# Government and Politics in Africa

Fourth Edition

William Tordoff

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

Also by William Tordoff

ASHANTI UNDER THE PREMPEHS, 1888–1935
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TANZANIA
POLITICS IN ZAMBIA (*editor and co-author*)
ADMINISTRATION IN ZAMBIA (*editor and co-author*)
THIRD WORLD POLITICS: A Comparative Introduction (*with Paul Cammack and David Pool*)
VOTES AND BUDGETS: Comparative Studies in Accountable Governance in the South (*co-editor with John Healey*)

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA

FOURTH EDITION

WILLIAM TORDOFF

palgrave
macmillan

For
Vanessa, Luke and Alice
Nicole and Jacob

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Preface and Acknowledgements

I decided initially to take the first year of the new millennium as the cut-off date for this fourth edition of *Government and Politics in Africa*. However, as fresh events unfolded in 2001, particularly in the wake of the 11 September tragedy, I extended this date selectively to cover such important issues as the developed world's response to the African predicament: to its poverty, debt and marginalisation in the global economy.

This revised and updated edition follows the format of the earlier editions, except that the former Chapter 8 on 'Revolutionary Movements and Former Revolutionary Regimes' is now omitted and replaced by a new chapter on 'Political Liberalisation and Economic Reform', which analyses Africa's democratic prospects on the basis of the extensive empirical material provided. Issues discussed in the book include the state in relation to the market economy; women, AIDS and the policies of multinational pharmaceutical companies; the politics of patronage and corruption; international aid and the slow provision of debt relief. Increased coverage is given to North and South Africa, and key issues such as elections and land in Zimbabwe and genocide in Rwanda are fully ventilated.

As before, the help and advice which I have received from Ralph A. Young of the Department of Government, University of Manchester, has been invaluable and is greatly appreciated. I am grateful to my publisher Steven Kennedy, and to Cecily Wilson, Keith Povey and Barbara Docherty for their guidance in preparing this edition for publication, and especially to my wife Audrey for her constant support.

I am indebted to the Director of the Publications Department, World Bank, Washington, DC, for allowing me to reproduce in an amended form (at pp. 2–4) Table 1.1 on 'Basic Indicators', in *African Development Indicators, 2001. Drawn from World Bank Africa Database* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001), Table 1.1: Basic indicators, p. 5, supplemented by data extracted from Table 2.1: gross domestic product, real, p. 15.

Chapel-en-le-Frith   WILLIAM TORDOFF
High Peak, Derbyshire

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Note: Where the geographic locus of any organisation is not clear from its title, this has been indicated in brackets.

ACP	African–Caribbean–Pacific (countries)
ADEMA	Alliance for Democracy in Mali
AEF	Afrique Equatoriale Française
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [Ghana]
AG	Action Group [Nigeria]
ALC	African Liberation Committee [OAU]
AMU	African Mineworkers' Union [Northern Rhodesia/Zambia]
ANC	African National Congress [Northern Rhodesia/Zambia; South Africa]
AOF	Afrique Occidentale Française
APC	All People's Congress [Sierra Leone]
APRC	Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction [The Gambia]
ARDP	Accelerated Rural Development Programme [Botswana]
ARPS	Aborgines' Rights Protection Society [Gold Coast]
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party [Zanzibar]
AU	African Union (formerly OAU)
BAe	British Aerospace
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BNF	Botswana National Front
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi [Tanzania]
CDR	Committee of the Defence of the Revolution [Burkina Faso]
CEAO	Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CFA	Central Franc Afrique
CFAO	Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency [USA]

CNR	Conseil National de la Révolution [Burkina Faso]
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COREMO	Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPP	Convention People's Party [Gold Coast/Ghana]
CUF	Companhia União Fabril [Portugal]
DIAMANG	Angolan Diamond Company
DP	Democratic Party [Uganda]
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EAC	East African Community
EACSO	East African Common Services Organisation
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa [United Nations]
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	European Economic Community
EPLF	Eritrea People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
EU	European Union
F & CO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office [UK]
FIS	Front Islamique de Salut [Algeria]
FLING	Frente para a Libertação e Independência da Guiné Portuguesa
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale [Algeria]
FLS	Front-Line States
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertaçao de Angola
FPI	Ivorian Popular Front [Côte d'Ivoire]
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
G8	The group of eight main industrial countries
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armée [Algeria]
GNP	Gross National Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDC	Jubilee Debt Campaign
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union [dissolved 1964]
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KFL	Kenya Federation of Labour

KPU	Kenya People's Union
LDC	Less-Developed Country
LOGOSP	Local Government Support Project [Zambia]
MAP	Muslim Association Party [Gold Coast/Ghana]/
	Millennium Africa Plan
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change [Zimbabwe]
MLGH	Ministry of Local Government and Housing [Zambia]
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy [Zambia]
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MPD	Movement for Democracy Party [Cape Verde]
MPS	Patriotic Salvation Movement [Chad]
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MRN	National Resistance Movement [Mozambique]
(RENAMO)	
MRNDD	National Republican Movement for Democracy and
	Development [Rwanda]
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons,
	subsequently called the National Council of
	Nigerian Citizens
NCP	National Congress Party [Sudan]
NDC	National Democratic Congress [Ghana]
NDP	National Democratic Party [Egypt]
NDP	National Development Party [Kenya]
NEC	National Executive Committee [Tanzania *et al.*]
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NIC	Newly Industrialising Country
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NLC	National Liberation Council [Ghana]
NLM	National Liberation Movement [Gold Coast/Ghana]
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NNP	New National Party [South Africa]
NP	National Party [South Africa/ Zambia]
NPC	Northern People's Congress [Nigeria]
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Northern People's Party, New Patriotic Party
	[Gold Coast/Ghana]
NPPL	National Patriotic Party of Liberia
NUM	National Union of Mineworkers [South Africa]

NUTA	National Union of Tanganyika Workers
OAU	Organisation of African Unity [now AU]
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development [Western Industrialised States]
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress [South Africa]
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa
PAICV	Partido Africano da Independência da Cabo Verde
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné a Cabo Verde
PDC	People's Defence Committee [Ghana]
PDCI	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
PDG	Parti Démocratique Gabonais
PDG	Parti Démocratique de Guinée
PDP	People's Democratic Party [Nigeria]
PF	Polisario Front [Western Sahara]
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice [Eritrea]
PFP	Patriotic Front Party [Zimbabwe]
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council [Ghana]
PNP	People's National Party [Ghana]
POGR	President's Own Guard Regiment [Ghana]
PP	Progress Party [Ghana]
PPP	People's Progressive Party [Gambia]
PPN	Parti Progressiste Nigérien
PRGF	Poverty Reduction Growth Facility [IMF]
PS	Parti Socialiste [Senegal]
RCD	Rassemblement Constitutional Démocratique [Tunisia]
RDA	Rassemblement Démocratique Africain [French Africa]
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme [South Africa]
RDPC	Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camérounais
RENAMO	*See* MRN
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPT	Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais
RUF	Revolutionary United Front [Sierra Leone]
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADCC	Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference
SADR	Saharan/Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme [IMF]
SCOA	Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TCP	Togoland Congress Party [Gold Coast/Ghana]
TDC	Transitional District Council
TFFTU	Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions
TFL	Tanganyika Federation of Labour
UAC	United Africa Company [UK]
UAM	Union Africaine et Malgache
UDF	United Democratic Front [Malawi]
UDPM	Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien
UDV	Union Démocratique Voltaique
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UGTAN	Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire [Guinea]
UK	United Kingdom
ULGS	United Local Government Service [Botswana]
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United National Independence Party [Northern Rhodesia/Zambia]
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UP	United Party [Ghana/Zambia]
UPC	Uganda People's Congress
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance [Nigeria]
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
UPP	United People's Party [Nigeria]
UPP	United Progressive Party [Zambia]
UPS	Union Progressiste Sénégalaise
US	Union Soudanaise [French Soudan/Mali]
USA	United States of America
UWUSA	United Workers' Union of South Africa

WDC	Workers' Defence Committee [Ghana]
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZCCM	Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Changes in Country Names

Note: Throughout the text, I have used the name by which the country was known at the date relevant to the discussion. Changes of name usually occurred at independence; post-independence changes are indicated in brackets.

Present	*Pre-independence*
Benin (1975)	Dahomey
Botswana	Bechuanaland
Burundi[1]	Ruanda-Urundi
Cameroon	French Cameroons
	British Southern Cameroons[2]
Cape Verde	Cape Verde Islands
Central African Republic	Oubangui Chari
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Belgian Congo[3]
Congo, Republic of	French Congo/Congo-Brazzaville
Côte d'Ivoire[4]	Ivory Coast
Djibouti	French Territory of the Afars and Issas[5]
Equatorial Guinea	Spanish Guinea
Eritrea	Eritrea, within Ethiopia[6]
Gambia/Senegambia[7]	Gambia
Ghana	Gold Coast and British Togoland
Guinea–Bissau	Portuguese Guinea
Lesotho	Basutoland
Malagasy Republic/ Madagascar	Madagascar
Malawi	Nyasaland
Mali[8]	French Soudan
Namibia	South West Africa
Rwanda[1]	Ruanda-Urundi
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic[9]	Spanish Sahara/Western Sahara

Present	*Pre-independence*
Senegal/Senegambia[7]	Senegal
Somalia	⎰ British Somaliland
	⎱ Italian Somaliland
Somaliland[10]	northern region of Somalia
South Africa (black majority rule)[11]	South Africa (white minority rule)
Tanzania (1965)[12]	⎰ Tanganyika
	⎱ Zanzibar
Togo	French Togoland
Zambia	Northern Rhodesia
Zimbabwe	Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia

Notes

1. Ruanda-Urundi was a Belgian-administered UN trust territory which became independent in 1960 as two separate states, Rwanda and Burundi.
2. Southern Cameroons, a British-administered UN trust territory, joined the Republic of Cameroon following a plebiscite in 1961; the people of Northern Cameroons opted for integration with Nigeria.
3. Referred to as Congo-Léopoldville following independence and as Congo-Kinshasa from 1966. It was known officially as Zaire from 1971 and became the Democratic Republic of Congo when Laurent Kabila assumed power in May 1997.
4. In 1986 the Ivorian government instructed international organisations to use the French language designation in all official documents. I have used this designation to cover the period from 1986, but have retained 'Ivory Coast' prior to that date.
5. Often referred to as French Somaliland.
6. Eritrea was subject in turn to Italian colonial rule, British military administration, and Ethiopian control. The imperial regime's destruction of Eritrean autonomy after 1952 provoked armed guerrilla opposition that ended with the achievement of independence in 1993.
7. The names 'The Gambia' and 'Senegal' are retained. In 1981 the two states formed the confederation of Senegambia; this was dissolved in 1989.
8. The Mali Federation was formed by Senegal and Soudan in 1959, but survived for less than three months after being granted political independence by France in June 1960. France then recognised the separate independence of Senegal and Soudan, and the Union Soudanaise changed the name of Soudan to the Republic of Mali.
9. Also known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Its international status is still in dispute.
10. The northern region of Somalia declared itself independent as the Republic of Somaliland in 1991; the United Nations has not yet granted recognition.
11. No change in name, but a change in substance of immense importance occurred when non-racial multi-party elections in April 1994 resulted in the establishment of black majority rule.
12. The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar came into being on 26 April 1964, as a consequence of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar; the name 'United Republic of Tanzania' was officially adopted a year later.

Madeira
(Port)
Rabat
Algiers
Tunis
Mediterranean   *Sea*
Tunisia
Tripoli
Cairo
Morocco
Canary Is.
(Sp)
**Saharan Arab
Democratic
Republic
(Western Sahara)**
El Aioun
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
*Red
Sea*
Mauritania
Nouakchott
Mali
Niger
Chad
Khartoum
Eritrea
Asmara
*Cape
Verde*
Senegal
Dakar
Gambia
Banjul
Bissau
**Guinea
Bissau**
Burkina Faso
Niamey
Ouagadougou
Bamako
Nigeria
N'djamena
Sudan
Addis Ababa
Djibouti
Djibouti
Somaliland
Hargeysa
Conakry
Guinea
Freetown
Sierra Leone
Monrovia
**Côte
d'Ivoire**
Abidjan
Accra
Ghana
Lomé
Togo
Benin
Porto
Novo
Abuja
Lagos
Yapundé
Cameroon
**Central
African Republic**
Bangui
Ethiopia
Uganda
Kampala
Kenya
Nairobi
Somalia
Mogadishu
Liberia
**Equatorial
Guinea**
Malabo
Libreville
Gabon
Congo
Rwanda
São Tomé &
Principé
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
Cabinda
**Democratic
Republic
of Congo**
Burundi
Dodoma
Tanzania
Dar es Salaam
Zanzibar
Luanda
*Indian
Ocean*
Angola
Zambia
Lusaka
Lilongwe
Malawi
Harare
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Antananarivo
Namibia
Botswana
Gaborone
Windhoek
Pretoria
Maputo
Swaziland
Madagascar
South Africa
Lesotho
*Atlantic
Ocean*
Seychelles
Comoro
Madagascar
Mauritius

Political Map of Africa, 2002

1
Introduction: African Politics since Independence

Africa is a vast and diverse continent, comprising 53 independent states (see Table 1.1); this number will increase to 55 if the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and the Republic of Somaliland secure international recognition. With only a few exceptions, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa, these are 'new' states: most of them achieved independence in 1960, the *annus mirabilis* of African independence, or within a few years of that date. To lump these states together and talk about 'African politics' is somewhat misleading because there are important differences between them. There is, for example, a wide cultural gap between the North African states and the Black African states south of the Sahara. The geographic and demographic differences are often striking, as witnessed by the huge Sudan and Zaire on the one hand and the tiny Rwanda, Burundi and Swaziland on the other; within West Africa, oil-rich Nigeria – four times the size of Britain and with a population in 1999 of some 124 million – contrasts sharply with the Gambia which, with an area of just over 10,000 square kilometres and a population of approximately 1.3 million, was once (in pre-independence days) described as 'an eel wriggling its way through a slab of French territory' (Table 1.1). There is also an immense divide between stable and prosperous Botswana and states – including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan – which are torn apart by civil war and (with the partial exception of mineral-rich Angola) face economic collapse.

None the less, at independence these new African states had several things in common. First they were ex-colonial: that is, with only a few exceptions (such as Liberia) they had been subjected to rule by one or another of the colonial powers: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and South Africa in respect of Namibia. But colonial

Table 1.1 Basic Indicators

	Population mid-1999[5] (million)	Land area (thousands of square km)	GDP per capita[1] US$ million 1999	GDP per capita[1] Average annual growth (%) 1990–MRA[2]	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	School enrollment 1994–7[3] Primary	School enrollment 1994–7[3] Secondary	Total net ODA[4] per capita 1999 US$
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	642.9	23,628	359,810	2.1	50	78	27	18
excl. South Africa	600.8	22,407	195,452	2.6	49	74	21	18
excl. South Africa & Nigeria	476.9	21,497	164,500	2.5	48	67	17	23
Angola	12.4	1,247	6,422	–0.2	47	N/A	N/A	31
Benin	6.1	111	2,458	4.6	53	78	17	34
Botswana	1.6	567	5,893	4.5	46	108	65	38
Burkina Faso	11.0	274	2,936	3.6	44	40	N/A	36
Burundi	6.7	26	955	–2.4	42	51	7	11
Cameroon	14.7	465	9,640	0.5	54	85	27	30
Cape Verde	0.4	4	625	5.4	68	148	N/A	318
Central African Republic	3.5	623	1,228	1.4	44	N/A	N/A	33
Chad	7.5	1,259	1,631	1.9	48	58	10	25
Comoros	0.5	2	211	–0.3	60	75	21	39
Congo, Democratic Rep. of	49.8	2,267	6,589	–4.6	51	72	26	3
Congo, Republic of	2.9	342	2,402	–0.3	48	114	53	49
Côte d'Ivoire	14.7	318	12,235	3.2	46	71	24	30
Djibouti	0.6	23	N/A	–2.7	50	39	14	116
Equatorial Guinea	0.4	28	509	17.1	50	N/A	N/A	46
Eritrea	4.0	101	692	5.0	51	53	20	37
Ethiopia	62.8	1,000	7,045	4.1	43	43	12	10
Gabon	1.2	258	5,279	3.2	53	162	N/A	39
The Gambia	1.3	10	457	2.8	53	77	25	26
Ghana	18.9	228	7,693	4.3	60	79	N/A	32
Guinea	7.2	246	4,406	4.1	47	54	12	33

Guinea–Bissau	1.2	28	217	0.9	44	62	N/A	44
Kenya	29.4	569	9,900	2.2	51	85	24	10
Lesotho	2.1	30	1,079	4.5	55	108	31	15
Liberia	3.0	96	N/A	N/A	47	N/A	N/A	31
Madagascar	15.1	582	3,641	1.4	58	92	16	24
Malawi	10.8	94	1,688	3.6	42	134	17	41
Mali	10.9	1,220	2,964	3.3	50	49	10	32
Mauritania	2.6	1,025	1,252	3.8	54	79	16	84
Mauritius	1.2	2	4,838	5.2	71	106	65	35
Mozambique	17.3	784	3,417	5.5	45	60	7	7
Namibia	1.7	823	3,568	3.6	54	131	61	104
Niger	10.5	1,267	2,194	2.0	46	29	7	18
Nigeria	123.9	911	30,958	2.7	53	98	33	1
Rwanda	8.3	25	1,952	−2.1	41	N/A	N/A	45
São Tomé and Principe	0.1	1	49	1.7	64	N/A	N/A	190
Senegal	9.3	193	5,487	3.1	52	71	16	58
Seychelles	0.1	0	574	3.3	72	N/A	N/A	162
Sierra Leone	4.9	72	837	−4.6	37	N/A	N/A	15
Somalia	9.4	627	N/A	N/A	48	N/A	N/A	12
South Africa	42.1	1,221	164,369	1.6	63	133	94	13
Sudan	29.0	2,376	9,161	7.6	55	51	21	8
Swaziland	1.0	17	1,421	3.1	56	117	54	28
Tanzania	32.9	884	6,197	2.9	47	67	5	30
Togo	4.6	54	1,493	1.9	49	120	27	16
Uganda	21.5	200	7,458	7.1	42	74	12	27
Zambia	9.9	743	3,841	0.2	43	89	27	63
Zimbabwe	11.9	387	8,366	2.9	51	112	49	21
NORTH AFRICA	135.5	5,738	208,087	3.1	68	100	64	19
Algeria	30.0	2,382	46,995	1.2	71	108	63	3
Egypt, Arab Republic	62.4	995	74,610	4.3	67	101	75	25
Libya	5.4	1,760	N/A	N/A	70	N/A	N/A	1
Morocco	28.2	446	38,387	2.3	67	86	39	24
Tunisia	9.5	155	22,600	4.7	72	118	65	26
ALL AFRICA	778.4	29,367	568,198	2.4	54	80	34	18

Notes overleaf

Notes to Table 1.1

1 I have used gross domestic product (GDP) rather than gross national product (GNP) figures in this table. GDP is calculated from national data and facilitates cross-country comparisons and the analysis of trends for individual countries. GNP, which is used by the United Nations for comparative purposes, comprises GDP adjusted for changes in international terms of trade and is subject to exchange rate fluctuations. The figures for 1999 GDP are expressed at 1995 prices.

2 MRA: most recent year for which figures are available.

3 Primary school enrollment is the ratio of children of all ages enrolled in primary school to the population of children of primary school age. Gross enrollment exceeds 100 per cent where pupils are younger or older than the country's standard range of primary school age. Secondary school enrollment is the ratio of children of all ages enrolled in secondary schools to the population of children of secondary school age. In respect of both primary and secondary schooling, the definition of school age differs between countries, but is most commonly considered to be 6 to 11 years for primary, and 12 to 17 years for secondary education.

4 ODA: Official Development Assistance.

5 All 1999 data are preliminary (i.e. not fully confirmed figures).
   N/A: not available.

Sources: *African Development Indicators, 2001. Drawn from World Bank Africa Database* (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001), Tables 1.1: Basic indicators, p. 5, and 2.1: Gross domestic product, real, p. 15.

rule was brief (often less than a hundred years) and these new states were also old societies, with a pre-colonial history of their own. Second, they were searching for a new identity as nation-states. At independence, they acquired statehood and, as members of the UN, international recognition, but (with very few exceptions such as Botswana) the task remained of welding into a nation a variety of different peoples, speaking different languages and at different stages of social and political development. Nowhere was this task more demanding than in Nigeria, which has been aptly described as 'the linguistic crossroads of Africa'. Third, these states were mostly poor, predominantly rural and over-dependent on the vagaries of the world market. Any benefits which they received from foreign aid, for example, might be swiftly eroded if the terms of trade turned against them through a fall in the price which they received for their primary produce. The leaders of many of these states, therefore, sought to diversify the economy away from reliance on a single cash crop or mineral product (for example, Ghana on cocoa, Senegal and the Gambia on groundnuts, and Zambia on copper). However, in trying to industrialise they faced immense problems: of technology and manpower, of the cost of imported machinery, and marketing. Moreover, in the West industrialisation took place before full democratic practices were introduced into the political process, and this meant that resources were available to meet the most pressing demands of the workers as they became enfranchised.[1] In Africa, as in Asia and the Caribbean, there was no such time-lag: universal franchise was granted just before, at, or immediately after independence, before economic policies could even be formulated. The expectations of the electorate, heightened by promises made during the independence struggle, far exceeded any government's capacity to provide.

In the fourth place, the newly independent states had an unsettled political culture. Not only had the political leadership next to no experience of operating a governmental system on a national scale, but the institutions (such as parties, parliaments and civil services) through which they had to work were also relatively new and weak. Thus, with the exception of Liberia's True Whig Party, which was formed in 1860 as the Whig Party, political parties were mostly post-1945 creations; they therefore lacked the political experience of the Indian Congress Party. The weakness of the inherited institutions was serious because the private sector was underdeveloped and the state itself had to assume a major entrepreneurial role. The result was an increase in the number of public enterprises and in bureaucratic power, and a further widening of the elite–mass gap, with educated, mostly urbanised elites existing side by side with conservative and often illiterate chiefs and villagers. Finally, in the international context, the new

states were no match, either diplomatically or militarily, for the developed states; in the 1960s especially, most francophone states took shelter under the wing of the former metropolitan power. It was only in the next decade that the oil weapon gave a few states a significant economic, and therefore diplomatic, leverage.

And so one could go on, adding to the list of common characteristics of the new African states and pointing to shared problems. Of course, these common characteristics masked important differences. In relation to the industrialised Western countries, the new African states were indeed poor; but, as between themselves, some were much better off than others (the Ivory Coast was better off than neighbouring Upper Volta, for example). There were also often glaring disparities between one part of a country and another: for instance, between Zambia's line-of-rail and outlying rural provinces, and between Nigeria's northern region and the two (after 1963, three) southern regions; these disparities underlined the differential impact of capitalist penetration during the colonial era. There were differences between the states in manpower terms: in this respect, West Africa was much better off than East Africa; educationally, there was almost a genera-tion gap between them. Mainland Tanzania, like Zambia, faced independ-ence with barely a hundred graduates and a totally inadequate number of secondary-school leavers; but both states were better off than Angola and Mozambique, though less so than Zimbabwe. Finally, despite the brief span of colonial rule and the fact that being 'ex-colonial' is obviously a dwindling distinction the further one moves away from independence, colonialism has left a deep imprint on the new states of Africa. Thus, there are important differences in the system and style of administration between (say) fran-cophone and anglophone Africa, so that a Ghanaian civil servant, trained in the British tradition, would feel more at home in distant Kenya or Botswana than in nearby Senegal, Guinea or the Côte d'Ivoire (the Ivory Coast until 1986, when the Ivorian government instructed the international organisa-tions to use the French language designation in all official documents). Moreover, as I have suggested, some of the differences arising from the colonial legacy were reproduced in the external sphere, with ex-French colonies tending to maintain closer ties with France than ex-British colonies did with Britain.

It might be objected that what have been depicted as characteristics of the new states at independence were not peculiar to those states, but were shared by some of the developed states also. This is true, regional imbal-ances in a country's economy being a case in point. The main difference lay in degree – the greater severity of these problems in the new states – and especially in the concentration of these problems. If it is accepted that such

features were common characteristics (subject to the *caveat* that they masked important underlying differences), we must ask next: what has happened since independence? Obviously, a great deal for as Pliny, the Elder, said: 'There is always something new out of Africa' (*Ex Africa semper aliquid novi*). Since we are faced with so much that is new in African politics, I identify a number of trends, concentrating first on the twenty-odd years following independence.

An obvious trend, in most of Africa in the 1960s, was the move away from pluralism towards the centralisation of power in the hands of a single party. By the early 1970s few countries retained multi-party systems and, with the odd exception (such as Botswana and the Gambia), we had – as political scientists – to talk in terms of competition within the single-party system rather than of competition between parties. There were, of course, important differences between one-party systems: how they came into being; whether they rested on a *de facto* or *de jure* basis; whether they had a strong ideological base, as in Guinea, or a weak one, as in Kenya; whether they made provision for inner-party democracy, as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) did in Tanzania and the Convention People's Party (CPP) in Ghana increasingly did not. It should, of course, be noted that this trend was reversed from the mid-1970s with the restoration, following military withdrawal, of multi-party politics in Ghana and Nigeria in 1979 and, to a more limited extent, with new constitutional and political experiments in the francophone states of Senegal and Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso). From the late 1980s the popular demand for an end to one-party rule and the institution of competitive multi-party politics became well-nigh universal; I return to this issue below.

A second and related trend was not only for power to be centralised in a single party, but also for it be personalised in the hands of the party leader, who became state president. This phenomenon, referred to by one Zambian minister as the 'divine right of presidents', carried obvious disadvantages: sometimes, as in Ghana between 1960 and 1966 and in Malawi under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, it meant the heavy concentration of powers in the president's own office, to the detriment of other ministries; the virtual monopoly of policy-making by the president, without adequate consideration of alternative policies, and the elevation of the president's own thought into the official ideology. Furthermore (the cases of Kenya, Senegal, Cameroon and Tanzania notwithstanding) it carried the danger of succession crises which, as Morris-Jones has pointed out, 'are the moments of truth in a political system's life'.[2] On the other hand in new state conditions, immediately after independence, the personalisation of power may have had advantages where an exceptional leader with charismatic qualities held

office – Julius Nyerere in Tanzania is an obvious example. In the pre-independence period, Nyerere – like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Ahmed Sékou Touré in Guinea – emerged as a charismatic leader, not only because he possessed those 'exceptional powers or qualities' which (according to Weber) anyone with charismatic authority must have, but also because the message of freedom which he conveyed was relevant and meaningful within the prevailing social context. It can be argued that Nyerere retained his appeal after independence because he realised that charisma must be socially validated; in practical terms, this meant that he was able to assess the changing social situation and adapt himself and his policies to it.[3] However, even he came to display authoritarian tendencies in insisting, for example, on the pursuit of a rural development policy based on *ujamaa* (village socialism) long after it had failed economically.

Authoritarianism, coupled with lack of accountability and transparency, and with corruption and political manipulation, were marked characteristics of African one-party regimes in the post-independence period. They were features of the patronage politics which everywhere prevailed and which a perceptive leader, such as Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, could check but not control. The weakness of the private sector meant that state economic management was dominant and provided state personnel with the opportunity to abuse their office, enrich themselves and benefit their supporters.[4]

A third trend, also related though not confined to one-partyism, was the espousal of some form of socialism. In the 1960s, the range among African states in this regard was very wide, thereby underlining the fact that socialism was a loose concept in Africa and subject to varying interpretations. It usually had nationalist overtones, and many African leaders would have agreed with Aimé Césaire, the West Indian who was influential in the intellectual circles of francophone Africa, when he said in resigning from the French Communist Party in 1956: 'What I want is Marxism and Communism to be placed in the service of the black peoples and not the black peoples in the service of Marxism and Communism.'[5]

In fact, few African leaders were orthodox Marxists. They rejected key tenets of Marxist orthodoxy, such as the notion of the class struggle, and adapted Marxist and other ideas to suit African conditions. We are, said Nyerere, 'groping our way forward towards socialism', but he warned of the danger 'of being bemused by this new theology'.[6] Of course, there were other African leaders, such as the Ivory Coast's Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who did not draw on Marxism at all, and some who, under the broad umbrella of African socialism, pursued (as in Kenya and Senegal) capitalist-type policies. Some states, including many of those under military rule, either shunned ideology or rested on a weak ideological base.

In the immediate post-independence period, most African leaders stressed the 'social responsibility' dimension of socialism, pointing (for example) to the social obligation to work and the need to convert labour unions from consumptionist to productionist associations.[7] From about the mid-1960s, they also emphasised the economic aspects of socialism by taking under public ownership and control import–export houses, mines and industries, banks and insurance companies, farms and other properties; these enterprises were predominantly foreign-owned. It is as well to remember, however, that such measures were taken by states, such as military-ruled Ghana and Uganda, which did not claim to be socialist as well as by states such as Tanzania, whose rulers did pursue broadly socialist strategies.

Further changes took place in the 1970s, though their effect was not everywhere to reverse the earlier trend towards an eclectic brand of African socialism. These resulted from the emergence in several states of a more orthodox form of Marxist socialism than had previously existed, except perhaps in Guinea in the late 1960s. Thus, revolutionary regimes emerged in Guinea–Bissau, Angola and Mozambique following protracted wars of independence, and in Somalia, Ethiopia and the People's Republics of Benin, Congo and Madagascar following military *coups*. These regimes shared a commitment to Marxist–Leninist principles, but differed in the way in which they set about the task of socialist transformation.

A fourth post-independence trend, which was observable in many states before the rash of military *coups*, was the progressive decline of the party as the centre of power and decision-making and the corresponding rise of the bureaucracy. Thus Aristide Zolberg, in *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa*, referred to 'a common tendency toward the emergence of regimes in which governmental and administrative structures are at least as salient as parties'. Writing in 1966, he pointed to the emergence of the administrative state, with the party reduced to a symbolic role.[8] His argument was on the whole valid, but exaggerated in some cases. In Guinea the party was not eclipsed by the state structure, but existed in parallel to it, subsuming it at the lower levels. In the Ivory Coast the governmental bureaucracy was pre-eminent, but by 1971 the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) had stemmed, if not reversed, 'the trend … toward inanition' which Immanuel Wallerstein, as well as Zolberg, detected generally in West Africa. Some seven years later, Donal Cruise O'Brien found Senegal's ruling party – the Union Progressiste Sénégalaise (UPS), renamed the Parti Socialiste (PS) in December 1976 – to be 'a remarkably efficient organization in its own unedifying way' and 'quite a formidable agency of national political power'.[9]

What is certain is that the ruling party nowhere became the mobilising agent projected at independence. Sometimes this was because the political leadership turned purposely to the administration, rather than the party, as the 'agent of development'. This happened in Kenya, where the party organs tended to atrophy through lack of use. It happened to some extent, too, though not intentionally, in Tanzania and Zambia. In Tanzania, bureaucratic dominance at regional and district levels was not thereby reduced and may even have been increased as a result of 'decentralisation' measures introduced in 1972. In Zambia, also, the bureaucracy rather than the ruling party increasingly spearheaded the development effort in the Second Republic. Again, the Partido Africano da Indepêndencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea–Bissau was ill-equipped to play a mobilising role and its growing weakness was one of the main reasons for the November 1980 military *coup*. In Senegal, too, the PS was effective as an agent of control and patronage, but it was not a machine designed for mass mobilisation.[10]

Another post-independence trend was the supplanting of civilian governments by military regimes in a large number of African states. Why did the military intervene? Why did it intervene in some states, but not in others? As I show in Chapter 7, sometimes the military, as the custodian of the national interest, intervened to save the country from corrupt and inefficient politicians; in others, it intervened to safeguard its own interest against a rival force being created by the President; and in others again it had political objectives. A common feature of the *coups* was the ease with which they were executed, often by only a small force of men. Most did not involve any fundamental restructuring of society, though this pattern was sometimes broken where revolutionary military regimes were established, as in Ethiopia and Somalia. The change was generally a change at the top – in the elite running the country – rather than 'a change in the class content of power'.[11] The military proscribed political party activity (though subsequently often establishing a party of its own) and found new allies among civil servants, chiefs and professional groups (as in Ghana under the National Liberation Council – NLC – between 1966 and 1969), but life in the village went on substantially as it had done before the *coup*.

On assuming power, the military sometimes promised that it would yield to a civilian government and withdraw to the barracks once constitutional integrity had been restored, corruption eliminated, and the economy revived. The military did in fact withdraw in a number of cases, including Ghana in 1969 and 1979 and Nigeria in 1979; sometimes, however, the military withdrew only to return, often within a short period of time, as in Dahomey (now Benin) on several occasions, Sudan in 1969, Ghana in 1972 and 1981, and Nigeria in 1983. From the mid-1960s, the nature of military *coups*

seemed to alter, with the soldiers coming to stay for long periods. The tendency in francophone Africa was for the incumbent military regime to seek to legitimatise its rule by forming a political party and then holding presidential and parliamentary elections. Though multi-party elections and a competitive presidential election were held in Upper Volta in 1978, elections in such states until the 1990s were normally of the plebiscitary type at which the electorate massively endorsed the regime's right to rule; Mali in 1979 afforded a good example of this process. Despite their civilian garb, these remained essentially military regimes.

Another post-independence trend in African politics was the move away from federal and quasi-federal systems of government to unitary structures; Nigeria, under civilian rule, and the Sudan after 1972, were the only important exceptions to this pattern. Thus the federal elements in the independence constitutions of Ghana and Kenya were removed in 1959 and 1964 respectively; a francophone-dominated unitary state was established in Cameroon against the wishes of the anglophone provinces; French West and French Equatorial Africa did not survive as quasi-federal apparatuses; the Mali Federation collapsed in 1960; and Buganda's federal relationship with the rest of Uganda was ended forcibly in 1966. The feeling was widespread that federal and quasi-federal constitutional arrangements would encourage sub-nationalist sentiments and render more difficult the daunting task of achieving national integration. As part of the colonial legacy, many African states faced this problem of sub-nationalism: the problem of widespread, popular attachment to a unit (whether tribally, linguistically or regionally defined) which was within, but not coterminous with, the boundaries of the new state. Thus there was the problem posed by (among others) the Ashanti in Ghana, Baganda in Uganda, anglophones in Cameroon, Eritreans in Ethiopia, Katangese in Zaire, Ibos in Nigeria, Southern Sudanese in Sudan, Lozi in Zambia, and Ndebele in Zimbabwe. Where the problem was solved and the integrity of the state maintained, different means were utilised: by mainly constitutional amendment in Ghana, the Sudan and Zambia, by periodic repression in Cameroon, by force in Zaire and Nigeria, and by a mixture of constitutionalism and force in Uganda and Zimbabwe. The Sudan was one of the very few African states where, following the agreement reached at Addis Ababa in February 1972 between the central government and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM: the recently formed political arm of the Anya-Nya insurgents), representative assemblies and governments were created at a level intermediate between the centre and the locality. Unfortunately, this agreement failed to bring political stability and economic development to the Southern Region and broke down in 1983, plunging the country again into civil war.

As discussed in Chapter 8, in recent years sub-national groups were stimulated into activity by the democratic process and made demands for independence or greater autonomy that state governments had to accommodate or resist. Examples include Zanzibari pressure for greater regional autonomy in Tanzania; the post-1991 experiment in ethnic federalism in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime's acceptance of Eritrean secession; and the anchoring of South Africa's constitution to a layer of potentially strong regional governments. However, until the 1980s and beyond, most states shied away from such sweeping decentralisation measures and, as in Zambia in 1968–9 and Tanzania in 1972, introduced what really amounted to a deconcentration of administrative authority, whereby civil servants working in central government ministries were posted to the field and given enhanced powers. The Ivory Coast, and indeed most of francophone Africa, retained a French-style prefectoral system.[12]

Another post-independence trend was more socio-economic than political, but had wide political repercussions and gave rise to several very important problems: this was the drift to the towns in many African states, leading to the growth (as in Zambia and Nigeria) of sprawling, insanitary shanty-towns around the main urban centres, and the increase in the number of school-leavers, educated at least to the primary-school level, for whom jobs were not available because the economy could not expand fast enough to absorb the rising school output. Thus, in Botswana, the stark facts at independence in 1966 were that only about three out of every ten primary school-leavers could hope either to find salaried jobs within the country or to obtain further training or education; the remainder had to find employment in the rural economy or enlist for work in South Africa. Hence the attempt made in Botswana, Tanzania, Mali and elsewhere to develop an educational system more relevant to the needs of predominantly rural societies. In many states, too, despite the increasing emphasis given to rural development, the rural–urban gap widened after independence and regional imbalances in the economy grew. In Tanzania, President Nyerere's government adopted equalisation measures: it imposed severe restrictions on private enterprise and, by taxation and in other ways, clipped the privileged wings of the political leadership and state bureaucracy. The result was not to halt the process of class formation, which was the inevitable corollary of modern education and public employment, but to prevent the ruling class (the 'bureaucratic' or 'managerial' bourgeoisie) from consolidating its power at the expense of other emergent classes. The Tanzanian experience contrasted sharply with that of Nigeria, where the dominant class was committed to capitalist development in alliance with multinational oil companies and private investors and quickly consolidated its power.[13]

A final trend – among others which could be isolated for comment – was the determination of African states to pursue an independent foreign policy. Aware of their weak bargaining power, several states tried to form regional political unions, but little came of such attempts; the 1959 union between Senegal and the French Soudan to form the Republic of Mali was a notable example of such failure. Regional functional organisations, founded primarily for economic purposes, fared better, while the continent-wide Organisation of African Unity (OAU) survived despite its financial and other weaknesses. Many states sought to widen their trading links and diversify their sources of foreign aid away from the former colonial power, often in favour of middle-ranking powers such as Canada and Sweden. Such changes in trade and aid patterns did not of course end the external economic dependency of African states. Take Mali – the former French Soudan – for example: though it developed important diplomatic and military links with the Soviet Union, France remained easily the most important of its trading partners and, through the control of cotton, still dominated the Malian economy.[14] Even revolutionary regimes, such as those in Angola and Mozambique, could not seriously contemplate short-term disengagement from the world capitalist economy; Angola was dependent on oil revenues and had therefore to work with the multinational oil companies, while Mozambique remained dependent on the regional sub-system, centring on South Africa. Such stark facts led some scholars to conclude that socialism in one state could achieve little and that world revolution must precede any meaningful transition to socialism. Yet continuing external dependency, as well as unfavourable geographical position and internal economic weakness, did not prevent African states from vigorously asserting their national interest, resisting foreign interference, and/or upholding revolutionary principle. This was shown when Zambia took majority control of the copper companies in 1969–70 against the wishes of the multinationals concerned, Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in 1976 at enormous cost to itself, and Nigeria nationalised British Petroleum (BP) holdings in 1979 in protest against the company's dealings in South Africa. Such incidents served to reinforce the conclusion reached by Richard L. Sklar that:

> The idea of foreign domination by proxy, through the medium of a clientele or puppetised upper class, is controverted by a large body of evidence. In many post-colonial and newly developing countries, governments, businessmen, and leaders of thought regularly defy the demands and frustrate the desires of their counterparts in the industrial countries.[15]

Sad confirmation of this fact was given in November 1995 when General Abacha's military regime resisted international pleas for clemency and executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni rights activists in Nigeria.

African states joined Caribbean and Pacific countries in negotiating a series of aid and trade conventions with the European Economic Community (EEC) and, together with other Third World countries, presented a 'Third World' view at international forums such as the general assembly of the UN and at various meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The oil weapon strengthened the diplomatic bargaining power of oil-rich African states such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria in the 1970s and enabled Angola to survive a costly civil war; however, it seriously disadvantaged non-oil, and especially poorer, states which faced enormous increases in the cost of importing petroleum products and manufactured goods.

More Recent Changes[16]

During the 1980s, especially in the latter part of the decade and the early 1990s, important changes took place which promised to reverse substantially two of the earlier political processes, namely those leading to the adoption of socialist strategies of development and one-party rule. These tended to be closely linked processes of change: economic crisis and the social problems caused by rising unemployment reinforced the demand for political change and led to the rejection of socialism in favour of elements of a capitalist system. The feeling was widespread by the latter 1980s that economic revival was dependent on getting rid of authoritarian, corrupt and inefficient one-party regimes and that only a multi-party system of government could halt Africa's downward economic spiral. 'We can't do anything in the economic field until we change the political field', said Nguza Karl-i-Bond, leader of the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans, an opposition party in Zaire.[17] The move to effect political and economic change was notably widespread. On the political front protracted strikes and huge demonstrations, and in francophone Africa national political conferences also, were held to demand multi-party elections, the removal of incumbent presidents, and democratic government. Additional pressure for 'good government' began to be applied in 1989–90 by Western governments and the World Bank which, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), also continued to insist on economic liberalisation measures as the price of their assistance.

In francophone Africa, Senegal's experience from 1976 showed that the advent of a multi-party system of government did not necessarily result in

the ruling party's loss of control. This possibly encouraged the introduction of comparable experiments in other parts of Africa, including Algeria and Tunisia in North Africa, Gabon in Central Africa, and the Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa. However, since no change of government was involved in Senegal, it was the events in the Republic of Benin leading to the removal of the dictatorial regime of Mathieu Kérékou in March 1991 which had the greatest impact on contemporary African politics. Incumbent Presidents in francophone Africa – for example, Paul Biya in Cameroon, Denis Sassou-Nguesso in the Congo, Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, and Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar – made political concessions in the hope of saving their skins.[18] Though the device of the national conference was not used, strong demands for democratic political change were also made by opposition groups elsewhere in Africa. Events in Zambia paralleled those in Benin. President Kenneth Kaunda and the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) were swept aside in remarkably 'free and fair' presidential and parliamentary elections in October 1991. Frederick Chiluba, the former head of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions and leader of the victorious Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), was sworn in as Zambia's second president.[19]

In the early 1990s new democratic constitutions were under preparation in Nigeria and Uganda, though with a disappointing outcome in the first state and an uncertain outcome in the second, and multi-party elections were held in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. Dramatic change occurred in South Africa, where the results of the April 1994 general election signalled the end of 350 years of white domination. Political change also occurred in ex-Portuguese Africa, most importantly in Mozambique and Angola; both countries decided to abandon one-party rule and to renounce their commitment to Marxism–Leninism. In Central Africa the wily Mobutu still clung to power in Zaire, which was the reluctant host to over a million refugees from war-torn Rwanda. Malawi, which had itself suffered from a massive influx of refugees from Mozambique, presented a happier picture: presidential and parliamentary elections in May 1994 brought to an end the dictatorial regime of Dr Hastings Banda and the Malawi Congress party (MCP). In Algeria and Tunisia, in North Africa, the process of democratic reform was begun in the late 1980s. However, in both countries and in Morocco Islamic fundamentalist groups posed a serious threat to national unity, as they had done earlier in Egypt, where Mohammed Husni Mubarak's assumption of the presidency in October 1981 led to a gradual process of political liberalisation.

Alongside these almost continent-wide moves towards political pluralism, economic liberalisation measures were being undertaken. Countries of

varying ideological commitment – African capitalist states such as the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria, and states of a socialist orientation ranging from Algeria, Ghana and Tanzania to Angola, the Congo and Mozambique – adopted elements of a market economy, introduced more liberal investment laws, and took steps to overhaul and often to privatise inefficient public enterprises.[20] As will be seen, the results overall were disappointing, especially in those states – including Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone – torn apart in the 1990s by intense faction-fighting under rival warlords. Such 'broken-backed' states – and also states like Zaire, which was financially bankrupt and riddled with corruption – were described as 'shadow states' by William Reno.[21] A shadow state is characterised by 'the near total decay of formal state institutions' and by the rulers' adoption of a survival strategy, whereby they manipulate informal markets in their own and their followers' interests. Thus in Mobutu's Zaire some leaders were absorbed into a private illicit trading network: approximately half of the country's coffee crop was smuggled. Much the same occurred in Sierra Leone (Reno's main case-study), where the rulers went into partnership with illicit diamond producers and smugglers. It is to be noted, however, that some of these practices also occurred in non-shadow states: in Senegal officials developed mutually beneficial ties to a groundnut clientèle, while smuggling was rampant in Benin, accounting for 90 per cent of its trade. This was indicative of a profound malaise still afflicting a majority of African states, namely the persistence of the post-independence pattern of personal and patrimonial rule, whereby the ruling elite continued to milk the state in its own interests. The expectation of the World Bank and other reforming institutions was that the effect of privatisation would be to reduce the economic role of the state, thus undermining patronage politics and strengthening the democratic process.

The Study of Development

It remains to end this introduction by discussing different approaches to the study of development. After outlining the modernisation school and the 'development of underdevelopment school',[22] I draw attention to sophisticated and more traditional deductive methodologies. I also refer to alternative approaches which, though limited in their application, are more conducive than any grand theory to a better understanding of development in individual African states.

The predominantly American modernisation school blossomed in the mid-1950s and owed much to Marion Levy, Talcott Parsons and ultimately

to Max Weber. Strongly behavioural, it was the product of a search for a comparative approach to politics that was extended to the developing areas and was conducted with the aid of various models, including structural functionalism and systems theory. Among its central concerns were problems of democracy and institutional stability, and cultural problems such as those arising from the highly uneven impact of processes of national integration. Its early 'African' exponents included James Coleman, David Apter and Aristide Zolberg. This school had behind it much of the weight of the American academic establishment and, having been well financed, resulted in a considerable literature (including the Princeton Political Development series) on the post-colonial states in Africa and other regions of the Third World. It was criticised for inculcating Western and non-traditional values and for not giving sufficient weight to the socio-economic basis of society: specifically, modernisation theorists said little about the role of economic forces, the emerging patterns of class formation, and class conflict. The school was also subject to criticism and revision from within. One leading revisionist was Samuel Huntington, who maintained that rapid modernisation led to the weakening of political institutions and that the latter could not sustain the heavy demands placed on them by mass, mobilised and increasingly literate electorates in the post-independence era. His solution was to strengthen key political institutions and the instruments of control, and to slow down popular mobilisation by increasing the number and complexity of political institutions, limiting or reducing communications in society, and minimising competition among segments of the elite by, for example, adopting the one-party system of government.[23]

The founder of contemporary underdevelopment theory, whose origins went back to Marx and Lenin, was Paul Baran; his *Political Economy of Growth* was published in 1957. More internationally diverse than the modernisation school, its exponents included André Gunder Frank, Celso Furtado, James Petras and Fernando Henrique Cardoso for Latin America, and Frantz Fanon, Samir Amin, Walter Rodney and John Saul for Africa. They placed a common emphasis on economic-based patterns such as modes of production, social formations and class conflict, and saw colonialism as essentially exploitative. The theory traced the unequal relations between the Third World and the expanding capitalist economy and argued that from the outset the latter benefited at the expense of the former.[24]

Among the merits of underdevelopment theory was that it offered a compelling explanation of the continuing predicament of underdevelopment; it was better able than (say) structural–functionalism to capture the dynamics of the political process. However, this school could also be challenged on a number of grounds. For instance, its exponents both neglected the cultural

aspects of development and, as Sklar has pointed out, underestimated the nationalism of members of the 'managerial' bourgeoisie.[25] However, like the modernisation school, the underdevelopment school did not constitute a closed system. Two strongly contrasting viewpoints were to be found within it: the first, represented by André Gunder Frank, denied the possibility of capitalist development in the periphery and the second, represented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, focused explicitly on the process of such development and showed how it differed from 'classic' capitalist development. In due course, this debate was transferred to Africa: in 1980 Colin Leys and Rafael Kaplinsky addressed themselves to the same issues in relation to Kenya; Leys and several other scholars adopted essentially the same perspective as was embraced earlier by Cardoso and others writing on Latin America.[26]

Such substantial revisions of modernisation and underdevelopment theories were made from within each school that the original theories no longer had much utility. From the outset, commented John Lonsdale, there was 'too much theory chasing too little empirical data': 'The behavioural circularities of modernization theory ... were as difficult to *use* as have been, more recently, the market determinisms of underdevelopment theory – which perhaps explains their incandescent brevities of life.'[27] There was some convergence between the two schools in the sense at least that 'modernisers' came to pay more attention to socio-economic dynamics than they had done initially and underdevelopment theorists were less neglectful than formerly of cultural factors. Although the underdevelopment school fell broadly within the Marxist tradition of scholarship, it was subjected to very sharp criticism by Marxist writers. The result was that the external dependency arguments, which dominated the English-speaking debate, were refined by those willing to admit that successful capitalist development in Latin America and Asia had sounded the death-knell of crude Marxist dependency theory. Henceforward, increased attention was given to relations of production and power-holding within the post-colonial state, representing something of a shift from neo-Marxism back to Marxism.

A number of propositions were advanced by Marxist scholars that bore directly on the politics of African states. One of the most controversial was that put forward by Immanuel Wallerstein, who maintained that socialist transition in backward, peripheral countries could take place only when the world capitalist system collapsed. Wallerstein's argument was carried further by Callinicos and like-minded authors who argued that only after a world-wide revolution had taken place would the conditions exist for a socialist transition. For them, therefore, the solution lay in smashing the world economy; it was not enough just to opt out of it. However, they saw little prospect of this happening so long as the revolutionary parties retained

their petty-bourgeois leadership. This view paralleled that previously adopted by Frank in the Latin American debate, but was at variance with the earlier Marxist view (taken up by Cardoso and others) that capitalism performed a progressive function in peripheral countries and thus facilitated the transition to socialism. This 'capitalist roader' view (as Munslow called it) was followed by Susanne Mueller, who wrote in favour of 'letting the kulaks run' in Tanzania, and by one side in the 'Kenyan debate', referred to above.[28] Thus, the argument had come full circle. Wallerstein's gloomy prognosis and its corollary – socialist withdrawal from the dominant world economy – were abandoned in favour of regulated market economies which would stimulate international trade and investment. The result was a resurgence of modernisation theory in the form of rational choice and other sophisticated deductive methodologies.

More traditional forms of deductive methodology also emerged within the political development group. They were often coupled with classificatory systems reminiscent of those adopted by modernisation theorists of the 1950s. The political systems of particular countries were classified according to the degree of democracy which they were held to exhibit; as before, the model was Western and capitalist. The democratic criteria were listed as including freedom of speech and association, multi-party competition and interest group activity, free and fair elections, accountable and transparent governance, social justice, and the rule of law. To discuss how far individual African countries meet or fall short of these criteria can be a meaningful exercise. However, the pigeon-holing of states into more democratic, less democratic or non-democratic and the predicting of outcomes is not helpful for a number of reasons. Does a classificatory system of democracy take sufficient account of the varying socio-economic contexts of the countries being compared? Does it give enough weight to the political changes which can occur in a given country within a relatively short period of time – and why, for example, the 'model colony' of the Gold Coast so quickly became the authoritarian state of Nkrumah's Ghana? Does a classificatory system face the unpalatable truth that democratic elements may be stronger during a country's one-party or no-party phase than in its preceding or subsequent multi-party period?[29] Or are such democratic elements stronger only in the short term, being destined to give way to authoritarianism in non-competitive political systems? And, indeed, how does one measure, for example, the excesses perpetrated during Obote's second administration (1980–5), when competitive politics were allowed, against the relative security and prosperity of the post-1986 period under the no-party rule of Yoweri Museveni?

* * *

This book takes account of theoretical considerations without, however, being closely tied to any one approach. It accepts that the exchange between the developed and underdeveloped countries is unequal – a central tenet of underdevelopment theory – and that Third World countries are saddled with an intolerable burden of debt. However, it does not concede that Africa's underdevelopment is to be explained exclusively or even primarily in terms of the international capitalist environment. If that were so, the book's focus on the domestic political scene, supplemented by a discussion of inter-African relations and relations external to the continent (Chapters 8–10), would not be justified. Again, while it recognises the importance of understanding the nature of class domination in Africa, it asserts with Crawford Young that 'it is not necessary to deny cultural pluralism in order to assert class'.[30] The fact that modernisation theorists were right to stress the importance of cultural factors can be readily illustrated – for example, by the resistance of several communal groups to the sweeping land reform measures and increasingly pro-Amhara policies pursued by Ethiopia's Marxist military regime after 1974. The book proceeds on the assumption that while class is often an important determinant of political behaviour, it is not the only determinant, given the variety and complexity of the socio-economic process in Africa. Identifiable classes have emerged in many states – the middle class in Gabon, Kenya, the Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Zambia, for example – but in others they are less developed. Again, I believe that in many rural areas of the continent, either because of the limited penetration of capitalism (as Hyden asserted)[31] or because of the breakdown of the market economy in the face of severe economic recession, the peasantry has a poor sense of class consciousness and is preoccupied with meeting immediate family needs and with other local concerns. This phenomenon, which is probably temporary, need not be surprising; as we shall see, it was what Amilcar Cabral foresaw.[32] In many states, too, the links between peasants and urban workers are still close; what Morris Szeftel wrote in his study of Zambia in 1978 still has some relevance: 'the articulation of factional interest in the towns takes much the same form as that in rural areas; people compete for a share of the spoils in terms of a faction defined with reference to the region of origin of the individuals concerned.'[33]

Sklar's argument that in Africa 'class relations, at bottom, are determined by relations of power, not production',[34] is persuasive and is illustrated by Zambian experience following the post-1968 reforms (see Chapter 4). His statement has a further importance: it underlines for this writer the need to study the institutions, including political parties and interest groups, through which power is expressed and to understand why such institutions

tended to be superseded by instruments of control, notably the military and the bureaucracy (Chapters 5–7).

It would be a fundamental error not to take account of institutional weakness – notably, the poor quality of state economic management which has been more patrimonially than developmentally oriented[35] – in explaining the disappointing record of most African states in the post-independence era. In his *State Politics in Zimbabwe*, Jeffrey Herbst focused on the role of institutions, issue-areas and the structure of interest groups in examining government decisions in a number of case studies, and was able in this way to make generalisations about state autonomy and the locus of decision-making. Within limits this approach, which I discuss here briefly, can be applied to African states generally. Herbst broke down the concept of state autonomy in order to assess societal pressures against the state. He wrote:

> It was shown explicitly in the case studies that states can be seen to be making two types of decisions: those concerning the structure of the decision-making process (involving structural autonomy), and those concerning actual resource allocations within the institutional structures of the state (involving situational autonomy). The second type of decision is much more common than the first because states seldom redesign institutions in fundamental ways. States can be autonomous when designing decision-making processes, but not when allocating resources within those structures. For instance, the Zimbabwe government could be structurally autonomous when reforming the mechanism for setting prices for farm products but, by design, be susceptible to societal pressures when the actual price decisions were being made.[36]

While the grant of political independence did not lessen the newly independent African states' incorporation into the international economy and the links between some states and the former colonial power remained so close that a neo-colonial situation was created, political leaders acquired formal control over the state apparatus and could therefore, by effecting institutional change, alter the nature of the decision-making process. This applied no matter whether the resultant institutions – parliaments and so on – were weak or strong (they were usually weak) since institutions had 'a determining effect on the kind of interest group that will benefit from allocation processes'.[37] Whether or not societal groups could influence state decisions was determined by the way in which the interest group related to the state's institutional structure; the issue-area and the tactics adopted by the group were also relevant. Thus in Zimbabwe ethnic groups were unable to exert unified pressure on the state in the siting of rural health centres since

only local issues were involved, not national issues cutting across regions. Again, the fact that most African states have weak organisational and administrative capabilities meant that any policy which did not originate from the state's juridical powers and was not a straightforward structural issue was open to societal pressures. For example, the government of Zimbabwe could legally establish the Foreign Investment Committee and revise the price-setting mechanism for farm produce.[38] However, it could not similarly execute by legal fiat such a complicated exercise as the amalgamation of rural and district councils. The former councils had serviced the needs of the white commercial farming community in the pre-independence period, while the (55) district councils had been created after independence in 1980 out of the former (243) under-resourced African councils.[39]

It was by addressing questions of situational autonomy in which there might be 'a clash between the state and societal groups within an institutional structure'[40] that Herbst escaped the charge of merely presenting structural–functionalism in a new guise. He was alive to the importance of the changing socio-economic context of Zimbabwean politics and by focusing on societal groups – some strong, others weak – he successfully captured the dynamics of the country's political process. Since the conditions within which such groups operated varied from one African state to another – and in Africa we are concerned with over 50 states – we are presented not with a new grand theory, but with middle-level propositions that offer a means of measuring the extent of state autonomy and of indicating how decisions are reached within a particular state framework.

Reno's work, referred to above, added a further dimension to this debate by locating other supports of the ruler's power – within society but outside the confines of the decaying state. Taking Zaire as an example, he pointed out that:

> state power and societal networks are more intimately linked than attention to state or society would have us believe … Rulers of the 'predator state' develop dual interests; as their power appears to recede in the formal sphere of decaying bureaucracies, they increasingly use non-formal state power, including their capacity to intervene in informal markets to seek new opportunities and resources for clients.[41]

In Benin's case, grand-scale smuggling benefited businessmen involved in informal market dealing, peasants who chose an 'exit option' to avoid state regulations and revenue collections, and the government which allowed this illicit entrepôt trade to continue.

Grand theories and methodologies have their place in the social sciences but need to be empirically validated when applied to particular cases; too great a

reliance on them may divert attention from the critical issues of politics and society[42] as identified, on a more modest scale, by both Herbst and Reno. This is especially the case at a time when the failure to regulate competing interests and to resolve disputes has resulted in civil war and state collapse, causing immense suffering among the subject population, as in Angola, Burundi, Chad, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan.

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2
Colonialism and the Colonial Impact

The pre-colonial history of Africa has been pieced together from archaeological findings, oral tradition, and the records of Arab and other alien chroniclers, such as Ibn Battuta, who travelled widely in the Muslim world in the fourteenth century. A good deal is now known, for example, of the richness of the Egyptian civilisation of the pre-Christian era, of the medieval empires of the Western Sudan – Ghana, Mali and Songhai – and of the forest kingdoms which subsequently emerged in West Africa. Some of these kingdoms extended at the height of their power over a wide area and were underpinned by a centralised bureaucracy. Such was Ashanti, which was founded at the end of the seventeenth century, but about whose internal organisation little was known until Thomas Bowdich and Joseph Dupuis visited Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Benin (in present-day Nigeria) was another powerful kingdom, which, according to oral tradition, had been founded by immigrants from Ife some three centuries before the coming of the Portuguese; possibly these immigrants brought with them the technique of casting in bronze which in Benin, as in Ife, resulted in sculpture of world renown. Benin City, the capital, seemed to a Dutch visitor to be comparable in many ways with Amsterdam.[1] While there is no doubt that many such states existed in pre-colonial Africa – in the Sudan, deep in the West African forest, and in Southern Africa, for example – they were not typical of pre-colonial Africa as a whole. Many Africans lived in stateless societies, organised around the family, kinship groups and clan although this did not necessarily mean that they were more 'backward'. Migration from one area to another was frequent, as a consequence of war, disease, drought, and economic need. Almost everywhere, the African was engaged in a constant struggle with a harsh environment.[2]

European contact with Africa – through missionaries, traders and explorers – long preceded the establishment of European rule. Thus, the Portuguese began to trade to the west coast in the fifteenth century and, in a vain bid to exclude other European seafarers – the Dutch, the Brandenburgers, the Danes, the British and the French – established a number of coastal forts from which they conducted a profitable trade in gold and ivory and, especially from the seventeenth century, in slaves. They also traded southwards to Angola, which was ravaged by the slave trade, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, sailed up the east coast, where they encountered fierce Arab competition, and so to India.

Until the nineteenth century, Portuguese and other European traders dealt almost exclusively with African middle-men in their coastal stations; nevertheless, they succeeded in diverting African trade away from the trans-Saharan route, which linked Africa with the Maghreb, and thus increased the power and wealth of the coastal states at the expense of the states in the Western Sudan. This pattern of coastal trading began to change, however, when the slave trade was supplanted by legitimate commerce and the interior of the continent was gradually penetrated by explorers and missionaries, culminating in the period of European empire building.

In most of the continent the establishment of colonies did not take place until the last quarter of the nineteenth century; before that time, only a relatively small part of Black Africa was under European rule. European colonisation of West Africa was established long before that of East Africa, but by 1875 only the 'colony' areas of Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast and the areas adjacent to Bathurst and Lagos were ruled by Britain, while France was firmly established only in Senegal. The partition of Africa was precipitated by the ambition of King Leopold II of the Belgians to absorb the whole of the Congo basin into a personal empire and the annexation by Germany, in 1883–5, of the Cameroons, East Africa, South West Africa and Togoland, thereby projecting the rivalry of the European powers into Africa. The Berlin conference of 1884–5, by recognising the existence of a 'Congo Free State', was the signal for France and Britain to extend their sphere of influence, preliminary to creating new colonies and protectorates. The boundaries between one colony and another were often drawn arbitrarily, with scant regard for traditional allegiance; thus, the Bakongo were split between the French Congo, the Belgian Congo and Angola.

What prompted this insatiable desire on the part of the various European powers – Portugal and Belgium, Britain and France, Germany, Italy and Spain – to establish colonies in Africa? Was it part of a civilising mission, as the Portuguese claimed and some of the other colonialists asserted?[3] Was it for purposes of trade, conducted for the mutual benefit of coloniser and

colonised? Was it for economic gain and exploitation, or were strategic considerations paramount? The answer to such questions depends on many factors, and not least the analyst's own ideological perspective.

In West Africa, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, British missionaries and traders pressurised their home governments to extend the colonial boundaries inland as a means of protecting their interests and gains against French and German competition. At first, British ministers held back, being doubtful whether the economic gains of empire in this region would compensate them for the cost of maintaining it. They also took account of strategic considerations, attaching prime importance to the Nile and its approaches. It was left to Joseph Chamberlain, who became Colonial Secretary in 1895, to break with this tradition and to try 'to make a business of the tropical African fields which others had staked out mainly with an eye to security'. He pressed the need for state enterprise in building roads, railways and harbours, and sought new opportunities for private enterprise and new markets for British industry. In August 1895 he told a West African Railways' deputation that progress and prosperity in Britain depended upon developing the empire.[4]

On another view, colonies were established not for reasons of security but to prolong the life of moribund European capitalism; as a French saying has it: 'the colonies have been created for the metropole by the metropole.'[5] While this view does not sufficiently encapsulate the complex motives which sometimes underlay the creation of colonies, there is no doubt that the European powers were anxious to secure easy access to the raw materials needed to fuel the manufacturing industries established following the industrial revolution and to obtain a protected market for their manufactured goods; moreover – as the British showed in 1900 in Ashanti and the Germans a few years later in Tanganyika – they were prepared if necessary to fight in order to gain these objectives. Profitable trading networks were established: thus, the cotton grown by African (and Asian) peasant farmers was fed into the Lancashire textile mills, via the flourishing port of Liverpool, and the cloth which the mills produced was exported back to Africa by European trading companies. However, while the price which the producer received for his cotton fluctuated widely, and often downwards, the price which he had to pay for imported cloth constantly increased. The unequal and exploitative nature of this exchange is not in question; it contributed to the capitalist development of Europe at Africa's expense.[6] This negative aspect of colonialism (one out of many) must be set alongside Chamberlain's argument that colonial development and metropolitan prosperity went hand in hand.

Yet Chamberlain was not wholly wrong and the impact of colonialism was not entirely negative: it was significant that African leaders, who had

often been educated overseas and nurtured in the Western political tradition, accepted not only the colonial state as the focus of their aspirations but also many of the changes which colonialism had introduced. Its beneficial effects included checking (if never entirely eliminating) inter-communal fighting and establishing a framework of territorial unity out of disparate social elements; in creating an essential infrastructure of railways, roads and harbours; in providing schools, churches and hospitals; in introducing new food plants, such as cassava, maize and sweet potato (imported by the Portuguese from South America); and in controlling disease among cattle through the use of veterinary skills. Whatever assessment is made of colonialism and its impact on Africa, it is important to remember that many different colonial powers were involved. These powers differed, often widely, in their specific policies and overall approach to colonial development.

Policies of the Powers

Following the Berlin conference of 1884–5, French troops sought to assert effective political control over the hinterland in West and Equatorial Africa. Eight colonies were eventually established in Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) and four in Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF); each had its own governor and budget and, from 1946, its own elected assembly. The governors were subject to the general direction and authority of a governor-general (AOF headquarters were in Dakar and those for AEF in Brazzaville), who controlled a general budget and was advised by a 'grand council', made up of elected territorial representatives. Ultimate control was vested in the Minister for Colonies in Paris.[7]

Each colony was divided for administrative purposes into *cercles*. A *cercle* was administered by a political officer, the *commandant de cercle*, and was in most cases divided into sub-divisions, each headed by a *chef de subdivision* (also a political officer). In what amounted substantially to a system of direct rule, traditional rulers were often replaced by 'straw chiefs' – frequently old soldiers and retired government clerks – who constituted the bottom tiers in the administrative hierarchy (*chefs de canton* and *chefs de village*) and served as agents of the administration. Like their British counterparts, French administrators sought to adapt existing social structures to their own use and this gave these structures a measure of flexibility. Thus, the system was more indirect where relatively strong traditional rulers were well established, as the Mossi chiefs were in Upper Volta and the Fulani Emirs in the northern provinces of the Cameroons (a French-administered trust territory which, like Togoland, did not belong to AOF), though in certain cases, as in Guinea's

Fouta Djalon, the French deliberately broke up the old political units. It was, overall, a highly centralised system, characterised by parallel administrative structures in each territory and staffed by a remarkably mobile public service, which ruled the vast French African territories with the aid of 'chiefs'.

Until the collapse of the Vichy regime and the Brazzaville conference of 1944, the French system of administration was also strongly paternalist: the mass of Africans were French subjects, not citizens, and were exposed to the *indigénat* (a form of summary administrative justice) and *travail forcé* (forced labour). Following the Brazzaville conference, French policy moved increasingly from paternalism to what Kenneth Robinson has called a policy of identity, which sought in principle to reproduce in the colony the same institutions as existed at home. (Other writers prefer to distinguish between policies of 'assimilation' and 'association'.) The educational system was based on the French model and provided the clerks, interpreters and teachers necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of a colonial administration dominated at senior levels by Frenchmen. The system was the avenue by which Africans sought to gain access to the elite, first as public servants and then often as politicians. The most prestigious institution in French West Africa was the William Ponty College in Dakar, the *alma mater* of the Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouët-Boigny and three of the other heads of the new states which became independent in 1960.[8]

Africans, as French citizens, were no longer subject to the *indigénat* or to compulsory labour; they were granted the right of free association and meeting; they could serve, in each territory, on local government organs called *conseils généraux* (later renamed *assemblées territoriales*); and they were allowed to send representatives to the French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic in Paris. The pull of the 'metropolitan axis' in the immediate post-war period was so strong that African political parties and trade unions tended either to be linked with, or to function within the orbit of metropolitan parties and unions; nationalism lost some of its force amidst the welter of other ideas to which French theorising gave rise.[9] For at least ten years after 1945 the main thrust of most nationalist activity was to secure equal rights for Africans as citizens of an 'indivisible' Fourth Republic. But, ultimately, equality was not enough. Though the *loi cadre* reforms of 1956, which conferred territorial autonomy, constituted on France's part a holding operation without any commitment as to the final outcome and may actually have been designed to prevent independence, they set in motion a train of events which resulted in the independence of Guinea in 1958 (by a 'No' vote in the constitutional referendum on the Fifth Republic in September of that year) and of the other territories in French West and Equatorial Africa in 1960, following individual negotiations with France.

British colonial policy was more pragmatic than the French and often seemed to be formulated as a reaction to extraneous events, such as the post-1945 challenge of African nationalism. British rule was also less centralised. Colonial governors were allowed considerable discretion, within the framework of policy laid down by the Colonial Office in London, in initiating policy deemed suitable for their individual territories. Indeed, this discretion extended to senior officers within a colony's administrative hierarchy. Thus, the proposal in the early 1930s to restore the Ashanti Confederacy was put forward initially not by the Gold Coast Governor, who was considering the case for amalgamating the administration of the Colony and Ashanti in the interests of economy, but by the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti.[10]

Restoration took place (in 1935) to further indirect rule, which from the 1920s was a cornerstone of British colonial policy and, together with the concept of preparation, gave it a certain theoretical basis. The chief architect of indirect rule was Lord Frederick Lugard, whose book *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* appeared in 1922. This approach entailed the British administration ruling through indigenous political institutions such as chiefs and their councils, who were constituted into native authorities and supported by native courts and, eventually, by native treasuries. The system tapped the innate conservatism of African society and worked best in areas where chieftaincy was strongly entrenched: Northern Nigeria served as the model and the northern Emirs were subject to minimal interference by British administrative officers. But it was a more flexible system than is usually assumed and even in Northern Nigeria there were 'spasms of unequivocal direct rule', as circumstances warranted.[11] Indirect rule proved least satisfactory in areas where traditional institutions were weak or non-existent and therefore depended, as in south-eastern Nigeria and parts of the Ashanti region in the Gold Coast, on government-created chiefs; closer administrative supervision was exercised over these areas. The experience was widespread – in British Africa and in certain parts of French Africa, like the Ivory Coast (designated the Côte d'Ivoire from 1986) – that a chief who was not selected according to customary procedures or was elevated to a status to which he was not entitled by tradition, lacked legitimacy and had difficulty in securing the respect and co-operation of his people. In the Gold Coast in the early 1930s this consideration, and above all the people's reluctance to pay taxes to a non-traditional ruler, reinforced the case for restoring the Ashanti Confederacy.

While indirect rule, at its best, was a worthwhile exercise in local self-government and resulted in the preservation of certain wholesome African traditions and customs that might otherwise have been lost, it also had negative

consequences. It exacerbated existing communal differences (based on eth-
nicity, language or geographical region) to such an extent in some territories
(for example, Nigeria) as to warrant the designation of 'divide and rule'.
These communal sentiments were sometimes fanned by the chiefs them-
selves: thus, in the Ashanti region of the Gold Coast, the Asantehene and the
great majority of Ashanti chiefs gave open backing to the National
Liberation Movement (NLM) – a movement of revolt founded in 1954 and
directed against the Convention People's Party (CPP) government – on the
main ground that the latter was discriminating unfairly against Ashanti
interests. The strength of such sentiments made it necessary to incorporate
power-sharing arrangements into the independence constitutions of several
states: a federal constitution was retained in Nigeria (its adoption in 1954 was
the inevitable sequel of the Richards Constitution of 1946), federal elements
were incorporated into the constitutions of Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, and
Barotseland secured a privileged position for itself in Zambia under the 1964
agreement. Again, in the post-1945 period, the effect of indirect rule was
often to drive a wedge between chiefs and those of their people who joined
mass-based political parties; the latter castigated the chiefs as 'government
stooges'. But this did not happen everywhere – as noted earlier, in Northern
Nigeria there was a close working relationship between the NPC and the tra-
ditional emirs. (Resentment of chiefs in French Africa was stronger and more
widespread than in British Africa.) Moreover, indirect rule made a nonsense
of the concept of preparation which, at least in principle, was the second
pillar of British colonial policy in non-settler Africa.

   This concept, according to which the territories ruled by Britain were held
in trust until their people could stand on their own feet, involved the early cre-
ation of legislative and executive councils, and a steady expansion in the local
composition of these bodies. However, it was not until 1946 that the legisla-
tive councils of the Gold Coast and Nigeria contained a majority of African
representatives, and even then the writ of the Gold Coast legislative council
did not extend to the Northern Territories. This change came in 1951, when
the executive council of each country finally secured an unofficial majority.
The attempt to marry the principles of indirect rule and crown colony gov-
ernment through the inclusion in the legislature, and subsequently in the
executive, of representatives of the traditional councils of chiefs came to
nothing when, in the 1950s, it was decided to allow political parties to com-
pete in national elections held under an expanded franchise. This 'reverse-
gear' policy of switching support from chiefs to a new political class was also
applied at the local government level in British West Africa – Creech-Jones'
1948 reforms sought to restrict chiefs to a ceremonial role.[12] Thus it can be
argued that the British had trained the wrong people; certainly, as Bernard

Schaffer has pointed out, meaningful preparation for independence began 'very late indeed' and was 'all along rivalled and hindered by other values, which were predominantly bureaucratic.'[13] Preparation was seriously distorted in areas of substantial white settlement such as Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and above all Southern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, it remains true that Britain did more to prepare its colonies for independence than any other European power; the contrast with Belgium and Portugal is sharp.

The Congo Free State, created in 1885 as the personal fief of King Leopold II, became a Belgian colony in 1908. Belgian rule was extremely centralised, being based on Léopoldville and Brussels, where policy was formulated by the Minister of the Colonies, advised by a Colonial Council. It was a strongly paternalist system of rule, resting on three main pillars: the state, the Roman Catholic Church and big business, such as Union Minière du Haut-Katanga. Its object was to create a materially prosperous and contented people, educated (mainly by missions, Protestant as well as Catholic) to the primary level, and subject to close European supervision. It rested on the conviction that social and political change could be arrested and Belgian middle-class values inculcated. The attempt failed and in the post-Second World War period educated Congolese came increasingly to resent restrictions on their civil liberty: political parties, independent African trade unions, and a free press were proscribed, and the social status of Africans was subordinate to that of Europeans. Europeans, too, enjoyed few political rights, as executive power remained firmly in the hands of the Administration.[14]

Portugal, Africa's oldest colonial power, conceived itself as a small nation in Europe, but a great nation in the world: it was the hub of a pan-Lusitanian community, geographically scattered over the globe, but held together by the bonds of Portuguese culture. According to this image, Portugal's overseas possessions were not colonies, but overseas provinces, indissolubly linked with metropolitan Portugal and forming an integrated whole. Portugal claimed to be undertaking in Africa a non-racial, Christian civilising mission, but in fact its colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principé) were subject to long years of neglect. In part, this neglect resulted from the poor state of Portugal's own economy – the industrial revolution in Europe passed it by – and, as far as Mozambique was concerned, from the collapse of the spice trade with India in the eighteenth century. But neglect it was: according to official government statistics, the illiteracy rate in 1959, after some 500 years of Portuguese presence, was 97.8 per cent in Mozambique, 96.97 per cent in Angola, 98.85 per cent in Guinea-Bissau and 78.5 per cent in Cape Verde. Moreover, economic exploitation and racial discrimination were cardinal features of Portuguese colonial rule.[15]

Economic exploitation on a more systematic scale took place in the 1930s following the introduction in Portugal of the corporatist New State (*Estado Novo*), and was accompanied by a significant increase in forced crop cultivation, notably of cotton, and forced labour. In the post-Second World War period, and especially after the outbreak of the African colonial wars in 1961, Portugal opened up both the metropole and the colonies to foreign investment. The Portuguese economy received a much-needed boost, but Portugal, still an underdeveloped country, could make its manufactured goods competitive in the European market only if it retained a cheap supply of raw materials. For this Portugal looked to its colonies, which also imported more than a third of its cotton manufactures, served as a refuge for unemployed Portuguese peasants, and acted as a major source of foreign exchange. Throughout the period of colonial rule and up to the *coup d'état* in 1974, these socio-economic policies were worked out within a framework of rule that, in Portugal as in the colonies, was both highly authoritarian and subject to tight bureaucratic control.[16]

The colonial period as a whole can be divided, from an economic and social standpoint, into three overlapping phases: the period from the establishment of colonies in the 1880s and 1890s until the First World War; the inter-war period; and the period from the Second World War to independence.[17] It should be emphasised, however, that this periodisation is inexact and more relevant to France and Britain than the other European powers. Portugal is substantially a case apart and subject to different periodisation: the period to 1926, when the colonies were neglected and left to foreign capital to exploit; 1926–50, when 'nationalist' economic policies were pursued, the colonies were more systematically exploited and 'labour-repressive' polices were adopted; 1950–60, when Portugal was again opened up to foreign capital and industrial production increased while remaining dependent on the supply of cheap cotton from the colonies; and 1960–74, a period mainly characterised by the impact of the nationalist struggle in the colonies leading to the encouragement of foreign investment. Throughout, colonial rule was authoritarian and even the tiny number of *assimilados* (that is, African citizens who were judged to have assimilated the Portuguese culture and way of life) was denied any meaningful outlets for political expression. Munslow argues, with some force, that Portugal took no steps to decolonise because, unlike the other European powers, 'it could not neocolonise': that is Portugal, an economically backward country, could not be certain that it could exploit its ex-colonies economically after granting them political independence.[18]

For more than 30 years after the intense diplomatic activity associated with 'the scramble for Africa', the colonial powers largely neglected their

territories. Colonies were expected to be economically self-supporting and were ruled by a handful of men, often with experience as army officers; thus, in Ronald Robinson's memorable description, the British colonial empire was a 'gimcrack effort run by two men and a dog'.[19] Local resistance was overcome, a national administration was established, and inter-communal warfare was prohibited. Taxation was also imposed, railway tracks were laid down both for security and commercial purposes, and cash crops were introduced, eventually to the serious detriment of food production. In territories where Europeans were looking for land and minerals, as in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique, African land was alienated, most extensively to the south of the Zambezi river. In these territories Africans were employed as wage-labourers on settler farms and by plantation and mining companies; they were also, especially north of the Zambezi, allowed to grow cash crops, but only to the extent that these did not prejudice the interests of European agriculture. Elsewhere – that is, where (as in most of West Africa) Europeans sought to trade and govern rather than settle – Africans were actively encouraged to grow cash crops, on communally owned land, for the European market. They were everywhere subject to compulsory labour on which, in one form or another, all the colonial powers relied for porterage and the construction and maintenance of roads, railways and government stations.[20] (The detested *travail forcé* was a feature of the French African scene until the Brazzaville reforms of 1944 and, under the euphemistic title of 'contract labour', of Portuguese Africa until the 1960s and beyond.) Direct governmental activity was minimal and most social development – in the sphere of education, for example – was the result of missionary effort.

The inter-war period began with the break-up of Germany's African empire and its partition, under the League of Nations' mandate, between Britain and France, Belgium and South Africa, which was thus added to the list of colonial powers. As the administrative authority of South West Africa (styled Namibia from 1968), South Africa established a grip on the territory's extractive, unbalanced and poorly integrated economy which was so tight that Namibia became virtually the state's fifth province. For Africa generally, the inter-war period was the high-water-mark of colonial rule. Civil administrations were served by an increased, though still fluctuating, number of colonial officials, with the district administrative officer as the linchpin of the system. The functions of colonial governments were still extremely limited; medical, educational, agricultural and veterinary services were improved, but remained grossly inadequate for the needs of the bulk of the African (as distinct from the European) population. Roads and harbours were built, but further expansion of the public works programme, as of other forms of

development, was curtailed by the world-wide economic depression of 1929–31. In the 1930s and during the subsequent war years neither colonial governments nor Christian missions had the resources to extend throughout the country the educational, medical and other services which they had already provided in areas adjacent to the national capital (for example, in the 'Colony' areas of Ghana and Sierra Leone and the southern part of Nigeria). African peasant proprietors stepped up their supply of produce for the world market and purchased imported goods, thus further linking the African economies to the international environment. In some instances, they adopted the tactic of holding up their produce when the price offered by the buyers fell below the costs of production. This happened in the Gold Coast, where farmers in the Colony and Ashanti areas staged cocoa hold-ups in 1931 and 1937 in an attempt to force the price upwards; they were convinced, with justification, that 'pooling' arrangements among the European companies had artificially depressed the cocoa price. No comparable action was taken in Nigeria, where cocoa played a lesser part in the total economy, but the device of the hold-up was not unknown in that country also. In Senegal 'peanut-running' – the practice whereby peasants smuggled their produce across the border into the Gambia in order to secure a higher price – had a long history though it reached its peak only in the post-independence period.[21]

European investment (both private investment and public loans) went especially to territories whose economies were based on mining, above all to South Africa, the Rhodesias and the Belgian Congo. Multinational companies began to loom large on the African scene; for example, the South African-based Anglo-American Corporation and the American-controlled Rhodesian Selection Trust (later renamed Roan Selection Trust) in Northern Rhodesia and the Société Générale, through its subsidiary Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, in the Belgian Congo. There was also limited investment in plantation agriculture – tea in Nyasaland and Kenya, for example – but, in general, European investors found it more profitable to support companies which concentrated on buying and selling to African producers, rather than those which themselves undertook agricultural production. Among such trading companies were the French-controlled Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain (SCOA), and the British-controlled United Africa Company (UAC), which was itself a subsidiary of Unilever, the Anglo-Dutch monopoly. These companies had a wide range of interests in Africa and made handsome profits for their European shareholders.

Turning to the third phase, the demand for raw materials during the Second World War and the shortage of foodstuff and many raw materials in the post-war period brought home to the European powers the great economic value

of their colonies. Copper exports from Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo increased enormously, while certain cash crops, including Gold Coast cocoa and Tanganyikan sisal, commanded high prices. Even after purchasing European manufactured goods out of their earnings, many of the richer colonies were left with substantial credit balances in London and the other European capitals (thus easing the credit position of the European powers), and in the 1950s they were therefore able to embark on what then seemed ambitious development schemes. An increased number of functional specialists – in agriculture, education, health and public works – now served at district level, though in most colonies only a small number of them were African.

On the political front mounting discontent outpaced the significant constitutional advance conceded in a number of colonies: for example, the grant of greater African representation in the territorial legislative councils of the Gold Coast and Nigeria in 1946 (marking the attainment of the 'representative stage' of Crown Colony government). Ex-servicemen returning from the war found jobs difficult to obtain and goods as scarce as they were costly. Together with the young men educated to primary-school level in the rapid educational expansion which had taken place in the inter-war period and who were now either unemployed or under-employed, they became fodder for the new nationalist movements that were springing up in various parts of the continent, such as French North and British West Africa, closely followed by British East and Central Africa. The colonial powers seemed oblivious to this growing ferment of unrest and to the inherent contradiction between empire and liberal democracy, in defence of which the Second World War had been fought (though not by neutral Portugal). Even in the case of the Gold Coast – the pacemaker in tropical Africa – Britain gave no serious thought to preparing the country for self-government before the 1948 riots. However, these riots, coupled with pressure from the UN and the USA, as well as liberal elements at home, led Britain to quicken the process of decolonisation. For successive British governments, Conservative as well as Labour, the issue in dispute throughout British Africa was not the final end, namely independence, but the timetable by which that end should be achieved. In colonies like the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone such delay as occurred in the achievement of self-rule in the 1950s was caused not by British reluctance to transfer power, but by internal communal conflict. The only seriously disputed areas were those where it was not clear who should receive the transfer of power, notably the areas of white settlement in East and Central Africa. In November 1965 the white minority in Rhodesia tried to resolve this issue by declaring their independence unilaterally and, in doing so, precipitated a protracted liberation struggle.

The French faced the dilemma of how to reconcile liberty and empire by stressing equality: the equal treatment of all citizens regardless of origin and colour; representation was provided in Paris for *départements* like Algeria and overseas territories, including Senegal, Gabon and other African dependencies. Decolonisation did not become an immediate policy objective; for France the retention of its African empire, and the resources that went with it, offered a means of reviving its political and economic power. There was indeed always more than a touch of the Lusitanian syndrome in French official thinking – France conceived itself as the hub of a global pan-French community in much the same way as Portugal, though a much weaker state, did in relation to its own colonies. However, the *loi cadre* reforms of 1956 showed that the French government was beginning to move in the direction of the British. It followed up recognition of the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956–7 with the grant first of autonomy and then of independence to its sub-Saharan African colonies; it hesitated only in Algeria which, like Rhodesia, was an area of substantial white settlement. Eventually, the Belgians followed suit: in 1960 they catapulted the Congo to independence in a brief six months, initially with disastrous consequences.

The alternative course to granting decolonisation would have been to attempt to hold the nationalist forces in check through a long process of repression, as the Dutch had tried unsuccessfully to do in the Dutch East Indies. This option, which would have been intolerable to British, Belgian and (following the reverses in Indo-China and the experience in Algeria) French public opinion, was chosen by autocratically ruled Portugal for reasons that were economic, political and cultural. The possession of colonies – 'overseas provinces', according to the myth of Lusotropicalism[22]– boosted Portugal's international image and provided the cheap raw materials necessary to fuel the country's nascent industrialisation programme; it also served as an outlet for poor, and often unskilled or semi-skilled, white immigrants who sought employment opportunities denied them at home. Portugal's decision to fight to retain its colonies thus resulted in a protracted armed struggle to win independence by Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, with the leadership committed in each case to the pursuit of Marxist–Leninist principles. The non-decolonisation path was also taken by white-minority ruled South Africa in respect of Namibia, and with the same bloody consequences.

The Colonial Legacy

Since Africa was subject to rule by several different colonial powers, the colonial legacy has varied from one part of the continent to another. The difference

between anglophone and francophone countries at independence was in many respects marked, while the difference between these countries and the ex-Portuguese colonies was profound. Though, as we shall see in Chapter 3, President Charles de Gaulle's attempt to maintain the historic bonds between France and the French-speaking states by means of a French Community foundered, the cooperation agreements that France made with individual states meant that ties between France and its former colonies remained close. This made for a greater divergence between French and British policies than had previously existed. At least initially, the newly independent francophone states benefited substantially from membership of the franc zone which gave them an assured market for their produce at stable prices. France benefited economically too: it was assured a regular supply of raw materials at controlled prices, while French firms and industries were guaranteed the right to the free transfer of profits and capital within the franc zone.[23] The relationship between France and its former colonies was more than economic and, with roots in French language and culture – in 'francophonie' – was also cultural and political. And it persisted, to the displeasure of the government of the USA, as was shown in the acerbic comments made in late 1996 by Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, that France continued to try and monopolise relations with its former colonies, but that 'the days are over when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence and when outside powers could view whole groups of states as their private domain'.[24]

The arrangements made by France reinforce the first point to be made that, generalising, the economies (and the communication networks) of the African states were largely developed in accordance with the needs of the colonial power. Primary products – whether cash crops such as cocoa and coffee or minerals such as copper and bauxite – were exported to European markets in their raw state; in return, the colony imported manufactured goods from abroad, mainly from the 'mother country'. Purchasing and distribution were handled by large European companies, such as the UAC, until at least the terminal phase of colonial rule, when some colonies established marketing boards in an attempt to break the European trading monopoly and to pay the farmers a stable price. The price of African produce on the world market fluctuated widely, sometimes falling dramatically (hence the importance of price stability afforded to members of the franc zone), but the price of manufactured goods was subject to the inflationary pressures of the European domestic economies and these were acute in the immediate post-1945 period.[25] Though political independence was achieved by most African colonies in (or about) 1960, economic dependency remained, giving rise to charges – as formulated by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, for example – of neo-colonialism. A corollary of the monopoly

long exercised by the large European companies was that the great majority of indigenous (African) entrepreneurs had scope only at the lowest levels of business activity; private entrepreneurial activity was very extensive at the level of the petty trader. While some Africans did prosper – in Nigeria, for example, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe established his 'Zik' group of newspapers – few Africans at this time possessed managerial skills, and the commercial banks were reluctant to grant Africans credit facilities. The effect was to retard the pre-independence growth of an African middle class and to vest the leadership of many nationalist movements and parties in the hands of petty-bourgeois elements such as primary school teachers, clerks, storekeepers, and small-scale businessmen and traders. A further effect was to deprive the post-independence state of the experienced manpower required to run the large number of public enterprises which, in the absence of African private business on any substantial scale, were almost everywhere established.

Second, the introduction of cash-crop farming had a profound impact on the rural scene: it led to the emergence of peasant societies integrated into the world economy. Examples of such societies in Tanganyika were the Chagga and Haya. However, there were also in Tanganyika (as in many other countries) intermediate regions which provided migrant labour: in Tanganyika's case, for the European and Indian-owned sisal plantations in the eastern part of the country. Thus, we can observe the differential impact of capitalism on a given country and the juxtaposition within the modern state of advanced economic regions and areas in which pre-colonial patterns of social organisation persisted. This juxtaposition was evident in the Gold Coast between the southern regions and the underdeveloped northern regions of the country. Cocoa was introduced at the turn of the century and flourished in the humid conditions of the forest areas. By the 1950s it accounted for 90 per cent of export revenues and vitally affected the lives of southern Ghanaians, as is indicated by the local 'highlife' sung during a 1954 by-election in Ashanti:

> If you want to send your children to school, it is cocoa,
> If you want to build your house, it is cocoa,
> If you want to marry, it is cocoa,
> If you want to buy cloth, it is cocoa,
> If you want to buy a lorry, it is cocoa,
> Whatever you want to do in this world,
> It is with cocoa money that you do it.[26]

While cocoa-growing was essentially a people's industry, the larger farmers employed labour, drawn from the north and neighbouring French colonies, and invested their wealth in buildings in the urban centres. Apart from

increased social differentiation, another effect of a cash-crop such as cocoa was to increase social mobility and to help further erode traditional institutions and values.

In the third place, the level of industrialisation was low in colonial Africa, though there were some exceptions. The latter were mainly in areas of substantial European settlement, such as Southern Rhodesia, which was developed as the manufacturing base of the Central African Federation between 1953 and 1963. On the other hand, substantial mining was undertaken (for example, bauxite in Guinea, iron ore in Sierra Leone, gold in the Gold Coast, copper in the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, and diamonds and uranium in South West Africa), with ownership, production and control vested in European or South African-based companies. In relation to the total African population, the labour force involved was small, often unskilled or semi-skilled, and mostly migrant. However, after the Second World War a settled labour force began to emerge in many colonies, including the Belgian Congo and on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and this facilitated trade union organisation. The difference in salaries and conditions of service between African and European workers became an obvious target of trade union attack.[27]

Fourth, the effect of colonialism was much more detrimental to women than to men. In general, the role and status of women deteriorated in the colonial period and failed to improve markedly with the achievement of independence, despite a few exceptions in certain spheres of economic activity, including aspects of the cattle and fishing industries. Whereas in many pre-colonial African communities, women had effective control of economic resources, in money or land, they were disadvantaged as incorporation into a cash economy proceeded. One of two things happened: they were either excluded from areas of production in which they had previously been involved and relegated to the 'domestic' sphere, or the productive activities in which they continued to engage were deformed and devalued in a new context. This can be graphically illustrated by Etienne's description of experience among the Baule of the Ivory Coast. In the pre-colonial economy men had controlled the distribution of yams, while women had controlled that of cloth, intercropping cotton in the yam fields, spinning and dyeing thread for the men to weave, and engaging in or directing long-range trade of the resulting product. In the colonial era, the importing (and subsequent manufacture) of thread relieved male weavers of their dependence upon female spinners, and eventually the introduction of cotton as a cash crop with new seed and technology controlled by men broke the interdependent relationship between women and men entirely. In the wake of these developments, women lost land rights and control over production,

and became labourers on fields owned by individual men. These trends were reinforced by the growing availability of manufactured cloth, purchased with the proceeds from cash crops, such as cotton, cocoa and coffee, controlled by men.[28] In sum, essential features of the colonial legacy were that women were disadvantaged by Western imports and by the introduction of cash crops and new technology; that men had much better access than women to education, capital and wage employment; and that women, driven back into the domestic arena, became the targets of programmes on 'home economics' rather than agricultural or industrial production techniques.

Finally, rapid urbanisation resulted from mining, the growth after the Second World War of manufacturing industry (if as yet on a limited scale), the commercial activity associated with the introduction of cash-crops, and an expanding administrative machine. Rural dwellers were attracted to the towns by the prospect of employment and relatively high wages, as well as by urban amenities such as pipe-borne water, street lighting and cinemas. Many immigrants were disappointed and eked out a precarious existence in overcrowded and insanitary compounds in the shanty areas which ringed, for example, Lagos and Ibadan in Nigeria and Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Windhoek faced the same problem when Namibia became independent in March 1990; the capital had served as a magnet for the country's unemployed and especially for migrants from Owamboland, a neglected and overcrowded area in the populous north, where unemployment was running at some 60 per cent at independence.[29]

Thus, the political leaders of the new African states inherited dependent economies that were still bound to the former colonial powers by established patterns of trade and by membership of European currency blocs, notably the franc zone and the sterling area. They faced formidable problems, in the socio-economic as well as the political sphere. Since, as we have seen, there were few large companies owned by Africans, the state itself became almost everywhere the main agent of economic development outside the mining sector; yet in most states, skilled manpower was in critically short supply. The alternative – and in mining there was no choice at independence – was domination by multinational companies, as in Congo-Léopoldville (later Zaire), Zambia and Namibia. Namibia's position was particularly unenviable since it had a fragile and poorly integrated economy and was dependent on three South African-based companies – De Beers, Rossing Uranium and Tsumeb Corporation – to extract its minerals. These minerals made up some 65 per cent of exports and were extracted from mines which were expected to be worked out by the year 2012.[30]

Another colonial legacy was that the growth of a market economy resulted in economic imbalances between different regions of a country, as

well as sometimes within a single region, the central area of Zambia being one such example. Social differentiation had also taken place, though as yet on a limited scale: an incipient middle class existed in states such as Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal; the growth of this class was to be enormously facilitated in the post-independence period when the holding of public office – as politicians, bureaucrats and army officers – gave more people (and men much more than women) an opportunity for personal advancement. Again, new state leaders headed political parties which had to be transformed from parties of revolt into parties of rule. They also inherited bureaucracies whose strength and experience for undertaking the immense tasks which confronted them was questionable.

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3
Nationalism and the Transfer of Power

Tropical Africa: The anglophone and francophone Experience

Since colonial states in Africa were created within artificial boundaries – boundaries which rarely coincided with those of traditional polities – we are dealing with 'anti-colonial nationalism', a nationalism that was predominantly expressed within the confines of the colonial state.[1] As compared with European nationalism, there were no strong historical and social identities upon which African nationalists could build; ethnically homogeneous Somalia was a partial exception, but was itself divided into a number of competing clans, as was also predominantly Tswana-speaking Botswana. This is not to suggest, however, that Africa was a *tabula rasa* when colonial rule was imposed: as we saw in Chapter 2, many different forms of political organisation existed in pre-colonial Africa, ranging from centralised kingdoms to stateless societies; there was also a rich variety of cultural forms, though no shared culture such as would have been provided by a system of universal primary education.[2] The problem facing anti-colonial nationalists was that popular loyalties tended to gravitate towards a traditional unit which in the great majority of cases lay *within*, rather than being coterminous with, the colonial state boundaries (the Buganda kingdom within the Uganda protectorate affords a good example of this phenomenon). One of the nationalists' most important achievements during the independence struggle was to render loyalty to a sub-national unit secondary to loyalty to the country-wide unit: in other words, to submerge sub-nationalism within a wider nationalism. This chapter seeks to explain why, and how, this happened.

The imposition of Western institutions and values upon the colonies disrupted the social structures and cultural life of the subject peoples.

European rule, while sometimes psychologically damaging in so far as it instilled a sense of Black inferiority and a tendency to imitativeness,[3] also gave rise to a cultural self-awareness and a pride in the African past. This found expression in the search for a national language, in the emergence of a literature, in works of history and oral traditions that both recalled African suffering and resistance to colonial rule, and glorified in past achievements; distinctly African religious protest movements also emerged. In these ways, African nationalism acquired a certain emotional content through the assertion of popular identities: identities that sometimes, as with the concept of pan-Africanism, cut across colonial boundaries. There was, however, also another, deeper side to African nationalism. Popular, emotional appeals were buttressed by instrumental arguments, which condemned colonial rule as authoritarian, bureaucratic and exploitative; the colonies, said the nationalists, were the milch-cows of the industrialised West and could develop only when the colonial yoke was removed and political independence was achieved.

African nationalism was most assertive in the post-Second World War period, when jobs were scarce and inflation was rampant and, at least in French and British Africa, political parties and interest groups were formed to articulate the people's grievances. The conflict which thus developed between nationalist leaders, who had been educated in government and mission schools and occasionally overseas, and colonial administrators was not, over most of Africa, a class conflict; classes, so far as they existed, were only incipient and we cannot talk convincingly in terms of the assertion of the collective interests of an economic class against an exploitative, foreign bourgeoisie. On the other hand, certain economic interests were involved.

Among these interests was a traditional elite of chiefs and elders, some of whom identified with the post-war nationalist movements while others remained aloof and sought to preserve their own privileged positions as allies of the colonial administration. Next there was a small professional group, especially of doctors and lawyers, who, together with successful merchants and contractors, were prominent in their countries' congresses and early political parties; the fact that members of this group constituted an economically privileged stratum of colonial society did not deter them from political agitation, although it was usually well-mannered; they sought full social status for Africans, as well as political enfranchisement and (ultimately) political power.[4] Third, we can identify a thrusting petty-bourgeoisie of mainly primary school teachers, clerks and small businessmen who were impatient to change places with the colonial elite for a variety of mixed, and sometimes contradictory, reasons: to develop the state

for the benefit of the people; to enrich themselves; and/or to transform the inherited socio-economic structure according to socialist principles. Fourth, there was a bureaucracy – hierarchical, compartmentalised and influenced by Western administrative values – whose members expected to profit from post-independence Africanisation policies. In the fifth place, there was an urban work-force, which sought to improve the wages and conditions of employment of workers through trade union activity; within a particular territory the trade union movement was occasionally linked with the dominant political party in a symbiotic relationship (as in Guinea), but more often it preferred to take independent economic or political action. Next, there was a large informal sector in the urban areas, made up of small shopkeepers and petty traders, sometimes supplementing an inadequate family income. Many of these petty traders were women; since colonial policies gave high priority to male wage employment over that of females, women (in West Africa especially) erected temporary pavement stalls, offering for sale cigarettes, matches, soap and other small articles (market trading was also important for women and a minority of them – such as Ghanaian women trading in imported cloth in Accra and Kumasi in the 1950s – did very well out of it). Finally, we identify a community of mostly cash-crop farmers who, in the southern areas of the Gold Coast, in other parts of West Africa and in Uganda, formed quite powerful farmers' associations in the post-Second World War period.

The socio-economic impact of cash-crop farming was often very great. In the Gold Coast, for example, cocoa was 'the people's industry' and led to the emergence of a new influential group of prosperous trading and business interests: the townsman with a number of cocoa farms in nearby villages, the trader with his cloth and general store, the cocoa broker acting as the link between farmer and European firm, and in time, too, the lorry-owner. In addition, there was a very large community of peasant farmers who grew food for themselves, their families and the urban market and who sometimes, as in Tanganyika, protested loudly against colonial agricultural regulations and thereby created a climate in which nationalism could develop.[5] These peasant farmers – constituting the bulk of the population in virtually all African states – together with urban workers and the unemployed, were the 'ordinary' people who looked for an improvement in their standard of living, better health care and increased educational opportunities for their children. Great importance was attached to education; if an educated citizenry is a characteristic of the modern nation-state, the lack of educational provision (extreme in Portuguese Africa) was acutely felt and powerfully reinforced anti-colonial nationalism.

Religious Associations

African nationalism was therefore composed of a number of different elements, representing sometimes interlocking, but often divergent, economic interests which united temporarily in an anti-colonial 'struggle'. This latter in turn appeared in various forms, according to the particular colonial context. One form was religious, especially in the early colonial period when opposition to colonial rule was either impossible or ineffective. Prophetic movements, such as Kimbanguism in the Belgian Congo, expressed new ideas and asserted an African way of doing things. The prophets themselves were remarkable people, and none more so than the Liberian William Wade Harris and Simon Kimbangu of the Belgian Congo.[6] 'With his cross, his Bible and his bowl for baptism in hand', Harris walked and preached from 1913 to 1915 along the West African coast 'in the most extraordinarily successful one man evangelical crusade that Africa has ever known'.[7] In the western Congo in 1921 reports of Kimbangu's healing powers attracted large numbers of people to his village of N'Kamba. Both men were harshly treated by the colonial authorities: Harris was expelled from the Ivory Coast, while Kimbangu spent 30 years in prison in the Congo where he died, still in prison, in October 1951. Yet they had a profound impact on the people's religious beliefs, leading eventually to an unintended outcome: the foundation of independent churches. In their messianic beliefs, these prophetic movements were paralleled by the Mahdist tradition within Islam.[8]

   The independent church movement was another expression of African dissent. Christian nationalists broke away from the European-dominated mission churches; in Nigeria, for example, many of them regarded Christian missionaries as 'the front troops of the Government to soften the hearts of the people'.[9] They founded self-governing, separatist 'Ethiopian' churches, modelled substantially on the churches from which they had seceded. Similarly, in Muslim Africa, political radicals reacted against traditionalism in Islam and founded not only Mahdist movements but also, and especially in French Africa, expressed Wahabist and modernist doctrines. In these ways, both Christians and Muslims created a climate in which modern forms of African nationalism – in the shape of congresses, parties and interest groups – could develop. Where (as in settler Africa, Namibia throughout most of the pre-independence period, and South Africa) such modern outlets for the expression of nationalist claims were absent or minimal, the independent church was important for a longer period, serving as a vehicle for radical nationalism.[10]

Political Parties

The political parties which became the vehicles of African nationalism within a few years of the ending of the Second World War were preceded by loosely structured and mainly urban-centred organisations; the latter had a limited appeal and were led in the main by middle-class elements, among whom lawyers, other professionals and merchants predominated. An early example of such an association was the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (ARPS): founded in the Gold Coast in 1897 to safeguard African rights to land, it continued in being to champion the African cause after the land issue was settled. Another was the National Congress of British West Africa which, following its foundation in 1920, tried to bridge the communications gap separating the four British West African colonies and to press for moderate constitutional reform in each territory; it was not founded as an anti-government movement and Casely Hayford, a prominent Gold Coast lawyer and one of its leading spirits, conceded that 'our interests as a people are identical with those of the Empire'.[11] The 1930s saw the emergence in British West Africa of territorially based youth movements, congresses and leagues; though better organised and more broadly based than such earlier associations as the ARPS and the NNDP – the Nigerian National Democratic Party, founded in Lagos in 1923 by Herbert Macaulay, a civil engineer and journalist – they put forward programmes of limited reform, appealed above all to a predominantly urban and educated public, and therefore did not attract effective mass support. Despite the radicalising effect of the Second World War (comparable with the effects of the First World War on India) the return of ex-servicemen who could not find jobs at a time when prices were rising sharply, and an increasingly strident African nationalist press, the congress-type organisation continued in the main to dominate the scene in British and French Africa in the early post-war years. The congress claimed to represent 'all the people'; it had a loosely knit, often federal structure comprising a number of affiliated associations, and pressed its claim to eventual self-rule or (in French Africa) to equality of political and social rights by petitions and deputations, supplemented (when these did not succeed) by mass demonstrations, national boycotts and general strikes.[12]

Notable examples of such congresses were the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), formed in August 1944; the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), an inter-territorial party established in French Africa in 1946; and the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, founded in 1947 and 1948, respectively. The NCNC was made up of a large number

of affiliated organisations (some 180 in 1945), including tribal unions (which were very important in the growth of Nigerian nationalism), professional associations and social and literary clubs; the decision in 1951 to admit members on an individual basis marked the transformation of the Council into a political party. The RDA, similarly, viewed itself as a 'national front'; in the words of Gabriel d'Arboussier, its secretary-general, it was 'a broad political organisation, including within itself all sorts of ideology; open to every national group, to men of all social conditions, and every Territory, grouped around a programme of concrete, definite aims'.[13]

Some of these congresses proved short-lived, while others gave birth to political parties, either because a new type of organisation was required to fight a general election or as a result of an internal split. The Gold Coast riots of 1948 and their aftermath revealed the sharp disagreement over strategy and tactics between the UGCC's moderate, middle-class leadership and Kwame Nkrumah, its general secretary; in 1949 Nkrumah broke with the UGCC and founded the CPP out of the already existing Committee on Youth Organisation. The CPP was a new type of political party; pledged to 'self government now' and with a well-articulated structure, it sought to enrol the bulk of the Gold Coast's adult population as individual members (but significantly, too, it retained the word 'convention' in its own title).[14] In Nigeria, as we have seen, the NCNC became more of a political party and less of a congress with the changeover to an individual-member basis of organisation in 1951. It could reasonably claim to be more national than any of the other parties which emerged in Nigeria in the 1950–60 period, but the extent of its support was limited. Though it won the backing of groups in the Christianised Middle Belt of the Northern Region, it made little impact on the Muslim North and yielded the initiative to the Action Group (AG), founded in 1951, in the Yoruba areas of the Western Region. Its strength lay in the Eastern region and the decision of its national president, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, to become Premier of that region in 1953 sealed the NCNC's identification as an Ibo-dominated body, no less committed to regional nationalism than its main rivals, the AG and the Northern People's Congress (NPC).[15] As for the RDA, its national front broke down in 1950 over the issue of compromise with the French administration. This was favoured by Houphouët-Boigny, its Ivorian president, and the RDA's conservative wing, while continued co-operation with the French communists was advocated by Gabriel d'Arboussier and the radical wing. Houphouët-Boigny was left in control of the RDA machinery but, as the emphasis in French policy shifted in the 1950s towards greater territorial autonomy, the strength of the RDA increasingly came to be located in its individual sections, such as the PDCI and the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG),

rather than in its central organisation; these parties adapted their organisation to fight elections to the territorial assemblies. The RDA's radical wing retained strong backing in Senegal and the French Cameroons and among trade unionists and students.[16]

If some political parties emerged out of 'parent' congresses, others, like the Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, were breakaways from existing parties or, like the Ghana Congress Party and the Sudanese National Unionist Party, came into being (in 1952 and 1953, respectively) as a result of a merger between minor parties and groups. Some parties, especially in French Africa, were nurtured by metropolitan parties: thus the (French) Movement Républicain Populaire supported the Parti Républicain Dahoméen, founded in 1951, while the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière) established a section in Senegal in 1936, under the leadership of Lamine Guèye. Other parties, such as the Union Progressiste Mauritanienne and the Union Démocratique Tchadienne, received such strong official backing as to be frequently dubbed *partis de l'Administration*. Several parties were of mixed origin. The National Liberation Movement (NLM), which was founded in the Ashanti region of the Gold Coast in 1954, contained a number of former CPP members who imported into the movement many of the organisational techniques which they had learned in the CPP; to that extent, the NLM, as well as the Muslim Association Party (MAP) and the Togoland Congress Party (TCP), can be regarded as communal parties which were in effect breakaways from the CPP.[17] But the NLM, which was backed by the Asantehene and all except one of the leading Ashanti chiefs, was also powerfully rooted in Ashanti tradition, and the traditional organisation reinforced the modern party organisation. An emotional appeal to Ashanti 'nationalism' was invoked to express Ashanti dissatisfaction with what was perceived to be the region's meagre share in the nation's resources. It was this belief that Nkrumah's government was discriminating unfairly against Ashanti interests and individuals that brought together in one hybrid organisation chiefs, cocoa farmers and traders, wealthy businessmen and ex-CPP leaders, and (Ashanti) townsmen and villagers. Many of the key members of the NLM, such as its chairman Bafuor Osei Akoto, senior linguist of the Asantehene and a prosperous cocoa farmer, had not formerly belonged to any political party, while others, such as Dr K. A. Busia, had actively opposed the CPP. Bafuor Akoto and the outlying paramount chiefs swore the Great Oath of Ashanti (or their own state oaths) in support of a movement that was also underpinned by paramilitary 'Action Groupers' (the equivalent of the CPP's Action Troopers) who were bedecked in NLM colours and armed with soda-water bottles, cudgels and guns.[18]

Finally, a number of political parties emerged out of cultural or other voluntary associations. Prominent examples were the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) (founded in the Ivory Coast in 1946), which had begun as a *comité d'action politique* of the Syndicat Agricole Africain, an organisation of African planters; the AG, which grew in Western Nigeria out of Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a Yoruba cultural association; the NPC (Northern Nigeria, 1951), a political offshoot of Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa, a pan-Northern, predominantly Hausa cultural organisation; the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP – 1951), which originated in the Sierra Leone Organisation Society, a body formed to promote co-operatives in the protectorate; and TANU (1954), which had its roots in the civil service-dominated Tanganyika African Association but whose subsequent growth owed a great deal to the strong rural protest against government agricultural regulations.

Whatever their origin – it was extra-parliamentary in nearly every case – African political parties often differed in important respects. There were obvious and sharp differences in the political experience of British and French Africa; as we shall see, these overlaid significant differences between parties *within* each region. The 'metropolitan axis' of French colonial policy had its counterpart in the party political sphere since a political party might well affiliate with a French political party, as the PDCI did for a time with the French Communist Party in the late 1940s; the ties were severed in October 1950. The PDCI was itself a territorial section of an inter-territorial political party, the RDA, of which there was no equivalent in British Africa following the Second World War. French African experience was also distinct in that the primary objective of political parties in at least the early post-war period was to secure for Africans equality of rights as French citizens rather than independence; in 1956 France reacted to the rising tide of nationalism by accepting territorial autonomy as a way to prevent independence.[19] In other countries again, including Algeria, the Portuguese territories and the white minority-ruled regimes of Southern Africa, political parties had to engage in protracted armed struggle to secure their independence. Such parties, in the pre-independence period, had no (or virtually no) opportunity of influencing and controlling the personnel and policy of government. This also corresponded with the experience of Zaire, though here there was at least an attempt, if mismanaged, at a constitutional transfer of power; but it contrasted with that of a country such as Ghana, where the transition to independence was relatively smooth and the CPP ruled, in a diarchical arrangement with the British, for six years before independence in March 1957.

This varying historical experience of Africa's political parties was supplemented by other distinctions based on differences in structure, recruitment

and the social basis of support, as well as on ideology and leadership. While some parties, like the CPP in Ghana and the PDG in Guinea, sought to appeal to the lower-middle strata of the population, others, such as the NPC in Nigeria and the Parti Progressiste Nigérien (PPN) in Niger, had a narrower appeal, the NPC especially being at the outset the mouthpiece of the native authorities. The former type of party has been characterised as a 'mass' party, which was structurally strong, ideologically based, had leaders who were selected for their political ability, sought to enrol as many individual members within its ranks as it could, and tried to take under its wing such interest groups as trade and co-operative unions and farmers' organisations. The NPC type of party has been described as an 'elite' party, built up out of associations affiliated to it, with a leadership enjoying ascriptive status and with a weakly articulated structure.[20] This categorisation, however, is inexact. The elite and mass parties represented ideal types and the divisions between them were never clear-cut. Moreover, parties sometimes grew away from their origins: thus, when it was forced by events to conduct a general election campaign, the NPC in Nigeria changed its nature and developed many of the structural features and organisational techniques of the mass party.[21] Other parties were difficult to categorise. The PDCI, for example, had many of the characteristics of the mass party but was more pragmatic than ideological and made formal use of ethnic bases of support in its organisation;[22] from the outset its policies were geared to the interests of the wealthy African planter group to which the party owed its existence rather than to the needs of the peasants and workers. Moreover, the patron–client relationship, which was supposed to typify the elite party, was also important within mass-type party organisations such as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in Kenya, UNIP in Zambia and the UPS in Senegal.

The ideological spectrum of Africa's pre-independence political parties was broad. Few of the parties which led their countries to independence in or about 1960 were revolutionary and committed to the transformation of the existing socio-economic structure, though the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria promised to be one such group and the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG) in Guinea another. Most parties were reformist, including the CPP in Ghana and TANU in Tanganyika, while others – the Ivory Coast's PDCI and KANU in Kenya, for example – were inclined to be conservative in orientation. The case of KANU is particularly instructive, demonstrating that a liberation struggle (assuming that Mau Mau in the 1950s can be interpreted in this light) does not necessarily have a radicalising effect. Evidence from Zimbabwe (independent in April 1980) and Namibia (independent in March 1990) reinforces this conclusion, despite the strong commitment to socialism expressed by the political leaders of

both states when they were fighting for independence. In Zimbabwe, social-ist ideology influenced foreign policy to an extent, but had limited impact on public policy generally,[23] notwithstanding Mugabe's anti-capitalist invective over the land issue. The government's predominantly pragmatic and politi-cal approach to economic issues was mirrored in Namibia, where the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) government recognised the country's extreme dependence on South Africa by publicly stating that it was in favour of a mixed economy. The experience of Guinea–Bissau, Angola and Mozambique suggested that the transition from liberation movement to revolutionary regime could occur only where the movement's leadership unambiguously embraced socialism during the course of the struggle and mounted an intensive political education campaign among its followers. However, subsequent events in all three states raised the question of the strength of their revolutionary commitment.

The quality and style of party leadership also varied. The contrast was sharp between the quiet authority of Milton Margai of Sierra Leone and Seretse Khama of Botswana and the showmanship (combined, however, with considerable organisational skill) of Nkrumah or Egypt's Jamal Abd-al Nasser; or again, between the philosophical reflectiveness of Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and the strident nation-alism of Guinea's Sékou Touré. Many of these leaders were said to have been 'charismatic' in that, in the view of their followers, they possessed 'exemplary' powers. However, as Chinoy observed, 'no prophet can suc-ceed unless the circumstances are propitious', and in the run-up to inde-pendence the sociological aspect of charisma was no less important than the psychological. Innate qualities of leadership might have gone unrecognised if the party leaders had not also had 'the right message to convey at the right time'.[24] In many cases, the message – of 'freedom' and the importance of unity to attain it (*uhuru na umoja* in Tanganyika) – was commonly deliv-ered at a public rally during pre-independence election campaigns. The social context within which a leader such as Samora Machel of Mozambique operated was very different, though in practice charismatic leadership was hardly less important even where there was an ideologically based liberation movement. This is illustrated by the standing of Amilcar Cabral in Guinea–Bissau.

All leaders recognised the importance of mounting a united campaign. For this purpose, many of them, and especially the heads of the so-called 'mass parties' like the CPP in Ghana and the US in the French Soudan (now Mali), founded party youth, elders' and women's wings. They also sought to bring trade union and farmers' organisations and co-operative groups under the party umbrella in order to form a single national movement. The

following section focuses on trade unions which, unlike the peasant farming community in non-plantation industrial economies, were not a scattered labour force but were mostly urban-centred. Potentially, therefore, the trade union movement was a powerful ally of the political party in the struggle against colonialism.

Interest Groups

The phrase 'African societomania' has been coined to describe the process whereby a large number of voluntary associations sprang up in the expanding urban centres of colonial Africa, especially in the post-Second World War period.[25] These associations ranged from youth, student, women's, old boys' and professional bodies to organisations, such as savings clubs, ethnic mutual benefit groups, craft groups and trade unions, which were in large measure a response to the sense of social and psychological insecurity felt by people who had left their rural homes and entered a new and strange urban environment. They served at once as the vehicles of new ideas and a proving ground for political leaders. Though many of the early groups were small and short-lived and had an interlocking leadership, their cumulative effect was vitally important for the emergence of the African nationalist movement.

　A small number of these associations (such as the Boy Scouts) were inspired by the colonial administration, but others bore a more distinctly African imprint. Among the latter were craft organisations; many of these were linked with traditional structures, while others occasionally grew out of old boys' associations. In time, the early syndical groups were transformed into mass organisations; an association at Bamako was instrumental in creating the first trade unions in the French Soudan in 1937.[26] That these organisations often became linked to the territory's emergent nationalist movement was an unintended consequence. Official advice – given, for example, by British labour commissioners and French *inspecteurs du travail* – was that the trade unions should not become politically involved. Instead, trade union leaders should (they were told) concentrate on strengthening union organisation by replacing, as in Tanganyika, a plethora of small craft unions with nation-wide industrial unions affiliated to a central organisation, and on using the new structure to negotiate better wages and conditions of work for their members. However, there were forces pulling in an opposite direction: the new nationalist movements that were beginning to emerge in post-war Africa sought to politicise, and bring under their wing, a large number of voluntary associations, including the trade

unions. Thus, in the pre-independence period, the labour movement was subject to dual pressures: it was both pulled towards political involvement, because of the sympathy of trade unionists with the nationalist movements to which most of them belonged in an individual capacity, and away from it in order to concentrate on industrial relations. The result, perhaps inevitably, was a very mixed picture and one which has evoked a sharply contrasting response from scholars who have studied the political role of African trade unions in the pre-independence period.[27]

There is universal agreement that in Guinea the party and trade unions constituted two legs of a single nationalist movement: Sékou Touré, the president of the PDG, had a trade union background and the Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTAN), which was founded in January 1957 as a result of a merger between the country's principal labour groups, played an important part in the achievement of independence.[28] Union–party ties were generally closer in French Africa than in British Africa, though the French Cameroons was an exception to the typical francophone pattern.[29] In some countries a period of intense political activity on the part of a labour movement might be followed by a long period of quiescence. Nigeria was a case in point: the vigorous activity of one segment of labour under the sponsorship of the Zikist movement after 1945 ended in 1950, and for more than a decade thereafter the labour movement was 'altogether outside the political main-stream'.[30] As in several other countries, it was itself divided over the question of political involvement.

In the Gold Coast the CPP, which formed the government in 1951 under a diarchical arrangement with the British, sought to use a reconstituted TUC to bring the labour movement under its control. It was supported in this move by CPP activists in the TUC, of whom the most prominent was John Tettegah, but was opposed by the leaders of individual unions, notably the Mineworkers, the UAC Workers, and the Railway Employees, who successfully battled to maintain the autonomy of their unions in the period up to 1958, when the Industrial Relations Act cut the ground from under their feet.[31] A similar split within the labour movement occurred in Northern Rhodesia, where the main upholder of the principle of non-involvement in politics was the powerful African Mineworkers' Union (AMU). What Amsden said of trade unionism and politics in Kenya also applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to Northern Rhodesia/Zambia: 'When examining the relations between trade unions and political life in Kenya, it appears crucial to avoid the pitfall of viewing Kenya's trade union movement as a homogeneous unity.' It was important, he maintained, to distinguish between 'the highly publicised political forays at the top of the union structure' and the activities of the individual unions affiliated to the Kenya Federation of Labour

(KFL), most of which were 'concerned almost exclusively with bread and butter issues'.[32]

The relationship between parties and unions often fell short of formal ties until the eve of independence. This was the case in Tanganyika where, as in the Gold Coast and many other colonies, the fact that trade unions antedated the formation of the dominant party gave them an independent basis of power and influence. There was also the fear that if the government should move against TANU, which it regarded as an extremist organisation, the trade union movement might also be proscribed. By the end of 1958, with TANU's victory in the first part of the 1958–9 general election, the danger was past, and the party and TFL grew closer together, though it was not until February 1961 that the TFL was given two seats on the TANU national executive committee. A review of the history of party–union relations in Tanganyika, which can be paralleled by the history of the Gold Coast and a number of other British dependencies, reveals periods of co-operation, estrangement and conflict, with the tendency for disagreement increasing in the terminal period of colonial rule, when substantial issues (such as Africanisation and citizenship in Tanganyika) divided the two sides.[33]

While Berg and Butler rightly challenged the earlier view that African trade unions were merely party instruments in the pre-independence period, Jeffries rightly points out that by concentrating too much on the behaviour of the majority of workers (or unions) and overlooking the significance of particular, more radical groups, Berg and Butler 'misconstrued the dynamics and direction of union development'.[34] Radical elements within a country's labour movement did indeed have interests which conflicted sharply with those of *apparatchiks* in the nationalist party. However, it must also be stressed that in the pre-independence period most trade unionists shared the politicians' resentment of foreign rule, being convinced that the economy was geared to foreign commercial and industrial interests; they believed that the standard of living of the workers could not be significantly improved until political independence was achieved. This belief was perhaps most strongly held in areas of white settlement, such as Northern Rhodesia, where the wages and employment conditions of the white workers were much better than those of the blacks. There is no doubt that the effect of this common (party–union) outlook was often to strengthen the thrust of African nationalism: in Tanganyika, for example, individual unionists joined TANU, while new union members were largely recruited from party ranks, resulting in a rapid expansion in the size of the trade union movement in the second half of the 1950s. However, we need to think predominantly in terms of parallel lines of resistance to colonial rule, with the political party and trade union movement sometimes agreeing, but also

often disagreeing, on the appropriate tactics to adopt. Though in Kenya the KFL, under Tom Mboya's leadership, conducted a holding operation for KANU (then the Kenya African Union) during the emergency period of the 1950s when nationally based political parties were proscribed, the fact was that the political party was avowedly political in a way that the labour movement was not, or at most times could not afford to be. It was above all the political party which aggregated and voiced the demand for independence. Partly in consequence, but also because of the differing functions of trade unions and political parties, it was the politicians rather than the trade unionists who were to benefit most when independence was achieved.

As far as most women were concerned, this distinction between the benefits accruing to members of political parties and labour organisations was not very meaningful as they were losers on both counts. As noted above, technical advance had passed most women by and relatively few of them were in wage employment. Moreover, although they had played an active political role in the women's wings of the political parties which were returned to power in pre-independence general elections – for example, those held in the Gold Coast in 1951, 1954 and 1956 – they were severely under-represented in the parliaments, and even more in the governments, which emerged from those elections. This pattern was carried over into the post-independence period.

The Transfer of Power

Nationalist pressure, particularly following the Gold Coast riots of 1948, quickened the tempo of constitutional reform throughout British Africa: the Gold Coast itself progressed from semi-responsible government in 1951 to internal self-government in 1954, and finally to independence in 1957. The progression was much the same in the other three West African colonies, though the adoption of federalism in Nigeria made that country's constitutional arrangements necessarily more complex. There were hiccups along the way, caused, however, not by the reluctance of the British to transfer power but by the outbreak of domestic political conflict, notably the eruption of communalism in the Gold Coast, the colony–protectorate cleavage in Sierra Leone and (though less fundamental) in the Gambia, and the demand for the creation of more states in Nigeria. The process in each case was punctuated by a series of elections to what, in the Gold Coast by mid-1954, had become an entirely African legislature from which the cabinet was drawn and to which it was responsible. These elections were keenly contested by a number of parties and gave a good indication of how the

political system worked. In each pre-independence election the CPP won comfortably in the Gold Coast, as did the SLPP in Sierra Leone and (from 1960) the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in the Gambia. In Nigeria, by contrast, the operation of the Westminster system of government was distorted because of the absence of truly national parties: each of the three main parties had a regional power base.

However, it is important to note that several of the parties which spearheaded the 'freedom struggle' and formed the government when independence was eventually achieved, rested on a somewhat slender base of voluntary support. Take, for example, the showing of the CPP in the pre-independence general election of 1956 in the Gold Coast. The results were as follows: CPP, 71 seats, 57 per cent of the total votes cast; non-CPP, 33 seats, 43 per cent of the total votes cast. Judged by the standards of a multi-party election in the West, this was a convincing win for the governing party. However, when these results are broken down by region, the victory is less impressive: the CPP won only two out of the country's four regions, losing Ashanti to the NLM and the MAP and the North to the Northern People's Party (NPP). Again the figure of 57 per cent of the total votes cast for the CPP is reduced to 28.5 per cent if the CPP vote is taken as a percentage of the registered electorate, and to a meagre 15 per cent if the eligible electorate (adults aged 21 and over who were entitled to register) is taken as the basis of calculation.[35] Thus CPP rule in the post-independence period rested on the *expressed* support of roughly one in six of the estimated eligible voters. (Of course, many people in the two Colony regions may not have registered because they regarded the contest as a forgone conclusion in areas where the CPP was dominant.) Support for the governing party declined further under the Republic inaugurated in 1960, though no free elections were held to test the extent of that decline, and the one-party state created in 1964 rested on flimsy foundations.

This pattern of constitutional advance punctuated by periodic elections was repeated in the rest of British Africa (except Rhodesia), though the early stage of multi-tiered, indirect elections in West Africa was omitted in East Africa.[36] Other variations occurred according to local circumstance, such as the constitutionally entrenched position created for Buganda within the Uganda protectorate and the existence between 1953 and 1963 of a Central African Federation embracing the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In East and Central Africa, as in Britain's West African colonies, elections were contested by two or more parties, the challenge to the dominant party being weak in some cases (in Nyasaland and Tanganyika, for example) and strong in others, such as Kenya, Northern

Rhodesia and Uganda. Multi-party elections even preceded the transfer of power in Rhodesia (under the abortive internal settlement in April 1979 and again under British supervision in February 1980), the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU-PF) emerging a more decisive victor the second time than many observers had predicted. In most cases, the Gold Coast lesson was repeated: measured in terms of support among eligible voters, the legitimacy of the party which took the country to independence was not impressive and meant that on this calculation the designation 'mass party' was not warranted.

On becoming independent a British-ruled territory – whether colony, protectorate or even trust territory like Tanganyika – in principle became a constitutional monarchy with the British Queen as its Queen, represented by a governor-general, and with a Westminster model of constitution, providing for an interlocking cabinet and legislature, a separate judiciary, and an independent public service commission. The monarchical arrangement was to prove short-lived, India having earlier demonstrated that republicanism was not incompatible with Commonwealth membership. While Nigeria and Uganda opted for formal, non-executive presidents after the Indian model (encountering some problems in each case in defining acceptable limits in practice to the scope of presidential influence), the other British territories followed Ghana's lead in 1960 in making constitutional provision for an executive presidency. Though Malawi waited two years after achieving independence in 1964 before adopting a republican constitution with an executive president, by 1964 the pattern had been set. On attaining independence that year, Northern Rhodesia immediately became the Republic of Zambia, headed by a president vested with executive powers. At independence two years later, Bechuanaland protectorate became the Republic of Botswana, though the other former High Commission territories (Lesotho and Swaziland) chose to remain monarchies, albeit with their own monarchs replacing the British Queen. The changeover to republican status had in all cases more than symbolic importance since it opened the way to the establishment of personal rule; however, it did not necessarily involve an abrupt change in the practice of government. Thus, for some time after Tanganyika changed from a Westminster-style parliamentary regime to a republic in December 1962, President Nyerere did not impose his own views on his ministers and an attempt was made in cabinet to secure unanimity. However, as the country faced a series of crises both at home and abroad in and after 1964, the President increasingly took important initiatives, often acting without any reference to the cabinet.

The constitutional context within which elections were held in French Africa was very different. Independence was never demanded throughout the

Fourth Republic (1946–58) and the overseas territories remained 'integral parts of an indivisible Republic'.[37] With responsibility for legislation vested in the French parliament, the territorial assemblies established in each French African colony and in Togo and the Cameroons (both UN trust territories) possessed limited powers, and these were primarily in the budgetary and financial spheres. It was only under the *loi cadre* reforms of June 1956 that these powers were increased and provision was made for the introduction of universal franchise and elected territorial executives. Although these reforms changed significantly the relations between France and its overseas territories, they were not designed as a prelude to the grant of independence.[38]

A uniform pattern of elections was introduced throughout French Africa and, under the Fourth Republican Constitution of 1946, voters went to the polls frequently – in order to cast their ballots in elections to the territorial assemblies, the French National Assembly and in referenda. The result was that they had more experience of limited suffrage and universal suffrage elections before independence than their British or Belgian counterparts.[39] (In the Belgian Congo, where the process of the transfer of power was drastically telescoped, there was only one territory-wide election before independence that was comparable to those held elsewhere, and there were only two such elections in Ruanda-Urundi, the Belgian-administered UN trust territory.)[40] Universal suffrage was introduced in French Africa in 1957, and in the general elections held that year the victorious party won so convincingly in many cases that it was able to consolidate its position at the next elections in 1959. Thus, PDCI candidates obtained 89 per cent of the votes cast and won all but two of the 60 seats in the Ivorian territorial assembly; 54 per cent of those registered voted, representing about 49 per cent of the eligible electorate.[41]

On the other hand, an overwhelmingly dominant party did not emerge in every case, and in Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey and Niger the party that won control of the government in 1957 lost power at the subsequent elections, leaving the way clear for the new ruling party to make use of the government machinery to strengthen its position. In general, party dominance resulted in high levels of electoral participation in French Africa; in British Africa, by contrast, a high turnout was most likely when, as in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, party fragmentation occurred and inter-party competition increased:[42]

> One of the reasons for the generally higher levels of party dominance in French Africa than in British Africa was the different electoral system in use. Voters chose a party under the French multimember list system and an individual candidate under the British single-member constituency system; the French system favoured the strongest party and tended to

eliminate weak ones. A second explanation was rooted in the nature of colonial rule: the French reduced the power of chiefs and traditional institutions and thus fostered elite cohesion, while the British policy of indirect rule sponsored two systems of authority and legitimacy (the traditional and the modern) and thereby heightened elite fragmentation. Whereas British policy enabled local and traditional leaders to serve as power brokers, there was less opportunity in French Africa to politicise ethnic groups. Moreover, because of the later and more limited provision of education in French than in British Africa, there was less of a split within the modern elite in most French colonies than occurred in British, and especially non-settler, Africa, between an older, predominantly urban elite of doctors, lawyers and merchants and the petty-bourgeoisie of primary school teachers, clerks and small traders which had emerged in the nationalist ferment of the post-Second World War period.[43]

The type of franchise in use was also probably important: the French list system of voting may have exaggerated the extent of party support. Whatever the explanation, the leading parties in French Africa were successful in using subsequent elections to secure very high voter turnouts; by independence they had consolidated their position to such an extent that *de facto* one-party regimes already existed and appeared to enjoy a high level of legitimacy.

It needs to be stressed, however, that although elections were more frequent and attracted higher voter turnouts in post-war French than British Africa, they were less meaningful from a nationalist perspective. They were not signposts along the road to independence but stages in the achievement by Africans of equality as French citizens. The 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic made independence possible, but also incompatible with membership of the (French) Community, a grouping of French 'autonomous republics' with its own senate and executive council, possessing consultative powers.[44] President de Gaulle made it clear that a territory voting 'No' in the constitutional referendum of 28 September 1958 had to 'take the consequences'; these were that it would receive no aid from France. Only Guinea chose the independence option, the other colonies in French West and Equatorial Africa electing to belong to the Community; powers on certain enumerated matters, including foreign policy, defence and currency, were reserved in practice to France and in effect to its President. However, these arrangements proved short-lived; the French changed their stance in 1959 and the next year amended Title XII of the Constitution in order to make it possible for a state to be independent and yet remain a member of the 'Communauté renovée'.[45] Each French African state negotiated its own independence with France. The resultant economic and political co-operation

agreements included new defence arrangements, negotiated on a bilateral
basis or in the form of collective sub-regional defence agreements like that
between France and the four countries of AEF. In the event all the franco-
phone states, except Guinea, entered into military assistance agreements with
France and a nucleus among them, including Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and
Senegal, retained closer links with France by also signing individual defence
agreements. (By contrast, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact of 1960 was a
modest affair, yet it was strongly attacked in Nigeria by the Opposition and
by radical and other critics, and was abrogated in early 1962.) These new, pre-
dominantly single-party states also inherited the centralising traditions of the
French. In general they possessed strong executives, modelled on the presi-
dential institutions which de Gaulle had made the centre-piece of France's
still novel Fifth Republic. Except where two political leaders of more or less
equal stature necessitated a power-sharing arrangement between a president
and prime minister – as in Senegal between 1960 and 1963 and in Dahomey
and Congo-Brazzaville for short periods – executive authority in the imme-
diate post-independence period was monopolised by the president to a greater
extent than in anglophone Africa, where vestiges of the British cabinet sys-
tem, with its emphasis on collective responsibility, persisted. Moreover in this
period, too, legislatures in French-speaking Africa were considerably weaker
than in English-speaking Africa and, within the framework of a prefectoral-
type system, local authorities were less autonomous.[46]

The Lusophone Experience

The three main movements fighting for independence in Portuguese Africa
were the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Partido
Africano da Indepêndencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and the Frente
de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). In conducting such a struggle,
the movements were not unique: guerrilla warfare subsequently paved the
way to independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Again, independence in
both Algeria in 1962 and Kenya the following year was preceded by several
years of bloody conflict. The post-independence government established by
Mohammed Ben Bella in Algeria expressed socialist pretensions, but a
pragmatic brand of non-revolutionary socialism was established and main-
tained until Ben Bella was removed in a military *coup* in 1965; Zimbabwe,
similarly, did not transform its inherited socio-economic structure. In
Kenya, Mau Mau was 'an integral part of an ongoing, rationally conceived
nationalist movement',[47] employing oaths and covert organisational methods
in a militant protest against the colonial settler system and leading to the

declaration of a state of emergency. However, it did not result in the radicalisation of Kenyan society, and Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism did no more than provide a thin socialist veneer to a predominantly capitalist framework. These various examples (from Algeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya) appear to substantiate Munslow's contention that a protracted armed struggle is 'a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition' for the revolutionary transformation of a nationalist movement.[48] The nationalist movements in Portuguese Africa supplied the missing ingredient – ideological commitment based on Marxism–Leninism.

In *Mozambique* FRELIMO, founded in June 1962, brought together three proto-nationalist parties and different classes – workers, peasants and the petty-bourgeoisie – in a common 'front' to oppose colonialism and demand national independence; the armed struggle began in September 1964. However, unity was fragile and needed to be cemented. The period 1967–70 particularly was one of internal crisis for FRELIMO, as two sharply opposed conceptions of the nationalist struggle emerged.[49] One section of the leadership, represented by the chairmen of Cabo Delgado, saw independence not as a means of accomplishing a social revolution but of establishing themselves in power within what would necessarily be a neo-colonial framework. On the other hand, the revolutionaries in FRELIMO sought to transform the nature of society in the liberated zones (for example, by collectivising production and through co-operatives); they argued that they were not fighting the whites so much as the exploitative system upon which Portuguese domination rested, and that women, youths and elders should all participate in the liberation struggle. The views of the revolutionaries prevailed both at the Second Congress of FRELIMO, held at Niassa in July 1968, and subsequently, despite severe set-backs to their cause (including the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, the party president, in February 1969). With the election of Samora Machel as president and Marcelino dos Santos as vice-president in May 1970, FRELIMO embarked on the final phase of the national liberation struggle; it did so under a leadership convinced that 'in our struggle everything, absolutely everything, depends on the people'[50] and that revolutionary ideology, drawing upon Marxist–Leninist principles, must inform daily practice. Political work was intensified at all levels and increased stress was placed on the primacy of the ideological struggle and the conduct of party cadres in the liberated areas. Old ideas and structures were discarded in favour of new economic and social relationships. The achievement of independence in 1975 provided Samora Machel and his government with the opportunity of establishing these relationships throughout the new state of Mozambique.

In *Angola* nationalism grew apace in the 1950s and by the beginning of 1961 Angola was, in John Marcum's graphic description, 'a black powder

keg with a ready fuse';[51] rebellion erupted that year in northern Angola. In a way that was more reminiscent of Rhodesia than Mozambique or Guinea–Bissau, the nationalist movement was subject to deep internal divisions, along primarily ethno-linguistic lines. Under this 'communal tripolarity', the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), which resulted in 1962 from the merger of two earlier parties, drew its main support from the Bakongo of the north; the União Nacional para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola (UNITA), founded in 1966, from the Ovimbundu and Chokwe of the south; and the MPLA, established in 1956, from the Mbundu of north-central Angola. However, the MPLA especially nurtured wider, national loyalties: it was strongly entrenched in the major urban centres and had a well-educated, largely Marxist and mulatto leadership; it appealed to the urban intelligentsia of all the country's communities, including the *mestiços* – people of mixed race – and the Portuguese.[52] Though the MPLA initially lacked the rural orientation of its rival organisations, it tried to identify with Angola's peasants and established camps, clinics and schools in the liberated areas under its control. Of the three nationalist movements, it was the most active in fighting the liberation struggle and the most assiduous in its attempts to involve the peasants in a variety of participatory structures. It also introduced a politicisation programme in Marxism, though ideological penetration was shallow in parts of the country.[53] While no ethno-linguistic region was entirely solid in its support of a particular liberation movement, the basic 'communal tripolarity' persisted throughout the liberation struggle and Angolan nationalists failed to form a united front.[54]

Apart from these communal differences and the deep mistrust which the leaders of the liberation movements had for each other, the movements varied in their policies and their external alliances. FNLA's chief support came from Zaire; it was also backed by the OAU (in the early 1960s) and by the USA, China and North Korea. The MPLA's basis of external support was wider and included the OAU (from about 1964), the Soviet bloc, Cuba, and left-wing parties in Portugal. Though it had established a clear dominance by 1972, the 'Chipende crisis' – a power struggle within the MPLA in 1972–3 – proved a serious set-back and checked MPLA's penetration into the Huambo-Bie area of central Angola. This worked to the advantage of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, who was able to gain followers in this important, food-producing region. The result was that no movement achieved permanent dominance before the collapse of Portuguese rule.[55]

The *coup d'état* in Portugal in April 1974 and the preparations for Portuguese withdrawal from its African colonies ushered in a bitter power struggle in Angola. The government of national unity, established under the Alvor Agreement of January 1975, collapsed and the power struggle was

internationalised. South African troops invaded Angola in October 1975 in support of UNITA and the FNLA, which were also helped by clandestine US military aid and the recruitment of mercenaries.[56] However, the decisive factor proved to be the massive Soviet and Cuban intervention on the side of the MPLA. An MPLA government under Dr Agosthino Neto soon came to be widely, though not universally, recognised as the legal government of Angola; the USA withheld recognition.

Guinea–Bissau[57] was the smallest and least developed of the Portuguese colonies. It was geared to the interests of a large Portuguese firm, the Companhia União Fabril (CUF), which had almost a monopoly in the country; the use of forced labour for crop cultivation was widespread and cash-crop prices were artificially depressed. The PAIGC, which was founded in 1956, combined members of the main ethnic groups of the mainland (Fula, Mandinga, Manjaca and Balante) and the geographically separate and lighter-skinned population of the *Cape Verde* islands. Within six years of launching the armed struggle in 1963, the PAIGC – led by Amilcar Cabral, an agronomist from Cape Verde – controlled over half the country; elected village committees, people's stores and people's courts were established in the liberated areas and the work of socio-economic reconstruction was begun, emphasis being placed on agricultural production, health care and education. The great strength of the PAIGC was its ability to adapt itself to the conditions imposed by the struggle and, in this respect, it was helped by what Chabal has called its 'pragmatic attitude towards ideology'. Though Cabral drew substantially upon Marxist theory in his own writing, he insisted that the party should avoid doctrinal rigidity. He told his party cadres, to whose training he gave a great deal of personal attention, to 'remember that the people are not fighting for ideas', but 'to gain material advantages, to live better and in peace, to benefit from progress, and for the better future of their children'.[58] The result of this approach was not only that the party avoided ideological disputes and party splits, but that its cadres spoke in a language which the ordinary villager could understand. Sadly, Cabral was assassinated in January 1973 some nine months before the PAIGC Assembly proclaimed the independence of Guinea–Bissau and the Cape Verde islands. Portugal delayed recognition of independence until 1974 and 1975, respectively.

Zimbabwe and South Africa

Rhodesia became independent in 1980 as the Republic of *Zimbabwe*, following a protracted period of armed conflict; the latter culminated in British-supervised elections in February 1980, resulting in a sweeping victory

for the ZANU-PF party led by Robert Mugabe. The conflict took the form of a nationalist struggle rather than (in the words of Samora Machel) 'a revolutionary struggle that implies profound changes in the society'.[59] Mugabe and the other early nationalist leaders, who were detained inside Rhodesia between 1964 and 1974, lacked direct experience of guerrilla warfare until the mid-1970s. ZANU was also wracked by infighting among its various factions. However, the party changed its methods after 1972 and its military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), improved its guerrilla war tactics, relying heavily on politicising the peasantry. The assassination of Herbert Chitepo (the national chairman) in 1975, and the wholesale detention of leading ZANU members by the Zambian government, set back ZANU's conversion into an effective instrument of war. But the set-back was only temporary. Close links were established between ZANU's political and military wings, and the importance of ideology was stressed.[60] New organisational structures, in the form of elected people's committees and a network of *mujibas* (mobilised youth who served as intermediaries between the guerrillas and the people's committees), were also established and some political education was undertaken.[61]

For its part, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) adopted different tactics. It was the older (and increasingly Ndebele-based) nationalist party which became the Patriotic Front Party (PFP) when the Patriotic Front split to contest the 1980 elections. The majority of ZAPU troops were not committed to fighting a protracted people's war, of which mass politicisation and mobilisation were essential components, but were held in reserve in their external (mainly Zambian) bases, waiting for an opportunity (which never came) to strike against Rhodesia's main economic centres and to seize power in Salisbury and the other cities. Joshua Nkomo, the party leader, was confident that the people still supported ZAPU, which relied on organisational structures established in the early 1960s and subsequently maintained underground. The fact was, however, that such residue of countrywide support as remained began to ebb in the second half of the 1970s as the liberation war, spearheaded by ZANU rather than ZAPU, spread and achieved greater impact. While ZAPU retained some support in the operational areas – almost entirely in Matabeleland through the successes of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), its military wing – it did not assume direct responsibility even here for administering the liberated areas. Its tactics contributed to a marked regional split in the 1980 general election; ZAPU failed to win any seat outside Matabeleland.

South Africa[62] is a complex multi-racial society made up of Blacks, Whites, Asians and Coloureds numbering some 44 million in all. Its present-day politics have been shaped by inter-white confrontation between British

rulers and the descendants of Dutch settlers ('Boers' or 'Afrikaners'), leading to the Boer War of 1899–1902, and by a black–white confrontation only finally resolved by the advent of majority rule in 1994. Following the Boer War, moderate Whites designed the structure for an independent South Africa that came into being in 1910 and substantially ignored the interests of the African majority. Excluded from the best land, and ultimately from all but 13 per cent of the land area, Africans were expected to provide the cheap labour needed by the white-controlled mines, commercial companies and farms. Discrimination against them increased following the assumption of political power in 1948 by Afrikaner nationalists under the banner of the National Party (NP); the latter was led by Dr D. F. Malan, who became Prime Minister. Having campaigned on a platform of *apartheid* (separate development of the races) the NP government sought to make substantial inroads into the sphere of financial and industrial capitalism hitherto monopolised by English-speaking whites, and to protect white labour from African competition in the urban areas. *Apartheid* therefore came to embody a far-reaching programme of separate territorial development: most Africans were to live in *bantustans* or 'homelands', enjoying partial self-government but denied any rights as South African citizens. Conditions in the homelands were so poor and work opportunities so limited that large numbers were forced to migrate to the towns to seek employment. Living in mine compounds and in crowded and insanitary townships – of which the South Western Township ('Soweto') in Johannesburg is the largest and best known – they were to be excellent fodder for the African nationalist movement.

The main African challenge to white rule was mounted by the ANC, an organisation founded in 1912 and committed to Gandhi-style passive resistance. Congress used boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience as its weapons until the Sharpeville massacre (discussed below); NP government excesses finally turned it to violent protest. As discrimination was extended to other population groups, the African National Congress (ANC) was joined in its opposition to *apartheid* and in its bid for a share in political power by Indian, Coloured and liberal white organisations. In 1959, stimulated by the success of African nationalist movements in Ghana, Nigeria and other parts of the Continent, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was formed as a breakaway from the ANC, whose vision of a multi-racial society it rejected.

In March 1960 the PAC organised demonstrations against carrying passes; at Sharpeville in the Transvaal the police reacted by firing on an unarmed crowd, killing 72 Africans and wounding more than twice that number. International opinion was outraged and for a time there was an outflow of foreign capital. However, the reality of white control within South Africa was in no way diminished. Indeed, the structure of white power

remained awesomely intact and, with the banning of both the ANC and PAC and the life imprisonment of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and other African leaders in the 1964 Rivonia trial, the nationalist movement entered a quiescent phase. Oliver Tambo and other exiled ANC officials concentrated on winning external backing for their cause.

Following Sharpeville, the NP government retreated for a time into a 'lager strategy', from which it eventually emerged to open up a dialogue with African leaders – notably President Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Dr Kofi Busia, the Ghanaian Prime Minister – who had become convinced that armed conflict with South Africa would get nowhere. It also attempted in the late 1970s to encircle South Africa with a protective ring or 'constellation' of independent friendly states and semi-autonomous homelands. The dialogue initiative split the ruling NP into the *verligtes* (enlightened, or outward-looking) and the *verkramptes* (stubborn and inward-looking) over the best way to maintain white supremacy. The government's opponents lacked the strength and unity to capitalise on these divisions. The creation of 'a constellation of Southern African states' was the South African government's response to the situation resulting from the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique in 1974. In a more fluid and potentially threatening setting than ever before, it was the latest of the government's schemes for forging closer economic links with the black states to the north. However, the chances of immediate success were slim.

The demise of Portuguese colonialism, and the grant of independence to Zimbabwe in 1980, changed the whole political climate in Southern Africa. It meant that the South African government could no longer control its external environment or be confident of containing indefinitely mounting domestic political pressures. Western governments, and especially the British government, were anxious to protect their economic and security interests in Southern Africa and were convinced that peaceful constitutional change was essential.[63] This came to be the view also of the Soviet Union: while wishing to preserve its influence in the region, it was not willing to risk a major confrontation in an area which, historically, lay within the Western sphere of interest and over a country – South Africa – which it saw as 'part of an integrated capitalist international society'.[64]

The 'constellation' idea was part of P. W. Botha's all-encompassing theory of 'total strategy' which he pursued between 1978 and 1989, first as Prime Minister and from 1984 as State President.[65] It resulted in a considerable increase in presidential power and centralised decision-making and amounted to reform from above by an authoritarian regime bent on narrowing the scope of political participation (a strategy recommended by Samuel Huntington, an American revisionist within the modernisation

school of development whose thesis on these lines appealed to General Johan Coetzee, the South African Police Commissioner).[66]

The 'total strategy' was a national security policy designed (according to official statements) to safeguard South Africa from the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. (The *real* threat was perceived to be African nationalism, presented as being orchestrated and controlled by Moscow to advance its own agenda.) However, the remit of the strategy was broad and embraced virtually every sphere of government activity both at home and abroad.[67] It entailed the restructuring of South Africa's internal and regional environment in order to preserve white minority rule, the continued political dominance of the NP, and the promotion of economic development. In the event, the formation and implementation of this 'total strategy' sharpened conflicts within the state, while the strategy's inherent contradictions weakened its thrust. Whereas B. J. Vorster, Botha's predecessor, had promoted the interests of traditional small-scale Afrikaner capital, agriculture and the white working class, Botha sought to liberalise South Africa's economy in exchange for large-scale (and not least foreign) capital's political and economic support.[68] For a time, wrote Nolutshungu, it looked as if 'a coalition of "the military and capital" had ascended to power in South Africa'.[69] However, the stable regional environment which large manufacturing capital needed to sell its produce was not created. The State Security Council, which met twice a week under the chairmanship of the State President and included key ministers and the heads of the defence force and police, became the seat of power under Botha. The 'securocrats' exercised a very strong influence on policy, and this led to tensions within the military–political–business alliance, to such an extent that after the July 1985 emergency a number of prominent South African businessmen went to Lusaka to talk to the ANC in order to dissociate capitalism from *apartheid* and ensure their position no matter who eventually came to rule the state.[70]

Under Botha, the long-term objective of full economic and political regional integration was sacrificed to the short-term objective of destabilising neighbouring (mainly radical) regimes which were perceived as hostile to the South African government and replacing them with moderate, pro-Western ones. In pursuit of this military-dictated policy, South African troops launched direct military attacks on ANC facilities in Mozambique and Lesotho and penetrated deep into Angola, allegedly in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas. South Africa also provided both military training and a great deal of equipment to dissident groups in Angola and Mozambique, and on a smaller scale to dissidents in western Zimbabwe. In defiance of the UN, it continued to rule Namibia, where (by consolidating power in the hands of a multi-ethnic, puppet government) it tried to prevent a SWAPO takeover.[71]

The South African government continued to pursue this destabilisation policy despite the non-aggression and security pacts signed with the governments of Mozambique and Angola in 1984, and despite the damage which this policy inflicted on the South African economy. For its part the United States government, which had maintained a policy of 'constructive engagement' with regard to South Africa since the early 1980s, announced publicly in 1986 that it would give military aid to UNITA rebels. Unrealistically, it linked the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the independence of Namibia and refused to recognise the MPLA government. The Cubans (it would seem of their own volition) became the Soviet surrogates in Angola, as in Ethiopia, though the government of the Soviet Union continued to station its own advisers in both countries.

The rapidly expanding African population continued to be denied even the partial representation which was granted to Coloureds and Asians under the 1983 tripartite constitution.[72] This, and the tight control of a repressive and often brutal state apparatus, added up to an explosive situation. A period of prolonged civil unrest in South Africa's black townships in 1984–6 forced the Western powers to reappraise their attitudes to the white minority regime. In 1985 Chase Manhattan's decision to 'call in' its South African loans was followed by other US banks and paved the way politically for the introduction of economic sanctions. The US Congress, against the opposition of leading members of the Administration, including George Bush Senior (then Vice-President), imposed a string of sanctions under the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, to add to the existing arms embargo; they included a ban on trade, investment and air links with South Africa. In September 1986 the EEC, after months of argument, banned the import from the Republic of gold coins, steel and iron, and placed an embargo on new investment in South Africa by Community firms. The effect of economic sanctions, for which the Commonwealth also voted, was to increase South Africa's international isolation, while the decision of Barclays Bank to pull out of the Republic in December 1986 was a notable example of an accelerating process of corporate disinvestment. Between 1984 and 1989 some 184 US firms and approximately 125 firms from other countries disinvested from South Africa. Though welcomed by the ANC, sanctions sapped business confidence and aggravated an already acute unemployment situation.[73]

Faced with urban unrest and mounting debt problems, President Botha was afraid of being outflanked on his right; he therefore failed to undertake liberal reforms at home which would have given him an alternative source of support on his left. The continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders, and the fact that the ANC remained a banned organisation,

ruled out a negotiated settlement. Then, in December 1988, the unexpected happened: astute US diplomacy succeeded, with Soviet connivance, in bringing to the negotiating table representatives of South Africa, Angola and Cuba to find solutions to the vexed problems of Namibian independence and the Cuban military presence in Angola. The result was the formal signing of a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, and a bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola at the UN headquarters in New York on 22 December 1989. These agreements – despite a number of hiccups on the way – facilitated the holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly in Namibia on 1 November 1989, the achievement of independence by Namibia on 21 March 1990, and the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (withdrawal was completed by the end of May 1991). The agreements relieved South Africa of the real danger of military defeat if the war persisted and of the heavy financial costs of its commitments in Namibia and its support for UNITA. The agreements were effectively guaranteed by the super-powers;[74] the attitude, and the longing for peace of the Angolan people, were critical in the signing of a peace agreement on 31 May 1991 between the Angolan government and UNITA. The South African government also claimed to be seeking an end to the Mozambican conflict and the establishment of a multi-party system of government in Mozambique.

The issues of peace or war in the Southern African region had an obvious bearing on political events within South Africa itself; this was appreciated by F. W. de Klerk who succeeded Botha as State President in September 1989. De Klerk moved quickly. In February 1990, to the consternation of his white conservative critics, he released Nelson Mandela from prison and removed the ban on the ANC, PAC, and the South African Communist Party (SACP). His subsequent discussions with Mandela were designed to pave the way for negotiations leading to a constitutional settlement. The prospects of this were improved by the ANC's suspension of the 'armed struggle' and the government's grant of amnesty to South Africans living in exile. The Western powers applauded de Klerk's reform programme and responded to it by removing most economic sanctions (the arms embargo remained); the sports boycott of South Africa was also ended. The ANC, PAC, the Black Consciousness Movement and the South African Council of Churches protested that the lifting of sanctions was premature, though the ANC would probably have accepted a phased withdrawal.[75]

The concern expressed by these organisations was understandable. They faced pressure from their constituents, for whom little that was fundamental had changed (black urban unemployment then stood at nearly 40 per cent). There were also serious set-backs to the settlement process. The first

was the continued violence in rural Natal and the Transvaal's urban town-
ships resulting from clashes between pro-ANC followers and activists
belonging to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a KwaZulu organisation led
by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, and the inability of the security
forces to control it. This violence had its roots in ethnic (Zulu/non-Zulu)
rivalry, accentuated by the hopelessness created by unemployment, malnu-
trition and poor housing, as well as in the Inkatha leadership's fear of being
excluded by the ANC from a share of power in a future black-ruled South
Africa. Ugly incidents occurred in Ciskei and other homelands, while white
right-wing extremists also gave violent expression to their anger at de
Klerk's 'betrayal'.[76] The second main set-back was 'Inkathagate', the rev-
elation that the South African government had covertly funded Inkatha and
that Inkatha and the South African secret police together managed and con-
trolled the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA). This organ-
isation had been launched in May 1986 allegedly as a counterweight to the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a radical labour feder-
ation founded six months earlier and subsequently allied with the ANC.

   'Inkathagate', and the admission by Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, that
South Africa had provided massive funding to SWAPO's opponents in the
1989 election campaign in Namibia discredited the government and raised
the question of President de Klerk's personal integrity; an alternative expla-
nation was that he was a prisoner of the powerful military–security appara-
tus built up during P. W. Botha's presidency.[77] De Klerk's transfer of
General Magnus Malan from Defence and Adriaan Vlok from Law and
Order to lesser ministries (though still with seats in the cabinet), and his
commitment both to end any further secret funding of South African polit-
ical organisations and to overhaul his government's covert operations, was
given a guarded welcome by the ANC. However, the ANC subsequently
accused the South African government of 'double-dealing' over covert
security force operations, claiming that it had evidence of continued
involvement in 'dirty tricks' projects.[78]

   The signing on 14 September 1991 of a wide-ranging 'national peace
accord' by President de Klerk, Nelson Mandela, Chief Buthelezi and the
leaders of some 20 other political organisations was a promising event.
However, the chances of its resulting in a lasting peace settlement were not
good. Dr Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party and white extremist move-
ments refused even to attend the meeting, while Chief Buthelezi expressed
publicly his scepticism about the Accord's practicality (about 3,000 Inkatha
supporters armed with traditional weapons – spears, machetes, and clubs –
demonstrated outside the Johannesburg hotel where the signing ceremony
was taking place).[79] Moreover, township violence both preceded and followed

the ceremony, raising the real possibility that 'a hidden hand' was behind this violence, intent on wrecking the settlement process.[80] The ANC's natural suspicions of the reforming President's motives inevitably increased the task of bridging what Spence called 'the gulf between the government's desire to "share power without losing control" and the ANC's firm commitment to black majority rule in a unitary state'.[81]

Despite these set-backs and suspicions, multi-party negotiations led to the adoption of a new post-*apartheid* interim constitution in November 1993. This constitution provided for a bicameral parliament consisting of a 400-member National Assembly, elected by a system of proportional representation, and a Senate composed of ten members from each of the nine regional legislatures. Executive power was vested in a President, to be elected by the National Assembly, and a government of national unity. The interim constitution, which was subsequently replaced by a permanent constitution, also provided for the ten *bantustans* or homelands to be reincorporated into South Africa.[82]

After a number of alarums and excursions, centred principally on the non-co-operative attitudes of Buthelezi's IFP and Lucas Mangope's Bophuthatswana (*bantustan*) regime, non-racial multi-party legislative elections were held in April 1994. The results of these elections, in which the IFP finally agreed to take part, signalled the effective end of 350 years of white domination in South Africa.[83] (If further confirmation was required, this was provided in November 1995 by the local government elections, the effect of which was to bring segregated local administration to an end.[84]) The ANC, under Nelson Mandela's leadership, won 62.6 per cent of the total votes cast and gained 252 seats in the 400-member National Assembly which was a clear majority, although just short of the two-thirds required to dictate the terms of the country's permanent constitution. The NP came next with slightly over 20 per cent of the vote and 82 seats, followed by the IFP with 10.5 per cent of the poll and 43 seats. The great majority of Africans supported the ANC or Inkatha, but the detailed results showed that, while the former won countrywide support, the latter was mainly a regional organisation. Nearly all Whites voted for the NP or other white parties; very few of them supported the ANC or IFP. The Coloured and Indian communities gave substantial backing to both the ANC and NP; they accounted for over a third of the latter's total vote. In the simultaneous elections for the nine provincial legislatures, the ANC obtained majorities in seven of them; the IFP was declared the winner in KwaZulu Natal and the NP won Western Cape.[85] Nelson Mandela was installed as President of South Africa on 10 May 1994 and included NP and IFP ministers in his ANC-dominated cabinet. Thabo Mbeki (ANC) and

F. W. de Klerk were inaugurated as First and Second Deputy Executive
President, respectively.[86]

Conclusion

The origins of African nationalism are different from those of European
nationalism. Pre-independence Africa did not experience an industrial rev-
olution, and class divisions were comparatively weak. African nationalism
was anti-colonial nationalism, which lacked deep historical roots and was
born out of a protest movement against European rule and exploitation; it
represented also the African's claim to human dignity and the right to self-
rule. In some cases – in areas of white settlement such as Algeria and
Rhodesia, and above all in Portuguese Africa – the African protest went
unheeded by the colonial power and violent conflict followed. In the major-
ity of cases, however, to talk of an independence 'struggle' in the post-
Second World War period is misleading even in areas, such as Tanganyika,
where the initial imposition of colonial rule had been strongly resisted. In
the 1950s, successive British governments seemed to be all too ready to rid
themselves of the burden of African empire, while leading French-speaking
Africans themselves raised the issue of independence (as distinct from
equal status with Frenchmen) only at the end of the decade, when President
de Gaulle realised that he could best preserve French economic and other
interests in Africa by granting political independence. It is therefore easier
to trace, as we have done, expressions of nationalist discontent than it is to
assess with any degree of certainty the impact of nationalism upon colonial
policy, or to determine the extent to which nationalism quickened the tempo
of reform. The Gold Coast riots of 1948 certainly seemed to have had that
effect, though the Gold Coast itself would probably have moved towards
independence even if these riots had not occurred.[87]

The year 1948 was a watershed in the political history of South Africa
since it marked the assumption of power by the NP and the establishment
of a white-minority government committed to the pursuit of separate racial
development. A long and bitter struggle to end *apartheid* and establish a
non-racial government and society was championed by the ANC and cul-
minated successfully in the advent of majority rule in April 1994 and the
installation of Nelson Mandela, a man of high principles and integrity, as
President. The struggle was against an entrenched and powerful white
regime underpinned by Western capital rather than against a colonial power:
South Africa had secured its independence from Britain in 1910. Never-
theless, South Africa shared with several African territories a trajectory of

national liberation; the parallels with those countries – notably Zimbabwe, Algeria and Kenya – where African nationalists were confronted by white settler interests were particularly close. In a perceptive article comparing and contrasting the Zimbabwean and South African liberation struggles, Ian Phimister has drawn attention to the differences and similarities between the two situations. Differences included the terrain on which the struggle was fought (almost exclusively rural and dependent on peasant support in Zimbabwe and largely urban with working-class backing in South Africa); the greater threat posed to the survival of the settler regime in Zimbabwe than to that in South Africa; and therefore the much stronger negotiating position of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (the ANC, by contrast, was forced to accept the constitutional provisions for compulsory coalition government). However, the similarities between the settler colonialism of Zimbabwe and the settler state of South Africa were more striking than the differences. Phimister wrote:

> In neither Zimbabwe nor South Africa did armed struggle turn out to be synonymous with revolutionary liberation, although in both instances the 'middle' period [1984–9 in South Africa] of intensifying conflict appeared to have been the most radical. There is certainly no evidence to back the notion that 'protracted struggle' necessarily goes in a progressive direction … In both countries the 'old guard' nationalist leadership survived; and in both cases the struggle was manifestly anti-colonial and anti-racist not anti-capitalist. And because political reform rather than social transformation triumphed in both Zimbabwe and South Africa, gender issues were left not only unresolved but hardly addressed.[88]

Moreover, although broad-based, the liberation struggle in both countries depended on the leadership and support of black professionals and other middle-class elements in society. In each case the process of deradicalisation and embourgeoisement worked to the detriment of those already socially disadvantaged, such as peasants, workers and women who, once again, did not reap benefits commensurate with their contribution to bringing an end to white minority rule.[89] As we shall see in Chapter 8, trade unionists in both Zimbabwe and South Africa came to feel in the late 1990s that their government ignored workers' interests. In South Africa the leadership was confronted with a major financial problem: it could not fulfil both its heavy domestic agenda – in tackling, for example, the acute urban problems of housing shortage, serious unemployment and mounting crime – and make the substantial financial input to Africa-wide development that the states north of the Limpopo expected of it. In part, these expectations resulted from the failure of the leaders of these states to realise that, despite

its relative wealth, the post-*apartheid* state faced many of the same sort of problems as they themselves, as rulers of new tropical African states, had experienced in the immediate post-independence period. Indeed, their horizons were still limited, absorbed as they were in grappling with pressing political, economic and social problems. As Hugh Seton-Watson pointed out: 'If national consciousness, based on religion, language and deeply rooted historical mythologies, were not available, then the agent of continuity could only be the central power.'[90]

South Africa, Zimbabwe and the black states north of the Limpopo were reasonably secure in juridical terms, their political independence being attested by membership of the OAU and the UN, among other international organisations. In sociological terms, however, many of them were weak,[91] in some respects including South Africa: there was no shared culture and the typical state was characterised by ethnic pluralism, linguistic diversity, the strength of communal ties and loyalties, and an educational system which hitherto had benefited only a minority of the population. Vitally important questions for the future – and *mutatis mutandis* many of them were also relevant to South Africa – were therefore first whether those who inherited power at the centre would be able to sustain or create a strong sense of national identity now that the cohesive factor of alien rule was removed, and second, whether the state had the organisational and administrative capacity to withstand the societal pressures to which it was now exposed. Expressed in Herbst's terms (discussed in the Introduction), the issue was the extent of situational autonomy. Certainly, the nature of the society within which the new state operated was critical; this forms the subject of Chapter 4.

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4
State and Society

Inheritance

At independence leaders of the nationalist movements in Africa, or of the victorious political parties in the elections of the decolonisation period, came to power and became ministers, MPs and, in some cases, regional and district governors/commissioners. However, they had mostly not been adequately trained by the colonial government and had limited experience of operating a governmental system on a national scale. A vitally important question was whether these new rulers would be able to adapt to their own purposes the structures of power established within the former colonial state. Their inheritance included the essential machinery of government (notably a legislature, executive and judiciary at the centre and – in anglophone Africa above all – the rudiments of a representative local government system at the base). As noted in the Introduction, adaptation generally proved easier in francophone African states (which followed the Gaullist constitutional model with its stress on firm executive leadership) than in anglophone countries which initially adopted Westminster-type constitutions. However, within ten years at most of independence, the latter had been discarded almost everywhere in favour of executive presidencies and one-party state systems.

Unfortunately, the new rulers did not also inherit the administrative capacity needed to work either these institutions or the new institutions (such as a large number of parastatal bodies) which they themselves created, although this was essential if they were to withstand the intense societal pressures to which they were subjected by universally enfranchised electorates. Trained and experienced manpower was in short supply, and in some cases the shortage was critical. In Zambia, at independence in 1964, few of the country's 109 African graduates possessed administrative experience at a senior level, and a number of chief clerks became permanent secretaries overnight.

In Mozambique, the exodus of expatriate managers in 1974–5 and the dearth of Africans with managerial skills had a crippling effect on the state-controlled economy – the transportation system, marketing and distribution were badly hit. The lack of trained personnel made it impossible to sustain the extensive measures of nationalisation that were undertaken to revive flagging industrial output and to underpin bold experiments in the communal production of agriculture, on which the economy was dependent.

This acute manpower shortage in Black Africa generally was partly the result of the slowness with which colonial regimes had adopted Africanisation policies, and reflected above all the inadequacy (or sometimes the irrelevance) of the colonial educational provision. In the Belgian Congo, for example, the primary educational net was spread very wide, but secondary and higher education was badly neglected; in 1960, when the Belgian Congo became the newly independent state of Congo-Léopoldville (later known as Congo-Kinshasa, then Zaire, and now the Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC), there were only 16 graduates out of a population of over 13 million. In Northern Rhodesia/Zambia which, like the Belgian Congo, had a large copper industry, next to no attention was given to technical education. As we saw earlier, the Portuguese educational record in Africa was abysmal.

The governments of the newly independent African states accorded education a high priority. In Zambia, educational expenditure rose from K13 million in 1963–4 to K85 million in 1973; primary education doubled during this period and secondary, technical and university education expanded even faster. In 1974 Tanzania, one of Africa's poorest countries, set the end of 1977 as the date for the achievement of universal primary education; though this target proved unrealistic, it was well within sight by the scheduled date. In Nigeria educational objectives changed several times. At independence the emphasis was on secondary, tertiary and vocational rather than primary education. The number of universities increased from one (at Ibadan) before independence to 13 by 1975 and 21 by 1985. During the 1970s the military (mainly for political reasons) shifted the emphasis to primary education, and in 1974 launched a plan to phase in universal primary education from 1976. The enrolment of children was up from 3.5 million in 1970 to 13 million by 1980.[1] Despite heavy investment in teacher training institutions, the number of children entering primary schools outstripped the state's ability to supply trained teachers and, inevitably, there was some fall-off in the quality of the education provided.

In Nigeria and elsewhere these educational measures, and corresponding initiatives in health and the other social services, were commendable, but they were adopted at the expense of investment in more directly productive,

job-creating sectors. In view of the downturn of their economies from the 1980s – the 1970s in the case of most non-oil producing countries – many states had to cut capital expenditure and were hard pressed to maintain high levels of recurrent expenditure on the social services generally. This was serious because urban migration proceeded apace following independence.

In the continent's temperate zones sizeable towns and cities already existed before the population explosion occurred in tropical Africa. North Africa had experienced urbanisation for at least 2,000 years and by 1945 Egypt had ten towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants (two of them – Cairo and Alexandria – each had more than a million), Morocco had nine, Algeria four, and Libya and Tunisia one each. In southern Africa white settlement and the early development of mining and industry had stimulated urban growth; by 1945 South Africa had 11 towns with more than 100,000 people and Southern Rhodesia had two. But elsewhere in Africa in 1945 there were few large towns; Nigeria had four cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, but all the other countries between them possessed only seven. The situation was transformed over the next 30 years when the number of towns in Africa with more than 100,000 inhabitants grew from 49 to 120 or more; very few countries had none and Nigeria had 32.[2] During the 1960s and 1970s the number of urban residents was estimated to have doubled; the increase continued apace in the next decade and by 1990 over a third of the population were town dwellers. Whereas in 1960 no tropical African city had a population of over 1 million, by 1985 there were 28 such cities. Today, the urban population of many states (including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Ghana, the Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia and the DRC) is approaching, or already exceeds, 40 per cent. The continuing rapid rise in the urban population is illustrated by the experience of Botswana, a large predominantly rural country with rich diamond deposits and only some 1,700,000 inhabitants. The population of Gaborone, its capital city, which stood at 138,471 in 1991 was close to 200,000 ten years later; with extensive government offices, large company buildings and broad, busy highways, it was a far cry from the small town of 17,718 inhabitants in 1971. Sadly, as I discuss below, the death rate resulting from the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS has also risen sharply.

Urban migration and high levels of urban unemployment militated against trade union organisation and effectiveness. Moreover, as Michael Lofchie has pointed out, industrialisation in Africa (as distinct from the West) did not have healthy social pluralistic effects through the creation of new interest groups. On the contrary, the prevailing pattern of social inequality was deepened and increased social conflict resulted.[3] This conflict was expressed in ethnic or regional–linguistic terms, though the real

competition was over educational opportunity, jobs and government contracts, and the provision of roads, bridges and hospitals.

A further consequence of this urban drift was the reduction in the number of able-bodied men to work the land, thus contributing to a fall in food production. The situation was made much worse because there was a series of successive years in which the amounts of rain that fell, particularly in the arid and semi-arid zones astride the equator, were markedly less than the average. As crops failed and pastures became exhausted, animals died or had to be moved on to lands hitherto used for food production. Where access to food was precarious, as it was for the many people who could not afford to buy it even when it was available locally, 'natural disasters' such as drought or flood or a plague of locusts, exacerbated by 'man-made disasters' such as civil war and by distribution problems, rapidly led to crisis. This occurred in several regions of Africa from the late 1960s onwards. In 1968–73 drought severely affected countries in the Sahel, the area stretching from Senegal in the west along the southern edge of the Sahara desert to Ethiopia and Sudan in the east. In 1983–5 drought was again widespread: it was centred this time in Sudan and Ethiopia, but extended also to Somalia, Mozambique and Botswana, a country in southern Africa which over the years has learned to cope with one or two seasons of drought – it is persistent drought that helps to account for widespread famine. After the animals, large numbers of people were to die, especially if they were infirm, or very young or very old. The survivors fled to swell the populations of the towns, or were brought together in refugee camps with minimal shelter and sanitation, there to be supplied by international relief agencies with what was hoped to be enough food and medical care to permit as many as possible to survive both the famines and the epidemics – of infectious diarrhoea, measles and pneumonia – and the tuberculosis that accompanied them.[4] The problems of famine and starvation simply would not go away. In July 2001 17 African countries faced food emergencies because of drought, civil strife, the influx of refugees and people returning home, and internally displaced persons. The situation was particularly worrying in Sudan, Somalia and Zimbabwe; in Zimbabwe the maize crop was down by 28 per cent and farm workers had lost their jobs, while in urban areas real incomes had declined, fuel shortages were acute and low income households were hard hit.

Whereas in 1970 Africa's population was increasing at a slower rate than food was produced, after 1975 population growth (at about 3 per cent a year) overtook the rate of increase in food production. Moreover, it was a very young population since about one-half consisted of children. Other consequences were urban problems of housing, sanitation and unemployment, and rising crime rates; and – through subsidies to keep the price of

food and other produce artificially low – the distortion of government policy in favour of often politically volatile urban dwellers who (as in Zambia in 1974, 1986 and 1990, and Morocco and the Sudan in 1984) demonstrated angrily when these subsidies were removed or threatened. Rural producers were disadvantaged and often reacted to the prevailing low prices by ceasing to produce for the market, merely growing enough food for themselves and their extended families, or by smuggling their harvest across the state borders (the reaction, as we note below, of Senegalese peanut-producing peasants in 1969–70). Both these practices had serious consequences for the state economy since the need to import grain and other essential foodstuff from abroad increased the already high level of external debt.[5]

Most African states were dependent for foreign exchange on the agricultural crops (including cocoa, coffee, sugar, tea and tobacco) which they exported, as well as, in some cases, mineral products ranging from oil (for the minority) to chrome, copper and diamonds. African leaders, anxious to end their dependence on primary produce, sought to diversify their economies, with industrialisation as a favoured strategy. Unfortunately, the new manufacturing industries that were established in many states (mostly in the towns) tended to be capital-intensive and dependent on the importation of costly machinery from abroad; they therefore created only a limited number of jobs. Even oil-rich countries like Nigeria and Gabon suffered. Though they benefited from the increased price of oil – the price of crude jumped within a decade from US$1.80 a barrel to some $34 by 1981 – they suffered with the rest from the world-wide inflation that followed. They had to pay more for the capital and manufactured goods which they all needed for their development, while the market for their own primary commodities was depressed.

South Africa was less seriously affected than the Black African states to its north. During the 1960s and 1970s the Republic's economy had been growing steadily at an average rate, in real terms, of 2.5 per cent per annum, with the result that by the beginning of the 1980s the country's gross national product was about US$2,500 per head. Though in South Africa wealth was very unevenly distributed between the races, in monetary terms black people in the Republic would seem to have been better off than the inhabitants of almost every other country in Africa south of the Sahara. Oil-rich Gabon, a rentier state with a small population, was one exception; other exceptions included Mauritius, which had prospered in agriculture and business, and – as their mineral wealth of diamonds and oil, respectively, came to be exploited – Botswana and Equatorial Guinea.

The five countries north of the Sahara were also less hard-hit than the tropical African states, though they too had earlier faced the same strategic

challenge. Up to the 1960s they were all largely dependent for foreign earnings on the export of primary agricultural produce; however, despite competition from their European neighbours across the Mediterranean, they achieved commendably high growth rates. In the 1970s the situation in the former desert kingdom of Libya and to an extent in Algeria was transformed by the exploitation of oil and, in Algeria also, of natural gas. Morocco and Tunisia were helped by profits from tourism, while Egypt, which by the mid-1980s had a population of 50,000,000, received subsidies from Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich, but thinly populated, Arab countries.

Communalism

Initially, the main problems that confronted Africa's new state leaders were not those 'of economic development primarily, but much more urgently, those of legitimacy'.[6] They had to establish their right to rule culturally diverse societies which were rent by social cleavage and were characterised, as a result of the differential impact of colonialism and capitalism, by varying levels of political and economic development. Faced with a fragile national unity, many African leaders privately echoed the statement made by Jawaharlal Nehru in post-independence India: 'We were simply horrified to see how thin was the ice upon which we were skating.'[7] The communal challenge took various forms, including acute ethnic rivalry (as in Rwanda and Burundi); disaffection on the part of ethnic minorities (such as the Kalenjin in Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta's presidency); regional pressure for a federal form of government or even for secession (as exerted by the Eritreans in Ethiopia); and movements for self-determination by people divided by artificial and colonial-imposed boundaries (as with the Somalis in the Horn of Africa).

The governments to which power was being transferred could not, like the colonial governments, stand outside the societies which they ruled. The imminence of independence often excited demands on the part of particular communities which lacked confidence in the impartiality of the new government and led them to try to maximise their position, constitutionally or otherwise, within the emergent state. Take the case of the Gold Coast (Ghana), where a strong Ashanti sub-nationalism clashed with Gold Coast nationalism, as represented by the CPP, in the 1950s. By 1954, with independence in sight, Ashanti – rich in gold, cocoa and timber and proud of its cultural traditions – felt that it was not receiving its fair share of political and economic resources at the hands of Nkrumah's CPP government. The NLM was founded with the backing of the Asantehene and the great majority

of Ashanti chiefs, and it linked up with the NPP and other regionally-based parties to demand a federal constitution. Though this movement failed to gain power in the 1956 elections, or even to have its demand for a federation accepted, it left behind a legacy of bitterness and probably inclined Nkrumah to adopt after independence what in his autobiography he termed 'emergency measures of a totalitarian kind', including the Preventive Detention Act of 1958.[8] Buganda, the seat of another powerful traditional kingdom, posed an even greater threat to the integrity of Uganda, the state to which it was destined to belong. Barotseland in Northern Rhodesia provides a third example of a community with a strong traditional base seeking to secure a privileged constitutional status within the newly independent Zambian state. These problems were solved differently. In Ghana, the CPP government removed the federal elements which had been incorporated in the independence constitution as a concession to the NLM and its allies by passing the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill, 1959; the latter abolished the assemblies which had been established in the five regions (including Ashanti). The Buganda problem was solved in 1966 by the forcible removal of the Kabaka, the traditional ruler of Buganda, and the dismemberment of his kingdom as a unit of government. In Zambia, in the period between independence in 1964 and 1969, the government used a mixture of persuasion, threats and legal enactment to bring to an end the privileged position accorded to Barotseland under the agreement reached at independence in 1964.

While tradition bolstered regional demands in each of these cases, it is important to stress that factors other than the traditional, or in addition to the traditional, lay behind the existence of sub-national loyalties. Ashanti, Buganda and Barotseland each sought not only to retain its separate customs and traditions, but also to secure access to political power and economic resources. Moreover, the existence of a centralised traditional authority within the boundaries of a new state did not necessarily constitute a threat to the integrity of that state, as the cases of Benin in Nigeria and the Mossi kingdom in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) illustrate. Again, sub-national loyalties might flourish without there being a centralised traditional unit upon which they could build, although, in general, the absence of strong sub-national units facilitated (as in Tanganyika) the process of nation-building. The Ibo in Eastern Nigeria and the Kikuyu in Kenya both lacked a centralised authority, yet in 1967 the Ibo sought to secede from Nigeria and establish the new state of Biafra, while the Kikuyu not only constituted the spearhead of the nationalist movement but, under the presidency of Kenyatta (1964–78), came to dominate Kenyan politics to an extent which alienated the Luo and other ethnic groups.

In Zambia, the conflict between the country's ethnic groups was sharp and was fanned by national leaders out to win support and votes. It was often expressed within the idiom of 'tribalism' (misleadingly so since the reality was vastly more complex). 'Tribe' is largely the invention of European administrators who found it convenient to assign people living in a certain environment to a particular social group presided over by a chief; the designation is as unsuitable in political science as it is in social anthropology. In the Zambian context the competition was between regional–linguistic groups each of which – the Bemba and Lozi, for example – comprised many distinct tribes. Possibly, contemporary ethnic conflict in Zambia revived memories of historic enmities which made it more acute. But this is unlikely: the fact that the Lozi exercised hegemony over the Tonga in the nineteenth century was not sufficient to explain why the Lozi and Tonga were on different sides in the 1967 UNIP central committee elections, since the bulk of them were on the same side in the 1968 general election. The conflict was over jobs and access to economic resources, but was expressed in ethnic terms. As Robert Molteno, writing on communalism in Zambia, put it: 'Sectional groups are essentially interest groups competing for scarce resources.' Sectionalism was reinforced by the heightening of the emotional dimension, sometimes making it difficult for ethnic leaders to restrain the enthusiasm of their followers.[9]

Thus the graphic statement which Sklar made about Nigeria in 1967 – that there was 'often a non-traditional wolf under the tribal sheepskin'[10] – also applied to Zambia. It was no less relevant to experience in the central African republic of Rwanda, even though, on the face of it, contemporary cleavages in that country are firmly rooted in historic ethnic rivalries. Ethnicity was indeed an important dimension in the tragic events of 1994, but in fact it was less the cause of them than the vehicle through which political and economic competition was symbolically expressed.

Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda[11]

In the very densely populated small territories of Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi cattle-owning aristocracy had imposed overlordships on majority populations of Hutu agriculturists before the colonial era. These overlordships had been perpetuated under European rule – Belgium administered Ruanda-Urundi, then a single entity, as a mandated territory after the First World War and as a UN trusteeship territory after the Second World War, giving the Watutsi preferential access to education and administrative office. In July 1962 Belgium conceded independence, without any real

preparation, to the two separate states of Rwanda and Burundi. Their legacy was unenviable. The new state leaders lacked political and administrative experience and were left with a weak infrastructure and a poor communications network. The Watutsi retained control of the government and army in Burundi, but had lost power to the Wahutu in Rwanda on the eve of independence; periodic clashes between the two communities occurred in both states. Before the 1994 atrocities occurred in Rwanda, the most serious conflict took place in Burundi where in 1966 the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown in a *coup* which made a Tutsi officer, General Michel Micombero, President of a republic, thereby upsetting the traditional balance that the monarchy had maintained with the people. In 1972 the Wahutu rose in a rebellion which was brutally crushed, resulting in some 100,000 deaths, including large numbers of educated people, and causing some 150,000 others to flee the country. Events in one country reacted on those in the other: thus, the massacre of Wahutu in Burundi resulted in reprisals against Watutsi in Rwanda, forcing a large number of them to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. It was from among these refugees, many of whom joined the Ugandan army, that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed in the 1980s.

That there was a marked ethnic character to the 1994 massacres in Rwanda is not in doubt: some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi men, women and children were killed by Hutu extremists, while an even larger number sought refuge in Zaire (now the DRC) and Tanzania. But this was much more than an ethnic conflict. At the root of these horrendous events was the determination of certain elements in the Rwandan army – especially the Presidential Guard – and unscrupulous politicians to retain their power and privileged positions by eliminating internal opposition to the regime of President (Major-General) Juvénal Habyarimana. The invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in October 1990 led on the one hand to repression of political opponents of the government by the army and well-documented human rights abuses, but also on the other hand to the promulgation in June 1991 of a new constitution that recognised opposition parties. There were increasing demands for political reform and greater democratisation, and the shape that democracy might take was discussed openly in newspapers, pamphlets and other publications. New organisations promoting human rights also emerged. In April 1992 four opposition parties were included in a government of national unity alongside ministers drawn from Habyarimana's party, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD). These reforms were anathema to extremist Hutu politicians and soldiers in the Rwandan army. They felt that the reforms and the terms of the Arusha peace accord of August 1993 to end the three-year civil war threatened their power and privileged position – Habyarimana had committed himself at Arusha to

restructuring the armed forces and reducing their size. His death in a plane crash in April 1994 sparked off a pogrom aimed principally at Tutsi civilians first in Kigali, the capital, and then in other parts of the country. The massacres were carried out by gangs of party militias using army weapons and machetes, and directed by members of the military and extremist politicians. Initially, there was some planning behind the slaughter, which in time became random and indiscriminate. Early victims included prominent democratisation and human rights activists from both ethnic communities; among them were Agathe Uwilingiyimama, the Hutu prime minister (and Africa's first female head of government), together with ministers from opposition parties. Anyone, whether Tutsi or Hutu and no matter what his social standing or calling (several priests and nuns were killed) were at risk if they were identified as an opponent of the MRNDD, the former ruling party, or its allied extremist Hutu party, the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic.

Account needs to be taken of other considerations in assessing the extent to which this was a purely ethnic conflict. Though the RPF – which by the end of July 1994 was in effective control of the whole country, thereby precipitating another mass exodus (this time of Wahutu) – was Tutsi-dominated, it included a number of Wahutu within its senior ranks. The socio-economic context was also important. Rwanda was (and remains) a poor country with an acute shortage of land and a high population density: over 8 million people live in area of 26,300 square kilometres. The sharp drop in the price of coffee in 1989, subsequent food shortages and lack of opportunities for paid employment may have excited local ethnic animosities and prompted local acts of violence.

In sum, while there was an important ethnic dimension to the 1994 conflict in Rwanda, ethnicity became above all a vehicle of expression for 'a brutal political struggle, in which ethnicity was manipulated by a small clique who sought to avoid losing control of the state'. Indeed, as Alex de Waal (quoting other sources) has pointed out, there is a very influential school of thought that the Wahutu and Watutsi were not separate ethnic groups originally, but separate class or caste groupings, and that it was the German and Belgian colonial administrators and anthropologists who were responsible for generating an ethnic loading with regard to what were at the time divisions based on functional role and class position. Belgian officials, when undertaking a census in 1936, used ownership of cattle to determine whether individuals were in one group or another (if a person had ten head of cattle he qualified as Tutsi, if less than ten, as Hutu). The labels then entered popular discourse, helped by the fact that the Belgians issued identity cards to everyone placing them in one camp or the other.[12]

In a cogently argued paper, Catharine and David Newbury conclude that

The evidence suggests that this assassination was a calculated deliberate act, with the ultimate purpose of neutralizing the democratic movement at all levels, using the confusion of Habyarimana's death as a pretext. To be sure, it was carried out under the cover of an 'ethnic conflict' … but one clearly provoked and orchestrated by the competing armies, most especially by the Presidential Guard and its allies … it is clear that in this case – as in many others – ethnic conflict was a derivative factor of the conflict, a political strategem [*sic*], not a causal factor or a simple case of 'primordial tribal hatred' unleashed.[13]

The authors of this paper also argue that the Rwandan crisis was not 'simply an example of an ethnic explosion resulting from a weakening of state power'.[14] On the contrary, they maintain that in Rwanda and 'in many cases in Africa these conflicts result precisely from the overweening power of the state, not from the dissolution of state power'.[15] Support for this contention is to be found in Ethiopia, where Mengistu Haile-Mariam's pro-Amhara policies provoked the resentment of the Tigreans and other ethnic groups, and in Kenya, where in recent years the ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley directed against Kikuyu immigrants have been prompted by state policies favouring the Maasai, Kalenjin and other minority groups. (The evidence from Sudan is less straightforward, though the pro-Arab policies pursued by the Khartoum government were the prime cause of the southern revolt and the ensuing civil war.) However, evidence from countries such as Angola, Chad, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Somalia, which have been ravaged by civil war, is more ambiguous and less obviously confirmatory of the Newbury thesis. Though the ethnic dimension was present in these cases, the root causes of conflict were complex. The personal ambition of rival political leaders and warlords was an important ingredient, as was sometimes external intervention (for example, by Libya in Chad and South Africa in Angola). In states such as these, ethnic conflict became more acute as the weakness of the state became more pronounced.

Inter-Ethnic Co-operation and Intra-Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflict models can both help to promote understanding of African political realities and distort them. Moreover, they often understate the degree of inter-ethnic co-operation evident in many new states and do not explain some forms of intra-ethnic conflict.[16] In the African context, where a broad consensus on goals and values may be lacking, bargains are struck

at the highest political level, resulting in the accommodation of different factional interests; this bargaining strengthens the hold of the factional leader over followers who, in return for their support, expect a share in the national economic cake.[17] This process could be seen at work in both the Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia, each of whose presidents long sought to maintain a regional balance in allocating cabinet posts to ruling party leaders. In Zambia the establishment, under the one-party state, of the central committee on a full-time basis both widened the scope of President Kaunda's patronage and opened up a new arena of competition between the country's regional–linguistic leaders.[18]

Zambia also affords other examples of inter-factional co-operation. In the UNIP central committee elections of 1967, the powerful Bemba-speaking group ignored language boundaries and struck an alliance with the much weaker Tonga-speaking group within the party. By this tactic it succeeded in increasing the Bemba share of key posts in UNIP at the expense of the Eastern and Lozi-speaking blocs. Similarly in the 1959 federal election in Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo realised that his party (the AG) could not win if its support was limited to Yorubas of the Western Region; he therefore sought and secured allies in the minority areas of the East and North (but still lost the election). The 1979 constitution of Nigeria sought to guard against the domination of the country's affairs by one or more ethnic groups by incorporating provisions which would promote national unity and reflect 'the federal character' of the new Nigeria. Thus, political associations whose activities appeared to be confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria were proscribed and the federal cabinet had to satisfy the principle of state equality by incorporating one minister from each state. However, in this search for an acceptable solution to Nigeria's acute ethnic problem, the fundamental socio-economic issues facing the country were substantially ignored.[19] Chief Moshood Abiola's apparent success in the Nigerian presidential election of June 1993 showed his ability to win inter-ethnic support as he could never have won by relying narrowly on the votes of his fellow Yorubas; the fact that he was a Muslim was probably important to northern voters. A serious effect of General Babangida's folly in annulling (and refusing to publish) the election results was to aggravate communal tensions.

It is also important to note that while patron–client networks may link people exclusively from the same ethnic group, they sometimes cut across ethnic identities. That faction as a technique of elite competition is compatible with contexts where ethnic (and/or religious) ties are not particularly salient or, at least, are apparently passive in their influence, is indicated by Epstein's study (among others) of the internal politics of the

African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) in Luanshya (Northern Rhodesia) in the early 1950s, by Sandbrook's analysis of trade union politics in Kenya, by Elhussein's thesis on rural development in the Gunaid area of Sudan, and by Donal Cruise O'Brien's study of the organisation of Senegalese peasant society.[20] In Senegal, peanut-producing peasants shared economic interests which both transcended and reinforced communal divisions. Though exploited as a socio-economic category and marginal to the political operation of the state to which they were subject, the peasants were able to secure concrete benefits by giving their support to a local leader who had influential connections in the capital city. Leaders of the Mouride brotherhood were particularly effective patrons; they articulated peasant grievances and persuaded the government to double the peanut producers' price in a single year (1974). In this way, they 'proved the efficacy of a bizarre and theatrical form of trade unionism'.[21]

The key roles in Senegal's factional politics were played by urban activists who dominated the alliances which they forged with rural notables; however, the field of operations of these activists was not infinitely malleable, according to the needs of shifting factional alliances at the centre. In Sudan also politicians and bureaucrats had to be attentive to the parameters which society itself imposed, thereby further underlying the validity of Herbst's arguments relating to the state's situational autonomy. After coming to power in 1969, the military regime in the Sudan introduced new political and administrative structures which were designed to strengthen the centre and to break the power of the traditional and tribal land-owning elites. In the event, the government was forced to integrate the old social forces into its new structures and could not (in the Gunaid area and elsewhere) prevent merchants and other local leaders from manipulating these structures for the economic benefit of themselves and their followers. In Burkina Faso it was Captain Thomas Sankara's persistence in trying to break down traditional structures and clientelist networks revolving round chiefs, religious leaders, and big city merchants influential in the Muslim community (many of whom transferred their activities to Lomé or Abidjan), together with his cavalier attitude towards the trade unions, that led to his downfall in 1987. Sankara seriously underestimated the continuing strong influence of the Muslim chiefs, underlining the point made by Naomi Chazan and her co-authors that in much of Africa, regardless of the type of political system in force, ethnic intermediaries remained active 'engaging state leaders at the political center in a continual process of informal political exchanges'.[22]

Like inter-ethnic co-operation, intra-ethnic conflict can be largely explained in terms of patron–client politics, where the patron is either a

national leader who reaches down to the grass-roots level or a local leader who is himself a client of the national figure. Again, we take examples from Zambia. As is shown further in Chapter 5, the solidarity of the Bemba-speaking 'group', which straddled three provinces, broke down in 1969 as the Luapula Province leaders expressed dissatisfaction with Northern Bemba domination of the alliance and their own meagre share of offices and resources. Though the unity of the Eastern Province, with its numerous ethnic groups (including the Cewa, the Ngoni and the Tumbuka), was maintained after 1967 and was reflected the next year in the formation of a 'Unity in the East Movement', alleged Tumbuka domination was resented *within* the province. As Szeftel has pointed out, the creation of the one-party state in 1972 removed the necessity to maintain party unity in order to contest multi-party elections and meant that a faction united at the centre might split into rival sub-factions at a lower level. Thus, 'in Livingstone … this Tonga–Lozi alliance, which had been a feature of politics between 1968 and 1973, was replaced by bitter factional competition between the two groups when confronted by a candidate from each in the 1973 elections'.[23]

That leaders and their followers tended to act situationally was not only a characteristic of political behaviour in Zambia; the same phenomenon was also to be observed in other African states. For example, in Nigeria the Ibos of the former Eastern Region retained their identity in relation to the country's other cultural–linguistic groups, being linked in this respect with Ibos in the Mid-West, but were themselves split over local matters between the land-locked Owerri Ibo interior and the better-off Ibo riverain groups (Onitsha, Oguta and Aro); in Uganda, the solidarity of the 'Bantu' peoples of the southern part of the country was less meaningful for most purposes than a 'Ganda', 'Soga', 'Kiga' or 'Gisu' identity; and in Kenya, the dominant Kikuyu group was rent by rivalry between the three Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Muranga and Nyeri. Again, in Zimbabwe, where the Shona–Ndebele ethnic split is still meaningful in distributional issues, there are also significant intra-Shona conflicts (for example in the operation and staffing of the government) between the Manyika, Zezuru and Karanga. Similarly, in recent years fighters of the rebel, southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have split into factions and turned against each other, while Somalia has been racked by inter-clan rivalry, particularly between the Isaq clan in the north, the Hawiye in the south, and the Darode in the centre and north-east. Siyad Barré, the former President of Somalia who was from a sub-clan (the Marehan) of the Darode people, was able to hold on to power for so long because the other clans were unable to unite against him. The fact is that ethnic groups are heterogeneous units and the individuals who belong to them have more than one cultural

identity; which has relevance depends on the situational context. Context determines the saliency and intensity of such multiple cultural identities: thus, in Nigeria ethnic identities flared up as civil war threatened but were more subdued following the federal victory and the policy of reconciliation pursued by General Yakabu Gowon; however, the attempted counter-*coup* of February 1976 revealed that they were far from being stilled.[24]

The situational context was different again in pre-independence Namibia, where the South African administration had determined the shape of factional competition by carrying forward, in Proclamation AG8 of 24 April 1980, the policy of racial and social fragmentation inherent in the Odendaal Plan of 1962–3. Ten population groups were defined on a racial and ethnic basis and the representative authority created for each of them (alongside an executive council) was made responsible for all members of that particular ethnic group throughout the country, even though some groups, like the Hereros, lived in several different areas. Taxation and other arrangements worked to the great advantage of the richer population groups: the Coloured group to an extent, but above all the whites, whose administration (in the educational field, for example) was able to spend six times as much on each pupil as the Owambos, by far the largest population group. The fact that government in pre-independence Namibia was so obviously geared to the perpetuation of white dominance served to direct inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic competition into racial, black versus white, channels.[25]

Nevertheless, some underlying conflict between the non-white groups themselves persisted; this stemmed largely from the imbalance (to an extent resembling Nigeria at independence) between the populous, underdeveloped northern part of the country, inhabited mostly by the Owambos, and the more economically developed regions to the south. The Owambos dominated the guerrilla army fighting for independence; their admitted maltreatment of Namibian 'prisoners' in Angola, on the ground that they were South African spies, alienated members of some of the other population groups.[26] This consideration, and worry that they would be disadvantaged in a SWAPO-dominated independent Namibia, explains why many Hereros, Damaras and Namas supported the white-dominated Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in the 1989 UN-supervised general election, thereby denying SWAPO the two-thirds majority in the constituent assembly which it needed to dictate the terms of the independence constitution. However, by winning 53 of the 72 National Assembly seats in the first post-independence elections in December 1994, SWAPO secured the power to change the constitution. President Sam Nujoma, who obtained 76 per cent of the votes in the presidential election, gave an undertaking that he would test any such alterations in a nation-wide referendum.

Class Formation and Class Action

The current, significant alternative to the 'ethnic conflict' model focuses on social class as the prime determinant of political change. This alternative, and predominantly Marxist, model rests on two assumptions: first, that classes exist objectively in Africa, and second, that class consciousness is sufficiently developed for political conflict to be explained primarily in class terms.

In his paper *Ujamaa*, written in 1962, Julius Nyerere argued that 'the capitalist, or the landed exploiter' was 'unknown to traditional African society'.[27] If this was the reality in some pre-colonial African societies, it was not true of others. In the forest kingdoms of West Africa and the emirates of (what was to become) Northern Nigeria, society was sharply divided between a chiefly strata, often supported by a well-organised bureaucracy, and commoners. Office-holding (especially at the higher levels) and wealth went hand in hand, though some commoners became successful traders.

The advent of colonialism reinforced existing social stratification patterns in some areas, such as Northern Nigeria (the birthplace of indirect rule), but resulted also in the emergence of new, educated elites. Some of the latter became doctors and lawyers; others were employed in the native authorities or the public service (nearly all at the lower levels); and others again became merchants and traders. The class structures generated by colonialism were incipient and uneven in their development; their unevenness depended on the levels of industrialisation and urbanisation reached by the end of the colonial era, as well as on the spread of education. Class formation was distorted in the white settler communities, where Africans competed with Whites on very unequal terms.

The resultant class patterns in the newly independent states differed from those to be found in Western settings. The number of Africans in professional occupations was small and, because of the tardiness of Africanisation policies, many senior posts in the public service were still held by expatriates; again, while a mercantile bourgeoisie was present in some states, there were very few African industrial capitalists. The petty-bourgeoisie was of a highly mixed character. Alongside primary school teachers and clerks, who would be recognisable in Western terms, were a large number of people – many of them women with no, or limited, education – who engaged in private entrepreneurial activity as small shopkeepers and traders. A number of them prospered, including in West Africa lorry owners in the transport sector and some of the market women. At independence, except for domestic service, very little paid work was available for women outside the home. This, and the small size of the proletariat generally, was mainly due to the

low level of industrial activity in the great majority of African states (South Africa was an exception to this pattern and the employment opportunities open to women there were increasing). Most workers were male, migrant and unskilled. African states still suffered from the legacy of colonial neglect because the colonial powers had given next to no attention to technical education and training, even in a territory like Northern Rhodesia with its large copper industry (the Belgians in the Congo had a better record in developing workers' skills).

The Urban Proletariat

An identifiable urban proletariat was slow to emerge in Black Africa, though the growth of manufacturing industry quickened its formation; mounting unemployment and a deteriorating standard of living in most countries were the source of discontent.[28] One reason for this slowness was that urban workers retained close social ties with their kinsmen in the rural areas. Many villagers still migrated to the towns in search of employment and, although a settled labour force was soon to be found in the towns of most states, thus creating a potential base for trade union organisation, seasonal migration remained widespread. Another consideration was that the urban work-force was not monolithic, being divided into skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the first category being itself subject to many gradations. Urban workers in many countries benefited from food and other subsidies (often at the expense of the rural population), but in other respects state rewards most advantaged those who were already well off. Upward mobility, or the prospect of it, dampened class polarisation even when differences of status and wealth were clearly perceived: early in the 1970s Michael Burawoy found that mineworkers on the Zambian Copperbelt saw their own union leaders as part of a new Zambian elite.[29] Moreover, the fact that factional politics penetrated labour organisations and other modern interest groups also militated against the development of class consciousness. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s urban workers were showing political solidarity as a class and were to play a key role in the pro-democracy movement. Certainly in South Africa they were showing increasing militancy. In August 2001 trade union leaders called a two-day general strike ostensibly to protest against the loss of jobs which were expected to result from the government's privatisation policy in a country where one-third of the work-force was already unemployed. But they also accused President Mbeki's ANC government of pursuing conservative policies which showed no concern for the lot of the poor. 'A clear picture is emerging', said Gwede

Mantashe, general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, 'of an ANC that was elected by the leftwing working class and is governing for the rightwing middle class'. This represented a public rift in the pre-independence tripartite alliance between the ANC, the 2 million-strong COSATU and the South African Communist Party.[30]

The Peasantry

The peasantry at independence also did not constitute a monolithic body. It was divided into peasant farmers who grew cash-crops for export, those who produced food for the expanding urban markets, and those – mostly living on marginal land without easy access to the centres of population – who were essentially subsistence farmers. Only those (the smallest category) who in Angola and elsewhere were engaged as labourers in plantation agriculture belonged to what might loosely be called a 'rural proletariat'.

While considerable socio-economic differentiation occurred within the peasantry following independence – for example, in Zambia's Luapula Province[31] – the peasantry *as a whole* was exploited by urban elites: it was the latter who controlled the marketing boards which, all too often, fixed the price of agricultural produce at a level that bore little relation to the costs of production. Such exploitation was resented and occasionally led to peasant 'revolts', as in Senegal in 1969–70, when some peanut-producing peasants expressed their dissatisfaction with government policies by smuggling their harvest across the border to the Gambia (where they both received a higher price and were paid in cash), while others either abandoned or curtailed their cultivation of peanuts.[32] Though an instance such as this shows that it was not only wage-employees who could develop a common perception of exploitation, it remains true that the peasantry faced substantial problems in organising concerted resistance.

Most African rural economies were not based on plantation agriculture and the great majority of the people lived in scattered homesteads or in small villages, with poor communications linking the various communities. The peasantry was a divided rather than a monolithic body, cross-cut by particularistic loyalties to age-set, clan and tribe; with a low level of class development and consciousness, it was not geared for class action.[33] Again, patron–client networks extended down to the village level and the ability of patrons (such as the Mouride brotherhood of Senegal) to defend peasant interests against governmental economic intrusion reduced the felt need for concerted action; this was particularly the case where there were no visible mechanisms of exploitation such as marketing boards. A further consideration militating

against overt resistance was the peasants' ability – shown in the 1970s and early 1980s in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, among other states – to retreat from production for the market into subsistence farming. These various factors help to account for the lack of revolutionary consciousness among the peasantry, an additional consideration being the absence of a landlord class (except in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie), the remittances received from urban relatives, the habit of deference to superiors (identified by education, public office-holding and wealth), and the lack of peasant self-confidence and requisite leadership to challenge a repressive state apparatus. In sum, African peasants 'generally exhibit[ed] very low "classness"'.[34]

The Middle Class

A middle class has emerged in most African states and is made up of political leaders, public servants, businessmen, lawyers, doctors and other members of the professions and military officers, all of whom, in Sklar's terminology, constitute a 'managerial bourgeoisie'.[35] While those members of the middle class who are public office-holders have benefited greatly from state expansion, those among them with private business interests have often done especially well, not least in contexts when the state itself has been in decline. In Mobutu's Zaire, for example, the 'new middle class' received preferential access to trade in diamonds, timber and consumer goods 'through ties to the president, *especially* as state institutions collapse[d]'.[36]

   Some scholars are convinced that elements of the managerial bourgeoisie (more commonly termed the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'), or the bourgeoisie collectively, consistently act in their own narrow, class interest. This may often be the case, though not invariably. Issa Shivji, in his *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, argued that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in Tanzania sought, through the nationalisation measures which followed in the wake of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, to bring the economy under its control for its own class interests and for the protection of the interests of international capitalism with which this bourgeoisie remained intimately linked. On this view, the Arusha Declaration was not a socialist initiative, but a selfish class-motivated intervention manipulated into being by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, whose agent President Nyerere had become. This was not a convincing argument.[37] If it had been valid, Nyerere and his government would have been less resistant throughout the 1979–85 period to the IMF's demands that they should moderate the thrust of their socialist policies. Significantly, success in pursuit of these policies was most marked in the very area where it would be least expected if the bourgeoisie was narrowly

pursuing its own class interest: that is, in the achievement of a greater equality through the government's policies on income tax, wages and salaries, education and public health. Senior public servants accepted policies that were mainly initiated by Nyerere himself in pursuit of a populist socialist experiment which, for more than a decade, attracted international interest and support.[38] No doubt there were some public servants who, either immediately or in time, questioned the wisdom of these policies; it certainly cannot be assumed in Tanzania or other African states that the interests of politicians and bureaucrats will necessarily coincide. After all, the managerial bourgeoisie comprises different elements, with often divergent interests, and does not constitute a monolithic class united in pursuit of its own aggrandisement. This point can be illustrated briefly from Zambian experience.

The middle class grew markedly in Zambia following independence. In particular, the economic reforms of 1968–72, which extended state control over a wide range of activities, resulted in an enormous expansion of the parastatal sector and therefore of the bureaucracy, and opened up massive new opportunities for citizen entrepreneurs. All sections of the middle class subscribed to a materialist ethic, which was strongly entrenched in Zambian society and which Humanism, Zambia's official ideology, proved powerless to counter. Though the country's leadership code specifically prohibited leaders from having private business interests, other than small-scale enterprises or smallholdings of land, an overlap of public position and private business interests was characteristic rather than exceptional. Zambian public office-holders, like their Kenyan counterparts, either acquired business interests while still in office or followed a business career after leaving office.[39] If such links, reinforced by connections with multinational companies, warranted Sklar's description of a 'managerial bourgeoisie', this bourgeoisie was also subject to internal divisions, which were reflected in both domestic and foreign policy.

Humanism, which was first elaborated by President Kaunda in April 1967, favoured 'a mixed economy' and combined capitalist, socialist and populist strands. For Kaunda, socialism had a purely instrumental value; it was 'an instrument for building a Humanist society'. However, many of the key tenets of Humanism, such as the commitment to a more egalitarian, participatory society, were not acceptable to bureaucrats and businessmen. W. H. Banda, a representative of the latter in parliament, stated boldly on 5 February 1976 that the party and government's policy of nationalisation was scaring away foreign investors and endangering the economy. In the next year the indigenous bourgeoisie began to demand that the mass welfare programmes and policies should be jettisoned to cope with Zambia's

economic crisis, thereby threatening the base of popular support on which the UNIP leadership depended. For the latter, the potential consequences of this trend were serious; as Morris Szeftel asserted: 'If individuals articulate class interests in their capacities as members of the bourgeoisie, they must nevertheless continue also to articulate geographic interests in their capacities as politicians and leaders of factions.'[40] In the event, the ability of Kaunda and the UNIP leadership to retain popular support receded further as the state of the economy, and the people's standard of living, continued to decline. Food riots in June 1990 were linked to mounting criticism of one-party rule and forced a reluctant President to concede multi-party elections in October 1991.

The post-independence experience of the Lusophone states pointed in the same direction as that of Zambia – to a divided managerial bourgeoisie with divergent interests, despite the avowed commitment of the leadership to Marxism–Leninism. In the cases of Mozambique and Angola, members of the variant middle class belonged to rival nationalist movements; unable to reconcile their differences by compromise and negotiation, they resorted to fighting and thus condemned their countries to long years of bloody civil war in which the poorest members of society were the principal sufferers. In the case of Guinea–Bissau and Cape Verde, the outcome was that each of these two states – hitherto linked by a single political party – elected to go its own way with its own separate party. All these countries eventually abandoned Marxism–Leninism in favour of political pluralism and a market economy.

At independence in 1975 a middle class hardly existed in Mozambique, which was a desperately poor state with a predominantly agricultural economy hard hit by rising oil prices. However, the exodus of white shopkeepers and traders and of Portuguese managers and technicians served as a forcing house of class formation; indigenous state and party personnel had to fill the gaps thus created and also to try and sustain the extensive measures of nationalisation that Samora Machel's government adopted. Pursuing a Marxist–Leninist strategy of development, they built up a creditable record in the spheres of health and education, but could not maintain pre-independence production levels or prevent the breakdown of the transport system and of marketing and distribution. Peasants flocked to the urban areas causing food shortages and food rationing in the towns; speculation and black-marketeering grew alarmingly.[41] In the 1980s, in an attempt to eliminate corruption and improve the performance of self-indulgent party and state bureaucracies, the government took corrective action that amounted to 'an almost puritanical cleansing of Mozambican society'.[42] However, this was not effective. The economy – over-dependent on South

Africa, which was supplying arms to the National Resistance Movement (MRN/RENAMO) guerrillas[43] – remained critically weak and many of the rural and urban poor were starving. In March 1984 the Mozambican government had little option but to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa – the Nkomati Accord – on terms dictated by the white-ruled republic. It also introduced austerity measures recommended by the IMF, and in July 1989 formally abandoned its former adherence to Marxism–Leninism in favour of 'democratic socialism'.

Angola at independence was potentially a very rich country, with vast deposits of oil, diamonds and other minerals, much fertile land and one-tenth of Nigeria's population. A middle class emerged earlier than in Mozambique, though the gap between rich and poor was wider and ethnic divisions were more acute. While the FNLA, backed by the Bakongo of the north, soon became a spent force, UNITA – operating from its ethnic home base in the south and well supplied with arms by South Africa and the United States – challenged the MPLA's right to rule Angola. Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, vitiated most attempts to make a government of national unity work and his political ambition condemned the country to a seemingly endless civil war.[44]

From the outset independent Angola faced serious economic difficulties alike in production, marketing and distribution. Agricultural output was low in a country that used to be the world's fourth largest exporter of coffee; industrial production declined; and poor distribution resulted periodically in acute food shortages in Luanda, the capital, and other urban centres. Sweeping nationalisation measures brought some 80 per cent of Angola's enterprises under state control and necessitated the recruitment of foreign managers and technicians. It also opened up opportunities for the advancement of indigenous state and party personnel; the middle class was expanded, patronage and corruption increased, and in due course many senior politicians and administrators prospered as businessmen. On the other hand, the suffering of the ordinary people in both urban and rural areas was immense.

Heavy defence expenditure, including the high cost of Cuban and Soviet military aid, forced Angola to the negotiating table with South Africa. UNITA played no part in these negotiations and talks with the MPLA during 1989 came to nothing; the next year opened with heavy fighting in the centre and south-east of the country. A war-weary people longed for peace, especially the nearly 2 million people in southern Angola who were suffering from famine brought about by drought and war. The MPLA government abandoned Marxism–Leninism, became a member of the IMF, and introduced elements of a market economy. In May 1991 it signed a peace agreement – the Estoril Accord – with UNITA, under which multi-party elections were to

be held the next year. However, UNITA refused to accept the results of either the presidential or the National Assembly elections and the country was again plunged into civil war.

Though at independence in 1974–5 the two states of Guinea–Bissau and Cape Verde were linked by a single party, the PAIGC, there were tensions between them; these resulted from spatial, racial and educational differences. Most Cape Verdeans, numbering some 430,000 today, were of mixed European–African descent and lived in a chain of islands situated some 300 miles off the Senegalese coast. As *assimilados*, they had much easier access to state education than Guineans; this meant that the number of educated Cape Verdeans far exceeded the number of educated Guineans despite the much larger population of the mainland state (approximately 1 million at independence and some 1,260,000 by 2001). In general the islanders had a more assured middle-class lifestyle – many of them had served as junior civil servants in other Portuguese colonies and thus, like the Asians in East Africa, were tarred with being colonial auxiliaries. There was resentment that a number of key posts in Guinea–Bissau were held by Cape Verdeans and it was alleged that power was being increasingly personalised in the hands of President Luis Cabral, Amilcar's younger brother, and a small circle of advisers. The ostentatious life-style and surly attitude of some of the city-bound officials was also resented and there was, above all, mounting dissatisfaction in Guinea–Bissau with the government's handling of the economy; rice, the staple diet of many people of Bissau, was frequently unobtainable. In November 1980 leading Guineans within the PAIGC staged a *coup d'état*. This brought to power a revolutionary council composed predominantly of military personnel and led by João Bernardo Vieira, chairman of the national council of Guinea–Bissau (the country's supreme party organ) and a former guerrilla commander. Its effect was to bring to an abrupt end a unique experiment, whereby a single socialist party (the PAIGC) had been in power in two separate countries – an experiment which (the *coup*-makers alleged) had been conducted for the benefit of Cape Verdeans. The latter established a party of their own – the Partido Africano da Indepêndencia da Cabo Verde (PAICV); a decade later the governments of both Guinea–Bissau and Cape Verde introduced multi-party systems of government.[45]

The Role of Women[46]

Falling living standards in Zambia and elsewhere increased the burden on women who were struggling to bring up their families on meagre resources. Many of them tried to supplement the family income by petty trading,

displaying their modest wares – cigarette sticks, matches, soap, biros, pencils and combs – on pavement or market stalls. Women who had prospered in business were often hard hit in the post-independence period, as the following examples show.

In Kumasi, capital of Ghana's Ashanti region, several African women had done very well throughout the 1950s by trading in imported cloth on a wholesale basis. However, adverse political conditions towards the end of the decade began to work against them, and in the 1960s the rising price of imported textiles and import restrictions made necessary by the shortage of foreign exchange, coupled with a decline in the cocoa trade, knocked the bottom out of a once-flourishing business. The Ghanaian women traders of Accra also suffered: they encountered competition from men with access to imported goods, capital and extended trading networks and were pushed into less profitable areas of trade.[47] The experience of women was the same, though in different circumstances, in Zimbabwe. Under the Land Resettlement Programme land was being made over to individual males, while programmes for women concentrated on home economics and small-scale craft and related projects. Women lacked rights both over land and over the means of production.[48] These were all examples of how women were adversely affected as their country became increasingly integrated into the global economy.

After independence African women retained or obtained a foothold in certain spheres of economic activity, including aspects of the cattle and fishing industries, while losing it in others. Overall, however, their standing tended to decline; in spheres where advance was made, it was woefully slow. Post-independence cabinets continued to be male-dominated institutions, with only a sprinkling of women ministers. In the former Marxist–Leninist states of Angola and Mozambique (whose constitution declared the emancipation of women to be 'one of the state's essential tasks') the political rewards to women were not commensurate with the important contribution which they made to the liberation struggle, especially as freedom fighters. In Africa as a whole, rather more was achieved in the professional (non-technological and non-scientific) field as an increasing (though still inadequate) number of girls proceeded to higher education, and subsequently became secondary school teachers, middle- and senior-level civil servants, lawyers and doctors, and business executives. However, the numbers involved were still small and it was clear that the standing of African women in general would be advanced only when more women came to occupy positions of authority in society, notably as ministers and MPs. The 1987 figures for sub-Saharan Africa made depressing reading: on average only 6 per cent of the members of national legislatures were women; no

country had more than four women ministers and over half the states had none at all.[49] Thereafter change came slowly.

In Zambia and Zimbabwe, party women's wings were mostly founded as adjuncts of the main parties in the pre-independence period. In Botswana, however, they were not launched until 1977 in the case of the Botswana National Front (BNF) and 1987 in that of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). In each country these women's sections became the preserve of tradition-minded women loyal to the party leadership; they were diverted into welfare-oriented activities and had virtually no impact on policy formulation. These groups had no attraction for professional women, who preferred to join non-government organisations (NGOs) such as the Botswana Council of Women. The mutual distrust between women party members and educated women weakened the women's cause, as did the reluctance of many women to vote for women candidates.

In Zimbabwe especially, post-independence rewards for women were poor in relation to their pre-independence efforts. By 1979 thousands of women had enlisted as guerrilla fighters in the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of ZANU-PF, and fought side by side with men on a basis of equality. However, very few ex-combatant women (and indeed women generally) were brought into Robert Mugabe's independence government, leading Gisela Geisler to conclude that 'The demobilization of the combatants in Zimbabwe went hand in hand with their depoliticisation.'[50]

In the 1990s, as an off-shoot of the democratic process, there were some, though not dramatic, changes[51] – the indications were that because women constituted a majority of voters in most African state electorates, governments were becoming increasingly wary of alienating the women's lobby. A number of countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Eritrea, took steps to increase the representation of women in parliament. In South Africa, where the ANC adopted a quota system of representation, 106 women entered parliament in 1994. In Tanzania in 1995, though only five women were directly elected to seats in the country's 232-member Union parliament, the electoral law reserved 36 additional seats for women; this number was increased to 40 for the 1999 legislative elections. In Zimbabwe, following the 1995 general election, more women became MPs than ever before in the post-independence period; among them were professional and ex-combatant women newcomers. Eritrea's new 1997 constitution reserved 11 popularly elected seats for women. A few women achieved high political office during the decade: in Uganda Specioza Kazibwe was appointed national vice-president in 1994 and was confirmed in that post when a new cabinet was sworn in on 24 July 2001; Agathe Uwilingiyimama

was the prime minister of Rwanda at the time of her assassination in 1994; and in Tanzania Fatima Magimbi, a lawyer and lecturer, became leader of the official opposition in the Union parliament following the 1995 parliamentary elections. Overall, however, there was no significant increase in the number of women who were given ministerial posts.

Zambia's experience was revealing. The MMD's gender-aware election manifesto attracted several professional women to the party, but few rewards came their way after the 1991 general election: a small number of women became deputy ministers, but no woman was given a cabinet post, and in fact the overall representation of women in government decreased. Prospects for women seemed to be improving when, in February 1992, President Chiluba responded to mounting pressure exerted by the Women's Lobby Group – a coalition of women's NGOs – by appointing three women to his cabinet. On the other hand, women were intimidated by male MMD supporters into withdrawing their candidatures for the ensuing local government elections and, increasingly, women's issues within Zambia's ruling party were more and more relegated to a conservative women's wing. A telling point following the November 1999 general election was Chiluba's inclusion of only one woman in his 23-member cabinet.

The disappointing experience of Zambian women was not exceptional. The democratic advances in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not lead to any significant improvement in the representation of women in government; indeed, in some countries their representation actually declined. The number of women given cabinet posts in ten countries during the year 2000 was as follows: Malawi (March) 2 out of 24; Rwanda (March) 3/22; Senegal (April) 4/28; Zimbabwe (July) 1/19; Chad (August) 1/29; DRC (September) 3/23; Cape Verde (October) 3/19; Togo (October) 1/21; Burkina Faso (November) 3/30; and Tanzania (November) 2/27.[52]

Cultural reasons help to account for the under-representation of women in African cabinets and for their slow political advance overall. In Botswana a group of professional women founded *Emang Basadi* ('Stand-up Women') to demand that government and political parties 'ensure equal participation and representation by women' in the 1994 general election.[53] The group faced an uphill struggle and was accused by government officials of trying to 'torpedo the God-given right of men to rule and be superior to women';[54] this was reminiscent of the Tswana proverb – 'cows never lead the bull' – which explains the great difficulty faced by women in achieving leadership positions in this male-dominated society. Despite the efforts of *Emang Basadi*, fewer women than previously were nominated as parliamentary candidates. On the plus side, however, was the group's publicity campaign drawing attention to the glaring under-representation of

women and its subsequent success in persuading the BDP to nominate two women as special MPs and also to adopt another woman as a parliamentary candidate in a by-election (which she went on to win).

If the political role of women is thus restricted in Botswana – a country where Christianity is the dominant formal religion – it is reasonable to assume that the impediments to women's advancement will be greater in countries (especially the less developed countries south of the Sahara) whose people have predominantly embraced the Islamic faith. Some confirmation of this was given in 2000 in Kenya, when an equal rights bill in favour of women and minority groups was opposed by Muslim women as contravening Islamic law and was therefore dropped. Though the number of well-educated women occupying important positions in teaching and administration, law, medicine and business is increasing year by year, in relative terms their number is still small. Few women hold important government posts and exercise a powerful voice in policy-making; this works to the disadvantage of women in the fight against AIDS.

HIV/AIDS

In their editorial to a special issue on AIDS for the *Review of African Political Economy* Carolyn Baylies and Janet Bujra wrote:

> The epidemic comes at the worst possible time for Africa, already facing economic crisis and indebtedness, the deliberate downsizing of national governments through externally-imposed neo-liberal policies, as well as riven by more armed conflicts than any other region of the world.[55]

The articles in this special issue underline the fact that 'AIDS is deeply embedded in the dynamics of political economy' and that it is 'profoundly grounded in social behaviour and underwritten by social relations of inequality'. The editors do not accept President Mbeki's thesis that poverty causes AIDS, but say that poverty is everywhere deepened by its impact. Their concern is that African governments should appreciate the enormity of the problem which AIDS poses and that they should adopt effective strategies to tackle it.[56]

The AIDS infection had been active in Central Africa since at least the beginning of the 1970s. It spread throughout East Africa and then into southern Africa, with devastating effects; North and West Africa were less affected. The disease is thought to have been spread mainly by men who engaged in unprotected sex with infected prostitutes or other women and then passed it on to their wives; the latter, in turn, passed it on to the children

whom they conceived. Western anti-retroviral drugs were not available at affordable prices to prevent transmission from mother to child or to stay the onset of full-blown AIDS. Taking the continent as a whole, since the early 1980s AIDS has led to the deaths of some 16 million people in Africa out of a world-wide total of 18.8 million (a conservative figure since the death certificate of an AIDS victim might ascribe death to fever or chronic anaemia or other illness which the sufferer's immune system could not resist). The UN estimated that as the new millennium opened there were 34.3 million people living with the AIDS virus across the globe and that 24.5 million of these lived in sub–Saharan Africa. The spread of the virus had reached pandemic proportions in southern Africa. The rate of infection at the end of 1999 was reported by the UN (as a proportion of the 15–49 age group in each case) as: Botswana, 35.8; Zimbabwe, 25.1; Lesotho, 23.5; Namibia, 19.9; South Africa, 19.9; and Zambia, 19.9. AIDS had replaced war, drought and every other disease (including malaria) as the cause of death.[57]

The repercussions were political, economic and social. In South Africa, where more than 4 million people are HIV-positive, President Mbeki embraced for a time the rejectionist theories of a University of California professor who disputed the claim that AIDS was caused by a virus. Mbeki was widely denounced for questioning the link between HIV and AIDS and the utility of anti-retroviral drugs in controlling the disease and preventing infected, pregnant mothers from passing it on to their unborn children. Western pharmaceutical companies were strongly criticised for asserting their patent rights and pursuing monopolistic marketing techniques. Though they made some policy changes and dropped the legal action which they had brought against the South African government to protect their monopoly, they remained more interested in maximising their profits than in meeting the urgent need in South Africa and other affected countries for cheap drugs to control the disease. Sadly, the South African government itself failed to give the HIV/AIDS issue the priority that it deserved. Politically, this seemed ill-advised: in November 2001 the Treatment Action Campaign, which had played a prominent part in challenging the drug companies, sought a court order forcing the Minister of Health and eight ANC-controlled provincial governments to draw up a timetable to distribute the drug Nevirapine to public hospitals and to develop the infrastructure for supplying it to HIV-positive pregnant women. The fact that the government of the Western Cape province, which was not controlled by the ANC, made Nevirapine widely available was a further embarrassment for the Mbeki government. In December 2001 the high court judge hearing the case ruled against the government; the latter is expected to appeal.[58]

The impact of HIV/AIDS on a country's economy was profound. The high death rate caused by the disease endangered the supply of skilled personnel – including teachers, doctors, nurses, engineers, agricultural and veterinary staff, and administrators – to implement development programmes. It meant, too, that there might not be enough men and women working on the land to produce the food required to meet the needs of rapidly expanding urban populations – in Malawi, the prevalence rate among the 15–49 economically productive age group was 16 per cent. The DRC, Tanzania and several other countries also had to feed hundreds of thousands of refugees. Inevitably, the food import bill increased sharply.

The social effects of HIV/AIDS were often calamitous since they bore most heavily on the poor and marginalised in society who stood to benefit least from the education, testing and treatment programmes which, according to the president of the World Bank, had caused infection rates to fall in countries which undertook them. While President Museveni had at an early date mounted a vigorous and effective anti-AIDS health campaign in Uganda, the political leaders in Kenya and a number of other African states were for some time reluctant even to admit that they had a problem. What was certain was that unless the disease could be brought under control, the fabric of village society would be destroyed and the extended family system disrupted. Already a serious orphan problem was created in a number of countries; in one Malawi village near the shores of Lake Malawi a grandmother was left to care alone for 28 orphaned grandchildren!

Political Behaviour

In the great majority of African states class divisions have become more marked over the last 30 years; however, it is doubtful whether class has not yet become the sole, or even the primary, determinant of political behaviour. Take the position of the urban work-force in Tanzania and Zambia. Shivji's contention that the strikes and lock-outs which took place in Dar es Salaam in 1972 were the prelude to a revolutionary struggle for socialism by workers and poor peasants is untenable. These groups were not out to promote a particular ideology, but wanted to improve the standard of living of themselves and their families. They were reacting spontaneously to the call made in *Mwongozo*, the TANU Guidelines of 1971, for the assertion of workers' rights.[59] It seems likely that securing these rights rather than taking an ideological stand is still their main preoccupation.

In Zambia the situation was more complex than in Tanzania. On the Copperbelt, there was a greater class consciousness among an urban

work-force that became more 'stabilised' following independence. However, taking the post-independence period as a whole, mineworkers especially have been highly paid and, at least until the downturn of the economy from the mid-1970s, merited the designation of 'labour aristocracy' rather than 'urban proletariat'. To a considerable extent, urban workers did not perceive conflict in class terms and political leaders did not seek to win support by exploiting class divisions. The position in Zambia was admirably summarised by Morris Szeftel, writing in 1978:

> In the urban context, the differential incorporation of various regions has tended to offset the solidarity created by class and interest associations such as trade unions and business groups. The process of labour migration has preserved the links between peasant and proletarian – and indeed combined them within many individuals. In any case, urban groups on their own are generally too small to be attractive as recruiting grounds for political leaders who can more easily and more profitably (in terms of support) continue to use the vertical links based on regionalism. More importantly, uneven development ensures that the most preferred resources and rewards are concentrated in the urban areas. It is there that faction leaders compete for spoils and that many rural people look for the opportunities which might free them from the poverty of the village economy. Thus, within the interest associations of the towns, the regional character of competition for scarce resources is also manifest; allegations of factionalism occur within the arena of trade union or business activities just as they do within the political party itself. In consequence, the articulation of factional interest in the towns takes much the same form as that in rural areas; people compete for a share of the spoils in terms of a faction defined with reference to the region of origin of the individuals concerned.[60]

This description remains substantially valid – while the importance of class must not be understated, there would appear to be still more of a patronage than a class dimension to the inter-party conflict in Zambia. The 1991 and subsequent elections revealed a struggle for power between an incumbent and an aspirant middle-class leadership, with each side vying for popular support.

Evidence from Nigeria also points to the rise of a vigorous and assertive middle class which, following the civil war of 1967–70, consolidated its class position through the further expansion of the state sector and the indigenisation of capitalist enterprise.[61] However, the 1979 and 1983 general elections showed that Nigerian political leaders, like their counterparts in Zambia, still sought to win support on the basis of ethnicity and language rather than class.[62] Corruption and serious ethnic divisions confronted General (retd.) Olusegun Obasanjo upon his inauguration as elected president

in 1999. Tensions between the western Yoruba and northern Hausa peoples mounted and there were inter-communal clashes in Lagos and Kano causing many deaths. It seemed that the Yoruba believed that the new president, though a Yoruba himself, represented northern and military interests; in the presidential election held in February 1999 they therefore voted overwhelmingly for Olu Falae, the All People's Party-Alliance for Democracy candidate. For their part, the Hausa were alarmed that a significant number of southerners had been promoted to senior military posts (this was done to offset the preponderance of northern officers). Clearly, in Nigeria material interests underlay what on the surface seemed a purely ethnic conflict.

Class also did not become the main determinant of political behaviour even in states, such as Angola and Mozambique, which at independence opted for a scientific socialist path of development. Both these states were subject to acute internal divisions and civil war. The ruling party in each case attempted to raise the level of class consciousness through political education campaigns, but patron–client networks, which cut across the party's organisational ties, were often salient in rural areas. At best, such states could claim to be in transition to socialism and the interests of urban workers and poor peasants were often ignored. The leaders of both Mozambique and Angola subsequently renounced socialism and adopted economic liberalisation measures; the results were much better in Mozambique than in Angola, which continued to be rent by civil war.

In general, then, class identifications by themselves have not yet emerged sufficiently to structure political conflict in most of sub-Saharan Africa. In the late 1980s and early 1990s trade unionists played an important part in the huge popular demonstrations across the continent against politically repressive and economically incompetent one-party regimes. However, even in a state such as Zambia, where the 1991 elections brought a trade union leader to power, their influence has since waned. Pre-capitalist forms of production persist in many up-country areas and the rural people, often operating at little above subsistence level, do not yet see themselves as an obviously or directly exploited class. Urban residents in employment tend to earn high wages by comparison with the rural people, but often retain close social links with them. Despite a relatively high level of cohesion, organised labour has (in the words of Baylies and Szeftel) 'represented a reformist and economistic, rather than radical, voice' in most countries.[63] Partly for this reason, proletarian solidarity may first become pronounced among the growing number of urban unemployed.

Class consciousness is most highly developed among the middle class, which is traditionally closely associated with the state apparatus and has

prospered because of the extensive privatisation measures adopted. Middle-class leaders exercise a patronage type of politics and value workers as voters rather than as members of a down-trodden class. The middle class itself is internally divided. Even the bureaucracy often lacks unity and cohesion; though an important segment of the middle class, it does not constitute an autonomous centre of power. For its part, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie can vigorously oppose policies which are detrimental to its interests, but in most countries it is dependent on the state for public subsidies and loans and for creating a climate in which private enterprise can prosper. However, that climate is now changing as more and more state governments – socialist as well as capitalist – seek to adopt economic liberalisation measures under the internal pressure of popular demands for improved standards of living and the external pressure of the World Bank, the IMF, and Western donor countries and organisations. Of course, the more capitalist the state structure, the greater is likely to be the identity of interest between the state and the indigenous entrepreneurial bourgeoisie; that identity will be reflected, as in Botswana, Gabon, the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia, by a substantial overlap of public position and private business interests.

Moreover, if it is accepted that factionalism is situationally defined, there is on *a priori* grounds no inherent incompatibility between sectionalism and nationalism since a politician can be a staunch sectionalist leader in one context and a strong nationalist in another wider context, and this can apply to his followers too. Factionalism is often an unedifying form of conflict over access to wealth, power, and status;[64] certainly, the pursuit of class interests by members of the bourgeoisie has not prevented them, in Zambia and elsewhere, from also advancing ethnic and regional interests as factional leaders. In circumstances where elements of both class and ethnicity are present, as in post-independence Cameroon, the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia, they are so intertwined that it becomes analytically difficult to demonstrate which element is primary and which is secondary. The holders of state power may be able to manipulate the situation to their own advantage: having state resources to allocate, they can try both to advance the interests of their particular faction and consolidate their own class position.

Though factionalism may be driven by self-seeking motives, a certain amount of factional competition can be healthy for the body politic, not least in the one-party state. The danger comes when loyalty to faction becomes so all-embracing that it is socially disruptive and functionally disintegrative. This occurred in Uganda following the ousting of Idi Amin in 1979, and has been a feature of life in Chad throughout much of the post-independence period.

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5
Political Parties

Chapter 3 assessed the contribution made by political parties to the achievement of independence. In this chapter I examine the role that political parties have played since independence and, at the risk of repeating some of the points made in the Introduction, I begin by drawing attention to certain political patterns which took shape. Then, I look again at the rejection by a majority of Black African states of one-party rule and military dictatorship, and ask what effect the movement towards political pluralism has had, or is likely to have, on the functions of political parties.

The Post-Independence Political Patterns

First, there was the movement towards single-party rule. In 1958 France's African territories (except Guinea, which voted 'No' in the Fifth Republican referendum) became autonomous republics within the French Community. Some two years later Senegal and Soudan achieved independence as the Mali federation and each of the other republics became independent separately under agreements which guaranteed that close links with France would be retained. The new states inherited the centralising traditions of the French, and most of them quickly became subject to one-party rule. To judge from the high level of support shown in pre-independence elections, most ruling parties in francophone Africa rested on a broad base of voluntary acceptance: there were, in general, higher levels of electoral participation in French Africa than in British Africa. However, coercion or electoral fraud was applied in several states (for example, in Cameroon, Chad, Gabon and Togo) where opposition groups did not voluntarily accept a one-party state.[1]

Competitive party politics survived longer in English-speaking Africa, though in the final analysis they continued without interruption only in Botswana and Mauritius, and until 1994 in the Gambia. Between independence in 1960 and the military *coup* in 1966, Nigeria had no truly

national party; the federal government was a coalition of regionally-based parties, with the NPC as the dominant partner. In Sierra Leone, competition between the SLPP and the All People's Congress (APC) continued until the military intervened in 1967. In Ghana the United Party, which had been inaugurated in November 1957 after the CPP government had proscribed regionally- and tribally-based parties, survived precariously until the one-party state was officially introduced in 1964. Tanganyika had already become a *de facto* one-party state before independence in 1961; legalisation followed in 1965, creating a *de jure* one-party state in mainland Tanzania. (The latter, formerly known as Tanganyika, had joined with Zanzibar in April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, known as 'Tanzania' from July 1965; Zanzibar retained its own single party – the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) – until 1977, when the two parties – TANU and the ASP – merged to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM).) In Kenya the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which sought to safeguard the interests of the country's minority communities, dissolved voluntarily at the end of 1964; however, from 1966 another party – the radically-inclined Kenya People's Union (KPU) – challenged the supremacy of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) until it was banned in October 1969. Thereafter, Kenya settled down as a *de facto* one-party state, though KANU's monopoly of power was eventually legalised in 1982. In Zambia, competitive party politics survived for eight years after independence, until a one-party state was established at the end of 1972.

The political leaders of these various states gave a number of sometimes contradictory reasons for establishing one-party rule; thus, it was argued, on the one hand, that the single party was necessary to control regional or ethnic divisions and curb factionalism and, on the other, that the single party reflected the basic consensus of African society. Whatever the reason – and selfish motives on the part of the African leaders themselves obviously cannot be excluded – there were often sharp differences between one single party and another. The political monopoly of power by one party might rest on a *de facto* basis and that of another party on a *de jure* basis, while the ideological underpinning of the single party was strong in one case (for example, the PDG in Guinea) and weak or non-existent in another (the PDCI in the Ivory Coast). The mandate for one-party rule was clear in some countries (for example, mainland Tanzania) and uncertain in others (Ghana, Zambia). This was revealed in the pre-independence elections in Tanganyika and the Gold Coast in 1960 and 1956, respectively, and in Zambia in the general election of 1968. Whereas TANU won all National Assembly seats except one in Tanganyika, the opposition parties in the Gold Coast and Zambia did well in terms of both votes and seats.

Again, while some parties such as TANU allowed considerable intra-party competition, others – such as the PDG and increasingly the CPP – did not. Such differences between single parties were difficult to plot typologically, though Coleman and Rosberg made a bold attempt to do so in 1964, when they distinguished between one-party states of the pragmatic–pluralistic pattern and those of the revolutionary–centralising trend.[2]

A second pattern was that many parties in the post-independence period came to rest on a firmer ideological base than they had before independence; this was understandable since party leaders needed to give their followers a new sense of direction and purpose. However, as indicated above, the ideological spectrum remained wide. Many parties claimed to be socialist, but almost everywhere it was socialism of a reformist and pragmatic, rather than revolutionary, kind. Rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding, this was true of the CPP and also the Union Soudainese (US) in Mali, where Modibo Keita's socialism was elastic and imprecise. Deviations from Marxist theory also occurred in Guinea, where Sékou Touré followed Lenin in emphasising 'the dominance of the political'.[3] In Tanzania the stress on equality was the vital aspect of Nyerere's brand of non-Marxist socialism, while Zambian Humanism comprised capitalist and populist, as well as socialist, strands. Overall, the ideological base of African political parties remained weak in the 1960s, however. Ideologies were often no more than a cluster of ideas elaborated by the party leader (thus Nasser gave us Nasserism and Nkrumah, Nkrumaism) and lacked systematisation, comprehensiveness and coherence; they therefore served as uncertain blueprints for action. Only in the 1970s did a substantial number of ruling parties come to rest firmly on Marxist–Leninist doctrine – among them the MPLA in Angola, the PAIGC in Guinea–Bissau, and FRELIMO in Mozambique – giving rise to what Rosberg and Callaghy have described as 'a second wave' of socialist regimes.[4]

A third trend was not only the move away from political pluralism and towards the concentration of power in the hands of a single, ruling party but also the personalisation of that power. In the great majority of cases, the party leader after independence became the national president, constitutionally vested with the executive power and increasingly inclined to take key policy decisions without the concurrence of his cabinet and after only token consultation with leading organs of the ruling party. (Until the late 1990s Zimbabwe was something of an exception to this pattern: Robert Mugabe distanced himself from the policy process.)[5] When presidential initiatives failed, either because they had not been critically examined before being promulgated or because the president's interest had shifted elsewhere, the party itself was discredited. However, given the complexity of

policy-making, the party's role in this sphere needs to be examined empirically, state by state, as I do below in the cases of Tanzania and Zambia.

Though an African president might seek, as President Kaunda of Zambia did, to accommodate demands from his party, the state bureaucracy and the business community (both domestic and foreign), among other social interests, he was not subject to the constraints imposed upon the head of government in a liberal democratic state by a host of powerful interest groups. This was less because such groups were rare than because those which did exist tended in many states to lack the resources to command leverage, let alone interact with government on an on-going basis. In these circumstances, the autonomy of the state and its government was increased. What Joel Samoff wrote of Tanzania suggests, further, that the African state itself might function to discourage a climate of 'group enterprise' *vis-à-vis* government:

> In Tanzania, party policy frowns on the formation of interest groups in general, and economic interest groups in particular. Except for trade unions, co-operatives, and social and charitable organizations, it is assumed that the interests of any particular section of the population can be adequately represented by TANU and its auxiliaries, and that adherence to bureaucratic norms assures individuals fair and just treatment without the need for recourse to interest group protection. In other words, it is assumed that the political functions performed by interest groups in other polities – especially interest aggregation, articulation, and communication – are performed by TANU and its auxiliaries, and that interest groups, which could be used to form competing centres of power, are both unnecessary and dangerous. In addition, it is assumed that interest groups with a primarily economic orientation represent anti-socialist elements in the society and therefore should not be tolerated.[6]

The increased limitations on the role of interest groups thus represented a fourth trend; this can be examined briefly in the light of trade union experience. There were economic, social and political reasons why the governments of new African states were inclined to put an end to such trade union autonomy as existed before independence.[7] In summary form, these were: the position of the state as the chief employer of labour and therefore as the butt of wage demands; the inflationary effect on the economy of conceding such demands, perhaps as a result of strike action, and the consequent widening of the rural–urban gap; and the possible political challenge presented to the government by a well-organised trade union movement strongly entrenched in the urban areas. The tactics employed by African governments to control the trade unions included giving recalcitrant labour

leaders positive rewards, perhaps in the form of a ministerial or ambassa-dorial post, as well as invoking negative sanctions such as imprisonment, exile, or the ending of legally protected union privileges (for example, the highly prized check-off system, whereby union dues were automatically deducted by the employer from the workers' wage packets). Other meas-ures used were to cause a split in the trade union movement by creating a rival union organisation friendly to the government, and to resort to legis-lation: anti-strike laws were adopted and a strengthened central trade union body was helped to control the individual unions compulsorily affiliated to it. However, control over trade unions was not everywhere complete or uni-versally successful in preventing strike action, as the cases of Congo-Brazzaville (now the Republic of Congo), Dahomey (now Benin), Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Zambia (among others) have revealed; in the 1960s the strikes of civil servants, teachers and/or students resulted in the fall of the govern-ments of Abbé Fulbert Youlou in Congo-Brazzaville, General Ibrahim Abboud in the Sudan, and Maurice Yaméogo in Upper Volta. A similar sit-uation recurred in the last-named state in late 1983, when a teachers' union strike, followed by the summary dismissal of nearly 2,500 primary school teachers, marked the beginning of the government's confrontation with the trade unions that was subsequently to be an important element in Thomas Sankara's removal from office in 1987.[8] Captain Blaise Compaoré, who supplanted him, favoured dialogue with the unions rather than what amounted, in the last resort, to a policy of repression.

The Tanzanian case was particularly instructive: not only did the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, 1964, estab-lish one central union – NUTA – comprising various industrial sections, it also provided for the general secretary of the union and his deputy to be appointed by the President of the Republic (these provisions were progres-sively relaxed – in 1978, 1991 and 1995, when the Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFFTU) was established as a more autonomous organ-isation without legal or constitutional linkage to the ruling party, and with 11 affiliated trade unions). Moreover, as a corollary to the 1964 Act, provi-sion was made in the objects of the new union for the latter 'to be affiliated to TANU, to promote the policies of TANU, and to encourage its members to join TANU'. Yet, despite the tightness of the control thereby established over the trade union movement, workers in Dar es Salaam staged a series of strikes and lock-outs in 1972. In pointing to the harmful effects on the economy of such work stoppages, most African governments emphasised the need for government–union dialogue and for wage increases to be linked to improvements in productivity. Some governments, such as those

of Mozambique and Tanzania, also attempted – not successfully – to introduce workers' participation in industrial management.

Many unions were hard hit by the general economic recession which faced a large number of African states in the 1970s and 1980s. Take Nigeria, for example: the dramatic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s led to a series of strikes, go-slows and demonstrations in the textile and automobile industries. In the last three months of 1985 vehicle assembly workers staged protest demonstrations at plants in Kaduna, Bauchi and Lagos against deteriorating conditions of work and management's job retrenchment policies. However, the workers were unable to co-ordinate their effort at a national (or inter-plant) level and were forced to accept the tough terms imposed by the various managements.[9] Major General Ibrahim Babangida, who staged a successful counter-*coup* in August 1985, dissolved the Nigerian Labour Congress and reorganised it under state direction (similarly, the Mohammed and Obasanjo military regimes had restructured the trade union movement between 1975 and 1978).

A final trend, closely related to the introduction of the one-party state and the advent of presidential rule, was the subordination of the party to the state. Already at independence the state was the main agent of economic development and subsequently, through the creation of state marketing boards and other public enterprises, it extended its long arm into most areas of economic life. As the regulation of economic activity became increasingly technical and scientific, the prime economic managers and advisers were drawn from government administrators and technical personnel rather than party functionaries. At independence, the party lost a large number of its key personnel to the state and, by contrast even with the latter, was chronically short of well-qualified manpower. In Algeria, as in the great majority of African states, the ruling party was ill-equipped to play a supervisory role. Roberts writes:

> Since independence the FLN has possessed neither the authority nor the technical competence to orient and supervise the activity of the administrative apparatus of the state … Neither armed forces nor bureaucracy have been subject to its authority. In a sense, therefore, the Party and its ramifications could be regarded as part of the bureaucracy, performing essentially a public relations function on its behalf … Its job was to explain and justify decisions taken elsewhere, not to reason why.[10]

At the sub-national levels of region and district, the various development committees established in many states tended to be dominated by bureaucrats; this applied even in a country such as Tanzania, where, to a greater extent than in most states, the party retained some of its former vitality.

In sum, the decline of the party and the consequent demoralisation of its personnel was a fairly universal feature of the post-independence African scene.

Even the ex-Portuguese states were not exempt from this development, though their Marxist–Leninist commitment arguably gave them a stronger strength of purpose and direction than elsewhere in tropical Africa. In each state more and more was being undertaken by the president and government at the centre, especially in the economic and international spheres, than by the ruling party. By the mid-1980s FRELIMO in Mozambique had become a more bureaucratic and centralised organisation that was in danger of losing touch with the people; in Angola the MPLA, especially in Luanda, was becoming caught up in the politics of patronage and self-seeking; and in Guinea–Bissau the 1980 *coup d'état* brought an end to the PAIGC's position as the ruling party of two separate states. What Munslow foresaw had become a distinct possibility. 'The greatest danger,' he wrote, 'was that the state might well be able to transform the revolution before the revolution could transform the state.'[11]

Party Roles

The Integrative Function

In the light of these various trends, we can now ask: what roles has the political party played in the African context? In the first place, the party was expected to fulfil an integrative function. The stress placed on the principle of state equality in the Nigerian constitution of 1979, for example, underlined the perception of its framers that the fabric of national unity was still uncertain in Nigeria. For the purpose of the 1979 elections in that country, a political party could be registered only if it met a number of stringent conditions which were designed to satisfy the Federal Electoral Commission that it was not an association 'confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria'; its headquarters had to be in the federal capital and its executive committee had to reflect Nigeria's 'federal character'. These conditions showed that in Nigeria the constitution-makers looked to the registered political parties to inculcate national values in place of communal or parochial values. This is what FRELIMO in Mozambique sought to achieve by means of an intensive political education campaign, especially in those areas which were barely penetrated by pre-independence guerrilla activity. The evidence from certain other states as to how well a political party succeeds in this task is sometimes contradictory: thus, in his *TANU Yajenga Nchi* (1968), Goran Hyden pointed to the success of TANU in institutionalising

new cultural values in the rural communities of mainland Tanzania, but in *Beyond Ujamaa* (1980) he found that 'familial and other communal ties provide the basis for organized activity' among Tanzanian peasants.[12]

To achieve national integration without making major concessions to group privilege was a key problem facing the ANC in post-*apartheid* South Africa.[13] In framing a permanent constitution for a non-racial democratic state based on individual citizenship, the party had to decide how far it could afford to go in accommodating regional, ethnic and group interests. The main challenge was twofold: on the one hand, Inkatha was demanding a federal model with a weak centre and powerful regions (a solution that would enable it to retain control in Kwa-Zulu/Natal); on the other hand, conservative Afrikaners were asking for a *volkstaat* as the price of their commitment to, and co-operation with, the new South Africa. The ANC was reluctant to see such cultural–ethnic divisions enshrined in the country's new constitution, through (for example) the adoption of federal arrangements, since they were at variance with its democratic principles.

After lengthy negotiations, the new constitution was approved on 8 May 1996 by the 490-member Constituent Assembly, made up of the National Assembly and Senate sitting together. South Africa was to remain a parliamentary democracy with executive president and was to keep its bicameral legislature, comprising a National Assembly and a National Council of Provinces, without any change in their composition and method of election. The constitution incorporated a bill of rights.

Before becoming law, the new constitution had to be certified by the Constitutional Court to ensure that it conformed with the 34 principles agreed by the political parties before the 1994 general election. In a 288-page judgement, the Court found on 6 September 1996 that, while most of the draft text was acceptable, nine sections failed the test. In particular, it ruled that the powers allocated to the provincial governments were 'substantially less than and inferior to' those set out in the 34 principles. The Constituent Assembly was given to the end of 1996 to meet the criticisms of the Court. On 11 October the Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a revised blueprint for the post-*apartheid* constitution.

In the meantime, before the Court's ruling (although not affected by it), de Klerk had announced on 9 May 1996 that the NP would withdraw from the government of national unity at the end of June on the grounds that 'the new constitution [did] not provide for the continuation of any form of joint decision-making in the executive branch' and that 'a strong and vigilant opposition [was] essential for the maintenance of a genuine multi-party democracy'. Although Buthelezi attacked the new constitution as 'treacherous', the IFP did not withdraw from the government, but continued as the ANC's sole partner.

The Legitimising Function

We can also identify what can be termed a legitimising role for the party. In a competitive party situation – such as had existed continuously in Botswana, Mauritius and (until the military take-over in 1994) the Gambia, at various times in Ghana and Nigeria following the restoration of civilian rule, in Senegal since 1976, and from 1989 in an increasing number of other states – each party sought to win maximum support at a general election. However, the winning party conferred legitimacy on the successor government only when the election was widely accepted as being 'free and fair'. This condition was satisfied in Ghana and Nigeria in 1979 and in Benin and Zambia in 1991, but not in 1980 in Uganda, where the opposition Democratic Party (DP) claimed, with some justification, that the election results in that year were 'doctored' in favour of Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC); serious outbreaks of political violence followed, soon leading to widespread civil strife. Accusations of electoral malpractice were made by opposition parties in a number of other states where multi-party elections were held. However, it is doubtful whether entirely 'free and fair' elections would have produced a different outcome in several of these states, including the Côte d'Ivoire in 1990 and Burkina Faso and Ghana in 1992. The failure of opposition political parties to unite behind a single candidate ensured the return of the incumbent presidents and ruling parties in elections in Kenya in 1992 and 1997, Gabon in 1993 and 1998, and Tanzania in 1995 and 2000. In Malawi the regional split in the voting was important in the success of Bakili Muluzi and his southern-based United Democratic Front (UDF) in both 1994 and 1999, while ZANU-PF's strength in the rural Shona-speaking areas enabled the increasingly unpopular Mugabe regime to remain in power in Zimbabwe following the elections in 2000. There were of course other states where the elections were seriously flawed. The elections to the House of Representatives in Zanzibar (the islands which form part of the United Republic of Tanzania) were characterised by blatant ballot rigging in both 1995 and 2000. The presidential election in Equatorial Guinea in February 1996 was 'farcical'; President (Brigadier-General) Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was returned by a massive vote following a campaign reported to have been marred by manipulation, intimidation and fraud.

The attitude of the opposition parties was important in determining whether elections served a unifying or divisive function. This becomes clear if we contrast the experience of Mozambique and Angola following the holding of simultaneous presidential and legislative elections in September 1992 in Angola and in October 1994 in Mozambique. In Angola

the MPLA secured a majority of the National Assembly seats and President José Eduardo dos Santos, the party's leader, won 49.57 per cent of the vote, just short of the 50 per cent needed to avoid holding a second round. Jonas Savimbi and UNITA refused to accept the results of either election and the country was again plunged into civil war. In Mozambique the National Resistance Movement (MRN or RENAMO), whose main power base lay in the northern and central regions of the country, did much better than most observers had expected. Afonso Dhaklama, its leader, won 33 per cent of the 4.9 million votes cast as against 53 per cent for President Joaquim Chissano, the FRELIMO candidate (there were ten other candidates). He was more amenable to external pressure than Savimbi in Angola and accepted the informal role as leader of the opposition (the formal position was denied him since he was not an elected MP). In the National Assembly elections FRELIMO won 129 of the 250 seats with 44.3 per cent of the votes cast; RENAMO secured 112 (37.8 per cent) and the Democratic Union 9 (5.1 per cent). Eleven smaller parties failed to secure representation.

In the one-party context, elections were used by the ruling party to demonstrate that it had a mandate for its continuance in office and for its policies. In most of francophone Africa, including the several military regimes which clothed themselves in civilian garb, the people turned out in large numbers to pledge their support for the ruling party's list of candidates in what were essentially 'plebiscitary' elections. On the other hand, by the end of the 1980s in parts of English-speaking Africa and in French-speaking Côte d'Ivoire, elections within the one-party framework were held on a competitive basis, though the ruling party itself did not of course face any formal challenge. (By this date, some 12 states had competitive one-party systems.) Tanzania had led the way in 1965: for each constituency the TANU national executive committee normally accepted as candidates the two party contestants who had topped the district conference poll; voters – who did not need to be party members – then chose one of the two as their MP. A system on these lines was used by Zambia, and at least once in Malawi. However, between 1969 and 1982 Kenya had felt little need to adopt the Tanzanian model; as a *de facto* one-party state a system of open party primaries, in which aspirant candidates were free to stand, ensured a significant level of intra-party competition. The presidential election, in which electors voted 'Yes' or 'No' for a single candidate put forward by the party, reaffirmed the government's continued right to rule; parliamentary elections, by contrast, revolved round local rather than national issues. However, while the party made a major effort to secure a large 'Yes' vote and was able to draw upon government transport and other state resources, the electorate in at least some states was free to register a 'No' vote if it

wished; thus, in Zambia's Southern Province (a former opposition area) 'Yes' votes only narrowly outnumbered 'No' votes in the 1978 presidential election, and in one constituency were under 25 per cent of the votes cast.[14]

The Democratic Function

Where multi-party elections were held, a fillip was given to the democratic process. This was clearly the case in both Benin and Zambia in 1991, when the outcome was the removal respectively of General Mathieu Kérékou's dictatorial regime and Kenneth Kaunda's authoritarian government. In 1996 the electors in Benin expressed their discontent with the belt-tightening financial measures of Nicéphone Soglo, who had defeated Kérékou five years earlier, by voting the latter back into office. In Zambia, political competition – expressed in seven competitive general elections between 1968 and 1996, all except one at five-yearly intervals – outlived (as Burnell points out) both the advent of independence and the interregnum of the one-party state. Thus, 'a latent dynamic in the party system' persisted despite the existence under Frederick Chiluba of 'a predominant party system with fissiparous tendencies'.[15] This remains a system where the president and party leader hold together what amounts to a broad coalition of interests, each subject if it breaks away from the government to form the nucleus of a potentially powerful opposition – as occurred when a group left MMD to form the United Party in 1993. This was a problem which Kaunda, Chiluba's presidential predecessor, had faced in 1971, when a breakaway group under Simon Kapwepwe left UNIP to create the United Progressive Party (UPP). In each of these cases, the perceived threat of electoral defeat had kept the government on its toes and provoked an authoritarian reaction, leading in large measure to Kaunda's declaration of a one-party state in 1972 and Chiluba's move in 1996 to change the constitution in order to prevent Kaunda from standing as a presidential candidate.

The presidential and general election campaigns in Zambia, Gabon and other states aroused considerable media interest and stimulated outspoken journalistic comment that augured well for democracy. This indicated that multi-party elections marked a shift away from one-party state authoritarianism. In a number of countries – in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia – they even resulted in a change of government. More often, they led to the Botswana-type pattern of dominant party rule, under which parties could conceivably alternate in power, though this was likely to be a rare outcome.

The advent (or return) of political pluralism cannot by itself ensure good, let alone democratic, government. In many African states political parties were unstable and subject to splintering; most of the states themselves rested on a shaky economic base; civil society was weak; and parliaments exercising only residual powers were incapable of holding governments to account. Chapters 8 and 10 discuss these and related issues, and assess Africa's democratic prospects.

The Policy Function

Another potential role for the party is the formulation and execution of policy. For the reasons already outlined – the subordination of the party to the state, the indifferent quality of its personnel, the dominant position of the state president, and the increasingly technical nature of economic activity – the party's role in policy-making, including the drawing up of development plans, was often limited to that of ratifying decisions taken elsewhere. As Jeffrey Herbst showed, this was the case in Zimbabwe where, by shifting the locus of decision-making upward, the government enhanced the role of the cabinet and not the ruling party, the ZANU-PF; the latter, 'despite the rhetoric, is not meant to have an important role in the policy process'.[16] The position in Botswana was much the same (without the rhetoric), despite Charlton's claim that one should not 'underestimate the actual and very real impact of Botswana's BDP leadership on the policy process'.[17] While it may be true that there were signs of a shift of power away from the bureaucrats and towards the politicians, the latter – the President and his cabinet ministers – were members of the government rather than full-time officials of the BDP. While the cabinet's role may have become 'crucial', the party itself was weakly organised and, except at election time, was not particularly effective.

The exclusion of the ruling party from any meaningful say in economic issues appears to be a common feature of the African scene. Nevertheless, it is necessary to sound a note of caution on two grounds: first, because policy-making is a sensitive area on which it is difficult to obtain precise information in some states and second, and above all, because policy-making is a complex and composite process. In a presidential system, it is often extremely difficult to say whose influence is dominant at any one time and whose counsel determines the final policy outcome: in Nkrumah's Ghana, it was said that to understand shifts in government policy it was essential to know who saw the President last! Presidential entourages may include at various times men (and a few women) drawn from a wide range of institutional

backgrounds, such as the party, cabinet, administration, university, defence forces, trade union and co-operative movements, business and commercial organisations, and overseas aid-giving institutions. To illustrate some of these points, I take the cases of Tanzania and Zambia and make brief reference to the experience of the former Afro-Marxist states of Angola and (especially) Mozambique in the pre-1990 period.

Tanzania   The working of the Westminster system of government, which Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) adopted at independence in December 1961, was not at first radically changed with the inauguration of the Republic a year later. However, in 1964 President Nyerere acted without the concurrence of his cabinet in handling a number of crises that arose, especially in the foreign field. Thereafter, Nyerere was responsible for several important policy initiatives, particularly the Arusha Declaration of January 1967. His proposals were not, however, automatically accepted. He experienced considerable difficulty, for example, in persuading the National Executive Committee (NEC), the main policy-making body of TANU, to accept the leadership rules embodied in the Declaration; these rules seriously restricted the leaders' income-earning activities.[18]

For some years after 1967, the President, party and cabinet worked out together the policy implications of the democratic socialist path which Nyerere had mapped out. From the mid-1970s, however, the party (the CCM) and government showed a tendency to pursue policies independently of each other, with the President sometimes acting (as over rural development policy) as initiator, sometimes as mediator, and sometimes in support of one side or the other.[19] He tended to come closer to the government's position during periods of economic crisis and reverted to the party's position when the crisis had been overcome. Party activists became more assertive in policy-making in the post-Arusha period, but tended to neglect economic considerations – they were reluctant to face up to the harsh economic realities with which the cabinet had to grapple.

The divergence of viewpoint between party and government was undoubtedly encouraged by Tanzania's poor economic performance and the apparent failure of the government's experiment in communal farming (*ujamaa vijijini*). However, these differences should not be exaggerated for several reasons: first, because of the overlapping links between the two institutions (in 1983, for example, ten cabinet ministers also served on the NEC – there was no incompatibility rule equivalent to that in Zambia, the effect of which supposedly, though not in practice invariably, was to prohibit such overlapping); second, because of Nyerere's dominance of both institutions; and third, because most senior officeholders were reluctant to

become identified with a particular policy in case it should fail.[20] Moreover, neither cabinet nor NEC were monolithic bodies and each contained a diversity of viewpoints; divisions between these bodies and within the NEC probably became more marked in the 1985–90 period when Nyerere remained party chairman but was no longer state president. Under Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the Zanzibari politician who succeeded Nyerere as president (and as party chairman in August 1990) and under Benjamin Mkapa, who took over in 1995, the country has moved steadily towards the adoption of a market economy and the introduction of more liberal investment laws. These reforms were welcomed by overseas aid-givers who early in the new millennium praised President Mkapa and his government for their economic achievements – low inflation, 5 per cent GDP growth rate, a steady rise in average incomes, the privatisation of two-thirds of public companies, and good investment opportunities. The changes in leadership no doubt facilitated this liberalisation process, though it should be recalled that some IMF conditions had already been accepted and the outline of the final agreement with the IMF reached before Nyerere left public office in 1985. In any event, it is clear that the initiative in this economic and technical sphere was taken by the President and his advisers rather than by the ruling party.[21]

Zambia   In Zambia, the Second Republican constitution of 1973 defined the respective roles of party and government in the recently instituted one-party state.[22] The UNIP central committee was established on a full-time basis, recognised as superior to the cabinet by a constitutional amendment in 1975, and assigned the overall direction of policy. It worked through a series of sub-committees and, following the second (one-party) general election in 1978, it was made responsible for supervising all central government ministries. The cabinet was relegated to the subordinate role of policy implementation and administrative decision-making. This was in part a constitutional fiction: the cabinet resisted its marginalisation on policy matters by the central committee and the latter's effectiveness never became commensurate with its increased formal power. Several channels of communication did exist between the two institutions to help remove potential points of conflict and to facilitate joint decision-making, which was said to occur (for example) over the setting of agricultural producer prices. But a silent struggle persisted between the two institutions; in order to resolve it, President Kaunda in 1988 increased the size of the central committee to 68, a number that included all the members of the cabinet. He also shifted the focus of authority to a newly created committee of chairmen, over which he himself presided and which had extensive policy-making, supervisory and

administrative functions. A party control commission was also set up at the same time with authority over all party and non-party institutions, including parastatals, and was charged with seeing that party policies were implemented. Inquisitorial in nature, the commission was unpopular with MPs, but survived until 1991 when both it and the committee of chairmen were abolished.[23]

Though President Kaunda himself and his advisers in State House formulated policy on most major, and many minor, issues, they had to accommodate demands from UNIP, the cabinet, the state bureaucracy, the business community (in the wake of the economic reforms of 1968–72) and the IMF. Kaunda consulted the cabinet on a wide range of issues, including some aspects of general policy, budget proposals, and draft legislation. In 1986 he bowed to IMF pressure to remove certain state subsidies, but reinstated the subsidy on maize meal (the staple diet) when food riots resulted in the death of 15 people and the arrest of at least 450 others. In June 1990 the doubling of the price of maize meal led to further riots, in which over 20 people were killed. These riots, the unsuccessful *coup* attempt which followed them,[24] and the growing popularity of the MMD were clear signs that Kaunda was fast losing his legitimacy.

He had instituted in Zambia a regime which combined socialist, populist and state capitalist strands. The President himself embodied the socialist strand – the desire for greater social equality – and this probably helped him to retain his popularity in many rural areas over a long period. The populist strand was uppermost within UNIP, and for many years the two together were able to moderate the starkness of state capitalism. By mid-1991 this no longer happened and, indeed, had ceased to be meaningful: the economy was in deep recession, the people's standard of living was in sharp decline, and UNIP was widely discredited. In these circumstances, the ruling party could make no significant contribution to policy-making and lost its monopoly of power to new political forces which combined demands for political pluralism and economic liberalisation.

The Afro-Marxist States

Following the achievement of independence in the mid-1970s, the vanguard-type socialist parties which emerged in Angola and Mozambique sought to assert more important policy-making functions than proved possible in countries such as Tanzania and Zambia. In fact, however, power tended to be concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite, and both party and state structures became bureaucratised and over-centralised. Corrective

measures were taken, but were not effective. Mozambique's experience of rapid economic decline was typical of that of other Marxist states in Africa.[25] FRELIMO, the ruling party, was not competent to deal with the complex economic and technical problems which arose and its role in policy-making became increasingly formal. In December 1990 a new constitution sanctioned inter-party competition, granted the right to strike, and pointed the way to a free market economy. FRELIMO approved these changes, but the initiative for them came from President Chissano and his advisers in association with external donors. Mozambique – a desperately poor country – became increasingly reliant on the latter.

In Angola the MPLA sought to relax its former centralised control by creating predominantly elected bodies: a 223-member National Assembly and assemblies in each of the provinces dominated by workers and peasants. However, the strength of UNITA meant that the MPLA was able to develop only a popularly supported party organisation in certain parts of the country. Again, the vital importance of external relations in this mineral-rich country made it inevitable that the central government would dictate policy in the economic and financial spheres. The size of the amounts pledged to Angola by international donors at the donor conference in Brussels in September 1995 – a total of US$1 billion in aid and reconstruction – was beyond the capacity of MPLA, and even most government, personnel to handle. By mid-1996 government had become increasingly presidential, though Eduardo dos Santos lacked essential support and the administration was on the verge of collapse. Reports at this time suggested that the MPLA itself was organisationally weak, that UNITA was in effective control of over half the country's territory, including the diamond areas of the north-east and the coffee-rich Uige province, and that only a small proportion of the proceeds from the sale of diamonds and oil went into the national coffers. The yawning gap between rich and poor became ever wider and the ruling party seemed incapable of doing anything about it. Thus, the evidence from both Mozambique and Angola suggested (and was confirmed by the experience of Zimbabwe, a non-Marxist state) that even a party which played a powerful role in the independence struggle over many years was not thereby guaranteed a correspondingly important role in its country's decision-making processes in the post-independence period.

Local Policy   In the great majority of African states, including eventually the former Afro-Marxist states, the tendency has been for responsibility for formulating and executing local policy to pass from party functionaries to agents of the state (except perhaps at village level where no or few government officers reside). This occurred purposely in post-independence Kenya,

where President Jomo Kenyatta appointed members of the provincial administration as his agents for development. It also occurred in the Ivory Coast and in less deliberate but still marked fashion in several other states, including Malawi. One aspect of the problem has been the inability of local party officials with limited formal education to understand complex development plans and to implement decisions of a technical nature, while another has been the run-down of the local party organisation. This did not take place in Zimbabwe, where Herbst found that ZANU-PF was strong at the local level. Party officials joined forces with squatters to press demands to land; the coalition thus formed was too powerful for most bureaucrats to resist. However, land seizure was the only area of government decision-making in which ZANU-PF became involved;[26] this apart, the civil service was 'the key element' in the issues of most concern to people in the rural areas.[27] In Tanzania Nyerere, as party chairman, worked hard from 1985 to revive local party structures, but everywhere met with a request from office-holders for remuneration. In Zambia one reason for the passage of the Local Administration Act of 1980 was to instil a sense of direction and purpose into apathetic local party officials and members; many constituency officials became district councillors and were entitled to receive sitting allowances. The Act merged the district administration, the local councils and the local party organisation into a new integrated administrative structure called a district council. However, the reorganisation did not extend to the central government departments operating at district level and, in so far as the state bureaucracy retained its former functions, UNIP's input into public policy-making and implementation was restricted.[28]

In the 1990s serious attempts were made to revive local government in Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and a number of other states as part of the democratisation process (see Chapter 6). Thus in Zambia, the incoming MMD government headed by Frederick Chiluba replaced the 1980 Act with the Local Government Act of 1991, which provided for a flexible and multi-faceted local government system. This marked the beginning of a major decentralisation programme, which had strong political backing but was hampered by financial constraints and the persistence in some quarters of centralising attitudes. The result was that the policy initiatives taken by the local authorities, and especially the rural authorities, were severely limited.

Occasionally, in a few states, voluntary associations had a say in policy-making. In Tanzania's Kilimanjaro Region, Samoff found that:

> The local TANU organisation plays no direct role in education decisions, and even though many people seek TANU assistance in a wide range of problems, very few come to the TANU office for school problems. While

the TANU regional executive secretary sits on the Moshi Town Council education committee as a nominated councillor, he and other TANU officials subscribe to the prevailing mythology that education is the concern of the technical experts, and do not become directly involved in educational matters.[29]

In fact, it was the Roman Catholic and Lutheran missions – and not the government or party – which dominated educational decision-making in Kilimanjaro. This picture, underlining the importance of informal mechanisms of decision-making on issues which, like education and liquor licensing, have a high local salience, probably did not change significantly following the introduction in 1972 of decentralisation reforms. At the time the latter resulted (as did corresponding measures in many other African states) in the deconcentration of administrative authority and the burgeoning of the number of bureaucrats rather than in meaningful political devolution. The chief beneficiaries of this process in Tanzania were senior civil servants – the regional development director at regional level and the district development director at district level; party officials were left to fulfil an ill-defined watching brief over government activities.[30] The position did not change significantly following the revival of elected local authorities in Tanzania in the 1980s, though further reform was undertaken towards the end of the next decade.

Mobilisation and Reconciliation Functions

In some states, the party retained a limited mobilising role. Indeed, 'mobilisation' – harnessing popular energies for economic development through self-help – was seen in the early post-independence period as a task for which the party was pre-eminently suited. However, the popular enthusiasm that was aroused in this manner was often misdirected or unco-ordinated (thus, a village school might be built without first ascertaining that a teacher would be appointed to it) and it could not in any case be sustained over a long period. Even in this sphere, the initiative might be taken by the government rather than the ruling party, as was the case with Botswana's Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP) between 1973 and 1976, and by vote-seeking government ministers, as tended to happen under Kenya's *harambee* (pulling together) programme. If, overall, the party has proved a somewhat weak mobilisation agent, part of the blame must lie with the central government, which was usually reluctant to encourage non-productive participatory activities that increased the

demand (for materials and manpower) upon its own resources. Botswana's experience under the ARDP (referred to above) showed however that a policy of devolving responsibility to the local level could pay good dividends, since, as Robert Chambers noted: 'the ARDP revealed and developed far greater implementation capacity in the districts than was expected. Councils and local contractors did more than many believed they could.' Similarly, the government of Mozambique sought to tap local energies in order to improve the living standard of the people: it placed a high value on popular participation and set about creating new structures to encourage it – communal villages in the rural areas and mechanisms of workers' control in industry. Some success was achieved until South African-backed rebel activity became widespread in the early 1980s and disrupted development efforts. FRELIMO also sought to extend the high level of political consciousness in the northern liberated areas to the rest of the country and to this end, in 1975 it established *grupos dinamizadores* (dynamising groups) to undertake the work of mobilisation and organisation. But party cadres were in desperately short supply, causing the gap between party and people to widen alarmingly.[31]

The early distinction between political parties which fulfilled mobilisation functions and those which played a reconciliation role[32] was not particularly helpful, since accommodating different interests and mediating conflict were functions which any kind of political party might be expected to perform. They were important in Zambia where factionalism within UNIP was rife at the time of, and after, the elections to the party's central committee in 1967. However, in this sphere too, the initiative in many states passed to the president and his personal representatives at provincial and district level.

The Patronage Function

The revival of multi-partyism has boosted the historically important patronage function of political parties, which promise patronage in return for electoral support. Take Nigeria, for example. Between 1954 and 1963 the federation was divided into three regions, each region being ruled by a party which was rooted in the region's dominant cultural–linguistic group: Yoruba in the west, Ibo in the east and Hausa-Fulani in the north. Each party (the AG, the NCNC and the NPC in turn) used its regional power base to confer benefits on its supporters, to strengthen its hold over its own region, and to gain direct access to national resources by seeking to capture power at the centre. In this last respect, the NPC succeeded best because it was able to win the support of the vast majority of the numerically preponderant

Northern population, while the people of the Western and Eastern Regions divided their allegiance between the two rival Southern-based parties, the AG and the NCNC. Events in the west were particularly revealing.[33] In the period before 1962, the AG ruled the region in alliance with leading chiefs and businessmen, and won popular support by providing a wide range of services, including free primary education, medical facilities, tarred roads and water supplies. Moreover, as the Coker Tribunal of Inquiry revealed in 1962, the ruling party siphoned off some £6 million of public money into its own coffers, thus enabling it to strengthen its organisation and further reward its supporters. In 1962, however, the party split into two wings, one led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the federal opposition leader, and the other by Chief S. L. Akintola, Awolowo's former deputy and the Western Region premier. This internal crisis prompted the federal government to replace the elected regional government with an Administrator and to weaken the west and the AG further by carving a new region (the Mid-West) out of the old Western Region in 1963. When Chief Akintola returned in that year as the head of a coalition government in the west, he was dependent on federal support. In order to strengthen his own position and that of the ruling party (the NNDP, formed as a result of a merger between his own United People's Party and a wing of the western NCNC) he forged an alliance with the NPC. The NPC-dominated Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) enabled Akintola to tap federal resources for the benefit of the West but, as world prices for cocoa and other products fell, the region seemed to most voters less prosperous than during the period of AG rule. Convinced that he could not win a 'free and fair' contest, Akintola blatantly rigged the 1965 regional elections and thereby sealed his own fate; in January 1966 he was assassinated by the military, and as a consequence the NNDP, as well as all other political parties in the country, was proscribed.

The ban on overt political party activity in Nigeria was lifted in September 1978, preparatory to the return to civilian rule in October of the next year. Under the 1979 constitution, the fact that the political parties had to be national in character did not prevent them from exercising a locally focused patronage function or from conferring maximum benefit on the geographical area of Nigeria where the party was most strongly entrenched: for example, the overwhelmingly Yoruba-speaking states of Ogun, Ondo and Oyo and the Yoruba-dominated Lagos state in the case of Chief Awolowo's Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), which inherited the mantle of the former AG. The party all but swept the board in these states in the 1979 elections and formed the government in each of them, thereby underlining the people's trust in Awolowo and their confidence in his party's ability to extract resources from the centre, even though it did not share in the ruling

coalition dominated by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). In 1983, how-
ever, the UPN hegemony in the western states was breached in elections
which, over the country as a whole, showed a marked trend towards the
NPN. While a large number of people in the western states, including
Lagos, continued to pledge their loyalty to Awolowo and to look to him and
his party for benefits, many others perceived that they would fare better by
joining the NPN bandwagon.[34]

The Ghana case is no less instructive. In the 1956 general election the
majority of the Brongs in northern and western Ashanti voted for the ruling
CPP in the belief that if the party was returned to power, it would honour
the official pledge given in a White Paper published in April 1956 to estab-
lish a separate Brong Region, with its own Regional Assembly and House
of Chiefs. That this (and the perception that a separate region would lead to
the channelling of additional resources to the area) was the real issue and
not the fact that the Ashanti, the traditional enemies of the Brongs, strongly
supported the rival NLM, was shown in the 1969 election. On that occasion,
both the Brongs and the Ashanti voted solidly for the Progress Party (PP)
led by Dr Kofi Busia, the former parliamentary leader, as it happened, of
the NLM; the PP had assured the Brongs in its election campaign that it
would not seek to dismember the Brong-Ahafo Region, which had been
legally established in 1959, and had made it clear that the region would
benefit more by backing Progress than any of the rival parties.[35]

Zambia affords a third example of the patronage function at work. In this
case, the predominant pattern was that the various factions which made up
UNIP, the ruling coalition until October 1991, competed with each other for
party and government office and therefore for the ability to distribute spoils
to their supporters. In the multi-party context (1964–72), this competition
was intense. A given faction, which was (in Morris Szeftel's words) 'a
patronage network organised for conflict', might operate singly; most
often, however, it linked up with another faction to form a 'super-faction'.
Thus, in 1967 the Bemba-speaking group combined with the Ila-Tonga-
speaking group in order to capture key UNIP central committee posts,
which at that time guaranteed appointment to a corresponding cabinet
office (for example, the party vice-president became national Vice-
President and the party treasurer became Minister of Finance). Alliances
were determined by a faction's perception of the advantages which they
would bring, and none proved permanent. Even the solidarity of the Bemba
regional–linguistic group, which straddled the Northern, Luapula and
Copperbelt Provinces, broke up in 1969 as the Luapulans expressed disil-
lusionment with Northern Province leaders, who had referred to them dis-
paragingly as *batubulu* ('mere fishermen'), and voiced dissatisfaction with

their meagre share of the fruits of independence. They asked the President to 'grant political recognition and status to our Province in the same way as other Provinces'.[36] They received some (though in their view inadequate) rewards, and at that time remained loyal. In this respect, they were unlike many of the Northern and Copperbelt Bemba leaders who broke away from the ruling party when the political pendulum swung against them after 1969 and joined the United Progressive Party (UPP), which Simon Kapwepwe, a former vice-president of the party and state, formed in 1971.

Whereas the Luapula Province voted overwhelmingly for Kaunda and UNIP in successive elections, the Southern Province remained a strong opposition area throughout the First Republic. This was due to the Ila-Tonga people's traditional hostility to government – a legacy of the colonial era – and above all to their belief that the ANC stood for the peasant agrarian interest.[37] Their suspicions of UNIP as a Copperbelt-based, Bemba-dominated party were reinforced in the 1968 election campaign by ANC propaganda that, if UNIP was returned to power, the Bemba would steal their cattle and their wives. During this election, in which UNIP fared badly in both the Southern and Western Provinces, officials of the ruling party revived the slogan, 'It pays to belong to UNIP', which had first been used on the Copperbelt in 1965. There is evidence, covering the period before as well as after the 1968 elections, to show that this was not an empty slogan. Morris Szeftel cites many examples, ranging from access to bank overdraft facilities for party officials to the appointment of staff to the Lusaka City Council, to show that UNIP membership conferred material benefits; he concludes that, 'given the relative scarcity of state resources, the monopolization of patronage for UNIP members constituted a major asset for the Party in building and maintaining support'.[38] Instances of discrimination against individual ANC members were numerous, not least in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt; they were often denied trading licences, excluded from the markets, and experienced difficulty in obtaining building plots and planning permission. Nevertheless, the Southern Province received generous allocations of revenue from the centre under the First Republic and was a major beneficiary of the government's agricultural loan scheme. It would therefore seem that the UNIP government used economic, rather than political, criteria in making allocations to Zambia's rural provinces; the Southern Province was the country's main cash-crop producing area.[39] Szeftel points out that though factional competition declined following the introduction of the one-party state in 1972, for many the party was still:

a form of security or insurance – a way of ensuring the continued issuance of trade licences, or an avenue to appeal for loans or other

resources when this was necessary. The mass party looked very much like a patronage party in some constituencies in 1973. The link between UNIP activity and the pursuit of patronage was clearly reflected in the registration of Party branches between February and September 1973 as people sought to have a vote in the primary elections and thus a voice in the choice of candidates. It might also have reflected the efforts of those who aspired to stand for Parliament to ensure that branches which might support them were registered.[40]

Moreover, UNIP continued to provide paid employment for politicians at national and regional levels. Though it still did not pay constituency and branch officials (most of the former claimed to work full-time on their party tasks), local officials who were chairmen of ward councils became *ex officio* members of the integrated district councils established – one in each district – under the Local Administration Act of 1980. The local party organisation also aspired to act from time to time as an employment agency by recruiting the labour required for road construction and other purposes.

The operation of patronage in Zambia showed that a faction constituted an informal hierarchy which often disrupted a party's organisational ties. As Richard Sandbrook has written:

> personal alliance networks in many underdeveloped countries, far from being restricted within organizational boundaries, characteristically cut across boundaries to link individuals in different organizational and territorial arenas. In many African countries the governing party became after independence merely one more arena within which members of the élite competed for precedence and political resources.[41]

Patrons in the government formed linkages which might have little connection with any political party. In Kenya, for example, President Kenyatta eschewed an important role for KANU. Instead he elevated clientelism into 'his *modus operandi* of politics', with himself as 'the Grand Patron' and 'Ultimate Arbiter' of factional conflict, thus acting in a manner reminiscent of King Hassan II of Morocco.[42] Where, as in Kenya, the party machinery was weak, personal political alliances assumed added importance and political leaders at the centre relied on factional linkages at the local level. They politicised many supposedly apolitical bodies, sometimes including trade unions, co-operative societies and the army. Thus, intra-elite competition in Kenya penetrated the trade union movement, which represented 'a poly-ethnic, territory-wide, organizational network invaluable to any politician seeking to extend his influence throughout the country'.[43] Similarly in Sierra Leone the civilian ruling group cultivated its army connections from

about mid-1964, and a relationship was established that appealed to both sides as mutually beneficial. Civilian 'big men' served as patrons to army officers anxious to improve their social standing and further their military careers, while the politicians insured themselves against the time when their legitimacy might decline.[44] In 1967, however, this relationship did not prove beneficial to either the leading politicians or to senior army personnel; as noted in Chapter 7, it resulted in a military *coup* that failed because the army was not united behind its commanding officer.

Roger Tangri's illuminating study *The Politics of Patronage in Africa* is replete with recent cases. His examples – drawn from Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and other African states and referred to below – substantiate his claim that 'patronage politics persists and is currently the defining political pattern in African countries'.[45] Those who distribute patronage are state personnel – top politicians, with leaders of the ruling party among them, and senior bureaucrats. Their control of largely state-run economies has enabled them to distribute benefits and patronage and thus secure the political support of various societal interests, to maintain their hold on state power, and at the same time to enrich themselves. Under pressure from international donors, they have perforce – as a condition of receiving external aid – had to commit themselves to improving state economic performance, privatising public companies, and establishing a market-run economy. But to secure their own position they have often dragged their feet and even impeded the reform process. Where economic reforms have been introduced, they have tended to favour business entrepreneurs associated with state rulers.

In the Côte d'Ivoire the marketing of cocoa and coffee, the country's major export earners, has been dominated by companies owned by the relatives of the country's first two post-independence presidents. In Kenya, according to Cohen (who is quoted by Tangri), positions in 'ministries, national financial institutions, and parastatals' were used 'to advance the business/economic interests of the President and his supporters'. In Tanzania economic liberalisation benefited Tanzanian businessmen with close connections to the ruling party. President Museveni in Uganda was reported to favour his own south-west region in making senior public sector appointments and in locating development projects; referring to the need for regional balance in his government, he said that he 'had to have enough cake to pass around'. In Zambia President Chiluba bestowed 'lucrative favours on backbenchers to keep them quiet'. In Zimbabwe, preferential treatment was given to black enterprises 'with good connections with the ZANU-PF party' and when the construction industry was being indigenised, contracts went to firms 'with the best relations with the ruling

party, not those that were best qualified'. In Cameroon, until recent years, President Paul Biya drew higher civil servants 'almost exclusively from his southern Beti ethnic group'. Even Botswana was not exempt: instances occurred where ministers and senior civil servants 'manipulated circumstances for their personal and partisan advantage'.[46] Patronage was also used as a negative sanction – state support was denied those who were deemed to be politically unacceptable. In Ghana the political leanings of local entrepreneurs wanting to take over public companies were carefully scrutinised by the Rawlings government; when the interested party was found to be a supporter of the political opposition, the proposed privatisation was set aside. In Nigeria the military government in 1994 withdrew the oil prospecting licence of Summit Oil because its owner, Kola Abiola, was the son of the late Chief Moshood Abiola, the rich Yoruba Muslim who had won the 1993 presidential election – an election that an embarrassed government had then aborted, imprisoning the victor. In Zimbabwe President Mugabe's government withheld benefits from the businesses of individuals outside of ruling circles. The abuse of power was often accompanied by corruption, blatant examples of which occurred in Kenya and Uganda in the 1990s (see Chapter 6). All across Africa senior state office-holders rarely faced criminal charges for abuse of public office.[47]

The Political Communication Function

The final party role which I identify is that of political communication. This is a corollary of political competition and, in mainland Tanzania, TANU at an early date stressed the importance of keeping open a two-way channel along which government policies could flow to the people and the people's wishes and reactions to those policies could reach the government. Potentially, communication remained an important party function, but many governments often preferred to use non-party channels: for example, even Tanzanian ministers, like their Zimbabwean counterparts, relied substantially in practice on the government bureaucracy, which was predominant in providing information and in making allocation decisions. For its part the government of Senegal, both before and after independence, relied upon the influence of Muslim leaders in administering the rural areas. One reason for this practice was probably that local party leaders were known to be reluctant to communicate unpopular messages, and sometimes distorted government policies. Thus, in Tanzania's Lushoto District, where land is a scarce and highly prized commodity, *ujamaa* was frequently misunderstood by local people as meaning self-help; this was found to be because TANU

officials were unwilling to press a policy which required the peasants to give up their individual holdings of land in favour of communal ownership and production.[48] Similarly, local UNIP officials in the Serenje District of Zambia were reluctant to denounce *chitemene*, the traditional form of agriculture, which entailed burning felled trees and growing crops in the ash thus formed; though condemned by the Ministry of Agriculture, this practice was still favoured by farmers in the district.[49]

These various findings were reinforced by the results of Samoff's research in the Kilimanjaro Region of Tanzania. Samoff found that TANU and other leaders, convinced that education was 'the key to the good life', not only did not put over government educational policy, which stressed the need to divert resources to other, less advantaged areas of the country, but assisted the missions to thwart government goals and priorities by establishing new schools. While 'professing support for and adherence to Tanzanian socialism', the political elite 'confessed that they were able to support the leadership code in spirit now, and would support it in practice as soon as their [own] children were educated'.[50]

* * *

There is no doubt that in the period between independence and the late 1980s party functions in most African states were subject to some decline. The party was either run down in favour of the burgeoning state machine and, being less efficient, was under-utilised, or it was dissolved by an incoming military regime (although sometimes the military subsequently created a new party as a means of strengthening its own legitimacy). An additional reason for party decline was that, decentralisation measures notwithstanding, the government in most African states imposed central control more than it encouraged meaningful popular participation. That it is the latter which invigorates and sustains political parties was shown in the pre-independence nationalist period and after independence in those anglophone states, notably Nigeria and Ghana, where civilian rule and competitive party politics were restored. In most of French-speaking Africa, by contrast, 'demilitarisation' tended to result in the re-establishment of single-party rule, with the leader of the military junta often assuming the civilian garb of an elected president.

The pro-democracy movements of the 1990s resulted in the formation of opposition parties in a large number of African states. The existence of these parties and the holding of competitive elections have served to put ruling parties on their mettle; on the whole, the result has been beneficial though, as in Chiluba's Zambia, such parties have tended to bring out an authoritarian strain in ruling politicians afraid of losing power. To date

political parties – new and old, government and opposition – have not transformed Africa's democratic prospects. Poorly organised for the most part (outside the immediate electoral period), they rest on a weak ideological base and are caught up in clientelist networks. Their electoral and legitimising functions have often been important, as was revealed in Senegal's presidential election early in 2000 when President Abdou Diouf, candidate of the ruling Parti Socialiste (PS), was defeated; this was an unexpected result in a country where there had seemed scant prospect of shaking PS's hold on power. In other states, political parties have shown limited capacity in getting out the vote, while their regional base (as in Chad, Malawi and Sudan) and ethnic base (as in the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Mali) have lessened their national thrust. The contribution of ruling parties to policy-making has not gone beyond setting the broad parameters within which they expect the government to work (in this respect, however, they do not differ greatly from political parties in developed countries – New Labour in Britain, for example). Virtually all African political parties are ineffective at grass-roots levels and often lack mobilising capacity. In general, the weakness of political parties and civic organisations is such that the continuance of executive dominance is assured. That dominance is asserted by an elite group or, more often, by an all-powerful president. In several states, the old ruling parties have continued to dominate the political process; few incumbent state leaders, whether civilian or military, have voluntarily abandoned their old ambitions and subscribed to the unfamiliar doctrine of political accountability. This remains the position in the first two years of the new millennium.

Paradoxically, we must probably look to opposition rather than ruling parties to lay firm democratic foundations in African states. Encouragement is to be found in the fact that elections have resulted in a change of government in Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia. True, only Mauritius and Benin have met what Bretton and De Walle consider to be 'the minimal two-turnover test for democratic consolidation'.[51] But this number could increase if elections are free and fair and if the opposition can overcome its fateful internal divisions which – in, for example, Gabon, Kenya and Tanzania – have gravely weakened it in the past.

To summarise, there has been no dramatic change in the role of political parties in recent years and no major change can be expected in the near future; also, the combination of patrimonialism and patronage on which African politics have been based seems likely to continue. Whether international donors are justified in their view that cutting back the state's role in the economy is the best way to weaken patrimonial politics and enhance

the prospects of development is open to question. The consequences of adopting this approach are discussed in Chapters 8 and 10.

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6
Administration

Before examining the basic properties of the administrative systems of the African states at independence, we would do well to remind ourselves of the colonial legacy. Colonial rule was alien rule, superimposed from outside mainly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and established in the midst of on-going cultures. It was exercised by predominantly European administrators, who were few in number in relation to the population being administered within what was typically a centralised and unitary framework; thus French West Africa, which comprised eight territories, covered a huge area and had a population of some 15 million, was served in 1937 by only 385 colonial administrators, of whom half were posted to offices at headquarters in each colony.[1] These administrators had a political role for, protestations of political neutrality notwithstanding, policy was not only implemented by civil servants but was primarily formulated by them. This role began to change in the terminal stages of colonial rule as government became much more specialised in function and, first in British Africa and then in French Africa, the rudiments of a ministerial system were introduced. Nevertheless, the colonial state was *par excellence* a bureaucratic state. This had its impact on the post-colonial state, which tended to adopt (with only slight modifications) the inherited civil service structure, rules and procedures, as well as the preferential arrangements for civil servants in relation to salary, housing, and medical services.[2]

While members of the British colonial service could be transferred from one colony to another, most of them spent their whole career in one territory; and, though an African from one British colony was sometimes recruited to serve in another colony (Creoles from Sierra Leone served in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, for example), nearly all indigenous members of the service were confined to their own territory. By contrast, the French colonial administrative service tended to be more mobile. Permanent civil servants fell into one of three cadres – the general, the upper, and the local

cadres – entry being determined by the standard of education achieved; until 1945 educational opportunities were limited for most Africans, who were French subjects rather than citizens, and so they were allowed to join only the lower ranks of the civil service.[3] Those in the first category could serve in different colonies within the French empire and those in the second within a group of territories, such as post-war AOF; only those in the local cadres (the majority) served in one territory. In practice, this meant that a non-metropolitan 'Frenchman' – that is, a citizen of the French Union, regardless of race or colour – who was, say, a Martiniquan in the general cadre could serve equally in Martinique, Chad or Indo-China, and a Senegalese member of the upper cadre could belong to the administrations of Senegal, the Ivory Coast or Niger. Thus Félix Eboué, who was Guyanese, served as Governor of Chad before the Second World War and as Governor-General of AEF during it, while Gabriel d'Arboussier, who was born in the French Soudan of mixed (French-Soudanese) parentage, served in several AOF territories as a colonial administrator before devoting himself full-time to radical political activity: he was a founder member of the RDA and became its secretary-general in 1949. This arrangement for senior civil servants made for more uniform patterns of administration in the French empire than the British. Coupled with the fact that many of the indigenous civil servants and politicians in AOF attended the same federal secondary school (the Ecole Normale William Ponty in Dakar), it also no doubt facilitated collaboration between francophone states after independence. Nevertheless, it was the British rather than the French pattern which prevailed in the post-colonial state. When the French territories in West and Equatorial Africa became independent – mostly in 1960 and as individual states rather than as members of a federal unit – they, like their anglophone counterparts, proceeded to build up national civil services, recruited from among their own citizenry.

Basic Properties of the Administrative System at Independence

In relation to earlier generations of new states (those in Latin America, for example) the post-colonial states of tropical Africa, Asia and the Caribbean were relatively well off in their administrative endowments; for Africa, this applied especially to the anglophone states and to some, though not all, of the francophone states. However, the very sophistication of the inherited administrative machinery, largely modelled on the institutions of the metropolitan countries in the post-1945 period, meant that that machinery was costly to run and difficult to staff without some help from expatriate officers.

The bureaucracy constituted a high proportion of the people within a given state who were in wage and salaried occupations, and therefore imposed a substantial drain on the national budget. In Senegal by the late 1960s over half of the national budget was allocated to civil service salaries.[4]

The expansion of state activity, particularly in the economic field, was alleged to be necessary because of the weakness of the indigenous private sector in a majority of African states: neither the colonial power nor intrusive Western economic institutions, such as the commercial banks, had created conditions in which African business enterprise could prosper. The state itself therefore became the main agent of economic development and this in turn stimulated the creation of new public enterprises. The growth of what in several countries – state capitalist as well as socialist – was to be a vast parastatal sector entailed an expanded role for the bureaucracy.

At independence, heavy demands were also placed on the latter, as well as the political system as a whole, by mass electorates newly enfranchised under pre-independence or independence constitutions. Whereas in the West industrialisation had occurred before fully democratic practices were introduced into the political process, the opposite was true in Africa. Nationalist politicians, only recently installed in office, had scarcely time to formulate economic policies, let alone reap the benefit of them, when universal suffrage was conferred.[5] They could not fulfil their (sometimes rash) electoral promises and several of them found in the bureaucracy a convenient scapegoat, alleging that its members had absorbed colonial values, attitudes and methods. That politicians in English-speaking Africa sought protection behind such a bureaucratic smoke-screen was not altogether surprising. Civil servants had largely stood aside from the independence struggle and, as a result, were often distrusted by the politicians (though in francophone Africa, by contrast, most of the principal post-war leaders had been civil servants by profession, a fact which may help to account for the relative moderation of nationalist politics in these territories).

Adjustment to the new dispensation was especially difficult for civil servants occupying senior positions in services where indigenisation had taken place at a relatively early date. This was the case in Ghana where, as in many other parts of English-speaking Africa, the traditions of Westminster and Whitehall implied a politician–civil servant relationship that the ruling party was not long willing to sustain. Public servants at independence might be pulled in other conflicting directions: while they were conditioned by the inherited cultural values of the colonial system, they were also likely to be influenced by the value systems and political cultures of the societies from which they originated. Few of them were immune from the communal and particularistic pressures of the society of which they formed such

an important part. Hugh Roberts pointed out that this was a continuing problem in Algeria, where 'the bureaucracy does not function primarily in accordance with a rational–legal code … On the contrary, administrative action is determined in large measure by personal ties and obligations and is characterised by the preferential treatment of friends and relatives.'[6]

Bureaucracy and the Post-Colonial State

To those who subscribe to the 'ecological' school of development adminis- tration, what Roberts said of Algeria need not be surprising: Fred Riggs, for example, has argued that corruption and inefficiency are naturally endemic to administration in poly-communal and poly-normative societies. Though most of Riggs' field experience was in Asia, where hierarchical social pres- sures are stronger than in Africa, and though the relevance of his views to Africa has been questioned by a number of writers (most cogently by Nelson Kasfir) they merit examination.[7]

Riggs uses the term 'prismatic society' for the intermediate society which exists at various points of the continuum between the traditional, 'fused' society and the modern, 'diffracted' (and functionally specific) society; it contains elements of each of the other two. He argues that the bureaucracy – the 'sala bureaucracy' as he calls it – is dominant in the prismatic society because there are no political institutions strong enough to control it. The sala is therefore characterised by corruption, nepotism, self-seeking and inefficiency; 'the more powerful officials become', he maintains, 'the less effective they are as administrators'.[8] That there are African bureaucrats with these characteristics is not in question. There is also evidence to suggest that, as bureaucrats seek to maintain their living standards in deteriorating eco- nomic circumstances and as opportunities for upward mobility within the public service become progressively reduced, the incidence of corruption in many states has increased (as, for instance, in Tanzania, where corruption was minimal until the late 1970s). Moreover, as was stated above, bureau- crats are subject to social pressures and some of them do accord preferential treatment to their friends and relatives, even if not necessarily on the scale in Algeria suggested by Hugh Roberts. Again, to the extent that the bureau- cracy could be held responsible for the dismal economic record of most African states, it has been less than efficient (though 'efficiency' is notori- ously difficult to measure). The question is whether such instances of admin- istrative behaviour can be explained satisfactorily in Riggsian terms.

Riggs concedes that the degree to which societies are prismatic may vary. Countries that are more prismatic – that is, where there occurs more

substantial overlapping between modern and traditional norms – have bureaucracies approximating to his sala model. However, against this it can be argued that the bureaucracy within a given state is not a monolithic body: some bureaucrats may be corrupt and inefficient and therefore deserve the designation 'sala officials', but not others. Riggs also does not distinguish clearly enough between different forms of corruption.[9] The preferential treatment of friends and relatives, and the system of rewards in return for services rendered which lies at the heart of patron–client politics, are socially acceptable in African states in a way that theft, fraud and embezzlement are not; the latter forms of corruption are subject to legal prosecution in virtually all states. Neither does Riggs tell us the level that corruption must reach before it ceases to oil the machinery of government and adversely affects government performance. As to efficiency, sala bureaucrats – as Riggs conceives them – would have been incapable of sustaining existing African state machineries for over 40 years and of making them work in adverse conditions, which have included political instability and military take-overs, ill-conceived 'presidential' initiatives and frequently shifting governmental programmes, constant ministerial reshuffles and organisational changes, as well as exogenous events such as natural disasters and world economic depression. If Riggs' theory does not prove helpful in identifying common strands in the administrative performance of independent African states, it is also not particularly illuminating when employed to examine the experience of individual countries, as can be shown by taking the cases of Ghana and Tanzania.

By most tests, including the quality of its public service, Ghana at independence in 1957 was closer to 'modernity' than Tanzania (then Tanganyika) at independence four years later. Yet in the decade following the independence of each state, there was less corruption among public servants in Tanzania than in Ghana (though it must be emphasised that Ghana had many excellent public servants who maintained the highest standards of integrity); and, to judge by the criterion of economic performance, efficiency was better in poor Tanzania than in the more richly endowed state of Ghana. That Ghana had an indifferent record was not because the 'weight of bureaucratic power' (to use Riggs' terminology) was too great, rendering the bureaucracy uncontrollable, but because it was *too little*: the effectiveness of the bureaucracy was sapped by the political manoeuvring and interference of Nkrumah and the CPP. In Tanzania, by contrast, bureaucrats – especially in the period before 1967 – had a relatively greater say in formulating public policy. Yet, as Cranford Pratt's discussion of educational policy shows, in the distribution of secondary-school places the civil service had 'the capacity and the will to serve the public interest rather than narrowly to

pursue its own class interest'. Though Africans in public life and in the public service were very well paid in Tanzanian terms, they were 'still responsive to the various influences and pressures which operate to keep public services reasonably efficient and free of corruption'.[10]

Again, as African states have extended the range of their economic and other activities in the post-independence period, structures have become more specific (that is, more institutions, including parastatal bodies, have been created to perform new functions); and at least formally (and often in practice) achievement has counted for more than ascription in bureaucratic recruitment. Universalistic rather than particularistic values have been stressed and the public service, by drawing its members from all parts of the country, has often played a nationally integrative role. Though there is wide variation among African states, it can reasonably be claimed that a number of them have, at least in the above respects, moved towards 'modernity'. According to the view expressed by Riggs in 1964 in *Administration in Developing Countries*, this should mean that the bureaucracy had lost some of its sala characteristics and had become both less corrupt and more efficient; in fact, the evidence points, if anything, in the opposite direction. It is true that Riggs subsequently broadened his concept of prismatic society to include within it a highly differentiated society with a low level of performance. But in this way – and perhaps also by arguing (in 1970) that 'a significant (but not overwhelming) degree of bureaucratic power is functionally requisite for the organisation of a developed system of government' – he modified the meaning which he had earlier attached to his adopted Parsonian variables (functional specificity, universalism and achievement). The utility of the concept 'prismatic society' is reduced the more elusive it becomes.[11]

Riggs' argument, that the bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries is all-powerful, cannot be uncritically accepted in its application to Africa. His view on this subject is shared by Joseph LaPalombara and several others in the modernisation school, as well as by a number of Marxist scholars, though the latter not only approach the subject from a different perspective but use different arguments and reach different conclusions as to the significance of the *overdeveloped* state concept. In his seminal article on 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', Hamza Alavi argued that the new rulers of the post-colonial society inherited an 'over-developed' state apparatus which had been designed with metropolitan, rather than their own, interests in mind and which had resulted, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, in the emergence of a powerful military–bureaucratic hierarchy. Moreover, the fragmentation of the dominant capitalist class in these countries had meant that the post-colonial state was not the instrument of a single class; this fact and the 'national' character of the post-colonial

bureaucracy gave it a certain autonomy, including the ability to mediate between the competing interests of the three propertied classes: the indigenous bourgeoisie, a sizeable strata of large-scale landowners, and the metropolitan neo-colonial bourgeoisie.[12] While not questioning the validity of Alavi's findings for the South Asian states with which he deals, there are grounds for arguing that the extent of the autonomy of the state apparatus in Africa was much more limited; thus, the localisation of the senior levels of the public service and the officer ranks of the army occurred much earlier in the Indian sub-continent than in Africa. In relation to the latter, Colin Leys has correctly argued that the colonial state was not 'very strong in relation to its tasks', which became increasingly economic and technical after independence.[13] Though South Africa and Zimbabwe might stand as exceptional cases, his conclusions certainly apply to the colonial state apparatuses inherited by virtually all the ex-colonial countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As I show in subsequent sections of this chapter, the new African states were initially short of trained and experienced personnel. Their bureaucracies, weakened on this score, were also subject to internal divisions. Moreover, even though the ruling party in a particular state might itself be incapable of curbing bureaucratic power, effective control over the bureaucracy was often exercised by individual politicians: perhaps the president himself or ministers with administrative ability (of whom there were several in Zambia's first post-independence cabinet). It is therefore only in relative terms that the bureaucracy in the African context is as powerful as Riggs and a number of other scholars would have us believe.

Finally, it can be said that Riggs was right to argue that to understand 'transitional' societies, a model based on the state systems characteristic of Western societies on the one hand, or those typical of traditional, peasant societies on the other, was not helpful. Unfortunately, his own model of prismatic society, underpinned as it is by pseudo-scientific theorising, offers an inadequate guide to an understanding of administrative behaviour in underdeveloped countries; however, it must in fairness be added that his ecologically based theory draws our attention, most valuably, to the large number of factors which affect the bureaucracy in such contexts. The paradox in Africa is (in Riggs' terminology). that in the post-independence period state structures have become more diffracted (and the state itself therefore more 'modern'), without a corresponding increase in bureaucratic competence. The bureaucracy has been required to assume tasks, notably that of running a vastly expanded state sector, for which it was not equipped by either training or experience. As Bernard Schaffer pointed out, the chosen remedy was not to consider alternatives – a change in the inherited administrative model – but to promote institutional administrative training.[14] This was understandable;

it is a daunting task for any state to adopt an entirely new pattern of administration to fit changed political and socio-economic circumstances; expressed in Herbst's terms (discussed in the Introduction), it was easier to seek to strengthen the state's structure than to address the more difficult question of situational autonomy.

As noted above, the political leaders themselves were inexperienced in operating a governmental system on a national scale and were faced with numerous pressing problems. One of these was to Africanise – or 'localise' (since Europeans and Asians took out citizenship in several states) – the public services, both to satisfy political demands and to cope with the problem caused by the exodus of expatriate personnel. It is to a brief consideration of this issue that I turn in the following section.

Manpower and Africanisation

The most serious problem facing new state administrations after independence was thus not so much the value system of the bureaucracy as the shortage of a trained and experienced indigenous work-force. In this respect certain francophone states, including Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Senegal and Madagascar, were better off than poorer states like Mauritania and Niger, which had weaker educational endowments. In general, the personnel situation at independence was healthier in French-speaking West Africa than Equatorial Africa: by 1960 there were only five university graduates in AEF, from which four newly independent states were to emerge later that year. Only in 1955 were hesitant steps taken in AEF to begin training Africans for posts of responsibility, with the result that at independence the new governments had to rely heavily on the continued services of French administrators and technicians in the state capitals and regional posts.[15]

Among the anglophone states, the problem was more acute in parts of East and Central Africa than in West Africa. In Ghana at independence in March 1957 some 60 per cent of senior posts were Africanised; in mainland Tanzania at independence in December 1961 only 26.1 per cent of senior *and middle* grade posts were filled by citizens (regardless of racial origin). In Zambia, which became independent in October 1964, the position was even worse than in Tanzania. The deliberate withholding of secondary education until the 1940s, and of locally-based higher education throughout the colonial period, both retarded the emergence of a nationalist leadership and meant that Zambia entered independence with only a small pool of educated personnel. As late as February 1964 only 38 of 848 administrative and

professional posts were filled by Africans, and only 26 per cent of Division I and II posts. The situation was no less dismal at independence in Zaire (July 1960), as a result of Belgium's long neglect of secondary and higher education. However, in some respects the scale of the task was greater in Zambia, where during the colonial period whites had monopolised posts down to very junior levels, such as typists, road and building foremen, and mechanics. As President Kaunda was to observe in 1968: 'we entered Independence without a single African technician in one of the most highly industrialised societies on the Continent.'[16] Even Zambia, however, was better-off than the ex-Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique where, at independence in 1975, the desperate shortage of skilled personnel, coupled with the precipitate departure of Portuguese managers and technicians, imposed a formidable constraint on development.

At independence there were insistent demands by politicians and trade unionists that the public service should be Africanised without delay. Though a few leaders, including Houphouët-Boigny in the Ivory Coast and (particularly in relation to the army) Banda in Malawi, deliberately slowed down the rate of Africanisation, most governments responded to this pressure. They showed little inclination to follow the 'colonial approach', which involved waiting for graduates from school and university to emerge and then to prove themselves within the service. Instead, promising local officers were given intensive training – the 1960s has been described as 'the training decade'[17] – and accelerated promotion, though in some states there was no alternative to making former chief clerks into permanent secretaries overnight. Sometimes the 'job analysis approach' was also used; this entailed relating the organisation of work and the qualifications required for a post to the local manpower available, even if this meant splitting a job formerly held by an expatriate officer into two. Predictably, it was easier to localise administrative posts than professional and technical ones. Among the earliest posts to be localised were those in field administration, the level at which most people came into contact with the new government; top policy-making posts, such as those of permanent and deputy permanent secretary; sensitive posts, including the offices of chairman of the public service commission and commissioner of police; and the foreign service. At the same time, most government leaders took steps to retain the services of expatriate personnel until local personnel became available and, in many states, Africans newly promoted to very senior positions were initially underpinned by white advisers. When Europeans left more precipitately than the government wished, they were replaced with overseas personnel recruited on contract (as distinct from pensionable) terms, often under technical assistance agreements with the former colonial power.

Administrative Aspects of the Post-Colonial State

The functioning of the administration in the post-colonial state was vitally affected as a result of the developments identified in the Introduction. The creation after independence of authoritarian power structures, which proceeded at a striking pace in francophone Africa and more slowly in English-speaking Africa, meant that the concept of a neutral, impartial and anonymous civil service was quickly eroded. At the least, new state governments required civil servants to be committed to the achievement of the goals which they laid down. Thus, shortly before Ghana became a Republic in July 1960, *A New Charter for the Civil Service* was issued, which stated that the control of the civil service would in future be vested in the president and that where 'a senior civil servant finds himself out of sympathy with the policies and objectives of the Government it is clearly his duty to retire voluntarily from the Government service'.[18] This document, it is true, also stressed that the civil service should be non-political in character and that individual civil servants should avoid identification with a political ideology or party. In practice, such provisions were never very meaningful and disappeared with the creation of the one-party state in 1964. President Nkrumah also weakened the position of administrators outside his own office by creating within it divisions which paralleled existing ministries; thus, the Bureau of the Budget took many of the decisions which would normally have been taken by the Ministry of Finance. In this way ministers became 'little more than presidential secretaries who represent the leader in departments of state',[19] thereby giving rise to acute feelings of frustration on the part of the ministers themselves and the civil servants who worked under them.

In the period before the one-party state was legally created, both Tanzania and Zambia undermined the political neutrality of their civil services by making some senior political and administrative posts interchangeable. In Zambia, the secretary-general to the government was both head of the civil service (replacing the former secretary to the cabinet on 1 February 1969) and a minister of cabinet rank. Nevertheless, party and administration remained broadly distinct in both countries, and merit was retained as the principal criterion for recruitment to the civil service.[20] Even in Guinea no symbiosis between the parallel party and state hierarchies took place. In an essay published in 1967, Lucy Behrman commented:

> in Guinea, the PDG has grown more, rather than less, powerful since independence. At the same time the position of the administration has been very unclear. It has not fused with the party, as Coleman and Rosberg contend, but remains distinct from it. In fact, the two organizations are

continually conflicting with each other, the conflicts being particularly noticeable on the regional level. Throughout the struggles between the party and administrative personnel it has been the party view which has tended to predominate.[21]

Though the PDG was stronger, both ideologically and organisationally, than most other ruling parties, almost everywhere in tropical Africa the uncertain relationship between party and administration led to misunderstanding and conflict. Where, as in Uganda in the 1960s, the governing party and the public service tended to be recruited from different (and indeed politically antagonistic) regional backgrounds, the potential for conflict increased. In Tanzania, the introduction of decentralisation measures in 1972 resulted in some conflict between the ruling party and the civil service as each sought to achieve supremacy under the new system. A number of serious clashes occurred between the political regional commissioners and the powerful new civil service regional development directors. Again, in Kenya, where the government used the administration rather than the party as its main agent of development, as well as its major instrument of control, parliamentarians publicly attacked the service; they accused its members, often unfairly, of putting personal gain before duty.[22] Political interference and (in many states) poor management sapped the morale of the civil service, in which political loyalty seemed to be becoming a more important criterion for promotion than administrative or technical efficiency. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that many civil servants resigned in order to join international organisations or private companies, while others transferred to the parastatal sector. The lot of the civil servant often eased with the advent of military rule; in Ghana under the National Liberation Council (NLC – 1966–9), for example, the civil service became the military's 'most important corporate ally'.[23] Again, in states such as the Ivory Coast, the progressive decline of the party after independence was paralleled by the corresponding rise of an extensive state apparatus, of which the civil service was a part. However, it is important to remember the *caveat* entered by Hyden in a different context, when he said of Kenya's ruling party: 'That KANU is weak is no proof that the civil service is powerful.'[24] The power of the bureaucracy in most African states is indirect, being exerted on the political leadership; it has no source of legitimacy independent of the political system as a whole; and its internal divisions, principally between a civil service and a parastatal sector, and its fragmentation along functional lines mean that it lacks a unified structure.[25] Moreover, as I argued above, authoritarian power structures are inimical to the continuance of a neutral, impartial and anonymous bureaucracy.

In much of tropical Africa the public service continued to face deep-seated problems, as Zambian experience in 1980 revealed:

> Such frequent transfers of departments and agencies among Ministries, the general reallocation of subject responsibilities, and the frequent movement of Ministers and civil servants have adversely affected the quality of administration. Chains of command at senior levels have been disrupted, resulting in serious delays; votes have had to be changed; and resources have been wasted both because of the lack of cost-consciousness in the public sector and inadequate financial control inside Ministries, which, like the Ministry of Finance itself, are short of qualified accounting staff. The staff shortage is general and the number of vacant posts in many grades of the civil service is alarmingly high.[26]

Zambia was not alone in lacking the indigenous personnel to fill many professional and technical posts, and in having appointments procedures which were cumbersome and time-consuming and facilities for civil service training which were both too limited and too centralised. Moreover, almost everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa, because of the shortage of qualified manpower so much energy was absorbed in keeping the state machinery going that fundamental administrative reform was neglected; on the other hand, periodic salary reviews were undertaken and the civil service retained both its hierarchical structure and elite status which were inherited from the colonial era.

This is not to deny, however, that the bureaucracy might be able to reform itself to a limited extent. For this to happen R. S. Milne argued that bureaucratic procedures – in the form, for example, of general rules and regulations, relating to civil service conduct among other matters – might need to be more closely observed, and elements of the Weberian model of bureaucracy, including the principle of hierarchy, retained and strengthened. Milne conceded that while particular features of the inherited bureaucracy might have to be modified in developing countries, that bureaucracy should – in the absence of 'clear viable alternatives' – be adapted to the changed circumstances of independence rather than replaced by an entirely new administrative system. These arguments challenged the widely accepted view put forward by Bernard Schaffer that the paramount need in the new state context was for an innovative, non-compartmentalised and change-oriented administration rather than for an administration of the Weberian type. African public services, said Schaffer, were geared to system maintenance rather than to innovative development administration; this was a valid comment, though the importance of the law and order and other non socio-economic goals pursued by the governments of newly independent countries should not

be minimised.[27] To provide innovation in administration, most of these governments looked to the parastatal sector; in doing so, they dodged rather than solved the question of administrative reform.

The Parastatal Sector

The rapid growth of this sector, after independence, took place for a variety of reasons. These included the relative weakness of domestic capitalism, the determination of political elites to strengthen their hold over state power, and the desire of the new state governments to end foreign control over the economy. Such control was often extensive: in Uganda, shortly before Amin expelled the Asian community in 1972, around 4,000 non-Africans controlled 70 per cent of the distributive trade, while 16,000 Africans were responsible for only 30 per cent.[28] Government attempts to change this unhealthy situation took various forms, from the establishment of new public enterprises to the outright nationalisation of foreign-owned companies. In some states, including Botswana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire, private enterprise (both domestic and foreign) was allowed to co-exist with public enterprise, operating either independently or in joint ventures, with the state as majority shareholder wherever practicable. In more radical states, such as Mozambique and Tanzania, the role of private enterprise was strictly curtailed, although not entirely eliminated. The public enterprise became a universal feature of the African scene, irrespective of a country's political regime and irrespective of whether that regime pursued a capitalist or socialist development strategy. A 1986 survey identified 2,959 public enterprises among just 30 African states, making it likely that the overall African total was considerably higher.[29] The public enterprise offered government leaders a more flexible instrument of development than the government department, which was subject to the full panoply of parliamentary and treasury control.

Among the parastatal bodies created in the post-independence period were agricultural marketing boards (sometimes to supplement those already existing); national development corporations or corporations split up into sectoral units covering agriculture, industry and mining; state commercial and national banks; and state companies. While the last-named were incorporated like any other private company to pursue a commercial undertaking, many of the other agencies rested on a statutory basis. The growth of these bodies, however established, was rapid. In Mali, in the early 1960s, wrote Zolberg:

the roster of state enterprises had grown longer year by year; it included garages, repair shops, metal works, a printing plant, and a number of

processing plants for locally grown produce; also SOMIEX (State Import-Export Organization) and its chain of retail shops, as well as a chain of state pharmacies and another one of book-stores.[30]

Houphouët-Boigny's Ivory Coast, less radical than Mali under President Modibo Keita and the US, followed a strategy which relied on the external infusion of money and manpower; yet here, too, the size and scale of the state apparatus expanded enormously. *Sociétés d'état* existed, Campbell noted, 'in almost every area of the economy whether concerned with regional planning … foreign commerce … or agricultural production'.[31] Corresponding increases in public enterprise activity took place in anglophone Africa: for example in Tanzania, in the wake of the Arusha Declaration of 1967; in Zambia, from 1968 onwards; and in Nigeria, where domestic increases in both the production and price of oil between 1969 and 1974 precipitated a process which had been under way since independence, resulting in the creation of over 250 public enterprises by 1973. The increase in the number of Nigeria's constituent states (to 19 in 1976) contributed to further expansion of the public enterprise sector, as the governments of the newly created states joined the federal and existing state governments in forming parastatal organisations committed to the promotion of development.[32]

This burgeoning of new institutions, as well as extensive constitutional change and ministerial reorganisation, began at a time in the early 1960s when the standard of administration was lowered (albeit temporarily) by the Africanisation of the public service. Not surprisingly, early results were disappointing. In Guinea, the enterprises responsible for basic economic activities, such as railways, roads, air transport, electricity, mining and banking, were relatively successful, but the commercial agencies (*comptoirs*) performed badly. Lucy Behrman observed that this was because 'the Guinean government had neither the personnel nor the experience necessary to move from a mostly private economy to a completely publicly-controlled one, and the distribution of imports in Guinea broke down rapidly'. Finally on 1 November, 1963, the government enterprises which had distributed retail goods were closed.[33] State enterprises in Nkrumah's Ghana (1957–66), too, were often inefficient and corrupt and saddled with cumbersome administrative procedures; in 1965 only two of 15 state manufacturing undertakings were making a profit. These enterprises could not compete with the private sector. In Nigeria between 1960 and 1966 Nigerian Railways alone had 13 enquiries into its activities, and in 1965 the World Bank described its finances as 'disastrous'.[34]

Experience from the mid-1960s was hardly more encouraging, despite some success in the financial sector (national banks and state commercial

banks performed reasonably well in Tanzania and elsewhere), the relatively better performance of the East African corporations as compared with their West African counterparts, and such valuable spin-offs from public enterprise activity as the rapid training of local staff. By 1973 half of all public enterprises in Ghana and Nigeria had had public enquiries conducted into their operations, while an official review of Kenya's statutory boards in 1979 found the existing enterprises to be over-politicised and inefficient, and recommended that no new parastatal company should be established unless the need was indisputable. In Mali, according to François, the state corporations were responsible for 70 per cent of national economic activity, but had enormous debts, high wage costs (with over 13,000 employees), and were very corrupt; they were used by top civil servants and other members of the exploiting class to amass personal wealth. In Zambia a parliamentary select committee, whose report was tabled in August 1978, drew attention to the inefficiency of many parastatal bodies, citing instances of poor management, theft and corruption. Many state-owned companies operated at a loss because they were constantly subject to political pressure and could not be run on businesslike lines; they were also hit by the shortage of qualified and experienced manpower.[35] This poor record of performance continued into the 1980s. At the beginning of that decade more than half of the public external debt of the Ivory Coast was attributable to ten or so parastatal organisations. In Nigeria in 1979–81 the performance of public enterprises in the strategically important areas of transport and energy was so poor that the federal government sacrificed national prestige in order to appoint foreign technical and managerial manpower to leadership positions in the enterprises concerned.[36]

Among the reasons for the disappointing performance of public enterprises were substantial over-staffing, poor project investment decisions and weak financial management. Another reason was the unsuitability of many of those appointed to the boards of public enterprises: some owed their positions to blatant political patronage – a common practice in both Nkrumah's Ghana and Nigeria under the first Republic – while others were civil servants who, though competent administratively, were completely lacking (through no fault of their own) in business acumen. The relations between the parastatal sector on the one hand and the civil service on the other were often uncertain. Steps taken by a number of states, including Zambia, to bring salaries and conditions of service in the parastatal sector into line with those in the civil service might be justified on the grounds of equity and in order to raise civil service morale; in Ghana early in 1975 salary differentials, as well as revised pension arrangements, were having a serious demoralising effect on the civil service. However, it was also possible that such steps would merely serve to reduce the parastatals' flexibility

in recruitment and therefore undermine their operational efficiency. Some public enterprises were also choked with bureaucratic regulations issued to check corruption, making the cure sometimes more damaging than the disease. Again, the parastatals were subject to government direction over both the siting of industries and the pricing of products, resulting – in Zambia, for example – in certain companies incurring heavy losses and thus, in the troubled context of the late 1970s and 1980s, adding to the pressures forcing governments to have recourse to large-scale external borrowing. This afforded international credit organisations a powerful leverage within the domestic economy.[37]

Privatisation

From the late 1970s African governments facing economic adversity and mounting debt problems came under pressure from both multilateral financial institutions and Western bilateral agencies to redefine the state's role within the economy. Partly for this reason, divestiture rather than the reform of publicly owned enterprises became a favoured economic strategy, especially from the second half of the 1980s: 40 African states, representing some 80 per cent of the total, were officially committed to privatisation by 1990. In practice, in the early 1990s diversification proceeded more slowly than these figures suggest; activity was unevenly spread and differed greatly in focus and scale. Privatisation programmes were modest in (for example) Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia and Swaziland, but were extremely ambitious in Nigeria where, in January 1988, President Babangida's military regime launched a scheme to privatise 98 federal and state enterprises. In general, the programmes' range was greater in West Africa than in other parts of the sub-continent, while francophone states showed more serious interest in privatisation than anglophone states.[38] As the decade proceeded privatisation was stepped up in a number of countries. In Cameroon, for example, the delay in privatising the economy was one of the reasons which led the IMF to suspend aid in 1996; the government responded two years later by privatising the sugar, railways and cement sectors. In Tanzania, two-thirds of public companies had been privatised by the beginning of the new millennium.

   Two final points need to be stressed. First, as Ralph A. Young has pointed out, the divestiture issue 'transcended ideological boundaries between the capitalist and socialist states', though some of the latter were more willing than others 'to grasp the privatisation nettle'.[39] Second, the reasons for the delay in implementing many privatisation programmes were both

economic, including the lack of both sufficiently developed capital markets and of indigenous buyers with the requisite funds, and non-economic. Many politicians saw the privatisation of parastatals as a threat to their own power base and to the patronage networks which they had established. State sector managers resisted divestiture programmes. Public sector unions, too, responded negatively, fearing a loss in employment security. This was dramatically illustrated in South Africa at the end of August 2001 when a general strike against privatisation hit schools, transport and factories. Tens of thousands of people marched through the centre of Johannesburg and other cities to protest against the sale of public assets which, the union leaders feared, would cost many jobs in a country where one-third of the workforce was already unemployed. (An additional grievance was the leadership's conviction that the ANC had no concern for the poor).[40] Also, several state governments (though not those of Togo and the Côte d'Ivoire) found that they could not easily proceed with divestiture without a formal master plan covering the public sector as a whole. Again, it often proved difficult to establish effective administrative machinery to manage privatisation.[41]

From a political point of view, such delays were perhaps no bad thing since divestiture, where externally imposed, clearly represented an infringement of state sovereignty. Partly for reasons of self-interest, but also so that the state could retain some control over its economic affairs, the bureaucracy in Mali in the late 1970s resisted the demands made, with French backing, by the IMF and other international credit organisations for the dissolution of some of the country's more profitable state corporations.[42] Such infringement did not occur where the initiative came from the African states themselves. Indeed, many governments had long been acutely aware of the need to overhaul a public enterprise sector that was a heavy drain on the economy. Thus the Zambia Youth Service (a statutory body whose staff was recruited primarily by UNIP regional secretaries) was brought under direct ministerial control as a result of a 1970 report on parastatals, and state-owned butcheries and sisal plantations in Tanzania were restored to private hands in 1977 and 1985, respectively. The Mozambican government moved in a similar direction when, in 1980 and again in 1993, it sold to private businessmen most of the small enterprises taken over by the state at independence.[43] However, the sale of publicly owned assets to foreign owners was a politically sensitive issue, as the NLC in Ghana had found in 1967–8 when it proposed to sell the State Pharmaceutical Company to a private American firm. It had to withdraw the sale offer in face of a strong public outcry.[44]

Though complete divestiture was the favoured strategy, reorganisation was another remedy. Taking Tanzania and Zambia again as examples, in the

1970s Tanzania drastically reformed its inefficient State Trading Corporation and National Milling Corporation, while in 1978–9 the Zambian government overhauled the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), which directly or indirectly controlled over 90 companies, many with substantial foreign minority interests. Reorganisation was also set in motion in the Ivory Coast (in 1977), though here the object of imposing tighter economic and financial supervision on the public enterprises (among other measures) was to enable President Houphouët-Boigny 'to regain firm control over the whole of the patrimonial system' by 'the bringing to heel of the country's political class and the drying up of the sources of clientelist enrichment'.[45]

The justification for divestiture was the fact that heavy statist economic management coupled with authoritarian polities impeded development and 'provided plenty of fertile ground for abuse of office and for the personal enrichment of state personnel'.[46] However, divestiture – discussed further in Chapter 10 – was not accepted as a universal solution in Africa. While most state governments, under pressure from international financial institutions, committed themselves to extensive privatisation programmes, many of them hesitated to follow a policy of full-scale denationalisation. For some time implementation was therefore modest, particularly in respect of 'strategic' enterprises, such as important transport parastatals and official marketing boards. Tangri found evidence of 'a gradual momentum towards privatisation' in Africa, but noted 'a continuing state presence in the economy' to the extent indeed that the state remained 'the central participant in economic activity'. Members of the government also 'continued to use state power for political and personal purposes'.[47] At the same time, few leaders were prepared to retain public enterprises at any price and risk cutting off international development assistance. Privatisation has been speeded up since the mid-1990s, though state governments have sometimes subjected publicly owned concerns to reform and rehabilitation and made use of other policy instruments, such as price controls and licensing, which they have at their disposal.

Whatever the size of the parastatal sector that is retained, state personnel, based predominantly at the centre, still control the national economy of African states. This will change only as further privatisation takes effect and as meaningful decentralisation programmes are adopted by states genuinely committed to democratisation and to popular participation in the institutions of government. However, as noted in the following two sections, the shortage of skilled personnel – acute in the financial and economic spheres – will adversely affect achievements in the spheres of both decentralisation and development planning.

Decentralisation and Local Government Reform

From the late 1980s, as 'democratic' governments replaced the former dis-
credited single-party and economically bankrupt regimes, the emphasis
shifted from administrative to political devolution. Whereas earlier experi-
ments in decentralisation had tended to reinforce central control – exercised
by officials of the central government in the field – rather than to enhance
local autonomy, many of the new multi-party governments pledged them-
selves to transfer powers to representative local councils, each with its sep-
arate legal existence and its own budget, and with the authority to allocate
resources and to carry out multiple functions. Appropriate legislative pro-
vision was made, but the extent to which a significant shift of power
occurred varied widely across the continent, depending on a variety of cir-
cumstances, of which political will was clearly important. Practice often
tended to be hesitant and cautious, according to the overall political and
economic situation.

'Decentralisation' is often used to refer not only to political devolution
(strictly, the correct usage), but also as a blanket term to cover both politi-
cal devolution and the deconcentration of administrative authority. In this
section I examine the contrasting experience of (1) states committed to
political devolution (Uganda, Zambia and South Africa); (2) states which
have placed the emphasis on the deconcentration of administrative author-
ity (Kenya and the Côte d'Ivoire); and (3) states which have sought to com-
bine devolution and deconcentration (Botswana and Ghana). It should
however be stressed that these are rarely discrete categories since nearly all
states contain an element of each.[48]

States Committed to Political Devolution

Uganda[49]   Uganda built upon the experience in 'bottom-up' democracy
launched by President Yoweri Museveni after he assumed power in 1986.
Under the guidance of a small decentralisation secretariat in the Ministry of
Local Government, a three-phased approach to decentralisation was under-
taken: 13 districts were decentralised in phase 1 in 1993–4; 14 in phase 2
in 1994–5; and 12 in phase 3 in 1995–6. Each local authority, with a revised
and less elaborate committee structure, was empowered to exercise func-
tions laid down in the Local Government Act of 1993; the chairman of the
district council was recognised as political head of the district. New admin-
istrative structures were put in place: the council assumed responsibility for
the operational activities and field staff of the line ministries, and

retrenched redundant and inefficient staff. The sectoral ministries continued
to be responsible for 'national' projects and for the recurrent estimates in
respect of centrally-based personnel and services. The centre also handled
policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation. The local governments were
given an unconditional grant to run decentralised services and, within the
framework of national policy, drew up their own budgets. However, it was
recognised that it would take several years before full financial decentrali-
sation was achieved, especially in the lesser developed and more remote
districts, such as those in the Rift Valley area, where the lack of financial
and management capacity was extreme. Nevertheless, Uganda carried
political devolution further than any other unitary state in Africa.

Zambia[50]   In March 1993 the MMD government headed by Frederick
Chiluba approved a public sector reform programme and committed itself to

> Strengthening the management of local authorities by devising mecha-
> nisms to facilitate deconcentration of certain functions to Provinces and
> devolution of selected functions to Local Authorities, as their manage-
> ment capacities improve and in order to provide for and facilitate demo-
> cratic Governance at the Local Authority level.[51]

This political commitment was very important because, as Dennis
Rondinelli emphasised, without a 'solid base of political support', decen-
tralisation cannot be successfully implemented.[52] Though the Ministries of
Health and Education created devolved structures of their own revolving
round district health boards and education management boards respectively,
in most ministries the deconcentration of administrative authority to provin-
cial level was slowed down by staff shortages, lack of financial resources,
and defects in the organisation of the provincial accounting control units.

The decision of the MMD government to devolve selected functions to
local authorities 'as their management capacities improve' meant that, in
Zambia as in Uganda, a phased approach to decentralisation was adopted.
This was a realistic approach, given the fact that all councils – city, munici-
pal and district – were heavily indebted and chronically short of both
money and equipment. This fact, and staffing and other infrastructural con-
straints, made it impossible for them to discharge the full range of functions
listed in the Local Government Act of 1991. This Act provided for a flexi-
ble and multi-faceted local government system and created organisational
structures which recognised that there was a difference between rural and
urban district councils. In elections held in November 1992, the MMD
swept the board, except in the Eastern province where UNIP retained strong
support. The 61 councils could appoint, promote and discharge their own

officers without reference to the Local Government Service Commission. This proved a mixed blessing and appointments made on political grounds resulted in a deterioration of staff security and morale. (Against this, positive effects of the re-introduction of multi-partyism were that overall political interference in council operations was significantly reduced and there was much more stress on local accountability and transparency than in the Second Republic.) In 1995, as the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) worked closely with the British-funded Local Government Support Project (LOGSP) to improve management and financial services at provincial and district levels, prospects looked rosier. However, the government's chronic shortage of funds meant that the Tyrie Report on Financing Local Government of September 1994 could not be fully implemented and cabinet-sanctioned reforms to restructure MLGH and fill crucial staff vacancies were again delayed. The LOGSP was wound up and the local authorities continued to face considerable difficulties in maintaining essential services.

South Africa   In examining the transition from the structures of government which obtained under *apartheid* to the new democratic system under Nelson Mandela, Christopher Pycroft wrote:

> The Government of National Unity inherited a confused patchwork of local government systems and structures with structural divisions between urban and rural areas; between areas previously designated 'white' and 'black'; between areas formerly under the jurisdiction of the 'independent homelands' and South Africa; and between the different provincial administrations that were responsible for local government in South Africa during the apartheid era, each with their own ordinances.[53]

A three-phased approach to local government transition was adopted, in accordance with the recommendations of a Local Government Negotiating Forum put forward in July 1993. Phase one began in late 1993 and entailed replacing the existing local authorities with nominated, but more representative, structures; phase two began following the holding on 1 November 1995 of elections to create 686 new local authorities throughout the country; and phase three was concerned with designing the final structures for the local government system to be established over the next three to four years.

There had been no single model of non-metropolitan local government under *apartheid* and it proved difficult to reach agreement on a satisfactory model within the new democratic system; one problem was that the existing relevant legislation had an urban bias, while another was how to accommodate

traditional structures. In the end no attempt was made to impose a uniform country-wide pattern. Transitional local councils, with full executive powers, were made responsible for providing services in the towns and urban areas; transitional representative councils were created to meet the needs of some of the smaller towns and peri-urban areas; and key bodies called transitional district councils (TDCs) provided the full range of local government services throughout the rural areas in those provinces where they were established. The membership of TDCs included (controversially) councillors drawn from four interest groups: farmers, landowners and levy-payers; farm labourers; women; and traditional leaders. Thirty-two per cent of the eligible population voted in November 1995: the ANC won outright majorities on 387 councils and the NP on 45. Voting did not take place in the metropolitan area of Cape Town nor throughout KwaZulu-Natal.[54] The outstanding local government elections took place there and elsewhere in May 1996. Inkatha retained rural support, though its vote was down on the 1994 general election, while the NP found favour with coloured voters in the Western Cape province.

Nine provincial assemblies were created under the interim constitution and were given some powers and grants, but had access to only modest sources of independent revenue. As well as being under-funded, their powers were insufficiently defined. In the 1999 elections the ANC retained power in seven of them and gained ground in the other two – KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape, each of which was subject to internal divisions and tensions between the ANC and the ruling parties (Inkhata and the NP, respectively).[55] The provinces varied in the way in which they tackled the problems that faced them and different outcomes ensued.

Responsibility for providing local authority services to the six metropolitan areas was vested initially in transitional metropolitan counties. In the past municipal rates (in Johannesburg, for example) had fallen mainly on suburban households rather than industry and commerce because the desire to attract foreign investment had kept company tax low. Since they paid most rates, Whites had been generously represented, but this arrangement could not be justified in the new South Africa. The government succeeded in the difficult task of bringing together the old white-controlled cities and the surrounding black townships into single administrations to form six new 'megacity' municipal authorities. In the December 2000 municipal elections the ANC won four of these cities, but lost Cape Town, after failing in a determined effort to win over the mixed-race or 'coloured' vote. It was also unable to gain an outright majority in Durban. The Democratic Party was the main beneficiary of the drop in support for the ANC and the IFP, and was emerging as the real opposition to President Mbeki's government;

however, the party had scant prospect of winning power at the centre without a big increase in support from black electors.[56]

States Which have Placed Emphasis on Deconcentration

Kenya   Under Jomo Kenyatta, the first President (1964–78), the institution of local government was 'treated by the centre as though it were just another government department',[57] virtually a branch of the state, after the French pattern. With a strong central apparatus, a rather weak political party in KANU, and a closely controlled local government system, Kenya had many of the characteristics of an administrative state.[58] That pattern, under which civil service provincial and district commissioners were the main agents of development, persisted under Daniel arap Moi, Kenyatta's successor.

In September 1982 the government adopted a strategy that entailed making the district the centre for the planning, implementation and management of rural development.[59] If one of the objectives of the new 'district focus' was to raise the efficiency of rural administration, another was clearly political: decentralisation was a means of restructuring the social base of the Kikuyu-dominated state which Moi had inherited. It gave the President an opportunity to increase the flow of resources to the less-developed regions populated by other ethnic groups (including his own, the Kalenjin), and entailed enlarging the power and role of the provincial administration and politicians in these regions, while marginalising the Central Province, Kenyatta's former political base. The district focus helped Moi politically, but its economic impact was limited. While the district budgetary process was supposedly strengthened, the proportion of the national budget over which the districts had total control remained small. Basic policy was still made in Nairobi by central ministries, most of which proved reluctant to disaggregate their sectoral budgets on a district-by-district basis.

Decentralisation to the district level in Kenya therefore resulted in the deconcentration of administrative authority rather than in political devolution to elected local authorities. The autonomy of the latter, and especially of the county councils (which had been deprived of their three major functions – education, health and roads – as far back as January 1970) was further reduced under the impact of persistent over-centralisation, or what John Cohen identified as 'hierarchical, monopolistic, and bureaucratic control'.[60] He urged the need to reduce the size of the public service, professionalise its senior levels and eliminate corruption; consolidate ministries and cut out duplication; and increase budgetary allocations to operating and

maintenance funds in support of existing infrastructure and investment. In July 1999 the President, under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, undertook a sweeping reshuffle of senior civil servants and, in a surprise move, appointed Richard Leakey, the celebrated palaeontologist and conservationist and a fearless government critic, as head of Kenya's public service to undertake essential reforms. Leakey did enough to unlock the credits which the IMF had held back, but over-centralisation continued; indeed, if anything, there was 'less autonomy, not more' for local government in Kenya and an inadequate resource base.[61]

Côte d'Ivoire   The ghost of colonial-style district administration lived on in Kenya, as it certainly did in the Côte d'Ivoire. In the latter, as in other parts of francophone Africa, local government was seen as set within an 'urban' context, though in fact in sociological and economic terms the communes to which the designation 'urban' was applied were mostly small market and administrative towns in a rural setting. Formally the communes were 'devolved local governments', each with the right to draw up and manage its own budget and its own resources. The mayor – often a person of high social and political status – and his assistants formed the executive and were formally accountable to the commune. They were elected as persons whose names appeared on a single list in a first-past-the-post system; since 'the winner takes all' principle operated, the system did not allow for an official opposition even following the advent of multi-party competition. Upon his election by the commune council, the mayor became an independent executive and state official, supported by a secretary-general and other staff who, at the senior level, were mostly seconded civil servants; they, and all other employees, were accountable to the mayor.

By 1996 *communalisation* had been extended to all the main settlements in the rural areas, bringing the total of communes to 196. Though the communes were legally empowered to perform a wide range of specified functions, they were subject to the *tutelle* of the Ministry of the Interior, which was exercised locally by the prefectoral service (there were some 56 prefectures and 227 sub-prefectures in 1998). This *tutelle* was no mere formality and amounted to close central control, notably in relation to the communes' fiscal and financial systems.[62] Crook and Manor summarised the situation as follows:

> The democratic potential of community-based devolved local authorities has been counterbalanced by an administrative and financial framework which retains tight central control over communal actions and programmes. Although formally devolved, the structure of decentralisation in fact reflects a determination to maintain central power.[63]

States Which have Sought to Combine Devolution and Deconcentration

Botswana[64]   Though its local authorities remained subject to firm central control, Botswana has a better record of representative local government than most African states. The reasons for this include the democratic climate in which the country's nine district councils and five city/town councils operate: this is reflected in the fact that the Botswana National Front (BNP), the main opposition party, has controlled the City Council of Gaborone, the national capital, since 1984 and subsequently captured the Gaborone parliamentary constituency. Another reason is that Botswana, because of its diamond, copper-nickel and beef export earnings, has had the resources to provide substantial financial underpinning for its local authorities. The latter are heavily dependent on the annual deficit grant which the central government – unwilling for political reasons to impose a tax on livestock – makes available to councils.

In the pre-1974 period all staff responsibilities were delegated to the local authorities. This arrangement was abandoned in 1974 on the ground that it was open to nepotism and other abuses and worked to the detriment of the smaller councils. The recruitment, posting, transfer, promotion and discipline of local authority staff other than industrial-class employees then became the responsibility of the centrally-directed Unified Local Government Service (ULGS), headed by a civil service Establishment Secretary.

In 1979 the *Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana* recommended that the district administration should remain a separate institution and that its principal functions should not – as a few senior civil servants and mainly Central District councillors had urged – be transferred to the district council. This decision was justified on the ground that, with the partial exception of the council for the large and populous Central District, district councils were not yet capable of handling substantial additional functions or resources. The central government still subjected district and town councils to fairly tight scrutiny and control and channelled the bulk of development expenditure in the districts to central ministries and departments. As in Kenya and Malawi, it continued to vest the effective control of district development in a generalist (and very senior) administrator who retained the old title of 'district commissioner'.

Ghana[65]   Since independence in 1957 successive Ghanaian governments, both civilian and military, have revised or changed the local government system which they inherited. The results have been almost universally disappointing for reasons which have ranged from over-centralisation and the

creation of non-viable local government units to political interference and corruption.

After a long gestation period a new, four-tiered integrated structure was formally introduced in 1974. Though this structure was never fully implemented, the 65 district councils that were created kept alive the concept of representative local government over the ensuing decade. Flight-Lieut. Jerry Rawlings favoured a populist form of democracy and established a country-wide network of people's defence and workers' committees. Increasingly disliked, they were abolished in December 1984 and replaced by grass-roots organisations which were less socially disruptive and somewhat more effective.

In the more democratic climate which was emerging in the late 1980s, the Rawlings regime introduced new decentralisation measures. Following non-partisan elections held between December 1988 and February 1989, 107 district assemblies and three metropolitan assemblies were established and formed part of a single integrated hierarchy of government administration from local to national levels. Each assembly had its own executive committee, chaired by a prefect-like district secretary and was expected to combine oversight of 22 deconcentrated line departments and agencies with the responsibilities, revenue powers and functions of devolved local government authorities. This proved over-ambitious and the system was subject to tight administrative and financial control from the centre.

A further difficulty arose because the 'democratic' 1992 constitution reaffirmed the non-partisan nature of the elected assemblies, thereby taking no account of the problems likely to arise by the creation of a partisan central government, formed by Rawlings (now a civilian) and his National Democratic Congress (NDC) party following the holding of separate, competitive presidential and parliamentary elections in late 1992. The assemblies as constituted were too big for the community-style politics that Rawlings had always favoured and their number was therefore increased very substantially so that they could better handle small-scale projects and services. This action was taken against the advice of the World Bank which was worried about problems of staffing, budgetary control and monitoring. However, the Ghanaian government took the view that this was the best solution, especially since the district assemblies would be complemented by the well-funded regional authorities which it intended to re-establish to cope with larger infrastructural developments, such as secondary schools, water and roads. Improvements to the assemblies' performance were, however, marginal and the resultant popular frustration was reflected in the poor turnout for the second round of district assembly elections in April 1994.

Development Planning and Implementation

In the immediate post-independence period, African leaders differed over the strategy most likely to promote the development of their countries; however, they agreed substantially over methods. 'The instrument of both diagnosis and remedy is the development plan', commented Martin Minogue. 'The approach comes very close to the equation: development equals planning; without planning, there can be no development.' As he pointed out, both empirical research and common sense quickly demonstrated that these arguments were either false or inadequate. 'If planning is Everything' wrote Aaron Wildavsky in 1973, 'maybe it's Nothing.' Professor Hanson had advanced the same argument some years earlier when, in the introduction to his study of planning in India, he observed that there was no general correlation between the extent of economic planning and the rate of economic growth, and that the very attempt to plan might actually retard the rate of growth.[66]

Despite many instances of failure, planning continued. This was understandable: when resources – material and personnel – are scarce, it is important to assign priorities to the way in which they are allocated. The question facing government leaders was not therefore whether to plan or not to plan, but what kind of planning to adopt. In general, African states lacked the resources and the socio-political structures to undertake (what we knew as) Soviet-style centralised, imperative planning. Nevertheless Guinea, after its break with France in 1958, and Mozambique, following independence in 1975, both went a long way in trying to determine centrally what should be produced, in what quantities and at what prices, and to exclude the free play of market forces by the imposition of rigid economic controls. This is not to suggest, however, that Mozambique allowed its socialist ideology to serve as an economic straitjacket, as Guinea did in the early 1960s when the bid to maintain socialist purity had an adverse effect on economic planning and organisation.[67]

At the same time, other African states committed to socialist strategies of development and/or with sizeable parastatal sectors were not content merely to emphasise desirable patterns of economic development and to do little or nothing to enforce them on the private sector. They and other African governments did not opt for indicative-type planning, which was better suited to developed, industrialised societies, but chose a position roughly midway between the extremes of centrally planned and market-based economies. They adopted controlled planning within a mixed economy, though the mix between the public and private sectors might vary

substantially between one state and another, thereby allowing a greater or lesser scope for private enterprise. In this type of planning, the power of the state was invoked to secure a given rate of economic growth. In practice, in many African states the targets set for the private sector proved unrealistic because of the lack of adequate consultation with that sector during plan formulation. Moreover, because of their preference for public over private enterprise, new state leaders were inclined to over-estimate the potential of the public sector. Thus, here again ideological commitment tended to work against rational economic decision-making. On the other hand, as Hanson shrewdly observed: 'If an economically rational decision upsets the political applecart, it is not rational at all in the wider context.' The techniques of planning were inextricably intertwined with the politics of planning.[68]

In the African context, the economic planner faced the immense difficulty of working with inadequate statistical data. Also, because of dramatic changes in world trading patterns and prices, and heavy debt in most cases, it was virtually impossible to forecast with any accuracy the size of the national revenue from one year to another. When the economic situation deteriorated and resulted in an acute shortage of foreign exchange, the state concerned was forced to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank on conditions which were felt to restrict its freedom to determine economic policy. This was (for example) the experience of the Côte d'Ivoire, with its reputation of having achieved an 'economic miracle' since independence, following the collapse of coffee and cocoa prices from the second half of 1978.[69] By this date the World Bank – the primary multilateral institution with extensive resources for promoting long-term development – was starting to replace project loans to debtor less-developed countries (LDCs) with new 'structural' and 'sectoral' adjustment facilities. Supported by the IMF, which mainly provided short-term relief, other multilateral financial institutions and Western bilateral aid agencies, the Bank made the grant and disbursement of development aid conditional upon the applicant country making changes in economic policy. These entailed currency devaluation, cutting defence expenditure, reducing the level of social services, removing food and other subsidies, reforming the public service and adopting economic liberalisation measures; these measures entailed overhauling public enterprises which had a poor record of performance and making them efficient or, alternatively, privatising them.

It was one thing for a government to take steps of its own volition to improve economic performance, as the Tanzanian government did in drastically reforming the inefficient State Trading Corporation and National Milling Corporation in the 1970s and restoring the state-owned butcheries and sisal plantations to private hands in 1977 and 1985, respectively. But it

was quite another matter to have such measures imposed by an external body. To Nyerere and several other African leaders such action smacked of neo-colonialism and infringed state sovereignty; they were reluctant to accept it. But dire need for financial assistance forced them eventually to acquiesce. Thus, the Tanzanian government felt obliged to accept in 1986 the tough conditions imposed by the IMF which it had resisted since 1979. The cost of withholding agreement could be high: when President Kaunda broke off Zambia's relations with the IMF and World Bank between 1987 and 1989, donor funding fell sharply. The depth of the new states' economic crisis was such that even socialist states like Angola and Mozambique joined the IMF. As the 1980s drew to a close, they and Ethiopia were becoming increasingly pragmatic in the policies which they pursued. Most African countries had virtually no alternative but to accept the economic and other conditions laid down by the international financial institutions.

In the few African states, such as Botswana, where the drawing up of development plans continued as a realistic exercise, planning tended to become a continuous process, with built-in mechanisms for the periodic review and adjustment of a 'rolling' plan; there was also a greater emphasis on setting specific and attainable targets rather than stating long-term objectives, as in the immediate post-independence period. From past experience a number of lessons stand out. Overall, as Arthur Lewis pointed out, planning will not be successful without 'sensible politics and good public administration'.[70] The political leadership must be strongly committed to the planning process: early experience – in Nigeria in 1960–1, Tanzania in 1964, and Zambia in 1966 – showed the futility of producing a 'planner's plan', to which the politicians did not feel committed and which they subsequently sought to change by introducing major projects not incorporated in the original plan.[71] A prime example of this occurred in the Ivory Coast in the 1970s when the Ivorian authorities abandoned the principal industrial projects of the Third Plan, covering the 1976–80 period, in favour of costly prestige projects, of which the most notorious was the building of an inland capital city based on the President's home town of Yamoussoukro.[72] It can be stated categorically that a plan which is technically sound will stand little chance of general implementation unless it becomes the focus of all government economic activity. Another prerequisite is that adequate resources must be available, both in terms of administrative personnel and finance, to implement the plan. Yet another, if decentralisation is to become a reality, is that the up-country areas must be given the specialist support to make a reality of 'planning from below'.

* * *

In this chapter, I have argued that while Riggs was right to stress the importance of the ecological context within which the administration operates – for new state public servants cannot, like their colonial counterparts, stand outside the society which they help to rule – he was mistaken in asserting that the bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries would inevitably acquire the characteristics of the 'sala'. My contention is that while the bureaucracy may in some instances be strong in relation to the political institutions of the post-colonial state, it does not therefore constitute an autonomous centre of power, free of political control. Indeed, the post-independence trend was for the effectiveness of the bureaucracy to be reduced because political control, far from being too weak, was too strong – as a result, above all, of the growth of powerful presidential institutions. Moreover, the bureaucracy has tended to be over-centralised since independence and to lack the organisational capacity to perform the multiple tasks piled upon it by new African governments, including the management of a vast parastatal sector and the drawing up and implementation of development plans. The advent of multi-party politics has changed, without necessarily diminishing, the bureaucracy's role, while privatisation and other reform measures will not – as I indicated in the case of Botswana – remove the need for state regulation and control of the economy. Again, administrators rather than politicians will in most cases be responsible for conducting detailed negotiations with external donors. An effective and disciplined bureaucracy is in fact essential for the well-being of any state, whether democratic or authoritarian, whether ruled by civilians or miltary personnel. The next chapter focuses on the military and begins by asking why the military intervenes in politics.

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7
The Military

Military Intervention

Since independence in (or about) 1960, civilian governments have been
supplanted by the military in over half of Africa's states, while in many of
these states (especially in anglophone Africa) one wing of the military has
subsequently been displaced by another – as in Nigeria in July 1966, 1975,
and 1985; Ghana in 1978 and 1979; and Burkina Faso in 1987. Several other
states have experienced serious *coup* attempts, including Gabon in 1964,
Angola in 1977 and Kenya in 1982. Such statistics underline the basic insta-
bility of most African governments, irrespective of whether the former colo-
nial power was Britain or France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal or Spain;[1]
whether the state was one-party, like Ghana and Mali, or multi-party, like
Dahomey (in 1963) and Nigeria (until 1966 and between 1979 and 1983);[2]
whether the character of the regime was conservative or radical (Niger and
Ahmed Ben Bella's Algeria offered contrasting examples); and whether the
state concerned was prosperous, like oil-rich Libya, or desperately poor, like
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta until August 1984).

Coups: *Motives and Lessons*

Though opinions differ as to why the military intervenes in the first place,
certain facts seem incontrovertible. First, the army can stage a *coup*
because, having control of the weaponry, it has the capacity for organised
violence. As the cases of Togo, Burundi, Chad and the Central African
Republic illustrated at the time when military intervention occurred, the
size of the army, either absolutely or in relation to the civilian population,
is not normally a factor; however, the very small number of officers and
men engaged in the Nigerian *coup* of January 1966 proved a major disad-
vantage in the south, where the *coup* substantially misfired.[3] The absence

of physical obstacles is an advantage for a small force: thus, the fact that Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, lay sandwiched between the mountains and the sea made the city particularly vulnerable to an army take-over.[4] Second, *coups* are usually undertaken by those who have operational command, such as battalion commanders. However, more senior officers may soon be brought in both to minimise the disruption to the army's internal command structure and to give respectability to the regime; this happened in Nigeria in January 1966 and in Ghana the next month, though not in Mali in late 1968 or Liberia in 1980. The Liberian *coup*, which brought Master Sergeant Samuel Doe to power, and the mutiny of 'other ranks', with the backing of a number of warrant officers, in Sierra Leone in April 1968, showed that *coup*-leaders in Black Africa are not exclusively commissioned officers. Ambitious non-commissioned officers and privates have left their mark on civil–military relations.[5]

In the third place, African *coups* are typically army *coups*: the Ghanaian case of *coups* in 1979 and 1981, both led by an air force officer (Flight-Lieut. Jerry Rawlings), did not really break this pattern since soldiers were among the armed services personnel involved; it was the attempted *coup* by members of Kenya's air force in August 1982 that was atypical. The police alone are unlikely to stage a *coup*, though a police paramilitary unit may be capable of doing so. On the other hand, the police, being scattered among the civilian population, may be a useful ally of the military. Fourth, training has an uncertain role. Officers trained at Sandhurst or Mons, as well as officers trained at St Cyr, the French military academy, have taken part in *coups* despite the inculcation during training of a tradition of military non-intervention. Indeed, as we shall see below, the Nigerian case showed that Sandhurst training and year of entry into the army served as cohesive factors among the majors who staged the January 1966 *coup*. On the other hand, training may prove divisive if, as in Ghana in the 1960s, officers of the same army are sent for training in different countries; this was also the experience in mainland Tanzania, where an army mutiny occurred in January 1964. Finally, there is the psychological factor: that is, once the barrier which deters the military from intervening has been broken in one state, it may be broken in a neighbouring state or, the military having intervened once in a state, it may be disposed to intervene again. Dahomey (now the Republic of Benin), which experienced six *coups* in less than ten years, is the prime example of the latter phenomenon. Even Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, one of the more democratic Francophone states in the 1960–80 period, underwent four military take-overs in little more than seven years in the 1980s. Such incursions are not after all surprising if the military is regarded as constituting a potential ruling elite who want to gain (or regain)

access to state resources. In this sense *coups*, and perhaps especially counter-*coups*, are 'part of a pattern of élite circulation'.[6]

Though substantial agreement may be reached on points such as these, the basic question remains: why has the military intervened so frequently in African states, as in many other parts of the Third World? There are many theories. One approach associated with S. E. Finer explained intervention primarily in terms of the social environment in which the military functions; the theory is that Third World states, being of low or minimal political culture, are particularly susceptible to military intervention. The 'Janowitz' school, on the other hand, pointed to the properties of the military itself: to its hierarchical organisation and its distinctive patterns of recruitment and training, control and discipline. Robin Luckham drew upon both these schools to argue that there is no one variable which is the key to civil–military relations. His own theoretical framework, therefore, put a number of the different variables together and led him to make the analytic distinction between the army which, as the custodian of the national interest, fulfilled a guardian role, and the praetorian-type army which, though retaining distinct group interests of its own, was sucked into politics. Ruth First observed that 'whatever the political background to a *coup d'état*, when the army acts it generally acts for army reasons, in addition to any it may espouse'. Samuel Decalo took up and broadened this observation by asserting, 'Though they may be predominant, secondary, or merely coincidental with civic unrest, corporate and personal motives are invariably present in *coup* situations and cannot be ignored.'[7]

What none of these theories satisfactorily explains, however, is why the military has taken power in some African states and not in others. For alongside the many African states that have experienced successful *coups* and counter-*coups* are a sizeable number which have retained their civilian governments over a long period: among them are Botswana and Swaziland in Southern Africa; Gabon, Malawi and Zambia in Central Africa; Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania in East Africa; Senegal and Cameroon in West Africa; and Morocco in North Africa. Until the early 1990s four states – the Côte d'Ivoire in francophone Africa and the Gambia, Malawi and Zambia in anglophone Africa – were still headed by the nationalist leaders who had brought their countries to independence a generation earlier. Former presidents who voluntarily relinquished power were Senghor of Senegal (1981), Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon (1982), and Nyerere of Tanzania (1985), though Ahidjo subsequently regretted taking this step and tried, unsuccessfully, to stage a comeback in 1983–4.

The above list sub-divides into a small group of states in sub-Saharan Africa, including Botswana, Senegal (since Mamadou Dia's attempted

coup failed in 1962) and Swaziland, which have experienced neither *coups* nor serious attempts at a *coup*, and a second group of states which have kept their civilian leadership but where there have been significant *coup* attempts. Among the latter group are Gabon, where only French intervention kept Léon Mba's government in power in 1964, and Kenya, where the general service unit (established for security purposes) put down an air force attempt to overthrow President Daniel arap Moi's government in 1982. (There were anti-government conspiracies in Zambia in October 1980 and – allegedly – in February 1993, and also in Tanzania early in 1983, the conspiracy in Tanzania being more serious than the government was willing to admit.) In short, though the civilian leaders survived in states such as these, it was not because their opponents did not try to topple them. It cannot be convincingly argued that *coups* were not attempted, or where attempted did not succeed, because the states in question had a higher level of political culture than the countries where the armed forces intervened successfully; as compared with Nigeria, for example, several of them patently had not. It is indeed difficult to validate the argument relating to political culture by comparing one African state with another. The significant fact is that, by comparison with the developed states, virtually all African countries are weak in terms of political culture and are, therefore, susceptible to military intervention; to this extent, Finer's argument is valid. (In fairness, it should be added that Finer did not present a uni-causal explanation of *coups*; both he and Huntington, who also stressed the social environment in which the military functions,[8] appreciated the need to consider the composite nature of the armed forces.) There appears, then, to be an element of chance at work, resulting in some regimes being toppled by *coups*, but not others. This point needs to be recalled as we consider rational explanations of the survival of civilian regimes.

The argument that the 'non-*coup* states' are better off economically than the '*coup* states' also cannot be sustained: true, in relative terms, Kenya and the Côte d'Ivoire (which did not experience a *coup* until December 1999) prospered, particularly in the period up to 1978, though the distribution of wealth, both between regions and individuals, was uneven; on the other hand, Malawi and Tanzania remained poor countries, while Zambia (like Tanzania) has been in economic decline since the mid-1970s. On present evidence, it is also unlikely that the 'non-*coup* states', as a group, have better preserved the corporate interest of their armed forces or better promoted the well-being of individual officers than the states where the military has assumed power. While the personal ambition of military officers may precipitate a *coup*, as in Uganda in 1971, this factor is in general probably more important in explaining the counter-*coup* than first-time military intervention.

Alongside the ambitions of military personnel should be set two other factors in explaining why some states have retained civilian governments after independence. One is the external dimension, which has two aspects: military intervention by overseas powers, notably France, and intervention by African armies. In order to preserve cohesion, I have relegated this discussion to a separate sub-section at the end of this section on military intervention. The other explanation for the survival of civilian regimes is the political skill shown by leaders such as Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia (eventually removed peacefully in October 1987 on the grounds of senility), Houphouët-Boigny, Nyerere and Kaunda. The converse would also appear to be true: that the lack of political skill, and the manipulation of elections, may precipitate a *coup* or encourage a counter-*coup*. As we shall see, the handling by the Nigerian federal government of the crisis in the Western Region in 1964–5 and Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi's unification decree of early 1966 were cases in point, while the 1967 military take-over in Sierra Leone was, according to Cartwright, 'to a very large extent … the responsibility of one man, Sir Albert Margai', and a handful of advisers.[9] Albert Margai certainly lacked the political skill and conciliatory attitude displayed by his elder brother, Sir Milton Margai, in maintaining the country's political system, but Cartwright's statement over-simplifies a complex situation; this merits our brief attention because of the light which it throws on civil–military relations in Sierra Leone in the pre-*coup* period.

Albert Margai faced a problem which had not existed under Sir Milton's premiership (when British officers had held most of the army's staff and line commands), namely that of establishing civilian control of a military organisation manned by African officers. Sir Albert did not, like President Nkrumah, seek to establish party control of the military or (when that failed) to build up a countervailing force; instead he encouraged the civilian and military elites, who were predominantly Mende, to join together in defence of their mutual interests. His relationship with Brigadier David Lansana, the army commander, was the most notable of the many links established between the army and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). Faced with electoral defeat at the hands of Siaka Stevens and the APC in March 1967, it was natural both for the Prime Minister and the members of his government to turn for succour to Brigadier Lansana and for the Brigadier to respond by arresting Siaka Stevens and declaring martial law, thus (as he claimed at his trial) averting civil disorder. The *coup*, then, did represent a failure of leadership, collective as much as individual, but its genesis lay in the development of a kind of symbiotic relationship between the civilian and military elites in the period prior to the initial *coup* (a *coup* that was to fail because the army was not united behind its commanding officer).[10]

Following intervention the military is usually quick to justify its action, and the Sierra Leonean officers who ousted Brigadier Lansana and formed the National Reformation Council on 25 March 1967 were no exception. In Ghana, in February 1966, the army explained that it had intervened to end autocracy and restore democracy; to check corruption and revive a bankrupt economy; to stop political interference with the army and police; and to prevent further rash foreign adventures. These reasons were largely negative: constitutional integrity was to be restored and the economy revived, but no fundamental reform was proposed.[11] At the end of the day, the dominant motive for intervention in Ghana remains unclear. Evidence of the personalisation and abuse of power, of Nkrumah's absorption with foreign affairs to the neglect of good domestic housekeeping, as well as of economic mismanagement and corruption, had existed for several years. These considerations may have disposed the military to intervene, but if they were the prime cause of the *coup*, why had the armed forces not intervened sooner? The answer to this question may be military professionalism; the adherence to British standards was well entrenched in the Ghanaian army and its officers may have been unwilling to turn against the country's legally established government until they were convinced that no other realistic alternative was open to them. The new factor in 1966 may have been not so much the creation of the one-party state two years earlier, since this changed little politically, but the army's growing perception of the strong threat to its corporate interests represented by several of the President's measures, and above all by his creation of the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR). In the Ghanaian case, at least, there is sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate Ruth First's contention that when the military stage a *coup d'état*, 'army reasons are invariably present', if not necessarily paramount.[12]

There may also have been an ideological motive for military intervention in Ghana. Emmanuel Hansen, writing from a Marxist perspective, pointed out that the officer corps of the Ghanaian armed forces 'broadly shared an ideological posture very close to that of the economic nationalists', of whom K. A. Gbedemah, a former Finance Minister under Nkrumah, had been a leading spokesman. The argument is that the *coup*-makers therefore sought to capture state power in order to reverse the policies of the Nkrumah regime both at home and abroad; this entailed encouraging private entrepreneurial activity and restoring other aspects of the colonial economy.[13] Another explanation, put forward by Samuel Decalo, is that Colonel E. K. Kotoka, the leading conspirator, had a personal motive for intervention: he is said to have been on poor terms with Major-General C. M. Barwah, the army commander recently appointed by Nkrumah, and consequently to have feared for his professional advancement;[14] but this,

too, is entirely speculative. While the personal element cannot be dismissed, it probably counted for less in Ghana in 1966 than in 1972, when Colonel I. K. Acheampong removed Dr Busia's government, and for a great deal less than in Major-General Amin's 1971 Uganda *coup*. In the latter case, Amin's personal fears and ambitions were compounded by President Obote's serious lack of judgement in leaving such an unstable officer in command of his army at a time when he himself would be out of the country.[15]

From the above discussion, it is clear that the causes of military intervention can vary from state to state. What about Nigeria, Africa's most populous state? As we noted earlier, the Federal Republic of Nigeria inherited a system of regional power which was wielded by three major political parties. In the absence at this time of a truly nationalist party with a nation-wide appeal, a coalition government ruled at the centre and, because of the north's numerical (though not technical or educational) superiority, was dominated by the NPC. As the events of 1964–5 made clear, the latter was determined to hold power at all costs.[16] However, it was not only northerners who abused their power; the impression was widespread that Nigerian politicians generally were self-seeking and corrupt. The politicians failed to agree on methods of resolving conflict; nowhere was conflict more bitter than in the troubled Western Region, 'the cockpit of Nigerian politics'.[17] The internal split within the ruling Action Group in 1962 set in motion a chain of events which, with the controversy over the 1963 national census and the crisis-ridden federal election of December 1964, constituted the backdrop to military intervention in January 1966. The culminating event in the Western Region to reveal the bankruptcy of the old political order was the holding in October 1965 of regional elections; these were rigged by Chief Akintola's Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) government and resulted in the widespread breakdown of law and order in the region. The federal government, of which the NNDP was now a junior partner, failed to deal with the crisis and therefore shared the discredit of its ally. Maladministration, corruption, electoral abuse and even thuggery had evidently become the coinage of Nigerian politics, and the legitimacy of the civilian authorities was gravely weakened.

The *coup* can, however, also be explained in historical terms as a victory for nationalism over regionalism, with the majors and captains who effected the *coup* of January 1966 seen as the reincarnation of the radical Zikists of the late 1940s.[18] In his excellent study of the *coup*, Luckham has pointed out that the conspirators belonged to the professional elite in the officer corps: with one exception, all the majors had university or Sandhurst training and all except one of the captains were Sandhurst-trained.[19] Though politicisation of the army was not very marked as far as the majority of the officers

were concerned until the January *coup*, the two key figures in the *coup* (Majors C. K. Nzeogwu and E. A. Ifeajuna, who co-ordinated operations in the north and south, respectively) had far-reaching civilian contacts and intellectual interests; Nzeogwu had socialist inclinations and Ifeajuna, a graduate of the University of Ibadan, had close associations with radical intellectuals in the civil service and universities. The core conspirators at least had an explicit set of political objectives (a fact substantiated in books subsequently written by two of the participants):[20] they aimed to destroy the authority of the old, conservative political order and to put an end to the north's political dominance. There was, however, no clear evidence of any link-up with the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) opposition, which had been defeated in the 1964 federal election. Moreover, although almost all the conspirators were Ibos and their principal victims were non-Ibos (they included the Federal Prime Minister, a northerner, whose death had not been planned, the northern and western premiers, and virtually all the northern and some Yoruba senior officers who monopolised top army positions), the *coup* was not the result of an Ibo plot. On the other hand, an ethnic element was present in so far as ethnic ties facilitated organisational requirements (ease of communication, secrecy and group cohesion) and interaction among military colleagues who were of the same rank (major and captain), belonged to the same entry cohort (1957–60), and also shared, perhaps unconsciously, similar values and outlook.

Whatever the real motives of the *coup*-makers, who voluntarily surrendered power to Major-General Ironsi, the army's general officer commanding, the belief was widespread among northern soldiers that there had been an Ibo plot. This belief was encouraged both by the failure of the Ironsi regime to prosecute the conspirators and by the advancement, though justified in demographic and seniority terms, of Ibo officers to senior positions in the army hierarchy. The dismissal of prominent northerners in both army and civilian life was widely predicted. The strong alienation of northern rank and file from the Ironsi regime came to be shared by northern junior officers when, in May 1966, Ironsi, who was personally courageous but politically inept, issued Decree no. 34 with the intention of scrapping the country's federal constitutional structure and establishing Nigeria as a unitary state administered by a single national public service. Matters were made worse when Ironsi persisted with this policy even after the outbreak of rioting in several northern cities later in the same month. In July the junior officers (predominantly northern but with a sprinkling of Yorubas and mid-westerners) and 'other ranks' drawn from all parts of the north, launched a series of poorly co-ordinated operations, as a result of which Ironsi was killed and his regime toppled. This counter-*coup* represented in

part a revolt against authority from below by junior officers and NCOs. Nevertheless, ethnic or regional cleavages were much more explicit in July than they had been in the previous January, and the revolt occurred because these cleavages became linked with organisational strains within an army that was fulfilling the unfamiliar role of government and was therefore directly exposed to pressures from the wider society.

What conclusions can be drawn from this case study? It shows first that the interaction of political and organisational variables differed over time: an army which had been predominantly non-political before the January *coup* became politicised after it, as army discipline broke down and civil–military boundaries fragmented. Second, the *coup* leaders in January 1966, as distinct from the army officers as a whole, were radically inclined and had clear political objectives: they sought to sweep away the old political order which rested on northern dominance. Third, the study shows that ethnicity and regionalism became more important as vehicles of political expression after the January *coup* than they had been before it, and that the flash-point occurred when these vertical cleavages in society became intertwined with organisational tensions within the army. Finally, it suggests that personal motives, such as the fear that their promotion would be blocked, might have influenced the majors in January 1966, as they did the junior officers and NCOs the following July.

Further lessons can be learned from other states where *coups* occurred, including Dahomey/Benin, which experienced six military *coups* and counter-*coups* in nine years (1963–72), and Uganda. In Dahomey the backdrop to intervention was provided by deep regional and ethnic animosities, a three-cornered struggle for political supremacy, a weak economy, a high level of unemployment, trade union resistance to austerity cuts, and a politicised military hierarchy presiding over a cleavage-ridden army.[21] In Uganda, in 1971, Major-General Amin was strongly motivated by personal fears and ambitions, though corporate reasons were present on this occasion too: the military resented the preferential treatment given to the Special Forces (an elite unit equivalent to Ghana's POGR) and to a rapidly growing paramilitary police organisation called the General Service Unit. The military may also have been motivated by economic interests, though ethnicity was probably a more powerful force than class on this occasion. Objectively, military privilege was not threatened by President Obote's 'Move to the Left', since his government was incapable of enacting its socialist proposals. However, elements within the army may have *believed* that a socialist state would eventually be established in Uganda to the detriment of their own economic and social positions, and that a less well-off army would be made to undertake self-help projects, including the building of roads, bridges and schools, on Tanzanian lines.[22]

These various cases suggest that the factors to be taken into account in explaining military intervention in Africa are frequently multiple and complex. Besides the level of political culture and the protection of the military's corporate interests and personal ambitions, weight may need to be given to economic conditions, political motivation and ideological persuasion, class interest and factional rivalries, the demonstration effect of other *coups*, the political skill (or lack of it) shown by the incumbent leadership, and external relations with civilian political groups or, on occasion, with foreign powers. External manipulation – for example, by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) – is a possibility in some cases, though there are usually sufficient internal causes of military intervention to render the conspiracy argument suspect. The 'mix' between these variables will differ from one state to another: the corporate interests of the army seemed to count for less in Nigeria in January 1966 than they did in Ghana the following month, while the political leanings of the Nigerian *coup*-makers evidently counted for more. To construct a typology of military interventions is not easy: thus, Huntington's three categories of breakthrough, guardian and veto *coups* are only partially relevant to Africa.[23] While certain generalisations about military intervention can usefully be made, each case is ultimately *sui generis*, to be understood by studying the military organisation of the state concerned and the political and socio-economic context in which that organisation operated.

External Intervention

Military intervention by French forces would appear to be of paramount importance in explaining why certain of the francophone states have avoided *coups*, and also why, until quite recently, francophone military regimes generally proved more stable than their anglophone counterparts. Twenty-four francophone states – including all 16 of France's former sub-Saharan African territories except Guinea – maintained military technical assistance agreements with France and eight of them (the non-*coup* states of Cameroon, Gabon, and Senegal among them) entered into defence agreements also. In 1994 France had an estimated 8,450 troops deployed in Africa: 1,200 in the Central African Republic, 750 in Chad, 500 in the Côte d'Ivoire, 4,000 in Djibouti, 800 in Gabon, and 1,200 in Senegal. In addition, 792 French military advisers were assigned to 20 African countries. In recent years France has undertaken a phased withdrawal of troops stationed in Africa: the number dropped to 7,913 in mid-1997 and will fall to some 5,000 in 2002, representing a 40 per cent reduction overall. The French

government also closed two military bases in the Central African Republic. Its interests in East, Central and West Africa are now covered by the bases retained in five countries – Chad, Djibouti (France's largest overseas base), Gabon, Senegal and the Côte d'Ivoire. French policy favours expanding an airborne rapid deployment force (*la Force d'action rapide*) stationed in the metropolis but available for despatch at short notice to African trouble-spots.[24] In this way the French government has sought to fulfil the under-taking given in 1994 by Edouard Balladur, the French Prime Minister, that the French would support peacekeeping situations that were 'proprement africaine … capable d' intervenir rapidement en Afrique pour des opera-tions de maintenir de la paix sur mandat des Nations Unies'.[25] France con-tinued to supply military equipment to most francophone states and launched a programme to strengthen Africa's own peacekeeping capacities. In 1998 the French government allocated some Ff.180 million in support of multilateral peacekeeping efforts, which included setting up training centres and holding exercises in a number of francophone countries.

In the post-independence period France honoured the elaborate network of agreements and logistical support structures which it had established; these enabled the French army to intervene at least 30 times in Africa from 1963 onwards. Taking the period from 1977, it intervened – in some cases to reinforce troops already on the ground – in the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Gabon (briefly), Mauritania, Rwanda, Somalia (as part of a UN operation) and Zaire (in 1978, and again in 1991 when France and Belgium airlifted soldiers to Kinshasa, the capital, to protect their nation-als). In 1991 French forces stationed in Djibouti were deployed in the north following a rebellion of the Afars. The list is lengthy, but the 'core' French states – Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal and Togo – were capable at most times of looking after themselves. Well into the 1990s, when the situation looked like getting out of hand – as in Gabon, following disturbances in 1991 – French assistance for these countries (central to France's economic interests) was made readily avail-able. As Robin Luckham explained in 1982:

> In the core francophone states … those in which French investment is more broadly spread and the community of expatriate Frenchmen is large, things were not permitted to degenerate to the point where such intervention was needed. With the current [1982] exception of Senegal they all have authoritarian single-party regimes, under-pinned by tightly controlled internal security services. In all, France's military weight has been cast firmly behind the ruling class, a good indicator being its role as their major weapons supplier.[26]

After 1990, there were signs of a change in French attitudes towards governments that were dictatorial and corrupt: they could no longer count on French support. Thus, significantly, France did not intervene to prop up the ailing and discredited military regimes of Mathieu Kérékou in Benin and Moussa Traoré in Mali, both of whom lost power in March 1991, or that of Gnassingbe Eyadéma in the tiny West African republic of Togo, when the country's national political conference stripped him of all but ceremonial powers in August of the same year. However, France's African policy was ambiguous and even contradictory, as subsequent events in Togo and the Côte d'Ivoire made clear. Early in December 1991 around 300 French troops, based in the Central African Republic and Chad, were sent to Benin so that they could, if necessary, quickly intervene in neighbouring Togo to protect French nationals who were under threat from mutinous soldiers loyal to Eyadéma (most mutineers belonged to his own ethnic group, the Kaybe); in the event, only 30 troops were sent to Togo to guard the French embassy in Lomé. The intriguing aspect of this incident was the statement by Roland Dumas, France's foreign minister, that French troops would not intervene to defend the reformist government of Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, the Togolese prime minister. He thus called into question his government's general commitment to the democratic process which it had encouraged its former colonies to carry out. The minister also said, no less intriguingly, that in due course France would reconsider its military co-operation agreements in Africa.[27] The immediate implication of this statement was that France's former colonies should learn to stand on their own feet.

Martin has argued perceptively:

> In the final analysis, France's military presence in Africa is determined by three main factors: the size and degree of her economic interests and involvement; the number of French residents; and the nature of the links existing between France and the national ruling elites … Ultimately, one suspects that the main objective is to help pro-French regimes stay in power.[28]

In the case of Rwanda in the 1990s the two last considerations would seem to have been particularly important. France, which had already intervened twice in Rwanda to give support to President Habyarimana against an incursion by rebels opposing his regime, pushed for a further intervention to halt the 'genocidal chaos' which followed his death in April 1994. Many commentators saw Operation Turquoise – a French-led multinational intervention in June 1994 with troops drawn from mainly francophone African states – as a smokescreen to cover France's earlier involvement; they accused France of 'training the *genocidaires* and, under the auspices of the

supposedly humanitarian intervention, helping to spirit the murderers and their 'blood-stained élite' out of Rwanda. An official French enquiry conducted in 1998 cleared France of direct involvement in the massacres, but admitted that policy in the region had been 'short sighted and naïve'.[29] France had indeed 'sleepwalked into a disaster on the assumption that established policy would continue to work';[30] that it did not meant that some change was inevitable. However, selective intervention in the future was not ruled out, as was evidenced between 1994 and 1997 when French forces were dispatched to Comoros in October 1995, the Central African Republic in May 1996 'to maintain the democratic state', and the Congo from March 1997. It therefore came as a surprise when in December 1999 the French condemned the military's overthrow of the Bédié government in the Côte d'Ivoire – a core francophone state central to France's economic interests – but made no attempt to intervene. Possibly, the thinking in French official circles was that the former Ivoirean government had only itself to blame for the weakness of its security arrangements. After all, the neighbouring state of Guinea had been able to look after itself, suggesting perhaps that the dependence on France of its former colonies should not be overstated. Under Ahmed Sékou Touré (1958–84) Guinea afforded an example of a French-speaking state whose internal security services and links with a neighbouring state (Sierra Leone) were adequate, without French underpinning, to survive a serious *coup* attempt (mounted by Guinean dissidents with Portuguese backing) in 1970, and to maintain a harsh civilian regime over a 26-year period.

Zaire, a Belgian colony before independence, also established a 'French connection' although, in addition, President Mobutu Sese Seko cultivated defence links with the USA (subsequently of diminished importance), Belgium, China, and Israel. Of the English-speaking states, Kenya came nearest to the 'neo-colonial' francophone model: it provided Britain with training facilities in Kenya and granted the USA, from which it came to buy most of its defence equipment, the right to use in an emergency the port of Mombasa and two air stations.

Another aspect of the external dimension is the use of African armies (as distinct from French or other European forces) as an instrument of foreign policy in relations between African states. Arnold Hughes and Roy May examined 29 instances of (mostly bilateral) transnational military intervention in Black Africa between 1960 and 1984: they identified 18 cases as regime-supportive and six as regime-opposing interventions. Their other five examples fell into the *state* supportive category,[31] where the object of external intervention was to ensure the survival of the state itself in the face of internal disintegration and external aggression, rather than to maintain (or undermine) a particular regime (Chad is a case in point, except that Libya acted to support

Goukouni Oueddei both in government and opposition, and always to pro-
mote its own interests). Guinea and Tanzania especially provided military
assistance to threatened regimes; by contrast, Nigeria was restrained in the
external use of its substantial military power, though it responded to
Tanzania's call for help following the army mutiny in January 1964 and was
instrumental in the dispatch (in the name of the OAU) of a Nigerian-led multi-
national peacekeeping force to Chad in December 1981 and of a West African
force, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), to war-torn Liberia in 1990 and subsequently to Sierra Leone.
Firm evidence of regime-opposing military intervention is rarer, though clear-
cut cases were the Tanzanian army's overthrow of Idi Amin, the Ugandan dic-
tator, in 1979 and Angola's intervention in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 in
support of Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso's successful armed struggle to oust
Pascal Lissouba's lawfully elected government.

The evidence assembled suggested first, that short-term bilateral inter-
ventions (such as the dispatch of Senegalese troops to the Gambia in 1981
to sustain President Sir Dawda Jawara's government) were successful, and
secondly, that civilian regimes (often radical and frequently poor) were
more likely than military regimes to use their national armies on external
military missions. A further conclusion, namely that the motives for exter-
nal intervention may be mixed, can be drawn from Zimbabwe's interven-
tion in 1985 on behalf of Samora Machel's beleaguered government in its
fight against rebels belonging to RENAMO. The stationing of more than
10,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique was in part a good neighbourly
gesture, but it was also a costly one and underlined the importance that
Zimbabwe attached to keeping open the vital supply line between the key
port of Beira and Harare, the Zimbabwean capital.

Above all five African states – Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe – had mixed motives in intervening in Zaire/the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Chad and Sudan also became involved at one stage).
Rwanda and Uganda gave military backing to Laurent Kabila's long struggle
to oust Mobutu's dictatorial regime, but in neither case was their intervention
divorced from their own national interest. Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated army
intervened to prevent Hutu ex-soldiers and militiamen (the *interahamwe*),
who had taken part in the 1994 massacre of some 800,000 mainly Tutsi men,
women and children, from carrying out their threat to 'liberate' Rwanda.
Uganda's primary interest, at least initially, was to prevent the use of
Congolese territory for rebel/anti-government attacks across its western
border. The two states, which had parallel strategic interests,[32] were instru-
mental in getting rid of Mobutu in May 1997 and installing Kabila in power.
Much was expected of a man with little political experience at a national

level. By the end of 1998 however it was clear that Kabila's promise of full, early democratisation would not be fulfilled. He revealed a strong authoritarian strain, imprisoned erstwhile supporters and, in a manner reminiscent of Mobutu, started filling key posts with members of his own family or with fellow Katangese. His ineffective and brutal regime could not hold the country together and civil war broke out again, the main line of division being between east and west. Armed ethnic groups defended their autonomy and the well-equipped Hutu militants used bases in North Kivu for launching attacks into their former homeland. Convinced by his actions and statements that Kabila was undertaking an anti-Tutsi pogrom, Rwanda and Uganda, in a dramatic *volte face*, switched their support to anti-Kabila rebels belonging to the multi-ethnic Congolese Democratic Rally which had its power-base in Tutsi-peopled South Kivu in the east of the country; troubles in their alliance eventually emerged. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia countered by sending troops (and in Zimbabwe's case aircraft also) to uphold the Kabila government, thus leading to greater multinational African intervention in the affairs of an OAU member state than had occurred elsewhere. In July 1999 a UN-brokered peace accord, providing for an immediate ceasefire and the incorporation of rebel troops in a national army, was signed by the Kabila government and the five countries which had intervened in the civil war. The motives of the five were indeed mixed. Angola, like Rwanda and Uganda, wanted to prevent hostile rebel forces from using Congolese territory to mount cross-border raids – in its case by UNITA troops or forces sympathetic to UNITA. Possibly all three countries, and Namibia too, thought that there were rich pickings to be had in the war-torn DRC; senior Ugandan army officers (like their Zimbabwean counterparts) were alleged to have enriched themselves.[33] Michael Nest argues that the Zimbabwan military involvement in the DRC was not immediately motivated by profit, but that business entrepreneurs and military personnel themselves exploited the commercial opportunities which the new military networks had made possible. Zimbabwe's interests were reported to range from contracts to provide arms and ammunition to Kabila to a cut in the revenues derived from cobalt and copper mining. The trade between Zimbabwe and the DRC was however beset by difficulties and few Zimbabwean entrepreneurs were thought to have made a profit. US and Canadian firms were also involved in mining exploitation in Kabila's Congo, while an Israeli company was engaged in diamond trading.[34]

Military Rule

In Uganda in 1985, the military regime headed by Lieutenant-General Tito Okello appointed as ministers a number of former members of Milton

Obote's ousted administration; among them was Paulo Muwanga (the ex-vice president), who became prime minister for a short period. This action was entirely atypical. Normally on assuming power the military suspends the constitution, dissolves the civilian government and parliament, disbands the existing political party (or parties), and detains – or, as it is often euphemistically claimed, 'holds in protective custody' – the political leaders of the former regime. The military also establishes a new structure of control, topped by a military council, and rules by decree. It will tend still to rely heavily (especially in economic matters) on the former bureaucracy, whose middle-class attitudes and values its members are likely to share – as Clapham noted, the military is in most cases 'the armed wing of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.[35] While the influence on policy-making of senior civil servants is considerable in virtually all military regimes, it varies from one regime to another. For example, it was much less in Nigeria under Babangida (1985–93) than it was under his predecessors,[36] while in Burkina Faso Sankara's populist regime aimed 'to reduce the budgetary and social weight of the bureaucracy'.[37]

The policies pursued by the military, once established in power, will depend on its character and aims. In Martin Dent's classification, a 'caretaker' regime is pledged to restore constitutional integrity and clear up the mess left behind by the politicians; a 'corrective' regime seeks to correct certain profound deficiencies in the old civilian order (such as the four-state basis of the federal constitution and the regional nature of the political parties in pre-1966 Nigeria); and the revolutionary regime aims to transform the structure of society and to end the prevailing pattern of elite rule.[38] While there clearly are differences between (say) the National Interim Council, established in Sierra Leone in April 1968 to play a strictly limited role, and Murtala Mohammed's corrective regime in Nigeria (July 1975–February 1976), the first two categories tend to shade into each other, both being a type of guardian regime. The revolutionary regime is theoretically distinct, but the performance in office of several military governments (including those of Jamal Abd-al Nasser in Egypt and Ja'far Numeiri in the Sudan) has fallen short of their initial revolutionary promise, and are more correctly designated as reformist rather than revolutionary. This section focuses on the non-revolutionary regimes – whether classified as reformist, corrective or caretaker – though much of the discussion is relevant to the revolutionary type of regime also. The populist radical regimes of Ghana under Flight-Lieut. Jerry Rawlings and Burkina Faso under first Sankara and then, following his assassination in 1987, Compaoré are categorised as reformist.

Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to draw attention to certain conclusions which command wide acceptance. First, the military's hierarchical command structure and the habits of discipline and obedience of its

members may lead a military government to believe that merely to issue a command is to have it obeyed. Military rulers may also fail to appreciate that sensitive issues – like those of the census and revenue allocation in Nigeria – cannot be depoliticised. A second and related point is that the military lack an organised popular base and an easy means of communicating with the people. They may, therefore, forge an alliance with the police who, as a force scattered among the people, have more sensitive political antennae than the military: thus, the NLC in Ghana (1966–9) comprised four senior army officers and four senior police officers. However, the fact that Major-General Ironsi, the head of Nigeria's first military government (January–July 1966), included a number of police officers in the narrow circle of his bureaucratic advisers (drawn predominantly from the army and civil service) did not prevent him from committing several grave blunders. His reforms, including Decree no. 34 referred to above, were largely symbolic but confirmed northerners in their worst fears of impending Southern domination. By contrast with Ironsi, Lieut.-Colonel (later General) Gowon, his successor, displayed a much greater political awareness when he came to power in July 1966. For example, he restored the federal constitutional framework by repealing Decree no. 34, recognised the need to create more states, and appointed 12 civilians, one from each state, to the federal executive council.[39]

In the third place, military regimes seek to compensate for their relative isolation and lack of experience in government by gaining the support of groups not too closely identified with the previous regime. The extent to which they do so may, of course, vary from one regime to another. Thus, in Ghana between 1966 and 1969 the NLC relied heavily on the civil service, and courted the chiefs and members of the legal profession and the universities, all of whom (together with leading politicians who had opposed Nkrumah) were strongly represented on the various commissions and committees established by the Council. The National Redemption Council under Colonel (later General) Acheampong, however, had a much less marked proadministration bias than the NLC; moreover, in a populist fashion reminiscent of the CPP, it looked for allies less to the lawyers and other professional and propertied classes than to the ordinary people (through its rural programmes and populist appeals). In Nigeria, Ironsi put maximum distance between himself and the old politicians; he turned for advice about the north to the Sultan of Sokoto. Gowon worked closely with former politicians, especially during the civil war, though most of them had belonged to opposition parties. Murtala Mohammed's government was collegiate in style, but was dominated by the armed forces and police, whose members held 14 of the 25 federal commissioner posts. The civil commissioners whom he appointed at both federal and state levels tended to be professional and

technical experts rather than politicians; he also incorporated chiefs within the reformed local government structure.[40]

A fourth consideration is that to remedy its lack of a popular base and to strengthen its claim to rule once the initial euphoria which greeted its (illegal) seizure of power has evaporated, the military regime may acquire civilian trappings. For example, it may hold presidential elections and seek to build up a national political party linked to, and controlled by, itself, as occurred in Egypt, Mali, Somalia, Togo and Zaire among other states. This was never attempted in Nigeria, but in Ghana General Acheampong sought, through the power-sharing device of 'Union Government', to perpetuate military rule by clothing it in civilian dress.

Fifth, however, 'civilianisation' may merely serve to increase the difficulty, which all military governments face, of maintaining organisational cohesion. The danger is that army officers involved in government will become divorced from the army command structure, giving rise to conflict over policies. This occurred in Nigeria in Gowon's later years in office, when the Supreme Military Council deferred the return to civilian rule beyond the scheduled date (1976), while the army command favoured early withdrawal.[41] On another level, internal jealousies may be created if, for example, the head of the military government should be less senior in rank than serving officers, thereby disrupting the army's hierarchical organisation. However, conflict on this score is not inevitable as the case of Mali clearly shows: Lieut. (later General) Moussa Traoré assumed power following the 1968 *coup* and survived for over 20 years until his removal in a counter-*coup* in March 1991. In Liberia Master Sergeant (later General) Doe, who swept aside President William R. Tolbert's government in 1980 and established in its place a brutal and corrupt regime, was removed in 1991 by a guerrilla force rather than by the army officer corps. Tension may be more likely to occur when there is an inter-generational gap between senior officers ruling the state and younger, better-educated and more radically minded junior officers serving in the armed forces.

In the sixth place the military, despite its image of moral integrity and puritanical spirit, may not in fact provide cleaner and more honest government than its civilian predecessor. Military regimes generally improve the pay and conditions of service of the armed forces, while army officers, like civilian politicians before them, have often enriched themselves at the public expense. In Ghana, the later Acheampong years (1975–8) were marked by massive corruption, with cocoa revenues embezzled on a scale never previously experienced.[42] In Nigeria, by 1975, the name of state governor had become a byword for corruption. The subsequent shock tactics of Murtala Mohammed proved salutary only in the short-term and corruption in public

life quickly resurfaced;[43] it was rife under Abacha. Again, the human rights
record of most military regimes is no better (and may often be worse) than
the civilian governments which they supplanted. The record in Amin's
Uganda and Jean-Bedel Bokassa's Central African Republic was truly
appalling, but so it was also in Equatorial Guinea under Francisco Macias
Nguema, a civilian ruler, while conditions in Sékou Touré's Guinea and in
Uganda under Obote's second administration (1980–5) were not much bet-
ter. In respect of both corruption and human rights abuse, the civilianisation
of erstwhile military regimes (as in Mobutu's Zaire) has substantially
diminished the validity of the distinction between military and non-military
regimes.

Finally, even a military regime which claims, with some justification, to
have intervened to restore stable and democratic government may be
sucked into politics as the boundaries between the military establishment
and its socio-political environment become fragmented.[44] This happened in
Nigeria. While the majors who staged the January 1966 *coup* had political
motives, the army as a whole was not politicised; however, politicisation
increased following the *coup* and led to moves to regionalise the army and
eventually to Biafra's attempted secession. In Ghana, the NLC (1966–9)
was subject to ethnic, as well as personal, divisions, and was accused (prob-
ably unfairly) of promoting Ewe political interests.[45]

Is a military government better equipped than a civilian government to
play a developmental role in the political, economic and social spheres?
This is a vitally important question; to answer it, I focus again on Nigeria
and Ghana, and refer briefly to Burkina Faso. During the first period of mil-
itary rule in Nigeria (1966–79), sectoral performance was impressive in the
building, construction, manufacturing and oil sectors, while the country's
infrastructure (including transport and energy) benefited from heavy invest-
ment.[46] On the other hand, performance in the agricultural sector was poor,
though one reason for the sharp fall in the export of certain cash-crops
(notably groundnuts, groundnut oil, palm oil, cotton and timber) may have
been the expanding home market during the oil boom;[47] food imports
increased alarmingly throughout most of the 1970s, partly in response to
changing consumer needs. Government attempts to step up agricultural out-
put through changes in the land tenure system (effected by the Land Use
Decree of 1978) and through large-scale farming and marketing board
reforms were not successful.

There was also evidence of substantial maladministration and corruption.
Moreover, the social consequences of government industrial policy were seri-
ous. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977 increased
domestic participation (both private and state) in industrial enterprises but at

the cost of accentuating existing class divisions within Nigerian society; the decrees benefited local merchant capitalists rather than the ordinary people. In the 1970s the Nigerian economy became ever more closely tied to the international capitalist system, though (contrary to what underdevelopment theory would lead us to expect) this did not prevent the military government – particularly the Mohammed and Obasanjo regimes – from pursuing a vigorous and assertive foreign policy which was sometimes, as over Angola and Rhodesia, inimical to the interests of major foreign powers and companies.

On a long-term view, there was no significant difference in the economic performance of the Gowon regime on the one hand and the regimes of Mohammed and Obasanjo on the other, while the military as a whole achieved no better results than might have been expected of a civilian government similarly blessed with an oil bonanza. Its legacy to the civilian regime in 1979 was a sluggish economy, a worrying level of inflation, a serious balance of payments deficit, and mounting problems in the social sphere. However, by creating a stable political order after 1970 and by shifting the locus of power to the federal centre, the military could claim that it had provided President Shehu Shagari's civilian government with a favourable context within which to tackle these problems.

Within four years, and following the holding in 1983 of a general election marred by blatantly dishonest practices, the army staged a further *coup*. This removed Shagari and brought to power a northern-based military regime under Major-General Muhammadu Buhari. The reasons for the army's renewed intervention were again multiple and included the grave economic difficulties facing the country, massive corruption, the army's unhappy experience in Chad, the cut-back in defence expenditure, and the preferential treatment seen as being given to the police, who were being equipped with armoured personnel carriers. Elements within the armed forces were also concerned about Shagari's conciliatory attitude towards former 'Biafran' civil servants and military personnel. They particularly resented the amnesty granted in May 1982 to Odumegwu Ojukwu, the former rebel leader, and the latter's subsequent appointment to a senior position in the NPN (the President's own party) following his return to Nigeria in June of that year.[48]

The incoming conservative-oriented Buhari regime pursued a deflationary economic strategy, accompanied by tight fiscal control and cut-backs in most areas except agriculture and debt-servicing, for which 44 per cent of Nigeria's annual external earnings were earmarked. Its 'war against indiscipline' entailed the adoption of draconian measures against those committing economic, anti-social and violent crimes.[49] The regime's policies were biased in favour of the deposed NPN.[50] Its over-partiality towards the northern states

excited ethnic suspicion, disrupted the unity of the armed forces and caused resentment among southerners. But it was above all the threat which the regime's policies posed to the defence-related industries which were developed on the initiative of Major-General Babangida, the Chief of Staff and the army's leading strategic planner between 1979 and 1983, that led Babangida to overthrow Buhari and his closest associates in August 1985. Babangida claimed in justification of his action that his predecessor was 'too rigid and uncompromising in his attitude to issues of national significance'.[51]

Initially, Babangida took steps to restore national unity: he based his rule on consensus and ethnic balance, committed himself to restoring civilian rule and established a 567-strong Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution. He also eased the harsh authoritarianism of the Buhari regime. Subsequently, however, he imposed his own brand of personalised, authoritarian rule, characterised by strong-arm methods, including media manipulation and the arbitrary repression of trade unionists, critical intellectuals and student activists. Following an unsuccessful *coup* attempt by armed service personnel in December 1985, Babangida tightened his personal grip on the armed forces. On the economic front he eased the burden of debt-servicing and, following a nation-wide debate, dropped his earlier intention of negotiating a loan package with the IMF. Instead, with undisclosed help from the IMF and World Bank, he introduced monetarist policies under which much of Nigerian industry was deregulated, the currency drastically devalued, and a number of public enterprises privatised. This market-oriented approach did not achieve any notable positive results.[52]

For a period in 1993 Nigeria was ruled by a non-elected 'interim national government' under Chief Ernest Adegunle Shonekan; he was removed by General Abacha in a bloodless *coup* in November 1993. Under Abacha's brutal regime the economy remained in a depressed state. Its harsh treatment of the Ogoni people, especially the execution of the environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others in November 1995, discouraged foreign financial investment – except for the Shell oil company, it was already sluggish – and set back the prospect of early economic recovery. External indebtedness was high; the standard of living of most people declined and there was a greater awareness of social inequality; unemployment was widespread and corruption was rampant. The predictable outcome of Babangida's restriction of electoral competition to two government-sponsored political parties, his refusal to accept the results of the presidential election, and Abacha's determination to cling to power was an unstable political situation. The military's preference for strong central government outweighed its commitment at this time to competitive politics.[53] However, the mould was broken by General Abdusalam Abubakar,

who assumed power when Abacha died in June 1998: he restored civilian rule the next year following the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. The new president – ex-General Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military ruler and the only one to have restored civilian rule voluntarily (in 1979) – admitted upon his inauguration that military rule had been a disaster, causing economic ruin and political discord.

In Ghana, the overall economic performance of the second military regime under General Acheampong (1972–8) was disappointing.[54] The level of both cocoa and gold production fell and export earnings declined at a time of high world-market prices and of increasing demand for imported goods; local food production also dropped sharply from 1975 onwards. In the wake of the oil price rise the regime chose not to devalue, but instead re-introduced comprehensive import licensing and printed more money, thereby encouraging black-marketeering. On the political front the regime's achievements, measured in terms of political stability, bridging the elite–mass gap, and establishing effective political structures, were also poor. Acheampong's proposed experiment with a non-party representative system of 'Union' (later 'National') government, in which the military would have a role, excited the vigorous opposition of professional bodies, as well as university lecturers and students. Even according to the official returns, it received unenthusiastic endorsement from the electorate in a nation-wide referendum held on 30 March 1978. (The referendum result was clearly rigged.)

The regime, like the preceding civilian government under Dr Busia, placed great stress upon agricultural improvement. In the early years agricultural output, particularly of rice and maize, did expand, though at the cost of increased social inequality; the main beneficiaries were the already advantaged larger-scale farmers, especially the emergent commercial farming community in the northern areas of Ghana. Of the two major instruments of policy to promote agricultural development – the regional development corporations created in 1973 and the 'Operation Feed Yourself' programme – the first had a positive, if limited impact, while the second served initially, though not permanently, as an incentive to food production; cocoa production, on the other hand, declined steadily. These various agricultural policies were part of the Acheampong regime's attempt to correct inherited regional imbalances in the economy; here again, the regime built upon policies set in motion by the Busia administration. While performance did not match aspirations, the relatively disadvantaged Northern and Upper Regions benefited from the northward thrust of the government's agricultural policies, while the highest *per capita* distribution of secondary school expenditure, for example, also went to those regions, followed by the

underdeveloped Brong-Ahafo Region. Clearly, the Acheampong regime's performance was better when judged by the extent to which it had achieved the goals which it had set itself than when measured by external criteria. In the post-1975 period the regime was characterised by corruption, gross mismanagement and political ineptness.

Acheampong was removed in July 1978 by a palace *coup* led by Lieut.-General Fred Akuffo. During the ensuing 11 months the Akuffo regime devalued the cedi by 60 per cent, appointed a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution, and legalised the formation of political parties. However, it allowed Acheampong and other 'racketeers' to go unpunished and failed to tackle mounting discontent within the military rank and file. In June 1979 the latter were instrumental in releasing from prison Flight-Lieut. Jerry Rawlings, a popular air force pilot who had been court-martialled for staging a mutiny; after removing Akuffo, they made him chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Between June and September 1979 Rawlings led a campaign of moral reform, which entailed the execution of Acheampong, Akuffo and other senior officers in the armed forces. He then allowed a 'free and fair' general election to be held and vacated office voluntarily in favour of a People's National Party (PNP) government under Dr Hilla Limann. The Limann government proved ineffective: it failed to end faction-fighting within the ruling party and to revive the ailing Ghanaian economy. During its two-year period of office, the burden of external debt increased and the people's standard of living continued to decline. It was against this background that Rawlings resumed power on 31 December 1981.

In the wake of an unsuccessful *coup* attempt in November 1982, Rawlings shook off the constraining shackles of his erstwhile neo-Marxist supporters and, behind a façade of populist measures, undertook a series of economic reforms with IMF and World Bank support. These reforms, known as the Economic Recovery Programme, were incorporated in the April 1983 budget and included a 65 per cent increase in cocoa producer prices and a massive devaluation. Rawlings subsequently abandoned the heavily urban-based economic strategies pursued by some of the previous Ghanaian regimes and adopted a policy of economic liberalisation.[55] A steady improvement in the country's economy resulted. However, the recovery was not dramatic, despite Ghana's receiving foreign loans amounting to over US$9 billion between 1983 and 1992. The level of foreign investment in the country was disappointing, as was the failure to diversify Ghana's exports to any extent. Over-dependence on its main exports – cocoa and gold – made the country vulnerable to the drop in real world prices caused by over-supply. The international recession also created problems outside the government's control.[56]

To the north of Ghana in the poor, arid state of Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, Captain Thomas Sankara established a regime (August 1983–October 1987) which bore some resemblance to Rawlings' rule in Ghana in 1979 and between 1981 and 1983. Each regime was populist and led by a charismatic figure with a strong moral sense; each was oriented towards the peasantry; and each established local organisations: People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) in Ghana and Committees of the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) in Burkina Faso. However, Rawlings recognised the unevenness of the performance of the PDCs and WDCs and the unpopularity of their leaders and abolished them in December 1984. The grass-roots organisations with which he replaced them proved more effective and less socially disruptive, though their performance still varied in different parts of the country. He distanced himself increasingly from the neo-Marxist intellectuals who subscribed to the dependency school of political economy and, as noted above, showed an increased sense of realism in tackling the severe economic problems which faced Ghana. On the political front, his regime was authoritarian and, as Naomi Chazan has pointed out, 'assailed some of the most basic prerequisites of freedom in Ghana'.[57] However, his performance overall was sufficient to ensure his election as the presidential head of a civilian administration in 1992.

In Burkina Faso Sankara initiated an agrarian reform programme in 1985 and adopted measures, including improved producer prices, to stimulate agricultural output. He sought to reduce the size, cost and social standing of the bureaucracy, and mounted an anti-corruption drive, setting up popular revolutionary tribunals for this purpose. However, he failed to temper his idealism with realism, as Rawlings had done. His regime, topped by the Conseil National de la Révolution (CNR), was also authoritarian and, in its bid to remodel society and establish new state-society links, it gave the CDRs wide-ranging powers, such as the right to seize land and livestock. His ultimately futile attempts to dismantle the old social order and to short-circuit existing clientelist networks alienated the peasantry (his chosen allies), the traditional chiefs – Mossi chiefs especially retained much of their former influence – and religious and other leaders of the Muslim community. He also clashed with the country's trade union movement and alarmed elements within the army by planning to create his own military unit. The CNRs' urge to reorganise everything was socially destabilising and resulted in Sankara's downfall. In October 1987 he was removed and killed in a counter-*coup* led by Captain Blaise Compaoré.[58]

In the light of the above case studies, it seems reasonable to put forward certain general propositions to supplement those presented earlier in this section. First, despite the fact that a military regime might be able to take

certain actions which a civilian government would find difficult (for Nigeria, the creation of additional states and the cancellation of the 1973 census come into this category), the record of the military in promoting development is likely to be no better than that of the civilian regime. This is particularly true in the political sphere: indeed, because of the restrictions which military rulers have imposed on political party activity and representative institutions at the national and local levels, it has mostly been worse. This will probably remain true despite recent, mostly reluctant or enforced, moves to broaden the base of political competition in a number of military-controlled states by the holding, or promise, of multi-party elections. In Togo, for example, it was only after two days of rioting in the capital, Lomé, in April 1991 that President Eyadéma agreed to legalise political parties and to promise that multi-party elections would be held later in the year. As noted above, he lost effective power the following August; however, some three months later, following the banning of the political party – the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolaise (RPT) – which he had founded and which had underpinned his regime, Eyadéma loyalists staged a military rebellion in his favour. In 1993 Eyadéma won a presidential election widely believed to have been rigged and, by detaching a small party from the opposition alliance which had collectively won the parliamentary (multi-party) elections in February 1994, he was able to have the RPT retained as the ruling party.[59] Like Mobutu in Zaire, Eyadéma was skilled in the art of political survival.

A second proposition is that military regimes display no greater capacity in promoting economic development than their civilian predecessors. The record for all types of regime is indeed mixed. The economy of Nigeria, which reverted to civilian rule in 1999, was not well managed by the military and a substantial amount of oil revenue was used corruptly or had to be diverted from productive investment into debt-service channels. Benin fared better from 1996 under Kérékou, the civilian president, than it had done before 1991 under Kérékou, the military dictator. Mengistu's Marxist military regime in Ethiopia made limited economic progess in the 1980s, being set back by its pursuit of centralising policies and its mistaken land and agrarian policies. Somalia fared marginally better economically from 1969 under Siyad Barré's harsh military socialist regime than it did following his fall in 1991, when the country was plunged into chaos by bitter clan warfare. Overall, as Decalo has pointed out, whatever the type of military regime under consideration, 'examples of Ataturk-style socio-economic transformation of new nations are extremely rare'.[60]

Third, in the social sphere too, there is little to choose between military and civilian regimes. Non-revolutionary military regimes, made up of officers

with predominantly middle-class values, tend to reflect the same middle-class bias as non-revolutionary civilian regimes. They therefore promote policies which, though often entailing the redistribution of political and economic power among elites, maintain the socio-economic *status quo*. Any departure from this pattern can be a risky business, as the contrasting experience of Ghana under Rawlings and Burkina Faso under Sankara showed. At the end of the day, Rawlings was forced to accept in essentials the social structure inherited from the civilian regime which he had overthrown; he established good working relations with the country's chiefs, including the Asantehene, the traditional ruler of Ashanti. On the other hand, Sankara's persistence in using the instruments of state to try to transform society proved his undoing. He underestimated the strength of Burkina Faso's traditional institutions and clientelist networks, while 'the confrontation with the trade unions illustrated the incompatibility between the revolutionary ideal and socio-economic constraints'.[61]

Military Withdrawal

In her study of *Regimes in Tropical Africa*, Ruth Collier pointed out that military withdrawal tended to lead to the resurrection of multi-partyism in anglophone Africa and to the establishment, under military tutelage, of one-party regimes in francophone Africa. As a generalisation, this statement is still acceptable for anglophone Africa, but needs to be revised for francophone Africa as a result of the 'democratisation' process which occurred in the early 1990s.

In both Ghana in 1968–9 and again in 1979, and Nigeria in 1978–9, the military governments supervised the drawing up of new democratic constitutions, under which strongly contested multi-party elections were held. Following the declaration of the results, the armed forces handed over power to the newly elected civilian governments formed in Ghana by Dr Busia (Progress Party – PP) in 1969 and, ten years later, by Dr Limann (People's National Party – PNP), and in Nigeria by President Shagari (National Party of Nigeria – NPN) in 1979. Further military intervention – in Ghana on 31 December 1981 and in Nigeria exactly two years later – ushered in a renewed period of military rule. This ended in Ghana as a result of presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992 and in Nigeria following presidential, parliamentary and gubernatorial elections in 1998–9; in each case, a former military officer – ex-Flight-Lieut. Rawlings in Ghana and ex-General Obasanjo in Nigeria – stood as his party's candidate for the presidency and was elected.

In francophone Africa, the tendency until the early 1990s was for the incumbent military regimes to seek to strengthen their legitimacy by forming single parties and then holding both presidential and parliamentary elections. The latter were 'plebiscitary' in most cases in the sense that both president and national assembly members were returned with overwhelming majorities. Thus, in Mali in 1979 the single presidential candidate, General Moussa Traoré, secured 99.89 per cent of the vote, while the 82 single-list candidates of the sole political party, the Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), were endorsed by 99.85 per cent of the electorate. These elections, therefore, represented a very modest step in the direction of democratic government and resulted in the retention of power by the military leader who had been head of state since the 1968 *coup*; army officers also held other government ministries. Comparable constitutional changes also took place in Togo, where in 1979 the electorate overwhelmingly endorsed General Eyadéma as president and the single list of candidates of the ruling RPT, as well as in the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of Congo and Rwanda.[62]

Upper Volta (as it then was) made important changes to the francophone pattern that brought it closer to the anglophone model. In this extremely poor West African state, where General Sangoulé Lamizana's administration had (from 1966) a better record in office than most African military governments, an experiment in multi-partyism was conducted in the 1978 parliamentary and presidential elections. The hitherto totally dominant Union Démocratique Voltaique (UDV) secured 28 out of the 57 seats contested as against 22 for the two main opposition parties together, while Lamizana (UDV) had to go to a second ballot before being returned with some 77 per cent of the vote. Moreover, there was a large number of abstentions in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, reflecting a further variation from the normal francophone pattern. Again, whereas in the partial return to civilian rule in Upper Volta in 1971–4 army officers had still held key ministries, in 1978 the army (President Lamizana apart) withdrew completely from political life in favour of an all-civilian government.[63]

Subsequent events forced the pace of 'democratisation' in francophone Africa. The experience in Benin (the former Dahomey) was exceptional; as we saw above, the multi-party elections in February and March 1991 resulted in the defeat and replacement of the incumbent military leader, Mathieu Kérékou, and of the party which had supported him. (However, Kérékou's discomfiture proved temporary; he was unexpectedly returned to power in the presidential elections held in March 1996.) Burkina Faso (the former Upper Volta), despite having some experience of competitive politics, did not follow suit, but pursued the normal pattern of 'controlled'

multi-party elections which (as in civilian-ruled Senegal) conferred some legitimacy on the government without, however, diminishing its hold on power. In other words, the introduction of a measure of electoral competition into the politics of francophone Africa did not lead in most states to permanent military withdrawal. At the same time, the spate of pro-democracy strikes and demonstrations which characterised the early 1990s was a warning to military rulers throughout the continent of the need to initiate more than token measures of reform if they were to escape the fate of President Moussa Traoré in Mali – he was toppled in a counter-*coup* in March 1991.[64]

Opinions will differ as to whether complete military withdrawal offers the best prospect of stable government. It can be argued that the military, even if no longer 'Africa's most important political institution',[65] should be accommodated in the various organs of government, including the executive and legislature. As far as the executive especially was concerned, both Tanzania and Zambia moved for a time slightly in this direction. But in anglophone West Africa, at least, such solutions are likely to be unacceptable, to politicians, professional groups, the academic community, and trade unionists alike. Thus in Ghana, the proposals put forward in 1977 by General Acheampong for 'Union Government' – initially conceived by him as a 'partnership of the military, the police and the civilians' – provoked a strong public reaction, being rightly seen as a device by the military to surrender some of the form of power, but little of its substance. In the event, Acheampong's proposals even in the emasculated version recommended by the *ad hoc* Committee on Union Government were never implemented because of his removal in a counter-*coup* in mid-1978.[66] What the head of Ghana's Supreme Military Council wanted, but in the end failed to obtain, was more easily achieved in Sierra Leone, when Siaka Stevens, the retiring civilian president, succeeded in transferring power to Joseph S. Momoh, an army general, who proceeded to don civilian clothes following his inauguration as president in January 1986. It was also more easily achieved by military leaders in much of francophone Africa: they established governments in civilian guise and embellished with representative institutions, but still under firm military control.

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8
Political Liberalisation and Economic Reform

As I noted in the Introduction, during the late 1980s leaders of pro-democracy movements in a number of Black African states (some of which had already adopted economic liberalisation measures) won popular support for their campaign against the continued monopoly of power by single parties and dictatorial presidents. These movements gathered momentum across the continent at staggering speed. At the beginning of 1990 constitutional provision for a multi-party system of government existed only in four mainland sub-Saharan African countries – Botswana, the Gambia, Senegal and Zimbabwe – and the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, a member-state of the OAU with a population mix similar to that of many states in the Caribbean. To this number could be added Namibia, on its becoming independent in March, and Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa. Nigeria was already committed to the restoration of democratic civilian government in 1992, while in Uganda a constitutional committee was collecting local views on the shape of a new democratic constitution.

In 1990–1 the pro-democracy movement took root in one-party states of varying ideological persuasion, of which some were ruled by civilians (for example, Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principé, and Zambia) and a larger number by the military (including Benin, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, and Togo). The wave of democratisation sweeping across Africa was also felt in Ethiopia and Somalia, where guerrilla forces ousted the discredited military regimes of Mengistu Haile-Mariam and Siyad Barré, respectively, in 1991. The leaders of many of these states were reluctant converts to political pluralism but had to bow to citizen power, expressed in noisy and sometimes violent demonstrations and often, subsequently, in national elections. The removal in February 1991 of

Kérékou's military regime in Benin and the electoral defeat of Kaunda and UNIP in Zambia the following October opened the floodgates of political reform throughout French-speaking and English-speaking Africa, respectively. In Zaire rioting by unpaid soldiers led Belgium and France to send in troops to protect their nationals in September 1991 and forced the wily Mobutu to fight for his political survival. In this he succeeded, as did Presidents Eyadéma in Togo, Omar Bongo in Gabon, Paul Biya in Cameroon, and Idriss Déby in Chad.

Intense domestic political pressure explains why a large number of African states joined the democratic bandwagon. It was exerted especially by urban residents who were angry and frustrated at the repression, corruption and gross economic mismanagement of one-party rule, leading to a decline in living standards which was often accelerated rather than improved by efforts at economic reform. They were influenced by events in Central and Eastern Europe, where communism and one-party rule were being emphatically rejected. The second main reason for the emergence of pro-democracy movements in Africa was the attitude of the World Bank, the IMF and Western governments who, again in the wake of events in Europe, made it clear that in allocating aid they would in future apply the criteria of 'good government' and respect for human rights.[1]

Before analysing the significance of the moves towards political liberalisation, I review briefly the African political and economic experience over the past decade.[2] The focus is on events in a wide selection of states grouped in geographical regions, beginning with Southern Africa.

In *South Africa*, Nelson Mandela enabled the country to move smoothly from *apartheid* state to democratic state and provided it with over four years of stable government before he retired from the presidency. The constitution prescribed that South Africa should remain a parliamentary democracy with an executive president and a bicameral legislature, comprising a National Assembly and a National Council of Provinces. The ANC had been successful in rejecting both the federal model with a weak centre and powerful regions demanded by Inkhata and the *volkstaat* sought by conservative Afrikaners. Buthelezi described the new constitution as 'treacherous', but continued to hold office under it. Not so de Klerk, who in 1996 announced the NP's withdrawal from government and its assumption of the role of opposition; he resigned as party leader the next year. His successor, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, remodelled the party which, as the New National Party (NNP), retained substantial support in the Western Cape, but was a spent force nationally, many of its major figures having defected to the rival Democratic Party. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, under the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu,

reported in October 1998 that under successive NP governments the *apartheid* state had indulged in 'systematic racial discrimination' and was the 'primary perpetrator of human rights abuses'. But the Commission also found that the ANC, Inkhata and the Pan-African Congress were 'guilty of comparable violations'. Though cases of individual reconciliation resulted from the work of the Commission, the issue of reparations for the victims of *apartheid* was sidetracked. By effectively neutralising responsibility for past state crime, the Commission did little to facilitate the transition from 'a deeply divided past' to a more peaceful future.[3]

Mandela inherited a highly developed financial and physical infrastructure and sound, if somewhat conservative, economic policies, with growth, employment and redistribution as essential elements. He benefited from the fact that, as compared with colonial administrations, the *apartheid* state had been 'relatively effective and comparatively efficient' and had undertaken a considerable range of social welfare functions.[4] His government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) committed it to an ambitious and costly domestic agenda. The problems were immense and much less was achieved than had been hoped. Government policies worked to the advantage of an emergent black business elite and were disliked by COSATU, the trade union confederation and normally a powerful ally of the government. The economic growth rate was well below the rate of population growth and demands for housing, education, health, water and electrification were far beyond the government's capacity to supply.

In 1999 ANC's dominance had seemed assured as a result of the National Assembly elections, following which Thabo Mbeki took over the presidency from Mandela. By this time, some of the problems which Mandela had faced had grown worse, while others had been added. The fall in the price of gold hit the South African gold industry hard and led to mine closures and massive retrenchments; the unemployment level rose to approximately 33 per cent of the work-force and was climbing at about 3 per cent annually. Low rates of productivity and the soaring crime level helped to account for the drop in foreign direct investment in South Africa. Income patterns remained skewed, with Blacks, who made up some 77 per cent of the country's 44 million people, still the most disadvantaged category. The invasion in July 2001 of a piece of neglected land at Bredell on the outskirts of Johannesburg by 10,000 people was short-lived, but it was one of many indications that land redistribution was potentially an explosive issue; less than 2 per cent of land had been transferred from white to black ownership since the ANC came to power in 1994.[5] Moreover, if a 'market-led' formula continues to be followed as the process of land redistribution is speeded up, the beneficiaries are likely to be members of 'a would-be black agrarian

entrepreneurial class rather than those of the propertyless'.[6] Trade union leaders were acutely worried about the unemployment problem. In August 2001 they staged a two-day general strike against privatisation in the belief that the selling off of public assets would result in the loss of many jobs. Gwede Mantashe, the general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, emphasised that they were also protesting about the government's conservative policies. 'A clear picture is emerging', he said, 'of an ANC that was elected by the leftwing working class and is governing for the rightwing middle class'.[7] It was the latter especially who prospered from persistent corruption, which was rife in the parastatal sector, the central Ministries of Social Welfare, Safety and Security, and Justice, and in the provincial administrations, no doubt partly as a legacy of the homeland civil services.[8] 'The government', commented Nattrass and Seekings, 'remains committed to policies that keep the economy growing along an inegalitarian path, with a large section of the poor being shut out of income-generating activities'.[9]

After becoming politically independent of South Africa in 1990, *Namibia* held three presidential and parliamentary elections. In the most recent elections, in November 1999, SWAPO swept to victory, overcoming the challenge of eight other parties. The scale of the ruling party's success was unexpected in view of Namibia's costly and unpopular military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the side of President Laurent Kabila, low economic growth, a 35 per cent unemployment rate, secessionist violence in the Caprivi Strip to the north-east, allegations of corruption and, possibly, unease at the constitutional change which allowed President Sam Nujoma to stand for a third term.

Botswana was one of the three former High Commission territories linked in a customs union with South Africa (the others were Lesotho and Swaziland). Following independence Botswana continued its enviable record of free speech and association and of holding 'free and fair' elections. The BDP's dominance was never seriously challenged and in the 1999 elections it won 33 of the 40 National Assembly seats, as compared with 26 in 1994. A lively press strengthened the country's democratic credentials by prodding the government to take action following the publication of reports in 1991 and 1993 on major public scandals over land and housing allocations, respectively; the ministers responsible were dismissed or resigned. The press also criticised the government for its lavish expenditure on a new air-base at Molepolole. Expenditure control was tightened, but was still inadequate.[10] The cattle-owning class continued to receive preferential treatment, for example over access to land and concessional loans.

Though *Zimbabwe* had, like Namibia, fought a long and bitter guerrilla war to achieve its independence (in April 1980), its ZANU-PF

government – anxious not to risk losing Western aid and trade – also avoided the adoption of socialist economic policies. Indeed, Herbst believed that while there was 'a public commitment to socialism, market forces are stronger in post-Independence Zimbabwe than at any point in the country's history because the new government has removed the racial laws and practices which prevented Blacks from competing economically with Whites'.[11] In fact, an embryo black bourgeoisie was already emerging and, in alliance with white capital and the bureaucracy, was coming to dominate the state.[12] Anticipating the reaction of their colleagues in South Africa a decade later, trade union leaders – nettled by the government's criticism of trade union corruption, maladministration and disorganisation – expressed their resentment of government policy. 'The honeymoon period between us and ZANU-PF is over', said one union official. 'Government doesn't give a damn about trade unions. At first government cared but now it only protects local and international capital'.[13] However, trade union disaffection was not sufficient at this time to affect the results of the April 1995 general election, which left ZANU-PF in control of 147 of the 150 National Assembly seats. Five years later the situation had changed dramatically: ZANU-PF had become little more than a Shona peasant party, with next to no urban support. This had gone to Morgau Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). One important reason was the downturn in the economy caused by lower foreign investment than expected and the fall in the price of the country's export commodities. This downturn meant that the government was unable to meet the high cost of maintaining the health and educational services established in the 1980s, to halt the fall in the people's standard of living, and to stem the rise of unemployment, which reached 70 per cent in some areas. The urban areas were especially affected. There were other causes of growing discontent. Opponents of the regime accused Mugabe and other leading politicians of being dictatorial and self-seeking, of trying to muzzle the press and of undermining the rule of law. The cost of keeping 12,000 troops in Kabila's Congo was also resented. The perception that ZANU-PF no longer represented the workers' interests was confirmed by the referendum held in February 2000 to ratify proposed amendments to the constitution, the effect of which would have been to increase the President's powers. The government's decisive loss of the vote persuaded Mugabe to exploit the land issue.

Since independence the government had faced an acute dilemma over land. It needed to satisfy the demand for land of its own black supporters, especially those former guerrillas who were not among the 30,000 or so absorbed into the new Zimbabwean army and who, possessing few employable skills, survived precariously in the urban centres. At the same time, it

remained heavily dependent for stepping up agricultural production on the approximately 5,000 mostly white commercial farmers, who were Zimbabwe's largest employers providing over 300,000 full-time jobs, and were also the country's largest earners of desperately needed foreign exchange. Government policy towards commercial farm workers shifted from one of initial concern for their well-being to one of seeming neglect in the latter 1980s; they were nevertheless included in the resettlement provisions of the National Land Policy of 1999.

The land issue was raised during the 1995 election campaign when an increasingly indebted government resisted donor pressure to undertake fiscal reform. The IMF suspended balance of payments support and the European Union (EU) and other donors followed suit. The adoption of structural adjustment policies strengthened external influences. The loss of domestic control over economic policy led a beleaguered president to revive the land issue[14] and, as the decade drew to a close, to encourage veterans and other ZANU-PF camp-followers to seize white farms; the violence that followed resulted in the death of a number of white farmers and of many of their black farm workers, whose homes and livelihoods were destroyed. Mugabe blamed the British government for refusing, except on what he said were unacceptable terms, to compensate the white farmers whose land was occupied. It was against this background of intimidation and violence that the campaign for the June 2000 general election took place.

The roots of the MDC – ZANU-PF's main challenger in this election – went back to the mid-1980s when the trade unions linked up with students, members of the Roman Catholic Church and civic groups to fight government plans to create a one-party state. In 1998 these various organisations formed a national assembly to press for public accountability, open democracy and a new constitution. It was out of this assembly that the MDC was born in September of the next year. Under the leadership of Tsvangirai – a prominent trade unionist, a former ZANU-PF office-holder and a Shona – the MDC won support from both sides of the ethnic Shona–Ndebele divide, especially in the urban areas, for its detailed schemes for poverty reduction, low-cost housing, a return to free health services and job creation. Mugabe, thoroughly rattled, sought to divert attention from the worsening socio-economic situation by drawing attention to the land issue; though this issue was certainly important, it was jobs, not land, that the young men in the urban areas wanted and it was their jobs on the land that farm employees were desperate to protect. In the general election, the MDC – referred to colloquially as 'the workers' party' though more accurately described as a broad-based social democratic party – won 57 seats to ZANU-PF's 62; it swept the board in Harare, the capital, and Bulawayo, and did well in

the other urban centres and Matabeland, but was easily outvoted in Mashonaland, the ruling party's heartland.[15] ZANU-PF's grip on power was strengthened when Mugabe, whose term of office as president did not expire until 2002, exercised his constitutional right to nominate 20 seats and was able to influence the election by the Council of Chiefs to 10 other seats.

Despite Mugabe's anti-democratic antics, the 2000 general election had presented some hopeful signs for the future in Zimbabwe. The MDC had shown itself to be a truly national party, capable of winning seats across the ethnic divide and backed by supporters who were ready to brave intimidation and violence to cast their vote. The critical stand taken against the regime by segments of the independent press was encouraging; so, too, was the readiness of the judiciary, for the most part, to uphold the rule of law on land, the media and other issues. Mugabe emerged from the election with a diminished reputation – he was willing to plunge Zimbabwe into economic crisis in order to secure his retention of political power. In September 2001 he accepted in principle a Nigerian-brokered deal – thrashed out by leaders of the Commonwealth and representatives of the Zimbabwean government at Abuja, the Nigerian capital – by which the British government pledged to pay £36 million for land distribution and the Zimbabwe government in return agreed to maintain the rule of law and the basic principles of democracy.

Sadly, however, the flagrant abuse of power continued following Abuja. The Nigerian-led Commonwealth Observer Group found the 2002 presidential election campaign to have been 'marred by a high level of politically-motivated violence and intimidation'. Though Mugabe was officially declared to have won the election and was sworn in as president for another six-year term on 17 March 2002, his country was suspended from the Commonwealth for one year. While the immediate economic outlook for Zimbabwe was bleak, the courage shown by opponents of the ZANU-PF regime and the way in which would-be voters defied threats and violence to queue for hours on end in order to cast their ballots gave promise of a more democratic future.

Whereas in the early post-independence period the main problem in *Mozambique* – Zimbabwe's eastern neighbour – was to counteract the bureaucratisation and over-centralisation of the party and state structures, in the 1980s the problem became that of safeguarding the state's very existence. The economy was crippled and RENAMO was in control of much of the countryside. A breakthrough came in October 1992 when, after difficult and protracted negotiations, the government signed a UN-backed peace agreement with RENAMO. Two years later, simultaneous presidential and legislative elections were won by the incumbent President, Joaquim Chissano, though RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, did considerably better

than expected. Dhlakama accepted the informal role of leader of the opposition (the formal role was denied him since he was not an elected MP). A second round of elections was held in December 1999, and Chissano and FRELIMO were again returned to power. Despite the civil war legacy of an estimated 500,000 land mines, which impeded peasant agricultural development, Mozambique's economic and financial standing was greatly improved. With an annual growth rate of over 8 per cent by 1999, a stable currency, a low rate of inflation, and important sectors of the economy run by foreign experts, Mozambique received sympathetic treatment from the international financial institutions and donor nations. It proved attractive to Portuguese, South African and other foreign investors. Upon the urging of Nelson Mandela, Mozambique was made a member of the Commonwealth in November 1995 and received help from Britain, South Africa and other states when the east of the country was devastated by flooding early in the first year of the new millennium.

In *Angola* – potentially a much richer country than Mozambique – the MPLA government also voted to abandon Marxism–Leninism, to inaugurate a multi-party system of government, and to introduce elements of a market economy. Hopes that the 1991 agreement with UNITA would bring lasting peace were dashed when UNITA and its power-hungry leader Joseph Savimbi refused to accept their defeat in the presidential and National Assembly elections held the next year; the country was again plunged into civil war. In November 1994, after protracted negotiations, the two sides eventually signed the Lusaka peace agreement providing for an immediate ceasefire, the completion of the electoral process and a power-sharing arrangement under which UNITA would be allocated a number of senior posts in the government. Progress in implementing this agreement was, however, slow and a state of 'armed truce' prevailed. The installation in 1997 of a government of national unity and reconciliation did not prevent the resumption of civil war during which leading politicians, bureaucrats and soldiers continued to prosper in the capital, often opening up their own businesses. At a time when Angola stood to benefit from the exploitation of recently discovered rich offshore oil deposits within Angolan waters, the ordinary people – including more than half-a-million refugees from the war zone – suffered from homelessness, malnutrition and disease and lived in fear of being maimed or killed by treading on land mines. The death of Savimbi in a clash with government troops in February 2002 raised hopes that the long years of civil war might soon be ended.

In *Zambia*, which also bordered on Southern Africa, Frederick Chiluba's victorious Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was, like many of the new pro-democracy movements, a broad coalition which fractured

when once it acquired power and faced the task of making difficult economic and other choices. Aware of the widespread dissatisfaction with its performance, the MMD government took the ill-advised step of preventing ex-President Kaunda from standing as a presidential candidate in 1996 on the ground that he had been born in Malawi. This undemocratic manoeuvre against a man who had led the country to independence in 1964 and served as prime minister and president for 27 years, coupled with the arrest of eight prominent UNIP members, led to the suspension of foreign aid and the boycott of the election by several of the smaller parties. The result of the boycott was an easy victory for Chiluba and the MMD on a low poll.[16]

The performance of the economy continued to be disappointing for the rest of the decade. A number of government departments regularly overspent; there were cases of financial mismanagement and instances of political favouritism and corruption surrounding the divestiture of state assets and the award of public contracts. Parliament was not strong enough for accountability to be meaningful[17] and there was an urgent need for wide-ranging structural reforms. Civic associations consistently charged the authorities with infringing human rights, harassing political opponents and exerting political pressure on the independent press. Nevertheless, a section of the press – notably the *Post* – continued to exercise its critical function and the judiciary by and large upheld the rule of law, even on occasion ruling against the government.[18] An important democratic advance was Chiluba's decision, albeit taken reluctantly, not to seek an extension to his constitutional term in office when it expired in 2001. His government credited itself with having privatised more than 90 per cent of the country's state-owned companies over the last few years, culminating in the sale in April 2000 of 70 per cent of the government-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) to the Anglo-American Corporation after lengthy negotiations.[19]

The *DRC*, which was known as Zaire for most of Mobutu's 32-year rule, shared a short common border with Zambia and a longer border with Angola. Well-endowed with natural resources, it was by far the largest state in Central Africa, though in continental terms it came second to the Sudan in area; its population of some 48 million was less than half that of Nigeria. Tough, wily and manipulative, Mobutu personalised the state and turned the dictates of the IMF and other international financial instututions to his own advantage; his dictatorial regime would not have survived as long as it did without the backing of the USA. In 1990–1 Zaire was not immune from the move to democratise authoritarian-ruled states that was sweeping across Africa or from the social unrest and rioting which accompanied rising prices and increasing unemployment. Mobutu promised political reforms,

but ensured that little came of them by pursuing a policy of elite circulation, whereby colleagues and opponents alike became his clients to be promoted, given lucrative appointments or discarded at will. Outwitted, his political opponents in Kinshasa called in vain for the Zairean army to intervene. It was not until May 1997 that Mobutu fled abroad as Rwandan soldiers and troops of Laurent Kabila's rebel movement – the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) – approached Kinshasa. On proclaiming himself president, Kabila announced that the country would revert to its former name. By the end of 1998 it was clear that Kabila's promise of full, early democratisation would not be fulfilled. He revealed a strong authoritarian strain, imprisoned erstwhile supporters and, in a manner reminiscent of Mobutu, started filling key posts with members of his own family or with fellow Katangese. His government could not hold the country together and civil war broke out again, drawing five African states into a conflict that continued sporadically following a UN-brokered peace accord in July 1999 (see Chapter 7). Breaches of the ceasefire and Kabila's unpredictable nature and exaggerated sense of his own importance made it questionable whether the misnamed 'Democratic' Republic would survive as a single entity. This remained an open question following Kabila's assassination in January 2001 and the succession as president (apparently at Zimbabwe's insistence) of his 31 year-old son, Joseph. Angolan and Zimbabwean troops assumed responsibilty for maintaining law and order in Kinshasa and protecting the new ruler.[20]

Conditions in the *Republic of Congo* (Congo-Brazzaville), which lay on the other side of the Congo river, were better, but still troubled. The power struggle between ex-President Sassou-Nguesso and his successor Pascal Lissouba, who won the 1992 election, culminated in 1997 in a four-month civil war, centred on Brazzaville, between rival militias – Lissouba's 'Zulus' and Sassou-Nguesso's 'Cobras'. With the help of Angolan troops, Sassou-Nguesso overthrew the Lissouba government, was sworn in as president and formed a government of national unity. In a referendum held in January 2002 the people overwhelmingly approved a new constitution which provided for a president elected for a seven-year term and a bicameral legislature. Early presidential elections were scheduled.

Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville's western neighbour, is an oil-rich, heavily forested state in Central Africa with an estimated population of 1.3 million. Since independence in 1960 the Gabonese government, first under Léon Mba and from 1967 under Omar Bongo, pursued a policy of close co-operation with France in economic and foreign affairs. Living off the unearned income that oil rentals provided, Gabon was and remains essentially a rentier state. In March 1990 internal unrest led to the convening of

a national conference and the establishment of a multi-party system of government. Bongo and the Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG) won the 1993 elections, which were marred by some violence, and the presidential election of December 1998, when Bongo was re-elected at the first round. Women played a prominent role in a campaign where the clear advantage in financial and other resources lay heavily with the incumbent president. A hopeful pointer for the future was the vigour with which the opposition press was allowed to criticise the government's performance and shortcomings.[21]

Compared with Gabon, *Rwanda* was (and remains) a poor country which until independence in 1962 had formed with Burundi the Belgian-administered UN trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi. As we saw in Chapter 4, periodic clashes between the rival Hutu and Tutsi communities occurred in both states, the events in one country reacting on those in the other: 'Victimisation of Batutsi within Rwanda', Hintjens notes, 'has consistently been justified as avenging victimisation of Bahutu in neighbouring Burundi'.[22] The government was determined to create a society in which 'there are no Hutus or Tutsis, only Rwandans'.[23] Neighbouring *Burundi*, where President (Major) Pierre Buyoya has been head of state and government since July 1996, covered much the same area and had a slightly smaller population than Rwanda. Sadly, no end was in sight to the civil war between the largely Tutsi army and various Hutu rebel groups, despite the peace-making efforts of Tanzania and other states in the region. Clearly, a polity based on 'ethnic exclusion' was not viable;[24] it was estimated that some 250,000 people had died between 1993 and 1999. The Buyoya government's cruel policy of housing suspected opponents in 'regroupment camps' was a more extreme version of the 'villagisation' policy initiated by the Rwandan government to counter sporadic rebel attacks in north-west Rwanda.

Malawi is also a poor country (over-dependent on tobacco) in Central Africa, but English-speaking rather than French-speaking. Though it experienced the long years of the dictatorial rule of Hastings Banda and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), its significant regional divisions have not plunged it into the sort of violent conflict that has been a feature of political life in Rwanda and Burundi. Indeed, some of the essentials of democracy were restored in the 1990s, beginning with presidential and legislative elections in May 1994.[25] A second round of elections was held in June 1999 when Bakili Muluzi, the incumbent president and leader of the southern-based United Democratic Front (UDF), fought off the challenge of two other presidential candidates, one of whose base was in the centre of the country and the other in the north. Thus, the split along regional lines continued, signalling the need for responsible behaviour on the part of Malawi's politicians if these fissures were not to be deepened.

From Malawi we move to East Africa and the United Republic of *Tanzania*, where the ruling CCM – no doubt anxious to secure foreign aid and attract overseas investment – opted for multi-partyism despite the March 1992 finding of the Presidential Commission on Political Change that a majority of Tanzanians favoured retaining the country's one-party system. The elections in October 1995 and October 2000 accentuated the divisions between the islands of Zanzibar and the mainland; those in Zanzibar in particular were seriously flawed due to the persistence of old conflicts and cleavages (see Chapter 5). In the 2000 presidential election the incumbent Benjamin Mkapa benefited from Tanzania's fast-growing economy and the failure of the opposition parties (as in Gabon and Kenya) to unite behind a single candidate. He gained an easy victory over his three challengers; CCM, the ruling party, also triumphed. The 2000–1 budget contained no specific measures for regional integration and the three member-states of the revived East African Community (EAC) – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – seemed to be pulling in different directions on the crucial issue of harmonising trade policies.

In *Uganda* the new 1995 constitution extended for five years the system of broad-based, no-party government which allowed political parties to exist, but not to campaign or hold rallies. Museveni won an easy victory in the 1996 presidential election under this 'movement' system, which was supported by just over 90 per cent of voters in a referendum held in June 2000, though on a modest turnout of 52 per cent. Members of the expanding middle class were unhappy about the government's tactics and demanded greater political freedom.[26] Nevertheless, within what amounted to a *de facto* one-party context, the press was relatively free to express its views and to expose corruption at the highest level. Thus, in 1998 it showed the banking sector to be in crisis and the President's half-brother (a former army major-general) to be implicated in a banking scandal; he resigned as presidential adviser on defence. It also ventilated the 1999 report of a parliamentary inquiry which revealed that privatisation had been 'derailed by corruption' and that three senior ministers were implicated.[27] In August 2000, the Constitutional Court showed its independence by declaring the Referendum and Other Provisions Act null and void on the ground that it had been passed into law by an inquorate legislature. Museveni won a landslide victory in the presidential election held in March 2001 and thus secured a final five-year term in office.

In *Kenya* the opposition movement was hopelessly divided by personal ambitions and ethnic considerations. This worked to the advantage of President Moi and the ruling KANU in the December 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections. However, the regime faced major problems of political instability and economic and social decline throughout the 1990s.

A series of financial and banking scandals in 1991–3 were particularly disturbing, the more so because no action was subsequently taken against the two men alleged to have been the main perpetrators of this multi-million-pound fraud.(It entailed the grant to a trading company called Goldenberg International of a monopoly on gold and diamond exports, plus a 35 per cent export bonus, though Kenya had no diamonds of its own and produced very little gold!) Moi and his faction-ridden party were again successful in the December 1997 elections, though KANU did not secure the two-thirds majority in the National Assembly required for major constitutional change. The Luo-based National Development Party (NDP) joined KANU in forming a coalition government in June 2001. Corruption remained a serious issue, resulting in the freezing of international development aid.

The West African Republic of *Cameroon* had been created in 1961 out of the union of two former UN trust territories, one administered by France and the other by Britain. This helped to shape the country's politics: instead of substantial autonomy within a federal framework, the anglophone region came to be totally integrated into a strongly centralised unitary state ruled by President Paul Biya (from November 1982) and the Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camérounais (RDPC). The political liberalisation of the early 1990s led to the escalation of demands for change by the anglophone provinces, but the government showed itself ready to defend the unitary state by all available means, including repression.[28] The IMF suspended aid to Cameroon in 1996 because of government delays in cutting back the over-manned public service, tackling corruption and privatising the economy; however, privatisation of the sugar, railways and cement sectors went ahead in 1998. The country's plentiful resources included oil and gas.

There seemed to be no end to the troubled history of *Chad*, the large, landlocked country to the north-east of Cameroon. Following a civil war between the Libyan-backed forces of President Goukouni Oueddei and those of his challenger Hissene Habré, Habré ruled precariously as president from October 1982 to December 1990 when, after appealing in vain for French assistance, he was overthrown by Colonel Idriss Déby, leader of the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS). Under pressure from France, whose troops provided logistical support, Déby called and won a presidential election in June–July 1996; the ruling MPS won a majority of seats in the parliamentary elections that followed. A new, broad-based administration included major critics of the regime. The existence of dissident groups in the south threatened the extraction of the region's rich oil reserves that were of vital importance for the country's economic future.

Lake Chad straddles the border between the Republic of that name and *Nigeria*, the dominant oil-rich state in West Africa with a population estimated

in 2000 at 132 million (see Chapter 7). The presidential election in February 1999 was won convincingly by General (retd) Olusegun Obasanjo, who stood as the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate; the PDP secured overall majorities in both the House and Senate. Following his inauguration in May, Obasanjo reached agreement with the IMF for an economic reform programme, which included the privatisation of non-oil public enterprises, and pledged to tackle corruption and to overcome Nigeria's ethnic divisions. The seriousness of the latter was quickly demonstrated as tensions between the western Yoruba and northern Hausa peoples mounted; there were inter-communal clashes in Lagos and Kano, causing many deaths. It seemed that the Yoruba believed that the new president, though a Yoruba himself, repre-sented northern and military interests, while the Hausa were alarmed that a significant number of southerners had been promoted to senior military posts (this was done to offset the preponderance of northern officers). Potentially more serious still was the surge in Islamic fundamentalism in northern Nigeria, heightening tension between Muslims and Christians and other non-Muslims who feared that they might be punished for infringing a law – *shari'a* – to which they did not subscribe.[29] Sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians also occurred outside the old Northern Region – at Aba and Umahia in the east of the country and at Jos in the centre, where an estimated 500 people were killed in September 2001.

In *Ghana* Rawlings, behind a façade of populist radical policies, under-took a series of economic reforms with IMF and World Bank support. His was essentially an authoritarian regime that severely curtailed political party activity until 1992, when (having resigned from the air force) he was returned as civilian president in elections regarded as unfair by the opposi-tion parties; they boycotted the ensuing parliamentary elections, thus giv-ing an easy victory to the ruling NDC. With the economy in reasonable shape, despite the sharp rise in the price of oil and the fall in the price of cocoa, he won again in 1996 in elections widely regarded this time as free and fair. Four years later he respected the constitutional limit of two four-year terms as president and stood down. Vice-President John Adams replaced him as the NDC's presidential candidate, but was defeated by John Kufuor, leader of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), who stood on a slogan of 'positive change' and did particularly well in the cities and key parts of the south. The election was significant as being the first time that government had changed hands in Ghana by means of the ballot box.[30]

The democratic record of francophone states in West Africa was mixed. The experience of *Benin* was both intriguing and exceptional. General Kérékou's discomfiture at the hands of the voters in 1991 proved tempo-rary. In the presidential election of March 1996 the people expressed their

discontent with the belt-tightening financial measures of Nicéphone Soglo, his successor, by voting the former dictator back into office. Despite strikes and protests against continuing austerity and an unstable economic situation, Kérékou won the presidential election in March 2001; he was confronted by an opposition-led legislature as a result of the important gains made by Soglo's Benin Resistance Party in the 1999 parliamentary elections. Kérékou's political record was certainly much better than that of General Eyadéma who had ruled *Togo*, the tiny state lying between Benin and Ghana, for over 30 years. Eyadéma was an old-style military dictator who came under continuing international pressure to democratise his regime, but made only token efforts of reform. He was pronounced the winner of a presidential election in June 1998, but the European Commission, supported by France and Germany, rejected the result as fraudulent and held back aid. His legitimacy was low outside his own northern area, from which the army drew most of its personnel.

Burkina Faso and *Mali* were poor states north of Ghana, with limited natural resources. In the former Blaise Compaoré and his party were returned to power in presidential and parliamentary elections in 1997. Demonstrations the next year followed the murder of a journalist that was widely believed to have been politically motivated. Compaoré was alleged to be involved in international diamond smuggling both from Angola and Sierra Leone. Mali was ruled from April 1992 by Alpha Oumar Konaré of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) after defeating Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (who had seized power just over a year earlier) in a presidential election. Over the next few years Mali built up an enviable reputation as one of the 'new model' African states which combined a functioning democracy with economic reform. The success story of agricultural and rural development in Mali was based on cotton production, while the country's democratic advance owed a great deal to the emergence in 1991, and functioning, of the National Union of Cotton and Food Crop Producers.[31]

As commodity prices slumped in the 1980s, leading to a squeeze on public finances, the *Côte d'Ivoire* began to lose its reputation as an 'economic miracle'. However, neither this nor the move to multi-partyism at the beginning of the 1990s seriously affected the dominant position of President Houphouët-Boigny, the ruling PDCI, or the working of the country's effective but highly centralised administration. Little of significance changed following Houphouët-Boigny's death in December 1993. With the economy in good shape his successor – Henri Konan Bédié, former Speaker of the National Assembly – and the PDCI easily won the general election, though the opposition boycotted the presidential contest. Unexpectedly, in December 1999 the Bédié government was overthrown in a military *coup*

(the reasons for which were unclear) led by General (retd) Robert Gueï, a respected former army chief of staff. The French government condemned the *coup*, but made no attempt to intervene, indicating a major shift in French policy towards its former colonies. Tragi-comedy and not a little confusion followed, but eventually the electoral commission declared Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian from the western part of the country long committed to democratic reform, the winner of the October 2000 presidential election; a number of political and ethnic clashes, resulting in many deaths, occurred. Gbagbo's party – the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) – won 96 seats as against 77 for the PDCI in legislative elections held in December 2000. The main party in the predominantly Muslim north, whose leader had been debarred from standing as a presidential candidate, boycotted the election. The country was seriously split along both religious and ethnic lines and the state of the economy deteriorated.

In neighbouring *Liberia*, Samuel Doe's brutal and corrupt regime was removed in September 1990 by a guerrilla force led by Charles Taylor. A protracted civil war, in which indescribable acts of cruelty were perpetrated, was eventually ended in August 1995 when a peace accord was brokered by ECOMOG – the Monitoring Group of the 16-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – which had arrived in Liberia in 1990. It broke down in April 1996, by which time an estimated 150,000 people had been killed, large numbers made homeless, and the iron ore and rubber-based economy crippled. With the backing of the Ghanaian and Nigerian heads of state, ECOWAS managed to persuade the warring factions to reach a new peace agreement; they were disarmed and disbanded and converted into political parties. Taylor emerged an easy victor over eight other candidates in the ensuing presidential contest in July 1997, while his National Patriotic Party of Liberia (NPPL) won the elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate. The new President appointed technocrats to his cabinet and announced that he would pursue a policy of reconciliation, national integration and economic rehabilitation. Opposition leaders were dissatisfied, however, and a plot to overthrow the government was uncovered; Taylor retained a tight grip on power by means of a loyal armed guard. He retained access to rebel-controlled diamond mining areas across the Sierra Leonean border[32] through his contacts with Foday Sankoh, leader until May 2000 of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to whom he was alleged to be supplying weapons. The diamond issue brought Taylor into conflict with the British government and the EU, which blocked aid to Liberia. His government also clashed with the local independent and foreign media.

Diamonds linked the politics of Liberia and *Sierra Leone*. After experiencing both civilian and military rule and then, from January 1986, a mixture

of the two under Joseph S. Momoh, an army general turned civilian, Sierra Leone embarked on political reform by adopting a multi-party constitution in October 1991. This became a dead-letter some six months later when Captain Valentine Strasser staged a military *coup*, assumed power and promised a reform programme. Widespread fighting between the RUF, unidentified armed gangs and government troops caused devastation and a massive refugee problem. Following Strasser's removal in a bloodless *coup* in January 1996, elections were held in which ethnic–regional and personality factors were again prominent. The unexpected outcome was the return to power in the legislature of the SLPP and the election of its presidential candidate Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabba, a former UN development economist, who formed a coalition administration from the SLPP and some of the minor parties. With the Côte d'Ivoire particularly serving as broker, a peace agreement with the RUF was signed in November 1996. It did not last: another *coup* occurred and it was not until March 1998 that ECOMOG forces, composed largely of Nigerians, cleared the way for President Kabba to return to the capital. An ugly period of civil war followed, when 'final' agreements proved temporary and a UN peacekeeping force proved ineffective. Britain expressed a willingness to help its former colony and dispatched some 1,500 troops to Sierra Leone, officially to train the Sierra Leonean army. There was little prospect of peace until the diamond fields were taken out of rebel hands, though Yusuf Bangura was convinced that by itself this step would not be enough to solve the problems which faced the peacemakers. He argued that at their root was the misfit between the country's majoritarian–presidential system of government and its bi-polar ethnic structure.[33]

Some of the above events affected *Guinea* both because it had common borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone and contributed troops to the ECOMOG force. Colonel Lansana Conté, who became president following a bloodless *coup* in April 1984, instituted an economic liberalisation programme and received extensive advice on the management of the bauxite-dominated economy from the IMF and World Bank. Standing as a civilian, he won the presidential elections in 1993 and 1998, but unfairly according to the opposition, whose main leader, Alpha Condé, was charged with fomenting a rebellion and imprisoned for five years in September 2000.

Whereas Guinea had been ruled by the French, *Guinea–Bissau* and *Cape Verde* were former colonies of Portugal. As noted in Chapter 3, each state had gone its own way after the *coup d'état* of November 1980. In 1994 the PAIGC won the legislative elections in Guinea–Bissau and João Vieira was elected president. A constitutional crisis in 1997 was followed by an army mutiny the next year – it was put down with the help of Senegalese and Guinean troops. A peace agreement was brokered by the francophone

members of ECOMOG. Vieira was forced out of office and was succeeded in January 2000 by Kumba Yalla of the Social Renewal Party, who defeated his PAIGC challenger in the presidential election; he included members of opposition parties other than the PAIGC in his 24-member cabinet. In November 2000 relations with the army became critical when President Yalla appointed mostly Balantas – the ethnic group which dominated his government – to 30 senior posts in the military. An army revolt occurred, but was put down. In 1991 *Cape Verde* was caught up in the democratic wave sweeping across the continent: Pereira and the PAICV were defeated in multi-party elections by the Movement for Democracy Party (MPD) and its presidential candidate, Antonio Monteiro. Following the ruling party's further success in the December 1995 elections, Carlos Veiga, MPD chairman and prime minister, took further steps to facilitate the transition from a state-run to a market economy. Under his tutelage, Cape Verde earned a reputation as one of the stablest of African states, which had invested extensively in health and education and had an enviable economic growth rate. However, the MPD was rent by internal division for much of 2000 and was defeated in the legislative elections of January 2001 by the PAICV, whose candidate – Pedro Pires – won the ensuing presidential election by a narrow margin.

Developments in Cape Verde were not obviously affected by events in *Senegal*, a 'core' francophone state with close historic ties to the metropole. The ruling Parti Socialiste (PS) had long benefited from electoral regulations which for many years did not allow the opposition parties to form a coalition, from having the whole weight of the government machine behind it, and from its ability to tap the patronage resources of government – in particular, to 'buy' the electoral support of the leaders of the Sufi Muslim brotherhoods who continued to exercise traditional elite control over the informal markets. The function of moderation played by these brotherhoods – and, on a broader front, the practice of clientelism – was vitally important because of the widening gap between state and society and the state's failure to control peanut-marketing mechanisms and other market forces.[34] The electoral success of the PS was also said to be due to the party's superior organisation and the professionalism of its campaigns.[35] As expected Abdou Diouf, the incumbent president, was returned to office in the 1993 election for which a reformed electoral code was in place, signalling (according to Villalon) 'a small step forward in the direction of buttressing democracy'.[36] The first round of the presidential election in February 2000 proved inconclusive, but – to the consternation of the PS – Diouf was defeated in the second round by Abdoulaye Wadé, the leader of an opposition coalition called the Front for Changeover. The voter turn-out was high for elections that were widely regarded as free and fair, making democracy a meaningful concept in

Senegal.[37] Rebel activities in the southern province of Casamance threat-ened stability in neighbouring Guinea–Bissau.

Until a group of junior army officers staged a bloodless *coup* in July 1994, *The Gambia* (notwithstanding an attempted takeover by a small group of conspirators in 1981) was one of the very few African states with long experience of uninterrupted competitive party politics. The military junta headed by Lieutenant (later Colonel) Yahya Jammeh sought to win legiti-macy by co-opting 11 civilian ministers and mounting an anti-corruption drive. Claiming to have reinstated democratic rule, Jammeh won the presi-dential election held in September 1996 under a new constitution and under conditions that greatly favoured his candidature. Following the success of his party – the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) – in the parliamentary elections of January 1997, aid programmes were resumed, tourism flourished again, and the Gambia was elected to a non-per-manent seat on the UN Security Council. On the negative side, however, were repeated opposition charges, backed by an Amnesty International report in December 1997, of human rights violations; the regime was also besmirched by financial scandal and was criticised for its attacks on the press and the opposition.

In North Africa resurgent Islamic fundamentalism posed a serious threat to national unity and militated against the democratic reforms initiated in some countries in the late 1980s.[38] Its impact was greatest in Egypt and Algeria, particularly among unemployed young men. In *Egypt* President Husni Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) government retained a firm grip on the political situation. The NDP dominated the coun-try's multi-party electoral system and controlled the bulk of seats in the People's National Assembly. Well aware of the damage to tourism caused by the attacks on foreign sightseers in Cairo in 1996 and Upper Egypt in 1997, the government took a tough stand against Islamic terrorist attacks. Thousands of Islamists were alleged to be held in detention without trial and curbs were placed on the press. At the end of the decade, as Mubarak began his fourth six-year term as president and his government – faced with labour unrest and strikes – tried to pursue IMF advice by cutting public spending and pursuing privatisation, Islamic fundamentalism continued to pose a serious threat to internal security. By September 2000 over 200 Muslim brothers were in custody; a concerned judiciary began to assert its independence and intervened to correct excesses by the security forces.

In *Algeria*, where a multi-party system of government had been intro-duced in 1989, a weak ruling party – the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) – faced growing opposition, especially from the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS), a radical Islamic party which was itself challenged by more

fundamentalist groupings. When the FIS followed up its crushing defeat of the FLN in the June 1990 local elections (the first multi-party elections since independence in 1962) by winning the first round of the country's general election, the army stepped in to halt the democratic process. The effect of this intervention, which was approved by the West, was to increase the spate of heedless violence. The government of Brigadier-General Liamine Zéroual, who had become president in January 1994 and was returned to office in the November 1995 presidential election, made some progress in ending the civil war. While the moderate wing of the FIS seemed content to achieve political power by peaceful means, radical fanatics (belonging especially to the Groupe Islamique Armée – GIA) continued to employ terrorist tactics, with women and children in under-policed rural villages the main victims. In 1999 the newly elected president – Abdulaziz Bouteflika, the former foreign minister – launched a peace initiative, which included an amnesty for Islamist militants not implicated in mass killings, rapes or bombings; this won wide support, but did not put a stop to all killing of civilians.

Morocco, Tunisia and *Libya* were able to hold their own against Islamic fundamentalism. Until his death in 1999 King Hassan II of Morocco pursued a cautious policy of political reform, partly to meet domestic pressure but also to satisfy key international organisations such as the World Bank and IMF and thus achieve Morocco's integration into the world economy. In 1992 a revised constitution gave greater powers to the government and the Chamber of Representatives; in 1995 a new cabinet, including representatives of the centre-right political parties, was appointed to replace the non-party cabinet; and in 1996 a bicameral legislature was introduced, with all members of the Chamber of Representatives (the lower house) elected by direct universal suffrage. The right of trade unions to take strike action was also recognised, and in 1998 Abderrahmane Youssoufi, the opposition leader who was appointed prime minister by the king, undertook to democratise the country's social and political life, and to promote the rule of law and human rights (the subject, it was alleged, of abuse). He also ordered all civil servants, cabinet ministers and MPs to disclose their wealth and private interests. However, his administration achieved less than it had promised. Under the new king – Mohammed VI, the former Crown Prince – a faster rate of political change seemed in prospect, together with regional decentralisation and economic liberalisation. Adopting a populist style, Mohammed dominated the political sphere and spoke out on sensitive issues, such as equal rights for women, which were anathema to elements within the Islamist movement. By contrast Youssoufi's administration seemed lethargic. It clashed with the independent press, which was a driving

force for change, and banned several newspapers and weekly magazines for straying into areas that were out of bounds – the monarchy, the army and the Western Sahara. Morocco carried most of the blame for the long delay in holding a referendum to determine the future of this former Spanish territory claimed by the Polisario Front (PF); however, its campaign to weaken support for the Front among members of the OAU met with some success. Polisario, backed by Algeria, refused to consider any solution outside the referendum framework.[39]

In *Tunisia* General Ben Ali and the ruling Rassemblement Constitutional Démocratique (RCD) retained a tight grip on power following presidential and legislative elections in 1994 and municipal elections in 1995. The regime was authoritarian and intolerant of opposition; it imposed restrictions on the local press, subjected foreign publications to regular censorship, and had a poor human rights record (though this did not prevent Tunisia's unanimous election to the UN Human Rights Commission in 1997). In April 2000 Taoufiq Ben Brik, an outspoken journalist writing in the European press, made human rights abuses in Tunisia a matter of international concern and provoked fierce French criticism of the regime; dissidents in Tunisia also joined in the attack. Token democratic moves included the holding in 1999 of a presidential election that was contested for the first time since independence and which Ben Ali won decisively; the RCD trounced the weak and divided opposition in the parliamentary elections. Despite mounting unemployment, the government's pursuit of an open market economy yielded strong economic growth; this was achieved by framing its own policy, 'without following IMF dicta'. Nevertheless, Tunisia shared with Egypt and Morocco the impact of structural adjustment programmes; as Karen Pfeifer pointed out: 'all three countries remain dependent on external finance … They are now more subject to global market institutions than ever before and more vulnerable to global recession or financial crises.'[40]

Following an abortive army *coup* in 1993, internal opposition to the regime of Colonel Muamar Qaddafi in *Libya* was reported to be on the increase. Apart from unrest within the armed forces and tribal rivalries, a growing number of militant groups – probably linked to the Algerian GIA – were active; in 1996–8 they clashed with the security services in eastern Libya, causing hundreds of deaths. However, the Qaddafi regime claimed that Islamist militancy had been contained. The decentralisation policy begun in the 1980s was continued, but real power remained with Qaddafi and a close circle of confidants. In 1999 UN sanctions against Libya, which had been in place since 1992, were suspended and most EU sanctions were lifted after Libya handed over for trial by Scottish judges in the Netherlands the two men accused of responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 (early in 2001

one of the two was found guilty and the other not guilty). Frustrated because of the weak Arab support over Lockerbie, Qaddafi sought to promote closer relations with those countries south of the Sahara which had backed him.

In the *Sudan*, Islamic law was adopted by the military governments of Ja'far Numeiri (1969–85) and then, following a three-year interregnum of civilian rule, of General Ahmed al-Bashir, effectively from June 1989. Its introduction was in part a reaction to economic failure and the disruption caused by the long years of civil war as the Arab Muslim-dominated government in Khartoum tried, for all except a few years following the 1972 accord, to impose its will on the rebellious, largely Christian and animist southern provinces. Bashir's political reforms eventually resulted in presidential and legislative elections in 1996 and again in 2000, but their significance was largely nullified by the cruel way in which opponents were dealt with – interrogation, detention and the rigorous application of *shari'a*. The civil war in southern Sudan caused immense suffering, while compulsory conscription into the army was resented and added to opposition to the regime in the northern heartland. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) was subject to bitter division, and a state of emergency was imposed in 1999; Egypt, Libya and Eritrea tried to reconcile the Sudanese government with its opposition groups. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – the leading rebel movement in the south – was itself split into rival factions and this diminished the prospect of resolving the north–south conflict. In consequence, Sudan's international political standing declined. The demands of war, and periodic drought and famine, imposed a constant drain on the economy of a heavily indebted country, which looked for succour to the Islamic Development Bank, the Gulf emirates and UN agencies. The country's economic performance improved somewhat early in the new millennium, though it did not regain access to the financial resources of the IMF.

In *Ethiopia* the authoritarian and paternalist regime of Emperor Haile Selassie failed to carry through the modernising goals on which it had earlier embarked. It was removed in 1974 by a *coup* staged by young army officers who declared a socialist republic under a military co-ordinating committee called the Derg. Lieut.-Colonel Mengistu Haile-Maryam established a system of government characterised by organisation rather than ideology and by continuity as well as change.[41] Far-reaching reform measures included the nationalisation of urban and agricultural land; in the manner of former emperors, the grip of the centre was tightened and state control of the economy extended. Fatefully, Mengistu followed Haile Selassie's policy of denying Eritrea federal status and of making it just another province of Ethiopia; the result was open Eritrean resistance to Ethiopian rule. Eritrea was supported by nearby Muslim countries and was joined in rebellion by

Tigre and other parts of Ethiopia. In retrospect, it is clear that it was the formation in 1989 of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of ethnic-based Tigrean, Amharic and Oromo liberation movements and other ethnic groups – which presaged the downfall of the Mengistu regime in May 1991. Besides this Eritrean-centred revolt, there was widespread resistance to the programme of land reform, which entailed establishing producer co-operatives in preference to individual peasant farms, despite the latter's better production record. In consequence, even with food and medical aid from the West, the government had difficulty in coping with the repeated droughts, famines and epidemics afflicting parts of what was one of the poorest countries in Africa.

Linking up with the Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the EPRDF inflicted a string of defeats on the demoralised Ethiopian conscript army in the early months of 1991 and formed a caretaker administration. Its leaders accepted the formation by the EPLF of a separate interim government in Eritrea. Western aid now mattered more than a commitment to Marxism–Leninism: Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Issaias Aferwerki of Eritrea claimed to be committed to democracy. In December 1994 a Constituent Assembly, elected on a multi-party basis, adopted a new constitution for Ethiopia establishing ethnic federalism: the country was divided into nine micro-states or 'regions', each enjoying considerable autonomy, including the right to secede. In August 1995 Zenawi became prime minister, with extensive powers, of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. His government was accused of human rights abuses – it clamped down on Oromo dissidents and imprisoned many journalists. Economic progress was made but was severely set back in 1998 by a border dispute with Eritrea, which quickly flared into open warfare. A peace agreement in December 2000 brought an end to a pointless war from which neither country had benefited and in which over 70,000 people were estimated to have been killed. Elections to Ethiopia's bicameral legislature were held in May 2000, when the ruling EPRDF coalition won over 80 per cent of the seats in the lower house; Meles Zenawi was formally re-elected prime minister. Eight journalists were still imprisoned at the end of the year and the government was again accused of human rights abuse.

In a referendum held in April 1993 the people of *Eritrea* had voted massively for independence from Ethiopia. Independence was proclaimed the next month and Afewerki became president of a transitional government. A new national constitution, adopted in 1997, formally committed the government to liberal democracy, but this belied the reality: initially at least Eritrea had more of the character of a *de facto* one-party state than a democratic polity (the ruling EPLF was restyled the People's Front for

Democracy and Justice – PFDJ); it had a powerful military and a government intolerant of opposition. The president's power increased enormously and open political activity was denied. Nevertheless Ruth Iyob, writing in 1997, felt able to express 'a cautious optimism about the country's democratic future'.[42] Subsequent events suggested that this optimism was not justified. The good economic progress which the government had been making was completely undone by the war with Ethiopia; hundreds of thousands of people had to leave their homes and farms. Western aid was threatened in 2001 following the government's crackdown on political dissent and a free press; 11 former cabinet ministers and several journalists were detained for 'endangering the country'.[43]

Somalia, Ethiopia's neighbouring state, was a poor and backward country ruled by Siyad Barré and his Supreme Revolutionary Council following a military *coup* in 1969. Bowing to the clamours of an impatient nationalism, the regime sought in 1977 to absorb within the Republic by force the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia; the Ogaden was quickly overrun but was recaptured the next year by re-equipped Ethiopian forces supported by Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers. This costly war crippled the economy, set back Siyad Barré's attempt to create a socialist state, and made Somalia almost as dependent on the USA as it had previously been on the Soviet Union. By the mid-1980s Somalia had become 'a garrison state'.[44] Barré's subsequent measures to liberalise the economy and his commitment to adopt a multi-party system of government came too late to save a regime that was no longer capable of meeting the challenge posed by clan-based, armed opposition movements. The regime collapsed in January 1991 and the President fled the country; his army surrendered to the Isaq-dominated Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north. The hoped-for government of national reconciliation did not emerge and the clan-based factions were left to battle among themselves for power. In May 1991 the SNM leaders of Somalia's (ex-British ruled) northern region declared an independent Somaliland which, despite fierce infighting within the ruling party, survived without however winning formal acceptance by the wider international community – neighbouring Djibouti did recognise the breakaway state in November 1997. In the south of the country neither a US-led multinational task force nor a UN peacekeeping force (withdrawn in 1995) was able to bring a permanent end to inter-clan conflict. However, some success was achieved in August 2000 when a Transitional National Assembly was chosen by a complex clan-based system and Abdiqasim Salad Hasan, who had held senior office under Siyad Barré, was sworn in as president. Ominously, however, faction leaders, 'warlords' and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland boycotted the proceedings.

Analysis

The Pro-Democracy Movement

A combination of internal and external pressures resulted in the holding of multi-party elections in virtually every African state in the 1990s; many of them were 'watershed elections'.[45] Internal pressures were dominant in a number of countries including Zambia, with its volatile urban electorate, and Nigeria, whose intensely politically minded people were impatient to remove the restraints imposed by the long years of military rule. However, external pressures counted for a good deal in poor states such as Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania, which desperately needed external financial help; in Kenya, where human rights abuse stemmed the flow of foreign aid; in the rentier state of Gabon; and in Ghana, where Rawlings' economic strategy was based on World Bank and IMF support. But dual pressures were often very real. Thus in Tanzania in 1992 the government decided not to offend the advocates of change in the towns by retaining – as most people wished – the one-party system which had been introduced by Nyerere in the 1960s. In Ghana the Rawlings' regime sought, by introducing democratic elements into the government structure, to recover the backing of some of the middle-class and professional groups which its earlier populist socialist policies had alienated. And in Mozambique the internal pressure of a war-weary people and the external pressure applied by the UN and Western powers combined to convince Dhlakama and RENAMO to accept defeat in the 1994 presidential and legislative elections and to act as a responsible opposition to the FRELIMO government.

   The leaders of many states were reluctant converts to political pluralism but had to bow to 'citizen power', which was often expressed in noisy and sometimes violent demonstrations, leading – especially in francophone Africa – to the holding of national conferences prior to calling multi-party elections. There was wide variation in the way in which the electoral process itself was conducted. The contrast was sharp between the states of Botswana and Mauritius, which held a series of free and fair elections in the post-independence period, and militarily controlled states such as Eyadéma's Togo and Nguema Mbasoga's Equitorial Guinea, where the elections were fraudulently manipulated. It was to Tanzania's credit that when the conduct of elections was disputed in Dar es Salaam in 1995 and in Zanzibar in both 1995 and 2000, the government ordered the elections to be re-run. As Obote found in Uganda in 1980 the legitimacy of a government which assumed power on the basis of bogus election results was low. From a democratic perspective, the outcome of the elections varied enormously. It was especially

and immediately important in those countries where a change of government resulted. In this respect Benin, Zambia and Cape Verde were the 1991 front-runners. They were followed in 1994 by South Africa, where elections brought an end to nearly 50 years of oppressive *apartheid* rule, and Malawi, where the outcome was the ousting of Banda's dictatorial regime. In 1995 elections in Mauritius once again led to a change of government, while the former military rulers of Benin and Madagascar (the Malagasy Republic) were returned to power in 1996 and 1997, respectively, by electoral means rather than through the barrel of a gun. In 2000 the PS lost office in Senegal when its presidential candidate Abdou Diouf was unexpectedly defeated and in Ghana when Vice-President Mills lost the presidential election to John Kufuor, the NPP candidate. Of these results the return to power by election of former dictators – Kérékou in Benin and Admiral Didier Ratsiraka in Madagascar – was the most surprising. While it was encouraging that they returned to office through the ballot box, it was disturbing from a democratic perspective that voters (especially those in Madagascar) should have restored to power men who had grossly abused their offices the first time round.[46] There was no change of government in Mozambique, but FRELIMO's electoral success led to an accommodation with the RENAMO opposition, thus bringing an end to the long years of civil war.

The pro-democracy movement of the early 1990s took root in one-party states – some *de jure* and others *de facto* – of varying ideological persuasion, without however any change of government immediately taking place in several of them. Of these states some, such as Kenya and Gabon, were ruled by civilians and others, including Ethiopia, Ghana and Guinea, were controlled by the military. The fall from power in 1991 of Mengistu in Ethiopia and Siyad Barré in Somalia bore witness to the strength of the democratic wave sweeping across Africa. So, too, did events in the tiny state of Swaziland in southern Africa where in July 1996 King Mswati III yielded to trade union and South African (especially ANC) pressure and appointed a committee to draw up a new constitution, thereby holding out the promise of moderate reform – hitherto political parties had been legally banned and press freedom was restricted. However, success for the advocates of democratisation was not guaranteed: the wily and discredited Mobutu managed to cling to power in Zaire, as did (for example) Presidents Eyadéma in Togo, Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso, Omar Bongo in Gabon, Paul Biya in Cameroon, and Idriss Déby in Chad. A near universal outcome of the 1990s' experience was that the one-party state, which, as in Tanzania, had sometimes been characterised by intra-party competitive elections, was replaced by the dominant party-state – the pattern of government established after independence in Botswana where, however, no

restrictions were placed on the BNF and other opposition parties to challenge the BDP's monopoly of power. In most states the incumbent government consolidated its power in a manner considerably less liberal than Botswana. Presidentialism – 'the divine right of presidents', as one Zambian minister in Kaunda's government had called it – remained a feature of most African states. Thus Chiluba, Kaunda's well-intentioned successor in 1991, became increasingly authoritarian in the face of mounting economic difficulties and splits within his ruling coalition, creating a situation in which presidential initiatives were not subjected to the rigorous and critical scrutiny which they often deserved. Presidentialism was certainly a curse in states with paranoid and self-seeking rulers, who were more interested in their own lust for power than the welfare of their subjects – a category to which Mobutu and more recently Mugabe belonged.

But the explanation for the disappointing democratic progress made since the early 1990s includes, but goes well beyond, the ambitions of the ruling elites and the atrophy of the parties which they led. Among other explanations are the reduced activity in many states of the trade unionists, students and church leaders who, in the late 1980s and the early years of the next decade, played such an important part in the pro-democracy movements. Account should also be taken of splits within the opposition, sometimes on regional and ethnic lines, as in Kenya and Malawi; the threat posed to state stability by Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, other parts of Muslim North Africa and the Sudan, and more recently in northern Nigeria; and the inability of weak parliaments, a press inexperienced in financial matters, ombudsmen and other regulatory bodies, and sometimes the judiciary to check the executive and hold it responsible to the people.

Nevertheless, it is pleasing that the great majority of rulers now respect the commitment to hold fresh elections, normally after a four- or five-year period, as stipulated in state constitutions. To this extent, Pinkney is probably right to say that 'The new democratic structures may work imperfectly, but it might be difficult to abandon them even if the rulers wanted to.'[47] The prospect of new elections is important because it gives the opposition parties an opportunity to mount a stronger challenge – always provided that they can overcome their internal divisions which have reduced their effectiveness, as in Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Tunisia. Of course, the ruling party might achieve success in any case because its access to public resources and its monopoly of the media are a considerable electoral advantage. Certainly, the holding of multi-party elections is not by itself enough to secure the firm establishment of the democratic process – military and other authoritarian governments have frequently sought to legitimise their rule through the ballot box. In most African states, there is in fact a fine line

between democracy and authoritarianism; they are not so much alternatives as uncomfortable bed-fellows. In saying, however, that democracy and authoritarianism are inextricably mixed in several countries, it must be recognised that the spectrum is broad, ranging from the token democracy of Eyadéma's Togo to the democratic reality of Mauritius, where successive governments have accepted defeat at the hands of the electorate.

Sadly, there are many states where the pro-democracy movement has brought few, if any, tangible benefits to their people. Indeed, some of the political events which occurred have been very disturbing. Conditions of civil war and/or violence prevailed in the 1990s and often beyond in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Mozambique (until 1994), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan; several of these states became, or were in danger of becoming, broken-backed, while a country such as the DRC was rendered virtually ungovernable. Conditions were somewhat better in Congo-Brazzaville but there, too, civil war raged for four months in 1997 and was followed by fighting between rival militias. In situations like these, the people were uprooted from their homes, sought refuge abroad, trod on land mines as they went to work on their farms, and suffered from poverty, hunger and disease. Yet scarce resources continued to be spent on arms and ammunition, and the elite managed to maintain the affluent lifestyle to which they had grown accustomed. The military took over in the Gambia and the Côte d'Ivoire, hitherto widely regarded as bastions of democracy; there was conflict between the supporters of the ANC and the IFP in South Africa's KwaZulu-Natal province; and many states were subject to corruption, electoral fraud, manipulation of the domestic political situation, rising crime levels, and human rights abuse.

Happily, it is possible to find encouraging signs in what is, from a democratic point of view, a dismal picture over a large part of the continent. Besides multi-partyism and competitive elections, several states tried (with varying success) to uphold other essential elements of 'good governance', such as freedom of speech and association, the rule of law, the right of the press and media to criticise the government and, by means of a strengthened parliament and ombudsmen, to render it accountable. In Ghana, it was to Jerry Rawlings' credit that he did not try to have the constitution amended to enable him to stay in office for a further five years, but stepped down voluntarily after nearly 20 years in power, during the last three-quarters of which the economy had grown by 4–5 per cent yearly. In Zambia, too, Chiluba was persuaded not to try and extend his tenure of the presidency beyond the constitutional limit of two five-year terms. Though military *coups* occurred in both the Gambia (in 1994) and the Côte d'Ivoire (in 1999), a civilian government was quickly restored in the Côte d'Ivoire,

while Captain Jammeh and his party were returned to office in multi-party elections held in the Gambia just over two years after the military takeover. The death of 13 young demonstrators in anti-government riots in Banjul, the Gambian capital, in April 2000 did not deter the opposition parties and the independent press from condemning the regime's heavy-handed response and from vigorously defending civil liberties and political rights; Jammeh ordered a week of national mourning following the deaths.

While multi-party elections do not necessarily lead to good government, that they were held at all was in most states an important advance on the previous decade (though not of course where they were blatantly rigged in favour of the incumbent elite, as in Togo in the presidential election of 1998). Take Zimbabwe. Mugabe's attempt in 2000 to establish a multi-party dictatorship was checked by the voting public who resisted threats, intimidation and sometimes violence to turn out in large numbers, especially in the urban centres and throughout Matabeleland, to support Tsvangirai and the MDC. Judges and journalists braved the wrath of a repressive regime in defending the rule of law and the freedom of the press. The opposition, voters, human rights activists and a number of journalists showed the same dedication and courage in the 2002 presidential election. In Morocco articles appeared in three magazines in late 2000 exposing alleged drug smuggling and political scandals; that the magazines were closed down was less significant than that the accusations were made at all – they involved senior political and judicial figures. Greater press freedom was secured in several states in the 1990s, including Gabon, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia. In Ghana many opposition newspapers resurfaced and dozens of FM radio stations appeared; the country also revived its strong parliamentary tradition. Critical outspokenness had always been a feature of Nigeria's vibrant political life, even during the darkest days of military rule; as we saw earlier, in 1995 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other fellow Ogoni gave their lives to prevent a powerful oil company from doing further environmental damage to their homeland. Lesotho in southern Africa was one of several states trying to stamp out corruption: what was unique was this small state's decision to charge multinational engineering companies with bribing a state official in order to secure the contract for a large dam project.[48]

'The most frequently cited preconditions' for democratic success are, to quote Richard Sandbrook, 'a history of protodemocratic institutions, competitive capitalism and a small public sector, industrialization, high literacy levels, and the emergence of a relatively strong middle class or bourgeoisie.'[49] Writing in 1988, he went on to point out that despite the lack of most of these preconditions (though capitalism and privatisation have subsequently increased in Africa and the urban middle class has grown

stronger), liberal democracy persisted in India for more than 40 years (with the notable exception of the emergency period in the 1970s) and also in Botswana, though for a shorter period. It is important to recall the achievements of Botswana, the Gambia (from 1965 to the military *coup* in July 1994), Senegal, Mozambique, Mali and especially Mauritius – an ACP–EU 'showcase', which enjoyed 'dynamic economic growth'[50] – even if (like Sandbrook) one categorises them as 'semi-democracies' or 'protodemocracies', because they show that *Africans do have the capacity for democratic government*. The task – no easy one – is to identify what has gone wrong in Africa and why.

I believe that a country's democratic record, or lack of it, depends on a variety of factors, including its pre-colonial history and traditions, its colonial experience and political culture, the quality of its post-independence leadership and its economic record. Take Botswana, for example. Its democracy owes a good deal to the Tswana tradition of free speech permissible in the *kgotla* – a place where the community meets with the chief to discuss openly issues of common interest – and to the persistence of patron–client ties, as well as to more modern elements of the democratic model. Among these were the practice of open and accountable government introduced by Sir Seretse Khama, the country's first president, and carried on by his successors; cabinet decision-making in most matters, with the bureaucrats (including a generous sprinkling of expatriates) carrying considerable weight on economic and technical issues; an independent judiciary; a multi-party system; and (despite opposition party criticism) substantially free and fair elections at both national and local levels. Yet, on the negative side, Botswana's colonial experience (as the High Commission territory of Bechuanaland) was far from democratic and was inferior to that of Senegal and Ghana, which also exhibited certain liberal elements. It was also a poorer country at independence than either of these two West African states; its early experience (before the Jwaneng diamond mine came into production and raised Botswana to the level of a middle-income economy) and the more recent experience of Mali and Mozambique suggest that, given good economic management, even poor countries can aspire to democracy in some measure.

The point being made is that the prospect of democracy taking root in Africa is as varied as the historical experience of its many states. With few exceptions (of which Ghana was one) the outlook for democracy at independence was poor. The constraints on 'good government' – meaning especially freedom of speech and association, a multi-party system, and the rule of law – were numerous. They included the difficulty of transferring such traditional democratic practices as existed at the local level to the national

arena; the authoritarian and bureaucratic nature of colonial rule; the lack of experience of African leaders in working a responsible and accountable national political system; the weak institutional legacy of parliaments, parties and public services; inadequate educational provision and high levels of illiteracy; ill-defined state boundaries; and often acute ethnic rivalries. In the subsequent period, many of these problems were overcome, but some persisted, such as underlying communal conflicts which multi-party competition might inflame. Other problems were added. Of the latter, perhaps the most serious stemmed from the failure of nearly all African governments to achieve economic growth and to share out equitably the benefits of such growth as was achieved: the urban elite benefited, but the urban proletariat and peasant farming community were left disadvantaged. Economic failure weakened the prospect of establishing and maintaining a viable democratic system of government, and had serious social and political repercussions: for example, it caused a rise in unemployment and a decline in the provision of social services, and resulted in increased levels of crime.

The late (and sadly missed) John Wiseman wrote perceptively about democracy in Black Africa, though I believe that he was too optimistic in assessing Africa's democratic prospects. He was right to suggest that Africa's objective circumstances do not exclude democracy, even though they are, in my view, generally unfavourable to its early achievement and continuance. Elements of democracy *can* exist in Africa and the demonstrated ability of Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia to change government peacefully through multi-party elections – a feat achieved in sub-Saharan Africa only by Mauritius in the past – is very encouraging. Nevertheless, it will be an uphill task to establish and/or maintain democratic systems which enable such changes of government to take place in a constitutional manner. The prospects of stable, democratic transition are particularly poor where the attempt to solve the problems which arise within and between states leads to armed conflict and violence rather than to negotiation and where, as in Ethiopia, there is a tradition of centralised, authoritarian government co-existing with an ethnic framework. Democratic prospects are certainly reduced in states such as Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC which, like Ethiopia, suffer from acute ethnic divisions; in a state like Sudan, where there are in addition religious differences and the rigour of Islamic law is applied; and in Somalia, which is torn apart by inter-clan rivalry. The position is worse where such divisions are linked to perceived economic and social deprivation. On the other hand, the prospects are correspondingly increased where, as in Tswana-speaking Botswana, Akan-speaking Ghana and Swahili-speaking Tanzania, there is substantial cultural homogeneity among the people.

The Economy

It can be confidently asserted that a sound economy from which all citizens reap benefit is more conducive to democratic progress than a weak one. Table 1.1 – *Basic Indicators* (p. 2) – gives data for 53 North African and sub-Saharan African states; it includes figures for the gross domestic product (GDP) *per capita*, which are calculated from national data. The table shows that several states have sound economies, among them the mineral-rich states of Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Namibia. However, as the GDP column reveals, percentage growth rates have with one exception been modest, reflecting in Botswana's case a decline in the price of diamonds in the 1990s. The exception is Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony small both in area and population and with a nominal multi-party system, but ruled in fact by a brutal autocratic regime sitting astride huge oil wealth – when oil first started flowing in 1997, GDP rose by 102 per cent.[51] Guinea and Namibia, each of which has recorded steady economic growth, are sustained by their mineral exports. The small island states of Cape Verde, Mauritius and Seychelles are shown to have good economic records: Cape Verde has benefited from a long period of political stability and good economic management; Mauritius has prospered in agriculture and business; and Seychelles has a thriving tourist industry. In the post-1990 period the GDP growth rates of South Africa and oil-rich Nigeria have been quite low (1.6 per cent and 2.7 per cent, respectively), reflecting the heavy call on their considerable resources made by their large populations. Eight countries have negative percentage growth rates, with the war-torn DRC and Sierra Leone having the worst records. The other six are Angola (its economy kept afloat by mineral revenue) and Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, the Republic of Congo and Rwanda; no figures are available for the troubled state of Liberia. The rates for the relatively poor states of Benin (4.6 per cent), Burkina Faso (3.6), Eritrea (5.0), Ethiopia (4.1), Mozambique (5.5) and Uganda (7.1) give an encouraging picture of their performance. In North Africa, both Egypt and Tunisia achieve good GDP scores, while Algeria, with its internal security problems, and Morocco earn a lower rating; economic data for Libya are not provided.

The GDP figures do less than justice to the achievements of a few states; Tanzania, for example, is one of them – its performance in recent years was described as 'impressive' by the World Bank's country director. This underlines the importance of taking account of the bases against which assessment is made. Obviously, any comparison based solely on GDP growth rates between an oil-rich state such as Gabon and a poor agriculture-dependent state such as Mali must take account of various factors – internal as well as

external – over which they have little control and which affect their rating. Among them are the extent to which a country is affected by natural disasters such as drought, famine and flooding; the possession or non-possession of minerals such as oil, copper and diamonds; and the price that a country's exports – whether minerals or cash-crops such as cocoa and coffee – realise on the world market; and the cost of essential imports. Prices and costs vary considerably over the course of a decade, as Ghana's recent experience reveals.

In the 1990s Ghana had a stable political system with some democratic features and a reasonably healthy economy. Yet in the first year of the new millennium it was reeling under triple commodity shocks: the price of cocoa, its main export, had fallen by nearly half over the preceding two years; the price of gold, on whose export it also depended, remained low; and the cost of the oil which it needed to import had almost doubled. Here was an obvious case of a country locked into a global economy over which it had no control. No doubt some blame lay with the Ghanaian government for not diversifying the economy and for adopting policies that had failed to attract external investment. But in the main these policies were based on the advice of the World Bank – indeed, Ghana was long regarded as one of its star pupils. It had followed the Bank's advice in pursuing an open market policy from the mid-1980s; economic growth had been achieved, but the ordinary people had not benefited – for example, from the flood of cheap imports with which Ghanaian business was not strong enough to compete.

Tanzania suffered in turn when the price of sisal and cloves (on which Zanzibar depended) fell sharply on the world market; so, too, did Zambia when the price of copper, its principal export, collapsed. All countries were adversely affected by variation in the price of oil, even including Gabon and Nigeria which produced it. The experience of the 1970s and 1980s was to an extent replicated in the new millennium when the price of crude oil jumped to US$34, fell back to about $24, and then plummeted to $17; however, the price increased as production was cut back.

I noted earlier that the concentration on cash-crop production in order to earn foreign exchange meant that the output of food from the mid-1970s onwards did not keep pace with the rise in population, especially the urban population. Experiments with capital-intensive farming, as in Zambia, did not provide a solution to this problem. African governments, anxious to end their dependence on primary produce, therefore sought to diversify their economies, with industrialisation as a favoured strategy. Since private entrepreneurs with risk capital were scarce, the state itself in many instances took the initiative to establish new manufacturing industries, vesting responsibility for managing them in parastatal organisations. The high cost structure of these industries and often poor management meant that the

goods produced were not competitive on the world market; within Africa, only Zimbabwe among African states south of the Sahara could come anywhere near matching the goods made in South Africa, either in quality or price. Under pressure from the multilateral financial institutions and Western donors, divestiture therefore became a favoured economic strategy, especially from the second half of the 1980s (see Chapter 6).

It made political good sense for an African government, which was anxious to secure re-election in a multi-party election, to provide a good range of health, educational and other services. Table 1.1 shows that in 1998 the inhabitants of only five countries had a life expectancy at birth of 70 years or over: these were the North African states of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia and the island states of Mauritius and Seychelles; for seven others, including South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Cape Verde, the expectancy was 60 years or over; it was 50 years or over in 20 other states and dropped to below 50 for the rest – to 44 in Burkina Faso, Guinea–Bissau and the Central African Republic, 43 in Ethiopia and Zambia, 42 in Burundi, Malawi and Uganda, 41 in Rwanda and 37 in Sierra Leone. Obviously, a variety or combination of circumstances explained these figures, including poverty and malnutrition, the quality of health care, the incidence of AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and war and conflict. Further reference is made below to the sort of problems that Zambia and Malawi had to face.

Most states invested heavily in primary education (see Table 1.1) and none more so in 1994–7 than Gabon (the front-runner), Cape Verde, Malawi, South Africa and Namibia. Botswana, the Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland invested substantially in both primary and secondary education during this period, as did also the North African states of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia.

Social service programmes were expensive and were a heavy drain on national budgets. As well as calling for a reduction in defence costs, the IMF – sometimes oblivious, it seemed, to the political consequences that might follow – insisted on the removal of food subsidies and on curtailing social services. African governments, strapped for finance, mostly felt obliged to respond. But anxious as they were to maintain the range and level of services which they had earlier provided, they had great difficulty in doing so and at the same time servicing their heavy debts. Without debt relief, the service sector of the economy inevitably declined. Zambia was one of many African countries which, even after debt relief, would still be spending more each year on debt servicing than on health – yet it was faced with a devastating AIDS epidemic (one in five of the adult population was HIV-positive). Table 8.1 provides data on six African countries; it shows that over a three-year period average annual debt payments exceeded the amounts

Table 8.1   **Indebtedness of Selected African Countries, December 2000***

	Mauritania	*Nigeria*	*Senegal*	*Tanzania*	*Uganda*	*Zambia*
Total debts US$	857 m	31 bn	3.2 bn	3.7 bn	1.5 bn	3.6 bn
Annual payments						
Debt US$	62 m**	1.5 bn	149 m**	145 m**	58 m**	222 m**
Health US$	19 m	100 m	24 m	56 m	102 m	123 m
Primary Education US$	30 m	400 m (education)	55 m	80 m	208 m	95 m

Notes
* Nigeria is not eligible for poor country debt relief.
** Average payment over three years.
Sources: UNDP, IMF/World Bank, UK Government.

spent each year on health and education combined in three of the six states and were only marginally less in Zambia. The cumulative effect of all categories of debt was devastating for poor African states, including Benin, Burundi and Mozambique, irrespective of their ideological orientation. World Bank figures for 1998 put the total external debt *per capita* for Africa south of the Sahara at US$367, for North Africa at $734 and for All Africa at $429.

Since the price of export crops continued to fall relative to the cost of imports, these debts could in no way be repaid, thus reinforcing the case for large-scale debt remission. Several African countries experienced negative growth rates. Even oil-producing countries could no longer meet their obligations because of the prevailing low price of oil. In these circumstances, it was essential that something should be done to lift this burden of debt which bore especially heavily on some of the world's poorest countries. Jubilee 2000, an organisation to fight for debt relief, responded to this challenge. What by the mid-1990s had become an international movement had humble origins: it was founded in 1990 at the University of Keele by Martin Dent, a senior lecturer in politics, following discussions with a group of students interested in finding ways of helping poorer countries. Dent was joined in his pioneering work by Bill Peters who, after retiring from the British diplomatic service in 1983, had begun to campaign for the cancellation of unrepayable debt. Without any public financial support, Dent and Peters carried the campaign to decision-makers, church activists, trade unionists, and members of community organisations both at home and abroad.[52] They laid the firm foundations on which Ann Pettifor, Director of the Jubilee 2000 Coalition, and her small London-based team built successfully over a three-year period on a £3 million budget. Other agencies involved in the campaign for debt relief included CAFOD, Save the Children, Christian Aid and Oxfam.

By the time that Jubilee 2000 was founded, it had become clear that to recover creditworthiness the poorest African and other Third World countries needed debt relief rather than the rescheduling of their debts; indeed, Dent urged that the debt slate should be wiped clean and without conditions to enable the poorest countries make a new beginning. Under first the 'Toronto' terms (1988–91), then the 'Trinidad' terms (from December 1991) and the full 'Trinidad' terms (December 1994) the Paris Club of creditor countries applied progressively improved terms of debt relief for the benefit of 20 impoverished and indebted Third World countries. Eligibility was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, with indebtedness, poverty and a commitment to economic reform being considered the key factors. Despite these advances, the main burden of debt remained in the mid-1990s and few countries were actually benefiting from the relief promised – Uganda and Mozambique were the earliest qualifiers. African countries still owed some US$200 billion, roughly in the proportion of 50 per cent bilateral debt and 50 per cent multilateral debt (some states – Nigeria, for example, had also incurred commercial debts). Writing in The *Guardian* of 10 June 1996, Kevin Watkins of Oxfam pointed out that:

> Every year Africa transfers to its creditors – principally northern governments, the World Bank and the IMF – around $10 billion (£6.5 billion): more than the region spends on health and education combined … for every dollar on health, the Ugandan government spends five on debt repayment … Zambia is spending ten times more on repaying the IMF than on primary education.

Progress in providing debt relief was slow, with the IMF particularly dragging its feet. A major breakthrough came in 1999 with the introduction of a World Bank plan called the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative which sought to eliminate debt as an obstacle to poverty reduction. Forty-one countries stood to benefit from this initiative and of this number 20 were expected to benefit at an early date through the provision of nearly US$50 billion of debt relief; with other forms of debt relief, the effect would be to slash the total debt of these countries by more than two-thirds. Since the Jubilee 2000 campaign officially ended on 31 December 2000, the World Bank and IMF speeded up the HIPC programme so that as many countries as possible would start receiving debt relief before the year ended. By mid-December 13 countries which had adopted a clear poverty reduction strategy had their debt relief plans agreed; of the 13, ten were in Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

Jubilee 2000's achievement was therefore very considerable. However, much remained to be done in the new millennium to ease the burden on

HIPCs, which it was calculated would still be paying US$2 billion a year to foreign creditors. The prospect was daunting for a country such as Zambia: the people's living standard had dropped by 30 per cent over the past three decades and more than 80 per cent of them were reported to be living below the World Bank's poverty threshold of US$1 per day. Even after debt relief, Zambia would still be paying $168 million a year to its creditors out of a total budget of some $800 million. Though hard-hit by a devastating AIDS epidemic, it could afford to spend less than $3 million on health care. So long as many African governments still have to spend nearly three times more money servicing their debt than on health services, the struggle to win a new deal on Third World debt will continue; an organisation styled 'Drop the Debt' emerged as the short-term successor to Jubilee 2000. It was followed by the Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC), of which Martin Dent and Bill Peters were members, and Ann Pettifor's Jubilee Plus. Their efforts resulted in the increase to 23 in the number of HIPCs which had qualified for debt relief by October 2001. To qualify, HIPCs had to accept the IMF's poverty reduction growth facility (PRGF), the successor to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs); this entailed investing in health, education and other sectors that would directly benefit poor people. It was, however, one thing to qualify and another to receive the full benefit of the relief promised – relief provision tended to be a slow process. According to the JDC, unpayable debt owed by poor countries to the developed world totalled some US$30 billion (including IMF and World Bank loans, which accounted for over 40 per cent), but at the end of the year just US$18 billion of debt had been cancelled and only four countries had benefited – Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda in Africa and Bolivia in Latin America.[53] Martin Dent argued that it was not enough to provide relief for only unsustainable debt since for a very poor country no debt was sustainable. He urged, too, that a country like Nigeria should qualify for debt relief. For the time being at least, Nigeria was ineligible for relief under the HIPC initiative because it was judged sufficiently creditworthy by the World Bank to obtain credit on more commercial terms and also because its debt ratios fell below the HIPC threshold. Though denied formal classification, Nigeria and other states similarly placed could negotiate for HIPC-type treatment.

Despite significant advances in debt relief, some countries seemed to be getting poorer and poorer, with little hope of early change for the better. The plight of a poor country such as Malawi, whose main export crops (tea and tobacco) fell on the world market, was compounded by the reduced value of its currency – in little over a year the kwacha slid downwards against the US dollar from 43 to 80 kwacha, thus almost doubling the interest payments on the country's international debts; these payments became

one-and-half-times greater than the national health budget. An example such as this, which could be replicated many times over, served to expose the weakness of Third World states within a complex global economic system. The latter was dominated by powerful economic and financial interests, some of which had scant regard for human development. Important though it certainly was, debt relief did not obviate the need (demonstrated above) for increased market access at fair and stable prices for Third World country produce and for development assistance.

Concern that aid was being misused and was not reaching the people who needed it most perhaps accounted for the waning of enthusiasm for aid in many developed states, including Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, though all these states (with Denmark) had been front-runners in this field in the mid-1980s. The altruistic motives of these states in the two preceding decades were to a large extent subsequently replaced by commercial and political considerations. Aid budgets came under increasing pressure, though the percentage of GNP which went to development aid in the 1980–6 period (around 0.5 per cent in Canada and Australia and between 0.8 and 1.10 per cent in the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) was still considerably higher than in Britain and the USA.[54] The record of the Scandanavian countries (including Denmark) and the Netherlands remained good in 1998, but that of Canada and Australia declined, while the USA continued to marginalise foreign aid. The percentage GNP figures for selected Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 1998 were: Denmark 0.99, Norway 0.91, The Netherlands 0.80, Sweden 0.71, France 0.41, Canada 0.29, Australia 0.28, Japan 0.28, UK 0.27, Germany 0.26, USA 0.10. Thus, only four OECD countries achieved the UN aid target of 0.70 percentage of GNP.[55] Gorm Olsen has produced evidence to show that issues relating to ecology, human rights and corruption were not sacrosanct for the EU and its members.[56] In Nigeria the Abacha regime came in for heavy criticism for abusing power, but Shell's right to exploit its substantial and – as far as the ecology was concerned – damaging investments was not questioned. European policies towards South Africa, Kenya, Niger and Algeria were all influenced by security considerations and by narrow national interests. This was especially true of France, whose lead helped to shape European development policy, and least true of the Scandinavian countries, though even the latter tried to ensure that an increased amount of untied aid was spent on goods and services which they provided.

Attitudes to Kenya were subject to change. In the 1980s when the USA and the Soviet Union backed different sides in the Ethiopian/Somali conflict in the Horn and control of the Indian Ocean was important for both

super-powers, Kenya's pivotal position enabled its government to pay lip service to Western demands for political reform. This no longer applied in the early 1990s: the EU and its member states did not have any important economic and security interests at stake in the area and, with the Scandinavian countries taking the lead, reacted to Daniel arap Moi's poor democratic record by channelling smaller amounts of aid to Kenya – mainly through NGOs – than they had done in the previous decade. In Kenya's case the European powers combined national interest with the application of moral sanctions.

In relation to minority-ruled South Africa in the early 1990s democratic and human rights issues continued to be of concern to the international community, though the stance of several European governments was some-what equivocal. However, the emphasis shifted following Nelson Mandela's assumption of power in 1994. Thereafter, the EU no longer felt the need to co-operate solely with the country's NGOs but sought to work also with the state apparatus. By and large, its policies were shaped by security considerations and trading interests.

France resumed bilateral co-operation with Niger following the January 1996 military *coup* and continued to give assistance to this West African state despite the badly flawed presidential election the following July and criticism of its stand by EU partners, notably Germany and Denmark. The EU equivocated but eventually followed the lead of France, which depended on Niger (and Gabon) for uranium. Olsen notes that aid from the EU and its member-states counted for approximately 70 per cent of the total aid to Niger in 1995. French policies were again paramount in shaping EU policies towards Algeria, the issues at stake being the dual threats posed by terrorist activity in the country and immigration into Europe. Instead of standing up for its declared policies on democracy and human rights, the EU elected to focus on security issues; in doing so, it deprived itself of any means of influencing events in Algeria.

The outbreak of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the civil war in Zaire/DRC, leading to the intervention for and against Laurent Kabila of five African states (the number rose to seven at one stage), reinforced the EU's concern with security. At the same time, France's conduct in Central Africa (discussed in Chapter 7) diminished its standing as European leader in devel-opment matters. While there is a sincere desire on the European side to put an end to fighting and the atrocities perpetrated against defenceless refugees, the themes of democracy and human rights have sometimes been in danger of becoming 'little more than the rhetoric of politicians and treaties'.[57]

Following the shock events of 11 September, there is some hope that Western countries will no longer allow their national economic interests to

override the economic interests of the Third World. Gordon Brown, Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer who is chair of the IMF's international monetary and financial committee, has given the lead by urging western countries to double aid budgets to $100 billion (£70 billion) a year in order to meet internationally agreed targets for halving global poverty by 2015. He promised to increase Britain's own aid budget accordingly over the next three-year programme of public spending, starting in 2003.

Some years earlier, Western governments had debated what form assistance should take, who should be the recipients, and under what circumstances aid should be withdrawn. At the prompting of the Swedish government, the Nordic Africa Institute and the African Development Bank arranged for a two-day seminar to be held in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in January 1997 in order to identify the main elements in a new partnership for African development that would 'move away from the format and language of structural adjustment'.[58] Some contributors argued that a relationship between equals could emerge – eventually – only if African states became less dependent on aid and more self-reliant by attracting international private capital investment and achieving high rates of economic growth. Others pointed to Africa's declining share of world trade, investment, information technology and production and therefore to the continent's marginalisation in the global economy. They questioned whether an equal partnership was possible in any strict sense, maintaining that the new relationship must be based on democratic principles that permitted greater participation rather than on economic self-reliance. There was a plea for capacity building in economic and financial management and civil service reforms. Most of the conference papers, however, gave insufficient attention to building the institutional structure that the market economy required and to strengthening the state apparatus. Happily, the importance of this was recognised by the World Bank in its 1997 *World Development Report*. However, until appropriate action is taken a fundamental problem facing Zambia and many other African states will be that the state institutional framework, though formally adequate, will be too weak to sustain a market economy approach.

Corruption remains a major problem in Nigeria and many other African states, though part of the blame lies with the European companies which offer bribes to secure overseas contracts. The problem is being addressed by African governments under pressure from the international financial institutions and Western donors. Progress is slow. Le Vine's proposition that 'the more democracy, the less corruption' has so far proved untenable, though a significant increase in government accountability should help. The problem appears to Morris Szeftel to be intractable unless its root causes are addressed. The fact that constitutional change in Zambia over a period

of some 40 years has not put an end to factional conflict and the corruption associated with it has convinced him that, though institutional change is both important and necessary, the way to deal with the problem of corruption is to root out 'the underlying political imperatives that drive the process, namely the use of clientelism for purposes of class formation and factional rewards'. There is, he argues, 'a need to develop strategies that uncouple private accumulation from access to public office'; corruption must not be treated 'in isolation from – and even as independent of – the structures and forces in which it is embedded'.[59] It cannot be eradicated by using the institutions of the market and liberal democracy but by tackling 'the structural forces which give rise to it'.[60]

* * *

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Western governments sought to deny African states the freedom to choose the political and economic systems which their leaders believed would best suit their countries' individual circumstances and needs. The World Bank, IMF and other aid agencies were already prescribing the conditions under which development assistance would be given. These attempts to force the pace of reform and to lay down the hallmarks of good government ('pluralist democracy', 'sound economic and social policies', etc.) entailed a clear danger that they would prove counter-productive and would end up undermining what was bound to be a difficult and protracted process of political and economic liberalisation. To most African leaders they smacked of neo-colonialism and were bitterly resented. In some respects, they were also unrealistic. Thus, for a government to be told that it must eliminate food subsidies and reduce the level of essential social services possibly made good economic sense, but could be very damaging politically when carried out. Again, to press for the early adoption of a market economy through privatisation measures before building up the institutional structure that the market economy required was to put the cart before the horse. Several state presidents – including Nyerere, who in the early 1980s refused to apply the IMF's and World Bank's reforms to Tanzania – themselves recognised the need to redefine the state's role in the economy and were working towards that end.

Some Western governments drew back and admitted that they did not have the *right* to impose a particular form of government and economic system on 'sovereign' African states. Yet underlying statements that 'good government' required pluralistic decision-making, the introduction of market forces and a strong private sector was an assumption that democracy required some form of capitalism – an assumption that came to be accepted in the 1990s by some of Africa's erstwhile socialist states, including Guinea and Mozambique.

The World Bank and the IMF, the pace-setters in providing development assistance, also changed their stand during the decade as it became increasingly clear that the poorest and most disadvantaged members of African society had received scant benefits from their policies. The focus therefore shifted more and more to poverty alleviation. Given Africa's marginalisation in the global economy, external assistance to Africa has never been more urgent. The danger is of course that continuing war and conflict in countries such as Angola, the DRC and Somalia, coupled with reports of the cruelty to which they give rise (projected by television into every Western sitting room) and the well-publicised actions of a few paranoid leaders, will lead donors to question whether they can justify the provision of further large-scale aid to their electorates. Against that, there is some hope that they will recognise that such assistance, and fair and stable prices for their produce in European markets, will enable African states to do much more to help themselves – to attract investment, improve economic and financial management, undertake public sector reform, and create political systems which are responsive to the needs and wishes of the ordinary people. A number of states, including such poor countries as Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania, have already taken up this challenge, while countries ranging in size and/or population from Nigeria and South Africa to Botswana and Mauritius have demonstrated that the democratic spirit is still very much alive. But democracy in Africa is a tender plant in need of constant and careful nurturing.

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9

Regional Groupings and the Organisation of African Unity

Following independence most African states had closer ties, especially in the economic field, with outside states than they had with each other, and foreign powers thus exercised considerable leverage within the continent. This applied especially to the former colonial powers since the 'mother country' was normally the new state's principal trading partner; economic, financial and cultural links between France and its former colonies (except Guinea) were particularly close. To President Nkrumah of Ghana the relationship smacked of neo-colonialism: he charged the metropolitan powers with granting formal political independence while still retaining economic control over their fledgelings. He believed that a united Africa, subject to a single government, was the only effective way of terminating this relationship, as well as of ending racist minority rule in Africa. In his view, regional blocs were incompatible with African unity: they not only impeded its achievement, but would sap its strength once it had been achieved.[1] The OAU, established in 1963, owed much to Nkrumah's statesmanship, but fell well short of his vision. Moreover, regional groupings, more often in the form of functional rather than political unions, continued to proliferate.

Regional Political Unions

Many attempts were made both before and after 1963 to establish such unions. This was understandable on several grounds. First, they were a possible means of reducing tensions between states divided by artificial, mostly colonially imposed boundaries: examples of the latter were the border which

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separated the Ewe-speaking people of Ghana's Trans-Volta Region from their kinsmen in neighbouring Togo, and Somalia's borders with Kenya and Ethiopia, where many ethnic Somalis traditionally resided. A second argument was that the large state could both surmount local crises better than the small one and more easily pursue a policy of non-alignment; union would therefore promote political stability. In the third place, supra-state unity was 'an historic value of the African nationalist movement'.[2] African leaders favoured African unity in principle, without necessarily agreeing on how closely united they should be and what forms their unity should take.

Many attempts were made, both before and after the establishment of the OAU in 1963, to form regional political unions. The successful cases can be counted on one hand: the union of Ghana and British Togoland in 1957, Italian and British Somaliland in 1960 (but now at an end), Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroon in 1961, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964. It is an interesting fact that in each case one or both of the states coming together was formerly a UN trusteeship territory and a significant fact that, with the single exception of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, every union to survive took place before the independence of one or more of the states concerned. (Southern Cameroons, which Britain had administered as part of Nigeria, continued under UN trusteeship following Nigeria's attainment of independence in October 1960 and pending the holding of a plebiscite in February 1961.) If the 1981 confederal arrangement between Senegal and the Gambia had survived (it collapsed in 1989), the case of Senegambia would have proved an exception on both counts since each state was independent at the time of union and neither was ever under UN tutelage. On these grounds, and because the union broke the linguistic barrier by linking together an independent French-speaking state and an independent English-speaking state, it merits our brief consideration.

The creation of Senegambia, which officially came into being as a loose confederation in February 1982, had advantages for both states. It satisfied the Gambia's need for effective protection following the anti-government plot in October 1980 and gave Senegal control of a unified defence and security system which would be ready to deal with any conspiracy that arose between Muslim/ethnic secessionists in its Lower Casamance region and external backers – Algeria was a prime suspect. Potentially, there were economic benefits too. However, the Gambia feared that it would be the loser when its cheap primary products were set against Senegal's costlier manufactured goods. There was little popular support for the confederation in either country – the Senegalese favoured closer political union, while Gambians saw the threat to their sovereignty mirrored in the presence of Senegalese troops on Gambian soil. Mutual recriminations led eventually to

the smooth dissolution of the union in 1989; a 'privileged relationship' was substituted and represented a reshaping rather than a termination of relations between the two countries.[3]

Other failures to achieve lasting political union included the Mali federation, the Ghana–Guinea–Mali union, the East African federation, the Greater Maghreb, and the United Arab Republic. The federal aspect of the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea disappeared in 1962 because of the centralising policies pursued by the imperial government, though technically the 'union' continued to exist until Eritrea achieved formal independence from Ethiopia in May 1993. Key issues in each case were institutional incompatibility and the perception of the incumbent leadership that their political power base was being, or would be, eroded. The latter consideration especially accounted for the break-up in August 1960 of the short-lived Mali federation between the former French West African colonies of Senegal and Soudan[4] and was a critical factor in the failure of the East African countries of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda to federate in 1963.[5]

In April 1964 Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form a United Republic, redesignated the United Republic of Tanzania in 1965. Officially this move was undertaken to cement the close historical and cultural links between the two states, but also – on Tanganyika's side – for reasons of security in the wake of the Tanganyikan army mutiny in January 1964 and communist penetration of Zanzibar by East Germany and China following the Zanzibar revolution earlier in January. However, Sheik Abeid Karume, the President of Zanzibar, was unwilling to forgo the substance of power, and the Zanzibar revolutionary council of some 32 members, which in practice acted as both the islands' executive and legislature, still retained in its own hands control over certain matters – including aspects of defence, the public service, and customs and excise – which were constitutionally reserved to the parliament and executive of the United Republic. It was not until 1977 that the long-awaited merger between the ruling parties of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar took place and the interim constitution of 1965 was replaced by a new constitution for the United Republic; under this Zanzibar, while retaining its separate government, elected representatives to the Union parliament for the first time.[6] In recent years, relations between the two parts of the Union have deteriorated; this became evident in the 1995 and 2000 elections. On the one hand, leading Zanzibari politicians alleged that the islands, which had suffered economically because of the depressed state of the cloves industry, were not receiving their fair share of donor-funded national development projects; some of them even pressed for Zanzibar's withdrawal from Tanzania. On the other hand, many mainland MPs felt that Zanzibar, with less than 3 per cent of the national population, benefited disproportionately in political terms from the Union.

Regional Functional Organisations

These organisations, formed primarily for economic purposes, have fared better than the regional political unions, though they, too, have had a chequered history. Several of the organisations with limited objectives had a long survival record; among them were the Conseil de l'Entente, the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale, and the Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauritienne, which became mainly a linguistic and cultural organisation. However, I focus on three major functional groupings in East, West and Southern Africa: EACSO and its successor, the East African Community (EAC); ECOWAS; and the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference (SADCC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), its successor.

East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO)/
East African Community (EAC)

EACSO was the successor of the East African High Commission, which officially came into being in January 1948 and was itself the successor of the Conference of East African Governors, instituted in 1926.[7] Under the EACSO agreement and constitution of December 1961, the High Commission of Governors was replaced by the East African Common Services Authority, the supreme policy-making body of EACSO comprising the principal ministers of the three territories. The hub of EACSO was the administration headed by a secretary-general in Nairobi. While the Organisation did valuable work in maintaining the common services, of which three – railways and harbours, posts and telecommunications, and the East African Airways Corporation – had substantial autonomy, it was (as Jane Banfield has argued) 'a temporary and rather makeshift organisation' dominated by its central bureaucracy.

EACSO survived the collapse of the negotiations in 1963–4 to establish an East African federation, but was badly in need of overhaul. At the root of its increasing difficulties was the fact that the benefits of membership went disproportionately to Kenya, which dominated the intra-regional trade in manufactured products. Attempts to redress this imbalance made little headway, but the Treaty for East African Co-Operation of 6 June 1967 kept hopes alive by establishing an East African Economic Community and an East African common market, thereby confirming and supplementing the EACSO arrangements.[8] However, the benefits of membership continued to be skewed in Kenya's favour and, mainly on this account, the Community finally broke up in 1977.[9] Nearly 20 years later – towards the end of 1995 – memories of

the past benefits of inter-state co-operation led to renewed negotiations to reactivate the Community. Though the Community was revived, by the end of the year 2000 no specific measures for regional integration had been adopted and the three member-states seemed to be pulling in different directions on the crucial issue of harmonising trade policies.

In view of the sharp ideological differences between Tanzania and Kenya and the personal animosity between Nyerere and Amin, it can be argued that the EAC might have stood a better chance of survival if its membership had been expanded to include other states in the East and Central African region. The possibility was mooted from time to time that Ethiopia and Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda, as well as Zambia, would join the Community. Nothing came of these proposals, though the Zambian government did conduct negotiations to join the Community in 1968–9. It eventually decided against this step, realising that, given the high-cost structure of Zambian industry, Zambia's manufactured goods would not be competitive in the East African market without a substantial devaluation. Thus, the Community retained its three-state basis up to the time of its collapse, differing in this respect from both ECOWAS and SADC.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Treaty of Lagos, which was signed in May 1975, established a 15- (subsequently 16-) nation economic community of predominantly English- and French-speaking West African states. These states pledged themselves to work towards the free movement of goods and people throughout the community area, with the object of promoting trade between themselves and increasing their independence, as a group, in relation to the rest of the world. A fund for co-operation, compensation and development was to be set up, one of its purposes being to compensate states which lost revenue as a result of reducing tariffs. The headquarters of the fund were located at Lomé and those of the Community at Lagos. Provision was made in the treaty for an annual meeting of heads of state and government, and for a subordinate council of ministers.[10]

Following its effective establishment in 1978, ECOWAS made progress in certain directions – for example, it launched a major communication project. However, work on its trade liberalisation scheme was subject to long delay – completed in 1981, it was restarted in 1989 – and its agricultural programme, which aimed to make the Community self-sufficient in foodstuffs, was set back by severe drought which affected the whole of the Sahel belt, especially in 1984–5. Economic co-operation was hampered by the linguistic and ideological differences and poor communications between member states, and also by the proliferation of currencies, and foreign exchange

restrictions and controls, which persist in the West African region (monetary union was one of ECOWAS' long-term objectives). Several member-states failed to contribute to the common fund. Other difficulties arose because the constituent states retained a strong sense of economic nationalism, and a majority of them were also simultaneously members of other West African regional groups. Thus, members of the francophone Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) also belonged to ECOWAS. Not confined to French-speaking states, ECOWAS was particularly disadvantaged by francophone regionalism which was shaped by the institutions of the franc zone and the military and other co-operation agreements linking France and its former colonies. States belonging to CEAO retained an independent approach to regionalism and occasionally adopted policies which discriminated against the interests of ECOWAS. The effect was seriously to impede the efforts towards economic integration made by each of these organisations.[11] The extent to which ECOWAS is dominated commercially and financially by oil-rich Nigeria is accepted, but not liked, by West Africa's francophone states; the sharp fall in the price of oil in the 1980s hit Nigeria economically and had serious knock-on effects for the Community.

Political events, including a rash of military *coups* and counter-*coups*, disrupted regional co-operation; so, too, did Nigeria's expulsion of some 2 million aliens in January 1983 and the recurrence of drought in Mali and Niger in 1984. However, it was above all the outbreak of civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone that proved most damaging. The ECOWAS monitoring group – ECOMOG – arrived in Liberia in August 1990 and was instrumental in the signing of a peace accord between the six main warring factions (increasingly defined by ethnic divisions) at Abuja, the Nigerian capital, in August 1995. However, ECOMOG troop levels and funds were inadequate for the tasks in hand and heavy inter-faction fighting erupted in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, in April 1996.[12]

For ECOWAS the lesson of the six-year Liberian civil war, in which an estimated 150,000 people were killed, was that its 16 member-states lacked the resources and the political will to undertake a long-term mission of this sort. Preoccupation with Liberia, and then with Sierra Leone, meant that only little, if any, progress was made in achieving ECOWAS' primary goals; economic growth in the region declined and member-states became increasingly indebted. In these circumstances, it proved difficult to implement the provisions of the ECOWAS treaty which was signed at the Organisation's 16th summit in Benin in 1993 and took formal effect on 30 July 1995. The treaty provided for the imposition of a community tax and the establishment of a regional parliament, an economic and social council, and an ECOWAS court of justice.[13]

Southern African Development Co-Ordination Conference (SADCC)[14]

This regional group came into being in 1979, but was not formally established until April of the next year. It had ten member-states – Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the former 'front-line' states, plus Zimbabwe upon its achieving independence in 1980 (see below) Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and (from 1990) Namibia – having between them a population of about 80 million at that time. With substantial energy resources, rich mineral deposits and abundant agricultural land, the region had great economic potential, but needed external finance, technology and personnel to supplement scarce local resources in these fields; intra-regional trade between the SADCC states was limited. The main stated aims of SADCC were to co-operate in designated areas in order to secure the equitable development of the region as a whole and reduce the external dependence of member-states on South Africa. With the exception of Tanzania and Angola, this dependence was extreme, especially in the fields of employment, trade and transport (six of the ten SADCC states were land-locked). The areas of co-operation of SADCC states covered transport and communications, agriculture, industry and trade, energy, personnel development, mining, tourism and finance. Individual member-states co-ordinated functional activities within a specific area: thus, Angola was responsible for co-ordinating energy and conservation and Mozambique for co-ordinating transport and communications.

Trade within the region was to be encouraged and priority was to be given to improving transport and communications. A development fund was set up, with finance supplied mainly by Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) governments (especially governments in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries); most of the technology came from the same source. The fact that SADCC relied so heavily on external (and almost entirely on Western) aid, even for co-operative projects, was a major drawback since it meant that outside interests would influence (and might determine) project-choice and long-term strategy (in 1984–5 SADCC member states themselves were committed to providing just under one-quarter of the total funds required). The future development of SADCC was tied to events in South Africa, as James Mayall, writing in 1988, explained:

> At first sight, SADCC created opportunities for the West, since Western governments could now support development projects which made economic sense, regardless of what happened in South Africa. The new organisation was accordingly greeted with enthusiasm by the EEC, the United States and indeed by most donor countries and agencies.

But SADCC also sharpened the Western policy dilemma: how to support the independence of its member states without intensifying their confrontation with South Africa and increasing the chances that the South African crisis would escalate into a much wider and unprecedented regional conflict. This danger is most acute in the transport sector, where Western assistance to develop a more effective and independent regional transport network – as in the current project to upgrade the Beira line and modernise Beira port – has created obvious targets for South Africa[n] or South African-backed saboteurs.[15]

Some of the SADCC states themselves did not live up to the group's objective of lessening dependence on the white-ruled Republic, since economic nationalism led them to retain (or develop) trade links with it. Such links, though officially frowned upon, were permissible under SADCC's flexible structure. In 1980 South Africa sold US$1.3 billion worth of goods and services to 40 African countries – a huge increase on the US$300 million worth of South African exports to the rest of Africa ten years earlier.[16]

The majority of southern African economies had areas of critical reliance on South Africa. To illustrate this, Stephen Chan drew examples from the spheres of trade, employment, higher education and training for employment, transport and communications, and medical and veterinary services.[17] Thus in 1985 Zambia, which was a leading advocate of the sanctions campaign against South Africa, took 21 per cent of its total imports from South Africa, but sent only 1 per cent of its total exports to the Republic. In the same year, revenue from participation in the South African Customs Union (SACU) was vital for the economies of Botswana and particularly of Swaziland and Lesotho (the dependence of Botswana, which has a good development record, subsequently became less acute as diamond production increased). Angola and Tanzania were the least dependent of states in the southern African region on South Africa. For historical and geographical reasons, Angola was foremost both in resisting South African aggression and in supporting the ANC and SWAPO.[18]

The context within which SADCC operated was transformed by the results of South Africa's legislative elections in April 1994. *Apartheid* South Africa no longer threatened the political and economic stability of the region. Instead in August 1994 the Republic, now ruled by an ANC-dominated government under Nelson Mandela, became the eleventh member of what had been known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since 1992 (the Community had altered its name in response to the changed situation in the region, where it no longer had as its principal object economic survival without South Africa). In 1995 the island state of Mauritius was formally admitted as the organisation's twelfth member and strengthened its

democratic credentials further by experiencing another change of government following parliamentary elections in December of that year.[19]

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)[20]

The revamped organisation retains its headquarters in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, and aims as before to promote the equitable development of the region as a whole, though this time in co-operation with South Africa. In February 1995, the latter was made responsible for co-ordinating the economic, financial and monetary policies of the member-states. SADC was committed to reducing the region's long-term dependence on donor aid and its members – at the Johannesburg summit in August 1995 – signed what purported to be a binding agreement requiring them to share water resources in this drought-stricken region. The next year the group of so-called 'front-line' states (FLS) – first formed in the 1970s to handle the political and security issues arising from support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa – was replaced by a SADC organ on politics, defence and security. Member-states of this body undertook to form a regional rapid deployment force to respond to 'sensitive and potentially explosive situations'. In the event, military intervention was spasmodic. South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho in 1998 to put down a military revolt following the general election; it resulted in both considerable damage to property and loss of life. As noted in earlier chapters, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened in the DRC in the second half of the 1990s. SADC subsequently sanctioned such intervention when it was undertaken at the request of a member state's government. The organ's status within the SADC structure has now been clarified, but its role, particularly in relation to the DRC, remains contentious. Headed hitherto by President Mugabe, it is intended that the leadership of the organ should in future rotate. At the Windhoek summit in 2001 the heads of state approved a radical restructuring of other SADC institutions; they were to be based on four directorates: trade, industry, finance and investment; infrastructure and services; food, agriculture and natural resources; and social and human development and special programmes.[21]

South Africa's position within the organisation remains critical. With its economy nearly four times the size of the other states put together, the balance of trade with SADC was heavily in South Africa's favour. Only Zimbabwe had any prospect of competing in the open market with South Africa's manufactured goods and agricultural produce. Mandela warned his fellow-members that the precipitate creation of a regional common market

from which all internal trade barriers were eliminated would not be in the interest of their states and might entail them in the loss of capital, skills and labour.[22]

Certain obstacles have been faced by all Africa's regional organisations. Among them are the political instability and economic nationalism of individual states; differences in ideology, language and culture, as well as in ruling-party strength; the difficulty of achieving an equitable distribution of benefits; lack of manpower and foreign exchange, and the heavy dependence on external aid, even for co-operative projects; poor inter-state communications; and the fact that member states tend to have economies which, not being sufficiently diverse, produce goods which are competitive with, rather than complementary to, each other. Most states have had difficulty, too, in manufacturing goods for export at prices which can match those of European and Japanese companies; in a free market, as suggested above, they will face more intense competition from South African (and to a lesser extent Zimbabwean) manufacturers than they do at present. Another matter for concern is the existence of several organisations with similar, and sometimes conflicting, aims, thus reducing their effectiveness; in particular, there is a real danger that the activities of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) will duplicate those of SADC.[23] The OAU could conceivably play an important role in reconciling differences and encouraging the merger of organisations with overlapping functions. The next section examines this Africa-wide organisation briefly.

The Organisation of African Unity[24]

In the early 1960s dramatic events in the Congo following Belgium's precipitate grant of independence, the struggle for independence in Algeria, and Mauritania's conflict with Morocco diverted the attention of African leaders from questions of unification. By 1962 these tensions had diminished and attempts to reconcile the difference between the two main groupings – the Casablanca bloc of Ghana, Guinea and other radical African states and the Brazzaville bloc, which subsequently became known as the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM) and was made up exclusively of French-speaking states – were made at conferences held at Lagos and Monrovia. These proved unsuccessful but, with all the various groups favouring some form of African unity, it was decided to try again by convening a new conference at Addis Ababa in May 1963. This conference was attended by 30 independent African states, which agreed to form the OAU; Morocco and Togo were not present, but signed the OAU Charter later in 1963. Both

the Casablanca and UAM blocs were then disbanded as 'partial' organisations whose aims and objectives were incompatible with membership of a 'universal' organisation. Though the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) was not formally wound up, most of its activities were taken over by the OAU.[25]

The OAU Charter was essentially a compromise document which could accommodate the divergent views of the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups; it fell far short of Nkrumah's vision of a united Africa, subject to a single government. As Catherine Hoskyns pointed out it was 'a curious hotchpotch of principles and purposes, which combined rather conservative statements designed to protect the *status quo* in inter-African relations with radical commitments towards the outside world', with 'absolute priority' given – at the insistence of the Casablanca states – 'to assisting the liberation movements in Southern Africa'.

Agreement on structure, revolving round four principal institutions, was more readily obtained. These were the assembly of heads of state and government (the supreme organ, which was to meet once a year in ordinary session); the council of (foreign) ministers, which was to prepare the OAU budget and be responsible for implementing the assembly decisions; the general secretariat, based in Addis Ababa and headed by an administrative secretary-general elected for a four-year term; and, at least on paper, the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The latter body, which was to have 21 members and was to attempt to settle disputes between member states, was never formally established. Provision was also made in the Charter for specialised commissions to deal with technical aspects of co-operation. In addition, a co-ordination committee for African liberation (popularly known as the African Liberation Committee, or ALC) was established, with headquarters in Dar es Salaam; however, this committee, which normally met twice a year and had an initial membership of nine (subsequently increased), was not based on the Charter but on a resolution passed by the assembly at Addis Ababa in 1963.[26]

The OAU registered some modest successes: it provided a meeting ground for African leaders and, in a loose sense, sponsored sub-regional organisations and UN agencies, such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); it tried to settle inter-state disputes and its Liberation Committee to an extent helped several countries to throw off the colonial yoke. But there were also significant failures and numerous problems, of which some were due to the Organisation's cumbersome structure (which worked against swift decision-making), its insecure financial base (discussed below), its lack of a groundswell of popular support, and its tendency to make economic plans without any realistic prospect of fulfilling them.[27]

The OAU sometimes suffered, too, from an excess of politics, as was shown at the summit conferences in June 1983 and November 1984 when the elections to the post of secretary-general were strongly contested. Some summit conferences have been poorly attended – only 6 out of 45 heads of state and government attended that held in Port Louis, Mauritius, in 1976. By contrast the Franco-African conferences of heads of state, instituted in 1973, were well attended, not only by leaders from former French colonies, but also from ex-Belgian colonies – Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda – and some of the smaller lusophone and anglophone countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and Mauritius.[28]

The underlying principles of the OAU Charter themselves contributed to the Organisation's difficulties. The clause stating that each independent African state has the right to join the OAU proved problematic, most acutely over the seating of a delegation from the pro-Western government of Chad, headed by President Hissene Habré, and the recognition as the Organisation's fifty-second state in 1982 of the former Spanish Sahara under the title of the Saharan/Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).[29] The prolonged period of crisis over these issues (from 1980 to 1984) threatened the OAU's very existence. The main facts can be recalled briefly. Morocco's claim to rule the phosphate-rich Western Sahara – the SADR – is challenged by the Polisario Front and an intermittent civil war has resulted. The UN's efforts to organise a referendum on whether the territory should be given independence or absorbed into Morocco have not been successful and the issue is not therefore settled. The francophone state of Chad is a vast, land-locked and mostly arid country whose northern region has been racked by bitter communal strife since the mid-1960s. The presence of French troops has not deterred Libya from constantly interfering in Chadian affairs and occupying a strip of territory lying between the two countries (the Aozou Strip), which is claimed by both of them; the OAU failed to achieve a settlement. Nigeria took the main initiative to find a solution to what frequently amounted to a civil war situation, rendering Chad a 'broken-backed' state. It was instrumental in the dispatch of a 3,800-strong OAU peacekeeping force to Chad in December 1981; this force was hampered by financial constraints and uncertainties over its mandate and was withdrawn in June 1982 after achieving little. Soon afterwards Habré's forces over-ran N'Djaména, the capital, and Habré was installed as president. He ruled precariously until December 1990 when, having appealed in vain for French assistance, his regime was overthrown by Colonel Idriss Déby who undertook to introduce a multi-party system of government.[30]

Further difficulties for the OAU arose over the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states and non-alignment;

neither principle has been strictly applied. The first was not observed in 1968 when four member-states – Tanzania, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and Gabon – recognised the right of 'Biafra' to secede from Nigeria and set itself up as an independent state; the OAU, as a body, was pledged to maintain Nigeria's territorial integrity. The second principle that each sovereign state should be non-aligned was flouted by states at both ends of the political spectrum. For example, Angola and Mengistu's Ethiopia, both subject to Marxist–Leninist regimes, relied heavily on the Soviet Union and Cuba for military support; on the other hand, several French-speaking states retained such close economic, monetary and other links with France as to establish a virtual neo-colonial relationship, while Mobutu's discredited regime in Zaire would not have survived without the USA's backing.

In respect of the major areas of activity established by the Charter, the Organisation's record was mixed. In promoting the liberation of Southern Africa – always its principal area of concern – the OAU worked through the ALC, though never exclusively.[31] The Committee, with a membership of 21 from 1972, had its own secretariat and budget, distinct from the general budget of the OAU, but the failure of many member-states to pay their contributions resulted in recurring financial difficulty. Probably the most serious, early problem which the committee encountered – shown clearly in the cases of Angola and Rhodesia – was to determine which of a country's various liberation movements deserved support. It came to rely increasingly on the initiatives taken by the 'front-line' states, which had a primary interest in the region, though these states were themselves sometimes divided over the best course to pursue. In general – in relation to the achievement of independence by Portugal's African colonies in the mid-1970s, by Zimbabwe in 1980, and Namibia in 1990, and in the transfer of power in South Africa in May 1994 from the apartheid regime to an ANC-dominated government headed by Nelson Mandela – the Organisation's moral backing always counted for more than its financial support.[32]

Since the OAU's projected Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, which was to be the key instrument in settling inter-African disputes, was never formed, the mediatory efforts of the OAU therefore counted for much less than the mediation of individual heads of state. The latter sometimes acted of their own accord, but more often they responded to the OAU's request to serve on an *ad hoc* reconciliation committee; when this happened, they reported back to the Organisation, normally to the next summit conference. For example, in 1990 a committee was set up by the OAU to reconcile the differences between Senegal and Mauritania; another committee, sitting under chairmanship of King Hassan of Morocco, tried to unravel the tangled Chad–Libya situation. Such initiatives sometimes met

with success, but rarely resulted in permanent solutions. Thus, though a major war between Tanzania and Uganda was averted in 1972, war did break out in 1979. Overall, the OAU's record in this sphere was not impressive, and for one good reason: states in dispute, such as Somalia in its long-drawn-out quarrel with Ethiopia, were more concerned to maintain their national self-interest than to uphold the OAU principles of unity and the peaceful reconciliation of differences.

The OAU, under cover of the principle of non-interference, failed to condemn the glaring atrocities which occurred in several Black African states, including Burundi (in 1972, for example), Equatorial Guinea, Bokassa's Central African Republic, and Amin's Uganda, thereby weakening its moral stand in condemning human rights abuses in *apartheid* South Africa. It was also slow to act over the explosive issues of Western Sahara and Chad, and was powerless to halt the politically motivated violence which occurred on a horrendous scale in Rwanda in 1994. It handed over the problem to the UN and, at the same time, failed to face reality by officially seating the discredited Rwandan government at its thirtieth summit in Tunis in June 1994 in preference to the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (which, however, attended as an observer).

Instability in Rwanda spilled over into neighbouring Burundi, where from 1993 onwards large numbers of people (mainly civilians) were killed at the hands of the Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu rebels. Julius Nyerere, the former Tanzanian president, acted as international mediator, but his efforts were vitiated by the failure of the rival factions to honour their agreements, thus removing any mandate for OAU or UN intervention. In late July 1996 Major Pierre Buyoya staged a coup in Burundi, of which he had been president from 1987 to 1993, when he was defeated in the presidential election. Though nothing came of the OAU secretary-general's threat to use external force to stop the subsequent slaughter, a seven-state regional sanctions co-ordinating committee, on which the OAU was represented, agreed to mount an economic blockade of Burundi in order to press for a return to constitutional rule. As the blockade – including an embargo on fuel deliveries, a ban on exports and the severing of international air links – began to bite and the main rebel group in Burundi became more effective, Buyoya made some political concessions, without however restoring the constitution.

Clearly, events on the scale of those in Chad, Rwanda and Burundi were beyond the competence of the OAU to handle; so too, in recent years have been those in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Zimbabwe. The Organisation is open to more legitimate criticism for the delays which have occurred in its taking action in situations with which it can deal, though such delays were perhaps inevitable given the often divergent interests of

its members. In the past most unanimity was achieved and a common pol-
icy agreed upon when the issue concerned white-ruled South Africa. The
assumption of power by an ANC-dominated government in May 1994
removed this cohesive factor but gave rise to the hope that South Africa,
under Nelson Mandela's presidency, would give the OAU, as its fifty-third
member, that sense of direction and purpose which had so often been lack-
ing since the establishment of the Organisation in 1963.

The Promotion of Economic Co-Operation

The increasing concern with economic affairs shown by the OAU in the
1970s was carried forward into the 1980s and 1990s. In April 1980 an
African economic summit was convened at Lagos and adopted an ambi-
tious 'plan of action', which *inter alia* aimed to create an African common
market by the year 2000 and to make the continent self-sufficient in food,
building materials, clothing and energy by 1990. There was never any real-
istic prospect that the OAU would be able to implement these resolutions
and a number of its operations were jeopardised.[33]

The OAU has also had to give prior attention to urgent, and often divi-
sive, political issues. This happened at the Lagos economic summit in April
1980 when decisions had to be taken on Chad and the Western Sahara, and
a successor as OAU chairman found to President William Tolbert of Liberia
following his death in a military coup. At an individual level, incidents of
drought and famine (as in Southern Africa in 1991–2) forced many OAU
member-states to import grain on a substantial scale, thereby adding to their
existing balance of payments difficulties.

In addition, the Organisation suffered from a lack of political will. It
lived up to its reputation of passing notable resolutions, but of then failing
to implement them. There are a number of examples. At the thirty-first
annual meeting of the heads of state and government, held in Addis Ababa
in June 1995, resolutions were passed on the conflicts in Somalia, Burundi,
Rwanda, Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone, but delegates failed to agree on
the advisability of establishing an OAU rapid reaction force. Another reso-
lution concerned the 7 million refugees in Africa, but no realistic solution
to this problem was found. In February 1996 the Council of Ministers dis-
cussed the possibility of sending a peacekeeping force to Burundi because
of the deteriorating security situation there, but the OAU's costly and
unsuccessful intervention in Chad in December 1981 effectively ruled out
this option; the possibility of OAU intervention in Burundi was raised again
in July 1996, but nothing came of it. Clearly, the Organisation was

ill-equipped to deal with the largest and most intractable intrastate conflicts which, Allen argues, arise because of 'the prolongation of spoils politics into its terminal stage, that of state collapse'. To remedy this and to provide 'the basis for peace', a different political system was needed, one grounded perhaps in democracy and accountability.[34]

In the straitened economic circumstances facing the OAU and its member-states, the Organisation continued what had become normal practice in the 1970s of referring economic development questions to the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), whose headquarters were in Addis Ababa. It also turned for economic assistance to the oil-rich Arab states, an approach that resulted in the establishment of an assistance fund in 1974–5 and led to the holding of the first ever Afro-Arab summit conference at Cairo (Egypt had been an OAU member-state from the outset) in March 1977 and the issue of a charter of political and economic co-operation, known as the Cairo Declaration. Some assistance was given by the Arab states, but many of the commitments entered into at the conference were not fulfilled. Limited co-operation did continue, but hopes of securing easy access to Arab oil-wealth proved illusory for the great majority of African states. Among the main beneficiaries of Arab financial aid were states of the Sahel, which had common borders with the Islamic-Arab states further north.[35] For Africa in general, the most important sources of external aid were Western states and international aid organisations.

The OAU was involved in other efforts to promote economic development in Africa. In its early years it invested much energy in presenting Africa's case at meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), but to little avail. Negotiations for the African–Caribbean–Pacific (ACP) countries to sign a trade and aid agreement with the EEC were conducted initially under OAU auspices. (However, prime responsibility for the negotiations in 1973–4 and for subsequent renegotiations on behalf of the ACP group rested first with the Council of African Ministers and then, following the group's expansion, with the Council of ACP Ministers and its secretariat.) At the OAU summit conferences in 1989 and 1990 the heads of member states discussed various aspects of Africa's economic crisis. In 1989 they expressed concern over the damaging social side-effects, particularly in the education and health sectors, of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The ECA took up their cause, but to little avail. The next year, while committing themselves to 'further democratisation', though on the basis of their own socio-cultural values, the leaders of the member-states expressed alarm at 'an increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of a political nature for assistance to Africa'.[36] This was their response to statements made by (among others) the President of the World

Bank, the British Foreign Secretary and the French President that there would be linkage between democratic performance and economic aid.

* * *

The OAU has had a chequered history, now extending over a period of nearly 40 years. Its main claim to success is that it has continuously provided a forum in which issues of concern to member-states can be discussed and disputes arising between them sometimes resolved. On the other hand, its members have frequently flouted the principles enshrined in the original Charter and they have tended to make economic plans without any realistic prospect of fulfilling them. The Organisation's weaknesses are that it is not underpinned by a groundswell of popular support, that too many member-states fail to pay their financial contributions by the due date, and that, in the unstable political conditions which have prevailed over much of the continent since its inception, the governments of its member-states have often been preoccupied with their own domestic problems. Yet the existence of such problems can only be part of the explanation for the lukewarm support given by many heads of state to the OAU, since a number of those who never attended summit meetings – such as the late President Houphouët-Boigny of the Côte d'Ivoire – were active participants in such regional organisations as ECOWAS and the annual Franco-African conferences. In the perception of these leaders, the latter meetings dealt with concrete issues, such as collective security arrangements and economic co-operation agreements, which promised to be of greater benefit to their states than many of the matters raised, and often discussed acrimoniously, at OAU summit conferences. (However, this was not a universal view and the failure of Cameroon and some other states to attend Franco-African conferences regularly meant that the significance of the results immediately achieved was reduced.)[37] While suggesting that their OAU membership enabled African states to derive individual and collective benefits from the UN, Amate concluded his detailed study of the Organisation on a sombre, but factual note: 'the UN and its non-African member-states take the OAU more seriously than do some of the OAU's own members.'[38]

Until the 1980s the discriminatory practices of the white-ruled *apartheid* regime in South Africa constituted the one outstanding issue which united OAU member-states and enabled an 'African' policy to emerge. The release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and de Klerk's reform programme breached this continental solidarity and led to the adoption of new attitudes towards the former white-ruled republic. Once an ANC-dominated government was formed in 1994 the member-states of the OAU (as of SADC) tended to look to South Africa for the leadership and financial support necessary to

promote economic development. While the South African government might provide some modest help – for example, in February 1996 it pledged to contribute R28 million for the troop confinement process in Angola[39] – the country's modest economic growth rate and the heavy call on its domestic agenda made this an unrealistic expectation. Nor has the mediation of South Africa's presidents – Mandela in the DRC and Mbeki in Zimbabwe – proved particularly effective. It is indeed questionable whether South Africa's membership of the OAU stiffened the Organisation's resolve and helped to close the yawning gap which has always existed between its pious intentions and effective performance. Perhaps because of this, the OAU was replaced by a more economy-directed African Union (AU) at a conference in Lusaka attended by 25 heads of state on 9–11 July 2001. The Constitutive Act of the Union, which amounts at present to no more than a declaration of intent, has subsequently been ratified by 50 of the OAU's 53 members. AU leaders want to promote faster economic integration, but the Union's relationship to existing regional organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC and even national governments (over tax and tariff levels) has not yet been determined.[40]

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10

Conclusions: Ideology, the Post-Colonial State and Development

It is difficult to reach agreement on the meaning of the concepts 'ideology' and 'development'. As Clifford Geertz remarked, 'the term "ideology" has itself become thoroughly ideologized', being on one view a cloak for interests and on another a response to deep-rooted social strains.[1] According to Edward Shils, 'An ideology differs … from a prevailing outlook and its creeds through its greater *explicitness*, its greater *internal integration* or *systemization*, its greater *comprehensiveness*, the greater *urgency* of its application, and its much higher *intensity of concentration* focused on certain central propositions or evaluations.'[2] By this test in much of the post-independence period, states such as Botswana, the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria could hardly be said to possess an ideology at all, while Algeria, Tanzania and most of the other 'first wave' of African socialist states had weak ideologies. I prefer, therefore, to take the looser definition of John Plamenatz, for whom ideology was 'any system of ideas which acts to support or subvert accepted modes of thought and behaviour'.[3] This definition not only accommodated the great majority of African states, it also had the advantage of laying equal stress on the supportive and subversive roles of ideology; Shils, by contrast, saw ideologies as the main preserve of opposition groups excluded from power. Yet while Plamenatz's definition is useful, ideology may be viewed perhaps more flexibly by de-emphasising the word 'system'; hence it could be any body of linked ideas and values which is shared and organised. Moreover, given that there are constraints on policy-making, some actions will necessarily fall outside the ideology, rendering it irrelevant in certain circumstances, while in other cases the indeterminacy which surrounds the concept of ideology makes it difficult to distinguish precisely between 'ideological' and 'non-ideological' phenomena.

To define 'development' is even more problematic. The concept is Western and was originally expressed in economic terms; however, economists were not agreed on what economic growth entailed or how it might best be measured: if industrialisation alone was not a satisfactory measure, neither was GNP. Lucian Pye's study of Burma, published in 1962,[4] showed that development was a more complex process than had previously been assumed. Theorists and practitioners came to realise that it was not appropriate to take the West (or the Soviet Union for that matter) as a precise blueprint for development: Third World countries had values and goals which were often very different from those of a modern industrial society. Furthermore, in seeking to achieve development, they might discard the Western democratic process in favour of a much more authoritarian approach; some analysts, including Samuel Huntington, even welcomed this possibility in the belief that such an approach might promote order and stability on which a high valuation was placed in the USA during the politically volatile years of the latter 1960s. For Peter Nettl, development was 'a highly differential process according to particular societies and their goals',[5] a formulation that served to remind us of the pitfalls to be encountered in trying to measure the 'development' achieved by one Third World state against that achieved by another. It was particularly pertinent to a comparative study of African states, which differed widely in their colonial experience, in the strength of their inherited political institutions, and in their socio-economic structure. It reinforced the argument of Fred Riggs, outlined in Chapter 6, that developing countries should be studied within their entire ecological context. Though their interaction with the 'developed' world was important, it was not enough to see these countries (as early dependency theorists were inclined to do) as mere pawns on an international chess-board, controlled and exploited by more powerful 'kings' and 'queens'. We can say what 'development' is not more easily than what it is: it is not economic growth alone, though economic growth is essential to development. It also embodies social justice: that is, the distribution in a reasonably equitable manner of the benefits of economic growth among the country's regions and people. Development also has a political component: provision must be made for popular participation in the political process and for the protection of civil rights and essential freedoms; an administrative component, so that the state has the capacity to respond to people's needs; and an international element, enabling the state to exercise some autonomy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Thus, development can be said to be multi-faceted, with economic, social, political, administrative and international dimensions. The form which it takes will vary according to the political and socio-economic context of the country being studied.

The Relationship between Ideology and Development

For each type of regime – whether capitalist or socialist-oriented – one can say that ideology is helpful if it enables the leadership to instil a sense of direction and purpose in its followers. No less obviously, ideology can become an economic strait-jacket if, as in Sékou Touré's Guinea in the early 1960s, it is too rigidly applied and makes changes of direction difficult. In Tanzania, a populist socialist state under the presidency of Julius Nyerere (1962–85), the experiment in village socialism (*ujamaa vijijini*), which he initiated in 1967, was persisted in for ideological reasons – the belief that traditional work methods could be adapted to the needs of modern production systems – long after it had failed economically. By contrast Amilcar Cabral, one of Africa's foremost political thinkers who drew substantially upon Marxist theory in his writing, had his feet firmly on the ground. He warned the party cadres in Guinea–Bissau against doctrinal rigidity and reminded them that 'people are not fighting for ideas' but to achieve 'a real improvement' in their living conditions.[6]

We have seen that in the late 1980s the mainly urban-based groups in many African states became convinced that the one-party system of government and state regulation of the economy were responsible for their country's economic decline. With the encouragement of Western governments in the political sphere and the economic prodding of these governments and the IMF and World Bank, a twin process got under way in the shape of vociferous demands for political pluralism and economic liberalisation. Though, sadly, the gains made in many African states did not prove permanent, significant advances were made on the political front – political parties competed against each other in elections at national and local level, there was greater freedom of speech, and more critical media coverage of events. In general, the economic gains were less substantial and by and large the conclusions reached by Crawford Young in his excellent book *Ideology and Development in Africa* were still valid well into the 1990s.[7] Africa's Marxist–Leninist regimes – notably Mozambique and Angola in Southern Africa – had a poor record of economic performance. An important reason for this was that these states, of all the new states in Africa, had the weakest legacy of public institutions, and yet were the most ambitious: they sought to achieve the total transformation of society by means of a command economy, comprehensive central planning, and an extensive state sector. In most cases the failure of these regimes – their problems compounded by civil war – was so dramatic that the leadership abandoned its former ideological commitment, opted for a pragmatic form of socialism, or shifted towards a more conventionally liberal market strategy, or was overthrown. The economic

record of the military revolutionary regimes of Ethiopia and Somalia was no better, and sometimes worse, than that of their civilian counterparts. The performance of populist socialist states – for example, Algeria and Egypt in North Africa and Burkina Faso and Ghana south of the Sahara – tended to be marginally better, while that of the capitalist-oriented regimes (excluding from consideration oil-rich states) was considerably better. The record of states such as the Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, Botswana (which made good use of the revenue derived from minerals – copper, nickel and diamonds – and the cattle industry), Cameroon, Malawi and Senegal, does suggest that the market economy formula is most conducive to economic growth.[8] However, as the notorious case of Mobutu's Zaire showed, such growth could by no means be guaranteed, a fact confirmed by the more recent experience of the Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya. Both these states had achieved impressive levels of economic growth in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, but had been adversely affected by the subsequent sharp fall in export commodity prices, causing mounting foreign exchange problems and external indebtedness. By the early 1990s most of the continent was facing what Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, called 'an unrelenting crisis of tragic proportions'.[9]

Performance over the enhancing of egalitarianism continued after 1982 (when Young's book was published) to draw a mixed evaluation. Though the socialist states were still committed to this principle, their failure to achieve significant economic growth meant that there were relatively limited resources to distribute. This fact, often coupled with questionable fiscal, pricing and marketing policies, and the unbalanced nature of their domestic economies, meant that the standard of living of rural producers fell rather than improved, while urban workers were not much better off, even though government policies tended to favour the urban sector. Moreover, economic decline in the adverse economic climate of the 1980s made it increasingly difficult for the socialist regimes to maintain the high level of social services, particularly in health and education, which they had established in the decade following independence. Among the capitalist states, Kenya and the Côte d'Ivoire had until the 1980s more resources to distribute than most of the socialist states: the wealthy benefited disproportionately, thereby confirming Sklar's statement that 'capitalism is unalterably identified with social injustice';[10] nevertheless, farmers did benefit from the rural-based economic achievements of these states. By contrast, in Gabon the foreign-operated mineral economy remained relatively buoyant, but the rural economy stagnated. Such stagnation also occurred in oil-rich Nigeria and copper-based Zambia: it suggested that there was an inverse ratio between the possession of extensive mineral resources and agricultural output, making such states

particularly subject to economic reversal when the price of their mineral product dropped sharply on the world market. When this happened, the governments of both states tried to make up for past neglect by promoting (mostly ineffectually) grandiose, over-capitalised agricultural schemes that carried few benefits for the peasant farmer. In each case, the result by the early 1990s was widespread dissatisfaction with regimes – civilian in Zambia and military in Nigeria – which were authoritarian, incompetent and riddled with corruption.

While there continued to be no close correlation between the degree of autonomy and ideology, the heavy external indebtedness of the great majority of African states gave foreign capital considerable leverage over them. By the 1980s foreign domination had become marked in the financial sphere. Thus, as Sklar put it, 'Imperialism, as a stage of capitalism, gives way to corporate international capitalism.'[11] This came to be true of virtually all African states, irrespective of their ideological orientation, and for one good reason: development (as distinct from military) aid came from the West, and not from the Soviet bloc. The dire need for financial assistance was general: it forced even the Tanzanian government to accept in 1986 the tough conditions imposed by the IMF and World Bank which it had resisted since 1979, and similar circumstances led both the Mozambican and Angolan governments to join these organisations. However, there was evidence to show that all regimes might sometimes pursue policies which were antithetical to the interests, or against the wishes, of their international backers. Notable examples were the insistent demands for sanctions against South Africa made by Zambia and Zimbabwe in defiance of British government policy; the failure of Soviet pressure to persuade the former Mengistu regime in Ethiopia to reach a political settlement with the (fellow Marxist–Leninist) secessionists in Eritrea; and Mozambique's refusal to support the Soviet line over Afghanistan in the UN and to give the Soviet navy access to the deep-water harbour at Nacala. Again, President Moi of Kenya refused to conciliate his Western critics by introducing a multi-party system of government; however, fear of losing substantial foreign aid eventually persuaded him to give way. Close co-operation with the West was normally the basis of Kenya's development policy; like other capitalist states, Kenya tended to be less assertive of its autonomy in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank than regimes of a socialist orientation had been in the past.

Evidence on *human rights* continued to support Young's contention that abuse stemmed not from ideological strategy but was a function of 'insecure and paranoid rulers'. The cases of Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Sékou Touré in Guinea, Moi in Kenya, Mobutu and Laurent Kabila in Zaire/the DRC, and Mugabe in Zimbabwe straddled

the ideological barrier. Other states where flagrant infringements of human rights occurred included an ethnic dimension (Burundi and Rwanda), a religious or racial explanation (Sudan and Mauritania,[12] respectively) or a mixture of some of these elements.

States with good human rights records were also to be found on either side of the ideological divide, though the record probably favoured the capitalist and populist socialist regimes over the Marxist–Leninist ones. Among capitalist-oriented states, Botswana had an excellent record, while – despite some blemishes – the Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Zambia had reasonably good records over most of the post-independence period, as did Tanzania among populist socialist states. The less satisfactory standing of most scientific socialist states was understandable, if not excusable: first, because these states alone had transcendent goals – the achievement of fundamental socio-economic transformation – and perhaps felt the need to apply coercion in order to achieve them; second because, when independence was achieved through a protracted liberation struggle (as in Angola and Mozambique), certain areas of the country had not been politicised by guerrilla activity and were likely to resist fundamental social change; and third, because civil war conditions prevailed in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. To tilt the human rights scales against Marxist–Leninist regimes in this way has however been challenged – in respect of Angola, for example, by Gerald J. Bender who argued that there was 'no less, and often more' political and religious freedom in such regimes than in the vast majority of other African states.[13] Certainly, human rights abuse on a massive scale occurred in the 1990s in the West African states of Liberia and Sierra Leone, although each state had a record of capitalist orientation.

In respect of participation, the overall picture – regardless of a state's ideological orientation – was that until the 1980s (and often late in the decade), African governments placed much more emphasis on political control than on political participation; the trend was towards a shrinking of the political arena and a consequent reduction in the levels of popular participation.[14] As we saw in Chapters 6 and 8, this changed in the 1990s when most African states moved towards some form of political pluralism and increased democratisation had an impact on government at the sub-national level. A few countries – Zambia and especially Uganda among them – made a realistic effort to decentralise their systems of government. On the other hand, French-speaking African states tended to retain a variant of the French prefectoral system which they had inherited at independence. Central control of local government remained tight in the Côte d'Ivoire.

The competence of the state or *state capacity* was, as Crawford Young pointed out, 'fundamental to all developmental designs'. The demands on

state capacity were highest for the 'second wave' of socialist states – notably Mozambique, Angola and Guinea–Bissau – where colonial educational provision for Africans was sparse and Africanisation policies were virtually non-existent. Marxist Ethiopia also had ambitious aims, but had the important advantage among Afro-Marxist states of an indigenised civil service of some size and experience; moreover, many of the Ethiopians who worked for the subsidiaries of Western companies in Ethiopia held managerial posts. Again, the Ethiopian army was reasonably efficient. However, Ethiopia lacked an effective rural administration to execute the sweeping land reforms of 1975 and had to rely on the newly created peasant associations for this purpose. The situation in the military-ruled People's Republic of the Congo, with its well-educated population, was different again. Of all Africa's 'revolutionary' states, it presented the sharpest contrast between its professed ideological (Marxist–Leninist) orthodoxy and its practical conservatism and pragmatism. It also created an 'oversized and wasteful public sector' that devoured state funds faster than they were generated, resulting in 'a never-ending fiscal crisis'.[15]

It would of course be a mistake to assume that all the non-Afro-Marxist regimes inherited strong administrations; in many cases, the latter only *appeared* strong in relation to the weakness of the Portuguese legacy in particular. The picture across Africa varied considerably: the institutional inheritance was (again, in comparative terms) enviable in a few states such as Kenya and the Sudan, and generally better in West African states, with their longer colonial association and absence of settler politics, than in East, Central and most of Southern Africa (Congo-Brazzaville/the Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe were something of an exception to this pattern). Nevertheless, it remains true that 'underdeveloped countries tend to have underdeveloped administrations', and the fact that the ruling party often proved weak within a few years of independence did not mean that the administration was therefore necessarily strong.

Their relative administrative incapacity would have mattered less if the new African states had been able to rely on an extensive indigenous private sector to develop their economies. Indigenous entrepreneurial activity, however, was generally limited (though, as Nicola Swainson showed for Kenya, not necessarily non-existent[16]), and the state itself had to assume many of the tasks which in more developed market-economy-type systems would have been left to the private sector. Moreover where, as in Zambia, the private sector was extensive, it was dominated by expatriates who were employed, in the Zambian case, predominantly by South African companies; nationalist-minded politicians were anxious to wrest control of the economy from foreign hands. As a result, in virtually all African states regardless of

ideological commitment, a vast expansion of public sector activity took place in the post-independence period. Unfortunately, as we saw in Chapter 6, the record of performance of most of the newly-created 'parastatal' bodies – both statutory boards and state companies – was disappointing and led the World Bank and IMF to insist on a programme of privatisation. This remedy was however itself fraught with considerable difficulties.

Does Ideology Matter?

I believe that ideology does matter in the sense that it determines the development strategy which a particular state adopts: thus, the contrast between the development paths pursued by the former Marxist–Leninist regime in Ethiopia and the capitalist regime in neighbouring Kenya was very sharp. In general, Afro-capitalist states had better economic records and, in relation to the limited goals which they pursued, somewhat stronger (if still inadequate) state capacities than the various socialist regimes. The latter had the edge when it came to equality, at least in avoiding the grossest forms of inequality such as the wide gap between the very rich and the very poor to be found in the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Nigeria. In measuring performance in the other spheres (autonomy, political participation and human dignity) there was little to choose between the various regime types at most times, although the socialist regimes (both Marxist and populist) could not match Nigeria, when under civilian rule, in the extent of citizen participation. Clearly, regime performance was not determined by ideological commitment alone and account needed to be taken of other factors also. All regimes, irrespective of ideological persuasion, faced internal and external constraints on their development. However, in examining the external constraints, it will be seen that some were themselves ideological. This applied, for example, to the interventionist strategies of the IMF and the World Bank; these strategies – and the privatisation, belt-tightening measures and other conditionalities attached to them – were often at variance with the national development strategies adopted by African governments, especially those which, like the government of Tanzania, pursued some variant of socialist planning.

External Constraints on Development

The Problem of Debt   In the pre-independence period, the colonies in Africa (like those in Asia and the Caribbean) were incorporated into the global capitalist economy dominated by the developed northern states.

A dependent relationship was established that continued after independence. It was greatly exacerbated for the non-oil producing states by the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973–4 and again in 1979–80. Thus after the early 1970s, in consequence, most of these states experienced serious balance of payments problems and accumulated substantial foreign debts.

By the end of the 1970s Angola, Nigeria and the other oil-rich states were experiencing the same problem, though on a much larger scale. The background to what had happened can be recalled briefly. For much of that decade, the member-states of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had been founded in September 1960, had been able to wrest control of oil prices and the determination of production policy from the multinational oil companies. This enabled them to push up the price of oil from just over US$5 per barrel in the early 1970s to over $30. The oil-producing countries accumulated huge revenues, enabling them to undertake large and costly projects, including in Nigeria the building of a new centrally placed capital at Abuja. However, the boom in oil prices did not last. In the face of a world recession, the Western countries cut back on oil imports, causing a glut of oil on the market; oil prices fell sharply, dropping in the early 1980s from a peak of US$33 a barrel to $10 at one time. Nevertheless, the OPEC member-states, who disagreed among themselves over the price and level of production, still seemed a good risk to the commercial banks. These banks, which were awash with billions of Middle Eastern petrodollars, continued to lend heavily in the 1979 to 1982 period to both oil producing and non-oil producing states (Mexico, Brazil and a number of other Latin American countries in particular accumulated massive debts). Bank interest rates were initially low but, not being fixed, rose substantially as inflation increased, and African and other Third World states had to carry a crippling burden of debt servicing. In the 1980s, as the value of the crops, minerals and other goods which they produced for export fell, it became increasingly difficult for these countries to earn enough foreign currency to repay their debts.

On top of the commercial debt owed to the banks and the multilateral debt owed to the international financial institutions (IFIs), there was official bilateral debt (the debt owed by one government to another); this bore particularly heavily on the poorest countries. As we saw in Chapter 8, the cumulative effect of all categories of debt was devastating for many Third World states, irrespective of their ideological orientation.[17] In Africa, south of the Sahara the increase in total debt owed was nearly US$85 billion in the period 1985–92. Since the price of African exports continued to fall relative to the cost of imports, this debt could not possibly be repaid, thus reinforcing the case for large-scale debt remission. More and more African countries were

in difficulties as falling commodity prices impacted on indebted countries.[18] In recent years the situation has deteriorated further: by November 2001 cotton, coffee and copper prices were at their lowest for several decades. Oil-producers were hit again following the 11 September terrorist attack, when the price of crude oil fell to some US$17 per gallon; big reductions in production halted the decline and led to an increase in price.[19]

Economic Reform   Several regimes themselves recognised the need to redefine the state's role in the economy and adopted divestiture as a reform strategy. However, increasingly from the later 1970s it was external pressure that speeded up the process of reform. The main impetus came from the World Bank which, by the end of the decade, was starting to replace project loans to debtor less-developed countries with new 'structural' and 'sectoral' adjustment facilities. The Bank – supported by the IMF, other multilateral financial institutions and Western bilateral aid agencies – made the grant and disbursement of development aid conditional upon the applicant country making changes in economic policy. Many African leaders found the conditions imposed hard to stomach; they included heavy devaluation, cuts in public spending, the adoption of privatisation measures, and the removal of urban food and other subsidies – food riots in Zambia and several other states suggested that the latter might prove politically destabilising. But in most cases the need for foreign exchange and economic aid was so desperate that the leaders felt obliged to accept the terms on offer. It was a 'no-win' situation, or so it must have seemed to the Zambian government which, in observing the policy conditionalities associated with its foreign debt negotiations, restricted its freedom to pursue a strongly pro-poor stategy in the 1990s, yet was criticised by the World Bank for its limited record on social progress at that time.[20] Karen Pfeifer's examination of three cases in North Africa – those of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – showed that SAPs rarely provided the predicted benefits:

> Despite, or perhaps because of, SAPs, all three countries remain dependent on external finance, whether it be debt, foreign direct or portfolio investment, or foreign aid and stand-by arrangements. All three have diversified their exports, and are competing with other LDCs to attract funding or to sell products. They are now more subject to global market institutions than ever before and more vulnerable to global recession or financial crises.

Tunisia struck a healthier balance between public and private investment than Egypt and Morocco and did so by shaping its own policy, without following external dicta. The other two states put too much emphasis on public

investment, but in the late 1990s switched to a policy of private investment; however, public investment was still required for critical functions. Moreover, while inequality increased in Egypt and Morocco during their SAPs, Tunisia showed that efficiency could be improved without sacrificing equity. The Moroccan phosphate industry demonstrated the same point.[21]

Despite their drawbacks, the SAPs remained an important plank in the drive towards political liberalisation. Privatisation became the development watchword following the second oil shock in 1979–80; the role of the state was restricted and that of the private sector enhanced. SAP conditions and the austerity programmes which African governments had to adopt tended to undermine state capacity further, thus reducing the ability of the rulers of increasingly weak regimes to attract societal or elite support for their reforms. In these circumstances, they sought to find new ways of buttressing their own authority and retaining elite support: a favoured tactic in Sierra Leone pursued by President Momoh and his successors was to supplement loyal followers' incomes with informal market opportunities.[22] The outcome of the political and economic reforms initiated by the SAPs was therefore to weaken the state and 'strengthen a parallel "shadow state" of corruption and criminal activity'.[23] African leaders were resentful since many of them associated the market and private property with foreign domination and racism. Nevertheless, the IFIs had their way – the role of the state was restricted and that of the private sector enhanced.

State Autonomy   By dictating policy in this way, the external institutions infringed the sovereignty of African states. Many African leaders were understandably resentful since they believed that the state itself should promote development and that 'the market and private property were associated with foreign domination and racism'.[24] But the financial organisations held the purse strings and even the socialist states had to become increasingly pragmatic in the policies which they pursued. Their response was a pointer to the depth of the economic crisis which they faced: Angola and Mozambique renounced their former commitment to Marxism–Leninism, while Ethiopia undertook agricultural reforms to satisfy external donors, notably the World Bank and the European Community. Given also events in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, capitalist development was now on the world agenda, a trend reinforced by the fact that virtually all non-military aid came from the West.

The lack of management and technological skills made African states very dependent not only on the World Bank and other outside agencies, but also on multinational corporations (MNCs). Thus in state-capitalist Zambia under President Kaunda, when the government assumed majority ownership

of the copper industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s, effective control still lay with the foreign companies – Anglo-American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust – though their subsidiaries were responsive to the wishes of the host government. The same thing happened in Angola, where the post-independence Marxist government acquired majority shareholding in both the country's oil and diamond industries. The foreign companies concerned – the Gulf Oil Corporation and the Angolan Diamond Company, DIAMANG (a De Beers subsidiary) – retained control, including control of day-to-day operations. The advantage to an MNC of such take-overs was that it was assured of a fee for providing the necessary managerial, technical and marketing inputs, but had no (or reduced) investment commitment in the enterprise. The disadvantage for the African state was the substantial loss of that control over its economy that 'nationalisation' was designed to achieve. (There might however be risks involved on both sides. In Zambia, the 1969–70 'nationalisation' of the copper mines had not proved advantageous to the government and, as noted earlier, 70 per cent of the government-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines was sold in 2000 to the Anglo-American Corporation; in Angola, DIAMANG incurred heavy losses because of guerrilla operations and was dissolved in 1986.)

A number of African states suffered both economically and environmentally from the activities of foreign companies. For example, in Sierra Leone – a poor country at the best of times – it was alleged in 1991 (before the country was torn apart by civil war) that Sierra Rutile Ltd paid very low wages to its approximately 2,000 workers (it was the country's largest private employer) and indulged in transfer pricing for the benefit of its parent company, the Nord Resources Corporation of America. Moreover, Rutile's mining of Sierra Leone's large deposits of natural rutile (the source of titanium) resulted in serious environmental damage. Another foreign company – Sieronco – was also accused of exploiting its work-force. The company exported 1.5 million tons of bauxite from Sierra Leone each year but, instead of paying the government taxes on income and royalties on exports, it paid a small lump sum in place of both (a better deal for the government was subsequently negotiated). Alusuisse, the parent company, bought all the bauxite produced in Sierra Leone at a low price and made a handsome profit in selling it, half to its German subsidiary in Europe and the rest to consumers around the world. Transfer pricing cost Sierra Leone in excess of US$100 million in the 1980s.[25]

The case of Namibia was also instructive. Following independence in March 1990, the country's heavy dependence on three South African-dominated mining companies, and on South Africa more generally, coupled with the enormous political load which its unbalanced and poorly integrated

extractive economy had to bear, forced SWAPO leaders to commit themselves to establishing a mixed economy.[26] Thus *realpolitik* prevailed over Marxist–Leninist revolutionary principle – the principle to which SWAPO had committed itself during the long liberation struggle.

The support given by certain powers to opposition movements fighting against the established government was an external constraint on development that was primarily ideological in character. Clear cases were the support given by South Africa's *apartheid* regime to RENAMO in Mozambique and by the South African and US governments to UNITA in Angola. This served to reinforce the conclusion that, while all African states suffered from external constraints on their development, states with governments of a socialist orientation were more adversely affected than those which opted for a capitalist approach.

Internal Constraints on Development

These constraints tended to operate either independently of ideological persuasion or with ideology as a marginal, dependent variable, rather than as a core factor. They included the existence of regionalism (as in Cameroon and Malawi), communalism or sectionalism (as in Burundi and Rwanda) threatening national unity and, in an extreme form (as in Nigeria, Somalia and the Sudan) causing civil war. The latter was also the outcome in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC, when the allure of oil, diamonds or other mineral riches or a combination of them, was a powerful incentive for nearby states to intervene. Inevitably in these circumstances economic development was at best impeded, if not entirely blocked.

The shortage of administrative, managerial and technical skills, caused initially by inadequate colonial educational and training programmes, persisted because of the lack of finance to maintain them and also because of the slowness in undertaking public service reform. Countries which achieved independence as a result of a protracted liberation struggle were most likely to be severely handicapped by this constraint. They were probably, though not necessarily, socialist regimes; examples were Angola and Mozambique, where in the post-independence period civil war further disrupted development in the educational and training spheres. Zimbabweans also fought for their independence, though Zimbabwe suffered much less from the personnel constraint than Angola and Mozambique and, despite the troubles in Matabeleland in the 1980s, civil war was avoided. Zimbabwe retained a rhetorical commitment to the creation of a socialist state but, except in the foreign sphere, the impact of ideology on public policy was

minimal. Namibia, as noted above, discounted wholesale nationalisation and sweeping measures of land redistribution in favour of a mixed economy with strong public and private sectors.[27]

The lack in many African states of a private entrepreneurial class capable of promoting business activity on a substantial scale resulted in the creation of a vast parastatal sector, often inefficient and sometimes corrupt, and one that imposed a serious drain on scarce foreign reserves. To keep costly import substitution industries afloat had a similar effect, and the two together channelled resources away from more productive investment. No less serious was the diversion of domestic resources and external assistance to military use. As J. K. Galbraith reflected sadly: 'In the poor lands [of Asia, Africa and Latin America] the military power and its claim on resources is the greatest economic scandal and the greatest political tragedy of our age.'[28] Unfortunately, more often than not the annual budgeting exercise failed to reveal the full extent of state expenditure on defence and security; even in 'democratic' Botswana, these major items of expenditure tended to be 'off-budget'.[29] African and other Third World governments bore much responsibility for the arms trade, though it was also encouraged by the major world powers. The latter were often the main arms exporters: in the 1990s the five permanent members of the UN security council were together responsible for 86 per cent of all conventional weapons exported.

A further internal constraint on development was the adoption of policies which subsidised the urban sector at the expense of the rural sector. The corollary of the drift to the towns which resulted, coupled with the rich pickings to be had from extracting and exporting minerals, was often a fall in agricultural production and rising crime rates, unemployment and acute problems of housing and sanitation in the urban centres. As noted earlier, food production might also drop as a result of agricultural neglect when exports of a particular primary product yielded rich returns, as was formerly the case in Zambia, with its copper-based economy, and oil-rich Nigeria.

The problems arising from natural disasters owing to flooding, as in Mozambique in 2000 and Algeria in 2001, and drought, as in Zimbabwe and other parts of Southern Africa in 1991–2, were additional constraints; they were accentuated by bad land management practices and deforestation. Many countries, especially those which bordered on states torn apart by civil war, faced a massive influx of refugees. Matters were made worse, and the economy ruined, when paranoid and short-sighted rulers – Laurent Kabila in the DRC and Mugabe in Zimbabwe – put their own self-interest before the national interest. Even able and well-intentioned leaders, such as Tanzania's Julius Nyerere and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, became increasingly authoritarian and divorced from reality in the face of mounting

economic difficulties. Some – including Kaunda, but not Nyerere – convinced themselves that their continued presence in office was essential if the economy was to be revived, when in fact they themselves had become a major barrier to improvement. Chiluba, Kaunda's successor as president, eventually decided in 2001 not to seek an extension to his ten-year constitutional term in office, thus following the lead of Rawlings in Ghana rather than Nujoma in Namibia.

* * *

In post-independent Africa the differences between the policies pursued by the two main types of regime – capitalist and socialist – were less wide than might have been expected on ideological grounds. This was because internal or external constraints, or a combination of the two, led most African regimes to temper their ideology with pragmatism. This was not after all surprising. In an interdependent world even First World states have been forced into economic realism; thus, the governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal pursued Thatcher-style policies despite their supposed espousal of significantly different ideologies. In Africa, as in many other parts of the Third World, the ideological debate about the ownership of the means of production – notably, whether public enterprises were 'socialist' or merely examples of 'state capitalism' – obscured for too long the more important issue of productivity and the need to apply stricter efficiency criteria.[30] For the time being at least, ideology has been put on the back-burner in Africa.

Development Prospects

Various ways in which the development prospects of African states might be improved have been suggested. First, African states might try and make a success of existing regional economic unions, or establish new unions where there is a need for them, in order to secure the advantages of bigger markets, avoid the wasteful duplication of projects, improve inter-state communications and reduce external dependency. Groupings such as ECOWAS and SADC are important in this respect, but it would be rash to expect too much of them. As far as SADC is concerned, the ideological differences between the constituent states have so far been contained and are now of diminished importance, though instances of economic nationalism persist and the grouping remains heavily dependent on Western financial investment. Since the advent to power of an ANC-dominated government in South Africa in May 1994, SADC – like ECOWAS and regional groupings in other parts of the world – has come under the domination of one

country. Much will therefore depend on the quality of the leadership which the South African government provides. It is important in the general interest of the SADC states that this domination should not militate against any substantial restructuring of trading and economic relations.

Second, given that African countries are predominantly agricultural, steps might be taken to stem the decline of agricultural output where this occurs, as it does in most of the continent, and also to correct the current rural–urban imbalance. These steps might include: currency devaluation on the ground that an overvalued exchange rate tilts the internal terms of trade against rural producers; a substantial increase in the producer prices paid to farmers; effective arrangements for the purchasing, processing and selling of major commodities; and the gradual disengagement from those import substitution industries which are high in cost, low in productivity and drain foreign exchange.[31] (This is not to deny that industry can play a key role in African development, subject to the precondition – stressed by Arthur Lewis for Ghana in 1953 – that there is a strong agricultural base.[32]) Most of these policies have been prescribed by the IMF and many of them have been accepted and some put into effect by African leaders of all ideological persuasion; the weak economic situation and desperate financial needs of their states left them with next to no alternative. It is the case that many African governments have feather-bedded the urban sector at the expense of rural producers. IMF conditions which seek to redress this imbalance make sense, but they have often been insensitively and too speedily applied, and have resulted in popular demonstrations – for example, against the abolition of food subsidies – which threaten regime stability. The fact that the IFIs have set aside their former structural adjustment approach in favour of a more politically sensitive and poverty-focused strategy demonstrates that concerted pressure by African and other Third World states to modify the conditions imposed upon them can be successful.

Third, African states might press again for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) on the ground that, until this is achieved, they and other Third World states will remain financially dependent on Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and MNCs. Unfortunately, African states have little leverage in this sphere; when this issue was raised in the past very few of the developed, northern states had a serious interest in creating such a new order. Elements within the governments of the Netherlands and Scandinavia were sympathetic and held reforming internationalist ideas, but these ideas had little impact on trade policies; this was shown by the willingness of these governments (with the partial exception of the Dutch government) to intervene to limit textiles and clothing imports from the newly industrialising countries

(NICs).[33] The lack of interest in a NIEO on the part of the leading industrialised states of the North was borne out by their response to the 1980 *Brandt Report* which put forward the concept of mutual interest and argued that a large-scale transfer of resources to the Third World would 'simultaneously assist the Third World and alleviate economic difficulties in the industrialised countries'.[34] The British, American and West German governments regarded the report as too interventionist and were not convinced that international pump-priming would be a good thing. The British government stressed the role of market forces in contributing to international growth and prosperity, and rejected the *Report*'s views of the limitations and imperfections of the world economy. It stated that: 'The Government believes strongly in the merits of the present world economic system, with its wide reliance on open markets for trade and financial flows.'[35] This statement ignored the extent to which the terms of trade had moved against Third World countries and disregarded the fact that impoverished states made poor trade partners.

In the aftermath of the 11 September tragedy Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, called in his speech at the Labour Party Conference in October 2001 for the creation of a new international order to be obtained by a fight for freedom and justice – 'justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to people around the world'. He expressed noble sentiments, no doubt sincerely held. What matters is how they are projected and received. The danger is that they may be seen as essentially Western values linked to international capitalism and any attempt to impose them on the less-developed world would be resented and resisted.[36]

Will Hutton, writing in The *Observer* (London) drew attention to the difficulties surrounding the Blair government's approach by pointing out that the street protests at the European summits in Prague and Nice and at the abortive World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting in Seattle showed that 'globalisation has not got many popular champions'. Capitalism, he believed, was inherently unfair and would result in 'vicious inequalities' rather than in the elimination of poverty.[37] To create a new international order would entail putting the needs of people before those of the MNCs and would also mean sacrificing Western financial interests where they were in conflict with Third World interests. This willingness to sacrifice was not evident in 1999 when the British Prime Minister publicly supported the giant Western pharmaceutical companies – from whose commercial and research activities Britain benefited – in their determination to maintain Western price levels at the expense of pregnant, HIV-positive women in South Africa.[38] Again the Blair government – with Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development, and Chancellor Gordon Brown dissenting – approved the

hugely controversial sale to Tanzania by British Aerospace (BAe) of a US$ 40 million military air traffic control system, thereby undermining the poverty reduction programmes in health and education of one of the world's poorest countries. Kevin Watkins, Oxfam's senior policy adviser, said that the decision to grant BAe an export licence 'exposes the huge gulf between prime ministerial rhetoric and foreign policy realities'.[39]

If real progress is to be made in eliminating poverty, starvation and disease in the poorest countries of Africa and Asia, the developed countries will need to divert very substantial resources from the domestic sector. But for Western leaders this could entail considerable political risk. Take, for example, the international arms trade from which the West has benefited. If this is substantially curtailed, embarrassingly heavy job losses could result. Past performance enables us to put future prospects in perspective – as noted in Chapter 8, for commercial and political reasons aid budgets in developed states have been under pressure since the 1990s. Except in the case of the Scandanavian countries and the Netherlands, the level of overseas aid in 1998 had fallen well behind the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GNP,[40] which was itself lowered in the Second Development Decade from the 1 per cent target set for the First Decade. The US record is poor and the statement made by President George Bush on taking office in January 2001 that his administration would prioritise national interests gives little ground for optimism. Yet the long-term attitude of the USA will be critical. In Africa, as distinct from Central and South America and Asia, the development problem is compounded because the decline in aid is not matched by productive private capital inflows. The situation is particularly acute in states like the DRC and Somalia, which have little chance of attracting private investment because of their internal troubles.

The problem of debt, to which attention was drawn in Chapter 8, underlines the fact that African states are part of an interdependent world and cannot divorce themselves from it even if they wished. Their very weak position has made it extremely difficult for them to withstand the pressure for change exerted by the World Bank, the IMF and Western governments. This has both political and economic aspects. Whereas in the 1970s Western donors applied creditworthiness, irrespective of regime type, as their main criterion for granting development aid and socialist regimes benefited accordingly, the emphasis from the late 1980s has been on respect for human rights and on the need for African governments to allow multi-party competition and to adopt other essential aspects of democratic government, including freedom of speech and association and the rule of law. This has been linked with the demand, already referred to, that African states should liberalise their economies, allow the free play of market forces and introduce a strong

private sector alongside reconstituted public enterprises. Good examples of this change in emphasis were to be found in the relations between France and francophone countries in Africa and in the revised Lomé IV Convention. As to the first, while important elements of continuity remained in Franco-African relations and were strongly reflected in the concept of *francophonie*, the 50 per cent devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994 'signalled the demise of the franco-African preferential monetary and trading area known as *la zone franc*'. As Martin pointed out, the corollary was that henceforth any new French aid commitment to regimes in this zone was made conditional upon a prior agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. In this way France shifted the burden of the huge foreign debts of countries such as Cameroon and the Côte d'Ivoire from the French Treasury to the Washington-based financial institutions.[41]

As to the Lomé IV Convention, the negotiations for the second (five-year) financial protocol led to the incorporation in the Convention (which covered the period from 1991 to 2000) of provisions on democracy, good governance and human rights. 'These reflect the modern consensus', said the ACP-EU *Courier* of January–February 1996, 'that genuine and sustainable development can only take place in a liberalised environment, both political or [sic] economic'. However, the revised Lomé IV Convention did not provide the ACP states with any increase in real terms in the financial resources made available to them, an important reason being the felt need to meet the demand for funds of the former communist-ruled states in Eastern Europe. The West in general welcomes a policy which seeks to enhance respect for human rights on the ground that the presence of 'liberty' – meaning, at the very least, freedom of speech, freedom of political association, and limited government – is 'basic to the structure of society' in all states, whether capitalist or socialist.[42] But this view is not necessarily shared by many people living in the underdeveloped states of Africa and Asia. As discussed above, the context in which these values are rooted is very different and traditional or other values may count for more. In any case, a libertarian policy is difficult to apply consistently, especially when the commercial interests of the donor country are affected and there is a risk of substantial job losses at home (the arms industry is an obvious example). As became clear during Jimmy Carter's presidency in the United States and when Robin Cook was foreign secretary in Britain's Labour government, human rights can be a blunt and uncertain instrument of foreign policy. To incorporate criteria of 'good government' (or 'good governance', to use the term that is currently in vogue) into aid policy also raises difficulties quite apart from the problem of securing general agreement on its meaning among Western governments. The problems are both moral and practical, normative and empirical.

The moral problem, referred to earlier, is whether Western governments have the *right* to impose a particular form of government on 'sovereign' African states. Official spokespersons deny that there is any intention of doing so, and there has indeed been some back-tracking on this issue. Yet 'good government', we are told in official statements by Western leaders, still requires pluralistic decision-making, the introduction of market forces and a strong private sector, as well as policies to tackle poverty and illiteracy, and an open and fair legal system. In this way, they implicitly affirmed the contention of Larry Diamond and his co-editors of *Democracy in Developing Countries* (1988) that 'one does not find democracy in the absence of some form of capitalism'.[43] They asserted that this empirical association was not necessarily permanent, and maintained that democracy as a system of government should be kept conceptually distinct from capitalism and socialism. Nevertheless, they gave little attention to alternatives to capitalism that might be compatible with democracy. The thrust of the Diamond study was the need for economic liberalism and the adoption of market mechanisms and incentives. This accorded closely with Western donor thinking, but sidestepped the practical difficulty that at independence the African state became the main agent of economic development precisely because of limited indigenous private ownership and control of productive enterprises. When Nigeria went some way in developing a basis of production and accumulation outside oil and the state, state regulation and intervention were still required both to check business excesses and to secure the equitable distribution of such wealth as was created. The argument that the reduction of state control of the economy would serve to reduce the premium on the holding of political power also did not necessarily follow: in Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia, for example, many politicians and bureaucrats acquired business interests while holding public office; this pattern has continued in Angola and elsewhere. Moreover, the existence in Nigeria of a considerable number of autonomous interest groups, and a process of embourgeoisement quickened by the oil economy, did not prevent the re-imposition of military rule in 1983 or, especially under the Buhari and Abacha regimes, the abuse of human rights.

Evidence from Botswana points in the same direction, even though its cattle industry, predominantly owned and controlled by citizens, made this Southern African country a partial exception to the pattern whereby the state was the main agent of economic development. Within a few years of independence, the Botswana government felt the need to tackle the problems of overgrazing and the deterioration of communal land in the tribal communal areas. Moreover, from the outset the government sought to prescribe the terms under which multinational companies operated the state's growing

mining industry. The result was that state intervention and regulation of the economy were hardly less substantial in Botswana than in African states like Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia which mostly pursued a state capitalist strategy of development. In Botswana, as in African states generally, such state control made power-holding attractive and strengthened the desire to maintain the existing system of government.[44]

The state also played a key role in promoting development in Mauritius. As Thomas Meisenhelder has pointed out, the Mauritian state took the initiative in promoting export-led industrialisation. He concluded:

> It is sometimes suggested that the NICs offer good examples of development by following the 'free market'. To the contrary, their actual experience – as confirmed by what has been achieved in Mauritius – points to the importance of the state as regards the process of dependent capitalist development. In these cases, economic growth has been the result of the guidance and intervention of the state bureaucracy rather than the unfettered market-place.[45]

The argument advanced here is that despite the move towards economic liberalisation, with privatisation as a significant element, the state still has an important role to play. J. K. Galbraith pointed out that the advocates of the capitalist or free enterprise approach to development in central Europe took insufficient account of 'the pragmatic admixture of private enterprise and state action and restraint that is the western and Japanese norm' and argued that not enough attention had been given to building the institutional structure that the market economy required.[46] Prior to its 1997 *Report*, the World Bank was guilty of neglect in this respect; yet it continued to put forward its structural adjustment policies, leading Whitaker to observe: 'The paradox of structural adjustment is that it envisages a stronger society and a weaker central state; yet, to implement the policy a vastly stronger state than currently exists is required.'[47] The African state co-exists with civil society and far from being 'all-encompassing' and 'all-signifying', it is often (in Chabal's words) 'a Leviathan with feet of clay'.[48] In those cases where the state is wracked by civil war – as in Angola, the DRC, and Somalia – it is very lame indeed and has all the characteristics of the 'shadow state', feeding on neo-patrimonial networks and leading to widespread political and economic corruption.[49]

* * *

Whereas in Africa there was much evidence for a decade or so from the mid-1970s that the 'second wave' of socialist states was marking out new

ideological directions in African affairs, with possible divisive effects on the OAU, thereafter (as a result of the sort of development constraints outlined in this chapter) there was a retreat from socialist commitments. The effect of these constraints was to increase the external dependence of African states and to magnify external leverage on domestic politics. The 1970s impetus to the ideologisation of African politics all but disappeared, to the extent indeed that many African states seemed to have entered an 'end of ideology' phase. The emphasis on implementing IMF and World Bank economic recovery programmes which followed was replicated throughout much of the Third World, in Jamaica, Mexico and Nicaragua no less than in Algeria, Mozambique and Tanzania; often, too, it was accompanied by steps to create or restore a multi-party system of government. There were of course a few exceptions to this pattern, Cuba and North Korea being examples; also the pattern was less dramatic in South and South-East Asia, where for a longer period than in Africa the leadership had inclined towards capitalist strategies of development. Even in Africa the apparent strength of the movement towards de-ideologisation might not prove permanent, given the problems which are currently facing many African economies and the likelihood that markets in Central and Eastern Europe will continue to prove more attractive to Western investment capital.

I have argued in this chapter that IFIs and Western governments must be realistic in the aid conditions which they impose, and that while they have every right to deny development aid to flagrantly repressive regimes, they are on much shakier ground in seeking to dictate the political and economic systems which African states should adopt. In so doing, they ignore the sovereignty of African states. They also take no account of the North's obligation to repay the South for colonial neglect and exploitation, for post-colonial trade imbalances which have saddled the underdeveloped states of the South with the heavy burden of debt servicing and, in some cases, for continuing exploitation of African economies by foreign companies. In Nigeria the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists in November 1995 brought to world attention the environmental damage caused in Ngoniland, in the oil-rich Niger Delta, by the mining activities of the Dutch Shell oil company. Environmental issues are assuming increased importance in Africa.

It is ironic that, in the name of 'political and economic freedom', Western governments should seek to deny Uganda and other African states the freedom to choose the political and economic systems which these states believe will best suit their individual circumstances and needs. That political democracy in Africa – a term used here to cover as a minimum freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assembly and the holding of free and fair elections, and the rule of law – is highly desirable, irrespective of the ideological

orientation of individual African states, is not in question. Rather, my argument is that for Western governments and aid agencies to force the pace of political reform in Africa artificially and to seek to encase democracy in a Western mould will merely undermine what in any event is certain to be a difficult and protracted process. The further criterion for the grant of development aid – that African states should move towards 'economic liberalisation' – should also be applied with caution: partly (and fundamentally) because African governments should be free to choose their own economic system, partly because of the impediments to privatisation noted in Chapter 6, and partly because, as Sklar argues, 'reform strategies designed to increase public-sector efficiency' may be 'more practical' than privatisation where natural resource and utility companies are concerned.[50] Additionally, as I pointed out in the case of Botswana and Mauritius, the state – except 'shadow' states such as the DRC and Somalia – still has an important role to play in regulating and promoting economic development. Though most African states are pigmies in the global economy, they are today supported by 'unruly heretics' who, at Seattle, Prague and elsewhere, showed that they were prepared to resist the encroachments of Western capitalism in its present form. What African and other Third World leaders want is not to reject globalisation, but to achieve a fairer distribution of its fruits. As Amartya Sen sagely observed: 'The predicament of the poor across the world cannot be removed by withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary technology, international trade and exchange – and the social as well as economic merits of living in open societies.'[51] This fact has been recognised for some time by James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, who has argued that the priority is to tackle poverty and global inequality (between as well as within nations), which have reached massive levels. Since 11 September the IMF – attacked by Joseph Stiglitz, a former chief economist of the Bank, 'for its secrecy, its arrogance and its wrong-headed policies' – has come to share this view. Hopefully, therefore, the Western financial institutions will no longer insist that they are the repositories of 'the one true faith' – a faith which, when structural adjustment was in vogue, had to be followed to the letter. Since African governments are aware of what can realistically be achieved within the political and socio-economic context in which they operate, the new policies must be based on co-operation with these governments and not on dictation.[52] As Gordon Brown has pointed out, badly managed globalisation will lead to the marginalisation of millions of people; but, if managed wisely, it can lift millions out of poverty.[53] Such statements suggest that there is now a heightened awareness among Western leaders of the development problems in Africa and other parts of the Third World. Opportunities for them to co-operate in promoting African development are evident from the initiative

taken in 2001 by the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria in putting forward the Millennium Africa Plan (MAP). This plan seeks the help of the IFIs and Western governments to achieve and sustain a GDP growth rate for Africa of over 7 per cent a year for the next 15 years.[54] The plan also commits Africa's rulers to fulfil the conditions for aid laid down by Western powers, namely respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy and accountable government, and economic liberalisation; in voluntarily accepting such commitments, African states must expect to be judged by the extent to which they uphold them. Tony Blair believes that this African initiative deserves a positive response. Following the lead given by President Bill Clinton, who visited six African countries in 1998 in order (it was claimed) to show that the African continent was no longer marginal to the USA's interests,[55] the British Prime Minister visited Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal in February 2002. His stated intention was first to secure the outline agreement of African governments to implement what has come to be known as the 'New Partnership for African Development' (NEPAD), combining MAP with a supplementary proposal (the 'Omega Plan') prepared by the President of Senegal, and then to submit NEPAD to the G8 leaders of industrialised states at their meeting in Canada in June 2002. However, the prospects of a meaningful 'new partnership' emerging are remote. Given Africa's marginalisation in the global economy, the relationship on Africa's side is bound to be a heavily dependent one. What Africa desperately needs from the West are: fair terms of trade, generous development aid, and the speedy provision of debt relief.[56]

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16. Munslow (1983), Part 1.
17. Oliver and Fage (1962), Chs 17 and 19, provide a good and succinct account of these various phases. See also Fage (1995), Chs 13–17.

18.   Munslow (1983), Ch. 2.
19.   Quoted by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 'The Thin White Line: The Size of the British Colonial Service in Africa', *African Affairs*, 79, 314(January 1980), p. 26.
20.   Oliver and Fage (1962), p. 200, and Ch. 17, *passim*; Fage (1995), Chs 15–16.
21.   For the hold-up of palm-oil 'for several months' by local traders in the Eastern Palm Belt of Southern Nigeria, see D. Forde and R. Scott, *The Native Economies of Nigeria*, ed. M. Perham (London: Faber & Faber, 1946), Ch. 2, especially p. 54, n. 1. On Senegal, see D. B. Cruise O'Brien, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 138.
22.   Bender (1978), pp. 6–9.
23.   J. Coussy, 'The Franc Zone', in Kirk-Greene and Bach (1995), pp. 160–1.
24.   The *Guardian*, 13 December 1998, quoted by Roy May, 'France: Down and Out in Africa', paper presented at the Conference of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom on 'Africa: Past, Present and Future', Trinity College, Cambridge, September 2000.
25.   Oliver and Fage (1962), pp. 221, 245; Rodney (1972), Ch. 5.
26.   Quoted in D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946–60* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 275.
27.   See Fage (1995), Chs 15–16; R. H. Bates, *Unions, Parties and Political Development – A Study of Mineworkers in Zambia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 198–200, and *passim*.
28.   M. Etienne, 'Women and Men, Cloth and Colonization: The Transformation of Production–Distribution Relations among the Baule (Ivory Coast)', in M. Etienne and E. Leacock (eds), *Women and Colonization: Anthropological Perspectives* (New York: Praeger, 1980).
29.   Essential background information is provided by D. Simon, 'Decolonisation and Local Government in Namibia: The Neo-Apartheid Plan, 1977–83', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23, 3(1985).
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3   Nationalism and the Transfer of Power

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2.   Ernest Gellner stresses the importance of a homogeneous educational system for a modern society in J. C. Jarvie and I. Agassi (eds), *Contemporary Thought and Politics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 147. For his earlier and subsequent reflections on nationalism, see his *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), Ch. 7, and *Nationalism and Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982).
3.   See D. O. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* (London: Methuen, 1956).
4.   Cf. Gellner (1974), pp. 154–6.
5.   W. Tordoff, *Ashanti under the Prempehs, 1888–1935* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 190; R. Young and H. A. Fosbrooke, *Smoke in the Hills. Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1960), *passim*.
6.   T. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (London: Frederick Muller, 1956), Ch. 3; A. Hastings, *African Christianity. An Essay in Interpretation* (London: Chapman, 1976), pp. 10–12.
7.   Hastings (1976), p. 10.
8.   *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12; Hodgkin (1956), Ch. 3.
9.   J. S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 108.

10. Hodgkin (1956), Ch. 3. See also B. Sundkler, *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961, 2nd edn).
11. Quoted in R. Emerson and M. Kilson (eds), *The Political Awakening of Africa* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 9–10.
12. Hodgkin (1956), Ch. 5, *passim*; Emerson and Kilson (1965), p. 13.
13. Quoted in Hodgkin (1956), p. 146.
14. See D. Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946–60* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), especially Ch. 2.
15. Coleman (1958), Chs 15–16; K. Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria* (Cambridge University Press, 1960), Chs 5 and 8.
16. Hodgkin (1956), pp. 151, 164; R. S. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), *passim*.
17. Hodgkin (1956), pp. 152–6.
18. See Austin (1964), Ch. VI, which brilliantly captured the excitement of the struggle for power in Ashanti between 1954 and 1956, and D. Austin and W. Tordoff, 'Voting in an African Town', *Political Studies*, 8, 2(June 1960).
19. Morgenthau (1964), p. 72.
20. See T. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961).
21. W. J. M. Mackenzie and K. E. Robinson (eds), *Five Elections in Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 478.
22. In *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton University Press, 1964), Aristide R. Zolberg noted that the PDCI 'emerged as an organization for the masses rather than as a mass organization' (p. 185) and that it 'had created a sort of confederation of ethnic associations' (p. 129). Bonnie Campbell drew attention to 'the continuing importance of ethnicity as an organizational principle of the single party' in the Ivory Coast: B. Campbell, 'Ivory Coast', in J. Dunn (ed.), *West African States: Failure and Promise. A Study in Comparative Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 90.
23. J. Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 230–4.
24. See W. H. Friedland, 'For a Sociological Concept of Charisma', New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Reprinted Series, 160 (New York, 1964). The quotation from Chinoy is taken from this paper.
25. Quoted in I. Wallerstein, 'Voluntary Associations', Ch. 8 in J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, Jr (eds), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 331. I have drawn substantially upon Wallerstein's chapter in the first part of this section.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 326–7; Hodgkin (1956), pp. 88–9.
27. See S. Low, 'The Role of Trade Unions in the Newly Independent Countries of Africa', in E. M. Kassalow (ed.), *National Labor Movements in the Post-war World* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 215–16; G. Fischer, 'Syndicats et Décolonisation', *Présence Africaine*, 34–35(October 1960–January 1961), esp. pp. 23ff.; and E. J. Berg and J. Butler, 'Trade Unions', in Coleman and Rosberg (1964), p. 341.
28. V. D. Du Bois, 'Guinea', in Coleman and Rosberg (1964), p. 208.
29. Berg and Butler in Coleman and Rosberg (1964), pp. 347, 351–2.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 348–51. The most authoritative account of trade union developments in Ghana is R. Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwaymen of Sekondi* (Cambridge University Press, 1978).
32. A. H. Amsden, 'Trade Unions and Politics: Kenya', in collected seminar papers on *Labour Unions and Political Organisations* (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, January–May 1967), 3, p. 122.
33. See W. H. Friedland, *VUTA KAMBA: The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), and W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), Ch. 5.

34. Jeffries (1978), p. 207 and *passim*; R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action* (University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 18–19 and 313–14 (by the editors) and pp. 117–25 (by C. H. Allen on Francophone West Africa).

35. Austin (1964), pp. 347, 347 n. 35, 354 (*Note*: the figures for adults aged 21 and over for the registered electorate do not include those for five uncontested constituencies).

36. See D. Austin, 'The British Point of No Return?', Ch. 9 in P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (eds), *The Transfer of Power in Africa. Decolonization, 1940–1960* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 234.

37. Hodgkin (1956), p. 36.

38. Morgenthau (1964), pp. 70, 72.

39. R. B. Collier, *Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–75* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Chs 2 and 3, *passim*. I have drawn substantially on these chapters in this final section.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 47; see also H. F. Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle* (Princeton University Press, 1967), Part 1.

41. A. R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 25.

42. Collier (1982), pp. 78–9. As Collier recognises, the picture was distorted because voters were allowed to cast their ballots in uncontested constituencies in French Africa and did so on a substantial scale; no voting took place in uncontested constituencies in British Africa. See *ibid.*, pp. 78 and 88.

43. See *ibid.*, pp. 80–94.

44. Morgenthau (1964), p. 73.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–4.

46. R. Luckham, 'French Militarism in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 24 (May–August 1982), pp. 58–9; S. K. Panter-Brick, 'French African Administration', University of Zambia lecture (mimeo, 1969), P.A. 320/430.

47. C. G. Rosberg, Jr and J. Nottingham, *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. xvii.

48. B. Munslow, 'FRELIMO and the Mozambican Revolution', PhD thesis, University of Manchester, April 1980, p. 410.

49. See B. Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins* (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 81–2 and Ch. 11. The anti-FRELIMO Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique (COREMO) was small, based in Lusaka, and had only a limited impact on the liberation struggle; it is not discussed in this section.

50. *Mozambique Revolution*, 56(June–September 1973), quoted in Munslow (April 1980), p. 380.

51. J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, I: *The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950–1962)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969), p. 123. As well as this excellent study (in two volumes), see C. Legum and T. Hodges, *After Angola: The War over Southern Africa* (London: Rex Collings, 1976); the study prepared by the Research Department of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, London: 'Angola after Independence: Struggle for Supremacy', *Conflict Studies*, 64(November 1975), and B. Davidson, *In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People* (London: Longman, 1972).

52. Marcum (1969), pp. 10 and 318.

53. This was admitted by Lucio Lara, the MPLA's leading theoretician. See J. Steele, 'Social Upheaval', the *Guardian*, special issue on Angola, 2 March 1981.

54. J. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, II: *Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962–1976)* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1978), *passim*.

55. Information supplied by B. Munslow; Legum and Hodges (1976), pp. 10–11; Marcum (1978).

56. J. Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978).

57. See P. Chabal, 'National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956–1974', *African Affairs*, 80, 318 (January 1981). This article was extracted from Professor Chabal's Cambridge University doctoral thesis and book: *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War* (Cambridge University Press, 1983). For an alternative interpretation, see B. Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky* (London: Zed Press, 1981). See also A. Cabral, *Unity and Struggle* (London: Heinemann, 1980). The small, anti-PAIGC Frente para a Libertação e Independência da Guiné Portuguesa (FLING), based in Dakar and supported by the Senegalese government, had a minimal impact on the liberation struggle and is not discussed here.

58. Statement by Cabral, quoted in Chabal (1983), p. 66.

59. J. S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (London: Heinemann, 1979): Machel quoted on p. 116.

60. See T. Ranger, 'The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 7, 1(October 1980) and *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See also D. Martin and P. Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London: Faber & Faber, 1981).

61. An account of ZANU-PF structures is to be found in L. Cliffe, J. Mpofu and B. Munslow, 'Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The 1980 Elections and Beyond', *Review of African Political Economy*, 18: special issue on Zimbabwe (May–August 1980).

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63. See J. Mayall, 'The South African Crisis: The Major External Actors', in S. Johnson (ed.), *South Africa: No Turning Back* (London: Macmillan, 1988), Ch. 10.

64. J. Spence, 'Domestic Order, Regional Power and International Relations: the Future of South Africa', in J. Mayall and A. Payne (eds), *The Fallacies of Hope. The Post-Colonial Record of the Commonwealth Third World* (Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 145.

65. See S. Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid. Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978–1988* (London: Macmillan, 1990), Part II: 'The Regional Policy of South Africa'.

66. S. Marks and S. Trapido, 'South Africa since 1976: An Historical Perspective', in Johnson (1988), pp. 28–9.

67. D. Geldenhuys, quoted by J. E. Spence in Johnson (1988), p. 245.

68. C. A. Pycroft, 'South Africa's Regional Foreign Policy during the Total Strategy Era', PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1989.

69. Nolutshungu in Johnson (1988), p. 341.

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71. Pycroft (1989).

72. See D. Austin, 'The Trinitarians: the 1983 South African Constitution', *Government and Opposition*, 20, 2(Spring 1985), esp. pp. 188–9.

73. Mayall in Johnson (1988), pp. 308–9; the *Independent*, 16 April 1991; the *Guardian*, 11 July 1991.

74. See Spence in Mayall and Payne (1991), pp. 150ff.

75. Report by Allister Sparks, the *Observer*, 14 July 1991; the *Independent*, 16 April 1991 and the *Guardian*, 11 June 1991 (lifting of European Community sanctions – the refusal of the Danish parliament to approve the move meant that they remained legally in place); the *Guardian*, 11 July 1991 (lifting of most US sanctions and the ANC's response); and the *Guardian*, 6 June 1991 (OAU sanctions retained). Robin Hallett, *Annual Register*, 1988, 'Angola', p. 286.

76. See, for example, the *Observer*, 19 May, 28 July and 11 August 1991; the *Guardian*, 17 May 1991, and N. Mathiane, 'Our Bloody Sundays', the *Guardian*, 3 June 1991.

77. See the *Guardian* 22 and 25 July 1991, and A. Sparks, 'De Klerk's Fall from Grace', the *Observer*, 28 July 1991.
78. The *Guardian*, 26 and 31 July, 2 and 3 October 1991.
79. A. Sparks, 'South Africans fear hidden hand of violence despite peace plans', the *Observer*, 15 September 1991.
80. *Ibid.* and the *Guardian International* (London), 9 September 1991; the *Guardian*, 12, 16 and 20 September 1991.
81. Spence in Mayall and Payne (1991), p. 159.
82. *Keesing's*, 41 (1995), Annual Reference Supplement, R30-1: 'South Africa'.
83. *Ibid.*
84. The ANC won easily: it gained 66.37 per cent of the votes cast and secured outright majorities on 387 councils, as against 45 for the NP and none for the IFP. *Ibid.* 41, 11 (1995), 'South Africa', 40809.
85. T. Lodge, 'The South African General Election, April 1994', *African Affairs*, 94, 377 (October 1995).
86. *Keesing's*, 41 (1995), Annual Reference Supplement, R30-1: 'South Africa'.
87. Austin in Gifford and Louis (1982), p. 233.
88. I. Phimister, 'Comrades Compromised: The Zimbabwean and South African Liberation Struggles Compared and Contrasted', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 8, I, March 1995, p. 89.
89. *Ibid.*
90. Seton-Watson (1977), p. 353.
91. R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg distinguish between empirical statehood and juridical statehood and argue that the latter is more important than the former 'in accounting for the persistence of states in Black Africa'; indeed, 'the survival of Africa's existing states is largely an international achievement'. See their article: 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood', *World Politics*, 35, 1 (October 1982), pp. 21–2 and *passim*.

4   State and Society

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2. J. D. Fage, *A History of Africa*, 3rd edition (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 504. I have drawn on this book elsewhere for background information.
3. M. F. Lofchie (ed.), *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), Conclusion, pp. 272–3.
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6. C. Leys, 'The Political Climate for Economic Development', *African Affairs*, 65, 258(1966), p. 55.
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12. *Ibid.*, p. 43; A. de Waal, 'The Genocidal State', the *Times Literary Supplement*, 1 July 1994, pp. 3–4.
13. C. and D. Newbury (1994), p. 44.
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17. M. Szeftel, 'Conflict, Spoils and Class Formation in Zambia', PhD thesis, University of Manchester, 1978, esp. Ch. 6.
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21. O'Brien (1975), pp. 164–5 and Ch. 5, *passim*, and D. B. Cruise O'Brien, 'Ruling Class and Peasantry in Senegal, 1960–1976: The Politics of a Monocrop Economy', in R. Cruise O'Brien (ed.), *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Dependence in Senegal* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1979), pp. 223–5.
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23. Szeftel (1978), p. 332.
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25. A. Abdallah, W. Tordoff, R. Gordon, and S. Nyang, *Report on the Second and Third Tier Authorities* (Windhoek, Namibia: UNDP, 9 September 1989), Chs II and III.
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28. For an informed discussion, see R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds), *The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Formation and Action* (University of Toronto Press: 1975).
29. M. Burawoy, 'Another Look at the Mineworker', *African Social Research*, 14(December 1972), pp. 261–7, 276ff.
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31. R. H. Bates, *Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village Zambia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 133–6.
32. O'Brien (1975), p. 138 and in R. C. O'Brien (1979), Ch. 7.
33. Bates (1976), p. 259; Sandbrook (1972), p. 107.
34. Sandbrook (1972).

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38.   See C. Pratt, 'Tanzania's Transition to Socialism', and R. H. Green, 'Tanzanian Political Economy Goals, Strategies and Results, 1967–74', in B. U. Mwansasu and C. Pratt (eds), *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (University of Toronto Press, 1979). Jeannette Hartmann argued that policy-making in Tanzania was a tripartite process involving the President, the government and the party: see J. Hartmann, 'Development Policy-Making in Tanzania, 1962–1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations', PhD thesis, University of Hull, April 1983.
39.   Szeftel (1978), Ch. 7; C. L. Baylies and M. Szeftel, 'The Rise of a Zambian Capitalist Class in the 1970s', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 8, 2(April 1982); N. Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918–1977* (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 203.
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41.   B. Munslow, 'The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique and the Origins of Post-Independence Political and Economic Policy', in *Mozambique* (University of Edinburgh: Seminar Proceedings, Centre of African Studies, 1979). See also Munslow, *Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins* (London: Longman, 1983), Part 4, and 'Disengagement from a Regional Sub-System: Problems and Prospects', *Journal of Area Studies*, 4 (Autumn 1981); J. Hanlon, 'Machel Back-Pedals on Private Enterprise', the *Guardian*, 15 July 1981, and *Mozambique: The Revolution under Fire* (London: Zed Books, 1984); N. Zafiris, 'The People's Republic of Mozambique: Pragmatic Socialism', in P. Wiles (ed.), *The New Communist Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), Ch. 4; K. Middlemas, 'Mozambique: Two Years of Independence', in *Mozambique* (1979), p. 104; and L. Vail and L. White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique* (London: Heinemann, 1981).
42.   P. Goodison, 'The Construction of Socialism in Mozambique', BA Econ. dissertation, University of Manchester, April 1982, p. 77.
43.   See T. Young, 'The MNR/RENAMO: External and Internal Dynamics', *African Affairs*, 89, 357(October 1990), p. 492, n. 5. The name 'RENAMO' was adopted by the National Resistance Movement (MRN, sometimes abbreviated as MNR) as 'part of an attempt to Mozambicanize itself'.
44.   K. Brown, 'Angolan Socialism', in C. G. Rosberg and T. M. Callaghy (eds), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979), pp. 298–304. See also J. Steele, 'Party Leaders', the *Guardian*, 2 March 1981; the various articles in this special issue on Angola, notably those by Jonathan Steele, provide information which usefully supplements Brown's earlier (1979) account. On the Angolan economy, see N. Zafiris, 'The People's Republic of Angola: Soviet-Type Economy in the Making', in P. Wiles (ed.), *The New Communist Third World* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), Ch. 2.
45.   P. Chabal, 'National Liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956–1974', *African Affairs*, 80, 318(January 1981), pp. 76–9; B. Munslow, 'The 1980 Coup in Guinea–Bissau', *Review of African Political Economy*, 21 (May–September 1981), p. 110; and B. Davidson, 'No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky: Building Guinea–Bissau and Cape Verde', *Race and Class*, 23, 1 (Summer 1981), extracted from Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky* (London: Zed Books, 1981).
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49. G. Geisler, 'Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa. Case Studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana', *African Affairs*, 94, 377(October 1995), p. 545.
50. *Ibid.* p. 553.
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and Action (University of Toronto Press, 1975). On Tanzania, see W. H. Friedland, *VUTA KAMBA: The Development of Trade Unions in Tanganyika* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), Ch. 5 and I. G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London: Heinemann, 1976), Ch. 13.

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17. R. Charlton, 'Bureaucrats and Politicians in Botswana's Policy-Making Process: A Re-Interpretation', *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 29, 3(November 1991), p. 276.

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46. All the quotations are from Tangri: *ibid.* pp. 98 (Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe); 139 (Kenya); 144 (Uganda); 141 (Zambia); and 138 (Botswana and Cameroon). On Kenya he quotes from J. M. Cohen, 'Importance of Public Service Reform: The Case of Kenya', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31, 3(1993), p. 472.
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49. T. Rasmussen, 'The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest', in Tordoff (1974), p. 58.
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6 Administration

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25. Lofchie (1967), *passim*.
26. W. Tordoff, 'Introduction' to Tordoff (1980), p. 21.
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63. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
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65. See Tordoff (1994), pp. 559, 565; W. Tordoff, 'Ghana', in D. C. Rowat (ed.), *International Handbook on Local Government Reorganization* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), Ch. 32, 379–92; D. Harris, 'Central power and Local Reform: Post-Nkrumah Ghana', in Mawhood (ed.), 1993, Ch. 8, pp. 211–34; Crook and Manor (1998), Ch. 5. In discussing the district assemblies in the early 1990s, I have drawn upon Crook and Manor (1998), Ch. 5 on 'Ghana'.

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67. See E. J. Berg, 'Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 78, 4(November 1964), pp. 558–60.

68. Hanson (1966), p. 474.

69. Y. A. Fauré, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Analysing the Crisis', in D. B. Cruise O'Brien, J. Dunn and R. Rathbone (eds), *Contemporary West African States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 59.

70. W. A. Lewis, *Development Planning. The Essentials of Economic Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), Preface, p. 7.

71. See R. H. Green, 'Four African Development Plans', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2 (1965), pp. 253–4.

72. Fauré in O'Brien, Dunn and Rathbone (1989), p. 68.

7 The Military

1. General Joseph-Desiré Mobutu seized power in Congo-Léopoldville (ex-Belgian colony) in 1965 and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in Libya (ex-Italian colony) in 1969, while President Luis Cabral was arrested and his government removed in Guinea–Bissau (ex-Portuguese colony) in 1980. In Equatorial Guinea (ex-Spanish colony), the tyrannical rule of Francisco Macias Nguema was ended with his overthrow in 1979, but human rights abuses have continued under his successor, President (Brigadier-General) Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.

2. Ruth Collier, *Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–75* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) criticises Professor Finer for introducing a blanket single-party concept and for his finding that one-party and multi-party regimes are equally likely to experience military intervention. She makes a valid distinction within the one-party category and argues that multi-party regimes above all, but also one-party regimes formed by coercion rather than as a result of electoral victory or merger, are likely to prove unstable. There may be something in this argument, but it cannot be pushed too far: Botswana and Mauritius are examples of multi-party states which have retained civilian governments continuously since independence, as did the Gambia for nearly 30 years (1965–94).

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A. R. Luckham, 'A Comparative Typology of Civil–Military Relations', *Government and Opposition*, 6, 1(Winter 1971); R. First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London: Allen Lane, 1970), p. 20; S. Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 19 (*Note*: A revised edition of Decalo's book was published in 1990; textual references are to the original edition).

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9. J. R. Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone, 1947–67* (University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 255.

10. Cox (1976), p. 135, and *passim*.

11. D. G. Austin, 'The Ghana Case', in *The Politics of Demilitarisation* (Collected Seminar Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, April–May 1966).

12. First (1970), p. 20.

13. E. Hansen, 'The Military and Revolution in Ghana', *Journal of African Marxists*, 2 (August 1982), pp. 10–11.

14. See Decalo (1976), p. 18.

15. The National Assembly's public accounts committee had drawn attention to a deficit in the defence budget for which Amin was held responsible. Before leaving for Singapore, Obote had told Amin that he would require a full explanation on his return: K. Ingham, *Obote. A Political Biography* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 135.

16. See R. L. Sklar, 'Nigerian Politics in Perspective', and 'Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System', in R. Melson and H. Wolpe (eds), *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 1971), Ch. 2, pp. 46–7, and Ch. 19.

17. J. P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 550. Mackintosh referred particularly to 1963, but his description applies to the 1962–6 period as a whole.

18. Sklar (1971), p. 49.

19. The account which follows draws heavily on Luckham (1971; see n. 3), esp. Chs 1 and 2.

20. A. Ademoyega, *Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup* (Ibadan: Evans, 1981); B. Gbulie, *Nigeria's Five Majors* (Onitsha: Africana Educational Publishers, 1981).

21. Decalo (1976), Ch. 2.

22. Michael F. Lofchie concluded that 'antagonistic social forces within Uganda society' led to the *coup* of January 1971. See his article 'The Uganda *coup* – Class Action by the Military', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10, 1(1972). However, this view was challenged in a subsequent issue of the same journal (10, 4) by J. D. Chick and I. Gershenberg.

23. Huntington (1968), Ch. 4.

24. G. Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33, 1(1995), pp. 12–14.

25. Quoted in R. May, 'France: Down and Out in Africa?', paper presented at the Conference of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom on 'Africa: Past, Present and Future', Trinity College, Cambridge, 11–13 September 2000, p. 9.

26. R. Luckham, 'French Militarism in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 24(May–August 1982), p. 70. For a discussion of the international dimension generally, see his 'Armaments, Underdevelopment, and Demilitarisation in Africa', in *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy*, 6, 2(July 1980), in which he argued that the process of militarisation in Africa includes not only the actual acquisition of weapons, but also the extension of military values into political and social structures.

27. The *Guardian*, 28, 29 and 30 November and 7 December 1991.

28. Martin (1995), p. 14.

29. *Financial Times* (London), 14 November 1996, quoted in S. Massey, 'Keeping the Peace or Maintaining Influence: The French Peacekeeping Initiative in Africa', paper presented at

the Conference of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom on 'Africa: Past, Present and Future', Trinity College, Cambridge, 11–13 September 2000, pp. 2–3. Massey drew on Assemblée Nationale, *Mission d'information sur le Rwanda: Rapport d'informa-tion* (Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1998) and *Agence France Presse*, 15 December 1998.

30. Shaun Gregory explores the reasons for the changes in French military policy in Africa and points to 'a continuing but refocused role for the French military in Africa'. See his article 'The French Military in Africa: Past and Present', *African Affairs*, 99, 396(July 2000), pp. 435–48, quotation, p. 440.

31. A. Hughes and R. May, 'Armies on Loan: Toward an Explanation of Transnational Military Intervention among Black African States: 1960–1984', paper presented at the 21st Anniversary Conference of the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom, University of York, 19–21 September 1984.

32. J. F. Clark, 'Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 2(June 2001), pp. 261–87.

33. *Ibid.* p. 285.

34. M. Nest, 'Ambitions, Profits and Loss: Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', *African Affairs*, 100, 400(July 2001), pp. 469–90.

35. C. Clapham, *Third World Politics. An Introduction* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 121.

36. Nolutshungu (1991), p. 97.

37. R. Otayek, 'Burkina Faso: Between Feeble State and Total State, The Swing Continues', in D. B. Cruise O'Brien, J. Dunn and R. Rathbone (eds), *Contemporary West African States* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 20.

38. M. J. Dent, 'Corrective Government: Military Rule in Perspective', in S. K. Panter-Brick (ed.), *Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), Ch. 4.

39. Luckham (1971), pp. 310–25.

40. R. Dowse, 'Military and Political Rule', in D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds), *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana* (London: Frank Cass, 1975), p. 21; A. D. Yahaya, 'The Struggle for Power in Nigeria, 1966–79', in O. Oyediran (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966–79* (London: Macmillan, 1979), Ch. 13; Dent (1978), pp. 113ff.

41. M. Berry, 'Factional Conflict in the Nigerian Army: The July 1975 Coup and the Decision to Demilitarise', *Huddersfield Papers in Politics*, 3(mimeo, Autumn 1981).

42. See C. Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 164.

43. O. Oyediran, 'Civilian Rule for How Long?', in Oyediran (1979), Ch. 14, esp. p. 279.

44. See First (1970), p. 436 and G. Lamb, 'The Military and Development in Eastern Africa', in 'Military Regimes', *Bulletin of the Institute of Development Studies*, University of Sussex, 4, 4(September 1972), p. 22.

45. Dowse (1975), pp. 25ff.

46. In this section on the economy, I have drawn on A. Kirk-Greene and D. Rimmer, *Nigeria since 1970: A Political and Economic Outline* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1981), Part 2; A. Iwayemi, 'The Military and the Economy' in Oyediran (1979), Ch. 3; O. Oyediran and O. Olagunju, 'The Military and the Politics of Revenue Allocation', in Oyediran (1979), Ch. 10; and R. L. Sklar, 'The Nature of Class Domination in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17, 4(1979).

47. As suggested by Rimmer in Kirk-Greene and Rimmer (1981), p. 76. The preponderant view, however, is that agriculture 'consistently stagnated during the military era': see Iwayemi (1979), p. 56.

48. S. Othman, 'Nigeria: Power for Profit – Class, Corporatism, and Factionalism in the Military', in O'Brien, Dunn and Rathbone (1989), pp. 130–5.

49. *Ibid.*, pp. 135–7. See also M. Dent, 'Nigeria', *The Annual Register*, *1984*.

50. Nolutshungu (1991), p. 98.

51. Quoted by Othman (1989), pp. 139–40.

52. Nolutshungu (1991), pp. 84–100. See also Othman (1989), pp. 140–4.

53. Othman (1989), p. 144.
54. This section is based on D. Rothchild, 'Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972–78', *Comparative Politics*, 12, 4(July 1980).
55. R. Rathbone, '*Politics in Ghana and Politics in Ghana*', in Mayall and Payne (1991), pp. 68–9.
56. J. Haynes, 'Ghana: From Personalist to Democratic Rule', in J. A. Wiseman (ed.), *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 99.
57. R. Jeffries, 'Ghana: The Political Economy of Personal Rule', in O'Brien, Dunn and Rathbone (1989), Ch. 6, esp. pp. 92–8; N. Chazan, 'Ghana: Problems of Governance and the Emergence of Civil Society', in L. Diamond, J. J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 2, *Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p. 121.
58. R. Otayek, 'The Revolutionary Process in Burkino Faso: Breaks and Continuities', in J. Markakis and M. Waller (eds), *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), and in O'Brien, Dunn and Rathbone (1989), Ch. 2.
59. The *Guardian*, 11 April, 28, 29 and 30 November 1991; K. Whiteman, 'Togo and Benin', *The Annual Register, 1994*, p. 284.
60. Decalo (1976), pp. 26–7. See also First (1970), p. 22.
61. Otayek (1989), p. 26.
62. O. E. Wilton-Marshall, 'Mali, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Benin, Togo', and 'People's Republic of the Congo', and R. Hallett, 'Rwanda and Burundi', *The Annual Register*, *1979*.
63. Wilton-Marshall, 'Upper Volta', *The Annual Register*, *1978*.
64. *Keesing's*, 42, 3(March 1996), 'Benin', 40982; Mali: the *Guardian*, 26 and 27 March 1991.
65. Luckham (1980), p. 217.
66. D. G. Austin, 'Ghana', *The Annual Register, 1977*, pp. 220–1, and *1978*, p. 215.

8   Political Liberalisation and Economic Reform

1. See, for example, the statement by Lynda Chalker, the British Minister for Overseas Development, reported in the *Guardian*, 26 June 1991.
2. Only selected references have been provided for this section, the sources for which include: *The Annual Register, A Record of World Events*, published annually in Bethesda, MD, by Keesing's Worldwide; Keesing's *Record of World Events*, published monthly in Cambridge, England, by Keesing's Worldwide; *African Research Bulletin*, Political, Social and Cultural Series and Economic Series, published separately each month by Blackwell; and newspapers, especially the *Guardian* (London and Manchester) and the *Observer* (London). Supplementary material will be found in the third edition of my *Government and Politics in Africa* (1997), especially in Ch. 8 on 'Revolutionary Movements and Former Revolutionary Regimes', which has been omitted from this fourth edition. I drew substantially on the third edition in contributing to the fourth edition of John Fage's *A History of Africa* – see J. D. Fage, with William Tordoff, *A History of Africa*, 4th edition (London: Routledge, 2001). In the fourth edition of *Government and Politics in Africa*, I have benefited from Professor Fage's comments on South and North Africa.
3. E. Stanley, 'The Truth and Reconciliation Commission', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 3(September 2001), pp. 525–46.
4. T. Lodge, 'Political Corruption in South Africa', *African Affairs*, 97, 387(April 1998), p. 162.
5. The *Guardian*, 26 July 2001.
6. L. Cliffe, 'Land Reform in South Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 84(June 2000), pp. 273–86.
7. Quoted by C. McGreal, the *Guardian*, 30 August 2001.

8. Lodge (April 1998), pp. 157–87.
9. N. Nattress and J. Seekings, 'Democracy and Distribution in South Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 3(September 2001), p. 495.
10. See J. Healey, 'Botswana: A Study in Political Accountability', in J. Healey and W. Tordoff (eds), *Votes and Budgets. Comparative Studies in Accountable Governance in the South* (London: Macmillan, 1995), Ch. 2.
11. J. Herbst, *State Politics in Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 227.
12. C. Stoneman, 'Some Concluding Thoughts', in C. Stoneman (ed.), *Zimbabwe's Prospects. Issues of Race, Class, State and Capital in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 364.
13. Quoted in Herbst (1990), p. 212.
14. S. Mayo, B. Rutherford and D. Amanor-Wilks, 'Land Reform and Changing Social Relations for Farm Workers in Zimbabwe', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 84(June 2000); C. Jenkins, 'The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 4(December 1997), pp. 600–1.
15. P. Alexander, 'Zimbabwe Workers, the MDC and the 2000 Election', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 85(September 2000).
16. See P. Burnell, 'Whither Zambia? The Zambian Presidential and Parliamentary Elections of November 1996', *Electoral Studies*, 16, 3(1997).
17. See E. Cromwell, 'Zambia: A Wind of Change in Expenditure Management?', in Healey and Tordoff (1995), Ch. 5.
18. For thoughtful comments, see P. Burnell, 'Does Economic Reform Promote Democratisation? Evidence from Zambia's Third Republic', *New Political Economy*, 6, 2(2001), p. 201.
19. P. Burnell, 'The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawn or Millennium Sunset?', *Contemporary Politics*, 7, 2(2001), p. 108; A. Vines, 'Zambia', *The Annual Register, 2000*, p. 269.
20. F. Reynjens, 'Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila', *African Affairs*, 100, 399(April 2001).
21. See W. Tordoff and R. A. Young, 'The Presidential Election in Gabon', *Review of African Political Economy*, 26, 80(June 1999) and 'Gabon: Never say Never', *West Africa* (London), 1–14 February 1999, pp. 63–4. See also W. Tordoff, R. Young and N. Ashford, 'The Gabon Presidential Election of December 1998: Reflections of the British Monitoring Team', *Representation*, 36, 4(Winter 1999).
22. H. M. Hintjens, 'Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37, 2(June 1999), p. 279.
23. R. Hallett, 'Rwanda', *The Annual Register, 1999*, p. 280.
24. See L. Ndikumana, 'Political and Economic Liberalisation in Burundi', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38, 3(September 2000), p. 455.
25. J. K. van Donge, 'Kamuzu's Legacy: The Democratization of Malawi', *African Affairs*, 94, 375(April 1995).
26. M. Bratton and G. Lambright, 'Uganda's Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott', *African Affairs*, 100, 400(July 2001).
27. Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda examined additional cases and concluded that Uganda's anti-corruption institutions 'failed to charge the big offenders and have them prosecuted in the courts'. See their article 'Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda's Privatisation in the 1990s', *African Affairs*, 100, 398(January 2001), pp. 117–33 – quotation, p. 129.
28. P. Konings and F. B. Nyamnjoh, 'The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 2(June 1997).
29. G. Arnold, 'Nigeria', *The Annual Register, 2000*, p. 241.
30. For an analysis of the elections, see P. Nugent, 'Winners, Losers and Also Rans; Money, Moral Authority and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Election', *African Affairs*, 100, 400(July 2001).

31. R. J. Bingen, 'Cotton, Democracy and Development in Mali', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36, 2(June 1998).

32. For background information, see P. Greenhalgh, *West African Diamonds, 1919–83. An Economic History* (Manchester University Press, 1985), esp. Part Three, 'African Diamond Diggers'.

33. Y. Bangura, 'Strategic Policy Failure and Governance in Sierra Leone', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38, 4(December 2000), p. 573.

34. C. Coulon, 'Senegal: The Development and Fragility of Semidemocracy', Ch. 4 in L. Diamond, J. J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa*, 2(Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1988).

35. J. A. Wiseman, *Democracy in Black Africa. Survival and Revival* (New York: Paragon House, 1990), p. 175. See also C. Coulon and D. B. Cruise O'Brien, 'Senegal', in D. B. Cruise O'Brien, J. Dunn and R. Rathbone (eds), *Contemporary West African States* (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 145–50.

36. L. A. Villalon, 'Democratizing a (Quasi) Democracy: The Senegalese Elections of 1993', *African Affairs*, 93, 371(April 1994), pp. 191–2.

37. See R. Vengroff and M. Magala, 'Democratic Reform, Transformation and Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal's 2000 Presidential Election', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39, 1(March 2001).

38. My main source on North Africa is *The Annual Register. A Record of World Events, 1990–2000*, and 'North Africa in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 26, 82(December 1999). The editors of the latter maintain that the region should not be seen and treated as different and separate from sub-Saharan Africa, but as subject to the same threat and consequences of globalisation as the rest of the continent.

39. See D. Seddon, 'Western Sahara at the Turn of the Millennium', *Review of African Political Economy*, 26, 82(December 1999), pp. 499–503.

40. K. Pfeifer, 'Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa', *ibid.*, p. 452.

41. See especially Christopher Clapham's annual articles on 'Ethiopia' for *The Annual Register, 1974–97*, his article on 'Revolutionary Socialist Development in Ethiopia', *African Affairs*, 86, 343(April 1987) and his book *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Cambridge University Press, 1988).

42. R. Iyob, 'The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 4(December 1997), p. 647.

43. The *Guardian*, 22 October 2001.

44. See J. Markakis, 'Radical Military Regimes', in J. Markakis and M. Waller (eds), *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 27.

45. This term was used for a study of elections in anglophone Africa, but can be extended to francophone and other African states. See J. Daniel, R. Southall and M. Szeftel (eds), *Voting for Democracy. Watershed Elections in Contemporary Anglophone Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), and M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

46. Ratsiraka won the presidential election by a narrow majority in late 1996 and resumed office early the next year. Gow's indictment of him is particularly damning; he referred to Ratsiraka's 'poorly formulated Marxist ideology, corrupt and inefficient government, and increasingly autocratic ways'. He was hated by the people and became the target of *coups*, plots and open rebellion. See B. A. Gow 'Admiral Didier Ratsiraka and the Malagasy Socialist Revolution', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 3 (September 1997), p. 409.

47. R. Pinkney, *Democracy and Dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania* (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 214.

48. The *Guardian*, 19 June 2001.

49. R. Sandbrook, 'Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist–Revisionist Perspective', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 22, 2(1988), p. 251.

50. 'Lomé IV Convention as revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995', *The ACP–EU Courier*, 155(January–February 1996), p. 2. See also T. Meisenhelder,

'The Developmental State in Mauritius', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 2 (June 1997).

51. K. Whiteman, 'Equatorial Guinea', *The Annual Register, 2000*, pp. 255, 257–8.
52. See M. Dent and B. Peters, *The Crisis of Poverty and Debt in the Third World* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). See also Ann Pettifor's pungent criticism of the international financial system – a system 'unjustly biased in favour of creditors' – in her article 'Debt Cancellation, Lender Responsibility and Poor Country Empowerment', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 83(March 2000), pp. 138–44.
53. N. Mathiason, 'G7's Debt Relief Plan a "Cruel Joke"', the *Observer*, 30 December 2001.
54. Among other industrialised states, the Federal Republic of Germany had a respectable aid programme in the 1980–6 period and Italy an improving one. See C. Pratt, 'Middle Power Internationalism and North–South Issues: Comparisons and Prognosis', in C. Pratt (ed.), *Internationalism under Strain. The North–South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden* (University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 8, Table 6, and Ch. 6. Professor Pratt follows the practice of the United Nations (in respect of the First and Second Development Decades) and Earthscan in presenting official development assistance (ODA) as percentages of GNP rather than GDP. For these terms, see the note to Table 1.1 (p. 2).
55. *The Reality of Aid 2000. An Independent Review of Poverty Reduction and Development Assistance* (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2000), 'ODA as a percentage of … donors GNP 1998', p. 5, and *passim*.
56. G. R. Olsen, 'Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in post-Cold War Africa: How Serious is Europe and for what Reason?', *African Affairs*, 97, 388(July 1998). The section which follows is based on Olsen's article.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 343 (abstract).
58. H. Kifle, A. O. Olukoshi and L. Wohlgemuth (eds), *A New Partnership for African Development. Issues and Parameters* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), p. 213.
59. M. Szeftel, '"Eat with Us": Managing Corruption and Patronage under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964–99', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18, 2(2000), p. 222. Szeftel quotes (*ibid.*, p. 207) from V. LeVine, 'Administrative Corruption and Democratization in Africa: Aspects of the Theoretic Agenda', *Corruption and Reform*, 7, 3.
60. M. Szeftel, 'Between Governance and Underdevelopment: Accumulation and Africa's "Catastrophic Corruption"', *Review of African Political Economy*, 27, 84(June 2000), p. 304.

9   Regional Groupings and the Organisation of African Unity

1. K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1965); *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann, 1963).
2. R. L. Sklar, 'Political Aspects of Regional Organization in Africa', synopsis of a lecture in the 'Africa and the World' series, University of Zambia, 1966 (mimeo). The first two points were also made by Professor Sklar in this paper.
3. See A. Hughes and J. Lewis, 'Beyond *Francophonie*? The Senegambia Confederation in Retrospect', in A. Kirk-Greene and D. Bach (eds), *State and Society in Francophone Africa since Independence* (London: Macmillan, 1995), Ch. 15.
4. W. J. Foltz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 187 and *passim*.
5. J. S. Nye, Jr, *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
6. See W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), pp. 171–3, and 'Tanzania', in *The Annual Register, 1977*, p. 217.
7. The early part of this section is based on E. N. Gladden, 'The East African Common Services Organisation' (mimeo, 1963), and especially on the paper by J. Banfield,

'The Structure and Administration of the East Africa High Commission and the East African Common Services Organisation', University of East Africa Conference on East African Federation, Nairobi, 26–30 November 1963.

8. See 'The Reshaping of East African Economic Co-Operation', Part 1, by P. Robson, and Part 2, by A. R. Roe, in *East Africa Journal*, 4, 5(August 1967).

9. See A. Hazlewood, 'The End of the East African Community: What are the Lessons for Regional Integration Schemes?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 18, 1(September 1979), p. 44.

10. This section is based on 'African Conferences and Institutions', in *The Annual Register, 1976–80* (by O. E. Wilton-Marshall) and *1981–90* (by K. Whiteman); on articles in *West Africa* (London), 24 May and 7 June 1982, notably the article by S. K. B. Asante on 'Trade Problems and Prospects' in the 24 May issue and on Asante's Ch. 5 'ECOWAS/ CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa', in R. I. Onwuka and A. Sesay (eds), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1985). See also O. J. C. B. Ojo, 'Regional Cooperation and Integration', in O. J. C. B. Ojo, D. K. Orwa and C. M. B. Utete, *African International Relations* (London: Longman, 1985).

11. Kirk-Greene and Bach (1995), p. 204.

12. On Liberia, see V. Brittain, 'A Land Shackled by War and Factionalism', the *Guardian*, 10 April 1996; *Keesing's*, 41(1995), Annual Reference Supplement, 'Liberia', R18–19 and 10(October), 'Liberia', 40759; the *Observer*, 7 April 1996, and the *Guardian*, 11 and 17 April 1996. On Sierra Leone, see *Keesing's*, 41(1995), Annual Reference Supplement, 'Sierra Leone', R29; and M. Huband, 'Secret War of Mindless Mutilation', the *Observer*, 4 February 1996.

13. *Keesing's*, 41, 7–8(July 1995), 'ECOWAS', 40635.

14. This section is based on P. Goodison, 'SADCC: Prospects and Problems until the Year 2000' (University of Liverpool, 1982, mimeo); R. Leys and A. Tostensen, 'Regional Co-Operation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference', *Review of African Political Economy*, 23(January–April 1982); R. Tangri, *Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: James Currey, 1985) pp. 143–6; and R. Sakapaji, 'Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) – Collective Self-Reliance or Collective Dependence?', MA Econ. Dissertation in Development Studies, University of Manchester (December 1984). Up-dating from D. G. Anglin's informative paper, 'SADCC after Nkomati', *African Affairs*, 84, 335(April 1985); E. A. Friedland, 'The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference and the West: Cooperation or Conflict?', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23, 2(1985); and S. Chan (with L. J. Chingambo), 'Dependency in the Region', in S. Chan (ed.), *Exporting Apartheid. Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978–1988* (London: Macmillan, 1990). Among other accounts is that by L. Abegunrin, 'The Southern African Development Coordination Conference: Politics of Dependence', Ch. 11 in Onwuka and Sesay (1985). Basic factual information is to be found under 'African Conferences and Organizations', in *The Annual Register* from 1979.

15. J. Mayall, 'The South African Crisis: The Major External Actors', Ch. 10 in S. Johnson (ed.), *South Africa. No Turning Back* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 317.

16. Tangri (1985), p. 129.

17. Chan (1990), pp. 134–42.

18. S. C. Nolutshungu, 'Strategy and Power: South Africa and its Neighbours', in Johnson (1988), p. 347.

19. *Keesing's*, 41 (1995), Annual Reference Supplement, R38, and 'Mauritius', 12 – December, 40854.

20. *Ibid.*, 41(1995), Annual Reference Supplement, 'SADC', R38 and 'SADC': 2 – February, 40397, 6 – June, 40588, 8 – August, 40670.

21. *Briefings:* 'SADC Puts on a New Face', *Review of African Political Economy*, 28, 87(March 2001), pp. 105–8.

22. *Keesing's*, 41, 8(August 1995), 'SADC,' 40670.

23. This issue was discussed at a SADC consultative conference at Lilongwe, Malawi, in February 1995. *Keesing's*, 41, 2(February 1995), 'SADC', 40397.

24. In this section – an abbreviated version of the section in the third edition of this work – I have drawn on C. Hoskyns, 'The Organisation of African Unity and Eastern Africa' (University of Dar es Salaam, mimeo, December 1966), p. 1, subsequently published in an amended form as 'Pan-Africanism and Integration' in A. Hazlewood (ed.), *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). Quotations are taken from the original version. For the background to the formation of the OAU, see I. Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (New York: Random House, 1967).

25. The story of PAFMECSA is told by R. H. F. Cox in *Pan-Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA, 1958–64* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). Studies of Pan-Africanism include C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (London: Pall Mall, 1962) and I. Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement* (London: Methuen, 1974).

26. See Hoskyns (1966); Z. Cervenka, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter* (New York: Praeger, 1968); and C. O. C. Amate, *Inside the OAU. Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London: Macmillan, 1986), which is a full and thorough study of the Organisation.

27. Amate (1986), *passim*; D. Austin and R. Nagel, 'The Organization of African Unity', *The World Today*, 22(December 1966); R. Nagel and R. Rathbone, 'The OAU at Kinshasa', *The World Today*, 23(November 1967); and M. Wolfers, *Politics in the Organization of African Unity* (London: Methuen, 1976), pp. 88–9, 201.

28. R. Luckham, 'French Militarism in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 24(May–August 1982), p. 77. For an account of the Franco-African conferences, see J. L. Dagut, 'Les Sommets Franco-Africains: Un Instrument de la Présence Française en Afrique', *Année Africaine*, Part II, Ch. 2 (Paris: Editions A. Pedone, 1980).

29. See A. G. Pazzanita, 'Morocco versus Polisario: A Political Interpretation', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32, 2(1994).

30. For an excellent study of Chad, of how the problems facing it were handled by the OAU, and of foreign interference in its affairs, see S. C. Nolutshungu, *Limits of Anarchy. Intervention and State Formation in Chad* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996). See also K. Whiteman, 'Chad', *The Annual Register, 1990*, pp. 274–5.

31. See Wolfers (1976), Ch. V.

32. J. Mayall, 'African Unity and the OAU: The Place of a Political Myth in African Diplomacy', *Handbook of World Affairs*, 27 (1973), p. 121.

33. *Keesing's*, 41, 11(November 1995), 'OAU', 40813; 42, 2 (February 1996), 'OAU', 40941.

34. *Keesing's*, 41, 6(June 1995), 'OAU', 40588 and 42, 2(February 1996), 'OAU', 40941, and C. Allen, 'Editorial: Ending Endemic Violence: Limits to Conflict Resolution in Africa', Violence and Conflict Resolution in Africa, *Review of African Political Economy*, 26, 81(September 1999), p. 319.

35. Kirk-Greene and Bach (1995), p. 196.

36. K. Whiteman, 'African Conferences and Organizations', *The Annual Register, 1990*, pp. 419–20.

37. Kirk-Greene and Bach (1995), p. 190.

38. Amate (1986), p. 568.

39. *Keesing's*, 42, 2(February 1996), 'OAU', 40941.

40. The *Guardian*, 13 July 2001; *Africa Confidential*, 42, 14, 13 July 2001.

10 Conclusions: Ideology, the Post-Colonial State and Development

1. C. Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in D. E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 47, 52ff.

2. E. Shils, 'The Concept and Function of Ideology', *A Reprint from the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, 7(New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), p. 68.

3. Paper on 'Ideology' presented to the Political Theory seminar, Department of Government, University of Manchester, 1972. In his book *Ideology* (London: Pall Mall, 1970), p. 15, John Plamenatz provided the following minimal definition of ideology: 'a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community.'

4. L. W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and National Building. Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962).

5. J. P. Nettl, 'Strategies in the Study of Political Development', in C. Leys (ed.), *Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development* (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 22.

6. See p. 63, above.

7. C. Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), Ch. 6.

8. Cf. Richard L. Sklar: 'Few sophisticated socialists today rate the "developmental merits" of socialism above those of capitalism; fewer still would dispute the short-term advantages of capitalism for societies at early stages of industrial development.' 'Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26, 1(1988), p. 14.

9. The *Guardian*, 16 September 1991.

10. Sklar (1988), p. 14.

11. R. L. Sklar, 'The Nature of Class Domination in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17, 4(1979), pp. 532, 539, and 'Postimperialism. A Class Analysis of Multinational Corporate Expansion', *Comparative Politics*, 9, 1(October 1976), p. 87.

12. In Mauritania, where aspects of 'chattel slavery' – the complete ownership of one person by another – formally existed until 1980, the country's black minority population suffered a wave of arbitrary arrests, torture, killings and expulsions at the hands of the country's Arabo-Berber-led military government in 1990–1. See K. Whiteman, 'Mauritania', *The Annual Register, 1988–90*, and the *Guardian*, 21 August 1991.

13. Sklar (1988), p. 19, summarises the views expressed by Bender in his Presidential Address, 'The United States and Africa', to the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Madison, Wisconsin (31 October 1986).

14. Bienen exempted Kenya from this trend on the questionable ground that the administration itself became 'a vehicle' for citizen access to the state. See H. Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 64, 195; N. Kasfir, *The Shrinking Political Arena* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

15. S. Decalo, 'Socio-Economic Constraints on Radical Action in the People's Republic of Congo', in J. Markakis and M. Waller (eds), *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 53.

16. N. Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918–1977* (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 288.

17. S. George, *A Fate Worse than Debt* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, revised edn, 1989), esp. Chs 3 and 11 (IMF) and 5, 6 and 7 (Africa).

18. M. J. Dent, 'Lessons of the World Debt Tables (1992–3), figures for the years 1985–92; the measurement of progress in the battle to obtain remission of all the backlog of the unpayable debt of the governments of poorer countries before the year 2000 AD' (Keele, 1993, mimeo), pp. 12–14. I have benefited from several helpful discussions with Martin Dent, a Fellow of Keele University and Co-Chair of Jubilee 2000, on the subject of debt remission.

19. The *Guardian*, 16 November 2001.

20. P. Burnell, 'The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawn or Millennium Sunset?', *Contemporary Politics*, 7, 2(2001), p. 106.

21. K. Pfeifer, 'Parameters of Economic Reform in North Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 26, 82(December 1999), p. 452.

22. W. Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 15 and *passim*.

23. M. Szeftel, ' "Eat With Us": Managing Corruption and Patronage under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964–99', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18, 2(2000), p. 207.

24. A. B. Zack-Williams, 'No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and Development in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, 28, 88(June 2001), pp. 213–23, quotation from Szeftel, p. 219.

25. Under a new deal with Sierra Rutile Ltd, the Sierra Leone government stood to receive a ten-fold increase in the revenue paid to it by the company. 'Inside Story – "Trade Slaves": Sierra Leone', BBC1, 2 October 1991 (produced by Steve Hewlett).

26. N. Woodsworth, 'Namibia 3: A Difficult Path to Economic Independence', *Financial Times* (London), 22 March 1990, p. 19. In another section of this informed survey, Woodsworth points out that 'Namibia's independence is political; for a long time to come, however, it will remain tied to South African trade, transportation networks, private investment, technology and Johannesburg financial markets'. Unemployment was Namibia's greatest development problem, particularly as it affected Owamboland, the base of SWAPO's political support (Woodsworth, 'Namibia 2', *ibid.*, p. 18).

27. Woodsworth, 'Namibia 2 and 3', *ibid.*, pp. 18–19, and 'Trial Run for Regional Peace', *ibid.*, 'Namibia', p. 17.

28. J. K. Galbraith, 'At the Mercy of the Military', the *Guardian*, 6 August 1991.

29. J. Healey, 'Botswana: A Study in Political Accountability', in J. Healey and W. Tordoff (eds), *Votes and Budgets. Comparative Studies in Accountable Governance in the South* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 36.

30. See P. Cook and M. Minogue, 'Towards a Political Economy of Privatisation in Less Developed Countries' (International Development Centre, University of Manchester, 1989, mimeo), p. 11, and E. A. Brett, 'Adjustment and the State: The Problem of Administrative Reform', *IDS Bulletin* (Sussex), 19, 4(October 1988). Brett maintained (p. 4) that 'the role of the state must remain central in any effective developmental strategy'.

31. See M. F. Lofchie, *The Policy Factor: Agricultural Performance in Kenya and Tanzania* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

32. *Report on Industrialisation and the Gold Coast*, by W. A. Lewis (Accra: Government Printing Department, 1953), para. 253.

33. C. Pratt, 'Has Middle Power Internationalism a Future?', in C. Pratt (ed.), *Middle Power Internationalism. The North–South Dimension* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), pp. 146–7.

34. *North–South: A Programme for Survival*, the Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt (hereafter the *Brandt Commission Report*: London: Pan Books, 1980), p. 240.

35. C. Kirkpatrick and F. Nixson, 'The North–South Debate: Reflections on the Brandt Commission Report', *Manchester Discussion Papers in Development Studies* (International Development Centre, University of Manchester, n.d.), 8104, p. 14.

36. This danger was recognised by Lynda Chalker, then British Minister for Overseas Development, quoted in Foreign and Commonwealth Office (F&CO), Background Brief, August 1991.

37. W. Hutton, 'A Third Way for the Third World?', the *Observer*, 10 December 2000, p. 30.

38. The *Guardian*, 12 October 2001.

39. See K. Watkins (Oxfam's senior policy adviser), 'This Deal is Immoral, Mr Blair', the *Guardian*, 21 December 2001, and C. Denny's article, 'Backlash Over Costly Hi-Tech for Tanzania', in the same issue.

40. *The Reality of Aid 2000* (Earthscan, 2000), p. 5.

41. G. Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33, 1(1995), pp. 14–20 (quotation, p. 20). The impact of the shift in French policy was already clear by the end of 1993, as the case of Madagascar revealed. France joined its Western partners and the Washington-based financial institutions in pressing the Malagasy government – as the price of granting much-needed loans – to devalue its currency by 40 per cent, reduce its budget deficit, and cut down the size and cost of the civil service. See the *Guardian*, 30 December 1993.

42. 'Lomé IV Convention as revised by the agreement signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995', *The ACP–EU Courier*, 155: January–February 1996, p. 2; Sklar (1979), p. 551. See also Richard L. Sklar's presidential address on 'Democracy in Africa' to the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington DC, 5 November 1982, reprinted in R. L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, *African Politics and Problems in Development* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), Ch. 12.

43. L. Diamond, J. J. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 2: *Africa* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p. xxxi.

44. W. Tordoff, 'Democracy in Botswana: An External Assessment', in J. Holm and P. Molutsi (eds), *Democracy in Botswana. The Proceedings of a Symposium held in Gaborone*, 1–5 August 1988 (Gaborone: Macmillan, 1989), p. 281.

45. T. Meisenhelder, 'The Developmental State in Mauritius,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35, 2(1997), p. 294.

46. Galbraith: the *Guardian*, 6 August 1991.

47. C. S. Whitaker, 'Doctrines of Development and Precepts of the State: The World Bank and the Fifth Iteration of the African Case' in Sklar and Whitaker (1991), p. 345.

48. P. Chabal, 'Introduction' in P. Chabal (ed.), *Political Domination in Africa. Reflections on the Limits of Power* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 15.

49. Reno (1995); Madelaine Bunting provides an insightful analysis of a 'catastrophic combination' of events in the 1990s in 'Of Course We're Guilty', the *Guardian*, 11 February 2002. Zack-Williams (June 2001), p. 216.

50. Sklar (1988), p. 11. Brett argues for 'the introduction of effective competition into service provision, rather than changes in the form of ownership … consumers must be allowed to choose between public agencies'. Brett (1988), p. 10.

51. The *Guardian*, 19 July 2001.

52. See Larry Elliott (quoting Stiglitz) in *ibid.*, 17 April 2000.

53. The *Guardian*, 16 November 2001.

54. *Africa Confidential*, 42, 14, 13 July 2001; R. Dowden, 'Blair's Mission Possible', the *Observer*, 3 February 2002.

55. Clinton's visit received wide press coverage: see *Le Monde* (Paris), 1 and 6 April 1998, *The Economist* (London), 21 March 1998, and *Financial Times* (London), 30 March 1998.

56. T. Baldwin, 'Blair's Quest to Defuse Africa Terror Time Bomb' and report on interview with Tony Blair, *The Times* (London), 6 February 2002.

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