# Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century

Edited by

Scarlett Cornelissen

Fantu Cheru

and

Timothy M. Shaw

Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century

International Political Economy Series

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Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century

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Preface

It is very striking, how, as we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, there is a marked change in international discourse on Africa. Once infamously described as 'The Hopeless Continent' by *The Economist*, it would now seem as if the continent is viewed in a much more positive light by analysts and, quite notably, investors. This is a far cry from portrayals in the international arena about ten years ago, when it was largely written off as a site of poverty, destitution and misery.

Recent signs of growth and tentative trends of political reform on the continent have fostered an international narrative of change and promise which advances that Africa is poised for a new phase of development, one in which the continent is not marginal and reactive but an active participant in the international system.

This volume provides new assessments of Africa's place in the international arena. It responds to the general under-representation of Africa in mainstream International Relations (IR) theory and considers the implications of emergent trends in Africa's IR.

The book is an update and extension of the 2001 volume edited by Kevin Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Drawing together a fresh collection of essays, it has the intention to contribute new insights on both the study of Africa as well as wider IR scholarship.

Africa's Challenge provoked a healthy debate within the IR community, providing ground for a set of reviews of IR's treatment of Africa and setting the backdrop to a series of publications on Africa's position in the international system. This book adds momentum to that debate by examining and theoretically contextualizing key emergent trends related to aspects of power, sovereignty, conflict, peace, development and changing social dynamics in the African setting.

The contributors set out to challenge conventional IR precepts of authority, politics and society – which have proven so inept in fully explaining African processes. They unlock the multiple realities that exist on the continent and consider their meanings for the continent's international politics. Many of the uncharted dimensions of Africa's IR are thus innovatively and authoritatively explored.

Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru and Timothy M. Shaw

Acknowledgements

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List of Acronyms

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AFRICOM	Command for Africa
ANC	African National Congress
APC	All-African Peoples' Conference
AU	African Union
BCE	Before the current era
BCG	Boston Consulting Group
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
CCID	Central City Improvement District
CIDs	Central Improvement Districts
COP	Conference of the Parties
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
FBOs	Faith-based organizations
FNDIC	Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities
FOCAC	Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
G7	Group of Seven
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
G77	Group of Seventy-Seven
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICT	Information and communications technology

IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGP	Income-generating projects
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
IYC	Ijaw Youth Council
LPP	Liberal Peace Project
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNOCs	Multinational Oil Corporations
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
NDVF	Niger Delta Volunteer Force
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
NOSLINA	National Organization of Sierra Leoneans in North America
NORAD	Norwegian Development Agency
NPM	New Public Management
OAMCE	Organisation Africaine et Melagache de Cooperation Economique
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIMS	Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
PCRP	Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme
PoA	Programmes of Action
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSC	Private security companies/contractors
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small arms and light weapons
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SSU	Strategic Surveillance Unit
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SWFs	Sovereign wealth funds

TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TRIP	Teaching, Research, and International Policy
TRIPS	Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
WAEN	West African Enterprise Network
WOMEN	Women for a Morally Engaged Nation
WTO	World Trade Organization

1

Introduction: Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?

Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru and Timothy M. Shaw

Introduction

Writing on the state of African studies a number of years ago, and the various responses and resistances of the field to changes in the international environment, the postcolonial scholar Bill Ashcroft (2002) traced three main representations of the continent in scholarly writing. The first was defined by an emergent postcolonial agenda in African intellectual thinking, which, building on early post-independence nationalist projects and following contemporary trends in postcolonial analysis, focused on colonialism's legacies in shaping African subjectivities and societal structures. The second was structured by 'a discourse of Africa', based on a particular framing of what the continent was or was not, and which tended to represent the continent in essentialist terms. The third was a form of internationalism, which attempted to cast the continent's economic and political dynamics against a changing global reality. According to Ashcroft (2002), all the representations contained some sense of ambiguity in relation to Africa's position in the world, consenting to a common notion that the continent was largely peripheral in a wider sociopolitical and economic reality. More than that, the study of the continent was preceded by a particular 'idea of Africa' – one that drew from colonialist imaginations and that projected the continent as 'the Other', the antithesis of Western subjectivity and institutional order (also see Mudimbe, 1994).

This concept of Africa and this sense of marginalism have also framed the study of Africa's international relations (IR). with a key – if

implicit – idea underlying most analyses of the continent's international politics being that they largely occur from a vantage point of detachment, exclusion and aberrance (Engel and Olsen, 2005a). Africa is generally under-represented in the mainstream IR scholarship emanating from the North Atlantic world and is mostly left out of the theoretical debates that have animated this scholarship. Indeed, the continent usually appears in IR scholarship as a case of delinquency – as the site of conflict, suffering and disorder, which in its institutional make-up fails to conform to Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and which is of little consequence to the world economy (Engel and Olsen, 2005b; Lemke, 2003). In a theoretical sense, the continent appears to sit uncomfortably with the discipline's main paradigms, neither displaying the conceptual characteristics that underpin the discipline's epistemological traditions, nor fitting neatly into the ideal-form typologies that define the different scholarly approaches. As such, the IR canon has tended to dispense with the continent in an offhand manner, with scholarship and theorization reflecting little consideration of 'the African case'.

But it is not only mainstream IR that is guilty of this: scholars dedicated to the study of Africa's international politics have themselves interrogated the deeper theoretical aspects of the continent's position in the international system in only very limited senses. Landmark works on Africa's IR such as Christopher Clapham's (1996a) *Africa in the International System* trace the endogenous conditions that structure, and the exogenous environment that shapes, the continent's external politics. Other recent volumes on Africa have variously focused on the continent's relations with the North (Engel and Olsen, 2005b; Taylor, 2010; Taylor and Williams, 2004); emergent state reconstitution (Agbese and Kieh, 2007); Africa and China, a burgeoning cottage industry mid-decade (Alden, 2007; Alden et al., 2008; Ampiah and Naidu, 2008; Besada, 2008; Campbell, 2008; Mohan, 2008; Sidiropolous, 2006; Taylor, 2006, 2008); and the internal dynamics of state and social development in contemporary Africa (Chabal, 2009; Ferguson, 2008; Harbeson and Rothchild, 2009; Hyden, 2006). For the most part, theory-building in African IR scholarship has tended to be partial and reactive.

It is a decade since the publication of Dunn and Shaw's (2001) *Africa's Challenge to International Relations*, one of the few attempts to probe the theoretical dimensions of the continent's international politics. Appearing on the cusp of the new millennium, that volume was responding to the under-representation, and at times pointed exclusion, of African

processes and issues in IR theory. It sought, in short, to expand the parameters of IR theory through innovative assessments of Africa's place in the international arena by provocatively turning the question of 'what is different about Africa' into 'what can analysis of the continent contribute to IR scholarship?'

Ten years on, a number of major empirical, theoretical and scholarly developments provide the context for an expansion and deepening of the agenda set by the 2001 volume. On the empirical side, these include the emergence of new (or altered) regionalisms and multilateralisms around issues with some major consequences for African development, such as climate change/biodiversity/water; the rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) as contending forces of power in the international arena; and the consolidation of Southern-based alliances such as the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) grouping. At the same time, as the tentacles of globalization penetrate deeper and with contradictory consequences, changes in Africa's (formal and informal) political economy are evident, reflected in the selective integration of African states into the world economy, leading to greater levels of intra-continental inequality and sharpened polarization.

There are also other – for the greater part under-researched – processes under way, however. Deterritorialization, the strengthening of illicit economies, the growth of remittance economies, intensified linear and circular migration, and changing forms of capital circulation have equally significant effects for Africa's political economy. Finally, new, if partial and uncertain, trajectories of democratization on the continent accompanied by revitalized civil society activism – or even waves of populism – in many parts imply important shifts in state–civil society relations, and in the nature of authority itself.

More broadly, as one of the patent consequences of the global financial and economic crises of 2008–10, there has been within mainstream IR a recent introspection regarding the discipline's focuses and a requestioning of major theoretical standpoints. The so-called 'trans-Atlantic debate' within the sub-field of International Political Economy (IPE), for instance – essentially a debate between North American and British scholars about competing epistemologies – has been recast to consider questions about the fundamentals of capital and its governance (Phillips and Weaver, 2010). Indeed, the crises prompted a deluge of rival scholarships on the underpinnings and determinants of the evolving world economy and even the projected decline of neoliberalism (*Development Dialogue*, 2009; Panitch and Konings, 2009). While a welcome extension to IR scholarship, the emergent revisionist work is very partial in its

geographical focus and very pointed in its silence about Africa (and, for that matter, other developing regions outside the East Asian economic sphere).

Fortunately, a very promising strand of analysis is arising on IR's geographical margins that is articulating the nature and contents of non-Western IR (most seriously marked in the two-volume compendium edited by Tickner and Wæver, 2009, but also see Amitav and Buzan, 2010; Bilgin, 2008, 2010; Shani, 2007; Wæver, 1999). In the latter body of scholarship, attention has started to be given to the meaning of African IR (see, in particular, Ofuho, 2009; Schoeman, 2009).

This volume seeks to cast new light on the study of Africa's IR in the twenty-first century. It builds on the foundations laid by the volume edited by Dunn and Shaw (2001) and is a response to the various developments in the scholarly and theoretical domains and to the shifts in Africa's place in the international arena. Drawing together a fresh collection of essays, the volume aims to bring the study of Africa's IR in line with new empirical developments. At the same time, however, on the understanding that IR's intellectual assemblage has been rather frail to date in relation to African processes, the text also aims to bring IR theory in line with emergent empirical trends. The collection of chapters in this volume presents the new research problems and puzzles emerging today as critical for understanding Africa's IR. Coming from different fields, the contributors seek to chart out possible futures for an '*emancipatory*' African political project.

The remainder of this chapter reviews prevailing features of Africa's contemporary IR, highlighting the external forces and internal dynamics shaping the continent's place in the emergent international order. This serves as the backdrop for an overview of the structure and contents of the volume.

Locating Africa in a shifting geopolitical context

Africa and the new powers of the emergent order

In a recent assessment of potential economic trajectories in the wake of the global financial meltdown, the World Bank outlined a major realignment of the world economy in the decades ahead. It posited tectonic shifts, with the centre of economic gravity gradually moving from the G7 countries – their economies contributing a decreasing proportion of world GDP – towards the BRICs and other smaller but equally important economies in the global South (World Bank, 2010). In various

forecasts, Goldman Sachs, which coined the term BRICs, has provided a similar outlook, suggesting not only the eclipse of the G7 by the BRICs, but also the rise of a next generation of major players from the South (the so-called N-11, comprising Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam) (Goldman Sachs, 2007). While these emerging powers differ in many important respects (such as the structural underpinnings of their economies, types of political systems or social make-up), they share the features of swift industrialization and concomitantly rapid, if uneven, societal transformations.

Strikingly few of the multiple – and often contradictory – catalogues on emerging powers include African states (Egypt, Nigeria and occasionally South Africa being notable exceptions), underlining the predominance of the idea of Africa's global marginality. This is an idea that has gained greater currency since the end of the Cold War, encouraged by unfavourable appraisals of the continent's potential contribution to a world economy that is being shaped by a progressively different set of forces, and the continent's seeming lack of importance within a changing geopolitical context. Yet these assessments often underplay the significance of emergent tendencies in African economic performance in the last decade. Since 2000, for instance, African growth has accelerated by an average of about 5 per cent, making it one of the world's fastest growing regions (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). Certain African countries (such as Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and Mozambique) have seen their economies grow at nearly double the continental average over the same period.

In the main, this has been prompted by the expansion of the global commodity sector and has been underpinned by the more intensive exploitation of the continent's resource industries. But growth in sectors such as telecommunications, finance and tourism also points to significant diversification in Africa's economic bases. As a result, the continent's contribution to global output – although still outstripped by the advanced economies of the North and the emerging powers of the South – has been on the rise.

Analyses of Africa that continue to depict the continent as largely peripheral to the main forces of change also fail to appreciate the manner in which it has become an important terrain for the emerging politics of the world's new major players (see *Politikon*, 2009 for a review). Among the BRIC states, it is China in particular that has led the incursion with high levels of economic penetration. For instance, by 2010 Chinese trade with Africa was US$ 100bn (AFP, 2010), significantly

more than that of several of the continent's 'traditional' partners from the global North. India is a second major new player in African economies: Indian trade with the continent was valued at close to US$ 40bn by 2009.

Both India and China have converted their closer economic ties with Africa into political processes that have given structure to diplomatic interfaces. The IBSA forum has grown in scope and vitality, giving more substance and focus to the activities of the three constituent members, which had initially loosely cohered around vague collaboration objectives. The election of all three IBSA member states in late 2010 as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council is likely to give greater momentum to the budding sense of convergence among the grouping's constituents. On a more direct basis, India has fostered closer ties with several individual African states, marked by increased visits to the continent by India's political elites, and the launch a few years ago of the Africa–India Forum Summit (Shrivastava, 2009).

The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), started as a gathering of Chinese officials and their African counterparts in 2000, has become the hallmark of China's engagement with the continent, constituting a channel for the Asian power's interests in Africa. But the FOCAC process has also had a number of other by-products, in the form of Chinese scholarships and educational and research exchanges, and by facilitating cooperation in jurisprudence (*The China Monitor*, 2010). These signal a deeper level of engagement and coherence between the two parties, extending beyond economic interests and policy into the realms of values and norms.

Indeed, the new bilateral and multilateral relations arising between Africa and several key emerging powers are predominantly fashioned in terms of a provocative postcolonial discourse that emphasizes shared histories and triumphs over colonialism, similar sociopolitical challenges and common development agendas in the contemporary era. This gives shape to a burgeoning politics of South–South alignment that has amplified the continent's role in international politics. China's more intense involvement with Africa, for example, has not only piqued fresh interest in the continent by the global North, but has also had some significant diplomatic outflows, which have given the continent greater centrality.

Recent cases that can be cited include the wrangling in the UN over the resolution of the conflict in Darfur. These deliberations often pitted major powers with vested interests in the region against each other.

China's stance on the issue – with the Asian power, for instance, often threatening to block key processes of UN decision-making, but later also emerging as a mediator between the Khartoum regime and Western states – had far-reaching consequences not only for the region but also for wider politics on international intervention and the humanitarian rationalization that underpins it (Black and Williams, 2010; Taylor, 2009). More generally, China has started to play a bigger role in matters of conflict and peace on the African continent, either through the indirect backing of strategic partner regimes or, more directly, through support to key institutions or processes in Africa's evolving security regime. In this, the Asian country has both played a facilitative role in the development of the continent's security architecture (by, for instance, providing much of the financing for the early warning facilities of the African Union, AU), but has also often been criticized for obstructing landmark processes both in and beyond Sudan (Adebajo, 2010).

While China's motives and impacts in Africa are widely debated (Alden, 2007; Ampiah and Naidu, 2008), clearly its involvement has significantly altered the bargaining environment and available leverage options for the continent. It is becoming more common, for instance, for debt-affected or defaulting African states to waive loans by international financial institutions (IFIs) and the stringent conditionalities attached to them in favour of the generous and seemingly condition-free monies from the Chinese government. Often Chinese financing enables the development of costly infrastructure or mega-projects that are politically motivated and are intended to buffer otherwise beleaguered regimes (see, for example, 'Congo defends $6 bln China deal, awaits funds', 2010).

Beyond affecting the external bargaining position of numerous African states, therefore, China's involvement in Africa has also triggered or enhanced changes in internal conditions across large parts of the continent. This relates both to the impacts of Chinese financing on strategic industries and the sectoral transformations this prompts, particularly in agriculture and resource extraction (Brautigam, 2009; Tull, 2006), but also to the constitutive nature of the African polity itself, providing leverage to certain elites, favouring particular policy courses and, more significantly, affecting relationships between states and civil societies. The way in which all of this may be transforming the African state is not yet well understood.

This situation, does, however, imply a rethinking of analytical categories of statehood generally applied to the African case: 'failed' states

(according to the indices developed by *Foreign Policy* and other think tanks) such as Somalia, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Chad are probably more capacitated by recent new levels of involvement by China, even if this may not be on bases that enable broad-based social advance in those countries. Similarly, several of Africa's new class of 'developmental' states (Mkandawire, 2001) have forged close ties with China, whose investments have further bolstered their economies. Indeed, while framed differently, China's relations with Africa and the political leverage it provides state elites offer some resonances with the earlier international debate about Asian values and the promise linked to them of alternative modernities (Sioh, 2010). The difference is that the embracing of a supposedly Chinese 'model of development', done quite enthusiastically by many African elites these days, often also implies the fashioning of political economies with strong oligopolistic traits, in which those elites might hold significant personal stakes (Taylor, 2010). In general, China's growing involvement in the continent and its effects on institutional – or elite – capacities suggest that broad-brush categorizations of the African state as fragile, weak or disconnected from a wider geo-economic order misrepresent an important evolving reality on the continent.

Security/insecurities and societal challenges

If it is the case that the continent is less peripheral in the emergent international order than often presented, African polities more complex in their internal configurations than usually depicted, and African IR more diverse and consequential than is generally allowed for, it is also true that the continent continues to display many features of paradox and uncertainty. The global financial and economic crises and their aftermaths have cast into relief a few telling dynamics in Africa's economic and political systems. At the apex of the crisis, the continent seemed fairly resilient to the most acute of the impacts that the financial meltdown wreaked in the global North (McCarthy, 2009). In part, this was due to the nature of the crisis, underpinned by profound failures in very specific parts of the global economy – advanced futures markets, for instance – with which much of the continent was not fully aligned. But Africa's economies were also shielded from the greatest shocks by the speculators' return to commodities as a means to buffer shortfalls, thereby providing revenue for numerous African countries. While not protecting it completely, the continent's resource industries at first enabled it to absorb much potential damage (Arief et al., 2010).

This is not to underemphasize the degree of vulnerability the continent and its population still faced: each time losses of virtual capital spiralled into the real economy, affecting fuel or food prices, livelihoods, particularly in the poorest parts of the continent, were concomitantly affected (AfDB, 2009). Food riots occurred in settings as structurally diverse as Mozambique and Burkina Faso. And while at a macro-level many African economies improved their growth performance, in real terms, per capita GDP has been negatively affected. Today, as full-scale recovery in the global North still appears tentative, prognoses regarding African development are mixed (Kasekende et al., 2010). On the one hand, Africa displays a form of economic vitality and level of integration into the world economy quite different from previous decades and a far cry from *The Economist*'s imaging of the continent as 'hopeless' (*The Economist*, 13 May 2000). On the other, however, the continent's ability to meet social development targets contained in declaratory frameworks such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seems highly questionable. The outcome of the UN's Millennium Development Summit of September 2010 reinforced the message that on existing levels of distribution, poverty and vulnerability were likely to remain part of the continent's reality – especially for women and children – for the foreseeable future (UN, 2010). MDG health targets in particular (child mortality, maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) are far from being realized (UN, 2009).

The impacts of long-term ecological change are likely to exacerbate such vulnerabilities. Even as the science on climate change is highly contested, emerging evidence suggests that the developing world is particularly susceptible to ecologically induced disasters, which have grown less sporadic and more intense over a short period. With its diverse ecologies, which still form an important component of its economic foundations, Africa is regarded as being especially at risk (Brown and Crawford, 2009). The increase in environmental threats, in conjunction with the limited ability of African governments to ameliorate the most intense cases of poverty, has implications for the budding human security agenda on the continent (MacLean, Black and Shaw, 2006). Just as human security can include a range of types – economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political (UNDP, 1994) – so climate change has several interrelated impacts, depending on region, period and so on. The supposition is that the uneven incidence and consequences of climate change would ramify into energy, food, land and water insecurities (Besada and Sewankambo, 2009; UNDP, 2007),

not only impacting livelihoods, but possibly also leading to greater population displacement.

There is awareness among African leaders of the implications of such 'formative disasters' (World Bank, 2009, p. 283) for the continent's future, inspiring their participation in a range of formal, multi-actor and hybrid environmental governance alliances. At the regional level, initiatives have centred in particular on rivers and other water resources. The Nile Basin Initiative, a cooperation and joint management initiative of Nile countries, exemplifies such meso-level and transverse state-led processes. These are often complemented by private or NGO-led initiatives, such as the Stockholm-based Global Water Partnership and the Water and Development Alliance (the latter a development partnership between United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Coca Cola). In general, public-private (or state-(I)NGO) partnerships have become prevalent vehicles for environmental governance on the continent. But environmental issues have also come to shape African orientation to global governance, becoming aligned with demands for greater equitability and the inclusion of development focuses in the agendas of multilateral structures.

South Africa has emerged as Africa's principal advocate in most of the major multilateral forums, being a member of the G20 (the gathering of the heads of state of the top 20 economies in the world) and the G8's Outreach 5 (or G5, also comprising Brazil, China, India and Mexico). The country's inclusion in the climate change alliance involving Brazil, India and China – the so-called BASIC alliance – at the conclusion of the Conference of the Parties meeting in Denmark at the end of 2009 provides another diplomatic conduit, although perhaps not always for the representation of the wider African continent. Indeed, South Africa's involvement as self-proclaimed continental leader in the various new multilateral alliances led from the South has not always been met with enthusiasm in African diplomacy (Habib, 2009). Yet the significance of stronger African claims for environmental justice in the international realm should not be underplayed. It is part of a broader change in politics in which the linkage between development and security has been more patently made. This has seen greater attention being given to so-called 'non-traditional' security threats – viruses/diseases, population displacement, poverty – and their victims (predominantly women and children) in policymaking, affecting, for instance, the debate on global public health and its governance (MacLean, Brown and Fourie, 2009).

More generally, however, the security continuum in Africa has become more, not less compressed. 'Traditional' security threats – conflicts over resources, deaths by conventional weaponry both legally and illegally obtained, and the growth of militias rivalling state powers – are still important. While certain achievements have been made over the past decade in the establishment of continental and regional security structures (Adebayo, 2010; Engel and Porto, 2010), conflict continues to simmer in large tracts of the continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo's and Sudan's protracted conflicts are said to have claimed in excess of five million lives in the last ten years,[1] and while key processes such as Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the AU/UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur are under way, their outcomes are highly uncertain. More importantly, 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' security threats mesh and mutually influence each other in unpredictable ways: resources, grievances and greed motivate and sustain conflicts; the political economies of violence that are created in this way lead to internal displacement and exacerbate humanitarian needs already provoked by environmental and economic vulnerabilities. Africa's high incidence of complex humanitarian emergencies is symptomatic of the deadly interplay between the breakdown of conventional state security and the new security threats. The US-led 'global war on terror' significantly complicated conditions on the continent. Hostility by alliance partners towards suspected terror-harbouring states further destabilized key countries, particularly in the Horn of Africa, and negatively affected a generally brittle security situation. The discursive framing of international security has not significantly altered with the departure of George Bush Jr and the other hawkish protagonists of the global war on terror, although it is being packaged differently.

In the main, the 'international community' has been inept in dealing with the hybrid character and fallouts of Africa's security threats. Globalization has tended to intensify inequalities within and between states and regions. Inappropriate peace processes, such as demobilization, disarmament and reconstruction, have proven to be highly problematic in such circumstances. People survive such difficulties by returning to informal sectors, which can be illegal and violent. Hence, successful peace negotiations and agreements have been infrequent and the returns to conflict frequent, along with the de facto division of states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and others. Another feature is that guns and their holders have been increasingly privatized (Wulf, 2005). The 'other' side of the security nexus

now stretches from global guerrilla/terrorist networks to private military companies and militias. As Muggah (2006) cautions, the intensified 'refugee militarization' in Africa (as elsewhere) has severe implications not only for peace processes, but also for livelihoods and development fortunes. In addition, despite continuing global and regional efforts, there is no effective regime for the regulation of, let alone a reduction in, the number of small arms that fuel the majority of Africa's conflicts.

These distinctively 'African' issues have a range of global implications. Moreover, recent international responses to piracy off the coast of Somalia reveal some interesting new tendencies. The naval deployments by European, American, but also Asian (Chinese, Indian and Japanese) forces in the Gulf of Aden represent a showcasing of hard power by both 'conventional' and emerging military powers. The relative lack of success of those deployments profiles the way in which African dynamics challenge the conventions and rules of diplomacy (and of war-making) that underpin IR. Orthodox realist understandings of IR certainly fail to explain this clash of conventions. But the case does underscore the point that the continent's 'security' is not separable from other parts of the world and, indeed, shapes broader international security.

This reinforces the claim by Lemke (2003) and Brown (2006) that the continent holds insights of relevance to the field of IR as a whole. This is so because so many of its cross-border relations are 'informal', often 'illegal', and thus not counted in orthodox IR data. So a significant portion of Africa's external trade is unrecorded, in part because, like other regions such as the 'new' Central Asia and Central Europe, it contains a high percentage of land-locked states. Likewise, any calculation of violent deaths through conflict that ignores its connection with 'invisible' or supposedly unrelated killers, such as drought, floods, famine or disease would disregard the compounding effect of conflict on humanitarian imperatives, all of which have ubiquitous external connections. Such a transnational perspective could be further extended by reference to global health factors such as cross-border viruses like HIV/AIDS and Ebola, where again the African dimensions are especially telling.

The contributions in this volume

The contributions in this volume take as their point of departure the inadequacy of the analytical equipment provided by established IR theory in capturing and explaining shifting processes on the continent.

Indeed, to the extent that Africa has been incorporated into IR theory, it has been so in a way that has disconnected several connected realities. Lemke (2003) and Brown (2006) question whether contemporary 'African' IR is different and, if so, whether it presents challenges and changes for the comparative field of IR elsewhere. In particular, they query whether IR in Africa poses significance for transnational relations outside the continent: that is, does the general, comparative field need to evolve away from a lingering over-emphasis on formal inter-state relations towards belated recognition of non-state (both civil society and corporate) actors? Traditional 'realist' blinkers blind orthodox state-centric analysis to the richness of non-state 'African' economic, social and strategic relations, with major implications for empirical analytical approaches, data collection and policy responses.

The contributions in this volume add to their insights by examining and theoretically contextualizing key emergent trends related to aspects of power, sovereignty, conflict, peace, development and changing social dynamics in the African context. Emphasis is placed on challenging conventional IR precepts of authority, politics and society. Instead, the volume explores the significance of many of the uncharted dimensions of Africa's IR. Also, rather than cast the continent in the role of different or subversive, the question posed is how processes in Africa should most appropriately be studied and what the continent teaches the IR canon in this regard. This includes an exploration of the dimensions about which IR is mostly silent, such as the role of identity and culture in international politics. In this, the volume reflects some of the more recent theoretical and methodological developments that have shaped the broader social sciences, drawing insights from, for example, political theory, postcolonialism, the 'spatial turn' in the social sciences, critical political geography and identity discourses.

An important attribute of the volume is that it uses a reframed epistemology to explore what emergent African processes yield in the way of broader lessons about changing power structures in the international order. Far from regarding the African continent as a case of aberrance that deviates from the empirical Westphalian norm and which could therefore contribute little to an overall understanding of IR, it is the concept of the Westphalian order itself that is interrogated. The entry point is provided in this volume through analyses of political authority that are both aligned to and delinked from the institutional state.

The volume is organized around three core themes. First, on the understanding that the formal (state and substate) and informal

(non-state) domains carry equal significance in shaping African IR, the volume explores shifting forms of sovereignty through multiple expressions of authority and the range of actors involved in this. Contributions by Karen Smith and Thomas Kwasi Tieku provide a conceptual foundation by reconsidering the place of Africa in the international system and the means by which the continent should be studied. They contend that not only does the continent exhibit centrality and agency in the international system that is often overlooked, but that viewing African forms of power and political behaviour (in collectivist, rather than individualist terms, for instance) provides important insights into the foundations of Africa's IR. Asking different questions about the meaning and locus of authority in the African setting explains many things about the continent's regional and multilateral politics, but also yields different insights into the nature of the state.

The chapter by Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen further explores alternative forms of sovereignty and statehood in Africa. Positioning themselves with the emergent wing in IR that questions the analytical value of the territorial state (Agnew, 2005), the authors challenge the utility of the standard Westphalian measures of statehood by which African polities are evaluated. They contest the ascriptions of state weakness and/or failure that have come to be popularly applied to the African continent in recent years as being analytically imprecise. Instead, according to Engel and Olsen, new regimes of territorialization at the state, substate and trans-state levels are fashioning new types of authority and social relations.

Epistemologically, this means that the apparent 'disorder' of conflict zones, population displacement, informal economies or migrant spaces in fact carry their own logic of order, which either challenges or contributes to higher hierarchies of authority. A complete understanding of the African state therefore requires looking beyond formal traits to such indigenous, informal and transboundary dynamics.

The second theme of the volume focuses on the transformation of the old order (including of the view of non-conforming/disobedient Africa) and the nature of the new alternatives that are arising. What are these innovations challenging in traditional IR? The focus here is not just on being 'disobedient', but rather on innovating theoretically and perhaps influencing politically the present global transformations. There is a tense relationship between 'constructive engagement' with the old order and 'constructive disengagement' from it. This theme of 'transformation and innovation from below' is

extended in various ways. In his contribution, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni reflects on the implications of the respatialization of the continent and the identitarian processes related to it. He considers the historical project of nationalism in the postcolonial African setting, and the contemporary rise of nativism, autochthony and xenophobia. By exploring how African identities are shaped, he offers an account of the intersubjective elements of power and politics in Africa and the way in which these might affect IR.

Louise Wiuff Moe's comparison of the assumed 'failed' state of Somalia with the 'hybrid' and apparently functioning state of Somaliland highlights the different levels at which (state) power is exercised. Further, this multiplicity of African authorities and the varying forms of statehood are not unique: rather, they describe conditions within the Westphalian order too. As such, looking at the territorialization and reterritorialization of authority within the African setting can offer lessons for the wider international system.

Alfred Zack-Williams traces the dimensions of Africa's diaspora communities and explores their consequences for the continent's IR. He focuses on the role of the Sierra Leone diaspora and their role in contemporary processes of peacebuilding in that country. He highlights the transmutability and impacts of diaspora identities, particularly as diaspora communities engage with external actors around the issue of their homeland. Through a case study of South Africa's migration regime and the micro-territorial orders that are arising from population movements in the post-apartheid era, Darshan Vigneswaran and Loren Landau explore changing forms of sovereignty and territoriality in the Southern African context. They identify alternative expressions of authority in the in-between spaces of the formal state and state-based institutions. In their view, these are linked to processes of state reconstruction (from below), which the state may be both party to and absent from. Not only does migration reset boundaries and respatialize the state, but the micro-configurations of authority it stimulates can contribute to systemic change.

As a third theme, the volume explores the forms of securitization and insecurities that shape everyday existence and practices on the continent, their exogenous and endogenous stimulants and their ramifications for the continent's external politics. Cyril Obi focuses on the interrelationship between globalization, ethnic identity and conflict in Africa. Through a case study of the resource conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta, he explores the transnational and local factors that shape war-making on the continent. A number of centrifugal forces and a

range of supra- and substate actors (global oil corporations, insurgents, local communities and so forth) affect the Nigerian state. Lying at the intersection of such forces and interests, the Niger Delta is a microcosm of complex wider dynamics on the continent. Obi's perspective on the Niger Delta conflict reinforces the argument in this volume that a state-centred analysis offers only a limited explanation of Africa's politics of conflict and security. In her contribution, Rita Abrahamsen focuses on the privatization of security in the African setting, exploring the role of both military private security agents, but also of new forms, such as commercialized security firms, vigilantism and privatized security spaces in Africa's urban environment. She identifies global assemblages of private security with which small pockets of the continent are connected. Security privatization is a response to weakened state capacities, but also reflects the reconfiguration between the public and private domains, creating the space for a range of actors (both local and global) to produce new forms of security practices, institutions and governance.

Finally, Jane Parpart and Lisa Thompson provide a gendered analysis of conflict and insecurity in Africa. They reframe the 'new wars' debate in gendered terms, appraising the various forms of violence that shape everyday lives. Masculinized violence underpins military conflict on the continent, and masculinized narratives of the state and state power often sanction violence against women (and some men). Mainstream IR literature does not capture the various forms of insecurity that exist on the continent. A more critical assessment of violence in Africa that explores its gendered nature can help extend not only theorization of war and insecurity, but also help to deepen the IR canon.

Conclusion

Just as there are not one but multiple Africas, the continent displays multiple forms of IR. The continent's states and societies are engaged in an array of activities and practices – formal, informal, institutionalized and ad hoc – and its markets are shaped by and themselves affect a range of local, national and cross-border/transnational economic forces and flows. In contrast to its assumed marginality and its proclaimed one-dimensional decline, Africa's development is not uniformly regressive or negative, and its analytical and policy contribution is much more significant than usually credited. The challenge for IR scholarship is to grasp the manifold ways in which IR play out and to recognize those dimensions not typically considered part of the analytical corpus – such

as diasporas, illicit economies, smuggling networks – as fundamental components of African processes that can offer profound lessons for the field.

Note

1. It should, however, be noted that this figure of 'war dead' in these two conflicts has been disputed. A widely disseminated 2008 report of the International Rescue Committee asserts that the Congo conflict had claimed 5.4 million lives between 1998 and 2007, which includes deaths due to starvation, disease and combat. Other studies have questioned this, claiming far fewer deaths (World Politics Review, 2010).

Part I

Reconceptualizing Authority and Sovereignty

2
Africa as an Agent of International Relations Knowledge

Karen Smith

Introduction

The inability of existing International Relations (IR) to deal with the challenges confronting the world today has led to a reappraisal of the discipline as a whole, accompanied by increasingly audible calls for disciplinary openness and a search for new perspectives that might address these shortcomings. Neuman's (1998, p. 1) observation that 'changes in the international system in general, and in the Third World in particular, seem to be outpacing developments in International Relations Theory' summarizes many of these views. The same is true of Ayoob's concern that, 'since much of the theoretically sophisticated IR analysis is based on premises that are of limited relevance, it does not reflect many of the major realities in the contemporary international system' (2002, p. 30). In particular, a number of IR scholars[1] have emphasized the lack of engagement with the developing world, Africa in particular, in the field as a whole. While some have focused on how Africa is overlooked as an important object of study, others have lamented the unsatisfactory tools with which IR tries to make sense of Africa.

Some commentators have justifiably noted that critics of the marginalization of Africa and the developing world in IR theory should be more specific in their criticisms. There have been shifts – and, some would argue, progress – within the discipline, as the results of the recent Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) survey conducted in 2008 show. One of the findings was that 'there is more diversity than hegemony in IR' (Jordan et al., 2009, p. 8) and that there is clear movement away from the major theoretical paradigms both within and outside the American academy. The notion of an unrivalled American hegemony in the field (as was argued by Smith in 2002) is therefore

challenged, also in relation to the subfield of International Political Economy (IPE), which is being counterbalanced by the British School (see Cohen, 2008; Higgott and Watson, 2008). It needs to be noted, however, that, due to its limited sample, the TRIP survey results cannot be generalized. For example, the only African country included in the survey was South Africa, which, given its particular history, is arguably unique in the African context. In addition, the major rift in IPE is taking place within the core, illustrating the continued insularity of the core of the field from what is going on in the rest of the world.

   Brown's (2006) point remains valid, however, that not all IR theory is inadequate for Africa, or for the developing world, and that there have been important advances in looking beyond neo-realism's state-centric approach to include factors that critics maintain are essential to understanding IR in Africa. Of course, there have been challenges to the mainstream that have contributed to a better understanding of the developing world and have resulted in more theoretical pluralism in the field. One could cite efforts made by critical theories and Marxist-inspired world systems and *dependencia* theories (mainly, however, within IPE) to understand the peripheral role that Africa and other developing countries played in the global economy. Similarly, Barnett's (2001) work is an important example of how constructivism may offer an alternative to bringing in the Third World. One could also mention the contributions made by postcolonial theory, historical sociology and other critical theories such as feminism. As Engel and Olsen (2005a, p. 5), however, point out, these 'radical contributions remained more or less isolated from the general debates between the other IR schools'. In addition, most of these theories, with perhaps the exception of postcolonial theory, are still limited in that they share with mainstream theory a reliance on Western philosophy and a Eurocentric framing of world history. As Thomas and Wilkin (2004, p. 249) point out, 'the dominance of mainstream International Relations approaches has not been sufficiently dented to give the confidence that as a discipline we are engaged systematically with understanding the major challenges facing the majority of humanity'. In addition, Engel and Olsen's (2005a, p. 6) argument holds true that 'it is quite obvious that Africa, its development and its special problems have had strikingly little impact on IR theory. By and large, empirical research on Africa, within either IR or comparative politics, has dealt with specific problems – not general theories'.

The aim here is not to revisit these debates, but rather to explore possible ways of addressing what has been established as a serious shortcoming in IR. The starting point of this chapter is that Africa and African scholars are underrepresented in IR, and that exploring contributions from Africa could potentially enrich our understanding of IR. This chapter constitutes a conscious attempt to reverse what has become the accepted flow of knowledge – from north to south, or core to periphery.

Looking South in search of difference

The spread of ideas from what we now refer to as the developing world to the developed world has, of course, been happening for centuries. One need only think of the influence of Indian religion and culture on the rest of the world, or the impact of Asian art on the development of art in Europe.

Unfortunately, the flow of knowledge in IR has been mainly unidirectional. This is partly due to internal and external factors relating specifically to the discipline of IR (gatekeeping being one example) within the broader context of the international political economy of knowledge. Not all the blame can be put on the North. As Tickner (2007, p. 5) highlights, academics in the South 'internalize and reproduce this hegemonic arrangement by favoring core knowledge as more authoritative and scientific in comparison to local variants'. This view is underpinned by Indian scholar Mallavarapu (2005, p. 1), who writes that scholars from the developing world 'have been complicit in viewing themselves as mere recipients of a discourse shaped elsewhere'.

An important question at this point is whether there is such a thing as distinctly African knowledge that can be differentiated from, for example, North American knowledge. This raises questions about what Bilgin (2008) refers to as the 'prevalent assumptions of "difference" between "Western" and "non-Western" approaches to world politics'. She argues that Western and non-Western experiences and their interpretations have become so interlaced that ' "non-Western" ways of thinking about and doing world politics are not always devoid of "Western" concepts and theories' (2008, p. 6). She goes on to call on proponents of non-Western insights into IR to 'consider the possibility that one's efforts to think past "Western" IR are not guaranteed to get one to a place where "different" ways of thinking about and doing politics preside' (2008, p. 7), and that much of what is found is little more than mimicry of

Western approaches. This seems to be partly confirmed by Tickner and Wæver (2009) and by the results of the TRIP study (Jordan et al., 2009), which found that, generally, there seem to be more similarities than national variations across the sampled countries.

Although one cannot dispute the tremendous influence of Western knowledge systems on Africa, in many cases ideas have not simply been imported uncritically. Instead, they have often been selectively appropriated and rearticulated within local contexts and discourses. The contention here is that such rearticulations constitute valuable innovations that may assist in the development of the field. Relatedly, instances of sameness cannot immediately be dismissed as mimicry. Boele van Hensbroek notes that the democratic turn in African political thought in the 1980s was considered by some as 'simply a mimic of the West and a deviation from African thought rather than its newest form' (1999, p. 171). He goes on to ask, however,

> Why would Africans develop democratic lines of thought only by imitating Europeans and not through their own force of mind? There is no valid reason to assume that African thinkers are intrinsically "unliberal" and can only develop liberal ideas through mimicry or that liberalism is intrinsically "un-African". (1999, p. 171)

This point is further developed by La Monica (2007), who argues that the best starting point for the inclusion of African knowledge is by identifying areas of overlap between African and Western thought. La Monica continues that not all the political ideas and thoughts proffered by Africans are incommensurable with Western IR thinking. Using a matrix, he shows how the thought of African scholars and statesmen fits into existing categories of realism, idealism and structuralism. Ultimately, his argument is that identifying such overlaps can be an important starting point for improving the dialogue between IR scholars in the core and in Africa, and avoiding the essentialization of Africa by emphasizing its differences and the inappropriateness of IR frameworks to the continent.

In exploring whether African insights can differ from those in other parts of the world, the notion of positionality, referring to the identity and position of the researcher in relation to the subject, is important. Shifting the position from which ideas are formulated may shed light on distinct aspects of global politics that dominant perspectives simply fail to see (Tickner, 2003a, p. 302). The different social, political, economic, cultural (including intellectual), historical, geographical and

ideological contexts found in the global South, in comparison with the North, thus provide potentially fertile ground for innovative perspectives on IR that may fall outside the intellectual framework of Northern scholars. In addition, one can include cultural–institutional factors (which include the political culture of the countries or regions in which theorizing takes place, as well as the habits, attitudes and professional discourse within the social science) identified by Jorgensen (2000) in his exploration of continental European IR versus British and American IR.

Of course, one must guard against overemphasizing Africa's difference to the point that it becomes essentialized, leading to further marginalization. At the same time, one must keep in mind Inayatullah and Blaney's (2004) point that the study of IR is in many ways about the erasure of difference. This relies on dangerous assumptions of universality, which have proven problematic, in that empirical evidence from the developing world clearly disputes mainstream IR theory's claim to universality. There is no reason why insights from Africa cannot be both similar to and different from those we would find in other parts of the world, just as they will certainly reflect the diversity of the continent itself. In light of this diversity, the adjective 'African' is therefore employed with full awareness that its usage constitutes a major generalization.

At this point, it is necessary to engage briefly with what is meant by the term 'African'.[2] The question of who qualifies to call themselves African is still hotly debated, and has significant implications for what might be considered African contributions to IR. During the era of colonialism, part of the colonial project was to portray Africans as unable to speak for themselves. In the aftermath of colonialism, who can identify themselves as African and can, therefore, legitimately speak on behalf of Africa remains a deeply political issue with racial, linguistic and geographical undertones. Clearly, the impact of colonialism and globalization on one's ability to distinguish between African and Western knowledge should not be underestimated. However, if one starts from the assumption that there is no such thing as pure, untainted African knowledge, one can begin to be open to the insights that can be gained from African and Africanist scholars and the lived experience of ordinary Africans, among other sources. Whether or not these insights have been tainted or, contrastingly, abetted by outside influences is beside the point.

With regard to what constitutes 'African' contributions, given the overarching aim of this chapter – to widen the scope of what can

be considered IR – limiting the catchment area from which African contributions could originate would be a paradoxical exercise. Instead, it is contended that we should recognize the plurality of the potential sources of African knowledge and promote alternative sites of knowledge construction in general.

In what way can Africa contribute to our understanding of international relations?

In exploring possible African contributions to IR, one can differentiate between those that fall within the constraints of what is considered IR, and those that lie beyond the disciplinary boundaries of the field. With regard to the former, one can consider contributions gained from (a) adapting existing theory and concepts to the local context; (b) moving beyond state-centrism; and (c) alternative understandings of state behaviour/different ways of doing IR. Beyond the boundaries of IR, one can investigate contributions from (a) other academic fields such as literature and anthropology; (b) popular culture and new media; and (c) everyday life. An overview of each of these is provided below.

Adaption, revision and reinterpretation

One way to facilitate inclusion of Africa as an object of study and Africans as potential agents of IR knowledge is by exploring African interpretations/articulations of concepts used in IR, as well as related concepts that may not be found in Western IR discourses. Investigating how African scholars have adapted IR theories for understanding the particularities of the region is important not only to a greater understanding of that region, but may also contribute to studies of other parts of the world.

   In itself, this is not a novel idea in IR. An important contribution of the constructivist turn has been the reformulation of existing theories – for example, Kratochwil and Ruggie's (1986) revision of regime theory. There are also similar examples from the developing world. Tickner (2003a) notes how the literature on autonomy produced in Latin America during the 1980s, for example, succeeded in establishing a 'conceptual bridge' between dependency theory and mainstream IR theory. Similarly, the work of scholars such as Helio Jaguaribe, Juan Carlos Puig and Carlos Escudé has been instrumental in adapting traditional IR theories to regional analysis in order to come up with contributions such as 'regional autonomy' and 'peripheral realism'. Mohammed Ayoob's

(1998) subaltern realism is another case in point where realism has been revised to take into account the experiences of the developing world. Specifically, he argues that because Third World states are generally weak, they are more concerned with relative gains and short-term benefits rather than absolute gains and long-term benefits. Importantly, he also proposes an alternative conceptualization of security that considers the different conditions prevailing in Third World states, and the fact that these states tend to be more preoccupied with security in their immediate neighbourhoods than in the broader international environment.

Similarly, a number of authors (Brown, 2006; Dunn, 2001; Neuman, 1998; Nkiwane, 2001b; Tickner, 2003b) have written how central concepts in IR (such as anarchy, states, sovereignty, alliances, the international system) become problematic when applied to the Third World, and how they can be reinterpreted from a Third World perspective. The rereading or problematizing of concepts central to the discipline is an important process, as one could argue that Western-centric concepts and the nature of the discipline prevent developing scholars from creating IR theories that are universally applicable. This is in line with Bleiker's view that it is possible to 'subvert the delineation of thinking space imposed by orthodox definitions of IR concepts', either by reassessing and reinterpreting existing concepts or by engaging in completely novel conceptualization (Bleiker, 2001, pp. 50–51).

Arguably, the most contested IR concept in scholarship on Africa is the state. Criticisms about the inappropriateness of a Western understanding of the state in Africa abound. Lemke (2003), for example, argues that the main difference between Africa and the rest of the world is that African states are states in name only. He suggests that IR scholars move beyond the idea of the state as an inherently fixed concept and allow it to be 'opened up'. Mustapha also emphasizes the importance of taking account of Africa's own experience of state formation in theorizing about the current political and other challenges facing the continent and its people. As it stands, 'Eurocentric models are implicitly or explicitly deployed without any effort being made at establishing and evaluating the relevance of any African experience' (2003a, p. 26).

Nkiwane uses the example of the African debate on the substance and meaning of democracy, framed in the context of liberal versus popular/radical democracy, to illustrate how African insights can be important in advancing our understanding of such basic concepts as IR, and how accepted theories, such as the democratic peace theory,

can be turned on their heads. African interpretations of democracy, with its communalism and broad-based deliberation aimed at consensus and reconciling all views, challenge Western assumptions about liberal democracy. Nyerere's *ujamaa*, which ultimately forms the basis for a non-capitalist path to development, is based on this idea of democracy: it conceptualizes the African nation as an extended family engaged in cooperative activities and direct participatory decision-making. African critiques of accepted concepts in IR thus 'enhance our breadth and depth of theoretical and operational understanding, and offer an important contribution to our interpretation of how nation-states relate' (Nkiwane, 2001a, p. 106). So, rather than accept the notion common in mainstream scholarship that African examples are aberrations and have only nuisance value, we should look more closely at these examples to see what we might learn from them that could potentially inform our broader understanding of IR.

Beyond state-centrism

Another important lesson from the African experience is the deficiency of state-centric approaches in trying to understand IR in Africa. The limitations of a state-centric approach have, of course, been noted by countless scholars and yet the focus on states seems to be almost integral to the study of IR. Therefore, the lessons from Africa can underscore the absurdity of trying to understand a complex, pluralist world from the limited perspective of the behaviour of states. In Africa, more than perhaps anywhere else, the actors who engage in warfare and trade, who provide basic services to communities, and around whom identities are shaped, are predominantly not states but warlords, nongovernmental organizations or ethnic groups. The unit-of-analysis problem is thus highlighted in the African case. This is line with Puchala's contention that 'non-Western theorists do not organize their worldviews in terms of familiar Western categories' (1997, p. 130). Relatedly, Swatuk and Vale (2001, p. 12) agree that 'state-centred discourses tend to stand at odds with the lived experiences of people, resources, animals, diseases, etcetera on the ground', reinforcing the point made earlier about the significance of insights generated through lived experiences. Recognizing alternative sub-state units of analysis, which behave in ways very similar to those ascribed to states in state-centric theories, can constitute an important revision of existing state-centric theories.

   Related to this is the artificial distinction between the international and the domestic in IR, a point underlined by numerous critical

scholars. In the African context, this distinction is especially senseless. Problems experienced by ordinary people at the grassroots level in Africa may not be perceived by them as having any international dimension whatever. However, many of them are closely linked to Africa's position in the global economy and its dependence on the powers of global capital. It is impossible to try to explain the myriad problems facing ordinary Africans – ranging from poverty to lack of housing, basic education and healthcare – without referring to the constraints imposed by the international system. So-called 'domestic' challenges facing the state today cannot be separated from the international environment. The problems of the poorest countries in Africa are closely tied to the marginalized position in which they find themselves in the international system. The local manifestations of global processes are essential to our understanding of IR. Relatedly, exploring domestic conditions such as poverty, high unemployment and crime, which enable the penetration of globally driven activities like drug and human trafficking, terrorism and so forth, can prove insightful in addressing the global governance of these issues.

Alternative interpretations of state behaviour

Insights from Africa can also be gained by probing how African states behave in ways different from state behaviour as it is usually explained in IR. This, in turn, can assist us in not only better understanding the IR of Africa, but also potentially of other parts of the world.

The tendency of African states to stand united in the face of international criticism of one of their number continues to puzzle analysts. One need only think of African leaders' unwillingness to publicly criticize Robert Mugabe's human rights abuses, or more recent refusals to honour commitments to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and cooperate in the arrest of Sudanese President al-Bashir. Thomas Kwasi Tieku's chapter in this book elaborates on this solidarity norm, which he argues is based on Africa's embedded understanding of the person. He contends that the state needs to be reconceptualized in a societal way, and that this will be relevant not only to understanding Africa, but also the tendency in the rest of the developing world to form groups such as the G77. In a related argument, Mahmud (2001) uses the cases of Nigeria and Libya to question the accepted notion in traditional IR theory that the most powerful states should be able to influence the behaviour of weaker states through the instrument of sanctions. He argues that the failure of sanctions to change the behaviour of Libya and Nigeria can be found in

factors generally ignored in mainstream IR theory, namely 'ideologies, the nature of inter-state/cultural interactions, and a type of diplomacy of solidarity' (2001, p. 130).

Another way in which the behaviour and interests of African states appear to differ from the 'common sense' we have come to associate with how states operate is African leaders' apparent prioritizing of regime survival. This runs counter to the generally accepted foundation of traditional IR theory, namely survival of the state and national interest. According to Clark (2001, pp. 91–92),

> The concept of national interest fails patently in Africa, for at least two reasons. First, as we all know, there are no real national states in Africa; rather, the continent's states, largely defined territorially in Europe, contain some variety of different ethnic peoples (or clans) who do *not* conceive of themselves as a nation. As a result, the leaders of African states are as likely to be pursuing sub-national (ethnic) interests as they are the state-wide interests of their populations. (emphasis in the original)

One could argue that it is often the perceptions by part or parts of the population that its/their interests are being overlooked in favour of another group's interests that lead to much of the violent conflict seen in Africa. In trying to understand why African state leaders sometimes intervene and sometimes don't in one another's affairs, and why leaders of African states have consistently sought sponsorship from powerful states and other actors in the international system (such as international financial institutions, IFIs), Clark concludes that the concept of regime security appears to be particularly useful (2001, p. 94). The argument is that the behaviour of African states, or of their leaders in particular, can be better understood in terms of regime survival rather than the widely accepted (in IR theory, at least) notion of state survival. It would thus seem that many of the IR of African states can be understood in terms of regime security or, put differently, of maintaining political power.

We also see that, in terms of state behaviour, personal and regional diplomacy play a significant role. The conclusion appears to be that African IR is much more personalized, a lesson that may apply elsewhere. Given the USA's foreign policy during the previous administration, many commentators speculated whether action was taken on the basis of the USA's national interest, or whether the personal convictions of influential people within the administration outweighed such 'traditional' considerations.

These examples show how African states do not always behave in the rational, predictable way assumed by mainstream IR theories, and how mainstream as well as Marxist-inspired theories (the latter often thought to be of greater relevance to Africa) underplay the agency of weaker states. However, the implication is not that African states are the only ones that behave in ways inexplicable to mainstream IR theories: once again African contributions may also provide insights into the seemingly irrational behaviour of Western states.

Another area where the African experience could contribute to our understanding of IR is regional integration. Regional integration efforts in the global South are usually compared with the Northern (read European Union) model of integration. Shaw (in an interview with Schouten, 2008) emphasizes that observers, by focusing only on the formal aspects of regional integration in Africa, overlook the crucial informal dimensions. The latter, which include cross-border networks involving a range of actors, are essential to understanding how regional integration works, not only in Africa but in other parts of the world as well. Drawing on West Africa as an example, Iheduru (2007) explores so-called 'transnational mixed actor coalitions' in highlighting the ever-expanding role played by non-state actors and civil society, especially in establishing new patterns of regional interaction, creating shared norms and impacting various regional governance issues. Some of the innovative developments evident in the region include the tendency of regional activist groups to form alliances with both inter-governmental organizations and governments. Another trend is the rise of sub-regional coalitions of organized private sector groups such as the West African Enterprise Network (WAEN). These are increasingly influencing regional decision-making processes, setting norms for regional practice and engendering new forms of regional cultural identity (Iheduru, 2007, pp. 15–19). He claims that these African trends contain important lessons for our understanding of IR on the grounds that these mixed-actor coalitions not only constitute novel strategies for influencing policy, but 'are also laying the groundwork for transforming the terms and nature of the debate' (2007, p. 7).

Venturing beyond disciplinary boundaries

Based on the notion that African IR take place outside the constraints of state-centrism, it is clear that we need to look beyond the traditional boundaries of the field in identifying contributions from Africa to IR. Much has been written in Africa about issues of great importance to the study of IR. Most of this work is, however, not within the

narrow confines of IR and would thus not be regarded as African con- tributions to the field. Answering the question of what African scholars have contributed to IR greatly depends on what criteria we use to define 'contributions' and 'IR'.

Following Smith (2002), several scholars have lamented the fact that power relations play an important role in determining what are regarded as legitimate concerns for IR. Challenging these boundaries is an impor- tant way of broadening the field to include insights from previously marginalized voices. This entails looking towards other academic fields such as sociology, anthropology, philosophy, development studies and so forth, but also breaking out of the confines of what is regarded as academia. Any attempt to understand the development of politi- cal thought in Africa (in relation to the international) cannot ignore the contributions of African statesmen such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, or writers such as Ngugi and Achebe. In addition, popu- lar culture has always been a vehicle for political statements. We need to explore how Africans express their views of the international through, for example, music and art. New forms of media open up a host of potential sources.[3] How, for example, are social networking sites such as Facebook impacting the ways in which African youth (at least those with access to the Internet) interact with each other and the world? Today, millions of people share their opinions on a range of issues with a global audience via blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other online media. The online activism during and following the elections in Iraq in 2010, for example, provided unprecedented insights into the political views of ordinary Iraqis. It is worth tapping into these sites, which increas- ing numbers of analysts are starting to take seriously in terms of their potential political and normative implications.[4]

This brings us to the lessons IR should be learning from the lived experiences of ordinary Africans. This is particularly important in view of the fact that IR as a discipline generally seems far removed from the realities of daily life. Basing their argument on philosophers such as Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Habermas, scholars such as Tickner (2003a, 2005) argue that knowledge of the world is largely a product of everyday experience. Based on the challenges faced or perceived daily, different questions are asked and different topics prioritized. For exam- ple, to ordinary people, especially those in the global South, the IR issues still regarded as important, such as nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism (in other words, those issues in the national interest of the great powers), are much less important than poverty, crime, conflict and access to scarce resources, including water. As Tickner (2005, p. 8) notes,

'it is precisely the experience of exploitation and marginality that allows certain social actors to tap into questions and issues that are deemed insignificant within dominant practices and discourses'. For this reason, it is essential to look beyond the narrow confines of scholarly work at the lived experiences of ordinary people, and to those working at the grassroots level (for example, in NGOs) to enhance our understanding of the reality of IR. On a related note, Castells (2009) suggests that the rich countries of the North can learn much from Africa about how to deal with the results of the current global financial crisis – in other words, how to cope with being poor.

As noted above, drawing on ideas and concepts from other fields is one way the boundaries of a field can be expanded. If one thinks, for example, of how terms from sociology or economics have found their way into IR, it is clear that such assimilations are important to expanding the scope of a discipline. In the same way, we can look to Africa for concepts that may provide new insights into our study of IR. The principle of *ubuntu* provides one such possibility. Essentially an indigenous world view referring to the notion of 'collective personhood' or, in the words of Archbishop Tutu, 'the very essence of being human', *ubuntu* may tell us something of how Southern Africans view the international community, and the responsibilities of citizens and states towards one another. It could also shed light on how African states engage with the international, including each other. For example, the displays of solidarity by African states mentioned earlier could be explained on the basis of *ubuntu*.

Perhaps most importantly, this concept could refocus attention on the role of morality in IR. The fact that IR has become virtually devoid of concern for humanity is one of the major shortcomings of the field as it is currently practised. This apparent gulf between IR and the very real problems facing the majority of the world's people has elicited expressions of concern by a number of scholars. This points to perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Africa, a lesson that goes beyond ontology, epistemology and conceptualization. It is a lesson about adopting a much more normative focus than that advanced in most IR textbooks.

This is not to imply that African stories are of themselves morally superior: that would entail turning a blind eye to the way in which various African actors themselves engage in marginalization and domination. Just as Africa as a continent is marginalized in IR, so various actors in Africa are marginalized and have limited access to knowledge-production on the basis of gender, class, ethnicity and so forth. In the

same way, while one may criticize the notion of *ubuntu* for its utopianism, especially in the African context (the harsh reality of which this chapter by no means wishes to romanticize), this does not nullify its potential to contribute to our understanding of IR. It is, however, precisely the *problems* facing Africa – the poverty, the conflict, the disease – that tell very powerful stories which IR scholars should heed.

Of course, calls for reprioritization within the field of IR are not new, and have been made by, among others, critical IR scholars. However, as Murphy laments, critical IR scholars, too, have failed in their quest to make IR more relevant:

> The critical turn in IR promised . . . an empathetic understanding of those we study . . . The promise of which has not been fulfilled because the research strategies of critical theorists have rarely given them direct access to the understandings of those outside the privileged core of world society. (Murphy, 2007, p. 117)

He goes on to express concern over the failures of IR scholars to engage in scholarship that, in the words of Nick Wheeler (quoted in Vale, 2001, p. 29), 'places human suffering at the centre of its theoretical project'.

Conclusion

In sum, contributions from Africa are important not only because they can help us make sense of the African situation (which existing theories clearly cannot) but also because they can shed light on the IR of other parts of the world. Drawing on African case studies could also contribute to the identification of trends and patterns that could assist in inductive theory-building, something that IR, with its focus on the systemic, generally avoids. Perhaps most importantly, however, reflection on the African situation can reinject a sense of morality into the study of IR.

Having explored possible African contributions to IR, the question that inevitably follows is how these contributions can be incorporated into IR. The responsibility for enabling African voices to be heard lies both with the IR community in the North and with African IR scholars. Crucially, the latter have a duty to question the manner in which they practise their craft. Cutajar (2008, p. 35) notes that many Third World scholars:

> …write a text with the premise that we are addressing a First World audience…we write in English, use First World concepts, methodologies and epistemologies…Some subalterns fail to engage seriously with urgent issues pertinent to the societies in which they are located since their primary objective might be to gain entry into Western academe…

Much has been written about the exclusionary practices of the core of the IR community. At the same time, a number of efforts are being made to engage with scholarship from the periphery. A significant onus therefore lies with African scholars to examine how they go about researching and teaching IR, what sources they rely on, and to think outside the disciplinary box to uncover previously overlooked contributions that the continent can make towards the development of the field and, ultimately, an improved understanding of the world.

Notes

1. Some of these include Neuman (1998), Aydinli and Mathews (2000), Dunn and Shaw (2001), Nkiwane (2001a), Thomas and Wilkin (2004) and Lavelle (2005).
2. Also see a recent book on the topic edited by Jideofor Adibe (2009).
3. Thank you to Tim Shaw for drawing my attention to this.
4. See, for example, Drezner and Farrell (2008).

3
Collectivist Worldview: Its Challenge to International Relations

Thomas Kwasi Tieku

Introduction

This chapter unpacks individualist and collectivist worldviews in social science scholarship to show that many scholars in the English-speaking international relations (IR) community look at the world through the prism of individualism, which usually renders unheard the international experiences and voices of people in the global South. The neglect in IR theories and discourse of experiences and voices of the invisible majority undercuts our ability to gain a comprehensive understanding of global life. Key collectivist features of Africa's IR are critically examined in the chapter and their ontological origins traced. The suggestion is that taking these collectivist features seriously and incorporating them into the analytical toolkits of IR would better enable scholars to gain a broader and deeper understanding of international affairs.

The failure of IR theory to account for the international life of global Southerners is a major weakness of these supposedly global theories, which, in fact, reflect the experiences and practices of a few state officials, transnational elites and organizations mainly in North America, Western Europe and some Asian states. These actions, voices and experiences are critical aspects of international affairs, and the numerous works that have examined them have enhanced our understanding of the IR of great powers and states in the advanced industrialized world. However, they do not constitute the entirety of global life, a more comprehensive account of which would incorporate the experiences and practices of global Southerners and the non-elites of the North. Yet,

the experiences and voices of these people are conspicuously absent in major IR discourses and theories.

This neglect has serious consequences not only for scholarship but also for real life, as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA taught us. In spite of this, the IR field remains ontologically narrow and methodologically elitist. The EU alone still takes up more space in leading IR journals and books than the international life of Africans, Latin Americans, Caribbeans and South Asians combined (Buzan and Acharya, 2007; Haklai, 2009; Sondhi, 2006; Tickner, 2003a).

The marginalization of the experiences and voices of Africans in IR scholarship is particularly acute. This neglect is interesting, in part because Africa has served as a major laboratory for the development and enhancement of and theorization about major disciplines in the social sciences and humanities (Bates et al., 1993; Zeleza, 2006b). As Bates et al. put it, 'Africa has shaped – and will shape – major fields of knowledge...Research in Africa has shaped the disciplines and thereby shaped our convictions as to what may be universally true' (1993, pp. xi–xiv). Moreover, Africa's diversity offers an escape from the many analytical, conceptual and empirical challenges facing the IR field. Taking African IR seriously can, at a minimum, help IR scholars avoid circular reasoning: that is, testing theories against the very historical cases from which they were extrapolated. As Moravcsik (1998) insightfully noted, circular reasoning is endemic in IR scholarship. So why does Africa remain marginalized, and why are African experiences and events deemed intellectually insignificant in the IR community?

A major reason is the widespread use of individualist ontology to study global issues.[1] This worldview projects the practices and experiences of political elites in North America, Western Europe and, to an extent, Asia, while simultaneously peripheralizing experiences and practices of collective international life common outside the industrialized world, such as consensual decision-making. The individualist worldview normally renders invisible the significance of international practices and experiences of Africans, who usually lean more towards collectivist international life.

The rest of the chapter falls into three sections. The first outlines individualist and collectivist worldviews in social science and humanities scholarship in the English-speaking world, giving particular attention to the application of the worldviews to global life in general and to inter-state politics in particular. The second traces the ontological origins of

collective traits in the African international system and explains their emergence and influence in the African international system. The final section provides a summary.

Individualist worldview and international relations scholarship

Global life can be examined through several lenses, yet many IR scholars in English-speaking countries tend to employ the individualist worldview. This sees persons as autonomous, self-bounded and independent of one another (Baumeister, 1998; Oyserman and Markus, 1993; Triandis, 2001). It also emphasizes the private self over group identity; accentuates the differentness and uniqueness of persons; prioritizes personal goals over group objectives; cherishes personal success more than group achievements; and, finally, gives higher priority to personal interests than to in-group interests (Hsu, 1983; Kagitcibasi, 1994; Kim, 1994; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Persons are conceptualized as atomistic beings, usually by rationalists, or as socially situated, often by social constructivists. Either way, those who employ the individualist worldview tend to assume that persons operate independently of their social entities, and that the individual's main goals are to cultivate and express his/her uniqueness (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Oyserman, 1993). As Oyserman et al. (2002, p. 3) note, all major studies of this genre 'conceptualize individualism as a worldview that centralizes the personal – personal goals, personal uniqueness, and personal control – and peripheralizes the social'.

The individualist worldview sees the state, like the person, as an independent entity endowed with sovereign rationalities, identities, interests, preferences and beliefs (Wendt, 2004). The behaviour of states in world affairs is governed either by the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequences (March and Olsen, 1998). For the rationalist, states are independent, egoistical beings that rely on the 'means-end logic of consequences' to maximize clearly defined material interests (Risse-Kappen, 1996), usually defined in power and economic terms. The goals may include enhancement of state power (Grieco, 1995), economic incentives for commercial groups (Moravcsik, 1998), security guarantees (Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Wallace, 1996), protection from external threats and pressures (Milward, 1984) and safeguards against the burdens of economic interdependence (Frieden, 1994; Goodman, 1992; Sandhotz, 1993). For the social constructivist, states are independent entities that possess distinct identities, whose actions are driven largely by well-established ideas (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993;

Hall, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Marcussen, 2000; McNamara, 1998; Parson, 2002).

Individualist worldview of interstate politics

Scholars favouring the individualist worldview employ utilitarian or social constructivist approaches and, to an extent, a combination of the two to explain the outcome of interstate politics. Those adopting the utilitarian approach generally agree that the outcomes of interstate politics reflect the interests or preferences of the most powerful government(s).[2] The reason is that powerful governments usually use coercive measures such as threats, side-payments, rewards or punishments, sometimes in combination, to induce smaller governments to accept, comply with or acquiesce in a particular outcome the powerful governments think will advance their material interests.

The argument of utilitarian IR scholars is based on the assumption that state representatives (governments) have similar preferences for material concerns, such as maintenance of territorial independence, security guarantees, military power, international prestige and economic domination (Grieco, 1995; Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Hoffmann, 1989; Lake, 1993; Moravcsik, 1997; Walt, 1987). These preferences are almost fixed, and the goal of every government is to achieve the optimal outcome for their material interests. To ensure that their states maximize their preferences, governments engage in cost–benefit analysis. Since governments are utility maximizers, they always choose the option that provides the optimal means to these material ends. Thus, governments are efficient choosers that make decisions through careful calculation and examination of different lines of action. In a technical sense, governments are *homo economicus* and enter into international negotiation primarily to maximize their utility.

Governments, however, recognize that their states do not exist in isolation. As a result, they pursue their material interests by considering the environment in which their states operate (Gilpin, 1982; Keohane, 1984; Waltz, 1979). The structural properties most utilitarian scholars find useful are international anarchy (the absence of centralized international government), global market competition and transnational economic processes. Based on these insights, many rational-choice theorists suggest that theoretical analysis of motivations for governments' actions in interstate politics should begin with the examination of international configurations of powers, actors and institutions (Hurrell, 1995; Mearsheimer, 1990).

There is disagreement in the literature over the exact material inter-ests (that is, the utility) that governments seek to maximize in interstate politics. While some theorists believe the quest for military power is the key motivator, others emphasize economic interests. This disagree-ment has led to three major lines of theorizing. These are rational state-power theories (the realist family – neo-realism, regime theory, hegemonic stability theory and voice opportunity theory) (Grieco, 1988); economic interests theories (the liberal family – neoliberal insti-tutionalism, transnational theory and pluralist domestic interests the-ory) (Caporaso, 1992; Pierson, 1996; Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998); and preference convergence theory (Moravcsik, 1997), or what some call liberal intergovernmental theory.[3]

Social constructivist individualist IR scholars tend to explain the outcome of interstate politics in terms of persuasion. According to these scholars, governments seek 'reasoned consensus' in interstate pol-itics (Müller, 2004; Risse, 2000). As a result, in any interstate political game, governments first challenge the inherent validity of the other's claims. Second, they seek communicative consensus and understanding, rather than exchanging information on the basis of fixed preferences or making promises, or providing material incentives, side payments, manipulating others or making threats. Most officials employ these approaches mainly because they know their counterparts can and will be persuaded by the better argument. For social constructivists, therefore, political outcomes reflect the positions of governments that succeed in convincing others to abandon formerly held views by providing information that discredits them (Avdeyeva, 2008; Goodman and Jinks, 2004), or that introduce new information that makes other governments accept new norms, or that provide new ideas that trigger normative and behavioural changes in other governments (Checkel, 1998; Finnemore, 1996). Persuasion, however, requires entrepreneurial leadership to have meaningful impact. Some constructivist scholars have identified a few heroic bureaucrats and transnational groups as key drivers (Checkel, 2003; Finnemore, 1996; McNamara, 1998). Other theorists, such as Adler and Haas, suggest that epistemic communities are the most critical agents of persuasion (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse et al., 1999; Wapner, 1995).

Collectivist worldview of interstate politics

While the huge body of knowledge produced from the individualist per-spective has enhanced understanding of the IR of great powers and

states in the advanced industrialized world, it has undermined our understanding of the international politics of collectivist social entities, such as those in Africa. In collectivist societies, persons and states are not independent entities. Rather, they are 'integral members of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity' (Okere, 1984, p. 48; Riesman, 1986). The reason for this is that collectivist cultures prioritize the social over the personal and group preferences over individual interests and goals. In addition, they peripheralize differentness, as well as uniqueness (Hofstede, 1980; Hsu, 1983; Kim, 1994; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et al., 2002). In such cultures, individuals are deemed interdependent, and their self is assumed to be inextricably linked with the selves of others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis, 1995).

The key identity markers in collectivist societies are group membership and obligations. As a consequence, these societies cherish group harmony and public displays of unity by members of the in-group, however shallow that harmony might be in private. African societies exhibit many features of collectivist cultures, as those who have closely studied the person in Africa have noted. The root of collectivist social life on the continent is to be found in the Bantu approach to life, wittily expressed in the saying that 'humans are humans because of other humans'. In the view of Stagner (1961, p. 184), many indigenous Africans 'show practically no self-awareness'. Vaunne and Schoeneman (1997, p. 263) suggest that the 'individual in a traditional African society does not aim to master himself or other things but instead aims to accept a life of harmony with other individuals. The ideal of life to the . . . African is correct behaviors and relationships to other people'. For several Africans, including Léopold Sédar Senghor, the Senegalese poet and former national president, and Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, this collective idea forms the bedrock of the African worldview (Oguejiofor, 2009; Senghor, 1971), which is apparent throughout the continent.

It is certainly true that formal education has removed some collectivist traits from African political life, and made some political elites surrender part of the collectivist behavioural persona. Indeed, almost all African political elites show some form of self-awareness and self-interest. Nonetheless, strong remnants of collectivist cultural practices, mediated by social context and interactions, still dictate African social and political life in different ways, both positive and negative.

At the domestic state level, such practices encourage sharing and strong family, ethnic and religious ties. On the other hand, they also promote exclusion of the out-group and generate political clientelism

as many writers and visitors to Africa have observed. In the view of Polish traveller and writer Ryszard Kapuscinki (2001, p. 29), 'African tradition is collectivist...And one of the conditions of collective survival is the sharing of the smallest thing'. However, as a former World Bank and Canadian diplomat noted, 'there is a darker side to the African character', as group loyalty is often tyrannous (Calderisi, 2006, p. 83). Anyone who breaks in-group social convention is ruthlessly punished and ostracized. At the international level, Africa's collectivist outlook has encouraged consensual decision-making, fostered group-think and generated the powerful Pan-African solidarity norm in the African international system. African ruling elites engage in group-think and consensual decision-making primarily because they do not see themselves as independent, atomistic, isolated and abstract entities, or think they just *have* relations with each other. Rather, they think they *are* relations (Piot, 1999). In other words, they think and behave in relational terms. As a consequence, since independence many African ruling elites have prioritized group preferences over the specific interests of the states they represent, and have usually prioritized group harmony and solidarity when dealing with each other at the international level. These priorities have led to a widespread current belief among African ruling elites that the proper and ethical behaviour for them is demonstrating oneness and support towards other Africans, at least in public. This 'we-ness,' or public show of support, goes 'beyond the merely rhetorical' to impose 'on African rulers a sense that, at any rate, they ought to act in harmony' (Clapham, 1996a, p. 106; Mazrui, 1963, 1967). The solidarity norm not only discourages African leaders from disagreeing in public but also puts 'pressure on the rulers of individual African states not to step out of line over issues where a broad continental consensus had been established' (Clapham, 1996a, pp. 106–07).

The norm was applied so strictly in the early days of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) that it was almost a taboo for African elites to disagree even on policy issues. Public disagreement was seen as un-African. A classic case occurred in July 1964 when a group of foreign ministers evinced strong opposition to Ghana's Africa unity proposal submitted to the second session of council of ministers held in Cairo. Their opposition was dubbed un-African and the Tunisian foreign minister, Ali Amer, complained that the disagreement undermined the spirit and letter of the Pan-African solidarity norm. He claimed: 'we speak of solidarity...[when we show] a feeling of *tolerance and support toward each one of us*...[when we support an African state] if we find that [the country in question is] in conflict or in difficulties with a

country outside of Africa' (OAU, 1964; Thompson and Zartman, 1975) (my emphasis).

This norm still exercises considerable influence over African political leaders, at least at the interstate level. The most recent illustration of its enduring power is the African Union's unanimous support for President Omar al-Bashir at the summit in Sirte in July 2009. The organization asked member-states not to execute the International Criminal Court's warrant for the Sudanese president's arrest, claiming that its request to the Security Council for the warrant's suspension had been ignored.[4]

Where did the ideas associated with Africa's collectivist worldview come from, when did they become part of Africa's international system and what were they designed to achieve? The formal introduction of consensual decision-making into Africa's international system dates back to the 1950s. Consensus was employed to make decisions at the interstate level during the first All-African Peoples' Conference (APC), held in Accra from 8 to 13 December 1958 and attended by more than 300 political and trade union leaders representing about 20 million Africans in 30 countries.[5] The delegates felt that the African way was to adopt resolutions based on consensus rather than on voting (Johnson, 1962), including the key resolution that the international boundaries separating African states are 'artificial frontiers . . . [that] operate to the detriment of Africans and should therefore be abolished or adjusted' (cited in Encyclopedia of African History, 2004; Legum, 1962, pp. 228–32). Delegates may have been influenced in part by the widespread view at the time that voting was a European and colonial practice and in part by the fact that many of the authentic chieftaincy institutions which existed at the time operated primarily on the basis of consensus.

The consensus-based approach was also adopted by the two ideational groups of African states that emerged in the early 1960s, unimaginatively dubbed the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups in African studies literature. To demonstrate that their group was more African than the other, each group adopted consensus as part of their mode of operation and actually practised it in a strict way. Both groups engaged in elaborate consultations prior to meetings, and there is no evidence that members of either group ever voted during their meetings. Both groups took consensual decision-making to the summit of independent African states held between 14 and 24 June 1960. Indeed, delegates to this conference formally agreed to institutionalize the approach. The annual OAU summits that replaced the conference adopted it, even though the OAU's founding charter, developed originally by Ambassador Truco, Chile's

representative to the Organization of American States, proposed voting-based decision-making procedures (Padelford, 1964, p. 526). Truco's proposal was neither rejected nor deleted from OAU/AU documents, but it is rarely used, and then mainly for non-consequential decisions, such as procedural matters for meetings of African states. Since the 1960s, and particularly since the formation of the OAU, all key IR decisions by African states have been based on consensus.

The group-think approach was formally introduced into the African international system by the Francophone group of states. These states, led by Côte d'Ivoire's Félix Houphouët-Boigny, began a series of consultations between 1960 and 1963, with a view to promoting closer links among themselves and to coordinating their relations with France.[6] To this end, they agreed to coordinate foreign policies, promote strong cultural ties and established an economic community, Organisation Africaine et Melagache de Cooperation Economique (OAMCE), with its secretariat in Yaoundé, Cameroon. They also agreed to merge their air transport systems into Air Afrique, based in Abidjan. These states later consolidated all the decisions they had made into a single legal instrument, the Charter of African States and Malagasy Union. The charter reinforced the Westphalian state system, but provided space for member-states to pool their security, economic and foreign affairs, and harmonize their policies towards France. Union member-states were required to coordinate their positions on interstate matters and adopt a common position in multilateral forums.

Group-think among some African states was also promoted with the formation of the Ghana–Guinea Union on 1 May 1959, after a series of consultations between Ghana's Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's President Sékou Touré. In a public statement, the two leaders announced that they 'have agreed to constitute [the] two states as a nucleus of a Union of West African States' (*Daily Graphic*, 2 May 1959). In the Conakry Declaration of 1 May 1959, the leaders deferred discussion of 'the portion of sovereignty [that] shall be surrendered to the Union in the full interests of the African community', but agreed 'that . . . nationals of the states or federations which are members of the Union will have a Union citizenship'. Citizens of the union required no visas to travel from one member-state to the other, and the Ghanaian representative in Guinea was invited to join Guinea's cabinet, and vice versa. The declaration made provision for other independent African states to join. Though the leaders never managed to translate into practice the overly ambitious objectives set out in the Conakry Declaration, it did enhance the ability of their governments to make common

cause on major African and international issues. Until the overthrow of Nkrumah in February 1966, Ghana and Guinea worked closely together and took common positions on almost all important interstate issues in Africa.

The death of Patrice Lumumba of Congo in January 1961, apparently orchestrated by Belgium and the USA, brought together Ghana, Egypt, Guinea, Libya, Mali and Morocco, which henceforth coordinated aspects of their foreign policy and adopted a common stand on those issues in multilateral meetings. At a conference on the Congo crisis held in January 1961, the six states developed the African Charter of Casablanca, which provided for an intergovernmental agency in the form of a permanent African Consultative Assembly. The assembly was empowered to encourage what became known among observers as the Casablanca group of six states to coordinate their IR and develop common positions on important international issues. Ghana, Guinea and Mali took their relations more seriously than the others and decided in April 1961 to create the Union of African States as the nucleus of the United States of Africa. While the union never materialized, the leaders of the three states did coordinate their foreign policies and their positions on key international issues and did take common stands at summits of African states.

The Pan-African solidarity norm was introduced into and embedded in the African interstate system during the first OAU Council of Ministers session, held in Lagos in 1963 (Thompson and Zartman, 1975, pp. 10–11). The norm was intended to address three concerns. First, it was to prevent African leaders from criticizing each other in public. This decision was motivated by the public spat between Liberia's William Tubman and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah on the issue of African unity. The acrimony climaxed when the Liberian ambassador to Ghana lodged a protest against Nkrumah's suggestion in a speech in India that joining the Ghana–Guinea union would be in Liberia's best interests. In his protest, the ambassador emphatically and perhaps undiplomatically asserted that 'his government had never attributed to Ghana's government either the ability or the capability to determine better than the Liberian Government . . . its best interests' (Thompson, 1969, p. 61). Council members felt that allowing similar disagreements to spill into the open would hamper the promotion of interstate relations among newly African independent states and the process of developing an African international system.

Second, Pan-African solidarity was introduced as an informal collective defence mechanism. The norm would fill the void left by the

absence of formal continent-wide security and collective defence pacts or agreements at the time. The norm would also encourage African states to treat an attack on one of their number by a non-African state as an attack on all African states, and would impose an obligation on African states to support each other and join forces in fighting external enemies and powers. The council's move to fashion this informal collective defence umbrella was perhaps sensible and unsurprising, given that no independent African state had the wherewithal to defend itself against serious external aggression and that many governments were looking for help in defending their new, and hard-won, independence.

Third, the Pan-African solidarity norm was adopted to prevent a repeat of the processes and conditions that led to the failure of the conference of African states held in Addis Ababa in June 1960. The conference had been mainly convened to reconcile the differences that had emerged among newly independent African states on the nature of their relations with one another. Ghana and Guinea favoured federated relations and intended the Ghana–Guinea union to serve as the nucleus of the federation. The other states wanted to retain their independence and Tubman, in response to the Ghana–Guinea union, proposed the creation of the Associated States of Africa. Unlike the Ghana–Guinea union's proposal, Tubman called for an intergovernmental association of independent states based on a convention of friendship and commercial interests. Not only was his plan carefully designed to preserve the sovereignty of member-states, but it also stressed that the institutions developed to manage the friendship would promote national sovereignty and the identity of individual member-states. Not surprisingly, there 'was a broad agreement . . . between Ghanaian civil servants and politicians that Liberia was the greatest obstacle' to the United States of Africa project, and a way had to be found 'to get him [Tubman] to bend' (Thompson, 1969, p. 91).

Tubman circulated his plan to the African group at the UN for consideration, consulted with other like-minded African leaders on the issue, and then, on 7 April 1959, invited Nkrumah and Touré to a meeting in Sanniquellie, Liberia. He convened the meeting, as Immanuel Wallerstein notes (1967, p. 37), to prevent Nkrumah from teaming up with other African leaders to erect 'new structures with supranational powers'. The Ghana delegation accepted the invitation because they thought they would be able to persuade Tubman to join the Ghana–Guinea union. Because of Tubman's firm statist beliefs and Nkrumah's strong commitment to the United States of Africa project, many observers expected nothing from the meeting. Notwithstanding

Nkrumah and Tubman's differences, which prompted Sékou Touré to tell the two leaders that 'African unity cannot wait on...[their] disagreements', the three leaders unexpectedly reached a compromise (Thompson, 1969, p. 74; Woronoff, 1970, p. 74), by agreeing to hold a:

> Conference in 1960 of all independent States of Africa as well as non-independent States which have fixed dates on which they will achieve independence to discuss and work out a Charter which will achieve their ultimate goal of unity between independent African states. (cited in Legum, 1962)

Borrowing ideas from the Ghana–Guinea project, the declaration suggested the conference would explore ways to develop a 'community of independent African States' with the aim of promoting 'Freedom, Unity, the African personality', as well as independence and the interests of African peoples. The declaration also suggested that the community could include councils for economics, culture and for science and research. But it also included a distinctive Tubman caveat: 'each member of the Community accepts the principle that it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any member [and] each member of the Community shall maintain its own national identity and constitutional structure.'

The agreement was, however, short-lived, since Ghanaian and Liberian officials had different understandings of its content. While the former felt it provided a basis for political union, the latter thought it envisaged a loose intergovernmental organization. The misunderstandings became more evident when the foreign ministers of Liberia and Ghana presented the Sanniquellie agreement at the conference of African states in Addis Ababa (Legum, 1962, p. 46), with each making a presentation reflecting the view of his respective government.

In the opinion of Ghana's Foreign Minister Ako Adjei, it was 'clear from the declaration of principles that the Union of African States which the three leaders discussed and agreed upon [at the Sanniquellie meeting]...[was] intended to be a political Union' (Legum, 1962, p. 93). However, it was obvious from the contributions of other delegates that 'Tubman's idea of the association of states...[was] more acceptable' to the majority of countries (Thompson and Zartman, 1975).[7] Even so, the Ghanaian, Guinean and, to an extent, Tunisian delegations insisted that their interpretation of the Sanniquellie agreement was accurate and that a committee of experts be set up to work out the details of the union.

This relentless defence by the continental union group encouraged other statists besides Liberia to be more frank in their opinions. The head

of the Nigerian delegation, Yussuf Maitima Sule, was particularly candid in expressing his country's opposition: 'the idea of forming a Union of African States is premature...too radical – perhaps too ambitious – to be of lasting benefit' (Thompson and Zartman, 1975). The split between Liberia and Nigeria on the one hand, and Ghana and Guinea on the other hand, meant that the meeting ended without any concrete agreement. Indeed, many observers thought another meeting of African states on the issue was unlikely in the near future.

The failure of this conference led Tubman to invite leaders of independent states opposed to the United States of Africa idea to a conference in Monrovia in May 1961. The 12 francophone countries comprising OAMCE attended along with eight others. Delegates agreed in principle to establish the Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States (OIMS) to govern the interstate affairs of member-states. The OIMS agreement tried to reconcile the OAMCE members' desire to promote interdependence among themselves with the wish of the outright statists, such as Liberia, to retain the core sovereign prerogatives of states.

Subsequent to the meeting in Monrovia, the participating countries, the so-called Monrovia group, engaged in regular consultations and held their own conferences independent of the Casablanca group. Neither group attended the summits of the other, and the emergence of the two groups was considered unhealthy for African politics. The result was that the Pan-African solidarity norm was later adopted to prevent similar occurrences in the future.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to show that collectivist features are at the heart of Africa's international system. They shape interstate politics by inducing African politicians to prioritize group preferences over the specific interests of states and by influencing African leaders to seek consensus in major interstate decisions. The collectivist practices have also generated the powerful Pan-African solidarity norm, which regulates African politics by circumscribing interstate discussions, formulating principles of acceptable political behaviour and pressuring African politicians not to step out of line over issues commanding broad consensus.

The chapter also shows that the ontological origins of these collectivist ideas and practices in interstate politics in Africa derive from the socially constructed cultural practices and interactions of the indigenous people of Africa, reflected in the Bantu dictum that 'humans are

humans because of other humans'. Africa's collectivist ideas and practices have undergone various transformations and their existence in the present politics of Africa has been mediated and shaped by historical process, events and social interactions. Yet, their basic features remain intact.

The three collectivist features highlighted in the chapter were introduced into the African international system in the 1950s and 1960s to enhance interstate relations in Africa. Consensual decision-making was used first in the African international system by civil society groups during the All-African People's Congress in 1958. It was then adopted by African leaders and embedded in international institutions when the OAU was created in 1963. Attempts by French-speaking African states and Madagascar to coordinate their international policies during the Congo crisis, as well as the efforts of Ghana, Guinea and Mali to promote the integration of African states, led to the emergence and institutionalization of group-think in Africa's international system. The Pan-African solidarity norm was developed and integrated into the African interstate system at the first session of OAU council of ministers in 1963.

However, collectivist ideas and practices are neither peculiar to Africa nor absent from the broader international system. Collectivist traits are in fact ubiquitous in international affairs. Their omission from the analytical tools of IR has impoverished our understanding of the IR of states in the global South and of non-elites in the global North. Extant IR works provide little, if any, insight into the international affairs of states that consider themselves as being inextricably linked to the selves of others, or into international episodes in which actors prioritize the social over the personal, and where group preferences take precedence over individual state interests. Thus, including collectivist ideas in the analytical toolkits of IR would not only enhance our understanding of the international life of states in the global South, and Africa in particular, but it would also enable IR scholars to gain broader and deeper insights into international affairs in general.

Notes

1. There is no suggestion in this chapter that individualism is a 'Western' or global Northern practice and that collectivist practices are confined to the global South. While it is true that formal education encourages individualist practices, and the academic community where most of the people who construct IR knowledge are located promotes individualism, the general view of students of the two worldviews and informed observers is that both approaches are common in both locales. Just as there are many African

hard-core individualists, many people in the global North are embedded in a collectivist cultural milieu.

2. For an elaboration of the approach, see Moravcsik (1998).

3. I have omitted functionalism/neo-functionalism and its spillover hypothesis, because the theory primarily seeks to understand increases in supranational authority, not explain the outcomes of interstate negotiation. Some IR scholars have caricatured and manipulated the theory to make their case. I eliminated it from the review to avoid such an exercise.

4. A simplistic reading of the decision suggests that African leaders made the decision mindful that they could be the next al-Bashir. However, this does not explain why many leaders with clean hands, such as Ghana's John Mills, supported the move.

5. The delegates were drawn from Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and the United Arab Republic (Egypt), as well as the following dependent countries: Angola, Basutoland (Lesotho), Belgian Congo, British Cameroons, Chad, Dahomey, French Somaliland, French West Africa, Guinea, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (Malawi), Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia), Tanganyika (Tanzania), Togoland, Uganda and Zanzibar.

6. The group consisted of Cameroon, Dahomey (Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Central African Republic, Chad, Mauritania, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Congo (Brazzaville). The bulk of the literature refers to this group as the Brazzaville powers. They met for the first time in Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) in October 1960, then in Brazzaville in December 1960, in Yaoundé in March 1961 and in Tananarive in September 1961.

7. Besides Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia and a couple of delegations such as Libya and Egypt, whose positions on the issues were ambiguous, the rest of the delegates supported the statist project.

4
Authority, Sovereignty and Africa's Changing Regimes of Territorialization

Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen

Introduction

Authority in Africa is increasingly exercised beyond the state. Likewise, forms of sovereignty are practised in settings that are not territorialized as 'states'. In much of the continent after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, accelerated processes of globalization and the weak institutionalization of the post-independence state contributed to the demise of the state as the major regime of territorialization. Processes of deterritorialization – the unmaking of an established regime of territorialization such as the international order of (nation) states – have taken different forms: economic liberalization and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), the outsourcing of functional domains, violent contestation and so on. Different actors contribute to and participate in these processes, including Africa's political elites, multinational companies, 'informal' traders, warlords and their middlemen, the so-called community of states providing 'development assistance', imperial interventions such as the 'war on terror' regime and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). As a result, much of the continent is seeing the emergence of new regimes of territorialization, including reordered states, complex transnational regimes, subnational entities, new localities and transborder formations. From the perspective of the historicity of international relations (IR), parts of the African continent have entered a phase for which the outcome cannot yet be predicted.

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa's place in the international system, or the global order as it is often imagined, has been changing significantly. At a time when most scholars working in the political science

subdiscipline of IR are focused on globalization, the decline of a unipolar power structure dominated by the US, the rise of the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) (Broadman, 2007; Goldstein et al., 2006) as well as their implications for the West, parts of the African continent are showing signs of becoming a different global suborder.[1] In the past, conventional wisdom was that Africa's post-independence states were integrated into the international system by means of unequal exchange, as dependent clients of external patrons (Clapham, 1996a; Taylor and Williams, 2004). Although these states exercised only limited forms of sovereignty, mainly displayed signs of 'juridical statehood' (Jackson, 1990, 1992; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986), and were chiefly concerned with regime security (Engel and Olsen, 2005b, introduction), the debates in IR still focus on states as units of analysis.

This chapter argues that the strong focus on the state as a core, and often sole, unit of analysis may not be adequate in the current phase of dramatic global change. The nature of the state in Africa, and Africa's reintegration into the international system, have changed quite significantly during the years following the Cold War. Today, with authority in Africa increasingly exercised beyond the state, the meaning of sovereignty is changing. After 1989, Africa's reintegration and the weakness of post-independence states contributed to the demise of the state as the major regime of territorialization, through which all authority is seemingly exercised. Therefore, a process of deterritorialization is under way in Africa with new regimes of territoritalization emerging. The chapter discusses these recent developments and presents a new research agenda on the trajectories of Africa's reterritorialization.

The chapter also briefly summarizes the empirical observations that have led to the reassessment of the state in Africa and its place in the international system. It goes on to analyse the academic representations about these observations as produced in IR as well as in comparative politics on Africa. Third, it discusses a research perspective informed by the more recent rediscovery of space as an analytical category, with reference to new debates in New Political Geography and Global History.

Empirical observations

The nature and public perception of the state in Africa are changing. Authority and governance are increasingly exercised beyond the state,[2] and the locus of sovereignty is shifting. In much of the continent, where the post-independence state has been described as weak, processes of globalization have contributed to the decline of this state

as the dominant form of organizing people, both in terms of public, political and academic perception and real-world practice. In Africa, the neoliberal agenda, introduced through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and, later, their Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) regime, has led, for instance, to the outsourcing of functional domains of the state (such as harbour management, fiscal management or presidential security) or simply their neglect, with the result that other actors have taken over core functions such as the provision of basic public goods. Even at a more central level, the state has become an actor among others, an insight long discussed in anthropological or sociological research in relation to the local level (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997; von Trotha, 2000). In addition, the state has been further weakened by forms of violent contestation (Engel and Mehler, 2005). Recently the preoccupation of social science in the 1990s with violent processes in Africa has given way to a new focus on borders, borderlands and the translocal or transnational dynamics around those borders, implying that the state as a unit of analysis is losing some of its appeal to social science.[3] These political developments are most visible in the Horn of Africa, where the former state of Somalia has broken up into several entities. Some of these, such as Somaliland or Puntland, successfully claim to exercise *de facto* sovereignty over territory and people (although the borders between the two entities are disputed), but are not recognized in international law. New forms of local and sometimes translocal or transnational authority have also emerged in the borderlands of Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and in the eastern DR Congo, below the level of newly emerging 'statehood', and are in many ways more relevant to local people than the post-independence state.

These processes have prompted or have been accompanied by renewed external interest and interventions (Callaghy et al., 2001). Various actors contribute to and participate in these processes: multinational companies, 'donor' governments of the OECD world, UN systems and agencies, 'humanitarian' interventions, INGOs and so forth. They all interact with new or revived forms of 'African agency' (Chabal et al., 2007), such as informal trade as well as stock-listed African capital, the continent's rapidly growing cities, private military companies, warlords and their commercial middlemen, new religious movements, area boys, child soldiers. As a result, in parts of Africa, states have been reordered: transnational regimes have emerged to deal with HIV/AIDS, intellectual property rights, refugees, wildlife protection and the management of nature, sports and so on; subnational entities have gained strength,

and new localities have increasingly come to the fore. Africa is being 'respaced' (Engel and Nugent, 2009). As a consequence of these various activities and entanglements, the state in Africa has come under stress.

Academic representations

Academics have responded to these empirical observations by producing a broad range of paradigms. In addition, practitioners have responded to real-world developments and academic representations of them with a distinctive set of policy choices. According to most analyses by academics and practitioners, African states are 'declining' or 'failing'; so-called 'new wars' have emerged; and new forms of 'governance beyond the state' are in the making, which call for new political-cum-security strategies, such as containment and state reconstruction (Andersen, 2005). Recently, most of the empirical observations that inform this kind of analysis have been attributed to the specific nature of the state in Africa (which is said to differ fundamentally from that of other states) and the end of the Cold War, whose supposedly integrating effect on regimes and territories no longer works.

In fact, over the past decade the focus of academic debate on the African state has moved from the quality of stateness to its very existence, with mostly implicit consequences for Africa's place in the global order. Whereas in the 1980s and early 1990s the African state was assessed through qualifying adjectives, it is now imagined through the prism of different degrees of (non-)stateness (Clapham, 1998). Debates on 'quasi states' (Jackson, 1990, 1992; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986) or 'weak states' (Reno, 1997, 1998) are increasingly giving way to debates on processes of 'state collapse' (Allen, 1999; Mair, 1999; Zartman, 1995), 'state failure' (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999; Herbst, 1996; Wunsch and Olowu, 1990), 'state inversion' (Forrest, 1998), state 'dysfunctionality' and even 'state decay' (von Trotha, 2000) and so on (Boone, 1998; Joseph, 1999). The empirical evidence provided by such diverse cases as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia or DR Congo in the 1990s seems to warrant this way of discussing the African state: governments were challenged by armed groups and either lost control over large tracts of state territory or lost power altogether. In these cases, even claims to fulfil key state functions such as providing security were abandoned (Clapham, 1998; Dunn, 2001; Reno, 2004). Yet, we would claim the 'African' state as such has not failed. What clearly has failed is the postcolonial social construction and related academic imagery of 'the state' in Africa. This theme is not entirely new, but some aspects of it still deserve to be discussed in more detail.

The former colonial powers and other countries of the global North, the increasingly important international aid agencies and the nature of the international system of sovereign nation states in general contributed to a reproduction of the 'stateness' of the new African quasi-states. The effects of international norms on the sovereignty (and thus external legitimacy) of what political scientists often call the Westphalian state, on the sanctity of national borders and on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states have been sufficiently described elsewhere (on the distinction between 'empirical' and 'juridical' statehood, see Jackson, 1990, 1992; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986). The Cold War has had an additional stabilizing effect and prevented *de jure* changes to the post-independence state system in Africa (Clapham, 1996a; Young, 1998). Within this set of institutions, norms and episodes, the aid regime has played a crucial role, first in stressing and later in reinventing the centrality of the state. The state was seen and treated either as a vehicle for 'development' or as an obstacle to it. In any event, financial and personnel support for national development plans, SAPs or, more recently, post-Washington consensus PRSP packages share one crucial point of reference: at the end of the day, the state is the only actor one has to deal with. By the same token, the international aid regime has defined itself in relation to what was (and still is) perceived as the main challenge in Africa, as an instrument to repair, change or reinvent the 'African' state.

Against this background, British scholar Christopher Clapham has discussed different degrees of African stateness, though he stopped short of developing a systematic typology (Clapham, 2001). The German political scientist Gero Erdmann has tried to close this gap (Erdmann, 2003) by combining territorial and functional variables to define three degrees of incomplete stateness: state failure, state decline and state decay.[4] The Great Lakes region provides a strong empirical background for this discussion. Callaghy et al. (2001, p. 7) have used this example to argue for the increasing importance of what they call 'transboundary formations', which are 'directly involved in the constitution of order and authority in various social and political contexts'. These formations include rebel militias, international humanitarian operations, refugee camps, INGOs and donor agencies, armed merchants, transnational corporations, UN transition authorities and the like. The existence of these transboundary formations, one might argue, actually predates their discovery in post-Cold War times (and, to some extent, they have been discussed earlier in terms of informal trade, armed insurrections or international regimes).[5] However, the emphasis in the literature seems now to have shifted from states towards other decentralized institutions of authority.

Two important academic debates feed this argument. The first is the interest in the historicity of the new social institutions of domination in Africa. The second is the attempts to reconstruct socioanthropological bottom-up perspectives on how public authority actually works in an environment of weak stateness (on the latter, see Lund, 2007). This kind of research discusses a broad spectrum of empirical types of authority, ranging from stateless societies (Ellis, 1999), decentralized power (Le Roy, 1997), local polykephaly (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1999), oligopolies (Bangoura, 1996) to precolonial statehood (Hopkins, 2000; Warner, 1999, 2001). States and stateless societies coexisted. Historically, the decentralized use of force and local legal pluralism seemed to be the standard norm, not the exception (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1997; Blundo, 1996). Bayart (1986) stresses the autochthonous foundations of the African state and the successful appropriation of colonial institutions.[6] In local arenas, the post-independence state is one actor among many. A wide range of other actors practise forms of what has been described as para-sovereignty (von Trotha, 2000). Sociologists have conceptualized the *longue durée* of exercising authority as a process of sedimentation in which new generations of social institutions of domination are continuously superimposed on historically grown and practised claims of domination.[7] In this context, the recent realignments between local warlords and foreign companies in Liberia or Sierra Leone, for instance, have been described in terms of a reprise of the alliances fostered in the nineteenth century between fragmented authorities and commercial entities of European origin (Reno, 2004).

To conclude this section, we briefly refer to the question of how these changes are integrated into mainstream IR. The changing nature of the state in Africa and its place in the global order is now mainly conceptualized in terms of the emergence of a 'new medievalism', that is, a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalties (Friedrichs, 2001), or simply as the establishment of a 'post-modern international order' (Sørensen, 2001). International politics have responded to these developments in various ways, most importantly with policies of 'humanitarian intervention', 'conflict prevention' and, after September 11, 2001, securitization through the 'global war on terror' (Andersen, 2005; Keenan, 2009). The common denominator in mainstream academic and political representations of Africa is the notion of the (nation) state as it has seemingly developed in Central Europe since the seventeenth century – the so-called 'Westphalian' system of sovereign nation states (Jackson, 1999; Osiander, 2001) – and the apparent political need to restore order along these lines.

New perspectives on authority, sovereignty and territoriality

Obviously, the notion of sovereignty underlying the above debates differs from conventional, mainstream IR notions, where sovereignty is seen as the ultimate ordering principle of international relations, separating the inside and the outside (James, 1999; Kurtulus, 2005; Walker, 1993).[8] The notion of sovereignty underpinning the alternative perspectives described above is mainly concerned with the social production of sovereignty (Bartelson, 1995; Biersteker and Weber, 1996). Hence sovereignty:

> most generally defined as the recognition of the claim by a state to exercise supreme authority over a clearly defined territory, is not a single norm, but an institution comprising several, sometimes conflicting norms, and is associated with a bundle of properties, such as territory, population, autonomy, authority, control, and recognition. (Zaum, 2007, p. 3)

The different ontological properties of 'sovereignty' in fact need to be deconstructed in their specific historical and geographical contexts. Against this background, the central methodological proposition of this chapter is that 'sovereignty is neither inherently territorial nor is it exclusively organized on a state-by-state basis' (Agnew, 2005, p. 437). In parts of Africa, we can observe the 'unbundling' of sovereignty and territory. As a consequence of these recent forms of de- and reterritorialization in sub-Saharan Africa, new and fairly basic forms of mapping authority and territoriality are called for. Later in this chapter, several different attempts at such mapping are discussed.

Certainly in our times, the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states, as it is frequently imagined by political scientists, is still very strong in most, but not in all parts of the world. In this perspective, post-Cold War Africa can be characterized as an arena where different forms of spatialization are competing (Mbembe, 2002a). The postcolonial regime of territorialization has been challenged in much of the continent. This is not to say the state has been or will be replaced by something else throughout Africa. Clearly, however, in substantial parts of the continent the state as conceived in the global North is no longer the main or dominant form of organizing people in a given territory.[9]

No doubt, in any historic period one way of aligning authority with territory has been dominant. The American historian Charles Maier (2000) refers to these dominant forms as 'regimes of territoriality',

while the British geographer Alan Hudson (1999) describes a similar phenomenon as 'regulatory landscapes'. To stress the processes involved in constructing and permanently renegotiating forms of spatialization, we prefer the term 'regime of territorialization'. Historically, these regimes have taken very different forms, including decentralized chiefdoms, centralized kingdoms, nation states and empires such as the Roman or the Ottoman, and so on (Opello and Rosow, 2004). The period of change from one dominant regime of territorialization to another, and the struggles in specific social arenas between the proponents of different regimes of territorialization, can be conceived as a 'critical juncture of globalization' (Middell and Engel, 2005). This implies an understanding of globalization processes different from, for instance, the perspective of US sociologist and economist Saskia Sassen (2006) and others, who basically describe globalization as a process of mere denationalization.

In our view, processes of globalization are indeed characterized by forms of deterritorialization, including voluntary sovereignty transfers by states to supranational organizations, new regionalisms such as the enlarged Europe or the revived African Union, the emergence of 'global cities', loss of state control over the economy through the activities of multinational companies and hedge funds, waves of migration and other Appadurainian 'flows' (Appadurai, 1996). At the same time, there is a dialectic between these deterritorializations and permanent attempts at reterritorialization (Brenner, 1999, p. 43). The latter can be seen in renationalized identity discourses (as in all the states of the former Soviet empire); in nationalized strategies to deal with the effects of globalization (for instance, the race for state guarantees in order to save jobs at international production sites in response to the restructuring of major car companies such as General Motors) or the recent financial crisis (with new forms and arenas of crisis control such as the G20); in anti-migration legislation (as introduced by the EU vis-à-vis Africa over the last decade); or in the re-emergence of the local (for instance, as a site of energy production in response to discourses on climate change and energy scarcity in preference to carbon dioxide-intensive ways of production), and so on.

Authority and sovereignty are two core concepts being renegotiated under conditions of increased globalization. In the words of American geographer John Agnew, 'state sovereignty may be understood as *the absolute territorial organization of political authority*' (2005, p. 439, original emphasis). In African studies, the central problem with this assertion has been discussed above in terms of 'juridical' versus 'empirical' statehood

(see Jackson, 1992; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986). Agnew's further proposition about the 'territorial trap' in political science's state-centrism (Agnew, 1994) was later taken up by Michael Barnett. He developed a notion of authority that retains some of its Weberian roots by postulating that 'authority only operates as a legitimate force and can be sustained when claims are grounded in established values of the community' (Barnett, 2001, p. 56). Following this line of reasoning, in some areas of Africa, the state as an organizing principle no longer plays a key role.

A new research agenda

Against this background, we introduce another analytical perspective on the changes in parts of Africa – a spatial dimension. The argument is borrowed from recent debates in the emerging field of Global History and the subfield of geography labelled New Political Geography. In both debates, space is privileged as an analytical category. This kind of research discusses the implications of the so-called spatial turn for the social sciences and humanities and their respective constituencies. The agenda for this metatheoretical debate was sketched by the French philosopher and Marxist Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]). The spatial turn is a set of propositions about the production of theory and, thus, an epistemological position. Proponents of the spatial turn claim that space is made through social practice. The arguments, as far as they pertain to the state, are well known. The central critique of the conventional wisdom is that the state as unit of analysis has been so privileged as to become essentialized, with the result that many disciplines have unlearned how to conceptualize transnational and other forms of social action that do not have the territorialized state as their fixed point of reference. This is what Agnew (1994) meant by the 'territorial trap' in, for instance, political science. In this perspective, as New York-based political scientist Neil Brenner (1999, p. 40) argues, 'space no longer appears as a static platform of social relations, but rather as one of their constitutive dimensions, itself historically produced, reconfigured, and transformed'. Along the same lines, Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi (2003, p. 110) stresses that territories 'are not frozen frameworks where social life occurs. Rather, they are made, given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action'.

When these claims are applied to the changing nature of authority and sovereignty in Africa, one can argue that current developments in much of the African continent cannot be adequately understood

academically in terms of *state collapse* (Zartman, 1995), *complex political emergencies* (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999) or *new wars* (Kaldor, 1999). Neither can they be conceptualized in political terms as *fragile states*, *failing states*, *difficult partnerships* or *terrorism* (Andersen, 2005). Rather, these developments represent a larger process of changing regimes of territorialization. In fact, this change can be conceptualized as a dialectical process of *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* (Engel, 2005). From the perspective of the historicity of international relations, Africa has entered a new phase whose outcome cannot be predicted yet. For IR, the interesting questions then are: how permanent will this process be, and how do predominantly non-nation state regimes of territorialization integrate with the rest of the global order?

It seems that some familiar analytical concepts – including the state and the nation – make only limited sense in the analysis of Africa's present situation. So what next? To us, the most promising way ahead would be a modest attempt at mapping out and describing in greater detail the dynamics we see unfolding. So, if one accepts this chapter's central methodological assumption that 'effective sovereignty is not necessarily predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed territorial boundaries of individual states' (Agnew, 2005, p. 438), disentangling sovereignty and the state makes sense.

At least three proposals to this end have already been made, but have not yet been translated systematically into a visible research programme. To these we will add two more proposals. One suggestion was made by Agnew (2005, p. 456), who invites us to analyse different sovereignty regimes, 'or combinations of degrees of central state authority and consolidated or open territoriality' (a proposition not too different from Clapham's of 1999). For Africa, this proposal has yet to be put into operation. Second, a targeted proposal has been made by Callaghy et al. (2001), who seek to concentrate on 'recognition' and 'permanence' as major analytical vectors. And, third, a study of functional claims or equivalents to core state functions has been proposed. The second and the third suggestions will be briefly outlined, as they have already been described with a view to being applied to the situation in sub-Saharan Africa.

In an edited volume of case studies drawn from experience of the Great Lakes region and the DR Congo in the 1990s, Callaghy et al. (2001, p. 16) have sketched out a classification of institutions based on two distinctions: whether they are part of the state or not, and whether their existence rests on some legal expression (juridical versus non-juridical). They claim this approach allows 'institutional innovations in

the non-juridical realm' to be conceptualized alongside the old ortho-doxy. The four possible combinations of the two categories illustrate the approach:

- The combination 'state + juridical' refers to proper 'Weberian' states, the standard model of the global North, as well as to formal economies.
- The pairing 'non-state + juridical' entails diverse entities such as vil-lages, NGOs, religious organizations, international organizations and mercenary (or private military) companies.
- The combination 'non-juridical + non-state' allows for consideration of 'shadow economies' and 'rebel militias'.
- And finally 'state + non-juridical' constellations include infor-mal networks and Reno's (1995) shadow states, that is, informal commercial-oriented networks.

In this context, sovereignty in the traditional IR sense – namely author-ity over some areas or symbols of the state and the use of this authority in international relations, which is still predominantly organized in the Westphalian sense – can still be important, as it provides important material and symbolic resources (Reno, 2001, 2004; Slaughter, 2005).

A second suggestion, by Latham, conceptualizes 'international are-nas', 'translocal networks' and 'transterritorial deployments' (2001, p. 71) using a similar heuristic tool, based on status (temporary versus permanent) and scope (narrow versus wide). Again, part of the matrix is reproduced (Latham, 2001, p. 78). Constellations can be either per-manent and narrow (such as extraterritorial offices, religious missions) or temporary and narrow (for instance, humanitarian operations, fact-finding missions). They can also be permanent and wide (such as organs of the colonial state or annexation) or temporary and wide (occupation forces, UN transition authorities). African social institutions of domina-tion, we assume, can be mapped according to these criteria. And, in the same volume, Kassimir and Latham (2001) ask what forms of authority and governance exist in social spaces where state legitimacy is chal-lenged or declining or has already disappeared. This refers to political and cultural strategies aiming to create counter-hegemonic legitimacy. Conventional political science wisdom holds that in the past a mix of clientelism, patronage, elite diffusion and/or identity politics, citizen-ship discourses, and so forth, has been deployed by Africa's neopatri-monial elites to construct or maintain legitimacy.[10] What then are the strategies and cultural resources of alternative and competing claims?

In academic debate on Africa, different strategies to legitimate alternative authorities are described:

- They can act as protectors against the state (Elwert, 1997; von Trotha, 2000).
- They may organize security and provide public goods (Bakonyi, 2001; Bates, 2001; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Kopytoff, 1987; Mair, 1999).
- They portray themselves as the legitimate continuation of past forms of political representation (such as traditional chiefs).
- Or they waive claims to legitimacy and employ coercion, violence and intimidation (Mkandawire, 2002; Waldmann, 2002).

Depending on the prevalence of these new claims to legitimacy and the functions performed, sociologists have characterized these formations as 'proto-state' or 'non-state' institutions (Bakonyi, 2001; Kassimir, 2001; Mair, 1999; von Trotha, 2000).

In addition to mapping the new empirical situation in Africa, two courses of action seem feasible. Since the social institutions that challenge state monopolies on the legitimate use of force operate at different levels, according to spatial and functional claims, a typology can be designed along two axes. One axis can range from territorially limited to unlimited claims (that is, state-level), and the other from functionally limited to widespread claims. The latter functions could be as wide as those described in standard World Bank texts on the role of the state in Africa, including the provision of security, health and education. Along these axes, different empirical types can be collated:

- Some actors make only limited territorial claims, such as urban militias, self-defence units, private security companies.
- Others assert multifunctional regional roles, for instance, religious authorities or traditional chiefs.
- There are also regionally based warlords with unlimited functional claims.
- Some warlords make counter-hegemonic claims to state control, and so on.

Needless to say in this case, the 'translocal' has to be conceived as being not necessarily confined to national space. Indeed, such instances can easily transcend boundaries and affect more than one established or claimed monopoly of legitimate force.

Finally, it does make sense to order empirical observations along a divide between deterritorialization and reterritorialization. The main point of this would be to map the forces and resources that either make or unmake new spatial references of social order. What are the social, symbolic and imagined resources for constructing or deconstructing new spatial orders? What determines successful implementation of a new spatial order? How do these new orders relate to existing order(s)? How do concepts of order travel in these processes? Focusing on the dialectic of de- and reterritorialization would be a first step out of the 'territorial trap' the social sciences face in analysing Africa. Such focus would allow the simple containerized 'domestic' versus 'foreign' imaginaries to be transcended and open the way for the de-essentialization of space as a given. This very basic suggestion does not privilege a specific method, other than those the different disciplines have employed to examine their objects of study. It merely calls for more modest descriptions and, based on these, systematic mapping of empirical observations. These systematizations will then inform perspectives from which major analytical concepts such as the 'state', 'sovereignty' and even 'power' can be reconsidered. They will provide new insights into how order and disorder in Africa is created and signified. Our guess is that IR as a theory will be changed in this process, though we cannot make a detailed prediction. However, the development of human geography clearly demonstrates the effects of the introduction of the spatial turn on disciplinary identities and methodological debates. IR (and comparative politics for that matter) as it is currently practised has simply become an unreliable tool for studying the state in Africa and its global entanglements. And from the point of view of the utility of IR theory, spatial turn-driven research will certainly result in insights into the interplay between local and transboundary authorities, multiple sovereignties and their external environments, and help us to understand why the toolbox of international interventions to fix the state in Africa has so often proven inadequate.

Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has argued that in parts of Africa the nature of the state is fundamentally changing. This has consequences, firstly, for Africa's integration into and interaction with the international system. It also has consequences for the way in which IR as an academic exercise can analyse these phenomena. In the current processes of deterritorialization of parts of Africa, sovereignty and territory are

unbundled. Therefore, we propose different analytical ways to re-map authority and sovereignty. Through these efforts, the assumed hierarchy of a general spatial order around the nation state will be challenged and, ultimately, deconstructed. Since social life can no longer be conceived within a containerized world of nation states along a vector from 'the local' to 'the global', a variety of old and new spatial orders will be discovered in which different social actors exercise authority and express sovereignty. Finally, Africa's place in the international system will then no longer be discussed in terms of an assumed general quality of stateness for all African states, but with a view to highlighting the different regimes of territorialization emerging on the continent, which exist side by side with and interact with the various components of the international system in very different ways.

Notes

1. The term 'global order' refers to the dominant imagination of and discourses about 'order', that is, spatialized power distributions. This term is constantly used by politicians and academics.

2. According to conventional wisdom in IR and comparative politics, but also in public administration and development thinking, governance is based on a functionalist, instrumentalist and normative understanding of the state, in which governance is usually equated with the practice of or quest for *good governance.* By contrast, we favour a notion of governance that is different from governing, administering or managing. In our reading, governance encapsulates complex dynamics that shape binding rules, procedures and behaviour in different social spaces. It is intrinsically relational, as it involves the practice of both constructing rules (as social process) and imposing rules (as the exercise of authority). And the units of governance are social spaces, whose territoriality can correspond with a bordered state, but may cut across states or be confined to far smaller, sometimes functional, territories (Engel and Olsen, 2005b, p. 9).

3. Two indicators of this trend, both from 2007, are the institutionalization of borderlands studies on Africa in the mainly European Aborne network (African Borderlands Research Network, www.aborne.org) and the establishment of a border programme by the African Union (the latter starting from the observation that only 25 per cent of Africa's national borders are properly demarcated and aiming at conflict prevention and regional integration).

4. *State failure* is characterized by structural deficits in service provision (public goods and security), without loss of the monopoly of the legitimate use of force or permanent loss of sovereignty over parts of the state's territory. State failure can take the form of collapsed health or education systems, high levels of corruption, declining public infrastructure, privatization of public security, etc. *State decline* is conceptualized as a territorial restriction of the state's monopoly of legitimate use of force, usually preceded by state failure, but without the threat of secession. Von Trotha terms this 'para-stateness'

or 'para-sovereignty', respectively (von Trotha, 2000, pp. 269ff.). *State decay* signifies the total collapse of stateness and can take two forms: partial or total decay. While the former represents the total loss of the monopoly of legitimate force, including a threat to the territorial integrity of the state, the latter characterizes countries like Somalia, Sierra Leone or Liberia at a certain point in their history, with little or no central authority over the former state territory.

5. While Callaghy et al. conceptualize transboundary formations in opposition to 'patrimonial networks or communal leadership', this divide seems slightly artificial, particularly since these transboundary formations are not entirely new phenomena (Callaghy et al., 2001, p. 12).

6. This line of reasoning is based on Gramsci's 'historic bloc', Braudel's '*longue durée*' and Foucault's '*gouvernementalité*'. The historical institutionalism reflected in this approach is also prominently at the heart of Chabal (1992), Hibou (1999) and Kopytoff (1987).

7. Forrest (1998) assumes that after incidents of 'state inversion', these historic and indigenous forms of authority network reappear. This is said to be the case in Somalia and Rwanda.

8. We would like to thank Adèle Garnier (University of Leipzig) for drawing our attention to this discussion.

9. This position is disputed, for instance, by Kahler and Walter (2006), who insist that, despite globalization, territorial attachments are still very powerful, also in constituting people's identities.

10. Englebert (2000) argues that precolonial legitimacy has been the key to postcolonial legitimacy.

Part II

Innovations from Below: Territory and Identity

5

Bringing Identity into International Relations: Reflections on Nationalism, Nativism and Xenophobia in Africa

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni

Introduction

In his groundbreaking book, *Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations*, Albert Paolini (1999, p. 29) criticized dominant International Relations (IR) trajectories in these words:

> My central contention...is that international relations, as traditionally constituted and in its mainstream trajectory, is narrow and increasingly limited as a discourse about world politics... First, international relations tend to be stuck in a statist groove... Consequently, it tends to ignore a range of issues in contemporary political and social analysis, such as identity, subjectivity, space, and modernity...Second...international relations is excessively Western in sensibility and orientation and thus severely circumscribed...Consequently, international relations marginalise what has variously been characterised as the Third World, the South or the postcolonial world.

Indeed, those scholars writing on the position of Africa in international politics follow the mainstream IR tradition that privileges the state as the focus of analysis at the expense of intersubjectivity and identity, which are equally important in understanding contemporary politics and human relations. The centrality of the state to the analysis is evident in Clapham's (1996a) work on Africa and the international system, in

which he emphasized how decolonization launched into international politics postcolonial African sovereign states as a group of the world's poorest, weakest and most artificial states. His argument tallied with that of Jackson (1990), who described postcolonial African states as 'quasi-states' characterized by recognition as sovereign and independent units by other states in the international system. To Jackson, postcolonial African states did not meet the demands of 'empirical' statehood, such as the capacity to exercise effective power within their own territories and the ability to defend themselves against external attack.

While these state-centric analyses of Africa in the international system are important, they tend to ignore a range of contemporary world issues. Chabal (2009) has engaged with some of the pertinent contemporary issues such as identity, locality, agency, belonging, migration and violence, as he pushes his central argument of defining African people's identity, belonging, beliefs, struggles and their agency. He defined agency (2009, p. 7) as 'directed, meaningful, intentional and self-reflective social action' as he tried to ground African politics in the realities of the everyday. To him, 'the agility demonstrated by African governments in maximising resource transfers within the radically different environments of the Cold War, structural adjustment and, today, rapid globalisation is truly impressive' (Chabal, 2009, p. 12). Chabal made great strides in taking into account and recognizing African subjects and their activities at the level of everyday practice, without necessarily considering these issues in the context of IR.

However, this chapter sounds a warning on blind celebrations of African agency that ignore the complex ways in which Africans have reacted to the pressures of globalization at various levels of their lives, including peddling autochthonous discourses that breed nativism and xenophobia. There is a need to understand Africa's position in IR and international politics from 'inside-out', that is, privileging internal dynamics as opposed to the dominant 'outside-inside', which emphasizes external dynamics. This argument is related to Clapham's (1996a, p. 4) idea that:

> a view of international politics from the bottom up may ... help ... to illuminate the impact of the global system on those ... least able to resist it, [and] to provide a perspective on that system, and ... on the study of international relations ..., which may complement and even correct the perspective gained by looking from the top downwards.

While it is partly correct to state that Africa resides within a global system not of its choosing and decidedly beyond its control, there is a need

to factor in African agency as part of any reading of the continent's position from both 'inside-out' and 'outside-inside'.

This approach enables a more nuanced reading of such pertinent broader processes as deterritorialization and reterritorialization and its identity components. In the first place, Africa is ceaselessly seeking to regain and negotiate itself above the Eurocentric egoisms of singularities that continue to inform conventional and often insensitive notions of identity imposed on it and its people by external agents. Nyamnjoh (2001, p. 25) argued that most people in Africa still refuse to be fenced in by particular identity markers, choosing instead to draw on the competing and different influences in their lives as individuals and communities. Identity is a relational concept, permeated through and through by imperatives of power and resistance, subjection and citizenship, and action and reaction. Indeed, the identity politics that dominated and haunted the post-Cold War world were basically about popular struggles for material redistribution and justice, autonomy and existential integrity and security in a context of collapsing and failing states and weakening regimes (Mama, 2001, p. 13). It is not surprising that as some African postcolonial states became weaker and others such as Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) collapsed, identity politics became the dominant mode of mobilization, further fragmenting the already weak states and provoking more conflicts. Contemporary postcolonial politics is dominated by such negative phenomena as xenophobia in South Africa, nativism in Côte d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe, 'ethnic cleansing' in DR Congo and the Sudan and genocide in Rwanda. Unless a clear understanding of the dynamics of identity politics is gained, these violence-generating phenomena may persist.

This chapter is mainly inspired by postcolonial writing and theorizing that not only grapples with contradictions, ambivalences, ambiguities, turbulence and the dispersal of power, but also reads global politics and IR from the margins. Postcolonial theorists' insights are useful, since they focus on identity, culture and a critique of the epistemology of Western scholarship that is often accepted uncritically in mainstream IR thinking. My main concern is how nationalism as an identitarian phenomenon has often degenerated into narrow, exclusive and xenophobic forms that compromise civic as well as pluralistic conceptions of citizenship in Africa. The chapter begins with a broad framing of the general issue of identity, introducing some of the important scholarly interventions and commentary on the issue. It proceeds to engage with the important issue of the making of Africa in seeking to explain the emergence and character of African identities. The third section

analyses how African nationalism became the key nodal point around which the imagination and practical formation of postcolonial identities crystallized and were fashioned. The last section engages with the somewhat puzzling politics of nativism and xenophobia in the present century. The intellectual challenge is to establish whether the degeneration of nationalism into nativism and xenophobia is happening across the African continent and to isolate the driving forces behind these processes.

Throughout the chapter, care is taken to situate the debate on identity within broader global, continental and national histories, including such processes as the slave trade, mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism, migration and globalization that have combined to fashion social identities in Africa. The central thesis of this chapter is that African nationalism, like all other nationalisms elsewhere, was and is basically an identitarian phenomenon thoroughly permeated by nativist and xenophobic tendencies. This argument is supported by Dorman et al. (2007, p. 4), who wrote that 'it is arguably in the nature of nationalism to distinguish insiders from outsiders'. Building on this argument, the chapter analyses the specific triggers in contemporary Africa, such as instrumental manipulation of citizenship, scapegoating of minorities, weakness of particular African national projects, diminishing resources, global migration, as well as the uncertainties provoked by globalization that help to explain such explosive and violence-laden phenomena as ethnic cleansing, genocide, nativism and xenophobia.

Identity as major mediator of contemporary human affairs

The dominant tendency among scholars is to delegitimate and in some cases eliminate the concept of identity itself by revealing its ontological, epistemological and political limitations (Moya, 2000, p. 2). For instance, activists and scholars alike reacted to essentialist tendencies in the cultural nationalist movements of the 1980s and 1990s by arguing that social identity, as a basis for political action, was theoretically incoherent and politically pernicious. The 'Elvis of cultural theory', Slavoj Zizek, has railed against the 'culturalisation of politics' that put identity at the centre of its ideological operation. This is how he put it:

> Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of intolerance, rather than...of inequality, exploitation, or injustice? Why is the proposed remedy tolerance, rather than emancipation, political struggle, even armed struggle? The immediate answer lies in the

> liberal multiculturalist's basic ideological operation: the 'culturali-
> sation of politics'. Political difference – differences conditioned by
> political inequality or economic exploitation – are naturalised and
> neutralized into 'cultural' differences, that is, into different 'ways of
> life' which are something given, something that cannot be overcome.
> They can only be 'tolerated'. (Zizek, 2009, p. 119)

Zizek attributes the 'culturalisation of politics' to Samuel Huntington's
(1998) 'clash of civilizations' thesis, in which the latter argued that with
the ending of the Cold War, the 'iron curtain of ideology' was replaced
by 'the velvet curtain of culture'. The concern with identities and cul-
tures is also attributed to the so-called 'cultural turn' in humanities and
social sciences in the 1990s. This 'turn' is said to have been marked
by a paradigmatic rupture separating the social/moral from the politi-
cal economy. Radical left scholars have interpreted this in terms of 'the
embourgeoisement of theory' (Yeros, 2002, p. 7). The central question
is whether identities need to be tolerated as a strategy of management
or whether they should be dismissed as a mistaken interpretation of the
real – as symptoms of the Marxian notion of 'false consciousness'.

What is beyond doubt is that individuals make their identity, but not
under conditions of their own choosing and making. To Hall (1990,
p. 225), identities are nothing more than names given to different ways
we achieve 'position by, and position ourselves within, the narrative
of the past'. Since identities are mainly determined by two factors,
cultural location and historical epoch, trying to dismiss them is not
helpful. What is needed is analysis of identities in relation to their
context and historicity. This is important, because identity issues con-
tinue to impinge on human relations across the globe. Alcoff (2003,
pp. 2–3) posed several important questions in her endeavour to under-
stand identity. Are identities simply the congealed effect of collective
historical experience, or are they imposed on individuals by external
forces, always within a strategy of domination? Are identities best under-
stood, using a psychoanalytical model, as compensatory attempts to
bolster a debilitated ego? Should identities be approached as temporary
political strategies with the aim of eventually dissolving all such social
categories, or should the ultimate political aim be to value the diver-
sity of identities and enhance the likelihood of collective, democratic
self-formation of identity?

The realities of the contemporary post-Cold War world indicate that
social identities have come to the centre of political mobilization for
both positive and negative ends. Social identities are currently deeply

located within the vortex of tensions between globalism, nationalism and localism (James, 2006, p. 292). Political leaders and policymakers have been forced to engage in ceaseless attempts to stabilize and destabilize human essence, which is always precarious, always in-the-making and always 'an ongoing process of fragile actualization' (Mbembe, 2006a, p. 148). On top of this, it has become clear that the dynamic interaction between migration and transnationalism, interceded for and promoted and mediated by globalization processes, has a direct bearing on the question of identity, which in turn impinges on the current shifting definitions and narrowing meanings of citizenship. Zizek (2009) has noted that humanity is today living in a world of exclusions rather inclusions.

Indeed, dreams of a 'postnationalist' world and a 'postnational imaginary' that gripped the immediate post-Cold War dispensation, characterized by new notions of cosmopolitanism, mobile openness, 'thin' and hybrid global identities, did not materialize (Calhoun, 1997, 2002). The debates on the new issues of deterritorialization, postnationalism, cosmopolitanism, globalism and localism soon reached the 'dead-end' of previous modernist arguments, becoming nothing more than repetitions of previous arguments of the relative merits of nationalism and internationalism (James, 2006, p. 294). The nation-state, which was said to have faded, refused easy burial, as did the national identities it had fashioned since the Westphalian endorsement of nationalism as a sociopolitical organizing principle of nationhood. This reality led Appadurai (1996, p. 166) to write that:

> This incapacity of many deterritorialised groups to think their way out of the imaginary of the nation-state is itself the cause of much global violence because many movements of emancipation and identity are forced, in their struggles against existing nation-states, to embrace the very imaginary they seek to escape. Postnational or nonnational movements are forced by the very logic of actually existing nation-states to become antinational or antistate and thus to inspire the very state power that forces them to respond in the language of counternationalism.

'Thick' social identities, ranging widely from ethnicity, gender, caste, race, class, sexuality, age, religion to nationality have remained strong throughout the post-Cold War world (Mendieta, 2003, p. 408). These vectors of social identity existed in complex relationships with one another, and the forms they took in mediating human affairs included

convergence, conspiracy, parallelism, intersection, tangentiality, synergism and even perpendicularity (Mendieta, 2003, p. 408). It was social identities' centrality in human affairs across the globe that prompted Alcoff (2003, p. 2) to argue that 'all students of society and all who want to become effective citizens must become educated about the multiple identities that structure our social worlds in order to . . . understand, evaluate, and . . . meaningfully participate in the struggles against identity-based forms of oppression'.

But social identities produce not only conflict and violence; they are also useful in the formation of solidarities. Throughout the world, identity-based emancipatory movements emerged and fought oppressions based on race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, culture, nationality, disability, age and other forms of recognized social identity (Alcoff, 2003, p. 2).

While global history is dotted with examples of both positive and negative mobilization of social identities, what is worrying is that the contemporary history and politics of Africa currently exhibit more of the negative mobilization of social identities. This has provoked new debates on such negative issues as autochthony, indigeneity, nativity and xenophobia (Hickey, 2007, pp. 83–104). These discourses and practices have provoked violent conflicts in several parts of Africa. The starting point in understanding the historical and epistemological roots of these problems is the historical circumstances and processes behind the making of the African continent itself and African identities in particular.

The making of Africa and the shaping of its identity complexion

There is now consensus that the term Africa started to be used during Roman times with specific reference to North Africa, before it was extended to the whole continent at the end of the first century BCE. Thus, Africa was originally a product of European naming and cartographic invention. Zeleza (2006a, p. 15) has argued that its 'cartographic application was both gradual and contradictory', as it became divorced from its original North African coding to be used with specific reference to sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the African continent as a geographical space, representation and historical phenomenon is an 'invention' and an 'idea'.

Mudimbe, in his seminal *The Invention of Africa* (1988) and *The Idea of Africa* (1994), interrogated the processes at work in the construction

of Africa and its representation through Eurocentric categories and conceptual systems, ranging from the anthropological definition of Africa, missionary activities, to Western philosophical social engineering. He revealed how navigators, traders, travellers, colonialists, missionaries and colonial anthropology combined in representing and shaping the idea and meaning of Africa and being African (Mudimbe, 1994). As with all 'inventions', there is indeed a history to and a complex of social and political processes behind the construction of Africa that help to explain its contemporary social complexion.

Zeleza argued that making sense of the meaning of Africa and its identity is very important, as it has a direct bearing on the way African identities have been analysed and understood. He added that:

> The idea of 'Africa' is a complex one with multiple genealogies and meanings, so that extrapolations of 'African' culture, identity or nationality . . . , explorations of what makes 'Africa' 'African', . . . tend to swing unsteadily between the poles of essentialism and contingency. Describing and defining 'Africa' and all tropes prefixed by its problematic commandments entails engaging in discourses about 'Africa', the paradigms and politics through which the idea of 'Africa' has been constructed and consumed, and sometimes celebrated and condemned. (Zeleza, 2006a, p. 14)

The processes of 'invention' and 'construction' of Africa have left the definition of an African open to contestation and appropriation, just like other identities. Such processes as the slave trade, imperialism and colonialism further complicated the picture. African nationalism and Pan-Africanism did not succeed in settling the question of who is an African. No wonder, then, that this question has come to occupy not only scholars but also politicians in postcolonial Africa.

Zeleza rightly argued that if we cannot easily define what Africa is, how can we define Africans? The safest way to define Africa is as a reality as well as a construct 'whose boundaries – geographical, historical, cultural, and representational – have shifted according to the prevailing conceptions and configurations of global racial identities and power, and African nationalism, including, Pan-Africanism' (Zeleza, 2006a, p. 15). He concluded that 'the subject of African identities, therefore, is as vast and complex as the continent itself' (2006a, p. 15).

Despite the complexities involved in defining these identities, there are some identifiable historical processes that have contributed to the current identity complexion of Africa. Neocosmos (2008a) argued that

the slave trade was perhaps one of the greatest forced migrations in history, and that had and has profound effects on the development of the African continent's identity complexion and the meaning of Africanness. The slave trade led not only to the emergence of a diaspora in the Americas but also to the creation of whole states composed of Africans transplanted to other parts of the world, such as Haiti and Jamaica. The formation of African diasporas led to the popularization of the name Africa and the increasing racialization of African identity (Zeleza, 2006a, p. 15). With this reality, the definition of an African became even more complex.

A combination of mercantilism, imperialism, colonialism and other processes introduced whites, Indians and foreign diasporas, such as the Lebanese and other people, to the African continent from the fifteenth century and even before. Colonialism introduced race as a factor in the definition of belonging and citizenship in Africa. Mamdani (1996) argued that colonialism produced colonial states that were bifurcated into citizens and subjects. What emerged from encounters between indigenous Africans and colonizing whites was a complicated citizenship in which the white settlers tried to exclude the natives from full belonging. Mamdani described this problem as 'the settler-native' question, which has continued to present problems of citizenship in countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (Mamdani, 2001a).

African nationalism, as a deeply interpellated phenomenon, had no capacity to solve the 'settler-native' question. Rather, it inverted the scale, putting the 'native' where the settler was and struggling to pull the settler down to where the native was. The explanation of this limit of nationalism is well captured by Chen (1998, p. 14): 'Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, Third World nationalism could not escape from reproducing racial and ethnic discrimination; a price to be paid by the coloniser as well as the colonised selves.'

Another important contour in the debates on the identity of Africa and Africans is that which tries to reduce African identity to the 'phenotype'. As argued by Neocosmos (2008a, p. 7), in the attempts to define Africa at such institutions as the World Bank and even the UN, there is the tendency to see North Africa as more part of the Middle East than Africa. In this case, Africa is defined as 'Black sub-Saharan Africa', largely inhabited by Bantu-speaking peoples. The other colonially produced layer of identity in Africa is that which stressed the division of Africans into francophones and anglophones.

To paraphrase Mbembe, African identities are a product of the combination of 'the elsewhere' and 'the here'. This is so because, even before

the age of colonialism, Africa was already open to external influences that further complicated its identity complexion. Bayart (2000, p. 217) has successfully challenged the Hegelian idea of an African continent that is 'cut off from all contacts with the rest of the world . . . removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of the night' (Hegel, 1975, p. 174). Bayart argued that from the perspective of *longue durée*, the continent was never isolated from the rest of the world, particularly Europe, Asia and the Americas. This is evidenced by the antiquity of Christianity in Ethiopia, the spread of Islam on the coasts, the establishment of Austronesian colonies in Madagascar and by regular trade ties with China, India, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Consequently, eastern and southern Africa were for centuries integrated into the premodern economic systems of the so-called Orient. According to Bayart, even the Sahara Desert was never an 'ocean of sand and desolation' that demarcated and closed off sub-Saharan Africa from external influences (Bayart, 2000, p. 218).

A combination of all the processes outlined above reinforces Appiah's (1992) argument that Africa is not a primordial fixture but an invented reality. But while it is true that Africans were not constructed from the same cultural clay, they have experienced common historical processes that largely justify their claim to a common identity. The contingency of African identities should not be used to deny that we have today an identity called African. Zeleza (2006a, p. 18) has concluded that 'the numerous peoples and societies that have carved out a place of their own across this vast continent have, in a sense, been creating their little Africas, each laying their bricks across the huge and intricate cartographic, cognitive, and cultural construct, known as "Africa"'.

The flows of commodities, capital, ideas and people have coalesced to create an African identity. Even the tragedies that have befallen the continent, including conflicts and underdevelopment, have indirectly provoked a consciousness of being African. The nationalist and Pan-African initiatives to deliberately create an African identity, such as the African Renaissance, the African Union (AU) and the Pan-African Parliament, have continued to build an African identity.

Chipkin (2007, p. 2) argued that Africans across the continent 'emerged primarily in and through the process of nationalist resistance to colonialism'. This is indeed a logical argument, since nationalism was and is a process of making people-as-nation and nation-as-state (nation-building and state-building) through the homogenization of differences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a). African nationalism was therefore a grand project and process of making African citizens out of colonial subjects.

But born of a continent whose identity has remained hard to define, African nationalism was never straightforward. Its progenitor, Pan-Africanism, was never a singular phenomenon. There were six versions of Pan-Africanism, reflecting the complex historical experiences of the African people. These were trans-Atlantic, Black Atlantic, continental, sub-Saharan, Pan-Arab and global (Zeleza, 2003, pp. 413–18). Zeleza summarized the core imaginations in each as follows: the proponents of the trans-Atlantic version imagined a Pan-African world stretching from the continent right into the diaspora in the Americas; the Black Atlantic version preoccupied itself with the African diasporic community in the Americas and Europe, excluding continental Africans; the continental version was primarily focused on the unification of continental Africa; the sub-Saharan and Pan-Arab versions restricted themselves to the peoples of the continent north and south of the Sahara, with Pan-Arabism extending into western Asia and the Middle East; and the global version sought to reclaim African peoples dispersed to all corners of the world into one identity (Zeleza, 2005).

African nationalism had an ambiguous relationship with Pan-Africanism: sometimes it reinforced it and at others subverted it through issues of sovereignty. This role also reflected the great complexity of African nationalism as a sociopolitical phenomenon. It was mediated by complex antinomies of black liberation thought and was propelled and also constrained by ideological conundrums (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008, pp. 53–86). It was fuelled by a complex combination of ambiguous local struggles, diverse micro- and macrohistories and sociologies. Emerging within a colonial environment, it was already deeply interpellated by the immanent logic of colonialism, including its racist and ethnic undertones, but was not completely disconnected from the fading precolonial past, myths, spiritualities and memories. African nationalism was also shaped from 'above', meaning its enunciations remained open to continental and global ideologies when they were seen as fitting and advancing local agendas. It is within this context that nationalism incorporated such external and diasporic ideologies as Garveyism, Negritude, Marxism, Ethiopianism, Christianity, Pan-Africanism, Leninism, Maoism, republicanism and liberalism, mixing these with such indigenous resources as entitlement to land, for instance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a).

In short, African nationalism was basically a particular form of imagination of freedom. Decolonization was a popular term to define this imagined freedom. Five fundamental questions preoccupied African nationalists as potential and actual nation- and state-builders: how

to forge national consciousness out of a multiplicity of racial and ethnic groups enclosed within the colonial state boundaries; how to fashion a suitable model of governance relevant to societies emerging from colonialism; what models of economic development were relevant for promoting rapid economic growth to extricate postcolonial societies from underdevelopment; what role was the independent African postcolonial state to play in the economy and society; and how might the new African political leaders promote the popular democracy and mass justice that was denied by colonialism (Mkandawire, 2005; Zeleza, 2005).

No African leader had clear answers to these complex questions. All nationalists embarked on trial-and-error initiatives backed by various grand theories of remaking African identity. Indeed, such African initiatives in identity-making as Pan-Africanism, Negritude, Consciencism, *ubuntu* (African Humanism), African Personality and African Renaissance make no sense outside the broader African search for self-definition and identity-reconstruction.

At least five imaginations of community, citizenship, belonging and coexistence are discernible from the history of freedom and modernity in Africa. Zeleza (2006a, p. 14) identified these as the nativist, the liberal, the popular-democratic, the theocratic and the transnational prescriptive models. The nativist has elicited widespread condemnation for being backward-looking, navel-gazing and founded on a false metaphysics of difference and alterity (Mbembe, 2002b, pp. 629–41). It is feared as the crucible of reverse racism and the nursery for xenophobia and even genocide, such as that which took place in Rwanda. The challenge is to identify the factors and forces that make African nationalism degenerate into nativism and xenophobia (Mbembe, 2002b, pp. 629–41.

From 'Diverse People Unite!' to nativism and xenophobia

One puzzle in the development of African nationalism is why it has increasingly abandoned its original slogan of 'diverse people unite' and metamorphosed into nativism and xenophobia in recent years. In such countries as Rwanda, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya and others, nationalism has revealed its narrower conceptions, its complex imbrications with ethnicity, its violence, its nativist and xenophobic potential with terrible consequences for those 'othered' as aliens. The challenge is to explain this failure of nationalism to create common identity and common citizenship, a failure that is creating 'strangers' out of people belonging to one country (Dorman et al., 2007). The

explanation for the resurgence of autochthonous discourses is to be sought in the broader context of the limits of the African national project, the failure of neoliberal democracy to address issues of social justice and poverty as well as the uncertainties engendered by globalization. Globalization has given rise to the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as part of its discontents (Cornelissen, 2007, 2009). At the centre of these processes is the issue of a 'fading state' and the concomitant birth of what has come to be termed the 'global citizen' (Christie, 2003).

Looked at from broader global politics, nativism and xenophobia could be located at the centre of the tensions between cosmopolitanism and the politics of identity. As argued by Howard-Hassmann (2000), at the core of global politics are two reinforcing discourses, one of Orientalism, which views the 'Third World' or the 'South' as having certain immutable features, and one of Occidentalism, which argues similarly that the 'West' or the 'North' have certain immutable features. 'The Orient and the Occident have incompatible cultures, and cannot understand each other's normative value systems. The Orient is communitarian, duty-based, and spiritual: the Occident is individualistic, rights-based, and materialist' (Howard-Hassmann, 2000, p. 3).

While Howard-Hassmann (2000, p. 5) thinks that inserting identity politics into IR leads to denial of the possibility of the development of cosmopolitan empathy and attitudes across nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, class and location, any IR approach that ignores identity, culture and intersubjectivity is lagging in grappling with contemporary world issues. Without occidentalizing and orientalizing human relations into inflexible 'oppressor–oppressed' binaries, there is a need to take into account the centrality of identity in local, national and global politics. Paolini (1999, p. 43) has postulated that 'one could argue in riposte to mainstream international relations that the question of personal identity is not only crucial but, in many respects, logically prior to any understanding of the state or order or security'.

With particular reference to Africa, African nationalism was the discursive formation within which African identities were being created as nationalist actors resisted colonialism and imperialism. The African nationalism that in its decolonization phase set 'out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a programme of complete disorder' (Fanon, 1968, p. 27). Fanon further argued that African nationalism was an impoverished ideology founded on the hollow idea of a non-existent national identity. To him, such phenomena as nativism and xenophobia

were a product of a particular 'pitfall' political national conscious-ness. In the struggle against colonialism, nationalists mobilized across ethnic, religious and even racial groups and promised loyalty to a cit-izenship that was unifying and inclusive. However, on the morrow of independence, a narrow, nativist and xenophobic nationalism, which emphasized indigeneity, took over. The slogan of 'diverse people unite' was soon abandoned as nationalist elites mobilized ethnicity and other identities to win power and access to particular resources and to retain power.

As African states gained political independence, African nationalism quickly assumed the new form of postcolonial state ideology. African nationalism underwent a metamorphosis from a popular-democratic imaginary pushing for common, pluralistic and civic citizenship into a xenophobic state ideology marked by chauvinism and racism. Nation-alism became available to the triumphant African bourgeois to reformu-late 'popular-democratic nationalism' as 'bourgeoisie nationalism' and to instrumentalize the latter (Neocosmos, 2006). At a practical level, the genesis of postcolonial nativism and xenophobia was understood by Fanon as beginning with the 'native bourgeoisie' violently attacking colonial personalities for being an insult to 'our dignity as a nation'. These attacks were justified as furthering the cause of decoloniza-tion, Africanization and nationalization. While the 'native bourgeoisie' attacked the 'white bourgeoisie', the workers would start a 'fight against non-national Africans'. Fanon (1968, p. 122) concluded, 'from national-ism we have passed to ultra-nationalism, to chauvinism, and finally to racism. These foreigners are called on to leave; their shops are burned, their street stalls are wrecked, and in fact the government . . . commands them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction.'

The Zimbabwean 'nativist revolution' known as the Third Chimurenga falls neatly within this Fanonian explanation. At the beginning of 2000, President Mugabe began to espouse an insurrectionist nationalism medi-ated by a racial trope and nativism. For instance, in December 2000, Mugabe told the ZANU-PF congress that 'this country is our country and this land is our land. . . . They think because they are white they have a divine right to our resources. Not here. The white man is not indigenous to Africa. Africa is for Africans. Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans' (quoted in Norman, 2008, p. 110).

This statement was one of many that indicated Mugabe's redefini-tion of nationalism in nativist terms and the promotion of reverse racism. These speeches were followed by open government support for

and assistance to war veterans and peasants in invading white-owned commercial farms. The 'native bourgeoisie' in ZANU-PF declared that 'Zimbabwe is for Zimbabweans' and that, as 'sons and daughters of the soil', they were entitled to land and mines in Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, 2009a). The same logic lay behind Idi Amin's expulsion of the Asians from Uganda in 1972, which was justified on the grounds of fulfilling mass justice that was denied by colonialism and on the basis of indigeneity.

But the latest violent manifestation of xenophobia was in South Africa in May 2008. South Africa, in its movement from apartheid colonialism to democracy, has been hailed as a successful transitional democratic state. It also has a well-functioning economy relative to its neighbours (Cornelissen, 2009). Consequently, South Africa has become a focal point and destination for economic refugees. All these processes are taking place within a state with very deep racial and ethnic cleavages created by apartheid colonialism. South African black nationalism, which crystallized around the African National Congress (ANC), has not yet succeeded in bridging the 'two economies' or in eradicating poverty among black constituencies. Therefore, behind the façade of successful democratic state lie deep-seated disillusionment, resentment and grievance, marked by constant strikes over such issues as housing and employment. It is within this context that issues of citizenship have become intertwined with indigeneity, as various groups compete for state support. It is also within this context that the politics of nativism and xenophobia become rampant (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007).

Neocosmos (2008b) has analysed the degeneration of nationalism into nativism and xenophobia in South Africa. He raises a series of arguments that build on the work of Fanon. To Neocosmos, nativism and xenophobia are founded on a politics of nationalism predicated on and stressing indigeneity as the central imperative of citizenship. He defines xenophobia as a political discourse and practice lodged within particular ideologies and consciousness that has arisen in a post-apartheid South Africa permeated by a politics of fear in both state and society. It has three contours: a state discourse of xenophobia, a discourse of South African exceptionalism and a conception of citizenship founded exclusively on indigeneity (also see Vigneswaran and Landau in this volume).

Neocosmos (2006) is very critical of the liberal human rights discourse that to him produces a passive citizenship, reinforces notions of victimhood and constrains human agency and legitimate appeals to the state

for help. He sees xenophobia as also rooted in 'agency-less' people who compete in appealing to the state. His conclusion is that:

> Xenophobia and the authoritarianism of which it is but an example, are a product of liberalism, liberal democracy and Human Rights Discourse. It is not an irrational aberration brought from outside the liberal realm...rather it is made possible/enabled by liberalism itself...The problem is that an emancipatory politics has disappeared from post-apartheid society in favour of appeals to the state. (Neocosmos, 2006, p. 133)

Indeed, in recent years South Africa has caught the eye of the world as the hotbed of xenophobia and nativism. The May 2008 pogroms that began in Alexandra township left more than 60 dead and thousands displaced. The fact that one-third of the dead were South Africans raised the question: do South Africans exist? This question is tackled by Chipkin (2007, pp. 1–15), who argued that the nationalist struggle was meant to create South Africans as a collectivity organized in pursuit of a political end. The next question is: did the nationalist struggle succeed in creating South Africans? The answer is partly yes, partly no. African nationalism was itself a vehicle for the retribalization of identities, and this compromised its ability to create stable postcolonial national identities. Second, nationalism suffered greatly from the interpellation by the immanent logic of colonialism and apartheid, leading it to reproduce racism and ethnicity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009a, pp. 89–99). Neocosmos (2006) has added that apartheid colonialism created what he described as 'foreign natives' and 'native foreigners' through such projects as the creation of bantustans. The bantustan mentality explains the failure by some South Africans to recognize that people of Shangani and Venda origin, for instance, are part of South Africa.

Mbembe provides a philosophically informed explanation of nativism. In the first place, he sees nativism as a politics of lamentation of loss of African purity, a form of culturalism preoccupied with identity and authenticity, inspired by 'a so-called revolutionary politics which seek to break away from imperialism and dependence' (Mbembe, 2002b, p. 629). Nativism is the twin sister of Afro-radicalism, according to Mbembe: both are 'discourses of self' and 'projects of self-regeneration, self-knowledge, and self-rule' (Mbembe, 2002b, p. 635).

These discourses are the crucible within which is born the argument of autochthony, with its perception that 'each spatio-racial formation has its own culture, its own historicity, its own way of being, and its

own relationship with the future and with the past' (Mbembe, 2002b, p. 635). Dunn (2009, p. 115) noted that autochthony functioned as a trope, without intrinsic substance, within the process of constituting political identities, which revolved around questions of citizenship and the concept of citizenship as the bearer of rights. The phenomena of nativism and xenophobia are not confined to southern Africa. In countries such as Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa, Kenya in East Africa, DR Congo in Central Africa, and in other parts of the continent, there are clear cases of a failed nationalism that is breeding narrow conceptions of citizenship and belonging. In Côte d'Ivoire, xenophobia and nativism have revolved around the concept of 'Ivoirite' promoted by Bedie (Marshall-Fratani, 2007, pp. 29–67). What needs further research is the role of globalization in all these instances.

Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with a number of issues. The first is that IR as a discipline cannot remain pitched only at the state level. It must seriously engage with issues of identity, intersubjectivity and cultures based on the realization that the local is always implicated and imbricated in the global, and vice-versa. Whatever the ugly baggage identity politics bring into IR, such politics are a fact of life across the globe, and need to be analysed alongside the behaviour of states.

The second issue is that the politics of identity, together with the negative aspects such as nativism and xenophobia, have their roots in the tensions between a cosmopolitan universalist trend that claimed human membership irrespective of race within the condition of postnationalism and an opposing particularistic trend that emphasized difference, specificity, tradition and the values of autochthony (Mbembe, 2002b,). This reality has led many scholars, particularly those within the postmodern cosmopolitan camp, to dismiss nativism and xenophobia as nothing but catalogues of epistemological errors, essentialist mystifications, masculinist appropriations of popular dissent and grievance, populist millenarianism, the utterances of the false prophets of African revolution and as mere reverse racism. For instance, when certain black intellectuals formed the Native Club in South Africa in 2006, Mbembe immediately railed against the move, seeing it as a dangerous form of nativism akin to 'Nongqawuse Syndrome', which he defined as a potent mix of 'populist rhetoric and millenarian . . . politics which advocates, uses and legitimises self-destruction, or national suicide, as a means of salvation' (Mbembe, 2006b).

Third, this chapter attempts to deploy Parry's (2004, p. 40) 'unsententious interrogation' of such identity-inspired articulations as nationalism, Pan-Africanism, nativism and xenophobia with a view to considering what can be gained from a systematic historical analysis. What is clear from such analysis is that identity politics in their different forms were shaped by a combination of historical realities, some local and others global. In a postmodern world, globalization and global migration are provoking uncertainties that in turn fuel discourses of autochthony, nativism and xenophobia. The chapter has also demonstrated that what started as a popular-democratic nationalist imagination of freedom, founded on civic conceptions of citizenship, was gradually transformed into state ideology and state discourses that were chauvinistic, nativistic and xenophobic. Liberal democratic principles have not been a solution to these problems, but are easily appropriated alongside notions of rights to buttress and justify exclusions.

6
Towards New Approaches to Statehood and Governance-Building in Africa: The Somali Crisis Reconsidered

Louise Wiuff Moe

Introduction

While the 'fiction' of African statehood (Clapham, 1996a) was discarded as a result of post-Cold War geo-political changes, the state-centrism of political science, international relations (IR) analysis and dominant policymaking discourses remained impervious to change. Cold War militarization and geo-strategic politics have been replaced by a preoccupation with implementing liberal democratic statehood worldwide, and in this way to promote economic prosperity, human development and international security. Unsurprisingly, the ideal 'democratic practice' and its implementation along liberal lines is 'the mode of government of the most powerful states in the international system' (Cavatorta, 2009, p. 124), and carries with it a conception of how the international system *ought* to function (Clapham, 2000). The incongruence of this ideal of liberal statehood with the realties on the ground, in particular on the African continent, has given birth to the discourse of 'state failure'. African states are commonly defined in terms of what they are not, rather than what they are (Clapham, 2000), and the issue of correcting their 'wrongness' has high priority in international politics.

This chapter aims to contribute to a critique of the liberal agenda and the attendant 'failed state' discourse in IR theory. In particular, the analysis responds to two interrelated problems in the dominant discourse on African statehood: the tendency to ignore or overlook the wider historical and global factors behind 'state failure', and, second, the conception that the crisis of statehood is rooted in internal deficiencies intrinsic

to African leadership, culture and religion. These two misconceptions are instrumental in justifying the rather partisan agenda of 'building other peoples' states' (Reno, 2009) and in reinforcing notions of Africa's dependency on 'solutions' from the West.

The first section of this chapter analyses the past phases of postcolonial governance as it developed at the interface between local, national and global power dynamics. The objective is to reach a more accurate and well-founded understanding of statehood in Africa than that provided in the prevailing normative discourse on 'state failure'. Such a historically anchored reality check is critical, since different ways of assessing and explaining past developments lead to very different conclusions regarding the nature of the contemporary crises of states in Africa. These conclusions, in turn, have a major impact on what international policy responses will be formulated and implemented.

The second section discusses the dynamics of 'state failure' and reconstruction in different regions of Somalia. Taking the Somali case as point of departure, the section elaborates on the discussion of how international and global agendas, most recently the 'global war on terror', influence state-building and conflicts in Africa. It then explores how local and regional responses to the disintegration of the postcolonial state have provided alternative pathways to promoting political order. Particular attention is paid to how the reconciliation processes and local construction of governance arrangements within Somaliland (a subnational *de facto* state in the north of Somalia) provide an alternative to conventional peace- and state-building models.

The section does not simply reaffirm the intractability of the Somali crisis. Rather, it aims to use the discussion of the different developments in the north and the south as a basis for contesting the state- and Eurocentric approaches to promoting peace and political order, and for drawing attention to the significance of local dynamics and strategies in restoring peace and basic structures of governance and government.

Exactly which model of state is 'failing' in Africa?

A historical and conceptual account of the development of the state in Africa

International recognition of newly independent states from the early 1960s signified critical changes both in terms of creating a new dynamic in the international system, and in terms of national-level political power and the rules of governance in African states taking on

new characteristics and dynamics. Yet, more than three decades on, the imposed model of modern bureaucratic statehood and multiparty democracy has failed to consolidate in most parts of Africa. Rather, it became increasingly clear that the postcolonial state had in most cases not given rise to deeper socio-cultural transformations or consent, but instead had become a driving force behind conflict and unrest (Chazan et al., 1999). Against this backdrop, the dominant discourse on African statehood became that of 'state failure', a discourse that arose alongside the economic and political reforms that were imposed on African states from the late 1980s and through the 1990s. During this period, the Cold War logic of global containment was replaced by a neoliberal discourse of promoting democracy, good governance and free markets. This agenda was accompanied by increasing concern for human security and development, as well as an emphasis on legitimate and effective state institutions. Moreover, the West constructed a new nexus between security and development, based on the perception that 'their' development is important for 'our' security (Andersen et al., 2007). The debate on 'failed states' rose to the top of the security agenda of the US and Europe in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, since Afghanistan had served as a safe haven for al-Qaeda while it was planning these attacks. The political debate on 'failed states' since 2001 has thus been centred on US and European security interests (Bøås and Jennings, 2005).

The literature on failed states is relevant in that it draws attention to the real problem that many states in the poorer parts of the world lack the capacity to uphold law and order, deliver public services and address development problems. However, the real question is to what extent the 'failed state' debate actually furthers our understanding of the challenges and potentials of African statehood. Several scholars have pointed to the limited analytical value of the 'failed state' concept (Bøås and Jennings, 2005; Boege et al., 2009a, b; Clapham, 2000; Clements et al., 2007; Jones, 2008). One of the concept's major demerits is its normative and ahistorical foundations: 'failed states' are evaluated against an abstract idea of a prototype advanced Western state, a conception that also underpins perceptions of how the international system should function. Consequently, the dichotomy between 'ideal' and 'failed state' – implicit in current debates – tends to lift cases of 'state failure' out of their historical contexts. Notions of 'state failure', 'state weakness' or 'state collapse', in other words, function as moral labels rather than theoretical tools for empirical analysis (Bøås and Jennings,

2005; Jones, 2008). Moreover, the discourse on state failure, by cementing the notion that African states are not what they are 'supposed' to be, says little about what can be hoped for in the future.

In order to further understanding of the current challenges and future prospects of African statehood, it is imperative to investigate *which model* of the state is 'failing', and what the historical and political processes behind this 'failure' are. These questions appear to be seriously underresearched within 'failed state' discourse.

The 'ideal-type sovereign state' has very little relevance as a starting point for analysing African statehood (or its so-called 'failure'), since such states have never existed in most of Africa.[1] Rather, the state as it developed in early postcolonial years was commonly characterized by centralized authority and personalized patron–client relations between state authorities and fractions of society and, correspondingly, informal decision-making processes regarding the distribution of resources, all thriving within the framework of a supposedly 'modern bureaucracy' (Chazan et al., 1999; Engel and Olsen, 2005b). The reorganization of governance arrangements in the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, had the 'dual effects of expanding state structures, while at the same time frequently limiting the effectiveness of these agencies' (Chazan et al., 1999, p. 54).

The explanations for the development of this form of rule, commonly termed neo-patrimonialism, are manifold and vary according to their theoretical foundations. Explanations rooted in a state-centric tradition explain neo-patrimonialism as a consequence of development in which 'the state has failed to penetrate society sufficiently and therefore is hostage to it'. By contrast, explanations rooted in a society-centric tradition hold that 'the society has failed to hold the state accountable and is therefore prey to it' (Mamdani, 1996, p. 11). The latter explanation can underestimate local agency, portraying the population as victims of anarchy or power abuse (Menkhaus, 2006a), whereas the former risks equating the concept of political governance with the institutional behaviour of a strong state and assuming that only a very particular kind of society is compatible with the exercise of political governance. While the society-centric position is often reflected in more recent discourses on democratization, the state-centric position dominates much academic work aimed at explaining the development of African statehood.

By arguing that the development of the neo-patrimonial state was rooted in the 'Africanization of politics' that allegedly occurred from the early years of independence onwards, Chabal (2005, p. 22) provides

one example of state-centric analysis. In this account of postcolonial politics in Africa, Chabal explains the failure of the imported Western state model to produce democracy by pointing to a mismatch between, on the one hand, political arrangements designed for citizens who are assumed to be 'discrete, autonomous and self-referential individuals who cast their votes according to . . . overtly political criteria' and, on the other, Africans who 'cannot be conceived outside of the community' from which they hail (Chabal, 2005, p. 23). Similarly, a recent account by Hyden (2006) characterizes the crisis of African statehood as a deep-seated tension between modern statehood and African societies. Drawing on the Durkheimian distinction between organic and mechanical forms of solidarity, Hyden argues that the distinction between community and collectivity is useful in illustrating the traditions and nature of social organization in Africa, and thus useful in explaining why the state in Africa is 'problematic'. Collectivity refers to a group of autonomous individuals who work together to reach specific objectives, whereas community refers to people who are tied together 'by a sense of affective solidarity' (Hyden, 2006, p. 53). In Africa, he argues, community prevails and tends to dominate: 'Allegiance in African society was – and continues to be – functionally diffuse and indivisible, involving the kind of primordial allegiance to which kinship ties easily lend themselves' (Hyden, 2006, p. 68).

Disturbingly, the assumptions underpinning such state-centric accounts bear a marked resemblance to colonial ideology by distinguishing the 'civilized' from the 'natives'. As Mamdani notes (1996), the notion that Africans are exclusively defined by 'primordial' allegiance to collective identities such as kinship was basic to legitimizing and exercising colonial rule, and, in effect, disqualifies 'Africans' as individuals capable of governing their own state. Explicit colonial ideas of Western superiority have been partly replaced by a more politically correct rhetoric, but there is a discomfiting continuity between the colonial ideology and the way in which the contemporary misportrayal of the conditions and causes of the crisis of African statehood 'serves to legitimize and reproduce the very imperial qualities of international order which lie at the heart of so-called "state failure" ' (Jones, 2008, p. 197).

The crisis in Somalia, discussed below, is one of many in which culture is commonly portrayed as a causal factor. Somali culture is in this narrative reduced to an intrinsically divisive mode of social organization based on blood ties. As Samatar argues (1992), this narrative confuses Somali tradition and kinship – a multifaceted social web, with blood ties just one dimension – with contemporary politicized expressions

of clanism, and fails to take into account the broader socio-economic and political transformations that produced competitive and divisive clanism. In fact, the framing of culture and tradition in static and primordial terms has resulted in international policies vis-à-vis Somalia that have reinforced the very clanistic behaviour that has been blamed for the crisis in the first place.

An alternative to these ahistorical explanations that portray the state in universalist and programmatic terms, and culture as 'primordial', is the scholarship focusing on the way statehood was introduced at the time of independence and on the conditions under which it was maintained. This latter approach has helped situate the crisis of African states within the historical context of global political economy and geopolitics (see, for example, Jones, 2008).

At the time of decolonization, the new African leaders were confronted with newly envisioned pluralist political institutions imported from the West, while having experienced only the values and institutions of authoritarian colonial rule. In short, the new leaders were given a structure, but lacked a power base and the means to legitimize their new status as state authorities (Chazan et al., 1999).

One crucial factor shaping early postcolonial statehood in Africa was the geopolitics of the Cold War. The convention of 'negative sovereignty' – that is, states holding formal sovereignty but unable or unwilling to discharge basic state functions – was applied during the Cold War as part of containment politics. Thus, African states – in their role as 'buffer states' – were afforded protection and military support by either of the superpowers without any concern for their internal functioning and legitimacy. Indeed, internal pressures for reform were often violently suppressed by authoritarian leaders relying on external support (Clapham, 1996a; Herbst, 1996; Jones, 2008).

Thus, the process of decolonization did not lead to a clean break with the illegitimate and centralized rule introduced during colonial times, just as the pattern of self-serving international intervention to establish certain political and social orders and conditions did not end with the advent of independence (Jones, 2008).

By the mid-1970s, it was becoming increasingly clear, however, that neo-patrimonial governance did not foster – and often undermined – economic development. And as, after 1989, the superpowers lost the political incentive to support repressive regimes, state authorities lost their capacity to accumulate and redistribute resources to clients. The neo-patrimonial state was slowly breaking down as it lost its relevance and effectiveness as the core of resource allocation (Andersen, 2007; Chabal, 2005).

In sum, the state as it has evolved in the postcolonial – or perhaps more accurately, the neocolonial – era is a historically specific product of colonial legacy and of often contradictory forces and interests interacting at the local, national and global levels (Jones, 2008). Investigating African statehood with reference to process, rather than through the language of 'state failure', re-emphasizes historical contextualization and also provides greater clarity as to the nature of the contemporary crisis of African statehood. As Mamdani notes (2001c, p. 652), 'it is not just any state that is collapsing; it is specifically what remains of the colonial state in Africa that is collapsing.' Moreover, this understanding, by rejecting cultural explanations of state failure and challenging the perceived universality of the Western ideal-type state, invites greater intellectual flexibility in considering contemporary and future approaches to governance and statehood in Africa.

The case of Somalia clearly illustrates the vital need to develop new approaches to state- and governance-building as well as to conflict-transformation. First, while Somalis themselves bear part of the responsibility for the disintegration of the state, Somalia has experienced the dire consequences of unsuccessful external interventions and invasion, events that exemplify how 'failed state' discourse, with its underlying beliefs in 'problematic' African culture and religion, lack not only historical justification, but also produce misconceived and shortsighted intervention policies. Second, developments in northern Somali regions, particularly Somaliland, show that under more conducive conditions, and in the absence of external agendas, Somalis have been able to restore peace by drawing on effective Somali traditions of negotiation and compromise, and have also succeeded in reviving structures of governance based on hybrid forms of authority. The relative effectiveness of these dynamic and complex local and regional efforts demonstrates the relevance of reinvesting in local agency and tradition as vibrant resources in reconstruction processes. More generally, these developments necessitate reconsideration by the international community of how best to approach governance- and peacebuilding under conditions of so-called fragility.

The Somali crisis: International and local responses

Misconceived international policies in Somalia

Stateless Somalia, with its warlordism and piracy and its reputed position in the global war on terror, poses significant challenges to the international community. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, numerous

internationally sponsored negotiations have been convened to revive a central state. Yet none of these initiatives have produced meaningful results (Samatar, 2007), and the country has earned the dubious distinction of being the most extreme case of 'state failure'.

The many externally led conferences convened to restore unity and peace in Somalia have generally relied on conventional diplomatic procedures, on the grounds that 'traditional Somali assemblies were unwieldy and far too time consuming, often lasting months rather than days or weeks' (Menkhaus, 2000, p. 192). One characteristic of these conferences, usually held in hotels outside Somalia, is the international community's inclination to give top priority to the interests and participation of leaders of armed factions with clanistic claims to power. The practice of 'waltzing with warlords' was justified as necessary *realpolitik* (Menkhaus, 2000) and, according to Samatar (2002, pp. 219–20), followed the logic that 'since Somalis are instinctively programmed according to the exclusive claims by their respective propinquity, none can fully escape "tribalism" and clan strongmen are therefore the real players in any negotiation' (see also Samatar, 2006).

This rationale contributed to a situation in which the Somali population, including community leaders, intellectuals and traditional leaders, were marginalized, while faction leaders learned to perfection how to manipulate the international diplomatic game. In this way, they gained access to the resources and aid channelled to the state, without having an interest in creating peace and national stability. Hence, meddling by the international community inadvertently fuelled warlordism and clanistic power struggles for state funds, at the same time preventing local communities from mobilizing their resources to promote reconciliation and reconstruction (Samatar, 2006).

The rapid rise to power of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006 brought a measure of peace and lawfulness to Somalia that neither the Transitional National Government nor its predecessor, the warlord-dominated Transitional Federal Government, had been able or willing to provide. Since the mid-1990s, the courts had operated in several local neighbourhoods, their confined role being to provide order and justice in the absence of formal institutions of government. They united in 2006, in response to the terror of the warlords and the increasingly bad and demoralizing situation in the south (Samatar, 2006, 2007).

The stability achieved by the UIC was shortlived, however. In December 2006, with tensions between the UIC and Ethiopia mounting, the latter intervened militarily with heavy US backing and succeeded in ousting the movement. This invasion and the subsequent brutal

occupation were 'justified' as necessary steps in the infamous global war on terror, but *produced* exactly the violent extremism they had ostensibly set out to combat (Menkhaus, 2009b).

The war on terror has become emblematic of recent US (and more broadly Western) foreign policy. However, ideologically driven attempts by the West to undermine political orders based on Islamic values in the Arab world, 'legitimized' by framing Islamic movements as 'enemies of democracy by definition' (Cavatorta, 2009, p. 125), antedate the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, the policies adopted in the name of counterterrorism can be seen as a radicalized extension of the long-held Western insistence that liberal democracy is the only legitimate model for political order and the corresponding denunciation of Islamic policies. A particularly telling example of this occurred in the early 1990s, when the West supported the Algerian army in stopping the democratic elections after it became clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut*) was heading for victory. In this case, as in Somalia, external actors were demonizing and defeating an Islamic movement that enjoyed substantial local support, while empowering political actors (supposedly committed to secular politics) who were fundamentally disconnected from the population (Cavatorta, 2009). Such Western partisan interventionism has, as the recent case of Somalia confirms, devastating consequences not only for the invaded countries but also for relations between the West and parts of the Arab world.

To sum up, explaining the crisis in Somalia as a 'failure' primarily caused by clanism and exacerbated by Islamic radicalism masks the complicity of international actors in compounding the crisis. It also reinforces the notion that Somalia's crisis can and must be solved by foreigners. Critical self-reflection by the international community, in particular the US, is imperative if the repetition of demonstrably unsuccessful policies is to be avoided.

Reconstruction in Somaliland

Locally driven reconciliation and hybrid governance arrangements

While it is almost impossible to overstate the despair and suffering flowing from the disintegration of the state and the subsequent violent power struggles, it is important to note that Somalia has not been stripped of all organizing structures since 1991.[2] As Menkhaus argues (2007, p. 74), Somalia is 'not merely a repository of lessons

learned on how not to pursue state-building. In some respects, it is at the forefront of a poorly understood trend – the rise of informal systems of adaptation, security and governance in response to the prolonged absence of a central government'. Local security and governance arrangements in the supposedly 'ungoverned' Somali regions are typically based on constantly renegotiated alliances between a range of actors, including businessmen and local political elites, along with traditional authorities, religious leaders and civic actors (Menkhaus, 2006a, b, 2007, 2009a). Moreover, in Puntland and Somaliland in the north of Somalia, local and 'informal' systems of governance and security, including customary institutions, have become building-blocks in alternative sub-national state-building processes. In other words, in these regions the disintegration of a central Somali state has caused a shift towards the decentralized reconstruction of governance and government. The 'Puntland State' in the northeast was formed in 1998, and has since functioned as a semi-autonomous political unit that is constitutionally committed to being part of an anticipated federal state of Somalia. By contrast, the state of Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence in 1991, is firmly committed to secession. Somaliland has developed into a remarkably peaceful and well-functioning political unit, and has recovered better and achieved greater stability than any other Somali region (Menkhaus, 2009a; Samatar, 2007).

Yet there have been setbacks and tensions in Somaliland, including a recent political crisis on the eve of the presidential election of 26 June 2010 triggered by the semi-authoritarian behaviour of the previous government, which was clinging to power beyond its term.[3] Moreover, while Somaliland's broader achievement of peace, stability and development is widely commended, its aspirations to independent statehood are intensely debated and contested among Somalis.[4]

Notwithstanding the political challenges and the controversy surrounding recognition, the processes of local reconstruction in Somaliland since 1991 have been particularly admirable and offer some insight into the significance of local agency to the wider discussions about peace- and state-building. First, the Somaliland peace processes during the early 1990s provide an impressive indigenous alternative to conventional UN-style peacebuilding interventions. While external international and regional actors, along with corporate-suited Somali warlords, set the agenda in the high-profile peace- and state-building conferences in the south, the peace processes in the north were driven by local actors and benefited mainly from the enormous negotiation and reconciliation skills of the elders.

Numerous localized and regional negotiations between elders from different clans dealt with civil issues, such as restoring cooperative relations to facilitate commerce, negotiating access to grazing, reopening roads, returning stolen property and reducing livestock raids. These negotiations were critical in containing local-level violence and in paving the way for the large-scale peace conferences that brought all the northern clans together to negotiate the pillars and institutional framework of a new political order. The Boroma conference in 1993 was particularly noteworthy in this regard, and provides an example of 'an indigenous popular peacemaking process that has few parallels in contemporary Africa' (Bradbury, 2008, p. 106). During this conference, attended by an estimated 2000 people, a peace charter based on an extended version of Somali customary law was agreed. In addition, a national charter was adopted that defined a hybrid system of governance based on a bicameral legislature, with traditional authorities afforded an explicit role in the upper house (Jhazbhay, 2009; Menkhaus, 2000; WSP International Somali Programme, 2005).

It is important to note that peace and stability were not re-established *because of* the revival of state structures. Rather, peace and stability were promoted locally and became a *precondition* for establishing a common political structure (pers. comm., 3 April 2008, Hargeisa). Some of the features of the peace processes in Somaliland that distinguish it from the top-down peacemaking attempts in the south are the synergy between local peacemaking and large-scale political reconstruction; local design of the process; acknowledgement of the need for a very flexible timeframe; innovative merging of traditional conflict-resolution and modern institution-building; and broad public involvement (Bradbury, 2008; Jhazbhay, 2009; Menkhaus, 2000).[5]

It has been argued that the international community has missed an opportunity to build on the consensus reached in Somaliland to reinforce and promote 'good governance'. On the other hand, a good case can be made that the lack of substantial aid for the peace process has been advantageous to Somaliland, since local processes of reconciliation were able to develop on their own terms, without the imposition of external agendas (interviews, 17 April 2008, 17 April 2008a; see also Bradbury, 2008).

Second, the case of Somaliland underscores the innovativeness, strong agency and aptitude of Somalis in promoting development and reviving structures of law and order: these human faculties flourished once a modicum of peace had been achieved. In the processes of reconstruction, local resources and non-state forms of authority have provided the

foundations for order and have, furthermore, been coupled with formal governance practices. Menkhaus (2009b, p. 3), who characterizes Somaliland as a 'hybrid state', argues that the successes in keeping crime rates low and in maintaining a relatively safe and peaceful environment 'are due in no small measure to the country's innovative integration of traditional and modern sources of law and authority'.

In 1993, a council of 84 elders was formally incorporated into the state structures: they serve as members of the upper house of parliament, or *Guurti*. This is the most visible and explicit (but, as we will see, not unproblematic) instance of integrating traditional leaders into the formal structures of governance. However, also on the local level, hybrid forms of authority prevail in most governance domains.

In fact, it is particularly in the spheres of local security and law that the coupling of local non-state institutions (customary and Sharia-based) and formal institutions (police and official courts) has proven rather effective (interviews, 20 March 2008, 15 April 2008, 25 April 2008, Hargeisa). The vast majority of everyday disputes and criminal cases are taken care of through the customary system. If suspects refuse to hand themselves over, the police force can be called in to undertake the arrest. Thereafter, the *Aqils*[6] lead the procedure of traditional justice, apply Somali customary law (*xeer*), and ensure that agreements on the payment of blood compensation are reached. Settlements, once reached, are sometimes registered in and thereby 'formalized' by the official courts (interviews, 15 April 2008, 25 April 2008, Hargeisa; see also Gundel, 2006; Menkhaus, 2007).

In large-scale conflicts, the army plays an important role in stopping the immediate fighting. However, even in these cases it is the clan elders, using the customary system, who mainly handle the negotiations required to settle the conflict (interview, 20 March 2008, Hargeisa). Thus, formal and customary security and judicial practices supplement each other in various ways.

The reliance on non-state and customary forms of authority and governance evident in Somaliland is typically viewed as a sign of fragility and failure. While this diagnosis may be correct in some cases, it would be erroneous to conclude that non-state forms of authority are by definition obstacles to enhancing governance. On the contrary, as Clapham argues (2000), state collapse has been intensified and accelerated by overly ambitious attempts to suppress or replace non-state governance systems, while imposing a measure of state control over societies that have exceeded what the state was ultimately able to bear (see also Herbst, 1996). In other words, 'failure' commonly stems from the displacement

of existing governance mechanisms combined with the incapability of newly introduced systems to provide order and human security, an incapacity that can be accentuated by the destruction of formal institutions that typically flows from civil war.

Hence, approaching the problem of political order and security in a non-dualistic manner, by allowing innovative attempts to combine existing non-state governance practices and customary authority with 'modern' types of governance, can have significant advantages (Boege et al., 2009a, b; Clements et al., 2007; Menkhaus, 2006a, 2007). Yet, the potential of processes of integration among different sources of authority to lead to legitimate and viable forms of governance hinges on the degree of local participation in these processes.

At the central level of government, 'hybridity' in Somaliland has not been trouble-free. While the integration of the council of elders into state structures initially boosted popular support for the government and was critical in securing stability (interviews, 17 April 2008, 9 May 2008; see also Bradbury, 2008; Jhazbhay, 2009), *Guurti* members have had severe difficulty over time in maintaining their downward accountability, since they have become increasingly involved in shaping 'high politics' (interviews, 15 April 2008, 17 April 2008, 17 April 2008a, 9 May 2008, 9 May 2008a, Hargeisa). Recently, the *Guurti* facilitated the abuse of power by the government by extending the term of the former president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, against the popular will. Clearly, the merging of customary authority and state authority does not *per se* secure downward accountability and legitimate governance. Rather, maintaining a productive synthesis of the virtues of tradition and the benefits of 'modern' institutions is an ongoing process, which needs constant negotiation and thoughtful evaluation.

On the local governance level in Somaliland, there are positive indications that actors from communities are involved in shaping and influencing the processes through which different forms of authority are combined and negotiated, and the new governance arrangements emerging from these processes. For example, ongoing dialogue meetings – which include community representatives, clan elders, ministerial representatives and NGOs – have been initiated to promote harmonization and mutually reinforcing relations among customary law, the Sharia courts and the secular courts in the Maroodi Jeex, Togdheer and Sanaag regions. These meetings focus on achieving explicit agreements on the 'division of labour' between the different actors within the law, and on reaching local consensus on procedures to buttress these agreements. Thus, for example, a mechanism for referring human rights

violations (in particular, gender-based violence) from the traditional system to the formal courts has been agreed; clan elders have committed to including vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), within the system of clan protection; and local action groups, comprising community members and local leaders, have been organized to continue the work of harmonizing the different legal systems in the three regions (Horn Peace, 2008; pers. comm., 30 March 2008, Hargeisa).

Large-scale community policing projects in Burao and Hargeisa provide further illustration of locally driven efforts to unite different forces so as to respond constructively to local needs for security. These projects were initiated by clan elders, who convened a series of meetings and negotiations between various representatives of the communities and from the government police and the judiciary. The meetings aimed at addressing mutual distrust[7] and reaching an understanding of common interest, and led to impressive systems of community policing comprising joint patrols as well as committees made up of police, judicial and community representatives. All told, these arrangements have significantly enhanced the rule of law for families and vulnerable groups of IDPs, as well as the business community, which provided substantial financial backing for the initiatives (interviews, 28 March 2008, 15 April 2008, Hargeisa; see also DRC, 2006).

The stability achieved through lengthy reconciliation processes and various forms of local cooperation between state and non-state actors across the spectrum of society has contributed to an environment conducive to several other activities, beyond security and law, critical to social and political development. Somaliland has completed four rounds of democratic multi-party elections (local council elections in 2002, parliamentary elections for the House of Representatives in 2005 and presidential elections in 2003 and in 2010). Moreover, cities and villages have been substantially rebuilt, the business community is vibrant and a basic system of social services has been revived. Community-owned institutions have come into being and illustrate that local developmental initiatives clearly transcend mere survival or 'coping' (Samatar, 2001). One such is Amoud University, established in 1998 through the joint efforts of local people, elders, businesspeople and the diaspora.

The reconstruction process in Somaliland clearly challenges the image of Somalia as the epitome of violent anarchy and social decay. The peace process and the developments it has triggered also indicate that the restoration of peace and political order against the backdrop of civil war may not be as dependent on external involvement as is often assumed (Bradbury, 2008). Surely the northern process of reconstruction, drawing

on Somali tradition as a plentiful reserve of resources and assets, has yielded far better results in terms of peace and stability than the externally led, top-down attempts to establish a central state in the south.

This is not to deny that Somaliland has not encountered its own problems, divisions and political deficiencies. Recent political divisions and tensions have already been noted. Somaliland has, moreover, been accused of 'othering Somalis from outside the region' as a means of securing its desired independence (Samatar, 2007, p. 63), thereby engendering destructive north–south enmity.

Yet, Somaliland's challenges and the tensions arising from the issue of secession do not nullify the significance of the confidence and aware-ness of local people – which have emerged out of peace – in mobilizing their own resources, cultural capital and traditions to address devel-opment, security and the rule of law. Public projects and the creation of local governance arrangements that integrate different sources of authority and are geared towards addressing common needs are impor-tant investments in peace and cooperation. These latter are, in turn, critical to the further (and much needed) transition to and construction of viable common government structures.

The coupling of state and non-state forms of governance to enhance peace and security is not unique to Somaliland. In fact, 'hybridity' is a common feature of social and political organization in many countries in Africa and, more broadly, in the global South. While the coexistence of multiple structures of power and governance does imply contradic-tory logics and confrontations, there is increasing evidence of – and interest in – workable alternative governance systems and arrangements resulting from positive accommodation between various sources of state and non-state authority (Boege et al., 2009a, b; Clements et al., 2007; Menkhaus, 2006a, b, 2007, 2009b). Thus, support for local 'informal' systems need not be antithetical to simultaneous support for a national state structure. Rather, as Menkhaus suggests (2006a, b, 2007, 2009a), in Africa the rise of 'mediated' and 'hybrid' states is observable, with policies at different levels 'nested together in a negotiated division of labour' to enhance overall governance capacity under conditions of state weakness (Menkhaus, 2006b, p. 103). Along similar lines, Boege et al. (2009a, b) and Clements et al. (2007) propose the concept of 'hybrid political orders' as providing a perspective more constructive than that offered by 'failed state'.

Emerging concepts such as the 'hybrid political orders' and 'mediated state' depart significantly from the dominant state-centric conception

of 'good governance'. Instead, they direct attention to the diversity of authority structures and institutions that influence processes of governance and institution-building, and to the ways in which these are combined and contested.

Importantly, the concepts of 'hybrid political orders' and 'mediated state' are proposed as analytical concepts, not as 'better' alternatives to the ideal-type state model. Thus, rather than presenting political hybridity and normative pluralism as a goal or ambition, the concepts draw attention to 'what is the case' (Boege et al., 2009b, p. 88) in several 'fragile' regions across the global South. On this basis, they aim to bring greater clarity to the empirical challenges and opportunities facing local and international actors wishing to contribute to state-building and conflict-transformation. Replacing the concept of 'failed state' with 'political hybridity' and 'mediated state' comes with an acknowledgement that attempts to contribute to governance-building, state-building and conflict-transformation need to work *with* rather than *against* the forces on the ground. This also implies that, contrary to the fixation on deficiencies and fragility common to 'failed state' discourse, 'political hybridity' research agendas set out to explore the 'strength and resilience of socio-political formations that are present on ground, that work, and that provide public goods for people and communities' (Boege et al., 2009a, p. 13). Such exploration allows the focus to shift from implementation of a particular state model to supporting gradual processes of transition and governance-building. After all, statehood may not always be the 'all or nothing condition' IR theory often assumes, since there is no clear demarcation between the well-known Westphalian state model (and the comforting system of state-to-state relations) and the uneasy sphere of stateless anarchy (Clapham, 2000).

Conclusion

While revealing much about the dominance of Western ideology in IR, the concept of 'failed state' explains little about the factors behind the disintegration of states and even less about the dynamic processes to reconfigure governance arrangements on the sub-national level, the changing nature of political authority and the localized forces that support development, provide protection and ensure survival for the population.

Hence, through the lens of 'state failure' one is apt to see what is *not* present (the ideal-type liberal state), while remaining ignorant of

what *is*. This, in turn, leads to the misunderstanding that state-building, bluntly put, can and must 'start from scratch' (Boege et al., 2009a) in Africa's fragile regions. From this perspective, existing non-state structures of governance are seen as something to be dismissed, co-opted or defeated to allow for the expansion of liberal democratic institutions and economic development. The distressing consequences of this approach have been illustrated in this chapter by reference to international involvement in Somalia.

A shift in perspective beyond the categories of state failure and fragility and the associated reconstruction templates is urgently needed to avoid misconceived 'state-building from scratch' and to become aware of what works and in what way. Indeed, the dynamic processes of change, adaptation and mutual accommodation currently occurring at the interface of the institutional state and African societies offer new opportunities for and challenges to scholars of IR and political science to adopt entirely new forms of governance analysis. In the best case, this could lead to the development of theories and concepts that break with the long tradition of self-referential Eurocentrism.

Notes

1. While the incongruence between the ideal-type sovereign state and the realities in great parts of Africa is particularly obvious, it is important to note that this model is an ideal *conception*, rather than an actual representation of any empirical and given reality of 'statehood in the global North'.
2. While secondary sources provide the basis for this section, the analysis has been significantly shaped by my three-and-a-half months of fieldwork in Somaliland in 2008. The fieldwork comprised a number of semi-structured key-informant interviews (individual interviews as well as focus group discussions); observer participation in traditional decision-making forums; as well as observation and exploration of the challenges and achievements of ongoing local initiatives to facilitate complementarity between different types of governance and legitimate authority. During my visit, I was based at the Academy for Peace and Development, a local Somali NGO. Because of security precautions and limited funds, the fieldwork was conducted only in the region of Woqooyi Galbeed/Maroodi Jeex, and mostly in the capital city of Hargeisa.
3. Former President Dahir Riyale Kahin came to power in a democratic election in 2002. Riyale's term officially ended after five years but was continually extended without the consent of the democratically elected House of Representatives. Finally, in June 2010, the election went ahead and Riyale was replaced by Ahmed M. Mahamoud Silanyo.
4. Direct and active contestation of Somaliland emanates from Puntland, since both semi-autonomous states claim the northeastern regions of Sool and Sanaag. This border dispute has on several occasions led to violent clashes.

5. Somali clan assemblies are characterized by open and consultative processes. However, women are typically excluded from decision-making.
6. In contemporary Somaliland, the *Aqils* are the category of traditional authorities most actively and directly involved (as mediators, peacemakers, judges) in the everyday life of Somalis.
7. During President Barre's rule, the state police earned the deep mistrust of the population.

7

Diasporas and African Development: The Struggle for Sustainable Peace and Development in Sierra Leone

Alfred Zack-Williams

Introduction: Making of the Sierra Leone diaspora, historical and new

In this chapter, the role of the Sierra Leone diaspora in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding in their homeland is examined. In analysing this process, attention is drawn to the process of external intervention in postwar reconstruction, noting that this was defined by the Liberal Peace Project (LPP); that is, the belief that world peace can be realized by the spread of political liberalism or capitalist democracy (van der Linden, 2001). It is argued that neoliberalism has defined the new relationship between African states and the developed capitalist nations. Furthermore, in looking at governance, in particular chieftaincy reform and decentralization, I argue that the imposition of neoliberal ideas has tended to deprive the 'rebellious youth' of agency as the *ancien regime* of chieftaincy was strengthened by externally funded reform. Finally, in examining the activities of local and international NGOs in the process of conflict resolution and postwar reconstruction, attention is drawn to the commitment by the former to development issues, thus pointing to the ephemeral nature of the contributions of Northern NGOs to issues of sustainable development.

Paradoxically, Sierra Leone diasporas are to be found both within and outside the African continent, located in the East (Chauhan, 1999; de Silva Jayasuriya and Pankhurst, 2003; Hunwick and Powell, 2007) as well as the West (the source of interest in this chapter), and indeed comprising overlapping diasporas. Sierra Leone contributed to the making of

the Atlantic diaspora in no small measure, since many slavers visited this area of West Africa during the trade in human cargo. There is the celebrated case of Sengbe Pieh of *Amistad* fame; the voyage of Captain John Newton, the author of the confessional hymn, *Amazing Grace*; but also the transportation of the Gullahs to South Carolina and Georgia because of their skills in rice production. Indeed, Bunce Island, off the coast of Sierra Leone, was founded in 1670 and became the largest slave fort on the Rice Coast of West Africa. From it, tens of thousands of slaves were exported to the New World. The island was controlled by the Royal African Company (with official recognition by the British Crown), the Gambia Adventurers, the private partners of Grant, Oswald and Company, and John and Alexander Anderson. There was a vertical link between rich slave traders such as Richard Oswald, who struck an agreement with Henry Laurens, a wealthy rice plantation owner in South Carolina. Moreover, Laurens was prepared to bypass the middle man by sending his own ships to buy slaves directly from Bunce Island. Farmers in this part of West Africa had been producing rice for thousands of years, and African 'rice-growing know-how was essential to the prosperity of the American rice industry' (www.visitsierraleone. org/Attractions/.../Bunce-Island.html). Paradoxically, it was the search for a home for freed slaves from the New World that led to the initial founding of Sierra Leone and later its establishment as a colony of Britain.

When the American War of Independence broke out, many slaves were encouraged to fight for the British with the promise of manumission at the end of the war. Following the cessation of hostilities, a large number of these former slaves were taken to Nova Scotia, where they had been promised land. While this promise never materialized, many former slaves migrated to London in search of freedom, since the judgement of Lord Justice Mansfield in the James Somerset case meant that slavery was unlawful in England. It was not long before these black poor were deemed to be a social problem in Georgian London. In 1787, a piece of land on the west coast of Africa was secured as a home for these liberated Africans (Schama, 2005; Wyse, 1989). Freetown, 'the province of freedom' (Peterson, 1969), had a difficult start as the territory was attacked by surrounding communities and many of its inhabitants killed, while others were re-sold into slavery (Schama, 2005).

This marked the emergence of a hybrid, cosmopolitan community, a creolized culture of European and African values, which was continuously expanded by assimilation of other groups both through internal and external immigration. In 1792, the territory was administered by

the Sierra Leone Company and the founders were determined to end slavery. In 1808, following the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire, the territory was annexed as a Crown colony. The population of the colony increased from 2500 in 1808 to around 6000 in 1818 due to migration into the colony, as more slaves were captured and released into the province of freedom. Many of the returnees were Europeanized Africans (to be known as creoles) who were soon to play a major role in spreading Western education and culture in the sub-region (Zack-Williams, 2002). Many members of this community migrated to other territories to work and live, in the process forming a number of cohesive groupings of the Sierra Leone diaspora on the west coast of Africa from Banjul in the Gambia down to Luanda in Angola. These communities are often referred to as Saros or Akus. Throughout the colonial period, Sierra Leone developed the image of 'royal, loyal Sierra Leone', because of its close ties to the British Crown; and in 1961 independence was foisted upon a hesitant colony.

In the post-1945 period, thousands of Sierra Leoneans and their descendants have made their homes abroad, mainly in Britain, the US, Canada and other West African territories. This wave of postwar migrants consisted mainly of seafarers and former students who used the right of citizenship to stay on. With the 1962 Immigration Act, however, the rights of Commonwealth immigrants to enter the United Kingdom were limited. These new communities were to be found in metropolitan centres such as London, Birmingham, Manchester, Tyneside and Liverpool. Others established settlements mainly in large urban centres on the US east coast, such as the Washington, Maryland and Virginia conurbation and the New York, New Jersey and Connecticut tri-state area. There are also small communities on the west coast and in Florida, Texas and Georgia as well as in the midwest. In Canada, they are mainly in Toronto. Initially, many of these migrants were engaged in manual work, but as globalization intensified (accompanied by Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAPs), and as labour shortages became acute in the developed world, many skilled Sierra Leoneans voted with their feet and moved to the northern hemisphere in search of a better life and political freedom.

The rapid decline in the country's fortunes, accompanied by the demise of democracy after 1968, impelled further migration of highly skilled and mobile workers. The chronic balance of payment problem propelled the authorities down the long road to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with their SAPs. The net effect was worsening economic conditions, as stagflation took hold

and political authoritarianism became well entrenched. These policies triggered another wave of outward migration, which was to be repeated in the late 1990s following the attacks on the capital in 1997, 1999 and 2000 by the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) ally. Many who left on this occasion went to neighbouring African countries, yet significant numbers gained asylum status and the right to enter Britain, the US and Canada. Indeed, the shortage of skilled professionals has led to calls by successive Sierra Leone governments since the end of the war for Sierra Leoneans to return home to help rebuild the nation. This shortage has meant that the diasporas continue to be a source of supply for skilled individuals in the country,[1] as well as having much influence in the homeland.

Civil society, social integration and the new Sierra Leone diasporas

Civil society in the diaspora can assume several forms: religious associations, national associations, hometown associations, social clubs, women's groups, ethnic associations, action groups, fraternities (Masonic Lodges), sororities, professional associations and interest groups (Zack-Williams, 1997). Civil society plays a major role in integrating migrants into the new society of their choice, largely because of its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the state and the relative paucity of knowledge among migrants of their new environment. In many cases, membership of such organizations acts as a mechanism of social integration into the new society, thus linking the diaspora with the homeland. Civil society plays a major role in transforming the individual from a migrant (often seen as a problem) into a member of a diasporic community, which 'with its strange association with the dialectic of simultaneous flight from and longing for home, foregrounds questions of emotion and desire' (Mercer et al., 2008, p. 51).

A number of these diasporic civil society agencies operated in Sierra Leone before, during and after the country's civil war, assuming the form of 'local Non-Governmental Organizations' (NGOs), working in specific areas away from, and often alongside Northern NGOs. Among these were the US-based Kono Union-USA, Leonenet Street Children Project, Kailahun District Development Foundation, Koinadugu Descendant Organization and the UK-based Pujehun District Development Association. At the height of the war, there were over 70 NGOs of all descriptions operating in the country. Indeed, the former minister of information in the Tejan-Kabba administration, Professor Cecil Blake,

who was seconded for a term from his university position in the US, complained that many of these Northern NGOs were operating without any formal accreditation from his ministry (Blake, pers. comm., 2002, Freetown). We shall return to their activities later.

The civil war and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

Given the susceptibility of African societies to economic crisis and conflict, policies such as SAPs and peacebuilding projects have defined Africa's international relations with developed capitalist formations: the need to rectify Africa's shattered economies and to prevent a relapse into conflict. The net effect of these policies is that Africa has been hemmed within global capitalism.

Karbo (2008, p. 129) has argued, 'there is potential for sustainable peace building in Africa that is rooted in strong and deeply embedded indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms'. Yet peacebuilding in Africa has assumed a top-down character that is externally imposed. Peacebuilding has been described as a neoliberal construct grounded in the idea that democracy and free markets alone can deliver peace and prosperity. Peacebuilding *per se* is not novel to Africa, as diverse forms of peacebuilding have been identified in various part of the continent (Albert, 2008; Karbo, 2008; Murithi, 2008). According to Karbo, what is new is 'the exportation and "imposition" of peacebuilding and development interventions based on the LPP, which asserts that world peace can be realized through the spread of political liberalism and capitalist democracy. This assertion in turn is based on the assumption that modern democracies have never fought wars with one another. Consequently, the advocates of LPP have argued that peace can be attained by pursuing a liberal foreign policy that promotes free trade and human rights. As a post-Cold War international relations tool, LPP has been described as a 'silver bullet for dealing with conflict in the long term' (Richmond, 2009) designed to settle conflicts in the land of the uninitiated, namely the non-capitalist world. As a programme with a universal remit but a one-dimensional framework that fits all (just like SAPs), it runs the risk of triggering relapses into conflict and backsliding, being inefficient and of giving rise to accusations of adventurism.

It is not surprising that LPP has been criticised for being self-interested and imperialistic, an ideology premised on a Cold War *mission civilisatrice*. It has, critics note, demonstrated its emptiness in its inability to provide basic needs, rights and security and by denying local people

agency and negating local culture and history. Of LPP, Roland Paris has noted, 'the process of political and economic liberalization is inherently tumultuous: It can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects for stable peace in the fragile conditions that typically exist in countries just emerging from civil war' (UN University, 2007).

By basing the model on the experiences of developed liberal, capitalist democracies, the advocates of LPP have failed to address the question of whether stability in emerging democracies such as Sierra Leone's demands a fundamentally different regulatory system. In this way, the Western peacebuilding paradigm limits the space for alternative models, in particular indigenous African models. As Karbo has pointed out, peacebuilding should be more than just designing interventions at the political and economic levels, as has been the case in the post-conflict peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone. Peacebuilding must address the fundamental causes of conflicts by 'sustained processes of designing programmes that address the security and political realities of the country as well as looking at measures that will transform the personal, social, economic and cultural relationships of that country' (Karbo, 2008, pp. 115–16). With this caveat in mind, we now briefly examine the attempts at peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and the lessons to be learnt from this experience.

Since 2002, Sierra Leone has been in transition from war to peace. Both the war and the transition processes of peacebuilding have been marked by a series of external interventions. Initially, this was in the form of an international brigade comprising exiled Sierra Leoneans, Ivoirians, Burkinabese and Liberians from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, under the umbrella of Foday Sankoh's RUF. Next to enter the war were mercenaries, such as the Gurkhas, Sandline International and Executive Outcomes from South Africa, which fought on the side of the government against the RUF. These were followed by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force, which drove the renegade soldiers of the AFRC out of the capital following their coup in May 1997 and the AFRC/RUF joint attack on Freetown in January 1999. They were followed by the 17,500-strong United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeeping troops, who were preceded by a UN observer team, UNOMSIL. British paratroopers were the last to intervene in May 2000 by taking control of the airport, releasing UN troops being held hostage by RUF fighters and clearing the capital of the menace of the West Side Boys, who were camped outside the capital and carrying out acts of banditry.

Fundamental to the Sierra Leone experience is the role of external players in attempts at post-conflict reconstruction of the 'Weberian state' (Ottaway, 2002), this time devoid of autonomy (local history and culture being discarded), as well as the developmental practices of the domestic hegemonic classes. Peacebuilding has been an economic tool at the disposal of the architects of the 'empire of capitalist democracy' (Laffey, 2003, p. 598) in their quest for global hegemony. Kandeh (2011) is doubtful that any forced transformation is possible in a social formation deprived of the exigencies of a liberal pluralist democracy:

> Low levels of material and social development, the absence of a sizable middle class, the numerical preponderance of a politically marginalized peasantry and the dominance of a political class whose mode of accumulation is incommensurate with both democracy and development may yet stymie or derail the liberal peace project in Africa.

Citing Taylor's scepticism (2007), Kandeh (forthcoming) points out that the dissonance between a neoliberal global governance agenda and the values and interests of the governing classes raises serious questions about the feasibility of such a project in a country like Sierra Leone, since these values cannot be replicated at the national level. For example, since the formal ending of the war in January 2002, the country has experienced two sets of parliamentary and local government elections. However, the economic and social conditions of the mass of people remain largely unchanged, with 70 per cent of them still ensnared in abject poverty. The economy is essentially donor-driven: 53 per cent of the 2011 budget is to be financed externally, accounting for 5.7 per cent of GDP (Government of Sierra Leone, 2010).

External intervention and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

External interventions include peacekeeping and peace-support operations, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration. However, the main thrust of peacebuilding is state reconstruction and relegitimation, for which a unique opportunity has arisen (Luckham, 2004). There is a wider view of peacebuilding favoured by NGOs in particular, which involves peacemaking, peacekeeping and long-term transformative endeavour, as well as securing donor resources to aid integrated strategies for sustainable development. After decades

of neglect, Britain intervened decisively in the war with the para-troopers, who rendered the RUF ineffective as a fighting unit. This provided Britain with an opportunity to embark upon a peacebuilding mission that would accentuate democratic institutions imbued with neoliberalism to prevent reversion to conflict.[2] Democratic institutions are seen as the antidote to alienation and conflict. The rationale behind international peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone includes promotion of peace and prosperity and the nurturing of sustainable development. Furthermore, it has been argued that personal security is a major con-cern in quasi-states and weak states (Cooper and Pugh, 2004). There is also the fear that repressive regimes could threaten global stability. Finally, a reformed security sector, along with efficient, transparent and democratic governance, are seen as prerequisites for conflict prevention and sustainable development (Ebo, 2006).

One major project in the transformative programme was security sec-tor reform. This included not only the armed forces, police, paramilitary and prison service but also the judicial system, parliament, customs, ministry of finance, fire service, immigration service and the Office of National Security. All these institutions had failed through lack of resources, bad governance and corruption. In the armed forces and civil service, political interference and ethnicity had transformed relatively efficient services at the time of independence into defenders of the cor-rupt one-party system. Indeed, the army had been reduced to a skeleton of its pre-independence form due to the need to adjust to the new one-party state. When the army intervened to prevent him from assuming power in 1967, Prime Minister Siaka Stevens became deeply suspicious of its loyalty. Not surprisingly, following his return to power he insti-tuted a new praetorian guard, the Internal Security Unit, later to become the State Security Division, trained in Cuba and better armed than the national army, a major grievance leading to confrontations between these two armed sectors.

Britain, as the former colonial power, through its Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and also the International Military Advisory Train-ing Team (IMATT), bore the lion's share of the costs of restructuring these institutions and training personnel to ensure their accountability to the citizens and democratic process. To avoid reversion to the *status quo ante*, it was important to address the underlying causes of insecu-rity (Fayemi, 2000). The command structure of the armed forces had been eroded by years of politicization and 'ethnic engineering' by suc-cessive governments. However, it was the 1992 coup of young officers

led by Captain Valentine Strasser that finally destroyed that structure, as brigadiers and colonels had to take orders from captains and majors. Not only did these institutions need new equipment and accommodation, but the skills of personnel needed upgrading to enable them to serve the new society.

Governance and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

The issue of governance and the youth has been a major causal explanation for the civil war. Once hostilities were over, the Sierra Leone government set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in order:

> ... to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered (Government of Sierra Leone, 2000).

This was followed by the establishment of the Special Court by the government and the UN 'to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996' (http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/SierraLeone-TRCReport.pdf, p. 11). The court indicted RUF leader Foday Sankoh and the leader of the Civil Defence Force, Chief Hingha Norman, who was also deputy defence minister in Kabba's war-time government. However, both men died in custody before their trials ended. In a subsequent verdict, the court convicted Augustine Gbao, Issa Sesay and Morris Kallon, while the case of the former Liberian warlord Charles Taylor continues as we go to press.

With support from Britain's DFID, an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was set up with the express aim to provide education and to prevent and prosecute corruption, which had been identified as a major cause of the war. Predation, it was argued, produced inefficient and corrupt use of resources, leading to poverty and conflict. The main criticism of ACC related to political interference in its activities, specifically its inability to bring corrupt bureaucrats and political figures to court.

In addition, DFID provided £15 million to support the removal of administrative obstacles to investment, thus creating an enabling environment for the private sector. With support from Western donors, the country was supported in producing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), thereby making Sierra Leone eligible for assistance under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This process involved public sector reform and capacity building to ensure efficient and effective delivery: the civil service was reorganized and reduced to ensure transparency, enhance accountability in the expenditure of public funds and improve planning and monitoring policies and budgetary oversight. Governance reform also implies effective participation by the population in governance issues and structural reforms. With support from UNICEF, the Children's Act was adopted to protect children, and women were also empowered, though female circumcision continues to be defended by all as 'culturally' sacrosanct.

Central to governance reform was the reactivation of local government administration and the decentralization of central government functions, through the restoration of paramount chiefs and the holding of democratic elections in chiefdoms and district councils. In local government, 'the legacy of colonial "indirect rule" is particularly strong . . . and chiefs remain closely involved in almost every aspect of everyday governance in rural areas' (Fanthorpe, 2006, p. 28). By the time war broke out, local democracy had given way to the dictatorship of party managers through appointed management committees and the authoritarian rule of traditional chiefs. The latter have been identified as a major source of the alienation of the youth (Richards, 1995, 1996), many of whom joined both rebel (RUF and AFRC) and government forces (Sierra Leone Army and Civil Defence Force). The TRC also drew attention to the role of poverty and the political marginalization of youths, as well as the predatory role of the governing class, in triggering off the rebellion.

To rein in the restive youth, the peacebuilding project concentrated on local government reform and consultations via the Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme (PCRP) and the fast-tracked decentralization programme, both supported by DFID. Prior to the war, many traditional rulers had fled, been chased out or been killed as they became a target of the rebel cause. One of DFID's first policies was to reinforce the position of chiefs by providing them with new houses (the rebels had destroyed the old ones) so that they could accompany their subjects back to their chiefdoms. A double perspective has emerged in the debate on the position of chiefs and their subjects' perception of them. Some,

such as Richard Fanthorpe (2006, p. 31), recognize the hostility towards the chiefs; he has nonetheless written: 'During the conflict, chiefs had been targeted along with authority figures, but there had been no indication that belligerents reserved a special hostility for them.' To support his argument, he points out that both the RUF and their AFRC ally saw room for chiefs in their administrative plan of action. Furthermore, he observes that preliminary public consultations in civil society forums reported that 'chiefs have a vital role to play in restoring stability and that there is no other institution capable of replacing them at this stage in the Sierra Leone polity' (Fanthorpe, 2006, p. 31).

By contrast, Paul Richards (2005) has drawn attention to the class-like repressive and exploitative role of chiefs and their entourages towards young people. He points to the deep resentment at unpaid community work, unnecessary fines, lack of educational provision and high 'bride price'. The impact of gerontocratic rule is most marked at the level of chiefdom governance, and if this sector is not reformed, there is a risk of renewed conflict. Richards's position is supported by Hanlon (2005), who argues that DFID's interventions to restore the chiefdom administration amount to recreating the preconditions for war.

The result is thus that the British, who took a lead in reforming local government, did not abolish corrupt chiefdom administration unlike the Americans, but strengthened it; and, as a supplementary move, fast-tracked decentralization and the re-establishment of elected district councillors. The eclectic nature of local governance has compounded the problems as the intensity of the chieftaincy politics has not diminished (Fanthorpe, 2006), and there is also confusion over the roles of district councillors and chiefdom administrators.

The diaspora and the search for peace

The relationship between the diaspora and homeland is often more complex than writers such as Collier and Hoeffler claim (2000). They stress the deleterious and subversive influence of the diaspora on the homeland's economy and society; in particular, the role of remittances in fuelling conflicts. However, while the Sierra Leone diaspora in Liberia formed part of the international brigade that led the RUF's initial attack on the country's boundary with Liberia in March 1991, the diaspora also played a major role in the search for peace, with little or no support for the rebels. Moreover, the diaspora embarked on fund-raising for charities in the homeland and was a major source of subsistence for many

unfortunate Sierra Leoneans who were heavily dependent on diaspora remittances.

In the face of discrimination in their adopted abode, the yearning for the homeland is intensified among members of the diaspora, giving rise to hypersensitive criticism of homeland rulers, who are blamed for their personal plight. Moments of such national consciousness tend to push ethnic consciousness into the background, as the perception of what was left behind becomes idealized. Paradoxically there is an urge to return, which is tempered by the fact that there are few chances to do so. Before long the realization dawns upon the individual that much energy and time has been invested in the adopted home. Through a number of national and regional associations, members of the Sierra Leone diaspora became involved in fund-raising designed to foster development in the homeland. These activities provided an opportunity for members of the 'old diaspora' to associate and work with members of the new, thus fostering new identities. It was this confluence of interests in the US between the new diaspora led by the National Organization of Sierra Leoneans in North America (NOSLINA) and the old diaspora led by the Rev. Jesse Jackson, President's Clinton's Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa (to give him his full title) that produced some results that led to the Lomé Peace Accord. This accord was murky in terms of human rights and did not bring immediate peace, but it later formed the basis of a strategy to end the war.

Sierra Leoneans in the diaspora, far removed from the atrocities at home, were alarmed by reports of such violence and human rights abuses. In the period before President Kabba assumed office, the dialogue between diaspora and elites in Sierra Leone was on how to bring peace to the country. Many thought that a return to democratic governance would force the rebels to sue for peace with the elected administration. Others warned that a democratic election was no panacea for the country's immediate problems. The former position was held by the Women for a Morally Engaged Nation (WOMEN) and donors. Both felt that a speedier return to democratic pluralism was a prerequisite for peace. This group, strongly influenced by members of the diaspora, triumphed, since elections were promptly called in March 1996. However, the onset of the elections was accompanied by an escalation of violence, in particular widespread amputation, with amputees being ordered by their abusers to show their severed arms to their president.

The Sierra Leone diaspora in both Britain and the US were active in calling for a swift international response to end the war. In Britain, as

Sankoh's forces were storming parts of central Freetown, a conference was held at Oxford University, which was attended by several Sierra Leonean academics from within the country and among the diaspora. RUF's actions were condemned by the delegates and people called for swift action by friendly countries, in particular Britain. Foreign Office Minister for Africa Tony Lloyd, a Manchester MP, was lobbied by local members of the Sierra Leone community. For example, in Manchester, one of the first black women to become a mayor of a large British city, Yomi Mambu, before her death in June 2000 worked with Labour Party activists, such as the Sierra Leonean Fadima Zubairu, to lobby Lloyd and other local and national politicians 'not to forget Sierra Leone'. Sierra Leoneans in other parts of the country, especially London, were also active. In London, several Sierra Leoneans had held prominent positions as councillors and activists both within the governing Labour Party and the trades union movement.

The Sierra Leone diaspora and socioeconomic development in the homeland

In this section, we examine the attitude of Sierra Leoneans who had formed corporate bodies (NGOs) to intervene in the homeland and compare these activities with those of Northern NGOs. In addition to those diaspora individuals and groups who organized through political and non-political action to end the war and to work for sustainable peace, there were others who followed the format of many Northern donors (NGOs) to bring change to a nation under siege (Zack-Williams, 2002). Based on an analysis of the NGOs registered by the Sierra Leone Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (*SLANGO Speaks*, Vol. 2, No.1, 1995) and of the website Leonenet in 1997, I identified 73 NGOs working in the country. They were international or local in origin, the latter consisting mainly of NGOs originating in the diaspora. Activities ranged from emergency food aid, as in the case of Action Contre La Faim, a French NGO, and Africare, a local NGO working on relief, to developmental aid (Zack-Williams, 1998). Other activities included district, regional, rural and community development.

Table 7.1 shows the distribution of NGOs operating in the country in the late 1990s at the height of the civil war. Of the total of 73, 28 (38 per cent) were international (mainly Northern) NGOs, while the vast majority, 45 (62 per cent) were NGOs either originating in the diaspora, or influenced and inspired by people in the diaspora. In terms

Table 7.1   Diasporic non-governmental organizations in the civil war in Sierra Leone

	Number	Percentage	Emergency relief/health*	Development/rural/ urban/gender*
International	28	38	14 (19%)	5 (7%)
Local/diaspora	45	62	3 (4%)	37 (51%)
Total	73	100	17 (23%)	42 (58%)*

*These percentages do not add up to 100 because other activities are not included in the table.
Source: Zack-Williams (1998, pp. 27–29).

of undertaking, 19 per cent of the activities of international NGOs dealt with relief or emergency aid, and were hence of a transient nature. Only 7 per cent of their activities could be defined as dealing with development/urban/rural/gender issues, the drivers of sustainable development and long-term peace. By contrast, only 4 per cent of diasporan/local NGOs addressed emergency health and relief, while 51 per cent of the work on development/urban/rural/gender issues was undertaken by diaspora and local activists. Several of these diasporic-sponsored organizations are district-based, including Kailahun District Development Foundation (US), Koinadugu Descendant Organization (US), Kono Union (US) and Pujehun District Development Association (Britain). Others are national, such as the Sierra Leone Progressive Union (US) and the Friends of Sierra Leone (US). The marked concentration of their contributions at district levels is further evidenced by the fact that 'more recently, chiefs identified diasporan Africans as a potential source of assistance for their development agendas' (Bob-Milliar, 2009, p. 543).

The diaspora has continued to be politically active in homeland affairs, even though they remain disenfranchised unless they return home to register. The three major political parties depend in no small measures on the diaspora to finance elections and campaigns. There are local chapters of each party in Britain and the US, and regular meetings are held in which national figures are invited to address members. These are ideal moments for fund-raising, as generous donors will not go unnoticed by the visiting dignitary. Thanks to the Internet and improved communications, which allow access to local newspapers, political, economic and social affairs of the homeland are discussed in local diasporan political caucuses and national associations. In short, the

diaspora, with its relative wealth and know-how, has clout in local politics. Thus, it is not uncommon for diasporan activists to return home to contest elections or be invited to take up cabinet positions. Such was the case with Cecil Blake of NOSLINA under war leader Ahmed Tejan-Kabba, and John Saad, who was nominated by Charles Margai, leader of the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) to represent his party in the coalition cabinet led by President Ernest Koroma of the All-People's Congress.

Conclusion

In the foregoing, discussion has focused on the 'new politics of international relations' between a failed state such as Sierra Leone and the developed capitalist democracies in the post-conflict attempts at peacebuilding, and also on the role of the diaspora. These new relations are defined by the need of the international community to maintain peace and prevent conflicts in weak and quasi-states. Post-conflict milieus provide a unique opportunity to start over again in reconstructing the post-Westphalia state and to institute Held's 'cosmopolitan democracy' (1995) by ridding the state of its primordial loyalties, corruption, patrimonialism and the other inefficiencies peculiar to predatory states.

To ensure sustainable peace and development, there has been an imperative for institutional arrangements to ensure that what 'has been tried and tested' in the West is implanted in these 'chaotic, weak, quasi-states' that pose a threat to global peace and security. The two drivers to achieve these goals have been, first, the SAPs and their successors the PRSPs and, second, the transformative peace building project or LPP. Both discourses are strongly neoliberal in content, and impregnated with the belief that only a liberal environment can prevent nations from slipping back into the conflicts and violence that negate sustainable development. This might include imposing policies contrary to the wishes of the people. Thus, in the context of chiefdom reforms, Fanthorpe (2006, p. 45) has warned that:

> . . . if there is any lesson here for the liberal peace project it is that reformist zeal, and 'one-size fits all' institutional remedies may blind practitioners to the political imperatives that bind rural poor to non-liberal modes of governance and therefore leave hastily erected 'democratic' institutions vulnerable to political capture by the very forces the project seeks to thwart.

Finally, in looking at the role of the diaspora, attention has been drawn in this chapter to a variety of activities in the process of finding peace and in peacebuilding. I have shown how the search for peace and aid to victims has brought the diaspora together, creating a new consciousness and new identities and new forms of activism, by mobilizing politicians and other professionals in support of the imagined homeland.

Notes

1. Under the regime of war leader Ahmed Tejan-Kabba, the minister of information was recruited from one of the leaders of the Sierra Leone community in North America: Cecil Blake, a professor at the University of Nebraska and a member of NOSLINA. Similarly, John Saad, who was living in Britain, was appointed as a junior minister in the All-People's Congress administration by Ernest Koroma in 2007.
2. At the time of the intervention in May 2000, many local people interviewed on British television called for the re-colonization of Sierra Leone by Britain.

8
The Transformation of Sovereign Territoriality: A Case Study of South African Immigration Control

Darshan Vigneswaran and Loren B. Landau

Introduction

More than 15 years after the publication of the seminal article 'Territoriality and Beyond' in the leading journal, *International Organization*, International Relations (IR) scholars are still coming to terms with John Ruggie's (1993) analysis of fundamental change in the international system. Part of his larger, decades-long multidisciplinary project on 'transformation', this article asked readers to consider whether actors in the international system might change how they divided land among themselves, and, if so, why? Attempts to find answers have generated a small mountain of historically oriented scholarship (see, for example, Keene, 2002; Krasner, 1999; Linklater, 1998; Rae, 2002; Reus-Smit, 1999; Rosenberg, 1994; Sassen, 2006; Spruyt, 1994; Teschke, 2003). Yet IR scholars still struggle with the most pressing question Ruggie raised: if the modern state system based on principles of sovereign, territorial exclusivity is facing new challenges, what might a 'postmodern' or 'post-Westphalian' order look like?

IR theorists following in Ruggie's wake have adopted an overly narrow perspective on how we might discover and theorize emerging territorial forms. One common tendency has been to conceptualize concerns over territorial transformation predominantly in terms of departures from the norm of territorial exclusivity in international agreements. Here, IR draws our attention to issues of extraterritoriality (Guantanamo Bay, Antarctica, international space) (Zacher, 2001) or non-exclusivity (Schengen, the Economic Community of West African States, the North American Free Trade Area) (Ruggie, 1993) as potential signs of an emerging international order. What these studies overlook is how political

actors are changing the territorial strategies they use to control people, goods and social and political relationships by reconstituting the legitimate authority over a given set of places, redefining the purposes of particular places or adopting new techniques to limit access for people, goods and ideas.

Similar problems plague efforts to gauge the significance of recent developments in international-migration governance for the long-term evolution of state forms. Along with shifting patterns of trade, security and political community, increased international migration is generating new challenges to state sovereignty and to that lynchpin of territorial exclusion: the international border. An ever-expanding body of scholarship examines how states are responding to these challenges by enhancing the armoury of regulatory mechanisms for controlling new migration volumes and patterns. Two trends are particularly worth mentioning. The first is that national immigration controls are now 'situated' across a much wider range of sites, as states seek to extend controls beyond their borders and to exercise immigration control within their borders (Coleman, 2007; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Lahav, 1998, 2000). The second is that these controls now involve a much wider variety of actors, as immigration responsibilities are delegated to different departments or levels of state bureaucracy (van der Leun, 2006), outsourced to private entities (Nicholson, 1997) and in some cases simply taken up by private citizens (Doty, 2007). While these changes hint at significant departures from contemporary norms of sovereignty (as new actors take over traditional state functions) and territoriality (as new spatial practices replace conventional border controls), much of the literature has struggled to 'see' these developments in this light. Rather than entertaining the possibility of a new order, scholars have instead interpreted them through more conventional political idioms.

The macrohistorical perspective in Ruggie's work (and that which it has inspired) helps us to gain insight into questions of transformation by providing innovative ways of studying new political forms. There are a multitude of claims developed in these historical surveys of the origins of the modern international system. In this discussion, we want to make use of only three. The first claim is a need to acknowledge that new forms of territorial authority will most likely be developed within the legal framework of previously dominant forms, rather than immediately becoming independently constituted legal orders. In the late feudal era, would-be sovereigns (city states, city leagues and sovereign states) did not establish themselves as successors to the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy by denouncing the authority of these institutions and

inventing new constitutions from scratch (though that would come much later). Instead, each of these units found ways to creatively legitimate their autonomous realms of authority in the constitutional language of the very same authorities that they sought to undermine and usurp.

The second claim is that we need to do a better job of defining the nature of different territorial strategies and configurations. Territorial sovereignty is such a deeply ingrained facet of contemporary political understandings that our language for describing alternatives usually consists of a series of binary opposites (such as non-exclusive, non-contiguous, hierarchical) rather than *sui generis* organizing principles. For example, feudal Europe has often been defined as fragmented or 'heteronomous', because it lacked the unified and monocephalic characteristics of modernity. Leaving our discussion there would be to neglect the unique set of territorial strategies that premodern European rulers employed to express and enforce their bonds with allies and subjects. A good example is feudal Germany's personalization of authority in the body of the liege. German rulers would maintain their realms by remaining peripatetic, consistently travelling their lands to reinforce allegiances in physical acts of lordship, backed up by the authority of a travelling army (Bernhardt, 1993). While characteristically non-exclusive in fashion, this strategy had a spatial logic of its own, reliant upon the capacity of the liege to travel, the willingness of surrounding lords to arrive at his/her camps and affirm their allegiance and the physical expression of these relationships in the act of homage (Major, 1987). The point is that while an acknowledgment of fragmentation may give us a sense of how different the medieval world would have looked if represented on a modern political map, we need a micro-analysis of the specific practices that bound these places together to reveal the nature of the territorial forms that gave this seemingly chaotic (when viewed from our peculiarly modern standpoint) landscape a sense of order.

The third and related point is that in the study of grand changes in the international system, we need to look closely at 'state–society' relationships. The forces that led to the emergence of the sovereign state involved both competition and cooperation with non-state actors. For Tilly (1985) and Spruyt (1994), this was a struggle between urban merchants who were interested in free trade and landlords who wanted to build protection rackets. For Teschke (2003) this involved the separation of a capitalist aristocracy from a (still quasi-feudal) militarily oriented Crown. A crucial strength of each of these studies is the ability to leave open the question of who constitutes a 'political' actor. This is essential,

because the processes they each describe involve the (re)constitution of the very nature of political authority. In these macrohistorical stories of change, feudal lords have become urban merchants and then transformed themselves into rulers of city states. Landed aristocrats have turned themselves into capitalist agriculturalists before becoming vanguard classes within parliamentary democracies. In this respect, it is important to examine how social forces and groupings that may have seemingly 'apolitical' origins have the potential to constitute, capture and redefine the territorial strategies employed in the formally 'political' realm.

This chapter attempts to carry some of these lessons forward in a discussion of changing forms of sovereignty and territoriality in South Africa. More specifically, we show how the South African government's increased efforts to utilize its prerogatives to exclude foreign migrants and control their movement have created openings for usurpation and exercise of these same prerogatives by a variety of sub-state and non-state actors. More importantly, we identify a range of micro-territorial orders that these new actors represent and their significant differences with the modern political order. This discussion will consist broadly of two parts. In the next section, we show how the South African government has contributed to the formulation of a political discourse that defines foreign nationals as threatening and unwanted outsiders, and legitimates various activities that would help to deny this group access to South African territory. Crucially, while this discourse is in some respects designed to win support for government activities, the expression of official resignation and defeat in the face of international migration flows constitutes an invitation for other actors to take on the mantle of migration regulator. In the final section, we show how local actors have utilized this discourse to legitimate a range of alternative territorial actions against migrant groups. While these practices clearly hearken back to the past, we suggest that they do not represent business as usual for the sovereign territorial state, but rather quite non-complementary frameworks of political action and authority. This may not represent an alternative political order, but it suggests the foundations from which an order may emerge.

To generate the necessary material to substantiate these claims, this study counteracts IR's traditional tendency for limited primary research by engaging in a multi-method analysis of migration and state transformation. At the core of this study are two surveys of migrants, one focusing on issues of social and spatial transformation, conducted with residents of inner-city Johannesburg in 2006 ($N = 847$), and the other

focusing on experiences of arrest and deportation, conducted with detainees at the Lindela detention centre (on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe) in 2009 ($N = 444$). This survey material is supported by a series of qualitative studies of the territorial practices of both state officials and non-state actors. This includes (a) an ethnographic study of three Department of Home Affairs (DHA) offices in Johannesburg conducted by a single scholar over six months (2008); (b) a team ethnographic study of five police stations in Gauteng Province undertaken over 12 months (2008–09); and (c) an interview-based study of eight cases in South Africa where xenophobic violence occurred (2008). Together with a broad range of materials from newspaper reports, parliamentary records and informal observations collected over eight years, these studies inform our understanding of how the various participants in the process of immigration governance are developing new territories, new spaces and new political forms within the 'husk' of modern immigration policy and law.

South African nativist discourse: Legitimating non-state action

This section focuses on the development of a discourse in South Africa that legitimates new forms of territorial authority. There is a large literature on the manner in which national identity practices and discourses serve to represent immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, as a large and threatening 'other' (see also Chapter 5 in this volume). For the most part, this literature assumes that the primary 'function' of this discourse is to validate state efforts to increase immigration controls (Bauder, 2005; Demo, 2005; Erjavec, 2003). While similar dynamics may be evident in African contexts, they often play out in different ways due to alternative understandings of state responsibility, nationality and relationships with territory. As such, many modern African discourses of exclusion have often been less firmly tied to legal or immigration status and more commonly revolve around an 'enemy' defined in spatial, ethnic, religious or other collective subnational or transnational categories. Examples of this are evident in terms such as 'cockroaches' in Rwanda and 'imperialists' in Zimbabwe or in the exclusions levied against long-term resident groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire (see, for example, Geschiere and Jackson, 2006; Mamdani, 1996). These terms were formulated by actors at the political centre, but then subsequently set in process forms of physical and often violent exclusion that involved

local actors and communities reinterpreting their meaning to suit their own ends.

The key elements of South Africa's nativist discourse are (a) its focus on, and demonization of an undifferentiated mass of outsiders within (as opposed to undocumented newcomers); (b) the consistent reiteration of the inability of state institutions to counter or mitigate this threat; and (c) migrants' construction of counter-identifying discourses that present them as aloof from the local community. We argue that, taken together, these ideas suggest a very different set of immigration control policies and practices. Instead of simply implying a need for the state to further control its borders, this framework of ideas encourages South Africans and non-nationals to take up these responsibilities themselves and to assert their prerogatives against their neighbours.

The enemy within

The South African government has long cultivated the notion that there is an enemy within South African territory: a segment of the population that is institutionally and socially excluded from legal protection despite regularly engaging with purported agents of law. The creation of an 'other within' is the consequence of three features that continue to resonate in contemporary South Africa. The first is the coding of unregulated human mobility as a threat to the economic and physical well-being of the citizenry. The second is the use of an individual's immutable geographic or cultural points of origin to determine insider and outsider status. Unlike systems of belonging such as religion or party membership, which provide avenues for migrating from one category to another, definitions of citizenship rooted in autochthony and allochthony are permanent. Third, the unbridled use of the state bureaucracy and coercive power to label and separate populations creates a category of people who are reduced to bare life and denied access to all but the most rudimentary political or human rights.

Past expressions of force have helped to naturalize the coterminous boundaries of nation and territory and the need to exclude others from both. Indeed, in the eyes of the state and the politically empowered, non-nationals are the functional equivalent of black South Africans two decades ago. The primary differences are that the citizenry is now South Africa's black majority and the aliens are, with notable and disturbing exceptions, people from beyond the country's political boundaries.

There are three areas of political action that illustrate how non-nationals have been turned into the violable alien: legal status and documentation; related practices associated with arrest, detention and deportation; and a more general lack of access to constitutional protections through court and political processes. Taken singly, none of these exclusions is unique to non-nationals: many of the poor are similarly marginalized. Those from historically disempowered populations – particularly Shangaans, Vendas and Pedis – often face enormous challenges in claiming full citizenship within the country's cities. What separates non-nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically and socially institutionalized. Although there are opportunities for transgression through corruption or other forms of subversion and subterfuge (for instance, passing as a local), the barriers to social and political membership are almost insurmountable. In all cases, it is not only the material acts of marginalization – imprisonment, denial of services or harassment – that matter, but also the nationalist discourse evoked to legitimize and explain them.

Although almost all South Africa politicians are publicly committed to tolerance and regional integration and recognize the country's international humanitarian obligations, efforts towards these ends are not supported by the legal and administrative mechanisms needed for managing immigration. Many government leaders, regardless of race or political affiliation, privately (and occasionally publicly) share the sentiment of the former minister of home affairs that 'South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country' (Buthelezi, 1997).

Given statements of this kind, it is not surprising that the most casual political conversations with South Africans, regardless of race or ethnicity, usually include tropes linking foreigners to the proliferation of drug and weapons syndicates, prostitution, smuggling rings and confidence scams. A Wits–Tufts survey found that more than three-quarters of South African respondents in Johannesburg who thought that crime had increased identified immigrants as the primary reason (cf. Crush and Williams, 2003). Others indirectly condemned foreigners by blaming them for unemployment and declining moral values. These opinions are reflected (and in turn fostered) by government officials. In 1997, then Defence Minister Joe Modise remarked, 'As for crime, the army is helping the police get rid of crime and violence in the country. However, what can we do? We have one million illegal immigrants in our country

who commit crimes and who are mistaken by some people for South African citizens. That is the real problem' (Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 24).

A statement in 2002 from another senior official to parliament further reinforces these perceptions:

> Approximately 90 per cent of foreign persons who are in RSA [South Africa] with fraudulent documents, i.e., either citizenship or migration documents, are involved in other crimes as well . . . it is quicker to charge these criminals for their false documentation and then to deport them than to pursue the long route in respect of the other crimes that are committed. (Masethla, 2002)

These statements not only highlight the physical and existential danger foreigners (evidently) present to South Africans and its post-apartheid renaissance, but also suggest a deeper fear of confusion between the native and the foreigner, a sentiment easily justifying measures to mark and alienate non-nationals. Indeed, in the statements outlined above, the state has essentially granted a kind of official endorsement for creating extra-legal systems for policing foreigners. Given the presumed links between foreigners and crime and their threat to the national project, such pronouncements effectively license targeting and excluding non-nationals by whatever means state officials and citizens deem appropriate. Because documentation is not an adequate marker between insider citizens and unwanted outsiders, the determination of who is 'in' and who is 'out' can be made at will.

The consequence of this is an irreconcilable contradiction in the country's policy frameworks and economic realities. While the South African government actively promotes regional integration vis-à-vis foreign direct investment and highly skilled labour, there has been little effort to facilitate the movements or protect the rights of low or moderately skilled migrants. While highly skilled workers who have worked continuously for five years or have permanent contracts may apply for permanent residence, others wishing to extend their stay have few mechanisms for doing so and are often criminalized, excluded from critical social services and subjected to detention and/or deportation.

State futility

The country's restrictive migration policies, coupled with the inability to issue appropriate documents to those legally in the country, have

a number of important effects. First, it reinforces perceptions that the country must protect itself from a threat within its borders. Second, by not effectively enforcing its own law, the state contributes to a sense that the body politic – the nation – is under economic, physical and even cultural threat and must unify to protect itself. However, in the South African case, the state has not represented itself as the necessary solution to these problems. Indeed, in our research we often come across expressions of doubt regarding the overarching purpose of immigration control, particularly expressions of the futility of trying to stop 'illegal foreigners' from entering the country. South African public discourse surrounding informal migration is replete with fantastic imagery. Headlines in the newspapers have created an image of an impending 'human tsunami' (*Pretoria News*, 2007), 'alien horde' (Sawyer, 1998), 'human tide' (Granelli, 2002) or 'swarm' (Maluleke, 2003). While choosing a more sober language, senior-level government officials have, often using pseudo-scientific reasoning, despaired at the prospects of ever developing meaningful public policy interventions for this issue. For example, the drafter of South Africa's Aliens Control Act 1991 reasoned that genuine border control was never going to be achieved: 'border control was not really a way of effective aliens control. Otherwise I think you should have had an official every ten yards [laughs], but it is impossible, it was impossible' (Vigneswaran, 2006). Also in this vein, former Home Affairs Director General William Masethla reported to parliament in 2000 that

> even in the unlikely event of all further illegal migration into the country being halted and their presence remaining constant at the 8 million ballpark figure, the removal of them at the current rate of 180,000 per year would take a total of 44 years. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2000)

In some respects, junior-level officials merely reiterate these frustrations. According to an official of the immigration inspectorate in Johannesburg, responsible for detecting and deporting illegal foreigners in the country's most populous province, 'everything looks nice on paper, but in the real practical side of it, it's very, very difficult to get to all these situations, so it's really – it's not humanly possible.' While these frustrations are apparently in line with senior officials' thinking, when local officials are brought into conversation about their more intimate experience with the onerous and seemingly endless process of detecting and deporting foreign nationals, significant disagreements with head

office are revealed. The same official from Johannesburg tells of his experience in a departmental workshop:

> They just want to give instructions? Or are they going to come down to our level and work for a month or two or three weeks or whatever? Even in this workshop we had training officers that's from Durban and whatever. They're working in the rural areas and whatever. They want every single person to be charged on a docket. You have been with us in the Hillbrow operations. We arrest 3, 4, 500 people in half an hour. How the hell do you document all these people at the end of the day?

For other officials in the same office, these frustrations spread horizontally, generating suspicions that other components of the department are responsible for the influx of illegals:

> Normally these people who are working in the ID sections – they are the ones who are issuing the – eh, how can I call it? Who are issuing the ID to people who were not supposed to obtain them, do you understand? But according to the Act, everybody must report to Immigration Services. But with the switching off of the electricity, most of them, like they say there are 3 million Zimbabweans in the country – and all those 3 million Zimbabweans did not report to the Immigration Officer before entering the country. So we cannot say the Act is not effective enough. It is the people who are controlling the borders who are failing the system.

If this disunity and disillusionment is prominent amongst DHA officials, then it should come as little surprise that those in other sections of the state bureaucracy and members of the public more generally share little faith in the system of immigration control. Crucially, when taken in combination with the demonization of outsiders referred to above, this does not result in a simple acceptance of having to get along with foreign nationals, in accordance with former President Mbeki's encouragement to his fellow South Africans to simply 'learn to live with' recent arrivals from Zimbabwe. Rather, they are more likely to provide legitimacy for South African officials and civilians to take the responsibility for dealing with these threats upon themselves. These sentiments are captured in the statement of one South African man soon after the widespread xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008, who explained that 'we are not trying to kill anyone but rather solving the

problems of our own country. The government is not doing anything about this, so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of foreigners in our country' (in Madondo, 2008).

Migrant aloofness

Crucially, South African nationals are not the only ones to respond to nativist discourses. Many migrants have developed a rhetoric of self-exclusion that asserts and maintains a position outside the embrace of state-sanctioned values and relationships. So, rather than striving to integrate or assimilate, non-nationals' extended interactions with South Africans are leading to a reification of differences and a counter-idiom of transience and superiority. One migrant from Lesotho who has lived in Johannesburg for four years reveals many dimensions of a discourse of non-belonging:

> I don't think any right thinking person would want to be South African. It's a very unhealthy environment. South Africans are very aggressive, even the way they talk. Both black and white. I don't know what's the word, it's a degenerated façade they are putting up ... They are just so contaminated.

Ironically, foreigners often brand South Africans with the same characteristics so often ascribed to them, describing South Africans as dishonest, violent vectors of disease. Few trust South Africans (see Table 8.1) and only a minority speaks of close relationships with them. All this is further complemented (and justified) by a sense that South Africans are uneducated or do not appreciate the opportunities they have for education (or other social services), and that they are promiscuous, overly tolerant (especially of homosexuality) and irreligious.

Table 8.1 Percentage of Johannesburg respondents indicating they can generally trust South Africans

	Country of origin			
	DR Congo	Somalia	Mozambique	South Africa
Agree	38.3	11.3	3.9	71.6
Disagree	46.2	85.5	75.4	20.0
No opinion	12.3	2.2	14.3	6.8
No opinion/Don't know	3.2	1.0	6.4	1.6
N	253	186	203	190

Table 8.2 Percentage of Johannesburg respondents who believe it is better to maintain customs or not maintain customs in South Africa

	National	Non-national
It is better for society if immigrants maintain their customs	67.7	77.3
It is better for society if immigrants do not maintain their customs	27.1	16.7
Don't know/Other	5.2	5.9
N	192	640

Clinging to the status afforded those belonging to the 'mobile classes' (see Bauman, 2000), migrants hover above the soil by retaining loyalties to their countries of origin and orient themselves towards a future out-side South Africa. Whatever the reasons for their self-imposed distance, many migrants deny ever having had aspirations of assimilation or per-manent settlement (that is, total inclusion). Others claim they would refuse such opportunities were they available. For them, allochthon status is not a scarlet letter, but instead represents their own form of inclusion. From the data represented in Table 8.2, there is little sign of an assimilating agenda. While many more foreigners would like their children to learn English or another South African language, they remain wary of their families ever considering themselves South African.

Although many refugees and migrants do not wish to be part of South African society or other systems of social regulation, they have neverthe-less developed a set of rhetorical devices to justify their position in South Africa, a physical presence that often belies South African political, legal and social prohibitions. These take a number of often contradictory forms, with a single person sometimes making claims to space on a variety of seemingly incompatible grounds.

Alternative discourses can emerge from principles of belonging that evade both assimilation into South African culture and a reactionary retreat into ethnic or national enclaves. Kihato's (2007) work on migrant associations in the inner city described Awelah, an Ivorian group that, unlike most of Johannesburg's previous migrant organizations, has founded itself upon a new kind of Pan-Africanism in place of specific ethnic or national ties. In the words of its founder:

We want to shift our patriotism to the continent, not to a country. We Africans share a history together; we are bound together by a neo-colonialism. When you dig up these feelings all Africans have

the same history. This is the link that we have got now, we are African even though we butcher each other but we are African. In our day-to-day living we are all confronted with problems of nationality, ethnicity and so on. But when you have this [broader African] perspective you do not see these problems anymore. (cited in Landau and Freemantle, 2009, p. 383)

But there is more to this than a desire to build a community of all Africans as an end in itself. Rather, the evocations of Pan-Africanism – drawn from 1960s liberation philosophy, President Mbeki's African Renaissance and the rhetoric of 'Africa's World Cup' hosted by South Africa in 2010 – are designed to erode the barriers that separate foreigners from South Africans. In the founder's words, 'South Africans are our brothers and sisters'. By encouraging South Africans to realize connections to their continental kin, they undermine the legitimacy of any barriers to inclusion that South Africans and the South African state may erect in front of them. Ironically, the foundations for such mobilization remain very much rooted in a transnational articulation of Ivorian identity, as most of the new members come from there. Through such rhetoric, migrants adopt a *de facto* cosmopolitanism: a willingness to engage a plurality of cultures and an openness to hybridity and multiple identities that undercut the dominance of South African nationalism within South African territory. By drawing on multiple identities simultaneously, this discourse of belonging evades subjection to the overarching authority of one, opening up a discursive space that resists both the reactionary xenophobia of the citizenry and the conventional state-centred notion of belonging as determined by the bureaucratic sanction of a legislative regime.

   Another set of discursive claims relies on norms of reciprocity – claiming territorial rights to South Africa based on what countries of origin did to assist South Africans during the struggle against apartheid. Nigerians, for example, will often claim (with some substantiation) that African National Congress (ANC) activists were given full university scholarships in the 1970s and 1980s, opportunities that were not always available to native citizens. Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and even Namibians claim that they personally suffered from wars tied to South Africa's anti-communist campaign and efforts to destroy ANC strongholds within their countries. If they did not experience the war first-hand, then they were deprived in an economy that had been destroyed by years of fighting. Others argue, plausibly, that because South African business derives so many profits from investments in

their countries, both now and in the past, they have a reciprocal right to South Africa's territory and wealth. In this way, South Africa's own transnationalism, past and present, serves as justification for transcending national residential restrictions.

It is important to note that migrants' strategies for claiming space outside legal discourse and bureaucratic regulation do not represent the creation of a single, counter-hegemonic form of sovereignty. Mang'ana (2004) reports, for example, that even people from the same country are careful to avoid the mutual obligations and politics that come from close association with other 'exiles'. The literature on migrant associations does not reveal the emergence of any lasting and cohesive alternative sovereignty (Amisi and Ballard, 2005; Götz and Simone, 2003).

Rather than integrating or assimilating, migrants enlist discourses which exploit their position as the permanent outsiders in ways that 'distances [them] from all connections and commitments' (Said, 2001, p. 183; see also Simone, 2001). As Simmel (1964) notes, these strangers are not fully committed to the peculiar tendencies of the people amongst whom they live. Indeed, avoiding such commitment enables a scepticism and a self-imposed distancing that allows them to elude state control.

Thus far, we have suggested that the public discourse on immigration in South Africa is characterized by three main elements. To begin with, we have an 'othering' process whereby, instead of drawing direct associations between undocumented status and unwanted outsider, the latter category is extended to a broad and undifferentiated mass of people residing within the nation's borders. Then, instead of isolating the 'state' as the catch-all solution, we have a 'no confidence' vote whereby state mechanisms for dealing with these problems are identified, even by those charged with responsibility for implementation, as essentially ineffective or futile. Finally, we have foreign nationals foregoing the notion that they should somehow validate their rights to South African soil, and instead articulating a set of transnational discourses to validate their rights to 'take what they need'. These three ideas provide a legitimating framework for sub-state and non-state actors in South Africa to reinvent the manner in which territorial control is expressed. While in many respects these ideas begin from the same starting point as exclusionary discourses in non-African contexts, they end up in a very different place, with little sense of state sovereignty and border control as the obvious solution. However, this framework is essentially indeterminate, not telling us what sets of practices groups and individuals should necessarily adopt. How have people living within South African

borders sought to utilize this new idiom of belonging and control? The next section attempts to outline the ways in which officials and civilians have responded to this call to redefine the nature of territoriality.

Transforming state territoriality from within

The immigration enforcement apparatus in South Africa is vast. At first glance, the statistics which reflect government activity in immigration control give the strong impression of a steady increase in government capacity to control migration. Over the course of the three ANC presidential terms, the government has consistently increased the number of people deported from South Africa (see Figure 8.1).

This impression of increasing assertion of traditional sovereign authority begins to look less certain when we examine more closely the work practices and official behaviours that tend to generate these statistics. The following discussion takes the reader inside the South African immigration bureaucracy, reviewing how government officials use immigration laws and policies. Specifically, it explores the manner in which civilians have made use of laws designed to protect the integrity of the national territory to define and defend new 'micro-territories' that have meaning and significance for highly localized actors. While distant in both space and time from feudal Europe, the analogy to this system of rule is pertinent, suggesting the need for further examination of the manner in which the monolithic image of the state is being

Figure 8.1   South Africa, annual deportations (1990–2007)
Source: Department of Home Affairs (2008).

hollowed out by small groups and individuals bent on shoring up their personal power and networks. The range of such practices is potentially endless, but here we attempt to categorize three ways in which sub-state and non-state actors have carved out their niches within the husk of the South African state: reinterpretation, reorientation, replacement and reconstitution.

Reinterpreting the state

We can begin to trace the transformation of state institutions by focusing on the foot soldiers charged with responsibility for maintaining this edifice. The general expression of the futility of attempting to control the nation's borders does not necessarily mean that officials lose motivation altogether. Instead, they find meaning for their daily work in a range of other, usually more localized and immediate, legitimating discourses. To a certain extent, this need to imbue one's daily work with meaning is captured by the resigned assessment of a South African Police Services station commander working in the town of Musina, which lies on the South African border with Zimbabwe. She regarded detecting and capturing illegal foreigners as 'a reason to get up in the morning'.

In a more serious vein, other officials have come to define their responsibilities in relation to the objectives of exerting control over their local environment. One example of this dynamic can be found in a superintendent's explanation of his police station's policy of asking the courts to impose criminal sentences, sometimes involving jail terms, on suspected illegal foreigners. While this departed significantly from the government's policy of immediate deportation after detection, the superintendent explained the policy in terms of its potential deterrent effect on local crime. Deportees, who were considered to be responsible for a significant amount of local crime, would be discouraged from returning to their former occupations and residences within his precinct for fear of the prospect of a jail term. The superintendent then explained the success of this solution by referring to the significant drop in crime rates within his precinct (Vigneswaran, 2008). In this instance, the senior police official sticks to a statist, albeit more localized script, defining his 'misuse' of Immigration Act powers for what is ultimately a core objective of the state.

More junior officials tend to reinterpret immigration control prerogatives in ways that are more difficult to reconcile with familiar statist tropes. For example, street-level police officers consistently reiterate the notion that the willingness of a suspect to show respect to the officer

is a key determinant of how they will use their discretionary authority to enforce immigration laws. In the specific historical context of post-apartheid South Africa, where the police struggle for acceptance in a society with strong memories of the role they played in the past, this is somewhat unsurprising. However, police officers rarely think specifically about whether an individual migrant is showing respect for 'the badge' *per se* in their encounters, and appear to react more strongly to whether there is a personal acknowledgment of the individual officer's authority. This is evident in one officer's reaction to a foreign national at a roadblock:

> Yes, you see how some people have a bad attitude. Like that one Nigerian he was saying you are wasting my time. I'm in a big hurry. And then he is saying, I know your senior officers I work with them and I'm going to call them and tell them you're wasting my time. So I said 'call them, why not call them and tell them?' You see you must show the police some respect.

While this official is appealing to broader themes of respect for state authority, what was important to her was that the suspect was showing respect for her personally rather than appealing to the broader institutions of recourse within the police. This dynamic is revealed in the following narrative of our observations and discussions with another official on patrol:

> I asked Prince [a reservist] if they arrest all people that they find without proper papers. He replied by drawing an analogy between his immigration policing activities and the role played by a referee in a soccer match. Even though the laws are there and may apply all the time to a playing offence, the referee can exercise discretion when he deems it necessary. So some migrants may be found without papers, but if they show respect and a good attitude, they may be let loose. Over the course of the next hour I watched as Prince stopped many people and let go most of those found without papers, but not before a thorough interview.

It is important to recognize the consequences of these alternative meanings officers bring to their application of immigration laws. When a series of localized motivations, objectives and relationships begin to take precedence, the documents which states deploy to exert their monopoly on the right to discriminate between insiders and outsiders (Torpey,

2000) fall away as the ultimate arbiter of residency rights. Ultimately, the cumulative outcomes of officials' efforts to implement immigration laws (arrests and deportations) will create the appearance of a state sovereignty that is being reinforced, regardless of the meaning which these officials apply to their work. However, when officials develop a set of alternative justifications for *why* they enforce immigration laws, it also becomes much easier to justify a range of other practices and institutions under this same rubric. This dynamic will become clear in the next section.

Reorienting the state

Not only are officials within the South African government deploying their immigration enforcement prerogatives to shore up their personal authority, but they are also being drawn into doing the bidding of civilians. South African government officials have an historical awareness of the fact that achieving extremely ambitious objectives of migration control requires assistance from a variety of non-state actors. Thus, the officials charged with responsibility for constructing and maintaining the quixotically unrealistic segregation schemes of apartheid have consistently sought to appeal to their fellow South Africans for support. South Africa's immigration legislation is a product of this tradition of 'socialized control', and if former Minister for Home Affairs Buthelezi had had his way, South African citizens would have been called upon to play a much larger role in ensuring that undocumented migrants were made to feel unwelcome in South Africa:

> . . . the future of law enforcement places the focus of enforcement elsewhere. The activities of foreigners are monitored where it counts, namely in workplaces, learning institutions and at the interface between government and its citizenry. Also, in terms of the Bill our Department will need to ensure that, in a climate where the presence of foreigners in South Africa will be less regulated, the activities of foreigners can be adequately regulated and the regulations enforced. Therefore, migration needs to develop the capacity to routinely inspect workplaces as well as communities. In doing so, it may request communities to cooperate with its activities as much as any other law enforcement agency would require the public to provide information. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2002)

Buthelezi envisaged a society that limited itself to the role of providing information about undocumented foreigners to the appropriate

authorities. However, results on the ground reveal a quite different power dynamic at play. In some cases, immigration agents have been 'commissioned' to implement the objectives of local community members. This can be seen in the activities of one DHA inspectorate office in central Johannesburg. One of the main tasks of this office is to conduct raids on sites where foreigners are believed to be illegally employed. While inspectorate officials are supposed to develop their own intelligence regarding which sites to raid, in practice they end up being almost entirely dependent on members of the public for information leading to a raid on suspected sites. Yet the citizens who report such cases are often competitors of the business under investigation, whose main objective is to use the raid to destroy the business in question and/or achieve control over the local market. In other cases, the people who come to report are members of the public who bear a grudge against the business owner, possibly because they have been turned down for employment at the same site.

While immigration officials are often aware of the manner in which these actions embroil the department in localized conflicts as opposed to national priorities, they are also often capable of reconciling this with their broader sense of the purpose of immigration control. This was revealed in one conversation with an inspectorate official:

> Inspectorate Official: That's why the South Africans, they are the ones who are giving us tip-off[s] because they don't get employed there at Nando's or whatever, or any company because they know that there are many illegal foreigners who like to work and then they will give them small money. Yeah, not the South Africans.
>
> Interviewer: Do you think that's right? That South Africans are giving the tip-offs?
>
> Inspectorate Official: Yeah, it's right. It's right because a lot of South Africans they don't have jobs, just because most of the companies they employ illegal foreigners.

It is not only South African nationals who have been able to win over state officials to their personal agenda. This can be seen in one example of refugee advocacy in Johannesburg. The growing gap between generous South African promises of refugee protection and the practical circumstances in which most asylum seekers in South Africa live has been accompanied by the proliferation of a range of advocacy groups, many of which play 'gatekeeper' roles between, on the one hand, state institutions and services, and on the other, migrants and refugee

groups. Building on the widespread recognition of state failure to dis-
criminate effectively between legally and illegally resident persons, one
Zimbabwean group in the Johannesburg inner city has worked with the
local police force to develop its own residency system. This organization
attempts to provide its members with virtual immunity from arrest on
suspected immigration offences. They have achieved this by establishing
registers of residents in particular buildings, reporting raids on build-
ings where its residents reside and then negotiating with police officials
to secure the release of its members if and when they are 'wrongfully'
detained. While the stated objective of the organization is to provide a
form of supplementary protection in a scenario where many migrants
are unable to obtain legitimate status and asylum-seeker status is diffi-
cult to maintain and/or prove, the organization has effectively, and in
collaboration with the police, provided a means of circumventing the
state and developing a quite separate, localized system for determining
who has the right to reside.

A key point to emphasize here is that, due to the new legitimat-
ing identity idioms identified above, neither party involved feels that
there is anything wrong about participating in this parallel system
of territorial belonging and control. The police officers feel that they
can continue deporting enemy outsiders while taking account of the
massive failures in the documentation system, while the Zimbabwean
nationals believe they are simply asserting their members' rights to
claim space for themselves. These dynamics occurring on the margins
of the immigration enforcement system have attracted little attention.
However, as the next part of this discussion will show, in some cases sim-
ilar dynamics are resulting in the development of entirely autonomous
political units within South African jurisdiction.

Replacing and reconstituting the state

In May 2008, after a series of isolated attacks on foreign nationals, res-
idents of townships and informal settlements across the country went
on a rampage, forcibly evicting foreign nationals and other unwanted
South African neighbours from their homes, burning their property and
in some cases subjecting them to brutal and demeaning forms of vio-
lence. A consistent refrain in these evictions was the idea that ordinary
South Africans, fed up with the inability of the state to respond in
convincing fashion to the growing numbers of foreign nationals in peri-
urban areas, were taking matters into their own hands. In the earliest
cases of violence, this appeared to result in a partnership in which state

officials tacitly endorsed these evictions, processing those fleeing the violence for their immigration status and summarily deporting those without rights to be in the country. This appeared to reflect a mutually supportive relationship between state and society towards the common objective of bolstering the capacity of the former to assert immigration control.

However, subsequent research has revealed a more conflicted affair, in which the autonomy and interests of local actors takes centre stage. Interviews with community members suggest that the principal arbiters of whether and when attacks would occur were a series of informal, local regulatory structures, often with links to formal policing and political bodies. These organizations reflected a mix of local elders, community policing forums, business associations and simple gangsters. In some sites, these groups had organized to provide security services to their local communities in the form of protection for fees and meting out 'rough and ready' justice when the police seemed unable to do so. Elsewhere, they organized to prevent non-nationals from gaining a foothold in the townships' thin economy.

What is most important for our discussion is how these groups – working outside but often with the full knowledge of some officials – targeted foreign nationals for exclusion, whether this was on the basis of their immigration status or more vague (and usually unsubstantiated) accusations about foreign nationals' involvement in criminal activity. It is important to note that these 'non-state' actors had for years been substantiating their authority by impinging on what is perhaps the foundational component of the state's claim to sovereignty, that is, its monopoly on the use of force (Landau, 2005). In some respects these types of groups have used mass displays of force as a signalling device to attract the attention of increasingly distant national leadership structures. However, in other respects, the capacity to deliver violent solutions to community problems is the defining feature of these organizations themselves. These same actors, or individuals with membership in such forums, were the principal instigators of the violent attacks on foreign nationals and seemingly the principal beneficiary of the state's inability to quell the violence or bring foreign nationals to justice. In most of these communities, those who organized and perpetrated the violence were not arrested or were released soon after their arrest. This has further endorsed their role as community leaders and sanctioned their right to participate in processes to determine if and when foreign nationals will be readmitted to their communities. Furthermore, the police and others are wary of intervening because these forms of

justice are legitimate in the eyes of many community members and the police do not have the ability to replace them with anything else.

Conclusion

International Relations has often looked for successors to the modern state in organizations that boldly announce their departure from modern principles of sovereign territoriality. In this respect, it is not surprising that images of a postmodern future are found in institutions like the UN or the European Union, which have been specifically and intentionally created to address some of the most prominent shortcomings of nation-states as they were revealed in the twentieth century. Our analysis has suggested the need to take a slightly different path. Following on from the work of historians of the medieval-to-modern transformation, we have argued that we may find glimpses of new combinations of territorial and sovereign power in the 'interstices' of the current system in Africa, as seemingly more humble actors carve out their own realms of authority and control within the confines of immigration policy and law, and cloak their activities in the language and uniforms of the nation-state or their self-exclusion from it.

The study of state and social controls over human mobility and relations to space in Africa offers us one lens to use in the broader study of systemic change. In this particular study, we have eschewed the common tendency in this literature for broad, sweeping macrohistorical work, in which 'Africa' tends to be awarded exceptional status and then quietly forgotten. Instead, we have homed in on the specific practices of individuals and groups by deploying micro-scale methods for interrogating the state and population from the inside. In this way, we have paved the way for a study of the transformation in Africa that avoids the clichéd tendency to reiterate the fact that borders in Africa were 'fabricated' in late nineteenth century Berlin while recognizing that contemporary African states tend to consistently reinforce the importance of these borders. Instead, we show how states may initiate and participate in the process of their own reconstruction from below as new configurations of actors reinterpret, reorient and sometimes simply replace traditional immigration functions.

The challenge going forward is to link the kinds of micro-narratives included here with broader stories about state development in Africa. The first way that this could be achieved is through investigations of continuities. The segmented territorial structure of African states is in some respects epitomized by apartheid South Africa, with its focus

on cities as zones of exclusion and non-urban areas as places commonly beyond central state control. While this history is well-trodden ground, scholars need to tease out the implications of this past for the type of future that African states will chart, particularly as they are increasingly called on to play a role in the global regime of migration governance. European states, in particular, assume that African partners can be encouraged to act as partners in global efforts to harness migration for development, or more simply to stop Africans from migrating North. If the analysis above is at all instructive, then pouring additional resources into the immigration enforcement sector on the continent may result in the proliferation of a range of unexpected and divergent territorial projects that have little to do with the objectives the European donors might have expected.

The second line of worthwhile analysis this study has identified is the possible emergence of a unique type of 'othering' on the African continent. While African leaders and states are certainly attuned to forms of exclusion elsewhere, it is possible that there are unique understandings of residence, belonging and threat which mean that migration and settlement patterns are problematized in a different way. Coupled with this is the possibility that the modern state in Africa may adopt a relatively unique relationship with processes of exclusion, avoiding the tendency to monopolize the prerogative to exclude and instead 'socializing' these processes by encouraging civilians to take up exclusionary tasks.

The final possibility might be to investigate how similar processes are fragmenting and reinventing states in the global North. Studies of immigration enforcement have revealed that a range of new actors, other government departments, private companies and international bodies are being empowered to regulate population movements as states struggle to assert border control on their own. Yet, these developments have commonly been interpreted as inevitably resulting in the reassertion of traditional sovereign norms, as states develop broader coalitions of actors to achieve their conventional ends. This study suggests that we need to look closely at the way in which this outsourcing of immigration enforcement responsibilities may in fact encourage the formulation of micro-fiefdoms of authority, even if this is seemingly within the administrative 'core' of ostensibly strong states.

Part III
Insecurities

9
Transnationalism, Africa's 'Resource Curse' and 'Contested Sovereignties': The Struggle for Nigeria's Niger Delta

Cyril I. Obi

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the impact of globalization on sovereignty in post-Cold War Africa. It shows how the assumptions of mainstream International Relations (IR) about state-centred sovereignty in relation to its geographical, territorial, spatial and juridical forms are called into question by transnational and sub-national social and economic forces that operate below, penetrate, mesh with and transcend the state. It demonstrates how state legitimacy and power over resources are challenged by new centres of power, such as ethnic-minority identity movements driven by the quest for self-determination and resource control, as in the case of Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region. In asserting ownership of crude oil, or in responding to some of the challenges from below, the Nigerian state has had to accommodate the interests of, and rely on some non-state transnational actors – Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs) and Private Security Contractors (PSCs) – or seek international support/legitimacy by engaging with various international actors/multilateral organizations.

Local resistance to oil extraction in the Niger Delta by the state–MNOC 'alliance' has in the main been organized by non- or sub-state actors, including insurgent militia, which sometimes court the global media or join forces with international advocacy groups or diasporic elements to challenge the state's power and 'ownership' of oil (Obi, 2010), thereby making sovereignty an object of contestation. The Niger Delta, rather than being defined by the boundaries of the Nigerian state,

is 'unbounded' by the trans-territorialization of globalized oil production and by non-state forces, whose activities continuously deconstruct or reconstruct sovereignty in local response to 'waves' of oil-fuelled transnationalization. Thus, any effort to explain Nigeria's IR solely in inter-state terms is bound to yield very limited or distorted results.

In its quest to neutralize resistance or attacks by insurgent groups and guarantee the uninterrupted supply of crude oil to global oil markets by its transnational partners, the MNOCs, the Nigerian state becomes an active player in the transnational securitization of a source of energy critical to global capitalism. Such involvement has to an extent resulted in undermining the power of the Nigerian state and subordinating its security to the calculations of powerful hegemonic global powers. This implies that 'its' oil-rich territory becomes a multiscalar site of global oil production, contested sovereignties and transnational energy security. It also blurs the lines of division between the local, regional and global. What is critical is not merely the relationship between Nigeria and other states, but relations between groups within, but operating across Nigeria's territorial boundaries, connecting the locale to a globalizing world and vice versa. Treating the Niger Delta as being in Nigeria and subordinate to its territorial sovereignty becomes problematic in terms of the globalization of the region; the direct impact of developments in the region on global oil supplies, markets and prices; and the reality that non-state transnational actors play critical roles in Nigeria's IR, beneath, within and beyond the reach of the state.

Thus, Nigeria's Niger Delta, by virtue of its history, political geography and strategic location in the global political economy of oil as a site of production, distribution and accumulation provides a context in which 'mainstream assumptions about sovereignty, political authority and social spaces are called into question' (Eberlein, 2006, p. 574). Most of the oil produced by Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer with a daily capacity of 2,248,400 barrels, comes from the Niger Delta. Oil production by globally integrated MNOCs for the global market places the region at the intersection of local, national, regional and global forces and processes linked to transnational relations of power and dispossession. This meshing of levels and intersections demonstrates some of the limitations of mainstream state-centric IR theory, and also provides evidence of the implications of developments in Africa for post-Cold War IR.

Questions about the impact of oil on the nature and dynamics of Nigeria's sovereignty reinforce the emerging position on the need to 'rethink traditional IR theories by taking Africa as its starting point'

(Dunn, 2001, p. 4). The chapter is organized in four parts. The introduction sets out the parameters of the discourse on an African perspective of post-Cold War IR, drawing on the case of contested sovereignties in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta. It is followed by a section that addresses the changing dimensions of sovereignty and how this relates to the struggles between the various groups in the Niger Delta, as transnational and local forces, acting in concert or in opposition to each other, seek control of the space(s) of globalized oil production. The third section explores the transnational perspective on the securitization of the Niger Delta in the context of an 'oil curse' and the struggle for oil in the region. Central to this is the challenging and resisting of the authority (and sovereignty) of the Nigerian state, as part of an extractive transnational alliance. In the 'Conclusion', the challenges that the emerging trans-global intersections of contested sovereignties embedded in the Niger Delta pose for transnational security and IR are examined.

Changing dimensions of sovereignty in a globalizing post-Cold War world

Sovereignty

Sovereignty has always been a core element in state-centric IR and law, even if it has been subjected over time to various interpretations and faced limitations often dictated by real power considerations. According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS):

> ...four challenges have appeared to the traditional and static conception of sovereignty: the increased salience of self-determination and the willingness to redraw borders, the ever-widening definition of threats to international peace and security, the recurring collapse of state authority, and the heightened importance attached to popular sovereignty. (ICISS, 2001)

This trend is partly borne out in the recognition by the former UN secretary general that 'state sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalisation and international cooperation' (Annan, 1999, p. 47). The point needs to be emphasized that sovereignty defined in terms of 'exclusive territorial jurisdiction' is 'transforming under pressure of the globalization of economic relations' (Jayasuriya, 1999, p. 431). This implies that sovereignty in a globalizing post-Cold War world 'needs to be unbundled from its link with territory'

(Agnew, 1994; Jayasuriya, 1999, p. 433; Slaughter, 2004) and its dynamics understood as a response to changes in the domestic and global environment. Such unbundling and transformation of sovereignty by the forces and processes of global capitalism can be gleaned from developments in Africa, particularly in the Niger Delta. Here integrative and extractive processes of global oil capital, and resistance to them, are transforming and redefining sovereignty, both as contested terrain, and as a context where territorial control of the oil in the delta has increasingly fallen under the control of transnational and local forces, simultaneously reinforcing and hobbling certain powers of the state.

Globalization and sovereignty

As noted earlier, globalization has contributed to the transformation of aspects of the nation-state and social processes. Of note are its implications for sovereignty, specifically 'entrenched geopolitical boundaries' (Brenner, 1999, p. 40), and exclusive territoriality (Sassen, 1996, p. ix). The acceleration of trans-boundary flows of information, finance, commodities and capital and the movement of people that reduce the influence of borders and the nation-state over certain transactions; the creation of 'new' countries; and the growing role of non-state actors/people(s) have provided a new discourse on individual and popular sovereignties and rights, as well as new perspectives on interventionism.

New international non-state or trans-territorial actors in a rapidly globalizing world, such as diasporic communities, multinationals, international civil society organizations/NGOs and social and resistance movements have been identified as impinging on, undermining or transcending state sovereignty. Such non-state actors have found legitimacy for their counterclaims to state sovereignty in popular sovereignty, based on individuals' rights. Globalization has intensified the 'global crisis of the nation-state as the main vehicle of sovereign power' (Hansen and Stepputat, 2006, p. 296).

It is also relevant that globalization has led to the transformation of territorial space(s), resulting in a new 'geography of power' (Sassen, 1996, p. 5). This transnationalization of territory in the form of spatial redefinition to accommodate, connect and 'enmesh' several levels of 'presence', the creation of jurisdictions that transcend and undermine the state and the dissolution of certain boundaries by information and communications technologies (ICT) pose new challenges to the notion of state sovereignty. Yet, despite this, the state form of domination

and hegemony is not set to disappear (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 33), but is rather adapting its interventionist role to suit the demands of a hegemonic transnational capitalist logic.

Acharya (2007, p. 275) argues that post-9/11 debates differ from those pre-9/11 in two ways: 'firstly it has returned the rationale for limiting sovereignty to the overriding importance of national security, rather than human security or welfare, which were central to the globalization and humanitarian intervention debates', and 'second, the post-9/11 challenge to sovereignty is organized and led by a hegemonic state (although it is backed by a number of other states allied with the hegemon) which is seeking simultaneously to safeguard and limit Westphalian sovereignty to suit its particularistic interests'.

State intervention is justified in the name of fighting global terror and preventing 'failed' states across the world that lack capacity to effectively govern their territories and promote an environment conducive to foreign investment from acting as an incubator for terrorism or providing spaces from which terrorists can strike internationally (Obi, 2006, pp. 91–92). Therefore, 'collapsed', 'rogue' or 'failing states' are targeted for intervention when it is believed they could harbour terrorists or insurgent groups/rebels that could tap into global (non-state) networks of terror (Patrick, 2006, pp. 27–29). While certain aspects of globalization undermine and transcend state sovereignty, hegemonic states seek to intervene in 'weaker' states to prop up state sovereignty and legitimize state protection of transnational economic and strategic interests.

The state cannot be excluded from the processes of globalization, underscoring what Robinson (2007, p. 131) notes is 'a national-global duality' with regard to an emergent 'transnational state'. While globalization may not be leading to the 'end of the state', it imposes new roles on states as connected nodal points in the ever-expanding web of transnational capital. The state-centric order is not about to give way completely, but it is being influenced in varying degree by the globally integrated system of capitalist production, consumption as well as by cultural, financial, population and information flows. The state in Africa is still a work-in-progress, in constant flux between domestic elites seeking to use the levers of state power and access to resources to establish hegemony at 'home', but also responding to the 'national-global duality' by participating in varying degree in processes of transnationalization.

It is against this background that the counterclaims of groups invoking popular sovereignty in their quest to create alternative spaces of power and claim ownership of resources can be understood as a struggle

against dominant national and transnationalized forces. The struggle over 'whose sovereignty?' will long continue, with implications for IR (Olukoshi, 2005, pp. 177–201; Reno, 2001, p. 197). This chapter illustrates the nature of the struggle, using the case of Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta, where local groups struggle against perceived 'internal colonialism' (Naanen, 1995, p. 48) by an ethnic majority-dominated state, backed by the forces of global oil. At stake is the contest between the sovereignty of the Nigerian state, supported by its transnational allies, versus the sovereignty 'from below' of the various Niger Delta ethnic minorities.

Transnational security and the struggle for control of the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta case illustrates how oil produced in a relatively small locale has a remarkable impact on the global political economy and spawns contradictions that throw up social forces which challenge state claims to sovereignty. Though located in Nigeria, the Niger Delta's significance transcends the country's borders due to its critical importance to global energy security. It is geo-strategically framed within the broader West African Gulf of Guinea, or new Oil Gulf, stretching from Mauritania to Angola (and possibly Namibia), which currently accounts for about 15 per cent of US oil imports; this figure is expected to reach 25 per cent in 2020 (Lubeck et al., 2007, p. 3).

Oil is therefore writ large in the securitization of the region. The Nigerian state is viewed both within the context of a region defined as being of critical global strategic importance in an era of growing oil demand and shrinking supplies, and through the lenses of its (in)ability to maintain security in the highly valued globalized space of the Niger Delta. For global actors keen on ensuring uninterrupted supplies of oil from the delta, supporting the Nigerian state's sovereignty over the source of supply becomes a basic tenet of their energy security interests. This suggests that the perceived (in)capacity of the Nigerian state to secure its territory provides the context for international intervention designed to empower it, but with implications for its sovereignty. On the other hand, for local forces resisting the transnational oil alliance – seen as extractors, expropriators and polluters – people's claims to sovereignty over the oil in their local communities becomes the organizing principle for challenging the Nigerian state's sovereignty and its claims to 'legitimate' ownership of the region's oil.

The international community, particularly the US, is concerned about its energy security in the face of a 'critically weak Nigerian state' (Rice and Patrick, 2008, p. 11) and the attacks on oil assets by insurgent militias, particularly the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Courson, 2009; Obi, 2010). The weakness of a Nigerian state (and the corruption of its political elites) that has been unable to put down challenges to its sovereignty or address the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta (Morris, 2006, pp. 229–32) is seen as a threat to global oil commerce. Not only are billions of dollars in investments by US oil companies at stake, but so is the safety of American oil workers. There is also the theft and sale of crude oil by transnational criminal networks (oil bunkering), and the entry of oil companies from China, India, Brazil, Malaysia and Korea into the region.

A Center for Security and International Studies report notes that, between 2006 and 2007, Niger Delta militants abducted and freed over 100 expatriate oil workers, increased their arms inventories to alarming levels and attacked oil installations, with huge losses to oil companies and the government (Iannaccone, 2007, p. 2). Also relevant is the centrality of the Niger Delta to post-9/11 US national interest calculations within the overall context of its post-Cold War global security. In this regard, the US has entered into various strategic and military cooperation programmes with the Nigerian state (Fischer-Thompson, 2007), and encouraged it to bring insurgent militias into some kind of peace arrangement based on an amnesty and a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programme. At the same time, the US has set up a command for Africa (AFRICOM) to oversee US strategic and security interests on the continent, and some support has been provided for a Gulf of Guinea guard force. US engagement with the Nigerian state coexists with massive investments by Western and US MNOCs in the Niger Delta and operations by Western and US-based PSCs hired by MNOCs to protect their personnel and physical assets.

The presence and activities of these national and transnational non-state actors intent on securing oil supplies from the Niger Delta has had far-reaching implications for Nigeria's sovereignty over the region. While, on the one hand, the 'territorial' Nigerian state has been the 'container' of and actor in the struggles over oil in the region, its legitimacy, power and sovereignty, buoyed by support from hegemonic global actors, has not gone uncontested. Indeed, resistance, though local, through organized ethnic-identity social movements and ambiguous

insurgent militias (Obi, 2009) has sought to empower local claims by targeting a global audience through transnational media and international rights advocacy discourses and networks.

This strategy was successfully used by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in its global campaign in the 1990s against Shell and the Nigerian state, which it accused of violating the human and environmental rights of the Ogoni ethnic minority of the Niger Delta. From 2005 until recently, some insurgent militias in the delta have targeted MNOCs by taking hostages or sabotaging installations, and using ICT and skilful media campaigns to draw global attention to local grievances and assert a popular form of sovereignty from 'below'.

Oil resources, power, ethnic-minority 'nationalism' and contested sovereignties in the Niger Delta

The intersection of the various transnational 'levels' in the oil-rich Niger Delta has placed in it the eye of a storm of contested sovereignties, a site from which to grapple with the ways ethnic-minority identity politics challenge the authority of the Nigerian nation-state, as well as the ways transnational forces and processes operate below, above and beyond the Nigerian state. At stake in the contested sovereignties is the struggle over natural resources, particularly land and oil. Oil in this context is a source of power and an object of struggle. The ethnic-minority resistance movements frame their struggle as one for self-determination and resource control (Saro-Wiwa, 1995), which suggests they do not consider federal ownership of the oil in their region fair or 'legitimate'. This would explain their struggle to either pressure the federal government to recognize their claims and renegotiate the ownership of oil or to block federal access to oil. Either way, the underlying strategy is one of asserting local sovereignty over the resources (oil) of the delta. It is in this regard that local 'nationalist' resistance movements such as MOSOP and other rights advocacy groups confronted Nigeria and MNOCs in the Niger Delta, but also 'bypassed' the state by using global media, ICT and transnational networks to empower their claims and struggles against the Nigerian state-MNOC alliance.

Following MOSOP's campaign, the Ijaw, regarded as the largest ethnic minority in the delta, continued their struggle for self-determination. According to Ukiwo (2007, p. 591), 'they are indigenous to six states in the country and constitute political minorities in all but one of these six states'. In December 1998, an all-Ijaw youth conference organized by the

Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) took place in Kaiama, the birthplace of Ijaw hero Isaac Boro, following which the Kaiama Declaration was issued. The declaration claimed ownership of all land and natural resources within Ijaw territory, and 'ceased to recognise all undemocratic decrees that rob our peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent. These include the Land Use Decree and the Petroleum Decree' (Obi, 2001b, pp. 118–20). The IYC demanded the withdrawal of the federal army and all MNOCs from Ijawland by the end of December. Ijawland was invaded shortly after the issuance of the declaration by the military in a bid to assert federal authority and the IYC-led protests were crushed.

It should be noted that ethnic-minority 'nationalist' resistance politics, though characterized by internal contradictions, is led by a Niger Delta elite that taps into the deep sense of grievance of the Niger Delta people against the alliance between state and oil transnationals. Though not a fully developed centre of power, this elite fraction has some leverage over the national and transnational elite and the state, accounting for the fluidity and political ambivalence of its politics.

A relevant feature of the struggle over the Niger Delta, according to Eberlein (2006, p. 590), is that 'the political strategy of extraversion ensures continued international diplomatic support for the elite faction currently at the helm of the official state hierarchy'. International interventionism by donors, PSCs and global oil companies, which penetrates and both strengthens and undermines Nigeria's sovereignty, is further reinforced by the securitization of the Niger Delta as a territory supplying a strategic commodity that must be kept safe for global oil commerce. This translates into support by global powers for the Nigerian state to strengthen its coercive capacity and its authority over the oil-rich region, and thereby ensure the transnational exploitation of oil and gas from the delta by MNOCs for the global oil market.

In spite of the violent contestations and contradictions in the nation-state project in Nigeria, more foreign oil companies are coming to the Niger Delta region, as global oil prices and demand continue to grow and Nigeria's oil production begins a steady shift offshore into the Gulf of Guinea. What the emerging scenario in this troubled region suggests is that the unfinished business of the national-global duality that characterizes the 'disorganized' transnationalization of Nigeria's sovereignty will have to contend with the pressures for sovereignty from below in the oil-rich Niger Delta for some time to come.

The struggle for popular sovereignty in the Niger Delta

From the foregoing, three currents underpin the struggles for sovereignty in the Niger Delta. These are framed around the interrogation of the legitimacy of the rule of the Nigerian federal government (at the behest of a fractious Nigerian 'state') over the territory, the right of access to the region and its resources by transnational oil corporations by virtue of their partnership with the Nigerian government and the quest of the local people for self-determination, regional autonomy and resource control (Obi, 2007, pp. 101–04).

The widespread feeling of alienation from the ownership of the land and oil and the benefits from the oil industry, and perceived marginalization by a highly centralized federal power structure and fiscal distributive system, provide a volatile brew of discontent among local people. Most of them question the legitimacy and authority of the Nigerian state over the people and resources of the oil-rich but underdeveloped region (UNDP Nigeria, 2006). These sentiments also feature in the protests against foreign exploitation of the region without just and adequate compensation for the local people and fuel the view that the federal government (dominated by non-oil-producing ethnic majorities) does not take the plight of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta seriously.

The struggle for self-determination has a long history. Its roots lie in the creation of Nigeria as a colonial state by the British in 1914, an act that consigned the people of the Niger Delta to the status of ethnic minorities among the numerically preponderant neighbouring ethnic groups, which dominated political life in what later became the Western and Eastern regions of Nigeria (Alagoa, 1964, p. 61; Dike, 1965, p. 14; Obi, 2005, pp. 189–212). On this basis, smaller groups defined as 'ethnic minorities' tended to lose out, while dominant ethnic groups asserted power at the regional (north: Hausa-Fulani; east: Igbo; and west: Yoruba) and national levels.

The initial reaction of the minorities was to protest against 'the majoritarian stranglehold of the three ethno-regional blocs' (Mustapha, 2003b, p. 8). Although they failed in their quest for the creation of states before Nigeria's independence in 1960, the post-independence crises that culminated in civil war between 1967 and 1970 provided new opportunities to this end.

The agitation resurfaced in February 1966 when a group of Ijaw youth, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), led by Isaac Adaka Boro, unsuccessfully attempted to secede from Nigeria by declaring the Niger Delta

Republic. Boro's action was partly to prevent the oil in the Niger Delta that was part of the Eastern region from falling into the hands of the dominant Igbo elite, and to assert Ijaw 'sovereignty' over its ancestral territory. However, Boro and his men were eventually arrested and charged with treason. Reprieve only came with the July 1966 military coup (Obi, 2005, p. 206), with some of those released choosing to fight on the side of the federal government against secessionist (Igbo elite-led) Biafra during the Nigerian civil war.

Just as the states were created by military fiat, the federal monopoly over oil was similarly established through Decree No. 51 of 1969 and Decree No. 9 of 1971, several pieces of oil legislation and the 1978 Land Use Act, which vested all land in the federal states in the hands of governors. Apart from the centralization of power over oil, the derivation principle of revenue allocation was progressively changed to reduce the 'share' of oil-producing states of the Niger Delta from 50 per cent in 1966 to 1.5 per cent in the 1990s. This latter was viewed by the ethnic minorities as an injustice, particularly given the decades of marginalization and neglect of the Niger Delta by past federal governments. It was also strongly felt that derivation was abandoned to enable 'majoritarian' ethnic groups to control the oil wealth produced in the minority oil states. Hence, controlling oil revenue became the object of the struggle between the oil minorities/states of the Niger Delta and the non-oil-producing ethnic majority groups/states/federal government.

Economic globalization and popular struggles

The struggles in the Niger Delta became more urgent with the collapse of the oil-dependent economy as a result of sharp declines in global oil prices and Nigeria's oil exports. Nigeria was forced to adopt a socially harsh structural adjustment programme (SAP) at the behest of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986. The economic crisis and the SAP hit the Niger Delta particularly hard. Apart from the increased leverage the SAP gave the IMF/World Bank over Nigeria to adopt 'anti-people' policies, such as reduction or withdrawal of social subsidies, retrenchment of workers and introduction of user fees for a whole range of social services, it also led to deregulation of the economy and the petroleum sector.

Many people who lost their jobs in the cities returned to the countryside only to find the environment severely polluted and hopes of employment in the oil industry, in the face of shrinking government revenues, non-existent. At the same time, MNOCs took advantage of the

deregulation, increased state dependence, new incentives and the quest for increased profits and revenues by the state–oil alliance to intensify oil exploitation. Factional struggles within the state over shrinking oil revenues intensified as the ruling military council sought to keep the fractious elite in power at any cost. Thus, formal channels for making demands and seeking redress by groups 'outside the state' remained blocked. This was particularly so in the Niger Delta, where the stakes in controlling oil had climbed and social discontent was seething beneath the surface, coalescing in popular agitation for the respect of the civic rights of ethnic minorities.

One of the earliest groups to articulate the demand for self-determination was MOSOP. In October 1990, MOSOP sent the Ogoni Bill of Rights, endorsed by representative organizations in Ogoniland, to the federal government (Saro-Wiwa, 1995). Its core demand was for political autonomy that

> ...guaranteed political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the rights to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions, and the right to pro-tect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation. (Obi, 2001b, pp. 121–25)

The following year, MOSOP added more demands to the bill of rights and internationalized its campaign against Shell, the largest MNOC operator in Ogoniland, when the federal government did not respond. Saro-Wiwa, one of MOSOP's leaders, noted that he was encouraged to internationalize the Ogoni struggle by three factors: 'the end of the Cold War, the increasing attention being paid to the global environment, and the insistence of the European community that minority rights be respected, albeit in the successor states to the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia' (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, p. 7). However, by 1995, follow-ing an incident in which five members of the Ogoni elite were killed by a mob in Ogoniland, Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members were charged and pronounced guilty of incitement to murder and trea-son, and hanged on the orders of a special tribunal constituted by the federal military government, despite worldwide appeals for clemency. Although Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth and some Western countries temporarily recalled their ambassadors in protest, no sanctions were imposed on the Nigerian state as expected by local resis-tance forces and their international supporters. Thus, the state forcefully

asserted its authority over the Niger Delta and repressed the challenge to the state–oil alliance posed by MOSOP.

MEND: From popular to militant resistance in search of Niger Delta sovereignty?

The drift to militant resistance was due in part to the militarization of the Niger Delta in the 1990s by the Nigerian state, which was intent on asserting its authority over the people and resources of the region, and to violent clashes between armed Ijaw and Itsekiri youth in the Warri area of the Western Delta between 1997 and 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Out of that conflict there emerged an Ijaw militant organization, the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), which also collaborated with Ijaw militant groups from other parts of the region (ICG, 2006; Okonta, 2007; Ukiwo, 2007, pp. 602–03).

The emergence of MEND early in 2006 signified a shift in the conflict in the delta from protest to an insurgency directed against the state–oil alliance. The group drew international attention to the plight of the Ijaw and its resistance campaign by taking foreign oil workers hostage, targeting oil assets, sabotaging oil installations and seeking to demonstrate the inability of Nigerian state to stop its attacks. It also made effective use of global news media, using the Internet to send e-mails and images to the world's leading news agencies and local newspapers, and taking journalists to its camps in the swamps of the Niger Delta (Junger, 2007). MEND also tapped into local grievances to embed itself in popular consciousness and elicit grassroots support for its struggle for self-determination and resource control. In a post-9/11 world, it gained most attention internationally through its threats to 'cripple Nigerian oil exports' (IRIN News, 2006; Sahara reporters, 2007).

In an interview with Brian Ross (2007), Jomo Gbomo, the spokesperson for MEND, elucidated the objectives of the group:

> . . . MEND is an amalgam of all arms bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years.

This illustrates the point made earlier about the challenge to the sovereignty of the state over resource-rich territory from 'below', and

how the state, in alliance with external non-state actors, 'transnational-izes' its sovereignty. However, it should be noted that the picture could be more complex. Although this situation shows how local actors seeking control of resources interrogate the basis of the state's (territorial and legitimate) claims to ownership of resources, particularly when the state is perceived as exploitative and unfair, it does not bring out the fluid dynamics and contradictions that sometimes underpin the struggles over natural resources and power. What is often not obvious is the dense matrix of contestations in the construction of sovereignty from below in the Niger Delta and the ways in which transnational forces intersect with, and simultaneously empower and undermine national and local ones.

Conclusion: Transnationalism, the struggle for resources and Africa's international relations

The significance of the struggles for power over resource-rich territories in Africa transcends national borders and involves non-state actors and processes connected with globalization. As demonstrated in the case of the Niger Delta, the intersections of the various transnational 'levels' in the oil-rich delta underpin the complex ways in which non-state actors, riding on and connecting with processes of globally led oil extraction, defy elements of territory and state-defined sovereignty and power, making the region the eye of a transnational storm. The situation in the delta shows that territoriality, sovereignty and power are being 'unbounded' by processes and forces of transnationalism. Whether viewed from above, in the context of a transnationally compliant Nigerian state asserting its authority over a resource-rich region with the support of global powers, or from below, as a site in which ethnic-minority identities challenge the authority of the Nigerian state and the presence of MNOCs, the kinds of alliances entered into by these various players in pursuit of their interests represent a new challenge for the discipline of IR.

Even so, the local, national and global intersections of power and contested authorities in the Niger Delta are fluid and dynamic. The forces of local resistance sometimes have an ambiguous relationship with the Nigerian state, the dominant elite and even the MNOCs, just as transnational forces also sometimes enter into expedient covert deals with local forces (Obi, 2010). These complexities and ambiguities that underpin contested sovereignties in the Niger Delta pose theoretical challenges to mainstream IR and underscore the contribution the case

can make to existing debates. What the emerging scenario in Africa suggests is that the 'unfinished business' of the national–global duality and the continued commoditization of the continent's resources for the global market will continue to spawn socio-economic, political and environmentally rooted contradictions that will manifest themselves as complex 'contested sovereignties', as the case of the Niger Delta shows, with wider implications for understanding Africa's IR.

10

Security Privatization and the New Contours of Africa's Security Governance

Rita Abrahamsen

Introduction

Mention private security in Africa, and images of mercenaries and heavily armed private soldiers spring readily to mind. Academic analyses, news reports, popular fiction as well as Hollywood films have zoomed in on Africa's 'dogs of war', painting a picture of a continent awash with private soldiers, toppling or propping up governments, looting resources and generally wreaking havoc across already ravaged countries. In International Relations (IR) too, hardly any analysis of security privatization is considered complete without reference to mercenary activities in Africa, especially those of Executive Outcomes (EO), Sandline International and the botched coup of Simon Mann and his planeload of private soldiers headed for Equatorial Guinea in 2004. An almost compulsory corollary of such accounts is a reflection on the relationship between security privatization and the decline of the African state and its sovereignty.

This chapter does not seek to deny the centrality and importance of Africa to discussions of security privatization, or to dismiss the concern with issues of sovereignty and state weakness. Instead, it seeks to demonstrate that security privatization in Africa is much more widespread, and potentially also politically more significant, than a focus on military privatization alone would allow. By broadening the discussion of private security to include commercial private security and more informal initiatives such as vigilantes, the chapter shows not only the pervasiveness of private security initiatives, but also private security's intimate connections to global political and economic transformations and discourses. By situating security privatization within broader social, economic and

political transformations, the chapter draws attention to its embeddedness within contemporary forms of governance. As such, rather than representing an automatic decline in state sovereignty, security privatization indicates a reconfiguration of the very categories of the public and the private, the global and the local. In the contemporary era, these conventional distinctions struggle to capture the empirical realities of security provision and governance, which increasingly extends beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation state in terms of participating actors, resources, technologies, discourses and normativities. Security in Africa, as elsewhere, is thus increasingly beyond the state, suggesting a focus on global security assemblages, where a multitude of actors interact and compete to produce new forms of security institutions, practices and governance (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2009, 2010).

Mapping security privatization in Africa

Executive Outcomes is without doubt the main reason for Africa's prominent status in discussions of security privatization.[1] The South African company was founded at the end of the Cold War by senior figures from the apartheid military apparatus, and primarily enlisted former soldiers from the various battalions and divisions that had spearheaded South Africa's destabilization strategy in the frontline states, including 32 Battalion, the Reconnaissance Commandos, the Parachute Brigade and the paramilitary Koevoet ('crowbar'). The company's founder, Eeben Barlow, was formerly the second in command of 32 Battalion's reconnaissance unit, whereas approximately 70 per cent of the soldiers were black Africans, including many Angolans who had fought with the South African Defence Force during the apartheid era. These hired soldiers, and the company's substantial resources and equipment, including Russian Mi7 and Mi24 attack helicopters, were put to use in Sierra Leone in 1995, when the beleaguered government of Captain Valentine Strasser contracted EO to fight against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), following the failed attempts of two less aggressive foreign private military companies (PMCs). In military terms, the EO intervention was highly successful. Within a month of its arrival, EO and the Sierra Leonean government forces cleared the capital Freetown of RUF rebels. Hundreds of RUF fighters are reported to have been killed in the operation, while even more allegedly deserted. In July and August of the same year, EO-led forces reconquered the all-important diamond-mining areas, again inflicting significant losses on RUF. Long-term peace, however, did not result from EO intervention,

nor were the political conditions for peace and stability established. Conflict in Sierra Leone persisted long after the EO contract had been terminated by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in January 1997, and also saw another notorious private military intervention by the British firm Sandline International, which, like EO, was hired by the Sierra Leonean government to train soldiers and fight against the RUF.

The operations of EO and Sandline International were not confined to Sierra Leone. One of EO's more long-standing engagements was in Angola, where it trained and fought alongside Angolan government troops against the rebel UNITA movement, after it refused to accept the election results in 1992. The direct involvement in combat by these two companies in 1990s seemed to echo the long history of private military involvement in Africa, especially as their payment was frequently linked to future access to lucrative resources such as diamonds. Throughout history, private forces have been employed to ensure access to Africa's riches: the British South Africa Company of Cecil Rhodes, for example, had its own paramilitary mounted infantry force, while later during the colonial period commercial companies like the Sierra Leone Selection Trust, a subsidiary of De Beers, employed a private police force of 35 armed men to protect its diamond concession in Sierra Leone. Numerous private soldiers also participated in Africa's civil wars in the 1960s and 1970s: in the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), French, South African, Rhodesian, Spanish, Italian, British and Belgian mercenaries fought on both sides, while in the Nigerian civil war, Americans, Germans, Frenchmen, Britons, Egyptians, South Africans and Rhodesians enlisted with both the federal government forces and the Biafran separatists (Clarke, 1968; De St. Jorre, 1972; Mockler, 1969).

Given this history, the emergence of PMCs like EO led to widespread fears that Africa was again becoming the favourite playground of surplus soldiers looking for profitable engagements as many Northern countries downsized their post-Cold War militaries. Today, however, the operations of foreign private armies have been significantly curtailed. EO ceased operations in 1999, and the activities of most contemporary private security firms that operate at the military end of the spectrum bear relatively little resemblance to the combat roles so widely associated with events in Sierra Leone and Angola. This is not to say that the possibility of private armies intervening in African countries has disappeared, or that private soldiers are no longer involved in African conflicts, but the spectacular, direct-combat involvement of international companies seems to have peaked in the 1990s, only to be replaced by a more 'corporate' private military sector.

The involvement of this private military sector in contemporary Africa is extensive, and includes military training and advising, support to special forces and intelligence services, as well as participation in peacekeeping operations and other development- and security-related activities. As development policies have become increasingly concerned with security, private military actors have become incorporated into a host of reform and training initiatives. Similarly, Northern countries have as part of their security and anti-terrorism policies focused on strengthening the capacities of African militaries, again expanding the opportunities for private military actors. Thus, today companies like the American Military Professional Resource Incorporated (MPRI), DynCorp International and Pacific Architects Engineers (PAE), as well as the British ArmorGroup (now part of Group4Securicor), provide military advice and training to numerous countries, often as part of broader security sector reform programmes funded by donor governments. A key example can be found in Liberia, where the US contracted DynCorp International to restructure and rebuild the country's military sector (McFate, 2008). Similarly, in Nigeria, MPRI has been involved in an extensive US-funded project to professionalize the military forces (Aning et al., 2008). International private military actors are thus still actively involved on the African continent, and this in turn raises important questions about accountability, transparency and the relationship of these companies to both their home and host states. Interestingly, South African companies and soldiers continue to play prominent roles in the private security sector on the African continent and beyond, with South African nationals comprising a substantial proportion of the private contractors involved in the conflict in Iraq.

Outside the military arena, the day-to-day delivery of security in Africa has also become increasingly privatized. While far from a new phenomenon, commercial private security companies (PSCs) have expanded at an astonishing rate in the last two decades or so, and their uniformed guards have become a familiar part of the urban landscape across the continent. Measured as a percentage of GDP, South Africa has the largest private security sector in the world. Currently, there are 6392 registered and active PSCs, employing 375,315 active security officers with access to 80,000 vehicles (*Annual Report, 2006/2007, 2008/2009*; Brogden and Nijhar, 2005; Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, 2007; 2009). By comparison, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has 114,241 sworn police officers and only 37,000 vehicles (De Lange, 2008, p. 154). In the nine years from 1997 to 2006, the number of security guards grew by over 157 per cent, while in the year from March 2008

to March (or February) 2009, the number of active guards increased by over 10 per cent.

In other countries, exact statistics are harder to come by, but in Nigeria there are between 1500 and 2000 PSCs, and in Kenya some 2000 companies employ approximately 48,000 people. Given Kenya's high dependency ratios, this means that the industry indirectly supports a total of 195,524 people (Keku and Akinbade, 2003; Wairagu et al., 2004, p. 45). In Angola, there are at least 300 PSCs with about 35,000 staff; in Uganda, the number of private guards equals that of police officers; and in many other African countries, private security is one of the few sectors of employment growth and expansion (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006; Rimli and Schmeidle, 2007). In Sierra Leone, for example, there were only two PSCs before the civil war, but now there are at least 20.

As the market for private security has developed, the presence of international security companies in Africa has also expanded. According to some estimates, the world's largest private security company, Group4Securicor, is now the continent's largest private employer, with a total payroll of over 106,500 people across 29 African countries. Other companies such as ADT and Chubb also have significant operations on the continent, while Securitas, the world's second-largest security company, recently entered the African market through acquisitions in South Africa and Morocco. The integration of Africa into the global security market is likely to continue to increase, as profit and growth rates in so-called emerging markets are significantly higher than in North America and Europe. All the major PSCs are accordingly pursuing aggressive global expansion strategies, and as a result, it is estimated that by 2015 emerging markets will account for 35 per cent of a global private security market, forecast to be worth some US$230 billion (*Securitas*, 2007).

Yet another aspect of security privatization is the emergence of informal or non-commercial security initiatives, often referred to as vigilantes. The term vigilante conceals a variety of different non-state security groups, defined by Pratten as groups that focus on the 'protection and care of the community encompassed within these boundaries', which 'involves maintaining surveillance and taking action against threats to this community' (Pratten, 2006, p. 711). Recent studies of vigilante groups have shown how they often begin as popular schemes for imposing order in the absence of adequate state provision and control, but subsequently degenerate into violent gangs or militias that increase social and political disorder. At their best, vigilantes are praised for their general contribution to public order by enforcing rules and penalties,

defined by and adapted to local needs (Heald, 2006). In Nigeria, for example, Ekeh (2002) has argued that vigilantes meet a local need for security that cannot be met by existing police forces. At their worst, vigilante groups become sources of insecurity and violence and can be difficult to distinguish from protection rackets and organized forms of crime. Many vigilante groups are also linked to powerful political actors and parties, and are mobilized for political thuggery during election campaigns. In Kenya, Anderson has highlighted how vigilantes 'all too easily become a political instrument in the hands of those with the money to pay', and such groups have played key roles in electoral and post-election violence in many countries (Anderson, 2002, p. 542). A key insight from recent research is accordingly that vigilante groups frequently operate on a sliding scale from 'order' to 'disorder', and that they may contribute to crime and social order at the same time (Titeca, 2009).

As the last point indicates, no automatic link can be assumed between an increase in the number of security actors and an increased feeling of public security. Instead, security actors of all kinds can be a source of insecurity. In the case of the public police, the uncomfortable truth is that they are often part of the problem rather than the solution to crime and insecurity. In an influential study of Sao Paulo in Brazil, Caldeira identified the police's disregard for the human rights of poor people as a key contributor to the escalation of crime and violence, arguing that it:

> ... is not indicators of economic crisis, unemployment rates, urbanization or even state expenditures on public security at which we must look in order to understand contemporary violence. Rather, we have to consider the everyday functioning of the institutions of order, the continuous pattern of abuses by the police forces, their disrespect for rights, and routine practices of injustice and discrimination. (Caldeira, 2000, p. 209)

Her observation is pertinent to Africa too, where many police forces since their colonial inception have often been preoccupied with regime security; that is, the protection of a particular political regime rather than the citizenry (Hills, 2000). In countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, the police have a history of political intimidation and violence, and accordingly command low levels of public trust and confidence. There is also a perception that the police are increasingly involved in criminal activities. In one survey in Kenya, for example, 36 per cent of people attributed all crime in Nairobi directly or indirectly to the police

force (Stavrous, 2002). The previous government of Kenya attributed the problems within the police to 'low morale . . . , low professionalism, inadequate allocation of required resources, and endemic corruption in the force' (Government of Kenya, 2003, p. 10).

In the case of PSCs, there are concerns that they may mirror the behaviour and abuses of the police, and thus contribute to insecurity, violence and human rights abuses rather than increased security. In many countries, the sector is almost entirely unregulated, and what rules exist are rarely implemented or controlled. Guards receive little, if any, training, and are generally poorly paid, and may fall prey to the same temptations towards crime as underpaid police officers. On a more positive note, PSCs – like the police and vigilantes – can contribute to increased security for their clients, and also provide a more secure environment for economic activities frequently considered crucial for economic growth and development.

Explaining the rise of private security

All these forms of security privatization on the African continent are linked in various and significant ways to global discourses and practices, and although there are important and specific African conditions, security privatization cannot be understood or analysed in isolation from the global.

Most obviously, military privatization is linked to the end of the Cold War, which created both 'push' and 'pull' factors in terms of surplus soldiers and equipment at the same time as many client states abandoned by the superpowers sought added military strength against internal resistance. More subtly, security privatization is also linked to the global dominance of neoliberal economic models and the neoliberal emphasis on privatization and outsourcing of previously public goods and services. While security functions and services were perhaps more resistant to the privatization ethos than services such as health and education, the delivery of security has in recent years been transformed by neoliberal modes of governance. The emphasis on fiscal discipline, value for money, efficiency and a reduced role for the state in the provision of services has meant that the police worldwide are increasingly required to work in partnership with other agencies in tackling crime and disorder. In the military sector too, outsourcing of a range of functions is a key reason for the growth of PMCs. The result is, on the one hand, increasing fragmentation of the delivery of security, in the sense that operations and decision-making are devolved from the centre; on

the other hand, neoliberalism has been accompanied by a host of New Public Management (NPM) strategies, including various forms of audits, procedures and reporting mechanisms to ensure that particular forms of behaviour are adopted and institutionalized as 'best practice', thus leading to a significant merging of the public and the private.

Another key condition for the privatization of security is its increasing commodification, which is of particular relevance to the growth of PSCs. When previously public goods and services become commodities that can be bought and sold in a competitive market place, members of the public are also increasingly seen as consumers with the right to 'shop around' for the best quality service. Security is no longer an exclusive service provided to all by the state, but instead something to be bought from a marketplace where the state is only one of many potential providers, and not necessarily the most efficient and reliable. Commodification thus entails a degree of depoliticization, in the sense that security is delinked from its previous identification with state programmes for justice, welfare and crime reduction, and becomes instead a globally traded commodity. Importantly in this regard, the World Trade Organization (WTO) now regularly includes private security in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, thereby facilitating the worldwide expansion of private security companies.

The proliferation of private security initiatives in Africa is closely linked to these neoliberal agendas of state minimalism and market freedom, and to a large extent the ethos of neoliberalism has been transmitted to the continent through its relationship with donors and creditors. Most notably, the powerful position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has led to pressures towards downsizing, cost efficiency and outsourcing. The capacities for public policing have often declined as a result of such austerity measures, as structural adjustment meant a decline in police resources, as well as in the wages and status of the police and the army. To subsidize meagre wages, police and soldiers alike have frequently turned their possession of public authority to private advantage. Corruption, bribes and collusion with criminals have escalated, leading to a progressive erosion of public trust in the police in many countries (Hills, 2000). Faced with declining legitimacy and popular support, partly as a result of austerity measures, some political leaders have also been tempted to utilize the police and military for political purposes to ensure their own survival, further exacerbating the lack of trust in public security actors. In short, in many countries the public force has been politicized for the sake of regime survival, eroding the notion of security as a public good. Instead, we see an informal

privatization of public security resources, both at the level of individual officers and at the level of the political regime, adding to the complexities of drawing a clear distinction between the public and the private. In these ways, global discourses and transformations have provided important conditions for the growth of both PSCs and vigilantes.

The contemporary belief in the superiority of the private sector has also influenced African political and administrative discourses and provided an incentive both for police reform and for the expansion of private security. The neoliberal ethos has allowed private security actors to defend their business in the face of state protectionism or allegations of threats to national security, while at the same time the expansion of international capital into Africa has been helped by the abandonment of trade restrictions and tariffs. To a significant extent, private security has followed in the footsteps of international corporate actors, as well as development personnel, whose increasing awareness of risk and insecurity provides an important boost for the private security market. This links to another aspect of modern society, which is frequently referred to as 'risk society' (Beck, 1992; Garland, 2001). Private security is both cause and effect here: as consumers of security, we become increasingly conscious of our potential insecurity and vulnerability. Private security actors, of course, play a role in reinforcing this process as their own survival and profit depend to a significant extent on society's sense of insecurity. Thus, in addition to an actual rise in crime in many countries, increased fear of crime is another main reason for the proliferation of security actors, even when objective crime rates cannot be seen to have increased. In Senegal, for example, the number of private security companies has expanded significantly in recent years, although crime rates remain low, but international companies, embassies and NGOs nevertheless find it necessary to provide private protections for their employees, equipment and buildings (O'Brian, 2008). Risk society also changes the social technologies of security, as it is a form of security knowledge that is primarily focused on prediction and the calculation of possibilities rather than on past offences, criminal justice and the actual 'catching of criminals'. Again, this further enhances the role of private security providers, as security becomes first and foremost about prevention, about designing places that foster security, about surveillance, risk profiling, spatial demarcation and so forth. As such, security becomes increasingly a question of the right technical solutions, and not a question of justice or social and political reform. Security, in other words, becomes both a commodity and a technology that is in principle applicable everywhere, regardless of time and place.

Global security assemblages

It is tempting to associate the rise of private security actors with a corresponding erosion of state power and sovereignty, especially given the perceived weakness of African states vis-à-vis the international system. This is, of course, a well-known theme in studies of globalization, which is frequently seen as indicating a long-term shift from state-centric forms of governance towards a dispersal of power and authority towards private actors and international organizations (Strange, 1996). Given that most definitions of the state centre on the monopoly of the means of violence, it is not surprising that the rise of private security actors tends to be interpreted as a loss of, or threat to, state power. In this respect, however, security privatization in Africa poses important challenges to conventional IR understandings of state sovereignty and governance, as well as to broader conceptual distinctions such as public/private and global/local.

While there is little doubt that private security may in certain settings be an indication of state weakness or pose a threat to the state, this should not be taken to be universally true. In particular, this interpretation overlooks the many ways in which the empowerment of private actors is directly linked to the shifts in governance and to transformations inside the state. Private security actors often operate with the active endorsement and encouragement of state authorities, and within contemporary neoliberal strategies of governance the private delivery and governance of security is more often than not an integral part of state policies. Rather than existing in opposition to the state, PMCs, PSCs, vigilantes and other private agencies are often part of complex security networks that knit together public and private, global and local actors. These complex networks, stretching across national territories and continents, have given rise to the emergence of what can be termed global security assemblages: settings where security is shaped and influenced by actors, values and normative orders beyond the nation state and by the growing power of private actors, who interact with the state to such a degree that it is often difficult to determine where the public ends and the private begins. Indeed, in global security assemblages the very categories of public/private and global/local are being reconstituted and reconfigured. What is at stake in security privatization is thus not merely a transfer of previously public functions to private actors, but instead a broader transformation of the relationship between security and sovereignty, as well as the traditional relationship between the public and the private, the global and the local.

As a brief illustration, let us consider urban security in Cape Town. Following the end of apartheid, private security expanded at a phenomenal rate in South Africa, partly as a result of widespread fear of crime and an actual rise in crime. South Africa's security policy also became increasingly influenced by global trends in policing and public management, which led to a focus on outsourcing, privatization and contracting of specialist services (Dixon and Rauch, 2004, p. 97). Faced with dwindling public resources and escalating crime rates, SAPS and the government chose to accept and incorporate the private sector into their security strategies. In the words of SAPS, there was a need for 'the police, the public, elected officials, government, business and other agencies to work in partnership to address crime and community safety' (Berg, 2004, p. 227). The Department of Community Safety similarly concluded that the 'SA Police Service can no longer be seen as the sole agency responsible for fighting crime . . . other sectors of society with a force multiplying capacity must be called on to support the SA Police Service in their efforts' (Department of Community Safety, 2006, p. 6). As part of this transformation, some tasks have been specifically assigned as 'private' (all police stations across South Africa are now, for example, guarded by private security companies in recognition that commercial guards are cheaper than police officers), while much day-to-day policing has been reframed as a partnership among a multiplicity of private actors and local communities.

The Cape Town Central City Improvement District (CCID) initiative is one of the most extensive examples of such public–private policing partnerships. Like so-called Business Improvement Districts that can be found in New York and other major cities around the world, the City Improvement Districts (CIDs) are non-profit organizations that are established when property owners in an area agree to levy an additional tax on their property, and the money collected is used to promote business and economic development. At present, there are about 15 CIDs in and around Cape Town, and their primary concern has been security. The Cape Town CCID is the largest and perhaps most controversial of these initiatives, focusing on downtown Cape Town and its central business district. The CCID is part of the Cape Town Partnership, a not-for-profit company founded in 1999 by the city council and the local business community. The main aim of the partnership is to reverse urban decay and capital flight from the city centre to surrounding suburbs and business parks. As part of this effort, the CCID was established in November 2000, after the majority of property owners in the area agreed to an additional top-up levy on their council bill. Today, the

CCID collects about R15 million annually from the 1200 ratepayers within the area. Of this amount, approximately 51 per cent is allocated to security. The remainder is spent on the CCID's other three areas of responsibility, cleaning the city (22 per cent), marketing (11 per cent) and social development (3 per cent, a recent decline from 8 per cent), and on administration (3 per cent).[2]

The CCID is in effect a large-scale policing partnership aimed at making central Cape Town safe and secure, an international city and a first-class tourist destination (www.capetownpartnership.co.za). Group4Securicor, trading in Cape Town as Securicor, has been contracted as the main security provider. At the start of the initiative, the CCID security force consisted of only seven officers, but it has since expanded to a total of six patrol vehicles, ten officers mounted on horses and 60 foot patrol officers providing a 24-hour security presence in the city centre. At night, the city is patrolled by 40 officers, supported by six vehicles. As a result, the presence of security personnel in the city has increased significantly, and during daytime the CCID vehicles and foot patrols are frequently encountered throughout Cape Town's relatively compact city centre.

To a significant extent, the security of Cape Town has been devolved to the largest private security company in the world. The visibility of Securicor's mounted, foot or mobile patrols far exceeds the visibility of the police. Both the City Police and SAPS concentrate their efforts in the poorer areas of town, where crime rates are highest, and the City Police have dedicated only two mobile patrols to the city centre. Moreover, the police do not conduct foot patrols. Yet, it would be incorrect to perceive the police as absent from Cape Town's security arrangement. Securicor officers work in close collaboration with the police, especially the City Police. The CCID/Securicor branded patrol vehicles include a City Police officer, although there are no police markings on the car. The CCID security patrols are also linked to the City Police control room by radio. Furthermore, Securicor operates the Strategic Surveillance Unit (SSU), the control room that supervises Cape Town's 170 closed-circuit television cameras. The SSU is manned by around 50 Securicor officers, reinforced by City Police officers, and is in direct contact with SAPS as well as the City Police, ensuring mobile response to incidents. As part of the move towards community or sector policing, Securicor also participate in weekly sector policing forums – together with a range of civil society actors such as neighbourhood watches – to identify potential problems, share information and coordinate the provision of security with SAPS and the City Police. Securicor officers in

the CCID also frequently provide support to police operations within the city, for example, by providing perimeter security when police are searching a building or area. It is no surprise then that Securicor managers frequently invoke the term 'paradigm shift' when describing the changes that have facilitated the extent of their embeddedness within public policing strategies.

The CCID is a striking example of a global security assemblage, where security provision and governance, in the sense of the authoritative setting and enforcement of collective norms, increasingly transcends the nation state and includes private actors in extensive and influential roles. Cape Town's security arrangement is made up of a multiplicity of actors, resources, discourses, norms and values, and marks the emergence of new security practices and institutions that are simultaneously global and local, public and private, and that draw on a broad range of capacities and discourses for their empowerment. In short, security governance is increasingly beyond the state, embedded in a complex transnational security architecture that is both a reflection and a significant component of the shifting structures of global governance.

In this way, the Cape Town example also highlights the inadequacies of perspectives that associate the rise of private security with an automatic decline in state authority and sovereignty. In Cape Town, and South Africa more generally, PSCs have to an important extent helped secure the authority of the state, by allowing for the presence of a much larger security force than the state alone could afford, thus providing important concrete and symbolic resources for combating post-transition insecurity and increasing urban blight and capital flight. In brief, the utilization of private security resources has made it easier for the government to claim that it is 'doing something about crime'. In a setting where crime is highly political, this is a powerful political strategy, particularly vis-à-vis the international community, which seeks assurances that South Africa is a safe place for business, tourism and sports tournaments such as the football World Cup. This is not to say that private security is always and everywhere in support of state sovereignty, nor that this is necessarily a permanent outcome in South Africa, but it is a warning against the continuing temptation to read privatization as a zero-sum game between public and private power.

While the Cape Town example focuses on commercial PSCs, most private security actors can be seen to stand in some relationship to the state and to be part of global assemblages. In the case of military companies, their main clients are governments and state militaries, whereas in the case of vigilantes, much research has shown that even those groups

that have emerged as a reaction to the perceived failure of the state to provide adequate security have connections to the state (Heald, 2007). This in turn highlights not only one of the problems with the term 'vigilantes', namely that it always stands in opposition to the state and formal law, but also the potentially misleading qualities of the very categories 'public' and 'private'. With neoliberal transformations, the private has come to be intimately interlaced with the public, and the global lodged within the local. Understanding contemporary African security thus requires attention to global security assemblages, and the manner in which security is shaped and influenced by new normative orders beyond the nation state and by the growing power of private and global actors who interact with the state to such a degree that it is often difficult to determine where the public ends and the private begins.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, private security is a pervasive feature of contemporary African societies, going well beyond the spectacular activities of mercenaries that have captured the imagination of so many observers. Indeed, it is often in the more mundane and everyday forms of security privatization that we can see the extent of the social and political transformations associated with the rise of private actors. The security arrangements in Cape Town, for example, illustrate the extent to which security is increasingly delinked from the exclusive monopoly of the state. When approached as part of transformations in governance, however, it is clear that security privatization in all its various forms has often occurred with the approval or even at the instigation of the state, and is an integral part of modern strategies of government.

Seen from this perspective, security privatization in Africa poses a clear challenge to the state-centrism that has been such an enduring feature of much IR theory. Despite frequent recognition of the emergence of non-state actors and admonitions to rethink the relationship between the 'global' and the 'local', the 'territorial trap' constantly ensnares the discipline (Agnew, 1994). In the words of Barnett, 'state, territory, and authority are forever married in IR theory', and even the way in which IR has generally approached the integration of the domestic and the global reflects a continuing tendency to treat them as ontologically separate, pre-given realms (Barnett, 2001, pp. 49–50). In recent years, research on global governance has begun to overcome these limitations, drawing attention to the expanding role and importance of private non-state actors that wield authority in a variety of different spheres, including the

economy, environmental protection and development.[3] To date, however, the realm of security has been remarkably resistant to claims about the need to unpack state-centric conceptions of authority: indeed, many studies of security privatization have, if anything, served to reinforce them. As this chapter shows, however, the growth of a range of different private security initiatives cannot be perceived simply as the erosion of state authority or, conversely, as the straightforward strengthening of the state through the integration of private capacities. In security, as in other domains, the authority of private actors helps give rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct the behaviour of actors and populations, and security governance can no longer be exclusively associated with the state or contained within its territorial boundaries. Instead, security provision and governance increasingly occur within global security assemblages that challenge the conventional conflation of government, territory and authority. They extend beyond the territorial boundaries of the nation state both in terms of participating actors, resources, technologies, discourses and normativities and involve complex rearticulations of public and private power and authority. Understanding security in contemporary Africa, including the crucial political and ethical questions of who gets secured and who is left insecure, thus requires a careful analysis of shifting forms of power in global governance.

Notes

1. For interesting discussions, see Avant, 2005; Singer, 2003; and Howe, 2001.
2. Since the focus of this chapter is the shifting forms of power and authority in security governance, I bracket here the exclusionary effects of the CCID. For a discussion, see R. Abrahamsen and M.C. Williams (2010) *Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Chapter 5.
3. See Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Cutler, 2003; Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Higgott et al., 2000; Ronit and Schneider, 2000; and Falkner, 2003.

11
Engendering (In)Security and Conflict in African International Relations

Jane L. Parpart and Lisa Thompson

Introduction

This chapter asserts that gender is essential to a full understanding of conflict, violence and human security/insecurity in Africa. While there is a growing literature arguing for the importance of gender in International Relations (IR) (Steans, 2006; Tickner, 1992, 2001), for the most part mainstream and even critical IR has remained relatively impervious to gendered arguments, particularly in regard to security and conflict. Moreover, much of the literature on IR and (in)security in Africa adopts this position as well (Clapham, 1996b; Harbeson and Rothchild, 2000; Reno, 1998).

In contrast, we seek to demonstrate the relevance of a gendered analysis for understanding African IR theory. Given the centrality of conflict and human (in)security to discussions of African IR, the chapter will focus on the insights offered by a gendered analysis of conflict, (in)security and violence at the level of states, institutions, communities and everyday life on the continent. It will analyse the impact of gendered assumptions and practices on conflict and human (in)security in Africa, in order to speak back to IR theories of war, violence and human (in)security.

While arguing for the importance of gender, we do not claim it is the only variable that matters in IR, but rather that gender is a central and often unseen organizing force bringing important analytical depth to understanding international issues such as governance, conflict and human (in)security. The intersectional approach, which incorporates gender into a broad-based analysis of political, economic and cultural contexts, is particularly promising (Meyer and Prugl, 1999; Peterson,

2007). This more nuanced and eclectic approach is appropriate for Africa, with its complex, often violent colonial history and its conflict-ridden postcolonial experience – too often explained away by primordial divisions (Kaplan, 1994) or predatory neocolonial and imperial forces (Nabudere, 2006).

Conceptualizing gender and (in)security in international relations

For the most part, the discipline and concerns of IR have been seen as a very male affair – focused on international security, states and their relations, as well as international trade, diplomacy and war. The extensive IR literature on war, conflict and violence has been preoccupied with state power, inter-state relations, the military and (in)security. This very masculine world has been contrasted with the more feminine world of domestic relations, community and home, largely seen as outside the purview of IR (Tickner, 1992, 2001). The argument that the international, particularly state politics, war and peace, is a gendered site requiring feminist analysis, has been ignored by most IR specialists, including many writing on Africa (Clapham, 1996a; Duffield, 2001; Reno, 1998).

Indeed, traditional theorizing on war and (in)security in IR has focused largely on states, military power, diplomatic relations and, where appropriate, the impact of political and economic forces. Whether writing from a realist perspective, harking back to the glory days of heroic Machiavellian leaders, or as liberal pluralists, with their focus on rational state policies, military strategists and technology, individuals only surface in these discussions as state leaders, military strategists and economic managers. Even Marxist analysts, with their focus on broad economic and political forces, emphasize state actors and structural forces (Harbeson and Rothchild, 2000). Ordinary people provide the backdrop. They are the shock troops and victims of war, but little else. Gender is rarely discussed (Peterson and Runyan, 1999).

Yet feminists have challenged this state-centric analysis of conflict and (in)security, particularly its lack of attention to gender, non-state actors and everyday life. Early work looked for women – where were they, what were they doing? Enloe (1990) documented women's important, if often unseen, roles in governance and the military. Feminists also highlighted women's absence from positions of authority in political and economic arenas (Rai, 2008; Steans, 2006). In the 1980s, the focus shifted to gender as feminists began to realize the limitations of equating biological sex with gender, and the need to recognize gender as a socially

constructed 'system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics' (Sjoberg, 2010, p. 3). Thus, the question moved from identifying women (or not) in state structures, to asking how masculine and feminine traits structure hierarchies and relations of power. Feminist research soon revealed a striking association of masculine traits (however locally defined) with power and authority, while feminine traits are identified with weakness and passivity (Wilcox, 2010). Belief in the possibility of state-led gender transformation faltered as feminists around the world began to realize that policies and programmes designed to empower women and transform gender relations, politically or developmentally, often merely reinforced gender hierarchies and women's subordination (Gouws, 2005a; Lowe-Morna, 2004; Meyer and Prugl, 1999).

These critiques resonated with growing concerns among IR theorists about the limits of a state-centric approach in an increasingly unequal, conflicted and interconnected world. As the Cold War ended, new thinking about security opened up IR analysis in both Northern and Southern contexts. Realist theory seemed increasingly inadequate as the post-Cold War spike in violent conflicts raised new questions and demanded new answers about governance, security and insecurity. These 'new wars' (also called low-intensity, privatized, informal or post-modern wars) were largely intra-state civil conflicts (albeit with transborder allies), based in states weakened by neoliberal economic restructuring and internal divisions, and characterized by increased civilian casualties and forced displacement, the breakdown of public authority and a blurring of the distinction between public and private security/combatants (Kaldor, 2006, p. 2). They also benefited from links (legal and illegal) with international trading networks (Newman, 2004, pp. 174–75), as well as easy access to the goods provided by international aid to vulnerable refugee camps (Duffield, 2001; Munkler, 2005 [2002], pp. 87–90).

While scholars have questioned the 'newness' of these conflicts (Malesevic, 2008, p. 99), as well as the focus on criminal violence rather than political and ideological motives (Kalyvas, 2001; Newman, 2004), most agree on the central role of global economic forces, particularly tensions between the winners and losers in the global economy. Greed and grievances rather than ideological motives have been seen as the primary drivers (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Kaldor, 2006, pp. 4–5). Moreover, the association of poverty with rebellion and violence, as well as victimhood, provided a renewed purpose for development agencies,

whose role in addressing global underdevelopment promised to provide a new form of 'riot control', offering solace to those who blame current conflicts on poverty and globalization (Duffield, 2001, 2007).

Indeed, the 'new wars' debates coincided with a growing concern about the links between global poverty, alienation and global (in)security. The state no longer seemed to have the answers. Policymakers, international organizations and some scholars called for a new approach. The UNDP, in its 1994 *Human Development Report*, argued for a focus on *human security*, wherein security required freedom from both *want* and *fear*. In an interconnected world, the insecurity of the vulnerable was seen as a threat to all. Human security consequently included non-traditional security threats such as access to economic opportunities, healthcare, safe environments and political and personal freedom, as well as the more traditional threats of war and conflict (MacLean et al., 2006). While this agenda, with its practical policy focus, initially garnered much applause and support, including from IR theorists, it has become less popular of late (Newman, 2010). Critics such as Duffield and Waddell (2006) have condemned human security as a tool for ensuring self-reliance and compliance from those suffering on the margins of a competitive global world.

The broad church now known loosely as *critical security studies* (CSS),[1] influenced by poststructuralist thinking and critiques of state-centric approaches to security, has pilloried human security for its uncritical reliance on state policy and for reducing security to a meaningless hodgepodge of amorphous threats (Newman, 2010). Yet, the concern with moving beyond state-centred analysis has remained central. The work of Booth (1995; Booth and Vale, 1995) and the Aberystwyth school, as it is known, has been particularly influential in fleshing out a more citizen-centred and gendered approach to security, focusing on societal security concerns rather than state-defined security issues. These initial framings of critical security were picked up and elaborated upon by, among others, theorists working in Southern contexts (see Swatuk and Vale, 1999, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Vale, 2000). Primarily, these scholars have attempted to explore (in)security where the state's role is not the main point of analytical departure.

In contrast, the more influential and widely known Copenhagen school has defined security as the existential threats to collective survival articulated by securitizing actors, such as political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. The broad issues raised by human security analysts and the more gendered, citizen-centred approaches of the Aberystwyth school, including attention to

gender-based violence, are dismissed by the Copenhagen school as mere social security problems. For them, a security threat must be a clearly articulated and voiced threat to society as a whole (Hansen, 2000, pp. 288–89; Newman, 2010).

While producing important alternatives to state-centric visions of security, these new approaches to (in)security have for the most part paid little attention to gender. However, feminists have launched their own critiques, emphasizing the importance of understanding the complex interconnectedness of political–military insecurities, development insecurities and gendered power relations in particular contexts (Meena, 1992; Sjoberg, 2010; Steans, 2006). Parpart (2010) argues that the 'new wars' literature has ignored the impact of masculinity and gendered forces, despite the prominence of young male soldiers and gender-based violence. Sylvester (2010) worries that human security has become pre-occupied with embodied surveillance against 'terrorism', while gendered attacks on women's (and men's) bodies continue. Southern-based analysts, drawing on the Aberystwyth school, have pointed out that the new emphasis on human security is often policy lip service on the part of states and, as such, is not a bottom-up approach to understanding collective threats at societal levels, including gendered insecurities (Swatuk and Vale, 2000; Thompson, 2000). Hudson (2010, p. 257) criticizes human security for its top-down approach and its insistence that the 'human' in 'human security' is gender-neutral. In a powerful critique, Hansen (2000) condemns the Copenhagen school for privileging voice and securitizing actors, while ignoring masculinist practices (and bodies). This refusal to listen to silent screams and embodied performances of insecurity has led to misinterpretations of subtle, unspoken expressions of collective insecurity, such as the honour killings that discipline women (and their bodies) and maintain a masculinist gender order. These feminist critiques challenge both recent and established IR theory. They call out for new thinking, including the possibility of learning from the gendered experiences of (in)security and conflict in Africa (and the world) that will be explored below.

Gendered (in)security and the African state

The gendered nature of the state in Africa needs no underlining (Parpart and Staudt, 1989). However, the implications of this for substantive as opposed to simply representative gender equality require further discussion. While gender machineries to enhance the position of women have been set up all over Africa, the majority of states have made little

progress (Lowe-Morna, 2004). Indeed, marginalized women in particular often have great difficulty in exercising their political rights, even trying to vote or attend meetings (Manicom, 2005). Even in countries such as South Africa and Rwanda, where the quota system has dramatically increased women's representation in parliament and an array of legislation has been passed to ensure women's rights (including socioeconomic rights), these advances have done little to undermine gender inequality. Indeed, gender-based violence in these countries continues at record levels (Jones, 2002; White, 2007). Thus, while many African states appear to support gender policies, for the most part masculinist power relations continue to sideline 'women's issues' as irrelevant to the malestream business of running the state (read: the political–military dimension) or the economy (read: meeting the challenges of globalization and integrating into the global political economy) (Gouws, 2005a).

This trend is underlined by the way organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (to mention just two) have attempted to broaden their security agendas to include a specific gender focus. Thompson (2000) and Lowe-Morna (2004) highlight how these attempts are still at odds with the tendency to see security as primarily military security. In both organizations, specific policies targeting the representation of women in the political sphere and in development rest uneasily alongside institutions specifically created to ensure military security, such as the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in the case of SADC, and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in the case of the AU. These measures in any case still do not address violence against women, although gender-based violence is explicitly recognized as a problem by both organizations (see, for example, the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC [AU, 2004]). Zimbabwe's recent instability and the gendered nature of the ongoing violence there illustrate the failure of continental and regional organizational attempts to pay more than lip service to gender (Parpart, 2008).

Not surprisingly, feminists in Africa have grown wary of state-based solutions to gender inequality and gender-based violence. The ability of rights-based approaches to address gender discrimination, violence and inequality across ethnic and racial groups has been questioned, as the failure of liberal democratic rights to address overlapping forms of gender discrimination has been revealed across the continent. Equally problematic, some policies that specifically target women with the aim

of empowering them either politically or developmentally can end up undermining the agency of those targeted by labelling them 'the poorest of the poor' or 'the most oppressed of the oppressed', without paying attention to the ways in which women themselves exercise agency in a multiplicity of ways (Goetz and Hassim, 2003; Gouws, 2005b).

Governments have even directed violence against women. The Rwandan genocide was orchestrated from the top, with state bulletins sent out over the radio urging the killing of men, women and children (Des Forges, 1999). The ZANU government's youth core (known as the Green Bombers) has been urged to rape 'insubordinate' women who have the gall to support the opposition (Parpart, 2008). Government forces throughout the continent have been implicated in rapes and other forms of gender-based violence, particularly of political opponents and ethnic or racial groups identified as enemies (Baaz and Stern, 2009; Jones, 2002; Peters and Richards, 1998; White, 2007).[2] State support for violence against women has reinforced cynicism about governments' commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment, and has inspired many feminist scholars concerned with Africa to move beyond state-centric analyses (Hudson, 2005). In that vein, we turn to a gendered analysis of the 'new wars' literature from an African perspective.

Engendering the 'new wars' debate in Africa

As post-Cold War conflicts raged on the continent (and elsewhere), the scholarship on civil wars and conflicts expanded as well. As we have seen, the focus has been on global inequality and war economies, with their reliance on looting, pillage and connections to international resource markets (Clapham, 1996b; Duffield, 2001; Reno, 1998).[3] Yet the images and stories being told are very gendered. The pictures of swaggering leaders, and the impoverished, unemployed young men who make up the foot soldiers of contemporary conflicts in Africa – dressed in guerrilla chic clothing, Ray-Ban sunglasses and waving AK47s menacingly in the backs of pickups – raise questions about masculinity and gender relations. Some scholars have touched on these issues. Bøås speaks of the young African guerrilla as 'neither an angel nor a demon . . . more a "man-child" than anything else. He is fragile, damaged and hurt.' Yet he often commits 'horrific acts' (2007, p. 39). Rolandsen admits that the Janjawiid routinely rape the women and girls in the villages they loot and attack (2007, p. 159), often targeting Muslim women

from non-Arab groups, derided as 'black slaves' (Johnson, 2006, p. 101). In two provinces of eastern DR Congo, 40,000 women were raped during the war by soldiers, militias, criminal gangs and individuals with guns.[4] There were somewhere between 250,000 and 350,000 rapes in Rwanda during the genocide, mostly of Tutsi women (Alison, 2007, p. 87).

Despite the scale and horror of these gendered atrocities, economic and political factors have continued to be seen as the drivers of conflict. As Munkler (2005 [2002], pp. 74–79) points out, the new wars are 'downright cheap', requiring only light weapons, pickups rather than armoured vehicles, cellphones rather than computers and the clothing of choice – sunglasses, jeans and tee-shirts or camouflage uniforms. Above all, they are cheap because so many young men are excluded from regular economic activity, lack social prospects and see picking up a gun and joining local warlords as at least a kind of livelihood. In the Congo, Baaz and Stern (2008) discovered that warfare has become one of the best (and often only) ways to make a living, particularly for landless, uneducated young men. War has become a business which many young recruits, and their leaders, have no desire to stop. Indeed, many poorly paid government soldiers in the Congo have joined the militias, which offer better pay and more possibilities for looting. In northern Uganda, the ongoing war has left few economic alternatives to joining the rebel forces (Dolan, 2002). The same can be said of many other conflicts on the continent (El-Bushra, 2004; Peters and Richards, 1998).

However, poverty alone cannot explain the attraction of war to young men (and some women). As Berdal (2003, p. 490) points out, the desire for social recognition, prestige and respect is also important, and this recognition is often framed in masculine discourses. Conflicts on the continent have undermined traditional paths to achieving the economic stability necessary to achieve adult manhood, with its associated authority, economic autonomy, social recognition and access to sex and family life. Picking up a gun and joining a local warlord promises access to the material wealth required for social recognition as an adult male, access to women and even a bride (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 507). This move has also enabled some young men to challenge the authority of senior males over women and resources (Dolan, 2002; Peters and Richards, 1998). It is revealing that Rambo was the favourite movie figure among young rebels in the Liberian conflict, particularly the film *First Blood*, with its story of expulsion from society, degradation and violence, and eventual triumph/redemption (Richards, 1996, pp. 103–04). Uvin (2009, p. 142) discovered that many young men in Burundi see guns as the best way to gain otherwise unattainable prestige, access to

sex and family life, while the Rwandan genocide was fuelled by frustrated young Hutu men who could not obtain land, which was required for acceptance as adult males (Alison, 2007, p. 87).

The masculinist culture of war has often been accompanied (and reinforced) by extreme sexual violence. Indeed, rape in contemporary conflicts is largely a group activity, providing a powerful site for performing masculinity, for proving one's credentials as 'real' men to fellow soldiers and demonstrating loyalty to the group/band of brothers involved in the fighting. Rape is also a site for reaffirming one's heteronormativity and expunging the dangers of being seen as feminine/soft (Alison, 2007, p. 77; Price, 2001, p. 216).[5] Pressures to prove one's masculinity, fuelled by militarized language and practices, thus encourage sexual violence, particularly rape (Enloe, 2007; Price, 2001). Government forces and peacekeepers have been no exception, both in anti-colonial struggles and recent conflicts (Higate, 2007; White, 2007, p. 872). As Dolan discovered, government forces in Uganda frequently used rape to display their masculine prowess and loyalty (2002, pp. 72–76). Similar stories have emerged in the Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia (Baaz and Stern, 2009; Coulter, 2008; Utas, 2005).

In order to 'explain' and legitimate this behaviour, rape was often portrayed as a necessary disciplinary tool of war. Rebel and government forces regularly raped women soldiers for their 'failings' in combat and daily duties (Coulter, 2008; Denov and Gervais, 2007; Peters and Richards, 1998). Rebel troops in Sierra Leone used sexual violence 'as a method of ensuring compliance and asserting power, as well as a means of propagating terror' (Denov, 2006, p. 327). In the Congo, government troops differentiated between rape for sex (due to a 'natural'/understandable need for sex)[6] and 'evil rapes', which were expressions of anger and rage. Yet the tensions of war also fuelled discourses about women's selfishness, unreliability and duplicity (Baaz and Stern, 2009).

At the same time, women in conflict zones have not only been victims: many have discovered ways to survive and even flourish. Given the ubiquity of sexual violence, survival in conflict zones often depended on obtaining powerful protectors, preferably more than one. The ability to attract multiple partners was thus a key survival strategy, although it also fuelled the discourses of materialistic, treacherous womanhood legitimating rape and other acts of sexual violence (Nhongo-Simbanegavi, 2000). Bintu, a young woman caught up in the Liberian conflicts, adopted multiple strategies for survival, including joining the rebels and acquiring powerful boyfriends as protectors – a sensible move as women soldiers experienced fewer rapes than civilians (Utas, 2005).

Coulter heard similar stories in Sierra Leone, where some young women joined the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), learned how to handle weapons and took part in battles (2008; Denov and Gervais, 2007). Some women moved up the military hierarchy – witness Colonel Black Diamond, head of the Women's Auxiliary Corps and commander of a group of girls and young women who spread fear, if not respect, among Monrovians during the advance of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) on Monrovia (Utas, 2005, p. 404). In Sierra Leone, the brutality of female soldiers became legendary. They were described as cold-blooded and cruel (Coulter, 2008, p. 59). Indeed, female soldiers in the Congo adopted masculine traits, even claiming that 'many of the men are afraid, more afraid than us women' (Baaz and Stern, 2008, pp. 68–70). Thus, it seems many women in combat openly adopted the militant masculinity of their units.

The question remains: did participation in these conflicts alter gender hierarchies and open up new opportunities for women? Some women did gain authority and self-esteem through advancement in military hierarchies, and others took on new roles in their struggle for survival (Coulter, 2008). During the fighting, some improvements in gender relations occurred in places such as the eastern Congo and Eritrea (Hale, 2001; Hunt, 2008, p. 241; Puechguirbal, 2003). Yet women soldiers were still expected to be 'proper' women in private life and many did not seem to mind this. The fierce young women warriors interviewed by Baaz and Stern saw no problem with accepting masculine privilege and authority in the home (2008, pp. 68–70). Thus, while taking up arms provided a means for both men and women to challenge established power structures, masculine privilege seems to have remained largely unquestioned. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, young male soldiers vilified elite males as soft and corrupt, while glorifying the rebel leaders or warlords (Ellis, 1999, pp. 286–87). Yet by idolizing rebel leaders, they were reinforcing the connection between militant masculinity, power and authority.

If anything, contemporary conflicts intensified the link between militant masculinity and power, undermining alternative ways of being masculine. As Baaz and Stern discovered, young male soldiers in the Congo often spoke longingly of getting an education and a good job, yet these dreams were still largely cast within patriarchal expectations. Indeed, they deliberately cast women soldiers as masculine/failed women, opportunists and incompetent soldiers, while simultaneously blaming them for getting all the good jobs (2008, pp. 71–72, 2009, pp. 505–06; see also Dolan, 2002). This suggests that women's agency

in war may have been unsettling for many, fuelling the belief (hope) that peace would bring a return to 'normal' (patriarchal) life and 'traditional' gender roles. Thus, as El-Bushra points out, while conflict can open up space for redefining gender relations, 'in doing so it seems to rearrange, adapt, or reinforce patriarchal ideologies rather than fundamentally alter them' (2004, p. 166). This tendency has profoundly affected the gendered practices of post-conflict societies in Africa,[7] with important consequences for the everyday lives of women and men and for rethinking (in)security on the continent and elsewhere.

Gender, (in)security and development in postcolonial/post-conflict Africa

The aftermath of anti-colonial struggles and more recent conflicts in Africa has been very challenging. Poverty has increased, life expectancy has fallen, HIV/AIDS has decimated the workforce and corrupt, ineffective governance has become commonplace. For most people, insecurity has become part of everyday life. This has been, and is, a gendered process. While some women have gained education and good jobs, even they suffer from the fear of crime, especially rape. Poor women carry enormous responsibilities and burdens and perform crucial service for their communities, often with little help. The HIV/AIDS infection rate of women is outstripping men, especially in Southern Africa. Gender-based violence, particularly rape, has reached epidemic proportions, especially in post-conflict zones and in Southern Africa (Alison, 2007; Meintjes et al., 2001). Thus the need to consider individual as well as collective (in)security and to adopt broad (and gendered) definitions of security threats is very clear in Africa. At the same time, the question of analytical depth and definitions of security threats also has to be considered. This section explores these questions in light of the aftermath of wars, the challenges of development and the crisis of sexual violence in South Africa.

The transition from 'war' to 'peace' has been a dangerous time for women in Africa (and elsewhere). Transitions to 'peace' have often been marked by violence, particularly towards women. In Liberia, women's organizations protested and lobbied for peace in extremely difficult circumstances. Nevertheless, despite their key roles in the peace process and the election of a woman president, both government and rebel forces engaged in a 'frenzy of rape' during the 'transition to peace'; and rape, particularly of young girls, continues to plague the country (Pedersen, 2008). In the Congo, women's groups actively sought

involvement in the peace process, but were largely rebuffed by the UN. Moreover, many were cowed by threats from rebel forces, who claimed women would disrupt the negotiations. There, too, rape was widespread (and committed by all parties to the conflict), suggesting more concern with bringing women under control than benefiting from their expertise (Puechguirbal, 2003).

Moreover, demobilization and reintegration programmes have done little for female ex-combatants. As Meintjes et al. (2001, p. 9) remind us, 'the return to peace is invariably conceptualized as a return to the gender status quo, irrespective of the non-traditional roles assumed by women during conflict'. Consequently, demobilization has been very different for males and females. In Sierra Leone, many women fighters were passed off as 'camp followers' and consequently declared ineligible for benefits. Even female commanders often lost their positions after disarmament. Promises of training and opportunities for men contrasted with admonitions to female soldiers to return home and establish 'normal' lives as daughters and wives (Coulter, 2008, p. 63). Female combatants who returned to their villages in Sierra Leone were generally regarded with suspicion and hostility. Many left to join other former fighters on city streets eking out a living as prostitutes. The demobilization process in Sierra Leone thus effectively extended 'gender-based power differentiation and gendered insecurity into the post-conflict era' (Denov, 2006, p. 331; Mackenzie, 2010). Similar stories surface around the continent (McKay and Mazurana, 2004).[8]

Moreover, weakly supervised demobilization and refugee camps were often dangerous places, exposing former fighters to sexual violence and economic insecurity (Denov, 2006, p. 335). Some peacekeepers used their generous stipends to sell food or money for sex. Indeed, for many women in these camps, sex was one of the few commodities they could sell. In the eastern Congo, two-thirds of the girls in secondary school paid their fees by sleeping with peacekeepers (Higate, 2007).

More broadly, developmental crises have exacerbated insecurity in daily life around the continent. This has been a very gendered process. The increasing poverty and high unemployment rates have driven many women into prostitution or relations of convenience. Growing unemployment and poverty have made it difficult for many young men to obtain the material wealth necessary for achieving adult manhood, even in times of 'peace'. Some turn to crime. The majority struggle to survive, moving to cities and across borders in search of opportunities. Corruption is increasing, and competition over resources and jobs is exacerbating conflicts along national, racial/ethnic and class divides.

These tensions are also gendered, particularly as many of the few decent jobs are in the service sector, an area that is often seen as feminine. These tensions are fuelling gender-based violence around the continent – primarily against women, but also against marginalized men, particularly homosexuals and migrants (Pedersen, 2008; Puechguirbal, 2003).

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is particularly pervasive and problematic in South Africa in the aftermath of the liberation struggle and apartheid policies. SGBV has been aggravated by South Africa's high unemployment rate and limited opportunities for training, which have hit the urban poor particularly hard. In this challenging environment, gender continues to play a role. Many women living in urban poverty are empowering themselves politically, claiming leadership positions and participating in efforts to ensure that socio-economic and political rights from the bottom up are taken seriously. Yet many remain deprived of basic rights through ill-designed national level policies that ignore the differential access of men and women to service provision (Thompson and Nleya, 2008). Drawing on data from interviews between 2007 and 2009 with women's groups who had recently joined income-generating projects (IGPs) in Khayelitsha, a 'dormitory suburb' in Cape Town,[9] Thompson and others discovered that most women joining the projects had been either unemployed or underemployed. For example, Bulelwa, living apart from a disabled husband, survives on two child-support grants. She joined the project and managed to obtain housing through a government housing scheme. She is also active in local civic organizations seeking to resolve issues of criminality, service provision and assistance to those in dire need. While this kind of civic activism plays an important role in the community, Khayelitsha remains largely underserviced, poorly housed and economically challenged (Thompson and Nleya, 2008).

The resulting economic tensions, overcrowding and inadequate infrastructure have fuelled a dramatic increase in crime, which is profoundly affecting the quality of life for the average citizen (Thompson and Nleya, 2008, 2009).[10] Indeed, among societies not at war, South Africa has the highest rape rate in the world. Moffett even speaks of a 'gender war' (2006, pp. 129–30), as much of this violence is aimed at women. Urban gangs on the Cape Flats are part of the global drug trade, with the money to lure boys and girls into their camp. This has led to quarrels with local women leaders and reprisals against them (Salo, 2006). Moreover, SGBV is not confined to the poor: it crosses racial, ethnic and class lines – perhaps not surprising given the long history of sexual violence in South Africa (Moffett, 2006).

The spiral of sexual violence has gained wide attention, particularly after dramatic revelations of baby rapes (Posel, 2005). Yet, despite public outcries and calls for change, the South African government has been loath to address gender-based violence. The country's gender-sensitive constitution and numerous female parliamentarians have not shaken the widespread belief that sexual violence is an individual matter. Rape victims have been urged to speak out to obtain justice – an empty 'solution' given the trauma of rape, the unreliability of police and courts and the widespread, entrenched culture supporting sexual violence (Moffett, 2006). Even the much-praised Truth and Reconciliation Commission paid little attention to evidence about sexual violence (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1998). Moffett argues that the publicity about rape in South Africa is seen as an attack on black men, and thus such discussions have often been dismissed (and silenced) as biased, racist diatribes. Others simply regard publication of rape statistics as anti-patriotic. These and other reactions have undermined efforts to address SGBV as a (human) security issue that threatens the bodies and well-being of women from all backgrounds, as well as some men and children. The refusal to name SGBV as a collective threat resonates with Hansen's critique of critical security studies, with its refusal/inability to acknowledge security threats when they have been silenced by fear of reprisals and warnings of disloyalty. Interestingly, Mackenzie (2010) makes a similar case for Sierra Leone, where authorities have ignored the silenced victims of SGBV and have refused to recognize it as a collective security issue. Both cases raise important questions and suggest the need for a new approach to (in)security, whether from a human or critical security perspective.

Conclusion

That new definitions of (in)security in mainstream IR literature have not changed the realities of many (if not most) women's lives in Africa is illustrated by the numerous examples above of both physical and structural violence against women (and some men). These insecurities highlight the pervasiveness of masculinist orthodoxies about women's roles and gender relations, even in situations of conflict and post-conflict, where women are only able to temporarily redefine themselves. The IR literature on security, whether realist or adopting broader definitions of security/insecurity, appears unable to grapple with these harsh realities and is woefully inadequate in capturing the layers of gendered insecurity in both Africa and elsewhere in the South.

The evidence discussed above raises profound and troubling questions about state-centred approaches to security. The African state has proved a site of masculine privilege, more concerned with maintaining the power and authority of hegemonic elites than encouraging gender equality, women's empowerment and gender transformation. Indeed, African states have sponsored attacks on single women, sought to strengthen gender hierarchies – whether in the name of 'tradition' or modernity – and ignored, denied or even fuelled SGBV on the continent. Even states with strong female representation in parliament have been unable to eliminate gender-based violence. Moreover, regional organizations such as the AU and SADC have had little impact on the realities of women in changing either continental or regional approaches to gendered violence – whether military or socio-economic – in any meaningful way. The African case thus reinforces the call to move beyond state-centric models of (in)security.

As we have seen, IR theorists have taken up this challenge, incorporating new elements into the analysis of post-Cold War conflicts, human security and critical security studies. Despite important feminist critiques (for example, Sjoberg, 2010), most IR security literature fails to incorporate gender in a meaningful way. Yet the gendered (in)securities discussed above point to the centrality of gender in understanding international security and insecurity. The 'new wars' literature has emphasized greed and grievances, but the conflicts in Africa demonstrate the importance of including a gendered analysis. Indeed, these conflicts have reinforced a particular type of masculinity and encouraged gender relations that violate women's rights in many senses. The search for masculine pride and adult manhood has intersected with developmental crises, to push many young men and some young women into conflicts around the continent, affecting the way these conflicts have played out, and their societal consequences. Thus, while greed and grievances are important, gender is also central, and IR theorizing that ignores that fact will miss many of the key influences shaping recent conflicts on the continent.

The link between developmental crises, rising crime rates and widespread SGBV on the continent affirms the importance of developmental questions as well as both individual and collective (in)security. Yet the gendered power struggles at the heart of much of the daily insecurity on the continent cannot be ignored. The South African case is particularly instructive, as it demonstrates the limits of human security's uncritical approach to gender. Policymakers in South Africa, and in Africa generally, have demonstrated little will or interest in addressing

SGBV. Vague promises about development as a tool to end gender-based violence have been both misleading and analytically bankrupt. Thus the Copenhagen school's call for collective definitions of security holds some appeal. However, like Hansen's (2000) silent mermaid, victims of SGBV can rarely speak, much less articulate a collective threat. Yet SGBV is clearly a threat to the security of all South African women and many men, as well as in many other parts of the continent. A gendered analysis would address these problems and provide critical security studies with a more subtle and effective analysis of social and individual (in)security.

Thus, stories of gendered (in)securities in Africa have much to say to IR theorists interested in questions of security and insecurity. The many UN and NGO reports and scholarly writings on African conflicts and daily insecurities, whether intentionally or inadvertently, highlight the central role of gender in (in)security on the continent – whether in war or in daily life. These stories illustrate the struggles of women and men to improve their lives, often in very difficult circumstances. They also demonstrate the ongoing struggle at many levels to maintain masculinist privilege and contain efforts to transform gender relations. These stories are embedded in the particularities of African societies, and remind us that local contexts have to be taken into account. At the same time, they also resonate with narratives from around the world, reminding us that gender plays a critical role in global (in)security. IR theorists would do well to take that warning on board.

Notes

1. It must be said that critical security thinkers are in some instances at odds with each other. For example, the approaches of the Aberystwyth and Copenhagen schools differ substantially.
2. Colonial violence no doubt contributed to this violence. However, direct causal links between current state violence and the past cannot be assumed. More historical analysis is needed. See Stoler's (2008) and Hunt's (2008) descriptions of embodied and gendered violence in the colonial Congo.
3. The indices of the books cited list neither masculinity nor sexual violence. Rape appears only in Bøås and Dunn (2007) and Kaarsholm (2006), although the latter equates gender with women.
4. *Mail and Guardian* online, 'Thousands Raped in the Congo', 8 March 2005, www.mg.co.za (accessed on 4 September 2009).
5. As Tosh points out, hegemonic masculinity creates hierarchies between men based on their ability (or not) to come up to certain standards and practices that vary with particular contexts, but tend to emphasize physical strength, practical competence, material resources, sexual performance and protection

of one's women. Hegemonic masculinity is potentially unstable, and must be proven over and over again (2004, pp. 42–48).

6. Understandably, they did not mention rape as a performance of masculinity and group loyalty.

7. Including societies affected by anti-colonial struggles.

8. This is not surprising, given the history of masculinist behaviour by nationalist leaders once victory had been declared and the division of the spoils of war had begun (Ranchod-Nilsson and Tetreault, 2000; White, 2007, p. 863).

9. Khayelitsha was established in the 1980s to house black African migrants to Cape Town on terms acceptable to the apartheid government's racial policies. Today, Khayelitsha is a sprawling urban area with about 1.5 million people, still characterized by poor services and infrastructure, and still predominantly made up of rudimentary housing known as 'shacks'.

10. The surveys were conducted in December 2007 and December 2008 using a random stratified survey sample. The survey instrument is based on *Afrobarometer*'s instrument for comparability purposes.

12
Conclusion: What Futures for African International Relations?

Timothy M. Shaw, Fantu Cheru and Scarlett Cornelissen

For the first time in more than two decades, Africa has begun to find its rightful place in the world, attracting the attention of the traditional Western powers as well as the leadership of emerging 'Southern powers' such as China, India, Brazil and South Korea. The pervasive 'Afro-pessimism' of the 1980s and 1990s has given way to an image of Africa that is socially and economically vibrant, politically more open, with an assertive civil society, an entrepreneurial indigenous private sector and an aggressive free press playing a central role in articulating an independent and authentic African development agenda.

At the end of 2010, Dorr et al. (2010, p. 80) captured the mood of 'The African Miracle':

> ...Africa has outgrown the gloom and doom...Africa, in fact, is now one of the world's fastest-growing economic regions...revenues from natural resources, the old foundation of Africa's economy, directly accounted for just 24 percent of growth during the last decade; the rest came from other booming sectors, such as finance, retail, agriculture, and telecommunications. Not every country in Africa is resource rich, yet GDP growth accelerated almost everywhere.

Various internal and external factors have contributed to rapid growth in many parts of the continent. First among the internal factors is improvement in the security situation in many conflict-ridden countries, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of the Congo notwithstanding. By the end of 2000, 15 countries were still at war. Today, that number has been reduced to five. Peace has brought with it the opportunity for development. There is greater continental and regional consensus on what needs to be done to accelerate growth, reduce

poverty and prevent deadly conflicts. Societies are becoming more open, and democratization is gaining momentum. Indeed, there is good news coming out of Africa that we should not dismiss.

Second, many African countries have put in place appropriate macro-economic, structural and social policies, which have contributed to improved GDP growth rates. Overall growth rates have averaged 5.7 per cent annually since 2000. Indeed, according to *The Economist*, over the past decade six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world were in sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda) (*The Economist,* 2011). African GDP growth rates are also expected to surpass those of Asia over the next five years (although per capita income is likely to lag). As noted above, growth has been more broadly based, although the net oil exporters continue to outpace the net oil-importing African countries. The global demand for Africa's energy and natural resources has increased dramatically, thus allowing many African countries to diversify their economies. Significant efforts are being made by African governments to reverse the productivity decline in agriculture by the institution of enabling policies, investment in infrastructure and expanded extension services. A similar effort is being made to reverse the decline in higher education and to expand access to basic education.

Third, there is greater consensus among African governments now than ever before on what needs to be done to address the continent's myriad problems. Regional initiatives under the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) are allowing African countries to improve governance; assume leadership and accountability for development; increase trade within Africa and the world; and enhance regional public goods such as cross-country transportation and electricity pooling. Most significantly, the African Union and regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are playing an important role in dealing with potentially disruptive national crises, such as in Côte d'Ivoire (in the case of ECOWAS) and Sudan and Somalia (in the case of the AU and IGAD). Over the past six years, regional efforts have resulted in a decline in the number of civil conflicts (Laporte and Mackie, 2010).

Fourth, while Africa itself deserves the credit for much of what has been achieved, the response of international partners has been valuable and enhances the prospects of sustaining the progress made so far. Since 2001, the international community has signalled a renewed

commitment to development and the mitigation of poverty and diseases by adopting a number of measures. At its summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada in 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) major industrialized countries adopted an action plan for Africa (Government of Canada, 2002) and agreed that at least half of the additional resources pledged at the 2002 Monterrey UN Conference on Financing Development would be channelled to Africa. And in 2005, the Commission for Africa, set up by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, made a compelling case for a 'big push' on many fronts to address the interlocking problems obstructing successful development in Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005).

Finally, the China and India factor is hard to dismiss in discussions of Africa's recent transformation. The global demand for Africa's energy and natural resources has increased dramatically, thus allowing many countries to start to diversify their economies for the first time in many decades, and to invest in the strategic infrastructure necessary for raising productivity and growth. Even those African countries with few strategic resources, such as oil and gas, have experienced moderate growth due to expanded trade with China, India and other emerging economies. Obviously, the increasing role of new Southern powers in African economies, which is likely to be long-term, requires that African countries devise innovative policies to harness these new opportunities (Cheru and Obi, 2010).

While the conditions for Africa's growth and development are much more favourable today than a decade ago, the ability of African countries to chart their own independent development path remains limited. An African-owned and African-driven development agenda is not yet securely on the table. As a new door to economic opportunity is opened up to African countries with the rise of the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China), lurking in the background are also new risks that Africa must avoid or manage strategically. Too many externally designed blueprints, purporting to identify the right path for Africa to follow, come with baggage that must be examined carefully. All of these externally conceived plans are 'supply-driven', not 'demand-driven', let alone 'Africa-driven'. How does one make sense of these competing blueprints, such as the 'Beijing Consensus', the 'New Delhi Consensus', the 'Ankara Consensus', the 'Brasilia Consensus', the 'Joint EU–Africa strategy' and so on? Do these new external initiatives on Africa signal a radical break with the past by allowing African countries the freedom and 'policy space' to manage their own affairs independently?

The growing influence of China and India in Africa may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can serve as a counterbalance in a world system still dominated by the West. On the other hand, it can intensify the 'new scramble for Africa' and further the 'securitization' of Africa's international relations. In sum, the glass is half full and half empty: for Africa, there are opportunities to exploit and rough currents to avoid.

The dawn of an African century?

Most African states are entering their second half-century as the global political economy is undergoing a profound period of change. The rise of the BRIC states over the last decade has been the central structural feature of a new 'second world' (Khanna, 2009), now accentuated by the very uneven incidence and impact of the 'global financial' crisis (Cooper and Subacchi, 2010). The established trans-Atlantic core, especially the vulnerable PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) in the EU's eurozone, faces increasing competition from the global 'South'. The 'rest', particularly the non-state rest (Zakaria, 2008), have come to challenge the hegemonic US even faster than expected. The opportunities for innovative policies by African states, companies and civil societies are considerably enhanced at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, in contrast with the independence period and the subsequent 'lost' decades on the continent (Cheru, 2002). Hence the reluctance, resistance almost, of African states to sign economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with the EU before the end of 2010 despite considerable pressures as well as incentives (see below). This has become possible for two reasons: broad consensus that the post-Bretton Woods system has failed; and new global power configurations – that is, new players in the global system – including civil society as well as newly powerful Southern countries, and the emergence of disguised protectionism in the US and EU in response to the inability of these powerful blocs to compete with the new Southern powers on their own terms.

The *World in 2011* review by *The Economist* (2010, p. 111) once again located half of the top dozen growth economies on the African continent: in descending order, with growth rates ranging from 14 to 7 per cent; these were Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Liberia. The Washington-based Center for Global Development recently identified 17 countries 'leading the way' in Africa (Radelet, 2010). And the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (2010) has identified 40 African corporations that are challenging stereotypes of the 'overlooked

continent'. Together, emerging economies/companies might lead to a proliferation of 'developmental states' on the continent (Mkandawire, 2001): from Mauritius and Botswana through Ghana and Uganda to...Morocco? South Africa? Rwanda?

But Africa still accounts for the 'top' half of the 'top ten' 'failed states' (Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad and, in first position, Somalia) (www.foreignpolicy.com) and 34 of the 41 countries in the 'Low Human Development' category of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with Zimbabwe coming bottom in position 169, below even the Democratic Republic of Congo, and with the lowest non-African state being Afghanistan (UNDP, 2010, pp. 145–46).

These very divergent perspectives on the continent, when combined with the emerging impacts of climate change and global recession, new regionalisms and new security, plus innovative forms of private or transnational governance (see more below), mean that 'African IR' (Brown, 2006) has much to teach, especially if its extensive non-state and informal, let alone illegal 'transnational' dimensions are recognized. As Douglas Lemke (2003, pp. 116, 138) lamented almost a decade ago, 'African international relations constitute the developing world activity most likely to be excluded from international relations research'. He continued:

> ...standard international relations research describes the interactions of official states...In contrast, Africanist international relations scholars describe interactions between and among a variety of types of international actors...in the developing world, international relations are more varied than standard international relations research recognizes.

So, in addition to established American and English 'schools', the claims of Asian and European genres (Tickner and Wæver, 2009) and the suggestion of a distinctive 'Commonwealth' school (Shaw and Ashworth, 2010), Karen Smith (2009, pp. 280–81) suggests that 'Africa has important contributions to make which IR scholars should take into account in order to enhance their understanding of international relations'. But she is also realistic enough to recognize that 'not all IR scholars are interested in or open to...integrating African stories into IR. While stories may be told, we are still confronted with the question of whether anybody will be listening.' The same is true of International Political Economy (IPE), where the transatlantic divide still overlooks the global

South (Phillips and Weaver, 2010), especially the BRIC states, but also Africa.

The rest of this chapter looks at two clusters of issues that together will shape Africa's futures: continued, even accelerated development or regression to the continent's hapless/hopeless stereotypical image? The outstanding issues include new regionalisms/security, and the emerging opportunities and challenges stretching from the BRIC states and global recession to climate change, EPAs, diasporas and private or transnational governance. As *The Economist* (2008, p. 20) came to admit three years ago:

> After four decades of political and economic stagnation . . . the continent's 48 Sub-Saharan countries have been growing for the past five years at a perky overall rate of 5% or so . . . Once described by this newspaper, perhaps with undue harshness, as 'the hopeless continent', it could yet confound its legion of gloomsters and show that its oft-heralded renaissance is not just another false dawn prompted by the passing windfall of booming commodity prices, but the start of something solid and sustainable . . . Africa has a rare chance to break out of the poverty trap.

Outstanding issues: Overcoming aid dependence and expanding 'policy space'

The conventional wisdom about Africa is that the continent is marginalized because it is not sufficiently integrated into the global economy. However, a proper understanding of globalization's influence on Africa must focus on the theoretical assumptions and institutional structures that underpin current North–South relations and, in particular, the aid, debt and international trade regime through which African development is regulated. These outstanding issues will continue to affect the course of Africa's development unless radical changes are introduced in the relations between Europe and Africa.

Overcoming aid addiction

Over the years, official development assistance (ODA) has assumed a significant role in Africa as private flows declined. With the onset of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, African governments increasingly turned to multilateral institutions for loans. For example, ODA accounted for almost 90 per cent of total flows to sub-Saharan Africa during 1991–2002 (OECD, 2004). Aid levels are also high in per capita terms: in

2002, they were US$9.80 for Latin America, US$4.70 for South Asia and US$25–30 for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004). This dependency brings with it high transaction costs for African governments, since the conditionality associated with aid limits the policy space for governments to consider a range of options. As Moyo succinctly put it (2010, pp. 75, 145):

> Africa is addicted to aid. For the past sixty years it has been fed aid. Like any addict it needs and depends on its regular fix ... We have been offered an array of financing alternatives: trade, FDI, the capital markets, remittances, micro-finance and savings. It should come as no surprise that the *Dead Aid* prescriptions are market-based, since no economic ideology other than one rooted in the movement of capital and competition has succeeded in getting the greatest number of people out of poverty, in the fastest possible time.

In addition to the conditionality that comes with aid, there is growing concern about the make-up of publicized development aid figures, which may include items that do not represent real resource transfers in support of development. The aid is poorly targeted, double counted as debt relief or allocated to finance housing for refugees in Europe. Moreover, the linking of aid disbursements to the purchase of donor country goods and services remains high, despite an OECD agreement (Paris Declaration on Aid Harmonization) to delink aid. Finally, when it comes to Africa, there is a 'pledge paradox': the more often commitments are made, the less often they are implemented. Commitments made by Western donors on aid levels for Africa are rarely fulfilled.

   Figuring out how to move from aid dependence towards strengthening national capacity for domestic resource mobilization should be high on the African development agenda in the coming decade. In this regard, we have added 'innovative sources for financing development', an approach that formally emerged out of the continuing Monterrey Consensus process initiated in early 2002. These sources have grown as a result of the rise of donors such as the BRIC states (but also the Gulf states), concentrated in the burgeoning 'second world' of Parag Khanna (2009); novel agencies like faith-based organizations (FBOs) (Clarke and Jennings, 2008); and new mega-private foundations like Gates and Clinton, BRAC and Ibrahim, along with emerging opportunities for direct foreign investment such as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (Xu and Bahgat, 2010).

Reforming the world trading system

One way that poor countries can try to benefit from globalization is by increasing their share of global trade. According to the proponents of neoliberal globalization, openness to international trade is supposed to allow poor countries to alter both the space and pattern of their participation in the international division of labour. They can thereby overcome balance-of-payments problems and accelerate technical progress and economic growth in order to catch up with industrialized countries (Bhagwati, 2004; Sachs and Warner, 1995). On the contrary, however, the benefits of trade liberalization tend to be distributed unevenly, and adverse forms of integration into the global economy may increase rather than reduce poverty (Akyuz, 2006). Despite the elimination of many of the barriers to international trade in goods, significant obstacles persist, often to the detriment of the poorest countries.

Developing countries, especially in Africa, have persistently complained that the current international trade regime works against them and have demanded major reforms to rebalance the rules. In 2001, developed countries agreed to a new round of trade negotiations, the Doha Development Round, to address issues of market access, terms of trade, commodity price volatility, the phasing out of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic supports for agricultural exports by industrialized countries, and special and differential treatment for poor countries (Khor, 2004; Perkins, 2003).

It has been almost 11 years since the 2001 Doha conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to rebalance the rules of international trade. Unfortunately, because of unrelenting pressure by the developed countries, the Doha negotiations have veered from their proclaimed development orientation towards a 'market access' direction, in which developing countries are pressured to open up their agricultural, industrial and service sectors. By the end of July 2006, the negotiations on the Doha Work Programme were suspended across the board. They are now back on track, but it is unclear that the most contentious issues raised by developing countries will be addressed satisfactorily. Without action on rebalancing the unbalanced rules on trade, Africa's development will always be held in check.

Cancelling Africa's illegitimate debt

Given Africa's financing needs, debt relief under the enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative has been neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently broad to reduce the levels described by the World

Bank as 'sustainable'. So far, 18 African countries have completed the HIPC process and were granted debt relief totalling US$40 billion. The initiative does not address the debt problem of 40 other African countries, which still owe over US$200 billion. The basic operating logic of the G8 debt relief strategy is simple: to lighten the debt burden just enough to keep the system going, but not enough to remove its oppressive and distorting effects. Thus, greater effort is needed by the international community to extend 100 per cent debt cancellation to all impoverished countries. In this regard, African governments should stop begging, but should, instead, strategically negotiate with creditor countries and institutions.

New regionalisms

Given its more than 50 states, Africa has been the leading region in the South to advance regional innovations and institutions; and reflecting its political economies, many of these experiments qualify as new regionalisms (Grant and Soderbaum, 2003). However, as we indicate below, the continent has also been in the vanguard of new security challenges and responses, and other dimensions of new regionalisms.

In the new century, regionalisms on the continent have covered the full spectrum of levels – macro/meso/micro (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2008) – and sectors – from economic development to civil society, corporate networks, ecology, security and so forth. While export processing zones (EPZs) are associated with Asia and gas pipelines with Central Europe, corridors and peace parks are largely a function of Southern Africa's distinctive political economy. Similarly, Africa has its share of river valley organizations and other cross-border micro-regions. The Maputo Development Corridor, Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (www.peaceparks.org) and Nile Basin Initiative (www.nilebasin.org) are emblematic, almost iconic. Finally, local communities and regional companies define their own regions in terms of cross-border migrations and trade, and logistics and supply chains respectively (Shaw et al., 2011).

New security

'New' security issues relate to transnational criminal networks typically involving the sale and supply of minerals such as coltan, diamonds and gold, along with drugs and guns. While regional conflicts have expanded and contracted over time in both the Horn and West Africa, the classic example of such new security is the Great Lakes Region (GLR), centred on an area labelled the Democratic Republic of Congo but in

reality a set of fluid territories controlled by warlords. Fauna and Flora International has attempted to mediate in coltan demand and supply and between mobile phone companies and networks and the environment of the Congo basin. Global Witness and successive UN reports have drawn attention to the flow of small arms into and commodity exports out of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a distinctive case of production and accumulation in a war zone. In turn, the UN has sought to establish some sort of peacekeeping presence in the eastern DR Congo, and the International Conference on the GLR has attempted to institute a regime to regulate trade in conflict minerals. The latter attempts to build on the Kimberley Process for artisanal conflict diamonds, by the terms of which, certification is used in an attempt to regulate informal, illegal flows (www.kimberleyprocess.com). While the latter process is global, albeit with particular nodes, the GLR conference is regional.

The exponential privatization of security is transforming the security nexus in Africa and elsewhere; this includes the recruitment of Africans by private security companies in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Such companies and services in Africa tend to be concentrated where the BRIC states and others are extracting and shipping energy and minerals. The relationship of private security companies to state, economy and civil society represents profound challenges for democracy and human security on the continent, as elsewhere. Global standards and codes of conduct for private security companies are becoming a major international issue. Despite profound reservations, international NGOs are increasingly hiring private security operatives to protect their humanitarian operations, especially in war zones (see Abrahamsen's and Obi's chapters in this volume).

Onshore conflict can spread offshore, as in the international waters off Somalia in recent years, leading to an international naval presence to try to contain the guerrillas at sea. Sea lanes of communication are essential for globalization, especially for energy and container shipping.

From aid dependence to innovative sources of financing development

Despite the elusiveness of the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in Africa, the traditional North–South funding gap was growing even before the end-of-decade global financial crisis, partly because some peacekeeping operations began to count as ODA under the OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate (DAC) rules and partly because resources were being diverted to the 'war on terror'. In response to

such deficiencies as well as the slowness of the Monterrey Consensus, France activated a 'leading group' of states (www.leadinggroup.org) to suggest other means of advancing global public goods. In association with major international NGOs in a forum on the future of aid (www.futureofaid.net), a taskforce on international financial transactions and development came to advance the notion of 'taxation for the governing of globalization'. The idea was later picked up by other global commissions, such as the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, a joint initiative of the governments of Finland and Tanzania (Helsinki Process, 2005, pp. 26–28), and the United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), which published a seminal report, 'New Sources of Development Finance' in 2005 (Atkinson, 2005).[1]

Emerging issues

> The illegal trade in drugs, guns, intellectual property, people and money is booming. Like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits governments against agile, stateless and resourceful networks, empowered by globalization. (Naim, 2003, p. 29)

BRIC-Africa engagements

This century has been notable for the appearance of emerging economies that present profound opportunities as well as challenges for Africa, especially those political economies with energy and/or mineral resources (Shaw et al., 2009). So far, the impact of the BRIC states has been very uneven, given the distribution of such resources. South Africa is particularly connected via IBSA and BASIC, but Angola, Nigeria and Sudan have also been major beneficiaries in terms of demand and exports. However, some manufacturing sectors, such as clothes, furniture, textiles and shoes, have suffered. India has a greater historic diaspora in Africa than China, which may be a mixed blessing, though Chinese entrepreneurs are increasingly ubiquitous throughout the continent, especially in growth areas (Cheru and Obi, 2010). Distinctions among emerging states/powers, emerging societies and emerging companies are of growing salience in terms of prospects for African development.

Global recession

The great recession since 2008 has had an uneven impact everywhere: it has been negative across the Atlantic but positive in the global South,

especially Asia. As indicated above, Africa has continued to grow since the turn of the century, even if the inflow of remittances has declined and the EU of 27 is less generous or extroverted than before. Contemporary global rebalancing is to the advantage of the South as the transatlantic world loses leverage, even if the G20 is but a waystation towards more representative, inclusive 'global' governance for economic expansion and ecological sustainability (Cooper and Subacchi, 2010).

Climate change

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other expert groups warn that Africa is likely to be the continent most seriously affected by climate change. To date, it has contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions and benefited least from climate change mitigation strategies. But changes in its weather are already apparent, leading to further tensions over food, land and water (Thurrow, 2010), now exacerbated by the land-grab by Gulf and other states with SWFs (Toulmin, 2009). The continent will have a belated opportunity to present its case when the Conference of the Parties (COP) 17 meets in Durban before the end of 2011. South Africa has been part of the Second World's BASIC negotiating group at the climate change conferences COP15 and 16.

Economic partnership agreements with the European Union?

In late 2010, at the third EU–Africa summit in Tripoli, Libya, the African states confirmed their unwillingness to sign a set of regional EPAs with the EU, unlike the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), which had done so a year earlier. Despite considerable pressure and some incentives, African leaders were concerned about the implications of free trade in services as well as goods. This new resilience reflects Africa's empowerment, given BRIC attention and investment on one hand and, on the other hand, the declining attraction of an EU of 27 which, in light of continuing reverberations in the global financial system, includes fiscally vulnerable members. In short, historic dependency relations are in flux as parts of Africa grow and much of Europe stagnates.

Diasporas

'Africa' is not confined to or solely defined by its own continent, since its transnational diasporas have moved to and settled in the western hemisphere – Brazil, the Caribbean, Canada and the US – over the decades and centuries. African and other diasporas are increasingly important in terms of policy development and remittance flows, even if

international financial institutions (IFIs) have only recently recognized this trend. But such communities, including proliferating hometown associations, increasingly demand rights in exchange for *de facto* taxation. Such remittance flows are of special importance to families in securing basic needs and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

There is an urgent need to identify an emerging consensus on the most pressing needs for research, data gathering and policy development in the 'host' countries as well as in the sending countries that will lead to superior development outcomes. The role of the diaspora in a range of spheres related to national development and quality of life is of growing interest to policymakers, practitioners and analysts. In Asia and Latin America, for example, the diaspora has been one of the pillars of development and industrialization. A further case in point is the Chinese diaspora, which numbers 50 million, and is believed to have generated US$700 billion in 1999, equivalent to two-thirds of China's GDP (Devan and Tewari, 2001).

In the case of Africa, however, research on the African diaspora and development has only just begun. With few exceptions, what little research there is on this diaspora has mainly addressed issues of 'identity' or the experience of settlement and integration in host countries and only to a lesser extent the diaspora's role in the development of the 'homeland'. This contribution is multifaceted: the diaspora may serve as 'cash dispensing machines', but also contributes to development in a myriad of other ways. Future research must go beyond the current focus on remittances and investigate the various ways in which diasporic communities form institutions and organizations that facilitate their engagement in various economic, political and social activities in order to promote development in their homelands. This might include humanitarianism and development; business and development; knowledge transfer; peacebuilding; and politics and democratic governance dimensions (Brinkerhoff and Riddle, 2009).

Africa and global governance: Private or transnational governance?

Among the many issues of importance to Africa is gaining voice in global governance. Insofar as global problems slice across borders, collective responses to them are increasingly important. The issues of pandemics, climate change, global recession, poverty, criminal networks, the availability of food and water can only be solved through collective global action. Ultimately, Africa must determine how to gain access to global

governance. IR scholarship must ponder the following questions: how to move from exclusion to inclusion; and how Africa can play a greater role in setting the agenda in the key institutions of the world system, including the United Nations. While the recent shift from the G8 to the G20 is a significant improvement, much more needs to happen for African countries to have a voice in key global decision-making.

On the other hand, the mix of incremental democratization and proliferation of issues has led to Africa being in the vanguard of the development of private/transnational forms of governance on issues such as conflict diamonds. Arguably, the first contemporary instance of such global animation was the international campaign to ban landmines leading to the Ottawa Process, spearheaded by Lloyd Axworthy among others. Then a combination of small and large NGOs generated the Kimberley Process to outlaw blood diamonds. This has since spawned a Diamond Development Initiative International to upgrade informal artisanal mining. And the industry, especially in Africa, has created the preemptive Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). In addition, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is in response to corruption arising from windfall energy incomes and profits. And the continent has been central to a couple of UN Programmes of Action (PoA) (for example, the decade-old PoA 1325 on women, peace and security, and PoA 1540 on small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as the burgeoning Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), advocated by the International Action Network against Gun Violence. Ensuring African representation in global governance will take two pragmatic approaches: engaging existing multilateral arrangements while cultivating strategic South–South tactical alliances in close collaboration with emerging Southern powers. The emergence of China and India as powerful economic actors, the proliferation of new trilateral formations (such as the BRIC alliance, the IBSA dialogue forum, the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the India–Africa, Korea–Africa and Turkey–Africa summits), and a profoundly transformed G20 forum in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, present challenges and opportunities that African states must exploit to their advantage.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, the study of Africa is still contested terrain, sometimes bitterly so. It is embedded in a complex of relations between Africa and the West. The vocabulary is still binary, 'us' versus 'them', and it extends

to the larger realm of relations among nations partly because social science research on Africa has always informed the powers that be, that have, over the years, sought to shape the destiny of the African continent (Ake, 1982 on *Social Science as Imperialism*). Often, social science research has tended to reinforce preconceived prejudices or been used for mastering instruments of domination of societies. Although much has changed over the past decade or so, considerable research driven by these motives still exists, feeding African suspicions of even those motivated by genuine interest in understanding the African continent as an important site for the performance of the human drama.

The contributors to this volume question whether conventional IR even comes close to understanding the African condition. Why? Because the study of Africa, and scholarship on Africa, is embedded in the historical legacy of racism that was at the core of colonial policy. Such views and sentiments still prevail in the social sciences, although the situation is changing slowly. Debates abound on what is good and scientific knowledge and on the terms and conditions under which non-white scholars are to be inducted into the elite club of mainstream academe, particularly the IR field. One might wonder why there are so few black scholars in IR. This boils down to gatekeeping and a deep-seated bias towards non-white scholars in elite universities. Thus, *it is not that mainstream IR scholars forgot about Africa: rather there is a deep-seated belief that non-whites have nothing to contribute to the making of world history*. Universities in the US and Britain, particularly the leading Ivy League institutions, are the 'imperial brain trust', socializing students and inducting them into dominant and mainstream culture. There is no place in the impenetrable imperial brain trust for dissenting voices. That is the IR field's core problem.

In this volume, we have sought to negotiate ourselves past the gatekeepers of the sites where the study of Africa's IR takes place and to provide openings that will nourish mutual respect and allow both sides to engage in a common exercise, without necessarily talking with one voice. The contributors have aimed to 'decolonize' the production of knowledge in IR.

Our aim has thus been to go beyond traditional IR prisms and to provide a space for many voices and perspectives. Such reformulation will advance IR in Africa and elsewhere, as Tickner and Wæver (2009) have urged. It could also serve to redefine IPE from outside the North Atlantic (Phillips and Weaver, 2010). As Brown et al. (2009, p. 263) indicate: 'Africa's place in the contemporary international system presents

a series of challenges to scholars and practitioners alike'. To repeat the Latin saying of old: *ex Africa semper aliquid novi!*

Note

1. Among the dozen or so global levies, mainly on financial flows, proposed by the task force to advance global public goods are (a) the Global Solidarity Fund (GSF) for global public goods; (b) Currency Transaction Tax (CTT) (along the lines of the original Tobin Tax); (c) airline ticket levy already being implemented by some states in the North, such as Spain and Korea, with revenue going to vaccines in association with the Clinton and Gates foundations; (d) carbon taxes/trading, a not uncontroversial set of measures encouraged by the UN IPCC and various climate change summits, including the Copenhagen COP15, Cancun COP16 and the upcoming COP17 in South Africa, related to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); (e) climate change funds such as Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and UN agencies' Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD); (f) Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF), established in Geneva; (g) UNITAID, an international drug purchase facility; (h) controls on money-laundering encouraged by the OECD and G8; and (i) remittance taxes on North-South flows, which have blossomed to over US$300 billion per annum, larger than ODA for states like Nigeria or Lesotho. Other alternatives include new members of the EU of 27 and the BRIC states, reflected in FOCAC, for example. FBOs span many religions, particularly the more pragmatic, mainstream denominations (for example, Catholic Relief Services; Christian Aid; Islamic Relief; Lutheran World Relief; and World Vision). With new and old foundations, they increasingly partner with international organizations in, for example, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). These are not the only examples of private transnational global governance.

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