



BRITAIN AND THE WORLD

# BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE DESCENT INTO CHAOS

The Career of Jack Garnett, 1902–19



JOHN FISHER



## British Diplomacy and the Descent into Chaos

BRITAIN AND THE WORLD  
*Edited by The British Scholar Society*

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# **British Diplomacy and the Descent into Chaos**

**The Career of Jack Garnett, 1902–19**

John Fisher

*Senior Lecturer in International History, University of the West of England*

palgrave  
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## Series Editors' Preface

*British Diplomacy and the Descent into Chaos* is the third book in the *Britain and the World* series, edited by The British Scholar Society and published by Palgrave Macmillan. From the sixteenth century onward, Britain's influence on the world became progressively profound and far-reaching, in time touching every continent and subject, from Africa to South America and archaeology to zoology. Although the histories of Britain and the world became increasingly intertwined, mainstream British history still neglects the world's influence upon domestic developments and British overseas history remains largely confined to the study of the British Empire. This series takes a broader approach to British history, seeking to investigate the full extent of the world's influence on Britain and Britain's influence on the world.

John Fisher's biography of Jack Garnett captures the chaos of the early twentieth century. Garnett's diplomatic career spanned the Ottoman Empire, Iran, Morocco, China, Mongolia, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Argentina during the turbulent years of 1902–19, with many of these places witnessing revolution or war. This is more than the story of one man – it is an insider's account of Britain's diplomatic service and foreign policy during a time of great change and uncertainty, covering the operation of British overseas missions, the promotion of British interests abroad and the life of British expatriate communities. We highly recommend it to you.

*Editors, BRITAIN AND THE WORLD:*

*James Onley, University of Exeter, UK*

*A. G. Hopkins, University of Texas at Austin, USA*

*Gregory Barton, The Australian National University, Australia*

*Bryan Glass, University of Texas at Austin, USA*

# Preface

William James 'Jack' Garnett was born at Quernmore Park, four miles to the east of Lancaster, on 19 July 1878. His family had been connected with the area for a number of generations. Garnett's great-great-great grandfather, John Garnett, was buried at Burton-in-Kendal. His grandson, William, was born at Ulverston in 1782 and was a merchant in the Jamaican, and latterly Russian, trade, working in Liverpool. In 1826, he bought the Bleasdale Estate, some distance to the East of Garstang, with its extensive grouse moor, and rebuilt the house there. He then bought Quernmore Park in 1842; the ground on which it stood had previously been in the family of Sir Thomas Preston, passing to the 2nd Lord Clifford of Chudleigh, and then to Charles Gibson of Myerscough, who enclosed the park and built the present house in the 1790s. The park was originally part of the Crown Estate, and some accounts suggest that remnants of walls constructed in the time of King John could still be found in its grounds well into the twentieth century. William Garnett, Jack's great grandfather, instigated changes to the main house. Most notably, he replaced the original semi-circular staircase hall in the centre of the house with a two-storeyed rectangular hall, decorated with Grecian plasterwork. Some elaborate coving, a lantern-skylight decorated with amber glass and brightly coloured pilaster strips completed the effect. A chapel was added to the south wing in the 1860s by William James, Jack's grandfather. In 1861, during the American Civil War, a flight of 143 stone steps was built in order to give employment to local workers who had been affected by the lack of raw cotton consequent on the war. The steps were called 'Hard Times' as a reminder.<sup>1</sup> This magnificent house looked out across the Lune Valley, some five thousand acres of which belonged to the family in the later nineteenth century.

The formative time in the gentrification of the family, in terms of the transition from purely mercantile to landed interests, was that of Jack Garnett's grandfather. After schooling at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford, he married the daughter of the Reverend Henry Hale of Kings-Walden, Hertfordshire, and distinguished himself in a number of ways. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in 1845 but elected not to practise. He was appointed a captain in the local militia in 1846 but retired in 1855 rather than serve overseas. He began a long-standing

tradition of involvement in social welfare with his appointment as the chairman of the board of the Garstang Union from 1850. More generally, he took an interest in industrial and religious education, as well as in agricultural matters. He was elected to the Commons as a Liberal member of parliament in April 1857 and was described as favouring 'a moderate extension of the franchise'.<sup>2</sup> This impressive curriculum vitae was a tall order to follow, and it seems that William Garnett was rather overwhelmed by his father's precocity. Nonetheless, he continued his involvement in the Bleasdale Reformatory, established in 1857, later became High Sheriff, and with increasing difficulty, sought to manage the estate which he had inherited.<sup>3</sup> In 1876, he married Bertha Tatham and had five children, Frances, Jack, Hilda, Noel and Phyllis.

From the fragments that survive about Jack Garnett's early education, we know that he attended preparatory school at Eden Mount, Grange-Over-Sands, Cumbria. During his first term he appears to have made a good, if undistinguished start. His knowledge of Divinity was considered to be 'good'; he worked well and showed intelligence in history and geography. His English was also 'good' but marred by haste in his composition. He was less able at French and too inclined to haste in his Latin, anxious to finish first. He seemed to be making progress in his arithmetic and was 'very fair' in drilling.<sup>4</sup> At some point thereafter, he moved to another school, Mr Bartholomew's, in Reading. In September 1891, Jack followed in his father's and grandfather's footsteps to Eton and remained there until 1896. Until 1895, he was in Francis Tarver's house, but on the master's retirement in 1895, he moved to R. S. de Havilland. Jack Garnett's academic ability was soon apparent. He was awarded the 4th Form Brinckman Divinity prize in his first term and the E. Brinckman Divinity prize in the summer and at Christmas in 1892. He won the Head master's German Prize on two occasions, in 1894 and 1895, and the Head master's B History and Geography Prize in 1895. Garnett apparently did not excel at sport; at least he was not in any school team, and he was not an officer in the college Corps. Before going up to Christ Church, he indicated a preference for a career in business.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Garnett remained in Oxford for only a year. He matriculated in October 1897, but no record of his progress or of his subject or even of the reason for his departure survives in the college archives.<sup>6</sup>

This premature end to Garnett's university career in part accounts for his father's efforts from the summer of 1897 to secure his entry into the civil service. A clerkship at the House of Commons was considered briefly, but his attention shifted to the Diplomatic Service. Candidates for it and for clerkships at the Foreign Office had to be between 18 and

24 years of age when they sat for the qualifying examination. After 1892, both sets of candidates took the same examination papers, but they were separately graded.<sup>7</sup> In order even to be considered for entry into the Diplomatic Service, candidates were required to have a private income of at least £400 per annum: sufficient to tide them over a two-year unpaid attachéship and, if necessary, to support them in a succession of expensive diplomatic postings. Further, for both the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, lobbying was required with the Foreign Office on the candidate's behalf. Chances of success and of obtaining the necessary nomination by the Foreign Secretary, a further hurdle before the examination could be taken, were generally better if the support of senior figures could be enlisted.

By November 1897, Garnett's name had been added to what was effectively a waiting list of potentially suitable candidates but the Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury's, private secretary, Eric Barrington, was quite categorical that he could not promise anything. The list was very full and the number of vacancies too infrequent for him to hold out much hope. Jack Garnett would be considered along with all of the other candidates when an examination took place. These occurred roughly every 15 months and anything between six and ten candidates fought for just a few vacancies.<sup>8</sup> When, in mid-August 1899, William Garnett pointed out that his son had been on the list for two years, Barrington replied that the Foreign Office was a small organization with fewer than 40 members of staff. As none of his colleagues had reached the age for retirement the outlook for candidates was bleak.<sup>9</sup> William Garnett was certainly the dutiful father and pressed the Foreign Office again in 1900 and once more in 1901. By way of leverage, he enlisted the help of Lord Cross and of Lord Londonderry also. Repeated rebuffs by Barrington led him to try a different tack. In August 1901, Lord Pauncefote wrote to thank him for a brace of excellent pheasant but regretted that there was still no news of the date of the next exam.<sup>10</sup> Not content with these efforts, William Garnett enlisted the help of the Duke of Devonshire. In November 1901, Lord Lansdowne, who had replaced Salisbury as Foreign Secretary in the previous year, informed the Duke that his list was a very long one and that he never liked to hold out too much hope.<sup>11</sup> By December 1901 Jack Garnett was in Florence improving his Italian. Arrangements had been made for him to attend William Baptiste Scoones's establishment on Garrick Street and to have further French classes with Amédé Esclançon in Maida Vale.<sup>12</sup>

Then, on 1 January 1902, Scoones wrote to William Garnett and told him, in confidence, that it had been decided on the previous day to

hold an exam at or before Easter. Although he was prepared to offer Jack some tuition, he pointed out that with only two places available there would be 'a rush of "high-fliers" '.<sup>13</sup> On hearing the news, Jack responded with some sarcasm: 'I suppose Scoones got his information from the charwoman or his charwoman's brother or cousin employed in the F.O. I wonder he didn't let us know the exact time of day the exam was decided on.' But he promised to return from Italy immediately in order to begin some intensive preparation.<sup>14</sup>

Though badly troubled with toothache, Jack did indeed work extremely hard for the examination and Scoones was optimistic about his chances. The examinations were held between 25 February and 6 March 1902, and Garnett sat for the compulsory papers in arithmetic, geography, English composition, dictation, Latin, *précis*, History, French, German, as well as optional Italian. The languages were examined by means of essays, translations and oral exams. The French exam had included, among other things, a French essay to be written in one hour on one of two subjects: 'Le commerce: doit-il, dans l'intérêt de l'agriculture et de l'industrie, se faire sans entraves' or 'Les dernières découvertes scientifique, entre autres le Téléphone et la lumière électrique'. The essay in German was to address one of the following: 'The result of the co-operation of the European powers in China', 'A good understanding between England and Germany is imperative in the great common interests of both' and 'The invasion of England by American capitalists'.<sup>15</sup>

Of the candidates for the Diplomatic Service, Garnett attained third place, with 3027 marks out of a possible 4350 and lost out by just one point to the runner-up, Henry Chilton.<sup>16</sup> Garnett was awarded highest marks for handwriting and orthography and also did well in the history paper.<sup>17</sup> The news from Scoones that the candidates for the Foreign Office had been rather better seemed of little consequence.<sup>18</sup> Garnett's feelings were captured by Lord Derby, a family friend, writing to congratulate his father: 'It is a distinction already achieved to have passed so well an examination which very few get through on the first occasion. I know well the relief that it is not only to candidates, but to parents also, when the result has been settled satisfactorily. And now I hope that he may have a happy & brilliant career before him and that you may have a deserved feeling of pride in your young diplomat's future.'<sup>19</sup>

There followed a six-month period of training at the Foreign Office and in Garnett's case this was the prestigious Far Eastern Department. There, apart from expressing a general impatience to be somewhere overseas, he made useful contacts, notably with Lord Cranborne, the

Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and, like all new entrants, he deciphered telegrams and copied despatches by hand.<sup>20</sup> After what appeared to be an interminable wait, at the beginning of August 1903, a letter of appointment arrived, informing Garnett that his first overseas post would be at Constantinople.<sup>21</sup>

# Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to Emmeline Garnett for providing insights into her uncle's life and for her comments on a draft of this book. Carol Johnson kindly permitted me to consult family diaries in her possession and also consented to the reproduction of photographs held in the Quernmore Papers. Mr Howard Oldroyd, the owner of Quernmore Park Hall at the time of writing, granted me access to its grounds, as well as its interior. My colleagues at the University of the West of England (UWE) provided a supportive and friendly work environment for working. In this regard, I thank, especially, Professor Glyn Stone. My thanks are also due to Dr Effie Pedaliu, Dr Kent Fedorowich, Dr Philip Ollerenshaw, Dr Ali Kocho-Williams and Professor June Hannam, who helped in different ways. I acknowledge the stimulus provided by students enrolled on my MA course in 2008–9. The completion of the book was hastened by a term's research leave, as well as financial support, in 2007–8, and for this I thank the Faculty Research Committee. For advice and help of one kind or another, I also thank Dr Thomas Otte, Dr Richard Smith, Dr Keith Hamilton and Professors Erik Goldstein, Keith Neilson, Alan Sharp, Geoff Berridge, Anthony Lentin and Keith Wilson. The conveners of the International History seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, kindly invited me to present some of my findings about Jack Garnett in 2010. Their interest in my research over the years has been most welcome. Dr James Onley and Bryan Glass, the editors of the *Britain and the World* series at Palgrave encouraged me in the final stages, as did Ruth Ireland and Alison Howson. Cherline Daniel dealt with the proofs with efficiency and courtesy. Friends, including John Cassidy, John Minaur and Bob Spicer, as well as my sisters, showed an interest in Garnett which sustained me. Former colleagues at The National Archives and staff at many other archives and libraries, including those at Lancashire Record Office in Preston, where the Quernmore papers are deposited, as well as staff at the St Matthias Campus at UWE, helped me with efficiency and good humour. Hugh Alexander and James Cronan at The National Archives; Neil Sayer at Lancashire Record Office; Richard Temple at the Special Collections, University of London Library; Alison Lindsay at the National Archives of Scotland; Debbie Usher at the Middle East Centre Archive, St Antony's College, Oxford; Katharine

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This book is dedicated with very fond memories to my father.



# Abbreviations

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| AA        | <i>Asian Affairs</i>   |
| BD        | <i>British Documents on the Origins of the War</i>               |
| B DFA     | <i>British Documents on Foreign Affairs</i>                      |
| B J M E S | <i>British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies</i>                 |
| BL        | British Library, London  |
| BLNC      | British Library Newspaper Collections, London                    |
| Bodl.     | Bodleian Library, Oxford   |
| BT        | Board of Trade Papers, TNA                                       |
| CAB       | Cabinet Office Papers, TNA                                       |
| CACC      | Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge                             |
| CBH       | <i>Contemporary British History</i>                              |
| CJH       | <i>Canadian Journal of History</i>                               |
| CSC       | Records of the Civil Service Commission, TNA                     |
| CUL       | The University Library, Cambridge                                |
| D&S       | <i>Diplomacy &amp; Statecraft</i>                                |
| DH        | <i>Diplomatic History</i>  |
| EHQ       | <i>European History Quarterly</i>                                |
| EHR       | <i>English Historical Review</i>                                 |
| FCO       | Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London                          |
| FO        | Foreign Office Records, TNA                                      |
| GHL       | Guildhall Library, London  |
| GJ        | <i>Geographical Journal</i>                                      |
| HJ        | <i>Historical Journal</i>  |
| HLRO      | House of Lords Record Office, London                             |
| HR        | <i>Historical Research</i>                                       |
| IAEA      | <i>Inter-American Economic Affairs</i>                           |
| IHR       | <i>International History Review</i>                              |
| IWM       | Imperial War Museum, London                                      |
| J B I A   | <i>Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs</i> |
| JBS       | <i>Journal of British Studies</i>                                |
| JCH       | <i>Journal of Contemporary History</i>                           |
| JLAS      | <i>Journal of Latin American Studies</i>                         |
| JMH       | <i>Journal of Modern History</i>                                 |
| JPA       | <i>Journal of Public Administration</i>                          |

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| <i>JRAS</i>  | <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>                    |
| <i>JRCAS</i> | <i>Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society</i>              |
| <i>JRSA</i>  | <i>Journal of the Royal Society of Arts</i>                    |
| <i>JSH</i>   | <i>Journal of Social History</i>                               |
| LMA          | London Metropolitan Archives                                   |
| L/P+S        | Political and Secret Department records, OIOC                  |
| LRO          | Lancashire Record Office, Preston                              |
| MECA         | Middle East Centre Archive, Oxford                             |
| <i>MR</i>    | <i>The Maghreb Review</i>                                      |
| NAS          | National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh                       |
| NLW          | National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth                         |
| OIOC         | Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library, London |
| <i>SEES</i>  | <i>Slavonic and East European Review</i>                       |
| SHC          | Surrey History Centre, Woking                                  |
| SLNSW        | State Library of New South Wales                               |
| TNA          | The National Archives, Kew                                     |
| ULL          | University of London Library                                   |
| WO           | War Office Papers, TNA   |

# Introduction

The diplomatic career of William James 'Jack' Garnett was relatively unusual in the number of his postings. Besides brief periods spent in the Parliamentary and Contraband Departments of the wartime Foreign Office, between 1902 and 1919, he served successively in Constantinople, Peking, Bucharest, St Petersburg, Tehran, Sofia, Athens, Tangier and Buenos Aires. He thus lived and worked in four of the world's continents at a time when the tectonics of international affairs shifted significantly. He was at the Foreign Office when the strains of war placed unprecedented demands on it, and his career as a whole spanned a period in which it, as well as the Diplomatic and Consular Services, underwent reform on several occasions. Garnett's nomination as an unpaid attaché in the Diplomatic Service was confirmed just as Britain signed an alliance with Japan, thus ending decades of relative diplomatic isolation. The period of his diplomatic career was one in which German military and naval power increased substantively and its ambitions erupted in August 1914. It was a period in which the old empires of Europe, including the Ottoman Empire, with its expansive Asiatic dominions, as well as the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, dissolved. Then, too, nascent Chinese and Japanese imperialism took shape, and both those powers joined Russia in seeking greater influence in Central and East Asia. It was, also, a time of growing nationalism in India, as well as in China, to say nothing of many European countries. In the pre-war period several countries experienced revolution of one kind or another. So too the increase of American influence, particularly in financial terms, was notable just as, in relative terms, German influence had been in the pre-war Middle East and Latin America. The impact of that increasing influence as well as longer term trade patterns was an important element in British diplomacy in Latin America during

## 2 *British Diplomacy and the Descent into Chaos*

and immediately after the First World War. As Garnett's career ended, America emerged briefly on the international stage as the leading power before retreating into relative isolationism.

In his oration at Garnett's funeral in 1965, the Bishop of Lancaster, the Right Rev. Anthony Hoskyns-Abrahall, noted that few men had lived such an adventurous life as Garnett and that it would take a large volume to do justice to it.<sup>1</sup> In focusing chiefly upon his diplomatic career, this book does not claim to document all aspects of his life. Indeed, Garnett spent just 18 years in the Diplomatic Service, but he was involved in local affairs for a much longer period after his return to the family home at Quernmore, Lancashire, in 1929. This book documents Garnett's postings. It does not provide a detailed or original interpretation of the major diplomatic/political issues which arose during his career. However, where evidence exists of Garnett's personal involvement in particular issues, relevant context has been provided. The primary focus is on Garnett himself, his perception of events, of colleagues and of life in the succession of legations and embassies to which he was posted.

There have been several notable additions to the 'diplomatic biography' in recent years,<sup>2</sup> and this work does not offer methodological innovation. Rather, it is an investigation borne out of detailed research among Garnett's voluminous, and hitherto neglected, correspondence at the Lancashire Record Office in Preston. There is also discussion of his travels, his ambition as an author and various other themes that are suggested by his correspondence. Naturally, consideration of his character at so great a distance has presented problems. Emmeline Garnett, daughter of Noel, Jack's younger brother, told me candidly that Jack Garnett was an odd man. What emerges from his letters and diaries is not perhaps so much his oddity, as his intelligence, perceptiveness and his talent for describing the world around him in colourful terms. He was also multifaceted and often apparently contradictory in his behaviour and opinions. His personal generosity is apparent in his correspondence. In August 1906, when posted to Peking, he might have been observed wrapping exotic Christmas presents for his family at Quernmore: kimono (one of them made especially for his mother), Korean fish bells, Szechuan embroideries and even a book of Chinese prison punishments. Admittedly, the items were cluttering up his rooms and he wanted to be rid of them. But this might also suggest a continuing interest in and affection for his family. On his father's death in 1929, when he returned to Quernmore Park Hall, he evicted an aunt who had been living there, effectively leaving her homeless. Possibly,

he resented the continual drain on the family's depleted resources that her presence represented. Then again, in later life, he funded a nephew through his studies at Oxford University. He was heartbroken when during his posting to Peking his pet dog had to be destroyed because of a rabies scare but thought little of poisoning stray dogs in Tehran. More notably, there was his largely unpaid social work in the East End of London during the 1920s, his dabbling in Labour politics and then his reincarnation into the ranks of the Conservative landed gentry in Lancashire.

Garnett's frequently indiscreet and sometimes scandalous correspondence may suggest an oddity of character. But this might also have resulted from a conjunction of his boredom with the social duties incumbent upon diplomats and a natural irreverence, both of which he accentuated in order to amuse his correspondents. A striking example was his depiction of his successive 'chefesses' or the wives of the ministers and ambassadors under whom he served. He systematically undermined and, in a sense, humiliated most of them, albeit in private correspondence. A further and possibly connected conundrum was his sexuality. The research for this book has not uncovered any clear evidence of homosexuality. Apparently, Archibald Rose, of the Chinese Consular Service, whom Garnett befriended in China, and with whom he maintained a regular and very close correspondence until after the First World War, became infatuated with Garnett. Garnett was clearly very fond of Rose, and Rose expressed his friendship in terms which nowadays would give pause for thought. In so far as it has any importance, whereas Garnett may have come quite close to a relationship with Rose, to the extent that he felt it necessary to request to return the letters he wrote, on account of a 'flutter', presumably rumours about the nature of their relationship,<sup>3</sup> it seems that he was not a practising homosexual. There are many flattering (and unflattering) references in his correspondence to women, and some speculation about the possibility of marriage. He was enchanted by the beautiful Marion Carnegie, the wife of a colleague in Peking. He was flattered by her enjoyment of his letters to her, but her spelling and her 'desires & views [which] are those of a woman one wouldn't want like one's female folk to know' concerned him.<sup>4</sup> In March 1909, when posted to Bucharest, Garnett took tea alone with the beautiful crown princess and confessed 'I lost my heart and almost my head.'<sup>5</sup> Of course, Garnett might have used such references to deflect unwelcome questions about his sexual orientation.

Garnett had one testicle removed as a teenager and the second in December 1903 during his first overseas posting in Constantinople. His

niece does not know the reason for this. One might speculate that mumps was the direct cause of the first operation and the indirect cause of the second. Cancer might seem unlikely in view of his longevity and the fact that it apparently did not recur. Garnett's reference in 1918 to the problem as a 'dangerous illness' might indicate that it was testicular cancer or, more likely, that it was tubercular. In June 1920, when writing to George Morrison, formerly *The Times*' Far Eastern correspondent, who had severe pancreatitis, Garnett noted that he also had suffered badly from the condition and that he had undergone two operations in this regard.<sup>6</sup> Whatever the cause, the operations would most probably have left him with a residue of testosterone and, therefore, with sexual desire.<sup>7</sup> It is distinctly possible that Garnett would have felt maimed, emotionally vulnerable, perhaps humiliated and, of course, keenly aware of the likely implications in terms of relations with the opposite sex. Again, one can speculate about linkages between his condition and his generally irreverent interest in diplomats' wives. In one sense, his irreverence was just that, and he applied it to men also.<sup>8</sup> Of King Peter of Serbia, he noted in March 1910 that he 'looks rather a villain, is old, ugly & greyheaded: rather a dirty looking object'.<sup>9</sup> Diplomats' wives were part of the spectacle which he, and others,<sup>10</sup> recorded, and he did not neglect the considerable influence wielded by some at the Foreign Office. Some diplomats' wives clearly were not suited to the role, and in such cases Garnett derived great enjoyment from documenting their transgressions, sexual and otherwise. But it is likely that his perception was distorted. His criticisms of the morally lax conduct of diplomats' wives seem vaguely incongruous with the delight that he apparently took in describing their lapses. Garnett was also a gossip. In September 1913, he reported (from Tehran) that the 1st Baron Rennell of Rodd, British Ambassador to Italy (1908–19), and Lady Rodd had been found 'most unsatisfactory' in Rome 'and that Lady Rodd behaves in such a way that people are apt to call her Lady "Rude"! Garnett had not served with Rodd and did not know him or his wife.<sup>11</sup>

In general, during his diplomatic career, Garnett demonstrated a capacity to fall out with men and women over relatively trivial matters. Most of the ministers and ambassadors, and their wives, with whom he served had a brief period of grace before they began to irritate him. They were then systematically targeted for parody and denigration in his correspondence. This was also true of a number of his other male colleagues. Partly, this might be explained by the strain of living at close quarters with others for long periods. The regularity of his correspondence with his mother especially ameliorated his sense of isolation and

vulnerability and the knowledge that most probably it would only end with his death. There was, therefore, occasionally a sense of Garnett unburdening himself in his letters, and of catharsis. For all the problems he faced, Garnett had a robust character, but his letters do suggest rapid changes of mood; not least, for example, when, deprived of fresh air and exercise, he endured the misery of Russian winters.<sup>12</sup> They further document his frequent disenchantment in considerable detail. Although he occasionally did profess happiness, generally briefly, and usually at the start of a new posting, the *leitmotif* of his correspondence was a sense of disgruntlement. When he found happiness, it was generally in nature – in the beauty of his gardens in Peking, Tehran and Tangier, and also in the spiritual revelations of his journey in Mongolia in 1908. At his summer temple in the western hills beyond Peking, in June 1907, he confessed to being ‘happy as a bird and like a child who has been taken to the seaside for the first time’.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the prospect of home leave could engender such feelings. In November 1904, he confessed to feeling ‘like a schoolboy let loose’, when anticipating his imminent return from Constantinople on leave.<sup>14</sup>

When taken at face value, Garnett’s correspondence also suggests a degree of bitchiness, social snobbery, not uncommon at the time, disloyalty, in the sense that he was inclined to gossip, and an element of cruelty in his character. He was also headstrong and this, together with an element of disloyalty and boredom, was probably his undoing. A representative selection of such correspondence has been cited. The egotism, self-centredness and even selfishness which characterized some of his letters were perhaps not unusual among contemporary successful and socially privileged young men. The almost constant sense of friction with his colleagues was in some cases based upon his actual perception of their conduct and abilities. Some corroboration exists for his views but this is not invariably so. For example, his occasionally scathing views of Sir George Barclay, when minister in Tehran (1908–12), were rather contradicted by the latter’s wartime service as Minister in Washington, where he was deemed to be, ‘eminently safe and reliable’.<sup>15</sup>

The further question might arise as to the nature of his relationship with his parents. Jack Garnett was not particularly close to his father, William, who lacked his son’s, as well as his own father’s, intelligence and academic ability. William, according to Garnett’s niece, was also ‘obstinate, choleric and litigious’, though undoubtedly hard-working and possessed of a strong sense of duty.<sup>16</sup> Jack’s letters to his father became less frequent as his career progressed and tended to be

less detailed and intimate than those to his mother. Often, they dwelt upon financial matters, as his father had agreed to manage his personal affairs when he was overseas, and sometimes on stamps, both being philatelists. Besides this, until Garnett was promoted to the rank of third secretary in April 1904, he was entirely dependent on an allowance from his father. Garnett suggested a staggered reduction in that allowance as his income increased. There was no indication in his letters that he had anything other than a respectful, caring, but not emotionally intimate, relationship with his father.

His correspondence with his mother suggests a much deeper bond. He wrote to her and for a time to his father also, on a weekly or fortnightly basis for most of his diplomatic career. He also wrote regularly to a number of other correspondents, including fellow-gossip, Lancelot Oliphant, who entered the Foreign Office in 1903. In part, the letters were written deliberately in order to create a record of events which he might later use for a book. Often they took the form of a diary or journal and were added to in order to provide the latest news before the diplomatic bag was sealed. Occasionally, he provided details of political developments in order that his correspondents should be able to make sense of current discussions in the newspapers or so he claimed.<sup>17</sup>

Garnett was drawn to diplomacy by an innate curiosity about foreign places. He was particularly drawn to the Far East and to its spirituality. He was eager to explore partly for its own sake, partly in order to gain insights that would advance his career and partly because as a young man he was anxious to prove himself physically. But he also, apparently, retained a sense of identity with Quernmore and an interest in local affairs, even when posted overseas. His appointment as a justice of the peace in Lancashire in 1909 was indicative of this, as was the fact that he continued to take *The Lancaster Guardian*, among others, when overseas. Intermittently, he longed for a European posting so that he could see more of his family. His refusal to return home from the East End of London, where he had embarked upon charitable work in the 1920s, having left the Diplomatic Service under a cloud, when his father's health broke down completely, was anomalous, and possibly evidence of that stubbornness, selfishness and contradictory personality to which reference has been made. As Garnett confessed to his mother in November 1903, when concluding a particularly long letter, he felt as if he had had a long conversation with her.<sup>18</sup> If the frequency and regularity of his correspondence with his mother especially appears odd, then it can only be assumed that it did not appear thus to Garnett.



The question also then arises of the extent to which towards the end of his career Garnett's behaviour was motivated either by genuine grievances with the Foreign Office or simply by an errant streak. Undoubtedly, on a number of occasions in the course of his career, he had expressed dissatisfaction with key aspects of the service. Notably, he repeatedly criticized the level of pay and the process of selecting staff for appointments, issues which often caused discontent. Equally, Garnett was unhappy that he was denied the opportunity to serve in the trenches during the First World War. The fact that instead he was twice posted to the Foreign Office simply increased his discontent. There he found the office quite unable to cope with the demands of war. Like some other, more elevated colleagues, including Lord Robert Cecil, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Minister for the Blockade and then Assistant Foreign Secretary, and Sir Reginald Tower, Minister at Buenos Aires (1911–19), he felt that the office's piecemeal growth and in particular the emergence of new committees and departments was ill-advised and inappropriate.<sup>19</sup>

A further important theme in Garnett's diplomatic career was that of the representation and projection of Britain's commercial interests overseas, a matter in which Garnett took great interest. This was an issue of growing concern to successive governments from the end of the nineteenth century with the emergence of foreign competition in key British markets. It led to the establishment in 1865 of a Commercial Department of the Foreign Office and the creation of several commercial attachés from the 1880s. By the time of Garnett's entry into the service, these developments had done little to overcome deeply ingrained prejudices against commerce within the Diplomatic Service and British establishment, feelings which persisted well into the twentieth century. The eight commercial attachés appointed by 1914 did collect valuable information but as had been recognized earlier their existence further stigmatized commerce among junior diplomats in those posts where staff not only lacked any formal training in commerce, but where they were also largely spared any exposure to it. The demands of war led to the appointment of two further commercial attachés in Brazil and Argentina in 1916 and in the spring of 1918, the Commercial Attaché service was reconstituted and considerably expanded.<sup>20</sup> This development, however, was part and parcel of more general reforms which led, among other things, to the creation of the Department of Overseas Trade in 1917. That department was squeezed between the Foreign Office and Board of Trade and struggled for life in the remainder of Garnett's career.

Like many others, Garnett was acutely aware of the lack of appropriate knowledge and training in commercial matters among diplomatic and consular staff, to say nothing of their superiors in London. His posting to Tangier especially also acquainted him with the weakness of the relationship between British diplomatic and consular representatives and the representation of British commercial interests overseas. Indeed, in March 1917, when feeling particularly under-stretched as first secretary, he asked foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour's private secretary, Theo Russell, if he might work in the Foreign Trade Department.<sup>21</sup> Lastly, the flow of information about commercial openings was deficient. When posted to St Petersburg, Garnett corresponded with the consul in Moscow, Henry Montgomery Grove, who confided that British commercial concerns were showing marked interest in openings in the Russian interior but that the Treasury refused to sanction the appointment of a paid vice-consul and a clerk. Such appointments would enable him or the vice-consul to investigate commercial openings more effectively.<sup>22</sup> Garnett was presumably one of the many diplomats in the first decades of the twentieth century who was aware of the neglect of the Consular Service, and who realized that remedial action was required.<sup>23</sup> But he was also acutely aware of the deep divide that separated the diplomatic and consular services. Efforts were made to disseminate information in a limited way through the pages of the *Board of Trade Journal* as well as in the pages of published consular reports. But there was a sense, even as the First World War raged, that this would not meet post-war challenges. Many of the issues surrounding foreign trade, the emerging commercial attaché service, to say nothing of broader issues surrounding the projection of British ideals, were put aside until the war's end when fuller discussion could take place between the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and other departments. Further, even when these reforms were instituted, there was a sense that the structural changes undertaken to bring greater coordination to the promotion of commerce had been mismanaged. This was true, for example, in Latin America, where in the late 1920s only three commercial secretaries and one assistant existed. By then, there was limited proactive involvement in the promotion of British commerce by dedicated staff, and it was clear even then that those individuals were 'of, rather than in, the Diplomatic Service'.<sup>24</sup>

To Garnett, these issues were highlighted during the First World War partly as a result of persisting concerns about Germany continuing to obtain grain and other commodities from Argentina, where he served from May 1918.<sup>25</sup> This was in spite of the institution of a statutory blacklist overseen by the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry

of Blockade, which was nominally under the Foreign Office. Garnett's brief attachments to the Contraband Department of the wartime Foreign Office gave him some knowledge of the complexities of this work and heightened his awareness of the shortcomings of the blockade and related trading with the enemy legislation.

More importantly, Garnett, as was the case with many British traders in Argentina, felt that the legation in Buenos Aires did not properly discriminate between war work, which would properly fall under the aegis of the Foreign Trade Department and the development of future British commercial interests in the Argentine, properly the remit of the commercial attaché service. This failing was important not only because of German competition and its anticipated revival after the war, but also, and more importantly, because of American commercial enterprise. Efforts early in the war to gain American cooperation in the Blockade of Germany were highly problematic.<sup>26</sup> The subsequent establishment of various bodies by the Allied and associated powers to discuss blockade issues was not entirely effectual and did not remove suspicion of future American commercial rivalry.<sup>27</sup> The precise workings of trading with the enemy legislation and its tenuous links with blockade policy were imperfectly understood by British representatives in Latin America, and it was partly in order to clarify policy, as well as to reassert British interests in the context of growing American commercial competition, that a commercial mission under Sir Maurice de Bunsen was despatched to South America in the spring of 1918.<sup>28</sup> In Buenos Aires, Garnett's dissatisfaction was heightened by the fact that he felt marginalized from the commercial as well as from the political business of the legation. As it became increasingly obvious that the Argentine Government would not be enticed away from neutrality, the habitual preponderance of commercial issues in the legation's business became more pronounced. Much of this commercial work, which, at this point in time, might ordinarily have been dealt with by the first secretary at such a post, was instead undertaken by a commercial attaché and his staff whom Garnett distrusted and disliked.

In seeking to explain Garnett's mindset, one must note that some posts were congenial to some diplomats but not to others. Garnett was apparently hardworking by nature and held a profound belief that government and administration at any level must be efficient. This theme recurs in his criticisms of the Liberal Government of 1906–16, and more specifically in his derision of Asquith and of Winston Churchill, whose fitness to govern he frequently questioned, on the one hand. David Lloyd George, on the other hand, gained his approval, not least because

unlike previous prime ministers, he gave Ireland Home Rule. Moreover, he was an efficient and effective war leader with whose modernizing and waste-eliminating policies Garnett agreed. When visiting Quernmore during the war, Garnett commented disparagingly on the number of charabancs on the road, headed for the seaside, when they ought to have been saving petrol. He took pride in the efficient management of chancery work at his successive posts and was quick to criticize and undermine outdated procedures. Similarly, he applauded the principle of the post-war Foreign Office reforms which accentuated the importance of commerce in foreign policy and, on paper at least, removed the division between the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. This interest in efficiency continued into the 1920s when he occupied a great many responsible positions with voluntary agencies working in the East End. In so far as Garnett had a worldview, one might say that he aspired to a society which was more conscious of its primitive instincts, and more aware of its emotions and their capacity to cause violent conflict and to a more self-consciously deliberative approach to international affairs.<sup>29</sup> The concomitant of this as far as the British Empire was concerned was that it must become better knit and that foreign policy must be driven to a greater extent by a clear vision and one which harnessed efficiency on domestic matters to the realization of a morally grounded international community. A narrow, self-interested definition of 'foreign policy' was, therefore, rejected. However, Garnett's patriotism, as indeed his fervent loathing of anything pertaining to Germany during the war, was unquestionable.

A further and related element in Garnett's character was his religious belief and his deep spirituality. Again, he was capable of being self-contradictory in this area. In offhand remarks, he could be dismissive of other faiths. Shortly before his departure for Mongolia in 1908, he wrote to his father that 'I want both mother and yourself to know that I put my utmost trust and confidence in the same Person you do. My trust, though not blind, is complete and has been for many years and through many difficulties.'<sup>30</sup> But his experience of Mongolia led him to reflect on the narrowness not just of his upbringing in terms of his worldview but also on his perception of the divine. Thereafter, for the most part, Garnett expressed his faith in fairly traditional terms, through his charitable work, and in his association with, and interest in, missionary work. The niche which he found in later life as a local landowner and politician in Lancashire did not allow for much deviation from traditional expressions of faith. It did, however, permit scope for consideration of how human affairs might be ordered more sensibly in order to avoid conflict. This led to active involvement in the League of Nations Union

and from 1939 in the moral rearmament cause. As far as the latter was concerned, Garnett was drawn to the big issues which it sought to confront, although, as little or no documentation exists on this, one can only speculate as to how he viewed its apparent failure over several decades to rectify mankind's irrationality.

Thus, although Jack Garnett was fun loving and irreverent, inevitably wartime postings to Tangier and Buenos Aires, where there was relatively little work of any kind, left him feeling underused and unhappy. This was particularly so in view of the sacrifices being made by many others in the war. Denied the opportunity to experience active service, he felt redundant. This feeling was accentuated in Tangier and Buenos Aires where there were well-established expatriate British communities, but, unlike St Petersburg, little political work to undertake, and where, as a result, social activities were intensive and difficult to avoid. By that point, Garnett must also have realized that he had been cast adrift from the 'inner circle' of diplomatic appointments. Unhappy with the apparently arbitrary and summary nature of his own postings, he commented upon a discernible theme in the Diplomatic Service before 1914.<sup>31</sup> In September 1917, when seeking to improve consular staffing in Morocco, he noted, 'The F.O. system of appointments seems to be to send anyone out anywhere without any regard to his linguistic or other capabilities for the post which is vacant or the country to which the man is to proceed. It is a lack of system which ought to be destroyed.'<sup>32</sup> Both Morocco and Argentina were neutral countries and, while not immune from German subversion and their waters from enemy submarines, they were relatively isolated geographically as well as mentally from the war. In the case of Buenos Aires, the minister, Sir Reginald Tower, had previously implied that the presence of a diplomatic first secretary was only really necessary when he left the country. At all other times, the work could be undertaken by him with the support of consular staff. So too by implication, from an early stage in his career, Garnett found fault with the lack of systematic thought given to postings, chiefly his own, but that of colleagues also, both junior and more senior.<sup>33</sup> On being moved from Bucharest to St Petersburg in 1909, he confessed to feeling 'like an ordinary parcel'.<sup>34</sup> In this case, the move was in fact at his request, though rather sudden, and Garnett had attempted to thwart it. On other occasions, he clearly felt that the cult of the generalist, who might be used anywhere and be expected to fit in without delay, was taken too far.

A further issue was the strained relationship between diplomats and consuls. Diplomats continued to regard consular staff as their inferiors<sup>35</sup> and this was often reflected in the fact that in countries which attracted

diplomatic as well as consular representation, the consulate-general and the legation or embassy were separately housed. During Garnett's career, the consular service comprised the General Consular Service, as well as two specialized branches: the Levant Service and the Far Eastern Service. Some discussion also occurred about instituting further branches for Russia and for Latin America. In peacetime, the duties of consular staff were set out fairly unambiguously in consular instructions. Generally, they reported to the Foreign Office through the senior diplomatic or consular representative in the country to which they were posted. From 1914, however, consular staff were expected to report directly to the Board of Trade on matters affecting commercial intelligence, and in some places, it was found that this work was being duplicated by commercial attachés at legations or embassies. The flow of commercial information largely bypassed the political departments of the Foreign Office.<sup>36</sup> More generally, some consular staff found that the war added immensely to their work. Many consulates were depleted of staff because of war service and were unable to obtain reliable and suitably qualified replacements. By the spring of 1917, the consulate in Buenos Aires had lost eight staff but its work had increased exponentially. This was particularly so with regard to commerce, shipping and security work in connection with enemy subversion, to say nothing of work relating to various patriotic societies in which the consul-general was expected to participate.

Garnett's recall from Buenos Aires at the beginning of 1919 coincided with the reforms which, on paper at least, dissolved the barriers between service in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, and in theory reduced previous hurdles to consular staff transferring to the Diplomatic Service. For a number of reasons, these reforms failed to allay discontent. The rationalization of the Foreign Office and its wartime departments also commenced. Besides Garnett, some Foreign Office staff and some other diplomats also left the service. There were various reasons for this. For many, the appeal of the service dwindled, as their career reached a plateau, and it became clear that they would not attain the top posts. Such feelings were not new and indeed the problem persisted long after Garnett's time.<sup>37</sup> The 5th Earl of Onslow had left the Foreign Office, having also previously served as a diplomat, in 1913, because his Foreign Office salary might easily be matched elsewhere, and as prospects for promotion were limited. There was no compelling financial need for him to continue his career. There was little prospect of advancement, and why, with only one life to live should it be spent doing the work of a clerk?<sup>38</sup> For those, like Garnett, whose financial situation was less

comfortable, the Diplomatic Service was not regarded as a generous employer, and this was a recurring theme of his life and correspondence, as of some of his colleagues also. Postings in St Petersburg and Buenos Aires, especially, left him impoverished and resentful towards the Foreign Office.

Such feelings were possibly accentuated in Garnett's case by the knowledge that having begun his career in a most promising fashion at several key posts, his star soon waned. By 1919, his exaggerated complaint, echoed by others, was that many of the top diplomatic postings were given to men from outside the service. A case in point was Lord Reading's appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary and High Commissioner on a special mission to America in January 1918. According to Reading, British Embassy staff were initially deeply unhappy at his appointment because it might form a precedent and it might block their own advancement.<sup>39</sup>

A further notable issue highlighted by Garnett's career was the way in which British expatriate communities interacted with British diplomatic and consular representatives. Typically, ambassadors and their staff were expected to play a prominent role in the social, charitable and other activities of such communities. In some postings, this was particularly important, and during the First World War, the need to mobilize British expatriate communities afforded considerable importance to such efforts.<sup>40</sup> Some months before the onset of war, in April 1914, Herman Norman, when commending the abilities of Sir Reginald Tower, minister at Buenos Aires, to the Foreign Office, noted 'the manifold duties which he is called upon to perform in relation to the British community' and the need for considerable patience in executing these duties. Norman continued, 'He must devote much time to attendance at their meetings and to the mastery of the endless details of their organization and activity, and much tact to the composition of the differences of opinion which cannot fail to arise from time to time in connection therewith.'<sup>41</sup> The British communities in Tangier and Buenos Aires were long-established, fervently patriotic and exhibited the *impedimenta* of white colonial settlement. Both required careful handling.

To these communities, the war represented a threat to an established way of life and often to their prosperity, concerns which were exacerbated by a perception of neglect on the part of the British authorities. In the case of Morocco in 1916, the British merchant community and commercial houses in Britain, which participated in the Moroccan trade, formed the British Morocco Merchants Association in order to lobby the Foreign Office and Parliament. Its principal concern was that the

French authorities in the French protectorate were capitalizing on the war to exclude British trading interests. Added to this were concerns about the government of Tangier and the future of British commercial interests there. Similarly, in Argentina, the much larger British community feared post-war German and American competition. This had led to the establishment of a British Chamber of Commerce in 1913 which evolved a comprehensive structure and membership to reflect the wide diversity of British interests. Pre-war Anglo-German rivalries which manifested themselves before 1914 in the celebration of martial virtues were reflected in the relationship between the British community in Buenos Aires and its German counterpart. By 1914, the latter was 30,000 in number and at the height of its self-confidence and homogeneity.<sup>42</sup>

Of course, Garnett's interest in commercial matters, and, to a lesser extent, his dealings with British expatriates, were not unusual. But the fact that several of his postings, notably China, Persia, Morocco and Argentina, were countries that were seen to be part of, or on the fringes of, the informal British Empire undoubtedly afforded those matters greater significance than might otherwise have been the case. This was especially true of Morocco and Argentina, where, as previously noted, commerce, and the related concerns of the British colonies, formed a significant portion of the work for the legations. This is not the place for a discussion of the motives behind British imperialism in these places or of its nature. Suffice it to say that by the time of Garnett's retirement from the Diplomatic Service, he believed that British overseas interests could not properly be represented or safeguarded by means of the old diplomacy. His mind appeared to move towards Lord Milner's conception of an 'outer empire', and a more tightly knit British world, which was founded upon an understanding of the connections between the domestic, the imperial and the foreign policy spheres.

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Some caveats are necessary. This is a biography of a diplomat and is not intended to provide a detailed evaluation of British foreign policy in each country to which Garnett was posted. Where possible, I have supplemented Garnett's own papers with embassy correspondence; material generated at the Foreign Office in London has been used to provide context, but I have not comprehensively trawled the pre- and post-1906 country/general Foreign Office files. Those with knowledge of British diplomacy in this period will notice gaps in my coverage. I have



discussed issues which were the focus of Garnett's correspondence. Matters which preoccupied him have received greater attention: those which he alluded to in passing, such as the Povagé case in St Petersburg, in 1911, though interesting in their own right, have of necessity, been omitted. A further consideration is that, as was the case in pre-war Persia and in Sofia in 1915, the view from the legation was very different from that of the Foreign Office. Local developments and pressures, as well as detailed information yielded by local contacts, helped to shape the perceptions of those on the spot just as wider considerations did for policy makers in London. On a number of occasions, it is clear that Garnett, through no failing on his part, simply did not appreciate the Foreign Office perspective.

As for Garnett's own papers, their strength is their voluminous nature. However, they are almost exclusively one-sided, as far as his parents are concerned, although letters from certain other correspondents, including Archibald Rose and Lancelot Oliphant, have survived in greater number. Many other private collections have been consulted. Unfortunately, the main collection of Toynbee Hall papers, previously accessible at Toynbee Hall itself, was unavailable for research.

This book contains much that some international historians might dismiss as tittle-tattle but this is intentional. Garnett, like most diplomats, did not spend the majority, or even very much, of his career dealing with crises or frenetic wartime diplomacy or with issues of vital and pressing importance. Rather, like the soldier awaiting the next big push, in the early part of his career especially, periods spent on routine administration were punctuated by a good deal of socializing and sport, of one kind or another, as well as travel. That is not to say that the latter activities were not a necessary part of diplomacy. As Sir David Kelly noted, 'The diplomatist's primary business always has been and always will be to cultivate whatever groups actually influence policy and therefore the relations between his own country and that to which he is accredited.'<sup>43</sup> Such activities feature in this account in proportion to their representation in Garnett's letters. So, too, some readers may find Garnett's views about foreigners repugnant. In some cases they were but by the standards of the day they were normal and, if anything, sometimes enlightened. The book offers a window into the various legations and embassies where Garnett served, and into the wider British world of which they, as well as the various expatriate communities or colonies, as they were often known as, were a part.

# 1

## Constantinople: 'A Very Wonderful Place'

By the time of Garnett's arrival in Constantinople in 1903, the city had long exerted a fascination on the minds of Westerners. For travellers and other visitors, the bazaars and mosques, the hectic street life, the smells and sounds and even the pariah dogs offered a gateway to the Orient. It was a city of over a million inhabitants, if its suburbs were included, a city with a preponderance of Muslims but with a substantial population of Jews, Greeks and Armenians, especially, and with a large foreign community, consisting of practically all nationalities.<sup>1</sup> Those communities were scattered across the city's three areas, Stamboul and Pera in Europe, separated from each other by the Golden Horn, and Scutari on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. The European communities had their embassies and consulates and, for the most part, lived in Pera, with its strong European influence. There, the Grand Rue de Pera, resembling a Parisian boulevard, stretched from Taxim Square in the east almost to the Galata Tower in the west.<sup>2</sup>

The city was saturated with history. At the heart of Pera were remnants of Byzantine influence in the magnificent St Sophia, 'the most interesting church in the world', according to Garnett, the Hippodrome and many mosques and churches. The neighbouring Suleimanieh Mosque, the Topkapi Palace, the Tomb of Sultan Mahmud II and the Museum of Imperial Antiquities were evidence of the city's more recent history. For those who sought the comforts of a European city, there were fine hotels, restaurants, cafes and brasseries. In summertime, there were open air performances of opera at the Petits Champs Assembly Gardens at the Concordia. Less salubrious, perhaps, were the many Turkish baths which, according to one contemporary guidebook, lacked in cleanliness. Of the theatres and music halls, the author of the guidebook, a former Greek Dragoman in Constantinople, was less appreciative. Of the

former, he noted that the Odeon Theatre in Stamboul 'should not be visited by ladies'. The music halls, it seems, were little more than 'low cafes chantants', a view which Garnett shared, when forced to entertain the military attaché in Sofia, Hubert Du Cane, when he visited Constantinople in May 1904.<sup>3</sup>

Then, as now, vantage points offered a vast seascape of the city's waterways, the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus and of the Sea of Marmora, which stretched beyond sight towards the Dardanelles. Ships of many sizes and various flags navigated through this great artery of trade and international rivalry. Steamers, lighters, sandals, *caïques* and galleons; Turkish, Greek, Russian, German, French, Austrian and Italian flags bobbed and weaved and replicated the hubbub of human activity within the city itself.<sup>4</sup> Some of these vessels carried people to and from the Asiatic coast, to and from the islands that nestled south of Scutari and up and down the Bosphorus, to the Aqueducts and the Forest of Belgrade and beyond. Such was its beauty that soon after his arrival, Garnett hired a *caïque* with two oarsmen for a month.

From Galata, as one writer recorded:

where life is a thing of shreds and patches, without coherent associations and without roots, one looks over to Stamboul and gets the sense of another, unknown life, reaching out secret filaments to the uttermost part of the earth. Strange faces, strange costumes, strange dialects come and go, on errands not necessarily too mysterious, yet mysterious enough for one who knows nothing of the East, its habits, its real thought and hope and belief.

Of the spice bazaar, the author noted that it was 'a museum of strange powders and electuaries', full of the aroma of the East; a maze of narrow alleys, fringed with dangling vines, jingling horse bells, wood-turning, basket making, amber-cutting, brass-beating: coffee houses where men smoked and sat and talked for hours. There or at the Grand Bazaar or at the various ceremonial occasions at the *Dolma Bagche* palace, where the weak and tiny Sultan Abdüllhamid received hundreds of officials, all of them salaaming in their turbaned finery, there were sights and sounds and smells to intoxicate those who were attracted to the East.<sup>5</sup> Among these were whirling as well as 'howling' dervishes, in whom Garnett took a keen interest, as well as an annual Persian festival at which the celebrants flagellated until bloody. As George Lloyd, the future Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, and one of Garnett's near contemporaries at the embassy, noted, though dirty and odorous, it was interesting

and, altogether, 'a very wonderful place'.<sup>6</sup> To Garnett, it was 'the most picturesque old world town that can exist'.<sup>7</sup>

Many of these attractions and distractions were enjoyed by members of the various diplomatic communities as well as by the sizeable foreign communities in and around the city. For entrants into the British Diplomatic Service, and certainly for those of the Levant Consular Service, a posting to Constantinople was something of a coup.<sup>8</sup> For more senior diplomats also, it was, if not quite on the inner circle of appointments of Paris, Berlin, St Petersburg, Rome and Washington, at least on a par with and probably marginally above Peking and Tehran, among others.<sup>9</sup> In its favour, of course, the embassy at Constantinople was at the centre of a vast hub of diplomatic activity which, in terms of day-to-day business, encompassed most parts of the Ottoman Empire. By the early twentieth century, the empire, in various levels of decomposition, still encompassed Tripolitania in North Africa, large tracts of the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia and the Syrian and Lebanese hinterlands, as well as Anatolia. Its European and island possessions, though riven by fissiparous movements, included much of the Balkan Peninsula, several Aegean Islands, as well as Crete. In some of these places, and especially in those more distant from Constantinople, considerable dependence was placed upon local diplomatic and consular staff. Egypt, for example, though nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire, was to all intents and purposes run by the High Commissioner and his staff, although some issues were still referred to the embassy in Galata for comment or information. Similarly, consuls-general in Crete, in the Balkans and in Tripolitania corresponded with the Foreign Office alone on some matters but on others copied their telegrams to the embassy in Constantinople. The telegrams, reports and other papers generated daily by such far-flung posts made for an eclectic mix of business, some of it, of course, destined for the British Consulate-General in Constantinople which was separately housed near the Galata Tower, rather than for immediate action by the secretaries at the embassy.<sup>10</sup>

In terms of British foreign policy as a whole and the defence of India, the handling of diplomatic interests at Constantinople was of great importance. In 1894, Lord Salisbury, acting on the advice of the Admiralty, had considered that Britain could not repulse a Russian move on Constantinople. Notions of direct intervention at Constantinople had then receded somewhat but such ideas recurred at the time of Garnett's arrival in 1903.<sup>11</sup> Evidence also existed of continuing Russian intrigues in religious matters, notably in connection with the protection of Abyssinian Christians and the Orthodox See in Beirut.<sup>12</sup> As will

be seen, the incipient chaos in Macedonia and on its borders, and unrest among Armenian communities on the Russo-Turkish border kept such concerns in the minds of British officials in London as well as diplomats at Constantinople. Indeed, these were the two key political issues during Garnett's posting there. Growing international involvement in various aspects of government and commerce in the Ottoman Empire brought added significance to British diplomacy in Constantinople. With some issues, especially those such as the Berlin–Baghdad Railway, which had a significant multilateral aspect, the initiative tended to lie with the Foreign Office in London. On lesser issues, however, the British Ambassador was expected to act with a degree of autonomy. After all, during Garnett's posting the diplomatic bag took 3 or 4 days to reach London, and it was periodically delayed and interrupted by disorder in Macedonia. The Ambassador also had to employ some delicacy, mindful of the possibility that a rebuff from the Sultan, or his chief adviser the Grand Vizier or his ministers might facilitate the efforts of a rival power. There was among the Turkish Government a clear undercurrent of suspicion towards British motives in the Near East, something which manifested itself in various ways, notably in the response of the Porte, the Ottoman Government, to the movements of British officers and consuls throughout the empire.<sup>13</sup> As evidence accrued of the further decay and maladministration in the Ottoman Empire, Britain's ambassador, Sir Nicholas O'Connor (1898–1908), had a difficult line to tread. This was especially so, perhaps, in view of the complexities of the Ottoman constitution and the language barrier, which led to the execution of much key business by the chief dragoman on the ambassador's behalf. The former, at one level a glorified translator, nonetheless required 'manner, tact, pliability, [and] resourcefulness' among other qualities.<sup>14</sup> With responsibility for obtaining intelligence also, his was a key role. During Garnett's time in Constantinople, Gerald Fitzmaurice occupied the post.<sup>15</sup>

On a practical level, Garnett's work in Chancery as an unpaid attaché, until April 1904, consisted in the main of transcribing telegrams destined for London. Unless a diplomatic bag was imminent, or unless the staff were depleted by illness or by leave arrangements, the work was undemanding.<sup>16</sup> However, this was a necessary apprenticeship and one which was intended to work to the advantage of both parties. For the attaché or third secretary, such as Garnett, it was an opportunity to reflect upon the wisdom of his career choice and to gain knowledge of a very wide range of topics, procedures and protocols with which the embassy routinely dealt. For his superiors, it provided added

opportunity, beyond the entrance examination and initial training at the Foreign Office, to gauge the aptitude of aspiring diplomats, not only in terms of their ability to work quickly and efficiently and develop knowledge of important issues, but also to adapt themselves to the embassy's demanding social life. As the journalist Sidney Whitman put it, 'Constantinople has long been a seminary, a high school for diplomats of every country. Here it is that uncouth youths, taken raw from the Foreign Office, their hands everlastingly in their pockets, a pipe in their mouth, with slouching gait and pitiable embarrassment, on entering the room of their official superiors come gradually to discard their angularities and are taught to behave themselves in accord with cosmopolitan usage. They are put through their paces, and finally learn to roar in true leonine fashion in the name of their country.'<sup>17</sup>

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It is difficult to say whether or not Garnett would have recognized this description. From the outset, he appears to have been conscious of his good fortune in being sent to Constantinople. By way of preparation, he had taken Turkish lessons with Dr Anton Tieu at the Imperial Institute in the summer of 1902 but stopped these after a few months, preferring to teach himself, confident that after a year of living in Turkey, he would be able to take and pass the examination in Turkish.<sup>18</sup> By doing so, and once he had been promoted to secretary, he would increase his salary by a further £100 per annum. As soon as the move seemed likely, he had intrigued to hasten it, attempting to hide the fact from his superiors in the Far Eastern Department who wished to keep him until the Foreign Office exam in the summer of 1903 had generated a replacement.<sup>19</sup> To his father, he confessed to feeling 'perfectly murderous' when Sir Thomas Sanderson delayed his departure and was not consoled by being told that he was 'such a good worker'.<sup>20</sup>

Garnett arrived at Constantinople on 31 August 1903 after an interesting, if uneventful, train journey. He travelled from Marianbad in the company of a King's messenger, who gave him a lot of news on Constantinople. At Marianbad, the Archduke Franz Josef, Emperor of Austria, joined the train for a short period, and then at Budapest, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria did so too. Ferdinand shared the dining car with the other passengers, and, as Garnett noted, he 'could have stuck a knife in him with the utmost ease'.<sup>21</sup> The last leg of the journey was by steamer. He shared his berth with a cockroach, but the Bosphorus seemed 'indescribably beautiful'. The acting third secretary, Edgar Lister,

met him at the quay and after lunch conveyed him to the embassy's summer quarters, the Summer Palace, which stood at the water's edge at Therapia, on the European side. There, Garnett was to share a 'very large & spacious' house with the other secretaries in the Palace grounds, and also from the spring of 1904, with Aubrey Herbert, who was an honorary attaché. Besides Lister, there were John Vaughan, George Young and Alban Young. Unless they were dining out, they ate together, generally outside, looking out across the water towards the Black Sea. Garnett shared a 'domestic' with Lister, who had inherited him from Charles Marling, but considered his pay of £6 a month ridiculously generous.<sup>22</sup>

Garnett also met Lt Colonel Frederick Maunsell, the Military Attaché, the Embassy Secretary, James Whitehead and his wife, and after a short delay, Sir Nicholas O'Connor. Garnett was pleased to learn that most of the work was undertaken between 9 am and 12.30 pm. When the weekly bag was being prepared, they worked after dinner until the early hours of the morning, but otherwise the afternoons and evenings were free for social activities, sport, as well as evening functions, which, after a lull in the late summer and autumn proliferated in the winter months, then diminished fractionally at the beginning of Lent. The elegant Summer Palace, which housed the British Embassy staff and archives generally between May or June and November each year, was separated from the Bosphorus only by a narrow road. Every morning in the summer months, the secretaries processed in dressing gowns and 'bathing drawers', their servants bearing towels and chairs, and bathed in its waters. Garnett was thrilled to be there. Soon after his arrival, he told his father that he was having a 'ripping time' with his colleagues. He also revelled in the '*suspicion* of danger to one's personal safety'.<sup>23</sup> On the day of his arrival, insurgent bands were said to be within 30 miles of the city, and on the eve of the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, with rumours of disturbances and even massacres abounding, Garnett took comfort in the presence of two British naval vessels, HMS *Harrier* and HMS *Imogene*.<sup>24</sup> On the following morning, a note arrived from the Porte asking what measures existed to deal with attacks on the Summer Palace in the event of disturbances. Garnett told his mother, 'we now feel there is a Macedonian lurking under the Ambassador's chair & a Bulgarian concealed in the Embassy Chapel: we try to keep up our spirits but feel that our young lives are going to be ruthlessly sacrificed!!'<sup>25</sup> O'Connor refused the offer of a Turkish guard for the Summer Palace, but as Garnett noted, the patrol which normally looked after that stretch of the road spent most of the day sitting on a bench under their window.

Soon afterwards, Garnett reported that he and his colleagues wallowed 'in blood stained despatches' from consuls in many parts of the empire.<sup>26</sup>

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Surviving official records suggest that Garnett worked routinely on a range of issues including developments in the Ottoman province of Macedonia as well as on some commercial matters that were deemed too important for referral to consular staff. The Macedonian question was a recurring issue for British diplomats in Constantinople, Garnett included, during 1903–5. For the expatriate community also, it was the key development in Ottoman affairs.<sup>27</sup> It was in large degree a legacy of the events of the 1870s and 1880s. In the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Russian efforts to redefine and considerably expand Bulgaria's borders had essentially failed. Its intention had been to dominate the country and, by proxy, and through a much expanded Bulgaria with an Aegean coastline, the Balkan Peninsula as a whole. Instead, a rather smaller Bulgarian kingdom emerged under Prince Alexander, a relative of Tsar Alexander III, and, to the south, forming a barrier to Russian expansion, the province of Eastern Rumelia, ostensibly under Ottoman rule but in reality under a largely ineffective international regime. The province of Macedonia, which formed a further barrier between Eastern Rumelia and the Aegean Sea and Russia's long-cherished warm water port, was retained by the Porte. This arrangement was unsatisfactory in every way, and by the mid-1880s, Bulgarian nationalists, encouraged by Russia, had begun to interfere in Eastern Rumelia and agitate for union with Bulgaria proper. Meanwhile, Serbia had begun to demand territorial gains at the expense of Macedonia. The union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was, in fact, attained but more because of Prince Alexander's initiative, something which Russia was keen to stifle. Although the Porte accepted Prince Alexander as governor of Eastern Rumelia, the episode was not resolved satisfactorily. Indeed, Russia forced Prince Alexander into exile. Russian ambitions in the Balkans had not been fulfilled, nor had those of Serbia or Greece. Both were aggrieved by the settlement of 1878 and continued to covet Macedonia. In the longer term, there was relatively little that Austria–Hungary, which was the other key regional power, with its own territorial ambitions, and Britain could do to restrain the ambitions of those powers. The Porte was correspondingly vulnerable, not only to this irredentism, but also to Bulgarian territorial ambitions in Macedonia.<sup>28</sup>



These concerns mounted in the following years when Prince Alexander's successor, Ferdinand, sought by stealth to assimilate Macedonia into Bulgaria.<sup>29</sup> This was exemplified by his toleration, and possibly more, of Macedonian bands that periodically crossed from Bulgaria into Macedonia, attacking Turkish villages. These attacks were indicative of a more substantive and powerful Macedonian nationalist element within the Bulgarian population. Ostensibly, it aimed to ameliorate Turkish misgovernment in Macedonia. Bulgaria's incipient weakness, the inability or unwillingness of Ferdinand to restrain these armed bands, and continuing suspicions of Russian influence in Bulgaria, meant that the Macedonian situation had potential to further destabilize the region and discredit Ottoman rule. To this was added growing evidence of Greek and Serbian ambitions in the last years of the nineteenth century in the form of guerilla attacks conducted against Turks and non-Orthodox Christians in Macedonia. Eventually, in April 1903, Austria and Russia, who had previously signed an agreement not to intervene in the situation, proposed a set of reforms for Macedonia. Briefly, a Turkish Inspector-General was to be appointed to oversee reforms instituted in the three Macedonian provinces of Salonica, Monastir and Uskub. The reforms entailed the overhaul of the Turkish Gendarmerie chiefly by foreign experts, the dissolution of the Macedonian bands operating from Bulgaria and the implementation of financial reforms.

This initiative essentially failed. Opposition to the reforms in Northern Albania led, among other things, to the assassination of the Russian consul at Mitrovitza and to the intervention of Turkish forces.<sup>30</sup> Frederick Maunsell described this action as a 'military promenade rather than a punitive campaign', and within a short time violence resumed.<sup>31</sup> In Constantinople, concern mounted that Bulgarian bands might plant explosives there, as they were doing in Macedonia, and guards were doubled around some of the embassies.<sup>32</sup> Telegrams arriving from Salonica and leaving for London from the British Embassy suggested that sooner or later Turkish forces would retaliate and, most probably, disproportionately. This had occurred in the summer of 1903, leading to representations from Sir Nicholas O'Connor to the Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister and, in return, complaints by the Turkish Ambassador in London regarding the condemnation of Turkish reprisals in the British press.<sup>33</sup>

In the following months, and after Garnett's arrival in Constantinople, the situation was periodically highly charged. On 18 September, Garnett told his mother that three battleships were to be sent into Turkish waters

from the Mediterranean Squadron. He did not consider this necessary as the stationnaires had orders to bomb the city in the event of massacres.<sup>34</sup> On 21 September, he reported news of Bulgarian troops crossing the Turkish frontier. Lady O'Connor, who was due to arrive the following month, would do so 'just in time to be massacred'.<sup>35</sup> Besides the avoidance of further instability, it was felt at the British Embassy that Russia, whilst apparently keen to resolve the Macedonian issue, was in reality content to permit the Macedonian bands to operate from Bulgaria. If, as was expected, this provoked a conflict with Turkey, opportunity might arise for Russia to intervene and fulfill its earlier strategic ambitions.<sup>36</sup> This was suggested, among other things, by Russian efforts to assert itself in the Bay of Platy, near Mt Athos, where, if its efforts were successful, it could shelter vessels in deep water. How keen a physical threat from Russia was felt is difficult to say. Garnett, as an eye witness, never alluded to it in his correspondence. If nothing else, it was sufficiently serious for O'Connor to commission detailed reports from Frederick Maunsell on the feasibility and implications of a Russian attack. As Maunsell reported in November 1903, Russian agents had been actively surveying the Turkish coastline and lesser ports of Asia Minor. A blow struck on Heraklia would prevent Turkey from moving troops from Anatolia to Macedonia and would also hinder any military response to the growing Armenian unrest in the provinces of Erzeroum and Bitlis.<sup>37</sup> These suspicions were shared by the British representative in Sofia, George Buchanan and, if local intelligence was to be believed, by many Bulgarians, who in the autumn and winter of 1903 felt increasingly squeezed by Russia and Turkey. The unsettled conditions had effectively stopped trade, and, as a result, credit, leading many Bulgarians to support a war with Turkey. Thus, by the end of 1903, evidence suggested that Bulgaria, Russia and Turkey were prepared to go to war.<sup>38</sup> A more general suspicion of Russian ambitions especially, but of Austria's intentions also, completely undermined confidence in the reform scheme within Macedonia, where it was simply equated with domination by those powers, and by Russia especially.<sup>39</sup> Added to this was mutual suspicion between Russian and Austrian officials. In September 1903, the head of the Austrian Military Intelligence Department in Vienna apparently believed that Russia was preparing to intervene in Bulgaria or Macedonia.<sup>40</sup> The Porte, while emphasizing its active efforts, in reality and with German support, frustrated the scheme at every opportunity.<sup>41</sup> Consequently, the outlook was gloomy.<sup>42</sup>

The failure of this bilateral initiative led to a further round of negotiations from which emerged a revised set of proposed reforms, the

*Mürzsteg* scheme, which was communicated to the Porte in October 1903. Its terms provided for a Russian and an Austrian nominee to act as civil agents to the Turkish Inspector-General. Macedonia was divided into five areas, each being allocated to one of Russia, Austria, Britain, France and Italy. These powers would then appoint suitably qualified officers to reform the gendarmerie in each area.<sup>43</sup> Further judicial and financial reforms were approved, also to be overseen by these agents as well as by delegates of four other signatory powers. Predictably these initiatives also hit the buffers. On Christmas Eve 1903, two months after the *Mürzsteg* scheme had been communicated to the Porte, the Foreign Office complained to O'Connor about the lack of progress noting that, at long last, the Russian and Austrian civil functionaries who would assist the inspector general in Macedonia had been appointed. However, nomenclature remained an issue with regard to these appointments. Furthermore, while some progress had been made on the key issue of the gendarmerie, the Italians having agreed to appoint a general to command the force, the Porte had begun to prevaricate. Further delays would ensure that the force would not be up and running by the spring, the insurgents having declared their intention to resume their activities then.<sup>44</sup> The delays duly occurred, many of them revolving around the appointment, and even the headwear, of junior officers who would assist the Italian General.<sup>45</sup> The latter's status, *vis-à-vis* that of Hilmi Pasha, the Turkish Inspector General in Macedonia, was also debated. As the situation in Macedonia continued to deteriorate, a huge relief effort got underway ostensibly on behalf of the Macedonian Christians, bringing in its wake, many foreign journalists.<sup>46</sup> The Foreign Office in London bore the brunt of a bombardment of petitions from those intent upon this relief work but the embassy in Constantinople did not escape entirely. Requests for local assistance from these bodies, as well as from individuals wishing to travel in Macedonia and more widely in the Ottoman Empire, added to the work of Garnett and his colleagues.<sup>47</sup>

Deteriorating relations between Russia and Japan in the Far East were likely to enforce Turkish intransigence and possibly provoke an attack on Bulgaria, which continually failed to curb the Macedonian bands working from its territory.<sup>48</sup> According to Garnett, the Turks hoped, unrealistically in his view, that the war would divert attention from Macedonia and allow them to crush Bulgaria.<sup>49</sup> In February 1904, there was further evidence of Turkish preparations for an offensive, including the repair of roads on Bulgaria's flank and efforts to move troops from Anatolia to Macedonia. When returning to Constantinople at the

beginning of February by train, Garnett and his fellow passengers had been ejected from their cabins at the Turkish frontier at 1.30 am, while the train was searched meticulously for bombs.<sup>50</sup> As the notional Russian support, which had previously moderated Turkish behaviour, evaporated, early in 1904, the Bulgarian authorities prepared for a spring offensive.<sup>51</sup> A month later, Garnett recorded the Sultan's refusal to accept any reform scheme.<sup>52</sup>

The continual prevarication of the Porte on the Macedonian reforms was, therefore, not altogether surprising. In June 1904, O'Connor, presumably with teeth firmly clenched, congratulated the Sultan on the reorganization of the gendarmerie. He then noted, however, the view of Colonel Fairholme, the senior British officer attached to the force, that the whole reorganization would have to be remodeled, that the so-called reforms introduced by the Inspector General were worthless, and that the ranks were crowded with old and infirm men, both Muslim and Christian having been chosen from the lowest class. When asked what he meant by remodeling O'Connor explained that the Sultan should let his personal backing for the scheme be known among his subjects and should extend the reorganization of the Gendarmerie to other parts of the Balkan Peninsula. The Sultan pledged his good faith as regards the reforms, noting that he had intended to reorganize the gendarmerie throughout the whole of Anatolia also and had only failed to do so because of his daughter's illness.<sup>53</sup> By such means as well as by continued opposition throughout 1904 to the increase in the number of foreign officers in the gendarmerie, the Porte stymied progress on the more limited aims in Macedonia.<sup>54</sup>

And yet, the Porte was not solely to blame. In the Monastir Vilayet, (province) the Italians, under General De Giorgis, were largely passive spectators and though the Austrians in the Uskub Vilayet displayed greater energy, their work was aimed chiefly towards attaining national ambitions rather than implementing reform. The two civil agents had apparently claimed credit for the slight improvement in the situation when it was in fact due to restraint on the part of the insurgents so that they might not be held responsible for the failure of the reform scheme. Indeed, the appointment of the two civil officers had apparently been unhelpful because with their appointment consular officers had greatly reduced their efforts.<sup>55</sup> Further difficulties arose early in 1905 when Russia and Austria announced details of their proposed financial reforms in pursuance of the *Mürzsteg* scheme. The reforms were based upon the control of the revenues of the vilayets being delegated to the Ottoman Bank at Salonica, Uskub and Monastir.<sup>56</sup> The fact that the

bank was essentially controlled by Britain and France, and the likely outcry from the Porte, among other things led to opposition from the German Ambassador, Marshal von Bieberstein, and from the Italian Ambassador.<sup>57</sup> As a result, discussions on the issue were ongoing when Garnett left and the financial issue was only resolved and the proposed solution accepted by the Porte in December when the Powers sent naval vessels through the Dardanelles.

A further political preoccupation was the situation in the Armenian provinces of Anatolia. War between Russia and Japan did not apparently assuage concerns about Russian interference there among the Armenian and Assyrian Christian communities. From the beginning of 1904, sparked by events in Macedonia, unrest recurred in Eastern Anatolia. For some time, local intelligence had suggested that a major conflagration was likely. Armenian groups in Europe, which aimed to have reforms in Macedonia extended to other parts of the empire, were apparently trying to provoke a massacre of their own people. There was also talk of a more general impending massacre of the Christian population as a whole. For some time, Russian, French and British missionaries had been in contact with Assyrians and Chaldeans. By 1903, their activities had come to resemble the pattern of other international rivalries in the Ottoman Empire, something which the Porte resented but was unable to prevent.<sup>58</sup> Although by comparison with events in Macedonia this evolving situation was a relatively minor issue, it was nonetheless persistent and an unpleasant reminder of the Armenian massacres of 1895. Moreover, as Armenian insurgents were mounting attacks from Russian territory, concern arose about the manner of the Porte's response to what for it was a deeply sensitive issue.<sup>59</sup> In addition, Kurds living in largely lawless Persian Kurdistan had begun to attack across the border. Among their neighbours were Assyrians who had joined the Orthodox faith in order to obtain Russian protection. In April 1904, Garnett reported evidence of massacres and early in May he dealt with telegrams about crimes, the burning of villages and massacres on a daily basis: Armenia was apparently in open revolution.<sup>60</sup> Rather ominously, in the autumn of 1904, the Ottoman Minister for War, in conversation with Frederick Maunsell, expressed the hope that the next railway to be built would be from Angora to Sivas and on to Erzerum as this would enable the Porte to bring Anatolian troops towards the Russian frontier.<sup>61</sup> For some time before this, O'Connor had detected a growing stridency at the Porte on account of Russia's preoccupation in the Far East.<sup>62</sup> Efforts to involve the Armenian Patriarch and other mediators were ineffective and O'Connor was obliged to complain repeatedly to the Porte about the failure of

local Ottoman officials to prevent attacks on the Armenians. Analysis of local intelligence suggested that the problem might have been overcome if there were an effective gendarmerie officered by Europeans, if the Christian and Muslim populations could be separated and if financial reforms were introduced.<sup>63</sup> These and other measures were debated and some reconstruction and resettlement work was undertaken among those elements of the Armenian population affected by the violence.<sup>64</sup> Overall, however, these efforts had little impact partly because of the manner of Russian rule in the Caucasus, which led many Armenians to cross the border, notwithstanding Turkish efforts to prevent this. Consequently, unrest persisted, with occasional lulls, throughout Garnett's time in Constantinople, and then, immediately after his departure in June 1905, suddenly came to a head with a campaign of bombing and violence conducted by Armenians in the capital.

During 1903–4, evidence of incipient decay in the Ottoman Empire was received on a regular basis at the British Embassy. Broadly, while the picture was not consistently bad, there were frequent reports of maladministration and lawlessness from every corner of the empire. This was true, for example, of outbreaks in the Hejaz and Asir, which had been encouraged by the rout of Turkish troops in October 1903 and then by efforts to levy taxes on the Arab population as well as by ineffective law enforcement.<sup>65</sup> Elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, in the autumn of 1904, Ibn Saud defeated the rival forces of Ibn Rashid and the Porte's inability to assist him effectively necessitated preparations for a more ambitious expedition, which was equally problematic.<sup>66</sup> Henry Longworth, reporting from his consular post in Trebizond early in 1905, noted that in the previous quarter, the Ottoman administration there had 'performed its duties in the usual listless and perfunctory manner. The assumption of the slightest responsibility was avoided and questions of even the paltriest kind were referred to Constantinople. Many remain unanswered and therefore undecided and perhaps forgotten.'<sup>67</sup> Equally gloomy reports relating to the situation in Smyrna, the Hejaz and Erzeroum, among other places, were received at this time.<sup>68</sup>

A more serious concern for the Porte was the outbreak in August 1904 of a major insurgency in the Yemen, led by the local tribal leader, the Imam Yahya. By March 1905, there were reported to be over 35,000 Turkish troops there and further reinforcements were expected from Akaba and Constantinople.<sup>69</sup> Sanaa, Hajje and several garrisoned towns in the southeast of Yemen had already fallen to the rebels. O'Connor, and indeed the Porte, was concerned that the continuing drain upon the Turkish forces threatened to undermine its position in Macedonia and in

Eastern Anatolia. Service in Yemen, where there had been several revolts since 1901, was deeply unpopular among Ottoman soldiers and there was a serious risk that if further troops were required, then they might refuse to go. There was also ample evidence that in logistical terms the Turkish War Office was ill-equipped to deal with the revolt, especially in the hot weather with attendant sanitary problems.<sup>70</sup> Evidence also mounted that the impact of recruiting was unsettling other regions and adding significantly to the Porte's financial difficulties.<sup>71</sup> Previously, in December 1904, Walter Townley, acting as *Chargé d'Affaires* in O'Connor's absence, had reported that troops in Constantinople and members of the civil service had not been paid for several months and that the latter were close to mutiny. In his view, while Germany and France were prepared to lend money, in each case the *quid pro quo* was unacceptable.<sup>72</sup> In the event, the siege of Sanaa persisted for four months until April 1905 but the re-conquest was only completed in the autumn. As it happened, Garnett missed at least some of these developments. Having suffered 'an attack of nerves' following a choleric attack in September, he had been advised not to ride by the embassy doctor. By December, however, he was clearly unwell and wrote to his father to make arrangements for an operation in London. Garnett was not due any leave and he was concerned that his departure after a few months in post might disadvantage his career.<sup>73</sup> Nevertheless, on 23 December, Garnett had an operation for the removal of a second testicle. O'Connor was suitably sympathetic. He assured Garnett's father that Jack was 'an excellent worker & a great help in the Chancery', and that his prospects were excellent.<sup>74</sup> Garnett resumed his duties at Constantinople at the beginning of February.

The mounting political problems previously noted partly explained the Sultan's increasing paranoia, something which Garnett documented with relish. In December 1903, he noted that the Sultan had just imprisoned his son for having saluted his uncle, the Sultan's brother. The latter was heir to the throne and the Sultan had had no dealings with him since his accession.<sup>75</sup> Also, there was the Sultan's growing unease during the annual celebrations of his, 'the "murderer's" accession', as Garnett later referred to it.<sup>76</sup> Typically, these involved illuminations, guns going off in all directions and orders from the Porte that boats should not take to the Bosphorus, in case of revolution. So deep rooted were the Sultan's fears that, according to Garnett's information, he had a spy in every embassy. Garnett pondered which of their domestic servants might be on the Sultan's pay.<sup>77</sup> There were stories, too, of the Sultan never sleeping in the same room on consecutive nights, of his food coming only

from a trusted cook and in sealed dishes. His weekly prayers in the Hamidieh Mosque just outside the palace gates involved thousands of troops. On close inspection, and when Garnett was presented to him in late November 1903, he described him thus: 'The Sultan is a small, dark, gloomy nervous looking man, very grey with a huge hooked nose—*very* like his caricatures. He had a very new pair of squeaky boots on which fairly screamed when he moved about. He is about 62 years old and has 360 wives, each of whom has a separate "konak" or palace.'<sup>78</sup> More annoyingly, the Sultan insisted on having the local English and French press censored and when revolution occurred in Russia early in 1905, information was scant.

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A further aspect of Garnett's time in Constantinople was his exposure to the expatriate British community, both in the context of the embassy's social life and with regard to commercial interests. At Constantinople, unlike many other postings, there was relatively little routine social contact between diplomatic staff and those of the host country.<sup>79</sup> Interaction between diplomats and their expatriate communities was correspondingly greater. That said the relationship was not always easy. During Garnett's time in Constantinople, influential British merchants maintained a steady flow of complaints and suggestions relating to commercial issues. Often these were channeled through the British Chambers of Commerce, which was presided over by Sir William Whittall, head of one of the scions of that renowned family, with its origins in the Mohair trade. The nature of these complaints varied considerably. Many related to flaws or perceived flaws in the operation of the Turkish customs administration which disadvantaged British commercial operations, or to the excessive payments levied by the Sanitary Council. More interesting were the differing perceptions that existed, and which underlay many of these criticisms, of the role of the Consular Service. In the winter of 1902–3, Whittall had recorded at length his belief that British consuls were failing to provide vital technical information which would allow British traders to compete with German rivals especially. O'Connor treated the letter with derision, as did Foreign Office staff when it was sent to London. O'Connor felt that his ideas were 'unpractical' and displayed ignorance of the workings of the Consular Service.<sup>80</sup> (William) Algernon Law of the Foreign Office noted that Whittall's ideas were based upon comparisons with Germany where there was a programme of national education, and a willingness among manufacturers



to study foreign markets. To that extent, his views were criticisms of the merchants as much as of consular staff. The latter, according to Law, provided general commercial information but were not expected, even by top businessmen, to provide detailed technical information.<sup>81</sup>

In fact, the issue of the provision of commercial intelligence by consular staff recurred throughout Garnett's career. The establishment in 1899 of the Board of Trade's Commercial Intelligence Department was intended to go some way to overcome deficiencies. However, the precise scope of its functions was unclear and while Foreign Office officials, despairing at the ignorance of expatriate Britons, made reference to it in their official minutes, it remained principally a source of information for merchants in the United Kingdom. There was a growing awareness of the need to disseminate commercial information through the *Board of Trade Journal* and other publications to these merchants, but the mindset of consular, and more especially of diplomatic and Foreign Office staff did not facilitate such efforts. When Garnett arrived in Constantinople, the handling of commercial issues was divided between the embassy and the consulate-general which were located in separate buildings, roughly a mile apart. By and large, routine matters were dealt with by the consulate-general which had its own dragomans or interpreters and which dealt directly with Turkish customs officials. If these efforts were unsuccessful and if the expatriate community or merchants in Britain complained, then O'Connor might intervene personally. Besides this, the embassy dealt with issues of principle as well as questions bearing on the interpretation of treaties.<sup>82</sup> Sometimes consular staff worked from the embassy and coordination of ideas and effort was achieved, but often issues had to be referred from one building to the other, leading to delays. Efforts by the British Chamber of Commerce in the spring of 1904 to have all commercial matters dealt with in one office were effectively smothered, possibly, in part, on account of the disdain felt by some diplomatic officers towards consular staff.<sup>83</sup> More generally, there was a perception that officers recruited into the levant service lacked commercial knowledge. Entrants into the general consular service were seconded to the Board of Trade as part of their training, but this was not true of the levant service. By 1903, the latter spent two years studying Oriental languages either at the University of Cambridge or the University of Oxford and were then sent to Constantinople for further training. Frequently, however, the students found the exams too hard and when they arrived in Constantinople, they were felt to lack the practical skills required for the job, among them, any knowledge of business matters.<sup>84</sup> Interestingly, according to Sidney Whitman, this

disdain for commercial matters was deeply rooted at the British Embassy. In his view, successive ambassadors ignored everything, and ostentatiously snubbed everybody, connected with commerce as being beneath the dignity of diplomacy. As evidence of this, he noted that not until 1908 did the embassy depute a representative to attend meetings of the British Chamber of Commerce.<sup>85</sup> Garnett's personal disdain for at least some of the expatriate community was palpable. He regarded some as 'only respectable shop keepers'.<sup>86</sup>

Whatever the truth of these charges, the British merchant community was generally unhappy with the vigour of its representatives on commercial matters. In October 1903, attempting to bypass the embassy, J. H. Mountain, secretary of the British Chamber wrote directly to Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, to suggest, among other things, that greater energy was required in the promotion of British commercial interests by officials in Constantinople. The want of this, in Mountain's view, meant that British businessmen were investing in foreign ventures rather than British concerns. He, therefore, suggested that the role of the Commercial Attaché should evolve in such a way that he would be brought into more routine contact with the commercial communities in the region. Furthermore, his responsibilities and powers should be increased in order to effect the promotion of British commercial interests.<sup>87</sup> As we have seen, six months later, the British Chamber had resumed the charge, suggesting that the commercial attaché or, ideally, a more elevated commercial agent or secretary, heading a special department within the embassy and with an assistant, should be much more proactive in assisting British enterprises.<sup>88</sup> In response, O'Connor reiterated that if foreign ventures experienced greater success, then this was due to 'some natural evolution of home industry rather than to superior push on the part of officials supporting such trade' in Turkey. O'Connor noted that Ernest Weakley, the Commercial Attaché, routinely sat in his office 9 hours a day, and yet no one consulted him. In response to figures produced by Whittall to demonstrate that British commerce was suffering, O'Connor had Weakley produced a memorandum showing more recent evidence relating to 1901–2. The figures for those years were, in fact, considerably better than those for 1899–1900, the years used by Whittall.<sup>89</sup> The discussion, as well as the embassy's reception of it, that this was special pleading on behalf of certain commercial interests was to be replicated precisely during Garnett's time in Tangier and Buenos Aires during and immediately after the First World War.

Such representations could elicit barbed comments from diplomats and Foreign Office staff, yet they could not easily be dismissed. The

increasing involvement of rival European countries in the commerce of the Ottoman Empire afforded such issues considerable importance, something which was not always reflected in the manner of their handling. Many of these difficulties were encapsulated in the response of O'Connor and his staff and of the Foreign Office towards railway construction. By 1903, there were several projects underway, mostly with French, British and German financial backing. Typically, however, a perception existed that Britain blew hot and cold in terms of its official commitment, something which further complicated relations between the embassy and expatriate investors, including Sir William Whittall.<sup>90</sup> Partly, this was due to the belief that the Sultan did not wish to see Britain dominate railways in Asiatic Turkey. There was also the huge cost and, in some instances, difficulty of construction, which necessitated the creation of international consortia. Inevitably, in the tangled negotiations which characterized the emergence of such groups, all manner of problems arose, not least the disinclination of the British public to cooperate with Germany. This, among other things, led after much public debate and prevarication to Britain's withdrawal from participation in the Berlin–Baghdad Railway scheme in 1903. While there is little to suggest that Garnett had much direct involvement in the machinations which preceded this, he would undoubtedly have been aware of the increasing body of intelligence that was assembled about the progress of that line, especially at the time.<sup>91</sup> In addition, he would have known of the manner in which the major banks such as the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank sought to win advantage in the hunt for concessions from the militarily and financially overstretched Porte. O'Connor noted that Britain could intervene profitably in this clash between the financial inducements of France and Germany, but this was not pursued by his political masters.<sup>92</sup>

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The glimpses of Garnett presented by the official correspondence suggest that he performed his duties with diligence and ability. In April 1904, O'Connor reported to Lansdowne that Garnett had completed two years as an unpaid attaché. He continued:

During the period in which Mr Garnett has been attached to this Embassy, I have noticed with pleasure the readiness and industry with which he has carried out the duties allotted to him; and his abilities, general conduct and knowledge of foreign languages are such

as to fully entitle him to any recommendation to Your Lordship's favourable consideration, of his claim to be promoted to the rank of Third Secretary.<sup>93</sup>

Garnett was duly promoted. To have the support and endorsement of a senior and distinguished diplomat such as O'Connor was no bad thing. Garnett also apparently befriended some of his other colleagues at the embassy and enjoyed a varied and demanding social life, much of it revolving around his official position and the expatriate community. Whatever the pressures of international developments, these were seldom allowed to disrupt the wide range of social activities. Among these were gymkhanas, with everything from competitive racing to potato bowls. The highlight of the annual gymkhana was the donkey race in which the male riders wore fancy dress. At the Polo Club's annual gymkhana in 1904, Garnett, having rashly agreed to wear a costume made by the wife of one of the Russian secretaries, found himself the 'sensation of the afternoon'; dressed in a pink satin, short skirt, lace, white stockings and a wig. He had ridden side saddle on a man's saddle but, to general amusement, had fallen off when the donkey bolted.<sup>94</sup> There were *regattas* at the San Stefano Sailing Club, football, polo, cricket, racquets, hockey matches and golf. During the summer months, the secretaries also played tennis at the Summer Palace Hotel. There was time for 'skirt dancing': in October 1903, Garnett asked his mother to send him a book on the subject as well as some material, pink by choice, to enable him to participate.<sup>95</sup> There were trips by *caïque* to see local sites, among them, the Genoese Tower between Therapia and the Black Sea. For those with more sedentary tastes, there was a literary society, the activities of The British Institute, the Société des Concerts D'Orgue and of the Choral Society. For the thespian, there was the Dorcas Society whose entertainment committee staged a number of plays, some of them in the embassy garden. In January 1905, Garnett added to his accomplishments by being appointed secretary of the Dorcas Ball.<sup>96</sup> In the winter of 1903–4, he played a handsome ADC in 'His Excellency The governor', and in February 1904, for the purpose of some *tableaux vivants*, Mr Winkle from *The Pickwick Papers*. There were picnics, shooting parties and informal dinner parties also. In mid-September 1903, Garnett was one of over 60 to attend a picnic on Giant's Mount on the Asiatic side, given by Commander Tower and the officers of HMS *Harrier*. There, he tapped *The Times'* correspondent, Dudley Braham, for information, and later took tea with Henry Whigham, the *Morning Post'* correspondent.<sup>97</sup> Garnett particularly liked picnicking there because the

frequent acts of brigandage invested the occasion with a little danger, to the point that he asked his mother to obtain a revolver for him.

As part of their official duties, the secretaries were expected to attend a variety of lunches, tea-parties, dinners, dances of a more or less formal nature and fancy dress parties, for one of which Garnett dressed as a Circassian.<sup>98</sup> Several weeks after his arrival, together with many of his colleagues, he attended a lunch hosted by O'Connor for the Khedive of Egypt. The Khedive had borrowed the Sultan's yacht and, much to Garnett's amusement, when attempting to land at the steps of the Summer Palace in a violent wind, had been thrown unceremoniously onto the deck together with his entourage.<sup>99</sup> A few days later, he attended an 'at home' hosted by Cyril Cumberbatch and his wife to mark the christening of their daughter.<sup>100</sup> Admittedly, some of these functions were extremely boring. In the autumn of 1903, O'Connor revived the custom of inviting his staff to dine on Sundays. These were mostly dull as the secretaries spent their time in one another's company anyway. On one occasion, by way of a diversion, Garnett and Vaughan had worked their way through the alphabet, introducing a topic related to each letter.<sup>101</sup> Unfortunately for Garnett, many of these functions were followed by bridge, in which, he noted, Lady O'Connor excelled in her stupidity and her dislike of losing.<sup>102</sup> Occasionally, as in November 1903, they were leavened by the presence of an outsider, often a foreign or passing British diplomat, journalist or high-ranking soldier. He confessed to having nearly choked with suppressed laughter during a luncheon for an Abyssinian delegation.<sup>103</sup> Some of these functions were on a grand scale and several hundred guests might attend, many of them in great finery and gloriously colourful uniforms. Garnett did enjoy some formal events, although an aversion to wearing uniform set in at an early stage of his career. Occasionally, and sometimes with mixed success, he or one of the other secretaries was asked to devise a seating plan for functions at the embassy. The *corps diplomatique* in Constantinople was no different from those at his subsequent postings in its punctilious regard for precedence. A last minute cancellation could throw arrangements into confusion and deep offence could be given (and taken) if not properly managed.<sup>104</sup> With his appointment as third secretary, Garnett, with his junior colleagues, was also expected to host formal dinner parties in the secretaries' residence at Therapia.<sup>105</sup> Besides these occasions, there were also invitations to attend social occasions organized by the expatriate community and by staff at the other embassies. In August 1904, Garnett had particularly enjoyed a luncheon with the secretaries at the Russian Embassy, where the Russian ladies used their knives to

put food into their mouths and ate cheese with their fingers. Nor did the need to be alert for the preparation of the bag interfere with the fun. On one occasion, the night before the bag was due to leave, Garnett and the other secretaries had decided to attend a dance some 10 miles away on the Asiatic side and arranged to pick up some female acquaintances *en route*. O'Connor had lent them the embassy barge, but it had been holed at the last moment. As they were unable to leave before 8.30 pm, they despatched a servant to Stambul by the last steamer to engage a tug. At last, at a quarter to ten, he arrived with a tug and the party set off. They collected the ladies as arranged, arrived at the dance at 11.30, stayed until 4 am, were home by 6 am, attended to the bag for an hour and a half, slept for 2 hours, and then saw the bag off at 10.15.<sup>106</sup> More sedate, but interesting in their own right, were occasional opportunities to visit the palace. In September 1904, Garnett attended a dinner at which the cutlery and plates were solid gold, and was later permitted to tour the palace in a carriage.<sup>107</sup>

As previously noted, during the summer months, these revelries were transposed from Pera to Therapia, a wealthy suburb of the city overlooking the Bosphorus, with relatively little discernible Turkish influence, where the British, and on the opposite bank, some distance to the South, the Porte had its palatial summer quarters. During Garnett's time, the move was a fairly arduous task, involving scores of bullock carts loaded high with furniture and archives. In November 1903, Garnett had driven from Therapia with the 'sacred ciphers, a kavass armed to the teeth with loaded pistol & drawn sword sitting on the box by the side of the coachmen'.<sup>108</sup>

The intensity of this social life may partly explain why Garnett was anxious not to extend his posting. There was some exposure to the less Europeanized aspects of the city, but the circles in which he moved and the demands of his position curtailed that exposure and ensured that much of his time was spent gossiping, often with the same people at different functions. Also, as with some other travellers to the city, as time passed Garnett began to dwell upon Constantinople's less appealing aspects, notably its dirty and congested streets. In winter time especially, it became muddy and galoshes were *de rigueur*, and the changeable weather annoyed him increasingly. The city seemed tame by comparison with what lay beyond. Occasional forays to the back streets of Stambul, and to the city walls in search of Byzantine remains, where he might have been the only Westerner, were 'rather alarming' but little more.<sup>109</sup> He longed for mountain scenery and for open spaces, and for the peace to contemplate. Some relief was afforded by visits to

places of interest on the Asiatic shore, among them Ismir in April 1905, a more adventurous trip to Macedonia with George Lloyd in May 1905, where they found the country swarming with troops, and with fleas and bugs also, and to Brusa in May 1905, when he climbed halfway up Mt Olympus. A boat trip in October 1903 along the Black Sea coast, in the company of Consul Harry Eyres and his family, had whetted his appetite. The party had visited Trebizond and Garnett continued with another group to Tiflis, which greatly impressed him. From there, they returned to their steamer which headed west, hugging the Circassian coastline, from which he almost fell into 'an ecstasy' at the beauty of the Caucasian mountains. The party then visited the Tsar's summer palace at Livadia, and, armed with maps and histories, spent some time at the Crimean War battlefields. Garnett noted that these excursions were 'amongst the most impressive' that he had ever undertaken.<sup>110</sup>

Also, as was to happen with his other postings, Garnett grew tired of his colleagues. He applauded George Young's departure for Rio in March 1904, as the latter had been too busy writing a book to do any work.<sup>111</sup> Maunsell was 'a boring sort of person', and Aubrey Herbert, whom he had known at Eton, was 'a hopeless ass', 'stupid', 'perfectly useless' and, though amenable, was practically blind and, therefore, incapable of doing much work.<sup>112</sup> This was particularly true, because in June 1904 he had fallen off his horse and injured himself, only to sprain an ankle two months later.<sup>113</sup> John Vaughan, with whom Garnett spent a lot of time, irritated him with his complete lack of interest in the city's history. Initially, Garnett had taken to Lady O'Connor, but after frequent contact, he found her charms had diminished. In February 1904, he reported that she was 'barely civil to anyone & is really thought to be going off her head again – she loses her temper so badly'.<sup>114</sup> Garnett found her quarrelsome, haughty, hard to please and 'stupid'. She managed to redeem herself briefly when in the summer of 1904, she inveigled Garnett onto the committee of the Club de Constantinople, the diplomat's club of choice.

However, unlike the trio of honorary attachés, Aubrey Herbert, Mark Sykes and George Lloyd, all of whom developed a passion and expertise in different aspects of the region, and who flitted in and out of Constantinople during and immediately after Garnett's time there, he did not travel routinely, and he was not encouraged to develop his knowledge by means of travel. In March 1905, O'Connor rejected his offer to spend the summer in Bitlis, where he might monitor the situation in Eastern Anatolia because he claimed to need him in the Chancery.<sup>115</sup> Garnett considered it overstaffed with the influx of new staff.<sup>116</sup> But

with the exception of O'Connor, he was by that point the sole remaining member of staff from 1904. He did not share the honorary attachés' intense passion for the region, and while he later claimed Lloyd and Sykes as friends, apparently he was not on intimate terms with Percy Loraine.<sup>117</sup> In May 1905, he looked forward to the move to Therapia, but O'Connor declined to say precisely when he intended to move, and Garnett did not wish to have to spend 3 hours each day travelling to and from the embassy at Pera. Constantinople was 'stifling', he craved vigorous exercise and when Lady O'Connor offered her tricycle, he crashed it in the embassy grounds.<sup>118</sup> Although it was suggested to him that his career might benefit from attaining the rank of second secretary in Constantinople, he was resolved to obtain a post in the Far East and pressed the matter with the Foreign Office. There, he hoped to find greater freedom, an opportunity to specialize in the region, and as he also later recalled, the opportunity to traverse Mongolia, in which he had a growing interest.<sup>119</sup> To this end, rather than taking the examination in Turkish, towards the end of his posting, Garnett took and passed an examination in public law, something that would have wider application in the remainder of his career.

It is also true that once the Russo-Japanese War was underway, it displaced events in Macedonia as the main geo-strategic preoccupation.<sup>120</sup> Clearly, the two were not unconnected. As an ally of Japan, Britain had considered the need to prevent Russia from moving its Black Sea fleet through the Straits to the Far East. In the event, they refrained and the Porte firmly resisted it. But lingering suspicions about Russian intentions ensured that the discussion, as well as efforts to prevent Russia from moving its fleet, continued well into 1905, and then became intertwined in efforts to attain broader agreement between Britain and Russia.<sup>121</sup> Although there had been some concerns that the war with Japan would sour relations with Russian diplomats at Constantinople, this appears not to have happened, and in July, Garnett and his colleagues watched with fascination from the Summer Palace, the progress of Russian ships heavily laden with troops and war materials *en route* to Vladivostok.<sup>122</sup> Garnett, who was already fascinated by the Far East, was greatly attracted by the extended analysis and commentary on the war in the English language press. To this was added articles relating events in Central Asia such as Sven Hedin's travels in Tibet, the Younghusband mission to Lhasa, Charles Campbell's journey across Mongolia and Russian railway construction, which were reported with surprising detail. In May 1905, fellow diplomat George Kidston, fresh from Peking, and *en route* to Tehran, regaled him with stories of China.



It seems possible that the urge to travel there as well as in Korea, which was also reported in the press, owed something to this exposure and what, for a truly adventurous soul, must have become a slightly stale existence.<sup>123</sup> Though colourful and cosmopolitan and the cradle of many successful diplomatic careers, Constantinople was also filthy, suffocating and had become too Westernized for anyone with a lust for adventurous travel and the truly exotic. Hence, because he believed that his destiny lay in the Far East, and as he wished to pursue that destiny while young and fit, Garnett applied for a transfer to Peking. In doing so, he ignored the advice of his peers that his transfer, before first obtaining promotion, would disadvantage his chances in the Diplomatic Service. In the event, Garnett anticipated his transfer to Peking with trepidation as well as elation, and no small element of regret. In mid-July, there seemed no better place on earth than Constantinople: 'Of course now that I'm leaving it all I wish I wasn't & that I'd never asked to go away! It's all looking so perfectly lovely now: cloudless skies all & every day & bluest of blue skies.'<sup>124</sup> And the attractions of Peking had already begun to dim. Common opinion had it 'that it is the beastliest &, especially in winter, the dirtiest place under the sun.'<sup>125</sup>

Whatever the reality, there was much to organize before his departure. Garnett had oversight of the secretaries' mess bills in Constantinople, and the Chancery was busy, and about to become busier still, when a series of terrorist attacks occurred. A friend of Garnett's had been among a group of Europeans attending the weekly *selamlik* ceremony. An explosion killed over 20 people, wounded over 50 others and killed many horses. Briefly, it seemed possible that the Sultan's troops might panic and open fire on the Europeans. Anti-Christian reprisals seemed possible. The tameness of Constantinople, which had bored Garnett, was instantly dispelled. Patrols were doubled, public buildings were heavily guarded, embassy dragomans were forbidden to approach them, boats and *caïques* were forbidden to use the Bosphorus after sunset without permission and only the diplomatic community was permitted to attend the *selamlik*.<sup>126</sup> At the end of August, a wealthy Armenian was murdered in broad daylight in Galata by another Armenian who was trying to blackmail him. Bombs were found at Smyrna and a widespread Armenian plot against the Sultan was exposed. Fears of a general massacre mounted. Policemen removed some of the student interpreters' Greek servants. As Garnett confessed to his mother, he didn't want to leave so long as massacres were in the offing. 'I'm much too blood thirsty!<sup>127</sup> Unbeknown to Garnett, as far as international relations were concerned, China was entering a new, much quieter, phase.

Garnett's delayed departure for Peking, and his preoccupation during July and August 1905, were caused by Percy Loraine, the unpaid attaché at the embassy, having contracted typhoid. With only the novice James Macleay to help Garnett in the Chancery, O'Connor insisted that he remain until further staff arrived. This precluded a further visit to England and would almost certainly mean that he would not see his family for three years. Although he regretted this deeply, Garnett told his father that in view of advancing years, it was better that such prolonged separation should occur now rather than later.<sup>128</sup>

## 2

# Like a Plant Uprooted: Life in Peking

As soon as Garnett's posting to Peking was announced, he began to receive advice from fellow diplomats. John Vaughan, who had previously served there, and who had recently left Constantinople, suggested that he would hate it.<sup>1</sup> Garnett, Vaughan advised, must bring warm clothes and skates for winter, and golf and tennis things; a smoking jacket, and a drill suit for the hot summers, wild climatic fluctuations being the norm. Should he contemplate learning Chinese, then Wade's *40 Exercises* would suffice. As there were no horses available in Peking but little else to do other than ride, Vaughan suggested saddlery, and in this regard, extra padding, as the Chinese ponies he must acquire were unforgiving. Vaughan described in detail the secretaries' quarters, with their wood, silk and cloth panelling. Garnett took advantage of his delayed departure by asking his father for an extensive list of books, some on Central Asia and the Far East, as well as works of fiction, including those of H. G. Wells. By way of a birthday present, he requested a food basket and a temporary loan to cover his travel expenses.<sup>2</sup> He asked his mother to obtain a long list of items on his behalf, including Eno's Fruit Salt, soap and boot laces.

In the event, Garnett felt a considerable wrench on leaving Constantinople. O'Connor, who wanted to keep him, lent him his personal launch to travel to the steamer, the *Equateur*, for the onward voyage. Indeed, the ambassador and his family came to see him off and presented Garnett with a silver cigarette case. In the event, the launch sustained a broken rudder and was abandoned. Garnett took to a rowing boat, until rescued by a passing motor boat and narrowly avoided missing the steamer. From Smyrna, where, in the company of Henry Cumberbatch, the British Consul-General, he visited various

archaeological sites, he proceeded to Beirut.<sup>3</sup> There, as he disembarked, his luggage was removed in 'a most appalling operation', by Arabs, who seemed to take it in every direction, just as Garnett's glasses were knocked from his face by a rope, and he was unable to intervene.<sup>4</sup> The onward trip to Port Said, after sightseeing in Jaffa with the acting consul, John Falanga, was uneventful, and from there, on the *Marmora*, he had a three-berth cabin to himself. The ship was comfortable, but for the unbearable heat, and the requirement to dress for dinner. The heat relented beyond Aden but the sea rose, to the point that the port holes were sealed. Garnett passed the time reading works in the officers' library, and, on one occasion, by attending a lecture delivered by a missionary, who had witnessed the siege of 1900.<sup>5</sup>

In Colombo, on a visit to the cinnamon gardens, Garnett was nearly killed when thrown from a rickshaw into the path of oncoming traffic. More profitably, he shared the onward voyage through the Straits of Malacca with an officer of the Chinese Consular Service, whose knowledge Garnett imbibed.<sup>6</sup> In Singapore, Garnett was first exposed to the Chinese. 'Awful devils they do look', was his verdict. Singapore was lovely but Hong Kong more so. The passage to Shanghai brought the first taste of cold weather, as well as severe sea conditions. Garnett spent the voyage on deck, in a deck chair, encased in two great coats, a blanket and two rugs, struggling to read the second volume of Archdeacon Gray's *China*. At Shanghai, where he had great expectations of being able to shop for many essential items, he was whisked off to the consulate-general and was entertained there and at the races by Sir Pelham Warren, the somewhat 'prosy' consul-general.<sup>7</sup>

Shanghai was a mixture of the foreign and of the familiar. But for the rickshaws and wheelbarrows used for transport, Garnett felt he might be in England. To his mother, however, he noted the Chinese custom of abandoning coffins randomly until soothsayers divined suitable spots for interment. He also attended a reception, where, for the first time, he saw Chinese dressed in exquisite embroidered silks, with peacock feathers hanging from jade and crystal buttons in their headwear. Then, his only reservation was that the officials at the reception had extremely long nails which 'pricked horribly', when they shook hands with their Western guests.<sup>8</sup> To add to his amazement, there were cormorants used for catching fish: their necks ringed in order to prevent them from swallowing the catch. From Shanghai, Garnett took a smaller, and much smellier, boat to Tientsin, where, together with some shopping, he lunched with the consul-general and his rather masculine niece, before continuing to Peking.<sup>9</sup> There, he was met at the station

by (Malcolm) Arnold Robertson, who had also just joined the legation staff as second secretary and head of chancery, whom Garnett had met briefly at Shanghai some days before.

Garnett was drawn to and repelled by Peking in equal measure. The legation compound was surrounded by high walls from which, *in extremis*, its staff might defend themselves from attack. Beyond was a space, a defensive buffer, known as the 'glacis' on which the Chinese had agreed not to build. The yellow tiles of the emperor's palace could just be seen from the legation walls. A section of the wall nearest the palace had been left in ruins, marked by bullets, since the siege of 1900 and Sir Claude MacDonald, minister at Peking (1895–1900), had daubed on the wall in white letters, 'Lest we forget.' Garnett described the scene to his mother: 'The whole of our quarter covers a very large area & seems like a fortress; sentries of every nationality on every legation wall & at every gate, bugles going off at all times of the day, officers & soldiers going about in every direction.' Within the legation compound, besides the large house occupied by the minister, Sir Ernest Satow (1900–6), Garnett shared another with Robertson. Each had his own large sitting room, bedroom and bathroom, and they shared a dining room and had another sitting room for guests. Other houses, mostly single-storied, were occupied, among others, by the legation doctor, the first Chinese Secretary, the second Chinese Secretary and his wife and another by the student interpreters of the Far Eastern Consular Service. Also, there were military quarters, barracks, huge stables and a recreation ground. A club within the legation quarter attracted all respectable foreigners. Garnett's initial forays beyond the quarter were of mixed success. The streets were broad but 'filthy and 10th rate'. He visited the Temple of Heaven in the Chinese quarter and was struck by its beauty. *En route* he saw 'weird people & trades' – palm readers, pigeons with whistles in their tails to deter hawks and barbers who shaved heads every two days 'with a dirty rusty knife & foul water and no soap'. There had also been an opportunity to play golf outside Peking, but the party had had to return quickly in case they were locked outside the city gates, which closed each evening at sunset.<sup>10</sup> And there had been an overnight trip towards the western hills where Satow had a cottage. The legation's summer residence had been destroyed in 1900, and in order to escape the heat of Peking some of its staff took a cottage for the summer months. Satow had shown one of the cottages to Garnett and Robertson and both had feigned interest. However, as Garnett recorded, it consisted of 'two filthy rooms and a courtyard'. If nothing else, it was close to the race track, which might offer a diversion.<sup>11</sup>

Garnett had also begun to learn Chinese and chose to smoke throughout each lesson in order to smother his teacher's alleged malodour. There was also the Chinese theatre. A previous attempt to attend a performance in the Chinese quarter had been impossible because of the unbearable stench at the theatre door. When eventually he did attend, he was greatly amused and much captivated by the beauty of the costumes. The performances seemed to last all day and had no discernible plot. The actors spoke in a falsetto whine and even the Chinese could not follow what was being said. A band, consisting of bones, drums and cymbals, sat at the back of the stage. When the actors spoke, only the bones were played but when they sang, 'the orchestra all clash out wildly & try apparently to drown the singers: it is a regular pandemonium & could easily be imitated by taking a tea tray & beating it wildly with a poker'.<sup>12</sup>

Demonstrations against foreigners at Shanghai on 18 December, during which several were badly injured and several Chinese killed, kept the legation very busy in the approach to Christmas.<sup>13</sup> But there was little risk to the legation. There was a Christmas dinner of turkey and plum pudding hosted by Satow, lunches and dinners, fancy dress balls, parties, skating, as well as visits to the legation by Chinese dignitaries. The latter traditionally called at the various foreign legations and by the time they reached the British legation they were drunk. Garnett was also kept busy participating in a play (although he soon fell out with a fellow thespian and abandoned his part); he also played bridge, of which Satow was unfortunately very fond, rode and looked after a colleague's dog.<sup>14</sup> The New Year also brought an open air banquet, at which Garnett arrived in a chair, like a parrot in a cage, and at which the cutlery and crockery were *fouly dirty*.<sup>15</sup> At the end of January, he processed to the *Wai-wu Pu*,<sup>16</sup> the Chinese Foreign Ministry, for a state visit of congratulations. There was the embarrassment of having to wear the 'Chancery' hat, which was too small and wobbled uncontrollably, his own having been broken *en route* from Constantinople. But Garnett was pleased to note the arrival of the Portuguese Minister, who drove 'his own shabby little dog-cart'.

Garnett had also been presented to the Emperor, beautifully dressed in silk robes and fur cap, and the Empress Dowager, who, though wizened, looked good for several years. Garnett ascribed the Emperor's apparent boredom to the fact that his aunt had usurped the throne.<sup>17</sup> As Garnett noted soon after his arrival, there was very little social interaction with the Chinese, but in late February, Satow had held a 'Chinese dinner' as a means of obtaining information about the Court. Two of the guests

had never before eaten in a European house, and one of them was seen to wonder about the drawing room. Satow explained that he was a connoisseur of porcelain, but Lancelot Carnegie, the first secretary, thought that he was looking for somewhere to spit, 'as he made the most excruciating noises during dinner & having several times put his head under the table to spit was accommodated with a spittoon'. Unfortunately, as Garnett noted, the spittoon was not taken into the drawing room after dinner, and the guest used his coffee cup instead.<sup>18</sup>

The political backdrop of Garnett's first months in Peking occurred against the continuing erosion of the imperial Manchu dynasty, and its inability to impose its authority on the country as a whole. In practice, government was undertaken by four members of the Council of State, two of them Manchu and two Chinese, who met on a daily basis at the Palace. This body formed a link between the Court and government departments (foreign affairs, interior, finance, education, army, justice, commerce and agriculture, communications and civil appointments). To add to its difficulties, the Court as well as the government was divided by personal rivalries which centred on opponents of Prince Ch'ing, who had acquired the confidence of the Empress Dowager, and of Yuan Shi-Kai.<sup>19</sup> More generally, however, there was mounting pressure in Peking and throughout the provinces for fundamental political change, feelings which had been intensified by the Russo-Japanese War.<sup>20</sup> Following upon the report in July 1906 of a special commission which had been sent abroad to study political administration, an imperial decree was issued in September 1906 which would pave the way for constitutional government. Partly because the court realized the enormity of the task, this was never implemented during Garnett's time in Peking: an outline of the constitution only appeared in August 1908.<sup>21</sup> The decree had spoken of the need for change in the legal and financial systems, education and the development of the military and police throughout the empire. This was followed in November 1906, by several edicts which collectively seemed to point to further reform. Among other things, they provided for the removal of several reactionary members of the Grand Council and abolished race distinction between Chinese and Manchus in the selection of high officials.<sup>22</sup> These proposed reforms encountered concerted opposition and they were, in any case, quickly followed by several counter moves which favoured conservative, Manchu, forces and which were echoed by the growing power of reactionary elements in the provinces also.<sup>23</sup> It was hoped that the promotion of the Viceroy Yuan Shi Kai to the Grand Council might invest government with greater efficiency, but the legation's view was that it failed to do so.

Efforts to reform the provincial administration of Manchuria, Chihli and Kiangsu had also produced few results, and it has been suggested that more generally, many of the reforms were hamstrung by failure to reform the taxation system. Little of the money derived from taxation in the provinces reached central government.<sup>24</sup> More promising was the edict of February 1908 which stated that Manchus and Chinese were to be on the same footing in civil and criminal courts. As the legation's Annual Report for 1907 suggested, the political rivalries and unrest that existed during Garnett's time in Peking were not only based upon a progressive versus a reactionary element but also reflected much deeper racial antipathies between Chinese and Manchus. Among other things, this led to efforts to consolidate military power in the hands of the Manchus.<sup>25</sup>

The siege and bloodshed of 1900 had left an indelible mark on the Western legations. Unrest at Shanghai, the killing of a missionary family in the central province of Shangsü early in 1906 and other isolated instances of anti-foreign sentiment were symptomatic of and reinforced a degree of unease among some observers. Sir Ernest Satow did not fear any general outbreak, although he was keenly aware that local outbreaks might occur at any time.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, a decision was taken to withdraw foreign troops from northern China, where they had remained since the Boxer Rebellion. In the case of British forces at Tientsin, it was felt that Britain might benefit if it were felt that she had initiated their removal.<sup>27</sup> Garnett considered that decision inopportune but took solace in the existence of the legation guard. The German legation acquired a howitzer in February 1906, and in any case, Garnett was, by his own admission, 'itching for a fight' and hoped that the court would seek to deflect criticism of it onto the foreigners. Partly this was due to his contempt for the weakness and vacillation of the Peking authorities, a feature which in the context of the opium question, he felt, could also be applied to the Liberal Government in London and the authorities in Delhi. Garnett and some of his colleagues believed that the Chinese government had agreed to a cessation of the opium traffic between India and China not because the Chinese were to be stopped from smoking it, but because they wanted to pocket the substantial revenues which it generated. Writing to his father in September 1906, just before an official edict banned opium, Garnett noted that large tracts of Chinese countryside had been turned to poppy production. He felt that Britain, and more especially the Secretary of State for India, John Morley, and his nonconformist following, had no right to interfere with the smoking of opium when it caused so little crime in comparison with alcohol in



Britain.<sup>28</sup> An opium edict was introduced in November 1906 and some of its provisions were implemented. Discussions between the British and Chinese Governments followed and were based around the phased reduction of the export of opium from India to China provided that the Chinese authorities also reduced the consumption of opium generally within China.<sup>29</sup>

Indeed, Garnett had few concerns for his personal safety and soon grew tired of the semi-imprisonment of life in the legation. Occasional trips to Tientsin, where he played tennis or skated (the tennis court doubled as a skating rink in winter), merely whetted his appetite for more adventurous travel. His trips to Tientsin even were curtailed from May 1906, when a tennis court was built in the compound. Garnett's preoccupation with travel was reflected in his reading, which included Savage Landor's *In the Forbidden Land*, and Percival Landon's *Lhassa*.<sup>30</sup>

To his delight, Garnett found that Satow and his successor, Sir John Jordan, not only tolerated travel beyond Peking, but also actively encouraged it, believing that it had a beneficial, edifying influence on their staff. In general, and except when Arnold Robertson was ill, Garnett was seldom overworked in the legation. The burden of work increased and his freedom to travel diminished when he succeeded Arthur Eastes as the minister's private secretary in the spring of 1907.<sup>31</sup> The existence of a second diplomatic secretary meant that periodically one of them could travel while the other dealt with routine Chancery work. Though fascinated with the Chinese people and their way of life, Garnett had little to say about the political situation, and his attention was chiefly focused upon travel. At the end of February 1906, he left Peking in the company of a guide/interpreter, cook and muleteers for a trip to the mountains. From the Ming Tombs he went to Nankow and over the mountains to Hwailai. Undeterred by severe cold and dust storms, he stayed the night in a trappist monastery, and in a rat-infested inn, where the rodents 'galloped about my room'.<sup>32</sup> Garnett's return to Peking enabled Robertson to travel in the Yangtze Valley and Garnett immediately began to plan his next excursion. In the next two years, Garnett undertook further journeys in the mountains, and his various reports were conflated for official circulation. Among other things, he documented railway development, missionary activity, educational provision, as well as detailing conditions facing travellers in those regions.<sup>33</sup> His report, though deemed to be rather long, was also felt to contain much of interest. Unexpurgated copies were sent to the War Office, to the Board of Trade and to the India Office, although due to the findings of a recent parliamentary commission, it was decided not to publish the

report as a blue book.<sup>34</sup> Garnett's journey on foot across Korea in June and July 1906 was to be the first of several more ambitious undertakings and reflected an innate curiosity about the Far East as well as a desire to distinguish himself as a traveller and writer.

The trip, though unremarkable in its own right, of relatively short duration, and without danger of any kind, enabled Garnett to explore another, very foreign country. He journeyed on several steamers from Tientsin to Taku.<sup>35</sup> At Taku, where it transpired that another vessel was not expected for some time, accompanied by a woman traveller, he returned briefly to Tientsin, making a further journey back to Taku by open goods truck. From Chefoo there was a punishing 27-hour journey to Chemulpo, exacting, partly on account of the execrable food.<sup>36</sup> Travel from Chemulpo to Seoul was by train. There, he took refuge at the consulate-general, as a guest of the Cockburns. Garnett was greatly struck by the indolence of Korean men, who appeared to him to loaf about the streets with eyes half shut. Unlike the Chinese, the Koreans showed no interest in foreigners, and there were no beggars. To his mother, Garnett noted that the emperor, though popular with his people, was effectively a puppet of the Japanese and lived in constant fear of assassination by them. His palace adjoined the American and British consulates, and some Korean army officers had asked if ladders might be placed against the walls of the former to facilitate the emperor's escape, should that be necessary. It was 'All truly Gilbertian.'<sup>37</sup> Garnett left Seoul on the following day for Gensan in the interior. The road was good, and his party walked the 180-miles stretch to Gensan in 6 days. Their path took them through winding fertile valleys among a series of mountain chains. After a half day's rest, Garnett continued by mountain track to Pyongyang, where he stayed overnight with a member of the American Methodist Mission. From there he returned to Seoul by train, reaching the capital on 28 June.

Garnett was much taken with the Koreans, who seemed kind, gentle and peaceable. Unlike the Chinese, they did not interfere with the traveller: 'there is no crowding about the inn where you halt, no poking of finger through the paper window to see the "foreign devil", no laughter at the unusual costume, appearance, colouring, etc'. On the other hand, the inns were uniformly 'vile'; the customary designated 'guest room' was little more than a dirty cupboard which opened onto a tiny stable yard with muck-heap 'just outside one's window'. There were flies, fleas and lice in abundance and on several occasions, following local custom, Garnett commandeered a house where he might sleep more comfortably. He also described the means of transport and communication,

explaining the removal of bridges at the start of the rainy season in order to prevent their destruction. Although oxen, mules, ponies and donkeys abounded, wheeled vehicles were almost completely absent, the Korean peasants preferring to carry their burdens by animal or on their own backs. The Korean ponies fought with one another incessantly and, when stabled, had to be slung up off the ground, by means of ropes around their bellies attached to the roof, in order to stop this.

Garnett was equally taken with Korean clothing and headdress. At Pyongyang, the hats worn by women were of such size that when two women walked abreast they disrupted the traffic. Besides the nakedness, in varying forms, of Korean women and children, he commented widely on native custom, including the pipe-smoking of women and the 8-foot high hideously painted 'devil faces' at the entrance and exit of villages. His report also described the abundant crops, the climate and the fauna, including tigers, which were chiefly hunted in wintertime.

In Garnett's view, the influx of undesirable Japanese elements after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 afflicted the Koreans. Japanese coolies, who were invariably armed, were often encountered on the roads, as were Japanese soldiers. The latter, if so inclined, could delay travellers' progress. Garnett listed many other transgressions, not least the sale to Koreans of opium and the rough treatment routinely meted out to innocent Koreans by Japanese. 'Small wonder that the Koreans – whose nature rather resembles that of a rabbit – are frightened out of their lives when they see any Japanese approach them.' After a further sojourn in Seoul, Garnett returned by way of Chemulpo for Chefoo, where he stayed for several days with Archibald Rose of the Chinese Consular Service, and his mother, who lived with him. They swam, played badminton and tennis and rode each day, and began an intimate friendship which lasted for many years.

Garnett's report was well received. One Foreign Office official noted that it 'presents a very pleasing picture which is only spoilt by the presence of the Japanese', and that Jordan should be asked to thank him for 'a most interesting report'.<sup>38</sup> It was sent to the director of military operations at the War Office, who would benefit from its discussion of railways.

For some time prior to his Korean journey, Garnett had speculated about Satow's replacement. Garnett had found Satow charming, friendly and frank. His, then rumoured, successor Sir John Jordan was an unknown quantity. In May, Garnett had reported that he was reportedly clever but with a temper, bordering on old age, that his wife was 'appallingly hideous', and that as a result she would not be "uppish"

as *some* diplomatic ladies are!<sup>39</sup> By the beginning of August, Jordan's appointment had been confirmed, but the date of his arrival hadn't, and Garnett considered this bad form if rather predictable 'from a man who isn't in the proper diplomatic service!'<sup>40</sup> Jordan, who like Satow was one of few consuls-general to be promoted to diplomatic rank, was practically alone among Garnett's superiors in escaping the harshest personal criticism. However, Garnett was keenly aware of Jordan's inferior consular origins, as indeed was Arnold Robertson.<sup>41</sup> Upon his arrival in September 1906, he noted that Jordan could never forget that as a former Chinese Secretary to the legation, he had once been subordinate to the secretaries whom he now controlled. The minister apologized when asking Garnett and his colleagues to do anything, and made the mistake of addressing them as 'Mr'. Lady Jordan, though 'nice', like her husband, was 'frightened' of her position, and her hair, which was long and straggly, gave her the appearance of a cook.<sup>42</sup> If nothing else, the Jordans' delayed arrival enabled Garnett to ponder his next adventure on which he hoped to embark in the autumn.

Garnett next travelled to the Shantung and Kiangsu provinces in order to study their resources and inhabitants and, more importantly, to establish by various means, the extent of anti-foreign sentiment, which had become pronounced towards the end of 1906.<sup>43</sup> Garnett was also to inspect the condition of the Imperial Grand Canal.<sup>44</sup> From there he had intended to traverse the mountains to Yichow-fu and to enter Kiangsu, but this project was abandoned on account of the severe discomfort of the cart trip. There, six French priests and three British subjects had been murdered in February 1906. The Foreign Office held that the British fatalities were due to the unwise actions of the French priests.<sup>45</sup> Garnett was accompanied on this journey by John Brenan, then a student interpreter and Chancery assistant at the legation in Peking. To his delight, Garnett's report was printed as a parliamentary paper, but this took some time, and the photographs which were to have accompanied it were omitted due to cost. He was, nonetheless, elated at the prospect of his first, and, as it transpired, his only blue book. Garnett derived much amusement from the efforts of several cutting agencies to supply him with newspaper reports of his tour.

Periodic outrages against missionaries especially and complaints from British companies that their operations were being thwarted by the Chinese authorities were perhaps more illustrative of the sheer size of China and the impossibility of the central government maintaining control than anything else. Discounting the outer territories of Mongolia and Tibet, China had 22 provinces, each of them under a

viceroys or governors. Efforts to reorganize provincial administration were apparently sidelined by provincial governors, who resented interference from the central government.<sup>46</sup> The complaints of British firms were not always received with much sympathy at the Foreign Office.<sup>47</sup> However, the general picture that emerged about the treatment of foreign rights in China was negative, and the physical security of the legation and of consular staff did occasionally cause concern at the Foreign Office during Garnett's posting. Naval sources, especially, furnished evidence to support a negative interpretation of events, although the Foreign Office and staff in the Peking legation did not invariably accept it uncritically.<sup>48</sup> For the latter, the issue remained the weakness of the court and its inability to impose its will throughout the entire country. The annual report for 1906, to which Garnett contributed, suggested that the idea of "China for the Chinese" is not a mere temporary craze, but a settled conviction which has sunk deep into the minds of the people.' At one level, this manifested itself in a determination on the part of the Chinese to recover prestige in Manchuria. The Russo-Japanese War had left the combatants with railway and other rights there, and their railway guards, if not their actual troops, remained. During 1907, the *Wai-wu Pu* attempted to recover these rights by every possible means. Similarly, it seemed likely that China would seek to consolidate its position in Tibet, a trend which was only temporarily stemmed by the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907. In fact, the Chinese Government did not object to the convention. When asked to associate itself with its proscription of scientific parties entering Tibet, it agreed, noting that it had never permitted any foreigners to enter into Tibet from China. It had also been asked to define the limits of Tibet but replied that as no change had been made in this respect such a definition was unnecessary. This subsequently led to problems as neither Britain nor Russia was able to prevent entry through China or prevent the gradual increase of Chinese influence in Tibet.

At another level, the Chinese central and provincial authorities had, as in previous years, sought to obstruct railway construction and the acquisition by foreigners of new concessions. They regarded them, as formerly, as political controls.<sup>49</sup> Vested interests among British consortia and international rivalries ensured that prior to Garnett's arrival in Peking progress on most lines had been tortuously slow. Greater self-assertiveness on the part of the Chinese authorities, arising partly from Russia's defeat in 1905, increasingly led to organized obstruction by the Chinese.<sup>50</sup> British policy respecting Chinese railways had increasingly to be seen within the framework of sustaining Anglo-French

cooperation and of containing German influence.<sup>51</sup> In August 1906, Garnett had visited the Peking–Kalgan line, which had been under construction for a year, but it had only traversed 35 miles. The line was being built entirely by Chinese engineers, and Garnett regarded this as symbolic of the growing nationalist movement.<sup>52</sup> More generally, legation staff had sought to negotiate the development of the Canton–Kowloon, Tientsin–Chinkiang and Burma–Yunnan railways. In 1907, much time was devoted to negotiations with the *Wai-wu Pu* over the Soochow–Hangchow–Ningpo Railway. Progress was held up by the attitude of the gentry in Chekiang and by the fact that an imperial edict of 1905 had permitted the Chinese to build the line themselves. After various difficulties, including local unrest in Chekiang directed against the railway, an agreement was close to completion early in 1908.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, after tortuous negotiations, which were periodically linked with the Soochow–Hangchow–Ningpo Railway talks, progress was made in 1907 regarding the Tientsin–Yantze Railway. This led to the signing of the Tientsin–Yangtze Agreement in January 1908.<sup>54</sup> The efforts of the Peking Syndicate to pursue its mineral extraction rights in the Province of Shansi under an agreement of 1898 had also met with difficulties. British rights under the Inland Navigation Regulations were also being obstructed, to the extent that Satow favoured a naval demonstration at Shanghai and at the mouth of the Yangtze River.<sup>55</sup> This anti-foreign sentiment was fostered increasingly and in a greater proportion of the country, by the native press, much of it, in the treaty-ports especially, financed by the very foreign interests it assailed. The annual report for 1906 suggested that anti-foreign writing owed much to the experience of the many thousands of students who visited Japan and imbibed the lessons of the recent war and Japan’s triumph over a white nation.<sup>56</sup> This trend and the Westernization of China’s own education system gathered momentum. Concerns about these developments among British diplomats in the legation, and among many British commercial interests, persisted throughout 1907.<sup>57</sup> As for the suspicions expressed in the press in 1907, the key concern was that foreign countries were looking for a pretext to divide up China or Chinese territory between them.<sup>58</sup>

Satow and later Jordan, whatever their private misgivings, were in general disposed to play down specific instances of anti-foreign feeling and to reassure their superiors that the legation was safe. This would at least prevent their withdrawal. And yet the situation was not satisfactory. America had acted more forcefully in late February 1906, when it complained to the Chinese authorities about growing

and unchecked antagonism towards its citizens throughout the country. Also, it noted the actions designed to frustrate American commercial access, including a boycott of its goods. Besides a crackdown on anti-foreign elements, the American Government demanded indemnities for the murder of its citizens and the punishment of officials who had failed to protect them or to ensure commercial rights.<sup>59</sup> The Chinese Government responded with an imperial decree, which, though 'weighty', was ineffectual.<sup>60</sup>

Having missed the German steamer from Taku to Tsingtau on his trip to Shantung and Kiangsu Garnett was obliged to reach Tsingtau via Chefoo. There, in order to occupy his time usefully, he investigated the local wine industry, sampling several varieties, on which he reported favourably. There was time for a brief inspection of other local affairs, including a proposed breakwater, as well as noting necessary improvements to Chefoo's harbour. From Chefoo the party continued to Wei-hai Wei, and then by Wönntöng to Tsingtau. Among other things, Garnett reported on the inefficacy of the edict against opium at Wönntöng, as well as the state of roads, commerce, crops and the general attitude of the people. At the market town of Hsiatsun, the party found itself the object of great interest, to the extent that a crowd of several hundred followed them to the inn.<sup>61</sup> There they had to be physically driven from the yard, and a stampede ensued. This open mouthed curiosity, as well as wrangling with inn-keepers, who refused to name their price and then protested when a reasonable amount was offered at the point of departure, recurred but Garnett found no evidence of hostility among the people. Rather, there was a sense of strangeness, for example, in the modes of travel. The mule-litter or Shentztu – a sedan chair suspended between two mules – was uncomfortable. The wheelbarrow, which could carry as many as eight people, and the mule-chair were more congenial, and certainly superior to the ordinary cart. Garnett's report conveyed other useful information for the traveller in China. Notably, he suggested that as there was no fixed coinage, it was advisable to take lumps of silver, known as 'shoes', which might be changed periodically for local currency.

Garnett had also intended to make contact with missionaries, whom he regarded as a barometer of local sentiment and as a corrective to the perceived alarmist perception of China broadcast by *The Times'* correspondent in Shanghai, John Bland.<sup>62</sup> As Garnett noted, the missionaries 'play an unconscious but excellent part' as intelligence officers, 'they are in touch with every one, they travel round the country districts, and are always ready to talk freely about the state of the neighbourhood'.

Garnett was sympathetic towards their work, especially that of the English Baptist Mission, but believed that their educative work was more effectual rather than their routine proselytizing. If nothing else, it created a fund of goodwill among their pupils, which might help them during 'evil days'. As an example of the Baptist Mission's good work, he instanced a museum at Chinan-fu, which aimed ostensibly to educate Chinese minds on physiography, geology, astronomy, natural history, manufactures and electrical apparatus, among other things.

There was also time for discussion of commercial matters as well as educational developments, both of which featured in Garnett's later diplomatic career. At Tsingtau, he noted that only one British firm had been established since 1905, and at Chinan he was shown around the Chinese College, and visited a factory showroom where items of Western civilization were manufactured. Garnett also recounted some sightseeing, notably his ascent of the sacred mountain, Taishan, which in its latter stages was almost vertical. From the uneasy comfort of a chair, he was 'swung down at a pace which fills one with awe'. At Chüfou, he met the lineal descendent of Confucius, Duke K'ung, and visited the Temple of Confucius, which Garnett, drawing upon an earlier report, described in some detail. The Duke insisted that Garnett and Brennan eat with him. As Garnett recalled,

Dishes followed dishes with an appalling rapidity. Sweet followed sweet & we harked back to meat again & then fish & sweets & nuts & again meat till I don't know whether I could sit it out or should burst. Chinese wine was first served, followed by champagne, crème de menthe, beer & cognac in the above order till I nearly sank under the table: the Duke made a most genial & affable host & was not in the least stiff with us: he expectorated freely to right & left during the meal, blew his nose with his fingers, helped us to titbits with his own chopsticks or fingers & sipped gracefully out of my wine glass till I felt we were indeed old friends.

Unfortunately, this meal, begun at 3 pm, was soon followed by another provided by the chief magistrate.<sup>63</sup>

Garnett also travelled along large sections of the Imperial Grand Canal in Kiangsu Province, reporting in considerable detail, all aspects of its use, construction, as well as on other aspects of life in Kiangsu. The town of Soochow, home to Kiangsu's governor, struck him favourably, in terms of its layout, cleanliness, the quality of its products and the refinement and advanced nature of its population.



Garnett had detected little evidence anywhere to support concerns at the Foreign Office about growing and generalized anti-foreign sentiment. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Bishop at Yenchow-fu personally assured him of this. The worst that could be said, in Garnett's view, was that when asked directions, the Chinese were most dilatory in their replies. Privately, however, Garnett argued that the time of danger would come after the Empress's death and by January 1907 he was less certain of the *status quo*. A wave of anti-dynastic feeling had swept across China, and rather in contradiction of his earlier findings, he suggested that the Chinese Empire was honeycombed with anti-Manchu secret societies. It was only a matter of time before the throne fell and anarchy ensued.<sup>64</sup> Apparently, Jordan was slightly more sanguine. Although acknowledging widespread unrest and agitation across the empire, in January 1907, he concluded that it was not a concerted movement and that the government would be able to withstand it.<sup>65</sup> Elsewhere, Garnett suggested that the unrest was specifically directed against the Manchu dynasty rather than foreigners and that the intention of the secret societies was to create a purely Chinese throne.<sup>66</sup> On 17 March 1907, he reported that the whole of the Yangtze Valley was 'seething' with unrest, and a fortnight later, he recorded the arrest of two men, one of them a British subject, who had bombs in their possession.<sup>67</sup> The degree of anxiety increased thereafter, when the Empress dismissed various officials, including the most prominent member of the government. The court was thrown into a state of 'frenzy' by the murder of the Manchu Governor of Anhui Province at Anking. Anti-foreign outbreaks had also occurred there in the previous year.<sup>68</sup> The latter's assassin was duly caught and beheaded, and more general reprisals followed in the shape of 'indiscriminate execution and torture'.<sup>69</sup> The central government was afflicted by lethargy but was powerless to act, as the viceroys were too fearful of the students.<sup>70</sup> Further, token reforms were instituted but the Chinese did not take them seriously. Fearing for its safety, the court returned early from the summer palace, but promptly moved back there on the discovery of secret stores of guns and ammunition in the capital.<sup>71</sup> The killing at Anking had wide repercussions in instilling fear and rumours within the Manchu dynasty across China. In August, Jordan reported that throughout China, Manchu officials were living 'closely guarded in their Yamêns', and that in Peking, senior officials were gravely and openly concerned.<sup>72</sup> Later in 1907, efforts followed to buttress the Court by moving the viceroys of Chihli, Tientsin and Wuchang to Peking. But it seems that this was a mixed blessing in that their personal ambitions outweighed their political loyalties to the

Manchu dynasty.<sup>73</sup> Anxieties persisted about a possible recrudescence of violence in the Yangtze Provinces especially, but by the autumn and winter of 1907 these areas were largely peaceful.<sup>74</sup>

Having expended so much effort on obtaining a posting there, life in Peking was not entirely to Garnett's liking. Partly this was due to his very limited social circle. Often, as was to happen in his next post, St Petersburg, this meant dining and partying at successive engagements with exactly the same people and being offered almost identical menus.<sup>75</sup> The periodic arrival of travellers – or 'globetrotters' – as Garnett described them afforded insufficient relief.<sup>76</sup> He had been disappointed by the winter season of 1906–7. Christmas Dinner was spent at the Jordans' house in the company of only four women, one of whom had to play the piano and another who did not dance. This was a far cry from the Treaty Ports with their large expatriate populations.<sup>77</sup> In September 1907, dreading another winter season in Peking, Garnett noted that there would only be twenty 'ladies' in Peking that year, of whom only two were unmarried.<sup>78</sup> There was also a degree of physical discomfort, at least until the summer of 1907, when the secretaries' house which he shared with Arnold Robertson was refurbished. The house was made of wood and shrank in the winter, leaving large gaps around the windows especially. The secretaries, therefore, lunched and dined in their overcoats and with rugs around their legs.<sup>79</sup> The typically cold winters were worsened by violent dust storms which coated everything in a thick layer of brown dust. The intense heat of summer and the mosquitoes, sand flies and the 'ubiquitous' scorpions did not help matters.

Garnett also developed a strong dislike of Robertson. Partly this was due to what Garnett regarded as his childish infatuation with a young American woman, to whom he had proposed, and partly because in Garnett's view, within little more than a year of his arrival, Robertson had grown tired of Peking. Garnett took great delight in describing his prevarications over his love match, especially when it was explained to him that taking an American bride would be tantamount to career suicide.<sup>80</sup> Robertson, according to Garnett, was idle and sickly. In the winter of 1906, he sustained a serious facial injury as a result of a riding accident, and Garnett treated this, as well as Robertson's consequent social withdrawal, with insensitivity and contempt. In April 1907, he described Robertson as 'hateful', and by the end of May, he explained to his mother that they were barely on speaking terms, the result of 18 months' of pent up feelings on his, Garnett's, part. He added, somewhat

strangely, that Robertson 'is a worm physically compared to me'.<sup>81</sup> Quite where fault lay in this relationship is difficult to say. But in August 1907, when convalescing at Shankhaikuan, Robertson had written to Garnett to apologize for having been 'very tiresome' that summer and to request his understanding and forgiveness. In the event, Robertson was not moved until December 1907.<sup>82</sup>

Garnett found relief from these frustrations in taking Mongolian lessons and more especially in extensive planning for an extended expedition across Mongolia. He was elected a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society in November 1906, on the nomination of Dr George Morrison *The Times'* Far Eastern correspondent, and this would enable him, among other things, to borrow equipment from the society. He also remained fascinated by the Chinese, and by the colour and spectacle of life in Peking. In January 1907, Jordan cancelled one of his Chinese dinners because it might coincide with an expected eclipse of the moon. As Garnett noted, their guests would prefer to be at home, banging gongs and other instruments to prevent the dragon from swallowing the moon.<sup>83</sup> In February 1907, carts arrived in the legation compound bearing sturgeon the size of sharks, gigantic deer, fruits and pheasants, the Dowager Empress's New Year gift to the legation ladies.<sup>84</sup> There was also time for an excursion to the Chinese quarter, to shop for curios. There, Garnett had noted the huge sewage pits in the roadway, some 3 feet square and 12 feet deep, in which, according to Jordan, people had occasionally drowned.<sup>85</sup>

Garnett's final summer in Peking was rather busier than he had anticipated. In June, he played in a tennis match against the Tientsin Club, one of only six members of the Peking Club to be selected. There was time for a brief visit to a temple at Sanshan in the western hills, accompanied by two student interpreters, where he was bitten by a scorpion. There, despite this mishap, Garnett was removed from the round of social engagements and from the physical confinements of a uniform.<sup>86</sup> However, the relief was short lived. Robertson, after a bout of dysentery, succumbed to his nerves and until the new councillor arrived in August, Garnett was kept hard at work, like a 'cat on milk', as he put it. The main sight of the season, Garnett noted, was the procession, accompanied by much ceremony, of coolies bearing the wife of the Russian ambassador, Pokotilow, a former bank manager, for her daily bath. Garnett found this particularly amusing in view of her relatively humble origins and her former occupation of opera singer.<sup>87</sup> To find solace on the death of his pet dog, he visited the Hankow Pass and the Ming Tombs, and

in September, he spent a fortnight visiting the Eastern Imperial tombs and Jehol. Garnett's intention had been to travel with his 'tame lama', who taught him Mongolian. After two weeks of intensive conversation, he would be ready to take his examination. If successful, that would guarantee him a further £100 per annum.

No sooner had he returned than he had begun to plan his remaining months in Peking. He hoped to be able to visit Mukden and Port Arthur in December and Shanghai in March, the latter in order to obtain supplies for his Mongolian adventure. In the event, neither was feasible, and he contented himself with a visit to the Wutai Shan Mountains in Shansi Province. Garnett was proud that he had scaled the highest peak of the 12,000 ft range and had negotiated deep snow drifts in order to do so. But he was also keen to return to civilization. The 6 a.m. starts, when the ground was white with frost, had taken their toll. The house in Peking was little warmer, and he was reluctant to light a fire because his house boy squeezed (cheated him) on coal. Garnett had also felt unable to miss the celebrations of the King's birthday on 9 November for a second year. The remainder of the year was spent writing up his reports of his journeys in September and October, and in an orgy of entertainments. Although Garnett was, in effect, acting head of the Chancery, as Robertson had apparently stopped work in anticipation of his new posting, he was not spared Lady Jordan's 'truly dreadful' afternoon dances.<sup>88</sup> On 22 December, he told his mother that he had dined out every night for a week and was sick of it. On the previous day, Jordan had hosted an official luncheon, and that was followed in the evening by a dinner party. That evening there was an event to mark the opening of the new skating rink, and on the following day, an afternoon dance and a formal dinner. A 'Christmas tree' party would follow that, at which Garnett would take the part of a 'sprite' to Jordan's Father Christmas. Then, further lunches and dinners would take place, culminating with a fancy dress ball on New Year's Eve. Amid all of this, Garnett had still to oversee an incoming and an outgoing diplomatic bag.<sup>89</sup> Such entertainments were not without risk because on more than one occasion the trigger happy legation guard had come close to shooting an apparently unfamiliar reveller in the dark.<sup>90</sup> There were also many details concerning his Mongolian journey to be finalized, not least obtaining supplies of money and tea bricks, which were widely used as a secondary currency, the hiring of guides, servants, an interpreter and the laying down of stores. All of these tasks, which involved consulting and correspondence with a number of colleagues in China and in London, had somehow to be organized in spare moments.<sup>91</sup> As he confessed to a colleague at

the Foreign Office in December 1907, four months before he was due to start:

It is so difficult to make all one's a thousand and one plans, dive into maps, arrange about money, stores, camels and interpreters and learn Mongol and the distractions of an unusually gay winter season and the devil of a lot of work, the responsibility for which being, as I am now, Head of the Chancery, lies heavily on me. Once the start is made and the pleasures of the world renounced in favour of those of an open air desert existence I shall feel happy again and my mind at rest.<sup>92</sup>

But Garnett persisted. He assembled his chosen reading for the trip: copies of The New Testament, Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, Emerson's *Essays*, Horace (in Latin and translation) and several travel books. Garnett was thrilled by the prospect that the record of his expedition might appear as a blue book or even, with the necessary permission, be disseminated more widely. He swapped travel tips with his father, for example recommending an early draft of Eno's Fruit Salt instead of whisky soda, and eagerly obtained supplies, maps and other equipment for his travels from shops in London.<sup>93</sup> He told his father: 'I know you realise as much as I do the chance I have in this matter for gaining distinction, for doing something which will lift me out from the rank and file of the service.'<sup>94</sup> Two months later, on 30 April 1907, he wrote: 'The opportunity is great and I only hope that I shall be able to rise to it. Already I see visions of fame in front of me! It is stupid perhaps to have them and so far ahead too but I feel absurdly strong and powerful enough to make the visions realities.'<sup>95</sup>

There was also the more problematic issue of Russian sensibilities about Garnett and any companions crossing the frontier. In January 1908, the War Office refused permission for his friend Captain Boone, who deputized for the military attaché, George Pereira, in the latter's absence, to accompany him, and the Foreign Office also declined permission for Garnett to take a surveyor with him. It was, Garnett noted, 'Truly a kind government and one which it rejoices my heart to see had another blow dealt it at South Hereford the other day.'<sup>96</sup> By February 1908, however, the Russian authorities had sent letters to their representatives in the areas he was to traverse. So, too, had the Chinese, and the Belgians had given him letters of introduction to their bishops and missionaries.<sup>97</sup> There were discussions with Charles Campbell, the Chinese Secretary, who had earlier traversed parts of Mongolia, and

with the sisters of Colonel Bruce, author of *In the Footsteps of Marco Polo*. On 1 March, he was examined in Mongolian by his lama and by Campbell, and passed with flying colours.<sup>98</sup> There was also good news, when he learnt that the report of his trips to Jehol and Wutaishan would appear as a blue book (in the event they did not). Amid this excitement, the legation carpenter came to measure his belongings for packing, and there was also much to be done in separating those belongings which were to be sent back to Quernmore, where his mother had set aside rooms for them. There was just time for some route marching with a detachment of the Middlesex Regiment in order to prepare him for the rigours ahead. Garnett faced his departure with mixed emotions. The Russian Ambassador had died suddenly, and to general regret, of heart failure. The Jordans had presented Garnett with a rifle as a parting gift, and he was to abandon them to a new horde of globetrotters, each of them more ungrateful than the last and ungrateful for the Jordans' acts of generosity. When reporting Garnett's departure, Jordan noted that he had devoted his leisure time to making tours in China and gathering information for reports and that he 'performed his duties in a thoroughly conscientious and painstaking manner'.<sup>99</sup>

As the weather was becoming warmer again, Garnett dreaded the thought of winter weather on the Mongolian plateau, and he had begun to see that his journey would entail much isolation and loneliness.<sup>100</sup> He hated the thought of abandoning the 'groove' he had found in Peking, only to start all over again somewhere else.<sup>101</sup> In his final letter from Peking, Garnett sent his mother the keys to his cashboxes, *portmanteaux* and other cases. Just after midday on 6 April 1908, he marched for the Nankow Pass, accompanied thus far by Boone and by a 'guard of honour' from the Middlesex Regiment. His servants discharged fire crackers to ward off hill devils.

His sense of trepidation and anticipation were captured in his parting words to his mother: 'The morning is still and bright: may it be an omen for the next eight months for us all... May God bless and keep you all well until I see you again. Goodbye, dearest mother. Your loving son.'<sup>102</sup>

# 3

## ‘People Who Squeeze and People Who May Be Squeezed’: Across Mongolia, 1908

Although Garnett was expected to sacrifice his leave and to contribute towards the costs of his expedition, Sir John Jordan and colleagues in the Foreign Office had been keen to sanction it. Previously, official investigations in the remoter parts of China and Mongolia were deemed necessary in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion. On his 1902 journey in eastern Mongolia, Charles Campbell had traversed west to Urga and then onwards to Kiakhta, on the Mongolian–Siberian border. He travelled for 5 months and a report on it, running to 43 pages, was published as a parliamentary paper in early 1904.<sup>1</sup> Soon afterwards, a further blue book relating to Mongolia appeared. That report was written by George Kidston, first secretary at the British Legation in Peking, with whom Garnett later served and then briefly replaced as head of chancery in St Petersburg. Kidston’s report recounted a less ambitious undertaking than Campbell’s, a three-month journey on a route which ran parallel to Campbell’s but which, unlike it, did not altogether by-pass the Gobi Desert. However, Kidston’s party was prevented by severe weather from proceeding to Urga and returned to Peking via the Trans-Siberian Railway.<sup>2</sup>

An investigation in Mongolia in 1908 was deemed necessary for several reasons. Since Campbell and Kidston had reported, China had apparently been trying to consolidate its power in Mongolia. This related, among other things, to the enforcement of anti-opium edicts.<sup>3</sup> In addition, as a response to these measures, the Russian government had stated that it might be obliged to strengthen its garrisons on Mongolia’s northern border. At the Foreign Office, these machinations were seen as rather predictable. China had quite naturally wished to capitalize on Russia’s preoccupation in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War to strengthen those sections of its northern borders across which

an invading Russian army would cross. In the spring and early summer of 1906, the precise scope of Russian ambitions had been unclear, but it was rumoured that she hoped to occupy two eastern provinces of Mongolia.<sup>4</sup> In June, the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Isvolsky, confirmed that Russia might feel it necessary to strengthen its frontier posts and garrisons.<sup>5</sup>

In retrospect, at least, Russian intentions loomed large in Garnett's mind. In August 1907, the year preceding his journey, Britain had signed a convention with Russia that was intended to resolve long-standing differences in Central Asia. By virtue of that agreement, Persia was split into spheres of interest whereby Russia predominated in the north and Britain in the south east. A central neutral zone lay in between. In neighbouring Afghanistan, which was also the focus of long-standing rivalries, British predominance was acknowledged. Tibet was also included in the convention. A British expedition had been undertaken to Lhasa in 1904 mainly on account of persistent suspicions of Russian exploration and intrigue there. Some of those changes had been conducted through the aegis of Lamaism, which was the predominant religious faith in Mongolia also.<sup>6</sup> Concerns that Russia would continue to exploit this religious connection persisted in the discussions which preceded the 1907 convention. The convention dictated that Britain and Russia would conduct any future dealings with Lhasa through the Chinese emissary there, the Amban.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the convention decreed a three-year moratorium on scientific exploration in Tibet.<sup>8</sup>

The consolidation of Chinese authority in Tibet was symptomatic of developments elsewhere in Chinese Central Asia as well as in Mongolia.<sup>9</sup> Garnett's brief was, in part, to report on the nature and extent of the military presence of the Peking authorities, especially in the main government centres in northern Mongolia. This was prompted, among other things, by information about tours undertaken in the spring of 1906 in Mongolia by Prince Su and the Duke P'u of the Chinese Court. To Sir John Jordan, those tours were chiefly intended to 'put the Mongol Princes on their guard against outside encroachment', but some newspaper reports in Peking suggested that the Chinese government had more ambitious plans to consolidate their hold on Mongolia by means of administrative reform.<sup>10</sup> Chinese control of Mongolia was exercised through mostly high-ranking officials appointed by and responsible to the Li Fan Yuan (Court for the Regulation of the Feudatories) at Peking.

The issue that required investigation was if Chinese efforts to consolidate its authority in Mongolia were likely to antagonize Russia.<sup>11</sup> Formal diplomatic contact between Russia and Mongolia had existed



from the early seventeenth century and there was a long-standing tradition of Russian exploration in Mongolia which had intensified from 1870. The most distinguished of the explorers was Lt Colonel Nicolai Prejevalsky, whose extensive travels in the country were recorded in his work, *Mongolia, the Tangut Country, and the Solitudes of Northern Tibet*. By contrast, British knowledge of Mongolia derived through exploration and preserved in written accounts was limited to the findings of Thomas Atkinson, Ney Elias and Sir Francis Younghusband. In addition, as part of the trigonometrical survey of India, an agent had surveyed part of the country from 1879 to 1882.<sup>12</sup>

The intensification of Russian exploration coincided with several agreements between Russia and China (1869, 1881 and 1892) aimed at formalizing Russian interests, chiefly commercial rights, in the country. The completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1902 appeared to offer Russia further opportunity to increase its influence in the future. By 1905, Russia was seeking to expand its trading rights in Mongolia, enshrined in a Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881, and was rumoured to be seeking rights to construct railways in Mongolia.<sup>13</sup> These efforts did not abate after the Russo-Japanese War. In the negotiations preceding the 1907 convention, Russia had made various suggestions about the inclusion in the convention of a declaration on the *status quo* in Mongolia, something that was clearly aimed to prevent any initiatives by China to strengthen its authority there. The idea was broached in the context of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 1902, which sought to maintain the *status quo* in Asia generally.<sup>14</sup> The consensus in Whitehall was that the idea contradicted the 1907 convention, whereby Chinese authority in Tibet was to be recognized. A future recognition of Russian authority in parts of Mongolia which were already under Russian dominion, or which were coterminous with Russian territory, was not ruled out, but the idea was not actively pursued.<sup>15</sup>

The occasional appearance or even residence of Japanese citizens in Chinese Central Asia had also been commented upon in official British documents for some time. The terms of the Treaty of Port Arthur gave Japan rights in Manchuria which neighboured south eastern Mongolia. Although this was not of particular concern in the British Legation in Peking, it was another issue on which Garnett would have reason to comment. More specifically, he was required to investigate reports from the Russian authorities that the Japanese were intriguing in Mongolia and causing unrest among the Mongols.<sup>16</sup>

Garnett's journey was an altogether more ambitious undertaking than that of Campbell or Kidston, both in terms of duration and in that

unlike Kidston at least, who was accompanied by Alfred Flaherty of the Chinese Consular Service, he had no European companion. Garnett's journey lasted eight months and his route was carefully chosen. In the first place he wished to avoid the main road from Peking to Kashgar, as it was the subject of frequent reporting. He also wished, for reasons of personal interest, to visit Chuguchak and Kuldja and felt obliged to visit Urga, Uliassutai and Kobdo in order to be able to report meaningfully on administrative changes in Mongolia. Similarly, as efforts by Peking to increase its influence were rumoured to be focused in the districts of Kweihuacheng and the Ordos, Garnett included them in his route.

The ambitious nature of Garnett's journey was reflected in the length and detail of his report. In its final printed form, it ran to over 130 closely typed pages. Garnett reported in detail on political matters, but he also wrote expansively on other subjects. These included topography, communications, commerce, flora, fauna, the nature of the Mongols and their customs, dress, diet and culture. A draft of the report was sent by the Foreign Office to the War Office's Military Intelligence Department, where it remained for three months.

The report took the form of diary entries made on the journey supplemented by extended passages relating issues of particular importance on which Garnett was expected to report. The style of the final report was also unusual, not simply because of the range of topics included but also because of the style of writing. Garnett's urge to find a wider audience was suggested by its reflective nature. Typically, official reports of this kind, if they were to be well received in Whitehall, did not dwell on non-political matters. On more than one occasion Garnett described the beauty of the scenery and the vast scale of the country. On the slopes of the Altai Mountains, towards the end of his journey, Garnett noted:

We descended the gully for some 4 1/2 miles and I warrant it would be difficult to find a prettier scene than this. At the same time we were gradually descending to summer again and the day being still and cloudless the sun shone with all the force of September. On the south side... the valley was thickly covered with firs while along the babbling stream grew willows, birches, poplars. On the north side were low bushes many covered with wild berries and turned to autumnal red and gold; among these the track wound. Butterflies of all the commoner varieties known in Europe were chasing each other in the sunlight, insects humming everywhere, gorgeous dragon flies flitting about while the air was fragrant with the scent of the firs. Added to

these were the chattering of the pies, the cawing of rooks, and the merry song of the woodcutter and ginseng hunter . . . Squirrels were darting across the path no longer condemned to bury themselves in the ground away from the sunlight.

Garnett's chief expense was transport, and in order to avoid carrying large sums of money, he had paid for carts for the journey to Kweihuacheng in advance. There and again at Ninghsia, he had deposited money, and on reaching Urga he had access to the Russo-Chinese Bank, from whose headquarters in Peking he had a letter of credit. Between those places, it was found that a supply of tea brick and small amounts of silver were sufficient.

Given the hospitable nature of the Mongols, it was not necessary to carry large amounts of food. For most of their journey, Garnett and his retinue survived on a diet of cheese, dried milk and a little rice, supplemented by supplies of meat, some of which Garnett procured with his gun.<sup>17</sup> There was a sense in Garnett's memorandum that he disapproved slightly of the Mongol diet. On one occasion, he noted the indifference of the Mongols to the way in which their meat was cooked and a Mongol official who breakfasted on uncooked and barely heated offal. Similarly, aside from mushrooms the Mongols never ate vegetables nor, unlike some Chinese communities in Mongolia, did they cultivate the ground. The only fruit eaten by the population was 'temenhock', which in appearance resembled French beans, and which grew in abundance in the Gobi. Garnett's diet undoubtedly improved when he entered Hassack territory as their diet included goat and mutton and many forest fruits. But as he informed his mother in June, the regime of three pipes a day with only tea to drink, and the occasional glass of wine when he encountered Catholic missionaries, suited him. At least he would appreciate the fleshpots of Europe on his return.<sup>18</sup>

By way of further preparations for his journey, Garnett had obtained an introduction to each of the Russian consular officials in whose districts he intended to travel, a letter of introduction to the head of the Belgian Mission in the Ordos and a further letter to a Japanese resident in Urumtsi, provided by the Japanese Legation at Peking. As regards the first, orders to facilitate his journey were dispatched from St Petersburg and from the Russian Legation in Peking. As Garnett recorded, 'the most generous welcome and hospitality were extended by one and all'. In fact, so generous were his hosts that on more than one occasion Garnett declined their offer of accommodation in order to retain some room for manœuvre. He had no official brief to gather clandestine intelligence

but Russian officials were as suspicious of his purposes as he was of the intentions of their government:

To one and all I explained in the course of private conversation, without laying any emphasis on the words, that I had no mission, that I was on my way home to England by this route, partly because of the hope of getting some sport, partly because of my interest in the *vie intime* of the Mongols. No secret was made of the route I had traversed, nor of that by which I proposed to travel.

Garnett felt that his journey was seen by the Russians as 'an intrusion', that they suspected him of having political intentions which were duly reported to their superiors. Given the corresponding perceptions and treatment of Russian travellers in Central Asia by British officials, Garnett's views were most probably accurate on this point.

As Garnett discovered, good relations with the Russian consular authorities in Mongolia were essential in order to be well received by their Chinese counterparts. The latter's deference towards the Russian authorities was pronounced especially in Urga and Uliassutai. The *Wai-wu Pu* and Board of Deputies had tried to ease Garnett's path, but he resolved not to call on Chinese officials unless, as in Mongolia's Northern provinces, it was unavoidable. This was partly because of what he termed the 'tedium of the etiquette of Chinese visits' and partly because of the Chinese officials' tendency to exaggerate the importance of travellers 'until the rumour is spread about that the British Minister himself is touring the provinces'. Yet, though he certainly disliked protocol in any language, Garnett found Chinese officials in Mongolia uniformly hospitable and helpful in procuring information for him.

As the Great Wall receded behind them, the party began to encounter a diversity of scenery: steep gorges, narrow passes and fertile plains, as well as the sharp variations in weather conditions which characterized the entire journey. Garnett recorded the spectacle of mules bearing wines, wool, oil, grain, skins, liquorice and even coffins, a trade which would one day be borne by the Peking-Kalgan Railway, which had recently been commenced. Besides this Garnett observed the difficulty of manoeuvring Chinese mules:

It is unusually difficult to induce a Chinese mule to walk backwards, but in these circumstances someone has to. This is done to the accompaniment of a great deal of condemnation of relatives of the carters, mules, and even innocent bystanders, as well as by some

odious comparisons, but the Chinese soon forget their grievances and the insults hurled at them, and five minutes later my cart men were screaming with laughter at their troubles.

After two days on the road, the party reached the town of Kalgan, a significant distributing centre for Mongolian trade, with a population of some 85,000 people. Of particular interest to Garnett was the positive nature of Russian and Chinese co-operation there, sustained by 'lavish hospitality and an expensive system of presents'.

Garnett's depiction of Lamaism had a pejorative flavour. As the party left Kalgan he recorded the many well-kept temples on apparently inaccessible crags, which 'testified to the piety or fear of past and present generations of credulous country folk'. Elsewhere, he noted the practice of tree worship, whereby paper decorations and inscriptions were attached to trees by 'an ignorant peasantry' and joss sticks burnt prior to long journeys. At the town of Hwaian, he recorded a funeral, 'which was accompanied by the usual scattering of paper cash, models of the deceased's house, pony, chair, and by the wailing hired mourners, and banging cymbals and letting off of fire crackers'. Similarly, Garnett had little time for the many large lamaseries which he termed 'nests of ignorance and vice'. A further potential disadvantage of the lamasery system, besides their negligible educational benefits and imposition of celibacy, was that the lamas were forbidden to fight.<sup>19</sup> Given that two-thirds of the male population in Mongolia was educated there, their martial abilities were deficient. To Garnett the Mongols' spirituality certainly seemed inferior to that of the Muslim Hassacks of northern Mongolia. He noted:

It was an impressive sight at sunset to see here, far away in the centre of the Altaishan, in Central Asia, each Mahommedan coming out of his tent to pray. The reverence for a Supreme being struck one with peculiar force after the meaningless and thoughtless whirling of the Mongol prayer-wheels.

Garnett demonstrated benign contempt towards a Lama who claimed, on seeing a falling star, that each person had a star and that particular one, as it was very bright, was most probably that of the Dowager Empress.

He was alternately charmed and vexed by what he termed on more than one occasion the 'densely stupid' Mongols. In the Ordos region, he found the Mongols, if not the lamas, 'friendly, honest and kindly'. He found their 'ignorance respecting everything in modern civilized

use... wholly delightful'. Unlike the Chinese, who pretended to understand when in fact they did not, the Mongols asked 'innumerable questions as to the use to which every single thing is put'. Of their essential honesty, Garnett was convinced in spite of the fact that he had been derided or, less frequently, congratulated for holding this view. In Garnett's experience, hospitality was always 'readily given', payment was never expected, 'while the present of a box of matches or a couple of Price's wax candles or a little Peking tea, gives invariably the greatest pleasure to the richer hosts'. For the traveller arriving at a village it was simply a case of inspecting the various 'yurts' or 'ghers', large circular, native tents, to see which he preferred, leaving his hosts to undertake all of the necessary menial work. In exchange each member of the family must be allowed to pay their respects and exchange snuff, 'to inspect everything he has and to ask a myriad questions as to the why and wherefore of each article'. Any closed or locked bags or boxes must be opened for this informal inspection.

As his journey progressed, the Mongols' innocent appeal faded. Garnett observed that they

would be a wholly delightful people were it not for their happy-go-lucky temperament, which is excessively provoking to travellers, and which leads them to form the opinion that the severe Chinese method of dealing with them is after all the best. They have no sense of responsibility, nor will they ever learn by their faults. To scold them is useless, for they are like children, a minute later they are whistling, laughing, and chattering like magpies, as if nothing had happened.

Garnett attributed this failing to their religion. As an example he cited the feckless way in which the Mongols tied loads to the camels. Repeated explanations were pointless. On one occasion, Garnett and his saddle fell violently to the ground, something which they considered 'a great joke'. More seriously, perhaps, Garnett noted the Mongols' love of pretty and, especially, glittery things. Typically, this led to debt, something that worked to the advantage of Japanese and Russian traders and the Russo-Chinese Bank at Uрга. Garnett noted many Japanese goods: mirrors, beads, chains, towels and photographs of Japanese singing girls, knives, scented soap, snuff and charms.

Though grateful for Mongol hospitality, Garnett did not always approve of their hygiene.<sup>20</sup> The ghers were huddled together within a stockade and offered warmth and safety for people and animals against

wild dogs. However, goats and other livestock wandered in and out, defecating freely and spreading vermin. More pleasant were the strings of prayer flags, some of them highly decorated and colourful, suspended from high poles at the entrance to the stockades. Old-fashioned guns and powder-horns, strange musical instruments and whips decorated the walls of the ghers. The princely ghers were lined with dark red silk and were heavily carpeted.

Garnett's observations on the shortcomings of the population were not restricted to the ordinary people. When visiting the Prince of Tourgout's realm in September 1908, apparently the first ever visit by a foreigner, Garnett wrote: 'He is a fat lad of 20 years, rather shy but with agreeable manners... He was dressed in a dark red silk robe, and wore huge spectacles and a Chinese pork-pie hat with peacock feather and red button.' From the collection of photographs, watches, clocks and a gramophone Garnett detected Russian commerce.

After four months in the company of Mongols from the Gobi desert as well as the mountains, Garnett remained equivocal. Though 'a marvelously hardy race' and, for the most part, hospitable, honest and trustworthy, he considered them 'timorous', 'entirely incapable of any deep emotions either of gratitude, love, or sorrow' and without reverence for their dead.<sup>21</sup>

Garnett noted that his journey had involved 'no danger and little risk', but he conveyed a willingness and capacity to defend himself. One of the chief dangers was simply from the recalcitrant Mongolian mules and camels. On more than one occasion their unbidable nature when fording rivers or traversing narrow mountain passes almost ended in disaster.<sup>22</sup> Of more immediate danger were the wild dogs which preyed on Mongol livestock and which, on one occasion, attacked and pursued Garnett, who promptly shot one dead. At Chuguchak in early October, having dined with the Russian Consul, Garnett recounted one particularly alarming encounter:

After dining at the Consulate I returned to the inn late. This was a third of a mile from the Consulate and situated in a street closed at night by high wooden gates. It was after midnight and a pitch dark night. The gates were shut and locked, and I had a difficult 25 feet climb, during which I knocked down a good portion of mud wall and expected to be picked off every minute by a zealous sentry. I had to drop into the street among howling dogs and with not a soul about. At night the streets are given over to the dogs, who reign supreme and resent all intrusion. Followed by barking dogs snapping at me

and having a hundred more to face, I thought it best to attack a small house in which there was a light in order to get a stick. The inhabitants were terrified, and refused to open, so there was nothing to be done except to burst the door open, while the inmates screamed 'thieves'. The door open, I was confronted by a frightened man whirling a heavy stick. As he was too scared to attempt to understand me, I made another attempt to face the dogs, but was driven back on the house.

Eventually, Garnett, accompanied by one of the inhabitants fought their way through the dogs to the inn where they were greeted by two night-watchmen who wanted to club and arrest him.

Latent anti-foreign sentiment was in evidence at Tatungfu, in the Shansi province, which Garnett had traversed in the initial stages of his journey. However, Garnett found the Mongols welcoming and child-like in their willingness to believe any rumours that were circulating. And there was the trigger happy sentry at the town of Pinglohsien, who 'was of so nervous a temperament that he [shot] indiscriminately at anyone he heard approaching on the chance that he might be a robber'.

What was required for such a journey in Garnett's view was 'good health, energy, patience, a good temper and...enthusiasm'. He explained:

Patience and a good temper, if not natural gifts, must be acquired for the time being. Good health is necessary for if this were to break down in the desert the traveller has no help at hand save himself. Energy is necessary to continue the march day after day be the weather good or bad, or however gloomy one may feel, to keep servants and camel men or carters up to the mark, for if the traveller flags, much more so will the retinue, to keep constantly on the alert in case of danger to life or property. Patience is necessary to deal with Chinese officials, natives, camel-drivers, and carters, to continue slowly day after day knowing that with camels the utmost you can do will be 30 miles a-day, and to deal with and thwart the dishonesty of servants; a good temper is necessary to stand the inquisitiveness of the crowd, their silly questions, and the Chinese mind which thinks so slowly and by such different methods to our own.

Besides these qualities, Garnett might also have mentioned a capacity to tolerate extortion or 'the national vice of squeezing'. Typical of this was a diary entry for 6 July 1908: 'We halted at Tuguruk to change animals,



and slept the night at Gashun having travelled 39 miles during the day. The Mongol official here tried to squeeze us, evidently dividing the world into people who squeeze and people who may be squeezed. Into the latter category we were placed and resented it accordingly.' Similarly, on occasions when Garnett needed transport to proceed on his journey, he invariably encountered recalcitrance and ill-concealed attempts to extort an unfair price for the animals. The 'rascality' of one particular camel-man on one occasion left him penniless and at the mercy of a local Chinese official.

More endemic were the abuses encountered on the official Chinese routes, the Tai-lu, through Mongolia. On these roads, Chinese merchants, money-lenders and the officials who supervised the system, travelled and extorted money from the local population. The former, Garnett noted, 'seem to regard their journey as a looting expedition' and demanded all manner of things, from sheep to money. So lucrative was this that one Chinese man encountered by Garnett's party obtained a healthy second income by riding continuously on horseback up and down the Tai-lu from Peking to Kobdo. Given the nature of his trade, he was obliged to ride continuously and without sleep for days on end in case he in turn was robbed. The Chinese were 'cordially despised' for allowing this criminality to continue.<sup>23</sup>

To the qualities necessary for such a journey Garnett might also have mentioned a spirit of independence. Besides the few Europeans encountered on his journey Garnett was cut off from Western values and comforts for over four months. Travellers met on the road were often few and far between. On the early stages of his journey he met Mongols on pilgrimage to the Dalai Lama when in residence at Tatungfu. Later he witnessed many returning from pilgrimage, so devoted to their faith that they had deliberately cast aside all belongings and now returned utterly destitute. However, in the Gobi desert especially Garnett noted that a traveller might venture for days on end without seeing another human.

Few people except those who have actually travelled for many days in the Gobi Desert can appreciate the intense monotony of the journey. One lies down to rest knowing that on the morrow nothing can be different; that on either side, in front or behind, as far as the eye can reach, will be nothing but green rolling downs, with the streak of brown which is the track worn by the hoofs of passing animals stretching away to the crack of doom. The comparison of a desert to sea and a camel to a ship is very close. From the top of the camel one

looks down on to wave after wave of downs, with little to catch or hold the eye. The monotony is enhanced by the absence of bird and animal life, for, with the exception of an occasional deer and still more occasional hare, there are no wild animals... while the birds, too, are extremely rare... The traveller sometimes has the experience that he is approaching the edge of the world, but on reaching what appears to be this a still greater expanse of downs unfold before him.

When travellers did meet, this led to an exchanging of snuff bottles; the size and quality of the bottle conveying an idea of the owner's prosperity. Garnett noted:

The art of giving and receiving the snuff-bottle in the correct manner is not so easy to acquire as one might imagine. Like the art of shaking hands where neither party looks at their own hands before giving it nor at the hand they are grasping, so the art of snuff-bottling. You do not look at the bottle you are giving nor do you look at the one you receive. To do the latter would suggest that you are appraising its value. The bottle may be received in one hand and should be raised slightly and then returned... It is a delightful custom doomed probably to extinction at no very distant date.<sup>24</sup>

In remoter regions such as the Ordos, Garnett was conscious of being a solitary European in a very sparse population. Travellers of any nationality other than Mongolian or Chinese were rare in such places and the actions of European travellers were therefore remembered for a long time afterwards.

The scarcity of Europeans undoubtedly sharpened Garnett's suspicions when he did encounter them. In June 1908, he met a young German, the representative in Peking of a German engineering and mining firm. Garnett suspected the company of prospecting in the Kingdom of Alashan. Similarly, although he did not share the widespread suspicion among Russians of Japanese in Mongolia, he did see through the rather weak disguise of one Japanese man who masqueraded as a doctor. As Garnett noted, '[h]e had "Agent" written on every line of his face and in every movement of his eyes'.

Garnett's keenest suspicions, and those of the Chinese Amban at Sharasumé, were reserved for the noted Russian explorer, Colonel Kozloff. According to the Amban, Kozloff had entered the country from the north without obtaining the permission from the *Wai-wu Pu*. As the party rested at the town of Ninghsia, Garnett heard of the recent arrival

in Alashan of a number of Russians. Leaving the tents and bags behind him, Garnett decided to investigate.

The Kingdom of Alashan, its capital Dinyuaning, and its king, provided Garnett with a rather different experience of Mongolia. The capital, which lay just west of the Alashan Mountains, had a population of about 4000, with about 1500 Chinese subjects. Garnett noted that few smoked opium, because they were intent on drinking themselves to death with brandy. The King, an elderly man with a violent temper who reputedly loathed foreigners, was effectively a despot whose conduct was supervised tenuously by the Chinese. Garnett did not meet the King but he was summoned to meet his son, the 'Duke'. Garnett recorded the meeting thus:

The Duke was dressed in a pale grey silk robe, he was heavily scented, his fingers were loaded with rings and he wore a large gold bracelet, at his waist a handsome gold watch and chain were suspended. Though a thorough dandy in appearance, his face was rather harsh, and he did not look so effeminate as his dress... The room was littered with foreign clocks, mirrors, and pictures scattered about, much like a shop; it was also fitted with a European table and chairs, the table being covered with the most gaudy and cheap ware which Birmingham could produce. Brandy, cigars, sweets and biscuits were served as a slight collation.

The town was also home to Prince Tuan, the 'notorious supporter of Boxerism', who had taken refuge there and lived as a 'modern Henry VIII', allegedly treating a succession of wives very badly. The departure of his latest for Peking, carried by 18 bearers on account of her ill-health, coincided with Garnett's arrival. Tuan was deeply unpopular not only because of his alleged cruelty but also because of the belief of the population that his presence was responsible for the fact that it had not rained for eight years.

Many of the wares that Garnett had spotted in the Duke's sitting room had been supplied by a large shop in the town which was run by a Buriat, a Russian Mongol, Badmayapoff. According to Garnett he was a 'remarkable young man' who had become the king's 'right-hand man'. Unfortunately for his subjects, the Duke had inherited his father's love of trinkets. The King had apparently borrowed a large sum from the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Russians were now demanding repayment. Garnett suspected that the King wished to obtain a further loan and that the Russians were keen to secure it with right to work the minerals in the

Alashan Mountains, where coal especially was reputedly of good quality and in abundance.

These suspicions were sharpened by several other factors, including the views of the local population and of the missionaries. The Buriat's shop had been due to close as the people were unable to buy his goods. However, the closure had been repeatedly postponed and Garnett felt that it was being used as a cover for efforts to boost Russian influence in the Kingdom. Besides this, Garnett also discovered that Colonel Kozloff and his party had been living in the Buriat's house for several weeks.

The Colonel, 'tall, dirty, and untidy', claimed to be collecting specimens of flowers and birds from the Alashan mountains, examining the geology and making astronomical observations. Garnett visited him, conversing in Mongol, Chinese and broken French and detected evidence to support these aims. Garnett was shown several stuffed animals awaiting transportation back to Russia, and he noted barometers, barographs, guns and photographic equipment. Garnett considered it possible that Kozloff had a general remit to increase Russian influence in Alashan, to obtain a repayment of the money owed by the King and possibly also to obtain mining concessions or a railway concession. Garnett also noted Kozloff's intention to visit Kokonoor which, according to Garnett, was in Tibet and therefore proscribed to scientific parties by the Anglo-Russian Convention.<sup>25</sup> The Colonel either did not understand Garnett or pretended not to and Garnett suspected that his investigations in Tibet might venture beyond the Kokonoor region. The possibility that this region lay within Tibet, and that in entering it in 1909 Kozloff had contravened the 1907 convention, continued to exercise minds in London, Simla and St Petersburg.<sup>26</sup>

Rumours of a major Russian expedition to Tibet, probably by way of Urga, had been current for some time before Garnett left for Mongolia. Isvolsky had denied it repeatedly in 1906, even going so far as to assure Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador at St Petersburg, that he personally would check any such ventures until the issue of exploration had been settled.<sup>27</sup> The matter was important because of suspicions about Russian motives regarding the Buriat Lamas and their religious loyalties to the Dalai Lama. After Francis Younghusband's entry into Lhasa in 1904, the Dalai Lama, accompanied or closely followed by Agvan Dorjiev, the Russian Buriat monk and spy, whose activities had done so much to provoke the expedition, had fled to Urga. There, the pontiff had met with Colonel Kozloff and with other Russians.<sup>28</sup> In July 1906, Isvolsky had noted the difficulty faced by Russia, which was not coterminous with Tibet, in preventing scientific expeditions there.

As he pointed out such expeditions might begin from Mongolia without Russia's knowledge.<sup>29</sup>

By July 1907, details of Kozloff's expedition had begun to emerge. The Foreign Office, anxious to discover Russian intentions, instructed Sir Arthur Nicolson to obtain details of Kozloff's route in the expectation that having been told not to enter Tibetan territory his itinerary would divulge Russia's definition of Tibet's eastern border. Isvolsky was evasive on the point and not until February 1908 were further details disclosed through an article in *Russki Invalid* which had originally appeared in November 1907.<sup>30</sup> In response to Grey's request that he be kept informed of Kozloff's activities, Garnett had sent an interim report from Ninghsia in June 1908, which was later incorporated in his extended report. Though inconclusive, both Garnett and Jordan felt that Kozloff's presence in Mongolia, while principally focused on scientific endeavours, was connected with Russian political ambitions in the region.<sup>31</sup>

More broadly, Garnett was in no doubt as to Russia's motives in Mongolia and some of his superiors shared his suspicions.<sup>32</sup> In his view, its policy was 'a purely selfish one' aimed at drawing that country as well as Chinese Turkestan 'towards the Russian Empire with the view of ultimate absorption'. The machinations of Russian consuls meant that Russian influence was not always reported to Peking and that efforts by a 'supine and inert' Chinese government to strengthen Chinese authority and to develop Mongolia were thwarted. Without action from Peking, however, Garnett considered that the extension of Russian influence from northern Mongolia was 'ready for a step forward'. The presence of effective consular agents and Cossack guards, Russian control of the postal system and effectively of the wool and hair trades, the influence of the Russian banks and of key Russian trading centres in Urga, Uliassutai and Kobdo left Russia in a strong position. Added to this was an extensive informal network of spies, many of them wool merchants, who reported back to the consuls and pressurized the Mongol tribes. Russian influence was noticeable at Urga, where Garnett's intentions were treated with suspicion. There, by means of discussions with the Chinese Amban, he was able to assess the extent of that influence. 'The plot at Urga', as Garnett referred to international intrigue there, was in three acts. The first was the loaning of money to all ranks of Mongolian society by the Russian Bank. The increasing impoverishment which this induced led 'the Mongols to look with a certain amount of longing at the prosperous state of Mongols under Russian rule'. Act two involved 'the tardy arrival of the Chinese Government Bank'. This

caused mild consternation in Russian circles, but this ineffectual commercial influence symbolized the otherwise weak political and military presence of the Chinese in Mongolia. The third act had yet to occur. It involved increasing brigandage which would induce Russia to act, purportedly, to protect her trade and frontier. An alternative scenario was that the Chinese would strengthen their presence, something which might provoke similar Russian counter-moves. China would seek to do this by opening Urga to foreign trade and residence. Further measures to improve trade, to eliminate extortion and to consolidate existing settlements in northern Mongolia would help to curtail Russian influence. Acceptance of the Russian idea of endorsing the *status quo* in Mongolia would be fatal to the maintenance of Mongolia as a buffer between the Chinese and Russian Empires. That contingency would enable Russia to extend its influence right down to the border of China proper.

In fact, almost certainly unbeknown to Garnett, Britain had rejected a Russian proposal that was broached prior to the Anglo-Russian Convention, that Russia might have primacy in Mongolia in exchange for British primacy in Tibet. Japan, Britain's ally, feared consequent Russian strategic gains that might thwart its ambitions in northern China. Britain, having further rejected Isvolsky's proposed inclusion in the convention of a clause recognizing the *status quo* in Mongolia, effectively ensured continued Russian efforts, by one means or another, to control it.<sup>33</sup>

They would be assisted in this by the weakness of Chinese authority, evidence of which abounded. Garnett found garrisons of Chinese and Mongol soldiers uniformly lacking. The garrison at Saharsumé consisted of 600 Mongols and 500 Chinese. The former were said to be 'extremely slow and densely stupid', and the garrison was afflicted by desertion. Similarly, Chinese authorities were unable to enforce the edict against opium smoking. In parts of southern Mongolia especially, in the absence of official measures, it was left to missionaries as well as the unsuitable soil to deter the habit. The inhabitants of Ninghsia and its environs were hopeless addicts: the entire population, children included, smoked it. It was sold openly and cheaply on the streets, the population took full advantage of this, and their dependence led to poverty. When the Chinese governor, the Taotai, enforced the ban it caused a demonstration and a threatened revolt by the local Muslim population, who were the main opium producers.

Garnett found a similar situation in northern Mongolia. In the Urga district, while opium was not cultivated, a good deal was smoked, especially by the Chinese population. In neighbouring districts where

religious beliefs precluded smoking, it was ingested. In Ningyehsien, where the police had taken concerted efforts, the population had taken to chewing nass, 'a kind of green tobacco... said to be far more deleterious in its effects than opium'. The main difficulty was widespread smuggling and customs fraud.

As regards Russian influence with the Bogdo, the religious leader of Mongolia, Garnett was apparently not unduly concerned. Dr T. J. N. Gatrell, who had journeyed in Mongolia for six months in 1904, had referred to the loans made to the Bogdo by the Russian consul and Russo-Chinese Bank at Urga. The loans were not interest-bearing and the livestock in three Mongolian provinces was understood to have acted as surety.<sup>34</sup> The Russian Consul at Uliassutai informed Garnett that a rift had occurred between the Bogdo and the Dalai Lama as, besides having a passion for alcohol, the Bogdo, contrary to his faith, had married.<sup>35</sup>

To Garnett the situation in Mongolia appeared ripe to promote British influence. The stabilizing influence provided by British goods and the spread of the English language would facilitate the maintenance of Mongolia as a buffer between China and Russia. In his view British goods from Shanghai and other cities might easily supplant the cheap Japanese goods which so transfixed the Mongols and led them into debt. As regards the spread of the English language, Garnett felt that this might promote the spread of Christianity within China as a whole, thereby preventing the possibility of it ever becoming Muslim and a potential threat to the safety of the British Empire. Real strides had already been made in this direction at the various stations of the Roman Catholic and China Inland Mission which Garnett encountered in Mongolia. Though sceptical of the priests' success in teaching the eighth commandment, Garnett considered that the missions exerted a positive influence, not least in their efforts to eliminate opium smoking and in their involvement in public works.

After Garnett's journey, events in Mongolia developed rather as predicted. Revolution in China caused Manchu authority to wither in Mongolia but to strengthen in Tibet. This, together with a declaration of independence by the Mongols in 1911, seemed to presage increased Russian influence, something which was reflected in a Russo-Mongolian Protocol of November 1911, and in the likely Russian response to Japanese efforts to secure Inner Mongolia.<sup>36</sup> There was scope to develop British commerce in Mongolia, especially as Russia was failing to meet demand, but this was not acted upon. As Lord Curzon, the former Viceroy of India noted, 'the Mongolian tribesmen... [are] now turning

to the risen Sun of Russia to find a warmth and protection which Chinese suzerainty has failed to give them'.<sup>37</sup> The deal was clinched in the Russo-Mongol Treaty of October 1912.

On reaching Kuldja towards the end of October 1908, Garnett calculated that he had traversed over 4000 miles. The open sledge which bore him to Omsk was a welcome change to horseback. From Omsk, where he boarded the Siberian Railway, he travelled to Moscow and then, in late November 1908, to London.

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In the event, Lord Hardinge, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, intervened to prevent Garnett writing up his expedition for the Royal Geographical Society, and Garnett suspected that he would also have vetoed a book.<sup>38</sup> The issue of diplomatic and consular staff writing material for non-official dissemination was something of a sore point at the time. But while Garnett fell foul of Hardinge later in his career, on this occasion it seems that the permanent under-secretary was simply applying office procedure.<sup>39</sup>

Prior to his departure from Bucharest in the spring of 1909, he was told to condense his report on Mongolia and to remove such extraneous, non-political material as he might wish to use elsewhere. He had intended to do this and to write a book for wider dissemination, despairing of his ability to write something sufficiently lifeless to avoid Foreign Office censorship. But, on hearing that his colleagues at St Petersburg were badly overworked, he postponed it.<sup>40</sup>

Garnett's suspicions about Hardinge's malign influence were not misplaced. Hardinge had considered his report 'unnecessarily diffuse' but advised that Garnett's feelings should be spared and that he should not be told this or of his intention to have a clerk from the 'China Department' delete all extraneous matter, anything without a political bearing, and have it printed in abbreviated form.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, while other Foreign Office officials deemed his official report 'interesting and exhaustive', it was considered too long for a blue book.<sup>42</sup> Garnett realized that the scope of the report was unlikely to please Hardinge but, rather than see it edited, he was prepared to contribute to printing costs.<sup>43</sup> A further disappointment came when the Royal Geographical Society, which had expressed an interest in his expedition and in the possibility of Garnett addressing its members, rescinded the offer because his route had been too similar to that taken by Ney Elias in 1872-3. Notwithstanding these disappointments, while official



postings took him to many other parts of the world and although he never returned to Mongolia, Garnett never lost his fascination with it.

More importantly, perhaps, the freedom Garnett enjoyed in Mongolia highlighted those aspects of diplomacy which he increasingly disliked. Endless socializing and 'soft living' left him frustrated, restless and feeling unfulfilled. The expedition enabled Garnett to reflect on life. As he later recalled, he had arrived in Peking little more than a gauche youth: 'I was barely 30 years old and until my transfer to Peking had had an extremely conventional life: my views on practically every subject were borrowed from the quiet but narrow valley in which my family had lived for several generations.'<sup>44</sup> Also, like many travellers before him who had been exposed to the mountains of Central and Southern Asia, Garnett questioned his religious beliefs and began to develop a deep spirituality. He did not reject his Christian upbringing but, as with Younghusband, Garnett had spiritual experiences. When lying under a cloudless sky on one of several expeditions, he came to 'realise the magnificence and grandeur of the Creator and also man's complete insignificance'.<sup>45</sup> So, too, he began to realize the value of other faiths: 'I remember reflecting at Urga that I had already become not so much non-conformist as revolutionary where God was concerned.'<sup>46</sup> And as he traversed Turkestan, amid severe weather, wild dogs and unfriendly inhabitants, 'I never lost that sense of divine protection.'<sup>47</sup> After his Mongolian adventures, that divine protection might equally manifest itself in what he termed the 'Oriental outlook on life' just as much as the contents of The New Testament. Garnett was not the happiest of men, and after his posting in China and various travels in the East, his life was frequently turbulent. The loneliness that he experienced during his Mongolian adventure was, as he acknowledged, inevitable and preferable to the frustrations of travelling with a companion, an emotion and an admission which might equally explain much of the remainder of his professional life.<sup>48</sup> Yet there is a sense in what he subsequently wrote, that these spiritual experiences, whilst they perhaps made diplomatic life seem trivial, eased some inner tensions and, briefly, left him feeling refreshed.

# 4

## Bucharest and St Petersburg

The New Year of 1909 dawned brightly for Garnett. He was to go to Bucharest, and William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, was keen that he should arrive there by 9 February, in order to replace Colville Barclay, who was to return to the Foreign Office.<sup>1</sup> In the event Garnett and Barclay did not coincide in Bucharest as planned, and Barclay advised Garnett by letter as to how best to prepare for the very mixed climate, and rather trying living conditions of his new post. He also informed Garnett that rather than rent a flat, it would be better for him to take a room at the Hotel du Boulevard, where the minister, Sir William Conyngham Greene, and other colleagues were staying. He also said that the legation house was in the process of refurbishment, although the Chancery had been finished and was back in use, and from June to October each year, when the legation moved to Sinaia, in the heart of the Carpathians, he would be able to obtain quarters in a villa. Garnett was also advised to come suitably equipped for skating, tennis, shooting, riding and, of course, bridge.<sup>2</sup>

Garnett's initial impressions were mixed. To his mother, just hours after his arrival, he spoke of Bucharest as 'a nice, clean, little town with the appearance of a large provincial town in France'.<sup>3</sup> By the end of his first day, however, he felt that it would be 'a stuffy little post till I run my own show'.<sup>4</sup> A court ball, a few days later, at which Garnett was one of over 1200 guests, improved his temper. He regaled the King of Romania with stories of Mongolia and was enchanted by the crown princess's beauty, though he professed outrage at 'horribly indecent' dresses and at the semi-nakedness of many of the women.<sup>5</sup> As the preponderance of the social side of the post became clear, his spirits sank. He wanted to retreat to his books and to Central Asia, where he might find inner peace. In fact, this was a recurring theme during his time in St Petersburg

and afterwards. Garnett continued to hanker after a posting in the Far East, and he read widely on the travels and commentary of Francis Younghusband, John Bland, Edmund Backhouse, William Rockhill and Sven Hedin, among others. There was no English church in Bucharest: the small community had long contested the issue, and weekly meetings were held in the German school.<sup>6</sup> The Hotel du Boulevard offered wonderful views across the Danube but servants took 15 minutes to arrive when summoned. Garnett read a wide range of English magazines, passed the time in various clubs, including the Jockey, which diplomats favoured, and awaited war between Austria and Serbia. This, as he explained to his mother, would involve Russia and Romania and most probably would lead to Bucharest being besieged. Serbia, Garnett believed, 'wants a good hiding', but most probably this would lead to a European war. On the following day, the crisis appeared to pass.<sup>7</sup>

Just a few weeks later, he complained to his father of bitter cold, deep snow and of a post where the work was 'infinitesimal'.<sup>8</sup> Garnett believed that the resolution of the crisis arising from Austria's annexation of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in October 1908, would enable Greene to go on leave and that he would then attain his first period as chargé. But this was not to be. The crisis was over but it seemed that a conference would be held, pending which the minister would have to remain. Already, Garnett had come to 'loathe the climate and the character of the people'. He worked in the Chancery from 11 until 1 and spent most of that time reading the legation archives, there being virtually no telegraphic correspondence to deal with.<sup>9</sup> At least this left much time to reflect upon his Mongolian experiences and to deal with many enquiries about it. The Royal Geographical Society had requested a copy of his report, and a further note and diagram of the Ulungu Lake, as well as the return of various instruments that he had borrowed but apparently not used.<sup>10</sup> Garnett learned that his report, after circulation within the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department, would be sent to the War Office and would then be printed.<sup>11</sup> Garnett, inspired by the attention, proposed to write a book about travel in China, focusing mainly on his recent Mongolian venture.<sup>12</sup> Such ideas, as well as other ruminations about the Liberal Government, and about the possibility of becoming a magistrate, were cut short by news of his transfer to St Petersburg.

Almost immediately upon his arrival at Bucharest, Garnett had spoken of his dissatisfaction and of his desire to move to St Petersburg, where the volume of political work would be much greater. As he settled into the rhythm of the legation he changed his mind. But by

the end of March, it was clear that help was badly needed in the St Petersburg Chancery. Tyrrell asked that he should arrive there by mid-April, by which time Nevile Henderson and Ernest Scott would have left.<sup>13</sup> Richard Onslow, noting that Tyrrell had simply acted on Garnett's expressed desire to move to St Petersburg, observed: 'St Petersburg, I know it well, is not perhaps an ideal post but it is very hard worked and a very interesting one. It should be above all things interesting to you as you have been in Turkey and Roumania and you know China & Mongolia, so that barring Persia, Austria & Germany you have served in all the countries which are contiguous with Russia.' At least his new chief, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was 'an excellent fellow'.<sup>14</sup> Ironically, on the eve of his departure, Garnett continued to bemoan conditions in the hotel in which he stayed, but the weather had improved, and the prospect of leaving his new friends, and of having to start afresh, filled him with dread.

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During his time in Russia, Garnett was chiefly interested in foreign policy issues, although he was, with Lord Gerald Wellesley, an unpaid attaché, expected to compose bi-monthly summaries of debates in the Duma or summaries of press reporting. This was congenial even if the Russian Government's legendary inefficiency, and the precarious existence of the Duma, the lower house, was frustrating. The Duma was now in its third incarnation and was less conservative than the upper house, the State Council, but landowning nobles in both houses routinely blocked legislation which affected their interests. The ministers, wedged between the Tsar and the Duma, comprised a further layer of government. The State Council, like the Tsar, had an absolute veto over legislation. This governmental edifice did not make for efficiency.<sup>15</sup> Garnett suggested that the Duma's motto should be 'dilatatoriness and delay'. It normally took three months to obtain an answer even to the simplest question from the Russian authorities. With the Chinese, Garnett noted, one could be rude and demand a prompt answer. Such an approach with the Russians simply got their backs up.<sup>16</sup> In March 1910, he recorded that even when the Duma did get legislation through it was amended out of all shape by the reactionary upper chamber.<sup>17</sup> He and his colleagues were keenly aware of the residue of combustible material from the 1905 revolution and its aftermath. Periodically, political violence threatened to erupt, as in the early months of 1911, when student protests began to assume ominous proportions and when,

according to one critic of the government, a sense of hopelessness prevailed in the country in a way which it had not done even in 1905.<sup>18</sup> Sir Arthur Nicolson and his successor as ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, expressed doubts about Prime Minister Peter Stolypin's oversight of political affairs (1906–11), and his tampering with the electoral system. But they also acknowledged the difficulty of his task and admired his ability.<sup>19</sup> Nicolson was broadly optimistic regarding Russia's political future, even if it remained uncertain, and he was a fervent supporter of the 1907 convention, arguing that it should become a more binding alliance.<sup>20</sup> In essence, the role of the embassy during Garnett's time in St Petersburg was to nurture contacts with, and to facilitate the endeavours of, those liberal elements that supported the continuance of the *entente* with Britain. Avoiding an appearance of interfering in Russia's internal affairs, or of criticizing its methods, was also vital.<sup>21</sup>

Garnett arrived in St Petersburg after a period of tension in Russian foreign policy.<sup>22</sup> Whereas relations with Britain had broadly improved as a result of the 1907 convention, Germany was attempting to undermine this arrangement and to encourage Russia to align with the Central Powers. German intrigues were also detected behind Austria's aggressive foreign policy, under the direction of Alois Aehrenthal. If successful that policy would marginalize Russia in the Balkans. Alexander Isvolsky, Russia's Foreign Minister from 1906, had agreed with Aehrenthal Austria's actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it was to have been contingent on Austria's acknowledgement of Russia's right of access through the Straits and on her support to obtain the Powers' recognition of this. Neither was forthcoming.<sup>23</sup> In view of the 1907 convention, Russia had expected British support in having Austria disgorge these gains. That it should do so was also the wish of Serbia and to a lesser extent Montenegro also, as those nations had their own territorial ambitions which clashed with Austria's. The new Turkish regime, of which Britain then had high hopes, also wanted British help. In seeking to thwart Aehrenthal's expansionist aims, Isvolsky had not only to deal with Russian public opinion, which was fervently opposed to Austrian objectives, but also with the fact that Russia was not prepared for war. And if Russia were to oppose Austria by force, it might provoke a revolution.<sup>24</sup> In seeking to resolve the crisis, Isvolsky could not count upon British military support in his desire to have the Straits opened to Russia. Also, it seemed that France, with which Russia was formally allied since 1894, could not be relied upon either. The key concerns in the early part of 1909 were the possibility of Austrian aggression against Serbia and of hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria, Bulgaria having

formally declared its independence from Turkey on 5 October 1908. The latter issue was, in effect, settled before Garnett's arrival, and to Russia's advantage, in the sense that its stock with Bulgaria grew as a result of Isvolsky's mediation. Briefly, it related to Bulgaria's financial obligations to Turkey relative to the Eastern Rumelian tribute, a legacy of the Eastern Crisis of 1875–8, compensation for its seizure of part of the Oriental Railway, as well as indemnification for Turkish crown lands in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The settlement of these differences, which Isvolsky orchestrated, partly in order to avoid a conflict that might escalate, and partly to stymie Austrian meddling, was completed by the end of 1909.<sup>25</sup>

With the issue of Serbia and Austria, Isvolsky was less successful. Differences between Austria and Turkey, which made Austrian aggression against Serbia less likely, were overcome in February 1909. However, Germany declined to reduce tensions by pressurizing Austria. The latter's military preparations pointed to imminent hostilities. Austrian troops lined the Montenegrin frontier, and, shortly before Garnett arrived in St Petersburg in April 1909, the Austrian army was rumoured to be mobilizing in Galicia. Isvolsky, sensing that neither British nor French assistance would be offered, and as Germany backed Austria's ambitions forcefully and unequivocally, issuing an ultimatum to Russia to this effect, strongly encouraged Serbia to come to terms with Austria. It did so at the end of March 1909.<sup>26</sup> Isvolsky's handling of this episode effectively ensured that he personally was blamed for Russia having foreclosed on further assistance to Serbia. British and French loyalty was not called into question as their assistance was not specifically requested, and therefore Germany's object of splitting the *entente* was thwarted, notwithstanding annoyance at Isvolsky's lack of consultation.<sup>27</sup> Privately, Nicolson viewed these developments with misgiving, and as presaging the breakdown of the *entente*, unless that arrangement could be formalized into an alliance.<sup>28</sup> Garnett was kept up to date with these issues by virtue of his chancery work and by means of private correspondence with, among others, Richard Onslow.<sup>29</sup>

The Bosnian crisis continued to affect Russia's foreign relations in 1910. Formal diplomatic relations were resumed with Austria but further efforts to improve relations were unsuccessful, not least because of animosity and considerable mutual suspicions between Aehrenthal and Isvolsky.<sup>30</sup> Matters were not helped by the revelation in June 1910 that a Russian journalist, a correspondent of the Austrian semi-official telegraph agency, who had previously worked in the Austrian Foreign Office's literary bureau, had passed a secret document to Major Spannocchi, Military Attaché at the Austrian Embassy.<sup>31</sup> The

relationship improved as a result of Isvolsky's replacement by Sergei Sazonov at the end of September 1910, and continued to do so in 1911, notwithstanding fears that Austria might capitalize upon an insurrection in Albania to incite Montenegrin involvement and then find a pretext to involve itself.<sup>32</sup> The risk of a reopening of the Eastern Question became more pressing as a result of the Italo-Turkish War, which was ongoing when Garnett left St Petersburg in July 1911. Indeed the long-standing suspicions of Austria persisted in official circles and substantive differences remained. Notably, Sazonov, like Isvolsky, sought a Balkan federation, which might have withstood Austrian efforts to capitalize upon an implosion of Turkish power, and he also pursued good relations with Italy, which could have counterbalanced Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.<sup>33</sup> So, too, relations with Germany were still affected by Germany's role in the crisis.

Acquiring familiarity with these and many other issues, as well as with procedures in the Chancery, was no easy task for Garnett but at this stage of his career his duties were, as he recorded, largely 'rubbishy routine work'.<sup>34</sup> Depending upon the issues of the day there could be rather a lot of it.<sup>35</sup> Michael Hughes has noted that in mid-1906, more than one hundred despatches and 200 telegrams were sent from the St Petersburg Chancery to London each month.<sup>36</sup> In particular, Garnett spent much time ciphery and deciphering telegrams on many different issues, and he regarded the Chancery as badly understaffed, in terms both of more experienced men and also of junior clerks. Garnett and, occasionally, Wellesley also wrote fortnightly summaries of affairs discussed in the press and in the Duma. This task required familiarity with a very broad range of issues from the summer of 1909. One such summary from September 1909 included news of reports of cholera, imperial proclamations, events in Turkestan, details of a scheme for diverting the Oxus, and news of Colonel Kozloff's movements.<sup>37</sup>

Garnett broadly applauded the improvement of Anglo-Russian relations consequent on the 1907 convention and regarded this as a prerequisite for the development of liberal ideas in Russia and for world peace.<sup>38</sup> Continued good relations were also necessary in order to prevent Russia from moving towards Germany. Events in the Balkans in 1909 made this unlikely, but Garnett understood the need to prevent Austria from pursuing its ambitions into Salonica by means of fostering a Balkan confederation, into which Turkey might have even been enticed.<sup>39</sup>

Besides the Balkan aspect of the Bosnian Crisis and its aftermath, there was also an equally troublesome<sup>40</sup> Cretan issue, which arose from

the longer-standing dispute regarding possession of the island between Greece and Turkey. In the years prior to Garnett's posting in Russia, Crete had become progressively Hellenized under the oversight of Alexander Zaimas, who was high commissioner from 1906. On 7 October 1908, the Cretan assembly had proclaimed its union with Greece, something which the four protecting powers, under Britain's instigation, rejected. At the end of July 1909, as they had been unable to find a solution that was acceptable to Greece and Turkey, the protecting powers' forces departed by prior arrangement but left several warships there. This was accomplished amid growing public dissatisfaction in Greece, regarding the royal dynasty's direction of policy. The Cretan question as well as the Macedonian question, with which Garnett was already familiar, rumbled on into 1910. Turkish efforts to disarm the Macedonian population seemed likely to inflame the already embittered relationship between Turkey and Greece. Such efforts might also inflame relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, and precipitate action by Turkey was feared. Garnett found the Cretan question equally tiresome: neither Greece nor Crete justified his strenuous efforts and those of his colleagues to avert war.<sup>41</sup> A revolution and a republic in Greece were to be deprecated. But as Garnett had reminded his mother, the real issue was to preserve the Greek monarchy, which was related directly to the British as well as to the German royal families.<sup>42</sup> By the end of August, Garnett doubted the survival of the Greek dynasty but failed to see who or what might replace it, other than Wilhelm II, who might seek the crown for one of his sons.<sup>43</sup> A few days later, two British warships sent to Piraeus as a steadying influence were withdrawn and were only to return in the event that the Greek royal family decided to leave. Asking his mother to regard a further disclosure as a profound secret, and as something for the family archives only, Garnett noted that the embassy had recently received a telegram from Grey in which the latter recorded Germany's professed desire to discuss limits on naval armaments.<sup>44</sup> But, of course, neither this nor other German offers fructified, and persisting doubts about the Greek dynasty led Garnett to speculate in February 1910 that it might lead to a European war, and in that event, the Liberal Government's 'little navy policy' would be dangerous.<sup>45</sup> By June 1910, the Queen of Greece was in St Petersburg, and as a 'confirmed wire-puller' was busily engaged in influencing her nephew Nicholas II, to prevent the cession of Crete to Turkey, something which Garnett desired.<sup>46</sup> Concurrently, the convening of the Cretan national assembly had caused renewed difficulties and the question recurred in the remainder of 1910,<sup>47</sup> and returned, on cue, in the summer of 1911: 'a sort



of "summer girl" which crops up annually about now & lasts till the autumn'.<sup>48</sup>

Added to the mix was the situation in Persia, where politics under the Qajar dynasty had been volatile for some time. Successive Persian Governments had experienced great difficulty exerting influence beyond Tehran. This was true of revenue collection through taxation which its small army, the Persian Cossack Brigade, was unable to collect reliably.<sup>49</sup> As part of more general reforms, a government gendarmerie was to be established beginning in 1909, with Swedish officers, as well as one American officer appointed in 1911. This military weakness meant that Persia had looked to Britain and Russia for financial support.<sup>50</sup> A succession of loans was obtained during the early twentieth century.<sup>51</sup> Continued financial difficulties occurred because the assembly or Mejlis created by the 1905 constitutional revolution either was not summoned or, when it was, refused to sanction an increase in taxation or further foreign loans until May 1911. The maladministration of customs receipts and of these loans had previously led to the imposition of Belgian advisers, who were to have overseen efficiency measures. The 1905 revolution sought to address these issues, but for Britain and Russia the constitutional movement was a mixed blessing. Britain tended to favour it because it might have strengthened Persia against Russia. Russia disliked it for that reason and supported the Shah, Mohammed Ali, whose excessive spending and inefficiency the revolution sought to curb, against the nationalists.

In view of the decades-long Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia, the British Embassy in St Petersburg was a key element in the diplomacy which surrounded these developments. Just prior to Garnett's arrival, after some months of deliberation, Britain and Russia had agreed on certain ameliorative measures; both governments accepted the need to avoid an impression of undue interference.<sup>52</sup> The key point was to induce the Shah to reverse his suspension of the constitution by an agreed date and with the assistance of 'able and energetic men', rather than the reactionary elements who had previously gained his confidence. The sticking point, though it was partly overcome, was British insistence that its share of a loan would be withheld until the assembly was reinstated. Isvolsky feared imminent political crisis unless funds were immediately forthcoming. Disorder ensued and he feared that Russia might be compelled to intervene. Russian consular guards were reinforced at various towns in the north, but when Russian interests in Tabriz were threatened, a column of 4000 men was sent to protect them in April 1909. Following the advance of the Persian nationalists on the town of

Kazvin, and when members of the powerful Bakhtiari tribe advanced on Tehran, Russia sent a further force to Kazvin, ostensibly to protect Russian and foreign subjects and institutions. At one level these actions occurred because the British and Russian legations in Tehran had failed to induce the Persian authorities to maintain order. The British Embassy in St Petersburg tended to view these actions as being orchestrated by the Russian Foreign Ministry, largely against the wishes of the war ministry. Concern existed that Russia might capitalize on the situation to extend its occupation. This fear persisted as, despite the nationalists' deposition of Shah Mohammed Ali in 1909, and the restoration of a degree of order in the north, Russian forces remained, albeit at a reduced number, in Tabriz and Kazvin until March 1911. Mohammed Ali was replaced by his young son, Ahmad Shah, for whom a regent, Nasr-ul-Mulk, deputized, presiding over a rapidly changing succession of cabinets. Beyond Tehran, political power was exercised by local chiefs and the Bakhtiaris gained the most, both in Tehran and elsewhere.<sup>53</sup> Among other aspects of the situation that Garnett dealt with were Turkish military operations, which long preceded the current unrest, on Persian territory, especially in the Urumia district, and which continued throughout 1910, notwithstanding an 'impressive warning' issued to the Turkish authorities by the Russian ambassador at Constantinople.<sup>54</sup> Joint British and Russian representations were made at Constantinople, but the Committee of Union and Progress declined to remove its troops until Russia's were withdrawn from northern Persia. The CUP, of course, constituted a key element in the new government of the Ottoman Empire, consequent on the failed counter-coup of the Sultan's supporters. Among other things, Garnett and his colleagues monitored Isvolsky's reaction to these developments, as well as Russia's desire to foster a strong Turkish power, as a bulwark against Austrian ambitions and chaos in the Balkans, and to prevent a recovery of German influence in Constantinople. These efforts became more problematic and Russia's relations with Turkey worsened due to Turkey's acquisition of two battleships from Germany in the summer of 1910.<sup>55</sup> They also did so because increasingly, in 1911, Turkish actions on the Persian border were deemed to be undermining Russia's strategic interests there.

Garnett's thoughts about Russian policies in Persia in 1909–10 do not survive in detail, but by June 1909 he had resolved that partition was the best solution.<sup>56</sup> Persia assumed greater significance in the following year, because of the Potsdam Agreement, which arose from discussions in Potsdam and in Berlin in November. Among other things, by virtue of that arrangement, which was finally signed in August 1911,

Russia undertook not to oppose the completion of the Baghdad Railway and permitted Germany to link the Baghdad Railway with the future system under Russian control in northern Persia. In the event that Russia was unable to obtain a concession for a line connecting the town of Khanikin with Tehran, Germany might then seek to obtain it.<sup>57</sup> The quid pro quo was German recognition of Russia's zone in northern Persia, which increasingly resembled a colony. Germany also renounced political but not commercial interests in Persia. Garnett recorded that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Sazonov, had confided details of the agreement to Sir George Buchanan, but in doing so insisted that they should not be telegraphed to London. Garnett doubted whether this was owing to the possibility of German interception. Rather, Sazonov did not wish his fellow Russians, who routinely intercepted British telegrams, to discover the embassy's source of information. In fact, as no official record was made of the discussions, the version of the agreement Sazonov supplied differed from that proffered by the German government to the British Ambassador at Berlin, and both these versions differed from the draft agreement which emerged in mid-November.<sup>58</sup>

Garnett, like Buchanan, felt that Sazonov had committed Russia by incautious and weak diplomacy. But, in general, the view from the embassy in St Petersburg was that while Sazonov had conceded certain advantages to Germany in the agreement, which were not admitted by prior agreement with Britain and France, including stipulations relating to Persia's neutral zone, there was little to suggest that the *entente* had been seriously damaged.<sup>59</sup> In January 1911, Nicolson confessed to being 'puzzled' by what exactly had occurred in Potsdam, but German intent to split the *entente* did not substantially diminish confidence in Russian commitment to it.<sup>60</sup> Such, at least, appears to have been Garnett's view, and Buchanan's, if not the Foreign Office's.

Connected with the Potsdam Agreement, and the feared Russo-German rapprochement, was the question of the construction of a Trans-Persian Railway. In October 1910, having imparted news about the latest fad among his circle, roller skating,<sup>61</sup> which Garnett thoroughly enjoyed, having been inducted by colleagues at the American Embassy, he noted that the line, if developed, would undermine the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Construction of that line had caused some dissent within the Triple *Entente*, not least because, having previously been alarmed by Anglo-German discussions about it, Russia had in the Potsdam Agreement undertaken not to oppose it.<sup>62</sup> Germany was correspondingly unhappy about a Trans-Persian line and Garnett hoped that

Hardinge, then Viceroy of India, could persuade opinion in India to support it.<sup>63</sup> Before his departure from Russia in late July 1911, some progress had occurred. In May, the British Government gave Russia its consent, in principle, to the line and to further talks among its sponsors, subject to certain conditions. These talks occurred but made little headway until the end of 1911, by which time Garnett had been transferred to Tehran. More generally, Germany had insisted on its right to participate in concessions in Persia. These ineffectual efforts to split the *entente* were reinforced by German involvement in intrigues against Aehrenthal, but as far as the Potsdam Agreement was concerned, Garnett judged that it had not affected relations with Russia at all.<sup>64</sup> It simply ensured that he and his colleagues remained vigilant in efforts to bolster Russia against German designs in Persia, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.<sup>65</sup>

Besides these issues, Garnett and his colleagues at the embassy were also expected to monitor Russian policy in the Far East. During 1909, far from seeking revenge upon Japan for its defeat in the 1904–5 war, Russia was apparently anxious to avoid a precipitate Japanese move against Russia's Manchurian interests.<sup>66</sup> In July 1907, following upon an agreement concerning Siberian fisheries, Russia had recognized Japanese special interests in Korea and Southern Manchuria in return for Japanese recognition of Russia's special interests in Northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. There were various indications of efforts to improve relations during 1909, not least because Japanese influence apparently continued to grow,<sup>67</sup> and because the abortive attempt, instigated by America, to internationalize all of the Manchurian railways at the end of 1909 drew Japan and Russia closer together. To Russia, the losses consequent on internationalization for her commercial interests, especially regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as strategic objections, outweighed the threat presented by continuing political instability in Manchuria. Russia and Japan also opposed the construction of a proposed railway between Tsitsihar and Aigun and instead suggested to China the construction of a line from Kalgan via Urga to Kiakhta and thence to the Baikal Railway. Mutual opposition to what appeared as attempts to promote Chinese political aims in Manchuria provided grounds for a Russo-Japanese agreement signed in July 1910. Garnett, who composed the Far Eastern section of the 1910 annual report, noted that Japan's annexation of Korea had not upset this relationship. In fact, China's recent forward policy with regard to pacifying its outlying dependencies was likely to foster it.

Conversely, Russia's relations with China had generally worsened. By February 1911, Russia had sent China an ultimatum concerning its non-observance of clauses of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881. In particular, Russia was concerned about China's assertive policy in Mongolia and Tibet. As regards the 1881 treaty, Garnett felt that China was foolish to have agreed to it in the first place but could not now evade its terms.<sup>68</sup> Garnett ascribed Russia's keen sensitivity towards the Chinese partly to German machinations.<sup>69</sup> In July 1911, a senior Chinese diplomat arrived in St Petersburg to discuss revisions to the treaty.

Besides these foreign policy issues, Garnett also expressed a passing interest in domestic affairs. His letters reflected the lingering threat of regicide, in the reluctance of the Tsar and Tsarina to return to St Petersburg and in elaborate security measures taken when they did. By 1909, contact with them was generally restricted to the New Year's audience. It was 'an unhappy dynasty – nearing its end after a very stormy but illustrious past'<sup>70</sup> and one which was increasingly isolated from and inaccessible to Russian society and British diplomats alike.<sup>71</sup> Also, Garnett's letters were suggestive of the underlying fear of political revolt which prevailed in court and political circles at the time. In March 1911, he noted Stolypin's threatened resignation, after his defeat by reactionary elements in the Council of the Empire. They wished to see the Tsar rule again as an autocrat. If Nicholas II were to accept it, he might then be succeeded by a reactionary government, and Russia would succumb to revolution. In the event, Stolypin was induced to remain when it transpired that the Minister of Finance would only replace him on grounds which were unacceptable. In the meantime, Stolypin had lost the backing of the Octobrist Party, whose support he needed.<sup>72</sup> Garnett recorded these developments in a short official memorandum.<sup>73</sup>

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Garnett's initial doubts about St Petersburg proved to be well founded. He arrived there on 22 April 1909, and, except for two periods of leave, the first over the Christmas period of 1909, and the second, a six-week spell from August to October 1910, he remained in Russia until the autumn of 1911. Although he came to enjoy certain aspects of the post, notably the occasionally pressing nature of the Chancery work, as well as the variety of political issues, he developed a strong dislike of the climate, of the Russian language and, increasingly, of the social

scene. In February 1911, he complained of 'a ceaseless round of gaiety', involving attendance at three or four parties each night, and of the practice adopted by ladies in the diplomatic corps of having 'days', which involved tedious social calls lasting all afternoon.<sup>74</sup> By then he received 'shoals of invitations', including one to a 'puzzle party', which involved teams reassembling large images of prominent society members which had been cut into pieces.<sup>75</sup> Garnett found that he socialized with many of the same people night after night, and the value of this activity among diplomats in Russia, from the perspective of obtaining useful information, has been called into question.<sup>76</sup> At his lowest point, he referred to Russia as a 'barbarian land' and a 'godforsaken country', sentiments which chimed with those of other diplomats.<sup>77</sup> More than at any of his other posts, daily life was conducted within the ambit of the embassy, and the British colony and among certain members of the country's aristocracy. As in any post, there was pressure to conform in terms of lifestyle. Garnett lodged briefly at the Hotel de France, which was just a 15-minute walk from the embassy, and close to the Winter Palace, where one of his colleagues also stayed, and where his colleagues often dined. Sir Arthur Nicolson disliked this arrangement and seemed envious of his pretty Russian servant. For Garnett, it had the added advantage that in the event of a vacancy arising elsewhere, he could leave without delay and without incurring financial loss. He had, after all, only recently paid his subscriptions to at least one club in Bucharest, and he anticipated the financial demands of his new post with some trepidation.

The contrast, from Vienna, from which place Garnett had travelled to St Petersburg, was stark. He had been ejected from the train at Granica, the customs frontier, and had to fight to secure his bags to offer them for inspection. St Petersburg appeared 'dreary & melancholy' and 'depressed', a theme which recurred, with minor deviations, throughout his time there.<sup>78</sup> He took stock of his colleagues directly. Sir Arthur, with whom he lunched on the day of his arrival, was 'a clever & very pleasant little man, almost hump backed'. Lady Nicolson, though immensely kind, eclipsed Lady Jordan in her unkempt appearance; Garnett claimed to have mistaken her for the ambassador's maid, when they met, a misapprehension which was not uncommon.<sup>79</sup> By November 1909, her charms had diminished further. She was, Garnett noted, 'a dreary, depressing woman to talk to'.<sup>80</sup> Besides Nicolson, there was Ernest Scott, whose posting to Constantinople had been terminated prematurely because Lady O'Connor took a dislike to him. George Kidston was second secretary, and he had previously served at Peking and Tehran. There was

also Claude Radcliffe, who was from October 1908 honorary attaché at the embassy. Radcliffe, according to Garnett, was a gossip but amusing company, especially as he was from the Kendal area and regaled Garnett with stories of William Garnett's appalling driving.<sup>81</sup> Nicolson was due to go on leave in the summer, which would leave the councillor, Hugh O'Beirne, in his place. The first secretary Ernest Scott was also shortly to leave for a six-month posting in Montevideo, and Kidston would replace him. Then Garnett would be next in seniority and, all being well, would obtain his first period as chargé. But this seemed to be little consolation for having been uprooted so abruptly from Bucharest.<sup>82</sup> The rental of a flat from an English governess, complete with crockery and other furnishings, brought some diversion from the 'grey, cold & miserable' weather and from regular visits to an American dentist, who was engaged in killing nerves in his mouth, and with whom Garnett had two sittings a week, the most that he could endure. All in all, it was an uninspiring environment.

Initially, however, and bag days excepted, work was not unduly stretching. At least part of Garnett's time was spent staring out of the window of the embassy onto the River Neva, where ice-floes drifted down from Lakes Ladoga and Onega towards the sea. The embassy was on the corner of the Souvrov Square and the Palace Quay, and faced the Troitzky Bridge, which crossed the Neva. By way of an antidote to its rather grey prospect, there were almost nightly social engagements which continued throughout the winter, until April, with only a slight diminution in the first week of Lent. Generally, soon after his arrival, the gatherings were small and quite intimate, enabling Garnett to get to know people, including members of the 4000-strong British community. The 'ruling distraction' was bridge, which Garnett found 'wearisome', though good diplomatic training, on account of having to keep his temper with players of many nationalities, and other card games, which frequently continued into the early hours of the morning. He seldom went to bed before 3 am, in or out of season. There was time also for courtesy calls, and, as the weather slowly improved, tennis. Garnett had also begun Russian lessons. French and German were widely spoken in society and even in the shops but Russian was essential for cabs. Due to his slow progress, Garnett often had to walk for miles.<sup>83</sup> Though he judged it variously 'an awful language' 'a hopeless language' and 'a dreadful tongue', Garnett began to make some headway, sufficient, at least, that he could communicate even in the most basic fashion with his servant. In late spring and early summer, Garnett also began to explore his surroundings. There were visits to the theatre, to the islands

in the Gulf of Finland, to the Royal Palace of Peterhof, to the Hermitage and to the carriage museum. He attended the unveiling of a monument to Alexander III in the presence of the court – ‘what an opportunity for bomb throwing!’ – and attributed the emotional response to it of the Empress mother, to its ‘hideousness’. Among other things, the horse had no tail.<sup>84</sup> A diplomatic club on one of the islands provided further distraction. Though rather distant from the embassy, and infested with mosquitoes, there was tennis and an execrable golf course. Unfortunately, the wife of the German minister insisted on serving from a yard within the court, but no one dared to raise the issue in case it should poison relations. There was cricket too. The English community boasted five cricket clubs and at the end of June, Garnett played a match. He noted: ‘Some of the fellows of the colony seem delightful & quite ready to be friendly which is wonderful considering how the Embassy – like most Embassies – gives itself airs & graces & snubs & looks down on the colony & insists on moving in its own little Diplomatic groove & persists in thinking that to stray outside is to lose caste!’<sup>85</sup> In fact, according to Garnett, the colony was invited to the embassy only once a year, for a dinner to mark the King’s birthday.<sup>86</sup> As he discovered when organizing the coronation festivities in 1911, the colony was ridden with cliques.

Cricket, for which Garnett had no great passion, was by way of a celebration to mark the end of his week as chargé. Hugh O’Beirne was at Ascot, and George Kidston had returned to England suddenly as his father was gravely ill. Garnett had spent most of the week in the Chancery, with only two assistants to help him, or at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was vaguely apprehensive about some of his actions. By the end of July, Kidston’s father still clung to life, and there was no prospect of his return; Garnett’s period as chargé would probably extend into the autumn. He was fully aware of the need to create a good impression.<sup>87</sup> In the event, Garnett was in charge of the Chancery for five months. In September, he moved into Gerald Wellesley’s room at the embassy during the latter’s absence.

Garnett returned to Quernmore for Christmas and the New Year in 1909. The strain of standing in for Kidston, who returned in early December, had taken its toll and he was desperately in need of rest. Such was his dissatisfaction that when passing through London *en route* for Quernmore, he had stopped at the Foreign Office and pleaded with Tyrrell to move him.<sup>88</sup> On his return to St Petersburg, he recorded the strange spectacle of the frozen Neva being flattened for motor traffic, lamp posts erected, blizzards, and people huddled around bonfires in the snow. The cold was leavened by the visit of Maud Allan,



the Canadian-born dancer. He found her unappealing, her legs were too skinny and her feet too long, and Garnett could not understand Asquith's infatuation. Her dancing was clumsy, and for Russian tastes, she was too heavily clad.<sup>89</sup> By contrast, the romantic novelist, Elinor Glyn, who visited in January, was clever and wicked, but might easily be taken for what she wasn't.<sup>90</sup> Upon her return to St Petersburg in February, she had evidently outstayed her welcome but Garnett feigned civility in case she portrayed him negatively in her novels. There was time for sledging and skiing, and Garnett, with 120 other members of the *corps diplomatique*, had attended an audience with the Tsar at Tsarskoe.<sup>91</sup> Early in February, Garnett wrote to his mother:

The week has been very full of gaiety... Last Friday dinner at the American Embassy & on to some private theatricals for a charity at which all society were present, on Saturday English cricket club annual night with private theatricals first followed by presentation of cups & medals by the Ambassador followed in turn by a ball... on Monday a tedious official dinner at the Bulgarian Legation: on Tuesday a dinner followed by an evening party at the American Embassy; on Wednesday ice hilling again on the island with a large party... on Thursday a big official dinner at this Embassy... last night a dinner at Mrs Bray's... tonight an official dinner at the German Embassy & party at the French Chargé d'Affaires' afterwards: I long to creep into bed instead, after my long day of skiing.<sup>92</sup>

These social demands, as well as an expectation that he should routinely lunch and dine in restaurants, involved considerable expense, and Garnett was becoming more outspoken on the fact that the compensations of the diplomatic service, financial and other, were not sufficient. Garnett viewed his time in St Petersburg as a useful stepping stone. It was a plum post even if the Foreign Office found it difficult to get people to go on account of the expense.<sup>93</sup> His knowledge of Central Asia would be useful to the ambassador, and once he had mastered Russian, he would hope for a transfer. He expected to take his Russian exam early in 1910, and this would add £100 to his salary. Initially, he considered that living costs would be low. However, in the summer of 1909, he had an 'imperative' need for money, especially as he was unlikely to be moved until the spring of 1911 at the earliest. Part of the problem was his decision to take a flat. Garnett's correspondence with his father suggests that he had borrowed at least £400 by the autumn of 1909 – this was in addition to his monthly allowance of £20 from his father – and Garnett continued

to borrow and sometimes to exceed his overdraft in the remainder of his time in Russia.<sup>94</sup> These difficulties were admittedly relatively common among junior diplomats.<sup>95</sup>

The death of Edward VII was marked by two services in the English church, attended by a truly international assembly of diplomats in glittering uniforms. Garnett was chiefly relieved to find that he was merely an usher and that he was not expected to kneel at any point in the proceedings, something that he had not previously done in his dress uniform, which he had outgrown.<sup>96</sup> He greatly regretted the King's death, and especially the rumoured culpability of certain members of the Cabinet, whose disrespectful behaviour had aggravated his ill health. The obligatory period of mourning, though brazenly ignored by the wife of Grand Duke Cyril, a niece of Edward VII, brought a more complete respite from the social round than was normal at the season's end.<sup>97</sup> Soon after, there was news of Hardinge's appointment as viceroy of India and the possibility that Nicolson would replace him as permanent under-secretary. There was much speculation as to who might replace Nicolson; both Garnett and Tom Spring-Rice, the newly arrived attaché, sought to thwart Sir Gerard Lowther's candidacy, for which his sister, who was married to the secretary at the French embassy in St Petersburg, campaigned.<sup>98</sup> In fact, Nicolson left St Petersburg in mid-August, and, as previously noted, was replaced by Sir George and Lady Buchanan, and their daughter, Meriel, whom Garnett had met in Constantinople. Buchanan took charge of the embassy in December 1910, and the interim period was overseen by Hugh O'Beirne.

It was perhaps fortunate that Garnett's posting at St Petersburg under the Buchanans was not extended. By March 1911, after some initial doubts, higher authority judged both Sir George and his wife as a success. He, according to Hardinge, was a 'gentleman', and she had considerable charm.<sup>99</sup> This judgement contrasted sharply with Garnett's view. His chief reservation initially was their fussiness. On arrival at the embassy, Lady Buchanan had insulted the Nicolson's by saying how ugly everything looked. The 'really appalling' wallpaper which she proposed to substitute was, with many of their other possessions, trapped on the SS *Jaffa* which had run aground at Reval. Sir George had taken to the Chancery in order to escape her grumbling and as his own room had yet to be redecorated.<sup>100</sup> Garnett had dined alone with them on their arrival: 'they are nice people but I hope *she* won't upset the apple-cart. She does not get on well with women, is a jealous little spit-fire, is very smart, loves men's flattery and attentions & has squabbled with ladies at every post she has been at.' He looked forward to a showdown

between the Buchanans and the Bakhmetieffs, with whom they had fallen out at Sofia,<sup>101</sup> and had begun to enjoy Lady Buchanan's disposition to scratch Mary Lowther (Madam Viengné). The latter had incurred the ambassadress' ire by claiming to have played with Sir George as a child. Lady Buchanan had snubbed the Japanese by refusing at the last minute to attend their official reception. As Garnett noted, it had been very dull 'but these official receptions are as much part of one's work as copying out despatches so one has to face them smilingly'. Sir George was scarcely better, preferring to spend his mornings 'rinking' or skating: 'It would make poor Sir Arthur Nicolson's few remaining hairs stand on end if he knew.' Nicolson knew that there was information to be had but only by 'harassing the Russian government night and day' and not on the skating rink.<sup>102</sup> According to Garnett, Lady Buchanan had soon alienated the Imperial Ceremonies staff and, though both she and her husband were openly critical of the Nicolsons, Garnett felt that the latter, though 'rather dowdy in appearance' (a view recorded by their son), were responsible for having raised the embassy's status after the Russo-Japanese War, from which the Buchanans were now benefitting.<sup>103</sup> In April, Lady Buchanan made the secretaries' lives miserable in her search for a summer residence, while the embassy was being refurbished. Each house was rejected because it was dirty or full of 'creepy-crawlies'.<sup>104</sup> In fairness to Lady Buchanan, the embassy's 'rotting grandeur' was notorious.<sup>105</sup> Sir George had then taken to his bed on account of rheumatism and lumbago. His wife argued that he needed a change, something that Garnett ascribed to her determination to 'get away herself from a place she hates and a people who do not care for her'. The difficulty was that both O'Beirne and Kidston were away, and if Sir George were to go, then Garnett would be left in charge. In fact, Garnett noted that he did practically all of the work anyway, including visiting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the ambassador's behalf.<sup>106</sup> In the event, the Buchanans did go on leave at the beginning of June, an event which Garnett recorded with the remark that they left, having 'created a quantity of enemies & no friends'.<sup>107</sup> Kidston had in the meantime become engaged to a Miss Bonham, the daughter of Sir George Bonham, minister at Berne (1905–9), and a niece of Sir George. These developments meant that Garnett's own leave was postponed. But a 'battle royal' fought with the Foreign Office meant that his intended departure date of 28 July most probably would not change.<sup>108</sup>

The rather claustrophobic social life in St Petersburg, and the limited opportunities for travel, beyond an occasional trip to Moscow, fuelled Garnett's appetite for a transfer. He refrained from asking about

this in August 1909, having cavilled at his move from Bucharest, but did so in October and was snubbed. His desire for a cheaper, warmer and quieter post, in social terms, was undoubtedly encouraged by his correspondence with George Lloyd about their travels in the Balkans, with William Rockhill, Percy Etherton and, especially, with Archibald Rose. The latter wrote regularly and expansively about his work on the Burma–Chinese frontier, and about its clear wild rivers, rhododendrons, jasmine, orchids, wooded valleys, exotic people and, above all, isolation, which ironically made Rose increasingly unhappy. Garnett also corresponded with George Morrison and spent time with him in St Petersburg in July 1910, when the latter traversed Central Asia by a more southerly route than Garnett.

As part of his chancery work, Garnett corresponded regularly with travellers who wished to enter Russian Central Asia, certain parts of which were proscribed by the Russian authorities. Occasionally, he was approached privately on a matter of this kind. For example, in October 1910, Colonel Abbott Anderson of the Manchester Regiment, who had commanded the legation guard at Peking, asked Garnett to make enquiries on his behalf with the Russian authorities about travel in the Altai Mountains. Anderson repeatedly changed his route and refused to accept that the Russian government did not issue passports. Also, as Ernest Scott, who was then posted to Peking, informed Garnett, Anderson, who was a habitué of the officers' mess of the British legation guard, had a tendency to abuse the Chinese with his cane, something which he was also prone to do on his travels.<sup>109</sup>

But more often the application would arrive via the Foreign Office. The procedures relating to such travel were complicated, rarely clear and often led to correspondence with many other authorities, including the India Office, the Government of India, which was very sensitive about the travel plans of Indian Army officers especially, the legation at Peking, as well as consular officials, not least the Vice-Consul at Baku, Ranald MacDonell and Henry Montgomery Grove at Moscow. As Garnett discovered, dealings with the Russian foreign ministry were desperately slow; there were no firm procedures in place, and travellers seldom left enough time to obtain the necessary permits. Garnett and, more especially, George Kidston were prominent in efforts to regularize the system.<sup>110</sup> Russia had proscribed travel in Russian Turkestan, and Garnett was sympathetic to its sensitivity on this issue and failed to see why British hunters could not pursue their quarry elsewhere.<sup>111</sup> Besides those heading for parts of the Russian empire, there were visitors to St Petersburg, who regarded the embassy 'as a special form of tourist

office'. In June 1909, Garnett recorded his annoyance at the visit of Lord Aldenham and his daughters, for whom he and his colleagues had to run around obtaining tickets and admission cards. The consul at Moscow was similarly afflicted.<sup>112</sup>

Garnett took advantage of his leave in the summer of 1910 to enquire about a new posting, and Tyrrell confirmed that he would be moved in the spring. In March 1911, Richard Onslow told Garnett that he could not be moved at that point, but he was assured that he would be kept in mind for Tehran.<sup>113</sup> Garnett had requested Tehran partly because he felt it too uncivilized for most people in the service. It was, therefore, inexpensive. The Foreign Office had agreed to regard his request favourably, but in his final weeks in St Petersburg, in the ambassador's absence, he was hard pressed in the Chancery. The calling season was over but the repercussions of the Albanian insurrection preoccupied him greatly. In June, Garnett was also responsible for organizing celebrations to mark the coronation. He recorded a 'frightful tussle with the Chaplain' over the service. There were further revelations about the Buchanans, who, having returned from England, had moved to a summer house. And Garnett was moved to comment increasingly on events in Persia, where the Russian zone was in turmoil. In the week before his departure, he deprecated Russia's involvement in the return of the ex-Shah, Mohammed Ali, and anticipated that much 'blood-shed and suffering' would ensue.<sup>114</sup> His earlier assessment of the Anglo-Russian Convention that 'it works thunderingly well'<sup>115</sup> was now more qualified. Of the Moroccan crisis, Garnett simply recorded his disgust that Germany was apparently to be bought off with territory in the French Congo. To him it smacked of 'sharp practice & I daresay history will record it' thus.<sup>116</sup> It was against this backdrop, as well as industrial disputes and the crisis over the House of Lords, that Garnett left St Petersburg for London.

# 5

## Tehran 1911–14 – ‘Into the Vortex’

Garnett's journey to Tehran took five days. The first leg, to Vienna, was spent in the company of Aubrey Herbert, 'dreadfully dirty & untidy', who was travelling to Constantinople. Garnett spent the Channel crossing, which was particularly rough, lying on the floor. Herbert fretted about the means of his entry into Turkey. His courier's passport had failed to arrive in time from the Foreign Office. He was also much preoccupied with his new bag which a servant had bought and packed for him, neglecting to explain its lock. After Vienna, the train traversed southern Poland, Galicia and southern Russia, 'the most dreary country in the world', and terminated at Baku. After a restful day there in the company of the vice-consul, Garnett endured a further rough sea passage to Enzeli on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Finally, with growing enthusiasm for this new venture, Garnett travelled by phaeton to Resht and finally by means of a landau to Tehran.<sup>1</sup>

For those who aspired to the senior ranks of the Diplomatic Service or who wished to change tack and move to the Foreign Office, Tehran was an important posting.<sup>2</sup> It lacked the prestige of a major European embassy, but it nearly ranked alongside Constantinople and possibly Peking. Garnett, having served in St Petersburg, was familiar with the Russian mind and was a valuable acquisition for the Minister at Tehran, Sir George Barclay.<sup>3</sup> As Archie Rose noted at the end of September, it would round his career and 'make with Petersburg and Peking the proper foundation for the work which must come to you in the future'. Indeed, Garnett was to have Tehran 'at the really psychological moment'.<sup>4</sup> Garnett's predecessor as second secretary, Lancelot Oliphant, though admittedly a Foreign Office entrant had, at his own request, been moved to the Foreign Office's Eastern Department as deputy to George Clerk. Thus it really was a stepping stone and Garnett soon came to see it as

such, either as a prelude to a posting to a west European embassy or to Constantinople as first secretary, or even to a councillorship at Peking.

Before Garnett's arrival in Tehran and indeed for a fortnight when they coincided there, Oliphant dispensed much practical advice. Life in Tehran, Oliphant noted in August 1911, 'is exactly like Constantinople only much more so'.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, he would need a frock coat for ceremonial occasions, notably the Shah's and the King's birthdays. But an old top hat would suffice. After all it wasn't Paris or Berlin. Books, music, as well as stores of food – jams, hams, sardines, biscuits, wine and whisky – would also be required, as all were expensive or difficult to obtain. Winters were cold; in fact they had had some sleighing and skating, so he would need a fur coat and snow boots, à la Grand Rue de Pera. Summers, on the other hand, were hot and dry, though often mitigated by a breeze, and a sun helmet was advisable. His own, Oliphant noted, was the 'Ellwood's Patent Air Chamber Hat' from the Army & Navy Stores, and though 'not beautifying... is certainly life giving'. Also, Garnett would need 'ship loads' of socks, as they wore through quickly, tennis balls and a thermos. As for riding and shooting, Oliphant offered him camping gear, as well as his horse and groom, the latter having been at the legation for twenty years. He would need fishing things and a rifle and cartridges. With three horses, exclusive of wine, Oliphant had budgeted on £30 per month. To Garnett this relative inexpensiveness was one of the posting's main attractions. Oliphant had enjoyed his time there enormously. Occasionally he felt that its politics were 'of the village pump', but, as he correctly predicted, developments in the winter were likely to be of great interest. Indeed, 'life was full of excitement' in Tehran.<sup>6</sup>

As with many diplomatic postings, there was a strong sense in Garnett's move to Tehran that he was simply taking on a baton handed down through a long line of diplomats of varying distinction. In Tehran, as in some other posts, this feeling was more pronounced because he knew his two immediate predecessors as second secretary, Oliphant and George Kidston. In addition, he inherited from them the same rooms in the secretaries' house in the legation compound in Tehran; rooms which were part-furnished with their belongings. Garnett derived great pleasure in tending the beautiful garden attached to the secretaries' house, which Kidston had established. From October to May, the small community remained in the legation. It moved to a summer compound in Gulhek, 6 miles north of Tehran and 900 feet higher on the foothills of the mountains that surround Tehran, generally at the end of May, in order to escape the heat.<sup>7</sup> There also Garnett's

summer house, with its loggia and stunning views, had an abundant garden. Life in the compounds brought various challenges, but both were quite large and therefore afforded a degree of privacy unknown in, for example, the relatively cramped Peking legation. After a brief visit to Gulhek in November, he described it thus: 'Our compound is quite charming, full of large trees with delightful long shady alleys, interspersed with flower gardens, pools of water, small streams, pergolas, a tennis court, a bathing pool & other delights.'<sup>8</sup>

The legation in Tehran, as he explained to his mother, was 'charming both inside & out', being located on the outskirts of Tehran and a few minutes from its walls with their dramatic views of sunsets and of the mountains. Its garden, the largest in Tehran, was full of trees and winding paths leading to various other quarters. The white-stuccoed legation building, with French windows and green shutters, opened onto a long veranda. From there, a flight of broad steps led to a garden full of roses and nightingales.<sup>9</sup> Each house in the legation's grounds had a section of garden and a share of a communal water supply with which to irrigate it.<sup>10</sup> A coolie maintained the system of water channels, which were lined with turquoise blue tiles. The secretaries' house was of pale yellow brick and had two storeys. There, Garnett occupied the 'very spacious & quite delightful' rooms on the upper floor, which Lady Barclay helped him to refurbish. Major William Fordham, the military attaché, occupied the ground floor. They shared a common room, kitchen and stables. Fordham's own house was used by Sir Coleridge Kennard, the third secretary, aka 'the Boy', and his wife. Besides the Kennards, there was the legation doctor, Richard Neligan, the councillor, Alban Young, whom Garnett had known briefly at Constantinople, and his wife, two student interpreters and a vice-consul. Besides their houses, the compound had laundry houses and a large swimming 'tank' or pool.<sup>11</sup>

Garnett lost no time in recording his impressions of Tehran and of his new colleagues. Besides his parents, and his aunt Addie, throughout his time in Tehran he corresponded with Oliphant. At the Foreign Office, Oliphant, besides routinely handling the correspondence with Tehran, was the experienced Persia hand offering wise counsel on the inevitable frustrations of the job, as well as an occasional corrective when procedure was not followed to the letter.<sup>12</sup> Also, Oliphant and Garnett shared a love of gossip. Besides his former colleagues in St Petersburg, with whom he exchanged occasional letters after his arrival, Garnett corresponded with many consular officers in Persia and with his old friend Archie Rose. Since their last meeting, Rose had met Professor Edward G Browne, whose views on the maintenance of



Persian independence largely became anathema to Garnett. Garnett also corresponded, often very indiscreetly, with Arnold Keppel, who was the nephew of Lady Susan Townley, whose husband, Sir Walter Townley, succeeded Barclay as minister in March 1912. Keppel, initially an honorary attaché at the legation, subsequently became *The Times*’ correspondent in Tehran.

Initially, Garnett considered Tehran inferior to Peking.<sup>13</sup> His overwhelming impression was of mud and squalor, or, as he put it, ‘the words mud and squalor repeated a hundred times almost describe it’.<sup>14</sup> Even the legation tennis court, and its high surrounding walls, where Garnett was destined to spend a good deal of time between political crises, was made of mud. And so, after a little time, the tennis balls became discoloured and almost impossible to see. Beyond the town, where Garnett would often ride, there were treeless hills rising to the higher mountains beyond. Within a week of his arrival, he had already met the British community in Tehran which included several newspaper correspondents and had attended several functions at the legation. Garnett had also called upon representatives of the other legations, and life had begun to settle into a routine which, with the exception of very busy periods, and with the addition of some swimming and gardening, persisted more or less unchanged until his departure in October 1914. As he explained to his mother, ‘My present daily routine is, breakfast at 7.30, munshi [Persian tuition] from 8 to 9, Chancery till 1 – we are frantically busy: tennis or riding in the afternoon – an occasional call will have to be paid – some Chancery from 6 to 7 & after dinner Persian & correspondence.’ This routine left little time in which to read the English papers, which arrived twice a week or to explore the legation’s excellent library.<sup>15</sup>

Garnett’s immersion into his new post was not without challenges. He confessed to his mother at the end of October, that he ‘had several days of dejection... they tell me everyone gets it here sooner or later after arrival. It all seems so squalid, uncivilized, monotonous: a perpetual wrangle was going on with my servant & the cook: one seemed so helpless & one’s efforts to learn Persian seemed so futile but I think it is all passed & that the sun is shining again.’<sup>16</sup> In fact, Garnett experienced recurring problems with his servants. He sacked his cook, who had mastered the omelette but little else soon after his arrival. Several house staff quickly followed. His manservant, notwithstanding several confrontations, persistently refused to waken him in time for his Persian studies before chancery. There were also legions of stray dogs which Garnett and others poisoned. Worse still was the insect life of Tehran, much

of which, if Garnett was to be believed, was in his rooms. There were wasps, huge hornets and biting insects in abundance. As Garnett tried to sleep, something which he found increasingly difficult because of the altitude, large house spiders would drop from the ceiling or spin webs between his bed and the wall.<sup>17</sup> The local fauna had also set its sights on him. A colony of crows or rooks had taken up residence in the trees in the legation compound and was so numerous and easily disturbed that, after his clothes were soiled one evening *en route* to a dinner, he had taken to carrying an umbrella.<sup>18</sup>

And yet, notwithstanding these difficulties, there is a sense that in Tehran Garnett was relatively contented. Despite his self-doubts, his Persian improved rapidly, and in January 1912 he passed his examination without any difficulty, thereby adding a further £100 to his salary. Also, against Oliphant's advice, he assumed the additional responsibility of dealing with commercial matters. The role was traditionally filled by one of the secretaries and, though dull, attracted a further £50 per annum. The chief responsibility was the compilation of an annual commercial report based upon information supplied by consuls throughout Persia as well as the annual administrative report of the Persian Customs which was published in the autumn.<sup>19</sup> Lastly, Garnett became head of the Chancery at the legation, a post which, among other things, entailed responsibility for communicating with the Foreign Office and with consular staff throughout Persia. This was not always a straightforward task as some officers clearly did not pull their weight.<sup>20</sup> There were social diversions too that Garnett enjoyed in the initial stages of his posting, among them entertainments provided by the Indo-European Telegraph Company and a visit to the bazaar with Lady Barclay. It was, he noted, 'a delightful place, miles & miles of a sort of Burlington Arcade but much more lovely and picturesque & more squalid! . . . the road crowded with natives, buyers, sellers & beggars: donkeys & mules laden with merchandise jostling through the mob'.<sup>21</sup>

His chief and cheffess, Sir George and Lady Barclay were also subjected to scrutiny. When writing to his mother, just weeks after his arrival, he had abandoned his resolve not to comment on the Barclays until he knew them better. Sir George was a hard worker, but he doubted his ability to obtain an embassy. This was partly due to his lack of social skills. When invited to dine, the minister habitually brought his own superior champagne in case that of his hosts impaired his digestion.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, the minister, who like Garnett suffered from insomnia, was inclined to somnolence; on one occasion, when attending a dinner at the Belgian Legation, he had to be 'screamed at to wake him up'.

Lady Barclay, though ‘desperately kind’, having showered Garnett with invitations upon his arrival, was in fact ‘a painted Jezebel’, whose infidelities had left many marks in Constantinople and Tokyo, and who, in Garnett’s view, would compromise her husband’s career, wherever he went.<sup>23</sup> On this point, Garnett was proved right.<sup>24</sup>

As previously noted, Garnett already had considerable knowledge of the volatile nature of Persian politics. Relations between Russia and the nationalists, who were openly hostile to Russian interests, deteriorated and came to a head soon after his arrival in October 1911. Developments in the remainder of Garnett’s time in Tehran did little to alter his initial impression that Persia was gripped by anarchy, a cabinet crisis occurring every few weeks, and that its future as an independent country was doubtful. The further backdrop to Persian politics and to international rivalries in Persia was the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 1907, which, as previously noted, had divided Persia into three zones. Russia’s northern zone was by far the largest, and it included Tehran. Britain’s considerably smaller zone was in the south east, and the intervening zone was to be neutral. Under the pretext of restoring order, Russia had increased its influence in its zone, such that it resembled a protectorate. Its proximity to Persia, its monopoly of trade on the Caspian Sea, and the existence of Russian rail-lines to the west of the sea and leading into Central Asia on its eastern flank, gave Russia an inherent strategic advantage. In 1903, Lord Lansdowne had declared the Persian Gulf a *mare clausum*, and Britain had valuable local allies, including the Sheikhs of Mohammerah and Kuwait. However, British naval power was of little use in the interior, and by the time of Garnett’s arrival, British rail-lines, which might have been used to project British trade and influence, were still in their early stages of development.<sup>25</sup> At least one of these, the Mohammerah–Khorramabad line, was designed to contain German commercial inroads. These had become more pressing with the Potsdam Agreement.

Whatever ability Britain had to influence events in Persia was not helped by the convoluted oversight of policy there. Ostensibly, it was the domain of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary, and of the Diplomatic and Consular Services. However, as part of the informal Indian Empire, Persia also lay within the remit of the Government of India, with its headquarters at Delhi, and the Secretary of State for India in London. The Government of India reserved the right to be consulted on Persian policy, particularly as it related to the southern and eastern parts of the country, as well as all matters pertaining to the Persian Gulf. It also nominated consuls for certain posts in Persia and

was represented there and in the Persian Gulf, by the Resident in the Persian Gulf. The latter, during Garnett's posting, was Sir Percy Cox. Suffice it to say that this administrative edifice did not always facilitate coordination of policy: nor did Russia's extensive interests in Persia and the existence of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Its politicians' reactions to British policy in Persia had particular significance, especially as during this period, Russia's ambassadors in Tehran were on balance puppets rather than the architects of policy. As a result, British diplomats in St Petersburg were routinely involved in business relating to Persia and Central Asia more generally. The evolution of policy – or more often, conflicting policies – was complicated, and the views of those on the spot in Tehran were sometimes neglected.

Throughout his time in Tehran, Garnett felt that too little was being done to resist Russia's encroachments, especially as Russia had no intention of regenerating Persia. He was aware of the constraints imposed upon British policy by the need for a strong Russian ally in Eastern Europe, capable of containing German ambitions. But when translated into policy its effect was unsatisfactory. Broadly, British policy aimed to pacify and stabilize southern Persia in order to permit a resumption of trade. This was increasingly important because of Britain's growing oil concerns. By 1911, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (formed in 1909) had built a pipeline to the Persian Gulf, together with a telegraph line and support facilities.<sup>26</sup> By the autumn of 1911, British and Russian representatives focused their attention on H. Morgan Shuster, the American financial adviser appointed by the Persian government to organize the country's finances. Although neither Britain nor Russia had interfered with his appointment, Shuster's ambitious reforms antagonized both powers, Russia especially. As Shuster had discovered, Persia's incipient lawlessness and the recurring financial crises were closely linked. His proposed remedy involved reforming the Persian Gendarmerie under Fordham's predecessor as military attaché, Major Claude Stokes. Stokes, however, was an ardent Russophobe and the Russian Government had objected strongly to his appointment. The British Government, having effectively agreed to Stokes's request to relinquish his Indian Army commission so that he might work under Shuster, then deferred to Russia's wishes and blocked his resignation, but the issue continued to poison Anglo-Russian relations.<sup>27</sup> The likelihood, in Garnett's view, was that Britain and Russia would assume dual control of Persia, dividing the neutral zone between them. This would entail considerable expenditure for Britain. Vociferous opposition to this idea arose among influential circles in London, notably Professor Browne and several distinguished

businessmen, including the Lords Newton and Lamington and other members of the Persia Committee.<sup>28</sup> The Committee, which met during 1906–10, revived in August 1911 ostensibly to stimulate interest in Persia among the British public and to maintain British imperial interests there by preserving Persia’s independence and integrity. This included criticism of Russia’s activities in the north of the country.<sup>29</sup> By contrast, Sergei Sazonov, Russia’s foreign minister from late 1910, tended to agree with Garnett’s proposed partition, and by the end of 1913 events were moving in this direction, urged, on the part of the Foreign Office, if Jennifer Siegel’s account is followed, by the need to secure oil supplies.<sup>30</sup>

Although Garnett regarded Russian ambitions in Persia with increasing suspicion, he believed Shuster had failed miserably. Specifically, Shuster had drawn support from the extreme nationalists who were then in the ascendant in Tehran, and ‘like a bull in a china shop’, and ignoring the efforts of the British and Russian legations, of the Regent and of moderate Persians, as well as vested financial and business interests, had tried to force change too rapidly.<sup>31</sup> In addition, his actions threatened to aggravate Russia and poison Anglo-Russian relations and to provoke a Russian occupation of Tehran.<sup>32</sup> Indicative of this was Shuster’s appointment of an Englishman, a Mr Haycock, as agent of the Treasurer General at Isfahan, a town which was in the Russian zone. In the meantime, after debate between the Government of India and the Foreign Office, 400 British troops had been deployed at Bushire ostensibly to strengthen the British consular escorts at Shiraz and Isfahan. Also, if the Persian government failed to restore security on the caravan roads, the force would escort caravans.<sup>33</sup> Russia had reciprocated by sending 100 men to Enzeli on the Caspian Sea to protect their consulate at Resht and by proposing a reinforcement of 200 men for its consular guard at Isfahan.<sup>34</sup>

British concerns about disorder in the south were to some extent acknowledged by the Persian government, but conditions in the north did not justify Russia’s action at Enzeli.<sup>35</sup> Less than a week later, Garnett reported an imminent crisis. The Russians had decided to force the issue of Shuster’s appointment. Shuster had enlisted a further agent in Russia’s sphere, at Tabriz, having ignored Barclay’s warnings of the likely outcome. The Gendarmerie had also been despatched to take possession of properties in and around Tehran of Shoa-es-Sultaneh, Mohammed-Ali’s brother, whose estates were deemed forfeited on account of his complicity in the latter’s efforts to regain the throne. This provoked several incidents and confrontations between Cossacks

and Shuster's gendarmerie which threatened to derail Anglo-Russian relations in Persia.<sup>36</sup> This and other matters had brought the Persian Cabinet, by then consisting of only two members, and the Regent to the point of resignation.<sup>37</sup> To Garnett, it seemed that a strong cabinet must have Shuster's backing, but as such it would be unacceptable to the Regent and to Russia.<sup>38</sup> In the following days, the atmosphere in Tehran was highly charged. Fighting seemed likely as Shuster tried to extract debts from senior Persian politicians, notably the Governor-elect of Fars, Ala-ed-Dowleh. Prices had risen sharply in Tehran and bread riots threatened. On 6 November, the Regent resigned and the British and Russian ministers formally objected to the Tabriz appointment. On 11 November, Russia issued an ultimatum, which reiterated its earlier demands – unless these were met, its troops would enter Kazvin.<sup>39</sup>

Although the British and Russian legations had cooperated during the crisis, there was evidence that the ex-Shah, Mohammed Ali, awaiting his moment to reclaim the throne, was building up stores of weaponry. Stokes, who had been officially recalled to Simla awaited the appearance of an exposé by Shuster in *The Times* of Anglo-Russian policy in Persia, in the hope, unfulfilled as events transpired, that he might still obtain his appointment. Faced with Russia's demand for apologies and the removal of gendarmes from Shoa-es-Sultaneh's property, the remaining ministers, according to Garnett, went about with their resignations in their pockets.<sup>40</sup> Four thousand Russian troops were ordered into Persia: two thousand destined for Tehran and the remainder for Kazvin. British efforts at Tehran and in St Petersburg to prevent this occurring were in vain. The Persian Cabinet was encouraged to accept Russian demands, and although it did so, further, and more extensive Russian demands followed on 29 November.<sup>41</sup> Russia demanded, among other things, Shuster's dismissal, Anglo-Russian control over the appointment of other foreigners and an indemnity.<sup>42</sup> The sense of near catastrophe persisted as the weather cooled. Garnett, who had taken to shooting the crows in the compound, did so only after warning fellow residents in case they feared a coup. Several weeks later, the Mejlis rejected the ultimatum. Political assassinations followed. The Regent was in a state of terror and was expected to seek refuge at the legation. Five thousand Russian troops were posted across North Persia at Khoi, Tabriz, Ardebil, Isfahan, Resht and Asterabad.<sup>43</sup> There were anti-Russian demonstrations in Tehran and the Cabinet was expected to resign. On Sunday 3 December, a huge procession marched to the legation gates, where speeches were made calling on the British Government to intervene.

The legation’s entrances were sealed and watched by mounted guards. The arrival of Russian troops in Tehran was expected. Amid the chaos, Garnett slipped out of the legation with his camera and made for the Mejlis which he was unable to enter; bystanders discouraged his efforts to photograph the scenes. By 5 December, the Russian Legation had increased its Cossack guard, the bazaars had closed and seditious leaflets circulated widely.<sup>44</sup> To Garnett, the Mejlis, in refusing to accept the Russian ultimatum against the wishes of the Regent and the Cabinet, would simply provoke worse demands. This proved correct. As the tension subsided, Garnett reflected that the crisis was largely due to the unreasonableness of the Persian Government, to Shuster’s provocations and to the limitations of the 1907 convention. To his mind, the creation of a neutral zone was folly, and he had registered his concerns about such an agreement some months before it was concluded.<sup>45</sup> The solution was partition. Russia must take over its zone in the north and the northern section of the neutral zone. Britain would then take the whole of the south. Rather than assume direct responsibilities in this larger area, Garnett argued that the Bakhtiaris should be established in semi-autonomy, and, as with Afghanistan, Britain should control their foreign relations.<sup>46</sup>

Garnett also considered the crisis to be partly of Britain’s making, specifically that of Sir Edward Grey, who had consented to Russia retaining troops in the north until order was restored, and whose policy Garnett considered ‘the most ignominious and cowardly’ of all the conflicting counsels.<sup>47</sup> Grey did, in fact, make representations against the further Russian demands, but these were not considered sufficiently vigorous.<sup>48</sup> However, disorder was endemic at the time, and Russia had warned of its intention to move its troops from Kazvin to Tehran if the Mejlis had not accepted its further demands by 21 December. The Ottoman authorities, anticipating the disintegration of Persia, had moved five battalions to the Persian frontier to stake its claims.<sup>49</sup> Talk at the legation was of a siege. Amid scenes of bloodletting and apparent fanaticism, Garnett and a colleague had attended the final day of the *Muharem* celebrations and had been jostled and abused by the crowds. In the event, the Mejlis, which was unable to pay the required indemnity, rejected Russia’s further demands. It was suppressed and Shuster was dismissed. This occurred after fighting between Russian and Persian forces at Tabriz, Resht and Enzeli.

To Garnett, the Foreign Office’s response was also deficient regarding endemic lawlessness in southern Persia. After an attack on the British consular escort in Fars province, the Government of India advised

evacuation of Fars and of Shiraz, a move which the India Office stopped. The latter was conscious of the impact of withdrawal from the neutral zone on British prestige and had devised a scheme for subsidizing tribal chiefs and making them responsible for opening the trade routes. This was to have been enforced by the deployment of a military force sufficient to control the Bushire–Shiraz road. The Foreign Office rejected this move, arguing instead for a smaller force which would ensure the safe evacuation of Fars.<sup>50</sup> Both Barclay and Garnett opposed evacuation and argued for the occupation of Shiraz, as the only means of preventing rival commercial enterprise.<sup>51</sup> Although that particular crisis subsided quite quickly, it left Garnett with the impression that the Foreign Office was not prepared to act robustly to uphold British interests. Furthermore, the manner in which Barclay's counsel was sidelined highlighted the extent to which the views of those on the ground were simply ignored. By late autumn, further disorder had erupted and the appointment of a new governor of Fars, Mukhber-es-Sultaneh, was of little use.<sup>52</sup>

The efforts of Garnett and of his colleagues in Tehran to encourage a stable Persian Government were challenged by the Persian government's intrigues, which were partly inspired and supported by several vocal opponents of the 1907 convention in the English press, among them Lord Strathcona, chair of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Lord Lamington, and the 'arch priest' of the 'sentimentalists', Professor Browne. Some of their criticism focused on Shuster's replacement as head of Persian finances by the Belgian, Joseph Mornard. The difficulty, as Garnett noted, was that if Mornard were ousted he would revert to his previous appointment of Administrator General of Customs, a position in which he could do much to harm British interests.

These intrigues complicated efforts by the British and Russian governments to provide an interim loan to the Persian Government, as well as to persuade the ex-Shah to leave Persia. Mohammed Ali's determination to remain, Garnett argued early in 1912, was due not to the direct support of the Russian Government but to the largely independent policies of Russian consuls in the northern zone.<sup>53</sup> Mohammed Ali was persuaded to leave Persia but his return remained a possibility. Similarly, disorder persisted in Tabriz and Meshed, where in March 1912 Russian forces bombarded the Shiite shrine of Imam Reza. Salar-ed-Dowleh continued to evade capture after an expedition was sent against him at Kermanshah. Joint British and Russian efforts to impose some stability were based around the Persian government's chronic financial situation. Negotiations for further joint subventions were linked to Persian



acceptance of a joint British/Russian note, presented in March 1912, which provided, among other things, for acceptance of the principle of the 1907 convention, and for British and Russian advice in the creation of a Persian army.<sup>54</sup> To Garnett, this seemed to have brought dual control in everything but name, but it did little to dampen political intrigues. Indeed, Garnett felt that these were endemic. The Bakhtiaris, initially so full of promise, on tasting the fleshpots of Tehran had gone to pieces. Stanislaw Poklewsky-Koziell, the Russian Minister, knew this and cultivated them assiduously, aware of the rivalry between the Bakhtiaris and Britain’s protégé, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in South West Persia, and of the strategic potential should the Bakhtiaris lose power and establish a separate kingdom in the neutral zone. Quite simply the country was beyond aid.<sup>55</sup>

As Persia teetered on the brink in the winter of 1911–12, Garnett continued to relate much detail of life at the legation. The crows with which he had battled since his arrival had sensibly taken to arriving late at night and leaving first thing in the morning to avoid Garnett’s gun. His goldfish had conceived and Garnett had attended many dinners. At these functions, the bibulous American minister, as well as the Austrian-born, grossly indiscreet and heavily bewigged wife of the Spanish Chargé, a former circus performer, continued to provide entertainment, though not sufficient for Garnett who rapidly tired of interminable rubbers of bridge.<sup>56</sup> He also attended dinners hosted regularly by the Barclays. Garnett noted that in the winter months the entire foreign population had been invited to one of these events and that he personally had attended all of them. One dinner, in January 1912, was marred by ‘a good deal of skirmishing & difficulty’, when the Persian Minister of War was asked to escort Lady Barclay into dinner. Unfortunately, the minister was unfamiliar with European ways and misinterpreted the situation, and dignity was only restored by permitting him to walk into dinner hand in hand with Lady Barclay.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, the activities of Lady Barclay, as with her successor, Lady Susan Townley fascinated and horrified Garnett. According to Garnett, Lady Barclay had brought disgrace to the British Legation at Tehran, having married her daughter to the third secretary, Kennard, who had been sent to Tehran while a divorce, the result of an indiscretion on his part, was taking place in England. The situation worsened when Kennard’s former *amoure* pursued him to Tehran. Kennard had only evaded her clutches by escaping through a window and by leaving on a hunting trip. His ex-wife remained, and amid ‘violent scenes’, circulated her grievances to the entire diplomatic community.<sup>58</sup> The full nature of Lady Barclay’s

transgressions do not emerge clearly in Garnett's letters, but his repeated references to her as a 'Jezebel' and to her décolleté ways leave little doubt that he considered her behaviour unbecoming of a minister's wife.

Garnett's irreverence was also directed towards the Shah, whom he met at a Grand Salaam in March 1912. Garnett described him as being well under 5 feet in height, 'enormously fat' yet only 14 years of age. Such was his girth that Garnett expected he would burst if he continued to grow at his current rate.<sup>59</sup> The final weeks of Barclay's time in Tehran were marked by farewell functions. At one of these, a luncheon, Garnett recalled, the party was grossly overfed; the meal culminated in a dish heaped with rice, 'which tasted as if it had been washed in a dirty bag, meat, condiments, and a raw egg on top', which the party was expected to devour with 'filthy' cutlery.<sup>60</sup>

Although Garnett had frequently criticized Barclay, and his wife especially, he had a grudging respect for him and for his knowledge of Persian politics. Garnett considered the sudden notification of his transfer to Bucharest to be entirely unfair but typical of the Foreign Office. His proposed replacement, Sir Walter Townley, had, in Garnett's view, little or no knowledge of Persia, unlike Charles Marling and Hugh O'Beirne, both of whom had been overlooked.<sup>61</sup> The timing was particularly unfortunate as Russia had just perpetrated further excesses at Tabriz and Meshed. Russian officials on the ground, as Barclay realized, often paid little heed to moderating edicts from St Petersburg.<sup>62</sup> But precisely who did control policy was often unclear.<sup>63</sup> As Garnett was soon reminded, Townley did, however, have a very forceful wife. They had met briefly in Constantinople, where her husband had served as councillor in 1904–5. There, although she had helped with Chancery work, she had irritated Garnett by interfering with his arrangements for the Dorcas Ball, when she was appointed its vice-president.<sup>64</sup> When in Peking, he noted her intrigues and gossip in Washington, in connection with Sir Mortimer Durand's recall.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, if Garnett's account is to be believed, it was Lady Susan's indiscretions which ultimately ended his diplomatic career.

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The arrival of the Townleys in April 1912 coincided with renewed intrigues against the Regent and the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vosuk-ed-Dowleh, resigned briefly but was persuaded to resume office. Mornard's appointment was also due for discussion. Elsewhere in Persia, Russian forces were despatched to Hamadan which

was threatened by rebels under Salar-ed-Dowleh at Kermanshah. Salar, it seems, had succumbed to personal ambition to obtain the throne, and, after an unsuccessful military encounter against a Bakhtiari and Armenian force, he had announced his intention to attack Tehran.<sup>66</sup> In trying to keep order in the provinces, Garnett likened himself and his colleagues to Sisyphus; the prestige of the central government was non-existent.<sup>67</sup> The appointment of an inexperienced minister would not help. Their efforts were also undermined by the rapid disappearance of the joint subvention to the Persian Government of March 1912. Neither Grey nor his Russian counterpart, Sazonov was willing to advance a substantial amount. A further cabinet crisis followed which strengthened the Bakhtiari hold on government but did not notably increase political stability. Work in the afternoon could not begin until after 4 pm because of the heat. In anticipation of the move to the cooler air of Gulhek, the round of socializing seemed even more tedious, even if Garnett was spared some of it on account of severe toothache.<sup>68</sup>

He was unable to avoid a banquet held at the Palace early in May. As he recalled, it was ‘an orgy of horrible food & wine and must have cost the bankrupt Persian Govt a mint of (unpaid) money... The fish smelt so horribly that few except the Persians (& the Russians who are still barbarians) could allow it to approach them.’<sup>69</sup> The move to Gulhek was also welcome because Garnett had been reminded of his strong dislike of Lady Susan Townley. According to Garnett, she was still a ‘shrew’, very critical and interfering. She had persistently cursed Lady Barclay ‘for selling [her] such dirty old furniture’ at exorbitant rates. In doing so no consideration was given to Lady Barclay’s daughter, Lady Kennard. She had revealed her complete ignorance of eastern affairs by suggesting that the gendarmes guarding the legation gates might be given a treat of bread and butter. Amid the mosquitoes, sandflies, wasps, and the discovery of a poisonous snake in his garden, Garnett was relieved when the legation packed and moved to Gulhek. There, his house was the most northerly in the compound, and had a delightful evening breeze from the mountains, as well as unlimited cold drinking water. On his arrival, he found the garden full of hoopoes, blue jays, owls, swallows and woodpeckers and every bit the ‘kind of paradise’ that he had anticipated on a brief visit in the autumn.

Typically, the social life of the foreign diplomatic community was less intense during the summer months. Admittedly, there were the Gulhek races in September, but the legations ran very few functions. One exception was the Russian minister, Poklewsky’s ‘at homes’ on Sunday afternoons which involved tennis, bridge and gossip. Though

irksome at times, Garnett fished for information among the Russians.<sup>70</sup> Soon after the move to Gulhek the Regent had fled Persia for Europe leading to renewed intrigues by Mohammed Ali, who, assisted by Russia, returned to Persia.<sup>71</sup> At Gulhek, there was more time for his Persian lessons. Garnett was anxious to make progress in order to facilitate a winter trip to the interior. There was also much time for swimming, walking, a great deal of tennis and even for some work. By electing not to participate in the annual legation trip to the Lar Valley, about 36 hours from Gulhek, Garnett was spared the 'piercing screams' of the Townley baby, at least for three weeks, and could enjoy the greater privacy afforded by the layout of the compound there.

But Lady Susan could not be avoided indefinitely, and Garnett's letters make frequent reference to her increasingly petulant and critical nature. According to Garnett, when the Townleys arrived in Tehran, she had refused to pay courtesy visits to the wives of other ministers, even though it would have taken two hours in total. She had insisted on a prolonged trip to the Lar Valley even though her husband's absence had affected British interests and created a huge backlog of work on his return.<sup>72</sup> By the beginning of September, Lady Susan's nerves had gone to pieces. Her cook sent up 'filthy dinners' because of her constant nagging. Garnett continued, 'all dinner time she wrangles with the servants about every conceivable thing: either the lamps are wrong, or the soup is high, or else the servants themselves are'.<sup>73</sup> Towards the end of September, however, they had 'developed quite a friendship'; Lady Susan confessed to Garnett that on her arrival she had taken a 'violent dislike to him' because he shaved his head. Garnett, for his part, was prepared to try to get along simply because, as he explained to his mother, they would be living in the same compound for at least another year, and because she was one of the 'petticoats' who had considerable influence at the Foreign Office.<sup>74</sup> If nothing else, to Garnett's delight, Lady Susan had delayed the legation's return to Tehran until the middle of October so that the legation house could be redecorated to a satisfactory standard.<sup>75</sup>

Garnett had also developed some respect for Sir Walter, whom he now felt understood the Anglo-Russian *entente* better than his predecessor. In anticipation of discussions between Sir Edward Grey and Sazonov about the future of Persia, and having first notified Poklewsky, Townley had telegraphed to London stating that there was no desire in Tehran for Mohammed Ali's resumption of the throne. Instead, Townley, to Garnett's satisfaction, had proposed a two-way split of Persia.<sup>76</sup> In the event this policy was not adopted when the discussions occurred at

Balmoral, although Sazonov did not entirely accept this, and Garnett felt bitterly let down by the Foreign Office. Grey firmly resisted the ex-Shah’s return but was unwilling to compromise policy *vis-a-vis* Germany, or run the risk of splitting the Liberal Party, by pressing for partition, notwithstanding pressure from within the Foreign Office itself to adopt a more accommodating policy towards Russia.<sup>77</sup>

On their return from Gulhek, Tehran was in upheaval. Salar-ed-Dowleh threatened to occupy it. Poklewsky, who was due to go on leave and was in Garnett’s view itching to see Russian troops enter Tehran, had telegraphed the Russian general at Kazvin to hold his troops in readiness. Some Russian troops, capitalizing on events in Tehran, had already occupied territory near Urumiah. Elsewhere in Persia there was further evidence of Poklewsky’s intrigues. Amongst other things, he had insisted on the recall of the Governor General of Isfahan and his replacement with ‘an old dodderer’, Ala-ul-Mulk. The latter had requested an escort of 150 Persian Cossacks, with Russian officers, and Garnett feared that their influence would seep into the neutral zone and undermine British trade there. Poklewsky had demanded Townley’s support for the appointment with the Bakhtiari-led central government. The risk was that whatever Townley did the government would perceive Russia to be the dominant power, thereby injuring British prestige. To Garnett, Poklewsky was merely trying to salvage his reputation with the Russian Foreign Ministry, which felt that he had sacrificed Russia’s interests by withholding his support for Mohammed Ali’s return.<sup>78</sup> In the meantime, the Persian Government had instituted martial law and preparations were undertaken for a siege. Briefly, an attack seemed imminent and passage through the streets of Tehran at night was by password only.<sup>79</sup> As the crisis passed and Salar-ed-Dowleh moved into north-eastern Persia, Poklewsky and Townley co-operated to have Saad-ed-Dowleh, the Russian favourite to replace the Regent, appointed prime minister.<sup>80</sup> This, however, did not occur despite the increasing unpopularity of the Bakhtiari cabinet. During this time, Garnett was kept busy completing his commercial report. He hoped that the appointment of a vice-consul at Hamadan, and the construction of a railway line between Mohammerah and Khoremabad, would also stabilize the north of the country.<sup>81</sup>

Although in political terms the winter of 1912–13 was relatively quiet in Tehran, gossip, rumour and boredom were rife among the *corps diplomatique*. Garnett’s relationship with Lady Susan Townley hit one of several troughs, and she attempted to have him replaced. Early in December, he reported her excesses at a local wedding, where it had

transpired that the groom did not have a best man. She had dragooned Garnett into filling the role and had proceeded to organize the seating plan for the *corps diplomatique* with her at its head, greeting the guests as if she were the host.<sup>82</sup> In January, the 'spiteful shrew' took to her bed for a day and would not speak to him. Garnett had also to thwart her efforts to gatecrash a party organized by the Russian Legation for Russian expatriates in Tehran as well as for foreigners in their employment. As Garnett evoked her displeasure, rumours began to spread of his impending transfer.<sup>83</sup> According to Garnett, she had poisoned relations with the Russian Legation. Also, neither the Austrian nor the Italian Ministers would come near the British Legation because Lady Susan had manufactured a dispute over the chairs in the Roman Catholic Church. Her departure for several months in the spring of 1913 provided respite, but on her return, in the company of Lady Kennard, she had resumed her previous ways. On Garnett's suggestion, and much to his subsequent regret, she had brought a croquet set from England, and insisted on playing every day. As he noted, the games invariably ended in recriminations and tears, as she invented rules as she went along. Such was Garnett's growing irritation that one evening he told her that she would make an excellent ambassadress in Berlin as her character was so much akin to the Kaiser's.<sup>84</sup> Later in August, he reported having had 'an awful row' with Lady Susan over a game of croquet to the extent that the Ambassador had had to intervene.<sup>85</sup> Sir Walter confided to Garnett that he had given up playing himself because she would cry 'bucket's full' whenever he won, which he invariably did.<sup>86</sup> Lady Susan's temper improved marginally when she began to raise chicks with an incubator brought from England. However, she tried to sell the eggs which resulted from this enterprise to her cook at London prices, which the latter understandably refused to pay. As Garnett recorded, the fuss was only settled when the cook and nearly all the house servants were summoned to the Minister's study, where he and Garnett were discussing 'a question of really great political importance', and Townley, 'long-suffering & over-worked', fixed a price.<sup>87</sup>

At Gulhek, in the summer of 1913, when not avoiding Lady Susan, Garnett began work in his pyjamas at 5.30 am, breaking in the afternoon for some reading – Shakespeare or Morley's *Life of Gladstone* – followed by swimming and tennis. This peaceful and pleasant existence was spoilt to some extent by the local wildlife, including the depredations of a large porcupine, which, on its eventual capture, Garnett suggested returning to London in the diplomatic bag. There was an infestation of very large spiders, and he routinely despatched twenty

a day, leaving the walls of his house spattered with their corpses.<sup>88</sup> More worryingly, he had caught three tarantulas. The last, he noted, ‘was careering wildly over the floor towards my bed’. Although he had taken the precaution of removing his floor rugs, the better to see their approach, they preferred to drop from the ceiling.<sup>89</sup>

Tarantulas and porcupines aside, the summer of 1913 at Gulhek afforded Garnett time to reflect on the organization of work in the legation. During the winter of 1911–12, he had found the burden of work intolerable. Formerly, chancery work had been undertaken by two unmarried secretaries who shared quarters, and a consular assistant, who worked mornings only and studied for his examination in the afternoons. From 1911, however, and despite Garnett’s protests to Barclay and Townley, there was no consular assistant, and as a married man, Kennard’s contribution to the workload was limited. Only the absence of social life in the summer months, and his habit of working very early in the morning, had enabled Garnett to keep on top of his work at Gulhek. This was not possible in Tehran, because of regular bridge, riding, tennis and dinner parties. Garnett had enlisted the help of Fordham’s successor as military attaché, Dick Steel and of Arnold Keppel, but the Foreign Office had repeatedly defaulted on the provision of a consular assistant and a replacement for Kennard.<sup>90</sup> Kennard, according to Garnett, ‘cares as little in his fifth year in Persia as he doubtless did a year before he ever came here’.<sup>91</sup> Not only had Garnett to assume much of his work but also, often unbeknown to the Foreign Office, he had periodically to deputize for Townley when the latter went on shooting trips. Garnett had also developed reservations about his oversight of commercial matters. The task of writing the report involved a digression from his customary focus on political issues. He did not have enough time to deal with it and ended up repeating information available elsewhere. An annual commercial report on Tehran and its environs compiled by a consular assistant was required.<sup>92</sup> Relief from the insect life, from Lady Susan, and from a further cabinet crisis, which had broken the power of the Bakhtiaris in Tehran, came in mid-September, with an opportunity to accompany a detachment of the Swedish-officered gendarmerie to Isfahan.

Garnett’s journey to the south of Persia lasted just over ten weeks, and as he expected to leave Tehran in the spring, he wished to see something of the country. The Gendarmerie hoped to organize a force on the Kerman–Bunder Abbas road. They were also due to take over part of the Bushire–Shiraz road in the autumn, and once posts had been established at Isfahan and Yezd, there would be two policed roads

in the south. Garnett hoped that this would help to improve trade. In the years prior to Garnett's arrival, Russia had increased its lead in the import and export markets.<sup>93</sup> With its monopoly of shipping on the Caspian and railroads running west and east from it, this was hardly surprising. Besides shedding a good deal of weight on his trip, Garnett found renewed lust for the 'open road'.<sup>94</sup> The trip to Isfahan was undertaken in the safety, but also in the searing heat, of the daytime and on horseback. Garnett considered Isfahan to be a hundred times more attractive than Tehran, and he marvelled at the frescoes on the Ali Kapu Gate. From there, he proceeded to Yezd and then to Kerman, without his escort. At both places, he met the small British communities and discussed means of stabilizing local conditions and of preventing robbery. Although Garnett had planned to extend his trip to the North-East, this proved impossible. He had, for the most part, high hopes for the Gendarmerie, and rightly so, in view of the continued expansion of their operations.<sup>95</sup> However, by way of an insurance policy, and in case the Gendarmerie failed to restore order, the legation supported the deployment of British officers to Bakhtiariistan and the use of Bakhtiaris in support of the Gendarmerie. His opinions about the future of Persia in the autumn of 1913 were generally more optimistic than before, not least because Bakhtiari power was then less unrestrained.<sup>96</sup>

There were indeed still many indications of incipient decay and of Russian opportunism. Despite the prohibition on foreigners owning Persian land, Russians had purchased one-third of Azerbaijan. Seventeen thousand Russian troops were posted in the northern zone by the autumn of 1913, and Garnett could see little prospect of a pliant Mejlis which would avoid provoking Russia and encouraging a further extension of its influence.<sup>97</sup> Russian oil imported via Askhabad and Meshed was also capturing many markets and undermining foreign rivals. Garnett and others at the legation worked tirelessly to resist Russian encroachments, which became more pronounced with the arrival of the new Russian minister, Ivan Korostovetz. Garnett took an almost instant dislike to him, noting his 'sly & depraved' appearance. His career in Tehran was expected to be short.<sup>98</sup> During the winter of 1913–14, Russian agents in the north continued to obstruct the collection of taxes and to resist the deployment of Swedish Gendarmerie there. Instead they pressed for the appointment of a Cossack Brigade at Kermanshah. Garnett felt that the Foreign Office did not understand the significance of resisting this and that the Gendarmerie would therefore probably fail and Persia would be partitioned.<sup>99</sup> The Foreign Office for a time refused to advance funds to support the Gendarmerie, and



though the impecunious Persian Government was willing to contribute, in practice it was difficult to see how it could do so.<sup>100</sup> Garnett, to his credit, continually pressed the point and had even discussed with A. O. Wood of the Imperial Bank of Persia the possibility of advancing funds to the Persian Government in anticipation of customs receipts in the northern zone, a solution which he knew the Foreign Office would resist.<sup>101</sup> He also worked tirelessly with his colleagues at the legation, and against the obstruction of the Persian foreign ministry, to obtain a mining concession at Kerman which would provide revenues.

In early 1914, both he and Townley believed that a more forceful stand would have ensured the continuation of the *entente* but would also have stopped further Russian depredations.<sup>102</sup> The problem, as Townley noted, was that the Foreign Office preferred to rely upon Russian assurances ‘rather than to believe the reports of eye-witnesses who can bear unprejudiced testimony to the fact that these assurances are rendered valueless by the actions of their agents on the spot’. Interestingly, unlike the Foreign Office, Townley did not believe that the problem lay with Russian consuls. They were simply working for promotion and did what they believed would please their superiors.<sup>103</sup> On the issue of the Gendarmerie, in June, there was speculation about its future. An article in *The Times*, which Garnett clearly felt to be inspired, suggested that the force had failed, and it was anticipated that the Swedish officers would be replaced by British officers. This would allow Russia to further consolidate its hold on the north and, most probably, to occupy Tehran.<sup>104</sup> Also, the Gendarmerie had encountered setbacks in Kazerun and had been publicly criticized for heavy-handedness.<sup>105</sup> The Russians had tried to exclude it from the northern zone from the spring of 1913, seeking to use the Cossack Brigade instead, the latter having become a Russianizing force.<sup>106</sup>

There was further evidence of Russia’s ambitions in abundance. Towards the end of March 1914, Townley had left Garnett in charge at Tehran. However, Garnett was already covering the work of two secretaries, as Kennard had by then left Tehran, with only some help from Dick Steel, the Military Attaché. In Townley’s absence, Korostovetz, acting through the opponents of the Interior Minister, Ain ed Dowleh, had tried to secure the latter’s removal at two cabinet meetings held on 26 and 28 March. Garnett had intervened personally to prevent this as Ain was seen as reliable and as a British protégé. To Garnett, Russian interference on this occasion simply reinforced the view that Russia wished to thwart Persia’s development.<sup>107</sup> As Garnett noted, on Townley’s return to Tehran, Korostovetz had visited him and threatened that unless

Ain was dismissed he would refuse to recognize him and would ensure the continuing obstruction of his consuls in the north to the Persian Government.<sup>108</sup> Garnett, and by inference, Townley were unequivocal, and also substantially correct, in blaming Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, for the manifestly Russophile direction of British policy.<sup>109</sup> In May–June 1914 Russia, according to Garnett, was pressing Britain on the issue of the Trans-Persian Railway, which was to traverse Persia from Julfa in the north to the Indian frontier. Continuing opposition to the linkage of the line with the Indian railway systems among Indian military circles had caused bad feeling on Sazonov's part.<sup>110</sup> It was not clear if the Persian Government would permit Russia to construct its section of the line in the northern zone even though Britain had supported this, albeit with various caveats.<sup>111</sup> Its financial impoverishment on the eve of the Shah's coronation would make it vulnerable to pressure on the issue.<sup>112</sup>

In spite of these frustrations, life in Persia still had some attractions for Garnett. He had added a summer house to his garden in Tehran and had some French windows installed in his house. He also derived pleasure from researching a report on education, which required him to visit a number of schools, including the American Boys School, where it was hoped to introduce Swedish gymnastics, something which Garnett hoped would increase sympathy for the Swedish Gendarmerie. The social antics of the *corps diplomatique* also sustained him. As he told Oliphant in May 1914, the Russian Legation ladies now consisted of the minister's wife, or 'that second hand little housemaid', 'whose sad story before marriage is still the chief item of gossip in Peking', and the English wife of an attaché, 'who danced or sang at a Manchester music hall before marriage'. The secret assignations of Mademoiselle Korostovetz's companion were also the subject of comment.<sup>113</sup>

As the political situation in Europe in the summer of 1914 deteriorated, evidence of Russian ambitions in northern Persia abounded. These ambitions were facilitated by the increasingly precarious state of Persia's finances, especially after the Shah's coronation.<sup>114</sup> By early August, the future of the Gendarmerie was critical, and Garnett considered the only remaining source of revenue to be the sale to Britain of some islands in the Persian Gulf, an idea which the legation had suggested to Sir Edward Grey and to the Persian Government. Relations between the Russian and British Legations had worsened and Korostovetz's superiors held him responsible for this. Korostovetz had then spoken with Townley who, overlooking the minister's complicity in Ain's removal from office denied any personal grudge but complained

about Russia's contravention of the Anglo-Russian Convention by virtue of its policy in Azerbaijan. Korostovetz promised to alter this, but Garnett suspected that Vasilii Klemm, the head of the Persian section of the Russian Foreign Ministry, might have other ideas. Furthermore, although Sazonov had given assurances about the behaviour of Russia's consuls in Persia, Garnett doubted his ability to control them.<sup>115</sup>

The outbreak of war in August 1914 diverted attention from events in Persia and from discussions that had occurred in London and St Petersburg about the revision of the 1907 convention. Many of the issues affecting Anglo-Russian relations were effectively shelved until after the war. Garnett's workload diminished and, as he felt isolated from the war, his own ambitions drifted towards military service or some other role in England in which he might make a more direct contribution. The international community in Tehran was also depleted; nearly all French, German and Austrian subjects had departed. The Swedish officers on the active list were recalled. Dealings with foreigners had become less comfortable, and as Garnett noted, before speaking 'one has to stop & think twice whether he is an enemy or not'.<sup>116</sup> Garnett's suspicions of Russia did not diminish either, and he predicted that the boost to Russia's fortunes afforded by the suppression of German militarism might ultimately require Britain to attack her.<sup>117</sup> More immediate was the possibility of Russia attacking Turkey or of Turkish forces invading Persian territory in order to spread holy war. German propaganda was rife and because of Russia's depredations in Persia, Germany was widely supported. In September 1914, besides the customary worries about Russia's behaviour, attention focused on the possible entry of Turkey into the war and the concern that it might also drag Persia in.<sup>118</sup>

Garnett's time in Tehran was generally one of optimism. He eagerly anticipated the retirement of senior colleagues so that his name might climb the list of second secretaries. A posting in Peking or Constantinople, or in Western Europe or in Scandinavia, would be congenial. Wherever it was, he expected to be a first secretary. The ultimate prospect of becoming minister in Peking seemed feasible. He had a valuable ally in Lancelot Oliphant, who had pointed out his good political sense as well as his efficient oversight of chancery work to William Tyrrell and Eyre Crowe. Despite his early reservations about Sir Walter Townley, he came to respect him even if he did not always appreciate his absences on shooting trips. Townley quite clearly felt that he could rely upon Garnett as a loyal and intelligent advocate of a more robust policy. Quite suddenly, however, and through no apparent fault on his

part, Garnett's fortunes, and his relationship with Townley, changed. Although its repercussions could not be foreseen, a seemingly trivial occurrence ensured that he would never rise to the heights of the Diplomatic Service.

Garnett's rather difficult relationship with Lady Townley has already been noted. When so inclined she spent time in his company – her pet name for him was 'Pompey' – and Dick Steel, the Military Attaché, 'True-as'. On or about 8 July 1914, on a car journey from Gulhek to Tehran, she made sexual advances towards Steel. As Garnett recalled in one letter, 'Lady Susan attacked, was rebuffed, attacked again on other lines, asked for friendship & then explained what she meant by friendship.'<sup>119</sup> Steel, a loyal married man, repelled these advances. Lady Susan told her husband what had happened. Townley, in order to protect his wife, sent Steel home in disgrace. The reverberations of this incident rumbled on as the situation in Europe worsened. Steel confided in his brother, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, and wrote anguished letters to Garnett, who supported him discreetly. Although Garnett's return to London in October 1914 was ostensibly on grounds of health, as he had suffered recurring bouts of fever in July, Townley, who recommended him highly to the Foreign Office, where Garnett wanted to work, had apparently insisted that he leave and there is a clear implication in his correspondence with Steel that his posting had been cut short because of the incident with Lady Townley.<sup>120</sup> Townley, though commending Garnett for his 'zeal, intelligence and industry', and noting that he had given 'entire satisfaction in the discharge of his public duties', suggested that as he had now served at Tehran for over three years, and as his health had suffered for several months, he supposed he would not return.<sup>121</sup>

In a fuller account of the incident which Garnett wrote in 1952, at the age of 74, he noted that Lady Susan's morals 'were basically farm-yard though less so than those of her predecessor'. Some weeks after Steel's departure, Arnold Keppel returned to Tehran and, assuming that he would not betray any confidences to his aunt, Lady Townley, whom he disliked intensely, Garnett had told him about her advances towards Steel. Keppel duly told Sir Walter who insisted that Garnett go on leave. On his return to London, as Garnett recalled, he was instrumental in having the Townleys recalled: 'A sort of ding dong warfare went on between the Townleys & myself & eventually Townley told the Foreign Office of the episode in Persia & how he had sent me home for "disloyalty to him." This black mark proved my eventual diplomatic ruin.' One consolation, however, had been to watch Lady Susan ruin her husband's career, when he was minister at The Hague.<sup>122</sup> The incident had

great personal significance for Garnett and he clearly found it difficult to forget. Besides his 1952 notes, he had previously added to his account in 1939 and again in 1946. Although in 1939 he recorded that on his death his detailed diary account of the incident should be destroyed, either his wish was ignored or he changed his mind and left separate instructions to this effect.

# 6

## London, Sofia and Athens, and the ‘Episode of the “Floating Bag” ’

On his return from Tehran, Garnett decided not to take any leave. For some time he had hankered to be at the centre of things, ideally in a trench somewhere in France, but failing that, at the Foreign Office. There, he had established a good reputation for himself and had important allies such as Oliphant, who had commented positively on his work as head of chancery in Tehran. Initially, Garnett was posted to the Parliamentary Department, where telegrams incoming and outgoing were deciphered and ciphered. Though depressed by the ‘drudgery’ of the work, he was able to read telegrams on a very wide range of subjects.<sup>1</sup> The department worked round the clock, in three shifts, and, after a brief experience of the evening shift, Garnett joined the 8.00 am to 4.00 pm shift.<sup>2</sup> His instruction to the office juniors to open the bags promptly enabled him to delay his arrival until 9.00 am: hardly Foreign Office hours, but an improvement nevertheless. It was a short walk from the Hotel Jules on Jermyn Street, where he stayed initially, and then from his new rooms on neighbouring Bury Street to his desk at the Foreign Office, overlooking the Horse Guards Parade. From there he listened to bands playing endless renditions of ‘It’s a long way to Tipperary’, and, not untypically, wished he was somewhere else.<sup>3</sup>

Garnett found the Parliamentary Department to be chaotic and he longed to re-organize it: the men on the night shift were too tired to work properly. When war broke out, it was completely ill-equipped for the huge increase in telegraphic communications and volunteers were solicited. Though ‘delightful fellows’, they hardly knew which end of a cipher to use. Among them was one Verney, a groom-in-waiting to the King in the morning, and a cipher clerk in the evening. Another colleague had been an honorary attaché at Dresden and Washington and had twice tried and failed for Parliament. He was ‘equally useless’

in the Parliamentary Department. In Garnett's shift there was an MP, Bobby Harcourt, brother of Sir Louis Harcourt, who also manned an anti-zeppelin gun, and whom Garnett suspected of using the information gleaned in the Foreign Office for political purposes.<sup>4</sup>

Working in the only department in the office which saw all telegrams, incoming and outgoing, including those denied to Cabinet members on grounds of secrecy, Garnett's horizons broadened, and he began to comment and to speculate widely, and very indiscreetly, on international affairs in his correspondence. He was very preoccupied with Russia's projected gains, as well as with the inevitability of an Anglo-Russian war, unless Germany were so convincingly defeated as to preclude any threat from a Russo-German alliance after the war.<sup>5</sup> He predicted correctly that Britain would substantially increase its Middle Eastern possessions. He also commented at length on the possibility of Greece, Bulgaria and Romania entering the war, as well as wider aspects of Balkan affairs, and speculated, not always consistently, on the likelihood of German aggression after the war.<sup>6</sup> Bulgaria, which rapidly became the lynchpin in the Balkan situation, had in July 1914, under extraordinary circumstances, obtained a substantial loan from Germany, and it still had a strong army.<sup>7</sup> As such, and in view of its determination to regain territories lost to neighbouring countries in the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, which had ended the Second Balkan War, the Central Powers and the Allies alike sought Bulgaria's loyalties and its participation in the war. The principal territories concerned were Southern Dobrudja, ceded to Romania, Cavalla, ceded to Greece and most of Macedonia, which had gone to Serbia and Greece and which was divided into a contested zone and an uncontested zone.<sup>8</sup> Greece, under King Constantine I, whose wife was a sister of Kaiser Wilhelm, consistently spurned Allied approaches and from an early stage in the war, the difficulties in obtaining territorial concessions from Bulgaria's neighbours were apparent.<sup>9</sup> In December 1914, an Allied offer to Bulgaria of undefined territorial compensation in Macedonia, as well as Thrace to the Enos-Midia line, in exchange for its continued neutrality, was rejected.<sup>10</sup> Like Bulgaria, Romania was torn between the pro-German sympathies of its king, Carol I, and the pro-Allied sentiments of its people. As the immediacy of the German threat increased in the summer and autumn of 1915, there were indications that Bulgaria's attitude would be vitally affected by Romania's allegiances. If Romania sided with the Allies then Bulgaria would be cut off from the Central Powers and the impossibility of siding with them would be apparent.<sup>11</sup> Of the Balkan powers, only Serbia was beligerent and by the winter of 1914–15 was attempting to stem Austrian

advances. The difficulty of reconciling these competing claims, and of marrying Balkan policy with the aims of Italy and Russia, was not lost on policy makers. Indeed it induced an element of lethargy and fatalism, albeit one tinged with realism in the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey.<sup>12</sup> This persisted until the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers in October 1915, the deployment of an Allied force in Salonica, and the subsequent abandonment of the Dardanelles Campaign.

Besides routine telegrams, Garnett also handled intelligence material which was forwarded to the Admiralty and War Office. Although much of it proved to be false, it gave him and his colleagues 'a temporary thrill', and the illusion of being at the centre of things.<sup>13</sup> Domestic and imperial affairs were also of interest. Surprisingly, perhaps, in view of his Conservative leanings, Garnett argued that Ireland should be allowed self-government. He argued for an imperial parliament with representatives from all parts of the empire, to discuss imperial matters. Further, he suggested a home rule parliament for England and others for Scotland and Wales, in all of which women should be represented. Garnett was also keen on some form of compulsory military training after the war to prepare the country for national emergencies.<sup>14</sup>

These speculations were cut short when, just a few weeks after joining the Parliamentary Department, on 23 November he moved to the Contraband Department. The latter, a war-time creation, under assistant under-secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe, gained a reputation as a waiting room for those awaiting a vacancy overseas.<sup>15</sup> Its genesis lay in the need to prevent goods reaching the enemy via neutral countries. Garnett felt hopelessly lost, as no one had troubled to explain the work to him or to other temporary members of staff. He felt that even those who had worked in it since its inception appeared to know little about it: a view which is inconsistent with one recent assessment of Crowe's oversight of the department.<sup>16</sup> Consequently, Garnett drifted, picking up bits of information as and when he could, feeling slightly redundant and unsure as to when he should attend, there being no fixed hours.<sup>17</sup> If nothing else, there was time to visit his grandmother and aunt in Weybridge, to see his sister Phyllis occasionally and to catch up with friends, among them Arnold Wilson. Also, while Garnett detected a complete lack of system in the Contraband Department, he was keen to use the opportunity of being in the Foreign Office to impress his superiors. At least some of his contributions on contraband work appeared to strike a chord.<sup>18</sup> He hoped for an inexpensive post somewhere in



Western Europe in the following autumn. The possibility of Mexico, which was then available, did not appeal.<sup>19</sup>

Early in 1915 the Contraband Department became much busier and Garnett seldom left the office before 8 pm. There was only time for the Foreign Office, the newspapers and an occasional visit to men's and boys' clubs in the East End.<sup>20</sup> There Garnett found a reassuring patriotic spirit, in which he rejoiced, and much less evidence of the promiscuity and drunkenness of the night-time West End, which somehow seemed 'not quite right'.<sup>21</sup> But these trials were short-lived. In late February 1915, Garnett was summoned by Theo Russell and was offered Madrid or Bucharest. Garnett refused both and was offered and accepted Sofia.<sup>22</sup> The latter was a compliment as he would almost certainly have to act as chargé. As he reported to his mother on 5 March, he was to meet Lady Bax-Ironside, his prospective chefess in a few days time. 'The operation w[ould] be a sort of veterinary one on both sides.'<sup>23</sup>

\* \* \*

Within a few weeks Garnett had arrived in Sofia. His journey, via Paris, Lausanne, Milan, Brindisi, Athens and Salonica had provided opportunity for sightseeing and some anxious waiting as efforts were made to locate his heavy luggage, which was lost at Brindisi. In Athens, he had enjoyed various archaeological excursions with, among others, George (later Sir George) Rendel, attaché at the British legation. As he recalled, on arriving at the legation he was greatly struck by the ignorance in which the minister, Sir Francis Elliot, was kept by the Foreign Office. Garnett's recent posting to the Foreign Office had acquainted him with Britain's contingent offer to Russia of Constantinople after the war. The minister, on the other hand, could obtain no clarification on the point.<sup>24</sup> He found Salonica as squalid as it had been in 1909, when he passed through it *en route* to Bucharest. In March 1915, the only entertainment was a dinner for the one-armed General Pau and his wooden-legged Aide-de-Camp.<sup>25</sup> But for the many Greek officers it was distinctly Ottoman, with shoe blacks, water carriers and Turkish hammams.<sup>26</sup> The journey north, through 'charming wooded valleys', the limestone gorges between Nish and Pirot, and the scenery surrounding Sofia, was delightful.

Arrangements were made for Garnett to have rooms at the Hotel de Bulgarie, which was a popular haunt of fellow diplomats, near the British Legation. Regrettably, the legation had been built in Sofia's dirty

outskirts in the expectation that it would duly expand in that direction. This had yet to occur and Garnett felt isolated as a result. His first weeks were spent calling on friendly legations and touring the local countryside, often with the minister, Sir Henry Bax-Ironside. Some of his spare time was spent at a club in Sofia, much frequented by foreign diplomats including Germans and Austrians. The potential awkwardness created by Bulgaria's neutral status was overcome by separate dining tables and the atmosphere remained tolerable.<sup>27</sup> Besides colleagues at the legation, there were only three other Britons in Sofia and, though Garnett would undoubtedly have complained bitterly had there been a large expatriate community, he was rather lonely. Bax-Ironside, though pleasant, was by common consent a buffoon and had managed to bore Garnett deeply on their first meeting. He provided a degree of entertainment but never redeemed himself in Garnett's eyes.<sup>28</sup> Letters seemed to take forever to arrive, especially in the diplomatic bag, productions at Sofia's only theatre were in Bulgarian, and Garnett consoled himself with bridge, baccarat and musical evenings, mostly at the Russian Legation, which he later termed 'a regular gaming hell'. His knowledge of Russian enabled him to make rapid progress in Bulgarian and he was soon able to translate articles in the local press.<sup>29</sup>

Although Sofia had few social distractions it offered much of political interest. In 1913 a coalition government had been formed under Vasil Radoslavoff, who, besides being Minister President, also became Minister of the Interior. His, soon-to-be ousted, foreign minister Ghenadieff was leader of the pro-Russian Stambulov party, which, though divided, had some influence within the Cabinet and Assembly. Bulgarian politicians diverged on policy towards Russia, but there was common agreement that the territories lost in 1913 to Bulgaria's neighbours, notably Macedonia, Dobrudja and Eastern Thrace, must be recovered.<sup>30</sup> Bulgarian politics were especially important because of the Dardanelles campaign. Periodic indications of Allied success in this campaign, as well as Russian military successes elsewhere, offered hope that pro-Entente elements in the Bulgarian Assembly might gain further support and that Bulgaria would at least remain neutral.<sup>31</sup> The importance of persuading Bulgaria to side with the Allies was clear. If Bulgaria, a land-bridge between the Central Powers and Turkey, were to come in then so might her neighbours. A pro-Allied Bulgaria, belligerent or not, would also provide a supply route to Serbia. To Garnett, however, as to his colleagues at the Foreign Office, it seemed most unlikely that Bulgaria would do so unless and until a breakthrough occurred at the Dardanelles.<sup>32</sup> King Ferdinand and his advisers were manifestly pro-German and simply

bided their time awaiting the most advantageous moment to join the war on one side or the other. Negotiations with the Central Powers and with the Allies in late 1914 had acquainted Ferdinand and Radoslavoff with the wide territorial concessions that were on offer (especially from Germany), but these concessions, from either side, were contingent on Bulgaria's participation in the war.<sup>33</sup> The queen, Ferdinand's second wife, Eleanore, was also German and a cousin of the Kaiser, and much to Garnett's disgust their children openly celebrated Allied reverses.<sup>34</sup> For several months after his arrival, Garnett suspected that a further agreement, besides that of August 1914, had been signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, giving the former territory lost to Turkey in the second Balkan War, something which would greatly undermine British diplomacy in the Balkans.<sup>35</sup> Initially, and in spite of persistent German intrigues at the palace, he was quietly optimistic that Bulgaria would ultimately side with the Allies. This was partly due to his belief that anti-Russian feeling among Bulgarian politicians did not necessarily mean anti-British feeling. It seemed necessary to establish contact with secret elements such as the Macedonian Organization which could pressurize King Ferdinand.<sup>36</sup> Such efforts were in fact under way even if the necessary urgency was lacking.<sup>37</sup> Garnett consoled himself with the thought that Bulgaria would shortly be crushed by Russia, but the chances of this diminished with Russia's defeats in the Carpathians in April–May 1915. Although it later transpired that King Ferdinand had deep suspicions of the Central Powers, as well as of the Bulgarian politicians in his own Cabinet, he certainly did not want Russia installed in Constantinople from where it could threaten Bulgaria.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, Ferdinand as well as many Bulgarian politicians remained deeply opposed to Russia's friendship with Romania and Serbia especially and its implicit endorsement of Bulgaria's considerable losses embodied in the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest.<sup>39</sup>

In the spring of 1915, Garnett was not critical of British policy towards Sofia as directed by Sir Edward Grey. There was a clear lack of urgency in that policy. Reluctance among Foreign Office officials, Sir Arthur Nicolson especially, to pressurize Sofia, was affected by the constraints placed upon Britain by fluctuating military fortunes and by its allies. Meanwhile, Bulgarian bands crossed into Serbian-controlled territory, disrupting the Nish–Salonica Railway.<sup>40</sup> Grey had at least entered into purposeful discussions with the Bulgarian minister in London. However, Garnett believed that Bax-Ironside was ineffectual. Neither he nor Sir George Barclay in Bucharest had done enough to persuade Bulgaria and Romania to join the Allies. Garnett implied that Bax-Ironside was

held in low esteem at the Foreign Office and Theo Russell had warned that he might find it difficult to work with him. The minister, Garnett claimed, was 'freely discussed & criticized' there, where his yearning for an embassy was common knowledge.<sup>41</sup> As Garnett informed Oliphant in April 1915, Bax-Ironside had added his own image to a row of photographs of former ministers in the Chancery and had added his intended date of departure – 1916 – presumably for his first embassy. The minister's copy of the *Foreign Office List*, carefully marked 'private', was annotated with the ages and ailments of his immediate colleagues.<sup>42</sup> His saving grace, as far as Garnett was concerned, was his school-boy French, scarcely better than his wife's, which included 'torpedo-er', meaning to torpedo, 'Souverain', for the English cold coin, 'royauté', for a royal person, and 'ôter la peau', to peel an orange.<sup>43</sup> Also, unlike Barclay in Bucharest, who had closed up most of the legation, and 'pigs it in a room or two' and only kept one old woman to answer the door, Bax-Ironside, a 'kind but... pompous ass', was free with his hospitality.<sup>44</sup> Criticism of the minister of a more serious kind was mounting, and he was frequently attacked by James Bouchier, *The Times'* Balkan correspondent, who lived in Sofia, and who supported Bulgaria's claim to Macedonia,<sup>45</sup> as well as by contributors to other publications. Garnett probably did not help matters by sending Theo Russell 'a sort of confidential letter of the situation', with each bag. Writing in late May 1915, he noted that the last of these letters had apparently been shown to Grey and to Herbert Asquith, among others.<sup>46</sup> Perhaps disingenuously, Garnett wished he were 'in some quiet spot far from all the intrigues & responsibilities of the life which diplomacy brings with it'.<sup>47</sup>

Life in Sofia presented other challenges. After much difficulty Garnett had found rooms to rent, secretly employing an Austrian cook, which he confided to his mother, and had bought some furniture from the minister and his wife. The weather was foul and in May 1915 it rained every single day. In despair, the local population had taken to firing cannon into the clouds in an attempt to break them up, a solution which Garnett questioned. Outdoor exercise was difficult and occasional tennis matches were invariably rained off. Naturally Garnett sought other distractions.

Garnett's predecessor as second secretary, William O'Reilly, had married a German woman and had developed a number of undesirable friendships at the German and Austrian Legations.<sup>48</sup> Garnett, who was fervently anti-German, noted the disdain for him among French and Russian colleagues soon after his departure. Such was his concern that he suggested that O'Reilly's wife's correspondence (she was by then nursing

on the South Coast of England) should be watched by the police.<sup>49</sup> It was grist to the mill when Garnett discovered that O'Reilly had been lending money, at high rates, to a particularly crooked chancery servant. Garnett reverted to the matter repeatedly in his correspondence with Oliphant, Russell and Eyre Crowe, hinting strongly at the likely scandal if it transpired that O'Reilly had attempted to have the servant's pay increased.<sup>50</sup> Another, more serious, diversion was Garnett's attempt to silence the Military Attaché, Lt Colonel Henry Napier, whose over-optimistic assessments of the situation in Sofia, which he refused to let Bax-Ironside alter, when the latter communicated his views to the Foreign Office, had been widely disseminated, not only to London and to other Balkan capitals but also to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force Headquarters on the island of Lemnos. According to Garnett, Napier obtained his intelligence from the Bulgarian Minister for War whom he (and others) suspected of passing the same information to the enemy, as well as information imparted by Napier.<sup>51</sup>

The sinking of the *Lusitania* on 28 May 1915 soured the atmosphere in the club, and Garnett found solace in his Bulgarian lessons and in Bax-Ironside's recall and his replacement by Hugh O'Beirne, with whom Garnett had worked in St Petersburg. They worked very well together but Garnett was disappointed to have been denied a period as chargé when Bax-Ironside ignored his orders and delayed his departure. During Garnett's time in Sofia, two official missions had been sent to try to resolve the impasse, and a third, under Leopold Amery, to gather information.<sup>52</sup> The first, under Gerald Fitzmaurice, formerly Chief Dragoman at Constantinople, sought to investigate a separate peace with Turkey. The second under Sir Valentine Chirol, a former diplomat and foreign editor of *The Times*, assisted by John Gregory of the Foreign Office, aimed to persuade the Balkan powers to enter the war. From mid-June until mid-August, Chirol moved between the region's capital cities, generating an enormous amount of additional work for Garnett but little in the way of political progress. Garnett applauded his efforts and agreed with his conclusions, not least that Serbia must make concessions to Bulgaria, which, of the Balkan states, was the most likely to join the Allies. But the Serbians refused determinedly to cede Macedonia, not least because their hopes of obtaining compensation in Dalmatia had been dashed with Italy's entry into the war.<sup>53</sup>

To Garnett, the fundamental error was that operations had commenced at the Dardanelles without considering their likely outcome. He was also deeply critical of British and Great Power diplomacy in 1913, after the Second Balkan War, which admittedly had been of Bulgaria's

making. Neither Serbia nor Greece was willing to return Macedonia to Bulgaria, and this was an absolute necessity not only as far as Ferdinand was concerned but, more importantly, for ordinary Bulgarians. The latter, in Garnett's view, had no desire to fight and were pro-Russian but they 'saw red' when Macedonia was mentioned, partly because of Serbian oppression of Bulgarians there.<sup>54</sup> In May 1915, Garnett had written of the need to expand Serbia to the west to induce the return of Macedonia to Bulgaria. This was unlikely to happen because Greece demanded guarantees of its dominions as they stood.<sup>55</sup> The only chance of swaying the King and his pro-German advisers was a Russian landing at Bourgos, on the Black Sea coast. This, however, would lead to war with Russia and most probably with Britain also.<sup>56</sup> Such measures were also unpopular at the Foreign Office, where Theo Russell had previously received robust ideas from Garnett.<sup>57</sup> Shenanigans at the Russian Legation enabled Ferdinand largely to ignore Savinsky, the Russian Minister, who was generally held in low regard, as well as his French counterpart, who spent much time enjoying Savinsky's hospitality.<sup>58</sup>

More importantly, according to Garnett's sources, Germany had offered Ferdinand more than Britain could, namely, all of Macedonia, Dobrudja and a piece of Serbia simply for its continued neutrality.<sup>59</sup> The perception that Britain would always be out-bid by the Central Powers was a recurring theme among some commentators.<sup>60</sup> Italy's entry into the war, talks with the Romanian Government about joining with the Allies, and the prospect of Greek elections, which might bring Eleftherios Venizelos back to power, brought a brief hope of a change of direction in May 1915. In view of these developments, Radoslavoff had approached the Allies suggesting, as the price for Bulgaria's participation in the war, Eastern Thrace down to the Enos-Midia line, both the contested and uncontested zones of Macedonia, and a large area of Western Thrace. However, Bulgaria's demand for the contested zone of Macedonia was seen to exceed the demands made by the Bulgarian minister in discussions with Grey, and Greece was likely to refuse its demand for Seres.<sup>61</sup> Ghenadieff, it seems, was anxious to capitalize on the moment and to create a constitutional crisis and with it a coalition government.<sup>62</sup> When a formal offer to Bulgaria was submitted, Ghenadieff, notwithstanding his anti-Russian sentiments, openly recommended siding with the Allies, a move which earned fierce opposition from Stambulovist members of the Cabinet, whose profound anti-Russian views precluded support for the Allies.<sup>63</sup> These conflicting views ensured a prolonged period of political instability, and the possibility of a reconstituted cabinet, which might be more amenable to

the Allies' overtures. It seemed vital to obtain concessions from Serbia and obtain Bulgaria's support before the autumn, by which time further operations at the Dardanelles might prove impossible.<sup>64</sup> However, Ghenadieff faced considerable opposition from other members of the Stambulovist party and members of the Cabinet, and was unable to generate and lead opposition to King Ferdinand and to Radoslavoff.<sup>65</sup>

The Allied offer included Thrace down to the Enos-Midia line, with the right of immediate possession, the uncontested zone in Macedonia, Cavalla, British assistance in negotiations with Romania to recover Dobrudja, and financial help.<sup>66</sup> These concessions would only be implemented after the war and only if Serbia and Greece could be suitably compensated, the latter in Asia Minor.<sup>67</sup> Radoslavoff and his followers regarded them as too vague.<sup>68</sup> The Central Powers, in response to an approach by Radoslavoff, made less equivocal inducements of Macedonia and Thrace, including the Maritsa Valley and territory on which the railway to Dedeagatch stood.<sup>69</sup> Garnett considered that even if Bulgaria were to accept Britain's offer, it was unlikely to abandon the semblance of neutrality. In mid-May, Bax-Ironside was more pessimistic still, observing that nothing would then induce Bulgaria to join the Allies.<sup>70</sup> It was clearly in Bulgaria's interest to choose its moment for attacking Turkey in order to minimize losses.<sup>71</sup> Garnett, who had been busy documenting these twists and turns, communicated the conflicting views of senior Bulgarian politicians to Russell in the following weeks in several diary letters. His information came from several Bulgarian newspapers, which he sifted for information with the help of a Bulgarian assistant, and from a 'private agent'.<sup>72</sup> The latter, a close friend of a member of the Bulgarian Cabinet, communicated details of the Cabinet split on the issue of the reply to the Allied note.

As for German intrigues at the court, the picture was confusing. Initial enthusiasm at Italy's entry into the war was soon replaced by concerns in Nish and Sofia about its Balkan territorial ambitions. Outspoken attacks on the pro-German leanings of the Cabinet and King Ferdinand in *Mir*, which Garnett regarded as the most 'responsible' Bulgarian newspaper, created a tense atmosphere in Sofia until, some 17 days after its delivery, Ferdinand replied officially to Britain's note. However, Garnett also reported rumours that Bulgaria had demanded use of the railway to Dedeagatch until the end of the war, in order to facilitate the transit of goods which Serbia, Greece and Romania blocked. Bulgaria wished to prevent Turkish troops intercepting and disrupting legitimate Bulgarian trade, but as Garnett noted, German agents were no doubt facilitating this agreement at the Palace, with a view to utilizing the railway to

reinforce Turkey.<sup>73</sup> In the event, a fortnight later, Garnett's agent told him that the Prime Minister, Radoslavoff, had refused Turkey's offer of Thrace without Adrianople in exchange for its continued neutrality, because it was felt to constrain Bulgaria's diplomacy with the Allies. Garnett felt that Radoslavoff was likely to continue in this line of policy in view of Bulgarian public opinion.<sup>74</sup>

Broadly, press commentary, which reflected the feelings of key opposition parties, strongly favoured an immediate acceptance of the Allies' offer as a basis for negotiation. Reservations existed on certain points, including the extent and specific nature of territorial gains, as well as the guarantees attached to them. Specifically, as emotions ran high about Macedonia, the Allies' offer was seen to be lacking in detailed securities regarding the Serbian portion of Macedonia and Greek occupied Cavalla. Garnett explained these views by referring to a Bulgarian cartoon which showed the Bulgarian fox staring at a jar containing the tempting Allied offer. However, the neck of the jar was too narrow for it to reach them.<sup>75</sup> Ferdinand attempted to clamp down upon press discussions of the offer, and several papers, some of which were funded by Russia, were briefly suspended because of their continued criticism of his policy.<sup>76</sup> The difficulty, as Garnett noted, was that even if the government decided to abandon neutrality and side with the Allies, there was little war-like spirit in Sofia. Press speculation that the Allies would insist upon the deployment of the Bulgarian army in its entirety also did not help, even though assurances had been given on this point.<sup>77</sup> The Greek Minister at Sofia claimed that as Greece had not been consulted by the Allies about the terms of their offer it must be seen as null and void, and this further undermined the work of the British Legation in Sofia. The Greek and Serbian press also whipped up anti-Bulgarian sentiment. The Turkish press played upon Bulgarian concerns about Italian ambitions by claiming that Serbia, having been forced to make substantial concessions to Italy, would not make further concessions to Bulgaria. Bulgaria could only achieve its national aspirations by fighting Italy and Serbia.<sup>78</sup> Russian press reports highlighted the suffering of Bulgarians in parts of Macedonia, then under Serbian control, and claimed that the Serbs would be held responsible if Bulgaria did not enter the war.<sup>79</sup> The 'Serbianization' of Macedonia had led to a huge migration of refugees into Bulgaria. According to information received from James Bourchier, some elements in Nish were prepared to make concessions to Bulgaria.<sup>80</sup> The situation then, was not entirely hopeless. Indeed, from a Belgian source, who had established close relations with Ferdinand, Garnett learnt that the King had never seriously contemplated siding with the Central Powers on account of his suspicion of their attitude after the



war, if they were victorious.<sup>81</sup> However, Garnett was quite clear that although the more proactive policy that he and O'Beirne wished to pursue was the right one, it had come too late in the day. He was strongly critical of Bax-Ironside, who seemed content with a policy of 'wait and see'. Provided that Bulgaria remained neutral the latter did not seem unduly perturbed. In fairness to him this was also broadly true of Grey and of his advisers.<sup>82</sup> Had the offer to Bulgaria been made six months earlier, after Russia's victories in Galicia and the Carpathians, Garnett felt the outcome might have been different. By the summer of 1915, German intrigues in Sofia had improved their position substantially, and in August, O'Beirne feared that Bulgaria might attack Serbia.<sup>83</sup>

By this point Britain had again, on 3 August, offered Bulgaria the uncontested zone of Macedonia, Turkish Thrace, and, assuming Serbian and Greek compliance, Cavalla and its hinterland.<sup>84</sup> To this, Radoslavoff responded that he could not commit Bulgaria unless and until Serbia gave unreserved guarantees of its acceptance of this deal. Greece had acted to stiffen Serbia's opposition to any such territorial concessions in Macedonia and by mid-August, as a reaction from Nish was awaited, progress seemed remote.<sup>85</sup>

Just as Garnett was settling into his new flat, and as debate occurred at the highest level about the diversion of troops from the Gallipoli Peninsula to Salonica, it seemed possible that the British Legation might have to pack up and leave. A further offer was then submitted to the Bulgarians on 3 September but to no avail.<sup>86</sup> The Central Powers were better placed than the Allies to redeem territorial inducements.<sup>87</sup> Serbia was coming under renewed pressure from Germany to permit passage of troops to Turkey. Suspicions grew of German-Bulgarian negotiations, which concluded on 6 September, and pressure was also mounting on Romania to permit the passage of supplies to Turkey. German victories in Poland and a further Allied reverse at Gallipoli increased the likelihood of their agreement. If this were to occur, Garnett argued, Bulgaria would have little choice but to follow suit. On 11 September, Garnett recorded news received from Constantinople of the Turkish Government's admission that its forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula could not last beyond the end of the month. This, apparently, led to even greater German pressure on the Balkan countries.<sup>88</sup> On 14 September, a final note was presented to the Bulgarian Government requesting its participation in the war and promising Bulgaria the uncontested zone. Radoslavoff showed little enthusiasm for the Allied offer.<sup>89</sup> There ensued anxious communications with Venizelos, who had resumed the premiership in August, about the possibility of landing troops at Salonica. Venizelos was restrained by the pro-German sympathies of King Constantine and by Serbia's proposed

attack on Bulgaria, which would enable Constantine to withdraw the Greek offer of help to Serbia. Hopes of a Balkan bloc still cherished by some Foreign Office officials faded rapidly.<sup>90</sup>

On 1 October, the Bulgarians having declared for the Central Powers, and having concluded an alliance with Germany some days prior to the Allied note of 11 September, Russia submitted an ultimatum.<sup>91</sup> Upon its rejection, on 4 October, and following a further unsatisfactory interview between O'Beirne and Radoslavoff,<sup>92</sup> Britain associated itself with Russia's action. On the following day, O'Beirne demanded his passports. In Garnett's remaining 48 hours in Sofia, he was fully occupied moving his furniture to a locked room in the legation, and burning ciphers as well as 30 years' worth of official archives.

The departure of the British, French and Italian diplomatic staff, with expatriates in tow, on 7 October was unusual. The Bulgarian Government had tried to divide up the train according to nationality but in the confusion – it was a dark rainy night – with crowds of politicians, officials and diplomats swarming on the platform to bid them farewell, they simply scrambled on board wherever they could and ate a picnic dinner. They were joined on board a requisitioned Italian steamer at Dedeagatch by a large group of nuns rescued from a Turkish prison. From Salonica, where they boarded another vessel, Garnett and his colleagues went to Piraeus at night, with all port holes firmly shut, and without any lights, in case of submarines. After a brief visit to the legation in Athens, as well as some shopping, Garnett embarked for Malta, and another nervous night. On that occasion not only had he to fear enemy submarines but also a fellow-passenger, the American dancer Isadora Duncan: 'exceedingly pretty if not examined too closely... her cherry lips should be viewed from a distance'.<sup>93</sup> Just sixth months after his departure, Garnett was back in the clutches of the Contraband Department.

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No sooner was Garnett back in London, free from Balkan entanglements, than his posting to Athens as first secretary was announced. There, a power struggle had been underway between Constantine and Venizelos. On 3 October, the risk of territorial losses to Bulgaria, sponsored by the Allies, having passed, Venizelos asked that Allied troops be sent to Salonica without delay. Two days later, landings commenced, but just as Venizelos resigned, having lost King Constantine's confidence. The new premier, Zaimis, was unwilling to risk siding with the Allies. As Bulgarian troops mobilized against Serbia, Cyprus was offered to and

refused by Greece, which, after further contacts, pledged 'benevolent neutrality'.<sup>94</sup> There was talk also of a formal letter to the Greek court and a mission by Lord Kitchener, accompanied by the military attaché at Athens, but there was much scepticism of Constantine's intentions at the Foreign Office, some believing that most probably he already had understandings with Germany and with Bulgaria.<sup>95</sup> The timing of Garnett's departure was uncertain, and to his annoyance he had to call at the Foreign Office each day in case a decision had been made. To his mother, who had hoped to see her son before his departure, he ruminated 'I wonder whether all the Governments of the world have such hopelessly rotten Foreign Offices! I can't help thinking that the Berlin F.O. must be better organised but that is presumably treason!'<sup>96</sup> Garnett's journey was eventful. He crossed the English Channel on a troop ship which was packed solid and his bags were left behind. At Naples, he was described by the consul-general there as British ambassador at Athens and was allocated a six-berth cabin for his sole use. He contemplated the very rough weather after Messina in miserable isolation. In fact, Garnett's posting to Athens, a place for which he had some affection, was very short-lived, largely because of the loss of some other, rather important bags.

Rooms had been arranged for Garnett at the Hotel Grand Bretagne just 5 minutes from the legation. Work began at 9.30 am; he lunched at his hotel and dined there each evening at 9.00 pm.<sup>97</sup> He found pleasant company in fellow diplomats, Ellice Beach and George Rendel. There were the usual introductions, as well as Christmas celebrations at the legation, and Garnett was inveigled into some 'theatricals', presumably amateur dramatics, by the wife of the Russian military attaché. More importantly, he had briefly met Venizelos. Indeed Garnett had only begun to find his feet when, quite suddenly, he left Athens on 8 January 1916.<sup>98</sup>

Garnett's first letters from Athens had been sent in the diplomatic bag, one of five, in the care of Captain Wilson, a War Office messenger, on a Greek steamer, *Spetzai*.<sup>99</sup> The ship had been intercepted by an Austrian submarine at the Straits of Otranto in the late afternoon of 6 December. The vessel's captain, Captain Wilson, and Lt Colonel Henry Napier, were taken prisoner. Beforehand, Wilson, after his instructions, threw the bags into the sea, having entrusted his military pouch to a Mrs Herbine, a British-born woman who had married an American, and who was probably a Red Cross nurse.<sup>100</sup> But shortly after these events, in early December, when news of this had filtered back to Athens, it was not clear what had been seized. It later transpired that the thick

canvas bag was not full and that the air at the top kept it afloat for some time, until it was spotted by the Austrian sailors who retrieved it. Besides Garnett's letters, the bag had contained communications from the headquarters of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force at Mudros, letters from some of Garnett's diplomat colleagues and from officers of the British Naval Mission to Greece, as well as some Christmas gifts sent by legation staff. According to George Rendel, the Minister at Athens, Sir Francis Elliot had personally sealed the legation bag, saying, as he did so, that the presents would ensure that it sank in the unlikely event that it had to be disposed of.<sup>101</sup> By mid-December, it was plain that most of the bag's contents had been seized.<sup>102</sup> Unfortunately for Garnett, these included several letters to his mother, containing very frank assessments of the political situation. Among other things, they conveyed Garnett's belief that King Constantine should be forcibly removed from the throne and Venizelos made president of a republic. The letters were duly translated and broadcast widely in neutral states as well as in the enemy press, and the implication was made that Garnett, among others, was involved in a conspiracy to remove Constantine.<sup>103</sup> Deeply embarrassed, Garnett offered his resignation. According to George Rendel he left Athens at his own request, and such was his remorse that Rendel sat up with him one night in case in his agitation he did himself an injury.<sup>104</sup> In the event, Garnett's resignation was refused, though his indiscretion was regretted. Though 'a horrid experience' and claiming to have been 'cured of letter-writing', his remorse was short-lived. On his return to the Foreign Office he reported that 'he had leapt to fame' and his mind moved quickly to possible postings. Cairo or Durazzo appealed.<sup>105</sup> If nothing else, Garnett's remarks about King Constantine had one important legacy. New rules governing the Foreign Office bag were introduced. In future, all bags had eyelet holes to let water in, and bags which crossed the English Channel had a special lower compartment in which weights were kept. In practice, according to Rendel, the weights were abandoned on arrival in France, and a large number subsequently accrued at the Consulate-General at Havre. The consul-general there gave them to the army which adapted them into trench clubs for hand to hand fighting; 'a queer final stage in the chain of consequences which followed from our Greek episode of the "floating bag"'.<sup>106</sup>

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Though apprehensive of a sudden overseas posting which was not to his taste, Garnett abandoned Hotel Jules for rooms, initially on Clarges

Street then, briefly, and for reasons of economy, a rather cramped bed-sitting room on Dover Street. Finally, he opted for more spacious rooms on Ryder Street, where he could entertain colleagues. At the Contraband Department, Garnett worked on Denmark and Greece and detested it. His job, he told his mother in mid-February 1916, was a 'sinecure', described by his predecessor as 'the softest in the office', and one which a one-armed or one-legged man could easily undertake.<sup>107</sup> Although the remark was facetious, Garnett believed that much could be done to release fit men for military service. The problem was an innate resistance to change in several government departments. Although, periodically, he continued to dream of a commission, he came to realize that it was impossible. Having grown accustomed to giving orders, he would not take easily to receiving them were he to become a private. His experience in Mongolia and Persia might suggest that he was physically fit but that was no longer the case.<sup>108</sup> Reluctantly, Garnett turned his mind to contraband work and to attending an increasing number of committees on which the Foreign Office view was required. Specifically, he attended Lord Emmott's committee twice a week, the Contraband Committee under Sir Ernest Pollock, and a further body under Lord Alfred Hopkinson. Pollock, according to Garnett, was tipped for a cabinet post, but was 'painfully slow'.<sup>109</sup> Garnett found the work turgid and claimed that the Foreign Office was over-staffed and badly in need of reorganization.<sup>110</sup> Surviving records suggest that he dealt variously with exports to Denmark, notably of tin, steel, jute, coffee, rubber and pepper, and with exports to the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which might advance Germany's war effort.<sup>111</sup> And there was even discussion of the export from Denmark of sausage casings. As Garnett noted, this might become a test case.<sup>112</sup>

It was, perhaps, ironic that Garnett came to dislike this work so much. Some of his more junior contemporaries relished the latitude that the Contraband Department afforded them. Zara Steiner's characterization of it as the Foreign Office's 'nerve centre', the apparent similarity between Garnett's views of the wartime Foreign Office and those of his chief, Eyre Crowe, and his general interest in commercial issues, might lead one to suppose that it would have been to his taste. But he apparently shared the view, echoed in public criticism of the Foreign Office that coordination between the various authorities involved was lacking, that it would undermine successful prosecution of the war, as well as Britain's post-war commercial interests.<sup>113</sup>

Relief, of a kind, came in April 1916, when he was asked to accompany two Spanish journalists to the Western Front. This was part of a

scheme devised to enable 'distinguished foreigners' to visit the Front and the British Government had acquired a chateau for the purpose.<sup>114</sup> Garnett found the experience a 'joy-ride' and, somewhat improbably, the Front a 'joy land', which surpassed anything he had done or seen.<sup>115</sup> The party visited Calais to inspect the recycling of equipment, and elsewhere a hospital and convalescent camp, where Garnett had spoken with some of the patients, including a German soldier. They proceeded to the Notre Dame de la Lorette ridge, covered with violets, bluebells and other wild flowers, which overlooked Loos, just as an artillery bombardment and gas attack were in progress. The debris of war was all around: skeletons, still with shreds of boots and clothing hanging to them, discarded equipment and sand-bagged shelters. The party was introduced to Generals Monro and Allenby and motored to Arras and St Eloi.<sup>116</sup> The journalists, however, had detracted from the experience and certainly did not elicit the better side of Garnett's personality.

On arrival in Paris, he had found them staying at the Ritz, at the expense of the British Government. They had ignored Garnett's advice to take a change of clothing and within 24 hours had become deeply malodorous on account of the heat and dust. After their tour, they arrived back at Boulogne, *en route* to Paris, 'in a filthy state – their faces plastered with sweat & dust' but declined the opportunity to wash in the waiting room at the railway station. Garnett delighted in telling his mother of the fear shown by one of the journalists when approaching the front line and the fact that he had complained bitterly of having a cold. Garnett wished that he could have been arrested as a spy. 'No spy could have been more assiduous in asking questions, no autograph collector more persistent in touting for signatures no souvenir hunter more energetic...'<sup>117</sup> In fact, as Garnett subsequently learned, the visit had generated much valuable propaganda in Spain.

Garnett also found some relief from the tedium of contraband work in occasional visits to Plaistow, where he noticed no visible increase in suffering among its poor. There was also time to see relatives, a boat excursion to Hampton Court and a visit to Hendon air field. There was also much gossiping about colleagues in the service, among them Henry Beaumont, the Counsellor at Rome, and 'possibly the stupidest man in the service', who in Constantinople in the autumn of 1914, in the absence of the Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, had claimed that war with Turkey was impossible. Garnett anticipated his removal to the 'wilds of South America' where he would be lost sight of.<sup>118</sup> He delighted in news of the 'complete tumbledown' of King Constantine but despaired at the lack of foresight evident in Britain's Balkan policy.<sup>119</sup> He disclaimed any

partiality between the various powers, but Bulgaria was the key to the region, and it seemed necessary that it should expand considerably after the war.<sup>120</sup> The Foreign Office did not understand the Balkans and had mismanaged the whole affair. Garnett was itching to go overseas. He toyed with the idea of moving to semi-rural Hertfordshire and then to Richmond-upon-Thames. In the event he did neither. He was to go to Tangier, via Quermore, where he had volunteered his services for the removal of some thistles.

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Garnett gained much valuable experience during the middle years of the war. His experiences at the Foreign Office, though generally dull, had provided him with a useful exposure to its inner workings. Prior to the post-war reforms the roles of diplomats and of Foreign Office officials were seldom interchangeable. This gave Garnett an advantage over his peers, even though he concluded that the office required urgent and wide-reaching reform. So too did his experiences in Sofia. There, partly because of Bax-Ironside's weakness, and as a result of the relations Garnett had established with Theo Russell, Lancelot Oliphant and, to a lesser extent, Eyre Crowe, he enjoyed a key position in assessing the possibility of Bulgaria joining the Allies. The importance of this move could not be over-estimated. As a result, his letters to colleagues at the Foreign Office and to Arthur Steel-Maitland assumed some importance. The latter, when sending Garnett's letter of 26 July to Andrew Bonar Law, the Colonial Secretary, asked that he read it 'at once', adding that a previous letter from Garnett, which he had also sent to Bonar Law had proved to be 'absolutely accurate'. Steel-Maitland asked that the second letter be shown to Grey personally, provided that it did not harm Garnett. To an 'outsider' such as he who was not aware of British diplomacy towards the Balkan states, it seemed that if Bulgaria were to join, and if Constantinople were to fall, then this might be the 'whole turning point of the war'. Garnett repeatedly castigated Winston Churchill and other architects of the Dardanelles campaign, but it is clear that periodically, and especially when a reconstitution of the Bulgarian Cabinet seemed possible in the summer of 1915, he felt that Bulgaria might join the Allies. If nothing else, he was prepared to couch his thoughts in positive language which might encourage those in high authority to go the extra mile in their efforts to persuade Serbia to disgorge Macedonia. To Steel-Maitland, in July 1915, he noted, 'The harvest is practically in, the army inoculated against typhoid etc & ready to move. Nothing

except "preliminary occupation of Macedonia" would seem to prevent Bulgaria joining us. The Macedonians would rise like one man if we give them what we want & I think it is proved that neither King nor Cabinet could resist their pressure."<sup>121</sup> In the event, of course, Ferdinand opted for the Central Powers, who had sensibly wooed him, rather than focusing their attentions on his political opponents, as the Allies had done,<sup>122</sup> but neither this development nor Garnett's subsequent embarrassment over the loss of his letters, were reasons for despondency. In theory, a posting to Tangier as first secretary under the ageing Herbert White brought with it the possibility of a *chargé*-ship and further promotion.





*Figure 1* Quernmore Park Hall. Photograph courtesy of Howard Oldroyd. Photograph by John Fisher



*Figure 2* 'Pyongyang Headdress'. Photograph courtesy of The National Archives, Kew. Reference: FO 371/39/32207



*Figure 3* Devil Posts, Korea. Photograph courtesy of The National Archives, Kew.  
Reference: FO 371/39/32207



*Figure 4* City Wall, Pyongyang. Photograph courtesy of The National Archives, Kew. Reference: FO 371/39/32207




Figure 5 Map of journeys in mountains of North China. Photograph courtesy of The National Archives, Kew. Reference: FO 371/421/4358



*Figure 6* Archibald Rose and 'Grouse'. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/21/3, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*Figure 7* At the Austrian Embassy, 1911. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/26/22, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*Figure 8* The British Legation, Tehran. Photograph courtesy of the Director, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford (GB 165-0241 Herbert Richards Collection, print 14)





*Figure 9* The legation gardens, Tehran. Photograph courtesy of the Director, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford (GB 165-0241 Herbert Richards Collection, print 16)



*Figure 10* Garnett in customized bathing suit, Tehran. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/31/52, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*Figure 11* With the Swedish Gendarmerie. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/34/4, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*Figure 12* City Gate, Tangier. Photograph courtesy of the Director, Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford (GB 165-0033 Harold Bowen Collection, Bowen Alb 2/14)



*Figure 13* Garnett, Tower and Millington-Drake, Buenos Aires, 1918



*Figure 14* Toynbee Hall. Garnett is standing 2nd left, James Mallon is seated, centre. Photograph courtesy of Toynbee Hall, London



*Figure 15* Alderman Garnett. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/79/3, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*H.A.P. photo. Oct. 1937.*

*Figure 16* John of Gaunt. Reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs C. Johnson and Lancashire Archives. Reference: DDQ 9/79/3, Quernmore Papers, LRO



*Figure 17* Final resting place, Quernmore, Lancs. Photograph by John Fisher

# 7

## Tangier – ‘A Confusion of the East and the West’

Garnett criticized the creation within the Foreign Office of new, war-time departments, and his service in its Contraband Department in the first half of 1916 further undermined his confidence in its organization and oversight. At one level, therefore, his posting to Tangier in August came as a relief. As he informed his mother in mid-February 1917, his friends pitied him being ‘out of the stir in England’, but he felt that it gave him a ‘truer perspective’ of events there.<sup>1</sup> In the first months of his posting, Garnett appreciated its more positive aspects. Among these were the climate, swimming, fishing, golf and the profusion of flowers. Pig-sticking, which was undertaken under the aegis of the Tangier Tent Club, a preserve of the British colony, had fallen into abeyance because of the war, but Garnett was unlikely to miss it. He was not a daring rider and his eyesight was weakening. There was, however, an ‘orgy of charity entertainments’ to attend, as well as Spanish lessons, picnics, rides to Cape Spartel, just beyond Tangier, and in the autumn a motor trip to Fez with the Russian diplomatic agent, undertaken in a record time, notwithstanding a prolonged lunch-break and the inadequacies of the roads in the Spanish zone.<sup>2</sup>

French endeavours before the war had instigated significant change in Morocco, notably road, rail and telegraph improvements. Garnett had travelled to Fez for a trade fair, in order to glimpse French achievements, and, if opportunity arose, to meet General Louis-Hubert Lyautey, the Resident-General, whose accomplishments he greatly admired.<sup>3</sup> Tangier and Morocco as a whole had undoubtedly been changed by the war, but a description of Tangier in 1910 by Gerald Selous of the Levant Service might also have been applied in 1916–17:

I had stepped back on landing in Morocco from the twentieth century into the world of Chaucer... Flowing robes, gaily embroidered



leather wallets slung from shoulders by silken cords, daggers in belts, Moorish slippers, tarbooshes and turbans, colour, more colour, a riot of colour, complexions of olive, copper, black, wheat, and occasionally white; horse, mule and donkey ... the haunting smell of spices in the bazaars or *soqs*, itinerant story-tellers and snake-charmers, squatting money-changers pouring tinkling coins ... chantings from mosque towers, noon-announcing cannon, veiled women, waddling, blanket-swathed bundles, black scullcapped Jews from the ghetto; what a scene of kaleidoscopic enchantment and diversity under a glorious sun and a cloudless sky ...<sup>4</sup>

However, the relief was short-lived and Garnett quickly found fault with Tangier. He stayed initially with the Minister, Herbert (later Sir Herbert) White, and his wife but tired of this arrangement and moved to a hotel that was close to the agency, 'a miserable place', where he rowed violently with the staff. Garnett was not oblivious to Tangier's charms, but soon after his arrival he judged it 'squalid', and 'evil smelling'.<sup>5</sup> He felt that the committees which dealt with sanitation and hygiene, comprising representatives of the *corps diplomatique* were incompetent. The Spanish representatives especially were unstinting in efforts to thwart French initiative in this sphere as in other areas which the Sultan of Morocco, beginning in the late nineteenth century, had gradually devolved to international control.<sup>6</sup> Within a week of his arrival, he found that there was not enough work at the legation for the minister as well as for a diplomatic secretary. It would be sufficient for a secretary to be sent when White was away, and White himself admitted this.

This, not surprisingly, was the prevailing theme of Garnett's correspondence during his time in Tangier.<sup>7</sup> In the months before his arrival the legation's business had included, among other things, discussions of the status of Spanish consuls in Morocco, the alleged German nationality of the brother-in-law of a British consul in Morocco and the court martial by the French of a British subject for buying a case of absinthe. Such issues were of no interest to Garnett. Just after his arrival, White, who suffered from ill health, had left for five weeks, leaving Garnett in charge. However, this did little to lighten Garnett's mood, and as his underemployment became more apparent, all-day bridge sessions became difficult to avoid without giving offence.<sup>8</sup> Some weeks after his arrival in Tangier, he lamented: 'I am getting so sick and ashamed of this ceaseless daily & nightly round of bridge that I yearn for a live place again where one can do something more profitable for one's country in war days.' Garnett regarded the British community as 'kind' but

lethargic and apathetic, and he did not wish to become like them.<sup>9</sup> He began to dwell on White's shortcomings. The minister had spent his entire career in Morocco in various consular capacities. His promotion to agent and consul-general in 1915 brought de facto diplomatic status, but this did not impress Garnett, who was sensitive to such matters.

Morocco's political significance during the international crises of 1905 and 1911 had subsided by the outbreak of war in 1914. Admittedly, there were periodic war-time discussions about the future of Tangier, and about territorial exchanges between Britain, France and Spain involving Tangier, Ceuta, its neighbouring Spanish enclave, and Gibraltar. These discussions revealed continuing British interest in securing the western Mediterranean. But Morocco's former significance in international affairs had waned, as indeed, to all intents and purposes, had any pretence that Britain might continue to be seen as the predominant power there. Increasingly, Garnett believed that British interests were being deliberately run down. This was partly because of the expectation that in fulfilment of the 1904 *Entente Cordiale*, France's de facto supremacy in Morocco would be sealed with the abandonment by Britain of various capitulations which it had secured progressively from the mid-nineteenth century. Among other things, these had assured special rights for British merchants, who were influential among the British community in Morocco during Garnett's time there.

By 1914, the community, roughly 700 in total, was chiefly based in the coastal towns: its most vocal and numerous element lived in Tangier. Briefly, it comprised traders, retired military men, government servants and professional classes, as well as a less easily quantifiable under-class, who were kept at arms' length by their social superiors. The wealthier families sought isolation and self-respect on 'the hill' without Tangier, where to all intents and purposes they lived as they would in England or in an Indian hill station, in elegant walled villas, with abundant flora. Picnics, tea parties and paper chases were common pursuits. Much of their clothing and furniture were shipped from England. And there were services at St Andrew's, the Anglican church near the legation, in the grounds of which the remains of several distinguished former British representatives, as well as their families, were interred. Indeed, those representatives had been instrumental in its construction and in efforts to appoint a permanent clergyman there, something for which Garnett also pressed without success.<sup>10</sup> Arguments abounded about pews, about the admission of foreigners and about the selfishness of summer visitors who died and were buried in the increasingly congested graveyard. It was a self-consciously elite community, which regarded itself and

which was known in the local English press as a 'colony'. In short, it guarded its status against a rapidly changing world.<sup>11</sup> War news trickled through in one or other of the local English language papers, and there were occasional, but very brief, stirs when news of momentous events was received.

To Garnett, these expatriate Britons were hospitable but tight-fisted where patriotic appeals were concerned. He did what he could to remedy this, such that the community complained that they were not invited to the agency unless their money was required.<sup>12</sup> Much of their time, and inevitably his also, was frittered away on evening parties, interminable rubbers of bridge, charades and other pastimes. In December 1916, amid much 'foaming at the mouth' among the colony's thespians, he had withdrawn his services as Bluebeard. Thus, there were occasional exceptions to this diet of undiluted bridge. In January 1917, a virtuoso Spanish violinist had given some concerts. And Garnett formed a friendship with Alice Drummond Hay, daughter of Sir John Drummond Hay, a former, distinguished, consul-general. He was also on good terms, but not always for the best of reasons, with Walter Harris, *The Times'* resident correspondent in Tangier, whose views about the Spanish administration he shared, and whose abilities he admired.<sup>13</sup> Other notable residents included Kaid Harry Maclean, formerly Inspector-General of the Sultan's army, whom Garnett regarded as 'tiresome', and whose stage entrances in full Moorish regalia on horseback, and confessed ambition to become British governor of Ceuta and the Riff, Garnett noted with bemused interest.<sup>14</sup> He knew of Maclean's shady past (he was divorced, had questionable business associations and was formerly a British spy) and considered him guilty of blackmail in his dealings with the French in December 1917. Increasingly, he considered the British colony to be self-absorbed and narrow-minded.

Franco-Spanish agreements in 1904–5 divided Morocco into Spanish and French zones, and a further agreement of November 1912 extended this arrangement and created, technically if not otherwise, an international zone around Tangier.<sup>15</sup> The international status of Tangier, which comprised the town itself and a triangle of country extending several miles on each side was not formalized because of Spanish objections and because of the outbreak of war in 1914. The French zone had protectorate status from 1912,<sup>16</sup> and from 1912, the Spanish zone was technically under the Sultan of Morocco's civil and religious authority. In practice, the Sultan delegated oversight of this administration to a Khalifa, who could be dismissed by Spain at any time but not by the Sultan unless the Spanish sanctioned it. The Khalifa, who lived in Tetuan, was in effect controlled by a Spanish high commissioner.<sup>17</sup>

When Garnett arrived in Tangier in July 1916 the maladministration of the Spanish zone was manifest. Also, there were repeated indications that the Spanish authorities were consorting with pro-German tribesmen, in particular those under Moulay Ahmad El Raisuni, to undermine French and British interests elsewhere in Morocco. German intrigues in the Spanish zone and its naval activities off the Moroccan coast sought to question Spain's neutral status in the war and force its hand and that of the Allies. To Spain, collaboration with Germany in Morocco might lead to redress for the perceived disadvantageous zonal settlement there.<sup>18</sup>

Spanish inefficiency and intrigues irritated the Foreign Office but it did not wish to precipitate Spain into an alliance with Germany. White, Garnett and their counterparts at the British Embassy at Madrid were mindful of this. In view of Spain's treaty rights in Morocco and of the physical proximity to Spain of Morocco, Sir Arthur Hardinge, Britain's Ambassador at Madrid since November 1913, was frequently drawn into discussions about British policy in Morocco, in a fashion which Garnett considered partisan and pro-Spanish. Garnett helped in the Chancery at Madrid for short periods and noted Hardinge's concern about the potential of Franco-Spanish rivalries in Morocco to upset relations between those countries. According to Hardinge, the Spanish King, Alfonso XIII, believed that French opposition alone prevented him from obtaining possession of Tangier.<sup>19</sup> But France also coveted Melilla, one of the Spanish *presidios*, and Spanish authorities in Morocco persisted in supporting the German-sponsored Raisuni, in his attacks upon the French.

Britain did not want Spain to enter the war alongside the Central Powers, but in the spring of 1917, the Foreign Office did not want it to join the Allies either. A Spanish declaration of war against Germany might sway opinion in South America but it would otherwise be of little value. Also, Spain would exact a heavy price for the alliance, in terms of loans and territorial gains, having hinted at possession of Tangier and Gibraltar.<sup>20</sup> Anglo-French discussions about the abandonment of the capitulations in Morocco and Egypt began in the summer of 1917. However, as with other minor diplomatic matters, including the future of Tangier, the war delayed their consideration.

By the spring of 1916 Spanish diplomatic pressure in Morocco had become problematic. In particular, White perceived that it was encouraging a more intransigent attitude among French officials at Tangier, especially with the new French agent, M. Boissonnas. This belligerence was sustained by the return to Tangier of many French officials who had left at the beginning of the war. The British Legation could do little to

ameliorate matters. These complaints at a local level by Spanish officials were mirrored by those of the Spanish Ambassador in London, Senor Mery del Val, that France increasingly dominated Tangier's administration. The situation was further complicated by aspects of the joint administration and by routine and unavoidable dealings between Spanish, French and British officials. Spanish intransigence was apparently being sustained by propaganda hostile towards the *entente*, which the Spanish Legation in Tangier funded.<sup>21</sup>

Such concerns were well established by the time of Garnett's arrival. He was drawn into them through his association with Walter Harris, whose outspoken criticisms of Spanish incompetence frequently caused ructions at the Foreign Office, in Madrid, and at the legation at Tangier. Garnett was one of relatively few diplomats whom Harris would tolerate. Harris and Garnett thought similarly about the British colony, the Spanish, and White's weakness. Both revered Lyautey and increasingly, Garnett and Harris socialized together. They shared the view that Spanish maladministration facilitated German intrigues directly and otherwise.<sup>22</sup> To Garnett, Harris might usefully undermine Spanish policy and promote French interests in Morocco. And he might become a useful tool in securing White's removal.

In the summer of 1917, Harris published a pamphlet which documented Spanish maladministration in Morocco, and pressed for French possession of Tangier. Though intended for private circulation, Harris had been indiscreet and Serrat, the Spanish Minister had demanded a copy. The problem worsened when Sir Arthur Hardinge, requested a copy for the Spanish government. Garnett recorded that although Serrat had scolded Harris, Spaniards in Tangier were pleased that the truth was known. Garnett agreed with Harris's views and felt that he might also have highlighted German infiltration of the Spanish zone.<sup>23</sup> But soon afterwards, Garnett noted that Harris's pamphlet was 'mischievous'.<sup>24</sup>

Harris was a *bête noire* at the Foreign Office and Garnett was instructed to tread warily, an instruction which he ignored. In September 1917, Philippe Berthelot, *sous-directeur* of the *Quai d'Orsay*, visited Lyautey for discussions about Morocco. Garnett met Berthelot but did not discuss political issues, as it might have compromised his position. Instead, he resolved to use Harris as a go-between and, by means of his articles in *The Times*, as a means of supporting French diplomatic efforts to secure possession of Morocco in its entirety.<sup>25</sup> Thus, Garnett had shown Harris official correspondence about signaling from the Spanish zone to German submarines, in order to strengthen his hand.<sup>26</sup> He also demonstrated considerable disloyalty towards White

with the arrival in Morocco of William Cozens-Hardy, Lloyd George's personal representative, who was investigating deficiencies regarding Allied interests.<sup>27</sup> Cozens-Hardy endorsed Garnett's ideas for improving oversight of British interests and Garnett suggested that Harris might become a conduit between the agency and the British colony.<sup>28</sup> Garnett realized that Harris at his most outspoken could seriously upset the diplomatic equilibrium over Moroccan affairs, but he broadly agreed with his criticism of Spanish administration.<sup>29</sup>

Evidence to support this perception of incompetence abounded. The Spanish had approximately 84 thousand troops in their zone and spent annually 144 million pesetas on its upkeep. The French zone, some twenty times larger, was controlled by 40 thousand territorial and native men. Spanish troops conducted an illicit traffic in rifles with the Moors and undermined their prestige by putting native troops into the field. The French, under General Lyautey, had instituted public works. In fact, Lyautey had even extended the French zone in spite of persistent German and Turkish propaganda aimed at stirring up local chiefs against French and British interests.<sup>30</sup>

Renewed German interference in the Spanish zone had apparently begun just before the outbreak of war and continued for its duration. It sought to capitalize on unrest among tribes caused by the war and to undermine French influence.<sup>31</sup> From the spring of 1915, weapons, ammunition and military advisers were supplied to a disgruntled local Sheikh, Abd al-Malik, who, with his followers, attacked the French zone. Neither Malik nor any other tribal leader emerged as a figurehead for a general tribal revolt, and during the period 1916–18, Germany turned its efforts to supplying the Raisuni.<sup>32</sup> These efforts focused on infiltrating supplies and ammunition from vessels along the coastline of the Spanish zone and more general propagandizing activities that France and Britain linked to a broader pan-Islamic threat. Some credence was given to this by the half-hearted involvement of Turkish advisers whose presence appeared to legitimize, in religious terms, tribal cooperation with Germany.<sup>33</sup> Periodic efforts in Madrid and London to confront the Spanish about these activities had little success.

As first secretary in Tangier, Garnett monitored these activities and sought to bolster the consular establishment against them. During one of White's absences in October 1916, he tried to placate the community in Tangier regarding German intrigues. On 12 October, Walter Harris had reported in *The Times* that the Raisuni's troops had dismantled the military telegraph west of Tetuan on the Tangier road and had refused Spanish troops access to it. As Garnett reported to Sir Edward

Grey, Harris's reports were circulated widely in the Spanish zone and had elicited a protest from Serrat. Ironically, when at Garnett's suggestion Harris visited Serrat to smooth the waters, Serrat told Harris that his reports confirmed his own information, something that the Spanish Prime Minister and the Spanish Ambassador in London vigorously denied.<sup>34</sup> Some at the time and since have pointed to a divergence in policy between an essentially conciliatory tribal policy directed from Madrid and that of successive Spanish high commissioners in Morocco and the forces they commanded, who antagonized the tribes and turned them against Spain.<sup>35</sup>

Garnett had reported the deteriorating relations between the Raisuni and Spanish authorities, and the closure to Europeans of the Tetuan-Tangier road, a month before Harris did. According to Garnett, the Raisuni had contemplated a breach for some time, having collected vast stores of flour, barley and fodder to support his operations. In Garnett's view, friction between Raisuni and the Spanish authorities was most probably the result of German agents. Garnett did not anticipate an imminent attempt by the Raisuni to break with Spanish authority, but he considered the situation to be 'interesting' and worth watching.<sup>36</sup>

German intrigues in Morocco assumed more direct significance when, in late 1916, the native servant of the British Vice-Consul at Tetuan, the capital of the Spanish zone, was enticed into the German Consulate there with an offer of lunch and was murdered. The German Consul, Dr Zechlin, who had previously been at the German Legation in Tangier, was connected with Abd al-Malik, who, as previously noted, was busy fighting Lyautey's forces, and with efforts to compromise Spanish neutrality. The episode persisted not least because of allegations made after the trial against the British Vice-Consul, Carleton Atkinson. During the trial Atkinson had intercepted correspondence addressed to the German Consulate. When interviewed by Garnett, Atkinson stated that he had only intercepted three communications. The issue, which might have caused difficulties with neutral powers, was referred to Arthur Balfour, Grey's successor as Foreign Secretary. White was ill and on extended leave, and Garnett dealt with Atkinson and with the delicate position at Tetuan. Outwardly, Garnett professed to have faith in Atkinson, but the issue of his retention was complicated by a desire to have other Germans removed from Tetuan. To Garnett, Atkinson's behaviour precluded the possibility of dealing candidly with the Spanish authorities regarding the removal of the German agent there.<sup>37</sup>

In the summer of 1917, further evidence of German intrigues emerged. While closely watched by German spies, Garnett had spent

several days at Laraiche, in order to establish what was being done to thwart these efforts.<sup>38</sup> In July 1917, White notified the Foreign Office that Germans at Laraiche had been seen signalling out to sea at night and that this was going unchecked by the Spanish authorities. Also, Germans had been seen by an agent of the French Consul, embarking in boats and landing packages secretly at night and using signalling equipment, when a German submarine was known to be in the vicinity.<sup>39</sup> By mid-September, Garnett furnished substantial evidence of continued signalling from George Monck-Mason, the British Vice-Consul at Laraiche. It included leaves of paper which had fallen out of the signalling apparatus used by the German agents. According to Garnett, German activities in Laraiche and Tetuan were coordinated, and while he argued that the Spanish High Commissioner and military commander at Laraiche could personally be trusted, their subordinates could not. In order to protect the identity of Monck-Mason's agent, the paper evidence of these activities could not be shown to the Spanish Government, although a 'violent leaflet' circulated by the German postman in Laraiche was.<sup>40</sup> In October 1917, the German subject at the centre of these allegations was deported with 30 others, but he was soon replaced. Britain and France made representations to the Spanish Government, but German intrigues in the Spanish zone persisted after Garnett's departure from Tangier.<sup>41</sup>

In spite of his periodically elevated position, and enhanced pay, in White's absences, Garnett was not happy in Morocco. He disliked the damp winters and could not understand why Tangier was the winter resort of choice for so many. Violent and damaging storms in the first months of 1917 did not help. More important was his sense of being underused. Having realized how little work there was, soon after his arrival he had attempted to define a role liaising with Lyautey and in overseeing consular and commercial issues. Although he greatly enjoyed his dealings with Lyautey and his staff, the nature of the role was unsatisfactory because his liaison duties were just that and he had no power to instigate change.<sup>42</sup> His efforts to improve the efficiency and morale of consular officers were also problematic. Some consuls complained of a lack of assistance, others of poor pay and adverse living conditions. Garnett felt that the service had been neglected and he visited posts in order to improve efficiency. His main finding was that consular staff were underused. In October 1916, he noted that the two consular officials at the legation were 'eating their heads off from idleness', and that the oriental secretary normally worked for just two hours a day. Henry Johnstone, the Vice-Consul at Tangier was 'notorious throughout



Morocco for his stupidity & drunken habits'. The Vice-Consulate at Fez was overstaffed and the official at Mogador was redundant.<sup>43</sup> The result of this and of White's refusal to contemplate change was that officials had become 'apathetic & lethargic'.<sup>44</sup> The Foreign Office would not release new men for service in Morocco, and blocked Garnett's attempts to have Johnstone moved. Elsewhere the service was characterized by slackness and its officers were afflicted by illness, and by what James MacLeod, the Consul at Fez, held to be a '*mental jadedness*'. Like Garnett, MacLeod felt that the underuse of men was endemic.<sup>45</sup>

In March 1917, Garnett confided his discontent to Theo Russell 'as day after day passes in complete (and involuntary) idleness'.<sup>46</sup> Soon afterwards he told his mother that he had requested a transfer. He had 'remarkably little work to do', and it seemed 'absurd to pay a man capable of doing ten hours work a day, a handsome salary to do absolutely nothing'. It was infuriating amid calls for every man to do his duty, 'to be stuck here to eat, sleep, play bridge and draw my pay!'<sup>47</sup> Two days later he claimed to be an 'expensive luxury'. His absence would not even affect White's golf or bridge though it might prevent the consular assistant from playing more than three times a week.<sup>48</sup> Garnett longed to be 'somewhere in France' and wondered if people in Tangier even realized there was a war on.<sup>49</sup> On 4 May, he noted that he had no work to do other than to read the French and Spanish press.<sup>50</sup>

As evidence of German intrigues in Larache mounted, Garnett's spirits rose. Recently returned from a month-long posting in Madrid, where he had covered for Percy Loraine on the death of his father, the Foreign Office had asked Garnett to think about post-war options, suggesting the post of chargé at Montevideo, head of chancery at an unspecified embassy, or a Scandinavian posting. Montevideo did not appeal partly because of the cost of living there and, as Garnett noted, he wanted to be in Europe at the end of the war in order to reclaim his furniture which he had left in Sofia. A recent unexpected increase in his salary, as well as what he considered to be the relatively low cost of living in Tangier, had improved his finances but the loss of his effects niggled.<sup>51</sup> In fact, Garnett had enjoyed Madrid. The work, undertaken against the backdrop of political upheaval in Greece and Russia, and a ministerial crisis in Spain, was 'absorbingly interesting', the bullfights grotesque, but the novelty of working long hours in chancery followed by late night social functions was refreshing.<sup>52</sup> His services were requested again in the autumn of 1917 but owing to White's absence he could not go.

Garnett's discontent in Tangier was partly due to his increasingly low opinion of White. In mid-December 1916, just after White had returned

from five weeks' leave, he was 'an amiable somewhat childish old gentleman of the Victorian school, addicted to golf & bridge'.<sup>53</sup> By May 1917, he was a 'benighted old fossil... always unable to form any decision'. Several months later, Garnett cancelled extended leave because White, in his view, was close to a breakdown: White left in September looking extremely ill. His return in November 1917 marked the resumption of a 'regime which I so cordially despise'.<sup>54</sup> In the following month, he recorded that White must be suffering from senile decay and that his indecisiveness worsened daily.<sup>55</sup> Part of the problem was White's antiquated views. To Garnett, much of White's career had been spent in 'fighting the French', notwithstanding the fact that during the war they, rather than the British, appeared to be forging ahead in Morocco. From the time of his first visit to Fez in the autumn of 1916, when he met Lyautey, Garnett was most definitely under the latter's spell. The Residency in Fez had the 'pomp & ceremony of a vice-regal court',<sup>56</sup> and to Garnett Lyautey's regime in Morocco was comparable to Cromer's in Egypt.<sup>57</sup> Besides Fez, Garnett had also visited Rabat, Casablanca and Mazagan. As he later confessed to his mother, on White's departure on leave, he had actively sought to improve relations with Lyautey. According to Garnett, there was mutual respect, and whenever he met Lyautey the latter told him that he, and not White, should be agent.<sup>58</sup> Garnett returned to Fez for several days in the summer of 1917, shortly before White departed for extended leave. Then he dined with Lyautey, met the Sultan again, and listened to Lyautey's fulminations against White's anti-French administration, as well as his strongly expressed view that Garnett should replace him.<sup>59</sup> Garnett recorded Lyautey's preference in this regard, as well as his views on other matters on several occasions.<sup>60</sup>

As regards White's personal shortcomings the evidence is mixed. When, in 1917, discussions took place at the Foreign Office about the possibility of conferring a knighthood on him, opinion was almost unanimously in favour. Admittedly, this owed something to a desire that in discussions with the French, White should not be disadvantaged on account of his rank. Eyre Crowe alluded to White's success in 1912 in negotiations with the French about Tangier but also to the reservations of Sir Arthur Nicolson, Hardinge's predecessor as permanent under-secretary.<sup>61</sup> In private correspondence, there is a sense that some of White's subordinates did not entirely share Crowe's favourable opinion.<sup>62</sup>

Precisely which aspects of Anglo-French relations Garnett considered neglected is unclear. Edmund Burke has suggested that there was routine

cooperation and exchange of information between British and French diplomatic posts in southern Spain and northern Morocco regarding German activities in Morocco. Whatever the truth of this, Garnett's own sympathy for French efforts in Morocco was manifest. This was demonstrated, among other things, in his attitude towards the British community. And he was outspoken on the need to rein in consular officials who expressed anti-French views.<sup>63</sup> In October 1917, when Vice-Consul Richard Broome and several merchants complained that the French were attempting to divert British trade in green tea from Shanghai to Morocco, Garnett issued a stern rebuke. To the Foreign Office he noted the 'peculiar attitude which many British merchants in this country still assume towards France in spite of the close intimacy and brotherhood in arms which have prevailed... for more than three years'. Garnett suggested that only a firm handling of the British community, which, presumably, was unlikely to come from White, would suffice, and that the Foreign Office should resist the colony's special pleadings. To him, Lyautey was fair in his dealings with British commerce, although some of his underlings possibly less so.<sup>64</sup> Garnett also reported in a less flattering way than White on the views of British merchants. He considered them mostly self-serving, narrow in outlook, and ready to make loose allegations.<sup>65</sup> In December 1916, he had noted the objections of the British Chamber of Commerce in Tangier to the French spending money on French schools when British money was being given to help France.<sup>66</sup> The anti-French views of senior officials in the Bank of British West Africa, which had close links with the Morocco merchants, buttressed these feelings. The chamber was in fact a loose cannon and in 1917, it had agreed to petition the British Government for British control of Tangier after the war.<sup>67</sup>

In fact, Garnett believed that the French public as well as General Lyautey considered that Morocco's development would require the continued prosperity of British merchants. This was especially true because after the war much French investment would focus on redressing damage inflicted by Germany on France.<sup>68</sup> To what extent Garnett's views were objective and balanced is difficult to say. In May 1917, he sympathized with the merchants when Lyautey's staff imposed local taxes which Garnett considered to be unfair.<sup>69</sup> On the narrow issue of the importation of green tea, discussions continued into the summer of 1918. According to James MacLeod, because tea was a staple crop, any disruption in the importing of supplies to Morocco would rebound unfavourably on perceptions of the Allied cause.<sup>70</sup> The Foreign Office endorsed Garnett's views on the issue, but it may be that in his desire

to assert the role of the consulate-general in White's absence, he was inclined to express himself too strongly.

Garnett's efforts to improve relations with the French, as well as his high regard for Lyautey, are also suggested by a memorandum which he wrote in August 1917, a month before White's extended period of leave began. It was written on the basis of 'dinner table conversations at the Residency', a dossier shown to him by Lyautey on the military situation, and a 'private conversation in his bureau during which he disburdened his mind very frankly'.<sup>71</sup> Garnett reported the general to be 'uneasy and pessimistic about events in Morocco'. Lyautey feared that Abd al-Malik's German-sponsored intrigues would spread to Algeria and that other tribes would obtain German supplies of arms and ammunition.<sup>72</sup> The thousand or so well-armed and well-trained troops under Abd al-Malik's direct control were currently within the French zone but Lyautey knew that if he cracked down on them they would retreat to the Spanish zone. Although Garnett recorded Lyautey's low opinion of Spanish administration, Lyautey felt that, in view of the depleted state of his own forces, nothing should be done to offend the Spanish or prompt their departure from Morocco. More generally, Lyautey had seemed gloomy about the future of French interests in Morocco, noting the apparent disinterest of the French public in their mission there. Garnett had also accompanied Lyautey to an official function at the Sultan of Morocco's palace, 'conducted with full court ceremonial and with much oriental splendour', at which a mission from the Bey of Tunis had conferred on the Sultan his country's highest award. Garnett was introduced to the Sultan, attended a reception at the Residency, and on the following day a ceremonial tea at the palace, after which the Sultan displayed his newly acquired lions.<sup>73</sup>

Garnett admired Lyautey greatly but he was not oblivious to the reservations of White and of foreign office colleagues.<sup>74</sup> These related to ongoing difficulties encountered by British merchants in undertaking commerce in the French zone. Their activities were embodied in treaties, but local French officials squeezed British merchants out. By the spring of 1916, this had caused bad feeling, and some of this sentiment was directed towards White's alleged indolence.<sup>75</sup> Concern also existed about French abuse of its courts in favour of French subjects.<sup>76</sup>

Whatever truth existed in the allegations against White, ambiguity persisted in the oversight of British commercial interests in Morocco. The commercial and political departments of the Foreign Office and its foreign trade department all had a stake. The Morocco merchants had apparently detected this ambiguity and discussed it at a meeting in

February 1916. Besides Lord Milner, who was in the chair, and representatives of the Bank of British West Africa, of which he was also chairman, leading British merchants in Morocco, as well as representatives of the Foreign Trade Department attended.<sup>77</sup> This meeting led to the formation of the British Morocco Merchants Association. Legal and technical difficulties arising from the division of interests between Britain, France, Spain and Germany in Morocco exacerbated confusion surrounding official involvement in commerce. This confusion also emerged in the discussions surrounding the appointment of a commercial attaché for Morocco,<sup>78</sup> something for which Garnett had argued from February 1917 if not earlier. A specific grievance of British merchants was that the French authorities routinely interfered with British exporting from the French zone. British merchants believed that these prohibitions worked in favour of French merchants, but the Foreign Office held that this would be difficult to prove, much as it would also be difficult to circumvent arguments of military necessity which the French would adduce if tackled on the issue. Moreover, Britain had enforced similar prohibitions on French exports from Egypt.<sup>79</sup>

Further meetings of the Morocco merchants and of government representatives occurred, one of them at least with White in attendance. A Department of Overseas Trade investigation into commercial conditions in the country was decided upon in the spring of 1918, but the merchants' grievances were not resolved during Garnett's time in Morocco. This failure was also partly due to their bearing on the foreign capitulations and the fact that discussions for their removal were contingent on discussions with France over their relative positions in Egypt and Morocco. As previously noted, these discussions were shelved until after the war. In addition, while some individuals such as James MacLeod had high hopes for post-war British trade in Morocco, typically, Foreign Office officials had reservations.<sup>80</sup>

Garnett's frustration in Morocco was also due to its increasing marginalization in British policy: he regarded it as a policy of 'scuttle' and willful neglect. He did not believe that the Moors wanted French domination.<sup>81</sup> He accepted that the Agency at Tangier was largely redundant and that its diplomatic function was superfluous, but he argued strongly that Morocco had a great commercial future and that France need not monopolize it. In January 1917, he argued for the appointment of a commercial attaché, with an assistant, to capitalize on these opportunities. In his view, the attaché should travel in Morocco, promoting industrial and commercial development, checking anti-French sentiment among Britons, and promoting liaison between the Chamber

of Commerce in Morocco and merchants in Britain.<sup>82</sup> Garnett sought to build support for a more energetic commercial policy among consular staff. There was, however, little prospect of such posts being created during wartime.

As first secretary and, during White's absences, acting consul-general, Garnett had regularly to deal with crises that arose regarding consular affairs. Dealing with consular officers, many of whom were perpetually disgruntled, was difficult and required understanding of challenging local conditions, as well as awareness of the likely impact of events in a consular district on British and Allied interests in Morocco as a whole. Staffing presented particular problems. Traditionally, consuls in Morocco were recruited mostly from the specialized Levant Service, but some, including MacLeod, were of the general service. Consular staffing in Morocco was depleted for most of the war, partly because its members were posted to other public positions or, in at least one case, because of military service. This impacted on those remaining, generating more work which, together with the climate and restrictions on leave, led to illness.<sup>83</sup> For those consular assistants who remained in post after the war began, promotions had been halted, something which led them to anticipate a disadvantaged position at the war's end, and also led to a feeling of being underused. Many consuls complained about the cost of living and housing, although opinions differed on these issues.<sup>84</sup> Coastal Morocco's climate was pleasant, that of its interior less so, but in terms of advancement within the service, it was out on a limb and to ambitious officials, it was a less desirable posting than some parts of the Ottoman Empire and Persia.

Recruitment of new and replacement consuls for service in Morocco during the war was also difficult because of language requirements for some of the postings brought about by pre-war agreements. Service at Tangier was seen to require rather less in the way of specialized skills than consular postings on the coast, where Spanish, French, Arabic and, during the war, German, were considered desirable. Military service depleted the pool of candidates for the service especially as entry into the Levant Service involved two years of language and other training at Cambridge University.<sup>85</sup> Obtaining replacements for ailing staff was, therefore, difficult. In April 1917, Garnett recorded that the Vice-Consul at Laraiche, a consumptive, could die at his post unless he obtained leave; his counterpart at Tetuan, and one of the vice-consuls at Casablanca, were 'breaking down', while the second at Casablanca was often laid up with illness. Representation at Mazagan was limited to a trading consul, and at Saffi there was a 'slack youngster who

does nothing'. At Fez, MacLeod was to go on leave and only a young vice-consul would remain, and at Tangier, as previously noted, the vice-consul was 'hopelessly incompetent', and his assistant spent his time playing golf.<sup>86</sup> In July 1917, Garnett had found Gerald Selous at Larache, desperately overworked. The seriousness of the situation was suggested by the fact that the Foreign Office first heard of German activities there not from Herman Mulock, Selous's predecessor, but from the British Embassy in Madrid. When asked about this, Mulock noted that ill health had circumscribed his investigations.<sup>87</sup> In October, Garnett reported that Consul Carlton Atkinson at Tetuan was suffering from overwork and ill health: a Mr Hopper, who had been sent out in order to relieve some of these problems had taken to heavy drinking and associating with undesirable people.<sup>88</sup> Increasingly, Garnett believed that the Agency at Tangier should be closed, and that a consulate-general should remain there with another established at Casablanca, the post at Fez being reduced from a consulate to vice-consulate. A commercial attaché would act as a link. This would reflect the growing divergence between the Tangier zone and the protectorate, the ascendancy of commercial interests, as well as the agency's redundant political role.<sup>89</sup>

Garnett's later criticisms of the Consular and Diplomatic Services and his interest in discussions for their reform, drew heavily upon his service in Morocco. In the autumn of 1917, he made his views plain to the Foreign Office in connection with Joseph Pyke, who had recently arrived in Morocco for consular duty. On 19 September, Pyke wrote direct to Lord Dufferin, a senior clerk at the Foreign Office, to say that the offer of employment in Morocco had been made on a misunderstanding, as there was no work for him to do. As Pyke added, Garnett considered his continued service there 'unnecessary and wasted', and he knew and approved of his writing. Pyke requested a position in the Department of Overseas Trade, something which he repeated in a letter to Lord Robert Cecil, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and Minister for the Blockade, at the Foreign Office.<sup>90</sup> Garnett defended his views to Dufferin, noting that

[t]he amount of work at Tangier is infinitesimal... There is thus literally nothing for Pyke to do.

We do want some fresh blood at the ports e.g. at Mogador and at Tetuan where Atkinson's health and temper are breaking down but it would be criminal to send Pyke to a post where a good knowledge of Arabic, German and Spanish is essential.

As Garnett added, Atkinson already had difficulty making ends meet in Tetuan, something that Pyke, a married man with three children, could therefore not be expected to do.<sup>91</sup>

Garnett's superiors at the Foreign Office had evidently not considered the necessary distinction between service in Tangier and at consular postings on the coast, and a systematic consideration of the skills required for specific posts was lacking.<sup>92</sup> Garnett submitted a formal protest to White about Pyke's posting to Tetuan.<sup>93</sup> During 1918, some investigations were undertaken to assess the relative cost of living in Morocco for consuls but nothing systematic was done to alleviate the problem until some time after the war when a more general overhaul of the Diplomatic and Consular Services was underway.<sup>94</sup> Garnett's views were shared by senior consuls such as James MacLeod,<sup>95</sup> and evidence abounds to support his criticisms of the Consular Service and its direction from London. However, his outspokenness on this and other matters, may have contributed to a feeling that he should be moved. He had become deeply bored and restless. There were some substantive matters to deal with such as German intrigue, but Garnett felt isolated from the war. The agency's routine work was monotonous. In White's absence he dealt with questions bearing on the postal services in the various zones and routine commercial matters, but this did not stretch him.

Writing to his father in March 1918, Garnett noted that he might be moved to Buenos Aires because he had been accused of taking action which should have been left to White.<sup>96</sup> His mother evidently regarded Tangier as a safe posting in wartime, but Garnett's sense of being under-used was pronounced. On learning of his transfer to Argentina, he referred to the Foreign Office's 'flowery language framed to gild the pill'. According to the latter, a good man was needed to replace Sir Reginald Tower, the Minister at Buenos Aires, when he went on leave. Garnett wished that they would look for the 'good man' elsewhere. Doubtless the work in Buenos Aires was of growing importance and scale, but he confessed to being 'tired, disgruntled and stale', doubted if he would meet their expectations and bemoaned the cost of living in South America: 'How tired I am of wandering round the world, settling afresh only to be uprooted soon again and meeting quantities of new people and trying – diplomatically – to like them all.'<sup>97</sup> If nothing, else, however, his new posting would mean relief for him, if not his successor, from the frustrations of dealing with White, whom he compared to Lazarus.<sup>98</sup>

Gauging the extent of Garnett's disloyalty is problematic. As far as Walter Harris is concerned, their collaboration, which was to some



extent aimed against White personally, began just a few weeks after Garnett's arrival. But his transgressions ranged more widely. A dispute which had emerged between Mehdi El Mennebhi, a leading Moorish landowner and businessman, and one of very few Moors deemed socially acceptable by the expatriate population, and the *corps diplomatique*, was indicative. According to Garnett, White, who socialized with Mennebhi frequently, before and after the case, had failed to address the issue satisfactorily. In his absence, Garnett convened a meeting at Tangier which Mennebhi and two officials from the French protectorate attended. During the discussions, it became apparent that Mennebhi had submitted a falsified photograph as evidence in support of his claim. Garnett investigated this, confirmed the forgery, summoned Mennebhi to the legation and gave him a dressing down.<sup>99</sup>

On this issue and British policy in Morocco more generally, in the autumn and winter of 1917 Garnett had corresponded with Cozens-Hardy on several occasions. Garnett regarded Cozens-Hardy as Lloyd George's 'mouthpiece', and as such one who might encourage the Prime Minister to alter policy in Morocco. Cozens-Hardy had with Walter Harris been commissioned by the Bank of British West Africa to report on commercial prospects in Morocco. Garnett regarded Lloyd George and his more active style of leadership as likely to stimulate Balfour and the Foreign Office. In correspondence and meetings with Cozens-Hardy, Garnett expressed himself unguardedly.<sup>100</sup> In particular, he criticized White and his anti-French policy. He also kept Cozens-Hardy abreast of White's reaction to the Mennebhi case and implied that even if he personally did not doubt White's motives in this context, others did.<sup>101</sup> These criticisms of White were, according to Garnett, apparently strongly reinforced by Lyautey when Cozens-Hardy visited him in Rabat.<sup>102</sup>

Similarly, although Garnett had expressed reservations about MacLeod during the latter's time at Fez, he found another ally when MacLeod moved to the Foreign Office, where he dealt ostensibly with Moroccan commercial affairs. Both men believed that Morocco had become three separate countries but that this was not reflected in British representation. Both agreed that White must leave, that the agency should be closed and that consular affairs in the French protectorate should be overseen from Casablanca. There, the consulate should be raised to a consulate-general and the consulate at Fez reduced to a vice-consulate. Both argued for a commercial attaché. Garnett sought to use Cozens-Hardy to combat a 'sinister influence at the Foreign Office' which had reinforced White's lethargy.<sup>103</sup> In January 1918, he also tried

to arrange an interview between MacLeod and Steel-Maitland, thereby bypassing the obstructive elements within the Foreign Office proper.<sup>104</sup>

Obtaining a clear picture of Garnett's contribution to British policy in Tangier at such a distance is difficult. Whatever his abilities were, Garnett, like his predecessor and his successor as first secretary, had to work within certain constraints. Notably, there was the difficult relationship between the British Legation and Lyautey and his staff, and between French and Spanish officials in Tangier. Also, there was the ageing and sickly White, a generally unhappy consular staff, a vocal and increasingly organized British community and a volatile situation in neighbouring Spanish Morocco. More importantly, although MacLeod disputed this point in 1918, when working at the Foreign Office on commercial issues, there was a divergence of views about Morocco's commercial potential. Whatever importance was attached to the country's commercial prospects the unavoidable truth was that Britain was prepared to sacrifice them in order to obtain ascendancy in Egypt.

It is instructive to consider the experience of Garnett's successor, but one, as first secretary, Archibald Clark Kerr, who was posted to Tangier in September 1919. In his case, some substantive political issues impinged to a greater extent upon his posting in Morocco than had been the case with Garnett. Most notable were the future of Tangier and settling the capitulations in Egypt and Morocco. Unlike in Garnett's case, both White and the Foreign Office regarded Clark Kerr as a sound appointment. Garnett had professed to despise the British merchant community but Clark Kerr developed extremely good relations with its leading figures and with the British Morocco Merchants Association.<sup>105</sup> Establishing an effective working relationship with these elements was difficult.<sup>106</sup> And yet, members of the British colony, including those involved in commerce, regretted Garnett's departure from Tangier. In March 1918, he was offered the honorary membership of the Chamber of Commerce in Morocco, which he accepted, as indeed he was subsequently to do in Buenos Aires. He clearly took the issue of promoting British commerce there seriously.<sup>107</sup> His departure was also keenly felt by the French.

Clark Kerr found that the legation had neglected the British community in the French zone, something which is difficult to reconcile with Garnett's visits there, if not with Garnett's accusations that White was personally reluctant to travel. As for White, Clark Kerr found him indecisive but misunderstood. Regarding relations with the French and, in particular, with Lyautey, unlike Garnett, he did detect a 'policy of down with the British in Morocco'.<sup>108</sup> He attempted to counter it not as

Garnett had done by ignoring the British merchants' concerns, and, as Clark Kerr claimed, by flattering Lyautey, but rather by means of energy, charm and sympathy, directed equally at Lyautey and his entourage, to the British community and to Walter Harris. In an interview with Lyautey, the latter had taken Clark Kerr by the ear and had shaken him, before launching a 'terrible scolding which amounted to an unmeasured personal attack on White'. According to Clark Kerr, this was the direct result of Garnett's unceasing attacks on White. He noted '[h]e dinned it into Lyautey chiefly because he was of the kind that simply must be bloody about the people he worked with and in dinning he flattered Lyautey. The natural result was that the General would not hear a word of good about Sir H. White.'<sup>109</sup> Clark Kerr was perceptive and he would have had no reason to fabricate accusations about Garnett. To his mind, White was, if anything, pro-French. It is tempting to conclude that Garnett, through a combination of boredom, indifference and inflexibility failed to subjugate these instincts to the pursuit of broader British objectives in Morocco.

# 8

## A 'Hardly Used Genus': First Secretary in Buenos Aires

Compared to Tangier, wartime Buenos Aires, with its population of one and three quarter million, was a vibrant, cosmopolitan city. It was laid out on a chessboard system; its main thoroughfare was the Avenida de Mayo, which connected Government House at one end with the imposing Congreso, or houses of Parliament, a mile and a half away. The Avenida, and other main avenues and pedestrian walks, as well as some of the larger buildings, were majestic and reminiscent of Parisian boulevards. The Calle Florida, the 'Bond Street' of Buenos Aires, the Plaza Saint Martin, next to the docks, the banks of Reconquista, and the branches of Harrods, Thompsons, Gath & Chaves, and, for those with sporting tastes, Lacey & Sons, were likely to appeal to western palates.<sup>1</sup> For those seeking evidence of the long Anglo-Argentine connection, there was the Plaza Británica with its replica of Big Ben and statue of George Canning. And there were theatres, cinemas, opera and ballrooms, all of them ruinously expensive. Such, at least, were the more salubrious parts of Buenos Aires.

Rather less impressive, to at least one contemporary observer, was its congestion. In 1913, the journalist John Hammerton and his wife found it a confusion of ostentatious cars, recklessly driven, trams and horse-driven coaches, all vying for space in excessively narrow streets, the facades of its many fine buildings often hidden from view on account of the narrowness of the streets. To Hammerton, and indeed to Garnett, it was a 'splendid city of sham'. The magnificent facades were just that, and the grander, newer buildings were constructed from steel and concrete rather than wood and bricks. The streets were a welter of shoe-shines, chemists, barbers' shops, hawkers selling lottery tickets and *liberías* selling books in many languages.<sup>2</sup>

When Garnett arrived in Argentina in May 1918, after a gruelling 35-day voyage,<sup>3</sup> with only Turgenev for company, he found that war had affected the country in several ways. From 1914, trade with Europe was interrupted, exacerbating a financial crisis which had arisen after the boom of 1908–12, when European investment suddenly decreased.<sup>4</sup> These difficulties continued to afflict the Argentine Government, especially as the country's main source of income, customs charges on European imports, was now severely reduced by the threat of German submarine activity.<sup>5</sup> As the authorities increasingly looked to loans from America to alleviate their position, many Argentines, who were unfettered by income tax, prospered because of the high prices that the Allies were willing to pay for their agricultural products.<sup>6</sup> Besides this Argentine manufacturing industry, textiles especially, which had hardly existed before the war, had grown in and around Buenos Aires and enjoyed considerable success though contributed relatively little to national industrial output as a whole.<sup>7</sup> Against this, from 1917, the decline in real wages encouraged trade unions and in turn led to frequent strikes in the ports, meat packing plants and railways; occurrences which were commonly attributed to the hidden hand of German influence.<sup>8</sup>

Argentina was one of few South American countries to remain neutral throughout the war.<sup>9</sup> Its natural wealth in agricultural terms especially, meant that its loyalties were an important factor in British diplomacy. In the first months of the war German naval successes at Coronel and the existence of German raiders in the Atlantic highlighted the issue of neutrality. According to Sir Reginald Tower, Britain's Minister in Buenos Aires, the attitude of President de la Plaza and of his foreign secretary was never more than strictly impartial; the latter's pro-British sympathies, among other things, were held in check by his German masseuse. The periodically unfriendly attitude of some Argentines at this point was affected by the issue of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The succession to the Presidency of 'Dr' Hipólito Yrigoyen and his Radical Party in 1916 marked a turning point. Yrigoyen, a former omnibus conductor, who lived above a shop, was widely known in elevated circles as 'El Peludo' or 'the hairy one'. More significantly, perhaps, he was manifestly pro-German and resisted attempts to have him sever relations with Germany. Thus, when in January 1917, Germany declared a policy of unrestricted U-Boat warfare, Argentina was the only neutral country not to protest. However, anti-German feeling peaked in the autumn of 1917 when America intercepted, in Buenos Aires, some of Count Luxburg's, the German Minister's, telegrams, and their contents were

widely publicized. The telegrams recommended that Argentine ships *en route* for Europe should be sunk and referred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Pueyrredo, as 'a notorious ass and anglophile'. This was compounded by the sinking, several months before, of Argentine vessels by German submarines.<sup>10</sup> Luxburg, already unpopular for having worn his hat in the Reading Room of the Jockey Club, was eventually asked to leave Argentina, the German Club in Buenos Aires was wrecked and key Argentine newspapers announced their support for the Allies. Several groups, some of them drawing support from opposition politicians, grew in strength. President Yrigoyen, however, vetoed a Senate and House of Deputies vote for a breach with Germany.

Although this and other acts apparently hostile to Allied interests did not endear Yrigoyen to Argentine society, the negotiation in January 1918 of a loan convention with Britain and France was mutually beneficial. An agreement of June 1916 gave Britain £40,000,000 on initially favourable terms for the purchase of Argentine wheat. The securing of the wheat supply marked the culmination of efforts, which had begun in earnest in early 1916 to ring-fence the Argentine export market for the Allied cause.<sup>11</sup> This aim tied into more general efforts to regularize and control grain supplies, as reflected in the activities of the Royal Commission on Wheat Supplies, established in October 1916. More specifically, the negotiations were intended to reverse the ban on the export of wheat and flour instituted by Yrigoyen in the spring of 1917. This was a reaction on the part of the Argentine authorities to the reduced stocks available in the Dominions, but a move attributed to German influence by some sections of the local press.<sup>12</sup> However, as alternative markets for Argentine wheat diminished, and as Britain effectively controlled merchant shipping to and from Argentina, it was obliged to engage seriously in the discussions which culminated in the loan convention of January 1918.

The challenge facing the British Legation in Buenos Aires by 1918 was to balance the long litany of apparently hostile acts by Yrigoyen's ministry with the need to protect British investments and capitalize on the conditions created by the war to improve post-war prospects. In the previous century, British firms had invested substantially in many areas of transport, infrastructure and commerce. By the early 1920s, almost a half of seaborne trade to Argentina was carried on British ships; notably by vessels of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, Nelson Steamship Lines, the Houlder Line, and Lamport and Holt Lines. Besides this, roughly 70 percent of Argentine railways, river steamers, telephones and gas works were operated or owned by British companies. British

finance was represented by, among others, the Bank of London and South America, The Anglo-South American Bank and the British Bank of South America.<sup>13</sup> Safeguarding these interests, preventing any German inroads, and, in particular, containing the growth of American influence, which was expected to increase exponentially after the war, was the focus of the legation's work in 1918.

As to German and American activities, there is much official correspondence reflecting an official preoccupation with these issues. Of particular concern were German efforts to obtain wheat supplies directly or otherwise from the Argentine markets. Pre-war concerns about the relative increase of Germany's share of the Argentine import market, especially among manufactured goods, persisted among commercial circles. The application of restrictions from July 1916 on Argentina's import trade, mainly through the Statutory List, led to considerable resentment, not least among Argentine businessmen. More seriously for Britain, there were indications throughout the war that German concerns were combining to control the grain export trade in which they had previously gained a preponderating share.<sup>14</sup> The British Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires ascribed this imbalance to the superior German banking system and to the inflexibility of British manufacturers, but problems encountered in the application of the Trading with the Enemy Regulations to South American nations was also a factor.<sup>15</sup> In the case of Argentina, the grain trade was the branch of commerce targeted under the Statutory List and efforts to curtail German involvement met with some success. However, in 1916 certainly, many Argentines regarded this British policy as unfair and discriminatory.<sup>16</sup> Such concerns were heightened, among other things, by the retention of German labour by many British and Argentine firms at the beginning of the war, until they could be replaced. These were men who had been unable to obtain neutral passports and return to fight in the war. The establishment in the summer of 1916 of a German chamber of commerce in Buenos Aires was also worrying. The concerns about German subversion in America also existed in relation to Argentina and reports of German espionage, with varying degrees of evidence, recurred in the local press during the war.<sup>17</sup> In May 1919, after Garnett's departure from Argentina, the Director of Military Intelligence notified the Foreign Office of evidence that at the start of the war a German committee had been formed in Buenos Aires to stir up feeling against Britain. Tower disputed its supposed membership but he had previously been aware of efforts to infect Argentine mules with glanders virus to prevent their export to Europe for war purposes. In addition, suspicion persisted

of German involvement in industrial action, especially in the railway strikes of 1918–19, although some officials simply regarded these outbreaks as bolshevism, a view echoed by *The Times* in January 1919.<sup>18</sup> These perceptions of German influence were undoubtedly affected by an awareness of growing German commercial and military influence in Argentina and Latin America as a whole before 1914.<sup>19</sup>

Fear of increasing American influence was also a recurring theme in correspondence between the legation and the various consulates in the country, and between it and the Foreign Office. Of note to Tower was the decision in 1914 by the American authorities to select men of high calibre and experience for commercial attachéships throughout South America.<sup>20</sup> Of more general concern to British commercial circles in Argentina was that America would capitalize on restricted British commerce and capture not only German outlets but also those previously dominated by British trading interests. The increase in industrial activity in America led to greater demand for Argentine products such as wool, hides, flax and cereals. According to Harold Chalkley, the commercial secretary at the legation in Buenos Aires, a 'widespread campaign' involving the press and commercial bodies had been orchestrated to promote American trade with Latin America.<sup>21</sup> In 1917, America took 0.1 per cent more of Argentina's exports than Britain. That figure was substantially reversed in Britain's favour in the following three years, possibly on account of American trading practices, but concerns did not disappear and were reflected in sections of the Argentine press.<sup>22</sup> The seriousness of this issue fluctuated throughout the war, although some sectors such as the meat trade and shipping were seen to be more vulnerable to American domination. Just before Garnett's departure in January 1919, his concerns about America's probable post-war domination of the Argentine market, or at least of some sectors of it, appeared to be borne out with the establishment of an American chamber of commerce in Buenos Aires.<sup>23</sup>

The scale of British investments and the need to prevent Britain being squeezed out of Argentina after the war afforded its substantial resident British community some importance. Initially, Garnett discovered the internecine quarrels of the diplomatic community at Tangier to be less evident in Buenos Aires, but the incestuous nature of the British community, which numbered some 30,000 in the entire country, was, if anything, even more pronounced. Relatively few had bothered to acquire Spanish and they were largely cut off from elevated Argentine society. This was also true of the quite sizeable Irish population which was, in the main, hostile to England, and which Garnett considered



Britain's most bitter enemy there.<sup>24</sup> The British community was sustained, among other things, by many churches, by a British hospital, founded in 1844, a significant chamber of commerce, formed just before the war, the British Club, the British Society in the Argentine, the British Patriotic Council, the Royal Colonial Institute, the Hurlingham Club, the Belgrano Athletic Club, the English Literary Society, and by a very active Masonic Lodge, to which Garnett was elected, somewhat against his will in August 1918.<sup>25</sup> The British community enjoyed polo, soccer, cricket, rowing, golf, hockey and tennis. Each had one or more clubs with teas, dances and gatherings, and each of these bodies expected some degree of active support and involvement in its activities on the part of legation staff.<sup>26</sup> As first secretary, it frequently fell to Garnett to deputize for Tower at a range of functions. The upper echelons of Argentine society as well as the British community was much given to excess and after dinner speaking was a national passion. The *corps diplomatique*, with all of the additional networking and functions that it entailed, comprised representatives from over 20 countries. A society and a role less likely to appeal to Garnett could scarcely be imagined.

And yet, initially at least, as had happened in Tangier, the auguries for Garnett's posting were outwardly positive. A description of Garnett from this time has survived among the papers of Eugen [sic] Millington-Drake, third secretary at the Legation. 'He must be 40 holds himself well distinctly red soap & water complexion, hair almost entirely silver white, small moustache with rather characteristic diplomatic mannerisms and... a very English accent.' Garnett had a good, slim figure, looked rather like a Swede and wore very strong pince-nez glasses. There was, as Millington-Drake noted, 'nothing ladida [sic] about him at all'. After the relative privations of Tangier, Garnett was 'flabbergasted' by the luxury of the tea offered in the Mertinez de Hoz and at Harrods.<sup>27</sup>

Identifying precisely what went wrong for Garnett in Buenos Aires is problematic. Outwardly, and if the surviving official correspondence is to be believed, during the War and prior to Garnett's arrival in May 1918, the British Legation overseen by Sir Reginald Tower, had in general dealt rather well with the representation of British interests in Argentina and neighbouring Paraguay. This was in spite of personal challenges Tower and his staff faced. The cost of living in Buenos Aires precluded the purchase of accommodation, and when the British commercial mission led by Sir Maurice de Bunsen visited the city just at the time of Garnett's arrival, they found His Majesty's Minister, his commercial secretary and Millington-Drake all living permanently in the Plaza Hotel.<sup>28</sup> On his arrival, Garnett, minus his portmanteaux and furniture, which

had been delayed *en route*, joined them. Initially, the arrangement might have had some attraction, especially as the hotel, an imposing building, was centrally located, just a 15-minute walk from the legation and had a pleasant, sun-drenched roof terrace. But its charms soon waned. By August 1918, Garnett informed his mother that he had acquired a new neighbour, a young American, whose room was linked to his by a communicating door, and who insisted on playing ragtime music on his gramophone night and day. As he noted, 'I get the full benefit of this toy and have threatened, diplomatically, to put a bullet through it.'<sup>29</sup>

Garnett's doubts about accepting the offer of Buenos Aires had only been assuaged when it was pointed out to him that he would stand in for Tower, with full powers, on the latter's frequent absences from the capital.<sup>30</sup> In February 1918, Russell had told him that his presence in Buenos Aires was 'urgently required', and Garnett's request for leave was sanctioned rather grudgingly, notwithstanding his plea that it was 'essential' that he see the surgeon who had operated on him in 1903.<sup>31</sup> Most probably, Garnett expected to replace Tower permanently at an early stage. Otherwise, there would have been little reason for him to have accepted what was essentially a side-ways move from Tangier. Also, Garnett hoped that his dealings with Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland would bear fruit. He had visited Steel-Maitland in London prior to his departure for Argentina and had gained his support should a vacancy arise for the position of trade commissioner, possibly in Argentina or Morocco.<sup>32</sup> Such an appointment would bring a substantial increase in salary. Garnett genuinely believed that he had the support of Steel-Maitland and of his influential friends and prior to his departure had spent time ingratiating himself with businessmen involved in Morocco and Argentina. He had also worked each day at the Foreign Trade Department and the American Department of the Foreign Office acquainting himself with issues bearing on the Argentine. In fact, he would find himself marginalized on both counts by a controlling, petty-minded minister, if Garnett is to be believed, and by an upstart commercial attaché, Harold Chalkley, who excluded him from any meaningful involvement in commercial matters. Worse, despite Garnett's determined efforts to prevent it, Steel-Maitland apparently supported Chalkley in his efforts to obtain promotion to the acting position of Commercial Attaché first class, which would enable him to claim the rank of counsellor. Before Garnett's departure, he noted the views of colleagues that Argentina had bright prospects as far as British interests were concerned. At one level, Garnett may have been tired of diplomatic life, but in the spring of 1918 he was keen to spread his wings, to modernize and to control. An appointment as trade commissioner

would enable him to act on his view that on commercial issues, as in many other areas, the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service were in need of fundamental reform.

As with any diplomatic post, the British Legation in Buenos Aires had its own politics, and in this instance the living arrangements of its staff exacerbated other tensions. Tower, tall, lean, bearded and immensely hard working, was in general seen by the Foreign Office as a safe pair of hands. But the added burden of war work and the lack of relief, which Garnett's appointment was to have afforded, had taken their toll. Some additional staff had been appointed prior to Garnett's arrival, but this was chiefly to support the expanding commercial work of Chalkley, with whom Tower worked well, notwithstanding the latter's personal reservations. Other appointments at the legation early in 1918 had not been a success. According to Millington-Drake, a new registrar, Tobitt by name, was a 'hunchback but with a determined head and active face'. Unfortunately, he was 'pretty low class British' and was dismissed for drunkenness soon afterwards.<sup>33</sup>

De Bunsen made repeated reference in his diaries and correspondence to Tower's personal qualities, to his excellent ability as a minister and to the widespread recognition of this by the Argentine government, the British colony and the British Chamber of Commerce. But he also noted that Tower was overworked and later in 1918 suggested that he required extended leave.<sup>34</sup> Garnett also commented upon this and it was implied by Millington-Drake in his correspondence with his parents. In Garnett's case, these references became more frequent and more pointed with the passage of time. Both men eagerly anticipated Tower's trips up-country and to neighbouring Paraguay as conditions at the legacy became less intense. On his arrival, Garnett noted that 'The Minister looks worn out and desperately tired after 4 years continuous strain with very little assistance.'<sup>35</sup> Six weeks later, he observed that if 'poor old Tower' went on leave, then some of the feuds inside the legation might be stopped. According to Garnett, Tower's perambulations benefited him physically, and the legation was more efficient in his absence. But on his return he was invariably querulous.<sup>36</sup> For Garnett to have formed this view so soon after his arrival suggests that this was an established pattern of behaviour on Tower's part and that Garnett drew upon the confidences of a colleague. By mid-August, he noted that the 'poor dear old minister is looking very ill again. I do wish he'd go home. He's quite stale and worn out and doing no good to the Empire.'<sup>37</sup>

Surviving evidence suggests that Tower was battling with exhaustion but in most respects continuing to fulfil his duties satisfactorily. As an

older man who had been in post since 1911, he naturally had certain expectations about the manner in which staff should undertake their work. Chalkley and Millington-Drake generally toed the line and also managed to get on with one another, dining and taking tea together regularly. Of Chalkley, Millington-Drake noted a month before Garnett's arrival that he was 'an extraordinarily able & quick worker with wide special knowledge in his own line which at present forms a large part of our work'. Indeed, as Millington-Drake observed, 'there are no trasseries and one has something of that good feeling of a crew that is "together."' <sup>38</sup> This was perhaps not entirely accurate. Chalkley, by Millington-Drake's own admission, was not on speaking terms with Charles Bristow, the legation's translator, until Garnett intervened, and he was, in Tower's opinion, efficient but not terribly easy to get on with, partly owing to a lack of finesse in speech and manner. <sup>39</sup>

Garnett did not share Millington-Drake's perception of the legation. In mid-July he noted that it was the 'nearest approach to a lunatic asylum which I have yet met with in official life'. Specifically, Garnett noted the mutual hatred between Tower and Captain Boyle, the naval attaché, and between Tower and Captain Willes, the Ministry of Information's representative. According to Garnett, Tower had informed his subordinates that anyone found to be on friendly terms with Boyle would be shipped home directly. <sup>40</sup> Accordingly, Boyle withheld naval intelligence from Tower. Not only did Garnett befriend him but he also spent time with the American chargé whom he had known at Tehran. In so doing, he appeared to be ignoring the slight of Sir Reginald's wife, who had thrown a glass of champagne at the attaché prior to America's entry into the war. According to Garnett, she had then challenged the American diplomat to come out into the open and declare his preference for Germany over the Allies by toasting the Kaiser with the proffered champagne. <sup>41</sup> Collectively, these elements did not signify a great deal, but they concealed disagreement on more substantive issues.

Unlike Millington-Drake and Chalkley, Garnett would make few concessions to Tower's idiosyncrasies. As a new member of staff, living in such proximity to his colleagues, he was expected to conform. Tower habitually breakfasted early at the Plaza in order to put in a full morning's work at the legation. Millington-Drake breakfasted just after his chief, aware that Tower 'love[d] one to fall in with all his ways'. Garnett, according to Millington-Drake, declined to follow suit and typically arrived at the legation 'nonchalantly about 10 am'. In Millington-Drake's view, Garnett had rapidly formed the impression that Tower was 'a bit of a "Don"', an impression he had attempted to alter,

apparently without success.<sup>42</sup> Some weeks later, Millington-Drake noted that 'Garnett meanders in at 10.30 am till 12 wanders back about 3.30 till 6.30 and is generally unconcerned and dilettante in his ways'. Garnett was once away for a whole afternoon without any explanation and Millington-Drake noted that he managed to lose paperwork.<sup>43</sup> When Garnett deputized for Tower this caused serious problems. On his return, Tower would complain that Garnett had not done things properly or followed procedures. Tower told Garnett that he found him 'inefficient & useless', a charge which Garnett found surprising in view of Tower's earlier confession that before his arrival he dare not leave the legation to travel up country.<sup>44</sup> Garnett, on the other hand, felt that in not mimicking Tower, he was seeking to break free from the drudgery of lunching and dining with his colleagues every day and to develop normal social habits. Garnett felt that Tower's efforts to control his staff prevented them from networking in a way that was essential for their advancement.<sup>45</sup>

Elsewhere, Millington-Drake, who generally found Garnett to be very 'pleasant, agreeable and amusing', and 'most refreshing' in his views, recorded that Garnett did not fit in. Garnett began Spanish lessons soon after his arrival, but he decorated his room at the legation with 'lots of Eastern bric a brac', which looked out of place. On one occasion, when Tower was away from the legation, Garnett and Millington-Drake had hosted a tea party for some of the British community. Garnett had been much taken with the party's success and wanted to follow it with a bridge party. Unfortunately, a Scots minister had called at the legation and had spotted the cards and had remarked on them disapprovingly. Garnett knew that Tower would disapprove but he had even boasted of it to Tower on the latter's return. On another occasion, Garnett spoke rather too openly for Millington-Drake's taste, to the proprietor of a letting agency about the difficulty of surviving on his salary. There was, indeed, a sense that Garnett took some pleasure in stirring things up. According to Millington-Drake, when Garnett discovered that efforts were being made to have Chalkley promoted, he became 'glum & discontented' and announced 'in an airy way that he ha[d] taken steps to get transferred'.<sup>46</sup> On that occasion, a dinner at the Jockey Club, Garnett had also made reference to the tendency of diplomats of his standing to resign because so many of the big posts were filled by men from outside the service. That evening Garnett had also speculated that as a Foreign Office official, Colum Crichton-Stuart had recently been mobilized, so Millington-Drake might also be called upon to serve. According to Millington-Drake, these pinpricks struck home and served to antagonize Tower and to play on his nerves.<sup>47</sup>

Quite why Garnett behaved thus is difficult to say. One factor, as previously mentioned, was his deep disappointment that Tower remained and that he had very little real work to do. According to Garnett, Tower insisted on doing practically everything himself, including filing, carrying papers and even winding the legation's clocks. As he alone knew where the key for the clocks was kept, they generally stopped when he was away for longer than a week.<sup>48</sup> At a personal level, Garnett was undoubtedly disposed to chafe, to gossip and, where he perceived weakness in higher authority, to expose it. In this instance, he was well aware of the effect that his behaviour had upon Tower. In July, he noted that Tower was 'on the verge – if indeed he has not already done so – of denouncing me as incompetent and inefficient'.<sup>49</sup> Also, Garnett quickly tired of Buenos Aires. The city, according to de Bunsen, was 'immense and over luxurious' and Garnett found society there to be excessively shallow, and the Argentines ignorant of social niceties but 'swollen with pride & conceit and so inflated with their money bags that they think the eyes of the world are upon them'.<sup>50</sup> His official duties on 30 November included a St Andrews lunch at the Plaza, with over three hundred present, a Red Cross show from three until five o'clock, a farewell banquet for the Belgian Minister at the Jockey Club, and then an Irish banquet at the Plaza. The latter, as he noted was a 'little inclined to sedition'.<sup>51</sup>

When he did have time to himself and played golf or bridge or attended race meetings, he noted that Tower hated to hear of this but still refused to delegate any of the routine work.<sup>52</sup> Whereas in Tangier, Garnett had had some involvement in commercial matters, in Buenos Aires he was marginalized, partly on account of Tower's trust in Chalkley. The minister's efforts to have Chalkley promoted and accorded local diplomatic rank became a divisive issue. Chalkley, according to Garnett, though a 'very useful little Consul who will do good work in a subordinate position', was no diplomat. 'Chalkley is a little Consul, both in size & intellect, entirely lacking in dignity & weight. All the leading merchants tell me frankly they do not like him & that they consider him of insufficient standing for the post.' Worse, Chalkley sought to appoint, as an assistant commercial attaché, 'a little merchant boy', Gibbs, whose bedroom adjoined Chalkley's at the hotel and with whom he shared a sitting room. Gibbs was, however, quite unknown in the merchant community, and was, like Chalkley, also suspected of shady dealings.<sup>53</sup> Garnett's initial disinclination to denounce Chalkley to Tower did not last, and early in 1919 he made no secret of the many rumours which had reached him about the commercial attaché's past dealings. In January 1919, he wrote to Russell that 'When I first came

he was running about with undesirable intimates in low haunts where he was known to all the fly by night young women as “the Sec. to the British Legation”. I was thankful when he left off his omnivorous habit & settled down with only one English dancing girl.<sup>54</sup>

Besides, Tower did not make the necessary arrangements with the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that during his absences Garnett was fully empowered to deal directly with the Foreign Minister. Instead, he dealt with the under-secretary, who was ‘a miserable little worm with no social position or weight, the son of an Italian livery stable keeper & very pro-German’.<sup>55</sup> The few surviving, official, dealings in commercial affairs which can be attributed to Garnett with certainty, related to the minor issues of modifications to customs tariffs and to openings for discharged British servicemen in the wine trade.<sup>56</sup> Nor, according to Garnett, would Tower permit him to travel up country in his place. As a new first secretary keen to explore the country, Garnett considered this restriction unhelpful. On occasions when Garnett was able to escape from Buenos Aires – he once visited an *estacion* where he experienced an ostrich hunt – this simply accentuated the limitations of city life. The British community in Buenos Aires surpassed its counterpart in Tangier in its self-obsessed and incestuous nature. Admittedly, between 5000 and 8000<sup>57</sup> British subjects in the country had enlisted, and those remaining in Argentina contributed to many war charities. Yet to Garnett, perhaps because of the excesses and grandeur of life in Buenos Aires, they appeared for the most part to be quite oblivious to the nature of the war: a view shared by foreign office officials.

More seriously, perhaps, Garnett felt that Tower had isolated himself from the British community, from his staff, and from some of the other foreign missions. In mid-August 1918, he noted that the legation was ‘always being abused by the British community and there is certainly no institution in Argentina more ridiculed for the way we carry on’.<sup>58</sup> He loathed the indignity imposed upon the legation and its staff by the cost of living. He described their visit to Government House in July 1918 in ‘dirty old cabs with knock kneed horses’. On leaving, he continued:

we were buffeted about by the crowd while looking for the same old cabs or even a tram to take us away. All our colleagues have proper equipages of some sort or another. It really is very undignified that the British minister should not know how to behave. Everyone talks to me about it, not only influential members of the British colony but even our diplomatic colleagues. Socially we don’t exist here & yet diplomacy depends very largely on maintaining a proper social

position. It is almost a scandal that the minister, with over £4000 a year should live in two wretched little rooms at the hotel, never entertain, rarely go out in society. It is very bad for & unfair on his staff who cannot get into touch with or meet the influential people...<sup>59</sup>

As Garnett continued, the energetic hand of Lloyd George must 'make a clean sweep'.<sup>60</sup> Garnett repeatedly commented upon Tower's serious neglect of the social side of his duties. In a country such as Argentina, and in particular a capital city such as Buenos Aires, where social interaction was deemed vital, this was a crucial failing and one which Theo Russell readily acknowledged.<sup>61</sup> Admittedly, Garnett did not blame Tower alone. The minister's salary precluded him buying or renting a house in which he could entertain. However, Garnett frequently cited instances where Tower and Millington-Drake had simply not bothered to turn up at functions, including an anniversary event held by the American Embassy to mark America's entry into the war.<sup>62</sup> According to Garnett, this had caused deep offence, and the legation was held in contempt by the *corps diplomatique*, by senior members of Argentine society and by the British community.

A further and repeated complaint of Garnett's was the cost of living in Argentina. He calculated that a rented flat would cost £400 p.a., and a servant, a further £90. The total exceeded his salary by £10. He felt that secretaries must receive a separate housing allowance of £400 and the legation, an annual entertainment allowance of £5000.<sup>63</sup> He continued: 'Everything is frightfully dear: everyone connected with the country is simply oozing with dollars & there is a most lavish display of wealth on every side. It is a very difficult matter for the poor diplomat to live among them. The English out here – & there are thousands of them – are as wealthy as the Argentines & simply exude money.'<sup>64</sup> In his letters, he berated the 'stingy British Government' for the mean salary it bestowed on its representatives who were expected to dress appropriately in the highest social circles. To his mother, he joked that the Ritz might employ him as a waiter in the evenings. The tips would help, and he would shock the Foreign Office.<sup>65</sup> If he went to the opera it was only when offered a seat gratis, and in order to see anything of society he was obliged to follow on the coat-tails of colleagues at the American legation. Garnett also mentioned the possibility of taking one of the many well-paid jobs in commerce open to Englishmen, which did not attract income tax.<sup>66</sup> Garnett saw little prospect of his replacing Tower either permanently or for a prolonged period and thereby increasing his salary. As winter approached, his dissatisfaction increased: something



which the excessive and, in Garnett's view, inappropriate reaction of Buenos Aires to the Armistice accentuated. The city 'went mad with joy', and the round of social engagements intensified, as did the searing Argentine sun. Garnett, as is clear from his private correspondence, required a complete rest.<sup>67</sup> His time at Buenos Aires was clearly limited.

In December, Garnett was instructed to travel north to Rosario in order to dismiss Captain Parr the Vice-Consul, whose unsatisfactory conduct Tower had reported to the Foreign Office.<sup>68</sup> Rosario had previously attained importance as an import centre for foreign goods and had a large commercial radius extending into Bolivia. As a posting, the city had claimed several victims in previous years to nervous breakdown and moral vice.<sup>69</sup> Parr and the Consul, Spencer Dickson, had revived British fortunes but not without cost. Parr had previously been warned that his private trading interests were conflicting with his official duties in connection with the Anglo-Argentine Wheat Commission. Parr had apparently ignored this warning and was accused, wrongly it seems, and with other brokers, of seeking to revoke an agreement with the Commission. Parr had then lost his temper in an interview with a delegate of the Commission, whom Garnett considered 'hot-headed'.<sup>70</sup> On arrival in Rosario Garnett found that Parr was contrite and that his war-service (he had a military cross and on being invalided out had undertaken intelligence work as a consul in Spain) and bearing suggested a 'man of discipline'. The British community regarded him highly. Garnett did not carry out his instructions to the letter. He presented Parr with his *exequatur* and suggested that he offer his resignation but said that he personally could not accept it and would leave it to Tower to do so or not.<sup>71</sup> As he noted to his mother these were, after all, 'only dear old Tower's instructions, not the Foreign Office's'. On his return to Buenos Aires, Garnett claimed that the whole case had been exaggerated and that he had acted as he had done simply to avoid 'any injustice'. Tower was 'very displeased', though Garnett recorded the support for his action among colleagues at the legation. Garnett knew that he had humiliated Tower and that there would be repercussions. A week later he noted that 'trouble is brewing between Tower and myself', and that the atmosphere in the legation was sultry.<sup>72</sup>

Another cause of this friction was Garnett's relationship with the press. For some time, Garnett had felt that Tower was high-handed with the press and that he overlooked their good work on behalf of British interests. Tower considered that Garnett was too intimate with leading figures in the press. In December 1918, he irritated Tower by delivering a speech in which he appeared to absolve the press in Argentina of

some of the criticism directed at it during the war.<sup>73</sup> On Christmas Eve, 1918, the *Buenos Aires Herald* published a notice that Tower would retire early in the New Year. Tower accused Garnett of leaking this information, a charge which Garnett denied. On 1 January 1919, he confided to his mother that he had endured the 'usual bickering' with Tower and had told him how much he resented Chalkley. This coincided with violent criticism of the commercial attaché service in the *Herald*. A week later, as a general strike broke, and as national life was paralysed, Garnett recorded his final reflection on life at the legation.

Inside the Legation we rub along somehow but relations are not comfortable as Tower bickers at me at least twice a week and when I refuse to squabble with him relapses into sulky silence till the next chance of a row.

Neither my patience nor my temper will stand the strain of the old man for much longer. However he is definitely going South in February (about the 10<sup>th</sup>) and I have told Balfour's private Secretary that if he doesn't go on leave to England in April I shall apply for leave myself. So that's that. It is no fun to be obliged to pay at least £2 a day for living even modestly, not including all extra expenses, clubs etc and also to have to listen to Tower's 2<sup>nd</sup> childhood bickerings.<sup>74</sup>

The *semana trágica* had begun.

Garnett's behaviour was inappropriate but there was some substance to his criticisms of British policy in Argentina. Sir Maurice de Bunsen on his trip to Argentina had many positive things to say of Tower as a minister. However, a key reason for his mission, besides generally to spread an awareness of British policy across the continent, was a perception among British communities in South America, including Argentina, that too little was being done to foster British commercial interests. This view was particularly pronounced among sections of the British community in Argentina. A key concern was the lack of a central source of commercial intelligence in London about prospects in Argentina and South America as a whole. By remedying this deficiency, it was felt that concerns about Germany and America supplanting British commercial ascendancy after the war would be allayed. The appointing of some commercial attachés was seen to have been a positive step, but these individuals would take time to settle in. In the meantime, the channel of information between the Commercial Intelligence Branch of the Board of Trade and consuls and commercial attachés was deficient. The

view of the British Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires was that an individual with detailed local knowledge should sit in the Department of Overseas Trade under Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland and act as a 'Trade Adviser' or conduit between London and Argentina. It was further felt that there was a general ignorance of Argentine affairs in London.<sup>75</sup> Tower, it seems, on the eve of de Bunsen's arrival was aware of and possibly slightly anxious about the purpose of the mission, noting, in a letter to de Bunsen at the beginning of May, that 'we are all looking forward with great pleasure to being thoroughly overhauled, as I am sure we require badly'.<sup>76</sup> In the previous month, he had confessed his inability to deal with a whole range of war-related commercial issues. He ascribed this to inadequate staffing, even though most of his previous requests in this area had apparently been met.<sup>77</sup> His efforts earlier in the war to regularize the flow of information on commercial matters from Argentine sources, official or otherwise, had not apparently succeeded. At the end of 1914, it had been decided that he should correspond directly with the Board of Trade, a practice which was reflected in the appearance in its journal of periodic bulletins from diplomatic stations.<sup>78</sup> The gathering of commercial intelligence was a task entrusted to staff at the legation and the consulate-general, but it is clear that liaison between the two, which were separately housed for much of the war, was ineffective.<sup>79</sup> Equally problematic was that early in 1917 at least, neither the British Chamber of Commerce nor Tower was deemed to understand official government policy with regard to foreign trade.<sup>80</sup> Admittedly, such problems and misconceptions were by no means unique to the Legation at Buenos Aires. Garnett believed that the country had almost unlimited potential in terms of wheat exports to the Empire and in other respects also, and so his frustration, even if it was tinged with personal interest, was understandable. Indeed, it is not fanciful to suggest that he perceived the potential for more than mere informal empire. It was of interest to him that Britons born in Argentina automatically became Argentine citizens and were therefore eligible to enter politics and potentially rise to the highest ranks.<sup>81</sup>

Besides specific issues affecting commercial intelligence there was a sense, articulated by Garnett, among others, that the British Legation lacked the necessary weight to impress the Argentine Government. This was not simply a matter of its non-involvement in the social scene but also because the American Legation, among others, had been upgraded to the status of an embassy, whereas the British Legation had not. Connected with this, as Garnett noted, Tower was doing little to wean the Argentine authorities from neutrality. More generally, of the countries

visited by de Bunsen's mission, only Brazil and Cuba were at war with Germany, although Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay had severed diplomatic relations with Berlin. There were also wider concerns relating to post-war trade such as the resuscitation of British imports from South America, tonnage and banking. Garnett felt that de Bunsen's mission, though it had been successful in political and social terms, had nonetheless failed with regard to commerce. The mission had overstayed its welcome in Buenos Aires. Its orgiastic reception culminated in a final day which Garnett described as a visit to a slaughter house/canning factory in the morning, the opening by Garnett of a Red Cross bazaar, an official dinner to the mission at Government House and then a ball at a local millionaire's house. Feasts, celebrations and endless expressions of platitudes were the order of the day. But its commercial members had misjudged the level of knowledge and also the degree of dissatisfaction among the British colony.<sup>82</sup>

As for the commercial attaché service, Garnett felt, apparently with some justification, that the wider British community shared his opinion of Chalkley's work and function. Of Tower's efforts to have Chalkley promoted, Garnett noted, 'I am up against it the whole time. A frightfully protracted and silent struggle with fortunately knowledge that a large section of the British community is behind me heart and soul.'<sup>83</sup> Besides this he noted that the British commercial community was 'up against Chalkley's intimacies with shady people'.<sup>84</sup> Garnett complained of this repeatedly, and he reported it and other people's suspicions of Chalkley's malpractices, to higher authority.<sup>85</sup> The precise nature of Garnett's concerns is not clear but it seems likely that he, like de Bunsen, felt that Chalkley and his assistants spent too long on war-related work and gave too little thought to the promotion of British interests after the war and to containing German and American inroads. Added to this was Chalkley's apparent popularity with Tower and Garnett's exclusion from commercial work, as well as from important political issues. More generally, Garnett, having spent some unhappy months dealing with Contraband and war trade issues at the Foreign Office in 1915, and again in 1916, was well aware of the discussions taking place within the Foreign Trade Department and in other Foreign Office departments about the need to re-evaluate the representation overseas of commercial interests and elevate their importance in the training and functions of consular and diplomatic staff. The lack of clarity and the bureaucratization of foreign trade policy that he noted in Whitehall were compounded by the handling of these matters at the Buenos Aires Legation, and he agreed with British residents' criticisms.

Their objections were varied and complicated but mostly highlighted the lack of coordination between the Statutory and Black Lists, and the exploitation of this by pro-German interests, as well as by unscrupulous American traders.<sup>86</sup> Although Tower and his subordinates were not singled out for criticism it was inferred that they were ill-equipped to oversee a statutory list and that the issue of trade in neutral countries should be tackled at root and in the countries where that trade originated.<sup>87</sup>

The discussions about the promotion of commercial interests had led to the creation of a committee chaired by Sir Eyre Crowe in 1916. The committee recommended the creation of a Foreign Trade Department which would collect commercial intelligence and enable government to impede the commercial policies of other powers where they contravened British interests. In addition, the department was to provide British traders with information about potential markets, local regulations and such like. In making this recommendation the committee advised that the department should replace the Board of Trade's commercial intelligence functions. After considerable debate between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, a new department was created in the summer of 1917, which subsumed the Foreign Office function of gathering commercial intelligence overseas and the Board of Trade function of its distribution among businessmen. As Ephraim Maisel suggested, the Department of Overseas Trade, headed by Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, was beset with problems, most notably, in terms of recurring overlapping in its functions with those of the Foreign Office, under whose direction it existed uneasily, and the Board of Trade. When, as Maisel notes, in 1919 a committee under Lord Cave, the Home Secretary, sought to clarify policy, it transpired that up to seven governmental agencies were involved in commercial matters. The subsequent decision to place the consular and commercial departments of the Foreign Office, as well as the commercial diplomatic service, formerly the commercial attaché service, under the Department of Overseas Trade, exacerbated the previous overlapping of functions.<sup>88</sup> The issues were highly complicated and the tendency in time of war was generally towards the mushrooming of bureaucracy, but at a practical level and for those such as Garnett who had somehow to channel the energies of British communities overseas, these developments were unhelpful.

On Tower's departure from Buenos Aires in the summer of 1919, the English language newspapers in Argentina, as well as some reports in English papers from correspondents in South America, were almost all positive in their appraisal of him. Typically, the *Standard* spoke of him

as 'Urbane, sensible, affable and tactful'.<sup>89</sup> However, on more specific matters relating to commercial prospects Tower was open to criticism. Steel-Maitland instanced the Buenos Aires Legation as one which did not distinguish between war work that properly related to the Ministry of Blockade and the Foreign Trade Department, and work which should ordinarily fall to a commercial attaché to deal with.<sup>90</sup> Hardinge, Robert Cecil and Eyre Crowe rejected these charges, though de Bunsen apparently did not, and in truth the Foreign Trade Department's work could not be divorced from considerations of post-war policy and was closely linked to the growth of the commercial attaché service.<sup>91</sup> If nothing else these discussions were indicative of the highly charged debates that took place between 1917 and 1919 on the future of the diplomatic and consular services and their promotion of commerce.

In mitigation of these criticisms of Chalkley and of Tower, it must be said that Chalkley did consider, albeit intermittently, the need to avoid the loss of trade to America by improving coordination between trading houses in London, the Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires and the Board of Trade's Commercial Intelligence Branch. In addition, the division of war-work from the consideration of future trade was not clear-cut. As Chalkley noted in 1916, Argentine traders needed regular information about the availability of goods from Britain, something which might prevent them from turning to American suppliers. However, a perception of neglect of post-war commercial interests persisted in some circles, notably with Steel-Maitland. This was precisely why he had supported Garnett's ambitions to become a trade commissioner in Argentina. Garnett attempted to utilize this acquaintanceship with Steel-Maitland and provided evidence of the Foreign Office's neglect of British commercial interests in Argentina. Not only this but also he was openly critical of Tower and of Chalkley in his correspondence with Steel-Maitland. Further, he provided an introduction to Steel-Maitland to leading members of the British Argentine community who visited London and who were unhappy with the oversight of British commerce. When, in July 1918, Steel-Maitland assured Garnett that Chalkley would not be appointed commercial attaché first grade, and that Gibbs would not be appointed, Garnett communicated this news to the merchant community.<sup>92</sup>

As regards policy on the Statutory List, although Tower may not have understood it fully, he certainly earned the gratitude of officials in the Foreign Trade Department for his work in this area. For example, in September 1916, he had reported at length on the measures taken in conjunction with the British Chamber of Commerce to restrict

German trade. Among these was the compiling of an extensive list by the chamber of substitute firms to replace those with suspected enemy affiliations. Yet, while these efforts met with considerable success in terms of convincing such firms to distance themselves from the Central Powers, Tower felt that even with the backing of important newspapers, it resembled pouring water into a sieve. The volume of foreign trade in the Argentine was such that cover was easily obtained by such trading interests, and they simply continued to trade under a different name.<sup>93</sup> These and other loopholes continued to exist in 1917 and beyond, some of them the result of deliberate government policy. America's entry into the war, as well as the sinking of several Argentine vessels by Germany greatly increased support for the Allies.<sup>94</sup> Yet, the key weakness in efforts to contain German trade, that America had continued to bankroll the Argentine government and to supply firms in Argentina, was not entirely overcome, even when America had entered the war.<sup>95</sup> In December 1917, the American War Trade Board issued a list of 1600 prohibited firms in Latin America, a figure which increased substantially before the end of hostilities. However, not until the spring of 1918 did the Allies and America attempt to coordinate the implementation of their black lists.<sup>96</sup>

Of the nature of the friction between Tower and Garnett it is more difficult to be precise. As previously noted, on certain matters, Tower was seen to be energetic and efficient or, in Gerald Villiers' words, 'most prompt and vigorous' and able to take the initiative.<sup>97</sup> At the same time, evidence of various kinds exists to support Garnett's perception of a man worn out by the increased demands of the war, unable to delegate and sensitive to any deviation from established practice, even in the smallest matter. Evidence of oversights by Tower was noted by his superiors at the time of Garnett's recall but while this was seen to warrant a rest and a new posting they were not in any sense grounds for serious reproach.<sup>98</sup> It is, indeed, ironic that Tower shared many of Garnett's concerns about the problems of British representation in Buenos Aires. He was, for example, very keenly aware of the financial strain placed upon his staff. In December 1913, he had referred to the 'wholly inadequate' salary of the secretaries ('the hardly used genus') and suggested that some special provision should be made for any secretaries appointed to Buenos Aires. Failing this, 'their coming must be largely a matter of compulsion, and their stay replete with lamentations at the unavoidable expenditure'.<sup>99</sup> Tower's superiors were unwilling to open the Pandora's box of local allowances, a resolve that hardened once the war had commenced and apparently ignored his view that unless a higher salary

could be offered a diplomatic secretary at Buenos Aires should be dispensed with.<sup>100</sup> On the issue of accommodation also, Tower had shown considerable sympathy for his staff. Recurring discussions from 1914 about the acquisition of new premises for the legation, which might also incorporate the consulate-general, were, as far as Tower was concerned, conducted on the basis that the building or buildings chosen should include quarters for at least one secretary.<sup>101</sup>

Similarly, on the matter of the prestige of the British Legation Tower had been proactive in efforts to have it elevated to the status of an embassy. In July 1916, shortly after the Spanish and Vatican legations had become embassies, Tower suggested that the British Legation should follow suit. Britain's position should not be disadvantaged by this issue. The concerns of some Foreign Office officials that Germany might preempt such a move and encourage the Argentine Government's pro-German tendencies was apparently outweighed by a belief that if they were to raise the legation's status this would open up to discussion the status of other legations in South America and in Europe.<sup>102</sup> On the related issue of Tower's alleged indolence in tempting President Yrigoyen away from neutrality, it seems that by the time of Garnett's arrival at least, the Foreign Office viewed any such efforts as largely hopeless. Tower considered American support in this as imperative. Without it, if these efforts were to alienate the Argentine Government, Yrigoyen might strengthen its ties with America and weaken those with Britain.<sup>103</sup> The prospect of gaining American support was in turn contingent upon overcoming the impediments to improved relations such as the operation of the Statutory List, the blockade and interference with mails, issues which were not entirely overcome with America's entry into the war. Garnett had some limited experience of that work, but he was not conversant with the bigger and more complicated picture of Anglo-American relations.

It seems that besides any personal failings, the difficulties between Garnett and Tower were partly due to poor communication. As previously noted, Tower had repeatedly raised some of the issues which irritated Garnett with the Foreign Office. On commercial matters, Tower perhaps failed to see how the legation might handle these more effectively. This was reflected in the de Bunsen mission's findings. Yet, it chiefly indicted the policy of the Foreign Office. Its conclusions took account of representations from the British Chamber of Commerce with regard to war measures but also post-war commercial prospects.<sup>104</sup> A memorandum submitted to de Bunsen's mission in June 1918 by Henry Powell-Jones and Hope Gibson, respectively, Secretary



and Chairman of the Chamber, was highly critical of war trade policy as it affected Argentina on a number of key issues, most notably regarding the operation of the Statutory List.<sup>105</sup> Yet, war trade policy could not be divorced from future prospects, and in this regard, Powell Jones, who was also *The Times'* correspondent in Buenos Aires until 1918, perceived government policy as being one of systemic failure, an inability to perceive Argentina in its proper light and to prepare adequately for the post-war situation. In a draft letter to *The Times*, he noted that the American Embassy in Buenos Aires was 'fully manned and admirably manned' and that its officers were working for the best interests of America by mixing with and entertaining the Argentines. Besides its intention of doubling its consular representation in Argentina, America's influence in the press was in the ascendant. Regarding commercial intelligence, Powell Jones noted the clear line of communication between the embassy and Washington, the proactive nature of American travelling salesmen and the cooperation between American houses in supplying the Argentine market. By way of analogy, Powell Jones likened Argentina to a maiden courted assiduously by Germany and by America but rather less so by Britain. Her 'oldest and most favoured lover' was rather undemonstrative and too preoccupied with the war.<sup>106</sup> Powell Jones did not single out for criticism staff at the British Legation and Consulate-General; indeed he praised Tower highly elsewhere, but he did infer that, like those chosen to promote commercial interests, they were not 'our best men', a concern which echoed earlier complaints about the standard of service given to businessmen by diplomatic and consular officials.<sup>107</sup> American interests, were, by contrast, being pursued at a commercial, diplomatic and consular level 'with energy, thoroughness and unquestioned skill'.<sup>108</sup>

The question must also arise as to Garnett's state of mind. His papers contain numerous letters, fragments and memoranda that document Tower's failings in considerable detail. All letters going to and from Argentina were opened by the censor, and many of his most indiscreet letters were thus intercepted. Also, besides his financial worries, Garnett had other concerns. In June 1918, Garnett's mother, and his chief confidante, suffered a nervous breakdown and remained in hospital in Manchester until the following spring.<sup>109</sup> Just after learning of this, he drafted a long letter to George Rendel's wife, in which he recorded Tower's excessively frail condition on his arrival.

I have never seen such a wreck of a man in an official position. He entered the room as a broken down, decrepit being. We had a good

talk, walked back to the hotel... & I went to pick him up an hour later to go off to dine at the Jockey Club. He was lying back in a half exhausted state but said to me that I had no idea how happy he had been for the past hour: he had had the whole weight on his shoulders for 4 years, he had had no one in whom to place any confidence, he had had to do every single thing himself: he had realized however in the last hour that if he were to crock up tomorrow there was now someone who could carry on the work. The words were very pathetic.<sup>110</sup>

By the time that Garnett wrote this letter, just weeks after his arrival, his relations with Tower were such that the minister had asked if he might write to Theo Russell and suggest that Garnett go on leave. Garnett had been in regular contact with Russell, who had also served in Buenos Aires, documenting Tower's failings and Garnett's growing, and increasingly bitter, fulminations against him and Chalkley. In July, Russell, though sympathizing with the need for change at the legation and applauding Garnett's attempts to remedy its social failings, had suggested that his superiors felt that that was not the time for change. The relationship between Garnett and Tower continued to deteriorate and culminated in a series of stormy interviews in the winter of 1918–19. Tower accused Garnett of not helping him in the Chancery and attacked him verbally in front of their colleagues. Among other things, Tower raised the matter of a complaint which had been made against Garnett by the American Consul-General for his intemperate behaviour at a dinner. He asked Garnett if he would go on leave and when Garnett declined, he ordered him to leave the legation.<sup>111</sup> As soon as this had blown over, there was another altercation in which Tower accused Garnett of being 'insubordinate', and Garnett claimed that he had a right to criticize. The issue of Chalkley's appointment recurred. Garnett informed Tower that he might inform Russell in writing, rather than by telegram, because he wanted the full story to reach Russell that he wanted to go on leave.<sup>112</sup> By that time his father had also suffered a breakdown and Garnett had been recalled. His final communications from Buenos Aires suggested an increasing and almost intolerable strain with the people, with his colleagues and with the stifling heat.

# 9

## A Climacteric

Garnett's departure from the Foreign Office coincided with a period that is often seen as a climacteric in British history. That it was a turning point, a period of transition, and one of triumph, underpinned by concerns about the cost of empire and the means of defending it, is undoubted. Ironically, perhaps, the months preceding Garnett's departure had also seen significant developments in many areas of British foreign affairs that had previously caused him concern. As previously noted, institutional reform at the Foreign Office led in 1918–19 to the amalgamation, at least nominally, of diplomatic service and foreign office staff. Extensive reforms were also introduced into the Consular Service. As previously noted, the commercial attaché service was reformed in 1918. These developments were the culmination of long-standing dissatisfaction with the promotion and representation of British interests, and, more especially, of commercial interests, worldwide. They also aimed to allay criticisms that had mounted during the war, but had existed many years before, of the inequities in pay and conditions for diplomatic and consular postings. The establishment in 1917 of the Department of Overseas Trade, though highly problematic, also reflected a broader sense of Britain having missed opportunities in developing its commercial interests. Such reforms seemed long overdue and a measured response to the likelihood of increasing economic competition in the post-war world.<sup>1</sup>

Garnett's increasing disenchantment with the Diplomatic Service undoubtedly owed something to a perception of it as being out of date in its methods and structure and badly in need of reform. Though personally he took little direct part in the discussions connected with these reforms, when he heard about the proposed amalgamation of the services in June 1917, he considered it a positive step that was long

overdue. So, too, because of the chorus among diplomats everywhere that they could not afford their posts, the prospect of salary increases was also welcome.<sup>2</sup> Scattered evidence in his personal papers suggests that he maintained a keen interest in the progress of these reforms after his recall to London, and in related public discussion, which had recurred during the war.

Connected with these developments, efforts were also made to sustain the greater degree of unity experienced among expatriate communities during the war. The Foreign Office Committee on British Communities Abroad, which was established in December 1918, sought to foster a patriotic spirit and to project British values overseas.<sup>3</sup> Its members included Sir Maurice de Bunsen and Follett Holt, respectively, the head and commercial member of the de Bunsen Mission of 1918. The fate of Follett Holt's report in some ways mirrored that of the Foreign Office Committee, in which his influence is clearly discernible. The limited institutional reforms of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, the smothering of the Foreign Office committee and the rejection of some of Follett Holt's more far-reaching suggestions reflected a dichotomy in the official mind in 1919. With relatively limited resources, and, more especially, with these resources controlled by a Treasury bent upon retrenchment, there was little scope for radical reform in Britain's overseas interests. Some officials, particularly those who were personally involved in its establishment, were highly committed to the implementation of the findings of the Foreign Office committee. The findings envisaged far-reaching measures to forge a closer bond between expatriate communities and the mother country. This was true in terms of business and commerce, education, science, language and many other areas of life. More specifically, expatriate businessmen would have been included in the development of commercial policy both overseas and in London. Follett Holt, of whom Garnett had ironically been extremely critical, had suggested precisely the same thing in his report and had also suggested the establishment of a separate consular service for Latin America. The rejection of the latter idea by many senior Foreign Office officials and diplomats, not least by de Bunsen himself, was grounded in a belief in the benefits of diplomatic and consular services staffed largely by generalists rather than specialists. Beyond this, however, there was much resistance to any institutional reforms that would include men of business and commerce in the decision-making process. The conceptual resistance to those occupations and preoccupations as somehow inferior persisted long after the Second World War, and as a result, the Department of Overseas Trade experienced considerable difficulties in its

early years. So, too, did the related perception of consular staff as inferior to diplomats, and this impediment to fostering British commercial interests was not addressed until further reforms in 1943.

There was, also, undoubtedly a sense that Garnett, having attained the rank of first secretary, found himself underused.<sup>4</sup> He had shown himself quite capable in Tangier of deputizing for White and yet at Buenos Aires he had even less scope for responsibility and development. Garnett was certainly not alone in sensing a waning in his fortunes at this point in his career. His former colleague in Peking, Arnold Robertson, would complain in similar terms, just a few years later when he felt his employers had failed to recognize his successful handling of the Tangier question.<sup>5</sup> It is also true that for one reason or another, Garnett's career had been derailed. The pattern of his early postings might have indicated a distinguished career: even the most desirable ambassadorial roles were attainable. Interestingly, of his fellow competitors in the 1902 Diplomatic Service examination, all three were knighted. Clive was, successively, Minister at Tehran, at the Holy See, Ambassador at Tokyo and at Brussels. Chilton was Minister at Washington, at Santiago, at Buenos Aires, and Ambassador at Madrid. Mounsey transferred to the Foreign Office and retired as Assistant Under-Secretary of State. In August 1906, Garnett had confessed to being 'chock full of ambition', but that feeling diminished gradually until he hit the buffers in Buenos Aires.

Like some other diplomats, Garnett was sensitive about the appointment of outsiders to senior posts in the Diplomatic Service. Certainly, there were always malcontents within the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office but criticism was heightened during and just after the First World War. The creation of wartime departments in the Foreign Office had allowed many outsiders, including many 'amateurs' into the office; a development which, if anything, Garnett possibly welcomed. However, some pre-war entrants considered that this, as well as the seniority given to those with war service recruited after the Armistice, had damaged their promotion prospects. For Francis Rodd, who was disenchanted with senior colleagues and with the oversight of the Foreign Office, other opportunities beckoned. In 1918, George Rendel, with whom Garnett corresponded occasionally after their service in Athens, shared Garnett's despair at the lack of drive and direction at the Foreign Office: 'It is always interesting to me to see the power of stupid officialdom gradually getting a stronger & stronger hold on the men who are too comfortable in their London offices ever to go abroad, ever to face even the bare facts of the case, let alone facing any ideal to which those

facts could be shaped.<sup>6</sup> Some shared Garnett's sense of being isolated from the war and of being prevented by age, occupation and in some cases physical imperfection, from taking a more active part in it.<sup>7</sup> Alfred Mitchell Innes, Britain's Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul-General at Montevideo, whom Garnett had visited *en route* to Buenos Aires, and who seemed exhausted,<sup>8</sup> took the opportunity to leave the service, before his time was up. Others, such as Alwyn Parker, were unhappy with the nature of the peace settlement.<sup>9</sup> For those such as George Kidston who had private means, there seemed little incentive to remain. Garnett, when writing to his father in March 1919 noted that there was no future in diplomacy, as the war had discredited Britain's leading representatives abroad. Moreover, appointments from without the service would increase. If junior diplomats could not anticipate remuneration in later life, then why remain in the service? This was a step too far in the so-called new diplomacy. But Garnett *did* intend to remain in the service, if possible, at least until he had availed of another opportunity and until he obtained recompense for his furniture in Sofia and for the cost of shipping his furniture from Tangier to Buenos Aires.<sup>10</sup> There was, therefore, any number of reasons for Garnett to leave the service, quite apart from that which later became accepted wisdom in family circles and in the Lancashire press.

The precise reason for Garnett's recall from Buenos Aires remains unclear. Evidently, he was under considerable pressure not only because of his parents' illness but also because of the peculiar set of circumstances and issues that had arisen within the legation. His niece has suggested that most probably he too suffered a breakdown at that time, and it seems that he later destroyed diaries which covered this period of his life, as well as his subsequent estrangement from his family.<sup>11</sup> In terms of how he sought to explain it to others, in correspondence with Steel-Maitland, he ascribed his departure from Buenos Aires to Steel-Maitland's decision, which contradicted an earlier undertaking, to appoint Chalkley commercial attaché first class. It is notable that whereas Garnett did seek to continue his acquaintanceship with Steel-Maitland, there is little evidence that this was warmly reciprocated, and in any case, Steel-Maitland's resignation from the Department of Overseas Trade, having essentially lost the battle for oversight of overseas commercial policy in a power struggle within the Foreign Office, made him a less valuable ally than he might otherwise have been. In addition, it seems likely that Garnett paid the price for his intrigues against Tower. He had confided in Steel-Maitland and Russell, when the former headed a new Foreign Office department, which was deeply unpopular among

senior officials. When, rather inevitably, the Department of Overseas Trade encountered difficulties and, more likely than not, was seen to be at variance with the commercial policy pursued by Tower and Chalkley, Garnett's position was vulnerable. This was particularly so given that Tower was a protégé of Lord Hardinge, the Permanent Under-Secretary. When, therefore, Garnett's allegations against Tower, as well as the issue of his further employment, were referred to higher authority, although Tower's fatigue was acknowledged, the inference remained that Garnett had undermined him.

In the summer of 1919, the 'remarkable demonstrations of cordiality from Argentines as well as from the local British community' were noted in connection with Tower's departure.<sup>12</sup> Lord Hardinge and Lord Curzon both argued for his further employment, suggesting that Russell, who had apparently put the case against Tower, had been misled. Curzon commented, 'I think that Mr Russell or the Committee or whoever decided against Sir R Tower's reemployment must have been influenced by the charges of perniciousness etc brought against him, by many who spoke with knowledge of the Argentine, & perhaps by certain unfortunate disputes that had occurred during his term.'<sup>13</sup> The 'unfortunate disputes' were almost certainly the result of a deep incompatibility between Garnett and Tower. David Kelly, who replaced Millington-Drake in April 1919, noted of Tower and of Millington-Drake also that he was 'a complete representative of the old school' of diplomacy. Well versed in protocol and social etiquette, Tower regarded the legation 'as a family party'. Kelly recorded Tower's expectation that his subordinates take breakfast, lunch and dinner together each day and commented upon the 'artificial glitter and lack of reality' of society in Buenos Aires, as well as the expense of life there. By 1919, for one reason or another, Garnett had outgrown the prioritization of 'duty' and of 'esprit de corps', which Kelly argued were the bedrock of the old diplomacy.<sup>14</sup> A perceived lack of loyalty was almost certainly his critical weakness. As for Tower, retirement was, by his own admission, in mid-January 1919, the extent of his ambitions. After a punishing war, he claimed that the legation had been understaffed, and that he, by his own admission, was personally undertaking routine work in the Chancery, 'one is foolish enough to try to do too much'.<sup>15</sup>

Other explanations for Garnett's disfavour exist. According to George Morrison, it was Garnett's actions while at Tangier, and when deputizing for White, that ended his career. When composing a letter of recommendation on Garnett's behalf to *The Times* in 1920, Morrison

recorded Garnett's transfer to Tangier in 1916 and his discovery of 'an extraordinary condition of affairs', whereby White 'was almost violently antagonistic to the French... [and] Relations were most strained'. Morrison recorded Garnett's visits to Fez, where Lyautey raged against White's policies. According to Morrison, Garnett, on his return from a second visit to Fez, and taking advantage of White's departure on sick leave, asked Lyautey to send representatives with whom all outstanding issues in Anglo-French relations in Morocco might be discussed. One of these was Mennebhi's claim which, as previously noted, Garnett discovered was based upon 'clumsy forgeries' which White had not detected. As Morrison concluded:

The end of it was that Garnett restored friendly relations with Lyautey, for whom he has a most sincere regard, and with the sense of justice that characterises the F[oreign] O[ffice], after rendering this service, Garnett was placed *en disponibilité* for one year, ending 30 April 1920 and White was rewarded with the K.C.M.G.<sup>16</sup>

How complete an explanation of the charges against Garnett this record represents is difficult to say. Morrison was a dying man and his letter of recommendation pulled no punches. It also undoubtedly rings true in terms of Garnett's professed sympathies for the French, his outspoken contempt for White, and the suspicion that his conduct at Tangier may have been investigated briefly even before his departure for Buenos Aires. But Morrison's account implies that there was a considerable delay before Garnett was held to account for his transgressions.

It is more likely that on a number of occasions, including at Tangier and in Buenos Aires, Garnett's behaviour was deemed unacceptable. According to Charles Campbell, who had been acting Chinese secretary during Garnett's time in Peking, and who in 1918 was posted to the Foreign Office, Garnett 'was almost openly rebellious', and there is a clear sense that he had spoken his mind very frankly to his seniors.<sup>17</sup> On his return to London in 1919, the family friend and former MP for Lancaster (1900–18), Sir Norval Helme, sought to dissuade him from leaving the service. Among other things, Helme intervened with Sir Edward Grey in order to have Garnett appointed to his special mission to America.<sup>18</sup> Surviving material suggests that Garnett had little choice in the matter of his resignation. He was asked to submit a 'report' – of what remains unclear – to Theo Russell and called at the Foreign Office in order to see him. After that meeting, Russell asked Lord Curzon, the



Foreign Secretary, if Garnett might be placed *en disponibilité* for a year on condition that he submitted his resignation during that time.

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At one level, the sudden transition from diplomat to charity worker seems incongruous. The arrogant tone in some of Garnett's correspondence might suggest that he would have had little time for those less fortunate than himself. In fact, throughout his diplomatic career he maintained an interest in social welfare and educational issues. This was true, for example, in his visit to a leper colony at Scutari, Constantinople, in 1904, and to a prison in Macedonia with George Lloyd in 1905. Lloyd had to be removed from the institution in a state of collapse but Garnett, abandoning any pretence of sycophancy, had informed the *Vali* in no uncertain terms that it required reforming. Similarly, when in Peking, he took a close interest in educational facilities as well as in the Chinese authorities' propensity for torture and the ill-treatment of prisoners. In Morocco and then in Argentina, he had elected to visit penal establishments as well as schools. When in Tangier he was particularly annoyed by stories of excess in England, among them investitures and weddings, when the working class Spanish and French in Tangier starved.<sup>19</sup> In December 1917, he declined an invitation to take Christmas dinner at the legation, not simply because he could not bear spending time with the Whites but also because he considered it wrong, in view of the hardship and illness in Tangier. In January 1919, just before leaving Buenos Aires, he took advantage of the temporary lull in social engagements to visit the seamen's hospital.

It seems likely that his interest in social issues related partly to his desire to understand better the nature of the countries concerned. It was also a reflection of a broader underlying preoccupation with the future strength and integrity of the British Empire, and of Britain's overseas interests more generally. As previously suggested, for much of his diplomatic career, this interest had found expression in vitriolic attacks on the Liberal Government under Herbert Asquith. But Garnett was no diehard Tory. When posted to St Petersburg, he had commented at some length on political developments in Britain. In December 1910, he told his mother that had he been able to vote, he would have opted for the Conservatives in order simply to act 'as a drag on the State'.<sup>20</sup> He sympathized with the principle of the Liberals' social reform but felt that they had gone too far. They were 'splendid, sublime but Utopian'.<sup>21</sup> The Conservatives, on the other hand, ought to have reformed the House

of Lords and made provision for Home Rule. On several occasions, he expressed enthusiasm for Lloyd George's abilities not only as a war leader but also as one who might reform government and tackle the gross inefficiencies which existed in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, among other places. Quite where his true political allegiances lay is difficult to judge, but it seems likely that he rated efficiency above dogma and that he was also deeply patriotic. He brought these two elements to bear in his criticisms of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic and Consular Services.

Although at one level he recognized the importance of display and pomp in its place, he clearly detested the orgy of self-indulgence which characterized some diplomatic posts. His chief complaint throughout his diplomatic career had been the pointlessness of most of what he, and many of his colleagues, did on a day-to-day basis. On many occasions, certainly more often during the war years, he had expressed a desire to undertake more worthwhile work. During his two wartime postings to the Foreign Office, he had of course visited the East End and involved himself in the work of boys' clubs especially. The desire to undertake 'useful', practical work, which had a demonstrably positive outcome, also owed something to the inner, spiritual turmoil which manifested itself on his journey across Mongolia and which may well have recurred in a different guise in his petulant and querulous behaviour in subsequent postings.

His involvement in social welfare and voluntary work was also to some extent self-interested in that he appeared not to have abandoned personal ambition entirely. When writing to his mother during this period, he singled out for special mention those aspects of his work that might bring him into contact with prominent people, politicians especially. Of course, this may have been intended to assuage her anxieties. It is also true that his immersion in voluntary work and paid employment in social work came about by default: his efforts to obtain paid employment in other areas, possibly overseas, were unsuccessful. Certainly, in the spring of 1920, when life in the East End had grown 'a little too strenuous', and Garnett planned to reduce his involvement in social work, he moved back, briefly as it transpired, to Langham Street in the West End.

There was also no obvious contradiction, indeed the reverse, in terms of family tradition, in explaining his move to social work. His grandfather had after all established the Bleasdale Reformatory, something which William Garnett, Jack's father continued. Furthermore, some of Garnett's work was undertaken under the auspices of Toynbee Hall.

Both it as well as the universities settlement movement in East London had led many prominent men and women from diverse spheres of life to take an active interest in social work. What might at first have appeared to be a bewildering trail of political allegiance was also less self-contradictory when one considers the nature of inter-war political convergence between the main parties. Furthermore, Garnett was, at one level, motivated by a diehard opposition to Bolshevism.<sup>22</sup>

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Soon after his return from Buenos Aires, Garnett found it necessary to make a number of personal economies. Firstly, he began to sell some of his Chinese things, eventually entrusting their sale to The Chinese Products Company, a specialist firm in London. In a short time, it became necessary to dispose of his Persian embroideries also. He forfeited his membership of St James's, the MCC, the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Society of Arts. He had initially turned to writing and lecturing on his overseas experiences as a means of generating self-publicity, with a view to obtaining some form of salaried employment. During 1919–20, he wrote several articles for the *Daily Mail*, the *Sphere*, *Morocco* and *The Times*.<sup>23</sup> He also wrote some articles for publications in America which were handled by an agent. His assiduous letter writing paid dividends, and on several occasions he asked his mother to send batches of his letters on which he might base his articles. Major lectures followed on the subject of Mongolia. He addressed an audience of over 500 at the Wigmore Hall in October 1919, a lecture which was undertaken to raise funds for the Church Army. He spoke at the Society of Arts, with Sir Percy Cox in the chair, and many China hands in the audience, among them Sir John Jordan. Then he hoped that a contact would introduce him to some businessmen with interests in the Far East, and he hoped for George Morrison's help.<sup>24</sup> At one level the lecture did help. Garnett was invited to dine with the Geographical Club, with Francis Younghusband in the chair. Other distinguished soldiers, diplomats and travellers, among them Sir Ernest Shackleton, also attended, but this simply led to an unwanted invitation to dine with the Bax-Ironsides.<sup>25</sup> He also spoke at a number of schools, including Westminster School, Eton, where he was cheered rapturously by 300 boys, and Harrow, where, to Garnett's trepidation, he found a hall of 800 boys awaiting him.<sup>26</sup> Besides these more prestigious venues, Garnett also lectured at a great many others in Essex and in the East End. Although, as he informed his mother, preparing for these lectures kept him busy,

he was not paid for them, and received relatively little for his journalistic work. Briefly, a career in journalism, initially with the Hulton Press, and then later with *The Times*, seemed a possibility. When, after an interview with Hulton, which controlled a number of newspapers, including the London *Evening Standard*, he was not offered a post, he claimed that this was a temporary disappointment, and that they had really wanted a writer with knowledge of domestic rather than foreign issues, who might write leaders for two of their papers.<sup>27</sup> But his continuing financial difficulties did preclude his return to Quernmore for Christmas in 1919. The appointment with *The Times* was to have involved extensive travel in the Far East and South Asia in order to measure the extent of Japanese influence. The appointee would then have settled in Peking, replacing David Fraser, the paper's China correspondent. In Garnett's view, and given the trend towards recruiting outsiders for key diplomatic posts, the appointee would most likely become minister at Peking.<sup>28</sup> This was not to be, not even with George Morrison's enthusiastic support, and Garnett's idea of a posting to Mongolia for that paper, which Morrison supported, also came to nothing.

Garnett's need for paid employment was indeed pressing. He continued even at this stage to receive an allowance of £200 a year from his father but that was not sufficient. Upon his return from Argentina, after an initial stay at Hotel Jules, and then at his old lodgings on Ryder Street, he moved to a number of temporary addresses. In May 1919, he relocated to the Great Eastern Hotel, Liverpool Street and was 'nearly on the rocks but not quite'.<sup>29</sup> This was partly because he had been obliged to repay some money which had been removed from the legation safe in Sofia, during his hurried departure in 1915. The surviving correspondence surrounding this issue is not entirely clear but in May 1919 there did not appear to be any obvious suggestion of wrong doing on Garnett's part.<sup>30</sup> In fact, in September 1919, he was forced to send an urgent telegram to Quernmore asking for £10 in order to pay his hotel bill. He was in dire straits and such demands were awkward. He had sold his furniture in Sofia but would not receive any of the money until after the peace treaty with Bulgaria was signed. On one occasion, Garnett returned unopened an envelope containing money which his mother had sent to him.

Garnett had refused to return to Quernmore despite his mother's repeated, anguished, appeals for him to do so in May 1919.<sup>31</sup> She had wanted him to write letters on his father's behalf. William Garnett was well enough to sit on the bench in the spring Quarter Sessions but was extremely unwell. Also, she wanted Jack to be present when he dealt

with James Cranston, his father's agent. She felt increasingly unable to cope with the strain of the family's financial problems, the persistence of which was ascribed to Cranston's incompetence and even criminality. William Garnett had little financial acumen, and among his other difficulties, besides Jack's allowance, he had inherited various financial liabilities, in the shape of annuities to family members.<sup>32</sup> Among other things, this necessitated the closure of Bleasdale Reformatory in 1905. These burdens, as well as the unsuccessful assumption of responsibilities which his own, more able father had executed with ease, led to a succession of breakdowns in his later life.<sup>33</sup> Garnett's mother was understandably extremely anxious about the ending of his diplomatic career, and his intention to embark upon largely unpaid work. Also, she found it difficult to contact him because of his repeated changes of address. Their correspondence became less frequent and fulsome. However, Garnett, although he recognized that he should not burden his father with his own financial problems, steadfastly refused to return to Quernmore, and this had forced his brother to return from West Africa, with power of attorney. There is, indeed, a sense that he was in denial about his predicament and that of his family.<sup>34</sup>

In August 1919, Garnett was flat-sitting in Cadogan Square, and toying with the idea of returning to Mongolia, but when that arrangement came to an end, and after a brief stay at Queen's Gate Gardens, he decided to move to the East End. There, as he informed his mother, he could live on £2 a week and he would immerse himself in voluntary work. Simultaneous with the pursuit of a journalistic career, Garnett also actively sought other opportunities, among them appointments with the YMCA, with the Russian Red Cross and as a salesman for Chinese goods. There was also some discussion of involvement in commercial openings in Morocco but he lacked the capital to commit to the venture. The appointment would have brought a salary of £500 per annum, a similar amount for expenses, and a quarter-share in its Moroccan profits, but the firm in question required an initial investment. William Garnett, who was rather sceptical of the venture, refused to guarantee a bank loan which his son hoped to raise against his salary and his investment and suggested that he should approach the bank himself.<sup>35</sup> A further opportunity arose of becoming an agent for some merchants in Morocco, but the opportunity also passed.

Soon after his return from Argentina, Garnett had also begun to spend several nights a week in Plaistow, where he resumed wartime involvement with boys' clubs, and also became involved in the Given-Wilson Institute, with its wide range of charitable endeavours. From the autumn

of 1919, the scope of his voluntary commitments increased considerably. In November, he attended a conference in Manchester on the subject of the Leisure of the People and informed his mother that he now sat on the council of the National Baby Week, which met on a monthly basis but did 'precious little work... [but] talks interminably'.<sup>36</sup> Garnett soon relinquished his seat on the council but continued to speak on its behalf. In time, he judged Plaistow rather too suburban for his tastes and moved to Stepney in the winter of 1919–20. There, he was again involved in boys' clubs but quickly became disenchanted with them and their members. Some of the boys were not destitute and paid too small a subscription and had rather too much left over to spend on cigarettes and gambling. His efforts to find them work were not always appreciated.<sup>37</sup>

Garnett continued to sit on the governing council of the Given-Wilson Institute, but he turned increasingly to various activities in the Shadwell and Wapping areas. Occasionally, these included lectures to boys' groups about his travels and his contacts with missionaries, but the majority of his time was spent on various boards and committees. In January 1920, he joined the college board of the London Hospital and also became its temporary treasurer. His services to the hospital were later recognized with a certificate of Life Governorship. In May 1920, he accepted an offer to become secretary of the Whitechapel branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. He later became chairman of the association's Stepney branch. In June, he was invited to sit on the committee of the Invalid Children's Aid Association at Toynbee Hall, and in July 1920, he was asked to join the Council and Executive Committee of Dr Barnardo's Homes. This growing burden of work, particularly his increasing involvement in the management of the London Hospital, at the instigation of Lord Knutsford, who was its chair, led him to move back to the East End, in July 1920, in order to save money on fares. Garnett moved to a room at Toynbee Hall with which the hospital was associated and which was nearby. From there he described his new home to his mother as 'a very pleasant place – full of life & intellect – though somewhat tending towards Bolshevism. There are about 20 residents (men) and at lunch a number of women join us – dropping from their various works'.<sup>38</sup> Although Garnett, as the newest resident had the smallest room, he hoped that another would be made available in due course. He reduced his costs by planning a series of educational lectures which he would deliver in the autumn.

An invitation to chair the Robert Montefiore School Care Committee followed in October 1920, and in November, he was asked to sit

on the committee of the British Dominions Emigration Society. He was later treasurer of the society's Stepney branch and was otherwise actively involved in its activities.<sup>39</sup> He also became manager of a group of schools and, from March 1921, chairman of the Stepney Boy Scouts Association, and apparently also, at some point, of the Samaritan Society. Garnett's involvement with Barnardo's, led to his appointment as honorary governor of its William Baker Technical School at Goldings in Hertfordshire, from its inception in 1922. The school was officially opened amid much fanfare by the Prince of Wales on 17 November 1922, and Garnett played a prominent part in the proceedings and in the school's early days. It offered training, initially to some 260 boys from the East End, in many different trades in rather palatial surroundings. A senior figure in Barnardo's, Howard Williams, clearly felt that Garnett was destined for 'a great career' in that organization. He noted:

Your training and experience, your knowledge of the conditions in which the poor live, and your sympathy and devotion to the best interests of the boys, mark you out as a possible Honorary Director of the whole work.

There are many great men in this world and we are proud of them, but the man who has the soul to inspire and the brain to lead a team of men and women engaged in making honest, loyal, Godfearing men and women by the thousand out of homeless and unwanted children is the superman who will make a bigger mark in the world, and do infinitely more good, than any leader in society, commerce, politics, or the Services.<sup>40</sup>

In November 1923, *The Sunday School Chronicle and Christian Outlook* noted of Goldings' honorary governor that he was 'a Christian gentleman, who realizes the importance and magnitude of the task. Mr W. J. Garnett, J.P., had devoted the leisure of life, which is so often given to selfish pursuits, to fathering these destitute boys, and to the work of creating in his great family a spirit and tradition akin to what are found in the great public schools. He regards the boys as his "sons," and nothing pleases him better than to see them making steady progress, and winning the good opinion of men who count.'<sup>41</sup> The scheme was one element in the wider initiative to encourage emigration to the Dominions. This, in turn, led to many invitations from, among others, Hertford Town Football Club, Barnardo's Old Boys' Sports Club

and Barnardo's Old Boy's Guild Committee. These were, however, to be temporary connections. Garnett was unhappy at Goldings. He felt that Barnardo's was badly run and he connived with the governing board to oust its administrator, Rear-Admiral Harry Stileman. Garnett believed that many of the boys were not destitute. Stileman's departure, though a relief at one level, placed an added burden of work on him. By the autumn of 1923 Garnett wanted to resign. He felt isolated and that both his role and the school's role were misunderstood.

Garnett's return to London led to a further broadening of his activities. Among other things, he became a visitor at Pentonville Prison, where he and the writer Stephen Graham ran over 120 cells between them. They had keys and came and went from the cells as they wished. He also became involved in the activities of the London Public Morality Committee and once again in those of the Ratcliffe Settlement. His work with the Dominions Emigration Society led to a month-long trip to Canada. The society had settled a number of men in Canada as harvesters and the purpose of the trip was to facilitate the settlement of their wives and children.<sup>42</sup> Garnett, as the leader of the visiting party, had a free passage and free use of the railway network. Among other things this enabled him to visit boys who had previously been at Barnardo's. From Quebec, they went to Montreal, and though he liked the city he felt that irregularly shaped telegraph poles spoil its appeal. Their itinerary took them to Winnipeg, Calgary and Banff, stopping at Regina and Moose jaw on their return, then to Toronto, some Ontario towns, including Niagara, and back to Montreal. Garnett also visited some prisons, the conditions of which he compared very favourably with Pentonville and other penal establishments that he had encountered.<sup>43</sup>

Several of Garnett's acquaintances from Toynbee Hall had been elected to Parliament in 1922-3, including Arthur Greenwood, Noel Buxton, Margaret Bondfield, and Clement Attlee.<sup>44</sup> Briefly it seemed that Garnett might join Stepney Borough Council as a Labour member, and a 'refining presence', as he told his mother, and he was actively involved in campaigning on behalf of the Labour Party. At its invitation he also became a member of an advisory committee on the Home Office which met at the House of Commons. This political activity and his own candidacy, which were thrown into confusion by his trip to Canada, ended with the disclosures in the Zinoviev letter, when, to his mind, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald failed satisfactorily to explain its provenance and accuracy.



It is difficult to know how much to make of this episode, as indeed of Garnett's flirtation with the Labour Government. Garnett was drawn to Labour *ideals* but increasingly he found Labour politics in the East End to be too radical. From his first association with Toynbee Hall he lamented what he perceived as recurring indications of Bolshevik influence and to that extent his decision to withdraw from campaigning was logical. From surviving records, he appears to have sat on the Council of Toynbee Hall for most of 1924–5, but his membership, as well as his residency at the Hall, appears to have continued until at least 1926. Thereafter, it seems that in so far as his voluntary work was concerned he was less inclined to toe the Labour Party line. This was evidenced in his involvement in a further, temporary and problematic venture when Garnett, in association with Toynbee Hall, tried to establish a new boy's hostel for boys.<sup>45</sup>

The impetus for its establishment, as the annual report of Toynbee Hall for 1926 noted, was 'in response to many representations which have been received during recent years from magistrates, clergymen and other social workers who are in touch with the East End boy... The boy who has no home or who is cursed with a bad one is in imminent peril. He is unguided; he contracts bad habits and enters into evil companionships: shades of the prison house indeed begin to fall upon him!'<sup>46</sup> From the outset, Garnett found himself under some pressure to bring the project to fruition. In April 1925, he recorded his aim to be installed in the new building, the construction of which had not yet begun, by Christmas. But he was far from enthusiastic, when anticipating the 'solid twelve hours work a day... ceaseless vigilance & control of temper' which would be required to inculcate the necessary spirit and tradition. The task would be more difficult because of red elements who were involved with it and he anticipated many fights to keep it on the right lines. Garnett was keenly aware and rather proud of the fact that the new hostel would impinge upon the work of nearby Barnardo's.<sup>47</sup> The patronage of the family of Sir Ernest Benn, with its strong Liberal associations, was enlisted. This provided a means of thwarting radical Labour influence, but the family expected rapid progress in the hostel's construction. As he noted to his mother in October 1926, 'Progress is one thing, chaos (as desired by the all-reds) another. The Labour element here is too soft towards the Communists.' But at this stage the venture still required £5000 as well as annual running costs.<sup>48</sup>

The John Benn Hostel and Milner Hall as it became was beset with problems. Garnett ascribed this partly to the interference of elements at Toynbee Hall, whose warden, James Mallon, was Vice-President of the

managing organization, the Council of the East End Hostels Association. He also considered it to be vulnerable to unrealistic expectations on the part of its sponsors. Garnett had enlisted the Prince of Wales to open the hostel and the latter had taken a good deal of interest in it, offering to return on an informal basis to speak to the boys. But within a short space of time Garnett had to dismiss the matron. The hostel had no solid financial foundations and planning was therefore impossible. Garnett's letters in the spring and summer of 1927 record his spiral into despondency. In July, he told his mother that he had agreed to postpone his departure until September. 'It has been six months of great drudgery "very patiently borne" as the obituary notices say! & I shall be thankful to be quit of it.'<sup>49</sup> A fortnight later, the hostel's water supply broke down. Garnett had had enough. After a few weeks holiday at Quernmore, he moved, initially to a small room on Park Lane, and then, when the reality of his financial situation dawned, to the Red House hostel on Commercial Road. He could not take a bath there, and he was criticized by fellow residents for not being a 'working man'. But at least he was free of the John Benn Hostel and of Toynbee Hall's politics.

Garnett, like many others who sympathized with the Labour Government, as well as many whose loyalties lay elsewhere, was concerned at the possibility of Soviet subversion. This was especially so, as when the Zinoviev scandal erupted, it transpired that MacDonald had also been in the process of concluding a commercial agreement with the Soviet Government. Fear of the mob may also partly explain why Garnett volunteered as a special constable during the General Strike.<sup>50</sup> The more immediate cause was the fact that the warden and sub-warden of Toynbee Hall had permitted some of the strikers to use the building as their headquarters and provided afternoon concerts for their entertainment. Garnett was increasingly at odds with James Mallon, whose political ambitions, in Garnett's view, exceeded his commitment to social work. Mallon was warden between 1919 and 1954 and did indeed stand for Parliament as a Labour candidate in 1922, but he has received a more sympathetic portrayal from others. It is possible that what Garnett perceived as personal ambition was rather a capacity for dealing with political figures.<sup>51</sup>

According to Garnett, some four thousand strikers had arrived suddenly on the morning of 4 May, 1926.<sup>52</sup> He reported for duty on 6 May, and actively encouraged some fellow residents to do the same. He was attached to Bishopsgate Police Station and undertook his first patrol that night. Early next morning he watched the convoy starting off to raise the siege of London and to seize flour supplies at the docks. As he

recalled, 'It was a wonderful sight: dawn was breaking and 100 lorries went at full speed through the empty City with troops on board and accompanied by armoured cars.' Rather incongruously, Garnett added, 'I am itching to use my truncheon on some East-End heads.'<sup>53</sup> It seems, however, that Garnett did not oppose the strikers *per se*. His argument was with their leaders whom he felt to be under communist influence.<sup>54</sup> Garnett's growing doubts about Labour leadership in practice are also suggested by the invitation that he extended to a Colonel John Dodge, prospective Conservative candidate for a Stepney division, in his child rescue work meetings. It seems that he and Dodge, whom he regarded as a corrective to radical Labour elements, became close associates.<sup>55</sup>

In the following year, according to a later account, Garnett seriously contemplated joining the Franciscans as a lay brother and was only deterred by the sense that it might seem a 'selfish way to evade responsibilities'.<sup>56</sup> This urge may simply have been the logical culmination of his charitable works. There are repeated indications of his religious faith in this period and of his urge to dispense alms. Some of his work in Stepney involved listening to pleas for help from the destitute. His association with St Augustine's Church also apparently led to missionary work, with some corrective political propaganda thrown in, among hop pickers. In the autumn of 1928, he lived in a hut on a platform in a field in Kent, sleeping under a large pile of blankets, and working from 7 am until 11.30 pm. From there, he dispensed studs, cotton, needles, stamps, Eno's Fruit Salt and wise words to the hop pickers. He took a perambulating canteen out in the morning and then after a quick meal was out with jugs of water until 4.30 pm. A football match, and obligatory fights, among the youths followed, and in the evening all of the pickers, as well as Garnett went to a local pub, where he organized the evening's entertainment in the courtyard for hundreds of, not infrequently disorderly, hoppers from all the farms. His only luxury was a cup of tea at 6 am.<sup>57</sup>

The death of William Garnett in April 1929, when Jack was 50 years old, placed him in a difficult position. It is clear that the family fortunes had dwindled and Garnett must have wondered what he could possibly do to reverse this.<sup>58</sup> He had become accustomed to a frugal existence in the East End. But this time he did return permanently to Quernmore. There he felt 'cold and unhappy' and his Tory neighbours openly referred to him as a 'socialist'.<sup>59</sup> It was this sense of not fitting in, mingled, perhaps, with a sense of responsibility, which led Garnett to return to Quernmore and adopt, to all intents and purposes, the outward appearance of a Conservative landed gentleman. 'Tall and always

sprucely attired', and with suggestions as to his previous career in the Diplomatic Service,<sup>60</sup> as one newspaper account described him, Garnett immersed himself in local affairs and continued his involvement in social concerns. He sat on many committees relating to parish relief, education, old age pensions and gave lectures for the Rural Adult Education Movement. In 1929, he joined Lunesdale Rural District Council, and in April 1936 became its chair, the first of three such occasions, representing it on the Lancashire County Council. In the following year, he followed three generations of his family in becoming High Sheriff, a position he occupied twice.

Garnett also revived his thespian interests, which had flagged during his East End years. He served as president of the Lancashire Footlights Club, of the Morecambe Warblers Amateur Operatic and Dramatic Society, as well as of the North Lancashire Branch of the English Folk Dancing Society. He was also an office holder with the RSPCA, was for a time chairman of the Lancashire Moor Hospital Committee and served on Lancashire River Board. Garnett did not altogether abandon his interest in world affairs and foreign policy issues. Among other things, he was actively involved on a local basis with the League of Nations Union, as president of its Lancaster branch. In September 1936, he attended the International Peace Congress in Brussels: 'one of the most remarkable & interesting gatherings I have ever seen'.<sup>61</sup> He encountered the *Daily Mail* special correspondent, Randolph Churchill, and managed to tone down Churchill's vehement criticisms of the meeting, if only marginally. Though fascinated by some of the discussions, in which he actively participated, Garnett found himself strongly opposed to the underlying theme of all of the speakers: that the idea of using force at all must be banished. To him this seemed to preclude national and personal defence of any kind and was therefore, not only dangerous, but also contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.<sup>62</sup> Further involvement with the cause included participation in the Interlaken Oxford Group House Party in September 1938.

Interestingly, however, in terms of party political loyalties, Garnett had become a Conservative. This did not mean slavish obedience to the local Member of Parliament, Herwald Ramsbotham,<sup>63</sup> or to Conservative policies. In 1931, Garnett was extremely critical of Ramsbotham's apparent lack of interest in his constituency and urged him to remedy this in no uncertain terms.<sup>64</sup> Almost immediately on his return to Quernmore, however, Garnett had joined the Conservative Association and soon after accepted the chairmanship of the Lancashire Conservative Association. His resignation in October 1936 was partly attributable to a

divergence of opinion with Ramsbotham and with government policy on Abyssinia. Although the precise point at issue is not clear, it appears that Garnett believed that sanctions should continue to be applied to Italy after Abyssinia had effectively been conquered.<sup>65</sup> Whether or not Garnett was also unhappy more generally about the effective capitulation of the Conservative Government towards Mussolini's invasion is unclear, but this is certainly possible. Ramsbotham, when seeking to explain his views to Garnett, and acknowledging his offer to postpone his departure until October 1936, noted that he would not be asked to speak on behalf of the government during that time.<sup>66</sup> It also seems possible that Garnett may have felt less comfortable following the edicts of a purely Conservative government rather than the admittedly Conservative-dominated, National Government under Stanley Baldwin. He was, in short, a Conservative with a Liberal mind, not dissimilar to Lord Milner.

In later years, Garnett also developed a keen interest in local history and wrote two pamphlets on the subject. He was also drawn towards voluntary activity related to mental health. In 1945, he was chair of the Lancashire Mental Hospitals Board, and in 1955–6 visited Istanbul in order to attend the conference of the World Federation of Mental Health. To Garnett, the city had retained much of its old charm but the institutions that he visited suggested scope for modernization. Garnett contrasted his experiences with his 1905 visit to a hospital in Macedonia in a short pamphlet and delivered a talk on the BBC Home Service.<sup>67</sup> Further 'then and now' comparisons were planned but, according to Garnett's testimony, were apparently prevented by a more rapid onset of old age than he had anticipated. Although Garnett's producer at the BBC had some difficulty melding the two aspects of his talk, the underlying theme that a 'closer understanding of the history and peoples of every other country is essential to world peace' was at least clear to Garnett.<sup>68</sup> In 1963, he returned to Iran, as a member of a moral rearmament delegation. Inevitably, such trips as well as his active involvement in local affairs became more limited. Living in Quernmore Park Hall had become difficult. The War Office had requisitioned it during the war, and after his mother's death in 1951, Garnett lived in just two rooms, formerly the housekeeper's. In his final years he moved to Constitution Hill House in Quernmore Park. There, his eyes failing and rather deaf, he was read to each morning by a servant who had worked for the family for over 65 years. Most of the farms were sold to the sitting tenants and the Hall was given, apparently on a whim, to an Anglican religious order, the community of the Sacred Mission.<sup>69</sup> The remainder of the estate, one

working farm, some cottages, the agent's house, and the park were left to his nephew. In October 1965, he fell in his lounge apparently when trying to close some window shutters. He sustained a fracture to his thigh, and this led to a blockage in his lungs. He died two days later at the age of 87 at the Royal Infirmary, Lancaster.<sup>70</sup>

# Epilogue

Garnett's diplomatic career possibly was not of fundamental importance in British diplomatic history. There is little to suggest that the course of British foreign policy would have been changed much, if at all, had his career ended somewhat earlier than it did, or even, if he had not entered 'the career' in the first place. And yet, in seeking to understand British foreign policy, the administrative edifices that sustained it, as well as the unspoken assumptions on which that policy was formulated, the individual case study is of considerable value. And while, when trying to explain foreign policy, one might identify trends and longer-term influences which doubtless transcend the individual and render him a mere surface flurry, thankfully Garnett was no automaton. At one level, he was, in terms of his upbringing and education, very typical of British diplomats of his day. But his psychological complexity, however one seeks to explain it, made him quite unsuited to the world that they inhabited.

In Garnett's case, we are very fortunate that he left such a voluminous and, now thoroughly catalogued, collection of private papers. If the portrait in this book has raised many more questions than it has answered, then that is, to some extent, the result of Garnett's enigmatic personality. Of its unique character, there can be little doubt. It can be said that, from the historian's perspective, he greatly enriched the various legations and embassies where he served. His work in the East End of London and in Lancashire was a fitting testament to his belief in combating the baser elements of the human mind. One can only speculate that the extent of his commitments in Lancashire when he returned after his father's death precluded the completion of a memoir.<sup>1</sup> Either that or else as a very prominent figure in local society, he could not risk exposing to scrutiny the events, either at Tehran, Athens, Tangier or

Buenos Aires, which had ended his career. Had he written such a memoir, then perhaps as with a surviving autobiographical fragment among his papers, its title might have been 'The Quest: or Journey's End'.

Precisely what did end Garnett's diplomatic career remains unclear, but even without his various transgressions its end was in many ways inevitable. Even at a relatively early stage in his career, he harboured grave doubts about the whole basis of British foreign policy. A case in point was his assessment of the situation in Persia, when seen from St Petersburg in December 1910. He noted, prophetically:

I do not understand the attitude of Western Europe towards the question of Constitutional Government to Oriental Countries. Orientals are wholly unfit for that form of rule: we know ourselves that Egypt and India are quite unfitted for it & yet we press the Chinese & Persians to adopt that form of rule though we also know that the Chinese & Persians are even behind Egypt & India in their state of fitness. And it is also a danger to the world as it also brings in its train an aggressive nationalist spirit. It has had that effect in Turkey where the Young Turk party openly state that the principal point of their creed is to osmanicize [sic] the whole of Turkey in Europe & then to carry out a forward policy against Europe . . . Europe will get its fingers burnt some day but it will hardly be in our life time.<sup>2</sup>

By 1918–19, as previously noted, he had most definitely outgrown the old diplomacy. His holistic conception of British overseas interests was turning increasingly upon a more tightly knit empire, both formal and informal, sustained by a more efficient, fitter and healthier people. His work in the East End during and after the war was a direct link to this notion, as was his activity on behalf of patriotic causes among the British colony in Tangier in 1916–18. To some extent, this was a displacement activity, there being little political work at that post. But it also reflected an element of his character and intellectual complexion which the Diplomatic Service did not and could not satisfy. Intertwined with this were his Christian belief and a moral underlay which his irreverence often belied. Old diplomacy had run its course as far as he was concerned. His increasing boredom with its social obligations and with the narrow and self-interested focus of foreign policy held little appeal. During the First World War, he identified in constructive imperialism and Lloyd George's approach to government ideas which might displace the old order. As far as its application to diplomacy was concerned, Garnett applauded the forced departure of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, as ambassador



at Washington, as he associated him with the 'old school', which Lloyd George was bent upon eliminating. The point has been made, quite accurately, that Spring-Rice's removal, and that of Lord Bertie of Thame also, was not the result of intrigue but of a sense that their continued service in, respectively, Washington and Paris, had ceased to be efficient or rational.<sup>3</sup> Garnett hoped for a further purge, and as previously noted, he applauded the post-war reform of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service.<sup>4</sup> This was no doubt partly due to a deep sense of bitterness and injustice which he felt, or purported to feel, towards the Foreign Office. When promising to show his Bulgarian diary to George Morrison in February 1920, he noted that 'It will show you why one mistrusts & despises the F.O. & all its works.'<sup>5</sup>

However, there were limits to his engagement with the idea of a 'new diplomacy'. It seems unlikely that he would have wanted these reforms to go too far, for example, to amalgamate the Diplomatic Service with the Consular Service. His criticisms of the old diplomacy were intertwined with a burning desire to fight in the trenches. Then, he appeared unable to suborn his own base instincts which he later castigated in others. Like many, perhaps, he identified a higher principle in the Allied cause, even if it entailed suffering and the very kind of international anarchy which it might prevent in the future. He opposed a negotiated peace. The war might finally settle many tiresome, outstanding, questions between the belligerents. During the war, he pondered how the Allies might avoid a German war of revenge, and how Germany's re-armament might be avoided. However, immediately after the war, he did not appear to engage very much, if at all, in the idea of an international body which might prevent war, though, admittedly, he did so during the 1930s. What does emerge, perhaps, is his belief that, as Professor Hinsley suggested, in the twentieth century, mankind's knowledge and power appeared to have outpaced their wisdom.<sup>6</sup> Garnett could do little to combat this in the Diplomatic Service and sought to do so initially in social welfare activity and then in a broad range of other worthy pursuits in Lancashire. Admittedly, this move was not entirely voluntary, and owed much to his state of mind and to allegiances within the Foreign Office in 1919, as well as to Garnett's personal volition. It was, also, a reflection of the fact that his definition of 'British overseas interests' was not limited to those within the purview of the Foreign Office. After the First World War, there was a heightened convergence between foreign and imperial policy. Partly this reflected the contribution of the formal empire to the war. Garnett's response to this and to Britain's future needs was to suggest an imperial parliament, drawing

representatives from across the formal empire, with federal chambers for England, Scotland and Ireland. Such thoughts, as with his criticisms of government departments during the war, and his belief in post-war compulsory military training for men, were rooted in the need for efficiency and vigilance as a nation.

At one level, more difficult to comprehend was his abandonment of his work in the East End and his return to Quernmore, and his adoption of a very different political and social demeanour in the remainder of his life. One can only surmise that his father's death removed the one impediment to his return and to the assumption of a role which would not be hampered in any sense by fraternal interference. Some time had passed since his refusal to return to Quernmore. And there was a clear sense in which his activities in the East End were not entirely satisfactory. He had very little money, he was not accepted by at least some of the people he dealt with, on account of his elevated origins and his accent, and he diverged sharply on political grounds with some of his colleagues. Undoubtedly, he might have risen quite far in certain charitable bodies but without embarking upon a political career, and his party political allegiances were uncertain after 1924, he could only achieve so much. As such, his immersion in Conservative politics in Lancashire was not as remarkable as it might seem at first sight. The political parties at that time were involved in successive national governments. He had little time for party politics *per se* and wished to rise above the considerable physical and psychological challenges which he personally had faced in the course of his life. Thus, his return to Quernmore merely reflected a degree of adaptability and determination, as well as of self-interest and self-preservation, which had previously sustained him.

The final enigma was his deeply sclerotic handling of the family affairs and property. Notwithstanding his own, as well as his father's concerns about Cranston, who was prone to bouts of heavy drinking, and whose disposal of parts of Quernmore Park was of doubtful legality, he retained his services.<sup>7</sup> He arrived too late to bid his father a final farewell but recorded a 'distressing meeting' with his mother, the day after his death. A few weeks later, perhaps having reflected upon this encounter, Garnett began the destruction of 'unwanted papers' and books.<sup>8</sup> It is tempting to wonder if this purge included his father's missing diaries. These, one might imagine, recorded an old man, in the throes of a prolonged breakdown, frequently depressed and increasingly unable to cope, being manipulated by his estate manager. Perhaps, Garnett felt that they reflected discredit upon the family as well as upon him personally. Even when the surviving diaries resumed in 1925, William Garnett

noted his continuing mental fragility, as well as Cranston's apparent inability, to appreciate his financial position.<sup>9</sup>

But having returned in 1929, and having destroyed this unpleasant record of events, Garnett lost little time in leaving his own stamp on family affairs. His father's last diary entry was on 12 April 1929, and Jack resumed on 26 April, with the simple note 'Jack Garnett begins'. The implied sense of family tradition and of continuity took strange paths thereafter. As previously noted, he sold, destroyed or otherwise disposed of many valuable paintings and furniture, and when making a will in the autumn of 1930, recorded that he had, by his own reckoning, done his best regarding the future of Quernmore Park. Those who followed would be able to live in the Hall 'if they have the will to do so and are prepared to make similar sacrifices to those made by myself.'<sup>10</sup> And yet, as we have seen, by virtue of subsequent actions on his part, his family were denied this opportunity.

# Notes

## Preface

1. This paragraph is largely based upon J. M. Robinson, *A Guide to The Country Houses of the North West* (London, Constable, 1991), p. 227, and C. Hartwell and N. Pevsner, *The Buildings of England: Lancashire: North* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2009), p. 552.
2. This is based upon *Dod's Parliamentary Guide 1863*. He remained an MP until 1864. His father had contested the seat of Salford in 1837 as a Conservative. According to Jack Garnett he lost by one vote; his opponent and victor having failed to return him the courtesy of voting for him; letter of William James (Jack) Garnett to *The Times*, 8 Jun. 1929.
3. The reformatory's genesis lay in efforts to remedy juvenile delinquency arising from the industrial revolution and specifically in the 'reformatory mania of the 1850s'; E. Garnett, *Juvenile Offenders in Victorian Lancashire: W J Garnett and the Bleasdale Reformatory* (Centre for North-West Regional Studies, Lancaster University, 2008), pp. 1–3, 32.
4. 1st term, 1st half term report. Eden Mount, Grange-Over-Sands: March 1889, Quernmore Papers, DDQ 9/1/1, LRO. All remaining material bearing this prefix is from this collection.
5. Mrs P. Hatfield, College Archivist, Eton College, to the author, 21 Jun. 2005.
6. Judith Curthoys, archivist, Christ Church, Oxford, to the author, 21 Jun. 2005.
7. Z. Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 17.
8. Barrington to William Garnett, 10 Nov. 1897, DDQ 9/1/4. Unless otherwise noted, remaining material in this section is from this file.
9. Barrington to Garnett, 14 Aug. 1899.
10. Pauncefote to Garnett, 29 Aug. 1901.
11. Lansdowne to Devonshire, 20 Nov. 1901.
12. Jack Garnett to his father, 27 Dec. 1901.
13. Scoones to Garnett, 1 Jan. 1902.
14. Jack Garnett to his father, 6 Jan. 1902.
15. Copies of the papers, annotated by Garnett, survive at DDQ 9/1/5.
16. Robert Clive was first with 3084. George Mounsey obtained 2947 marks.
17. In the 3-hour paper, Garnett's chosen questions included the Treaty of Kalisch (1813), the terms and effect of the Quadruple Treaty of London (1834), the French occupation of Rome and the chief provisions of the Treaty of Prague (1866). Interestingly, subjects for the two and a half hour English composition paper included 'The commercial leadership of the future' and 'The expansion of Russia.'

18. Scoones to William Garnett, 28 Mar. 1902. In fact, three unsuccessful candidates for foreign office clerkships also gained higher marks than Clive, Chilton, Garnett and Mounsey, CSC 6/10/11, TNA.
19. Derby to William Garnett, 29 Mar. 1902.
20. Steiner, *The Foreign Office*, pp. 13–15; T. G. Otte, 'Old Diplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Office before 1914', *CBH*, 18, 3 (2004), 35.
21. Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office to Garnett, 4 Aug. 1903, in Jack Garnett to William Garnett, 6 Aug. 1903.

## Introduction

1. 'Funeral Tribute to County Alderman W.J. Garnett', *The Lancaster Guardian & Observer*, 29 Oct. 1965, p. 11.
2. See, for example, B. J. C. McKercher, *Esme Howard: a Diplomatic Biography* (Cambridge, CUP, 1989); K. Hamilton, *Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador* (Woodbridge, Suffolk, The Royal Historical Society/The Boydell Press, 1990); D. Gillies, *Radical Diplomat: the Life of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel, 1882–1951* (London, Tauris, 1999); G. J. Protheroe, *Searching for Security in a New Europe: the Diplomatic Career of Sir George Russell Clerk* (London, Routledge, 2006); G. R. Berridge, *Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865–1939) Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey* (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007).
3. Rose to Garnett, 16 Dec. 1907, DDQ 9/7/2. Rose later married.
4. Marion Carnegie to Garnett, 12 Jul., DDQ 9/7/7, Garnett to his mother, 10 Aug. 1907 (addendum of 20 Aug.), DDQ 9/13/20.
5. Garnett to his mother, 5 Mar. 1909, DDQ 9/23/6.
6. Garnett to Morrison, 9 Jun. [1920], Morrison Papers ML MSS 312/103, SLNSW.
7. Two former medical practitioners, one a psychiatrist, advised me about this.
8. In the case of Sir Herbert and Lady Helen White, under whom he served at Tangier, he dedicated a short, undated, parody narrated by Lady White, in which he, Garnett, was portrayed as 'partially insane' and with manners 'of the wilds of Northern England'; 'Life of Helen, Lady White 1916 & 1917', DDQ 9/46/110.
9. Garnett to Aunt Addie (Adela Tatham), 23 Mar. 1910, DDQ 9/27/5.
10. Sir Frederick Ponsonby considered Lady Feo, wife of Sir Francis Bertie, ambassador at Paris (1905–18), to be 'quite impossible as Ambassadress'; Hamilton, *Bertie of Thame*, p. 10. So, too, the 'unpresentable' wife was a means of maintaining the integrity of the diplomatic elite, when amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services was proposed. Z. Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office Before the Great War', in B. J. C. McKercher and C. J. Lowe (eds), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy 1895–1939* (Edmonton, The University of Alberta Press, 1984), p. 34.
11. Garnett to Oliphant, 2 Sept. 1913, DDQ 9/29/5.
12. He confessed to being greatly affected by the weather: Garnett to his mother, 29 May 1909, DDQ 9/24/11.
13. Garnett to his mother, 20 Jun. 1907, DDQ 9/13/15.
14. Garnett to his mother, 2 Nov. 1904, DDQ 9/4/72.

15. Sir William Wiseman to Eric Drummond, quoted in K. Burke, *Britain, America and the Sinews of War 1914–1918* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 185.
16. Introductory notes to hand list for DDQ 8, LRO.
17. See, for example, Garnett to his mother, 20 Oct. 1910, DDQ 9/25/32, where he cautioned against his father alluding to his letters at his club.
18. Garnett to his mother, 30 Nov. 1903, DDQ 9/4/32.
19. Tower felt that the new departments had quadrupled the work of the legation at Buenos Aires and had reduced its efficiency; Tower to Ernest Satow, 5 Mar. 1917, PRO 30/33/13/4, Satow Papers, TNA.
20. W. J. Glenny, 'The Trade Commissioner and Commercial Diplomatic Services', *JPA*, 2, 3 (1924), 282–7. See, generally, D. C. M. Platt, *Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1968).
21. Garnett to Russell, 25 Mar. 1917, DDQ 9/45/38.
22. H. M. Grove to Garnett, 29 Nov. 1909, DDQ 9/21/2. In fact, Sir Arthur Nicolson, then ambassador at St Petersburg, had also blocked the idea; Nicolson to Grey, 15 Mar. 1909, FO 369/239/6195/11815. Some efforts had been made to improve commercial openings, though with mixed success: K. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 105–6. M. Hughes, *Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution: Britain, Russia and the Old Diplomacy, 1894–1917* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 107–8.
23. David Kelly, on the other hand, who shared Garnett's despair at the Treasury's penny-pinching attitude regarding consular appointments, 'found it utterly impossible to take an interest in anything I was doing', when attached to the Consular Department of the Foreign Office in 1921. Sir D. Kelly, *The Ruling Few or The Human Background to Diplomacy* (London, Hollis and Carter, 1952), pp. 137, 139. Regarding dissatisfaction in the Levant Service before 1914, see G. Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy* (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), pp. 93–7.
24. Glenny, 'The Trade Commissioner', 284. Steiner, *The Foreign Office*, p. 184.
25. The Swedes were frequently held responsible, as they were for transshipping to Germany. See, Marsden, 'The Blockade', in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 497–9, 507–10. In the case of Argentina, the Italians were also blamed.
26. Marsden, 'The Blockade', pp. 493–5, 501–5, 511–12.
27. See M. C. Siney, 'The Allied Blockade Committee and the Inter-Allied Trade Committees: the Machinery of Economic Warfare, 1917–1918', in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt (eds), *Studies in International History* (London, Longmans, 1967), pp. 330–44.
28. The mission built upon previous investigations undertaken in 1898 by Thomas Worthington, in 1911 by T. G. Milne on behalf of the Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence, FO 368/638/43856/47414, and by E. J. Bray temporarily seconded to the Commercial Intelligence Branch in 1917, minute by Rowland Sperling, FO 368/1689/17343/171749.
29. On this, see Garnett's reported comments at a talk on psychology, at a meeting of the Lancaster Branch of the Bank Officers' Guild in April 1939: 'Need for Change in Human Philosophy', *Lancaster Observer and Morecambe Chronicle*, 14 Apr. 1939.

30. Garnett to his father, 19 Feb. 1908, DDQ 9/10/69.
31. R. A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914* (Gerrards Cross, Colin Smythe, 1983), pp. 196–7.
32. Diary/journal entry, 6 Sept. 1917, DDQ 9/46/33. The post-war reforms to the Foreign Office/Diplomatic Service, did not resolve the problem; M. J. Hughes, 'The Peripatetic Career Structure of the British Diplomatic Establishment, 1919–39', *D&S*, 14, 1 (2003), 29–48.
33. The argument has been made that the Foreign Office considered senior appointments carefully; T. G. Otte, '“Not Proficient in Table-Thumping”: Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900–1906', *D&S*, 13, 2 (2002), 191.
34. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 24 Jul. 1909, DDQ 9/27/3.
35. See, for example, C. Gandy, 'Fez and Frock-Coat: A Very English Consul in Ottoman Turkey', *AA*, 15, 1 (1984), 68.
36. Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy', pp. 35–6.
37. S. Jenkins and A. Sloman, *With Respect Ambassador, An Inquiry into the Foreign Office* (London, BBC, 1985), pp. 33–4.
38. Dougald Malcolm to Onslow, 30 Dec. 1913, GD 5337/7/17, Onslow Papers, SHC.
39. Quoted in Burk, *Sinews of War*, p. 184.
40. See J. Fisher, 'Keeping “the Old Flag Flying”: The British community in Morocco and the British Morocco Merchants Association, 1914–24', *HR*, 83, 222 (2010), 719–46.
41. Norman to Grey, 3 Apr. 1914, FO 371/1898/F19663. Norman was appointed to Buenos Aires on a temporary basis, and in the absence of a first secretary who could deputize for the minister when the latter went on leave.
42. R. C. Newton, *German Buenos Aires: 1900–1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis* (Austin/London, University of Texas Press, 1977), pp. 28–31.
43. Kelly, *The Ruling Few*, p. 117.

## 1 Constantinople: 'A Very Wonderful Place'

1. F. F. Goodsell, 'Historical Setting', in C. R. Johnson (ed.), *Constantinople To-Day or the Pathfinder Survey of Constantinople – A Study in Oriental Social Life* (New York, Macmillan, 1922), pp. 14–17.
2. Now the İstiklâl Cad. On its character, see for example, S. Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Everyday Life in the Ottoman Empire from the Middle Ages Until the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* (London, Tauris, 2000), p. 256.
3. D. Coufopoulos, *A Guide to Constantinople* (London, Adam and Charles Black, 1902), pp. 36–7. Garnett to his father, 17 May 1904, DDQ 9/3/40.
4. W. E. Curtis, *Around the Black Sea: Asia Minor, Armenia, Caucasus, Circassia, Daghestan, the Crimea, Roumania* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1911), p. 3.
5. *Ibid*; see also, H. G. Dwight, *Constantinople Old and New* (New York, Charles Scribener's Sons, 1915), pp. 14ff.
6. Lloyd to Gertrude Bell, 17 Nov. 1905 and undated letter (late 1905), GLLD 29/1 George Lloyd Papers, CACC. Aubrey Herbert, who was an honorary attaché at the Embassy, agreed. Herbert arrived in Constantinople

in April 1904 and was consigned by Garnett to do 'most of the dirty work'; M. Fitzherbert, *The Man Who Was Greenmantle: A Biography of Aubrey Herbert* (London, John Murray, 1983), p. 71; Garnett to his mother, 16 Mar. 1904, DDQ 9/4/40. Lloyd had met Garnett when staying in Constantinople in the spring of 1905. He formally became an unpaid attaché and returned to Constantinople in November 1905, by which time Garnett had left. Lloyd's time in the city is described briefly in J. Charmley, *Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 11–12.

7. Garnett to his mother, 31 Aug. 1903, DDQ 9/4/12.
8. Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey*, p. 42.
9. See L. Oliphant, *An Ambassador in Bonds* (2nd edition, London, Putnam, 1947), p. 17. Oliphant, having failed the entrance examination for the Foreign Office in March 1903, passed it on his second attempt in July 1903 and undertook an exchange with Eric Phipps, who was in the Diplomatic Service.
10. As with several other postings where the embassy and consular functions were separately housed, in the case of Constantinople, this sometimes led to confusion and duplication.
11. On this occasion, it was in the form of a report cited by the Director of Military Intelligence; A. L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire* (London/New York, Longman, 1998), p. 116.
12. See, for example, undated 'Memorandum. Russian Influence in Syria', FO 195/2140.
13. See, for example, the case of two Indian Army officers who wished to travel from India to Basra to obtain information for the *Gazetteer of India*. The Porte accused them of wanting to enter into relations with Ibn Saud and encourage his resistance to Turkish troops: FO 78/5392 f. 89. This led to accusations that British officers were serving under Ibn Saud.
14. O'Connor to Sanderson, 30 May 1905, private, FO 78/5403.
15. The role is investigated in Berridge's, *Gerald Fitzmaurice*, *passim*.
16. G. Waterfield, *Professional Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle, Bt., 1880–1961* (London, John Murray, 1973), p. 10. Aubrey Herbert was dissuaded from a career in the Diplomatic Service by the experience of Chancery work at Constantinople; Fitzherbert, *The Man Who Was Greenmantle*, pp. 48, 54.
17. S. Whitman, *Turkish Memories* (London, William Heinemann, 1914), p. 189. Whitman visited and stayed in Constantinople, as well as in other parts of Thrace and Anatolia between 1896 and 1908, and, though an Englishman, was special correspondent of the *New York Herald*.
18. In fact, he found the language difficult, and the endless round of social commitments left little time for practice.
19. Garnett to his mother, 3 Aug. 1903, DDQ 9/4/10.
20. Garnett to his father, 19 Jun. 1903, DDQ 9/3/27. The delay also precluded the idea of two months at the legation in Athens, where help was needed.
21. Garnett to his mother, 31 Aug. 1903, DDQ 9/4/12.
22. Garnett to his father, 11 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/3/32.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Garnett to his mother, 31 Aug. 1903, DDQ 9/4/12.
25. Garnett to his mother, 1 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/13.
26. Garnett to his mother, 11 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/16.



27. This assessment is based especially upon issues of *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, published in English and French, which was the chief local expatriate paper.
28. This summary is based upon the following works, J. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question: A Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1925 edition); W. N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After a Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878–1880* (London, Frank Cass, 1963); D. R. Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia 1828–1914* (London, Methuen, 1977); M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London, Macmillan, 1978 reprint).
29. Unless otherwise stated, the material below is based upon the Foreign Office Peace handbook on Bulgaria (London, HMSO, 1920), pp. 24–39.
30. Vice-Consul Raphael Fontana, Uskub, to Alfred Biliotti, 1 May, copy, in O'Connor to Lansdowne, 4 May 1903, FO 78/5266.
31. Maunsell to O'Connor, 17 Feb. 1904, no. 11, FO 195/2176.
32. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 6 May 1903, FO 78/5266.
33. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 28 Jul. 1903, FO 78/5267; minute by Villiers, 28 Aug. 1903, FO 78/5289.
34. Garnett to his mother, 15 Sept. 1903, addendum of 18 Sept., DDQ 9/4/17.
35. Garnett to his mother, 21 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/18.
36. See, for example, Hugo Marinitsch for O'Connor, 26 Sept. 1903, confidential, FO 195/2146.
37. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 6 Nov. 1903, enclosing report by Maunsell, same date, FO 78/5270. Also at FO 195/2150. Maunsell had been studying this issue for some time.
38. Elliot to Lansdowne, 9 Sept., secret; Maunsell to Elliot, 20 Sept.; *The Times*, 3 Nov. 1903, FO 78/5295. War between Turkey and Bulgaria had been anticipated for some time; Alfred Biliotti to O'Connor, 9 Jul. 1903, confidential, FO 195/2157.
39. Graves to O'Connor, 12 Oct. 1903, confidential, FO 78/5270.
40. Extract of Colonel William Fairholme, Military Attaché, Vienna, to Sir William Nicholson, 6 Sept. 1903, confidential, copy, FO 78/5289.
41. Much of this propaganda made its way from the Turkish press into the English press in Constantinople. See, for example, *Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 2 Nov. 1903, p. 1.
42. Such, at least, was the reported view of Pierre Cambon, French Ambassador at London; minute by Francis Villiers, 28 Aug. 1903, FO 78/5289.
43. R. Graves, *Storm Centres of the Near East: Personal Memories, 1879–1929* (London, Hutchinson, 1933), p. 202.
44. Foreign Office to O'Connor, 24 Dec. 1903, FO 78/5263.
45. Foreign Office to O'Connor, 27 Jan. 1904, FO 78/5328. The powers nominating officers were Italy, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary.
46. See Graves, *Storm Centres*, pp. 199–201.
47. Among those involved were the Society of Friends, the Macedonian Relief Fund, the Balkan Committee and the Church of England.
48. Maunsell believed this to be a certainty; Maunsell to O'Connor, 26 Jan. 1904, in O'Connor to Lansdowne, same date, FO 78/5329.
49. Garnett to his mother, 9 Feb. 1904, DDQ 9/4/35.
50. Garnett to his mother, 4 Feb. 1904, DDQ 9/4/34.

51. Marling, Sofia, to Lansdowne, 10 Feb. 1904, FO 78/5359; see also various reports in FO 78/5364.
52. Garnett to his mother, 9 Mar. 1904, DDQ 9/4/39.
53. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 7 Jun. 1904, FO 78/5333.
54. Further discussions on the gendarmerie may be found at FO 78/5339-40.
55. Buchanan, Sofia, to Lansdowne, 19 Nov. 1904, FO 78/5361. Buchanan based these remarks on a discussion with the Bulgarian Commercial Agent recently returned from his post at Monastir.
56. Walter Townley to Lansdowne, 20 Jan. 1905, FO 78/5392.
57. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 14 Mar. 1905, FO 78/5393.
58. Gerald Tyrrell to O'Connor, 8 Apr., 1 and 5 Jun., 1 Sept. 1903, FO 195/2147.
59. The Porte had earlier complained of external interference in the situation and of inaccurate reporting of the facts. See, for example, Marrinitsch memorandum for O'Connor, 10 Aug. 1903, FO 195/2146.
60. Garnett to his mother, 6 Apr. and 2 May 1904, DDQ 9/4/43 and 47.
61. Townley to Lansdowne, 11 Oct. 1904, confidential, enclosing report by Maunsell, 10 Oct. 1904.
62. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 11 May 1904, confidential, FO 78/5332.
63. Minute by Lord Percy on Townley, 29 Oct. 1904, FO 78/5337.
64. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 27 Sept. 1904, FO 78/5336.
65. Devey (Jeddah) to O'Connor, 8 Feb., in O'Connor to Lansdowne, 10 Apr. 1903, FO 78/5332.
66. See discussions in FO 78/5339, FO 78/5488. The risk for British interests was that Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait, with whom Britain enjoyed treaty relations, and who was in regular contact with Ibn Saud, might be drawn into the dispute; (Francis Crow) to O'Connor, 27 Apr. 1904, confidential, FO 195/2163.
67. Longworth to Walter Townley, 19 Jan. 1905, in Townley to Lansdowne, 6 Feb. 1905, FO 78/5392. In an earlier report, Longworth had reported of the new Governor General Resdah Bey, 'Judging from first impressions however he can scarcely be mistaken for a strong and energetic man. Heavy in gait, sleepy in visage, slow in speech, his general bearing is that of one who feeling exhausted seeks repose.' Longworth to O'Connor, 1 Apr. 1903, FO 195/2136.
68. O'Connor to Lansdowne, confidential, 4 Apr. 1905, FO 78/5393, Devey, Jeddah, to O'Connor, 12 Feb. 1905, FO 78/5394; O'Connor to Lansdowne, 20 Jun. 1905, enclosing Shipley to O'Connor, 8 Jun. 1905, FO 78/5395.
69. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 27 Mar. 1905, FO 78/5393.
70. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 9 May 1905, FO 78/5394.
71. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 27 Jun. 1905, enclosing Wilkie Young, Acting Vice-Consul at Diarbekir, 14 Jun. 1905, FO 78/5395.
72. Townley to Lansdowne, 6 Dec. 1904, and Townley to Richard Maxwell, private, 28 Dec. 1904, FO 78/5338.
73. Garnett to his father, 13 Dec. 1903, DDQ 9/3/35.
74. William Garnett to O'Connor, 30 Dec. 1903, DDQ 9/3/36, and O'Connor to William Garnett, 6 Jan. 1904, DDQ 9/3/37.
75. Garnett to his father, 1 Dec. 1903, DDQ 9/3/34.
76. Garnett to his mother, 5 Sept. 1904, DDQ 9/4/63.
77. Garnett to his mother, 3 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/14.

78. Garnett to his mother, 30 Nov. 1903, DDQ 9/4/32.
79. The revolution of 1908 and counter-revolution of 1909 may have changed this slightly.
80. O'Connor to Villiers, 12 Jan. 1903, FO 78/5274.
81. Minutes by Law, 20 Feb. 1903, and Charles Hardinge, FO 78/5275.
82. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 7 Mar. 1904, and enclosure, FO 78/5344.
83. *Ibid.* On the attitudes of diplomatic staff, see, for example, Gandy, 'Fez and Frock-Coat', 68.
84. There were recurring discussions on the system of training in 1903–5, not least because of a shortage of interpreters in Constantinople; FO 195/2145, FO 78/5275, FO 78/5342, FO 78/5403.
85. Whitman, *Turkish Memories*, p. 190.
86. Garnett to his mother, 16 Feb. 1904, DDQ 9/4/36.
87. Mountain to Lansdowne, 12 Oct. 1903, FO 78/5291.
88. See n. 57, O'Connor to Lansdowne, enclosure, and O'Connor to Lansdowne, 30 May 1904, and 'Memorandum re Commercial Department – British Embassy.'
89. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 4 Jun. 1904, and memorandum by Weakley, n.d., FO 78/5344. O'Connor wished to deploy Weakley's figures in the *Board of Trade Journal* to spike Whittall's guns.
90. Whittall was a director and major shareholder in the Mersina–Adana Railway Company.
91. See, for example, O'Connor to Lansdowne, 22 Jul. 1903, on the investigations of a Captain Smyth, FO 78/5324. Also, for Smyth's report, FO 78/5449.
92. O'Connor to Sanderson, 29 Dec. 1904, FO 78/5338.
93. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 22 Apr. 1904, FO 78/5331.
94. Garnett to his mother, 5 Sept. 1904, DDQ 9/4/63.
95. Garnett to his mother, 2 Oct. 1903, DDQ 9/4/21.
96. Harold Satow to Garnett, 27 Jan. 1905, DDQ 9/2/6.
97. Garnett to his mother, 15 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/17.
98. *Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 6 Mar. 1905. On one occasion, George Lloyd recorded a day which ended at 5.30 am and which had included a lunch with Aubrey Herbert, dinner on HMS *Imogene*, an Araba race down the Grand Rue de Pera, a jujitsu bout at the embassy and revolver practice out of a window; GLLD 26/4, George Lloyd Papers.
99. Garnett to his mother, 23 Sept. 1903, DDQ 9/4/19.
100. *Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 17, 23 and 28 Sept. 1903.
101. Garnett to his mother, 4 Oct. 1903, DDQ 9/4/23. Elsewhere he noted that he and his colleagues 'nearly yawned our heads off' at one such dinner; Garnett to Aunt Addie, 23 Nov. 1903, DDQ 9/5/3.
102. Garnett to his mother, 22 Mar. 1904, DDQ 9/4/41.
103. Garnett to his mother, 7 Jun. 1904, DDQ 9/4/51.
104. On one occasion, Vaughan 'made an awful mess' of the arrangements and some of the diners did not take their seats until after the fish course: Garnett to his mother, 16 Mar. 1904, DDQ 9/4/40.
105. *Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 9 Sept. 1904.
106. Garnett to his mother, 5 Sept. 1904, DDQ 9/4/63.
107. Garnett to his mother, 10 Sept. 1904, DDQ 9/4/64.

108. Garnett to his mother, 6 Nov. 1903, DDQ 9/4/28.
109. Garnett to his mother, 25 Nov. 1903, DDQ 9/4/31. For other perspectives, see, for example, E. B. Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise: Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople Through Kurdistan to Baghdad, 1907–1909* (St Helier/Amsterdam, Armorica Book Co, 2nd edition, 1926), pp. 1–15. Soane's views were very negative.
110. Garnett to his mother, 22, 25 and 27 Oct. 1903, DDQ 9/4/24–26. See also Garnett's extended account of his journey: 'Journey Round the Black Sea', n.d., DDQ 9/6/1.
111. He published several, including *Constantinople* (London, Methuen, 1926).
112. Garnett to his mother, 9 and 29 Mar., 12 Apr., and 2 May 1904, DDQ 9/4/39, 42, 44, 47.
113. The second injury was sustained when Herbert leapt from a second storey window after dinner, believing that he was on the first floor.
114. Garnett to his mother, 9 Feb. 1904, DDQ 9/4/35. Garnett likened Lady O'Connor's arrival in the autumn of 1903 to a wolf on the fold. According to him, she suffered from nerves and had seen the inside of a 'home'; Garnett to Aunt Addie, 5 Oct. 1903, DDQ 9/5/2. See, also, Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 38.
115. Garnett to his father, 21 Mar. 1905, DDQ 9/3/43.
116. Eric Phipps joined as third secretary in January 1905, and Percy Loraine, as an unpaid attaché, in February 1905, just before the Townleys left, with a further unpaid attaché, Pat Ramsay, following in August. James Macleay was second secretary from April 1905; Lancelot Oliphant was appointed acting third secretary from September 1905. On the history of the embassy's, typically large, staffing, see Berridge, *British Diplomacy in Turkey*, pp. 46ff.
117. Garnett first met Sykes during the latter's honeymoon in November 1903 when both were O'Connor's dinner guests.
118. Garnett to his mother, 6 Jun. 1905, DDQ 9/4/94.
119. 'The Quest or Journey's End', DDQ 9/79/7.
120. Several consular reports attest to the keen interest in the war in many parts of the empire. See, for example, William Richards to O'Connor, 9 Jul. 1904, FO 195/2164.
121. O'Connor to Lansdowne, 25 Feb. 1904, secret; MacDonald, Tokyo, to Lansdowne, 29 Feb. 1904; Charles Scott, St Petersburg, to Lansdowne, confidential, 3 Mar. 1904; O'Connor to Lansdowne, 18 Jul. 1905, FO 78/5448. K. Wilson, 'Passing on the Straits: the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus in Anglo-Russian relations 1904–1907', in Wilson, *The Limits of Eurocentricity: Imperial British Foreign and Defence Policy in the Early Twentieth Century* (Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2006), pp. 113–30.
122. Garnett to his mother, 7 Jul. 1904, DDQ 9/4/55.
123. See, for example, *Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, 2 Dec. 1903, 25 Jan. and 15 Jul. 1904, 4 May 1905.
124. Garnett to his mother, 18 Jul. 1905, DDQ 9/4/99.
125. Garnett to his mother, 15 Aug. 1905, DDQ 9/4/103. Otte, 'Satow at Peking, 1900–1906', *D&S*, 164–5; idem., *The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation 1894–1905* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 23.

126. Garnett to his father, 23 Aug. 1905, DDQ 9/10/4.
127. Garnett to his mother, 29 Aug. 1905, DDQ 9/4/106.
128. Garnett to his father, 9 Aug. 1905, DDQ 9/10/3.

## 2 Like a Plant Uprooted: Life in Peking

1. Vaughan to Garnett, 27 Jun. 1905, DDQ 9/7/1.
2. Garnett to his father, 29 Aug. 1905, DDQ 9/10/5.
3. Garnett to his mother, 6 Oct. 1905, DDQ 9/12/1.
4. Garnett to his mother, 10 Oct. 1905, DDQ 9/12/2.
5. Garnett to his mother, 20 Oct. 1905, DDQ 9/12/4.
6. Garnett to his mother, 25 Oct. 1905, DDQ 9/12/5.
7. Garnett to his mother, 9 Nov. 1905, DDQ 9/12/8. On Warren, see Garnett to Aunt Addie, 10 Nov. 1905, DDQ 9/14/1.
8. Garnett to his mother, 10 Nov. 1905, DDQ 9/12/9.
9. Garnett to his mother, 16 and 20 Nov. 1905, DDQ 9/12/11–12.
10. Garnett to his mother, 20 Nov. 1905, and addendum of 24 Nov., DDQ 9/12/12. The golf course was close to the Yellow Temple and the priests acted as caddies for a penny a round.
11. Garnett to his mother, 9 Dec. 1905, DDQ 9/12/14.
12. *Ibid.*, addendum of 11 Dec.
13. For a brief account of the riots, see Warren to Grey, 18 Dec. 1905, no. 10, FO 405/157.
14. Garnett to his mother, 24 Dec. 1905, with addenda of 26–27 Dec., DDQ 9/12/13; Garnett to his mother, 1 Jan. 1906, DDQ 9/12/15.
15. Garnett to his mother, 11 Jan. 1906, DDQ 9/12/16. Original emphasis.
16. It was reconstituted as such in 1901, having previously been known as the 'Tsung-li Yamèn'.
17. Garnett to his mother, 29 Jan. 1906, DDQ 9/12/17. The Emperor was nominal sovereign, but since a coup in 1898, *de facto* power had been in the hands of the Empress, widow of Emperor Hsien Feng, who died in 1861, and mother of the late emperor, T'ung Chih. See 'General Report on China for the year 1906', in Jordan to Grey, 1 Jun. 1907, no. 268, in K. Bourne, and D. C. Watt, *BDEA, Part 1: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War: Series E, Asia, 1860–1914, ed., I. Nish, vol.14, Annual Reports on China 1906–1913* (Frederick MD, University Publications of America, 1993), p. 16.
18. Garnett to his mother, 26 Feb. 1906, DDQ 9/12/20.
19. S. R. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics in Late Imperial China: Yuan Shi-Kai in Beijing and Tianjin, 1901–1908* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), p. 89.
20. D. H. Bays, *China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih-tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895–1909* (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1978), pp. 125–6. H. Z. Schiffrin, 'The impact of the war on China', in R. Kowner (ed.), *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War* (London/New York, Routledge, 2007), pp. 169–82.
21. Garnett to his mother, 28 Aug. 1906, DDQ 9/12/36.
22. 'General Report on China for the year 1907', in Jordan to Grey, 27 Feb. 1908, no. 94, in *BDEA, Part 1, Series E, vol.14*, pp. 38–9.

23. On opposition to the reforms, see M. Gasster, 'Reform and Revolution in China's Political Modernization', in M. C. Wright (ed.), *China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900–1913* (New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 75ff.
24. J. Chesnaux, M. Bastide and M. C. Bergère, *China from the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution* (Transl., Sussex, Harvester, 1977), p. 350.
25. General Report for 1907, pp. 38–42.
26. Satow to Grey, 22 Feb. 1906, no. 28, FO 405/165.
27. Lansdowne to Satow, 2 Oct. 1905, no. 143, FO 405/157. In fact, by September 1907, over 1500 British troops remained and over 1200 French and 1200 Japanese, as well as other smaller foreign contingents.
28. Garnett to his father, 5 Sept. 1906, DDQ 9/10/30. The Anglican Bishops in China had also registered strong feelings on the matter, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson's backing. See enclosure in RANDALL CANTAU to Grey, 24 Sept. 1906, no. 94, FO 405/710. The edict was issued on 20 Sept.
29. M. E. Edwards, 'Great Britain and China, 1905–1911', in Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 351–2.
30. Garnett benefited from the Student Interpreters' library (besides Satow's own collection) which had been destroyed in 1900 but replaced just after his arrival. Satow to Lansdowne, 15 Nov. 1905, FO 371/21/F961.
31. This arose when Eastes took a year's leave on account of his mother's illness.
32. Garnett to his mother, 23 Mar. 1906, DDQ 9/12/21.
33. Report by Garnett on Journeys in the Mountains of North China, in Jordan to Grey, 23 Dec. 1907, FO 371/421/4358.
34. *Ibid.*, undated minutes by Miles Lampson and Beilby Alston, 11 May 1908.
35. Unless otherwise noted, all remaining material below is from Garnett's 'Report on a Journey Across Corea', in Carnegie to Grey, 6 Aug. 1906, FO 371/39/32207.
36. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jun. 1906, DDQ 9/12/29.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Minute by unknown official (possibly Walter Stewart), 26 Sept. 1906, FO 371/39/f32207. To Robertson the Japanese in Korea were 'dirty, brutal, hectoring, [and] swindling'; Robertson Papers, RBTN 1, China, p. 30, CACC.
39. Garnett to his mother, 11 May 1906, DDQ 9/12/26.
40. Garnett to his mother, 1 Aug. 1906, DDQ 9/12/34. It was considered good etiquette for a head of mission to inform his chargé of his date of arrival. See also Garnett to his mother, 28 Aug. 1906, DDQ 9/12/36.
41. Robertson Papers, RBTN 1, China, p. 7. On this disdain, see Steiner, *Foreign Office*, p. 184.
42. Garnett to his mother, 12 Sept. 1906, DDQ 9/12/37. On the Jordans' persistent awareness of their origins, see also Garnett to Aunt Addie, 3 Mar. 1907, DDQ 9/14/8.
43. See, for example, Jordan to Grey, 21 Feb. 1907, no. 98, and enclosures, FO 405/174; Jordan to Grey, 21 Feb. 1907, no. 98, confidential, FO 228/1639, regarding serious internal trouble in Hunan and Shantung.
44. 'Report by Mr W. J. Garnett of a Journey Through the Provinces of Shantung and Kiangsu, China.' No. 1 (1907), Cd. 3500. Unless otherwise noted, the material below is from this source.

45. 'Memorandum', Foreign Office, 22 May 1906, copy, in Lancelot Carnegie to Grey, 7 Dec. 1906, FO 228/1607. Also, Grey to Bertie (Ambassador at Paris), 20 Nov. 1906, no. 646, FO 405/168.
46. General Report for 1906, pp. 34–5.
47. See discussions of Sir John Lister Kaye's syndicate at FO 371/19/f388.
48. See, for example, minute by Francis Campbell, 7 Apr. 1906, FO 371/25/2374/11842.
49. E. W. Edwards, *British Diplomacy and Finance in China, 1895–1914* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1987), p. 32.
50. See, for example, regarding the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, William Keswick (Chairman, British and Chinese Corporation) to Foreign Office, 29 Jan. 1908, FO 405/165, and Edwards, *ibid.*, pp. 50–2, 90ff.; Otte, 'Satow at Peking', 188.
51. On containing Germany, see Otte, *ibid.*, 186–7.
52. Garnett to his mother, 20 Aug. 1906, DDQ 9/12/35. See also his report on his trip: 'Memorandum by Mr. Garnett respecting the Peking-Kalgan Railway', in Carnegie to Grey, 20 Aug. 1906, no. 350, FO 405/168. The Chinese authorities had previously announced their intention to cancel preliminary agreements, which had not been finalized, and to buy back railways which were managed by foreigners; Grey to Jordan, 7 Aug 1906, FO 405/167.
53. General Report for 1907, pp. 46–53.
54. *Ibid.* See T. G. Otte, "'The Baghdad Railway of the Far East': the Tientsin-Yangtze railway and Anglo-German relations, 1898–1911", in T. G. Otte and K. Neilson (eds), *Railways and International Politics: Paths of Empire, 1848–1945* (London/New York, Routledge, 2006), pp. 112–36.
55. General Report for 1906, p. 9.
56. On the student movement, see Bays, *Students*, pp. 131–62, and Schiffrin, 'The impact of the war on China', pp. 171–3.
57. Grey to Jordan and enclosure, 20 Nov. 1907, FO 405/175.
58. General Report for 1907', pp. 65–6.
59. Telegram received Washington, 26 Feb. 1906, confidential, FO 228/1606.
60. 'Peking Gazette 5 March 1906 decree', in Satow to Grey, 8 Mar. 1906, *ibid.*
61. At one inn, where his room had no door, he and Brenan had slept with revolvers tied to their wrists; Garnett to his mother, 4 Oct. 1906, DDQ 9/12/39.
62. Telegram, Drummond, Shanghai, 24 Jan. 1906, FO 371/25/2374/2901.
63. Garnett to his mother, 28 Oct. 1906, DDQ 9/12/40.
64. Garnett to his father, 23 Jan. 1907, DDQ 9/10/35.
65. Jordan to Grey, 7 Jan. 1907, no. 9, very confidential, with enclosure, FO 405/173.
66. Garnett to his father, 20 Feb. 1907, DDQ 9/10/36.
67. Garnett to his mother, 17 and 27 Mar. 1907, DDQ 9/13/7 and 8.
68. Carnegie to Grey, 17 May 1906, no. 235, FO 405/167. MacKinnon, *Power and Politics*, p. 181.
69. General Report for 1907, pp. 41–2. Jordan reported the attack as 'purely an anti-Manchu demonstration'; Jordan to Grey, 10 Jul. 1907, no. 332, draft, FO 228/1640, but part of a wider movement, Jordan to Grey, 22 Jul. 1907, no. 343, *ibid.* Discussion had also occurred about a more protracted means of death for the assailant, including slicing, prior to hanging; Garnett to

- his mother, 21 Jul. 1907, DDQ 9/13/17, and Garnett to Aunt Addie, 21 Jul. 1907, DDQ 9/14/1.
70. Garnett to his mother, 4 Jul. 1907, DDQ 9/13/16.
  71. Garnett to his father, 8 Aug. 1907, DDQ 9/10/46.
  72. Jordan to Grey, 21 Aug. 1907, FO 405/175.
  73. General report for 1907, p. 42.
  74. Jordan to Grey, 12 Nov. 1907, no. 525, draft, enclosing summary of reports from consuls in China.
  75. Garnett to his mother, 11 Dec. 1906, DDQ 9/11/45. Robertson also noted the 'incredibly tedious' social life in Peking, and in terms similar to Garnett's; Robertson Papers, RBTN 1, China, pp. 12, 14.
  76. Garnett seemed much concerned by the possible visit of General Booth of the Salvation Army, who had been busily attempting to convert the Japanese. He doubted if the Dowager Empress would take to a poke bonnet and tambourine.
  77. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 1 Jan. 1907, and 6 Feb. 1907, DDQ 9/14/6-7.
  78. Garnett to Granny, 1 Sept. 1907, DDQ 9/14/12.
  79. Garnett to his mother, 23 Dec. 1906, DDQ 9/11/46.
  80. Robertson was apparently told that the Foreign Office frowned upon marriage to foreigners of any kind and that those who ignored this were apt to be sent to 'bad posts' such as Rio de Janeiro. Garnett to his mother, 14 Apr. 1907, DDQ 9/13/9.
  81. Garnett to his mother, 27 Mar. 1907, addendum of 4 Apr., DDQ 9/9/8; and further letter of 10 May 1907, DDQ 9/13/11.
  82. Robertson to Garnett, 9 Aug. 1907, DDQ 9/7/9. Hardinge (for Grey) to Jordan, 16 Dec. 1907, FO 228/1645.
  83. Garnett to his mother, 22 Jan. 1907, DDQ 9/13/3.
  84. Garnett to his mother, 18 Feb. 1907, DDQ 9/13/5. This was not unusual; Lady Susan Townley, *Indiscretions' of Lady Susan Townley* (London, Thornton Butterworth, 1922), p. 83.
  85. Garnett to his mother, 23 Apr. 1907, DDQ 9/13/10.
  86. The temple was five hours from Peking by cart, faster by horse. The Jordans also apparently took a somewhat larger temple nearby. Many other residents of the legation compound preferred the seaside resort of Peitaiho, but Garnett avoided it for that very reason. The Court's summer palace was in the lee of the same mountains some 6 miles further north.
  87. Garnett to his mother, 21 Sept. 1907, DDQ 9/13/22.
  88. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 27 Dec. 1907, DDQ 9/14/16.
  89. Garnett to his mother, 22 Dec. 1907, DDQ 9/13/29.
  90. Garnett to his mother, 5 Jan. 1908, DDQ 9/13/30.
  91. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 27 Dec. 1907, DDQ 9/14/16. Claude Russell and the Viscount Cranley (from 1911, 5th Earl of Onslow), among others, advised Garnett.
  92. Garnett to Miles Lampson, 25 Dec. 1907, FO 371/421/4358.
  93. Garnett to his father, 10 Jul. 1907, DDQ 9/10/44.
  94. Garnett to his father, 12 Apr. 1907, DDQ 9/10/38.
  95. Garnett to his father, 30 Apr. 1907, DDQ 9/10/39. Rose undoubtedly encouraged Garnett's expectations. See, for example, Rose to Garnett, 29 Sept. 1907, where he suggested that Garnett must write about Mongolia as



- Younghusband or, as in the case of Egypt, Milner: DDQ 9/7/2. Less helpfully, Rose had suggested that Garnett consume curry powder and an egg well beaten in a cup of strong tea with sugar, Rose to Garnett, 27 Feb. 1908, DDQ 9/7/3.
96. Garnett to his father, 13 Feb. 1908, DDQ 9/10/68. Garnett remained on friendly terms with Boone until the latter's death on active service in 1917. The Foreign Office declined because the War Office did not require information, beyond geographical data, about the regions Garnett was to traverse. Also, it was feared that the Russian authorities would regard a surveyor with suspicion and would shadow Garnett were he to carry evidence of his surveying across Russian Turkestan. Minutes by Kidston, 21 and 22 Jan. 1908, and Nicolson to Grey, 21 Jan., FO 371/419/2343. Like Mid-Devon, South Herefordshire had at a recent by-election returned a Unionist to Parliament, overturning a previous Liberal majority.
  97. Garnett to his father, 19 Feb. 1908, DDQ 9/10/69.
  98. Jordan to Grey, 1 Mar. 1908, FO 371/419/2343/10252.
  99. Jordan to Grey, 27 Apr. 1908, FO 371/431/20526. Such also was the view of Satow, who noted that Garnett's and Robertson's arrival had led to 'various useful reforms' in the Chancery; Satow to Grey, 3 May 1906, draft, FO 228/1606.
  100. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 7 Feb. 1908, DDQ 9/14/17, and Garnett to his mother, 25 Mar. 1908, DDQ 9/13/36.
  101. Garnett to his mother, 25 Mar. 1908, DDQ 9/13/36. Garnett was also sorry to leave, as he had greatly enjoyed directing pickets from the legion guard in their efforts to extinguish a fire in the Chinese quarter.
  102. Garnett to his mother, 4 Apr. 1908, addendum of 6 Apr., DDQ 9/13/37.

### 3 'People who Squeeze and People who may be Squeezed': Across Mongolia, 1908

1. 'Report by Mr C. W. Campbell on a Journey in Mongolia', China, no. 1 (1904), Cd 1874. Campbell's report has since been republished as *Travels in Mongolia 1902, A Journey by C.W. Campbell, the British Consul in China* (London, The Stationery Office, 2000).
2. 'Despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking enclosing a report by Mr George J. Kidston on a Journey in Mongolia', China, no. 3 (1904), Cd 1954. A further investigation had been undertaken in the summer of 1903 to the east of the Khingan range by Claude Russell, Garnett's predecessor as second secretary in Peking, accompanied by a son of Sir Michael Hicks Beach.
3. 'Report by Mr Garnett Respecting His Journey from Peking to Semipalatinsk', FO 405/190. The original diary on which the report is based survives among the Quernmore Papers. Unless otherwise noted, all remaining material in this chapter is based on the report.
4. George Dering to Louis Mallet, 4 May 1906, enclosing undated despatches FO 371/34/f15579; Cecil Spring-Rice to Grey, 21 May 1906, and Minutes by W[alter] L[angle]y and F[rancis] A[l]exander C[ampbell], 30 May, and Hardinge, n.d., f15579/18146; and Minutes by Hardinge, n.d., f15579/20585.

5. Nicolson to Grey, 8 Jun. 1906, FO 405/168.
6. On the general issue of Russian intrigues in Tibet, see A. Lamb, *British India and Tibet 1766–1910* (London, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1986), Chapters 9 and 10; P. Mehra, 'Tibet and Russian Intrigue', *JRCAS*, 45, 1 (Jan. 1958), 28–42; Lamb, 'Some Notes on Russian Intrigue in Tibet', *JRCAS*, 46, 1 (1959), 46–65. On the specific issue of Lamaism as the conduit for intrigues, see Lamb, *British India*, pp. 206–9, 250–2, and *The McMahon Line*, vol. 2 (London, Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1966), pp. 76, 83–6, 91–2.
7. On British concerns, see, for example, Morley to Government of India, 28 Jun. 1906, FO 583/8.
8. On the diplomacy surrounding this clause, see Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, pp. 94–100, and A. K. J. Singh, *Himalayan Triangle* (London, British Library, 1988), pp. 41–2.
9. See Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, Chapter 8.
10. Jordan to Grey, 4 Apr. 1907, no. 170, FO 371/228/16219, enclosing extract from the *Nan Fang Pao* of 16 Mar. 1907, on 'The Proposed Division of Mongolia'.
11. Jordan's despatches on these high-level Chinese investigations in Mongolia coincided with the report of a Chinese Commission into Russian incursions on the northern border of Mongolia; see Jordan to Grey, 18 Mar. 1907, no. 136, FO 371/228/f14411. On Russia's response to Chinese reforms, see Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, pp. 119–20.
12. 'Report on the Explorations in Great Tibet and Mongolia Made by A-K in 1879–82', 1884, IOR/V/27/69/31, OIOC.
13. Memorandum respecting Mongolia, confidential, 8886, Cranley, 8 Mar. 1907, FO 881/8886.
14. Grey to Nicolson no. 326, 17 Jul. 1906, FO 535/8. It also coincided with Isvolsky's efforts to obtain Japanese consent for maintenance of the *status quo* in Mongolia in the context of a general recognition of respective possessions in the Far East and treaty rights in China; see also Note 13.
15. Nicolson to Grey, 5 Jan. 1907, India Office to Foreign Office, 5 Feb. 1907, no. 48, Grey to Nicolson, 8 Feb. 1907, FO 535/9.
16. Japanese exploration in Mongolia soon after, if not before Garnett's journey, was common knowledge. See note on the expeditions of Zuicho Tachibana in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, *GJ*, 35, 4 (Apr. 1910), 448–9.
17. In a letter to the Viscount Cranley, Garnett noted that pheasants, partridge, duck, goose and wild hare had all been plentiful; Garnett to Onslow, 11 Sept. 1908, G173/24/63, Onslow Papers.
18. Garnett to his mother, 9 Jun. 1908, DDQ 9/19/3.
19. Some other travellers shared this negative perception of Lamaism. See, for example, N. Prejevalsky, *Mongolia, the Tangut Country, and the Solitudes of Northern Tibet: Being a narrative of three years' travel in High Asia* (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1876), p. 80, and E. Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China: Impressions of a Trip Across West China and Mongolia* (London, Constable, 1913), p. 279.
20. Garnett's perceptions of the people as childlike, hospitable but also dirty and, in the case of men, lazy and prone to alcohol abuse, were shared by some other Western travellers. See, J. Hedley, *Tramps in Dark Mongolia* (London, T Fisher Unwin, 1910), pp. 241, 244–5; D. Carruthers, *Unknown*

- Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-West Mongolia and Dzungaria*, 2 vols (London, Hutchinson, 1913), vol. 1, p. 306; R. L. Binstead, 'Life in a Khalka Steppe Lamasery', *JRAS*, 23 (1914), 862–3; B. Bulstrode, *A Tour in Mongolia* (London, Methuen, 1920), p. 74.
21. Much to Garnett's disgust, the Mongols left their dead to wild animals.
  22. Some other travellers shared Garnett's opinion of the Mongolian camel. Prejevalsky considered it vicious during the rutting season but not inherently malicious; Prejevalsky, *Mongolia*, p. 124. Its deviant nature has since been disputed; J. Hare, 'A Tale of Two Deserts: The Sahara and the Gobi', *AA*, 36, 1 (2005), 52.
  23. Other travellers commented on the ubiquitous extortion. See, for example, Report on Major de Lacoste's Journey Across Mongolia, *GJ*, 36, 1 (Jul. 1910), 102.
  24. Garnett was wrong. Snuff continues to facilitate social interaction in Mongolia.
  25. All English maps noted the area as lying within Tibet, but Russian and Chinese maps suggested otherwise. The Foreign Office considered the point but as the location of Kokonoor could not be agreed upon, it was decided not to make a formal protest to St Petersburg; see minutes and correspondence at FO 371/634/10646/29696/33132/35621/39162. Garnett, having initially stated his opinion that it lay within Tibetan territory, changed his mind: Nicolson to Grey, 17 Oct. 1909, FO 371/634/39162. Also see Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, pp. 40–1, 98–100. William Rockhill, an American diplomat who had travelled extensively in the Kokonoor region and recorded his expeditions in *The Land of the Lamas: Notes of a Journey Through China, Mongolia and Tibet* (London, Longmans, Green, 1891), was consulted. The proscription on scientific expeditions became contentious again in 1910 when the article was due to be renewed. Then, it was feared that British and Russian interests would be disadvantaged if they refrained from exploration and if the Chinese, whose influence in Tibet was by then paramount, did not actively enforce the ban with regard to expeditions from other countries; FO 371/1078/283/1732.
  26. Kozloff had considerable experience of Mongolia having crossed the Gobi on five occasions and in three different directions. He published his findings, devoid of political reference, in a number of volumes and in two articles entitled 'The Mongolian-Sze-Chuan Expedition of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society', *GJ*, 34, 4 (1909), 384–408 and *GJ*, 36, 1 (1910), 288–310.
  27. See, for example, Nicolson to Grey, 13 Jul. 1906, no. 441, FO 535/8. On Russia's efforts to have Mongolia included in the convention, see Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, pp. 101–7. Britain rejected the idea but Japan agreed with Russia on their respective interests in Inner and Outer Mongolia.
  28. D. Rayfield, *The Dream of Lhasa: The Life of Nicholas Przhevalsky (1839–1891) Explorer of Central Asia* (London, Paul Elek, 1976).
  29. Nicolson to Grey, 21 Jul. 1906, no. 467, FO 535/8.
  30. India Office to Foreign Office, 18 Feb. 1908, enclosing Government of India to India Office, 15 Jan. 1908, in which Extract from the *Russki Invalid* of 13 (26) Nov. 1907, FO 535/11. Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, p. 95, suggests that

British suspicions of Kozloff prompted the idea of prohibiting Russian officials from Tibet, an idea that was subsequently modified to prevent scientific exploration.

31. 'Memorandum by Mr Garnett Respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Kozlov's Expedition', Ningshia, 2 Jun. 1908, in Jordan to Grey, no. 307, confidential, 7 Jul. 1908, FO 535/11.
32. See Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, p. 101.
33. I. Klein, 'The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problem of Central Asia, 1907–1914', *JBS*, 11, 1 (1971), 126–47.
34. Satow to Lansdowne, 3 Nov. 1904, enclosing 'Notes of a Journey in Western Mongolia', by Dr T. J. N. Gatrell, FO 881/8317.
35. According to Charles Campbell, when asked to explain the Bogdo's nuptials, devout Mongols referred to it as a 'subjective hallucination only apparent to the unfaithful.' C. W. Campbell, 'Journeys in Mongolia', *GJ*, 22, 5 (Nov. 1903), 512.
36. Jordan to Grey, 29 Jan. 1912, no. 50, L/P+S/11/8/P846. The conduit provided by Lamaism also continued to haunt British officials; Jordan to Grey, 6 Mar. 1913, L/P+S/10/364/P1099. For efforts by Japan to increase its influence, see correspondence at L/P+S/10/365.
37. On the issue of British commerce, see Alston to Grey, 1 Nov. 1913, no. 406, L/P+S/10/364/P4977. For Curzon's views, see his foreword in Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, vi. These developments were followed in 1913 by China admitting the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, and in 1915 by a tripartite agreement between Russia, Mongolia and China; Lamb, *British India*, p. 284.
38. Garnett to his father, 15 May 1909, DDQ 9/22/12. The model for the book was to have been Sir Francis Younghusband's *Heart of a Continent: narrative of travels in Manchuria, across the Gobi Desert, through the Himalayas, the Pamirs, and Chitral, 1884–1894* (London, John Murray, 1896).
39. However, in June 1903, Charles Campbell had lectured to the Royal Geographical Society on his Mongolian journey. His lecture subsequently appeared in its journal.
40. Garnett to his father, 27 Mar. 1909, DDQ 9/22/4.
41. Hardinge to Sir Arthur Nicolson, 10 May 1909, private, vol. 17/342, Hardinge Papers, CUL. Hardinge's reaction was in some ways surprising given that he had been in no doubt about the political ambitions of Russia and of Colonel Kozloff. See, respectively, undated minutes by Hardinge, FO 371/34/f15579/20585, and FO 371/37/f22081.
42. The original faded, pencil-written diary on which the report was based can be found among Garnett's papers. A further copy is at FO 371/631/f4463.
43. Garnett to Alston, 8 Feb. 1909, *ibid*.
44. 'The Quest or Journey's End'. Undated biographical fragment, DDQ 9/79/7.
45. *Ibid*.
46. *Ibid*.
47. *Ibid*.
48. See Note 17.

#### 4 Bucharest and St Petersburg

1. Tyrrell to Garnett, 26 Jan. 1909, DDQ 9/21/1.
2. Barclay to Garnett, 30 Jan. 1909, *ibid.*
3. Garnett to his mother, 11 Feb. 1909, DDQ 9/23/1.
4. Garnett to his mother, 12 Feb. 1909, DDQ 9/23/2.
5. Garnett to his mother, 12 Feb. 1909, *ibid.* (14 Feb. addendum).
6. Garnett to his mother, 18 and 22 Feb. 1909, DDQ 9/23/4-5.
7. *Ibid.*, 22 Feb., later entry.
8. Garnett to his father, 14 Mar. 1909, DDQ 9/22/2.
9. *Ibid.*
10. (Sir) John Keltie (Assistant Secretary, RGS), to Garnett, 21 Jan. 1909, DDQ 9/21/1.
11. Beilby Alston to Garnett, 22 Jan. 1909, *ibid.*
12. Garnett to his father, 20 Feb. 1909, *ibid.*
13. Tyrrell to Garnett, 15 Mar. 1909, *ibid.*
14. Richard Onslow (Viscount Cranley) to Garnett, 23 Mar. 1909, *ibid.* Cranley was not being entirely candid: he had disliked Russia; The Earl of Onslow, *Sixty-Three Years* (London, Hutchinson, 1944), p. 89; M. J. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia 1900–1939* (London, Hambledon, 1997), p. 22.
15. D. Lieven, *Nicholas II: Twilight of the Empire* (New York, St Martin's Griffin, 1993), pp. 170–1, 173.
16. Garnett to his mother, 19 Oct. 1909, DDQ 9/24/30.
17. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 23 Mar. 1910, DDQ 9/27/5.
18. 'Russia: Annual Report, 1911', in Buchanan to Grey, 18 Mar. 1912, FO 881/10022, pp. 31–2.
19. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 27. Hugh O'Beirne, councillor at the St Petersburg embassy, characterized Stolypin's approach towards government as 'pack you into prison or remove you to Siberia if you oppose the Government'. *Ibid.*, p. 43. See, also, Hughes, *Before the Revolution*, pp. 91–2.
20. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, pp. 49–50; Neilson, *ibid.*, pp. 27–8.
21. Neilson, 'Wishful Thinking: The Foreign Office and Russia 1907–1917', in McKercher and Moss, pp. 155–6. Nicolson to Grey, 9 Jun. 1909, FO 800/73.
22. The following paragraphs, besides sources otherwise identified, are derived from 'Russia: Annual Report, 1909', in Nicolson to Grey, 30 Dec. 1909, FO 881/9583.
23. Although Italy, in the October 1909 Racconigi Agreement, promised 'benevolent consideration' of Russian aims; H. Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988 imprint), p. 692.
24. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 304.
25. See D. W. Sweet, 'The Bosnian Crisis', in Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 183–4.
26. C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, *The Mirage of Power: Volume 1: British Foreign Policy 1902–14* (London/Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 83–4. On the issue of the ultimatum, also see D. E. Lee, *Europe's Crucial Years: The Diplomatic Background of World War I, 1902–1914* (Hanover, New Hampshire, University Press of New England, 1974), pp. 203–4. Nicolson

- was in no doubt as to its intent; Nicolson to Grey, 24 Mar. 1909, private, FO 800/73.
27. Sweet, 'Bosnian Crisis', pp. 190–2.
  28. K. Neilson, "'My Beloved Russians": Sir Arthur Nicolson and Russia, 1906–1916', *IHR*, 9, 4 (1987), 540–1; *Britain and the Last Tsar*, pp. 305–6.
  29. Cranley to Garnett, 5 Mar. 1909, DDQ 9/21/1.
  30. 'Russia: Annual Report, 1910', in Buchanan to Grey, 22 Mar. 1911, FO 881/9865, p. 10.
  31. See O'Beirne to Grey, 30 Jun. 1910, FO 881/9827.
  32. Russia: Annual Report, 1911, p. 5; O'Beirne to Grey, 28 Jun. 1911, no. 183, G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, *BD*, vol. X *The Balkan Wars pt. 1, the Prelude; The Tripoli War* (London, Johnson Reprint, 1933), p. 480.
  33. *Ibid.*, Annual Report, pp. 4–5, O'Beirne to Grey, 26 Sept. 1910, no. 395, confidential, and 14 Oct., no. 416, confidential, Gooch and Temperley, *ibid.*, pp. 212–13, 223–4.
  34. Garnett to his father, 2 Dec. 1909, DDQ 9/22/28. Earlier reforms instigated to relieve junior diplomats of routine work had limited effect; R. A. Jones, *The British Diplomatic Service, 1815–1914* (Gerrards Cross, Colin Smythe, 1983), pp. 164–7.
  35. Hughes, *Before the Revolution*, p. 93.
  36. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, p. 39.
  37. 'Memorandum by Mr Garnett', 9 Sept. 1909, in Nicolson to Grey, same date, no. 486, FO 881/9634.
  38. Garnett to his father, 29 Jun. 1909, DDQ 9/22/17.
  39. Garnett to his father, 2 Nov. 1909, DDQ 9/21/24.
  40. Nicolson recorded that Isvolsky 'rubs his forehead as to how the Cretan question is to be solved': Nicolson to Hardinge, 6 Jun. 1909, in *BD*, vol. 10, pt.1, pp. 12–13.
  41. Garnett to his mother, 18 Aug. 1909, DDQ 9/24/23.
  42. Garnett to his mother, 13 Aug. 1909, DDQ 9/24/22.
  43. Garnett to his mother, 29 Aug. 1909, DDQ 9/24/25.
  44. Garnett to his mother, 4 Sept. 1909, DDQ 9/24/26.
  45. Garnett to his mother, 5 Feb. 1910, addendum of 7 Feb., DDQ 9/25/3.
  46. Garnett to his mother, 3 Jun. 1910, DDQ 9/25/15.
  47. Russia: Annual Report, 1910, pp. 20–1.
  48. Garnett to his mother, 28 May 1911, DDQ 9/26/20.
  49. On Persia's sources of revenue and connected problems, see J. Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970* (London, Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 7–9.
  50. See S. Cronin, *The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926* (London, Tauris, 1997), pp. 17–29. For an assessment of the Cossack Brigade, see *ibid.*, pp. 54–65.
  51. M. E. Yapp, '1900–1921: The Last Years of the Qajar Dynasty', in H. Amirsadeghi (ed.), assisted by R. W. Ferrier, *Twentieth Century Iran* (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1977), p. 5. D. McLean, *Britain and Her Buffer State: the Collapse of the Persian Empire, 1890–1914* (London, Royal Historical Society, 1979), pp. 57–8. Between 1903 and 1913, the British Government

- and Government of India had advanced roughly £750,000 to the Persian Government.
52. Unless otherwise noted, this paragraph is based upon Russia: Annual Report, 1909.
  53. M. E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923* (London, Longman, 1987), p. 258. This paragraph draws upon this source, pp. 246–60, and Yapp, ‘The Last Years’.
  54. Russia: Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.
  55. *Ibid.*
  56. Garnett to his mother, 12 Jun. 1909, DDQ 9/24/14.
  57. Germany abjured rail, road and telegraph concessions in northern Persia but would have equal economic freedoms there: Lee, *Europe’s Crucial Years*, pp. 216–19; Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 96–7.
  58. Lee, *Europe’s Crucial Years*, p. 217.
  59. Russia: Annual Report: 1910, pp. 3–4, and Russia, Annual Report: 1911, p. 11.
  60. *Ibid.*, p. 6. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 315.
  61. In July 1910, he recorded: ‘we all tumble about in wild disorder – Grand Dukes and duchesses, their Court, officers of the guard, diplomats & the world generally’: Garnett to Aunt Addie, 21 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/27/8.
  62. On Isvolsky’s concerns in November 1909, see D. W. Sweet and R. T. B. Langhorne, ‘Great Britain and Russia, 1907–1914’, in Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 249, and Nicolson to Grey, 19 Nov. 1909, private, FO 800/73.
  63. Garnett to his mother, 29 Oct. 1910, DDQ 9/25/37.
  64. Garnett to his father, 11 Jan. 1911, DDQ 9/22/44 (Aehrenthal), and Garnett to his mother, 16 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/25/41 (Potsdam).
  65. Garnett to his mother, 26 Jan. 1911, DDQ 9/26/3.
  66. Unless otherwise noted, the material below is based upon the annual reports for Russia for 1909–10.
  67. See, for example, letter from F. Anderson, China Association, Shanghai, 10 Apr. 1908, and enclosure, FO 405/182.
  68. Garnett to his mother, 22 Feb. 1911, DDQ 9/26/7.
  69. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 12 Apr. 1911, DDQ 9/27/10.
  70. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 24 Jul. 1909, DDQ 9/27/3. On the inaccessibility of the Court to British diplomats, see Hughes, *Before the Revolution*, p. 70.
  71. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, pp. 24–5.
  72. Garnett to his mother, 27 Mar. 1911, DDQ 9/26/12.
  73. ‘Memorandum by Mr. Garnett’, n.d., in Buchanan to Grey, 23 Mar. 1911, no. 69, FO 881/9927.
  74. Garnett to his mother, 4 Feb. 1911, DDQ 9/26/4. Meriel Buchanan (Sir George Buchanan’s daughter) recalled the ‘purgatory’ of the weekly ‘At Home’ which each ambassadress was expected to host and, more generally, the tedium of much of the socializing; M. Buchanan, *The Dissolution of an Empire* (London, John Murray, 1932), pp. 18ff.
  75. Garnett to his mother, 22 Feb. DDQ 9/26/7, and 16 Mar. 1911, DDQ 9/26/10.
  76. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, pp. 30–1.
  77. See Hughes, *Inside the Enigma* (p. 272), on Cecil Spring-Rice, who was embassy secretary, 1903–6. Also, as regards the weather, Buchanan,

- Dissolution*, p. 63, and *Ambassador's Daughter* (London, Cassell, 1958), pp. 99–100; Hardinge of Penshurst, *Old Diplomacy* (London, John Murray, 1947), p. 84.
78. Garnett to his mother, 22 Apr. 1909, DDQ 9/24/1.
  79. Garnett to his mother, 4 Sept. (addendum of 6 Sept.), DDQ 9/24/26, and 2 Oct. 1909, DDQ 9/24/29. Lady Nicolson's 13 year-old daughter was apt to say 'Maman déteste la toilette'; something which, Garnett noted, 'was obvious to any eye'. Hardinge also adjudged Lady Nicolson's attire to resemble a maid's; Hardinge to Bertie, 4 Dec. 1903, and Hardinge to Bertie, 14 Aug. 1904, cited in Neilson, 'My Beloved Russians', 524–5.
  80. Garnett to his mother, 16 Nov. 1909, DDQ 9/24/33.
  81. In fact, Radcliffe decided not to return to St Petersburg after a period of leave on account of the expense.
  82. Garnett to his mother, 24 Apr. 1909, DDQ 9/24/2.
  83. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 18 May 1909, DDQ 9/27/2.
  84. Garnett to his mother, 7 Jun., DDQ 9/24/13, and 25 Jul. 1909, DDQ 9/24/19.
  85. Garnett to his mother, 29 Jun. 1909, DDQ 9/24/15.
  86. Garnett to his mother, 25 Oct. 1909, DDQ 9/24/31. The occasion was a success notwithstanding Sir Arthur Nicolson's concern that the Embassy Chaplain, Bousfield Swan Lombard, would use the occasion to project his high church views. Garnett also crossed swords with him for this reason.
  87. Garnett to his mother, 26 Jul. 1909, DDQ 9/24/20.
  88. Garnett to his father, 15 Jan. 1910, DDQ 9/22/28.
  89. Garnett to his mother, 7 Dec. 1909, DDQ 9/24/39. Allan's 'Vision of Salome' gained her wide public attention.
  90. Glyn's *Three Weeks*, a shocking tale of adultery, was published in 1907. It echoed her affair with Lord Curzon.
  91. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jan. DDQ 9/25/1, and 27 Jan. 1910, DDQ 9/25/2.
  92. Garnett to his mother, 5 Feb. 1910, DDQ 9/25/3.
  93. On this, see the Rt. Hon. Sir John Tilley, *London to Tokyo* (London, Hutchinson, 1942), pp. 72–3. Tilley visited St Petersburg at the end of 1909.
  94. See, for example, Garnett to his father, 6 Aug. 1909, DDQ 9/22/21, 14 and 22 Jun. 1910, DDQ 9/22/34 and 36. The expense of the post was notorious; Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 52.
  95. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, pp. 21–2.
  96. When introduced to the Tsar in August 1910 at a luncheon, Nicholas II had complimented Garnett and Kidston on their sunburnt healthy appearance. According to Garnett, he was red not brown, on account of being 'frightfully pinched' by his tight collar and as he was not used to eating in uniform; Garnett to his mother, 6 Aug. 1910, DDQ 9/25/24.
  97. The issue became fraught because Buchanan felt that too strict an observance would impede him in his duties.
  98. Garnett to his mother, 4 Jul. 1910, DDQ 9/25/20. Lowther refused the post; Neilson, 'My Beloved Russia', 543.
  99. Nicolson to Hardinge, 2 Mar. and Hardinge to Nicolson, 11 Mar. 1911, cited in Neilson, 'My Beloved Russians', 543. Also see Neilson, *Strategy and Supply*, pp. 25–6.



100. Garnett to his mother, 25 Nov., DDQ 9/25/36, and 8 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/25/38.
101. Garnett to his mother, 10 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/25/39.
102. Garnett to his mother, 19 Dec., DDQ 9/25/42, and 28 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/25/43.
103. Garnett to his mother, 16 Mar. 1911, DDQ 9/26/10. H. Nicolson, *Lord Carnock*, p. 176, cited in Neilson, 'My Beloved Russians', 524.
104. Garnett to his mother, 20 Apr. 1911, DDQ 9/26/15.
105. Hughes, *Inside the Enigma*, pp. 13–14. A. Cross, 'A Corner of a Foreign Field: the British Embassy in St Petersburg, 1863–1919', *SEER*, 88, 1–2 (2010), 328–58.
106. Garnett to his mother, 1 May 1911, DDQ 9/26/17.
107. Garnett to his mother, 6 Jun. 1911, DDQ 9/26/22.
108. Garnett to his mother, 24 May, DDQ 9/26/19, 28 May, DDQ 9/26/20, 1 Jun., DDQ 9/26/21, 6 Jun. 1911, DDQ 9/26/22.
109. Anderson to Garnett, 18 Oct., DDQ 9/21/4, Scott to Garnett, 15 Mar. 1911, DDQ 9/21/5.
110. See J. Fisher, 'Official Attitudes to Foreign Travel at the British India and Foreign Offices before 1914', *EHR*, 72, 498 (2007), 956–1. The Foreign Office was partly culpable as when travellers obtained a passport with visa for the Russian Empire, they were not informed that a further visa was required and that it took at least three weeks to obtain from the authorities in St Petersburg; MacDonell to Garnett, 28 Nov. 1910, DDQ 9/29/1–15.
111. *Ibid.*, Fisher, 'Official Attitudes', 959.
112. Garnett to his mother, 12 Jun. 1909, DDQ 9/24/14.
113. Cranley to Garnett, 13 Mar. 1911, DDQ 9/21/5.
114. Garnett to his mother, 21 and 25 Jul. 1911, DDQ 9/26/31–2.
115. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 23 Mar. 1910, DDQ 9/27/5.
116. *Ibid.*, letter of 25 Jul.

## 5 Tehran 1911–14 – 'Into the Vortex'

1. Garnett to his mother, 15 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/2.
2. Jones, *Diplomatic Service*, p. 202, Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy', p. 45.
3. Barclay to Garnett, 16 Sept. 1911, DDQ 9/29/1.
4. Rose to Garnett, 30 Sept. 1911, *ibid.*
5. Oliphant to Garnett, 6 and 19 Aug. 1911, *ibid.* Remaining material in this paragraph is from these letters.
6. Oliphant to Garnett, 10 Sept. 1911, *ibid.*
7. The quarters at Gulhek were situated just outside the village of Gulhek, which had been gifted to Britain by Mahomed Shah in 1835.
8. Garnett to his mother, 16 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/10.
9. Townley, *Indiscretions*, p. 253.
10. At the secretaries' house, the water was held in two large tanks which also contained goldfish. Another observer described the legation as 'the most restful and charming spot in all Teheran'; F. B. Bradley-Birt, *Through Persia: From the Gulf to the Caspian* (London, Smith, Elder, 1909), p. 295. Also see Oliphant's description: Oliphant, *Ambassador in Bonds*, pp. 25–6.

11. Garnett to his mother, 19 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/1.
12. In February 1912, Barclay (and Garnett) was reminded that the word 'the' need not be ciphered. Garnett commented that small words were sometimes required in order to make the message comprehensible. He also noted on a similar, niggling, corrective, but inadvertently undated, despatch from the Foreign Office, that 'This delightful new form of inquisition paper must be causing great merriment in the various chanceries.' Undated notes by Garnett, on Under-Secretary of State to Barclay, 13 Feb. 1912, FO 248/1044.
13. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 22 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/33/1.
14. Garnett to his mother, 28 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/6. For a more balanced, near contemporary, account see A. V. Williams Jackson, *Persia, Past and Present: A Book of Travel and Research* (New York/London, Macmillan, 1906), Ch. 26.
15. Garnett to his mother, 22 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/5.
16. Garnett to his mother, 28 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/6.
17. Garnett to his mother, 11 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/9.
18. Garnett to his mother, 1 Dec. 1911, DDQ 9/31/13.
19. His second report was praised highly. According to *The Near East's* commercial and financial editor, 'It is one of the most instructive Foreign Office publications among the many which it has fallen to my lot to peruse. The whole philosophy of politics in its interdependence with foreign commerce and economics generally is implicit in this report, but only they that have eyes will see and they that have ears will hear'; 'Notes and News', *The Near East*, 7 Feb. 1913.
20. Garnett learnt that Hammond Shipley in Tabriz spent most of his time asleep. This was only partly true. Shipley corresponded regularly with his mentor E. G. Browne, providing him with newspapers as well as current information which Browne then used to attack government policy in the press. This had been taking place for some time before Garnett's arrival. George Churchill, the Oriental Secretary, and Claude Stokes in Tehran, among others, also did so. See Add 7604, boxes 8, 11 and 12, E. G. Browne Papers, CUL.
21. Garnett to his mother, 22 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/11.
22. Barclay apparently also did this when serving as second secretary at Madrid in the 1890s. According to Henry (later Sir Henry) Beaumont, who served with him then, Barclay also had a particular passion for plovers' eggs and gooseberry fool and he drank a pint of champagne every day of his adult life. *Diplomatic Butterfly*, unpublished manuscript, IWM, p. 78.
23. See Note 21.
24. (Sir) Henry Beaumont commented on the extra-marital activities of Lady Barclay, *née* Beatrix Chapman, noting her 'indifference to what people thought of her', and that 'she wanted to have as many men as possible – including all the unmarried members of the Embassy staff – at her feet'; *Diplomatic Butterfly*, pp. 78–9.
25. For the background, see 'Précis of Railway Projects in Persia, 1870–1910', WO 106/52, TNA.
26. J. Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran 1900–1970* (London etc., Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 155. In the summer of 1914 Britain acquired a 51 percent holding in APOC; *idem*.
27. F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: a Study in Imperialism* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968), p. 586; J. Siegel,

- Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia* (London/New York, Tauris, 2002), pp. 103–7.
28. Garnett to his mother, 20 Oct. 1911, DDQ 9/31/4.
  29. On Browne, the Persia Committee and opposition to Grey's policy, see by D. McLean, 'A Professor Extraordinary: E. G. Browne and his Persian Campaign, 1908–1913', *HJ*, 21, 2 (1978), 399–408; 'English Radicals, Russia, and the Fate of Persia, 1907–1913', *EHR*, 93, 367 (1978), 338–52; M. Bonakdarian, 'The Persia Committee and the Constitutional Revolution in Iran', *BJMES*, 18, 2 (1991), 186–207. Bonakdarian attributes the committee with greater influence on Grey than McLean.
  30. Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 174ff.
  31. *Ibid.* Further entry of 22 Oct. For Shuster's defence, see his book, *The Strangling of Persia* (New York, Greenwood Press, 1968), passim.
  32. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain*, pp. 613ff.
  33. The India Office and Government of India had strongly opposed large troop deployments in Southern Persia; India Office to Foreign Office, 16 Oct. 1911, FO 371/1181/F236/40874. See also, *ibid.*, F236/47662, minute by R[obert] G V[ansittart], 14 Nov. 1911.
  34. Enzeli was connected to Tehran by an excellent road which was maintained by a Russian company.
  35. *Ibid.* Further entry of 28 Oct. I. Ahmad, *Anglo-Iranian Relations 1905–1919* (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1974), pp. 249–3.
  36. Siegel, *Endgame*, p. 109.
  37. Persia. Annual Report, 1911, FO 416/11, pp. 16–18.
  38. Garnett to his mother, 2 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/7.
  39. Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 109–10.
  40. Entries of 3, 5, 6, 10 and 12 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/7.
  41. 'Persia. Annual Report, 1911, FO 416/11', p. 19. Notably, these were the dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre, his assistant at Tabriz, the approval by the Russian and British Legations of any foreigners to be employed by the Persian Government and the payment by the Persian Government of Russia's military operations in Persia.
  42. Yapp, '1900–1921', p. 15.
  43. Garnett to his mother, 2 Nov. 1911, DDQ 9/31/7, additional entry of 14 Nov.
  44. Garnett to his mother, 1 Dec. 1911, DDQ 9/31/13, and further entries of 2–5 Dec.
  45. Garnett to his father, 5 Sept. 1906, DDQ 9/10/32.
  46. Garnett to his mother, 8 Dec. 1911, DDQ 9/31/16.
  47. Garnett to his mother, 27 Dec. 1911, DDQ 9/31/19, further entry of 6 Jan. 1912. Grey was also criticized openly in the press for his inactivity; 'Russia in Azerbaijan', *The Near East*, 27 Mar. 1914, p. 664, 'Russification of Persia', *The Near East*, 29 May 1914, p. 106, 'Russia in Azerbaijan', *The Near East*, reprinted from the *Manchester Guardian*, 24 Jul. 1914, p. 419.
  48. Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 111–12.
  49. *Ibid.*
  50. Garnett to his mother, 31 Jan. 1912, DDQ 9/31/24.
  51. Persia. Annual Report, 1912, in Sir W. Townley to Sir E. Grey, 18 Jan. 1913, FO 416/11, pp. 7–8. Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 122–3.

52. Persia: Annual Report, 1912, FO 416/11, p. 19.
53. Such also was the opinion conveyed by Barclay in the annual report of 1911. Barclay implied that the Russian Government might, on the other hand, have done more to prevent his return; Persia. Annual Report, 1911, in Sir G. Barclay to Sir E. Grey, 28 Jan. 1912, FO 416/11, pp. 10–11. On the direction of Russian policy in Persia, see Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 108, 114–15, 118–20, 128.
54. Ahmad, *Anglo–Iranian Relations*, pp. 253–5.
55. Garnett to Archibald Rose, 28 Mar. and diary entry, 7 Jun. 1912, DDQ 9/34/5.
56. Garnett to his mother, 18 Dec. 1911, further entry of 19 Dec., DDQ 9/31/18; 1 Jan. 1911 [1912], DDQ 9/31/20; 27 Jan. 1912, DDQ 9/31/23.
57. Garnett to his mother, 18 Jan. 1912, DDQ 31/22.
58. Garnett to his mother, 27 Jan. 1912, DDQ 31/23. For details of Kennard's indiscretions, which were known to the intelligence authorities, see HD 3/136, TNA.
59. Garnett to his mother, 25 Mar. 1912, DDQ 9/31/34. Such also was Lady Susan's impression; Townley, *Indiscretions*, p. 237.
60. Garnett to his mother, 8 Apr. 1912, DDQ 9/31/35.
61. Garnett to his mother, 27 Jan. 1912, DDQ 9/31/23. As Garnett noted, Townley had served in Tehran in 1889; letter from Garnett, 'my dear fellow', 7 Feb. 1912, DDQ 9/34/5.
62. Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 118–20.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 114–15, 128.
64. Garnett to his mother, 2 Feb. 1905, DDQ 9/4/79. She had subsequently collapsed and left Garnett to deal with her work also: Garnett to his mother, 14 Feb. 1905, DDQ 9/4/80.
65. Garnett to his mother, 8 Feb., DDQ 9/13/5, and 3 Mar. 1907, DDQ 9/14/8.
66. 'Persia: Annual Report, 1911', FO 416/11, pp. 8–9.
67. Garnett to his mother, 20 May 1912, DDQ 9/31/39.
68. He reported having been 'attacked ... with great savagery' by his doctor and then by his dentist; Garnett to his mother, 26 Apr. 1912, DDQ 9/31/37.
69. *Ibid.* Entry of 4 May.
70. Garnett suspected that his waning sympathies towards Russia were detected and that the Russian Legation was intriguing to have him replaced; Garnett to his mother, 14 Aug. 1912, DDQ 9/31/46.
71. H. Nazem, *Russia and Great Britain in Iran 1900–1914*, Columbia University Ph.D, 1954 (University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan), pp. 136–7; Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain*, pp. 600–8; Siegel, *Endgame*, p. 101.
72. Garnett to his mother, 2 and 8 Aug. 1912, DDQ 9/31/44 and 46.
73. Garnett to his mother, 3 Sept. 1912, DDQ 9/31/47.
74. Garnett to his mother, 28 Sept. 1912, DDQ 9/31/50. Further entries of 25 and 27 Sept.
75. Garnett's house was also being refurbished and an infestation of scorpions dealt with, but his new dining room windows could only be opened from the outside.
76. Diary entries of 11 and 23 Sept. 1912, DDQ 9/34/5.
77. Kazemzadeh, *Britain and Persia*, p. 674; Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 327.

78. Note by Garnett, 18 Oct. 1912, DDQ 9/34/5.
79. Garnett to his mother, 25 Oct. 1912, DDQ 9/31/54.
80. McLean, *Buffer State*, pp. 89–90.
81. The line that was surveyed by Arnold Wilson was to be undertaken by the Persian Railway Syndicate, which comprised the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Imperial Bank of Persia and the British Indian Steam Navigation Company, which commenced in the summer of 1911. The line was projected eventually to link with Hamadan and Tehran. The syndicate had also applied for other concessions in the south.
82. Garnett to his mother, 7 Dec. 1912, DDQ 9/31/59.
83. Garnett to his mother, 24 Jan. 1913, DDQ 9/32/2 and 1 Feb. 1913, DDQ 9/32/3. Garnett had also learned of his impending betrothal to an English governess. The rumour had apparently been started by the wife of the Colonel of the Russian Cossacks, for whom the governess worked.
84. Garnett to his mother, 5 Aug. 1913, DDQ 9/32/21.
85. Garnett to his mother, 8 Aug. 1913, DDQ 9/32/22.
86. Garnett to his mother, 18 Aug. 1913, DDQ 9/32/23. Garnett, desperate to avoid further confrontations, encouraged Arnold Keppel, Lady Susan's nephew, to play on his return from London. She also played, and lost, regularly at bridge.
87. Garnett to his mother, 7 Sept. 1913, DDQ 9/32/25. Garnett had previously speculated as to how the minister ever managed to get any work done. His study routinely hosted Churchill, the oriental secretary, Lady Susan, Albyn Young, the Townleys' dog and sometimes their baby also.
88. Garnett to his mother, 25 Jun. 1913, DDQ 9/32/17, and 8 Jul. 1913, DDQ 9/32/19.
89. Garnett to his mother, 25 Jun. 1913, DDQ 9/32/17 and 2 Jul. 1913, DDQ 9/32/18.
90. Diary entry Jul. 1913, DDQ 9/29/5.
91. Garnett to Oliphant, 2 Sept. 1913, *ibid.*
92. Garnett to Townley, n.d. (but 1914) enclosing undated note on commercial affairs, DDQ 9/29/8.
93. In 1907, Persia's imports totalled £8,000,000 and its exports £6,500,000 million. Of these totals, Britain had £3,500,000 and Russia, whose share was increasing hugely, £8,250,000; A. T. Wilson, *Persia* (London, Ernest Benn, 1932), p. 79. A more recent study provides different figures but notes that whereas Russo-Persian trade was balanced, Britain had a serious deficit in its trade with Persia; Bahrier, *Economic Development*, pp. 10, 106. Garnett's trade report for 1911–12 suggested that Russia accounted for almost 56 percent of Persia's trade and Britain just under 28 per cent; 'The Trade of Persia', *The Near East*, 21 Feb. 1913, p. 453. By September 1913, the legation noted those figures as, respectively, 62.7 per cent and 20.9 per cent; 'Persia's Foreign Trade', *The Near East*, 5 Sept. 1913, p. 529.
94. Several accounts survive among his papers. See, for example, DDQ 9/34/3.
95. By the end of 1912, it had 21 Swedish officers and one American officer and 2892 Persian officers and men. Of these, 3 Swedish officers and 500 Persian officers and men were employed in the south. During 1912, posts were established along some key routes: Tehran–Kazvin–Enzeli, Kazvin–Hamadan; Tehran–Kum, and from Shiraz towards Bushire; Persia. Annual

- Report, 1912, in Sir W. Townley to Sir E. Grey, 18 Mar. 1913, FO 416/11, p. 29. His reservations included the Swedes' capacity for alcohol: 'Vodka, Madeira, whisky, beer, champagne & a most obnoxious concoction called Swedish Punch were among the baggage in great quantities & were trotted out on the slightest provocation.' Garnett also questioned the Swedes' wisdom in remaining completely nude for long periods before their Persian gendarmes; Garnett to Townley, 28 Sept. 1913, DDQ 9/29/5.
96. Garnett to Townley, 10 Nov. 1913, DDQ 9/29/5. Ironically, perhaps, Garnett, when travelling beyond Anar in November, had by choice, and for reason of security, followed in the wake of a party of over 600 looting Bakhtiariis.
  97. Garnett to Rose, 8 Sept. 1913, DDQ 9/29/5.
  98. Diary entry, 4 Feb. 1914, DDQ 9/29/7.
  99. Garnett to Oliphant, 8 Feb., and diary entry 27 Feb. 1914, DDQ 9/29/7.
  100. Garnett to Townley, 31 Mar. 1914, DDQ 9/29/8.
  101. The bank was established in 1889 with a royal charter and had a monopoly on note issue. It operated throughout Persia, and the legation oversaw its interests. It became a medium for British efforts to supplant Russian loans to Persia; McLean, *Buffer State*, pp. 70–1. Its Russian rival, the *Banque des Prêts de Perse*, was established in 1890.
  102. Garnett to Townley, n.d., Townley to Garnett, n.d. (both early 1914), DDQ 9/29/8.
  103. *Ibid.* Townley to Garnett, n.d. Such also is the interpretation offered by Kazemzadeh, *Britain and Persia*, p. 620. Siegel differs slightly on this point: *Endgame*, pp. 154–5. On the Foreign Office, see Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 325.
  104. Diary entry, 20 Jun. 1914, DDQ 9/29/10.
  105. 'Persian Gulf Affairs', *The Near East*, 3 Apr. 1914, p. 695, 'The Fight at Kazerun', 17 Apr. 1914, p. 761. On these difficulties see Cronin, *The Army*, pp. 22–3.
  106. *Ibid.* Cronin, pp. 63–4.
  107. Garnett to Oliphant, 8 Apr. 1914, DDQ 9/29/9.
  108. Garnett told Mrs Rockhill of these developments, asking that she inform her husband, William Rockhill, who had recently left the American Foreign Service, but who might communicate with the State Department. Garnett to Mrs Rockhill, 8 Apr. 1914, DDQ 9/29/9. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs verified Korostovetz's complicity in the cabinet crisis.
  109. Garnett to Oliphant, 6 May 1914, DDQ 9/29/9. Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*, p. 28. Neilson, notes that Nicolson was by June 1914 reconciled to partition, *idem.*, p. 337.
  110. Neilson, *ibid.*, pp. 332–6.
  111. Russia was not to extend into the neutral zone without Britain's prior agreement and was to support its demand for the construction of the Mohammerah–Khorremabad line.
  112. Garnett to Oliphant, 2 Jun. 1914, DDQ 9/29/10. The line was to have been undertaken by an international consortium under Russian auspices. On its antecedents, see D. W. Spring, 'The Trans-Persian Railway Project and Anglo-Russian Relations, 1909–14', *SEES*, 54, 1 (1976), 60–82; Siegel, *Endgame*, pp. 159–60.

113. Garnett to Oliphant, 6 May and 2 Jun. 1914, DDQ 9/29/9, DDQ 9/29/10.
114. Garnett had written an account of the coronation for the Lancashire press. The Shah had, in effect, crowned himself as the Grand Vizier had placed the crown on his head back to front, and the Shah then rectified the mistake; Garnett to his father, 27 Jul. 1914, DDQ 9/30/25.
115. Garnett to Dick Steel, 8 Aug. 1914, DDQ 9/29/12.
116. Garnett to Steel, 11 Aug. 1914, *ibid.*
117. *Ibid.*
118. Garnett to Steel, 3 Sept. 1914, DDQ 9/29/13.
119. Garnett to his father, 10 Jul. 1914, DDQ 9/30/23. Garnett subsequently asked his father to destroy this letter.
120. Steel to Garnett, 24 and 27 Sept. 1914, DDQ 9/29/13.
121. Townley to Grey, 10 Oct. 1914, no. 258, FO 371/2079/66095.
122. 'A diary which can be preserved with other Persian papers. It records a true & damnable situation in 1914. W.J. Garnett, August 1952', DDQ 9/29/15. See K. Hickman, *Daughters of Britannia: the Lives and Times of Diplomatic Wives* (London, Flamingo, 2000), pp. 276–9. According to one account, in November 1918, Lady Susan had learned from Sir Walter of the Kaiser's imminent arrival on Dutch territory. She had a British airman drive her to the frontier station, where she demanded access to the platform, on account of her husband's position; K. Young, *The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart vol. 1 1915–1938* (London, Macmillan, 1973), pp. 316–17. She was forcibly removed from the bonnet of the car in which he left the station; G. MacDonagh, *The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous* (London, Weidenfeld, 2000), p. 418. The matter was raised in Parliament: FO 371/3788/f29021. Hardinge considered Townley's defence of his wife 'rather "thin"'. Undated minute by Hardinge for Drummond, on Townley to Hardinge, 22 Nov. 1918. Garnett claimed to feel less constrained when writing in 1952 because of the publication in 1951 by Robert Hichens of *The Mask*, a fictional *exposé* of the philandering of Lady Marjorie Denham, wife of a rising star in the British Diplomatic Service. She is torn between her ambitions to become an ambassadress, and, thereby, advance her husband's fortunes, and her wayward sexual desires, which lead to her undoing. Garnett appeared to believe that it was drawn as much from Lady Barclay as Lady Townley and represented a composite image of loose living among the wives of highly placed diplomats.

## 6 London, Sofia and Athens, and the 'Episode of the "Floating Bag"'

1. Henry (later Sir Henry) Beaumont also regarded the work as dull: *Diplomatic Butterfly*, p. 442.
2. Garnett to Archie (Archibald Rose), 13 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/29/14.
3. Garnett to his mother, 11 Oct. 1914, DDQ 9/35/2, 11 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/35/3, 12 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/35/4.
4. *Ibid.* Garnett to his mother 11 Nov. This was something of a family trait. Lord Curzon monitored Sir Louis Harcourt's illicit note taking at Cabinet.
5. Garnett to Dick (Steel), 17 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/29/14.

6. Garnett to Archie (Rose), 13 Nov. and Garnett to Dick, 26 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/29/14.
7. R. J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918* (Boulder, East European Monographs, 1983), pp. 432–4; *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 137. It received a second loan in February 1915. On the loans and German and Austrian attempts to impose a treaty on Bulgaria in late July 1914, see K. G. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy and Bulgaria 1914–1915', *SEES*, 49 (1971), 565, 571.
8. D. Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 59.
9. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 566–9. Noel Buxton, who with his brother campaigned for a more vigorous policy towards Sofia, argued that Bulgaria had more to gain from siding with the Allies rather than with the Central Powers. Once Bulgaria had acquired Macedonia, it would seek Thrace, which would bring it into conflict with Turkey, and which Germany could not satisfy. Also, he noted that Germany might not prevent Bulgaria from having Cavalla, but its possession would not be secure without the sanction of the Western maritime powers; Noel Buxton to Clerk, 1 Dec. 1915, FO 371/2281/181820/184516.
10. *Ibid.* Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 570.
11. O'Beirne to Grey, 8 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2266/108897/109479.
12. K. G. Robbins, *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon* (London, Cassell, 1971), pp. 304–9, 325.
13. Garnett to his mother, 11 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/35/3.
14. Garnett to Archie (Rose), 13 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/29/14.
15. Gerald Fitzmaurice, formerly first Dragoman at Constantinople, and his successor Andrew Ryan were thus affected. Ryan found it 'wearisome': A. Ryan, 'Memories of Twenty-Five Years Service', 22, Ryan Papers, 3/3, MECA.
16. K. Neilson and T. G. Otte (eds), *The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854–1946* (New York/London, Routledge, 2009), pp. 167–9.
17. Garnett to his mother, 22 and 27 Nov. 1914, DDQ 9/35/9–10
18. See T. G. Otte, "Between Hammer and Anvil": Sir Francis Oppenheimer, The Netherlands Overseas Trust and Allied Economic Warfare, 1914–1918', in C. Baxter and A. Stewart (eds), *Diplomats at War: British and Commonwealth Diplomacy in Wartime* (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 100.
19. Garnett to his mother, 20 Dec. 1914, DDQ 9/35/12.
20. Garnett had befriended a flower seller at the Given Wilson Institute in Plaistow, for whom, as an act of charity, he obtained flowers from Quernmore; Garnett to his mother, 21 Feb. 1915, DDQ 9/35/16.
21. Garnett to his mother, 20 Dec. 1914, DDQ 9/35/12.
22. Sir George Barclay was Minister at Bucharest and Garnett, as Russell knew, was not on speaking terms with Lady Barclay. Russell had served with Barclay 16 years before and had crossed swords with her. He had vowed never to serve at the same post as her again. Barclay himself refused to have her in Bucharest 'on any terms'.
23. Garnett to his mother, 5 Mar. 1915, DDQ 9/35/26.
24. Undated account, DDQ 9/37/1. He noted elsewhere that Charles Marling, when passing through St Petersburg *en route* for the legation at Tehran,



where he was to be minister, was informed of the surrender to Britain of the neutral zone in Persia by Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. The Foreign Office had failed to tell him: Garnett to Steel, 3 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/15. Other weaknesses in the sharing of information were noted by Sir Valentine Chirol, during his Balkan mission in 1915; L. B. Fritzinger, *Diplomat Without Portfolio: Valentine Chirol, His Life and The Times* (London/New York, Tauris, 2006), p. 457. On the cession of Constantinople, see M. G. Ekstein, 'Russia, Constantinople and the Straits, 1914–1915', in Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, pp. 423–35.

25. Garnett to his mother, 30 Mar. 1915, DDQ 9/36/5.
26. Note of 29 Mar. 1915, DDQ 9/37/1.
27. Garnett to his mother, 10 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/36/7.
28. Garnett to his mother, 30 Mar. 1915, DDQ 9/36/5.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, p. 438.
31. *Ibid.* pp. 439–40. Also see, for example, Bax-Ironside to Grey, 16 Mar. 1915, FO 371/2243/214/30861.
32. Letter of 2 May, DDQ 9/36/10; minute by Lancelot Oliphant, 24 Feb., FO 371/2243/214/21552; minute by Sir Arthur Nicolson, 4 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2243/214/39228. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 573.
33. Crampton, *Bulgaria, 1878–1918*, p. 439.
34. Garnett to Oliphant, 11 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/9.
35. Letter of 24 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/36/9. Rumours of such agreements, and between Bulgaria and Germany, had been current for some time: Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 569; Sir F. Bertie to Grey, 25 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2242/214/9440.
36. Garnett to Russell, 22 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/10.
37. Bax-Ironside to Grey, 19 Apr. 1915, on meetings with Dr Vladof, leader of the Macedonian Organization, and Savinsky, FO 371/2244/214/46397.
38. Garnett to his mother, 12 May 1915, DDQ 9/36/11.
39. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, pp. 434–5, 437.
40. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 584. On Nicolson, Steiner, 'The Foreign Office and the War', in Hinsley, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 519.
41. Garnett to his mother, 10 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/36/7. This is not particularly apparent among Foreign Office files on the Balkans for 1915. He was also renowned for 'cardsharpping and for evading the payment of his card debts': 'Visit of W.J. Garnett, en disponibilité, February 13th 1920', ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
42. Garnett to Oliphant, 11 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/9. Garnett later noted that after Gerard Lowther's departure from Constantinople, Bax-Ironside had made preparations to leave for the city in order to replace him; Garnett to Oliphant, 19 Aug. 1915, DDQ 9/37/54.
43. Letter of 22 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/36/8.
44. Letter of 24 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/36/9 and Garnett to his mother, 12 May 1915, DDQ 9/36/11.
45. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 562.
46. Russell, as well as Steel-Maitland, continued to circulate Garnett's letters to Cabinet members on occasion and more regularly within the Foreign

- Office. He reminded Garnett of the need for concision; Russell to Garnett, 27 Jul. 1915, DDQ 9/37/49.
47. Letter of 18 May 1915 with post-script, DDQ 9/36/12. Also see Russell to Garnett, 4 May 1915, private, DDQ 9/37/16.
  48. Russell rebuked Bax-Ironside for this: note dated 4 Apr. 1915, with annotation of 8 Apr., DDQ 9/37/1, but not, apparently, for the indiscretions of his own German-Swiss butler.
  49. Letter of 17 Jul. 1915, DDQ 9/36/14.
  50. See, for example, undated note in Garnett to Crowe, 24 Apr., DDQ 9/37/11, Garnett to Oliphant, 27 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/13.
  51. Garnett to Russell, 22 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/10; Garnett to Crowe, 24 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/11. Napier's meddling in political affairs, as well as Bax-Ironside's failure to restrain him, had already caused concern: Bax-Ironside to Grey, 24 Dec. 1914, enclosing Napier to Bax-Ironside, 15 Dec. 1914, FO 371/2251/f6452; minute by George Clerk, 10 Feb. 1915, on Bax-Ironside, 8 Feb. 1915, no. 42, FO 371/2242/214/15480; minutes by Lancelot Oliphant, 22 Feb. and Sir Arthur Nicolson, 22 Feb., FO 371/2243/214/20538. Prime Minister Asquith had also noted this tendency: minute by Asquith, 4 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2243/214/39227, but Grey considered that his contacts with the Minister for War might prove useful; minute by Grey, n.d. (but c. 22 Apr. 1915), FO 371/2244/214/47669.
  52. See D. Whittington, 'Leo Amery and the First World War in the Balkans and at the Dardanelles', unpublished MA dissertation, University of the West of England, 2009, *passim*.
  53. Fritzinger, *Diplomat Without Portfolio*, pp. 455–64; Stevenson, *First World War*, p. 61. The difficulty of negotiating with the Serbs had been recognized from an early stage; see, for example, Mr des Graz to Grey, 29 Jan. 1915, FO 371/2242/214/11283.
  54. On Bulgarians' pro-Russian sympathies, see Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, pp. 435–6.
  55. Garnett to Steel, 3 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/15.
  56. Garnett to Steel, 26 Apr. 1915, DDQ 9/37/12.
  57. See, for example, minute by George Clerk, 9 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2244/214/41244. Garnett to Russell, 12 Apr. 1915, FO 800/43, cited in Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', n. 78.
  58. Letter, 11 Apr. 1915, private and secret, not sent, DDQ 9/37/6.
  59. Garnett to Russell, 12 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/20.
  60. See, for example, the views of Leo Amery; Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 577.
  61. Minutes by Grey and Clerk, 10 May 1915, FO 371/2245/214/57145; minute by Clerk, 22 May 1915, FO 371/2245/214/64248.
  62. Garnett to Russell, 28 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/28.
  63. In fact, efforts were made, possibly by the King and Cabinet, to have Ghenadieff arrested; Garnett to Steel-Maitland, 26 Jul. 1915, private and secret, 51/1/37, Bonar Law Papers, HLRO.
  64. *Ibid.*
  65. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, pp. 444–5.
  66. Garnett to Steel-Maitland, private and secret, 20 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/41.

67. The details of this compensation was discussed but barely clarified at cabinet meetings in June/July 1915; Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 578.
68. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, pp. 440–1.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 441–2, and Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 579.
70. Robbins, *ibid.*, 575.
71. Garnett to Russell, 30 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/29.
72. See, for example, Garnett to Russell, 11 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/37.
73. Garnett to Russell, 31 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/33.
74. Garnett to Russell, DDQ 9/37/37, post-script, 10 Jun. 1915.
75. Garnett to Russell, 6 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/34.
76. Garnett to Russell, 31 May 1915, DDQ 9/37/33, further entries of 1 and 2 Jun. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, p. 444.
77. Garnett to Russell (?) 11 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/37.
78. Garnett to Russell, 6 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/34. The fact that Italy had failed to declare war on Turkey, and that the Italian Ambassador remained at Constantinople, provided useful propaganda for German agents; Garnett to Russell, DDQ 9/37/37, entry of 10 Jun., midnight.
79. Garnett to Russell (?) 11 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/37.
80. Garnett to Russell, 27 Jun. 1915, DDQ 9/37/42.
81. Garnett to Russell, 15 Jul. 1915, DDQ 9/37/44.
82. Such also was Chirol's view: Fritzingler, *Diplomat Without Portfolio*, pp. 459–60. See also, Grey to Bax-Ironside, 27 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2244/214/51029, on discussion with Bulgarian Minister. However, George Clerk had expressed some desire not to further delay approaches to Athens and Sofia; 'Action at Athens and Sofia', minute by Clerk, 6 Apr. 1915, FO 371/2243/214/41063.
83. O'Beirne to Grey, 20 Aug. 1915, FO 371/2266/108897/117145.
84. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 579.
85. O'Beirne to Grey, 16 Aug. 1915, enclosing telegram from Chirol, no. 17, n.d., FO 371/2266/108897/121176.
86. Savinsky had apparently leaked its terms: Garnett to Oliphant, 19 Aug. 1915, DDQ 9/37/54.
87. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, p. 442.
88. Garnett to Steel, 12 Sept. 1915, DDQ 9/37/59.
89. O'Beirne to Grey, 17 Sept. 1915, FO 371/2266/108897/133601.
90. Minutes by George Clerk, 16 Sept., FO 371/2269/132931, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, 15 Sept., 132931/133735.
91. Robbins, 'British Diplomacy', 580.
92. O'Beirne to Grey, 4 Oct. 1915, FO 371/2267/108897/144535. Garnett later recorded the crisis in detail, documenting indications of growing German influence. Garnett to Oliphant, 19 Oct. 1915, FO 371/2267/108897/156199.
93. Garnett to his mother, 14/18 Oct. 1915, DDQ 9/36/22. Duncan's obituary in *The Times*, noted her 'slender, well-proportioned figure'; 'Miss Isadora Duncan', *The Times*, 16 Sept. 1927, p. 13.
94. M. Hankey, *Supreme Command 1914–1918*, vol. 1 (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 429–4.
95. Minute by George Clerk, 21 Oct. 1915, FO 371/2273/149268/154420.
96. Garnett to his mother, 8 Nov. DDQ 9/38/2, and 9 Nov. 1915, DDQ 9/38/3.

97. Garnett to his mother, 28 Nov. 1915, in Garnett to his mother, 15 Feb. 1915, DDQ 9/39/3.
98. Garnett to his mother, 2 Jan. 1916, DDQ 9/38/11.
99. This was done for sake of convenience, as there were many such messengers passing through wartime Athens, but technically it was an improper use of the bag. In addition, it seems that Wilson may have ignored War Office instructions to travel via Malta; minute by Miles Lampson, 6 Dec. 1915, FO 371/2281/185415.
100. Her identity and other details of the event were obscured by a number of slightly differing accounts. She may have been associated, incorrectly, with Dr Findlay of the Red Cross Mission in Serbia who had been on board the *Spetzai*, and who returned to London with some of the salvaged bags and passports; Rodd (Rome) to Foreign Office, 6 Dec. 1915, FO 371/2281/185415/185976. The issue became more complicated when it emerged that Findlay had been followed to Le Havre by one Jean Dimopoulos, 'a very unpleasant looking individual, tall, lean and cadaverous, very black untidy hair, black moustache, dressed in dark clothes and a dark overcoat'. Findlay had reported to the consul-general at Havre, Harry Churchill, his suspicions of one of the passengers on the vessel, who had joined at Athens, and had sought to strike up a friendship with Napier, Wilson and him. Churchill recognized Dimopoulos, who had presented himself for a visa for the Southampton boat on the previous day and alerted Vernon Kell of MI5. Dimopoulos, who claimed to be travelling in connection with the sale of dried fruit, was allowed to proceed but was to be taken to Scotland Yard to give a thorough account of himself; Churchill to Grey, secret, 9 Dec. 1915, enclosing Walsh to Kell, 9 Dec. 1915, copy, FO 371/2281/185415/188819.
101. Unedited version of *The Sword and the Olive*, S11, Rendel Papers, NLW.
102. Garnett to his mother, 14 Dec. 1915, DDQ 9/38/9.
103. See, for example, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11 Jan. 1916. His letters were returned to him in 1916, and most of Rendel's letters later reached their intended recipients. On the conspiracy theory, see also Elliot to Foreign Office, 11 Dec. 1915, secret, FO 371/2282/189657.
104. G. Rendel, *The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service 1913–1954* (London, John Murray, 1957), p. 24, noted that Garnett 'was never the same man again'.
105. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jan., DDQ 9/38/12, and 20 Jan. 1916, DDQ 9/38/13.
106. Rendel, *Sword and the Olive*, pp. 23–4. When Rendel submitted his draft autobiography to the Foreign Office for scrutiny, its communications department expressed concern that his descriptions of the misuse, according to strict protocol, of the diplomatic bag, not least because it contained Christmas presents, might encourage unscrupulous foreign governments to interfere with sealed packets and cases; A. Duncan Wilson to Rendel, 27 Mar. 1956, S2, Rendel Papers. The story is also briefly related in Henry Beaumont's *Diplomatic Butterfly*, p. 460.
107. Garnett to his mother, 17 Feb. 1916, DDQ 9/39/14. Garnett's experience and criticisms of the Parliamentary and Contraband Departments closely resembled Duff Cooper's: D. Cooper, *Old Men Forget* (London, Hart-Davis,

- 1953), pp. 48–9; J. J. Norwich (ed), *The Duff Cooper Diaries, 1915–1951* (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), entry of 16 Jan. 1916, p. 24.
108. Garnett to his mother, 6 Mar. 1916, DDQ 9/39/16.
  109. Garnett to his mother, 21 Apr. 1916, DDQ 9/39/13. (Sir) Maurice Peterson was less complimentary: M. D. Peterson, *Both Sides of the Curtain* (London, Constable, 1950), pp. 5–6.
  110. Garnett to his mother, 6 Mar. 1916, DDQ 9/39/6.
  111. Minutes by Garnett, 31 Jan., 26 May, 12, 13 and 24 Jun., 18 Jul., FO 382/f21/16993/f284/18157/90158/180023/121306/139711; 15 May, 18 Feb., 14 Apr., FO 382/614/f998/31403/70537; 19 Jun., 14 Mar., FO 382/615/f998/114487/f1200/47466; 3 and 9 Mar., 23 Feb., FO 382/616/f2610/40125/f5186/34337; 28 Jan., FO 382/617/f17047/17047; 16 Mar., FO 382/619/f31551/50083; 17 May, FO 382/620/f73313/93147; 26 Jul. 1916, FO 382/622/f146602.
  112. Minutes by Garnett, Robert Vansittart, Eric Adam, 7 Jun., and Eyre Crowe, 8 Jun., 1916, FO 382/620/f96198/108255.
  113. Steiner, 'The Foreign Office and the War', pp. 517–18, 520–2, 530.
  114. Tilley, *London to Tokyo*, pp. 87–8.
  115. Garnett to his mother, 3 May 1916, DDQ 9/39/15.
  116. Garnett to his mother, 6 May 1915, DDQ 9/39/16.
  117. Garnett to Oliphant, 3 May 1916, DDQ 9/40/8, Garnett to his mother, 6 May 1915, DDQ 9/39/16.
  118. Garnett to his mother, 15 May 1916, DDQ 9/39/19.
  119. Garnett to his mother, 24 Jun. 1916, DDQ 9/39/23.
  120. *Ibid.*, and Garnett to Steel, 12 May 1916, DDQ 9/40/15.
  121. Garnett to Steel-Maitland, 26 Jul. 1915, private and secret, 51/1/37, Bonar Law Papers. Bonar Law suggested that Balfour or Curzon might care to read the letter but that it should otherwise be kept private.
  122. Crampton, *Concise History*, p. 138, and *Bulgaria 1878–1918*, pp. 444–5.

## 7 Tangier – 'A Confusion of the East and the West'

1. Garnett to his mother, 18 Feb. 1917, DDQ 9/42/16.
2. *Al-Moghreb Al-Aksa (The Tangier Chronicle and Morocco Gazette)*, 6 Nov. 1916, BLNC.
3. Garnett had smoothed the path for his visit with the Foreign Office by recommending Lyautey for an award. He duly received the GCMG as did, also, at Garnett's behest, the Sultan of Morocco.
4. G. H. Selous, *Appointment to Fez* (London, The Richards Press, 1956), pp. 13–14.
5. Garnett to his mother, 10 Sept. 1916, DDQ 9/42/3.
6. Garnett to his mother, 15 Oct. 1916, DDQ 9/42/5.
7. Garnett to his mother, 2 Sept. 1916, DDQ 9/42/9.
8. Garnett to his mother, 11 Dec. 1916, *ibid.*
9. Garnett to his mother, 22 Oct. 1916, DDQ 9/42/6.
10. During Garnett's time in Tangier, services were led either by a lay reader or, during the winter months, by a temporary chaplain; Garnett to his mother,

- 31 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/42/11. Garnett argued that the chaplain might combine his ministering with the task of educating English children. On the history of the church, see L. Taylor, *The Sultan's Gift: A History of St Andrew's Church, Tangier* (Tangier, Lance Taylor, 2006). In December 1917, Garnett told his mother that a chaplain promised by the Bishop of Gibraltar had failed to turn up: 'I expect that chaplain earmarked for us heard what a ghastly place Tangier was & what freaks we all were.' Garnett to his mother, 22 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/42/39.
11. See Fisher, 'Keeping "the Old Flag flying"', *passim*.
  12. Garnett to his mother, 14 May 1917, DDQ 9/42/22. See, for example Garnett's 'Appeal to British Residents at Tangier', *Moghreb Al-Aksa*, 16 Oct. 1916. Also, *Moghreb Al-Aksa*, 22 Oct. 1917, regarding Garnett's entertainment for the British Red Cross and garden party for 'Our Day'.
  13. Garnett was less enthusiastic about Harris's friendship with King Constantine and Queen Sophie of Greece. When, to his delight, Constantine abdicated, he suggested that Harris might offer them the use of one of his Moroccan properties. This might provide amusement as he, Garnett, censored suspicious letters arriving by the British post; Garnett to his mother, 3 May 1917, DDQ 9/42/21.
  14. Diary/journal entry, 10 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/45/89.
  15. G. H. Bennett, 'Britain's Relations with France after Versailles: The Problem of Tangier, 1919-23', *EHQ*, 24 (1994), 54.
  16. On the powers accorded to France, including the conduct of Morocco's foreign policy, see J. P. Halstead, *Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 24-5.
  17. These details of the constitutional arrangements are taken from 'Notes on Gibraltar and Ceuta', by Lord Drogheda, 25 Apr. 1917, secret, GT 590, CAB 24/11, also in CAB 27/51.
  18. Regarding Spanish cooperation with Germany in Morocco, see E. Burke, 'Moroccan Resistance, Pan-Islam and German War Strategy', *Francia*, 3 (1975), 434-64. On Spain's motives in Morocco, see for example, J. A. Chandler, 'Spain and Her Moroccan Protectorate, 1898-1927', *JCH*, 10, 301-22. According to Sir Arthur Hardinge, the prize was to be Spanish possession of Gibraltar and Algeria after the war; A. Hardinge to Hardinge of Penshurst (his cousin), 15 Oct. 1916, private, vol. 26, Hardinge Papers, CUL.
  19. Arthur Hardinge to Hardinge of Penshurst, 28 Jul. 1916, private, vol. 23, Hardinge Papers.
  20. 'War Cabinet: Potential Value of Spain as an Ally', Foreign Office memorandum, nd [but Mar. 1917], secret, GT 198, CAB 24/7, also in CAB 27/51.
  21. Minute by Kennard, n.d., but c.17 Oct. 1916, FO 371/2712/F36074/205628.
  22. Garnett to Loraine, 10 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/45/94.
  23. Garnett to Oliphant (Foreign Office), 31 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/45/115.
  24. Garnett to Oliphant, draft, 22 Aug. 1917, DDQ 9/46/27.
  25. Diary/journal entry 13 Sept. 1917, DDQ 9/46/60. Garnett had apparently used Harris in this way in 1916; Harris to Garnett, 23 Sept. 1916, DDQ 9/44/16.
  26. Entry of 15 Sept., *ibid*.

27. Cozens-Hardy was apparently working for Admiralty Intelligence.
28. Garnett to Cozens-Hardy, 4 Oct. 1917, draft, DDQ 9/47/12.
29. Journal entries of 13–6 Sept. 1917, DDQ 9/46/60.
30. On this subject see Burke, 'Moroccan Resistance', *passim*.
31. *Ibid.*, 441.
32. *Ibid.*, 444–6.
33. *Ibid.*, 457–1. According to French investigations, the propaganda was generated in Madrid, Berlin and Constantinople and was disseminated in French, Arabic as well as the Berber dialects through the Spanish consular postal service.
34. Garnett to Grey, 16 Oct. 1916, no. 176, FO 371/2712/F22471. Also see Garnett to Russell, n.d., DDQ 9/44/45.
35. See, for example, D. S. Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 73. On the Spanish forces' repressive tendencies in Morocco, see Chandler, 'Spain and Her Moroccan Protectorate', 307–8.
36. Garnett to Grey, 24 Sept. 1916, no. 169, confidential, FO 371/2713/f65579/200305.
37. Diary entry 5 Jan. 1917, DDQ 9/45/4.
38. Garnett spent part of his time inspecting the Phoenician settlement of Lix, which he claimed the Spanish authorities were systematically destroying: Garnett to his mother, 7 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/24/27.
39. On the arms smuggling and the deployment of funds, see Burke, 'Moroccan Resistance', 451–5.
40. Garnett to Balfour, 14 Sept. 1917, no. 124, secret, FO 371/2970/111236; also note by Gilbert Hubbard, 29 Jul. 1918, 'Unneutral activities of Germans at Laraiiche', FO 371/3251/f14451/128486.
41. *Ibid.*, Hubbard note. These activities were of most serious concern in the early summer of 1918 when some, especially Harry Maclean, feared a full-scale 'Moorish uprising' sponsored by German activities.
42. Garnett to Lancelot Oliphant, 3 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/44/81.
43. Garnett to Dick Steel, 10 Oct. 1916, draft, DDQ 9/44/87.
44. Garnett to Lancelot Oliphant, 16 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/44/91.
45. Draft journal entry of 5 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/45/42. MacLeod to Garnett 30 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/45/43. On this subject, see J. Fisher, 'British consular representation in Morocco, 1912–1924: "A question of pounds, Shillings and pence"', *MR*, 34, 2–3 (2009), 131–58.
46. Garnett to Russell, 25 Mar. 1917, DDQ 9/45/38.
47. Garnett to his mother, 8 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/42/18.
48. Garnett had reservations about Roy Talbot, a consular assistant at Tangier. Talbot's career would be undermined by his prolonged retention in Tangier but Garnett also felt that he took advantage of White's dependency on him as a golfing partner; Garnett to his mother, 10 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/42/19.
49. *Ibid.*, Garnett to his mother.
50. Journal entry of 4 May 1917, DDQ 9/45/54.
51. Garnett to his mother, 25 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/42/28.
52. Garnett to his mother, 14 Jun. 1917, DDQ 9/42/25.
53. Garnett to Oliphant, 16 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/44/91.

54. Garnett to his mother, 14 May 1917, DDQ 9/42/22; 13 Nov. 1917, DDQ 9/42/35.
55. Garnett to his mother, 22 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/42/39.
56. Garnett to his mother, 20 Nov. 1916, DDQ 9/42/8.
57. Garnett to his mother, 16 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/42/10.
58. Garnett to his mother, 13 Nov. 1917, DDQ 9/42/35.
59. Garnett to his mother, 12 Aug. 1917, DDQ 9/42/29. Garnett also had the opportunity to admire the Sultan's newly acquired Senegalese lions, which he kept in freshly painted green cages. Unfortunately, he had imprisoned them before the paint was dry. On Lyautey's reported views of White, Garnett to his mother, 23 Oct. 1917, DDQ 9/42/33.
60. See, for example, Garnett to his mother, 13 Nov. 1917, DDQ 9/42/35, and 12 Jan. 1918, DDQ 9/42/41.
61. Minutes by Crowe, 20 Mar., and Hardinge, n.d., and de Bunsen, 19 Apr. 1917, FO 372/1019/F3293/57598.
62. See, for example, Satow to MacLeod, 7 Apr. 1918, PRO 30/26/85/2, Satow Papers. Satow, responding to MacLeod's news that he was to return to Morocco, noted that he should like to see him as White's deputy at Tangier, 'were it not that I imagine you would not care to serve under White'. MacLeod had served under Satow in Morocco in 1894-5, and they corresponded with some lapses thereafter.
63. See, for example, Garnett on Vice-Consul Lennox, journal entry of 31 Aug. 1917, DDQ 9/46/35.
64. Garnett to Balfour, 29 Oct. 1917, no. 149, FO 368/1766/F173424/214639. Garnett also resisted the merchants' claims that they had been excluded unfairly from French trade fairs. This and the matter of transshipping green tea continued to preoccupy the British Merchants Association; meetings of 31 May, 13 Jun., 4 and 18 Jul., 3 Oct. and 7 Nov. 1917, 3 Jan. and 11 Apr. 1918, MS 16,538 vol. 1, British Morocco Merchants Association, GHL. See also MS 16,540, GHL.
65. See, for example, Garnett to Balfour, 2 Nov. 1917, no. 74, commercial, FO 368/1766/f192426/216942.
66. Garnett to Lancelot Oliphant, 16 Dec. 1916, DDQ 9/44/91.
67. Journal entry 10 Jul. 1917, DDQ 9/45/89.
68. Diary entry 31 Aug. 1916, DDQ 9/44/11.
69. Journal entry 7 May 1917, DDQ 9/45/54.
70. 'Tonnage Required for Green Tea to Morocco', note by J. M. MacLeod, Foreign Office, 18 Jun. 1918, FO 368/1946/f32308/104782.
71. 'Memorandum by Mr. Garnett', 10 Aug. 1917, very confidential, FO 371/2970/166087.
72. Lyautey's pessimism is perhaps a little surprising given that in 1915, France had broken the code used by the German Embassy in Madrid and had also infiltrated and subverted some members of the Turkish military mission to Spain; Burke, 'Moroccan Resistance', 450; M. Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, pp. 107-8, suggests that Lyautey's bouts of pessimism were short-lived.
73. See Note 71, memorandum by Garnett.
74. Selous shared Garnett's views about the scale of Lyautey's achievement; Selous, *Appointment to Fez*, pp. 26-7, 171-86.



75. See, for example, Rabino to Garnett, 30 May 1917, DDQ 9/45/73, and Garnett's journal entry of 11 Jul. 1917, recording Alice Drummond-Hay's perception of White as 'weak & obstinate', DDQ 9/45/87.
76. Minute by Nugent, 17 Apr. 1916, FO 371/2713/f83820. For details of the commercial difficulties see, for example, White to Grey, no. 67, commercial, FO 368/1552/f137469/233394. On the use of courts martial, see Burke, 'Moroccan Resistance', 441.
77. Minute by Roland Nugent, 16 Jun. 1917, FO 371/2713/f83820/83821. When he joined the government in December 1916 Milner was replaced as chairman by Lord Selborne. British merchants with interests in Morocco had met informally in 1916, and an association was formed at the suggestion of Lord Milner and held its first statutory meeting in August 1917. The Association was keen to build a strong relationship with the Foreign Office and to promote the interests of the British community in Morocco. See Fisher, 'Keeping "the Old Flag flying" '.
78. Minute by unknown official, 14 Mar. 1917, FO 368/1766/f33753/56266.
79. Minute by Laurence Collier, 26 May 1916, FO 371/2713/f83820/83821.
80. See, for example, MacLeod to Wellesley, 21 Jul. 1917, FO 368/1766/f33753/145831. MacLeod lectured and wrote on the subject during his posting to the Foreign Office in 1917–18. He greatly admired French achievements in Morocco, referring to them as an 'amazing transformation'; J. M. MacLeod, 'The Achievements of France in Morocco', *GJ*, 52, 2 (1918), 101. Among other things, MacLeod noted the vast increase from 1911 in the European population in the towns within the French Protectorate, MacLeod, *idem.*, 95.
81. Garnett to his mother, 23 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/42/20.
82. Undated note by Garnett [Jan. 1917], DDQ 9/45/10.
83. See Fisher, 'British consular representation', *passim*.
84. Costs in the French zone were less than those in the Spanish zone and in Tangier, which were affected by the depreciation of Sterling against the *peseta*.
85. Typically, candidates spent time cramming before taking the entry examinations. This might have occupied two years or longer. There followed two years as a probationary Levant Student Interpreter at Cambridge University. Proficiency in oriental languages was then examined before overseas service began. See, D. Morray, 'The selection, instruction and examination of the student interpreters of the Levant consular service 1877–1916', in J. F. Healey and V. Porter (eds), *Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 14: Studies on Arabia in Honour of G Rex Smith* (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2002).
86. Diary/journal entry, 5 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/45/42.
87. White to Balfour, 24 Jul. 1917, treaty, no. 10, FO 372/1019/f108188/152972.
88. White to Dufferin, 21 Jul. 1917, FO 369/941/f75795/149538; *ibid.*, Garnett to Foreign Office, 3 Oct. 1917, no. 56, f75795/192459; Garnett to Foreign Office, 5 Oct. 1917, no. 59.
89. Garnett to Cozens Hardy, 4 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/47/97, and Garnett to MacLeod, 15 Dec. 1917, secret and private, DDQ 9/47/104. In 1924,

- the agency was abolished, leaving a consulate-general there. A second consulate-general was established but at Fez not Casablanca.
90. Pyke to Dufferin, 19 Sept. 1917, FO 369/941/160300/187161. It seems that Pyke's request found its way to Arthur Steel-Maitland, head of the Department of Overseas Trade; Pyke to Malcolm, 15 Sept. 1917, GD 173/1/81, Steel-Maitland Papers, NAS.
  91. Garnett to Foreign Office, 20 Sept. 1917, FO 369/941/160300/187161.
  92. Journal entry of 6 Sept. 1917, DDQ 9/46/33.
  93. Garnett to White, n.d., copy, DDQ 9/46/57.
  94. See, for example, White to Foreign Office, 7 Feb. 1918, no. 7, Consular, FO 369/1006/F5599/34062; *ibid.*, Mallet to Treasury, 14 Nov. 1919. A DoT investigation conducted in 1918–19 suggested changes to consular posts, the abolition of the Agency at Tangier and the replacement of the first secretary there with a vice-consul; report by E. Herman Mulock, n.d., BT 61/2/8.
  95. Due to staffing difficulties, MacLeod was briefly posted to Casablanca where he was required to undertake 'clerking' for between 11 and 14 hours a day. The work might easily 'have been done by an intelligent boy of eighteen', MacLeod to Satow, 10 Dec. 1916, PRO 30/33/13/3, Satow Papers. Also see MacLeod to Garnett, 30 Apr. 1917, DDQ 9/45/43.
  96. Garnett to his father, 4 Mar. 1918, DDQ 9/43/9.
  97. Garnett to his mother, 8 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/42/43.
  98. Garnett to his mother, 10 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/42/44.
  99. Among the accounts of this in Garnett's papers, see Garnett to his mother, 22 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/42/39.
  100. See, for example, journal entry of 24 Sept. 1917, DDQ 9/46/89; Garnett to Cozens-Hardy, 30 Sept., 3 and 4 Oct. 1917, DDQ 9/47/1, 9 and 12.
  101. Garnett to Cozens-Hardy, 27 Nov. 1917, draft, DDQ 9/47/89 and Garnett to Cozens-Hardy, 18 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/47/107.
  102. Undated note by Garnett, DDQ 9/47/114.
  103. The sinister influence may have been Eyre Crowe; note by Garnett, n.d., DDQ 9/47/113. Also see Garnett to MacLeod, 15 Dec. 1917, secret and private, DDQ 9/47/104; Garnett to MacLeod, 6 Jan. 1918, DDQ 9/47/118; MacLeod to Garnett, 17 Jan. 1918, DDQ 9/47/124; Garnett to MacLeod, 7 Jan. 1918, draft, DDQ 9/47/119.
  104. Garnett to Guy Locock, DoT, 25 Jan. 1918, DDQ 9/47/126. Locock reported some progress regarding the selection of candidates for such roles, but post-war economies stymied efforts to appoint an attaché to Morocco.
  105. When Clark Kerr's departure was announced, the British Morocco Merchants Association judged him to have been an 'unqualified success'. M. B. Milne to Foreign Office, 20 Apr. 1921, 'General correspondence and papers, 1921', Inverchapel Papers, Bodl. Kerr was made an honorary vice president of the British Chamber of Commerce for Morocco in February 1921.
  106. That was the experience of its president during 1917–20, the 5th Earl of Onslow. See, for example, Onslow to Lord Carnock, 21 Dec. 1920, G173/107, Onslow Papers.
  107. Broome, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce for Morocco, to Garnett, 4 Mar. 1918, in Garnett to his mother, 25 Mar. 1918, DDQ 9/48/3. Broome was fulsome in thanks for Garnett's 'active sympathy and support ... to all

that could serve the welfare of British interests and the British colony'. See also, Alice Drummond Hay to Garnett, 15 Jun. 1918, DDQ 9/50/24, and Walter Harris to Garnett, 10 Jun. 1919, DDQ 9/54/3.

108. Clark Kerr to Lidderdale, 25 Nov. 1920, 'General correspondence and papers, 1920', Inverchapel Papers.
109. *Ibid.*

## 8 A 'Hardly Used Genus': First Secretary in Buenos Aires

1. 'Argentina: Notes for HRH the Prince of Wales' Visit 1925', Jun. 1925, Tower Papers, ULL. Unless otherwise noted, the material below is drawn from this document and from A. Graham-Yooll's, *The Forgotten Colony: A History of the English Speaking Communities in the Argentine* (London, Hutchinson, 1981), pp. 239, 267.
2. J. A. Hammerton, *The Argentine Through English Eyes and a Summer in Uruguay* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1916), pp. 26–60. Hammerton's account was overwhelmingly negative in its portrayal of Buenos Aires and of Argentina and its people.
3. Garnett was prevented from taking an earlier steamer on the 19th because of a chill. A German submarine sank it off the coast of Ireland.
4. D. Rock, *Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism* (London, Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 105.
5. From 1913–18, British exports to South America were reduced by a third; K. Neilson, 'Reinforcements and Supplies from Overseas: British Strategic Sealift in the First World War', in G. Kennedy (ed.), *The Merchant Marine in International Affairs, 1850–1950* (London, Cass, 2000), p. 48.
6. This was in preference to buying from Europe at even more inflated prices because of disruption to pre-war shipping patterns. Neilson, *ibid.* p. 33.
7. R. Gravil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection and the War of 1914–1918', *JLAS*, 9, 1 (1977), 86–7.
8. D. Rock, 'Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite, 1912–1930', in D. Rock (ed.), *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* (London, Duckworth, 1975), p. 78; Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, pp. 125–79.
9. The others were Mexico and Chile. Eight Latin-American countries eventually declared war on Germany. The rationale for Argentina's neutrality, mainly relating to economic factors, is explained in R. Gravil, *The Anglo-Argentine Connection 1900–1939* (Boulder/London, Westview, 1985), pp. 112–13.
10. R. C. Newton, *German Buenos Aires: 1900–1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis* (Austin/London, University of Texas Press, 1977), pp. 48–9.
11. Gravil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection', *passim*. Britain's purchase of Argentine grain supplies was undertaken on terms favourable to Britain.
12. 'Work of the Unseen Hand', *Buenos Aires Herald*, 26 Mar. 1917; Gravil, *Anglo-Argentine Connection 1900–1939*, p. 123. The failure of the American crop in 1917 placed an additional premium on supplies from Canada especially; A. Offer, *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1991 edition), p. 369.

13. For details of British investment, see A. G. Ford, 'British Investment and Argentine Economic Development, 1880–1914', in Rock, *Argentina*, pp. 12–40; see also, D. C. M. Platt, *Latin America and British Trade* (London, A & C Black, 1972), *passim*.
14. Gravil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection', 63, and *The Anglo-Argentine Connection 1900–1939*, pp. 113–14.
15. Tower to Grey, 24 Dec. 1915, no. 320, FO 368/1202/10092.
16. Gravil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection', 68–9.
17. 'The Unseen Hand', 6 Apr. 1917, 'Spies in B.A.: 'Germany's Underground Bureaux', 9 Aug. 1917, *Buenos Aires Herald*. See, also, Newton, *German Buenos Aires*, pp. 35–8.
18. DMI (to Foreign Office), 3 May 1919, FO 371/3503/231/69432; 'Bolshevist Plot in Argentina', 15 Jan., 'Argentina Disorders: Bolsheviks Active in the Provinces', 20 Jan. 1919; Tower to Balfour, 1 Jul. 1919, FO 371/3504/231/112566; Barclay (to Foreign Office), 4 Jan. 1919, FO 371/3503/F231/2440, minute by Rowland Sperling, 8 Jan. 1919. Interestingly, *The Times'* special correspondent also noted this subversion just after Barclay reported this incident; 'The Germans in Argentina: Methods of Propaganda', *The Times*, 13 Jan. 1919.
19. G. P. Atkins and L. V. Thompson, 'German Military Influence in Argentina', *JLAS*, 4, 2 (1972), 257–9.
20. Tower to Grey, 27 Jan. 1915, FO 368/1203/22267.
21. 'United States Trade with South America', Harold Chalkley, 8 Nov. 1916, in Tower to Grey, 9 Nov. 1916, FO 368/1479/80321/247561.
22. Gravil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection', 61. On the alleged shortcomings of American traders, see *ibid.*, memorandum by Chalkley. On Argentine perceptions of the issue, see 'An Argentine view of United States and British Trade with Argentina', *Review of the River Plate*, 31 May 1918, translated from *La Razon*, in Tower to Balfour, 31 May 1918, FO 368/1876/21046/12570.
23. Tower to Balfour, 23 Dec. 1918, FO 368/2050/16026. The post-war American challenge in Argentina is discussed in Gravil, 'Anglo-U.S. Trade Rivalry in Argentina and the D'Abernon Mission of 1929', in Rock (ed.), *Argentina*, pp. 41–65.
24. P. McKenna, 'The Formation of Hiberno-Argentine Society', in O. Marshall (ed.), *English-Speaking Communities in Latin America* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 98–9; Hammerton, *The Argentine*, p. 224, noted the unwillingness to learn Spanish. The lack of integration as regards English immigrants, in so far as intermarriage was concerned, has been challenged by D. Jakubs, 'The Anglo-Argentines: Work, Family and Identity 1860–1914', in Marshall, *English-Speaking Communities*, pp. 151–3. On Garnett and the Irish, Garnett to his mother, 2 Sept. 1918, DDQ 9/48/16.
25. Tower belonged to the same lodge and considered that it would facilitate Garnett's dealings with the British colony. Garnett questioned the propriety of diplomats joining the Masons but succumbed to pressure from the colony.
26. The history of these bodies may be traced in Graham-Yooll, *The Forgotten Colony*, *passim*.

27. Millington-Drake to his mother, 12 Feb. 1918; Millington-Drake Diaries, entries of 16 and 26 May, and 4 Jun., 1918, CACC. George Morrison recorded that Garnett was tall and good looking; 'Visit of W.J. Garnett, en disponibilité', 13 Feb. 1920, ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
28. Diary while on mission to South America, entry of 1 Jun. 1918, de Bunsen Papers, vol. 12, Bodl.
29. Garnett to his mother, 29 Aug. 1918, DDQ 9/48/15. Ironically, Millington-Drake liked living in the hotel, precisely because it was cheaper than any private accommodation; Millington-Drake to Tilley, 29 Mar. 1917, FO 371/2861/16830/90687. Tilley discounted this view, considering Millington-Drake to be a poor judge of what was required.
30. Garnett to his mother, 8 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/42/43.
31. Russell to Garnett, 8 Feb. 1918, and Garnett to Russell, 9 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/47/136.
32. Garnett to his mother, 6 Mar. 1918, DDQ 9/48/1, and Garnett to his father, 4 Mar. 1918, DDQ 9/43/9.
33. Millington-Drake to his mother, 8 Feb. 1918, and to his parents 27 Mar. 1918, Millington-Drake Papers.
34. On Tower's attributes, de Bunsen to Balfour, 13 Jun. 1918, FO 800/200/45. On his tiredness, minute by de Bunsen, 4 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3131/5715/193769.
35. Garnett to his mother, 26 May 1918, DDQ 9/48/7.
36. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/10.
37. Garnett to his mother, 17 Aug. 1918, DDQ 9/48/13.
38. Millington-Drake diary entry, 30 Apr. 1918, Millington-Drake Papers.
39. *Ibid.*, and entry of 15 Jun. 1918.
40. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/10.
41. Garnett to his mother, 23 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/11.
42. Millington-Drake Diaries, entry of 22 May 1918.
43. Millington-Drake Diaries, entries of 2 and 6 Jul. 1918.
44. Garnett to Alice Drummond Hay, n.d., DDQ 9/50/18.
45. Garnett to Mrs Rendel, 18 Jun. 1918, draft, DDQ 9/50/27.
46. Millington-Drake Diaries, entries of 28 May, 15–16 Jun., 28 Jun., 2 Jul., 1918. Tower had previously raised the issue of Chalkley's status; Tower to Balfour, 11 Sept. 1917, FO 368/1693/199068/203305.
47. *Ibid.*, diaries.
48. Garnett to Sir Francis Elliot, 16 Jun. 1918, draft, private and confidential, DDQ 9/50/25.
49. Garnett to his mother, 23 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/11. When commending his subordinates to higher authority in November 1918, Garnett's name was notably absent from this communication and Millington-Drake was singled out for praise on account of his loyalty; Tower to Balfour, 12 Nov. 1918, FO 371/3130/2949/208132. According to Garnett, this telegram was the 'focus of violent criticism' among the legation staff. He felt that the work of the military attaché in particular, who had undertaken very useful propaganda work, had been completely ignored; Garnett to Russell, 14 Nov. 1918, DDQ 9/50/75.
50. Garnett to his mother, 17 Aug. 1918, DDQ 9/48/13.
51. 'Argentine Scrapbook', entry of 30 Nov. 1918, DDQ 9/51/1.

52. Garnett to his mother, 23 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/11.
53. Garnett to Russell, 11 and 23 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/50/33 and 40.
54. Garnett to Russell, n.d., but Jan. 1919, DDQ 9/50/94.
55. Garnett to Russell, 14 Nov. 1918, DDQ 9/50/75.
56. Garnett to Balfour, 10 Jun. 1918, FO 368/1875/2861/130915; Garnett to Balfour, 12 Jun. 1918, FO 368/1877/130918.
57. Grivil, 'The Anglo-Argentine Connection', 62, puts the figure at 6000; the *Buenos Aires Herald* ('Conscription of Britons Overseas', 9 May 1917) at 8000, Graham-Yooll, *Forgotten Colony*, p. 5, at just under 5000.
58. Garnett to his mother, 17 Aug. 1918, DDQ 9/48/13.
59. Garnett to his mother, 13 Jul. 1918, DDQ 9/48/10.
60. See Note 58.
61. Russell commented that 'The whole state of affairs at the Legation seems to be most unsatisfactory and calls for some drastic change: Russell to Garnett, 2 Sept. 1918, DDQ 9/50/50.
62. Undated minute, DDQ 9/50/15. See also, Garnett to Russell, 9 Sept. 1918, private, FO 800/200/59.
63. Undated fragment, DDQ 9/50/14.
64. Garnett to his mother, 26 May 1918, DDQ 9/48/7.
65. The legation's registrar gave private tuition in order to supplement his salary but the increased business of the Chancery had forced him to stop; Tower to Balfour, 1 Oct. 1918, FO 371/3130/2949/193766. D. Rock, basing his assessment on contemporary figures of E. Tornquist and Co., notes a 65 per cent increase in the urban cost of living, 1914–18 (Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, p. 106), a figure reflected in Hammerton's, *The Argentine*, pp. 106–23.
66. Garnett to his mother, 15 Jun. 1918, DDQ 9/48/8.
67. Some time before this, he had reflected in a document entitled 'A few Private Thoughts' that death was 'the natural and final act of that brief transit through the world... to die is merely to fulfil a law of nature.' The world's religions were given to facilitate the final passage. 'Courage, then, all ye who suffer in this mortal passage through the world and be happy at the prospect of that eternal & wonderful rest'; DDQ 9/51/1.
68. Tower to Balfour, 4 Dec. 1918, FO 369/1060/3380. Garnett later recalled that he had been forced to write this despatch, notwithstanding his doubts about the accuracy of its contents.
69. Note by Algernon Law, n.d., FO 368/924/9807; Dickson to Grey, 2 Dec. 1914, 88728.
70. Garnett to Victor Wellesley, 16 Dec. 1918, DDQ 9/50/84. Garnett also felt that the Foreign Office was culpable regarding Parr's anomalous position.
71. 'Rosario Brokers: Memo on interviews with Consul Dickson & Capt Parr', 11 Dec. 1918, DDQ 9/50/81.
72. 'Argentine Scrapbook', entries of 11 and 18 Dec., DDQ 9/51/1.
73. The occasion was a victory dinner at the Belgrano Athletic Club and Garnett had delivered a toast to 'the Press'. Tower kept a report of the occasion among his papers; f. 157, Tower Papers, formerly at FCO Library.
74. Garnett to his mother, 9 Jan. 1919, DDQ 9/53/1.
75. Secretary of the British Chamber of Commerce, Buenos Aires, to de Bunsen, 11 Jun. 1918, vol. 11, de Bunsen Papers.

76. Tower to de Bunsen, 3 May 1918, vol. 15k, de Bunsen Papers.
77. Tower to Balfour, 16 Apr. 1918, FO 371/3484/67961.
78. See, for example, regarding trade in the Rosario district, Spencer Dickson to Grey, 2 Dec. 1914, FO 368/924/88728.
79. Memorandum by Consul-General Mackie, 1 May 1917, in Tower to Balfour, 13 May 1917, FO 369/915/f106012/117753.
80. See, for example, minute by Lord Eustace Percy, 20 Feb. 1917, FO 368/1690/36000.
81. Garnett to his mother, 8 Aug. 1918, DDQ 9/48/12.
82. Garnett to his mother, 15 Jun. 1918, DDQ 9/48/8.
83. 'Argentine Scrapbook', entry of 8 Oct. 1918, DDQ 9/51/1.
84. *Ibid.*, entry of 18 Dec. 1918.
85. See, for example, Garnett to Steel-Maitland, n.d., draft, DDQ 9/50/34.
86. 'US Exports: A Warning', *Buenos Aires Herald*, 14 Jul. 1917, 'The "Statutory" List—And Others', 20 Dec. 1917.
87. 'Is a "White-List" Advisable', *Buenos Aires Herald*, 17 Jul. 1917.
88. This interpretation follows closely the arguments of Ephraim Maisel, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy* (Brighton, Sussex Academic Press, 1994), pp. 189–99. See also his article, 'The Formation of the Department of Overseas Trade, 1919–26', *JCH*, 24 (1989), 169–90.
89. *Standard*, 15 Aug. 1919; *Times of Argentina*, 4 Aug. 1919; *The Morning Post*, 17 Sept. 1919, Tower Papers, formerly at FCO Library.
90. Memorandum by A[rthur] S[teel] M[aitland], 17 May 1918, Steel-Maitland Papers, GD 193/115/7/21.
91. Maisel, *The Foreign Office*, p. 191. A 'Memorandum by the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Office' of 16 Nov. 1916, whilst rejecting the American complaint that the Statutory List was not a belligerent measure, nonetheless, admitted that it would clearly disadvantage German trading interests after the war; FO 833/16/10052/88325. On de Bunsen, see de Bunsen to Balfour, 13 Jun. 1918, FO 800/200/45.
92. Steel-Maitland to Garnett, 16 Sept. 1918, private, DDQ 9/50/52, and Garnett to Russell, n.d., DDQ 9/50/53.
93. Tower to Grey, 30 Sept. 1916, enclosing 'Memorandum on the Statutory List Policy in the Argentine Republic', same date, FO 833/16/52963/89262.
94. Tower to Balfour, 30 Jun. 1917, enclosing 'Memorandum on the Statutory List Policy in the Argentine Republic October 1st 1916 to June 30th 1917', FO 833/17. On these loopholes, see Gravil, *Anglo-Argentine Connection 1900–1939*, pp. 115–16.
95. Efforts to have America blacklist firms with enemy associations had formed part of the Balfour mission of 1917; Burk, *Sinews of War*, pp. 107–10.
96. T. A. Bailey, 'The United States and the Black List During the Great War', *JMH*, 6, 1 (1934), 33–4.
97. Minute by Gerald Villiers, 10 Apr. 1918, FO 368/1876/21046/12570.
98. See, for example, Tower, 20 Jan. 1919, FO 369/1060/F29622, and various minutes, including Arthur Steel-Maitland, 2 Mar. and Curzon, 4 Mar.
99. Tower to Tyrrell, 11 Dec. 1913, FO 371/1897/1219.
100. 'Memorandum' by Tower, 21 Mar. 1914, *ibid.*, f425/17173.
101. For discussions of this issue, see *ibid.*, and FO 371/1898/29303/33583, FO 371/2240/F199596, FO 371/2861/16830.

102. Tower to Russell, 11 Jul. 1916, and minutes by Russell, 7 Jul., Hardinge, n.d., Sperling, 8 Aug., FO 371/2240/15491; minute by [Charles Tufton]?, 26 Aug., 154591/168777.
103. Tower to Balfour, 25 Oct. 1918, FO 371/3131/5715/178813.
104. The membership of the chamber was very strong and influential. Its various sectional trade committees considered and represented specific interests.
105. 'Memorandum presented by the British Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine Republic to Sir Maurice de Bunsen GCMG', in Allen C Kerr to Balfour, 6 Jun. 1918, FO 371/3132/125734.
106. On the relatively favourable position of German business and finance interests in Argentina after the war, if not of the German community itself, see Newton, *German Buenos Aires*, pp. 46–67.
107. Maisel, *The Foreign Office*, p. 190.
108. Draft of a letter sent to the 'Times' By Mr Powell Jones, in Naval Staff, I.D., to Rowland Sperling, 12 Dec. 1918, FO 371/3132/205498. The letter was apparently not published and efforts were made to educate its author about official policy.
109. According to William Garnett, his wife had suffered from 'fearful noises in her head' which prostrated her: William Garnett to Jack Garnett, 13 Jun. 1918, DDQ 9/50/23. A local doctor diagnosed a 'want of blood on the brain'; entry of 27 May 1918, Garnett family diary.
110. Garnett to Mrs Rendel, 18 Jun. 1918, DDQ 9/50/27.
111. Undated fragment but late Jan. 1919, DDQ 9/50/92. According to Garnett, he had been forced to attend the dinner when Tower declined at the last minute, and at much personal inconvenience, and it was very badly organized. However, when his inappropriate behaviour had been brought to his attention, he had immediately visited the consul-general to apologize.
112. Garnett to Russell, n.d., DDQ 9/50/94.

## 9 A Climacteric

1. On the reforms, see Z. Steiner and M. Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office Reforms, 1919–21', *HJ*, 17 (1974), 131–56.
2. Garnett to his mother, 24 Jun. 1917, DDQ 9/24/26. The findings of the pre-war MacDonnell Commission had identified the need for such reforms.
3. See J. Fisher, "'A Call to Arms": The Committee on British Communities Abroad, 1919–20', *CJH*, 44, 2 (2009), 261–86.
4. This was a common problem which persisted long after Garnett's time. See Jenkins and Sloman, *With Respect Ambassador*, pp. 32–3, 36.
5. Robertson to his mother, 4 Jan. 1924, RBTN 1, Robertson Papers. Robertson remained in the service until 1929, enduring the 'ruinously expensive' Buenos Aires, before quitting; *ibid.*, Robertson to Sir Edward Crowe, 10 Jun. 1929, RBTN 5/1.
6. Rendel to Garnett, 6 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/47/131.
7. Ralph Paget, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Copenhagen, complained to Theo Russell, that he 'would rather drive a motor lorry or stack provision boxes at the front than go on with the inactive life



- I am leading now': Paget to Russell, 23/24 Jul. 1918, Add Ms 51256, Paget Papers, BL.
8. Garnett to his mother, 26 May 1918, DDQ 9/48/7.
  9. Parker to Sir John Simon, 5 Nov. 1931, vol. 69, Simon Papers, Bodl.
  10. Garnett to his father, 12 Mar. 1919, DDQ 9/49/5.
  11. Emmeline Garnett to the author, 11 Sept. 2004. The years 1919–24 inclusive were destroyed. It was also rumoured within the family that Garnett was recalled because he had written rude postcards about his colleagues at the legation.
  12. Sir Charles Mallet to Curzon, 22 Aug. 1919, FO 371/3506/72245/131695.
  13. *Ibid.* Minute by Curzon, 25 Sept. 1919.
  14. Kelly, *The Ruling Few*, pp. 116–17, 120–2, 132, 134. Interestingly, Kelly also noted that Chalkley's appointment was 'secretly regarded as a regrettable innovation'; Kelly, *The Ruling Few*, p. 120. Kelly was appointed third secretary at Buenos Aires on 24 Apr. He acted as chargé 7–28 Aug. 1920.
  15. Tower to Satow, 17 Jan. 1919, PRO 30/33/13/7, Satow Papers. See, also, Tower's confessions of fatigue in same to same, 5 Mar. 1917, PRO 30/33/13/4, and 24 Sept. 1918, PRO 30/33/13/6.
  16. 'Visit of W. J. Garnett, en disponibilité. February 13th, 1920', undated note by G. E. Morrison, ML MSS 312/156 ff23-5. The term *disponibilité* was used to describe a temporary absence which was permitted generally to deal with illness or difficult family circumstances. It was known only to the Diplomatic Service, on account of the fact that for pensionable purposes that service, unlike the general civil service or consular service, did not assume continuity of service. The Treasury appeared to consider it, in effect, leave without pay; minute by Leslie Sherwood, 20 Apr. 1920, FO 369/1483/K7166/2000/228.
  17. *Ibid.*, undated note by Morrison, and Garnett to Morrison, 14 Feb. [1920], ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
  18. Helme to Garnett, 17 Mar., 27 May, and 2 Sept. 1919, DDQ 9/54/7.
  19. Garnett to his mother, 17 Dec. 1917, DDQ 9/42/38.
  20. Interestingly, Garnett's concern does not appear to have related to the possibility that such radical reform would undermine support for the *entente* in high Russian circles; K. Neilson, 'Wishful Thinking', p. 156.
  21. Garnett to his father, 24 Nov. 1906, DDQ 9/10/32.
  22. See, for example, Garnett to Morrison, 11 Feb. 1920, ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
  23. See, for example, 'Mongol Princes at Home', *The Times*, 17 Sept. 1919; 'The Shah of Persia', the *Sphere*, 1 Nov. 1919, and 'In the Valleys and Deserts of Unknown Mongolia', the *Sphere*, 7 Feb. 1920.
  24. For the purpose of the lecture, Garnett was styled first secretary in His Majesty's Diplomatic Service, which of course was technically correct, as his period of *disponibilité* ended just a few weeks later on 1 May 1920. Garnett suggested that Mongolia's resources were still an unknown quantity, and he argued that in view of Russia's collapse, a return of Chinese influence was to be desired. His lecture was published as 'Mongolia from the Commercial Point of View', *JRSA*, 68, 3516 (1920). Garnett felt that in view of the chaos in Russia, Mongolia would do well to align itself with China and become a self-governing dependency of the Chinese Empire. Garnett to his mother, 3 Mar. 1920, DDQ 9/55/12. He was deeply annoyed by the Foreign Office's

- insistence that he should submit his talk for scrutiny before delivering it, and for the 'fatuous' nature of the changes that they requested; Garnett to Morrison, 3 Mar. [1920], ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
25. Garnett to his mother, 23 Mar. 1920, DDQ 9/55/14.
  26. Garnett knew the headmaster, Lionel Ford, from Eton, where the latter had taught.
  27. Garnett to his mother, 22 and 26 Nov. 1919, DDQ 9/53/29 and 30. An association with the Viscount Burnham, through the London Hospital, led him to contemplate working for the *Daily Telegraph*, to which Burnham contributed. However, Garnett considered the paper rather provincial when compared with *The Times*.
  28. Garnett to his mother, 25 Feb. 1920, DDQ 9/55/10. Garnett had previously considered the idea of an appointment as 'a sort of Mongolian Harris' at Urga: Garnett to Morrison, 2 Sept. 1919, ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers.
  29. Garnett to his mother, May 1919, DDQ 9/53/8.
  30. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen to Garnett, 12 May 1919, DDQ 9/54/11. He had apparently offered to make up a sum of money which had gone missing and the sum was calculated at just over £86, which he could ill-afford.
  31. Bertha Garnett to Jack Garnett, 7 May 1919, DDQ 9/54/10. She had written that Jack was 'urgently needed', that his father could not cope, 'And *you* must help him, – he *really* wants you to'.
  32. Garnett, *Juvenile Offenders*, p. 91.
  33. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
  34. This is suggested by an annotation by G. E. Morrison on a record of their meeting in February 1920, to the effect that Garnett was 'a man of large independent means, heir to estates in Lancashire.' 'Visit of W.J. Garnett, en disponibilité, February 13th 1920', ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers. The inference is that Garnett felt that the image of an aggrieved, wealthy former diplomat was more likely to elicit Morrison's support than protestations of poverty.
  35. Garnett to his mother, 26 Mar. 1920, DDQ 9/55/16; Garnett to his father, 27 Mar. 1920, and William Garnett to Jack Garnett, 28 Mar. 1920, DDQ 9/55/17.
  36. Garnett to his mother, 22 Nov. 1919, DDQ 9/53/29.
  37. Garnett to his mother, 4 Jun. 1920, DDQ 9/55/26.
  38. Garnett to his mother, 19 Jul. 1920, DDQ 9/55/29.
  39. See, for example letter to *The Times* 14 Dec. 1923, from Garnett and St John of Bletso, respectively, Treasurer and Chairman of the society.
  40. Williams to Garnett, 21 Feb. 1922, DDQ 9/58/8. Williams was the son of Sir George Williams, founder of the YMCA, with which he too was closely involved.
  41. *Sunday School Chronicle and Christian Outlook*, 8 Nov. 1923, DDQ 9/52/1.
  42. Garnett to his mother, 8 Jul. 1924, DDQ 9/60/13.
  43. See undated accounts at DDQ 9/68/6 and DDQ 9/68/7.
  44. Garnett had known Noel Buxton prior to his association with Toynbee Hall. Buxton was Minister of Agriculture in 1924. Attlee was elected for Limehouse in 1922 and was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Ramsay MacDonald from 1922. He was mayor of Stepney 1920–21 and had been associated with Toynbee Hall for some time. Bondfield, the leading woman trades unionist

- of the 1920s, was also prominent in the international labour movement. Greenwood was elected in 1922.
45. The idea was Garnett's; Council Minutes, 16 Jun. 1924, ACC 2486/001/f352, Toynbee Hall Papers, LMA.
  46. Toynbee Hall, 1884–1925, 40th Annual Report, Jan. 1926, A/TOY/17/1, *ibid.* Besides the Hostel, there was also, within the same building, The Milner Hall, named after Lord Alfred Milner, whose close involvement in Toynbee Hall, and kindred bodies, had led to patronage of a social centre for the people of the neighbourhood. In less than two years of life it housed an evening play centre, attended by approximately 300 children from adjacent schools, a pack of brownies, several companies of girl guides and a troop of scouts. It also offered clubs for men and boys and sewing circles for women. Toynbee Hall 42nd Report 1927 and 1928, issued Oct. 1928, ACC 2486/15, *ibid.*
  47. Garnett to his mother, 30 Apr. 1926, DDQ 9/63/12.
  48. Garnett to his mother, 20 Oct. 1925, DDQ 9/63/7.
  49. Garnett to his mother, 20 Jul. 1927, DDQ 9/66/10.
  50. Interestingly, so, too, did Francis Rodd, who resigned from the Diplomatic Service in June 1924, and whose reservations about the service prior to this closely resembled Garnett's.
  51. On Mallon, see A. Briggs and A. Macartney, *Toynbee Hall: The First Hundred Years* (London, Boston, Melbourne & Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 91–139. Interestingly, Mallon publicized his role in defusing a stand-off between some strikers and some special constables. The latter were, apparently, Cambridge University undergraduates, and the encounter led to collaboration between the institutions; 'An Incident of the Strike', By the Warden. Reprinted from the *Observer*, A/TOY/26/11/57, Toynbee Hall Papers, LMA.
  52. Garnett did not attend the council meeting on 31 May 1926, at which the Council recorded its unanimous support for Mallon's actions during the strike; and he did not attend any subsequent meetings either; ACC 2486/001/f400, Toynbee Hall Papers, LMA.
  53. Garnett to his mother, 11 May 1926, DDQ 9/63/13.
  54. *Ibid.*
  55. Garnett to his mother, 6 Nov. 1927, DDQ 9/66/17.
  56. 'The Quest or Journey's End', DDQ 9/79/7.
  57. Garnett to his mother, 21 Sept. 1928, DDQ 9/66/29.
  58. Garnett's father left assets valued at over £24,000. Garnett, having sold a good deal of land, left over £104,000.
  59. 'The Quest or Journey's End', DDQ 9/79/7.
  60. This paragraph is primarily based upon a feature in 'People in the Public Eye' in the *Lancashire Daily Post*, 4 Feb. 1932.
  61. Undated account DDQ 9/76/19.
  62. *Ibid.*
  63. After Uppingham and Oxford, and distinguished war service, Ramsbotham was Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of Education (Nov. 1931 to Jun. 1935), to the Ministry of Agriculture (Nov. 1935 to 1936) and Minister of Pensions from September 1936. He was then first commissioner of

- Works from June 1939 and president of the Board of Education. He became Viscount Soulbury in 1941 and was later governor general of Ceylon.
64. Garnett to Ramsbotham, n.d., but late Dec. or early Jan. 1930–31, DDQ 9/71/1.
  65. See Ramsbotham to Garnett, 7 Jul. 1936, DDQ 9/76/14.
  66. Ramsbotham to Garnett, 16 Jul. 1936, DDQ 9/76/15.
  67. *Macedonia 1905 and Turkey 1956*, by W.J. Garnett, 1963, DDQ 9/79/8; script of talk delivered on BBC North of England Home Service by WJG, 4.45–5.00 on Tuesday 28 Feb. 1956, DDQ 9/84/21. The recording does not survive. Garnett also funded the Garnett Clinic at Lancashire Moor Hospital, the regional mental hospital.
  68. *Ibid.* Foreword to *Macedonia 1905* entitled 'Change or Decay'.
  69. One account suggests that Garnett, when confronted by a request for a contribution to the community, rather than offering some small change, donated the deeds of the house. Howard Oldroyd suggested to the author that Garnett tried to sell the house on the open market but was unable to do so; he was also unable to sell it to the local council because of the extensive work required to its roof.
  70. *Lancashire Evening Post*, north edition, 26 Oct. 1965; 'Funeral Tribute to County Alderman W.J. Garnett', *The Lancaster Guardian & Observer*, 29 Oct. 1965, p. 11.

## Epilogue

1. When sorting through his diplomatic papers in 1925, he noted the extent of material that existed for a memoir: entry of 24 May 1925, Garnett family diary.
2. Garnett to Aunt Addie, 31 Dec. 1910, DDQ 9/27/9. This closely resembled the views of Arnold Robertson, as recorded in his unpublished memoirs, with whom Garnett served in Peking. To Robertson, the best that could be hoped for was to find some middle way between East and West; RBTN 1, China, Robertson Papers, pp. 36–7.
3. K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy* (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 146.
4. Garnett to his mother, 2 Feb. 1918, DDQ 9/42/42.
5. Garnett to Morrison, 11 Feb. 1920, ML MSS 312/156, Morrison Papers. Morrison recorded Garnett's 'grievance against the Foreign Office' when they met two days later: 'Visit of W.J. Garnett, en disponibilité, February 13th 1920', ML MSS 312/156.
6. F. H. Hinsley, *International Relations in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 280.
7. On Cranston's drinking, see, for example entry of 31 Jan. 1929, Garnett family diaries.
8. Entry of 19 May 1929, *ibid.*
9. Entries of 15–16 and 21 Jun., and 19 Aug. 1925, *ibid.*
10. Entry of 13 Oct. 1930, *ibid.*

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