ITALIAN AND ITALIAN AMERICAN STUDIES

MEMORY AND MASSACRE

Revisiting Sant'Anna di Stazzema

PAOLO PEZZINO

TRANSLATED BY NOOR GIOVANNI MAZHAR

Italian and Italian American Studies

Stanislao G. Pugliese
Hofstra University
Series Editor

This publishing initiative seeks to bring the latest scholarship in Italian and Italian American history, literature, cinema, and cultural studies to a large audience of specialists, general readers, and students. I&IAS will feature works on modern Italy (Renaissance to the present) and Italian American culture and society by established scholars as well as new voices in the academy. This endeavor will help to shape the evolving fields of Italian and Italian American Studies by re-emphasizing the connection between the two. The following editorial board consists of esteemed senior scholars who act as advisors to the series editor.

Queer Italia: Same-Sex Desire in Italian Literature and Film
edited by Gary P. Cestaro, July 2004
Frank Sinatra: History, Identity, and Italian American Culture
edited by Stanislao G. Pugliese, October 2004
The Legacy of Primo Levi
edited by Stanislao G. Pugliese, December 2004
Italian Colonialism
edited by Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, July 2005
Mussolini's Rome: Rebuilding the Eternal City
Borden W. Painter Jr., July 2005
Representing Sacco and Vanzetti
edited by Jerome H. Delamater and Mary Anne Trasciatti, September 2005
Carlo Tresca: Portrait of a Rebel
Nunzio Pernicone, October 2005
Italy in the Age of Pinocchio: Children and Danger in the Liberal Era
Carl Ipsen, April 2006
The Empire of Stereotypes: Germaine de Staël and the Idea of Italy
Robert Casillo, May 2006
Race and the Nation in Liberal Italy, 1861–1911: Meridionalism, Empire, and Diaspora
Aliza S. Wong, October 2006
Women in Italy, 1945–1960: An Interdisciplinary Study
edited by Penelope Morris, October 2006
Debating Divorce in Italy: Marriage and the Making of Modern Italians, 1860–1974
Mark Seymour, December 2006

A New Guide to Italian Cinema
Carlo Celli and Marga Cottino-Jones, January 2007
Human Nature in Rural Tuscany: An Early Modern History
Gregory Hanlon, March 2007
The Missing Italian Nuremberg: Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics
Michele Battini, September 2007
Assassinations and Murder in Modern Italy: Transformations in Society and Culture
edited by Stephen Gundle and Lucia Rinaldi, October 2007
Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution
James Martin, December 2008
Primo Levi and Humanism after Auschwitz: Posthumanist Reflections
Jonathan Druker, June 2009
Oral History, Oral Culture, and Italian Americans
edited by Luisa Del Giudice, November 2009
Italy's Divided Memory
John Foot, January 2010
Women, Desire, and Power in Italian Cinema
Marga Cottino-Jones, March 2010
The Failure of Italian Nationhood: The Geopolitics of a Troubled Identity
Manlio Graziano, September 2010
Women and the Great War: Femininity under Fire in Italy
Allison Scardino Belzer, October 2010
Italian Jews from Emancipation to the Racial Laws
Cristina M. Bettin, November 2010
Anti-Italianism: Essays on a Prejudice
edited by William J. Connell and Fred Gardaphé, January 2011
Murder and Media in the New Rome: The Fadda Affair
Thomas Simpson, January 2011
Mohamed Fekini and the Fight to Free Libya
Angelo Del Boca; translated by Antony Shugaar, January 2011
City and Nation in the Italian Unification: The National Festivals of Dante Alighieri
Mahnaz Yousefzadeh, April 2011
The Legacy of the Italian Resistance
Philip Cooke, May 2011
New Reflections on Primo Levi: Before and After Auschwitz
edited by Risa Sodi and Millicent Marcus, July 2011
Italy on the Pacific: San Francisco's Italian Americans
Sebastian Fichera, December 2011
Memory and Massacre: Revisiting Sant'Anna di Stazzema
Paolo Pezzino, translated by Noor Giovanni Mazhar, February 2012

Memory and Massacre

Memory and Massacre

Revisiting Sant'Anna di Stazzema

Paolo Pezzino

Translated by Noor Giovanni Mazhar

palgrave
macmillan

MEMORY AND MASSACRE

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-34078-7

First published in 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN 978-1-349-34349-2 ISBN 978-1-137-01111-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137011114

For the appendix, the author thanks Taylor & Francis Group and the editors of the review for permission to reproduce "'Experts in Truth?': The Politics of Retribution in Italy and the Role of Historians," published in Modern Italy 15, no. 3 (2010): 349–63.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pezzino, Paolo.
[Sant'Anna di Stazzema. English]
Memory and massacre : revisiting Sant'Anna di Stazzema / Paolo Pezzino ; translation by Noor Giovanni Mazhar.
p. cm. (Italian & Italian American studies series)
Originally published in Italian: Bologna : Il mulino, c2008.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-1-349-34349-2
1. World War, 1939-1945—Atrocities—Italy—Stazzema. 2. Massacres—Italy—Stazzema—History—20th century. 3. Civilians in war—Italy—Stazzema—History—20th century. 4. Stazzema (Italy)—History—20th century. 5. Waffen-SS. SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Division "Reichsführer SS," 16. 6. Terrorism—Italy—Stazzema—History—20th century. 7. Criminal investigation—Italy—History—20th century. 8. Collective memory—Italy. 9. Italy—History—German occupation, 1943-1945—Historiography. 10. Civilians in war—Italy—History—20th century—Historiography. I. Title.
1. Subject listing—Subject listing. 2. Subject listing Subject listing—Subject listing. 3. Subject listing—Subject listing—Subject listing. I. Subject listing Subject listing.

D804.G4P4413 2012
940.54'05094553—dc23 2011047894

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Scribe Inc.

First edition: February 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Luca Baldissara, my colleague at the University of Pisa, for reading the Italian version of this book and for making a number of perceptive suggestions, particularly about the conclusions. Phil Cooke revised the English translation and suggested a number of corrections and additions. He also translated the appendix. Marco De Paolis, former military prosecutor at La Spezia (now in Rome) kindly provided the maps for this English version. Finally, Michele Morabito, from the town council of Stazzema, provided the cover image. I want to thank the master Giuliano Vangi for allowing the reproduction of his work.

List of Maps

Series Editor's Preface

Paolo Pezzino's *Memory and Massacre* recounts and revisits a highly contentious event of World War II: the Nazi massacre of hundreds of the villagers of Sant'Anna di Stazzema in Tuscany. This was the second largest massacre of civilians by the Nazis in Italy, after that of Marzabotto.[1] While the facts of the event have long been known, the interpretation of what transpired on August 12, 1944, has been disputed for more than 60 years. Pezzino's book not only scrupulously reconstructs the massacre using eyewitness accounts and German documents, it explains the logic of Nazi terror, exposes the feeble attempts after the war to mete out justice and the moral culpability of the Italian Fascists, and ends with a meditation on the role of the historian and the difference between "judicial truth" and "historical truth."

Pezzino, professor of modern Italian history at the University of Pisa, is a specialist on Nazi and Fascist crimes during World War II (Pezzino 2001b; Pezzino 2007a; Battini and Pezzino 1997). He was a consultant to the parliamentary commission established to investigate Nazi atrocities. *Memory and Massacre* not only reconstructs the events in Sant'Anna, but deals with the "forgetting" of the massacre as well as the continuing debates among historians, politicians, and popular memory. Were the Germans acting according to the "rules of war"? Should wartime atrocities be prosecuted? If so, how? Most controversially, was the massacre the responsibility of the partisans? Some historians and politicians insist the killings were in retaliation against Italian partisans resisting German occupation; others maintain it was an unwarranted act of terror.

With the signing and the announcement of the Armistice on September 8, 1943, Italy was subject to Nazi occupation.[2] Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, removed from power and arrested by the King Victor Emmanuel III, was rescued by Nazi storm troopers, flown to

Berlin for a pep talk from Hitler, and installed in a puppet regime in north Italy called the Italian Social Republic, or the Republic of Salò. Die-hard Fascists followed him there and were derisively known as *repubblichini*. They collaborated with German Wehrmacht soldiers and SS officers in attempting to destroy the anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi partisan movement. In the process, they would also purposively disseminate terror throughout the Italian countryside and cities.

On August 12, 1944, some 300 troops of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division under the command of SS Gruppenführer Max Simon and its second battalion, under the command of SS Hauptsturmführer Anton Galler, surrounded the village of Sant'Anna di Stazzema. Most of the able-bodied men had fled to the surrounding countryside to escape deportation to forced labor camps in Germany. Hence, Sant'Anna di Stazzema was populated by women, children, the elderly, and refugees. The Germans rounded up and shot hundreds of villagers. Some people were herded into basements and other enclosed spaces and killed with hand grenades. Before burning the village to the ground, the SS murdered hundreds of women and elderly and 116 children in front of the village church. At least eight pregnant women were killed. One of them, Evelina Berretti, had gone into labor that morning. The soldiers shot her dead, pulled the baby from her womb, and killed the baby too. Eight children of the Tucci family—from 3 months to 16 years old—were killed. The youngest child to die, Anna Pardini, was only 20 days old. The other Pardini women who died that day were Gelsoma, aged 40; Orietta, 15; Sara, 12; Bruna, 36; and Maria, 15 (Popham 2004). When they had completed the massacre of some 560 people, after just three hours, the soldiers sat down to an early lunch at 10:00 a.m. within walking distance of the charred and burning bodies. The precise number killed is uncertain, but the most commonly cited number is 560 people. This was one of the worst massacres of civilians on Italian soil during the war.

Collected here for the first time in English are eyewitness testimonies to the atrocities committed, many almost too painful to even read. Antonio Tucci, a naval lieutenant, recounts hearing of the massacre and running to the village: "I found around a hundred burning corpses in front of the church square, and in the midst of them I could only just recognize my poor wife holding in her arms

our three-month-old little girl, our youngest child. At the sight of this I was afraid of losing my mind, and I ran like a madman" (chapter 1). Tucci lost his wife and eight children; when the next day the bodies were buried, he threw himself half mad with grief into the tangle of corpses, shouting, "I want to be with them!" Mario Bertelli saw "an enormous pile of corpses burning slowly and were by then so wedged together in an immense heap of flesh . . . I rushed toward the pile: an indescribable heap of corpses, you couldn't recognize anyone. And underneath there was my wife, my mother, my little sisters Pierina and Aurora, my nephews and so many friends" (chapter 1).

Today, the village of Sant'Anna di Stazzema maintains a website, devoted to the massacre and the history of the Resistance. Tellingly, the Italian and English versions of the website are accompanied by a German-language one as well (http://www.santannadistazzema.org/).

As early as July 1945, just weeks after the end of the war, an officer of the British War Crime Section had already come to the conclusion that the Germans had put in place "a systematic policy of extermination, pillage, piracy, and terrorism" in Italy. The responsibility for this "criminal policy" lay with "the highest military authorities." Further investigations conclusively demonstrated that the massacre of civilians, the reprisals for partisan attacks, and the strategy of terror were not isolated events that could be subscribed to individuals but to "an organized campaign, directed by Field Marshal Kesselring's headquarters." Pezzino argues that these policies were the result of a process that had begun on the Eastern Front. The "brutalization of war" there as described by Omer Bartov (Bartov 2001) was transplanted into the "war against civilians" in Italy. This, Pezzino argues, is the qualitative difference that characterizes the German occupation of Italy.

After the war, Italian officials supposedly "lost" track both of the perpetrators and incriminating documents. Few soldiers or Fascist officials were punished as postwar Italy sought to forget its Fascist past (Domenico 1991). Then, in 1994, 700 documents were discovered in the so-called *armadio della vergogna* (the cupboard of shame) in the basement of a Roman military court (Franzinelli 2002). But it was not until 2005 that ten former SS officials, still

alive and living in Germany, were tried in absentia in La Spezia, Italy, before a military tribunal.

In a sense, the debate over Sant'Anna and other Nazi massacre of Italian civilians mirrors the infamous *Historikerstreit* (Historian's Controversy) in Germany of the 1980s. There, Ernst Nolte's controversial interpretation of the Nazi death camps (that they somehow were a response to Stalin's Gulag system), ignited an intellectual, cultural, and political firestorm (Knowlton and Cates 1993). It was in this atmosphere that President Ronald Reagan, in West Germany on the invitation of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, visited the military cemetery of Bitburg, where SS officers were buried.

A decade later, a similar "historian's controversy" erupted in Italy on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war when Gianfranco Fini, leader of the neo- or post-Fascist Alleanza Nazionale, suggested that April 25, celebrated as the day of liberation from Fascism and Nazism, should be reconsidered as a day of national reconciliation, because after all, Fascists too were "victims" of World War II.[3]

In October 2008, Spike Lee's film, *Miracle at St. Anna*, which was based on James McBride's book of the same name, was released in Italy and revived the controversy. Lee has been criticized because it appears to some viewers of the film that the partisans are made responsible for the massacre, supposedly knowing that their attacks against the Germans will result in reprisals against innocent civilians. Some Italian *partigiani* (partisans) found Spike Lee's movie and James McBride's book "insulting" because of the role of a (fictional) traitor in their midst. But no serious student of the *Resistenza* subscribes to a whitewashed history of 1943–1945. While there is quite a bit of talk (and complaint) of the "mythology" of the Resistenza, including three-time Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi who wishes history books to be rewritten with a more critical (read: condemning) eye, those who participated in the armed Resistance against Italian Fascism and the Nazi occupation were always conscious of the deep moral ambiguity of the conflict. One need only to read Italo Calvino's *Path to the Nest of Spiders* of 1947 to see that the Left was fully aware of what Primo Levi, in another context, called the Grey Zone (Levi 1988).

Lee's film presents not one, but two characters as the proverbial "good" German, perpetuating another stereotype. But Pezzino

notes that "in many episodes of massacres the rumor spreads about one or two 'good' Germans who, having refused to participate in the slaughter, have been executed by their fellow soldiers" but concludes that "there has never been real evidence that such episodes have actually happened" (chapter 1). Such an event would surely have been noted in official German sources and reports from the field. When the trial finally took place in 2005, none of the attorneys for the accused (all tried in absentia) offered the defense that refusal to follow order to massacre civilians meant summary execution. The Military Tribunal at La Spezia concluded that there was no evidence of "a single case of the summary execution of disobedient soldiers" (chapter 1).

The depiction of partisans fleeing to the mountains and leaving defenseless civilians to fend off the Germans is nonsense. During the so-called Republic of Salò, men were to be drafted in a last-ditch effort to win the war. It was at this point that many men (and women) chose to fight against the Fascists (a civil war) and the Nazi occupation. They were often considered traitors. We now know that some prominent postwar politicians and intellectuals supported the Salò Republic out of some sense of misplaced nationalism. Most have admitted their mistake; others have not.

More important is the perpetuation of a right-wing, Fascist myth: that the partigiani were unscrupulous cowards in placing civilians in harm's way. The ur-myth here begins with a partisan attack on a German police battalion on the Via Rasella on March 23, 1943. With 33 Germans dead, the SS and Gestapo command in Rome were ordered to execute 10 Italians for each dead German and accordingly rounded up 335 (not 330) men and boys (aged 17–77 with 73 Jews), none of whom had anything to do with the attack.[4]

And here is where memory and history play tricks on us. To this day, there are Romans who insist that they saw posters immediately after the attack, posted by the German command, demanding the partisans present themselves for punishment, or else civilians would pay the price. In fact, some of these "eyewitnesses" can still claim what these posters looked like. When the partigiani failed to appear, according to this misremembered history, the Germans executed the 335 the next day, March 24, 1943, in the Fosse Ardeatine. From the beginning, this myth circulated around Rome and Italy. But the Germans never placed those posters; the order to execute was secret

and was to be carried out within 24 hours. All this was confirmed by Herbert Kappler, the SS captain in charge of Rome in his postwar trial. And yet, there are still Romans today who insist that the partigiani were to blame.[5]

It is curious that, today, there are those who repeat, almost word-for-word, what the Nazi officer responsible for the massacre at Sant'Anna di Stazzema says in the Spike Lee film. In what is perhaps a fictitious scene, he berates the "partisan" traitor for the massacre; it was *their* fault! In shifting moral responsibility for this massacre (and in effect, other massacres as well), the officer effectively absolves himself, the German Wehrmacht, the SS, Italian Fascism, and National Socialism and conveniently places the blame on the partisans in a cynical rewriting of history.

Pezzino offers a valuable insight when he unveils the link between the German reprisals against the partisans and the policy of terrorism aimed at the civilian population. His work is part of a new school of Italian historiography that has challenged the traditional interpretations of the Nazi occupation of Italy and the military, political, and ethical implications of the German massacres of civilians. The simple dichotomy of a "noble" Wehrmacht as opposed to the "diabolical" SS, a necessary fiction agreed on by all as a foundation myth of the West German Republic, has been shattered by a generation of German historians. The questions asked are no longer about the "irrationality of evil" or the "unmasterable past" or the ontological nature of terror. Instead, these historians have descended from the lofty heights of philosophy to the more rugged terrain of history: "reconstructing power structures, the logic and cultural condition which made them possible, behavior of the various protagonists, the complex evolution of the survivors' memories, the ways in which the community memory has been taken up, or expelled, by the anti-Fascist paradigm of republican Italy" (introduction).

In his conclusion, Pezzino addresses some vexing questions concerning the relationship between what is discovered in a court of law and what is discovered by historians. He challenges the "repeated and apparently widespread statement that historical truth has definitely been ascertained by judicial truth." Here, American readers might think of the libel trial in England of Deborah Lipstadt of Emory University (Lipstadt 2005; Evans 2002; Guttenplan 2001).

"Is it possible," Pezzino asks, "that people do not realize the dangers inherent in the imposition of an 'official' version of history?".

There is also, Pezzino points out, the unintended consequence of erasing the historical Resistance in certain forms of commemoration:

> If the transition from the historical Resistance to the one idealized in an epic and ever more rhetorical celebration has been explained by the need to find a "site of memory," at a national level, after the end of the war, and in the case of Sant'Anna di Stazzema by the former partisans' need to defend themselves against the accusation of having been morally responsible for the massacre, today repeated statements that the partisans were not in Sant'Anna (and do not enter the picture) paradoxically contributes to a historical representation in which the armed resistance against the Germans disappears, almost as if it were an embarrassing fact to be concealed. With the result that the epic and essentially anti-historical Resistance of the commemorations has been replaced by a history without the Resistance. (conclusions)

Of particular concern is Pezzino's examination of the claim by certain organizations that they are "owners of memory" or "custodians of the truth." A further complication is the fact that in Italy and Italian historiography, "revisionists" and "revisionism" are terms often associated with the Right in an attempt to disparage and denigrate the anti-Fascist Resistance, while the same terms are often used in the United States to describe leftist historians who challenge the triumphalist and manifest destiny schools of historical interpretation.

In the appendix, Pezzino examines the role of historians in the "politics of retribution" and in court cases. "When an historian is used as an expert witness in a trial," he argues, there is an underlying presumption and

> belief that that individual can operate according to the path of truth and justice…Even though the work of the judge and of the historian may be similar—both use the so-called evidential paradigm—they do differ fundamentally in their aims. The insistence of the historian on context, so essential for his trade, makes the terms of reference more complex, his method shies way from simple linear explanations, from chains of causality that are too immediate and restricted. The judge, instead, tends in the final analysis to extreme

> simplification, which is captured in the question of whether a given accused is guilty or innocent of a crime attributed to him—a question with respect to which the historian frequently has nothing to say and which, besides, in most cases has no particular interest for him. (appendix)

For decades, the massacre in Sant'Anna di Stazzema was thought to be a senseless act of madness, a tragic consequence of war. This facile interpretation contributed to an "aura of mystery" that "has fuelled the proliferation of myths, false information, imaginative accounts, in the search for a cause and a guilty party" (chapter 2). Instead, Pezzino has conclusively demonstrated that the massacre in Sant'Anna, as well as the other massacres perpetrated by the Germans, had their own internal, diabolical logic, systematically planned by military and political authorities with the aid of the Italian Fascists. The eighteenth-century Jewish mystical rabbi Yisroel ben Eliezer, known as Baal Shem Tov, admonished us that "Forgetfulness leads to exile; in remembrance lies the secret of redemption." But as Paolo Pezzino shows, forgetfulness is seductive, and remembering is often painful.

Stanislao G. Pugliese, PhD
Professor of History
Queensboro Unico Distinguished Professor
of Italian and Italian American Studies
Hofstra University

Introduction

The Study of the Massacres in Italy

The interest shown by Italian historians in the massacres of civilians by German soldiers during World War II is the result, not only of incidental circumstances (the 50th anniversary, in 1994, of these episodes and the two trials against Erich Priebke in 1996–1997 for the massacre of the Ardeatine Caves), but is also directly related to a debate that developed in Germany on the nature of the war waged by the German Wehrmacht. German historians have discussed at length the part played in the war by the extermination of civilians, especially in Eastern Europe, and their conclusions have reshaped our understanding of this specific aspect of the conflict. The image of a "clean" Wermacht, for years a central element of the German (and Italian) memory of World War II, has been definitively dismissed.

When studying the Italian case, historians have asked two related questions: 1) To what extent can the behavior of the German Army be traced back to National Socialist ideology, and 2) what do the massacres of civilians (about 12,000–15,000 people killed) tell us about the nature of the German system of occupation in Italy?

The subject of the massacre of civilians has produced a considerable number of studies, but there is still a need for a nationwide assessment of these episodes, in order to place them in a precise historical context. We do not know how many massacres can be considered reprisals for partisan actions or were part of a policy of terrorism toward the civilian population; we often know neither the exact number of victims nor which units were responsible for specific episodes. It is not clear how some of these incidents developed and even less what provoked them. In only a few cases has there been an analysis of the nature of the recollections of a community or how

P. Pezzino, *Memory and Massacre*

memory has been in some cases "divided" and in others integrated into the official processes of mourning. In this book I offer a detailed examination of one specific case—that of the massacre at Sant'Anna di Stazzema. Before moving to Sant'Anna in detail I would, however, like to make some further introductory observations.

A research group that I led, comprising scholars from the Universities of Pisa, Naples, Bologna, and Bari, has effected a careful contextualization of these episodes in four regions (Apulia, Campania, Tuscany, and Emilia-Romagna), which enables one to go beyond the references—which, in my view, do not contribute much to an analytical interpretation—to the irrationality of evil, the unchangeable core of violence in human nature, or terror as an end in itself. The aim has been to place these massacres in a more precise historical context by reconstructing the power structures, the logic and the cultural conditioning that made them possible, the behavior and aims of the various protagonists, the complex evolution of the survivors' memories, the ways in which the community memory has been taken up or expelled by the anti-Fascist paradigm of republican Italy.

There is copious testimony provided by German generals soon after the war regarding the nature and causes of the massacres in Italy. For them, the massacres should be viewed in terms of strategic and military considerations; they were the unpleasant but inevitable result of military operations against the partisans, and this explains the utilitarian and rational explanation given by those who carried them out. At most, the German generals were prepared to admit that individual units might have gone too far in their assigned tasks, evading the control of their superiors. However, such excesses were regarded as understandable, bearing in mind various factors: the unfavorable course of the conflict or worries about the bombing raids in Germany and the partisans' fighting tactics, which were considered underhanded. Nevertheless, the perpetrators' motivations are important in order to understand the subjective logic of the massacres. By analyzing the German perception of the enemy, or the choice of strategies and means to fight it, it is possible to clarify the extent to which plans prepared and put to the test in the war on the Eastern Front came to be applied to the *Bandenkampf* (the fight against the partisan bands) in Italy.

References to a "dishonorable" way of fighting, as opposed to the "values" which would have regulated the "normal" conduct of war, were current at the highest levels of the German Army as well as being widespread among lower officers. They represent an example of that identification of children and women as logistic support for the partisans, which will lead to dramatic consequences in some of the most terrible German massacres.

Finally, there is in the German attitude an obvious punitive intent toward a population described as untrustworthy and treacherous. The contempt for the so-called second betrayal (of September 8, 1943) thus fed on stereotypes of the Italian character, which undoubtedly had a considerable influence in directing the violence toward civilians.

The War Waged against Civilians

Investigations into the crimes committed by the German Army, and by its Fascist Republican allies, had already been set in motion during the war, when news began to arrive of the killing of civilians by German troops. For example, *Stars and Stripes*, the newspaper of the American Army, in informing its readers, on July 4, 1944, of the massacre of Guardistallo, in the province of Pisa, compared it to those of Lidice, Warsaw, and Kiel and stated that "officers of the American Army fear that . . . it might not be an isolated case. Information from villages north of the present front line points to other German reprisals" (*Stars and Stripes*, 1944).[1] It was the perception that an all-out "policy of massacre" was being waged in those months against the population, both as reprisals and, often as a way of punishing civilians, objectively considered accomplices of the partisans. This realization found confirmation as the Allied troops moved northwards and liberated, ever more arduously and slowly, the territories of Central Italy. Consequently, two investigative groups were set up, one by the British (the Special Investigation Branch—SIB) and the other by the Americans with the task of conducting thorough formalized judicial inquiries to gather evidence of these crimes and identify those responsible for them, in order to bring them to trial after the war.[2]

The salient feature of the "war against civilians" waged by the Germans, their allies, and collaborators identified by the SIB investigations, is precisely the system of orders that regulated it. Initially, the fundamental directives of the fight against the bands, which were applied in Italy, were those issued in November and December 1942 in the context of the war of extermination put into effect in the countries of Eastern Europe. However, even when these directives were replaced by less radical orders for other theatres of war, they were made even harsher for Italy. Thus, even though on April 1, 1944, Instruction Sheet No. 69/2 "Bandenbekämpfung" replaced the "Kampfanweisung für die Bandenbekämpfung in Osten" (directive for fighting the bands in the East) of the previous November, attenuating some of its dispositions, only a few days later, on the 7th of the same month, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring made the strategy against the partisans even harsher, declaring that excessively drastic interventions should never be punished.[3]

At this time, the problem of defining the areas of jurisdiction of the SS and the army was resolved in favor of Kesselring by a

> telegraphed message dated May 1, 1944, sent by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel to the General Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Sector. It was established that the supreme command of the operations against the partisans in Italy should be entrusted to the General Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Sector. The Supreme Commander of the SS and the police would be responsible for the conduct of operations, but would have to follow the guiding principles laid down by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Sector and operate directly under him.[4]

This meant that Kesselring was entrusted with the leadership of the fight against the partisans in Italy. Even if beyond the army's zone of action the operational responsibility rested with the Supreme Commander of the SS and the Police Karl Wolff, the latter always remained subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front and subject to his directives.

On June 17, 1944, Kesselring issued regulations for the fight against the partisan bands with exceptionally severe measures, which contained the so-called impunity clause (a guarantee of immunity for those commanders who adopted excessive methods

in fighting the partisans).[5] On July 1, 1944, Kesselring repeated his order of June 17 and specifically indicated, among the measures to be undertaken, the arrest of a percentage of the male population in the areas with a partisan presence and the execution by firing squad of these hostages in the event of acts of violence.

The transmission of Kesselring's order to various levels in the chain of command is confirmed by the discovery of copies of the order and of orders issued by various commanders who reproduced it almost verbatim. The British investigators detected a change of attitude in August 1944 following Benito Mussolini's protests to Kesselring but also because of the undesirable effects of such a policy ("the excesses were driving those Italians who had previously adhered to the German cause to join the partisans") and "the concern of the General Commander in Chief of the South-West Sector, as a soldier, for the reputation of the German Army." This is a motivation that should be borne in mind, because it will be found to recur, after Kesselring's trial, in the order that commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment. Consequently, new orders were imparted by Kesselring on August 21, 1944 (in which he deplored the excesses); September 24, 1944 (in which he warned that he would not tolerate further excesses); and February 8, 1945 (which mitigated those draconian orders of the previous late spring). It should, however, be noted that the military operations of Monte Sole near Bologna, characterized by the worst massacre of civilians in Italy, began on September 29, a few days after the issuing of the second set of orders, which had prescribed moderation, just as with the massacre of Vinca, in the Apuan Alps, which occurred on August 24, 1944. It seems in effect that Kesselring had no real interest in ensuring that his calls to moderation should actually be heeded. In Tuscany, at least up to mid-October, there is no evidence of a significant change in attitude on the part of German troops toward the civilian population. The reply to Mussolini's complaints was sent on December 27: "It was evasive in character, and defended the actions undertaken but promised that within a short time a new order regarding reprisals would be issued."[6]

On July 9, 1945, an officer of the British War Crime Section, in analyzing the chain of command and the structure of the orders given, defined the German military approach toward the Italian

civilian population as "a criminal policy for which the highest military or other authorities were primarily responsible . . . a systematic policy of extermination, pillage, piracy and terrorism," stressing precisely the planning aspect of the operations against civilians, which presupposed a "structure of functional organizations and the responsibility for the issuing of orders."[7]

The British *Report on German Reprisals for Partisan Activity in Italy* correlated even in its title the reprisals with partisan activity, stressing its importance and extent and linking the very system of orders, which gave rise to the most intense phase of reprisals against civilians, with the German concern about partisan activity. The report's conclusion was that the "reprisals were not carried out on the orders of the commanders of single German units, but were instances of an organized campaign, directed by Field Marshal Kesselring's Headquarters."[8] However, the report called attention to the role of units particularly trained for these tasks: the Hermann Göring Division, (especially in June–September), the First Parachute Division, and the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division.

The range of orders relating to the "war against civilians," which we have highlighted, convinced the English investigators that it was a question of a strategy of terror, which was voluntarily adopted and fully coordinated, undoubtedly with a typically Nazi imprint, not only because, as we have seen, it had been affected by the experiences of the conduct of the war in Eastern Europe and the identification of the partisan with the Bolshevik, but also because Italy, having "betrayed" her former ally, became part and parcel of the Nazi system of occupation as an essentially subjugated nation.

Tuscany

In Tuscany, 210 episodes have been counted; the total number of victims has been found to be 3,650, of whom 75 percent were male. An analytical file has been drawn up for each of these episodes, thus enabling us to go beyond the general data. One aspect is very striking: Only 41 massacres (19.5 percent) were committed as reprisals for partisan actions (namely, massacres in which there was a response to armed action by partisans, irregulars, or civilian combatants or to insurrections and revolts and in which the relationship between

partisan action and repression is clear and localized in space and time). In these massacres, 526 people were killed (12.8 percent), of whom 93 percent were male.

This is very important evidence because it tends to weaken the defensive theses of the German generals and also calls into question other factors linked to territorial control that tended to assume an openly terrorist character in relation to the civilian population. The massacres committed in the course of rounding up partisans, the forced evacuation of civilians, and the deportations in order to achieve territorial control are, in fact, 98 in number (46.7 percent), and they account for 27.5 percent of the victims. If we add to these the gratuitous massacres, without an apparent explanation and massacres committed in the course of what we have defined as an aggressive retreat, which include the motives of revenge and territorial control in variable proportions (26.2 percent), we can state that only a minority of the episodes and victims can be linked to "reprisals," according to the way this term is defined by the procedures of warfare.

If we consider the victims, this result is reinforced: Only 1,120 victims counted were old enough for military service or forced labor: The rest were women, children, and old people. In 60.7 percent of the incidents (130 episodes) only men were selected for execution. In 13 cases (6.2 percent) there were indiscriminate killings of whole communities: The victims included women, the elderly, and children. In the episodes involving, above all, units of the Hermann Göring and the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division, we also found the highest number of victims: 48.8 percent of the total number were killed in the course of these actions, which were more distinctly terrorist or punitive in nature.[9]

In other words, while admitting that "one cannot disregard the fact that the massacre of civilians often occurred in the context of the fight against the partisans" (Klinkhammer 1997, viii), the repression of civilians took place according to modalities, which only in a few cases can be categorized as "reprisals," insofar as this term is defined by the legal rules of warfare.

The results of our research in Tuscany, a region of great significance for the subject we are dealing with, demonstrate the very wide range of units involved and so confirm the existence of a general

approach that led to massacres. Furthermore, it should be noted that in some episodes the victims were selected with a decision to include only adult males, thus showing the persistence of a "perception of war as a conflict only involving men" (Klinkhammer 1997, 100).

Nevertheless, in other instances there was absolutely indiscriminate violence, which indicates the total identification of the civilians in the theater of war with the combatants, and reveals the assimilation of a type of war of annihilation already put into practice in Eastern Europe.

However, this identification was triggered, above all, in certain units, and usually in a particular phase of the military struggle, mainly as the front line drew nearer and passed through a given zone (as was the case in many of the massacres in the province of Arezzo, the commune of Guardistallo, and the marshes of Fucecchio). In particular, the retreat and reorganization of the German troops on the Gothic Line marked a crescendo of the terror inflicted on the civilian population in Sant'Anna di Stazzema, Bardine-San Terenzo, Vinca, Fosse del Frigido, Bergiola Foscarina, and, on the other side of the Apennines, Monte Sole. In these areas, terrorist control of the population was the prevalent aim, and the fact that only 23 of the 84 indiscriminate massacres can be ascribed to special units reveals that "unthinking racism . . . even though having very vague outlines, was widespread, deeply rooted and easily ignited" (Schreiber 2001, 232). I think we would come to the same conclusion after analyzing accurately the "minor acts of violence"—theft, robbery, rape, and the killing for no apparent reason of men and women, "guilty" only of an instinctive resistance to the violence.

In conclusion, if World War II was the overall framework that favored, on both sides, the directing of violence toward civilians, it is undoubtedly true that the system of orders we have described and its application—in what appeared to be, with the agreement of the Wehrmacht High Command, the functional assigning of tasks, to be put into effect above all by men transferred to Italy from the Eastern Front, where they had already undergone "the brutalization of war" referred to by Bartov (2001)—are in my opinion the elements that contribute to defining as typically Nazi the "war against civilians" waged in Italy. They therefore qualitatively distinguish the German system of occupation.

Certainly one should not simply view the system of orders as making massacres compulsory. If this were the case, that is, if there had been a German reaction to every partisan action in accordance with the guidelines drawn up in the late spring of 1944, even taking into account only what Schreiber defines as the second phase "of the measures for fighting the partisans in the Italian theatre of war" (Schreiber 2000, 110 and 262), namely from the beginning of April to the end of September 1944, the number of victims would have been very much higher. Moreover, it seems to me that facts regarding certain units are of the utmost significance.

The episodes for which the units of the SS and the Hermann Göring Division were responsible add up to 43.8 percent of the total but account for a much higher percentage of victims (62.5 percent), since the actions undertaken by these units were mainly for territorial control and were, on average, marked by greater bloodshed. If we consider the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division (commanded by Lt. General Max Simon) and the Hermann Göring Division alone, we find that these two units taken together were responsible for 53 out of the 118 massacres for which it has been possible to reach a reasonable identification of the units involved, and undoubtedly their intervention contributed to characterizing these actions as exterminations, with the result that they can be held responsible for over half the victims of German actions.

These data mean that, if the "war against civilians" was planned by the Germans and not dictated by circumstances on each occasion, it is however possible to differentiate between the German troops, both as regards the propensity to put into practice the draconian orders issued by the High Command, and the ways these were applied when this was in fact the case.

Sant'Anna di Stazzema

On October 13, 2008, Spike Lee's film *Miracle at St. Anna* was released in Italy. Based on the novel with the same title by James McBride, who wrote the script, the film tells the story of a group of soldiers, belonging to the Ninety-Second "Buffalo" Division, made

up of African Americans who, in the autumn of 1944, were dispersed in the hills around Lucca. It is, like the novel, a complex film. At the heart of the story is the widespread racism among the American troops. But the film also deals with the encounter between different cultures, the "magical" relationship between a child who had survived the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema and a soldier, a sort of gentle giant with limited intellectual capacity. But the soldier is the only one, because of his humanity, able to get through to the devastated soul of the surviving child.

It is not, therefore, a film about the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema, which remains in the background and only really comes to the fore for a few minutes (out of the film's total running time of about two and a half hours), when one of the many episodes of the massacre, the killing of women and children in front of the village church, is shown.

And yet, from when shooting started, in November 2007, the film was accompanied by controversies, triggered initially by the partisan veterans' Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia (ANPI) section of Pietrasanta.[10] ANPI's request for changes to the script, based on the assumption, which later proved to be correct, that it would follow the storyline of McBride's novel, was denied: In the book, and then in the film, there is the figure of a partisan traitor who brings the SS to Sant'Anna di Stazzema in order to capture his commander. As the commander, who had suspected the betrayal, is not to be found, the SS unleash their fury against the civilian population, guilty of not revealing the hiding place of the partisan leader they wanted to capture. This reconstruction of the reasons that supposedly drove the Germans as far as Sant'Anna di Stazzema is totally imaginary and without foundation. On November 1, 2007, the newspapers published extracts from the statement of the ANPI of Pietrasanta that challenged the approach of the novel: "It is incredible that in 2007 the presence of Partisans in Sant'Anna should again be proposed as the cause of the massacre of 560 civilians. After the ruling of La Spezia, this doubt, which has for decades clouded the truth about the terrible slaughter, seemed to have been dispelled."

The ruling referred to in the ANPI statement is from June 22, 2005, when the Military Tribunal of La Spezia, presided over by Francesco Ufilugelli, sentenced to life imprisonment ten former

members of the SS (all in absentia), who were found to be responsible for the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema.

It was precisely in November 2007, following confirmation at the Court of Appeal, that the ruling was submitted to the criminal division of the Court of Cassation, Italy's highest court. Deputy Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor Vittorio Garino had asked for the sentence to be annulled and for a new trial. Hence, the controversies arising from this request (not granted by the judges of the Court of Cassation) became intertwined with those regarding the presumed script of the film, in a media crescendo that even reached the French press.

On November 15, the Istituto storico della Resistenza e dell'età contemporanea (Institute for the History of the Resistance and Modern Age) of Lucca, in a joint statement from the president and the director, proclaimed itself to be the "legitimate custodian of the memory of those events" and deplored the fact that Spike Lee had not replied to their many attempts to contact him. On November 22, 2007, from the pages of *Il Tirreno*, Giorgio Giannelli—a former parliamentary journalist and historian from Versilia, the author of numerous works on Sant'Anna di Stazzema—and the former mayor of Stazzema, Gian Piero Lorenzoni, "announced that the Spike Lee episode will not end here, since it could have sensational repercussions in parliament and the law courts."

There is no trace of these putative legal proceedings, but there were repercussions in Parliament, even if they were not exactly sensational: On Monday, December 10, 2007, the deputies Mario Ricci, the first signatory, Fabio Evangelisti, Anna Maria Cardano, Olga D'Antona, Tana de Zulueta, Mercedes Lourdes Frias, Aleandro Longhi, Mauro Maria Marino, Bruno Mellano, Salvatore Raiti, Antonio Razzi, Massimo Romagnoli, Nicola Tranfaglia, Andrea Orlando, Giuseppe Morrone, and Luigi Cancrini, issued a question requesting a written reply from the culture minister:

> On August 12, 1944, in the city of Sant'Anna di Stazzema (Lucca) a unit of the *Waffen* SS carried out a violent action against the local community, culminating in the death of 560 innocent civilians. It has been ascertained, both in historical and in judicial terms, that no partisan was in the area after July 30, 1944, on the orders of Allied Military Command, and that for this reason the action undertaken by the Nazi unit cannot be ascribed to a reprisal, but to an act of

> terrorism coldly planned by the German General Headquarters. The Military Tribunal of La Spezia endorsed and confirmed this view of the events with its verdict of June 22, 2005, sentencing both the Nazi officers and the soldiers who carried out the massacre to life imprisonment.

In view, therefore, of all this, the signatories wished to ask the minister for an explanation about any finances the film might have received from Italian state funds. The written reply by the Undersecretary of State for Culture Elena Montecchi, published on February 4, 2008, was negative.[11]

> The controversy resumed on the occasion of the film's Italian preview, in Florence on September 30, 2008. It was once again the ANPI, this time with a joint statement by the sections of Pietrasanta, Montignoso, Massa, Carrara, Intercomunale di Licciana Nardi, Villafranca and Pontremoli—who then repeated the accusations on the occasion of the screening of the film at Viareggio on October 1, 2008, referring to "a historical falsehood and a very serious affront to the Resistance . . . Moreover the Military Tribunal of La Spezia established that the massacre was an operation conceived and planned to attack the population, that there was no responsibility on the part of the Partisan Movement, thus confirming the results of historical research."[12]

On the discussion list of SISSCO-Società italiana per lo studio della sto-ria contemporanea (Italian Society for the Study of Contemporary History), a debate ensued, mainly concerned with the dividing line between artistic freedom and the falsification of history and the real meaning of the "artistic license" used by Spike Lee when recounting the causes of the massacre.[13]

An end to the controversy came with an official statement, dated October 8, 2008, from the Board of Governors of the Committee for the Remembrance Ceremonies of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna, the Association of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna, and the Mayor of Stazzema Michele Silicani in which the film was defended as

> a work of fiction . . . The film is not, in reality, nor in its basic intentions, a work which casts discredit on the Resistance Movement (even though it is not a film about the Resistance), nor does it offend the

> martyrs of Sant'Anna . . . Nevertheless, the film's deviations from historical reality, particularly regarding the non-existent blame directed at the Partisans, lead to concerns that the film could provide the general public with a version of the facts at variance with what has been established by years of historical research, by survivors' eyewitness accounts, and finally by the Military Tribunal which ended in 2005 at La Spezia and by the Court of Cassation in Rome in 2007, namely that it was one of the numerous operations planned by the Nazis to produce "scorched earth" around the "bandits."[14]

One can agree with the statement regarding the distinction between historical reality and fiction and the consideration that a single figure, that of the partisan traitor, is not enough to discredit the Resistance. Likewise, the concern that the cinema-going public, which is likely to read little in terms of history books, should only have information about the massacre through the film's inevitably distorting lens, is fully justified. The references, not only to the verdict of La Spezia (which many consider a kind of revealed truth to be believed almost as an act of faith), but also to the years of historical research (which have advanced our knowledge about the subject of massacres, for example scaling down the theme of reprisals, and showing that only a very small number of the actions against civilians fall into this category) are also germane. And finally, the link—correct in historical terms and necessary in terms of logic—between the terrorism waged against the civilian population and the fight against the "bandits" is an important one.

This statement calls for a *historical* discussion of the massacre, the only kind of discussion I believe able to advance hypotheses—more or less convincing, depending on the sources available and the historian's interpretative acumen—regarding the contexts, the causes, and the responsibilities for the massacre. In other words, it is possible to provide answers to the many "whys," which are still posed as to what happened in that small, remote village of northern Versilia on August 12, 1944. And it is to the story of Sant'Anna, still so little known, that the pages that follow are dedicated.



Figure I.1 Sant'Anna di Stazzema and Surroundings



Figure I.2 The Gothic Line and the Front Line in September 1944

I

The Massacre

The Place

Sant'Anna di Stazzema: a handful of houses scattered here and there on a hillside amphitheatre with a view of the sea, at an altitude ranging from 600 to 800 meters. Strictly speaking, there isn't a village, there isn't a square, apart from the open space in front of the church, near the school and the grocer's shop. Despite the fact that the splendid view of the Tyrrhenian Coast gave it a remarkable feeling of openness, Sant'Anna was in fact one of those places "far removed from the world," which are not infrequent in Tuscany, the Apuan Alps, or the Garfagnana. At the time of the events we are discussing, the poor houses of Sant'Anna could only be reached on foot, by paths or mule tracks, with a tiring walk of over an hour from the nearest place. And yet it was precisely in that place, among those remote houses in the woods, that there occurred the second most serious massacre of civilians in Italy, after that of Monte Sole, and one of the most brutal in the parts of Western Europe occupied by the Germans.

The isolation of Sant'Anna gave those who were seeking refuge—and there were many in those months of war and of the bombing of the coastal cities—a sense of security. It was almost as if the village could live isolated from the world and what was happening all around, even a few kilometers away, along the coast. Alfredo Graziani, evacuated with his family to Colle, remembers the days before the massacre with nostalgia and fondness:

P. Pezzino, *Memory and Massacre*

> Sant'Anna, at 750 meters above sea level, is a haven of peace. Perched here and there between Canal d'Angina and Argentiera, under the sleepy gaze of Monte Lieto and the imposing majesty of Monte Gabberi, it offers the peaceful hospitality of its old, blackened houses, the welcoming and restful shade of its thick chestnut woods, the very crisp air of its steep, rocky hilltops. (Graziani 1945, 14)

The memory of those people who have experienced tragedy first goes back to its original location, and with a faraway gaze, searches for a lost Eden where the violence of men has overturned the natural order of things. And this distortion, according to which the "story" only begins with the traumatic event, is all the more true for the various hamlets of Sant'Anna di Stazzema, a village which was certainly not known for marked political activism: Rolando Cecchi Pandolfini, who from August 1943 began climbing to Sant'Anna to distribute ration cards, has left us a vivid description of its inhabitants:

> Good, honest, simple people, imbued with a Christianity which permeates their lives. The Christian view of life, combined with old beliefs and myths, was the real foundation of this vision and acceptance of the world and its evils . . . I compared the people of Sant'Anna with the inhabitants of the hamlets of Stazzema in the marble basin: Arni, Terrinca, Levigliani, Ruosina. Despite the nearness, the mentality, the behavioral norms, the way of looking at life were profoundly different. There, the men were very keen to improve their condition, they were pugnacious; here, life was static, the village was closed and isolated, looking toward the valley. (Giannelli 1997, 32)

But also the apparently isolated small villages were in fact fully involved in the war, and not only because of the ever-increasing number of evacuees seeking refuge there. Versilia, enclosed by the sea and the hills, was a strategically important zone, behind the Gothic Line, or Green Line, the defensive strip that the Germans were preparing from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Adriatic. Along this line they organized their forces in the late summer of 1944: The defensive works started from the mouth of the Cinquale, with a second line, further back, which branched off from Marina di Carrara. The delay in their construction made the Germans, in August 1944, extremely nervous about anything, especially partisan activity, which could hinder them.

Sant'Anna di Stazzema, August 12, 1944

In the early hours of August 12, 1944,[1] squads of German soldiers moved from three different bases toward Sant'Anna di Stazzema. They belonged to the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division.[2] Other soldiers created a barrier to demarcate the area, or perhaps they were supporting those men. They were from the divisional tank corps and the Wehrmacht, stationed at Valdicastello in the days preceding the massacre, men of the battalion of the Alpine Military School deployed between Ruosina and Stazzema, and the divisional recruit-training battalion, deployed between Ripa, Vallecchia, and Seravezza. In June the Fourth Company of the Reconnaissance Battalion commanded by SS Sturmbannführer Walter Reder, made up of young Alsatian soldiers, had been joined to this outfit.

The SS arrived at about 7 a.m. from three directions: from Monte Ornato, coming from Capriglia-Capezzano (in the direction of Pietrasanta), from the Compito Pass, coming from Ruosina (in the direction of Ponte Stazzemese), from the Farnocchia Pass, coming from Farnocchia; a fourth squad stopped above Valdicastello to block the access path to Sant'Anna (according to some eyewitness accounts it also reached Sant'Anna). According to Enio Mancini, they came from Pietrasanta: "they had left around three at night, at three at night they had got on and had arrived in lorries as far as they could go with the lorries." In 1951, the brothers Stefano and Luigi Lucchetti stated that the SS troops, who since early July had been stationed at Capezzano, on the night of August 11, at 11:30 p.m., had left the village with their commander and returned at about 5:00 p.m. the following day.[3]

Before reaching Sant'Anna, some men of the squad, which left from Farnocchia killed the parish priest, Don Fiore Menguzzo and five members of his family, in the presbytery of Mulina di Stazzema.[4]

Argentiera and Vaccareccia

The squad coming from Monte Ornato was the first to reach the locality of lower Argentiera, a former mining site from which silver-bearing galena (lead sulfite) was extracted, on the other side of the

hill with respect to the other small villages that make up Sant'Anna di Stazzema, about 20 minutes' walk at a brisk pace, from the village church. Almost all the eyewitness accounts concur that the Germans arrived at about seven, a time when the adults were already at work, tending to the animals.[5] Ennio Navari, who was 13 years old, and had moved with his father, brother, and step-mother to his grandfather's house, as soon as he heard that the Germans were arriving, went to look for his father and, when he did not find him, went to upper Argentiera, a nearby group of houses, to warn the inhabitants. Then he returned to lower Argentiera and rejoined his father while the Germans were arriving at the small village, where they immediately adopted an aggressive attitude toward the population:

> They put us in a small square there in Lower Argentiera, all the young people were there . . . and they crowded us together against the wall . . . I latched on to my father because I was a child, but I really didn't understand what was happening. Then there was a certain Romiti of Pietrasanta, and he began to speak . . . There was one of these Germans who was dark, black; he had black hair . . . who beat him savagely with the butt of his rifle, blows to his stomach, blows to all parts of his body. Then some other Germans came and lined up near my father and they gave all the other men boxes of munitions on their shoulders and they sent them ahead and all of us young people and women we were sitting at the back; then we crossed the hill, first we went to upper Argentiera, later called the Colle, which is now near Ossaio up there, we went down and then so many things happened there, I was in the crowd.[6]

Lina Antonucci, a cousin of Ennio's, was nine years old, and had been sent to stay with her maternal grandmother after the fire at Farnocchia on August 8, because her parents were convinced that the Germans would never go to Argentiera: "I was in bed, my uncle arrived and told me 'Look, the Germans are coming, stay here with your grandmother, they won't do anything to you.' I called my grandmother, but she wasn't there, she had gone down to prepare the fodder for the cows." She remembers that lower Argentiera was the first place to be scoured. "I was the first with my grandmother and some other people walking along the path to go and get some other people because in that village the houses were a little distant

one from the other, then they made us get in line, the Germans behind, the Germans in front and us in the middle and we went to Vaccareccia."[7]

Mario Ulivi, who was five years old, was also seized in Argentiera, together with his mother Letizia and his 18-year-old sister Lida, and taken to Vaccareccia.[8]

Milena Bernabò was 16 years old and lived with her family in Argentiera. In those days there were about 40 people in the houses, many were evacuees. On the morning of the 12th she had got up early to go and fetch the water, while her mother had gone to look after the animals (there were also those belonging to the evacuees): "when I was out on a hill I saw that the Germans were arriving from the direction of Contornato [sic], then I came back and I went to warn my family . . . We were afraid, the men went outside because we were afraid." She and her sister were also directed toward Vaccareccia: "My sister . . . called mother and one of these Germans came, he gave her a slap, a big slap and threw her on the ground. Then he made her get up and put her in front." When they had arrived close to a small chapel, the soldiers who were guarding them fired a signal rocket, which was followed by another one, like a reply, from the other side of the hill.[9] Then they went on toward Vaccareccia, where the group arrived at about nine o'clock. Milena remembers that when she reached the "small pass," that is, as they descended the hill, she saw the Franchi houses, under Vaccareccia, which "were already burning, one could see the smoke and then one could hear some cries, but we didn't think that they were, well, things . . . and afterward we saw that . . . we heard what had happened." She remembered "clearly that [she] saw [her] sister's house burning, well there was smoke then [they] heard these cries, these screams."[10]

Mauro Pieri lived at Monte Ornato, but after the fighting between the partisans and the Germans on July 30, the latter "had burned the houses and we unfortunately had to turn to an aunt of my father's in Argentiera . . . In that house there were 15 of us, all outside, there were only my father's aunt, Isola and her daughter with the grandson, then the others were all [outside]." He was 12 years old, and he remembers that that morning two people came to tell them, "Men run away, the Germans are here," but he, being a boy, stayed at the door: "One of them pushed me and came in, then they burst into

the house, there were 15 of us in that house." They lined them up and made them go toward Vaccareccia. He recounts,

> The first one who took me from the house was an Italian because he spoke Italian well. At a certain point when we were in line along the mule track we arrived at Cuccetta [from where, according to Milena Bernabò, the signal rocket had been fired by the Germans] there they made us stop, and they fired a rifle shot at the one I referred to earlier; my sister who was eight years old began crying, my mother gave me the small child and she took my eight-year-old sister. At a certain point when they made us start off again, as there were two roads, I asked where we should go, one went to the centre of the village and one went toward Vaccareccia . . . This man was in front of me, he was gesturing with his arms like this, at a certain point he lowers his eyes and . . . and does like this "go to those houses there" and he pointed them out to me. He was not a German . . . I think he was a pure Italian because he spoke Versiliese [the local dialect] well.[11]

At Vaccareccia, where the hostages from Argentiera were being directed, there was already a German patrol in place. We do not know if they had arrived from the same direction of Monte Ornato, or from elsewhere. In fact, at seven in the morning, while one squad arrived in Argentiera, Agostino Bibolotti heard someone banging at the door of his house in Vaccareccia where he had moved from Pietrasanta together with his parents, a brother, Alfio, his sister Genny and her son, Mario Marsili, who was six. Agostino Bibolotti, 28 years old, was still in bed, and it was his father who went to open the door: A group of German soldiers burst into the house and made everyone go outside, taking them to a stable on the ground floor of the same building, together with the members of two other families of the area, making a total of about 20 people.

At about half past seven, Angela Lazzeri was also taken from her home in Vaccareccia to a nearby stable, where she found about 40 people, including men, women, and children. An elderly woman, Benedetta Bottari, who was 72, was with her.[12]

Lina Antonucci remembers that, when they arrived in Vaccareccia from Argentiera, "there they put us in a shed where we couldn't all fit in, actually first they took out the cows, the horses, and threw them into a ditch and then we went in, there were quite a lot of us,

we couldn't all get in, they took away some other people and they put us in another shed." There must have been about 30 people. The same event is also recounted by Mauro Pieri: "Having arrived in Vaccareccia first they made us stop, then they put us in a shed, which was very small. All of us couldn't get in, they took me and my brother and they put us against the wall . . . Then they took us to another larger shed, and we found some of the people who had been with us."[13]

In the shed where the Bibolotti family had been locked up, a soldier came in and asked, in German, for two men: Agostino and Alfio Bibolotti came forward, and they were made to leave the shed and loaded with two radio transmitters. It was in fact their salvation: Immediately afterward, when they were still a few meters from the shed, the Germans began shooting into the shed with machine guns.

The use of flame-throwers was almost simultaneous with the burst of machine-gun fire—Agostino Bibolotti went on to testify in 1951—"I can positively state that the Germans did not take the trouble to ascertain whether people were dead before using the flame-throwers on them and that given the simultaneous use of the two weapons, there were certainly people who died because of the action of the flame-throwers or who at least were burned before dying of bullet wounds."[14]

Then the Germans went toward the church, ordering the two brothers—whose state of mind, anguished by what they had seen, can only be imagined—to follow them with the radio transmitters.

The nephew of the two Bibolotti brothers, their sister Genny's son, Mario Marsili, miraculously survived in that shed. The episode is well known, because it soon became one of the symbols of the martyrdom of Sant'Anna, immortalized in a 1945 cover page of *La Domenica degli Italiani*, reported, and very soon codified in the survivors' collective narration of those events.[15] This is Mario Marsili's account at the trial in La Spezia:

> I was in my mother's arms because I was small; naturally we had got up because it was early in the morning, and they took us to this shed. They took us inside. I was always in my mother's arms, and I don't know about my uncles, I didn't see them, I only saw my mother, my grandmother and my grandfather, and they pushed us into this shed with their rifle butts. Naturally I saw that there was some hay inside

this shed, they pushed us in, and these Germans began using a flamethrower, the machine gun inside this shed . . . My mother . . . perhaps instinctively found, behind the door of this shed, two blocks of stone, and it seemed like a kind of niche.

My mother perhaps intending . . . to save me put me astride these two blocks, behind the door . . . The shed was burning, it began burning, and then at the same time these Germans were firing, as they heard these people . . . They had already shot some people, so I heard continuous crying, naturally they were trying to get out, but undoubtedly they were driven back inside this shed. I saw my mother who had been shot . . . She took a clog and threw it at the German. Now I don't know, I think it struck him in the face, this German, and certainly my mother tried to distract this German so that he wouldn't come in because otherwise he would certainly have seen me.

At the same time this German, who had perhaps been hit, fired his machine gun again, she fell . . . mortally wounded. Then this shed . . . began to burn, continuously, at the same time it was burning. Perhaps these Germans went out, perhaps they didn't come back inside any more perhaps having seen that they had already done . . . their thing, and I . . . one couldn't hear anything, and at the same time I stayed there between these two protruding blocks, and at the same time the shed was burning, and the door was also burning . . . In fact I was also burnt, on the neck, the arm, and the back because the door was burning at the same time.[16]

Mario remained in that niche—with the shed burning, with the smoke and the smell of the burned bodies—until the late afternoon, when he was picked up by someone and taken to Valdicastello, where he first received treatment. He remained in hospital for a year and a half. He was the only survivor from among those who were in that shed.

The Germans also fired and threw bombs into the other sheds, where the hostages had been locked up, as well as setting fire to the houses in which there were bodies. The largest number of recorded survivors was in the shed where the hostages from Argentiera had been locked up; the protagonists of some incredible stories were little girls and boys, at most adolescents: The oldest, Milena Bernabò, was 16, Ennio Navari was 13, Mauro Pieri was 12, Lina Antonucci, 9, Mario Ulivi, only 5. Ennio, after having witnessed his stepmother's death, managed, in the midst of the confusion of the people who were trying to escape, to get out and go around the building:

> And there was an oven; at that point I got the idea of getting in where they make the bread, but I don't know, I have thought about these things so much, I seemed . . . like a marionette, I said "but here they'll bake me like bread," then I looked up and saw a small hole like this where they put the paddles, and then as I have always been small I passed through and got in . . . Then these Germans came and started a fire where they make the bread, they put in some bundles of sticks and lit them, then they put a bundle of twigs two palm widths from my finger, right inside this little opening, and they lit it with some matches, not with the flame-thrower because there were no flame-throwers to be seen. It was while I was inside this oven that they started the fire with the matches, and I stayed there waiting.[17]

Nine-year-old Lina Antonucci recalled:

> I was all the time with a lady: Her name was Alda, now she's dead; she held me by the hand . . . A German arrives at the door with these bombs, people fell on top of me, and I remained under the people. I didn't see if they were bombs; if they were machine guns, I don't know, I don't know that because I remained underneath the dead . . . In the meantime there were those people burning in the shed; we were all black, all . . . I was choking with the smoke because people were burning, then I was moaning loudly under these dead bodies, and I saw Milena Bernabò; she pulled my hair, she said "Lina is that you? We've got to get away, we've got to get away, it's burning, it's burning!" . . . It was the cows' manger, she said "Give me your hand," and Milena Bernabò was the first to clamber up, then this Mario, then me.[18]

Mario Ulivi hardly remembers anything, except that he was injured by shrapnel on his hands, his head, his back, but not seriously, and that Milena and her cousin Mauro were there. The latter has clearer memories:

> They threw the bombs, and after a second or two there was an explosion, I was about two meters from the entrance. When I was able to gather my senses a little I saw my brother leaning against the wall, I told him, "Get down Romano"; while he was doing that a German soldier arrived at the door, saw him, fired at him and he fell on my legs. With the third shot I felt I was wounded, my leg was burning. I had my left hand on top of my head, I was bleeding, perhaps he thought I was dead he kept on shooting, he fired his whole magazine

at the wounded, those who were still alive, then he went away, he threw straw and hay on top of the corpses and set them alight. After a moment I don't know, I was looking for my family, I was looking around, I saw my mother at the back, my brother on my legs, I saw a girl who was getting up, her name was Bernabò Milena, I said "I'm here as well," and from there we went behind a kind of fence inside the shed; there was a cousin of mine called Mario who pulled himself out from where he was and another girl, Antonucci Lina. For a while we stayed behind this fence which divided the shed, there was a wounded woman, but the fire was getting worse, the smoke, we couldn't stay there, at a certain point this woman said, "Children, get away otherwise you'll be burnt alive, go, go," and then she said, "But . . . take the suitcase, there's money in it," but we were concerned with saving ourselves. At a certain point Milena was the first to climb onto the fence and get on the floor because the floor was wooden, and as the bombs exploded it was all damaged. First I looked for my cousin Mario, before going up, then Lina, and at a certain point I told this woman, "We're going away, we're going away, I'll help you, I'll help you." She said, "No, I can't make it, in any case I'm dying, get away, save yourself, save yourself," and the fire was getting worse and worse. At a certain point I also climbed up, but then the smoke prevented us from staying there, and we went outside.[19]

According to Milena, 16 years old, the eldest,

And then at a certain point there was a loud noise, they fired full blast, and the people who were near the door went out, my sister went out, and then they killed her when she was outside, and we stayed there all wounded. I had 22 wounds and I stayed with my head under the dead bodies because I tried to save myself as well as I could. Then at a certain point they started a fire, they threw some wood inside, the people were burning so that at a certain point you couldn't stand it anymore. After quite some time we tried to get out, but we couldn't get out through the door because of all the people who were burning, dying, were dead, most of them were dead, so many people were moaning, some were crying, some were asking for help, there were four of us who were safe, four children, among other things I was the eldest. When at a certain point we didn't know anymore where to get out we looked for a plank of wood, we put it against the wall, and then we climbed onto the kitchen floor, which was all damaged because with their shots they had in effect damaged everything. We

> got up there, and we pulled up these children, all three of them; we were all wounded, we stayed in this kitchen for a while and then at a certain point everything was burning, everything there was on fire, we couldn't stand it anymore. We got out.[20]

Once again, Lina recounts,

> I heard someone calling me "Lina, Lina! Come here, I'm in the oven." I said "Who are you?" I went closer, and I couldn't see him; he was in the opening above where they put the paddle, he said "Come here, come here because the Germans are still around further down committing massacres, come here!" Then Milena said, "Yes, yes, I'm coming as well," and instead the other one went into the woods. Mauro said "I'm not going there," and he went into the woods, then the day we got into that hole we stayed three or four hours, there was this Mario; he was small, he was five years old, and he was thirsty, he was crying and crying . . . and Milena told him, "Keep quiet because the Germans are still here, keep quiet" . . . anyway at about five, at six we heard a voice which was one of ours, and we started shouting, we were all black, all covered in blood . . . I said, "Milena, they are our people"; she said, "Yes, yes, now we'll call out"; we called, and we all came out, and they took us, someone picked me up . . . I was walking with my legs like this; they took me by the shoulders, and so a gentleman took me into a house that wasn't burnt; they got some chickens, which were outside, [and] they killed them to give us something to eat.[21]

Mauro Pieri, who didn't want to get into the oven, ran instead into the woods: "I walked about 150 meters, or a little more, then I just couldn't go on, I sat down on the ground, I fell asleep, and I woke up the next day, at about four in the afternoon."[22]

Franchi

The Germans adopted the same procedure in Franchi and Le Case.

In 1944, in Franchi, there was Enrico Pieri's family, including his grandparents; four families were living in the same building. Enrico was 10 years old then, but "having lived in a small mountain village, we were already very quick-witted children because it was our task to go to school in the morning and after lunch look after

the sheep, we were leading this life as early as six or seven years of age, so although we were children we were quite quick-witted on the mountain."[23] That morning someone warned that the Germans had arrived in Argentiera. The men, nevertheless, decided to stay at home, because they had killed a heifer and they had to slaughter it that morning: They were afraid therefore that the Germans might find it, as slaughter was illegal, and take it out on the women.

The Germans came down the hill behind the house: Gabriella Pierotti, who was 13 years old and who had moved with her family from Pietrasanta to the house of Enrico's grandmother, saw them at about 8 a.m.: "They were approaching Sant'Anna, coming down from Monte Ornato across Argentiera. From time to time they would shoot. At a certain moment, while . . . they were a few hundred meters away, a burst of machine-gun fire was directed at the door of our house, and so we all took shelter inside."[24] Her sister Maria Grazia, who was 14 years old, adds that the burst of machine-gun fire was aimed at her mother who had appeared at the front door of the house to see what was happening. She wasn't hit, and immediately came back into the house, badly shaken.[25]

After a little while the soldiers arrived: Enrico Pieri remembers that they rounded up his family and the Pierotti family and that this group, made up of about ten people, was directed toward the church square, but after about 50 meters a counter-order arrived, and the Germans took them back and locked them up in his grandmother's kitchen. In 1951, Maria Grazia testified that the two or three Germans who entered her home, armed with machine guns and flamethrowers (a detail confirmed by her sister), made them all go out into the farmyard and also testified that there were many soldiers wandering about in the lanes. Then they were made to go back into the kitchen, and shortly afterward their neighbors were also locked up in there. Gabriella remembers that the Germans locked them up in the kitchen on the ground floor and brought other people who had been rounded up. About 20 people were crammed into the room: "My father wanted to approach them to speak to them and they immediately shot him, they killed him immediately, they shot him in the head . . . and he died immediately."[26]

Enrico recounts, "As soon as they came into the kitchen they started shooting, now I can understand that the men shielded us, they began shooting with automatic pistols and things like that, machine guns . . . not machine guns no, small stuff, small caliber."[27] Gabriella and Maria Grazia remember that it was only one soldier who fired, a German armed with a submachine gun, who did not fire at random but aimed at the people, even the wounded who were getting up. Hand grenades were thrown. Gabriella, who was furthest from the kitchen door, threw herself on the ground and managed to save herself, covered by the bodies, which were falling on top of her. Maria Grazia hid in a cupboard under the stairs. Enrico heard her calling him: "In the kitchen there was a walk-in cupboard where we used to keep flasks, demijohns, where we used to put a few things, potatoes, things like that and she had taken refuge there and I went toward her and this cupboard was under the stairs and hidden from the kitchen and those five minutes were the end of the world because well there was . . . my sister who was crying, shouting, after five minutes there was absolute silence. In the kitchen we, three children, saved ourselves: me, Grazia, and Gabriella."[28]

Today, Gabriella remembers that, after the bursts of machine-gun fire,

> the Germans went out once they had killed everyone; I got up in the room, and my mother was wounded, my little sister said, "Grandma, give me something to drink . . ."; she was thirsty; my little brother who was in my mother's arms was dead because the burst of machine-gun fire had struck him directly; he was three years old, and it had destroyed his face. Instead, my little sister was all wounded inside here in her little stomach; my mother was wounded, and so was my aunt, she was twenty-one.[29]

But it wasn't over. The Germans tried to burn down the house by piling up some sheaves of wheat and setting them alight (with a flame-thrower, according to the 1951 testimony of the two sisters). Enrico maintains that the fire did not take hold because

> in the straw there were still some *colmi* [sheaves] as we called them in the mountains; there was still the wheat attached; this must be why

> they didn't catch fire, but with the smoke it wasn't possible to breathe anymore, then I remember that there was still the mother of the two girls who was wounded, she wanted to drink, she was moaning, and we had to open the windows, to try and give a bit of relief.[30]

Gabriella well remembers their feeling of impotence:

> My mother was saying, "Take me outside, take me outside . . ." At a certain point, my sister, who had been in this cupboard under the stairs, came out but my sister was also a child; she was fourteen years old, and we couldn't manage to take her out first of all because there wasn't a floor anymore, and we couldn't go out because there was a hole and underneath there were the cows; there was a shed below, so that we couldn't take her out.[31]

One could no longer breathe in the kitchen. The two girls and the little boy managed to get out by putting "a bench across where there was the hole, and we passed over the bench and went out."

Enrico remembers that they hid

> in a clearing where there were some beans; they were shaped like huts, which was a natural hiding place, and we stayed there for several hours without crying, without complaining . . . After a certain time the girls wanted to go back to the kitchen to see if there was anyone still alive, and all three of us went back . . . and I know that they took some valuables, and then we went back again to the field of beans and we stayed there once again for several hours.[32]

A detail has stuck in Gabriella's mind that also recurs in other testimonies:

> We could hear the Germans talking, and we could see their feet as they were walking because we were in this field of corn at the end of the field as there was a wall further on, and they couldn't see us, we were squatting but we stayed there so long and at a certain point we heard someone playing a mouth organ, a German was playing it, presumably he had either found it or he had it in his pocket as he had done a good job so he started playing his mouth organ.[33]

In the evening, Enrico went back to his own home

> at about six or seven . . . because the days were still long in August, I [wanted] to go back to my parents' house, my grandmother's house where my parents were, but I didn't go in the kitchen anymore although my grandfather's house next door was burnt, while the main beam where my parents had died was burning. I took a container. I went to the spring, which is 500 meters if not 600 meters away, with a container; in short I got a bit of water in this spring because then we didn't have water in the house, it was a small village up in the mountains, and somehow I tried to put out the fire in the main beam of the house, because of this I have to say that the house didn't burn down, and my parents and the Pierotti family were buried a few days later by my uncle.[34]

Le Case

The Germans who came to Le Case, a small village near Franchi, also arrived from Vaccareccia. At about seven in the morning, they made Giuseppina Bottari, 24 years old, and her family leave their house in Le Case and led them to a ground floor kitchen in a house near hers, where she was locked up with many other hostages (from 20 to 30).[35] Florinda Bertelli, 56 years old, indicates eight in the morning as the time when she, her daughter, and her two-year-old granddaughter were taken from their home (one of the soldiers spoke Italian) and locked up in the same kitchen, where, she thinks, there were about 30 people.[36] Alfredo Graziani's family—he had only recently moved to Sant'Anna—was also made to leave its own house and taken to the kitchen. While they were passing in front of a line of armed men, one of them struck a 30-year-old man in the back with his machine gun: The man died immediately after being dragged, with the others, into the room. According to Graziani, there were about 40 people, mainly the elderly, women, and children. The Germans locked them up and then went to burn down the houses, which had just been cleared of their occupants. In that brief space of time, Graziani and his family, shocked by what they had seen, took refuge in the room on the upper floor.[37] Angiola Bacci, who was 17 years old and had moved to Sant'Anna, went up with them.[38]

Renato Bonuccelli, who was then seven years old, remembers that a patrol of six or seven men came to his home: They were coming from Franchi. Only one soldier, who spoke Italian, came in and

forced them to go outside. Then a red signal rocket was fired, and another group of men arrived from the opposite side. It was these men—harsher than the first ones, according to his recollection—who pushed them toward the kitchen of the nearby house. He also remembers the scene of the fatally wounded young man: He had tried "to go to the right, and they shot at him poor man so he began writhing on the ground, and that was difficult for everyone."[39]

In the kitchen, on the ground floor, Giuseppina Bottari was waiting, with the other hostages, for about 15 minutes; then "the Germans opened the door and a window, through both of which they began firing wildly on us, the hostages, and I was wounded in the left thigh. Having done this, they set fire to the house, which, for reasons unknown to me, did not burn down." She managed to escape to a hemp field and in the afternoon was helped by some villagers and taken to Valdicastello, where the hospital of Pietrasanta had been transferred. She stated that "among those who were burning at least one of them was still alive because she heard his cries."[40]

Renato Bonuccelli and his uncle Nello Bonuccelli, a merchant from Camaiore who had moved with his family, remember that the window pane was smashed and some bombs with long wooden handles were thrown in, and from the upper floor Alfredo Graziani heard the boom of the explosion. The kitchen door opened again, and many sought escape outside the room, but "as soon as we had taken a few steps outside," testified Nello Bonuccelli, "we were machine-gunned by a firearm, which the Germans had positioned facing the entrance of that room." He saved himself because while the other hostages, who had come outside, turned to the right, he went in the opposite direction, being out of range of the machine gun, and he was able to hide in a poultry pen. A two-year-old girl had remained in the room and was crying desperately; Nello heard "two single shots from a rifle or a musket or a pistol and then silence." He remained hidden for three hours, until the Germans had gone, after burning the bodies, covering them with wood, which they set alight. From there he could see and hear the cries of "a woman half burnt who was dragging herself away from the mound of burning corpses, and she died a few meters away."[41]

Immediately after the explosion of the bombs, Nello's nephew Renato was taken to the upstairs room by his mother

> who said "I'll come back immediately, I'm going to get mother downstairs, and I'll come back immediately," but she didn't make it in time because at that moment they started [with the] machine gun, so we locked ourselves in there . . . There was Alfredo Graziani who was a relative of mine; he closed the trap door, put the bedside table and other furniture on top of it so that it couldn't be opened, and for several minutes we heard the very loud crackling of the bursts of machine-gun fire downstairs and so on, then a very thick cloud of dust because we also heard, among other things, other explosions so they probably also threw some bombs as well. At a certain moment I began to hear . . . We couldn't hear any more shots, we waited in silence for the right moment perhaps to get out, and the moment came when we began to smell the smoke because from the small upper window in the room we also began to smell the acrid smoke, so at this point Graziani said, "We've got to get out of here otherwise we'll be burnt alive." He reopened the trap door and we went down. Among other things, I owe my life to Graziani because he had the courage to ask me if I knew where to go, I said that I did I could go to the shelter where my father was and he said, "Whatever you see you mustn't stop, you must get away"; they were the very words which saved me. I went down, I saw my dead relatives, I stopped for a little while like this, and I saw my grandfather. I saw my mother, and then I went toward my house.[42]

Graziani's family together with Angiola Bacci took refuge in "a small corn field, and we saved ourselves there lying down in this field, we stayed there from the morning to the afternoon."[43] Then they set off for Valdicastello.

Colle

The squad of Germans, which had emerged from the Compito Pass came from Ruosina, having, Enio Mancini maintains, passed through "La Porta."[44] Ada Lida Angelini, 18 years old, who lived in La Porta, was awakened by her grandfather, at about half past six or seven: "'Hurry, hurry the Germans are here!' I got dressed, went down to the kitchen, my grandfather gave me two buckets with some stuff in them . . . and told me 'Go to the end of the Orlando wood to the cave' because there was a sort of quarry, a dumping pit

with a cave underneath, in short, he sent me to this cave," where she remained, by herself, all morning.[45]

The Germans passed near to "Bambini," not taking any notice of that small village, then they went on and reached Colle. Federico Bertelli, who was 33 years old, saw them coming down "directly from Monte Lieto which they had reached from Ruosina. The route through Ruosina was not only noticed by those inhabitants, but in Colle a certain Cesare Lazzeri was killed by the Germans after he had been rounded up on the road from Ruosina Monte Lieto in the locality of Veciullo or La Porta."[46] He immediately went to hide. Maria Luisa Ghelardini, who was 34 years old and had moved to Colle from Forte dei Marmi, saw them arriving at about eight o'clock, coming from the direction of Monte Lieto.[47]

"They immediately made everyone leave the house, they didn't interrogate anyone, nor did they listen to what we were telling them, namely that we had left Forte dei Marmi on the orders of the Germans (SS), then they went into the house to burn everything, which they did. They didn't find any arms or munitions or men in hiding."

Maria Luisa's uncle, Ettore Salvatori, was born in Forte dei Marmi in 1887 and was living there with his family; on July 1 the Germans forced them to leave their home within a few hours, and they found refuge "in the small village of Sant'Anna di Stazzema." His testimony is handwritten and dated September 28, 1944, hence soon after the events:

> It was about half past seven in the morning when the rumor spread that the Germans had already reached Argentiera and so there was no time to waste for us men, because we already knew from too many previous cases, the latest being that of Montornato, that they didn't spare the men of any age, even the invalids. The rumor, therefore, having spread that the killers, the destroyers, and the arsonists were about to arrive, such was the notoriety of the SS, I went away from the house with my son and two other young men, but who knows for what reason, because at those moments one can't always act logically, but it is often destiny that guides us, I didn't want to get too far away, and I took refuge in a field of corn and beans, which hid me well from anyone passing along the mule track, while the others went even farther away and, as they later told me, hid in a wood. Only a few minutes had elapsed when about ten Germans descended from

> various directions: in a camouflaged uniform, with their helmets, devils both in appearance and in reality, who were firing in all directions, aiming in particular at the windows of the house of the Bertellis in Colle, the house, in short, where I lived and where there was still my wife Ada Salvatori and my little five-year-old girl Maria Pia.[48]

The Germans assembled the women and made them set off on the mule track, in the direction of Sennari. Maria Luisa remembers that "once they arrived at a small house they set fire to it and made us go beyond it."[49] Ettore Salvatori decided to join the group, to share the fate of his dear ones:

> While they were passing near me I decided to come out and get in line with all those from home, we were, including the children and the elderly, nineteen people in all, who, ignorant of our destiny, were going toward death. As soon as a German saw me he pushed me into the group, which was still moving forward, amidst the general fear because by now the idea was clearly taking shape that we would be burned because they had already set fire to some sheds and a house on the mule track itself.[50]

According to the testimony of Maria Luisa, having arrived at Sennari they encountered another group of soldiers, who spoke to them then made the civilians "turn toward a field where a machine gun was already in place, with three or four Germans and an Italian standing around it."[51]

According to Ettore Salvatori, apart from the Germans, there were also some Italians: One was carrying a case (probably of munitions), while the other two didn't have anything, at least so he seems to remember. He also confirmed the change of direction, but not the encounter with another patrol in Sennari: "They pushed us downward toward a ditch making us cross some fields where the wheat had been reaped; there were still some sheaves of wheat, which were immediately set alight. At this point, Armida Bertelli tried to get away from the group and go toward her house, but one of the SS troops who was setting fire to the wheat hit her left arm with an exploding bullet, and she was the first to be hit." Once the machine gun had been positioned, "it was at Lobelia Ghelardini, who was begging and calling for mercy for herself and

also for her little eight-month-old Maria Sole, that the first burst of fire was aimed, and others fired their rifles and so on at the whole group. I closed my eyes and waited for death, which, for me, did not come." Maria Luisa remembers that "during the shooting some . . . tried to go behind a mound of earth, but by moving the machine gun they fired at everyone. Some were killed by the rifles. From the effects that could be seen, I think they were also using exploding bullets. There were 19 of us including a man who had brought munitions and was killed with us."

When the shooting stopped, the Germans went away:

> Then [continues Ettore's written account] I heard my wife calling me in a voice broken by terror and pain because she had been wounded in the right elbow by an exploding bullet, and she told me that our little one was dead, and I also heard my other granddaughter Luisa Ghelardini who had also been wounded in the leg. Ten minutes passed, and once again there was the noise of the German boots, brief muttering, and they came close to me; they grabbed my belt and tried to lift me from the ground, to open my hands, which I kept crossed, then two gunshots one at my wife, who was hit on the left side of her chest, the other at Luisa who was also hit on the left side and then nothing, only the silence of death. Luisa was still alive, and it was possible to save her after a month's stay in hospital.[52]

Sennari

A German squad arrived from the Farnocchia Pass, on the mule track, which comes from Farnocchia. The track passes through the small village of Sennari and goes on toward the area of the church. The soldiers did not reach either Case di Berna, the easternmost of the many hamlets that make up Sant'Anna di Stazzema, nor the most isolated one, on the slopes of Monte Gabberi, and instead headed directly for Sennari. Enio Mancini, who was then six and a half years old, was awakened by his father, who told him to get up, because the Germans were coming, "signaled by the launch of some flares."[53] Natalina Bottari, who was 22 years old, remembers that the signals were coming from the mountain, from the pass.[54] Angelo Berretti, who was 11 years old, also remembers the color of those signals

> from the side of the Farnocchia Pass—and those were the first shots—they fired two colored rockets into the air: One was light blue, and one was orange; they crossed, and the women who were there, my mother and all the others said, "What are they doing this morning, fireworks?" After a few seconds there was a reply to the west of the Argentiera Pass, once again these two luminous rockets crossed in the air. They were a little surprised, because they didn't know what it meant; there weren't any men; there were only women and youngsters.[55]

Together with his elder brother, his mother, and his maternal grandmother, Enio Mancini began to "throw outside the house whatever we could of our household goods and food supplies. My father, like the other men who were afraid of being rounded up, left the small village to hide in the nearby wood."[56] After about half an hour, a group of about ten soldiers arrived; two of them had their faces hidden by nets, and one of them spoke Italian, heavily influenced by local dialect. They led them into the farmyard in the upper part of Sennari, where they were very soon joined by those who had been rounded up from the other houses of the small village. In all there were about one hundred people. The Germans lined them up against a wall and began setting up some tripods: At that point someone started crying, because of what was emerging, clearly by now, as a mass execution.

The intervention of a soldier, who arrived unexpectedly and whom everyone thought was an officer, stopped those preparations. He spoke in German, and one of the soldiers who spoke Italian translated the order: They had to go down toward Valdicastello. Natalina Bottari does not remember having heard Italian spoken but confirms that they were lined up and escorted by the Germans: "In coming down from the square (it is in fact in the upper part of Sennari), passing in front of the houses, I saw that almost all of them had been set alight. Fortunately, mine was safe, as was the one next door, that of Salvatore Bottari."[57] The tongues of fire coming out of the windows of his house have left a deep impression on Enio Mancini.

The testimony of Angelo Berretti, who was 11 years old, is instead at variance with the others:

> Three Germans came down from the Farnocchia Pass after the firing of these two shots in the air with colored bullets as a military

> signal, and they were very thirsty; they only found women and children there, then after they had quenched their thirst, they went on in the direction of the church . . . The last of the three was careful not to be seen and then made the gesture of running away. The women were in doubt because they said, "But a German doesn't know that in Italian this gesture means running away" . . . Afterward 10 or 15 German soldiers arrived; one had a net on his face, the one in command . . . lined [us] all up in the direction of Valdicastello . . . They were shrewd; they didn't speak; they only said, "Val di Castè, Val di Castè."

According to Berretti, there were two groups of hostages: his, lined up toward Valdicastello, and the one in the upper part of the small village, lined up against a wall and threatened with execution by firing squad:

> However, that morning, the small village of Sennari was divided, half immediately and the others after us . . . in Sennari a section of which I was also part was lined up in the direction of Val . . . while a section was put in a square with a machine gun in front of them, but I wasn't there and, with the machine gun ready to shoot them like . . . but a person came down and said . . . he said something, I was told this . . . in German, they packed up the machine gun and they were lined up behind us in the direction of Valdicastello.

Initially, they had all gathered in the house of the Mancinis:

> We were together, Mancini was twenty meters further down, and we were in the house that was right on the mule track for Farnocchia; so that morning the women all gathered in the Mancini house, the grandmother's house. There was Enio Mancini and his brother, and they began saying the rosary for the very reason that they said, "What will happen this morning?!" but they never said that they will kill us . . . I never heard anyone say that, and we stayed there until the arrival of those Germans who began lining us up, but later we went down . . . I looked again because we were also friends, more or less of the same age, and I never saw Mancini again.

Berretti's group set off, escorted by those soldiers, on the path toward Valdicastello:

> They lined us all up telling us . . . the word which they said was 'Val di Castè' which lies down below and when we arrived in the woods . . . When we arrived in the wood seeing that we were going directly toward Valdicastello which they had indicated to us, they left us and turned around, they went back to Sennari and they burnt the houses there . . . There in the wood everyone took the destination he thought was best: Some proceeded toward Valdicastello while others like me and my mother and other people hid in the wood and we stayed there waiting for the firing to subside. We were in front of the church and we returned home at about three o'clock in the afternoon, while two sisters who had proceeded toward Valdicastello were killed in Molini di Sant'Anna.

Having returned to Sennari, they found

> their house which was burning; all the people whose houses were burning were there; everyone was desperate; it was each to his own; some were extinguishing the fire in their houses, and then my mother was tormented by anxiety for the two girls who had gone in the direction of Valdicastello, and at about half past three in the afternoon my father arrived, and we learnt of the tragedy that had happened at the church. Then father and mother were a bit upset, and father decided to start looking for the sisters; we went to Colle, and there were 17 dead people, then we went to Le Case. The houses were burning, and there were some dead people. We went here and there three or four times to look for the sisters, then at about half past six in the evening the news arrived [about] the girls . . . A woman told my mother, "Don't call them anymore because they are in Molini di Sant'Anna; they have been killed." Then there was a terrible commotion; they embraced each other; they were crying.

From the information subsequently gathered, they learnt that the sisters,

> when they were in Molini, stopped and were asked, "Where are you going?" They replied, "They lined us up to send us to Valdicastello," and they were told, "The Germans have passed through here, they have gone to Sant'Anna, and they haven't done anything, and so if you also want to stop here, in any case you are waiting for your mother . . ." because they had told them that my mother and I were

> further back. The girls stopped there, and then when the Germans returned, coming down from Sant'Anna, they killed the miller, his wife, and the two sisters.[58]

Enio Mancini, who belonged to the group gathered in the upper part of the village, remembers that, after having been sent toward Valdicastello, "the group . . . rapidly dispersed and every family moved away going down toward the valley. We had, in fact, been left to go free."[59] Instead, Natalina Bottari, who belonged to the same group, maintains that they were escorted by the soldiers: "Having reached the mule track that leads to the valley, toward Valdicastello . . . I turned back . . . On seeing this, the German soldier who was following me hit me in the leg, with the butt of his musket."

Despite the pain, she continued walking, carrying her daughter, only a few months old, until, passing in front of her parents' house, and seeing it destroyed by the flames, she could bear it no longer and collapsed. "Finding me on the ground with my little girl, the last German soldier, who was bringing up the rear of the column that was escorting those who had been rounded up, took pity on me and told me to go home, leaving me immediately free."[60] In pain, dazed by the noise of the collapsing houses and the bursts of machine-gun fire, which could be heard all around, she did not have the strength to get up, until a woman helped her, took her baby, and led her to a cave, where she stayed until the evening.

Instead, Genoveffa Moriconi, who was 21 years old, reached Valdicastello. She was escorted, together with other hostages, as far as a building called "Metato bianco" by a German, who then indicated that they should go to Valdicastello.[61]

Enio Mancini's group only remained free for a little while: After a few hundred meters, they encountered another group of soldiers, who stopped them and drove them on to the path that led to the church, but a bed of chestnut husks slowed them down, above all the youngest, who had left their homes barefoot.

> Some of them were in front of us; we were in the center, the others behind us, and the ones who were behind us were certainly not too particular; they hit us, those blows with their rifles, but in spite of this sometimes violent encouragement, we couldn't walk much faster. And then they went away. They left a boy with us; you see I'm

> recounting this because it is the other side of the story of that day. A young soldier, very young, my women, not so much me, thought he was 17–18 years old; I only remember the typical young German blond. He was alone with us and also spoke to us, certainly we didn't understand what he was saying, but he made some gestures and we understood these. He was telling us, in effect, to keep quiet and go back, we clambered up, but it was understood, we went back up to go toward our homes, as soon as we turned our backs on this soldier we heard a burst of gunfire; he had a machine gun, an automatic weapon, he fired a spray of bullets, we turned round with a start because we couldn't see where he was shooting; we thought he was shooting at us and instead, turning round, we saw that he was shooting in the air.[62]

This episode, which is singularly reminiscent of what apparently happened a few hours later at Coletti, has only one eye witness, namely Enio Mancini, who was then slightly more than six years old. Indeed Berretti maintains that he has "never heard it recounted by anyone."[63] The fact remains that, from the small village of Sennari, the only victims of that day were Berretti's two sisters.

The Church

Alfredo Graziani, from his house in Le Case, noted that the column of Germans that was coming from Argentiera with the men and women rounded up in that place, after reaching the village, divided into two groups: One group surrounded the small village of "Pero"—the largest hamlet of Sant'Anna—made the civilians come out of their houses and lined them up in the direction of the church square. The other houses near the church were also destroyed and the inhabitants sent toward the church.[64]

What happened in the church square has become a symbol of the massacre, even if, it should be stressed, the majority of the inhabitants were killed in the various hamlets scattered in the territory of the village. What has contributed to rendering the episode of the church as emblematic has been not only the high number of victims concentrated in that place, but also the particular rage of the Germans against the burnt corpses, on top of which they piled the church benches and furnishings, in behavior that, apart from being cruel

and blasphemous, highlights very well the pagan and anti-Christian nature of that division of the SS, which manifested itself even more clearly in the subsequent massacre of the monks of the charterhouse of Farneta, near Lucca, at the beginning of September.[65]

It is not, therefore, mere chance that, in the massacre of the population, what is remembered above all is the martyrdom of the parish priest of Farnocchia, Don Innocenzo Lazzeri, who after having done his utmost to mitigate the harsh measures of the Germans against the inhabitants of that village, having moved to Sant'Anna when Farnocchia was abandoned. Lazzeri found death there,[66] together with women and children, despite the fact that, according to a well-established account, his father had invited him that tragic morning, to escape with him in the wood:

> In that terrible orgy of blood there emerges the noble figure of Don Innocenzo Lazzeri, the parish priest of Farnocchia, who was awarded a gold medal for bravery after the war. It was he who offered Reder's fiends his own life, in vain, in exchange for those of the villagers and, then, as a supreme warning, lifted up the lacerated body of a child to show it to the executioners, then falling on the dead bodies of his parishioners as he himself had also been hit. (Pesci 1975, 286)

In fact, as there were no survivors, there were apparently no eyewitnesses to what had happened in front of the church. The massacre happened quite early in the morning, if Angelo Berretti's recollection is correct: While the first Germans were coming down from the Farnocchia Pass, at the same time, in the valley where the church was, they were beginning to fire shots, which were increasing all the time.[67]

When Agostino Bibolotti, who with his brother Alfio had been saved from the massacre of Vaccareccia because the Germans had given them two radio transmitters to carry, arrived in the church square following the soldiers, the massacre had already taken place: "The corpses were almost completely burnt; they were still smoking and there was a terrible stench, which made the air almost unbearable." The two brothers were lined up against the wall of the church and were about to be executed when the intervention of a German—an officer or a noncommissioned officer—stopped it, as they could still be useful in carrying the two cases of the radio transmitters

to Valdicastello. They were then put with the other bearers of munitions (14 men): "We set off, under the constant threat of arms, toward Valdicastello. We went along the path called 'Cacciadiavoli,' which starts from the back of the church of Sant'Anna but which I could define as secondary . . . On this journey, having arrived near a mill, I saw, on the path, the lifeless body of a woman."[68]

Angelo Berretti remembers:

> I arrived at the church of Sant'Anna with my father and mother in the evening at about nine o'clock. There we found a heap of corpses, which the fire was slowly consuming. There were 136, which were found, but there could be even more because the heads of small children could have been destroyed by the fire, they counted 136 heads with a shovel . . . There was a fire, which was sheer madness. When my father arrived they all embraced in turn because there were some men who were trying to see if they could recognize someone from their family, and they said, "Look here, the houses are all burning, here there's a heap of corpses, I certainly won't be able to find my family members in this heap."[69]

The police superintendent Vito Majorca, who went to Sant'Anna in August 1946 for his investigations, heard gruesome details, which offended his "conscience as a man . . . The corpses mainly appeared as a confused mass of limbs, flesh, bones, in an advanced state of decomposition."[70]

Today, concerning what happened in front of the church, we have an eyewitness, the noncommissioned officer of the Eighth Company of the Second Battalion of the SS Adolf Beckerth, who came to testify—an exceptional occurrence—in the trial in La Spezia, and in the hearing on November 10, 2004, he recounted (through an interpreter) what he had seen, standing apart, with a fellow soldier, to the right of the church:

> The elderly, women, children gradually arrived in the church square and were assembled there, and then on that occasion I also saw the parish priest for the first time. On that occasion I also saw, for the first time, that the officer [of whom he cannot indicate either the name or rank] called the parish priest and several times there was a kind of discussion between the parish priest and the officer. I point out that while the discussions were going on the telegraph operator was going

> back and forth communicating with other people. I point out that there were various communications between the parish priest and the officer; I cannot indicate precisely how many times. The people were continually instructed or asked to say where the men were and since there was no reaction on the part of the assembled people the parish priest was called once again, he was given an ultimatum. I don't know if the ultimatum the parish priest was given was for 10 or 15 minutes then he was called back once again after the expiry of the ultimatum, and they asked him again, "If they don't say where the men are then they will be killed, executed by firing squad" . . . The MGs [machine guns with two legs] were placed right in front of the main entrance of the church on the left and right of the door . . . I confirm that the order was hit [sic] precisely by the officer who was present in the church square, the exact order to carry out the execution by firing squad arrived precisely through the person who had the two-way radio, in short it arrived through the telegraph operator . . . The parish priest after receiving the ultimatum that if they did not indicate the partisans, then the men would be executed . . . As far as I remember all the people were standing, the parish priest approached the people and probably told them in Italian, then after hearing this message from the parish priest they knelt down and prayed, and then I saw how they were shot.

Then Adolf Beckerth learnt from his fellow soldiers that "they threw out the church furniture and set it alight."[71]

Coletti

Upper and Lower Coletti are dwellings near the path that leads to Valdicastello. In Upper Coletti, where there is only one house, at about midday, the two sisters Alba and Ada Battistini, 15 and 13 years old, saw five German soldiers arriving. They were coming from the church and were going toward Valdicastello "through a little-known shortcut." Another group went toward the two houses of Lower Coletti. Four of those who stopped at their house spoke Italian, with an accent that Alba today defines as either local or Pisan:

> One was at the door below from where they had entered, one was there at the door, and I was at the front door; he was armed to the teeth. One was at the corner of the house . . . Two came inside,

> climbed the stairs, kicked the doors and opened them . . . Then others also went to the top and broke the furniture, things . . . In short they damaged a lot of things . . . I have no idea what they put inside their clothing . . . Then they set fire to the house . . . Then they came down, they lined us up and told us not to run away, to stay in line . . . instead of passing where they had killed everyone they made us pass on the other side where we had a shed, the door was open my mother told them, "Oh God if we go to Valdicastello the animals will go."[72]

Alvaro Ulivi, who was 13 years old, remembers that at first they were lined up against a wall, that the soldiers positioned a big machine gun in front of the building, and that it was his mother's intervention that stopped the Germans from killing them.

During the journey to Valdicastello, they encountered some animals obstructing the path, and one of the Germans, after firing at them, since a heifer wasn't dead yet, was heard to say, by Ada, "'Die you ugly beast, die . . .' In short, a phrase like that."[73] The group divided in two: Four soldiers (those who, according to Alba, were Italian) rejoined the Germans who had just carried out the massacre in Lower Coletti, the hostages were left with a single German, whom Alba describes as "blond with red cheeks, light skinned, about 18 at the most." The latter, who had obviously been ordered to kill them, fired instead at a group of sheep: "He killed these five sheep and then he fired and while he was shooting a bullet struck him here on the left, and there was even a drop of blood, and he shook his head like this, he never spoke . . . never . . . never . . . then he fired and he went away"[74] in the direction of Valdicastello. At that moment they heard midday being rung by the bell tower of La Culla, a small village a little below Sant'Anna.

Those who had, instead, been taken further on by the other Germans were killed along the way. Alba maintains that there were 15 people, 5 taken from her home (Ada lists her father; a female primary school teacher; a man who had come down, with his son, to bake some bread in the oven; and a girl of her age), the others were encountered along the path. An explanation given, but only years later, by Cesira Pardini, who was nevertheless in Lower Coletti and could not have witnessed the episode, was that "the members of that company were not interested in human lives, but money and gold, in fact having captured some women they took their money (one

had 200,000 lira), then they fired in the air and at some sheep before going away."[75] But this detail is not present in any of the eyewitness accounts. Marisa Cipriani, who was 19 and was captured in Coletti, remembers, however, that they encountered an elderly couple, with three or four women, near the mill, which is situated on the path (probably the miller, the miller's wife, and the two Berretti sisters), and remembers the theft of "that small amount of gold which those poor people jealously guarded," but immediately afterward "those unfortunate people" were killed with a burst of machine-gun fire. She, who had been forced "with kicks and slaps" to carry a very heavy rucksack, which she thought was full of munitions, proceeded with the Germans as far as Valdicastello, where she was set free.[76]

At Lower Coletti, a group of two houses, the cousin of the Battistini sisters, Cesira Pardini, 18 years old and the eldest of 11 children, saw a group of Germans—at about seven o'clock, going in the direction of the church—who took her cousin and a colt, and after an hour or two (today she remembers that it was about nine o'clock) a squad coming down with some civilians who were carrying cases of munitions—she was struck by the sight of Marco Romiti "wearing pants and a singlet, barefoot, with a case on his shoulders." They asked the way to Valdicastello, and they were shown

> a lane that we always used because we were far from the mule track. We always went down, and we used to end up in Molini di Sant'Anna and then down to go to Valdicastello, Pietrasanta we used to take that path . . . In the meantime, four . . . passed by they had a length of cloth, one said that he was injured, but I didn't see it, nor his face; Four of them were taking him down in a length of cloth.[77]

Lidia Pardini, 10 years old, saw a soldier coming toward her with her sister Maria, holding her by the arm. He lined them up against a wall:

> My sisters and my mother were close to me. As I was clasping a suitcase containing my younger sister's clothes (just twenty days old—Anna) a German soldier, to make me let go of it, kicked me, I don't remember if with his foot or a rifle, in the lower belly. But I didn't let go of the suitcase. I remember that this man told me, in Italian, more precisely in *versiliese*, verbatim, "Go to the wall with the others." I

> recall that he was wearing a mask, which covered his face from his nose to his chin, and anyway he had black eyes.[78]

Cesira, who had a bag with a bottle of oil (everyone had quickly grabbed something to take with them in their flight), was also hit by a soldier whose face was covered (in her view, he was an Italian who didn't want to be recognized, even if, she admits, she never heard Italian being spoken), because she didn't want to line up against the wall. She remembers that, in that scuffle, almost all the oil was spilt on the ground.

There were about 30 people, women and children, gathered by the wall. Cesira managed to open the door of the oven and found herself in a shed, together with Lidia and two other sisters, Adele who was four and Maria who was 16 years old, the latter though was gravely wounded: From there Cesira could see "a German soldier . . . who with a machine gun opened fire killing all those who had been put up against the wall." Then she saw the smoke, which was coming from the building where she lived with her family and from that of her paternal uncle.

After the Germans had gone, the Pardini sisters came out of their hiding place, Cesira realized that her little sister Anna, who was 20 days old, was still alive but gravely wounded, in her dead mother's arms—"I opened my mother's arms she was there like this, . . . and milk and blood were coming up, that child had her mouth full of blood"—and they managed to hide in a cave. Cesira ran to tell her father, whom she knew was hiding in a vineyard, above Valdicastello, and then they hid in an olive grove of theirs, in Cacciadiavoli:

> In the evening Federico Bertelli came with a young man who was studying medicine in Pisa. He treated us a little as well as he could and then in the morning I went back up to Coletti . . . and my uncle cut the clothes I was wearing with a pair of scissors because they were soaked . . . My mother's brains, all the blood . . . between mine, my little sister's and . . . He took the scissors, and he cut off my clothes, and then he went to the clothesline because there was a black dress, and he put that on me.[79]

On September 4, her little sister Anna died; on September 20, Maria. From the massacre, of the 28 people that there were, those who

survived were the Pardini sisters (Cesira, Adele, and Lidia) and a baby who would have been a year old on August 20, Paolo Lencioni.

Valdicastello

At about 11 o'clock, now that they had finished the massacre, the Germans went toward Valdicastello taking three different paths, through the village of La Culla, through Fosso dei Molini and through the path that, from the small village of Coletti, reaches Molini.[80] They killed anyone they encountered on their way to Molini. Bruno Antonucci, who with his family had taken refuge, after August 8, in Farnocchia on a hill about 300 meters, as the crow flies, from Sant'Anna, and from there he was able to witness the various phases of the massacre and saw the soldiers leave after the slaughter

> and I can still hear the sound of a mouth organ that a German was playing as if he were coming back from a party. At about twelve o'clock a father came up to me at Sant'Anna distraught, his eyes full of tears, holding his baby, only a few months old, horribly riddled with bullets and his small body soaked in his own blood. He was looking for a doctor, but only a father's heart could still harbor any hope.[81]

The SS arrived in Valdicastello exhausted and with blood on their clothes, according to the eyewitness account of Elio Benvenuti,[82] the future mayor of Pietrasanta from May 1945 to April 1946, and Ada Cantucci saw the Germans passing through Valdicastello "serious and in silence" (Giannelli 1997, 140); Elio Toaff (former chief Rabbi of Rome), who had then moved to Valdicastello, describes them as having wild eyes and their arms, with their sleeves rolled up, stained with blood up to their elbows (Toaff 1987, 114).[83] For Anna Coluccini, instead, "with long cartridge belts, full of blood on their hands and uniforms . . . they were singing and laughing as if they were coming from a party. In the midst of the Germans there were also some Italians and they were also singing and laughing" (Giannelli 1997, 82).

Marco Antonio Marchetti, 16 years old, heard those military songs while they were marching. Some people remember some

music, played by a gramophone or a mouth organ, during the final phase of the massacre, in the church square and on their return journey, but there are no reliable testimonies regarding this point (which is also reported for the later massacre of Vinca, August 24).[84] Renato Bonuccelli wrote—and confirmed in his deposition at the trial in La Spezia[85]—that he saw a gramophone and some broken records on the wall of the washboard, but he did not hear any music. Luigi Calcagnini, who was nine years old and admitted in 2000 that his recollections were a little vague, had stated in a 1996 transcript of concise information that he had seen the Germans returning to Valdicastello from Sant'Anna at about noon, and remaining in the village until the late afternoon, "some of them were playing accordions and mouth organs: It almost seemed as if they were celebrating." In a group of soldiers, who he thought were officers, he noticed that one of them was without an arm (obviously Reder), who was wearing an ordinary uniform and not the camouflaged combat uniform like the rest of the troops.[86] Ignaz Alois Lippert, a soldier of the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion, which operated in Sant'Anna, states that after the massacre some of the soldiers were downcast, while others, instead, were proud and euphoric (the latter, according to him, were all volunteers and "real" SS).[87]

Marcello Mori, who was 31 years old, and had moved from Marina di Pietrasanta to a hut in the upper part of the village, saw them entering his hut "with bloodshot eyes . . . They were probably also tired."[88] Lidia Maremmani, 21 years old, who had moved from Pietrasanta to the house of some relatives in Valdicastello, saw

> a sea of soldiers armed to the teeth, with what I call necklaces, all with camouflage combat suits, heavy boots . . . It was them who were making such a noise. Then they set off toward the village where the whole village gathered, and they took various people including my father and my mother who caught hold of one of them . . . I wasn't there; I was far away, and she told him, "Don't take him away from me," and he kicked her and threw her on to the ground; my sister was present.[89]

At Valdicastello the German troops rounded up several hundred men of a suitable age. Fourteen individuals, according to some eyewitness accounts, were those who had been used as munitions

carriers. According to other eyewitness accounts those fourteen individuals had been taken from those who had been rounded up and were killed on the pebbly bank of the stream. Enio Mancini recalls: "The first was killed in the small village of Coletti as they were coming down, the nearest small village . . . I know that this man who was called Marco Romiti they had actually loaded him up with a mortar. But seeing that they were killing everyone as they were coming down . . . he tried to get away and . . . he was shot down in the wood; the other 14 were killed at the end of the descent from Pini."[90] On the same day, in Seballa di Capezzano, around two in the afternoon, an SS patrol, probably returning from Sant'Anna and Valdicastello, killed six men without reason.

Renato Brunini had moved with his family to the pyrite mines of Valdicastello. At half past noon, a group of Germans, coming from Sant'Anna, discovered him hidden under a blanket and took him prisoner. Near to a bridge there was a first selection, "carried out by a noncommissioned officer assisted by a soldier who had previously been with the partisans declaring himself to be a deserter," while in fact he was an SS spy, of Polish extraction, Brunini was later told. Six people were recognized as presumed partisans or their collaborators. In the meantime other SS troops "were proceeding with rounding up the whole place, making all the men assemble in the center of the village." At the trial in La Spezia he added that, as well as the "Pole," whom he described as "a young blond soldier with the emblem of the Wehrmacht," there was another soldier who had also been a double-crosser, Joseph from Merano, who had been seen in Cardoso di Stazzema.[91]

In 2000 Sirio Macchiarini, who was then 18 years old, maintained that it was Reder himself who carried out the selection "assisted by a Pole who spoke Italian well."[92] This is a scarcely credible detail, not so much as regards the presence of Reder in Valdicastello, about which the testimonies are belated and contradictory, but which in any case cannot be excluded a priori, but rather because of the operation in which he was supposedly involved, which an officer of his rank would never have deigned to carry out.

Most of the men rounded up in Valdicastello were sent, in the late afternoon, toward the clearing center of the Pia Casa (Religious Center) of Lucca, and from there deported to Germany. Others,

perhaps considered more compromised with the partisans, were taken to Nozzano Castello near Lucca, where Max Simon had his headquarters and where there was also a special military tribunal set up at the division. Among them there was also the parish priest of Valdicastello, Don Libero Raglianti, who would later be executed by firing squad, together with other hostages, at Laiano di Filettole, between Lucca and Pisa, on August 29.[93]

Marcello Mori remembers his imprisonment at Nozzano:

> We stayed there sitting on the floor for almost three days waiting for another German soldier to arrive who, it seems, had been with the partisans, he had come . . . He had pretended to be a deserter from the German Army, and so he was coming to identify those who had been partisans, and I saw some people being taken away; I don't know if they subsequently killed them or not . . . They let me go because I was not a partisan.[94]

Renato Brunini confirms that they were "barbarically" interrogated for a week, but after 2 days, 14 people, including the former *podestà* (fascist mayor) of Forte dei Marmi, were freed.[95] Agostino Bibolotti who, with his brother, did not share the fate of the munitions carriers, was held there for seven days: "We were continually interrogated with every type of torture. On the seventh day those from Sant'Anna were called, and five of them said they were inhabitants of Sant'Anna . . . I later learnt that those five were killed in San Terenzo,"[96] in the province of Apuania (now Massa-Carrara), where that day, August 19, 53 hostages from Nozzano were executed in a particularly brutal way—tying them with wire round their necks to some poles and then machine-gunning them—as a reprisal for the deaths, two days earlier, of 16 men of the SS, in a shoot-out with the partisans.

On August 12, the daily bulletin of the information office of the Sixteenth Army reported that—in an operation under way north of Camaiore, a place north of La Culla (Molino di Sant'Anna) and a kilometer further north (Sant'Anna)—7 ammunition dumps, one of which was in a church, had been blown up, and 270 "bandits" killed. The following day, the report was incorporated in the bulletin of the operations office with the following news: 11 ammunition dumps were blown up, fixed kitchen equipment destroyed, and part

of a clothes depot was secured. The support center of the bands, a kilometer north of La Culla (Sant'Anna), was set alight. Here, 68 bandits were captured, 5 of them members of the General Staff. 208 suspects were sent to the camp in Lucca.[97] In short, a real success for an operation against the "partisans," achieved at the modest cost of the wounding of two of those brave men who, on August 12, slaughtered defenseless women, children, and old people.

The Victims

A naval lieutenant Antonio Tucci, stationed in La Spezia, had taken refuge in Sant'Anna di Stazzema with his wife and their eight children. Hearing of the arrival of the Germans, he had made off, reaching Valdicastello. When he learnt of the massacre, he immediately ran to Sant'Anna:

> I found around a hundred burnt corpses in front of the church square, and in the midst of them I could only just recognize my poor wife holding in her arms our three-month-old little girl, our youngest child. At the sight of this I was afraid of losing my reason, and I ran like a madman to Valdicastello, where I was taken in by friends who hid me because of the presence of the German SS who were continuing to round up men there, and also executed another 14 men by firing squad.[98]

Enio Mancini describes a nightmare scene, after the Germans had left Sant'Anna:

> We returned home because we were thinking of the fire, the house, and we could see the fire because there was black smoke rising from all sides, noise, collapsing buildings, and when we returned home it must have been a little before ten, and any way we set to work like this, even if it was useless any how we tried to extinguish the fire. Several hours passed, we heard about the massacre, of what had really happened, I don't know exactly when, but I presume it was about three, four in the afternoon . . . At that time the men started coming home, and a young man from the small village arrived . . . and he gave us the terrible news about the massacre of the village. Then the fire, the house, no longer meant anything to us, and we ran, and first we went where our relatives lived, I arrived in the small villages Le Case and

> Franchi where our relatives lived. There we found the houses devastated, fire . . . corpses . . . inside the houses, some certainly also outside. I entered a kitchen where the massacre of the Pierotti and Pieri families had occurred where I found the bodies, in fact the house had not . . . the fire had not taken hold, there the corpses had remained intact, although in the other cases there were above all burnt corpses. You see the sensation, which has remained with me and which has upset me which I still haven't got over is the smell. The sensation of the smell of the burnt flesh, and then fortunately a grandmother, seeing the scenario which was in front of us, took us with the children toward our home; I didn't see anything else that day.[99]

Mario Bertelli, who returned to the village in the early afternoon, describes the scene like this:

> An enormous pile of corpses were burning slowly and were by then so wedged together in an immense heap of flesh, so the only thing you could do was to stoke up the fire. Some men were doing it . . . I rushed toward the pile: an indescribable heap of corpses, you couldn't recognize anyone. And underneath there was my wife, my mother, my little sisters Pierina and Aurora, my nephew, and so many friends. (Volpe Rinonapoli 1961, 65)

Also Graziani, when he returned to the village on August 14, saw in Le Case "some men, led by someone who spoke with a southern accent, who were busy banking up the tragic fire." He was told "that it was a mush and that the terrible stench was unbearable" (Graziani 1945, 29). The explanation did not convince Graziani, who was more inclined to think of jackals covering up, in this way, the evidence of thefts from the corpses and in the houses. Lidia Pardini, on August 13, in the church square, met three "partisans"—the same ones she surprised, a few hours later, robbing the dead in front of her house in Lower Coletti—who invited her to find some straw to throw on top of the dead (evidently to stoke up the fire), but she declined the invitation.[100]

On August 13, Massimo Pellegrini also saw some people in the church square who told him they were partisans, who were stoking up the fire of the pile of corpses. One of these men had taken the wallets from the corpses, to return them to the relatives, he told him.[101]

Don Giuseppe Vangelisti went to Sant'Anna the day after the massacre and has left an accurate description of what he saw:

> The scene that caused most anguish was that of the church square: a mass of corpses in the middle, with the flesh still almost frying; on one side, the body of a little boy about three years old, all swollen and charred by the fire, his arms rigid and raised as if asking for help, and all around the scenario of the houses which were still emitting flashes and crackles, the church with the door wide open, enabled you to see a big brazier inside, made up of pews and furniture, and in the air the stench of roasted flesh which almost took your breath away and which spread throughout the valley. The burial of these dead bodies was carried out on the 14th, and about thirty volunteers from La Culla took part. It was quite a difficult task and dangerous, especially because of the great clouds of flies, whose stings could have caused fatal infections. We didn't have any masks; we didn't have any disinfectants. We only had a small bottle of alcohol and a bit of cotton to plug our noses. There was also an episode which moved all of us: Among the corpses there was a big family, that of Antonio Tucci, a naval officer from Foligno, but stationed in La Spezia, who in the course of various evacuations had found himself up here. His family was made up of eight children (ranging from a few months to 15 years of age) and his wife. While we were preparing the grave, Tucci arrived running and shouting like a madman, ready to throw himself into that tangle of corpses: "I want to be with them!" he was shouting. He had to be restrained until he calmed down. For a few days, it was as if he were half mad.[102]

It is not surprising, therefore, if, on account of the ways in which the massacre was carried out, the state of the bodies, almost all burnt, as well as the large number of evacuees from other municipal districts, the number of the victims of the slaughter has remained uncertain. Don Vangelisti, in a written record attached, in an English translation, to the investigation conducted by the United States War Crimes Commission, referred to the naked bodies of six women found behind the bell tower.[103] In his testimony before the commission he said he had counted 178 dead and had buried 138: He also added that he had seen the corpse of a half-naked woman. In his account in the *Nazione del Popolo*, he wrote of 133 skulls and 6 corpses, one being of a half-naked woman, behind the bell tower

(Vangelisti 1945, 34).[104] In Don Vangelisti's memorial quoted in Graziani's book, there is the figure of 132 skulls, including those of 24 women and 32 children (Graziani 1945, 22). The same figure is to be found in a Don Vangelisti's quotation in Giannelli, in which the dead behind the bell tower become eight, and there is no reference to the corpses of naked women, while a new detail appears: "We agreed that they were the ones the Germans had rounded up lower down to carry munitions and various cases. Among the dead we also found a German soldier, recognizable from the colors of his camouflage combat suit, probably one who had refused to shoot at all those innocent people" (Giannelli 1997, 163–64).

This detail is reported, but in different ways, also by others: Alderano Vecoli, speaking in the context of the investigations for the Reder trial, declared that he had seen in the church square, on top of the heap of corpses around the tree, two burnt military rifles, near to the corpses of two Germans whom he recognized by the remnants of their uniforms. He heard it said that they were Austrians who had refused to take part in the massacre and had been executed.[105] According to Mario Bertelli, "in the church square, as well as the dead, I saw a rifle and something, which seemed to be military cartridge boxes: Someone said that two Germans were executed by firing squad together with the victims, because they refused to shoot at the women. I don't know if it's true" (Volpe Rinonapoli 1961, 65). The detail is also reported today by some witnesses: Enio Mancini says that among the dead in the square there was also a German soldier, recognized from his uniform, and he remembers having played with his rifle and helmet (even if today he is inclined to believe that it was an Italian soldier, a former military internee, enrolled in the SS).[106] Avio Pieri in fact maintains that he saw, on August 13, on the left side of the pile of corpses in the church square, two bodies with the uniform of the German Army, the boots, the helmet, the rifle: He heard it said that they were soldiers who had refused to shoot.[107]

However, it seems improbable, and not only because the state of the charred bodies would have made it difficult, not to say impossible, to recognize the clothes they were wearing: In fact, in many episodes of massacres the rumor spreads about one or two "good" Germans who, having refused to participate in the slaughter, have been executed by their fellow soldiers, but there has never been

real evidence that such episodes have actually happened. And yet, a summary execution by firing squad, possible only in the case of flagrant desertion during combat in the face of the enemy, would undoubtedly have been noted in the official German sources, starting from the lists of the fallen. And furthermore, such a sensational event as the summary execution of a fellow soldier would certainly have come to the knowledge of the soldiers present at Sant'Anna and would have been reported in the many testimonies given by the accused at the trial in La Spezia, inasmuch as it would have represented an extenuating circumstance with regard to their participation in the massacre, as the soldiers could have invoked the need to obey orders if they did not want to end up like the apparently insubordinate executed soldier. The ruling of the military tribunal of La Spezia underlines that it has not been proved that there was "a single case of the summary execution of disobedient soldiers" regarding an order as manifestly criminal as the killing of women and children nor that

> substantially similar results also came from the Ludwisburg Central Office of the Regional Courts for the investigation of Nazi crimes, which starting in 1958 examined hundreds of cases in which it had been stated that the failure to carry out orders would have constituted a mortal danger, without however indicating a single instance. (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 190)

To return to the Italian dead, the American commission attached to the investigation a list of the 131 victims from Sant'Anna and the 86 evacuees, whose source is always Don Vangelisti. Nevertheless, in a first report drawn up by members of the British 110th Battery of the Thirty-Ninth Royal Field Artillery Regiment, not dated but undoubtedly drawn up before September 15 and transmitted on October 12 to the headquarters of the Fourth Corps, the figure of 400 dead was reported, of which 138 were killed in the church square.[108] Two and a half years later, Bruno Antonucci, the mayor of Stazzema, spoke of about 560 victims, a figure that he said had been given to him by the parish priest of La Culla (namely, the same Don Vangelisti), distributed as follows: 95 children and youths up to 15 years of age, 35 men over the age of 60, 177 women, 49 men between 16 and 60 years old, and 204 unidentified and not recorded.[109] Don

Vangelisti, in a contemporary testimony, referred to 132 bodies in the church square, including 32 children and 24 women, about another hundred bodies not far from the church, and his estimate of about 200 people killed and burnt in their homes and in sheds, adding that he thought there were approximately 100 bodies that had already been buried by the survivors. As can be seen, this adds up to a figure of 532 victims.[110] In his oral testimony at the trial of Simon, the priest denied ever having spoken of 560 victims and maintained that he had reported a figure of 400 dead to the partisan leader Bandelloni, adding nevertheless that he had personally seen only 230 dead.[111] At the same trial Antonucci, the mayor of Stazzema, after repeating that the figure of 560 had been communicated to him by the priest, specified that the number of victims officially recorded in the registry office was 320.[112] In a letter by the Committee of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna, undated but presumably from 1947—which laments the fact that at the Kesselring trial the massacre of Sant'Anna had only been referred to en passant—the figure of 600 victims is given.[113]

As can be seen, the number of victims varies in the different testimonies, at times even in the statements of the same person made on different occasions. Nevertheless, some progress in determining a figure, which could plausibly approach the real one, was made, many decades later: In 1983, Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 204–10), published an "Elenco delle vittime di Sant'Anna di Stazzema finora accertate" ("List of the Victims of Sant'Anna di Stazzema Determined To Date") of 390 names. In 1995, Bonuccelli published the results of the research he had conducted a year earlier in the registry offices of the municipal districts of Stazzema, Pietrasanta, and Camaiore, identifying 371 victims. Giuseppe Bertelli (1997, 82–94), on the basis of the death certificates in the municipal district of Stazzema (324 victims), various conversations with Don Vangelisti, and the testimonies of the survivors, tried to calculate the number of dead in the various places: 132 in the church square, 8 behind the bell tower, 43 or 44 in Le Case, 12 in Franchi, 15 in Colle, 60 to 62 in Vaccareccia, 27 in Lower Coletti and along the path for Molini, 5 in Molini, and 1 in Pianacci under the primary school. The number reached was between 303 and 306 victims, which Bertelli maintains cannot be more than 20 to 25 off the mark. On the occasion of the

recent trial in La Spezia, the list of victims drawn up by the *Carabinieri* of Pietrasanta referred to the death certificates of 370 people (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 17).

It is to be deplored that in the case of Sant'Anna the rigorous work of counting and cross-checking the various sources—which, in the case of Monte Sole, has revised the initial figure of 1,830 victims, which had included all those who died because of the war, to 770 attributable to the German operations that lasted for seven days starting from September 29, 1944, affecting, apart from the municipal district of Marzabotto, also those of Monzuno and Grizzana (*Marzabotto. Quanti, chi e dove* 1995)—still has not been carried out. It is to be hoped that the municipal district of Stazzema will wish to put an end to these see-sawing figures by promoting a similarly in-depth investigation of the number and the identity of the victims: The gravity of what happened at Sant'Anna would certainly not be reduced, and it would avoid the continuous corroboration of inexact information, something that is never in any case commendable and which, apart from everything else, is dangerous because it risks providing opportunities for possible accusations of negationism (as happened for Monte Sole, before the figure of over 1,800 victims was more than halved).

2

Investigation of the Massacre

After the Massacre: The Absence of Justice and the Search for the Reason Why

After the massacre, in spite of its enormity, there was no serious attempt on the part of the institutions to prosecute the perpetrators, nor even to reconstruct what had happened. The village practically did not exist anymore, its already poor subsistence economy was destroyed, its families definitively disrupted. What had been one of the most serious massacres committed in Italy was practically ignored: When the Deputy Police Inspector Vito Majorca was instructed by the Prefect of Lucca "to gather all possible information suitable for reconstructing the facts and the circumstances," it was August 1946, well over two years after the massacre. He went to Sant'Anna:

> In the small square . . . I found the grave was still there, quite big, a rudimentary cross and some flowers on top of it. Corpses were heaped together haphazardly in the grave. The inhabitants . . . complained because the removal of the corpses had not yet been carried out, and no provision had been made for a fitting burial.[1]

And, when on February 26, 1947, the mayors of Versilia wrote a note to the Prime Minister's Office asking that the massacre of Sant'Anna should be taken into consideration in the Kesselring trial, they were told that the British prosecutor had refused, as the massacre of Sant'Anna was considered an adjunct to that of Bardine

P. Pezzino, *Memory and Massacre*

di San Terenzo. An indication of the ignorance and confusion that reigned among the investigators can be inferred from the comments of the colonel who was an observer at the trial, working on behalf of Italian military justice. The colonel first reported the court's refusal to reply to a heart-rending letter from the Committee of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna, which complained that at the trial the massacre of Sant'Anna had only been mentioned en passant and had been confused with those of August 19 in San Terenzo Monti (erroneously indicated as being in Liguria). But then the colonel himself stated that both places were in the province of Lucca and that the two massacres had occurred on the same day, August 12. Whatever was the case, the documents sent to the Allied Headquarters to implicate Kesselring were not considered sufficient.

The failure to identify the German unit responsible for the massacre is a tragic paradox. On the one hand, it has to be stressed that, as regards the massacre in Sant'Anna di Stazzema, there are fewer German sources than for other episodes. Thus, the commander of the Sixteenth SS Division, Simon, who even admitted that he had ordered the subsequent operations against the "bandits" of Vinca and Monte Sole—naturally fully defending the thesis that it was a question of military operations against the partisans, and not an indiscriminate, planned slaughter of civilians—as regards Sant'Anna di Stazzema—which represented the second charge at his trial—declared:

> *I don't know anything* about this action or who gave the orders. The reports can't have indicated anything out of the ordinary, otherwise I would have remembered them . . . I cannot offer any explanation for the presumed excesses in VALDI CASTELLO [sic] and ST ANNA. If I had seen a similar report I would have ordered an investigation and would have seen to it that the guilty were punished and the officers demoted.

To defend himself from the numerous testimonies on Sant'Anna, both those presented in person by the survivors at the general's trial in Padua, which took place from May 29 to June 26, 1947, and those presented as exhibits, he adopted the usual tactic of accusing the Italian witnesses of exaggerating or lying, and he cast the responsibility for what happened on the partisans:

> I don't think that the incident happened as it has been described by the witnesses. I only deny that it was on such a large scale as that described by the witnesses. The circumstances, according to me, are not exactly those described. I think that in ST ANNA there was a battle. The Italian witnesses lied. There was only one witness who referred, on hearsay evidence, to the pile of bodies. I haven't forgotten the evidence presented by the priest who saw the bodies [Don Vangelisti], but a witness has admitted that the partisans had burnt some bodies, which were decomposing. The priest arrived the following day. He didn't see who brought the bodies into the square. I think that this could have happened, that women and children died during the action, while the men were fighting. I can imagine that the partisans returned and found the bodies in the houses, which showed signs of the fire because of the use of flame-throwers, and that they took them to the square with the intention of burning them. This is the reason why the priest found 230 bodies. The witnesses have said that there were no partisans in the village, but someone had to admit that they were involved.[2]

Nor did Walter Reder give any indication that a massacre had occurred at Sant'Anna, and yet he was in that zone in those days and for a long time has been considered responsible, with the men of his reconnaissance battalion, for the massacre. In the trial at the military tribunal of Bologna, he in fact admitted that on August 12, 1944, he was in a locality between Pietrasanta and Marina di Carrara, and it seemed to him that his headquarters was located in Villa Barsanti, in Pietrasanta. But he maintained that he didn't even know where Sant'Anna di Stazzema was, and in an inspection that took place during the trial he did not recognize any of the villas shown to him, including the Villa Barsanti, as the site of his headquarters. Like him, none of the many officers heard in the two trials gave any information that could be of use in identifying those responsible for the massacre.[3]

Nevertheless, those who were responsible were already known to the Americans, practically immediately after the slaughter.[4] A first report was drawn up by elements of the British 110th Battery of the Thirty-Ninth Field Artillery Regiment, on a date prior to September 15, and transmitted to the headquarters of the Fourth Corps. There was an initial description, brief (and imprecise), of what had happened on August 12, and of its antecedents (the clashes between the

Germans and the partisans at the end of July and the beginning of August, with which I will deal later). On September 15, the Fifth Army Headquarters also charged its own war crimes commission to investigate what had happened at Sant'Anna, mistakenly referred to as August 19 (and the error will be repeated for a long time, probably because it was mixed up with the massacre of Bardine di San Terenzo, where, as we have seen, some of the men—rounded up in Valdicastello by the SS, who were coming down from Sant'Anna di Stazzema—were hanged as a reprisal). The commission met at the Fifth Army Headquarters on September 15, once again in Livorno on September 16, listening to the German deserter Willi Haase, then it adjourned. After Sant'Anna was occupied by the Allies, the commission resumed its investigations. It met in Valdicastello on October 8, 1944, it listened to Don Giuseppe Vangelisti and other witnesses; it got the priest's written record, to which I have already referred several times, as well as various other documents. Its definitive report was dated October 16, 1944, and it identified, with certainty, the unit responsible for the massacre, on the basis of the precise testimony of Willi Haase, a deserter from the Fifth Company of the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth SS Grenadier Armored Regiment: The entire battalion had participated in the massacre. On October 17, the report was approved by the Fifth Army Headquarters, and on October 31 it was sent to Washington (the date of the massacre continues to be indicated as August 19), where, on November 4, 1944, less than three months after the massacre, it arrived on the Judge Advocate General's desk. And there it remained, practically untouched, for over two years.

The investigations of the Italian authorities were much slower and initially directed above all at identifying the Germans' Italian collaborators: Hence the warrant officer of the *Carabinieri* Alberto Vannozzi, in charge of the Carabinieri station of Stazzema, sent a report, with 22 enclosures, on July 22, 1946, to the Magistrates' Court of Pietrasanta, in the context of the investigations undertaken by the latter in the proceedings against two individuals, Aleramo Garibaldi and Guido Buratti. Many survivors had recognized Garibaldi and Buratti in Sant'Anna di Stazzema on August 12 and accused them of having actively collaborated with the Germans in the rounding up and the execution by firing squad of the hostages. Incredibly, two

years after the event, the mistaken date of August 14 was still being indicated in the documents of the investigation. Another inquiry was initiated by the Public Prosecutor of the Extraordinary Court of Assizes of Lucca, and in the remit of the latter the already mentioned report of August 20, 1946, of the Deputy Police Inspector Vito Majorca of the Viareggio Police Station, in which finally the date of the slaughter was correctly reported. Reference was made to the names of some German officers and noncommissioned officers present in the zone, given by Italian witnesses and difficult to identify (because often mispronounced), and the names of some Italians accused of collaborationism, above all civilians utilized to carry munitions cases and recognized by various survivors of the massacre, who, inexplicably, had subsequently been freed by the Germans.

In the meantime, the Prosecution of German War Criminals Service (a department of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office), after receiving a copy of Lieutenant Tucci's report, had opened a file against unknown German SS soldiers for violence, murder and arson (n. 869 of the General Register of War Crimes). Having received a copy of the Italian investigations, it therefore opened a new file, n. 1976, against the German soldiers whose names were contained in the Vannozzi and Majorca reports.

On December 10, 1946, the American military authorities sent the Italian government the various files of the investigations on Sant'Anna di Stazzema in compliance with a general policy regarding all the investigations undertaken by them. As the victims were Italian, it was up to the Italian government to carry forward the investigations. The United States, obviously, no longer had any interest in doing so, given the new international climate, which would soon lead to the Cold War. We thus reach the crucial moment of the whole episode: Instead of adding the documents received from the American authorities to one of the two files already opened, the Prosecution of German War Criminals Service of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office opened a new file, n. 2163 of the General Register, against the individuals whose names appeared in the American inquiry. To this file was added the original documentation of the American inquiry, and therefore the fundamental testimony of Willi Haase, with the correct indication of the unit responsible for the slaughter.

What is even more serious, and seems to show a precise wish to hide the truth, is that subsequently, instead of following the right path, the Chief Appeal Court Prosecutor's Office continued to pursue the illusory one of the Italian investigations, looking for the officers whose presumed names, badly reported and often further misspelt in the passage from one document to another, had been given by Italian witnesses. Thus, on February 24, 1947, the Deputy Military Prosecutor, Colonel Carlo del Prato, requested information from the *Carabinieri* of Pietrasanta. They sent, as the most up-to-date document in their possession, the report of the warrant officer Vannozzi of the previous July. And on April 26, 1947, the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor Borsari wrote to Padua, where the British were preparing a case for the trial of the Commander of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division Max Simon, referring to the Extraordinary Court of Assizes of Lucca (namely, the Majorca report), and asking for the handing over of two German officers whose names appeared in those investigations. They were told, obviously, that those names were not known to the British military authorities, and it was correctly pointed out that in all probability it had been units of the Sixteenth SS Division that had carried out the slaughter, about which, however, the English admitted that less information had been gathered, even though those which were in their possession were considered sufficient to also include that episode in the charges against the general.

And here we arrive at another essential point in the story: The British investigating magistrates who were conducting the trials of Kesselring in Venice and Simon in Padua, apparently did not know of the American investigation, of which there is no trace in their files (but which had, in any case, been sent to the Italian government at the end of 1946). It is probable that the Americans had decided, before the British, to put an end to the season of war crime trials (who decided to do so in mid-1947), and therefore did not feel obliged to communicate to their main ally the outcome of the investigations conducted by their troops in the Italian theatre. And it is particularly significant that not even in Simon's trial did the documents of the American inquiry appear or be utilized, given that some of the witnesses heard in Padua, and in particular Don Vangelisti, had also been heard by the Americans. It appears difficult

to believe that the British would not have known of this. Nevertheless, they did not feel the need to obtain further documentation because on the basis of the testimonies they had gathered Simon was not only indicted but also found guilty on all charges, including the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema. Nevertheless, the trial did not succeed in elucidating who had been the actual perpetrators of the crime.

But the Italian authorities knew those names. And yet, once again, on September 3, 1947, the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor Borsari wrote to the liaison officer of the War Crimes Group at the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, sending him, for the investigations, the names of the Germans under investigation, which had emerged from the Italian inquiries, apart from everything else further misspelling some of these names. The names indicated in the American file, which were much more accurate, were not sent on. Naturally, the investigations stopped there.

They resumed some months later, when the British handed over Walter Reder to the Italian authorities in May 1948, before disbanding the War Crimes Group. The inquiries were entrusted to the investigating magistrate of the military tribunal of Bologna, since the worst episode for which Reder was being tried was the massacre of Monte Sole. For about three years the investigating magistrate questioned Italian and foreign witnesses, searching for evidence that could link Reder with the slaughter of Sant'Anna di Stazzema, which had been carried out—as is stated in the order of committal for trial, prepared by the Military Prosecutor and the Investigating Magistrate—in the same way that Reder had carried out the massacres of Bardine San Terenzo and Valla of August 19, Vinca on August 24, and Monte Sole on September 29. In short, there was "a method" (which however, and here the two military magistrates were in error, was not the sole prerogative of Reder's reconnaissance battalion, but rather of the division to which he belonged). But it had to be admitted that the evidence against him for Sant'Anna di Stazzema was less "reassuring" than for the other episodes. If truth be told, there was a witness, Biagio Bramanti, who turned up, in October 1951, during the trial, to say that he had seen Reder in Valdicastello on August 12, 1944, but the court did not give credence to this tardy recognition and pointed out the contradictions between the various

testimonies regarding the presence in Sant'Anna of the commander of the reconnaissance battalion, maintaining that there was an element of evidence, but a lack of the links necessary to arrive at "sufficient" evidence to tie Reder to the slaughter of August 12. He was therefore acquitted for lack of evidence with regard to that charge (and at the appeal hearing for not having committed the action).

It should be emphatically pointed out that the Bolognese investigators succeeded in obtaining a copy of the records of Simon's trial, but they did not receive, from the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, a copy of that file no. 2163 of the General Register to which had been added the records of the American investigation of Sant'Anna di Stazzema. If those documents had been sent to the investigating magistrates, it is probable that those really responsible for the massacre could not only have been identified, but found and called to answer for their actions, then, and not 50 years later. It therefore seems obvious to me that well before that file, like the others relating to war crimes committed in Italy, was illegally closed by the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor Santacroce in 1960,[5] justice for the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema was in fact denied by the behavior—whether willful or without malice aforethought is a moot point, even if the events brought out here would tend to make one favor the former hypothesis—of the upper echelons of the Italian military judiciary. It would be necessary to wait until the mid-1990s, when the American inquiry, declassified from the American National Archives, began to circulate among scholars, and the files on the war crimes investigations, found in 1994 in Palazzo Cesi in Rome (the so-called *armadio della vergogna*, or cupboard of shame) in the premises of the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, were finally sent to the competent Military Prosecutors' Offices, so that not only the historical investigation of Sant'Anna di Stazzema could be started again, but also the judicial one, which resulted in the verdict of the military tribunal of La Spezia referred to at the beginning of this book.

The outcome of the Bologna trial of 1951, which today we know to be correct as regards determining Reder's responsibilities, seemed a further mockery to the survivors of Sant'Anna, convinced that in any case Walter Reder had been responsible for the massacre. Undoubtedly, the missing justice was an essential element

in accentuating the feeling of "incommunicability" of the experience, in itself so extreme, which the inhabitants of Sant'Anna had lived through, their "separate" memory.[6] As in other similar situations, this heightened the survivors' sense of isolation, the feeling of being abandoned, which recalled and renewed the sensation of impotence experienced in those terrible moments of the massacre, when nobody in the world could have helped them or saved them from the terrible experiences they were living through. It was precisely this feeling of impotence, the conviction of not succeeding in "communicating" the horror experienced, the distrust felt toward the men of the institutions, who after all were doing so little for them, which the Deputy Police Inspector of Viareggio Vito Majorca, in opening his report on the events, incorrectly defined as a "general conspiracy of silence." However, Majorca immediately afterward found very effective expressions (unusual in a police report) to better explain the desire not to speak:

> Therefore, the elements gathered, which are essentially imprecise, have given a generic framework to the inhuman drama: They have not fixed and embodied it objectively. Vague and subjective elements, which, rather than unraveling or cracking the mystery of the drama, have rendered it more impenetrable. The very few survivors, the only ones that is who can make accusations, do not speak or do not want to speak. They only remember. But, for them, recollection is not a tissue of light, but a zone of shadows where the ghosts of the dead crowd together in a nameless delirium, in the torment of a holocaust suffered without a reason, without faith, without passion: the holocaust of fatality.[7]

That sense of fatality that Majorca noticed was in fact a withdrawal into themselves, the impossibility of working through a bereavement that was too serious to deal with without outside help and the impossibility of finding a plausible reason for what seemed an unexpected and incomprehensible explosion of violence. For a long time, what happened in Sant'Anna remained a "massacre without a reason,"[8] and this aura of mystery has fuelled the proliferation of myths, false information, and imaginative accounts in the search for a cause and a guilty party. And so, while in his various testimonies Don Vangelisti made Don Lazzeri the symbol of the

martyrdom of Sant'Anna, describing him with a child in his arms as he implored the Germans at least to spare the lives of those innocents, the Police Chief Superintendent of Viareggio, Mario Cecioni, charged with resuming the investigations on Sant'Anna on the occasion of the Bolognese committal proceedings against Walter Reder, in a report to the Bologna military tribunal of February 27, 1950, reported the criticisms he had heard in Sant'Anna about the priest who had been killed: Not only had he refused his father's invitation to "clear out" but had even prepared "drinks and beverages to offer the Germans" to placate them (the same behavior, as we will see, he had successfully adopted, a few days earlier in his parish of Farnocchia) and had "assembled women and children near the church, so that it was simpler and quicker for the Germans to slaughter them."[9]

A Random Massacre?

The first explanation given by the survivors was that of a random slaughter. That the massacre had not been planned but represented the sudden evolution of a rounding up operation, was a hypothesis that had been explicitly referred to, as early as 1946, by the Deputy Police Inspector Vito Majorca. Majorca, however, had been unable to find firm evidence of what could have provoked the brusque change of attitude on the part of the Germans. He had probably got the information from Alfredo Graziani, an eyewitness of the events, who in his account published on the occasion of the first anniversary of the massacre, wrote:

> It was said that, near "Vaccareccia," a rifle shot had been fired at the Germans and one of their officers had been wounded. The massacre was, therefore, an unexpected consequence for the Germans themselves who—it is said—would otherwise have restricted themselves to destroying the houses to "punish" the inhabitants for their connivance, present or past, with the partisans. In fact, some people saw a stretcher with a wounded officer being brought down to Valdicastello, and this was also confirmed by the interpreter of an Allied Commission who, last October, went to Sant'Anna for a preliminary inquiry, and said in fact that the Allies were holding some of the SS participants in the massacre, including the wounded officer who, at that time, was in a military hospital in Leghorn.[10]

Therefore the rumor spread immediately after the slaughter and represented a plausible answer to the questions as to the reason for the massacre, all the more so as there was more than one testimony regarding that German. Agostino Bibolotti, questioned in 1951 by the investigating magistrate in the Reder trial, declared that, in the church square of Sant'Anna, he had seen a "wounded German soldier" and stated that his head was bandaged but that there was no trace of blood to be seen: "I therefore thought he had fallen and hurt himself."[11] Cesira Pardini says that at about nine o'clock she saw some Germans passing through Coletti carrying, in a sheet, "a commander wounded in the shoulder" (Gierut 1984, 12). Carlo Biagi saw some soldiers arriving in Valdicastello carrying, on a stretcher, "one of their number wounded in the leg" (Gierut 1984, 54). And as early as September 1944, it was stated in a British report, that after the massacre a German officer, whose name would have been Josef Albritz, had had his bullet wound tended to in Valdicastello.[12]

According to the Deutsche Dienststelle, on August 12 in Sant'Anna there were two wounded men, both of the Eighth Company of the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth SS Grenadier Armored Regiment: a second lieutenant wounded in the abdomen by hand grenade fragments and a corporal with a superficial head wound from a rifle shot.[13] It is therefore confirmed that one or two German soldiers were wounded during the massacre. Much more problematic is the close causal link that sees the wounding—maintained by Graziani and recently taken up again by Bertelli, who writes of the shoulder wound of the squad commander in Vaccareccia, and by Paolo Paoletti (Graziani 1945; Bertelli 1997, 74; Paoletti, 1998)—as triggering the decision to carry out the massacre.

This thesis was soon countered by that of an accidental wounding, by "friendly" fire. Graziani continued his exposition as follows:

> This fact in itself does not prove anything, however. The bursts of machine-gun fire and the shots from the rifles were so intense that the Germans, having flooded into the valley, were shooting wildly with an intimidatory aim, on account of which nothing could be closer to the truth than that the officer should be wounded by his fellow soldiers (Graziani 1945, 33–34).

We have already cited the testimony of Alba Battistini, according to whom the German soldier who spared her and her group by shooting at some sheep, wounded himself: "a cartridge case wounded his upper lip making it bleed."[14] Today we have the confirmation that at least one of the two Germans was wounded accidentally during the massacre: The testimony, at the trial in La Spezia of Adolf Beckerth, whom I have quoted widely, has elucidated that the Untersturmführer (second lieutenant) Herbst of the Eighth Company, wounded in the abdomen by hand-grenade fragments,

> was not wounded by the partisans but when he threw a hand grenade at the woman and that little girl who was at the window where the hand grenade instead of going through the window touched it, rebounded and exploded right in front of him. This news was not official, but it has been told afterward like this unofficially.[15]

Beckerth was instructed, together with others, to carry the officer down below.

The other wounded German was corporal Horst Eggert, also of the Eighth Company, who in a video interview of May 2000 declared that he had been wounded—superficially, according to the Deutsche Dienststelle—in the head by a rifle shot, even if he did not specify by whom. According to a member of the Sixth Company, Ludvig Göring, interrogated in March 2004, a fellow soldier was wounded by a shot fired by a partisan.[16] But it is difficult to believe this version of a single rifle shot: There were no partisans in Sant'Anna on August 12, and it is even more problematic to give credence to what was being whispered in Sant'Anna, of a shot that had been fired, perhaps by the village "idiot," or in any case by some inhabitant of Vaccareccia who, at the arrival of the Germans, got out his hunting rifle. None of the survivors of Vaccareccia, or of anywhere else, heard this shot (which should have preceded the German bursts of machine-gun fire), and it is difficult to understand its purpose, the evident futility of such an act being more than obvious.

Furthermore it appears scarcely convincing that a massacre on such a scale was the response to the superficial wounding of a single soldier: For Sant'Anna there was the mobilization, as was determined by the inquiry of the War Crimes Commission of the Fifth Army, of the entire Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment

of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division, composed of four companies (and in fact the two wounded soldiers belonged to the Eighth Company), armed with heavy machine guns, with a lot of munitions (so many, in fact, that they used at least 14 civilians as munitions carriers), and with mortars (which however do not seem to have been used): There were, according to the estimates, some 150 to 300 men in fighting trim.[17] This is totally out of proportion for a simple rounding up operation, all the more so if one maintains, as does Paoletti, that the Germans were aware that there were no partisans in the zone.

That the action was instead planned as a "roundup intended to be a massacre" (so Klinkhammer [1997, 118] has defined the subsequent operations at the end of September against the partisan Brigade "Stella Rossa" at Monte Sole), is borne out not only by the whole course of the operations that day, but also by the testimony of Gianfranco Quilici, given during the Simon trial. The cook of the villa of Nozzano San Pietro, where Simon's headquarters had been established. The latter had told him in advance of the operation of Stazzema ("He told me that they were going to Stazzema and other villages for a rounding up operation and that they might kill civilians."[18]) On the other hand, many witnesses had the impression of an action planned in advance: Gabriella Pierotti who, as we have seen, survived the massacre in Franchi, expressed herself as follows to the investigating magistrate of the Reder trial on February 22, 1951:

> While the terrifying scene I have described was taking place in my home, in neighboring houses other German soldiers were operating in the same way, both as regards killing people, and as regards the subsequent fires. Evidently, therefore, it was a matter of a systematic action due to precise orders received by the executors and not due to the actions of a single particularly ferocious German soldier.[19]

The same consideration was made by Graziani (and was later taken up again, to the letter, by the Deputy Police Inspector Majorca), another survivor of the massacre: "Both on account of the considerable number of SS troops who took part, and the plan of attack that they developed, it is clear [that] everything had already been foreseen and that the patrols went up there with the precise aim of

doing what they did" (Graziani 1945, 33–34). And today, knowing the declarations of some of the SS soldiers present in Sant'Anna, the planned character of this operation is confirmed. Thus, Ignaz Alois Lippert remembered that, on the way to Sant'Anna di Stazzema, they saw two elderly men who were walking in the same direction. Someone in his squad said that they were partisans; he instead maintained that they were villagers. Without asking them anything, a noncommissioned officer took out his pistol and killed them by shooting them through the back of the neck, leaving them dead on the edge of the road.[20]

Even clearer is the interview given by Horst Eggert, using the pseudonym Alfred Otte, to Christiane Kohl in 1999. Eggert, who was 18 years old, remembers that they were quartered near Pietrasanta. The order regarding what was presented as an operation against the armed bands was given the previous evening: "It was a matter of wiping out the partisans." This, in fact, was how anyone found in the area of the mountains, the men but also the women, who "could be very dangerous," were considered.[21] And a number of orders given to the Wehrmacht included the killing of the civilian population, for example if the latter supplied the partisans with foodstuffs. Finally, Göring admitted that the presumed wounding of his fellow soldier by a partisan only happened after his squad had already killed a group of women.

A final question remains to be tackled, the different behavior of the soldiers in the hamlets farthest from the center of the village (Argentiera, Sennari), where the people were rounded up and sent toward the village (to Argentiera) or to Valdicastello (at Sennari). Furthermore, some of the villages were not affected by the German action (Bambini, Case di Berna and Vallecava). From this circumstance, a change of attitude on the part of the Germans has been deduced: Up to a certain moment, their action was to be restricted to burning the houses or huts and rounding up the people sent toward Valdicastello or Vaccareccia. Only after the firing of the mysterious rifle shot did the roundup turn into a massacre. But, apart from the above-mentioned considerations, it is difficult to identify a precise hour after which the massacre started (the testimonies in this regard are, understandably, not very precise). Furthermore, other considerations of a more strictly tactical nature could explain such

behavior: for example, the need to restrict the perimeter of the field of operations before concentrating on the operations of mass extermination, which, in any case, would require the time and attention of the units involved. It should be borne in mind that Argentiera is on the other slope with respect to the pass that leads to the amphitheatre of Sant'Anna; Case di Berna is the group of houses on the slopes of Monte Gabberi, furthest from the center of the village; and Vallecava is a relatively peripheral hill (today the ossuary is situated there). In any case, a difference in the behavior of the troops can also be detected in the various localities where there were no killings: In Argentiera people were sent toward Vaccareccia; in Bambini there were no acts of violence, and the houses were also spared (so much so as to justify the suspicion on the part of the inhabitants of Sant'Anna that this was due to the presence in those houses of relatives of Fascists); Case di Berna and Vallecava were sidestepped; and in Sennari an officer's intervention prevented the planned massacre from taking place.

It is difficult today to account for these differences of behavior, for which no explanation can be found. Nevertheless, the same can be said for the thesis that the differences of behavior demonstrate a change of attitude on the part of the Germans during the operations in Sant'Anna. A possible hypothesis could be the one advanced by Carlo Gentile: "The vast majority of the killings took place in the western sector, the one closest to the zone of access of the Galler Battalion. This could mean that other units, with a different attitude toward civilians, were involved in the eastern sector" (Gentile 2005, 116–17). On the other hand, the hypothesis is applicable to the small villages of Sennari and Case di Berna, but not to Bambini.

The methods adopted in the roundup/massacre in Sant'Anna di Stazzema are, on the other hand, the same as those that were used a few days later, on August 19 in Valla and on August 24 in Vinca (both in the municipal district of Fivizzano, in the Apuan Alps), and over a month later in Monte Sole. The zone to be "rounded up," which in many testimonies is indicated as a "black zone," represented the perimeter within which anyone encountered, children, the elderly or women, were considered an "enemy" to be eliminated. This zone was surrounded by troops—the total number depended on its size; then it was penetrated by selected troops, normally belonging to the

units most "experienced" in this type of action aiming at extermination. Once the various units were in position, indicated by signal rockets, the massacre began.

Only Germans?

Another explanation formulated by the survivors identified a political and entirely Italian motive for the carnage (the Germans were simply the executors). Deputy Police Inspector Vito Majorca wrote in his report of 1946: "Further more tardy information stated that the SS units were pushed up there by the relatives of some Republicans killed by the partisans on 'Gabberi.'" This information was corroborated by the account according to which the woman who owned a house, further down, in which some SS soldiers were quartered, talking of Sant'Anna received the following reply from an officer: 'Sant'Anna not our fault, responsibility of Italians.'"[22] It is probably a question of the same entry recorded in one of the enclosures of the report of the *Carabinieri* warrant officer Vannozzi, a statement of Stefano Lucchetti, living in Capezzano di Camaiore in the locality of Acquarella, whose house had been partially requisitioned by SS officers starting from early July. These soldiers, according to Lucchetti, participated

> in the carnage of Sant'Anna. Evidently, [Lucchetti] received confirmation of this from their interpreter, a certain Giovanni da Merano, in the late afternoon of August 12. Merano, an Italian soldier, said to him: "What had happened in Sant'Anna di Stazzema . . . was enough to make you shudder," which he could not recount: "You will know about it later," adding that "everything which has happened has to be attributed to the women who acted as informers."[23]

As may be seen, it is a matter of rumors, which nevertheless fuelled many investigations. Stefania Pilli, the wife of the lawyer Lasagna, killed by the partisans on August 14, and the sisters of Emanuele Bottari, who was also executed by the partisans, were dragged into the affair as instigators of the Germans. Regarding the former, who was identified in 1950,[24] further elements did not emerge, and her name disappears from the investigations. There is more documentation instead about the second episode, relating to the killing by

the partisans of Emanuele Bottari, later buried in a field near to the Compito Pass. His sister Severina, who had made arrangements with some relatives and villagers to exhume the body and transfer it to the cemetery of Sant'Anna, not finding people willing to help, gave vent to feelings of resentment toward the village. Shortly afterward, however, some men did collaborate in the operation and brought the body to the cemetery. One of the men who had helped recover Bottari's body, Egisto Berretti, whose house had been spared from destruction, testified that some time afterward Severina and Amelia Bottari, Emanuele's sisters, went to Sant'Anna and told him: "You see, the houses of honorable men have not been set alight."[25] And similar words were repeated by Emanuele Bottari's mother, Alfonsina Timpani, to Elide Pieri, whose son had also helped to exhume the body and bury it decorously. "This makes one think," Elide Pieri concluded in her testimony, "that the people present at the disinterment of the body of the Fascist Bottari Emanuele, were not included among the families against which the Nazi fury vented itself."[26] To this day, Natalina Bottari reports what her father had told her: Severina Bottari had threatened him because he had not helped her to bury her dead brother, informing him in advance that his house would be burnt and his son would meet the same fate as her brother.[27] Severina Bottari admitted having pronounced these words of rancor "in a moment of great despair" but denied any other charge, as did the mother of the murdered man.[28]

Someone else who was also drawn into the affair was Margherita Giorgini, the widow Maggi, whose husband, it was said, had been killed by the partisans. But the woman denied these circumstances, maintaining that she had been convinced that her husband had died because of heart disease.[29]

It certainly appears plausible that the relatives of those killed by the partisans could have expressed resentment and perhaps even satisfaction for what happened in Sant'Anna, a village considered friendly toward the partisans, but one cannot reasonably affirm that a military operation like the one conducted by the SS was only planned to avenge some Fascists, who had, moreover, been killed some time before the massacre. It is to be excluded, in a situation of scarcity of means and men, that German headquarters would commit a whole battalion as a favor to Italian civilians, even if the latter

had, in effect, been their supporters. After all, the investigations on the above-mentioned people did not lead to anything, as the investigators were unable to find anything with which to charge them.

More detailed investigations were conducted on some men who were, as munitions carriers, assisting the Germans: The names that recur in the records are those of three Italians certainly present in Sant'Anna: Aleramo Garibaldi, Giuseppe Ricci, and Guido Buratti. After the massacre, Garibaldi had even obtained safe conduct from the Germans. The two survivors from Colle, Ettore Salvatori and his niece Maria Luisa Ghelardini, had denounced him in January 1946 to the Deputy Police Inspector Majorca, who had tracked Garibaldi down in Terni and taken him to Viareggio. He was recognized by the two of them "as the individual who, at the side of the Germans, helped them to carry out the carnage." Garibaldi denied "having participated with the Germans in the above-mentioned slaughter,"[30] but he was not believed and was declared as being detained for the Public Prosecutor at the Extraordinary Court of Assizes of Lucca. Guido Buratti was also arrested. A few months later, in May, Ettore Salvatori also recognized Ricci as the one who had taken him by the arm to make him go into the ditch where Garibaldi "in shirt sleeves was helping the Germans to position the machine gun" which then killed the whole group.[31]

Ettore Salvatori once again accused the three men when the investigations resumed on the occasion of the committal proceedings against Reder. In the group of Germans who had arrived in Colle there were also the three men. Twice, Ricci had grabbed his arm telling him to go "down," where he found a German and Garibaldi who were putting the belt in the machine gun. After 19 months, he saw Ricci again in Querceta, and the latter first denied and then admitted having been in Sant'Anna.[32]

In a later cross-examination involving Ettore Salvatori, Maria Luisa Ghelardini, and Giuseppe Ricci, Salvatori recognized Ricci, who denied having arrived in Colle and instead maintained that he had reached Sennari. The girl was much more uncertain about the recognition but confirmed having seen Buratti—who was carrying his brother-in-law's bicycle on his shoulders—and Garibaldi near the machine gun. She had subsequently met the latter in 1945 in Pietrasanta and had had him stopped by a policeman. After having

denied it, he later admitted having been present in Sant'Anna. She had then gone to the partisan headquarters, but she had been told that Garibaldi had already been interrogated, without being charged. Naturally, the three men[33] maintained that they had been forced to carry munitions and had not collaborated freely with the Germans. But what fuelled suspicions was the fact that the majority of munitions carriers had been killed by the Germans after they had been used, and those who were not killed (for example, Agostino Bibolotti, who was made to carry the radio), had later been deported to Nozzano Castello, the site of the SS headquarters. Nevertheless, none of these accusations came to anything, as was the case following the arrest of Garibaldi and Buratti in 1946. In 1950, Police Chief Superintendent Cecioni wrote in the final report of his investigations that he had not been able to identify Garibaldi, who was not from those parts.[34] In any case, it should be pointed out that Aleramo Garibaldi lost his wife and two children in the massacre. This must have carried considerable weight in his probable acquittal in the committal proceedings, even if public opinion maintains that the day before the massacre he warned his wife to leave the village with the children, and she did not listen to him.

Finally, we have already seen that some of the witnesses reported the presence in Sant'Anna of soldiers in German uniforms who spoke Italian, some with the typical accent of the zone, and they hid their faces with a net or bandage (a detail which, however, is not found in any of the testimonies immediately following the massacre). Angelo Berretti maintains that one of these men acted as a guide:

> My sisters got to the top of the Compito Pass on the other slope from where one can see the Apuan Alps, Corchia, etc. They saw, below, a very large number of people, men who were coming up. They listened and heard one of them say, "Come on! In a few minutes we'll be at the top of the Compito Pass."[35]

Nevertheless, today we know that there were quite a few Italians enrolled in the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division. Simon stated that in the division, which included about 10,000–12,000 men, there were Germans, Alsatians, and Italians and that behind the lines half the regular troops were Italian. This presence was

denied by Simon's successor, Baum, who stated that "no Italian wore a German uniform," but it was confirmed by Frederich Knorr, who was in charge of the services of the division and had about 320 men under him: "20 percent of all the branches of the administration was made up of Italians. I had 120 Italian volunteers. The same uniform of any other soldier of the SS."[36] The presence of Italians enrolled in the division is also confirmed today by a member of the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion, which operated in Sant'Anna, Lippert (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 50).

In short, I think I can exclude, for Sant'Anna di Stazzema, at the present state of the testimonies, the official involvement of men of the political and military apparatuses of Republican Fascism, which instead operated at the side of Reder's SS a few days later, in the great roundup of the Valle del Lucido in the Apuan Alps on August 24, in which the Black Brigade of Carrara and men of the Republican National Guard participated. If the collaboration of some Italians with the Germans is plausible—both as guides on the paths (on the other hand, one should not underestimate the meticulous preparation of actions like that of Sant'Anna, also with the preparation of very detailed maps of the territory, and with preliminary reconnaissance activities[37]), and during the action—this action has had, according to all the evidence, a totally subordinate character.

The Accusations against the Partisans

If the idea of a random slaughter, or one induced by the Fascists, represented the attempt to give a plausible explanation for what had happened, there is no doubt that the most widespread accusations for the responsibility of the massacre were directed at the partisans (as happened, after all, in other episodes). In 1950, Police Chief Superintendent Cecioni could write as follows, in his report, cited several times: "Almost all the inhabitants of Sant'Anna express the opinion that their misfortune should be attributed to shortcomings in the conduct of the partisans in that difficult situation."[38] These accusations were crystallized in a specific event, an episode seen as being responsible for unleashing German violence.

In a British report, undated but undoubtedly prior to September 15, 1944, signed by Major Cromwell, it states that on August 7,

Sant'Anna, full of refugees from Farnocchia and other villages, was reached by a German patrol, to order the evacuation of the village within five days. Immediately afterward the partisans tore up the notice, replacing it with one of their own in which they guaranteed that they would protect the inhabitants, inviting them not to obey. In the early morning, on August 12, a German patrol ascertained that the evacuation had not been carried out in the expected period, and at about eight the massacre started. The officer who forwarded this report to the headquarters of the Fourth Corps maintained therefore that it was doubtful whether the massacre could be considered a war crime, since the majority of the inhabitants of Sant'Anna were involved in partisan activity and had refused to comply with a German order: a serious and unfounded statement, both in terms of international law, which has never accepted the killing of women and children as a collective punishment or reprisal, and in terms of ethics, but significant from the historical point of view, because it denotes a fundamental insensitivity for the fate of the civilian population in wartime, common to the military culture of the age.[39]

That report, written immediately with information gathered on the spot soon after the slaughter, shows how, in the days immediately after the massacre, public opinion (on which the British report was based without any corroborating evidence) explicitly linked the carnage with the failure to evacuate the village, for which the partisans were held responsible. In the account written six days after the slaughter, Don Giuseppe Vangelisti also referred to a notice attached to the church door by the partisans on July 30 (it should be noted that the date does not precede that given in the British report), in which the population of Sant'Anna was called upon not to obey the evacuation order. Despite this, following clashes that had occurred that day in the environs, all the families of Sant'Anna had left the village. In the meantime, however, a German officer reassured the civilians and permitted them to return to their homes. In his deposition before the American Commission of Inquiry, on October 8, 1944, the priest stated, instead, that he had seen the partisans' notice on July 26 and had never seen any evacuation order on the part of the Germans. One "Alfrido [sic] Curzi" testified that someone from La Culla had spoken to him about a German evacuation order posted near the church (which he supposed was printed, like the one

he had seen in Seravezza): The partisans' notice had been attached on top of the German one.[40]

That there was an evacuation order had also been asserted by Graziani: "The rumour spread that Sant'Anna had been declared a 'black zone' and, therefore, had to be evacuated by the population. Everyone was extremely worried" (Graziani 1945, 17). Leone Palagi backdates the German order considerably: "On the morning of 29 July . . . five or six partisans armed to the teeth, removed from the façade of the church of Sant'Anna a notice which the Germans had posted about 15 days earlier, and which ordered the evacuation of the zone . . . and they attached another one" (Palagi 1981, 63). Mario Curzi, another witness heard by the Americans, who had fought for about a month in Bandelloni's unit and witnessed the massacre, stated that the inhabitants did not want to disobey the evacuation order but, rather than trusting to luck in searching for another place where to live, they had preferred to remain there.[41] Don Vangelisti precisely sets the evacuation of Sant'Anna after the clashes between the partisans and the Germans of July 30 (with which we will deal later): "We could no longer delude ourselves and the exodus which then took place, forced but comprising almost all the families of Sant'Anna, released me from a nightmare which had been haunting me for a long time. They took refuge in the huts, in the lower caves for some time" (Vangelisti 1945, 26–27).

At the trial in La Spezia, the person who stated with the greatest conviction that he had seen the German evacuation order was Angelo Berretti, who at the time was 11 years old:

> The Germans had brought an evacuation order . . . A few days before August 12, it had already happened it seems to me . . . or very close to August 8 when they had burnt Farnocchia . . . They came to the church and put up this notice and the news spread around the village . . . We lived a short distance from the church, about a kilometer and a half from the church, the news came that the Germans had brought an evacuation order, so my father and my mother and me too went there to the church square and for me it was right there near to the door of the church, there was this notice posted which said, "Order of evacuation German Headquarters." . . . Then the people . . . these women together, and they were saying, "But where shall we go now?! We left our houses in the plain, we thought

> we would be safe, we arrived here, we settled in, we found ourselves . . .” even in caves; people had withdrawn in the mountain caves and to separate men and women they had made some screens with chestnut branches. The women were all anguished because they didn't know where to go; they all spoke, like this then at a certain point each one made her way home. A few days later there was the news that “The partisans have put up a notice that they are the defenders, not to evacuate, thank goodness . . .” What did people do? My mother, my father and so many others . . . I say my father and my mother, but there it was like a procession, everyone went to find out exactly what was happening at that moment. They went there; they were reading, and the women [said,] “Thank goodness!” They were happy, satisfied: ‘Thank goodness there's no need to evacuate because the partisans have put up a notice not to evacuate,” and it was signed [by] partisan Headquarters . . . Then everyone went his own way.[42]

It is therefore probable that, in the realm of the various evacuation orders that assailed the zone, the inhabitants of Sant'Anna were also told to leave their homes even if, as we have seen, the testimonies regarding a German order, posted for all to see, are not in agreement. Apart from Berretti's 2004 testimony, no one in the official documents claimed to have seen it personally, and its existence was denied by the Italian Deputy Police Inspector Majorca who, after the war, investigated the massacre.[43] Probably it was not so much a question of a real notice, as of a rumor that spread, perhaps because of the fact that Sant'Anna was a hamlet of Stazzema, whose evacuation had already been ordered. Once again, Graziani, who personally lived through those events, wrote that:

> *There were no precise orders, nor were there ever any* [my italics]. There were those who said that there were, and those who said that there weren't. Some of those who went to the town hall of Stazzema confirmed that the village was not included in the evacuation; but being in doubt, most of us packed up and went down near to Valdicastello . . . It lasted a few days: Because—I remember—between August 5 and 8 we all returned to Sant'Anna, having received an official assurance from the German Headquarters, where some courageous people had gone, that we could go home as long as there were no partisans in the village. (Graziani 1945, 17)

Another survivor, Renato Bonuccelli, remembers: "Toward the beginning of August, we were notified to leave the village. We went to a place near Argentiera. For two nights we slept in a barn on a sheet spread out on the hay, tormented by every type of insect . . . Then we were told that the danger had passed and we went back to our homes" (Bonuccelli 1995, 32).

Following that order the sisters Giuliana and Anna Maria Mutti left Sant'Anna with their mother, where they had only recently moved. They remember, 50 years later, that their mother accompanied, to the German Headquarters in Fiumetto, a female primary school teacher, Albertina Lazzareschi who, having spoken to the German commander, left his office stating: "Sant'Anna can stay as it is." Albertina Lazzareschi in fact returned to Sant'Anna, where she died on August 12. The sisters, having already brought their things down and not able to find anyone who could take them to Sant'Anna, stayed in their new lodgings and saved themselves.[44] At the trial in La Spezia, Anna Maria, who was 19 years old, places that encounter between August 8 and 12, thus demonstrating how vague and contradictory memories can be, after so many years. (We have seen that the evacuation happened at the end of July, and the return to Sant'Anna between 5 and 8 August.) Subsequently, the version of the meeting with the German commander changed:

> They went to the headquarters, which I think was near Tonfano, between Fiumetto and Tonfano, I couldn't tell you precisely . . . When they came back our mother told us what had happened and said that they arrived, and there was the interpreter who was Mrs. Ciampolini; we knew her because she was the owner of the hotel in Fiumetto . . . I know that this lady said to these two who were . . . "It's a bad morning because the commander is nervous," and I remember that they were about to go in but the soldier who was on guard duty only allowed this Mrs. Albertina to pass; my mother remained outside in the corridor, but she says that there was a glass door and that she could see what was happening, let's say. Then this lady explained her problem: She asked if Sant'Anna had to be evacuated. The lady translated and the commander opened a map, looked at it, and drawing a small circle with a red pencil said, "Sant'Anna can stay as it is," these exact words, upon which this Mrs. Albertina came out happy and blissful, embraced my mother and said "*Signora*, we can go back, we can go

> back!" and they came away. Then she said, "Come back up, come back . . ." She had a room up there, her things, everything.[45]

Some people give a lot of importance to this alleged reassurance and consider it evidence of a kind of "trap" that the SS set for the inhabitants of Sant'Anna. But it is a hypothesis that does not appear to be plausible to me, both for the confusion of dates and the vagueness of the recollections. No one witnessed that conversation, which today we are told lasted a few minutes; No one can really say what information was given. No one, apart from anything else, can state that it was an SS headquarters and not of another unit of the Wehrmacht stationed in the zone, whose possible assurances to the population of Sant'Anna, even admitting that there had been such assurances, could without any problem be ignored—either because they did not know of them or because they did not represent any restriction—by the SS units that carried out the action on a precise order to annihilate the bandits, namely, as we shall see, a scorched earth strategy. It should, furthermore, be stressed that, according to what Graziani states in the passage, the permission to return would be subject to the absence of partisans, who instead continued to remain in the zone until August 8, as we shall see later.

What Giuseppe Pardini, who was born in Sant'Anna, asserts in a written record also appears improbable: After the destruction of Farnocchia on August 8, on August 9, Don Vangelisti and Miss Scalero went to the German headquarters in Camaiore "to hear if we had to evacuate both Sant'Anna and La Culla. They were both told that, as there were no longer any partisans there, the part of the slope of the church of Sant'Anna and La Culla had been declared a white zone. Therefore no evacuation. Miss Scalero was subsequently also barbarically killed on August 12" (Giannelli 1997, 41). Such an event does not find corroboration either in the various versions of his record or in any of Don Vangelisti's many testimonies about the events in Sant'Anna,[46] while it is certain that, if it had actually happened, the priest would undoubtedly have reported it. In fact, Don Vangelisti, in talking about the return of the population, makes a veiled criticism of those who trusted German reassurances: "The unexpected calm induced the repopulation of the village. The people were too attached to their animals, their cottages, their land. I

realized that they had been taken in by certain ambiguous promises of the German headquarters" (Vangelisti 1945, 26–27).

In conclusion, it seems certain to me that the news of an evacuation order spread to Sant'Anna and provoked an exodus of the population that nevertheless only lasted a few days: Because of the difficulty of finding other places where to settle and the more-or-less unfounded rumor of reassurances from the Germans regarding the exclusion of the village from that order, the inhabitants returned to Sant'Anna. Another thing that appears unfounded is the news of a rapid evacuation order imposed by the Germans on August 7, contained in the British report, or on August 5, as Bergamini and Bimbi maintain (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 150). This was probably an attempt to exclude the responsibility for the massacre from the partisan leaflet, attached on July 29, in other words according to this thesis, a week earlier [!] than the German evacuation order.

There can be no possible doubt as to the existence of the notice attached by the partisans. Massimo Pellegrini remembers having seen it "attached to the door of the little shop (in the church square)" (Gierut 1984, 129). After the war, Alderano Vecoli gave it to Don Vangelisti, who kept it: The original has been photographically reproduced in the books by Giannelli and Bonuccelli and in the 1993 edition, edited by the Municipal District of Stazzema, of Don Vangelisti's written record with the caption: "The original copy of the leaflet put up by the partisans in the church square." After all, its existence is also confirmed by the partisans: Lorenzo Bandelloni, the commander of the partisan formation that remained in the zone to the last, recounted years later that the notice had been decided on in a meeting about Sant'Anna in which he had not participated, but he knew that Alvo Fontani, the political commissar of the newly created X Bis Garibaldi Brigade, had been present. He maintained that, when he subsequently read the text, he was opposed to it, considering a similar notice to be an irresponsible "provocation" (Gierut 1984, 35–36). Marcello Iacopi, another partisan, in a statement of 1945, declared,

> A sheet from the partisan Headquarters was attached in the village square. I also read the sheet, which called upon the population not to obey the Germans, to arm themselves and help the partisans who, with all their forces, would defend the zone . . . The statement, which

> could be called official, about defending the zone and the civilians, put us all into a warlike ferment full of patriotism. So we began to prepare to face the consequent German reaction. (Orlandi 1945, 13)

Another testimony is that of Edo Polacci, also a partisan, who stated that he was the one who had typed the leaflet in a small chestnut-drying building under Monte Gabberi on July 20, during a meeting of some partisan commanders and political commissars. Eight copies of the leaflet were made to be affixed in the various hamlets of Stazzema, in Levigliani and Farnocchia. Edoardo Banchieri maintained that it had also been affixed in Capriglia (Giannelli 1992, 292).

According to the testimony of Polacci, which was however very tardy, the decision to go ahead with the leaflet was imposed by the members of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN, Committee of National Liberation) against the views of Ottorino Balestri, the brigade commander; Alvo Fontani, a political commissar; and other commanders who were present:

> There was a long and bitter discussion: On the one hand, there were those of the CLN who maintained that it was only a question of an appeal against the absurd and unfeasible evacuation order of the population toward Northern Italy . . . of an encouragement to get involved in the struggle, along the lines of the leaflets which were being thrown every day from American aircraft . . . Ottorino Balestri and the other commanders said in no uncertain terms: None of us is in a position to guarantee an intervention of that kind, we are, at this point, tired, hungry and unarmed, we are not at all happy with that leaflet. (Giannelli 1992, 306)

Leaving aside the accuracy of this version, provided many years later and aimed at attributing the responsibility for the leaflet to the "civilians" of the Committee of National Liberation, it seems to me indisputable that in any case it was an initiative that came from the anti-Fascist fighting front and was not a fake, as some people even today persist in claiming. And after all the appeal not to evacuate followed the precise directives that Renato Bitossi, a member of the Tuscan Committee of National Liberation and in charge of the Garibaldi Brigade in this zone, had sent on July 12, 1944, to two

of his local contacts, one of whom was a member of the Camaiore CLN. In the face of the German evacuation orders it was necessary to urge all the women and children to undertake passive resistance. And this explains why the famous leaflet was signed "From the Headquarters of the Garibaldi Assault Brigade" and not from the headquarters of the X b Garibaldi Brigade, since it reproduced, almost to the letter, Bitossi's instructions. He had in fact written: "1) the passive resistance of all the women and children (remaining in their own homes without following the order to leave)," and the leaflet declared: "The women, the old, the children should not leave their homes and should offer passive resistance." Bitossi added, "We will respond to reprisals with reprisals," and the leaflet claimed, "The partisan formations are ready for action and will respond to reprisals with reprisals." It was addressed "to the population of Versilia" and urged "all the men to arm themselves with every available means from hunting rifles to pitchforks."[47]

But what is the relationship between the evacuation order, the leaflet posted by the partisans that called upon the civilian population not to obey the order, the evacuation that did not happen, and the slaughter? It seems to me that on this point things are much more complex than the direct causal link supported by many people in their search for a *simple* explanation for the controversies that have above all characterized the years following the massacre. First of all, it should be stressed that most of the inhabitants of Sant'Anna had left the village at the end of July and therefore had not followed the exhortation of the partisans to remain and disobey the evacuation order. And the return to the village certainly did not happen because of pressure from the partisans. Furthermore, in his report of 1946, Deputy Police Inspector Majorca noted that "in the other villages the Germans had sent the population away with fairly brisk means. Then why was this particular fate solely reserved for Sant'Anna?"[48] And, in effect, sometimes the evacuation orders were not respected because of the opposition of the population (as in the case of the demonstrations by the women of Carrara from July 7 to 11, which prevented the evacuation of the city); at other times, there was the possibility of negotiating with German headquarters, as in Capriglia where the intervention of Margherita Cerpelli, a German by birth, at the German headquarters of Pietrasanta, succeeded in averting,

for some days, the evacuation of the village (and when the order was repeated, they all became members of the Todt, the German organization responsible for public and fortification works, and could remain in their own homes)[49]; or in Farnocchia, where the parish priest had managed to get a 24-hour delay. In that village, among other things, the partisan leaflet was posted, but it does not appear that it provoked particular reactions in the Germans, who had gone up there to convey the evacuation order.

I therefore think that the failure to evacuate was not the direct cause of the slaughter. Consequently, the much-discussed leaflet of the partisans, above and beyond the historical judgment one could make about it as regards its advisability, cannot be considered responsible for the unleashing of the subsequent German violence—violence, it should be forcefully repeated, which in any case was totally unjustified also with respect to any regulations and interpretation of international law that could legitimize the so-called reprisals, inasmuch as it struck a defenseless population, condemned to extermination in order to punish it for its presumed active involvement in the Resistance movement.

Nevertheless, if the nonevacuation of the population of Sant'Anna di Stazzema cannot "in itself" be considered the cause that triggered the slaughter, it could have assumed the significance of a confirmation of the active involvement of the civilians in the partisan struggle, for whoever decided on the operation against the "partisans" on the subsequent August 12, above all after the clashes of August 8, which we will consider later. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the motives behind the violence that was unleashed in Sant'Anna di Stazzema, leaving aside any attempt to find one cause and turning instead to the context of the fight against the armed bands in that part of upper Versilia in the summer of 1944.

3

Fighting the Armed Bands, the War against Civilians

The Partisans

The start of the Resistance in this area, as in others, was difficult. Small groups of anti-Fascists and disbanded soldiers of the former army found themselves in inaccessible zones, making contact with the anti-Fascists who had remained in the villages and trying to organize some sort of liaison with them. A group of men, later called "Hunters of the Apuan Alps," gathered in the zone of Ruosina (Seravezza) around pilot officer Gino Lombardi, born in 1920, a student at the University of Pisa. An anti-Fascist by family tradition (his father was a Socialist), he had been a member of Catholic Action, and his formative influences found expression in the varied political allegiances of his men, so much so that it provoked suspicion in other partisan commanders, in the bordering zones, who had Communist leanings.[1] The group, originally composed of about ten people, grew after the various announcements of calls to arms—by the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic)—which increased the number of draft dodgers who went into the hills, and so the group came to include over 20 people.

At the end of January 1944, Lorenzo Bandelloni, sent by the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN, Committee of National Liberation) of Stazzema—an infantryman of the Sassari Division who had returned from Yugoslavia, where he had been for a short while with Tito's partisans—joined the formation. He was mainly concerned with the "provisioning of the men hidden in the hills between Monte Gabberi and Farnocchia" (Bergamini and Bimbi

P. Pezzino, *Memory and Massacre*

1983, 77).[2] This was a delicate problem, due to the scarcity of foodstuffs, but it was also a fundamental issue because being able to keep many men in hiding depended on good relations with the peasants, and more generally with the civilian population. "There were serious problems, above all concerning food, for a military formation in the Apuan Alps," as is stated in the report of the brigade (Giannelli 1992, 51). The first Allied drop took place at the Mosceta Pass at the end of February 1944, but the difficulties of procurement continued, so much so that in April the partisans had to rob the outlet of the consumers' cooperative of Pontestazzemese.

From March, the roundups by the Republican National Guard increased, reaching a peak in April: The Resistance was in this period above all an issue between Italians—partisan fighters on one side and Fascist Republicans on the other. Even though the latter had the support of the Germans, they themselves conducted the operations against the "rebels." On April 17, Lombardi's formation, on Monte Gabberi, was attacked in a roundup conducted by the Republican National Guard and the men of the X Mas: Still militarily disorganized, it had recently grown excessively in relation to its organizational capacities and armaments, but nevertheless succeeded in getting away. Then the Fascists occupied Farnocchia and interrogated various men, suspected of collaborating with the partisans.

As late as the spring of 1944, the "general political situation" in the provinces of Lucca and Apuania was seen in positive terms by German sources. A report of the Militärkommandatur 1015-Lucca, having jurisdiction over the provinces of Lucca, Pistoia, Apuania, Leghorn, and Pisa, regarding the month of April stated that "most of the population maintains a calm attitude," while not interesting itself in the conduct of the war. The May report highlights the intensification of the partisan movement, which nevertheless had not "disturbed the tranquility of work nor had it interrupted work activities," but it was also noted that "vast sectors of the population are expecting an imminent invasion by the Anglo-American forces" (Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana 1997, 363, 382).

On April 21, 1944, Gino Lombardi and his deputy commander were killed in an exchange of fire with the Fascists at Sarzana, where they had gone, it seems, to prepare for the transfer toward Upper Lunigiana. The Hunters of the Apuan Alps then disbanded and

the majority gathered around Bandelloni, who led them near to Seravezza, in order to stay in contact with the CLN of that village, which supported him with supplies (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 89). News of the airdrops, through "Radio Rosa," were received by the radio operator, Vera Vassalle, a young teacher from Viareggio, who on September 14, 1943, had left her city, had managed to cross the front line, and had been trained by the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), returning to Viareggio the following January 19 with a radio transmitter. "I was the only one who was able to get the news of the airdrops" as Bandelloni later remembered (Giannelli 1992, 101). On May 13, this group also joined the formation denominated "Mulargia" of Marcello Garosi "Tito," with Communist leanings. Bandelloni, with a few men, operated in the plain and was concerned with procurement (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 99). On June 4, they moved, with a 48-hour march, to the zone of Forno, very close to Massa, because they had received news of an imminent roundup. Additions to this group included Ottorino Balestri, a former infantry second lieutenant who had already collaborated with Gino Lombardi, as well as some deserters from a unit of the X Mas of Pietrasanta.

In these months, the Germans were more concerned with the forced evacuation of the population from the front and with finding a labor force than with fighting the armed bands. "The overriding commitment of the Administration is at the moment the evacuation of the coastal zone," as is stated in a report of April 14: "So far, the evacuation of Marina di Pisa and Viareggio has been ordered." And in the following report it is repeated that "the evacuation of the coastal zones has continued to be the pivot of administrative activity." It was also stated that 14,000 people had been evacuated, up to then, from Viareggio, Marina di Pisa, and Gombo. Furthermore, reference was made to the problem, crucial for the Germans, of manpower: No one responded to the mobilizations of the labor exchanges, so much so that "from the whole region, under the control of the headquarters, which has 1,450,000 inhabitants, only about 110 people have been made available for manpower in the Reich." The report went on to ask for "an identity card for work" and "an efficient labor police," in order to use coercive methods: in effect, a generalized police system that would consider the civilian

population, as a whole, exclusively as a resource to be exploited for the needs of the Reich (Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana 1997, 365, 384).

Starting from June, the war enters a new phase. After the fall of Rome, the front moves very quickly, the Germans are in serious difficulties. Their retreat seemed as if it would turn into a rout, while the defensive line, called the Gothic Line or Green Line, was not ready yet. German sources accurately record the change. A report of June 15, 1944, states that

> under the pressure of these events the people have already prepared for the imminent Anglo-American occupation of this region . . . The vast majority of the population openly sympathizes with the enemy under the effect of the German withdrawal, irritation with Fascism, and the impact of English propaganda. Such sympathy is total . . . The activity of the armed bands has, at times, assumed the aspect of open rebellion, with attacks on means of transport of the German Army and things like that. (Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana 1997, 402–403).

The report referred to the recent "passing to the rebels" of those belonging to the military district of Massa (which happened during the partisan occupation of Forno, which I will shortly deal with), it indicated the crumbling of the Italian military units, and an intensification of the fight against the armed bands, "conducted with the necessary harshness" both in the province of Lucca and in that of Apuania, "employing a unit of the Wehrmacht and a strengthened SS battalion." From the middle of June 1944, fighting the armed bands thus becomes a decisive element in the German conduct of the war. With the Allied advance toward the North after the seizure of Rome, there was an increase in Kesselring's orders and draconian proclamations on the measures to be adopted to fight the armed bands.

On June 6, 1944, General Alexander, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Italy, sent a message to the "patriots of occupied Italy," in which he made

> an appeal to all the patriots of Italy to rise up united against the common enemy . . . Where the latter tries to withdraw or attenuate the

> battle of annihilation, I appeal to all of you to strike him with my troops which are advancing. Do all that is in your power to hinder the enemy's movements, to heighten the confusion . . . The Liberation of Italy is taking place for your cause; collaborate with me: Together we will attain victory. (Secchia and Frassati 1962, 112)

On the night between June 8 and 9 there was another radio message from the General to the "patriots . . . who find themselves between our advancing troops and the Pisa-Rimini line," called by the Germans "the line of the Goths":

> Do all that you possibly can to destroy, delay, deceive the enemy with all the means you use . . . The order is to harry the German troops and in particular to hinder their transport. For the above-mentioned zones the order is: Kill the Germans, destroy their means of transport in every way . . . A valid instruction for all the patriots, is: Kill the Germans, destroy their materials. (Casella 1972, 144–45, and with slight modifications in Palla 1974, 171–72)

The expectation of an imminent end to the conflict gave an impetus to the mobilization of the partisan movement, but it also led, at times, to reckless actions that had tragic repercussions. Thus, on June 9, the partisans of the "Mulargia," expecting the imminent arrival of the Allies and spurred on by a misinterpretation of two radio messages from Radio London, announcing an airdrop and, at least so it was thought, an Allied landing between Viareggio and Marina di Carrara (the airdrop actually happened, the landing obviously did not), occupied Forno, using it as an outpost on the way to the city of Massa. They were about 200–300, poorly armed and badly trained, and in the village they were well received even by the warrant officer of *Carabinieri* who was stationed there. They did not do anything to go unnoticed. In addition to attacking the local Fascists, they attacked a lorry of the X Mas coming from La Spezia, they pushed forward as far as Massa where they attacked a barracks of the Black Brigades, the recruiting center and a barracks of the Republican Army, bringing about the desertion of all the soldiers who were quartered there, they arrested some Fascists, they seized the son of the head guard of the prison of Massa, negotiating his freedom with that of 11 political prisoners. From as far away as the

province of Lucca, soldiers of the Fascist Republican armed forces who had deserted also reached Forno.

The Apuan CLN, having realized the recklessness of the action undertaken by the formation, repeatedly ordered the evacuation of the village and, in the following days, sent its members of various political parties to Forno. June 13 was the feast of St. Anthony, the patron saint of Forno, and perhaps this may have delayed the withdrawal from the village, which had nevertheless been decided on. But at dawn, on that day, troops of the X Mas and composite German forces (detachments from the naval unit "Riviera Italiana," the Fortress Battalion 105, the Luftwaffe, the SS) attacked the village, taking the partisans by surprise and capturing it after some fighting, in the course of which "Tito," the commander of the formation, was killed.

Perhaps with the help of a spy who had infiltrated the partisans in the preceding days, the men present in the village were then sorted out. Some, deserters from the recruiting center of Massa, evacuees, inhabitants of Forno, were deported to Germany. Those suspected of being partisans were instead executed by firing squad on the evening of June 13, on the banks of the river Frigido. There were 68 victims: 56 (including the *Carabinieri* warrant officer) were executed by firing squad, two died in the fire in the barracks, and 10 in the armed conflict and the roundup (including a woman hit within her own home and a 9-year-old boy).[3]

After that episode, the "Mulargia" disbanded. Bandelloni and Balestri, having escaped the slaughter, reunited their men in the hills near Seravezza; they divided them into three companies, "also in order to obviate the serious difficulties of procurement" (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 110), and named the new formation "Gino Lombardi," the first leader of the partisan movement killed, as we have seen, the previous April. Bandelloni, well thought of by the Americans because of the news about him sent to the OSS by "Radio Rosa," continued to be favored by the airdrops, even if the first OSS officers who subsequently arrived in Versilia did not confirm that flattering opinion (Petracchi and Reali Vannucci 1995, 110).

On June 18 the formation retrieved some Allied airdrops, but the Germans identified the place, and so on June 20 the formation's headquarters were transferred to Tacca Bianca, in the Altissimo, an

imposing massif of the Apuan Alps, a virtually inaccessible position, but which could easily be isolated. On the evening of the 28th, following further clashes with the Germans, partisans of other companies also went to Tacca Bianca, where they joined the men of the leading company. Nevertheless, it was decided that the position had become indefensible, and on July 3 there was a return to the zone of Monte Gabberi, above Sant'Anna di Stazzema, from where the partisans of Gino Lombardi had started out the previous spring.[4]

The Unification of the Formations

Also in order to meet the need for greater coordination in view of a liberation which seemed imminent, and not only because of the wishes of the parties—above all the Communist—to control armed groups which often arose spontaneously, through gathering around a leader, there was an attempt to unify the many small formations in the zone. The efforts of Alvo Fontani, a Florentine member of the Gruppi di Azione Patriottica (GAP, resistance movement of the Italian Communist Party), sent to Versilia by the Tuscan delegation of the General Headquarters of the Garibaldi brigades and assault detachments, were decisive in bringing about the unification which also led to the appointment of a political commissar.

Sergio Breschi, from Viareggio, who had escaped from prison at the end of June, also joined this unified force. He was in contact with Renato Bitossi, a Florentine, born in 1899, an anti-Fascist of an older generation compared to the majority of partisans, he was responsible for the Garibaldi brigades in the provinces of Apuania, Lucca, Pisa, Leghorn (after the Liberation, he became President of the Lucca CLN and later Deputy Mayor of Florence).[5] He appointed Breschi as the deputy political commissar of the "Gino Lombardi," and Breschi went to the headquarters, which were still in Tacca Bianca, by means of an adventurous journey in the quarrymen's cable car (which jammed and remained suspended in mid-air). At headquarters, he found Fontani, Bandelloni, Balestri, Colonel Enzo Mencaraglia, an air force pilot, who had been with Bandelloni's group since May. Mencaraglia, who sought to be in command, was marginalized and left the formation. (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 113).

In 1951 Mencaraglia, who had in the meantime become the commander of the air force garrison of Malpensa Airport, remembered leaving the partisan formation "because of differences in political ideas and, above all, in the methods adopted."[6] In an interview with Giannelli much later, he explained that break as follows:

> I had about a hundred men with me and I gave the order to climb to Tacca Bianca with a precise aim: to release the population from any obligations and make sure that the lads remained united at the headquarters. I wanted to organize our survival in a military way . . . Unfortunately, there had already been isolated cases of individual arrogance, which I absolutely intended avoiding in future . . . Certainly one of the main problems was that of a single leadership: I no longer intended accepting responsibilities, even moral ones, in a situation which could be compromised by the duality of command and the confusion of leadership. In this connection, without notice, toward the end of June 1944, one day Sergio Breschi from Viareggio, Pietro Del Giudice, the Florentine Alvo Fontani and others came to Tacca Bianca. Lorenzo Bandelloni was also present. The Florentine said that it was necessary to establish a hierarchy with a politician in absolute command. Subordinate to him would be the military commander whose only task was to prepare the men for combat. I replied that the proposal was unacceptable . . . I had immediately realized that they had come to Tacca Bianca with the intention of imposing their views. It was not a long discussion and when it came to voting I naturally found myself in a minority. I took my rifle, a magazine and arranged to leave by means of the cable car of the quarrymen of the Altissimo. (Giannelli 1992, 120–21)

In another publication, he accused Bandelloni of being inexperienced, and of exercising little control over the formation, in which he had accepted too many Germans. He also suspected that not all the airdrops reached the formation, and he denounced the violence committed by the partisans against the civilian population to obtain food. With regard to a single leadership, he confirmed his conviction that it was a "Communist plan to take over and dominate the formation" (Gierut 1984, 110). For his part, Bandelloni, while confirming the penetration of the parties in the life of the formation ("the Communist Party, represented by Sergio Breschi, was the one which tried its best to get in"), accused Mencaraglia of "coming up

there in his captain's uniform, and people began to grumble." On the other hand, he did recognize that, in effect, not all the material from the airdrops reached the formation, in his opinion because "sometimes someone from the population helped himself," and admitted that his control over the formation was precarious. They had been joined by sixteen common criminals who had escaped from the jail in Massa after a bombardment, and it was not always possible to keep them under control ("I also reprimanded them, lads, behave, otherwise I'll put a bullet in your heads . . .") (Gierut 1984, 33–34). Nicola Badalacchi, who commanded the partisan police, confirmed this: "We certainly had some problems: Our partisan police had its hands full. Four or five of our men were executed by firing squad for serious reasons, including abandoning their guard post" (Giannelli 1992, 237).

In short, the multiplicity of formations, often composed of a few men gathered around a leader, uncontrolled growth, with the admission of doubtful figures, like the common criminals who had escaped from the jail in Massa (the same ones who after the massacre, as we have seen, were seen wandering around among the corpses in order to rob them), the clash between "politicians" and "soldiers" on the conduct of the armed struggle and its aims[7], the suspicions about the Communist Party, accused of wanting to dominate the armed struggle in Versilia, not only led to serious divisions within the partisan movement, but also to little control over the actions of the partisans, not always in line with rigorous military and political criteria, particularly regarding the safety of the population. An extremely delicate point upon whose solution depended the possibility of a collaborative relationship between partisans and civilians. Bruno Antonucci, a former partisan and future Christian Democrat Mayor of Stazzema, polemically stated that, after Gino Lombardi's death, the orders he had issued to guarantee the safety of the population had been ignored, "and some partisans had begun to settle in the village [Farnocchia] dressed as cowboys, perhaps to organize a dance" (Giannelli 1992, 122).

In other words, in June, the increase in the number of men who set out for the mountains posed serious problems, both in terms of safety and of coexistence with a population which had, in turn, increased out of all proportion because of the growing number of

evacuees from the coast. The Communist plan of unification and a single command was based therefore on the real need to regulate the influx to the numerous groups which were weighing heavily on a restricted area with limited agricultural resources, exploiting at the same the opportunity which in some way was offered to the party, undoubtedly the most organized, if not of always achieving absolute control, at least of increasing its influence on groups and formations often not politicized, mainly tied to local realities, through the key figure of the political commissar. Furthermore, in this process, the militant Communists were very careful to favor the men who gave them the greatest political guarantees:

> I urge you to stay on top of the CLN and make sure that the funds are only put at the disposal of those detachments that show themselves to be effective in military terms in the framework of National Liberation. You must insist that the financial help of the CLN is only given to those detachments which I'll indicate.

So wrote Fontani to the old communist Antonio Giorgetti.[8] Moreover, in his opinion, too many former Fascists and deserters from the X Mas had joined the "Gino Lombardi" formation. For his part, Bandelloni subsequently recounted this phase: "They wanted to gauge my intellectual capacities, weigh up my words and my actions, and they were always asking me my opinion. A real ideological process. I remember that once I took a commissar, who had come specifically to make propaganda, and I got so angry with him that I lost my temper. I tied him to a tree, and I was going to shoot him" (Giannelli 1992, 102 and 201).

That political commissar was in fact Alvo Fontani. Despite the clashes and the different political positions of the commanders, Fontani succeeded in constituting a single formation. This came into being on July 18 according to some sources, according to others on July 25.[9] The formation was called the X Bis Garibaldi Brigade "Gino Lombardi" and was organized in 3 companies of about 120 men each: The first positioned itself on Monte Gabberi, toward the San Rocchino Pass; the second, near Farnocchia; the third on Monte Lieto, straddling the path that goes from Sant'Anna to the Farnocchia Pass. Finally, a squad was deployed on Monte Ornato. As can be

seen, they are names of places already known to us, because they are the hills surrounding the amphitheater of Sant'Anna di Stazzema.

The person appointed commander of the brigade was Ottorino Balestri, also known as "Libertas" (an anagram of his surname), who had in fact been opposed to the unification plan, considering it a means of ensuring Communist dominance. According to the historians Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 130), "Fontani, to dissipate those fears and to demonstrate that his aim was only the operational unity of the partisan forces, entrusted the command of the new brigade to Balestri himself, keeping the posts of political commissars for the Communists." But the lack of well-trained political cadres forced Fontani to not assign this role in two of the three companies and to take on the post of political commissar of the brigade himself. Lorenzo Bandelloni was put in charge of procurement.

The response of the inhabitants of Sant'Anna di Stazzema to the presence of the partisans does not appear to have been enthusiastic, at least according to the account of Aulo Viviani, the commander of a detachment of the "Gino Lombardi" and originally from Capezzano Monte, from where the formation got supplies and where there were contacts with the Liberation Committee. In July, he had attached a typed leaflet to the door of the shop in Sant'Anna. The leaflet invited the men to a meeting, which nevertheless was not held because the inhabitants of the village did not want to have anything to do with it. From then onwards, according to him, Balestri did not want to go down to the village any more, and the partisans who went there were "jackals" (Gierut 1984, 149–53). But, in any case, Sant'Anna was considered by people a "partisan center," as Olinto Cervietti, who had moved to nearby Valdicastello, wrote in his diary (Volpe Rinonapoli 1961, 5). The fact is that, whether the villagers liked it or not, the formation was positioned in the hills surrounding Sant'Anna. Leone Palagi pointed out that the formation "was deployed in an arc around Sant'Anna, as if it had had to defend it from a possible enemy attack: to the East on the slopes of Monte Gabberi and higher up at Farnocchia; to the North-West on the lower part of Monte Lieto and to the West in the zone of Monte Ornato and Minazzana" (Palagi 1981, 59). One of the SS soldiers found guilty at the trial in La Spezia, Alfred Concina, remembered that that village was known to them as a partisan "hideout," and one of his fellow soldiers,

interrogated by rogatory letters, confirmed that it was known, also because of information from spies who had infiltrated the formation, as a partisan base.[10]

The official report comments on the birth of the brigade: "Even though the tactical-strategic position was not very good as the brigade could easily be encircled, the system of procurement improved considerably thanks to the CLN and the Agricultural Committees which provided Bandelloni with enough wheat and meat" (Giannelli 1992, 254–55).

But it seems like a toned down representation of the situation and the persistent difficulties of procurement. Elio Benvenuti, who operated with the CLN, remembers how the nearby Valdicastello had become a converging point for everyone: evacuees, elements of the X Mas, Republican Fascists, and anti-Fascists.

> The partisans in the nearby mountains were hungry and gave signs of impatience . . . Supporting the partisans weighed heavily on the population, which initially contributed spontaneously, almost always with generosity. Now however the young men who had gone up into the hills were too many, and supporting them had become impossible also because foodstuffs could by then only be found in the black market. (Giannelli 1992, 205, 233–34)

The situation was aggravated by the fact that there were stray armed individuals, roaming through the hills and the countryside, who passed themselves off as partisans and stole from the population. But that the problem of provisions led even the "real" partisans to behave in ways that were hardly reassuring is confirmed by various testimonies. Sauro Bertozzi, a partisan, remembers that in July 1944, 15 of them, given the lack of provisions, at about one in the morning penetrated "the house of 'Gallo' in Pietrasanta which was said to be stocked with food"; they found some in the cellar and left, but "if truth be told, the Liberation Committee did not view the matter very favorably" (Gierut 1984, 53). Renato Bitossi, shrewder than many of his companions, and certainly more experienced, wrote a letter to one of the members of the Coordinating Committee of the Versilia CLN, also an "old" Communist, which describes how the wheat amassed for the formations by the Food

Commissions (which, although being officially part of the CLN, in fact acted in the name of the Communist Party) stirred up resentment in the population:

> It is necessary to employ a policy a little more suitable for the times. You understand it is unacceptable that, while having in the people's barns (our stockpiles have to be called that) a very big quantity of wheat, we can today leave the majority of the people themselves without a gram of bread. I realize that those who today, out of fear, do not dare to show their indignation and the necessity of bread, for fear of reprisals, will do so tomorrow reproaching us bitterly if we don't satisfy their needs, but on the other hand they would criticize us all the same if they came to know (and they would certainly come to know it) that we, despite having the possibility of giving them some wheat, have preferred to keep it hidden.[11]

For his part, Alvo Fontani and other partisans, in a report to the CLN of Marignana, Camaiore, of August 2, 1944, denounced the black market practiced "with inhuman casualness . . . by all the peasants in general" (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 124). It is obvious that, in a similar situation of shortages and mutual recriminations, the relations between partisans and civilians, the peasants in particular, should have deteriorated. Some people remember that, at the beginning, the population viewed the partisans favorably, above all because of Gino Lombardi's growing prestige and the trust he evoked, and it is from the time of his death that they trace the less solicitous attitude, on the part of the partisans, toward the civilian population:

> Until Lombardi's death, the population of Farnocchia was solidly behind us and ready to help the partisans who were at Porta on Monte Gabberi, far from the village . . . Because also among the partisans there was the need for a man like him, above every ideology, capable of organizing things in the military sphere and with a great spirit of humanity. Unfortunately, Gino died in that way just when he was studying the timing and the possibility of taking the various partisan groups away from the range of the inhuman and pitiless reaction of the German occupying forces. Above all with the intention of safeguarding the fate of the people who lived in the villages. (Giannelli 1992, 65 and 122)

This testimony is by Bruno Antonucci, a former lieutenant and fighter in Gino Lombardi's formation. After the Liberation Antonucci was the Christian Democrat Mayor of Stazzema for three terms (and it should be remembered that Lombardi came from the ranks of Catholic Action), and so his testimony should be seen in the context of a precise political standpoint, which explicitly links the safety of the population with the apolitical attitude of the partisan formations and implicitly with a non-Communist control over them. But it is undoubtedly true that the increase in the number of men weighed heavily on the population—already in difficulty finding food for the high number of evacuees from the coastal zones—and now having to provide for the formations in the hills, and this situation gave rise to clashes and ill-tempered exchanges. And the situation was no different in Sant'Anna: Cesira Pardini still remembers that in her home the partisans were not well-liked because of what they demanded from the civilian population:

> The partisans . . . used to come; they took away whatever they liked . . . They used to enter the house and take what they wanted . . . By then we had reached the point that we hated them, because we down there had this great land, and there were the sheep; I had a cow . . . In short, there was wine; there was oil . . . They came into the house, and whatever they found they took away . . . They would come, take things, and be off . . . and they did not stop to think if it was a numerous family, if we had enough to eat . . . Then there were so many evacuees, so many people.[12]

Partisan Actions

Starting from July 1944, and with greater intensity after the constitution of a single formation, partisan operations increased. The formation's official report states that

> The German Army had already shown obvious signs of being tired and demoralized as early as the beginning of July. Apart from a considerable number of Russians, former worker-prisoners of the Germans, who had reached the partisan formations evading the SS, in that period, there were numerous Alsatian, Austrian, and even German soldiers who deserted. (Giannelli 1992, 255)

And nevertheless among those soldiers, as we will see, there were also ambiguous figures, subsequently known to be spies. The use of Italian spies, taken from a special unit of the "Fascist militia" quartered in Carrara, was subsequently confirmed by Max Saalfrank, an officer of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division.[13]

July is punctuated with clashes between the Germans and the partisans, and at dawn on July 22, there was the first assault by an entire German brigade, who was heavily armed with mortars and cannons. They attacked on three sides; the battle lasted all day, and in the fighting four Mongols and two Slavs who had joined the brigade were killed. When darkness fell, the partisans disengaged, going toward the San Rocchino Pass, but on July 24 the formation re-entered the zone and cleared the area of Fascists (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 128ff.). On July 22, at Pontestazzemese, the Germans rounded up some men to reconstruct a bridge blown up by the partisans. On that occasion, two civilians who were trying to get away were killed (Palagi 1981, 62, Orlandi 1945, 7). On July 23, four Germans passed through Stazzema, and in the evening, when they passed through it again, they fired as an intimidatory measure. As always, a partisan patrol was wandering through the streets of Stazzema, but there were no clashes. Danilo Orlandi wrote that "it was ascertained that the partisan patrols had been ordered by the brigade headquarters not to attack the Germans and only to gather information" (Orlandi 1945, 8).

The next day, July 24, the same Germans were attacked at Stazzema by a group of partisans (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 133). One soldier was killed, and another injured. The population left the village, fearing the German reaction. The soldiers arrived at about midday and began firing in the direction of the "mountain," where the population had taken refuge, but a woman took them where there was the body of their fellow soldier killed by the partisans. After paying him military honors, they left with the body and the wounded soldier, who had been treated by a local Red Cross nurse (Orlandi 1945, 9; Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 133; Palagi 1981, 62; Giannelli 1992, 268–73). The partisan patrol withdrew to the chain between Monte Ornato and Monte Gabberi, where the formation was quartered.

Another episode happened the following day, July 25, at Pontestazzemese: A German officer, who together with two fellow

soldiers was going up toward Monte Matanna, was gravely wounded by the partisans. The feared reprisal did not take place thanks to the intervention of someone involved in the marble industry, of Swiss extraction, who told the Germans that the shot had been fired by a young man expelled from the X Mas (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 133). On July 28 or 29, a German patrol sent on reconnaissance toward Monte Ornato took two partisans prisoners: They were subsequently freed by their companions. On the same day, another German patrol appeared in Farnocchia. Suspecting that he was a spy, the partisans executed the German deserter Rolland, who had joined their formation.[14]

The partisan guerrilla warfare disturbed and worried the Germans. After the war, an officer of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division, Max Paustian, spoke of it in these terms:

> When the division arrived in Italy, partisan activity was not important. During the summer and autumn, it increased and called for strict safety measures for all the units. In time, the partisans became so widespread as to impede the free movement of individual members of the troops . . . Initially, partisan activity was mainly concerned with impeding supplies, above all by sabotaging roads and communication routes. It also used to happen that single vehicles would be attacked and the passengers robbed. Subsequently it used to happen that the vehicles with their passengers would disappear completely.

Paustian also spoke of the difficulties in attacking the partisans. In June 1944, in the first action he was ordered to conduct against the partisans of Altissimo, the operation, carried out by a company reinforced by mortars, was not successful because his troops were not trained for fighting in the mountains.[15]

On July 30, the Germans attacked the partisan positions in two directions: above La Culla, coming from Valdicastello (where they blew up a chestnut-drying building, a dwelling place for evacuees, a cable car of an iron mine, and a cableway), and in the direction of Monte Ornato. Here, according to the report of the brigade,

> German units, supported by armored cars attacked the positions of the 2nd and 3rd parts of the company . . . The massive attack was sustained by a few men who, drawn up at Casa Bianca and only armed

> with 'sten' and old rifles, reacted calmly to the great superiority of the enemy and, being confident in their dominant positions, repulsed—even though at the cost of the death of Italo Vangelisti and of many injured partisans—the German attack. (Giannelli 1992, 286)

Some civilians were involved in these clashes. Don Vangelisti (1945, 26), wrote that "later we came to know of the arbitrary killing of those who were ill, of some old people unable to escape, of fires in cottages and huts." Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 136) add "It seems that the Germans, before leaving the battlefield, managed to devastate the 'Casa Bianca' of Monte Ornato, the partisan headquarters, kill the mules and start numerous fires in the brush." Orlandi (1945, 10–11) noted how the line of partisan resistance—the Santa Barbara Pass, the Compito Pass, the mule path for Farnocchia—was "a circle on the watershed around the hollow of Sant'Anna." After these encounters—"real battles," as Don Vangelisti defined them, which, as we have seen, recur in the accounts of many of the survivors of the massacre—the population of Sant'Anna, involved in the clashes, left the village en masse, to return a few days later nevertheless.

On the same day, July 30, according to the report of the brigade,

> A strong German squad entered the village [Farnocchia] in the early afternoon . . . ordering the immediate evacuation of the population. The reaction of the partisans was immediate. The enemy patrol fell into an ambush, and while three Germans were killed, the others, some of whom were injured, managed to evade capture with a precipitous flight down the crags of the hill. (Giannelli 1992, 286)

The Germans, 11 or 12 of them according to the testimonies, arrived in the village at about 3 p.m. to order a complete evacuation before 5 p.m., but the parish priest, Don Innocenzo Lazzeri, called them into the presbytery and offered them something to drink, obtaining a deferment of the order until the following day. Bruno Antonucci, who had returned to Farnocchia after a period with the partisans, as his baby daughter had just been born, maintains that those who attacked the Germans at about 4:30 p.m., about ten partisans, did so on their own initiative: "I myself got angry with the man who was leading them, shouting that his men had to avoid clashing with the Germans" (Giannelli 1992, 182). Orlandi

(1985, 11) describes the moments before the attack as follows: "In the meantime, many people had returned to the narrow and steep streets to have some news and decide what to do, when it was said that the partisans had given the order to clear the streets because they intended attacking. One could, in fact, see them preparing. The people, gripped by panic, fled." Farnocchia was evacuated, as Antonucci remembers:

> It was Sunday . . . and we didn't have a minute to lose. The German reprisal would start within a few hours. Don Innocenzo and I ordered the people to save themselves . . . Thousands of people left their homes, carrying as much as possible on their shoulders, and, with the elderly, the sick and children, made their way . . . through the woods . . . to La Culla and Valdicastello . . . With my family and some other families we stopped above the mines of Monte Arsiccio, and we stayed there until the English arrived at La Culla. And from there we had to witness the tragedy and the massacre of Sant'Anna, which happened 12 days later. (Giannelli 1992, 283)

The population had correctly foreseen the German reaction. The next day, the Germans went back up to Farnocchia from Mulina and clashed with the partisans, who were waiting for them with heavy machine guns. According to the partisan report, the Germans withdrew after six hours of combat, leaving some dead and a heavy machine gun on the field, and on their return journey they were once again attacked by a squad of partisans that "waited by the side of the road for the jeeps which were coming down the curves of Mulina and with antitank grenades hit three of them wrecking them and machine-gunned the survivors with Sten guns" (Giannelli 1992, 286). There were four Germans dead and five wounded, looked after by Don Fiore Menguzzo in his presbytery (Giannelli 1997, 174).

Many local authors extol that partisan "victory" and talk of dozens of dead among the enemy soldiers. German sources report considerably lower figures for their losses. On July 31 there is evidence of a roundup in the areas of Monte Belvedere; Monte Folgorito; and Cervaiole, north of Monte Altissimo, during which three partisans were hanged. The German losses were one dead and one wounded. For August 1, the daily bulletins of the information office record a reconnaissance in the area of Farnocchia, with the killing of three

or four men who were firing with automatic weapons from the surrounding hills. The Germans had one man wounded. The "bandits," among whom there were some Alsatian deserters, had fled eastwards.

For August 2 there is the record of the "result of the antipartisan operation of the Seventy-Fifth Army Corps" in the area of Vallecchia-Monte Altissimo-Monte Cavallo: 15 partisans killed, 18 wounded, and a deposit of munitions and food supplies of the armed bands destroyed.[16] As can be seen, partisan losses are also overemphasized in the German sources. Nevertheless, the information on their own losses usually turns out to be accurate, and one can conclude that in the three days of fighting in the mountains around Farnocchia the Germans had, in all, one dead and two wounded—on the whole, a modest outcome that does not mean, however, that the clashes of those days should be underestimated in terms of their importance in the eyes of the Germans, who, it should be remembered, took the initiative in going to seek out the partisans. Obviously, the intensification of the actions of harassment of the last days of July had convinced the headquarters of the need to adopt a more active approach: to clear an area that, with the proximity of the Gothic Line and with the front at a standstill on the Arno, became of vital strategic importance.

In fact, the clashes of that day, reported in the local historiography as a partisan victory, led to the dissolution of the new formation, just a week after it had been constituted. The brigade report tells of the decision as follows:

> In a meeting [on July 31, in the evening] of all the company commanders and commissars, presided over by the commander Ottorino Balestri, the military and political situation was studied in detail. On account of the danger of all the access routes to Monte Gabberi and Monte Lieto being blocked, with the possibility of seeing all the supply routes (of wheat and other foodstuffs which were arriving from the plain) being cut, because of the lack of munitions which the airdrops had not sufficiently replenished, the brigade headquarters considered whether or not to transfer the formation. In view of the development of the plans to be carried out in the plain, everyone agreed to transferring the brigade to the Lucese, between Monte Acuto and Monte Rondinaio and Monte Pedone and Prano. (Giannelli 1992, 287)

A partisan deputy company commander, Paolo Alberto Cavalli, a former army officer, subsequently commented on that decision—which, according to him, had already been made prior to the German attack on Farnocchia—as follows:

> By then, the danger of our being encircled was obvious. The Germans were sending the civilian population away, and we had great difficulties about provisioning. We did not intend remaining in the zone any longer, and we were preparing to get closer to the Americans who, by then, had gone beyond Pisa . . . The Allies were due to break through at any moment, and we decided to go and make contact with them . . . with a formation, by then too numerous because people were coming from all over; they were often uncontrollable and of different origins. We felt that the end was near, and our numerical growth was unforeseen and totally unsuitable. (Giannelli 1992, 281)

Bearing in mind the few days separating the birth of the brigade and its breaking up (this meant in effect its transfer, as we will see), the decision to bring into being a single formation shows itself nevertheless to be pretentious and disastrous, for three different kinds of reasons: the excessive and uncontrolled increase in the number of men who had gone into hiding, which, apart from anything else, prevented the effective coordination of their actions; the ever-present difficulties with supplies in a zone burdened with the presence of thousands of refugees; and the configuration of the place, in fact easily encircled by an average roundup operation. Thus the formation could not bear the brunt of its first real clashes after its constitution.

The decision to move was not unanimous; in fact it provoked strong disagreements and a new serious split between the combatants. Soon after the Liberation, Marcello Iacopi remembers those moments as follows:

> During the battle we realized that there were few of us left. Wherever one went, one always saw the same faces—those who were left—who moved from one place to another as necessary. In fact, in the evening, when the enemy had been repelled and we were all returning, apart from the fallen, to the cottage that was the headquarters, we heard the news that Ottorino [Balestri] had withdrawn, going

> toward the Lucese with numerous squads. Only the garrison commanded by Villa was left. I remember the commotion we made in the small clearing next to the cottage. In the meantime, a letter from Ottorino arrived, inviting all of us, the remaining partisans, to join him in the Lucese. Once again, more discussions between us. A few put down their arms and went off on their own. (Orlandi 1945, 13–14)

Bandelloni maintained that he had been abandoned by Balestri and Breschi, after the headquarters "had had the notice posted on the door of the church of Sant'Anna that urged the population to defend itself with pitchforks" (Gierut 1984, 35–36), hence his decision to remain on the spot, together with Loris Palma, who had always remained at his side. Iacopi also remembers that decision:

> After a meeting held in the small clearing itself between Bandelloni, Villa, and Dal Porto and other commanders, including the squad leaders, we agreed to remain and hold out to the last, because of the word that had already been given even without everyone being consulted and that compromised the good name of us patriots. And in fact we remained. It was decided to withdraw to Monte Gabberi because, there being few of us, we could maintain the positions of Monte Ornato, the Compito Pass, etc. During the night, we withdrew on Gabberi and in the morning we were deployed on the new line: Farnocchia, Le Mandrie, Gabberi, San Rocchino. (Orlandi 1945, 13–14)

That transfer, therefore, provoked a definitive split, for which Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 141) hold those who decided not to leave the zone as being responsible: "The Third [Company] of Lorenzo Bandelloni and Loris Palma 'Villa' and also the Fourth (formerly the Thirteenth Squad) of Oscar Dal Porto, despite the order received from headquarters, did not leave Monte Gabberi, thus leaving themselves open to an enemy roundup already in progress" and provoking the "complete break-up of the two companies" a few days later "and . . . a serious crisis in the ranks of the partisans." What Palagi (1981, 66), writes therefore appears inexact, namely that "the other companies commanded by Villa and Bandelloni remained on Monte Gabberi for a few days to provide cover and to recover a great deal of scattered material."

That split also had precise political connotations: Leonardo Di Giorgio, President of the Committee of National Liberation of Casoli di Camaiore, recounted having being told by Balestri to

> arrange the transport to guarantee the transit of the companies of the X b Garibaldi Brigade without incidents, from Monte Gabberi to the "Casa Bianca," on Monte Prana . . . The transfer happened without any incidents. Fontani, who together with Sergio Breschi and Ottorino Balestri was the last to pass through, told me: "Bandelloni and "Villa" have remained on Monte Gabberi. As they are monarchists, especially "Villa," I forbid you, in the name of the [Communist] party to concern yourself with them." (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 149)

During that transfer march a tragic episode happened, which has never been completely cleared up: The brigade commander, Ottorino Balestri, killed the partisan Giuseppe Tellini. According to one version, Tellini deserted his sentry post; according to another version he refused to hand over his light machine gun to Balestri and wanted to return to the zone of Sant'Anna, where his fiancée was; and according to others still it was an accident (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 149; Giannelli 1992, 236). On August 8, on Monte Pedone, a partisan tribunal put the commander Ottorino Balestri on trial for the killing of Tellini. Due to the absence of the main witness, judgment was suspended, but Balestri was considered "irresponsible in his actions and therefore not up to holding the post of brigade commander, nor any other position of responsibility" (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 144). As Balestri, confident of the support of the members of the "Toscanini" OSS mission, rejected the verdict, the Communist members—Sergio Breschi and all the political commissars and commanders of the 1st and 2nd companies—resigned, and the brigade split into three formations: Apart from the group of Bandelloni and Loris Palma, who had remained at the San Rocchino Pass, there was the Garibaldi assault detachment "Marcello Garosi" of Giancarlo Taddei, on Monte Pedone, which included the officers and political commissars of the disbanded formation, and a new X b "Gino Lombardi" brigade, commanded by Balestri, established up on Monte Prana at the "Casa Bianca."[17]

Bandelloni's men, who had stayed in the zone of Gabberi, did not remain inactive: On August 4, the lawyer Lasagna, a centurion of the militia, was captured at Pietrasanta. Although he managed to escape into the hills, he was recaptured and executed by firing squad. On August 5, the partisans obstructed the road between Pontestazzemese and Mulina, and the Germans rounded up some men, including the parish priest of Mulina, Don Fiore Menguzzo, to clear the road (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 142; Giannelli 1997, 175).

On August 8, in Mulina di Stazzema, despite the intercession of Don Fiore Menguzzo, the Germans executed two men. On the same day, they attacked the positions on the northwest slope of Gabberi, in the zone that overlooks the villages of Farnocchia, by then abandoned by its inhabitants, and "La Mandria," with heavy weapons set out in the territories of Mulina and Pomezzana. Near Farnocchia they encountered resistance from a squad of partisans, and in the ensuing exchange of fire the partisans Cristina Ardemanni and Paris Ancillotti lost their lives, and another four were captured and subsequently executed. The village was set on fire (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 142–43).

We have an exceptional witness of that episode, Elio Toaff, the future Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community of Rome, who personally lived through it, because he had moved to that zone, and was rounded up, by the SS, together with other young men to carry cases of munitions. In that action, the Germans had some wounded, and Toaff, who was in fact present, remembers that the commander had them taken to Valdicastello on emergency stretchers. There were no reprisals against the civilians who were used as stretcher bearers, while Toaff's five companions in misfortune, who remained as munitions bearers, were executed by firing squad in Camaiore two days later. Toaff survived by dint of good fortune (Toaff 1987, 94–95).

After these battles, the partisans of Bandelloni and Palma, who had remained in the zone, also withdrew. According to Bandelloni,

> On August 8, we had taken a real beating . . . We were wrecked, we had lost some men . . . We were not well organized yet because they had taken away [to the Lucese] some arms, [and] we were still recovering; there were quite a lot of us, about 150, but the mortar fire started, then some civilians came up, we were afraid to shoot because

> we could have hit them. At a certain point the collapse, we resisted, then . . . (Gierut 1984, 35)

According to Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 142–43), the partisans' withdrawal toward the Lucese "soon degenerated into a real disbanding."

The Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division

The men with whom the partisans had clashed in Farnocchia on August 8 belonged—it can be deduced from the information regarding the wounded Germans—to the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division, the same one that would operate in Sant'Anna on August 12. In those first days of August the troops of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division "Reichsführer SS" were involved, between Lucca and Pisa, in a series of operations of roundups and clearing the territory, which often turned into serious acts of violence against civilians.[18]

The division had been formed in January 1944 in Lubiana, Slovenia, and it had been transferred to Vienna in March 1944, then to Hungary, and from there in May 1944 to Italy, "precisely on the Ligurian coast . . . The commander of the division was SS Major General Max Simon. Simon was known to me as a fanatical National Socialist and an excellent officer." So wrote the officer mentioned earlier, Max Paustian, who summarized the tasks assigned to the division:

> 1) Protecting the Ligurian coast from possible Allied landings; 2) on approaching the front, direct commitment and participation in the action; 3) being employed against possible partisan activity in the division's zone. This last task, in conformity with the orders issued by the Southern Armies Group with which I am acquainted, was put into practice by all the units. With regard to the quality of the division, I would like to point out that the 16th SS grenadier armored division was a resolute formation, made up of the most excellent officers and of hand-picked troops.[19]

Gentile (2000) has written:

> With incomplete ranks and a great part of its men who still had not completed their training, the division was initially assigned to defending the coast between Marina di Carrara and Leghorn. In June, while training was being completed, some of the more efficient units were sent to the front in the Maremma near Grosseto. But shortly afterward, from the beginning of July, the whole division was thrown into the heat of battle in the area of Cecina, Rosignano, and Leghorn. The losses inflicted on its units were very high from the start. Around July 20, it reached Pisa and the line of the Arno, drawing itself up on the northern bank. From that moment, the Allied military effort was concentrated on Florence, leaving the division out of the main battles until the beginning of September. It is in this phase of calm on the front that the violent operations, on a massive scale, against the civilian population began.

It was no longer a division consisting solely of volunteers, but also of young men eligible for conscription. In the battalion that operated in Sant'Anna, out of 219 soldiers and noncommissioned officers of whom there is information, no less than 91 were born in 1926. Numerous officers and NCOs came from the "Totenkopf" Division, one of the most notorious SS units, linked with the Nazi concentration camp system and having its own particular ideological fanaticism. Max Simon and Otto Baum, Simon's successor, had both been at the head of the "Totenkopf," and Reder and many of his company commanders had served in it. Anton Galler, the commander of the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment, and Walter Reder, the commander of the Reconnaissance Group, had also been posted to Dachau, like many other officers.

Other officers had served in the SS and ordinary police battalions in Eastern Europe, responsible for extermination operations of Jews and civilians in occupied Poland. Galler himself had been indicted for the killing of civilians in occupied Poland, and his regiment commander, Karl Gesele had been Chief of Staff in 1941–1942 of the unit that had begun the extermination operations of the Jews in the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the summer of 1941. In December 1942, Max Simon, one of the first members of the SS in the early

1930s, had been promoted to Major General, and then given the command of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division.

Among the officers, a precocious political commitment in favor of Nazism was common: Anton Galler, at 15, had joined extreme right-wing Austrian Pan-German associations, and on account of his political activity, he had had to leave Austria at 17 years of age and take refuge in Germany. Reder had been suspended from all the Austrian schools for his political activity, and he had been forced to flee to Germany in 1934.

From July 24, the division established its headquarters in Nozzano, near Lucca. Then, with the withdrawal of the front, another headquarters was established in Camaiore and subsequently in Massa until August 31. Having arrived in the zone, the division was involved in operations against the partisans between Versilia and the Apuan Alps, which lasted throughout the month and which, apart from disrupting the partisan movement, caused enormous grief to the population.

A Crescendo of Terror

Lutz Klinkhammer wrote that "in the dramatic military situation at the beginning of the summer of 1944, the sole concern was the problem of evacuating the Tuscan population," and to this end a special "'Colonel Ebner' General Staff [had been created] with the aim of evacuating a zone 10 km to the north and 20 km to the south of the Green Line." The inhabitants of the Pisan Mountains "were actually threatened that those who stayed, beyond the limit, in those mountains and villages, for which evacuation had been ordered, would be considered partisans" (Klinkhammer 1993, 380–81, 383).

In the final report of the Militärkommandatur 1015, of August 10, 1944, before the dismantling of the headquarters, it was pointed out how, after the fall of Rome, there was a prevalent administrative "anarchy," for which the main responsibility was ascribed to the activity "of the Italian labor exchanges which have summoned thousands of those ordered to do compulsory work with the result that not even one of those who had a valid reason . . . to suppose a recruitment responded." Moreover, the evacuation "of the protective strip in front of the emplacements of the Gothic Line by the

General Staff Ebner" had had a minimum of success, also because it had been envisaged

> Without any thought as to its actual feasibility. The evacuation orders issued have therefore simply been ignored by the population and in fact have partly led to demonstrations and disorders. The survey of the manpower connected with the evacuation has had scant success since the civilians thought that it would undoubtedly be impossible to wrench them from their own homes. (Istituto storico della Resistenza in Toscana 1997, 420)

The very close link between preparing the Green (or Gothic) Line and the issuing of orders regarding compulsory work and the evacuation is obvious, as is the fact that the failure of these initiatives would seriously put at risk the Germans' strategic plans for the prosecution of the war, and would come to be linked with the hostile attitude of the civilian population. The radicalization of the attitude toward the latter, accused, wrongly or rightly, of protecting the partisan guerrillas, reached a peak at the beginning of August. But as early as the period between June and July there was increased pressure to guarantee the regular influx of manpower to be utilized for the defensive works, and the threat of compulsory work had led to the flight of the male population, which came on top of the evacuation of entire villages and cities.

Versilia had been hit by peremptory evacuation orders; Orlandi (1945, 5), remembered that

> The systematic persecution of the whole population of Versilia, in the tragic year 1944, began on 1 July with the evacuation order for the municipal district of Forte dei Marmi for which the Germans gave a few hours. There followed, on the 5th, that for the zone which goes from Strettoia to Cinquale where everything was razed to the ground in order to arrange the line of resistance on which the Germans stayed until the evening of April 7, 1945. Then it was the turn of the municipal district of Seravezza, on July 15.

On July 7, Arni was cleared in just two hours; Seravezza on the 10th, and on July 27 the order was given for the evacuation of Pietrasanta and Stazzema. The former was abandoned in a few

hours, and many took refuge in Valdicastello, where the hospital was also evacuated, Stazzema was only partly cleared. Ripa, Strettoia, and Corvaia were destroyed with TNT and artillery shells. Evacuation orders were posted up on July 29 in Stazzema, which included Sant'Anna in its administrative territory, and on July 31, as we have seen, the Germans went up to Farnocchia to order the evacuation of the population.[20]

In the Pisan Hills, adult males were ordered to evacuate the zone by August 2. Between August 2 and 3, the notification of forced recruitment and deportation was also extended to Pisa, ordering all those still living in the center of the city to present themselves in Piazza del Duomo: In the evening of August 3, there were about 300 people concentrated in that square, and over 250 were directed toward Lucca.[21]

The commander of the Seventy-Fifth Army Corps, General Anton Dostler, being unable to enforce the complete evacuation of the population between Massa and Carrara, on July 31 gave the commander of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division General Max Simon an order that authorized him to shoot anyone who came out of his house in the zone which had to be evacuated: "In the front line we cannot permit ourselves, in any event, to show particular consideration, but we have to intervene, there is no choice" (Klinkhammer 1993, 383).

The month of August therefore marks an escalation of the repressive strategy, which takes on more markedly terrorist connotations. The increased activity on the part of the Resistance appeared to the Germans a threat to be faced up to at all costs, and their reaction envisaged punitive and terrorist measures toward the civilian population, undoubtedly identified (including women and children) with the partisan fighters.

Thus, from the end of July there was an intensification of the episodes against civilians. In the provinces of Lucca and Pisa, the most serious occurred on the night between August 6 and 7 on the Pisan Hills: Following some partisan actions in the preceding days, units of the SS and the Wehrmacht conducted a roundup on a vast scale, attacking the huts built by the evacuees in the locality of La Romagna. The operation had been preceded by a notification issued by the German headquarters of Asciano, which ordered all the men

between the age of 16 and 50 to leave their refuges on those hills. About 300 civilians, including women and children, were rounded up: The men, separated from their families, were led down below, accompanied by the language teacher Livia Gereschi, who had been asked to act as an interpreter. Those fit for work were taken to Lucca, a stopover for the German camps; the remaining 68 men and the woman were locked up in the secondary school of Nozzano, the headquarters of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division, and executed by firing squad on August 11 in various places between Pisa and Lucca. The same day, seven workmen of the Todt organization, on their way to Forte dei Marmi, were stopped in "La Sassaia" by an SS platoon, probably returning from killing one of the groups. Their membership cards were torn off, and they too were executed by firing squad, confirming the fact that, when the SS were engaged in actions against the "armed bands," passes and exemptions given by other organizations of the German occupation regime would have no value whatsoever.

Sant'Anna di Stazzema, August 12, 1944

German sources recorded the actions around Farnocchia on August 8: "Ten enemies killed, another five probably, two prisoners." The German losses were five wounded. The partisans were estimated at 150 to 200 men, armed with light machine guns, rifles, and other machine guns. The armed band, according to the Germans, then retreated eastwards ("*Bande nach Osten ausgewichen*").[22]

There has been much discussion regarding this retreat of the armed band indicated by the German sources. The inference has been that the Germans knew that there were no longer any partisans in the zone of Sant'Anna. It has also been said that the spies who had infiltrated the partisan formation had certainly informed the Germans of this retreat toward the Lucese, and this thesis was taken up again by the judgment of the military tribunal of La Spezia.

Nevertheless, the annotation of the daily bulletin of the Fourteenth Army does not permit, it appears to me, a similar interpretation, as it limits itself to reporting that the partisans had been seen retreating eastwards, a disengagement that is absolutely normal on the part of a formation involved in combat with superior

enemy forces. To infer from this that on August 12 the Germans knew that there were no longer any partisans in Sant'Anna seems to me a strained reading of the source. After all, in confirmation of this, I would like to recall that, as we have seen, there was the same annotation, of an eastward retreat, in the bulletin of the information office of the Fourteenth German Army of August 1, which recorded that day's clashes, in the same zone. And after that retreat, the Germans had been well able to verify how the partisans, who by then had already retreated eastwards, had remained in those hills to fight.[23]

As for the spies who informed the Germans that the partisans had taken refuge in the Lucese, those who can be traced in the documents had already been executed by firing squad. This was the fate of Aldemar, a dentist, who was executed on Bandelloni's orders during the move from Altissimo to Monte Gabberi at the end of June, and of Rolland, a German deserter who had only recently joined the formation and was executed on July 29. According to another partisan, Nicola Badalacchi, a German spy who made himself out to be Polish—in fact, according to him, a captain in the Gestapo—abandoned the formation on the evening of the transfer toward the Lucese (that is on July 31) and had seen leading the Germans in the action against Farnocchia on August 8 and in Valdicastello on the evening of the 12th, directing the selection of those who had been rounded up in the square; another spy was executed in the woods of Farnocchia in the morning of August 4. In short, even if one were to give credence to these testimonies, none of the presumed spies would have remained among Bandelloni's partisans after August 4 and would therefore not have been able to inform the Germans that the latter's formation had, in fact, disbanded after the fighting on August 8.[24]

The Ruling of the Military Tribunal of La Spezia, which had a different opinion, utilized the 2003 testimony of Bruno Terigi, an interpreter at the Wehrmacht headquarters of Pietrasanta until June 20, 1944, when the SS arrived and he was replaced by another interpreter, who was introduced to him by Walter Reder. On August 12, Terigi was in Valdicastello, and he was rounded up and taken to Nozzano Castello. There he saw the SS interpreter again, a certain Joseph—who in another testimony is called Joseph from

Merano—and he spoke to him during the journey to Nozzano, coming to know

> That he had been a double-dealer with the partisans, with whom he had been for no less than three months until a few days earlier, and it was for that reason that he had been called to point out who, among those who had been rounded up, had had contacts with the partisans. Pretending to be a German deserter, while actually being an SS spy (he laughed when he said that ". . . they had been easily taken in"), he boasted that he had been the author of the reprisal of Sant'Anna and had supplied the headquarters of the 16th with all the necessary elements in order to carry it out. (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 93–94)

On the basis of this single (and tardy) testimony, the tribunal deduced that

> Since Joseph himself . . . had said that he had been with the partisans until a few days earlier, it has to be concluded that the Germans knew that the partisans had moved away in order to go "eastwards." In fact, it has to be considered probable that Joseph had left them precisely because they were moving farther away, information that would certainly have been passed on to the divisional headquarters, as he himself reported having done for all the other information necessary for organizing the "reprisal." In fact, such an observant informer certainly would not have failed to see the opportunity of conducting an action without the danger of further bloody clashes with the partisans themselves. After all, if at the conclusion of the operation Joseph, well informed about the movements of the partisans, boasted of the results of that day, when it was by then clear to everyone that a massacre of innocent people had been perpetrated, it has to be concluded that that was precisely the result that had been foreseen and wanted. (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 113–14)

The statement is questionable under various aspects, and above all in the actual ascertaining of the circumstances. The interpreter Joseph from Merano must be the same person to whom Stefano Lucchetti refers on two occasions, calling him Giovanni da Merano, who used to associate with the officers stationed in Capezzano, in Lucchetti's house. In the Majorca report he is identified as Rodolfo Sebastiani, an SS warrant officer. Yet, in the same hours in which

he was supposedly boasting to Terigi of being the real author of the massacre, he made no mention of his role to Lucchetti, and in fact blamed, as we have seen, Italian women of acting as informers.[25]

Moreover, Terigi's testimony contains a grave inexactitude (on June 20, 1944, Reder could not have been in Pietrasanta because he was organizing the German defense along the southern Tyrrhenian Coast, from Grosseto to Cecina) and an error of logic (how had Joseph managed to be a spy for three months, if at the end of June he was acting as an interpreter in Pietrasanta?).

The military tribunal's statement that Joseph abandoned Bandelloni's partisan formation precisely on August 8, after the clashes in Farnocchia, therefore appears totally conjectural, lacking as it is in any real corroboration. A mere hypothesis, of scarce validity in my opinion, also given the fact that regarding this presumed spy, as against all the others, there is no reference in the partisans' various testimonies: If he had been with them for so long, somebody would surely have remembered him, and would have spoken of him. Finally, as to the result of the operation, of which, according to the tribunal, Joseph would have boasted well knowing that this had not involved the partisans, it has to be repeated that for the Germans, and in particular for this division in this phase of the conflict, the population came to be identified with the partisans, and it is not mere chance that the dead civilians were counted as "bandits" or their collaborators in the bulletins that reported the actions carried out.

After all, the partisans had not moved so far away as not to be able to return to the zone easily: Leonardo Di Giorgio, the President of the CLN of Casoli di Camaiore, tells of a meeting he had on August 11 with Loris Palma "Villa," in the presbytery of Casoli, when he pointed out "the mortal danger for the population of Sant'Anna, represented by [the partisans] staying in the nearby mountainous zone," exhorting him to join the monarchical formation of Colonel Brofferio, if he did not want "to join the Communists Fontani and Breschi . . . As he was leaving the presbytery, 'Villa' reassured me: 'I am convinced. I'll go up and move my men.' Unfortunately, it was already dawn and the massacre of Sant'Anna was taking place" (Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 149). Police Chief Superintendent Cecioni wrote in 1950: "A shopkeeper, whose house is in the church square,

where the most serious episode happened, told me that at about midnight of August 11 the partisans went to his house and after taking some goods, they went away."[26]

On August 12, Bandelloni was on the Camaiore slope of Monte Gabberi, from where "with a spyglass, we could make out the troops who were climbing toward Sant'Anna" (Gierut 1984, 30).[27] Aulo Viviani, a partisan in the same formation, subsequently learnt that there were partisans in Sant'Anna who had seen the massacre but had not intervened, even if he then talks of stragglers, "according to them under the command of Bandelloni" (Gierut 1984, 149). They must, obviously, have been the escapees from the jail, who were seen by many stoking up the fire and rummaging among the corpses after the massacre. Lidia Pardini remembers that, the day after the massacre, on returning with her father from the hospital of Valdicastello where they had taken her sister Maria, who had been wounded at Coletti di Sotto, they saw

> Three partisans, near to our house, who after lifting the sheet covering the dead, tried to search the bodies. At this point, my father, turning to me, said "Go and fetch that stuff." I understood that he was talking about his hunting rifle. I went back home and after shouldering it for a bit; I gave it to my father who pointed it at them saying: "Put that stuff down. I'll give it to the families." They said something in Italian and gave some items (watches—money and other things) to my father, who saw to it that they were given to the relatives of the victims.[28]

The episode was admitted by Bandelloni himself: "These young men came to tell me what they had found on the ground [some gold], I told them not to touch anything, and I gave what was found to the appropriate person, namely the priest Don Vangelisti" (Gierut 1983, 36). I am not interested at this point in going into detail as to whether they were real partisans or rather disbanded criminals from Bandelloni's formation, but rather in underlining that, as those men had remained or returned to that zone, in any case they had been part of Bandelloni's formation, and so this could also have been done by the "real" partisans. What Enio Mancini stated at the trial in La Spezia is logically correct: If they had brought mortars, this meant that the Germans "wanted to guard against a possible attack

which might come from the partisan formations, which were not close by but could, in theory, be there that day, someone be there once again."[29]

In short, the Germans, who as late as August 8 had clashed with the partisans in Farnocchia, causing some of their soldiers to be wounded, had ascertained that the "bandits" were still present in the zone and very active. It cannot be stated that they knew that after the clashes Bandelloni's formation had left their positions (and in any case had returned a few kilometers away, about an hour and half's march from Sant'Anna, before August 12). The comment that seems to me to correspond most closely with the situation is that of Orlandi (1945, 15), in his reconstruction of the events before the massacre, which he made on the first anniversary: "Now all the spur from Monte Gabberi to Lieto and Monte Ornato was without defense at the mercy of the Nazis *who knew that it was a partisan position* [my italics]. Therefore it was necessary to sow destruction there."

After all, the clashes of August 8 are still today well remembered by those who were there and by those who heard of them. Josef Ziller, who belonged to the Sixth Company of the Second Battalion, remembers that on that day he and his fellow soldiers had brought a truck to the mountains near Farnocchia. As they were coming down, they were told that it was an action against the partisans. Ziller was gravely wounded in the clashes and was taken away by two Italians who had been forced to carry cases of munitions. Today Ziller wonders if the action against Sant'Anna was not caused by this partisan attack, which Horst Eggert heard about when his unit received the orders for Sant'Anna, in the evening of August 11: "It was said that the partisans had attacked one of our units." In his extensive testimony at the trial, Adolf Beckerth stated, "We were only told to gather the men, seek out and round up the partisans. Therefore, first of all, at night we climbed a hill precisely to find these individuals, this order was issued in the morning."[30]

In the interview given in May 2000 and which came into the possession of the Military Tribunal of La Spezia, Eggert added a detail of great importance: They were informed beforehand that the action was an operation against the partisans, and for them all those who were in the zone of the roundup were partisans and had to be killed.

I remember that, before the action of Monte Sole, analogous orders were given to the men of Reder's battalion by their company and squadron commanders (as was stated by some soldiers who subsequently deserted).[31]

Gentile (2005, 116), commenting on Eggert's statements, wrote that the order to kill the civilians without any distinctions was given "probably as a reaction to the resistance offered by the partisans on August 8 and to the losses sustained on that occasion by the battalion."

In fact, the documents obtained by the Military Tribunal of La Spezia show that as early as 9:40 p.m. of August 7 the commander of the Seventy-Fifth Army Corps, on whose orders the Sixteenth SS Division depended, communicated to the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army his intention of effecting an action against the armed partisans and asked for the release of the Second Battalion of the Thirty-Fifth Regiment (Himmler's former escort battalion, since May 1944 amalgamated with the Sixteenth SS Division, "under the command of Captain Anton Galler, withdrawn from the front at the end of July after heavy losses and stationed, at rest, near Pietrasanta").[32]

It is obvious, therefore, that the action had already been decided on before the clashes of Farnocchia and was certainly the response to the intensification of the partisan actions in July, as well as the climax of the operational cycle initiated by the Germans with the attack on Monte Ornato on July 31. It is nevertheless probable that the subsequent clashes of August 8 would have convinced headquarters to speed up the operation against the partisans, and would have accentuated its exterminatory character. The fact that there had never been clashes in Sant'Anna was of little importance for those who planned that action. It was, in any case, as we have seen, at the center of the partisan deployment in the zone, and what the Military Tribunal of La Spezia wrote—that "even the most recent testimonies have highlighted its complete noninvolvement in partisan operations and activity" (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 177)—shows that it was unaware of the criteria with which the Germans considered a population involved or not, and therefore a zone to be cleared or not.

Because of the identification of the population with the partisans, and the Germans' reluctance to go and find the "bandits" in

the hills and forests, the antipartisan actions seemed like reprisals against the population.

> They could not find the partisans; they could not capture them because they eluded them like eels . . . An advantage they had was their knowledge of the territory and so destroying the village with its population, destroying the houses and even killing all the animals . . . [Why] did they destroy, burn the houses and the cattle, burn the sheep inside, but even kill chickens and rabbits? What was the point in killing even small animals, if not that of removing the means of subsistence? Theirs is a strategy . . . I consider it, I like to call it the clearing of a territory, of a territory that could in any case be infested, as they used to say, by the partisan armed bands.[33]

Conclusions

Judicial Truth and Historical Truth

Let us, in conclusion, return to the controversies about Spike Lee's film, from which I started. I do not here intend, for lack of space, to enter into the merits of the debate about the film. Succinctly, I maintain that every artist should be free to rework, and also literally to invent, or to distort, the historical reality of the facts, preferring his "own" style, suitable for the messages he is interested in communicating. If then the dramatic fiction that caused such a stir—the invention of the figure of the partisan traitor—has produced a good film or not (and, previously, a good novel), and if it has shown respect or not for the feelings and expectations of the survivors, who had warmly welcomed the director to Sant'Anna, is a question that does not concern the logical reasoning of the subject I have been dealing with in this book. I would like to point out, among other things, how the problem of the transmission of more or less distorted historical knowledge through the media—cinema, television, the press, the Internet—is a question that goes well beyond the controversies contingent on the film in question, and on the Italian Resistance, and concerns the nature of those who mould the collective memory—namely, the widespread perception of the events of the past—following the crisis of the agencies that were traditionally the depositaries of such an important task: the school system, and therefore above all the state institutions, but also the political parties and their ideologies.

I would prefer to underline—expressing my concern—some recurring statements in the debate dealt with above: the claim by bodies and various agencies to be the "owners" of the memory and

P. Pezzino, *Memory and Massacre*

therefore, through the widespread confusion between memory and history, of the "real" history of Sant'Anna di Stazzema and the disparaging use of the term "revisionist" for anyone who advances proposals at variance with a declared official truth. It should be remembered that all historical research can only be based on a spirit of authentic revision: To question once again in terms of a sound foundation, namely, on the basis of new sources or material, what, in a given moment, appears to be the state of an issue, is the prime mover that permits the advancement of knowledge, in history as in the other fields of human knowledge.

I take particular issue with the repeated, and apparently widespread, statement that historical truth has definitively been ascertained by a court verdict. Is it possible that people do not realize the dangers inherent in the imposition of an "official" version of history? This happens every time when, instead of the free comparison of theses and interpretations, trust is put in agencies that consider themselves to be the depositories of historical truth—and in fact they only disseminate a given version, more or less in line with their own interests—or in courts, whose task is not to define once and for all the "truth" about the past, but to determine the innocence or guilt of the individuals accused of a crime. Henry Rousso has rightly written that "ce n'est pas le rôle de la justice de faire—ou refaire—l'histoire" (*Esprit* 1992, 37).

What would have happened if the Military Tribunal of La Spezia had not returned a verdict in conformity with the expectations of those who today shelter behind that judgment to state that the truth has been established once and for all? Besides, the reference to that judgment is selective: That is, only those elements with which there is agreement are utilized, leaving aside the others. Thus, the figure of 560 victims, which many, including the drafters of the parliamentary question mentioned in the introduction, cite is excessive, as everyone knows. It was also challenged by that judgment to which everyone refers, only to ignore it when it is a matter of correcting mistaken information, or when it relates unwelcome statements, like those about the relationship between the population and the partisans—"the defenseless population often had to defend itself, first of all, precisely from partisan robberies"—or when it even seemed to bring up again the old controversies about the partisan

leaflet: "If there really had been a strong tie, the population would certainly not have been *abandoned* [my italics] to its fate despite the leaflet in which, only a few days earlier, it had been invited to remain at home" (Ruling of the Tm 2005, 177, italics mine).

The attitudes to Spike Lee's film actually highlight a wound that is still open: I am not referring so much to that of the survivors and the relatives of the victims—who, as we have seen, have been among the last to intervene in the controversy, through their association, with a moderate official statement in which they dissociated themselves from the most heated accusations against the film—specifically the controversy about the presumed partisan responsibilities for the massacre, which for decades has characterized the local memory and which has only been overcome, with difficulty, by the patient efforts of institutionalizing that memory itself by local bodies and, above all, by the region of Tuscany.

All massacres are inexplicable in the eyes of those who suffer them, populations often convinced of being at the "margins" of the conflict, in remote places apparently of no strategic importance, and the perception of individual episodes on the part of the survivors is often that its tragic nature appears unprecedented. For them, the massacre in which they were involved has a distinctiveness that makes it unique, and more often than not incomprehensible. Very often the accounts of the survivors are characterized by the impossibility of finding some meaning in what happened, even after a long time, and on one hand this aggravates the feeling of incommunicability with the outside world, on the other hand it favors mythical narration, searching in any case for an explanation, for a link which can account for the massacre, and at times for a scapegoat who will permit an interpretation of the events within reach of the common experience of those who have felt firsthand the consequences of an apparently inexplicable violence.

In Sant'Anna di Stazzema, as we have seen, this character of incomprehensibility, also due to the isolation of the survivors in the first decades, has been particularly strong and has increased the aura of mystery surrounding the events. Still today, one can find traces of mystery in the statements of those who maintain that—despite the great number of testimonies, studies, and publications—there is still a hidden "truth," or else it has only

recently been revealed. Today the massacre is described as the product of the homicidal fury of the Germans toward the civilian population, a real "war against civilians," but the automatic substitution of the partisan responsibility with premeditated German terrorism, even if correct in identifying the mechanism of the massacre, does not succeed in providing a plausible explanation of what happened, or in replying to the question: "Why precisely in Sant'Anna di Stazzema?" In this book I have tried to show that there had been in the preceding weeks intense partisan activities around Sant'Anna and that the SS had climbed to the village to counter them. Only in this way does the terrorism against the civilians regain historical depth, and also a useful logic, since the scorched earth operations, where they were effected, served to impede for a long time, if not forever, the prosecution of any armed resistance against the Germans.

This certainly does not mean that "the partisans are to blame," nor that if the latter had actually been found in Sant'Anna, the civilian population would have been spared. In the action there came into effect that identification of the civilian population with the partisans which we find in all the major massacres carried out by the Germans in Italy: "a fatal prejudice"—as Gentile (2005, 116), has defined it—"widespread at every level among the occupation troops, which was among the major causes of the crimes perpetrated in our country." At Monte Sole, Reder's troops found some partisans and in the fighting in the morning of September 29 killed their commander "Lupo," but this did not stop them from continuing to massacre women and children for the whole day and the next. In that type of operations conducted by the SS in Sant'Anna di Stazzema, and then in Vinca and Monte Sole, everyone who found themselves in the zone being scoured were a priori considered "partisans," even if they were but newborn children or elderly invalids. Their extermination was, therefore, planned before the massacre itself took place.

In this phase of the "war against civilians," the ways of conducting the antipartisan operations disregarded the actual possibility of entering into contact with, rounding up, or killing the armed men in combat but did take on a distinctly terrorist character. By striking and eliminating entire communities in the zones where there was thought to be a strong concentration of "bandits," it was equally

possible to obtain the result of disrupting, often definitively, relations between the partisans and the communities, destroying the latter and therefore producing a scorched earth around the partisan formations, moreover optimizing the utilization of resources (human and material). The loss of men in operations against women and children are obviously nil, or in any case minimal, compared to those in rounding up or fighting an armed and insidious enemy, made up of men operating in inaccessible places which they knew perfectly. Naturally, for the civilian population the price to pay was instead the highest: Massacres and the total elimination of entire communities made the "war against civilians" an instrument of military strategy.

If the transition from the historical Resistance to the one idealized in an epic and ever more rhetorical celebration has been explained by the need to find a "site of memory" at a national level, after the end of the war—and in the case of Sant'Anna di Stazzema by the former partisans' need to defend themselves against the accusation of having been morally responsible for the massacre—today the oft-repeated statement that the partisans were not in Sant'Anna (and do not enter the picture) paradoxically contributes to a historical representation in which the armed resistance against the Germans disappears, almost as if it were an embarrassing fact to be concealed. With the result that the epic and essentially antihistorical Resistance of the commemorations has been replaced by a history without the Resistance.

As we have seen, this omission highlights a difficult problem, that of the relationship between the partisans and the civilian population which, in Versilia as elsewhere, was more complex than has subsequently been reported, subject to a delicate balance, and dependent on a multiplicity of variables in which the distinction between support, tolerance, indifference, hostility on the part of the communities, and above all the peasants, toward the armed bands was often very fine: Historians have for some time tackled these burning issues without fear of being labeled revisionists or detractors of the Resistance as a whole, but for some these themes still seem a taboo, and in the case of Sant'Anna di Stazzema the impression is that it is preferable to have a silenced Resistance, put to one side, rather than insulted (as is often considered any attempt at a "historical"

reconstruction of the role of the partisans). And thus also in the latest controversies, crushed between a questionable artistic fiction and a partial representation of what happened, based on the verdict of the Military Tribunal, the story of the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema has continued to be ignored.

This book has tried to provide a complete reconstruction—I certainly do not claim that it is definitive—and a plausible explanation—I certainly do not claim that it is the only one—in accordance with the criteria of historical research: keeping to the sources, honestly reconstructing the facts, providing a plausible interpretation, that is based, as far as possible, on the facts, on what happened. This method has to be the starting point for continued discussion about the massacre of Sant'Anna di Stazzema.

Appendix

"Experts in Truth?"

The Politics of Retribution in Italy and the Role of Historians

Introduction

After the armistice declaration of September 8, 1943, the German army rapidly occupied more than half of Italy's territory. Among the many consequences of the occupation were the deaths of more than 10,000 civilians, killed in so-called acts of reprisal, which, in some cases, included the active collaboration of adherents of the Italian Social Republic (RSI) (Pezzino 2007b). In the same period 6,806 Jews were arrested and deported and, of these, 5,969 died in prison camps.[1]

Once the war was over, only a few trials took place against those held responsible for civilian massacres, and none based exclusively on the accusation of participation in the extermination of Jews in the Italian peninsula (Pezzino 2001b). However, a new and tardy phase of "transitional justice" began at the end of the 1990s following the 1994 discovery of hundreds of judicial files relating to war crimes committed on the Italian population. These files had been illegally archived by the Military Prosecutor, Santacroce, in 1960 and hidden in Palazzo Cesi in Rome, the HQ of the Prosecutor's office.[2]

It is not my intention to discuss the reasons for this late revival of Italian transitional justice; rather I would like to present some considerations on the role played by historians in this new phase.

Historians and Trials

With the end of the Second World War historical studies began to be used for the purposes of the political condemnation of totalitarian regimes (to be precise, above all, the Nazi regime),[3] but the use of an historian as a consultant in trials is a more recent phenomenon. At Nuremberg, historians played no significant role. The 1961 trial in Jerusalem against Adolf Eichmann was to be, in the judgment of Idith Zertal, "an efficient history course, destined for both compatriots as well as the international community" (Zertal 2007, 111). Nevertheless, even though those who carried out the investigations consulted the historical works that were available at the time, and they used the archive and the staff of Yad Vashem, "an expert in tracing materials for the trials of Nazi criminals that took place in West Germany." The only history professor called to testify (for the prosecution) was Salo Baron, who taught Jewish history at Columbia University and who gave evidence on Jewish life before its destruction by the Nazis (Ceserani 2006, 301, 320).

Just a few years later (1963–1965), at the trial in Frankfurt against 22 officers from Auschwitz-Birkenau, numerous historians from Munich's Institut für Zeitgeschichte (including Martin Broszat) were asked to testify in their capacity as expert witnesses. According to Alberto Melloni, this was a significant change: "Instead of the universal history of Nuremberg, or the philosophy of history that Hannah Arendt searched for, in vain, at Jerusalem, here the justice of the penal process and the truth of historical judgment met in a formal setting" (Marquard and Melloni 2008, 19). But it is only at the end of the 1980s that a new type of historian emerges "who chooses to play the role of 'expert' in public debates about the past" (Carole Fink, as cited by Jones, Östberg, and Randeraad, 2007a, 1).

Since it was established as a discipline—that is, as a critical method applied to a range of sources as defined by the subject under scrutiny, with a narrative structure, but defined nonetheless by moral codes and conventions that are generally accepted by historians—history, and historians, have been used to establish the confines of belonging (to a local or national community) and to sustain "that nexus of rites and values that constitutes for a people their sense of their own identity and their own destiny" (Yerushalmi 1990, 19).

Nevertheless, when an historian is used as an expert witness in a trial there is something more: the belief that that individual can operate according to the path of truth and justice, on the basis of the "ethically ambiguous role of professional interpreter of the past . . . Deciding *wie es eigentlich gewesen* acquires a new meaning and can have an incomparably more profound impact, when communicated in court rather than in a lecture hall or in print" (Carole Fink, as cited by Jones, Östberg, and Randeraad, 2007a, 2–3).

In Italy, prior to the latest series of trials, I know of only one case where an historian has been used as a consultant: In the 1976 case, at the Court of Assizes at Trieste, Enzo Collotti was called to testify against the senior administrators of the concentration camp of the Risiera of San Sabba. In the new period, which began with the trials of Erich Priebke at the Military Tribunal in Rome (1996–1998), Gerhard Schreiber of the Historical Office of the German Army at Freiburg was a technical consultant for the prosecution. Since then, around 15 separate proceedings have reached court, and they have frequently seen historians called as technical consultants, exclusively as prosecution witnesses. Before discussing my own personal experience, I would like to emphasize how research into the massacres of civilians in Italy, perpetrated by Germans, has made significant discoveries in the last 15 years. In these cases sometimes the historian has been given the responsibility[4] of giving a definitive judgment on episodes that have almost always divided the affected communities when it comes to the question of attributing blame. If the actual perpetrators of the massacres have remained in the shadows, memories have divided over the role of the partisans, accused by some of the survivors, or else the relations of the victims, of having provoked, following useless attacks, German reprisals, or of having left communities undefended in the face of them.

I have been researching massacres since 1993. Prior to the 50th anniversary of the massacre at Guardistallo, a village in the province of Pisa, I was asked by the local authorities and a committee of citizens, in which the various "souls" of the village were represented, to put an end to the nagging doubts that had divided the community, to show once and for all who was to "blame" for the 50 civilians killed following a clash between retreating German troops and the local partisan band. I had to demonstrate, after a detailed inquiry,

who had been the first to shoot, reconstruct honestly how things had "in reality happened," without worrying which of the two sides, which in a conflict of memory had been in opposition in a divided town, would be the eventual "winner."

It was a case of a community seeking out the professionalism of a historian or a truth expert. The research lasted for two years and represented for me a significant challenge to those principles of responsibility about which, for some time, historians have been developing discussions, following on from the *Historikerstreit*, which some years ago divided German historians over the interpretation of Auschwitz.[5] But it was also an extraordinary challenge in searching for the "truth." The citizens of Guardistallo showed that they truly believed that only the historian, with his rigorous passion for the facts, for proof and for the testimonies that are central to his craft, can really keep guard against the agents of forgetting, against those who tear documents to shreds, against the assassins of memory and the revisers of encyclopedias, against the conspirators of silence (Yerushalmi 1990, 23).

Furthermore, on that occasion, it was not just about writing history, but also, as Charles Maier has emphasized in connection with the massacre of civilians in the Second World War, it was also about "doing justice" (Maier 1995), in the sense that I was asked to narrate the events according to a scheme that was not just truthful but that was expected from me to be the absolute truth. Justice, above all, for the victims, listening to and giving the dignity of a historical narrative to their reasons, but justice too for the partisans, obliged in all these years to defend themselves from vilifying accusations.

In other words, in this case "doing justice" meant not only, as Yerushalmi maintains, opposing oblivion, but also attributing responsibilities, if only on the ethical plane, following Tzvetan Todorov's conviction that "human existence is everywhere loaded with values and, as a consequence, the desire to expel from the human sciences every link with such values is itself inhumane" (Todorov 1995a, 17).

In 1997, when I published the results of the research on Guardistallo, I gave the book the structure of an out and out trial investigation, divided into three parts: the preliminary investigation, the judgment, and the sentence. The reasons for this choice were

discussed in the book: Although I was aware of the difference between the work of the judge and that of the historian, I had felt I needed to respond to the request for the truth—and for justice—that came from the inhabitants of Guardistallo, but without avoiding, I quote from the "Introduction" to the volume, "perhaps with a justified, but in this case too easy, reference to the context of those years, the questions of those who wanted to know 'who is to blame.'"

I added immediately after that "blame" lies always, *in the first instance*, with the perpetrators of the massacre (Pezzino 2007, 20), and the analysis that followed was aimed at shifting the center of attention away from the question "who fired first?" to the general context in that the massacre took place, that of the war, and the particular type of war conducted in Italy by German troops. It was this question that had been at the center of the polemic that had divided the population of the village—a question that so strongly recalls the useless question about who in a conflict fired the first shot, a question so dear to the historians ridiculed by Marc Bloch in his book *The Historian's Craft* (1979).

But so strong was the emotional impact of my encounter with the citizens of Guardistallo—both the accusers of the partisans, as well as some of the partisans who had been profoundly marked by the tragedy they had lived through that June 29, 1944—that I could not resist the temptation to make a judgment. I quote my "Introduction" again: "I envisaged a potential decision to proceed either to judicial referral, or else, to complete acquittal from the accusations leveled, by the individuals who had commissioned me, against the protagonists of that episode" (Pezzino 2007, 21).

It is a phrase that today I would not write, just as I would not organize the research material according to the typical structure of a judicial investigation. Furthermore, given that my research had allowed me to identify the Germans who had carried out the massacre, in theory still eligible to be brought to justice, it was possible that my work could have "done justice" in the full judicial sense of the word. At the time, however, I didn't think about the judicial aspects of my study. Furthermore, even though the work of the judge and of the historian may be similar—as both use the so-called evidential paradigm[6]—they do differ fundamentally in their aims. The insistence of the historian on the context, so essential for his

trade, makes the terms of reference more complex, his method shies away from simple linear explanations, from chains of causality that are too immediate and restricted. The judge, instead, tends in the final analysis to extreme simplification, which is captured in the question of whether a given accused is guilty or innocent of a crime attributed to him; a question with respect to which the historian frequently has nothing to say and which, besides, in most cases has no particular interest for him.

I had to look more closely at these problems of the distinction between the judge and the historian a few years later (2002–2004), when I was appointed as the military prosecutor's technical consultant at the Military Tribunal in La Spezia—with competence for the events in Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna in 1943–1945—for four separate proceedings, relating to the massacres at Bardine San Terenzo, Valla, and Vinca (in the province of Massa-Carrara); Sant'Anna di Stazzema (Lucca); Monte Sole (the communes of Grizzana, Marzabotto, and Monzuno, in the province of Bologna); and Certosa di Farneta (Lucca). These locations included the two gravest massacres to take place in Italy (the massacre at Monte Sole was the largest in Western Europe), the only massacre that involved a religious community, and a terrorist operation against the population of the Apuan Alps, which lasted four days with around four hundred victims. In all four cases those responsible for the killings were units of the Sixteenth Panzer-Grenadier Division, under the command of General Simon, who was tried and condemned to death by an English military tribunal at Padua in 1947, only to be later pardoned and freed in the mid-1950s.

In Italy, for all four cases there had been judicial procedures; for the Certosa di Farneta killings a lower-ranking official had been accused and acquitted, while for the other three there had been a general trial in Bologna, at the beginning of the 1950s, against Walter Reder, who was the commander of the exploration battalion of the division. Reder had been condemned for the massacres at Vinca and Monte Sole but found not guilty for the others. As far as the massacre at Sant'Anna di Stazzema was concerned, the local authorities, the partisan associations and the survivors continued to argue for the guilt of Reder even though, in the mid-1990s, documents from the American military investigation clearly showed, without

any doubt, that another unit of the same SS division was responsible for the massacre.

Of the four judicial proceedings we are discussing, three—those for Sant'Anna di Stazzema, for the Certosa di Farneta, and for Monte Sole—have reached the end of their course (in the case of military trials, there are three separate levels, as in civil proceedings), while the fourth, begun in June 2008, was suspended following the closure of the Military Tribunal of La Spezia and then transferred to the Military Tribunal of Rome, where it concluded in June 2009. The trials have seen the majority of the accused condemned to life imprisonment. But, since these were proceedings where the accused were in absentia, there is no possibility that the guilty individuals will be extradited from Germany, and the sentences have an essentially symbolic value.

My Experiences

Compared to the prevailing judicial culture in place at the end of the conflict, the strategy of the Military Prosecutor at La Spezia Marco De Paolis (undoubtedly the military lawyer who has been most actively engaged in these proceedings involving war crimes, which are extremely technically difficult 60 years after the events themselves) has been to concentrate on all those who had a leadership role, from the rank of corporal upward. This has led to a complex task of reconstructing the groupings of the outfits responsible for the massacres—who had been initially and definitively identified in the Allied postwar investigations—and of establishing who among them was still alive. To help him in this task the prosecutor employed the assistance of Carlo Gentile, an historian based in Cologne who had frequently worked with the German and Italian legal authorities.

My role was rather different. I produced for the prosecutor four written papers, which I was asked to discuss in the first-level trials, which are now finished. In the case of Certosa di Farneta, the questions posed when I was given the task of expert witness required me to provide an historical reconstruction of the events that had led to the trial. In particular, I was asked to discuss the issue of orders and directives by the German High Command (by Field Marshal

Kesselring and senior commanders) to units spread around Italy after September 8, 1943, to comment on antipartisan measures, showing tactics and operational practices imposed on each individual commander and how these were put into action by the commanders themselves. I was, furthermore, asked to gather archival material related to these issues or at least indicate where such material could be located.

In practice, the episode was relatively straightforward and very clear in terms of the facts (there had already been a trial at the end of the 1940s): The prosecutor was interested in a reconstruction of the general context of the "war against civilians" (Battini and Pezzino 1997) and in particular in the existence of the system of orders that emanated from the supreme command of the Wehrmacht. He wanted to know the level of coercion required by the orders and what were the characteristics of antipartisan operations (Were they aimed at civilian massacres?) that were carried out in the summer of 1944 by the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division.

The questions relating to the other investigations were, on the other hand, more complex: They required an historical reconstruction of the facts, and clear indications as to where and when precisely they took place, and how exactly events unfolded. For the *Procuratore* (public prosecutor) that meant that I had to figure out the reasons that had led the soldiers to carry out those actions, whether there were any connections between the massacres and partisan activities, and specify the particular circumstances (around which a forever divided community memory of the events had organized itself). I also needed to specify the troops involved and the Italian and foreign commanders in the locations where the massacres had taken place; indicate precisely the hierarchical organization within each combat unit; provide general information on the SS (i.e., ideology, composition, recruitment, aims of the corps) and its relations with other German armed forces; the names of the partisan leaders operating in the zone at the time and the composition of the partisan formations they led; and the level of knowledge at the time of the events of the local population and of the partisan leaders.

Furthermore, I also had to give information about other massacres and other grave acts of violence that the Germans had previously committed; ascertain whether the soldiers concerned were still alive, as well as provide the names and numbers of the victims (both

civil and partisan); provide the names of witnesses able to speak usefully about the events; and, finally, give information concerning previous trials and investigations.

It is evident that some of these issues required standard historiographical interpretation and were concerned with questions that historians had already debated: the nature and reasons for the massacres; their ideological profile; the system of orders; the chains of command; the division of labor between the Wehrmacht and the SS; the role of special units in this type of action, such as the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division and the Hermann Göring Division; and the relationship between massacres and partisan activity (Were they reprisals in the accepted sense of the word or operations designed to clear territory with a clear terroristic scope toward the civilian population?). The question relating to the motives and behavior of the partisans was implicitly informed by the numerous polemics following the massacre; the antipartisan memories spread around all the localities mentioned; and, in my case, was further framed by the approach of Todorov (1995b). But, I need to add, in Italy my Todorovian framework placed me in a very small minority of Resistance historians.

Some of the other questions too, which up to a few years ago were unusual in historical research, have now in reality become standard. Individual circumstances, usually ignored, are more and more important in studies that, as they have to reconstruct divided memories, deal with issues of memory conflicts in order to establish how far they correspond to the reality of events. (Was there a partisan action that led to the massacre? Are the accusations that the partisans didn't care about the civilian population myths, or are they grounded in reality? What was the real nature of the relations between the partisans and the environment that hosted them? And who were the partisans in reality, beyond the epic narratives of the postwar period?) So, as far as the names and numbers of the victims were concerned, I directed a research project aimed at listing and giving a name to all the victims of massacres in Tuscany (Fulvetti and Pelini 2006).

In general terms, then, all the trials of recent years owe a lot to the historiographical current of the "war against civilians," which provided the lawyers with a nuanced reading of the barbarizing processes enacted by the German army in occupied Italy. The fact

that lawyers read works of history is one thing, freely drawing on them for ideas and interpretations that may help them in their roles as enquirers (or as judges); but it is something quite different when historical truth takes on an official dimension through the sworn expert testimony of an historian given in court. Ruti G. Teitel has correctly emphasized how "'truth' is not an autonomous response . . . Truth is seen by some as a precursor phase that leads to other legal processes, such as prosecution" or "sanctions against perpetrators, reparations for victims, and institutional changes" (Teitel 2000, 88).

Responsibility: A Difficult Principle to Apply

In his discussion of the responsibilities of the historian, Peter Mandler suggested that it is not his job to model himself as a judge or jury of society: "The canons of evidence and argument that prevail in the courtroom are different from those that prevail in the classroom, and as a result historians often come off badly when they are dragged into judicial proceedings. In courtrooms, facts are ascertained and then measured up against the law. In classrooms, facts are ascertained and then interpreted. While superficially similar, these processes are in reality very different." Mandler's conclusion is that historians can have a role in the courtrooms, but "ought to go in without illusions about their place and authority there" (Mandler 2007, 15–16).

As a starting point, I would like to state that I agree, at least on the basis of my personal experience, with the argument about the secondary nature of the historian in judicial proceedings. In effect, even though such proceedings might be concerned with events that took place many years before, as was the case in Italy and the current round of war-crimes trials, the expertise of the professional historian is only one element—and not always the most important—in the work of the investigator, perhaps a point of departure for enquiries that then develop according to the standard practices of judicial analyses.

In other words, it is difficult to see an historian being asked a question that is connected to establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused; it is difficult to envisage how this expert evidence might have the same stringent characteristics as a ballistics report or the

examination of a DNA sample; it is difficult to conceive how the historian's evidence can be the fundamental element on which a court can base its judgment. Indeed in my case, following my evidence as presented by the prosecution, no member of the defense team felt it important to nominate an historical consultant for the accused. This would seem to suggest that only relative importance was attached to this evidence, rather than being an indication that its contents had been accepted. This secondary role may perhaps upset the vanity and the narcissism of the historical consultant, but it also bestows on him a freedom that allows him to avoid excessive simplification in his answers to the questions posed to him. (But naturally, much depends too on the nature of the questions asked of him and the type of judicial procedure to which he is called to contribute.)

I would like to emphasize another element: the opportunity presented to the historian who operates as a consultant for an investigating magistrate to gain access to sources in a way that is not affected by the usual archival restrictions.[7] Even though I am aware of the "cumulative or evolutionary" (Karlsson 2007) character of historical enquiry, and although I am under no illusion about the discovery of the document that is the equivalent to the "smoking gun" of detective novels, I have to confess that, when I accepted the task, this was perhaps—together with a certain undeniable dose of professional pride in having been chosen—the most important element for me. In effect, it is difficult for a professional historian to resist such a seductive offer.

Nevertheless, the reality was rather disappointing as regards the expectations I had for what I imagined would be limitless possibilities for investigation. Most of my work was based on documents that I already knew well, and for the most part that I possessed, and that I myself made available to the Office of the Public Prosecutor. I had access to sources of a certain level of interest in the Historical Office of the Army HQ, which were, however, declassified and made available to all academics about a year after I had consulted them. I didn't manage to find any original document in the Historical Office of the *Carabinieri* in Rome, in the Archives of the Prefecture of Bologna, or at the Archive of the *Carabinieri* Command in Bologna.

As far as the enormous quantity of material related to the judicial investigation, which as an expert appointed by the Public Prosecutor I could freely consult, most of this was connected to

research on single individuals in the units that operated during the massacres, to investigatory commissions, and so on. In other words, for me an aspect in which I had little interest, given the predictable and absolute denials of the accused who were questioned by the rogatory commissions, of all the events for which they had been cited (with one important exception, that of a soldier present at Sant'Anna who agreed to testify and confirmed my hypotheses concerning the preordained nature of the massacre, which other writers had questioned).

But let us come to the most radical objection, which argues that the work of the historian and the judge are simply incompatible. This is based on two elements: On the one hand, as was the case with the Mandler passage quoted earlier, there is an emphasis on the differences in method and the privileging, in the work of the historian, of interpretation over the minute establishment of the facts. At a different level there is the conviction expressed by Henry Rousso who—in discussing the possibility of prosecuting the leaders of Vichy for crimes against humanity by facilitating the extermination of the Jews, crimes that, on the December 26, 1964, the French Parliament declared were not subject to the statute of limitations—emphasized how the highly symbolic character of these crimes hid certain dangers: "This is tantamount to asking justice to formulate a condemnation of past generations, to undertake, in the strictest sense of the term, a trial of history . . . It's not the job of justice to make—or remake—history" (*Esprit* 1992, 36–37). Rousso himself, as is well-known, has repeatedly refused to testify at trials.

In Rousso's judgment there is certainly an element I agree with: the concern for the so-called judicial institutionalization of history. In this context I quote Alberto Melloni, who voiced his concern that "appearing in court representing what is properly the scholar's trade . . . means irredeemably losing the past and all its uncertain qualities" (Marquard and Melloni 2008, 27). The institutionalization of historical judgment involves an implicit danger that the certainties established in court then become a new source of historical truth: If a certain narrative is to be found in a judge's sentence, public opinion is generally led to believe that it is authentic.

Nevertheless, Rousso's position, taken to its limits, would seem to imply the absolute impossibility of judging before a court

individuals who have tarnished themselves with crimes in the name of political ideas and who obeyed the orders of criminal states in the course of conflict or in experiences of totalitarian government. It would seem to empty the dimension of individual responsibility, which is predominant in the courtroom, of all meaning.

For example, Aldo Menghini, a general in the Italian army, from Florence, on November 24, 1947, wrote a letter to General Giovanni Minaxhò, public prosecutor of the Military Court in La Spezia, in support of a member of the Third Polizei-Freiwilligen Battalion "Italien," which was made up of those Italian soldiers, captured after September 8, who had accepted the invitation to enroll in the ranks of the RSI's army, or directly in the German forces. The soldier was accused of taking part in the massacre of 83 miners at Niccioleta in Northern Tuscany, which took place between June 13 and 14, 1944 (Pezzino 2001a). General Menghini reconstructed the events, emphasized that the soldier's company during a search of the village had found weapons and that the workers had gone on strike; raised a red flag; and, after making a case in defense of the soldier, begged indulgence for the "outpourings of an old soldier which you will well understand. If things are . . . as I have reported them to you, when a soldier is amnestied who went to serve, as far as he was concerned his Country, albeit in the opposing camp, then how can he be considered an individual responsible for acts which his superiors ordered him to do?" The answer was already contained in the rhetorical question: "*a soldier in the army doesn't have to respond for his acts* [my italics]" (Pezzino 2001a, 200).

It is another example of that legitimacy that is guaranteed "to soldiers of every type and rank who operate in the framework of legal violence carried out by the State," with a "paradoxical overturning of responsibility: Nazi criminals were 'regular' soldiers, who were acting within a constituted system of power, while the partisans, as the statements of the German command said, were bandits, outlaws, who did not fight according to the rules" (Pavone 1996, 43). Such legitimacy often meant they were beyond punishment, according to the principle that someone who acts on orders is always beyond responsibility. This very claim of lack of responsibility has made war crime trials so difficult; it was necessary to establish exactly which link in the hierarchical chain was presumed to carry responsibility.

But how far could this process be stretched? As far as the soldier, who does indeed obey the orders of his officers but who, as is evident from many eyewitness accounts of massacres, frequently showed, as he carried out his orders, an indifference or a cruelty that does not allow him to be considered blameless? Should it go as far as the subordinate officers, who could be accused of interpreting, with excessive zeal, orders that had a general character? Or up to the level of divisional command, or army corps level, or the supreme command of the Wehrmacht, or even higher up, to Hitler and his restricted entourage?

We are thus led to reflect on the limits of human actions, on the conditioning that makes violence appear normal, plausible, and even inevitable in those circumstances. It is exactly that cogent dimension of the "circumstances" of the "ordinariness" of violence that makes the fundamental question so difficult: at what level, in the long series of events and circumstances that leads to a massacre, is it possible to clearly identify individual responsibility? At what level do we see it emerge clearly, in order to support our moral, political, and ultimately historical judgment?

The principle of responsibility is, then, very difficult to pin down, so much so that an issue of *Esprit* on the theme, which was significantly entitled *Les equivoques de la responsabilité*, warned of the "frequency of the phenomenon of a search for scapegoats" (*Esprit* 1994, 5). In Krzysztof Kieslowski's *Three Colors Red* (1994), the protagonist, a retired judge, as he thinks back about the accused he had tried and condemned, confesses that "in their place . . . in the same life, in those circumstances, he would have robbed, he would have killed, he would have lied." He would have behaved, that is, exactly as they had: "I condemned—he concluded—because I wasn't in their shoes, but in mine." Briefly, according to this position what emerges is

> a harsh notion of responsibility, based not on what men intended but what they find they have achieved in the light of the event . . . Historical responsibility transcends the categories of liberal thought—intention and act, circumstances and will, objective and subjective. It overwhelms the individual in his acts, mingles the objective and subjective, imputes circumstances to the will; thus it substitutes for the individual as he feels himself to be a role of phantom in which he cannot recognize himself, but in which he must see himself, since

> that it was he was for his victims. And today it is his victims who are right. (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 42–43)[8]

Nevertheless, I think that such standpoints, taken to their extreme consequences, completely empty the dimension of individual responsibility that counts in the courts. And it is exactly here, in the establishment of the legal terms that define responsibility, that the question of the responsibility of individuals has gotten lost, at least on the penal level, and an image has been provided of a totalitarian machine possessed of its own autonomous powers of coercion, independent of the will of individuals. And within this machine the only people ultimately held responsible were the dictator and a few of his closest collaborators.

But conversely, and exactly in the context of historical discussions, the theme of individual responsibility has imposed itself with some force; both Christopher Browning and Tzvetan Todorov, for example, have confronted the issue, and for them a moral judgment can always be made when faced with a choice. Todorov has written that "human beings do not obey their laws as frequently as all other beings: They can decide to break them, precisely because they have come to a realization that this is possible . . . In other words, the human being, even though he is subject to an infinite range of factors which determine his behavior—historical, geographical, social, mental—is characterized by his own unalienable liberty" (Todorov 1995a, 17. See also Todorov 1992). And Browning, in the conclusion to his book *Ordinary Germans*, argues that there is always the possibility of choice: "This story of ordinary men is not the story of all men. The reserve policemen faced choices, and most of them committed terrible deeds. But those who killed cannot be absolved by the notion that anyone in the same situation would have done as they did. For even among them, some refused to kill, and others stopped killing. Human responsibility is ultimately an individual matter" (Browning 2001, 188).

That orders are obeyed is the common sense on which every army bases its own capacity to be a machine of destruction, without having to confront the anguished problems of conscience that war in general and, in particular, acts of reprisal against civilians, pose. It is certain that, once the logic of obedience has led to the argument

for the moral, rather than the penal, "lack of responsibility" of a soldier, for whatever act he is ordered to carry out, the result would be that no soldier could ever be tried for his acts while in uniform. Since every superior is, in turn, dependent on another hierarchical superior, the responsibility for any criminal act can always be attributed to the supreme leader of the armed forces or, in the case of a totalitarian regime, to the dictator to whom the armed forces are, as a matter of course, subordinate; once he has disappeared from the scene, something that usually has already happened when trials are taking place that call into question the legitimacy of those orders, then everyone can be considered "exempt from responsibility."

Historian and Judge

I would like, lastly, to tackle the other objection raised by Mandler—he maintains that in the work of the historian interpretation prevails over the minute reconstruction of the facts and that the historian is more attentive to the causes of an event, rather than whether an individual is guilty or innocent. A court is rarely interested in questions of cause. This last observation recalls Marc Bloch's well-known comment: "The judge expresses it as: 'Who is right and who is wrong?' The scholar is content to ask 'Why?' and he accepts the fact that the answer may not be simple" (Bloch 1979, 193). Shortly before he was shot for his contribution to the Resistance in Lyon, Bloch found the strength to write, toward the end of his essay dedicated to Lucien Febvre, composed as a "simple antidote . . . amid sorrows and anxieties both personal and collective," that

> When all is said and done, a single word, "understanding," is the beacon light of our studies. Let us not say that the true historian is a stranger to emotion: He has that, at all events. "Understanding," in all honesty, is a word pregnant with difficulties, but also with hope. Moreover, it is a friendly word. Even in action, we are far too prone to judge. It is so easy to denounce. We are never sufficiently understanding. Whoever differs from us—a foreigner or a potential adversary—is almost inevitably considered evil. A little more understanding of people would be necessary merely for guidance, in the conflicts which are unavoidable; all the more so to prevent them while there is yet time. If history would only renounce its false

> archangelic airs, it would help us to cure this weakness. It includes a vast experience of human diversities, a continuous contact with men. Life, like science, has everything to gain for it, if only these contacts be friendly. (Bloch 1979, 2 and 143–44)

But yet, I feel I have to say, that the interest the historian has in interpretation takes nothing away from his specific competence in establishing the truth. The fact the historian is drawn to the unfolding of events, which are integral to the questions an investigator (judicial or political, it matters little) poses to the historian, places an unusual, but profitable burden, on the tools of his trade and challenges his capacity to reconstruct (together with his awareness of his own limits: It is the nature of his sources that defines the completeness of the reconstruction), "how things really happened," in other words, the truth of the event, the *événementielle* aspect of history.

Events are not to be ignored and, besides, Marc Bloch, certainly not one who could be accused of being attracted to them, was moved to write:

> For something like 34 years I have been wholly occupied with the writing and teaching of history. In the course of my professional career I have had to examine a great many documents belonging to a great many periods of the past, and, as best I might, sift what is true in them from what is false. (Bloch 1949, 2)

He saw in the Rankean invitation (the historian sets out to describe things "as they happened"), as well as in Herodotus' earlier "to narrate what was," an exhortation to "efface himself before the facts," an invitation to "integrity" and of "honest submission to the truth," qualities that should bring together the judge and the historian. It is only from that moment that their paths start to separate: "When the scholar has observed and explained, his task is finished. It yet remains for the judge to pass sentence" (Bloch 1979, 138–39). Returning to this distinction, Claudio Pavone has, however, usefully clarified that "this does not mean it can become an alibi for both judge and historian; both of them are bound by the ethical imperative of the search for the truth, each are using the methods and objectives which belong to him" (Pavone 1996, 39–40).

Certainly, by referring to context, the historian looks to complicate the terms of reference, he recoils from simple, one-dimensional explanations, from chains of causality that are too narrow. But it is beyond doubt that the narrating of the fundamental elements of historical events (who, where, when, how), gives emphasis to the "professionalism" of the historian as an "expert in truth"—an expertise that does not imply an absolute or positivist stance but an ability to reconstruct and establish a plausible sequence and concatenation of the events or rather the most plausible sequence among many. This is what lies behind the "requirement for truth," which is fundamental to the professional code of the historian (Moretti 1998, 101). Furthermore, Yosef Yerushalmi has emphasized that "with his rigorous passion for the facts, for proof and for testimonies," the historian distinguishes, dissects, analyses, raises doubts: His "God lies certainly in the detail" (Yerushalmi 1990, 21–23).

The theme of truth is, in my view, at the center of these reflections. From this perspective, the ideas outlined a few years ago by Arnaldo Momigliano are extraordinarily contemporary. He showed how for centuries the historical operation was an individual and free enterprise, a search for a fragment of truth. He defined two schools, which were clearly identifiable in the eighteenth century, on the one hand the traditional school of erudite antiquarian historians, on the other the new school of philosophical history. The antiquarians, who had prevailed until the middle of the century, "had given much evidence of patience, of critical acumen and of honesty . . . leading to intelligent reflection on the difference between the gathering of facts and their interpretation." Significantly, Nietzsche saw quite the opposite: "the repugnant spectacle of a blind collecting fury, a ceaseless harvesting of everything that once existed" (Weinrich 1999, 176). The philosophical historians, instead, were above all interested in "what was later called civilization. The historians in this school studied the progress of humanity as reflected in political institutions, in religion, in commerce, in customs . . . They didn't aim to establish the authenticity of individual facts, rather they wanted to trace the development of humanity" (Momigliano 1984, 5 and 297).

Only from the nineteenth century has history believed it could "respond to questions about the meaning of existence or the quality of the future," leading to a radical change in perspective: This "has

frequently encouraged the temptation to offer conclusions which are not backed up by hard information. It has also created what seems to me to be an imbalance between the interpretation of the facts and the discovery of them . . . We need to ask ourselves if history has not overrated its capacities" (Momigliano 1985, 59 and 72). The historian no longer restricted himself to collecting clues about an unknown or distant past, perhaps assembling them according to an exhaustive investigative procedure that allowed them to be read in a plausible context, in the knowledge that "chance has dictated that we can know some things about the past and not others, because chance has meant that some things have been preserved and others not" (*Parolechiave* 1995, 49).

It is a reminder that is of some value against the evident falsifications, the false revisions, the academic slovenliness of the person who privileges the political/polemical dimension over historical reconstruction. Without wishing to bury interpretative creativity, the historian needs to stick to the "facts," that is the study of the sources, to the search for clues, to keep separate what he is allowed to affirm and what is instead interpretation, a fundamental lesson against every manipulation of the historiographical operation.

I have therefore realized, as my job as an expert witness developed, that this role put under considerable pressure my convictions on the limits (and on the aims) of the "trade of the historian." And from this perspective, I feel a certain sense of calm. I feel I can respond to Mandler's exhortation and say that I have tried "to ensure that the historian's involvement does not do damage to history" (Mandler 2007, 24). Perhaps, in this experience I have taken more than I have given, and obviously my written reports for the prosecutor are the result of an interpretation that can legitimately be discussed. But I hope (and believe) that no one can accuse me of having deliberately infringed the historian's code for purposes that are foreign to it.

Notes

Series Editor's Preface

1. On the massacre at Marzabotto, also called Monte Sole, see Baldissara and Pezzino 2009; Giorgi 1985.
2. On the controversy over September 8, 1943, see Aga-Rossi 2000.
3. See Umberto Eco's response, a lecture delivered at the Casa Italiana of Columbia University on April 25, 1995 (Eco 1995).
4. On the Ardeatine Caves massacre, see Katz 1967.
5. On the manipulation of memory regarding the Ardeatine Caves massacre, see Portelli 2003.

Introduction

1. *Stars and Stripes*, July 4, 1944. I quote the Italian translation, dated July 5, available in the Township Archive of Guardistallo.
2. About the investigations, the English group was more active: "The only nations actively engaged in the investigations on war crimes in Italy were the British and the Americans. The Americans' organization was very similar to ours, since they had an investigative section under the order of the Lieutenant Colonel P. G. Holder, who was subjected to the American Judge Advocate for the war theatre, Colonel Tom Barrett. Both he and the British substitute Judge Advocate General were responsible towards the High Allied Headquarter of the Allied Forces for the matters of handing over criminals to the foreign authorities, dealing with the Italian Government." *Summary of War Crimes*, report written by the Lieutenant Colonel P. J. H. Heycock of the War Crimes Group, South East Europe, and sent with an accompanying letter on February 26, 1948, to the judge advocate general of London, the National Archives, London (hereafter, NaL), WO 310/4.
3. On the application to Italy of directives put in effect in Eastern Europe see Schreiber 2001, 91–131; Klinkhammer 1997, 51–53, 88–96, 333–34. The *Kampfanweisung für die Bandenbekämpfung in Osten* was the

more important general instruction issued by the Wehrmacht on the fight against partisans (November 11, 1942).

4. *Report on German Reprisals for Partisan Activity in Italy*, p. 9, NaL, WO 204/11465 (Another copy in NaL, WO 32/12206). There is no date: However, it refers to a report dated July 9, 1945, analyzing more deeply paragraphs 5 and 6 and represents the synthesis of the British investigations on German war crimes in Italy. On August 11, 1945, the report was sent from Allied Headquarters to the British undersecretary of state at the War Office, together with attached files and appendices, which contained the results of the investigations.
5. Actually, the "impunity clause" was not a novelty: Order No. 9, issued on February 24, 1944, by the Major General Ludwig Kübler (hanged in 1947 in Yugoslavia), who was the military commander officer of the Adriatic coast operational area, referred already to the impunity granted to those who applied terroristic and ruthless measures for fighting the partisan war (Schreiber 2011, 95). The impunity clause was also granted in another order issued on June 8 by the SS Commander Officer Karl-Heinz Bürger, who was also the commander officer of the Central Italy police (Ibid., 100). The promise of impunity was also explicit in the quoted Kesselring order of April 7, 1944.
6. *Report on German Reprisals for Partisan Activity in Italy*, pp. 5 and 8, NaL, WO 204/11465. Kesselring's several orders are preserved in NaL, WO 235/366. Almost all recent studies on the subject refer to these orders.
7. Quoted in Battini and Pezzino, 1997, 197–98.
8. *Report on German Reprisals for Partisan Activity in Italy*, p. 14, NaL, WO 204/11465.
9. The data are cited in Fulvetti 2009, pp. 269, 278.
10. For the controversies about Spike Lee's film see, in particular but not exclusively the local press, (*Il Tirreno*, *La Nazione*, and *Giornale della Versilia*) on the dates cited.
11. The parliamentary question and the written reply can be seen at http://banchedati.camera.it/sindacatoispettivo_15/showXhtml.Asp?idAtto=19417&stile=6&highLight=1&paroleContenute=percent27spikepercent27+percent7C+percent27INTERROGAZIONE+A+RISPOSTA+SCRITTApercent27 (accessed June 8, 2011).
12. The Ruling of the Military Tribunal is available at http://www.santannadistazzema.org/immagini/Sentenza_Stazzema.pdf (accessed June 8, 2011).
13. The interventions on the discussion list of SISSCO are in the archives, only visible to members of the list, at http://liste.racine.ra.it/mailman/listinfo/sissco.

14. The communiqué of the Board of Governors of the Committee for the Remembrance Ceremonies of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna and of the Association of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna of October 8 is at: http://www.santannadistazzema.org/news.asp?idn=1422 (accessed October 15, 2008).

Chapter 1

1. For the reconstruction of that day I have followed the outline of the report (August 20, 1946) drawn up by the police deputy inspector Dr. Vito Majorca, of the Viareggio police station, "Massacre committed by the German SS in Sant'Anna di Lucca (August 12, 1944)," Records of the Walter Reder Trial, Military Tribunal of La Spezia (hereafter Pr) III, 195–197, verifying and integrating his information with that from other sources. His main source is the account of Don Giuseppe Vangelisti—the parish priest of La Culla at the time of the massacre, who was in Sant'Anna on August 13 and 14—dated August 27, 1944, and reproduced in Graziani 1945, 20–21. I was unable to see the original. It should be stressed that in none of the official testimonies given at the National Archives (hereafter Na) by Don Vangelisti to the records of the American investigation, including in his attached written account an English translation, is there a description of the ways in which the massacre was carried out, which is instead presented in a publication edited by the Municipal Administration of Stazzema in 1993, but in a different version than that reproduced by Graziani.
2. Information about the battalion and the other troops who might have participated in the operation can be found in Gentile 2005, 116–17 and 130–31.
3. Transcript of the interrogation of Stefano and Luigi Lucchetti, 28.2.1951, Pr III, 201.
4. Enio Mancini specified that Mulina di Stazzema was one of the bases from which the columns of SS set out: about an hour and a half on foot from Sant'Anna (Records of the Trial Hearings at the Military Tribunal of La Spezia, hereafter Vtm, hearing of October 13, 2004).
5. Testimonies of Bruno Antonucci, 18.3.1947, Pr IV, 57, and 18.3.1948, Pr XIV, 52.
6. Testimonies of Ennio Navari, 1.8.2000, in "Report on the state of investigations and transcripts of the examination of witnesses" (hereafter Apm-Carabinieri) record n. 21, and Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004
7. Testimonies of Lina Antonucci, 9.2.1951, Pr XIV, 355; 25.8.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 29; Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004.

8. Testimonies of Mario Ulivi, 3.3.1950, Pr III, 46; 9.2.1951, Pr XIV, 358; 30.7.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 10; and Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004.
9. The detail of the flares is also recounted by Graziani 1945, who makes use of the account of Don Vangelisti, and is also found in numerous testimonies at the trial in La Spezia. The rogatory letters, of one of the SS soldiers present at Sant'Anna di Stazzema, Ignaz Alois Lippert, of March 23, 2004, in Germany, confirm that some of the red tracer bullets fired into the air signaled the beginning of the action (see the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 96).
10. Testimonies of Milena Bernabò, 29.7.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 20; and Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004.
11. Testimonies of Mauro Pieri, 29.7.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 18; and Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004.
12. Testimonies of Angela Lazzeri, 3.3.1950, Pr III, 44; and Giuseppina Bottari, 3.3.1950, Pr III, 47.
13. Testimonies of Lina Antonucci.
14. Testimonies of Agostino Bibolotti, 15.3.1947, Pr IV, 43; 8.1.1951, Pr III, 184; 9.2.1951, Pr XIV, 348; 12.9.1996, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 5 bis.
15. On April 25, 2003, Genny Bibolotti was posthumously awarded a gold medal for bravery in peacetime by the President of the Republic. Regarding the episode, and its remembrance, see Marcucci 2005.
16. Testimonies of Mario Marsili, August 22, 2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 25; and Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004.
17. Testimonies of Ennio Navari.
18. Testimonies of Lina Antonucci.
19. Testimonies of Mauro Pieri.
20. Testimonies of Milena Bernabò.
21. Testimonies of Lina Antonucci.
22. Testimonies of Mauro Pieri.
23. Testimony of Enrico Pieri, Vtm, hearing of 4.11.2004.
24. Testimonies of Gabriella Pierotti, 9.1.1951, Pr III, 187; 22.2.1951, Pr XIV, 381; and Vtm, hearing of 11.11.2004.
25. Testimony of Maria Grazia Pierotti, 23.1.1951, Pr III, 185.
26. Testimonies of Gabriella Pierotti.
27. Testimony of Enrico Pieri.
28. Ibid.
29. Testimonies of Gabriella Pierotti.
30. Testimony of Enrico Pieri.
31. Testimonies of Gabriella Pierotti.
32. Testimony of Enrico Pieri.
33. Testimonies of Gabriella Pierotti.

34. Testimony of Enrico Pieri.
35. Giuseppa Bottari, undated written statement, attachment O of the American investigation, Na, and testimonies 25.7.1950, Pr III, 112, and 12.3.1951, Pr XIV, 395.
36. Testimony of Florinda Bertelli, 3.3.1950, Pr III, 43.
37. Testimonies of Alfredo Graziani, 15.3.1947, Pr IV, 47; and 9.2.1950, Pr XIV, 55.
38. Testimony of Angiola Bacci, Vtm, hearing of 4.11.2004.
39. Testimony of Renato Bonuccelli, Vtm, hearing of 4.11.2004.
40. Testimonies of Giuseppina Bottari.
41. Testimonies of Nello Bonuccelli, 7.1.1951, Pr III, 182; and 12.2.1951, Pr XIV, 365.
42. Testimony of Renato Bonuccelli.
43. Testimonies of Alfredo Graziani.
44. Testimony of Enio Mancini, 13.9.1996, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 1, p. 5.
45. Testimony of Ada Lina Angelini, Vtm, hearing of 12.10.2004. According to the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 100, Angelini's testimony refers to the Germans who were coming up from Farnocchia: However, on returning from Sant'Anna, a group of soldiers passed by the same place, asking her directions for the road for Ruosina.
46. Testimony of Federico Bertelli, 25.1.1951, Pr XIV, 283.
47. Testimony of Maria Luisa Ghilardini [Ghelardini], 25.1.1951, Pr XIV, 281.
48. Handwritten testimony of Ettore Salvatori, 28.9.1944, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, the Prosecution of German War Criminals Service, "Eccidio di Sant'Anna di Stazzema" (one of those found in 1994 in Palazzo Cesi, in Rome, in the premises of the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor, and subsequently addressed to the Military Prosecutor's Office of La Spezia), in Apm, 15.3.1947, Pr IV, 41.
49. Testimony of Maria Luisa Ghilardini [Ghelardini].
50. Hand-written testimony of Ettore Salvatori.
51. Testimony of Maria Luisa Ghilardini [Ghelardini].
52. Handwritten testimony of Ettore Salvatori. See also his deposition in Records of the Simon Trial, in the National Archives, London, WO (hereafter Ps), 235/584, p. 21.
53. Testimonies of Enio Mancini.
54. Testimonies of Natalina Bottari, 20.9.1996, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 3, and 31.7.2000; and Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
55. Testimony of Angelo Berretti, Vtm, hearing of 11.11.2004.
56. Testimonies of Enio Mancini.

57. Testimonies of Natalina Bottari.
58. Testimony of Angelo Berretti.
59. Testimonies of Enio Mancini.
60. Testimonies of Natalina Bottari.
61. Testimony of Genoveffa Moriconi, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
62. Testimonies of Enio Mancini.
63. Testimony of Angelo Berretti.
64. Testimony of Alfredo Graziani, 15.3.1947.
65. According to Gentile 2004, p. 99, a total of 28 monks were killed in Tuscany by the men of the Sixteenth SS Grenadier Armored Division. Regarding the massacre of the monks of the Charterhouse of Farneta, see Fulvetti 2006.
66. Don Lazzeri was awarded the gold medal for bravery in peacetime in 1959.
67. Testimony of Angelo Berretti.
68. Testimonies of Agostino Bibolotti.
69. Testimony of Angelo Berretti.
70. Testimony of Vito Majorca, 2.2.1951, Pr XIV, 294.
71. Testimony of Adolf Beckerth, Vtm, hearing of 10.11.2004.
72. Testimonies of Alba Battistini, 30.7.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 11; and Vtm, hearing of 3.11.2004.
73. Testimonies of Ada Battistini, 5.8.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 9; and Vtm, hearing of 3.11.2004.
74. Testimony of Alvaro Ulivi, 3.8.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 14.
75. Testimonies of Cesira Pardini, 9.9.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 33, in Gierut 1984, 126, and Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
76. Testimony of Marisa Cipriani, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 92.
77. Testimonies of Cesira Pardini.
78. Testimonies of Lidia Pardini, 4.9.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record. n. 28; and Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
79. Testimonies of Cesira Pardini.
80. The paths used by the Germans to go down have kindly been shown to me by Enio Mancini.
81. Testimony of Bruno Antonucci, 18.3.1948.
82. Testimony of Elio Benvenuti, 17.3.1947, Ps, exhibit F1, 235/586.
83. From the book it emerges that Toaff did not reach Sant'Anna, during or immediately after the massacre, as he, instead, stated in subsequent interviews, for example in *La Repubblica* of February 6, 2005.
84. Testimony of Marco Antonio Marchetti, 22.8.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 26. The detail about the music in the church square reported by Don Vangelisti in Graziani 1945, 22.
85. Bonuccelli 1995, 39, and deposition in Vtm, hearing of 4.11.2004.

86. Testimonies of Luigi Calcagnini, 31.7.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 6, and 12.9.1996, record n. 6 bis, and Vtm, hearing of 9.11.2004.
87. Testimony of Ignaz Alois Lippert, 23.03.2004, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 97 and 124.
88. Testimony of Marcello Mori, Vtm, hearing of 3.11.2004.
89. Testimony of Lidia Maremmani, Vtm, hearing of 15.12.2004.
90. Testimonies of Enio Mancini. According to Volpe Rinonapoli 1961, 80, there was a woman among the 14 victims.
91. Testimonies of Renato Brunini, 12.9.1996, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 7; 29.7.2000, record n. 7; and Vtm, hearing of 9.11.2004.
92. Testimony of Sirio Macchiarini, 4.8.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 32.
93. Regarding Don Raglianti see Fulvetti 2004.
94. Testimony of Marcello Mori.
95. Testimonies of Renato Brunini.
96. Testimony of Agostino Bibolotti, 15.3.1947.
97. On the German bulletins see Carlo Gentile's report prepared for the National Research Group "War against Civilians. For an Atlas of the Nazi Massacres in Italy," consisting of the Universities of Bari, Bologna, Naples, and Pisa and financed by the Ministero per l'Università e per la Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica (MURST) for the two-year period from November 1999 to November 2001. I personally coordinated the research group. Copies of the bulletins are in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 111.
98. Testimony of Antonio Tucci, 24.10.1944, in file n. 869 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, the Prosecution of German War Criminals Service, proceedings against unknown Germans, the injured party being Antonio Tucci, lieutenant of the Regular Army Royal Corps Maritime Crews (CREM, or Corpo Reale Equipaggi Marittimi). The file is one of those documents found in 1994 in the Palazzo Cesi in Rome and subsequently addressed to the Military Prosecutor's Office of La Spezia), in Apm.
99. Testimony of Enio Mancini, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
100. Testimony of Lidia Pardini, 4.9.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, hearing n. 28.
101. Testimony of Massimo Pellegrini, Ruling of the Tm 2005, 93.
102. Testimony of Don Giuseppe Vangelisti. Available at: www.santannadistazzema.org/sezioni/LApercent20MEMORIA/pagine.asp?idn=284 (accessed September 13, 2011). An English translation, attached to the records of the American investigation, reproduces quite faithfully Vangelisti's written account.

103. Testimony of Don Giuseppte Vangelisti, English translation, attached to the records of the American investigation, undated (but started on August 27, 1944), in Na.
104. In an account cited in Giannelli 1997, 149, Almo Rovai maintains that his father recognized, behind the church, the body of Enzo Siciliani, who had been taken from Valdicastello to carry arms.
105. Testimony of Alderano Vecoli, 9.2.1951, in Pr XIV, 350.
106. Testimony of Enio Mancini, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
107. Testimony of Avio Pieri, 14.3.2003, in Ruling of the Tm 2005, 95.
108. The American War Crimes Commission's list of victims is Exhibit R of the file, where there is also the report drawn up by the 110th Field Artillery Battery.
109. Testimoniy of Bruno Antonucci, 18.3.1947.
110. Testimony of Don Giuseppe Vangelisti 15.3.1947, Pr IV, 49.
111. Deposition of Don Giuseppe Vangelisti at the Simon trial, Ps 235/584, 12.
112. Deposition of Bruno Antonucci at the Simon trial, Ps 235/584, 22.
113. The letter of the Committee of the Martyrs of Sant'Anna in Pr III, 28 bis.

Chapter 2

1. Testimony of Vito Majorca, 2.2.1951, Records of the Walter Reder Trial, Military Tribunal of La Spezia (hereafter Pr) XIV, 294.
2. Testimony of Max Simon, Records of the Simon Trial, in the National Archives, London, WO, (hereafter Ps), WO 235/585, 147, 165, and 166.
3. Testimony of Walter Reder, Pr XVIII, 8, 27, and 82.
4. The reconstruction of the Allied and Italian investigations was carried out on the basis of the relevant judicial files at the National Archives, College Park (Maryland), (hereafter Na), at the NaL, and in the Pr.
5. On the episode of the shelving of the war crime files see the majority and minority reports of the Parliamentary Commission investigating the causes of the suppression of the files dealing with the Nazi-Fascist crimes, which operated during the sixteenth legislature. Available at: http://wai.camera.it/_bicamerali/nochiosco.asp?pagina=/_bicamerali/leg14/crimini/home.htm (accessed June 8, 2011).
6. On the memory of Sant'Anna di Stazzema see Rovatti 2004; Di Pasquale 2005 and 2010; and Gallinaro 2005.
7. Deputy Police Inspector Dr. Vito Majorca of the Viareggio Police Station, "Massacre Committed by the German SS in Sant'Anna di Lucca (August 12, 1944)," Pr III, 195.

8. Just for this aura of mystery, I entitled my first study of this subject (Pezzino 2003), *Una strage senza perché?* (A massacre without reason?), which I have here re-elaborated and utilized in part.
9. See Mario Cecioni's report in Pr III, 37.
10. Majorca, "Massacre Committed by the German SS," 196.
11. Testimony of Agostino Bibolotti, 9.2.1951, Pr XIV, 348.
12. The British report, signed by Major Cromwell and sent on October 2 to the Fourth Corps Headquarters, is available in the Na.
13. The information about the wounding of the German soldiers present in Sant'Anna, obtained by Carlo Gentile, is quoted in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 106.
14. Testimonies of Alba Battistini, 30.7.2000, in "Report on the state of investigations and transcripts of the examination of witnesses" (hereafter Apm-Carabinieri) record n. 11, and Records of the Trial Hearings at the Military Tribunal of La Spezia (hereafter Vtm), hearing of 3.11.2004.
15. Testimony of Adolf Beckerth, Vtm, hearing of 10.11.2004.
16. Testimony of Ludvig Göring, 27.3.2004, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 107.
17. The information on the size of the Second Battalion is *ivi*, 118 and 163.
18. Testimony of Gianfranco Quilici, Ps 235/584, 36.
19. Testimony of Gabriella Pierotti, Pr XIV, 381.
20. Testimony of Ignaz Alois Lippert, 23.03.2004, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 97.
21. Testimony of Horst Eggert, in Christiane Kohl, "Der Himmel war strahlend blau," *Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin*, n. 43, October 29, 1999, quoted by the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 106.
22. Majorca, "Massacre Committed by the German SS," 196.
23. Testimony of Stefano Lucchetti, 16.7.1946, enclosure n. 21 of the judicial report on Garibaldi and Buratti of the *Carabinieri* warrant officer Alessandro Vannozzi, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, in Apm.
24. Stefania Pilli was identified in the report 27.2.1950 of the Viareggio Police Chief Superintendent Mario Cecioni in Pr III, 33.
25. Testimony of Egisto Berretti, 16.4.1946, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, in Apm.
26. Testimony of Elide Pieri, 23.4.1946.
27. Testimony of Natalina Bottari, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.

28. Testimonies of Severina Bottari and Alfonsina Timpani, 2.5.1946, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, in Apm.
29. Testimony of Margherita Giorgini, 23.5.1946.
30. Testimony of Vito Majorca, 18.1.1946, Pr III, 22.
31. Testimony of Ettore Salvatori, 29.5.1946, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, in Apm.
32. Testimony of Ettore Salvatori, 4.3.1950, Pr III, 51.
33. Testimonies of Maria Luisa Ghelardini, Giuseppe Ricci, and Ettore Salvatori, 5.3.1950, Pr III, 53.
34. Mario Cecioni's report in Pr III, 37.
35. Testimony of Angelo Berretti, Vtm, hearing of 11.11.2004.
36. See the testimonies at the trial in Padua of Commander Simon conducted by a British Military Tribunal (29.5.1947–26.6.1947): Deposition of Max Simon, Ps, 235/585, 134; deposition of Otto Baum, Ps, 235/585, p. 194; deposition of Frederich Korr, Ps, 235/585, 206.
37. On the reconnaissance operations, see the interrogation by rogatory letters of 4.3.2003 of the former SS Bartlewsky, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 119–20.
38. Mario Cecioni's report in Pr III, 33.
39. The British Report, sent on October 2 to Fourth Corps Headquarters, and all the testimonies to the American Fifth Army Investigating Commission are in Na.
40. Don Vangelisti's account, Vangelisti's and Alfrido Curzi's depositions before the American Fifth Army Investigating Commission are in Na. In the version of Don Vangelisti's account published by Giannelli (1997, 36), Don Vangelisti specified that the partisans' notice appeared on the night between July 29 and 30, and that Sunday, July 30, was the feast of the patron saint.
41. Mario Curzi's depositions before the American Fifth Army Investigating Commission in Na.
42. Angelo Berretti, Vtm, hearing of 11.11.2004.
43. Majorca, "Massacre Committed by the German SS," 195.
44. Testimonies of Anna Maria Mutti and Giuliana Mutti, 26.9.1996, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 4.
45. Testimonies of Anna Maria Mutti, Vtm, hearing of 4.11.2004.
46. On Vangelisti 1997, see Cipollini 2006 and Vezzoni 2006.
47. See Bitossi's instructions in Cipollini 1996, 328–29.
48. Majorca, "Massacre Committed by the German SS," 195.
49. On Margherita Cerpelli, see the testimony of Edoarda Banchieri in Giannelli 1992, 291.

Chapter 3

1. Account of the Garibaldi Brigade "Gino Lombardi," Clearing Office of Pietrasanta, quoted in Giannelli 1992, 24–27, 51, 53–58. The biographical profile of Gino Lombardi in Giannelli 1992, 99.
2. The biographical profile of Lorenzo Bandelloni in Giannelli 1992, 65 and 101.
3. For the facts about Forno I have followed the precise reconstruction of Fruzzetti, Grossi, and Michelucci 1994 and Torre 2010, 98–112.
4. See Bergamini and Bimbi, pp. 113–14 and 125, and the account of the Garibaldi Brigade in Giannelli 1992, 248.
5. The biographical profile of Renato Bitossi in Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 113.
6. Statement of Mencaraglia, 27.1.1951, Records of the Walter Reder Trial, Military Tribunal of La Spezia (hereafter Pr) III, 178.
7. The clashes within the formation in Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 130–31.
8. Fontani's undated letter in Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 122.
9. Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 129–30, and account of the Garibaldi Brigade in Giannelli 1992, 254.
10. Alfred Concina's testimony, 21.7.2003, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 142; Bartlewsky's *ivi*, 112.
11. See Bitossi's undated letter in Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 124.
12. Testimony of Cesira Pardini in Records of the Trial Hearings at the Military Tribunal of La Spezia (hereafter Vtm), hearing of 13.10.2004.
13. Saalfrank's deposition of 27.1.1947, Pr IV, 30.
14. Palagi 1981, 63; account of the Garibaldi Brigade in Giannelli 1992, 257–58; and Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 136.
15. Paustian's deposition, 17.2.1947, in Pr IV, 17.
16. The German sources in Carlo Gentile's report prepared for the National Research Group "War against Civilians. For an Atlas of the Nazi Massacres in Italy," consisting of the Universities of Bari, Bologna, Naples, and Pisa and financed by the Ministero per l'Università e per la Ricerca Scientifica e Tecnologica (MURST) for the two-year period from November 1999 to November 2001. I personally coordinated the research group.
17. Regarding the Garibaldi "Marcello Garosi" assault detachment, a report has been published in *Documenti e Studi* 10, no. 11 (December 1990): 181ff.
18. For the history of the Sixteenth SS Division see Gentile 2000, 2001, and 2004.

19. Deposition of Max Paustian 17.2.1947, Pr IV, 19.
20. The various evacuation orders in Bergamini and Bimbi 1983, 135; Pardini 1997; report 27.2.1950 of the Police Chief Superintendent, Pr III, 35; Bettina Federigi's diary in Giannelli 1997, 61.
21. The text of the notice to evacuate the Pisan Hills in the Municipal Archives of Buti, Carteggio, b. 61, bando "Alla popolazione dei Monti Pisani," unfiled; the one for Pisa in Vanni 1972, 135.
22. The German losses and the information from the daily bulletins of the information office of the Fourteenth German Army are in the report prepared by Carlo Gentile.
23. The bulletin of August 1 appears in this chapter under "Partisan Actions."
24. Aldemar's execution by firing squad is reported by Bandelloni in Gierut (1984, 39), and Rolland's execution is described in Bergamini and Bimbi (1983, 136). Badalacchi's testimonies are in Gierut (1984, 29–30); in Giannelli (1997, 54–55); and in Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 23, 1.8.2000.
25. Regarding Joseph from Merano, see the testimonies of Stefano and Luigi Lucchetti, 28.2.1951, Pr III, file n. 201; Stefano Lucchetti, 16.7.1946, file n. 1976 of the General Register of the Crown Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office, in Apm; Vito Majorca, "Massacre committed by the German SS in Sant'Anna di Lucca (August 12, 1944)," Pr III, 195ff.; Ruling of the Tm 2005, 42.
26. Cecioni's report, Pr III, 37.
27. See also his testimony given to the magistrate of Pietrasanta on January 15, 1950, Pr XIV, 44.
28. Testimony of Lidia Pardini, 4.9.2000, Apm-Carabinieri, record n. 28.
29. Testimony of Enio Mancini, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.
30. Testimonies of Ziller and Eggert in C. Kohl, "Der Himmel war strahlend blau," *Süddeutsche Zeitung Magazin*, n. 43, October 29, 1999; Beckerth's testimony is in Vtm, hearing of 10.11.2004.
31. Testimony of Eggert, May 2000, in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 111.
32. The information about the Second Battalion is in the Ruling of the Tm 2005, 160, and in Gentile 2005, 116.
33. Testimony of Enio Mancini, Vtm, hearing of 13.10.2004.

Appendix

1. Data on Jews persecution in Italy is available at: http://www.cdec.it/home2_2.asp?idtesto1=589&idtesto=185&son=1 (accessed May 30, 2011).

2. On the illegal filing by Santacroce, the so-called *armadio della vergogna,* (the cupboard of shame), see the two reports by the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into the Reasons for the Concealment of Files relating to Nazifascist Crimes which was operational during the 14th legislature. Available at: http://wai.camera.it/_bicamerali/nochiosco.asp?pagina=/_bicamerali/leg14/crimini/home.htm (accessed May 30, 2011).
3. As example of the use of historical studies for political condemnation of the Nazi regime Marina Cattaruzza (2005, 83) refers to the volume *The Third Reich*, commissioned by the International Council for Philosophy and Humanistic Studies (an initiative supported by UNESCO), which was published in 1955 and contained a contribution by Léon Poliakov.
4. On the question of the responsibility of the historian I recall the conference, The Responsibilities of the Contemporary Historian Today, organized by the Department of History and Civilization at the European University Institute, by the SISSCO (Società italiana per lo studio della storia contemporanea), and by the journal *Passato e Presente* (S. Domenico di Fiesole, April 11–12, 1996). On this theme, see also, Stengers, 1994, and more recently Jones, Östberg, and Randeraad, 2007b.
5. For a summary of the most important discussion on *Historikerstreit* see Rusconi 1987.
6. On evidential paradigm, see Ginzburg 1984 and 1991.
7. Paul Bew has also emphasized how the access to closed sources is an important element for the historian consultant; in his case, however, the result was rather more exciting than mine (Bew 2007, 67).
8. The context of Merleau-Ponty's statement (a reflection on purging in a book on communist violence) does not, however, deprive it of its validity as a general reflection on the theme of responsibility, which is at the center of my discussion.

References

Note on Special Sources: Archived Files, Interrogations, Judicial Documentation, Newspapers, and Testimonies

This reference list contains all works cited in the text, with the exception of newspaper articles, for which full references are given in the endnotes only. Quotations from testimonies, interrogations, archive files, judicial documentation (except for the Ruling of Military Tribunal of La Spezia) are also cited in full in the endnotes only, with the following abbreviations:

Apm	Archives of the Military Prosecutor's Office in La Spezia (now transferred to Rome)
Apm-Carabinieri	Carabinieri of the Liguria Region, Provincial Headquarters of La Spezia, Operational Unit, "Report on the state of investigations and transcripts of the examination of witnesses" sent to the Chief Appeal Court Military Prosecutor's Office at the Military Tribunal of La Spezia on October 1, 2000, in the Archives of the Military Prosecutor's Office in La Spezia (now transferred to Rome).
Na	National Archives, College Park (Maryland), The Judge Advocate General, Army, RG 153–War Crimes Case File n. 16–62 (Records of the American investigations)
NaL	The National Archives, London
Pr	Records of the Reder Trial, followed by the number of the volume and the page of the fascicle. Currently lodged with the Military Tribunal of La Spezia. These records have now been transferred to the Military Tribunal of Rome.

Ps	Records of the Simon Trial, National Archives, London, WO 235, followed by the number of the volume and the page of the fascicle.
Tm	Military Tribunal of La Spezia
Vtm	Records of the Trial Hearings at the Military Tribunal of La Spezia. An extensive selection of transcripts of hearings is available at: http://www.santannadistazzema.org/sezioni/LA%20MEMORIA/elenco_pagine.asp?Sez_ID=75&Box_ID=1184 (accessed November 11, 2011).

All other sources of information are cited in full in the following section.

Works Cited

Aga-Rossi, E- 2000 [1993]. *A Nation Collapses: The Italian Surrender of 1943*. Translated by H. Fergusson II. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baldissara, L., and P. Pezzino. 2009. *Il massacro. Guerra ai civili a Monte Sole*. Bologna: il Mulino.

Bartov, O. 2001 [1985]. *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*. New York: Palgrave.

Battini, M., and P. Pezzino. 1997. *Guerra ai civili. Occupazione tedesca e politica del massacro. Toscana 1944.* Venice: Marsilio.

Bergamini, F., and G. Bimbi. 1983. *Antifascismo e Resistenza in Versilia*. Viareggio: Anpi Versilia.

Bertelli, G. 1997. *Raccolta di notizie (anche amare) sulla Resistenza*. Unpublished manuscript.

Bew, P. 2007. "The Bloody Sunday Tribunal and the Role of the Historian." In *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe Since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian*, edited by H. Jones, K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad, 62–80. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bloch, M. 1949. *Strange Defeat. A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Translated by G. Hopkins. Italian edition 1995 [1990]. *La strana disfatta. Testimonianza del 1940.* Translated by C. Pischedda. Turin: Einaudi.

Bloch, M. 1979 [1954]. *The Historian's Craft*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Italian edition 1969 [1949]. *Apologia della storia o mestiere di storico.* Translated by G. Gouthier. Turin: Einaudi.

Bonuccelli, R. 1995. *Cinquanta anni fa in Versilia*. Viareggio-Lucca: Baroni.

Briglia, G., P. Del Giudice, and M. Michelucci, eds. 1995. *Eserciti popolazione Resistenza sulle Alpi Apuane*, Part 1: *Aspetti geografici e militari*. Massa: Tip. Ceccotti.

Browning, C. R. 2001 [1992]. *Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. London: Penguin. Italian translation 1995. *Uomini comuni. Polizia tedesca e "soluzione finale" in Polonia*. Translated by L. Salvai. Turin: Einaudi.

Buratti, C., and G. Cipollini. 2006. *Vite bruciate. La strage di Sant'Anna di Stazzema 1944–2005*. Rome: l'Unità.

Casella, L. 1972. *La Toscana nella guerra di liberazione*. Carrara: La Nuova Europa.

Cattaruzza, M. 2005. "La storiografia della Shoah." In *Storia della Shoah. La crisi dell'Europa, lo sterminio degli ebrei e la memoria del XX secolo*, vol. 2, *La memoria del XX secolo*, edited by M. Cattaruzza, M. Flores, S. Levis Sullam, and E. Traverso, 81–123. Turin: UTET.

Cesarani, D. 2006 [2004]. *Adolf Eichmann. Anatomia di un criminale.* Translated by N. Lamberti. Milan: Mondadori.

Cipollini, G. 1996. *Operazioni contro i ribelli*. Viareggio-Lucca: Baroni.

Cipollini, G. 2006. "Sant'Anna di Stazzema: fantasie, menzogne e realtà sulla strage del 12 agosto 1944." In *Vite bruciate. La strage di Sant'Anna di Stazzema 1944–2005*, edited by C. Buratti and G. Cipollini, 29–102. Rome: l'Unità.

Clemente, P., and F. Dei. 2005. *Poetiche e politiche del ricordo. Memoria pubblica delle stragi nazifasciste in Toscana*. Rome: Carocci.

Deák, I. 2005. "Storia e giustizia: Norimberga e dopo." In *Storia della Shoah. La crisi dell'Europa, lo sterminio degli ebrei e la memoria del XX secolo*, vol. 2, La memoria del XX secolo, edited by M. Cattaruzza, M. Flores, S. Levis Sullam, and E. Traverso, 357–85. Unify with Cattaruzza, M. 2005, vol. 2, *La memoria del XX secolo*, 357–85. Turin: UTET

Di Pasquale, C. 2005. "Ricordare l'oblio. Osservazioni sul processo di patrimonializzazione dellememorie a Sant'Anna di Stazzema." In *Poetiche e politiche del ricordo. Memoria pubblica delle stragi*

nazifasciste in Toscana, edited by P. Clemente and F. Dei, 240–62. Rome: Carocci.

Di Pasquale, C. 2010. *Il ricordo dopo l'oblio. Sant' Anna di Stazzema, la strage, la memoria*. Rome: Donzelli.

Domenico, R. P. 1991. *Italian Fascists on Trial, 1943–1948*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Eco, U. 1995. "Ur-Fascism." In the *New York Review of Books*, June 22. Reprinted in U. Eco, *Five Moral Pieces*, translated by A. McEwen, 65–88. New York: Harcourt, 2001.

Degli Esposti, M., L. Arbizzani, and B. Bertusi. 1995. Marzabotto*. Quanti, chi e dove. 2nd ed.*, revised and expanded. Bologna: Regional Committee for the Commemoration of the Fallen of Marzabotto.

Esprit. 1994, November. Special issue *Les equivoques de la responsabilité*. 206. http://www.esprit.presse.fr/archive/review/detail.php?code=1994_11 (accessed November 11, 2011).

Evans, R. J. 2002. *Telling Lies about Hitler: The Holocaust, History and the David Irving Trial*. London: Verso.

Franzinelli, M. 2003. *Le strage nascoste. L'armadio della vergogna: impunità e rimozione dei crimini di guerra nazifascisti*. Milan: Mondadori.

Fruzzetti, R., A. Grossi, and M. Michelucci. 1994. *Forno 13 giugno 1944. La storia di un eccidio*. Massa: Ceccotti Editore.

Fulvetti, G. 2004. *La vicenda umana e cristiana di Don Libero Raglianti*. Pietrasanta: Comune di Pietrasanta.

Fulvetti, G. 2006. *Una comunità in guerra. La Certosa di Farneta tra Resistenza e giustizia*. Naples: l'ancora del mediterraneo.

Fulvetti, G. 2009. *Uccidere i civili. Le stragi naziste in Toscana (1943–1945)*. Rome: Carocci.

Fulvetti, G., and F. Pelini, eds. 2006. *La politica del massacro. Per un atlante delle stragi naziste in Toscana.* Naples: l'ancora del mediterraneo.

Gallinaro, D. 2005. "Prima che si dimentichi tutto. Il ricordo e l'attuazione della memoria della strage di Sant'Anna nei lavori degli studenti." In *Poetiche e politiche del ricordo. Memoria pubblica delle stragi nazifasciste in Toscana*, edited by P. Clemente and F. Dei, 279–92. Rome: Carocci.

Gentile, C. 2000. *Relazione presentata al Centro giovanile "ex tirò" di Casalecchio di Reno il 7 ottobre 2000*. Unpublished manuscript.

Gentile, C. 2001. "'Politische Soldaten.' Die 16. SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division 'Reichsführer-SS'." *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 81: 529–61.

Gentile, C. 2004. "Le SS di Sant'Anna di Stazzema: azioni, motivazioni e profilo di una unità nazista." In *Tra storia e memoria. 12 agosto 1944: la strage di Sant'Anna di Stazzema*, edited by M. Palla, 86–117. Rome: Carocci.

Gentile, C. 2005. "Truppe tedesche, repressione antipartigiana e stragi di civili in Toscana." In *Le stragi nazifasciste in Toscana 1943–45*. Part 4: *Guida archivistica alla memoria. Gli archivi tedeschi*, edited by C. Gentile, 68–131. Rome: Carocci.

Giannecchini, L., and G. Pardini, eds. 1997. *Eserciti popolazione Resistenza sulle Alpi Apuane*. Part 2: *Aspetti politici e sociali*. Lucca: S. Marco Litotipo.

Giannelli, G. 1992. *Versilia. La trappola del '44*. Querceta: Versilia Oggi Editrice.

Giannelli, G. 1997. *Versilia. La strage degli innocenti*. Querceta: Versilia Oggi Editrice.

Gierut, L. 1984. *Una strage nel tempo*. Pisa: Giardini.

Ginzburg, C. 1984. "Prove e possibilità." In *Il ritorno di Martin Guerre. Un caso di doppia identità nella Francia del Cinquecento*, edited by Natalie Zemon Davis, 295–315. Turin: Einaudi.

Ginzburg, C. 1991. *Il giudice e lo storico. Considerazioni in margine al processo Sofri.* Turin: Einaudi.

Giorgi, R. ed. 1985. *Marzabotta parla*. Venice: Marsilio.

Graziani, A. 1945. *L'eccidio di S. Anna*. Pisa: Scuola Tipografica "Beato Angelico."

Guttenplan, D. D. 2001. *The Holocaust on Trial*. New York: Norton.

Istituto Storico della Resistenza in Toscana. 1997. *Toscana occupata. Rapporti delle Militärkommandaturen 1943–1944*. Introduction by M. Palla. Firenze: Olschki.

Jones, H., K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad. 2007a. Introduction. In *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe Since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian*, edited by H. Jones, K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad, 1–11. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Jones, H., K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad, eds. 2007b. *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe Since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Karlsson, K.-G. 2007. "Public Uses of History in Contemporary Europe." In *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe Since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian*, edited by H. Jones, K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad, 27–45. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Katz, R. 1967. *Death in Rome*. New York: Macmillan.

Klarsfeld, S., and H. Rousso. 1992. "Histoire et justice. Débat entre Serge Klarsfeld et Henry Rousso." Special issue *Esprit* 181 (May): 16–37.

Klinkhammer, L. 1993. *L'occupazione tedesca in Italia 1943–1945*. Translated by G. Saija Panzieri. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.

Klinkhammer, L. 1997. *Stragi naziste. La guerra contro i civili (1943–1944)*. Translated by S. Meyer. Rome: Donzelli.

Knowlton, J., and T. Cates, trans. 1993. *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Levi, P. 1988 [1986]. "The Gray Zone." In *The Drowned and the Saved*, translated by R. Rosenthal, 36–69. New York: Summit.

Lipstadt, D. E. 2005. *History on Trial*. New York: Ecco.

Maier, C. 1995. "Fare giustizia, fare storia: epurazioni politiche e narrative nazionali dopo il 1945 e il 1989." *Passato e Presente* 34 (January–April): 23–32.

Mandler, P. 2007. "The Responsibility of the Historian." In *Contemporary History on Trial: Europe Since 1989 and the Role of the Expert Historian*, edited by H. Jones, K. Östberg, and N. Randeraad, 12–26. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Marcucci, R. 2005. "Percorsi di simboli." In *Poetiche e politiche del ricordo. Memoria pubblica delle stragi nazifasciste in Toscana*, edited by P. Clemente and F. Dei, 263–78. Rome: Carocci.

Melloni, A. 2008. "Per una storia della tribunalizzazione della storia." In *La storia che giudica, la storia che assolve*, edited by O. Marquard and A. Melloni, 3–68. Rome: Laterza.

Merleau-Ponty, M. 1980 [1947]. *Humanisme et terreur. Essai sur le problème communiste*. Paris: Gallimard. Italian edition 1978. *Umanismo e terrore*. Translated by A. Bonomi. Milan: SUGARCo.

Momigliano, A. 1984. *Sui fondamenti della storia antica.* Turin: Einaudi.

Momigliano, A. 1985 [1982]. "La storia in una età di ideologie." In *Tra storia e storicismo*, 57–74. Pisa: Nistri-Lischi.

Moretti, M. 1998. "La discussione sulla 'responsabilità' dello storico. Alcuni appunti storiografici." *Passato e Presente* 44: 95–111.

Orlandi, D. 1945. "La lotta contro i tedeschi dal 1o luglio 1944." In *Sant'Anna 12 agosto 1944*. Supplement of *La Nazione del Popolo*. Lucca: La Nazione del Popolo.

Palagi, L. 1981. *Cronache e fatti della Resistenza in Versilia*. Querceta: Versilia Oggi Editrice.

Palla, E. 1974. *Popolo e partigiani sulla Linea Gotica*. Legnano: Bandoni.

Palla, M., ed. 2003. *Tra storia e memoria. 12 agosto 1944: la strage di Sant'Anna di Stazzema*. Rome: Carocci.

Paoletti, P. 1998. *Sant'Anna di Stazzema 1944: la strage impunita*. Milan: Mursia.

Pardini, G. 1997. "Il dramma delle popolazioni: i piani di sfollamento delle province di Lucca e di Apuania." In *Eserciti popolazione Resistenza sulle Alpi Apuane.* Part 2: *Aspetti politici e sociali*, edited by L. Giannecchini and G. Pardini, 161–210. Lucca: S. Marco Litotipo.

Pavone, C. 1996. "Note sulla Resistenza armata, le rappresaglie naziste e alcune attuali confusioni." In *Priebke e il massacro delle Ardeatine*, 39–50. Rome: l'Unità/IRSIFAR.

Pavone, C., and F. Orlando. 1995. "La letteratura e le cose." Conversation between Francesco Orlando and Claudio Pavone. *Parolechiave* 9: 45–66.

Pesci, G. 1975. "I sacerdoti toscani vittime dei nazifascisti." In *Il clero toscano nella Resistenza*, edited by Tuscan Regional Committee for the Celebrations of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Resistance and the Liberation, Proceedings of the conference held in Lucca on April 4–6, 1975. Florence: La Nuova Europa.

Petracchi, G., and F. Reali Vannucci. 1995. "Rapporti delle formazioni Apuane con gli Alleati." In *Eserciti popolazione Resistenza sulle Alpi Apuane.* Part 1: *Aspetti geografici e militari*, edited by G. Briglia, P. Del Giudice, and M. Michelucci, 105–32. Massa: Tip. Ceccotti.

Pezzino, P. 2001a. *Storie di guerra civile. L'eccidio di Niccioleta.* Bologna: il Mulino.

Pezzino, P. 2001b. "Sui mancati processi in Italia ai criminali di guerra tedeschi." *Storia e Memoria* 10 (1): 9–72.

Pezzino, P. 2003. "Una strage senza perché? Indagine su Sant'Anna di Stazzema." In *Tra storia e memoria. 12 agosto 1944: la strage di Sant'Anna di Stazzema*, edited by M. Palla, 34–85. Rome: Carocci.

Pezzino, P. 2007a [1997]. *Anatomia di un massacro*. 2nd ed. with new preface. Bologna: il Mulino.

Pezzino, P. 2007b. "The German Military Occupation of Italy and the 'War against Civilians.'" *Modern Italy* 12 (2): 173–88.

Popham, P. 2004. "SS Massacre: A Conspiracy of Silence is Broken." *The Guardian*, July 2.

Portelli, A. 2003 [1999]. *The order has been carried out: History, memory, and meaning of a Nazi Massacre in Rome*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rovatti, T. 2004. *Sant'Anna di Stazzema, Storia e memoria della strage dell'agosto 1944*. Rome: Derive Approdi.

Ruling of the Tm (Military Tribunal of La Spezia). 2005. http://www.santannadistazzema.org/immagini/Sentenza_Stazzema.pdf. (accessed June 8, 2011).

Rusconi, G. E. 1987. *Germania: un passato che non passa.* Turin: Einaudi.

Schreiber, G. 2001 [1996]. *La vendetta tedesca: 1943–1945, le rappresaglie naziste in Italia*. Translated by M. Buttarelli. Milano: Mondadori.

Secchia, P., and F. Frassati. 1962. *La Resistenza e gli alleati*. Milano: Lerici.

Stengers, J. 1994. "L'historien face à ses responsabilités." *Cahiers de l'ecole des sciences philosophiques et religieuses* 15: 19–50.

Teitel, R. G. 2000. *Transitional Justice.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Toaff, E. 1987. *Perfidi giudei, fratelli maggiori*. Milano: Mondadori.

Todorov, T. 1992 [1991]. *Di fronte all'estremo.* Translated by E. Klersy Imberciador. Milan: Garzanti.

Todorov, T. 1995a [1991]. *Le morali della storia.* Translated by F. Sessi. Turin: Einaudi.

Todorov, T. 1995b [1994]. *Una tragedia vissuta. Scene di guerra civile.* Translated by L. Corradini. Milan: Garzanti.

Torre, R. 2010. *La Resistenza nel Comune di Apuania 1943–1945*. Pontremoli: ISRA-Istituto storica della Resistenza Apuana.

Vangelisti, G. 1945. "Sopralluogo a Sant'Anna subito dopo l'eccidio, del sac. Giuseppe Vangelisti." In *Sant'Anna 12 agosto 1944*. Supplement of *La Nazione del Popolo*. Lucca: La Nazione del Popolo.

Vangelisti, G. 1997. "Memoria inedita su l'eccidio di S. Anna, 12 agosto 1944, con nota di presentazione della presidente Velella Bisi." *Quaderni versiliesi* 17: 197–207 (dated April 1982, published posthumously).

Vanni, R. 1972. *La Resistenza dalla Maremma alle Apuane*. Pisa: Giardini.

Vezzoni, G. 2006. *Un prete indifeso in una storia a metà. Don Giuseppe Vangelisti e il suo memoriale*. Massarosa: Tipografia Massarosa Offset.

Volpe Rinonapoli, A. M. 1961. *Fuoco sulla Versilia*. Milano: Edizioni Avanti.

Weinrich, H. 1999 [1997]. *Lete. Arte e critica dell'oblio.* Translated by F. Rigotti. Bologna: il Mulino.

Yerushalmi, Y. H. 1990 [1988]. "Riflessioni sull'oblio." In *Usi dell'oblio*, translated by C. Sorba, 9–26. Parma: Pratiche Editrice.

Zertal, I., 2007 [2002]. *Israele e la Shoah. La nazione e il culto della tragedia.* Translated by P. Arlorio. Turin: Einaudi.

Index