Debating American Exceptionalism

Empire and Democracy in the Wake of the Spanish-American War

Fabian Hilfrich

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

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For Margaret and Rebecca

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Contents

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Cover: "I rather like that imported affair," Hamilton E. Grant Cover of *Puck* Magazine, September 21, 1904.

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Abbreviations

AAIL	American Anti-Imperialist League
AHR	American Historical Review
AIL	Anti-Imperialist League
AILB	Anti-Imperialist Leaflets and Broadsides
ARR	American Review of Reviews
CAIL	Central Anti-Imperialist League (Chicago)
CR	Congressional Record
DH	Diplomatic History
FRUS	Paper Relation to the Foreign Relating of the United States
GPO	Government Printing Office
HM	Harper's Monthly
HW	Harper's Weekly
JAH	Journal of American History
MVHR	Mississippi Valley Historical Review
NEAIL	New England Anti-Imperialist League
PHR	Pacific Historical Review
PSQ	Political Science Quarterly
PSSR	Philippine Social Science Review
RNC	Republican National Committee

Introduction

> Why do we think that we can rule [Iraq]? This is American imperialism you're hearing up here. And that hasn't worked and it will never work.
>
> Senator Mike Gravel (2007)

> This is not an empire. We don't go out and occupy a territory for personal gain. We're there because we know that if we change the situation on the ground in a place like Iraq or Afghanistan, that freedom is the best antidote to terror, that democracies don't produce and breed the kind of terrorist extremists that hit us on 9/11.
>
> Vice President Richard Cheney (2004)[1]

Since the United States was founded in opposition to the British Empire, "empire" has fascinated and frightened Americans with its ambivalent connotations of power and prestige, doom and decline. As ex-Senator Mike Gravel and former Vice President Richard Cheney did on the occasion of the Iraq War, policymakers usually reject the label, whereas dissenters seek to apply it.[2] These uses of the "empire" epithet indicate that debates on foreign policy transcend their narrow confines and turn into "great debates" about American values and America's purpose and role in the world. As David Levy has remarked, these are "moment[s] of critical and traumatic *self*-scrutiny for the American people" even though their contents relate to *foreign* policy questions.[3] This solipsist quality renders the analysis of such debates particularly rewarding because the debates illustrate differing conceptions of American nationalism, of what the United States is or ought to be.

The debate at the heart of this study became "officially" known as the "imperialism debate," in which Americans discussed the desirability of acquiring former Spanish colonies occupied in the 1898 war against Spain—most notably Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Among all "great debates" on foreign policy, from the war with Mexico in 1848 to the recent one in

Iraq, it alone revolved around colonial expansion, the acquisition of overseas territory, that no one considered integrating into the American state. Like the other debates, however, the one on imperialism was characterized by a surprising degree of consensus on American national identity and by disagreements about that identity's implications for the conduct of foreign policy. Imperialists *and* anti-imperialists justified their foreign policy strategies by appealing to American exceptionalism, the belief that the United States was unique as the first nation founded on democratic ideals rather than on historical boundaries or ethnic cohesion.

At first glance, this seems paradoxical: a divisive debate was based on a fundamental consensus. This empirical observation prompted one analytical interest of this study: an inquiry into why exceptionalism is malleable enough to accommodate different foreign policy strategies. On one level, imperialists and their opponents interpreted the mandates of exceptionalism differently: While imperialists claimed that being unique endowed the United States with a special *right* to actively proselytize in the name of democracy, their opponents insisted that exceptionalism bestowed a *duty* to refrain from aggressive behavior in the international arena. Democracy, they maintained, would be more appropriately spread by passive example, by perfecting it at home so that the nation would shine as John Winthrop's proverbial "city upon a hill," enticing others to voluntarily emulate the U.S. example.

Taken by itself, this observation adds little to the historiography of American foreign relations, exceptionalism, and the idea of a global mission. Many scholars have pointed to the "exegetic dilemma" of trying to deduce a specific foreign policy from exceptionalism. While the *ends,* the global triumph of American-style democracy, are usually agreed upon, exceptionalism does not stipulate the *means* for implementation. Therefore, completely diverse strategies, such as an active crusading mission and a complete abstention from world affairs for fear of being "contaminated," have traditionally been legitimized by appeals to exceptionalism.[4]

Although these assertions are undoubtedly correct, I claim that the concept's elasticity is also based on its dialectic internal structure. In postulating that the United States is unique because of its democratic founding, exceptionalism combines the universal and inclusive element of "democracy" with the particularist and exclusive element of "nation." Accordingly, in the second part of this study (chapters 5–7), I intend to demonstrate that the debaters exploited this tension. The imperialists emphasized the national element, whereas their opponents insisted on the democratic aspects of American exceptionalism.[5]

This distinction might seem anachronistic, since exceptionalism *as a whole* forms the basis of American nationalism. Therefore, it is necessary to define

the "national element" as it is used in this study. Scholars of nationalism distinguish between "open" and "closed" as well as "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms. While closed nationalisms define the in-group and its territory according to ethnic and cultural characteristics, which are supposedly fixed or have "naturally" *emerged* in the dark reaches of history, the open type assumes that the nation was deliberately *created.* An individual becomes a citizen by consent, and his or her loyalty extends more to the nation's political order than to its territorial domain. Whereas civic nationalism requires rational individual choice, ethnic nationalism appeals to a pre-rational and communal sense of belonging and obedience.[6]

Although American nationalism has traditionally been identified with the civic type, traces of the ethnic variety can be found throughout U.S. history. Nativism, anti-immigration fervor, and racism illustrate that some Americans have conceived of theirs as a closed nation, endowed with a specific cultural and ethnic character that had to be protected against outsiders. Not surprisingly, strains like external war and internal debate elicited rhetoric that is more closely associated with ethnic and chauvinist nationalism than with the civic variety. When I speak of the "national element," therefore, I discuss attitudes commonly associated with this closed nationalism.

Finally, since "democracy," the other ingredient of exceptionalism, is a notoriously open-ended concept, the national creed contained additional potential that imperialists and their opponents could exploit. Even if imperialists relied on more nationalist rhetoric, they were not willing to forsake the nation's democratic heritage and ideals. On the contrary, all debaters insisted that their respective foreign policy strategies best represented and propagandized American democratic ideals. The first part of this study (chapters 1–4) will, therefore, focus on how imperialists and anti-imperialists exploited the malleability of "democracy" to claim that their recommendations were advancing the cause of democracy abroad.

This multi-pronged approach to the American imperialism debate around 1900 transcends the immediate historical example to address enduring questions about U.S. foreign policy, political culture, and discourse. By illustrating how exceptionalism was exploited by advocates and opponents of an aggressive policy overseas, this case study indicates why the belief in American uniqueness has survived strong challenges and international setbacks. Exceptionalism has received several premature obituaries, most famously by Daniel Bell after the Vietnam War, but again recently by Andrew Bacevich during the Iraq War. William James did the same after the Philippine-American War by telling an anti-imperialist audience that the national belief "that we were of a different clay from other nations" had turned out to be nothing but an "idle dream! pure [*sic*] fourth of July

fancy."[7] Yet, as we can readily observe, the belief in exceptionalism remains alive and well.

In relation to nationalism studies, these observations confirm that we do not usually find a clear-cut juxtaposition of closed and civic conceptions of the nation. Both forms coexist even in one nation. In relation to democracy studies, debaters, unsurprisingly, did not adhere to rigid theories when they argued about empire. Instead, they "used" democracy pragmatically, exploiting theoretical ambiguities and contradictions to legitimize their foreign policy views. Nevertheless, their discussions about the relevance of American democracy in an international context alluded to basic dilemmas of democratic theory and practice, among them questions of how culturally dependent democracy is as a form of government, whether democracy should be more concerned with safeguarding the rights of the individual or of the community, and whether it is more adequately expressed in a people's mentality or in a nation's institutions.

Some readers might question the approach to the imperialism debate through the prism of exceptionalism because they see little value in the question of whether the United States is or ever was unique. This question, however, is not the focus of this study. I am concentrating on exceptionalism because it was, empirically speaking, the most important reference point of the debaters' arguments, although this debate also had inter- and transnational features.[8] In addition, I am interested in the reasons why this foreign policy discourse remains so stable, even in the face of doubts and defeat. Finally, the internal makeup of exceptionalism—that is, its democratic contents and the inherent tension between the terms "nation" and "democracy"—helps structure this investigation.

* * *

While the analytical framework of this study focuses on the "timeless" nature of American foreign policy discourse, it is equally crucial to anchor the debate in its unique historical context. This is, after all, the first in-depth study of the imperialism debate. Particularly in the 1960s, inspired by the contemporary example of antiwar activism, scholars analyzed anti-imperialist arguments and strategy, but there is a dearth of studies comparing anti-imperialism with its binary opposite.[9] Previously, scholars were more interested in why an "anti-colonial" nation embarked on colonial adventures in Asia and the Caribbean. While traditionalists have explained this period as an "aberration," in which "the United States had greatness thrust upon it,"[10] revisionists have interpreted the policies as an integral part of a long-standing attempt to achieve *economic* global hegemony. They speak of a "tradition" of American

expansionism, which extends back to the revolution and forward into the twentieth century. Therefore, they belittle the imperialism debate as one on means rather than ends, with the anti-imperialists as the cleverer champions of "informal" economic empire—a path the United States supposedly followed subsequently.[11]

Belief in the continuity of American "imperialism" is shared by a third group of scholars, whose research agenda has been cultural and who are preoccupied with American attitudes toward other peoples *and* domestic minorities. By breaking down the boundary between the foreign and the domestic, these historians undermine the notion that nineteenth-century continental expansion was a "domestic" and therefore not an imperial(ist) venture. They highlight the continuity of racism at home and abroad. Initially, cultural historians focused on the attitudes of imperialists and on the impact of cultural concepts on policymaking. Most recently, they have turned their attention to colonial administration, whether it expressed particularly American ideas and values, and how colonial experiences impacted domestic practices. Most of these studies have not specifically addressed the imperialism *debate.* Nevertheless, Eric T. Love's recent monograph on the role of race in earlier nineteenth-century discussions of overseas expansion has illuminated the multiple meanings of *one* cultural concept—race—for the discussion of empire. Love's approach hints at the potential of a more comprehensive analysis of cultural and ideological concepts in the imperialism debate.[12]

His hypothesis (and its limitations) serve as a reminder of the historical contingency of such debates. He argues that the role of racism in facilitating overseas expansion has been exaggerated in the literature and that, on the contrary, attitudes toward race served as a deterrent *against* empire. Nevertheless, had Love extended his analysis beyond late 1898, he would have discovered that the role of racism in the debate on expansion changed, prompting many debaters to adjust their arguments, as the second chapter of this study illustrates.

Another example of the historical contingency of the imperialism debate is the relative importance of the "national element" in imperialist rhetoric. Even a superficial comparison with other foreign policy debates shows how much the imperialists emphasized the national unit as a value in itself. This was not only a logical consequence of advocating overseas expansion, but also dependent on a contemporary wave of intense nationalism, which was fed by internal and external sources. Internally, nationhood was celebrated as a means to reunite the country one generation after the Civil War, whereas externally, the United States followed a wave of nationalist fervor that also peaked in Europe at this time.

Historical contingency thus complements the "long view" that this study takes of the formulation and discussion of U.S. foreign policy. This dichotomous approach to the imperialism debate illustrates how cultural concepts shape a nation's encounter with the outside world, how they condition responses to foreign policy challenges, and how, in turn, these challenges impact and change cultural attitudes. Ultimately, the object of this study is to show the enduring *and* contingent cultural backdrop against which diverse approaches to U.S. foreign policy develop and which they equally shape.

* * *

Geir Lundestad has written about the impact of exceptionalism on U.S. foreign policy: "While *other states had interests,* the United States had responsibilities. Its prime mission was nothing less than to save the world."[13] This recognition informs the perspective of this study and explains why I focus on those aspects of the debate that concerned American ideals and ideology and much less on specific disagreements about (narrowly defined) national interests and tactical preferences. This is a study of culture and its expression in rhetoric. "Culture" is not only a fashionable term, but also a slippery one. According to Akira Iriye, "culture in the study of international relations may be defined as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays particular attention to this phenomenon."[14] This definition is especially suitable because it reflects the shared belief in American exceptionalism and the way in which it shaped foreign policy views. With its inherent international relevance, encapsulated in the sense of mission, the belief in exceptionalism bridges the gap between the self and the other—the "within and across," in Iriye's definition—between the particular ("nation") and the universal ("democracy"), and between the export of democracy and the impact of "imperialism" at home.

Since culture manifests itself as rhetoric in such a debate and since "experience is mediated by language,"[15] it is appropriate to discuss another fashionable term, "discourse," which culture has obscured in recent years. Like many terms derived from post-structuralist and post-modernist theory, discourse is no less slippery than culture. Following Michel Foucault, Gail Bederman has formulated a useful definition: "By 'discourse,' I mean a set of ideas and practices which, taken together, organize both the way a society defines certain truths about itself and the way it deploys social power . . . [T]his methodology does not differentiate between intellectual ideas and material practices." While I am not advocating the ultimate consequence of this explanation, that our entire universe consists only of language,

the definition mirrors the central contention of my study that cultural constructs, such as exceptionalism, can affect the "material practices," in this case the foreign policies, of a society. Or, as Frank Ninkovich has put it, culture does not *pre*scribe policy choices, it *de*scribes "the field of possibility for what can and cannot be done."[16] The term "discourse" is particularly appropriate for research into exceptionalist beliefs, because these were shared by all debaters and can therefore be adequately described as the way in which an entire "society define[d] certain truths," to quote Bederman. At the same time, exceptionalism represents an extremely successful discourse because—in spite of the shared beliefs—it contained sufficient conflictual potential to permit a vigorous debate.

The notion of a discourse makes redundant the doubt that analyses of rhetoric and culture merely deal with "words" rather than with the "real" motives hidden behind public pronouncements. Instead, the entire body of language is considered important not only in reflecting, but also in shaping symbolic patterns shared by audiences and speakers alike. American rhetoric has to reflect the values of American audiences because only then can the respective speakers gain audience support.[17] By the same token, rhetoric narrows policy choices for each politician or activist because only the decisions and actions that are commensurate with the proclaimed objectives will preserve freedom of action in the future. Rhetoric is important because it reveals the value system of speaker *and* audience. For these reasons, I have made few attempts to distinguish rhetoric from presumably "true" motives; private and public rhetoric have been used interchangeably (unless there was a noticeable gap between the two).

Finally, a word on the uses of the terms "empire" and "imperialism." As intimated at the outset, both terms were always loaded in the American context, but even more so since the beginning of the twentieth century, when "imperialism" was increasingly associated with the capitalist economic order of the "Western" powers by communist thinkers, and also by liberals such as John A. Hobson. Subsequently, "imperialism" described not only formal annexation, but a variety of formal and informal means of hegemony: social, economic, cultural, military, and political. In the imperialism debate itself, however, "imperialism" was synonymous with colonialism, the formal acquisition and subject rule of overseas territories. The anti-imperialists applied the term to contemporary overseas expansion, and their opponents rejected the label for their policies. Only if we use this narrow definition of imperialism can we adequately represent the historical significance of the debate. As indicated above, the use of an expansive definition of imperialism has led revisionists to dismiss the debate as cynical because some anti-imperialists advocated an "informal empire," which would establish U.S. political and

economic hegemony without the burden of formal administration. While there is some truth to this observation, it fails to explain why the imperialism debate was such an emotional affair, precisely because it involved more than merely the best way to dominate others, namely the implications of overseas expansion for American national identity. This, and not ideological preference, has prompted the use of a narrower definition of imperialism.

* * *

In its focus on rhetoric, this is more a study of ideas than of people. More attention has been paid to representing the prevailing views than to accounting for every important imperialist or anti-imperialist. Biographical detail has only been taken into account where it was relevant to the stance that an individual or a group might take. Nevertheless, it is important to describe the makeup of the debate's camps. Most imperialists were found in the ruling Republican Party and among its sympathizers in the elite foreign policy public of the late nineteenth century. There were some important differences, however, between "moderate" imperialists of President William McKinley's ilk and more forceful (and younger) advocates of a "large" foreign policy, such as Theodore Roosevelt or Henry Cabot Lodge.

The anti-imperialists were a more diverse group. This diversity eventually hampered their effectiveness, particularly in the elections of 1900. The most prominent and vocal part of the movement—and the group that has received the most attention in scholarly literature—consisted of "mugwumps," ex-Republicans who had bolted their party in the 1880s because they had grown disenchanted with political corruption. Before the anti-imperialist crusade, they had focused on the reform causes of the Gilded Age, especially civil service reform. As veterans of the Civil War and often of the abolitionist movement as well, these were (mostly) men for whom anti-imperialism was the "last hurrah." As political independents, these debaters were fiercely individualist, although they founded local and regional "Anti-Imperialist Leagues." The most important of these was the New England Anti-Imperialist League in Boston. These leagues mainly organized gatherings and published the proceedings as well as members' individual tracts.[18]

Mugwumps found themselves incongruously paired with the majority of the Democratic Party, particularly its Southern wing, which clung to a racist opposition even after other anti-imperialists had abandoned that line of argument. Perhaps because of this single-mindedness, but also because of the dubious role the party leadership played in the Senate ratification of the peace treaty with Spain in early 1899, anti-imperialist Democrats' opinions have been somewhat neglected in the scholarly literature. This already combustible

mix of Democrats and ex-Republicans was supplemented by a handful of anti-expansionist Republicans, most notably Senator George F. Hoar, who harbored no sympathy for either the mugwumps or the Democrats.[19]

The other group included in this study has been selected less for its pronounced opinion on imperialism and more for the repercussions of the imperialism debate on its position in American society. Since much of the imperialism debate revolved around white majority attitudes toward nonwhites abroad and since racism was central to both imperialist and anti-imperialist arguments, it is important to see how African Americans reacted to the new foreign policies and to the contention that their nation had a mission to "redeem" nonwhites. The majority of African Americans instinctively opposed imperialism, particularly the racism inherent in its justification, but also felt politically hamstrung because the Republican Party remained their "natural" political home in the times of Jim Crow. The imperialism debate thus put African Americans between a rock and a hard place, and this dilemma renders research into the community's response especially rewarding. While there are a handful of pioneering works on this subject, most authors have focused on the political choices and implications of African American responses to imperialism rather than on the arguments and ideology behind them.[20]

* * *

The structure of the book follows the arguments outlined above. Whereas the first part explores the connections that debaters formulated between overseas expansion and democracy, the second part analyzes the ways in which imperialists and anti-imperialists exploited the dialectic structure of American exceptionalism.

The first chapter looks at the debaters' claims of what "democracy" would entail for the respective other: the Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. "Freedom" and "liberty" were the key terms. The imperialists insisted that annexation meant liberation—from Spanish (mis)rule and from "barbarism"—and they emphasized the individual negative liberties because they were not willing to grant the positive and collective freedom of self-government. Predictably, their opponents seized on this omission and claimed that the right to govern oneself was *the* essential precondition of true democracy, without which all other liberties were meaningless.

With racism at its center, the second chapter presents an obvious paradox: imperialists and anti-imperialists used democracy, theoretically a universal and inclusive political order, to rhetorically *exclude* the other. Both sides expressed their racism by discussing whether nonwhites were capable of

practicing democracy. The difference between them was tactical rather than substantive: while the anti-imperialists emphasized that other races' lack of self-governing qualities was as immutable as the color of their skin, the imperialists showcased a paternalist version, insisting that Americans could teach the "natives" the art of self-government. The discussion of race did not remain static, but moved with contemporary developments in the larger imperialism debate. As soon as the McKinley administration demonstrated that neither the Philippines nor the Filipinos would ever be admitted to the Union, race lost its attractiveness as a scare tactic, at least for Northern anti-imperialists. Still, the question of race and the annexation of territories inhabited by nonwhite populations had important repercussions for African Americans at home—another important feature of the second chapter.

While the first two chapters focus on American hetero-stereotypes, or images of the other, the remainder of the work concentrates on auto-stereotypes, or images of the self. Imperialist and anti-imperialist conceptions of an American mission to the world form the heart of the third chapter. All debaters agreed that the United States had such a global role, but they disagreed about the precise contents and means, particularly about the question of whether this mission ought to be passively offered or actively pursued. Both sides also discussed ancillary foreign policy principles, especially the wisdom of a departure from international "isolation," and they formulated rivaling utopias, which would fulfill the global potential of exceptionalism, the "regeneration" of the world.

The fourth chapter analyzes argumentative strategies that have been neglected in the relevant literature. Imperialists and anti-imperialists not only fought about how democratic ideals ought to be expressed in foreign policy, but they equally maintained that their recommendations were democratically sanctioned at home. The McKinley administration had the obvious advantage of being able to point to a general popular mandate for its policies, particularly after the midterm elections of 1898 and after the Senate had ratified the peace treaty. Their opponents were forced to argue from a minority position. There was more to this difference, however, than necessity or convenience. This difference alluded to an important distinction in democratic theory, namely the question of whether democracy is more adequately manifested in procedural arrangements or whether it resides in a polity's substantive and institutional rules. Although their minority status forced the anti-imperialists to embrace the latter idea, they believed in it firmly as well, occasionally betraying a considerable degree of elitism toward the whims and wishes of a majority.

The second part of the study deals with the debaters' emphases on the national and democratic elements within exceptionalism. The fifth chapter

focuses on how the antagonists defined their own nation and what foreign policy consequences they drew from those definitions. Their clashing viewpoints culminated in their interpretations of American history. The imperialists formulated a narrative of nationalization, which equipped and obligated the United States to assume a more assertive role abroad. The drama was heightened by the proposition that the nation had its own "destiny," independent and beyond the reach of human intervention. To the anti-imperialists, the enduring legacy of American history was the advance and perfection of its democratic (or republican) institutions. In their eyes, the nation had no legitimacy independent of its founding ideals or its citizens. Democracy required the principle of rational choice, and American ideals in turn mandated that this choice be an abstention from overseas expansion.

In Chapter 6, we encounter a similar disagreement about the nature of the threat that the United States was facing. While the imperialists invoked a clear military threat to the *nation* from without, their opponents perceived a danger to American *democracy* from within. This danger, they insisted, was not a result of an external enemy threat, but a repercussion of the foreign policies of their day. Each side foresaw dire consequences if its advice went unheeded, but their priorities were reversed, with the imperialists claiming that there would be no more basis for democracy if national security mandates were ignored and the anti-imperialists countering that the nation forfeited its *raison d'être* if it undermined its democratic character. The anti-imperialist America emerged more as an idea and ideal than as an actual country.

The last chapter, on definitions of patriotism, is a particularly apt illustration of the conflicting emphases on nation and democracy. The imperialists emphasized an instinctive and chauvinist patriotism, defined as loyalty toward the national unit per se, and charged the dissenters with treason and with endangering the lives of American soldiers in the field. The anti-imperialists instead vowed their loyalty to their nation's democratic ideals and insisted on dissent as a crucial democratic and patriotic right.

Taken together, these chapters confirm that the imperialism debate was not simply a disagreement about foreign policy strategies and tactics. Instead, it was a "great debate," which went to the heart of American nationalism, self-understanding, and ideals, as imperialists and anti-imperialists pitted their conceptions of what the United States was and what its global function ought to be against one another. At the same time, as hyperbolic as this debate was, it took place within one large consensus on American exceptionalism and on the idea that this exceptional nature bestowed an international mission—however defined—upon the country. The arguments discussed in the two parts of this study illustrate how the elasticity of exceptionalism as a shared discourse could be exploited. Ultimately, this elasticity, the fact that diametrically opposed

foreign policy strategies and conceptions of national identity could be legitimized with this one shared discourse, made it superfluous for most debaters to place themselves outside the consensus, and appeal to more radical, more "deconstructionist," even more "un-American" ideas to oppose the dominant policies of the day. This, in turn, confirmed the strength and longevity of exceptionalism.

CHAPTER 1

Democracy and Freedom Abroad

The debaters' consensus on an American mission extended to an understanding that the global spread of democracy was its central ingredient. While they disagreed about the appropriate *means* for spreading democracy, they also discussed what "democracy" would mean for the respective "other"—Cubans, Filipinos, Hawaiians, or Puerto Ricans—although the debate focused on the Philippines. Key to everyone's understanding of democracy was the concept of freedom, or "liberty," as it was more commonly referred to at the time.

The imperialists used several lines of arguments—sometimes simultaneously—and did so at various stages of the debate. In the immediate aftermath of the war and until the ratification of the peace treaty with Spain, which sealed the cession of the Philippines to the United States, imperialists exploited the theme of liberation from Spanish tyranny. This theme was already well established, because it had been used to justify U.S. intervention in Cuba. In this context, liberty was negatively defined—as the absence of Spanish oppression. Anti-imperialists objected to this simplified equation and charged their opponents with replacing Spain and continuing the denial of freedom in the Caribbean and in Asia.

While the contending viewpoints resulted from diverging interpretations of the "facts," the absence of an unequivocal definition of the term also facilitated the discussion about freedom. As Isaiah Berlin has pointed out, "[l]ike happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, the meaning of [freedom] is so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist." Berlin has developed a typology of liberties that is particularly suited to highlight the differences in the imperialism debate. He has distinguished between "negative" and "positive" freedom: negative freedom denotes the freedom of the individual *from* the constraining interference of any, even

democratically constituted, authorities, whereas positive freedom signifies the political freedom *to* rule oneself.[1]

After the peace treaty, the imperialists emphasized negative liberty for the Filipinos, a "Bill of Rights" under American sovereignty, whereas the anti-imperialists emphasized the right of the Filipinos to rule themselves—a call for individual and national self-determination. To be sure, the imperialists did not have a deliberate desire to square their policies with democratic theory. Nevertheless, they exploited ambiguities in the broad concept of freedom to insist that they were guaranteeing Filipino liberty even when their program for the Philippines envisioned American sovereignty and the curtailment of indigenous political rights.

Even "imperialism," the rule of subject populations, had to be squared with American ideals, an observation further illustrated by the fact that the opposition forced the advocates of overseas expansion to temper and "democratize" their rhetoric over time. Rhetorical concessions to positive liberty increased, ranging from the implementation of local to assurances of national self-government after a period of American "instruction." By the election of 1900, imperialist promises of future Philippine independence were difficult to distinguish from anti-imperialist alternatives. The imperialists also added a social dimension to their catalog of democratic rights for the other. As if to compensate for the absence of other democratic rights, expansionists promised to improve the material lot of the Filipinos by "liberating" them from the constraints of poverty. Only a few imperialists were bold enough to suggest that the Declaration of Independence was irrelevant in the Philippine context and that the United States should rule the archipelago indefinitely.

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Liberty as Liberation

Liberation from Spanish oppression as the early "democratic" theme in imperialist discourse arose naturally out of the prewar debate about whether the United States should intervene in Spain's brutal campaign to pacify its Cuban colony. Americans had weighed intervention in Cuba at least since the beginning of the colonial uprising in 1895. The claim that Americans were obliged to liberate the Cubans was so strong in this debate that it superseded emotional calls for revenge after the mysterious explosion of the U.S. battleship *Maine* in the Havana harbor in February 1898.[2] Particularly, Democrats, Populists, and the yellow press used humanitarian arguments to move the seemingly reluctant Republican President William McKinley toward war. When Republican Senator Redfield Proctor spoke in favor of intervention

in mid-March, observers interpreted his speech as a major step toward war because Proctor was a close ally of the president and of the East Coast business community, long rumored to be the major obstacle to war. Proctor had traveled to Cuba to inform himself about the conditions on the island, and he admitted that before his visit, he had had "a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn." He discovered, however, "that the case had not been overstated" and reserved his harshest judgment for Spain's "reconcentration" policy, which was designed to deprive the Cuban insurgents of their popular base by concentrating the civilian population in fortified garrison towns. Proctor observed that this policy "is not peace nor is it war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation."[3] When President McKinley finally asked Congress for authority to intervene in mid-April, he also did so with humanitarian justification, "to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing" in Cuba.[4]

One aspect of the intervention debate prefigured and burdened that on imperialism and motivated Congress to reaffirm the selfless purpose of the impending war. Partly as a logical extension of the argument that intervention was intended to free the Cubans from Spain and partly out of fear that the United States might acquire Cuba as a colony, Democrats and Populists had long insisted that the U.S. government recognize the Cuban rebels as the rightful government and accord them the status of belligerents. From a legal point of view, the McKinley administration countered that the rebels had no organized government warranting international recognition. In truth, McKinley wanted to preserve freedom of action in his negotiations with Spain and, in case of war, did not want U.S. forces to be subject to the military command of a Cuban government. These differences complicated congressional negotiations on the president's war message. In the end, a compromise resolution emerged that preserved American freedom of action but simultaneously affirmed the selfless justification for intervention. The first paragraph stated that "the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent." The fourth paragraph, the so-called Teller Amendment, reinforced this message by disclaiming any American intention of acquiring Cuba: "[T]he United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."[5] These two paragraphs were in line with McKinley's pledge in his 1897 annual message against "forcible annexation . . . That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression."[6] These promises embodied the American self-perception of being motivated by a selfless desire to liberate the Cubans from Spanish oppression.

Such pledges facilitated the support of many who later became anti-imperialists and who had long been skeptical about a war with Spain because they feared it would engender jingoism and demands for territorial annexation. An outbreak of jingoism during the Venezuelan boundary crisis in 1895 and earlier efforts to annex Hawaii had given them cause to doubt the motives of those who advocated war with Spain.[7] Initially, therefore, they had celebrated the president's "calm attitude" and "self-contained dignity" in stemming the rush to war. Against the background of the Teller Amendment, however, they could celebrate intervention as "a case of self-sacrifice."[8] Privately, skeptics like Republican Senator George F. Hoar still insisted that war "might have been averted and freedom and independence secured to Cuba if our ardent patriots in the two Houses of Congress had not disturbed the diplomatic action by hot and intemperate speech." Publicly, however, Hoar, too, supported his president and the war as one "in which there does not enter the slightest thought or desire of foreign conquest or of national gain or advantage."[9]

In the case of Cuba, the administration felt bound by these pledges after the war. In his annual message in December, McKinley promised "a just, benevolent, and humane government, *created by the people of Cuba*." Negative *and* positive liberties were being offered, initially preceded by a U.S. military government, until "complete tranquility" was restored and a future Cuban government installed.[10] Only the most ardent imperialists, like Indiana Senator Albert J. Beveridge, thought that "a separate government over Cuba, uncontrolled by the American Republic, *never should have been promised*."[11] Although the senator was criticized for his deviation from the administration's established policy at the time, he was vindicated by the passage of the Platt Amendment in 1902, which severely limited Cuban sovereignty and reserved to the United States the right to intervene "for the preservation of Cuban independence." These stipulations gave the Northern neighbor a veto over Cuba's foreign relations.[12] In terms of the imperialism debate, however, the official plans for Cuban independence effectively removed this island as a "rhetorical battlefield."

The debate on the Spanish-American War established a universally acclaimed theme of liberation, which the imperialists subsequently applied to the Philippines. At the same time, the theme and the numerous pre-war pledges constrained policy options and provided ammunition for the anti-imperialists.

Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that the Philippine case would be different from that of Cuba. On May 1, 1898, Admiral George Dewey's Pacific squadron sank the Spanish fleet in the Manila harbor. As the news reached the United States, the imperialism debate began, even though the

administration's desire to annex the Philippines was not publicly known until late fall and although the Senate did not ratify the archipelago's cession in the peace treaty until early February 1899. As before the Spanish-American War, President McKinley kept his options open, and it is difficult to reconstruct when he decided to demand the Philippines. On July 30, he privately formulated his preliminary thoughts: "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want."[13] From the beginning, Puerto Rico and the Philippines were placed in two different categories. The U.S. government insisted on retaining the former from the start, but left the future of the Philippines to negotiations.[14] This difference, but also the archipelago's size and distance, ensured that the imperialism debate would concentrate on the Philippines.

Although the envisioned administrative arrangements for Puerto Rico and the Philippines were different from those in Cuba, the annexationists rhetorically placed all islands in the same category by emphasizing their deliverance from Spanish tyranny. This emphasis prevailed in the months leading up to the conclusion of the peace treaty and during its discussion in the Senate. Republican Representative Henry R. Gibson (TN) described what his country had done for Puerto Rico: "We have delivered her from thralldom. We have wrenched the hand of the tyrant from her throat. We have spent our treasure and shed our blood in rescuing her." President McKinley emphasized the islanders' "gratitude for delivery from Spanish rule," which, as Albert Shaw, editor of the *Review of Reviews,* was certain, would be reciprocated by the Filipinos as well.[15] These claims implied that the islanders would welcome almost any type of rule after Spanish tyranny.

Imperialists also asserted that liberation bestowed a *positive responsibility* on the United States. With respect to the Philippines, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (MA) advised the president of the "practical unanimity everywhere[,] even among those opposed to annexation[,] . . . that we must not and cannot without great discredit return them to Spain." Otherwise, the Democrats would charge the administration with having perverted the war for liberty by returning the Philippines "to a tyranny far worse than that of Cuba."[16] The naval theoretician Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose book on sea power had been influential in promoting the idea of a "large" foreign policy, also emphasized the impossibility of continued Spanish rule over the Philippines, despite his own initial reservation of taking the islands, because "Spain cannot observe a pledge to govern justly, because she neither knows what good government is, nor could she practise it if she knew."[17] At the very least, imperialists argued, the liberation of the Philippines prohibited their return to Spain.

The notion of responsibility or "duty" as a result of war became President McKinley's favorite theme. Initially, he combined the themes of a

humanitarian war and subsequent American responsibility for the liberated colonies without committing himself to a specific policy. In a typical statement at Chicago in October 1898, the chief executive proclaimed: "The war has put upon the nation grave responsibilities. Their extent was not anticipated, and could not have been well foreseen. We cannot escape the obligations of victory . . . Accepting war for humanity's sake, we must accept all obligations which the war in duty and honor imposed on us." In his November 1898 notes, on which the final instructions to the peace commission were based, the president was more specific. It was possible, he wrote, to negotiate about questions of war indemnity and commercial opportunities for the United States in the Far East, but it was impossible to compromise on the "obligation of the people" and the question of "duty," both of which precluded returning the islands to Spain.[18] This emphasis on duty was important in other respects as well (cf. Chapter 5), but in this context, it reinforced the notion that liberation bound the liberator.

The view that the "universal sentiment of the nation and the world is against" returning the Philippines to Spain came to be the dominant argument of expansionists in the congressional debate on ratification of the peace treaty. Either the Senate signed the treaty, thereby accepting the cession of the Philippines, or it rejected the treaty, thus subjecting the Filipinos to continued Spanish oppression and perpetuating the state of war between America and Spain. "Imperialism," according to these arguments, was a moot point because the treaty itself did not stipulate details of the Philippines' future disposition.[19]

After the treaty had been ratified, liberation emerged as an argument for fighting the Filipino "rebels" against American sovereignty. Pretending astonishment for maximum effect, President McKinley condemned the "ungrateful rebels":

> We never dreamed that the little body of insurgents whom we had just *emancipated* from oppression . . . would turn upon the flag that had sheltered them against Spain . . . This nation for nearly a century has not compromised liberty . . . and Abraham Lincoln spoke in 1863 the proclamation of liberty to all men beneath our flag . . . Our flag stands for liberty wherever it floats; and we propose to put sixty-five thousand men behind that flag in Luzon, to maintain the authority of the United States and uphold the sovereignty of the republic in the interest of civilization and humanity.[20]

McKinley combined "logic" and history to make his case. It was logically impossible that the United States oppressed the Filipinos because it had liberated them from Spanish oppression. Recent American history, a civil war for the abolition of slavery, proved how preposterous the charge of oppression

in the Philippines was. To underline the historical parallel, some imperialists referred to the Filipinos as "the emancipated" (cf. Chapter 5).[21]

This was a tautological justification, postulating that a liberator with established "credentials" could not turn into an oppressor. More importantly, while the word "liberation" shares the linguistic root with the word "liberty," it describes a one-time act, whereas the latter describes a continuous state. The theme of liberation from Spanish rule carried similarly positive connotations as "liberty," but it revealed very little about the extent of the *liberty* that the United States was prepared to offer. Finally, the theme of "liberation" created the impression as if there were no difference in the plans for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, while in reality only one island was to be given independence, whereas the others would be held as subject territories for an indefinite period.

By contrast, the anti-imperialists claimed that liberation bestowed a different responsibility upon the liberator. Offering unsolicited advice in a letter when McKinley had not yet publicly committed himself to a specific course on the Philippines, the German American reformer and former Secretary of the Interior, Carl Schurz wrote:

> According to the resolution adopted by Congress, this was to be a war of liberation, of disinterested benevolence, and not a war of conquest . . . If we annex [Puerto Rico] it will be a palpable, flagrant conquest by arms, annexation by force . . . And what did you say in your annual message? That annexation by force cannot be thought of; that it would be, according to the American code of morals, a *criminal* act of aggression.[22]

Repeating the president's own promise, Schurz's "advice" was a warning, which indicated the course that anti-imperialist criticism was going to take, particularly in the period preceding ratification of the peace treaty. The president's 1897 annual message and the Teller Amendment provided some of the best fodder for the anti-imperialists, who repeated or paraphrased the relevant passages in virtually every speech and pamphlet. To them, McKinley's and Congress's promises were declarations of *principle,* applicable not only to the specific case of Cuba, but also to the other territories occupied during the war. Imperialist "sophistries" could not obscure the fact that a war for liberation had been turned into one for conquest. Instead of fulfilling the American role as liberator, the McKinley administration stepped into the Spanish role of oppressor, as the Central Anti-Imperialist League (CAIL) platform explained:

> We protest against the extension of American empire by Spanish methods, and demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us . . . Our government should at once announce to the Filipinos its purpose to grant them under proper guarantees of order the independence

> for which they have so long fought . . . It is today as true of the Filipinos as it was a year ago of the Cubans that they "are and of right ought to be free and independent."[23]

"Liberation" precluded not only the return of these territories to Spain, as the imperialists claimed, but also their annexation by the United States. Democrats like Congressman Claude A. Swanson, of Virginia, who had called early on for intervention in Cuba, relished the opportunity to point out what they considered the ultimate irony:

> An Administration that could scarcely be forced into waging war for humanity and for liberty became bent upon a war for conquest and for aggression; an Administration that had unwillingly consented to be the liberator of the Cubans gladly became the despoiler of the Philippines; an Administration that was loath [*sic*] to destroy colonial government in Cuba now seeks in the Philippine Islands to create a counterpart of the vicious one there destroyed.[24]

Only Philippine independence could fulfill the original intent of the war against Spain.

By the same token, the anti-imperialists viewed the Philippine-American War not in the context of Filipino ingratitude, but as continuation of a struggle for liberation—the very liberation that the United States had supposedly fought for against Spain. Anti-imperialists, therefore, dwelled on evidence that the United States had been effectively allied to the Filipinos in the war against Spain by using, for example, the published correspondence between Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino independence movement against Spain, and American officers.[25] To Schurz, these documents proved that "the Filipinos . . . were practically recognized as our allies, and as such they did effective service, which we accepted and profited by," irrespective of whether the alliance was ever formalized.[26] Numerous pamphlets also dealt with American responsibility for the war. In Edward Atkinson's words, it did not matter "on whichever side the first shot was fired in the slaughter of these people, the sole responsibility for this act of criminal aggression rests upon the President of the United States."[27] The logic behind this claim was the larger logic of the anti-imperialist argument: by denying the Filipinos the freedom and independence they had already fought for against Spain prior to Dewey's arrival, Washington had stepped into Madrid's shoes and betrayed its own prewar promises. This left the Filipinos no choice but to resume their struggle against a new colonial overlord. With this interpretation, the anti-imperialists served notice about which liberty, namely positive liberty and national independence, they considered essential.

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American Sovereignty and Filipino Liberty

After the treaty had been ratified and the Philippines ceded to the United States, discussion moved away from the theme of liberation. The imperialists now had to explain how U.S. sovereignty and Filipino liberty could be reconciled. They dealt with this logical dilemma offensively, by claiming that American sovereignty and "good government" were the preconditions of Filipino freedom. In the process, liberty was implicitly or explicitly defined as negative individual freedom.

This line of argument was already evident in President McKinley's "benevolent assimilation" proclamation of December 21, 1898, which became the guideline for military government in the Philippines. After instructing the secretary of war to safeguard the "fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty," McKinley added

> that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights . . . [I]t should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them . . . that full measure of *individual rights and liberties* which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.[28]

The proclamation repeated the theme of liberation and offered guarantees of personal freedom and property rights. It left no doubt, however, that the United States, at the time merely occupying Manila and its outskirts, would establish its sovereignty and government over the Filipinos. This point was not lost on Aguinaldo's forces, who had fought Spain and who had hoped that the Americans would grant them independence. The proclamation therefore did little to convince the Filipinos that the United States had come as their liberator. In this respect, McKinley contributed to the outbreak of war in February.[29]

For the purposes of domestic consumption, American sovereignty itself was described as benevolent and far different from that of Spain. After having outlined a "model" colonial administration, Senator Beveridge emphasized that the "[a]dministration of good government is not denial of liberty." On the contrary, this government would guarantee very specific liberties, as Beveridge explained some years later:

> We do not deny them liberty; we instruct them in liberty. Liberty is not a phrase; it is a reality. Savages left to themselves do not know liberty. Liberty

> manifests itself in just institutions. Equal laws are liberty, we have given them to the Filipinos. Impartial courts are liberty; we have given them to the Filipinos. Free education is liberty; we are giving it to the Filipinos.[30]

The enumerated liberties were ingredients of Berlin's negative freedom, whereas the positive freedom of self-determination was not included. This understanding was also the essence of the slogan Beveridge coined to counter the anti-imperialist argument that the American Constitution would have to "follow the flag," which was meant to say that *all* American rights had to be extended to the Filipinos. Instead, Beveridge argued that "wherever the Flag is established . . . larger liberty must necessarily develop in the end. There is no spot on earth that would not ultimately be better for the sovereignty of the Stars and Stripes *for our institutions are the noblest known to man, and American institutions follow the flag*."[31] Apart from tautologically claiming that American sovereignty entailed enlarged liberties, the senator implied that U.S. governmental institutions would be vastly superior to any run by Filipinos. Occasionally, imperialists stretched American benevolence to such an extent that they, like Republican Senator John C. Spooner (WI), rejected the conventional label "colony" and instead referred to the acquisitions as "territories," invested with a full bill of (personal) rights according to the American standard.[32] Yet, in difference to other American territories, neither the incorporation of the islands into the body politic nor national self-determination was envisioned. The historian Albert K. Weinberg has summarized the essence of this limited liberty:

> True freedom was apparently not the *national* liberty which was being withheld but the *individual* liberty which was being offered. McKinley's imperialist terminology thus presupposed the validity of the anti-nationalistic but utilitarian idea of freedom which had been advocated by Dante in his project for world empire. Although much that is sensible can perhaps be said for it, this sharply limited doctrine of freedom *had never been accepted by Americans for themselves*.[33]

It is difficult to gauge to what extent imperialists themselves believed that U.S. sovereignty guaranteed Filipino (negative) liberties. Nevertheless, they had fashioned a narrative that accommodated both conquest of and freedom for the other in one mental framework.[34]

After war broke out in the Philippines, imperialists described American sovereignty as the *conditio sine qua non* of Filipino (negative) liberty. Washington rejected the understanding of the conflict as "war," insisting that Aguinaldo's armed resistance was a rebellion against rightful American authority. Theodore Roosevelt considered it "the all important duty . . . to

restore order." Order was not an end in itself, but the precondition for "peace . . . and the gradually increasing measure of self-government for the islands which will follow peace." Commenting on a Republican sample plank for the 1900 elections, Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University and head of the First Philippine Commission, who was sent to the islands to investigate the transition to civil government, similarly greeted "the proper sequence of objects to be pursued in the Philippines,—peace, justice, etc. first, and afterwards liberty." Although the precise content of "liberty" often remained nebulous in such passages, it enabled the speaker to portray "vigorous military action on our part" as "the only *humane* course for us to pursue" because only after the full establishment of American authority could "liberty" be guaranteed to the Filipinos.[35]

If "disorder" was the problem, then it was logically the (rebellious) Filipinos themselves, not the Americans, who were obstructing progress toward Philippine freedom. Wrote John R. MacArthur, secretary of Schurman's commission, to Beveridge: "I soon became convinced that full liberty to govern themselves would speedily result in a denial to the people of the other liberties, the prime liberties, which we all . . . are so desirous of securing to them."[36] MacArthur explicitly stated that personal liberty was only to be had at the price of relinquishing national self-determination. This judgment was derived from the imperialist view that the Filipinos were not yet capable of governing themselves (cf. Chapter 2) and from the proposition that the "rebels" were a *minority* faction in the islands. U.S. army officers and imperialist visitors in the Philippines constructed the image of a fanatic, elitist rebel movement that disregarded ordinary Filipino wishes for peace and American institutions. Commenting on Democratic proposals for the Philippines, McKinley formulated this conviction in the context of the democratic principle of majority rule in his letter accepting the presidential nomination in 1900: "We are asked to transfer our sovereignty to a small minority in the islands without consulting the majority." As Paul Kramer has shown, this rhetorical attempt to reduce Filipino resistance to a minority phenomenon was buttressed by "tribalizing" it—by insisting that only the Tagalog tribe opposed American sovereignty and that its victory would result in the oppression of the remaining "tribes."[37] The tables had thus been turned: not the imperialists, who were actually fulfilling the desires of a Philippine majority, but the anti-imperialists were guilty of the negation of democratic principles because they favored an unrepresentative minority.

After his trip to the Philippines, Schurman emphasized that the Filipinos had never wanted independence. Rather than ascertaining the concrete will of the Philippine majority, however, the imperialists stated it as a matter of fact. President McKinley assured an audience in Boston that formal consent

to U.S. sovereignty had not been required because Americans could sense it "in every aspiration of their [the Filipinos'] minds, in every hope of their hearts." These claims supplemented the usual justification for guardianship, the contention that others *could* not govern themselves. To this, the imperialists added that the Filipinos did not even *want* to govern themselves.[38] The assertion that American rule represented the democratic will of a local majority completed the imperialist case for Filipino "liberty." The most important argument remained the claim that specific *negative* liberties of America's new subjects took precedence and that they could only be safeguarded by depriving the Filipinos of *positive* liberty.

By contrast, anti-imperialists emphasized the indivisibility of freedom *and* independence, negative *and* positive freedom. They also dismissed their opponents' majority argument out of hand. Aguinaldo, they countered, *did* represent a majority of the Filipinos and had established a functioning government prior to the American acquisition of the Philippines. Schurz ridiculed the imperialist application of the majority principle in the Philippines:

> But if, as the President says, "this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great mass of the Filipino people," why do we not put arms into the hands of the great mass to enable it to tackle that small rebellious minority and hand it over to the police? Why not? The reason is simple: Because, as everybody knows, there is too much reason to fear that this great mass of "good Americans" would, upon occasion, turn out to be good Filipinos and eventually use those arms against us.[39]

The anti-imperialists concluded that the United States had purchased something in the peace treaty that Spain no longer held title to—the sovereignty over the Philippines, which was already in the hands of Aguinaldo's revolutionary government. Consequently, they never employed the label "rebellion" for the conflict in the Philippines because it implied the recognition of American sovereignty; the conflict remained a war of "criminal aggression" against an established government.[40]

Since the anti-imperialists contested their government's title to the archipelago, they dismissed promises of negative liberties and "good government" as a conqueror's palliatives. Edwin Burritt Smith, lawyer and "leading spirit" of the CAIL, insisted that "it is not the duty of the American people to give government, whether just or otherwise, to anybody." "[A] people may be happy and even prosperous," he added, "under institutions unlike our own." This view was seconded by Jane Addams, the social reformer and one of the few women in an anti-imperialist organization:

> We forget that an ideal government is merely an adjustment between men concerning their mutual relations towards those general matters which concern them all; that the office of an outside and alien people must always be to collect taxes and to hold a negative law and order. In its first attempt to restore mere order and quiet, the outside power inevitably breaks down the framework of the nascent government itself, the more virile and initiative forces are destroyed.[41]

According to this interpretation, "good government" could never be given to another people, but had to be constructed by them to reflect their aspirations and character. Negative *and* positive liberties were the prerequisites of good government. To anti-imperialists, it did not matter whether Americans would be better colonial administrators than the Spanish, or whether their form of government was the best system available. What was good for Americans would not necessarily work as well in another country.

This is not to say, however, that all anti-imperialists were "cultural relativists" or that all of them were truly concerned about the kind of government the Filipinos would establish if left to their own devices. While Smith and Addams did not make a qualitative judgment on the governments other nations might choose, George S. Boutwell, president of the New England Anti-Imperialist League (NEAIL), speculated that an independent Filipino government "may not be a good government as we prize governments, but it will be their government." Other anti-imperialists took an even dimmer view of Filipino capabilities for self-government, but, as the renowned Yale sociologist William Graham Sumner reassured his readers, this was of no concern to Americans unless it was decided to admit the Philippines as states into the American union.[42] In fact, although the anti-imperialists were fighting for Philippine independence, some of their early alternatives betrayed an utter disregard for the other's destiny. In late August 1898, Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard University, privately counseled McKinley to leave the islands to Spain and to "help Spain to govern them better." John G. Carlisle, President Cleveland's former secretary of the treasury, expressed the spirit that inspired such proposals: "Better a thousand times that monarchical Spain should continue to rule a people against their will than that the United States should usurp her place and hold them in subjection in the name of liberty and humanity."[43] Keeping *America* pure from the stain tyranny was far more important than guaranteeing the independence of the territories conquered in the war.

Nevertheless, the emphasis on freedom *and* independence, on negative *and* positive freedoms, was the nexus that the anti-imperialists insisted upon when speaking about liberty. Negative liberty paternalistically "granted" by the imperialists, their opponents asserted, was a cover for conquest. Even if it

were sincerely envisioned by the McKinley administration, however, it could never result in a "good government," because only a government constructed by the Filipinos themselves would provide a stable basis for the safeguarding of all popular liberties. Independence, not American sovereignty, was the anti-imperialist *conditio sine qua non*.

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Measures of Positive Freedom and the Idea of a Protectorate

Although the anti-annexationists had failed to prevent the passage of the peace treaty, their emphasis on positive liberties and Philippine independence had a discernible impact on imperialist rhetoric. After ratification and especially in the context of the presidential elections in 1900, most imperialists promised some measure of self-government and future independence to the archipelago. Beveridge formulated a minority position when he introduced a resolution demanding that "the Philippine Islands are territory belonging to the United States; that it is the intention of the United States to retain them as such and to establish and maintain such governmental control throughout the archipelago as the situation may demand."[44]

President McKinley had already mentioned the continuity of Philippine municipal government under overall American military authority in his "benevolent assimilation" proclamation. In his speech on ratification, Senator Lodge sounded almost like an anti-imperialist advocating a protectorate scheme:

> I believe that we shall have the wisdom, the self-restraint, and the ability to restore peace and order in those islands and give to their people an *opportunity for self-government* and for freedom *under the protecting shield of the United States* until the time shall come when they are able to stand alone, if such a thing be possible, and if they do not themselves desire to remain under our protection.[45]

To be sure, Lodge did not desire a protectorate, but his rhetoric was designed to dilute the issue of "imperialism" at a critical moment when the peace treaty could have been defeated in the Senate.

Terms like "local self-government" started to appear in imperialist texts, obfuscating the fact that no imperialist considered *national* self-government in the Philippines anytime soon.[46] This strategy was again employed in the election year of 1900. Schurman suggested omitting any reference to potentially permanent rule over the Philippines in the Republican Party platform. Privately, though, he had no doubt that America had to rule the archipelago "till our work is done." In the end, the platform read

ambiguously: "The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law," an improvement over the First Philippine Commission's recommendation in 1899, "[t]he amplest liberty of self-government . . . which is . . . compatible with the sovereign rights and obligations of the United States."[47] The insistence on "sovereign rights" had been replaced by the less provocative reference to "our duties." Although Philippine policies had not changed since 1898, the slogan of "self-government" was designed to defuse the issue of imperialism.

Most anti-imperialists were not deceived by these rhetorical strategies. Commenting on McKinley's letter accepting the presidential nomination, Samuel Bowles, editor of the *Springfield Republican,* remarked:

> The president makes free use of the words "liberty" and "self-government" as the end of his purposes respecting those islands, but these words are plainly not used in their full and accepted meaning. It is "self-government" under absolute American sovereignty which he plainly means. It is "liberty" within lines drawn by an absolute alien power which he clearly has in mind. And this is the "liberty" of the vassal and the slave—nothing more.[48]

Nevertheless, the anti-imperialists had difficulty formulating viable or noticeably different alternatives. Already before ratification of the peace treaty, Senator Hoar realized that there were certain conditions that had to be taken into account:

> [T]he great need to defeat the present attempt to prevent our acquisition of a distant empire . . . is to satisfy the people what ought to be done with the Philippines if we do not take them. There is a strong feeling that it would be alike humiliating and dishonorable to give them back to Spain, or to let them become the prey of European powers, and that they are not fitted for self-government.[49]

Most anti-imperialists advocated an American protectorate over an independent archipelago. Hoar and Schurz collaborated briefly on plans for a protectorate, but fell out over questions of partisanship. The Chicago Liberty Meeting in April 1899 favored international guarantees of Philippine independence: "Our government should at once announce to the Filipinos the independence for which they have so long fought, and should seek by diplomatic methods to secure this independence by the common consent of nations."[50] Such a course, however, would have had to rely on the consent of the other imperialist powers—by no means a given in the climate of late-nineteenth-century imperialist competition.

The Democratic platform of 1900 recommended three ingredients: "[F]irst, a stable form of government; second, independence; and, third, protection from outside interference."[51] While Republicans countered that

these promises were dangerous because they incited the Filipinos to resist U.S. sovereignty in the hope of a Democratic election victory and because a protectorate could draw the United States into international quarrels without any control over Philippine policies, other anti-imperialists were appalled by the vagueness of the proposal. The historian Robert Beisner has commented:

> By promising to "give" the Philippines "a stable form of government," [the Democrats] implicitly endorsed the administration policy that made it the first order of business to crush the Filipino rebellion by force of arms. By promising "independence" but failing to offer any timetable for its realization, they disappointed those who wanted a pledge of immediate independence.[52]

If other anti-imperialists found it difficult to distinguish Democratic from Republican proposals, it must have been even harder for the average voter. This confusion added to misgivings that mugwump anti-imperialists harbored because the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, had played a crucial role in the Senate's passage of the peace treaty (cf. Chapter 4). Since most of them had no sympathy for Bryan's economic proposals either, particularly his "free silver" approach, a united anti-imperialist front in the presidential elections looked unlikely.[53]

The anti-imperialists were left without a unified political strategy against or credible alternative to imperialism. The fact that it was difficult to distinguish between Democratic and Republican proposals for the Philippines helps explain why the election of 1900 never really hinged on the question of imperialism, as the anti-imperialists had so fervently desired.[54] Perhaps more importantly, it is remarkable that many anti-imperialist speeches and pamphlets lacked credible alternatives altogether, focusing instead on condemning administration policies. While it was undoubtedly difficult to find viable alternatives, the inability to do so hints at an essential feature of anti-imperialist thought: many activists were concerned less with Philippine independence than with preserving the purity of American ideals.[55]

While the anti-imperialists were unable to effect major changes in their opponents' *policies,* their arguments contributed to a "democratization" of imperialist *rhetoric.* All but the most rabid expansionists felt obliged to offer positive liberties and to talk about eventual independence. Even if many imperialists privately believed that the Philippines would be indefinitely subject to American sovereignty, they did not dare emphasize this view in public.

* * *

The Origin of Democratic Rights

The suspicion that anti-imperialists were more interested in the purity of their nation's ideals than in the fate of the Philippines is confirmed by the way in which they discussed the origin of universal democratic rights. The theory of natural rights, the notion that every human being is endowed *a priori* with certain personal and political freedoms, was central to the anti-imperialist argument. Nevertheless, they did not cite Greek philosophers or Enlightenment thinkers, but instead referred to *American* documents and traditions. While the centrality of the Constitution will be analyzed in another context, the Declaration of Independence emerged as the key text in discussing democratic rights. As Senator Hoar put it, the Declaration of Independence "is the great interpreter of the Constitution."[56]

Invocations of the Declaration of Independence were ubiquitous in anti-imperialist texts. The National Liberty Congress of Anti-Imperialists, designed to find a common election strategy in 1900, affirmed: "We believe in the declaration of independence. Its truths, not less self-evident to-day than when first announced by our fathers, are of *universal application,* and cannot be abandoned while government by the people endures."[57] Alternatively, as at the Chicago Liberty Meeting of April 1899, anti-imperialists quoted or paraphrased the declaration without referring to it in name: "We regret that it is now necessary . . . to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We still maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed."[58]

The Declaration of Independence was defined both as the source of *American* aspirations for self-government and as the embodiment of *universal* natural rights. This mixture between the national and the international, the particularly American and the universal, indicated the connection that anti-imperialists formulated between the events abroad and democracy at home. As the Unitarian minister and social reformer Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones expressed it,

> we are here to plead for that last hope of humanity—democracy—that never yet has found a place in its lexicon for the words "colonies," "invasion," and "conquest." When those words come into our dictionary then the words "democracy" and "republicanism" must be blotted out. We stand here for those who believe that the revolutionary fathers meant what they said when they declared that all just governments must derive their power from the consent of the governed.[59]

The platform of the NEAIL was more explicit: if "[t]hese principles [are] abandoned, a republic exists but in name, and its people lose their rights as free men."[60] This was the flip side of the anti-imperialist contention that the

Declaration of Independence had universal validity: Should Americans ignore its principles outside their own borders, they would be threatened at home as well. It was thus not Philippine self-determination that preoccupied most anti-imperialists, but the sanctity of American principles of government.

Given the quasi-religious character of the Declaration, many imperialists avoided confronting this charge directly. When they did, they either tried to mesh the Declaration with their restricted definition of liberty or they discarded it as a historical document created for a particular people at a particular time. In a speech in Minneapolis, President McKinley followed the first course, subtly referring to the promises of the Declaration's preamble: the Filipinos "will not be governed as vassals or serfs or slaves; they will be given a government of liberty, regulated by law, honestly administered, without oppressing exactions, taxation without tyranny, justice without bribe . . . and protection in 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' "[61] Using these famous words implied that imperialist policies were realizing the promises of the Declaration and not comparable with British eighteenth-century imperialism. Yet, the Declaration's *raison d'être,* the achievement of national independence, was peculiarly absent. In his most important speech on the Philippines, Senator Beveridge combined this approach with a direct attack on the presumption of a universal validity of the Declaration:

> The Declaration of Independence does not forbid us to do our part in the regeneration of the world. If it did, *the Declaration would be wrong* . . . The Declaration has no application to the present situation . . . The Declaration does not contemplate that all governments must have the consent of the governed . . . And so the Declaration contemplates all forms of government which secure the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Self-government, when that will best secure these ends, as in the case of people capable of self-government; other appropriate forms when people are not capable of self-government.[62]

Negative and positive liberty, which were actually coterminous in the Declaration, were found to be in conflict, thus buttressing the imperialist assertion that Filipino independence would result in the denial of negative freedom. Although the document had legitimized American self-determination, Beveridge asserted that other forms of government were within its purview, thus sanctioning American sovereignty in the Philippines. Just in case this exegesis was not considered adequate, Beveridge flatly stated that "the Declaration would be wrong" if it obstructed expansion.

This was the other approach that some imperialists took. Attorney General John W. Griggs defined the Declaration as "a noble sentiment, but utterly inapplicable as a practical maxim to the case in hand . . . It was a

mere philosophical justification for revolution . . . [but] not intended to be a precise, correct and universal statement of law." For if it had been, Griggs reminded his audience, the Founding Fathers would have been guilty of disregarding it in the case of the Native and African Americans. The editorialist Amos K. Fiske went even further, not only emphasizing the Declaration's historicity, but also denying its universality: "There is no universal truth or fundamental principle which forbids their being governed without their consent, if rights and interests broader and higher than their own require it."[63]

The anti-imperialist and president of the Indian Rights Organization, Herbert Welsh, sarcastically summarized the logical consequence of these arguments: "The right of self government . . . is no longer universal—it exists but only between certain degrees of latitude."[64] These "extreme" imperialists not only separated negative and positive liberty, they also asserted that the theory of natural rights was a regional and historically contingent philosophical construct. Rights granted under its auspices had to be qualified by consideration of a people's "fitness" and by the "higher interests" of civilization. Both of these arguments were rhetorical "escape valves," which will be analyzed in the next chapter. They were clearly incompatible with democratic theory. The idea of natural, preexisting rights ruled out the possibility that some "higher" authority limited the exercise of these rights. Irrespective of the degree of negative liberty the imperialists were willing to bestow upon the Filipinos, their rejection of a natural right to positive liberty provided the justification for guardianship rather than the proclaimed "education" for democracy.

* * *

Compromising the Principle? Anti-Imperialist "Exceptions"

Although the anti-imperialists had seized the moral high ground of universal principles, their absolutism was tempered by "exceptions" and logical inconsistencies. Some anti-imperialists openly welcomed the annexation of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, while others experienced difficulty integrating their view of the American past with its present.

The most spectacular example was Senator Hoar's acceptance of Hawaiian annexation in July 1898, which underlined both his partisanship and the political tensions within the anti-imperialist movement. Efforts for the annexation of Hawaii had been underfoot since 1893, when a clique of American-born planters overthrew the native government and negotiated a treaty of annexation with Washington. The incoming Cleveland administration, however, rejected the treaty because it disagreed with the coup and with the involvement of an American naval detachment. The matter was revived

by the McKinley administration in 1897, but the Spanish-American War provided the necessary spark because Hawaii had proved to be a strategic station en route to the Pacific theatre of war.[65]

Hoar had favored annexation in 1893, but in 1897 he was afraid that Hawaii might be used as a "wedge" for future annexations. Nevertheless, when pressed by Albert Parsons of the NEAIL to resist annexation, Hoar replied that "it is not well to make Hawaii the battleground, and that the objections which apply to [the Philippines] do not apply to the acquisition of this little group of islands." Before the Senate and his home constituency, Hoar tried to reconcile his approval of Hawaiian annexation with a principled opposition to imperialism. He focused on strategic arguments, but also felt compelled to discuss the democratic dimension. He claimed that the principle of self-government was not violated because Hawaii "came to us with the consent of her own government, the only government capable of maintaining itself there for any considerable length of time." Hoar glossed over the fact that there had been a coup by a small American elite. Like the imperialists, Hoar added that the native Hawaiians were mentally incapable of comprehending and deciding the issue.[66] He obviously compromised his own commitment to a natural right of self-determination. While some anti-imperialists understood that Hoar's fierce partisanship partly accounted for his inconsistency, Samuel Bowles ridiculed Hoar's "exception to the rule of anti-colonial extension," for which even the senator could "find nothing to commend it save the littleness of landed area involved and the small number of inhabitants."[67]

Hoar, however, was not the only anti-imperialist who made exceptions. The steel tycoon Andrew Carnegie supported the annexation of Puerto Rico and even future acquisitions in the Caribbean because "the islands are small and the populations must remain insignificant and without national aspirations."[68] Carnegie was only consistent in strategic respect since he considered the Philippines as too distant, but Caribbean islands as good coaling stations in "America's backyard." With respect to self-determination, however, Carnegie turned Hoar's single exception into a new rule: as long as a given territory was sparsely populated, the universal right to self-determination could be disregarded.

Although this reasoning was illogical, it was hardly new in American political discourse. It had been one of the rationalizations for disappropriating Native Americans, whose treatment presented another dilemma for anti-imperialists. One of the critics' most important historical arguments was that past continental expansion had been justified because all new territories were eventually granted statehood, as provided in the Constitution. While this worked as a constitutional argument, the anti-imperialists omitted the fact

that Native Americans' right to self-determination had been flagrantly violated in the process. Most anti-imperialists tried to resolve this inconsistency by claiming that the North American continent had been "empty," only waiting to be populated by European settlers. Two years before the imperialism debate, Sumner sounded like an imperialist when he explained that "uncivilized tribes" had to give way to civilized colonists in the name of progress. In the debate itself, Sumner referred to the Mississippi valley as a territory "with no civilized population in it," whereas Hoar described the Louisiana territory, Alaska, and California as "very largely unoccupied territory, not having in themselves even the germ or semblance of national life."[69] This historical explanation was close to the imperialist justification for present policies, namely that "tribal" rights, as opposed to "national" rights, did not have to be respected and that the demands of "civilization" could trump universal rights (cf. Chapter 2), seriously compromising the anti-imperialists' commitment to positive liberty.

The imperialists relished pointing out these inconsistencies and they used historical "Indian policies" to stress that the right to self-determination had always been less than universal. The *Republican Campaign Text-Book* of 1900 thus declared "imperialism" a "fiction":

> From the beginning of our government we have had Indian tribes within our domain. We have recognized that they were not capable of the same measure of self-government as our own people, and we have kept them in a separate and dependent position. We have not allowed one Indian tribe to rule over another, and have not permitted them to establish a confederacy among themselves. We have held that they were under our dominion, and that it was our province to establish such a relationship as was best for our interests and for their own.[70]

This was the type of trustee-ward relationship that the imperialists envisioned for the Philippines. They added that expansion had been a dominant feature of American life and that Thomas Jefferson, icon of the anti-imperialists and the Democratic Party, had made the most significant step with the Louisiana Purchase, disregarding the rights of the territory's residents. If what Republicans recommended was imperialism, Beveridge concluded, Jefferson had been "the first Imperialist of the Republic."[71] Although the imperialists also had difficulty constructing a legitimizing narrative of the past, as we shall see later, they were justified in claiming that past expansion had not been concerned with the rights of original inhabitants either.

A few anti-imperialists tackled this problem head-on, acknowledging that their nation had compromised its ideals in the past, but insisting that this was all the more reason not to repeat the mistakes. E. L. Godkin, editor of *The Nation,* mused that enthusiasts of an American duty to enlighten the

Far East had forgotten America's failure to "uplift" the "Indian," and concluded: "We had responsibilities here which we did shirk, and worse than shirk"—a warning echoed by the lawyer Moorfield Storey.[72] Nevertheless, most opponents of expansion continued to pit a glorious American past against a disastrous imperialist future.

* * *

Social Dimensions of Democracy

The imperialists also emphasized a social dimension of U.S. rule over the Philippines, promising a higher standard of life than that provided by Spain. This theme further illustrated the imperialist understanding of "good government" and its difference to Spanish rule. Promises of economic development were also designed to help obfuscate the lack of positive liberty. Finally, the specific promise of an education system meshed with the contention that Americans would prepare the Filipinos for self-government (cf. Chapter 2).

The foremost exponent of these strategies was the president himself with his promises of "benevolent assimilation." In January 1899—even before the ratification of the peace treaty—McKinley sent the First Philippine Commission to the islands to investigate the prospects for future civilian rule and to initiate "efforts . . . to alleviate the burden of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity." In the Philippines, the commission concretized McKinley's plans. Apart from local self-government, it promised the "construction of roads, railroads and other means of communication and transportation, and other public works of manifest advantage to the people." An effective school system modeled on that of the United States was envisioned as well. Similar efforts were undertaken in Cuba and Puerto Rico.[73]

In his third annual message in December 1899, the president cited progress on developmental objectives in the Philippines:

> No effort will be spared to build up the waste places desolated by war and by long years of misgovernment. *We shall not wait for the end of strife to begin the beneficent work.* We shall continue . . . to open the schools and the churches, to set the courts in operation, to foster industry and trade and agriculture, and in every way in our power to make these people whom Providence has brought within our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our power, their welfare and not our gain, we are seeking to enhance.[74]

Considering that many imperialists insisted that the war had to be won before any transfer of power could be discussed, it was striking that the president emphasized the beginnings of social reform efforts in the midst of

the "rebellion." Such reform projects underscored the peaceful purpose of the United States and implied that war had been forced on Americans, who only wished to help the Filipinos to a better future.

Although an analysis of the actual reforms is outside the purview of a study on rhetoric, it is instructive to consider which areas U.S. reformers focused on. Scores of engineers, teachers, and missionaries descended upon the archipelago to build a model colonial administration that would surpass any previous example. They focused on four high-visibility areas. Administration of the Philippines was to be based on a professional colonial service and the rule of experts. This was the reason why many "fact-finding" missions were dispatched to the Philippines in a short amount of time. Large infrastructure projects—the construction of roads and railways—were designed to pull the country into the twentieth century, but also to facilitate the exploitation of its natural resources and to provide a network for trade. Land reform was another crucial ingredient, and U.S. administrators redistributed vast tracts belonging to the Catholic church. Nevertheless, the American belief in private property and alliances with local elites prevented a more meaningful redistribution. Finally, thousands of teachers and missionaries went to the Philippines to educate the natives and to offset the "superstition" of their previous Catholic education. These efforts were based on faith in American abilities to effect profound change and they mirrored the contemporary Progressive movement in the United States (cf. Chapter 6).[75]

Most anti-imperialists did not react to these material promises because they concentrated on their demands for *political* liberties. John Presto of the *American Fabian* was one of the few who parodied the imperialist promises for the social "improvement" of the Philippines:

> What they appear to have in mind now is to make of the Philippines a sort of cross between a social settlement, a missionary station and a coal yard. The settlement will establish boys' clubs to teach the little Filipinos how to save their pennies and read entertaining books and play instructive kindergarten games; and mothers' clubs to show mamma Filipinos how to warm up the baby's milk and wash his little face; and gymnasiums to enable tough young Filipinos to work off surplus energy on the harmless Indian club. As a missionary station the Filipinos will be encouraged to cast off the bonds of the Catholic church and embrace the most of up-to-date Protestantism . . . We shall introduce trolley cars, the Australian ballot, store clothes, tracts, telephones, canned beef and Lyman Abbott's "Theology of an Evolutionist," and so extend the blessings of *our* civilization.[76]

Presto mocked overseas *and* domestic paternalism toward the poor and "the other," unconvinced that American civilization was that desirable and

exportable. Instead, he insisted that the Filipinos would have "to work out their salvation in their own way." As Edwin Burritt Smith warned, "[w]e forget that the Filipinos may not wish to be as we are, that a people may be happy and even prosperous under institutions unlike our own, and that even our duty to civilization may not require us to become benevolent assimilators of other races." Differently put, other peoples might not choose the American "pursuit of happiness" but instead decline the "generous" offer. No amount of "benevolence" and material prosperity could replace the loss of individual and national positive liberties. In addition to this principled opposition, anti-imperialists did not trust the sincerity of their opponents' claims to improve the lot of the Filipinos. Instead, the critics reminded their audiences of the ongoing war, *American* reconcentration camps, and the general devastation wrought in the islands, and they emphasized the more sinister motives of greed and glory in imperialist designs.[77]

* * *

The anti-imperialists thus affirmed that only a truncated version of democracy and liberty was on offer as long as Washington insisted on sovereignty over the new territories. As imperialist responses demonstrate, these categorical attacks had an impact. Arguments based on conquest or advocacy of a permanent retention of the Philippines were hardly uttered in public because the speakers were afraid that such rhetoric would not mesh with majority values. The approach of a Beveridge was much rarer than that of the "cautious imperialist" McKinley.[78] Most rhetorical strategies were designed to defuse the issue of imperialism and to deny that American sovereignty over the Philippines would undermine Filipino liberties. "Liberty" emerged as the key word in the context of what American rule would mean for the objects of U.S. foreign policy. Through the theme of liberation, by enumerating concrete negative liberties, and by insisting that only American sovereignty guaranteed negative Filipino liberties, the imperialists argued that their policies were in line with American political traditions and designed to further democracy abroad. Emphasizing concrete developmental aspects of American "good government" reflected not only American traditional beliefs in progress, but also contemporary domestic social engineering projects of the Progressive era. These strategies demonstrate that contemporary foreign policy discourse had to adhere to certain rules and reflect the nation's values of democracy, although the debaters could exploit the ambiguities of "democracy" and "liberty."

The election campaign of 1900 proved that the imperialists were successful in blurring the lines between the negative and positive liberties. The

anti-imperialists had pushed the McKinley administration to promise eventual independence, but this "success" made it harder to show that their policies would be notably different. Some of their protectorate schemes did not sound all that different from the government's "liberal imperialism."

The anti-imperialists' effectiveness and credibility on the question of defending universal democratic rights was also damaged by the inconsistencies many of them exhibited in the period. While people like Hoar and Carnegie dramatically insisted that American democracy was in mortal danger if its universal precepts were violated abroad, they inexplicably defended exceptions if the foreign people to be ruled were few in number or the territory close and desirable enough.

These inconsistencies also indicate that most anti-imperialists were not truly fighting for *the other's* rights. Their primary motive was to keep *American* ideals and traditions unstained. This is also why most anti-imperialists were not too preoccupied with offering viable alternatives to annexation. Implicitly criticizing the domestic state of affairs, a minority of anti-imperialists wondered—in a culturally relativist way—whether the United States actually had a "model government" to offer to other peoples abroad. The majority, however, presumed that the ethnic other was unable to emulate the American example in a meaningful way. In other words, most critics questioned not only whether the rest of the world *wanted* to be American, but also whether it *could* be American. The democratic universalism even of many anti-imperialists was tempered by "cultural" differences—the topic of the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Democracy and Exclusion: The Issue of Race

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal . . . [T]o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.[1]
>
> Declaration of Independence (1776)

> [Racism] became a key component of the national theology, from the Bay Colony's New Israel to the republic's Manifest Destiny and white man's burden . . . In the national experience race has always been of greater importance than *class,* the cornerstone of European property-based politics.[2]
>
> Richard Drinnon (1980)

The excerpt from the American Declaration of Independence embodies some of the hallmarks of (American) democratic theory. Proceeding from the principle of natural rights ("self-evident" truths), they represent what Robert Dahl has identified as the two main principles of democracy, the "idea of intrinsic equality," the notion of an equality with respect to political processes, and the "strong principle of equality," the assumption that most adults "are adequately qualified to govern themselves."[3] Apart from forming the basis of democratic government, these sentences also imply *racial* equality in relation to democratic theory. As such, they are difficult to reconcile with Richard Drinnon's judgment about racism as a central tenet of the American creed.

In the imperialism debate, racism provided crucial arguments for *and* against overseas expansion. Surprisingly, at first glance, the debaters seemed to have no problem using democratic and universalist language alongside racist language/vocabulary. On the contrary, they were able to integrate both concepts into a more or less consistent ideology. By maintaining that

human beings need certain racial or developmental characteristics to exercise self-government, the debaters turned "democracy" into the very vehicle of racial prejudice. Democracy was no longer a universal *right,* but an exclusive *privilege* dependent on the "inherent capabilities" of the respective other.[4]

The imperialism debate unfolded in a particularly racist period in American history. Undisturbed by the North, Southern states cemented their segregation regime, and lynchings of African Americans were reaching record levels. At the same time, the national government was curbing Asian immigration and discussing limits on the influx of Eastern and Southern European immigrants. "Race" was a cultural construct, but contemporaries believed that their prejudice was buttressed by "science" and social Darwinism, as well as by the "positive" racism of Anglo-Saxonism, which stipulated that white Anglo-Saxons constituted the pinnacle of human development. Since racism was so multifaceted, defining it *formally*, as "exclusionary relations of power based on race," makes sense.[5]

Imperialist racist rhetoric does not seem surprising, given the last chapter's observations on how expansionists qualified the universalism of the Declaration of Independence. It seems more difficult to reconcile the racism of anti-imperialists with their emphasis on democratic universalism and the rights of the Filipinos. Their invocations of universal ideals may have been the reason why some historians have overlooked the racist dimensions of anti-imperialist thinking.[6] Even the scholars who have stressed anti-imperialist racism have not successfully resolved the contradiction between demands for equal rights for the Filipinos and their denigration as an "inferior race." Equally striking was the de facto alliance of Northern mugwump and Republican anti-imperialists such as Schurz or Hoar, both with a background in abolitionism, with Southern racists such as Benjamin R. Tillman, the South Carolina senator.[7] I contend that Northern anti-imperialist racism can be primarily explained as a tactical phenomenon. These critics employed racist arguments less out of conviction than out of their expectation that these appealed to contemporary audiences. They believed what the historian Eric T. Love has recently claimed, namely that racism was the biggest obstacle to expansion.[8]

While racist rhetoric remained consistently tied to the nation's democratic creed, the precise arguments of imperialists and anti-imperialists depended on their view of expansion and their objectives. The imperialists propagated a paternalist and Lamarckian variant of racism, focused on schooling the other in democratic government. The anti-imperialists adopted a purely negative racism, excluding the possibility that the other acquired the ability to practice self-government. In both cases, but more consistently in that of

the imperialists, negative stereotypes of the other were enhanced by positive stereotypes of the self, as manifested in the discourses of Anglo-Saxonism and civilization.

Nevertheless, the trajectory of racism in the imperialism debate was not as clear-cut. Some debaters avoided racist arguments altogether. They—and ironically many who used racism—*charged* their respective opponents with being racists in a way that stretched the boundaries of argumentative consistency. Many Northern anti-imperialists changed their approach over time, switching from racist portrayals to comparing the Filipinos with American revolutionaries. Finally, the discourse on race was complicated by the role of racial minorities within the United States, most notably that of African Americans. The racism of the imperialism debate had a detrimental impact on their place in American society, but they also reacted to expansion and its racist implications. Race was thus one of the fault lines that dramatized the relationship between domestic and foreign policy.[9]

Paternalist and Negative Racism

Race already played a crucial role in the run-up to the Spanish-American War. In an effort to increase sympathy for the Cuban insurgents, advocates of intervention "bleached" the island's population, counterfactually asserting that Cuban blacks had "been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years." Countless articles and speeches celebrated the Cubans as heroic freedom fighters by comparing them to American revolutionaries of 1776. Some interventionists argued that they deserved their own government, even though the McKinley administration deemed it inadvisable to ally itself to any embryonic indigenous government. The Spanish, on the other hand, were singled out for racist scorn, as a "Latin" race that had become decadent and deserved to be expelled from the Western Hemisphere. Intervention was thus partially legitimized on racial grounds.[10]

These views changed quickly, however, once the United States entered the war. Admiration turned to disgust as American soldiers and correspondents realized that a sizable proportion of the poorly clad and ill-equipped rebel army consisted of blacks. Having expected a regular army, Americans now viewed the Cuban rebels as worthless. Theodore Roosevelt described them as "a crew of as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes ever looked on . . . It was evident . . . that they would be no use in serious fighting, but it was hoped that they might be of service in scouting . . . [T]hey turned out to be utterly useless." The image of the Spanish, on the other hand, improved markedly as Americans won respect for their fighting capabilities.[11]

When American observers discovered the Cubans' "true colors," some rekindled the prewar debate about whether they "deserved" independence. Some imperialists expressed the hope that this "mistake" would not be repeated in the Philippines, where there were no "obstacles" like the Teller Amendment or McKinley's denunciation of "forcible annexation."[12] The intimate connection between self-government and "racial characteristics" had already been well established in the Spanish-American War.

* * *

In the imperialism debate, racial stereotypes were ubiquitous. Within this broad agreement on the inferior status of Filipinos, Hawaiians, or Puerto Ricans, there were nuances, which illustrated the instrumentalization of race to fit the overall purpose of the respective debater. Imperialists displayed a paternalist racism and claimed that the people considered for annexation were not yet fit for self-government and were in need of American tutelage. Racist anti-imperialists, on the other hand, were more pessimistic in their assertions that other races were permanently unable to govern themselves. The United States, they concluded from this "observation," should stay away from these populations in order not to "debase" its own civilization.[13]

Still, "pure" racism also pervaded imperialist rhetoric. The Filipinos "are, as a people, dull and stupid," Senator Beveridge asserted, whereas the editor Whitelaw Reid spoke of the "Malay and half-breed insurgents" in Aguinaldo's army. The "rebellion" itself seemed to confirm the traditional stereotypes about "Asiatics," namely that "all of them [are] liars . . . [and h]alf of them are savages."[14]

It was more important to judge, however, whether the Philippine "race" was capable of self-government. On the basis of firsthand observations on his travels and by conversations with "competent observers," Senator Beveridge concluded:

> They are a barbarous race, modified by three centuries of contact with a decadent race. The Filipino is the South Sea Malay, put through a process of three hundred years of superstition in religion, dishonesty in dealing, disorder in habits of industry, and cruelty, caprice, and corruption in government. It is barely possible that 1,000 men in all the archipelago are capable of self-government in the Anglo-Saxon sense . . . They are not capable of self-government. How could they be? They are not a *self-governing race.*[15]

Beveridge's term of the "self-governing race" implied that such capabilities were immutable and dependent on inherent ethnic characteristics. In the case

of the Philippines, its population's inability was compounded by the influence of the Spanish "decadent" race, another tier in the contemporary racial hierarchy. The attributes that Beveridge assigned to Spain and their effect on the Filipinos confirm that race was hardly a "scientific category," but rather an odd and adjustable mix of mentality, religion (Catholicism in this instance), language, and politics.

Who were the "competent observers" on whose testimony Beveridge and others relied? Imperialists cited members of the indigenous or foreign elite who welcomed American sovereignty and American officers who were fighting the Filipinos—hardly impartial or experts in democratic theory. General J. Franklin Bell admitted to Theodore Roosevelt that the Philippine "rebellion" was motivated by a desire for independence, but he insisted that this desire was "uninformed and unreasoning." Although it is difficult to understand why the Filipinos would fight for something they did not understand, Bell emphasized: "Only those thoroughly acquainted with the character of the people, and with the condition of affairs here, who are entirely *disinterested* and *unprejudiced,* can understand how dismally incompetent to rule the Archipelago the Filipinos would prove themselves to be." Dean C. Worcester, tellingly a zoologist by training, emerged as a civilian expert because he had spent four years in the Philippines researching the *wildlife.* After the battle of Manila, he hurriedly wrote a book about his experiences, emphasizing the "natives' " limited skills. His "expertise" gained him the favor of the administration and he became the only person to be appointed to both civilian commissions in the Philippines.[16]

For the most part, however, the Filipinos' inability to govern themselves was a foregone conclusion, based on their "racial" composition and on the fact that they were living in the tropics, a region that had supposedly never been able to sustain good government. It did not matter that Aguinaldo had organized an army and a government, modeled after the American one, or that many American observers had positively commented on his rule *before* Washington decided to keep the Philippines.[17]

If the immutable concept of race was decisive for a people's democratic talents, it is difficult to see how imperialists could logically develop a paternalist racism with the promise of eventual independence. Beveridge's description of the Filipinos as "not a self-governing race" implied the absence of evolutionary potential, and other imperialists were similarly pessimistic. Josiah Strong, the social gospeler whose book *Our Country* has been judged influential in preparing the ground for overseas expansion, wrote in 1900 that "the advanced and the belated races are not traveling the same path . . . Nor must we imagine that the belated race will some day reach the *same* development as that of the advanced race at the present time . . . The difference between races

and civilizations is not simply one of time and of degree, but one of kind." He concluded that it was not necessary to consult the Filipinos on the future of their islands.[18]

Nevertheless, the imperialist "master narrative" required a more "benign" and optimistic racism because only the prospect of developing the Filipinos' capacities made an educational American mission feasible (cf. Chapter 1). Congratulating David Gilman, the president of Johns Hopkins University, on a speech on the subject, Mahan used this "developmental" jargon: "I was glad, too, to see the country reminded that our shibboleths of self-government, and the consent of the governed, are not universal applications. Races, like men, have a childhood in which they are not fit for one or the other."[19] The childhood metaphor was an imperialist favorite because it implied evolution and growth, but also the need for a "parent" or "teacher." In many contemporary cartoons, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and Cubans were depicted as children. A float in the peace jubilees of Philadelphia and Atlanta, which celebrated the recent victory over Spain, represented the relationship that imperialists envisioned between these "children" and the United States: " 'A Trifle Embarrassed' showed Uncle Sam and Miss Columbia standing at the threshold of the 'United States Foundling Asylum,' at their feet a group of dusky children representing Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, clamoring for recognition."[20] In this production of the racial drama, "Uncle Sam" acted as benevolent father to the immature wards and instructed them in the art of self-government. Imperialists thus managed to reconcile racism and overseas expansion, explaining the need for outside guidance for the Filipinos (cf. figure 2.1).

As children, the Filipinos needed not only the benevolent but also the authoritarian parent. Left to its own devices, the Philippines would fall prey to "anarchy and chaos," "rapine and bloodshed." This argument was the racially sanctioned version of the claim that Filipino liberty could only flourish under American sovereignty (cf. Chapter 1). Senator Knute Nelson (MN) rejected anti-imperialist calls for Philippine independence as "the highest cruelty," thereby turning the tables on the opposition's charges of the brutality of American conquest. "They are absolutely a people to be led," concluded the soldier Sherman A. Cunes, and, in the absence of such leadership, "there would not only be continual contention and revolution, but degeneration."[21] The Philippine "rebellion" against American rule was understood as the act of unruly children who had to be disciplined by their parents. General Bell was convinced "that force is absolutely the only influence by which these people can be reached."[22] These assertions fit with the imperialist emphasis that positive and negative liberties had to be preceded by order and discipline. Future



Figure 2.1 Cover of *Harper's Weekly,* August 27, 1898, depicting representatives of the "new possessions" as children in Uncle Sam's school

Source: Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Online Catalogue.

President Woodrow Wilson reminded his readers that Americans too had had to undergo a similar development before self-government:

> The people of the United States . . . have forgotten the discipline which preceded the founding of the colonies, the long drill in order and in obedience to law, the long subjection to kings and to parliaments which were not in fact of the people's choosing. They have forgotten how many generations were once in tutelage in order that the generations which discovered and settled the coasts of America might be mature and free.[23]

In comparing events in the Philippines to Anglo-Saxon development, Wilson provided an almost "non-racist" explanation of the evolutionary doctrine of self-government. At the same time, the description of the Philippine-American relationship as one between child and parent euphemistically rationalized the brutal warfare on the islands as the necessary punishment that parents occasionally had to mete out to their children for the latter's sake. Even the war could be interpreted as "benevolent assimilation."

Another imperialist argument was closely related to American experiences with Native Americans: the "tribalization" of the Philippines already mentioned in the first chapter. Dean Worcester provided the appropriate "scientific" background when he classified the Filipinos much like the zoological specimens he had collected in the islands. Although a 1903 census revealed that the archipelago's inhabitants were ethnically less diverse than the population of the United States, Worcester described them as a myriad of savage and inimical tribes, incapable of generating a truly *national* life. Theodore Roosevelt echoed this view in his enumeration of Filipino "groups": "Their population includes half caste and native Christians, warlike Moslems, and wild Pagans. Many of their people are utterly unfit for self-government and show no signs of becoming fit. Others may in time become fit, but at present can only take part in self-government under a wise supervision at once firm and beneficent." As Paul Kramer has shown, the description of the tribal organization of Philippine life was designed to legitimize U.S. occupation and the denial of self-government. Only *nations* could develop self-government, whereas tribes engaged in internecine warfare, a notion that reinforced the imperialist contention that anarchy would prevail in the islands without U.S. sovereignty.[24]

Imperialists resurrected the religiously and economically based doctrine of the "destined use of the soil," previously employed to justify the dispossession of Native Americans. Their subsistence lifestyle, it had been argued, prevented progress and development because the tribes failed to cultivate the land and thus wasted valuable resources. Imperialists now globalized this continental argument. Mahan asserted that there were "no natural rights" to

self-government. Instead, these rights depended on "political fitness . . . and [on] developing, in such manner as to insure the natural right of the world at large that resources should not be left idle, but be utilized for the general good." Democratic natural rights were thus overridden by new "natural rights," the rights of the "higher civilizations" to exploit global resources for an undefined greater good. In contrast to national rights, tribal rights did not have to be respected, particularly if said "tribes" did not contribute to the greater good of humankind.[25]

This larger discourse of "civilization" transcended discussions of the fate and capabilities of the Filipinos. "Civilization" was as ambiguous as race, freely combining elements of race, gender, millennialism, and Darwinism. Although civilization theoretically allowed for the "progress" of "inferior" races—Frank Ninkovich has compared it to contemporary globalization—it clearly carried with it connotations of hierarchy.[26] As a progressive force, "civilization" supposedly possessed inherent rights and agency, superseding all claims that its implacable foe on the periphery, "barbarism," might have. This "natural" antagonism was a favorite theme of the Rough Rider Roosevelt. He described the conflict in Darwinian terms of the survival of the fittest. Barbarism, of which the Philippines were an example, equaled war, disorder, and regression, whereas civilization, embodied by, among others, the United States, stood for peace and progress. Civilization had not only a right, but also a duty to expand in order to ensure the Filipinos' uplift and the progress of humanity. In this version, which was no less racist than imperialist paternalism, the Philippines merely stood for a lifestyle that had to be conquered. The New York lawyer Albert Walker described the mercilessness of this "march of civilization":

> Evolution is stronger than any constitution. The age long western movement of the Anglo-Saxon is not to be stopped by any abstract definition of the rights of man. It is in the order of Nature that the Brown Man shall be civilized, even against his will. Natural selection goes forward with or without consent. The operation of the laws of nature does not depend upon which way a majority votes at an election.[27]

By posing the larger question of civilization and by assigning the Filipinos to the stage of barbarism, imperialists could gloss over the "petty details" of a de facto wartime alliance with Aguinaldo or of their legal title to the islands. Universal democratic rights became theoretical abstractions, swept away by "natural laws." These questions, Josiah Strong asserted, paled against the "great world conditions," which demanded that "these people cannot be permitted a lawless independence."[28] For it was in the very nature of barbarism that war and anarchy had to break out. In this respect, the discourse

of civilization reinforced the claim that American forces were acting for the good of the Filipinos, even though the latter, living in the night of barbarism, could not see it. Webster Davis, former assistant secretary of the interior, stressed at the 1899 Washington Peace Jubilee that "the only way . . . to carry the blessings of civilization . . . to barbarous people is by force. It is a war of civilization against barbarism, a war of liberty against slavery, a war of law against anarchy."[29] As barbarians, the Filipinos could not be allowed to determine their destiny, just as Americans could not escape their mission in the regeneration of the world.

This rhetoric divided the globe into civilizers and those who had to be civilized. Imperialists could not only legitimize their relentless war against the Filipinos, but also create an overarching narrative for their particular racism. Whether it was through "civilization" or the children metaphor, the Filipinos were described as incapable of self-government. Both rationalizations, however, left room for progress, if those less fortunate were taken under the wings of a civilizing patron, who would provide them with the education and the tools for their moral and political improvement. This understanding enabled imperialists to reconcile racism with grandiose promises of "benevolent assimilation" and eventual independence.

* * *

At first glance, anti-imperialist descriptions of other races hardly differed from imperialist ones. Applying the yardstick of civilization, E. L. Godkin referred to the Filipinos as "half savages," Democratic ex-President Grover Cleveland labeled them "a heterogenous population largely mixed with elements hardly within the light of civilization," and Carl Schurz defined them as "more or less barbarous Asiatics." The former abolitionist and Massachusetts Governor George S. Boutwell echoed the notion of tribalism when he emphasized that the population mixture in the Philippines ranged from "cultivated Europeans to the wild mountain negritos, undersized Malays, who are hardly more than the first remove from the walking but speechless inhabitants of Central Africa."[30]

Nevertheless, the anti-imperialists deployed racism for a different purpose and it was predicated upon their understanding of the U.S. Constitution's relevance for the question of overseas expansion. This understanding predated the fin-de-siècle debate, but at the start of the peace treaty ratification debate, Senator George G. Vest (MO) summarized it in a resolution that stipulated that "under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies." From this proposition followed a vicious circle of imperialism, as pointed out by the Boston lawyer Winslow Warren:

> [W]e will either have to hold those possessions in a system of colonial slavery, . . . abolishing all the principles which we have striven for, or we shall have to recognize them as Territories of the United States, to be made States in due time. If any man can contemplate the possibility of making of those islands States of the American nation, I pity that man, and I pity the American nation.[31]

This was the point where anti-imperialist racism was instrumental in the debate: if everyone conceded that a democracy could not hold colonies, then all territories would have to be admitted as states and its inhabitants as fellow citizens. The latter option, Warren only implied, would wreck the racial and political fabric of the United States. This was the most important argument in the anti-imperialist arsenal, and it was labeled "the dilemma" by William Graham Sumner and emphasized so consistently by Schurz since the early 1870s that the historian Robert Beisner has referred to it as "Schurz's Law."[32]

This argument was particularly prevalent in the early stages of the debate—for reasons to be discussed below. Claiming specific "expertise" on the question of race, Southern Democrats like Senator John Daniel (VA) insisted that "the Philippine Islands will *never* be fitted to become American States" because "you will never change the different qualities of the races which God has created in order that they may fulfill separate and distinct missions in the cultivation and civilization of the world." Senator Benjamin "Pitchfork" Tillman (SC), the leader of Southern opposition to imperialism, used the metaphor of poisoning to warn against "the injection into the body politic of the United States of that vitiated blood, that debased and ignorant people."[33]

The rhetoric of Northern anti-imperialists may have been milder, but they also emphasized that the "Filipinos are not far enough advanced to share in the government of the people of the United States." Most Northern mugwump and Republican anti-imperialists shared this consensus. Some of the most prominent, among them Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Felix Adler, Grover Cleveland, Charles W. Eliot, and Carl Schurz, sent a memorial to the Senate, protesting against colonial rule and pointing out the "danger" of the Filipinos ever participating in American government.[34] The American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers sounded very much like Tillman when he claimed that admitting "inferior races" to the union would effect a "contamination" of American political life, "the threatening danger of Chineizing [*sic*] our people, the degeneracy of our institutions, and the possible decadence of our Republic."[35] The consequences of Filipino inclusion in the United States, which these anti-imperialists invoked, are illustrated in the cartoon in figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2 "Troubles which may follow an imperial policy," encapsulating anti-imperialist racism

Source: Milstein Divison of United States History, Local History & Genealogy, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

The decisive difference to imperialist racism was the assumption that the Filipinos' "lineage education and environment will *always* disqualify them for American citizenship."[36] This brand of racism held out no developmental hopes for the "inferior races." Natural laws forever disqualified them from the type of self-government Americans were able to exercise. When the anti-imperialists conjured up horror scenarios of how the Filipinos, as American citizens, would debase and corrupt American democracy, they alluded to recent nativist debates about immigration. This was particularly true of the mugwumps, who had long attributed "bossism" and party patronage in the cities to "corruption" by Irish, Southern, and Eastern European immigrants. If these Europeans could hardly be integrated, so the thinking ran, how much more impossible would it be to integrate "inferior races?" This may have been what Moses Lyman had in mind when he recalled that America already had

"an abundance of anti-American elements at home which it is a hard and slow process to assimilate."[37]

Conversely, anti-imperialists emphasized that racial homogeneity of the people was a fundamental prerequisite for a viable democracy. The Democratic presidential contender William Jennings Bryan contrasted imperialist and anti-imperialist visions: "If some dream of the splendors of a heterogeneous empire encircling the globe, we shall be content to aid in bringing enduring happiness to a homogenous people, consecrated to the purpose of maintaining a government of the people, by the people, and for the people." According to Schurz, the success of democratic government depended on "a substantially homogenous people, united by common political beliefs and ideals, by common interests, laws and aspirations."[38]

Like Tillman or Gompers, these anti-imperialists conceived of the American political system as a "*body* politic" and employed biological and medical metaphors when conjuring up the "death" of the republic. The German American Hermann von Holst associated the incorporation of other races with insidious diseases that destroyed the body from within, warning that "if we annex Hawaii we consciously insert into the nation's lifeblood a foreign body which cannot be assimilated." This argument was taken from the old racist stockpile with its sexual fears of miscegenation, which would supposedly debase the "superior" racial type. In this context, anti-imperialists did not shy away from the discourse of civilization either, only that in their logic, the annexation, not the abandonment of the Philippines, would be "a crime against civilization."[39] Describing the destruction of American political order in terms of a deadly disease fit the understanding of race as a biological trait. In fact, the use of biological metaphors mirrored imperialist rhetoric—only that the imperialists described the *nation,* not its political order, as a body and living organism (cf. Chapter 5).

When imperialists stressed that they would never admit the Philippines as states, anti-imperialists countered that citizenship laws would allow individual Filipinos, at least those born after annexation, to come to the United States as citizens. In a Senate debate before the passage of the treaty, the Republican imperialist Nelson acknowledged that the largest opposition stemmed from the view that annexation would automatically make U.S. citizens of the Filipinos. This, Nelson continued, was not necessarily so since there were already subjects in the United States, notably women and children, who were considered Americans but had no right to vote. Nelson's rhetorical efforts backfired when Senator Hoar pressed him to admit that the Filipinos could legally immigrate, take up residence, and work in the United States.[40] The specter of massive Filipino immigration was invoked not only as a political, but also as an economic scare tactic, echoing arguments that had been

used to justify the exclusion of Chinese contract laborers since 1880. This topic was particularly dear to West Coast Democrats, one of whom wrote to Bryan:

> I claimed that for more than twenty years, that we of the Pacific Coast had stood as a stone wall to keep out the millions of Chinese that would have otherwise flooded this country. To my utmost surprise I found that they [East Coast industrialists] now wished to add sixty to seventy five million of these people at one fell swoop.[41]

The preferred target audience for this argument was American labor, until recently reeling from the impact of the 1890s economic depressions. As labor union president, Samuel Gompers, was harping on this particular argument, predicting that Filipino and Chinese "pauper" or "coolie" labor would "flood" the United States and displace American workers because of their willingness to work for lower wages. This new type of contract labor would adversely influence general American attitudes toward labor, Gompers continued, just as slavery had earlier throughout the South. By concluding that such "debased labor" could very well threaten the foundations of the republic, Gompers broadened the appeal of the argument beyond the labor constituency to elites who feared class conflict and "socialism."[42] The competition of American "free labor" with Asian "pauper labor" was also picked up in congressional debates and in the pamphlets of Northern elite anti-imperialists, most of whom had not previously distinguished themselves as friends of labor. Senator John L. McLaurin (SC) decried that "[t]o permit cheap Asiatic labor to come into competition with our intelligent, well-paid labor will be to degrade and lower our civilization," which could also wreck the republic.[43] This topos acquired its suggestive force from the pre-Civil War ideology of free labor, from contemporary debates on contract labor, and from the perception that "inferior races" were able to live on much less than the average American laborer. The cataclysmic view that millions of Filipinos and Chinese—via the Philippines—would descend upon the American republic was the mirror image of imperialist prophecies of the boundless China market. While the imperialists envisioned millions of Asians as customers for American products, the anti-imperialists saw these same millions at the gates, clamoring for admission as American citizens or at least as workers.

* * *

This prediction completed the anti-imperialist horror scenario of how any institutionalized relationship with "inferior races" would threaten the United

States. How can we square this negative racism with anti-imperialist demands for Philippine independence that were based not only on abstract appeals to democratic theory, but also on concrete claims that the Filipinos had already proved themselves to be worthy of a government of their own? How can one reconcile the women's rights activist Susan B. Anthony's protest that the Americans' treatment of Hawaiian natives amounted to "degrading Queen Lil and the other members of the royal family and the aristocratic educated classes to the level of idiots, lunatics and criminals," with her characterization of Hawaiians as "semi-barbaric people" in the same letter?[44] These questions have thus far not been satisfactorily resolved in the relevant literature.

Robert Beisner is justified in pointing out that "[t]he anti-imperialists were no better or worse than their countrymen," but this assertion does not explain the apparent inconsistencies.[45] It is also true that not every anti-imperialist was a racist and that many of them complained about the racism manifesting itself in the Philippines. Senator Hoar and Moorfield Storey are frequently mentioned in this context. Hoar had a long-standing record of fighting Chinese exclusion, whereas "Storey was one of a very few Americans of his time who applied the ideals of the Declaration of Independence to all races." At home, the lawyer was extensively engaged in the struggle for African American rights and would go on to become the first president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).[46] Nevertheless, even these proponents of minority rights were not above appeals to racism. In letters, Hoar occasionally referred to the Filipinos and others as "inferior races," and, in public, he raised racially based doubts about future U.S. statehood for the Filipinos at least once. In the case of Hawaii, whose annexation he favored, Hoar argued like an imperialist when he claimed that asking for the inhabitants' consent was "as reasonable" as taking "the vote of the children in an orphan asylum or an idiot school." Storey resorted to racial stereotyping even less than Hoar. In the first anti-imperialist meeting in June 1898, Storey criticized the racism implicit in imperialist judgments on the capabilities of Filipinos, Hawaiians, or Puerto Ricans. He was not ashamed to admit the wrongs America had committed against Native and African Americans in the past. At the end of his speech, however, he could not resist a rhetorical question, which made him sound like a Southern racist: "If we admit them as States with their senators and representatives, how long shall we bear our own Congress demoralized by these additions?"[47]

If even such "anti-racists" were not above using racist rhetoric, there must be substantial reasons for risking logical inconsistency. Two elements in anti-imperialist rhetoric provide a fuller explanation: a "cultural relativism" that privileged concern for American ideals over the other's destiny, and the *tactical* nature of racist arguments.

In terms of cultural relativism, we have seen in the last chapter that some of the most "democratically" minded anti-imperialists like Jane Addams or Edwin Burritt Smith believed that any race or people should freely choose its own system of government because only that would adequately reflect its customs and culture. While this axiomatic belief did not necessarily contain a value judgment, Bryan demonstrated that "cultural relativism" could do just that and provide the bridge from democratic universalism to anti-imperialist racism: "The Filipinos are not far enough advanced to share in the government of the people of the United States, but they are competent to govern themselves." Sumner put it even more bluntly: he criticized imperialism because it contradicted the doctrine that all peoples were capable of self-government. "But then," he continued, "if it is not right for us to hold these islands as dependencies, you may ask me whether I think that we ought to take them into our Union, at least some of them, and let them help to govern us. Certainly not. If *that* question is raised, then the question whether they are, in our judgment, fit for self-government or not is in order."[48] In terms of *theory,* all races and peoples were entitled to self-government, but in *actual practice,* most anti-imperialists doubted that Filipinos, Cubans, Hawaiians, or Puerto Ricans could ever rise to the level of *American* government.

What really mattered to anti-imperialists was that American doctrines were kept unspoiled. They were equally threatened by a denial of constitutional provisions or by the incorporation of "lesser material" into the body politic. Arkansas Congressman Hugh Dinsmore's response to imperialist predictions of anarchy in the Philippines encapsulated this ethnocentrism: "We are told that if we leave them to themselves the Filipinos will murder each other, will cut each other's throats. Mr. Chairman, I would regret to see that, but I would far rather see it than to have our people cut their throats."[49] This combination of a preoccupation with the purity of *American* ideals and institutions with indifference toward the Philippines provides the best explanation for the simultaneous use of exclusionary racism and democratic "universalism."

A survey of changes in anti-imperialist rhetoric over time suggests that tactical considerations determined the uses of racism. This finding modifies Eric Love's hypothesis that anti-imperialist racism was a matter of conviction. Since Love's analysis ends with the treaty debate of 1899, he may have missed the fact that this was a turning point for some anti-imperialists.[50]

Evidence for this assumption is particularly prevalent in Schurz's correspondence and speeches. Although Schurz used the link between racist and constitutional arguments extensively, he refrained from overt racism roughly

after February 1899, when the peace treaty was passed and hostilities in the Philippines broke out. After that time, Schurz relied on praise for the Filipinos and on comparisons of their cause with that of American revolutionaries. This change, which can be observed in other *Northern* anti-imperialists as well, suggests that racism may have been a *tactical* weapon, employed when it was unclear how the constitutional relationship between the Philippines and the United States would look. There is evidence in Schurz's papers that buttresses this hypothesis. When discussing the strategy for an anti-imperialist movement with Schurz in October 1898, Charles F. Adams, Jr., great-grandson of the second U.S. president, wrote: "[T]ruly, in my judgment, we need to invoke and excite the powerful agencies of race prejudice, (the anti-Chinese and Asiatic feeling), the labor organizations . . . and protected industries (beet sugar and tobacco). They can be aroused and they count." Schurz communicated similar thoughts to Erving Winslow, secretary of the NEAIL. Without explicitly referring to the issue of race, he predicted that "if well worked up the movement will have powerful support in the industrial centres [*sic*] among the laboring people, in the beet-sugar and tobacco producing regions, and *all over the South.*"[51] Citing labor and the South indicates that Schurz had taken Adams's advice on "race prejudice" to heart. Apparently, anti-imperialists realized what historians like Eric T. Love or Stuart Creighton Miller pointed out later, that racism was "the most effective anti-imperialist tactic" because most white Americans shared the vocabulary and underlying beliefs at the time.[52] This is not to say that all Northern anti-imperialists secretly believed in the equality of all races. More likely, they felt a "benign neglect" like Sumner and thought that white Americans did not have to worry about other races as long as they avoided "excessive" contact. Realizing that their racism was in part tactically motivated, however, accommodates some of the contradictions in anti-imperialist thought and particularly the occasional stereotyping by otherwise decided "anti-racists," such as Hoar or Storey.

The shift away from racism in *Northern* anti-imperialist contributions—racism remained strong among Southern anti-imperialists—was never openly acknowledged or explained. It may have been motivated by a desire for achieving argumentative consistency instead of simultaneously denigrating and celebrating the Filipinos. More important, however, were probably imperialist tactics—particularly in convincing Americans that no one considered future admission of the Philippines as states or of Filipinos as citizens. This achievement undermined "Schurz's Law," the very basis of anti-imperialist racism.

A discussion in *Century Magazine* demonstrated that imperialists had recognized the dangerous combination of constitutional and racist concerns

early on. Commenting on two articles by Whitelaw Reid and Carl Schurz, the magazine's editor concluded that although both writers were far apart on Philippine policies, both agreed that statehood for the islands was dangerous. The imperialist Reid acknowledged that Americans' biggest fear stemmed from the speculation that the Philippines might acquire statehood, which "would . . . be humanitarianism run mad, a degeneration and degradation of the homogenous continental Republic of our pride too preposterous for the contemplation of serious and intelligent men."[53] With his emphasis on degradation and homogeneity, Reid sounded like an anti-imperialist, only that he believed a *colonial* arrangement would be constitutional. For all their claims of benevolence, most imperialists felt like the opposition. Privately, Beveridge admitted that "Porto [*sic*] Rican, Filipino and Hawaiian Senators are not a refreshing prospect." It was this "prospect," in fact, that kept some potential imperialists out of the camp as long as McKinley had not committed himself to a *colonial* policy. In the second half of 1898, for example, William R. Day, former secretary of state and head of the Paris peace commission, and Jacob Gould Schurman, head of the First Philippine Commission, still advised the president against annexation because they feared that the "ignorant and . . . degraded people" in the Philippines could never be assimilated.[54]

Therefore, the imperialists' main task consisted in breaking the nexus between annexation and future statehood. In the debate on the peace treaty, Senator Nelson acknowledged popular fears, but reassured his audience that Congress could legislate against statehood and immigration. Senator Lodge promised correspondents that he was "entirely opposed to ever incorporating those islands with our body politic, or making their people part of our citizenship." A Southern Democrat, Senator Samuel D. McEnery (LA), devised a joint resolution, subsequently passed by Congress, that addressed concerns about individual and collective Filipino entry into the Union. The resolution affirmed that "it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States." In 1904, the Supreme Court declared the substance of this resolution constitutional, thereby stipulating an awkward status between citizen and foreign national for Puerto Ricans and Filipinos.[55]

Before the Supreme Court decided on the larger question of the constitutionality of colonial rule, the imperialists acted to underline that Congress could legislate for the new territories as it saw fit. They took the most important step far away from the Philippines, in Puerto Rico. To much popular acclaim, President McKinley had promised in December 1899 that no duties would be levied on trade between the island and the United States—a move designed to symbolize the benevolence of American motives. Since the

anti-imperialists had always insisted, however, that free trade was mandated because the Constitution automatically extended to the new territories, the administration reversed course and implemented a token tariff. This decision caused a political uproar because many considered it a betrayal of McKinley's promise, but it was passed by Congress. The president himself privately justified this reversal on constitutional grounds because there was "much to be said in favor of the assertion of the power of Congress under the constitution to levy duties upon the products of the new acquisitions." In letters to troubled political friends, Senator Lodge explicitly connected the decision to racial concerns about the Philippines:

> The real bottom of the movement, however, is in the objections made on Constitutional grounds. The enemies of the Philippines wanted to establish a Congressional precedent that we are bound to have free trade with our new possessions and make them part of the United States. They would have turned round on the stump and demanded that we abandon the Philippines . . . for nobody will consent to bringing the cheap labor of the Philippines in direct competition with our own, or make the numerous people of those islands . . . a part of our body politic.[56]

The *Puerto Rican* tariff bill was thus designed to assuage racially motivated fears of automatic statehood or citizenship for the *Philippines.* In 1901, finally, the Supreme Court ruled in the so-called Insular Cases that the Constitution did not follow the flag and that the United States could acquire colonies and govern them as subject territories.[57] Allowing for the acquisition and dependent rule of colonies, the Supreme Court not only countered the anti-imperialist contention that colonial rule was unconstitutional, but also allayed fears of "amalgamation" and immigration. Although this decision was not made until 1901, earlier imperialist promises, the Senate's ratification of annexation in February 1899, and the establishment of "constitutional precedent" in Puerto Rico may have convinced Northern anti-imperialists that it was better to abandon racist scare tactics in favor of a more consistent discourse on universal rights. Even though this assumption is impossible to prove beyond a doubt, the fact that Northern anti-imperialists dropped racist arguments after February 1899 suggests that tactics rather than conviction dominated their use of racist rhetoric.

Environmental Racism

As long as the anti-imperialists relied on racism, however, they also identified a particular cause of racial difference. While they agreed with their antagonists on the "natural foundation" of racial characteristics and on "civilization" as a

yardstick and a "white" prerogative, the anti-imperialists emphasized an *environmental* reason for why their opponents' civilizing mission was doomed to failure. Since the ancient Greeks, science and experience had supposedly demonstrated that "the tropics will . . . breed individual men who know how to govern others, but no great masses of men who know how to govern themselves." No amount of tutelage, Adams concluded, could surmount this unchanging restriction of climate and geography.[58] More than merely precluding a "civilizing mission," the anti-imperialists' environmental determinism also held that climate would prohibit the immigration of Americans (Anglo-Saxons) into the new territories. According to Andrew Carnegie, the example of the British in India proved that "our race cannot settle [in the tropics] and make permanent homes." The maverick businessman Edward Atkinson compiled medical studies from Great Britain and France to illustrate the extraordinary death and disease rate of the "white races" in the tropics. A disregard for the powerful influence of the environment would be physically fatal and lead to moral "degeneracy." "Morality of a high type," the *Springfield Republican* explained, "is a plant that grows with difficulty under hot, lazy skies . . . The natural difficulties imposed by climate upon the development of the highest type of manhood must at least be recognized."[59] The sturdy American and his healthy work ethic would wither under the "hot, lazy skies" of the tropics—a topos that informs Western travel and adventure literature to this day.

The claim that large-scale American immigration to the new territories would be impossible fit well with the populist contention that only the rich would profit from imperialism, by purchasing large plantations, for example. Workers and "ordinary" Americans, however, Senator Vest underlined, could not go to the tropics.[60] For labor, imperialism was a dangerous one-way street: cheap Asian labor would flood the American market, and free American labor was "environmentally prohibited" from benefiting from the colonial enterprise. This impossibility of extensive American immigration had more than economic consequences. As Schurz explained, it would also prevent the democratization of the archipelago *by immigration* because "it is the working-masses . . . that everywhere form the bulk of the population; and these are the true constituency of democratic government."[61]

These arguments about labor and migration echoed traditions in American political discourse, such as the pre-Civil War debate on continental expansion and Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis. Back then, the Republican Party had similarly argued that the extension of slavery into the West would close off those territories to free labor, scuttling the expansion and development of that crucial constituency of American democracy. This logic still resonated with anti-imperialists, many of whom had embraced free soil ideology in their youth. Similarly, the climate theory provided an

implicit answer to those who advocated overseas expansion as an appropriate substitute for the frontier, whose official closure in 1890 had stimulated Turner's seminal article on the significance of continental expansion for American democracy. The anti-imperialists claimed, though, that colonies in the tropics could not provide a safety valve for the migration of impoverished American labor and that they would, therefore, not perform one of the essential functions of Turner's frontier thesis.[62]

Most imperialists did not seem too worried about this environmental racism. Josiah Strong, for example, agreed that tropical climates would never allow manufacturing and that their inhabitants would remain inferior forever. He predicted, however, that the Northern races would move into the tropics in their competition for world markets and that they would use these regions as outlets for their surplus products. The sociologist Franklin H. Giddings conceded that "the white races can never colonize the strictly tropical portions of the world," but instead of rejecting an American role in the tropics, he concluded that the "tropical character" was the very reason why these regions had to be annexed by civilized countries. Only such annexation, Giddings asserted, would guarantee beneficent government to the populations and the development of their resources for the good of humankind. Other writers maintained that scientific progress enabled whites to settle in the tropics by lowering their mortality rate.[63]

As so often in this debate, cultural perceptions—like social Darwinism and racism—cut both ways. Belief in these ideas did not automatically determine what a person thought about overseas expansion. In anti-imperialist logic, the claim that the new territories could not be democratized because democracy's vital constituency, free labor, could never emigrate there fit well with the overarching charge that imperialism doomed America's democratic experiment. It also emphasized the difference between past continental and present overseas expansion, which imperialists denied.

Anglo-Saxonism

Negative heterostereotypes were supplemented by positive autostereotypes. The fin de siècle witnessed the height of Anglo-Saxonism, a concept designed to instill racial pride in the American (and English) people and to reinforce the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism. The roots of contemporary racism and Anglo-Saxonism reached back to the European Romantic tradition and, more pertinent to the United States, to the old Puritan concept of chosenness. The term Anglo-Saxon had increasingly been divorced from its historical origins as a name for those Germanic tribes that had populated parts of Great Britain. In the late nineteenth century, it could be used to describe Americans of English origin, Americans and English,

or Americans, English, and Germans, although some preferred the label "Teutonic" for the latter grouping.[64] It is probably no coincidence that Anglo-Saxonism gained ascendance when the ethnic makeup of the American population was becoming more diverse. The country's leadership, was predominantly "Anglo-Saxon," and men like Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and John Hay, the ambassador to London who became secretary of state in September 1898 expounded the virtues of Anglo-Saxonism and cited Great Britain's colonial empire as the model for the incipient American one. In political regard, Anglo-Saxonism facilitated a rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain despite disputes such as the Venezuelan boundary crisis, and some Americans even advocated a formal alliance between both Anglo-Saxon nations.[65]

The concept emphasized three traits: Protestant religion, love of freedom coupled with the ability to develop grassroots democracy, and "an adventurous spirit," which drove Anglo-Saxons to discover and populate distant regions. The idea was well suited to legitimize a "democratic" civilizing mission, not only because the latter was inherent in the "adventurous spirit," but also because Anglo-Saxonism underlined the *racial* basis of democratic government, which Americans and British had supposedly perfected through the centuries.[66] Anglo-Saxon heritage, the imperialists agreed with their president, "has fitted [the American people] for the great task of lifting up and assisting to better conditions and larger liberty those distant peoples." The American proficiency at self-government was a source of pride and a mandate. And since the British branch of Anglo-Saxonism had proved the race's "genius" for colonial administration, some imperialists claimed that the American talent for the task was a foregone conclusion.[67]

More than that, American Anglo-Saxons claimed that their "race" constituted a new and improved breed at the apex of Anglo-Saxon development, a description they adopted in particular when addressing audiences that were skeptical of or even hostile to closer association with Great Britain. Beveridge wrote to the president of an Irish American organization:

> Mixed races are the most vital, most resourceful, most enduring. The ruling peoples of the world have had composite origins . . . The American people . . . who, under God, are to be the sovereign people of the future—are compounded of the best and freshest blood of the young and unexhausted races of the world . . . Our blood may have originally been Irish, German, Swedish, Scotch or English, but now it is American—the most glorious blood of history.[68]

Emphasizing his own "mixed" heritage in a letter to a German American, Theodore Roosevelt was similarly fond of describing the Americans as a

new race with vastly assimilative powers—even if Southern and Eastern Europeans, not to even speak of African Americans, were conspicuously absent from the ingredients of this superior "melting pot." If the American "race mixture" was superior, so were its capacities: after having surveyed the historical efforts of the English, Dutch, and Germans at self-government, Beveridge concluded that "our race is the most self-governing, but also the most administrative of any race of history."[69] Administrative experience conveniently recommended Americans for governing others.

At the same time, imperialists liked to cite Anglo-Saxons' aggressive and adventurous qualities. Whereas the democratic traits appealed to the reason of audiences, these presumably biological traits roused their instincts, suggesting that a colonial future was not only logical but also irresistible. Conquest and struggle were described as the fundamental instincts of Anglo-Saxon blood, which had contributed more to the race's rise than the skills of self-government. Senator Edward O. Wolcott (CO) demanded "a realization of our virile strength . . . [and] that Anglo-Saxon restlessness which beats with the blood of the race into an activity which will not be quenched until we have finally planted our standard in that far-off archipelago." Given these traits, it was superfluous to debate expansion, for, as Beveridge insisted, "when you run up against the instinct of the American people for national power, expansion and wealth, you are running up against a great natural ocean current, resistance to which is perfect folly. Please remember that we are at bottom English, or to go still deeper, Teutonic."[70]

Anglo-Saxonism fused with the social Darwinist conception of the world's future as a ruthless competition of races and nations, as an apocalyptic battle between civilization and barbarism and even between "higher" and "lower" civilizations. As C. H. Davis wrote to Lodge, the Spanish-American War "has really arrayed the manifest destiny of the Anglo Saxon race, as the civilizing power of the world, against the forces that oppose and would repress it. On the continent, they fear us, on account of our overwhelming victories gained against a latin nation."[71] Most imperialists were confident that their "race" would win the contest and inaugurate an age of global progress, peace, and order. This confidence was buttressed by social Darwinism, which—in contrast to biological Darwinism—was teleological and moral in postulating the victory of the "best" nations and races. In a sermon at the Chicago Peace Jubilee in October 1898, Reverend Dr. Newell D. Hillis lectured his parish on the most important elements of Anglo-Saxon superiority and social Darwinist teleology, without forgetting the role of Protestant religion:

> From an intellectual and moral standpoint, it is the only race capable of digestive and assimilative power, of gathering into itself all the bloods, customs, and

> institutions of the world, and assimilating them into its fiber. Christianity, as held by English speaking races, is the only propagating and attacking religion. It is leading the world into a new social order whose destiny is the universal leadership of those who speak the English tongue.[72]

Other imperialists may have been less confident of victory or more interested in motivating their compatriots. Roosevelt admonished Americans not to succumb to "slothful ease" and to dedicate themselves to the "strenuous life," through which they would perfect their race's virile fighting qualities and "play the part of men" in the international arena, "for it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness."[73] If Americans followed his advice and picked up "the white man's burden" in the Philippines, Roosevelt was also certain that the future was theirs, because of their innate and actively honed racial superiority. This positive racism, social Darwinism, the discourse of civilization and that of duty and destiny were all analogous, creating a powerful determinist narrative that posited the American people at the apex of civilization, ready to regenerate the world (cf. Chapter 5).

Although this "positive" racism heightened the potential appeal of imperialism, the adherence to Anglo-Saxonism or social Darwinism was no safe indicator of the position a person might take on expansion. In fact, many anti-imperialists adhered to one or both thought constructs. Carnegie, for example, had long advocated close Anglo-Saxon cooperation, and he wrote to the president in mid-1898 that the reason why only Great Britain stood with the United States in its war with Spain could be found in the shared "racial element."[74] William Graham Sumner and David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University, were two of the most renowned social Darwinists of their age. Yet, Jordan interpreted that theory to have an entirely different significance for the question of imperialism. According to him, wars wasted the youngest and strongest members of a race, imperiling its evolution and perfection. Since imperialist rivalries might involve the United States in perpetual warfare, overseas expansion had to be avoided.[75] In sum, the realization that "[w]e have in our veins the best blood of the northern races, who now dominate the world," did not necessarily result in a mandate to regenerate the world. It could equally be interpreted as a mandate to avoid "excessive" contact with the "corrupting influences" of an "inferior" other.[76]

It was also possible to contrast Anglo-Saxonism and "Americanism," de-emphasizing the race's aggressive traits at the expense of the nation's democratic heritage. Alluding to the imperialist claims of triumphant Anglo-Saxonism, William Jennings Bryan compared both civilizations: "Anglo-Saxon civilization has carried its flag to every clime and defended it

with forts and garrisons. American civilization will imprint its flag upon the hearts of all who long for freedom." In his democratic and nonviolent mission, "the American" was "superior to any which has existed heretofore."[77] Many anti-imperialists were thus equally convinced that their "race" represented the crown of civilization, but they often omitted the aggressive traits emphasized by their opponents. Anglo-Saxonism was as much a part of contemporary discourse as racist heterostereotypes were. Neither stereotype, however, prescribed a specific foreign policy.[78]

Nevertheless, some anti-imperialists objected to the entire concept. In his praise of "American civilization," Bryan may have been pragmatic in reflecting the ethnic basis of the Democratic Party, traditionally aligned with immigrants who did not consider themselves Anglo-Saxon. More focused on debunking the concept because he was aware of its imperialist potential, Samuel Bowles relied on the latest "scientific" discoveries of anthropology and craniology to prove that Anglo-Saxons were not a "pure" race, but a mixture of all European peoples. Americans should acknowledge "that we are all of mongrel stock, that such thing as an 'Anglo-Saxon' is not to be found."[79] The country's ethnic minorities had most reason to rebel against Anglo-Saxonism because this "positive" racism excluded them from an American community. The anti-imperialist African American *Philadelphia Tribune* sarcastically praised the Anglo-Saxon's "ingenuity" to rationalize his aggressive conquests by appeals to idealistic concepts. Neither were African Americans content to congratulate only the Anglo-Saxon on the success in the war with Spain. Speaking at the Chicago Peace Jubilee, Reverend R. C. Ransom concluded that "[t]he peace which we celebrate was not truly an Anglo-Saxon victory . . . [but one] won by representatives of the various national types which compose the nation." He went on to explicitly include African Americans, Jews, and even "Indians," whose "Americanness" was never acknowledged in imperialist *or* anti-imperialist texts. In Ransom's mind, however, the Anglo-Saxon was but one group among many making up "the most cosmopolitan nation on the globe," and *all* had displayed "the virility, patriotism and courage of American manhood."[80]

What emerges from the discussion of Anglo-Saxonism, however, is an indication why imperialist racism may have been more attractive than the anti-imperialist version. As Alan Merriam has shown, both racist points of view appealed to the *emotions,* not the deliberation of audiences. But whereas "[t]he pro-expansionists clearly appealed to the *pride* of their Anglo-Saxon audiences . . . [t]he anti-expansionists . . . utilized *fear* as their primary emotional weapon."[81] As in Bryan's celebration of the American race, anti-imperialists also tried to enlist racial pride for their purposes and reveled in the democratic achievements of the "race," but fear of "contamination" by

other races dominated their racism. The imperialist invocation of pride in so-called innate racial qualities and in a glorious future may have been appealing per se, but it must have been all the more successful after the imperialists had allayed the public's fears about Philippine statehood and immigration.

Nevertheless, Anglo-Saxonism was a double-edged sword for imperialists. As Paul Kramer has pointed out, Anglo-Saxonism diluted "national exceptionalism" by replacing it with a transnational "racial exceptionalism," which "normalized" American history and identity. This had the potential of alienating audiences, particularly those that did not consider themselves part of the Anglo-Saxon family. Imperialists like Beveridge and Roosevelt sensed this when they spoke of a distinct *American* race. In pointing out that the practice of colonial rule in the Philippines also led to a decrease in citations of the British model because Americans grew annoyed at British criticism and began to feel that they were developing a superior type, Kramer has identified another reason for the demise of the Anglo-Saxon discourse and the restoration of national exceptionalism.[82]

Charges of Racism and Inconsistency

Given the pervasiveness of racism, it seems paradoxical that both camps also attacked each other for being racist and inconsistent. The reference point for consistency was the attitude ascribed to debaters in relation to domestic minorities, particularly African Americans. Republican imperialists portrayed *all* anti-imperialists as hypocritical Southern Democrats who were disenfranchising blacks at home while pleading for other races' right to self-government abroad. Southern anti-imperialists countered that Northern imperialist racism implied that the South had been right to enslave "inferior" African Americans. Northern anti-imperialists charged their opponents with betraying Civil War heritage and exacerbating domestic racial tensions. Consistency on this issue could be claimed by only a few, mostly anti-imperialist debaters who were committed to a nonracist discussion and by the rare breed of Southern imperialists. What emerged clearly, though, was that the racist tone of the debate affected the status of American racial minorities. They found themselves caught in the middle, torn between a desire to prove their patriotism and a racially and politically motivated sympathy for the Filipinos.

To accuse their opponents of racism, the imperialists availed themselves of the composition of their opponents' camp. Although the relevant literature on anti-imperialism has focused on mugwumps and dissident Republicans, the issue was also partisan, with most Democrats opposing and most Republicans favoring territorial expansion. Republicans therefore attempted to portray *all* anti-imperialists as racist Southern Democrats who were clinging to their

region's pre-Civil War doctrines. This strategy was particularly pronounced in the election campaign of 1900 and served the dual purpose of tarnishing the political enemy and the cause of anti-imperialism. Speaking at the Republican National Convention in 1900, Governor Roosevelt, his party's vice-presidential candidate, emphasized the importance of questioning "the sincerity of [anti-imperialism's] chief exponents," the Democrats:

> [T]he leading argument against our holding the Philippines is that based upon the "consent of the governed" theory. Nothing but indignation can be felt for such an argument in view of the fact that it is made by or on behalf of the very men who are at this moment either suppressing or willing to benefit by the suppression of the colored vote in certain Southern states. It is set forth with strident emphasis that "no man is so good as to be fit to govern another" so long as the first man is an American and the second a Tagal bandit; yet at the very time this argument is being made, those making it are amending or conniving the amendment of the constitution in certain States, so as to provide that the White man shall govern the Black.[83]

By equally faulting all those who "failed to denounce" the Southern Jim Crow practices, Roosevelt implicated Northern anti-imperialists who wanted to vote for Bryan. Accepting the Republican nomination, McKinley similarly castigated his opponents' "hypocrisy . . . to extend the constitutional guarantees to the people of the Philippines, while their nullification is openly advocated at home." If "imperialism" meant denying constitutional guarantees to minorities, McKinley implied, then the Democrats were "imperialist" experts who could hardly be trusted with liberating the Filipinos. As a true partisan in the election, Senator Hoar also questioned the veracity of Democratic anti-expansionism. Alluding to the foremost African American leader, Hoar rhetorically asked: "Shall we . . . strangle Booker Washington with one hand, and wave the flag over the head of Aguinaldo with the other?"[84]

By brandishing their party's Civil War accomplishments, Republican imperialists emphasized how unthinkable it was that the party of Lincoln would engage in suppression in the new territories. On the contrary, the party that had done so much to break the bonds of slavery and to "uplift" African Americans could be entrusted with a similar task for the Filipinos—an argument in line with the claims to liberation that have been examined in the previous chapter. Suggesting that consistency was on the side of the Republicans, a campaign advertisement listed the names of blacks appointed to office under McKinley and his call for black volunteers in the late war, concluding that "the colored voter [and] the anti-imperialist . . . may well be asked whether or not the rights of the American negro at home and the destinies of the inhabitants of those islands . . . are not safer with the Republican

party . . . than with the Democracy."[85] Such material served the dual purpose of enlisting blacks' political support and of rejecting charges of "imperialism." In the same vein, the president liked to refer to the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos as "the emancipated." This rhetorical strategy culminated in his acceptance speech: "The Republican party was dedicated to freedom forty-four years ago . . . It broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free, and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of imperialism."[86]

Southern anti-imperialists countered with their own sectional narrative, derived from the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the South's "expertise." Senator Tillman claimed that only Southerners "know whereof we speak. We are in contact with the race question at close quarters and have been and will have to continue to be. You know not what you do."[87] Since Southerners had long contended that other races were incapable of self-government and since they were practicing this belief by disenfranchising Southern blacks, they felt that they were being consistent in rejecting contact with the newly acquired peoples. Similar to Republicans, Southern Democrats identified one group—Northern Republicans—as imperialists and charged *it* with inconsistency because it disenfranchised the "new subjects" after having "forced" black equality on the South. They portrayed themselves as victims of Republican Reconstruction, which subjected the South to the tyranny of black legislators. The racism inherent in imperialism proved, however, Southern Democrats continued, that Republicans had been motivated not by a sincere desire to enfranchise all men irrespective of color, but by the sinister idea to curtail the political power of Southern whites. Imperialism confirmed a suspicion of Northern carpet-bagging that Southerners had always subscribed to.[88]

With respect to overseas expansion, Southern anti-imperialists emphasized the irony that their opponents were now implicitly endorsing Southern views of race and history. Either they sarcastically commented that "[w]e could have ruled the [Philippines] measurably well before reconstruction" or they triumphantly proclaimed that current Republican doctrines on race "vindicated the South."[89] Southern anti-imperialism thus acquired a dual purpose in preventing expansion and in sanctioning Jim Crow practices. Said Senator Tillman in an exchange with the Republican Knute Nelson: "I want to call the Senator's attention to the fact . . . that he and others who are now contending for a different policy in Hawaii and the Philippines gave the slaves of the South not only self-government, but they forced on the white men of the South, at the point of the bayonet, the rule and domination of those ex-slaves . . . Do you acknowledge that you were wrong in 1868?"[90] Senator Nelson had difficulty contesting that imperialism justified Jim Crow.

Nevertheless, Southerners were not successful in resolving their own contradiction of criticizing imperialism as undemocratic *and* as a sanction for Jim Crow. Senator Tillman made the only serious attempt in a pre-election issue of the *North American Review*. Contrary to imperialism, he explained, the consent of the governed was not disregarded in the disenfranchisement of "ignorant Southern negroes," because even the ideal's erstwhile champion, Thomas Jefferson, had owned slaves. Tillman claimed that the South was treating "its" blacks better than the North, where racial hatred targeted "blacks indiscriminately," while in the South, "the mob hunts down the man who is guilty or supposed to be guilty, and innocent negroes are not molested."[91] Apart from reaffirming slaveholder ideology and justifying lynching, this argument did little to resolve the contradictions in Southern anti-imperialism. These debaters were only consistent in rejecting any contact with other races, but that discourse left little room for the doctrine of democratic rights.

Most consistent in their approach toward the twin problems of domestic and foreign racism were Southern imperialists, a rare breed in the debate. "By applying a southern model for disenfranchising and segregating nonwhite minorities," Senator John Tyler Morgan (AL) "hoped to establish malleable, republican governments in the island empire." In this reading, Jim Crow was elevated to a domestic *and* international principle in approaching other races. Similarly consistent was another minority: Northern imperialists who considered Reconstruction a mistake. Kentuckian civil service reformer, John R. Procter warned that Americans should not repeat the "criminal blunder made in the past, when we bestowed with unthinking liberality the highest privilege of Anglo-Saxon freedom upon an illiterate, alien race just emerging from bondage." Although this Northerner contended that education rather than race should be the yardstick for granting democratic privileges, he conceded that the South was justified in passing voting restrictions on Southern blacks.[92]

A distinct minority of Northern anti-imperialists was as unconcerned about logical consistency as its Southern counterpart. Andrew Carnegie cited Southern "expertise" on the race question as proof of the dangers of the imperialist project, even though he also stressed the universalism of democratic rights.[93] For the most part, however, Northern anti-imperialists cited an existing "race problem" that militated against expansionism without clarifying whether they detected its origins in black Americans' inherent inferiority or in white Americans' unwillingness to integrate them. The first anti-imperialist meeting at Faneuil Hall in Boston resolved that only "when we have shown that we can protect the rights of men within our own borders like the colored race at the south and the Indians in the west . . . it will be time to

consider whether we can wisely invite distant populations of alien race and language and of traditions unlike our own to become our subjects . . . or our fellow citizens." In its vagueness, this statement was a proposition on which racist and nonracist anti-imperialists could agree because it integrated the racist assertion that "unassimilable races" should not be annexed with the antiracist charge that Americans could not protect their own nonwhite citizens. Schurz was more derogatory in locating the "problem" in the ethnic minorities themselves, warning that "we have now a race problem on our hands in the country . . . would it not be sinful folly to add to [it] tenfold by the incorporation in our body politic of millions of persons belonging partly to races far less good-natured, tractable and orderly as the negro is."[94]

Irrespective of where Northern anti-imperialists located the source of racism, they agreed that overseas expansion would exacerbate racial tensions at home. Comparisons of imperialism with Jim Crow were frequent, as were warnings that Northern Republicans (and imperialists) could no longer criticize the South. Even the Republican stalwart George F. Hoar, commenting on Southern attempts to assert white domination and Northern apathy, admitted that "[t]his is not to be marveled at when the party of justice and freedom is engaged in this unrighteous attempt to crush a people fighting for their freedom in the Eastern hemisphere."[95] Still, this realization did not make Hoar abandon his party over imperialism. As we shall see in Chapter 5, these anti-imperialists considered imperialism not only a violation of American ideals, but also of the mandate of a civil war that had been fought in the name of liberty and equality. While imperialists had pointed to the hypocritical alliance of Southern and Northern anti-imperialists, the latter countered that imperialists had adopted Southern race doctrines.

At the same time, Northern anti-imperialists ignored the implications of being linked to Southern Democrats. Samuel Bowles made one of the few attempts to "explain" the role of the South in the election of 1900 and in the question of imperialism. While he conceded that "the political situation is considerably awry, when the chief political support of the Declaration of Independence . . . must come from the South," he postulated that the South was ideologically predestined to support imperialism because the region's racist beliefs and practices were logically legitimized by Republican policies. By ignoring that racial fears attracted most Southerners to anti-imperialism, Bowles "externalized" racism and projected it onto Republican imperialists. This attenuated strategy of interpreting political reality climaxed in an open letter by three white Northern anti-imperialists to "the colored people of the United States." George S. Boutwell, Henry Lee Higginson, and William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., three men with abolitionist credentials, explained to African Americans why they should vote for the Democratic

ticket in 1900, thereby embracing a party that disenfranchised them in the South. The Republicans, the authors argued, had abandoned the legacy of emancipation in their quest for overseas empire, and it would be political folly if African Americans supported this party any longer. "The Southern Democrats," on the other hand,

> are at least doing the colored race this service; that they as a rule oppose the national policy of imperialism. This may seem an inconsistency, but it is really simple. The very fact of their unwillingness to give equal rights to the American Negro makes them unwilling to undertake the government of ten millions more belonging to the colored race. This much, at least, experience has taught them. Thus far, at any rate, they are on *your side*.[96]

The three authors claimed that imperialism exacerbated racism, which would end up hurting African Americans. Yet, to argue that Southern Democrats were "on your side" was intellectually dishonest.

With its questionable logic, this appeal confirms that most Northern anti-imperialists' concern was not combating racism at home and abroad, but keeping (white) American doctrines of liberty and equality unsullied. Just like slavery, imperialism was considered a matter of (white) conscience, rather than a matter of consequence for the objects of foreign and domestic policies. How else can one explain the callousness of counseling blacks to vote for the people bent on disenfranchising them? It is equally instructive that those anti-imperialists who opted for McKinley in 1900 did not do so because they were appalled by racial injustice in the South, but because they despised the Democrats' advocacy of a silver-based currency and their party machines in Northern cities.[97]

To be sure, there was a minority, particularly among anti-imperialists, genuinely interested in alleviating the plight of African Americans. These advocates worried that the racial ideologies underpinning imperialism would make it even easier to discriminate against and disenfranchise ethnic minorities at home. There was enough evidence for this suspicion in the rhetoric of imperalists *and* anti-imperialists as well as in contemporary domestic events. For the most part, however, and for *both* sides, charges of racism or hypocrisy served to discredit the other party and the adversaries on overseas expansion. That in itself is nevertheless remarkable in an era of intense racism and hierarchization.

The Response of African Americans

In one respect, Boutwell, Higginson, and Garrison were right: their appeal had inadvertently demonstrated that African Americans no longer had a

political home. Democrats pursued their disenfranchisement, while African Americans' traditional Republican allies advocated imperialism and racial hierarchization. Blacks shared the Filipinos' and Cubans' fate of being "rhetorically objectified," of being talked *about* without being integrated into the political discourse. As the mathematician and essayist Kelly Miller put it in a pre-election article, "[t]he Negro is placed in a pitiable plight. The historic policy of one of the great parties has always been hostile to his claims . . . The other great party seems anxious to forget its history . . . The Negro is thus placed politically between the devil and the deep sea."[98] The black community's response to imperialism mirrored this political predicament and was therefore more "parochial" than that of whites. African Americans remained torn between sympathy for the plight of the Filipinos and their desire to prove themselves as "good Americans."

African Americans did not hesitate to answer their nation's call to arms against Spain, in part because they were encouraged by the large proportion of blacks involved in the Cuban resistance. African American newspapers had not engaged in the prewar "bleaching" of the Cuban rebels. Some hoped that Cuba would become a "racial utopia," self-governed by a black majority and a possible destination for the emigration of Southern blacks. George L. Knox, editor of the Republican *Indianapolis Freeman,* found it encouraging that white Americans were willing to fight for black Cubans. J. M. Henderson even predicted that "[t]he same feelings that now lead America to reach out her arm to the oppressed of Cuba will one day lead her to rescue the Negroe of America from his oppression." More importantly, African Americans emphasized that their community should prove its patriotism through military service, a call that most heeded as much as white Americans did. There was a cautionary note in the African American response from the beginning, however, as even the most patriotic spokesmen warned that "[p]atriotism means a home to protect, that protects the individual in return." African Americans expected an improvement of their status in American society in exchange for wartime service.[99]

When the rewards did not materialize, hope turned to disillusion. Although the Republican Party later claimed that "President McKinley did not hesitate to call upon valiant colored men," he had actually been careful not to offend white Southern sensibilities. Black soldiers remained segregated and were greeted with open hostility in the South. The proportion of black volunteers deployed was significantly lower than that of whites, and black regiments were not allowed to serve under officers of their own race. Theodore Roosevelt, generally considered sympathetic to African Americans, demonstrated the logic of the new racist paradigm when he questioned the valor of African Americans because it obstructed narratives of white heroism and

superiority. Roosevelt vehemently denied reports that a black regiment had saved his Rough Riders at San Juan Hill. Instead, he claimed that black soldiers had been unable to fight without the guidance of white officers. By thus "subordinating African Americans within the national body . . . Roosevelt was simultaneously making place for newly colonized subjects in the disembodied American empire."[100] Imperialist exclusion and domestic segregation and disenfranchisement were mutually reinforcing, and African Americans were painfully aware of this connection.

Given their hopes for Cuba as a shining example of black self-government, many African Americans viewed the white reinterpretation of Cuban abilities as a cloak for conquest.[101] Since Cuba was not about to be annexed, however, the Philippines also became the focus of discussion within the African American community, a discussion that reflected "a dilemma that Negro Americans never completely resolved throughout the Philippine Insurrection, a dilemma born of the conflict between their obligations as American citizens and their ideological and racial identity with the insurrectionists." Just like white Americans, African Americans perceived the racial dimensions of the conflict. Unlike their white compatriots, they felt sympathetic toward "our colored cousins," not only on account of skin color, but also because they felt that the treatment of the Filipinos paralleled that of their own community. African American troops in the Philippines noticed that white soldiers referred to the Filipinos as "niggers." To Rudyard Kipling's highly touted "White Man's Burden," the clergyman H. T. Johnson juxtaposed "The Black Man's Burden," which compared the treatment of the new "subjects" to that of minorities at home. What was at stake in all territories populated by "dark" races and under American control, whether in the Philippines or in the American South, was whether nonwhites would be allowed to govern themselves. W. H. Lewis, member of the Cambridge City Council, expressed the mutually reinforcing dynamic between foreign and domestic policies most drastically after a lynching in Georgia in April 1899: "What a spectacle America is exhibiting today. Columbia stands offering liberty to the Cubans with one hand, ramming liberty down the throat of the Filipinos with the other, but with both feet planted upon the neck of the negro."[102]

From these observations, a radical minority deduced a duty to abstain from military service in the Philippines. The emigration advocate Bishop H. M. Turner criticized African American volunteers for fighting the Filipinos because "these . . . are dark skinned themselves" and Clifford Plummer, head of the National Colored Protective League, even prophesied that black soldiers would actively support the Filipino struggle.[103]

Most argued against this train of thought. Black imperialists like George Jackson, American consul in France, warned that "the most important

mistake of the Afro-American anti-expansionist is expressed in the declaration that the Philippinos [*sic*] are of our color." Jackson counted the latter among an entirely separate "brown race" and insisted that American blacks had to support their mother country. This would enable them to benefit from the territorial and commercial advantages of expansion. The *Indianapolis Freeman* commented on the political explosiveness of the race question when its editor conceded that differences of opinion on the question of imperialism could exist, "but as a race issue—never!" Blacks had favored the war against white Spain and could not abandon their country now because it fought against nonwhites. By identifying with America's enemies on a racial basis, Knox feared, blacks would cement racial fault lines at home and forfeit future integration.[104]

To avoid the pitfalls of a racialized debate, most African American opponents of expansion based their dissent on American ideals of freedom and democracy, much like white anti-imperialists. The only difference was that, as the *Washington Bee* added, African Americans could understand the issue much better because they were still experiencing oppression. In the election campaign of 1900, the Negro National Democratic League passed a resolution that explicitly rejected racial reasoning, but drew the comparison between black and Filipino experiences:

> Whether the people who will be affected by such a policy . . . are black, is but of little moment. They are by nature entitled to liberty and freedom. We being an oppressed people, to use the words of Daniel O'Connell, should be "the loudest in our protestations against the oppression of others."[105]

The League approached the question through universal human rights, but not without stressing that Filipinos and American blacks shared the same *experiences,* if not the same racial origins.

Given these push and pull factors on African Americans, it is not surprising that the attitude of some spokespeople remained conflicted and even contradictory. Edward Cooper, editor of the *Colored American,* conceded that "our racial sympathies would naturally be with the Filipinos" and went on to describe the bravery of Aguinaldo's forces. In the same text, however, he proclaimed that there must be no doubt about African Americans' patriotism and that "the black soldier and the black citizen must vie with their Caucasian brethren in upholding the dignity and authority of our common country." Only nine months earlier, Cooper had advocated a protectorate over the Philippines, enlisting an argument more reminiscent of Southern anti-imperialists, when he praised American homogeneity as the precondition of democratic government and spoke of the Filipinos as "an indigestible and

unsympathetic population."[106] Extreme caution characterized the approach of Booker T. Washington, who once had seemed similarly torn, but who also wanted to preserve his ties to the political establishment. Initially, he suggested that the Filipinos should be left to work out their own self-government. Later on, however, he also sided with the McKinley administration.[107]

The needs of their community were the crucial referent for African American protest *and* conditional support. Throughout the debate, they remained weary of the promises for minorities abroad, when the administration was not even able or willing to defend American citizens at home. In a letter to McKinley, a group of black citizens from Boston contrasted the administration's conciliatory policy toward the white South with silence on racial violence in that region. They also juxtaposed the claims of liberation of foreign peoples with the treatment of blacks:

> Shall it be said that the federal government . . . reaching to the utmost limits of the habitable globe for protection of others, is powerless to guarantee to certain of its citizens at home their inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness because those citizens happen to be negroes residing in the Southern section of our country? Do the colored people of the United States deserve equal consideration with the Cuban people at the hands of your administration?[108]

Imperialist promises became a vehicle for African Americans to dramatize their own plight in white society. In a slightly altered and "imperialized" version, even the faithfully Republican (and imperialist) *Indianapolis Freeman* warned that America should establish racial equality at home in order to make its claims to racial uplift more convincing abroad.[109] Whether of imperialist or anti-imperialist persuasion, African Americans understood very well that the ways in which white Americans thought about Filipinos, Cubans, or Puerto Ricans deeply affected their own situation in the United States.

Although, as Willard Gatewood has concluded, "[a]nti-imperialism became the prevailing *sentiment* within the black community," and although some African Americans did switch their allegiance to the Democrats in 1900, the majority continued to support the Republicans. Indicative of their primary concerns, editors like Edward Cooper and Calvin Chase ceased opposition to imperialism when black volunteers were sent to the Philippines and when McKinley conceded that some regiments would be commanded by black officers. Even then, they frequently averred that these soldiers probably did not sympathize with the cause of the war.[110] Unlike white Northern anti-imperialists, they could not ignore or rationalize the Democrats' overt racism in the South. In the campaign itself, many editors simply ignored the issue of imperialism or openly attacked Bryan as a hypocrite.[111] Nevertheless,

the African American community retained its skepticism toward imperialism and its support remained motivated by potential rewards for patriotic service, rewards that were only likely under a Republican administration.

* * *

If the African American reaction to imperialism seems parochial, it should be recalled that most white anti-imperialists were also motivated by the blot imperialism would leave on *their* forefathers' democratic theories. While the latter talked about theories, African Americans were the first to experience that imperialism's racial underpinnings buttressed the legitimacy of Jim Crow and that African Americans were almost as affected by its doctrines as Filipinos or Cubans. More than that, in both (white) imperialist and anti-imperialist pronouncements, democracy had been turned from a universal theory into a racialized practice, dependent on a people's color or environment. Instead of being mutually exclusive, as in the wording of the Declaration of Independence, race and democracy had become complementary categories, with some men created *less* than equal. For the imperialists, this racial interpretation of democracy complemented the doubts they raised about the theory of universal rights (cf. Chapter 1). Even if such rights existed, they claimed, they could be overridden by the demands of "civilization," another nineteenth-century construct that facilitated discrimination.

If imperialists and anti-imperialists disagreed on the precise manifestation of their racism, it was due to the tactics and logical requirements of their overall arguments rather than to conviction. The imperialists' paternalism and Lamarckian gradualism fit well with the idealistic narrative of annexation and the promise of eventual self-government and independence. Anti-imperialists, on the other hand, stressed the immutability of racial characteristics and the risks of "contamination" in order to dismiss all schemes that involved American sovereignty over the new possessions. The ease with which most Northern anti-imperialists abandoned such arguments after February 1899, when imperialists had plausibly reassured the American public that the Philippines would never become part of the United States, buttresses the interpretation that tactics determined the uses of racism. Many of them apparently did not believe in racist explanations of global development, but they were not above employing a racism that they considered to be popular.

Although skepticism toward the ethnic other ran deep, there was hardly a debater who did not question the universalist credentials of the opposition at the same time. Racism was instrumentalized as a scare tactic and as a charge against the other side. This dual use did not enhance the consistency of the debaters' arguments, but it redirects the analyst's attention toward the

debaters' real concerns. Particularly many anti-imperialists were interested less in universalizing American democracy and more in preserving the universalist tenets handed down by their forefathers. Senator Tillman expressed these concerns with unequivocal brutality: "We are at a crisis in our own history, when we must turn our faces away from this temptation . . . or we must move forward remorselessly and relentlessly, doing our own country and our own people more harm than can result to those people [the Filipinos], *though we exterminate them from the face of the earth*."[112] While countless Filipinos were being killed as a result of U.S. foreign policy, possibly even "exterminated," these debaters suggested that their own country, its ideals and future, was suffering more.

Given such priorities, the "dual use" of racism acquired its own internal logic. In anti-imperialist eyes, both "excessive" contact with and suppression of other races would negate the old ideals. They did not care what type of democracy (if any) other races would practice in their domain, as long as they did not do it in the United States, and as long as the United States did not engage in oppression.

CHAPTER 3

Roads to Utopia: Exceptionalism, Mission, and Principles

> In the history of the nation's encounter with the world, the themes of withdrawal and reformation are deeply embedded . . . For Jefferson . . . the desire to change the world was at war with the desire not to be corrupted by the world.
>
> Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson (1990)

> The striking persistence of two visions of American mission deserves scrutiny, the dominant vision equating the cause of liberty with the active pursuit of national greatness in world affairs and the dissenting one a foreign policy of restraint as essential to perfecting liberty at home.
>
> Michael Hunt (1987)

> In the whole discussion [on imperialism] both sides . . . were on imaginative and sentimental ground. It . . . was but one Utopia against another.
>
> William James (1910)[1]

In the preceding chapters, we have seen how most debaters based their arguments on American traditions and experiences. Instead of universal principles, the tenets of *American* democracy—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and American institutions—were not only the objectives that all sides claimed to guided by abroad, but also the yardstick by which they measured "the other's" capabilities.[2] The American *national* creed was the bedrock for the discussion of *international* policies. The Philippines did not matter in their own right, but in the context of how U.S. policies there expressed or contradicted American ideals.

This gap between the universal and the particular, between concerns for the rest of the world and for the sanctity of American ideals, was bridged by the belief in American exceptionalism and by the concomitant conviction that the United States had a global mission. This belief was at the heart

of American nationalism, the idea that America had been singled out by history, destiny, God, or natural design as a nation unlike any other. The roots of this concept were religious, going back to the Puritans who had left Europe to found the "New Zion" in the New World. The act of emigration symbolized the desire of successive waves of migrants to leave the Old World behind and to start over, unencumbered by despotism and social strife. The Puritans had already laid the ground for fusing the religious and the political because both elements had been largely congruous in their society. The idea of America as a novel experiment preceded the founding of the nation, and this quality distinguished the American creed from other nations' exceptionalist myths.[3] Enlightenment thought and the American Revolution completed the secularization of exceptionalism by postulating that the democratic foundations of the United States were the distinguishing features of its uniqueness.

Affirmations of such beliefs were ubiquitous and shared in the imperialism debate. To Albert J. Beveridge, Americans were "God's chosen people," whereas the anti-imperialist Catholic Bishop of Peoria John L. Spalding was convinced that his countrymen were "the favored children of heaven."[4] From exceptionalism, both sides deduced two versions of an international American mission that shared the same objectives—spreading the gospel of democracy and inaugurating a global millennium of eternal peace. Yet, imperialists and anti-imperialists were far from agreeing on whether current policies reflected that mission. While imperialists insisted that "proselytizing," the active "teaching" of democracy, was sanctioned, if not required by the exceptionalist mandate, their opponents countered that imperialism undermined everything the United States stood for. And precisely because of the postulated significance of the American experiment to the world, anti-imperialists could reconcile their apparent disregard for the ethnic other with universalism: if imperialism destroyed American democracy, the last best hope of humankind would die with it. Therefore, anti-imperialists advocated perfecting the democratic order at home so that it would serve as an example that others abroad would freely emulate. This disagreement on the means of global democratization will be the focus of the first part of this chapter.

The anti-imperialist advocacy of an example function abroad raises the question in how far it is appropriate to conceive of them as isolationists. The second part of this chapter will demonstrate that they considered isolation not only as a geographic, but also as an ideological advantage because it insulated the country from the corruption of the Old World. Since the consequences of isolationism and appeasement in the 1930s, we are used to a pattern of debate in which the isolationists have to justify themselves. In the

1890s, however, this pattern was reversed: it was the imperialists who had to explain why they were abandoning a policy that was widely assumed to have been beneficial to the United States. Their defense of overseas "activism" laid the groundwork for an American globalism that came to dominate much of the nation's twentieth-century foreign policy. Many familiar tenets of "Wilsonianism" were forged in the debate on the Philippines.

Both camps' belief in exceptionalism and an international mission culminated in distinct utopias. Visions of (eternal) peace and the "end of history" dominated, but the debaters disagreed on how they were to be achieved. While the imperialists maintained that utopia required struggle and war, their opponents rejected the paradox of peace through war. Since the world's future hung in the balance on this question, the debaters greatly exaggerated their respective differences and suggested that their opponents' recommendations would not only delay the millennium, but instead lead to global destruction. Even in this negative proposition, Americans insisted that their actions had momentous import for the world.

Exceptionalism proved to be an all-encompassing discourse from which it was almost impossible to escape. As this chapter also illustrates, the concept was so extraordinarily durable because it accommodated both an activist and an "isolationist" foreign policy—thus allowing for domestic consensus *and* conflict at the same time. The discourse was similarly elastic in bridging the gap between the foreign and domestic realms.

Exemplar or Crusader?

Although historians no longer agree on this point, most contemporary observers were convinced that they witnessed a major departure in their country's foreign relations.[5] The imperialists had to justify the changes, and they did so by pointing to their nation's mission to the world, which had supposedly been fully revealed through the war against Spain. They identified the war as a watershed because it "awoke the nation to self-consciousness and to a consciousness of its mission in the world . . . [T]he republic is to stand for liberty and self-government everywhere within the zone of its influence." The war "has sacredly sealed [the covenant] with mankind" and thus saddled the United States with a responsibility for other peoples, which it had not sought, but from which it could not flinch. Americans did not have to fear the changes, because they symbolized the "great movement for uplifting the races of men, teaching them the truth of the common fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and showing that, if we are not our brothers' keepers, we can be our brothers' helpers."[6]

With their emphasis on revelation and sacred covenants, these statements indicate what role religion still played in the American mission. Religion and self-government were almost inseparable, both as contents of and legitimation for a mission abroad. A correspondent of Senator Hoar's perfectly fused both principles:

> God . . . has given us a mission to the Asiatic peoples, which it is His purpose we should fulfill . . . Selfish interests may dictate that we should retain these islands, but no matter whether they do or not, it must be remember [*sic*] that as the great Apostle of Liberty *this nation has ceased to exist for itself alone,* but lives as well for others in protecting them from oppression and carrying them to a free civilization.[7]

While this writer did not specify whether liberty ought to be spread with "fire and sword," he believed that America's mission had changed. No longer could the United States dwell in isolation because it was obliged, as Secretary of War Elihu Root explained, "to ever spread . . . through the world the blessings that we enjoy."[8] Imperialists claimed that these "blessings" were freedom and democratic government and that they had to be spread actively abroad. Not the annexation of the Philippines, but their abandonment would be a betrayal of America's tasks. The banker Franklin MacVeagh, toastmaster of the Chicago Peace Jubilee and future secretary of the treasury, explained that American ideals were too universal not to be globalized:

> Democracy . . . has seriously begun to rule humanity; and the illuminating truth is that democracy's ideals are not the ideals of isolation. *Its concern is mankind.* We are the greatest exponent of democracy, and we are appointed to live up to its ideals. And we must realize that a new democratic development is advancing which is characterized by broader demands of the democratic spirit—not demands for mere political institutions, important as they are, but for democratic civilization that shall reach all mankind, and for democratic human progress that shall include every corner of our earth.[9]

The American mission extended far beyond the specific place in which it was currently being implemented. Like the discourse of civilization, the semantics of this American mission were ideally suited to transcend the "petty details" of a morally questionable policy in the Philippines. In describing the new active mission as "inescapable," the imperialists reduced the element of choice on the question of imperialism—a rhetorical strategy that will be explored more closely in Chapter 5.

If the United States carried its light to the dark regions of the globe, turning the Philippines into "a colossal statue of liberty enlightening the world,"

the splendor of its own civilization would be enhanced in the eyes of that world. This was the framework in which the nation's aggressive war in the Philippines could be reformulated as a defense of its values, as a former officer in the islands pointed out:

> I was fighting to defend those principles which have made this Nation the premier Nation of the world in all that stand [*sic*] for liberality of conscience in action . . . [I]f from a small colony . . . we have grown to a mighty Nation whose influence is felt to the uttermost parts of the earth for everything that is good in civilization, art, science, letters and learning is Imperialism, then we are Imperialists.

Although the Filipinos had not asked to be subjected to the American mission, their resistance could not be tolerated since it obstructed the global progress of democracy. American exceptionalism thus provided the rationale for imperialism, which in turn reinforced exceptionalism. The nation's new mission was as much a test as it was a God-given right. Humankind, its very object, was also sitting in judgment, a notion that Archbishop of Saint Paul and Minneapolis John Ireland intoned in the form of a prayer: "America, the eyes of the world are upon thee. Thou livest for the world. The new era is shedding its light upon thee, and through thee upon the world. Thy greatness and thy power daze me; thy responsibilities to God and to humanity daze me—I would say affright me. America, thou failing, democracy and liberty fail throughout the world."[10] This prayer placed the United States at the center of the world, all eyes cast upon the democratic nation and its new "experiment" in the distant Pacific. The country was not only practicing democracy, but *alone* embodied its tenets. If the colonial endeavor failed, Ireland warned, democracy itself would be expunged from the globe.

As we have seen in the last chapter, American imperialists conceived of their nation as one of the (Western) civilizing powers on earth, but it was its democratic character that distinguished its mission apart from that of its competitors. In the election campaign of 1900, the Republican Charles Henry Grosvenor affirmed that the "government . . . has done more in the last two years to disseminate, among the fallen and the suffering, the blessings of liberty and democracy, than has been done by all the other countries of the world for a quarter of a century!" The charge of "imperialism" was therefore misplaced.[11] The United States was embarking on an exceptional civilizing mission. "Civilization" also marked the boundaries of America's global concern for democracy, for no one seriously intended to actively proselytize among the civilized but undemocratic nations of the globe (yet!). In the "barbarian" world, however, the United States had found its peculiar rationale to improve humankind.

Occasionally, anti-imperialists roundly rejected this sense of mission. Charles Francis Adams, Jr. mocked: "Our people have got into their heads . . . a curious idea that the United States is a kind of Messiah among nations, and that the Barbarian and the Heathen will be only too glad to sit at our feet, listen to the wisdom that falls from our lips, be the beneficiaries of our blessings, and accept at our hands Liberty and the Bible."[12] While such criticism satirized exceptionalism, most anti-imperialists embraced the concept, but criticized their opponents' activist strategies. "What a role our country was born with—what a silver spoon in its mouth, and how it has chucked it away," psychologist and philosopher William James lamented. The writer and social reformer Edwin Mead explained how imperialism violated America's "God-given" role:

> If [the American people] have not the courage and the greatness of heart to settle [the issue] rightly, they will stand condemned in history of making the republic a murderer—more than a murderer of men, a murderer of the cause of human liberty, the holy cause whose chief custodian and champion in the world God had appointed them to be.[13]

While he criticized imperialism as the antithesis of his nation's purpose, Mead concurred with his opponents that the United States was the anointed defender of liberty and democracy worldwide.

Instead of actively proselytizing, the anti-imperialists preferred the idea of providing a passive example. This conception was as old as the idea of America, deduced from John Winthrop's sermon about the "citty upon a hill," a "shining example" that other nations would choose to emulate if Americans perfected the democratic experiment. Such an alternative rendered global interventionism not only superfluous, but dangerous because aggressive interventions could undermine the ideals that the United States represented.

The first anti-imperialist meeting defined "the mission of the United States" as helping "the world by an example of successful self-government." The notion of America "as a model to the builders of republics" was ubiquitous in anti-imperialist statements. Like imperialists, their opponents believed that the United States could exercise a global civilizing influence that was superior to that of other powers but, with William Jennings Bryan, they attributed that superiority to their country's methods, using "the influence of example [to] excite in other races a desire for self-government and a determination to secure it . . . American civilization will imprint its flag upon the hearts of all who long for freedom." Bryan's statement about the American flag in Filipino *hearts* was juxtaposed to imperialist proclamations that the flag could never be withdrawn from Philippine *territory.*[14]

Exceptionalism and mission provided the linchpins of anti-imperialist ideology, just as they did for the imperialists. The critics' invocation of cherished American doctrines also implicitly answered the charge that criticism was "un-American" (cf. Chapter 7). By formulating their own sense of mission, anti-imperialists could claim that *imperialism* was un-American and contrary to the nation's purpose. The critics' idea of mission reconciled their ethnocentric particularism with their universalism, enabling Hoar to reject the charge that a preoccupation with America was selfish:

> [T]he first duty of the American people is to themselves. And when I say this I say it in no spirit of selfishness or of indifference to the welfare of mankind. On the contrary, I believe the highest service the American people can render to mankind and to liberty is to preserve unstained and unchanged the Republic as it came to us from the Fathers. It is by example and not by guns or bayonets that the great work of America for humanity is to be accomplished.

The stakes were as high as the imperialists claimed, only in a different way. If the United States committed itself to empire, Bishop Spalding asserted, its experiment of self-government would fail. But, "[i]f we fail, the world fails; if we succeed, we shall do more for the good of all men than if we conquered all the islands and continents."[15] All debaters thus agreed that their country had been created to advance democracy at home and abroad. The world was an extension of America and the destination of its mission. The only difference was that, by virtue of the example function, the critics reversed the order of priorities: while the imperialists believed that the American experiment had to prove itself in concrete application in the "uncivilized" parts of the world, their opponents asserted that only the perfection of that experiment at home would provide the basis for a mission abroad.

Geographical Chosenness? The Question of Isolation(ism)

The anti-imperialists' advocacy of the examplar role raises the question of whether they favored isolation(ism). Traditionally, isolationism had been justified by exceptionalism in the sense that only abstaining from world affairs, particularly from alliances with Old World powers, could prevent "contamination" by them. In a similar vein, the anti-imperialists characterized isolation as an ideological *and* strategic advantage. They argued that it embodied the nation's traditional attitude and the mandate of the Founding Fathers. To this effect, they quoted extensively from George Washington's Farewell Address and from Thomas Jefferson's first Inaugural, which contained the iconic statement about avoiding "entangling alliances."[16]

To Carl Schurz, a policy of isolation was more than a cherished tradition: "Not Washington's name alone gave his teachings their dignity and their weight. It was the practical results of his policy that secured to it, until now, the intelligent approbation of the American people." In a defensive conception of American power, E. L. Godkin explained: "The United States of America is, for all purposes of self-defence, the strongest Power in the world to-day—strong in resources, strong in intelligence, strong in distance from other Powers, and strongest of all in moral greatness."[17] *Defensive* power was all that America needed because offensive operations were unthinkable to those who considered themselves morally superior. Outlying territories would only expose the United States to attacks from jealous foes, thereby weakening the strategic advantage of its "splendid isolation" and embroiling the nation in the destructive power plays of European nations.

Even more importantly, geographical isolation was described as the basis of American exceptionalism, the nation's "third unique providential factor," exempting it from an entire host of Old World ills. Wrote William Graham Sumner:

> The people who have led us on to shut ourselves in, and who want us to break out, warn us against the terrors of "isolation." *Our ancestors all came here to isolate themselves from the social burdens and inherited errors of the old world*. . . What we are doing is that we are abandoning the blessed isolation to run after a share in the trouble.[18]

The idea that U.S. physical security depended on isolation was thus combined with the notion that its moral and social superiority required spatial distance as well, insulating America from Europe's internal problems.[19]

Whereas the Founding Fathers had advised against meddling in European affairs, the anti-imperialists added that overseas colonies would be contemporary points of friction—strategically weak points, which could invite the hostile attention of the other imperialist powers. Yet, the anti-imperialists' embrace of "isolation" was by no means absolute. These elite Americans knew how quickly their nation's "isolation" was passing as it became entangled in international and transnational networks. In fact, many anti-imperialists belonged to such networks, through business relationships and reform endeavors. Their isolationism was a "modernized" version, which Christopher Nichols has labeled "cosmopolitan isolationism" or "economic internationalism" because it took global interconnectedness into account and because it was not blind to the advantages of international trade.[20] The crucial point was avoiding "contaminating" contact, corrupting practices, such as "imperialism," and potential conflict with the other world powers. The

majority of the anti-imperialists also embraced the Monroe Doctrine and with it the notion that U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere had to be paramount. Anti-imperialist inconsistencies regarding Hawaii or Puerto Rico (cf. Chapter 1) illustrated that some were even willing to acquire territory that might invite other powers' envious attention. Considering the distance of Puerto Rico, Andrew Carnegie sounded like an imperialist: "That is no distant possession. That is on *our* continent and I approve of its acquisition. I am no little American. The day is coming when we shall own all these West Indian Islands. They will gravitate to us of their own accord. This is essential for their prosperity."[21] Hence, although "isolation" from the Old World was formulated as a question of ideological purity and moral superiority, some anti-imperialists believed that certain acquisitions would not undermine its moral *and* strategic advantages.

Such qualifications opened the anti-imperialists to counterattacks. Yet, since "isolation" still carried positive connotations in the 1890s, the burden of proof was on the imperialists for advocating a new foreign policy. Privately, those who had long advocated an activist foreign policy and who had been exasperated by their compatriots' "queer lack of the imperial instinct" were thrilled that the Spanish-American War offered the opportunity to break with old habits. Commented Senator Lodge: "This is a great time. The United States is going to leave her position of isolation and become a world power."[22] Publicly, however, most imperialists conceded that isolation had benefited the nation greatly. Washington's advice had been "admirable . . . for that age," Josiah Strong acknowledged, because "our business was confined to this continent." The imperialists considered "isolation" a *historical* necessity, however, once required by the nation's weakness, but not to be forever enshrined.[23]

Recent events had supposedly rendered isolation untenable: "Isolation was not a policy; it was a habit. We have passed out of it, some people think for evil, I think for good, but whether it be for evil or for good the United States, under the shock of this war, has emerged from the old period of isolation, and stands where she ought to stand, without a rival among the great Powers of the earth." Lodge welcomed the change but, as if to put the arguments to rest, he emphasized the absence of choice. "When Dewey sailed into the bay [of Manila]," George Peck, head of the Chicago bar, proclaimed, "he readjusted in an hour the policies and aims of a century. He changed the balance and equilibrium of nations, and served notice . . . that henceforth the United States must be counted. We have entered new fields, as advancing nations always do; we have assumed new duties, as living nations always must."[24] The imperialist treatment of isolation fit perfectly with the notion of destiny and with the "cult of the new," the conviction that America's first century had

been dominated by internal development and expansion and that the nation had been preparing to take up an international role. Redundant traditions had to be discarded in favor of new policies (cf. Chapter 5).

The imperialists added that the entire world had changed and that the United States could no longer afford the "dead waters of isolation." Before, John R. Procter explained, the country had been truly isolated because communication and travel had been slow and difficult. Technological advances and the international commerce, however, had contributed to a tighter network between nations and to faster communication. Americans had to take these new developments into account if they did not want to be left behind. In such a changed world environment, isolation was no longer defensive wisdom, but dangerous nostalgia:

> We cannot sit huddled within our own borders and . . . care nothing for what happens beyond. Such a policy would defeat even its own ends; for as the nations grow to have ever wider and wider interests and are brought into closer and closer contact, if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy, we must build up our power without our own borders. We must build the Isthmian canal, and we must grasp the points of vantage which will enable us to have our say in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the east and the west.[25]

This interpretation allowed imperialists to affirm that they too were interested in *defending* their country, but that the modern world environment required a wider conception of defense.

Senator Beveridge added that progress undermined the central premise of anti-imperialist isolationism and nostalgia, namely the notion that only "contiguous" expansion was legitimate. Technology was so far advanced, Beveridge maintained, that it turned the distant new territories into contiguous ones, making travel to them no lengthier than that across the North American continent. The possibility of steamship travel eliminated the argument that territories were too far removed to be governed from Washington.[26]

While technological progress undermined the practical arguments in favor of "isolationism," recent events had also destroyed the nation's "transcendental" distance to the world. Reverend Dr. John H. Barrows, University of Chicago professor and a propagandist of missionary work, proclaimed at the Chicago Peace Jubilee: "The echoes of the artillery in the harbor of Manila brought the great continent [of Asia] 7000 miles nearer to our shores." He branded isolation as "selfish" and instead called for a missionary policy abroad.[27] Both sides thus insisted that isolationism had a strategic as well as a moral dimension.

Total War and Eternal Peace: Rival Utopias

Beliefs in exceptionalism and mission have traditionally conditioned a peculiar understanding of history, a redemptive vision of progress, in which the United States' role was considered to be crucial. From the beginning, American and European observers, like the German philosopher Georg F. Hegel, were convinced that "America is . . . the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World's History shall reveal itself," America had the unique chance to "improve" history, to discard the baggage of the Old World and start over, benefiting not only itself, but the world at large and ultimately leading the world toward the millennium.[28]

The idea of eternal peace was such a centerpiece in this vision that Kurt Spillmann has referred to the American creed as an "ideology of peace." Like exceptionalism, this discourse had been originally derived from the religious roots of millennialism, the fulfillment of God's prophecies with the return of Christ. While this eschatological event had long been believed to be "outside of history," Puritanism and the secularization of exceptionalism changed "eternal peace" into an objective *within* human history, as the "end of history." Americans had long believed themselves to be the agents of utopia or, to speak with Hegel, of the "*Weltgeist*." The democratization of the world was an important contribution to world peace because democracies were supposedly less inclined to fight one another than monarchies or dictatorships.[29] By the same token, however, threats from bellicose nations threatened not only national interests or regional balances of power, but the entire edifice of world peace, progress, and redemption. This makes it easier to understand why America's enmities were rarely relative and more often "total." Potential apocalypse was the flipside of the global promise of exceptionalism (cf. Chapter 6).

When the debaters spoke of peace, they meant more than concrete peace in the Philippines. They were referring to *world* peace and progress toward utopia. By employing these larger concepts, even the imperialists managed to portray their war as a means to the larger metaphysical peace, arguing that the antagonism between "civilization and barbarism" had to be resolved before the world advanced toward eternal peace.

This discourse was already prevalent after the Spanish-American War in a number of "peace," rather than "victory," jubilees. Some commentators praised this difference, noting that the participating cities "celebrate the return of peace" instead of the triumph in war.[30] Parts of the festivities visually manifested the millennialist reading of history and the United States' role within it. The Washington Peace Jubilee climaxed in a parade of historical floats depicting crucial events, from the discovery of America to the recent

war and beyond. Allegorical depictions of war and victory preceded a float depicting the recent territorial acquisitions as children in need of tutelage. At the end came the " 'Peace' float," drawn by white horses with the goddess of peace as its centerpiece, surrounded by "a large horn of plenty" and symbols of industry and technological progress. The reporter summarized the significance of this "grand finale": "Thus peace and prosperity, coming after war and victory, was [*sic*] represented. The muse of history has heralded the coming of the pageant; the great events in America's history had been depicted, and peace has come as the end of all." The parade suggested that the United States' victory over Spain inaugurated the end of history. Preempting Woodrow Wilson's famous words, Methodist minister J. P. Brushingham echoed this feeling: "We have had a war to end war—maybe forever."[31]

The imperialists preserved the discourse of eternal peace during the Philippine-American War and despite the fact that America's global influence was still largely potential. Beveridge proclaimed: "We are trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace." His colleague Lodge maintained: "I believe with [Seward] in the mission of the American people . . . I believe it is a harbinger of peace and civilization to the nations which today do not dream of our influence." In praise of the president's recent policies, T. C. Crawford, who described himself as a world traveler, thought he detected the added weight of U.S. diplomacy abroad, predicting that "it is not unreasonable that through mere moral influence we shall in time hold the balance of war or peace throughout the world in our hands."[32] These imperialists simply assumed that their nation's mission was synonymous with the pursuit of peace, often without referencing the increasingly brutal war. Focusing on a larger utopia legitimized overlooking this "minor detail."

To be sure, the imperialists emphasized their desire for peace in the Philippines, but they insisted that the Filipinos were the only obstacle. Imperialists provided a "larger" explanation for Filipino obstinacy—the antagonism between civilization and barbarism. As indicated before, "barbarism" was synonymous with war, whereas "civilization" stood for peace. The historian John Fiske had propagated this fundamental antagonism in the 1880s. His lecture series and an article titled "Manifest Destiny" had been extremely popular with the general public and with the foreign policy establishment. Fiske was invited to the White House and courted by John Hay, who was to become McKinley's secretary of state. According to Fiske, the civilized nations were destined to replace barbarism, with Great Britain and the United States leading the way. Their predominance would inaugurate "a Sabbath of perpetual peace," an era in which civilized nations would submit their problems to "one central tribunal supported by the public opinion of the entire human

race." For this Anglo-Saxon utopia to be realized, however, "barbarism" had to vanish.[33]

While Fiske never said that the "barbarians" had to be forcibly pacified or even annihilated, his ideas (and those of other propagandists of "civilization") provided the framework for the argument that the Philippine war contributed to world peace because, as Roosevelt put it, "[e]very expansion of civilization makes for peace." In fact, as Paul Kramer has demonstrated, the "barbarians" themselves were aware of the pitfalls of the civilization discourse, agonizing about the shift to guerrilla warfare in late 1899 because they knew that it would be regarded as "barbaric." Given their relative military strength, however, they had little choice. Whereas many imperialists merely assumed that barbarism stood for war and civilization for peace, the Populist ex-Senator William A. Peffer took more pains to explain why American sovereignty in the Philippines advanced global peace:

> Nothing now would add greater momentum to the movement in that direction [of peace] than the building of a republic by Americans, after the American model, in the Philippine Archipelago, for it would tend to multiply trade marts among the nations, it would encourage the project *to merge war into peace,* it would raise the standard of international law and lift the world's politics to a higher level.[34]

As new American subjects, the Filipinos themselves would benefit from these developments after they were pacified, and the role of the American soldiers was "not to make war but to carry peace."[35] The Filipinos' failure to grasp American benevolence was ascribed to their barbarian state, and the best the United States could do was to pursue the war in as swift and total a manner as possible. Vacillation would only prolong the (necessary) suffering.

Hence, wars against barbarism were not really "wars" in the pejorative sense, but different strategies for pursuing peace. They were defensive by definition because barbarism was belligerent. Imperialists could still describe the United States as the most peaceful nation on earth while advocating ruthless war. It was possible to simultaneously praise international arbitration with European powers while declining to negotiate with Philippine "barbarians." James Angell, president of the University of Michigan, thus celebrated the "glories and rewards" that the United States would reap from the new territories, but equally warned that "[o]ur points of frictional contact with other nations are multiplied." Therefore, he advocated new initiatives in international arbitration vis-à-vis the "civilized" nations.[36] With the discourse of civilization, the imperialists returned to the tautological starting point of their argument that, as a civilized nation, the United States was peaceful by definition, unable to engage in wrongful wars.

In their confidence that an American victory in the Philippines advanced the peaceful utopia, the imperialists seemed supremely optimistic. Yet, the discourse of civilization had a darker undercurrent, a fear that all gains were threatened by civilization's enemies. Therefore, the imperialists emphasized that peace had to be an *armed* peace, and they advocated military preparedness. Mahan, Lodge, and Roosevelt had pleaded for an enlarged navy throughout the 1890s, and they used the war with Spain, the disorganization it had displayed in the volunteer army, and the war in the Philippines to emphasize the need for a larger *standing* army.[37] The preservation of peace required being prepared for war because only then would America's word be respected throughout the world. "[T]ogether with the love of peace has gone the ability to carry on war." This notion was underlying Roosevelt's "strenuous life" and the idea that connected the imperialist understanding of peace with the rejection of isolation. History taught that the ancient civilizations went down "solely because . . . [they] had lost the great fighting capabilities, and, in becoming overpeaceful, had lost the power of keeping peace with a strong hand." The fact

> that the barbarians recede or are conquered, with the attendant fact that peace follows their retrogression or conquest, is due solely to the power of the mighty civilized races which have not lost their fighting instinct and which by their expansion are gradually bringing peace to the red wastes where the barbarian peoples of the world hold sway.[38]

If war was peace, as some imperialists argued, peace by withdrawal or "appeasement" was unthinkable, particularly if applied to "barbarians." Beveridge thought that the Civil War had taught the lesson that "irreconcilable conflict," such as existed with "barbarians," could only be settled by "unconditional surrender." Imperialists described any other outcome as disservice to the "real" peace and denigrated their opponents as "peace-at-any-price men" or "idiot peace-at-any-price individuals"—just like those who had opposed the Civil War.[39]

The imperialist understanding of global peace was thus predicated on material and mental preparedness for war and on the paradox that a (small) war sometimes safeguarded the (larger) peace. Other designs for peace were deemed not only dishonorable, but self-defeating. Since America's enemies threatened its global mission, the antagonism was absolute, and only *total* war (aims) were appropriate to combat the challenge. Wars could only be settled by the total defeat of an enemy who, by definition, stood in the way of utopia. Already by 1900 and long before the struggle against "totalitarian" ideologies, the rhetoric of moral absolutes and imperatives was firmly established in U.S. foreign policy discourse.

Although the anti-imperialists rejected these views, they embraced the idea that the United States should function as the missionary of "eternal peace." As mentioned previously, many anti-imperialists had initially opposed the war against Spain, and they finally backed it only with regret, as Senator Hoar did: "I had hoped and expected that the mission of this country would be to be the *great Peacemaker* among nations, *both by example and by influence.*" Despite accepting the war, they never subscribed to the imperialist paradox. Edwin Mead, for example, distinguished clearly between peace and war:

> [The war] will be a well disserved [*sic*] if a belated justice, the extreme act of a people acting . . . in the interests of their brother men . . . I still think that the very highest wisdom . . . could lead us in a way which, fruitful to all these interests, would also glorify us as the great advancers of *"Eternal Peace."* But if we lack as a nation that very highest wisdom . . . then we may at least force history and judgment day with the solemn satisfaction that our people went into war not selfishly, but heroically, not for themselves, but for others, for justice and for freedom in the world.[40]

While Mead defended the vision of America as messenger of "eternal peace," he faulted his nation as well, as not yet far enough advanced to pursue peaceful mission with exclusively peaceful means. The anti-imperialists' ambivalence toward even righteous war can be explained by their conviction that war unleashed its own dynamics, that it engendered a spirit of jingoism that could transform the people. Too much war, large armaments, and constant crises could alter the people's character and subvert the potential for being "the great Peacemaker."

War might be necessary at times, even in the defense of ideals, the anti-imperialists conceded, but they did not recognize it as a progressive force for peace. Instead, they viewed the imperialists' combative discourse as a regression in humanity's development. Schurz criticized Roosevelt's speech on the "strenuous life" as proof of "the savage instincts which at present seem to animate some of the younger generation," whereas Edward Atkinson believed that such developments "merely constitute a few survivals of the brute element of man."[41] Even social Darwinist anti-imperialists commented on the waste and destruction in war. Although Sumner fundamentally agreed with imperialists that war had historically contributed to evolution because it "destroyed what was effete and opened the way for what was viable," he now warned of war's "frightful waste," which had "made the evolution of civilization so slow." Peace, the sociologist maintained, developed alongside war, but never as a logical result of it. "Peace groups"—families, tribes, states—grew larger, thereby also enlarging the area of peace. This analysis explained why the United States occupied such an exalted position as a force for peace

because its geographical isolation had permitted the nation's development as an extraordinarily large peace group. Sumner actually rejected the idea of "universal" peace altogether, but he left no doubt that war would only beget war. The other prominent social Darwinist anti-imperialist, David Starr Jordan, who vehemently attacked those "who justify war for war's sake," did not even believe that war contributed to evolution by eliminating the weak. To him, war was an unqualified evil: "To waste good blood is pure murder, if nothing is gained by it . . . War is killing, brutal, barbarous killing, and its direct effects are mostly evil." Waging a war for peace remained an anachronism. Worse than that, if the United States relinquished its commitment to peace, the cause of peace worldwide would be impaired, just as the cause of universal democracy would be obstructed by depriving the Filipinos of their natural rights. The imperialist paradox, Edwin Burritt Smith argued, represented nothing more than the tyrant's habit of cloaking aggressive impulses by appealing to a higher good, such as civilization and peace.[42]

The anti-imperialists also condemned military preparedness. Commented Sumner:

> If you prepare a big army and navy and are all ready for war, it will be easy to go to war . . . There is no state of readiness for war; the notion calls for never-ending sacrifices. It is a fallacy. It is evident that to pursue such a notion with any idea of realizing it would absorb all the resources and activities of the state; this great European states are now proving by experiment.[43]

The new annexations would not simply "enlarge" the area of peace. On the contrary, U.S. overseas territories would be more vulnerable to attack and draw the nation into a vortex of colonial wars. The renowned clergyman and author Henry van Dyke, therefore, warned that "the annexation of the Philippines means a new danger to the world's peace."[44]

The fact that van Dyke thought that *world* peace hung in the balance because of the events in the Philippines confirms the convictions of anti-imperialists about the significance of their country in the global drama. Their notions of how the United States should work for world peace remained unchanged by the war with Spain and the issue of imperialism. Hoar claimed that "the mission of the United States was moral, and not a mission of force; that our country stood among the nations of the world as the great peacemaker and the great peacekeeper."[45] This vision had idealist and "realist" implications. On the "realist" level, the anti-imperialists believed that America could function as the disinterested arbiter of world peace if it remained aloof from the troubles and selfishness of the other powers.

On the idealist level, anti-imperialists maintained that progress toward world peace and global utopia was to be achieved like that toward universal

democracy, by example. The United States had to *live* peace and demonstrate its advantages, such as progress in industry and commerce. For Jane Addams, peace was more than "merely absence of war." It was "a rising tide of moral feeling, which is slowly engulfing all pride of conquest and making war impossible." Its agents were the "working-men" who had to bear the brunt of fighting in war. In contrast to their respective national governments, they were developing a true internationalism, which would supersede war. Addams defined peace as a habit that needed to be cultivated, and, true to her settlement house roots, she also believed that it had a social and class-specific basis. Despite her internationalism, Addams also returned to the exceptional role of her country, now threatened by recent developments:

> Some of us were beginning to hope that we were getting away from the ideals set by the civil war, that we had made all the presidents we could from men who had distinguished themselves in that war, and were coming to seek another type of man. That we were ready to accept the peace ideal, to be proud of our title as a peace nation; to recognize that the man who cleans a city is greater than he who bombards it . . . Then came the Spanish war, with its gilt and lace and tinsel, and again the moral issues are confused with exhibitions of brutality.[46]

More than other anti-imperialists, Addams located the roots of a new martial spirit in the Spanish-American War. For her, it was war per se, not merely the undeclared one in the Philippines that unleashed the regressive, brutal instincts in human beings. Even Addams, however, invoked the hope that the United States had a special destiny as peacemaker among nations, guiding the world toward a brighter future. She and other anti-imperialists rejected the interventionist paradox that a millennialist peace could be reached by war. On the contrary, on the international level, the United States had to lead by demonstrating that peace was superior and, on a national level, that peace needed to be inculcated in a people.

* * *

When they were discussing *foreign* policy principles, imperialists and their opponents talked about their nation. Given their pervasive belief in American exceptionalism, this solipsism did not contradict an internationalist vision. All debaters were convinced that their nation's ideals had universal relevance because they would liberate and pacify the entire globe. In religious and secularized versions, they believed themselves to be God's agents of redemption. Within this missionary consensus, however, imperialists and anti-imperialists vigorously disagreed about the appropriate means for reaching utopia.

Forced to justify an apparent departure in foreign policy, the imperialists maintained that the Spanish-American War had revealed to the nation and to the world America's *raison d'être* and mission. By actively proselytizing the "barbarian" Filipinos, the United States would demonstrate its superiority and increase its global influence. Force would be necessary to fulfill the democratic mission, but its realization would advance the cause of eternal peace.

While the anti-imperialists rejected the paradox, they embraced the notion of a universal mission. They claimed the mantle of tradition, insisting that American ideals would conquer the world by their inherent force rather than by the force of arms. In their eyes, continued "isolation" was the best defense *and* the best way to perfect and spread American ideals. Some anti-imperialists were willing to compromise these principles, however, particularly when the Western Hemisphere was concerned. While advocating annexation of these territories might not strategically detract from a "Fortress America" conception, it raised doubts about the commitment to principle.

Despite such inconsistencies, the anti-imperialists' interpretation of American exceptionalism and its relevance for foreign affairs reconciled the altruistic claims for the other with the egoistic claims for the self. If American ideals were to be spread by the power of example, the United States had to be kept unsullied and perfect, for only such a "citty upon a hill" would shine so intensely that other nations would emulate its example. This was the reason why the critics maintained the primacy of domestic over foreign matters (cf. Chapter 6). In this context, not even isolation(ism) had to be described as a "selfish" policy. Nor was it merely a strategic choice. On the contrary, "isolation" and the other disagreements over the power of example or the nature of peace pointed to substantively different versions of the American creed in an international context.

CHAPTER 4

Democracy at Home: Democratic Sanction for Foreign Policy

> The American intellectual tradition has two profound commitments: to "ideals" and to "the people." It is the marriage of these two themes that has made the American mind and given it its characteristic cast—which might be called *transcendentalist populism.*
>
> Irving Kristol (1967)[1]

Further illustrating the intimate connection between foreign and domestic questions, imperialists and anti-imperialists also discussed whether overseas expansion was democratically sanctioned *at home.* Irving Kristol's above-cited dichotomy captures the two different poles between which the debaters' justifications oscillated. The imperialists invoked "the people"—public opinion and the majority principle—and their opponents emphasized "ideals"—the institutions and traditions of American democracy. These emphases reflect the distinction that theorists make between procedural and substantive democracy. Procedural democracy addresses the *ways* in which decisions are made, for example whether the people are sufficiently consulted in the decision-making process. Substantive theories, on the other hand, analyze the *outcome* and the institutions that form the basis of democratic government.[2]

These differences might not seem surprising. A ruling government, voted into office by a majority, can rely on this evidence to buttress its case (even if most democracy theorists reject majority backing as insufficient for sophisticated standards of modern procedural democracy).[3] An emerging (minority) opposition, on the other hand, is almost forced to take recourse to substantive democracy. The majority may be a protest movement's *target,* but it does not form its *basis.*

Despite this structural logic, the dichotomy had deeper roots in the debaters' repertoire and therefore reveals important features of the debate. The imperialists appealed to procedural democracy because they found their opponents' substantive arguments difficult to answer and because they wanted to underline the critics' minority position and "elitism." By contrast, the anti-imperialists relied on substantive democratic arrangements because they believed that imperialism undermined these and because many of them insisted that institutional arrangements were more important than "the people."

Procedural Democracy: Majority Rule and Minority Opposition

In American democracy, elected administrations and particularly the president as the only nationally elected leader point to their popular mandate to legitimize contested policies. Around 1900, when politicians could not yet rely on opinion polls, they referred primarily to national elections. In this vein, the imperialists pointed to "evidence" for popular support of Philippine policies. When they invoked "the people," they had "the common people" in mind and contrasted them to a critical elite, which was supposedly out of touch with the wishes of "ordinary" Americans. While writing that "the people want accession" of the Philippines, George Lyman, political associate of Senator Lodge, explicitly contrasted their desire with the stalling techniques of Boston's financial and social elites.[4]

President McKinley's speaking tour in the Midwest before the midterm elections of 1898, the Senate's passage of the peace treaty with Spain, and the presidential elections of 1900 were the events that imperialists cited as broad and mediated popular consent for their policies. McKinley asserted not only that most Americans supported his policy, but that it was the people who had forced his hand in the decision to demand the entire Philippine archipelago from Spain. This rhetorical strategy was particularly pronounced in the period leading up to the passage of the peace treaty and nowhere more so than in an October tour of the Midwest, which had been billed as a conscious effort to "sound out" the people's opinion on the Philippines. On this trip, the president emphasized that "it is the public sentiment of the country that governs the country" and that it would also be popular wisdom deciding the question of the Philippines. Observers interpreted the trip as proof of popular enthusiasm for annexation, and the president himself used this "evidence" when he wrote to ex-Secretary of State William R. Day, the only uncommitted peace commissioner in negotiations with Spain, that "[t]here is a very general feeling that the United States, whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it can not let go . . . [I]t is my

judgment that the well-considered opinion of the majority would be that duty requires we should take the archipelago." Although these were not yet the official instructions, the president indicated which way he was leaning. More significantly, he invoked majority opinion to legitimize his decision to the one undecided member of the peace commission.[5]

While some contemporaries—and scholars—have taken such invocations of popular will as evidence of McKinley's weak leadership, they are more appropriately read as the deliberate argumentative strategy of a shrewd politician who employed a groundswell of public opinion that *he* had helped orchestrate. About the Western tour, Postmaster General Charles Emory Smith remembered that McKinley "led public sentiment quite as much as public sentiment led him."[6] Senator Lodge's own dealings with the peace commission confirm the suspicion that imperialists deliberately enlisted public opinion as a factor that supposedly tied their hands. When he already favored retention of the Philippines in mid-August—and confided as much to Cushman K. Davis, a staunch imperialist commissioner—he invoked "the people" in a letter on the same day to Day. Feigning personal ambivalence, Lodge warned that "there is the strong reluctance on the part of our people to hand back those islands to Spain."[7] If a committed imperialist deliberately invoked "the people's" preferences, it is likely that the president proceeded in a similar fashion, using "majority opinion" to shape and defend policy choices.

The imperialists employed similar pressure tactics in the Senate debate on ratification of the peace treaty in January 1899. As previously noted, imperialists had already narrowed down the alternatives to either returning the "liberated" Philippines to Spain or to "accepting" them under American supervision. Passage of the treaty, they never tired of emphasizing, would not prejudice the future status of the archipelago and would not constitute a vote for a *colonial* policy. In his speech on the treaty, Senator Lodge combined the claim that the treaty "commits us to no policy" with the impassioned plea for respecting "the rule of the majority, because I believe that in the long run the majority is far more likely to be right than the minority." An irresponsible minority, the senator argued, could not be allowed to obstruct a treaty that most Americans wanted.[8]

Once the treaty had passed the Senate, imperialists "forgot" their claims about the vote's open-ended mandate and instead cited it as further proof of "the people's" desire for full annexation. At a speech in Boston, McKinley proclaimed that the "treaty has been ratified by the votes of more than two thirds of the Senate of the United States" and then, perhaps extrapolating from the number of the senators' constituents, he added, "and by the judgment of nine tenths of its people." Other imperialists were even more sanguine in asserting that ratification had democratically settled the question of whether the

United States could and should have a colonial policy. Surveying a year of public debate on the issue, the influential editor Whitelaw Reid concluded that "the people" had decided not only that it would have been foolish to abandon the new possessions, but also that the Constitution covered the possibility to govern subject territories—a contention that the anti-imperialists bitterly contested because they denied that "the people" possessed any such right to "constitutional exegesis."[9]

The ultimate test of the people's wishes, imperialists and anti-imperialists agreed, would be the presidential elections of 1900. In fact, the Democratic challenger, William Jennings Bryan, claimed to have worked for ratification of the peace treaty in 1899 because a popular referendum on "imperialism" would only be possible once the issue had been disentangled from the state of war with Spain.[10] The elections, however, produced a resounding Republican victory, in which McKinley even carried Nebraska, Bryan's home state. McKinley celebrated the results as "an emphatic declaration by the people of what they believe and would have maintained in government." He emphasized the people's determination that "the obligations of a righteous war and treaty of peace [remain] unrepudiated." While this was a diplomatic formulation of how the people had sanctioned expansion, Senator Beveridge attacked a colleague as undemocratic for questioning the will of the majority *and* the decision of the Supreme Court, which declared colonial rule constitutional in 1902: "I was not surprised that the Senator did not think that this case had been settled, because a man who will not accept without criticism the vote of the majority of the Supreme Court is not apt to accept without criticism the vote of the great majority of the American people . . . What is the principle upon which this Republic is founded? It is that the majority rules."[11]

Beveridge's attack indicates that the imperialists were making a more principled argument than merely claiming majority support. Successive procedural acts, such as elections, votes in Congress, and verdicts by the Supreme Court, had supposedly bestowed democratic legitimacy and thereby dispelled the charge that imperialism undermined democracy. Those who did not accept such a majority verdict were themselves undemocratic, guilty of elitism and of committing "a slander against the American people," as Republican Representative Charles Henry Grosvenor put it. Democracy resided in the hearts and minds of the people rather than in specific substantive arrangements. Questioning contemporary foreign policy therefore amounted to doubting the American people, as Senator Lodge affirmed at the Massachusetts Republican convention in 1898: "Among the doubts and hesitations, gentlemen, you will find that the underlying doubt is of the capacity of the American people." This charge was confirmed by the Chicago Republican Henry D. Estabrook, who "confessed" to the

underlying motivation of his former anti-imperialism in a letter to Beveridge: "My former judgment was all founded in fear and in jealousy of popular sovereignty. Your argument is founded in the serene confidence of the American people."[12]

Positively turned, Senator Lodge reiterated his "profoundest faith in the American people," to whom he dedicated a testimonial that sounded like a democratic version of the apostolic creed:

> I believe in the American people as they are to-day . . . I believe not merely in what they have done, but in what they are yet to do. To the American people and their Government I am ready to intrust [*sic*] my life, my liberty, my honor; and what is far dearer to me than anything personal to myself, the lives and the liberty of my children and my children's children. If I am ready thus to trust my children to the Government which the American people create and sustain, am I to shrink from intrusting to that same people the fate and fortune of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands? I have beheld with amazement the specters of wrongdoing which have been conjured up here and charged as possible to the American people.[13]

Prioritizing procedural over substantive democratic arrangements had other practical benefits. Instead of providing blueprints for how Congress ought to administer the new territories and whether these should conform to traditional institutional arrangements, imperialists could simply point to "the practical common sense of the American people," which "will continue to insist upon the settlement of the political problems of the nation upon considerations of wisdom and justice, as they are able to see them to-day, and not under the sway of delusive fallacies solemnly promulgated a century and a quarter ago." The "delusive fallacies" that the journalist Amos Fiske was referring to were key passages from the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution on the universality of human rights. By implying that any arrangement ratified by a majority of the American population would necessarily be just, this argument would give the imperialists a free hand in the future administration of the Philippines. Turning this thinking into a principle, Lodge explained why the spirit of the people was more reliable than the Constitution:

> Constitutions do not make people; people make constitutions. Our Constitution is great and admirable, because the men who made it were so and the people who ratified it and have lived under it were and are brave, intelligent, and lovers of liberty. There is a higher sanction and a surer protection to life and liberty, to the right of free speech and trial by jury, to justice and humanity, in the traditions, the beliefs, the habits of mind, and the character of the American people than any which can be afforded by any constitution,

> no matter how wisely drawn. If the American people were disposed to tyranny, injustice, and oppression, a constitution would offer but a temporary barrier to their ambitions.[14]

Although the imperialists denied that their policies violated the Constitution, their definition of democratic government countered the determinist anti-imperialist charge that American democracy would fail once one of its substantive arrangements had been breached abroad. That this was a more fundamental difference in the understanding of democratic government than only one conditioned by the exigencies of the imperialism debate is indicated by the fact that Senator Beveridge, for example, had already polemicized against "strict constructionism" of the Constitution *before* the Spanish-American War: "The Constitution exists for the people, not the people for the Constitution." In the imperialism debate itself, Beveridge added a racial component to his understanding of constitutional law, claiming that "you cannot interpret a constitution without understanding the race that wrote it."[15] Since the American "race" was an "expansive" one, its Constitution could not obstruct overseas expansion.

Some anti-imperialists were not ceding the majority to their opponents without a fight. In an age without opinion polls, they initially enlisted "majority opinion" in the same roundabout fashion as the imperialists. Despite the postwar triumphalism in the jubilee festivities in late 1898, the labor leader Samuel Gompers claimed that "the vigilance and the sober second thought of our people is [*sic*] beginning to assert itself" and that the people would reject the imperialist ventures.[16] Professional politicians were particularly keen on declaring their trust in the people's judgment. As previously mentioned, Bryan had justified his vote for the peace treaty with his confidence in the people. Although this strategy laid the groundwork for suspicions between Democrat and mugwump anti-imperialists, he continued to affirm his belief: "If I mistake not the sentiment of the American people they will spurn the bribe of imperialism, and, by resisting temptation, win such a victory as has not been won since the battle of Yorktown."[17]

While the midterm elections of 1898 and the passage of the peace treaty by the Senate seemed inconclusive barometers for the anti-imperialists, the Puerto Rican tariff debate in 1900 gave them hope for a sympathetic public hearing. As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision to reverse McKinley's original promise of free trade with the island outraged voters even though Congress devised a compromise solution, which guaranteed all proceeds of a reduced tariff to Puerto Rico. The president and individual Republicans were deluged by protest letters, and even Republican newspapers defected from their party's position. The reaction was most pronounced in Indiana,

where political associates warned the state's junior Senator Beveridge that the coming elections might be lost for the Republicans and that he himself could become "a ruined man." The people suspected "some sinister motive and mercenary greed . . . at the bottom of" the compromise as well as improper cooperation between politicians and the sugar and tobacco interests. The editor of a local paper was certain that the Puerto Rican tariff "will jeopardize the entire issue of expansion."[18]

Some anti-imperialists exploited this mood. The social reformer Herbert Welsh felt that "the Porto [*sic*] Rican blunder and crime of the President are working powerfully for us." Armed with this "evidence" of imperialism's devious designs, Bryan set out to change the Democratic *New York Journal*'s positive attitude toward expansion, but failed. A representative of the paper wrote to Bryan that "Americans are not the 'give up' type" and would not reverse the decision on the Philippines because of what had happened in Puerto Rico. Bryan's failure indicated that the tariff episode ended up being "a tempest in a tea-pot," as one of Beveridge's correspondents already put it at the height of the storm. The fact that the tariff debate had no lasting impact, even in an election year, might be explained with the observation that most anti-imperialists, despite Bryan's efforts, failed to capitalize on their opponents' predicament. Some of them may have been reluctant to criticize the president on Puerto Rico because they did not object to that island's annexation or because that might dilute the focus on the Philippines. Others were preoccupied with discussing a third party movement for the November elections. Irrespective of the reasons, it is surprising that the tariff debate barely figured in the anti-imperialists' publications and correspondence. Perhaps, this is indicative of their inability and, in some cases, unwillingness to organize a *mass* movement—an unwillingness that was rooted in some anti-imperialists' disdain for the masses and pride in their minority status.[19]

Senator Hoar noticed this minority pride—and failure to mobilize mass support—early on when he told Edward Atkinson that the statistics in his self-published pamphlets were instructive, but ill-designed to appeal to a mass audience. This, Hoar continued, was indicative of the mugwump anti-imperialists' dilemma: "The trouble with the way some of our worthy friends . . . are managing this fight is that . . . they do not seem as if they cared to succeed so much as to show their own wisdom and their great disrespect for other people."[20]

Although, as a staunch partisan, Hoar had always disdained mugwump anti-imperialists, the movement's evaluation of the presidential election illustrates that he had a point. Many anti-imperialists did take pride in being "right" and in the minority, even if some of these statements simply highlight

the frustrations of having lost. The NEAIL president George S. Boutwell's acknowledgment of political defeat was certainly the exception:

> We are to address the body of the American people . . . in the hope that in the next two or four years a change of opinion may be secured . . . In one particular we should accept the view of the President. To him any one of the millions of votes that he has received is a full and unqualified endorsement of his administration, including the war in the islands . . . Thus, and only thus, can we appreciate the magnitude of the work that is before us.[21]

Boutwell's intention was to reinvigorate the movement, but he did at least admit defeat.

Other anti-imperialists were less willing to accept the verdict and instead blamed "the people." To Senator Benjamin R. Tillman, the election results proved the "ignorance and venality of the masses," whereas Joseph Murphy from California wished "severe punishment" on the "laboring men [who] get so low as to wish the continuance of the shooting down of the poor Philippino [*sic*] in order to put a few more cents into their pockets."[22] Greed, "commercialism," and "petty personal pocket-book interests" were the factors to which particularly Democrat, but also mugwump, anti-imperialists attributed their defeat. The "masses"—incidentally the very constituency at least the Democrats had tried to court—had supposedly sold their belief in justice and democracy for a "hand-out" by the ruling classes and trusted the imperialists' promises of overseas economic boom and financial stability at home. To William Croffut, head of the capital's Anti-Imperialist League, the "worst of it all is that the American people have deliberately become partners in the great crimes we are committing and have brutally ordered that they be continued."[23]

At the same time, the election results did little to dampen the anti-imperialists' faith in their own righteousness. Majority opinion may have spoken, but it was wrong. A correspondent of William Jennings Bryan insisted: "That my predictions [of a rejection of imperialism] did not prove correct, I hold to be a reflection upon the people rather than upon myself, since they should have been true by every consideration of right and justice." Minority pride, the conviction that "it was better to stand for the right and be right and be with the minority than to stand with the majority who will eventually wipe out our institutions," outweighed any evaluation of flawed anti-imperialist strategies. The only such thoughts were still deflections, most prominently mugwump attacks on the Democrats for obscuring the issue of imperialism with the silver question, which had been anathema to the mugwumps' fiscal conservatism. They failed to ask themselves, however,

whether their insistence on righteousness and their distrust of "the people" did not keep them from gaining mass audiences in the first place.[24]

While post-election frustration might go some way toward explaining anti-imperialist impatience with "the people," evidence from before the elections indicates that elitism and minority pride were deeply ingrained, particularly among the mugwumps. The roots of their elitism were anchored in their political biographies, long before "imperialism" became an issue. By 1898, most mugwumps were quite old, so much so that Senator Lodge dismissed an anti-imperialist meeting in Boston as "very small, utterly ineffectual, and chiefly composed of elderly people." Throughout their political lives, most mugwumps had represented several minority causes, from abolitionism to civil service reform. They had left the Republican Party in the 1880 out of disgust with machine politics, without joining the Democrats, and they took pride in the "purity" of their politics. Geoffrey Blodgett has commented: "The Mugwumps cherished their minority privileges. They acknowledged obligations only to their public principles and to their personal integrity . . . They had no stomach for the compromises that responsibility to a majority demanded. Their function as they saw it was to stand in the teeth of the wind and wait for the possible to bend to their ideal." Richard Hofstadter has argued that their self-righteousness had been deepened by a sense of displacement in the Gilded Age. Accustomed to positions of leadership, they perceived ominous changes toward mass production, mass society, and a new leadership in business and politics. Already then, they had warned of American democracy's decline, which they felt was sealed by imperialism.[25]

While the continental European tradition of the general will raised doubts about the democratic nature of minority opposition, the American pluralist tradition, most famously formulated by James Madison in Federalist 51, sanctions minorities.[26] More than that, mugwump anti-imperialists were proud of being in the minority and considered themselves to be the "better elements" of American society. When Dwight Braman, a Boston banker, wrote to President McKinley that "the vast majority of conservative, thinking and educated people" opposed the annexation of the Philippines, he implied that it was the "*plebs*" that supported imperialism. The *Boston Evening Transcript,* initially against annexation, confirmed this characterization, commenting on the same meeting in Boston that Lodge had dismissed. Conceding that the meeting could not match the numbers achieved in election campaigns, the *Transcript* described "the large audience [as] a thoroughly representative one, holding to an eminent degree the *best of the intelligence and character of this community.* On all sides could be seen the well-known faces of leaders of good causes among us." The anti-imperialists were willing to give lonely testimony

to a just cause. While the imperialist Representative Galusha A. Grow (PA) derided them as "prophets of evil from the hilltops of a happy and prosperous Republic [who] are, Jeremiah-like, pouring out their lamentations over the extension of American free institutions," William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., deliberately fashioned himself into a latter-day Jeremiah, misunderstood in his own time, but subsequently proved right. This self-righteousness occasionally assumed the pathos of martyrdom, as when the journalist Oswald Garrison Villard suggested to Schurz that the anti-imperialists forge a third party:

> I am sure that you will never do a better deed . . . than to give us young men . . . the encouragement we need to set up a standard of morals and of true patriotism in this crisis. It is true enough that we may fail in making a great showing at the polls, but if we do fail, we shall fail honestly and it will be much to our credit to have made the attempt, and certainly failure is not a crime. The very fact that we shall have refused to knuckle under to the bosses and shall have made a fight for independence shall be much to our credit.[27]

Failure was to be preferred to the more sensible political strategy of forging an alliance with the Democrats. This proved impossible for many mugwumps because they despised the Democrats as unreliable anti-imperialists and disastrous on social and economic questions. Although they occasionally appealed to the "masses," as they did deliberately with arguments about race and labor competition, the mugwumps' independence and self-righteousness prevented political compromise. Being "right" and untainted by unpalatable political alliances was more important than being successful.

Self-righteousness was matched by disdain for the masses. The critics warned that imperialism could not only result in governmental tyranny, through standing armies and constant crises (cf. Chapter 6), but also turn the people into *active* destroyers of their own liberty. This was a psychological argument, postulating that "war fever," a by-product of imperialism, made the people belligerent. Carl Schurz and E. L. Godkin warned of "all the intoxication of triumph in war" and the "half-drunken condition into which war plunges about half the population." This fear was strongest among elitist mugwumps, and it predated the imperialism debate. While Democrats and Populists had whipped up jingoism before the Spanish-American War in order to embarrass the Republicans, mugwumps had criticized this practice as dangerous because it could lead to an uncontrollable popular demand for war, obstructing peaceful adjudication.[28] Even when they consented to the war against Spain, the enthusiastic popular response made them fear that "war fever" might result in calls for annexation. Initially, conservative

anti-imperialists pleaded, as ex-President Grover Cleveland did before a high school class, that the citizens not give in to the "temptations so dangerous as those which now whisper in our ears alluring words of conquest and expansion, and point out to us fields bright with the glory of war." After the war, Georgia Senator Augustus Bacon explained why war and jingoism were particularly detrimental to a democratic society:

> [N]ot simply because [war] involves death and bloodshed, but because it accustoms our people and familiarizes them with scenes of violence and of blood; because it accustoms them to the idea of military rule rather than the peaceful agencies of civil government; because it weakens our reverence for and obedience to the great constitutional limitations which have been set up as the guardians of personal and political liberty, because there is no war but what . . . works a revolution in the free institutions of the country; because it is generally depraving and demoralizing to public sentiment.[29]

Since overseas expansion would embroil the nation in international struggles, the critics maintained, wars and crises would ensue, militarizing and brutalizing the public sphere. This was deemed pernicious to democracy itself because it depended on reasoned judgment and consent. The people themselves would inaugurate the end of democratic government, either by consenting to the military government of a dictator or by abandoning their democratic mores.

The imperialists had a point when they claimed that anti-imperialism was founded on a deep mistrust of the people and their "instincts." To Godkin, Gustave Le Bon's book on mass psychology provided the perfect explanation for the "hysteria" that accompanied the Spanish-American War and that Godkin described as just one of the many "oddities of popular government." These anti-imperialists not only distrusted "the people," but positively *feared* them, assuming that they were not reflective and responsible individuals, but a shifty mass susceptible to impulse and irrationality. "Public sentiment," Schurz affirmed, "does sometimes run away with sober judgment." Such views had been conditioned by the experience of labor unrest in the Gilded Age. Mugwumps and other elite Americans had condemned the Haymarket riots, the great railroad and steel strikes, and the march of Coxey's army on Washington. Once mass passions were unleashed by expansion and war, the people would clamor for more wars and more territorial aggrandizement until they brought the country down. To the most pessimistic anti-imperialists, this specter of doom was not only a consequence of imperialism, but of democracy itself. Robert Beisner has evaluated Godkin's misgivings about popular sovereignty: "He had long believed that expansionism and jingoism

were growing in tandem with the growth of democracy. War itself was being democratized, with the masses laying their rude hands upon what had once been the affair of a small circle of gentleman statesmen."[30]

To these elitists, "democracy" smacked of mob rule, harking back to the Greeks who had used the term to describe the perversion of "isonomy," the ideal state of equality. Conservative anti-imperialists preferred to speak of a "republic," not of democracy, when they talked about the ideal American polity. Their ideas were close to classical republican theory, which postulates a carefully calibrated and constantly threatened equilibrium in government. Civic virtue, the devotion of each citizen to the ideals and practices of the polity, was a necessary precondition of republicanism, but it was in danger of being subverted by passion. Therefore, politicians had to avoid inciting popular passions with promises of victory and conquest. Said Carl Schurz: "War makes military heroes, but it makes civic cowards. No wonder that war has always proved so dangerous to the vitality of democracies, for a democracy needs above all things the *civic virtues,* which war so easily demoralizes, to keep it alive." What Bernard Bailyn has written about the Founding Fathers could also be applied to elitist anti-imperialists:

> [I]f "republic" conjured up for many the positive features of the Commonwealth era and marked the triumph of virtue and reason, "democracy"—a word that denoted the lowest order of society as well as the form of government in which the commons ruled—was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the early assumptions of power by a dictator.[31]

Given this view of the people's irrationality, it seems all the more cynical that people like Schurz and Adams consciously enlisted popular racist prejudice in their fight against imperialism. Was an intensification of white racism less anathema to them than the policy of "imperialism?"

Against the background of this mistrust of the people's "civic virtues," it is not surprising that these anti-imperialists preferred substantive over procedural democratic arrangements to keep the people in check. The imperialists' disrespect for the Constitution proved that "we have at last been willing to take off of democracy the only bridle it has ever borne with patiently." Schurz warned that the inculcation of civic virtues would be swept away by imperialism:

> Far more than any other kind of government does a democracy working through universal suffrage need the conservative influence of high principles and ideals of right and justice and of popular beliefs founded upon such principles and ideals; for when they disappear the evil passions of covetousness and of selfish ambition take their place and become the only motive power

> of action . . . And that is the direction in which the imperialistic policy is driving us.[32]

In its substantive form, democracy, or republicanism, thus ended up as an institutional arrangement that was not designed "for the people," possibly not even conceived "of the people," but rather *against* them, residing in the institutional arrangements and traditions that made up the American polity. These critics felt that the American way of government had to be protected from the people, not only from the encroachments from above. Their hopes for popular "sobriety" and for an eventual popular rejection of imperialism were not just a pretense, but when they felt that they had to choose between the people and the institutions, they chose the latter. Asked by a Massachusetts House representative not to oppose the peace treaty for reasons of party loyalty, Senator Hoar forcefully answered:

> [M]y course was taken without knowing who would stand by me . . . and I must pursue it; and it does not depend in the least upon majorities or minorities, but upon justice and righteousness . . . You ask me if the question is greater than the people . . . Perhaps you can answer it for yourself by first answering these questions: Whether righteousness be greater than the people. Whether truth be greater than the people. Whether justice be greater than the people. Whether freedom be greater than the people. It is certainly greater than any one party, or any one generation.[33]

For these anti-imperialists, democratic government primarily resided *outside* of popular sovereignty, in its institutions and traditions. Contrast this with the supreme confidence that Albert J. Beveridge pretended to have in the people: "Militarism! Imperialism! Young men of America, will you strike your colors to a fear, and that fear a fear of yourselves? Your future is in your own hands." Not only did the imperialists promise bounty in the islands, they also sought to make their compatriots proud of their achievements and confident in the future. Perhaps, then, it makes more sense to read the conservative anti-imperialist critique not as a battle for the hearts and minds of the electorate, but rather as a lament and warning for other members of their own "class," the elite.[34]

Jane Addams's dire predictions showed that there was a variant of this thinking that was not primarily predicated on the assumption that "the masses" were the main problem of democratic or republican government. Contrary to elitists, she asserted that workers were naturally inclined toward peace and arbitration of conflicts because they understood that they were the ones paying the price for war. Still, Addams also feared that the "appeal to the fighting instinct does not end in mere warfare, but arouses . . . brutal instincts

latent in every human being." In the neighborhood of her settlement house, Addams registered signs of brutalization in an increase in homicides and in children's war games:

> The humane instinct, which keeps in abeyance the tendency to cruelty, the growing belief that the life of each human being . . . is still sacred . . . gives way, and the barbaric instinct asserts itself. It is doubtless only during a time of war that the men and women of Chicago could tolerate whipping for children in our city prison, and it is only during such a time that the introduction in the legislature of a bill for the re-establishment of the whipping post could be possible. *National events determine our ideals, as much as our ideals determine national events.*[35]

When Addams talked about brutalization, she was not only thinking of the "masses." She believed that this brutalization could seize the entire society, leading to the destruction of her social engineering project in poor neighborhoods, but also to elite demands for brutal punishments. Undoubtedly, Addams shared some of the elitist convictions of the members of her class, but her assertion that workers were naturally prone to peace was vastly different from Godkin's and Schurz's fears that the masses' bellicose tendencies were disguised under a thin veneer of "civilization."

Lest it appear that the anti-imperialists were defenders of a declining elite order and the imperialists the champions of modern mass democracy, it should be emphasized that this dichotomy only emerged after the Spanish-American War had brought about a fortuitous reversal for the advocates of a "large" foreign policy. Before the war, the imperialists despaired of the people's "queer lack of the imperial instinct." In another context, when commenting on the chances for political reform in New York, Theodore Roosevelt commented on "the people" in much the same way as a mugwump could have: "There is still a large percentage of voters so very ignorant that they are quite indifferent to any appeal to their consciences, though they can sometimes be reached by an appeal to their emotions."[36] Such examples indicate that arguments about procedural and substantive democracy were in part matters of convenience rather than conviction.

Nevertheless, all debaters wanted to demonstrate how their foreign policy recommendations were democratically sanctioned at home. As supporters of a ruling administration, confirmed in office during the debate, the imperialists could point to a popular mandate. This and other appeals to procedural democracy allowed them to defend themselves from charges of being "undemocratic" and instead to attack the latter as "undemocratic" and elitist. The logic of being in a minority almost forced anti-imperialists to discard procedural justifications. Self-righteousness and the frustration of failing to

gain adherents, however, turned minority pride into elitism. In fact, many critics came to the debate with clear reservations about popular democracy. To them, the people's enthusiasm about overseas expansion confirmed previous misgivings about "unbridled democracy."

Substantive Democracy: The Constitution

Preference for substantive democracy was not only motivated by elitism. The charge that imperialism subverted the institutional underpinnings of American democracy was the key to the anti-imperialist critique. Predictably, their opponents denied these claims. Less predictably, some imperialists maintained that traditional institutions would have to be adapted if they stood in the way of expansionist "progress." In this context, the Constitution emerged as the central institutional arrangement under discussion.

The anti-imperialists' main constitutional argument was part of "Schurz's Law," the notion that new territories could only be annexed with the purpose of turning them into states. If the imperialists heeded this precept, the influx of "inferior races" would wreck the American political system. If, on the other hand, the government simply disregarded the Constitution, it would undermine the basis of American democracy.

To prove their constitutional case, anti-imperialists relied on Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution, stipulating that "[n]ew *States* may be admitted by the Congress into this Union." As Senator Hoar paraphrased, "[o]ne of the constitutional purposes is the enlargement of the country by the admission of new States, and therefore Congress may lawfully acquire, hold, and dispose of territory with reference to the accomplishment of that great constitutional purpose."[37] Anti-imperialists were thus not "anti-expansionists," opposing any new addition of territory. On the contrary, they acknowledged *continental* expansion as a determining feature of their history, but always with the important caveat that every territorial addition was eventually given statehood.

The case was not as easy as the anti-imperialists made it appear, however, because the Constitution did not contain an explicit *prohibition* of colonial rule. With equal conviction, the imperialists concentrated on the second paragraph of the same article, which stated that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the *Territory or other Property* belonging to the United States." Beveridge praised this passage as "words of growth, of expansion, of empire, if you will, unlimited by geography or climate, or anything but the vitality and possibilities of the American people."[38] This paragraph had the obvious advantage of speaking of "territory or other property" instead of "states." Imperialists thus maintained

that Congress had the power to legislate for the new territories in any way it saw fit, including legislation to turn Puerto Rico and the Philippines into American colonies.

The discussion of constitutional questions involved increasingly intricate legal arguments, and the debate in the Senate, whose members were often lawyers by profession, was mirrored by one in the law journals and courtrooms of the United States. Imperialists and anti-imperialists asked more fundamentally how the Constitution should be interpreted. Did the branches of government possess only the powers explicitly granted to them under the articles of the Constitution, or did they also have "implied" powers, which could be deduced from related explicit powers? Predictably, the imperialists embraced the doctrine of implied powers. Republican Senator John C. Spooner (WI) asserted that the "framers of the Constitution . . . used language elastic in its nature and clearly expressing the power conferred in general terms and leaving full play for necessary implied powers." The legal scholar Harry Pratt Judson thought that "the power to expand may . . . also be implied from the power to make treaties and from the war power." Other imperialists went even further, arguing that the Constitution allowed *everything* that it did not expressly forbid.[39]

If that line of argument failed, imperialists sought legitimacy *outside* the Constitution by maintaining that the power to acquire foreign territory was an inherent attribute of national sovereignty. As Senator Orville H. Platt (CT), erstwhile member of the Committee on Territories and soon of the Committee on Cuban Affairs, put it, "I propose to maintain that the United States is a nation; that as a nation it possesses every sovereign power not reserved in its Constitution to the States or the people; that the right to acquire territory was not reserved, and is therefore an inherent sovereign right." This reliance on national sovereignty helps explain why the imperialists emphasized the national element to the detriment of the democratic one, as we shall see in the following chapters. To imperialists, the treaty with Spain settled the issue, prompting President McKinley to affirm that "[o]ur title [to the Philippines] is good."[40]

Against this expansive interpretation of the Constitution, the anti-imperialists stuck to strict construction. Denying any implied powers outside the Constitution, Senator John L. McLaurin insisted that "the United States as a nation has no reserved powers or inherent sovereignty, except such as may be delegated in the Constitution of the United States." On the contrary, he continued that "[t]here was no nation of the United States until the adoption of the Federal Constitution; hence before that time there could be no sovereignty of the nation." McLaurin not only rejected the imperialist emphasis on national sovereignty, but implied further that the United States

was indeed different and could therefore not exercise other nations' inherent rights if it did not want to forfeit its *raison d'être.* Most anti-imperialists conceded, however, that imperialism was perhaps not opposed "indeed to the letter, but to the evident spirit of our Constitution." Thus, Schurz wrote:

> That we *can* do this as far as the power of Congress to make all the needful regulations concerning the territories of the United States is concerned, I do not question. But I affirm that we cannot permanently govern by arbitrary powers millions of people as subject populations without doing ruthless violence to the spirit of our constitution and to all the fundamental principles of democratic government.[41]

For anti-imperialists, this point was crucial because, as the bedrock of American democratic government, the Constitution could not possibly be used to justify undemocratic practices, such as depriving a people of its right to self-government. "The power to conquer alien peoples and hold them in subjugation is nowhere *expressly* granted," said Senator Hoar. "The power to conquer alien peoples and hold them in subjugation is nowhere *implied* as necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes declared by the Constitution."[42] Hoar did not deny the power of Congress to pass laws and regulations, but this power was only absolute insofar as it did not violate the constitutional *purpose* of building a government of free states.

As to the peace treaty, anti-imperialist senators seemed to realize that they could not prevent passage, and they therefore tried to attach resolutions. Vest's resolution (see Chapter 2) stood no chance because it would have resulted in eventual Philippine statehood. Other senators suggested compromise solutions, which tacitly acknowledged the power of Congress to dispose of the new acquisitions. These ranged from Senator Bacon's proposal, which would have denied future statehood *and* permanent colonial status of the Philippines, to Senator McEnery's resolution, which allowed the United States to hold the islands for the purpose of "educating" the inhabitants. Since this resolution suited the publicly proclaimed objectives of most imperialists, it was finally agreed to.[43]

In addition to the argument about statehood, the anti-imperialists also claimed that all constitutional *provisions* applied to the new territories, irrespective of their status. For this proposition, they coined the catchy phrase "the Constitution follows the flag." The anti-imperialists extended this argument particularly to citizenship rights:

> Planting itself upon these lasting truths, the people of the United States solemnly declared in their Constitution that the citizens of each State should have the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; that all

> persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction should be citizens of the United States and of the several States; and that the rights of none should be abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Constitution gives to the United States, no more than to the individual, the right to hold slaves or vassals, and recognizes no distinction between classes of citizens,—one with full rights as free men, and another as subjects governed by military force.

In a letter to William Jennings Bryan, a Nebraska lawyer elaborated that the Constitution "fails to make a distinction between states and territories, so far as the general rights of citizenship are concerned." Hence, the Filipinos would automatically become American citizens through annexation.[44] As discussed in Chapter 2, this claim—like that on statehood—was designed to trigger racist fears and fears about the importation of cheap Asian labor.

Senator Beveridge countered by claiming that only "American *institutions* follow the flag." More concretely, Beveridge referred to specific benefits of American occupation, such as education and development (cf. Chapter 1). Nevertheless, he left no doubt that these would be the only "institutions" that Americans were willing to grant. An extension of the Constitution to the new territories would not occur automatically, but would require a positive act by Congress. In a legal brief for the president, Attorney General John W. Griggs emphasized that this had been the traditional position of the Republican Party when it had fought the automatic extension of slavery in the Western territories.[45]

When the constitutional issue finally came before the Supreme Court in 1901, the bench refused to decide the actual question, but legitimized imperialist practice by declaring the other two branches of government "competent" to decide the details. This equivocation prompted Elihu Root, the new secretary of war, to comment sarcastically: "Ye—es, as near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn't quite catch up with it."[46] Still, the Supreme Court's (in)decision provided the imperialists with added legitimacy and rhetorical ammunition—as when Beveridge cited it as another procedural act sanctioning "imperialism."

Nevertheless, the anti-imperialists' argument about the Constitution's *spirit* was not shattered by the Supreme Court or by a lost election. To them, the Constitution was more than a document regulating the federal government's powers. It was the essence of American democracy and the first creation of a democratic nation. All powers had to be exercised according to this democratic spirit and according to the Declaration of Independence, which Hoar described as "the great interpreter of the Constitution." The Declaration stipulated the necessity of the consent of the governed, and if

this principle were infringed upon in the Philippines, the anti-imperialists warned, it would not long prevail in the United States itself. It was this pervasive charge that survived the narrower question of congressional powers. The Constitution was the institutional expression of a democratic ideology, which was logically incompatible with colonial rule. With imperialism formally adopted, Godkin warned, "our Constitution will have to be seriously altered, or, still worse, to be disregarded—a very dangerous business." Explicitly declining to interpret the constitutional clauses, William Graham Sumner concurred that the "question of imperialism, then, is the question whether we are going to give the lie to the origin of our own national existence by establishing a colonial system of the old Spanish type, even if we have to sacrifice our existing civil and political system to do it." To anti-imperialists, this transformation of the republic into an empire was a logical proposition, for which they did not require any proof because, as Schurz put it, there were "certain things which democracies cannot do well."[47] If Americans were unwilling to accept this "natural" limitation, they would have to give up their unique system of government in favor of a monarchy or autocracy.

With respect to the role of the Constitution in previous continental expansion, however, the imperialists were more consistent. Avoiding details, they simply asserted that contemporary annexations were a logical continuation of continental expansion. President McKinley reassured his audience that the "subject of expansion is not a new one. It was the gospel of the early statesmen and patriots of this country." All previous expansions, he continued, had been met with Cassandra calls about subverting the Constitution, which had not happened then and would not happen now. Whitelaw Reid recalled that Americans had never asked the inhabitants of the new territories whether they wanted to join the republic—neither the French and Native Americans of the Louisiana territory nor the Hispanic residents of the Southwest after the Mexican-American War. These acquisitions, he pointed out, would have been unconstitutional as well. Republican imperialists relished emphasizing that these territories had been acquired under Democratic administrations. Alluding to the Louisiana purchase, Senator Beveridge commented that "Jefferson, *strict constructionist of constitutional power though he was,* obeyed the Anglo-Saxon impulse within him" to become "the first Imperialist of the Republic." The *Republican Campaign Text-Book* of 1900 therefore declared imperialism a "fiction," because, "[i]f it be imperialism to hold the people of acquired territory in a different relation toward the government from that held by our own people . . . then every single expansion of our domain has been marked by imperialism."[48] According to this reading of history, past expansion had also raised constitutional questions, but never undermined American democracy. Neither would the contemporary annexation of the Philippines.

These historical observations put the anti-imperialists on the defensive because their entire case rested on embracing the American past and on charging that McKinley's plans constituted a dangerous departure. One of the most developed elaborations of the presumed differences between historical and contemporary expansion was Sumner's essay "Earth Hunger," which predated the imperialism debate. Repeating much of Turner's frontier thesis, Sumner distinguished between "economic and social earth hunger," which he considered legitimate, and "political earth hunger," which only served as a "gratification of national vanity" and which was synonymous with "imperialist" policies. By contrast, the Louisiana purchase had not only been a "case of life-necessity," but also the type of expansion that had made American democracy feasible: "If you have an abundance of land and few men share it, the men will be all equal. Each landholder will be his own tenant and his own laborer. Social classes disappear." This opportunity, the anti-imperialists emphasized, was not available in the contemporary expansion in the Pacific. In this sense, although the inhabitants of the Louisiana territory had not been consulted, Senator Hoar could still insist that Thomas Jefferson's measures amounted to an "expansion of freedom."[49]

Nevertheless, these were arguments that skirted constitutional issues, particularly its "spirit," which anti-imperialists themselves stressed in relation to contemporary expansion. "Freedom" and "consent" in the historical examples applied to the white American conquerors, but not to the conquered, mirroring the imperialist argument in this instance. Arguments about "geographical predestination," that Americans were destined to possess the North American continent, and "free soil" expansion replaced considerations of democratic rights. The only context in which the anti-imperialists harmonized their celebration of past with the condemnation of future expansion was the narrow constitutional one, namely that Americans previously annexed territory only with a view to eventually admit it as a state.

Today, most scholars would agree with the imperialists' interpretation. Revisionists and cultural historians insist that America's development had always been characterized by an expansion that disregarded the rights of minorities. Writes Michael Hunt on the subject of Jeffersonian annexation: "Expansionists now had the considerable advantage of being able to point out that their critics' stand in behalf of a pristine Jeffersonian vision of liberty had become thoroughly compromised—by Jefferson himself and by his disciples earlier in the nineteenth century."[50] With the Insular Cases, the anti-imperialists lost the argument about constitutional restrictions on the administration of overseas territories. Their inconsistencies in relation to historical expansion also impaired their argument about the Constitution's spirit.

War Powers

After war broke out in the Philippines, the anti-imperialists expanded their constitutional repertoire by a "modern" charge. Just as the Vietnam War became known as Johnson's or McNamara's war to emphasize that the executive usurped congressional war powers, early-twentieth-century critics referred to the conflict in the Philippines as "McKinley's War." This presumed abuse of executive power served as the first example of how imperialism would lead to tyranny.

But whereas war powers became the crucial constitutional issue in the Vietnam War debate, they remained subordinate to the larger question of the constitutional legitimacy of overseas expansion in the 1890s. To be sure, Congress never declared war on the Filipinos, and hostilities broke out in similarly dubious circumstances as in the Gulf of Tonkin in the 1960s—after a disputed attack on American forces in Manila. Nevertheless, the anti-imperialist argument was predicated on the conviction that the acquisition of the Philippines had been an illegal act and that the president was therefore engaging a sovereign nation in an undeclared war. Anti-imperialists were already critical of the president's "benevolent assimilation" proclamation in December 1898 because it prematurely asserted American sovereignty in the islands. When the anti-imperialist Republican Senator Richard F. Pettigrew (SD) investigated the outbreak of the war two years later, he speculated that the proclamation had been a deliberate effort to provoke a Filipino attack and to create a fait accompli, which forced Congress to ratify the treaty. Therefore, as Atkinson put it, the ensuing "warfare [was] conducted without any declaration of war by the arbitrary power of the Executive of this country." By the same token, the publisher Joseph Pulitzer blamed Congress for abdicating its constitutional duties and referred to the conflict as "Mr. McKinley's personal war."[51]

The anti-imperialists used this example of the abuse of constitutional powers to dramatize the changes under "imperialism." Boutwell explained, "the President makes war in Asia—a war which has never been sanctioned or recognized by Congress, and whose conduct and fortunes are systematically concealed from the people. Thus does imperialism in Asia react and imperil liberty in America."[52] Such changes, Godkin predicted, were "bringing the Constitution more and more into contempt" and making the president "a de facto sovereign, like the Queen of England, with a full set of colonies and 'subjects.' " On this issue, even Senator Hoar abandoned his allegiance to the Republican Party. When the army appropriation bill of 1900 envisioned temporarily investing the president with the exclusive power to appoint a governing council for the Philippines, Hoar objected because this provision

"makes the President a virtual czar, unchecked and uncontrolled by any supervisory power of Congress." The abuse of the war powers was portrayed as the first step toward undermining the separation of powers and the system of "checks and balances," upon which the United States Constitution rested. If the president appropriated the one power considered crucial to the role of Congress in foreign affairs, he would soon, the anti-imperialists predicted, eliminate all checks and assume quasi-monarchical powers. His abuse of the war powers set the nation on a course toward despotism.[53]

To the imperialists, these charges were unfounded "scare tactics." Proceeding from their own view of constitutional powers, the imperialists did not even have to discuss the question of "presidential war" on its own merits. Since they believed that the Philippines had legitimately passed into U.S. possession, there could be no "war" in the archipelago. Instead, imperialists referred to the conflict as a "rebellion" or an "insurrection" by a minority of ungrateful natives who had attacked their American benefactors without just cause, as President McKinley clarified with his usual gusto for alliterations: "The first blow was struck by the insurgents, and it was a foul blow. Our kindness was reciprocated with cruelty, our mercy with a Mauser."[54]

Without seriously addressing war powers, the imperialists produced several connected defenses of their military action in the Philippines. In addition to referring to the war as a rebellion against lawful U.S. authority, they claimed that American forces were defending themselves against Filipino attacks. Furthermore, the "insurgents" were portrayed as such a tiny minority that their resistance equaled banditry rather than organized warfare. This became even easier when the Filipinos were forced to resort to guerrilla tactics. In one of the few direct responses to charges of executive warfare, Senator John T. Morgan, one of the small number of imperialist Southern Democrats, invoked the rights of sovereignty: "To suppress an insurrection in any of theses islands there is no necessity to declare war against them or that a state of war exists, even in the Philippines."[55]

Under the Constitution, members of Congress had (and have) the authority to stop "unconstitutional war" by using the "power of the purse," by denying appropriations for military operations. Some anti-imperialists outside of Congress recommended as much. Yet, as the Vietnam War and other military operations would subsequently demonstrate, this power is politically difficult to use when U.S. forces are already engaged on the ground. Congressional anti-imperialists were similarly loath to vote against appropriations. Few went as far as Hoar in 1902, though, defending his vote for appropriations by claiming that a state of war did not exist in the archipelago because it was U.S. territory. While he had previously condemned the "unconstitutionality" of the war, he now used the imperialist view of the conflict to defend

himself from the attacks of fellow anti-imperialists. This is less a reflection of inconsistency, however, and more one of the political difficulty of using the power of the purse in wartime.[56]

* * *

Unlike during the Vietnam War debate, the question of war powers never became the central constitutional concern in the imperialism debate. It was only one anti-imperialist example of how imperialism was upsetting the balance between "power" and "liberty," between government and the people, and, within government, between executive and legislative power. It was this concern that imperialism undermined the substantive arrangements of American democracy that was central to the critics' opposition.

The imperialists, by contrast, underlined elements of procedural democracy legitimizing their foreign policy. Public opinion, as manifested in elections, congressional votes, and court decisions, sanctioned overseas expansion. While most imperialists also steadfastly denied that their foreign policies contradicted substantive democratic arrangements, the firebrands, such as Senator Beveridge, introduced more "essentialist" arguments about the people, their "race," and their character, and about powers inherent in national sovereignty. If the Constitution were found to contradict expansion, the people's desire and "destiny," then it would have to be altered.

While the structural logic of domestic debates, with ruling majorities and critical minorities, goes some way toward explaining the differing emphases of both camps, it should not obscure more substantive differences between their conception of American democracy and its role in U.S. foreign policy. Intent on interpreting the Constitution and other democratic arrangements in a more pragmatic way, the imperialists defined democracy as residing in the people rather than in its institutions. If the "needs" of the people changed, the institutions would have to change with them. Professing their confidence in the people, advocates of expansion added that democracy was safe in the people's hands.

Accordingly, they attacked the anti-imperialists as elitists, with some justification. Anti-imperialist fears that aggressive foreign policies adversely affected the popular mood were founded on a fundamental skepticism of popular government. "The people" could not be trusted to combat imperialism and, worse yet, could actively assist in the destruction of the careful equilibrium of democratic government. Such fears echoed the classical republican obsession with *virtú,* the individual's commitment to the *res publica,* a disposition that had to be carefully nurtured because it was constantly threatened with corruption by base instincts. The concentration on substantive

democracy was apparently also a matter of conviction, not only argumentative convenience. American ideals and their institutional manifestations were considered as indispensable restraints on government *and* on the people.

The controversies about domestic sanction for foreign policy touched upon fundamental problems of democratic government, even if some debaters did not intend to raise theoretical questions. Is democracy more safely anchored in the people's minds or in a nation's specific institutional arrangements? How can a people be prevented from voluntarily surrendering its liberties to a dictator? Is a majority automatically "right?" What rights does a minority possess, should there be particular safeguards for its status and opinions?

From the vantage point of democratic theory, the imperialists might appear as more "modern" democrats, trusting the people and advocating a dynamic interpretation of the Constitution. We should not forget, however, that overseas expansion required "adjustments" of basic democratic tenets, including that of universal natural rights, and of certain constitutional provisions. Finally, when "democratic" arguments no longer sufficed, imperialists appealed to *national* arguments, emphasizing the potential inherent in national sovereignty. As the next chapters illustrate, imperialists also argued that nationhood preceded and superseded specific constitutional arrangements.

CHAPTER 5

What Is America?

> Americans . . . have generally seen America as special in its defence of general values and principles . . . *Tension may easily develop between being unique on the one hand and defending universal values on the other. This tension is rarely explored.*
>
> Geir Lundestad (1986)[1]

The previous chapters have confirmed the first part of Geir Lundestad's assumption about the universal principles informing U.S. foreign policy. Imperialists and their opponents both claimed that their foreign policy strategies embodied their nation's global democratic mission. Within the context of their racism, we could even observe how universal values can be used to exclude others.

As Lundestad further explains, however, there is also tension between universalism and particularism. This is contained within American exceptionalism because it explains American uniqueness with the commitment to universal values. Differently put, exceptionalism combines a national and a democratic element, with the former implying exclusion and singularity and the latter inclusion and universalism. The next three chapters demonstrate that imperialists and anti-imperialists exploited this tension. The imperialists emphasized, even celebrated the national element, whereas their opponents relied exclusively on the democratic ingredients of exceptionalism. In this context, the "national element" denotes rhetorical strategies that "center . . . the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state," without invoking qualifying principles such as democracy.[2]

The imperialists pursued two rhetorical strategies emphasizing the national element and complementing the description of the United States as an agent of global redemption (Chapter 3). They devised a narrative of

the nation's past and future that defined overseas expansion as unavoidable destiny. This understanding minimized rational choice and human decision-making, which theoretically form the basis of democracy. "The nation" was personified, demanding unqualified obedience from its citizens. These strategies echoed noncivic varieties of nationalism, in which the nation is based not on a compact between rational human beings, but on a mythical, preexisting entity. Whereas, at least in theory, an individual affirms his or her belonging to a democracy by repeated rational *choice,* he or she is born into a nation by *chance.* Secondly, the imperialists defined the nation's power and prestige as a function of its military prowess. To convey this image internationally, they demanded that the entire country exhibit a fighting spirit and a unity of purpose. This aspect led to the celebration of strife and war for their own sake, rather than for the idealist purposes that the imperialists simultaneously proclaimed.

The difference in emphasis becomes even clearer when we contrast this narrative with the anti-imperialist one. The critics insisted that Americans *had* a choice and an obligation to make reasoned policy decisions. From their nation's history, they derived a completely different narrative and denied that prestige depended on war-making martial potential. Instead, they claimed that the nation's democratic order and humanitarian impulses constituted a source of real power.

Remembering the Civil War

Nowhere was this dichotomy between "nation" and "democracy" more apparent than in competing definitions of the nation's history and particularly that of the Civil War. Little more than thirty years had passed since the monumental conflict. Many debaters, especially anti-imperialists, had personally experienced the war. The imperialists claimed that the Civil War had been fought solely to save the Union and that its enduring mandate consisted of advancing reconciliation between the sections, which had been sealed by the war against Spain. They celebrated a more perfect nationalism as an achievement in itself. Imperialists invoked this legacy to preserve national unity vis-à-vis the problems resulting from the Spanish-American War and to create the impression that overseas expansion embodied the inescapable destiny of the "completed" union. The anti-imperialists, on the other hand, emphasized abolition and emancipation as Civil War legacies, claiming that the conflict had perfected the democratic example. Colonial acquisitions violated this heritage and the people not only had a choice but an obligation to rationally decide their country's destiny. A third group, Southern anti-imperialists,

approached the Civil War with a particular narrative and a "dual purpose" in mind. Not only did they enlist its legacy in the fight against imperialism, but the issue of imperialism could be employed to question the dominant versions of the Civil War as having resulted in either emancipation or unification. These three narratives correspond to those identified by David Blight, but they were complicated by their instrumentalization in the imperialism debate.[3]

National reunion had already been pursued for its own sake before and during the Spanish-American War. In the political realm, the compromise of 1877 had terminated Reconstruction and removed one of the primary causes of animosity between the sections. On the cultural and popular level, veterans' organizations from North and South—more than the government—had undertaken efforts to heal the rift between the sections.[4] The Spanish-American War, however, provided an ideal opportunity to deepen national reconciliation because it engendered a wave of *national* enthusiasm, with volunteers from all parts of the country enlisting for military service. As President McKinley emphasized, "[t]here was no division in any part of the country. North and South and East and West alike cheerfully responded."[5]

This national enthusiasm was genuine and extended to future imperialists and anti-imperialists alike (see figure 5.1), but it was also orchestrated by an administration whose chief executive was haunted by his personal experience of the fratricidal conflict. His gestures, such as commissioning the ex-Confederate officers Joseph Wheeler and Fitzhugh Lee as major-generals, were welcomed in the South. When Theodore Roosevelt resigned his government position and selected his Rough Riders, he paid similar attention to enlisting volunteers from all regions and (preferably) social classes as well. Most evocative, however, was an event that constituted almost a rewriting of history. Early in the war, the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment marched through Baltimore, where the same regiment had been attacked by a secessionist mob thirty-seven years before. This time, the reception was different:

> First came the city people, bands and then the drums and fifes of the regiment playing "*Dixie*"—the drums and fifes of the 6th Massachusetts—and the crowd cheering wildly. Tears were in my eyes. I never felt so moved in my life. *The war of 1861 was over at last* and this great country for which so many died was one once again.[6]

The postwar peace jubilees, locally organized events that were held in four large cities, each with the participation of the president and members of his cabinet, embellished on this symbolism to such an extent that the victory



Figure 5.1 William Jennings Bryan and ex-Confederate General Fitzhugh Lee, awaiting deployment to Cuba (N.B.: Notes on the side of the picture)

Source: William Jennings Bryan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

against Spain occasionally faded into the background. George Peck, chairman of the first jubilee in Chicago, proclaimed:

> [T]he greatest prize we have won . . . is the supreme victory which North and South have won over each other. Long ago all sensible and patriotic people in both sections knew that the hour had come. To-day we hail it in the assured faith that, henceforth, we march together to the same music, under the same flag and to the same destiny. Verily, this is the year of jubilee.[7]

The organizers of these festivities also staged parades with Civil War veterans from North and South prominently placed and sometimes noted as "the real heroes," instead of those soldiers who had fought in the recent war. In historical pageants, floats representing reunion were also a staple.[8] But it was the president who made the most dramatic gesture in Atlanta's Peace Jubilee. Wearing a confederate badge and bearing out his private secretary's prediction

that "[h]e is evidently going to make *unity*—a reunited country—the central thought," McKinley surprised his audience:

> Every soldier's grave made during our unfortunate Civil War is a tribute to American valor . . . And while, when those graves were made, we differed widely about the future of this government, those differences were long ago settled by the arbitrariment of arms; and the time has now come . . . when in the spirit of fraternity we should share with you in the care of the graves of the Confederate soldiers.[9]

Southern *and* Northern audiences were thrilled that the national government would treat all Civil War graves in the same manner, suggesting that the dead were no longer separated into loyal sons of the Union and disloyal rebels of the South, but remembered as *national* heroes.

Southerners were "readmitted" to the Union on account of their recent military service, proving their *American* patriotism. They relished pointing out that the first war victim, Ensign Worth Bagley, hailed from North Carolina. The *Atlanta Constitution* commented that "the blood of this martyr freely spilled upon his country's altar seals effectively the covenant of brotherhood between the north and south and completes the work of reconciliation which commenced at Appomatox."[10] Such tributes amounted to an almost pagan narrative of human sacrifice, which, in the eyes of its propagandists, had been necessary to consecrate the reconciliation of former foes.

These examples illustrate what Cecilia O'Leary has emphasized, namely how "the popular imperialism generated by the Spanish-American War played a critical role in creating the conditions for the reincorporation of Confederate veterans and their sons into the nation's fraternity."[11] The reverse was true as well, however: expansionists used the theme of reunion to realize their foreign policy agenda. The development of these connections can be traced in the president's speaking tours of the West and South. When McKinley traveled West, U.S. demands for the Philippines had not yet been publicly formulated so that his typical appeal, reiterated at countless stops, was to preserve national unity "until we have settled our differences abroad." On the Southern trip, by contrast, after the conclusion of the peace treaty, but before its ratification, McKinley enlisted the theme of unity for a more specific purpose. In a region known for its opposition to expansion, McKinley garnered much acclaim when he predicted that "[w]e will stand united until every triumph of that war has been made permanent," implying that the American conquest of overseas territory was not going to be reversed.[12] Pride in the military accomplishments of the late war and in the reconciliation between the sections could sweep even potentially anti-imperialist audiences off their feet.

The imperialists created a historical narrative with reunion at its center, which pointed to an expansionist future. When McKinley only implied annexation at Chicago's Peace Jubilee in October, the city's imperialist newspaper was more sanguine in concluding that the jubilee "told of sectional animosities now forever buried, and of a larger destiny for the reunited nation—a destiny reaching out to the islands of the seas." At the Washington Peace Jubilee in May 1899, Cleveland's secretary of the Navy, Hilary A. Herbert, a Southerner, expanded on the imperialists' interpretation of national history:

> There have been three great eras in the history of our Republic—the first . . . the settling of the colonies; second, the era in which the Constitution was framed and the new government launched on an uncertain sea, the era of an imperfect union . . . and the third, the era of the perfected Union, the era that began with Fort Sumter, continued while the Union was being tried with fire and sword, continued through the days of reconstruction and subsequent rehabilitation and reconciliation, and closes with this great jubilee.[13]

National cohesion had always been a potentiality, but never a reality since the days of independence. The Civil War had been necessary to settle the long-standing differences between the sections, and the Spanish-American War had been necessary to close the bloody chasm. A new generation, "the sons of those who wore the blue and of those who wore the gray," now symbolically "blended with the brown" of the volunteers against Spain.[14] This narrative indicated the crucial position that the discourse on reunion and "the nation" had in imperialist rhetoric because it provided the linchpin between an "isolationist" past and an expansionist future. Only with its internal affairs rectified could the (Re-)United States break out of its continental confines to face new tasks in the world arena.

To imperialists, these new tasks were logical and preordained. With racist and social Darwinist bravado, Senator Beveridge connected national unity to future international prominence: "We are this at last, a great national unit ready to carry out that universal law of civilization which requires of every people who have reached our high estate to become colonizers of new lands, administrators of orderly government over savage and senile peoples."[15] Nationalization and imperialism were thus portrayed as each other's handmaiden, and both were considered as signs of progress and modernization.

Conversely, if reconciliation had been consummated by the Southerners' loyal service to the Union in the war against Spain, secession had to have been the sole issue at stake in the Civil War. This was precisely the imperialists' historical interpretation. As Navy Secretary John D. Long explained,

"[i]t was a war of the Union against disunion; and union conquered and forever obliterated disunion." While Long only implied that the North's fight against slavery had been a secondary concern, President McKinley stressed that "Abraham Lincoln did not start out to free the slaves, but to save the Union." Speaking about the Civil War dead at Shiloh, Beveridge was most unequivocal: "[T]heir blood was shed to make of the American people a single Nation . . . *Other results of our Civil War were incident to that*." The emancipation of the slaves was classified as a "byproduct" and a war measure. While Lincoln's primary goal had been to save the Union, the imperialist interpretation deliberately minimized the role that slavery had played in bringing about the conflict. Nevertheless, this narrative was crucial for the purposes of reunion because it facilitated ignoring persistent civil rights violations in the South. The national government "bought" Southern loyalty by its silence on the other important Civil War legacy.[16]

De-emphasizing slavery and emancipation was also crucial in legitimizing overseas expansion. The fact that emancipation came about as a "byproduct" of the Civil War illustrated that "[w]ar in each case asserted its supremacy over declarations of all kinds."[17] As in the Civil War, the dynamics of war had supposedly transcended the original objectives against Spain. Despite McKinley's promises of "no forcible annexation," imperialists explained, they could not hand the Spanish territories back and instead had to assume the responsibility of governing them.

Secondly, describing the Civil War as one against secession provided a justification for dealing with Filipino resistance. This comparison was usually reserved for Northern audiences because it could have offended Southern sensibilities. In a speech in which he had already elaborated on the imperialist interpretation of the Civil War, McKinley justified American actions in the Philippines: "We intend to put down that rebellion, just as we would put down any rebellion anywhere against the sovereignty of the United States." Roosevelt similarly pointed out that General Grant's demand of unconditional surrender should instruct posterity in their "duty of reducing the islands to quiet at all costs and of stamping out the last embers of armed resistance." While McKinley and Roosevelt were measured in their comparisons, the African American *Indianapolis Freeman* openly wondered why the Filipinos should be granted "special" rights and attacked the anti-imperialists:

> The independence of the Philippines is no part of the American program. We have nothing more to urge against the heroism of Aguinaldo than we have against the heroism of Gen. Lee or "Stonewall" Jackson. These had to submit and in this submission lost quite as much as Aguinaldo will loose . . . The tears shed over the lost liberties of the Filipinos in the face of the past events are

> certainly insincere or the position of the North in 1862 was incorrect. If at that time it was right to coerce a people into a government without their consent it is still right.[18]

The editor realized the logic that reacting differently to "rebellion" in the Philippines could be seen to undermine the legitimacy of the Civil War. No one was more unequivocal in his use of the theme of rebellion than Senator Beveridge, who pitted national rights against those of self-government when he asserted that the Civil War had clearly "shot . . . to death . . . the right of the Republic to set up its own self-government outside of the Flag." One can hardly imagine a more forceful statement about the primacy of the nation over democracy. Borrowed from Civil War memory, the theme of rebellion neatly fit with American actions in the Philippines, but it remained an argument used by Northern imperialists for Northern audiences. One of the few exceptions was the maverick Democratic Senator John T. Morgan (AL), who cited Reconstruction approvingly as a precedent for territorial government in the new possessions. Most Southerners, however, would not have dreamed of legitimizing Reconstruction in that way.[19]

The anti-imperialists' Civil War narrative was markedly different. Consider the divergent meanings attributed to Gettysburg: whereas McKinley claimed that "at Gettysburg the Union was the issue," Senator Hoar believed that the battlefield symbolized the struggle for the "consent of the governed." Often alongside the Declaration of Independence, anti-imperialists quoted from Lincoln's Gettysburg Address to that effect. Occasionally, they contradicted the imperialist narrative as Hoar did, insisting that Lincoln would not have saved the Union "at the sacrifice of the Declaration of Independence." More often, however, they conceded that emancipation might not have been the original purpose of the war, but they added that it was the war's most significant and lasting achievement as a step toward perfecting American democracy. "A more perfect union" existed not only because sectional harmony had been restored through the war, but because emancipation resulted in the realization of the Union's democratic promise for another segment of its population, the former slaves. As the veteran abolitionist Gamaliel Bradford clarified, the "Union . . . came out stronger and more prosperous than ever before" precisely because the deep-seated conflict about slavery had finally been resolved. To these critics, America was an ongoing project, a democracy that could always be improved, instead of a nation that had been "completed" by reunion.[20]

As long as it was reasonable to assume that the United States fought in order to liberate or "emancipate" the Cubans, the anti-imperialists consented (cf. Chapter 1). Samuel Bowles applauded the intervention as "widening

the boundaries of human freedom upon the continent, just as Lincoln was burdened with the work of emancipation within our own borders." As the administration's postwar plans became clearer, however, the anti-imperialists realized that "the other" Civil War narrative would be used to legitimize colonial expansion. While Bowles welcomed the "consummation" of reunion, he warned against using the theme for legitimizing territorial acquisitions. Against the claim that the Civil War, too, had transcended its original objective, an anonymous writer in the *Springfield Republican* argued that emancipation had been consonant with the objective of preserving the Union, whereas the oppression of the Filipinos contradicted the goal of liberating the Cubans.[21]

Instead of witnessing a glorious march of "globalized" emancipation, the anti-imperialists perceived a more infamous repetition of history. According to Edwin Mead, "the logic of Luzon [one of the islands in the Philippines] has brought back to new life the warring philosophies of 1861." Charles Francis Adams, Jr. predicted that "[s]lavery, under another name," would have to be introduced in a future empire, whereas Republican Senator William Mason (IL) commented that the key passage of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address would have to be rewritten to read, "a government of some of the people, by a part of the people, for a few of the people." The administration's course was judged to be far worse than a betrayal of McKinley's prewar promises. It amounted to a wholesale negation of American history and, more specifically, of the Civil War's achievement of ending racist oppression, "which our fathers have shed their blood to stamp out." William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., son of the eponymous abolitionist, summarized this view in a poem:

> When the great charter signed by Lincoln's pen
> From out the land of bondage brought a race,
> How little did ye dream that later men
> Would dare this seal of promise to efface!
> Has virtue vigor to uprise again,
> Or sinks one more republic in disgrace?[22]

This reading implied that the results of the Spanish-American War betrayed Civil War legacy. As Garrison indicated in the fifth line of his poem, the anti-imperialists felt called upon once again to don the "abolitionist" mantle, which many of them had worn in their youth. This time, however, Edwin Burritt Smith feared that the struggle would be harder because "[o]ur slaves were among us; our 'subjects' are remote from us. The wrong we did the former was obvious and more and more burned its way into the nation's conscience; the wrong to be done to our 'subjects' will be less apparent and

not so likely to disturb our self-complacency." Already, the anti-imperialists warned, the doctrines of imperialism had a dangerous domestic impact as an increase in racial violence demonstrated. The bitter irony was the reversal of history: if, as William Graham Sumner claimed, imperialism symbolized "the conquest of the United States by Spain," its meaning in the context of Civil War memory was the victory of the South, because it was that region's "spirit of the 'lost cause' " and theories of slavery that dominated imperialist discourse.[23] (see figure 5.2)

These interpretations of the Civil War revealed not only the dichotomy between the national and the democratic elements in, but also different conceptions of history's legacy. The imperialist narrative symbolized closure because the "only" issue of the Civil War, that of the Union, had been resolved through common sacrifice in the war with Spain. As McKinley formulated it, "the memory of old disagreements has *faded* into history."[24] The Civil War receded into a safe past, a necessity if the nation wanted to concentrate on new tasks abroad. This was not the anti-imperialist understanding. If the Civil War represented *one* step toward the perfection of American democracy, it could not be safely historicized. Worse than that, imperialism resurrected the issue of slavery, which the opponents of expansion considered as the paramount cause of the inner-American conflict. To them, history remained alive and was repeating itself.

Nevertheless, the imperialists did not completely cede the theme of emancipation to their opponents. Although the "emancipation" of the Cubans was less emphasized than national reunion, President McKinley did mention it on two occasions. Significantly, one of these speeches was delivered to a black audience, and McKinley was silent on the theme of reunion because it did not include African Americans. Possibly in response to anti-imperialist attacks, references to "emancipation" in the Philippines increased although the nexus to the Civil War was rarely made explicit. McKinley repeatedly referred to the Filipinos as "the emancipated" when he could have chosen the term "liberated." After having claimed "Lincoln, the unifier," the president belatedly discovered "Lincoln, the liberator." His nomination acceptance speech in 1900 made the most explicit connection between expansion and emancipation:

> The Republican party was dedicated to freedom forty-four years ago . . . It broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free, and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of imperialism.[25]

This was the rhetoric of "benevolent assimilation," of portraying the conquest of the Philippines as another episode in the story of domestic and

Figure 5.2 Father – "My boy, when I fought I fought for liberty, in '61, my father fought for liberty, and I don't like to see my son fight for anything else"

Source: *Expensive Expansion* (Boston: Philpott Hardy Co., 1900); Harvard College Library, Widener Library, US559.5.

international democratization. Yet, the fact that most of these alternative interpretations came from the president and particularly during the campaign of 1900 demonstrate their tactical nature. They were part of the effort to obfuscate the issue of "imperialism" in the presidential election (cf. Chapter 1). The imperialists' nationalist interpretation of the Civil War remained the dominant one.

Southern anti-imperialists added a third reading of the Civil War, a highly sectional one, which illustrated that the issues were far from resolved, as the imperialists would have it. Their interpretation had little in common with that of Northern anti-imperialists because Southerners refrained from citing emancipation as the war's positive legacy. Nevertheless, they could not resist pointing out that Republican imperialists polemicized against racial equality, which they had once tried to "force" upon the South. Southerners' response was schizophrenic, however, in that it used imperialism as a sanction for contemporary Jim Crow practices, but rejected colonial rule for the same racist reasons (cf. Chapter 2).

Instead of emancipation, Southerners had their own narrative of how the "consent of the governed" had been violated in the Civil War, claiming that it was *they* who had been victimized because the South had fought for "constitutional liberty" and a "belief in States' rights." In 1861, *their* consent had been disregarded in "a war waged by the Government against its own citizens." Reconstruction had compounded the injustice because it subjected white Southerners to military rule and African American "tyranny." These experiences supposedly gave them an understanding of what awaited the Filipinos, whom the same critics otherwise denigrated in racist terms. "Those of us who live below the Mason and Dixon line," said Democratic Senator William B. Bate (TN), "those of us who after the war saw regiment after regiment mustered around us in the South, know what it is to be under the military. We know what it is to have a government of that kind."[26] This particular version of the "consent of the governed" fulfilled a dual and highly contradictory purpose. On the one hand, Southerners claimed "special expertise" as victims of oppression and warned against repeating such mistakes in the Philippines. On the other hand, they rhetorically reopened the bloody chasm between the sections and triumphantly maintained, particularly on race matters, that Northern imperialists had proved the South right and the cause of their own forefathers wrong. Contrary to what McKinley maintained, the past was very much alive in this analysis.

To complicate matters further, this reading provided the imperialists not only with ammunition to accuse (Democratic) anti-imperialists of hypocrisy (see Chapter 2), but also with arguments to attack Northern anti-imperialists for opposing the use of force in the Philippines when they had once sanctioned it in the South. Some imperialists conceded that Lincoln had violated Southern rights, but they used this as precedent for subjecting the Filipinos to American rule. The Republican Congressman Walter Brownlow (TN) attacked Boutwell for respecting Filipino rights while "at an earlier period he [had] favored the arming and equipping of 2,000,000 men for the invasion of the Southern States." Although this remained a minority argument,

this concession by Republicans that they had once ignored Southern consent added an interesting footnote to a confusing debate on Civil War memory. Such a reading of democratic doctrine further obscured the emancipated slaves because these Northern imperialists no longer counted *their* rights as an important reason for the Civil War. Above all, however, this instrumentalization of memory demonstrated that consistency was not the central concern on either side of the imperialism debate. Instead, both used their nation's history as a quarry, picking what served them well in the battle over territorial expansion. At the same time, particularly Southerners could not resist "re-fighting" some of the old battles in light of expansionist doctrine.[27]

As contradictory as the Southern anti-imperialist argument was, it remained within the parameters of interpreting the conflict as one about democratic consent, while the imperialists stuck to the emphasis on national reunion. This preference for the national principle was most dramatically captured in a letter by Senator Beveridge: "I feel also that the present war has been one of the three great national blessings that God's watchful providence has given to his chosen . . . No sections anymore, but a Nation. At last, my friend, a Nation. No, not *a Nation* but *the Nation. The Nation,* God's chosen people."[28] The mere repetition of the word "nation" illustrates how Beveridge felt that national reunion was the central experience, confirming the nation's "chosenness." Here, democracy was no longer the mark of the chosen. The anti-imperialists, on the other hand, interpreted the Civil War as a struggle for a more perfect democracy, which had culminated in the emancipation of the slaves. Rather than "historicizing" the conflict, therefore, colonial expansion resurrected the old ghosts and renewed the battle for the soul of (white) American democracy.

Duty and Destiny

The imperialist emphasis on how the Civil War had illustrated the unpredictable (and inescapable) dynamic of wars served as an ideal bridge to one of their favorite themes, the alliteration of destiny and duty. This argument implied that the new foreign policy was preordained—a determinism that fit well with their teleological reading of American history and with the ethnic variety of nationalism, which is based on history and circumstance of birth. For if democracy demands the continuous reaffirmation of policy outputs by thinking citizens, traditional nationalism expects the unconditional support of its citizenry for any policy decision. Furthermore, "destiny" fit with the exceptionalist notion of having been chosen, without necessarily attributing this selection to any value structure, such as democracy. Against this determinism, anti-imperialists asserted the importance of choice. They defined

America not as a personified nation with *one* destiny, but as a country of politically equal individuals, whom destiny could not deprive of their power and responsibility to make decisions.

"Manifest Destiny" is a term that predates American fin-de-siècle imperialism. Originally propagandized by John O'Sullivan in the 1840s, the concept referred to the inexorable, preordained forces feeding America's continental expansion. The concept envisioned the eventual inclusion of new territories into the Union as federal states (the anti-imperialist preference) and the advance of political and religious freedom. This vision of republican expansion, however, was already compromised in the war with Mexico, in which Manifest Destiny was also used as a justification for aggressive war and conquest.[29] By the 1890s—evident first in the 1893 debate on Hawaiian annexation and subsequently in the 1898 debate—the concept had been torn from its original moorings to serve as a legitimizing tool for colonial expansion.

It resurfaced in imperialist rhetoric, as when President McKinley confided in his personal secretary in June 1898: "We need Hawaii just as much and a good deal more than we did California. It is manifest destiny." For the most part, however, the imperialists preferred the simpler term "destiny." What convinced many contemporaries that providence, not human decision, had brought about a foreign policy change was "our *sudden* leap overseas toward our manifest destiny." "Forced" to war by Spain, the United States succeeded swiftly and decisively. Not only had the nation expelled Spain from the Western Hemisphere, but it had also "stumbled" upon the Philippines. Although Dewey's attack had been part of a long-standing war contingency plan, it came as a surprise to many Americans and reinforced their conviction that they were witnessing the dawn of something preordained. The future was uncertain and possibly frightening but, as the New Jersey Republican Cortlandt Parker claimed, when "Providence imposes upon us the Extension of Christian Civilization . . . [i]t is vain for us to reject, or struggle to escape the task."[30]

While the concept was used by all imperialists, it was the president who did most for its dissemination. The fullest and most quoted exposition of his views stemmed from a November 1898 meeting with the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in which the president "explained" his decision-making process on the Philippines:

> I have been criticized a good deal about the Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is I did n't [*sic*] want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them . . . When . . . I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little

> help . . . I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way . . . that there was nothing left for us to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.[31]

Human counselors had proved unable to help the president so he had had to await God's judgment on the nation's duties. When that was revealed to him, it provided ultimate sanction for his decision. Undoubtedly, the president deliberately chose a religious forum to share his "innermost" thoughts with. Such an audience appreciated the religious underpinnings of "destiny" and the duty to "Christianize" the Filipinos, although most of the latter were devout Catholics, already "Christianized" by their former Spanish rulers.

Irrespective of when the president had his "divine inspiration," he used the theme from the very beginning, cloaking his instructions to the peace commissioners in this language when no decision on keeping Spanish possessions had been formally made. On the Caribbean, the president was unequivocal, implicitly basing his demands on the Monroe Doctrine: "The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged." Although McKinley recognized that the Philippines "stand upon a different basis," it could not be discounted that the "march of events rules and overrules human action," imposing "new duties and responsibilities" upon the United States.[32] With this language, the president indicated that the same "duty" that required Americans to expel the Spanish from the Western Hemisphere could impel the nation to take up "the white man's burden" in the Far East.

During his Western speaking tour, the president prepared the public with his use of duty and destiny. In Chicago, he formulated his famous alliteration: "Duty determines destiny." The United States, McKinley argued, had entered the war with the highest regard for humanity. After its successful conclusion,

> we must accept all obligations which the war in duty and honor imposed on us . . . It is not within the power of man to foretell the future . . . Almighty God has his plans and methods for human progress, and not infrequently they are shrouded for the time being in impenetrable mystery. Looking backward, we can see how the hand of destiny builded [*sic*] for us and assigned us tasks whose full meaning was not apprehended even by the wisest statesmen of their times.[33]

That there was not much substance to the catchy alliteration was already indicated by the fact that his aforementioned conversation with the Methodist

visitors suggested exactly the opposite, that destiny—in the form of Dewey's victory—determined the duty to annex the Philippines. Nevertheless, perhaps this very interchangeability made the proposition so attractive. The concept reinforced McKinley's reputation as a "reluctant imperialist," whose hand was guided by the people and by "a trust we have not sought," but "a trust from which we will not flinch." If "destiny" was an ingenious rhetorical device to win the people for the cause of expansion, then McKinley certainly appears as a less reluctant imperialist than many contemporaries and historians believed.[34]

In terms of advocating expansion, the alliteration served to reject anti-imperialist allegations of selfishness and to underline the "selfless" devotion to Filipino welfare. Following the nation's destiny was an inescapable proposition, whereas fulfilling one's duty is generally classified as honorable rather than selfish. For the Republican platform of 1900, therefore, Jacob G. Schurman recommended an emphasis on duty because an alternative emphasis on the empire's financial benefit would appear as "sordid and distracting gloss." The president needed little convincing, as was evidenced in his letter of acceptance: "[W]ithout any desire or design on our part the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great Nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization." McKinley retraced the origins of duty and destiny to the exceptionalist birthmark of the United States. His interpretation was in line with Archbishop John Ireland's, that "[t]he elements of greatness were not imparted to [the United States] by the war, but they were revealed to her by the war."[35] This understanding buttressed the aforementioned understanding of national history as a teleological buildup to this moment in time, thus weakening the anti-imperialist recourse to tradition. For if colonial expansion had been the American "destiny" from the beginning, temporarily hidden from mere mortals, then there could be no past that contradicted the present. "Duty and destiny" transcended time.

Most importantly, however, this "objective determinism" suspended human agency and free will. "Destiny" absolved the American people from having to decide the difficult question. When Senator Lodge discussed Secretary of State Day's hesitation about Hawaiian annexation in a letter to his mother, he invoked the impotence of the doubters: "The Secretary is wise and cautious but he feels the pressure of destiny . . . which is bearing us along whether we will or no." Even in private correspondence, one of the foremost architects of America's new foreign policy, who had worked hard to awaken Americans to their international "destiny," disavowed his own responsibility. The historian Albert Weinberg has noted that this type of determinism

distinguished the contemporary version of Manifest Destiny from its origins: "In the 'nineties, . . . the doctrine of the inevitable meant not merely that American expansion could not be resisted by others but that it could not be resisted by Americans themselves, caught, willing or unwilling, in the toils of an inevitable destiny."[36] The notion of an inevitable destiny asked Americans to suspend their democratic power to decide matters and to let themselves be swept along by the "current of events." This was a pre-rational, if not irrational, argument. Instead of explaining the necessity of overseas expansion, it simply postulated it, functioning as a potential silencer and moral tranquilizer of the vox populi.

Well aware that destiny and duty were effective imperialist arguments, the anti-imperialists dismissed them as "easy . . . talk . . . to cover a crime" or "[t]he desire to hold a new toy, to enjoy a new renown . . . or the baser desire to gain money by it." E. L. Godkin, the keenest critic of this rhetoric, exposed the indeterminacy of the concept, ridiculing that "[w]hat Manifest Destiny is, nobody exactly knows," but he realized that "it is evidently the most useful phrase in the whole range of political terminology." Some anti-imperialists also formulated their own version of "duty," which confirmed the American mission of perfecting democracy at home. The Worcester Congregationalist Minister Daniel Merriman compared the preservation of American democracy to that of sacred relics:

> Duty and Destiny . . . combine in laying upon the Christian patriot at this momentous crisis, the obligation to resist with all his might the movement that tends to set the feet of this nation in the pathway of mercenary and forcible conquest of alien and savage races, to the dishonor of his own birthright; and on the other hand to magnify, to exalt and to guard the peculiar treasure entrusted to our keeping, till, like Mary's precious box of ointment, its fragrance . . . shall fill the whole earth.[37]

Most importantly, however, anti-imperialists turned against the determinism of the entire argument, "nature's fatal sway, pitiless, blind, destroying." Instead, they propagated voluntarism, which they considered indispensable in a democracy. Chicago attorney Sigmund Zeisler referred to the "cry of manifest destiny" as "a cowardly evasion of responsibility. The statement that duty determines destiny is a meaningless and hollow phrase. It begs the whole question as to what our duty was and is." On the contrary, Godkin explained, "one of the fundamental assumptions of the politics of the modern world is that what a Christian nation does has been done *deliberately, and after full consideration of the pros and cons.*" In a democracy, it was the people, not events, that decided the future. William Jennings Bryan stated this theory most emphatically: "Destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a matter

of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved."[38] To anti-imperialists, the irrational and impersonal understanding of national destiny had no place in a democracy.

Such arguments did not deter the imperialists. If their opponents wanted to discuss the role of the democratic sovereign, the imperialists were happy to oblige. Even if they willed it, the people had no choice because, as Beveridge explained, "[r]ight or wrong, expedient or inexpedient, we are going forward upon this line because such is the *command of our blood.*" The objective determinism acting upon the nation was paired with a "subjective determinism" acting upon the people. Their Anglo-Saxon impulses, imperialists maintained, forced the people to extend their historical expansion beyond the confines of the American continent. This racially determined expansive quality of the American people not only elaborated on the inevitability of colonial annexations, but it was also designed to further undermine the distinction that anti-imperialists sought to make between continental and overseas expansion. The "march of the flag," as Beveridge liked to call it, had been the prime feature of American history precisely because it was racially ingrained.[39]

Destiny was thus not only religiously, but also racially sanctioned. The imperialists wedded these ingredients to another time-honored notion, the idea of a westward course of empire, a *translatio imperii,* which Bishop Berkeley had captured in his famous eighteenth-century poem:

> Westward the course of empire takes its way;
> The four first acts already past,
> A fight shall close the drama with the day;
> Time's noblest offspring is the last.[40]

This was the millennial notion that empires had risen and fallen to bequeath their mission to a new and rising empire further west. Supposedly, this process had begun in China and moved from there to Greece, Rome, and Great Britain, to finally arrive on the shores of America. This process, the imperialists claimed, could not stop at the water's edge of the Pacific, but had to return to Asia. Wrote General Wheeler to President McKinley: "Civilization is ever turning toward the setting sun."[41] Historical and geographic sanction was thus added to the religious and racial destiny. This reading was buttressed by the official closing of the frontier in 1890 because that event confirmed the end of continental expansion. Contrary to how the significance of this census result has usually been interpreted in the literature on imperialism, as a dangerous development requiring new "outlets," it could also be understood as a positive development within the logic of imperialist rhetoric, as the end

of one historical period and as a necessary prerequisite for the next step in the nation's history (cf. Chapter 6).

In sum, overseas expansion had been preordained not only by an *external* destiny, but also by one that was *internal* to American "race" and culture. With this interpretation, imperialists fused subjective and objective determinism, creating a narrative that left no choice but to expand. Through the alliteration of "duty" and "destiny," the irresistible compulsion was represented in language as well as in substance. Expansion was described as a given, just as ethnic nationalists postulate that the origins and qualities of nationality are preexisting and mythical. In style and substance, this irrational "explanation" stood in stark contrast to the anti-imperialist emphasis on volition and rational decisions, upon which democracies depend.

Tradition vs. Progress: The Nation as Evolutionary Achievement

The example of Civil War memory demonstrates how central American history and tradition were to both camps. Yet, there was also a crucial difference in their treatment of history: only the imperialists insisted that it was time for a new departure. This was the logic of their understanding of national reunion and continental expansion. Beveridge formulated it with an eye to legitimizing colonial rule: "Self-government and internal development have been the dominant notes of our first century; administration and the development of other lands will be the dominant notes of our second century."[42]

Perhaps, expansionists realized that excessive traditionalism could obstruct their case. This would explain why some of them engaged in a "cult of the new." In his less well-known book on expansion, Josiah Strong praised the "novelty" of the enterprise: "Conservatism demands precedents; progress creates them. The first precedent is always unprecedented. The world moves. It is time to dismiss 'the craven fear of being great,' to recognize the place in the world which God has given us, and to accept the responsibilities which it devolves upon us on behalf of Christian civilization." Beveridge similarly warned that "[p]recedent becomes paralysis, if observed when customs no longer fit conditions." It was in this spirit that imperialists dismissed the Declaration of Independence or George Washington's warnings about alliances as outmoded and romantic notions that no longer stood the test of time. Combining this understanding with his "supreme confidence" in popular wisdom, Senator Lodge emphatically proclaimed: "I have ideals and beliefs which pertain to the living present, and a faith in the future of my country. I believe in the American people as they are to-day, and in the civilization they have created. *I believe not merely in what they have done, but in what they are yet*

to do."[43] This was the optimistic language of progress, and the imperialists consciously pitted it against their opponents' traditionalism.

While the imperialists had identified an activist global democratizing mission as progress (cf. Chapter 3), they also defined greater nationalism as such, as previously discussed. Lodge felt that his country was following the spirit of the times, emulating "the movement for national unity which was worldwide." More than that, greater nationhood was described as not only a historical, but also an evolutionary achievement. The imperialists' brand of (social) Darwinism conceptualized the nation as a personified organic entity or quasi-biological body, with its own inherent laws of growth and decline.[44] Having explained the nation's past as discreet developmental periods, the imperialists personified the present nation as a young adolescent, for whom the new international tasks represented a rite of passage to manhood. "The progress of a nation," the president lectured, "can alone prevent degeneration. There must be new life and purpose or there will be weakness and decay." His secretary of the navy, John D. Long, claimed that "natural laws" governed not only individuals, but nations as well: "Expansion is the natural law of animal, vegetable and moral life. The tendency of the age is toward expansion . . . God governs this earth and expansion is the natural development under the law of God."[45] In this narrative, the nation's overseas expansion was understood as natural growth and as a *conditio sine qua non* for the continued health of the United States. Nations and "conquering" races like the Anglo-Saxons had to expand, or they would whither and decay.

In this biological sense more than simply by virtue of available space, imperialism offered an escape valve for a nation that had reached the end of its "frontier," the limits of continental growth. This "solution" calmed some of the most pessimist thinkers of the Gilded Age. Brooks Adams, a disenchanted Brahmin who had developed a pessimistic cyclical theory about the inevitable growth and decline of nations, welcomed in imperialism the salvation for a society he had previously considered doomed. For him, natural laws rendered superfluous the entire (moral) debate on whether the United States should enter world politics: "It is in vain that men talk of keeping free from entanglements. Nature is omnipotent; and nations must float with the tide."[46] Imperialists believed that nations and their "destinies" were created and guided by nature, geography, religion, and history, but decidedly *not* by the influence of human beings, who were unable to withstand nature.

The evolutionary view of the growth toward nationhood was also encapsulated in the discourse of civilization (cf. Chapter 2). Nationhood was synonymous with civilization and progress, whereas "tribalism," the supposed organizational form in the Philippines, bore the mark of barbarism and a lower stage of development.[47] And while, in the logic of civilization, wars

between organized national units were no longer allowed, except in case of self-defense, because they undermined progress, tribal rights did not have to be respected.

In the concept of civilization, moreover, objective and subjective determinism coincided yet again. The American nation possessed not only a right but a duty to disown the "lower" orders of man, which the yardstick of civilization had fixed in an abiding hierarchy. "God must have intended that savage life and customs should yield to higher standards of living," the former Populist William A. Peffer remarked. If Americans failed to bear their part of the "white man's burden," they would be deaf to their own destiny and, more importantly, commit "a crime not only against America but against civilization," as Theodore Roosevelt put it. Once again negating choice, Senator Beveridge described civilization as a

> universal law . . . which requires of every people who have reached our high estate to become colonizers of new lands, administrators of orderly government over savage and senile peoples . . . These are the laws which history advises are the laws of civilization's growth. These, therefore, are the high ordinances of universal and racial morality which has for its ultimate object "that far-off divine event towards which civilization tends." And it is to this divine order of progress that I appeal in answer to the misapplied individual moralities [of the anti-imperialists].[48]

In this definition, Beveridge combined the forces of the inevitable, elevating civilization to the plane of a "universal law," sanctioned by history and the "end of history," the millennial event that would inaugurate global redemption and God's rule. In Beveridge's narrative, there was no room for "individual moralities" or individual decisions. Even "imperialism" became a rather inconsequential question because it was merely one necessary event in the conception of universal history.

The discourse of civilization also advanced the "normalization" of the American nation, which Lodge had indicated in his remark that the United States was following a nationalizing trend in world affairs—a trend that indeed manifested itself not only in foreign policy, but in a plethora of cultural phenomena, such as a standardization of Fourth of July celebrations or the Americanization movement. As Akira Iriye has explained, Americans increasingly "view[ed] themselves as members of Western civilization which was spreading its ideas and institutions to the rest of the world . . . The vocabulary of European expansion thus found its way to American consciousness and prepared Americans emotionally and intellectually to comprehend the meaning of what their government would soon undertake." While imperialists were convinced that the United States had to participate in a global

movement, they had no doubt either that their specific colonial system would improve the civilizing model set by the other European powers. They located the crucial difference in more benevolent and instructive arrangements, which would be provided through American *democratic* institutions.[49] It was obviously possible to integrate the belief in American exceptionalism with the notion that the United States was participating in a global movement for civilization and progress.

The notion that progress was synonymous with (national) growth was supported by parallel internal developments in fin-de-siècle America. Many observers discovered this trend in the world of business. Senator Beveridge, and with him most of the Republican Party, welcomed the formation of trusts and the growth of corporations as another law of advancing civilization. Although he favored restrictions on the ability of trusts to exploit monopoly positions, Beveridge criticized Democratic plans to dismantle them. To him, the Democrats' categorical position on the question of trusts amounted to a similar mistake as their position on imperialism, namely that "all the forces of civilization are to be reversed."[50]

Instead of outlawing trusts, Progressive reformers advocated strengthening the national government and enabling it to regulate the economy. As scholars have noted, such centralizing and nationalizing tendencies could be observed on many levels. With the influence of the yellow journals before and during the Spanish-American War, for example, public opinion was "nationalized," whereas the shortcomings of the army in that war convinced policymakers of the need for a professionalization and reorganization of the U.S. armed forces. This is not to say that all Progressives were imperialists, a connection that will be more thoroughly explored in the following chapter, but there was an affinity between internal centralizing trends and the imperialist emphasis on an invigorated foreign policy conducted by a reunited and strengthened nation. It was certainly not a coincidence that Alexander Hamilton, champion of a strong national government, emerged as imperialist hero, whereas the anti-imperialists favored Hamilton's arch rival, Thomas Jefferson. William Widenor has interpreted Senator Lodge's attempts to "rehabilitate" the memory of the Federalists in this vein: "Lodge was concerned to wed the emotive spirit of American nationalism, brought to fever pitch by the war, to Hamilton's belief in strong national government and faith in the powers of such a government to advance the national interest." Both a strong national sentiment and a strong national government, the imperialists believed, were prerequisites for the successful reorientation of U.S. foreign policy.[51]

In sum, the imperialist reliance on the national element was partially due to changes in foreign and domestic policy, supported by theories in science

and religion as well as by a worldwide wave of nationalism at the turn of the century. By emphasizing the American nation, the imperialists were implicitly advocating a "normalization" of their country, thereby enabling it to act in the same way as the other great powers. This trend coincided with the extreme position discussed in the preceding chapter that "the nation" superseded its precise institutional arrangements, above all the Constitution. "If the constitution is bigger than the country," Washington's imperialist African American consul in France, George Jackson, flatly concluded, "it should be buried." "Nations," Senator Spooner seconded, "must be selfish or they can not live."[52] According to this logic, the nation was invested with its own "natural" rights (which tribal cultures did not possess), and these outweighed universal democratic rights, if both were found to conflict.

The anti-imperialists disagreed with such ideas and the notion that progress was a value in itself. Their cause was conservative in the true sense of the word; they wanted to preserve traditional American policies, which, in their opinion, had made the country exceptional in the first place. Exceptionalism was construed as an internal duty rather than as an external (expropriating) right. Every anti-imperialist pamphlet contained quotations from American icons, and some material concentrated exclusively on the "voices of the fathers of the nation."[53] Although the advanced median age of this protest movement may have had something to do with this emphasis, they believed in the practical value of these traditions and, like Charles G. Ames, disparaged the notion that America had received a "new light" through its experiences in the war against Spain. He did not attack "progress" per se, but the imperialist version of it because it amounted to *re*gression as the nation stooped to the level of the Old World.[54]

Neither could the anti-imperialists agree with their opponents' understanding that the national principle itself constituted progress. They never celebrated an American nationalism and territorial growth divorced from the democratic moorings. David Starr Jordan expressed his impatience with the celebration of the nation, asserting that "[t]he greatness of a nation lies not in its bigness but in its justice, in the wisdom and virtue of its people, and in the prosperity of their individual affairs." Bryan argued against *territorial* growth, juxtaposing it with a democratic conception of progress and growth:

> Imperialism might expand the nation's territory, but it would contract the nation's purpose. It is not a step forward toward a broader destiny; it is a step backward, toward the narrow view of kings and emperors . . . We cannot afford to enter upon a colonial policy. The theory upon which a government is built is a matter of vital importance. The national idea has a controlling influence upon

> the thought and character of the people. Our national idea is self-government, and unless we are ready to abandon that idea forever we cannot ignore it in dealing with the Filipinos . . . *Other nations may dream of wars of conquest and of distant dependencies governed by external force; not so with the United States.*

The "normalization" of America was impossible if the country did not want to lose its exceptionalism. Nevertheless, few conservative anti-imperialists would have shared Jane Addams's "progressive" view that "evolution" consisted in overcoming the national principle altogether, toward a new "internationalism," in which "patriotism" would be replaced by "humanitarianism."[55]

Even the attitudes of conservative anti-imperialists, however, illustrated different conceptions of progress, which, in turn, mirrored the different emphases within the shared belief in American exceptionalism. The anti-imperialists did not object to progress, but they opposed divorcing territorial growth and the national principle from the nation's democratic foundations. Without relinquishing the claim to uniqueness, the imperialists defined a certain "normalization" of the United States as progress. Territorial growth and greater nationhood were seen as necessary and natural steps in an evolutionary process, even if U.S. colonialism was thought to be more "democratic" than that of other powers.

Reputation and Power

These differences between emphasizing a "normalized" nationalism and the democratic contents of exceptionalism were also reflected in the debaters' discussion of national honor and power. The imperialists crafted a narrative of individual and collective sacrifice and strife, which would enhance the reputation of the United States before the court of "world opinion." Against this traditional conception of national power and international reputation, the anti-imperialists pitted their own understanding of power in a purely moral context, as a function of the nation's fealty to its idealistic promises and democratic mission.

To stress the inevitability of annexing the Philippines—in line with the rhetoric of "duty" and "destiny"—the imperialists relied upon the concept of "world opinion," an idea that became increasingly important as American involvement in the global arena grew. In this reading, the United States had to prove itself worthy of the new international role and the incumbent duties that had been "suddenly" thrown upon it as a result of the war with Spain. A failure to pass the peace treaty would be "humiliating in the eyes of the

world." The president admitted privately how crucial world opinion had been in his decision to demand the entire archipelago:

> [O]ne of the best things we ever did was to insist upon taking the Philippines and not a coaling station or an island, for if we had done the latter we would have been the *laughing stock of the world*. And so it has come to pass that in a few short months we have become a world power; and I know . . . with what added respect the nations of the world now deal with the United States.[56]

Such statements implied that the United States' arrival on the world stage was closely watched and judged by the other "civilized" powers and that the nation had to prove itself worthy of their trust and respect. To do this, it would have to carry its own share of the "white man's burden."

The imperialists also believed that a nation's reputation and honor depended on its prowess and strength, as well as on its ability to meet military challenges and to avenge insults. Before the Spanish-American War, hardliners had grown increasingly frustrated with "appeasement" in the face of Spanish provocations, "the last pitch of national cowardice and baseness" in Roosevelt's eyes. "National honor" demanded satisfaction for Spanish insults.[57] These conceptions of national honor were individualized and personalized, based on the celebration of a combative masculinity, which was globally ascendant in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Taken together with the "biologized" parallel between the nation and a young male adolescent, it emphasized reputed masculine values, such as courage and stamina, violence, strife, and sacrifice. While the use of force was justified in the logic of the civilizational discourse, imperialist rhetoric increasingly celebrated strife and struggle as character-building in themselves, divorced from the purpose for which an individual or nation might engage in a struggle. This view was most famously embodied in Theodore Roosevelt's concept of the "strenuous life." Like many of his contemporaries in America and Europe, Roosevelt had long feared that Western societies had become materialist, complacent, and effeminate or, in the Rough Rider's own words, "over-civilized." War had been necessary not only for achieving specific foreign policy goals, but also because it "would once again call forth 'the best' in the American people," their manly fighting capabilities and the spirit of sacrifice for the common good. Such individual qualities were also national ones:

> [T]he nation, like the individual, which is going to do anything in the world must face the fact, that . . . it must work and may have to fight . . . The law of worthy national life, like the law of worthy individual life, is . . . the law of

> strife. It may be strife military, it may be strife civic; but certain in it is that only through strife, through labor and painful effort, by grim energy and by resolute courage, we move on to better things.[58]

Strife and even warfare emerged as values in their own right, designed to garner respect and honor for the individual and the nation. As Anders Stephanson has commented on imperialism, "[c]onquest here is *dual*: an internal conquest of the self, a regeneration, as well as an outward charge to purge and uplift the conquered spaces and peoples themselves."[59] Combative impulses and an aggressive nationalism were interpreted as highly desirable qualities, which obscured the democratic "end values" that the United States was presumably trying to convey.

Roosevelt had already tried to live what he preached. When he first entered the New York legislature in 1882, he had the reputation of being an effeminate dandy, an image he tried to shed after his mother's and wife's deaths. He traveled west in order to reinvent himself as a rugged frontiersman and to live the romantic stories he had imbibed in childhood. The war with Spain provided him with the opportunity to style himself into "a charismatic war hero." Commented George Lyman: "Teddy is a jingo, and has always admitted himself as such. He is a fighter. The first he has shown in advocating the war, and he has proved the second as well as his sincerity, and patriotism, by going to the war and taking the part in it which he did. All this will give him a large class of votes."[60] Lyman's predictions were fulfilled in the fall of 1898 when Roosevelt won the New York governorship. This political success demonstrates how widespread the appeal of his combative style of manliness was.

As analyzed above, the narrative of masculinity, bravery, and sacrifice had been a crucial element in sectional reconciliation. The South was "readmitted" because its sons had demonstrated their devotion to the nation in war. By the same token, the Civil War was reinterpreted and laid to rest as a glorious illustration of *American* valor and heroism. The Northerner Beveridge praised Southerners as "sons and daughters of a heroic race," whereas General Joseph Wheeler mused that "one great effect of our civil war [was] . . . to display the wonderful endurance and bravery of the American soldier—when every foe met 'foeman worthy of his steel.' "[61] This conviction reinforced the "historicization" of the Civil War because the respective issues receded into the background, while a truly national heritage of heroism, dedication, and gallantry was celebrated as the enduring legacy. *Dedication* to the respective sectional causes had superseded the causes themselves.

In turn, this historical heroism was "re-instrumentalized" as a model for the behavior in the Philippine-American War. Once again, Americans were

called upon to prove themselves worthy of their nation and of their fathers' memory. Secretary of War Elihu Root told an assembly of G. A .R. veterans: "The war of to-day is the logical outcome of the war you fought. The soldiers of to-day . . . are your children and they are worthy of you." Similarly, Roosevelt celebrated the achievements of Civil War leaders as consisting in "the great memory of their great deeds, to serve forever as an example and an inspiration to spur us on so that we may not fall below the level reached by our fathers."[62] History bestowed an obligation on the following generations not to be less heroic and steadfast than their forefathers, irrespective of the causes that heroism might serve. Loyalty to the nation and to its honor, which required meeting all military challenges, was implicitly used to legitimize the Philippine policies.

While the salience of this understanding of patriotism will be at the heart of Chapter 7, it is more important to emphasize here that the imperialists used the concept of a combative masculinity to define individual and national honor and the basis of national power. The ability and willingness to take up a share of the "white man's burden" and of steadfastly meeting military challenges were described as the basis of the nation's reputation and its new status as a world power. The idealistic end values of America's mission were undoubtedly present in interventionist rhetoric, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, but the emphasis on an aggressive nationalist spirit at the expense of ideals was equally undeniable. When President McKinley admonished his audience that there was only a choice between "manly doing and base desertion" in the Philippines, he left no doubt that "real men" would support his policy, but he did not explain why.[63] Americans were asked to support imperialism not because it was morally justified, but because they would want to prove their own and their nation's "manhood."

The pre-rational appeal of the imperialist vision of national reputation emerges more clearly when contrasted with the anti-imperialist model. Anti-imperialists criticized the "obsession" with power. Commenting on Roosevelt's "strenuous life," Carl Schurz deplored "the savage instincts which at present seem to animate some of the younger generation." Senator Hoar keenly criticized that the celebration of power and force had become divorced from the idealistic purpose for which it had been deployed in the war against Spain:

> Certainly for the last few weeks there does not come from anybody connected with the administration one word for justice or for liberty. All we hear is boasts of the exploits of our nation, the young athlete which has struck down an old man of ninety and now has gained a great military advantage with its wealth, its civilization, its discipline and its pride and strength of race and of intelligence

> over a people struggling out of barbarism and striving for liberty. The whole thing is unspeakably shocking and degrading.[64]

The anti-interventionist conception not only sought to reconnect the use of force to idealistic ends, but more importantly considered American ideals of democracy and humanitarianism as the true foundation of national credibility. They believed that the power of passive example (cf. Chapter 3) was tangible power, even when the nation refrained from using physical force. The Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones criticized "those who would read democracy in terms of military power and who believe that the physical arm of man, which never has been strong enough to save any nation . . . is stronger . . . than the spiritual power of man, which never yet has been defeated by any empire or power since time began." Military power was fleeting and superiority could not endure as other nations sought to surpass their opponents' potential. "Spiritual power," however, was described as eternal, always reasserting itself even after defeats at the hands of tyrants. When imperialists talked of America's ascension to world power status, anti-imperialists like Bryan countered that their country already possessed this power by virtue of its moral influence:

> The forcible annexation of the Philippine Islands is not necessary to make the United States a world-power. For over ten years our nation has been a world-power. During its brief existence it has exerted upon the human race an influence more potent for good than all the other nations of the earth combined, and it has exerted that influence without the use of sword or Gatling gun . . . In the growth of democracy we observe the triumphant march of an idea—an idea that would be weighted down rather than aided by the armor and weapons proffered by imperialism.[65]

David Starr Jordan agreed: "[O]ur influence goes abroad without our armies. Force of brains is greater than force of arms, more worthy and more lasting." As we have seen in Chapter 3, anti-imperialists were adamant that *armed* force was only required to repel attacks on the American heartland. The power of example, on the other hand, was considered to be more suitable to spread American ideals to every corner of the world. This view was most succinctly captured in Godkin's words: "The United States of America is, for all purposes of self-defence, the strongest Power in the world to-day—strong in resources, strong in intelligence, strong in distance from other Powers, and strongest of all in moral greatness."[66]

Against the president's belief that only "manly doing" of the nation's new duties would increase the United States' international stature, the anti-imperialists pitted their own conviction that the country had to remain true

not only to its own general traditions, but also to the concrete prewar renunciation of "forcible annexation." Schurz privately warned the president that a violation of this pledge would result in "general distrust in our international relation" and it would dishonor America: "The American democracy will have lost its honor. It will stand before the world as a self-convicted hypocrite."[67]

They were equally certain that a policy faithful to the president's promises would reap tangible international results. Senator Hoar described how the relationship between the Philippines and the United States could have developed without armed intervention: "There would have been to-day a noble republic in the East, sitting docile at our feet, receiving from us civilization, laws, manners, and giving in turn everything the gratitude of a free people could give—love, obedience, trade." While this utopia reeked of benevolent paternalism as well, it demonstrated that the anti-imperialists were not oblivious to material benefits. Schurz focused on the global benefits of keeping McKinley's promise:

> If this democracy, after all the intoxication of triumph in war, conscientiously remembers its professions and pledges . . . and then deliberately resists the temptation of conquest, it will achieve the grandest triumph of the democratic idea that history knows of . . . Is not this genuine glory? Is not this true patriotism? By so splendid a proof of good faith this Republic will achieve a position of unexampled moral grandeur and influence.[68]

By declining annexations, Americans could have preserved their credibility and increased their standing among the great powers. Credibility, therefore, was not based on the United States' ability to fight and conquer, but on being true to the specific promises of its president and to the general principles upon which the nation had been founded.

In the eyes of these anti-imperialists, the Monroe Doctrine furnished the perfect example that a largely abstentionist, principled foreign policy could be materially successful. Throughout the nineteenth century, they argued, the United States had successfully prevented the establishment of new European colonies in the Western Hemisphere—without the use of force—by decreeing that it would look unfavorably upon such a development. The war against Spain had then purged the last vestiges of European colonialism from the continent. If, however, the United States itself renounced the doctrine's underlying principle of anticolonialism and engaged in a part of the world where the European powers were jockeying for the last "open spaces" to colonize, these powers would no longer feel morally bound to abstain from expansion in Central and South America. Senator Hoar was certain that the "Monroe doctrine is gone. Every European nation, every alliance, has the right to acquire dominion in this hemisphere when we acquire it in the

other."[69] The success of the Monroe Doctrine seemed to prove that moral power could have very real strategic benefits, which were now in danger of being undermined by "bellicose" imperialists.

* * *

The ways in which interventionists and their critics described their nation's historical development and the basis of its power and influence revealed the inherent dichotomy within their shared belief in American exceptionalism. With their interpretation of American history, particularly with their understanding of the Civil War, and with their emphasis on destiny and the pseudobiological forces of evolution, the imperialists celebrated the nation as the apex of a teleological development, as an evolutionary and "modern" achievement in its own right, which enabled and even required a departure in foreign policy. When describing the attributes of that nation and of its status in the international arena, imperialists cited from the repertoire of "traditional" nationalism and its emphasis on military strength and prowess, comparing their country to a budding and combative man undergoing a rite of passage. The anti-imperialists detested such bellicose talk and, more importantly, also rejected the "nationalist" reading of American history. Instead, they replaced it with a thoroughly democratic one, which posited the perfection of democracy as the only mandate and "destiny" of their exceptional nation.

If the imperialists emphasized the attributes of a more "traditional," almost chauvinist, nationalism, it could be argued that they abandoned the confines of American exceptionalism. They were aiming for a certain "normalization" to enable the United States to participate in the contemporary wave of global colonialism. Some of the old baggage of exceptionalism, they maintained, particularly an abstentionist foreign policy, should be stripped away, although they were still convinced that the United States, more than any other nation, was ideally equipped to exercise a civilizing and democratizing mission on the periphery. As will be recalled from the last chapter, this willingness to "normalize" the exceptional country was required in part as a rhetorical defense against the anti-imperialists' constitutional arguments. National sovereignty was interpreted as a "primeval" source of right, which predated and superseded the Constitution if it was at odds with foreign policy objectives. While a "normalization" of American nationalism was thus required by the specific case to be made in defense of "imperialism," we can also assume that some imperialists were swept along by the enthusiasm that many Westerners and even colonial peoples held for the modern nation as superior organizing principle in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The juxtaposition between the imperialist and anti-imperialist narratives was exemplified in two statements by Senator Beveridge and David Starr Jordan. When Beveridge argued against the anti-imperialists' constitutional qualifications, he closed categorically: "The Constitution is immortal and even useful only as it serves the orderly development of the nation. *The nation alone is immortal. The nation alone is sacred*. . . Our Constitution is its instrument." David Starr Jordan, on the other hand, was emphatic about the subordination of the nation to the principle of popular sovereignty: "*The nation exists for its men, never the men for the nation*. . . The will of free men to be just, one towards the other, is our final guarantee that 'government of the people, for the people, by the people, shall not perish from the earth'."[70]

These statements provide an apt conclusion for the different emphases on the national and the democratic principles. Beveridge implied and Jordan understood that the emphasis on the nation made men subservient to their country. Through the concepts of duty and destiny as well as through "evolution," the nation acquired a life and a persona of its own, complete with its own laws of growth and decline and code of honor and prestige. In imperialist eyes, the people had to make sacrifices on the nation's altar, and the individual's free will, an important prerequisite for democratic decision-making, was the first such sacrifice. In fact, the question of free will functioned as a reliable indicator of the rivaling emphases: the national principle generally acts *upon* human beings, whereas the democratic principle acts *through* them. Like Jordan, all anti-imperialists underlined free will as the foundation of democracy. Their opponents, however, insisted that the decisions had already been made by "fate," that Americans had no choice but to support them as members of the national "in-group," and that a failure to do so would lead to existential threats to the nation's survival.

CHAPTER 6

Doomsday Scenarios

> Great power breeds great insecurity.
>
> Knud Krakau (1984)

> [W]hen the sense of mortality begins to take hold, there arises the question of exemption. Is one always fated to pass away from greatness? Many such speculations—and hopes—centre on the theme of some form of "exceptionalism." In the United States there has been the belief . . . in an American exceptionalism . . . Yet now . . . arise doubts whether America can maintain its greatness, and equally the fear that the curtain is falling on the American play.
>
> Daniel Bell (1991)[1]

American exceptionalism carried within itself the germ of its own destruction, the nagging question of whether the unique status could be maintained indefinitely. Had not other empires fallen before? Did the westward course of empires imply that history would end once "empire" returned to the shores of Asia, or was the westward course a repetitive, cyclical movement, which singled out the United States for a brief instant in historical time? In the past, religion and democracy had provided explanations for why the United States was supposed to be exempt from these cyclical laws. Within apocalyptic history, America was perceived as the last seat of historical empire and the transition to the millennium. Democracy replaced (or coexisted with) religion as the force that superseded history. Other empires, most notably Rome, had supposedly fallen after they had abandoned popular rule. As long as Americans maintained their form of government, this would not happen to them. Nevertheless, the fear remained, particularly in crises: "When urgent and baffling questions about the right course for the nation have arisen, the apocalyptic view of its history has come to the front."[2]

This was also the case in the imperialism debate, when both sides formulated distinct doomsday scenarios. More than reflecting the debaters' fears,

these scenarios functioned as latter-day versions of the Puritan jeremiad, a ritualistic rhetorical strategy derived from the prophet Jeremiah. Apocalyptic visions were conjured up "to arouse a slumbering people from lethargy to instant action," as William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., put it. In other words, the imperialist and anti-imperialist jeremiads served as dramatic rhetorical strategies to gain support.[3]

In these scenarios, the differing emphases on the national or the democratic element within exceptionalism emerged again. The imperialists emphasized external threats to the nation-state, whereas the anti-imperialists focused on the negative impact of overseas expansion on domestic democracy. These differences confirmed distinct interpretations of the relationship between the foreign and domestic spheres, which have been explored repeatedly in this book. The critics who concentrated on threats to democracy believed that only successful policies at home, perfecting American democracy, provided the basis for a sound foreign policy, designed to realize the American mission by example. Imperialists, by contrast, believed that a successful foreign policy furnished the basis for successful domestic policies because the survival of the nation-state depended upon meeting the contemporary challenges. Imperialists thus juxtaposed a "national(ist)" jeremiad to their opponents' democratic one. Significantly, though, imperialists invoked threats less frequently than anti-imperialists. As advocates of a new beginning, they preferred to promise a bountiful future.

The jeremiads were a mixture of perennial American (and indeed universal) concerns and contemporary problems. The fear of standing armies, for example, was as old as the American Revolution, but the recent turmoil of the Gilded Age, political corruption, industrialization, and immigration provided a very "modern" background, particularly for the anti-imperialist visions of decline. At times, it seemed as if anti-imperialism disguised deeper misgivings about modern America.

Threats to the Nation

The imperialists warned that inaction in foreign policy and a failure to seize Spanish territories would endanger the American nation-state. If the nation-state ceased to exist, some of them continued, American democracy would perish with it. Nevertheless, foreign policy concerns took precedence in this scenario.

The imperialists conjured up a strategic-military threat to national security, claiming that the outlying territories were "necessary to our safety." If the United States failed to annex them, but hostile powers did, they could threaten the American mainland. In the case of Hawaii, George F. Hoar

sounded a typically imperialist warning: Should the islands be seized "by any powerful foreign government [there] will be a great military and naval danger to our Western coast." In Hawaii, Japan was usually identified as the most likely competitor, whereas Germany emerged as the potential opponent in the Philippines. A German fleet had observed the battle of Manila, and U.S. policymakers remembered the recent tensions over Samoa. Anglophilia and the blustering of "William the Wild," as Lodge called the German emperor, increased the plausibility of such threat perceptions. The future Secretary of State John Hay wrote to Lodge: "*Voilâ l'ennemi* in the present crisis. The jealousy and animosity felt toward us in Germany is something which can hardly be exaggerated . . . They want the Philippines, the Carolines, and Samoa."[4] With such scenarios, the imperialists invoked a fear of encirclement, which appeared credible given the intense contemporary competition for colonies.

Yet the military-strategic danger they invoked was hardly immediate. Even if other European powers acquired the territories in question, it was still quite a leap to claim that they then intended to attack the American mainland. In this mediated form, the imperialist strategic thinking resembled a famous modern threat abstraction, the domino theory. Like a later generation of policymakers in that "condensation symbol,"[5] the imperialists attempted to link geographically remote territories to U.S. national security and to the security of the American economy—a topic with enormous resonance after the Gilded Age's economic crises. Nevertheless, to the extent that the domino theory was influential in the imperialism debate, it was a reverse or "positive" reading that pervaded the arguments of annexationists. In order to motivate their audiences to acquire the "domino pieces" in the first place, they had to offer more than the negative incentive that foreign powers might seize the opportunity instead. They had to describe the opportunity first before audiences understood that it was dangerous to let it pass.

What the 1950s domino theory and imperialist thinking on the "new possessions" shared was their focus on the extrinsic, rather than the intrinsic, value of the territories in question. To speak with the historian Thomas J. McCormick, Hawaii and the Philippines were described as "stepping-stones" on the way to "China's illimitable markets," as coaling stations and strategic strong points that would facilitate the promotion of America's commercial interests in Asia.[6] For years, Alfred Thayer Mahan had expounded this idea with particular reference to the Caribbean and the Pacific. His vision, as that of many other advocates of a "large" foreign policy and expansion of the navy, included an American-controlled canal through the Central American isthmus. In fact, Mahan's preference for strategic way stations over large-scale colonies was so strong that he initially hesitated before accepting annexation of the entire Philippine archipelago.[7] Nevertheless, annexationists continued

to describe the islands' strategic value in Mahan's extrinsic terms. While occasionally alluding to the Philippines as a source of raw materials and a market for American goods, Senator Lodge summarized the prevailing opinion when he referred to the archipelago as "the great strategic and commercial point of the East. We hold one side of the Pacific and with Manila we have our foothold on the other." The islands emerged as America's version of Hong Kong, celebrated as "key of the whole eastern situation."[8]

To escape anti-imperialist charges of greed, however, the imperialists had to balance such commercial arguments with ideals, which the president did in his first instructions to the Paris peace commission. After having rationalized Philippine annexation as being required by "high public and moral obligations," by "new duties and responsibilities," and by the "high command and pledge of civilization," he pointed to the "commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent."[9] As long as self-interest did not contradict the mandates of "duty" and "civilization," there was nothing wrong with seeking trade advantages in the Far East.

Events during and after the Spanish-American War seemed to confirm the imperialists' strategic domino-thinking. During the war, the U.S. pacific squadron had been resupplied in Pearl Harbor, thereby reinforcing the view that Hawaiian annexation was a "military necessity." The "sudden" emergence of American opportunities in the Philippines effected a reversal in the "natural" order of the dominoes, as even some who had previously been opposed to the acquisition of Hawaii now believed that "we *must* have Hawaii because we must have Manila." While the American position in the Philippines thus legitimized the annexation of Hawaii, acquiring the Philippines seemed to be sanctioned by developments in China. In 1899 and 1900, John Hay sent two "Open Door" notes to the major players in China, demanding equal commercial access for the United States and guarantees for China's political integrity. When the other powers answered positively, even if without any tangible commitment, the imperialists attributed their response to the *real* power Washington had at its disposal near the Asian mainland. Similarly, the fact that the United States participated in suppressing the Boxer uprising with troops from the Philippines "serve[d] to prove how useful the Philippines are likely to be to us in the event of any future difficulties with China and how useful they are now."[10] With domino-like step-by-step reasoning, the imperialists had thus constructed a case for annexations in Asia, in which one acquisition justified the other. The mythical China market, they explained, could only be exploited from a strong local base like the Philippines, which, in turn, required annexation of Hawaii. With this reverse domino theory, imperialists confirmed their opponents' worst fear that "the appetite will grow with the eating," that one annexation would lead to another.[11]

In their confidence that Hawaii and the Philippines would open up the markets of Asia, imperialists were as positively determinist as their ideological successors in the Cold War were gloomy about the consequences of "losing" South Vietnam. Notwithstanding the fact that other powers held exclusive spheres of influence in China, the imperialists insisted that, simply by holding outposts on the Asian periphery, the United States would not only receive its share of Asian markets, but assume "command of the East" and become the "first power" in the Pacific. Senator Beveridge made an even bolder prediction: "The power that rules the Pacific . . . is the power that rules the world. And, with the Philippines, that power is and forever will be the American Republic."[12]

Yet, this confidence could not fully assuage imperialist fears. After all, an initial commitment had to be made, and expansionists were not certain their compatriots had the stomach for it. Social Darwinism and the twin concept of duty and destiny may have suggested that expansion was a foregone conclusion, but even these determinist concepts left room for an imperialist narrative of doom. Roosevelt's understanding of social Darwinism, for example, still entailed the element of choice and, with it, the possibility of failure. There was his fear of "over-civilization," as indicated in the preceding chapter. If "the civilized nations . . . had lost the great fighting qualities," barbarism, with its atavistic impulse of war, would continue to dominate the periphery and could ultimately threaten the "civilized" world. Given the world's "evolution," however, this eventuality did not seem likely to the Rough Rider. More important was the contemporary race for colonies, which Roosevelt described in similarly social Darwinist terms: "If we stand idly by, if we seek merely swollen, slothful ease, and ignoble peace, if we shrink from the hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will pass us by."[13] Social Darwinism was no guarantee for *American* success because evolution would progress if Americans made the "wrong" choice. More than the scenario of a future attack on the American mainland, this suspicion that Americans might be too feeble for the global social Darwinist struggle embodied *real* imperialist fears.

The imperialists also reconnected this imaginary threat to their idealist agenda. If "civilization" advanced without the United States, it could have negative consequences for the world and for democracy's progress. Brooks Adams and John R. Procter claimed that only the Anglo-Saxon nations would guarantee an open colonial system, whereas the powers of continental Europe and Asia preferred a closed one. The sociologist Franklin H. Giddings asked rhetorically: "Are world politics to be dominated by English-speaking people in the interest of an English civilization, with its principles of freedom,

self-government and opportunity for all; or by the Russian-Chinese combination, with its policy of exclusiveness and its tradition of irresponsible authority?"[14] If the imperialist Jeremiad sounded more democratic at this point, two crucial differences remained to the anti-imperialist one: First of all, it reemphasized the primacy of foreign over domestic policy, implying that even domestic democracy was best defended abroad. As Woodrow Wilson, the "father" of liberal internationalism, put it: "[W]e shall not realize these ideals of liberty and democracy at home, if we suffer them to be hopelessly discredited amongst the peoples who have yet to see liberty and the peaceable days of order and comfortable progress."[15] Secondly, when these imperialists talked about potential losses to the global sphere of freedom, they conceived of these in a *quantitative* or *territorial* manner, as the loss of territory to those countries that stood for democracy. When the anti-imperialists talked about threats to democracy (cf. below), they spoke in *qualitative* terms, as the loss of democratic rights. And whereas the imperialists claimed that threats to the American nation *and* its democracy came from without, their opponents saw them arising from within, as a consequence of foreign policy. Hence, even when imperialists were invoking threats to democracy, these were still a consequence of threats to the American nation, democracy's agent and embodiment.

More than in relation to territory or democracy, the imperialists discussed the dangerous implications of their social Darwinist conception of world affairs in commercial terms—corresponding to their positive invocation of the illimitable China market. "Closed systems," for which the division of China into exclusive spheres of influence was the prime example, would keep the United States out of future export markets. Against the background of the economic crises of the 1890s, which were generally attributed to the overproduction of industries and agriculture, Brooks Adams claimed that the United States "must protect the outlets of her trade or run the risk of suffocation." Senator Lodge warned that "a great social revolution" could tear the country apart if it failed to secure foreign markets.[16]

As indicated in Brooks Adams's metaphor "suffocation," imperialists also returned to their understanding of the nation as an organic entity. The growth of foreign trade was but one aspect in this narrative. Implying that God had created America as he had Adam, Henry R. Gibson, Republican congressman from Tennessee, explained: "When God made us a nation, He gave us the right to grow; and when we cease to grow we will begin to die." This warning was the flip side of the imperialists' teleological understanding of history, and it reinforced their conception of the nation as a quasi body, subject to a biological clock and the need for growth (cf. Chapter 5). The implication was that the "death" of a nation could be prevented by continuous territorial

growth. Within this narrative, China's development served as an apt warning because it was supposedly stagnating. Too deeply mired in the ways of the past, Roosevelt remarked, China was "rot[ting] by inches in ignoble ease."[17] This characterization of the nation as a "body" with a life independent of its citizens confirmed how nationalist the imperialist jeremiad was.

Still, there was a place for "the people" in their jeremiad, not as thinking democratic sovereign, but as biologically predetermined representatives of their "race." As Anglo-Saxons, they were supposed to have an abundance of energy and positively aggressive impulses (cf. Chapter 2). Yet, this "positive" racism had an implicit narrative of doom, too. There were two ways in which the people's "energies" could become destructive. One was implied in Roosevelt's idea of the "strenuous life" and the fears of "over-civilization," namely that Americans could fail to hone their energies and begin to atrophy, like their nation, if they failed to live up to destiny's and the world's expectations abroad. The other scenario incorporated recent events, which most Americans would have experienced as traumatic. Overseas expansion was portrayed as the prerequisite not only to preserve and develop martial traits and energies, but also to *contain* them. "If, by any mistaken policy, [this energy] is denied an outlet," Giddings warned, "it may discharge itself in anarchistic, socialistic and other destructive modes that are likely to work incalculable mischief." Even more dramatically, Senator Beveridge defined expansion as the only chance of preserving social peace at home:

> Our energies will have an outlet; prosperous employment will keep busy those hands which, when idle, are always dangerous. Class hatred, sectional strife, internal dissension—these are the rocks on which the Republic will founder . . . and it is from these rocks of disturbance at home that our active foreign policy draws us safely away. It is better to employ a few American soldiers . . . in other lands . . . than to employ many soldiers at home to suppress riot, disorder, and insurrection here, caused by the very fact that we have failed to find . . . a market abroad for American surplus products.[18]

In this paragraph, Beveridge pulled together trade and the people's "energies" to describe why territorial and commercial expansion was crucial to the perpetuation of the nation *and* of the republic. Next to a sort of withering away and "over-civilization," revolution was the principal specter that imperialists liked to invoke to scare their audiences into action. Against the background of the economic crises and labor unrest of the 1880s and 1890s, in which troops had been deployed against striking workers, the scenario exploited prevalent fears.

It is in this sense that Turner's frontier thesis mattered in connection with U.S. imperialism. Advocates of overseas expansion were not seriously

considering a continuation of the settlement frontier because they shared their opponents' concern that the tropics were not suitable for Anglo-Saxons (cf. Chapter 2). Instead, without explicitly acknowledging Turner, they alluded to the crucial role he had attributed to the frontier in preserving social peace, namely the fact that people could always start over further west when the settled parts of the country had become too stratified. This social and psychological escape valve, the specter of new opportunities, imperialists implied, could now be provided by the overseas frontier. If Americans failed to seize this chance, however, upheaval and revolution might ensue.[19]

The imperialist jeremiad was a clever mixture of threats and promises, but even with the latter, disaster was always implicit. Most of the identified threats were threats to the nation, to the territorial integrity and survival of the country, particularly the threat of an "encirclement" by hostile powers. Significantly, though, the new territories were deemed important because of their extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, value. In a strategic abstraction that was almost a "positive" domino theory, imperialists justified the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines with the prospects of the China market. The most serious threats in this scenario emerged as dark undercurrents of their determinist narratives, if Americans rejected the role that fate had scripted for them. Whether imperialists warned of the innate "energies" of the people, which needed an outlet, or of the competition by the civilized nations to colonize the globe, these were again forces beyond the influence of human beings. In that sense, they fit better with the national than the democratic element. Imperialist doomsday visions also established a clear hierarchy of foreign over domestic affairs. Conversely, external activism was offered as a solution to internal problems.

The anti-imperialists rejected these scenarios, denying that these were the real threats and that their opponents suggested viable solutions to contemporary problems. They contradicted the notion that outlying territories possessed any military value. On the contrary, they were convinced that distant islands would be difficult to protect and that an attack by a foreign power upon them would draw the United States into wars it might not have to fight otherwise.[20] The imperialists' commercial argument was treated with more respect. Most elite anti-imperialists agreed with Schurz, who described himself as "by no means blind to the commercial side of the question. I desire the greatest possible commercial expansion, honorably accomplished." These men were laissez-faire liberals, however, believing with Adam Smith that powerful producer nations like the United States could command the world's markets through free trade without incurring the cost of administering colonies. "Trade does not follow the flag," Andrew Carnegie asserted, "it scents the lowest price current." The anti-imperialists were confident that

their country could outsell competitors, particularly because its expenditures for military matters had traditionally been low, compared with European nations. While some of them conceded that coaling stations in the Pacific would be desirable, they were certain that treaties with Hawaii and the Philippines could secure that goal, considering that the United States had long been granted the privilege of using Pearl Harbor. Entire colonies, however, would not only be an added financial burden, but their acquisition "in the hornets' nest of European rivalry" would generate wars. "Business," by contrast, "is the child of security and peace."[21] In their pursuit of trade advantages, many anti-imperialists were not opposed to benefiting from the empires of other nations, most notably that of Great Britain.

In fact, their advocacy of commercial expansion was so strong that the Massachusetts Labor Party complained that the "opposition of a portion of the capitalists themselves is based principally on cold-blooded calculation. These individuals . . . believe that the enterprise will not be a paying venture." Revisionist historians have concluded that the anti-imperialists were the "better imperialists," if one considers twentieth-century economic definitions of this term. William A. Williams has argued that they were championing a less expensive and more sophisticated version of empire, which would not require the administration of colonies, but still ensure "the overseas expansion of the American economic system and the extension of American authority throughout the world."[22] To be sure, like their opponents, the anti-imperialists believed that the economic crises of their time had been caused by overproduction and the lack of markets. They were therefore equally interested in trade expansion. As Robert Beisner has countered, however, "to describe the anti-imperialist movement as a campaign to create a less bothersome and more sophisticated empire than the one forged by William McKinley and his cohorts is to miss the essential point of the protest."[23] The revisionist analysis also contradicts explicit statements made by the anti-imperialists themselves. After having discussed the advantages of free trade expansion, for example, Andrew Carnegie warned an interviewer to "remember that this is all upon the *lowest* plane—mere material prosperity. I think little of that; the honor of the Republic is involved, and its adherence to the first principles of democracy." Despite his professed interest in foreign trade, Schurz still charged: "Then we are told that those islands are rich and will be a foothold for our Chinese trade . . . No more brutal appeal to sordid greed, no appeal so utterly hostile to the vital principles of our free institutions . . . has ever been addressed to the people."[24] While the anti-imperialists did not criticize their opponents' plans out of humanitarian concern for the Filipinos, it would be too "conspiratorial" to explain their opposition with a desire to find a cheaper way to expand American

influence. Their overarching interest remained the preservation of American ideals and institutions.

Republican-Democratic Jeremiads

Therefore, anti-imperialists focused on the consequences of overseas expansion at home, charging that imperialism undermined American democracy. This would strip the country not only of its exceptional character, but of its *raison d'être*. Thus, while the imperialists warned that without national security, there would be no nation to practice democracy, the anti-imperialists maintained that without democracy, there would be no nation. Instead of merely postulating the logical inconsistency between colonial domination and democracy, anti-imperialists pointed to concrete repercussions of contemporary foreign policy. Apart from those mentioned elsewhere and from the criticism of reputed censorship, which will be discussed in the next chapter, they warned of the cost of imperialism, the neglect of domestic affairs, the dangers of a standing army and the militarization of society. All of this culminated in the drama of the decline of empires. These elements were molded into a powerful narrative of doom and decline, which rivaled the positive determinism of the expansionist narrative.

Guns and Butter?

Rejecting their opponents' promises of the profits of expansion, the anti-imperialists cautioned about the costs involved and their implications for domestic reform. Even if there were enough money for guns *and* butter, they maintained, politicians' energy would be sapped by overseas problems. This analysis was noticeably influenced by contemporary problems, which predated the imperialism debate, among them the same economic crises and labor unrest that the imperialists alluded to in their doomsday scenarios. But while imperialists promised to solve these problems through their overseas policies, their opponents criticized this sequence of priorities. As labor leader Samuel Gompers put it:

> It is worse than folly . . . to lull ourselves into the fancy that we shall escape the duties which we owe to our people by becoming a nation of conquerors . . . We cannot with safety to ourselves, or justice to others keep the workers and the lovers of reform and simple justice divided, or divert their attention, and thus render them powerless to expose abuses and remedy existing injustice. A "foreign war as a cure for domestic discontent" has been the device of tyrants and false counselors from time immemorial, but it has always

> lead [*sic*] to a Waterloo, a Sedan, to certain decadence and utter ruin. In our country we are perhaps too powerful to incur outside disaster; but we shall certainly court worse evils at home if we try to benumb the nation's sense of justice and love of right, and prevent it from striving earnestly to correct all proved errors.[25]

Senator Hoar argued: "Any small trade advantages that we may get from acquiring the Philippines will be purchased, first, by the sacrifice of the fundamental principles of our Constitution . . . , and next, by heavy burdens of taxation and public expenditure." Enormous funds would be needed to administer the new territories and to enlarge the army and the navy, necessary to control the new subjects and to defend the colonies against the desires of great power rivals. To illustrate the expense of maintaining the necessary military establishment, anti-imperialists drew comparisons with other colonial nations or with the cost of continental Europe's large armies. These men were fiscal conservatives and initially confident that the projected costs of imperialism would deter their compatriots. Charles F. Adams, Jr. wrote to Senator Hoar that

> it is sufficient to take even minimum figures, and demonstrate from them that no possible commercial advantage to be anticipated from this territorial expansion can equal its cost . . . An outlay of five thousand million of dollars, in order to secure trade both undeveloped and limited, even with the consciousness of a missionary and shot-gun duty performed thrown in, should be enough to give us pause.[26]

Even more important was the question of how the funds were to be raised. The anti-imperialists warned that an "inquisitorial taxation" would be required. With this argument, they believed to have national history on their side again. After all, the American Revolution had been, among other things, a response to increased British taxation. George Washington had warned not only of permanent alliances, but also of excessive taxation and of "not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burthen [*sic*]" of public debt.[27] To the anti-imperialists, taxes were "un-American" and they would rob the United States of its advantage over the other industrialized nations. By adopting an imperialist policy, Edward Atkinson explained, "we throw away our previous exemption from militarism, which constitutes one of our chief advantages in establishing low cost of production coupled with high rates of wages or earnings . . . by which advantages we were attaining a paramount control of trade."[28] This was one of the reasons why anti-imperialists were confident that the United States could command the bulk of the world's trade without distant colonies.

They connected the tax argument to the charge that "the annexation of the Philippines would pay a speculative syndicate of wealthy capitalists, without at the same time paying the American people at large." As William Graham Sumner put it, "militarism, expansion and imperialism will all favor plutocracy, . . . [t]he great foe of democracy." This argument was based on the familiar assumption that average Americans could not emigrate to the "tropics" to benefit from overseas expansion as generations of Americans had benefited from continental expansion. Only large corporations would reap the profits. Dramatizing the fact that this argument was designed to appeal to the "working class," William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., reminded his audience that "[p]rosperity to a class is not prosperity to the people."[29]

Unable to profit from expansion, average Americans would foot the bill via taxation. Commenting on the war in the Philippines, Senator Tillman concluded: "Those bayonets must be supported by taxation, and the taxation will be paid by the laboring classes of the United States, the common, everyday citizens." The *Springfield Republican* connected this class-specific argument to that on the competition of foreign contract labor (cf. Chapter 2):

> Annexation is therefore a question for American labor in a double aspect. It involves the maintenance of a military system whose great expense will fall chiefly on the backs of the wage-earning classes. It involves the opening up of a new source of competition with American labor, which, for degraded standards of living and possibilities of demoralization to the industrial civilization of the United States, has never been equaled in our experience as a nation.[30]

Even if no contract laborer ever set foot upon the American continent, Samuel Gompers added, the damage done by the mere existence of cheap labor anywhere under U.S. jurisdiction to the reputation of (free) American labor would be immense. As with the institution of African American slavery, "slave" labor in the Philippines would ensure that manual labor would not be respected in the United States, thereby destroying the progress made by unions. Viewed from this vantage point, anti-imperialists were particularly appalled that labor voted for McKinley in 1900. Senator Pettigrew complained: "I cannot understand the labor vote of this country, neither can I understand how the farmers of this country are willing to submit to the taxation which must come from a large standing army." A pamphlet by the Massachusetts Socialist Party may solve this "riddle." It ridiculed the anti-imperialist fusion of the arguments on tax and labor because most workers were too poor to pay taxes. Contemporary plans for an income tax actually only envisioned taxes on higher incomes. This particular threat scenario may therefore have been too "theoretical" for workers, which helps explain why many anti-imperialist appeals to the "common man" remained unsuccessful.[31]

Nevertheless, Democratic and Populist anti-imperialists clearly sought to connect their diatribe against expansion to a broader critique of the Gilded Age. Domestic problems and imperialism, the clergyman and university administrator E. V. Zollars wrote to Bryan, were all part of the same pernicious process: "The money question, the trust question, imperialism, militarism, all fall under one head which may be sumed [*sic*] up in the phrase, 'Plutocracy vs. Democracy.' "[32] Imperialism was portrayed as another devious scheme of the few to exploit the many, and Democrats used it to emphasize their long-standing charge that Republicans championed the privileged.

Although they harbored no sympathies for Populists or Democrats, mugwump anti-imperialists also invoked the specter of a worsening "struggle of the poor against the rich" as a consequence of imperialism. Alluding to the possibility of a violent revolution in America, Garrison asked: "When the duped people awake to a sense of their deception [by imperialism], how long will your puerile trade calculations and national glory pretenses prevent 'the whirlwind?' "[33] Coming from the mugwumps, however, such warnings of revolution were more likely targeted at their own social class, particularly if put into the context of the mugwumps' fears of "the people" as destroyers of liberty (cf. Chapter 4).

What these critiques shared was their interpretation of imperialism and contemporary ills as moral rather than systemic. Social upheaval was analyzed not as a consequence of a new economic system, with its tendencies of centralization and monopolization, but as the result of individual greed. Democrats, Populists, and mugwumps shared disdain for modern business methods, and they sensed "conspiracy" as the reason for the concentration of industry. Individual businessmen were supposedly conspiring to control prices and politics. By the same token, individual greed was identified as the main driving force behind an imperialist policy.[34] This emphasis could be attributed to rhetorical hyperbole, but the intellectual foundations for such a critique of individual greed can also be deduced from classical republicanism, with its fear of the corruption of civic virtue. As Pocock and others have emphasized, republicans worried that the specialization of labor and the concomitant unequal distribution of wealth would widen the gulf between the differing interests in society and complicate the search for the common good. Furthermore, the restructuring of modern (American) society made it increasingly difficult for the urban masses to acquire property (preferably land), which had usually been defined as the independent source of virtue for the individual citizen. Such close parallels illustrate the persistence of vestiges of the republican persuasion in American political ideology.[35]

In addition to imperialism's cost and the diversion of financial resources from the domestic sphere, anti-imperialists also emphasized that expansion

would deflect attention from the important problems of their day. They focused on domestic race relations and political corruption, warning that these would be exacerbated by imperialism. Such charges already appeared in the resolutions of the first anti-imperialist meeting:

> Resolved, That our first duty is to cure the evils in our own country, the corrupt government . . . the disturbed relations between labor and capital, our disordered currency . . . , and when we have shown that we can protect the rights of men within our own borders like the colored race at the south and the Indians in the west, and that we can govern great cities like New York, Philadelphia and Chicago, it will be time to consider whether we can safely invite distant populations of alien race and language . . . to become our subjects and accept our rule, or our fellow-citizens and take part in governing us.[36]

As we have seen in Chapter 2, white anti-imperialists used segregation and racist violence as arguments against imperialism, suggesting that the United States was not prepared to shoulder another "race problem" when it could not even manage its own.

For African Americans, however, the priorities were reversed. They enlisted the new foreign policies to dramatize their own plight in American society. If a white anti-imperialist had uttered the African American editor Calvin Chase's warning that "before any government attempts to throw its protecting arm around a foreign foe, it should first protect its own citizens," we would have read it as a rejection of imperialism. Yet, Chase did not object to contemporary foreign policy in this instance, but actually used the imperialists' claims to "benevolence" toward the Filipinos to demand that African Americans should be treated just as benevolently. While many African Americans watched overseas expansion with considerable unease, they focused more on its impact on domestic race relations. Most African American newspapers continued to devote more space to internal affairs than to the Philippines.[37]

Even white anti-imperialists harped so persistently on domestic ills that it appears unclear at times whether they already considered their country doomed and imperialism only the "last nail" in its coffin. As a system of government, Sumner emphasized, democracy had certain limitations "and one of them is that we can never have an imperial policy and can hold no subject dependencies." While this argument was one about the logical incompatibility between democracy and empire, anti-imperialists also furnished evidence for this claim. In a democracy such as theirs, David Starr Jordan and E. L. Godkin explained, impermanence and vacillation in administration were inbuilt since the people elected and exchanged a large portion of the government biannually. Colonial administration, on the other hand, required permanence and administrative efficiency, which could never be

achieved in such an environment. Yet, they were so essential because "it is only by permanence in rules and regulations that a really civilizing influence can be exercised on barbarous, or semi-barbarous people." While both authors used these explanations to demonstrate primarily how imperialism would negatively impact American democracy, these complaints can also be read as diatribes against specific contemporary institutional arrangements and practices:

> It is said that in the ideal of our fathers our government was not a democracy. It was a representative republic, and the system of representation was expressly designed to take the settlement of specific affairs out of the hands of the people. It was not the part of the people to decide public questions, but to send "their wisest men to make the public laws." Nowadays this *ideal condition* has been lost. The people no longer think of choosing their wisest men for any public purpose. They try to choose those who will do their bidding.[38]

Such comments confirm the elitist disdain for the people and for modern democracy that some anti-imperialists harbored (cf. Chapter 4). "Imperialism" provided them with the opportunity to criticize foreign *and* domestic policies and to channel their yearning for a time when the "best men" were chosen for public office and then left "undisturbed" to craft the wisest policies for the nation.

The tendency to criticize contemporary practices was particularly strong when mugwump anti-imperialists elaborated on the requirements of a "good" colonial service, often derived from the British model. More than at the national level, they asserted, administrators in the colonies were dependent on professional training and a long tenure of office in order to be efficient. To develop such an essentially "aristocratic" foreign service with a certain corps d'esprit, however, was anathema to the American system of government, which relied primarily on the "spoils system," as anti-imperialists pointed out with relish. It is not surprising that the mugwumps emphasized this topic because they had long been active in civil service reform. Schurz and Godkin had polemicized against the Gilded Age practice of giving offices to political favorites and financiers and against the large party "machines," which ran entire cities as their own fiefdoms. Colonial government, Godkin asserted, would require "a totally new civil service," but pessimist that he was, he did not consider such a development likely: "That principal argument [against imperialism] is that we have neither the machinery of government nor the kind of public servants for any such work, and neither our political habit nor our political system *is likely to produce them.*" While Godkin seemed to believe that the entire system was corrupt beyond redemption, other anti-imperialists, like Schurz, used similar warnings for the

dual purpose of combating imperialism and continuing the struggle for professionalizing the civil service. Most important for our purposes, however, was the claim that imperialism would exacerbate political corruption. The anti-imperialists painted a picture of a future colonial administration, in which greedy office-seekers would go to the new territories, make as much money as possible, and then return. The reality of the spoils system would expose imperialist claims of the "redemption" of the natives as a travesty, and increased political corruption would doom republican or democratic government at home.[39]

It was such thoughts on contemporary political practices that led many mugwumps to view Democratic anti-imperialism almost as wearily as Republican imperialism, resulting in their refusal to back Bryan in 1900. Reasoned Sumner: "The Democrats will never give up the power and patronage of the Independencies [*sic*] when they are in power. They have gone over to Populism and will never return. They are very dangerous in every way." The Democrats controlled some of the most notorious party machines. Referencing these, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. wondered whether the source of his country's decline might not be internal, rather than external:

> You see [imperialism] externally, in the Philippines; I see it internally, in New York City and Pennsylvania—in Croker, and Quay, and Platt. Nations and communities don't die from disorders external to them; dangerous decay is internal. The trouble with Rome wasn't in the colonies and the empire; it was in the Senate . . . You know perfectly well, just as I know . . . to-day, republican institutions are . . . a ghastly . . . farce . . . Rome is repeating itself. We cant about imperialism, and look for the "man-on-horseback," and all that nonsense. Our Emperor is here, now, in embryo; only we don't recognize him, and we scornfully call him a "boss" . . . What is the remedy? . . . I see Bryan . . . come East, and go direct [*sic*] to New York . . . He strikes hands with Tammany; and now you propose to me to remedy the external danger by installing in power the . . . cancer. I can't see it![40]

In this interpretation, imperialism was merely the latest fruit of a corrupt system, whose decline would only be accelerated, not caused, by external factors. Some of this hyperbole is due to the fact that Adams needed to justify his decision to back McKinley. Nevertheless, many elite anti-imperialists believed that they were forced to choose between the Scylla of imperialism and the Charybdis of internal corruption, for which they blamed the Democrats. For them, overseas expansion provided the latest opportunity to voice a deeper pessimism about the nation's democratic order and its chances for survival. In contrast to imperialist scenarios of decline, anti-imperialist doomsday visions focused on threats to democracy or republicanism and

shared the assumption that imperialism would exacerbate existing domestic problems.

The anti-imperialist civil service reformer Charles J. Bonaparte keenly observed that imperialists attempted to reverse the links between political corruption, reform, and colonial rule:

> Some persons, such as our friends Foulke, Roosevelt and Procter, profess to believe . . . that the acquisition of colonies or dependencies will advance our cause by making the evils of the "Spoils system" more obvious and intolerable; others, of whom I am myself one, think that the danger of a far-reaching and disastrous extension of the "Spoils" system constitutes by far the most serious reason for deploring and discouraging the acquisition of territory for such purposes.

Imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt had long cooperated with mugwumps on civil service reform. With regard to colonial rule, they shared the conviction that "good government and just administration" were prerequisites, but unlike the anti-imperialists, they believed that American political culture could provide these. Franklin Giddings ridiculed anti-imperialist warnings: "If the republican form of government is to be undermined and destroyed . . . under the strain of devising and administering a workable territorial government for outlying island possessions . . . it would appear that our estimate of the excellence and stability of republican institutions must have been a grotesque exaggeration." More important was the reversal of anti-imperialist causality: the imperialists asserted that the need for an efficient colonial service would further the cause of reform at home. George R. Bishop of the Civil Service Commission cited the example of Great Britain to demonstrate that a professional colonial and diplomatic service had a positive impact on the administration of the mother country. Senator Beveridge summarized more catchily: "Model administration there [in the colonies] will be an example for model administration here."[41]

Once again, the imperialists located the key to domestic problems in foreign policy. Their ideas were testimony to the ideological affinity between imperialism and Progressivism. Imperialists (and many of them *were* Progressives) shared with Progressives a preference for a strong and centralized government and believed that the increased demands of a "large" foreign policy would speed up this development. Once established, this stronger government would be able to cope with the growing tasks of an expansionist foreign policy and with the problems of modernization at home. The national government and a professionalized civil service could function as arbiters between capital and labor and as regulators of burgeoning industries. This connection has not yet been sufficiently analyzed, and no

serious attempt can be made within the context of this work. A few studies, however, have begun to explore the connections, pointing out that colonial administrators increasingly considered the Philippines with a contemporary scientific mindset, as an "engineering project," encompassing civil administration, the construction of a modern infrastructure, and an efficient school system. These were key Progressive concerns, based on the assumption that the problems of modernity ought to be solved by modern methods, through science, professionalization, and efficiency. Imperialist Progressives expected that the successful application of these principles in colonial administration, directed largely by government agencies, would lessen the resistance to state intervention at home.[42]

The doomsday scenarios of both imperialists and anti-imperialists connected guns and butter, the foreign and the domestic. Both sides even advanced similar analyses of the ills plaguing their society, but they differed on solutions and priorities. The imperialists claimed that overseas expansion would resolve the problems connected to modernization and industrialization, and they formulated threats to the nation-state if this advice were ignored. The anti-imperialists rejected this as the flawed logic of conquerors and dictators. An overseas focus would not only divert financial resources, it would also exacerbate a host of problems that were already threatening democracy—the core of the anti-imperialist jeremiad. When anti-imperialists detailed these domestic problems, it was hard to tell whether they considered these or imperialism as the more ominous development of their time.

Militarism and the Balance between Power and Liberty

Anti-imperialists also warned about a militarization of society, which would corrupt the popular spirit and shift the balance of power between the government and the people. In Chapter 4, we have discussed the first proposition, how imperialism was supposed to undermine civic virtue, which was considered indispensable for upholding a democratic (or republican) form of government. The opponents of expansion argued that a militarized spirit would seep into the body politic and accustom the people to the use of violence. In order to be protected against outside attacks, which anti-imperialists were sure would increase as a result of expansion, the people would freely give up their liberties.

While this scenario of a threat "from below" contained elitist undertones, anti-imperialists also formulated a threat to democracy "from above," warning that "militarism," a large army, and the constant threat of warfare could provide the national executive with the necessary tools to assume autocratic powers and to abrogate democracy. President McKinley's (ab)use of the war

powers already seemed to be a case in point. In theoretical terms, this fear was based on traditional American (and republican) conceptions of a balance of power, which went beyond the separation of powers between various branches of government to the general balance between "power" and "liberty," between the government and the people. As Bernard Bailyn has explained, this issue had already preoccupied the Founding Fathers: " 'Power' to them meant the dominion of some men over others, the human control of human life: ultimately force, compulsion . . . Most commonly the discussion of power centered on its essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its endlessly propulsive trend to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries."[43] The tendency of "power" to encroach upon "liberty" was considered inevitable and therefore had to be contained by institutional arrangements and popular vigilance. This was why the Founding Fathers had favored a national militia system, because they suspected that a standing army would provide power with an excellent tool to encroach upon liberty.

Around 1900, the United States did not yet have a sizable military establishment. The anti-imperialists were confident that the "dislike of a standing army is a strong chord" with the public. This notion was so ingrained that it was often sufficient to recall that "our fathers dreaded a standing army" in order to make a point against imperialist designs. With Sumner, anti-imperialists believed that "militarism" was the handmaiden of imperialism and that, like the latter, it represented a system and a philosophy which was "entirely opposed to the American temper which has been developed by industrialism, and which does not believe in fighting methods." The sociologist also cited the examples of France and Germany, where militarism had stifled fragile democratic beginnings. What was particularly shocking to the anti-imperialists was the fact that their opponents *volunteered* to "take up the burden which is crushing Europe," thus setting their country on the same course that had ruined the Old World—a powerful argument in a country conceived as the antithesis of Europe.[44]

The anti-imperialists provided a number of distinct scenarios through which a standing army could upset American democracy. First, the mere existence and availability of a standing army would lead to war because "the military and the naval men will have a lot of new machines and they will be eager to see what they can do with them," as Sumner put it. War, in turn, would produce heroes whose popularity would give them political influence and office. Some anti-imperialists feared that this was already happening when Admiral Dewey was briefly discussed as a presidential candidate in 1900. Senator Hoar warned that "it is not the special business of soldiers and sailors to determine the policies of this country." In these ways, a more prominent role for the army might soften the boundaries between

the civilian and the military realms, paving the way for the popular election of a military hero and the inauguration of military government. The rise of Caesar and the fall of the Roman Republic were often cited as the most vivid examples.[45]

Democratic and Populist anti-imperialists added a class-based twist. While the Senate debated the ratification of the peace treaty, the House discussed the issue of imperialism in the context of a bill on the expansion of the peacetime army, which Republicans justified with the demands of occupying the new territories. Proceeding from the anti-imperialist claim that the existing military was sufficient to defend the republic, Democrats warned that the expanded army "is for home use and not for any colonies." This argument was—once again—based on the memories of labor unrest in the 1880s and 1890s, in which federal troops had been occasionally employed to quell strikes. Since they had identified the Republicans as the "party of the plutocrats," it was not unreasonable for Democrats to argue that a substantially enlarged professional army would be employed to protect the interests of capital. With a simultaneous anti-immigration angle, the Populist Congressman Curtis H. Castle (CA) claimed that the new army, composed of the "outcasts" of the world, would not care whether it fought enemies abroad or American workers at home. He closed his remarks with an impassioned plea: "Let us not provide the instrument for our own destruction! Let us not place the power in the hands of our enemies to destroy us!"[46] This suspicion was a populist variation on the republican fear of standing armies, the result very similar, though. As a tool in the hands of the few, a standing army would topple the American republic.

Imperialists derided such Cassandra calls by employing their "trust" in the people again. During the House debate, Republicans interpreted their opponents' fears as a "slander against the American people" because it was unthinkable that an army of Americans would turn against its compatriots. Neither was it conceivable that an American administration would use the army in this way. Senator Beveridge roused his audience: "Militarism! Imperialism! . . . There can be no standing army which You Yourselves do not provide from among Yourselves." Imperialists thus implicitly relied on the concept of the citizen-soldier, which had informed the militia structure of the U.S. military establishment. This was not exactly what the reform plans envisioned: militiamen were part-time soldiers, whereas professional soldiers—the core of the proposed army—would make their career in the armed forces. The imperialists glossed over this detail, maintaining that there was no difference between a militiaman and a professional soldier in terms of their democratic mores. President McKinley celebrated the ideal of the citizen-soldier in a speech in Illinois:

> Our people become soldiers of the republic to defend with their lives what they love; but the moment the emergency is over, that moment they rush back to the peaceful walks of citizenship . . . When Appomatox came, with the peace which it brought, the mighty army of two million six hundred thousand men from every section of the North melted back into citizenship, and ever since have been upholding as good citizens the government they so faithfully served.[47]

Formulated in the midst of the Philippine-American War, McKinley's remarks were designed to blur the lines between two distinct military establishments (and between two wars). The objective was to emphasize that an American army would never endanger the American people or their government. By his comparison with the Civil War, McKinley implied that military service was an important instance in which the citizen fulfilled his civic duty.

The discussion of "militarism" illustrates how different the two jeremiads were: while the imperialists sought an enlarged army to combat threats to the nation from without, their opponents considered such an army a threat to American democracy. "Militarism" was more than a larger army, however. It was a spirit and a "system," providing another example of how anti-imperialists were wary of both too little and too much influence by "the people." The carefully calibrated equilibrium between power and liberty could be upset by both. For power to be restrained, liberty (the people) needed to be vigilant. The military spirit destroyed both sides of the equation simultaneously. It tempted power into usurping more authority, while it scared or brutalized the people into accepting the growth of power. This understanding of popular rule as threatened equilibrium exposed the republican heritage of the anti-imperialist jeremiad, a notion buttressed by the invocation of the decline of empires.

Decline of Empires

> When Rome began her career of conquest, the Roman republic began to decay. The spoils of the provinces debauched the Senate, and the Government which had conquered Hannibal fell at the touch of Caesar. The French republic did not long survive the conquests of Napoleon. For an imperial system the concentrated power of an emperor is essential . . . Let us once govern any considerable body of men without their consent, and it is but a question of time how soon this republic shares the fate of Rome.[48]

Anti-imperialist doomsday scenarios climaxed in this "lesson of history." In their warnings about militarism, abuses of constitutional power, or the oppression of other peoples, anti-imperialists sought to prove that democracy and empire were incompatible and that the former would inevitably turn into

the latter. The fall of the Roman Republic served as best historical proof for this proposition.[49]

Such scenarios were simultaneously "timeless," reflecting the persistence of classical republican ideals, and time-bound, echoing prophecies of decline that had been fashionable in the Gilded Age. One of the most persistent dilemmas of classical republicanism had been a cyclical conception of history, the conviction that every social order had a corrupt antithesis it would turn into, that republics would turn into empires and these were fated to decline. Initially, as J. G. A. Pocock has analyzed, New World immigrants were quite confident that they could escape the cycle because they had broken with Old World vices. Nevertheless, the doubts associated with "empire" remained:

> The very word "empire" engendered not only pride but also anxiety, not only America's hope of unexampled greatness but also its fear of exampled decline. For to call America an "Empire" . . . was to invite comparisons with other empires, to invoke a common profile and a common fate—in short, it was to position America in history, as a temporal and presumably temporary phenomenon.[50]

In addition to representing a perennial fear, the fall of the Roman Republic had already been a staple of the utopian literature of the Gilded Age, most notably in the Populist Ignatius Donnelly's best-selling futuristic novel *Caesar's Column,* which predicted that class antagonism would destroy the American republic. In fact, the most pessimistic anti-imperialists like E. L. Godkin had also invoked the Roman parallel in the tumultuous 1890s without connecting it to overseas expansion. The fact that many anti-imperialists only had to allude to the "spirit of Rome" to be understood demonstrates how accustomed their society had grown to the scenario.[51]

In the imperialism debate, the Roman parallel was closely tied to the turning point when republic became empire. In harmony with the anti-imperialists' other threat perceptions, *their* Rome fell as a result of *internal* corruption and decadence, brought on by empire, rather than by the *external* barbarian onslaught: "Every empire which the world has every [*sic*] seen, founded on brute force and conquest, has fallen or will surely fall as a result of internal dissensions resulting from the inevitable protest and rebellion of its subjects." Even though anti-imperialists focused on internal decline, the Roman example was multifaceted enough to allow for very specific, politically tailored arguments. Samuel Gompers attributed the fall of Rome to his favorite argument against imperialism, that it was slave labor that had destroyed Rome, just as it would now be the slave labor in the colonies that would destroy the United States.[52]

Most imperialists ignored their opponents' use of the Roman parallel, perhaps because it had traditionally been the dark undercurrent in dreams of greatness and "empire." When imperialists did engage the historical lesson, they had various strategies to dispense with it. Some rejected the parallel altogether because Rome had never been a "true" republic. Others attributed the fall of Rome not to the transition from republic to empire and not to internal causes, but to the onslaught of barbarians from without—in keeping with their favorite juxtaposition of civilization and barbarism. More fervent imperialists, such as Beveridge or Reid, emphasized that the United States had been exempt from the laws of history because of the availability of space for growth (cf. Chapter 5). According to this understanding, empires *and* republics were fated to fall once they abandoned expansion. Rome had made this mistake when its leadership grew decadent and "over-civilized" and thus unable to withstand the barbarians. Few imperialists went as far as Roosevelt, however, who positioned his country squarely within history when he explained: "Nations that expand, and nations that do not expand, may ultimately go down, but the one leaves heirs and a glorious memory, and the other leaves neither." The implicit recognition that the United States might not be exempt from the laws of history and therefore not "exceptionalist" remained a minority position in the imperialist camp.[53]

Still, Roosevelt's impatient response went to the heart of the anti-imperialist jeremiad, the notion that the cost of imperialism would be the nation's uniqueness. The Roman Empire parallel implied that an exceptional nation could turn into an ordinary one, forfeiting the exemption from historical laws of decline. Godkin warned that Rome's decline would pale next to that of the Americans because their republic had been so much more exceptional than that of Rome:

> The history of America under [imperialism] will . . . be that of a calamity far greater than the fall of the Roman Empire, considering what our example has been, what our religion has been, what our knowledge and experiences are, considering how many instruments of civilization we possess which the Romans did not.[54]

In addition to the Roman Empire, anti-imperialists also liked to invoke more recent "lessons," the examples of the European powers, the "Old World," in opposition to which the United States had been founded. Having fled Europe's scourges, Schurz warned, Americans might now find themselves adopting its old vices. Sumner reminded his readers of the nation's anti-colonial origins: "This country owes its existence to a revolt against the colonial and navigation system," but McKinley's policies would inaugurate the same "European" methods in the American commonwealth. In this

context, the European methods were identified with a "despotic side," whereas the United States embodied the "freedom-of-action side."[55] This particular jeremiad also had traditional and contemporary roots. During the recent socioeconomic crises, many Americans had been wondering whether their nation's exemption from Europe's problems could have been a temporary phenomenon. With large-scale immigration, industrialization, and increasing class stratification, the United States was experiencing some of the difficulties to which it had long believed itself to be immune. Imperialism, its opponents were certain, would accelerate this dangerous development, leading to the ultimate irony, which Sumner clothed in an allegory:

> I intend to show that, by the line of action now proposed to us, which we call expansion and imperialism, we are throwing away some of the most important elements of the American symbol and are adopting some of the most important elements of the Spanish symbol. We have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies.

Sumner's provocative allegory confirms that the anti-imperialists considered the most severe threats to be spiritual rather than military, affecting the nation's soul and not its territory. As Senator Hoar put it, "[t]he American flag is in more danger from the imperialists than there would be if the whole of Christendom were to combine its power against it." This notion stressed the perception of U.S. omnipotence, which not only imperialists, but also anti-imperialists subscribed to. Only Americans could endanger the nation and its great experiment; outside foes would never be powerful enough to effect such results.[56]

The result of these scenarios was the end of exceptionalism, which William James drastically described as the nation's willingness "[t]o puke up its ancient soul, and the only things that gave it eminence among other nations." Yet, the anti-imperialist jeremiad did not stop with the destruction of history's most exceptional nation because the entire world's destiny was in American hands. By virtue of the power of example, the "death" of democracy in America spelled the end of the concept in the rest of the world. "The people of the United States," Senator Hoar preached, "if they will, can cause the great doctrine of the liberty of nations to perish from the face of the earth, and that is the great question you are attempting to decide." Edwin Mead was even more dramatic:

> If [the American people] have not the courage and the greatness of heart to settle [the question of imperialism] rightly, they will stand condemned in history of making the republic a murderer—more than a murderer of men, a

> murderer of the cause of human liberty, the holy cause whose chief custodian and champion in the world God had appointed them to be.[57]

The fight for America's soul was the fight for the regeneration of the world, very much like in Puritan rhetoric. America's destiny was that of the world, and since the country stood for freedom and democracy, these concepts would stand or fall with the United States.

* * *

The fact that imperialists and anti-imperialists affirmed their nation's exceptional character reveals the doomsday scenarios as what they truly were: the ancient biblical and traditional American rhetorical form of the jeremiad, preachings of latter-day prophets to rouse audiences in support of a particular cause. By emphasizing exceptionalism, the debaters dramatized the stakes: America could be saved, but if decisive action were not taken soon, the exceptional nation would be destroyed and the hope for humankind forever extinguished.

While interventionists and anti-interventionists agreed on the magnitude of the threat, they disagreed about its nature and direction. Their differences elucidate the tension between national and democratic elements within exceptionalism. The interventionist jeremiad was a national one, focused on threats from without. In a "non-exceptional" analysis, foreign foes were described as poised to encircle and attack the American nation. Such "territorial" scenarios have been invoked by "normal" nations to justify "defensive" or "preemptive" wars. American democracy would only fail as a result of the *nation*'s fall. The conflict between civilization and barbarism and the competition between the colonial powers were the reifications of these threats in the 1890s. The imperialist jeremiad was also predicated on an understanding of the nation as a living organism. If its growth were stymied by internal opposition, decay would inevitably set in. These threat perceptions prioritized the *physical* survival of the United States, rather than that of its particular form of government.

The anti-imperialist jeremiad, by contrast, was thoroughly republican or democratic, focused on the democratic foundation of American exceptionalism. "Normal" nations, this narrative insisted, were fated to decline, and the United States was only exempt as long as it practiced the democratic underpinnings of its society. Dangers did not emanate from without, but from within, through the adoption of imperialism, the concomitant neglect or exacerbation of domestic ills, and the attack on democratic institutions and mores. In terms of prioritizing domestic over foreign affairs, they

proceeded according to Carnegie's dictum that "[t]o be more powerful at home is the surest way to be more powerful abroad."[58] The most dangerous threats were also internal. The focus on the origin of the threat was crucial because, theoretically speaking, a *nation* is always threatened from without, whereas a *democracy* can fall to enemies from within, although external factors might contribute. The anti-imperialists experienced contemporary foreign policy not as protection, but as the source of danger threatening the United States with destruction. If America was more an idea than an actual nation, this idea needed to be protected for the benefit of Americans *and* of humankind.

Although the jeremiads were motivational strategies to convince audiences, they also reflected deep and recurring uncertainties about whether the United States truly was "God's chosen country." Had the "errand into the wilderness," as Perry Miller has described the Puritan concept of millennialism, turned into its antithesis, "the errand into the abyss," as Sacvan Bercovitch ironically paraphrased Miller?[59] In religious terminology, there is no faith without doubt, and in the American political discourse, such doubts repeatedly came to the fore when the nation seemed to be on the brink of betraying its original promise.

Such nagging questions always trouble dissenters to a larger extent than their opponents, whose policies are reality, after all. Some of the most pessimistic anti-imperialists, most notably Godkin, seemed ready to resign themselves to the imminent demise of the American republic. Others, however, retained hope as long as protest was dividing the country because the free expression of opinion proved the resilience of democracy. This was why they vigorously defended their *right* to dissent, a right that they described as a patriotic *duty*. This understanding of patriotism clashed with that of the imperialists, once again revealing the dichotomy between national and democratic emphases.

CHAPTER 7

The Right to Dissent and the Meaning of Patriotism

> There is a patriotism which mainly springs from the disinterested, undefinable, and unpondered feeling that ties a man's heart to the place where he was born . . . Like all unpondered passions, this patriotism impels men to great ephemeral efforts, but not to continuous endeavor. Having saved the state in time of crisis, it often lets it decay in time of peace . . . There is also another sort of patriotism more rational than that; less generous, perhaps less ardent, but more creative and more lasting, it is engendered by enlightenment, grows by the aid of laws and the exercise of rights.
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/1840)[1]

Alexis de Tocqueville referred to these types of patriotism as "instinctive" and "reflective" patriotism. The juxtaposition resembles the difference between ethnic and civic nationalism, between a primeval loyalty to the nation, "unadulterated" by any values on which that nation might have been founded, and a loyalty to that community's specific ideals.[2] As such, the dichotomy perfectly describes imperialist and anti-imperialist disagreements about patriotism. The imperialists enlisted de Tocqueville's instinctive patriotism and asked for their compatriots' support because the nation was at war and national unity and determination were allegedly required to win.[3] Dissent was defined as "unpatriotic" because it undermined unity. The anti-imperialists, by contrast, relied on a "reflective" patriotism, defining their loyalty to the United States in terms of its democratic ideals. This definition was essential in order for the critics to justify dissent itself as a patriotic endeavor. This subdebate on patriotism and the right to dissent once again captured the emphases on "nation" and "democracy."

The Right to Dissent

Before the anti-imperialists could portray dissent as a patriotic *duty,* they had to defend it as a democratic *right.* Although freedom of speech—and of dissent—is guaranteed by the First Amendment, dissenters traditionally have to contend with the explicit or implicit charge that their criticism is giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy in wartime. This was no different during the Philippine-American War when imperialists made little effort to affirm the right to dissent.[4] Nevertheless, there were only a few instances of censorship, against which the anti-imperialists rebelled, but which they exploited to dramatize their charge that imperialism was already undermining democracy. In the Philippines, military authorities in Manila censored press reports, but this practice was eased when the media vigorously protested against it. The most famous episode of censorship took place off the battlefield, in the United States. The eccentric businessman Edward Atkinson had financed the mass printing of primarily self-authored anti-imperialist pamphlets, and in 1899, he decided to send hundreds of them to officers in the Philippines. Deliberately testing the boundaries of "free speech," Atkinson requested the officers' addresses from the War Department. When the War Department failed to answer, Atkinson mailed his material without its help. At that moment, the postmaster general confiscated the pamphlets and the attorney general recommended charging Atkinson with treason.[5]

Although most anti-imperialists disavowed Atkinson's actions as too flashy and counterproductive, this episode and the broader dilemma of wartime dissent convinced them of the necessity to defend their right to dissent. For this purpose, they relied primarily on the First Amendment to the Constitution. Although freedom of speech is theoretically a *universal* democratic right, protesters labeled it a particularly *American* right, implicitly stressing their concern for their home country. The intolerance they witnessed was proof of their central argument that imperialism was already subverting American democracy. For Atkinson, the seizure of his mail symbolized "a step toward military despotism." Sigmund Zeisler claimed that repression was the logical consequence of imperialism, implying that it had to result in a monarchical system of government at home: "Today the exercise of our constitutional right of free speech is called treason, tomorrow it may be called lèse-majesty."[6] In a less fundamental way, attempts to stifle opposition were also described as involuntary admissions that government policies were flawed, for, as E. L. Godkin remarked, "all suppression looks as if somebody was afraid to be called to account." Within this context, the anti-imperialists returned to their elitist disdain for the people. William Graham Sumner explained that recent charges of treason exemplified a change in

the "temper" of the American people. As a result of the strained wartime atmosphere, the people were becoming intolerant and oblivious of their civic virtues. By attacking the dissenters, Sumner warned, the "masses" were chipping away at democracy.[7] These examples indicate that anti-imperialists were not satisfied with defending their entitlement to free speech. Instead, they used imperialist attacks and censorship to illustrate their core argument that imperialism subverted American democracy, whether through censorship from "above" or intolerance from "below."

It is a testament to the vitality of American democratic discourse, however, as well as to the relative efficacy of the anti-imperialist line of attack, that imperialists felt obliged to deny the existence of censorship. In 1902, when the anti-imperialist crusade was briefly rekindled by reports of atrocities and torture by U.S. soldiers in the Philippines, Senator Beveridge emphasized that the War Department was not censoring information from the Philippines.[8] Even in wartime, outright suppression of information and freedom of speech was incompatible with American democratic practices.

Dissent and Emotions

Although most imperialists avoided openly doubting the right to dissent, they employed subtler rhetorical strategies to delegitimize the opposition. Most of these appealed to audiences' emotions by questioning the anti-imperialists' motives. They disputed their critics' courage, political judgment, and—most importantly—their loyalty to their country, ultimately charging them with treason. Such attacks implicitly relied on an "instinctive" patriotism because they did not address the question of whether the critics had just cause for their dissent. This approach exemplified the imperialists' emphasis on a pre-rational and instinctive understanding of patriotism and nationalism.

The imperialists' "discourse of masculinity" has already been analyzed in the context of their visions of national greatness and international standing (cf. Chapter 5). In that context, the discourse was designed to enhance the personification of the nation and to identify its military ventures as worthy, "manly" endeavors. Within the debate on patriotism, expansionists "individualized" male virtues and qualities: in order to prove himself a man, each American male (and voting citizen) had to support the country's policies, particularly in the face of war in the Philippines. Imperialists used this conception of normative behavior to disparage their critics' motives and to question their "manhood." Raising doubts about the dissenters' courage and masculinity was a staple in the "Rough Rider" Roosevelt's speeches. He ridiculed the anti-imperialists as "timid, lazy and dull minded" and attributed their criticism exclusively to "impulses of sloth and fear." Senator

John R. Procter described his opponents as men who "shrink with fear." Such characterizations, echoed by virtually all imperialists, glossed over substantive anti-imperialist concerns and rationalized them as cloaking effeminate cowardice. President McKinley enriched this discourse of manliness with his conception of duty, portraying the choice in the Philippines as one between "manly doing and base desertion."[9] Only base cowards, he implied, would refuse to do their "duty." While Roosevelt defined struggle and warfare as worthy endeavors in themselves, McKinley's appeals to duty were less aggressive. The implications for the characterization of the anti-imperialists remained much the same, however: their criticism was unmanly and rooted not in lofty ideals, but in mere cowardice. Such charges were emotional and difficult to counter. They invited audiences to support the administration's policies not because they were right, but because backing them was the "manly" option. The theme of masculine courage also shifted the debate's focus from the reasons for war—arguably U.S. claims to sovereignty over the Philippines—to the requirements for winning it, from a substantive to an operational basis, which no longer required engagement with the critics' arguments.

To buttress their case that success in wartime demanded individual stamina, courage, and obedience, the imperialists invoked "lessons" from recent history, particularly the model provided by President Lincoln in the Civil War—more of an anti-imperialist icon in other contexts. Imperialists stressed that even in his darkest hour, Lincoln refused to heed his advisors' recommendation of a compromise settlement with the South. John Hay used this precedent to stiffen McKinley's resolve: "The country is with you, more than ever. Your policy has been just, humane and patriotic. It resembles Lincoln's, and receives, like his, the support of the many and the criticism of the few—and the support and the criticism comes from precisely the same classes as in his time."[10] Given many anti-imperialists' personal Civil War history, their support for Lincoln and emancipation, Hay's parallel was highly inaccurate. Most anti-imperialists were not the same men who had opposed Lincoln during the Civil War. Nevertheless, historical accuracy was not Hay's objective, but underlining the importance of unerring perseverance in wartime—even in the face of staunch internal opposition.

"History" could be employed in other contexts as well. Imperialists likened their opponents to those Americans who had resisted continental expansion in the past, implying that the nation would be weaker if past Cassandra calls had been heeded. Again, this parallel was inaccurate because it brushed over the crucial distinction that anti-imperialists made between continental and overseas expansion, but it painted the latter as timid enemies of progress. Thus framing dissent in the context of discredited historical examples fulfilled

an important overall purpose, as F. M. Kail has pointed out on the use of similar parallels in the Vietnam War debate: "The intended inference was plain: though there were critics during every war, in each case the outcome had exposed their position and vindicated the official line. The pattern would, doubtless, be repeated again. In the national experience dissent was nothing more than a tolerated aberration."[11]

Of course, "history" cut both ways. The anti-imperialists answered their opponents with different historical examples or with different readings of the same examples. Carl Schurz reminded his audience that the abolitionists had also been vilified as traitors after the compromise of 1850, only to be "vindicated" by subsequent events. When anti-imperialists invoked Lincoln, they often spoke not of the president, but of the young congressman who had opposed the Mexican-American War and insisted on his right to dissent in wartime. By omitting Lincoln, the president, who had suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War, the anti-imperialists were as conveniently selective in their history lessons as their opponents.[12] Irrespective of the contents of both camps' historical parallels, however, the motives and directions were quite obvious: The anti-imperialists defended their own opposition with historical parallels that had demonstrated the validity and value of dissent, even if only after the fact. The imperialists, on the other hand, delegitimized dissent by using examples of historical dissent that had subsequently been discredited.

No charge was more emotional or damning, though, than the "trinity of treason"—the accusation that dissent emboldened the enemy, endangered American soldiers, and therefore constituted treason. Even if not all imperialists called their opponents traitors, most were convinced that domestic dissent was the main cause of the Philippine "insurgency." This attitude was especially pronounced during the election campaign of 1900. General Joseph Wheeler asserted unequivocally that "there is little left in support of the Insurrection except that backing which comes from the element who call themselves the anti-imperialists, in the United States," a notion that was shared by American soldiers in the Philippines. By the same token, imperialists were confident that the insurgency would subside after the defeat of the Democrats at the polls. Only three weeks after the election, William Howard Taft, civilian head of the Second Philippine Commission, observed "a marked decrease in the activity of the insurgents." Although this post-election confidence would be tested when it became obvious that the Filipinos were shifting from organized to guerrilla warfare, the imperialists kept insisting that their opponents' rhetoric was "giving sentimental aid and comfort to the enemy," which was nothing less than the old-fashioned definition of treason.[13]

By supporting the enemy, imperialists insinuated, their critics were endangering the lives of American soldiers, a charge that also increased during the election campaign of 1900. While the president again preferred positive rhetoric, encouraging unquestioning public support for "the boys" abroad rather than criticizing the dissenters as traitors, other imperialists were less circumspect. Secretary of War Elihu Root explicitly condemned the invocation of lofty principles as an illicit excuse for the "abandonment" of the soldiers: "No man can shelter himself under the flag of party or justify himself by any declaration of principle in failing to stand behind the men of all parties and all creeds who lie today in the trenches of Luzon. (great applause) No man who knows his duty and is a true American will fail to do it. (cheers)." The support of the soldiers in wartime was a national and a natural task. Once troops were deployed, debate on substantive or moral issues was to stop. Veterans' organizations and imperialist politicians also maintained that anti-imperialist statements had "a tendency to create dissatisfaction or discontent among our soldiers or sailors" or that the Democrats were guilty of outright "hostility to our sailors and soldiers." Once again, it was Beveridge who drew the most drastic conclusion from these charges: "I say to those whose voices in America have cheered those misguided natives on to shoot our soldiers down, that the blood of those dead and wounded boys of ours is on their hands, and the flood of all the years can never wash that stain away."[14] The logic was inescapable: Anti-imperialist criticism was the driving force behind Filipino resistance, so it was directly responsible for the deaths of American soldiers in that remote archipelago. The anti-imperialists were not only guilty of a lack of patriotism, but of criminal neglect of their compatriots in the field (see figure 7.1).

Consequently, imperialists branded their critics' arguments as "traitorous, imbecile, and fool's talk" and the anti-imperialists themselves as "this dangerous element of traitors." During the election campaign of 1900, Beveridge explained that either the Democrats were advocating retreat from the Philippines, thereby supporting the enemy and displaying "un-American attitudes," or they would have to declare themselves in favor of retaining the archipelago, in which case "imperialism" was an inflated partisan issue. In other words, anti-imperialists who did not reconsider were traitors.[15] This interpretation of the Philippine "insurgency" and its surprising tenacity enabled the imperialists not only to tarnish the opposition, but also to shed responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. Not the administration's declaration of U.S. sovereignty, but the anti-imperialists' planting false hope for Philippine independence was responsible for the uprising. Such reasoning "internalized" the overseas conflict, as if the real battle were taking place in the United States, between the administration and its critics. The imperialist claim that the outcome of the war hinged on the loyalty and stamina of the

Figure 7.1 Louis Dalrymple, "Halt!" Cartoon showing the spirit of General Henry Ware Lawton trying to prevent William Jennings Bryan from tearing down the American flag in Cuba and the Philippines

Source: *Puck,* November 7, 1900, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.

home front betrayed a sense of omnipotence: apparently, it was inconceivable that "backwards" Asians could defeat the United States. Only Americans could do that to themselves; the choice between victory and defeat was entirely in their own hands.

Such charges have been the hardest to refute for antiwar critics of all eras and societies. In the debate under consideration, there were defensive and offensive ways to deal with these attacks. Defensively, the anti-imperialists pleaded that both sides "respect the purity of purpose of each other" in the debate, implying that their criticism was not intended to help the enemy. More generally, they insisted on their democratic right to dissent from government policy even during wartime. H. K. Love, a U.S. army officer in the Philippines, combined these two approaches in an appeal:

> I think it will be found that the opposition has not been with any view to tarnish American arms, but from an honest conviction that a radical change has been adopted . . . I dont [*sic*] see why there may not be an entirely patriotic difference of opinion on this. It is certainly an incident of free government to watch and to criticize, even tho' armies be afield.[16]

The genesis of the Philippine-American War also allowed for an offensive strategy in dealing with the proposition that the war might not have taken

place had it not been for the domestic opposition. As we have seen earlier, the anti-imperialists maintained that the war resulted from a betrayal of a de facto American-Filipino 1898 alliance. Therefore, it was preposterous, as Senator Hoar asserted, to blame the anti-imperialists for the war: "[T]o attempt to charge this thing upon those of us who have but proclaimed the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, and have but repeated the Cuban resolutions . . . is a proceeding not matched in impudence since the day of the upstream wolf and the downstream lamb." Remarkably, though, most anti-imperialists avoided responding to the charge that they endangered the soldiers' lives, perhaps because they thought that it was obvious from their arguments that they blamed the imperialists for putting the soldiers in harm's way in the first place. Senator Tillman was one of the few dissenters who spelled out this reasoning in more detail: "If you want my opinion as to whose hands are red with the blood of American soldiers . . . [t]hose are the men who, whether from corruption or from weakness or both, gave the President the legal excuse which he needed to prosecute the war."[17] For the most part, however, anti-imperialists seemed to sidestep this sensitive issue.

The imperialists' attacks on the right to dissent and the anti-imperialists' defense of that right anticipated their positive conceptions of patriotism. The imperialists emotionalized the debate by claiming that dissent in wartime harmed the nation, its soldiers, and Americans' masculine identity. These arguments obscured the substantive issues the anti-imperialists had raised, implying a loyalty that was automatic instead of reflective. Anti-imperialists, on the other hand, insisted on their right to reason and argue.

Unity and the Patriotism of Soldiers

This dichotomy was fleshed out further in the opposing sides' positive definitions of patriotism. If dissent detracted from the common purpose imperialists considered necessary to win the war in the Philippines, the simplest way to invoke instinctive patriotism was the appeal to "unity" in the face of external foes. In wartime, the imperialists argued, "partisanship" had to end, and all Americans had to rally around the flag. While this is undoubtedly an appeal shared by interventionists of all ages, "unity" was enhanced by the theme of national reunion in the imperialism debate. As discussed in Chapter 5, particularly McKinley instrumentalized reunion to further his foreign policy agenda. In a typical statement fusing patriotism and unity, he claimed: "This is an era of patriotism. There are no party lines. Partisanship has been hushed and the voice of patriotism alone is heard throughout the land. Never was there a more united people." In the midst of the 1898 midterm election campaign and public discussion of the upcoming peace treaty, McKinley postulated the end of sectionalism *and* of partisanship. He

sought to identify his foreign policies as nonpartisan and patriotic, whereas the opposition was defined as *a priori* partisan and unpatriotic. "Partisanship" also implied that the Democrats had not adopted anti-imperialism out of conviction, but out of convenience, to increase their chances at the polls—a charge that was made more credible by William Jennings Bryan's legislative maneuvers on the Spanish-American peace treaty. This political opportunism magnified the "crime" they were committing against their own nation. For the 1900 presidential election, Beveridge shrunk this proposition into a handy campaign slogan: "McKinley, union and advance; Bryan, division and retreat—that is the meaning of this campaign."[18] The theme of unity implied that there was only one legitimate—or at least patriotic—viewpoint. Irrespective of the wisdom or morality of overseas expansion, Americans were asked to unite in the face of a common foe. This understanding superseded not only (universalist and American) ideals and principles, but also individual conscience in favor of a mass reflex.

Imperialists defined the soldiers as the ideal representatives of this attitude, as quintessential patriots. While the critics were already lambasted for "abandoning" the soldiers, the latter were also celebrated as models for patriotic behavior on the home front. Imperialists pointed to the soldier's willingness to bring the ultimate sacrifice, his life, in service of the nation, and they emphasized his discipline and unquestioning obedience. Like true American patriots, the soldier did not ask why a war was being fought. Recalling Civil War heroism, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the future Supreme Court judge, had famously celebrated this spirit on Memorial Day 1895, before the events discussed here, and contrasted it with the "civilized" pursuits of contemporary reformers: "[T]he faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has little notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use." Four years later, the president's jingoist attorney general, John W. Griggs, added the enduring glory of battle:

> People sometimes deplore war and speak of peace conferences as though they could put out of the soul of mankind all love of glory . . . You may declare and resolve and vow till the end of the world, my friends, but the longest and last in the admiration of the human soul will live deeds of heroism and gallantry done in noble causes for the benefit of the world and mankind and God . . . My friends, when the honor of the Nation, when the glory of the flag and its supremacy are in question no honest patriot, nothing but a coward, would stop to ask what it would cost to save it.[19]

Although Griggs qualified his remarks by alluding to the idealistic objectives of the imperialist mission, he celebrated the soldier's heroism as attractive in

its own right. An attack on the nation's soldiers was described as an attack on the nation itself because American forces acted as representatives of the nation abroad, fulfilling its will and sharing with the entire nation the glory they earned on the "field of honor." McKinley spoke similarly before a volunteer regiment: "Our troops represented the courage and conscience, the purpose and patriotism of their country. Whether in Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines, or at home awaiting orders, they did their full duty, and all sought the post of greatest peril." This idea of representation was crucial because it also worked in reverse: since the soldiers shared their glory with the people at home, they could also expect their support. More than that, an attack on one such American "representative" or on the flag he carried logically constituted an attack on the honor of every American on the home front as well. Nation and citizen, collective and individual, soldier and civilian, were one once again. William D. Hoard, ex-governor of Wisconsin and editor of the *Dairyman,* expressed this personalization of the distant war: "[T]he same doctrine governs me in [*sic*] at present that concerned me in the Civil War, which is, that the man who shoots at the flag shoots at me."[20]

Many imperialists emphasized the soldiers' attitude toward duty—clearly a loaded term in the imperialism debate. The district judge Emory Speer added that volunteer regiments in the Philippines had done more than their duty because they "did not depart in the hour of need" when their time of enlistment was up, but regular regiments had not yet arrived to replace them. For Griggs, the most important point was *how* American soldiers fulfilled their duties "on the firing line," namely "*without reasoning or questioning why.*" Unlike the "undisciplined" civilians at home, they did not ask for the price of victory and instead followed orders automatically. This was the attitude toward duty that imperialists wanted the home front to replicate, after having identified the tasks in the Far East as their country's new duties. Griggs also reminded his audience that the soldier's duty entailed the willingness to sacrifice his life for the honor and the greater good of the nation, and he called for a national education of the young in that spirit: "There should be taught to the boys a spirit of manliness, a spirit that scorns suffering and hardship and loss, and death itself if the honor of the country demands such sacrifice."[21] The soldier's model of patriotism was therefore crucial for the imperialists in several respects. His unquestioning attitude toward the fulfillment of duty should be emulated at home. The automatic nature of the soldier's reflexes underlined the instinctive nature of patriotism that the imperialists projected. The serviceman's willingness to sacrifice his life for the nation was designed to shame the dissenters and doubters at home. If some Americans were willing to die for their country, they deserved the utmost support, and dissenters should at least remain silent.

The African American minority generally subscribed to the imperialists' close connection between patriotism and military service, even those who opposed overseas expansion. As indicated in Chapter 2, however, they did so not necessarily because they subscribed to imperialist policies, but because they hoped that military service would advance the cause of civil rights. When the Spanish-American War broke out, there was a large consensus within the African American community that speedy volunteering for army service would prove its patriotism. The Washington lawyer Thomas Jones's words were indicative of the prevalent mood and of the larger rationale behind it:

> The Spanish-American war will mark a new era for the negro in our national history. It is his opportunity, he who advises him otherwise is a traitor to the negroes[']' best interest . . . [A]ll of the sister nations of the earth shall applaud your deed and the American people will be compelled to accord you that honor and distinction which shall be due to all of her loyal sons whose sacrifices and valor brought victory and triumph to the nation.[22]

This enthusiasm cooled considerably when several states refused to enroll black volunteers and when these volunteers had to serve under white officers. Nevertheless, integrationists did not give up hope that military service would reap peacetime rewards, as Booker T. Washington confirmed at the Chicago Peace Jubilee in front of a largely white audience: "[T]hen decide within yourselves whether a race that is thus willing to die for its country should not be given the highest opportunity to live for its country?" By alluding to the soldier's willingness to sacrifice his life for his country, Washington employed a dramatic appeal similar to that used by imperialists, but he did so for a different purpose, namely to further integration. Although no recognizable gains materialized as a result of the Spanish-American War and although many African Americans had strong misgivings about the war in the Philippines, most of them eventually supported the McKinley administration and the idea of sending black volunteers to the Philippines. They kept on hoping that military patriotism would improve their opportunities at home, but they equally continued to insist on black officers for black troops.[23] A survey of the contemporary African American press showed that these themes were much more prevalent than "imperialism." Their embrace of the imperialist version of "military patriotism" should therefore not be read as unqualified support for overseas expansion.

There was also a flip side to their support for a "soldierly" patriotism that was based on the expectation of tangible benefits for the African American community, namely that it was conditional. In some parts of the African American community, doubts about the value of a patriotic attitude coexisted with qualified support for the administration's policies. The editor Calvin

Chase complained: "The negroes are still waiting to be called to defend a flag that is not giving them protection and uphold a constitution that is construed in the interest of the white man." Writing in the Democratic *Broad Ax,* W. P. Hough warned:

> If more respect is not shown for the American negro and the rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States, the negro will cease to think he is an American, and like the Indian become an uncertain factor. No flag to serve, no home to call his own. No interest to protect. No country to shed his blood [for] and manifest his loyalty and undying devotion [to].[24]

Thus, although most African Americans seemed to embrace the imperialist rather than the anti-imperialist brand of patriotism in the debate, their patriotism was much more qualified. Some warned that they might relinquish a patriotic attitude altogether, unthinkable even among white anti-imperialists. For our purposes, however, it is crucial to emphasize that such dire warnings were uttered out of desperation over the unsatisfactory state of integration at home, not because of any implacable opposition to imperialist policies abroad. This finding indicates that it is highly unlikely that the American exceptionalist consensus will shatter as a result of foreign policy debates. If this powerful ideological cohesion ever ruptures, it will more likely be the result of broken domestic promises.

Apart from these vague, domestically motivated warnings, however, the majority of African Americans subscribed to the imperialists' "soldierly" patriotism. On the whole, this version invoked allegiance to those who fought the nation's wars. More importantly, the imperialists emphasized those soldierly qualities that buttressed their overall case for an unquestioning and instinctive patriotism that focused on the nation, not on its reputed values.

Dissent as Patriotic Duty

Anti-imperialists criticized their foes' "bellicose and defiant" variety of patriotism, observing that it was specifically designed to avoid debate on the issues. Sumner warned that "[p]atriotism is being prostituted into a nervous intoxication which is fatal to *an apprehension of truth.*" Turning the same thought into a positive mandate, Andrew Carnegie pleaded for a more peaceful patriotism: "If there be one duty which a man of influence has to perform to his country higher than another, it is to refrain from arousing the passions of the people against other nations and to keep them in the paths of peace."[25] With its warning about popular passions, Carnegie's statement echoed the anti-imperialists' fear of "the masses."

Anti-imperialists also objected to their opponents' interpretation of unity and nonpartisanship. In fact, the charge of partisanship worked both ways, depending on whether one identified loyalty to the nation or to its democratic ideals as the foundation of patriotism. Erving Winslow, secretary of the NEAIL, praised senators who had voted against the peace treaty with Spain for "showing . . . that they preferred patriotism to partisanship." Frederick W. Gookin, member of the CAIL, carefully distinguished between loyalty to the country and "loyalty to an administration [which] is an entirely different thing." Similarly, Moorfield Storey insisted that the *imperialists* were being partisan because they demanded that Americans "shall be loyal to them and disloyal to the country."[26] Anti-imperialists thus implied that their objective was not dissent for its own sake, but the creation of a true consensus based on democratic deliberation. By attempting to suppress legitimate differences about overseas expansion, the imperialists were guilty of sowing discord among Americans.

The critics described their own love of country as "a truer and larger patriotism," which put loyalty to the nation's democratic ideals and its system of government first. In their minds, both were threatened by colonial expansion. Dissent was therefore not only a right, but a duty for every "true" American. To dramatize this understanding and to contest the imperialists' monopoly on the term "duty," critics pointed out that *their* duty to dissent was not easy, but instead a difficult task in the face of official pressure, censorship, and popular passions. As the following excerpt from the CAIL's 1899 platform illustrates, anti-imperialists took great pains to emphasize that they wanted to strengthen the country or, to be more precise, its democratic society: "The frank expression of honest convictions upon great questions of public policy is vital to the health and even to the preservation of representative government. Such expression is, therefore, the sacred duty of American citizens."[27]

Occasionally, anti-imperialists even invoked soldierly ideals, which their foes seemed to monopolize to such great effect. As Reverend Jenkin Lloyd Jones put it: "['P]atriot' used to mean a man who was willing to die for the freedom of his own country; now it would seem to come to mean in this country the willingness of a man to die that the freedom of a remote fellow-being may be taken away from him." Jones's ideal soldier did not serve his country *unquestioningly,* but instead fought for a noble and higher cause, the purpose of protecting freedom and democracy. By implication, military service could only be considered patriotic if it furthered the cause of freedom, not if it served to destroy it. With this qualification, Jones rejected the interventionist celebration of soldierly heroism while reaffirming the anti-imperialist definition of patriotism as being anchored firmly in the nation's

ideals. His and "his" soldier's point of reference was not the nation, but the idea and ideals that the nation stood for.[28]

* * *

What remains remarkable is the fact that virtually *all* debaters wanted to be known as American patriots. Hardly anyone invoked an internationalist stance in defense of his or her position. The differences between imperialists and anti-imperialists were reflected in their divergent definitions of patriotism, which, in turn, pointed to different conceptions of the United States itself. The opposing viewpoints were best exemplified by two slogans that Beveridge and Schurz coined for their respective patriotisms, slogans that predated the imperialism debate and that were echoed in subsequent debates on foreign policy. Beveridge proclaimed: "Our country—may she ever be right! But right or wrong, our country!" Schurz countered with a significantly altered version, which he had already advanced in 1872 in the context of domestic debates on the Franco-Prussian War: "My country, right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right."[29] Beveridge's patriotism demanded loyalty to the nation only and always, irrespective of its particular policies. As the use of the first person plural in his quote indicates, individual conscience was submerged in a display of collective unity in an emergency. Although not all interventionists were willing to go that far, their appeals to soldierly qualities and national unity logically implied silence on the issues. Dissent was subtly or overtly discouraged in favor of a loyalty that focused on the nation as a preexistent community. Patriotism became a pre-rational, instinctive reflex of "insiders" to (imagined) attacks from without. Increasingly, this reflex was also directed toward the dissenters *within* because they supposedly aided the enemy and damaged the crucial projection of unified determination and resolve.

Schurz's loyalty was quite different, directed less toward the nation and more toward the democratic principles on which that nation was founded. This patriotism of the first person singular left room for individual conscience in times of war, but it still postulated a particular duty toward the community, the patriotic duty of dissent against policies that were perceived as damaging to American democracy. This patriotic variety privileged issues over emotions. Dissent was legitimized not only as an essential democratic right, threatened by the imperialists, but also as a necessary, if difficult, patriotic duty. Like the interventionists, the critics internalized the conflicts abroad. Danger did not accrue to the United States from without, but from a misguided policy that led to undemocratic tendencies at home.

In these competing narratives of patriotism, we find a very clear expression of the dichotomy between "nation" and "democracy," which has been at the heart of the last three chapters. While the interventionists appealed to the United States as a national entity, their opponents defended it as the idea and process of democratic government, a process that was never complete and in need of continuous analysis, criticism, and correction. These different emphases allowed all debaters to conceive of themselves as patriots and proponents of American exceptionalism. Both versions of patriotism were facilitated by this concept, which so paradoxically incorporates the particularism of nationalism and the universalism of democracy.

There were very few challenges to this dominant rhetoric. Those that emerged were raised by ethnic minorities. Their doubts were prompted by their own treatment at home, however, and not by "imperialism." As paradoxical as it may seem, the all too understandable "parochialism" of African Americans was also reflected in the embrace of the imperialist "military" patriotism by integrationist African Americans. They clung to soldierly ideals for reasons different than those of the interventionists, namely because they expected peacetime rewards for their "patriotic" army service. This particular patriotism and the cautious doubts of African Americans indicate, however, that any challenge to the dominant discourse of exceptionalism is more likely to arise from unfulfilled domestic promises than from contentious foreign policy debates.

Conclusion

> [P]atriotism is not love of power; or some cheap trick to win votes—patriotism is love of country. Years ago when we prote[s]ted a war, people would weigh in against us saying: "My country right or wrong." Our answer? Absolutely, my country right or wrong. When right, keep it right. When wrong, make it right.
>
> John Kerry (2008)[1]

This is how Senator John Kerry justified dissent on the Iraq War in 2008. The fact that he linked the debate on Iraq to that on Vietnam, when he had been active in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and that he did so by using slogans pioneered in the nineteenth century—paraphrasing Carl Schurz—indicates that the debate on empire after the Spanish-American War was part of an ongoing discourse on U.S. foreign policy. The same ideas, concepts, and justifications have clashed time and again.

All these debates have dealt with the question of empire. Whether in relation to the Philippines, Vietnam, or Iraq, foreign policy critics have accused successive administrations of imperial(ist) ambitions, which the latter have mostly denied. Although each debate unfolded in a unique historical context around very specific disagreements, they were sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusion that there is *one* continuous discourse on foreign policy in the United States.

This ongoing discourse is characterized by two specific qualities. Although presumably preoccupied with foreign affairs, these debates amounted to—and here we return to David Levy's introductory analysis—moments of "*self*-scrutiny for the American people," a finding that has not puzzled Levy. But in fact, is it not remarkable that in the face of the destruction wrought on the (ethnic) other by American arms, critics stress that the damage the United States does to itself is far greater? The degree to which almost everyone in the imperialism debate focused on the self bordered on solipsism, and the controversy frequently revealed more about American self-representations

than about foreign policy. When the debaters talked about democracy, they referred to *American* democracy, as enshrined in national institutions and traditions. When they grappled with issues of race or insurgency, they looked for parallels in their national history, particularly in their dealings with Native and African Americans. This observation on the primacy of *American* themes in the debate is valid, although the imperialism debate was also part of a contemporary global discourse on empire.

While no claim is being made that these features rendered the American imperialism debate objectively unique, the solipsist bent of such foreign policy debates is primarily due to a shared *belief* in exceptionalism. Contrary to numerous obituaries over the years, this belief has proved resilient. Even Barack Obama, initially skeptical of the idea, used it to explain his response to the "Arab Spring" in Libya in 2011: "Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different."[2] Importantly for our purposes, in its peculiar mix of particularist and universalist elements, exceptionalism expresses certain convictions not only about the American self, but also about the world at large. The concept was traditionally understood as a mandate to "improve" the world and to spread the gospel of democracy. Irrespective of how the American-led millennium was to be brought about, exceptionalism entailed the conviction that the rest of the world shared American aspirations. The "other" was thought of as an "American-in-waiting." Given these assumptions, it is hardly surprising that imperialists and anti-imperialists considered their country's experience as a model for the outside world. Exceptionalism thus bridges the gap between the particular and the universal *and* between the self and the other.

The belief in exceptionalism endowed the discourse with remarkable internal stability. Paradoxically, intense conflict between imperialists and anti-imperialists unfolded on the basis of a deep ideological consensus on American exceptionalism, on the country's unique position, and on the peaceful and democratic utopia that the nation was trying to realize worldwide. This consensus was (or is) so strong because it contains enough conflictual potential to allow dissent and debate. My study has identified three areas in which the consensus is open to interpretation. First, exceptionalism does not dictate the *means* by which the millennium is to be achieved. Second, the two divergent principles within exceptionalism, the particularist element of the unique nation and the universal principle of democracy, allow for the different emphases that distinguish the cases made by interventionists and anti-interventionists. Third, "democracy" itself is open to interpretation.

Proponents of a given foreign policy have traditionally advocated an activist mission, whose precise nature depended on the circumstances. While the imperialists were very open about this, the impulse was more muted

during the Cold War, when administrations claimed to be defending democracy, rather than actively expanding its reach. This difference did not reflect a change in beliefs, however, but the zero-sum dynamic of the Cold War, which made "roll back" a dangerous proposition. In the recent Iraq debate, missionary zeal of the imperialist persuasion has made a comeback. As weapons of mass destruction were not found, the justification shifted to the democratic transformation of Iraq and the entire Middle East.[3]

The anti-imperialists sought to restrict the missionary aspect of their nation's foreign policy to the power of passive example. American democracy, they maintained, was a model that would attract emulators without the force of arms. Active proselytizing would not only discredit American missionary proclamations, but also undermine democracy at home, thereby damaging the example function. To them, exceptionalism provided a mandate to preserve *American* democracy unstained, not a right to implement it abroad. Although most foreign policy critics conceded the need for active global engagement after World War II, they still considered the example function more appropriate. As ex-President Bill Clinton put it in 2008: "People the world over have always been more impressed by the power of our example than by the example of our power."[4]

More than merely about appropriate means, however, the fin-de-siècle debate also revolved around what the imperialists were offering to the Filipinos under the twin heading of "democracy" and "freedom/liberty." Since imperialists sought to justify American sovereignty in the Philippines, they emphasized negative liberty at the expense of individual and national positive liberties. Their opponents focused on these missing elements, insisting that negative liberties were meaningless without the right to self-determination. This argument effected changes in imperialist rhetoric. While some imperialists denied the universality of democratic principles, most—and particularly the president—began to emphasize local self-government and eventual Philippine independence, thereby defusing the issue of "imperialism." An alternative response to anti-imperialist charges was to assert that the Filipino rebels were a minority, representing only one "tribe." Granting them their own government, imperialists continued, would be tantamount to denying the other "tribes' " right to self-government. Finally, as if to compensate for the absence of key rights, the imperialists added a material dimension, "the pursuit of happiness." They promised development and prosperity, which corresponded to overall assertions of humanitarian altruism and to more specific Progressive reform efforts being undertaken in the United States.

Although theoretically universal, democracy was also used to *exclude* the other. Most debaters assumed that different races possessed different capacities for self-government. While the "Anglo-Saxon" race was deemed the most

advanced, the capacity of Asians to develop democratic government was supposedly underdeveloped or absent. The instrumentalization of this "political racism" depended on the overall purpose of the argument. Imperialists adhered to a paternalist racism, claiming that only the tutelage of a "superior" race would enable the ethnic other to practice democracy. By contrast, anti-imperialists initially propagated a negative racism that ruled out the possibility that "inferior races" would ever reach a developmental stage commensurate with self-government. In conjunction with the constitutional argument that the United States could not permanently rule territories as colonies, this negative racism emerged as an anti-imperialist scare tactic, implying that the Filipinos would enter the United States and "corrupt" its government.

Whereas this debate illustrated the virulence of contemporary racism, the precise claims reflected *tactical* uses of prejudice. Although many imperialists privately shared their opponents' negative views, their advocacy of a civilizing mission logically required a Lamarckian perspective. For if "inferior races" could never "learn" self-government, there was no use in "educating" them. Northern anti-imperialists changed course when they realized that the imperialists had broken the nexus between constitutional obstacles to colonial rule and racist fears. After the Philippines officially became U.S. territory in 1899, racism vanished from many anti-imperialist addresses and pamphlets. The triumph of the imperialist constitutional exegesis also shows that neither side contemplated the inclusion of the other in the American body politic. Everyone seemed to agree that democratic government depended on a racially homogenous citizenry.

The debaters' racism confirmed the debate's solipsist nature. Although some debaters may have felt genuine sympathy for the plight of the "objects" of U.S. foreign policy, their real concern was the repercussions on the United States. The imperialists argued that a successful mission abroad would enhance their country's international standing, whereas the anti-interventionists were primarily concerned about the purity of American ideals. When they criticized their government's "oppression" of the Filipinos, they did so mainly because they feared negative consequences for their own democracy.

The usefulness of "democracy" as an argumentative weapon was finally displayed in the question of whether expansion was democratically sanctioned at home. Although not consciously deployed by them, the distinction between procedural and substantive democracy illustrates the crucial difference in the debaters' arguments. In part, the difference depended on the structure of a debate, in which a minority challenged the majority. Not surprisingly, the McKinley administration relied on elements of procedural democracy,

pointing to its electoral mandate. Dissenters were on the defensive, forced to insist that overseas expansion violated central *substantive* arrangements of American democracy. Although in part tactical, these discrepancies illuminated the debaters' understanding of democracy. The imperialists emphasized their own "populism" and attacked their opponents' "elitism." While they did not doubt the constitutionality of their policies, some insisted that the Constitution would have to be changed if it contradicted the "popular will" for colonial expansion. Although some anti-imperialists were confident that the people would "come to their senses," they claimed that the Constitution superseded the people's wishes. They did display elitist and republican attitudes about "popular passions," fearing that the republic's careful balance between "liberty" and "power" could be upset not only by an authoritarian executive but also by excitable masses. In their view, the substantive arrangements functioned as a check on executive power *and* on the people.

While none of these discussions on the democratic character of contemporary foreign policy deliberately referred to democratic theory, we can derive some conclusions about the views of both camps. First, virtually all (white) imperialists and anti-imperialists considered ethnic homogeneity crucial for successful democratic government. Second, the anti-imperialists' fear of the people and their emphasis on a careful balance between various "interests" evoked classical republicanism. They harbored grave reservations about "democracy," as it implied mob rule, and preferred a nostalgic conception of their nation as a "republic," led by the "best" men. The imperialists seemed much more comfortable with mass democracy and a broader construction of the Constitution. In this respect, the debate on colonial expansion reflected the social turmoil and the political debates of the Gilded Age and Progressive era.

Some of these divisions, even if they sprang from argumentative convenience, hinted at dilemmas of democratic theory that continue to vex scholars. The question of whether democracy is tied to culture is one that, today, is raised not only by Western "racists," but also by non-Westerners who suspect the United States' and the West's democratizing agenda as an attempt to perpetuate Western predominance. Communitarians wonder whether (American) democracy's emphasis on individualism does not dangerously undermine the status of community. Furthermore, scholars still debate the merits of substantive versus procedural democracy and whether democratic government is more securely anchored in a people's mentality or in its democratic institutions.

* * *

The last three chapters have shown that the debaters were also able to exploit the dialectics of exceptionalism. In its assertion of national uniqueness inherent in the democratic ideal, exceptionalism fuses the particularist element of the nation with the universal ideal of democracy. Within their large repertoire, imperialists emphasized the former, a nationalism unadulterated by the qualifying value of democracy. This emphasis often emerges most clearly when read against the anti-imperialists' consistently "democratic" discourse.

The dichotomy surfaced in the controversy over American history. The imperialists used national reunion between North and South to assert that American "nationalization" was finally complete and that the reunited nation was prepared to assume its civilizing "duties" abroad. There was no room for human decision-making, as historical forces, the mandates of civilization, and "natural laws" acquired their own dynamic, which made Americans subservient to their nation's presumed destiny. The nation was provided with a sanctified and biological basis, independent of its citizens and democratic form of government. (This sweeping narrative raises doubts about the abovementioned imperialist emphasis on the will of the people and again indicates the tactical nature of many arguments.) Focusing on the emancipation of the slaves, by contrast, the anti-imperialists emphasized that the Civil War's true legacy was ever greater democratization. Ruling subject populations abroad would violate this heritage and invalidate the sacrifice of Northern soldiers. They rejected "destiny" and instead upheld the principle of human choice on imperialism because it was essential to the functioning of democracy.

Their respective conceptions of America's role in the world also conditioned the debaters' "doomsday scenarios." Imperialists focused on external threats to the nation-state—and only by extension to its political order. Their story was similar to that of other imperialist nations at the time: a failure to seize some of the last available territories would result in being "encircled" and at the mercy of big power rivals. Proceeding from their understanding of the nation as a quasi-biological entity, they added the simplistic equation that an absence of territorial growth would spell death and decay. Apart from this Darwinist narrative, the imperialists invoked ordinary external threats, which have been similarly expressed in subsequent wars, right up to the one with Iraq. In fact, in the wake of 9/11, doomsday scenarios have become more apocalyptic, and they have been used to justify even preemptive military action against potentially threatening nations and non-state actors.[5]

By contrast, the anti-imperialists warned that American democracy was endangered from within. Overseas expansion was violating the Constitution, "militarizing" the national spirit, and deflecting attention from domestic problems. These internal tensions could destroy social cohesion and result in revolution. To these concrete predictions, they added the determinist

(republican) fear of imperial decline. Had not Rome declined when it set out on a course of conquest? In their eyes, only an impeccably moral foreign policy would guarantee exemption from the historical laws of rise and decline. In its warnings about the consequences of torture, "extraordinary renditions," and censorship, the recent opposition to the "War on Terror" has sounded similar alarms.

The diverging emphases culminated in an explosive controversy on patriotism. The imperialists advocated an "instinctive" patriotism, loyal to the national unit in wartime and unqualified by democratic principles. By referring to the United States as a nation, the imperialists sought to unify and mobilize the inhabitants of a clearly delimited territory against outsiders. Although most did not dispute the right to free speech, they employed emotional strategies to disparage their critics, warning that the latter were aiding the enemy's cause and endangering U.S. soldiers. The dissenters, on the other hand, defined protest itself as patriotic, relying on a "reflective" patriotism, which was loyal to and protective of the nation's ideals. Their America was less a physical nation and more the idea of democratic government, which could always be perfected.

Both sides' interpretations "internalized" the Philippine-American War, reinforcing the debate's solipsist character. While the anti-imperialists consistently emphasized that the main threat was "homemade," their opponents' view of dissent created the impression that this was more harmful than external enemies. Interventionists and anti-interventionists thus arrived at a last tacit consensus: if the United States were to be destroyed, it would be the fault of Americans. "The other" had been almost completely obliterated from the debate.

* * *

These features characterize an ongoing discourse on U.S. foreign policy, but this study has also uncovered aspects unique to the imperialism debate. Many of these arose from the specific historical context. The particular international position of the United States, for example, generated distinctive rhetorical strategies: since they had to justify what contemporaries considered an epochal change in U.S. foreign policy, imperialists relied more on promises than threats. After World War II, by contrast, American power was at its apex, and policymakers wanted to preserve the status quo against communist challenges. Therefore, doomsday scenarios played a much larger role in their arguments. This difference is most pronounced in the strategic domino-thinking of the imperialists and during the Vietnam War. The "original" domino theory, formulated at the height of the Cold War, was an

apocalyptic vision of the threats in Southeast Asia, predicting the progressive fall of the entire Pacific region to communism. In the 1890s, similar step-by-step reasoning was largely positive. The imperialists were confident that the acquisition of strategic way stations in the Asian-Pacific region would enable the United States to control the fabled China market. Measured against reality, this version was as fantastic in its optimism as its Cold War counterpart was in its pessimism.

Nationally and internationally, the imperialism debate reflected its period's cultural and intellectual climate. Apt examples were the racist discourse or the anti-imperialists' elitism toward the "masses," which emerged from their republican convictions and mirrored Gustave Le Bon's treatise on mass psychology. In foreign policy rhetoric, the most remarkable (and "time-bound") find is the extent to which imperialists were willing to emphasize the national at the expense of the democratic. This was most obvious when sanguine imperialists proclaimed that national sovereignty predated and superseded the Constitution or when they "biologized" the nation in an attempt to invest it with rights that overruled those of individuals.

Internal and external factors account for this intense "ordinary" nationalism. The Spanish-American War had not only generated a wave of authentic nationalist fervor, but had also expedited national reunion, a contemporary policy objective in its own right. National reunion, however, could only proceed on the grounds of *white* nationalism and at the expense of the memory of emancipation. This explains the emphasis on the nationalist rather than the democratic potential of Civil War memory. In turn, the theme of national reunion was useful to defend overseas expansion. Internally, this temporary impulse was buttressed by the nationalizing and centralizing tendencies of the Progressive era, as they impacted on government and society. Externally, the imperialists' fascination with the national principle was part of a general late-nineteenth-century trend in the West. The aggressive and chauvinist variety of a "closed" nationalism gained ascendancy in Europe, and it also fueled imperialist competition there. A cursory glance at the situation in Germany, also recently unified, is instructive. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany had been reluctant to seek colonies abroad, but the imperialist fervor seized the imagination of German propagandists and adventurers who pressured the government into sanctioning territorial acquisitions. Like their American counterparts, German imperialists interpreted the completion of their national unity as the prerequisite for the assumption of "world power" status. In their speeches and writings, we find the same biological metaphors of growth and decline that American imperialists used. In Germany as well as in the United States, the nation acquired the characteristics of a body separate from its citizens. In this respect, American imperialists "normalized"

American nationalism, bringing it in sync with similar developments in the Old World.[6]

If expansionists were willing to advance arguments modeled on Old World experience, does this not imply that the imperialism debate was less solipsist and grounded in exceptionalist beliefs than has been claimed here so far? In fact, the imperialist emphasis on Anglo-Saxonism was arguably another instance of "normalization." As Paul Kramer has emphasized, Anglo-Saxonism amounted to "racial exceptionalism," grouping Americans with other English-speaking peoples, and logically undermined the "national exceptionalism" discussed in this study. Nevertheless, most imperialists relativized or abandoned Anglo-Saxon arguments during the course of the debate. Several reasons accounted for this shift. Defending overseas expansion by pointing to British parallels became increasingly problematic because it did not appeal to anti-British constituencies in the United States. Some imperialists therefore spoke about Americans as a new "mixed" race, superior even to Anglo-Saxons. Furthermore, as Kramer himself has acknowledged, the imperialists reverted to national exceptionalism when they defended incipient U.S. colonial rule against British detractors.[7] From the vantage point of the inner-American debate, moreover, it could be argued that the imperialists abandoned racial exceptionalism because they did not want to cede national exceptionalism to their opponents. As on the question of democratic rights for the Filipinos, imperialist rhetoric might have changed in response to anti-imperialist attacks, thereby confirming this study's finding that national exceptionalism remained the crucial reference point for both camps.

The fact that anti-imperialist rhetoric modified the justifications for overseas expansion raises the question of who actually "won" the imperialism debate. On one level, the answer seems simple: the American people endorsed "imperialism" in the elections of 1900, and the Philippines remained an American colony until 1946. The case is more complicated, however. Already by 1900, Republican campaign literature suggested that McKinley's rhetoric of "benevolent assimilation" and promises of "training" for self-government and independence had superseded the "radical" imperialism preached by Beveridge or Roosevelt. The effect of this modification was ambiguous. On the one hand, the Republicans managed to defuse the issue of imperialism by creating the impression that their concrete proposals for the Philippines were not that different from those of the anti-imperialist Democrats. Neither party advocated immediate independence or permanent retention. "Imperialism" appeared to be a shrill exaggeration by a Democratic party desperate for an election issue and by a coterie of old Northeastern elitists. Even news of torture and atrocities in the Philippines in 1902 failed to rekindle the anti-imperialist movement for the long term, although the Senate was forced to

form a committee to investigate the charges. Nevertheless, this committee's hearings did not have a tangible political impact.

On the other hand, the modifications of "imperialism" demonstrated that there was no widespread appetite for further annexations. Although saddled with the highly oppressive Platt Amendment, Cuba did achieve independence, and Americans began to consider even the Philippines a responsibility at best and a liability at worst. In 1907, Roosevelt himself described the archipelago as "our heel of Achilles" in the Pacific in potential future confrontations with Japan. This had been the anti-imperialist strategic warning, and it came true in World War II. Under the first Democratic administration since 1898, Congress passed the Philippine Autonomy Act, or Jones Law, in 1916, which increased the measure of local self-government. This disenchantment with some consequences of "imperialism" did not lead to a retreat into isolation, however, as some scholars have claimed.[8]

In the absence of subsequent formal acquisitions, a foreign policy emerged that fused imperialist *and* anti-imperialist thinking. The imperialist dichotomy of "civilization" and "barbarism" continued to guide differing approaches to European and non-European regions. While the Roosevelt administration peacefully arbitrated several disputes between "civilized" nations, it forcibly intervened in the affairs of "barbarian" nations in the Western Hemisphere. Taking the Panama Canal zone from Colombia and warning Caribbean nations in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine that "chronic wrongdoing" on their part could generate U.S. interventions were justified with the interests of a global community of civilized nations.[9] One foreign policy strategy that both sides agreed on was the pursuit of the "Open Door." Through diplomatic notes, the United States attempted to gain access to the other powers' spheres of interest in China and to safeguard Chinese political independence. This was the formulation of an emerging liberal internationalism that facilitated the simultaneous pursuit of principles and interests, without predetermining the means, but definitely without formal annexations.

When the "civilized" nations went to war with one another in 1914, Woodrow Wilson ultimately responded in the spirit of this liberal internationalism. He had developed many of his foreign policy views in the imperialism debate when he had sided with the "benevolent" imperialists, subscribing to the idea that the Filipinos would benefit from a period of American tutelage. This impulse remained visible in his approach to the Mexican Revolution, where his desire to "democratize" and "educate" the Southern neighbor outweighed his promises of non-intervention.

In these regards, the imperialism debate left a more ambiguous legacy than claimed by orthodox or revisionist historians: U.S. foreign policy was

neither isolationist nor exclusively "informally imperialist" after Philippine annexation. The debate settled the question of formal colonial expansion, but a wide array of measures for exerting informal hegemony and "democratic interventionism" for the purposes of "educating" indigenous populations was subsequently used. "Imperialism" was not an aberration, as orthodox historians would have it, because its actively transformative impetus was also the source of "democratic interventionism," a malleable staple of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, it is too narrow to summarize the legacy of this debate as the perfection of informal empire, as revisionists have done. "Democratic" interventions have been more than a cloak for economic interests. The democratic content of foreign policy was an integral part of the imperialism debate and a condition of overseas strategies that were acceptable at home. This part of American identity moderated imperialism, but without necessarily inaugurating a more peaceful foreign policy.

* * *

Despite the historically contingent differences between the debates on imperialism, Vietnam, and Iraq, the similarities remain remarkable, justifying the conclusion that American debates on foreign policy follow a pattern that is characterized by a high degree of solipsism and based on a consensus on American exceptionalism. This consensus provides the United States with extraordinary ideological cohesion, which in turn furnishes the foundation for the nation's social cohesion.

For critics in particular, this discourse also has its drawbacks. By arguing from within the consensus, dissenters end up supporting the attitudes that contributed to a given overseas crisis in the first place. Criticism becomes almost ritualistic, a tendency that was most noticeable in the rhetorical strategy of the jeremiad, the dissenters' warnings about moral decline.[10] This conclusion confirms (post)structuralist thinking about the power of discourse. "Power" is not something wielded by sinister yet easily identifiable forces, but is inherent in the discourse itself, as evidenced by the fact that dissenters end up affirming the United States' ideology when they try to change policies that are founded on the same ideology. Conversely speaking, the discourse is so powerful because it contains a richness of traditions, myths, and narratives that makes it superfluous for critics to position themselves outside of it.

As a result, foreign policy debates are unlikely to shatter the belief in American exceptionalism, which has survived challenges in the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq. The recent debate on the Iraq War is instructive in this regard. It actually shared more features with the imperialism debate than

that on Vietnam did. Although this is not the place for a thorough analysis of either debate, impressionistic evidence indicates that (neo)conservative commentators have been more willing to propagate an imperial role for the United States than supporters of the Vietnam War in the 1960s. The columnist Charles Krauthammer is an apt example. Already in 1990, he proclaimed a "unipolar moment," demanding that the United States shape the world as the only remaining superpower. In the run-up to the Iraq War, Krauthammer was even more sanguine when he spoke of a "unipolar era," arguing "explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance." In addition to these thinly disguised pleas for an American empire, Krauthammer's argument contained more elements that sounded familiar from the imperialist period. His "rogue states with weapons of mass destruction" sounded like Roosevelt's barbarians threatening to undermine world order. In August 2007, President Bush explicitly referred to the war in Iraq as "a struggle for civilization. We fight for a free way of life against a new barbarism."[11] Nevertheless, and although some members of the Bush administration were even more sanguine about the application of U.S. power, the president was generally no more willing than McKinley to acknowledge an imperialist role.[12]

Nevertheless, this confident rhetoric about America's imperial role seemed stronger and more widespread than during the Cold War. One simple explanation is that much of it was advanced by a neoconservative minority in powerful positions for the first time. The end of the Cold War itself contributed as well because there was no longer a superpower opponent to level the charge of "imperialism" against the United States.

As in the imperialism debate, however, the bold rhetoric did not survive a reversal of fortunes. The pride of empire once again gave way to doubts about its temporality. It became fashionable to ask again, "Are we Rome?" Like Godkin in the imperialism debate, Chalmers Johnson warned that "[e]mpires do not last, and their ends are usually unpleasant." If the United States did not immediately reverse course, Johnson continued, "Nemesis, the goddess of retribution and vengeance, the punisher of pride and hubris, waits impatiently for her meeting with us." Nevertheless, American exceptionalism also survived this debate, as indicated in Obama's above-cited remarks—not least because empire's antagonists *also* invoked American uniqueness. As Cullen Murphy put it, "the antidote [to Rome's fate] is everywhere. The antidote is being American."[13] Being American is both the problem *and* the solution.

* * *

If at all, more serious challenges to exceptionalism are likely to arise from one of two directions. The more "traditional" challenge, much discussed these

days, is one from without, the rise of other powers, e.g. China, and the decline of American power, which could raise doubts about the nation's exceptional destiny. The other option is a challenge from within, from minorities who do not feel part of America's "exceptional" story. Around 1900, there were a few indications from African Americans that they doubted their nation's commitment to its own values and that these doubts were not triggered by foreign policy events, but by experiences at home. In discussions of patriotism, they were the only ones to raise fundamental questions about whether it was appropriate for their community to feel and act "American." Having answered this question negatively, Bishop Turner encouraged emigration to Africa. Although his remained an isolated voice, his reaction indicates the origin of potentially more fundamental challenges to the American creed.

The Vietnam War debate confirmed this suspicion when white, but particularly African American, radicals attacked exceptionalism, abandoned American patriotism, and proclaimed new loyalties to Third World "national liberation movements." The roots of their radicalization preceded Vietnam as many radicals had started out in domestic reform movements. Groups founded exclusively in response to the war did not become radicalized to a similar extent.

* * *

In the absence of such challenges, the belief in exceptionalism is here to stay, and we have to take it seriously not only as a legitimizing, but even as a motivating force in U.S. foreign policy. This awareness does not make American foreign policy any easier to predict since the exceptionalist creed justifies diverse strategies. Neither does U.S. support for democracy guarantee a foreign policy that other countries will consistently judge as "benevolent" because democracy has been used as vehicle of exclusion and hierarchization. The absence of democracy in other countries has also been traditionally used to justify intervention for the purpose of "exporting" its tenets.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has acted multilaterally and unilaterally, with both principles sometimes advanced by Congress and sometimes by the executive. As in Bosnia, Iraq, or Libya, the United States still uses universalist language to justify interventions, and this language has been "globalized," being shared by some of the most important U.S. allies. The rhetoric of moral absolutes, however, exposes its user to charges of hypocrisy because neither the United States nor its allies intervene in every country in which human and democratic rights are threatened.

One way out of this dilemma seems to be that even administrations that intervene with force somewhere in the world propagate the "power of example" as more appropriate elsewhere. The most prominent example is

China, where not only the United States, but most Western countries claim to be working "silently" for human rights. Economic intercourse, Western products (the ancient dream of the boundless China-market), and the media, so it is argued, will eventually result in democratization. Convenience rather than conviction dictates the choice of strategy.

Nevertheless, the mission of passive example can actually sow its own discontent. The slow erosion of political authoritarianism that the United States confidently predicts as a result of global intercourse shares features with the process fashionably referred to as "globalization." Many observers equate this process with "Americanization," however. Will it bring forth an age of global peace and prosperity, as its advocates believe, or will it generate violent countermovements that detest the cultural and political values that are being transported? If the latter prediction proves correct, we are confronted with the paradoxical result that even the anti-imperialists' concept of a peaceful mission of example can spawn discontent and violence.

Thus, we have come full circle and return to the solipsism of the United States' discourse on foreign policy. On the one hand, the self-reflexiveness and inclusiveness of American exceptionalism ensure a large degree of stability for a particular American discourse on foreign policy and possibly for American society as well. On the other hand, the tendency to view the other through the self not only limits the range and focus of one's perception, but can also compel the other to retaliate in kind—with violence and limited vision.

Notes

Introduction

1. Mike Gravel (AK), "Democratic Presidential Candidates Debate at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa," August 19, 2007; Richard Cheney, "Remarks by the Vice President and Mrs. Cheney Followed by Question and Answer at a Town Hall Meeting, Tallahassee, Florida," October 6, 2004, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds., *The American Presidency Project,* http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ [accessed July 9, 2010].
2. Recent books with an "imperial theme" include Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2004); Niall Fergusson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2006); Cullen Murphy, *Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007). On the view that "empire" engendered an anti-imperialist response, see David Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789–1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 13–4.
3. Levy, *The Debate over Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), XIII (emphasis mine). Stephen Garrett, *Ideals and Reality: An Analysis of the Debate over Vietnam* (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), Chapter 1; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Robert Beisner, "1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," *PSQ* 85 (June 1970), 187–216.
4. Quotation from Kurt R. Spillmann, *Amerikas Ideologie des Friedens: Ursprünge, Formwandlungen und geschichtliche Auswirkungen des amerikanischen Glaubens an den Mythos von einer friedlichen Weltordnung* (Bern, Frankfurt, and New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 214. See also Geir Lundestad, "Uniqueness and Pendulum Swings in US Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 62 (Fall 1986), 405–21; Brian Klunk, *Consensus and the American Mission* (Lanham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1986), Chapter 1; Tami R. Davis and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Citty Upon a Hill," *Foreign Policy* 66 (Spring 1987), 20–38. For a surge in

post-Cold War analyses of the missionary theme, compare Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); H. W. Brands, *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). While most authors juxtapose two schools of foreign policy thought, Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), has identified *four* typologies.

5. On the "contradictory character" of American nationalism, compare Gary Gerstle, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism," *JAH* 86 (December 1999), 1280. Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire,* 16–8, explains that variations of American nationalism engender different foreign policies.
6. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," in David Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell Collier and MacMillan, 1968), 66; Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, "The Origins and Nature of American Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in Knud Krakau, ed., *The American Nation—National Identity—Nationalism* (Münster: Lit, 1997), 19–52; John Bodnar, "The Attractions of Patriotism," in Bodnar, ed., *Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–17; Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 5–26. For the rejection of this dichotomy as simplistic, see Timothy Baycroft and Mark Hewitson, eds., *What Is a Nation? Europe, 1789–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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8. Michael Cullinane, "Transatlantic Dimensions of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1899–1909," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8/4 (December 2010), 301–14; Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910," *JAH* 88/4 (March 2002), 1315–53. More authors emphasize trans- and international aspects of U.S. imperialism, but not of the debate; Frank Schumacher, "The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in America's Search for Imperial Identity, 1898–1910," *GHI Bulletin* 31 (Fall 2002), 35–50; Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American*

Internationalism, 1865–1890 (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2009); Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010).

9. Robert Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (1968; rpt., 2nd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States*; David Mayers, *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 190–218; Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1972). For a brief juxtaposition of imperialism and anti-imperialism, compare Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation:" The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 104–28.
10. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (3rd ed.; New York: Holt, 1950), 463; Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power* (1961; rpt., New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), 270. Compare Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years: The History of America's Brief Moment of Imperial Fervor* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956); Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), 42.
11. William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (3rd ed.; New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984); Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1963); Walter LaFeber, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Thomas J. McCormick, "Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the Spanish-American War," *Pacific Historical Review* 32 (May 1963), 155–70; John W. Rollins, "The Anti-Imperialists and Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy," *Studies on the Left* 3 (1962), 9–24.
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13. Geir Lundestad, "Uniqueness and Pendulum Swings in US Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 62 (Fall 1986), 405 (emphasis mine).

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16. Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 24; Ninkovich, *Global Dawn*, 330. Compare Frank Ninkovich, "No Post-Mortems for Postmodernism, Please," *DH* 22 (Summer 1998), 451–66; "Two Lectures," Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed., Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 93.
17. Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 15–6; Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., *Presidents and Protesters: Political Rhetoric in the 1960s* (Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1990), 14.
18. Geoffrey Blodgett, "The Mugwump Reputation, 1870 to the Present," *JAH* 66 (March 1980), 869. Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation,*" 117; E. Berkeley Tompkins, "The Old Guard: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Leadership," *Historian* 30 (May 1968), 366–88.
19. On Hoar, compare Mayers, *Dissenting Voices,* 201–6.
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Chapter 1

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3. Redfield Proctor, *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 2916–7. Gerald F. Linderman, *The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), Chapter 2; Lewis L. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1980), 40; McCartney, *Power and Progress,* 100–2. On the yellow press, see

Linderman, *Mirror of War,* Chapter 6. Gould has undermined the view of McKinley's reluctance and passivity; *The Spanish-American War*. Compare also Chapter 4, fn 6.

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5. Resolution and Senate vote; House vote in *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 4040–1; 4062–3. Charles S. Campbell, *The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865–1900* (New York, Hagerstown: Harper Colophon Books, 1976), 272–7.
6. William McKinley, "First Annual Message," December 6, 1897, in *Messages and Papers,* 10: 131.
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8. Quotes from Carl Schurz, the first two in "National Honor," *HW* 42 (March 19, 1898), 267; the last, "A Case of Self-Sacrifice," *HW* 42 (April 23, 1898), 387. The editor of the *Springfield Republican,* subsequently the leading anti-imperialist newspaper, praised the Teller Amendment as evidence that intervention would be "a mission of professed humanitarianism," *Springfield Republican,* April 20, 1898. E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 81–92; Robert Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (1968; rpt. 2nd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 25, 93–4, 146.
9. Hoar to Vignaud, April 19, 1898, Box 179, Hoar Papers; Hoar, *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 3835.
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11. Albert J. Beveridge, "The Star of Empire," in Albert J. Beveridge, *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1908), 122–4.
12. "The Platt Amendment, 1902," in Robert F. Smith, ed., *What Happened in Cuba: A Documentary History* (New York, 1963), 125–6.
13. The President's Platform, July 30, 1898 (handwritten note), Box 56, Cortelyou Papers. Lewis Gould believes that McKinley had made up his mind by September, *Spanish-American War,* 101, and he dismisses the view that McKinley "was now clay in the hands of the little group of men who knew all too well what to make of the war," Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1936), 327. Compare McCartney, *Power and Progress,* Chapter 7.
14. William McKinley, "Instructions to the Peace Commissioners," September 16, 1898, U.S. Department of State, *FRUS—1898* (Washington: GPO, 1901), 904.

15. Henry R. Gibson, *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 106; McKinley, "Second Annual Message,"172; Albert Shaw, "Progress of the World," *ARR* 19 (January 1899), 16.
16. Lodge to McKinley, July 30, 1898, Box 56, Cortelyou Papers. Traditionally, Lodge has been characterized as an enthusiastic expansionist; William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 110–5. Nevertheless, still in August 1898, Lodge argued for the retention of Manila only, hoping that the rest of the archipelago could be exchanged for British possessions in the West Indies; Lodge to Day, August 11, 1898, Box 13, Lodge Papers.
17. Mahan to Lodge, July 27, 1898, Box 13, Lodge Papers. On Mahan's influence, see LaFeber, *The New Empire,* 85–95, Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898,* 12–22; Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), 29–41; Widenor, *Lodge,* 87–91. More skeptical Peter Karsten, "The Nature of 'Influence:' Roosevelt, Mahan, and the Concept of Sea Power," *American Quarterly* 23 (October 1971), 585–600.
18. William McKinley, "Speech at the Citizens' Banquet in the Auditorium, Chicago, October 19, 1898," in William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1900), 133–4. Handwritten, untitled notes, November 12, 1898, Box 57, Cortelyou Papers.
19. Representative William S. Kirkpatrick (PA), *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 164; compare Lodge, *CR*, 55/3, 1899: 959.
20. William McKinley, "Speech at Fargo, North Dakota, October 13, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 280–2 (emphasis mine).
21. Lyman Abbott, editor of *The Outlook*, "The Rebellion of the Filipinos," Speech excerpt, n.d., Robert I. Fulton and Thomas C. Trueblood, eds., *Patriotic Eloquence: Relating to the Spanish-American War and Its Issues* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900), 5–6.
22. Schurz to President McKinley, July 29, 1898, Frederic Bancroft, ed., *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz,* 6 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), 5: 476.
23. Platform of the CAIL, *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* April 30, 1899 (Chicago: CAIL, 1899), 4. Compare Andrew Carnegie, "Distant Possessions: The Parting of the Ways," *NAR* 167 (August 1899), 248.
24. Claude A. Swanson, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 447. Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *PSSR* 3 (August 1930), 7–9.
25. Hoar, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 4290; Edward Atkinson, "Criminal Aggression: By Whom Committed?," Senate Document, No. 163, 56th Cong., 1st sess, 38–42; T. W. Wood, *Momentous Issues* (Richmond, VA: Wood Publishing Co., 1900), 46–7.
26. Carl Schurz, "The Policy of Imperialism," Address at Anti-Imperialist Conference in Chicago, October 17, 1899, rpt. *CR,* 56/1, 1900, Appendix: 159.

On the wartime alliance, see Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 82–6; Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 31–66.

27. Atkinson, "Criminal Aggression," 42. For the publication of the pamphlets see Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1972), 142. Even Thomas M. Anderson, brigadier general of the U.S. volunteers in the Philippines, thought that the United States was responsible for the outbreak of war; "Our Rule in the Philippines," *NAR* 170 (February 1900), 272–83.
28. William McKinley, "Executive Order to the Secretary of War," December 21, 1898, in *Messages and Papers,* 10: 219–21 (emphasis mine). For an earlier proclamation, emphasizing "personal and religious rights," but not self-government, on May 19, 1898, see ibid., 208–11. Kramer, *Blood of Government,* 97–8.
29. Filipino suspicions were heightened because the proclamation circulated in two different versions, one of them with the explicit passages on sovereignty omitted. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation,"* 52–3. General Ewell Otis blamed his subordinate Miller for the confusion, Otis, Cable to Adjutant General, January 8, 1899, Box 58, Cortelyou Papers.
30. Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 710; "Speech before the Republican State Convention, Ogden, UT," September 11, 1902, quoted in *New York Times,* September 12, 1902.
31. Beveridge, "The Balance Sheet," Speech at Minneapolis, September 27, 1900, Box 297, Beveridge Papers (emphasis mine); Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Relations of the United States to their New Dependencies," in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Lessons of the War with Spain and other Articles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), 246; Assistant Secretary Webster Davis, Speech at Washington Peace Jubilee, *Washington Post,* May 26, 1899.
32. John Spooner, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1379. The Second Philippine Commission similarly recommended the extension of the Bill of Rights to the Philippines; Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation,"* 137.
33. Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (1935; rpt. Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1963), 295 (emphases mine). On the importance of independence in discussions in nineteenth-century America, compare David Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789–1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 20.
34. Widenor, *Lodge,* 70–1, thinks that Lodge truly believed this, which seems to be confirmed in a letter to Senator William E. Mason: "I have the profoundest faith in the American people, and I believe if the Filipinos are committed to their care they will fulfill that trust and give to those people more freedom, peace and self government than they could possibly get in any other way." Lodge to Mason, January 24, 1899, Vol. 41, Bound Volumes, Lodge Papers.

35. Theodore Roosevelt, "Address at the Grant Anniversary at Galena, IL," April 27, 1900, State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1900* (Albany: Brandow Printing Company, 1900), 242. Schurman to McKinley, June 12, 1900, Reel 10, Series 1, McKinley Papers. General Franklin Bell to Beveridge, August 1, 1899, Box 124, Beveridge Papers (emphasis mine).
36. MacArthur to Beveridge, January 9, 1900, Box 127, Beveridge Papers.
37. McKinley to Lodge, September 8, 1900, Box 16, Lodge Papers. On the opinions of military officers, General Otis to the Adjutant General, January 8, 1899, Box 58, Cortelyou Papers; J. F. Bell to Beveridge (copy), August 1, 1899, Reel 3, Roosevelt Papers. Kramer, *Blood of Government,* 122; Paul Kramer, "Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War," *DH* 30.2 (April 2006), 185–9.
38. Schurman to McKinley, June 1, 1900, Reel 10, McKinley Papers; McKinley, "Speech at Dinner at the Home Market Club, Boston, February 16, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 189. Senator Beveridge supplied "evidence" of Philippine "majority opinion" in Congress after his trip to the Philippines, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 705–7. For the theoretical justification of guardianship, see Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty,* 35–7. Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 52–64.
39. Carl Schurz, "For the Republic of Washington and Lincoln," Address at Anti-Imperialist Meeting in Philadelphia, n.d.; rpt. *CR,* 56/1, 1900, Appendix: 156.
40. Ibid. Evidence of a popular Philippine government was published by Edward Atkinson, including a letter from Aguinaldo, "the president of the revolutionary government," and a supporting manifesto by many Philippine "town chiefs," Aguinaldo, "Memorial to the Senate of the United States," August 6, 1898, rpt. Atkinson, *The Anti-Imperialist* 1 (June 3, 1899), 1–23; George S. Boutwell, *Party or Country* (Boston: NEAIL, 1900), 14. Acknowledging Filipino efforts to construct a government, Paul Kramer writes of "competitive state building" in this early period; *Blood of Government,* 97.
41. Edwin Burritt Smith, "Liberty or Despotism," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* April 30, 1899, 26–7. For the "leading spirit," see Schirmer, *Republic or Empire,* 176. Jane Addams, "Democracy or Militarism," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 38.
42. George S. Boutwell, *Peace or War* (Washington, D.C.: AIL, 1899), 13. William Graham Sumner, "Conquest of the United States," 1898, rpt. in William G. Summer, *War and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 309–10.
43. Eliot to McKinley, August 25, 1898, Box 56, Cortelyou Papers. Carlisle, Reprint of Article in *Harper's Magazine* (October 1898), Anti-Imperialist Broadside No. 2, AILB.
44. Joint Resolution S.R. 53, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 644. Beveridge's original version was even stronger, stating "that it is the intention of the *American government permanently* to retain them," Original Draft of Philippine Resolution, Box 297, Beveridge Papers (emphasis in the original). Before introducing the resolution, Beveridge consulted with White House officials and fellow senators—a possible

explanation for why it was toned down. Cortelyou, Diary entry, January 4, 1900, Box 53, Cortelyou Papers.

45. McKinley, "Executive Order to the Secretary of War," 220. Lodge, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 959 (emphasis mine).
46. John R. Procter, "Isolation or Imperialism?," *Forum* 26 (September 1898), 19.
47. Schurman to McKinley, June 1, 1900, Reel 10, McKinley Papers. Senator Hoar similarly advised the president to promise Philippine independence "as soon as they were capable of it" in his nomination acceptance letter; Cortelyou, Diary entry, September 7, 1900, Box 53, Cortelyou Papers. "Republican National Platform, 1900," in RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book 1900* (Milwaukee, WI: Press of the Evening Wisconsin, 1900), 425. For the Philippine Commission's Announcement see ibid., 336.
48. Editorial, "The President's Defense," *Springfield Republican,* September 10, 1900.
49. Hoar to Schurz, October 26, 1898, *Speeches, Correspondence,* 5: 528.
50. Schurz to Hoar, October 30 and December 1, 1898; Hoar to Schurz, December 5, 1898, Box 126, Schurz Papers. Richard Welch, "Senator George Frisbie Hoar and the Defeat of Anti-Imperialism, 1898–1900," *Historian* 26 (May 1964), 362–80. *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 4. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," 25.
51. "Platform of the Democratic Party adopted at Kansas City, July 5, 1900," in John Woolley and Gerhard Peters eds., *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ [accessed July 9, 2010].
52. Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*, 121–2. On the anti-imperialist failure to unite politically in 1900, see Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation,"* 136–8; Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," 38–9. For the Republican charges, compare David Jayne Hill, "The Fiction of 'Imperialism,' " RNC, *Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900,* 15–6.
53. Everett V. Abbott to Schurz, October 5, 1900; Charles Francis Adams, Jr. to Schurz, October 11, 1900; Charles N. Eliot to Schurz, October 4, 1900, William Graham Sumner to Schurz, October 2, 1900, Box 135, Schurz Papers.
54. Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?," *MVHR* 24 (June 1937), 43–52.
55. Resolutions of the (New England) Anti-Imperialist League, *Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 25, 1899* (Boston: NEAIL, 1899); and New England Anti-Imperialist League, *Report of the Second Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 24, 1900* (Boston: NEAIL, 1900); Address Adopted by the Anti-Imperialist League, February 10, 1899, AILB.
56. Hoar to Reverend A. P. Putnam, January 9, 1899, Box 189, Hoar Papers. McCartney, *Power and Progress,* 240–2.
57. National Liberty Congress, *Address to the Voters of the United States* (Chicago: AAIL, 1900), 1 (emphasis mine).
58. CAIL, *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 4. Compare "Address to the People of the United States," Platform of the AIL, n.d. [November 18, 1898], AILB. In one of its

campaigns, the NEAIL distributed "The Patriot's Pledge" cards, on which signers promised "to defend the Declaration of Independence at the Polls." NEAIL, "Resolutions," *Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League*, 1899, 30–1.

59. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, "Why We Protest," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 12–3.
60. "Address to the People of the United States," Platform of the Anti-Imperialist League, n.d., AILB.
61. McKinley, "Address at Minneapolis, MN, October 12, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 269.
62. Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 710 (emphasis mine).
63. Griggs, Address at Milwaukee Banquet, October 16, 1899, Reel 83, McKinley Papers; Fiske, "Some Consecrated Fallacies," *NAR* 169 (December 1899), 821–8. McCartney, *Power and Progress,* 250.
64. Welsh to Schurz, December 26, 1899, Box 128, Schurz Papers.
65. Osborne, *"Empire Can Wait."*
66. Hoar to Parsons, June 28, 1898, Box 181, Hoar Papers. Quote from Hoar, No Vassal States, no Subject Peoples, November 1, 1898, Rare Books and Pamphlets Collection, Missouri Historical Society. Compare Hoar, *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 6660–5; *Autobiography,* 305–9. Frederick H. Gillett, *George Frisbie Hoar* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), 205–10; Beisner, *Twelve against Empire,* 147–9.
67. "Senator Hoar's Apology," *Springfield Republican,* July 6, 1898.
68. Carnegie, "Distant Possessions," 242; Carnegie to McKinley, July 27, 1898, Box 56, Cortelyou Papers.
69. Sumner, "Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing," 1896, rpt. in Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice R. Davie, eds., *Essays of William Graham Sumner,* 2 vols. (2nd ed.; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1940), 1: 196–7. Sumner, "Conquest of the United States," 305; Hoar, No Vassal States. On the myth of the empty continent, see Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 53.
70. RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1900,* 79. Compare Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 710; Theodore Roosevelt, "Expansion and Peace," *The Independent* 51 (December 21, 1899), 3403–4. Walter Williams, "United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism," *JAH* 66 (March 1980), 810–31, on parallels between imperialism and "Indian policies."
71. Beveridge, "The March of the Flag," *Meaning of the Times,* 50.
72. E. L. Godkin, "Governing Inferior Races," *The Nation* 67 (August 11, 1898), 104. "Address of Mr. Moorfield Storey," *Anti-Imperialism,* Speeches at the Meeting in Faneuil Hall, June 15, 1898, AILB, 24.
73. McKinley, "Executive Order to the Secretary of State," January 20, 1899, in *Messages and Papers,* 10: 222–3. Commission announcement in RNC, *Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900,* 336–7. In Puerto Rico, such projects were designed to defuse a political crisis, which arose after the McKinley administration reneged on its initial promise of free trade (compare Chapter 4). Compare "Porto Rican

Legislation," RNC, *Republican Campaign Textbook, 1900,* 54–8; J. B. Foraker, "The United States and Puerto Rico," *NAR* 170 (April 1900), 464–71.

74. William McKinley, "Third Annual Message to Congress," December 5, 1899, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 35 (emphasis mine).
75. Kramer, *Blood of Government,* 151–206.
76. John Presto, "Blessings of Civilization," *The American Fabian* 5 (March 1899), 3; rpt. Roger J. Bresnahan, *In Time of Hesitation: American Anti-Imperialists and the Philippine-American War* (Quezon City, Phil.: New Day Publishers, 1981), 185–6.
77. Smith, "Liberty or Despotism," 27; Sigmund Zeisler, "Democracy or Tyranny," in *Chicago Liberty Meeting*, 30–1.
78. Richard E. Welch, Jr., "William McKinley: Reluctant Warrior, Cautious Imperialist," in Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Tradition and Values: American Diplomacy 1865–1945* (Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1985), 29–52.

Chapter 2

1. *The Declaration of Independence,* July 4, 1776 (rpt., Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency, n.d.), 5.
2. Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating & Empire Building* (1980; rpt. New York: Schocken Books, 1990), XXVII. Compare Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 91; Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism & U.S. Imperialism, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 18–25.
3. Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 85, 97. Ralph Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (3rd ed.; New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 14.
4. For the contradiction between internationalism and racism, compare Akira Iriye, *From Nationalism to Internationalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 39, and Frank Ninkovich, *Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865–1890* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 137–8. On "inclusion" in democratic theory, see Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics,* Chapter 9.
5. Love, *Race over Empire,* 17. On the concept's malleability, compare Allen H. Merriam, "Racism in the Expansionist Controversy of 1898–1900," *Phylon* 39 (December 1978), 380; Stuart Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904* (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1981), 18–9. David Healy, *US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison, WI, and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), 39–42. On social Darwinism, compare Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (2nd ed., Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), particularly Chapter 9.

6. For examples, see Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1972), *passim,* especially 83–92; Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," Chapters I-XI, *PSSR* 3–5 (August 1930-October 1933), 7–41, 118–32, 182–98, 239–254, 222–30, 248–79; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 109–10.
7. On the abolitionist background, see Schirmer, *Republic or Empire,* 7; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism,* 151.
8. Love, *Race over Empire.*
9. Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).
10. Quote by Senator Redfield Proctor, *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 2918; Gerald F. Linderman, *The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 131. Cuban revolutionaries were also cast as women in need of rescue; Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 44–5. On the Spanish, see Senator Morton Thurston, *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 3163.
11. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Rough Riders* (1899; rpt. New York: Signet Classic, 1961), 54; Linderman, *Mirror of War,* Chapter 5, and Joseph Smith, "The American Image of the Cuban Insurgents in 1898," *Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik* 40 (1992), 319–25.
12. Albert J. Beveridge, "The Star of Empire," in Albert J. Beveridge, *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1908), 122–4; Congressman Jacob Bromwell, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1103.
13. For this juxtaposition, see Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 122–3.
14. Albert J. Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 709; Whitelaw Reid, *Later Aspects of Our New Duties* (New York: Henry Hall, 1899), 21; Z. Swift Holbrook, *The Philippine Question* (n.d., n.p.), 16. Even the African American George L. Knox referred to "the swartzy hordes of the Philippines," "A Poisonous Leaven," *Indianapolis Freeman,* August 26, 1899.
15. Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 705, 708 (emphasis mine). Compare Senator Edward O. Wolcott (CO), ibid., 55/3, 1899: 1451; Representative Marsh (IL), ibid.: 1086; Senator Cushman K. Davis, member of the Paris Peace Commission, in "The Treaty of Paris," Robert I. Fulton and Thomas C. Trueblood, eds., *Patriotic Eloquence Relating to the Spanish-American War and Its Issues* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900), 262.
16. Bell, Extracts from Letter to a Friend, February 26, 1899, Reel 2, Roosevelt Papers (emphasis mine); compare General Samuel Young to McKinley, July 4, 1900, Reel 10, McKinley Papers; Worcester, "Knotty Problems of

the Philippines," *Century Magazine* 56 (October 1898), 873. On Worcester's role in the Philippines, see Rodney J. Sullivan, *Exemplar of Americanism: The Philippine Career of Dean C. Worcester* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1991); Drinnon, *Facing West,* Chapter 20.

17. Marion Wilcox, "The Filipinos' Vain Hope of Independence," *NAR* 171 (August 1900), 347. Senator Hernando D. Money quoted early positive evaluations by the same generals who later denigrated the Filipinos, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1419.
18. Josiah Strong contradicted himself, however, by suggesting that racial abilities could change, *Expansion Under New World-Conditions* (New York: Baker and Taylor Company, 1900), 36–37; 289–90. Strong's influence on American imperialism is hotly debated. Affirming his crucial role are Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism,* 178–9; Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1963), 72–80; Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands* (1936; rpt. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 19. For skeptical evaluations, compare James A. Field, Jr., "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book," *AHR* 83 (June 1978), 647; Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 245–7.
19. Mahan to Gilman, October 23, 1898, Robert Seager II, Doris D. Maguire, eds., *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan,* 3 vols. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 2: 605; Woodrow Wilson, "The Ideals of America," *Atlantic* 90 (December 1902), 728–31.
20. *New York Times,* October 29, 1898; *Washington Post,* May 25, 1899.
21. Unattributed quotes in William McKinley, "Speech at Dinner of the Home Market Club, Boston, February 16, 1899," in William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1900), 188; Knute Nelson, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 836; Cunes to J. A. Porter (President McKinley's secretary), February 8, 1900, Reel 9, McKinley Papers.
22. Bell, Extracts from Letter to a Friend, February 26, 1899, Reel 2, Roosevelt Papers. Roosevelt "Response to the Toast 'The State of New York' at the Lincoln Club Dinner, New York City, February 13, 1899," State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899* (Albany: Brandow Printing Company, 1899), 267.
23. Woodrow Wilson, "Democracy and Efficiency," *Atlantic* 87 (March 1901), 294–5.
24. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," *Public Papers—1899,* 304–5. On Worcester's classifications, see Drinnon, *Facing West,* 291–4. Paul A. Kramer, "Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War," *DH* 30.2 (April 2006), 185–9.
25. Alfred T. Mahan, "The Problem of Asia, Part III," *HM* 100 (May 1900), 929; Holbrook, *Philippine Question,* 12. On "the destined use of the soil,"

see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (1935; rpt. Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1963), Chapter 3. On "Indian policies" as model, see Drinnon, *Facing West,* 287–8; Walter L. Williams, "United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism," *JAH* 66 (March 1980), 810–31. On the economic dimension of "civilization," see Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues,* 50–2.

26. Gail Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1995), 23–31; Ninkovich, *Global Dawn,* 8. Michael Adas has objected to Ninkovich's non-hierarchical understanding of "civilization"; H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable Review, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-3–3.pdf [accessed September 28, 2011]. Paul T. McCartney, *Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 12, 184.
27. Theodore Roosevelt, "Expansion and Peace," *Independent* 51 (December 21, 1899), 3400–5. Albert H. Walker to Beveridge, February 14, 1899, Box 124, Beveridge Papers.
28. Strong, *Expansion,* 288–9.
29. Davis, Speech at the Washington Peace Jubilee, May 25, 1899, *Washington Post,* May 26, 1899.
30. Edwin L. Godkin, "Imperial Policy," *The Nation* 66 (May 26, 1898), 396. Cleveland, "The Democracy's Opportunity," *Saturday Evening Post,* February 20, 1904; rpt. Roger J. Bresnahan, *In Time of Hesitation: American Anti-Imperialists and the Philippine-American War* (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers, 1981), 169. Schurz, Our Future Foreign Policy, Address at the National Conference at Saratoga, NY, August 19, 1898, Rare Books and Pamphlets Collection, Missouri Historical Society, 5. Boutwell, "Isolation and Imperialism," Reprint as pamphlet from *Boston Herald*, November 5, 1898, AILB.
31. Vest's resolution and speech in *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 93–6; Warren in NEAIL, *Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League,* Boston, November 25, 1899 (Boston: NEAIL, 1899), 4; Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898*, 346.
32. William Graham Sumner, "Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing," 1896, rpt. Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice R. Davie, eds., *Essays of William Graham Sumner,* 2 vols. (2nd ed.; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1940), 1: 199. Robert Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (1968; 2nd ed., rpt. in Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 22. For the use of this argument in earlier debates, see Love, *Race over Empire,* 53–5, 67; Robert L. Beisner, "Thirty Years before Manila: E. L. Godkin, Carl Schurz, and Anti-Imperialism in the Gilded Age," *The Historian* 30 (August 1968), 561–77; Thomas J. Osborne, *"Empire Can Wait": American*

Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893–1898 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981).

33. John Daniel, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1422–32 (emphasis mine); Benjamin Tillman, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 837.
34. William Jennings Bryan, "Jackson Day Speech at Chicago," in William Jennings Bryan et al., eds., *Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question* (Chicago: Independence Company, 1899), 24. Memorial to the United States Senate with Respect to the Spanish Treaty, January 30, 1899, Box 204, Schurz Papers.
35. Samuel Gompers, "The Future Foreign Policy of the United States," *American Federationist* 5 (September 1898), 140. Edward Atkinson, "The Hell of War and Its Penalties," *The Anti-Imperialist* 1 (June 3, 1899), 19.
36. Arthur Rodgers to Hoar, July 6, 1898, Box 182, Hoar Papers (emphasis mine).
37. Lyman to Editor, *Springfield Republican,* May 27, 1898. On immigration, see Nell Irvin Painter, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877–1919* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), xxix-xxxi; Beisner, *Twelve against Empire,* Chapter 1; Geoffrey T. Blodgett, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," *MVHR* 48 (March 1962), 614–34.
38. Bryan, "First Speech against Imperialism," *Republic or Empire,* 13; Carl Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," in Frederic Bancroft, ed., *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz,* 6 vols. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), 6: 3. Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 100.
39. Holst, "The Annexation of Hawaii," pamphlet, Box 204, Schurz Papers; Adlai Stevenson, "A Republic Can Have No Subjects," in William Jennings Bryan et al., eds., *The Second Battle or the New Declaration of Indepdence* (Chicago: W.B. Conkey Co., 1900), 504.
40. Knute Nelson and George F. Hoar, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 837–8. Samuel Bowles, "Labor's Interest in Annexation," *Springfield Republican*, June 19, 1898.
41. E. E. Crandall to Bryan, July 14, 1900, Box 25, Bryan Papers.
42. Gompers, "The Future Foreign Policy," 136–40; Samuel Gompers, "Imperialism, Its Dangers and Wrongs," *American Federationist* 5.9 (November 1898), 179–83. Compare protest note by the Convention of the AFL against Hawaiian annexation, *American Federationist* 5.5 (July 1898), 93–4. McCartney, *Power and Progress,* 237; Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism,* 109.
43. McLaurin, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 641. George S. Boutwell, *Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism* (Boston: AIL, 1899), 15.
44. Anthony to Hoar, February 2, 1899, Box 1, Hoar Papers (emphasis mine).
45. Beisner, *Twelve against Empire,* 232–3.
46. George F. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years,* 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), 2: Chapter 9, especially 125. Quote on Storey in Williams, "United States Indian Policy," 822. Compare Bresnahan, *In Time of Hesitation,* 22; Robert Beisner, "1898 and 1968: The Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," *PSQ* 85 (June 1970), 202.

47. Hoar to Chandler, July 28, 1898, Box 185, Hoar Papers. Hoar, No Vassal States, No Subject Peoples, November 1, 1898, Rare Books and Pamphlets Collection, Missouri Historical Society. His statement on Hawaiians in *CR,* 55/2, 1898: 6663. "Address of Moorfield Storey," Anti-Imperialism: Speeches at the Meeting in Fanueil Hall, June 15, 1898, n.d., n.p., AILB, 25.
48. Bryan, "Jackson Day Speech," 24; William Graham Sumner, "The Conquest of the United States by Spain," 1898, rpt. in William G. Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 310. Andrew Carnegie, "Americanism versus Imperialism," pt. 2, *NAR* 168 (March 1899), 370; "Americanism versus Imperialism," pt. 1, *NAR* 168 (January 1899), 12–3. David Starr Jordan maintained that the Filipinos' "[s]elf-sacrifice for an idea means some fitness for self-government," but also believed that "as [U.S.] citizens they have no hope," *The Question of the Philippines* (Palo Alto, CA: Graduate Club Print, 1899), 9–10.
49. Hugh Dinsmore, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1090.
50. Love, *Race over Empire, passim*.
51. Adams to Schurz, October 22, 1898; Adams to Schurz, November 24, 1898; Schurz to Winslow, November 23, 1898, Box 126, Schurz Papers. On the decrease of racist arguments after February 1899, see Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States," *MVHR* 22 (September 1935), 223–4.
52. Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation,*" 125; Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History* 24 (August 1958), 330. Love's central argument is that nineteenth-century American imperialism triumphed *in spite* of contemporary racism; *Race over Empire.*
53. Whitelaw Reid, "The Territory with Which We Are Threatened," *Century Magazine* 56.5 (September 1898), 791; Carl Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism," ibid., 781–8. For the editor's comments see "Problems," ibid., 796.
54. Beveridge to Harry—[illegible], March 7, 1900; Beveridge to Larz A. Whitcomb, March 7, 1900, Beveridge Papers, quoted after John Braeman, *Albert J. Beveridge: American Nationalist* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 47. Day to McKinley, October 28, 1898; enclosed in Hay to Porter, November 12, 1898; Schurman to McKinley, August 12, 1898, Reel 4, McKinley Papers. Göran Rystad, *Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the Century* (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1975), 113.
55. Nelson, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 837; Lodge to William H. Johnson, February 6, 1899, also Lodge to Henry Healy, January 17, 1899, Vol. 41, Lodge to Lyman, December 5, 1898, Vol. 40, Bound Volumes, Lodge Papers; S.R. 240, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1480. Christina Duffy Burnett, "Empire and the Transformation of Citizenship," in Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, eds., *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 332–41.

56. William McKinley, "Third Annual Message to the Congress," December 5, 1899, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 36; McKinley to Herman Kohlsaat, March 5, 1900, Box 59, Cortelyou Papers; Lodge to Winthrop L. Marvin, March 5, 1900, Box 44, Lodge Papers. The most thorough study of the Puerto Rican debate is Rystad, *Ambiguous Imperialism*.
57. Miller, "*Benevolent Assimilation,*" 156–7; Bartholomew H. Sparrow, *The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism,* 244.
58. Quotations from Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny," *HM* 87 (October 1893), 741; Adams, *Imperialism,* 15. Compare Jordan, *Imperial Democracy* (New York: Appleton and Company, 1899), 44; Andrew Carnegie, "The Opportunity of the United States," *NAR* 174 (May 1902), 609–10. Love, *Race over Empire,* 24–5.
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60. George G. Vest, "Objections to Annexing the Philippines," *NAR* 168 (January 1899), 119.
61. Schurz, "Issue of Imperialism," 7.
62. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (1970; rpt. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 54–7. Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," 1893; rpt. Everett E. Edwards, ed., *The Early Writings of Frederick Jackson Turner* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1938), 183–232. The frontier thesis may have supported overseas expansion, but the connection was not as determinist as some scholars have claimed; e.g. Walter LaFeber, *New Empire,* 63–72.
63. Strong, *Expansion,* 30–7; Franklin H. Giddings, "Imperialism," *PSQ* 13 (December 1898), 600. Anonymous, "Climate and Colonization," *Quarterly Review*; rpt. *ARR* 20 (September 1899), 343–4.
64. Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), Introduction; Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* 12–20. Germans were increasingly excluded from the Anglo-Saxon group after the 1870s, Anna Maria Martellone, "In the Name of Anglo-Saxondom, for Empire, and for Democracy: The Anglo-American Discourse, 1880–1920," in David K. Adams and Cornelis A. van Minnen, eds., *Reflections on American Exceptionalism* (Staffordshire, GB: Ryburn Publishing, 1994), 83–96.
65. Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 54–8. On Venezuela, see Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* Chapter 5; LaFeber, *The New Empire,* Chapter 6.
66. Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* 20–1. For contemporary examples, see John Procter, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," *Forum* 24 (September

1897), 41–2; John G. Carlisle, "Our Future Foreign Policy," *HM* 97 (October 1898), 723–8.

67. McKinley, "Speech at Banquet of the Ohio Society of New York, March 3, 1900," *Speeches and Addresses,* 365; Spencer Borden to McKinley, July 27, 1898, Reel 4, McKinley Papers. On Great Britain's "model function," compare Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910." *JAH* 88.4 (March 2002): 1315–53; Frank Schumacher, "The American Way of Empire: National Tradition and Transatlantic Adaptation in America's Search for Imperial Identity, 1898–1910." *GHI Bulletin* 31 (Fall 2002): 35–50.
68. Beveridge to A. M. Sweeney, March 17, 1899, Box 267, Beveridge Papers.
69. Roosevelt to Ernst Bruncken, March 1, 1898, Reel 315, Roosevelt Papers; Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900, Appendix: 283. Ex-Secretary of the Navy Herbert also only enumerated white Northern European immigrants in America's ethnic makeup, Speech at the Washington Peace Jubilee, May 25, 1899, *Washington Post,* May 26, 1899.
70. Wolcott, *CR,* 55/3rd sess., 1899: 1451; Beveridge to John Temple Graves, November 26, 1900, Box 266, Beveridge Papers. Albert Shaw in *ARR* 19 (January 1899), 8; Speech of Attorney General Griggs, St. Paul, MN, October 12, 1899, Reel 82, McKinley Papers; Strong, *Expansion,* 38–9.
71. Davis to Lodge, August 9, 1898, Box 107, Lodge Papers.
72. Newell D. Hillis, *Chicago Tribune,* October 17, 1898. Compare Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (New York, 1885). On Darwin and social Darwin*ism*, see Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny,* 82–3; Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 7.
73. Roosevelt, "Strenuous Life," *Public Papers—1899,* 306–7. Practically, Roosevelt advocated military preparedness and enlargement of the standing army. Bederman, *Manliness & Civilization,* 192–6. Lodge shared these beliefs, William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 15–6.
74. Carnegie to McKinley, April 27, 1898, Reel 3, McKinley Papers. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire,* 171. For Godkin's Anglo-Saxonism, see Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* 135. LaFeber, *The New Empire,* Chapter 2, and Anderson, *Race and Rapprochement,* 34–5, 51–4; Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission,* 245–7, disagree on whether Anglo-Saxonism and social Darwinism logically supported imperialism.
75. Göran Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism: American Expansionism and Its Critics at the Turn of the Century," in Marc Chénetier and Rob Kroes, eds., *Impressions of a Gilded Age: The American Fin-de-Siècle* (Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1983), 249–50; Bresnahan, *In Time of Hesitation,* 10–1; McCartney, *Power and Progress,* 187, 245; Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism,* 195–6.
76. Tillman, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1532.

77. Bryan, "America's Mission," *Republic or Empire,* 38–39. Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism," 252–3.
78. Most anti-imperialists rejected an alliance with Great Britain. Among Democrats, such reluctance was buttressed by the party's Irish American constituency.
79. "The Anglo-Saxon Myth," *Springfield Republican,* September 5, 1899.
80. "Some Stoop Low to Conquer," *Philadelphia Tribune*, rpt. *Broad Ax,* January 14, 1899; Ransom, Address Delivered at the Chicago Peace Jubilee, n.d., *Indianapolis Freeman,* November 12, 1898.
81. Allen H. Merriam, "Racism in the Expansionist Controversy," *Phylon* 39 (December 1978), 380 (emphasis mine).
82. Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons," 1348–9.
83. Speech of Governor Roosevelt at Republican National Convention, Philadelphia, June 1900, Reel 417, Roosevelt Papers. Roosevelt struck an earlier reference to "*Southern*" states from his speech manuscript, suggesting his desire to tarnish *all* anti-imperialists.
84. McKinley to Lodge, Letter of Acceptance for the Presidency, September 8, 1900, Box 16, Lodge Papers; Hoar, "President McKinley or President Bryan?" *NAR* 171 (October 1900), 480; compare Andrew Carnegie, "The Presidential Election: Our Duty," *NAR* 171 (October 1900), 499.
85. RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book 1900* (Milwaukee: Press of the Evening Wisconsin Co., 1900), 150.
86. McKinley, "Speech at Canton, July 12, 1900," RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book,* 400. For references to the Filipinos as the "emancipated," see McKinley, "Speech at Madison, WI, October 16, 1899," "Speech at Jackson, MI, October 17, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 318, 336. For the comparison between emancipation and Cuban "liberation," see McKinley, "Speech at Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical College, Savannah, December 18, 1898"; *Speeches and Addresses,*178, 127.
87. Tillman, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 1261. Compare Senator McLaurin, Representatives John S. Williams, Thomas C. McRae, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 639, 342, Appendix: 96.
88. Benjamin Tillman, "Causes of Southern Opposition to Imperialism," *NAR* 171 (October 1900), 444.
89. Representative Williams, Senator McLaurin, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 339, 639.
90. Tillman, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 837.
91. Tillman, "Causes of Southern Opposition," 443, 446.
92. Joseph A. Fry, "John Tyler Morgan's Southern Expansionism," *DH* 9 (Fall 1985), 345–6; compare Tennant S. McWilliams, *The New South Faces the World: Foreign Affairs and the Southern Sense of Self, 1877–1950* (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 9, 74. John Procter, "Isolation or Imperialism?" *Forum* 26 (September 1898), 26.
93. Carnegie, "Americanism Versus Imperialism," pt. 2, 363.
94. Resolutions at the Boston Anti-Imperialist Meeting, Anti-Imperialism: Speeches at the Meeting in Fanueil Hall, June 15, 1898, n.d., n.p., AILB, 3. Schurz,

Our Future Foreign Policy, 11. Compare Adams to Hoar, December 20, 1898, Box 5, Hoar Papers; Adams to Schurz, November 24, 1898, Box 126, Schurz Papers.

95. Hoar to Caroline Putnam, May 19, 1900, Box 207, Hoar Papers. Compare Boutwell, *Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism*, 16; Storey, Address, Anti-Imperialism: Speeches at the Meeting in Fanueil Hall, Boston, June 15, 1898, AILB, 22. Samuel Bowles, "Citizenship in the Colonies," *Springfield Republican,* December 18, 1898.
96. Samuel Bowles, "The South in the Campaign," *Springfield Republican,* September 30, 1900; Higginson, Garrison, Boutwell, "To Colored Voters," *Broad Ax,* October 27, 1900 (emphasis mine). For reprint and analysis, see Fabian Hilfrich, "Race and Imperialism: An Essay from the Chicago Broad Ax," in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 250–7.
97. Adams to Schurz, March 23, 1900, Box 130, Schurz Papers; Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?," *MVHR* 24 (June 1937), 43–52.
98. Kelly Miller, "The Effect of Imperialism upon the Negro Race," *Howard's American Magazine* 5 (October 1900), 87–92; rpt. Bresnahan, *In Time of Hesitation,* 161; Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898–1903* (Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 7.
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101. *Philadelphia Tribune,* n.d. (Republican paper), rpt. *Broad Ax,* January 14, 1899; Gatewood, *Black Americans,* Chapter 7.
102. Gatewood, *Black Americans,* 184–8; compare *Washington Bee,* March 11, 1899; Gatewood, ed., *"Smoked Yankees" and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902* (Fayetteville, AK: University of Arkansas Press, 1987),

Chapter 5. Lewis in *Boston Evening Transcript,* April 25, 1899, quoted in Schirmer, *Republic or Empire,* 146.

103. "Turner's Devotion," *Indianapolis Freeman,* October 21, 1899; Gatewood, *Black Americans,* 210.
104. Jackson, "Philosophy of Expansion," *Colored American,* October 28, 1899; Knox, "Sentiment Building," *Indianapolis Freeman,* May 6, 1899.
105. *Washington Bee,* February 11, 1899; "Negroes for Bryan and Stevenson," Address by the Negro National Democratic League to the Public, Kansas City, n.d., in *Broad Ax,* July 21, 1900.
106. "To End the War in the Philippines," *Colored American,* November 11, 1899; "A Protectorate for the Philippines," ibid., February 11, 1899. On these contradictions, see Gatewood, *Black Americans,* 187–9.
107. *Indianapolis Freeman,* September 24, 1898; Gatewood, *Black Americans*, 162, 248.
108. Colored People of Massachusetts, "Not as Supplicants do We Present our Claims, but as American Citizens," Open Letter to President McKinley, rpt. Marks, *Black Press,* 206.
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110. Gatewood, *Black Americans,* 221 (emphasis mine). Compare Cooper, *Colored American,* September 16, 1899, Gatewood, *Black Americans,* 208–9, 218–9, for the election-year "return" to the Republicans.
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Chapter 3

1. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Spring 1990), 150; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 43; William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," William James, *Memories and Studies* (1910; rpt. New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1912), 274.
2. Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Knopf, 2001), 96.
3. Sacvan Bercovitch, "The Typology of America's Mission," *American Quarterly* 30 (Summer 1978), 135–55; Knud Krakau, *Missionsbewußtsein und Völkerrechtsdoktrin in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Frankfurt and Berlin: A. Metzner Verlag, 1967), 30; Ralph H. Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought* (3rd ed.; New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), Chapters 2 and 3. On the distinction of American from other exceptionalisms, compare Joyce

Appleby, "Recovering America's Historic Diversity: Beyond Exceptionalism," *JAH* 79 (September 1992), 419.

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5. Continuity of American imperialism has been the essence of 1960s revisionism and of recent cultural analyses, which emphasize parallels between continental and overseas expansion; Mead, *Special Providence*, Chapter 1, and Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876–1917* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 6.
6. Reverend F. A. Noble, Thanksgiving Service in Union Park Congregational Church, *Chicago Tribune,* October 17, 1898; McKinley, "Speech at the Citizens' Banquet in the Auditorium, Chicago, October 19, 1898"; "Address at the Ecumenical Conference on Foreign Missions, New York, April 21, 1900," in McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1900), 133; 366–7.
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17. Carl Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," in Frederic Bancroft, ed., *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz,* 6 vols. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), 6: 31; Godkin, "Militarism in a Republic," *The Nation* 62 (March 5, 1896), 190.
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20. Ian Tyrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 13–27; Christopher McKnight Nichols, *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2011), 7, 11.
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23. Strong, *Expansion,* 251–2. General James H. Wilson, "America's Interests in China," *NAR* 166 (February 1898), 141.
24. Lodge, Speech at the Republican Party Convention, October 6, 1898, Box 99, Lodge Papers; Peck, Excerpts from Speech at Atlanta Peace Jubilee, December 15, 1898, in Fulton and Trueblood, *Patriotic Eloquence,* 248.
25. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," in State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899* (Albany: Brandow Printing Company, 1899), 296–8. John Procter, "Isolation or Imperialism?" *Forum* 26 (September 1898), 14–26; first quote T.C. Platt, "The Cost of a Blunder," *NAR* 171 (October 1900), 488.
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33. John Fiske, "Manifest Destiny," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine* 70 (March 1885), 578–90; Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating & Empire Building* (1980; rpt. New York: Schocken Books, 1990), Chapter 17; Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny,* 81–2.
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39. Roosevelt to Paul Dana, April 18, 1898, Reel 316, Roosevelt to Cecil Spring Rice, December 2, 1899, Reel 415, W. E. Chandler to Roosevelt, August 17, 1898, Reel 2, Roosevelt Papers. Lodge to Lyman, April 4, 1898, Box 37, Lodge Papers. Beveridge, "Grant, the Practical," *Meaning of the Times,* 38.
40. Hoar to William Claflin, Samuel May, April 12, 1898; Mead to Hoar, April 15, 1898, Box 178, Hoar Papers (emphases mine).

41. Schurz to Edwin B. Smith, May 4, 1899, Box 128, Schurz Papers. Atkinson, "The Thinking Bayonet," *New York Times,* June 14, 1899, rpt. *The Anti-Imperialist* 1 (July 4, 1899), 43.
42. William Graham Sumner, "War," 1903, rpt. in id., *War and Other Essays* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1919), 3–40; David Starr Jordan, *"Lest We Forget": Address before the Graduating Class of 1898, Leland Stanford Junior University, May 25, 1898* (Palo Alto: John J. Valentine, 1898), 11; Edwin B. Smith, "Liberty or Despotism," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 26.
43. Sumner, "War," 39.
44. Van Dyke, "The American Birthright and the Philippine Pottage," Excerpts from Sermon, Thanksgiving Day, 1898, Anti-Imperialist Broadside No. 4, AILB. Göran Rystad, "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism: American Expansionism and Its Critics at the Turn of the Century," in Marc Chénetier and Rob Kroes, eds., *Impressions of a Gilded Age: The American Fin-de-Siècle* (Amsterdam: Amerika Instituut, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1983), 248–9.
45. Hoar, "South and North," Clipping from *Boston Herald,* April 20, 1899, Box 24, Hoar Papers.
46. Jane Addams, "Democracy or Militarism," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 35–9.

Chapter 4

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2. Russell L. Hanson, *The Democratic Imagination in America: Conversations with Our Past* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 398–400; Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), Chapter 12. Preference for procedural arrangements in Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (1962; rpt. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), and, more accessible, "Towards a Communication-Concept of Rational Collective Will-Formation: A Thought Experiment," *Ratio Juris* 2 (July 1989), 144–54; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972).
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4. Lyman to Lodge, May 18, 1898, Box 12, Lodge Papers.
5. William McKinley, "Speech at Marshalltown, Iowa, October 11, 1898," in William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1900), 91. For contemporary opinion, see *Washington Post,* October 17, 1898; Henry C. Lodge to Cushman K. Davis, October 31, 1898, Box 13, Lodge Papers. McKinley to Day, October 25, 1898, Reel 4, McKinley Papers.
6. Charles Emory Smith, "McKinley in the Cabinet Room," *Saturday Evening Post,* October 11, 1902, as cited in Lewis L. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1988), 104. For McKinley's weak leadership, compare Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898: The*

Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (1936; rpt. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 337; Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in Daniel Aaron, ed., *America in Crisis* (New York, 1952), 179–80. For the opposite view, see Richard E. Welch, Jr., "William McKinley: Reluctant Warrior, Cautious Imperialist," in Norman A. Graebner, ed., *Tradition and Values: American Diplomacy 1865–1945* (Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1985), 44; Ephraim K. Smith, " 'A Question from Which We Could Not Escape:' William McKinley and the Decision to Acquire the Philippine Islands," *DH* 9 (Fall 1985), 373; Ephraim K. Smith, "William McKinley's Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands," in James C. Bradford, ed., *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & Its Aftermath* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 204–49.

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10. McKinley, Speech at the Banquet of the Union League, Philadelphia, November 24, 1900, Reel 84, McKinley Papers. On imperialism and the election, see *ARR* 21 (March 1900), 270–1; Albert Shaw to Theodore Roosevelt, April 4, 1900, Reel 4, Roosevelt Papers. Imperialism also dominated a pre-election issue of the *NAR* (171; October 1900). William Jennings Bryan, "Liberty, Not Conquest," in William Jennings Bryan et al., eds., *Republic or Empire? The Philippine Question* (Chicago: Independence Company, 1899), 28–9.
11. McKinley, Speech at the Banquet of the Union League, Philadelphia, November 24, 1900, Reel 84, McKinley Papers; Beveridge, *CR,* 57/1, 1902: 1243–4.
12. Grosvenor, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1091; Lodge, Speech at Convention, October 6, 1898, Clipping, Box 99, Lodge Papers; Henry D. Estabrook to Beveridge, September 23, 1898, Box 120, Beveridge Papers. Compare McKinley, "Speech at Banquet of the Ohio Society of New York, March 3, 1900," *Speeches and Addresses,* 365; id., Letter of Acceptance for the Presidency, September 8, 1900, Box 16, Lodge Papers.
13. Lodge, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 959. Compare Jacob Bromwell and Senator John C. Spooner, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1101; 1388.
14. Amos K. Fiske, "Some Consecrated Fallacies," *NAR* 169 (December 1899), 828; Lodge, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 958. Compare Senator Shelby M. Cullom (IL), Address at Washington Peace Jubilee, May 24, 1899, *Washington Post,* May 25, 1899.
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16. Samuel Gompers, "Imperialism: Its Dangers and Wrongs," *American Federationist* 5 (November 1898), 183; compare Edwin D. Mead, *The Present Crisis* (Boston:

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18. Edward Clark to Beveridge, March 24, 1900; C. C. Brinkley to Beveridge, March 13, 1900; J. Bennett Gordon to Beveridge, March 14, 1900; Box 125, Beveridge Papers. Compare John D. Long to McKinley, March 10, 1900, Reel 9, McKinley Papers; George Lyman to Lodge, February 12, 1900, Box 15, Lodge Papers. Göran Rystad *Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the Century* (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1975), Chapters 2–3.
19. Welsh to Schurz, March 6, 1900, Box 130, Schurz Papers. Arthur Brisbane to Bryan, February 6, 1900, Bryan Papers. H. W. Bennett to Beveridge, March 28, 1900, Box 125, Beveridge Papers. Contemporary anti-imperialist correspondence contains more material on a third-party ticket, however. Among the leaflets and broadsides of the NEAIL, not a single publication was devoted to the Puerto Rican tariff bill, AILB.
20. Hoar to Atkinson, December 16, 1898, Box 187, Hoar Papers.
21. George Boutwell, Address in NEAIL, *Report of the Second Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, November 24, 1900* (Boston: NEAIL, 1900), 15–6.
22. Tillman to Bryan, December 5, 1900, Box 26; Murphy to Bryan, November 12, 1900, Box 25, Bryan Papers.
23. Louis A. Ehrich to Schurz, October 1, 1900, Box 134, Schurz Papers. J. W. Goldsmith, Secretary of the Democratic State Executive Committee, attributed the election results to the "almighty dollar," Goldsmith to Bryan, November 10, 1900; Croffut to Bryan, November 7, 1900, Box 25, Bryan Papers.
24. S. E. DeRockin [?] to Bryan, November 8, 1900; Fred L. Francis to Bryan, November 12, 1900, Box 25, Bryan Papers. E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 235, on the post-election break of Bryan and the mugwumps.
25. Lodge to Adams, June 20, 1898, Box 39, Lodge Papers; Geoffrey Blodgett, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," *MVHR* 48 (March 1962), 633; compare Geoffrey Blodgett, "The Mugwump Reputation, 1870 to the Present," *JAH* 66 (March 1980), 869. The median age of the anti-imperialists was fifty-eight, whereas that of the imperialists was fifteen years below that; Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation:" The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 117; E. Berkeley

Tompkins, "The Old Guard: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Leadership," *Historian* 30 (May 1968), 366–88. On mugwump prophecies of doom before "imperialism," compare Robert Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (2nd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1968; rpt. 1985), Chapter 1. The sense of displacement, a "status revolution," is Richard Hofstadter's main argument about the rise of the progressive movement out of mugwumpery, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), Chapter 4.

26. James Madison (Publius), No. 51, *The Federalist Papers,* ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 1961), 323–4. On differences between democratic traditions, see Ernst Fraenkel, *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien,* ed. Alexander v. Brünneck (1964; enlarged edition, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990).
27. Braman to McKinley, August 2, 1898, Reel 4, McKinley Papers; "The Fanueil Hall Protest," *Boston Evening Transcript,* June 16, 1898; Grow, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 588; Garrison, "Imperialism," Address at the Annual Meeting of the Progressive Friends, Longwood, PA, June 10, 1899, AILB; Villard to Schurz, August 29, 1900, Box 132, Schurz Papers.
28. Carl Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," in Frederic Bancroft, ed., *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz,* 6 vols. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), 6: 35; Edwin Godkin, "The President's Popularity," *The Nation* 68 (April 6, 1899), 252. On 1890s jingoism, see Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," 176–83. For mugwump critiques of jingoism, see Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire,* 74–6; Schurz, "About Patriotism," *HW* (April 16, 1898), 363.
29. Cleveland, "Good Citizenship," Commencement Address at the Lawrenceville School, June 21, 1898, excerpted in *New York Times,* June 22, 1898; Bacon, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 739.
30. Godkin to Charles Eliot Norton, July 1, 1899, bms Am 1083, Godkin Papers; Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1895; rpt. New York: Viking Press, 1960). Schurz, Our Future Foreign Policy, Address at the National Conference at Saratoga, NY, August 19, 1898, Rare Books and Pamphlets Collection, Missouri Historical Society; Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire,* 73. On the influence of Gilded Age unrest, compare Iriye, *From Nationalism to Internationalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 146.
31. Schurz, "Militarism and Democracy," Address at the American Academy of Political and Social Science, April 4, 1899, excerpted in *New York Times,* April 8, 1899 (emphasis mine); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1967), 282. John Greville Agard Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton and London, 1975); Hanson, *The Democratic Imagination in America,* 92–3.
32. Godkin, "The Old Constitution," *The Nation* 68 (January 12, 1899), 22; Schurz, "I am Firmly Convinced . . .," *CR,* 56/1, 1900, Appendix: 649. Compare Blodgett, "Mind of the Boston Mugwump," 623.

33. Hoar to William C. Lovering, February 3, 1899, rpt. Frederick H. Gillett, *George Frisbie Hoar* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), 226–7.
34. Beveridge, The Young Men of America, Speech at Tomlinson Hall, Indianapolis, October 18, 1900, Box 297, Beveridge Papers. Fabian Hilfrich, "The Corruption of Civic Virtues by Emotions: Anti-Imperialist Fears in the Debate on the Philippine-American War (1899–1902)," in Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ed., *Emotions and American History: An International Assessment* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 51–65.
35. Addams, "Democracy or Militarism," CAIL, *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* April 30, 1899 (Chicago: CAIL, 1899), 37–9 (emphasis mine).
36. Roosevelt to William Laird Clowes, January 14, 1898; Roosevelt to Rudyard Kipling, January 5, 1898, Reel 315, Roosevelt Papers.
37. Hoar, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 497. As a champion of Hawaiian annexation, Hoar added a second qualification that Congress could also acquire territory "for the purposes of national security and defense," even if such lands would never become states in the Union.
38. *Constitution,* 10 (emphasis mine). Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 711; compare Senator John C. Spooner, *CR,* 55/3: 1378.
39. Spooner, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 1378; Harry Pratt Judson, "Our Federal Constitution and the Government of Tropical Territories," *ARR* 19 (January 1899), 67; similarly David Jayne Hill, "The Fiction of 'Imperialism,' " n.d., Republican Documents—1900, Widener Library. William A. Peffer, "A Republic in the Philippines," *NAR* 168 (February 1899), 318. On "implied powers" and foreign relations, compare Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), 17; Bartholomew H. Sparrow, *The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 40–51.
40. Platt, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 287; McKinley to Lodge, Letter of Acceptance for the Presidency, September 8, 1900, Box 16, Lodge Papers.
41. McLaurin, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 639; George G. Vest, "Objections to Annexing the Philippines," *NAR* 168 (January 1899), 112–20. Schurz, Our Future Foreign Policy, 10; previous quote in Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," 8.
42. Hoar, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 496 (emphases mine).
43. Bacon Resolution, S.R. 211, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 733; McEnery Resolution, S.R. 240, ibid., 1480. Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation,"* 26–30; Love, *Race over Empire,* 190–5.
44. Address to the People of the United States, Platform of the AIL, n.d. [November 18, 1898], AILB; W. H. Thompson to Bryan, November 29, 1898, Box 22, Bryan Papers.
45. Beveridge, "The Balance Sheet," Speech at Minneapolis, September 27, 1900, Box 297, Beveridge Papers (emphasis mine); Griggs to McKinley, July 5, 1900, Reel 10, McKinley Papers. This subdebate about the automatic extension of the Constitution confused even imperialists. In a thoroughly "imperialist toast," Judge Emory Speer maintained that the Constitution *had* been extended to the Philippines, a proposition that Beveridge would have contested; Speer at Banquet

in Honor of Admiral and Mrs. Dewey, Savannah, March 21, 1900, Reel 83, McKinley Papers.

46. Quoted after Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 228. On the Supreme Court decisions, see Sparrow, *Insular Cases.*
47. Hoar to A. P. Putnam, January 9, 1899, Box 189, Hoar Papers; Godkin, "Revolutionary Imperialism," *The Nation* 67 (July 28, 1898), 69; Sumner, "The Conquest of the United States by Spain," 1898, rpt. Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 314; Schurz, "Thoughts on American Imperialism," *Century Magazine* 56.5 (September 1898), 786.
48. McKinley, "Speech at Madison, WI, October 16, 1899," "Address at Minneapolis, MN, October 12, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 319, 262–9; Reid, *Later Aspects,* 13–4; Beveridge, "The March of the Flag," *Meaning of the Times,* 50. RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book 1900* (Milwaukee: Press of the Evening Wisconsin Co., 1900), 78–92.
49. Sumner, "Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing," 1896, rpt. Albert Galloway Keller and Maurice R. Davies, eds., *Earth Hunger and Other Essays,* 2 vols. (2nd ed.; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1913), 1: 174–207; Hoar, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 4284. Edward Atkinson, "Criminal Aggression: By Whom Committed?," Senate Document, No. 163, 56th Cong., 1st sess, 37.
50. Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 40. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (3rd ed.; New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1988), Chapter 1. On geographical predestination, see Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History* (1935; rpt., Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), Chapter 2.
51. Pettigrew, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 669; 766–70; Atkinson, Preface to *The Anti-Imperialist* 1 (August 20, 1899), 1; Joseph Pulitzer, "Has Congress Abdicated?," *NAR* 169 (December 1899), 887–8.
52. Boutwell, *The War of Despotism in the Philippine Islands* (Boston: NEAIL, n.d.), 3–4.
53. Godkin, "The Old Constitution," 22; "Expansionist Dreams," *The Nation 68*. (January 26, 1899), 61. Hoar, *CR,* 56/2, 1901: 2961.
54. McKinley, "Address before the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment, United States Volunteers, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, August 28, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 216. Theodore Roosevelt, "Address at the Grant Anniversary at Galena, IL," April 27, 1900, in State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor—1900* (Albany: Brandow Printing Company, 1900), 242–3.
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56. The recommendation to reject appropriations in Atkinson, *The Anti-Imperialist* 1.4 (August 20, 1899), 1. For the refusal, see Hoar, *CR,* 57/1, 1902: 2026. Edward Keynes, *Undeclared War: The Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power* (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982), 44.

Chapter 5

1. Geir Lundestad, "Uniqueness and Pendulum Swings in US Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 62 (Fall 1986), 405 (emphasis mine).
2. Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," in David Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), 63.
3. David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press, 2001), 2.
4. John A. Garraty, *The New Commonwealth, 1877–1890* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 240–4; Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary, " 'Blood Brotherhood:' The Racialization of Patriotism, 1865–1918," in John Bodnar, ed., *Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 53–81; Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 6; Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 102–9.
5. William McKinley, "Speech at Decatur, Illinois, October 15, 1898," in William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure Co., 1900), 125–6; compare Theodore Roosevelt, "Annual Message," January 2, 1899, in State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor—1899* (Albany: Brandow Printing Co., 1899), 6. Gerald Linderman has estimated that one million volunteers enlisted, *The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 61–2.
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7. George Peck, "The Year of the Jubilee," Address at the Peace Jubilee, Chicago, October 19, 1898, in Robert I. Fulton and Thomas C. Trueblood, eds., *Patriotic Eloquence Relating to the Spanish-American War and Its Issues* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900), 244. Elizabeth Marshall, "Atlanta Peace Jubilee," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 50 (Fall 1966), 276–82; Fabian Hilfrich, "Creating and Instrumentalizing Nationalism: The Celebration of National Reunion in the Peace Jubilees of 1898," in Géneviève Fabre, Jürgen Heideking, and Kai Dreisbach, eds., *Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early 20th Century* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), 228–56.
8. *Washington Post,* May 24, 1899; ibid., May 26, 1899; *New York Times,* October 29, 1898.
9. Cortelyou, Diary Entry, December 8, 1898, Box 52, Cortelyou Papers; McKinley, "Speech before the Legislature in Joint Assembly at the State Capitol, Atlanta, Georgia, December 14, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 159. Gould,

The Spanish-American War, 111. For reactions, see *Chicago Tribune, New York Times, Washington Post,* December 15, 1898.

10. *Atlanta Constitution,* May 13, 1898, as quoted in Wood, "South and Reunion," 427.
11. O'Leary, *To Die For,* 137.
12. McKinley, "Speech at Clinton, Iowa, October 11, 1898"; "Speech at Augusta, Georgia, December 19, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 85, 182.
13. "The Jubilee Parade," *Chicago Tribune,* October 20, 1898; Herbert, Speech at the Washington Peace Jubilee, *Washington Post,* May 26, 1899; compare Albert Bushnell Hart, "The United States as a World Power: A Chapter of National Experience," *HM* 98 (February 1899), 485–94.
14. Roosevelt, "Annual Message," *Public Papers—1899,* 6; Representative R. B. Hawley, "National Spirit of the South," *Hamilton Club, Tenth Annual Banquet, April 9, 1900* (Chicago: Library and Publication Committee, 1900), 14; McKinley, "Speech at Auditorium, Atlanta, Georgia, December 15, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 160.
15. Albert J. Beveridge, "The Star of Empire," in Albert J. Beveridge, *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1908), 132.
16. Long at Evansville, October 11, 1899; similarly Elihu Root at Antietam Battlefield, MD, May 30, 1900, Reel 83, McKinley Papers. McKinley, "Speech at the Citizens' Banquet, Auditorium, Chicago, October 19, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 134–5; Beveridge, "The Voice of the North to the Soul of the South," *Meaning of the Times,* 219 (emphasis mine).
17. Walter P. Brownlow, *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 89.
18. McKinley, "Speech at Sioux Falls, SD, October 14, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 297; Roosevelt, "Address at the Grant Anniversary at Galena, IL," April 27, 1900, *Public Papers—1900,* 242; *Indianapolis Freeman,* April 22, 1899. A Wisconsin newspaper publisher wrote to McKinley: "[T]he same doctrine governs me in [*sic*] at present that concerned me in the Civil War, which is, that the man who shoots at the flag shoots at me," W. D. Hoard to McKinley, October 23, 1899, Reel 8, McKinley Papers.
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20. McKinley, "Speech at the Auditorium, Atlanta, Georgia, December 15, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 162. Hoar at Gettysburg, *Worcester Spy,* September 17, 1900, Box 24, Hoar Papers; Hoar, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 498; "Address of Mr. Gamaliel Bradford," Anti-Imperialism: Speeches at the Meeting in Fanueil Hall, June 15, 1898, n.d., n.p., AILB, 5. For the centrality of Lincoln in anti-imperialist thought, see E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 152.
21. "Entering the War Stage," *Springfield Republican,* April 21, 1898; compare Charles Francis Adams, Jr., *Imperialism and the Tracks of Our Forefathers* (Boston:

Dana Estes & Co., 1899), 8. X to the Editor, July 1, 1899, *Springfield Republican,* July 3, 1899.

22. Edwin D. Mead, *The Present Crisis* (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis Publishers, 1899), 22; Adams to Hoar, February 11, 1899, Box 5, Hoar Papers; Mason, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 533; Garrison, "Invocation," April 30, 1899, in id., *The Nation's Shame: Sonnets* (n.d., n.p.).
23. Edwin Burritt Smith to Schurz, March 17, 1900, Box 130, Schurz Papers; Mead, *Present Crisis,* 22. For the abolitionist background, see Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism,* 151–2; Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972), 7–8.
24. McKinley, "Speech at Auditorium, Atlanta, Georgia, December 15, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 160.
25. McKinley, "Speech at Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical College, Savannah, December 18, 1898"; "Speech at Madison, WI, October 16, 1899"; "Speech at Jackson, MI, October 17, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 178, 318, 336; McKinley, "Speech at Canton, July 12, 1900," in RNC, *Republican Campaign Text-Book 1900* (Milwaukee: Press of the Evening Wisconsin Co., 1900), 400.
26. John Lamb, *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 97–8; Bate, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 2436. On this "lost cause mentality," compare David Blight, " 'For Something Beyond the Battlefield:' Frederick Douglass and the Struggle for the Memory of the Civil War," *JAH* 75 (March 1989), 1167; Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory,* 102–9.
27. Brownlow, *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 88–9; compare Foraker, *CR,* 55/3, 1899: 571. The *Springfield Republican* complained about a similar contention by Senator Orville Platt because this reasoning "counted blacks [and *their* consent] as nothing." The paper reminded its readers that the South had voluntarily entered the union, whereas the Filipinos were conquered, "Slandering Lincoln," "The Civil War and the Consent of the Governed," *Springfield Republican,* January 27, 1899; September 27, 1899.
28. Beveridge to John Temple Graves, July 13, 1898, Box 266, Beveridge Papers.
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Chapter 6

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Chapter 7

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* ed. J. P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (1966; rpt. New York, Grand Rapids: Perennial Library, 1988), 235–7. Compare Jonathan M. Hansen, *The Lost Promise of Patriotism: Debating American Identity, 1890–1920* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 8–9; Susan Brewer, *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12–3.
2. John Bodnar, "The Attractions of Patriotism," in John Bodnar, ed., *Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–17; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 11. Tocqueville's "reflective" patriotism was the first type to emerge after the French Revolution; Eric J. Hobsbawm,

Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 87.

3. Contrary to Cecilia O'Leary, I would argue that this "chauvinist variety of patriotism" already asserted itself before World War I, in the imperialism debate. It is a type of "wartime patriotism," designed to rally the people around the flag; Cecilia O'Leary, *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 8.
4. For one of the few specific affirmations of the right to dissent, see Henry Cabot Lodge, Address, Middleboro Town Hall, October 10, 1900, quoted in *Boston Herald,* October 11, 1900; Box 99, Lodge Papers.
5. On censorship, see Stuart Creighton Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 82–8. The Atkinson episode in Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898–1900* (1968; rpt., 2nd ed.; Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 99–101; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890–1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 206–10.
6. Edward Atkinson, "The Thinking Bayonet," Letter to the Editor of the *New York Times*, June 14, 1899; rpt. Atkinson, *The Anti-Imperialist* 1 (July 4, 1899), 42; Zeisler, "Democracy or Tyranny," CAIL, *Chicago Liberty Meeting*, April 30, 1899 (Chicago: CAIL, 1899), 29.
7. E. L. Godkin, "Suppression," *The Nation* 68 (May 25, 1899), 388; William G. Sumner, "The Predominant Issue," *International Monthly* 2 (November 1900): 504–5.
8. Albert J. Beveridge in *CR*, 57/1, 1902: 1068 and 1091.
9. Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life," in State of New York, ed., *Public Papers of Theodore Roosevelt, Governor—1899* (Albany: Brandow Printing Co., 1899), 297; Roosevelt, "Response to the Toast 'The State of New York,' at the Lincoln Club Dinner, New York City," February 13, 1899, ibid., 265; John R. Procter, "Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," *Forum* 24 (1898), 45; William McKinley, "Speech at Banquet of the Ohio Society of New York," March 3, 1900, in William McKinley, *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, from March 1, 1897 to May 30, 1900* (New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1900), 364. Fabian Hilfrich, "Manliness and 'Realism:' The Use of Gendered Tropes in the Debates on the Philippine-American and Vietnam Wars," in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), 60–78.
10. John Hay to McKinley, June 10, 1898, Box 56, Cortelyou Papers.
11. Albert J. Beveridge, "The Star of Empire," in Albert J. Beveridge, *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1908), 141–2; McKinley, "Address at Minneapolis, Minnesota, October 12, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 262–9; F. M. Kail, *What Washington Said: Administration Rhetoric and the Vietnam War, 1949–1969* (New York and Evanston: Harper Torchbooks, 1973), 218–9.

12. Carl Schurz, "For the Republic of Washington and Lincoln," Address at Anti-Imperialist Conference in Philadelphia, n.d., rpt. *CR,* 56/1, 1900, Appendix: 158; J. Laurence Laughlin, "The Philippine War," *Chicago Liberty Meeting,* 21fn.
13. Wheeler to McKinley, November 20, 1899, Reel 9; McKinley Papers; Taft to Lodge, November 30, 1900; Box 16; Lodge to Taft, November 22, 1900, Box 44, Lodge Papers; Brigadier General Samuel B. M. Young to McKinley, July 4, 1900, Reel 10, McKinley Papers. For soldiers' comments, see W. E. Dane to Roosevelt, June 1, 1900, Reel 5; R. L. Howze to Roosevelt, November 9, 1900, Reel 6, Roosevelt Papers. The shift to guerrilla warfare in Miller, *"Benevolent Assimilation,"* 98.
14. McKinley, "Speech at Evanston, Illinois, October 17, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 331–2; Speech of Secretary Root at Quincy, Ill., October 6, 1899, Reel 83, McKinley Papers; G.A.R. Department of Illinois, "They Stand by the Flag," May 20, 1899, Newspaper Clipping, Reel 6, McKinley Papers; Roosevelt, Speech at Akron, OH; rpt. *The Lyons Republican*, September 29, 1899, Reel 455, Roosevelt Papers; Beveridge, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 708.
15. Lyman to Roosevelt, September 25, 1898, Reel 3, Roosevelt Papers; Beveridge, The Balance Sheet, Speech at Minneapolis, September 27, 1900, Box 297, Beveridge Papers. On shifting blame, see Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," *PSSR* 3 (August 1930), 31. Sharing contemporary imperialist opinion is John M. Gates, "Philippine Guerrillas, American Anti-Imperialists, and the Election of 1900," *PHR* 46 (February 1977), 51–64.
16. George F. Hoar, *CR,* 57/1, 1902: 650; Love to Roosevelt, October 5, 1900, Reel 5, Roosevelt Papers.
17. Hoar, *CR,* 57/1, 1902: 650. Hoar refers to one of Aesop's fables, in which the wolf seeks an excuse to eat the lamb by charging that it muddied the waters even though the lamb stood downstream from the wolf—an example of tyrannical arbitrariness. Tillman, *CR,* 56/1, 1900: 1259; compare Representative Edward Carmack (TN), *CR,* 55/3, 1899, Appendix: 168.
18. McKinley, "Speech at Denison, Iowa, October 11, 1898," *Speeches and Addresses,* 97–8; Beveridge, The Balance Sheet, Speech at Minneapolis, Sept. 27, 1900, Box 297, Beveridge Papers. On Bryan's motivations to pass the peace treaty for fear of being branded a traitor otherwise, see Paolo E. Coletta, "Bryan, McKinley, and the Treaty of Paris," *PHR* 26 (May 1957), 131–46.
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20. McKinley, "Address before the Tenth Pennsylvania Regiment, Schenley Park, Pittsburg, August 28, 1899," *Speeches and Addresses,* 212; Hoard to McKinley, October 23, 1899, Reel 8, McKinley Papers.

21. Emory Speer, Speech Manuscript, March 21, 1899, enclosed in Speer to Cortelyou, March 20, 1899, Reel 9; Speech of Attorney General Griggs, Aberdeen, S.D., October 14, 1899, Reel 83; Speech of Griggs at Public Reception in Youngstown, OH, October 18, 1899, Reel 82, McKinley Papers.
22. Thomas Jones, Address before the Varick Lyceum, Washington, D.C., n.d., rpt. *Washington Bee* (May 7, 1898), 4; compare "The Negro in the Impending Crisis," *Colored American,* March 19, 1898; "Destiny of the Negro," *Indianapolis Freeman,* May 14, 1898; "War Has Been Declared," *Broad Ax*, April 30, 1898. The ideal of the citizen-soldier discussed in Manfred Berg, "Soldiers and Citizens: War and Voting Rights in American History," in David K. Adams and Cornelis A. van Minnen, eds., *Reflections on American Exceptionalism* (Staffordshire, UK: Ryburn Publishing, 1994), 188–225.
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2. Barack Obama, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Libya," March 28, 2011, in John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds., *The American Presidency Project,* http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ [accessed July 19, 2011].
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Index