUR/F88/363, p. 264.
661. From the first volume of his journals, 14 January 1801 to March 1802. BL/MSS EUR/F88/ 368.
662. Elphinstone, *Journals*, BL/MSS EUR/F88/ 358.
663. April 16, 1801. BL/MSS EUR/F88/368, p. 42 and May 1806. BL/MSS EUR/F88/358 p. 8–9.
664. For Herbert Edwardes see (1851) *A Year on the Punjab Frontier, in 1848–49* (London) and Emma Edwardes (1886) *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes* (London).
665. Vasunia, 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', p. 63.
666. F.G. Hutchins (1987) *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India* (Princeton) p. 43. See also Betts, 'The allusion to Rome', p. 152.
667. For Jenkins see Colebrooke, *Life*, vol. 1, p. 273. For Kennedy, see Elphinstone, *Journals*, Dec. 15, 1803. BL/MSS EUR/F88/360, p. 37. *Ibid.*, July 25 1820. BL/MSS EUR/F88/363, p. 256. See BL/MSS EUR/F88/36, p. 3 for Davis. BL/MSS EUR/F88/360, pp. 43, 46 for Malcolm. BL/MSS EUR/F88/363, p. 250, 12 July 1826, for Munro; BL/MSS EUR F88/426, p. 171 for Shingle.
668. N.B. Halhead (1771) *The Love Epistles of Aristaenetus* (London) and (1793) *Imitations of some of the Epigrams of Martial* (London). G.O. Trevelyan (1924) *Interludes in Verse and Prose* (London) p. 97; quoted in N. Vance (1993) 'Horace and the Nineteenth Century', in C. Martindale (ed.) *Horace made new: Horatian influences on British writing from the Renaissance to the twentieth century* (New York) p. 215. For Lear and Cromer see R. Owen, *Lord Cromer*, pp. 87–8.
669. R.D. Choksey (1971) *Mountstuart Elphinstone: the Indian years, 1796–1827* (Bombay), p. 24.
670. R. Heber, *Narrative of a Journey through the upper provinces of India, from Calcutta to Bombay, 1824* (London) vol. 1, p. 162. Robertson called it the 'Athens of India'. See *An Historical Disquisition*, p. 256–7.
671. As described by Heber, *Narrative of a Journey*, vol. 1, p. 162.
672. These range from daily hassles, significant life change, environmental factors, work pressures, illness, to violence and physical danger. A.L. Dougall and A. Baum 'Stress', in H. Friedman (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Mental Health* (San Diego) p. 599. See also Cary L. Cooper and P. Dewe (2004) *Stress: A Brief History* (Malden). Confusion as to the definition of stress centres on the issue of whether stress is a 'stimulus', a 'response', or some combination of the two. Cooper and Dewe, *Stress: A Brief History*, p. 111. On the varieties of coping see R. J. Gruen (1993) 'Stress and Depression: Toward the Development of Integrative Models' in *Handbook of Stress* p. 556. For an example relating to environmental stress see E. Graig, 'Stress as a Consequence of the Urban Physical Environment',

- Handbook of Stress*, pp. 317, 327. For one relating to life change see M. Fiskie 'Challenge and Defeat: Stability and Change in Adulthood', in L. Goldberger and S. Breznitz (eds) *Handbook of Stress: Theoretical and Clinical Aspects* (New York) p. 415.
673. Cooper and Dewe, *Stress*, p. 79. See also Gruen, 'Stress and Depression', p. 556.
674. R. Lazarus (1977) 'Cognitive and Coping Processes in Emotion' in A. Monat and R. Lazarus (eds) *Stress and Coping: an Anthology* (New York) p. 158.
675. Lazarus stressed the 'myriad forms of self-regulation that are available and serviceable to given kinds of people and in given types of situations in managing their emotional lives.' Lazarus, 'Cognitive and Coping Processes', p. 145. There are two general classes of coping, direct action focused on solving or eliminating the problem causing the 'stress' and palliative coping, which focuses on dealing with emotions triggered by stress in order to feel better. Gruen, 'Stress and Depression', p. 556. Classical study appears consistent with the latter type.
676. BL/MSS EUR/F88/368, p. 35
677. Letter to Strachey, quoted in Choksey, *Mountstuart Elphinstone*, p. 30.
678. Albeit in the company of a close friend, Edward Strachey. The prospective resident, Col. Wm. Kirkpatrick, had fallen ill and his replacement had not yet been selected.
679. For the dangers encountered on the trip see Choksey, *Mountstuart Elphinstone*, p. 32.
680. Fiskie, 'Challenge and Defeat', p. 415. She stresses that even ostensibly positive changes are moments of challenge that can inspire feelings of loss and discontinuity.
681. BL/MSS EUR/F88/368. p. 35. On various occasions after 1803 Elphinstone revealed his preference for classical European authors, in part because he believed the Persian poets contributed to his struggles with depression. See Letter to Strachey, Nagpoor, 25 August 1804, and his journals at Nagpoor, 26 June 1804. Also Colebrook, *Life*, vol. 1, pp. 124–5.
682. His first experience of political violence came in 1799 when he narrowly escaped Vizier Ali's 'uprising' in Benares. J.F. Davis (1871) *Vizier Ali: or the Massacre at Benares a chapter in British Indian History* (London) p. 69.
683. Elphinstone to Strachey – 15 October 1803 (Colebrooke, *Life*, vol. 1, p. 80). See also Choksey, *Mountstuart Elphinstone*, pp. 50–1.
684. The topics of discussion were the poets Sadi, Hafiz, Horace and Anacreon. BL/MSS/EUR F88/360, p. 37.
685. *Aeneid*, III, 571 ff. Elphinstone to Strachey, 11 December 1803. He presents the text in Latin. English translation from T.C. Williams, Virgil (1910) *Aeneid* (Boston). See also Colebrooke, *Life*, p. 94.
686. Letter to Strachey, 18 December 1803. See also Colebrooke, *Life*, vol. 1, p. 107.
687. A concept first articulated by Melanie Klein 'Notes on Schizoid Mechanisms'. See R.J. Campbell (ed.) (2004) *Psychiatric Dictionary*, eighth edition (Oxford) p. 326.
688. Theocritus, *Idylls*, I. 115. BL/MSS EUR/F88/363, p. 234. See also Colebrooke, *Life*, vol. 2, p. 99.
689. The style of administrator Mason identified as a Guardian in open reference to Plato's Republic. P. Mason (1954) *The Men Who Ruled India: The Guardians* (New York).
690. i.e. 'intuitive, automatic, and unconscious', Cooper and Dewe, *Stress*, p. 75, following R. Lazarus.

691. So on the way home from India in 1827 he found Greece (Athens was the great exception) disappointing because his experiences and surroundings in India had in a sense spoiled him. Apparently his imagined antiquity had been so thoroughly projected onto India, that the latter had started to show through and had reshaped his conception of the former. BL/MSS EUR/ F88/ 5. See also Colebrooke, *Life*, vol. 2, p. 214.
692. C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating Empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge) pp. 72–3.
693. C. Napier and W.F.P. Napier (1977) *Defects Civil and Military of the Indian Government* (Ajmer) p. 64–5. Napier included a passage from his journal on the possible site of the battle between Alexander and Porus.
694. Hodson, *Twelve Years*, p. 93. Owen, *Lord Cromer*, pp. 87–8.
695. R.N. Cust (1899) *Memoirs of Past Years of a Septuagenarian: Twenty-One Years before India, in India, after India* (Hertford), p. 17.
696. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
697. For example, S. Patterson (2009) *The Cult of Imperial Honor in British India* (New York) p. 100. P.J. Marshall (1997) 'British Society in India under the East India Company', *Modern Asian Studies*, 31:1, pp. 89–108, providing an overview. J.A. Mangan (1998) *The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal* (London), discussing sport in general. For gender and sporting pursuits in India M.A. Procida (2001) 'Good Sports and Right Sorts: Guns, Gender, and Imperialism in British India', *Journal of British Studies*, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 454–88.
698. To these we could add data concerning flora. Jones (1795) 'Additional Remarks on the Spikenard of the Ancients', *Asiatick Researches*, vol. 4, pp. 109–18.
699. J. D. Patterson (1805) 'The Origins of the Hindu Religion', *Asiatic Review*, vol. 8, pp. 50–1, 65, 68–9, 77–8. H.T. Colebrooke (1805) 'Remarks on the Foregoing Essay', *Asiatic Review*, vol. 8, p. 85. Captain F. Wilford (1805) 'An Essay on Sacred Isles in the West', *Asiatic Review*, vol. 8, pp. 280–1, 294.
700. Reid, 'Cromer and the Classics', p. 7. Following Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, pp. 7–11.
701. East India College Examination Papers, BL/IOR/SW/186, December 1851.
702. My italics. Talboys Wheeler (1874) *History of India from the Earliest Ages* (London) vol. 3, p. 165. In India, Wheeler edited the *Madras Spectator*, and became a professor at Madras Presidency College, before entering the government of India's service first as a historian, then as assistant secretary in the Foreign Department.
703. H. Cleghorn (1865) 'Report upon the Forests of the Punjab and the western Himalaya', *Calcutta Review*, vol. 44, no. 87, p. 57. G. Barton (2002) *Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism* (Cambridge) pp. 43–4, quoting Arrian.
704. T.O. Lloyd (1996) *The British Empire 1558–1995* (Oxford) p. 131. D. Headrick (1981) *Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford) p. 54. Additional confirmation is provided by R.M. Martin (1858) *The Indian Empire* (New York) vol. 2, p. 3636. For Russia see: Anon. (1827) 'Projects for the Invasion of India', *Asiatic Journal* 23, no. 135, pp. 323–4. Anon. (1842) 'Our Indian Empire', *Liverpool Mercury* 32, no. 1608, p. 72. Anon. (1887) 'Brief review of the campaigns undertaken against India from the West and through Afghanistan', *The Calcutta Review*, 85, p. 317. And finally, Stein, *On Alexander's Track*, pp. 34–5.

705. R. Kipling (1928) *Book of Words* (New York) p. 86.
 706. Heber, *Narrative of a journey*, p. 4.
 707. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
 708. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
 709. *Ibid.*, pp. 306–7.
 710. Burnes (1834) *Travels in Bokhara: Containing the Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus* (London) vol. 3, p. 14.
 711. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 49. Arrian, *Anab. Alex.*, 5.4
 712. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 58–9, emphasis added. See also vol. 1, pp. 46, 300, 350–1; vol. 2, pp. 6, 130, 271–2, and vol. 3, pp. 12–14, 114–15, 284–5. Arrian, *Anab. Alex.*, 5.15.
 713. Dewey, *Anglo-Indian Attitudes*, p. 139.
 714. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) pp. 246–7.
 715. *Ibid.* See Arrian, *Indica*, 7.
 716. See also J.H. Grose (1766) *A Voyage to the East Indies Began in 1750 with Observations Continued till 1764* (London) p. 355 and Jones, ‘Third Anniversary Discourse’, *Sir William Jones: A Reader*, p. 174.

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717. BL/MSS EUR/A205.
 718. G. Hodson (1859) *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India: Being Extracts from the Letters of the Late Major, W.S.R. Hodson* (London) p. 250.
 719. For a summary, see C. Stray (1998) *Classics Transformed: Schools, Universities and Society in England, 1830–1960* (Oxford) p. 9. (2001) ‘A Parochial Anomaly: the Classical Tripos 1822–1900’ in Stray and Smith (eds) *Teaching and Learning in Nineteenth Century Cambridge* (Cambridge) pp. 31–44. (1996) ‘Culture and Discipline: Classics and Society in Victorian England’, *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 3, 77 ff.. and (1997) ‘Thucydides or Grote? Classical Disputes and Disputed Classics in Nineteenth-Century Cambridge’, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. 127, pp. 363–72.
 720. J. Bowen (1989) ‘Education, ideology and the ruling class’, in G.W. Clarke (ed.) *Rediscovering Hellenism* (Cambridge) p. 183. Quoted in V. Larson (1999) ‘Classics and the acquisition and validation of power in Britain’s Imperial Century (1815–1914)’, *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 225.
 721. Reid (1996) ‘Cromer and the Classics’, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 7, 11, 13–15. E. Greenwood (2005) ‘We Speak Latin in Trinidad’ in B. Goff (ed.) *Classics and Colonialism* (London) pp. 65–91. See also F. Budelmann (2005) ‘Greek Tragedies in West African Adaptations’, in B. Goff (ed.) *Classics and Colonialism* (London), pp. 118–46.
 722. Elphinstone, *Journals*, 15 Jan 1815. Quoted in Colebrooke (1884) *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone* (London) vol. 1, pp. 274–5. He could already read all but the most difficult Greek poets.
 723. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 80.
 724. Lyall to his Father, 18 May 1857. BL/MSS EUR/F132, p. 3.
 725. See C. Masson *The Panjab and the Route of Alexander*, unpublished manuscript, BL/ MSS EUR/E168/ p. 67. Also (1842) *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab; Including a Residence in those Countries from 1826–1838*

- (London) vol. 1, p. 403; and (1834) 'Memoir on the Ancient Coins found at Beghram, in the Kohisan of Kabul', *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 3, no. 28, p. 157.
726. Elphinstone, *Journals*, February 1803 to October 1803. BL/MSS EUR/F88/361, p. 28 and *Journals*, 3 and 11 September. Quoted in Colebrooke *Life*, vol. 1, p. 273.
727. BL/MSS EUR/F88/178 & MSS EUR/F88/323/2.
728. For examples, consult BL/MSS EUR/F132/39, particularly the letters from Baring dated 6 November 1877 and 17 November 1878, pages 32 and 45 respectively. For Lyall's correspondence with his family see BL/MSS EUR/F132/160, letter from Alfred Lyall dated 18 November 1877.
729. 'Live, be well, go on and prosper!' From Simla, Aug. 15, 1879. BL/MSS EUR/F132/ 23, p. 156.
730. Cowley is quoted in E. Edwardes (1886) *Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes* (London) vol. 1, p. 5. H. Edwardes (1851) *A Year on the Punjab Frontier, in 1848-49* (London) and (1911) *Political Diaries of Lieutenant H.B. Edwardes, Assistant to the Resident at Lahore 1847-9* (Allahabad) pp. 13, 44, 60, 61, 101, 127.
731. BL/MSS EUR/F76/210.
732. Ibid.
733. Ibid.
734. Ibid. Virgil, *Aen.*, I.9-10. 'Why the Queen of Heaven was provoked to doom a man of such distinguished piety to struggle with a series of calamities, to encounter so many hardships.' From Various (1826) *The Works of Virgil Translated into English Prose...for the Use of Schools as well as Private Gentlemen* (London) p. 183.
735. Journal, Sept. 21 1812. Quoted in Colebrooke, *Life*, p. 270.
736. A. Burnes (1834) *Travels in Bokhara: containing the Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus* (London) containing references to Arrian or Curtius at vol. 1, pp. 2, 9, 11, 27, 31, 50, 68, 70, 78, 98, 99, 110, 112, 208, 268, and 300, and vol. 2, pp. 6, 7, 36, and 382.
737. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 49.
738. Ibid., vol. 1, p. ix.
739. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 12.
740. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 136-7.
741. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 34.
742. See Arrian, *Anab.* 7.1.6. This is a point stressed by a many Britons during the 19th century: e.g. H. Murray (1850) *The History of British India* (London) pp. 33, 35. R. N. Cust (1879) 'The Geography of the Greeks and Romans', *Calcutta Review*, vol. 72, no. 145, p. 14, and (1897) 'Obituary Notice. Sir James Abbott, K.C.B.', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 29 p. 126. Anon. (1857) 'Megasthenis Indica. Fragmenta collegit; commentationema at indices addidit. E.A. Schwnebeck, D.Phil Bonn. 1846.', *Calcutta Review*, 273, Issue 56, p. 301. In every case this seems to have been a point of identification that inspired confidence in Britain's imperial mission.
743. This conflation of Ancient Greeks and modern Britons in terms of their relation to Asia also appears in Burnes' later (1842) *Cabool: narrative of a journey to and residence in that city* (London) p. 73.
744. Burnes, *Travels in Bokhara*, vol. 2, p. 141. See also A. Burnes (1833) 'On the reputed Descendants of Alexander the Great, in the Valley of the Oxus', *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, 1, no. 18, pp. 305-7.
745. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) *The Competition Wallah* (London) p. 443.

746. Trevelyan, *The Competition Wallah*, pp. 78, 111. For a less heroic comparison of character see p. 399, where he compares British magistrates in India to 'the provincial officers of old Rome' in terms of the 'cold justice and magnificent indifference' they applied to 'sectarian squabbles'.
747. This is a point respectively underplayed and ignored by J. Mangan and P.J. Rich in otherwise excellent discussions of public school contributions to ideals and character. Alternatively see, L. Colley, *Britons: forging the nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven) pp. 167–8. Also G. Dawson (1994) *Soldier Heroes: Adventure, Empire, and the Imaging of Masculinities* (London) p. 234. Dawson claims, for instance, that Havelock's inspiration for his military exploits derived from readings of Roman military history.
748. For Macaulay's inspiration see C. Edwards (1999) 'Translating empire? Macaulay's Rome', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences* (Cambridge) p. 84.
749. B. Groseclose (1998) 'Death, Glory, Empire', in J.F. Codell and D.S. Mcleod (eds) *Orientalism Transposed: the impact of colonies on British culture* (Brookfield) pp. 191–2, pl. 9.1 for West, and Plate 9.3 for Home.
750. Curzon (1925) *British Government in India: The Story of the Viceroy and Government Houses* (London) vol. 2, p. 37. Later the names of those killed at Maharajapore and Punnar in 1844 were added.
751. S. Nilsson (1968) *European Architecture in India, 1750–1850*, translated by E. George & E. Zetersten (London) pp. 25–31, especially p. 28. R.G. Irving (1981) *Indian Summer: Lutyens, Baker and Imperial Delhi* (New Haven) stresses the same point throughout: see pages 170, 195, 242, 258, 278. Also, T. Metcalfe (1989) *An Imperial Vision: Indian architecture and Britain's Raj* (Berkeley), pp. 2–3.
752. G. Macmunn (1932) *Vignettes from Indian Wars* (London) p. 61 no.s 1 & 3 (top), no.2 & no.3 (bottom) and p. 100, no.1 (bottom).
753. W.W. Hunter (1890) *Rulers of India: The Marquess of Dalhousie* (Oxford) p. 84.
754. G.R. Elsmie, (1908) *Thirty-Five Years in the Punjab: 1858–1893* (Edinburgh) p. 273.
755. Arnold Burrowes 'excerpt from Bombay Courier' *Calcutta Gazette*, 21 February 1799. Printed in W.S. Seton-Karr (ed.) (1987) *Calcutta Gazettes* vol. 4 (Calcutta) p. 164.
756. George Forrest (ed.) *Selections from the Letters and Despatches and Other State Papers preserved by the Military Department of the Government of India 1857–8*, vol. 1, (Calcutta) p. 7.
757. C. Allen (2001) *Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the Northwest Frontier* (London) p. 11.
758. P.S. Lumsden and G.R. Elsmie (1899) *Lumsden of the Guides: A Sketch of the Life of Lieut.-Gen. Sir Harry Burnett Lumsden, K.C.S.I., C.B* (London) p. 196. H. Daly (1905) *Memoirs of General Sir Henry Dermot Daly, G.C.B., C.I.E., sometime commander of Central India Horse, Political Assistant for Western Malwa, etc. etc.* (London) p. 366. Hodson, *Twelve Years*, p. 202. G.B. Malleson (1898) *History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857–8* (London), commencing from the close of the second volume of Sir John Kaye's *History of the Sepoy War* Vol. II (London, 1879) dedication. R.M. Martin (1858) *The Indian Empire* (New York) vol. 2, p. 118. G.A. Henty, *In Times of Peril* (London) p. 108.
759. H.B. Edwards (1858) *A Year on the Punjab Frontier in 1848–9* (London) vol. 1, p. 235.
760. Anon., 'Megasthenis Indica', pp. 276, 301, 275, 302.
761. G.O. Trevelyan (1864) 'Letters from a Competition Wallah: Letter IX', *MacMillan's Magazine*, vol. 9, p. 290.

762. Odysseus' son Telemachus, executed his mother Penelope's maids for dallying with the suitors that had improperly wooed her in Odysseus' absence. Homer, *Odyssey*, 22.500–29.
763. Anon. (1840) 'The Dinner to Lord Keane', *The Friend of India*, vol. 6, no. 302, pp. 657–8.
764. C. Dewey (1993) *Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The Mind of the Indian Civil Service* (London) p. 1.
765. P. Vasunia, (2009) 'Greek, Latin, and the Indian Civil Service', in J. Hallet and C. Stray (eds) *British Classics Outside England: The Academy and Beyond* (Waco) pp. 87, 91.
766. BL/MSS EUR/F76/210.
767. I. Hurst (2006) *Victorian Women Writers and the Classics: the feminine of Homer* (Oxford) p. 2.
768. Bowen, 'Education, ideology, and the ruling class', pp. 174–5.
769. W.W. Hunter (1883) *Report of the Indian Education Commission* (Calcutta) p. 256.
770. Not everyone accepted the minute, even if it did persuade the Governor General Lord William Bentinck. E.g. .T. Prinsep's response in February of 1835. Readily available in Moir and Zastoupil (eds) (1999) *The Great Indian Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist–Anglicist Controversy, 1781–1843* (Richmond) pp. 174–88.
771. H.B. Edwardes, *Political Diaries of Lieutenant H.B. Edwardes, Assistant to the Resident at Lahore 1847–9* (Allahabad) p. 127.
772. S. Sathianadhan (1893) *Four Years in an English University* (Madras) p. 74.
773. N. Das (1852–3) 'Appendix N: Hooghly College Essays', *Great Britain Parliamentary Papers*, 32, pp. 594–5. Quoted in Edwards, 'Translating Empire', p. 85.
774. V. Shastin (1885) 'Progress in India', *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 44, pp. 801–2, 805. See also (1886) 'Hinduism by a Hindu', *The Library Magazine*, vol. 7, n.s., p. 97.
775. R.C. Dutt (1903) *Lake of Palms: a story of Indian Domestic Life*, second edition (London) pp. 38, 58, 210 and (1900) *The Civilization of India* (London) pp. 16, 22, 25, 27, 31, 34, 49, 53, 55, 93.
776. D.R. Bhandarkar (1919) *Lectures on the Ancient History of India on the Period from 650 to 325 BC* (Calcutta) p. 9.
777. D. Cannadine (2001) *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire* (Oxford).
778. Reid, 'Cromer and the Classics', pp. 14–17.
779. F. Budelmann (2005) 'Greek Tragedies in West African Adaptations', in B. Goff (ed.) *Classics and Colonialism* (London) pp. 118–19. E. Greenwood (2005) 'We Speak Latin in Trinidad' in B. Goff (ed.) *Classics and Colonialism* (London) p. 70 and more comprehensively in (2010) *Afro-Greeks: Dialogues Between Anglophone Caribbean Literature and Classics in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford).
780. Dutt, *Lake of Palms*, p. 204.
781. Compare J.A. Hobson (1902) *Imperialism* (London) pp. 365–6.

Conclusion

782. 'London, January 9m, *Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle*, iss. 223, 16 January 1804, p. 2.
783. Sir Edward Cook (1919) *More Literary Recreations* (London) p. 42.
784. N. Vance (1999) 'Decadence and the subversion of empire', in C. Edwards (ed.) *Roman Presences: Receptions of Rome in European Culture 1789–1945* (Cambridge) p. 121.

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