# Religious Internationals in the Modern World

Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750

Edited by
Abigail Green
and
Vincent Viaene

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Religious Internationals in the Modern World

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Series Editors' Foreword

For a very long time, historians tended to treat modernity and secularism as bedfellows. Religion, by definition, was metaphysical and numinous, and was hard to categorize in the civic-minded taxonomy of the Enlightenment. For the most determined secularists, religion was not just something to place in a separate category of existence, but more of a holdover of a primitive past, destined for elimination. In particular, the rise of the nation-state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might have seemed to spell doom for religion. For whether modern or traditional, religion's assumptions often took pride in dismissing boundaries and frontiers as designed by earthly leaders. Instead, the nation-state, territorially and mentally bounded, would be the future and religion would have to play its part in building that state rather than standing athwart it. Europe in particular seemed to be heading in this direction in the past century, as it grew richer and more secular.

Yet at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the secular direction of one part of the globe, Europe, may not be a harbinger for the rest of the world. In the United States, religious language and conceptions of identity remain important as they were from the earliest days of its foundations (although contemporary usage tends often to conflate 'religion' and 'Christianity' in a way that the Founding Fathers might have found surprising). But in the parts of the world where economies and self-confidence are rising in equal measure, it is often the most transnational forms of religion, from evangelical Christianity to a resurgent Islam, that are making the most impact in societies that are at the cutting edge of what modernity means in a world where the West no longer dominates.

As with so many historical phenomena, we should have seen this one coming. And this volume does a wonderful job of pointing out the clear historical precedents for exactly this phenomenon. Far from being eclipsed by modernity, religion, even in the high age of the nation-state, changed modernity and was changed by it in turn. The idea of the 'religious internationals', a group that took premodern religious ideas and adapted them in a world of faster communications and flatter hierarchies, is an exciting one that adds an important new dimension to our understanding of the evolution of modernity.

Nor were the 'religious internationals' concerned with spiritual or other-worldly issues. The communities bound by religion also tackled some of the most important transnational issues of the era. The abolition of the slave trade involved not just a rethinking of the commercial economy, but the moral one too. For Ottoman Muslims, the restoration of the Caliphate was central to very real, very dangerous issues of power in a part of the world left desperately unstable in the aftermath of the Great War. And the quest to define and consolidate Jewish identity led to a whole variety of movements whose political and social impact is still relevant today.

The book also takes us beyond Europe and the West to show the global nature of the religious internationals. From Tunisia to Taiwan, we see the interweaving of complex discourses of empire and liberation with the language and practice of religion. While the monotheistic religions of west Eurasia are of necessity prominent, we also hear about the impact of transnational ideas on the reshaping of very different religious discourses such as Buddhism.

This is a book to take what we thought familiar and reorient it in provocative new ways to make us think again. It is transnational history at its best; but more than that, it is also a work of profound importance for understanding our present condition, and developments yet to come.

Rana Mitter and Akira Iriye
Oxford, January 2012

Acknowledgements

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Vincent Viaene (PhD KULeuven, 1999) has published several edited volumes and 40 articles or book chapters on Catholic internationalism, religious culture, Belgium's foreign relations and Belgian imperialism. A Marie Curie Fellow at Oxford, he is currently working on a project entitled 'Internationalism and the Congo Question (1875–1914)'.

1
Introduction: Rethinking Religion and Globalization

Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene

The role of religion in international politics has brought the globalization of religious ideologies and identities to the top of the twenty-first-century agenda. The central idea behind this book is that the globalization and politicization of traditional religious identities is a historical phenomenon with deep roots in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The world's major religions have always defied territorial or ethnic boundaries, but it is our contention that the modern era saw the emergence of a new and distinctive phenomenon: the religious international.

This new configuration drew upon traditional communal institutions and practices, while remaining distinct from them. It may be defined as a cluster of voluntary transnational organizations and representations crystallizing around international issues, in which both 'ordinary' believers and religious specialists could serve as protagonists. Spurred on by developments such as the communications and transportation revolutions, mass migration, colonial expansion, the spread of the nation-state model or the challenge of secular ideologies, the rise of religious internationals involved a double outward projection of religious energies: into modern society and into the global arena. It entailed the reforging of religious identities in transatlantic or imperial encounters, and the emergence of new forms of sectarian politics, philanthropy and the press. In short, the interaction of traditional religious structures and identities with wider processes of political, social, cultural, technological and economic change promoted the transformation of communities of believers into communities of opinion.

At a very basic level, 'religious international' (or 'religious internationalism') can serve as an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of international/transnational religious activity in the modern world.

Within this overarching framework, we may see formally constituted international organizations and congresses; transient social movements, communities of action and religiously inflected ideologies; sects and religious brotherhoods; global and transnational religious publics; and a wide variety of interrelated kinship groups and diaspora organizations. This diversity of historical experience is well reflected by our contributors, who explore the phenomenon from a variety of angles. In every case, however, we would emphasize the key role of *mobilization* and *a religiously inflected voluntarism* at the heart of the religious international paradigm. Considered in itself, religious belonging often has a non-voluntary dimension. Focusing on bodies of opinion rather than on the bodies of believers that underpin them helps to distinguish religious internationalism from the processes of internal transformation and external repositioning that led to the emergence of so-called 'world religions' in this period.[1] It also places religious internationals squarely within the remit of what has variously been called 'global civil society', the 'global public sphere', 'global consciousness', 'world culture' or 'internationalism'.

Historians of this somewhat protean phenomenon have long ignored religion, although it was undoubtedly the lever propelling a great many people for the first time into a communicative space between the state and the private sphere. This book, which explores the transformative current connecting civil society and different faith traditions in an age of globalization, is an attempt to grapple with this problem. In so doing, we seek to shed light on sociological debates about the role of religion in global civil society, and on historical debates about the nature and origins of globalization. Our focus is on the intertwined trajectories of the so-called Religions of the Book, although contributions on Hinduism and Buddhism serve to transcend a confessional framework and demonstrate the broader relevance of the religious international paradigm.

The rise of globalization theory in the social sciences and the crisis of the secularization thesis have shaped work in both fields, but with very different results. Recognizing that fundamentalism (no less than enlightened 'inclusive' religion) is an essentially modern riposte to globalization, sociologists have engaged in an increasingly lively debate about the role of religion in global civil society.[2] Most of this debate is strikingly contemporary in focus: policy-driven and often implicitly normative in its underlying Weberian assumptions about 'civility' or 'world culture'. Here, sociologists find common ground with political scientists, who approach global civil society both as an ideal type and

as an actually existing phenomenon that can be subjected to empirical investigation.[3] This, of course, is the preoccupation of historians. Indeed, the work of more historically sensitive social theorists like John Keane, Peter Beyer and Charles Taylor demonstrates an awareness of the chronological dimension.[4] Thus Beyer's account of the emergence of a religious function system, divided into different religious subsystems – religious communities (re)constructed both through internal processes of renewal, implicit comparison and explicit conflict with one another – is explicitly rooted in the *longue durée*.[5] When applied to the historical trajectories of different religions, however, Beyer's Luhmannian model proves too monocausal to satisfy historians. This book takes a more properly historical approach. While accepting the premise of most recent sociological scholarship that it has become impossible to conceptualize civil society without taking full account of religion, we add empirical richness and a deep-time perspective to the problem. If the paradigm appears to fit some cases better than others, then that is only to be expected when applying a social-science model to specific historical events.

As relative latecomers to the globalization debate, historians have taken their cue from the pioneering work of social scientists on (for instance) transnational relations, global consciousness, hybridization and the dialectics between homogenization and polarization. Their contribution has been to highlight the antiquity and multipolarity of these processes.[6] Like anthropologists (though from a somewhat different angle), historians question the predominantly Western and liberal (or radical) assumptions behind the way we think about globalization. Yet religion has occupied, at best, a subsidiary place in these analyses.[7] This reflects both traditional assumptions informing international history and the ghettoization that has characterized the history of religion, limiting our understanding of its place in the modern world.[8] Scholars working on different religions deal with the same fundamental questions and cannot satisfactorily resolve them without comparison. While historians working on the experiences of different faith communities have begun to study religious networks and linkages in global context, there remains a need to integrate these different histories.[9] Christopher Bayly's discussion of the nineteenth-century religious revival in global perspective – with special reference to the exploitation of new opportunities for travel and mass communications – represents a rare attempt to map this scholarly terrain.[10] To some extent, this may reflect Bayly's background as a historian of empire, since so many of the historians working on transnational religion have viewed their subject through

an imperial lens.[11] Overwhelmingly, however, practitioners of the new global history have failed to address the issue of religion – perhaps because it is a far more traditional field of enquiry than topics like disease and the environment.[12]

This reluctance to engage with the problem of religion is strikingly apparent in work on the longer-term origins of 'internationalism' and 'global civil society'. While theorists of civil society no longer hesitate to incorporate religion, historians are still struggling to make the leap. Some, however, sense there is a problem. Akira Iriye, in his 2002 study on the role of international organizations in the making of the modern world, for instance, defined a nongovernmental organization (NGO) as a 'voluntary nonstate, nonprofit, nonreligious, and non-military association', choosing to mention religious bodies only when they engaged in 'secular' activities such as humanitarian relief and cultural exchange.[13] He admitted that the distinction was 'a tenuous one', unavoidable 'at this stage of scholarship'. Such an approach reflects the Enlightenment origins of the term 'civil society' and its inherently Western bias. For European Christians, there was the Church and the World, and the World was then divided into state and society. Thus civil society was defined partly against religion, although this proved to be a false distinction once the marketplace of ideas prompted the rise of voluntary religion. Building on this premise, the essays in this volume aim to move beyond the culturally narrow understanding of civil society that still dominates much of the literature. The concrete trajectories of different faith traditions explored here suggest that religion was inside civil society from the start, and became one of the motor forces behind its emergence in different parts of the world.

In approaching the phenomenon of religious internationalism, this book proceeds from the general to the particular and from the distant to the more recent past. The first part, 'The Religions of the Book: Trajectories, Comparisons', brings together macrohistorical perspectives on Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the three interrelated religious traditions at the heart of this project. It traces the emergence, from early modern roots, of religious internationals in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the most part. The second section of the book, 'Religious Internationals in Transition', views these processes from a microhistorical angle. Four case studies explore how religious internationals took shape and the concrete problems they encountered, whether from the vantage point of the geographical 'periphery' like Tunis, key individual players such as leading Muslim modernists or specific groups like Japan's Buddhist missionaries and

Russia's Imperial Palestine Society. The third and last part of the book, 'Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Limits and New Horizons', is more squarely concerned with testing the limits of the model. How useful is the concept of religious internationalism for understanding a perennial transnational network such as the Islamic Hadrami Sada, the 'Descendants of the Prophet', or an ultramodern ethnoreligious lobby like the Hindu Sangh Parivar? Does the paradigm still hold in the second half of the twentieth century, when Christianity and Judaism faced mounting challenges from secularization and centrifugal forces?

Such broad and varied subject matter inevitably poses problems of terminology. Phrases intended to denote the crossing of state boundaries such as 'transnational', 'international' and 'supranational' make more sense in a Europe of nation-states than they do when applied to the multiethnic territorial empires of Eastern Eurasia.[14] Some of our contributors have therefore adopted alternative formulations, such as translocal, transcommunal or intercultural; most have chosen to speak of transnational religion nonetheless. On occasion, too, it has proved difficult to standardize place names while doing equal justice to all the religious cultures under discussion. Recognizing that different norms prevail in different contexts, we have preferred not to impose rigid guidelines, allowing Istanbul and Constantinople to exist side by side.

The four contributions of Part I focus on patterns of continuity and discontinuity between 'modern' religious internationalism and what preceded it. Chris Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas describe the mutation of the diasporic transnational world of the eighteenth-century evangelical revival into a more focused international community thriving on mass print, and galvanized by missionary expansion and humanitarianism. Abigail Green explains how a Jewish international in which the press served as the principal lever of philanthropy replaced early modern Jewish networks, forging new connections between Western, East European and Sephardi Jews. Vincent Viaene considers the mid- to late nineteenth-century Catholic International crystallizing around mobilization for the pope as part of the larger story of transnational Catholic linkages in civil society since the Counter-Reformation. Francis Robinson shows how a tidal wave of religious reform and the challenge of Western imperialism transformed the Islamic umma into a community of opinion. These stories reveal striking similarities; together they outline a kind of 'master narrative' of religious internationalism.

Judaism, Christianity and Islam all sustained a global presence long before the modern era. 'Modern' religious internationalism inevitably

capitalized on these earlier transnational networks. Pilgrimage as the most conspicuous expression of mass religious mobility remained a key feature of modern Islam and Catholicism. To a lesser extent, the same was true of holy war. Networks of religious specialists carried over from the eighteenth into the nineteenth centuries, powered by oral transmission, correspondence and (for Christians and Jews) early print. This is exemplified by the ulama of the great Islamic centres of learning, by itinerant rabbis and fund-raising emissaries in the Jewish world, by Catholic Jansenists and by the Pietist and Calvinist divines bridging the Atlantic. Last but not least, traditions of corporate voluntarism continued to provide a model of transnational social activism that was not restricted to the elites. Such were the religious orders and congregations of Catholicism, the Sufi orders of Islam, the coordinated diaspora support for Jews in the Land of Israel and support networks for the Protestant diaspora in the 'wilderness' of North America or the Eurasian plains. Across the board, the redemption of captives by these and other more specialized institutions is particularly striking. All of these ancient manifestations of cross-border religious life persisted, and even grew in importance, although organizations were streamlined – often as international (rather than transnational) structures. Crucially, voluntarism was reconceived as the collective expression of individual will: one was now supposed to commit because one chose to. Traditional institutions and forms of expression thus acquired an added dimension as conscious tools of mass mobilization profiling religions in the public sphere. At the same time, radically new practices and institutions reinforced a sense of discontinuity, even rupture.

The levers of change that drove these developments were both internal and external. The most important internal driver was a series of broadly simultaneous movements of religious renewal tracing their roots to the eighteenth century. They can be considered as the cultural matrix of internationalism. Many of these were religious revivals marked by eschatological urgency, and by an overriding concern with salvation and the search for truth: the evangelical revivals of Protestantism; the Catholic revival in reaction to Enlightenment and Revolution; the ecstatic mysticism of East European Hasidism; the Islamist reform movements of Wahhabism, neo-Sufism and Deobandism animated by the vision of a 'willed' scriptural Islam. Some groups advocated a more open engagement with the heritage of the Western Enlightenment, such as Protestant and Catholic liberals, Islamic modernists and the integrationist Jews who espoused the Haskalah. Despite their acute differences and bitter conflicts, all these movements were alike in

bringing about religious individuation and a turn to social activism. The gravitational point of religion shifted from the public order to the individual conscience. It thus became a force striving to reshape the modern world.

A key external driver was the experience of persecution, discrimination and, in many places, disestablishment. For Jews and Protestants, this experience was deeply ingrained in the collective memory of communities, persisting in the Jewish case through the nineteenth century and beyond. For Catholics, the tabula rasa of the French Revolution was a powerful collective trauma, prompting the reconstruction of transnational networks from the bottom up. In Islam, humiliation and discrimination at the hands of the colonial state reshaped the traditionally conceived opposition between the Dar al-Islam and the Dar al-Harb, magnifying the appeal of reform.

At once internal and external to these religions were two further incubators: the communications revolution and the expansion of empire, commerce and popular settlement. Mass print and the development of the press multiplied connectivity, opening up new spaces for collective action, while steam and the telegraph sped up 'time–space compression'. Religious reformers and organizations were among the first to demand mass print and to create journals or newspapers for an international readership. These trends were already relatively well advanced in the Protestant world, as Chris Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas indicate; even here, however, the innovations of the nineteenth century proved transformative in terms of scale. If the communications revolution opened new horizons for world religions, so did processes of expansion, whether diasporic, commercial or imperial in nature. Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism both induced and benefited from Western imperial expansion. Meanwhile, the sprawling empires of Britain and France unwittingly became great boulevards for the spread of Islam. This extension was partly diasporic, as South Asian Muslims built new homes in Africa. Nor can the mass migrations across the Atlantic of Catholics from Ireland and Italy, and of Jews from Eastern Europe, be disentangled from the context of culture wars and (in the Jewish case) persecution. These diasporas created powerful transatlantic connections in Catholicism and Judaism by the late nineteenth century, supplementing the older Anglo-American axis of Protestantism.

Stepping up the globalization of religions in the nineteenth century was not just a matter of geographical expansion but also – and more importantly – of tying believers together in new ways across hardening boundaries. Here, the launching of single-issue campaigns, the creation

of international organizations and the fostering of more consciously global identities all played a key role. Major transnational campaigns dotted the development of religious internationals. They mobilized the masses against the persecution of fellow believers, against the 'tyranny' of the modern state or against the double standards of Western colonial powers. Campaigning against oppression, injustice and human rights atrocities led religious activists to embrace the language of rights and the humanitarian traditions of the Enlightenment, although this proved more problematic for large sections of Catholic and Muslim opinion than it did for Protestants and Jews.

In each case, we can pinpoint the single issue that, more than any other, catalysed a process of politicization and transformed these creeds into globally visible forces in civil society. For Protestants from the late eighteenth century onwards, this was abolitionism. For Jews from 1840s onwards, it was international Jewish relief. For Catholics it was the defence of the Papacy in the 1860s and 1870s. For Muslims it was the crisis and demise of the Ottoman Empire and its claims to the Caliphate between 1911 and 1924. Through transnational campaigns like these, Protestants, Jews, Catholics and Muslims pioneered the full panoply of modern civic action: from the press, petitions and subscription fundraising, through meetings and congresses, to mass manifestations and the ballot box. In this, they were often ahead of their better-known secular counterparts such as the socialist International or the peace movement.

In many cases, these single-issue campaigns gave rise to more permanent organizations. The abolitionist élan was institutionalized in the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, the Mortara affair provoked the creation of that symbol of international Jewry, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, while mobilization for the pope was perpetuated in the fundraising machine of Peter's Pence. More generally, the expansion of philanthropic, missionary and educational networks underpinned the rise of religious internationals. The missionary organizations and auxiliary societies of different denominations were essential to the globalization of Protestantism. The same applies in Catholicism to the new 'expert' congregations aiming at social reform, to the charitable lay society of St Vincent de Paul and to the central missionary fundraising body of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith. South Asian Islam was covered by a network of madrasas following the Deobandi model, while in North Africa and the Middle East the social activism of the Muslim Brotherhood gained a large following from the 1920s onwards. In the Jewish world, meanwhile, organizations like the Alliance Israélite

Universelle (1860) provided an institutional focus for philanthropic relief, exporting new educational models across the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East.

Campaigns and organizations thrived on and promoted a heightened sense of international community and brotherhood for members of these different faiths. Such global religious consciousness was apparent, for instance, in the World Missionary Conferences of Protestantism, in the papal Jubilees of the Roman Catholic Church, in the World Jewish Congress or in the expansion of the Hajj as the quintessential Muslim experience. This softened the unequal distribution of power within religious internationals. Regions that combined conditions of religious or ideological pluralism with industrialization loomed largest in the new religious landscapes, but their dominance was never uncontested. In the Protestant International, the Anglo-American axis overwhelmed the multicentred world of eighteenth-century pietism; yet continental European Protestantism reaffirmed its global presence by the end of the nineteenth century, and African or Asian converts indigenized the gospel, inviting a general reappraisal of the missionary ethos. 'Secular' Western Judaism took the lead in the Jewish International, but the modern Hebrew press provided a vehicle for less acculturated voices from Eastern Europe and North Africa, while philanthropic realities gave non-Western communities considerable room for manoeuvre on the ground. In Catholicism, likewise, the new ultramontane heartland of Western Europe defined its own identity in relation to its missionary periphery, and had to come to terms with the Mediterranean legacy mediated by the 'Roman spirit'. And in Islam, the Khilafat movement underscored the rise to prominence of South Asian Islam in a world that remained essentially decentred.

In the second part of the book, we learn more about religious internationalism beyond the Western world, often from the vantage point of places apparently on their 'peripheries' like Tunisia, 'Russian' Palestine or colonial Taiwan. Yaron Tsur shows us the Westernized Moroccan Jew David Cazès as he introduces a school of the Alliance Israélite in Tunis around 1880, but gets caught up in imperial rivalries, clashes with the champions of more 'nationally' oriented Hebrew culture and seeks to overcome renewed resistance from the local elite. Guided by Amira Bennison, we follow the Syrian Rashid Rida, editor of the groundbreaking pan-Islamic journal *al-Manar*, as he travels the Middle East and India in the first decades of the twentieth century, visiting the clubs and teahouses of the budding Arab public sphere, founding

philanthropic organizations and garnering support for the project of a modern Islamic International. With Simon Dixon, we assist in the fervour of the tens of thousands of late nineteenth-century Russian pilgrims from the Volga, mobilized by the Imperial Palestine Society and shocked to find the Holy Land ruled by the Sultan rather than by the Tsar. Through Adam Chau, we meet the 'transnational Buddhist activists' spreading across the shores of East Asia from the 1890s onwards in the wake of Japan's bid for empire, as they strive towards 'authentic' Buddhism, found schools and cater to a new Buddhist reading public. In their different ways, all four chapters focus closely on the role of individuals as transnational religious agents. As we follow the careers of itinerant teachers, publicists, missionaries and activists – many of whom actually hailed from 'peripheries' like rural Iran, colonial Taiwan and Tetuan in northern Morocco – we begin to appreciate the increasingly decentred quality of religious internationals in this critical transitional period.

One of the pleasant surprises of this project is how well a concept originally designed to capture a key dimension of Jewish, Christian and Muslim experiences in modern times holds up when applied to an Eastern world religion like Buddhism. This is borne out in the chapter by Adam Chau. Inspired sometimes by studies in the West and by Christian missionary examples, East Asian Buddhists set about to reinvent Buddhism as a modern global force in very similar ways to the 'Abrahamic' religions. Here, too, travel and imperial expansion opened new pathways for the streamlining of doctrines and for a social activism calling upon laypeople next to clerics. Here, too, such activism found an outlet in mass print and in the emergence of a periodical press, or in new educational and philanthropic endeavours. Here, too, the missionary drive from Japan's imperial centre reinvigorated Buddhism in colonies like Taiwan or Korea, but also provoked reaction as indigenous 'broker monks' appropriated modern Buddhism, and the transnational linkages it created, for their own ends.

If the chapters of Part II validate the model, they also tend to complicate it. They underscore the two principal factors countering the effectiveness of religious internationals. These factors, which are also emphasized by the authors of Part I, are internal rivalries between doctrinal or ideological currents, and the pull of nation-state or empire. In addition, the close-ups of Part II point to different rhythms of expansion and contraction characterizing each religious international, and making it hard to synchronize their history in a single narrative.

Divisions are manifest in all internationals, undermining the coherence of the phenomenon. The story of the globalization of Tunisian Judaism sometimes appears less the story of a single Jewish International than that of two or three different ones animated by starkly diverging visions. Likewise, the civil networks built by Islamic modernists remained highly localized and fragile; after the First World War wrecked them, the new generation of clubs and societies proved to be more ethnic and national in orientation. Buddhism, for its part, resembled Protestantism in its strong centrifugal tendency, falling apart in different sects pursuing their own missionary projects.

Just as imperial expansion prompted the globalization of religious internationals, the modern nation-state facilitated their emergence by providing a model of bureaucratic organization and a more stable framework for civil society. But national and imperial loyalties were also a further element fracturing religious internationals. The dangerous liaison of the Alliance Israélite with French imperialism thus alienated many Jews, including the Grana of Tunis, who felt more affinity with Italy's dreams of empire. It underscored the division with the proponents of the Hebrew Haskalah, some of whom started dreaming of Zion as a Jewish homeland. In Islam, the mobilizing appeal of the Caliphate was hollowed out by the way the Ottoman Sultans put its charisma at the service of authoritarian ends in their attempt to shore up a tottering empire – a problem not unlike that facing the Catholic international as the Vatican started moving it around on the diplomatic chessboard. And Japan's attempts to harness Buddhism to colonial ends paled in comparison with the relentless instrumentalization of Russian Orthodoxy by the Czarist empire, which proved an essential stumbling block to Orthodox cooperation across borders.

A more conceptual handicap borne out by the contributions of Part II in particular, but implicit throughout the volume, is that religious internationals developed along different, only partly overlapping timelines. The Jewish International was fully fledged by the 1870s, like its Protestant and Catholic counterparts. This was the time when the missionary drive of Russian Orthodoxy started picking up steam, although a genuine Orthodox International would have to await the demise of the empire and the émigré diaspora after the revolution. Islamic internationalism, likewise, came only to a boil with the Khilafat movement around the time of the Great War, whereas transnational Buddhism does not seem to have reached maturity before the interwar years. A Hindu International came into its own even later, as we shall see.

By and large, however, the case studies in Part II suggest that the decades between 1880 and 1930 were a period of take-off for religious internationalism beyond the Western world. These years saw a gradual turn towards more plural and decentred religious internationals, while the phenomenon itself acquired a broader geographical reach as developments hitherto confined to Europe and the Anglosphere spread outwards. For Jews, Orthodox Christians and Muslims this transition was inextricably linked to European imperialisms, which reached their zenith during this period, although the precise relationship between religious internationalism and empire varied in each case. The Buddhist example reveals that similar processes were unleashed by the Japanese colonial enterprise, underlining the genuinely global nature of the phenomenon by the end of this period.

The 'model' of religious internationalism is more severely tried in the six contributions of the last part of the book. Two 'limit cases', the Islamic 'descendants of the Prophet' and the Hindu Sangh Parivar, raise questions about its applicability to all forms of global religious life in modern societies. The common thread of ethnoreligious diaspora underpins these very different case studies which, together with the Jewish example, represent an important limit to our characterization of religious internationals as communities of opinion and activism rather than birth and belief. A further limit is chronological. As five of these six chapters bring the story into the late twentieth century, we consider how far the model holds good once we enter our own era.

The diaspora of Hadrahmi sada from Yemen analysed by William Clarence-Smith, form a subgroup of the sprawling genealogical network of sada and ashraf, or 'descendants of the Prophet'. They have acted as religious experts, Sufi brothers, political leaders and peace brokers from the earliest days of Islam, and have continued to do so throughout modern times, whether in the Middle East, Southeast Asia or East Africa. As such, they were present in the new forms of religious internationalism described elsewhere in this volume, such as philanthropic organizations or the press. But this major expression of cross-border religious activity escapes our conceptual framework in important respects. It is a central part of the argument of this book that the voluntary side of religion increased dramatically from the eighteenth century onwards, and that this sea change found expression in new international commitments. Here, in contrast, we are faced with an ancient transnational religious network that is non-voluntary by definition and successfully adapts. Nonetheless, as Clarence-Smith notes,

the legitimacy of its authority was increasingly questioned. The rise of a more 'democratic' Muslim internationalism may thus help to explain the crisis of Hadrami sada in the early twentieth century and their diminished social relevance as a distinct body.

In a similar way, the 'model' may be seen to accommodate another important limit case, the Hindu International of the Sangh Parivar discussed by Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath. A centralized organization cemented by travelling charismatic holy men and doctrinal streamlining, voluntary social activism, political militancy, mass rallies and creative use of modern media: all mark the Sangh as a classic instance of religious internationalism. And yet, as Jaffrelot and Therwath demonstrate, the Sangh places the Hindu International explicitly at the service of ethnic Indian nationalism in the motherland. This fusion between religious internationalism and a long-distance nationalism that capitalizes on the combination of a deep-rooted religious attachment to a distant holy land with a more modern sense of ethnic bond has obvious parallels with the Jewish experience. In this case, it seems likely that as the Hindu diaspora integrates into their respective host nations, the Hindu International will develop an agenda of its own.

The Sangh Parivar is a contemporary example of religious internationalism. The four remaining contributions also carry the story up to the present day. Jonathan Dekel-Chen traces the significant changes in the Jewish International from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century, as the mass migration of East European Jews shifted the axis of mobilization across the Atlantic and the foundation of the state of Israel influenced (but did not displace) traditions of nonstate diplomacy by rival philanthropic organizations. The Protestant International, too, was the scene of far-reaching change in the second half of the twentieth century, a process that James Kennedy illustrates through the important Dutch case. Thus ideological polarization and congregationalization undermined a fragile ecumenical unity, while the commitment to international development was increasingly motivated in terms that were no longer explicitly religious. Galvanized by the *aggiornamento* of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic International always remained a more centralized body than its Protestant counterpart, because of papal leadership. Yet Scott Appleby demonstrates that these years also saw the rise of new formations, more explicitly geared towards changing culture through civil society: Catholic NGOs and transnational movements of laypeople thus partly replaced the orders and charitable networks dating back to the nineteenth-century revival. Finally, the

post-Cold War period saw the tentative emergence of a Greek Orthodox International, building upon older traditions of interculturalism in the Orthodox commonwealth, which had been severely curtailed by nationalist rivalries and the Iron Curtain. The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople takes the lead in renewal but, as Paschalis Kitromilides emphasizes, the dearth of lay leadership and the weaknesses of civil society in Southeastern Europe remain obstacles to a sustained Orthodox internationalism.

Like the four contributions of Part I, these four essays have a lot in common. They point to major differences between the 'classic' forms of religious internationalism that took shape in the nineteenth century and most of their post-1960 successors. These can be subsumed under the headings of secularization (external and internal), democratization and decentralization.

Secularization became a comprehensive challenge to all religious internationals. This was not a new phenomenon, of course. But in the nineteenth century, it had long been a predominantly Western elite phenomenon, and even afterwards it tended to have a tonic effect on religions, prompting them to pull themselves together. A similar dialectic still underlies the 'search for fundamentals' that has driven some of the most conspicuous transnational mobilizations across the spectrum of contemporary religion. However, at the same time, secularization has turned into a much more invasive force, at work 'inside' as much as 'outside' religions. 'Internal secularization' was not unknown in the nineteenth century, especially in Judaism and Protestantism. But liberal Protestantism was essentially a project of religious reform, and even 'secular' Western Jews remained self-consciously part of a 'religiously defined *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*'. In the second half of the twentieth century, Christianity and Judaism were subject to a more corrosive process, which cannot always be understood as a new religious formation. International Jewish philanthropy thus became for the most part decidedly secular in outlook. Christian social activism, likewise, was often much less articulate in its religious identity: this is evident, for instance, in the switch from missionary culture to development aid in Protestantism and Catholicism, or in the environmentalism of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Internal secularization, in combination with decolonization and demographics, has not only undermined the leading position of the West in the Christian and Jewish internationals, it has also globally weakened them vis-à-vis much less affected religions like Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism.

A second trend is democratization and decentralization. Again, democratization was in evidence in the nineteenth century, and it was even a fundamental feature of religious internationals. We are not referring primarily here to decision-making processes, but rather to the ways in which they provided new opportunities to laypeople for actively expressing their religious commitment and seizing the initiative, most notably through fundraising. While not always displacing traditional elites, this at the very least forced them to take into account the preferences of the many. In the second half of the twentieth century, democratization made a leap as a result of the 'generational trigger' of the 1960s, the women's movement and especially the new communications revolution of satellite TV, mobile phones and the internet. This made it harder to control centrifugal forces, and it implied a far-reaching decentralization of some religious internationals. But as the elementary building blocks of internationalism emancipated themselves, they also escaped the grip of the nation-state and created fresh transnational connections. This is evident in the 'congregationalization' of Protestantism and in the rise of Pentecostalism; in the multivocality of Jewish philanthropy; and in the elusiveness of the Islamic Tablighi Jamaat, a popular revivalist mission movement. A countertrend is manifest as well – in the Hindu Sangh Parivar, for instance, in the comeback of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, or in the recentralization of Catholicism under John Paul II. In this last case, it should be noted, clerical authoritarianism is strongly resented and generally contrasts with the ethos of the new transnational lay movements.

Sandwiched, dispersed, sometimes eroded, religious internationals seem to have reached their outer limits by the early twenty-first century. Whether these will open unto new horizons is anybody's guess, but the concept remains a useful analytical tool for capturing the transformation of religion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and deepening our understanding of its role in globalization.

So how does the approach pioneered in this book transform our understanding of global civil society?

First, the essays in this volume suggest that religion was an integral and even constitutive part of the history of global civil society at every turn: from the eighteenth-century matrix of revival and enlightenment through the mass mobilizations of the nineteenth century to the more formalized NGOs and INGOs of our own era. Rather than seeking to distinguish religious from secular civil societies (a hangover from that peculiarly Christian distinction between the Church and the World), we

need to integrate their histories. Indeed, it is impossible to write the one without the other.

Second, bringing religion into the picture provides the basis for a far richer history of global civil society and allows us to rethink the generally accepted chronology of internationalism. It throws into the open the categories that the nature of the concept has long overshadowed: other races, obviously, but also other classes and the other sex.

The repertoires of participation and mobilization developed in religious internationals ensured that they were the channel through which many persons first entered a communicative space between the system of states and national societies. As a result, religious internationals involved very different classes of people to those normally dealt with by historians of what used to be considered the 'core' business of global civil society, such as debating clubs or secular INGOs. This goes for the Protestant labourer signing an abolitionist petition, the Catholic peasant joining the Zouaves, the Jewish artisan giving money for his beleaguered brethren, the Orthodox freeholder travelling to the Holy Land, the Muslim villager outraged by the humiliation of the Caliph, the lay Buddhist learning to read sutras, or the Hindu immigrant joining a shaka. Mass mobilization and activism did not only rely on men, but also on women. This underscores the ability of religious internationals to involve women in large numbers at a far earlier stage than the current master narrative of global civil society seems to suggest – whether in Catholic congregations, Protestant missions, Jewish philanthropic networks or Muslim societies.

Finally, integrating religion into the history of global civil society helps to shift the emphasis in that history from convergence to contestation, confirming the view that this was a tougher and more diverse set of interlocking spaces than hitherto imagined.[15] Religious internationals (like their secular counterparts) belong to a single interdependent playing field in which mutual encounters or confrontations prompted the rewriting of scripts and the trading of repertoires. War is widely acknowledged as a critical crucible for nationalism, the conflict between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups is well known as a key factor in the emergence of counterstate nationalisms, and even within relatively successful nation-states the process whereby different constituent units and traditions contest the meaning of nationhood was an important factor in popularizing the nation. By analogy, it is only to be expected that the confrontation between different faith traditions in a globalizing age contributed decisively to the crystallization of religious politics and more coherent confessional identities on the world stage.

Many of the causes around which religious internationals mobilized involved interventions in localized conflicts between different communities. In this context, we would note the transformative impact for different faith communities of episodes such as the Damascus Affair of 1840, the Mortara Affair of 1859, the Damascus massacres of 1860, the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876, the Congo reform movement of 1903–12 and, more recently, the Kosovo crisis. Unlike Samuel Huntingdon, however, we would stress that conflict is only part of the picture.[16] Such episodes provoked new alliances as well as confrontation: Protestants and Jews against Catholics during the Mortara Crisis, Jews and Hindus against Muslims in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. And there have also been important instances of broader cooperation. The famous Chicago World's Parliament of Religions in 1893, discussed by several authors, was a groundbreaking experiment, even though it was overshadowed by Western imperial assumptions. In the twentieth century, the ecumenical movement picked up speed in Christianity, and the last few decades have seen sustained attempts at interfaith dialogue, both at the highest and grass-roots levels.

More generally, the extent to which different religious internationals have borrowed from each other is apparent in the names they chose for their organizations and representations: Universal Evangelical Alliance/Alliance Israélite Universelle; World Jewish Congress/World Muslim Congress/World Buddhist Forum; World Council of Churches/World Hindu Council; Christian Aid/Muslim Aid/Islamic Aid; World Jewish Relief/Muslim Global Relief/Buddhist Global Relief and so forth. For in spite of their over-publicized differences, religious activists are constantly learning from one another. Surprising examples abound throughout the book, from Protestants reinventing the nun and Catholics inspired by jihad, through Muslims admiring Freemasons and Jews learning the humanitarian ropes from evangelical Christians, to Buddhists adapting Protestant missionary techniques and Hindus intrigued by the Vatican. Underlying the religious international paradigm, therefore, is a complex model of interaction, consisting not only of competition and conflict, but also of emulation and adaptation, if not of cooperation.

Notes

1. Here, see Peter Beyer, *Religions in Global Society* (London: Routledge, 2006); Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

2. See, for instance, Peter L. Berger, 'The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview', in idem, ed., *The Desecularization of the World* (Washington: Ethics & Public Policy Center, 1999), pp. 1–18; Mark Juergensmeyer, ed., *Religion in Global Civil Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Peter Beyer and L. Beaman, eds, *Religion, Globalization and Culture* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007).

3. This contrast is explored in David Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society. Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

4. John Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

5. Beyer, *Religions in Global Society*.

6. See especially the introduction and opening chapter in A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico, 2002).

7. To give some examples: Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Globalization. A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 32–3, notes the importance of religious ecumenes as a form of translocal integration in the premodern world, but fails to pursue the theme further. Important collections of essays show a similar imbalance. See Hopkins, *Globalization in World History*, and Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds, *Competing Visions of World Order. Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), both of which include only one chapter with a religious focus. Recent stimulating works on the role of empire in world history have likewise failed to engage seriously with religion. See, for instance, John Darwin, *After Tamerlane. The Global History of Empire* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), and James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth. The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

8. For a general discussion of the relationship between religious history and different forms of international history, see V. Viaene, 'International History, Religious History, Catholic History: Perspectives for Cross-Fertilisation (1830–1914)', *European History Quarterly*, 38.4 (2008), 578ff.

9. Examples include: for Protestantism Andrew Porter, *Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), and Christopher Leslie Brown, *Moral Capital. Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); for Catholicism, J. P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided. Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), and Vincent Viaene, ed., *The Papacy and the New World Order. Vatican Diplomacy, Catholic Opinion and International Politics in the Time of Leo XIII, 1878–1903* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005); for Judaism, Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews. The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), and Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: 'Ritual Murder,' Politics, and the Jews in 1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); for Islam, Amira Bennison, 'Muslim Universalism and Western Globalization', in A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico,

2002), pp. 74–97, and William G. Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the Abolition of Slavery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

10. C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), chapter 9.

11. Tellingly this is true of almost all the works cited in n. 9 above.

12. Bruce Mazlish and Akira Iriye, eds, *The Global History Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2005), may be taken as representative of this tendency. Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds, *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), incorporates religion but not systematically: there are entries for Religion, Religious Fundamentalism and Religious Pilgrimage; also for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and some sub-categories, such as Evangelicalism and Shi'i Islam; Hinduism, Sikhism and Sunni Islam receive no specific coverage; Catholicism is covered only under the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council and Judaism only under Zionism.

13. Akira Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 2. Likewise, in their introduction to another landmark volume, *The Mechanics of Internationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Dietrich Geyer and Johannes Paulmann regret the absence of religion.

14. For a discussion of these issues, see C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol and Patricia Seed, 'AHR Conversation: On Transnational History', *The American Historical Review*, 111.5 (December 2006), 1441–64.

15. As resulted, among other things, from the conference 'The Roots of Global Civil Society' organized by Cambridge University, 1–3 October 2009. See also the approach taken in Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, 'Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s', in idem, eds, *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 1–25.

16. Samuel P. Huntingdon, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

Part I

The Religions of the Book:
Trajectories, Comparisons

2
The Protestant International

Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas

Since the Reformation, the idea of internationalism has broadcast an alluring but intermittent message to Protestants, like a radio station with infectious tunes but a narrow frequency band. Although the Reformation was from its inception a continental and then a transatlantic movement spread by exiles and their books, it is important not to assume but to explain why Protestants developed consciously international structures. For much of the early modern period, 'Protestant' was more a heuristic term than a collective noun: the first loyalty of many Protestants was to established, territorial churches and to states rather than to an invisible church of true believers. This chapter argues that the rise of the Protestant International was intimately connected with an evangelical revival centred in the Atlantic world, which promoted and benefited from an expansion in print culture, the movement of peoples and the rise of civil society. The revival was initially not so much international as transnational, or oblivious to national boundaries. It exploited and reacted against 'archaic globalization': competition between states whose ethos was dynastic and multiethnic rather than national.[1] Several developments made it into a genuine but unstable international community. The industrialization of communications thickened and broadened the evangelical public sphere. Communications networks, which were modern not so much in the messages they transmitted but in their density and scale, sustained humanitarian causes that evangelicals did not originate, but certainly appropriated. Missionary evangelicals exploited opportunities opened by the expansion of imperial nation-states. For Protestants, then, the international message grew in symbiosis with the technologies required to broadcast and receive it.

The result was an informal spiritual empire, a network of formal bodies that federated believers across increasingly distinct national

boundaries. Yet hierarchy and enmity soon entered into the Protestant family. This chapter emphasizes that during the long nineteenth century a Protestant International reared on the Continent learned to speak English. British and American evangelicals choreographed it during an age of Anglophone globalization, in which the number of English speakers grew at least sixteen fold 1790–1930.[2] Yet their pre-eminence was increasingly undermined by the very grandeur of their ambitions. The activity of missionaries in the extra-European world unleashed movements that escaped their power to control them and strengthened a liberal Protestant critique of the evangelical obsession with conversion. The international coalitions forged by evangelicals were weakened by erosion of their domestic support base and fractured by two world wars. The formal Protestant International thus gave way to a revived transnationalism, which resembled its eighteenth-century predecessor in running on the hectic, decentred enthusiasms of sectarian churches.

The Matrix of Revival

When did the Protestant International come into existence? One important precursor was the 'Calvinist International'. From the mid-sixteenth century, persecution by Roman Catholics and established churches alike turned an inchoate grouping of Reformed Protestants into transnational Calvinists. 60,000 left the southern Netherlands in the period 1540 to 1630s and in all about 175,000 southerners may have emigrated. This figure was outstripped by Huguenot emigration, with up to 200,000 leaving early modern France. The 'Calvinist International' ran on aspiration as well as persecution. While Calvin and other Reformed theologians condemned 'Nicodemism' – the unwillingness of believers to stand up and be counted during persecutions – they had nothing against timing one's departure prudently. Merchant families moved a step ahead of the Counter-Reformation, trading with and marrying one another in the process.[3] The centrality of merchants in the Huguenot diaspora was in contrast with transnational Catholic networks dominated by officials, magistrates, financiers and members of the hierarchy.[4] The mass migration of Huguenots in the later seventeenth century was in many ways a response to an economic slump as was the migration of over 100,000 Ulster Scots to the American colonies from 1718 to 1775. Many of the latter ended up in Pennsylvania not just because they were drawn to the tolerant rule of the Quakers but also because the proprietors of the ships which took flax from the Delaware to Ulster used a 'trade in strangers' to fill their holds on the return journey.[5]

If migration was motivated by Calvinist commitment, then it also did much to create it. Calvinists anticipated Dr Johnson's dictum that no man's mind is enlarged by travel. Exiles often chose or were impelled to join 'stranger churches' and had to subject themselves to increasingly stereotyped forms of discipline and faith. Calvinist students roamed from Geneva to Cambridge, Leiden and Saumur in search of an orthodoxy that got narrower the more its teaching was decentred. The power of prayers against shared enemies was an important resource for exiles, with one describing them as 'murtherers that will kill point blanke from one end of the world to another'.[6] American migration had deterritorialized the eschatology of English puritans, teaching them, as one of their number wrote, that 'we are all, in all places, strangers and pilgrims, travellers and sojourners...our dwelling is but a wandering; and our abiding, but as a fleeting'.[7]

Expulsion and forced migration continued to create the matrix for the Protestant International well into the eighteenth century. Some migrants, like the Protestant farmers expelled by Archbishop Firmian (1679–1744) from the Alpine districts of Salzburg in the early 1730s, became causes célèbres in their own right, stimulating a flood of contemporary print, in which they figured as latter-day descendants of the Children of Israel trudging into exile in Prussian Lithuania and American Georgia. The first Lutheran pastor in New York had been expelled from his parish in Upper Hungary by the Turks. Many of the Pietist clergymen-scholars gathered around August Hermann Francke (1663–1727) in Prussian Halle, one of the centres of German moderate Pietism, had been expelled from their livings by the Orthodox Lutheran authorities in other German states. The Protestantism of the Moravian Brethren was suffused with a consciousness of exile: Count Nicolaus Ludwig Zinzendorff (1700–60), their leader, was the grandson of an Austrian Protestant émigré.[8] The exchange of letters developed these bonds into a conscious network. The sheer volume of traffic is remarkable. Francke in Halle boasted five thousand correspondents. Other leading religious figures of the era such as Philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705), the Wesleys, Cotton Mather (1663–1728) or Isaac Backus (1724–1806) collected huge international archives, but it was the involvement of humbler figures in transatlantic correspondence networks that opened dispersed communities to influences from the broader 'north Atlantic world'. In the 1740s, Henry Davidson of Galashiels (1687–1756), a poorly resourced figure serving an isolated Scottish community, tapped into a sophisticated correspondence network to keep the people of his area informed of developments in England and America.[9]

Mobile believers posed an implicit challenge to and could count on only grudging support from Protestant states and established churches. With confessional loyalties losing their power to trump patriotism from the later seventeenth century, foreign brethren met with apathy or dislike. Thus German Palatines and Huguenot refugees in England had to reckon with the xenophobia of their hosts. As the 'Protestant interest' lost its hold over British foreign policy from the mid-eighteenth century on, the willingness to send funds to continental Protestants dwindled.[10] Moreover, the commitment by Lutherans and Anglicans to sacramental and episcopal definitions of the church often made them distrustful of other Protestants.[11] Lutheran preachers in Sweden were less worried about Roman Catholicism than they were Calvinist migrant workers, students and imported books.[12] The first English outreach to Halle Pietists was motivated by a desire to reunite German Protestants beneath a liturgy borrowed from the Church of England.[13] When foreign Protestants were assisted it was often as pawns for mercantilist or strategic objectives. German court chaplains recommended the Salzburgers to the Trustees of the Georgia Colony, who were eager for industrious settlers.[14] The Moravian Brethren had a harder time establishing their usefulness, but were eventually invited to settle the Labrador and Newfoundland fisheries in order to mediate between the English and the Inuit, and also to convert slaves in the West Indies.[15]

Print was the solvent of these clerical and national jealousies. It greatly expanded the impact of personal networks and emancipated the communication of spiritual insight from specific persons, locations and hierarchies, generating a placeless lay religion. *Blessed Footsteps of the Still Living and Reigning Benevolent and Steadfast GOD*, the pioneering journal of Halle Pietism, was launched in 1708 with a combination of appeals for donations, dramatic conversion narratives and reports from correspondents of a German-speaking network that stretched from the Protestant Netherlands across the German states and deep into the Russian Empire's archipelago of German diasporas. Books, tracts and the evangelical journals launched in the 1740s were the mainstay of the Anglophone 'North-Atlantic World' and had an explicitly transnational audience. In 1710, the New England revivalist Cotton Mather, author of numerous tracts, was confident that 'excellent men' in distant Scotland would take his words to heart.[16] The sermons of Pastor Nicholas Gilman (1707–48) of Durham, New Hampshire, instigator of a religious revival in the early 1740s, drew upon a library of revivalist essays and conversion narratives from England and Scotland.[17]

Because eschatology frames events in worldwide terms, the evangelical imagination was always global. Hence John Wesley's (1703–91) remarkable comment in his journal for 1739: 'I look upon all the world as my parish.'[18] A sense of common threat, whether from Roman Catholicism or indifferentism, reinforced transnational solidarity. Bostonians, for instance, were surprisingly clued up on the confessional politics of the Holy Roman Empire.[19] When in 1712 George Lewis (d.1730), East India Company Chaplain at Fort St George (site of today's Madras) urged the London Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge to support the work of Danish Pietist missionaries on the South Indian coast, he stressed that their mission represented 'the first attempt that Protestants have ever made in this kind. We must not put out the smoking flax. It would give our adversaries, the papists . . . too much cause to triumph over us.'[20]

This mood of dread and exaltation made Protestants anxious for conversions, especially through the revivals that pulsed through and reinforced the transnational matrix. The revivalist impulse moved with such speed and along so many vectors that it is sometimes impossible to distinguish 'periphery' from 'centre'.[21] The centenary edition of Cotton Mather's revivalist tract *Bonifacius*, printed in Boston in 1810, was an exact reprint of the second London edition of that year, so that Mather had been repatriated to New England via London.[22] Print and correspondence produced a common script for revival, disciplining religious enthusiasm through processes of authentication and creating behavioural norms for the reborn.[23] It was acceptable to cry out, moan or sob in the New Birth, the revivalist Connecticut clergyman Timothy Edwards (1668–1759) assured his son Jonathan (1703–58) in the 1740s – a gentleman he knew had shown him a 'letter from Scotland' describing how the Edinburgh congregation at the General Assembly had made a 'loud cry' during a stirring sermon.[24] Shameless self-publicists, the pioneers of the evangelical movement described new models of selfhood and understandings of conversion for their readers, whatever their status, gender or ethnicity.[25] George Whitefield (1714–70) produced 90 separate editions of his writings in the year he began his American ministry, while a typical portion of his *Journals* allotted 500 pages to just three years.[26]

The Industrialization of the International

The wave of world evangelization that transformed the Protestant world in the nineteenth century was therefore not new in its eschatological

focus, its anti-Catholicism or its reliance on formulaic conversion narra-tives.[27] Changes internal to the theology of evangelicals explain why they were able to act as well as to think globally. Where the Pietist tradition was often introverted, the Calvinist tradition was wary of revivals even while it had benefited from them. Calvinists felt that the will of individuals was too corrupted to allow them to seek their own conversion. Sinners must wait for the gift of grace, whose signs were easy to mistake. Calvinist migrants were stubborn in their attachment to the Westminster Confession and ethnocentric in their understand-ing of revival. The Ulster Scots in America, for instance, continued to hold 'Holy Fairs' – al fresco Lord's Suppers that struck one observer as 'something like the assembly of the ancient tribes, on their national festivals'.[28] Whitefield's bluff ecumenicism broke down such clannish exclusivity, while the insistence of Wesley's followers on the ability of believers to cooperate with grace in seeking their salvation also encour-aged a more forthright approach to conversion. Methodists prevailed over their rivals in a growing religious marketplace and forced Calvinists in the United States and later in Britain to 'Arminianize' in a bid to compete.[29]

Just as the sphere of action widened, time was running out. Evangelicals looked for 'special providences': spots of time in which God demanded immediate action to gather in converts or to atone for national sins.[30] British providential thinking coincided with a period of exploration, imperial expansion and wars with France.[31] Anglican the-ology blessed the expanding Empire: the Church hoped to profit from and support the imperial state by planting bishoprics in new colonies.[32] Yet even dissenters who disliked the state's church wanted to exploit the openings established by its sailors and soldiers. 'The first thing that engaged my mind to think of missions', remembered William Carey (1761–1834) of his time as pastor in the tiny Northamptonshire vil-lage of Moulton, 'was reading of Cook's voyages'.[33] A proliferation of societies was the result: Carey's Baptist Missionary Society (1792) and the ecumenical London Missionary Society (1795), which came to be dominated by Congregationalists; the Church Missionary Society (1799) and the Glasgow and Edinburgh Societies (1796) among others. These organizations loosened the tie between mission and the state. If the clergy trained and dispatched to the American colonies by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel were its religious police, then the soci-eties sent what Sydney Smith (1771–1845) called 'little detachments of maniacs' beyond its boundaries.[34]

It was not just British evangelicals who benefited from the expan-sion of the British Empire. War and revolution weakened ancien régime

clericalism on the Continent and fostered a growth in voluntary and associational culture, with missionary societies taking off in Holland, France, Germany and Switzerland.[35] Continental missionaries were often employed by British societies, whose need for men made them de facto international. Unable to get Englishmen to brave hot climates and odd food, the Church Missionary Society followed the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in recruiting Germans from Halle and Basel – while Basel, to its chagrin, found it impossible to recruit Englishmen.[36] As late as the 1850s, British commentators muttered about the 'national disgrace' of leaving hireling Germans to evangelize India. The Church Missionary Society and the London Missionary Society also had warm contacts with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, sharing their interest in protecting mission fields in the South Seas and Near East against profiteers and Roman Catholic snakes in the grass.[37] The adventures of Samuel Gobat (1799–1879), the second bishop of Jerusalem, illustrate how individuals could build international careers: he hailed from the Pietist Swiss Jura, trained at the Basel Mission Institute, studied Arabic in Paris and attended the Church Missionary Society College in London before working in Egypt and Palestine. Before he took Anglican orders and heading for Jerusalem, he had been a professor back in Basel and worked in Malta and Lebanon.[38]

It was not just the theology of the societies that was new, but also their scale. There were 10,000 mainly 'evangelical' missionaries working in the British Empire by the end of the nineteenth century. James Dennis (1842–1914), an American missionary from Beirut, bullishly estimated that they had effected 100,000 conversions in 1892 alone – or 2000 new souls to pray for every Sunday.[39] Nineteenth-century societies were elastic in their operations because they did not wait for grudging state help but chased voluntary funding. It was admittedly difficult to persuade congregations that charity did not end at home. The Baptist Missionary Society did not have an assured income of £25,000 until the 1860s. It and other societies never lived within their means, but that was the point: every new target incurred more debt, stimulating fundraising and more activity. Auxiliary societies were the most important vehicle in this process, enabling donors to swap cash for exciting information and social pleasures.[40] The British and Foreign Bible Society already had 859 auxiliary societies by 1824 and around 300 in Russia by the same date.[41] Even the relatively modest Society for the Promotion of Christianity among the Jews founded in Berlin (1822) established auxiliary societies across the whole Prussian state. These organizations, which engaged local worthies and pious artisans, may not have constituted the

'critical' public sphere idealized by Habermas, but they gave Protestant networks a new social depth.[42]

Auxiliaries might have remained cellular prayer meetings, poorly informed about the places they paid to evangelize and one another, if they had not had been able to consume so much printed data.[43] Mass print publicized what missionaries were doing and supplied them with a vital technology of conversion. Again it was not Bibles, tracts or journals that were new, but the scale of their production. The Church Missionary Society circulated 2.5 million magazines a year and 5 million newspapers by 1899. British and American Bible and tract societies were founded at the dawn of mass publishing – steam presses, stereotyping, wood-pulp paper and wholesaling – that their patronage did much to advance.[44] From its foundation to 1880, the American Bible Society issued just over 32 million Bibles from its depositories, while the price of its standard Bible plunged from 64 cents in 1819 to just two cents in 1897.[45] By 1884, the British and Foreign Bible Society had circulated around 100 million copies of the Scriptures from depots in London and abroad.[46] In 1892, Dennis could estimate the total circulation of the Scriptures that century at a barely credible 350 million copies.[47]

Some scepticism is in order, given that these statistics record volume of production rather than acts of reading, but their collation reflects a newly quantitative, industrial definition of conversion. Print consolidated a transatlantic public sphere, leaving Dutch and German readers to eavesdrop on its 'missionary stories'.[48] Like German car manufacturers or Hollywood filmmakers, British and American publishers used their large domestic market to subsidize mass production for export. England's lead in Protestant publishing actually dated back to the early eighteenth century. Evangelical societies built on this pre-eminence and franchised salvation, using French and German societies as distributors for translated Bibles and tracts and hiring colporteurs to reach their public in such hostile environments as Italy and Spain.[49] Of course many publications still presented missionary news in consciously international rather than narrowly Anglo-Saxon terms: periodicals such as the *Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift* (1874); statistical atlases, global and regional histories of composite endeavour. Roman Catholics often got a section in such works, but Protestants retained the lion's share.[50]

In globalizing Protestantism, missionary endeavour and mass print changed it. Missionary print had a dramatic impact in places like Africa, introducing a powerful technology, unlocking a macrocosmic, supernatural realm and making Christianity and literacy synonymous terms.[51] Yet missionaries did not just stamp Western mentalities on converts,

not least because translating Bibles into local tongues and making dictionaries involved dialogue with local people and adoption of their political frame of reference.[52] Far from extirpating cultures, missionary Bibles enriched them with new narratives that plotted how individual futures and collective histories might go. This was not least because it was converted Africans who usually introduced translated texts to other Africans, indigenizing them as they did so.[53] Thus the 80 or so translations of Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* into African languages during the long nineteenth century rapidly decentred and indigenized its meaning.[54] African converts created movements based on idiosyncratic readings of Scripture in which visions, miraculous healing and a literal reading of Old Testament commandments loomed large.[55] Such developments represented not so much a perversion of a true gospel as a transplantation of Protestantism's hermeneutic freedom to a different context. Conversion struck both ways: in envisaging the native's journey from one religion to another as a free choice, many European Protestants deepened their conviction that belief at home must be decoupled from nationality or citizenship rights.[56]

The railway, the telegraph, the steamship and even the bicycle helped missionaries to abbreviate time and space and routinized the itinerancy of charismatic individuals. Like the contemporary world's fairs and exhibitions with which they often coincided, the missionary jamborees that culminated in the Edinburgh World Conference (1910) brought this infrastructure into impressive, ephemeral relief. John Mott (1865–1955), the convenor of Edinburgh, was an Ohio farm boy who had become *the* 'world citizen'; the 'Ulysses of modern missions'. One hagiographer recorded that if Wesley had travelled around 250,000 miles during his life, then Mott had racked up over 1,700,000: the equivalent of 68 journeys round the globe. A martyr to sea-sickness, he crossed the Atlantic over 100 times, with only 'deck golf' for solace. Students from Paris to Manchuria thereby gained 'a world outlook…from lips touched with the fire from the altar'.[57] In the year after Edinburgh, the peak of his activity, Mott attended 21 separate conferences around the world to create local coordinating committees that would carry on the Conference's work.[58]

The Protestant International was increasingly mapped on to an 'Anglo-world' defined by the mass transfer of money and information. North America was connected to Britain by submarine cable as early as 1866, while by the mid-seventies around 6 million letters crossed the Atlantic yearly. Around 25 million people emigrated from the British Isles 1815–1924, the vast majority to swell Anglophone societies.[59] In

the early nineteenth century, wealthy Britain had exercised a prepon-
derant influence over international Protestantism. Hard-up German
evangelicals directed begging letters there, while British hardliners flush
with cash exported their extremism to France and Switzerland.[60] By the
mid-nineteenth century, however, the arrival of American revivalists
in Britain itself was a sign that leadership was parcelled out across
the Atlantic. James Caughey (1810–91), Charles Finney (1792–1875),
Phoebe Palmer (1807–74) and Dwight Moody (1837–99) were the most
celebrated travellers along transatlantic denominational circuits. Ira
D. Sankey's (1840–1908) *Sacred Songs and Solos* (1873), which sup-
plied Moody's music, sold 80 million copies in Britain in the first 50
years following publication.[61] The Salvation Army copied the tactics of
American holiness theology: the promise of instant sanctification; extra-
denominational itinerancy and female preachers and the use of venues
like music halls.[62] Yet if the revivalist industry anticipated Hollywood in
conquering Britain, then it resembled it in remaining open to British
talent. John Nelson Darby (1800–82), the founder of the Plymouth
Brethren, was lionized in America as was J. Hudson Taylor (1832–1905),
the founder of the China Inland Mission.[63]

Empires and the Spirit

Empires were the most palpable symbol of the disparity between peo-
ples in technological and financial resources in the nineteenth century.
Did the global ambitions of the missionary movement simply entrench
such disparities? The opposite was initially true in the British case, with
crusading evangelicals and the officials of an empire that had to be
multiconfessional and even multireligious, regarding one another with
distrust. While the imperial state promoted religion, it did not exclu-
sively favour Protestantism. An 1839 inquiry by the House of Commons
revealed that 8.7 per cent of public money for colonial religion went
to Roman Catholics, while in Jamaica a Jewish synagogue got £1000 a
year.[64] In the long run though, it is hard to find daylight between Protes-
tant missions and the forcible spread of Western power.[65] The fierce
independence of many agents of the London Missionary Society and
Baptist Missionary Society from the imperial state soon faded.[66] By the
later nineteenth century, missionaries were 'good citizens' valued by
colonial authorities for their hospitals and schools – by 1900 there were
20,000 of the latter worldwide.[67] In the African colonies of the German
Empire, missionaries often performed minor administrative tasks, as
assessors in court proceedings, for example, while instruction in literacy

and Western medicine made missionaries tolerated or welcome in many cultures.[68] In India, China and Mejii Japan, missionaries converted more people to modernity than to Protestantism.[69] The refusal of faith missions to recommend themselves through the teaching of English expressed a conviction that others had confused 'Anglobalization' with the evangelization of the world. But they were eccentrics from a powerful consensus, as were the Anglo-Catholics who fled Zanzibar – that combination of 'Piccadilly, Sodom, and a public bar'– to plant apostolic traditions in the virgin soil of Central Africa.[70]

Given recent scepticism about the deliberate impact missionaries could have on colonized cultures, it may be more productive to ask what impact missionary experiences had on how Western Protestants saw the world. Christ may have known neither Jew nor Greek, but were European and American missionaries similarly oblivious to the ethnic and racial barriers between themselves and other Protestants? Logistics and strategy pointed that way, for if planted churches were to survive 'the casualties of war, or the revolutions of empires' they needed indigenous roots.[71] The mid-century enthusiasm of the Baptist Missionary Society, the Church Missionary Society and the American Board for the 'euthanasia of missions' is remarkable, whether it is ascribed to ecclesiology or cost-cutting measures.[72] Faith missionaries went one better, not only employing natives as evangelists but dressing like them. Theology reinforced these strategies. If racists warped biblical verses into defences of slavery, then the Book of Acts contained a clear affirmation that all men were of the same blood.[73] The freethinking racist Richard Burton (1821–90) might dismiss Samuel Ajayi Crowther (1809–91), the freed slave ordained in 1864 as the bishop of 'Western Africa beyond the limits of our dominions' as 'our Gorilla, our missing link'. To Henry Venn of the Church Missionary Society, he was the future of African Christianity.

Black, brown and yellow Protestants might be nominally equal to white Protestants, yet were hardly identical with them. Evangelical missionaries shared the human foible of caring most for those who resembled or could be made to resemble them. Disgust at the failure of cultural assimilation in the West Indies or at the Cape may have pushed British missionaries to develop dismissive, even racist views of subject populations, attitudes quickly transmitted back home.[74] Missionary societies had always seen some boundaries as insurmountable. In 1817, for instance, the London Missionary Society had put a stop to missionaries marrying natives.[75] Keen to put a spoke in the wheels of Juggernaut, missionaries sent back stories about the wickedness of other religions that made their host cultures look as weird as possible.[76] The litmus test

for whether missionaries accepted natives as equals was whether they allowed them to be clergy. This was rare where and once whites could survive in large numbers. The 'Niger purge' of 1890 in which emissaries from Britain dismantled Crowther's diocese and pushed him into retirement was one straw in the wind.[77] Elsewhere, natives remained humble 'catechists' rather than proper clergy. Indian Anglicans did not get their first diocesan bishop until 1912; tellingly, V.S. Azariah (1874–1945) would be a critic of white arrogance.[78]

Moral Capital

In 1808, the London clergyman Thomas Clarkson (1760–1846) published a celebratory history of the abolition of the African slave trade. The book featured a two-page map charting the development of the abolition movement. An aerial view of two river deltas shows numerous tributaries, each named for an activist or group, join broad watercourses in a vast capillary network. The prominence of religious figures and groups is obvious, although the names of a few secular intellectuals and politicians also appear. So is the intertwined, transatlantic configuration of the networks, in which, for example, streams marked 'J. Wesley' and 'G. Whitefield' feed into the swollen river of American Quaker abolitionism. The capacity to mobilize a broad, international constituency in support of moral causes was a remarkable feature of the nineteenth-century Protestant International. Yet the roots of the Protestant abolitionist movement extended back into the networks of the eighteenth-century exiles. Salzburger and other German Lutheran colonies in the Caribbean and America were prominent in the early articulation of antislavery sentiment. The early Quaker antislavery campaigner Anthony Benezet (1713–84) was a son of Huguenot refugees who took a general interest in the condition of exiles and the dispossessed, including not only enslaved Africans, but also American Indians and uprooted Nova Scotians.[79]

The confluence of antislavery sentiment and transnational ecumenical revival made abolitionism as a modern movement. Abolitionism broadened the interests of Protestant networks, allowing them to link themselves with a public question and to free themselves from accusations of puritan narrowness.[80] Their abolitionism was fuelled by a dynamic theology in which reform was the fulfilment of a divine plan and an act of atonement. The evangelical preoccupation with the 'convulsive experience of conversion' was mapped onto the slave, triggering hope and eschatological urgency.[81] This theology was not

just activist, but transnational and ecumenical. Wesley's *Thoughts on Slavery*, for example, was strikingly eclectic, drawing on Anglicanism, Quakerism, premillennial revivalism and the redemptive theology of the Moravians.[82] Abolitionism therefore became as important a catalyst of Protestant collaboration as revival. The Congregational preacher John Angell James (1785–1859) cultivated strong links with American evangelicals and the prominent Baptist (and sometime editor of the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*) John Howard Hinton (1791–1873) promoted collaboration with his American codenominationalists. British Methodists likewise pressured their American counterparts to adopt firmer positions against slavery.[83] Migration constantly brought dissenters from Britain to put abolitionist arguments in person.[84] A 'transatlantic sisterhood' was vital to abolitionism's fortunes at mid-century, with women in Britain remitting profits from fundraising bazaars across the Atlantic.[85]

Yet the anti-slavery cause could not overcome the fissiparous character of Protestantism, especially once the abolition of slavery within the British Empire (1833) was followed by disagreement about future plans.[86] British abolitionists were not, for instance, sure which Americans really spoke for anti-slavery. Many American Protestants, especially Quakers, were alienated from the abolitionism of the free-thinking William Lloyd Garrison (1805–79) by its aggression, heterodox supporters and its overt public role for women – their misgivings crossed the Atlantic.[87] The problem persisted after the formal termination of American slavery.[88] The fit between abolitionism and evangelical revivalism seems looser still if we accept recent claims that secular political and economic arguments were at the former's core. But the power of the Protestant International in this and subsequent causes lay in its ability to assimilate arguments first made by others. The abolitionism of the evangelical Quaker Joseph Sturge (1793–1859) was, for instance, powered by a dream of realizing a millennium of peace and justice on earth. He thus organized a 'World's Anti-Slavery Convention' (1840) – or 'Sturge's Parliament' – then three anti-slavery, peace and temperance conventions (1843) to mobilize 'citizens of the world' against their governments.[89] The 'people diplomacy' of Sturge and his 'League of Universal Brotherhood' was washed in the '*blood* of the *Lamb*', but it strongly resembled the tactics that free traders used to evangelize continental civil society.[90] Evangelical and secular 'people diplomacy' fused in the years after 1848 when the Peace Society's congresses pursued a vision of committing nations to peaceful arbitration.[91]

Protestants had no more than a Pisgah sight of world peace, but were more successful in promoting international exchange in philanthropy.

The century after the Napoleonic Wars saw common anxiety about how to respond to the 'age of great cities' and its problems. Protestants wanted to know how to educate orphans, care for the sick, rescue prostitutes and reform prisoners. In doing so, they were keen to affirm the charitable duty of all believers and to create an elevating ministry for women. Institutional models and exemplary lives appealed across denominational, national and even confessional lines – with Catholic orders being much admired. Governments promoted these transfers. This mood prompted Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia (1795–1861) to accompany the Quaker Elizabeth Fry (1780–1845) to a prayer meeting at Newgate prison in 1841 and onto a 'most complete and nice' dinner at her house in Upton.[92] Institutions such as the Diakonissen Anstalt at Kaiserswerth founded by Theodor Fliedner (1800–64) and the visiting society at Hamburg founded by Amalie Sieveking (1794–1859) drew eclectically on British, Roman Catholic and Pietist models to create philanthropic models that were adopted by the Prussian state and then exported to Britain, the United States and the Near East.[93] By the later nineteenth century, congresses and journals brokered detailed, statistical knowledge among Protestants in an age when social policy was news. The 'Social Gospel' variously preached by liberal Protestants and evangelicals infused the mundane exchange of policy ideas with religious emotion.[94] So did the work of agitators who exploited photographic and eyewitness reporting of Indian and Boer starvation, Armenian massacres and Chinese slavery to provoke outrage across religious, cultural and racial boundaries. British nonconformist ministers showed magic lantern slides of mutilated children to hymn-singing congregations in the campaign against Belgian atrocities in the Congo – simultaneously helping and discomfiting their secular allies.[95]

Shared absorption in humanitarian news arguably brought Protestants closer than formal efforts to institutionalize unity ever did. Evangelical voluntarism was meant to be a 'funeral of bigotry', but denominational and sectarian rivalries had killed off its naïve ecumenicism.[96] The 'Evangelical United Front' collapsed in the United States as competitive denominations preferred to finance their own expansion in the heartland, while British nonconformists increasingly preferred campaigning against to working with the established churches.[97] Of course, internecine conflict and sectarian impulses multiplied transnational contacts within Protestant Christendom even as they threatened its notional unity. The more fanatical the sect, the greater its viral spread across borders. By the time Darby died, there were over 15,000 Plymouth Brethren assemblies worldwide.[98] Conversely, tensions provoked within

and outside state churches by those who preached or opposed aggressive clericalism generated a search for international allies. The Prussian Jewish convert Michael Alexander (1799–1845), Gobat's predecessor as bishop of Jerusalem, had thus been consecrated in 1841 to snub the insular English Tractarians and to demonstrate that the Church of England was Protestant enough to cooperate with German Lutherans.

Formal institutions such as the Evangelical Alliance (1846), which tried to reassemble the evangelical jigsaw, merely worsened confusion about what the picture was supposed to be. Its organizers certainly mastered the mechanics of internationalism: holding peripatetic bean feasts timed to coincide with international commercial exhibitions and speaking up for religious freedom, protesting, for instance, against the forced conversion in the Papal States of the Jewish Edgar Mortara (1859). Nonetheless, many wondered whether its pettifogging doctrinal basis, prevarication over anti-slavery and addiction to crude anti-Catholicism represented the future of evangelical cooperation.[99] The World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations (1855) was more successful because the vague agreement on which it was founded linked without constraining its national associations. By 1900, the World Alliance had a Central International Committee in Geneva (1878) and 875,000 affiliated members. Not bad going, when the first YMCA had been formed in London as recently in 1844 and as little more than a Bible class for young men in the draper's trade.[100]

The World's Parliament

Over 17 days in the summer of 1893, a World's Parliament of Religions took place in Chicago as part of the Columbian Exposition. A total of 150,000 spectators heard 200 delegates of every faith from Shintoism to Greek Orthodoxy search for common denominators of faith. A Catholic cardinal sat on its platform with Bishop Arnett (1838–1906), the 'ebon-hued but bright face[d]' archbishop of the African Methodist Church and Commissioner Pung Kwang Yu, who was 'deputed by the Emperor of China to present the doctrine of Confucius'. Its convenors hoped to rediscover the 'white light of heaven' that had been 'broken into many colored fragments by the prisms of men'. American fundamentalists denounced a 'masterpiece of Satan' at which 'God's elect flirted with the daughters of Moab'.[101] The Parliament was certainly not evangelical, but reflected a new yet distinctively Protestant reckoning with the reality of religious pluralism. Liberals who disliked the creeds of established churches and the aggressive certainties of evangelical religion

had always formed an important if elitist fraction of the Protestant community, a republic of letters with their own journals and favourite universities. By the later nineteenth century, churches and congregations that had previously resisted liberal Protestant ideas adopted some of them, notably a positive evaluation of the nation-state, a preference for the improvement of the natural and human world over fretting about the life to come and the concession that other religions shared in divine revelation.

These developments challenged the notion that the priority of Protestants must be conversion. The comparative study of religion, whose development as a scholarly discipline was spearheaded by liberal Protestants, questioned the conviction that faiths other than Christianity were rank heathenism or heretical deviations from the one true revelation. Over time, scholars recognized Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism and finally Islam as 'world religions' in their own right, a step that cleared the way for their admission to the World's Parliament.[102] Significantly, critics of such scholarship connected it with a 'crisis of missions'.[103] The first waves of evangelical missionaries had aimed to sweep away demonic superstitions, but the greater their contact with resilient belief systems, the greater the urge to explain their relative dignity.[104] 'Fulfillment theology,' in which Christianity was 'the crown' rather than the enemy of Hinduism, caught on with missionaries who saw themselves as Christianizing India by helping to refine Hinduism, rather than making Christians. Similarly, fundamentalist visitors to early twentieth-century China condemned modernist missionaries for diluting their message with 'swollenheadism, Bolshevik ideas, Buddhist principles [and] Confucian ethics'.[105]

This international vision may have weakened evangelical definitions of world Protestantism, but it left Protestants in charge of brokering entry to their imagined world's Parliament. Buddha became the Luther of Brahmanism, while 'neo-Hindus' impressed their Protestant interlocutors with the primal monotheism of their purified Scriptures.[106] It was significant that Islam, Christianity's most aggressive competitor in Africa, was long dismissed as a merely ethnic rather than a universal religion whose adherents were ripe for proselytizing: its representative in Chicago was actually heckled by other delegates.[107] Nor did representatives of other faiths escape lectures at an event that began with a daily recital of the Lord's Prayer. Precisely because liberal Protestants believed in the goodness of secular civilization – that 'colossal image of gold that all men are now called upon to worship', snorted one fundamentalist critic – they did not doubt that civilized peoples should

control the search for a universal faith. Liberal theology was thus quite compatible with the custodianship, if not the conversion, of backward peoples.[108]

The International and the Nations

Late nineteenth-century nationalism and imperial competition strained without destroying the Protestant International. One straw in the wind was the decision by Germany to create its own, rival bishopric of Jerusalem in 1887. Similar tensions emerged elsewhere in the mission field. The 'scramble for Africa' precipitated an 'ecclesiastical scramble' in which newly constituted colonial authorities favoured missionaries of their own nationality. Although German missions had been transnational in structure, the exclusively German missionary conference convened in 1885 represented a turning point in the history of German missions.[109] As Germany moved into Cameroon in 1884, for instance, so did Basel missionaries, replacing British Baptists. French and German authorities now insisted that missionaries teach in their language; only in the Belgian Congo did Protestant missionaries of other nations go undisturbed, as King Leopold (1835–1909) did not have enough Belgian Protestants to replace them.[110] The First World War finished the shake-out, but before then international comity arrangements preserved some cooperation. Finnish Lutheran missionaries continued operating in the northern part of German Southwest Africa (Namibia), both in the German era and after the war.[111] British missionaries parcelled up Madagascar with the Norwegians, partners where Admundsen and Scott would be rivals at the Pole.[112] Indian and Chinese societies saw themselves as 'shareholders of a Joint Stock Company' investing joint capital in Bible translations and Union colleges. The Kikuyu Conference (1913) discussed the federation of Anglican, Presbyterian and other Protestant missionaries in Kenya. Catholic missionaries were the ghosts at such feasts, for Protestants still desired a united front against both Catholic missions and Islam in Africa, anxieties that made some keener on formal empire than before.[113]

There was no let-up in the creation of ecumenical structures to federate missionary societies during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[114] British pre-millennialism and American enterprise fused in the YMCA or the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions which plotted the 'evangelization of the world in this generation'. Students were a crucial constituency: in America and Europe they supplied activists and in the extra-European world intense bookworms ready to

hearken to a conversionist message. The Student Volunteer Movement had sent 20,500 students to the mission field by 1945. Yet it was suspected of being a front for Anglo-Saxon values, a charge informed by the belief that Americans had commandeered the missionary enterprise.[115] From the 1880s to the later 1920s, American sending societies increased from two dozen to 122. Their lay secretaries brought the mentality of trust capitalism and scientific management to the 'business of missions'.[116] The Laymen's Missionary Movement (1907) was funded by pious tycoons like J. D. Rockefeller (1839–1937) and pumped out non-denominational promotional literature from One Madison Avenue, the world's tallest building.[117] John Mott was foremost in plotting 'strategic points in the world's conquest'. Having worked for the YMCA and attended World's Alliance meetings, Mott organized the World's Student Christian Federation, chaired the 1910 World Conference and ran its Continuation Committee, setting up national Christian councils in India and China. The desk of God's CEO featured a world map under glass as a perpetual reminder of his global task.[118]

The efforts of 'missionary statesmen' like Mott fell into a trap familiar from the historiography of secularization, frittering away resources on a top-heavy associational culture that catered to the committed without pulling in new recruits.[119] Domestic churches in Europe had their own problems, not least falling levels of working-class attendance, while Mott's bureaucratized charisma grated. *La Suisse Liberale* found his speeches full of 'hollow phrases about the invisible Enemy . . . . Did Mr. Mott imagine he was addressing Arkansas trappers?'[120] German professors of missiology blanched at the crudeness of world evangelization and remembered the Anglophone arrogance of holding the 1910 Conference in Edinburgh as the religious equivalent of the Versailles Conference.[121] The First World War revealed that the bridge building of Protestant committee members had confused breadth of span with solidity of foundation. With revealingly disastrous timing, the Anglo-German Church Councils chose 3–4 August 1914 for a peace conference in Constance: 'war by timetable' meant half the delegates could not find trains to get there.[122] The YMCAs and Student Volunteer Movement had a good war caring for prisoners and refugees, while some new foundations were created in or after the peace, such as the World Alliance for the Promotion of International Fellowship through the Churches (1915) or the Faith and Order movement (1917). Yet the suspicion engendered by war took decades to heal, while the last great effort to unite American brio with evangelical zeal, the Interchurch World Movement (1919), rapidly collapsed.[123]

Global Village People: The Decline of the International?

The Protestant International did not so much vanish as decompose into the transnational elements from which it had originally been formed. The missionary impulse was dispersed and indigenized. The historian of the 1910 World Conference could already single out 'yellow, brown, or black' faces in the Edinburgh crowd: a Japanese Methodist bishop or a 'negro of immense size glorying in his African race, from Liberia'. He presented intrepid Korean missionaries as the 'Moravians of the East' and noted that Polynesians had joined Scotchmen in being martyred on New Guinea.[124] Mott and company were right to think that they had successfully relayed the baton, if mistaken to think they could control the direction and speed of the new runners. It is now Koreans who bring the gospel to Iraqis and Afghans.[125] The combination of transnational messages and local initiative was marked in the prophetical, Pentecostal and charismatic movements that swept through Africa and China in the early twentieth century. Of course the touch paper of these explosions still trailed back to America and Europe: to British pre-millennialism and Keswick holiness mixed with the fervour of the Southern United States; to the 'four square gospel' (holiness, revivalism, faith healing, Adventism) of Azusa Street chapel, Los Angeles, to Chicago's Zionism and to Pentecostal missionaries. Moreover, African Pentecostalism's missionary impulse makes it a transnational phenomenon in its own right, not a reversion to a generically African spirituality.[126]

Pentecostalism has emerged as the 'negotiated transnational network' par excellence: linked yet decentred by readings of an inerrant Bible. Lacking strong federated international structures or rules, Pentecostalism has been especially serviceable to diasporic communities, such as Chinese migrants on the Pacific Rim, migrants from the Dominican Republic in the suburbs of Boston and Zimbabweans in London. For the 'transnational villagers' of a networked world, Pentecostalism is a 'deterritorialized cultural system', representing the triumph of placelessness over specific historical locations.[127] The fissiparous nature of a Protestant International again challenged its coherence. Pentecostalism's use of local idioms has often caused mainline Protestants to dismiss it as barely Christian. If Dutch Reformed Protestants recognized a traditional revivalism in the Cape's new ecstatic churches, then British authorities in Rhodesia were appalled by their writhing adolescent converts and cracked down on what they regarded as a 'pseudo religion'.[128] Globalized Pentecostals might be, but they

perhaps represent not so much a new branch of that plant whose roots had clustered most thickly in European and American soils as a new growth altogether.

Protestants did not surrender the direction of international causes overnight. Pacifism in the interwar years was an international Protestant cause, expressing a millennial hope that the lion would lie down with the lamb. British nonconformists ardently supported the League of Nations Union, whose pageantry suited provincial chapel culture.[129] Yet universal peace was too unrealistic a cause to be integrative, particularly given the rise of fascism. After the Second World War, German and British Protestants played a role in the peace and anti-atomic movements of the post-1945 era (and there was even some modest transnational collaboration), but the Protestant churches were slow to take principled stances on nuclear disarmament and constituted a marginal presence within CND.[130] Only in the early 1980s, did the churches begin playing a more proactive role in the emerging protests against stationing nuclear missiles in NATO countries. Following the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, the Church of England produced a report advocating a non-nuclear Britain. But even then, engaged Protestants were only one stripe in a rainbow coalition of greens, Trotskyites, feminists, communists, socialist neutralists, trade unionists and humanists.[131] Through a process of functional differentiation, secular agencies now broker humanitarian news and policy: the World Health Organization, UNESCO, NGOs (many admittedly Protestant in origin) and national welfare bureaucracies.[132]

If international bodies combining a Protestant and ecumenical character with social depth have dwindled in the twentieth century, then we can emphasize the compensatory emergence of formal international communions of churches. Thus from the mid-nineteenth century, the Church of England's overseas bishoprics became the basis of autonomous national churches, which were gathered into an international Anglican communion by the Lambeth Conferences.[133] To take a different example, the Lutheran World Federation (1947) now represents over 68 million Lutherans worldwide from Geneva, while the Baptist World Alliance (1905) represents 36 million Baptists and the World Methodist Council (1881) up to 75 million Methodists.[134] Moreover, American Protestants have retained their conversionist zeal. The zealous authors of a study on *Maximum Impact Short-Term Mission* estimate that in 2001 over one million evangelical Protestants made missionary trips abroad, ranging in duration from two weeks to a year. The number of autonomous and cross-denominational faith missions leapt from

28 in 1900 to 115 in 2001, while the 'mega churches' in which one sixth of all active American churchgoers are now grouped concentrate funds for overseas mission. The spending power of wealthy American Protestants complicates the notion of a 'global Christianity' with its centre of gravity in the South.[135]

If earlier Protestants – addicted to the holy pornography of statistics – could have seen these figures they might have noticed that their story is also one of relative, or for many denominations, absolute decline in their former heartlands. And while a vast American media still services Protestants worldwide – Tim LaHaye (b.1926) claims to have sold over 50 million *Left Behind* novels and the missionary organization Campus Crusade for Christ to have distributed 61 million versions of its 'Jesus film' in 1,000 languages since 1979, resulting in cumulative viewing and listening figures of 6 billion and triggering over 200 million 'decisions for Christ' – it is largely invisible to the wider public.[136] It is also striking that this media has been most successful when aping secular genres or pinching the imagery of Roman Catholicism. LaHaye even allows Mother Theresa and the Pope to be 'Raptured'.[137] Yet a decentred world whose consumers are free to choose any religion or none is the one that Protestants helped to create.[138] Today's fundamentalist refuseniks against that world, who post news about the end time on the internet, may not be all that different to the letter writers of Galashiels and Halle. They too can broadcast their feeling of belonging to a sect 'everywhere . . . spoken against' (Acts 28:22) to the ends of the earth; their enemies and their friends are global; and every step in globalization detonates warnings that the end is nigh. Protestants have always been keen students of typology: perhaps they might accept that the current tribulations of their religion were prefigured in its origins and that in its extensive marginality the Protestant International has come full circle.

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3
Old Networks, New Connections: The Emergence of the Jewish International

Abigail Green

How can we conceptualize the sheer diversity of Jewish experience in the nineteenth century? An earlier generation of historians turned to the Zionist national narrative, with its emphasis on the unique historical destiny of the Jewish people and the unity of their experience through the ages. Thus the Jerusalem School saw modern Jewish history in terms of the catastrophic impact of the nation-state on traditional Jewish communal and religious structures, as a result of emancipation, assimilation, and their by-product, secularization.[1] The opposition between 'modernizers' and 'traditionalists' in the Jewish world is a fundamental tension within this narrative – a tension only resolved by the Zionist movement, which promised a fusion between the aspirations of the modernizers and the ethnoreligious cultural identity of the traditionalists. This version of Jewish history has been attacked for homogenizing a wide range of experiences and contexts. Most obviously, it privileges the history of European Jewry at the expense of the Jews of Muslim lands.[2] Even within Europe, the viability of this overarching narrative has been brought into question by revisionist historians who emphasize not the common European encounter with modernity but the plurality and diversity of the Jewish world.[3]

In some ways, the revisionist approach has created as many problems as it solves. All places are different and ancien régime Europe, like the rest of the premodern world, was, almost by definition, a mosaic of localities, institutions and political structures. While the process of modern-state formation inevitably generated greater uniformity, different socioeconomic, religious and ethnic patterns continued to shape the integration of specific localities and groups into their constituent

states. Studies focusing on the Jews of a particular town, region or state add richness and texture to our understanding of the period, but by dwelling inevitably on local specificity they risk missing the wood for the trees.[4] Differences do not necessarily preclude commonalities, particularly commonalities that derive from interconnectedness. And the transformations wrought by modernization in the Jewish world partly involved the reconfiguring of existing connections and the forging of new ones through migration, voluntarism and the public sphere.

Thinking about these connections and the very different ways they resonated in local communities all over the Jewish world may help us see the transformation of Jewish life in Europe, the Middle East and North America as part of a single global phenomenon – a phenomenon in which the Jewish International played a critical, connecting role. By focusing on processes rather than the well-known ideological options, we can begin to rethink the relationship between modernists and traditionalists as well. There is room here for the old model, with its focus on the Western European experience of emancipation, acculturation and modernity. But there is also room for the traditional worlds of Eastern European Ashkenazi Jewry and the Sephardi Jews of Muslim lands, as both groups began to adopt and adapt the cultural and political structures and strategies generated in the West. Thus this chapter will trace the gradual displacement of established Jewish networks and religious institutions by civil society and an international public sphere during the critical decades of the mid-nineteenth century. Exploring this transition is the first step towards formulating a new model for understanding both the changing nature of Jewish identity in the West and the impact of these changes on Jews elsewhere as complementary facets of a global transition to modernity: one that reflected both the unity and diversity of the Jewish world.

Communal Structures, Civil Society and the Jewish Public

Looking back on the middle years of the nineteenth century, Ludwig Philippson (1811–89) – reform-minded rabbi, editor of the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* and a leading German-Jewish activist – did not doubt that these years had seen a rebalancing of the relationship between the global and the local. 'In recent times a feeling of solidarity has developed among the Jews', he wrote with some satisfaction in 1872,

> a united interest in the best and noblest sense of the word . . . . Without
> directly reducing interest in the local community, for which the Jew

makes great sacrifices and whose welfare institutions have been quite unusually enhanced, public spiritedness towards all, even the most distant branches of the Jewish religious community have increasingly developed and grown.

Dating this transformation back to the Damascus Affair of 1840, Philippson highlighted the role of political lobbying, international fundraising, associational activity and the Jewish press in shaping a new sense of global community.[5]

Philippson's understanding of this process points to the fragmented reality of nineteenth-century Jewish experience. Juxtaposing the local and the global without reference to the national, his analysis suggested the lack of religious hierarchy in the Jewish world. Habits of communal autonomy both reflected and reinforced political realities in countries where the unitary state remained at best an aspiration: from Morocco and the Ottoman Empire, through Russia, the German states and the Habsburg lands. Culturally, even politically, nationhood assumed growing importance for certain kinds of Jewish individual during this period, particularly in Western and Central Europe. But the nation was not in any sense the primary frame of reference for the majority.

For much of the nineteenth century, only Britain and France really differed from this model. In both cases, the differences reflected the political traditions of non-Jewish society. The centralized consistorial system developed for French Jews under Napoleon (1769–1821) was entirely in keeping with the unitary state and aggressively modernizing administrative culture nurtured since the Revolution.[6] In Britain, meanwhile, the leadership assumed by the Chief Rabbi reflected the Anglican ideal of a national church while the Board of Deputies of British Jews took its cue from the Board of Dissenting Deputies and the voluntarism that characterized the nonconformist world.[7] With time, both French and British Jewish institutions acquired an imperial dimension. In France, the 1840s saw the extension of the consistorial system to Algeria; in Britain the authority of Chief Rabbi Nathan Adler (1803–90) encompassed congregations all over the Empire and the Board of Deputies claimed moral leadership throughout the Anglosphere. Not until 1859 did a rival emerge in the shape of the Board of Delegates of American Israelites, but the institution was short-lived. Geography, entrenched localism, mass immigration, and the strength of the Reform movement all mitigated against the emergence of centralized Jewish leadership in the USA. In the Ottoman Empire, meanwhile, the reinvention of the post of *chakham bashi* (Chief Rabbi) and the formulation of a modern constitution for the Jewish *millet* (nation/faith community) during

the *Tanzimat* era never really succeeded in replacing ingrained tradi-
tions of local autonomy with a centralized religious hierarchy on the
Franco-British model.[8]

Institutional cohesion, imperialism and the rival ideologies of French
universalism and British liberalism undoubtedly ensured French and
British Jews a certain pre-eminence within the emerging nexus of Jewish
associations, publications and networks that mobilized around interna-
tional Jewish issues during the mid-nineteenth century.[9] By and large,
however, this nexus remained rooted in myriad localities. Here, the cor-
porative voluntarism that underpinned traditions of Jewish autonomy
and self-government both facilitated and inhibited the emergence of
more modern forms of Jewish voluntarism in which the individual –
not the *kehilah*, that is formally constituted community – took centre
stage.[10] The rise of Hasidism in the late eighteenth century superim-
posed an extra layer on this patchwork in Eastern Europe. For Hasidic
rabbinic dynasties provided a nucleus for voluntary supracommu-
nal organizations that bypassed established structures and were better
placed to respond to the challenges of modernity and mass migration –
as the vitality of the Schneersohn dynasty's Chabad movement (origi-
nating in the Russian town of Liadi but now based in Crown Heights,
New York) demonstrates. In Western Europe, meanwhile, the religious
divide precipitated by acculturation, secularization and the birth of the
Reform movement added a new dimension to established patterns of
diversity and fragmentation, a schism that originated in the modern-
ing heartlands of Western Europe and rapidly began to spread. But the
winds of change that brought new divisions also created new connec-
tions. As Philippson noted, the continued importance of the local did
not preclude the renewal and transformation of international ties in the
Jewish world.

Civil society and the public sphere were hallmarks of the new soci-
ety emerging on the European continent and in the white settler
colonies of the New World during this period; they were hallmarks of
the Jewish experience, too. Voluntary associations, newspapers, pam-
phlets, books and petitions took pride of place among the structures
and strategies developed by Jews to meet the challenges of modernity
in different Western contexts. They proved key weapons in the strug-
gle for emancipation and the reformulation of relations between Jews
and the non-Jewish majority, although they never displaced more estab-
lished forms of intercession (*shtadlanut*) epitomized by the informal
and personal influence of Jewish financiers like the Rothschilds and
Bismarck's banker Gerson von Bleichröder (1822–93).[11] But then politics

remained a matter for the notables in most Western political cultures well into the final quarter of the nineteenth century. More importantly for our purposes, civil society and the press played a critical part in the internal transformation of Western Jewry. With the decline of officially sanctioned communal structures, voluntarism provided a fresh basis on which to build a religious community (as the Hasidim had discovered a couple of generations earlier). With the rise of the press and the emergence of a Jewish public sphere, educated Jews found a fresh platform from which to elaborate new perspectives, debate with communal authorities and question – or defend – the status quo. Yet the rise of the Jewish press in the 1840s also promoted the internationalization of communal politics and the Jewish question – a process rooted in transnational mobilization and the increasingly global nature of the Jewish public sphere.

The Transformation of Existing Structures of Solidarity

Neither international Jewish solidarity nor transnational mobilization around Jewish issues were really nineteenth-century novelties.[12] Diaspora support for Jews in the Land of Israel was the most long-standing manifestation of Jewish mutual-aid. Charity (*tsedakah*) is a fundamental religious duty in Judaism, and it is a basic principle of *tsedakah* that while the poor of your own town come before the poor of any other town, the poor of the Land of Israel take precedence over all. Giving money towards the redemption of Jewish captives is another venerable tradition rooted in religious obligation.[13] But we should not exaggerate the *longue durée* of transnational Jewish philanthropy, for the politicization, diversification and institutionalization of these practices was very much a product of the early modern era.

In the sixteenth century, Donna Gracia Nasi (c.1510–69) – a Portuguese converso and international banker – established an escape network that saved thousands of Jews from the Inquisition and spearheaded a boycott of the Italian port of Ancona after the officially sanctioned murder of 23 fellow Jews.[14] The emergence of organized support for Jews living in the Land of Israel can be dated to about the same time, thanks in part to the efforts of itinerant emissaries known as *shelichim*.[15] Thus we see the formation of local committees, the appointment of authorized 'collectors for the Land of Israel' and, by 1800, the establishment of two central fundraising committees in Istanbul and Amsterdam. Indeed, the eighteenth century also saw the first stirrings of concerted international political action, when the expulsion of the

Jews from Prague in 1745 sparked a Europe-wide campaign to over-turn the initiative.[16] These structures and initiatives inevitably drew on transnational Jewish networks: not just the commercial and family ties that underpinned the Atlantic and Levantine diasporas of Donna Gracia's world, but the individual, dynastic and intercommunal connections created by itinerant rabbis, scholars and religious ministrants that characterized (and to some extent bridged) both Ashkenazi and Sephardi spheres.

Of course, these connections remained important. Yet it is worth pointing out the fundamental discontinuities between the geopolitical structures and networks that underpinned early modern forms of Jewish internationality and the patterns that would emerge thereafter. Jews had played a key role in the world maritime empires of the Atlantic and Mediterranean, but the mid-eighteenth century saw the decisive retreat of both of these empires and of the Western Sephardi diaspora.[17] Changes in the Ashkenazi world were similarly far-reaching. The partitions of Poland divided the East European heartlands in new ways, while the rise of emancipated and self-consciously patriotic 'national' Jewries within the emerging European framework of nation-states created the potential for genuinely international forms of Jewish activity. Meanwhile, the mass migration of Ashkenazi Jews to the New World formed the basis for an entirely new set of global connections.

More importantly for our purposes, the emergence of a Jewish public sphere around 1840 provided a coherence and focus that premodern expressions of Jewish internationality had hitherto lacked. The speed of this development is striking. The *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* had been the only Jewish newspaper in 1838; by 1846 the number had risen to18, with eight published in Germany and ten elsewhere in the world; by 1880 there were over a hundred Jewish periodical publications.[18] As Jonathan Frankel has noted, such newspapers usually sold in the hundreds rather than the thousands: the *Allgemeine Zeitung* boasted 400 subscribers in 1841; the Philadelphia-based *Occident and American Jewish Advocate* 500 in 1845; *Der Orient* 550 in 1850; the London-based *Jewish Chronicle* 1000 in 1855; the Russian *Raszvet* 640 in 1860–1. In practice, the impact of these newspapers was far greater: copies passed eagerly from hand to hand, and the news and views they disseminated spread rapidly by word of mouth.

At first, the Jewish press appeared to be divided on national lines. Newspapers and periodicals like the *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, the *Archives Israélites*, the *Univers Israélite*, the *Jewish Chronicle* and *The Occident* were written in the vernacular, primarily served the Jewish

readership of a particular country and necessarily paid disproportionate attention to domestic Jewish politics. Yet this national bias did not prevent the internationalization of the Jewish public. For one thing, these newspapers effectively addressed linguistic communities – as Adam Mendelsohn has demonstrated so convincingly, the emerging Anglosphere.[19] Moreover, for those actually producing early Jewish newspapers, active participation in a global Jewish enterprise was a central aspect of the undertaking. In 1842, the London-based *Voice of Jacob* informed its readership that a Ladino-language newspaper was to be launched in the Jewish community of Izmir in Turkey.[20] It welcomed the projected *Buena Speranza* as 'an additional and important link to the great chain of communication which we hope to see established between Jews all over the world'.

This points to the dual role of the Jewish press as a forum not just for news and debate but for international mobilization. With the emergence of publications catering to a Jewish reading public, it became relatively easy to disseminate specifically Jewish disaster news and coordinate an organized international response. Jonathan Frankel's seminal study of Jewish mobilization around the Damascus Affair explores the origins of this synergy.[21] This critical episode became a major cause célèbre, when news that the leading Jews of Damascus had been convicted by the Egyptian government of the ritual murder of a Catholic priest and his servant on evidence produced by the French consul prompted an international outcry. European and North American Jews led the ensuing campaign to free the Jewish prisoners of Damascus, well aware of its implications for the emancipation process. Thus Frankel shows how the complex interaction between improved communications, imperialism and the birth of a global public enabled the revival of the blood-libel myth among European and Syrian Christians in Damascus to develop into what was in some sense a confrontation between international Jewish and Catholic opinion.

Mobilizing Western public opinion in this way against the treatment of Jews by a particular government was to prove a key function of the new Jewish press – directed against Russia in the 1840s, against the Papal States during the Mortara Affair of 1858–9, and against the governments of Morocco and Romania during the 1860s and 1870s.[22] Ultimately, however, the ability of the Jewish public to shape policy in authoritarian regimes remained limited, particularly outside zones of informal empire. Western opinion was only influential, where Western governments were willing and able to intervene. Such mobilizations undoubtedly served to internationalize the Jewish question, but they

also had a transformative impact within the Jewish world. Thus the Damascus crisis heralded a dramatic renewal of the structures of Jewish solidarity, undermining existing forms of transnational charity like the funds sent to the Land of Israel known as *chalukah* and providing the basis for innovative alternatives. For the 1840s marked the birth of modern subscription fundraising in a global Jewish context. These years saw three such initiatives: Sir Moses Montefiore's (1784–1885) appeal on behalf of Jewish survivors of the great fire of Izmir launched in 1841; Ludwig Philippson's campaign for a modern Jewish hospital in Jerusalem to counteract the threat posed by Protestant missionaries, launched in 1842; and the Essaouira relief fund, also initiated by Montefiore after the sack of the Moroccan port in 1844.[23] As I have argued elsewhere, the different trajectories of these appeals reveal the extent to which the public sphere continued to rest on personal connections and established networks. With time, however, the existence of a Jewish press would enable communities and individuals to bypass existing channels and appeal directly to an international Jewish public.

In particular, Jewish newspapers chipped away at the traditional monopoly of Western *chalukah* exercised by the committee in Amsterdam under the auspices of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Lehren (1784–1853).[24] Persistent attacks on Lehren's financial integrity and administrative practices prompted growing numbers of congregations and charities in Europe and the USA to make alternative arrangements.[25] Of course, Lehren remained an important figure. Yet the collapse of his fundraising monopoly testified to the scale of the revolution shaking the Jewish world. Jewish newspapers had shattered the stranglehold of communal authorities, and nowhere was this more apparent than in international affairs. When Lehren attempted to discredit a *shaliach* (emissary) from Palestine who arrived in North America during the late 1840s, the editor of *The Occident* informed his readership 'that the poor of Hebron had a right to call upon distant Israelites for voluntary aid, and we do not see any good policy in preventing their receiving it'.[26] The word of Lehren and his associates was no longer law, and those who depended on their bounty were no longer bound by their dictates.

Before 1856 almost all the leading Jewish newspapers were published in Western Europe and the New World, but Jews in Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire were far from ignorant of their activities. Without an organ of their own, the modernizing Jewish intellectuals (maskilim) of Poland and the Pale of Settlement looked to the German-Jewish press as a forum for publication, sending correspondence articles and other pieces to newspapers like Philippson's *Allgemeine Zeitung*. The

agenda of these maskilim was, in any case, inspired by the culture of the German-Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) – a form of cultural transfer that reflected much deeper traditions of mutual exchange among the religious elites of Ashkenaz.[27] More importantly perhaps, the role of the Western Jewish press in mobilizing public opinion and financial support on behalf of distressed Jewry in the traditionalist heartlands of Eastern Europe and the Sephardi world inevitably drew the beneficiaries of these interventions into the orbit of the international Jewish public. In the case of Palestine, this process was reinforced by the arrival of a new, more economically dynamic wave of Eastern European immigrants, who brought fresh ways of doing things and retained close ties with their communities of origin but also imported the traditionalists' fear of the Haskalah.[28] Such men were often well placed to mediate between Western Jewish philanthropists, the local Jewish community and the wider public sphere.

Rabbi Israel Bak (1797–1874), a master printer from Berdichev, was paradigmatic in this regard. Shortly after his arrival in Palestine in 1831, he established the first Hebrew printing press there since 1587; when it was destroyed during the sack of Safed he appealed to Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848) for compensation and was granted the village of Djermek in return. Bak's resulting engagement in agriculture enabled him to forge a connection with Montefiore, who sent him a state-of-the-art printing press after Bak was forced to leave Djermek during the 1840 war. In July 1842, the *Voice of Jacob* announced with great excitement that a Hebrew book had recently been published in Jerusalem.[29] Three years later, Israel's son Nissan (1815–95) was one of three Jews Montefiore brought to Preston in 1845 as part of a scheme to promote cotton manufacturing in the Holy Land. One of Nissan's two companions was J. A. Rosenthal, a Prussian now living in Jerusalem who had published several articles in European Jewish newspapers discussing the need to provide his fellow Jerusalemites with alternative sources of livelihood.[30]

This engagement with the emerging Jewish public was not restricted to Ashkenazi circles in Palestine. Men like Rabbi Moses Hazan (1808–62), who were sent out from Jerusalem as *shelichim* to raise money in the traditional way, also learnt to do business with the Fourth Estate. Born into a distinguished family of Ottoman rabbis, Hazan travelled through Europe in 1845 to raise money for a Jewish hospital in Jerusalem.[31] He demonstrated his ability to work with the new structures of civil society by persuading leading Jews in London, like Lionel de Rothschild (1808–79) and Hazan's old acquaintance Sir Moses Montefiore, to establish a committee to support the new hospital. On Hazan's return to

Jerusalem in 1846, he began corresponding directly about the issue with journalists like Jacob Franklin, editor of the *Voice of Jacob*.[32] The presence of a *shaliach* from Hebron in North America during the same period highlights the extent to which concurrent processes of globalization were transforming the networks of the Jewish world.

These new connections and interactions gathered pace during the 1850s, expanding dramatically during the Crimean War. For Jews, the conflict marked a sea-change in diaspora engagement with Palestine, heralding the dawn of a more intensive and interventionist Western Jewish philanthropy that would ultimately affect the whole Middle East.[33] Tensions between the established Sephardi community in Palestine and incoming Ashkenazi groups were ingrained, but these tensions reflected religiocultural divisions and financial competition rather than conflicting worldviews.[34] Both groups were, after all, profoundly traditionalist in orientation: the Ashkenazim more explicitly so. Now, the informal imperialism of European powers and the cultural imperialism of Western Jewish modernizers entered the picture.

This was to some extent a by-product of the broader political climate. Sensitive to the implications of the war for Jews in the West, French, German and British lobby groups and activists campaigned for Eastern Jews to be treated equally with Ottoman Christians in any religious settlement.[35] While Philippson preached the need to 'civilize' Eastern Jews in his *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the Hungarian-born orientalist Albert Cohn (1814–77) was dispatched by the French Rothschilds on a round trip to Jerusalem (via Alexandria and Istanbul) where he founded a variety of progressive charitable institutions.[36] Cohn was the first in a steady stream of European and North American Jewish activists who set out for Jerusalem in these years amid much publicity.[37] They included the British Montefiore, whose staggeringly successful Holy Land Relief Fund raised £20,000 through international subscription fundraising around a massive press campaign; the North American Gershom Kursheedt (1817–63) entrusted with supervising Montefiore's disbursement of a major bequest from Judah Touro (1775–1854), a childless New Orleans businessmen; and the Austrian writer, Ludwig August Frankl (1810–94), who was empowered by the rich Viennese widow Elisa Lippet Herz (1788–1868) to found a school for Jerusalem's Jews.[38]

Not only did these initiatives mark a break with established philanthropic practices, the physical presence of so many Western Jewish leaders in Jerusalem was itself an inversion of the traditional relationship between Palestine and the diaspora. As one American Jew commented in the Reform-oriented *Israelite*, the Holy City had once been so distant

that most Jews could not even contemplate going there.[39] Now, it was near enough for schools to be established and land purchased, so that instead 'of receiving messengers from Jerusalem for the purpose of collecting alms, messengers are sent thither, to see, what beneficial results the charity of the European Jews is producing'. Dr Lil attributed this revolution to steam, 'the absolute civilizer of our age'. It also testified to the growing maturity and increasingly global orientation of the Jewish public.

The launch of *Hamagid* in 1856 added a further dimension to this phenomenon. Situated in the East Prussian border town of Lyck, *Hamagid* was produced by moderate maskilim like the Belorussian Rabbi Eliezer Lipmann Silberman (1819–82) and the Lithuanian protonationalist David Gordon (1826–86), whose roots lay on the other side of the border. As one contemporary testified, the emergence of *Hamagid* prompted a seismic shift in power relations within Jewish communities in the Tsarist Empire, as Russian Jews came to see reading the news as a social need.[40] In the small Lithuanian town of Vilkomir, for instance, groups of four people clubbed together to buy joint subscriptions and 30 such groups were soon flourishing in Vilkomir alone. In his memoirs Rabbi Jacob Halevi Lifschitz (1838–1921), who served as secretary to the leading Lithuanian Rabbi Isaac Elhanan Spektor of Kovno (1817–96; an adherent of the mitnagdic tradition known for its opposition to Hasidism), lamented the inevitable passing of an earlier world in which

> the Torah alone was still the only nationality we had . . . . The people at large were disciplined, pious and humble . . . and did not presume to speak their minds in public, questioning the thoughts of the leaders. . . . Then it was as yet unheard of to pay heed to the opinion of the crowd in the name of 'public opinion' and internal disputes were brought before God, through those who were great in Torah.'[41]

Lifschitz's concern with the internal balance of power was essentially communal, but *Hamagid* had broader horizons. From the beginning its aspirations were global. Thus the newspaper's masthead undertook to 'tell [the House of] Jacob of everything occurring in the world that touches them and that they need to know, for their benefit and for the benefit of the beautiful Hebrew tongue'.[42] The choice of language was also significant. The existence of a Hebrew-language public was uncertain since, as the publisher noted, most Jews in the West could not read Hebrew, while many in Russia and Poland could be expected to reject the newspaper as an innovation.[43] In the event, *Hamagid* became not

just a voice for the Hebrew-language religious and intellectual elites of Central and Eastern Europe, but a bridge between Jewish activists in East and West.

Above all, *Hamagid* gave voice to less acculturated elements in the Jewish world: enabling them to adopt the strategies of Western Jewry while remaining ambivalent – or even hostile – to their values. Few things testify more effectively to this process than the extensive space *Hamagid* devoted to the mission of Rabbi Azriel Selig Hausdorf (b.1826), a member of the small but wealthy Germano-Dutch community in Jerusalem, who set out from Palestine to raise money to build new houses for the Jewish poor.[44] The whole structure of the Hausdorf campaign betrayed the hallmarks of Montefiore's modern approach to fundraising: committees established in major European cities like Berlin, Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam; subscription lists reproduced faithfully in *Hamagid*; and endorsements from relatively acculturated Jewish leaders.[45] Like Montefiore, Hausdorf also looked beyond the continent of Europe, setting sail for North America in June 1859.[46] But unlike the Holy Land Relief Fund, Hausdorf's mission sprang from the heart of Jewish Jerusalem. And with other Ashkenazi immigrants like Moses Sachs (1800–70) and Zvi Haim Sneersohn (1833–81) embarking on similar missions, it was far more than a one man show.[47]

A Multitude of Voices

The emergence in 1860 of two transnational associations that transcended the entrenched geographical and cultural divides of the Jewish world testified to this broadening and deepening of the Jewish public. These were the Paris-based Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Kolonisationsverein für Palästina in Frankfurt an der Oder – or the Hevrat Yishuv Erets Yisra'el (Society for the Settlement of the Land of Israel), as it was known in Hebrew. The former was dedicated to a vision of international Jewish relief underpinned by the secular, universalist principles of 1789; the latter represented a fresh take on Jewish religious tradition, inspired by the belief that Jews working the soil in the Land of Israel could hasten the coming of the Messiah.[48] The Alliance Israélite was founded by wealthy, highly acculturated members of the French Jewish elite; the Kolonisationsverein was the brainchild of Haim Lurje (1821–78), an obscure East Prussian schoolmaster who had attended a German university and dabbled in kabala. But if the Alliance Israélite and the Kolonisationsverein originated in fundamentally different cultural milieus, they also represented a common organizational impulse:

the shift from ad hoc mobilization around periodic crises towards the foundation of permanent international organizations as a basis for long-term transnational mobilization in a Jewish cause.[49] Both also testified to the politicization of existing structures of solidarity in the Jewish world. Inevitably, this common organizational model reflected broader changes in patterns of social organization evinced by the foundation of non-Jewish organizations like the Red Cross (1863), and the concomitant globalization of the Evangelical Alliance (1846).[50] There were, indeed, concrete links between such developments and their Jewish equivalents. The name given the Kolonisationsverein in German suggests a response to European imperialism, while the Alliance Israélite was consciously inspired by the organizational structures that were beginning to unite the Protestant world.[51]

For the first couple of years, membership of both the Alliance Israélite and the Kolonisationsverein was small but eclectic. Both associations were characterized not merely by their transnational character but by their ability to represent dramatically different things to wildly diverging constituencies. Thus the Kolonisationsverein famously brought together messianic rabbis from Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire, established Western European communal leaders, and a handful of individuals hovering on the verge of a precocious Jewish nationalism.[52] Ostensibly, these groups represented both 'traditional' and 'modernizing' elements in Jewish society. In reality, the realistic messianism of Rabbis Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795–1874) and Judah Alkalai (1798–1878) marked a radical break with the passive traditions of the diaspora – as orthodox contemporaries appreciated.[53] Jews were traditionally enjoined to do nothing more than perform their religious obligations and quietly await the coming of the Messiah. Yet Kalischer and Alkalai believed that human agency (specifically a return to the Land of Israel with a view to performing those religious obligations that could only be fulfilled there) could hasten the divine process of redemption. From their different perspectives, both elements in the Kolonisationsverein invested the creation of the Alliance Israélite with world-historical significance. For Alkalai it marked the fulfilment of biblical prophecy, while the disillusioned socialist Moses Hess depicted it as a harbinger of the rebirth of Judaism in his 1862 Zionist classic *Rome and Jerusalem*.[54]

This confluence between the protonationalists of the Kolonisationsverein and assimilationist founders of the Alliance Israélite is less surprising than Michael Graetz's ideologically loaded opposition between the Eastern European 'centre' and French 'periphery' of the Jewish world

implies.[55] Ultimately, both groups were profoundly influenced by their exposure to mainstream European culture, which the messianists of the Kolonisationsverein certainly did not reject out of hand. Lurje was, after all, a university graduate while, as Israel Bartal has argued, Alkalai saw emancipation and the transformation of Western Jewry as further steps on the road to salvation.[56] If the Kolonisationsverein was located in the very heart of Jewish Europe, then the Alliance Israélite emerged in the birthplace of emancipation – peripheral to traditional Jewish culture but near the geographical core of the Jewish International. And it reflected the power and reach of this emergent international that the Alliance Israélite proved able to connect with Jews living on the fringes and well beyond the boundaries of this European Jewish world. Between 1862 and 1880, 345 local committees were founded, including 55 in France, 114 in Germany, 15 in Austria-Hungary, four in Bulgaria, one in Crete, five in Gibraltar, one in Luxembourg, 15 in the Netherlands, one in Portugal, one in Rhodes, 35 in Romania, one in Scandinavia, two in Serbia, six in Switzerland, five in Algeria, four in Egypt, two in Libya, seven in Morocco, one in Tunisia, two in Iraq, three in Palestine, 26 in Turkey, two in the Western Antilles, two in Brazil, two in Colombia and eight in the USA.[57] Over half these branches may have been based in Western Europe, but the large-scale involvement of Middle Eastern and Balkan Jewries was a product of the changing patterns of world politics that marked a dramatic renewal of existing Jewish networks.

Very often, philanthropy acted as a critical trigger for the engagement of traditional Jewries with their Western European counterparts; whether through innovations pushed through by the established authorities, or through a more diffuse participation in the concerns of the global Jewish public. In Tangier, for instance, the ability of Western Jews to raise vast sums of money on behalf of their Moroccan coreligionists demonstrated to members of the existing communal elite the desirability of establishing their legitimacy in Western eyes. In a letter to the Board of Deputies, written a year after the Moroccan Jewish Relief campaign of 1859, the newly created Governing Committee of the Jewish Congregation of Tangier (*Junta*) undertook 'to conduct all affairs upon a system similar to that observed in Europe', recognizing that as the objects of widespread public solicitude, it was incumbent upon them to 'govern our communal affairs in a way best calculated to elicit from our Brethren in Europe their approbation'.[58] The origins of the Junta were more complex than this implied, but the willingness of its leaders to present themselves in this way reflected their ability to engage with the new structures of world Jewry in appropriate ways.[59] On one level,

their initiative can be read as the response of a subaltern group to a political environment coloured above all by informal Western imperialism. On another level, it can be seen as an attempt to seize the initiative – both vis-à-vis Western Jews and vis-à-vis their Moroccan rulers.[60] The dynamic in Tunis explored in Tsur's contribution to this volume was by no means dissimilar.

Conversely, when the Alliance Israélite launched its first campaign in 1860 on behalf of the Christian victims of large-scale ethnic violence in Syria, the appeal resonated most powerfully among those communities which had themselves appeared in the news. Contemporaries would have had no difficulty relating the Corfu contribution to the ongoing controversy over the status of Jews in the Ionian Islands, or the participation of Jews in the Gibraltar Syrian Relief Committee, to the welcome accorded Moroccan Jewish refugees there six months earlier.[61] The famine of 1868 would unleash a similar process among the Jews of Lithuania, whose plight galvanized an unprecedented level of institutional coordination among French and German Jews and a worldwide fundraising campaign. The ability of Rabbi Isaac Rülf of Königsberg (Memel, 1831–1902) to raise over 600,000 Marks on their behalf demonstrated the relevance of international Jewish activism to an entirely new sector of the Jewish public. When Montefiore appealed for funds on behalf of the starving Jews of Persia four years later, the subscription lists that began to appear in *Hamagid* included the names of some forty thousand Jews living in the Pale of Settlement – including a very significant proportion of the population in some Lithuanian towns.[62] At least at first, the appeal proved far more popular here than in some of the Western European countries that had hitherto formed the core of the Jewish International.[63] The high concentration of donors in places that had benefited from Rülf's international fundraising campaign highlights the interlocking nature of these initiatives as international Jewish activism assumed critical mass: the centre was beginning to shift.

All this testified to the (re)forging of ties between European and Oriental Jewries. In 1866, for instance, the Baghdad community appointed a European, Isaac Lurje, to represent them in their dealings with the central committee of the Alliance Israélite in Paris.[64] When Lurje received a telegraph from the Jews of Mazandran over a case of false imprisonment and forced conversion, he at once contacted the committee in Paris, which wrote in turn to Abraham Camondo (1781–1873), head of the Istanbul branch of the Alliance Israélite.[65] As a wealthy banker and leading member of the Jewish community, Camondo wielded considerable influence with the Porte and would have been the obvious port of call

for the Jews of Baghdad in earlier times. The decision to appeal to Paris rather than Istanbul in the first instance demonstrated their sensitivity to the shifting balance of international relations and the growing ability of European consuls to intervene with Muslim governments on the Jews' behalf. The Jews of Baghdad were almost certainly indifferent to the Alliance Israélite's ideological agenda and seem to have had only a vague understanding of its organizational functions. But they were alive enough to the realities of the situation to appreciate that membership represented a kind of hotline to the new centres of political power in the Jewish world.

Back in Eastern Europe, the founders of modern Orthodoxy were similarly alive to the potential (and threat) posed by voluntarism and the new Jewish public in their fight against the subversive forces of modernity. In Hungary, Rabbi Akiva Joseph Schlesinger (1837–1922) – later one of the most prominent and inflexible ultra-Orthodox opponents of innovation and modernization – looked to the structures of international civil society as a way of bolstering traditional Judaism. In an 1863 pamphlet, he advocated the creation of an international alliance of Torah-true Jews: a two-tiered organization that would comprise an association of 'the Society for the Restoration of the Crown to its Former Glory' for the masses with a more exclusive and demanding '*kolel* of the Hebrews' for the elite.[66] The secular, Western origins of the Alliance Israélite were in stark contrast to this vision but, as Michael Silber has shown, both the title and the nature of Schlesinger's proposed international network suggest that the model and the threat posed by the Alliance was an inspiration in his thinking.

Schlesinger's plan remained a utopia until the foundation of Agudat Yisrael in 1912 created the frameworks for an Orthodox Jewish International.[67] As early as 1863, however, the launch of the Hebrew-language *Halevanon* demonstrated the potential for a global Orthodox public. Its subsequent affiliation with the neo-Orthodox *Israelit* suggests that *Halevanon* did not represent the most hardline elements of Jewish society. Even so, the long beard and wholly unacculturated appearance of its editor, Rabbi Yehiel Bril (1836–86), underline its origins in the traditional world of Eastern European rabbis and scholars. Despite (or even because) of this background, *Halevanon* proved to be a quintessentially transnational project: originally founded by Eastern European mitnagedim in Palestine but later published in Paris, Mainz and London. It carried news from all over the world, engaged in vigorous debate with secular figures like Charles Netter, founder of the Alliance Israélite agricultural school in Jaffa, and promoted the right of Jews in Palestine

to devote themselves to Torah study rather than engage in productive work. In Jerusalem, moreover, *Halevanon* stimulated the publication of a rival Hasidic organ, *Havatselet* – produced on Montefiore's printing press by none other than the elderly Israel Bak. Relaunched in 1870 by Bak's son-in-law, *Havatselet* was to conduct a vigorous campaign against the established system of *chalukah*. Once again we see the role of Western philanthropic intervention as a catalyst in the transformation of existing intellectual habits and communal structures, prompting new voices to make themselves heard within the Jewish public sphere. The fragmented nature of this public had yet to undermine its cohesion as a communicative space: this was a virtual, global community drawn together in part by the desire of its members to express their acutely felt differences. The emergence of a Ladino-language press in the Ottoman Empire during the 1860s and early 1870s would add another layer to this complex picture.[68] With the birth of Zionism in the 1880s, the Jewish International was fully formed.

But was it still, as Jonathan Dekel-Chen argues, essentially an elite phenomenon? The critical involvement of rabbis certainly highlights continuities with the early modern world, although most rabbis active in the Jewish International engaged with it in a private capacity rather than ex officio. Indeed, there is no denying the central role played by Jewish religious, intellectual and financial elites during this initial period of take-off – a role that is entirely consistent with the broad contours of non-Jewish politics and the 'bourgeois' nature of the public sphere in mid-nineteenth-century Europe. Even in countries like France and Germany that operated systems of universal suffrage, it was not until the 1890s that the masses really began to make their presence felt in the world of mainstream politics. This was, if anything, even truer of the Jewish world. In Britain, a small and wealthy 'cousinhood' of elite, interrelated families proved well able to defend its oligarchic position even after the onset of mass migration from Eastern Europe in the 1880s and 1890s.[69] In Russia, the decline of communal self-government undermined the alliance of communal magnates and rabbinical authorities, but the opportunities now available to Jews created a different kind of partnership between a new class of more acculturated Jewish plutocrats, like the Gintsburgs and the maskilim.[70]

How far the Jewish International reached beyond these communal oligarchies is open to question. Yet the transformation of existing structures of solidarity epitomized by the collapse of Lehren's monopoly of Western *chalukah* and the challenge posed by *Hamagid* to Jewish communal authorities in Russia suggest that it had, at the very least, a

profoundly subversive potential. Those actually running international Jewish organizations like the Alliance Israélite and the Anglo-Jewish Association were inevitably members of the communal elite. But other expressions of transnational Jewish solidarity do appear to have tapped into a far broader public, as the proportion of Lithuanian Jews subscribing to the Persian Famine Relief Fund of 1872 indicates.

Nor was the Jewish International an exclusively male affair, although female participation was probably restricted to elite social groups.[71] Women may not have founded Jewish newspapers, but we know they read them – just as they participated actively in the world of European Jewish letters.[72] Historians like Frank Prochaska have emphasized the role of women in nineteenth-century philanthropy and humanitarian activism, and Jewish women were no exception.[73] Most importantly, perhaps, very wealthy women like Judith Montefiore (1784–1862), Betty (1805–86) and Evelina (1839–66) de Rothschild, and Elisa Herz were pivotal figures in the world of Jerusalem's Jewish charities. Often they also took an active interest in the societies they supported and the institutions they founded there.[74] Recognizing the different norms apparently prevalent in Europe, the representatives of both Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities in Jerusalem wrote to Judith Montefiore during the cholera epidemic of 1849 as follows:

> it is but rarely that ladies trouble themselves with such matters. But you have on so many occasions joined your noble and august consort in his benevolence to our distressed brethren . . . that we are encouraged to appeal to you, as well as to Sir Moses, to make known and publish our distress among your numerous circle of friends, among the women of Judah and Israel in Europe, and particularly in England . . .[75]

That these communities regularly empowered Judith as well as her husband to act officially on their behalf in Europe and North America testifies both to Judith's personal engagement and to the importance of female financial support.[76]

More generally, Judith's correspondence with women in Jerusalem over many years suggests the continuous but low-level interaction between transnational and local spheres of philanthropic activity. Charities devoted to female education, childbearing and women's needs required women to do the daily work. Sometimes these were local women, like those who wrote to Judith. Sometimes they were

in-migrants like Flora Randegger (1824–1910), a rabbi's daughter from Trieste who devoted herself to educating Jewish girls on her arrival in the Holy City, or the wives of the Jewish doctors working in Jerusalem's Rothschild hospital who ran the Evelina de Rothschild school.[77] Elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, wealthy Turkish Jewish women helped girls' schools and contributed to the educational improvements inspired by Western example and sponsored by international Jewish organizations like the Alliance Israélite and the Anglo-Jewish Association.[78] In this sense, too, the Jewish International was more diverse and inclusive than the conventional narrative of modern Jewish history and politics might lead us to think.

This account of the emergence of the Jewish International has emphasized its plurality, and the autonomy and agency of traditional East European, North African and Middle Eastern Jewries as they began to engage with international civil society and a global Jewish public. Such a move away from established geographical and ideological dichotomies is long overdue. The death of the secularization thesis and growing interest in the religious revival of the nineteenth century has highlighted the ways in which the reformulation of traditionalist religious attitudes and practices was a constitutive part of the modernization process in many different parts of the world.[79] Readers of this volume will find obvious parallels between the willingness of traditional Jews to embrace 'modern' means in order to project a (new) vision of 'orthodoxy', the activities of ultramontane Catholics and the evangelical worldview aggressively projected by members of the Protestant International. Yet the imperial dimension may render a comparison with the Islamic world particularly instructive.

The rise of the West forced Muslims onto the defensive against Western imperialism, although some, like the Islamic modernists that are the subject of Amira Bennison's essay in this volume, proved willing to learn from it. Colonial rule removed much of the financial and institutional support for an Islamic society, raising questions about how an Islamic society could be sustained without power that had preoccupied Jews for centuries. As members of a religious minority, European Jews were vulnerable both to the power of modern European states (which undermined communal structures) and to a sense of cultural inferiority. These vulnerabilities meant that Jews in both Eastern Europe and Muslim lands were necessarily less ambivalent about the Western political model and its promise of citizenship than their Muslim counterparts. As Yaron Tsur demonstrates, however, they had considerable

reservations about the cultural and religious changes that went with it. Here, the reforging of traditionalist Jewish identities as self-consciously orthodox may have something in common with the internal transformation of Islam described by Francis Robinson, but the relationship between Eastern and Western Jews was always more complex than the relationship between Eastern Muslims and Western Christians. For the recognition of a common heritage and destiny served to balance inherent inequalities to some degree. This applied both to European Jews, who combined orientalist attitudes with fellow-feeling, and to those of their Eastern brethren who, having internalized orientalist discourse and values, began to identify both worlds.[80] Focusing on the engagement of non-Western Jewries with an emerging – and truly global – Jewish public illuminates both these inequalities and this balance, revealing the impact of Western Jewish interest in Eastern Jewries as a more complex, open-ended relationship than the current emphasis on international Jewish organizations as proxies for European imperialism suggests.

Within the broader context of this volume, however, two issues merit further reflection.

First, what was new about the Jewish International? As an ethnoreligious diaspora, Jews had always operated within a transnational framework. Individual Jews of all kinds travelled widely and participated in continental, Mediterranean, African and trans-Atlantic trade networks. Intellectual contacts, however, were limited to a scholarly, and usually rabbinical, elite, while more formal kinds of contact between Jewish communities were inevitably mediated by communal authorities. By contrast, the Jewish International as it emerged in the mid-nineteenth century was characterized by Jewish voluntarism outside traditional communal spaces around international Jewish causes. It entailed the large-scale mobilization of Jewish individuals around modern political and social issues, both galvanized by and contributing to the dynamism of a global Jewish public sphere. This posed a challenge to the communal authorities and rabbinical leaders of the traditional Jewish world that was not dissimilar to the challenges these elements faced locally and within different regional contexts. The financial and political clout of Western Jewry meant it was a challenge they could not ignore. As a result, philanthropy often acted as a critical catalyst for the engagement of traditional Jewries with the international, although the scale and nature of this engagement was inevitably determined by specific local and regional conditions. Here, I am in agreement with Dekel-Chen, who also stresses the critical role of philanthropy and advocacy in the emergence of a new community of opinion and action.

Second, what was religious about the Jewish International, when so many of the causes that mobilized its adherents were ostensibly secular? Dekel-Chen stresses this latter point, arguing that the Jewish International was 'essentially a secular international in which nearly all of the leaders and activists are laypeople' and 'the relatively few rabbis involved do so mainly in lay functions'. This assessment may hold true for the twentieth century but it does not apply to the middle years of the nineteenth in which, as I have argued, a Jewish International first emerged. For this was a period when secularization was far less advanced, and it comes as no surprise that so many of the early Jewish journalists and transnational activists were rabbis. This was unavoidable for the traditionalist elements highlighted in this essay, but it was almost equally true in the West. Leading rabbinical newspapermen included Philippson himself; David Meldola (1797–1853), co-founder of *The Voice of Jacob;* Isaac Leeser (1806–68), founding editor of *The Occident*; Esdra Pontremoli (1818–88), founding editor of the *Educatore Israelita*; and Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–88), father of German neo-Orthodoxy and founding editor of *Jeschurun*. Nor should we forget the key philanthropic role played by men like Rülf of Königsberg or Chief Rabbi Nathan Adler, who worked intimately with Montefiore on his various relief initiatives. The importance of such figures underlines the central role rabbis continued to play in Western Jewish culture. Yet there is no denying the secularism of the Alliance Israélite in particular, nor its place at the very heart of the Jewish International.

Of course, such secularism was never culturally neutral. Those who espouse secular beliefs and lifestyles define themselves against existing faith traditions in ways that are conditioned by their own religious backgrounds. Secular Christians, secular Jews and secular Muslims are all, inevitably, secular in different ways. For Jews, moreover, emancipation was predicated on the privatization of religion and the abandonment of a collective ethnic or national identity. In Clermont Tonnerre's famous phrase, 'to the Jews as a Nation nothing; to the Jews as individuals everything'. This premise made it politically difficult for transnational Jewish activists to define their Jewishness in anything other than religious terms. These constraints were very real, but it is worth pointing out that there was nothing insincere about the patriotism of men like the President of the Alliance Israélite Adolphe Crémieux (1796–1880), Montefiore and Philippson, who contributed so much to the formation of the Jewish International. They were, paradoxically, precisely the kind of Jew for whom the nation was a significant frame of reference. Within this frame of reference – before the birth of Zionism, when racial

thought was still in its infancy – they were bound to understand their Jewish identity primarily in religious terms – even if, like Crémieux, they were radically secular in lifestyle. As Isidore Cahen, editor of the *Archives Israélites* and co-founder of the Alliance Israélite declared in 1859, 'The link which can unite the Israelites is religious and social. As a nation, as a race, it tends constantly to weaken: we embrace more and more the interests of the countries which have adopted us, and which often run counter to one another.'[81]

This emphasis on religion runs counter both to the national claims of Zionist historiography and to the shared history of an ethnoreligious diaspora persisting for two millennia, highlighted by Dekel-Chen. For Judaism was, of course, an ethnic religion, perpetuated through endogamy and matrilineal descent rather than conversion. This self-evident truth should not blind us to the fact that the fragmented reality of nineteenth-century Jewish experience had deep roots. Indeed, Jonathan Ray has recently argued that the long centuries of Jewish migration and statelessness would be better understood as a series of culturally defined and temporally limited micro-diasporas than a monolithic and undifferentiated whole.[82] The early modern Sephardi experience provides particularly fertile ground for scholars emphasizing both the coexistence of 'diasporas within the diaspora' and the emergence of exclusionary subethnic groupings such as Portuguese New Christian 'Nation' within the Jewish world.[83] But such phenomena were also apparent within the Ashkenazi world, particularly after the mass migrations of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.[84] If, as Matthias Lehmann argues, the Jewish experience of *galut* (exile) – the traditional term for the Jewish diaspora – is best understood as a temporal category signifying the absence of redemption, then it becomes easier to conceptualize 'the Jews' in primarily religious terms.[85]

From this perspective, the religious self-identification of nineteenth-century Jewish activists like Crémieux appears more comprehensible. Such activists were often acutely aware of the cultural gulf that separated them from the 'oriental' Jews of the traditionalist heartlands – whether Eastern European, North African or Middle Eastern. Yet they also felt bound to their traditionalist brethren by membership of a religiously defined *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* (community of destiny). Thus European Jews intervened in the Damascus Affair rather than be found guilty of ritual murder by association, and they turned their mind to Westernizing educational projects with a view to 'raising' oriental Jews to a more 'civilized' cultural level. Both projects appeared necessary to justify

claims to European Jewish emancipation. This coexistence of divergent cultural and political identities and of exclusionary subethnic groupings within an overarching faith community reveals striking similarities with the diversity and pluralism of the Islamic *umma* outlined by Robinson, Bennison and William Clarence-Smith in this volume. These are similarities that an ideologically loaded preoccupation with 'the Jews' as a nation-in-the-making have obscured for too long.

Notes

1. See David N. Myers, *Re-Inventing the Jewish Past: European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Efraim Shmueli, 'The Jerusalem School of Jewish History (a Critical Evaluation)', *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, 53 (July 1986), 147–78.
2. Recent synthetic histories continue to do so: see David Vital, *A People Apart: The Jews in Europe 1789–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Lloyd P. Gartner, *History of the Jews in Modern Times* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
3. Exemplified by three landmark collections of essays: Jacob Katz, ed., *Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model* (New York: Leo Baeck Institute, 1987); Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson, eds, *Paths of Emancipation. Jews, States, and Citizenship* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstein, eds, *Assimilation and Community: The Jews in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
4. Examples of local studies include Steven J. Zipperstein, *The Jews of Odessa. A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Lois C. Dubin, *The Port Jews of Habsburg Trieste. Absolutist Politics and Enlightenment Culture* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). Examples of national studies include Todd M. Endelman, *The Jews of Georgian England, 1714–1830. Tradition and Change in a Liberal Society* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979); Eli Lederhendler, *The Road to Modern Jewish Politics. Political Tradition and Political Reconstruction in the Jewish Community of Tsarist Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Hasia Diner, *The Jews of the United States, 1654–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
5. 'Eine schöne Erscheinung aus der neuern Zeit', *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums* (*AZ*) (13 February 1872), 119–22.
6. See Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth Century* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 1977).
7. See Norman Cohen, 'Non-Religious Factors in the Emergence of the Chief Rabbinate', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, 21 (1968), 304–13.
8. See Benjamin Braude, 'Foundation Myths of the *Millet* System', in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*,

Vol. 1, *The Central Lands* (New York and London: Holmes & Meier, 1982), pp. 69–88.

9. On this nexus see Abigail Green, 'Nationalism and the "Jewish International": Religious Internationalism in Europe and the Middle East c.1840–c.1880', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 50.2 (April 2008), 535–58, and idem, 'Sir Moses Montefiore and the Making of the "Jewish International"', *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 7.3 (November 2008), 287–307.

10. For a classic account of the workings of the early modern Ashkenazi *kehilah*, see Jacob Katz, *Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages* (New York: New York University Press, 1993).

11. See Niall Ferguson, *The World's Banker. The History of the House of Rothschild* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998); Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron. Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire* (Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin, 1977).

12. But see the argument in Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity. The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

13. The *Terra Santa* fund for the Holy Land and the *Cautivos* fund for the redemption of Jewish slaves and prisoners were two of the three earliest charities established by modern Anglo-Jewry; see Albert M. Hyamson, *The Sephardim of England. A History of the Spanish and Portuguese Jewish Community, 1492–1951* (London: Methuen, 1951), p. 81.

14. See Andrée Aelion Brooks, *The Woman Who Defied Kings. The Life and Times of Doña Gracia Nasi – A Jewish Leader during the Renaissance* (St Paul: Paragon House, 2002); Cecil Roth, *Doña Gracia of the House of Nasi* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1977).

15. See Jacob Barnai, *The Jews in Palestine in the Eighteenth Century under the Patronage of the Istanbul Committee of Officials for Palestine*, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), chapter 7, and more generally.

16. See Baruch Mevorach, 'Die Interventionsbestrebungen in Europa zur Verhinderung der Vertreibung der Juden aus Böhmen und Mähren, 1744–1745', *Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte*, 9 (1980), 15–81; François Guesnet, 'Textures of Intercession – Rescue Efforts for the Jews of Prague, 1744/1748', *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook*, 4 (2005), 355–75.

17. See Jonathan Irvine Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540–1740)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

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28. On the Ashkenazi immigrants of the 1830s, see Sherman Lieber, *Mystics and Missionaries. The Jews in Palestine 1799–1840* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992), chapter 10.

29. 'Jerusalem Literature', *VJ* (22 July 1842), 175.

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31. 'The Jewish Hospital at Jerusalem', *The Jewish Chronicle* (*JC*) (12 December 1845), 42.

32. 'Jerusalem – Subscriptions to the Hospital – Emigration and Industrial School Bubbles', *JC* (4 September 1846), 207–8.

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35. Eliyahu Feldman, 'The Question of Jewish Emancipation in the Ottoman Empire and the Danubian Principalities after the Crimean War', *Jewish Social Studies*, 41.1 (Winter 1979), 41–74.

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39. Dr Lil, 'The Jews in Palestine', *The Israelite* (15 August 1856), 44.

40. Lederhendler, *Road to Modern Jewish Politics*, p. 124.

41. Lederhendler, *Road to Modern Jewish Politics*, p. 132.

42. Lederhendler, *Road to Modern Jewish Politics*, p. 122.

43. Eliezer Lipman Silberman, 'Kore ahuv', *Hamagid*, 1.2 (8 August 1856), 6. More generally, Gideon Kouts, 'The First Hebrew Newspapers in Europe. Economic and Organizational Aspects', *Historia y Comunicación Social*, 8 (2003), 147–58.

44. Specifically on the Hausdorf mission, see 'Lema'an tsiyon lo neḥshah', *Hamagid* (23 March 1859), 45.

45. 'Levinyan batei maḥseh le'ani'im vehakhnasat oreḥim al har tsiyon', *Hamagid* (13 April 1859), 58; Azriel Selig Hausdorf, 'Al devar binyan batei maḥseh le'ani'im vehakhnasat oreḥim al har tsiyon birushalayim', *Hamagid* (7 June 1859), 85. For specific assurances about the destination of the money, see Azriel Selig Hausdorf, 'Poh ir habirah london arba-esreh sivan 1859', *Hamagid* (29 June 1859), 1 (of appendix).

46. Hausdorf, 'Al devar binyan batei maḥseh'.

47. On Sachs's involvement, see 'Tirkiyah', *Hamagid* (7 November 1860), 172. Sneersohn's mission to Australia in 1862 also related to the Hausdorf project. See 'Oystralyen', *Hamagid* (29 April 1862), 132 and Haim Zvi beharav Mendel Schneersohn (Sneersohn), 'Oystralyen', *Hamagid* (4 December 1862), 371.

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50. See John F. Hutchinson, *Champions of Charity. War and the Rise of the Red Cross* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).

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56. Israel Bartal, 'Messianism and Nationalism: Liberal Optimism Vs. Orthodox Anxiety', *Jewish History*, 20.1 (March 2006), 5–17.

57. Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity*, p. 164.

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71. Less so later, see Mary McCune, *'The Whole Wide World without Limits'. International Relief, Gender Politics, and American Jewish Women, 1893–1930* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005).

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80. On this 'inner orientalism', see Yaron Tsur, *Mavo letoledot hayehudim be'artsot ha'islama batekufah hamodernit 1750–1914* (Tel-Aviv: Open University Provisional Edition, 2004), chapter 9; also Borovaya, 'Jews of Three Colors'. More generally, see Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, ed., *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2005).

81. Isidore Cahen, 'Mélanges. Le Droit de Légitime Défense', *Archives Israélites de France* (March 1859), 149.

82. Jonathan Ray, 'New Approaches to the Jewish Diaspora: The Sephardim as a Sub-Ethnic Group', *Jewish Social Studies*, 15.1 (Fall 2008), 10–31.

83. See Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora*, and Miriam Bodian, ' "Men of the Nation": The Shaping of Converso Identity in Early Modern Europe', *Past & Present*, 143 (1994), 48–76.

84. See, for instance, Rebecca Kobrin, 'Rewriting the Diaspora: Images of Eastern Europe in the Bialystok Landsmanshaft Press, 1921–1945', *Jewish Social Studies*, 12.3 (2006), 1–38. Lehmann, 'Rethinking Sephardi Identity', emphasizes the exclusionary aspects of the Ashkenazi diaspora in an earlier period.

85. Lehmann, 'Rethinking Sephardi Identity', p. 83.

4
Nineteenth-Century Catholic Internationalism and Its Predecessors

Vincent Viaene

'The pope: how many divisions?' We all know Stalin's rhetorical question. What he meant, of course, was that the pope has no divisions and is therefore of no consequence in the world of power politics. Such 'realism' was long the dominant outlook of political scientists and international historians on Catholicism, and on religion generally. On this point at least, an A. J. P. Taylor or a Hans Morgenthau would have agreed with Stalin. Since then, we have had Samuel Huntington's conversion on the road to Damascus, and realists have attempted to reappropriate religion. Sociologists always took a bit more note but, following the Gospel according to Max Weber, prophesied religion's 'rationalization' or marginalization as a force in civil society. Now that the demise of religion is not expected anytime soon, some (like Peter Berger) grade it on the scale of 'the Protestant ethic': Pentecostalism A, Catholicism B minus, Islam D.[1]

Yet, even if the pope does not have divisions, he continues to hold sway over the popular imagination. There is an interesting genealogy to be made of the Vatican theme in modern novels, from Disraeli and Zola to Robert Ludlum and Dan Brown. Scheming Cardinals are helpful to get on to the bestseller list. The conspiratorial view of international Catholicism in thrillers conjures up the image of the Vatican as a kind of religious CIA, an 'Entity' wielding tremendous global influence through mysterious organizations such as the Jesuits or Opus Dei (or those organizations through the Vatican).

Mystery novels may tell us something about the secretive culture of Vatican diplomacy, and Stalin's quip may equally reveal something about the predicament of the papacy around 1940, but in essence both

miss the point. The Vatican, in fact, is but the tip of a transnational iceberg. It is the hub of an international network of voluntary organizations that mediate the presence of the Church in civil society. If over a hundred states care to accredit a representative at the Vatican today, it is not because they are impressed by the Swiss Guard. The challenge facing the historian of international Catholicism is to look beyond the papacy, charting its interaction with this international network. Ultimately, it is this web that is constitutive of the modern papacy, and that lends credibility to the pope as a spokesman of Catholic opinion. Catholic internationalism can thus be defined as the sum of practices, representations and organizations that unite believers of different nationalities or ethnicities in a global effort to reform modern society in accordance with the Church's principles. Yet, though springing from a religious motivation, the phenomenon is distinct from traditional religious ceremonies and from the formal hierarchy of the Church. There is certainly some overlap: Catholic internationalism leans upon ecclesiastical structures or devotional symbols, and in turn partially transforms religious practices. In essence, however, it remains an outward projection of religion into society, displaying an autonomous logic that stems from its intricate involvement in civil society. Previous essays of mine were concerned with the second half of the nineteenth century, the golden age of the 'first' Catholic International, which was marked by a symbiosis between the Holy See and Catholic opinion. In this essay I want to take a step back, and consider the Catholic International as part of the larger story of transnational Catholic linkages in civil society since the Counter-Reformation.

The Counter-Reformation: Cosmopolitan but not 'Civil'

Judging by appearances, the ultramontane Church of the nineteenth to twentieth century pales in comparison to its early modern predecessor of the Catholic Reformation.[2] The magnificence and the sheer ferocity of the Church's global counter-offensive against Protestantism are well known. The Council of Trent brought together many hundreds of bishops and their staff from across Europe for long periods of time in order to issue ecclesiastical reforms. Habsburg and papal diplomacy ensured a measure of convergence in the double struggle against Protestantism and Islam.[3] Multinational Catholic armies fought Protestants in the Low Countries or in France, and the Turks in the Mediterranean. The Vatican court served as a clearing house to finance these wars, channelling the proceeds of Iberian ecclesiastical taxes or of its own extensive

system of tax farming (there is a good case to be made that the public loan was invented in Rome).[4] Baroque became the universal artistic idiom to circulate counter-reformatory ideals, and the city of Rome its most dazzling showcase. Missionary orders evangelized Latin America, mounted the first campaign against genocide (of their Indian converts) and attempted to convert other continents. In some respects, this outburst of Catholic missionary fervour was more universal in spirit than its nineteenth-century successor, less burdened by racial and cultural prejudice or Roman formalism. Jesuits made a furore as mandarins in the Forbidden City, and the king of Kongo sent a (black) envoy to the Vatican.[5]

While undoubtedly transnational and 'cosmopolitan', all of this hardly added up to a Catholic International. The counter-reformatory offensive was directly dependent on the strong arm of the early modern state, on force. This imposed sharp limits on its role in fostering voluntary networks of transnational communication. For similar reasons, the imperial diaspora of Iberian Catholics did not play the same formative role in Catholic internationalism as the simultaneous diaspora networks of Protestants, Jews and Muslims. While these escaped the constraints of empire, the Iberian version was a tightly regimented product of empire, in which communication was contained by intricate hierarchies of caste and colour. The nexus of the cross-fertilization between absolutist state formation and the government of the Tridentine Church were the Papal States in Central Italy.[6] Here the pope was king, and vice versa. They were the springboard for the counter-offensive against Protestantism, providing money, men, a diplomatic ticket and the family networks that underpinned the Roman Curia, the bureaucracy of prelates and Cardinals. However, the Papal States were also the Achilles heel of the Catholic Reformation, an involuntary model for the territorialization of the Church. Catholic princes who wanted to strengthen their grip on the Church in their kingdom, only had to look to Rome. By the eighteenth century, Catholicism was as tied to territories and dynasties as was Anglicanism or Lutheranism.

An Incomplete Catholic International? The Jansenist Republic of Letters and the Anti-Jesuit Campaign

Some religious internationals trace their roots to movements of reform or revival in the second half of the eighteenth century. Historians like Christopher Bayly see a period of global religious ferment starting in the 1760s, which was related to 'industrious revolutions' and to the imperial

turmoil caused by the Seven Years War and the American Revolution.[7] Catholicism, too, was marked by such a movement, Jansenism, but its connection to the first Catholic International that eventually rose to dominance in the nineteenth century is tenuous.

Jansenism originated in the seventeenth century as a Catholic cousin of Calvinism in the Southern Netherlands and France. In the eighteenth century, it became more of an 'ethic', appealing in particular to the patrician bourgeoisie and the service nobility. As such, it often engendered an openness towards the general climate of 'enlightenment'. Even as borders were shaping up and peoples turned into nations, the Jansenist Catholic Enlightenment linked priests, scholars and lawyers across Europe around a fairly coherent programme of reform in church and state.[8] Like their counterparts in other religious traditions, the reformers advocated a more personal, activist and rational type of religion – a *regolata devozione*, in the words of the erudite Ludovico Muratori (1672–1750). Moreover, they strove for the decentralization and (partial) democratization of ecclesiastical structures under the aegis of enlightened rulers. In France, they were early advocates of constitutionalism.[9] They favoured religious tolerance, and sometimes, a dialogue with Protestants. In Central Europe, in particular, they were influenced by the Pietist scholarship and devotion prominent in the 'Protestant matrix'.[10] Naturally, the movement had very little to do with the papacy, which was essentially a powerless onlooker. The Papal States trapped the Holy See in a negative spiral of debt and underdevelopment. Eighteenth-century popes were paying the price for their predecessors' strategy of territorialization, and for their reckless mortgaging of the state's future to finance the counter-reformatory Church.

The Catholic Enlightenment was concentrated in France, and along a Habsburg axis running from the Southern Netherlands, through the ecclesiastical principalities of the Rhine and the Austrian empire in Central Europe, to Northern Italy and Tuscany. In France, the *parlements* of Paris and some provinces were poles of attraction; along the Habsburg axis, enlightened ideas enjoyed the protection of ruling dynasties – with figures like Joseph II of Austria (1741–90), Grand-Duke Leopold of Tuscany (1747–92) and Prince-Bishop Hontheim of Trier (1701–90), the Catholic Enlightenment would even come to power in the late eighteenth century. From its interrelated core areas, it percolated into Italy south of the Arno (Rome counted a small but active 'underground' of Jansenists), the Iberian Peninsula and the Latin American colonies.

In the 1750s and 1760s, Jansenism was the motor force behind one of the first transnational political campaigns in modern history: the

destruction of the Jesuit order, the backbone of counter-reformatory Catholicism.[11] The French journal *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques*, with its print run of 6000 and its European readership, used the myth of 'Jesuitism' as a powerful weapon to break the old system and clear the path for reform. The *Nouvelles* were buttressed by a deluge of pamphlets and letters, 3000 volumes of which were to be found in the library of Parisian busybody Louis-Adrien Le Paige (1712–1802), one of the forerunners of professional journalism. Clandestine networks of distribution through booksellers, itinerant peddlers and personal contacts spread the news. Anti-Jesuit opinion crystallized in the web of chatter linking the salons of the Old and the New World. The propaganda was highly successful, leading to the expulsion of the order from the Iberian Peninsula, the Latin American colonies and France. The campaign culminated in 1773, when the pope finally capitulated to the cumulative pressure and banned the order. In the name of progress and tolerance, the suppression was accompanied by considerable ideological violence and it was eagerly instrumentalized by the Catholic courts to strengthen their hold over the clergy and education.[12] If these were the first stirrings of international civil society in continental Europe, the omens were not all that good.

The anti-Jesuit campaign ended when the campaign against the slave trade began. It was at least as significant an episode in the history of global civil society as its better-known, Protestant-inspired counterpart. Nevertheless, the Catholic Republic of Letters remained an incomplete international. The Catholic Enlightenment mobilized elites but generally failed to mobilize the masses, except in Paris.[13] Along the Habsburg axis and in the Bourbon empires, the Jansenists remained above all courtiers in reform programmes that were very much imposed from above. The elitist bent of Jansenism compounded the challenge of forming public opinion without mass print, steam power and telegraph.

The Catholic Enlightenment reached its limits in a few dramatic years at the end of the 1780s.[14] Ecclesiastical reform and the long-awaited introduction of religious tolerance by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II provoked riots in Tuscany and rebellion in Belgium. At the same time, in France the Jansenists lost the initiative as the Estates General gave way to the National Convention. In order to have had a future, the networks of the Catholic Republic of Letters should somehow have been able to garner sufficient popular support to cushion the revolution from above in Habsburg lands and to moderate the revolution from below in France. But because of the limitations inherent in the Jansenist project,

it is just very difficult to contrive such an outcome, even in the best of counterfactual worlds.

The Pivotal Role of Revolution and Persecution

The experience of persecution and exile, or at least of discrimination and a sense of disenfranchisement, has at one time or another galvanized all modern religious internationals. For Catholicism, the French Revolution was such a turning point. The revolution swallowed up the Catholic Enlightenment, while physical exile, followed by Napoleon's European empire, ensured an extraordinary *brassage* of ultramontane networks of solidarity.[15] This continued and completed a process that had started with the Jesuit diaspora to the Russian Empire, the USA and Britain after the suppression of the Society. Even the Pope and the Cardinals of the Curia were forced to leave their Roman habitat for once; however painful or tragic from a personal point of view, the experience did the institution a great deal of good. War and revolution also strengthened the populist undercurrent in ultramontane sentiment, as the ultramontanes encouraged regional counter-revolutionary insurgencies with a similar physiology and common symbols such as the Sacred Heart of Jesus, for instance, a devotion propagated by the Jesuits since the eighteenth century.[16] From the Vendée to Calabria and from the Tyrol or Flanders to Castille and the Douro, peasants took up arms 'for altar and hearth', the Sacred Heart pinned on their breasts or on their hats – a transnational symbol over against the national *cocarde* of revolutionaries and the imperial eagle of Napoleon.

Across much of Western Europe, but above all in France and Belgium, the established Church of the ancien régime was dismantled. Stripped of the privileges that chained it to particular places and particular families, Catholicism was deterritorialized. The leaner, more efficient structure introduced by the Concordat of 1801 would prove a better springboard for seeking a profile in civil society. If the nineteenth-century Church was a more disciplined body than its ancien régime predecessor, this was also because it rested on the bedrock of shared memories of persecution. Regicide, revolutionary martyrs and the struggle against Napoleon became staples of the spiritual diet of Catholics, and (later) a common key in which to understand 'culture wars'. The tale of persecution and resistance became a foundation myth for modern Catholicism, even in regions that had never been touched by the events in France. In the revolutionary furnace, a particular worldview was forged, in which a visceral distrust of the state and of the continental liberal tradition became

a cornerstone of Catholic identity.[17] It made sense of war and revolution as providential instruments in a cosmic struggle of the 'sons of the crusaders' against the 'sons of Voltaire' (seen, in their turn, as heirs to the Lutheran 'spirit of rebellion', if not as agents of a 'Judaeo-Masonic conspiracy'). One of the great *maîtres-penseurs* was Count Joseph de Maistre (1752–1821); the other was Abbé Félicité de Lamennais (1782–1854). Maistre's mystical authoritarianism had been sharpened by his contact with Orthodoxy while ambassador of Piedmont in St-Petersburg from 1803 to 1817, a time when the Russian Empire projected its power into the heart of Western Europe.

In the new marketplace of ideas, despite recurrent tactical alliances with liberalism to achieve emancipation, the revolution thus tended to (re-)position Catholicism on the right, in a contentious and populist sense. This would put the future Catholic International, unlike Jansenism, on a collision course with the two other religious internationals originating in the West, the Jewish and Protestant ones. Human rights, the strong suit of the Protestant and Jewish Internationals, were an important symbolic marker. Catholics would campaign for the liberty of coreligionists and converts, but only rarely and belatedly for other people's liberties: in many Catholic minds, the 'Rights of Man' remained mixed up with the memory of persecution, and were therefore seen as opposed to the 'Rights of God'. Their ambiguity on this score led to an ongoing debate about the legitimacy of Catholicism's place in (global) civil society. It was a handicap not unlike that facing Islam more recently, and the news of the day leaves the scholar of nineteenth-century Catholicism with a sometimes depressing sense of déjà vu.

International in the Making:
The Dynamics of Catholic Revival

Between the world of Jansenism and the world of the Catholic revival, there was more carry-over than meets the eye. The eighteenth-century reformers would have recognized the search for an intensely personal yet socially relevant faith; they might have envied the power of nineteenth-century bishops, 'mitred prefects' turning their dioceses into well-oiled bureaucratic machines; and they would have noted with satisfaction that, despite acrimonious debate, Catholics in most of Europe, the USA and the British Empire accepted civil tolerance with varying degrees of conviction. Nevertheless, the dominant impression remains one of rupture. The broken fragments of 'enlightened'

Catholicism went into the revolutionary blender, dissolving into the stronger stuff of counter-revolutionary ideology and traumatic memory; what emerged were the lineaments of a different kind of Catholic International, articulated in the dynamics of Catholic revival.

The revival was above all a global offensive to 'install everything in Christ'. Unlike Jansenism, it was not encumbered by a pessimistic sacramental philosophy that favoured introspection. Rather, the Catholic revival (like its Protestant counterparts) rooted faith in a liberating personal experience of conversion that enshrined a 'religion of the heart'. It expressed itself through a romantic 'devotional vernacular' (Mary Heimann), which harnessed and standardized popular devotions without spurning them.[18] Playing on popular universal archetypes, cults like those of Mary or the Sacred Heart became as acclimatized on the Great Plains or in Bengal as in Flanders or Ireland.

Ultramontane 'pop culture' gave expression to a borderless economy of salvation that powerfully helped Catholics to reimagine themselves as a transnational community in the modern world. It was anchored at grass-roots level between the 1820s and 1850s by the wildfire proliferation of domestic missions.[19] These emotional collective rites of expiation and regeneration provoked a massive response across Europe, from (parts of) France, the Valais and Piedmont through the Low Countries, Rhineland-Westphalia and Bavaria, to Polish Galicia and the Tyrol. In many places, the churches being too small, the missions turned into open-air happenings. There were counter-reformatory precedents, but what made the nineteenth-century missions different was their intense populism. They experimented with active liturgical participation by the masses, and sought to involve them actively in the work of converting the hesitant or the sceptics. As one Jesuit wrote after a successful mission, 'all had become missionaries'.[20] This made them more like the Wesleyan missions or the American 'camp meetings' that the Jesuits had come to know during their years of exile.

Domestic missions not only aimed at personal conversion but were also rooted in the old idea that one could do penance for someone else, whether he lived in another place or in another time. The horizon of such 'reversibility of merit' was now expanded to encompass modern society as a whole, everywhere. It thus informed the ethic of self-sacrifice that constituted the mental trigger of activism. Through the right life and good works, Catholics could save a sinful society infected by revolution. They could tilt the scales against 'the ruses of Providence' and prepare 'the social kingdom of Christ'.[21] There are striking parallels for this eschatological nexus between the 'community of believers' and the

'community of opinion' in Protestantism,[22] as in the more populist and charismatic strands of Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. In Catholicism, at any rate, it made for a forceful outward projection of religious energies, especially after 1830. Demographic pressures and industrial revolution, the collapse of domestic industry and famine, the growth of liberty and the public sphere ensured a combination of push-and-pull factors that encouraged expansion. There were four transnational junctures between the Catholic revival and civil society: religious orders or congregations of consecrated women or men, the overseas mission movement, the philanthropic networks of lay charity and political Catholicism. These would remain the bedrock of the first Catholic International until 1914.

Before RINGOs (Religious International Non-Governmental Organizations): Orders and Congregations

After 1815, old orders like the Jesuits, the Franciscans, the Dominicans or the Redemptorists were reintroduced. At least as important was that hundreds of new congregations were founded on their model – over 400 in France alone.[23] Grassroots initiatives for the most part, often recruiting from the middle and lower classes, they at first responded to local needs in a rapidly changing world. However, the more important ones were, or in time became, transnational enterprises, running extensive networks of schools, hospitals, orphanages, asylums and penitentiary experiments. In consequence, like the major orders, they were key channels for cultural transfer, spreading not only devotional prototypes but also organizational models and expert knowledge.[24] The Jesuits, for instance, whose membership rose from 600 in 1815 to 15,000 in 1900, prided themselves on their elite lyceums and colleges, which followed a single standardized blueprint across Europe, the Americas, India and Oceania. They were imitated by the Sacred Heart Sisters, whose equally transcontinental group of over a hundred boarding schools also attracted non-Catholic girls. At the other end of the social spectrum were congregations like the Christian School Brothers, whose 1500 primary schools extended from France and Belgium to the French colonies and the Ottoman Empire; or the Poor School Sisters, originating in France but headquartered in Bavaria by the early twentieth century, whose network spread across Europe and North America. In the field of social reform, one of the most spectacular cases of expansion were the Good Shepherd Sisters, who were founded in France in 1829 and specialized in the (re)education of prostitutes or marginalized girls. With their services much in demand by governments and colonial rulers, they had established a web of 110 asylums in the five continents by 1868.

Likewise devoted to a philosophy of 'tough love' for inmates or wards were three Belgian congregations with an expertise in penitentiary work, which spread rapidly to Italy, England and Canada.

Transnational orders and congregations were typically organized into provinces, with provincial superiors strictly subordinated to the (elected) general superior residing at the motherhouse. In the first decades of the revival, provinces would often group core regions across borders, but after 1850 they tended to coincide with nation-states, recruiting (and training) nationally. Allaying fears of domination by the congregation's country of origin, such a strategy of 'inter-nationalization' and 'indigenization' proved a successful formula. Centrifugal tendencies were countered by the hierarchical command structure, the detailed rule governing the life of all houses of a congregation, a distinct dress and spirituality, and last but not least, the high mobility of members. The Sacred Heart Sister Edith Blandford from Newcastle in England, for instance, also did stints in Australia, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand and Latin America. The Good Shepherd Sister Countess Maria Droste zu Vischering (1863–99), trained in her native Münster, swore obedience to the local and the general superiors, both French women of modest background. Eventually, she herself became superior of the house in Porto, leading a group of French, German and Portuguese nuns with the spiritual support of an Irish Dominican and an Austrian Benedictine. Along with the cult of the Sacred Heart, she introduced German organizational *Gründlichkeit* and the Christmas tree to the back alleys of Porto. Unlike Maria Droste, Brother Paul of the Belgian congregation of Our Lady of Charity came from a dirt-poor family, but like her he was actively involved in cultural transfer between Western Europe and the Mediterranean, establishing modern penitentiary institutions in Central Italy. In the process, he moderated their stringent emphasis on work ethic as the key lever to self-improvement, something that fed back into the revision of prison models by Belgian and French philanthropists.

Mobility of people and ideas was further encouraged by periodic diasporas as a result of anticlerical measures expelling orders and congregations. The Jesuits were of course the scapegoat par excellence: the Belgian province, for instance, was resurrected in 1832, repatriating Jesuits from their places of exile in Switzerland, France, Germany, the USA, Austria, Russia and Italy. In the course of the nineteenth century it served in its turn as a haven for Jesuits expelled from France, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Germany and Italy. A more general (temporary) exodus was triggered by the German Kulturkampf of the 1870s, and even

more by the French laws of 1901–04, which resulted in the worldwide exile of over 30,000 religious.[25]

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were about half a million religious in Europe alone, and a further hundred thousand in North America.[26] Throughout the century, they had been intimately involved in creating the basic fabric of modern civil society, and in tying it together across borders. There are parallels with the Sufi orders and madrasa networks of Islam, or with the monasteries of Theravada Buddhism.[27] What makes the role of congregations in Catholicism distinctive is their strong vertical integration and above all their unparalleled capacity to mobilize women as teachers, nurses and social workers. Almost two thirds of the half million religious just mentioned were women, and they had three times as many houses as the male religious (25,000). While it was mostly left to men to flaunt Catholicism's internationalist feathers in politics (see below), much of the transnational groundwork in civil society was carried out by women. In the Catholic International, even more than in other religious internationals, the tapping of female religious energies proved essential to the rise of a more voluntarist, transnational and 'social' type of religion in the modern age. The congregational model provoked fear and fascination. In Protestantism, for instance, lurid fantasies about nuns' convents were a staple of anti-Catholic propaganda. At the same time, however, the model was emulated by Lutheran diaconesses and Anglican sisterhoods, or by the centralized military command structure of the Salvation Army.

Missionary Transactions

In the overseas missions, it was Catholic orders and congregations that followed in the footsteps of the Protestant International. There was a continuum between their expansion in the Mediterranean semi-periphery or in the colonies, and their initiatives to convert 'heathen' populations. Old orders like the Jesuits re-established a global presence and some of the new congregations specialized in the overseas missions. This 'second wave' of Catholic evangelization (after the first one of the Counter-Reformation) was intimately tied to the revival. Missions globalized ultramontane devotions, improvising their acculturation in the process. The Flemish Jesuit Pieter-Jan De Smet (1801–73), for instance, gathered the Sioux of the American West around the totem of the Sacred Heart and encouraged trance visions of Our Lady (the 'Great Mother'). A farmer's son, he was also practical enough to introduce Western medicine, agriculture and architectural know-how. De Smet's

bestselling *Voyage aux Montagnes Rocheuses* (1844, the first of eight editions), completed by a lecture tour in Belgium, France and Britain, celebrated the achievements of 'Christian civilization' over and against the 'false' secular civilization spawned by the French Revolution. This underscores the importance of the overseas mission to the sense of mission at home, as a 'laboratory for the reconquest' of the metropoles (Claude Prudhomme).[28]

Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the mission movement was quite independent of empires and was not 'nationalized': mission territories did not necessarily correspond to imperial borders, and many missions were a transnational cocktail. De Smet, for instance, worked alongside French, Germans and Americans on the Great Plains, while in India, the Jesuit mission involved no fewer than six nationalities. Its transnational character was most palpable in the fundraising organization of the Oeuvre de la Propagation de la Foi, based in Lyon and run by laymen.[29] Alms and fixed small donations were collected locally by a chain of volunteers from all classes: in fact, when the Oeuvre was founded in 1822, its first fundraisers were two working-class women from the Lyon silk factory. The collections were centralized and redistributed over mission territories according to need (following, once more, Protestant models). A parallel initiative was the Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance, which has rightly been called one of the first international aid organizations.[30] Founded in 1843 to rescue Chinese children from supposed infanticide and to baptize them, by the end of the century the Oeuvre was supporting a worldwide network of orphanages. These were sometimes poorly run institutions with high mortality rates, which involuntarily boosted the traffic in human beings by 'redeeming' children. The gap between rhetoric and reality apart, the Oeuvre was, like its Lyon sister, very successful in the Western world. It relied even more on women as fundraisers: through their mothers, children were socialized into a transnationally connected culture of giving. By 1890 the total annual income of the two organizations was a rather handsome ten million francs.[31] In their journals, printed in several languages, readers revelled in missionary adventure tales and sentimental rescue stories the world over (whatever the missionary's nationality, which was often not even mentioned). The French edition alone numbered over 300,000 copies. The print-run represented only part of the 'audience', for the articles were also read aloud in families or parish confraternities.

With their easy and straightforward style, these publications aimed to sensitize the masses. They were the centrepiece of a missionary culture that also included songs, school theatre, lotteries, fun fairs and

devotional objects (in the single year of 1860, for instance, the Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance distributed more than a million medals and images worldwide).[32] This was a form of popular global consciousness *avant la lettre*, connecting regions across imperial and national borders. Mid-nineteenth-century Catholics from Flanders, for instance, identified with missionaries and converts in Oregon, the Antilles, Bechuanaland, Kurdistan, Bengal, Mongolia, Hawaii and the Arctic. While such communities were entirely imagined, they nonetheless had real effects. In Europe, they not only changed the way Catholics understood themselves, but also (re)defined their outlook on the world. As in Jewish philanthropy or the Protestant mission movement, the paternalist culture of compassion was a code for Western superiority, but the revivalist economy of salvation could also operate surprising reversals: in the Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance, for instance, Western children prayed for protection to 'martyred' Chinese child converts, who became their 'guardian angels'. Overseas, missionary Christianity brought 'development aid' for converts and defined the parameters within which they were forced to renegotiate their cultural identity in a modernizing world.

Philanthropy and the Origins of Political Catholicism

The missionary 'contact zone' provided a model for the rechristening of the 'new barbarians' in urban jungles at home. Lay charity extended beyond almsgiving to different forms of 'community work'. The most important global network was the Society of St Vincent de Paul: founded in France in 1833, it was active in the five continents by the 1870s. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 8000 local sections grouped over 133,000 active members and donations amounted to 15,000 francs a year.[33] A central office in Paris guarded organizational uniformity and fidelity to the Oeuvre's philosophy. While regional (rather than national) sections enjoyed considerable autonomy, the central office and its journal helped spread successful local initiatives – such as youth circles in Ghent or insurance schemes in the French *Nord*. At the same time, the Society issued highly popular 'one penny' almanacs in different countries, which combined amusement with philanthropic sensitization, and the propagation of a devout and industrious lifestyle. Around 1875, in France and Flanders alone, their print-run was 535,000. The Society also organized fundraising campaigns for global disaster relief – from the New Orleans yellow fever of 1853/5 through the Asian famines of 1877/9 to the eruption of Mount Pelée in Martinique in 1903 (to give only a few examples). Like their Jewish counterparts,

they created 'reverse' and 'transversal' flows of money and sympathy. In 1856, for instance, the Irish contributed substantially to the relief of French flood victims after the French had tried to alleviate mass starvation in the Irish famine a decade earlier; or at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Mexican sections of the Society sent money to help Chinese Christians after the Boxer Rebellion, just as the section of Chinese Catholics in Shanghai organized a collection for Martinique.[34]

Even if paternalist organizations like the Society of St Vincent de Paul never helped more than a fraction of the working poor, they were highly effective in forging a transnational Catholic elite. In this sense, they often served as the springboard for another form of 'lay apostolate', political Catholicism. Chris Clark has written about the 'transnational community of sentiment' fostered by the rise of Catholic journals,[35] which freely copied one another, putting scissors and glue-pot to good effect. Working in tandem with the journalists were the parliamentarians. Catholics again looked to nonconformist Protestant models. The repertoire of petitions, meetings and parliamentary lobbying developed in campaigns like abolitionism was adopted by Irish and English Catholics in their struggle for Emancipation (1829). From there it passed to Belgium, where Catholics rose against the Dutch in 1830, under the motto *la liberté en tout et pour tous*. The French followed the Belgian example, campaigning for freedom of education in the July Monarchy (*la liberté comme en Belgique*). From France and Belgium, the practice and theory of political Catholicism was refracted back to the Irish and the English, to the Dutch and to the Germans, who would eventually come up with the model Catholic party after 1870, in turn reinspiring the Belgians and inspiring the Italians. Political scripts were passed along by the press, by personal contacts and by letters, letters and more letters. Leading figures like Charles de Montalembert (1810–70) or Louis Veuillot (1813–83) were assiduous travellers and wrote volumes of correspondence, which can still make a historian's day.

The role of political Catholicism in multiplying transnational linkages before 1860 should not be exaggerated. Unlike the new congregations and the mission movement, it was largely an elite phenomenon and it could be divisive. Nonetheless, there was a string of small-scale international campaigns between the 1830s and the 1850s: for Catholic rights in Prussia (1837), for Belgian independence (1838–9), in the Damascus affair (1840), for Polish freedom (1845), in support of the Catholic cantons in the Swiss civil war (1847), to help the exiled pope (1849) and in the 'unholy rivalry' around the Holy Places (1853). These efforts could be marked by a nasty anti-Protestant, anti-Jewish, anti-Orthodox

or anti-Islamic undertone, and in some cases by a direct confrontation with other religious internationals. But there were also close parallels with the early campaigns of the Jewish International in particular, from the successful appropriation of a discourse of liberty through the key role of the press, to the close alignment with imperial politics (of France, in particular).[36]

Mapping the Nineteenth-Century Catholic International

The Catholic revival was invented on the margins of revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe, in places of exile or along an outer circle of rebellion. After 1815, as we have seen, the missionary peripheries overseas were essential to the definition of a global revivalist identity. Diaspora reinforced the dynamics of Catholic expansion, playing a similar role as in other religious internationals, even if the link with trading networks was less explicit than in Judaism, Islam or Protestantism. Among Catholic migrants, the Poles, the Irish and the Italians stood out. The mid-nineteenth-century milieu of Polish political exiles in Paris, Brussels, London and Rome spurred transnational campaigns for political liberty. Together with the elite contingent of Russian converts, they played a disproportionate role in the salon culture underpinning the lay apostolate – with the inspiring Madame Swetchine (1782–1857) in Paris, or Princess Sofia Odescalchi née Branicka (1821–86) in Rome – in several religious orders and in the Roman Curia. Unlike its Polish counterpart, the Irish diaspora was a mass exodus. Like the earlier French diaspora to Quebec, it ensured that the 'new worlds' of North America and Oceania were rapidly pulled into the orbit of the European revival.[37] In the last decades of the century, Italian mass migration reinforced the transatlantic connection, laying the groundwork for South America's late integration into the Catholic International. Where Irish and Italian migrants went, sisters or brothers of congregations and lay philanthropists followed, closely monitored by mother houses or 'centrals' in Paris, Angers, Namur, Dublin, Mainz or Piacenza.

For, lest we forget, transnational linkages were overwhelmingly generated in a well-defined geographical heartland in Western Europe, consisting of France, Belgium, the British Isles, Germany and Northern Italy. Here the Church was either disestablished or a minority faith; here the combination of political and industrial revolution challenged it to reinvent itself in rapidly changing societies. Here, too, the mechanics of industrialization generated the excess (wo)manpower, the wealth and the instruments of communication needed to create new organizations

and connect them. This explains the striking marginalization of the Iberian Peninsula, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Southern Italy for most of the century, all regions that had been core areas of earlier incarnations of Catholic transnationalism, as we have seen. France and Belgium were undoubtedly the hard core, a kind of powerhouse of the *devotio anti-moderna*. French Catholicism had been in the eye of the revolutionary storm, and Belgian Catholicism enjoyed an unparalleled liberty after the country gained independence in 1830. It was in France and Belgium that most of the new congregations originated, and it was from here that they were led; the Oeuvre pour la Propagation de la Foi was based in Lyon and the Society of St Vincent de Paul in Paris; Catholic journalists took their cue from the *Univers*; and the first international Catholic Congresses, a kind of Estates General of the revival, were held in Mechelen in the mid-1860s.

Between the heartland and the diasporic or missionary outer circles, there was an intermediary zone consisting of Central Europe, most of the Mediterranean and the scattered Eastern rite communities of the Ottoman and Persian empires. The place of these 'old' Catholicisms in the Catholic International shows many similarities with that of the Sephardic communities of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire in the Jewish International. Like these, they were the subject of 'internal colonization' but also retained a considerable degree of agency (more so, in any case, than the converts made by missionaries).[38] That was to be expected where the European 'semi-periphery' is concerned. Individual Neapolitans, Romans, Austrians or Spaniards merged easily into elite networks further north, infusing Mediterranean colour and Danubian flavour into the revival's devotional vocabulary and ideological grammar. The terms of cultural exchange were less favourable for Eastern Rite Catholics, but they too were not simply objects of revivalist imperialism. In Bethlehem and in Cairo, for instance, sections of the Society of St Vincent consisted exclusively of Arabs, and the Cairo section published an Arab bulletin.[39] Like rabbis from the Holy Land, itinerant clergymen from the East appealed directly to the solidarity of Western Catholics, bypassing Rome and the Oeuvre pour la Propagation de la Foi. In the mid-1870s, for instance, the Chaldean Bishop Bartatar from Sert (1800–84) roamed European capitals and raised considerable amounts of money (we happen to know because Rome accused him of embezzlement and, curiously, a 'too European' lifestyle).[40]

Rome occupied a peculiar place on the map of the Catholic International. The Eternal City was the symbolic centre, conveniently located on the (semi-)periphery. Much like Jerusalem for the Jewish

International, this made Rome perfect as an exclusive site of pilgrimage where Catholic elites intermingled, projected their worldview and tested out utopian experiments in religious modernization (like agricultural colonies and craft schools).[41] But Rome also meant the Holy See, of course. The papacy's role in the resistance against Napoleon restored its moral credit. As an undisputed source of authority, it was the keystone of the revivalist worldview. Slowly, the popes awakened to the opportunities, continuously prodded by Catholics from across the Alps. If this was an empire of the spirit in the making, it was one by invitation.

Roman diplomacy allayed governments' fears of mass religious militancy. The popes favoured the renaissance of the orders, and protected them from suspicious bishops. They broke the stranglehold of the Iberian *padronado* (but not the French protectorate) over the missions. They showered indulgences (remissions of time in purgatory as penance for sin) on institutions like the Oeuvre pour la Propagation de la Foi or the Society of St Vincent de Paul, bolstering the borderless economy of salvation. The Holy See encouraged, but above all it trimmed and disciplined, curbing the 'fissiparous' potential of revivalism. It stopped ultramontanes from veering to the far right, and liberal Catholics to the left. After 1850 especially, it imposed a division of labour and a measure of uniformity on the sprawling world of congregations, which tended to compete with one another and with the secular clergy as they expanded. Until 1860, then, the papacy's role in the Catholic International was important, but subsidiary. It was like a distant landlord too busy at home to collect the rent punctually. In fact, what held the popes back was their troubled state, which was becoming more of an anachronism with every passing year, and their concomitant dependency on the goodwill of the European Concert. Their gaze was above all turned towards their own side of the Alps, and the Mediterranean was still the centre of their world.

Significantly, as the papacy was being increasingly challenged by modernization, its first instinct was to 'nationalize' itself through the reform of its state at the heart of an Italian Confederation. This was the master plan of Pius IX (1792–1878) when he became pope in 1846. The strategy seemed a huge popular success until 1848, when Italians felt betrayed by Pio Nono's open refusal to sanction the war of liberation against Catholic Austria. The decision was hotly debated among his advisors, and the outcome had a lot to do with the impressionable conscience of a politically naïve pope. At other critical points too, the imponderables of war and personality intervened to preclude outcomes that would have continued to tie the papacy more closely to Italy.

In 1860, Garibaldi's unlikely success in the Two Sicilies led to a full-scale invasion of the Papal States by Piedmont. In 1870–71, the utter humiliation of France seduced Italian leaders into making Rome their effective capital. These events alone provoked a mass mobilization for the pope, which changed the course of Catholic internationalism. Among historians there is an unspoken assumption that the papacy is genetically predisposed to universality. The mid-nineteenth-century reality was that it was fully incarnated in a state, and had been so for the previous four hundred years. It was only when the pope-king was found to be naked that he at last turned to Catholic opinion, which stood waiting with a new set of clothes.[42]

Super-Ego: Mobilization for the Pope

Several essays in this volume suggest that the 1860s and 1870s mark a new phase in the history of religious internationalism. The communications revolution, mass print media, expanding capital markets and the challenge of secularization enlarged the physical scale and raised the political stakes of the Jewish, Muslim and different Christian Internationals. For Catholicism, these decades were dominated by a massive effort in support of the pope, who declared himself (in 1870) 'the prisoner of the Vatican'.[43] The onset of this mass mobilization in 1860, coming on the heels of the Mortara Affair and coinciding with the foundation of the Evangelical Alliance and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, underscored the intense rivalry with the Jewish and Protestant Internationals in particular. Responding both to humanity's age-old desire for a sacred king and to its new need for supranational moral authorities in the space opened up by 'global consciousness', the campaign is not without parallel. The role of the caliphate in the rise of the Muslim International comes to mind, and later on the appeal of the exiled Dalai Lama.[44] However, its consequences were arguably more far-reaching.

In the mobilization for the pope, the full panoply of the public sphere was deployed, from monster petitions and addresses (over five million signatures in 1860) through meetings and congresses, to transnationally coordinated press campaigns and parliamentary lobby work. Catholics matched and outdid the scale of the earlier Protestant mobilization against the slave trade, but under the motto 'the Church will go it alone' (*la Chiesa farà da se*). The mechanics of political mobilization privileged the leadership of clerical and lay elites, leaning at times on aristocratic networks (as in Islam, incidentally).[45] The movement was

also increasingly coordinated by Rome, a trend underscored by the declaration of papal infallibility at the end of the First Vatican Council in 1870. Still, this was mobilization *for* the papacy rather than *by* the papacy, with a strong participatory element, grafted on to the dynamics of revival. In mass addresses and petitions, the personal commitment of a signature created a new bond with the pope, allowing Pius IX to project his charisma on a global scale. The voluntary and bottom-up dimension was underlined by the three central levers of mobilization: fundraising, 'holy' war and pilgrimage. All three were intimately tied to what religious and secular rivals were doing in the single interdependent playing field of internationalism.

The fundraising operation of Peter's Pence was not only a substitute for the income of the Papal States, but also a conscious tool for mobilizing the loyalties of the Catholic masses and expressing their 'suffrage'.[46] It raised ten million francs a year on average. More than three fourths came from Western Europe, in line with the geography of the Catholic International, but this was a global campaign of sensitization addressing communities in Quebec, Melbourne or Sao Paulo no less than in Strasbourg, Antwerp or Munich. While support of the clergy was essential, the brunt of the fundraising effort was borne by local lay volunteers from all walks of life, in order to reach as many people as possible. In the face of vigilant anti-clericals, they were often explicitly instructed to avoid cajoling: if Catholics gave to the pope, it was generally because they wanted to. The modus operandi of Peter's Pence drew on the experience of the Oeuvre pour la Propagation de la Foi, but the project to turn philanthropy into a political statement betrays the influence of the Jewish model.[47] Successive anti-Semitic schemes to create a 'universal financial power' that would buttress the Catholic press underscore the fascination for the nexus between philanthropy, banking and journalism in the Jewish International.

The military brigade of the Zouaves was the parade-horse of mobilization for the pope. Some 12,000 young men enlisted, many of them from the lower classes – people like the Flemish farmhand Gustaaf Ulens who presented himself to the Brussels Nuncio ('I am a good and able-bodied guy') or the Alsatian candle-maker Henri Elperding who walked for days to reach a recruitment centre.[48] The bulk of the volunteers came from France and the Low Countries, but there was also an Irish legion, and contingents from German-speaking lands and from North America. Looking for adventure or martyrdom, most of them found neither, because after the battles with the Piedmontese in 1860, Rome assigned them a strictly defensive and largely symbolic role. What counted was

not the shots they fired, but the newspaper articles they could inspire, the signatures their example could elicit, the money they helped to raise for the pope – not the blood, but the ink and the gold. The Zouaves borrowed their name and uniform from an indigenous corps of France's colonial army in North Africa. Their two founders, the French General Christophe de Lamoricière (1806–65) and the Belgian Mgr de Merode (1820–74), were veterans of the Algerian campaign of the 1840s. This suggests that they were influenced by the model of Abd-al-Qadir's 'modern' jihad, both in the idea of an internationally recruited volunteer corps and in the way this was tied into transnational support networks. Naturally, there were important differences, such as the role of women in crafting 'Zouave stories',[49] the bricks of a powerful myth that would long outlive the military (in)significance of the 'last crusade'.

Women were also massively present in the wave of pilgrimages for the pope-king that climaxed in the first half of the 1870s. In Rome, international elites joined ordinary Italians in St Peter's Square in carefully orchestrated manifestations that prefigured socialist May Day parades. Across Europe and the New World, Catholics went to local shrines in great numbers, with former Zouaves often a conspicuous presence.[50] These pilgrimages offered people the occasion to vote with their feet. They were at once religious events and mass demonstrations of the 'Black International'. In Brussels in 1871, for instance, following a rousing sermon by the archbishop, 50,000 men and women marched through the streets behind banners with the papal and national colours. They said the rosary but also shouted '*Vive Pie IX! Vive le Pape Roi!*'; the nuncio was greeted with rapturous applause and the waving of hats or handkerchiefs.[51]

In what ways did mobilization for the pope benefit the Catholic International? The answer may be subsumed under the terms integration, political consciousness-raising and Romanization. The papacy's independence was the cause par excellence that unified the Catholic International and increased its influence in other large transnational campaigns of the 'culture wars', such as German relief in the Kulturkampf or sympathy for Garcia Moreno's (1821–75) theocratic republic in Ecuador. In other words, the Roman Question functioned as a dynamo accelerating the conversion of the religious and social energies of the revival into the political ones of a Catholic opinion. For millions of ordinary Catholics, this was the first time they acted in the global public sphere. They did so under the much-strengthened leadership of Rome. Nevertheless, the affirmation of papal authority hid a complex process of interaction. More than before, Rome streamlined the Church, but

mobilization for the pope also modernized the Holy See, synchronizing its clock with that of the Catholic International. What Romanization often really meant was the globalization of (West European) revivalist codes under the papal seal.

Behind the brave façade of Saint Peter's, the relationship between the papacy and Catholic internationalism was fraught with tension. Catholic opinion had become the new (political) 'body' of the pope, but the Vatican yearned for the safe haven of territorial sovereignty (Roman Cardinals never put much stock in the lilies of the field). From its point of view, that ought to be the principal strategic objective of the Catholic International. Catholic opinion-makers, while paying loud lip service to the temporal power – so loud that it was unhelpful – did not want this outcome. For them Catholic internationalism was the end, and the modern Vatican the means. They feared that once the Vatican regained a territorial foothold, it would sacrifice Catholic opinion and end up as a kind of religious San Marino in Italy's backyard. In consequence, the electrical current between Vatican policy-makers and Catholic opinion-makers crackled with static, especially after Pius IX was succeeded by the more conciliatory Leo XIII (1878–1903). Leo made peace with governments, toned down the radicalism of leading Catholic newspapers and eased the Church's isolation. However, the demobilization of Catholic internationalism threatened: papal press policy unravelled and the proceeds from Peter's Pence took a sharp downturn. The pressure 'from below' made the pope think twice before carrying his policy to its logical conclusion by a *mezzo termine* with Italy. Catholic opinion forced the Vatican to stick to its guns in a strategy of internationalization.[52]

The Politics and Geopolitics of a Fragile Empire of the Spirit

The last two decades of the century were a time of rapid expansion for the Catholic International. The demographic revolution and the spread of education led to an exponential growth of the basic structures underpinning it, such as congregations, lay philanthropy and missionary networks. The advent of mass democracy promised to anchor it more firmly in civil society, and imperial expansion facilitated its globalization. These years saw a conscious bid by the papacy to restyle the Catholic International as a 'moral great power', but democracy and imperialism also put internationalism under increasing strain.[53]

Starting in the late 1880s, social Catholicism broadened into workers' organizations and the Christian Democratic movement. The upswing of large-scale international Catholic congresses in the 1880s and early

1890s (especially in Belgium) facilitated the exchange of experiences and the creation of the social programmes that underpinned Catholic mass politics. After the initial enthusiasm, however, it became rapidly clear that the rise of confessional parties wove Catholics more tightly into the fabric of national politics, setting them on widely diverging paths, from the reformist conservatism of the Belgians to the anti-Semitic populism of the Austrians. The rise of the Catholic International had rested on the connection of a supranational identity to fierce regional loyalties, but now this wellspring was starting to dry up. With the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* 'on the condition of the workers' (1891), Leo XIII nonetheless found an inspiring common denominator that allowed the papacy to mediate between the conflicting ideological currents of organized Catholicism and to ensure a modicum of convergence across tightening borders. The inflation of papal devotion to totemic proportions helped to sublimate differences. Roman Jubilees became media events, the carefully staged celebrations of an empire of the spirit.[54] They were choreographed and marketed in a quasi-managerial way by a shrewd Italian from Bologna, Giovanni Acquaderni (1839–1922), who was never short of imagination in inventing new ways for the Catholic middle classes to identify with the pope (and give him money).[55] If the pull of Rome could still counterbalance the pull of national politics, this was also because the city had become the genuine, physical nerve centre of Catholic internationalism. From the 1850s onwards, congregations had started transferring their headquarters to Rome in the search for autonomy from bishops. The carousel of papal devotion made for a constant flow of lay elites. In consequence, Rome turned into a crucial meeting ground where Catholic inter-nationalism was not only displayed (in the succession of national delegations to the pope on the occasion of his Jubilees, for instance, or at the Vatican 'World Fair' of 1887), but was also transcended by the forging of transnational linkages.

These linkages became more intercontinental as the era of 'modern globalization' reached its apogee, even if the Catholic International remained clearly centred on Europe. A major international congress was organized in Jerusalem in 1893, and emissaries from the East became a familiar sight in Rome or Paris as Leo XIII attempted to strengthen ties with the oriental Churches.[56] The very different North American models of the USA and Quebec provoked intense curiosity. Australia obtained its first Cardinal, and Latin Americans made their debut in the Roman Curia. Events like the creation of an apostolic delegation in India, the civil war in Uganda, the Boxer Rebellion or Congo reform propelled Asian and African Christianities into the public sphere, even

if they remained as yet dependent on Western spokesmen. The USA in particular affirmed its place on the map of the Catholic International, something that was reflected in its increasing contribution to Peter's Pence or in the star status acquired by Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore (1834–1921).[57]

Catholic internationalism was part and parcel of the belle époque's 'golden age' of international civil society, as was highlighted by its close involvement in the peace movement, the origins of international labour legislation, the World Congress of Religions in Chicago, the struggle against 'white slavery', the campaign against the slave trade or the outcry against the Armenian massacres. No one less than William Stead (1849–1912) wondered if the pope might become 'the Director-general of the humanitarian forces of the world'.[58] The papacy's claim to global moral authority rested in no small part on the surge in missionary activity as the Church embarked on a scramble with Protestantism, Islam and socialism to redivide the world. At the same time, however, missions were prime loci where imperialism domesticated religious globalization (to paraphrase Antony Hopkins).[59] The militant ultramontanism of most missionaries ensured the acceptance of standards and territorial divisions imposed by Rome, and (in some congregations at least) a healthy distrust towards colonial authority. However, in an age of intense imperial rivalry, missionaries were also more nationalist (and often more racist) than before. The Vatican, wishing to be taken seriously as a player in the system of states, agreed to a partial nationalization of the mission movement, aligning mission territories with imperial borders and favouring congregations from the metropole.[60]

The experience of the Church's campaign against the 'Arab' Indian Ocean slave trade in the late 1880s and 1890s, a campaign that rested on missionary culture and missionary support networks, is instructive. Led by the charismatic French Cardinal Lavigerie of Carthage (1825–92),[61] it entailed above all a global fundraising campaign on the same scale as Peter's Pence, but also meetings, congresses, journals, plays and expeditions of military volunteers. If the campaign underscored the humanitarian potential of the Catholic International, it also laid bare the limits of this outreach. On the ground in Central Africa, it turned above all into a battering ram against Islam and nonconformist Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, in a close alliance with the unholy Congo State of King Leopold II (1835–1909).

The geopolitics of imperialism hollowed out the empire of the spirit even while extending its borders, but the geopolitics of spirituality made its very foundations shake around 1900. The Catholic International

had originated and grown from a compact core area within a radius of 500 miles from Paris. The cultural hegemony of the French epi-centre was self-evident and uncontested. This changed dramatically in the closing years of the century. The expansive can-do spirit of North American Catholics led to a first tremor in 1899 with the condemna-tion of 'Americanism'. But a more self-conscious German Catholicism, armed with growing financial clout and the model of the Zentrum, came even more rapidly to the fore. And the Mediterranean made a comeback, with a newly assertive Italian Catholicism and the sudden return of Spain, which provided two of the most powerful Roman Car-dinals under Pope Leo's successor, Pius X (1903–1914). These shifting sands favoured a backlash from the clerical hinterland against the 'deep' involvement of the Catholic International in civil society that was typ-ical of the 1890s. In the name of doctrinal purity, conservatives in the Roman Curia teamed up with their counterparts in France, Italy and Spain above all.[62] Their 'anti-modernism' was also a warning shot to the more progressive German and North American Catholics.

Even if the actual witch-hunt had already ended before the First World War, in important respects the 'modernist' crisis offered a preview of the interwar future. A century after its beginnings around 1830, the Catholic International appeared as an insular behemoth, or perhaps rather an archipelago, hard to reach (except by birth or conversion), harder yet to reach out from. Gathered around the pope in Rome, the Catholic masses celebrated their empire of the spirit in impressive happenings, but some-how much of the non-Catholic world failed to take notice. After having played an integral part in galvanizing a global public sphere in the later decades of the nineteenth century, the Catholic International would be no less integral to its balkanization in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

This chapter has emphasized both the normalcy and the distinctiveness of the Catholic International. Like other world religions, Catholicism developed strong transnational linkages in the early modern period, from the cosmopolitan (but 'uncivil') Counter-Reformation to the 'civil' (but elitist) Jansenist movement. The experience of persecution and exile during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire prompted a grass-roots reconstruction of Catholic internationalism in which women played a key role. It was the combination of voluntary social activism and mass appeal that defined the essential modernity

of this 'circulatory configuration'.[63] Originating in a West European heartland, it rapidly became a global force to which missionary transactions and non-European Christianities were integral, even if we should entertain no illusions about the geopolitics of what was to remain a stubbornly Eurocentric phenomenon. The essay has highlighted the intense interaction – correlations, cross-fertilizations, conflicts – with other religious (and secular) internationals in giving rise to a fractious global consciousness.

However, the Catholic International was also distinctive, especially after the mobilization for the pope tied its fate to that of the Vatican, a sovereign actor in international politics. 'Romanization' never boiled down to a simple top-down affair: Catholic internationalism was a complicated electric circuit in which the papacy found itself surprisingly often at the receiving end. It is no less obvious, for that matter, that the Catholic International was more vertically integrated than other religious internationals, even to the point of 'stateness'. This multiplied its transnational potential, but it also imposed unique constraints. The 'Roman spirit' cast the dynamics of Catholic diaspora and missionary expansion into a single mould, helping to 'make globalization work' (Roland Robertson). The papal operator allowed Catholics to articulate a modern transnational identity in the public sphere with rare single-mindedness. But if Vatican diplomacy represented Catholics on the highest international level, it also mediated the pressures emanating from the state system, making it easier for empires to 'frame' the Catholic empire of the spirit; and as a watchdog of orthodoxy, the Roman Curia exacerbated the proclivity towards 'tunnel vision'.

The first Catholic International, then, was not the classic Habermasian 'public'. It involved the masses actively, and so it was altogether messier than a global community of citizens engaged in good-natured conversation. Yet, it was precisely this mix of voluntarism with mass-mobilization that made the Catholic International all the more effective as a counterweight against nationalism and the steamroller of the modern state. On a darker note, in carrying faith into politics, it absolutized religious authority and polarized society. It was a critical public, but hardly a self-critical one. In all honesty, I believe that, to varying degrees, much the same can be said of other religious internationals and universal secular ideologies. The history of the Catholic International, in other words, invites a reappraisal of global civil society as a more open-ended and agonistic concept, which derives its vitality as much from the collision of the particles as from the harmony of the spheres.

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5
The Islamic World: World System to 'Religious International'

Francis Robinson

I am concerned to consider how, over the past two hundred years, aspects of Muslim piety and Muslim worldviews have come to be refashioned with the aim of seeing in what way Muslims might have come to form a 'religious international'. I start from the position that the Muslim world has always been a form of international; it was the world system which preceded the Western world system, as Janet Abu-Lughod has so rightly described it.[1] This world system was held together by the long-distance trade across land and sea and by the connections of ulama and Sufis (learned and holy men) from West Africa through to Southeast Asia and China, which formed the arteries and veins along which the life-giving blood of Islamic knowledge flowed and along which new ideas might travel. It was supported by one of the five pillars of Islam, the requirement that believers should perform the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetime. During the eighteenth century this world system was beginning to experience a process of religious reform which arguably was to fashion the most important religious change of the Islamic era. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries this process came to interact with Western hegemony in the Muslim world, an interaction which continues to this day.

In this context this chapter will examine the various transformations of Islam which have taken place. There is the inner transformation expressed increasingly by many in a change of emphasis in piety from an other-worldly to a this-worldly Islam of social action, arguably a transformation towards a scriptural, willed religion in which the individual human conscience has had a growing role to play. There is the emergence of a Muslim/Islamic political identity, whether in the interaction between Islamic reform, the colonial state and sometimes the revivalism of other religions, or in the differing visions of Muslims as

to the identity the modern state should have. Then there is the spread of Muslims, the many different ways of being Muslim, and the organizations which support them, so that they have come to have, as never before, a worldwide presence. Some have tended to see Christianity as the great gainer from Western imperialism, but Islam has done at least as well, if not better, and usually so when in direct competition with Christianity. These three processes, in whole or in part, were exhibited by the other religious internationals of the period.

Alongside this transformation there was a second which has been described as a transformation of the Muslim community, the *umma*, from a community of believers into a community of opinion, a process also shared by other religious internationals. Key to this process has been the adoption of new communications technologies beginning with print, and then subsequently those of the electronic media, of radio, film, television, satellite television and the internet. Muslims have been able to grasp, and to have an increasingly intense engagement with, their global existence. They have been able to talk to each other as never before, but equally to see how their fellow Muslims have fared at the hands of the West. Muslims from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–97) to Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) to Osama Bin Laden (1957–2011) have come forward to express defiance towards and disapproval of the West, and in doing so to reach out as widely to their community as they can. Equally, the views of this burgeoning community of opinion have come to be expressed in forms of pan-Islamic action from the great protests against the threats to the Ottoman Khilafat which flared in South and Southeast Asia after the First World War to the formation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 through to the actions of the al-Qaida franchise which, although abhorred by many Muslims, would not have had the impact it has had if it did not strike a chord with some.

The Islamic World System and Its Workings

Let us briefly get a sense of the Islamic world system and its workings. At the heart of this system was, of course, the Quran, the word of God revealed to humankind through the Prophet Muhammad, and Hadith, tradition, the reported sayings and doings of the Prophet. This guidance was encapsulated in practical form in the law, *sharia*. Ulama acting as qadis, judges, or muftis, givers of *fatawa*, legal judgements, interpreted the law for the benefit of society. Acting as teachers they transmitted the Quran and Hadith to their pupils along with the many skills needed to make them socially useful. Classically, all this knowledge was

transmitted orally. Only person-to-person transmission was regarded as authoritative, which is one of the reasons why the ulama deplored self-teaching from books and rejected print until the nineteenth century. When a pupil finished learning a book and repeated it back to his teacher successfully, and with an appropriate gloss, he was given an *ijaza*, a permission to teach the book, and on that *ijaza* would be all the names of those who had transmitted the text back to the original author. The respect due to the teacher was immense: 'know that . . . one does not acquire learning or profit from it', declared a thirteenth-century manual, 'unless one holds in esteem knowledge and those who possess it. One [must also] glorify and venerate the teacher'.[2]

The knowledge transmitted by the ulama revolved almost entirely around the law and making it work in society; it was cold, clinical. Thus, there grew up a second form of knowledge, that of the Sufis, or Muslim mystics. This was knowledge of how to know God in one's heart. When an aspirant disciple presented himself before a Sufi master, he would be expected to endure tests before being accepted. When he was, he would undergo an initiation which would recall the oath which Muhammad's followers had sworn to Him, and would also receive a *shajara*, or tree, which would show how spiritual knowledge had come down from the Prophet, through the founder of the order and then through many Sufi masters down to him. He would then set out on his spiritual journey, in which his obedience to his master was total: 'a spiritual state', wrote Abu Hafs al-Suhrawardi (d.1234), 'flows from within a master to within a disciple, like one lamp lighting another'.[3]

More often than not, scholar and mystic were two sides of the same Muslim personality. Indeed, it was widely thought that effective learning required a proper balance of the formal and the spiritual. Thus, the powerful bonds of disciple–master allegiance were often closely intertwined with those of pupil and teacher. Thus, Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandis in Asia and the Qadiris in Africa could play a key role in reinforcing the transmission of formal knowledge.

The *ijaza* and the *shajara* suggest a connectedness through time, but the practices of ulama and Sufis brought about a connectedness in space. 'Seek ye knowledge', exhorted the Prophet, 'even if it be in China'. Thus it was the established practice of ulama and Sufis to travel widely, to sit at the feet of experts in their fields and to receive *ijaza*s and *shajara*s for the new learning they had acquired, and the added authority that came with it. In consequence great knowledge networks came to be built up which spanned the Muslim world from Spain and West Africa through the Central Islamic lands to Central, South and Southeast Asia.

Nothing demonstrates the effectiveness of these networks of ulama and Sufis more clearly than the way in which reforming ideas travelled along their connections in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Reformers drew on a repertoire of ideas which took shape according to time and place. Reform might involve abandoning *taqlid*, the following of the great traditions of medieval Islamic scholarship, and engaging afresh with the Quran and Hadith. It might also involve attacks on ecstatic Sufism, on ideas that there might be intercession for believers at saints' shrines, and on the following of any custom, usually of indigenous origin, which was not sanctioned by Scripture. Typically, it involved the development of a more *sharia*-minded Sufi practice, and thus reformed Sufi orders, called by some neo-Sufi orders, were great carriers of these ideas. Representative of this was the Mujaddidi development of the Naqshbandi order, which in the seventeenth century under the influence of the Indian, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), had rejected Ibn Arabi's *wahdat al-wujud* (unity of being) in favour of the idea of *wahdat al-shuhud* (unity of witness), that is, revelation must dominate religious practice. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, few parts of the Muslim world were unaffected by the spread of reform.

The neo-Sufi spirit was carried through much of Asia by the Naqshbandiyya, who inspired notable movements in island Southeast Asia, China, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Networks of Naqshbandi scholars, moreover, played important roles in India and West Asia. The new Sufi spirit was carried through much of Africa by orders flowing directly or indirectly from the Khalwatiyya, who had much influence in Egypt, in particular amongst the ulama of Cairo's al-Azhar. There were, for instance: the Tijaniyya, whose influence spread to the Maghreb, the Nilotic and Central Sudan; the Sammaniyya, whose influence also spread to the Nilotic Sudan, plus Eritrea and Ethiopia; the Sanusiyya, who spread from their headquarters in the Libyan desert through much of the Sahara; and the Salihiyya, who became the dominant force in Somalia. Often these Sufi drives for internal reform became warlike jihads, and it was these movements which the Europeans encountered, but also the Chinese, as they expanded into Muslim territory.[4]

It is worth noting some of the more specific connections which underpin these Sufi movements. Key in the eighteenth century were leading scholars of Hadith in Mecca and Medina, for instance, Abu Tahir, b. Ibrahim al-Kurani (1670–1753), and Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi (d.1749), many of whose pupils were major figures in the process of eighteenth-century reform: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702–63), Mustafa al-Bakri of Cairo (d.1749), Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab of

the Nejd (1703–92) and Muhammad Samman (1717–95), the founder of the Sammaniyya. Overlapping their networks were those of the great Mizjaji family of ulama in the Yemen. One Mizjaji pupil was Murtada al-Zabidi (d.1791), who had earlier been a pupil of Shah Wali Allah in Delhi and who became a great intellectual figure in late-eighteenth century Cairo. One of his pupils was Jibril bin Umar of Agades in the Sahara, who taught Uthman dan Fodio (1755–1816), the leader of the reforming jihad which led to the formation of the Caliphate of Sokoto. Murtada al-Zabidi's records reveal the large numbers of scholars from West Africa who came to sit at his feet. A second Mizjaji pupil was Ma Ming Hsin (d.1781), who from 1761 led the militant 'New Sect' teaching amongst the Naqshbandiyya in China which inspired great rebellions against Chinese rule. Another distinctive connection was made by Mawlana Khalid Baghdadi (1776–1827), who after studying under the successors of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi in Delhi stimulated Naqshbandi reforming activity throughout Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Anatolia. In Anatolia he helped to inspire the reforming movement of Said Bediuzzaman Nursi (1877–1960), which lies behind both the industrialization of Anatolia and the rise of Islamism in Turkish politics.[5] Thus the life-giving blood of knowledge flowed through the arteries and veins of the Islamic world.[6]

It was this Islamic world which arguably is better seen as one framed by wide-ranging knowledge networks than as a disaggregated assemblage of empires, caliphates, sultanates and fiefdoms, and which was in many places vibrant with ideas of reform, which came to be overwhelmed by the West from c.1800 onwards. Classically, the process began in 1798 with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and 1799 with Wellesley's overthrow of Tipu Sultan, the last serious Muslim resistance in India. It continued through the nineteenth century, as the British, the French, the Russians and the Dutch, with the Germans and the Italians picking up the crumbs, brought most Muslim peoples under their control. By 1920, only Afghanistan, north Yemen and central Arabia were outside European control; Iran was subjected by Britain to a humiliating treaty and the Turks were fighting for their lives in Central Anatolia. From the 1930s through to the 1990s, Muslim peoples were for the most part relieved of formal foreign rule but remained under Western hegemony (we regard the Soviet Union in this respect as part of the West), as they still do, as Western capital and Western military interests worked with Muslim elites to achieve their ends. When Muslim elites were deemed to have stepped out of line, as in Iran in 1953, in Afghanistan in 1979, or in Iraq in 2003, they found themselves on the receiving end of

Western intervention. As the two centuries of Western hegemony progressed, the knowledge networks of ulama and Sufis persisted, but came to be part of a much larger complex of Muslim connectedness. Much of this new connectedness, a development which was mirrored in other religious internationals, had little to do with religion per se.

Islam in the Age of Western Domination

We now turn to consider the greatest change in Islam, as a framework for a pious life and for living that life well in this life and the next, since the time of the Prophet. We shall consider this change in three dimensions, aspects of which are to be found in other religious internationals: inner change, the transformation of religious consciousness; outer change, the development of political identity; and expansion, the further spread of Islam throughout the world. I shall consider these processes primarily in the context of South Asia, which contained roughly one third of the Muslim population of the world and which was the arena in which Muslims felt the weight of Western power longest and most severely.

The inner transformation

Our focus will be on those in the reforming tradition of Shah Wali Allah: some mention will be made of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–98) and his modernist strand, but the main focus will be on the Deoband School, the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahl-i Quran and the Tablighi Jamaat. Attention will also be given to the evolution of reform into the Islamism of Mawlana Mawdudi's (1903–79) Jamaat-i Islami, as well as to the insights of that extraordinarily perceptive poet-philosopher, Muhammad Iqbal, who was admired by Muslims as different as Mawdudi, S. Abul Ali Hasan Nadwi (d.1999), the great Indian Sunni scholar, and Ayat Allah Khumayni (d.1989), the Shia leader of the Iranian Revolution. Particular attention will be paid to those in the Wali Allah tradition because they embrace a religious change, indeed a religious transformation, which helped to drive a broader set of changes that we might associate with modernity.

In considering inner change it is crucial to remember the colonial context. British rule brutally removed much of the financial and institutional support for an Islamic society. This helped to create a general anxiety about how an Islamic society might be sustained without power. Specifically, it meant that ulama, who had once received land grants and jobs in government, now turned to society to sustain them in their role.

Let us consider the key aspects of reform which continue and develop the main themes of eighteenth-century reform set out above. There was an emphasis on *tawhid* (the unity of God) and a condemnation of *shirk* (actions that compromised the unity of God) prominent in all the main movements of the time. There was a running attack on all Sufi customs which, following interpretations of Ibn Arabi, suggested that God might be immanent rather than purely transcendent, which was expressed most frequently and forcibly in attacks that suggested that Sufi saints might be able to intercede for people with God. By the same token there were assaults on indigenous customs that had come to be incorporated into the practice of some Muslims, for instance following the Hindu custom of not marrying widows.

There was a concern to review the knowledge handed down from the past to see what could be used to enable reformers to operate effectively in the present. At one level, that of the Deoband school, it meant no more than a shift in emphasis in the madrasa curriculum from theology and philosophy, and the triumphs of medieval Persian scholarship, to the Quran and Hadith and those subjects which made these central messages of Islam socially useful. Ulama in this tradition followed the precedent of medieval scholarship. At another more exacting level, ulama circumvented medieval scholarship and the schools of law to exercise *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) on the Quran and Hadith, if they were Ahl-i Hadith, and on just the Quran if they were Ahl-i Quran. As the stream of reform flowed into ever more challenging contexts from an Islamic point of view, the use of *ijtihad* became ever more pertinent. It was used after the manner of the Ahl-i Hadith by both Islamic modernists and Mawdudi's Islamists.

A major concern of all reformers was to spread their message as widely as possible. All to a greater or lesser extent founded madrasas or other educational institutions. The Deoband madrasa, founded in 1867, and supported by public subscription alone, was the model. By 1967 it claimed to have founded more than 8000 madrasas in its image. From these institutions came the teachers and scholars who provided the knowledge and guidance to enable Muslim society not just to survive but also to entrench itself further. One important development at Deoband was the establishment of a Dar al-Ifta, ready to receive questions and to issue *fatawa* all over India. A key development in supporting this self-sustaining community of Muslims was the introduction of print and the translation of the Quran and large numbers of important religious texts into the regional languages of India. The reforming ulama were amongst the very first to use the printing press; rightly they saw it

as the means to fashion and consolidate their constituency outside the bounds of colonial rule.[7] Reform, moreover, reached beyond the world of the literate. From the 1920s it was carried forward by the Tablighi Jamaat, or preaching society, in which the devout set aside a period each year to work in teams that transmitted the reforming message orally to small town and village communities. The Tablighi Jamaat is said now to be the most widely followed society in the Muslim world.[8] Thus, the reformers created a broad constituency for their message in Muslim society, and amongst the literate a growing body of Muslims who, without the constraints of madrasa education, reflected upon the sources of their faith and interpreted for themselves.

The impact of the increasing ability of Muslims to engage with scripture themselves was enhanced by the way in which the reforming movement made it clear that there was no intercession for man with God. Muslims were personally responsible for the way in which they put His guidance to them into practice on earth. Thus, the leading Deobandi reformer and Sufi, Ashraf Ali Thanwi (d.1943) in his guide for women (but equally applicable to men), *Bihishti Zewar* (*The Jewels of Paradise*), which is said to be the most widely published Muslim publication on the subcontinent after the Quran, paints a horrific picture of the Day of Judgement and the fate which will befall those who have not striven hard enough to follow God's guidance. To help believers avoid this fate, he instructs them in regular self-examination, morning and evening, to ensure purity of intentions and to avoid wrongdoing.[9] Thus, those in the Deobandi way were made powerfully conscious that they must act to sustain Islamic society on earth if they were to be saved. At the heart of reform was an increasingly active human conscience.

This led to an increasing emphasis on personal responsibility before God. It was a central issue for Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–98) who hailed from the Wali Allah tradition but, in his development of the principles of Islamic modernism, travelled far beyond it. 'I regard it as my duty to do all I can, right or wrong', he said of his striving to realize his faith on earth, 'to defend my religion and to show the people the true, shining countenance of Islam. This is what my conscience dictates and unless I do its bidding I am a sinner before God.'[10] This sense of personal responsibility was, if anything, even stronger in Muhammad Ilyas (d.1944), brought up in the Deobandi tradition and the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat. He was oppressed by fear of Judgement and by whether he was doing enough to meet God's high standards: 'I find no comparison between my anxiety, my effort and my voice', he wrote, 'and the responsibility of Tabligh God has placed upon my shoulders. If he shows

mercy, He is forgiving, merciful, and if he does justice, there is no escape for me from the consequences of my guilt.'[11]

The sense of personal responsibility and the centrality of action on earth to the Muslim life were expressed most completely by Muhammad Iqbal. For Iqbal, humanity was chosen by God, but was equally free to choose whether to follow God's guidance or not. Humanity realized itself in the creative work of shaping and reshaping the world. The reality of the individual was expressed most explicitly in action. 'The final act', he declares in the closing sentences of his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 'is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego and sharpens his will into creative assurance that the world is not just something to be seen and known through concepts, but to be made and remade by continuous action'.[12] Humanity was the prime mover in God's creation. As the prime mover, humanity was God's representative on earth, his vice-regent, the Khalifat Allah. Thus Iqbal drew on the Quranic reference to Adam as his vice-regent, or successor, on earth, which had been much discussed by medieval commentators on the Quran, and not least among them Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and Ibn Arabi, into the modern Islamic discourse of South Asia. In doing so he both emphasized the enormous responsibility of each individual human being in the trust he or she has received from God and encapsulated that relationship in the concept of the caliphate of each individual human being.[13] The idea was taken up by Mawlana Mawdudi, who added his considerable weight to its acceptance.[14] Indeed, the idea is present in much of the movement of reform in the wider Shia as well as Sunni world.[15] It represents a substantial democratization of the faith, an empowerment of the individual believer.

Taken together the aspects of reform surveyed above come close to that mix of aspects of 'Protestantism' that Eisenstadt argued some years ago gave it transformative potential. They were: its strong combination of 'this-worldliness and transcendentalism', its 'strong emphasis on individual activism and responsibility' and 'the direct relationship of the individual to the sacred and the sacred tradition', which in South Asia becomes stronger the closer reform moves into the modes of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Islamists.[16]

Given the presence of Protestant Christian missionaries in South Asia it is pertinent to ask what influence they may have had on the development of Islamic thought. The ulama paid them little attention except to hold public debates with them, most notably at Agra in 1854 and at Chandapur in 1876 and 1877, both occasions when the

ulama considered they had comprehensive victories.[17] Sayyid Ahmad Khan kept an eye on contemporary Protestant thought but largely as an aid to dealing with the challenges of science to belief. Iqbal knew enough about Christian Reformation history as well as reforming ideas amongst his fellow Muslims to describe them as being similar to the Protestant Reformation in Christianity.[18] This said, the active engagement of Muslims with Protestant Christian ideas was slight. The main trajectories of reforming thought in South Asia, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, were arguably structurally intrinsic to a revealed religion, had their roots deep in Islamic history and were well established before Protestant missionaries flooded across the Muslim world.

We should note, however, that Islam was not the only faith in South Asia in the nineteenth century to begin to emphasize personal responsibility and this-worldliness. Sikhism had always had a profound slant towards this-worldly action, but it gets new emphasis in the late nineteenth century as Singh Sabhas worked to ensure that all Sikhs had the knowledge and understanding to resist Christian and Hindu missionary activity.[19] Similar developments can be seen in Angarika Dharmapala's (1864–1933) 'Protestant Buddhism' in which lay folk had access to religious texts, engaged in a religion of salvation and expressed their new private and internalized faith in a life of this-worldly asceticism.[20] These developments can be seen, too, in the shift in the focus of nineteenth-century Hinduism from social structure to the individual human being. We can see this in Vivekenanda's (1863–1902) emphasis, echoing Bankimchandra (1838–1904), on personal *dharma* and individual realization. Individual Hindus had to take responsibility for their religion and culture, which no longer meant renunciation, but social involvement and social action.[21] Certainly in the cases of Buddhism and Hinduism there was considerable interaction with Christian thinking. All three were adapted to the requirements of South Asia's rising bourgeoisie at the end of the nineteenth century and all three, with Islam, were to develop 'fundamentalist' dimensions in the twentieth century.

We should also note that the great nineteenth- and twentieth-century transformation of Islam, with its emphasis on activist and personally responsible faith, developed other facets in the believer of which we might emphasize the following: the growth of a belief in human will and human instrumentality in the world; the emergence of a religious leadership from outside the ranks of the ulama; the emergence of self-interpretation of Scripture; the revelation of a new self-consciousness and reflectiveness in piety; and a growing capacity to reify the faith, to conceive of Islam and its community of believers as an object.[22]

All these developments bear comparison with those driving 'collective voluntarism' in other religious internationals.

From a Muslim to an Islamic political identity

It might be thought that a direct line could be drawn between outcomes of the reforming transformation, such as the emergence of a 'willed' Islam and the growing capacity of individuals to reify their faith, and the emergence of a Muslim political identity, and subsequently an Islamic one, in the politics of South Asia. But this is not, in any simple way, so. Let us consider briefly how a Muslim political identity came to emerge in the politics of British India. It is a complex story, in which we shall focus on the heartland of Muslim identity politics, the great north Indian province of the United Provinces, and in which the following factors need to be taken into account.

There is the background of major social change. The commercialization of royal power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries helped to bring about a rooted Muslim service gentry and a unified Hindu merchant class. The former perpetuated their sense of identity and economic domination through the institution of the rural qasbah; the latter did so through market towns called ganjs. The impact of British rule brought shifts in group positions. A substantial drop in jobs held by Muslims in government service led to the decline of the qasbah, while the commercialization of agriculture and the growth of trade brought prosperity to the ganj.[23]

There is, of course, the Muslim movement of religious reform. This meant a new urgency to protect and promote Muslim ways of life, so there was considerable anxiety about what European customs and innovations might be adopted and a determination to root out Hindu customs from religious practice. Along with these concerns there was a new emphasis on active proselytization which in the 1920s led to the foundation of the Tablighi Jamaat as Muslims competed with Hindus for the souls of poor peasants. Occasionally this new urgency might erupt in formal jihad, as it did throughout the Islamic world in the period, which helped fashion the British penchant for seeing Muslims through a religious prism. This said, most Muslim reformers, if they entered politics, preferred those of Indian nationalism. It was primarily Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Islamic modernists who were interested in the Muslim political identity.

Hindu revivalism, which like that of the Muslims was powered forward by the need to confront colonial rule and Western knowledge, also had a part to play. Hindu revivalists pressed for the adoption of the

Nagri script (of Sanskrit) in government as opposed to the Persian script then in use and asserted Hindu preferences in many localities regarding cows and religious processions. Campaigns such as these which threatened Muslim jobs and sparked bruising battles on municipal boards, and sometimes riots, were part of the backdrop to the all-important Muslim deputation to the Viceroy of 1906 and its requests for protection and special privileges.

Crucial to the development of a Muslim political identity was a Muslim elite which saw its adoption as the best way of defending its interests. From the 1870s Sayyid Ahmad Khan began to organize this elite. His main vehicle was the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College founded at Aligarh in 1877, which was designed to give the sons of Muslim service gentry from the qasbahs an education which would enable them to enter the higher echelons of government service. This was the basis on which a series of Muslim separatist organizations were founded. Its leadership formed the Muslim deputation to the Viceroy of 1906 which demanded those special privileges, in particular separate electorates. The leadership went on to form the All-India Muslim League to drive these demands forward.[24]

Central to the success of these demands was the way in which the British envisioned India. They saw Indian society primarily in terms of religious groupings. Indian history was divided into Hindu, Muslim and British periods; the census tabulated Indians by faith. Of these groupings the Muslims were seen as the greatest threat. So the British welcomed the bridge-building work of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and were sympathetic to the demands of his followers in 1906 that they be given separate electors, plus extra seats, because they were 'politically important', in the Morley-Minto Councils of 1909. Thus, a Muslim political identity was established in the developing constitutional arrangements of British India.[25]

Even though the identity was established, the fate of the All-India Muslim League is instructive. To begin with, the Muslim secular elites of northern India were firmly behind the League, but from the 1920s through to the 1940s these elites preferred other political parties. It was only the special circumstances of the 1940s which enabled the Muslim League to give the Muslim political identity the broad appeal that enabled it to win 90 per cent of the reserved Muslim seats in the elections of 1945–6. The state of Pakistan, which emerged in large part because of this victory, was intended by the Muslim League, with a small group of dissenters, to be a homeland for Muslims, not an Islamic state. The League's leader, Jinnah, made this absolutely clear when he addressed the first meeting of Pakistan's constituent assembly in August

1947: 'You may belong to any religion or caste or creed', he said, 'that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.'[26] Religion in Jinnah's Pakistan was to be a private matter.

Knowing that this was so was one of the reasons why Mawdudi was profoundly opposed to the Pakistan movement. It was not going to realize his vision in which the *sharia* must be united to power on earth, which meant bringing Islam and the machinery of the modern state together. However, as soon as Pakistan was created, together with a breakaway group of Deobandis, he set about making his happen; he was determined gradually to Islamize Pakistan state and society. He exerted pressure both by constitutional means and by the work of the Jamaat-i Islami on the streets. Early victories were the naming of Pakistan an Islamic Republic in its first constitution of 1956 and the establishment of an Institute of Islamic Research 'to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis'. By the time of Mawdudi's death in 1979, General Zia ul-Haq was using state power to put substantial aspects of Mawdudi's system, his *nizam*, into effect. As in many other Muslim states at the time, aspects of an Islamic political identity were coming to triumph over secular ones.

The aim to capture power for the purpose of his religious vision, which Mawdudi described as jihad obligatory on all his followers, has also been a feature of other South Asian faiths as their religious transformations of the nineteenth century have travelled through the twentieth. It was the aim of the Sikh Khalistan movement of the 1980s, which sought to carve out a separate state for Sikhs in India's Punjab province.[27] It was the aim of the Buddhist nationalism of the Sinhalese when they found it impossible to incorporate the Tamils of the north of their island in their vision of Buddhist democracy.[28] It was the aim, too, of Hindu revivalists who sought to use power to impose their Hindutva ideology, which meant that all those who lived between the Indus river and the ocean should embrace one common nationality, one common race and one common culture.[29] It was thus in the distinctive context of British India, and later the Subcontinent, that the forces helping to drive the development of religious internationals also came together to form either 'religious nationals' or the ambition to create them.

Expansion

A third development in the era of Western domination was of renewed Muslim expansion throughout the world. At this point we move outside our specific focus on South Asia. European empires provided opportunities to expand. This was the case with specific sects. British

policy, for instance, enabled the Nizari Ismailis to migrate from India to East Africa, where they participated in its economic development, becoming in the process wealthy and highly educated. When, after independence, their African masters turned against them, they travelled once more on post-imperial connections primarily to Britain and to Canada. The connections of British Empire enabled the Ahmadiyya, regarded by most Muslims as a heretical sect, to carry their proselytizing mission from the 1920s to East and West Africa. Now, despite the bitter hostility of the rest of the Muslim community, they claim missions in 120 countries. Similar connections have enabled the Tablighi Jamaat, the most vigorous proselytizing organization to come out of the reforming transformation, to spread from South Asia to 80 different countries.

The British Empire also presided over a more general expansion of the Muslim world. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, although the British brought an end to warlike expansion, they provided an environment in which peaceful expansion could take place as Muslims spread from the hinterland towards the coast in West Africa or from the coast inland in East Africa in search of jobs and commercial opportunities. As they did so, they competed with Christian missionaries for pagan souls, with the advantage that they promoted a faith different from that of the imperial ruler. Specific imperial tasks led to the formation of specific Muslim communities, such as the Punjabi and Pushtun camel drivers who helped open up Australia's deserts, and the lascars, often Yemeni highlanders from Aden, who founded Muslim communities in British ports. Seizing economic opportunities within the framework of empire also contributed to expansion. Thus, Indian Muslims took the opportunities provided by indentured labour (allegedly a modern form of slavery) and came to form communities in Fiji, Mauritius, South Africa and the Caribbean. And, of course, Muslims from all over the empire came to seek their fortunes in the UK and establish communities. Similar economic pulls and similar imperial connections led to Muslim movement to other European countries such as France and Holland.[30]

The pull of economic opportunity, alongside political and racial discrimination, was also important in the expansion of Islam outside the framework of the European empires. In the late nineteenth century desperate economic conditions in the Ottoman empire along with the industrialization of North America led to the large-scale movement of Ottoman citizens, Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians, Shia and Sunni, across the Atlantic. There was a similar movement to Argentina. Then from the 1920s the mass migration of southern blacks to the

industrialized north of the United States brought them into contact with the new Muslim communities from West Asia. Various Muslim movements were formed, including the Nation of Islam, as blacks found in Islam a resource which could restore self-esteem and pride in a dominant white society. In the second half of the twentieth century the economic pull of the West and flight from war and discrimination has led to continuing strong flows of people from the Muslim world so that in the twenty-first century over 40 million Muslims live in the West.[31]

So in the context of reform and of Western domination Islam has experienced extraordinary change. A transformation of religious understanding has been set moving in which believers have felt the need to act on earth in order to be saved and which has involved a process of democratization – each individual has come to feel personally responsible for carrying God's guidance into action. With the spread of education and the growth of bourgeois social formations, this understanding, in various forms, continues to make its way in the Muslim world. Alongside this process there has also grown the desire to link some developments of the reformed religious vision to political power, a process of course not unique to the Muslim world. This has led to the secular ethnic or secular ideological identities which most Muslim societies assumed for themselves in the immediately post-imperial era coming to be challenged by Islamic political identities. Simultaneously, political and economic aspects of Western domination have enabled the expansion of the Muslim community to achieve a global presence. Thus, the Muslim world came to express many of the attributes of the religious internationals of its time.

A Newly Imagined Community

We need to consider how the nature of the Muslim world as a connected system may have changed as a result of its great transformation in the years since 1800. First, the old forms of connectedness have continued to exist. Ulama have continued to travel and make themselves readily comprehensible to their colleagues through their shared immersion in classical Islamic learning and knowledge of Arabic.[32] Moreover, their *ijaza*s continue to carry weight, whether it be in modern Indonesia or to support the authority of a shaykh offering legal decisions by website.[33] Sufi orders continue to offer connectedness across great distances and sometimes with significant adaptations to the contemporary environment. So the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriya maintain extensive links

through north and west Africa and the links of the Chishti shrine of Baba Farid of Pakpattan (Pakistan) reach powerfully into Malaysia.[34] The links of the Senegalese Muridiyya form an economic network, no less than a spiritual one, which embraces Senegal but also reaches into France and the east coast of the USA.[35] Some Sufi orders have been particularly adept at making modern technology, from print to the internet, serve their spiritual networks.[36] Then, throughout the period, that great symbol of Muslim community, the Hajj, has flourished as never before; today it attracts over two million pilgrims.

Alongside these transnational connections with roots deep in the past, new ones have come to be formed. We have already noted that the missionary Tablighi Jamaat reaches 80 countries; its annual *ijtima*s or gatherings in Pakistan and Bangladesh are said to be the largest meetings of Muslims after the Hajj. Islamic organizations provide another set of international networks. Mawdudi's Jamaati Islami embraces India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, but also reaches into the UK. The closely related Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates embrace Egypt, countries in North Africa, West Africa and the Gulf, and likewise reach into Europe and the USA. There are, moreover, other NGOs which reach into some or on occasion most Muslim societies: charities such as Islamic Relief Worldwide and Muslim Aid; Muslim solidarity organizations such as the World Muslim League (est. 1962) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (est. 1972); advocacy groups such as Women Living under Muslim Law (est. 1984); and scholarly networks such as the International Institute for Islamic Thought, with its headquarters in Herndon, Virginia, its programmes for the Islamization of knowledge, and its branch offices in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, Nigeria and so on; or that of private schools which Fethullah Gulen was inspired by the teachings of Said Nursi to establish in Turkey and over 50 other Muslim countries.[37] Beyond this, there are the new levels of individual connectivity as the great Muslim diasporas travel between the West, and perhaps the Gulf, and their countries of origin.

It is reasonable to suggest that the most important change in connectivity, as in the case of other religious internationals, has been brought about by the development of the media. The adoption of print in the nineteenth century was the first step in this direction, and to this day it has remained of primary importance. In its newspaper form it was well supported from the mid-nineteenth century by the introduction of the telegraph.[38] In British India the ulama, as we have noted, were at the forefront of the adoption of print, and therefore much early content was religious. By the beginning of the twentieth century in one province

alone Muslims published over 500 books a year and their newspapers had a combined circulation of c.75,000.[39] In the mid-twentieth century radio and television came to join the printed word, but their role in Muslim connectivity was limited by state control. Audio cassettes came to have an increasingly important role, which supported by the telephone was to notable effect in the Iranian revolution. This said, it was not until the information revolution of the 1990s with the emergence of satellite television and the internet that there was a step change in Muslim media connectivity to match that achieved by print.[40]

The development of the media over the past two centuries has seen a move from elite to mass connectivity. The impact of print was dependent, of course, for the most part on literacy. This is often hard to measure, but there is little doubt that for much of the past 200 years it has remained an elite skill amongst Muslims. It has only been since the mid-twentieth century and the onset of political independence that matters began to change. Mass primary education only began in Egypt in the 1950s and in the Arabian peninsula in the 1970s. Now literacy is 71 per cent in Egypt, 85 per cent in Bahrain and 87 per cent in Qatar. Moreover, the rate in the country with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia, is 83 per cent, but nearly 100 per cent amongst those of school-going age.[41] The emergence of mass literacy has meant that print has a major role to play in Muslim connectivity to a wider Muslim world. Moreover, the emergence of satellite television, alongside widespread television ownership, has brought a new dimension to connectivity which, for instance, Osama bin Laden was skilled at exploiting through Qatar's al-Jazeera station. On the other hand, the internet is at the moment distinctly less significant: in Malaysia it had by 2006 achieved 40 per cent penetration, but in all the populous Muslim countries it was less than 10 per cent.[42]

A crucially important outcome of this growing connectedness, which is also reflected in the behaviour of believers in other religious internationals, has been that from the late nineteenth century more and more Muslims have developed a pan-Islamic dimension to their consciousness, and more and more have engaged imaginatively and emotionally with the fate of Muslims in faraway lands. The term *umma*-consciousness has been coined to define the phenomenon.[43] If we turn to India we note that this development had a particular intensity, in part because the British Empire played such a considerable role in the conquest of Muslim peoples and in part, too, because Indian Muslims as a minority in a predominantly Hindu society felt especially insecure. There was a symbiotic relationship between the advance of

European power, the growth of the press and the growth of pan-Islamic consciousness. The more Indian Muslims discovered about the fate of their brethren elsewhere in the Muslim world, the more they wished to know. When Russia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in the late 1870s, the press boomed. When Britain invaded Egypt in 1882, it boomed again. When the Ottoman Empire entered its terminal stages from 1911 onwards, it boomed as never before. Great newspapers flourished on pan-Islamic news: Abul Kalam Azad's *al-Hilal*, Mahomed Ali's *Comrade* and Zafar Ali Khan's *Zamindar*.[44]

The new mental horizons were not expressed just in a thirst for news of the Muslim world. They were also expressed in the themes of much literary output of the time. For instance, Sarshar's novel, *Fasana-yi Azad*, written against the background of the Russo–Turkish war of the late 1870s, sees the hero going off to fight in the Crimean War alongside the British and the Turks against the Russians.[45] In the same way the many historical romances of Abd al-Halim Sharar were set in all parts of the Muslim world.[46] The leading Muslim historian of the day, Shibli Numani, devoted his energies to reawakening interest in past Muslim lives and culture, especially the achievements of the Arabs and Persians.[47] It was symptomatic that some of the most successful poetry had pan-Islamic themes; Hali's *Musaddas*, for instance, took the world by storm after its publication in 1879, going quickly through six editions and having many imitators into the twentieth century.[48] A vaunting Islam-wide vision pervades the poetry of Muhammad Iqbal. When he wanted to emphasize the decline of Islam, he wrote a tearful poem about the end of Arab rule in Sicily; when he wanted to reflect on human creativity, he wrote his great poem on the mosque at Cordoba.[49] Moreover, he wrote much of his verse in Persian so as to reach an audience beyond India.

Pan-Islamic sympathies were expressed in dress. The Turkish fez was part of the early uniform of Sayyid Ahmad's Khan's Aligarh College, as his movement identified with the Ottoman reformers. Muslim scholars in Lucknow followed clothing fashions in Egypt, Syria and Iran.[50] At the height of pan-Islamic activism in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, Western-educated Muslims made a point of shedding Western dress in favour of clothes bearing distinctive Islamic symbols. Such was the level of identification with the wider Muslim world that men and women were willing to spend huge resources in time and money to further pan-Islamic causes. One, at least, was driven to contemplating suicide when he heard in 1912 that the Bulgarians had advanced to just 25 miles from Istanbul.[51]

The most powerful expression of the pan-Islamic dimension which had become part of the Indo-Muslim identity came with the period which stretched from the Balkan Wars in 1911 through to the abolition of the Turkish caliphate in 1924. Great organizations were founded to fund pan-Islamic purposes: the Red Crescent Mission of Indo-Muslim volunteers to provide medical services to Turkish troops in 1912; the Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Kaaba founded in 1913 to protect and otherwise serve the holy places of Islam; the Indo-Ottoman Colonization Society of 1914 which aimed to establish a pan-Islamic settlement at Adana in southern Anatolia; and the Central Khilafat Committee founded in 1919 to protect the temporal and spiritual power of the Turkish caliphs. This last organization swept aside the Muslim League and for two years dominated the Indian National Congress, playing the key role in enabling Gandhi to persuade it to adopt policies of non-cooperation with government. The Khilafat movement, as it came to be known, had mass appeal not only attracting the Western educated and the traditionally educated but also women and large numbers from the small towns, even the countryside. The movement went into decline from 1922 as the British arrested its leaders and the Turks moved towards abolishing the caliphate. Nevertheless, it was the most substantial mass movement in India since the Mutiny Uprising. Moreover, even though the movement was profoundly bound up with Muslim unease about their position in India, as well as being an expression of their opposition to British rule, it was also remarkable witness to their sensitivities to the Muslim world beyond the subcontinent.[52]

In the latter half of the twentieth century, with the massive expansion of the media and of literacy in the context of Western domination, *umma*-consciousness both widened and intensified. It is expressed, for instance, increasing concern over the fate of Muslim minorities. Most Muslim journals have sections devoted to the problems of minority communities across the world.[53] It is expressed by real concern, indeed anguish, when Muslims find fellow Muslims being bullied by greater powers, as in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and Afghanistan. 'We feel humiliated', I was told by the wife of a Farangi Mahalli Sufi in the old city of Lucknow in February 2005, 'by what is happening in Iraq.' Numbers have felt the need actively to assist their brethren in resisting foreign aggression, as for instance Osama bin Laden and his Arab followers did in waging jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The memoirs of Moazzam Beg, the Birmingham lad who drove aid convoys to Bosnia and helped dig tube wells in Afghanistan before he was delivered by the Pakistani security services to the Americans and then

to Guantanamo Bay, are a good example of the mindset.[54] 'The Muslims throughout the world', declared a South African Muslim newspaper in the 1960s, 'be they in China or Palestine, see themselves as a single unit, linked by a dynamic that does not allow themselves to remain silent when people, especially those of the same faith, have their human rights trampled upon.'[55]

Umma-consciousness has also developed a political dimension well beyond the concerns of Muslims in individual states. This first began to gain substance in the international Congresses held in 1924 and 1926 to elect a Caliph to replace the dethroned Ottoman holder of the office. Further activity in the 1930s was sustained by the Palestinian cause. Nothing lasting emerged, however, until the founding of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the wake of the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel and the al-Aqsa Mosque fire of 1969. Committed, like the earlier Islamic Congresses, to advancing solidarity amongst its members, the Conference has come to consist of over 50 states plus Palestine.[56] Differences amongst its members have often hampered its political effectiveness, although it was able to lead an international consensus against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its more successful activities have been in the economic area and in aid. So far there have been no signs of moves towards tighter political integration.[57] Political action at the *umma* level, however, has not been limited to the leaders of Muslim nation-states. It also acquired a notable populist leader. Osama bin Laden's whole strategy was to reach over the heads of state leaders to the Muslims of the *umma* as a whole and to spur them into jihad against global unbelief.[58]

Arguably, over the past two centuries the *umma* has been imagined afresh. One handmaid in the process has been Western domination, which led to a continuing need to define the *umma* against the outsider. A second handmaid has been reform whose enabling of a reification of Islam has led it to be seen by some as a system but by many others not just as a community of believers but as an object in its own right. We can see the process at work in the ideas of the mercurial reformer Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Under the influence of Guizot's lectures on the history of civilization, Afghani came to see Islam less as a religion than as a civilization. Muslims served God by making the civilization created through his revelation flourish to the greatest possible extent. Amongst other things this meant enhancing its unity and solidarity, an idea emphasized, as we have noted, by both the Muslim Congresses and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.[59] These ideas were developed by Afghani's successors, Muhammad Abduh and

Rashid Rida, and came to be promulgated by the *al-Manar* newspaper through much of the Muslim world from North Africa to Southeast Asia. One interesting outcome of this civilizational approach was the cult of Spain, in particular what European civilization owed to Islam through Spain, which flourished so vigorously amongst Muslims at the time.[60]

India's Hali, writing before Afghani, has in his *Musaddas* an approach which promotes the idea of civilization. He refers to the Prophet teaching civilization (*tamaddun*) and in his poetic survey of the rise and fall of Islam treats it not just as a faith but as a civilization in the round.[61] For Iqbal, the *umma*, implicitly a civilization, is far superior to the empires and nations into which humankind has come to be divided and which do so much harm to humanity. The community, created by God's revelation, to which every Muslim belongs, is the environment in which the individual human self can be developed to its fullest capacity. The creation of God's love, it is not limited by space or time because God's love has no such limitation. It is held together by the idea of *tawhid*, the unity of God, and its symbolic focus is the kaaba at Mecca, where the one God was first worshipped. In its acceptance of God and his revelation, this community is profoundly different from the capitalist and communist worlds which worship only material things. It is, moreover, a work still in progress, which requires the effort of all Muslims. More than just a static community of believers, it is a Quranic state in the making.[62]

Thus we can discern a series of reimaginings of the *umma*, dependent on time, place and purpose. For Afghani it was a civilization in need of unity in the face of the West, while for Hali it was a civilization in deep decline because of inner decay. Iqbal, on the other hand, refashioned it as a work in progress, an ideal for which Muslims were constantly striving. To these we might add the implicit vision of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the *umma* as a grouping of nation-states and that of Osama bin Laden of the *umma* as a body of opinion to be wooed.

So, how far can we talk of an 'Islamic International' coming into being over the past two hundred years? We have noted that over this period the Islamic world has gained new forms of connectedness, as have other faith communities. In addition to the old connections of ulama and Sufis, there have developed new levels of connectedness sustained in particular by the development of the media, from print to the internet, alongside growing levels of literacy and education. The connectedness of the *umma* has moved from that of the elite to becoming a mass phenomenon. Throughout, urgency has been given by Western domination to the messages which travel along the *umma*'s connections.

While these new levels of connectedness have been developing, the *umma* has experienced, as have other faith communities, a reforming transformation. Muslims have increasingly come to share a scriptural Islam and an ethic of this-worldly action. The individual Muslim conscience has had a growing role to play. These reformed Muslims have been able more and more to grasp the *umma* as a whole and differentiate it from the West. This new worldview has been carried forward by an increasingly educated bourgeoisie. On the other hand, while the religious transformation fashioned growing similarities in piety and attitude across the Muslim world, it also sharpened sectarian differences. It sharpened the traditional differences of Shia and Sunni. But at the same time it brought into existence a whole new set of differences as believers strove to find their best way forward: Wahhabis, Ahl-i-Hadith, Salafis, Deobandis, Tablighis, Barelwis, Jamaati Islamis, Ahmadis and so on. Moreover, if the *umma*, this religious international, was divided in belief, it also came to be divided into nation-states with often competing interests. Furthermore, when these nation-states came together in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, it has not proved to be effective.

There is, however, one dimension in which the *umma* might be regarded as functioning well as a religious international. It is as a community of opinion, informed by religious sensibilities on particular issues. Among these are: respect for the Prophet, opposition to Western imperialism and any form of bullying, opposition to their own corrupt rulers so often supported by the West, opposition to injustice of all kinds and opposition to particular injustices meted out to Muslims, especially that of Palestine. These are all issues on which the growing bourgeoisie of Muslim societies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have large-scale agreement, and on which they often differ from the West.

Notes

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3. Carl Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism* (Boston: Shambhala, 1997), p. 124.
4. Francis Robinson, *Atlas of the Islamic World since 1500* (Oxford: Phaidon, 1982), pp. 118–29.
5. European Stability Initiative, 'Islamic Calvinists: Change and Conservatism in Anatolia', Berlin–Istanbul, 19 September 2005, www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf.

6. Francis Robinson, 'Knowledge, Its Transmission and the Making of Muslim Societies', in idem, *Islam, South Asia, and the West* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 19–58.

7. Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India, 1860–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 46–52; Ulrike Stark sets out the relationship between the ulama and entrepreneurial publishing in carrying this process forward, in *An Empire of Books: The Naval Kishore Press and the Diffusion of the Printed Word in Colonial India* (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2007), pp. 285–91.

8. Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed., *Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), and Yoginder Singh Sikand, *The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jama'at (1920–2000): A Cross-Country Comparative Study* (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2002).

9. This is done in book VII which bears the title 'On Comportment and Character, Reward and Punishment', Barbara D. Metcalf, *Perfecting Women: Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi's 'Bihishti Zewar'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 177–239.

10. Speech of Sayyid Ahmad Khan quoted in Altaf Husain Hali, *Hayat-i Javid*, trans. K. H. Qadiri and David J. Matthews (Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabyat-i-Delli, 1979), p. 172.

11. S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Life and Mission of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas*, trans. Mohammad Asif Kidwai (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1979), p. 108.

12. Muhammad ch. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf ,1954), p. 154.

13. For a discussion of this, see Francis Robinson, 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam and the Islamic Revival', in idem, *Islam, South Asia and the West*, p. 180 and n. 22.

14. Syed Abdul A'la Maudoodi, *Fundamentals of Islam* (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami, 1979), p. xviii, and for a discussion on the role of humanity as God's trustee on earth, see pp. 29–30.

15. Robinson, 'Other-Worldly and This-Worldly Islam', pp. 54–6.

16. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'The Protestant Ethic Thesis in an Analytical and Comparative Framework', in S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 10.

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18. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 163.

19. Triloki N. Madan, *Modern Myths and Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 189.

20. Torkel Brekke, *Makers of Modern Indian Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 63–115.

21. Ibid., pp. 113–62; Madan, *Modern Myths*, pp. 63–115.

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28. Stanley Jevaraja Tambiah, *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

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31. Ibid., pp. 692–716.

32. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'The Scope and Limits of Islamic Cosmopolitanism and the Discursive Language of the "Ulama" ', in Miriam Cooke and Bruce B. Lawrence, eds, *Muslim Networks: From Hajj to Hip Hop* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 84–104.

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34. Dale F. Eickelmann and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 142; and Robert Rozehnal, *Islamic Sufism Unbound: Politics and Piety in Twenty-First Century Pakistan* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

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36. Carl Ernst, 'Ideological and Technological Transformations of Contemporary Sufism', in Cooke and Lawrence, eds, *Muslim Networks*, pp. 191–207.

37. Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 279–301, and Bekim Agai, 'Islam and Education in Secular Turkey: State Policies and the Emergence of the Fethullah Gulen Group', in Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds, *Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 149–71.

38. Altaf Husain Hali refers to the impact of the telegraph thus: 'In all the lands, fresh news arrives each instant. News of joy and sorrow keeps coming in. / The news of every continent is openly published. The world's news is revealed to the world.' Christopher Shackle and Javed Majeed, trans. and intro., *Hali's Musaddas: The Flow and Ebb of Islam* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 205.

39. Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 77–8.

40. R. Michael Feener, 'New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications and the Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries', in Robert W. Hefner, ed.,

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41. Francis Robinson, 'Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3.19.3 (2009), 351–2.

42. Mandaville, *Global Political Islam*, p. 323.

43. Eickelmann and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, p. 141.

44. Robinson, *Separatism*, p. 186.

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46. Muhammad Sadiq, *A History of Urdu Literature*, 2nd edn (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 430–35.

47. Ibid., pp. 358–68.

48. Ibid., pp. 347–51.

49. Ibid., p. 450.

50. Abdul Halim Sharar, E. S. Harcourt and Fakhir Husain, eds and trans., *Lucknow: the Last Phase of an Oriental Culture* (London: Elek Books, 1975), p. 176.

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52. Robinson, *Separatism*, pp. 175–344; Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

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55. Eickelmann and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, p. 147.

56. Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press,1986), and Haider Mehdi, *Organization of the Islamic Conference OIC: A Review of Its Political and Educational Policies* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988).

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58. Osama bin Laden's populism was exemplified in his statements to the world broadcast in various ways but with particular effect through the Qatari satellite television station al-Jazeera. See Bruce B. Lawrence, ed. and intro., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (London: Verso, 2005).

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60. Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'The Cult of Spain in the Muslim World', unpublished MSS.

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Part II

Religious Internationals in Transition

6
Nationalism versus Internationalism: Russian Orthodoxy in Nineteenth-Century Palestine

Simon Dixon

Anxious to advertise Orthodoxy's global reach, the influential Synodal official Andrei Nikolaevich Murav'ev (1806–74) opened his *History of the Church of Russia* in 1838 by boasting that the Eastern Church could 'count her children' from the Adriatic to the Pacific and 'from the ice-fields which grind against the Solovetsky Monastery on its savage islet in the North to the heart of the Arabian and Egyptian deserts, on the verge of which stands the Lavra of Sinai'.[1] Later in the century, changing international borders made the diaspora seem even wider. After the Alaska Purchase in 1867 opened up a new episode in the Russian missionary presence established on Kodiak Island in 1794, the Orthodox community stretched from Abyssinia to the North American Arctic.[2]

Since such a far-flung flock required a multinational system of ecclesiastical government, a network of patriarchates of equal status initially seemed to offer a plausible springboard for the formation of a vigorous Orthodox International. Under Alexander I (r.1801–25), there was every prospect that it might incorporate Russians whose patriarchate had been abolished by Peter I (r.1682–1725) in 1721. During the Greek War of Independence, the chief procurator of the Holy Synod and Minister of Education, Prince A. N. Golitsyn (1773–1844), galvanized both secular and ecclesiastical authorities to raise millions of roubles to ransom captives taken into Muslim slavery after the massacre at Chios and to relieve the Ottoman Christians who fled to Ukraine after the Turks hanged Patriarch Grigorios V at Easter 1821. Over the following decade, Golitsyn's philanthropic appeal touched every level of Russian

society across the empire,[3] and so, on a somewhat smaller scale, did the campaign organized privately by the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee in support of Bulgarian refugees from the Ottoman Empire in 1858.[4] Indeed, in that year the Orthodox Church was acclaimed by E. A. Freeman (1823–92), an admirer of the Greeks, as 'the greatest existing witness to the principle that national independence and religious intercommunion are in no way inconsistent'.[5]

By then, however, tensions in the pan-Slav ideology, splintered from the start by the Poles' attachment to Catholicism, were further aggravated by hostility between Greeks and Bulgarians, whose cause was championed in the 1860s by the maverick Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Count N. P. Ignat'ev (1832–1908).[6] In 1872, the declaration of an independent Bulgarian exarchate, branded schismatic by the Patriarch of Constantinople, obliged Russians to choose between the ethnic principle of national liberation and the spiritual quest for ecclesiastical unity. Pan-Slavists such as Mikhail Pogodin (1800–75) and Ivan Aksakov (1823–86) preferred the former; Tertii Filippov (1825–99), Konstantin Leont'ev (1831–91) and Fedor Dostoevskii (1821–81) advocated the latter, though not in a spirit sympathetic to the Greeks.[7] Dostoevskii famously envisaged Russia as conqueror rather than protector of the Orthodox East. It was not, however, necessary for contemporaries dissatisfied with the role of *primus inter pares* to subscribe fully to his brand of messianism in order to aspire to ecclesiastical predominance in the Balkans and the Levant. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some more moderate men believed that they had already achieved their aim. 'Our patriotic Church incontestably occupies first place among all the Orthodox churches', claimed a prominent activist, Professor I. E. Troitskii, following his first visit to Constantinople and Mount Athos in 1886. Significantly, Troitskii, an historian of Byzantium at the St Petersburg Theological Academy, believed that Russian achievements had been made in spite of the papal pretensions of the Patriarch of Constantinople, Joachim III (1834–1912), and in the face of unremitting hostility from rival members of the Orthodox *oecumene*: 'Despite the difference in their national characters, in their relations with Russia both Greeks and Bulgarians adhere to one and the same policy: "To take from her as much as possible, and to give nothing in return." '[8]

Such stridency was by no means simply a response to the exigencies of ecclesiastical politics in the Orthodox East. On the contrary, it was in some ways a natural outcome of long-standing intellectual developments within the Russian Church. Having emerged from the

eighteenth century heavily dependent on the legacy of three currents of Christianity from beyond Russia's borders – Counter-Reformation Catholicism filtered through the Kievan Mohyla Academy after 1654, Pietism funnelled through scholarly exchanges between Russia and Germany from the time of Peter I, and Hesychasm radiating out from Mount Athos during the reign of Catherine II (r.1762–96) – Russian churchmen devoted much of the following hundred years to an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to strip away accumulated foreign impurities and to formulate and propagate in their place a universally accepted and authentically Patristic form of Orthodoxy, capable of transforming the world.[9] To those who subscribed to such a faith, and not only at its messianic extremes, there could be no tension between nationalism and internationalism: what was beneficial for Russia was good for everyone else. But since others beyond their borders took a different view, conflict was hard to avoid. Mount Athos was the main flashpoint in the Orthodox world.[10] A second flashpoint, connected by a common nodal point at Constantinople and framed by the wider imperial ambitions of ultramontane Catholicism and Protestant mission, was Palestine, the subject of this chapter.

Thanks not least to Murav'ev himself – 'an immense man, an immense talker, and an immense controversialist'[11] – Palestine was to play a central part in the imagination of a growing number of nineteenth-century Russians, determined to recover the precise historical circumstances of Christ's earthly life and crucifixion at Golgotha and if possible to experience something of its spiritual inspiration for themselves.[12] Lacking the opportunity to travel abroad, early modern Muscovites had perforce been content with attempts to recreate the Holy City within the bounds of their own lands, notably in the form of two sixteenth-century churches – the Cathedral of the Resurrection in the Moscow Kremlin and the Jerusalem chapel in the Church of the Intercession on the Moat (St Basil's Cathedral) – and the Ascension Monastery, 'New Jerusalem', not far from the old capital, where in 1656 Patriarch Nikon (1605–81) built an exact model of the Holy Sepulchre surrounded by its own garden of Gethsemane.[13] Visiting the monastery in 1857, Arthur Penrhyn Stanley (1815–81), who had published a bestselling study of *Sinai and Palestine* the year before, testified to the authenticity of the replica:

> Externally it has the aspect of an ordinary Russian cathedral, still further complicated by the addition of successive chapels built by, or

in honour of, the various members of the Imperial family in after times, down to our own day. But internally, it is so precisely of the same form and dimensions as the church at the actual Jerusalem, that, intricate as the arrangements of the church are, beyond probably any other in the world, a traveller who has seen the original can find his way without difficulty through every corridor, and stair and corner of the copy; and it possesses the further interest that, having been built before the recent alterations of the church in Palestine, it is in some respects . . . more like the old church in which the crusaders worshipped than is that church itself.[14]

By the late 1850s, however, Russians were no longer satisfied with mere copies and set out instead to establish in and around Jerusalem itself what a prominent recent student of the subject has called 'Russian Palestine':

> a unique phenomenon comprising, in material terms, a complicated infrastructure of Russian churches, monasteries, plots of land and monastic residences, gathered together and founded in the second half of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth, on the basis of Russian money, labour and the energy of representatives of the Russian state, church and culture.[15]

Operating outside the constraints of traditionally inward-looking communities of belief, 'Russian Palestine' owed its existence partly to the secular diplomats of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and partly to the clerical hierarchy of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. But it reached its zenith in the form of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, founded in 1882 and granted its imperial title seven years later, in which clergy and laity combined as much in the pursuit of modern social and political causes (above all in terms of popular mobilization) as in the pursuit of traditional research and scholarship.[16] In that sense, 'Russian Palestine' incorporated many of the features of a religious international, with the potential to reach out in collaboration with other representatives of ecumenical Orthodoxy. Yet although the main spur to Russian activities in Palestine was always the perceived need to compete with the Eastern Church's Christian competitors and their associated imperial enterprises, rivalries with the Greeks (whose alleged negligence was blamed for the parlous state of Orthodoxy in the Holy Land) contributed as much as recurrent internal dissensions to the fissures which ultimately disabled Russian ambitions.

The Orthodox East in Russian Culture from the 1830s to the 1850s

Russia's victory over the Ottomans, sealed by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829, brought to an end almost a decade of turbulence in the eastern Mediterranean and released a growing stream of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Land that was to be stemmed only by further international conflict in the Crimea and natural disasters such as famine and cholera in 1891–2. After 1861, the emancipation of the serfs and the advent of cheap modern transport by rail and steamship allowed crowds of peasant pilgrims to bring back to their villages the secrets of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. In the middle decades of the century, however, most Russians relied on books for their knowledge of the Holy Land. More than 1200 pilgrim accounts appeared in print in Russia between 1800 and 1914 by comparison with only 100 in the eighteenth century.[17]

The turning point came in 1832, when the publication of Murav'ev's *Journey to the Holy Places in 1830* signalled the transposition of the traditional pilgrim narrative into an attractive work of literature (it was characteristic that the corrections to the third edition of the five issued by 1849 were largely restricted to matters of style).[18] Hitherto known primarily as a poet and dramatist from the circle of S. E. Raich (1792–1855), whose literary reputation derived from his translation of Tasso's 'Jerusalem Delivered', Murav'ev 'poeticized religious feeling' in a work which critics such as N. I. Nadezhdin (1804–56), who regarded literature as 'a mouthpiece of national self-awareness', favourably compared with Chateaubriand's allegedly more mechanical travel account, itself widely read in Russian translation.[19] Having spent between 3500 and 4000 roubles on printing his *Journey*, in the expectation of recouping 10,000, Murav'ev was more than satisfied with the outcome. As no less a writer than Pushkin (1799–1837) acknowledged, the book made a 'powerful impression'.[20] It was flatteringly reviewed in the 'thick journals' which proliferated in Russia from the time of Alexander I, simultaneously stimulating and reflecting the interests of their growing body of educated readers.[21]

Any doubts about the level of demand for books on the Orthodox East are dispelled by the parallel success of the *Journey to the Holy Land in 1835* (1838) by A. S. Norov (1795–1869), an original contribution to biblical archaeology guided by the Scriptures themselves. 'It is very pleasing', declared the Oriental scholar Osip Senkovskii (1800–58) in his review for *Biblioteka dlia chteniia*, 'to encounter among the works of our native literature a book so sound and so unlike the greater part of the

superficial and cloying descriptions of travels to the Holy Land which incessantly appear in Europe'. Ivan Aksakov, who turned to both Norov and Murav'ev in 1846 after writing 'Mary of Egypt', found both books 'interesting in themselves'. His verdict was widely shared. At a time when Russian publishing as a whole still teetered on the brink between patronage and the market, Norov, another product of the Raich circle, was no less entrepreneurial than Murav'ev in his approach to publishing. Having paid 1417 roubles to print the second edition of his *Journey*, subsidizing the outlay through subscriptions to the forthcoming publication, he received 10,000 roubles from A. F. Smirdin (1795–1857) for the privilege of marketing it. By the late 1840s, the author's income from the sales of his five works on the Orthodox East amounted to roughly a third of his annual salary as a high-ranking member of the Commission for Petitions, and it was thanks partly to his prominence as a writer on religious subjects that he became deputy Minister of Education in 1850 and minister four years later.[22]

Although the accounts of the Holy Land by Murav'ev and Norov had helped to create a climate of opinion that gave the Orthodox East an unprecedented prominence in Russian culture in the late 1830s, it took the British establishment of a consulate in Jerusalem in 1838 and the creation of the Jerusalem bishopric in 1841 to prompt the tsarist government to send the first Russian missionary to the Holy City in 1843, initially in personal capacity.[23] (Ironically, the decision was taken by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Karl Nesselrode [1780–1862], a Baltic-German Anglican born in Lisbon, and a key architect of Russia's triumph over Napoleon.)[24] Advocates of a more aggressive policy would have preferred earlier and more decisive action. The bishop of Khar'kov, Innokentii (Borisov; 1800–57), was characteristically eloquent in his response to the Anglican initiative:

> Our diplomats have complained. But instead of complaining, we should long ago have done what the far-sighted English and Prussians are now doing, i.e. establish our own bishopric in Jerusalem. It is hard to credit the short-sightedness of our administration. What a huge field the East offers us! Everything calls us there, and yet we run away. Shame and grief be upon us![25]

Repeatedly refused permission to travel to Jerusalem, Innokentii, author of an emotional study of *The Last Days of the Earthly Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ* (1847), sought to quench his thirst for knowledge in correspondence with Russians with personal experience of the Holy City.[26]

They offered him scant consolation. Over the course of the 1840s, both the Russian consul in Beirut, K. M. Bazili (1809–84), and Archimandrite Sofronii in Constantinople filled his heart with despair with their accounts of the poverty of the Orthodox Church and the negligence of her clergy by comparison with the zeal and wealth of the Roman Catholics.[27] Frustrated on the wider front, Innokentii attempted to promote pan-Orthodoxy within the Russian Empire following his translation to Kherson in 1848. Three years later, he received the Greek Order of the Saviour in recognition of his work on behalf of the Greek cause in general and the émigré Greeks in his diocese in particular; he was vocal in support of the Bulgarian national project; and as a means of reconciling the two in the cause of Orthodox intercommunion, he founded an Athonite community in the Crimea, proclaiming the peninsula as no less holy in its associations than Mount Athos itself.[28] Meanwhile, his commitment to Orthodox interests in Palestine remained undimmed, emerging with particular clarity during the escalating diplomatic dispute over the Holy Places. 'Although this is one of those subjects that one least of all wants to hear debated', Innokentii confessed in June 1851 when an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed him Murav'ev's response to a French pamphlet urging support for papal ambitions in Jerusalem, 'now that necessity has dictated the defence of our rights, then it is gratifying to see them defended as triumphantly as the author has done. May he receive honour and thanks from all the children of the Orthodox Church!'[29]

'More pan-Orthodox than pan-Slav in outlook', Innokentii was drawn to religious internationalism both by personal predisposition and by the strategic location of his Crimean diocese. Yet there was never any doubt about his essentially patriotic approach to religious questions. In contrast to prevailing depictions of the Crimea as an exotic borderland, Innokentii's sermons claimed it squarely for Russia.[30] His equally patriotic interests in Palestine, tinged with anxieties about Russia's abdication of her leading role in the East, were shared by other members of the Russian hierarchy. In 1845, the embattled archbishop of Riga, Filaret (Gumilevskii; d.1866), then locked into painful conflict with Lutheranism in the Baltic lands, confided his own fears about the 'poor church of Jerusalem':

> Protestantism is putting down roots there. True: better inadequate faith than bestial Islam. But it is painful to see the true faith so diffident within its own borders. You do not know how difficult it is to return people to Orthodoxy over two or three generations. It is hard,

very hard. People realize that this is a situation not without danger, but they either turn away from self-improvement or fear the thought of so-called changes in the faith. The latter especially powerfully troubles the souls of the most pious people, or those who contemplate piety.[31]

That same year, even the most unbending opponent of innovation, the metropolitan of Moscow, Filaret (Drozdov; 1782–1867), found it 'sad to think about the East' having read his friend Murav'ev's accounts of the troubled state of Orthodoxy in the Holy Land: 'The Patriarch of Alexandria is dead, and the Patriarchate itself barely alive. For some time now we have been talking more often than before about the Eastern Patriarchates. We must somehow ensure that what we have been discussing really happens – that is, the maintenance of Orthodoxy.'[32]

In the wake of her victory over the Ottomans in 1829, many suspected that 'the maintenance of Orthodoxy' was the least of Russia's ambitions in the Holy Land. As Murav'ev himself had acknowledged, his arrival in Jerusalem in 1830 was accompanied by 'strange and ridiculous rumours':

It was said that I was the leader of a powerful detachment, sent to conquer the Holy City, and that 10,000 Russians would follow me from Arzrum or put in on ships at Akra. The basis for this was the rumour about a crowd of pilgrims, making their way from the coast, two hundred of whom did indeed arrive several days later, the majority of them Greeks from the island of Castel Rosso.

But the main source of these rumours was the fear of the Russian name, spread across the east and now increased by the glory of our victory over the Porte. The idea that we shall eventually conquer Jerusalem has so powerfully taken root among the common people, that two years before, at the start of the war, Pasha Akrskii himself sent a gunboat to inspect the pilgrim ship on which G. Eropkin sailed, alleging that it concealed warriors for a secret invasion.[33]

Similar anxieties were still rife a decade after Murav'ev's first journey to Palestine. When Bazili appeared in the Holy City at Easter 1840, dressed in full ceremonial uniform and 'attended by the Russian pilgrims, many of them old soldiers in their regimentals', the British consul reported that 'the pilgrims from Russia have been heard to speak openly of the period when this country will be under the Russian government'.[34] Not everyone was quite so alarmist. Observing 'the silent and beneficial influence of Russia, as exercised by her representatives in the East, with

a degree of impartiality I did not expect', George Williams (1814–78), chaplain to the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem in 1842, 'could not participate in the jealous and suspicious fears with which my countrymen are wont to regard Russian diplomacy'.[35] Williams went on to become chaplain to the British Factory in St Petersburg in 1844–5 and later, as Senior Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, became prominent in the ecumenical Eastern Church Association (est. 1864). In the 1840s, however, his Russophile voice was drowned by growing continental anxieties about the imminence of the Slavic threat to European civilization.[36] In 1848, not long after completing *Jerusalem*, his second opera touching on the history of the crusades in the Near East, Verdi (1813–1901) wrote of his fear of inexorable Russian expansion: 'If we let the Russians take possession of Constantinople we shall all become Cossacks in a few years . . . Christ!'[37]

In fact, Nesselrode's aims in 1843 were both more modest than some European rivals feared and less ambitious than many leading Orthodox churchmen might have wished. Presciently anticipating difficulties in the relationship between Russians and Greeks, the minister sent to Jerusalem only a relatively humble archimandrite, Porfirii (Uspenskii; 1804–85), who remained monitored by the secular authorities even after the formal establishment of his mission in 1847. When the Moscow theologian, A. V. Gorskii (1812–75), contemplated joining this emergent enterprise five years earlier, wiser heads were anxious to dissuade him. 'My friend, abandon the idea!', advised Filaret (Gumilevskii), himself then uncomfortably embroiled in politics at St Petersburg en route to Riga:

> You have been given an impression of this business which simply does not correspond to reality. You think you will find there food for pious enquiry or for pious exploits [*podvigi*] in teaching Christ's truth. But that is not what they expect of those whom they wish to send there. There you have to live in the embassy . . . . They want a man who can bear in mind the calculations of the earthly powers, and only then consider the calculations of the spiritual life. They require a cunning, secular man who knows how to conceal the purposes of earthly wisdom beneath his black cassock.[38]

Filaret's predictions were in many ways borne out by the subsequent history of the Russian mission in Jerusalem, riven as it was with personal and institutional dissensions motivated principally by conflicts of interest and authority.[39] For all their scholarly talents, successive

leaders of the mission proved no better able to withstand political pressure than many of their fellow 'learned monks', catapulted with little or no administrative experience from their cocoons in one of the four Russian theological academies into the alien environment of a diocese in the borderlands of Russia's multidenominational empire. Contrary to the diplomatic demands of his role, Archimandrite Porfirii proved to be headstrong and fractious; his successor, Archimandrite Leonid (Kavelin; 1822–91) was a former Guards officer whose military methods were scarcely more conducive to a productive relationship with the other authorities in Jerusalem.[40] While Catholicism and Protestantism in Jerusalem went from strength to strength, Orthodox achievements remained negligible. 'We have nowhere left visible and permanent reminders of the love of the Russian Church for the Eastern', admitted B. P. Mansurov (1828–1910) in his account of the *Orthodox Pilgrims in Palestine*. The book was published in 1858 at the behest of Mansurov's patron, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich (1827–92), who was determined to improve the standing in Jerusalem of both Russia and Orthodoxy. Not only did he make his own pilgrimage to the Holy City in 1859, but he defied the banking crisis of that year to set up a new Palestine Committee. This, however, was converted to a moribund commission under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the grand duke's appointment as viceroy in Poland in1862.[41]

International and Interdenominational Rivalries in the Holy Land and Beyond

Russian anxieties were not wholly without foundation. Following the loss of the holy places in the Crimean War and the creation by Pius IX in 1862 of a Congregation for Eastern Orthodox affairs, Professor I. T. Osinin (1835–87) of the St Petersburg Theological Academy was among those who accused Rome of systematic aggression. The Minister of Internal Affairs, P. A. Valuev (1815–90), heard him speak on the potential for rapprochement between Orthodoxy and Anglicanism at the home of Tat'iana Borisovna Potemkina, and he also frequented both the reformist salon of Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna (1807–73) and the 'Russophile' circle of Countess Antonina Bludova (1813–91).[42] The Russians' fears of Roman domination in the Holy Land were intensified by their sensitivity to Catholic pretensions in Poland, inflamed by the Polish uprising of 1863, and to the transmission of Jesuit propaganda within the empire by Russian émigrés in Paris. Indeed, no matter where they looked, Orthodox seemed to face the spectre of militant

Catholicism. In 1868, Nikolai (Kasatkin; 1836–1912), the chaplain at the Russian consulate in Japan, wrote in despair to Innokentii (Veniaminov; 1797–1879), successor to Filaret (Drozdov) as metropolitan of Moscow:

> As a missionary, I am still alone here, and in a private capacity. Catholicism has long been posting phalanxes of its own missionaries here; Protestantism is not far behind. And Orthodoxy? Do we shrink from placing ourselves on the same level as them? It is not that Orthodox fear a papist, who practically worships his pope as the fourth person in the Holy Trinity, or a Protestant, who is ready to be schizophrenic in his religious convictions. We have no money and no people! When, oh when, will Russia, seventy million strong and leaning ever to the left, find the necessary few thousand roubles and few dozen people to fulfil one of the most essential commandments of the Saviour? Catholicism and Protestantism have spread all over the world. This is almost the sole remaining corner of the earth where Orthodoxy can contribute its own pure, immaculate mite. Surely Orthodoxy will not fail to act here, too? No, that cannot be: God will grant it![43]

In the event, even when Nikolai was granted permission for an official mission to Tokyo in 1870, the Russian Ministry of Finance assigned him only a down-payment of 5000 roubles and an annual grant of 3000, both of which paled into insignificance by comparison with a single donation of 10,000 roubles by an anonymous merchant.[44] Held at the same level even in the early twentieth century, this miserly state subsidy was believed to have contributed to the mission's indebtedness.[45] To some extent, the limited level of support was motivated by realistic calculations of the chances of success, shared by more sophisticated churchmen. Though the mission to Japan became more vigorous toward the end of the century, thanks partly to the involvement of several pupils of the inspirational Archbishop Antonii (Khrapovitskii; 1863–1936), Professor V. V. Bolotov (1854–1900), a specialist in Coptic languages at St Petersburg and a leading theorist of Russian ecumenism, argued in the late 1880s that an aggressive Orthodox mission to the Ethiopians was bound to fail because everything in the Africans' history and contemporary situation militated against it.[46] The prospects for Orthodox activity in Palestine seemed more promising. And at the beginning of the reign of Alexander III (r.1881–94), political circumstances were ripe for the foundation of an Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, established in the following year.

The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society

Though the development of a streak of voluntarism in Russian society, beginning in the 1760s and strengthening a century later in the era of the Great Reforms, is now more widely acknowledged than once it was, the associations about which we know most were overwhelmingly secular in purpose. In his recent study of the great learned societies such as the Free Economic Society, the Moscow Agricultural Society and the Russian Geographical Society, Joseph Bradley argues that they helped to foster 'three defining developments in imperial Russia: an interest in science, education and the diffusion of useful knowledge; patriotism and public service; and the public sphere of civil society'. He does not, however, claim that such societies were either typical or representative.[47] And indeed, it is possible to identify religious organizations whose ethos was equally patriotic, and no less linked to the public sphere, even though their purpose was to diffuse knowledge that was always in competitive tension with modern science and sometimes diametrically opposed to it. An obvious example at local level is the sort of parish charitable society pioneered by Father Aleksandr Gumilevskii (1830–69) in one of the poorest parishes in St Petersburg.[48] The Palestine Society is more directly comparable to the metropolitan learned societies discussed by Bradley, but unlike them was to assume international and imperial significance in a profoundly conservative era.

The Palestine Society was largely the creation of V. N. Khitrovo (1834–1903), who had been agitating for an autonomous Russian association on the model of the British Palestine Exploration Fund and the German Palästina-Verein since discovering the miserable state of the official Orthodox mission on his first visit to Jerusalem in 1871.[49] With the cooperation of K. P. Pobedonostsev (1827–1907), chief procurator of the Holy Synod between 1880 and 1905, the Society opened under the patronage of Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich (1857–1907) and under the banner of Khitrovo's own *Orthodoxy in the Holy Land*. The book began with a firm declaration of purpose:

> For us Russians, the significance of the Holy Land is not only religious, but also political and ethical-educational. We should not forget that, if the Catholic is a partisan of France and the Protestant a partisan of Germany and England, then the Orthodox is an ally of Russia . . . . Neither must it be forgotten that our pilgrims, the peasants and [female] babas, maintain in the Holy Land the same influence as the heterodox communities with their scholarly expeditions.[50]

Consonant with this overall ideology, the Society adopted a threefold mission: to develop and diffuse knowledge of the Holy Places in Russia; to support Orthodox pilgrims in the Holy Land; and to found schools, hospitals and accommodation, not only for such pilgrims, but also for the local Arab population. In support of this last aim, the Society's schools directly fostered the development of a number of Arabic writers and poets – notably Khalil Baydas, Salim Kubayn, Iskandar al-Khuri and Bandali al-Dzhawzi – whose works were published in the twentieth century.[51]

Having opened with a deficit of 50 roubles on 21 May 1882, the Society rapidly came to operate on a very large scale. At the zenith of its activities in 1905, membership stood at almost 5000. A wider public learned of its activities from the ecclesiastical press and conservative dailies such as *Moskovskie vedomosti* (*Moscow Herald*), whose coverage characteristically wavered between triumphalism and despair when measuring the relative strengths of Orthodoxy and its denominational rivals.[52] When the Society celebrated its silver jubilee at Peterhof in 1907, Nicholas II (r.1894–1917) noted that its funds amounted to more than 2 million roubles, supporting eight hostels for the 10,000 Russian pilgrims who visited Jerusalem each year (the young Stephen Graham [1884–1975] shared a vast dormitory for between 300 and 500 at the St Katherine hostel, 'an immense glass house – damp in winter and hot in summer'), a hospital, six ambulances, and 101 schools in which 10,400 Arab children were enrolled.[53] According to calculations made in 1901, 70 per cent of the Society's income came from donations from the faithful, facilitated by empire-wide collections authorized by both ecclesiastical and secular authorities on the model established by Prince Golitsyn in 1821. A further 13 per cent came from members' subscriptions; 12 per cent from pilgrims in Jerusalem; 4 per cent from interest on investments; and 1 per cent from the sale of the Society's publications, of which some 347 had appeared by 1907. Thirty-five per cent of the expenditure budget was used to support the pilgrims; 32 per cent went on the construction of schools and churches; 8 per cent was spent on scholarly research; and the remaining quarter of the income was used to support the Society's mobilizing activities in Russia itself. According to this calculation, each pilgrim cost the Society an annual average of 12 roubles 38 kopecks, and each Arab school pupil an average of 23 roubles 21 kopecks (the relative proportions may reasonably be taken as representative of the Society's pan-Orthodox ambitions).[54]

Though the dimensions of pilgrimage can only be estimated approximately, there is no doubt about the growth of the phenomenon. Down

to the 1820s, no more than 200 Russian pilgrims had visited the Holy Land in any one year, and an annual figure between 50 and 100 seems plausible. By 1857, there were roughly 500 of them; the following year saw another 800 arrive. From the 1860s, their numbers steadily increased as travel was eased by the triumph of the steamship and the particular connection with the Jerusalem mission of the Russian Company of Steam Navigation and Trade, founded in August 1856 under the watchful eye of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich: 75,596 Russian pilgrims are recorded between 1865 and 1899, the great majority from the densely populated black-earth provinces, and at least 6000 were thought to be resident in the Holy City at Easter 1912.

The largest numbers came from Voronezh province, at the centre of the black-earth region, where demographic pressures on the land became increasingly intense in the wake of the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. These were the years in which pilgrimages to the shrines of holy people believed to possess wonder-working powers – in particular, Mitrofan of Voronezh and Tikhon of Zadonsk – expanded in scale and meaning as part of a process which invested regional cults with wider significance and helped to inculcate a 'a popular understanding of "Russia" that was ambiguously modern and equivocally national'.[55] A related phenomenon was the exponential growth of female monasticism. Whereas the total of male religious in Russia, including novices, rose only from 9997 to 21,201 between 1850 and 1912, female numbers shot up in the same period from 8533 to 70,453 as part of a wider feminization of European religion.[56] Women travelling in groups also constituted a majority of pilgrims, both in Russia and the Holy Land. There, motivated by a combination of economic need, spiritual searching and patriotic fervour, they helped to transform both the size and the atmosphere of 'Russian Palestine' in the second half of the nineteenth century.

It would be artificial to suppose that this stream of impoverished migrants behaved any more impeccably than the petty criminals who 'traveled the [Russian] shrine circuit in search of new victims'.[57] 'As concerns our pilgrims', the Russian ambassador in Constantinople warned the newly appointed consul in Jerusalem in 1858,

> experience has sadly shown that many of them live in Jerusalem in a manner which corresponds neither to the holiness of the place, nor to the aim of their pilgrimage, falling prey to various temptations and thereby angering the spiritual authorities at the Holy Sepulchre, as the Patriarch of Jerusalem has more than once complained to us.[58]

Two generations later, Graham was told that cheaper transport had delivered boatloads of pilgrims of even lower quality: 'The pilgrims are not so austere as they were, not so hardened and fanatical, more out for pleasure and curiosity.'[59] Jerusalem did indeed become a paradise for the sort of peasant entrepreneur who, in defiance of the Palestine Society's rules, touted for local shopkeepers who sold all manner of souvenirs ranging from pilgrim staffs, imprinted 'With the blessing of the Holy City of Jerusalem', to stamped tablets of Jerusalem earth.[60] Indeed, so buoyant was the souvenir market that the Sa'ade brothers were among the Palestinian shopkeepers prompted to set up business in Kiev, selling icons, incense and other religious articles from Bethlehem, Jerusalem and Mount Athos to local churches and monasteries.[61]

Graham also drew attention to 'the type of degenerate Jerusalem monk', living out his life in 'drunkenness, religious hysteria, and corpse washing'.[62] Yet there is no doubting the piety and wonderment he discovered in 'Dyadya' (Granddad), a 55-year old peasant from Tver province:

> We went together to Golgotha and saw the life-size representation of the Crucifixion – the great cross standing beside the cleft in the rock where the actual cross is supposed to have been fixed – and we kissed the place where St. Mary and the beloved disciple stood looking at the sacrifice. We also kissed the place where Jesus was nailed to the cross, and the great rent which was made in the rock when He expired. Dyadya prayed a long time and shed tears of joy. When he came away he told me in confidence that he should buy a cross here at Golgotha, a large one, surrounded by little pictures showing the whole life of Jesus from the manger to the tomb, and he would take it home as an offering to the village church.

Descending the Mount of Olives, believed by Orthodox to be the mountain from which Christ ascended to Heaven, they came to the cave of St Pelagia, 'where by tradition the disciples first set up a cross as the symbol of the Christian Faith':

> This seemed to give my old friend some further satisfaction in thinking about the cross he intended to take home to the village church. He would be doing at his little village what the disciples did at St. Pelagia's cave. I think the thought materially lightened his steps as we plodded through the valley of Jehoshaphat once more.[63]

Even if Graham found the Society's magic-lantern lectures in Jerusalem 'somewhat uninspiring', many of Dyadya's companions had doubtless been mobilized by the Society's vigorous proselytism in Russia.[64] It sponsored a wide range of illustrated edificatory talks based on its own hierarchy of published materials, graded in price and sophistication according to the intended level of their readership. Peasants who had no prospect of visiting the Holy Land in person were encouraged to prostrate themselves at Christ's tomb in their imagination. Urged to take a hostile view of Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam and their associated imperial sponsors, some expressed surprise that the Holy Land remained outside their empire's control. 'Some peasants', declared the Society's report on its activities in the Ukrainian province of Chernigov in 1900–1, 'were convinced that the Holy Land fell under the power of the Russian tsar, and they were astonished, and indeed did not wish to believe, that it fell under the power of the Turkish sultan, a Muslim. This news has revolutionized their religious feelings'.[65] Such discoveries also helped to inflate popular contributions not only to the Society, but also to the other institutions of 'Russian Palestine', though the authorities were anxious that not all such donations reached their intended destination. In 1908, the tsar himself requested the Society to investigate charges of clerical peculation raised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: since only 216,000 roubles of an estimated 400,000 posted to Jerusalem in 1906 had been accounted for in the Holy City, it seemed possible that the remainder had fallen into the 'bottomless pockets' of the clergy, led by Archimandrite Evfimii, the Russian custodian of the Holy Sepulchre.[66]

Combining imperial sponsorship, educated leadership and a strong peasant following, the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society offered the prospect, in miniature, of the sort of integrated implementation of policy that government in late imperial Russia so notoriously lacked. Its achievements were by no means negligible, particularly among the native Arab population. Ultimately, however, its work was stymied by the sorts of interinstitutional conflict that paralysed so many of the empire's political and social initiatives. The published account of the student pilgrimage led by Arsenii (Stadnitskii; 1862–1936), rector of the Moscow Theological Academy in 1900, paints an edifying picture of pious endeavour.[67] Yet in a private audience with Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich on his return, Arsenii gave a franker account of his experiences, bemoaning the 'undesirable triple power' prevailing among 'the consulate, the Mission, and the Palestine Society. Each pulls to its own side and imagines itself in authority over the others'. The consul, it

emerged, had offended the rector by smoking in his presence; the head of the ecclesiastical Mission was not even a member of the Society.[68] Beneath the surface of urgent activity, internal tensions and hostilities still inhibited the work of 'Russian Palestine' much as they had in the 1840s.

As before, unity was best preserved in hostility to common international enemies: the Greek clergy in Jerusalem, their patrons in the patriarchate and the Turkish government (regarded as less hostile than the other two). Behind them all lay the lurking menace of global Catholicism, preying on Orthodox divisions. Just as it had been in the 1840s, Constantinople remained the main source of rumour and innuendo, the role of alarmist-in-chief falling in the century's last two decades to G. P. Begleri, agent of the Russian Company of Steam Navigation and Trade. Begleri's assessment of the Catholic threat verged on the paranoid. In 1887, for example, he confided to Professor Troitskii that he was investigating 'intrigues among many influential people' who were trying to convince 'the mad Greeks' that the best way 'to destroy forever the influence of Russia in the East' was to facilitate the conversion of the Arabs and the Slavs to Catholicism.[69] Begleri nevertheless had access to the highest ecclesiastical circles as a result of his descent from a prominent clerical family, and some of his reports were well informed. A characteristic missive reported in August 1890 that although Patriarch Nikodemos (r.1883–90) had approved a request from Pobedonostsev to allow Russian priests to serve a weekly mass in the church of the Ascension in Jerusalem without participation by Greek clergy, the Synod had

> not only failed to respect [the request] but protested against the patriarch and against Russian demands, resorting simultaneously on the one hand to a denunciation to the grand vizier, in which they charged the patriarch with extreme russophilia and hostility to the Turkish government and the Greek clergy in Jerusalem, and on the other hand, through the intrigues of Tavularios [the secretary of the Jerusalem Patriarchate], to the Turkish newspapers here with the information that another thirty monks and deacons etc. would soon arrive in Jerusalem from Russia.[70]

Not all Russian anxieties were fantasies. Even Nikodemos proved hostile to the Palestine Society, and also to other Russian interests in Jerusalem, though he had been consecrated patriarch and lived for a while in St Petersburg.[71] In such circumstances, the development of Orthodox international energies was bound to be restrained.

Some revelled in Jerusalem's 'holy rivalry', as the evangelical Lord Shaftesbury (1801–85) approvingly described it.[72] Others found its nationalist tone repugnant. John Henry Newman (1801–90) regretted as early as 1841 that

> When our thoughts turn to the East, instead of recollecting that there are Christian Churches there, we leave it to the Russians to take care of the Greeks, and the French to take care of the Romans, and we content ourselves with erecting a Protestant Church at Jerusalem, or with helping the Jews to rebuild their temple there, or with becoming the august protectors of Nestorians, Monophysites, and all the heretics we can hear of, or with forming a league with the Mussulman against Greeks and Romans together.[73]

Few heeded his warning. Indeed, by the time that George Adam Smith (1856–1942) published his classic account of *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* in 1894, Palestine seemed 'more a museum of church history than of the Bible – a museum full of living as well as ancient specimens of its subject'. These subjects, moreover, displayed 'most of the faults, as well as the virtues, conspicuous in church history from the beginning':

> Greeks and Latins have warred for the possession of holy places, real and feigned. They have disfigured the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, and threatened the rest of the land, with rival sanctuaries, planted side by side as even at Gethsemane. Behind the churches move, as of old, political interests, complicating and debasing the quarrel.[74]

Visiting the Holy City in 1882, the former Russian Minister of War, Dmitrii Miliutin (1816–1912), recorded his first depressing impressions in his diary: 'Instead of authentic, original vestiges of Christian archaeology, you see architectural constructions of various ages and various styles, in the form of marble altars with suspended candelabra of the most fantastic sorts, with many inappropriate trinkets and bad paintings.' Worse still was the rivalry between denominations. It was 'hard' to witness such an age-old struggle over holy objects, 'especially in view of the well-known inclination of the Roman Catholic clergy and monks toward deception, intrigue and charlatanry, and on the other side, the cynical cupidity of the Greek clergy and monks'.[75] 'Many a bloody strife has arisen over the possession of a few square inches of floors or walls', echoed a critical Protestant minister in 1906, noting that 'every

inch of ground, every altar, every lamp' in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem had been 'carefully allotted to the rival sects'. Only the Turkish police preserved order and, even in their presence, fights occasionally broke out between rival clergy conducting simultaneous masses in different parts of the church. It was the same unseemly story at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. 'Bigotry and fanaticism were never more rampant than they are still amongst the Latin, Greek, and Armenian churches in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.'[76]

Slow to join battle, and perpetually conscious of lagging behind their rivals, the Russians made a concerted attempt to make up lost ground in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The achievements of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society were far from negligible, its methods in many ways modern. Yet they continued to founder on the sorts of internal dissension that had hampered 'Russian Palestine' from the beginning. While the British nonconformists who toured the Holy Land may not have developed much sympathy for the Catholics and Orthodox they encountered, their visits to Jerusalem did at least 'facilitate pan-Protestant fellowship'.[77] By contrast, Russian settlement in the Holy City remained, in Graham's phrase, 'a little Russia', and apart from its investment in the education of Arab children the most international feature of the Russian ecclesiastical mission in 1914 was the debt incurred by the over-ambitious property portfolio acquired by Archimandrite Leonid (Sentsov; 1863–1918).[78] Ironically, it was only after 1917 that the Russians were able to generate the embryo of a genuine religious international in the form of the modern Orthodox diaspora, after the Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War dispersed roughly one million Russians to parts of the globe more disparate even than those charted in 1838 by Andrei Nikolaevich Murav'ev.

Notes

1. A. N. Mouravieff, *A History of the Church of Russia*, trans. Revd R. W. Blackmore (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1842), p. 3.
2. See Mitropolit Kliment (Kapalin), *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' na Aliaske do 1917 goda* (Moscow: OLMA Media Grupp, 2009).
3. Theophilus C. Prousis, *Russian Society and the Greek Revolution* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), pp. 55–83.
4. S. A. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858–1876 godakh* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1960), pp. 1–58.
5. (Edward A. Freeman), 'The Eastern Church', *The Edinburgh Review*, 107 (April 1858), 322–57 (327).
6. Thomas A. Meininger, *Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1864–1872): A Study in Personal Diplomacy* (Madison: University

of Wisconsin Press, 1970). On the Polish origins of Panslavism, see Georges Luciani, *La Société des slaves unis (1823–1825): Panslavisme et solidarité slave au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Université de Bordeaux, 1963), pp. 77–154.

7. Olga Maiorova, *From the Shadow of Empire. Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855–1870* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), pp. 176–81.

8. L. A. Gerd, ed., ' "Nasha otechestvennaia Tserkov" zanimaet pervoe mesto mezhdu vsemi pravoslavnymi Tserkvami': Otchet professora I. E. Troitskogo o komandirovke na Vostok. 1886 g.', *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (2001), 168, 160, 144.

9. Simon Dixon, 'The Russian Orthodox Church 1721–1917', in Michael Angold, ed., *The Cambridge History of Christianity, Vol. 5, Eastern Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 325–47.

10. L. A. Gerd, *Konstantinopol' i Peterburg. Tserkovnaia politika Rossii na Pravoslavnom Vostoke (1878–1898)* (Moscow: Indrik, 2006), pp. 309–60, explores a huge literature. For dissensions among the Russians on Athos, see A. M. Khitrov and O. L. Solomina, eds, *Zabytye stranitsy russkogo imoslaviia. Sbornik dokumentov i publikatsii po afonskim sobytiiam 1910–1913 gg. i dvizheniiu imiaslaviia v 1910–1918 gg.* (Moscow: Palomnik, 2001), and Alfeev Ilarion, ed., ' "Delo ob afonskikh monakhakh" v Kantseliarii Sviateishego Sinoda Rossiiskoi Tservki', *Bogoslovskie trudy*, 39 (2004), 111–268; 40 (2005), 165–273.

11. Rowland E. Prothero, ed., *Letters and Verses of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D. Between the Years 1829 and 1881* (London: John Murray, 1895), p. 274, Stanley to his mother, 20 August 1857.

12. Stephen Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims in Jerusalem* (London: Macmillan, 1913), pp. 125–6, characterized Orthodoxy as 'the religion of the mystery of death' in contradistinction to Protestantism, 'the religion of the mystery of life'.

13. Andrei Batalov and Aleksei Lidov, *Ierusalim v russkoi kul'ture* (Moscow: Nauka, Vostochnaia literature, 1994), pp. 154–71, 174–81; Michael S. Flier, 'Church of the Intercession on the Moat/St. Basil's Cathedral', in Valerie A. Kivelson and Joan Neuberger, eds, *Picturing Russia: Explorations in Visual Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 44–5.

14. Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, *Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church*, 5th edn (London: John Murray, 1876), p. 368.

15. N. N. Lisovoi, ed. *Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 1 (2 vols; Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), p. 12.

16. Although by 1905 the society had published 61 volumes of *Palestinskii sbornik*, a series devoted primarily to archaeology, its scholarly interests were widely regarded as 'secondary': see the memorandum of March 1915 by the society's secretary A. A. Dmitrievskii, in Lisovoi, ed, *Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle*, vol. 1, pp. 350–56 (quoting E. P. Kovalevskii at p. 351).

17. Theofanis G. Stavrou and Peter R. Weisensel, *Russian Travelers to the Christian East from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century* (Columbus: Slavica, 1986), p. xlv.

18. (A. N. Murav'ev) *Puteshestvie ko Sviatym mestam v 1830 godu*, 4th edn (St Petersburg, 1840), Preface, n.p.

19. The alleged contrast has recently been reasserted by N. A. Khokhlova, *Andrei Nikolaevich Murav'ev – Literator* (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001),

pp. 168–84: 'The religious experiences of Chateaubriand and Murav'ev are a reflection of the Catholic and Orthodox perceptions of the Holy Places. If the former completed a journey in the precise sense of the word, the latter's was rather a pilgrimage' (p. 174). In the context of a discussion of Orthodox internationalism, it is more revealing to note that the Russian equation of spiritual improvement with physical sacrifice 'resembles more the Western *peregrination* . . . than the Greek *proskinima* and its tradition of spiritual renewal': see Chris J. Chulos, *Converging Worlds: Religion and Community in Peasant Russia, 1861–1917* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), p. 67. On Nadezhdin, see Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia. Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 109–11.

20. Khokhlova, *Andrei Nikolaevich Murav'ev*, pp. 140–43.
21. V. N. Khitrovo, *Palestina i Sinai. Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' russkikh knig i statei o Sviatykh mestakh vostoka, preimushchestvenno Palestinskikh i Sinaiskikh* (St Petersburg, 1876), here pp. 39–40, lists over 100 publications and their various reviews.
22. I. S. Aksakov, *Pis'ma k rodnym 1844–1849*, ed. T. F. Pirozhkova (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 315 (28 September 1846); Peter R. Weisensel, *Prelude to the Great Reforms: Avraam Sergeevich Norov and Imperial Russia in Transition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1995), pp. 7, 25–31, 47 (quoted at pp. 28, 30–31). The claim at p. 29 that the sum earned from Norov's books was 'approximately equal' to his salary seems not to match the calculation at p. 47.
23. A. L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine, 1800–1901. A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 29–57.
24. Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843–1914. Church and Politics in the Near East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 34.
25. Innokentii (Borisov), *Pis'ma Innokentiia, arkhiepiskopa khersonskago k Gavriilu, arkhiepiskopu riazanskomu i zaraiskomu* (Moscow, 1869), pp. 43–4 (6 March 1842).
26. Innokentii (Borisov), 'Poslednie dni zemnoi zhizni Gospoda Nashego Iisusa Khrista', in *Sochineniia Innokentiia arkhiepiskopa Khersonskago i Tavricheskago*, vol. 5, 2nd edn (6 vols; St Petersburg: Tipografiia I. L. Tuzova, 1908), pp. 332–61, prefaced the discussion of Christ's suffering on the cross with a detailed description of the crucifix. Prot. Georgii Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia*, 2nd edn (Paris: YCMA, 1981), p. 197, famously dismissed the book as a work of 'literature, not theology' since it failed to break 'the bounds of rhetorical and sentimental humanism'.
27. N. I. Barsov, ed., 'Pis'ma k preosv. Innokentiiu s vostoka', in idem, ed., *Materialy dlia biografii Innokentiia Borisova*, vol. 2 (2 vols; St Petersburg, 1888), pp. 1–19. First published in 1862, K. M. Bazili, *Siriia i Palestina pod turetskim pravitel'stvom v istoricheskom i politicheskom otnoshenii* (Moscow: Mosty kul'tury, 2007), remains a significant work of scholarship.
28. Mara Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea. Shaping Space in the Russian Empire and Beyond* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), pp. 75–8; 84–8 and passim.
29. Quoted in L. V. Mel'nikova, 'Ierarkhi Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v gody Krymskoi voiny (1853–1856 gg.)', in V. M. Lavrov, ed., *Tserkov' v istorii Rossii:*

Sbornik 9 (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii, 2010), p. 128. The memorandum has been published as A. N. Murav'ev, 'Otvet gospodinu E. Bore na vopros o sviatykh mestakh', ed. and trans. Z. I. Platonova, in *Pravoslavnyi Palestinskii sbornik*, 103 (2005), 106.

30. Kozelsky, *Christianizing Crimea*, p. 78; Maiorova, *From the Shadow of Empire*, pp. 31–2.

31. S. Smirnov, ed., *Pis'ma Filareta, arkhiepiskopa chernigovskago k A. V. Gorskomu* (Moscow, 1885), p. 179 (17 May 1845).

32. Filaret (Drozdov), *Pis'ma Filareta, mitropolita moskovskago i kolomenskago, k A. N. M[urav'evu] 1832–1867* (Kiev: I. and A. Davidenko, 1869), pp. 166–7 (24 October 1845). Murav'ev had sent Filaret the manuscript of those parts of his *Journey* that concerned dogma 'in order not to sin in any way against Orthodoxy': Khokhlova, *Murav'ev*, p. 142.

33. (Murav'ev), *Puteshestvie*, pp. 236–7.

34. W. Young, quoted in Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, p. 16.

35. George Williams, *The Holy City. Historical, Topographical, and Antiquarian Notices of Jerusalem*, vol. 1, 2nd edn (2 vols; London: John Parker, 1849), p. 458.

36. Orlando Figes, *Crimea. The Last Crusade* (London: Allen Lane, 2010), pp. 61–99. Jonathan Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism. English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830–1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 211–12, counters that francophobia outranked russophobia in mid nineteenth-century Britain, and that anyway 'English discussion was directed not against or for particular foreign countries, but on the distinctiveness and duty of *Britain* in the global struggle between liberalism and autocracy'.

37. Verdi to Piave, 23 July 1848, quoted in full by David R. B. Kimbell, *Verdi in the Age of Italian Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 224–5.

38. Smirnov, ed., *Pis'ma Filareta, arkhiepiskopa chernigovskago*, p. 62, where the letter is dated 10 May 1845, a misprint for 1842.

39. The pioneering account was Hopwood, *Russian Presence*, now significantly amplified, though not radically amended, by N. N. Lisovoi, *Russkoe dukhovnoe i politicheskoe prisutstvie v Sviatoi Zemle i na Blizhnem Vostoke v XIX–nachale XX v.* (Moscow: Indrik, 2006).

40. Porfirii left a voluminous memoir: Porfirii (Uspenskii), *Kniga bytiia moego*, ed. P. Syrku (8 vols; St Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1894–1900); on Kavelin, see A. A. Dmitrievskii, 'Ocherk o zhizni i deiatel'nosti arkhimandrita Leonida (Kavelina), tret'ego nachal'nika Russkoi Dukhovnoi Missii v Ierusalime, i ego nauchnye trudy po izucheniiu pravoslavnogo Vostoka', ed. N. N. Lisovoi, *Bogoslovskie trudy*, 36 (2001), 57–175.

41. Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, passim (Mansurov quoted at p. 57); K. A. Vakh, ed., *Velikii kniaz' Konstantin Nikolaevich na Sviatoi Zemle v 1859 godu* (Moscow: Indrik, 2009).

42. I. Osinin, 'Novye stremleniia papy k utverzhdeniiu vlasti ego nad vostochnogo tserkoviiu', *Khristianskoe chtenie* (1862), vol. 1, 108–13. On the salons, see, for example, P. A. Zaionchkovskii, ed., *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva 1861–1876 gg.*, vol. 2 (2 vols; Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1961), p. 25 (7 March 1865).

43. Quoted in full by I. P. Barsukov, *Innokentii, mitropolit moskovskii i kolomenskii* (Moscow, 1883), pp. 620–2.

44. George A. Lensen, *The Russian Push toward Japan. Russo–Japanese Relations, 1697–1875* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 400–16.

45. R. K. Tsurkan, ed,. *'Ia zdes' sovershenno odin russkii…': pis'ma Revel'skogo episkopa Nikolaia (Kasatkina) iz Iaponii* (St Petersburg: Kolo, 2002), p. 67, Nikolai to Makarii, 8 February 1907.

46. V. V. Bolotov, 'K voprosu o soedinenii abissin s Pravoslavnoiu Tserkoviiu', *Khristianskoe chtenie* (1888), vol. 1, 450–69; vol. 2, 30–62, 775–832. On Japan, see Arkhimandrit Sergii, *Na dal'nem vostoke*, 2nd edn (Arzamas, 1897), and N. A. Samoilov, 'Strany Dal'nego Vostoka v vospriiatiii russkogo missionera (Po dnevnikam i stat'iam arkhimandrita Sergiia (Stragorodskogo) – vposledstvii Sviateishego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseia Rusi)', in M. N. Bogoliubov, ed., *Pravoslavie na dal'nem vostoke, vypusk 2: Pamiati Sviatitelia Nikolaia Apostola Iaponii 1836–1912* (St Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 1996), pp. 79–98.

47. Bradley, *Voluntary Associations*, pp. 10, 9 and passim.

48. Adele Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society and the State in Imperial Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 132–5.

49. The pioneering modern study is Theofanis G. Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine. A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), though A. A. Dmitrievskii, *Imperatorskoe Pravoslavnoe Palestinskoe Obshchestvo i ego deiatel'nost' za iztekshuiu chetvert' veka 1882–1907*, introduction and afterword by N. N. Lisovoi (Moscow: Olega Abyshko, 2008), first published in 1908, remains valuable.

50. Quoted in Elena Astafieva, 'La Russie en Terre Sainte: le cas de la Société Impériale Orthodoxe de Palestine (1882–1917)', *Christianesimo nella storia*, 1 (2003), 10.

51. See Omar Makhamid, *Rossiia i Palestina. Dialog na rubezhe XIX–XX vekov* (St Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2002), pp. 49–108.

52. Key articles are listed by D. V. Korovin, ' "Moskovskie vedomosti" o russkikh v Sviatoi Zemle', *Bogoslovskie trudy*, 35 (1999), 209–15. For the sorts of material published by the ecclesiastical press, see Arkhimandrit Antonin, *Iz Ierusalima: stat'i, ocherki, korrespondentsii 1866–1891*, ed. P. B. Butova (Moscow: Indrik, 2010).

53. Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, p. 131; Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims*, p. 94.

54. Astafieva, 'La Russie en Terre Sainte', pp. 11–12. Contributions from the Society's diocesan sections were unequal, dominated between 1901 and 1903 by the dioceses of the Don, Ekaterinburg, Viatka, Ekaterinoslav and Orel, not all of which supplied significant numbers of pilgrims: see Lisovoi, ed, *Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle*, vol. 1, pp. 371–3.

55. Chulos, *Converging Worlds*, pp. 66–7.

56. Igor Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche 1700–1917* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), p. 713.

57. Chulos, *Converging Worlds*, p. 80.

58. Lisovoi, ed, *Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle*, vol. 1, p. 58, A. P. Butenov's instructions to V. I. Dorobuzhinov (9 August 1858).

59. Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims*, p. 98.

60. Ibid., pp. 143, 147, 151–3.

61. Katrina Saade Kenny, *Katrina in Five Worlds: A Palestinian Woman's Story*, 3rd edn (n.p.: Five Worlds Press, 2010), pp. 17–18. I owe this reference to William Clarence-Smith.

62. Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims*, p. 163.

63. Ibid., pp. 175–7.

64. Ibid., p. 103.

65. Asafieva, 'La Russie en Terre Sainte', pp. 13–18 (18, n. 76).

66. A. B. Efimov and E. Iu. Koval'skaia, *Velikaia kniaginia Elisaveta Feodorovna i Imperator Nikolai II. Dokumenty i materially (1884–1909 gg.)* (St Petersburg: Aleteia, 2009), p. 797, N. M. Anichkov to M. P. Stepanov (25 February 1908). Unauthorized collections from a credulous peasantry were another problem.

67. Sergiev Posad, *V strane sviashchennykh vospominanii* (first serialized in *Bogoslovskii vestnik*, 1901–2), passim. Arsenii was only the fourth Russian bishop to be permitted to visit Jerusalem since 1800.

68. Arsenii (Stadnitskii), Mitropolit, *Dnevnik, 1880–1901*, ed. Protoierei Vladimir Vorob'ev et al. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Pravoslavnogo Sviato-Tikhonovskogo universiteta, 2006), pp. 351–6 (352), 19 September 1900.

69. L. A. Gerd, ed., *Rossiia i Pravoslavnyi Vostok. Konstantinopol'skii patriakhat v kontse XIX v. Pis'ma G. P. Begleri k prof. I. E. Troitskomu, 1878–1898 gg* (St Petersburg: Olega Abyshko, 2003), p. 118, Begleri to I. E. Troitskii (17 December 1887).

70. Ibid., p. 195, Begleri to Troitskii (20 August 1890).

71. Hopwood, *Russian Presence*, pp. 107–8.

72. Geoffrey B. A. M. Finlayson, *The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury 1801–1885* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981), p. 308.

73. J. H. Newman, *Apologia pro vita sua*, ed. M. J. Svaglic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 132.

74. George Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, 2nd edn (London: Collins, 1966), p. 50.

75. D. A. Miliutin, *Dnevnik 1882–1890*, ed. L. G. Zakharova (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), p. 276 (30 May–11 June 1882).

76. Revd Haskett Smith, *Patrollers of Palestine* (London: Edward Arnold, 1906), p. 251, speaking through the authorial voice of 'the Sheikh'.

77. Timothy Larsen, 'Thomas Cook, Holy Land Pilgrims and the Dawn of the Modern Tourist Industry', in R. N. Swanson, ed., *Holy Land, Holy Lands, and Christian History* (Studies in Church History, 36; Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2000), p. 338.

78. Graham, *With the Russian Pilgrims*, p. 106; Lisovoi, ed, *Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle*, vol. 2, 117–69, 'Otchet po revizii denezhnogo i material'nogo khozi- aistva … russkoi dukhovnoi missii v Ierusalime', 4 November 1914. Foreign loans are listed at p. 122, conflicts with the Palestine Society at pp. 139–41.

7
Muslim Internationalism between Empire and Nation-State

Amira K. Bennison

In keeping with other world religions, Islam had a universalist profile from the outset. Although the caliphate, a universalist religiopolitical institution, ceased to actually govern more than a small portion of the Islamic world quite early on, the expansion of Arabic as a lingua franca and centripetal religious impulses such as the annual pilgrimage and the search for knowledge (*talab al-ʿilm*) undertaken by scholars created a startlingly well-integrated society which transcended the political boundaries of the time.[1] Although this society was primarily an elite one, the *umma*, the universal community of all Muslims, existed in the imagination of Muslims from every walk of life.

Nonetheless, non-Muslim invasions such as the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century or divisions of a sectarian, ethnic or socioeconomic nature could rupture the unity of the *umma*. For instance, the famous Islamic historian, Marshall Hodgson, characterized the early modern period in the Islamic world as the era of the gunpowder empires – the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals – whose different religious and ethnic profiles fostered a breakdown of earlier patterns of cultural and religious universalism.[2] Certainly, the development of what might be termed state Sunnism in the Ottoman Empire versus state Twelver Shiʿism in Safavid, then Qajar Iran, contributed to a closer identification between sect, territory and government from the sixteenth century onwards. Nonetheless, religious and intellectual trends often straddled Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal boundaries, providing a basis on which later internationalism could develop.

Moves in this direction occurred in the eighteenth century when a wave of Sunni religious renewal swept across the Middle East and North Africa and was cross-fertilized by similar movements in the Indian subcontinent often as a result of meetings between reformers

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in Mecca for the annual pilgrimage. Although there were tensions between reformers of mystical (Sufi) and scholarly backgrounds, one of the implicit aims of reform was to promote a simple normative version of Islam with strong pietistic and activist strands across the Islamic world from Morocco to Indonesia.

Many reformers expressed their activist and revivalist outlook using the terms jihad and *ijtihad*. These two words are intimately linked in Arabic as they have the same root *j-h-d* which denotes effort and striving. In Islamic law, jihad denotes striving in the path of God, which encompasses both the greater jihad, the individual's struggle against his or her baser desires, and the lesser jihad, public actions on behalf of religion which include jihad of the tongue, the pen and the sword. Its common meaning was, however, fighting for religious ends and books of jihad in premodern Islamic legal compendia generally focused on the rules for licit military engagement rather than other aspects of the concept.

In contrast, *ijtihad* is a more limited term denoting the legal technique of using independent reasoning to derive legal opinions. This technique was in constant use by Shiʻi Muslims, but many Sunnis believed that *ijtihad* had ceased to be operative after the consolidation of Sunnism in the twelfth century. Jurists and scholars had continued to use it in practice, but they preferred to present their work as *taqlid*, a concept which meant respectful emulation of earlier authorities. Sunni reformers, however, revived *ijtihad* in preference to *taqlid*. Frequently, they used *ijtihad* to call for *tawhid*, a word meaning monotheism but also the unity of God, which they juxtaposed with 'deviant innovations' (*bidʻa*) such as the veneration of holy men or the Shiʻi imams which they felt compromised God's transcendent oneness. Although this is often taken at face value, practices categorized as *bidʻa* were also local manifestations of Islam which conflicted with the homogenizing global Islam implied by the reformist concept of *tawhid*.

Shortly after this wave of Islamic renewal began, the Ottoman Empire and neighbouring states such as the ʻAlawi sultanate in Morocco and Qajar Iran began to engage with Europe in new ways as a result of their awareness that European states were becoming more effective in the political and military spheres. Government officials, cognisant of European military and political developments, attempted to apply them in their own states. Meanwhile European powers intensified their pressure on the region, a process which began with the French conquest of Algiers in 1830 and culminated in the carving up of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War and the imposition of European control over its erstwhile Middle Eastern and North African territories.

During these difficult decades, military reform and political modernization became defensive measures to enable Muslims to resist non-Muslim European aggressors. Now the revivalist interpretations of jihad and *ijtihad* used in the eighteenth century to champion internal Islamic developments, provided a vocabulary to legitimize engagement with Europe and modernity: jihad became a synonym for armed resistance to colonialism and then mutated into an all-encompassing social, political and intellectual struggle to avoid total European domination, while *ijtihad* came to denote drawing analogies between Islamic and European institutions and interpreting early Islamic principles as compatible with those of modern Europe.[3] These terms thus functioned to manage the transition occurring in the Islamic world from the premodern to modern eras and they went on to become an important resource for the ideological development of international Islamic reformist tendencies in the nineteenth century, including pan-Islamism and Islamic modernism. For this generation of reformers jihad and *ijtihad* meant an engagement with modernity, striving for Muslim betterment in a changing world, and the assertion of a modern religious identity alongside the secular options of the time.

To what degree these tendencies constituted a modern religious international is a complex question. On the one hand, reformists only represented a small proportion of Muslims from the elite and the newly formed professional middle class and their ability to establish concrete international organizations was limited. Moreover their sociopolitical interpretation of jihad in particular did not go uncontested. On the other hand, most reformers recognized the existence of modern state structures and systems and thus did see their activities as international or transnational rather than universalist in the premodern mode. They also imagined an international civic religious community which functioned according to contemporary social desiderata and modern technologies.

In the rest of this chapter I shall investigate the evolution of reformist concepts of jihad and *ijtihad* in the context of increasing interaction with modern Europe, and their adoption by Islamic modernists to legitimize the creation of a modern Muslim community. I shall then look at the development of this new sector among the Muslim population by reference to the writings of prominent thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) and reform tracts published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Such works not only present a theory of Islamic internationalism but also refer to the strengths and limitations of this new international

Muslim sensibility and its actual field of action. While it may be unwise to speak of a Muslim international in the sense of specific organizations, Muslim internationalism certainly existed.

First Steps towards Muslim Internationalism

The concepts described above were all present during 'Abd al-Qadir's desperate struggle to prevent the French conquering the Ottoman province of Algiers in the 1840s. 'Abd al-Qadir (1808–83) himself emerged from the Sufi reform milieu of the eighteenth century and, galvanized by the French capture of the city of Algiers in 1830, attempted to create a western Algerian state supported by a modern army, a small industrial complex and a reformist Islamic programme. When the French finally attacked him, his jihad against them benefited from the assistance of hundreds of Moroccan tribesmen from the neighbouring 'Alawi sultanate and a sophisticated network of propagandists, fundraisers and traders who linked western Algeria to Fes, Tangiers, Tetuan and Gibraltar.[4] In the Caucasus (Daghistan and Chechnya), Shamil, a member of the reformed Naqshbandiyya brotherhood, engaged in a similar reform programme and led the Avars and Chechens against Russia for thirty years (1829–59).[5] In both Arabic and Western sources the two men were praised for their commitment to domestic Islamic reform, modernization and resistance to colonialism, indicating a growing Muslim sentiment that internal Islamic reform was a precondition for self-defence against imperialism, and the internationalization of that sentiment within Muslim circles and beyond to Europe.[6]

   The failure of military resistance in Algeria and elsewhere triggered the shift in the meaning of jihad from armed resistance to striving to modernize Islamic societies to meet the challenges of the contemporary world. It also engendered a shift in the locus of responsibility and action from reformist leaders such as 'Abd al-Qadir or Shamil to non-state players, in particular scholars ('ulama') and the new bourgeoisie (*wujaha'*). The transposition of jihad from the battlefield to the broadsheet is expressed by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902) in *Umm al-Qura*, his fictional account of a meeting of Islamic reformers in Mecca in 1316 AH/1898 CE, where he defines jihad as 'to glorify the word of God and firmly establish his religion' but 'not by individual fighting against the unbelievers as the masses imagine', because,

> The meaning of combating the unbelievers (*kuffar*) is to strengthen the Islamic community (*al-jami'a al-islamiyya*) and serve the human

community by allowing the unbelievers to participate with Muslims to achieve happiness in both worlds because nations (*umam*) with advanced knowledge have a natural custodianship over less developed (*munhatta*) nations and they have a human responsibility to guide them to the good, even if they are unwilling, in the name of religion or politics.[7]

Although the connections between this intellectual endeavour and earlier armed resistance may seem linguistic rather than substantive, many refugees from French Algeria went to Damascus, including 'Abd al-Qadir himself after a period of imprisonment in France and forced residence in the Anatolian town of Bursa, and their descendants played a prominent role in late nineteenth-century Islamic reformism in Syria, from whence al-Kawakibi originated.[8] Many in 'Abd al-Qadir's circle had hoped to strengthen Islam using pietistic but socially engaged Sufism, but by the late nineteenth century a reassessment of the Shari'a, Islamic law, seemed the best means to maintain Islam and the Muslim community in modern times.

In this context, *ijtihad* entailed rational analysis of the early Islamic era for principles to apply to modern circumstances in preference to doggedly adhering to what appeared 'medieval' beliefs and practices, the approach now pejoratively described as *taqlid*, which had engendered the societal lethargy (*futur*) which al-Kawakibi's fictional reformers lamented.[9] As al-Kawakibi suggested in the above quote, this required an openness to European ideas, perhaps even acceptance of European tutelage, but with the ultimate objective of Muslim nations taking their rightful place in the modern international political system.

To this end Islamic modernists strove to create modern Muslims who would possess a common view of Islam regardless of ethnicity, language or political loyalty and be true to their faith but active in their rational engagement with modernity in its many guises. They would participate in committees and clubs which promoted discussion of politics, science and social development and facilitate the latter by collecting money to provide modern schooling and other welfare services. They would keep abreast of international developments by means of the new Muslim journals being published in Europe, the Middle East and India and thus become part of a small but important new Muslim community of public opinion which was self-consciously equivalent to its European analogues.[10] These aspects were summed up as progress (*al-taraqqi*), the 'buzz word' of the movement.

Modern communication technologies and methods of organization gave Islamic modernism its structural form. The ideas of Islamic modernists and reformers of other types were disseminated throughout the Ottoman Empire and the wider Islamic world by means of journals and newspapers. In 1831 the Ottoman government began to produce an official paper called *Takvim-i Vekayi* which was followed by a spate of privately owned but government-subsidized papers in the 1850s.[11] In the 1860s independent Arabic- and Turkish-language newspapers and journals financed by subscriptions and advertising began to appear and by the 1870s and 1880s, the Arabic press was flourishing in Beirut and Cairo. Although all publishers had to gain a licence from the Ministry of Education following the Press Law of 1865 and submit proofs to the Ottoman censor, Cioeta has argued that the level of censorship in the late Ottoman Empire was less than in many European countries at the same time, enabling the relatively free circulation of all kinds of knowledge and information.[12]

Muslims themselves were very aware of the potential of the press. When 'Abd al-Qadir visited Paris to meet Louis Napoleon (1808–73) as the prelude to his release from French custody in 1852, he was given a tour of various sites, including a cannon foundry and a printing press. When asked for his impressions, he replied, 'Yesterday I saw the foundry for cannon with which fortresses and strongholds are destroyed. Today I saw the letters (*huruf*) with which ruling dynasties (*usrat al-muluk*) are overthrown and their regimes laid waste without them feeling it!'[13]

The simultaneous development of new social spaces in the form of clubs, schools and societies enhanced the impact of newspapers and journals and provided movements such as Islamic modernism with their primary arena for action. Literary clubs in particular recruited new middle-class members alongside local notables and religious scholars and provided an important space for the dissemination of the information published in new journals. Societies with political, sociocultural or philanthropic objectives also appeared in the last two decades of the nineteenth century in most towns of any size, including Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli, Cairo and Alexandria.

In addition, freemasonry, which had enjoyed only a minor presence in the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century, became 'an important social factor in the last third of the nineteenth century' as lodges began to recruit Muslim members in Istanbul, Salonica, Izmir, Aleppo, Damascus, Alexandria, Cairo, Tunis and Algiers.[14] By the late nineteenth century, there were several masonic lodges in Egypt whose memberships consisted of Europeans and indigenous Turks and Egyptians, and

their objectives were generally philanthropic.[15] According to Wissa, freemasonry was an important force not only in promoting European ideologies among the Egyptian elite but also as 'a vehicle for the solidarity and cohesion of the Egyptian establishment and aristocracy'.[16]

Masonic lodges offered spaces where civic-minded individuals of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds could meet. 'Abd al-Qadir joined an Alexandrian lodge in 1845,[17] a move which the French certainly perceived as part of his rehabilitation from a hopelessly medieval *chevalier de la foi* to an enlightened modern Muslim. When he intervened to save Christian families from the Muslim mob in Damascus in 1860 he received a letter recognizing his merit from the 'Freemasonic Association of France' which hailed the civilized world's (*al-'alam al-mutamaddan*) recognition of his divinely inspired humanity which contrasted with the 'fanaticism' (*ta'assub*) shown by his co-religionists.[18] Cited by his son, this letter indicates both the social role of freemasonry and Muslims' deployment of European materials to signal their incorporation into the new domain of international public opinion. Despite their usually apolitical and philanthropic stance, the secretive nature of some lodges also made them a desirable form of association for political activists.[19]

By the early twentieth century an embryonic civil society functioned in many cities of the Middle East and North Africa, consisting of a hodgepodge of conservatives and reformers, some Islamic and some 'frenchified', the colloquial Arabic term for 'Westernized' in dress and attitude. This new urban social formation provided an audience for Islamic modernists as well as for other religious and political theorists who disseminated their written work via clubs and societies, formed such institutions of their own and travelled to give lectures at their meetings, thereby taking religious learning out of the great mosque-universities such as al-Azhar in Cairo directly to educated people who did not claim to be 'ulama'. It was also the members of these clubs and societies who initiated philanthropic activities in the name of Muslim solidarity and involved themselves in the politics of the era.

Islamic Modernism, Ottomanism and European Imperialism

Middle Eastern cultural, religious and political identities in this period could not be disentangled from the tangible threat to the Ottoman Empire's independence presented by Britain, France and Russia. Christian communities saw European powers as potential protectors and supporters of their aspirations for independence, but the

situation of Muslims was different. They identified more closely with the Ottoman Empire and became exposed to a series of cross-cutting ideological trends which sought to unite them against the European enemy and re-establish their place in the world order either as ethnolinguistic nations or as Muslims. On the one hand, Arabism and Turkism defined the Arabs and Turks as distinct peoples and defined their cultural identity and achievements, laying the foundations for secular Arab and Turkish nationalism which incorporated people of all faiths. On the other hand, Ottoman reformers of both a radical and conservative colour, including the sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1908), endeavoured to create a new Ottoman sense of nationality which utilized Islam in various ways.

While the Young Ottomans of the Tanzimat era had focused on developing a new cultural interpretation of Islam to encourage Muslims and non-Muslims to perceive themselves as part of a new secular Ottoman nation, Abdülhamid II imagined a modern *umma* under the auspices of himself as caliph. The function of the modern caliph was not to rule all Muslims but to act as their international protector to mirror the Russian tsar's protection of Orthodox Slavs and to unsettle the British in India and the French in North Africa. The ideological arm of Abdülhamid's caliphate was pan-Islamism, which stressed the need for Muslim unity to defend effectively Muslim autonomy vis-à-vis the threat posed by European imperialism. He came to be regarded by Muslims outside the empire and Europeans as *une sorte de pape de l'Islam*, an image which would probably have gratified him, given his desire for the Ottoman Empire to take its proper place in the nineteenth-century international system.[20]

On the domestic front, one aspect of this endeavour was Abdülhamid's interaction with nascent Ottoman civil society in the form of qualified support for fundraising campaigns for good causes to enhance Muslim solidarity within and beyond the confines of the Ottoman Empire.[21] Although Ottoman Jews and Christians first organized such events, Muslims, mostly women, did too. Özbek mentions a number of women's magazines and societies which solicited funds for orphan girls, girls' schools and even to provide clothing for the needy Ottoman army in Salonica.[22] He also points out that the contributors were often people of quite humble means, indicating the extent to which this new form of giving had been internalized by urban society as a whole.

Abdülhamid II entered this arena directly by initiating empire-wide fundraising for 'poverty and disaster relief, projects in the area of public

services and the military, and those fostering patriotism'.[23] The best-known example of this kind of project is the construction of the Hijaz railway which relied on donations not just from within the empire but also from Muslims in India. Moreover Abdülhamid II ensured that his subjects knew of his public spiritedness by means of the press. Donor lists published in newspapers ensured that members of the public also received due recognition for their generosity and commitment to Islamic causes, putting a social premium on such behaviour.[24]

Many within the Ottoman Empire viewed Abdülhamid II's rule as tyrannical due to his suspension of the Ottoman constitution, his extensive use of spies, and his authoritarian manner. However, this did not prevent them from engaging with his broader message of pan-Islamic unity or using similar methods to appeal to the public. Ideologically, pan-Islamism intersected with the more intellectual discourse of Islamic modernism, described above. Indeed, the Arabic term for pan-Islamism, *al-jami'a al-islamiyya*, could also be translated as Islamic solidarity across political lines, something which was of key importance to Islamic modernists, or even as the Islamic community, making it a modern synonym for the *umma*.

Some of the best-known exponents of pan-Islamism and Islamic modernism are Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the most vocal of the early pan-Islamists, his assistant and follower, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), an Islamic modernist who later became grand mufti of Egypt, and the latter's student and biographer, Muhammad Rashid Rida, who combined pan-Islamic, Ottomanist and modernist tendencies in his life-long struggle to renew Muslim society through education and preserve at least part of the Islamic world from European control. These men are frequently studied alongside each other and have tended to dominate studies of Islamic modernism, along with 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi.[25] This emphasis perhaps exaggerates their centrality, and it is important to recognize that they had their detractors and that numerous Muslims and Arabs published their views on the nature of Islam and Muslim society in the modern age. Nonetheless, it is instructive to investigate how the Muslim community conceptualized by these figures constituted a departure from the universalist *umma* of the past, whether they formed or imagined an Islamic International, and how it related to empire (Ottoman and European) and nation.

The pages of journals such as al-Afghani and 'Abduh's *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa'*, published in Paris in 1884, and Rida's *al-Manar* (1898–1940), published in Cairo, both express how reformers of this crucial era envisioned the Muslim community and provide a wealth of anecdotal and

descriptive information about how their social and political worlds functioned and how European and Ottoman authorities responded to their initiatives. Although intellectual activity is not equivalent to the formation of a new Muslim religious international, *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* and *al-Manar* circulated widely and al-Afghani, 'Abduh and Rida supplemented their journalistic enterprise with extensive travel, public speaking and active engagement with local political and religious elites, both Muslim and non-Muslim, which enhanced the impact of their writings. The journeys of al-Afghani from his native land of Iran to India, Egypt, France – where he was joined by Muhammad 'Abduh – and the central Ottoman Empire are well known.[26] 'Abduh spent time teaching in Syria and visited Tunisia and Algeria as well as making regular trips to France, Switzerland and Great Britain. Rashid Rida was also well travelled and recorded his visits to Syria, Istanbul, India, the Hijaz and Europe in *al-Manar*.

The international impact of these journals may be illustrated by the response of Indian Muslims in particular to the difficulties faced by the late Ottoman Empire. They sent medical aid to the Ottomans during the Balkans wars of 1911–13 and after a trip to India, Rashid Rida was disappointed to hear a rumour that over £200,000 collected by supporters of Aligarh for the purpose of making it an independent university had been sent to assist the Ottoman war effort instead.[27] The awareness of Muslims affairs created by these journals was backed up by visual materials. Postcards depicting the Ottoman army in action and later posters depicting Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) as a champion of Islam appeared as far west as Tlemsen in western Algeria, despite the tensions between Arabism and Turkism in the late Ottoman Empire and French closure of Algeria's borders to neighbouring Islamic countries.[28]

Al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa' and al-Afghani's Modern *Umma*

Although published in Paris for less than a year in 1884, al-Afghani and 'Abduh's *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* was an influential publication which was smuggled to numerous countries and later issued in book form. Despite his atheistic tendencies, al-Afghani became a firm supporter of Muslim unity after 1881 as the only way which Muslims might avoid subjugation to the imperial powers, and wrote impassioned editorials in the journal about the dangers of division within the house of Islam.[29] Writing as he was in the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt, al-Afghani reserved his most biting commentaries for the British whom he believed represented European hatred of Islam in its most potent form. In response, the British unsuccessfully tried to prevent the entry

of *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* to Egypt and India and confiscated copies when they came across them. The paper reported, for instance, that the cabinet had met in Cairo to discuss *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* and then issued a directive to the Ministry of the Interior to have it banned from Egypt and a fine of between 5 and 25 Egyptian pounds imposed on anyone discovered to be in possession of a copy.[30]

The articles in the paper, which was issued weekly, consisted of news reports about British activities in Egypt and the Sudan and editorials on the parlous state of the Islamic lands and the looming threat of European imperialism. In an uncanny foretaste of Huntingdon's late twentieth-century clash of civilizations thesis, al-Afghani juxtaposed Europe, a Christian entity which only gained its identity through the Crusades, against Islam and the Muslims as two eternally opposed religiocultural blocs. However, this also engendered a new and revolutionary concept of the *umma* itself which downplayed previous intra-Muslim divisions such as the sectarian division between Sunnism and Shi'ism and heavily criticized Muslim elites for their lethargy in leading the Muslim masses and directing Muslim rulers to the right path. Al-Aghani's own assumed name, which suggested he was a Sunni Afghan, rather than the Iranian Shi'i that he actually was, reflected his commitment to a nonsectarian understanding of Islam.

In an article in *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* entitled 'The reasons for the decline and passivity of the Muslims', he contrasted intra-Muslim political, ethnic and religious divisions with an ideal of 'Muslims' and 'brothers' who share a common obligation to the entire *dar al-islam.*

> According to the ruling of their law (*shari'a*) and its sound texts, Muslims are required by God to preserve the territories which have come under their rule. All of them are commanded to do that with no distinction between those that are near or distant, nor between those who are united by ethnicity or differ in it.[31]

By way of illustration, al-Afghani lamented the way the Muslims of Baluchistan did nothing while the British invaded Afghanistan and how the Afghans were not upset when the same fate befell the Iranians.[32] He attributed this to the fact that Muslim unity had simply become a pious concept rather than an active applied principle and criticized the 'ulama' for their parochial attitudes,

> For the 'ulama' are the ones entrusted with preserving beliefs and guiding the people towards them but there is no connection or communication between them: the Turkish scholar is unaware of the

situation of the Hijazi scholar let alone those who are further away; the Indian scholar knows nothing of the affairs of the Afghan scholar and so on. Indeed the 'ulama' of one region have no connections between them . . . and it is the same among the kings and sultans of the Muslims.[33]

Al-Afghani reluctantly accepted the reality of different nationalities (*jinsiyyat*) and political units within the Islamic world but he also felt strongly that Muslims had to retain, or forge, some sense of affiliation and responsibility towards Muslims. His solution was for the 'ulama' to implement the 'true heritage' of Islam by reviving the religious connection between Muslims. He recommended that they preach 'the spirit of unity' in mosques and *madrasa*s until every Muslim became a link in a chain which would tremor in its entirety if someone shook one of its links. He also spoke vaguely of an international network of 'centres' in every region disseminating the concept of unity (*wahda*) to the general population, connected to an institute in the 'holy lands', that is, the Hijaz. This institute would have the mission of 'spreading knowledge, illuminating minds and purifying religion from false innovations' by creating a scholarly hierarchy able immediately to take action against them to preserve the correctness, and implicitly the unity, of Islam.[34]

Al-Afghani was rarely more specific than this about the modern *umma* because, as Keddie demonstrates, his primary concern was to mobilize Muslims to defend themselves and the elaboration of a detailed reform programme would have engendered debate and disagreement.[35] Nonetheless his vision encapsulated the striving (jihad) and intellectual endeavour (*ijtihad*) propounded by Islamic modernists in the context of modern political plurality. He envisaged the Muslim community as international rather than universal in the premodern sense and aimed his comments at the new literate urban Muslim public, susceptible to his invectives against the old Islamic order and European imperialists.

In Egypt in the decade before he published *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'*, he tried to galvanize this public by other means, most notably through freemasonry. Al-Afghani joined at least five orders in the 1870s and attempted to use the 'significant number of Egyptians of the educated and public-spirited classes' within the lodges for political ends despite their generally philanthropic and apolitical stance.[36] The relationship between freemasonry, which theoretically united men of different nationalities and faiths in socially progressive endeavours, and pan-Islamism was awkward: al-Afghani's manipulation of the lodges for political ends triggered disagreements within them and his withdrawal

from this arena, accusing his fellow masons of cowardice.[37] However, the reticence of Egyptian masons to get involved with al-Afghani's conspiracies against the khedive also reflected a lack of homogeneity within the Egyptian elite with its competing Arab and Turkish elements and the unfamiliarity of his vision of an active, revolutionary Muslim *umma*.

In the event, Egyptian nationalism became one of the most effective in the region and pan-Islamic sentiment quickly adapted to the Egyptian national framework. After his pan-Islamic youth in the entourage of al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh turned to the legal reform of Islam, a task he undertook as grand mufti of Egypt, a national post. However, this acceptance of the nation-state, or at least the ability to work within the constraints imposed by it, may be one of the features which justify describing ideologically universalist Islamic organizations of the twentieth century as international. The obvious example of this trend is the Muslim Brotherhood founded by the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna' (1906–49) in 1928 which had a universalist agenda but actually operated as a series of independent national organizations in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere with varying degrees of contact and coordination.

Al-Manar and Rashid Rida's Modern Muslim

In contrast to *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'*, *al-Manar* was published for over 40 years and had readers across the Middle East, North Africa, India and Indonesia. It was an eight-page publication issued weekly at first but monthly for most of its life. The initial print run was 1000 and it had 300 regular subscribers, although it circulated much more widely than this implies since individual articles were read and discussed in the clubs and societies mentioned above.[38] In addition to having a wide readership of its own, *al-Manar* also inspired the publication of like-minded journals such as Ibn Badis's (1889–1940) *Shihab* in Algeria.[39] Although it had a clear message of Islamic reform, it did not have the strident polemical tone of *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'* and delved into social and religious as well as political issues. Rashid Rida was its chief editor until his death in 1935 and contributed the bulk of the material reproduced in *al-Manar*, but it also published material by al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Kawakibi, whose famous *Umm al-Qura* only gained renown after its republication in *al-Manar* in 1903.[40] It also included material written by the later pan-Islamist, Shakib Arslan (1869–1946).[41]

For our purposes here, Rida's account of his own experiences and travels are particularly valuable because they shed light on his construction of a normative modern Muslim and the difficulties faced by

Islamic modernists as they tried to promote Muslim internationalism surrounded by the conflicting but overlapping currents of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and Arabism. Like al-Afghani, Rida believed that the institution of the caliphate had a crucial role to play in the modernization of Islam, the maintenance of international Muslim links, and resistance to European imperial tactics of divide and rule.[42] However, his view of the exact role the caliph should play altered due to the dramatic political changes which took place between 1900 and 1924, the year in which the caliphate was finally abolished by fiat of the new Turkish government in Ankara.[43]

At the outset Rida saw the Ottoman caliph as the pivot of Turkish–Arab solidarity and broader Muslim unity and prior to the 1920s he concurred with al-Afghani and al-Kawakibi that Mecca should be the physical location for an annual gathering of the members of an international Muslim society presided over by the caliph.[44] To facilitate cooperation between Muslim sects and ethnicities, Rida also hoped to establish a seminary in Istanbul under the aegis of the caliph whose graduates would do missionary work in rural and tribal areas to promote a homogenized version of Islam.[45] The subsequent demise of the Ottoman Empire forced him to reconsider his views and invest the caliph with a more symbolic role in a new federal *umma* of Muslim nation-states.

The real focus of Rida's attention, however, was the new urban Muslim middle class. His contrasting accounts of his two trips to greater Syria, one in 1909 and one over a decade later in 1919–20, illustrate both his interest in mobilizing the Muslim urban elite and his hopes for the modern caliphate. In his first tour of Ottoman Syria, his natal region, after an absence of 11 years following the restoration of the Ottoman constitution in 1908, his tone was cautiously optimistic and the potential for a modern *umma* under the auspices of a reformed Ottoman Empire seemed to exist. Rida repeatedly made two points to his readership, first that Muslims must revive their faith but also embrace progress by creating a new public education system which combined a solid Islamic education with modern subjects such as mathematics, languages and economics, and second that the future lay in Arab and Turkish solidarity under the Ottoman aegis, and wider Muslim solidarity when applicable.

Rida perceived both these objectives to be the responsibility of the Muslim elite (*wujaha'*) of each town, who included religious scholars, government officials and business men, rather than the government per se. He wished to see the thriving range of societies or committees (*jam'iyyat*) in major cities such as Damascus, Beirut and Tripoli

take charge of these matters because, as he reported from Istanbul a year later, 'governments are weak at this kind of undertaking because they bring politics in which corrupts things'.[46] Some societies were local branches of political parties such as the ubiquitous Committee of Union and Progress (*jam'iyyat al-ittihad wa'l-taraqqi*) while others focused on education (*al-jam'iyya al-'ilmiyya*) or welfare (*al-jam'iyya al-khayriyya*). Where suitable societies did not exist, Rida urged the elite to found them and advised on the work the society should undertake. In Homs, for example, he urged the establishment of a welfare society with the objective of establishing public schools (*madaris ahliyya*) to assist the poor in educating their children.[47]

His lengthy account of his role in setting up an Islamic welfare society in Tripoli gives considerable insight into the strengths and limitations of Muslim civic engagement at this time. Rida characterized Tripoli as lagging behind Damascus and Beirut in terms of social readiness to progress due to the absence of newspapers in the city and its lack of a rail link which could bring daily papers from Beirut.[48] Despite this lack of a requisite 'modern' infrastructure, he urged the *mufti*, Rashid Efendi Karami, to set up an Islamic welfare society similar to the Egyptian one in order to provide free schooling to children from poor families while children from richer families would pay fees. Rashid Efendi agreed but asked Rida to give a speech to the notables explaining the importance of the society and school. He then invited about one hundred men, of whom around twenty attended to hear Rida's speech.[49]

Rida explained that civic organizations were essential to material, scientific and religious progress and that all developing countries required welfare societies so that if a travelling European wished to give money to assist the poor he could write a cheque addressed to the welfare society without wondering whether such an organization existed or not. By way of incentive, he then warned the assembled notables that the restoration of the Ottoman constitution and the creation of a 'democratic' Ottoman government would mean the overthrow of the notables if they did not do something to ameliorate the condition of the Muslim masses! He finished by saying that love and service to the *umma* demanded social cooperation in educating the next generation of Muslims and urged the notables to sign a document establishing a school under the direction of Rashid Efendi 'to promote religious and secular (*dunyawi*) education of a modern type'.[50]

In this speech, Rida assumed that his audience would see progress as desirable and aid from Europeans as a natural part of the development progress, another indication of the multifaceted engagement

by Muslims of this group not simply with other Muslims but also non-Muslim participants in the international system. Whilst the older personalized giving of alms (*zakat*, *sadaqa*) or setting up of pious endowments (*waqf*) was an intra-Muslim endeavour, Rida implicitly saw philanthropy as an international human endeavour in much the same way as the freemasons who congratulated 'Abd al-Qadir in 1860.

The notables of Tripoli responded in an ambivalent way. The fact that 80 per cent of the invitees chose not to attend is revealing, even though the invitation was issued at short notice and there were heavy rains at the same time. The list of donors which follows the published text of the speech is equally revealing as it shows that while Rashid Efendi himself and 'Umar Basha al-Muhammad, who hosted the meeting, gave 100 Ottoman *lira* each, 15 of the 20 donors gave 10 *lira* or less and most gave 5 *lira*, which was a nominal sum. Rida says that some men promised to give more later but one gets a sense of lukewarm commitment, which indicates the difficulties faced by reformers such as Rida in the face of the factionalism and opportunism of local elites.[51] In Tripoli again, Rida commented upon the fact that the existing welfare society was a club for rich entrepreneurs seeking to make money from grand projects and that public clubs were used for slander and gossip as much as for edifying lectures. In a similar admonitory tone, he recommended that the members of the Ottomanism club should purchase books to nourish their minds and hold monthly sessions to discuss a 'scientific, political or social issue' which would also facilitate fundraising for good works.[52]

In addition to attending meetings of clubs and societies, Rida engaged with the population in two other ways which adapted traditional modes of communication to his reformist agenda. Wherever he stayed, he transformed his lodgings into a *majlis* (salon) where scholars, officials and students came to greet him, discuss what they had read in *al-Manar* and hear his views. This was not just the case in Syria but also in Kuwait, Oman and India, among other places. The *majlis* functioned as an important alternative space for civic engagement by bringing together members of different societies and clubs as well as like-minded men of different faiths. In Homs, for example, Muslim and Christian notables came to pay Rida their respects and speak with him.[53]

In order to communicate with the Muslim population as a whole, Rida used the mosque. In Damascus, he spoke twice in the Umayyad great mosque after the *asr* (afternoon) prayer to huge crowds, a time when other teachers also spoke. His message was that the preservation of religion depended upon the Muslim embrace of modern knowledge, 'the mathematical, natural and social sciences and arts', since Muslims

needed modern weapons to protect their states and modern technologies facilitated the practice of Islam: as examples he pointed out that electricity lit the mosque and the Hijaz railway enabled Muslims to reach Mecca easily.[54] To mollify further those who opposed science as an illicit innovation, he contrasted contemporary Western science with the Greek sciences current in the 'Abbasid caliphate, saying that there was nothing wrong with the former because it was instrumental, while the problem with some Greek 'science' (i.e. philosophy) had been its preoccupation with divine matters. On the second evening, Rida faced heckling from a North African who insisted upon the validity of pilgrimage to the shrines of holy men, a subject he was not actually speaking about, but which obliquely asserted the local and traditional in opposition to Rida's modern global vision of Islam.[55]

Rida's second reported trip to Syria took place in very different circumstances when the Arab government of Faysal (1883–1933), son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, was holding out against British and French pressure and the Turks were fighting for their survival in Anatolia. He depicted a ravaged region in which people were suffering from starvation and deprivation as a result of the First World War.[56] When he wished to send clothing parcels to his home village of Qalamun near Tripoli, he did not use the Islamic welfare society he had tried to establish but a combination of French and British organizations who took over a year to get the parcels to their destination, showing the almost total breakdown of the infrastructure in the region.[57] His own stay in the Victoria Hotel in Damascus was uncomfortable and he moved to a smaller hotel with better facilities to receive his usual delegations of visitors. However, these meetings were a pale reflection of the gatherings held on his earlier trip.

One positive aspect of the visit was his commentary on the development of an Islamic women's society in Beirut. This society held 'women's gatherings attended by women and male supporters of the enterprise including literary figures and doctors' who gave speeches and classes using modern books and had discussions with the women on 'literary, economic and health matters'. The women were veiled and sat on one side of the room with men on the other. Rida responded to an invitation to come and speak to the women and lectured on Muslim women's responsibilities to their religion but also to their 'home, country and community', showing his acknowledgement of the new national context.[58] In her welcome address to Rida, the club's president, Khadija Barbir, indicated that the female members were as avid readers of *al-Manar* as men, describing it as 'lighting the Islamic world with its beneficial educational studies'.[59] Although the role of women in this

era has generally been seen in terms of their support for modern secular trends such as feminism and nationalism, it is clear that there was also a place for them in Islamic modernism.

Rida's lively narrative sheds light on other aspects of the modern Muslim experience alongside the development of the press and social organizations, notably the way in which contact was facilitated by the new British-dominated steam communications between the Persian Gulf and India and the introduction of the railway and telegraph in India and the Ottoman Empire. Rida was a fan of such developments – and others, such as the thermos flask which kept his water cold while he was on pilgrimage! – and stressed their importance for Muslims.[60] He used the train regularly in Egypt and Syria and while in India he toured the country, visiting Delhi, Lahore, Lucknow, Benares and the Muslim colleges at Aligarh and Deoband using the rail network. He travelled to Bombay from Iraq via Kuwait, Muscat and Karachi on a British steamer and he also took a steamer from Suez to Jeddah to perform the pilgrimage.

His departure and arrival times were often communicated by telegram (*barqiyya*), which enabled local dignitaries to welcome him and ensure his comfortable transition from ship to shore.[61] In addition to conveying people, the steamers also conveyed the post which took *al-Manar* itself around the Muslim world. In his account of his trip to India via Kuwait and Oman, Rida describes his welcome in every location as being effusive and although he does not specifically say this, the majority of those who hosted him were *al-Manar* readers, since he subsequently dedicated several pages in *al-Manar* to 'public thanks' of the many people who had hosted him and discussed Muslim affairs, especially Islamic education, with him during the trip. Like Abdülhamid's employment of the same tactic, this emphasized the behaviour expected of the modern Muslim by journalistic means.

Rida also alluded to the development of international Muslim philanthropy, especially from India in support of Islamic causes in the Middle East, for which *al-Manar* was a vehicle and also beneficiary. One recipient of *al-Manar* was Mawlawi Muhammad Insha' Allah, the owner of the Indian newspaper *Watan*, who wrote to Rida complimenting him on the *tafsir* (commentary) on the Quran published in it. He offered him a monthly salary to focus exclusively on the *tafsir*, which Rida turned down on the principle that one should not be paid for religious work, and requested that 100 copies of each issue containing the *tafsir* be distributed to Arab mosques at his expense and that others be sent to him for distribution to Indian mosques.[62] Members of the circle around the

Ottoman chief minister had also heard of Mawlawi Muhammad, whom they criticized for supporting the dictatorship of the recently ousted Abdülhamid II by giving money for the Hijaz railway until Rida assured them that he had only done this out of piety and zeal for Islam.[63]

Interestingly, the direction of this philanthropic flow implies a wealth differential between India and the Ottoman Empire with the latter functioning as the recipient of charity, a situation also envisaged by Rida in his call for the establishment of a welfare society to receive aid from European tourists in Tripoli. Additional indications of philanthropy occur in Rida's account of his pilgrimage during which he mentions that the Egyptian government took out a newspaper advertisement offering pilgrims low-cost trips to the Hijaz and paid for a party of 'ulama' to make the pilgrimage, although the political motivations which may have undergirded this offer are opaque.[64]

These observations about Muslim internationalism are based on a brief survey of the theory and practice of protonational Muslim reformers and their Islamic modernist successors. It remains to be seen to what degree they are corroborated or contradicted by other materials. The first generation of Islamic reformers used the concepts of jihad and *ijtihad* to transform their spheres of activity while later reformers adopted this vocabulary and used it to facilitate a new transformation: the creation of a modern Muslim community able to contend with European imperialism and secular nationalism. This had a theoretical dimension and practical ramifications within society itself, both of which implied international engagement.

On a theoretical level, men like al-Kawakibi, al-Afghani and Rida had an international perspective which corresponded to the modern rather than the premodern world. They made reference to nationalities (*jinsiyyat*), nations (*umam*) and nation-state structures which existed within and alongside larger religiocultural entities such as Europe and the Islamic world, and they accepted the modern reinterpretation of the term *watan* from a natal locality to a national homeland. They also adopted a neologism, 'the Islamic community' or 'pan-Islamism' (*al-jami'a al-islamiyya*), rather than simply using the older term, *umma*, to describe their community. Under the looming shadow of European imperialism, reformers often looked to the Ottoman Empire as the symbolic head of the international Muslim community. While this gave Islamic modernism a Sunni emphasis, al-Afghani promoted a view of Muslim identity and cooperation beyond the constraints of sect, nation-statehood, imperialism and ethnicity. Rashid Rida was a reformer of a

different type, inspired by al-Afghani but also by Muhammad 'Abduh who spent much of his life promoting a modern normative type of Islam through a concerted reinterpretation of the Quran and Sunna. However, Rida, too, hoped that the caliph might give leadership to the contemporary Muslim community, a hope that was dashed by the abolition of the caliphate and which may have contributed to Rida's perceived conservatism in his later years.

In the realm of praxis, Rida's travel accounts provide many insights into how Muslims did or did not associate at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. Clearly, Muslims who read *al-Manar* considered themselves part of a network which transcended national and imperial boundaries. They showed nascent international philanthropy in the form of donations to *al-Manar* itself and various Ottoman projects. This contributed to unprecedented connections between the Ottoman and Indian Muslim public spheres, which found a political outlet in the Khilafat movement. Local societies of many kinds also engaged in philanthropic activities which became international news via *al-Manar*.

However, this international sensibility was largely informal rather than institutionalized and international Muslim action was often conspicuous by its absence. The societies and masonic lodges which existed across the Ottoman territories shared a modernizing mission in the eyes of Rida, but most had localized and sometimes self-serving agendas which led *al-Manar* to name and shame as well as praise individuals. Few organizations possessed a truly international dimension: the Committee of Union and Progress, the Arab Brotherhood Society or the masonic lodges had branches in different cities but their members usually had local political aspirations. It was left to individuals such as Rida himself to act as the link between the numerous welfare and educational societies he encountered. Moreover this network appears to have been partially shattered in the Middle East by the First World War. When clubs and societies were reconstituted, the majority had ethnic and nationalist rather than Islamic programmes and Islamic modernism declined to be replaced by a new generation of international Muslim organizations.

Notes

1. See Amira K. Bennison, 'Muslim Universalism and Western Globalization', in A. G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 74–97.
2. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilisation, Vol. 3, The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974 [1961]).

3. It is important to note that I am discussing reformers' use of the term jihad and that their interpretations subsisted with older interpretations, some of which were not 'modern' at all.

4. Amira K. Bennison, *Jihad and Its Interpretations in Pre-Colonial Morocco* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 89, 93, 100 et passim.

5. Alexander Knysh, 'Shamil', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 9, 2nd edn (Leiden: Brill, 1960–), p. 283.

6. Alexandre Bellemare said that the three greatest men of his time were 'Abd al Qadir, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt and Shamil, an observation then quoted by Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Qadir in his biography of his father, which corroborates the above point about the growing desire of Middle Easterners to cite European sources. Alexandre Bellemare, *Abd-el-Kader sa vie politique et militaire* (Paris: Hachette, 1863), p. 3; Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Qadir, *Tuhfat al-za'ir fi ta'rikh al-Jaza'ir wa'l-Amir 'Abd al-Qadir* (Beirut: Dar al-Yaqza al-'Arabiyya, 1964), p. 8.

7. 'Abd al-Rahman (al-Sayyid al-Furati) al-Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura: Record of the Discussions and Decisions of the Conference 'The Islamic Revival' Held in Mecca the Noble in the Year 1316 AH* (Cairo, 1899). Bound with similar materials in *Arabic Tracts: Defence and Reform (Islam)* (n.d.), pp. 19–20.

8. Itzchak Weismann, 'Between Sufi Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle', *Die Welt des Islams*, NS 41.2 (2001), 206–37.

9. Al-Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura*, p. 15 et passim.

10. Often Muslims signalled their participation in this community by deployment of educated references to contemporary European figures and publications rather than to esteemed figures in the Muslim past.

11. Donald Cioeta, 'Ottoman Censorship in Lebanon and Syria, 1876–1908', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 10 (1979), 167.

12. See Cioeta, 'Ottoman Censorship', pp. 180–81.

13. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Qadir, *Tuhfat al-Za'ir*, p. 566.

14. Jacob Landau, 'Muslim Opposition to Freemasonry', *Die Welt des Islams*, NS 36.2 (1996), 188–9.

15. A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, 'Afghani and Freemasonry in Egypt', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 92.1 (1972), 26.

16. Karim Wissa, 'Freemasonry in Egypt 1798–1921: A Study in Cultural and Political Encounters', *Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, 16.2 (1989), 143.

17. Jacob Landau, 'Prolegomena to a Study of Secret Societies in Modern Egypt', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1 (1965), 139.

18. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Qadir, *Tuhfat al-Za'ir*, p. 644.

19. Landau, 'Muslim Opposition to Freemasonry', p. 190.

20. Anne-Laure Dupont, 'Des musulmanes orphelins de l'empire Ottoman et du khalifat dans les années 1920', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 82 (special issue: *Islam et politique méditerranée au 20e siècle*, 2004), 45.

21. Nadir Özbek, 'Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism and the Hamidian Regime,1876–1909', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 37 (2005), 59–81.

22. Özbek, 'Philanthropic Activity', pp. 67–8.

23. Ibid., p. 68.

24. Ibid., pp. 69–70, 72.

25. For example, Zaki Badawi, *Reformers of Egypt: A Critique of al-Afghani, 'Abduh and Ridha* (Slough: Open Press, 1976); Malcolm Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
26. The best introduction to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's life and works is Nikki Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
27. He was disappointed by this because he had been assured that Arabic and Islamic studies would be a major component of the new university curriculum, not because the money had assisted the Ottomans. Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Rihlat al-imam Muhammad Rashid Rida*, ed. Yusuf Ibish (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li'l-Dirasat wa'l-Nashr, 1971), p. 84.
28. Dupont, 'Musulmanes orphelins', pp. 46, 47–8.
29. Keddie's comparison of the full range of al-Afghani's writings in Arabic, Persian and European languages indicates that his chameleon-like changes of tone and position probably derived from the Islamic philosophical principle that the intellectual elite and masses need to be addressed in different registers. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, pp. 37–8.
30. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, *al-'Urwa al-wuthqa wa'l-thawra al-tahririyya al-kubra* (Cairo: Dar al-'Arab, 1958), p. 286.
31. al-Afghani, *al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa'*, p. 30.
32. Ibid., p. 31.
33. Ibid., p. 33.
34. Ibid., pp. 34–5.
35. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, p. 44.
36. Kudsi-Zadeh, 'Afghani and Freemasonry', p. 28.
37. Wissa, 'Freemasonry in Egypt', p. 149.
38. These publication details are taken from Jacques Jomier, 'al-Manar', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 6, p. 360.
39. Ali Merad, 'Ibn Badis', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 3, p. 727.
40. Sylvia Haim, "Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 4, p. 775.
41. Jomier, 'al-Manar', p. 360.
42. The caliphate was also a topic of interest for proponents of Arabism, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The Syrian Catholic Louis Sabunji wrote a book called *al-Khilafa* (*The Caliphate*) in 1881, opposing Ottoman claims to the title in support of an Arab caliphate, a position also taken by the Muslim al-Kawakibi. Leon Zolondek, 'Sabunji in England 1876–91: His Role in Arab Journalism', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 14 (1978), 106.
43. See Mahmoud Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117.2 (1997), 253–77.
44. Haddad, 'Arab Religious Nationalism', pp. 254–5.
45. Mission areas specifically mentioned were Yemen, Anatolia and Iraq. Rida, *Rihlat*, pp. 62–3.
46. Ibid., p. 56.
47. Ibid., p. 44.
48. Ibid., p. 12.

49. Ibid., pp. 45–6, 50.
50. Ibid., pp. 47–8.
51. Ibid., p. 49.
52. Ibid., p. 16.
53. Ibid., p. 43.
54. Ibid., pp. 28–9.
55. Ibid., pp. 32–3.
56. Ibid., pp. 227–8.
57. Ibid., pp. 219–20.
58. Ibid., pp. 246–7.
59. Ibid., p. 248.
60. Ibid., p. 120.
61. Ibid., pp. 108–9.
62. Ibid., pp. 58–9.
63. Ibid, p. 58.
64. Ibid., pp. 94, 105.

8
Religious Internationalism in the Jewish Diaspora – Tunis at the Dawn of the Colonial Period

Yaron Tsur

This chapter deals with the early evolution of Jewish internationalism from the perspective of one of North Africa's most important Jewish communities – Tunis. Through its history we shall encounter the key centres of the Jewish International, and explore the motivation behind transcommunal action. Western Jewry led the new course in Jewish history, but subsequently new forms of Jewish internationalism sprang up in Eastern Europe: the demographic centre of the Jewish diaspora. How did these initial developments spread to communities in Asia and Africa? How did non-European Jews react to them? And to what extent did they develop their own preferences in modern Jewish transcommunal relations? The story of Tunis's Jewish community does not provide a general answer to these questions, but it does open a window onto the effect exerted by early Jewish internationalism in non-European communities during the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, in this formative period, Tunisia became an arena for Western competition – followed by competition within the Jewish community between the different nationalist orientations of European Jews and their developing intercommunal tools. As a result, a glance at Tunis's Jewish community illuminates the broader contours of the Jewish International. These contours are, paradoxically, sometimes clearer outside Europe in regions on the brink of colonial conquest than in Europe itself.[1]

Envoy of Jewish Internationalism

In 1878 a young man arrived in Tunis whose name, David Cazès (1851–1912), was to be linked with the changing profile of Tunisian Jewry

in the colonial era (1881–1956). A product of the international Jewish forces then penetrating North African Jewish communities, Cazès's biography opens a window on to one of their chief aspects: the educational networks established by Western European Jewry for Jews in the Balkans and in Muslim lands. For Cazès arrived in Tunis as the representative of what was, certainly before the Second World War, the largest and most influential Western Jewish educational network – the Alliance Israélite Universelle.

The impetus for the establishment of the Alliance Israélite in 1860, some 18 years earlier, had come from Christian Europe – not the lands of Islam. This concerned an incident in 1858 involving a Jewish family by the name of Mortara living in Bologna, Italy. Five years earlier their two-year-old son, Edgardo, had fallen ill and, when he seemed to be dying, his Christian nanny had him baptized in secret so that he might find salvation. The Vatican eventually learned of it and policemen burst into Edgardo's home when he was seven, tearing the child from his family to raise him as a Christian.[2] This incident, which became known as the Mortara Affair, shocked the Jews of Western Europe. They had believed that a new model of Jewish status was taking root in society, at least in the Western part of the continent. That belief was now seriously shaken. This model, promoted since the French Revolution by the Jewish leadership in France, England, Germany, Italy and other places, rested on three elements: (1) legal emancipation; (2) acculturation to the majority society's high culture, which, at this stage, meant the 'national' one; and (3) full integration into all spheres of society. The model had variations and other, different basic modernist models developed in other parts of the Jewish diaspora. But we will define the model of the Western Jewish reformist current outlined above as the classic Western model. Clearly, the Mortara Affair dealt a serious blow to the element of legal emancipation. It recalled the days when society was characterized by the hegemony of the majority religion and the Church gave concrete expression to the inferior, vulnerable status of Jews. That such an affair could take place in northern Italy was particularly alarming, much as the Damascus Blood Libel of 1840 had rocked Western Jewry because the French Consul had supported the accusations of ritual murder made against prominent Jews in Damascus with the backing of the French government.[3] Time and again emancipated Jews found the old attitude towards Jews rearing its head in the backyard of the West. For Jews to pass on to a new stage in the history of their communities, it was vital that they consolidate the Western reformist model. This meant forming new contacts and mechanisms, both international and Jewish.

Thus in 1860, without further ado, the Alliance Israélite was created in Paris.[4]

The original mission of the Alliance Israélite was political – to protect oppressed Jewish communities beyond Western Europe. The shocking episodes that dictated the evolution of the Jewish International in the West struck primarily at personal and collective safety and security: the Damascus Blood Libel, the Mortara Affair and subsequent traumas such as the pogroms in Russia, mass emigration, the distress during the First World War and widespread assaults in its aftermath.[5] But once an urgent problem had subsided, the leading figures and organizations turned their attention to other aspects of the Jewish predicament which, they believed, necessitated reform for the long-term welfare of their coreligionists. The same was true of the Alliance Israélite.

The Spanish–Moroccan war broke out in the same year that the Alliance Israélite was founded. Twenty years after the Damascus Blood Libel there was another Jewish crisis in a Muslim country, this time on the western side of the Mediterranean and of a different sort. Western Jewry prepared for an emergency campaign to help Jewish war refugees in northern Morocco. Britain's Jewish leadership played a key role but the war soon ended, the refugee problem was resolved, and something needed to be done with the remaining funds. British Jews had not yet established an international organization of their own – they were to do so only in 1871 in the form of the Anglo-Jewish Association. Meanwhile, many were members of the Alliance Israélite, cooperating with this organization headed by French Jews. The funds were thus partially transferred to the Alliance Israélite, which decided to invest in education.[6] In the northern Moroccan city of Tetuan, the Alliance Israélite inaugurated the first school in its educational network (1862); David Cazès, who had been born in this city in 1851, was one of its first cohort of pupils.[7]

The education offered at this new institution heralded the profound cultural change that the Alliance Israélite was to generate in communities to which it spread. Its education policy was far from fixed in 1862, yet its principles were already clear: (1) an end to religious hegemony in Jewish education; (2) the ideology of the European Enlightenment to replace religion as the hegemonic factor; (3) an end to Hebrew and the local dialect as the main languages of instruction; and (4) both languages to be superseded by French.[8]

The first three principles corresponded to the educational aspect of the Western Jewish model used in France itself, but the fourth sharply digressed. According to the Western classic model, the modern school

was an instrument of acculturation to the local society's high culture. Thus Arabic rather than French should have been the language of instruction. The digression from the Western model in territory outside Europe exposed the actions of the Alliance Israélite as inspired not only by Jewish solidarity but by French patriotism, and by a conviction in both the superiority of French culture and the importance of transmitting the French national language to Jewish youth in Asia and North Africa. For the territory in question was then an arena for European powers vying for influence, each striving to enlarge its cultural presence as a bridge for economic and political penetration. Reflecting their Jewish solidarity, the leaders of the Alliance Israélite were convinced that French elementary school education for Jewish youth in Eastern communities would be the chief lever for their cultural and spiritual elevation. They also believed that this form of education was the swiftest, surest way to guarantee their economic future because it was the key to mobility in Western market networks that had robustly invaded the local markets only recently. At the same time, reflecting their French patriotism, the leaders of the Alliance Israélite built an infrastructure convenient for their country's imperialist penetration. The two aspects were interwoven and difficult to separate. But the significance of French imperialism for the activities of the Alliance Israélite is clear and frames the digression from the Western Jewish educational model. We see here a kind of imperialist 'mutation' of the modern Jewish educational model devised in Western Europe some seventy to eighty years earlier.[9]

David Cazès aptly represented the vision of the Alliance Israélite from its inception. Before entering the Alliance institution in Tetuan at the age of 11, he had attended the local, traditional school system. There he had been initiated into Jewish sacred literature and its universal languages of Hebrew and Aramaic. This cultural heritage was meant to serve him as the high culture of reading and writing, just as it had regularly served the educated Jewish class in the premodern era. Spanish, too, may have played a role in his early education since the native Jews, who spoke a Judeo-Espagnol dialect, *Haketiya*, used to teach modern Spanish to some of their boys, for commercial purposes. But Cazès's studies at the new school and the career planned for him by the French Jewish institution caused him to diverge from the normal course. During the few years that he spent at the Tetuan school, the leaders of the Alliance Israélite began to grasp that their primary and practical role was not, perhaps, to give Jews in Muslim lands political protection, but rather cultural training: they embarked on a policy of recruiting teachers. The first teachers dispatched by the Alliance Israélite to the few schools it opened

in the 1860s had come mainly from French Alsace-Lorraine. Now it set its sights on local pupils such as Cazès, who excelled in assimilating French culture. It earmarked them for Paris, to reinforce their absorption of the national culture and to equip them to open new schools as teachers and principals. Cazès reached Paris in March 1867 as part of the first cohort of young people undergoing French 'conversion'. Two young men that arrived with him hailed from other parts of the Mediterranean world: Jerusalem and Istanbul. Later that year, there was a fresh shipment of future teachers: another student from Tetuan, two from Tangier and one from Baghdad.[10] The dimensions of the new Western Jewish educational network started to take shape and grew clearer and more extensive from one decade to the next. After finishing his studies in Paris, Cazès was sent to set up the first Alliance school in the Balkans – in the city of Volo. In this decade, the 1870s, he also founded the first Alliance school in Izmir. Then he was called upon to set up a school long-planned by the Alliance Israélite – in Tunis.[11]

Muslim Reformism and Jewish Internationalism

Efforts to open an Alliance school in Tunis had begun in the 1860s and met with repeated failure due to resistance from various interests in the Jewish community and the Muslim government.[12] In 1874 the Alliance Israélite began to nurse new hopes when Khayr al-Din al-Tunsi (c.1822–90) – a statesman and thinker influenced by the European Enlightenment – took office as prime minister. Khayr al-Din represented an international Muslim movement that also falls into the analysis of religious internationalism: a group whose members were known as reformists. Like its Jewish equivalent, the Muslim movement had a modernist agenda that was inspired, at least partially, by Europe's innovations. As an international movement it had representatives in different regions of Islam and some of its people had spent short periods in Europe. It had no official centre or structure; it was an intellectual movement rather than an organized political body. For a long time, however, its de facto centre was in the Ottoman Empire where some of its adherents played a key role in government and established policy that expressed their modernism – *Tanzimat*. There was a branch of this current in Tunis as well, headed by Khayr al-Din who, in the 1870s, reached the highest office of prime minister.[13] In the Ottoman Empire under the *Tanzimat*, the Alliance's schools network expanded gradually, and there was reason to hope that Khayr al-Din would allow the network into Tunisia. It was not to be. Khayr al-Din's official attitude to the

international Jewish organization was positive, yet the license to open a school was withheld.

While Khayr al-Din's relations with the Alliance Israélite are under-documented, there seems to have been a conflict of interests between local Muslim reformists and the international Jewish organization. The conflict was rooted in the connection of the Alliance Israélite to the French imperialist thrust. Neighbouring Algeria had been a French dominion since 1830 and Tunisian reformists were anxious to spare their country a similar fate. An Alliance school in Tunis could have been seen as one of the stakes that greedy France sought to drive into Tunisian ground. Khayr al-Din supported reform in Jewish education and actually obtained land for a new school from the Bey, but he intimated that the education of local Jewish youth was to remain the monopoly of local Jews rather than pass into foreign hands.[14] The relations between these two international movements, the Jewish and the Muslim, were coloured by the global balance of power: the Muslim world was on the defensive and Tunisia's reformists were wary of certain forces; in their perception, the Alliance Israélite belonged to these forces. This was not the case in Istanbul, where there was no fear of an immediate French invasion of Turkish territory. As a result, the Alliance network was able to develop in Turkey and the Balkans before it received any encouragement to penetrate Tunisia. Cazès thus arrived in Tunis after serving as a principal in Izmir.

Jewish Internationalism and Colonial Competition

Before a license could be obtained to open a school in Tunis, Khayr al-Din had to vacate the seat of prime minister. But he was not the sole or even the main obstacle to the entry of the Alliance Israélite into Tunisia. Initial opposition came from both the Bey's administration and the Jewish communal establishment. The dominant local Muslim and Jewish elites were unwilling to relinquish control of educational resources and the sensitive sphere of youth education. Pressure for significant change could only come from alternative elites. For this reason, it was the Muslim reformists under Khayr al-Din who, at first, appeared to be rather accommodating of the Alliance Israélite.

The change in the government's attitude to the presence of the Alliance Israélite in Tunis is to be credited to a local Jewish notable with an unusual profile: Baron Giacomo di Castelnuovo (1819–86). Di Castelnuovo did indeed belong to an alternative Jewish elite which had grown stronger in the face of Western pressures and the waning

of Muslim rule. He represented a minority group in the local Jewish population with roots on the other side of the Mediterranean, in Italy. Italian Jewish immigrants had reached Tunis in waves beginning in the seventeenth century and most of them had melded imperceptibly with the Arab-Jewish population. However, recent immigrants and some veteran elite families maintained strong economic, cultural and political ties with the Jewish community of Livorno (Leghorn), the port city of Toscana. They managed to establish an autonomous community that embraced all the offshoots related by descent to Italian Jewry. Tunis's Jewish population thus subdivided into two communities, each with its own ethnic identity: Tunisians (Twansa) and Livornese (Grana). For the most part, the Tawansa's demographic strength and political force were evident. As far as the authorities were concerned, the head of this large community was the leader of all the Jews, a Kaïd who also filled an important post in government, responsible for the general treasury income and expenses, managing the Bey's finances.[15] Nonetheless, in the 1860s and 1870s the power of the Grana increased along with Western penetration in the region. Di Castelnuovo represented this change well. A relatively recent immigrant from Italy, he served as the Bey's physician while managing wide-ranging business affairs and enjoying excellent connections with both the Italian and French consuls. Shortly after Khayr al-Din was ousted in 1878, di Castelnuovo used his palace and diplomatic connections to obtain the sought-after permit for the Alliance Israélite, paving the way for Cazès's arrival from Izmir.[16]

Just as Cazès's biography as pupil, teacher and school principal helps illustrate the spread of the international Alliance education system, so Baron di Castelnuovo exemplified the economic and political net that the Alliance Israélite cast from Paris. As we have seen, the original purpose of the Alliance had not been education. It had sought to build a network of philanthropic and political support for Jews the world over. The links of this network were small committees established with the encouragement of the Alliance Israélite in every possible Jewish community. From 1877, di Castelnuovo was the chairman of one such committee.[17]

The committees consisted of figures from the local elite who, on the one hand, could be a source of information about the community's situation and problems (if there were any) and, on the other, could mobilize support for Alliance initiatives – from projects such as a local Alliance school to international aid for Jews in distress, whether due to natural disasters or to pogroms. The network of committees preceded the network of schools and was much easier to establish. However, unlike the

corps of principals and teachers who were entirely dependent on the Parisian centre, members of the local committees, by their very nature, had power of their own and did not necessarily bow to the central authority in Paris. On the contrary, they were able to serve local interests that might have totally escaped the organization heads – and even been diametrically opposed to their intentions and plans. This was the case with di Castelnuovo.

We have seen that di Castelnuovo was a fairly new immigrant from Italy. Far from severing his ties with his mother country, he was actively involved in its struggle for independence. Once independence was achieved, Italy, too, entered the colonial race for Tunisia. Di Castelnuovo, one of the leaders of the Italian colony there, was one of the foremost promoters of Italian interests. He shared the ideology of Western Jewish reformism; however, he belonged to the Italian rather than the French camp in the power struggles of the West. Since Italian Jewry did not establish its own international Jewish network, di Castelnuovo set his sights on the Alliance network. He meant to draw on it to strengthen the local Italian-Jewish community, and to use the school not for French but for Italian acculturation of the Arab-Jewish majority, the Twansa. He also planned to turn the local Alliance Israélite committee, now under Livornese control, into the major welfare committee of the entire Jewish community. In short, the Italian-Jewish baron intended to harness the development of Jewish internationalism not only to Western-style Jewish reformism, but to changing the traditional majority–minority internal Jewish balance and to reinforcing Italy's imperialist stake in Tunisia.[18]

Di Castelnuovo was among the first to welcome Cazès to Tunisia and to begin with the two men were on excellent terms. They shared the ideology of Western Jewish reformism, supporting the 'mutation' of the classic Western model in the lands of Islam (and the Balkans) outlined above. They differed only in their vision of the desired, hegemonic Western culture – French or Italian. But in 1878 this was not a bone of contention. Cazès learned of di Castelnuovo's hidden political motives only gradually.

United around the Idea of a Modern School

Di Castelnuovo's involvement in the Alliance Israélite's penetration of Tunis illuminates the development of a branch of Western Jewish reformism there. For years, this kind of reformism was considered the most prominent aspect of international Jewish influence in the

local arena. However, in recent decades research has exposed the existence of local elites and currents inspired by the development of new centres within the Jewish International based in Eastern Europe, not the West. To recap, the efforts of the Alliance Israélite to open a school in Tunis had begun in the 1860s but failed because of interests and objections from parties in the Jewish community and from the Muslim government. In the Jewish community, the political and rabbinical establishment was unwilling to yield control of the education of the young. There were economic reasons, but the chief motive was cultural. Rumours of the secularization of Western communities had reached Tunis and threatened the traditional elites. These elites, particularly the rabbis, were in contact with their counterparts in other communities. They knew of the development of a religious-ideological counter-reaction to the Western-reformism model that had prepared the ground for secularization. The first centre of this counter-reaction was in Central Europe, in Pressburg on the Austrian-Hungarian border; it was followed by other centres in Eastern Europe. One of the notable centres of this current arose in the Holy Land, in Jerusalem. In time, its members were to be known as Ultra-Orthodox. Rejecting all elements of the Western-reformism model with its vision of acculturation and integration, they were even prepared to forego legal emancipation for the cause.[19] A local branch of this international Jewish current could not develop without minimal political and financial resources. Such backing existed in Eastern Europe, in the former Kingdom of Poland. In Tunis, it did not. Yet Tunis had rabbis who shared the fears that had spawned the Ultra-Orthodox current, which made itself felt in the local arena and on the question of the Alliance school. The rabbinical establishment consulted with colleagues in other, more experienced communities about the desirability of cooperating over the projected school. Though not fully preserved, the correspondence on the subject contains clear traces of the fear of secularization. The religious establishment thus introduced conditions into the community's contract with the Alliance Israélite which, it thought, could ensure the religious nature of the new school.[20]

Ultra-Orthodoxy was the traumatic reaction to the cultural and political message of Western Jewish reformism. But before it developed, another international Jewish current emerged, one representing the adherents of Hebrew in the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) movement. This group, known as Hebrew maskilim, went their own way after two or three generations of cooperation with Western Jewish reformism, and in many locations the two currents clashed. The Hebrew Haskalah evolved as a hue of Western Jewish reformism, accepting the latter's

three elements of legal emancipation, acculturation and integration. But the cultural agenda of the Hebrew maskilim was broader than mere acculturation to the local majority's high culture; it meant also modernization of the holy tongue of the Jews – Hebrew – and its conversion into a modern language of high culture. The maskilim began to create a new Hebrew literature and poetry along with a modern Hebrew press. The Hebrew Haskalah's first prominent centre was in Berlin. This soon vanished, as Berlin completely succumbed to Western Jewish reformism in its various hues, including an interesting form of neo-Orthodoxy. The next centres of the Hebrew Haskalah sprang up in regions where the adoption of the Western model would have encountered serious obstacles – notably in Eastern Europe, in cities such as Vilna, Krakow, Lodz, Warsaw, Odessa and so forth.[21] Nor did the Hebrew Haskalah have an institutionalized organizational form. It bore the character of an international Jewish cultural current with member writers and journalists and their works; it was a transcommunal quasi-republic of Hebrew letters. Its main vehicle of communication was the modern Hebrew press, with an international circulation that took wing in the 1850s.

Eastern Europe's maskilim differed from Western reformists in that they did not pin all their hopes on non-Jewish society but fashioned tools to develop Hebrew as the axis of a modern high culture. The reform model they designed presented an acculturation option that focused on modernizing the original language of the Jews. Although at first they had no conscious national intent, they paved the cultural path for the development of Jewish nationalism. Herein lay the seeds of conflict between the local–patriotic orientation of Western Jewish reformism and the Hebrew Haskalah reform model. By the late 1870s, as progress was made towards setting up an Alliance Israélite school in Tunis, the conflict was already evident: the vision of emancipation had suffered serious setbacks in the Russian Empire and the Hebrew Haskalah press gradually moved towards an increasingly Jewish-national line, which was to reach its full expression after the pogroms of 1882.[22]

The Hebrew Haskalah current had a small, interesting branch in Tunis. The first of its activists to send off a letter to the international Hebrew press was a local merchant by the name of Abraham Chemla (d.1883). He was a severe critic of the corruption in the upper echelons of the Jewish community in Tunis. In the twilight of autonomous Muslim rule he seemed to identify with the Muslim reformist current, striving to promote Khayr al-Din in the period's most important Hebrew newspaper, *Hamagid*.[23] But like many of his maskilic counterparts in Eastern Europe, he became disappointed with the deficiency of reform in general

government and at a certain stage applied to the Alliance Israélite for help, particularly when his complaints against the authorities nearly cost him his head.[24] When it became known that an Alliance Israélite school was to be built, Chemla was one of its chief enthusiasts.[25]

The cultural and political agenda of the Alliance Israélite, a Western network headquartered in Paris, was not fully known in Tunis. The city rabbis had been warned through the Ultra-Orthodox network not to permit the establishment of any secular school, yet they hoped that they would be able to channel the new institution along a course acceptable to them. Di Castelnuovo, like the leaders of the Alliance Israélite, was interested in modern, Western, secular education and he hoped he would be able to direct the school along Italian-national lines. Chemla's precise cultural agenda is unclear, but he passed away soon after the Alliance school was established in 1878; his place was taken by another maskil, Shalom Flak (1855–1936), who identified entirely with the national-Hebrew orientation of the Hebrew Haskalah press in those years. It seems that the only people who did not believe in the benefits to come from the new school were members of the Muslim government, including the reformists among them. However, the autonomous Muslim government was weak and crumbling. Its debility made it easier for different international Jewish currents to penetrate Tunis and the spreading corruption ultimately helped Jewish modernists obtain a licence for the school. When Cazès arrived in Tunis to take up the post of principal, he was greeted by an air of unity. On the eve of the school's establishment, the representatives of the different Jewish currents were able to imagine its development and implications as they liked.

Colonial Domination and Local Jewish Nationalism

The harmony did not last. The first note of discord concerned Giacomo di Castelnuovo, chief local founder of the Alliance school. The school was founded in 1878 and Tunisia was to be conquered by the French in 1881, only three years later. As the conquest approached, di Castelnuovo strained to leverage his engagement with Jewish internationalism on behalf of the Italian side in the struggle for mastery. Cazès, discovering his intentions, took the opposite line: that now was the time to underline the new institution's potential French identity. The colonial race forced a redrawing of national lines that menaced the unity in the Western Jewish reformist camp. At this stage, its local collaborators all belonged to the Grana community of Italian-Jewish ethnic identity. Cazès detected among them a small core of influential figures politically

affiliated to France, and he encouraged them to gain control of the local Alliance Israélite committee. His efforts succeeded but there was a heavy price to pay. The majority of Italian Jews did not identify with France and they stopped cooperating with the Alliance Israélite. Until that moment, the main fruit of cooperation had been the readiness of the Italian-Jewish community (Grana) to relinquish its own autonomous education system in favour of joint Jewish education with the large Tunisian community (the Tawansa) in the modern Alliance school. Now, the Italian community backtracked from its original consent; it left its old education framework in place and managed it as it saw fit. More-over, a large colony of Italian-Christian immigrants was developing and most Grana youth – certainly those from wealthy families – were now educated in institutions that it established. Most of the Italian-Jewish elite thus shifted their interest from intra-community cooperation in Jewish education to inter-religious, Christian–Jewish cooperation based on a common national identity.[26] The conflict in Tunis between these two European nationalist orientations among local representatives of the Jewish International is instructive. At the critical moment diver-gent European nationalist interests won over general Jewish interests. The transition from joint to separate action could be accomplished swiftly because at that stage both powers had a presence on Tunisian soil on which their Jewish factions of identity were able to build. Nor did separateness pose a threat to the local branches of Western Jewish reformism.

This was not the case of elite groups identifying with the typical international Jewish currents from Eastern Europe – Ultra-Orthodoxy and the Hebrew Haskalah. As we have seen, it is difficult to discern an active Ultra-Orthodox current in precolonial Tunis, a situation that remained unchanged upon the French conquest. As for the maskilim, like di Castelnuovo they soon apprehended the particularistic cultural and political agenda of the Alliance Israélite and its Tunis representa-tive, Cazès. When they did, they reneged on their original cooperation with the Alliance Israélite and, like di Castelnuovo, they sought a dif-ferent base for their programmes. But unlike di Castelnuovo, they did not find in colonial Tunis a political, economic or cultural support net-work nourished by a European power. They abandoned the vision of a united reformist effort, which had been promoted by an organization pretending to Jewish internationalism but actually pro-French in orien-tation and encouraging distance from traditional Jewish heritage. For them, the departure was much more traumatic and critical than for the Italian faction of Western Jewish reformism. Aware that without

European Jewish support they were doomed to failure, they sought a brace in Eastern Europe, in currents within the Jewish International that did not yet have either a developed supracommunity structure or the backing of an imperialist power. In that period, the 1880s and 1890s, Zionism began to send out shoots in the form of the Hibat Tsiyon (Love of Zion) movement, and its values struck them as nearest their own. Tunisian maskilim thus formed an early connection with this new manifestation of the Jewish International.[27]

The attempts of Tunis's Hebrew maskilim to consolidate their position in the early colonial period were pathetic. Writing in Eastern Europe's Hebrew press, they bitterly attacked not only the Alliance Israélite but colonial France as a whole. They told of their strategies and tactics to try to stem the French and secular 'conversion' of local Jewish youth, and of their efforts to imbue the local struggle with the love of Judaism and to play a part in the transcommunal national-cultural Jewish current suited to them, not necessarily the Zionist-political one. Ultimately, they were confronted with their severe enfeeblement and reached breaking point in the public arena. Their chief spokesman, Shalom Flak, had to bow to the hegemony of the Alliance Israélite and come asking for a job, even if a minor position, as a Hebrew teacher in its school network. At the peak of his struggle, he had dreamt of establishing a rival, international Jewish network of Hebrew education with its centre in Tunis. When he broke, his ideological rivals provided him with a job, though in return, he apparently had to leave the Tunisian capital.[28]

While the Hebrew modernist current declined, the Judeo-Arabic wing of the local maskilim grew more robust. We have seen that the latter's first representative, Abraham Chemla, apparently tended towards both pan-Jewish Hebrew modernism and Tunisian Muslim reformism, acting to promote local society in all its facets. In this respect, too, the maskilim of Tunis resembled their counterparts in Eastern Europe: while urging the modernization of their original community culture, they themselves were acting to further local society as a whole. Local interreligious modernism and international Hebrew-Jewish modernism could coexist in the archetype of this kind of reformism. The degree of emphasis on the local or international aspect depended on dynamic circumstances; when France took over Tunisia the pendulum swung, for the maskilim, towards the local aspect. The official resources of community education favoured French hegemony and the maskilim found no external Hebrew-national support network, while the broad Jewish public still used Judeo-Arabic for talking and for reading, and new printing options in this language flourished on the private market. Maskilic

efforts thus shifted from Hebrew to Judeo-Arabic, and the first decades of the colonial period saw an unprecedented development of literature and newspapers in the Arab dialect of Tunisian Jews.[29] This stage also saw the modernization of the Jews' Arabic culture, which may be seen as part of the general modernization of local Arab culture.[30] The tendency of local maskilim to seek to integrate Tunisian Jews into modern Hebrew transcommunal culture more or less vanished. Like the Italian Jews, they turned their attention to developing their own communal culture.

Nevertheless, the flourishing of the local Haskalah was short-lived. The cultural hegemony of the ruling power – the French – gradually made itself felt not only by the weak Hebrew current but also by the more powerful Arabic and Italian presence. French cultural domination affected the Muslim majority too, although not as much or as forcefully as it affected the Jews. The difference stemmed from the position occupied by the Alliance Israélite – that influential centre of the Jewish International – in the colonial metropolis: a centre that Muslims did not have at that time. This centre ensured the French 'conversion' of Arab Jews. However, the development of the Jewish International was dynamic and the international Hebrew option made a reappearance. It returned to occupy an important place on the eve of the Second World War as fears rose about the status of Jews in Europe, the cradle of the classic model of Western Jewish reformism. In this period, the Zionist centre in Palestine began to occupy a growing role among the currents and organizations comprising the Jewish International. After the Holocaust its status in Tunisia was comparable to that of the Alliance Israélite. The maskilim of Tunis in the late nineteenth century had failed to bring forth an economic and political support system from the budding Jewish national movement, but a handful of local Zionists succeeded in this after the war that destroyed European Jewry. In the final analysis, the Jewish-national current and its organizations, and Western Jewish reformism and its central pro-French organization, affected the fate of Tunisia's Jewish minority to a similar degree. With decolonization, about half the Jews of Tunisia immigrated to France; the other half to Israel.

The waning of autonomous, precolonial Muslim rule in Tunisia created a convenient climate for both the penetration of various international Jewish influences and a vain show of unity and harmony between the reformist currents. The unity stemmed from complex motives: Jewish solidarity, Western imperialism and modernist ideologies. But it could not persist after the change of government in Tunisia and the coming

to power of a new 'landlord', French colonialism. Most of the potential conflicts lurking behind the broad range of modern Jewish identities represented in Tunisia then burst forth. The pro-French and pro-Italians, who had united around the Western Jewish reform model, felt first-hand that the model embodied conflict between Jews of different national states; conflict that erupted as soon as the die was cast in France's favour in the struggle for Tunisia. In addition, the classic model of Western Jewish reformism and its imperialist mutation encouraged the original Jewish cultures to be abandoned. This ran counter to the model that became dominant in the Jewish reformist current in Eastern Europe, which suited and was adopted by Tunis's local maskilim. This, too, undermined the united front created at the end of the autonomous Muslim period. The pro-Italian current resorted to isolationism, distancing itself from the broad Jewish public; the Hebrew-cultural current declined and virtually disappeared for some time.

What lessons can be learned from the fate of Jewish internationalism in Tunisia? Above all, the story helps us understand the implications of the world balance of power for Jewish communities. Especially prominent is the influence of modern imperialism: people in a distant and relatively small Western Jewish community (France), who had hitherto played no role in the life of Tunis Jewry, managed the education of Jewish youth in the city from 1878 and contributed to forming the cultural and political profile of its Jewish population as a whole. In neighbouring Libya, Italian Jewry achieved something similar following Italy's conquest of that country (1911). Had Italy won the colonial race for Tunisia, Italian culture would have prevailed there as well. Western cultures increasingly spread across Asia and Africa, and the Jewish elite in every colonial empire attempted to extend its national culture as widely as possible.

This was a new phenomenon that had little in common with previous transcommunal relations. The Jews of Tunis were familiar with more or less regular contacts between the religious elites of different communities around the Jewish world, enabling an exchange of Responsa, information on new religious works and the influence of new religious schools and movements. The main actors in this arena were rabbis through whom the messages of that communication reached the local publics and played a major role in the practices that ensured religious hegemony. Concepts and values supporting this system of intercommunity relations were prevalent in the Jewish world and the Alliance Israélite, upon its establishment in 1860, borrowed one – *kol yisra'el chaverim* (all Israel are friends) – for its name in Hebrew, the sacred

tongue. The original concept alluded to mutual religious responsibility among Jews, but the founders of the Alliance Israélite probably chose it because its message of brotherhood and solidarity applied also to Jews who had abandoned religious practices. In general, religion no longer occupied a central place in intercommunal Jewish relations; it often merely marked the boundaries of the targeted public. As Jewish internationalism made its mark in Tunis, the principal actors were new forces in world history: Western imperialism, the European Enlightenment, the Jewish and Muslim reform movements that were influenced by the Enlightenment (*Tanzimat*, Haskalah), and especially nationalism.

To return to the impact of Western imperialism, one may argue that Tunis's case is not typical of diaspora Jewry as a whole. At the end of the nineteenth century the Jews of the lands of Islam constituted less than ten per cent of world Jewry and, in the period under discussion, a no less important international Jewish endeavour was aimed at the troubled Jewish region in Eastern Europe where most of world Jewry lived. There, international Jewish forces strove to ensure Emancipation and conduct mass emigration. Western Jews did not interfere there in local education nor was their connection to Western imperialism pronounced. However, there too they played a key role in managing the affairs of their coreligionists. The different needs dictated different tasks, but in every arena of international Jewish activity in this period, the rise of Western power was obvious – as was the concomitant ability of Western Jewry to assist Jews in other regions, to intercede on their behalf, to try to guide them and influence their destiny.

At the same time, the story of Tunis highlights opposition to this guidance and the ability of opponents to join alternative currents within the Jewish International that developed in the nineteenth century outside of the West. Modernity's map of expansion lent priority but not exclusivity to the global dissemination of the Western current within the Jewish International. In Tunis, we were able to examine the early development of different currents as alternatives to the first. They reflected different conditions throughout the Jewish diaspora, enabled various elite groups in Tunis to choose the orientation, movement or organization most suited to them and to attempt to construct a local branch for it. As alternative currents were added to the picture of international Jewish activity in Tunis, the importance of Eastern Europe as a second diaspora centre became clearer, generating competitive currents to the classic Western European one. Whereas the latter was basically secular and European-nationalist, the currents that developed in the densely populated, Ashkenazi demographic centre of the diaspora emphasized

Jewish religion and/or culture, identity and nationalism. But at the end of the nineteenth century, the organization of Eastern European currents was weak; their status within the Jewish International reflected the troubled status of the Jewish minority in the region, and their ability to help establish viable branches in Asia and Africa was minimal (with one exception – Zion). In parallel, the evolving map of the Jewish International within the Jewish diaspora shows the conspicuous absence of a unique current originating in Jewish communities in the lands of Islam, spreading through them, and even penetrating other areas of the diaspora. In Tunis we met modernist, elitist core groups with their own cultural and political agenda. They were, however, cores, not consolidated elites with a solid social hinterland. Moreover, the region in this period entered its colonial phase when the power of native elites declined.

Jews in the lands of Islam in this period were a minority within the minorities of world Jewry both numerically and in terms of balance of power. Little wonder, then, that they were profoundly affected by international Jewish currents emanating from Europe and that their history reflects the dynamic swings in Europe's status. We dealt in detail here only with the latter half of the nineteenth century when the power of Western European Jewry was at its peak. But we have noted that this situation did not last long; Western European Jewry was gravely hurt in the Second World War. Meanwhile two new centres were emerging – one in the USA and the other in Palestine – both based chiefly on immigrant populations from Eastern Europe. The former tended towards the classic Western model; the latter towards Jewish nationalism in its Zionist form. Against the background of the Holocaust, the Zionist current achieved hegemony within the Jewish International for several decades while the other currents, ideologically weakened, cooperated with it. This explains how, in a relatively short time, the situation in Tunis was overturned and the Jewish-nationalist current was able to impact deeply the fate of the local Jewish community, resulting in the emigration of some 50 per cent of its Jews to the State of Israel.

It is perhaps worth ending by noting the importance of comparing Jewish internationalism with the impact of religious internationalism on the communities of the Christian minority in the lands of Islam. In North Africa, there were no autochthonic Christian communities, but in the Middle East their importance was substantial. The premodern starting point of both faith communities in the Middle East appears similar although their modern history is different: Christians played a prominent role at the start of Arab nationalism and integrated into

the Arab national states – which was not the case with most Jews. It is relatively easy to understand their different routes after the Second World War when the national conflict sharpened the boundaries between Muslims and Jews and international Jewish mechanisms had already entered their pro-Zionist phase. It is more difficult to understand the routes taken at earlier stages when Christians and Jews alike were affected by competing religious internationalisms emanating from Europe. The question calls for a comparison of the two publics with respect to the place of religion within different religious internationals, imperialism and nationalism, the impact of the European centres and so forth. Despite the difference between Christians and Jews in the Middle East, Christians emigrated earlier albeit not *en masse*, and there is room to compare the impact of religious internationalism in this sphere, too. Finally, the European-centred education systems for both Christians and Jews were the most prominent feature of religious internationalism in its early stages: Did they change the profile of the local minorities to make them more similar or more different? A comparative analysis of this type would deepen our understanding of both the Middle East and the nature of religious internationalism.

Notes

1. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 864/09).
2. David Kertzer, *The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara* (London: Picador, 1997).
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9
Transnational Buddhist Activists in the Era of Empires

Adam Yuet Chau

This chapter is about the ways in which religious activists populated and mobilized transnational pathways in an era when expansive empires opened new pathways, widened and reconfigured pre-existing ones, and facilitated their traversing for a wide variety of not only ideas, discourses, institutions, commodities and technologies but also social actors (e.g. merchants, capitalists, labourers, bankers, explorers, adventurers, treasure-hunters, fundraisers, ideologues, revolutionaries, propagandists, scholars, students, militarists, colonial officers, soldiers, sex workers, conference-goers, world exhibition-goers, tourists, Christian and Buddhist missionaries, relic traffickers, pilgrims, cosmopolitans, exiles, refugees etc.). The key images and words in this narrative are 'flows', 'encounters', 'congresses', 'mergers', 'taking advantage', 'collaboration', 'collusion', 'elective affinities', 'mistaken identities' and 'resistance.' By 'the era of empires', for the purpose of my chapter, I mean specifically the period between the middle of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth century, when an imperially ambitious Japan, tutored by, yet aiming to better, Western imperialism, encroached onto the rest of East Asia militarily and culturally in its attempt to build a pan-Asianist empire with Japan at its centre and acting as its ideological leader – later coined the 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' during the Pacific War – that could counter and roll back the influence of Western colonial and imperial powers. Japanese Buddhism played a crucial role in this audacious undertaking, both as a self-interested missionizing effort and a cultural-ideological accomplice of the Japanese imperial state.

The expansionist milieu of the era of empires gave rise to a large group of Buddhists and what might be called 'Buddhism-sympathizers' (among them there were Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Mongols,

Tibetans, Sri Lankan and other Asians, Americans, Europeans) who would qualify to be called 'transnational Buddhist activists'. Exploiting and building both real and imagined connections through Buddhism, these activists wove their personal biographical trajectories and ambitions into the larger fabric of denominational, national/nationalist, transnational/transnationalist, imperial/imperialist and global structures, in the process changing their own lives and contributing to moulding these very structures. This chapter will introduce the lives and works of some of these activists and situate them in the various 'theatres of action' not only within the expanding Japanese Empire such as Taiwan and Korea but also in the West, where 'Oriental spiritualism' was invented and avidly consumed (in tandem with fashionable Orientalist styles such as Japonisme) and where Buddhism, admittedly in newly invented forms, managed to attain the pride of place among contending non-Christian spiritualities and eventually became a 'world religion'.

Under the umbrella term of 'transnational Buddhist activists' it might be useful to develop a typology to understand better the subcategories of activists and the relationships among them. A possible list of the subcategories would be as follows: studying abroad, student-scholar, cleric/missionary going abroad, myth-maker, colonial officer, cultural translator, diasporic, military priest, networker, colonial collaborator, sectarian merger seeker and so forth. Of course many of these categories overlap, and sometimes a person moved from one category to another over time. In what follows I will provide brief biographical synopses of a few prominent transnational Buddhist activists as illustrations of some of these categories and embed these biographies within the larger historical and sociopolitical structures and processes of the time. Unlike most other chapters in this volume, which highlight the ambitions and workings of religious organizations that are international/internationalist either in scope or in aim (or indeed both), this chapter foregrounds the social actors themselves (with biographical sketches of seven individuals), working the transnational and international pathways thrown up by expanding and clashing empires.

Japanese Buddhism in the Early Modern and Modern Era[1]

Though introduced from China (in the sixth century), Japanese Buddhism had taken distinctive shapes over the centuries. Different schools and sects within schools developed and a few had become very influential and powerful, forming the Buddhist establishment in premodern Japan. There were four major Buddhist orientations in Japan:

Pure Land, Zen, Nichiren (all three having split from the Tendai lineage of transmission) and Shingon (esoteric Buddhism). Within the Pure Land orientation two schools were dominant: the Jōdo Shū (the Pure Land school) and the Jōdo Shinshū (the True Pure Land school). And within the Jōdo Shinshū there are the west (*nishi*) and east (*higashi*) branches, headquartered at the west and east Honganji (Monastery of Fundamental Vow) in Kyoto. Within the Zen orientation two schools were dominant: the Sōtō school and the Rinzai school. The Nichiren school spawned the now influential new religion Soka Gakkai. These Buddhist schools and sects are organized following the principle of lines of transmission (through lineages of successive masters). Even though there can be significant distinctions in doctrines (e.g. what is the best way to achieve enlightenment), in practice these schools and sects can be understood as Buddhist denominations similar to Protestant denominations. The Tokugawa shogunate granted many rights and privileges to the Buddhist denominations, and Buddhist temples became important political-economic as well as ritual entities, present in every corner of the Japanese archipelago.

The Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) saw the restoration of the imperial system and promulgation of many new decrees, many of which led to the stripping of power of the Buddhist establishment. As Shinto was promoted as the true spirit of the Yamato race (i.e. the Japanese people) and the spiritual foundation of the new imperial state (though notably not as a religion since it was perceived as *above* religion), State Shinto was invented and Buddhism's previous dominant position was under dire threat. For example, many Buddhist parishes were forcefully converted into Shinto parishes.

Buddhist activists responded to such gross encroachments with two strategies. One was to emphasize the role Buddhism could play in protecting the Japanese nation and the imperial throne, a role it in fact played in premodern times. The competition with Shinto to show one's usefulness to the state brought about the invention of the so-called Imperial Way Buddhism (*kodo bukkyo*) in the 1930s, a religious-political ideology advocating the equivalence between worshiping the Emperor and worshiping the Buddhist 'three treasures' (the Buddha, the dharma and the sangha). This led to the reconsolidation of the Buddhist establishment and the right-wing-ification of institutional Buddhism, which eventually led to the active involvement of some segments of Japanese Buddhism in Japan's imperialist and militarist project.[2] We may call these right-wing Buddhists 'regimist Buddhists'. Though influential in the 1930s and 1940s, this strand in Japanese Buddhism was largely

delegitimized and broken upon the defeat of Japan in 1945 (despite the fact that conservative, rightward-leaning Buddhists are never rare in today's Japan).

The other response to the Shinto threat was what can be called 'reformist Buddhism'. This strand of Buddhism saw the future of Buddhism not in purely nativist terms but in its prospect of expansion beyond the traditional monastery walls, parish duties (such as death rituals for parish households) and state-Buddhism patron–client relations. These reformist activists advocated a more ecumenical vision for Buddhism (which resonated with the modern pan-Islamicist vision discussed in this volume by Bennison and Robinson), and many set up new sects that were often syncretistic (known as the 'new religions'). Some reformists advocated a kind of socially engaged Buddhist theology that was quite close to leftist ideologies and as a result they were suppressed by the more right-wing Buddhist establishment and the state.

But both regimist Buddhists and Buddhist reformists were interested in spreading their particular teachings and expanding their bases. When Shinto was in ascendance in Japan many Buddhist sects sent missionaries abroad to scout out possibilities of expansion or to form alliance with Buddhist coreligionists in other countries and areas such as China, Korea and Taiwan. As a result, Buddhist missionaries and 'merger seekers' of all kinds were active in East Asia and even in the West. As mentioned earlier, the different Japanese Buddhist schools and sects are similar to Protestant denominations, each with a strong corporate identity and in competition with one another for adherents, converts and spheres of influence, and sometimes in cooperation with one another in the face of common enemies and when embarking on shared projects (not unlike, and most possibly imitating, Protestant ecumenical missionary movements of the nineteenth century). Many of these Buddhist schools and sects during this period organized their outreach programmes modelling themselves upon Protestant mission societies, the latter having been in active operation in Japan ever since the reopening up of the country to Western trade and religious proselytization in the 1850s. Space will not allow me to discuss what specific techniques and organizational forms the Japanese Buddhist schools had learned from the Western missionaries,[3] suffice it to say that by the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many of the Japanese schools would qualify to be called 'religious internationals' in the sense used in this volume, that is, religious organizations with a global vision and operating transnationally.

Awakening to Religious Modernity:
Japanese Buddhists Encountering Western Buddhology

As Japan opened up to the West again in the mid-1800s, news of Western scholarship on Buddhism came as a welcoming surprise to the newly shaken Japanese Buddhists. The rise of Sanskrit Studies and the closely related Buddhology in the West was thanks to the discovery and 'invention' of the so-called Indo-European language family by philologists such as Sir William Jones (1746–94).[4] Sanskrit was seen as not only holding the key to the origin of the Indo-European languages but also ancient Oriental wisdom (as in the Vedas). To the extent that ancient languages such as Sanskrit and Pali were connected to Buddhism, a hierarchical order emerged in the Western academic studies of Buddhism: on the one hand, there was an attempt to recover the original, 'pure' Indic Buddhism, and Theravada Buddhism as found in South and Southeast Asia was considered a more direct descendant of the original Indic Buddhism; on the other hand, Mahayana Buddhism as found in East Asia was considered impure, overly corrupted by distance (from the birthplace of Buddhism), time (from the time of the Buddha) and linguistic differences. This ideology of a pure or *Ur*-Buddhism began to have some impact in certain Buddhist circles in Meiji Japan (or at least seen enough as a potential threat to the legitimacy of Japanese Buddhism to be dealt with seriously). One of the more outward-looking and expansionist Buddhist sects in Meiji Japan, the Higashi (East) Honganji branch of the Jōdo Shinshū School (True Pure Land), sent some of its young members abroad to learn from famous Western Indologists and Sanskritists.[5]

Nanjō Bunyū (1849–1927)[6] was one of these young monks sent abroad who eventually became one of the most well-known Indologists in Japan, exemplifying a type of transnational Buddhist activist that we might call 'student-scholar'.[7] Nanjō was born into a Jōdō Shinshū clerical family (his father was an abbot of a temple; see below for an explanation of clerical marriage in Japanese Buddhism). As a teenager he studied classical Chinese and other subjects at the Takakura Academy, a school operated by Jōdō Shinshū to prepare junior clerics. He then became an accomplished young preacher cleric and was brought to Kyoto to assist with works at the sect headquarters, the Higashi Honganji. In 1876, at the age of 27, he was sent by the Higashi Honganji sect headquarters together with another young cleric, Kasahara Kenju (1852–83), to England with the intention of pursuing Sanskrit Studies and Western Indology. The two young men first spent two years in London studying

English and then were welcomed by Max Müller (1823–1900), the German Sanskritist who was then the Professor of Comparative Theology at Oxford University (from 1868 on), to study Sanskrit at Oxford. At that time Indology based on the study of old Sanskrit texts (many of which had been sent back from India and Nepal by various scholars and the East India Company)[8] was a 'hot', emerging subject, particularly in the wake of the rapid expansion of the British colonial empire and the new interest in 'Oriental Spiritualism'. (In fact, the main reason Müller welcomed the Japanese Buddhist students was that he was interested in knowing more about and accessing the collections of Sanskrit and Pali original sutra materials in Japan.) Kasahara unfortunately contracted consumption and had to terminate his studies and return to Japan and died soon afterwards. Nanjō continued with his studies and made some important contributions to Buddhology while in the West. In 1883 he published *The Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka, the Sacred Canon of Buddhism in China and Japan*, an English translation of a Chinese manuscript catalogue of the Ming Dynasty Buddhist Canon (Tripitaka) held at the India Office in London. He also co-translated with Müller sutras from Sanskrit and edited translations of Japanese Mahayana texts. He was awarded a Master of Arts degree by Oxford for his works. Nanjō returned to Japan in 1884, taught first at the Shinshū Otani School (later Otani University, one of the first Buddhist-sect-operated universities in Japan) in Tokyo, took up the post of Lecturer in Sanskrit at the Imperial Tokyo University and later became Chair in Sanskrit Studies. In 1887 he made a trip to Buddhist sacred sites in India and on his way back also visited Buddhist temples and sites in China.[9] In 1889 he was awarded one of the first doctoral degrees granted in Japan. In 1898 he was part of his sect's delegation to Siam, among many other Buddhist delegations from different countries, to receive a gift of the Buddha's *sarira* (relic) from the King of Siam. In 1901 he became a professor at the Otani University and in 1914 he was elected the president of Otani University. Nanjō became an internationally respected Sanskrit scholar and Buddhologist, collaborating with Western scholars, publishing many sutra translations and critical editions (of Chinese and Japanese translations of Sanskrit and Pali original sutras), and introducing Western religious studies methodologies (e.g. philology) to Japan. The reconnection to India through Buddhological scholarship lent the Japanese Buddhist a direct link to the original source of Buddhism (however little impact this link had on the Japanese Buddhists theologically was another matter), bypassing China and Korea, Japan's now tainted historical dharma teachers. Though

Nanjō continued to preach and served as consultant to his sect, his influence on the Buddhist establishment was very limited because of his dedication to the academic studies of Buddhism. The thriving Buddhist Studies scene in today's Japan owes much to the pioneering works by Nanjō.

Proffering Oriental Spiritual Superiority: Japanese Buddhists at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago[10]

The above-mentioned Western-derived new orientation towards Indic, supposedly originary Buddhism was largely confined to the academic Buddhist circles in Japan. In fact, Japanese Buddhism was reinvigorated by this new challenge to its legitimacy, and more Japanese nativist Buddhist discourse was produced at the time to prove that actually Buddhism had reached its highest form after having been brought to Japan and merged with the spirit of Japanese culture. Hence came the birth of highly self-aggrandizing spiritualist Buddhism ready to be packaged and exported to the rest of the world.

But the Western world at that time was ready to listen to the Japanese Buddhists' message. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw an expansive and optimistic West riding on the successes of colonial empire-building and dizzying technological advances. The world became much smaller thanks to steam engine travels, the telegraph, the telephone and heightened cross-cultural contacts. Chicago played host to the Columbian Exposition in 1893, aiming at displaying the wonders of new discoveries, inventions and exotic cultures (and of course in the tradition of a series of successful world's fairs beginning with the 1851 Great Exhibition in London). With full support of the Meiji government, the Japanese delegation to the exposition put together a beautiful display of both old and new Japan, the centrepiece of which was a Buddhist temple structure (a replica of a famous temple's hall). The Japanese display was well received, as exposition-goers were duly impressed by the fact that Japan's rapid ascendance in the ranks of the world's nations apparently did not destroy its exotic and appealing native culture.

As a common practice inherited from previous world's fairs, the 1893 Chicago World's Fair also had numerous congresses and 'parliaments' attached to it, taking advantage of the convergence of professionals, specialists, scholars and prominent people in the same place. A 'World's Parliament of Religions' was organized in conjunction of the fair by a

group of Christians (all Protestants) interested in interfaith dialogues and combating what was perceived as an age of irreligion. Invitations were sent to representatives of various major religions of the world (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism of various countries and varieties, Judaism, Shinto, Confucianism etc.). A delegation of Japanese Buddhists representing many of the major Buddhist schools attended the Parliament and presented to the audience a united front of Japanese Buddhism and Oriental spiritual superiority. Apparently their message was well received, and it was primarily thanks to their well-prepared formulation presented in rather good English (some of the presenters and translators were scholar-monks who had studied abroad). A tradition of selling Japanese Buddhism to the West was born, leading to the famous efforts by D. T. Suzuki (1870–1966) and his presentation to the West of a Zenified Japanese civilization in the twentieth century that had a lasting impact on how the West understands Japan and 'Oriental spirituality' even today.[11]

Literacy, Publishing and Language

Now let's come back to the East Asian 'theatre of action' for transnational Buddhist activists. As mediums of communication, written and spoken languages occupied a key role in forming the new Greater Asian Buddhist public. In the later nineteenth and early twentieth century the Japanese language was undergoing enormous transformations.[12] A new national education system enabled a larger than ever literate public to consume not only novels, newspapers, restaurant and café menus, consumer product manuals but also government announcements, laws, and factory and company regulations. The new Buddhist activists took advantage of the expanding literacy and founded many Buddhist denominational publishing houses (not in small measure following the Protestant missionary example). The publications of these publishing houses included new, affordable and home editions of sutras, commentaries on sutras, famous monks' treatises, scholarly journals and popular Buddhist-themed magazines. Though divided by sectarian/denominational borders to a certain extent, the readership of these new Buddhist publications formed a large and translocal imagined community, a *Buddhist public*, which included both Buddhist clerics and lay people sympathetic to and interested in Buddhism beyond the traditional household rituals (mostly relating to death rituals). Traditionally Buddhist sutras were only aurally consumed by the common Japanese people, as they were chanted by monks at funerals and on

other merit-making ritual occasions. The common people did not own any sutras or read them. But the proliferation of Buddhist publications in the modern era changed this, and more and more common people began to own sutras and read sutra commentaries and printed sermons.

Because the Japanese language has incorporated a large amount of Chinese characters (called *kanji*, 'Chinese characters', in Japanese), and because most highly educated persons in premodern and early modern Japan were conversant in written Chinese, a Japanese literatus (a person of sufficiently high literary training) and a Chinese literatus could communicate with each other using written Chinese, a practice known as 'brush/pen talk' (*bitan* or *hitsudan*), even though they could not understand each other's spoken language.[13] (The same was true for the Korean literati in the same period.) This practice allowed most Japanese, Chinese and Korean monks to communicate with one another without much difficulty. However, this idiom of shared written medium also became the basis of the ideology of 'same written language and same race' (*tongwen tongzhong*) promoted by the Japanese imperialists to legitimize Japan's expansionism in East Asia (and ostensibly in an effort to counter Western imperialism, which was interpreted as a forceful imposition on the East Asians of alien values based on Christianity and materialism).

A significant portion of modern published materials in Japan at the time were in classical Chinese, for example reprints of sutras. This long-standing script conservatism in Japanese Buddhism allowed these Buddhist works to act as potential spiritual export products to China and other East Asian areas such as Korea and Taiwan. For example, the gigantic Taishō-era new compilation of the Buddhist Tripitaka (*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, literally *Taishō Newly Compiled Tripitaka*) published in 1929, besides the Japanese commentaries (which in any case had more Chinese characters than Japanese syllables and were often in classical Chinese), was mostly reprints of sutras in Chinese. It became a gift of choice by Japanese Buddhist sects to their Asian allies in China, Taiwan and Korea.

Yang Wenhui (1837–1911) was credited with initiating modern Buddhist publishing and a new kind of lay Buddhism in China.[14] Born into a literati-official family in 1837 in Anhui Province, he did not follow the usual literati path of taking the civil service examinations and obtaining an official post. Instead, in his youth he wrote poetry and was engaged in self-cultivation. After obtaining a copy of

a Buddhist text quite by chance, he was deeply moved and began devoting himself to Buddhist learning and collecting sutras. Because of his father's connections, he was assigned the job of building works and the reconstruction of Nanjing in the wake of the devastation wrought by the mid-nineteenth-century Christianity-inspired Heavenly Kingdom (Taiping) Rebellion that swept through most of southern China. Now based in Nanjing, he founded the Jinling Sutra Printing Press (Jinling kejingchu) for printing Buddhist texts, especially sutras but also ancient and modern Buddhist commentaries. The reprinting of Buddhist texts was much more urgent now since so much was lost to the ravage of war. He used his own money and raised contributions from lay Buddhists and officials to fund the collection of extant Buddhist texts, the carving of new woodblocks and the repair of damaged old blocks, and the printing of thousands of texts amounting to over a million volumes. Yang also founded a lay-run Buddhist seminary, the Qihuan Jingshe (Jetavana Hermitage), one of the first of its kind in China. Its students included lay devotees as well as Buddhist clerics, including Taixu, the soon-to-be famous Buddhist reformer.

As a transnational Buddhist activist, Yang had extensive experience interacting with foreigners. He was a counsel for the Qing Dynasty embassy to London during two long periods, from 1878 to 1881 and then from 1886 to 1888. While in England he studied English, politics and industry. During his first stint in London he met the Oxford Sanskrit scholar Max Müller and became a friend of Müller's student Nanjō Bunyū (see above). He lent assistance to Nanjō while the latter was preparing *The Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka*. After Nanjō returned to Japan he helped Yang obtain copies of many sutras from Japan that were no longer extant in China for reprinting in China. Yang also collaborated with the prominent Baptist missionary Timothy Richard (1845–1919) to translate into English *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana* (*Dacheng qixinlun*) (published in 1907 in Shanghai by the Christian Literature Society), the very text that years earlier drew Yang to Buddhism. Yang also met with the Sri Lankan Buddhist reformer Dharmapala (1864–1933) – considered by many to be the father of Buddhist modernism – in 1893, when the latter made a trip to China on his way back from the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago (see above).[15] Through this meeting and subsequent correspondence between the two men, Yang was persuaded by Dharmapala of the importance of not only reviving Buddhism in China and India but bringing Buddhism to the entire world.

Mergers and Revitalization: Taiwanese Buddhists Encountering Japanese Buddhist Intervention during the Colonial Period (1895–1945)

The island of Taiwan was the most outlying outpost of the Manchu Qing Empire from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries (after having served as a trading outpost for the Dutch and the Spanish during part of the seventeenth century). The island had seen a steady stream of Han Chinese settlers coming in from Fujian Province across the Taiwan Strait, lured by opportunities in the expanding tea and camphor export trade and abundant land for farming. The indigenous tribal people were driven to more remote and mountainous areas or gradually intermarried with the Han settlers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the coastal and plains areas of the island were well settled with bustling market towns and port cities, and the Qing government had consolidated its rule on the island by establishing Taiwan as a province (while prior to that Taiwan was administratively part of Fujian Province).

The religious landscape on Taiwan at that time was similar to that among the Han Chinese of coastal Fujian Province.[16] What dominated the scene were folk religious temples dedicated to various deities and spirits such as locality gods, the Jade Emperor, the goddess Mazu, and deities specific to the settlers' original home prefectures in Fujian Province. Also widespread were spirit mediums, fortune tellers, *fengshui* masters and householder Daoist priests who specialized in funeral rituals, exorcism and conferring blessing at communal festivals. The government sponsored the building and maintenance of the official cults devoted to Guandi, the city gods, and Confucius. There were a number of Buddhist temples, and all traced their roots to Fujian Province. Some Buddhist monk acolytes would go to famous large temples in Fujian to receive ordination and then come back to Taiwan to pursue a clerical career in a temple. There was also folk Buddhism, where devotees practised vegetarianism, got together regularly to chant sutras, and organized charitable activities. This variety of Buddhism is called *zhaijiao* (literally 'vegetarian teaching') that can be understood as Buddhist sectarianism.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed between the Manchu Qing Dynasty government and Japan after the Qing was defeated by the Japanese in 1895 (known as the first Sino–Japanese War in the historiographical literature) ceded Taiwan to Japan and thus began the Japanese colonial period, which lasted for 50 years, ending in 1945. The Japanese colonization of Taiwan was quick and well planned. First the colonial

political and commercial infrastructure was set up, which was quickly followed by the educational, religious and cultural. The colonial government adopted a pro-Buddhist policy, encouraging the establishment of Japanese Buddhist interests in Taiwan and the expansion of Taiwanese Buddhist temples, as the Taiwanese Buddhist elite seemed to be the most cooperative. Most of the large Japanese Buddhist schools ('denominations') set up branch temples and missionary outposts on the island, serving the fast-expanding resident Japanese population as well as proselytizing to the Taiwanese. But the most effective strategy of expanding influence was to invite local Buddhist temples to join the fold of particular Japanese Buddhist denominations. A new generation of Taiwanese Buddhist broker-monks (the equivalent of compradors in the trading realm) was created, as they learned to speak Japanese, negotiated with Japanese Buddhists and the colonial authorities, interpreted for Japanese sect leaders touring Taiwan giving dharma lectures, went to Japan to visit headquarter temples and to study, and built temples and Buddhist denominational schools in Taiwan.

But the Japanese colonial government was not always supportive of the Japanese Buddhist sects' activities. For example, very early on the colonial government decreed that the Japanese sects and Taiwanese temples were not allowed to enter into privately agreed headquarter–branch relationships. This gave many of the Taiwanese temples the freedom to detach themselves from the adoptive Japanese sects and to develop on their own. It also spurred the Japanese sects to rethink their development and mission strategies in the colony and to begin relying on building their own facilities as their bases for proselytization, all the while continuing to collaborate with local temples and to influence the newly established Buddhist associations on the island.

Buddhist expansionism in Taiwan was halted towards the latter part of the colonial period, as Japan at full-blown war adopted more extreme measures of turning the Taiwanese colonial subjects into loyal Japanese imperial subjects (the *kominka* or 'imperial subject-making' process from 1937 to 1945), when, among other changes, Shinto worship was forcefully imposed on the population.

Below I will introduce three of the most important transnational Buddhist activists during this period of Taiwanese history, one Japanese and two Taiwanese.

Marui Keijiro (1870–1934)[17] was a colonial officer and Buddhist-friendly religious reformer. Marui was a native of the Mie Prefecture of the Kansai region of Japan. He graduated from the Sōtō University, which was a university run by the Sōtō School (the university was

founded in 1905 and was renamed Komazawa University in 1925). He went to Taiwan in 1912 to take up a post in the colonial government as a document compilation officer and interpreter-translator. He was put in charge of investigating the religious situation in the colony and designing ways to 'civilize' the natives. In 1919 he published *A Report on the Investigation on Religion in Taiwan*, which was a detailed survey on religious practices in the colony. In the same year he became the director of the Zhennan Buddhist Learning Centre (Zhennan xuelin), one of the leading Buddhist schools set up by the Japanese Buddhist sects (established by the Rinzai school but later incorporated into the Sōtō Taiwan branch) for training Taiwanese clerics and laypeople. In the same year he also became the section chief of the newly established Shrine and Temple Management Section (*shajika*) in the Bureau of Interior. With some Taiwanese monks and lay Buddhist leaders he founded the South Seas Buddhist Association (Nanying fojiaohui) with an aim to reform Taiwanese religious customs and to propagate Buddhist teachings.[18] The association published a journal *South Seas Buddhism* (*Nanying fojiao*) and organized regular sermons/lectures (*jiangxihui*) for the public. Marui returned to Japan in 1925 and took up a lecturer position in Taisho University, a united Buddhist university established in 1926 as a result of the merging of four denominational Buddhist universities (Religious University of the Jodō school, Tendaishu University of the Tendai school, and Buzan University and Chisan College of the Shingon school). Marui spent 13 years in Taiwan as a colonial administrator and Buddhist-friendly religious reformer, occupying a crucial nodal point in the interactions between Japanese Buddhists, the Japanese colonial authorities on Taiwan and Taiwanese Buddhists.

Taiwanese Buddhist monk and 'collaborator' (Jiang) Shanhui (1881–1945) was born in the northern Taiwanese port city of Keelung (Jilong).[19] His family originally came from Dingzhou in Fujian Province. In 1896 he followed his mother to join the Longhua sect of the 'vegetarian teaching' (*zhaijiao*), a form of institutionalized folk Buddhism, and in 1900 became a formal lay follower with a formal Buddhist title. But as he listened to more Buddhist sermons he decided to go to the Yongquan Temple on the Drum Mountain in Fujian in 1902 with Shanzhi (a monk from Fujian; 1852–1906) to become disciples of a monk called Jingfeng, eventually receiving full ordination there, thus becoming members of the twenty-third generation of the Drum Mountain Linji lineage of transmission. After having studied for more than half a year at Drum Mountain, Shanhui returned to Keelung. He and Shanzhi began raising funds to build the Lingquan Temple on Yuemei

Mountain in Keelung. In 1907 he became an official member of the Japanese Sōtō sect and therefore, when the Lingquan Temple opened in 1908, it became a Taiwanese branch temple of the Sōtō sect and Shanhui was appointed by the Sōtō headquarters to be its first abbot. Thanks to Shanhui's close connections to the colonial government and the Japanese Buddhist establishment, the Lingquan Temple prospered and became one of the four major dharma lineages (*fapai*) in Taiwan. In 1912 he took a trip to Japan to visit the Sōtō headquarters and was given a set of the above-mentioned newly annotated Taishō edition of the Buddhist Tripitaka (*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*) to bring back to his temple. He also went on trips to India and Burma and brought back *sarira* (Buddha's relic) and jade Buddha statues. He focused his efforts on Buddhist teaching and proselytization. In 1917 he helped found the Taiwan Buddhist Middle School (Taiwan fojiao zhongxuelin) for training junior clerics and lay pupils and was its director for 13 years from 1920 to 1933. In 1924 he founded the Lingquan Buddhist Academy. Upon completing another trip to Japan he toured Korea and Manchukuo (both then under Japanese control) and returned to the Drum Mountain in Fujian. He later went to Southeast Asia and spread Buddha's teachings in the then-British Malaya, becoming the abbot at the Jile Temple in Penang, a branch temple of the Drum Mountain Yongquan Temple. He retired to Taiwan in his old age, and upon Japan's surrender in 1945 was involved in the establishment of the new Taiwan Buddhist Association (Taiwan fojiao zonghui). But because of his history of involvement with the Japanese he and many other Taiwanese Buddhist leaders were quickly marginalized by the monks who came from the mainland with the Nationalist (Guomindang) government. He died in December 1945. The Lingquan Temple in Keelung also languished in post-Retrocession Taiwan.[20] Shanhui's personal religious biography illustrates the enormous space for expansion in the Taiwanese Buddhist realm during the early Japanese colonial period, and how an otherwise small segment (represented by Shanhui and Shanzhi) of a regional transmission lineage originating from Fujian (the Drum Mountain), once planted in soil made fertile by the dynamic environment of Japanese colonialism, prospered into a powerful presence.

Monk (Shen) Derong (1884–1971) exemplified another type of Taiwanese Buddhist monk and 'collaborator' during the Japanese colonial period.[21] Derong was born in Taipei county in 1884 to a farmer's family. At age 15 he began attending the government-run primary school in the local area. At that time these government schools taught

the pupils the Japanese language, technical skills and civics. After graduating school he worked as an intern in a Japanese-run photo studio and as a translator and interpreter between Japanese and the Minnan dialect (the dialect most spoken in Taiwan, also known today as Taiwanese). He became the first disciple of Monk Shanhui (see above) at the Lingquan Temple in Keelung (though he was merely three years the junior of his master). Because of his fluency in Japanese, he became an indispensable right-hand man for his master Shanhui, who did not speak Japanese and had to rely on Derong in all his interactions with the Japanese colonial government and the Japanese Buddhist leaders in Taiwan or those visiting from Japan. Indeed, it was because of his interpreting work done for the visiting Sōtō dignitary (chief of Japan Sōtō headquarters Ishikawa Sodo) at the opening ceremony of the Lingquan Temple that he was handpicked by Ishikawa to be brought to Japan to study at the Sōtō Secondary School in 1908. He graduated in 1912. Upon returning to Taiwan he became involved in supervising the newly founded Taiwan Buddhist Middle School (Taiwan fojiao zhongxuelin). In 1934 he was appointed by the Sōtō headquarters to be the proselytizing director of the Rixin precinct Sōtō proselytizing branch in Taipei. In 1938 he was appointed by the headquarters to take over the abbot position of the Lingquan Temple in Keelung. Like his master Shanhui, Derong was also very devoted to training junior Buddhist clerics as well as lay Buddhist disciples. He was involved in the founding of the Taiwan Buddhist Youth Association (Taiwan fojiao qingnianhui) and the South Seas Buddhist Association (Nanying fojiaohui). After Retrocession (1945) he was involved in Taiwanese Buddhist affairs in a limited way. For example, he was elected as a board member of the Taiwan provincial branch of the Chinese Buddhist Association (a national Buddhist organization that eventually came to Taiwan together with the Nationalist government in 1949). Because of his language skills, Derong played a crucial role in brokering between Japanese and Taiwanese Buddhists during the colonial period. When the Chinese Buddhist reformer Taixu (1890–1947; later known as 'the father of modern Chinese Buddhism') visited Taiwan in 1917, Derong served as his companion and interpreter (for those Japanese speakers) for more than a month, which introduced Taixu to important transformations in the Taiwanese Buddhist world under the Japanese. This experience prompted Taixu to take a trip to Japan in the same year to visit temples, sect headquarters, Buddhist schools and learn from the modern Japanese Buddhist experience, which informed his efforts to reform Chinese Buddhism.[22]

Even though most of the major Japanese Buddhist sects have resumed friendly relations with Taiwanese Buddhist organizations in recent decades, their influence on the island is very small today when compared with their heyday during the colonial period. But the expansive vision of Buddhism in colonial Taiwan prepared the ground for the amazing Buddhist revival in Taiwan starting in the 1980s. There are three large Buddhist organizations in Taiwan that have extensive transnational reach in their proselytization and charity networks: Ciji (Buddhist Compassion Society), Foguangshan (Buddha's Light Mountain) and Fagushan (Dharma Drum Mountain). As Taiwan became a major economic powerhouse in East Asia and more and more Taiwanese emigrated abroad to study and to work, the influence of Taiwanese Buddhism has been spreading across the globe, ushering in a new age of Buddhist transnationalism centred in Taiwan.[23]

Collaboration and Resistance: Korean Buddhists Encountering Japanese Buddhist Intervention[24]

Buddhism was introduced to Korea from China. It achieved a dominant position in the religious landscape during the Silla and Goryeo dynasties (sixth century–early fifteenth century). The elite of Korea in traditional times were all trained in literary (classical) Chinese, and all government documents and religious tracts were written in classical Chinese, even though the pronunciation of individual characters were different from that in Chinese. Despite the invention and promulgation of the Korean alphabet (*hangul*) by Emperor Sejong in 1446, writing in *hangul* did not become widespread until the twentieth century. All Buddhist sutras in traditional Korea were written and printed in Chinese characters (often reprints of Chinese editions), as was the case in Japan, and during the Silla and Goryeo dynasties the Buddhist clerics were elite members of society. But the ascendance of neo-Confucian ideologies during the Choson (or Joseon) Yi Dynasty (1392–1897/1910) ended the Buddhist dominance, as the neo-Confucians adopted a virulent anti-Buddhist attitude. Many Buddhist temples were closed or appropriated by the state, and Buddhist monks were even prohibited from entering Seoul, the imperial capital. The remaining temples were mostly located in the mountains and the monks became isolated from the wider Korean society.

The Japanese colonial presence in Korea presented an opportunity for Korean Buddhist revival. There was already some Japanese Buddhist clerical presence in parts of Korea before the nineteenth century, mostly

catering for the Japanese traders and other residents in port cities such as Pusan. The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki mentioned above also forced the Manchu Qing Dynasty to recognize Korea's independence (previously Korea was Qing's tributary state). But this also exposed Korea to large-scale encroachment by Japanese commercial and political interests, and in 1910 Korea was officially annexed to Japan and became a colony. All major Japanese Buddhist sects rushed into Korea and competed to establish branch temples, training schools, bring in Korean converts, and, as they had done in Taiwan, persuade Korean Buddhist sects and individual temples to join their sects.

The strong nationalist, anti-colonial resistance to Japanese rule also found expression in Korean Buddhism. While some Korean Buddhist leaders welcomed the opportunity to collaborate with the Japanese colonial government and the Japanese Buddhist sects and to expand Buddhism's influence in Korean society after having been marginalized for nearly three centuries, the more staunch nationalist-minded Buddhists refused to collaborate. One of the points of contention between the collaborationists and the resisters was the issue of clerical marriage and meat eating, brought over to Korea by the Japanese Buddhist sects.[25] Some progressives welcomed the relaxed stipulations on sangha precepts and argued that this would bring Buddhism closer to the masses while the traditionalists insisted that such changes were against fundamental sangha principles. Those Korean clerics willing to collaborate were groomed to become abbots of important temples while those who resisted were marginalized.

Two Korean monks will serve to illustrate the figures of 'collaborator' and 'creative appropriator'.

Yi Hoe-gwang (1862–1933) was perhaps the most notorious 'collaborator' monk during the Japanese colonial period.[26] Yi was an heir (dharma descendant) to Poun Keungyeop, a prominent Seon (Chan) patriarch of the late Choson period. Yi became one of the greatest lecturers on dharma in his late twenties and early thirties. His more intimate encounter with Japanese Buddhism came about when he brought the Myeongjin School – the first modern Buddhist school in Korea, the precursor of the Dongguk University – under the sponsorship of one of the Japanese Buddhist sects, the Jōdo Shū. In 1908, a large group of senior Korean Buddhist monks gathered and decided to found a new Buddhist order called the Won Order as an effort to consolidate and modernize Korean Buddhism, in large part as a response to the threats and opportunities thrown up by the Japanese presence. They

elected Yi to be the Grand Patriarch of the new order. In 1910, soon after the official annexation of Korea by Japan, Yi went to Tokyo to negotiate an alliance (though more like a subordination merger) of the order with the Japanese Sōtō Zen sect. This 'alliance cum merger' would have meant that the Sōtō sect would have control of a vast majority of the powerful Korean Buddhist temples and monks.[27] But with fierce opposition from monks aiming for a more independent Korean Buddhism, the merger attempt failed. In the early 1920s, Yi again tried to merge Korean Buddhism with the Japanese Rinzai sect (of the Myosinji branch), the other Japanese Zen sect, but again the effort met with fierce opposition from other Korean monks and failed. But merger-seeking was not all that Yi did. Steeped in Confucian learning and classical Chinese, Yi attracted many Confucian elite to the Buddhism Promotion Society (Pulgyo Chinheunghoe) that he founded in 1914. The Society published a monthly (*Pulgyo Chinheunghoe weolbo*), advocating a modern kind of Buddhism. Yi also continued to hold top positions in the colonial administration of Buddhism. Though vilified as a collaborator, and quite probably an opportunistic careerist (witness his indiscriminate alliance with various Japanese sects in different periods), Yi contributed significantly to the modernization of Korean Buddhism modelled after Japanese examples. He brokered not only between Japanese and Korean Buddhist sects, but also between two Buddhist traditions, one (Japanese) thriving and armed with imperialist power and the other (Korean) weak, vulnerable and in desperate need of outside assistance, however problematic and tainted the sources of such assistance.

Han Yong-un (1879–1944), quite the opposite of Yi Hoe-gwang, is considered in modern Korean historiography as one of the greatest and most patriotic Buddhist reformers of the Japanese colonial period.[28] Born into a well-to-do rural gentry family, he grew up learning Confucian classics. He later joined a Buddhist hermitage and was ordained as a monk. Exposed to the impact of Protestant missionaries and modern Japanese Buddhism, Han began actively promoting the modernization of Korean Buddhism. Like many elite monks of his time, Han went to Japan on a tour of the country and its Buddhist monasteries. In 1913 he published *Choson Pulgyo yusinnon* (*A Thesis on Reforming Korean Buddhism*), advocating a thorough destruction of Korean Buddhism in its then current form in order to build a new Korean Buddhism. One of the most unorthodox views Han advocated was that Korean monks should follow the example of Japanese monks of getting married, so that not

only the descendants of these unions would ensure that the number of Buddhists would grow but, more importantly, that Korean Buddhists could once again penetrate to the heart of Korean society rather than staying away meditating in the mountains. Though initially opposed by many monks who were traditionally minded, clerical marriage took root in Korea and was followed by the majority of Korean monks during the latter years of the Japanese colonial era. Han's other reformist and modernizing proposals also included the translation of Buddhist sutras from Chinese into Korean (*hangul*) to facilitate the wider dissemination of Buddhist thought. But despite his radical modernizing views on clerical marriage and sangha–laity relations, Han was a staunch nationalist and opponent to any attempt to merge Korean Buddhist institutions with Japanese ones.[29]

During most of the Tokugawa period, Japan was a country to a significant extent closed off to the rest of the world (as a result of the so-called 'country-shutting policy' partly in reaction to Western missionary activities and the threat of Western colonialism). With the support of the shogunate government the Japanese Buddhist sects enjoyed a dominant position in Tokugawa society. Even though there was competition among different sects, and there were some sect activities among Japanese residents abroad, none of the sects was outward-looking or intended to go 'international'. All this changed with the Meiji restoration, the opening up of Japan and the rise of expansionist ideologies. Japan was to become the light of Asia against the oppression of Western powers, and Japanese Buddhism was to become the spiritual bedrock of a New Age embodied in the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese Buddhists, while facing the unprecedented challenges from Christian missionaries and the rise of Shinto, benefited immensely from this expansive moment and literally reinvented Japanese Buddhism into a religion in touch with all the new developments of modern society. The innovations developed in Japanese Buddhism quickly spread to other parts of East Asia and even parts of the West through colonial contacts and other new pathways of communication, transportation and transmission. A dense network of transnational Buddhist activists emerged that included a diverse range of individuals including Japanese, Chinese, Taiwanese, Koreans and quite a number of Westerners. These activists all seized upon the opportunities offered by the 'era of empires' and through their actions formed an important component of not only the emerging, modern religious culture but modernity itself.[30]

List of Chinese Characters (in sequence of appearance in the text and not comprehensive)

Nanjō Bunyū	南条文雄
Kasahara Kenju	笠原研寿
bitan	筆談
tongwen tongzhong	同文同種
Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō	大正新脩大藏經
Yang Wenhui	楊文會
Jinling kejingchu	金陵刻經處
Qihuan Jingshe	祇洹精舍
Taixu	太虛
Dacheng qixinlun	大乘起信論
zhaijiao	齋教
kominka	皇民化
Marui Keijiro	丸井圭治郎
Nanying fojiaohui	南瀛佛教會
jiangxihui	講習會
(Jiang) Shanhui	(江)善慧
Taiwan fojiao zhongxuelin	台灣佛教中學林
Taiwan fojiao zonghui	台灣佛教總會
(Shen) Derong	(沈)德融
Ishikawa Sodo	石川素童
Taiwan fojiao qingnianhui	台灣佛教青年會
Yi Hoe-gwang	李晦光
Han Yong-un	韓龍雲
Chosŏn Pulgyo yusinnon	朝鮮佛教維新論

Notes

1. This section primarily draws upon Nam-lin Hur, *Buddhism and Social Order in Tokugawa Japan: Buddhism, Anti-Christianity, and the* Danka *System* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); James E. Ketelaar, *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Wang Junzhong, 'Riben fojiao de jindai zhuanbian – yi foxue yanjiu yu jiaotuan chuanjiao weili' ('The Transformations of Japanese Buddhism in Modern Times – Using the Examples of Buddhist Studies and Denominational Proselytisation'), *Shizihou* (*Lion's Roar*), 33.4 (1994), 27–36 (article available online at http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FLLTEXT/JR-MISC/mag86915.htm); Brian Victoria, *Zen at War* (New York: Weatherhill, 1997); Helen Hardacre, *Religion and Society in Nineteenth-Century Japan: A Study of the Southern Kantō Region, Using Late Edo and Early*

Meiji Gazetteers (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, the University of Michigan, 2002).

2. See Victoria, *Zen at War*.

3. For example, the establishment of missionary networks, the active engagement with modern forms of education (e.g. setting up of Buddhist schools, including universities, and running summer schools) and charity, the adoption of mass voluntary organizations such as Buddhist equivalents of the YMCA, the organization of national and international conferences, the establishment of denominational presses etc.

4. See Philip Almond, *The British Discovery of Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Edwin Bryant, *The Quest for the Origins of Vedic Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Dilip Chakrabarti, *Colonial Indology* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1997); Elizabeth Harris, *Theravada Buddhism and the British Encounter* (London: Routledge, 2006); Sheldon Pollock, 'Deep Orientalism?: Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj', in Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, eds, *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia* (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), pp. 76–133; Thomas Trautmann, *Aryans and British India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

5. This section is primarily based on Dongchu, 'Mingzhi fojiao xuezhe zhi haiwai jinchu' ('Journeys Abroad of the Buddhist Scholars of the Meiji Era'), *Haichaoyin* (*The Sound of Ocean Waves*), 15.2 (1934), 69–76 (available online at http://dongchu.ddbc.edu.tw/html/02/4.html).

6. When transliterating Chinese, Japanese and Korean names I follow the East Asian convention of rendering the family name first followed by the given name. See character list at the end of the article for the Chinese characters for Chinese and Japanese names.

7. This section is mostly based on M. Zumoto and J. Takakusu, 'Bunyiu Nanjio: His Life and Work', *Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies*, third series, 6 (2004), 119–37 (online version available at www.shin-ibs.edu/documents/pwj3-6/PW3-6.pdf).

8. I thank David Gellner for clarifying for me the source of these materials (personal communication).

9. On the significance of travel for the reconstruction of Japanese Buddhism, see Richard M. Jaffe, 'Seeking Śākyamuni: Travel and the Reconstruction of Japanese Buddhism', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 30.1 (2004), 65–96.

10. This section is primarily based on John S. Harding, *Mahayana Phoenix: Japan's Buddhists at the 1893 World's Parliament of Religions* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2008). I thank Harding for sharing his work with me.

11. See Martin Baumann, 'Culture Contact and Valuation: Early German Buddhists and the Creation of a "Buddhism in Protestant Shape"', *Numen*, 44 (1997), 270–95; Robert H. Sharf, 'The Zen of Japanese Nationalism', in Donald S. Lopez, Jr, ed., *Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 107–60; Thomas A. Tweed, 'American Occultism and Japanese Buddhism: Albert J. Edmunds, D. T. Suzuki, and Translocative History', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 32.2 (2005), 249–81.

12. See Miyako Inoue, *Vicarious Language: Gender and Linguistic Modernity in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

13. See Joshua Fogel, 'Japanese Literary Travelers in Pre-War China', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 49.2 (1989), 575–602.

14. This section is mostly based on Gabrielle Goldfuß, 'Binding Sutras and Modernity: The Life and Times of the Chinese Layman Yang Wenhui (1837–1911)', *Studies in Central and East Asian Religions*, 9 (1996), 54–74; Holmes Welch, *The Buddhist Revival in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 2–10.

15. The irony, though perhaps not a surprising one, is that Dharmapala had been inspired by Westerners' views on Buddhism, especially those of the American Civil War veteran Colonel Olcott (1832–1907), who was the first to campaign for Buddhists of different Asian countries and traditions to recognize one another as members of a single world religion (see Sarah LeVine and David N. Gellner, *Rebuilding Buddhism: The Theravada Movement in Twentieth-Century Nepal* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005]). I thank David Gellner for alerting me to the importance of this connection between Asian Buddhist reformers and Western 'friends of Buddhism' (personal communication).

16. This contextualizing section is mostly based on Charles Brewer Jones, *Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the State, 1660–1990* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).

17. This section is based on Jiang Cian-Teng (Jiang Canteng), *Riju shiqi Taiwan fojiao wenhua fazhanshi* (*The Development of Buddhist Culture in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonial Period*) (Taipei: MSC Book, 2001); idem, 'Riju shiqi Taiwan xinfojiao yundong de xianqu – Taiwan fojiao madinglude Lin Delin de ge'an yanjiu' ('The Forerunner of the New Buddhist Movement in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonial Period: The Case of Lin Delin, the Martin Luther of Taiwanese Buddhism'), *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal*, 15 (2002), 255–303; idem, 'Rizhi shiqi Gaoxiong fojiao fazhan yu Gisei Higashiumi' ('Gisei Higashiumi and the Development of Buddhism in Gaoxiong during the Period of Japanese Rule'), *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal*, 16 (2003), 211–32; Anonymous, 'Marui Keijiro', *Nanying fojiao* (*South Seas Buddhism*), 12.2 (1934).

18. 'South Seas' during the Japanese colonial period mostly referred to Taiwan, 'south' in relation to the Japanese 'homeland'.

19. This section relies mostly on Jones, *Buddhism in Taiwan*, pp. 39–44; Jiang, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xinfojiao yundong de xianqu*; idem, *Riju shiqi Gaoxiong fojiao fazhan yu Gisei Higashiumi*.

20. Retrocession refers to the taking over of Taiwan by the Nationalist government in 1945 upon Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied forces.

21. This section relies mostly on Jiang, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xinfojiao yundong de xianqu*; idem, *Riju shiqi Gaoxiong fojiao fazhan yu Gisei Higashiumi*.

22. For more on Taixu, see Gotelind Müller, *Buddhismus und Moderne: Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu und das Ringen um ein zeitgemäßes Selbstverständnis im chinesischen Buddhismus des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (*Buddhism and Modernity: Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu and the Quest for a Timely Self-Definition of Chinese Buddhism in the Early Twentieth Century*) (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993); idem, 'Buddhism and Historicity in Early 20th Century China – Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu and

the Problem of Modernity', *Orientierungen*, 2 (2007), 28–51; Don A. Pittman, *Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).

23. For more on Taiwanese Buddhist transnationalism, see Julia C. Huang, *Charisma and Compassion: Cheng Yen and the Buddhist Tzu Chi Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Richard Madsen, *Democracy's Dharma: Religious Renaissance and Political Development in Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

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25. Certain Buddhist sects in Japan had a long tradition of supporting clerical marriage and meat eating. But under the new Meiji regulations the general prohibition against clerical marriage was lifted, causing the large-scale adoption of such practice by most sects.

26. This section is mostly based on Kim, 'A Buddhist Colonization?', and Tikhonov, 'Korean Buddhist Pro-Japanese Collaboration (1877–1905) and Its Modern Critics'. I thank Vladimir Tikhonov for kindly providing me with a biographical sketch on Yi (personal communication, August 2009) and Hwansoo Kim for sending me his articles.

27. Hur, 'The Sōtō Sect and Japanese Military Imperialism in Korea'.

28. This section is largely based on Buswell, 'Buddhist Reform Movements in Korea during the Japanese Colonial Period'; Nam-lin Hur, 'Han Yong'un (1879–1944) and Buddhist Reform in Colonial Korea', *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*, 37.1 (2010), 75–97; Hwansoo Kim, 'A Buddhist Colonization?'; Kwang Sik Kim, 'A Study of Han Yong-un's "On the Reform of Korean Buddhism" ', *Korea Journal* (Spring 2005), 64–86; Jeung-bae

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29. Han was also a prominent poet who initiated the writing of poetry in vernacular Korean.
30. I would like to express my gratitude to the following people: Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene for inviting me to join the international workshop 'Religious Internationals in the Modern World' held at Oxford University (12–13 January 2009); my colleague Amira K. Bennison in the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at Cambridge for introducing me to Abigail and Vincent's workshop and book project; the workshop participants for their stimulating papers and comments; and David Gellner, Vladimir Tikhonov and the editors for reading earlier drafts of this article and making helpful comments and suggestions.

Part III

Religious Internationals in the Modern World: Limits and New Horizons

10

The Hadhrami *Sada* and the Evolution of an Islamic Religious International, c.1750s to 1930s

William G. Clarence-Smith

Modern scholars have tended to neglect the role of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad when considering the intricate transnational networks that developed over the centuries in Islam. They have paid more attention to schools of law, sects, mystical brotherhoods and pilgrims. Earlier generations of scholars, however, were keenly attuned to the significance of the genealogical charisma of the lineage of the Prophet, and the subject is coming back into vogue.[1]

Such an 'Islamic aristocracy' might scarcely appear to conform to the model of a religious International in modern times, given that membership was by birth. Moreover, many descendants of the Prophet were resolutely opposed to anything that smacked of modernity. Nevertheless, segments of this hereditary elite played a key role in rejuvenating Islam from the latter part of the eighteenth century CE. Moreover, they did so, at least in part, through a religiously inflected voluntarism that was typical of emerging religious internationals elsewhere in the world, with the use of modern techniques and through interventions in the public sphere. This example suggests that the break between early modernity and modernity did not need to be absolute, and that some older transnational structures were able to adapt to changing circumstances.

This chapter focuses on one particular group of descendants of the Prophet who originated from Hadhramaut, today in eastern Yemen. From the middle of the eighteenth century, they reinforced existing diasporic structures across the Indian Ocean, becoming very successful entrepreneurs with a strong political and social impact in host societies. Because of their wealth and status, they were uniquely placed to

adopt modern procedures, both associational and material, to achieve religious ends. They can perhaps be characterized as a hybrid religious international, simultaneously deeply traditional and profoundly modern.

Descent from the Prophet in Islamic History

As Muhammad had no surviving male offspring, particular status accrued to those issued from the marriage between his daughter Fatima and his cousin 'Ali, the fourth caliph and the first imam of Shi'i varieties of Islam. Patrilineal descendants of al-Husayn, the Prophet's grandson, adopted the title of *sayyid* (pl. *sada*), while those of the line of al-Hasan, another grandson, held the title of *sharif* (pl. *ashraf*). This distinction was somewhat erratically observed, and in South Asia the term *ashraf* referred more widely to Muslims of Middle Eastern origins. The collective term for the Prophet's line was *ahl al-bayt*, 'people of the house'.[2] They were thought to number some 30 million in the 1980s, a little under three per cent of the estimated global Muslim population.[3]

Men transmitted their exalted status to all their offspring, whether born from up to four free wives of any social background or from an unlimited number of servile concubines. In contrast, a woman from this group could only marry another descendant of the Prophet. The 'people of the house' soon attempted to place barriers against impostors by developing sophisticated genealogical techniques.[4]

The status of the *ahl al-bayt* rose in the 'middle period' of Islamic history (more or less early modern times), for they benefited from a growing reverence for the person of the Prophet, who was generally deemed to have been sinless by the thirteenth century. A visit to his grave in Medina became an increasingly prominent part of the pilgrimage, and celebrations of his birthday became ever more elaborate. Sufis propagated ideas of the 'perfect man' and his mystical 'light'.[5] The *ahl al-bayt* were believed to possess a special spiritual gift, *baraka*, the term used for President Obama's first name. This can be translated as 'blessing', but it can also connote magical power. A male believer meeting such a man was expected to 'kiss' (more accurately smell) his hand, as a sign of respect and as a means of attracting blessings. 'People of the house' might be seen as uniquely qualified to act as religious specialists and played a major role in peaceful conversion on peripheries of the Islamic world.[6]

Politically, the descendants of the Prophet generally remained influential rather than powerful. The Moroccan sultan-caliph was obligatorily a *sharif* from around the fifteenth century, but this was unusual.[7] Elsewhere, rulers appointed a *naqib* to register and administer descendants of the Prophet. The Ottoman *naqib al-ashraf* in Istanbul was a great dignitary, as was the *naqib al-sada* in Mecca, but their jurisdiction was limited, and there was no single *naqib* for the whole Islamic world.[8]

The exaltation of the Prophet's progeny did not go uncontested. Social egalitarianism was strong in Islam, and was reinforced by a dislike of mediators between believers and God. Even a slave woman could head a Sufi mystical order, and the ulama, the scholars of Islam, were to be distinguished by their knowledge and piety, not by their birth. Moreover, quite a few *sada* and *ashraf*, especially in areas where they were numerous, fell into poverty and failed to match the levels of learning and virtue expected of them.

From the late eighteenth century, the tide thus began to turn against the 'people of the house'. A violent challenge emerged in central Arabia, where Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) sought to strip away all medieval accretions to the faith, returning to literalist readings of the Quran and the canonical traditions.[9] He called for the abolition of titles and greater social equality, with even masters and slaves addressing each other as 'brother'.[10]

Above all, the Wahhabi struck centrally at the prestige of *sada* and *ashraf* by reversing the long process of exalting the person of the Prophet, which they equated with idolatry. Things could never quite be the same again after 1804, when Wahhabi forces wrecked the elaborate superstructures of the tomb of the Prophet in Medina, exiled the servile eunuchs guarding the tomb and forbad pilgrims from praying there for intercession in the hereafter. Muhammad, as they reminded the faithful, had been a mere mortal.[11]

Another threat to the 'people of the house' came from developments in Sufism. Originating in West Africa in the mid-seventeenth century, a rash of Neo-Sufi holy wars broke out from Senegal to western China. Traditional Sufis engaged in an other-worldly and peaceful search for esoteric experiences of God. In contrast, Neo-Sufis, according to the definition preferred here, forged structured brotherhoods, demanded commitment to a single order, and sought to impose Islamic law on 'bad Muslims' and unbelievers.[12] Neo-Sufis did not openly reject the position of *sada* and *ashraf*, but founders of many new orders claimed a relation to the Prophet based on dreams and visions rather than on genealogy or

generational transmission. Moreover, they typically accused established Islamic elites of a great variety of sins.[13]

The Rise and Spread of the S*ada* of Hadhramaut

The far-flung diaspora of *sada* from Hadhramaut constituted a mere fraction of the descendants of the prophet dispersed across the Islamic world, but they were particularly influential and dynamic. The founding father, Sayyid Ahmad b. 'Isa al-Muhajir (873–956), is said to have arrived in Hadhramaut in 952, coming from Iraq via the Hijaz. As his grandson, 'Alawi b. 'Ubaydallah, was the only one to have had issue, the Hadhrami *sada* came to be called collectively Ba 'Alawi, or variants on this name. They accumulated rural and urban property and established themselves among the leading families of southern Arabia. Giving up their weapons, they brokered truces on neutral holy ground between turbulent tribes and rulers.[14]

Generally successful in economic, political and social fields, highly educated Hadhrami *sada* were also renowned in the religious sphere.[15] Many took up leadership positions in the Shafi'i school of law, which dominated much of the Indian Ocean world. Others placed more emphasis on Sufi mystical brotherhoods, often promoting their own Tariqa 'Alawiyya. Probably founded in the thirteenth century, and based in Tarim, this order was simple in its rituals, opposed shows of wealth, engaged with the wider world and fostered learning. Membership was in theory restricted to the Ba 'Alawi, hence its name, and this hereditary approach to Sufism was probably unique in the Islamic world.[16]

Early modern emigration from Hadhramaut was particularly skewed towards the *sada*. In 1750, a Dutch document stated that 'The Arab priests of Mahomed's descent, called sayyids, have spread everywhere throughout the Malay countries.'[17] Marrying into prominent local families, *sada* acted as ulama, but also as traders, shippers, mercenaries and officials. They accumulated much wealth, enabling them to invest in religious learning.[18] They went mainly to areas belonging to the Shafi'i school of law, which facilitated their employment as religious specialists.[19] Some also perpetuated the tradition of proselytizing among unbelievers on the frontiers of Islamdom.[20]

However, as emigration from Hadhramaut grew more intense from the 1750s, other strata of the population increasingly joined the *sada* in the diaspora. Around a central node in the Indonesian island of Java, Hadhrami migrants spread from Egypt to the southern Philippines,

and from South Africa to Japan. About a third of the population was estimated to be abroad by 1939.[21]

A Cautious Distancing from Holy War

The Hadhrami *sada* generally opposed the holy wars that rocked the peripheries of the Islamic world from the late eighteenth century. They agreed with complaints about elites who 'mixed' Islam with other faiths and oppressed their peoples. They were also concerned about the growing encroachment of Western colonial powers. However, the Hadhrami *sada* had long renounced the use of arms, owned businesses that were vulnerable to violence and disliked some of the more radical reforms of jihadist groups.[22]

The Hadhrami *sada* suffered particularly from violent Wahhabi attacks on their beloved homeland. In 1805–6, and again in 1809–10, Wahhabi hosts stormed out of the desert, destroying the white-domed tombs of local Sufi 'saints', many of them from *sayyid* lineages, burning books, prohibiting certain devotional practices and demanding large ransoms.[23] Egyptian troops defeated the Wahhabi in 1818, driving them back into Central Arabia, but the Hadhrami *sada* never forgot the trauma.[24] That said, some Wahhabi influence trickled into Hadhrami religious circles, notably through pupils studying in Yemen proper.[25]

Attitudes towards holy war in the lands of the diaspora were more ambivalent. Indeed, it was a Yemeni *sayyid*, 'Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani (c.1704–c.1789) who propagated the Neo-Sufi Sammaniyya in his native Southeast Asia, becoming the most influential apostle of holy war in the region, with his calls to jihad circulating long after his death. Most of his career was spent in Arabia, studying and teaching among the large community of Southeast Asians resident in the holy places.[26] However, al-Palimbani's father probably came from highland North Yemen, and he was not obviously part of the community of Hadhrami *sada*.[27]

Divisions over holy war existed in other cases, but the wealthier and more cosmopolitan members of the community generally held aloof. In the great Java War of 1825–30, a *sayyid* of uncertain family and a *sharif* from the Hijaz backed Prince Dipanagara's rebellion. However, Sayyid Hasan al-Hibshi and other *sada* from leading Hadhrami families proved to be invaluable allies of the Dutch.[28] In the Thirty Years War in Aceh, which raged in North Sumatra from 1873, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Zahir (1833–96), from a Hadhrami family established in southwestern India, played a crucial role in the early years. However, he soon

surrendered to the Dutch, and the *sada* played little or no part in the rest of this bloody affair.[29]

An overtly warlike Hadhrami was Sayyid Fadl b. 'Alawi b. Sahl (1824–1900), born in southwestern India. In the transition to British rule, he authorized jihad to purify Islam, throw off the yoke of Hindu rulers and landowners and counter European pretensions. The British expelled him to Arabia in 1852. From 1875, Sayyid Fadl became involved in Zufar (Dhofar), southern Arabia, again aiming at religious purification. Arbitrating in tribal disputes, he proclaimed himself Ottoman governor in 1876, albeit without official Ottoman sanction. The tribesmen rebelled against his modernization programme in 1879 and he left for Istanbul. There, he became one of the Ottoman sultan's four advisers on Arab affairs till his death in 1900.[30]

The most forthright condemnation of holy war came from Sayyid 'Uthman b. 'Abdallah b. 'Aqil b. Yahya (1822–1914), of Hadhrami-Egyptian parentage, who considered himself to be the mufti of Indonesia and received a salary for advising the Dutch government on Islamic affairs from 1889. He vigorously denounced the Banten War of 1888 in northwestern Java, which had been supported by the Neo-Sufi Qadiri wa Naqshbandi order, founded by a *shaykh* from western Borneo. Sayyid 'Uthman argued that the proper preconditions for holy war had not been met and denounced Sufi leaders for leading believers astray. This debate became internationalized, as Sayyid 'Uthman's tracts were referred to authorities in the holy places and debated in Arabia, albeit more for condemning Sufi errors than for rejecting jihad.[31]

The Pahang War in Malaya, from 1891 to 1895, was one of the last holy wars to be triggered by the imposition of colonial rule, and Hadhrami *sada* were on both sides. Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-'Aydarus, *shaykh al-islam* in the neighbouring sultanate of Trengganu, under Thai overlordship, preached jihad against the British. In contrast, Sayyid Hasan b. Ahmad al-'Attas was Britain's envoy to negotiate the surrender of the rebels.[32]

Towards the end of the century, anti-colonial violence became more influenced by pan-Islam, and the Hadhrami *sada*, with their cosmopolitan links, were suspected of being involved.[33] Some *sada* were appointed honorary Ottoman consuls in Southeast Asia, and sought Ottoman support against colonial discrimination, but they eschewed violence.[34] Although one *sayyid* was arrested in Palembang in 1881 for conspiring with two Ottoman envoys, the overwhelming majority of the *sada* in southern Sumatra wanted nothing to do with this conspiracy.[35] Overall,

the Hadhrami *sada* appear to have welcomed pan-Islam as a movement of spiritual renewal, but not as a blueprint for violent revolution.

Controversies over Mysticism

Debates also broke out over 'prohibited innovations' allegedly promoted by Sufis, such as monist and pantheist heresies, ecstatic rituals to achieve trances and intercession with God by departed or living 'saints'.[36] Hadhrami *sada* again took a middle line, rejecting excessive and heterodox forms of Sufism but defending restrained and orthodox forms.[37] In a flood of pamphlets rolling off his lithograph press from around 1885, Sayyid 'Uthman accepted the validity of Sufism per se. However, he lambasted ignorance of religious law, indolence in following the ways of the Prophet and demands for blind obedience from followers. He also targeted ecstatic practices of a physical nature, and joint worship by women and men in dark mosques.[38]

The Hadhrami *sada*'s own Tariqa 'Alawiyya remained firmly in their hands, but people of other social origins were increasingly allowed to join. A famous East African Hadhrami scholar, Shaykh 'Abdallah Ba Kathir (d.1925), was not a *sayyid* but became an ardent member.[39] Indeed it was in East Africa that the Tariqa 'Alawiyya was probably most open to non-*sada*, and it was credited with a significant role in stressing scholarship and rejecting 'barbaric' practices.[40] Sayyid Salih b. 'Alawi Jamal al-Layl (Habib Salih) courted controversy in Lamu, Kenya, by reaching out to the poor and the enslaved, and tolerating music and drumming.[41] In South Asia, where the 'Attasiyya sub-order flourished, membership was also fairly open, at least for ordinary adepts.[42]

As Sufism moved away from Neo-Sufi violence, Hadhrami *sada* increasingly took up leadership positions in brotherhoods other than their own, and contributed to a gradual modernization of mysticism. Sayyid Muhammad Ma'ruf b. Ahmad Abu Bakr b. Salim (1853–1905), from the Comoro Islands, joined the Yashrutiyya, headquartered in Acre in Palestine. He assiduously promoted this offshoot of the ancient Shadhiliyya across East Africa.[43] The main rival order was the even more ancient Qadiriyya, which was taken over in Mozambique in 1929 by another Hadhrami *sayyid*, one Abu Hasan, whose family name is not indicated.[44] Sayyid Muhammad b. Salih al-Zawawi, possibly from the Hijaz, taught Southeast Asians in Mecca. He founded the Mazhari offshoot of the Naqshbandi order, which became solidly implanted in the island of Madura off the northeast coast of Java.[45] Sayyid Muhsin b. 'Ali

al-Hinduan, from a prominent Hadhrami family, further developed this order from about the 1940s.[46]

The Schools of Law and Colonial Legal Structures

Internationally connected and highly educated Hadhrami *sada* played a disproportionate role at the heart of the Shafi'i school of law, which was headquartered in the Hijaz until the First World War. A number of them filled the prestigious position of Shafi'i mufti in Mecca, receiving Ottoman salaries, and they were generally extremely influential.[47]

This may have influenced colonial regimes in appointing Hadhrami *sada* as Islamic judges at the highest levels. Thus, the British named Sayyid Ahmad b. Abu Bakr b. Sumayt, from a well-known Hadhrami lineage of the Comoro Islands, as chief judge for Shafi'i Muslims in Zanzibar in 1907.[48] In 1949, the British in Nyasaland (Malawi) called on Sayyid 'Abd al-Hasan b. Ahmad Jamal al-Layl, from another old Hadhrami-Comorian family, to mediate a dispute between Yao Sufis over whether drums could be employed in their mystical rituals.[49]

In Southeast Asia, Sayyid 'Uthman b. 'Abdallah b. 'Aqil b. Yahya had studied for over 15 years in the Hijaz and Hadhramaut and had travelled as far as Fez and Istanbul to consult with leading Islamic scholars of the time. The Dutch paid him a monthly stipend from 1889 till his death in 1914 to advise on Islamic policy, with the title of 'honorary adviser for Arab affairs' from 1891.[50] Many *fatawa* (opinions on points of religious law) circulating in Indonesia were attributed to Sayyid 'Uthman or other Hadhrami *sada*.[51] Each Malayan sultanate was responsible for its religious affairs, and Hadhrami *sada* were prominent on religious councils sponsored by the British. They played a major role in a quiet legal revolution, which witnessed shari'a law increasingly replacing Malay custom.[52]

Hadhrami *sada* also acted as transnational mediators in disputes that lay largely outside the framework of colonial legal structures. In Cape Town, South Africa, believers quarrelled about the necessary quorum of believers for Friday prayers. The British authorities brought in an Ottoman religious expert, but he attempted to impose Hanafi rules on overwhelmingly Shafi'i congregations. Cape Muslims eventually appealed to the Shafi'i *imam* in Mecca, a Hadhrami of the great *sayyid* al-Junayd family. The matter was referred to the chief Islamic judge in Zanzibar, another Hadhrami *sayyid*, Ahmad bin Sumayt. The latter sent to Cape Town yet another Hadhrami, Shaykh 'Abdallah b. Muhammad Ba Kathir from Lamu in Kenya, a non-*sayyid* but a close associate.

Arriving in 1914, Ba Kathir brokered a temporary agreement between the contending parties.[53]

On the other side of the Indian Ocean, a similar dispute over Friday prayers broke out in 1932, pitting modernist Cham Muslims in Cambodia and Vietnam against their traditionalist opponents. The warring factions sought arbitration from Sayyid Muhammad al-'Aydarus, from a great *sayyid* family of Hadhramaut, who was established in the leading Islamic centre of Patani in southern Thailand. In this instance again, the moderator's decision failed permanently to resolve the conflict.[54]

Modernist Opportunities

The development of modernist reform from around the 1870s was a prima facie threat to descendants of the Prophet, but it could also be an opportunity.[55] Indeed, many of the great pioneers of Islamic modernism were themselves of the line of Muhammad, even if they accorded little or no significance to that fact. An excellent example was a Syrian scholar, Sayyid Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935). As editor of Cairo's reformist journal *al-Manar*, he probably became the most influential thinker of modernist Islam in the first third of the twentieth century.

Divisions developed among Hadhrami *sada* as modernism took off. Families with no stake in the diaspora were the most religiously and socially conservative in Hadhramaut, but they were also the poorest and least influential.[56] Modernism caught on among the younger generation of *sada* abroad, to a greater extent than among their elders.[57] Those with Western education were likely to be the most enthusiastic proponents of modernization of every kind. Wealthy *sada* sent their sons to schools in Istanbul, Beirut or Cairo, often to *lycées* and sometimes to universities in Europe. Many of these young men became leading protagonists of modern ideas.[58] In British Malaya, a rather eccentric figure, passionate about body-building, was Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Saqqaf, who studied at Christ's College Cambridge in 1908–10.[59]

Sada educated along more traditional Islamic lines might still be reformers, and Islamic education was itself in a state of great flux. Cairo became especially important after 1872 when the Dar al-'Ulum (abode of the sciences) was set up in al-Azhar University to teach non-religious subjects. The peripatetic Sayyid Abu Bakr b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. Shihab (1846–1922) pushed for reforms in Zanzibar, India, Malaya and Indonesia. Sayyid 'Ali b. Shihab, from the same family, called for

modern schools in Hadhramaut, writing in the columns of the Egyptian reformist journal *al-Manar* in 1910.[60]

When benevolent associations emerged in Southeast Asia, they broke with the pattern of inherited status, albeit in a very cautious way. Though strongly Arab in composition, and initially dominated by Hadhrami *sada*, they were in theory open to all.[61] They followed the model of the Jam'iyyat al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya, which appeared in Alexandria, Egypt, in the late 1870s. The first in Southeast Asia may have been in Johor Bahru, Malaya, in 1888.[62] The most significant was the Jam'iyyat al-Khayr of Batavia, set up in 1905.[63] A plethora of voluntary reformist associations emerged over time, in both Indonesia and Malaya, running modern schools and providing many other charitable and cultural services. Financed mainly through donations, with rich Hadhrami *sada* to the fore, these associations might be incorporated as trusts under Islamic law.[64] Associations printed newspapers and pamphlets on lithograph presses, which maintained the cherished calligraphic aspects of Arabic script. The steamer, the railway and the telegraph tightened bonds across the abode of Islam and helped to diffuse newspapers, pamphlets and the text of speeches.[65]

Through their participation in these organizations, a number of Hadhrami *sada* became public intellectuals of a new kind. Alternatively, they patronized men of humbler birth, of both Arab and indigenous origins. Progressive *sada* tended to downplay descent from the Prophet in this more egalitarian age, even if the status still carried much weight.[66]

Modernist Challenges to the 'People of the House'

Muslim reformers increasingly contested the exalted position of the *sada*. Modernist thinkers portrayed the Prophet as a mere mortal and looked askance at hereditary privilege, stressing reason and science. They thus tended to reject the pretensions of the *sada* as fundamentally non-Islamic.

Two issues lay at the heart of these disputes, the custom that a non-*sayyid* should 'kiss' the hand of a *sayyid*, and the refusal of the *sada* to give their daughters in marriage to men who were not descendants of the Prophet.[67] Sayyid 'Uthman in Java accepted the first complaint, but rejected the second.[68] Additional points of contention concerned the use of the title *sayyid* (meaning 'lord'), colonial appointments of 'commoners' to administer *sada*, the allocation of part of the religious tax to *sada* and the veneration of prominent *sada* as 'saints'.[69]

Marriage became the flashpoint. An Indian Muslim married the daughter of a Hadhrami *sayyid* in 1905 in Singapore, but it later transpired that the bridegroom's claim to be *sayyid* was false. An Islamic judge annulled the wedding, but the couple refused to accept his decision. Rida issued a *fatwa* in Cairo, declaring the marriage to be valid because the woman had consented to it. Sayyid 'Umar Salim al-'Attas issued a counter-*fatwa* in Indonesia, based on the inequality of the spouses. As this escalated into an international controversy fought out in the columns of the Egyptian reformist journal *al-Manar*, Rida stressed that all that was necessary for the wedding to be accepted was the consent of the bride and her legal guardian. The *sada* could exercise no collective veto.[70]

In 1914, the Sudanese head of the Jam'iyyat al-Khayr schools, Ahmad b. Muhammad Surkitti (1876–1943), contradicted the al-'Attas *fatwa* on marriage, causing a lasting and bitter split in the Hadhrami community in Indonesia.[71] The anti-*sayyid* party formed a new organization, Jam'iyyat al-Islah wa-l-Irshad al-'Arabiyya (Arab Association for Reform and Guidance). Commonly known as al-Irshad, this association banned all *sada* from serving on its board.[72]

The *sada* responded initially by modernizing the Jam'iyyat al-Khayr, for example by changing the curriculum of its schools. A more conservative step was the foundation of a new organization in 1927, al-Rabita al-'Alawiyya (the 'Alawi League), clearly focused on descendants of the Prophet. This embittered relations even further and ensured that the dispute would spill over into Hadhramaut itself.[73] Al-Rabita al-'Alawiyya sought to contribute to the advancement of all Hadhrami people through education and charitable works, but also to strengthen the links between *sada*, in part by maintaining accurate genealogies.[74] In 1931–3, rioting broke out between the two Arab factions in Java and lives were lost.[75]

This very public and acrimonious dispute was fought out in the press around the Islamic world, but divisions were not always as clear-cut as they seemed. Some *sada* quietly took the side of al-Irshad, discretely supporting it with their considerable fortunes.[76] Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Aqil, in Singapore, while defending the high position of the Prophet's progeny, considered that many modernist reforms were essential for the revival of Islam.[77] Conversely, some non-*sada* continued to be active in Jam'iyyat al-Khayr after 1914, and a non-*sayyid*, Salim b. Ahmad Ba Wazir, was on the central committee of al-Rabita al-'Alawiyya in 1927.[78]

Moreover, younger *sada* born in Indonesia became increasingly impatient with the quarrels of an older generation born in Arabia. These

young people joined Arabs from other social origins to found the Persatuan Arab Indonesia in 1934, closely allied to Sukarno's nationalist party. They abolished the title of *sayyid*, declared that Indonesia (not Hadhramaut) was their country and Malay their language, and called for social reform in matters such as the treatment of women and lending money at interest.[79]

The Hadhrami *Sada* and the Sharifian Caliphate

A major opportunity to bolster the religious position of the 'people of the house' arose with the campaign for a new caliph from around the 1880s. He would be an Arab from the line of Muhammad who would reunite secular and religious responsibilities in Islam.[80] The Sharif of Mecca gradually emerged as the main candidate for this position and he enjoyed some Hadhrami backing. By the 1850s, a *shaykh al-sada al-'alawiyyin* administered the Hadhrami *sada* in the holy places, reporting to both the Sharif of Mecca and the Ottoman governor.[81] In 1867, a group of Hadhrami notables called on the Sharif to mediate in a dispute between the two rival sultans of the country, and he also backed Sayyid Fadl's claim to rule Zufar in 1880.[82] Hadhrami *sada*, especially those of the al-Saqqaf family, staffed the Sharif's growing administration.[83]

Sharif Husayn (1853–1931), who led the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans from 1916, initially sought international recognition as King of Arabia. He only had himself proclaimed caliph of all Sunni Muslims in 1924 after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.[84] Indeed, there was continuing tension between his religious claim to be caliph and his political ambitions to lead the Arab nation.[85]

Some *sada* enthusiastically backed Sharif Husayn's claim to the caliphate. The Imam of Yemen, leader of the Zaydi sect of Islam and himself a *sayyid*, attempted to mobilize the 'people of the house' behind this cause. He published a manifesto in 1923, calling on *sada* and *ashraf* to use their considerable influence to oppose the resurgent Wahhabi party and the rival al-Sa'ud dynasty.[86] Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Aqil, with a background in Singapore and well regarded in Hadhramaut, coordinated relations with the Imam of Yemen and the Sharif of Mecca in the early 1920s.[87] Efforts by Hadhrami *sada* to rally support for Sharif Husayn extended to the far periphery of the diaspora. Thus, in 1923 Sayyid Muhammad al-Hibshi arrived in Ternate, an island in eastern Indonesia, as the Sharif's personal envoy, collecting funds on his patron's behalf.

Local Muslims met him with reverence and he preached in the island's mosques, greatly increasing attendance at prayer.[88]

Nevertheless, there was no general mobilization to achieve the dream of a sharifian caliphate. In part this reflected a cautious pragmatism and a realization that Sharif Husayn stood little chance of winning the day. Moreover, modernist *sada* virulently opposed the project. Rida denounced Sharif Husayn and his family as 'the worst disaster that has befallen Islam in this age'. For Rida, the Sharif of Mecca and his sons were pawns of British and French imperialists, traitors to the Palestinians, corrupt, inefficient, greedy, and authoritarian. They were enemies of 'all knowledge which could contribute to a spiritual or temporal reform'. Even though Rida also opposed many aspects of the Wahhabi creed, he still preferred that 'Abd al-Aziz b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ud (Ibn Saud, c.1880–1953) should rule in the holy places of Islam.[89]

The collapse of the dream of a 'sharifian caliphate' in the late 1920s ended a brief revival of the fortunes of the 'people of the house'. A slow decline in the religious and social status of the descendants of the Prophet then set in across the Islamic world. Social and religious tensions in the 1950s were well documented by Michael Gilsenan, an anthropologist who worked on the *sada* of both southern Lebanon and Hadhramaut.[90]

Interrelated families of Hadhrami *sada* formed a remarkably dynamic and cohesive social group which greatly influenced Islam in the Indian Ocean basin up to the Second World War. Indeed, their contribution to the renaissance of Islam was out of all proportion to their restricted numbers. They participated forcefully in overlapping networks that gradually restructured the existing internationalism of Islam. They revamped traditional networks of scholars and mystics, but also founded voluntary associations embracing modern technology. Overall, they formed a kind of ginger group, attempting to steer Islam in the direction of moderate and cautious modernization.

The Hadhrami *sada* relied heavily on their genealogical charisma to achieve these aims, but this was a double-edged sword. Influence based on lineage waned from the late nineteenth century as modernism sapped its foundations. Even if the challenge mounted by the anti-*sada* party in Southeast Asia from 1914 was only partially successful and was slow to reach other areas – the aura attaching to descent from the Prophet was fading. The Hadhrami *sada* bolstered their threatened

position through their great wealth and through the educational opportunities that this afforded them, but the more enlightened among them also made considerable concessions to modernism. Through such pragmatic compromises they have remained a force to be reckoned with well into our own times.

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11
A Religious International in Southeastern Europe?

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To talk of an Orthodox 'religious international' emanating from Southeastern Europe before the end of the Cold War would require excessive imagination. The overall historical trend shaping the religious scene in this part of Europe since the early nineteenth century has been the phenomenal growth of 'national Orthodoxies', which attached religion to the nation states of the Balkans and served faithfully their nationalist projects. This of course was a nineteenth-century development and it should not obscure an earlier history extending throughout the early modern period, from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the advent of the age of nationalism, during which the Orthodox Church did function as a transnational and transcultural religious institution. In that earlier period in its history the Orthodox Church united under its pastoral care the multilingual Orthodox population of the Balkans and Asia Minor within the Ottoman Empire and also the dense network of Orthodox diaspora communities in Italy, Central and Western Europe and Russia. All these populations came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople which exercised its pastoral care through a broad network of dioceses within and outside the Ottoman empire.[1] The Arab-speaking Orthodox of the Near East in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia came under the jurisdiction of two other ancient Orthodox patriarchates, those of Antioch (based in Damascus) and Jerusalem. The Orthodox in Africa came under the Patriarchate of Alexandria, which, however, was a minority church in Egypt whose Christian population in its majority belonged to the Coptic Church. The Patriarchate of Alexandria rose in influence and power only in the nineteenth century with the growth of Greek immigration which created a powerful Orthodox diaspora in Egypt and the rest of Africa.

Russia as an independent empire claimed and received from Constantinople its ecclesiastical independence or autocephaly and its elevation to patriarchal status in 1589. This development, which created a fifth Orthodox patriarchate at the end of the sixteenth century, was entirely within Orthodox canon law, which provided that local churches within independent states were entitled to autocephaly.[2]

Such was the structure of the Orthodox world in the early modern period. Within this world a discerning eye could perhaps distinguish informal 'internationals' of merchants, clergymen and scholars, all of them sharing an Orthodox identity and moving from communities within the Ottoman Empire to communities in the diaspora. These of course were not necessarily religious 'internationals' although their human resources were distinguishable primarily in terms of a religious identity. The 'international' network or movement could not be seen as a 'religious international' because a religious motivation was not necessarily present among the motives of its participants. But it was such networks of merchants and intellectuals, the latter very often carrying clerical orders, that supplied the infrastructure for the transfer of the Enlightenment into the Orthodox world. Indeed the most clearly distinguishable 'international' in this Orthodox diaspora world which covered the whole of Europe from Nizna in Southern Russia to Paris, Amsterdam and London was an 'international' on behalf of education and the revival of the classics. But that is a different story. In the domain of religion and ecclesiastical life the premodern unity of Orthodox affinities and shared identities was disrupted with the emergence of nationalism and the advent of national states, which in consolidating their project of state- and nation-building subjected local Orthodox churches to their own secular agendas. The new secular agenda demanded independent churches which were expected to mobilize the age-old power of religion in the service of the programme of the nation-state. Thus the new national states claimed and achieved the emancipation of their churches from Constantinople, creating new autocephalies and eventually patriarchates, only to subject these modern ecclesiastical institutions politically and ideologically to the secular state with the consequence of enmeshing them into fratricidal intra-Orthodox conflicts in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This is how national Orthodoxies were put in place.[3]

Most national Orthodoxies were taken over by the communist states in the post-Second World War period and functioned, in concert with the Church of Russia, as important ideological agents in the Cold War. In contrast to Russian Orthodoxy, which in the diaspora after the

Russian Revolution did produce forms of religious action that could be seen as a version of a primitive 'religious international', Balkan Orthodoxy remained paralyzed by its split by the Iron Curtain. The national divisions separating individual Orthodox churches from each other were supplemented and compounded by the confrontation of communist and noncommunist regimes in the Cold War.[4] Constantinople, Greece and Cyprus were on the Western side, Romania and Bulgaria were firmly behind the Iron Curtain, while Serbia followed the neutralist tendencies of Yugoslavia. In Albania, through a systematic policy of terror and destruction, the communist regime managed to obliterate any form of open expression of religious life. This situation precluded the formation of an Orthodox International before the end of the Cold War.

Premodern Forms of Religious 'Interculturalism' in the Orthodox World

The assertion of national Orthodoxies in the modern age should not obscure an earlier history of 'internationalism' in the Orthodox world. 'Internationalism' of course is a rather problematic term if employed to describe phenomena in premodern periods. Nationalism and the consequent phenomena of national definition are historically meaningful only in conjunction with the processes of modernity and especially in connection with the construction of modern statehood. To extend the use of the relevant terminology beyond these contexts is to render it meaningless by elevating it to a transhistorical status. With these caveats in mind I might be allowed to use the term 'internationalism' as a shorthand convention to describe phenomena of coexistence within religiously motivated movements of people with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. In the interest of analytical clarity and precision the term 'interculturalism' could perhaps replace the term 'internationalism' when referring to premodern historical contexts.

In the premodern Orthodox world, two intercultural movements or phenomena stand out, pilgrimage and monasticism. In both of these instances, which represent historical practices bridging the divide between the premodern and the modern age, we can observe many continuities in religious life that make the epochal contrasts on the surface of historical existence appear of rather secondary significance.

Pilgrimage, that is movements in space motivated by the desire to pay homage to holy places of the faith, had been a practice inherited by Christianity from Judaism. It became a widespread practice in the early Church motivated by the need many Christians felt to worship in the

places sanctified by the earthly presence of their Saviour. Quite early on, nevertheless, pilgrimages became also associated with unbecoming forms of behaviour, something that attracted the censure of St Gregory of Nyssa in his letter 'About Those Absent in Jerusalem'.[5] We see here that the *Canterbury Tales* did not report on anything that was new to Christians. Despite all this, pilgrimage to the Holy Land and to other sacred places like Mt Sinai remained popular in medieval Europe, both in East and West, being interrupted by the Muslim conquest of Palestine. Thus the spiritual needs of pilgrims, as is well known from relevant historical sources, supplied one of the pretexts of the Crusades making these disorderly medieval campaigns of the West against the East a form of 'armed pilgrimage'.[6]

In the early modern period the Ottoman conquest of Palestine in the sixteenth century in a way reopened the itineraries of pilgrimage to the Orthodox by politically unifying the whole of the Orthodox East. Pilgrimage to the Holy Land and to the great monastic foundations throughout the Orthodox East became the only form of mobility for large masses of Orthodox faithful, whose geographical horizon beyond the local community was punctuated only by the holy places of the faith. These holy itineraries were occasions of encounters among Orthodox from diverse cultural backgrounds. Languages were not serious obstacles: they were overridden by the shared body language of faith. Thus an informal 'international' of pilgrims to the Holy Land became a feature of Orthodox religious life in the early modern period. The best-known representative of this religious 'international' of pilgrims was the Kievan monk Vassily Barsky who toured the Orthodox East between 1723 and 1747. Barsky left the most sympathetic and reliable record of his visits to the holy places of Orthodox pilgrimage, which he illustrated with his own drawings, thus making it an invaluable visual testimony.[7] The most important aspect of Barsky's testimony was in fact the evidence he supplied about the way the shared Orthodox identity and the intimacy of common belief transcended ethnic and linguistic otherness and sustained the sense of an 'Orthodox commonwealth'.[8]

The Orthodox commonwealth was disrupted by the growth of nationalism in the nineteenth century. The new conditions brought about by reason of state, however, did not discourage the tradition of pilgrimage. On the contrary, pilgrimage of Russian faithful to the Holy Land and elsewhere in the Orthodox East, especially Mt Athos, grew to considerable proportions in the nineteenth century.[9] Imposing hostels for these pilgrims were constructed at many points in the Orthodox East, including a multistorey one in Constantinople with a chapel of St

Andrew on its top floor. The lavish gifts and cash donations brought by Russian pilgrims and the vigorous construction activity designed to cater to their needs on Athos and in Jerusalem were part and parcel of Russian imperial strategy in the Middle East.[10] The consequence was serious conflicts among the Orthodox in these areas, including a systematic incitement of nationalism among the Arab Orthodox Christians.[11] The Orthodox commonwealth and the premodern form of the Orthodox 'international' of pilgrimage were put to rest.

When Russian pilgrimage to the Holy Land resurfaced under communism it was usually politically motivated. In the interwar and postwar periods, Orthodox pilgrimage to the Holy Land became primarily a Greek and Cypriot phenomenon, increasingly attracting also faithful from the Orthodox diaspora, especially from North America. In the post-Cold War period Orthodox pilgrimage to the Holy Land grew to remarkable proportions. We can talk of a true revival of the 'international of pilgrims', now in a literal sense as the several Orthodox nations which acceded to statehood and independence after the disappearance of the Soviet Empire attempted to reclaim and reconstitute their Orthodox heritage. As had been the case during the nineteenth century, since the end of the Cold War pilgrimage to the Holy Land, especially the growth of the Russian pilgrimage movement, has not been free of behind-the-scenes state direction. Behind the pilgrims and their outward expressions of intense piety in the distinctive Slavic style come calculations and expediencies of Russian state interests and designs in the Middle East.

The second premodern intercultural movement in the Orthodox world was monasticism. Like pilgrimage, monasticism was an expression of religious life already in the early history of the Church. In this case though, *anachoresis*, departure from the world into the desert originally in Egypt and Palestine and later throughout Christendom, was a form of protest against the world, an expression of a radical craving of living in a more existentially authentic way the Christian spiritual values.[12] This radical profession of faith through *anachoresis* subsequently took on more organized forms with the growth of coenobitic monasticism in Asia Minor under the inspiration and spiritual guidance of St Basil the Great (330–79). From its original hearth in Cappadocia, coenobitic monasticism spread to the rest of Asia Minor and the Greek peninsula and thus several 'holy mountains' populated by groups of monks made their appearance: Mt Olympus in Bithynia, Mt Latros in Caria, Mt Ganos and Mt Papikion in Thrace attracted monastic populations who either lived in coenobitic monasteries or continued the old tradition of desert

monasticism and *anachoresis*, living alone in the wilderness and coming together only on Sunday to attend mass and take communion. The most famous of 'holy mountains' was Mt Athos, the easternmost peninsula of Chalkidiki in Macedonia.

In its over one millennium history, Athos, the Holy Mountain par excellence, although always predominantly Greek in its demographic make-up, was never characterized by a unique and exclusive ethnic identity. Already in its earliest history it hosted houses of Amalfitan monks while two of the four senior monasteries still surviving to this day, Irivon and Chilandar, were founded and endowed by Georgian and Serbian princes respectively. Another monastery, Zographou, came under the control of Bulgarian monks in the thirteenth century. Monks from Russia appeared on Athos already in the eleventh century and by the following century they had their monastery at St Panteleimon. From the fourteenth century onward, St Panteleimon became a Greek monastery and returned to Russian control with the massive influx of Russian monks in the second half of the nineteenth century. Monastic populations remained mixed throughout the centuries and following the Ottoman conquest of Athos in 1430 various monasteries at different times were dominated by diverse ethnic groups of monks, changing ethnic composition as circumstances changed.

When the number of official monasteries was stabilized to 20 in the mid-sixteenth century, there was no clear indication of the ethnic identity of individual monasteries, but Chilandar and Zographou seem to have remained regularly in Serbian and Bulgarian hands, while the rest had by then become primarily Greek. When Athos was incorporated into the Greek kingdom in 1912, 17 monasteries were Greek, one Serbian, one Bulgarian and one Russian.

Athos had been rife with nationalist tensions during the second half of the nineteenth century, causing considerable consternation to many observers, among them the historian of the Ecumenical Patriarchate Manuel Gedeon (1851–1943), who in 1885 after an extended stay on Athos commented as follows: 'Only one hearsay was never wrong, that concerning racial conflicts among monks belonging to different nations, which foreign policies or an evil doctrine emanating from the West, that of the emancipation of nationalities, led into discord, disfiguring the mission and character of an Orthodox monk.'[13]

Such had been the climate of interethnic relations on Mt Athos on the eve of its liberation from Ottoman rule. It was symptomatic of the situation that when the abbots and official representatives of the 20 ruling monasteries convened on 3 October 1913 to vote for the

incorporation of Mt Athos into Greece and the transfer of sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire to the kingdom of Greece, following its liberation by the Greek navy during the First Balkan War on 2 November 1912, the representative of the Russian monastery of St Pennteleimon was absent and his signature was not put to the document. At the same time it was characteristic of the Athonite traditions of interethnic coexistence and of Orthodox supranational principles of Christian ecumenicity that the representatives of Chilandar and Zographou signed the document. It so happened that Chilandar was exercising the function of the *protepistasia* of Mt Athos during the year 1913 and therefore it fell upon a Serbian Athonite monk, Prior Clement of Chilandar, to hand over the Athonite resolution of union with Greece to the Greek king, Constantine.

The Russian Revolution put a halt on the massive Russian influx on Athos and eventually caused a drastic reduction in the numbers and resources of the Russian monastery. The division of Europe and the imposition of communist dictatorships on all Orthodox countries except Greece led non-Greek monastic communities on Mt Athos to decline for most of the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1980s the decline especially of Zographou monastery acted as a stimulus to a veritable temptation in the biblical sense to appear on Mt Athos. Some Greek monastic circles on the Mountain began considering the idea to move a Greek brotherhood into the Bulgarian monastery to save it from imminent dissolution. It was on that occasion that the genuine Orthodox tradition of ecumenicity asserted itself and the most authoritative elders on Athos moved against such designs. Abbot Aimilianos of Simonopetra, one of the most respected spiritual elders on Athos at the time, played an important role in warding off the temptation of nationalism on the Holy Mountain, asserting that the presence of foreign-speaking monasteries was an integral component of Athonite tradition. Thus Athos has carried on from medieval times into the contemporary world an authentic Orthodox heritage of ecumenicity and internationalism.

This ecumenical heritage was celebrated in the most solemn and evocative way to mark the millennium of the establishment of the senior monastery on Athos, the Great Lavra. An imperial foundation owing its origin to the piety of East Roman emperors Nicephorus II Phokas and Ioannis I Tzimiskis, the Great Lavra, founded by St Athanasios the Athonite in 963, completed its millennium in the year 1963. Upon that occasion the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras I (1948–72; b.1886), upon whose spiritual authority Mt Athos depended,

issued an invitation to the other Orthodox Churches and to the Greek authorities to join the Church of Constantinople in celebrating the millennial anniversary. The splendid ceremonies and acts of worship in June 1963 in the presence of King Paul of Greece (1901–64) turned into a celebration of pan-Orthodox unity and of the supranational character of Mt Athos.[14] The Ecumenical Patriarch was joined on Athos by the Patriarchs of Jerusalem, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria, the Archbishop of Athens and representatives of the churches of Alexandria, Russia, Cyprus, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Finland. This show of pan-Orthodox unity amidst the tensions of the Cold War represented a confirmation of the survival of a millennial tradition of Christian ecumenicity and intercultural religious life on Athos as a living witness of Christian faith in the modern world.

Initiatives toward an Orthodox International after the Cold War

Following the end of the division of Europe, from the 1990s onward incipient forms of an 'Orthodox International' can be discerned in some of the initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In what follows I would like to discuss these initiatives. Two questions will be primarily probed: (1) to what extent and in what sense could the initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate be considered to represent, even in an incipient form, an 'Orthodox International'?; and (2) what are the possible consequences of such initiatives and openings to the lures of postmodernity for the character of the Orthodox tradition?

The Ecumenical Patriarchate has not fared well under the Turkish Republic. Since the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Patriarchate has operated as a purely religious institution catering to the spiritual needs of the Orthodox minority in Turkey.[15] Turkish state authorities have consistently refused to recognize the international religious character of the Patriarchate and its role as the senior see in the Orthodox Church. Every possible form of restriction, disguised as the application of the provisions of prevailing law, has been placed on the operation of the Patriarchate, including, until quite recently, serious restrictions on the movement of its religious personnel. The most serious blow which is critically affecting the long-term prospects of the Patriarchate's survival in Turkey, has been the closure in 1971 of the Theological School at Halki (Heybeli ada). Since its establishment in 1844 this college of theological education had functioned as the training ground for the Patriarchate's senior clergy, but also for clergy from other

Orthodox Churches, thus providing a channel for the transaction of the Patriarchate's pan-Orthodox role.

In the period immediately following the Treaty of Lausanne, the unfortunate episode of the expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI (1859–1930; patriarch 1924–5) from Turkey as a *non-établi* – that is, as a citizen who had no right to be in Turkey under the provisions of the 1923 convention for the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey – served as a warning concerning patriarchal movements abroad. In the interwar period no patriarch travelled abroad. Only after the Second World War during the brief patriarchate of Maximos V (1946–8; b.1897) did the Patriarch undertake an official visit to Greece. During Athenagoras's long patriarchate (1948–72) the patriarch undertook only four visits to other Orthodox churches and to Rome. Athenagoras's successor Dimitrios I (1972–91; b.1914), the last Cold War patriarch, also undertook carefully planned visits to other churches on a limited scale. All this suggests that the Patriarchate's international involvements remained limited and this also meant that activism of the kind implied by the idea of an 'Orthodox International' remained a rather remote prospect. Participation in the World Council of Churches and inter-Orthodox engagement through regular communication and meetings remained formal ecclesiastical activities, very often encountering serious stumbling blocks having to do with Cold War politics.

Things changed radically after the Cold War during the patriarchate of the incumbent Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios I (b.1940) since 1991. No patriarch in history has travelled so much or has been more widely known, not just among Orthodox communities but in the world at large. From the very first, Patriarch Bartholomaios's strategy has been to work for the reversal of the decline of the Church of Constantinople on account of the virtual disappearance of its flock within Turkey by strengthening its position vis-à-vis the Turkish state through an active international involvement. A broad strategy has been employed in order to achieve this objective. The strategy involved an active pursuit of a higher profile for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its head in international fora, in relations with foreign governments and in inter-Christian and even interfaith relations. This objective has been admirably achieved showing the Patriarch to be not only a charismatic ecclesiastical leader but also a great diplomat.

Two other components of the same overall strategy of survival through activism could be seen to contain the dynamic of an 'Orthodox International'. In 1995, quite early on in his reign, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios inaugurated his campaign on behalf of the

environment. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's concern for the environment and ecological issues had been already voiced in 1988 under Patriarch Dimitrios who established the opening of the ecclesiastical year on 1 September as a day of prayer for the environment. The celebration during the year 1995 of the 1900th anniversary of the writing of the Book of Revelation by St John the Theologian provided Patriarch Bartholomaios with the appropriate occasion on which to broaden the Patriarchate's ecological campaign. Besides the religious ceremonies and a conference of biblical studies, it was thought that reflection on Revelation could also provide the occasion for the articulation of an Orthodox perspective on the major ecological and environmental issues facing the planet. Thus the Ecumenical Patriarchate inaugurated its floating ecological symposia with a voyage from Istanbul to Ephesus and thence to Patmos.[16] The good reception of that initiative provided the stimulus to convoke a succession of floating symposia, each one focusing on the environmental problems faced by specific regions: the Black Sea,[17] the Adriatic,[18] the Danube,[19] the Baltic Sea, the Amazon and most recently the melting Arctic and Greenland. The symposia attracted considerable publicity and earned Patriarch Bartholomaios the reputation of the 'Green Patriarch'. Thanks to the presence of Metropolitan Ioannis of Pergamon (b.1931), one of the foremost Orthodox theologians of our time, the early symposia appeared also to deliver their original promise of producing an Orthodox theology on the environment.[20]

This aspect of the project is having a clear if indirect influence on theological reflection in the Orthodox world in as far as it has led to a greater emphasis on the importance of social, political and economic actions on the ground, while downplaying the exclusive precedence accorded to otherworldly elements in Christian thinking that have at times led to criticism of Orthodoxy for quietism. This may be seen, to cite but two recent examples, in the writings of a range of Orthodox thinkers on issues as different as bioethics and consumerism,[21] but also, not least, in Patriarch Bartholomaios's own recent publications, which are uncharacteristic of much Orthodox thought in the emphasis they give to social and economic aspects of contemporary life.[22]

The symposia did seem to mobilize a group of Orthodox and philo-Orthodox Christians in an incipient form of an 'Orthodox International' concerned with environmental questions and attached to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. What will come of this will depend primarily on the quality, the qualifications and the commitment of the people involved. A lot will also depend on the discernment the Patriarch and the Patriarchate will exercise in the selection of their collaborators who

will lead the project. The human factor will be the critical variable for the sustainability and eventual success of the movement in producing a credible Orthodox perspective on ecological issues and in saying something meaningful on the future of the planet.[23] Occasionally the press coverage of the events leaves the rather worrisome impression that there is little substance beyond public relations in these costly cruises. But judgement should be suspended until the long-term results of the initiative become visible with the emergence of versions of religious and social thought bearing a distinctive Orthodox imprint and sustained by Orthodox groups of diverse national backgrounds, united by their shared commitment to environmental protection and respect of nature as God's creation.

   The other component of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's strategy under Patriarch Bartholomaios has been a more active pursuit of canonical leadership in the affairs of the Orthodox churches. This did not of course mean a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of other churches, but a readiness and a responsiveness whenever needs and problems arose to activate in facing up to them the 'canonical conscience of the Church',[24] whose guardianship Constantinople considers its primary mission. Many such problems surfaced, for instance, in the Orthodox churches formerly behind the Iron Curtain following the dissolution of the communist regimes. Everywhere the Ecumenical Patriarchate contributed with its involvement to the restoration of canonical order and the revival of Orthodox religious life: in Romania with the resignation and reinstatement of Patriarch Theoktist (1986–2007; b.1915) following the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime; in Bulgaria with the schism attempting to overthrow Patriarch Maxim (1971–; b.1914); in Albania with the revival from nothing of the Orthodox Church thanks to the election by the Patriarchate of the charismatic Archbishop Anastasios (1992–; b.1929); in Esthonia with the restoration of the local autonomous church; in Czechoslovakia where the unity of the local Orthodox church survived the splitting of the state into two splinter republics; most recently in the Ukraine where, despite the serious misgivings and objections of the Russian Patriarch against his involvement, Patriarch Bartholomaios managed to sustain the canonical order against various schismatic tendencies. With all these canonical actions the Ecumenical Patriarchate under Patriarch Bartholomaios went a long way in restoring the ecumenical character of Orthodoxy against its identification with nationalism that had marred its image for so long.[25] In regions which had remained outside the

sphere of communist dictatorships, the contribution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate also proved positive in the resolution of ecclesiastical crises: in Cyprus where an explosive contest over the archiepiscopal succession was set on the way to a canonical resolution following a synod convoked by the Ecumenical Patriarchate at Chambésy in Switzerland (17 May 2006); in Jerusalem where a similarly explosive contest threatening to throw the Orthodox Patriarchate into the minefield of Middle Eastern politics was also resolved after a synod in Constantinople (24 May 2005).

The result of all these engagements of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been the establishment of trust on the part of local churches toward the sacred centre of Orthodoxy and the cultivation of feelings of gratitude and attachment to the person at its head. Thus another 'Orthodox International' seems to be taking shape, focusing on a will to unity and mutual engagement along with respect and strict observance of autocephaly and pluralism. The question that arises in this connection has to do with the extent to which trust and solidarity at the top filters downward into the communities of the faithful, thus providing motivations for initiatives that may give rise to versions of 'Orthodox Internationals', going beyond the national and political divisions of the past.

These reflections lead us to a consideration of what could be described as the 'structural', as it were, impediments to the emergence of Orthodox versions of 'religious internationals'. These have to do primarily with the weaknesses of civil society in the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe for reasons which have to do with the overall pattern of development that has marked their social and political history. Excessive state domination over society, which included the subjection of the churches to political expediencies and the imposition of various forms of cultural authoritarianism, be it communist or anticommunist, could be seen as the cause of the weakness of both civil society and liberalism. This in turn has generally hindered the autonomous development of movements of voluntary association at the grass roots, free from partisanship or guidance from above. This could be considered the explanation of the absence of religious internationals in the Orthodox world. Besides the structural impediments there are of course other obstacles as well, such as the subjective inhibitions which largely derive from the character of pastoral work in the Orthodox churches.

For all these reasons it would be extremely interesting to witness the eventual turn to be taken by the dynamic of Orthodox Internationals that appears to have emerged from the initiatives of the

Ecumenical Patriarchate since the 1990s. In appraising these prospects one inevitably returns to the critical human factor. Scarcity of human and material resources is the major problem facing any form of autonomous religious action in the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Of the two variables, human and material resources, the most critical and difficult to mobilize is the human. Material resources can be found relatively easily from public and private sources. But human power remains scarce. One of the explanations has to do with the destruction of the Orthodox minority in Turkey on account of the pressures, restrictions and pogroms instigated over the decades by the Turkish state at their expense. The result has been a true tragedy for the Christian Church. This community had been the flock that sustained the presence and survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in its historic seat. It supplied the human resources and the field of pastoral work for the Church of Constantinople. But it was much more than that. After 1923 the Church of Constantinople, which means the clergy and the laity of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in broader Istanbul and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, provided the only model of a non-national church in the Orthodox world, that is, an Orthodox church not attached to a national state. The mentality connected with this condition of collective existence was shaped primarily by Christian rather than national values and this would qualify this population group to be quite amenable to the experiences that would make a religious international possible. This population, however, became virtually extinct as a consequence of the policies of Turkey at its expense, and this has seriously affected as well the viability of Orthodox ecclesiastical life at the seat of the Patriarchate of Constantinople: what has been left is the magnificence of patriarchal ceremonial in all its humility and dignity and almost one hundred beautifully restored and functioning churches in the broader Istanbul region in Europe, on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus and the Princes Islands in the Sea of Marmara but without the active presence of the faithful who make the Church a living communion. This fact of life is the major source of doubt as to the possibilities of viable Orthodox Internationals emerging as by-products of the broader strategy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This may resemble a form of Aristotelian speculation about potentialities and actualities. Regardless of philosophical preferences, however, few will disagree, I would suspect, that without autonomous lay leadership a religious international could not be a viable proposition. And this autonomous Orthodox lay leadership possessing the appropriate intellectual and moral calibre does not appear to be available. For precisely this reason the prospect of

a religious international in the world of Balkan Orthodoxy seems at present to be a rather remote possibility.

Before closing a word about the Orthodox tradition is in order. This aspect of the subject is essential in preserving in the focus of analysis the religious motivation that defines the character of the transnational phenomena that concern us. If we lose sight of the religious motivation we could be discussing religious internationalism as indistinguishable from any other form of transnational movement and this would render our task meaningless. Let me just remind ourselves that international relations specialists were talking of transnational phenomena as an integral part of international life already in the 1970s.[26] As far as the study of religious internationalism is concerned, the substantive question appears to be first how the religious factor renders pertinent phenomena distinguishable – that is, in what sense does it imprint upon them a distinctive character – and second, what are the consequences of transnationalism for religious motivations and values?

It would be presumptuous to attempt to answer these questions in general and all-encompassing terms. But an attempt to approach them inductively by looking at the Orthodox tradition may prove workable, perhaps even illuminating. First of all religious internationalism, by emancipating action and belief from the motivations of national particularism, and by bringing together human groups of diverse backgrounds that share a common spiritual motivation, could very well release the salutary energy associated with the ecumenical values of Christianity, and it may infuse the deformed national Orthodoxies of modernity with the spirit of a revived radical Christianity that could be that religion's only way of survival and salvation as a *religious* experience rather than as an ideology in the twenty-first century. This pointer to the ecumenicity of Christian values and to the need of the Orthodox tradition to reclaim them as its authentic, non-national, nonethnic heritage is the simple and rather obvious answer to the question posed above. There is a more complex answer, however, that might point to the secular dynamic of transnational movements led for the most part by cosmopolitan individuals and the risks this would involve for the spiritual character of religiously motivated initiatives. This is a visible risk in the budding religious international associated with the ecological initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The impression is inescapable if one observes the social make-up of the groups involved, being for the most part wealthy sponsors, international socialites and media figures, all of them united by the desire to taste some of the 'Greek patriarch's' glamour. Such groups of course are not capable of doing much more than

underwrite publicity and worldliness rather than spiritual substance as the dominant characteristic of the initiatives.

Yet the ecological dimension itself could be a guarantee of substance and of an authentic spiritual concern as the defining feature of the movement. Respect and affection for nature as God's creation is a pronounced and recurring feature of Orthodox worship. The exaltation of God's creation of the natural order and of its spiritual, aesthetic, but also material enjoyment by humanity as outlined with unique poetic power in David's psalm (Ps. 103) is heard in Orthodox vespers invariably every evening throughout the year. The greatness of Creation is also evoked every morning at matins with the recitation of Psalm 102. These are genuine lessons in honouring God by respecting and admiring his Creation for the Orthodox. And this the Orthodox share with other religious traditions reared on the Psalms, such as Judaism. It is this ethos I believe that could turn the initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate into a genuine spiritually motivated religious international attuned to the urgent task of saving the planet. Whether this is a viable proposition in view of the constraints outlined above and whether we are in fact in sight of the transcendence of Orthodoxy's ethnic and national fragmentation through the emergence of religious internationals should remain for the moment an open question.

Notes

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2. Maximos (Christopoulos), Metropolitan of Sardis, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church* (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1976). pp. 287–93. On the historical background, Robert Crummey, 'Eastern Orthodoxy in Russia and Ukraine in the Age of the Counter-Reformation', in Angold, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, pp. 302–24.
3. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'The Legacy of the French Revolution. Orthodoxy and Nationalism', in Angold, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, pp. 229–49.
4. M. Bourdeaux and Al. Popescu, 'The Orthodox Church and Communism', in Angold, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, pp. 558–79. For two revealing case studies, see Tatiana A. Chumachenko, *Church and State in Soviet Russia. Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khruschev Years*, trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk

and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); and Lucian Leustan, *Orthodoxy and the Cold War. Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947–65* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

5. *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 46, cols 1009–16.

6. Geoffrey Hindley, *The Crusades: A History of Armed Pilgrimage and Holy War* (New York: Carrol & Graf, 2003).

7. Alexander Grishin, 'Barskyj and the Orthodox Community', in Angold, ed., *Eastern Christianity*, pp. 210–28.

8. For the concept, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate/Variorum, 2007), pp. ix–xi.

9. Manuel I. Gedeon, *O Athos* (Constantinople: Patriarchal Press, 1885; repr. Athens: Ermis, 1990), p. 11.

10. Theophanis G. Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine 1882–1914* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963) and Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine 1843–1914. Church and Politics in the Near East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

11. Elie Kedourie, 'Religion and Politics', *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies* (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1984), pp. 317–42.

12. Peter Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 81–101.

13. Gedeon, *Athos*, pp. 60–1.

14. See *Nea Estia* (Christmas 1963), pp. 267–283.

15. Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek Turkish Relations, 1918–1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), pp. 87–95, 144–73, 194–206.

16. See Sarah Hobson and Jane Lubchenco, eds, *Revelation and the Environment AD 95–1995* (Singapore: World Scientific, 1997).

17. See Sarah Hobson and Laurence David Mee, eds, *The Black Sea in Crisis* (Singapore: World Scientific, 1998).

18. Neal Acherson and Andrew Marshall, eds, *The Adriatic Sea. A Sea at Risk, a Unity of Purpose* (Athens: Religion, Science and the Environment, 2003).

19. Neal Acherson and Sarah Hobson, eds, *Danube: 'A River of Life'. Down the Danube to the Black Sea* (Athens: Religion, Science and the Environment, 2002).

20. On his views on religion and ecology, see John D. Zizioulas, 'Preserving God's Creation', *King's Theological Review*, 12.2 (Autumn 1989), 41–5, and 13.1 (Spring 1990), 1–5, and idem, 'Man the Priest of Creation', in Andrew Walker and Costa Carras, eds, *Living Orthodoxy in the Modern World* (London: SPCK, 1996), pp. 178–88.

21. See, e.g., the contribution by Kallistos of Diokleia and Tristram Engelhardt, Jr, in Walker and Carras, eds, *Living Orthodoxy*, pp.64–84, 108–30 respectively.

22. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, *Encountering the Mystery. Understanding Orthodox Christianity Today* (New York: Doubleday, 2008).

23. The inspiration for this is readily available in the writings of Patriarch Bartholomaios himself. See *Encountering the Mystery*, pp. 89–119, and more extensively, *Cosmic Grace and Humble Prayer. The Ecological Vision of the Green Patriarch Bartholomew I*, ed. John Chrysavgis, foreword by John Zizioulas

(Grand Rapids and Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2003), bringing together his addresses and statements on ecology in the decade 1991–2002.

24. Maximos of Sardis, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Orthodox Church*, pp. 253–66.

25. On this subject, see the contributions making up the section 'Ethnicity and Nationalism', in Emmanuel Clapsis, ed., *The Orthodox Churches in a Pluralistic World. An Ecumenical Conversation* (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2004), pp. 139–91. For a concise statement of the view of the incompatibility between Orthodoxy and nationalism, see Paschalis M. Kitromilides, 'Orthodoxy, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict', in ibid., pp. 183–9.

26. See, e.g., Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). Note in particular the chapter on the Roman Catholic Church as a transnational actor by Ivan Vallier.

12
Activism as Engine: Jewish Internationalism, 1880s–1980s

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This essay proposes what may seem to some an outlandish idea, namely that the emergence of modern Jewish internationalism had little to do with conceptions of nationhood or even Judaism. It was not a religious movement in the conventional sense, nor was it a relatively abstract, imagined community of the type described by Benedict Anderson.[1] Rather, the spread of transnational ties across class, ethnic and denominational lines was a product of the practice of philanthropy and advocacy begun in the mid-nineteenth century. This internationalism can be defined as a sort of peoplehood (*umah* in Hebrew), reflected and forged by increasing circles of activism for one's coreligionists, strikingly similar to the Islamic *umma* examined by Francis Robinson and Amira Bennison elsewhere in this volume. To borrow a term from Robinson, Jewish internationalism is a community of opinion; to refine it further, it is a community of action informed by a vague communal and traditional religious consciousness.

The core of this chapter explores the modern rise of philanthropic activity in Jewish communities in the West on behalf of their coreligionists in Eastern Europe. At times this was manifest in humanitarian intervention, at times in reconstructive philanthropic programmes, and more recently, through public advocacy. Due to limitations of space and my expertise, I deal only marginally with the Ottoman Empire, where the French philanthropic organization, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and others aided Jewish communities.

Jewish history in the modern era should be understood in ways often obscured by an overemphasis in scholarship on religious, national or municipal bonds among Jews. I do not question the importance of studying Anglo, French, or Russian Jewries for their own sake. Indeed, there is great value in local histories about the Jews of London, Paris

or the shtetl. But there is no time in modern Jewish history during which there was not great significance to cross-border links. In fact, Jews behaved in transnational fashion decades, if not centuries, before this phenomenon was employed in the academy and before scholars began thinking about other diasporas in similar ways. As will be shown, traditional religious divisions within the Jewish world yielded to relative nondenominational unity within this philanthropic internationalism. We shall also investigate whether this non-state internationalism diverged from other groups after the establishment of Israel in 1948.[2]

The Judeo-Christian ethic of charity is often cited as the ancient spiritual source for newer types of philanthropic work in the West.[3] During the past two decades increasing academic attention has pointed toward philanthropy as a transnational agent of civil society and positive change. Rarely is it discussed, however, as a bearer of collective identity.[4] More often than not, scholarship on Jewish philanthropy has overlooked prior or parallel developments in philanthropy among non-Jews whereas general histories of philanthropy do not always account for Jewish organizations.[5] The field of diaspora studies has widened its scope of vision to Asia and Africa but increasingly does not take stock of the possible lessons to be learned from the Jewish model.[6]

What Is Jewish about This Internationalism?

When observing this philanthropy in its modern form, Jewish traditions can explain only part of the motivation for activists. From the mid-nineteenth century onward, Jews in the West have repeatedly intervened on behalf of their coreligionists abroad less through a feeling of sacred obligation than through a more modern sense of ethnic bonds and shared fate. This growing internationalism interacted with other Western religious philanthropies at the organizational and individual levels. Hence, someone involved in the mobilization campaign for Soviet Jewry in the USA during 1970s had very likely been inspired by the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. Moreover, many of the nonprofit and social welfare frameworks constructed in the state of Israel were to a degree imported with the activists and future politicians who returned to Zion from the various sites of diaspora.[7]

Before and after the social and political upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s in the West, Jewish philanthropic mobilizations and their non-Jewish counterparts were attuned to similar ideological, educational and sociological currents. These Jewish and non-Jewish mobilizations often identified and aided target communities in the same geographic space.

An example would be the multinational, multidenominational mobilization for the relief of Eastern Europe's civilian population after the First World War; the YMCA, Quakers, Nansens and American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee all helped to revitalize East European communities. Since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, many INGOs have engaged in philanthropic relief in its successor states. From the late 1800s an array of religious and secular philanthropies worked sporadically in Eastern Europe. But none had the length of exposure – or, dare I say – the success of their Jewish counterparts.

What pieces of the Jewish past contributed to the construction of internationalism via philanthropy from the late nineteenth through the twentieth centuries? By answering this, we may learn if Jewish activists deployed unique methods and whether these produced outcomes that differed markedly from philanthropic endeavours of non-Jews. For a start, let us point to the obvious – the simple fact of a two thousand year exile from Zion was a key contributor to the modern appearance of Jewish internationalism.[8] It is unquestionably true that many non-Jewish diaspora communities have at times shown great concern for their homelands.[9] Among Jews, however, the circumstances are atypical. The ideal of 'homeland' was very complex for Jews before and after the creation of the modern state of Israel. Moreover, mass migrations of Jews, with the subsequent formation of coherent, loosely connected communities scattered through Europe, Asia and eventually the Americas occurred centuries before the industrial and technological revolutions created similar conditions for more recent, non-Jewish diasporas.[10] The duration of the diaspora led many Jews over the centuries to consider their countries of residence a 'homeland', particularly with the broadening of their emancipation across Europe during the nineteenth century. But this was always a precarious relationship given the ups and downs of government policies and public opinion toward Jews.

Religious and nationalistic Jews gazed for millennia toward the Land of Israel as a future homeland, based on the biblical promise of redemption. Until the Balfour Declaration of 1917 – in which the British government committed itself to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine – there was no concrete basis for its realization in one's lifetime. Consequently, Jewish communities were a religious and/or ethnic minority wherever they lived; at times welcomed by local rulers, at times cruelly repressed. So, in ways similar to Islam, Jews and Judaism were historically on the defensive inside Christian lands. Because little could usually be expected from one's local ruler, responses to communal Jewish needs at home and abroad had to be initiated, if not entirely

executed, by non-state actors from the Jewish community. This reality forced activists to learn an unofficial diplomacy to navigate the international political waters. Therefore, a type of non-state diplomacy infused Jewish internationalism well before 1948.

Transnational activism embodied for centuries a dilemma of Jewish life under conditions of diaspora: retaining the balance between national and ethnic loyalties. Should a Jewish citizen of a Western nation be more committed to the interests of fellow Jews across the seas or to the interests of his or her compatriots or empire? Put more concretely, should an emancipated citizen of a West European nation emphasize integration over uniqueness as a solution to the 'Jewish question' wherever it arose?[11] For example, the Paris and London houses of the Rothschild family around the turn of the twentieth century had to balance their 'Frenchness' and 'Englishness' with their 'Jewishness' when dealing with the Russian regime. They had to decide if, and how, to advocate aggressively for oppressed Russian Jews and thereby endanger lucrative financial arrangements with Russia. In the final analysis, financial interests more often than not played a clear, if not equal, role in their decisions surrounding business deals with Russia.[12]

The development from commercial contacts of an internationalism based in philanthropy is a distinctively Jewish progression. From the mid-nineteenth century, cross-border links between Jews began to take on increasingly philanthropic meaning. Transnational contacts until then had been based mainly on extended family connections servicing far-flung business interests.[13] Alongside these, fairly extensive ties linked clergy and religious institutions in the Ashkenazi world.[14] As Yaron Tsur points out, expansion of the Hebrew-language press in the second half of the nineteenth century helped to encourage more interaction between East European Jews and Sephardic communities in North Africa, thereby going beyond traditional rabbinic correspondences.[15]

Far away events contributed to a major shift in this paradigm, starting in mid-century. Following several centuries of relative geographic immobility, masses of Jews began to migrate westward from Eastern Europe, creating new dynamics in the Jewish world along with huge needs. In response to the shadow of mass immigration and deteriorating political conditions for Jews in the Ottoman and Russian empires, their wealthy fellow Jews in Western Europe began to take a more active interest in their fate. During these decades, and with increasing force as the century closed, the transnational networks that had brought economic success to some of Western Europe's wealthy Jews took on philanthropic roles.[16]

Jewish internationalism grew in an unexpected way from transnational philanthropic action. The term 'internationalism' presupposes a large critical mass of participants. In the case of the Jews, the premodern transnational business links and early attempts at international philanthropy were the domain of a small number of wealthy men. But as more Jews in Europe and the Americas mobilized around the turn of the twentieth century through some of the organizations described below, international philanthropy had the unanticipated effect of democratizing contacts across the Atlantic. Abigail Green argues in this volume that a public sphere of Jewish internationalism emerged around 1840. An important development in its own right, this was nonetheless internationalism from above, practised among a narrow class of literary and political elites and not yet a mass movement or democratization. As for the proliferation of the Alliance Israélite Universelle between 1862 and 1901, one must wonder to what degree its branches in Europe reflected internationalism, given that the creation of separate organizations was a consequence of nationalist tensions, not solidarity.[17] Moreover, its offices in distant lands could be seen mostly as local service providers who contributed little to the construction of a global community of action. Green and Tsur indeed add greatly to our understanding of the reconnection of Eastern and Western Jewries in the mid-nineteenth century. I suggest caution, however, regarding the implications for internationalism from relatively passive and isolated acts, like the signing of petitions and the contribution of small sums for the relief of distant crises.

From the 1880s onward, Jewish internationalism developed as a community of direct action, driven in great part by large numbers of activists from below. A feeling of moral and national obligation – but not always a shared ideology – motivated these men and women. They tended to unify around ad hoc missions of mercy, together with a belief system that supported an imperative for action. The Jewish International that emerged has, therefore, never been tied to a single territory. Rather, it coalesced at the modern intersection of an inherited ethnonational identity and a sense of urgency to remedy humanitarian crises for distant coreligionists.

Internationalism with an East European Target

Russia's political volatility, and its effect on the diaspora, catalyzed the growth of Jewish internationalism. On one side, the Jews of Russia never knew what to expect, having endured recurring waves of mass violence

starting with the widespread pogroms of the 1880s.[18] The violence, in turn, had made the Jews' legal, social and economic future almost completely unpredictable. By this time, individual intercessors (*shtadlanim* in Hebrew) had already established a precedent of intervention in Russia and the Ottoman Empire. But this was hardly enough to ensure an effective response from abroad to an increasingly dangerous situation for Russian Jews. Western Jewish philanthropies continued their activities in Eastern Europe throughout the political upheavals that followed, barring a period of involuntary exile from the USSR between 1938 and the mid-1980s, during which the Soviet authorities barred their operations. International philanthropies, particularly Jewish, were allowed to return in the last years of Gorbachev's rule. But during this time, and even more so after 1991, they found it difficult to navigate the complexities and uncertainties of overnight liberalization in the former Soviet Union. How did activists from abroad account for these changes?

Jewish transnational philanthropy evolved into a modern, popular internationalism in three overlapping phases. The first can loosely be described as *shtadlanut* (intercessions), exemplified in Europe by the Rothschilds from the 1870s until 1914.[19] These bankers, situated throughout Western and Central Europe, intervened widely in the Jewish world, providing charitable and reconstructive aid, as well as political support. This familial type of philanthropy survived the global changes of 1917 but never regained its prewar predominance. The banker Jacob Schiff (1847–1920), active from the late nineteenth into the early twentieth century, was the most visible intercessor in North America, translating his significant financial power into political leverage on behalf of Russian Jews.[20] Scholars still argue how much this or that *shtadlan* influenced the tsarist regime. Whatever the outcome of these debates, the intercessors' well publicized advocacy surely brought more worldwide attention to the plight of Russian Jewry than would otherwise have been the case.

A degree of popularization of Jewish internationalism occurred during this first phase. Starting in the late 1880s, large numbers of ordinary Jews (including many women) with little significant family, business or religious connections to Eastern Europe began working more systematically on behalf of coreligionists with whom they had little in common beyond a belief in a shared bloodline and a vague sense of collective fate. These new campaigns pursued a range of goals, from the relatively simple 'export' of charity (as religious philanthropies tended to perform), to rescue at times of political crisis, to vocational training (led by the Organization for Rehabilitation of Jews through Training [ORT]

in Eastern Europe), to land settlement (pioneered by the Jewish Colonization Society in Argentina of Baron Maurice de Hirsch [1831–96]), to the orderly absorption of immigrants in the West (led by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society in the USA), to more straightforward political advocacy (by intercessors and groups like the Anglo-Jewish Association). Whatever the philanthropic 'deliverables', this surge of philanthropic activism – particularly in the Americas – brought with it globalization and democratization as increasing numbers of individuals entered Jewish organizational life.

Although it was neither a philanthropic movement nor an advocacy campaign in the conventional sense, the Zionist movement accelerated democratization and internationalism in the Jewish world from the 1880s until 1948. For many of its proponents, Zionism meant a concrete political goal, not just a cultural or humanitarian effort. Its disproportionate importance derived from the fact that it mobilized a major transnational campaign around the turn of the twentieth century on behalf of the interests of the Jewish people (whether one agreed with its goals or not) almost completely outside the control of the intercessors or other communal authorities. Although it had a number of elite proponents, early Zionism appealed mostly to the Jewish masses; the various arms of the movement claimed membership rolls that totalled in the hundreds of thousands. Although the Balfour Declaration had been addressed to a member of the Rothschild family in 1917, the Zionist rank and file in Europe had made it possible in the first place.[21]

Transnational philanthropy entered a second phase after the First World War, more or less in parallel with the shift in leadership from Europe to North America. This stage can be categorized as organized philanthropy, as embodied by the highly institutionalized Joint Distribution Committee, ORT and others.[22] These organizations, like the individual intercessors before them, acted on a global scale. The new organizations, however, functioned more systematically and eclipsed the importance of the individual elites and the relatively sporadic popular campaigns that had come before. Their roots can be traced to smaller western mobilizations in the first phase of internationalism, when the German Deutsch-Israelitischer Gemeindebund, the French Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Board of Delegates of American Israelites and the British Board of Deputies aided the westward emigration of imperilled Russian Jewry and mobilized for the defence of Jews in Romania.[23]

The third, and for now, last phase in transnational Jewish philanthropy commenced in the West shortly before the Second World War. This democratized philanthropy – focused more on political advocacy

than material aid – did not appear 'out of the blue' during the 1960s, as some activists of the time have claimed. Rather, it had antecedents in the interwar period in which organized philanthropies operated in a grey area between philanthropy and political advocacy.[24]

By the second half of the twentieth century, Jewish internationalism had transformed significantly from the top-down model described by Green and Tsur into a bottom-up version that had a significant female component. It is commonly known that a few 'great' men like Jacob Schiff, Felix Warburg (1871–1937), Louis Marshall (1856–1929) and Alexander Kahn (1881–1962) had formed the first major philanthropic organizations in the United States around the turn of the century. Less noticed by historians was the evolution of transnational women's organizations around the same time.[25] With increasing frequency into the 1970s, the largest and most dynamic Jewish advocacy groups in North America had large proportions of female members. Some of the new leaders were former activists, others were newcomers to the Jewish establishment in the USA and the UK. Some of the new faces were even described as 'housewives who came out of nowhere'.[26] Despite some intergroup confrontations, these activists (of both genders) mobilized a global campaign in the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in a series of international conferences on Soviet Jewry in Brussels and Jerusalem, and finally, organized a mass demonstration in Washington DC in 1987 to coincide with Mikhail Gorbachev's summit with President Reagan.[27]

A generational trigger coincided with the rapid democratization of transnational advocacy in the Jewish world from the 1960s onward. Simply put, younger people were more likely to be more activist than older ones. This played itself out in the movement for Soviet Jews in two ways. First, the youth tended to favour and employ far more belligerent tactics in the campaign than did their elders. Often criticized by the younger generation, the older establishment feared aggressive action in the West toward the Kremlin for fear that it would incite retaliation against Soviet Jews.[28] Second, the generational proximity to the mass youth movements of the time in the West energized many young people already uncomfortable with a legacy of supposed inaction of their parents' generation around the Holocaust.[29]

The Intersection of Global Events and Internationalism

The needs of East European Jews in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries forced transnational philanthropies to innovate. A readiness for trial and error, coupled with the urgency of aiding suffering fellow

Jews abroad caused them to pioneer organizational tools. At home in the West, this necessitated improving fundraising mechanisms. As transnational philanthropy grew in scope, so too did the volume of resources necessary to sustain these billowing projects. Fundraising became proportionately harder from the late 1920s until the 1950s. This period began with the Great Depression, which depleted the wealth of the small numbers of principle donors to Jewish philanthropy. This new financial reality forced all philanthropies to appeal to wider sections of the Jewish public, where they hoped to fulfil their fundraising goals through the collection of much larger numbers of smaller donations. Thereby tens, if not hundreds of thousands of new donors partook, even if in a minor way, in the growing internationalist activity of the organizations. No less important than the money raised was the awareness of a global Jewish community it brought to the donors, borne by the extensive publicity material that fundraisers regularly distributed. Closer to the target communities, the readiness among activists in the West to explore new philanthropic strategies led to the application of entirely new programmes on the ground in Eastern Europe. These innovations included large-scale agrarianization projects, vocational training programmes and cooperative loan societies.[30] With the establishment of Israel, the scale of inputs into transnational philanthropy skyrocketed. In addition to its other obligations, the Jewish diaspora now mobilized to collect huge sums for the fledgling nation's wartime budget, infrastructure and welfare services.

Jewish internationalism did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, events dictated in great part conditions and responses from transnational philanthropies. For example, the British occupation of Palestine in 1917 brought with it a range of formerly unthinkable possibilities for the massive resettlement of East European Jews. Seven years later, the Reed-Johnson Act in the United States, and similar legislation in Western Europe, severely limited the cross-border mobility of Jews from Eastern Europe. The rise of détente decades later created a new set of opportunities for world Jewry to assist their Soviet fellow Jews. But neither the authors of the Balfour Declaration nor the architects of détente envisioned these outcomes in the arena of Jewish internationalism.

The aid and attention received from abroad, and the prestige it bestowed upon them, fortified local Jewish communities beyond face value. Moreover, turning the international spotlight on Russian or Soviet Jews had a more forceful impact than met the eye. After repeated campaigns from abroad, East European regimes could not help but see 'their' Jews as being inextricably linked to the seemingly influential and

generous Jewish benefactors in the West. The tsarist and Soviet states certainly sensed the political ramifications of foreign philanthropy.[31] While there is much yet to be learned from unopened Soviet archives, we already know that the intervention of Western philanthropies merged with the strategies of survival and accommodation that Russian and Soviet Jews used to better their lives.[32]

Internationalism through a *longue-durée* Lens

In order to deliver charity, a means of rescue, or reconstructive aid to relatively closed societies, foreign philanthropists have taken on roles of significant, albeit informal, diplomats while in pursuit of these goals. These sorts of roles have tended to repeat themselves over decades, despite generational transitions.[33] The informal diplomacy practised by intercessors and later activists appears to be a flexible skill, which can be deployed on a personal or institutional basis. Unlike formal diplomacy between states, the informal transnational Jewish version that emerged from the late nineteenth century is more a collective, social-cultural engagement. Indeed, organizations are better suited to the pursuit of modern philanthropic goals than individual intercession because of the continuous negotiation necessary to create and sustain philanthropic projects. These negotiations, of course, had to be conducted both with relatively liberal home governments and with the illiberal governments where the target communities lived. This informal diplomacy has proven itself a subtle tool for keeping lines of communication open between otherwise unfriendly governments. As such, Jewish philanthropies have had marked effects on international politics even if they were not involved in the formation of official foreign or domestic policy. But more importantly for the purposes of this study, this sort of Jewish non-state politics bore the public face of Jewish internationalism from the mid-nineteenth century until 1948.

The professional background of philanthropists greatly determined the contours, and probable success, of their campaigns. For example, the Rothschilds and Jacob Schiff advocated for Russian Jewry using nearly the same tools that they had employed to broker international loans and to float bonds for the Tsar's treasury. Somewhat later, the heads of the Joint Distribution Committee during the interwar period – most of them prominent lawyers and businessmen with connections to the American government – acted on the international stage in ways that echoed a boardroom. They cut deals with the Kremlin for nearly twenty years based on pragmatic interests, almost devoid of politics. At home,

they worked hard to sell the Soviet colonization plan to their home communities. For their part, American Jews tended to be more attuned than their non-Jewish neighbours to international affairs by virtue of sustained contact with relatives abroad and a disproportionately high degree of politicization.[34]

Examination of decision-making in philanthropy illuminates how internationalism spread from the interwar period onward. The major organizations in the West before 1939 certainly bore the imprint of prominent men in terms of leadership and in the way that money was raised. The accepted narrative held that these grandees occupied the commanding heights of the organizations and were also the primary donors. This, however, is only partly accurate. The non-Zionist Joint Distribution Committee, for one, functioned on a more democratic basis than seemed at first glance; its leaders debated policy with, and were also highly aware of, input from local activists.[35] The Joint's operational budget surely depended upon the largesse of wealthy donors like the Rosenwald and Warburg families, both of whom held leadership positions in the organization. But starting in the mid-1920s, the Joint (for reasons mentioned above) began to seek out thousands of small contributions in synagogues and communities throughout the USA. This, in effect, gave some voice in the operations of the hitherto elitist Joint to these many small contributors. Added to this financial democratization among non-Zionists, lack of interest among wealthy Jews in the diaspora meant that the Zionist movement from its inception depended on the generosity of tens of thousands of very modest households in the Jewish world. Competition between Zionists and non-Zionists for support from the diaspora communities before and after 1948 forced them both to reach farther and farther afield, thus increasing the democratizing process. A multifocal, somewhat competitive, structure still characterizes Jewish transnational philanthropy today.

As with most of Jewish life, the Holocaust changed conditions for internationalism. One factor could be classified as the substance of Jewish philanthropy. Transnational activism before 1945 usually focused on the delivery of materiel and expertise to needy communities in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Near East. By contrast, once the challenge of relief for Europe's Displaced Persons had passed in the early 1950s, transnational Jewish philanthropy turned increasing toward political advocacy for embattled Jewish communities elsewhere.[36] One could argue that this change in the substance of international intervention constituted a major shift in trends. I believe, however, that a change

in the deliverables did not indicate a fundamental change in the aims and character of transnational Jewish philanthropy after 1950.

At first glance, the creation of a sovereign Jewish state in 1948 should have caused some shift in Jewish philanthropy and internationalism. But did this event, in fact, change the character and foci of Jewish transnational activism? While Zionism surely enjoyed mass support in Eastern Europe (where the majority of Jews lived at the time) before the Second World War, Jewish elites throughout the world tempered hopes for an autonomous Jewish state with pragmatism. Nonetheless, because of its support base in Eastern Europe, Zionism played a part in the trends of philanthropy and internationalism many years *before* 1948, even if Zionism was never accepted by all as the sole (or main) vessel of internationalism. Even if it did not enjoy universal support among all Jews, providing for the needs of a new state did result in a major shift in the application of philanthropic resources in the few years before 1948 and for decades thereafter. Herein, resources from the Jewish communities in the West moved away from Eastern Europe (and other target communities) and toward Israel. The creation of a Jewish state also meant that its officials began to wield greater influence in the diaspora. A case in point would be the significant role played by Israeli diplomats and other officials in the campaign that was launched in the USA and the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s on behalf of Soviet Jews who wanted to emigrate from the USSR.[37]

Looking through a prism of internationalism, we can reassess a view of the establishment of Israel as a watershed in all aspects of Jewish life. As mentioned above, Jewish philanthropies employed a sort of informal diplomacy before and after 1948. Indeed, nearly all of the pre-existing Jewish INGOs continued to operate *after* 1948. It is important to note that these organizations continued to support an array of activities, only some of which dealt with Israel. New transnational Jewish philanthropic organizations came onto the scene after 1948; some of them have focused on support of Israel, some have not. Even those with an Israel focus have not always worked harmoniously with the Israeli government.[38] Some leaders and laymen in the Jewish world prefer to see Israel as the nexus or leader of contemporary Jewish internationalism. But this is hardly a consensus opinion and, according to many observers, may be less true in 2012 than it has been at any time since 1948. Hence, while the vast majority of Jews in the diaspora support the existence of Israel and feel a sense of national solidarity with it, there is no evidence that they consider Israel as an authority for their daily lives or communal affairs.

Did increased internationalism always produce the desired results from governments, both liberal and illiberal? The answer is difficult to gauge. As the Rothschild family (and later philanthropists) learned the hard way, familiarity with, and access to, government officials at home did not always guarantee action when dealing with foreign rulers.[39] Nor did cordial relations with senior officials in the Russian regime always translate into an ability to push the tsars toward better treatment of 'their' Jews.[40] When transnational philanthropy was applied to Eastern Europe – in ways reminiscent of how intercessors employed it in the unstable Ottoman Empire in the 1840s – the interventions of philanthropic organizations led to both improvements and dilemmas for the Jews that they meant to aid.

Perhaps the severest consequence of philanthropic involvement was the cynical use by the Stalinist regime of the legacy of the Joint Distribution Committee's work in the USSR during the interwar period. By manipulating the image of this episode of transnational philanthropy, the Kremlin was able to destroy Jewish cultural and political elites from 1948 to 1953 in what came to be known as the Crimea Affair and the Doctors' Plot.[41] Here I will pause to point out an eerie parallel between the anti-Semitic imagery of Jewish internationalism and the pride that manifestations of *kelal yisra'el* (in Hebrew, the concept of the unity of the Jewish people) understandably evoke for Jews worldwide. Accusations of a Jewish international conspiracy have been a common thread linking anti-Semites since the appearance of the *Book of the Kahal* in 1869, then distributed globally through the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as of 1903. The myth was perpetuated in Nazi propaganda, anti-Israel propaganda in the Arab world since 1948 and Soviet anti-Zionism in the 1960s and 1970s, with troubling echoes in post-Soviet politics.[42] Ironically, the image of conspiracy popularized through these anti-Semitic campaigns are the fabricated opposite side of a coin that celebrates a Jewish 'success' story of international intercession in hostile environments.

Relations with democracies at home have always posed a challenge to transnational philanthropists. The power calculus of liberal political systems prioritizes electoral success. Consequently, Jewish activists in the West for many decades debated the wisdom and possible consequences of mobilizing their communities. When trying to incite action for fellow Jews abroad among elected officials, candidates and civil servants, should they use silk gloves or the boxing variety?[43] Here we encounter a question of sequence regarding the democratization process in Jewish communities. Did they become more vociferous and forceful

as mobilized diasporas (to borrow the term from John Armstrong) after 1945 in order to campaign for Jewish interests abroad? Or, did the experience of mass mobilizations for the relief of displaced persons in post-Holocaust Europe, the creation of Israel, and for the defence of Soviet Jewry forge them into a more democratized internationalism than they otherwise would have been? It is still unclear to what extent aggressive pressure yielded the desired results from the Kremlin and other targets of mass campaigns. It is certain, however, that by becoming more aggressive and visible, the campaigns were a force for change and internationalization among far wider portions of world Jewry. In other words, once drawn into activism on behalf of coreligionists abroad, masses of Jews would simply not return home and leave the daily affairs of their communities to traditional leaders, drawn from wealthy elites.

Have the financial needs of philanthropy had a democratizing effect on non-Jewish internationals as well? It may indeed be true, as some scholars suggest, that democratization is a common result of philanthropy.[44] I believe, however, that there is no unconditional philanthropy-fundraising-democratization paradigm. For example, an emerging financial international has not, over time, resulted in a fundamental democratization of Catholicism. Rather, the Vatican's power and status remained greatly intact despite the vast geographic and economic changes throughout the Roman Catholic world since the mid-nineteenth century.[45] Hence, in the Catholic case it seems that globalization of resources and faith has not equated to democratization of power. Among Protestants, the democratization process described by Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas in this volume was more similar to the Jewish International than to the Catholic one, given the lack of a pre-existing centre of power like the Vatican. And in all three cases, technological revolutions in communications and transportation were an engine of growth. Moreover, an assault by a state catalyzed the Catholic and Jewish internationalisms: for the former, the French Revolution; for the latter, repression of Russian and Soviet Jewry.

The Jewish case does depart from others in important ways. Both the Catholic and Protestant Internationals are monodenominational and fundamentally spiritual, whereas in the Jewish case the denominations are largely irrelevant. This is essentially a secular international in which nearly all of the leaders and activists are laypeople; the relatively few rabbis involved do so mainly in lay functions. Second, most religious internationalisms work toward the delivery of charity or spiritual salvation as their main goal. Jewish internationalism aims to deliver

various combinations of relief, reconstruction and advocacy. Moreover, unlike many of the cases discussed in this volume, the centre of the Jewish International has moved over time in terms of geography and class; if it sprouted among elites in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, it reached its apogee in a multiclass movement for Soviet Jewry in most of the Jewish diaspora in the second half of the next century. Consequently, the Jewish International has never been place-based, even after the creation of Israel. Rather, it is based on a shared ethnic and national consciousness among communities spread over a wide diaspora; this consciousness has proven geographically mobile and institutionally flexible.

Limitations of Internationalism

Philanthropic mobilizations in the West on behalf of distant brethren did not singlehandedly unify Jewish communities. Even among Jewish philanthropic activists, consensus rarely existed. For example, a cursory examination of the movement for Soviet Jewry in the USA or in the UK from the 1960s until the 1980s reveals serious internal rifts. Enmity of grass-roots organizations toward the so-called Jewish 'establishment' in the USA at times seemed to rival only their hatred for the Kremlin.[46] In England, the unorthodox (female) activists of the 35s often came into conflict with the conservative (male) establishment embodied by the Board of Deputies of British Jewry.[47] During the century of activism studied here, arguments often arose over other questions, including how and where aid should be directed toward their coreligionists. Should it be applied wherever needy Jews lived? Or, should target communities be relocated to a place of relative safety? Or, could all of the Jews' problems in the diaspora be solved only via national autonomy, as Zionism claimed? In light of these competing visions, mobilizations often widened instead of narrowed divisions within Western communities and transnational movements.

  Internationalization borne by philanthropy also had limits in terms of improving the relationship of one group of Jews to another. Put simply, philanthropic activity by Westerners did not always translate over time into personal affinity for, or identification with, one's coreligionists in Eastern Europe. The Rothschilds and others had almost nothing other than religion in common with oppressed Jews east of the Vistula.[48] For the intercessors, part of the motivation for action was a belief that rampant anti-Semitism in Russia was unacceptable not just on purely humanitarian grounds. If unchecked, experience had shown

that anti-Jewish violence ignited waves of emigration and thereby cast a threatening shadow over the status of Western Jewish communities. From the perspective of these emancipated Jews, working on behalf of Russian Jewry therefore made sense on two levels; by helping to solve the 'Jewish question' in the Russian Empire, the Rothschilds and other early transnational philanthropists in the West simultaneously responded to a moral imperative as Jews and reduced the risk of renewed waves of poor Jews disembarking in their cities in the West.[49] And, according to Yaron Tsur's case study of Tunis in this volume, the arrival of foreign philanthropies in North Africa had the unintended effect of institutionalizing pre-existing conflicts in target communities.

In fairness to the Rothschilds and other early activists on this point, evidence abounds that Western philanthropists often had ambivalent views toward needy East European Jews before and after 1941. This was manifest in the patronization of Soviet Jews who benefited from major reconstruction projects during the interwar era.[50] It also surfaced in statements from American Jewish leaders who grew frustrated with problems encountered while absorbing in their communities those immigrants released by the Soviet Union during the 1970s who seemed 'ungrateful' or 'unproductive'.[51] Even within the home communities, transnational philanthropy had a darker side. Scholars have long recognized that for many of the principle European and American donors and leaders, organized philanthropy had the effect of enforcing a social, class-based stratification. It seems that a similar pattern existed among non-Jews.[52]

In parallel to its humanitarian importance, transnational philanthropy was a flywheel for Jewish internationalism. First and foremost, these projects nearly spanned the globe.[53] In the case of Eastern Europe, this Western Jewish philanthropic engagement outlasted huge political changes. But as the Rothschilds and others learned from the late 1870s onward, the power of Jewish internationalism had limits: financial leveraging of the Jewish policy in a newborn and crippled nation like Romania was one thing; pushing more powerful tsars or commissars to act benignly toward Russia's Jews was far more difficult.

Analysis of the Jewish world through the prism of internationalism may carry added meaning. Most of the existing scholarship and the narratives of local Jewish communities tend to overemphasize national and/or ethnic exceptionalism. According to this conception, Jewish communities in the Americas developed along different trajectories than their European counterparts. While this is surely true in some ways,

transnational philanthropy shows that many of the individuals and communities were thinking and acting similarly, if not identically, over time. While avoiding inflated pronouncements, there is little doubt that such activism – seen through a *longue durée* lens – strongly affirms trends of internationalism. What must be understood is the transition at the end of the 1800s from activism of a relative few, based in religious tradition, to a more secularized mass activism that developed in the twentieth century.

Neither the democratization of internationalism, nor any other factor, have totally eliminated the centrifugal tendencies in the Jewish world since the mid-1800s. Changes abounded with the diversification of Judaism, the politicization of the Jewish street, the flowering of Yiddish and Hebrew culture and the building of a national homeland. Many of these processes would suggest greater unity. But with the possible exception of Zionism, the politicization of East European Jewry usually deepened social fault lines and did little for internationalism. This was true even in the ranks of the Bund, a transnational Jewish labour movement, which had branches throughout Europe and the Americas. Moreover, none of the major Jewish religious denominations (Orthodox, Conservative and Reform) has sustained an organized presence on a worldwide scale, all claims aside. A notable recent development has been the proliferation of the Ultra-Orthodox Chabad movement, as its emissaries from Western communities and Israel have established energetic centres of Jewish life throughout much of Eastern Europe and beyond.[54] But Chabad's position at the Orthodox edge of Judaism, together with a lack of administrative transparency, make it a kind of exception that proves the rule about the inability of Jewish denominations to create effective, inclusive global bodies; having helped to revitalize Judaism in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in Europe, Chabad is still viewed as an outsider by many of the communities it means to serve. No less important in the analysis of Jewish internationalism, the three main branches of Judaism do not maintain (or perhaps even desire) significant cross-denominational links.

Over the years, some transnational organizations have claimed to represent the will or the best interests of the Jewish people; to date, however, such claims have not reflected reality.[55] In fact, Jewish organizations often seem to expend more energy in competition than in cooperation, descending at times to petty squabbling along religious or ethnic lines. Even today, it often seems that little other than a vague communal consciousness links Jews across myriad religious and political ideas and practices. At no point has the mere fact of a Jewish

communal presence in multiple countries automatically constituted a Jewish internationalism. For most of the two thousand years following the destruction of the Second Temple, there was not much contact between Jews in most countries. Transnational philanthropy – and not political umbrella organizations like the World Jewish Congress (created in 1936) – seems to be among the rare factors that cultivated more than fractured these ties.[56]

This chapter suggests that if one can identify an internationalism among Jews, this would most likely be called a community of transnational action. Given the many social and political conflicts in Jewish communities of the West since the mid-nineteenth century, it seems that transnational philanthropy might be the *only* area in which internationalism developed.[57] Nonetheless, unification of the Jewish world through supranational organizations like the Jewish Agency remains elusive today.[58] Over the past several decades, transnational advocacy has done at least as much to democratize Jewish organizational life. I believe that this advocacy has created an as yet only partly realized opportunity for the development of a more substantial Jewish internationalism.

Jewish transnational activism at the start of the twenty-first century is vastly different than its precursors. More than any other reason, the target communities have changed. If most of the world's Jewish communities lived in some degree of real (or imminent) physical danger until the mid-twentieth century, this situation no longer exists. Today's transnational activism therefore deals more with long-term education and reconstruction in Jewish communities and, increasingly, with non-Jewish target communities. Moreover, as discussed above, the activists themselves have changed greatly during the past 150 years. While much of the funding for transnational activism may still originate among a relatively narrow set of Jewish elites, the activists and organizations that envision and implement philanthropic programmes worldwide now reflect the highly heterogeneous origins and interests of Jewish communities in the West. As in other aspects of Jewish life, 1948 was not a watershed. Overall, the creation of Israel did not monopolize transnational philanthropy or the priorities of communities of action in the diaspora, where in recent years there has been an increasingly inward redirection of resources toward local goals of education.

Humanitarian and political crises have repeatedly served to mobilize, embolden and strengthen Jewish internationalism. Conversely, more bickering occurs among its component parts during periods of relative

calm. One might ask, then, whether the history of modern Jewish internationalism suggests that it requires an external threat in order to survive and thrive. I sincerely hope not, but only time will tell.

Notes

1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).
2. For seminal works, see John A. Armstrong, 'Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas', *American Political Science Review*, 70.2 (1976), 393–408; and Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St Martins, 1986).
3. For an enduring analysis, see Ephraim Frisch, *An Historical Survey of Jewish Philanthropy from the Earliest Times to the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1924). See also Alfred J. Kutzik, 'The Social Basis of American Jewish Philanthropy.', PhD dissertation, Brandeis University, 1967; and Henry Allen Moe, 'Notes on the Origin of Philanthropy in Christendom', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 105.2 (April 1961), 141–4.
4. Among recent relevant works: Bas Arts et al., eds, *Non-State Actors and International Relations* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); and Volker Berghahn, 'Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the "American Century" ', *Diplomatic History*, 23.3 (1999), 393–419.
5. For example, see André Chouraqui, *L'Alliance israélite universelle et la renaissance juive contemporaine, 1860–1960* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965); Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the Jewish Colonization Association* (London: Routledge, 1985); Merle Curti, 'Tradition and Innovation in American Philanthropy', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 105.2 (April 1961), 146–56.
6. A recent example is Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ed., *Diasporas and Development: Exploring the Potential* (Boulder: Rienner, 2008).
7. David Eliezer Jaffe, 'Sociological and Religious Origins of the Non-Profit Sector in Israel', *International Sociology*, 8.2 (June 1992), 169.
8. For overviews, see Daniel J. Elazar, 'The Jewish People as the Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis', in Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas*, pp. 212–57; William Safran, 'The Jewish Diaspora in a Comparative and Theoretical Perspective', *Israel Studies*, 10.1 (2005), 36–60; and Jaffe, 'Sociological and Religious Origins', pp. 159, 169–71.
9. For examples, see Milton J. Esman, 'Diasporas and International Relations', in Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas*, pp. 333–49.
10. Many scholars concur on the formative nature of these revolutions. For example, see Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 63.
11. For example, see Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews and International Minority Protection* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 149.
12. Jonathan Dekel-Chen, 'Business and Philanthropy: Engaging and Disengaging in Russia (1880–1906)', paper presented at conference in Roubaix,

France, November 2006. For general histories, see Niall Ferguson's two-volume *The House of Rothschild* (New York: Penguin, 1998, 1999); Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (London: Collins, 1978); and Mattiyahu Mintz, 'Nesigat harotshildim memilveh April 1891 lerusyah min hahebet hayehudi', *Zion*, 54 (1989), 401–35.

13. In the early modern Sephardic world, see Jonathan I. Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews, and the World Maritime Empires 1540–1740* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

14. Israel Bartal, 'Politikah yehudit terom-modernit: 'va'adei ha'aratsot' bemizraḥ eiropah', in Stuart Eisenshtadt and Moshe Lissak, eds, *Hatsiyonut vehaḥazarah lehistoriyah* (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1999), pp. 186–94.

15. Transnational rabbinic correspondences existed from late antiquity. See Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*, pp. 180–1.

16. This network fits the 'weak' theoretical model proposed in Mark S. Granovetter, 'The Strength of Weak Ties', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 78.6 (May 1973), 1360–80.

17. Unhappy with French dominance in the Alliance, British Jews founded the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1870, Austrians founded the *Israelitische Allianze* in 1873 and Germans founded the *Hilfsverein der Deutscher Juden* in 1901. See Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p.167.

18. For new reassessments, see Jonathan Dekel-Chen, David Gaunt, Natan Meir, Israel Bartal, eds, *Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

19. *Shtadlan* (*shtadlanim*, plural). Others translate this as 'Court Jew', working on behalf of Jewish interests.

20. Priscilla Roberts, 'Jewish Bankers, Russia, and the Soviet Union, 1900–1940: The Case of Kuhn, Loeb and Company', *American Jewish Archives Journal*, 49.1–2 (1997), 9–37; Naomi W. Cohen, *Jacob H. Schiff: A Study in American Jewish Leadership* (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1999); Evyatar Friesel, 'Jacob H. Schiff and the Leadership of the American Jewish Community', *Jewish Social Studies*, 8.2–3 (2002), 61–72.

21. Daniel Gutwein, *The Divided Elite: Economics, Politics and Anglo-Jewry, 1882–1917* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), p. 335.

22. Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the AJJDC, 1929–1939* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974); Mikhail Mitsel, 'Uchastie Amerikanskogo evreiskogo raspredelitel'nogo komiteta v bor'be s golodom na Ukraine v 1922–1923 gg.', *Evreis'ka istoriia ta kul'turakintsia XIX – pochatku XX st. Zbirnik nauckovikh prats'. Materiali 10 mizhnarod-noi konferentsii* (Kyiv: Institut Iudaiki, 2003), pp. 75–84; Michael Beizer, 'Samuil Lubarsky: Portrait of an Outstanding Agronomist', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 34.1 (2004), 91–103; Leon Shapiro, *The History of ORT: A Jewish Movement for Social Change* (New York: Schocken, 1980).

23. For descriptions of early efforts, see Ya'akov Kelner, *Reshito shel tikhnun ḥevrati kelal-yehudi: hahitarvut hamemusedet bimetsukat yehudei rusyah bereshit shenot hame'ah ha-19* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 6–40; and, Eli Bar-Chen, 'Two Communities with a Sense of Mission: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden,' in Michael Brenner et al., eds, *Jewish Emancipation Reconsidered: The French and*

German Models (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 111–21. On Romania, see Leff, *Sacred Bonds*, pp. 158–9, 184–91.

24. For case studies, see Selwyn Ilan Troen and Benjamin Pinkus, eds, *Organizing Rescue: National Jewish Solidarity in the Modern Period* (London: Frank Cass, 1992).

25. Some of these are described in Mary McCune, *The Whole Wide World without Limits: International Relief, Gender Politics, and American Jewish Women, 1893–1930* (Detroit: Wayne State, 2005).

26. Stuart Altshuler, *From Exodus to Freedom: A History of the Soviet Jewry Movement* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), p. 50.

27. This movement is described in Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin, eds, *A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jews* (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1999); and Henry Feingold, *Silent No More: Saving the Jews of Russia, the American Jewish Effort, 1967–1989* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006). The first Brussels World Conference convened in 1971, attended by 760 delegates from 38 countries, covered by 250 newspeople. The second Conference convened in 1976 with nearly double these numbers.

28. William W. Orbach, *The American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979), p. 34.

29. Feingold, *Silent No More*, p. 54 n. 37, pp. 147, 294.

30. For example, see Nahum Karlinsky, 'Jewish Philanthropy and Jewish Credit Cooperatives in Eastern Europe and Palestine up to 1939: A Transnational Phenomenon?', *Journal of Israeli History*, 27.2 (2008), 149–70.

31. Soviet sensitivity can be seen during the interwar period. For example, see Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv pri Sovete Ministrov Avtonomnoi Respubliki Krym (State Archive of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine; GAARK), fol. r-515; 'Komzet', opis 1, dela 416, ll. 113–17 (Mandel'shtam to *Emes*, c.May 1934); GAARK, fol. p-1, 'Obkom', opis 1, dela 990, l. 146 (report of Crimean OGPU on the activity of Agro-Joint, 27 December 1930). It can also be seen in the 1970s. See Boris Morozov, *Documents on Soviet Jewish Immigration* (London: Cass, 1999).

32. This pattern emerged in late imperial Russia. See Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 11–13, 225–7, 376–9.

33. For example, see Jonathan Dekel-Chen, 'An Unlikely Triangle: Philanthropists, Commissars, and American Statesmanship Meet in Soviet Crimea, 1922–37', *Diplomatic History*, 27.3 (2003), 353–76.

34. Jonathan Dekel-Chen, *Farming the Red Land: Jewish Agricultural Colonization and Local Soviet Power, 1924–41* (Newhaven: Yale University Press, 2005), chapter 3.

35. The JDC's investment in Soviet Russia between 1923–37 resulted, in part, from pressure 'from below'. See Dekel-Chen, *Farming the Red Land*, chapter 2.

36. For example, see Selwyn Ilan Troen, ed., *Jewish Centers and Peripheries: Europe between America and Israel Fifty Years after World War II* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1999), pp. 6–12.

37. Fred Lazin, *The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel versus the American Jewish Establishment* (Lanham: Lexington, 2005); Pauline Peretz,

'The Action of Nativ's Emissaries in the United States: a Trigger for the American Movement to Aid Soviet Jews, 1958–1974', *Bulletin du Centre Recherche Français de Jérusalem*, 14 (2004), 112–28; Altshuler, *Exodus to Freedom*, p. 52; Feingold, *Silent No More*, pp. 298, 314.

38. For example, see David Clayman, 'Cooperation and Tensions between American Jewry and Israel over Selected Problems Confronting European Jewry', in Troen, ed., *Jewish Centers and Peripheries*, pp. 355–71.

39. For an early example, Nathaniel Rothschild made little headway with Foreign Minister Henry Lansdowne in 1901 to defend Romania's Jews. See Rothschild Archive London (RAL), dept. 11, series 111, box 109 (Foreign Office to Nathaniel Rothschild, 4 July 1901).

40. See Nathaniel Rothschild's 1890 correspondence with Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradskii, RAL, dept. 11, series 111, box 108 (Vyshnegradskii to Nathaniel Rothschild, 29 November 1890). See also Eliyahu Feldman, 'The Rothschilds and the Russian Loans: High Finance and Jewish Solidarity', *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 10 (1994), 231–56 (237–41, 244).

41. Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, *Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, *Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot against the Jewish Doctors, 1948–1953* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); Gennadi Kostyrchenko, *Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin's Russia: From the Secret Archives of the Former Soviet Union* (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1995).

42. Dina Porat, 'The "Protocols of the Elders of Zion": New Uses of an Old Myth', in Robert Wistrich, ed., *Demonizing the Other* (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1999), pp. 323–35; Jonathan Frankel, 'The Soviet Regime and Anti-Zionism: An Analysis', in Yaacov Ro'i et al., eds, *Jewish Culture and Identity in the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 310–54 ; Esther Webman, 'Anti-Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel: The Arab Perspective', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte*, 33 (2005), 306–29; Jonathan Dekel-Chen, 'Crimea 2008: A Lesson about Uses and Misuses of History', *East European Jewish Affairs*, 39.1 (April 2009), 101–5.

43. For example, the Rothschilds tended toward a more subtle approach. See Feldman, 'The Rothschilds and the Russian Loans', 238; and, RAL, dept. 11 series 130A, box 0 (Nathaniel Rothschild to French cousins, 9 January 1906). For the activism in North America during the 1960s, see Friedman and Chernin, *A Second Exodus*.

44. For example, see Angel M. Eikenberry, 'Philanthropy and Governance', *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, 28.4 (2006), 588.

45. I rely here on the findings of John F. Pollard, *Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy: Financing the Vatican, 1850–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Vincent Viaene's chapter in this volume.

46. Residual hostility endures. See Jacob Birnbaum, 'U.S. Jewish Student Activism for Soviet Jewry in the 1960s', unpublished MS, New York, Center for Russian Jewry with SSSJ, December 2007.

47. Daphne Gerlis, *Those Wonderful Women in Black: The Story of the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry* (London: Minerva, 1996).

48. Ferguson, *The House of Rothschild*, p. 260. Similar tensions brewed in North America between 'veteran' German-speaking Jews and newcomers

from Eastern Europe. See, for example, Daniel Soyer, 'Brownstones and Brownsville: Elite Philanthropists and Immigrant Constituents at the Hebrew Educational Society of Brooklyn, 1899–1929', *American Jewish History*, 88.2 (2000), 182, 190, 207.

49. This, we must assume, was a reason why the spectre of mass immigration usually arose in contacts with government officials. See, for example, RAL, dept. 11 series 130A, box 0 (Nathaniel Rothschild to French cousins, 18 June 1906). See also, Gutwein, *The Divided Elite*, pp. 308–11, 322–3; and Cohen, *Schiff*, p. 127.

50. Dekel-Chen, *Farming the Red Land*, p. 112.

51. Interview with Rabbi Herschel Schacter, 30 May 1974. William E. Wiener Oral History Library of the American Jewish Committee, New York Public Library, 'Soviet Jewry Movement in America', p. 38; interview with David A. Harris, 7 October 1991, idem, pp. 12, 14.

52. Luisa Levi d'Ancona, 'Philanthropy and Politics: Strategies of Jewish Bourgeois in Italy, France and England between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries', *Traverse*, 1 (2006), 85–86, 89; Kutzik, 'The Social Basis', 984–9; Thomas Adam, ed., *Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society: Experiences from Germany, Great Britain, and North America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 9.

53. Space does not allow for a full accounting. Many are mentioned in Eliyahu Benjamini, *Medinot layehudim: uganda, birobidzhan ve'od 34 tokhniyot* (Tel Aviv: Hakibuts Hame'uhad, 1990).

54. Chabad (a Hebrew acronym signifying 'Wisdom, Understanding and Knowledge') is a Hasidic movement founded in the eighteenth century. Its currently operates on a global scale and has assumed leadership roles in Jewish communities in parts of Europe.

55. One of these cases – Agudat Yisrael – is studied in Jeremy Stolow, 'Transnationalism and the New Religio-Politics', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 21.2 (2004), 109–37. I would counter that Agudat Yisrael does not qualify as internationalism because: (a) it has little appeal in the Jewish world beyond its own relatively small, Orthodox constituency; (b) the limited civil authority it enjoys in Israeli politics does not equate to acceptance of its agenda among the majority of Israelis; and (c) the Orthodox community remains fractious due to ethnic differences and disagreements among rabbinical 'courts'.

56. Some of these dilemmas are hinted at in Avi Beker, 'Sixty Years of World Jewish Congress Diplomacy: From Foreign Policy to the Soul of a Nation', in Troen, ed., *Jewish Centers and Peripheries*, pp. 373–96.

57. Kutzik (written in the 1960s) affirmed Salo Baron's earlier observation that philanthropy was 'the one institution which had more than any other unified a socioeconomically disparate and ideologically divided [American] Jewish community'. See 'The Social Basis', 1–3, 980–1.

58. Fink, *Defending the Rights*, pp. 283–5, 317–20; David Vital, 'Diplomacy in the Jewish Interest', in Ada Rapaport-Albert and Steven Zipperstein, eds, *Jewish History: Essays in Honor of Chimen Abramsky* (London: Halban, 1988), pp. 683–95.

13
Protestant Ecclesiastical Internationals

James C. Kennedy

In featuring as its cover story the 1961 gathering of the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches in New Delhi, the American news weekly *Time* was chiefly impressed with the challenges and difficulties facing the churches seeking ecumenical unity:

> [M]any of the sectarian dicta and dogmas that once stirred great debates in Protestantism are dead letters. In America the ethnic loyalties and local ties that once buttressed such sectarian doctrines have almost dissolved in the comings and goings of the most restlessly transient population in the world. In Europe the state churches – both Protestant and Catholic – that once were part of the fibre of society, stand cold with empty pews and silent with declining vocations. The uncertainty at the center has been matched by the pressure from outside. The march of Marxism, the idolatry of science, the determinism of Freud, the stigma of [Christianity] being a 'white man's religion', the resurgence, with the rise of the new nations, of the 'national' religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism and Islam – all are helping herd the scattered Christians into one corral. This is not true Christian unity, but it is producing a sense of unity and a growing recognition of an urgent common need – to rethink fundamentals and to change traditional ways.[1]

The inclusion of not only four Eastern Orthodox churches (including the Russian) but a much larger number of 'youthful' Asian and African churches fired the imagination of *Time* and other news sources, in part because of these churches' call for greater social action. 'The church

must become part of the world', Ceylon bishop D. T. Niles (1908–70) proclaimed. 'God doesn't love the church – God loves the world.' And the Nigerian physician George Ademola added: 'I don't believe in saving souls imprisoned in miserable bodies.'[2] Accordingly, the World Council took, in the wake of the massacre of anti-Apartheid demonstrators in Sharpeville and high profile Civil Rights activism in the USA, a tough new line against racial prejudice. In addition to this, the World Council merged with the International Missionary Council, as both organizations resolved to give new form to the old task of evangelization. 'New Delhi 1961' was perhaps the high water mark of the still largely Protestant World Council of Churches. Christians might be herding themselves into a common global corral, as *Time* observed, but there was also optimism for the future. After all, the Third Assembly of the Council constituted a global and ecumenical movement of hundreds of churches and several hundred millions of members engaging at once in theological reconciliation, new mission strategies, and with the inclusion of the new Orthodox churches, the church's social and political engagement with 'the Sputnik world', as the Secretary General of the World Council, the Dutchman W. A. Visser 't Hooft (1900–85) put it. Perhaps at no time did it seem closer to functioning as a global religious assembly parallel to the United Nations, from which it drew inspiration, and at no time did the Council better articulate the hopes of a postcolonial era, in which East and West, North and South, might embrace each other, at last, as equals. In any event, it seemed now that the Protestant *churches*, once hopelessly fragmented and divided, were now at last willing to work in concert at the international level, inspired by a common faith to serve humankind.[3]

Churches and (International) Civil Society

Much has been written about the relation of the institutional church to the nation and to the state, but relatively little on the churches' relation to civil society, that field of associations situated between family, state and market.[4] Some scholars regard churches and other worshipping communities as more or less constituent parts of civil society.[5] Others, however, are reluctant to conceptualize churches as such. Though recognizing that some voluntary associations of nineteenth-century civil society were religious in character, the historian Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann chose to define these organizations as 'non-ecclesiastical' in nature.[6] In some respects, churches, historically speaking, have not resembled the voluntary associations of civil society. The hierarchical

organization of some churches, the fact that church membership is more a given identity determined at baptism than a free choice, and the religious or spiritual focus of churches can disqualify them from being considered part of a voluntaristic, secular civil society. Akira Iriye's important book on 'global community' excludes 'churches, synagogues, cemeteries and other religious bodies' from the 'non-governmental organizations' he analyses, except when they engage in 'secular' activities. Iriye admits that this distinction is 'tenuous', but argues that the inclusion of religious activities like evangelization would render his analysis 'unmanageable'.[7] Other scholars have problematized the shifting historical relationship between church and civil society, perhaps most notably the Roman Catholic Church. Jose Casanova argues that the Church of Rome only became a church of civil society in the decades after the Second World War, when it embraced, or at least accepted, the pluralism inherent in civil society. Another American social scientist, Robert Putnam, has argued that the Catholic church continued to stymie the development of civil society in southern Italy where, in contrast to the association-rich northern Italy, it retained its dominant role.[8] In general, churches operating in religiously plural settings, such as the nonconformist churches in the English-speaking world, have seemed to more readily constitute a part of civil society than churches with a predominant social and political position.[9] Not only scholars, however, but ecclesiastical bodies have had difficulty seeing themselves (exclusively) as part and parcel of associational life. Perhaps it is best to say that churches – not only Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic but also Protestant – have often consciously conceived of themselves as different from other civil society organizations, even strongly religious ones. As worshipping communities Protestant churches have often conceived of themselves as distinguishable from Protestant or generically Christian organizations like the YMCA, maintaining at times a reserved distance from the activities of civil society.[10] As institutions on which the salvation of humankind depends, the churches' public significance could not be reduced to the particular aims and interests of even the most high-minded lay organizations. Pope John Paul II (1978–2005; b.1920) is said to have insisted that the Catholic Church is not 'civil' but 'sacred society'.[11] It was rather to serve a more universal purpose that transcended human politics and society. What the spiritual nature of the Church meant in practice for its public presence in the world, however, remains now, as ever, a point of debate among Christians.

Ecclesiastical Internationals and the Church as 'the real supra-national community'

This chapter is about the striking rise and relative decline of a particular kind of religious international that emerged within global Protestantism: the ecclesiastical international, a formal federation of churches focused, first and foremost, on worldwide Christian unity.[12] (Though the focus here is on global organizations, one might add that the postwar period also saw the rise of regional, ecumenical ecclesiastical internationals, such as the Middle East Council of Churches or the Council of European Churches.) That search for unity has concomitantly committed ecclesiastical internationals to a set of causes which international Protestantism long has had among its aims: evangelism, social justice, education and humanitarian relief. But at the centre of the ecclesiastical international was the search for an ecumenical fellowship that morally and spiritually formed the prerequisite for effective Christian action in the world. Accordingly, ecclesiastical internationals see their efforts to promote specific causes (such as economic justice or the environment) as particular expressions of the Christian communion at the centre of their project. Iriye's decision to include, for example, Lutheran World Relief as an 'international organization' and not its spiritual parent, the World Lutheran Federation, might strike some Christian ecumenists as missing the heart of their international presence and the deeper purpose of their humanitarian effort.

In one sense the federation of churches as manifested in bodies like the World Council or other more purely Protestant federations could be seen as chiefly another effort to better and further organize Protestant (or more broadly, Christian) organizational endeavour throughout the world, a logical step in the development of Protestant internationals that came into being in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The active Presbyterian layman John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) – who in the 1950s would serve as Dwight Eisenhower's staunchly anti-communist Secretary of State and whose son would become a leading Catholic cardinal – held that Christian global impact at the very least required that 'their churches must have better organization, more unity of action and put more emphasis on Christianity as a world religion'.[13] Churches were uniquely situated to tackle world problems, Dulles and others believed, precisely because they were global bodies that transcended the old national divides.

But many proponents of the World Council of Churches saw in global Christian ecumenism a deeper kind of 'religious international' than merely extending and reorganizing the network of religious organizations that had preceded it. The work of churches in the world – much of it in the form of material aid – was to be seen as grounded in something deeper, a global spiritual fellowship. Indeed, it was international ecumenical fellowship that was required not only to transcend divisions among Christians but, through the special spiritual nature of the Church, to bring peace and justice to the whole world. Writing in 1948, the Dutch jurist Baron F. M. van Asbeck (1889–1968) – member of the World Council's Commission on 'The Church and the International Disorder' and professor of international law at Leiden University – viewed the churches of the world as together constituting 'the *militia Christi*, a unity of mankind beyond politics, breaking through the idolatry of nation, race and class' with a calling to defend 'solidarity and justice' throughout the world. Van Asbeck explained:

> For in the Church, in contrast to any other agency, is the *real* supranational community, a community not created by man, but by God's intervention in this worldly dispensation; having within its purview the 'whole earth and all it holds' and charged with the care of man, a creature after God's image. *Oikumene* means something which is radically different from the world of states and of nations, and the *ecumenical* work transcends by the call of the Church's Master all human *international* co-operation. The ecumenical leaven should revolutionize the international world.[14]

For van Asbeck, the church could not be a mere 'agency' of international civil society, but must see itself as a divinely appointed institution, a special spiritual community entrusted with the task of facilitating human flourishing across the globe.

The rest of this chapter traces in broad outlines the efforts of Protestant-led ecclesiastical internationals to assert themselves on the world stage in the decades after the Second World War. In some ways, the advent and development of international church networks from the mid-twentieth century onwards was a success story that would have pleased founding ecumenists like Visser 't Hooft. Global networks of churches proliferated in the years after 1945, and international ecumenical contacts – and the forms of material and immaterial solidarity they generated – changed for good the nature of Protestantism, intensifying intercontinental contacts and rendering Protestants more globally

and ecumenically minded than they had been before. At the same time, however, the limits of organized ecumenism as embodied in the World Council, and other Protestant church federations, would soon be felt. After 1961 the World Council of Churches would not again generate the same degree of public attention, and the ecumenical movement it represented would fade in significance in subsequent decades. Accounting for this decline over time are at least three factors to be outlined below: (1) the decline of ecclesiastical internationals in the face of secularization that stemmed in part from the very broadness of the Protestant vision; (2) the inability of ecclesiastical internationals to maintain a 'transcendent' spiritual authority in the midst of growing rifts over the place of churches in international civil society; and, most important, (3) the increasingly fragmented nature of international Protestantism itself, exemplified not only in the rise of charismatic and evangelical Protestantism in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but in the 'congregationalization' of Protestant churches across the globe, in which international contacts would increasingly be conducted not via the great institutions of Christian ecumenism, but in more diffuse international networks.

In offering an analysis of international Protestantism, this chapter places special emphasis on developments within the Dutch Protestant churches. After 1945, the Dutch played a disproportionate role in international organizations, religious and secular. The Second World War had put an end to their neutrality and their status as a colonial power, and they sought new outlets for an active international role. A series of regional and global projects – NATO (Dutch secretaries general seemed to dominate the post, together serving far longer than those of any other country) , the European Economic Community, the United Nations and the expansion of international law, and extensive development aid helped define the strikingly internationalist commitment on the part of the Dutch government and other Dutch public agencies. Many Dutch Protestants eagerly participated in this internationalist turn. The country yielded key figures to the postwar ecumenical movement; not only was Visser 't Hooft the first secretary general of the World Council (1948–66), but its Ecumenical Institute at the Swiss Château de Bossey was first headed (1946–55) by the missions expert Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965), like Visser 't Hooft a layman with extensive international contacts. Dutch Protestants served not only as mediators between Anglo-American and continental European Protestantism but their experience in Indonesia helped inform their consciously postcolonial commitments (Kraemer, for example, himself

had worked hard to bring about the creation of independent Protestant churches in the Indies during the 1930s). In the 1970s and 1980s, Dutch church activists would play an important international role in issues like the anti-Apartheid movement – for which it felt a particular responsibility given Holland's historic ties with the Afrikaners – and in the effort to block the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe. Later, and in a very different way, the Netherlands would itself become an important field of mission for new Protestant networks that sought to introduce evangelical or charismatic Protestantism to the now substantially unchurched Netherlands. For all of these reasons, the Netherlands is a useful example for illustrating the shifts in ecclesiastical internationals that took place after the Second World War.

The Rise of Protestant-Dominant Ecclesiastical Internationals

One of the most striking developments within global Protestantism in the period after the Second World War is the assertion of the institutional churches as conscious, ecumenical players in global society, and efforts to create new religious internationals that were consciously *ecclesiastical* in nature. Protestants had been quite active, prior to the Second World War, in the creation of many kinds of Christian organizational endeavour that had effectively mobilized believers, through new forms of media and transport, to band together in global projects, from mission groups, including John R. Mott's (1865–1955) Christian Student Movement, to a plethora of global reform projects defined by international Protestantism. These projects required a degree of cooperation that was best achieved by new, more versatile forms of Christian organizational endeavour than the institutional churches could provide. Denominations could and did field their own international programmes (most notably missions) but sectarian loyalties often stood in the way of a greater measure of cooperation, and Protestants found that non-ecclesiastical religious associations, from schools to reform societies, were often the most effective way for Protestants to make a collective impact in society.

    As good as Protestants were at developing Christian voluntary associations outside the formal constraints of the Church,[15] the very experience of cooperation spurred the desire for deeper international ties that would end the doctrinal and institutional divisions that were increasingly regarded as an embarrassment at best, a serious impediment to the Christian cause at worst. The first international ecclesiastical bodies of

Protestantism appeared roughly at the same time as the First Vatican Council (1870): the Anglican Lambeth Conference of bishops (1867), the Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World holding the Presbyterian System (1875) and the Methodist World Council (1881). Another important Protestant group, the Lutherans, organized themselves only later on the international front (at Eisenach, for the first time, in 1923), and then only on a small scale until after the Second World War. But the big drive for deeper ecumenical contacts lay in advancing missions – as articulated at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh (1910) and the dream of helping to create overseas mission churches, churches that would overcome the doctrinal and denominational divisions of the past.[16]

In the wake of the First World War, Protestant ecumenists from Western Europe and North America sought contact with the Eastern Orthodox churches (Constantinople and Jerusalem were no longer controlled by the Ottomans), and bestowed more attention on the churches of Asia and Africa. The International Missionary Council, launched at Edinburgh and formally established in 1921, itself functioned as a venue where European and North American church leaders could come into contact with the indigenous churches of Asia, an encounter encouraged by interwar Council meetings in Jerusalem (1928) and in Madras (Chennai, 1938). The stance of the Protestant churches and their theological status as one of the world's great religions would become a central focus of these meetings.[17] With the moral and spiritual superiority of the Christian West increasingly in doubt, Western Protestant missionaries and church leaders began to take into account Christian minority experiences in places like Palestine and India.

Also fuelling the ecumenical movement, as evidenced at the 'Life and Work' ecumenical conference in Stockholm (1925), was the sense within Protestantism that the institutional churches had remained all too detached from the world and its challenges. World war, economic crisis, social change and unprecedented totalitarian challenges had challenged the position of the churches. The great churches of Europe in particular had been passive pillars of society; now they needed to speak to economic and social issues both national and international in scope.[18] Non-ecclesiastical Christian institutions were not enough; the Church itself must speak and act.

For these reasons, by the 1930s a largely Protestant ecumenical international called the institutional churches to put an end to their isolation and to arrest their palpable decline, and to stand together for the right where states had failed. In 1938 a conference was held

at Utrecht in the Netherlands to prepare the way for a World Council of Churches. 'Nations and peoples of the world are being driven apart, but the churches are coming together', Visser 't Hooft, then secretary of the Student Christian World Federation, told participants at an Amsterdam student conference a month before Hitler invaded Poland. 'There is a growing conviction concerning the essential unity of all Christians.'[19] The war, however, did delay Visser 't Hooft's plans. It was not until 22 August 1948 that the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, consisting of 147 largely but not exclusively Protestant bodies, was at last able to convene in Amsterdam. Now at last, many ecumenists hoped, things were to be different. Influences of the Church had been 'hardly perceptible' on 'the international level', wrote C. L. ('Conny') Patijn (1908–2007), a highly placed official in the Dutch government, but he now hoped the Church could use its special spiritual authority more forcefully in international affairs.[20] Visser 't Hooft himself had long been confident that this would be the case. Already in 1943 he had written that 'the church will take less the place of a spectator, and that church history will not be an appendix to but a central element in world history'.[21]

This renewed interest in the Church as a key actor in 'world history' did not come at the expense of an interest in the world's political institutions. Within progressive Anglo-American Protestantism there arose in the interwar years an interest in world government, sometimes modelled on the British Empire, that would lay the basis for world peace. Such a project could only succeed with the support of the churches, whose aims must not be doctrinaire and exclusivist but rather to advance a broad social gospel along lines that would be acceptable to people of all the world religions.[22] Not all postwar ecumenical leaders shared the religious syncretism of this particular vision, but after 1945 the ecumenical movement demonstrated a strong interest in global government as a necessary force for global peace and justice. The international Church therefore was obliged to support world government when and where it was feasible to do so, and international leaders saw a role for the united churches of the world to exercise an influence on both the United Nations and on national states to further the universal goals of peace and justice. The opportunity for the world Church, as an actor on the world stage, lay precisely in the moral and spiritual suasion it could exercise on a chastened and fragile global political order.

Thus the period after the Second World War was indeed characterized by an unprecedented phase of Christian ecclesiastical ecumenism, in which international church assemblies and ecumenical networks were

developed far more extensively than ever before, rapidly encompassing in the 1950s and 1960s many new members from Asia and Africa in particular. New forms of communication and transportation, and the tremendous increase in wealth evident in Western Europe and North America made it much easier for church leaders to create and sustain international fora where church leaders could meet each other and hammer out a multilayered religious agenda, whether theological, social or (increasingly) political in orientation. In this the World Council was joined by purely Protestant and confessionally defined bodies like the World Lutheran Federation (1947) and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (created in 1970 through a merger of two nineteenth-century bodies), each representing scores of millions of believers. In the postwar context, ecclesiology, the doctrine of the Church, received more attention precisely in a context where the nexus between 'church' and 'world' had become so contested. Precisely because the churches' own position could no longer be taken for granted within a 'secular' Europe or a decolonized Africa and Asia (where they could be dismissed as colonial 'mission posts'), many churches sought affiliation with a worldwide movement, a religious international that would bring about spiritual unity and social solidarity. International cooperation could not be left to the superior organization of the Roman Catholic Church – which had stayed aloof of these efforts and which in any event continued to be distrusted by many of these ecumenists – but must be taken up by other churches as well.

As the World Council in New Delhi illustrates, the postwar period ushered in, at least in ecumenical Protestant circles, a rather expansive understanding of the Church and the Church's mission in the world. Determined to reject the historical patterns of political and social quietism on the one hand and doctrinal disputes on the other, and to demonstrate anew their relevance to the world and to redeem a planet threatened by war, underdevelopment and inequality, many ecumenically minded Protestants longed for the global Church to be an important and active force for human flourishing. Through Christian fellowship and ecumenism, the churches of the world could be turned into a network of mutual assistance. Individual churches long had established their own aid agencies, but the requirements of a new age – changing economies of scale and the theological imperative to break down church walls – led to new forms of cooperation. Already during the Second World War the ecumenical movement developed 'Interchurch Aid' (1941), a relatively small-scale humanitarian aid programme which Visser 't Hooft helped direct from Geneva. Church World

Service, an American organization that combined the humanitarian efforts of mostly Protestant churches, was founded in 1946 and in that year provided '80 percent of all relief goods shipped from non-governmental organizations in the USA to Europe and Asia'.[23] Relief services, initially offered to churches but increasingly to a wide variety of partners, would become an important part of how new ecclesiastical internationals like the World Lutheran Federation, initially led by the prominent Swedish theologian Anders Nygren (1890–1978), gave expression to their newly found ecumenism.[24] Nor was attending to the physical needs of the destitute the only way in which the nascent ecumenical movement expressed itself. Noticeable, too, was the stress that some ecumenical leaders, not least within the influential USA, placed on the development of human rights. Ecumenical leaders not only supported the creation of the United Nations, but championed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), themselves largely penning the article on religious freedom.[25] The ecumenical movement, then, was an early and important advocate of human rights, though it would not be until the 1970s, when human rights became a central political concern throughout the globe, that the global ecumenical movement made this concern an indispensable part of its identity.

From the beginning, but also increasingly over time, this kind of religious international had a strong 'this-worldly' orientation. To be sure, such concerns continued to be understood in the context of Christian reconciliation and fellowship. Efforts at strengthening Christian ecumenism would always form a significant part of what the new ecclesiastical internationals sought to bring about; the World Council of Churches statement on Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry accepted at Lima in 1982 was an attempt to understand Christian sacraments as a means to further ecumenical unity.[26] But much of the attention by the 1960s had come to focus on issues directly tied to the North–South divide, and the inequity in social, economic and political relations. Already by the 1950s, the World Council and other Protestant ecclesiastical internationals became increasingly defined by the imperative of development aid. Northern European churches developed a particular enthusiasm for this effort at solidarity, as well as Protestant church-based development agencies including generous Scandinavian organizations like Finnchurchaid and Danchurchaid and their the German Protestant development organization Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED). More generally, the World Council succeeded, at least in the first decades of its existence, as an effective religious international, mobilizing money, expertise and volunteers in programmes that expressed a

socially progressive outlook that reflected, albeit for different reasons, the Protestant character of the Council.

What mattered to many Protestant ecumenists as much as (or more than) such activities was the necessity of the Church to speak prophetically on world problems and set an agenda for the world. In the 1950s, the World Council, itself consisting of churches in Asia and Africa, had renounced racism and discrimination, increasingly with an eye to South African Apartheid. Increasingly, however, this was not enough for many members. Given the composition of the Council (which drew heavily from socially progressive Westerners and the churches of recently decolonized lands), it is perhaps not surprising that the council developed a 'political' course in the mid- to late 1960s, advocated by the Church in Society conference in Geneva in 1966 (which espoused solidarity with revolutionary causes) and the Fourth World Assembly in Uppsala in 1968. There, the Council formally determined to 'eradicate' racial discrimination from the face of the earth, resulting in a Programme to Combat Racism (1969) which included the controversial financial support of freedom movements, including those which had taken up arms.[27] In subsequent decades, the World Council and Protestant councils would take up other themes systematically, including the future of youth, improving social justice and environment, engaging in interreligious dialogue.[28] Though women activists sometimes complained that the World Council resisted gender balance, the international itself launched a campaign in the 1990s (Ecumenical Decade of Churches in Solidarity with Women).

Initially, at least, the new ecclesiastical internationals generated much enthusiasm from Protestant clergy and laity, certainly in the Netherlands. The early Dutch champions of international ecumenism – including Visser 't Hooft, Kraemer, van Asbeck and Patijn – wanted a new, broader role for the Church on the national and international stage as a way of breaking through the religious parochialism of Dutch society, with its plethora of Christian parties, trade unions, newspapers and schools. All of them were moderate progressives politically, sympathizing with the Dutch Labour Party. Increasingly they were not alone in their yearning for a wider engagement of church and world. Dutch Protestants – like many of their fellow citizens – were looking for a new international role for their country and its institutions. The churches' increasingly critical stance toward Holland's colonial legacy was one sign of this. The Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk) – by far the largest of Holland's Protestant bodies – became critical of government policy in Dutch New

Guinea in the 1950s.[29] Over time, Dutch Protestants became increasingly estranged from the Afrikaner churches, although it was not until the 1970s that the Dutch Protestant churches would seek out their black counterparts in South Africa.[30] But it was not only the colonial legacy that prompted a Protestant reorientation. The old theological divides now seemed increasingly irrelevant. As in the case of Scandinavia, the advent of a generous welfare state and prosperity prompted many church activists in Holland to conclude that Christian efforts should be aimed at areas of the world less materially blessed; in 1964 Dutch Protestant churches launched their own church-related development organization, the Nederlandse Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (ICCO). The world in need outside the national boundaries called the Dutch churches to action. A synodical report of the more conservative Calvinist denomination, the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, concluded in the early 1970s that 'the church should guard against an excessive emphasis on the needs of the fatherland, given that needs abroad are incomparably more urgent. If there is a need for a solemn and clear statement from the church, then it lies on the international level.'[31]

Whatever the precise reasons, Dutch churches, and Dutch church members, were highly active in the 'new social movements' (those focused on 'post-material' values), most notably through the Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, or IKV), founded in 1966, and which soon developed its own international network.[32] Later, in the early 1980s, the IKV would achieve its greatest success, when some 550,000 people attended their sponsored protest against the stationing of the cruise missile in the Netherlands, the largest demonstration in Dutch history.[33] Perhaps true to the highest moral demands of their tradition, Dutch Protestants seemed to feel responsible for everything, from making amends for the destruction of Dutch Jewry – more than three-quarters of the Netherlands' Jews perished in the Shoah – to development aid and the necessity of preventing war. Some Dutch even hoped that their country would become a kind of moral 'guide land' in the cause of peace and justice.[34] Not all of these Dutch movements were tied to the ecclesiastical internationals; quite the contrary, as we shall emphasize. But one could argue that international ecumenism and its vision for global community and action helped define the activist, internationalist agenda of Dutch churches, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. But it is not only that international ecumenism defined progressive Dutch Protestantism; international ecumenism served as the justification of their own national vision for a better world.

The Limits of Ecclesiastical Internationals: Secularization and Contested Moral Authority

For a time, the new ecclesiastical internationals seemed at the cusp of change, a spiritual community at the heart of global shifts. In the long run, though, the World Council of Churches, or the more purely Protestant ecumenical church bodies, could not remain the global contenders that initially – until the 1960s or 1970s – it seemed they might remain. If in 1948 ecumenists were hopeful that the Church would transform the international order by the 1980s, many of them seemed embarrassed at this pretension. As if to underscore this chastened insight into their own significance, the commemorators of 'Amsterdam 1948' chose in 2008 to hold a low-key closed commemoration of the event, in anticipation of minimal public interest.[35] To be sure, the World Council and the other ecclesiastical internationals would continue to play a significant role in building and sustaining ecumenical contacts between churches, and in sponsoring programmes in the poorer nations, from education to relief aid. The voice of such ecclesiastical internationals continued to be heard in international fora like the United Nations and the European Union. But their ability to define or to steer international civil society, and their ability to fire the public imagination for their cause – inside and outside the churches – declined in the course of the 1960s and 1970s.

The reasons for their eclipse as visible and effective champions of religious causes are, of course, varied. In one very evident sense of the term, secularization played a role. The rapid de-churching of Western Europe after 1960 undermined the vitality of churches that had given leadership to the World Council and ecclesiastical internationals like the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World Lutheran Federation. For example, the precipitous membership decline of the traditional Dutch Protestant churches who came to support postwar ecumenical Protestantism (which went from representing roughly 40 per cent of the Dutch population in 1945 to perhaps 10 per cent to 12 per cent today). In North America, too, the 'mainline' Protestant denominations that had underwritten the new ecclesiastical internationals declined in members, status and influence. That meant less money for these international organizations, but it also meant that the influence of Protestant churches on government policy in rich Western countries also declined. In this way, the shift in balance toward the African and Asian churches could not stem the tide of decline.

And there was another related problem with secularization, already mentioned in this volume. Postwar Protestant ecumenism obviously had been grounded in Christian theology and commitment, but its

'particularism' had often been experienced as a problem by Protestants, especially Protestants with an expansive global vision. They saw strong parallels between their own concerns for the world and the best aims of secular society; they did not necessarily see a large gap between the ideals of a united Christendom and the United Nations. In 1953, UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjöld (1905–61), a Swedish Protestant of a very deep and very broad spirituality, found it possible to 'conceive the Secretariat and the Secretary-General in their relations with Governments as representatives of a secular "church" of ideals and principles in international affairs of which the United Nations is the expression'.[36] To the Second Assembly of the World Council meeting in Evanston in 1954 he explained that 'The United Nations stands outside – necessarily outside – all confessions, but it is nevertheless an instrument of faith. As such it is inspired by what unites and not what divides the great religions of the world.' The United Nations preamble on the dignity and worth of the person he saw as having the same meaning as the Ten Commandments.[37] The tendency to understand Christian mission in secular terms, long evident in Protestantism, would intensify in the course of the 1960s and 1970s. Even among sincere Protestants spiritual unity and social action in the international context could be conceptualized outside explicitly Christian frameworks. New international organizations like Amnesty International and Greenpeace – Quakers played a chief role in founding both – could fire the moral imagination of active Protestants as much as any church-related body, and the saliency of Protestant international organizations became less clear. As global civil society further professionalized and specialized, moreover, the Protestant ecclesiastical internationals tended to fade from view, and slip in importance.

Just as problematically, ecclesiastical internationals were often unable to achieve the spiritual unity that was to be their hallmark; Protestants continued to be badly divided about the proper place of the Church in the international order. In particular, the World Council was unable to bridge the distrust generated by the Cold War. The problem was not only that member churches from communist countries were partially or wholly under the control of authorities in their home countries, but that churches in non-communist societies were at loggerheads with each other on how to respond to this situation. Additionally, the theological divide between Protestants and Orthodox would only grow after the end of the Cold War, since both traditions tended to articulate different views on the extent to which the world Church should intervene in addressing issues such as gender inequality and human rights. But within Protestant bodies, too, the economic divide between

North and South remained a perennial one that engendered suspicion and irritation in both rich and poor countries. Indeed, the very agendas of the ecclesiastical internationals were a point of contestation between more conservative and more progressive church activists. Much of the discussion was theological: a debate that consisted of conservatives who decried the 'messianic' or quasi-Marxist pretensions of the new global engagement and progressives who were opposed to the quietism of the conservatives. It was a point of conflict that was also evident among Dutch Protestants.[38] The large percentage of resources spent on development assistance was a sticking point more particularly, and more generally the question was how these internationals should prioritize the broad-ranging agendas they had set for themselves: missions, theological education, ecumenical ties, material assistance, political advocacy, to name several of the key priorities.[39] Later, sexual ethics – most strikingly seen in the vehement debate over homosexuality in one ecclesiastical international, the Anglican Communion – would serve as an apparently insurmountable roadblock to the envisaged aim of global Christian unity.

Central to these discussions was the issue of whether the unique spiritual nature of the Church was served or harmed by the political and social stances and activities that ecclesiastical internationals sometimes felt compelled to adopt. Was it enough for an ecclesiastical international to serve as an ecumenical fellowship of believers? Or did its primary ability lie in speaking 'prophetically' to the principalities and powers, taking controversial stances and launching programmes of action? The lack of consensus, long present within Western Christendom, concerning what the proper public role of the Church ought to be eroded the authority of ecclesiastical internationals.

The Limits of Ecclesiastical Internationals: The Congregationalization of Protestantism

But more important than the factors outlined above, international Protestant ecumenism was decreasingly dependent on the formalized structures of religious internationals such as the ecumenical movements that appeared to be so strong in the years after the Second World War. To be sure, they retained a place as brokers, providing an often pivotal network for making and sustaining global contacts between Christian activists. But in many instances, local churches were capable of creating their own religious networks on the basis of their own contacts and their own initiatives. This was part of a wider trend of what David Fergusson

has observed, namely that, at least in Western societies, a new ecclesiology is emerging 'that in important respects stresses the increasingly congregational, voluntarist and ethically formative dimensions of the church'.[40]

One reason for the change had to do with a growing breach, at least in Western Europe and North America, between the grass roots and the top of organized Protestant ecumenism. That meant that the initial strengths of ecclesiastical internationals – a new network of church leaders and the consolidation of resources into larger units of organization – began to become a liability in the legitimacy of formal ecumenical ties. Instead of enhancing the authority of ecclesiastical internationals, the bureaucratization of organizations like the World Council of Churches alienated rank-and-file church members who saw such organizations staffed by 'superchurch' functionaries who seemed insufficiently sensitive to grass-roots concerns. Local churches in the West, increasingly detached from their own denominations, began to demonstrate less loyalty to ecclesiastical internationals like the World Council or World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and many churches, especially in Africa, worked with no particular denominational structure at all. Jos van Gennip, a prominent figure active in development aid, noted that from the early 1970s on it became more difficult for national and international church bodies to receive the necessary funds from local churches, whose own influence accordingly grew.[41] That the local churches would and should become part of the international ecumenical movement had always been professed by ecumenical leaders like Visser 't Hooft, and the Third Assembly in New Delhi had emphasized the central role of local churches. But a deep recognition of the increasing importance of local congregations – and the need to cultivate ties with local bodies – came too late in the World Council, as Secretary General Philip Potter would concede in the 1980s.[42] The World Council and bodies like the World Alliance had tended to operate, if not exactly thinking of itself as a 'superchurch', as an association of national churches and as a large-scale agency, addressing global problems in a centralized fashion.[43]

This was not only a problem within the Protestant churches. Other large institutions, such as trade unions or political parties in countries like the Netherlands, had difficulties in keeping publics mobilized.[44] It seems safe enough to suggest that anti-institutional thinking influenced also those who remained active in the Church, and the controversial stances that national and international church bodies did (or did not) take served both as cause or occasion for believers to distrust the

ecclesiastical structures above them. The apparent lack of institutional efficacy of large, unwieldy institutions whose workings were often invisible to the laity did nothing to close the widening gap between the ecumenical top and the pew. The palpable loss of influence of these larger institutions in the national and international public sphere may also have helped local bodies to take on a more independent stance.

Second, and directly related to the first point, many ordinary believers increasingly possessed a greater confidence in their own ability to decide and to act for themselves. The same material factors that had encouraged the creation of the World Council of Churches – well-developed (religious) media, high-speed transportation and discretionary time and income among unprecedented numbers of believers – in the long run had the effect of reducing the importance of the ecumenical internationals, since local religious bodies were often in a position to act themselves. In simple terms, local believers and churches had the means to travel, and to give directly of their time to the causes for which they cared. And they had the information they needed, drawn from a host of news sources (including in recent years the internet) and from a host of action groups, religious or secular. These local impulses were fed by the desire by many people, frustrated by apparently frozen institutions, to act in tangible ways that they found personally satisfying. It mattered, as it turned out, that believers become direct participants in international action, and the best way to do that was by involving them directly in international networks.

By the 1950s, Dutch commentators were noticing the rise of assertive congregations with their own agendas.[45] The number of church-based volunteers active in various church activities also grew dramatically, as members of local congregations, confronted by television with the urgency of responding to the world's need, sought to respond by direct forms of local church action. The first appeal to Dutch television viewers for money – urging them to help Algerian refugees – was broadcast by liberal Protestants in 1959. With television, local churches could respond immediately to world crises, as did the church in the small village of Ottoland, when it sent clothes in 1971 to help war victims in Bangladesh.[46] By the 1970s, hundreds of Dutch congregations were involved in programmes to financially support specific projects, often churches, in Third World countries.[47] Often women would play an important part in these activities. Having been invisible in the first stages of international ecumenism, their crucial role in local congregational activities changed the gender balance in the churches' outward reach.

But if the local church played a new and important role in mobilizing and inspiring believers to direct forms of action, it was often not within the traditional bonds of the local church. One 1977 report of the Dutch Reformed Church noted the importance for many volunteers of

> the ecumenical movement, liturgical movement, Jewish–Christian contacts, political-theological and social-critical movements circling around different social problems (the peace question, development work, the environmental question, class conflict and repression), the charismatic movement, feminist theology and so on. Characteristic of these movements is that they develop fairly independent of the organizational structure of the church their own 'networks of information and inspiration', which find their embodiment in secretariats, working groups, action groups, associations, foundations, periodicals, radio and television broadcasts, national gatherings, etc.[48]

In important ways, the proliferation of groups weakened the institutional Church not only at the national level but at the local level as well, as the Church became just one other way of becoming globally engaged. At the same time, however, the presence of these kinds of volunteers in the Church had the effect of drawing churches into sustained international contacts, and into the development of conscious efforts to think of congregations as part of a worldwide 'community' of solidarity in which local and global problems such as poverty were intentionally linked. The task was for local churches to set its international agenda, as one Reformed church report put it in the late 1980s. Examples of how local churches were already enacting such a global vision were plentiful:

> help for the hungry in the Sahel, commemoration of the murdered Salvadoran bishop Romero, an exchange with the Javanese church of Sumatra, protest against atomic tests in the Pacific, Easter greetings for political prisoners in the Soviet Union, [supporting] 2% development aid [as percentage of GDP], solidarity with the 'mad mothers' of the missing in Latin America, [supporting] synodical decisions over South Africa, food packages for Poland, and work days [devoted to] Sharing Gifts Worldwide, etc.[49]

Several particularly important examples of congregationalization are perhaps helpful to note here. The Interchurch Peace Council was not

only successful in launching massive demonstrations against cruise missiles in part by mobilizing congregations, but also by encouraging congregations themselves to seek out churches on the other side of the Iron Curtain. By the mid-1980s, some 150 Protestant churches and 9000 members had, on their own initiative, developed systematic exchange programmes with East German churches. The approach initiated by the Dutch churches was at the start very consciously grass roots and congregational in orientation (at the insistence of the theologian Albert van den Heuvel, active in the World Council).[50] Although Dutch churches miscalculated the manoeuvring room of the East German churches, efforts by Dutch and East German churches to establish congregation-based peace networks is one example of how congregations became the building unit of bilateral ecumenical ties that sought to change international foreign policy.[51] International ecumenism could be conducted outside the formal constraints of the ecclesiastical internationals.

A similar process of congregationalization occurred in debates over the struggle to end Apartheid. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, for example, the two largest Dutch Reformed churches reduced their once-close ties to the white Calvinist churches, slowly developed ties with black South African churches and embraced black liberation movements.[52] But this process remained contested. Divergent Dutch groups, including congregations, cultivated ties with two different sets of churches, one set of congregations (though declining in number) maintaining ties with Afrikaner congregations and the other seeking concrete contact with black churches. In the South African case, the role of religious internationals like the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, firmly committed to ending Apartheid, played an important role, but politically progressive local churches in the Netherlands sought ties with local black churches, sometimes through Dutch-trained black ministers. These contacts were important for sustaining grass-roots interest in putting an end to Apartheid.

Over time, too, many Dutch Protestant churches also developed programmes, such as *Kerk in actie*, in which congregations could select international projects in which to participate.[53] Congregational participation came to be seen as an indispensable element in maintaining enthusiasm in mission and diaconal work in foreign countries; the Free Reformed Churches (a smaller orthodox Protestant denomination) stated plans to encourage every congregation to develop concrete ties with one of its missions projects. Broad denominational support for particular missions was no longer enough; international work must be

embedded in the support of congregations.[54] That is why congregational initiatives in international work, whether aimed at missions or forms of material support, have been regarded as a necessary basis for the work of many Protestant international projects, whether led by denominations or other Christian agencies.

Feeding congregationalization, too, was an increasing sense among Westerners like the Dutch of 'glocalization' – that engagement in global causes did not mean focusing on developments in Timor or Tanzania but in Amsterdam and Arnhem.[55] In the 1960s and 1970s, Dutch churches, in speaking of their growing international responsibilities, seldom tied them to national or local concerns, as all serious social problems were now, almost by definition, foreign in nature. Suddenly, during the economic crisis in the early 1980s, this changed, when the revival of local diaconal work prompted many Dutch to make the connection between poverty at home and poverty abroad. Inspired by the American example abroad, the Dutch (and Europeans) looked to the Sanctuary Movement, begun in the American Southwest, which saw congregations as the place where 'illegals' might find protection. Housing and supporting asylum seekers became a major project of hundreds of Dutch churches in the late 1980s and 1990s, and many of them developed European networks with other churches engaging in similar work.[56] Here, too, was a form of international cooperation rooted in church networks that might or might not make use of the ecclesiastical internationals.

A few years later, migration would cause Dutch Protestant churches to think further about the nexus between the work of local churches abroad and at home, with increasing attention then being devoted to the local context. The migration of various African and Asian diasporas to the Netherlands, in addition to much of the rest of Europe, has been an important trend in recent decades. Christians have been an important, if largely unnoticed, part of this migration.[57] Although the Netherlands has drawn international attention as the Western European country with the second largest percentage of Muslims in Europe (6 per cent, or roughly 950,000 people in 2006), the number of Christian migrants is considerably more (8 per cent, or an estimated 1.3 million).[58] Their presence also stimulated the rise of new global networks in Dutch cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In their turn, migrant churches, such as 'New Mission Churches' which made use of their own loosely organized religious networks, were largely focused on helping their members survive or thrive in the local context.[59] At the same time though, the way these churches have operated as local institutions has been informed by these churches' participation in global networks.[60]

Pentecostal, charismatic and evangelical churches in European cities are integral parts of a global religious network which is often critical of Western rationality, and these local churches often see their mission as contesting the sins of Western society.[61] Migrant congregations have been local embodiments of what might be called religious internationals – insofar as loose networks of churches with a more or less shared vision for missions may be considered such.

By the 1990s, migrant churches, then, had become an important part of the religious landscape in the larger Dutch cities. The term 'migrant churches' has been problematized, since many churches do not regard themselves as diaspora communities but as part of the societies in which they are physically situated.[62] Whatever the designation, over 100 of these churches were concentrated in Amsterdam Southeast, where many immigrants had settled. But being embedded in the local context hardly precluded such churches from maintaining active links with their countries of origin. Though many congregations with origins in Latin America and Africa were not tightly organized in international structures, they nevertheless drew inspiration from religious networks in their countries of origin; religious videos, for example, allowed Ghanaian and Nigerian churches to imagine religious communities beyond their local settings.[63] And some churches clearly had a stronger network, such as the GATE (Gift from Africa to Europe), connected to the Alliance of Evangelical Churches in Africa, for example.[64] But whatever the precise organizational form, these congregations became the sites where evangelical, Pentecostal and charismatic visions of mission were embodied and enacted. They reflected both the enormous diversity and the considerable fragmentation that had come to characterize both Dutch Protestantism and world Protestantism.

Thus Protestant congregations of the most widely varied stripes, rather than denominations or ecclesiastical internationals, increasingly became important sites of their own in the construction of new, often more fluid, forms of Protestant action in the world. The shift 'downwards' from ecclesiastical internationals to congregational networks is, of course, simplistic in that international Protestantism was always characterized by the interplay of local initiative and international organization. Furthermore, congregations have not obviated the need for other ecclesiastical levels, or other agencies; congregations often continue to depend on these organizations for many of their international contacts. It is worth noting, however, that through the very breadth and diffusive nature of Protestantism – from liberal Protestant to evangelical and charismatic – congregations had become important centres

for international action, weakening the need for the kind of organized Christian unity envisioned at mid-century by a generation of Protestant ecumenists. In undergoing these changes, Protestantism was subject to forces that were changing networks of other faiths; internet, telecommunications and global travel had changed the dynamic of religious exchange. Churches continued to play a role in international civil society, but it was often a diffuse role, more evident at the street level than in the collective power of an ecclesiastical international like the World Council of Churches. The tracking of Protestant international activity after the 1960s thus requires looking less at the great international institutions and more at the local level, at how local churches became important agents in identifying international responsibilities for mission and social solidarity, and agents in enacting, to the extent that their looser, more fragmented structures allowed, such responsibilities internationally.

Notes

1. 'Religion: The Ecumenical Century', *Time* (8 December 1961), available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,895790,00.html.
2. 'Religion: The Ecumenical Century'. It might be pointed that the editor-in-chief of *Time* in 1961 was still the founder of the magazine, Henry Luce, the son of a Presbyterian missionary to China and publisher with a continuing interest in global Protestantism, though he had preferred the anti-communism of Presbyterian Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the softer stance of the World Council. Robert Edwin Hertzstein, *Henry R. Luce,* Time *and the American Crusade in Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 57.
3. On 'New Delhi 1961', see World Council of Churches, *The New Delhi Report* (Norwich: SCM Press, 1962); A. L. Boeser, *Het Licht van de wereld: uitgave ter voorbereiding van de derde vergadering van de Wereldraad van Kerken te New-Delhi 1961* (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1961).
4. For a recent effort to correct this omission, see Arnd Bauerkämper and Jürgen Nautz, *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge. Christliche Kirchen in den europäischen Zivillgesellschaften seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009).
5. G. Buijs, Paul Dekker and Marc Hooghe, eds, *Civil Society: Tussen oud en nieuw* (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009); David Fergusson, *Church, State and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
6. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, *Civil Society. 1750–1914* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 9.
7. Akira Iriye, *Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 2, 17.
8. José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

9. Jürgen Kocka, 'Civil Society in Historical Perspective', in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society: Berlin Perspectives* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2006), p. 44; for the connection between Protestantism and civil society, see Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (New York: Penguin Press, 1994), pp. 45–9, 103–8.

10. Arnd Bauerkämper and Jürgen Nautz, *Zwischen Fürsorge und Seelsorge*.

11. Ralf Dahrendorf, 'Twilight of a Pontiff', www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dahrendorf35/English.

12. See, for example, 'What is the World Council of Churches?', www.oikoumene.org/gr/who-are-we.html.

13. John Foster Dulles, 'The Christian Citizen in a Changing World', in World Council of Churches, *The Church and the International Disorder: An Ecumenical Study* (Norwich: SCM Press, 1948), p. 114.

14. F. M. van Asbeck, 'The Church and the Disorder of International Society', in World Council of Churches, *The Church and the International Disorder*, pp. 68–9.

15. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, *Der Protestantismus. Geschichte und Gegenwart* (München: C.H. Beck, 2007), pp. 115–17.

16. David M. Thompson, 'Ecumenism', in Hugh McLeod, ed., *Cambridge History of Christianity: World Christianities c. 1914–c.2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 50–4.

17. See Jan van Lin, *Shaking the Fundamentals. Religious Plurality and Ecumenical Movement* (New York and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002).

18. Adolf Keller, *Sociale programs der kerken en vrije godsdienstige organisaties*, trans. and expanded by J. C. Wissing (Utrecht: P. den Boer, 1932).

19. See D. G. M. Patrick, *Christus Victor. The Report of the World Conference of Christian Youth. Amsterdam, Holland, July 24 – August 2* (Geneva: Conference Headquarters, 1939).

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31. Generale Synode van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, *Het spreken van de kerk in de samenleving. Rapport van deputaten voor advies inzake de bevoegdheid en de roeping van de kerk zich uit te spreken over actuele vragen van politieke en economische aard* (Kampen: Kok, 1972), p. 26.

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33. Remco van Diepen, *Hollanditis. Nederland en het kernwapendebat 1977–1987* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2004).

34. See Simon Vinkenoog's most telling poem in *Wonder boven wonder: Gedichten 1965–1971* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1972), pp. 46–7; Bas de Gaay Fortman, 'Vredespolitiek der radicalen', *International Spectator*, 27 (1973), 109–13; James C. Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig* (Amsterdam: Boom, 1995), pp. 79–80; idem, 'Nederland als het meest progressive land ter wereld', in Wim van Noort and Rob Wiche, eds, *Nederland als voorbeeldige natie* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), pp. 105–18.

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43. For an account of Council difficulties in the 1970s and after, see John Briggs, Mercy Amba Oduyye and George Tsetsis, *A History of the Ecumenical Movement. Volume 3, 1968–2000* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004).

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49. Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk, *Gemeente-zijn in de mondiale samenleving. Pastorale Handreiking van de Generale Synode van de Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk* (The Hague: Boekencentrum, 1988), pp. 24–35.

50. Beatrice de Graaf, *Over de muur. De DDR, de Nederlandse kerken en de vredesbeweging, Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2004), pp. 56, 371.

51. See also van Diepen, *Hollanditis*.

52. Meijers, *Blanke broeders, zwarte vreemden*.

53. www.kerkinactie.nl.

54. A. N. Hendriks, *Werelddiakonaat? Enige opmerkingen over de hulpverlening aan de verre naaste* (Barneveld: De Vuurbaak, 1971).

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56. Arie van den Broek et al., *De kerk als Vrijplaats wereldwijd: een ontmoeting met de Sanctuary Movement* (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 1987).

57. See Gerrie ter Haar, *Halfway to Paradise: African Christians in Europe* (Cardiff: Cardiff Academic Press, 1998).

58. Hijme Stoffels, 'A Coat of Many Colours: New Immigrant Churches in the Netherlands', in Machteld Jansen and Hijme Stoffels, eds, *A Moving God. Immigrant Churches in the Netherlands* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008), pp. 14–15.

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also Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom. The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

62. Claudia Währisch-Oblau, 'We Shall Be Fruitful in This Land. Pentecostal and Charismatic New Mission Churches in Europe', in André Droogers, Cornelis van der Laan and Wout van Laar, eds, *Fruitful in This Land. Pluralism, Dialogue and Healing in Migrant Pentecostalism* (Zoetermeer: Boekecentrum, 2006), p. 33.

63. See the work of Birgit Meyer, summarized in *Religious Sensations. Why Media, Aesthetics and Power Matter in the Study of Contemporary Religion* (Amsterdam: Vrije Univeristeit, 2006).

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14

From State to Civil Society and Back Again: The Catholic Church as Transnational Actor, 1965–2005

R. Scott Appleby

The Roman Catholic Church in the twentieth century was a 'religious international' by any definition of the term. First, the Church is itself a transnational, global religious body that maintains formal relations with nations abroad, especially through diplomatic relations with the Holy See. The popes from John XXIII (1958–63; b.1881) through Benedict XVI (2005–; b.1927) have seen the Church as an international actor uniquely situated to work for global unity. The Church also includes within the fold semi-autonomous transnational movements that are fluid, mobile and only informally related to local churches. In the period under review in this chapter the Vatican itself began to conceptualize 'Catholic power' as rooted in and guaranteed by the Church's evolution as a transnational civil society – or at least as a leavening agent for civil society in numerous emerging and established democracies.

Catholicism's self-conceptualization as a nongovernmental force for global social and political transformation occurred only in the wake of the Second Vatican Council ('Vatican II', 1962–65). The shift was not inevitable; prior to the mid-century, the Vatican had seen itself as a state among states, and relied primarily on diplomacy, concordats and other instruments of political self-preservation and influence. The Vatican also, as outlined by Vincent Viaene in this volume, rallied the faithful to its defence and support whenever its earthly properties and power were threatened.

By the dawn of the conciliar period ushered in by Vatican II, however, the popes largely eschewed pretensions to worldly rule (in 1958, John XXIII was the last pope to be crowned with the papal tiara, signifying temporal sovereignty) and emphasized their spiritual and cultural

authority as the Church's primary 'political' resource. The 'turn to culture' did not mean the complete abandonment of direct engagement with hostile or friendly states, and the end of the Cold War triggered yet another substantial modification in the hierarchy's pattern of relations with presidents, prime ministers and dictators. Nonetheless, the revolution in Catholic self-understanding promised to outlive its major architects, Pope John XXIII, Pope Paul VI (1963–78; b.1897) and Pope John Paul II (b.1920), who reigned as Pope and Sovereign of Vatican City State from 16 October 1978 until his death almost 27 years later, making his the third-longest pontificate in history.

The Revolution That Was Vatican II

In his diplomatic career and tenure as patriarch of Venice before being elected pope, Angelo Roncalli had engaged leaders of Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, taken the measure of Marxism and its socialist offspring, and welcomed ecumenical stirrings within the Church. Although he disapproved of Marxism, he welcomed the 'caring state', refrained from condemning Communism unequivocally (as had his predecessors) and called on wealthy nations to provide significant assistance to the developing world. As Pope John XXIII, Roncalli set the Church on a truly global mission of justice and peace. He denounced war in the nuclear age as 'an unfit instrument with which to repair the violation of justice'. His social encyclicals, especially *Pacem in Terris* (1963), proclaimed 'the universal, inviolable, inalienable rights and duties' of the human person, and presented a moral framework within which socioeconomic rights were woven together with political and civil rights. 'In endorsing this spectrum of rights…the pope took the Catholic church into the heart of the United Nations human rights debates', notes J. Bryan Hehir. 'For *Pacem in Terris*, the foundation and purpose of all rights is the dignity of the human person. The scope of the rights to be endorsed as legitimate moral claims is determined by the specific needs – material and spiritual – each person has to guarantee human dignity.'[1]

John XXIII's 'turn to the world' and engagement with the secular human rights tradition might have died with him had he not convened the first ecumenical council of Catholic bishops since Vatican I (1869–70) and only the second since the Reformation-era Council of Trent (1548–63). With breathtaking swiftness Vatican II changed the Church's attitude toward the modern world. The Council famously described the Church as the biblical 'People of God', declared the Church's openness to and respect for human cultures and affirmed the

right of every person, regardless of religious affiliation, to worship God (or not) according to his or her conscience and without coercion from religious bodies or the state. The assembled bishops praised the work of the Spirit in other churches and religions, and acknowledged the need for interreligious discussion and collaboration.[2]

If the Council was the occasion for *aggiornamento* ('updating'), it also embraced *ressourcement* – the retrieval of the early sources of Christian wisdom and self-understanding. The liturgical movement, the critical study of the Bible and other currents of twentieth-century ecclesial reform that unfolded prior to Vatican II had prepared the bishops, or the theologians advising them, to take history seriously as the arena of God's redemptive activity and thus to see the world, and the laity working daily in it, in a new and more positive light.

Specifically, Vatican II drew upon and developed Catholic social teaching, the Church's modern tradition of papal and episcopal analysis of social and economic conditions, in service of the development of the theological principles underlying the Church's advocacy of social justice, development, peace-making and human rights.[3] *Gaudium et Spes*, the 'Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World', identified the Church with the aspirations of all people seeking equality, freedom and opportunity for self-improvement. And the Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty (*Dignitatis Humanae*) teaches that all people, not only Catholics, possess full civil and political rights simply by virtue of being human. Its main ideas, contributed by the American Jesuit John Courtney Murray (1904–67) and the French theologian Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), essentially reversed Catholic teaching on church–state relations by accepting the fact of religious plurality and aligning the modern Church unambiguously with democratic polities. With this document, the Church officially condemned penalizing citizens in a Catholic-majority state who do not espouse the 'correct beliefs', that is, Roman Catholic orthodoxy.[4]

The cumulative effect of these dramatic innovations was a reconceptualization of the relationship between the Church headquartered at Rome and the thousands of local churches around the world, each rooted in its own 'cultural horizon of self-understanding'. *Inculturation* – the adaptation of the gospel and apostolic life to indigenous customs, rituals and cultural values – became the code word for the new understanding of the Church's evangelical mission.

The echoes of Vatican II across the Catholic world were thunderous. In its cumulative impact, the Catholic *aggiornamento* recast the mission and institutional imperatives of numerous lay and religious

groups in fidelity to a specifiable body of doctrines and principles governing Catholic participation in the social order. Thus, for example, the Latin American bishops who gathered at Medellín, Colombia in 1968 lamented the massive poverty of the continent and focused attention on the social and political factors responsible for the oppression of the poor. Citing Vatican II's embrace of a 'new humanism', the bishops denounced the 'institutionalized violence' of Latin American society, and demanded 'urgent and profoundly renovating transformations' in the social structures of their countries. They urged each episcopal conference to present the Church as 'a catalyst in the temporal realm in an authentic attitude of service', and to support grass-roots organizations for the 'redress and consolidation of their rights [of the poor] and the search for justice'. Finally, the bishops called for Catholics worldwide, in exercising their political and religious responsibilities, to adopt a 'preferential option for the poor'.[5]

Principles such as the *preferential option for the poor*, in short, laid the foundation of postconciliar Roman Catholic political philosophy and constituted the official frame of reference for every Catholic exercising his or her civic rights in the political order.[6]

Meanwhile, the conciliar-era emphasis on *inculturation* both coincided with and helped to deepen a transformation in the Church's understanding of 'evangelization' and the work of missionaries in particular. Previously, emphasis had been placed on 'bringing souls to Christ', which effectively equated preaching the gospel with the work of conversion, and conversion with baptism and formal membership in the Roman Catholic Church. Gradually, internal reforms of missionary orders such as the Catholic Foreign Mission Society in America (the Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, founded in 1911), prompted by the missionaries' own experiences and by the conciliar-era teaching of the bishops and popes, led to a new emphasis on solidarity, humanitarian service and work for social justice as integral dimensions of 'missionizing'. In official Church teaching these elements were never to replace the direct witness to Jesus Christ and the doctrines of Christianity, but 'witness' was given a broader meaning. For example, in *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, Paul VI's apostolic exhortation issued in 1975, on the tenth anniversary of the close of Vatican II, the pope wrote,

> 21. Above all the Gospel must be proclaimed by witness. Take a Christian or a handful of Christians who, in the midst of their own community, show their capacity for understanding and acceptance, their sharing of life and destiny with other people, their solidarity

with the efforts of all for whatever is noble and good. Let us suppose that, in addition, they radiate in an altogether simple and unaffected way their faith in values that go beyond current values, and their hope in something that is not seen and that one would not dare to imagine. Through this wordless witness these Christians stir up irresistible questions in the hearts of those who see how they live: Why are they like this? Why do they live in this way? What or who is it that inspires them? Why are they in our midst? Such a witness is already a silent proclamation of the Good News and a very powerful and effective one. Here we have an initial act of evangelization. The above questions will ask, whether they are people to whom Christ has never been proclaimed, or baptized people who do not practice, or people who live as nominal Christians but according to principles that are in no way Christian, or people who are seeking, and not without suffering, something or someone whom they sense but cannot name. Other questions will arise, deeper and more demanding ones, questions evoked by this witness which involves presence, sharing, solidarity, and which is an essential element, and generally the first one, in evangelization . . .

29. But evangelization would not be complete if it did not take account of the unceasing interplay of the Gospel and of man's concrete life, both personal and social. This is why evangelization involves an explicit message, adapted to the different situations constantly being realized, about the rights and duties of every human being, about family life without which personal growth and development is hardly possible, about life in society, about international life, peace, justice and development – a message especially energetic today about liberation . . .

30. It is well known in what terms numerous bishops from all the continents spoke of this at the last Synod, especially the bishops from the Third World, with a pastoral accent resonant with the voice of the millions of sons and daughters of the Church who make up those peoples. Peoples, as we know, engaged with all their energy in the effort and struggle to overcome everything which condemns them to remain on the margin of life: famine, chronic disease, illiteracy, poverty, injustices in international relations and especially in commercial exchanges, situations of economic and cultural neo-colonialism sometimes as cruel as the old political colonialism. The Church, as the bishops repeated, has the duty to proclaim the liberation of millions of human beings, many of whom are her own children – the duty of assisting the birth of this liberation, of giving

witness to it, of ensuring that it is complete. This is not foreign to evangelization . . .

31. Between evangelization and human advancement – development and liberation – there are in fact profound links. These include links of an anthropological order, because the man who is to be evangelized is not an abstract being but is subject to social and economic questions. They also include links in the theological order, since one cannot dissociate the plan of creation from the plan of Redemption. The latter plan touches the very concrete situations of injustice to be combated and of justice to be restored. They include links of the eminently evangelical order, which is that of charity: how in fact can one proclaim the new commandment without promoting in justice and in peace the true, authentic advancement of man? We ourself have taken care to point this out, by recalling that it is impossible to accept 'that in evangelization one could or should ignore the importance of the problems so much discussed today, concerning justice, liberation, development and peace in the world. This would be to forget the lesson which comes to us from the Gospel concerning love of our neighbour who is suffering and in need'.[7]

I quote Pope Paul VI at length because he was instrumental in effecting the expansion of the Church's understanding of its mission in and to the world. The Council's respect for the integrity of cultures, as well as Paul VI's progressive vision of the meaning of evangelization, was reinforced on the institutional level by the pope's internationalization of the Curia (the clerical bureaucracy in the Vatican that administers the worldwide church). This executive decision was critical in transforming the promise of a truly globalized Catholicism into a reality.[8] So, too, was the example he set in word and deed. Paul VI was the first modern pope to travel extensively as pope (though he would not come close to his Polish successor's world record in that regard). In 1967 he became the first Pope to visit Africa, where he ordained bishops, encouraged the growth of an indigenous Church and refined, reinforced and elaborated the themes of *Populorum Progressio*, his groundbreaking encyclical, promulgated earlier that year, on human and economic development. The encyclical signalled the Vatican's intention to be the voice of 'authentic human development' and the moral/spiritual guide to governmental, nongovernmental and intergovernmental humanitarian relief and development organizations worldwide.[9]

These various 'mini-revolutions' in the realm of theology, ecclesiology (theory of the church) and governance led, in turn, to the relocation

of the Church's presence within the public sphere. And this expanded sense of mission also led to a shift that stands at the centre of our discussion, namely the evolution of Catholic missionary support networks into Catholic INGOs. These INGOs, as will be explained below, solidified the Church's presence as a 'religious international' in the 1970s and beyond.

The Catholic International:
Neither Communist nor Capitalist

One of Paul VI's most notable reversals from previous Vatican policy was his attitude toward communist-dominated Eastern Europe and Russia. Popes Pius XI (1922–39 as pope) and Pius XII (1939–58 as pope) had taken an extremely confrontational stance against the communist regimes. Catholics and Christians in the East had been targeted for persecution as a result, and the faith was under severe strain. Paul VI sought partial accommodation with communist regimes, recognizing that the Vatican would have to depend on the state to adhere to such agreements. This was a risk that the Vatican had exposed itself to during the morally ambiguous Second World War period, when the Vatican had entered into concordats with fascist states. Because both the Vatican and the communist states found negotiation and agreement about the Party's official anti-religious and atheistic ideology impossible, however, the Church did not sign official concordats or diplomatic agreements; both sides found more vague and ambivalent terms with which to characterize their 'arrangements'.

   The Pope's approach to the Eastern bloc was controversial to say the least, and it was unpopular with the Cold War-oriented Western governments. Paul VI ignored his critics, in part because, while he knew that the Church had been unable to protect itself against the secular power through the concordats negotiated with the fascists during the Second World War, he was seeking a way to work with the secular power out of necessity, not choice. The pope had no illusions about the communists. He was aware that they were not always sincere in negotiating, and that they sought their own interests first, 'seeking to misuse the good will of Catholics for their own purposes'.[10] In addition to the aim of easing the burdens of life on Catholics in socialist countries, Paul VI sought a closer relationship with the Orthodox Church. Yet he could not establish ties with it except by working through the socialist state.

   Most Vatican officials and public officials agreed with Paul VI's goals, but some disagreed about how those goals should be met. In

negotiations between the Vatican and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and in overtures to Poland and the GDR (East Germany), the Church ultimately made sacrifices and lost much more than it gained from any 'arrangements' – in every case except in Yugoslavia. In some cases, the communist 'partners' launched new anti-religious campaigns. Ostpolitik seemed to be failing.

Pope John Paul II took a significantly different approach to the exercise of 'Catholic power', such as it was. Having suffered as a worker in Poland under Nazism, and then as a clandestine priest under Soviet Communism, Karol Wojtyła detested both forms of totalitarian rule. By the late 1970s, as John Paul II, he perceived that the conditions necessary for a popular revolution against the Soviet-sponsored regime in Poland were in place. The nation was reeling from economic stagnation, a failed export policy (geared to the needs of the Soviet Union but dependent on Western loans designed to strengthen Poland's industrial base and increase productivity), episodic government attempts to raise food prices, state harassment and persecution of Jewish intellectuals and Catholics priests, and a series of workers' strikes and student protests that were put down violently by the state. John Paul II's American biographer, George Weigel, argues that it was the charismatic former actor and playwright, poet, theologian, philosopher, mystic and social activist – the first Slavic pontiff – who served as *the* catalyst for the collapse of the communist regime in Poland. He did so, the argument goes, by inspiring and sustaining the Polish workers' movement Solidarity, the first independent trade union in the communist world. Solidarity became the heart of the resistance movement that provoked the downfall of the regime in 1989, a cataclysm that had a domino effect on the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union itself.[11]

If John Paul II made the defeat of atheistic communism a centrepiece of the Church's agency in international affairs, he did not embrace free-market capitalism uncritically. A champion of the worker and an advocate of the traditional nuclear family, the pope developed an 'internal critique' of democratic capitalism, summarized by the axiom, 'Culture is prior to politics and economics'. The pope's major statement of this critique came in 1991, in the encyclical *Centesimus Annus*. The key question regarding the moral status of capitalism, he asserted, is precisely how democratic polities and market economies may be 'disciplined' in such a way as to serve the ends of genuine human flourishing. In keeping with the Church's preferential option for the poor, the pope advocated a form of capitalism that circumscribes freedom and the economic sector 'within a strong juridical framework which places it

at the service of human freedom in its totality and which sees it as a particular aspect of that freedom, the core of which is ethical and religious'.[12] The greed and self-absorption promoted by Western consumerist culture weakens the traditional family, the encyclical argues, no less than communism's denial of the family's right to own private property. This fundamental moral failure to recognize and protect the human person's transcendent dignity and extra-worldly orientation promotes what John Paul described, most famously in his subsequent encyclical, *Evangelium Vitae* (1995), as a 'culture of death' infecting modern developed societies.[13]

If John Paul was a vociferous critic of capitalism and communism alike, neither was he an early advocate of the so-called Third Way, as some portrayed him.

> The Church has no models to present; models that are real and truly effective can only arise within the framework of different historical situations, through the effort of all those who responsibly confront concrete problems in all their social, economic, political and cultural aspects, as these interact with one another. For such a task the Church offers her social teaching as an indispensable and ideal orientation, a teaching which . . . recognizes the positive value of the market and of enterprise, but which at the same time points out that these need to be oriented towards the common good.[14]

If by the 'Third Way', however, is meant a modified capitalism 'which recognizes the fundamental and positive role of business, the market, private property and the resulting responsibility for the means of production, as well as free human creativity in the economic sector', as John Paul put it, then he could be said to have joined US President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other political leaders in forging a conceptual path to a new, more humane global economic orientation.

John Paul II was a larger than life figure, but one person could not alone embody 'Catholic internationalism' after Vatican II. It is fair to ask, Did the pope's voluminous writing and ceaseless preaching on these economic and social themes make any difference in the way governments, businesses, voters and consumers behaved? It is tempting to say, not a bit of difference. Yet the pope did have Catholic bishops, religious, educators and catechists in his corner, not a few professional lobbyists and bureaucrats, and the clout in some settings that comes from the institutional strength and social service networks of the Church. In the

USA, for example, especially prior to the sexual abuse scandals of 2002, the US Catholic Conference, the administrative arm of the US Catholic bishops, worked vigorously and with some modest success to translate the principles of Catholic social doctrine as articulated by John Paul into public policies and legislative agendas, serving often as a public voice and advocate for the working class, the poor and the dispossessed.[15]

More importantly, however, the pope also worked vigorously to steer the Church, considered more expansively, in the direction of his vision of Catholicism's new relationship to a globalizing world – and in this effort he was remarkably successful.

The Catholic Church as Transnational Actor

Behind his critiques of capitalism and communism stood John Paul II's conviction that culture, not politics or economics, is the primary source of social progress toward the realization of innate human freedom and dignity. It was this conviction, seemingly demonstrated definitively on the world stage in the collapse of the Soviet Union, that inspired Catholicism's turn to culture and civil society as the sectors where the Catholic Church would focus its efforts to influence world events.

The ambition of the project was breathtaking in its attempted scope and scale. Building Solidarity in Poland, while a central element in the pope's campaign against Soviet Communism, was but one piece of a multifaceted global strategy that unfolded over the course of three decades. This strategy saw the Church inhabit virtually unprecedented roles, including global champion of religious liberty, promoter of democracy and apostle of nonviolent revolution. These campaigns, which would be dubbed 'progressive' in the secular world, were proclaimed by the Church as constituting nothing less than social conditions necessary to the flourishing of the authentic human person, the unsurpassable model for which is Jesus Christ.

In describing the shift of orientation in Vatican 'foreign policy' after 1978, Weigel describes John Paul II as 'the post-Constantinian Pope'. Prior to Wojtyła's accession to the papacy, modern Vatican diplomacy, anachronistically reflecting the days when the Holy See was a worldly power, still tended to focus energies on negotiations with other sovereign powers, nation-states protecting their political and economic interests. Thus, as we have seen, the Ostpolitik of Paul VI and his secretary of state, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, was aimed at defending the distinctive interests of the Church and its people around the world. Concordats and high-level treaties characterized this 'realist' policy

orientation. John Paul, while shrewdly retaining Casaroli as his foreign minister and thus ensuring a certain continuity of relationship with political and governmental elites in the communist world, recognized that in the emerging milieu of high-tech global communications the papacy and the Church would be able to exercise a far more powerful and enduring impact as a moral leader acting not in alliance with or in direct political opposition to nation-states, but as an advocate of human rights operating within the realm of civil society and on its behalf. He saw the right to religious freedom as paramount among the human rights, for such rights are grounded not in the particularities of race, religion, creed, class or political affiliation, the Church teaches, but in human nature itself. And because to be human is to be oriented beyond the merely physical or material aspects of existence toward a transcendent destiny, each person must be free to follow his or her conscience in establishing the priorities of life.

The new strategy was populist and 'democratic' in that Pope John Paul II carried the message directly to the people – not only to the workers, students, mothers and fathers in Poland, but to their counterparts in Hungary, Ukraine and Czechoslovakia (whose nonviolent 'Velvet Revolution' was also, ultimately, a cultural and spiritual revolution). Beyond Eastern Europe, the pope reached out to Catholics and 'all people of good will' in Latin America, Asia and Africa who were struggling to achieve liberation from oppressive regimes. The appeal was direct, immediate and personally compelling. Early in his pontificate, John Paul II became the most travelled pope in history; indeed, he is said to be the most travelled and well-known *person* in history.[16]

Of course the pope, however charismatic a presence, was only the most visible representative of the new Catholic International. As mentioned, he had to rely on the national or local cardinals, bishops, priests and laity of the Catholic Church to implement Catholic social teaching before and after his galvanizing but brief appearance on the scene. Indeed, this part of John Paul's vision – the interrelated campaigns for religious freedom, democracy and nonviolent revolution against totalitarian regimes – relied for its implementation on the agency of new or renewed transnational movements, largely peopled by lay women and men, as well as individual Catholic political and social leaders in various nations.

This vision of a progressive social vanguard of lay Catholics incarnating Christ in the late modern world coexisted alongside John Paul's rather different view of how the Church should conceive itself internally, that is, as a divinely founded institution set apart from the world.

In that realm hierarchy and autocracy, not democracy and lay auton-
omy, were the norm. A corps of seminarians and newly ordained clergy
that came to be known as John Paul II priests were the vanguard of
internal church 'renewal'.

Catholic internationalism flourished, however, because the trans-
national activism of the Church had many agents, with varying degrees
of proximity to the Vatican, and a strikingly diverse set of political orien-
tations and consequences. Some forms of this activism worked primarily
on the national level, albeit with links to similar movements in other
countries. The basic ecclesial communities of Brazil, for example, remain
operative at a local level but as such do not constitute a transnational
actor. Similarly, the Polish Solidarity movement that helped bring down
the country's communist regime affected and was supported by other
countries under the Iron Curtain, but did not constitute a transnational
religious movement.

The truly transnational growth and activity in the Church after the
mid-1970s took two major forms. The first was the evolution of Catholic
INGOs, which expanded their missions to incorporate peace-building,
development and human rights advocacy to complement long-standing
charitable, relief and refugee work. Most prominent in this category
is *Caritas Internationalis*, the umbrella organization of Catholic chari-
table and humanitarian agencies around the world. Its largest member
is Catholic Relief Services, founded in 1943 by the US Catholic Bish-
ops and present in more than 100 countries and territories in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Catholic Relief
Services, its mission statement explains, 'provides relief in emergency
situations and helps people in the developing world break the cycle
of poverty through community-based, sustainable development initia-
tives'. Approximately 5000 employees, 'working in the spirit of Catholic
Social Teaching to promote the sacredness of human life and the dignity
of the human person', serve 80 million people. In the 1990s, Catholic
Relief Services developed a 'social justice lens' and a 'peace-building and
reconciliation' lens, which serve as the criteria by which to evaluate its
worldwide relief and development work.[17]

There are also Catholic NGOs outside the umbrella of *Caritas
Internationalis*. Some are focused on a particular geographic area, such as
the Catholic Near East Welfare Association (CNEWA) and the Mission-
aries of Africa. These focus on humanitarian issues such as healthcare,
water access and education, and also support local religious commu-
nities in their evangelistic mission. CNEWA, for example, builds and
maintains seminaries and schools of religious formation, and also

engages in ecumenical dialogue with the Orthodox Churches.[18] Other NGOs have a specific focus for their work. The Christian Foundation for Children and Aging cares for children and the aged in developing countries, primarily through child-sponsorship programmes for hunger relief and education. The Catholic Medical Mission Board works primarily for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in local communities around the world. Other NGOs are run by the lay associates and professed members of religious orders. Most prominently these include Catholic World Mission, founded and run by the Legionaries of Christ, and Malteser International, the relief organization of the Sovereign Order of Malta.

The last half of the twentieth century saw a second expression of Catholic internationalism in the expansion of new or renewed lay religious movements in the Church. Founded and directed by lay men and women as well as priests and religious, many of these movements gained endorsement by the Vatican. They are known especially for their mobilization of young people, their upholding of traditional Catholic doctrine presented in contemporary forms, and their ecumenical and service work. Chief among the movements that have flourished in the postconciliar period are Focolare, Communion and Liberation, and the Community of Sant'Egidio.

Focolare, whose name means 'hearth' in Italian, emerged initially out of the crucible of the Second World War. Chiara Lubich and a group of other young women in Trent founded the group in 1943 to be 'an instrument of unity in a divided world'. The movement expanded significantly during the conciliar era. As of 2009, Focolare exists in over 100 countries with more than five million members.[19] To carry out its mission, the organization conducts dialogues between ecclesial groups, Christian bodies and non-Christian religions. The leaders of Focolare have built 35 small towns in underdeveloped areas around the world, with houses, schools, businesses and places of worship. The towns reflect the local culture where they have arisen and offer an alternative way of living in community. In a similar way, Focolare sponsors the 'economy of communion in freedom', a programme of companies primarily but not exclusively in Brazil, whose profits are given to work with the unemployed and to catechesis of people in charitable business practices. The movement also operates a number of schools of formation, called Mariapolis centres, for members, plus an NGO called Action for a United World, a centre for interdisciplinary studies (the Abba School) and Citta Nuova publishing houses.[20]

Communion and Liberation takes a more intellectual, catechetical approach to their work. Founded in the mid-1950s by a Milanese priest

named Fr Luigi Giussani, the movement focuses on education, catechesis and moral/spiritual formation though an innovative pedagogy grounded in the conviction that the Christian is 'a person who perceives eternity in hiding within every appearance'.[21] Communion and Liberation's theological focus is the Christian mystery of the Incarnation; the movement takes its inspiration from the doctrine that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us'.[22]

Communion and Liberation's members pursue theological study and work to shape the culture around them. These efforts come chiefly in the form of cultural centres, schools, publishing initiatives and international conferences. Communion and Liberation has also started local charitable organizations, NGOs in Spain and Italy for international development, and foundations for the provision of food and pharmaceuticals.[23]

The Community of Sant'Egidio, founded in the 1960s by a group of Italian Catholic high school students, is composed of local communities mostly formed of lay people of all states of life. These communities have spread to 72 countries and contain more than 50,000 members.[24] Sant'Egidio claims no particular mission or agenda, only friendship with the poor and marginalized around the world. The group was known initially for its work with those sentenced to death, AIDS victims, immigrants, the disabled and the elderly. Their relationships with those in need led them to see war as the force sustaining and deepening poverty; eventually, therefore, the movement began to engage in conflict mediation and transformation. Their various worldwide cultural and religious efforts, most prominently the hosting of ecumenical dialogues and days of prayer for peace, such as the one held at Assisi in 1996, were matched by increasing involvement in track-two diplomacy and peacebuilding. A major success in this arena was Sant'Egidio's facilitation of the series of negotiations that led to the 1992 peace agreement, signed at the Sant'Egidio headquarters in Rome, that ended the civil war in Mozambique. The group has also served as a mediator in wars in the Balkans and Algeria.[25]

Lay movements such as Focolare, Communion and Liberation, and Sant'Egidio represent but one area of Catholic transnational activity. They are more loosely configured than traditional religious communities, and their members are almost all lay men and women. The other major transnational Catholic actors are orders composed of men and women in traditional religious life. There is one notable exception to this rule: Opus Dei. The movement is composed of men and women, clergy and laity – over 85,000 members, of which roughly 1900 are

priests – sharing the same religious vocation but playing different roles in the religious body, and pursuing their own professional vocations in the world. The transnational organization has been controversial from its inception; Opus Dei's founder, St Josemaría Escrivá, was accused of heresy in 1940s Spain. It eventually required the creation of a new type of body in the Catholic Church, and the organization remains the only personal prelature of the Pope.[26]

Though its organizational status breaks from traditional Catholic norms, Opus Dei's members embrace traditional piety and practices – such as attending daily Mass, praying the rosary and set times of prayer and the study of Scripture – and Catholic orthodoxy as articulated by the Magisterium (teaching office of the Church, composed of all the Catholic bishops in unity with the pope). Over time the movement has attracted many religiously and politically conservative members. (Opus Dei, like the new lay movements, insists that it has no agenda other than the faithful witnessing and preaching of the gospel.) Its ethos centres on the sanctification of ordinary work. As John Allen explains, this means 'that one can find God through the practice of law, engineering, or medicine, by picking up the garbage or by delivering the mail, if one brings to that work the proper Christian spirit'.[27] Escrivá's supporters, Allen reports, believe that in Opus Dei is 'the death knell of clericalism, a bold empowering of the laity as the primary ministerial corps of the Catholic Church in everything except the sacraments'.[28]

The critics of the movement are vociferous, however. Charges include coercion of recruits and harsh ascetical discipline, undue influence in Vatican politics and close ties to corrupt or oppressive, anti-democratic political regimes in Latin America. From angry former members the organization has attracted more negative publicity than any other body in the Catholic International.[29]

Taken together, these elements of global Catholicism present something of a paradox to the external observer. On the one hand, each movement or organization pledges strict obedience to the bishops and the pope.[30] In other words, in the growth of transnational Catholic movements we find organizations, composed primarily of laity, that seek not to break their ties to the traditional, hierarchical structures of their faith, but rather to reinforce them – a distinctive pattern among some contemporary world religions.[31] To be sure, there are many groups within the Church in conflict with the hierarchy, but the most numerous and active transnational movements consciously root themselves as part of

the broader body of the Church, and do so by expressing allegiance to and working with the pope and the bishops.

The papacy, in turn, has gone to great lengths to foster and encourage these groups. While corrections have been issued to some, for the most part the hierarchy has responded positively to the diverse expressions of worship, evangelization and social action that have sprung up. John Paul in particular met many times with the new movements, giving thanks for these new forms of devotion and exhorting members to continue their good work in the world. The pope also reached out to the groups through large-scale events, in particular the triennial World Youth Day pilgrimages that have attracted millions of young people from across the globe.[32]

On the other hand, the constituent elements of Catholic internationalism are politically (as well as literally) 'all over the map'. Certainly they do not cohere around a shared political platform – one could not, for example, confidently predict the voting patterns, in a given national election, of Catholic Relief Services staffers. Much less would one expect, say, Opus Dei and Sant'Egidio members to agree on matters of public policy on several issues. Critics from both the political right and the political left are befuddled by the seemingly confused mix of progressive and socially conservative positions of the Church under the leadership of John Paul II and Benedict XVI.

With respect to the legacy of John Paul II in laying the foundations for a transnational Catholic civil society, whose agents work in a coordinated or coherent fashion to advance the social mission of the Church, the verdict is mixed in several respects. First, the significance of his international visits was frequently manipulated or distorted for political purposes, as it was by Castro in Cuba (propagandizing for a lifting of the US embargo), by Muslim and Jewish religious officials in the Holy Land (each of whom loudly announced that the pope's visit vindicated his religion's exclusive claims to Jerusalem), and by Hindu nationalists in India who accused the pope of 'proselytizing'. Second, the national churches the pope visited did not always live up to his ideals. In Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the euphoria of the revolution soon gave way to the rancour of partisanship, as ecclesial and political leaders jockeyed for position in the post-communist state. The Polish church, which had been a source of unity and moral leadership during the resistance, reverted to a sectarian and authoritarian mode.[33]

Third, the tension, not to say contradiction, between John Paul's external and internal agendas in leading the Church arguably undermined the effectiveness of Catholicism as a transnational actor. Critics

contend that John Paul did not adjust sufficiently to the realities that face the worldwide church in the new millennium. Even as the number of priests and women religious has plummeted in Europe and North America (the historic sites of the majority of Catholic vocations), for example, John Paul II (and Benedict XVI) insisted on maintaining a traditional ecclesiology despite the changing demographics of laity (increasing worldwide from 683 million in 1975 to slightly over 1 billion by 1997) and clergy (decreasing by 17,000 over the same period, despite a minor upswing and wave of new vocations from the Third World). Vatican II's emphasis on the vocation of the laity in the modern world led many theologians and some bishops to call for innovation in the official Catholic theology of ministry – indeed, they called for an official theology of *lay* ministry, reinforced by an adequate financial plan to support full-time, professionally trained lay ministers possessing significant sacramental faculties. Rather than heed these importunations, John Paul II focused almost exclusively on recruiting seminarians for the priesthood.[34]

Because of the continued shortage of priests, however, the Church faces a serious ministry crisis that could eventually lead to a crisis in numbers as pastoral, catechetical and sacramental needs go unmet. In this respect the Latin American experience serves as a cautionary tale; the losses there will continue, and be duplicated elsewhere, if the systemic imbalance persists between an undermanned but elite clergy and eager but inadequately trained and underpaid lay ministry. Needless to say, the prospects for the Church's effectiveness as a force for social justice operating in civil society and in the political realm diminish to the extent that the educative and formative mission wanes. Without a religiously literate laity, formed in the spiritual and social traditions of Catholicism, the Church in any given setting is truly bereft of papal 'divisions'.

Others criticize what they see as the Church's benighted policies toward gender and sexuality. How could a pope who champions human rights and personal dignity, they ask, send delegates to the World Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo (1994) for the purpose of undermining a final report that called for a full range of family-planning measures (including abortion) designed to address the global population crisis – a crisis that heaps untold suffering upon the very people of the developing world whom the pope loves and purports to defend?[35]

And some of these detractors, in addition, are critical of Catholicism's and Catholics' historic failures to prevent terrible crimes against

humanity, including genocide, some of which were committed in the deluded conviction that they were expressions of the will of God or the Church. They point to the moral failures of Catholic leaders who were silent during the Holocaust and complicit in the eruption of genocidal fury in Rwanda, where 800,000 Hutus and Tutsis were slaughtered in a few short weeks of 1994 – to name but two of the major catastrophes of the century now past. John Paul II was duly apologetic for these failures – by one count, he apologized publicly on 94 separate occasions for Catholic expressions of anti-Semitism – some of which, he has acknowledged, were rooted in false interpretations of Christian doctrines that were propagated by Catholics in positions of authority.

In addition to the moral failures of individual Catholics, including members of the hierarchy, it can also be said that Roman Catholic structures failed the Church and humanity at crucial junctures. The Vatican bureaucracy in Rome, known as the Curia, is the nerve centre of a worldwide organization that draws upon the 'intelligence reports' of bishops, papal nuncios and other apostolic delegates and ambassadors assigned to each nation or region where Catholic churches and populations are located. The Curia, putatively under the direction of the pope, coordinates Roman Catholic policy and practice to the extent possible for such a vast and sprawling operation. The complexity only deepens when one considers the numerous religious orders stationed around the world. The members of these religious orders are Roman Catholics, to be sure, but they are usually answerable to their religious superior rather than the local bishop. As one might expect, the diocesan bishops and clergy do not always see eye-to-eye with the religious, and vice versa. Nor do Roman Catholic religious orders always collaborate peaceably and productively with one another, to employ understatement. Often the question facing the Curia, the pope or the local archbishop is this: To whom shall we turn for reliable reportage and diagnosis?

This structural challenge also impedes coordination between the Vatican and the Church hierarchy and the transnational lay movements described above. Channels of communication are both informal and formal – hardly a pattern unique to the Church – but coordination and transparency across bureaus and individuals, and the specific transnational movements is often lacking. This discrepancy has allowed 'the official Church' to distance itself from, or even repudiate, decisions and initiatives of Sant'Egidio or Opus Dei, for example. While this pattern of interaction has certain advantages, it also works against coherence and coordination.

While these administrative structures often serve Catholicism extremely well despite their cumbersome nature, at times the system breaks down or fails to respond with alacrity and wisdom to warning signs emanating from troubled churches or regions. Bickering and out-right intra-ecclesial fighting can and does occur, especially in regions beset by severe ethnic, tribal or class divisions and vulnerable to deadly conflict. Indeed, despite the Church's best efforts to orient Catholics to a greater common good beyond their ethnic or tribal loyalties, the latter sometimes win out over the shared religious identity. Neither ordination to the priesthood nor life as a vowed religious inoculates men and women against the deadly virus of ethnic hatred.

The Return to Statecraft: Post-Cold War Developments

The two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have been a period when civil wars, ethnic and religious battles and regional conflicts have dominated the conflict arena. In this context, in which several states failed or were in the process of failing, and in which religious movements and ethnic groups challenged the state in providing social services – and, in some cases, competing political authorities – religious leaders found themselves placed in a new and potentially powerful role as collaborators with, or alternatives to, governmental and other nongovernmental actors. In particular, Catholic bishops, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia, find themselves called upon to perform a variety of public and civic functions, ranging from mediation between warring parties to leadership of truth and reconciliation/human rights/healing of memory commissions, to diplomacy or advocacy on behalf of the state itself.[36]

In this capacity the Roman Catholic Church is acting as a national as well as transnational agent in a new and distinctive way. Top-down, Vatican-directed diplomacy is being complemented by local and national interventions in governance, policy-making, and public education. The bishops and priests who nonetheless accept it do not always embrace the role enthusiastically. As John Onaiyekan (b.1944), the Roman Catholic archbishop of Abuja, Nigeria and president of the Episcopal Conference of Africa, explained during an international conference of the Catholic Peacebuilding Network in Burundi in 2006, 'We have no model or guide for this kind of ministry. Yes, we prefer to work through civil society. But I am the alternative to the state in Nigeria! And the government often needs an alternative!'[37]

In this context, 'Catholic internationalism' takes on a new dimension. Part of the appeal of the Church, whether in the form of a Catholic bishop or an international NGO such as Catholic Relief Services, is precisely its transnational character. The commitment of local Catholic leaders to a multinational institution and chain of command with the moral authority of the Church carries at least three perceived advantages in countries struggling to overcome conflict or to experience sustainable economic growth. First, Catholic leaders may control, or be perceived to control, significant resources (personnel as well as financial) that flow from other centres, constituencies and religious orders. Second, the Catholic hierarchy enjoys the advantage of a local as well as global profile; that is, the Church tends to be trusted, owing to its rootedness in the people and historic (benevolent, charitable etc.) presence in the local communities, while also possessing a certain political, social and even economic independence from local or national politics and politicians. Finally, the Catholic bishops are perceived to have influence (the perception is often greater than the reality) with intergovernmental and international agencies, and with prominent states such as the USA, France and the UK.

Recent studies explore this development, even as Catholic universities and NGOs are conducting training sessions in conflict resolution and peace-building in Latin America, Africa and Asia for local bishops, priests, religious and laity. Most Catholic lay and clergy leaders worry that their previous study and training leading to ordination or religious vows or lay leadership has not prepared them for the Church's new role as on-the-ground conflict mediator, reconciler and human rights advocate. This makes the post-Cold War era both intriguing and challenging for a transnational church that finds itself in great demand in many settings to provide a presence and ministry that emerges from a dimension of Catholic internationalism for which Catholics are not fully prepared. In this context, transnational movements of lay Catholic professionals might flourish and play increasingly important and effective roles in the Catholic International. Whether they do so will likely depend on the ways in which such movements are empowered and supported by the papacy, the hierarchy and the Vatican.

Notes

1. J. Bryan Hehir, 'Religious Activism for Human Rights: A Christian Case Study', in John Witte, Jr and Johan D. van der Vyver, *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspectives: Religious Perspectives* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), p. 103.

2. A gathering of approximately 2300 Catholic bishops from 79 countries, the Second Vatican Council opened in St Peter's Basilica, Vatican City, on 11 October 1962 and adjourned in December 1965 after four momentous sessions that produced 16 official documents. The most detailed and authoritative history to date is the five-volume series edited by Giuseppe Alberigo and Joseph A. Komonchak, *History of Vatican II* (Maryknoll and Leuven: Orbis/Peters, 1995–2006). See also, Giuseppe Alberigo, *A Brief History of Vatican II* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2006).

3. This 'Catholic social teaching' began in 1891, with the appearance of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter *Rerum Novarum* (*The Condition of Labour*). By condemning atheistic socialism while providing a sustained economic and moral critique of the inhumane excesses of the unfettered market, *Rerum Novarum* set Catholics on a pathbreaking intellectual journey which led ultimately to the affirmation of innate human dignity, rather than theological orthodoxy and Catholic Church membership, as the authentic source of civil rights and political self-determination.

4. '*Dignitatis Humanae*' (*Declaration on Religious Liberty*), in Joseph Gremillion, ed., *The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching since Pope John* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1976), pp. 337–50.

5. 'Medellín Documents: Poverty of the Church', in Gremillion, ed., *The Gospel of Peace and Justice*, pp. 471–6.

6. These principles include the following: (1) *the common good*, the notion that Catholics and other citizens ought to pursue policies and programmes that serve the best interests of the public at large rather than a particular subgroup within society; (2) *solidarity*, the affirmation that all people at every level of society should participate together in building a just society; and, (3) *subsidiarity*, the dictum (articulated in papal teaching first by Pius XI) that greater and higher associations or governing bodies ought not to do what lesser and lower (more local) associations can do themselves (a sort of Catholic federalism).

7. Pope Paul VI, *Evangelii Nuntiandi* (*On Evangelization in the Modern World*) (Washington, DC: Publications Office, United States Catholic Conference, 1976), pp. 51, 60–1.

8. In 1961, 10 out of the 11 congregations had Italian cardinals at their head; by 1970, 4 out of 12 did. In 1961, 80 per cent of the curial professional staff was Italian, which decreased to 65 per cent by 1970. Thomas Reese, SJ, *Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the Catholic Church* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 141. Paul VI elevated many Third World bishops to Cardinal, eliminating the Italian domination of Papal elections. Not least, he confirmed permanent secretariats for Christian Unity, for Non-Christian Religions and for Non-Believers as permanent parts of the Vatican administration. See Eamon Duffy, *Saints and Sinners: A History of the Popes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 277–8.

9. Pope Paul VI, '*Populorum Progressio*' (*On the Development of Peoples*), in Gremillion, ed., *The Gospel of Peace and Justice*, p. 390.

10. 'Criticisms of the Vatican's Eastern Policy', *Der Spiegel*, available at http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/99-4-28.shtml.

11. George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), p. 631. Solidarity, the name eventually given to the

Gdansk shipyard union, was an idea, rooted in Catholic social doctrine, that Father Wojtyła began to expound and develop in his lectures on social ethics at Jagiellonian University and the Catholic University of Lublin in the mid-1950s. As Bishop (1958), Archbishop (1963) and Cardinal Archbishop (1967) of Krakow, Jonathan Kwitny writes, Wojtyła 'forged the Solidarity revolution – in his philosophy classes, his community synods, his secret ordination of covert priests, his clandestine communications seminars, the smuggling network he oversaw throughout the Eastern Bloc, and above all by his example'. See Jonathan Kwitny, *Man of the Century: The Life and Times of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997).

12. Pope John Paul II, '*Centesimus Annus*' (*On the Hundredth Anniversary of* Rerum Novarum), in David J. O'Brien and Thomas A. Shannon, eds, *Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1992), pp. 475–9.

13. Pope John Paul II, '*Evangelium Vitae*' (*The Gospel of Life*), in *The Encyclicals of John Paul II*, ed. with introductions by J. Michael Miller, CSB (Huntington: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 1996), available at www.vatican.va/.

14. John Paul II, '*Centesimus Annus*', p. 471

15. See the essays and case studies in Margaret Steinfels, ed., *American Catholics and Civic Engagement: A Distinctive Voice* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Thomas Massaro, *Catholic Social Teaching and the United States Welfare Reform* (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1998).

16. Visiting Brazil in 1980, the pope ordered his fellow Catholic bishops to avoid class struggle and political partisanship while nonetheless exercising a 'preferential option for the poor'. During a nine-day trip to Central America in March 1983, John Paul, celebrating a papal Mass in Managua for hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguan Catholics, rebuked Sandinista Party members who tried to drown out his criticisms of a Marxist-inspired 'Popular Church' set over against the Catholic Church's legitimate pastors. (The Sandinistas had caused a commotion and shut off the pope's microphone during the sensitive part of his sermon.) In Guatemala he upbraided the government of General Efrain Ríos Montt for its abrogation of democracy, oppression of the native Indian population and other human rights abuses. In Haiti he castigated the autocratic policies of the Duvalier family. In El Salvador the pope honoured the memory of the slain Archbishop Romero by visiting his tomb and preached on the importance of nonviolent resistance and national reconciliation. In Asia and Africa, John Paul attacked socialist and communist systems that denied peoples the rights to religious freedom, a living wage, and political self-determination. In these travels John Paul II set forth a framework for evaluating the political change that much of the world was undergoing. *Centesimus Annus* celebrated the opportunities that lay before the new democracies of east central Europe and elsewhere, while cautioning against the idea that democracy could be value-neutral. In 1993, *Veritatis Splendor* deepened the pope's moral analysis of the democratic prospect by linking the recognition of absolute moral norms to democratic equality, the defence of the socially marginal, the just management of wealth, integrity in government and the problem of self-interest and the common good in a democracy. *Evangelium Vitae* argued that democracies risked self-destruction if moral wrongs were legally defended as rights. See Weigel, *Witness to Hope*; Duffy, *Saints and Sinners*.

17. Other members of *Caritas Internationalis* include the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF); the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD), an organization largely funded by the Catholic Community in England and Wales; Karina, the Indonesian branch of Caritas; Trocaire, the Irish branch; Development and Peace, the Canadian branch; Cordaid, the Dutch Caritas; and the French Secours Catholique. All engage in similar work for gender equality, hunger relief, climate change advocacy, care and justice for the disabled, peace-building and HIV/AIDS prevention and care, using methods inspired by Catholic teachings. See 'CRS History Series, vol 3', Archives Library Research Center, Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore, MD. See also Reina Neufeldt et al., *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual* (Vatican City: Caritas Internationalis, 2002).

18. www.cnewa.org.

19. Pontifical Council for the Laity, *Movements in the Church: Proceedings of the World Congress of the Ecclesial Movements, Rome, May 27–29, 1998* (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1999), p. 148. For a collection of essays on new religious movements by their members, see Michael A. Hayes, ed., *New Religious Movements in the Catholic Church* (London: Burns & Oates, 2005).

20. www.focolare.org. See also Chiara Lubich's *May They All Be One: Origins and Life of the Focolare Movement* (New York: New City Press, 1984) and S. Lorit and N. Grimaldi's *Focolare after Thirty Years: Insights into the Life of the Focolare Movement* (New York: New City Press, 1976).

21. Pontifical Council for the Laity, *Movements in the Church*, pp. 154–8. See Giussani's many writings, including *The Religious Sense* (1997), *At the Origin of the Christian Claim* (1998) and *Why the Church?* (2000). See also Davide Rondoni, ed., *Communion and Liberation: A Movement in the Church* (Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2000).

22. www.clonline.us.

23. www.zenit.org/article-16048?l=english.

24. Pontifical Council for the Laity, *Movements in the Church*, pp. 167–74.

25. See the analysis of Sant'Egidio in R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 155–64.

26. See John L. Allen, Jr, *Opus Dei* (New York: Doubleday, 2005). For a description of Opus Dei by a member, see Scott Hahn's *Ordinary Work, Extraordinary Grace: My Spiritual Journey in Opus Dei* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

27. Allen, *Opus Dei*, p. 3.

28. Ibid, p. 374.

29. See, for example, Michael Walsh, *Opus Dei: An Investigation into the Secret Society Struggling for Power within the Roman Catholic Church* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992).

30. As Giussani put it, 'Our certainty, the source of our joy, is our belonging to the Church, on whose authority, as it is translated at all levels, we depend'.

31. In contrast with some developments in Islam and Protestantism, such as those outlined by Robinson and Kennedy in this volume.

32. Between one and two million people commonly attend World Youth Day celebrations, though one Mass in the Philippines supposedly contained 4.5 million and is thought to be the largest gathering of human beings in history.

33. George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 134.

34. The decision has paid off in South America, Africa and Asia, where the number of seminarians has grown four- or fivefold during the last quarter-century. Even so, the far more accelerated growth of the laity gives support to a 'Full Pews, Empty Altars' scenario worldwide, as one American sociological team led by Richard Schoenherr described the situation in the United States. See also, inter alia, Bryan T. Froehle and Mary L. Gautier, *Global Catholicism: Portrait of a World Church* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2003).

35. The Church by definition is not the world; it shares some but by no means all secular values and moral judgements. According to Catholic teaching, one is not 'free' to choose from an unlimited array of options in the realm of 'private morality' while remaining bound to a universal set of norms in the public arena. Both 'private' and 'public' behaviour should conform to the objective moral order inherent in reality, which Catholics and others call the natural law. Basic Catholic principles hold that there is an externally ordained social order that humans can understand rationally. Society is organized in a hierarchy, running from the Church through the state and through subsidiary associations like labour unions down to the family, the basic social unit. Society is an organism; each component is bound by a complex of duties and obligations to the other. The allocation of social functions is determined by the principle of subsidiarity: no higher-level association, like the state, should undertake a task that a lower-level one, like a union or the family, could do as well. Individuals derive their identity from a thick web of social relations – as family members, first and foremost, but also as parish members, as union members, as members of professional societies and finally as members of a state. The modern tendency to elevate the rights of individuals, considered independently of their relational obligations, is to Catholic eyes, Charles Morris writes, 'absurdly at variance with reality and a source of endless social mischief'. Charles Morris, *American Catholic: The Saints and Sinners Who Built America's Most Powerful Church* (New York: Macmillan, 1999). In sum, once one concedes or at least comprehends its foundational principles, Catholic teaching exhibits a high degree of internal consistency. The pope's prominent profile as a world leader acting on behalf of social justice and human rights has raised false expectations that he and the Church will conform in other respects to the conventional humanist/liberal ordering of values.

36. For background, see R. Scott Appleby, 'Catholic Peacebuilding', *America* (8 September 2003), 12–15.

37. Transcript, minutes of the Catholic Peacebuilding Network conference, Bujumbura, Burundi.

15
The Global Sangh Parivar: A Study of Contemporary International Hinduism

Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath

The Sangh Parivar, a network of organizations articulated around the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – National Volunteer Corps), has become over the years a global movement propagating a Hindu nationalist agenda. As such, it links and imbricates transnationalism and nationalism. Hindu nationalism is an exclusive form of ethnoreligious nationalism which thrived in the first years of the twentieth century in reaction to the 'threat' the West (Christian missionaries as well as British colonizers) and the Muslim minority (allegedly related to a pan-Islamic movement rooted in the Middle East) were according to its leaders posing to the Hindus. It was and still is very much linked to the soil of India and is not naturally inclined to overflow India's borders. Its deep-seated ethnoreligious nature coincides with a people and a civilization. It is indissociable from a territory, the 'sacred' land of 'eternal' India. However, over the years, the Sangh Parivar developed the idea of a global Hinduism that transcends the physical frontiers of India and reaches out to the diaspora, thus operating a shift from an ethnoterritorial to a more purely ethnic base – a development related to the growth of the Hindu diaspora. An RSS pamphlet significantly entitled *RSS: Widening Horizons* can thus boast that 'the Sangh's sphere of influence has been spreading far and wide, not only inside Bharat [India] but also abroad, like the radiance of a many splendoured diamond'.[1]

Sangh Parivar representatives working outside India have sought to reproduce the modus operandi that were successful in the homeland. *Swayamsevaks* (volunteers) in other parts of the world are also supposed, like their Indian counterparts, to get together morning or evening, if possible dressed in the standard uniform, for physical training sessions

including the virtually military raising of the flag and ideological oaths that vary according to circumstance, but the targets of which are usually the Muslims in the West and whose heroine is always eternal Hindu India. This militaristic and masculine ethos still exists abroad albeit often undercover and in the guise of charitable and cultural activities. One reason behind the creation and expansion of this very particular brand of international Hinduism is that Hindu migrants have gradually formed communities in the four corners of the world. These ethnic bridgeheads have justified an overseas expansion of Hindu nationalist movements because they formed fragments of India abroad which, without them, were in danger of being denatured.

Conquering the World: Six Decades of Global Hindu Nationalism

The promotion of a reform version of Hinduism in the diaspora was the primary motivation of the Arya Samaj *updeshaks* (activists) in the first movement of this school of thought founded in 1875, which followed the waves of immigration in the colonial nineteenth century in South Africa and the Caribbean.[2] The RSS later took up the flame according to the same logic. One of its leaders, M. S. Golwalkar (1906–73), who became head of the movement in 1940, in fact devoted an entire passage of his famous book, *Bunch of Thoughts*, to overseas Hindus, calling on them to act as ambassadors for their nation. Actually, the first *shakha* (branch) to have been created outside of India was formed by a young Indian *swayamsevak*, Jagdish Chandra Shastri, or Sharda (1924–), who spontaneously gathered some fellow members of the RSS in 1946 aboard a ship linking Bombay to Mombasa in Kenya. In his memoirs, Sharda remembers that

> When I went to see my Sangh colleagues to bid goodbyes, they were upset because they did not want me to leave at that crucial juncture [pre-Partition time] and wished that I was with them in Sangh work. But, Shri Chamanlal ji and other *karyakartas* [senior leaders of Sangh] thought I might lose this chance to go abroad if I stayed back in Bharat. I also promised them that wherever I go, Sangh will go with me; and wherever I went, I would organize Sangh work. They believed in me and acceded to my request, albeit reluctantly.[3]

This testimony shows how the Sangh Parivar was initially concerned more with the Partition of India and its own local growth than with

its spread outside India and the diaspora that could have fostered it. At the beginning, from 1946 onwards, its global presence was not policy-driven but was the result of individual initiatives, and the Sangh abroad developed largely thanks to diasporic family networks functioning independently from the central command of the RSS. Once in Kenya, Jagdish Chandra Shastri, for instance, travelled the country and the region to create branches of the Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh (BSS – Indian Volunteer Corps, the name the RSS assumed in Kenya) and, along with his colleagues, formed the first overseas regional network of the RSS in the years 1947–57. Branches of the RSS were also created thanks to personal contacts in Burma, Mauritius, Seychelles and Madagascar in these years. The BSS was an important locus of socialization for the Hindu minority, as much through its athletic activities as through cultural events. It was also one of the crucibles for the Hindu Council of Kenya, which was to become the main political organization for the defence of Hindus in that country.

These East African beginnings contributed to the development of the Sangh Parivar in the West, because many full-time cadres that would operate in Great Britain and North America first went through Uganda or Kenya. The African experience of nearly a quarter of the Hindu community living in Great Britain has considerably influenced British Hinduism and has given it a strong diasporic dimension. The same African and Caribbean detour can be found among many Canadian Hindutva adherents.

Before 1957, the RSS had put a *swayamsevak* named Chamanlal Grover (1920–2003) in charge of keeping a record of all the volunteers abroad and to put them in contact with each other so that the network could expand. In the 1960s, two new factors enabled the spread of the RSS from East Africa to Europe and then North Africa. First, by 1957 the RSS had become fully aware of the potential of having a global presence and nominated Lakshman Shrikrishna Bhide (1918–2001) as full-time cadre in charge of the overseas operations, making him a roving ambassador for Hindutva. Second, the Indian populations in East Africa, which had been socialized in the RSS ideology and were already sending their children to the United Kingdom for higher education, were faced with the Africanization policies of the newly independent African nations in the 1960s and massively migrated to the United Kingdom, as most of them held British passports. They carried with them, amongst many other things, the Hindutva ideology.

The RSS operated under still a different name, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS – The Hindu Volunteers Corps) in the United Kingdom

and then in the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, Trinidad and Hong Kong. To begin with, the HSS gave absolute priority to multiplying the number of *shakhas*, as the RSS had done in the years from 1925 to 1948. In Great Britain shakhas were thus rapidly created in cities such as Birmingham and Bradford where they attracted Hindu immigrants eager to convey Hindu culture to their children.[4] In 1973, Golwalkar's successor, Balasaheb Deoras (1915–96), took a step forward by entrusting diaspora Hindus with part of the RSS mission and in 1977, Lakshman Shrikrishna Bhide transferred the RSS overseas operations headquarters from Nairobi to Leicester. The BSS became a regional organization, while the HSS stood at the helm of the RSS's global network.

The HSS took on new importance in the eyes of the 'mother organization' during the Emergency in 1975–7. During these 18 months when democracy was suspended in India, the RSS was banned for the second time in its history (the first dated back to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi – b.1869 – by a former movement member in 1948). It then found in its international affiliates valuable advocates of its cause and an alternative source of funding. The RSS headquarters in Nagpur at that time kept a secret register of *swayamsevaks* who had applied to emigrate, putting them in contact, through Chamanlal, with those already settled in the destination country and encouraging them to join a *shakha* or to start one.[5] In 1976, *swayamsevaks* settled in Great Britain founded the Friends of India Society whose primary aim was to organize and defend Hindutva principles abroad. This organization remained very active in Great Britain and continental Europe, particularly in Paris.[6] The existence of family links has sometimes helped a great deal in the development of this network. The RSS thus gradually relied on Hindu communities abroad to spread its message. To this end it created in 1978 a special branch for Hindus overseas, the Antar Rashtriya Sahayog Parishad (ARSP – Indian Council for International Cooperation). It was, moreover, this very strategy that involved creating sister organizations which gave rise to the expression 'Sangh Parivar': the RSS – or Sangh – forms a 'family' that it lords over and of which the multiple branches are its children.

Duplicating the Sangh Parivar Structure outside India

Reflecting the RSS strategy which, after having created a network of *shakhas*, gave rise to a multitude of affiliates forming a so-called family – the Sangh Parivar – the HSS created a network of sister organizations

in the United Kingdom. First, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) UK was founded some eight years after the VHP in India, in 1972, as an affiliate of the India-based VHP in the United Kingdom.[7] Second, the Overseas Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party (OFBJP) became the correspondent for the Bharatiya Janata Party in the country. Third, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti (Committee of the Female Servants of the Nation) – the female wing of the RSS founded in 1936 in India – also has an alter ego in Great Britain in an organization of the same name. Fourth, the main Hindu student Union in Great Britain, the National Hindu Students Forum (NHSF), is likewise the official correspondent for the ABVP (Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad – All India Sudent Association). Lastly, Bharat Sewa (Service of India) is the functional equivalent of the RSS affiliate devoted to social work, Sewa Bharti. Like their Indian counterparts, the various components of the British Sangh are in constant contact but strive to mask the links they have with the RSS to avoid being overtly stigmatized by too strong an ideological branding and thereby circumvent the legislation in force. Indeed, the British Charity Commission prohibits the funding of political and sect activities, while section 5 of the Indian Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act of 1976 (FCRA) forbids the RSS and its affiliates from receiving funds from abroad without prior authorization from the central government on a case-by-case basis. It is thus of the utmost importance for the components of the RSS to distinguish themselves from transnational political movements which would be illegal to fund. Thus the press officer of the NHSF stated in November 2005 that 'we have no direct link with them [HSS UK]; we are not funded or bonded to them, but there is a moral affiliation as with every other Hindu organization'.[8]

This tactical distance nevertheless conceals real collaboration that AWAAZ, a network of anti-communal individuals and organizations based in India and the United Kingdom and set on exposing the illegal foreign funding of the Sangh Parivar, sets out to demonstrate in its report.[9] It points out that the leader of the HSS sits on the board of directors of the VHP UK, whose representative for religious education issues is also a leader of the HSS and the former editor-in-chief of *Sangh Sandesh*, an HSS publication. The same interpenetration can also be observed among grass-roots activists. The homology between the RSS and the HSS is thus mirrored in the networks formed by the Sangh Parivar in India and Great Britain.

In the United States, Hindutva adherents reproduced the same system, except that the first organization to have been created on American soil was not the local equivalent of the RSS but the Vishva Hindu Parishad

of America. This is totally atypical since a functional equivalent of the RSS – like the HSS – generally comes first. Founded in 1971, at the time when a wave of qualified emigrants arrived in the United States, the VHPA is today one of the most active branches of the Sangh with 40 operational sub-branches and over 10,000 members.[10] In May 1990, the Hindu Students Council (HSC) was formed, and today claims some 50 branches in universities throughout the United States and Canada.[11] Its growth is remarkable given that the first HSC chapter was founded only in 1987 at Northeastern University in Boston. As for the alter ego of Sewa Bharti, in the United States it is called the India Development and Relief Fund. Canada followed the same path as the United States. VHP Canada was created in 1970 and built a temple in Vancouver the following year. It was only later, in 1973 on the recommendation of M. S. Golwalkar, that L. M. Sabherwal, an RSS member since his youth who had arrived in Canada in the early 1970s, founded the HSS (initially under the name of Bharatiya Swayamsevak Sangh).[12] Four years later, Sharda, the *swayamsevak* who had created the first *shakha* outside India, decided to retire, leave Kenya and settle with his sons in Toronto. The RSS policy of expansion built upon individual efforts and even sometimes life-long commitments to the spread of Hindutva, as was the case of Sharda.

Throughout the entire 1980s and 1990s the American *swayamsevaks* attempted to reproduce the development of the Sangh Parivar in Canada. VHP Canada, of little importance until then, got a second wind in 1987.[13] Similarly, the HSC in Canada came about with the help of activists from the neighbouring United States. Thus still today, the VHP and the HSC, together with Sewa International, the charity arm equivalent locally to Sewa Bharti, constitute the pillars of Canadian Hindutva.

From the 1970s to the present, numerous branches and affiliates of the Sangh have been created throughout the world on a model that pre-existed in India, creating a fully fledged transnational Hindu nationalist network. The last decade even saw the spread of the RSS in South East Asia, particularly in Malaysia where the sizable Indian minority suffers from state discrimination. In South Asia, the regional implantation of the Sangh has been fuelled by conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka and by the subsequent migrations from these countries to India.

The Sangh Parivar has thus managed to reproduce most of its structure abroad, except that the HSS is not at the system's hub: the centre continues to be the RSS. Hindu nationalist movement affiliates either in India or abroad thus swear allegiance to the same decision-making centre,

which certainly makes this movement qualify as a network. Not only do the members of the British Sangh regularly attend events organized by the Indian Sangh, but reports on the RSS activities in India are also presented in meetings of the HSS UK. More importantly, Rajendra Singh (b.1959), the leader of the RSS from 1994 to 2000, presented his organization's 'Code of guidelines to workers' to HSS members in London on 24 April 1995.[14] Interestingly, the RSS has divided the world into geographical areas, one of its senior cadres being in charge of each of them.[15] Similarly, since 1984, the VHP centre in Delhi has been exercising its jurisdiction over the entire organization all over the world.[16] It is thus to India that the overseas components of the Sangh Parivar look for their material and ideological leadership.

The Mechanisms of Success

The highly organized and structured outlook of the global Sangh Parivar, along with its systematic outreach efforts, play a significant part in its appeal all through the world. However, these factors alone do not explain the success of this ethnoreligious international. The appeal of a nationalist project, that culminates in the formation of a Hindu State in a Greater India, for populations that have left their home country sometimes decades ago and strive to secure their material success and social advancement in their country of residence seems paradoxical at the least. It is this paradox that Devesh Kapur endeavours to explore in a chapter of *Diaspora, Development and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of Migration from India*. According to him, the expression 'long-distance nationalism', coined by Benedict Anderson, has gained considerable currency without a proper definition. For him, the impact of the Sangh's outreach efforts among the diaspora cannot even be quantified since the Indian law forbids foreign contributions to sectarian or political groups. He also shrugs off the idea of a 'foreign hand' at play in Indian nationalism as a 'puzzling' fantasy emanating from NGOs and academics traumatized by the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 1990s.[17] He argues that the diasporic support of the Hindu nationalist cause is a scarecrow that has never been proven nor ever will be.

We have also problems with the notion of 'long-distance nationalism', but for different reasons.[18] As we explained elsewhere, Anderson assumes that diasporas develop a nostalgic sense of belonging towards the mother country (and may be more radical because they have no repression to fear), whereas the case of Hindu nationalism shows that the Hindu diaspora turned towards this 'ism' *after* the Sangh Parivar

approached its members actively – an argument that runs contrary to those of Devesh Kapur. The way Kapur downplays the growing presence of the Sangh Parivar out of India, and especially in the USA, needs to be qualified by the existence of hundreds of *shakhas* across the world, the ban of several RSS-affiliated organizations in the USA and the UK following reports of diasporic funding going to communal causes by AWAAZ, Stop Funding Hate and Human Rights Watch and the fact that BJP leaders have toured the USA for fund raising.[19]

Yet, the success of the Sangh Parivar in the USA and in the UK derives not only from the active strategy of development of the Sangh but also from sociological factors specific to the Indian and Hindu communities and from the social setups of the diaspora's host countries.

Internal Factors

Arvind Rajagopal explains the attraction of Hindu nationalism for the Indian diaspora in the United States by some of its sociological characteristics. Hindus in America count among their ranks a growing number of computer scientists and small-business owners that come from the 'little-exposed strata of Indian society, completely bypassing the usual socialization of the bigger cities'.[20] Certainly, the core of Hindu nationalism has been historically recruited among what Bruce Graham has called the 'middle world' of the Hindi belt, small-business executives and professionals, all who come from upper castes.[21] But to attribute the Hindu nationalist leanings of a new wave of migrants to their lack of cosmopolitanism is not convincing when the most cosmopolitan ones are no less attracted by the Sangh Parivar. Indeed, since the end of the 1980s, the Sangh Parivar has made its way into the upper middle class in big cities.

Jayant Lele suggests another, almost opposite, interpretation of the development of the Sangh Parivar in Canada. Whereas most of the Indians who came to this country before the Second World War were workers and farmers, the more recent wave of immigration, particularly beginning in the 1960s, was mainly made up of members of the upper middle class. According to Lele, these affluent Indians find in the Brahmanical, unifying and flattering dimension of Hinduism as it is presented by the Sangh Parivar confirmation of their dominant position within Canadian society and within the Indian community.[22]

The main internal factors of the Hindu nationalist movement's success may still lay elsewhere, first of all in the consolidation of its network in the course of time and in an increased mobilization drive on the

part of the Sangh Parivar. This could be seen in the Milton Keynes (1989), 'Global Vision' (1993) rallies and the Vishwa Sangh Shibirs world camps, organized by the RSS for the diaspora every five years in India since 1995, but also in Rajendra Singh's 1995 tour and those of his successor, K. Sudarshan (b.1931). The importance of these tours has been considerably overlooked. Never before had an RSS leader travelled outside of India. Neither Golwalkar nor Deoras had felt the need to set out into the world to which they had nevertheless decided to extend the Sangh Parivar. Rajendra Singh's visit to Europe thus marked a turning point. The RSS leader presented his ideas in a very moderate tone, which suited what was basically an exercise in public relations. At the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, for instance, he gave a provocatively entitled speech, 'The 21st Century: A Hindu Century', but the content was reassuring. He claimed to be open to a third way between socialism and capitalism, true to the holistic qualities of Hinduism, a model, if he were to be believed, of social cohesion and fraternity.[23] Singh's visit showed a new style that is better suited to international relations than the RSS's usual lectures peppered with references to a glorious Hindu past.

The second factor of success that one can attribute to the Sangh Parivar has to do with the 'mainstreaming' of the Hindu nationalist movement. From the mid-1990s onwards, particularly after the 1996 elections that gave the BJP the largest number of seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), Hindutva gained respectability. As a result, the diaspora was less afraid to show its face during its rallies and fundraising drives.

The third factor, internal not to the movement but to the Hindu diaspora, has to do with its political culture, which indeed became more radical in the 1990s. For the first time the Sangh Parivar was no longer popular among the diaspora merely because it met a religious demand, but also because of its ethnic nationalist project. But why did the Hindu diaspora prove receptive to this ideology at that point of time in its history? To understand this, specific factors having to do with the situation in countries of immigration must be taken into account.

Islamism, Racism and Multiculturalism in the Host Societies

The radicalization of the Hindu diaspora is partly a reaction to the epitome of the Other that is the Muslim, in India as well as abroad.[24] In India, the conversions that took place in 1981 in Meenakshipuram – a little town in southern India where thousands of untouchables 'went

over to Islam' – and the Shah Bano incident in 1985[25] prepared the ground for the Hindu nationalist mobilization in 1980–90. Abroad, the Rushdie affair of 1989 and Hizb ut Tahrir's campaigns had a similar impact, especially on university campuses where cohabitation among students from different communities was becoming more and more problematic. At the SOAS in London, for instance, Hindu and Jewish students joined efforts to get the Hizb banned. At the same time they also led a campaign against the conversion of young Sikh and Hindu women to Islam when they marry a Muslim.[26] More recently, the 9/11 attacks prompted a crystallization of the Hindu identity as opposed to Muslims, whether from South Asia or not, and a further collaboration with Jewish groups in the USA in particular.

Besides, Hindu nationalist organizations have cashed in on a very specific sociopolitical context in Great Britain and in North America, two countries which, especially in the 1980s–1990s, combine a certain amount of ordinary racism and a strong sense of multiculturalism. Such alchemy tends to exacerbate communitarian mobilizations, as Peter Mandeville has shown about Muslim movements[27] and as Aminah Mohammed-Arif and Christine Moliner have shown about the South Asian diasporas.[28] The cases of Serbs[29] and Sri Lankan Tamils in Europe and of pro-Khalistan Sikhs in the United Kingdom and in Canada are also well-known examples of the importance of the settlement context of migrants in fostering long-distance nationalism.

In the United States multiculturalism has enabled the organization of the Indian minority, first because of the affirmative action policy underlying it. In 1977 the Association of Indians America fought to include Indians as 'minorities' expressly 'to benefit from the modest affirmative action provided by the state in its contracts'.[30] In 1982, the US Small Business Administration accepted a petition from the National Association of Asian Indian Descent requesting that Indians be recognized as a 'socially disadvantaged minority in need of special preferences'.[31] In the 1990s, many Indian-American groups, including the Congressional India Caucus and the IACPA (Indian American Center for Political Awareness) were founded, while the United States census gave Indians a specific category enabling them no longer to be tallied together with Pakistanis from 2000 onwards. The creation of USINPAC (United States India Political Action Committee) in 2002 and of a Senatorial India Caucus in 2004 gave further weight to the Indian voice in the USA. These groups, along with powerful Indian and Indian American CEOs and top executives, aim at influencing US policy-makers in favour of India. They are, by law, bipartisan and not affiliated to any Indian political party or

movement. However, they are constituted of an overwhelming majority of Hindus and have consistently defended a rather pro-Hindu securitarian approach to international politics while sometimes giving vent to Islamophobia.[32]

In Canada, known for its social-mosaic rather than melting-pot ideal, the federal and provincial authorities, confronted with the demands of French-speaking Canadians, strengthened community groups by granting them tax advantages and giving them a role in the decision-making process at the municipal level. Thus, in both Great Britain and in North America, Hindus benefited from communitarian policies. In these three countries, Hindutva adherents seek to assert their 'genteel multicultural presence', to use Arvind Rajagopal's expression, and take on the most ordinary attributes in order to appear harmless.[33]

But alongside Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, British, American and Canadian societies have multiplied forms of discrimination. Here it is important to distinguish between the xenophobia of extreme right-wing movements and everyday expressions of ordinary racism. Bhatt and Mukta point out that 'the American and British New Right language of the 1980s...carried similar themes of "majority discrimination" and an attack on minority rights and protection'.[34] And thus Senator Pat Robertson (b.1930) slammed Hinduism, which he described as diabolical in the context of a campaign aiming to reduce the flow of Indian immigrants into a 'dominantly Christian' country. Besides these political developments, one must not overlook more benign forms of racialism. Children are the first victims of this refusal of otherness. How many second-generation immigrants in primary or secondary school have been the butt of classmates who were taken aback not only by the colour of their skin but by Hindu customs such as vegetarianism, cow worship, arranged marriages, wearing the sari or the sacred rope worn by upper-caste men? Suketu Mehta (b.1963), in the autobiographical part of *Bombay, Maximum City*, recalls about his school in Queens,

> I was one of the first minorities to enrol, a representative of all they were trying to hold out against. Soon after I got there, a boy with curly red hair and freckles came up to my lunch table and announced, 'Lincoln should never have freed the slaves.'... This was how the school saw me: as a stinking heathen, emitting the foul odours of my native cooking.[35]

This cultural context explains the founding of Hindu defence organizations not belonging to the Sangh Parivar. For instance, in the

USA the Federation of Hindu Associations vehemently protested against Sony's and Gap's use of Hindu deities in their advertising campaigns. Both companies had to cancel the ads and apologize for them. Similar protests were levelled at the American series *The Simpsons*, when in one of its episodes one of its characters threw peanuts at a statue called Goofy Ganesh. The scale of the challenge posed by these practices in the eyes of militant Hindus prompted them to create the American Hindu Anti-Defamation Coalition (AHADC) in 1997, modelled after the Anti-Defamation League initially founded to combat anti-Semitism. The primary aim of the AHADC is to monitor the iconography and vocabulary used regarding Hinduism as to whether these convey prejudice. This approach was only possible because American law – in keeping with the official multiculturalism – recognizes everything dear to the followers of one religion as worth protecting.

Across the border, several organizations such as Canadian Hope and the Hindu Conference of Canada pride themselves in monitoring and protecting Hindus' image in the national media.[36] The Hindu Conference of Canada has also set itself the aim of increasing the number of visas granted to Indians and facilitating the establishment of Indian and Hindu managers by granting degree equivalences. Moreover, it publicly backed the Conservative party in the 2006 federal elections.[37] This example thus shows that multiculturalism enables communitarian defence groups to form associations, which quickly turn into ethnic lobbies.

Great Britain provides the most accomplished example of this evolution. Since September 2003, Hindutva organizations resolutely present themselves as ethnic lobbies. On this date, some of them, including Hindu Forum UK, as well as several MPs of Indian stock, launched an 'Operation Hindu Vote' modelled after the 'Operation Black Vote'. This campaign sought at once to identify Hindu population centres and people who openly support a nationalist and extreme vision of Hinduism in order to supply them with the necessary lobbying material, such as press packets.[38] This national lobbying effort is combined with growing participation in local politics. The NHSF, for instance, strongly encourages its members to be active in the National Union of Students and in student politics. The penetration of champions of Hindutva in student unions enables this ideology to benefit from legitimate forums. British Hindutva activists see in these various sources of political support, fostered by a policy of multiculturalism and a lack of information on Hindu extremism, a means of legitimization and a way to position themselves as spokespersons for the entire Hindu community, even the entire Indian community in the country.

Long-Distance Regionalism

The toleration for multiculturalism – including religious expressions of cultures – in the US and the United Kingdom created a favourable context for the Sangh Parivar through a variant of long-distance nationalism that we may call long-distance regionalism. The Gujarati connection, with its sectarian dimension, is a case in point. The Sangh Parivar finds in the Swaminarayan movement a valuable ally in Great Britain and in North America.[39] In 1995 the building of the huge temple in Neasden, in the London suburbs, reflected the growing influence of the movement in England, especially among the affluent Gujarati community. Not only does this temple present all the deities of the Hindu pantheon as does Satyamitranand Giri's Bharat Mata Mandir, but its permanent exhibit entitled 'Understanding Hinduism' adopts a very nationalistic tone, the devotees being informed of the fact that Hindus not only discovered the zero, but also geometry, astronomy, plastic surgery and quantum physics![40]

Beyond the channel offered by the Swaminarayan movement, the Gujarati community – most of whose members subscribe to this movement – has given Hindu nationalism countless specific advantages, including communication relays: a radio station (Radio Sunrise) and three newspapers (*Garavi Gujarat, Gujarat Samachar* and the weekly *Asian Voice*). All these media echo the debates concerning the Christian 'threat' constituted by the conversions of aboriginals and Dalits in India and the Muslim 'threat' of terrorism, while simultaneously recognizing the organizational strength and appeal of religions based on a universal and hence global predicament. Furthermore, the Gujarati community and the Swaminarayan movement also wield considerable financial clout.

The prerequisite for such an efficient tapping of local political resources and of various multicultural policies is the adaptation of the Sangh Parivar's modus operandi and discourse so that this global Hindu network appears benign, banal and universally appealing all at once.

Global Hinduism: A Study of Adaptation and Semitization

In the diaspora, the RSS has been obliged to adapt its techniques to the new environment. Less time is spent reciting prayers, and team sports replace martial arts training. Moreover, certain *shakhas* are mixed and meet on Sunday or during school vacation in order to attract the largest possible audience. Actually, the modus operandi of the global Sangh Parivar has three distinctive features: the federation of religious figures,

catechism and electronic networks. These three characteristics highlight the will of the RSS to create a global movement in line with religions of the Book, with a centralized clergy and uniform teaching.

The Key Role of Saffron-Clad Men

Since its inception during the colonial era, the Sangh Parivar developed both in opposition and in imitation of Christianity and Islam. The organization still seeks to counter Muslim and Christian proselytism while adopting a 'strategic mimetism'.[41] In order to imitate those who were posing a threat to Hinduism and to resist them more effectively, one of the key assumptions of the Hindu nationalist ideologues was that Christians and Muslims were more organized and united than the Hindus. In order to unify Hinduism in diaspora – like in India – the VHP organizes Dharma Sansads (Dharma parliaments) throughout the world. These assemblies bring together Hindu religious figures that have come from local ashrams and temples and who strive to establish a 'Hindu Church' with a mass following.

Like in India, the British, American and Canadian branches of the VHP hold huge rallies in the form of ethnoreligious events. The first such gathering was probably the Virat Hindu Sammelan (Great Hindu Assembly) which took place in Milton Keynes, a 'new town' some distance northwest of London, in 1989. For the first time in Great Britain the VHP had managed to bring together hundreds of Hindu organizations (officially 300) and from 50,000 to 100,000 participants. In the United States an even larger rally took place in 1993 to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the arrival of Vivekananda (1863–1902) – a religious reformer with nationalist leanings – in Chicago and his famous speech to the world parliament of religions in 1893 in which he had criticized the materialistic West and praised the virtues of a spiritual Orient. This gathering was called 'Global Vision 2000', which was an apt reflection of the international ambitions of Hindutva adherents.

The idea of emulating the ecclesiastical structure of Christianity has been interpreted in terms of the Semitization of Hinduism by Sunil Khilnani and Romila Thapar, among others, during the Ramjanmabhoomi movement (for the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya) in the 1980s and 1990s[42] when Ayodhya was presented as a 'Hindu Vatican'.[43] The formation of 'an inclusive "syndicated Hindu" identity' has been promoted by the Sangh Parivar abroad thanks to religious leaders and institutions.[44] Hence the construction of massive

pan-Hindu temples in the United States, on the model of the pan-Indian and nationalist Bharat Mata temple built in Hardwar in 1983. These temples incorporate and juxtapose architectural features from different Indian areas in order to achieve a pan-Hindu synthesis and unite Hindu Non Resident Indians (NRI) while channelling and controlling their cultural consumerism. For instance, the 'Hindu Unity' temple in Dallas, described at length by Arvind Rajagopal, houses 11 deities from around India, while the Shiva-Vishnu Temple in Livermore, California displays a *shikhara* (a tower typical of northern India sacred architecture) and a *gopuram* (a similar feature typical of southern sacred architecture). Just like the RSS had benefited from the support of the Hindu temples in India when it developed its organization, the HSS can count on an important network of temples as a logistical base. But, even more than its mother organization in India, the global Sangh truly relies on a group of transnational holymen. The variety of sects and schools of thought to which they belong makes it difficult to see them as a clergy per se. They nonetheless constitute an organized and international backbone of global Hinduism.

Drafting a New Catechism

The saffron-clad men of the Sangh Parivar abroad have been involved not only in organizing the Hindus, but also in disseminating a Hindu code of conduct by inventing a sort of catechism – another example of the 'strategic mimetism' mentioned above. Such a catechism was justified in the Sangh's opinion from two points of view. First, the Hindu nationalist felt that the Hindus abroad whose children needed to be initiated into a creed they had never experienced had to learn a version of Hinduism that had to be even more stylized (and even simplified) than the one the VHP diffused among the Hindu population in India. Second, the Hindu nationalists were convinced that they had a message for the world – while being the champions of a monolithic Hindu moral, cultural, economic and social dogma.[45] Ravi Iyer, in charge of the Sangh activities in South East and Far East Asia, is very clear about the universal mission of the Sangh workers and more largely of the Hindu diaspora: 'Overseas Hindus not only have a divine destination (Hindu Unity) to reach but a divine destiny to fulfill, i.e. "*Vishwa Mangala Hetave*" (Bharat Mata as the giver and cause of all the good in the world)' (Bharat Mata means Mother India).[46] This universal message partakes of larger efforts to unify, codify, homogenize and project Hinduism in a similar light as the religions of the Book.

The difficulties that young people encounter when they have to justify aspects of their culture that arouse astonishment or sarcasm partly help to understand the success of the VHP. Here is an organization able to explain the Hindu 'catechism' clearly to the young generations. It has even undertaken to train teachers. The VHP UK published *Explaining Hindu Dharma: A Guide for Teachers* in 1996. In the United States in 2005, the VHPA sought to influence the rewriting of history textbooks in the state of California, giving rise to a debate among experts between community representatives and India scholars opposed to this fallacious rewriting for ideological ends.[47] The VHP UK follows the same line. Seeta Lakhani's textbook, for instance, pretends to draw its inspiration from Hinduism to pronounce negative opinions on cloning, contraception, precocious sexual intercourse, divorce, adultery and homosexuality. The author's efforts to fashion the mentality of second- and third-generation Hindu youths go so far as to warn this population against the BBC and what she deems its partial treatment of Hinduism. (Her map of India naturally encompasses the portion of Kashmir under Pakistani control, as per Hindu nationalist ideology.[48])

To appeal to the youth, the Hindutva movement often has recourse to apparently inoffensive activities such as summer camps or language courses.[49] They also offer student cultural evenings such as Mastana, a student night of 'fun' organized on the campus of Cambridge University.

In the United States and Canada many temples also host VHP classes aiming to explain their culture to children and to inculcate a Hindu pride that denies the diversity or even ambiguities of Hinduism. The situation, however, is not the same in all the countries under review. In the United States as well as in Great Britain, various offshoots of the Sangh Parivar focus on the most affluent Hindus. The high rate of academic success among American and British youth of Indian stock, mainly Hindus, and from more affluent families than the rest of South Asia, is often held up as proof of an intrinsic superiority. This justifies the campaign to dissociate Hindus from the mass of 'Asians' conducted in various Sangh publications that target a young audience.

In Canada, however, where the not-so-well-off Sikh community has been firmly established since the early twentieth century, the HSC has adopted an inclusive strategy aiming to highlight the numerical – and therefore political – significance of Hindus in the country, and the universal and encompassing dimension of Hinduism. But the Hindu nationalist propaganda in Great Britain and in the United States is not always the same either. The adaptation of certain moral codes to make room for homosexuality, living out of wedlock and divorce, for

instance, and the negation of caste distinctions constitute a major difference between British and American Hindutva with respect to their Indian versions.

However, aside from these exceptions, the causes and ideology defended by the pro-Hindutva movement in Great Britain, the United States and Canada have been imported from India and these organizations claim inspiration from the same 'gurus'. And indeed, the same idea of a besieged community prevailing in India is found here and the low proportion of Hindus in the British and North American populations lends that idea even greater strength.

Finally, the pedagogical outreach efforts of the Sangh Parivar Indian diaspora is construed as complementary to the work of the various lobbying associations ranging from advocacy groups to think tanks and research institutes doling out grants and scholarships.

Cyber Hindutva

In addition to this new defensive and sometimes, as was the case in California in 2005, proactive activities, the Sangh has come to develop a very large cyber presence. The HSS has had to adapt to a new sociology and so, instead of emphasizing the classical functioning of shakhas, it has invented *cybershakhas*. The first one was conducted in India in 1999 in the presence of the RSS dignitary. Since then, the overseas branches of the Sangh have been relying heavily on YouTube and Skype to conduct their activities and recreate the semblance of a gathering in spite of the scattered nature of the diaspora.

In the 1990s, the Hindu nationalist movement has thus multiplied internet websites enabling its members to remain in contact, to keep informed of Sangh Parivar actions and to follow its analysis of current events. The most important of these sites in the United States is probably the Global Hindu Electronic Network (www.hindunet.org), founded in 1996 by the HSC and the VHPA. As for the most radical of them, it is beyond a doubt Sword of Truth (www.swordoftruth.com), which includes a blacklist of 'anti-Hindu' people. Initially based in Maryland, it was forced by the American authorities to shut down and opened up again from Bombay, before being forced again, this time by request of the Indian police, to close down. Its contents are still accessible through other Sangh Parivar websites, like www.hinduunity.com (which happens to be run by the same team). These websites also offer instant answers to the questions with which the Hindu diaspora is confronted, as evidenced by headings such as 'Eternal Hindu Values' or 'Hindu Customs'.

Overall, the electronic network of the Sangh Parivar is extremely dense and falls into three types of sites: institutional websites, pro-Hindutva platforms and the publicity wings and publications of different organizations. A number of branches also use the blog format, which is more flexible to maintain and more difficult to censor. They very often do not include hyperlinks to other Sangh groups so as to dissociate themselves, at least informally, from possibly contentious affiliations. In addition to these blogs belonging to groups, a number of pro-Hindutva activists blog in defence of the Sangh Parivar and its ideology. Most of them are men, which shows that, on the internet as in real life, Hindu nationalism maintains a strongly masculine bias.

The organization Haindava Keralam, the Sangh Parivar outlet in Kerala for non-resident Keralites, occupies a central position in the electronic network which illustrates the penetration of the RSS in Southern India and from there to South and South East Asia. Many of these websites mention links to evangelical or extremist Jewish groups. Their common point is openly stated: Islamophobia. The universal appeal of global Hinduism is therefore mostly a borrowed garb aimed at appealing to migrants while tapping the favourable multicultural policies of the host countries.

This case study enables us to understand how the RSS and its affiliates have established themselves overseas and orchestrated a veritable process of 're-Hinduization', a clear indication that 'long-distance nationalism' can originate *not* from the diaspora itself but at the intersection of its militant nostalgia for the mother country (that Anderson over-emphasizes) and the activism of ideologically minded entrepreneurs who crystallize latent identities. In addition, regionalism may play an equally important role in this long-distance phenomenon, as evident from the pervasive feelings of 'Gujaratiness' among the Swaminarayanans rallying around the Sangh Parivar abroad.

To expand its network overseas, the RSS has been obliged to adapt its modus operandi. But its success was also due to the changing demands of the Hindus of the West – who were not interested as much in religion as in ethnonationalism from the 1980s onwards – and to the very specific context of host countries combining racism and multiculturalism in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

These conclusions rehabilitate the role of political entrepreneurs in a field where social forces – that is, diasporas – are often analysed as largely autonomous and almighty.[50] By ignoring the role of political agencies such as the Sangh Parivar, one takes the risk of disregarding new

forms of overseas nationalism and religious internationals to conclude that diasporas and transnational religious groups belong to a post-national world, simply because they are incapable of giving a territorial dimension to their national imaginations.

Our approach does not only re-evaluate the role of ideological movements but of another actor, too, the state. The Sangh Parivar indeed benefited from state patronage in India between 1998 and 2004 when the BJP was in power. It also flourished outside India thanks to the multicultural policies put in place by the USA, Canada and the UK, while providing to Hindus services like child care and literacy programmes that could have fallen within the purview of public services but were instead delegated to communities by the host countries.

In the years to come, the Sangh Parivar will continue to spread well beyond the shores of the sacred land of India. It will foreground its universal message in the hope of gaining a universal appeal, while trying to reconcile the paradox, or at least the tension between, its very local political project and its global ambitions. Much of the debates around these two goals will take place on the internet where the cyber Hindutva network should expand in a way that seems much more centralized and therefore much more organized than the Muslim internationals. At the same time, the discrimination that overseas Hindus sometimes face as a minority will continue to fuel the idea that Hinduism at large is under attack, the syndrome of the besieged majority in India.

But, in spite of the support it enjoys abroad among the diaspora, the Sangh Parivar's global Hinduism project does not meet with systematic approval or even indifference. The latest example of the debates and unease generated by the Sangh Parivar's global presence occurred in November 2008. At that time, the nomination of Sonal Shah, a prominent American entrepreneur and NGO-founder of Indian origin, in the Obama transition team spurred very strong reactions among Indian-American academics who denounced her allegiance to the Sangh Parivar. Passionate arguments were exchanged both privately and in public forums, like the South Asian Journalists Association (SAJA), about Shah's true sentiments towards the RSS and more specifically the HSS, who invited her to speak as a chief guest during a special event in 2004, and the VHP, which made her regional coordinator for the USA in 2001.[51] She and some of her supporters claim that she was being smeared and guilted not because of her own, but her family's long and acknowledged association with Sangh. However, the fact that many groups' individuals, whether Indian or not, have voiced concern over

the penetration of religious internationals in the mainstream political set-up reveals the limits of the Sangh Parivar.[52]

Notes

1. *RSS: Widening Horizons*, available at Hindubooks, www.hindubooks.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1348.
2. Bhai Parmanand (1876–1947), for instance, travelled through southern Africa and Guyana at the turn of the twentieth century as an Arya Samaj updeshak. See Bhai Parmanand, *The Story of My Life* (Delhi: S. Chand, 1982), pp. 27ff.
3. J. C. Sharda Shastri, *Memoirs of a Global Hindu* (New Delhi: Vishwa Niketan, 2008), p. 20.
4. Stacey Burlet, 'Re-Awakenings? Hindu Nationalism Goes Global', in Roy Starr, ed., *Asian Nationalism in the Age of Globalization* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 1–18, 13.
5. Desraj Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (New Delhi: Radhakrishna Prakashan, 1979), p. 106 n. 91.
6. Walter K. Andersen and Shridhar D. Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 212–13.
7. Chetan Bhatt, 'Dharmo Rakshati Rakshitah: Hindutva Movement in the UK', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.3 (May 2000), 559.
8. Rujuta Roplekar, interview with Ingrid Therwath, 22 November 2005, London.
9. AWAAZ-South Asia Watch Limited, 'In Bad Faith? British Charity and Hindu Extremism', 2004, pp. 14, 51, available at www.awaazsaw.org/ibf/index.htm.
10. See the VHP website.
11. Arvind Rajagopal, 'Hindu Nationalism in the US: Changing Configurations of Political Practice', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.3 (May 2000), 476.
12. Ajit Jain, 'Genesis and Growth of HSS in Canada', *India Abroad* (1 May 1998), p. 19.
13. Jayant Lele, 'Indian Diaspora's Long-Distance Nationalism: The Rise and Proliferation of "Hindutva" in Canada', in Sushma J. Varma and Radhika Seshan, eds, *Fractured Identity. The Indian Diaspora in Canada. 66–119* (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2003), pp. 66–119 (85).
14. AWAAZ-South Asia Watch Limited, 'In Bad Faith?', pp. 13, 50. Bruce D. Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics. The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 158.
15. Ibid., p. 46.
16. Ibid., p. 51.
17. Devesh Kapur, *Diaspora, Development and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of Migration from India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 210, 213, 218.
18. Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath, 'The Sangh Parivar and the Hindu Diaspora in the West: What Kind of "Long-Distance Nationalism"?', *International Political Sociology*, 1.3 (2007), 278–95.

19. Competing for funds with the Congress, the Vajpayee government prevented Ashok Gehlot, Sheila Dixit and Digvijay Singh from travelling abroad before the 2003 elections.

20. Rajagopal, 'Hindu Nationalism in the US', p. 482.

21. Bruce D. Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics. The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 158.

22. Lele, 'Indian Diaspora's Long-Distance Nationalism', pp. 93–8.

23. Dhooleka Sarhadi Raj, ' "Who the Hell Do You Think You Are?" Promoting Religious Identity among Young Hindus in Britain', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.3 (May 2000), 549.

24. Christophe Jaffrelot and Ingrid Therwath, 'Le Sangh Parivar et la diaspora hindoue en Occident: Royaume-Uni, États-Unis et Canada', *Questions de recherche*, 22 (October 2007), 1–70.

25. This incident involved a Muslim woman repudiated by her husband by virtue of Koranic law who through the courts obtained maintenance payments despite the opposition of Muslim organizations for which this decision challenged the status of the Sharia as a source of law in India. In 1986, Rajiv Gandhi had a constitutional amendment passed exempting the Muslim community from the article of the Criminal Code by virtue of which the Supreme Court had ruled. He did this in order to ensure the continued support of Muslim opinion leaders. But his tactic resulted in a resurgence of Hindu nationalist activism.

26. Raj, 'Who the Hell Do You Think You Are?', p. 555 nn. 15, 19.

27. Peter G. Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (New York: Routledge, 2001).

28. Mohammed-Arif and Moliner , 'Introduction. Migration and Constructions of the Other: Inter-Communal Relationships amongst South Asian Diasporas', *South Asian Multidisciplinary Academic Journal – SAMAJ*, 2, *Migration and Constructions of the Other* (2007), available at http://samaj.revues.org/index136.html.

29. Zlato Skrbis, *Long-distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities* (Southport: Ashgate, 1999).

30. B. Mathew and V. Prashad, 'The Protean Forms of Yankee Hindutva', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 3.3 (May 2000), 519–20.

31. Karen Leonard, *The South Asian Americans* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 83.

32. Ingrid Therwath, 'Working for India or against Islam? Islamophobia in Indian American Lobbies', *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal – SAMAJ*, 2, *Migration and Constructions of the Other* (2007), available at http://samaj.revues.org/document262.html.

33. Arvind Rajagopal, 'Hindu Immigrants in the U.S.: Imagining Different Communities?', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (1997), 51–65, 47.

34. Bhatt and Mukta, 'Hindutva in the West: Mapping the Antinomies of Diaspora Nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.3 (May 2000), 437.

35. S. Mehta, 'Maximum City. Bombay Lost and Found', *London Review* (2004), 8.

36. See the Canadian Hope website, available at www.canadianhope.org/aboutus.html.

37. See the website of the Hindu Conference of Canada, available at www. hccanada.com/media/HCCEndorsement.pdf.
38. www.redhotcurry.com/archive/news/2003/hindu_vote.html.
39. Its founder, the ascetic Neelkanth, born in 1781, emphasized social work in cities and villages, monotheism rather than idolatrous polytheism and superstition, and to counter the Christian missionaries he structured the sect into dioceses according to the model of Christian churches. See R. B. Williams, *A New Face Of Hinduism – The Swaminarayan Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and, by the same author, *An Introduction to Swaminarayan Hinduism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
40. Parita Mukta, 'The Public Face of Hindu Nationalism', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.3 (May 2000), 442–66.
41. Christophe Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
42. Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1997); Romila Thapar, 'Syndicated Moksha?', seminar paper (September 1985).
43. Therwath, 'Working for India or against Islam?' In 2003, the creation of a Vedic and Hare Krishna centre, nicknamed 'Hindu Vatican' in a former Orthodox Church in Moscow, created a sense of outrage among Orthodox Russians. Nick Paton Walsh, 'Orthodox Russians see red over plans for "Hindu Vatican" in Moscow', *The Guardian* (22 October 2003), available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/oct/22/russia.nickpatonwalsh.
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48. Seeta Lakhani, *Hinduism for Schools* (London: London Vivekananda Centre, 2005), pp. 105–6.
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51. *South Asian Journalists Association – Forum* (11 November 2008), available at www.sajaforum.org/2008/11/obama-sonal-shah-on-transition-team.html.
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