

Ottoman Greeks
in the
Age of Nationalism:

Politics, Economy, and Society
in the Nineteenth Century

Edited by
DIMITRI GONDICAS
and
CHARLES ISSAWI

THE DARWIN PRESS, INC.
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ottoman Greeks in the age of nationalism : politics, economy, and society in the nineteenth century / edited by Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-87850-096-0

1. Greeks—Turkey—Social conditions—History—19th century.

2. Greeks—Turkey—Economic conditions—History—19th century.

3. Greeks—Turkey—Politics and government—History—19th century.

I. Gondicas, Dimitri, 1955-

II. Issawi, Charles Philip.

DR435.G8088 1999

956.1'00489—DC21

99-28792

CIP

The paper in this book is acid-free neutral pH stock and meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Printed in the United States of America.

This book has been composed in Baskerville typeface by The Darwin Press, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, USA.

Publication of this volume has been made possible with the support of the Program in Hellenic Studies (Stanley J. Seeger Hellenic Fund) and the Program in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

Cover: "The Floating Bridge" from *The Beauties of the Bosphorus, illustrated in a Series of Views of Constantinople and its Environs* by Miss Pardoe; drawings by William H. Bartlett (London: Virtue and Co., 1843).

Contents

Contributors	vii
Preface	
<i>Dimitri Gondicas</i>	ix
A Note on Transliteration and Place Names	xiii
Map	xv
• Introduction	
<i>Charles Issawi</i>	1
Chapter I	
The Economic Activities of the Greek Community of İzmir in the Second Half of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries	
<i>Elena Frangakis-Syrett</i>	17
Chapter II	
The Greek Census of Anatolia and Thrace (1910–1912): A Contribution to Ottoman Historical Demography	
<i>Alexis Alexandris</i>	45
Chapter III	
Economic Foundations of a Civil Society: Greeks in the Trade of Western Anatolia, 1840–1876	
<i>Reşat Kasaba</i>	77
Chapter IV	
The Development of a Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie: Investment Patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850–1914	
<i>Haris Exertzoglu</i>	89
• Chapter V	
A Millet Within a Millet: The Karamanlides	
<i>Richard Clogg</i>	115
Chapter VI	
Brigandage and Insurgency in the Greek Domains of the Ottoman Empire, 1853–1908	
<i>John Koliopoulos</i>	143

Chapter VII	
Greeks in the Ottoman Administration During the Tanzimat Period	
<i>İlber Ortaylı</i>	161
• Chapter VIII	
From Tâ'ife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community	
<i>Paraskevas Konortas</i>	169
Chapter IX	
The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the "Society of Constantinople"	
<i>Thanos Veremis</i>	181
• Chapter X	
The Greek Millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament (1908–1918)	
<i>Catherine Boura</i>	193
Conference Program	
The Social and Economic History of The Greeks in the Ottoman Empire: The Greek <i>Millet</i> from the <i>Tanzimat</i> to the Young Turks	207
Index	211

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Preface

DIMITRI GONDICAS

ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES OFTEN tend to be as fiercely independent in their intellectual pursuits as nation-states are in asserting their territorial integrity and national identity. Accordingly, departmental boundaries in universities can be as impervious and rigid as national frontiers and linguistic barriers. To a great extent shaped by Cold War politics and policies and generously funded by United States government agencies and private foundations, area studies programs in American universities have competed with one another as they stake out territory on the intellectual map of university curricula, research programs, and scholarly publications. In recent years, increasingly scarce resources and challenges to the intellectual and institutional autonomy of area studies departments have led to a re-examination of their role in the academic world and to a rise in cross-cultural and comparative work.¹

In this context, the present volume of essays attempts to break down the traditional barriers of academic discipline, language, and ethnocentric discourse in Greek and Ottoman studies by providing a forum for exchange among Greek, Turkish, English, and American scholars working on the political, economic, and social history of modern Greece and the Ottoman Empire.

For decades, American institutions have promoted programs of research and teaching in Ottoman and modern Turkish studies. Typically, such programs are in "Near Eastern" or "Middle Eastern Studies" departments, and have focussed on diplomatic affairs as well as the political, economic, or institutional histories of states and elites in the area. In large measure, scholarship has drawn upon Ottoman and Turkish archives and on monographic studies written in Turkish and thus accessible only to area specialists.

Scholarly interest in the social and economic life of the non-Muslim peoples who lived in the Ottoman Empire is fairly recent. A turning point was the 1978 Princeton Conference on the *millet* system, the proceedings of which were published in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*.² This work was the first systematic attempt to examine the social structure

of the different religious, linguistic, and ethnic communities that made up the empire. Similarly, Charles Issawi's *The Economic History of Turkey 1800–1914*³ is a fundamental study of these ethnic groups and their religious, economic, and communal life. However, neither of these works dealt in any depth with the Greek *millet*, which, by virtue of its Orthodox Christian faith and the Greek language of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, was the legatee of the Byzantine tradition. Despite the central role of the Greeks in Ottoman society and especially during the last century of the empire's existence, the Ottoman Greek community has not been studied systematically by Ottoman specialists in Europe or the United States. At the same time, groundbreaking work by Greek historians⁴ of the period remains largely inaccessible (due to both linguistic and cultural-institutional barriers) to their colleagues outside Greece, while few historians of modern Greece have published studies in English on the Ottoman Greek communities.⁵

This situation is hardly surprising given that the field of Modern Greek Studies is a relative newcomer to the American university. Long under the shadow of the Classical tradition, this young field has yet to find a secure departmental "home" in academic institutions. Neither "Middle Eastern" nor "Western (or eastern) European," modern Greek culture cannot fit neatly within the contours of existing area studies departments or any one academic discipline. Thus, neohellenists in America are forced to be comparatists with a theoretical bent. Their institutional "insecurity" within academia may turn out to be an asset in the long-term as they seek to avoid the isolation and introversion that area studies programs are often criticized for, by seeking to engage intellectually colleagues in related fields.

In this spirit, the Program in Hellenic Studies initiated the 1989 Princeton Conference on "The Social and Economic History of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire: The Greek *Millet* from the *Tanzimat* to the Young Turks"⁶ from which the present volume derives. The idea of a gathering of neohellenists and Ottomanists—two scholarly communities involved in complementary activities—was conceived by Thanos Veremis, University of Athens, who was Visiting Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs during the spring term of 1988. Charles Issawi was receptive to the idea and helped identify potential participants, including both established scholars and young historians. The success of the conference

was a manifestation of the cross-fertilization that occurs when different fields of scholarship turn to one another for mutual enrichment.

Organized under the joint auspices of Princeton University's Program in Hellenic Studies and the Department of Near Eastern Studies, this conference was the first collaboration of its kind in the United States.⁷ The editors express their special thanks to their respective chairmen at the time, Edmund Keeley and Avrom Udovitch, as well as to the Council of the Humanities, the Council on Regional Studies, and the Department of History, all of which were co-sponsors of this event. In the actual planning of the conference, we were joined by our then Princeton colleagues Cemal Kafadar and Ahmet Kuyas, and our then graduate student and now colleague, Molly Greene. We are grateful to them for their good counsel. The administrative support of Mrs. Claire Myones of the Hellenic Studies office was indispensable to the success of the conference.

For the preparation of the manuscript, this editor would like to thank former graduate student Sara Monoson, as well as Princeton students Ta-Tanisha Payne, Christine Philliou, Lisa Marie Priddy, and Ipek Yosmaoglu. We also thank our Princeton colleague M. Sükrü Hanioglu and Sia Anagnostopoulou (University of Cyprus) who helped us with the final review of the manuscript. Messrs. Ed Breisacher and Albert McGrigor, our publisher and editor, respectively, at Darwin Press, were instrumental in helping us bring together the collection of essays in its present form. Both editors would like to express our gratitude to the Program in Hellenic Studies and the Program in Near Eastern Studies and their respective chairmen, Alexander Nehamas and Heath Lowry, for their support of this volume. Finally, we owe thanks to the authors for their contributions and patience. The process of editing this volume may have taken longer than we would have liked, but we very much hope that the result will have been worth the wait and that this work will help open new avenues of academic collaboration among scholars of Greece and the Ottoman Empire.⁸

NOTES

1. See P. A. Hall and S. Tarrow, "Globalization and Area Studies: When Is Too Broad Too Narrow?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 23 January, 1998.

2. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).

3. Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

4. See the important series of publications of the Center for Asia Studies, as well as the notable book by Sia Anagnōstopoulou, *Mikra Asia, 190s ai.-1919: Hoi Hellēnorthodoxes koinotētes, Apo to Millet tōn Rōmiōn sto Hellēniko Ethnos* [Asia Minor, 19th century-1919: The Greek Orthodox Community. From the Millet of Rum to the Hellenic Nation] (Athens: Hellēnika Grammata, 1997), and the sources cited there. Other important recent publications in Greek include Haris Exertzoglou, *Ethnikē Tautotēta stēn Kōnstantinoupolē ton 19o Aiōna* [National Identity in Constantinople in the 19th Century] (Athens: Nephelē, 1996), and Paraskevas Konortas, *Othōmanikes Theōrēseis gia to Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio* [Ottoman Perspectives on the Ecumenical Patriarchate] (Athens: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 1998).

5. Notable recent exceptions include works by Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), Gerasimos Augustinos, *The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community, and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1992), Elena Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820)* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), Paschalis Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum; Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishers, 1994), and Richard Clogg, *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Variorum; Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishers, 1996).

6. A reprint of the conference program can be found at the end of this volume, immediately preceding the index.

7. Since the 1989 conference, the Program in Hellenic Studies and the Department of Near Eastern Studies have collaborated in two other joint colloquia: "The Business of Change: Merchants and the Fall of Constantinople" (1995), and "Religion and Democracy in Greece and Turkey" (1996).

8. In this direction, the Program in Hellenic Studies and the Department of Near Eastern Studies are establishing a joint graduate program that is already attracting interest on the part of many young scholars.


A Note on Transliteration and Place Names

IN TRANSLITERATING GREEK proper names, place names, authors and titles, we have tried to follow, as consistently as possible, the guidelines established by the Library of Congress. Though this may be sometimes awkward, it is hoped that readers will be able to look up references without confusion, especially if they are not familiar with Greek spellings. Whenever appropriate, names and places are given in their standard English form (e.g., Constantinople, Lycia, Cavafy, etc.).

All titles of works (books or articles) written in Greek or Turkish have been transliterated into English (in the footnote sections).

There are many place names that have both a Greek and an Ottoman or Turkish equivalent. We have not tried to be consistent throughout the book by opting for one or the other version. Rather, we have kept each author's usage, recognizing the fact that "Smyrna" or "Trebizond" may be more appropriate in a certain context than "İzmir" or "Trabzon" respectively, and vice versa. These place names are cross referenced in the index.







Introduction

CHARLES ISSAWI

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE was ruled by Turks and other Ottomanized Muslims, including the Janissaries. Muslims commanded the armies and constituted the bulk of land forces. They governed the provinces (*eyâlets* or *paşaliks*) and dispensed justice in the *qadi* courts. They formed the overwhelming majority of the *timariots* and *zâ'ims*, who, in return for assignments of land, administered the countryside, raised taxes, and provided military service. They staffed the bureaucracy and controlled and dispensed Muslim education. Lastly, and most important, it was from their ranks that the sultan chose his advisers and ministers. In short, in more ways than one, the Ottoman Empire was what the Greeks called it—a *Tourkokratia*.

Rulers often have neither the aptitude nor the inclination to pursue other activities besides government, however, and, like others before them, the Turks delegated many economic, social, and cultural activities to their *millets*: the Orthodox, including the Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, and those of other minorities.

The role of the Greeks in the empire shows a clear trend: a slow rise followed by a somewhat swifter decline. Whereas, at all times, the Greeks were the most numerous non-Muslim millet in the empire, in the second half of the fifteenth and during the early sixteenth century, the Jewish millet was the most prominent, though the part played by Bosnians and Serbs should not be underestimated. Tens of thousands of Jews immigrated from the Iberian Peninsula and Italy to Constantinople, Thessaloniki, Smyrna, Adrianople, and elsewhere, and many were relocated by the sultan to other parts of the empire. Many of these immigrants possessed valuable skills that enabled them to achieve a measure of success. For example, European-trained Jewish physicians rose to positions of distinction; some even served as personal physicians to the sultans. Jewish printers set up the first presses in the empire and, starting in 1494, produced texts in European languages as well as in Hebrew but not in Arabic or Turkish, as the printing of texts in these languages was prohibited by Bayezid II in 1485.¹

Since these immigrants knew European languages, and the sultans often regarded them as more trustworthy than Christians, they were sent abroad on diplomatic and other missions. Many Jews also

set up banks and shops and at times controlled the customshouses and the mint, and, as they often had good foreign contacts, they played a leading role in foreign trade. The appointment of Joseph Nasi as "Duke of Naxos," with the rank of *sancak beyi*, marks the apogee of Jewish influence.² Jewish influence declined sharply in later years. One reason was possibly Sabbatai Sevi's (1626–76) messianic claims, which prompted many Jews to sever their contacts with European learning and technology. Another was the increasingly strict enforcement of the empire's policy of Muslim control over *dhimmis* (non-Muslim subjects). In addition, other Europeans, protected by the Capitulations, were gaining influence in certain economic sectors and thus had developed a bourgeoisie well before the Ottoman communities.

The vacuum left by the Jews was, in due course, filled mostly by the Greeks, the most active group within the Orthodox millet. A number of factors can account for this. The Greeks were a highly urbanized community. They formed a large proportion of the population of the biggest and most active towns, notably Constantinople, Smyrna, and Thessaloniki. Their position on either side of the Aegean put them athwart the busy trade route connecting Constantinople and the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and Europe. Because of the paucity of natural resources in mainland Greece, Greeks had become over the years deeply engaged in commerce and shipping and thus had developed a bourgeoisie well before other communities. In addition, the empire prohibited Europeans from doing business in the Black Sea area. Most of the merchants in the Black Sea area were Muslims, but the Greeks soon gained a prominent role in that trade, especially in the wheat supply of Constantinople. When Russia began trading through the Black Sea, moreover, it was largely in Greek ships, sailing under the Russian flag, and through Greek merchant houses.³ The large Greek diaspora, first in Italy and the Balkans, then in Russia, Egypt, central and western Europe, and, finally, in the Americas, also provided this community with a flow of ideas, funds, and various other kinds of support that helped their kin in the empire.

Together with the Armenians, Greeks were far more educated than other communities. From the sixteenth century on, graduates of the Greek College in Rome and the schools set up by Greeks in Venice returned home bringing with them elements of European culture and Greek books published in Venice and elsewhere—an estimated 2,500 titles between about 1750 and 1821.⁴ This was followed by the founding of Greek schools and the setting up of printing presses in Constan-

tinople and elsewhere.⁵ Greeks also had contacts with the Western world through the Venetians (and later French, Russians, and British), who controlled the Ionian Islands.⁶ The Patriarchal Academy, founded in 1454 in Constantinople, was also an important resource for the Greeks of the empire. It trained the Phanariots (rich Greek merchants of that city who played a leading part in the church), staffed the upper ranks of the Foreign Ministry (Dragoman to the Sublime Porte), provided the governors (*hospodars*) of Moldavia and Wallachia, and supplied influential interpreters (*dragomans*) to foreign embassies.⁷

The international prominence of the Greek language also was a significant factor in the rise of the Greek millet. The Greek language provided a link with Byzantium (and later in the form of archaizing *katharevousa* with Classical Hellas), giving the Greeks a prestige and inspiration unavailable to any other millet. It also provided them with a more immediate advantage. "Thousands of Albanians and Vlachs became Hellenized through their membership in the Greek Orthodox Church," including the many Albanians who migrated to Greece in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸ In addition, "Greek was the commercial *lingua franca* of much of the Balkan mercantile bourgeoisie."⁹

Greek influence in the Ottoman Empire probably reached its peak in the first few decades of the nineteenth century, just before the War of Independence. The war and its aftermath led to a sharp decline in the Greek population, as the paper by İlber Ortaylı in this volume shows. First of all, the new Hellenic state accounted for perhaps 800,000 Greeks, or about a quarter of the estimated number of Greeks in the empire. This proportion rose steadily thanks to both a high birth rate and reunification, which more than offset emigration from Greece to the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere. By 1907, the population of independent Greece was 2.6 million, a figure that exceeded that of the Greeks in the empire (about 2 million).¹⁰ Secondly, the war inflicted large losses of lives and property on the Greeks, as well as on the Turks. Thirdly, the Porte was severely shaken by the Greek War of Independence and never again permitted its Greek subjects to exercise the kind of power they had once enjoyed.

The Greeks' loss of power coincided with, and was facilitated by, the rise of the Armenians, who held considerable influence until the end of the nineteenth century. Like the Greeks, they also had established contacts with Europe, sent young men to be trained in Italy

and elsewhere, set up printing presses, promoted education, and profited greatly from their diaspora, which gave them contacts not only with Europe and Russia but also with Iran and India.¹¹ It appears, moreover, that Armenians spoke Turkish at home more often than the Greeks. This may have helped them in their dealings with Turks and enabled them to play a more active role in the cultural affairs of the empire.

The part played by Greeks and Armenians, and to a lesser extent by Jews, in the economic life of the empire was enormous.¹² In certain fields, this was already apparent at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For example, the overwhelming majority of *sarrafs* (money-lenders who also often acted as tax-farmers) were members of these groups, trade between the Balkans and Austria was largely in Greek hands, and Greeks played a part in Ottoman sea trade with Europe.¹³ In industry and other branches of trade, the influence of the millets increased steadily up to the First World War. Table I shows the ethnic distribution of bankers and bank managers in 1912.

TABLE I
Ethnic Distribution of Bankers and Bank Managers in 1912

Place	Total					Other and Unidentified
	No. of Bankers	Greeks	Armenians	Jews	Turks	
Constantinople	40	12	12	8	0	8
European Provinces	32	22	3	3	0	4
Anatolia	90	40	27	0	2	21
	162	74	42	11	2	32

SOURCE: P. Marouche and G. Sarantis, *Annuaire Financier de la Turquie* (Constantinople: Impr. du Levant Herald, 1912), pp. 137-40.

The role played by Greek banks and more generally by Greek capital in banking and other activities is the subject of Haris Exert-zoglou's paper contained in this volume. We should add that Greeks continued to be influential at both ends of the scale. On the one hand, some of the Galata bankers, such as the bankers Zariphēs and Zōgraphos, worked directly with Sultans Abdülhamid II and Murad, for example. And, on the other hand, many remained active as money-lenders and tax-farmers in the villages.

The situation in industry was similar, but here one cannot be so precise, since many establishments, especially the larger ones, were listed under the name of the firm, not that of the owner. A perusal of

the 1913 census returns shows that Turkish Muslims appear much more frequently here than in finance, but still constitute a small minority. In the silk industry, Armenian names prevail, whereas in the cigarette-paper industry, the Jews are most prominent. In other branches of industry, the predominance of Greeks is very clear.¹⁴ A study by the Turkish scholar Tevfik Çavdar puts the distribution of 284 industrial firms employing five or more workers as follows: Greeks, 50 percent; Armenians, 20; Turks, 15; Jews, 5; and foreigners, 10. Their labor force was 60 percent Greek; 15 percent Armenian; 15 percent Turkish; and 10 percent Jewish.¹⁵ A breakdown of firms in industry and crafts in 1912 (6,507) shows that 49 percent were Greek; 30 Armenian; 12 Turkish; and 10 other.¹⁶

The predominance of the millets in the industrial labor force was reinforced by the fact that their women, unlike Turkish women, worked in factories. In Bursa in 1872, only 4 percent of workers in silk-reeling plants were male. These men were foremen, engine drivers, and packers. The rest of the work force was made up of women and girls, 95 percent of whom were Greek or Armenian. "The authorities endeavor to discourage and prevent the employment of Turkish women in factories," a report from the period advises. Turkish women sometimes found the wages tempting and later did join the labor force in increasing numbers.¹⁷ Workers from the millets formed a large proportion of the skilled labor force and also played a leading role in organizing workers in large enterprises in Constantinople, Smyrna, and Thessaloniki. They played leading roles in the strikes that broke out in these cities after the promulgation of the 1908 Constitution.¹⁸

In the nineteenth century, Greeks became prominent in foreign trade. In the 1830s, Greeks opened offices in England. By the 1850s, they had 55 firms in Manchester and 14 in London; by 1870, there were 167 Greek firms in Manchester.¹⁹ These firms were probably engaged in exporting textiles, and some remained prominent until the outbreak of the Second World War. A list of the large importers of textiles in Constantinople in 1906 shows 26 Armenian names, 5 Turkish, 3 Greek, and 1 Jewish. In 1910, of 28 large firms in Constantinople importing Russian goods, 5 were Russian, 8 Muslim, 7 Greek, 6 Armenian, and 2 were Jewish; almost all large traders with Russia in the eastern provinces were Armenians.²⁰ In 1912, of 18,063 firms engaged in internal trade, 43 percent were Greek, 23 Armenian, 15 Muslim, and 19 other.²¹ Of the membership of the Chamber of Commerce of Constantinople, Turks and foreigners each formed about 25 percent, "the balance, often exceeding 50 percent of the total," was

composed of members from the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities.²² In Smyrna, at the turn of this century, as Elena Frangakis-Syrett shows in her essay in this volume, “Greek merchants made up between 40 and 50 percent of the city’s merchants, Ottomans and Westerners included,” and were particularly prominent in the cloth, wine, and liquor trade, as well as in that of the main export items, such as figs, raisins, and olive oil. In addition, as early as 1896, the Greeks of Samsun controlled 156 businesses out of a total of 214.²³ Lastly, in Trebizond, in 1884, of 110 merchants listed as engaged in foreign trade as commission agents, exporters, and importers (there was some overlap in these categories), 48 had recognizably Greek names and 40 Armenian.²⁴

As already noted, Greeks of course also played an important part in navigation, particularly in coastal shipping. During much of the nineteenth century, many Greek ships sailed under either Ottoman or Hellenic flags. For example, in 1850 Rhodes and its three tiny neighbors (Kasos, Castel Rosso [Kastellorizo], and Symē) had 142 locally built vessels aggregating 27,000 tons under the Ottoman flag and 54 aggregating 12,000 under the Greek.²⁵ The growth of steam navigation in the eastern Mediterranean adversely affected Greek sailing ships, however, and several islands lost much of their population. “The crisis was overcome when wealthy overseas Greeks began to purchase old steamships in England and to lease them to captains in Greece” and, we may presume, to Ottoman Greeks. “Large profits were made during the South African War, and the capital was used to buy still more steamships.” By 1915, there were 475 steamers, aggregating 894,000 tons, under the Greek flag alone.²⁶ Several Greek or Ottoman Greek lines were actively engaged in the trade of İzmir (e.g., Papayanni Brothers, Pantaleon Oriental Navigation Co., etc.), according to Elena Frangakis-Syrett. As early as 1842, Greek flag steamers were also plying along the Black Sea coast as far as Samsun, and, in 1896, two out of ten steamship lines calling at Trebizond were Greek.²⁷ In the fiscal year from 1912 to 1913, over 10 percent of the ships calling at Constantinople were under the Greek flag. Presumably, a large part of the 11 percent under the Ottoman flag was Greek-owned.²⁸ Needless to say, the Greek lines employed Ottoman Greeks as agents, as did certain other lines.²⁹

Greeks were also well-represented in the professions up to the First World War. In 1912, Greeks accounted for 52 percent of physicians (Armenians 17; Turks 10); 52 percent of architects (34 and 5); 49 percent of pharmacists (25 and 11); 37 percent of engineers (11 and 2); and 29 percent of lawyers (21 and 38).³⁰

Within the government bureaucracy, after 1821 Greeks never recovered the influence that the Phanariots had enjoyed before that date. They were, however, well-represented in those branches where their skills were needed, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture. I suspect that many Greeks served in the Public Debt Administration, but I have not been able to locate any relevant evidence.³¹

Largely due to the excellent studies by Carter V. Findley, abundant material is available on the ethnic composition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the education and career patterns of its officials. In the sample he studied, the share of Greeks rose from 4 percent in 1850 to a peak of 10 in 1882 declining to 7 by 1908 as the number of qualified Turks increased. The Greek component was consistently smaller than that of the Armenians (11, 18, and 13), but much higher than that of the Jews.³² Here, too, a key reason for the better showing of the Armenians was likely to have been their greater knowledge of Turkish: 85 percent of Armenians claimed proficiency in Turkish as compared to 77 percent of Greeks. Conversely, Greeks seem to have endeavored to master European languages, most significantly French.³³ Another factor is of course the clannishness of minorities and their tendency to appoint, support, and promote their own members. Thus, Armenians were heavily concentrated in the Foreign Correspondence Office and Office of Legal Council, which had been headed at an early stage by prominent Armenians.³⁴ Greeks, however, were prominent in the diplomatic, consular, and commercial departments. For illustration we can mention Iōannēs Aristarchēs, who served for a long period as ambassador to Berlin; or Kōnstantinos Mousouros, Kōnstantinos Anthopoulos, and Stephanos Mousouros who, among them, headed the embassy in London from 1856 to 1901 and, most surprising, became ambassador to Greece itself. Alexandros Karatheodōrēs was ambassador in Rome and a leading Ottoman delegate at the Congress of Berlin; he rose twice to ministerial rank, serving, at different times, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Public Works. There was also a Greek member in all the Young Turk cabinets, from 1908 to 1912, usually in one of the more technical ministries such as Mines, Forestry, and Agriculture.³⁵

In the Ministry of Agriculture, however, Armenians seem to have played a much more prominent part than Greeks. In the 1870s, two Armenian Agriculture Directors were appointed and soon after were joined by other officials. A list of Agricultural Inspectors serving in Anatolia in the period from 1883 to 1908 shows 4 Armenian names as against 2 Greek and 6 Turkish, with 2 uncertain.³⁶

The high position occupied by Greeks (and Armenians) in business, the professions, and government service was due to their advanced educational level. Findley's breakdown of Foreign Affairs Ministry officials shows that some 63 percent of Muslims obtained their elementary schooling in Quranic schools, where they received poor training. The schools attended by minorities were distinctly better. The same discrepancy held at all subsequent levels and was particularly marked at the higher ones. Table II gives a breakdown of Foreign Affairs Ministry officials.

TABLE II
Foreign Affairs Ministry Officials (in Percentages)

	Muslims	Greeks	Armenians
Studied in Higher and Professional Schools	50	77	50
Completed Higher Education	20	50	19
Studied at University	4	27	14
Received University Degree	2	10	10

SOURCE: C. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), Table 4.7, p. 162).

As in the past, Ottoman Greeks continued to go abroad for a university education, often to the Kingdom of Greece. In addition, from the middle of the nineteenth century, efforts were made to expand and improve Greek schools within the empire. By the 1870s, there were 105 schools in Constantinople, including 22 girls schools, with 15,000 pupils, entirely supported by private funds.³⁷ By 1920, the Greater Constantinople area had over 30,000 pupils—some 10 percent of the total Greek population.³⁸ In these schools Greek children learned foreign languages (mainly French) and business skills that enabled them to compete successfully with other groups.

So far I have focused on Greeks living in urban areas, but 70 to 75 percent of all Ottoman Greeks lived in the countryside.³⁹ The situation of these rural Greeks was very different. The bulk of the agricultural land belonged to Muslims, and large properties were, with few exceptions, in Muslim hands.⁴⁰ Most of the land was (and still is) planted with cereals and farmed by Muslims. In the farming of cash crops, however, the millets played an important part. In the words of an acute observer: "Their [Greeks and Armenians] broader [*ganzer*] mind, which is more oriented toward gain, leads them in mass to the cultivation of cash crops and also fruits. Thus they frequently prefer the cultivation of vegetables, tobacco, mulberries, and other

fruit to that of cereals because the former present greater prospect of gain (of course that does not prevent the Greeks or the Armenians from stepping in after the harvest, buying the Turkish peasants' crops, and conveying them to the towns) [footnote in original]. And through this greater sense of profit they usually push out of agriculture those Turks whom they find in their way. . . ."41 In fruits and cash crops the leading role in western Asia Minor was played by Greeks, further east by Armenians, and to a small extent in Palestine by Jews. In the growing of mulberries (for silkworm breeding) the leading groups in western Asia Minor were the Armenians and the Greeks, in Syria the Christian Arabs. It may be added that in the most rapidly expanding sector of agriculture, cotton, the main thrust came from Greeks. In the Smyrna region, cotton farms belonged "mostly to Greeks, but also to Turks," whereas in Adana, of the large landowners using modern methods, "few are pure Turks, but rather Greeks, Armenians, Syrians and so on."42 Greek predominance was even more apparent in spinning and weaving, and cottonseed oil pressing in Adana, the development of which must have stimulated cotton growing.

The progress of Greeks and Armenians in agriculture was helped by their greater access to the judicial system after the *Tanzimat* reforms and their ability to take advantage of the introduction of Western concepts of land property. Another great advantage was their exclusion from the army. Consider three examples. In Erzurum, in 1848: "The Armenians have more hands, the Mussulman youth being taken for military service. The Mussulmans do not hire labor and they are unable to cultivate the extent of land they possess." In Biga in 1860: "Their [Christians'] pecuniary means being larger than those of the Mussulmans, they are constantly purchasing property from the latter"; in the past this had been prohibited. In Smyrna, at the same time, "The Christian races are buying up the Turks; the Turks, handicapped by conscription, fall into the hands of some Christian usurious banker (Armenian, Greek, or occasionally European) to whom the whole property or estate is soon sacrificed."43 As a British diplomat observed: "But when force does not rule, when progress, commerce, finance and law give the mixed population of the Empire a chance of redistributing themselves according to their wits, the Turk and the Christian are not equal; the Christian is superior. He acquires the money and land of the Turk, and proves in a lawcourt that he is right in so doing."44 The advance of the Greeks into western Anatolia was noted by many observers. "Everyone who has any familiarity with the Aeolic and Ionian coasts knows of many a flourishing Greek vil-

lage, which not so many years ago was empty or peopled only by Turks. The Turks are losing, or have in places lost, their hold on the coast and on the valleys that open on the coast. . . . As the railway goes inland, the Greek element goes with it and even in front of it."⁴⁵

This feeling of being overwhelmed and driven out of the countryside caused much resentment among Turks and helps to account for the intense bitterness and violence in the struggle among Turks, Armenians, and Greeks in the period from 1895 to 1923.⁴⁶

Nowhere else in the Middle East, except in Egypt, did the Greeks occupy a position commensurate with the one they had in Turkey. Unlike other minorities (Copts, Syrians, Armenians, and Jews), the Greeks in Egypt were never in a position to influence Egyptian politics or contribute to Arab culture, though they did produce a large number of minor scientists as well as prominent physicians, engineers, and lawyers in the Mixed Courts, where the language was French. They can also boast of modern Alexandria's most distinguished son, the poet C. P. Cavafy. In the economy, they operated at every layer, from large-scale banking and cotton exporting (Salvago, Benaki, and others) through internal trade to village grocery stores. They played a leading part in the development of long staple cotton, commemorated by such varieties as Sakellarides, Zagora, Yannovitch, Pilion, and others; and they reintroduced vine growing (Gianaclis). They were prominent in cotton ginning, cigarette manufacturing, and other industries and played an active part in construction work, hotels, and Nile transport. Lastly they were well represented among the employees and skilled workers not only of Greek but of other firms.⁴⁷

The Greeks played a similar, though distinctly smaller, role in the Sudan. They first penetrated the country in the middle of the nineteenth century, during the Egyptian occupation, and reentered literally on the heels of the British army of reconquest, to Lord Cromer's amazement and slight amusement.⁴⁸ However, they were less prominent in the upper social strata, though they did have some leading merchants and contractors such as Kontomichalos.

In Iran, the main Greek interest consisted of firms established in Tabriz conducting trade through Trebizond, the main outlet for Iran's foreign trade.⁴⁹ Of these, the main one was the Ralli and Agelasto firm, connected with the well known Ralli Brothers (Adelphoi Rallē), which had been established in London in 1818 and had branches in Marseilles, Odessa, and Constantinople and, by the 1850s, in India. The owner of the Tabriz firm was a Russian national who later became a British subject. There was also another Greek firm in

Tabriz. At the Trebizond and Constantinople ends, all non-Persian firms trading with Iran seem to have been Greek.⁵⁰ Ralli and other Greek firms also played an important part in the silk trade of Gilan, advancing funds to growers, buying their crops, and, when the muscardine blight struck in 1864, introducing disease-resistant eggs, first from Japan and later from Bursa.⁵¹

In Iraq, Greek firms played a minor role in foreign trade. We know of two in Baghdad in 1857 and two in Basra in 1891.⁵² I am confident that research will reveal the presence of Greek merchants and shipping agents in various parts of the Arabian Peninsula. In Syria, however, I have not come across any signs of Greek trading activity. A few Greeks settled along the coast, such as the Katzeffis, Katafago, and Augerinos families, but they intermarried with local Christians and most were soon assimilated. The only Greek economic activity I have come across was sponge fishing. In 1839, it was reported that some 300 divers from the Castel Rosso archipelago came to Tripoli each year and fished for sponges; by 1912, their number had fallen to 80, the divers having migrated to the United States.⁵³ Of course, there was also much Greek shipping calling at the Syrian ports. In 1899, for example, 55 ships, aggregating 15,000 tons, entered Beirut under the Greek flag, and a substantial proportion of the 2,739 vessels (143,000 tons) carrying the Ottoman flag must also have been Greek-owned.⁵⁴

Mention should also be made of the role of the higher Greek clergy in the Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate, a matter that attracted much attention and controversy at the end of the nineteenth century.

So far, I have dwelt on the role of Greeks in the economic life of the empire. This is partly because I am most familiar with this aspect of Greek history during this period, partly because it lends itself, more than others, to quantitative analysis. I will conclude my introduction with some discussion of the culture and politics of the region during this period.

First of all, a distinction must be made between the cultural advance of Ottoman Greeks and their influence on Turkish cultural development. On the first matter, in addition to the schools mentioned earlier, there were the *syllogoi* (societies), of which there were 26 in Constantinople alone in the early 1870s, and more later.⁵⁵ In addition to their educational, literary, and social work, these associations were active in disseminating Hellenic ideals. They were supported exclusively by private funds.

Greek contribution to the development of Turkish culture, though

considerable, seems to have fallen short of that of the Armenians. Here, again, one gets the impression that, through language, the Armenians were closer to the Turks and therefore could more easily pioneer and participate in such activities as theatre, journalism, and music.⁵⁶ Prominent among Greek contributions were translations from European languages, even after their monopoly as dragomans was broken following the Greek Revolution in 1821; here again one may mention Alexandros Karatheodōrēs. In journalism, in the 1870s, Theodore Kassape edited *Diyojen*, which published some of Namık Kemal's articles; he also edited the satirical journal *Hayal* in which he published a translation of Molière's *L'Avare*. One may also mention Alexander Istamatyadi, who wrote a patriotic play, *Gazi Osman* (1878).⁵⁷ Of course, Greeks exercised a much wider, though much more difficult to trace, influence through such aspects of social life as dress, manners, and life-style.

As regards politics it is tempting, but ultimately misleading, to think of the Ottoman Greeks purely in terms of modern nationalism and the desire for unification with the Kingdom of Greece. Two essays in this volume show the complexity of the issues. The one by Paraskevas Konortas points to the dangers of identifying Orthodoxy with Hellenism or the Roman (*Rumî*) religious community with the Greek nation. The changes in the title of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries show both the complexity of the evolution of relations between Greeks and other Orthodox Ottomans and the shifts in the attitude of Ottoman authorities towards these relations. The essay by Richard Clogg in this volume explores a fundamental fact of Middle Eastern politics, the primacy of religion. The Turkish-speaking Karamanlı Christians of Anatolia wrote in the Greek alphabet but do not seem to have considered themselves Greeks. They conducted at least part of their liturgy in Greek, but otherwise used Turkish. Efforts were made by various Greek societies, in both the kingdom and the empire, to re-Hellenize the Karamanlıs by sending them teachers and books and educating their young men in Athens, but they "met with mixed success," and the increasing number of translations into Karamanlı Turkish from both European languages and Greek shows that the Karamanlıs continued to cling to their tongue. Not surprisingly, in 1923, at the time of the exchange of populations, both the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to consider them Greeks and transferred them to Greece. Surely, this was prudent; in the Middle East, it is much easier to change one's language than one's religion, and the

Karamanlis in Greece, however much discrimination they may have encountered, probably fused more easily with the Greeks than they would have done with the Turks.

Pending studies on the attitudes taken towards various questions by the Greek deputies who sat in successive Ottoman parliaments, and of content analyses of Greek publications in different parts of the empire, it is difficult to make definitive statements about the political views of Ottoman Greeks. One point brought out in Thanos Veremis's essay in this volume is certainly important. Not all Greeks, whether in the empire or even in the kingdom, thought in terms of unification. Partly because of growing tensions with the Bulgarians and other Slavs, and partly because of the favorable position of Greeks in the empire, some Greeks aimed for a state that would guarantee the rights of all the ethnic communities in the empire. The Society of Constantinople propagated such views. According to Thanos Veremis (p. 187), "During the first years of its operations, the organization made considerable headway in the middle-class community of Constantinopolitan Greeks, but there is little evidence of its impact on the lower middle class, the working class, and the population of the countryside." Ultimately, it foundered on the intransigence of Young Turk nationalism and on the increasing tensions brought about by successive wars between Greece and Turkey.⁵⁸ Among the features of these wars were the actions taken by irregular bands of *armatoles* and *klephts*, who combined insurgency with brigandage. The development of such activities in Epirus and Thessaly in the years between 1853 and 1908 forms the subject of the essay by John Koliopoulos.

The Greek community in the Ottoman Empire was shattered by the disastrous war of 1918–1922. However, the survivors—more fortunate than some other peoples—found a new home in the Kingdom of Greece. Their contribution to the development of their new homeland falls outside the scope of this book.⁵⁹

NOTES

1. Abraham Galanté, *Turcs et Juifs* (Istanbul: Haim, Rozio, 1932), pp. 94–101.

2. See Mark Epstein, "The Leadership of the Ottoman Jews," in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 101–15, and Joseph R. Hacker, "Ottoman Policy Towards the Jews," in *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 117–26.

3. A. Üner Turgay, "Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth-century Trab-

zon," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, p. 288. On the wheat trade, see Lütfi Güçer, "İstanbul'un İaşeci İçin Lüzumlu Hububatın Temini Meselesi," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2 (1949-50): 397-411, translated in Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 26-31; see also John H. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 83.

4. C. M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece, A Short History* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), p. 126.

5. Nicolas Svoronos, *Histoire de la Grèce Moderne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980), p. 24.

6. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958), pp. 198-213. As early as the fifteenth century, the Greeks "seem to have been the most closely involved with the foreigner"; they controlled the guilds concerned with navigation and shipbuilding; they supplied both translators to the merchants and dragomans to the foreign embassies; and they were prominent in the wheat and coin trade. See Robert Mantran, "Foreign Merchants and Minorities in Istanbul During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. 1, pp. 130-33.

7. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, p. 107; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 85-86.

8. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, pp. 98, 109-12, 146-53.

9. Richard Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. I, p. 188.

10. See Svoronos, *Histoire*, pp. 39, 59, 72; and Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, p. 18.

11. For Iran see Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 57-62 and sources cited therein.

12. The following paragraphs draw heavily on Charles Issawi, "The Transformation of the Economic Position of the *Millet*s," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. I, pp. 261-85 and id., *Economic History of Turkey*, p. 57.

13. See dispatches from the Austrian Internuncio in Constantinople of 11 and 25 January 1802, translated in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, p. 57. In the eighteenth century, Greeks from Chios (including the Ralli family) and elsewhere had a far-flung trade, with branches ranging from Amsterdam to Vienna, Odessa, and Moscow, and in various European and Ottoman Mediterranean ports.

14. A. Gündüz Ökçün, *1913-1915 Yılları Osmanlı Sanayii* [Ottoman Industry, The Years 1913-1915] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1970), *passim*.

15. Cited by O. G. Indzhikian, *Burzhuziia Osmanskoi imperii* (Erevan: Izd-vo Arm.SSR, 1977), p. 166.

16. Issawi, "Transformation," p. 263, which gives the breakdown by branches.

17. Great Britain, *Accounts and Papers*, 1873, vol. 68, "Turkey" and Bursa, "Trade Report, 1858," Foreign Office Archives, FO 195/64.
18. See Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 50–52.
19. S. D. Chapman, "The International Houses," *Journal of European Economic History*, 6, no. 1 (Spring, 1977).
20. Indzhikian, *Burzhuaziia*, p. 212.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 211, which gives the breakdown by branches.
22. Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876–1908," Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1973, p. 68.
23. A. A. Bryer, cited in R. Clogg, "The Greek Millet," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. 1, p. 206.
24. Turgay, in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, pp. 308–10.
25. Dispatch of 16 April 1850, FO 78/833, reproduced in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 155–56.
26. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, p. 480.
27. Despatch of 31 December 1842, FO 78/533, reproduced in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, p. 166; Turgay, "Trade and Merchants," p. 292.
28. See table in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, p. 176.
29. For examples, see Turgay, "Trade and Merchants," and Indzhikian, *Burzhuaziia*, p. 212.
30. See table in Indzhikian, *Burzhuaziia*, p. 214. I suspect that the relatively stronger representation of Armenians in the legal field may have been due to their greater mastery of Turkish.
31. There is no reference to personnel in Donald Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929).
32. See table in Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 103; see also *idem*, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 205–12.
33. See table in *idem*, *Ottoman Civil*, p. 168.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 264–65.
35. Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), pp. 28–30, 43; Komnēnos served as ambassador in St. Petersburg. See R. Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. 1, p. 326.
36. Quataert, "Ottoman Reform," table on p. 85 and pp. 68–110.
37. For a breakdown, see A. Synvet, *Les Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman: Etude Statistique et Ethnographique* (Constantinople: Imprimerie de "l'Orient Illustré," 1878), pp. 32–33, 80–83, translated in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 60–61.
38. See Alexandris, *The Greek Minority*, pp. 326–31.
39. Of the estimated 2.1 million Greeks in the empire in 1897, some 300,000 lived in Constantinople and 100,000 in Smyrna; another 100,000 to 200,000 probably lived in the smaller towns.
40. For examples, see Indzhikian, *Burzhuaziia*, pp. 60–63.

41. A. J. Sussnitzki, "Zum Gliederung Wirtschaftlicher Arbeit," translated in Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 114–25.

42. W. F. Brück, "Türkische Baumwollwirtschaft," *Probleme der Weltwirtschaft*, no. 29, Jena, 1919.

43. Report on Trade, FO 78/796; Reply to Questionnaire FO 78/1525; *ibid.*, FO 78/1533; see also R. Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change," pp. 324–25.

44. Sir Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe* (reprint, New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), p. 153.

45. W. M. Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897) pp. 130–31. The same connection with railways was noted twenty years later by Karl Dietrich, *Hellenism in Asia Minor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), pp. 46–49.

46. For a bitter Turkish account of conditions in the Smyrna market, see Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil *Kırk Yıl* [Forty Years] (Istanbul, 1936), vol. 2, pp. 14–16; translated in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 72–73.

47. For details, see Athanase Politis, *L'Hellénisme et l'Égypte Moderne* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1929–1930), vol. 2, pp. 401–490.

48. Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1908), vol. 2, p. 250.

49. See Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830–1900," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 1, no. 1 (1970).

50. See various documents reproduced or translated in Issawi, *Economic History of Iran*, pp. 97–109.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–32.

52. *Idem*, *The Fertile Crescent, 1800–1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 25.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 279, 296–97.

54. Great Britain, *Accounts and Papers*, 1900, Report No. 2441, "Beirut."

55. For a list, see Alexandris, *The Greek Minority*, pp. 324–25.

56. For an account, see Hrachya Adjarian, "Hayots dere Osmanian," *Bamber Erevani Hamalsarani* (Erevan, 1967), translated in Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 62–65; R. Davison, "The Millets as Agents of Change," pp. 323–24.

57. See Metin And, *A History of Theater and Popular Entertainment in Turkey* (Ankara: Forum Yayınları, 1963–64), pp. 67–80. An interesting point may be mentioned: In 1913, the number of daily papers published in Constantinople in Greek was 6 and of periodicals, 12; the corresponding figures in Armenian were 6 and 17. In the provinces there were, however, 19 Greek papers (mainly in Smyrna) and 17 Armenian—see Ahmed Emin [Yalman], *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1914), pp. 117–18.

58. On this subject, see Alexandris, *The Greek Minority*, pp. 36–44.

59. See D. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962).

I

The Economic Activities of the Greek Community of İzmir in the Second Half of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*

ELENA FRANGAKIS-SYRETT

IN THE SECOND half of the nineteenth century, İzmir (Smyrna) continued to be one of the principal economic centers in the Ottoman Empire¹ and the major exporting port involved in trade with the West—a position it had held since the middle of the eighteenth century.² It exported to the international market large quantities of Ottoman foodstuffs and raw materials and imported various Western textiles and other goods, some of which were necessary for industry, such as coal,³ as well as an array of consumer goods. These goods were for distribution not only in the immediate western Anatolian hinterland and the Aegean Islands, but throughout Anatolia. With the exception of consumer goods, İzmir was carrying on a pattern of trade that had essentially been going on since the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, certain changes had taken place: the volume of trade had increased tremendously since the earlier period; the İzmir hinterland had expanded considerably and the city-port had come to dominate the Ottoman Empire's trade with the West. Western mercantile communities first established in İzmir early in the seventeenth century grew in numbers and flourished considerably during the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. These were centuries that saw İzmir become cosmopolitan and "Frankish." The Greek community of İzmir, which had been prominent in the economy

* The research for this essay was supported in part by a grant from The City University of New York, PSC-CUNY Research Award Program.

of the city-port at least since the eighteenth century,⁴ maintained its predominance in certain sectors, such as trade, and an active presence in a number of other sectors of the city's economy during the period under study.

From the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, Greeks were already participating on a large scale in the international trade of İzmir—the most dynamic sector of the city's economy—often coordinating their efforts with their kinsmen abroad.⁵ The Greeks managed to accumulate enormous capital from their participation in maritime transportation, privateering, piracy, and arbitrage, besides trade, during the forty years or so preceding the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In the decades following the return of peace to Europe, the economy of İzmir continued to grow, and Great Britain became its principal trading partner.⁶

The signing of the 1838 Balta Limanı Trade Agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, and subsequently between the empire and other European countries (as well as the expansion of the world economy in the early nineteenth century), gave new impetus to the trade of İzmir. Following the signing of the Trade Convention, as western European merchants started penetrating the interior of western Anatolia commercially, they found Greek merchants already established there and, indeed, controlling, to varying degrees, local trading networks.⁷ Although Western traders managed to gain a foothold in the interior of western Anatolia, in accordance with the free trade provisions of the treaty, they did not succeed completely in ousting the Greeks from the local trading networks.⁸ Other countries besides Britain became important trading partners of İzmir during the second half of the nineteenth century, and the city-port maintained an active trade in the international market,⁹ part of which remained in Greek hands, thus making the Greeks important competitors of western traders.

The Greeks, whether as Ottoman citizens, European-protected subjects, or Hellenes, predominated in all sectors of trade—from large-scale international trade to medium-scale intraregional trade and from small-scale local trade in the interior to wholesale and retail trade in the stalls of the city's bazaars. At all times they successfully met the competition of other Ottoman merchants, Muslim and non-Muslim, inside and outside the empire, such as the Armenians,¹⁰ Turks, Jews, as well as the British.¹¹ Towards the end of the century, they fought against the the relentless efforts of the French and the Germans to win over the Levantine market.¹² Still strong at the end of the

nineteenth¹³ and in the early twentieth centuries,¹⁴ Greek merchants made up between 40 and 50 percent of the city's merchants, Ottomans and Westerners included.¹⁵ Greeks accounted for a similar percentage of the merchants who specialized in one product only, such as figs, raisins, or olive oil.¹⁶ In addition, Greeks were particularly predominant in the cloth, wine, and liquor trade. They had been leaders in the cloth trade already since the middle of the eighteenth century,¹⁷ initially as distributors of cloth in İzmir and in Anatolia at large and subsequently as importers of cloth from the West. In both these areas of trade they met strong competition from the Armenians¹⁸ and the British,¹⁹ respectively. By 1905, they owned more than two-thirds of all the wine and liquor stores in the city,²⁰ as well as several wine and liquor-making concerns.

Greek Commercial Organization

There are many reasons for the commercial successes of the Greeks. One of them was the Greeks' tightly knit kinship organization that linked together Greek commercial houses. This enabled them to establish their businesses not only within the Ottoman Empire, but throughout the Mediterranean as well, and, by the second half of the nineteenth century, throughout the world. For example, we can identify the truly international network of the Ralli Brothers, which started from the Chiot community of İzmir at the beginning of the century and then spread over Europe, the Middle East, India, and the United States by the 1860s.²¹ Other important families with international trading networks include the Argenti,²² the Rodocanachi,²³ the Damiani,²⁴ and the three lesser-known Barry brothers—one a naturalized British subject residing in Britain, one a naturalized American established in the United States, and the third a Hellenic subject resident in İzmir—who carried on very extensive trade with one another.²⁵

Their trading contacts with İzmir, and with the rest of the Ottoman Empire, constituted an important conduit for Western capital that could make its way to the Levantine market. Such networks also offered to the Smyrniot Greeks an international array of contacts and intimate, confidential knowledge of the market from the most remote areas of the Anatolian hinterland to London or Calcutta; this knowledge could be, at times, as important as availability of credit. Moreover, Greek capitalists resident in the West had access to Western capital and technology and could, potentially, bring such resources to the Greek capitalists in İzmir. Although it is difficult to quantify

the scale of such transactions or their relation to the overall Greek capital in İzmir, they were, no doubt, important. Moreover, they bear some similarities with the cases of naturalized American citizens of Greek origin, who came back to trade in İzmir at the turn of the century, as part of the rising activity of American capital in western Anatolia. Although their links with local Greek capital in İzmir were not as close or as clearly defined as those of Greeks in western Europe, their activities must have added to the Greeks' economic strength in the city and its environs. Of course, Greeks were not the only ones with such economic links to the West. For instance, Armenian communities resident in Manchester were actively exporting British cloth to İzmir. Yet, it would appear that other ethnic groups did not establish economic links with the West as strong as those established by the Greeks.

There was also close cooperation between Greeks in İzmir and their compatriots in other economic centers in Anatolia, such as in Bursa,²⁶ as well as with the Ottoman capital.²⁷ In fact, there were very strong ties between Greek entrepreneurs in İzmir and those in İstanbul: Profits that were generated from trade by one branch of the family or partnership in İzmir were invested in banking activities by the İstanbul branch and vice-versa. The Greeks also enjoyed a certain advantage over other local non-Muslim communities of the city: the relatively easy acquisition of European status, through the Greek state, and an almost interchangeable identity between Ottoman Greek and Hellenic Greek.²⁸ The latter identity afforded them European status and protection, whereas the former was sometimes necessary to bypass certain regulations. And, of course, they could get Hellenic nationality more easily than any other Western nationality. Certainly, there could also be problems for Hellenic Greeks whenever relations between the Ottoman Empire and Greece deteriorated as, for instance, during the Cretan War of 1897 when they faced temporary expulsion.²⁹ Yet, on the whole, the advantages they enjoyed outweighed the disadvantages.

Another important factor that contributed to the Greeks' predominance in İzmir's trade was their intimate knowledge of the Anatolian market—of the customs and tastes of the local population—and their ability to tap even the smallest corner of this market through an elaborate network of agents and subagents who sold imported goods or bought Ottoman goods for export and who operated on both a large and small scale. So widespread was their network that by the end of the nineteenth century, the British consul in İzmir observed that "the principal language of the people directly or indirectly en-

gaged in trade is Greek."³⁰ Greek merchants, working on their own account or as agents, bought goods both from the place of production, sometimes contracting for them in advance,³¹ and from intermediary markets to which the producers themselves brought their goods.³² The merchants either sold the goods they bought from the source on the spot to speculators, or brought them to the city to sell them to exporters at higher prices.

Sometimes the merchants continued buying from local markets until a large enough cargo was collected to be sent to the city-port for export abroad. Collecting such a cargo could, however, be a slow, piecemeal process liable to be affected by the considerable variation in the prices on the market so that it could be risky to accept a large order from Europe. Therefore, the tendency was to sell the goods from the interior to different exporters in İzmir. In fact, there was a distinction between those merchants and agents who brought the goods from the interior to the city-port and those who exported them.³³ Whenever a merchant combined both activities and went himself to intermediate markets in the interior to purchase goods, such as figs, valonia, or cotton, he often sent an agent to more remote markets to complete the firm's purchases, the agent usually buying the goods from the local producers directly.³⁴ Sometimes Greek merchants acted as purchasing agents for Greek commercial houses based abroad, such as those based in Britain or elsewhere in the West.³⁵ These agents were sometimes independent Greek firms established in İzmir in their own right.³⁶ At other times they were single merchants working on a commission basis.

Very often Greek merchants were hired by Western firms based either in İzmir or abroad, especially towards the end of the century.³⁷ In particular, even when they were actually based in İzmir, British firms hired Greek merchants as their agents to trade in the interior to a far greater degree than any other western European nation. It should be remembered that British merchants seldom went into the interior. These agents' scale of operations could be quite large. For instance, in the late 1880s, the British firm of Messrs. Creswell of London was making very considerable purchases of sponges through their Greek agent.³⁸ It was usual for the agent to get up to one percent from his principal on anything purchased for him—and an equal amount from the seller.³⁹ The agent could also be a businessman who was of considerable standing in western Anatolia, active in other sectors besides trade, and who frequently had power of attorney over his client's concerns.⁴⁰

Large British firms sometimes nominated a Greek merchant as their Director of Interior Business, who then hired a network of sub-agents. The director was paid on a commission basis and the sub-agents were paid on a monthly salary by the British firm.⁴¹ Of course, British firms were not the only ones hiring Greeks as their agents or exporting goods to İzmir through Greek agents or correspondents. Other Western firms did so too.⁴² Although the Greeks were predominant in the field, there were also Armenian and Jewish agents in İzmir.⁴³ Moreover, there were Greek firms in Britain, based in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and other centers, which had very respectable British merchants as their representatives in İzmir.⁴⁴

Whether as agents of Western exporting houses or as importers, the Greeks themselves were particularly strong in the import trade. This was a sector dominated by a large number of small-scale businessmen, where local merchants were active and competition was intense. In fact, the eagerness of the many firms from the United States, Canada, Russia, India, and other places besides Western Europe to do business with the Ottoman market often led them to send goods to western Anatolia on credit, sometimes overestimating the credit-worthiness of their newly contracted correspondents.⁴⁵ Yet, the Levantine market was so competitive and demand for an agent so strong towards the end of the nineteenth century that any agent who offered a low commission, or other favorable terms, was bound to get business. Giving credit remained, moreover, an important way of doing business due to the chronic monetary shortage in the Ottoman economy. The British Consul in İzmir advocated doing a credit check on prospective agents through the British Chamber of Commerce in İzmir.⁴⁶ However, only one serious case of fraud is known from this period.⁴⁷

The British had difficulty bypassing this intricate web of Greek agents and brokers. For when Western houses based in İzmir tried to establish branches in the interior to deal directly with the producers and do away with local agents, they found that the mere establishment of such a branch raised prices on the spot. Moreover, their branch managers had neither the contacts nor the knowledge of how to deal with the locals.⁴⁸ This strengthened the position of the Greeks, especially in the importation of British goods into the Ottoman Empire. Hence, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, trade came increasingly into the hands of important, longstanding local Greek firms that had branches in Britain. The Greeks also proved to be more reliable than the agents sent into Anatolia by Western trading houses based in Austria, France, and Germany.⁴⁹ By the early

twentieth century, the import trade of İzmir was completely dominated by small-scale Greek importers.⁵⁰ Yet, it would be misleading to consider the Greeks as all-powerful and able to keep Western merchants out of any branch of trade, including the import trade. There existed Western entrepreneurs who carried out their commercial operations in the interior without Greek or other local intermediaries, by going there themselves or by employing other Westerners as their agents or managers. This was the case particularly in the export trade.

Besides working as agents, Greeks also acted as brokers for Western firms in the import and export trades. There was a hierarchy of such brokers, all with different titles according to their field of expertise and all paid at different rates. For instance, there were house brokers and street brokers; sales of imported goods were made by the house or merchant's broker to the street or buyer's broker.⁵¹ The top broker working for a firm could get as much as 2 percent per month on the value of the transactions he effected, while a lesser broker might be getting as little as 5 percent per year.⁵²

İzmir's export trade to Britain remained, on the whole, in the hands of a few large British firms, some of which used Greek agents to purchase these goods. Nevertheless, Greek merchants, trading on their own, remained active in all branches of the export trade: opium,⁵³ madder roots,⁵⁴ licorice roots,⁵⁵ olive oil,⁵⁶ wheat, barley,⁵⁷ and in other goods already mentioned, such as valonia and raisins. There were some Greek merchants in İzmir and its environs who traded with Britain through British firms established in the Anatolian city-port.⁵⁸ There were some Greek merchants in İzmir who sold goods to Britain directly.⁵⁹ Such operations could be speculative. By the early twentieth century, bank credit made it possible for a Greek merchant to expand his business, at the risk, however, of overextending himself. The merchant contracted crops and sold them in advance, in some cases before they were even produced. Some also used bank loans to buy more goods for export. The profit margin on each transaction was small and, therefore, one aimed to undertake as large a number of transactions as possible. However, even a slight fluctuation in the market price could mean heavy losses and financial ruin.⁶⁰

Western firms, disposing of considerable capital resources and operating on a large scale, aimed at dominating certain branches of the export trade but were constantly challenged by local Greek merchants, in particular, as the following example shows. A leading British firm in İzmir, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., established operations in western Anatolia in the 1850s using, apparently, Western personnel in its operations. Over the next twenty-five years or so, this firm

expanded its business in the Meander Valley, becoming the chief licorice root and paste exporter in the area. In order to get a firmer foothold in the trade, MacAndrews Forbes & Co. leased the ground (where licorice root grew naturally) from the owners and paid laborers (usually migrant) to dig the root out. The cost of leasing was offset by the very low prices paid to the diggers—the company paid 2 *paras* per *okka*, whereas their competitors paid 15. They were able to pay such low prices because, by leasing these lands in advance for a decade or so, they were in effect the sole purchasers.⁶¹

In the process, however, they faced serious competition from Greek dealers who did not have the same operational costs and were probably prepared to accept a lower margin of profit. In 1878, for instance, a Hellenic merchant named Varipatis disputed the tenancy rights of the British firm over a certain area near Söke (Sokia). As a result, a large quantity of licorice root was claimed by both parties and, according to MacAndrews Forbes & Co., sequestered by the Hellenic merchant. According to the latter, the goods had been duly purchased by offering a substantially higher price to the root diggers than MacAndrews Forbes & Co. Varipatis was not the only competitor. During the previous years, MacAndrews Forbes & Co. had faced serious competition from petty Greek traders in Söke and Aydin who, by offering higher prices, induced villagers to sell to them licorice roots already leased by the British firm. Varipatis, who represented a company, was the strongest of these rivals, especially because of his European status.⁶² The British company's problems did not end there. A year later, two small rival manufacturers, by the names of Abajoglou and Seferiadi, who had been in business for quite a while, were creating enough competition for MacAndrews Forbes & Co. to ask them to join them. The offer evidently was not accepted, for several years later Abajoglou, in concert with a new rival, this time the German company of Simon & Co., once again disputed the British company's tenancy rights.⁶³ The British company survived the competition to emerge in the early twentieth century as tenants of considerable lands for the digging of root in western Anatolia. In areas where they were not dominant, they procured the root from leaseholders, who were contracted for their entire licorice crop to MacAndrews Forbes & Co. These leaseholders, who included Greeks backed by the powerful British company, were themselves monopolizing (on behalf of MacAndrews Forbes & Co.) the trade in licorice root and fought, with varying success, other Greek competitors who tried to lure away their tenants by offering them better prices.⁶⁴

Finally, in the new developments regarding business organization and financing of trade and other sectors that developed in early twentieth-century İzmir, the Greeks played an active, although not a leading, role. Western companies, disposing of considerable capital resources, led the way in the formation of liability companies and trusts. The Smyrna Fig Packers, Ltd. was an amalgamation of a large number of local and Western companies exporting figs from İzmir; this firm was formed with the purpose of decreasing the competition that was resulting in higher fig prices in İzmir than on the international market. It was the second British registered trust launched in İzmir and the first in the export trade. Greek firms were represented in it, although, interestingly enough, other Greek companies initially stayed out. The success of the trust, after its first twelve months of operation, led other companies, including Greek ones, to join it.⁶⁵

To conclude this section on Greek commercial organization, it should be stressed that, although Greeks predominated, they did not, at any time, monopolize the sector of trade and did not eliminate competition from Western and other local capital.

Shipping

Shipping, a sector complementary to trade, was another area in which the Greeks had been traditionally active. A series of events initially led the Greeks to lose their hold on the Mediterranean shipping trade.⁶⁶ These events included the onset of peace after the Napoleonic Wars, which put an end to piracy and privateering; the Greek War of Independence of 1821–28, which ravaged the Greek merchant marine; and technological changes in maritime transportation from sail to steam, which the Greeks found difficult to follow. By the second half of the century, however, they rebounded even though they continuously faced strong competition from Western shipping. Already from the 1840s and 1850s, Chiot entrepreneurs from İzmir, who had established family branches in London, were involved in shipping.⁶⁷

By the 1860s, a Greek shipping firm out of Liverpool, Papayanni Brothers, was doing considerable business in İzmir. They employed as their agent one of the most prestigious British mercantile houses in the city-port, the firm of Paterson.⁶⁸ It remained as one of the principal British-based Greek shipping companies until the early twentieth century.⁶⁹ In the 1890s, they had a fleet of nine Lloyd's-insured steamships.⁷⁰ Another Greek shipping company of equal capac-

ity at the time was the Pantaleon Oriental Navigation Company employing ten steamships. In the midst of the anti-Greek boycott of 1911, the owners of the shipping company applied to become a British limited-liability company, not only because its ships were remaining idle due to the boycott but also because they wished to expand the company's activities. Expansion would have been possible with an infusion of British capital, although the Pantaleons were to keep the larger portion of the company shares.⁷¹

The British consul, in support of the application, cited the good business reputation of the owners, the Pantaleons, as well as the owners' substantial fortune independent of the steamers. Its rival, the American Archipelago Steamship Company, a Syrian-owned company, had come under American protection in 1909, exchanging its Ottoman flag for the American one.⁷² There were also Greek shipping companies with Greek personnel and flying the Greek flag but which were financed by British capital,⁷³ carrying on a trade in British goods with the leading British houses in İzmir.⁷⁴

The carrying trade between İzmir and the islands and along the western Anatolian coast,⁷⁵ as well as with Greece,⁷⁶ was largely in Greek hands. Although the number of ships involved was considerable, their tonnage was very small. Usually, they carried the Ottoman or the Hellenic flag.⁷⁷ During the time of the anti-Greek boycott, Greek coastal shipping suffered considerably, but so did the western Anatolian coastal area and the islands.⁷⁸ It was probably due to the tenacity of Greek shipping and trade that the anti-Greek boycott, in the end, apparently affected Turkish more than Greek economic interests:

It was the shipping that suffered most openly, but most of the boycotted lines of navigation have since established profitable services elsewhere: while Greek merchants were but little affected, as they either found means of trading through others or changed their nationality to Austrian or Italian. Within the last year Greek tonnage itself increased⁷⁹

Greeks were also active in the lighter trade,⁸⁰ easing the congestion of traffic in the harbor of İzmir. In the early twentieth century, the Smyrna Lightermen's and Barge Owners' Company, Ltd. was formed, following a growing trend of setting up limited liability companies in İzmir and registering them in London. Its directors were all well-known İzmir men connected with local shipping.⁸¹ Greeks were also involved in shipping as agents on behalf of Western shipping lines

operating in İzmir.⁸² Although there had always been Greeks employed as agents for Western insurance firms⁸³ operating in İzmir⁸⁴ and elsewhere on the western Anatolian coast and the Aegean Islands, by the early twentieth century, they were markedly improving their position in this trade-related sector, too.⁸⁵ By 1921, there were four Greek insurance companies listed in İzmir, all originating in Greece and having branches in the city-port.⁸⁶

Mining

Greeks were also engaged in mining, a sector not as closely related to trade as shipping. They were active in finding, mining, and exporting minerals from western Anatolia, particularly emery and chrome, the two most important minerals mined in the area. As early as 1862, before mining got under way on a large scale, a Greek entrepreneur had acquired from the Ottoman government "the sole and exclusive privilege of shipping and exporting emery stone" from extensive areas in western Anatolia, which he subsequently sold to a major British mining concern owned by the house of Paterson.⁸⁷ Greek entrepreneurs also mined other minerals such as lignite, manganese, antimony, zinc, and silver lead. Although their scale of operations did not equal that of the "giants" in western Anatolian mining, the British houses of E. Abbott and D. & E. Paterson, which dominated the sector, the Greek mining enterprises disposed of considerable capital resources.⁸⁸ Such an entrepreneur was Manopoulos, who, besides working a lignite mine, built an 8 km-long railway to transport the coal to the nearest port of shipment and set up the machinery necessary for turning coal into transferable units. He also owned or operated, either in partnership or on his own, several other mines in the area.⁸⁹

Co-ownership of mines was typical in this sector. Greeks frequently co-owned mines with other Greek, Turkish, or Western entrepreneurs.⁹⁰ The high degree of Turkish co-ownership, not only with Greeks but also with Westerners, raises the question of its authenticity. Although several such partnerships may have been genuine, the many difficulties experienced by entrepreneurs—Westerners and locals alike—with the government bureaucracy, from the time they discovered a mineral deposit until they acquired the concession to exploit it on a permanent basis may have made such co-ownership the expedient policy to facilitate the acquisition of such a concession.⁹¹ Mining, like trade, was an intensely competitive sector with the tendency, by

the early twentieth century, of forming trusts. In 1900, some Greek emery mine owners contracted their entire output in advance to an American emery trust, only to be induced subsequently to sell to another purchaser, who offered them a higher price.⁹² A decade later, this American trust joined its assets with some of Abbott's as well as with another British entrepreneur, forming an even stronger trust, Abbott's Emery Mines, Ltd.⁹³ Greeks were mostly involved as clients of such mining cartels rather than as organizers.

Commercial Agriculture

Besides mining and exporting minerals, Greeks were active in large-scale landownership and in producing goods for the international market.⁹⁴ Some of the most successful Greek entrepreneurial families, such as the Baltazzi⁹⁵ or the Amira,⁹⁶ as well as some British consular officials of Greek origin, were amongst the largest local landowners.⁹⁷ There were also Greek entrepreneurs cultivating medium-scale land holdings.⁹⁸ On the whole, commercial agriculture on a large scale was not as widespread as was Greek participation in trade. However, the same can be said of Western entrepreneurs among whom few were owners of large estates.⁹⁹ One reason for this was the lower rate of return in landowning compared to that of other economic sectors. Another factor was continuous brigandage in the environs, which made security of property and the lives of such property holders particularly vulnerable.¹⁰⁰ In addition, even when they had European protection and enjoyed considerable economic standing, Greek landowners could at times still be obstructed from cultivating their lands by local Ottoman officials.¹⁰¹ The vulnerability of even medium-scale Greek landowners was evident during the periodic anti-Greek boycotts from 1909 to 1911. During this period Greek landowners became targets of local hostility on the part of boycott committees that were active in the environs of the city.¹⁰² Ultimately, as the British consul in İzmir warned British and British-protected merchants, landownership in western Anatolia could be an insecure and hazardous investment.¹⁰³

Banking and Finance

The worsening condition of Ottoman finances during the nineteenth century led to the state selling an increasing number of tithes

and other dues as tax-farms, for increasingly greater amounts of money to Ottoman administrators or private entrepreneurs—in fact, to whomever would offer the highest bid. Growing venality on the part of state authorities¹⁰⁴ enabled the purchasers of such tax-farms to collect ever-increasing amounts of money to be compensated for their initial capital outlay. The cultivators, who were usually the ones who had to pay, rarely had any other alternative but to submit to such increases. The only recourse, in fact, was the moneylender. Ironically enough, he was often also the tax-farmer, lending the peasants money so that the latter could pay the very tithes they owed him!¹⁰⁵

The cultivators were not the only ones who had to submit to growing tithes and other dues. Merchants, both foreign and Ottoman, often found themselves in the same position.¹⁰⁶ For instance, in the 1850s, the powerful mercantile and banking house of Baltazzi of Smyrna and Constantinople were tax-farmers for the customhouse of İzmir. Besides making large profits from the increasing volume of trade that passed through the city-port, they also wielded significant political power, which they used to promote their own economic interests. In agreement with the Ministry of Finance they found ways, time and again, to increase the customs' revenue. Neither the governor of İzmir nor the mercantile body of the city, Western merchants included, could succeed in eliminating such increases.¹⁰⁷

In addition, tax-farmers were well-versed in the complexities of the monetary system of the Ottoman Empire and knew how to take advantage of it in order to augment their profits from their tax-farm deals. For instance, when purchasing a tax-farm, they used their connections at the Porte and bribed the right officials, so that they could outbid offers made in cash and could pay the government in paper money, thus causing it to lose 25 percent from the deal. Moreover, by immediately reselling the tax-farm for cash, they made for themselves at least a 25 percent profit, in addition to any increase in the resale price.¹⁰⁸

Like moneylending, tax-farming in western Anatolia was practiced by western European,¹⁰⁹ as well as Ottoman Muslim¹¹⁰ and non-Muslim, entrepreneurs.¹¹¹ Abbott tax-farmed and lent money to the Ottoman government in the 1840s, whereas forty years later Mac-Andrews Forbes & Co. tax-farmed the dues in licorice as part of their commercial operations.¹¹² Nevertheless, extensive large-scale tax-farming, when it took place, was the near-preserve of Greeks and

Armenians. Greeks in İzmir worked closely with their compatriots in Istanbul, who usually financed these ventures or used their contacts with the Porte to see them through.¹¹³ The latter were active in the banking network of the metropolis, advancing short-term loans to the Ottoman government.¹¹⁴

Although it was the Greeks of Istanbul who were particularly active in lending to the government, İzmir Greeks also invested in speculative monetary activities such as arbitrage, money-changing, and moneylending. Profits from such activities were invested in trade and vice-versa. Such activities were the result of the monetary crises of the Ottoman economy. In fact, at least since the second half of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman economy had suffered from chronic monetary shortages, and an official monetary policy that led to frequent depreciations and to the weakening of its currency in the international exchange as well as inside the Ottoman Empire, with the result that foreign currencies circulated side by side with Ottoman currency in the large urban centers of the empire. Not as merchants, but as arbitrageurs and money-changers, the Greeks turned to their advantage the fluctuations in the rate of exchange of the Ottoman currency, as well as the differences in the value of local currencies that circulated in different parts of the empire, lending money or collecting debts in the currency that was most favorable to them at any particular time.¹¹⁵ They also speculated on the varying rates of bills of exchange made out in different foreign currencies.

The Greeks were also very active in banking. In the early 1860s, a small number of Chiots in İzmir tried to set up a merchant-banking operation, working on behalf of a number of mercantile houses in the city-port. One of their aims was to alleviate seasonal specie shortages, which were most acute during the first half of the year when most purchases were made and İzmir's exports had not yet reached the market. They thus bought paper money on three to four weekly installments, reselling them at a profit and charging a 1/4 percent brokerage commission on the transaction.¹¹⁶ It was not until quite late in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, that credit became available, particularly for the businessman, through an organized banking system.¹¹⁷ In fact, banks in İzmir eventually got to the point of advancing money to entrepreneurs without collateral security. Such a "liberal" practice did not bring about the collapse of the banking system, not even at a time of grave financial crisis, such as that of the

Balkan Wars, which the İzmir bankers were able to weather particularly well given the circumstances.¹¹⁸ Certainly the extension and relative generalization of the credit system greatly aided merchants and other businessmen alike.¹¹⁹

By contrast, credit was not as generally available in the interior,¹²⁰ where it failed to alleviate monetary shortages. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, small-scale cultivators (including Greek cultivators) suffered from extremely usurious interest rates and from the double exploitation of the tax-collector-cum-money lender.¹²¹ The need for adequate security made it difficult for them to get credit from banks. This situation was not much changed with the establishment of the Agricultural Bank, even though it had been set up with the explicit aim of helping the producers and for which purpose 2 percent per annum was apparently levied on all agricultural produce. For the cultivator, the result was to continue borrowing money at interest rates varying from 20 to 60 percent.¹²² Those peasants who were lucky enough to get a loan from the Agricultural Bank but had subsequently defaulted in their payments saw their property mortgaged to the bank being sold for sums exceeding the debt, though the surplus was apparently never given to them.¹²³

Greeks, like other entrepreneurs with cash took advantage of the situation. The Greeks of İzmir also remained actively involved in the banking networks of the city-port throughout the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. In 1889, of the forty private bankers listed in İzmir, two-thirds were Greeks.¹²⁴ The same ratio emerges from the lists of bankers and money-changers in the city during the years 1904 to 1905.¹²⁵ Moreover, out of five banks listed in İzmir in 1904 to 1905, two were Greek—the Bank of Athens and the Bank of Mytilēnē.¹²⁶ In 1921, out of a total of nine banks in the city, three were owned, in full or in part, by Greek capital: the National Bank of Greece, the Bank of the Orient, and the Bank of Athens. The Bank of Piræus also had a representative in İzmir. Furthermore, many of the management positions in all the city's banks, including non-Greek banks, were held by Greeks.¹²⁷

Light Industry

Traditionally, İzmir was a city of international trade and banking and thus occupied a major position in these sectors of the empire's

economy from at least the middle of the eighteenth century. However, by the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, as the economy of the city-port became further integrated into the world economy and increasingly modernized¹²⁸ and its internal market considerably expanded,¹²⁹ a sector of light industry grew, mainly food-processing and textiles, catering primarily to the domestic market. It exported part of its surplus to the islands in the Aegean and to western Anatolia. There was a considerable output from the textile mills making yarns for carpets, bath towels, shawls, socks, underclothing, and bed covers, which mainly supplied the lower end of the domestic market.¹³⁰ Despite competition from cheap British imports, factories for spinning and weaving cotton and woollen cloth in such traditional textile centers like Manisa and in the islands in the Aegean increased in number in the early twentieth century. The Greeks were particularly active in this sector, dominating these local textile centers.¹³¹ Hellenic and Ottoman Greek-owned cotton-spinning factories were also extending their operations in the city.¹³² Nevertheless, Western capital also played an especially important role in this sector. There were British-owned dye works, dyeing British-imported yarns.¹³³ The chief cotton-spinning factory was the Belgian *Compagnie Industrielle de Filature et de Tissage du Levant*, which produced one-third of the total local demand.¹³⁴

On the eve of the Balkan Wars, an anonymous Ottoman company registered in the empire was formed: the *Société Anonyme Ottomane de Manufacture du Coton*, which was considered an offshoot of the Amalgamated Oriental Carpets Manufacturing Company, Ltd., a British trust.¹³⁵ The latter company dominated the carpet industry.¹³⁶ İzmir served as the center for the carpet industry in the Ottoman Empire, although the industry was increasingly organized and run by Western entrepreneurs, particularly British.¹³⁷ As most of the carpet industry was still organized on a putting-out system, the Greeks, along with other local Muslim and non-Muslim entrepreneurs, acted as agents in the interior for Western firms. They were in charge of the manufacture and remittance of carpets to İzmir on behalf of their principals.¹³⁸

The milling industry was foremost in the food-processing industry of İzmir. Its steam flour mills had up-to-date machinery, organized in either the British or the French systems and by the early twentieth century had converted İzmir from an importer into an exporter of a considerable surplus of flour to the islands in the Aegean and to the

Asia Minor coast.¹³⁹ Greeks were especially prominent in this sector. In 1921, nine out of ten flour mills in İzmir were owned by Greeks.¹⁴⁰ They were also active in the confectionary industry and in the making of cardboard and wooden boxes for the export of dried fruit, figs, and raisins. They also owned the majority of soap factories in İzmir. Mytilene had an important soap industry. They were also dominant in the part of the wine industry that catered to the domestic market. The Samos Wine Company, Ltd. was a partly Greek company registered in Britain and had considerable capital resources at its disposal.¹⁴¹ There were also 20 Greek concerns active in the tannery sector and in extracting olive oil from olive pits. Two out of the three ice factories in İzmir were owned by Greeks, the third ice factory being American.¹⁴² Although Greek participation in this sector was considerable, light industry, with the exception of carpet making, never attained the economic importance of trade and banking in İzmir. Yet, it is important to recognize Greek participation in the light industrial and mining sectors, for it shows that Greek entrepreneurs did not engage exclusively in trade and monetary speculative activities, but diversified their investment and economic practices, presumably financing them with profits from their other, more traditional activities and were thus capable of responding to new economic opportunities as these emerged in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

There were certain sectors where Western capital and technological know-how were dominant, despite the existence of some local capital, such as the building of infrastructure—from the laying of railways in the interior of western Anatolia to the construction of the quay in the harbor of İzmir.¹⁴³ Another such sector was public utilities, funded principally by British, French, German, and Belgian capital. The city was lit by gas supplied by a British company, while its tramway system was controlled by a Belgian company. By the early twentieth century, British and French companies were undertaking surveys for the canalization of rivers and land irrigation in the principal valleys in the city's hinterland. Electricity and telephones were installed in the environs of İzmir by British firms.¹⁴⁴

As further evidence of the Greeks' considerable economic and social standing in the city, however, we should cite their high degree of participation in the professions. A half to two-thirds of all the lawyers and half the doctors of the city were Greek, with the numbers

growing as both the community and the city grew.¹⁴⁵ Greeks were prominent in the legal profession. Greek lawyers not only handled legal disputes involving Greeks, but also suits among Europeans as well as among other Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim.¹⁴⁶

Finally, the Greeks of İzmir enjoyed certain demographic advantages over other communities, including the Ottomans, in the city. As the second half of the nineteenth century progressed, the number of Greeks both in the city itself and in its environs¹⁴⁷ increased as people from other areas of the empire, as well as from the Greek state, migrated to İzmir.

We can conclude, therefore, that Greeks participated in a large number of sectors of the city's economy, and their economic activities were diversified, demonstrating an economic predominance probably exceeding their relative demographic strength.¹⁴⁸ They were important in trade, particularly the import trade, which was a traditional sphere of activity for them, and in coastal shipping, and were equally prominent in banking, tax-farming, and other speculative monetary activities, thus continuing a pattern of economic activity they had started in the eighteenth century. But they also responded successfully to new economic opportunities. Their activities in the mining and light industrial sectors and their participation in the formation of limited-liability companies testify to this. Right until the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, the Greeks of İzmir remained not only an economically vibrant and dynamic community, but one that continued to grow economically.

NOTES

1. Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 108; *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London: 1890), vol. 77, Commercial Report for 1889 (Smyrna), p. 2.

2. Elena Frangakis, "The Ottoman Port of İzmir in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 1695-1820," *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 39 (1985): 149-62.

3. For example, Public Record Office, FO 195/1990, C. Whittall & Co., İzmir, 4 Aug. 1897 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir. Henceforth, this archive will be cited as PRO. See also, PRO, FO 195/1990, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 5 Aug. 1897 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

4. Archives Nationales de France, AE Bi 1053, Consul Peyssonnel, Mémoire, İzmir, 22 Nov. 1751. Henceforth this archive will be cited as ANF. See also, ANF, AE Biii 243, Felix de Beaujour, Inspection Générale du Levant, İzmir, 5 June 1817.

5. Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "Greek Mercantile Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1780-1820," *Balkan Studies* 28 (1987): 73-86.

6. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, CCC, vol. 35, Importation et Exportation de Smyrne, 1817-1820. Henceforth, this archive will be cited as AMAE. See also, AMAE, CCC, vol. 42, for 1828; and AMAE, CCC, vol. 43, for 1832.

7. For example, PRO, FO 195/128, Vice-Consul Charnaud, 18 May 1838 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/128, G. Glenzo, İzmir, 19 Oct. 1839 to Consul Brant, İzmir; FO 78/442, Consul Brant, İzmir, 21 Jan. 1841 to Foreign Office, London. Henceforth, the Foreign Office will be cited as FO.

8. Elena Frangakis-Syrett, "The Implementation of the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention on İzmir's Trade: European and Minority Merchants," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 7 (Spring 1992): 91-112.

9. Salgur Kaççal, "La conquête du marché ottoman par le capitalisme industriel concurrentiel (1838-1881)," in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont & P. Dumont, eds., *Économie et Sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman (fin du XVIII^e-début du XX^e siècle)* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983), pp. 360-66.

10. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1899), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1893-97 (Smyrna), pp. 10-11; *ibid.* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 9; *ibid.* (London, 1913), vol. 73, Annual Series Report for 1912 (Constantinople), pp. 8-9.

11. PRO, FO 83/395, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 28 Dec. 1872 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

12. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912-13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911-1912 (Smyrna), pp. 12-13.

13. *Hēmerologion kai Hodēgos tēs Smyrnēs . . . 1890* [Commercial Yearbook for Smyrna and the Surrounding Towns and Islands, 1890] (Alexandria, 1889), pp. 237-42.

14. *Indicateur Commercial de Smyrne, 1904-1905* (Smyrna, 1905), pp. 107-113.

15. In the late nineteenth century, Greeks made up approximately half the population of the city of İzmir, which was well over 200,000 people. PRO, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 21 Nov. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

16. *Indicateur*, pp. 88-89, 93-94; *Commercial Yearbook*, p. 261.

17. ANF, AE Bi 1053, Consul Peyssonnel, Mémoire, İzmir, 22 Nov. 1751.

18. *Hellēnikos Hodēgos* [Greek (Commercial) Guide] (Athens, 1921), p. 65. Despite its title, it contains information on all the communities.

19. PRO, FO 83/111, British Commercial Houses in Smyrna, Consul Brant, İzmir, 8 Dec. 1848.

20. *Indicateur*, pp. 132, 133; *Commercial Guide*, p. 17.

21. Mikes Syriotēs, "Ho Oikos tōn Adelfōn Rallē" [The (Commercial) House of Ralli Bros.], *Chiaka Chronika* 1 (1911): 101-110; and S.D. Chapman, "The International Contribution to British Commerce, 1800-1860," *The Jour-*

nal of European Economic History 6 (Spring, 1977): 36–39. See also, D. Man-kriōtēs, “Hē Paroikia tou Londinou: Dēmographia” [The Greek Community of London: Demography], *Ta Historika* 3 (December 1986): 350–52; *Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping* (London, 1888), p. xxx.

22. K. Amantos, “Hoi Argenti tēs Chiou” [The Argenti of Chios], *Chiaka Chronika* 4 (1919): 106–119; see also, Henry Baird, *Modern Greece: A Narrative of a Residence and Travel in that Country* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1856), p. 16.

23. PRO, FO 626/16/679, R. Hadkinson, İzmir, 19 Nov. 1891 to Consul Holmwood, İzmir: on the estate of C.D. Christodoulo; see also, *Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping* (London, 1888), p. 298.

24. A. Syngros, *Apomnēoneumata* [Memoirs] (Athens: Typographeion Hestia, 1908), p. 21.

25. PRO, FO 195/1009, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 10 Jan. 1872 to British Ambassador, İstanbul.

26. For example, The Anglo-Greek house of Tamvaco based in Istanbul and London, with branches in Bursa and agents in Anatolia. PRO, FO 78/1398, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 1 Dec. 1858 to FO, London and FO 78/1686, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 10 Feb. 1862 to FO, London.

27. Such a family were the Baltazzi of İzmir and Istanbul, who were active in trading, banking, and tax-farming in both these cities. PRO, FO 195/241, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 25 Aug. 1843 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/527, British merchants, İzmir, 2 July 1857 to Consul Blunt, İzmir, and FO 195/610, Consul Brant, İzmir, 10 Aug. 1858 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

28. PRO, FO 195/1620, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 26 Oct. 1888 to Vice-Consul Anamissaki, Chios.

29. PRO, FO 195/1990, Consul Rougon, İzmir, 30 June 1897 to French Ambassador, İstanbul.

30. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1900), vol. 107, Annual Series Report for 1897–1899 (Smyrna), p. 13.

31. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 10–11.

32. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1902), vol. 110, Annual Series Report for 1901 (Smyrna), p. 4; see also, PRO, FO 78/490, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 5 Feb. 1842 to FO, London.

33. *Indicateur*, p. 119.

34. PRO, FO 195/720, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 4 Nov. 1862 to British Ambassador, İstanbul.

35. PRO, FO 195/1009, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 10 Jan. 1872 to British Ambassador, İstanbul; see also, *Indicateur*, p. 119.

36. PRO, FO 195/1075, Zantopoulo & Ghisi, İzmir, 15 July 1875 to Acting Consul Jolly, İzmir.

37. PRO, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 29 Jan. 1890 to British Ambassador, İstanbul and FO 78/1020, FO, London, 8 May 1854 to Consul Brant, İzmir; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1904), vol. 101, Annual Series Report for 1902–3 (Smyrna), p. 6.

38. PRO, FO 195/1620, Vice-Consul Billiotti, Rhodes, 9 Oct. 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

39. PRO, FO 626/17/1760, J. Honischer vs. G. Aperio case, H.M. Consular Court at Smyrna, 17 March 1895.

40. Such was the case with the Greek businessman Amira, under Russian protection, who owned considerable land in western Anatolia, a soap factory in Mytilene, dealt in olive oil and wheat, and lent money. He also looked after all the concerns of ex-Vice-Consul Werry in Izmir. PRO, FO 195/389, Vice-Consul Grenville Murray, Mytilene, 6 Nov. 1853 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

41. PRO, FO 195/1161, Hadkinson, Merrylees & Co., İzmir, 11 July 1878 to Consul Reade, İzmir; see also, FO 195/1161, Consul Reade, İzmir, 14 Sept. 1878 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and FO 195/1161, Hadkinson, Merrylees & Co., İzmir, 26 Sept. 1878 to Consul Reade, İzmir.

42. AMAE, NS, vol. 480, Ministry of Commerce, Paris, 4 Nov. 1905 to Foreign Minister, Paris.

43. Armenians acted as agents in western Anatolia for firms based in Britain. PRO, FO 78/1398, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 1 Dec. 1858 to FO, London. Armenians also acted as importers of British textiles into the Ottoman Empire, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1899), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1893-97 (Constantinople), pp. 10-11 and *ibid.* (London, 1913), vol. 63, Annual Series Report for 1912 (Constantinople), pp. 8-9.

44. PRO, FO 195/720, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 15 Nov. 1862 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

45. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1904), vol. 101, Annual Series Report for 1902-3 (Smyrna), pp. 5-6; see also, FO 195/2331, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 15 March 1909 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; and FO 195/2383 Consul Barnham, İzmir, 31 Oct. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

46. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1909), vol. 98, Annual Series Report for 1908 (Smyrna), p. 12.

47. They were apparently an Armenian group of fraudulent shippers called *Bande Noire*, sending rubbish instead of Ottoman goods to their unsuspecting customers. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 22. They were eventually caught and imprisoned by the authorities. PRO, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 28 Nov. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1914), vol. 95, Annual Series Report for 1912-13 (Smyrna), p. 17.

48. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1902), vol. 110, Annual Series Report for 1901 (Smyrna), p. 4; see also, *ibid.* (London, 1890), vol. 77, Annual Series Report for 1889 (Smyrna), p. 15.

49. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1900), vol. 107, Annual Series Report for 1897-99 (Smyrna), pp. 12-13.

50. PRO, FO 195/2331, Consul Heathcote-Smith, İzmir, 2 Sept. 1909 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, Orhan Kurmuş, "The Role of

British Capital in the Economic Development of Western Anatolia, 1850–1913,” Ph.D. diss., London University, 1974, pp. 253–54; Reşat Kasaba, “Was there a Comprador Bourgeoisie in Mid-Nineteenth Century Western Anatolia?” *Review* 11 (1988): 217–25 and Alkis Panayotopoulos, “The Greeks of Asia Minor, 1908–1912. A Social and Political Analysis,” D. Phil. diss., Oxford University 1983, p. 73.

51. *Parliamentary Papers, Tariffs* (London, 1843), vol. 2, p. 98.

52. PRO, FO 195/758, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 11 Sept. 1863 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

53. PRO, FO 195/720, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 4 Nov. 1862 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

54. PRO, FO 195/610, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 31 March 1858 to Charles Aleson, Esq., Istanbul.

55. PRO, FO 195/2090, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 20 June 1900 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir.

56. PRO, FO 195/389, Vice-Consul Grenville Murray, Mytilene, 6 Nov. 1853 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

57. PRO, FO 626/16/679, the estate of the late C.D. Christodoulo, İzmir, 19 Nov. 1891.

58. PRO, FO 195/910, Cadoux for MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 21 March 1868 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir.

59. PRO, FO 195/610, Consul Blunt, Istanbul, 31 March 1858 to Charles Aleson, Esq., Istanbul.

60. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 10–11.

61. For example, PRO, FO 195/1161, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., Söke, 29 Jan. 1878 to Consul Reade, İzmir; FO 195/1620, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 10 July 1888 to Consul Barnham, İzmir.

62. PRO, FO 195/1161, Consul Reade, İzmir, 11 Oct. 1878 to Hamdi Paşa, Governor General of the vilayet of Aydın; see also, FO 195/1161, Consul Reade, İzmir, 9 Nov. 1878 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

63. PRO, FO 195/1547, Consul Dennis, İzmir, 17, 21 & 30 Dec. 1886 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1620 Consul Dennis, 24 March 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1620, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 10 July 1888 to Consul Barnham, İzmir.

64. PRO, FO 195/2090, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 14 April 1900 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/2090, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 24 Oct. 1900 to British Ambassador, Istanbul. In the early twentieth century, the company became American: MacAndrews and Forbes of New York. It continued its operations in much the same way.

65. National Archives, Washington, D.C. RG 84, U.S. Legation, Consular Letters Received Series, vol. 18, U.S. Consul General Horton, İzmir, 14 Feb. 1912 to U.S. Ambassador, Istanbul. Henceforth, this archive will be cited as NA.

66. AMAE, CCC, vol. 8, Consul David, “Mémoire,” Chios, 1823; see also, G.V. Leon, “The Greek Merchant Marine (1453–1850),” in S.A. Papadopoulos, ed., *The Greek Merchant Marine* (Athens: National Bank of Greece, 1972), passim.

67. For example, *Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping* (London 1846), pp. xxvi–xxviii, xxx, xxxvii; *ibid.* (London 1859), pp. xiv, xliii–xlvii.

68. PRO, FO 195/720, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 15 Nov. 1862 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

69. PRO, FO 195/1009, Shipping Agents, İzmir, 1 Feb. 1893 to the customs authorities and *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1900), vol. 107, Annual Series Report for 1897–99 (Smyrna), p. 17.

70. *Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping* (London 1896–97), p. 146.

71. PRO, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 30 March 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

72. *Ibid.*

73. PRO, FO 195/2383, British Ambassador, Istanbul, 23 Jan. 1911 to Consul Barnham, İzmir.

74. PRO, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 7 June 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

75. PRO, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 21 Nov. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 30 March 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

76. In the early twentieth century, there were three principal Greek shipping companies in İzmir operating a total of ten different shipping routes covering the northern part of the eastern Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea ports and Trieste. *Indicateur*, pp. 47–48.

77. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1883), vol. 72, Annual Series Report for 1877–1881 (Smyrna), pp. 1040–41.

78. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 4; see also, *ibid.* (London, 1912–13), vol. C, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), p. 5.

79. PRO, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 28 Nov. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

80. PRO, FO 195/2090, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 14 April 1900 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

81. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), p. 8.

82. PRO, FO 195/1009, Shipping agents, İzmir, 1 Feb. 1893 to Consul Holmwood, İzmir.

83. *Indicateur*, pp. 53–56; *Commercial Guide*, pp. 33–35.

84. It was a lucrative sector for Western capital, as seen by the proliferation of insurance companies despite, apparently, acts of incendiarism. PRO, FO 195/1808, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 20 Jan. and 16 March 1893 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

85. For example, FO 78/1760, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 26 Dec. 1863 to Foreign Office, London; FO 195/1808, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 20 Jan. and 16 March 1893 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/2158, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 16 March 1903 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/2209, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 28 Nov. 1905 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

86. *Commercial Guide*, pp. 33–35.

87. PRO, FO 195/720, Paterson, İzmir, 9 Dec. 1862 to Consul Blunt, İzmir.
88. PRO, FO 195/2134, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 31 May 1902 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
89. PRO, FO 195/2134, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 31 May 1902 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, Table A, List of Mines worked under Firmans, Jan. 1902 and Table B, List of Mines worked under Permis de Recherches, Jan. 1902.
90. *Ibid.*; see also, PRO, FO 195/2090, D.C. & E.W. Paterson, İzmir, 10 Sept. 1900 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir.
91. PRO, FO 195/2134, Table A, List of Mines worked under Firmans, Jan. 1902 and Table B, List of Mines worked under Permis de Recherches, Jan. 1902.
92. PRO, FO 195/2090, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 14 April 1900 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
93. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912-13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911-12 (Smyrna), p. 11; see also, Kurmuş, "The role of British capital," pp. 228-30.
94. PRO, FO 195/2090, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 22 June 1900 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir; see also, FO 195/2383, British Ambassador, Istanbul, 5 March 1911 to Consul Barnham, İzmir; FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 31 Oct. and 16 Dec. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
95. PRO, FO 195/758, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 25 April 1863 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1620, Acting Consul Barnham, İzmir, 30 Oct. 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 20 Dec. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
96. PRO, FO 195/389, Vice-Consul Grenville Murray, Mytilene, 6 Nov. 1853 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1620, MacAndrews Forbes & Co., İzmir, 10 July 1888 to Consul Barnham, İzmir.
97. PRO, FO 195/1620, Acting Consul Barnham, İzmir, 3 Oct. 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1620, Vice-Consul Eliopoulos, Ayvalık, 8 Oct. 1888 to Acting Consul Barnham, İzmir and FO 195/1990, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 28 Sept. and 26 Oct. 1897 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
98. PRO, FO 195/2383, Acting Consul Heathcote-Smith, İzmir, 20 Sept. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
99. PRO, FO 195/910, Barker, attorney for Novelli & Co., İzmir, 27 April 1868 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir; see also, FO 195/1009 Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 8 March 1873 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.
100. PRO, FO 195/389, British & Ionian merchants, İzmir, 9 Dec. 1851 to Consul Brant, İzmir; see also, FO 195/2090, British Vice-Consul, Administrative and Economic Report, Rhodes, 31 March 1900 and Vice-Consul Eliopoulos, Administrative and Economic Report, Ayvalık, 31 March 1900.
101. PRO, FO 195/1620, Acting Consul Barnham, İzmir, 3 Oct. 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 4 Nov. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/1990, Vice-Con-

sul Eliopoulos, Ayvalık, 17 Dec. 1896 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir and FO 195/2299, British Ambassador, Istanbul, 1 Feb. 1908 to Acting Consul Heathcote-Smith, İzmir.

102. PRO, FO 195/2383, Vice-Consul Hadkinson, Mytilene, 11 April 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 15 April 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and Acting Consul Heathcote-Smith, İzmir, 6 Sept. and 20 Sept. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

103. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1890), vol. 77, p. 10; Annual Series Report for 1889 (Smyrna), p. 10; see also, PRO, FO 195/2090, Vice-Consul Eliopoulos, Administrative & Economic Report, 31 March 1900.

104. PRO, FO 195/389, Wilkin, İzmir, 15 Nov. 1852 to Consul Brant, İzmir.

105. PRO, FO 195/241, J.A. Werry, İzmir, July 1845 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, PRO, FO 83/395, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 28 Dec. 1872 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and PRO, ZHC 1/2043, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, Feb.-Aug. 1877), vol. 92, Conditions of Christians in Turkey, p. 97.

106. PRO, FO 195/1620, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 26 May 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

107. PRO, FO 195/350, Consul Brant, İzmir, 2 March 1851 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, FO 195/527, British Merchants, İzmir, 2 July 1857 to Consul Blunt, İzmir; FO 195/177, Consul Brant, İzmir, 30 Oct. 1840 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and FO 195/610, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 10 Aug. 1858 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

108. PRO, FO 195/447, Consul Brant, İzmir, 14 Sept. 1854 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, AMAE, CCC, vol. 49, Consul Pichon, İzmir, 6 July 1854 to French Chargé d'Affaires, Istanbul.

109. PRO, FO 195/527, Calvert, Antalya, 13 March 1857 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

110. PRO, FO 78/612, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 5 April 1845 to Foreign Office, London; see also, FO 195/720, Consul Blunt, Istanbul, 30 June 1862 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

111. PRO, FO 195/1075, J. Boyarizzi, İzmir, 14 July 1876 to Acting Consul Jolly, İzmir.

112. PRO, FO 83/111, British Commercial Houses Abroad, 1842 and 1848; and FO 195/1620, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 17 May & 28 June 1888 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

113. PRO, FO 195/350, Historique de l'affaire de Glenzo, Istanbul, 8 April 1851.

114. Haris Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850-1881" Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1986, pp. 116-30, passim.

115. PRO, FO 78/1398, Consul Sandison, Bursa, 1 Dec. 1858 to Foreign Office, London; see also, Reşat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 78-83.

116. Lewis Farley, *The Resources of Turkey: With Special Reference to the Profitable Investment of Capital in the Ottoman Empire* (London: Longman, 1862), p. 81.
117. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1902), vol. 110, Annual Series Report for 1901 (Smyrna), p. 4.
118. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1914), vol. 95, Annual Series Report for 1912–13 (Smyrna), p. 15.
119. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 10–11.
120. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1902), vol. 110, Annual Series Report for 1901 (Smyrna), p. 4.
121. PRO, FO 83/395, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 28 Dec. 1871 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, p. 75.
122. PRO, FO 195/2090, Vice-Consul Eliopoulos, Ayvalik, Administrative and Economic Report, March 1900; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), pp. 18–19.
123. PRO, FO 195/2090, Consular Agent Crindiropoulos, Administrative and Economic Report, Vourla, March 1900.
124. *Commercial Yearbook*, p. 259.
125. *Commercial Guide*, pp. 60–61, 78–80.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 60; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–3), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), p. 17.
127. *Commercial Guide*, pp. 26–27.
128. For example, PRO, FO 195/883, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 18 Oct. and 13 Dec. 1867 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/910, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 18 Jan. 1868 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 195/910, James Whittall, İzmir, 16 Jan. 1868 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir and *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 14–15.
129. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1883), vol. 73, Annual Series Report for 1877–81 (Smyrna), p. 1069; see also, *ibid.* (London 1886), vol. 86, Annual Series Report for 1882–85 (Smyrna), p. 5 and *ibid.* (London, 1890), vol. 77, Annual Series Report for 1889 (Smyrna), p. 2.
130. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1908), vol. 116, Annual Series Report for 1906 (Smyrna), p. 9.
131. PRO, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 21 Nov. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 19.
132. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1904), vol. 101, Annual Series Report for 1902–3 (Smyrna), p. 4.
133. For example, PRO, FO 195/2209, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 3 Feb. 1905 to Chargé d'Affaires, Istanbul; *ibid.*, Hadkinson, Mytilene, 25 March 1905 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir; FO 195/2299, British Ambassador, Istanbul, 12 June 1908 to Consul Heathcote-Smith, İzmir; *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1909), vol. 98, Annual Series Report for 1908 (Smyrna), p. 9; and PRO, FO 195/2331, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 31

March 1909 to British Ambassador, Istanbul and *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1920), vol. 43, General Report on the Trade and Economic Conditions of Turkey for the year 1919, pp. 40–42.

134. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1909), vol. 98, Annual Series Report for 1908 (Smyrna), p. 9; see also, *ibid.* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 19.

135. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 11, 13.

136. The Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Company, Ltd. was initially a joint-stock company established in the Ottoman Empire in 1907 by British and other capital. (PRO, FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 30 Jan. and 13 April 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.) The company was based in the vilayet of Aydın with a continuously expanding range of operations and newly established branches all over Anatolia. (FO 195/2383, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 28 Oct. 1911 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.) It apparently employed a very large number of weavers, and a sizeable number of workers in its factories. (FO 195/2383, British Chamber of Commerce, İzmir, 12 Dec. 1911 to Consul Barnham, İzmir.) Its capital of £500,000 in 1911 doubled in just a year to £1,000,000 thus making it the largest company in İzmir in terms of capital resources. By then, it was no longer a limited company but an amalgamation of several firms previously engaged in the same kind of business. See *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 11. It should also be noted that British preponderance in the carpet industry was a fairly recent phenomenon. See *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1904), vol. 101, Annual Series Report for 1901–3 (Smyrna), p. 7.

137. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1920), vol. 93, Report on the Trade of Turkey, p. 41–43; see also, Edmond Dutemple, *En Turquie d'Asie* (Paris: G. Charpentier, 1883), p. 223; Donald Quataert, "Machine Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia, 1860–1908," *Journal of Social History* 19 (Spring, 1986): 476–78; Issawi, *The Economic History*, pp. 306–7 and Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (London, New York: Methuen, 1981), pp. 211–12.

138. For example, PRO, FO 195/2134, W. Griffith & Co., İzmir, 3 Dec. 1902 to Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir; FO 195/2331, Consul Barnham, İzmir, 27 April 1909 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

139. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1908), vol. 116, Annual Series Report for 1906 (Smyrna), p. 9.

140. *Commercial Guide*, p. 7; on Greek-owned flour mills, see *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1920), vol. 43, Report on the Trade of Turkey, p. 40.

141. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1914), vol. 95, Annual Series Report for 1912–13 (Smyrna), p. 15.

142. *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1910), vol. 103, Annual Series Report for 1909 (Smyrna), p. 19; see also, *ibid.* (London, 1920), vol. 43, Report on the Trade of Turkey, p. 40 and *Commercial Guide*, p. 7.

143. For example, PRO, FO 195/883, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 13 Dec. 1867 to British Ambassador, Istanbul; FO 78/2255, General Manager,

The Ottoman Railway Company, İzmir, 14 Sept. and 8 Oct. 1868 to the Directors, The Ottoman Railway Company, London; Pierre Oberling, "The Quays of İzmir," in H. Batu & J. L. Bacqué-Grammont, eds., *L'Empire Ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France* (Istanbul-Paris: ISIS Yayıncılık, 1980), pp. 315–25 and İskender Gökalp, "Réflexions sur les origines du réseau ferroviaire en Asie Mineure," *Actes du II Colloque International d'Histoire* (Athens: Centre de recherches neohelleniques, Fondation nationale de la recherche scientifique, 1985)," vol. 2, pp. 357–75.

144. PRO, FO 78/1760, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 31 Aug. 1863 to Foreign Office, London; see also, *Parliamentary Papers, Accounts & Papers* (London, 1912–13), vol. 100, Annual Series Report for 1911–12 (Smyrna), pp. 14–15 and *ibid.* (London, 1914), vol. 95, Annual Series Report for 1912–13 (Smyrna), p. 17.

145. *Indicateur*, pp. 56–59, 103–5; *Commercial Yearbook*, pp. 235–36; *Commercial Guide*, pp. 43, 46.

146. PRO, FO 195/1009, Consul Cumberbatch, İzmir, 19 Sept. 1874 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

147. In 1890 there were approximately 300,000 Greeks in the vilayet of Aydın exclusive of over 100,000 Greeks in İzmir. PRO, FO 195/1693, Consul Holmwood, İzmir, 21 Nov. 1890 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

148. PRO, FO 195/758, Consul Blunt, İzmir, 23 June 1863 to British Ambassador, Istanbul.

II

The Greek Census of Anatolia and Thrace (1910–1912): A Contribution to Ottoman Historical Demography

ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS

THE ECONOMIC AND cultural flourishing of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century, has recently been the object of notable scholarly research. Various aspects of the manifold contributions of the Greeks to the development of the multinational Ottoman state have come to light¹ as more research centers, like the Center for Asia Minor Studies in Athens, seek to promote the study of the Greek presence in Ottoman Anatolia.² Indeed the Greek presence, both in Anatolia and the Balkans, was so marked that some scholars have gone so far as to argue that the Greeks, far from being an ethnoreligious minority group, were one of the two founding peoples of the Ottoman Empire.³ Though debatable, such theories reflect the importance of Ottoman Greeks and reaffirm the powerful position within the Empire attained by the *Millet-i Rum* at the turn of the twentieth century.

While scholarly interest so far has centered around cultural, economic, ethnological, and religious aspects of Greek activity, research on the demography of the Ottoman Greek millet has been lacking. As a result, most studies on the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire depend on obsolete statistical data published mainly between 1919 and 1922; these data are tainted by the intense Greek-Turkish national antagonisms in the aftermath of World War I.⁴ In contrast, an important new trend in Ottoman Turkish studies focuses on the historical demography of the empire as a whole.

A number of Turkish and American scholars have attempted in

recent years to reconstruct the evolution of the population in various parts and provinces of the empire. The importance of these studies lies in the new documentation they bring to light from the generally inaccessible, at least to Greek scholars, Ottoman archives.⁵ Through such authoritative studies as Kemal Karpat's *Ottoman Population 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Ottoman census data, particularly of the post-1880s period, attained considerable respectability, reversing, to a large extent, the hitherto widely held view regarding the unreliability of Ottoman population records.⁶

In this way, it is possible to document the historical demography of more recent times, especially of the nineteenth century, on the basis of official Ottoman censuses and other population registers. However, the perspectives of the scholars, as well as the types of sources used, tend to detract from the rigorous demographic analysis expected in such studies. As a consequence, we observe a general trend to overestimate the Turkish population at the expense of other ethnic communities in the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Ottoman demographic studies produced valuable results in determining the size of the Ottoman Muslim population, though they proved less trustworthy in calculating the exact proportion of non-Muslim communities. This tends to be even more pronounced in demographic studies regarding politically more sensitive times, especially the period of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, extending roughly from 1878 to 1920.

In the case of Ottoman Greeks, the difficulty inherent in any attempt to determine numbers is primarily connected with the tendency of these populations to avoid registering with Muslim civil authorities. Thus, even after the establishment of the Hamidian compulsory system of registration between 1881 and 1882, there is strong evidence indicating that the Greek community used records to show numbers as low as possible so as to avoid military service and minimize its tax burden.⁷ Reluctance to register is illustrated by the fact that as late as the 1920s only some 30,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks had registered with the civil authorities and had received their Ottoman identity cards. The vexing question of the *établissements* of 1923 and 1924 should be chiefly attributed to the nonregistration of some 70,000 Istanbul Greeks with Ottoman officials.⁸ If this is the case for the Ottoman capital where the official registration system was supposed to have yielded the best results, one can imagine its success in registering the Greeks of the sparsely populated Orthodox villages of the Pontic Alps or those of the overwhelmingly Greek coastal towns and villages of the Çeşme Peninsula.

At any rate, in 1909 the Young Turk administration publicly acknowledged the inability of civil authorities to get Ottoman Greeks to register. In an attempt to justify the striking underrepresentation of the Ottoman Greek element in the Young Turk parliament after the elections of 1908, the Sublime Porte stressed that a large number of Greeks were not allowed to vote because they had never registered as Ottoman citizens or applied for a *tezkire* (identity card).⁹

In considering Ottoman society, we must keep in mind that the Ottoman population was made up of a multitude of largely self-administered ethnoreligious groups, each one living in distinct communities, using—though not necessarily exclusively—its own language, while exhibiting its own traits and jealously preserving its own individuality and ideals. It is because of this idiosyncrasy of Ottoman society that historians studying the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire must consult the records of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of local dioceses, now kept at the patriarchal archives at the Phanar. These include substantial collections of population data from every Anatolian and Balkan Orthodox diocese, since, in accordance with the millet system, it was with the patriarchal authorities rather than with the civil government that Ottoman Greeks registered every birth, marriage, divorce, death, and change of domicile (parish).

The Greeks remained strongly attached to the millet system and reacted vehemently to any attempt by the Sublime Porte to curtail their traditional privileges, some dating back to the fifteenth century. For example, in the early 1880s, when the centralizing policies of the Hamidian regime affected millet privileges, the popular Ecumenical Patriarch Iōakeim III resigned in protest. The rift between the Porte and the Phanar culminated in November 1890 when patriarchal authorities resorted to the extreme measure of closing all Greek Orthodox churches in Istanbul. This dramatic manifestation of protest attracted international attention, forcing Sultan Abdülhamid II to issue a proclamation restoring the traditional rights and privileges of the Greek millet.¹⁰ Likewise, despite the more rigorous efforts and ethnocultural policies of standardization pursued by the Young Turks, the millet system survived almost intact until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Within this sociopolitical context and primarily because of practical administrative, judicial, and fiscal considerations, patriarchal authorities maintained population records. The first concerted attempt by the Phanar to gather standardized population data on its entire Ottoman Greek flock appears to have taken place in 1891, soon

after the resolution of the millet question. A patriarchal encyclical instructed all Greek Orthodox dioceses to adopt a uniform registration system updating the already existing parish registers. The same encyclical stressed that the population registers would be available not only to the patriarchal authorities but also to the competent Ottoman government offices as well as to insurance companies.¹¹ Accordingly, Greek Orthodox parish authorities throughout the empire provided population data on Ottoman Greeks to Ottoman government authorities for purposes of census-taking, military conscription, sanitary administration, taxation, food, and relief distribution.

The fact that we still do not have scientifically rigorous demographic analyses based on Ottoman Greek sources has prompted a number of leading Ottoman social historians to question the very existence of such sources. Thus, Karpas maintained that "the birth, death, and marriage registers supposedly kept by some Ottoman non-Muslim communities, to my knowledge, have never been unearthed."¹² Another scholar, in his determination to prove that "there were in fact no usable population records for the Ottoman Empire other than the Ottoman records," contended that "common sense should indicate to any researcher the unlikelihood of any army of Greek census-takers running across Anatolia and Thrace, counting all the inhabitants."¹³

Yet, the archives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the historical archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry provide substantial evidence that between 1910 and 1912 Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, in close cooperation with the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities in Anatolia and Thrace, carried out a detailed census of the Ottoman Greek population. These data were first presented in the *Deltio* [Bulletin] of the Center for Asia Minor Studies in 1986.¹⁴ Evidence of a major Greek statistical source, independent of the official Ottoman censuses and *sâlnâmes* (yearbooks), could gradually lead to a reappraisal of an earlier thesis advanced by scholars on Ottoman demography that "there were no usable population records for the Ottoman Empire other than the Ottoman records."¹⁵ In fact, the Greek census of 1910–12 and its wider relevance to the historical demography of the Near East is the subject of a recent study by G. Tenekidēs.¹⁶

Until very recently, the data from the 1910–12 census were scattered in various files, under different titles and varying dates. Most of the documents were placed in the files for the years 1919–20. It

was during this period that the yields of the census were carefully consulted by Premier Eleutherios Venizelos and his close associates and publicists D. Kalapothakēs, Geōrgios Sōtēriadēs, Leon Maccas, and D. N. Botzaris.¹⁷ The first attempt by the Greek government to obtain reliable statistical records on the Ottoman Greek Orthodox took place during the premiership of Stephanos Dragoumēs, and it appears to have been prompted by the striking underrepresentation of the Greek element in the Ottoman Parliament following the November-December 1908 Young Turk elections (only 23 Greeks managed to get elected to the 288-member House). In view of the ensuing debate over the proportional representation of the communities in the Ottoman Parliament, the government in Athens, in close agreement with the Phanar, decided to determine the exact size of the Ottoman Greek community. Further, with the introduction of compulsory military service for non-Muslim citizens of the empire by the Young Turks, the Athens government had an additional interest in determining the size of the Greek presence in the Ottoman army.

In 1910, Foreign Affairs Minister D. Kallergēs instructed all Greek consular authorities in Anatolia and the Balkans to conduct a detailed census of Ottoman Greek nationals throughout the empire. The census was to be conducted in close cooperation with Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities in every district. Thus, mixed committees formed by consular employees and clerics would visit every single Greek or mixed village in Anatolia and Thrace and get in touch with local notables, priests, doctors, and teachers, who in turn would furnish them with relevant statistical materials. For the determination of the non-Greek population, the minister suggested basing their data either on local information or on the Turkish *sâlnâmes*. Above all, Kallergēs stressed the sensitive nature of the undertaking and instructed them to discharge their task as discreetly as possible.¹⁸

In another note dated July 1910, the consul general in Istanbul, Kōnstantinos Kypraios, was instructed to form a central committee that was to direct and coordinate the whole enterprise. Soon thereafter, Kypraios organized a team of experts that included a number of Ottoman Greeks who had previously served in the Ottoman civil service.¹⁹

Meanwhile, responding favorably to an invitation by the Athens government to assist in the conduct of the census, the Ecumenical Patriarchate instructed its dioceses in Anatolia and in the Balkans to furnish the census-takers with the necessary local records and statis-

tical data. To make sure that Greek census-takers would obtain from the local clergy the required data, representatives of Phanar were also included in the census central committee.²⁰

Eventually, the census was taken on the basis of the following questionnaire.²¹

1. What is the name of the town or village that you inhabit?
2. To which *kazâ* does it belong?
3. How many inhabitants does it have (men, women, children)?
4. How many Greek Orthodox are registered with the ecclesiastical authorities?
5. How many Turks reside in your town or village?
6. How many Armenians?
7. How many Jews?
8. How many of other nationalities?
9. What language do the Greek residents speak?
10. How many Greek Orthodox churches, chapels, and monasteries do you have in your town or village?
11. How many Orthodox priests do you have?
12. How many of them are educated?
13. How many boys schools do you have in your town or village?
14. How many girls schools?
15. How many classes does each of them have?
16. What is the number of teachers employed in each of them?
17. What is the expenditure of the schools in your town or village?
18. How many missionary schools do you have in your district?
19. How many Greeks study in missionary schools?
20. How many Turkish schools do you have in your town or village?
21. How many Greeks study in them?
22. What other additional information can you give us?

The Patriarchate distributed the questionnaire to all the heads of the Greek Orthodox dioceses in Anatolia and the Balkans. Table I shows 38 dioceses covering a major part of the Anatolian peninsula and roughly modern-day Turkish and Greek Thrace, extending over nine *vilâyets* and three independent *sancaks*. It can be therefore argued that the Greek census of 1910–12 was a full-scale survey of almost the entire Greek Orthodox population of Anatolia and Thrace. Table II shows the 14 Greek diplomatic and consular missions participating in the census-taking.

A new boost to the Greek census effort was given by Eleutherios Venizelos, who became prime minister in November 1910. In a tele-

TABLE I

Greek Orthodox Dioceses of Asia Minor and Thrace Instructed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to Assist the Greek Consular Authorities in the Census of 1910–1912

Constantinople	(Istanbul)	Philadelphiea	(Alaşehir)
Chalcedon	(Kadıköy)	Nicomedia	(İzmit)
Derkos	(Terkos/Tarabya)	Dardanelles	(Çanakkale)
Sylviria	(Silivri)	Imvros	(Gökçeada)
Metrai	(Çatalca)	Smyrna	(İzmir)
Adrianople	(Edirne)	Krēnē	(Çeşme)
Hērakleia	(Marmara Ereğlisi)	Ephesus	(Efes/Selçuk)
Ainos	(Enez)	Thyateira	(Akhisar)
Vizya	(Vize)	Hēlioupolis	(Aydın)
Tyroloi	(Çorlu)	Ikonio	(Konya)
Ganos	(Şarköy)	Caesarea	(Kayseri)
Myriophyto	(Mürefte)	Pisidia	(Antalya)
Saranta Ekklesiēs	(Kırklareli)	Angora	(Ankara)
Lititsi	(Ortaköy)	Trebizond	(Trabzon)
Prousa	(Bursa)	Amaseia	(Amasya/Samsun)
Nicaea	(İznik)	Rodopolis	(Maçka/Cevizlik)
Cyzicus	(Erdek)	Chaldeia	(Gümüşhane)
Kydōniai	(Ayvalık)	Neocaesarea	(Niksar)
Proikonēsos	(Marmara Adası)	Kolōnia	(Şebinkarahisar)

*The census extended to the rest of the Balkan vilâyets of the empire (Epirus, Northern Epirus, Macedonia, Greek and Bulgarian Thrace, as well as Ottoman-held Aegean Islands), but its results are not included in this study.

TABLE II

Greek Authorities in Anatolia and Thrace Participating in the Census of 1910–1912

Greek Embassy Constantinople / Istanbul
Greek Consulate General Smyrna / İzmir
Greek Consulate Trebizond / Trabzon
Greek Consulate Adrianople / Edirne
Greek Consulate Kydōniai / Ayvalık
Greek Consulate Ikonio / Konya
Greek Vice Consulate Amisoss / Samsun
Greek Vice Consulate Prousa / Bursa
Greek Vice Consulate Raïdestos / Tekfurdağı
Greek Vice Consulate Saranta Ekklesiēs / Kırkkilise
Greek Vice Consulate Hellēspontos / Çanakkale
Greek Vice Consulate Vrioula / Urla
Greek Vice Consulate Magnēsia / Manisa
Greek Vice Consulate Attaleia / Antalya

gram dispatched to all Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, Foreign Minister Iōannēs Gryparēs underlined the importance of expediting the census for Greece's national interests. These interests, he explained, necessitated the acquisition of accurate figures concerning the real strength of the Ottoman Greek element throughout the empire, since any future Greek policy towards the Sublime Porte would be based on the findings of this census.²²

The task proved, however, to be colossal. A series of consular reports reveals details on the difficulties encountered in carrying out the census, including the suspicious attitude of Greek Orthodox ecclesiastic authorities. There was widespread fear that the Ottoman administration might get hold of the records and use them as evidence to increase taxation and impose an army draft on Ottoman Greeks. Thus, the consul in İzmir complained that the notables of the Greek villages in the area of Menteşe refused to cooperate with the consular or ecclesiastic authorities.²³ Others, like the consuls of Konya and Ayvalık, complained about the indifferent attitude adopted by some of the senior clergy in their districts.²⁴

The vastness of the area under the jurisdiction of the few Greek consuls in Anatolia and the Balkans added to these difficulties. It is clear that almost no consul was able to furnish statistical material on any but the Ottoman Greek population. In calculating the numbers of non-Greeks, the more enterprising consuls relied exclusively on contemporary sâlnâmes, while the overwhelming majority did not include in their reports any information on the other millets. Predictably, the census concentrated solely on Ottoman Greeks and has no practical value in determining the other racial, linguistic, or religious groups of the empire.

From consular reports accompanying the statistical data, some fairly large population movements of Ottoman Greeks can be detected, reflecting the broader social and economic trends in the Empire at the close of the nineteenth century. Thus, the Greek consul of Konya pointed to the large-scale migration of Cappadocian Greeks towards the big coastal urban centers such as Samsun, Adana, İzmir, and Istanbul. For instance, of the 320 Greek families in Phlaviana-Zincidere, 80 were made up of women and children, whereas their men had settled in coastal cities. Other purely Greek villages, such as Molon of the kazâ of Kayseri, were totally abandoned in the 1890s. Yet, the Greek consul of Samsun mentions the crucial role played by the Turkophone Cappadocian Greek entrepreneurs in transforming the port into the main commercial center of the Ottoman Black Sea

coast.²⁵ Unlike the sancak of Canık, neighboring Trabzon experienced a decline in its Greek population at the turn of the century. A migratory trend of the Black Sea Greeks towards the Caucasus and other parts of Tzarist Russia affected mainly the Pontus Greek mining communities; originating from the region of Gümüşhâne, they could be found as far west as the village of Karatepe in the kazâ of İzmit and Yaşlıgeçit of Adapazarı. Another interesting development was the transfer of a number of historical seats of Greek Orthodox dioceses to the now-flourishing urban centers. Thus, in İzmir and its suburbs, there were the seats of three archbishops, those of Smyrna, Ephesus, and Krênē. The archbishop of İkonio had left Konya and settled almost permanently in the commercial town of Niğde, whereas most of the Pontic bishops had moved their seats to the coastal towns of the Black Sea.²⁶

Another interesting aspect of the census is the valuable information that it provides on such matters as the numbers of churches and schools, as well as the language or dialects employed by the Greek Orthodox population in every single Anatolian and Thracian city, town, or village. A study of the documents reveals, for instance, a very high number of Turkophone Greek Orthodox villages not only in central Anatolia but also in regions close to the Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean coasts.

Finally, by the end of 1912, Athens was able to obtain a full-fledged statistical report on the Greek population and ecclesiastical institutions. As may be seen in Table III, the Greek population of nine vilâyets and three independent sancaks amounted to 2,008,402 people. This census did not include the Ottoman Greeks of southeastern (Adana-İskenderun) and eastern (Erzurum) Anatolia, who belonged to the Patriarchate of Antioch.

Partial overlap of Ottoman administrative divisions and Greek Orthodox archepiscopal boundaries makes it difficult to compare the results of the 1910-12 census with data in Ottoman archives. This is particularly so because a large number of Thracian and Anatolian village names were altered after the Kemalist revolution. In Table III, an attempt is made to place this new picture in a comparative perspective by juxtaposing the data of the 1910-12 census, on the one hand, against the Ottoman population returns of 1914 as provided by Karpat,²⁷ and, on the other, against the population figures advanced by spokesmen for Greek claims in Anatolia and Thrace at the end of World War I.²⁸ Ottoman population returns of 1914 cited by Karpat put the Anatolian and Thracian Greek population at 1.5 mil-

TABLE III
Total Population Figures for the Greeks
of Anatolia and Thrace

Vilâyets	Greek Census 1910-1912	Karpāt (1914)	Sötēriādēs
Istanbul			
(Constantinople)*	378,605	242,171	64,459
Edirne (Adrianople)**	290,690	200,012	265,515
Hüdavendigâr (Prousa)	262,319	184,424	278,421
Konya (Ikonio)	74,539	65,054	66,895
Trabzon (Trebizond)	298,183	260,313	353,533
Ankara (Angora)	85,242	77,530	66,194
Aydın	495,936	319,019	622,810
Kastamonu	24,349	26,104	24,937
Sivas	74,632	75,324	99,376
İzmit (Nicomedia)	52,742	40,048	73,134
Biga (Dardanelles)	31,165	8,541	32,830
	2,068,402	1,498,540	1,948,104

*Includes the independent sancak of Çatalca.

**Roughly the section of the vilâyet that forms part of modern Turkey.

lion people—half a million less than the yields of the 1910-12 Greek census. In contrast, the population figures on which Greek claims were based after 1918, as presented by Sötēriādēs, appear to be inflated by nearly 250,000 people.

Western Anatolia

The greatest concentration of Greeks in Anatolia was to be found in the western and northwestern coastal regions of the peninsula, from the Sea of Marmara to Kerme Gulf, extending inland along the riverine valleys of western Anatolia. The ancient, densely populated Greek settlements on the littoral were reinforced even further over the course of the nineteenth century by migration from the Aegean Islands, the Peloponnese, and continental Greece. Moreover, the influx of Greek settlers was not confined to seashore towns such as İzmir and Ayvalık, but extended into the fertile hinterland, especially to such towns as Manisa, Aydın, and Akşehir. Curiously, the migration

process was strengthened after the creation of the independent Greek state in the early 1830s.

This phenomenon was closely connected with the economic development experienced by major Ottoman seaports after the Balta Limanı Trade Agreement signed in 1838 between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. This agreement coupled with the proclamation of Hatt-ı Şerîf of Gülhâne in November 1839 provided the impetus for an unprecedented Greek economic expansion, with İzmir as its metropolis and the coastal and inland cities of the region as its epicenter. The Greek-led economic boom expanded to the interior with the construction of the Aydın and Kasaba railways in the late 1860s. The development of the port cities created needs in manpower, and, accordingly, Anatolian Greeks, often from Karamanlı Turkophone villages of the interior, migrated to the flourishing urban centers from the 1860s onwards. This affected significantly the linguistic behavior of many rural migrants, who on the whole were natives of Karamanlı villages. Thus, in a report from İzmir, the Greek consul general pointed out that in the overwhelming Hellenic environment of the city, Turkophone Greek Orthodox migrants gradually adopted Greek as their main language of communication.²⁹

The Ottoman administrative division of western and north-western Anatolia comprised two provinces, the vilâyets of Aydın and Hüdâvendigâr, and two independent subprovinces, the sancaks of İzmit and Biga. However, the boundaries of the Greek Orthodox ecclesiastical dioceses were not identical with the Ottoman provincial units. Only in broad terms, therefore, did the Ottoman administrative units of the region correspond to the Greek Orthodox dioceses given in Table IV. While the archbishop of Smyrna had the overall supervision of the census from the ecclesiastic viewpoint, the Greek consular authorities of İzmir, Ayvalık, Bursa, Çanakkale, Urla, and Manisa participated in the census of 1910–12. The task of coordinating the census effort throughout the entire region was assumed by the Greek Consulate General in İzmir, the most important Hellenic consular authority in Ottoman Anatolia.³⁰

In an effort to compile uniform statistical data, the Consulate General of Greece in İzmir developed a standardized registration form based on the Foreign Affairs Ministry questionnaire of 21 July 1910. With the approval of Athens, Consul General Xenophôn Stelakēs dispatched the forms to the dioceses of Smyrna, Ephesus, Hēlioupolis,

TABLE IV

**Greek Orthodox Dioceses Belonging to Ottoman
Vilâyets Participating in the Census of 1910–1912**

Vilâyet	Diocese
İSTANBUL	Constantinople
	Chalcedon
	Derkos
	Sylviria
	Metrai
EDİRNE	Adrianople
	Hērakleia
	Ainos
	Metrai
	Vizya
	Ganos
	Myriophyto
	Saranta Ekklēsies
BURSA	Lititsi
	Prousa
	Nicaea
	Cyzicus
	Kydōniai
	Proikonēsos
	Philadelpheia
İZMİT (independent sancak)	Nicomedia
	Nicaea
BİGA (independent sancak)	Dardanelles
	Imvros
AYDIN	Smyrna
	Krēnē
	Ephesus
	Philadelpheia
	Thyateira
	Hēlioupolis
	Kydōniai
KONYA	Ikonio
	Caesarea
	Philadelpheia
	Pisidia
ANKARA	Angora
	Caesarea
TRABZON	Trebizond
	Amaseia
	Rodopolis

TABLE IV (continued)

Vilâyet	Diocese
TRABZON (continued)	Chaldeia Neocaesarea Kolônia
KASTAMONU	Nicomedia Amaseia Angora
SİVAS	Amaseia Neocaesarea Kolônia Rodopolis Chaldeia

and Krēnē on 8 August 1911.³¹ By the beginning of 1912, the first set of completed population data from the dioceses of Hēlioupolis and Ephesus (section Vrioula-Urla) were received in Athens.³² Soon after, population records of the dioceses of Philadelphia, Krēnē (Çeşme Peninsula), and Annea (kazâ of Seferihisar-Sivrisarion) were compiled and dispatched through İzmir to the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry.³³ Concurrently, the consul general outlined the serious problems of communication within the vast area covered by the Greek vice-consul at Aydın. Stressing the divisions in Aydın between Greek Orthodox ecclesiastics and the lay leadership, he contended that a Greek consular agent would play a unifying role and would bring together the local elements.³⁴

The consul of Ayvalık, Marinos Sgouros, faced similar difficulties with the local religious dignitaries. Having sent to Athens the set of population records of his area of jurisdiction as early as November 1911, he needed almost another year to obtain from the bishop of Adramytti (Edremit) the additional comparative data he requested.³⁵ From his telegram to the Foreign Ministry on 22 May 1912, it becomes clear that the vice-consul of Bursa, S. Kōnstantinidēs, faced problems of cooperation with the archbishops of Prousa and Nicaea.³⁶

The population data so painstakingly gathered by Greek consular officers in western and northwestern Anatolia are given in Table V.

Central Anatolia

The second largest ethnographic entity of Asia Minor Hellenism was the Orthodox Christian population of the interior of the penin-

TABLE V

Greek Population in Western and Northwestern Anatolia: Census of 1910-1912			
1. VİLÂYET OF AYDIN			
Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
A. Manisa (Magnēsia)	22,455	E. İzmir/Karşıyaka)	
Kasaba	4,298	(Smyrna/Kordelio)	208,478
Salihli	1,722	Bergama	
Alaşehir (Philadelphēia)	3,170	(Pergamos/ Dikeli)	15,398
Kula	3,140	Menemen	6,994
Eşme	750	Urla (Vrioula)	38,082
Demirci	340	Çeşme (Krēnē)	34,555
Gördes	765	Foça (Phōkaia)	10,825
Karaağaç	2,984	Kuşadası	10,252
Soma	1,890	Seferihisar (Sivrisarion)	2,454
Akhisar (Thyateira)	9,306	Tire (Theirai)	5,000
Total, Manisa (Saruhan)	50,820	Bayındır	6,250
		Ödemiş	7,700
B. Aydın	18,782	Nif (Nymphaio)	5,039
Nazilli	6,800	Karaburun	9,765
Bozdoğan	29,519	Total, İzmir	360,792
Söke		Total, Vilâyet of Aydın	495,936
Çine			
Karacasu			
Total, Aydın	55,101		
C. Denizli	1,940	2. VİLÂYET OF HÜDAVENDİGÂR	
Tavas	—	Administrative	Greek
Çal	—	Districts	Census
Buldan	400	Sancaks	1910-1912
Sarayköy	2,273	A. Bursa (Prousa)	48,135
Garbikaraağaç	—	Gemlik (Kios)	8,657
Total, Denizli	4,613	Karacabey (Michalitsi)	10,739
D. Menteşe (Muğla)	3,305	Mudanya (Moudania)	16,003
Marmaris	730	Kirmasti (Kermastē)	1,215
Köyceğiz	900	Orhaneli	—
Fethiye	8,215	Uluabat (Apollōnias)	6,165
Bodrum	5,060	Total, Bursa	90,914
Milâs	6,400		
Total, Menteşe	24,610		

TABLE V (continued)

Greek Population in Western and Northwestern Anatolia: Census of 1910-1912			
2. VİLÂYET OF HÜDAVENDİGÂR (continued)		3. INDEPENDENT SANCAK OF İZMİT	
Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
B. Ertuğrul/ Bilecik	11,057	İzmit (Nicomedia)	6,010
Söğüt	2,316	Adapazarı	11,929
İnegöl	60	Karamürsel	6,370
Yenişehir	4,360	Kandıra	5,100
Total, Ertuğrul/Bilecik	17,793	Geyve	9,325
		Yalova	11,020
C. Kütahya (Kotyaion)	6,400	İzmit (Nicaea)	2,988
Gediz	1,352	Total, Sancak of İzmit	52,742
Uşak	2,500		
Simav	250		
Total, Kütahya	10,502		
D. Afyonkarahisar	164	4. INDEPENDENT SANCAK OF BİGA	
Dinar	387	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
Bolyadin/Sandıklı		Çanakkale (Dardanelles)	6,000
Aziziye	436	Ezine	11,250
Çivril	230	Ayvacak	2,673
Total, Afyonkarahisar	1,217	Bayramiç	1,400
E. Eskişehir	4,350	Biga	7,622
Total, Eskişehir	4,350	Lapseki (Lampsakos)	2,220
F. Balıkesir/Karesi } Balya	15,847	Total, Sancak of Biga	31,165
Edremit (Adramytti)	9,850		
Erdek (Artakē)/ Marmara (Proikonēsos)	48,485	Gökçeada (Imvros)	8,125
Ayvalık (Kydōniai)	45,925	Bozcaada (Tenedos)	3,752
Bandırma (Panormos)	10,405		
Burhaniye	3,461		
Sındırgı	850		
Gönen	2,700		
Total, Balıkesir/Karesi	137,523		
Total, Vilâyet of Hüdavendigâr	262,319		

sula. The population was dispersed over a vast geographic area enclosed by the great rivers of Anatolia: to the east of the fertile riverine valleys of the Aegean region, to the south of the rivers flowing into the Black Sea (Kızıl Irmak and Sakarya), and to the west of the region of the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates. Isolated by mountain ranges, deserts, and plateaux on all sides, bordering to the east on the vastness of the Asiatic continent, this region has its only outlets to the south, where the valleys of the Taurus Mountains and of the highlands along the Mediterranean coast provide throughways to the sea.

The area is a classic case of the strong impact of geography on collective life in Mediterranean society, as has been argued by Fernand Braudel.³⁷ In the hinterland of Anatolia, the presence, location, and natural formation of mountain masses influenced, to a considerable extent, the collective destiny of local populations. This is made plain by the survival of Christian populations from Byzantine times into the twentieth century in the isolation of the mountain valleys of central Anatolia. Thus, the natural features of the region turned it into a closed and self-contained world that preserved over time the essential characteristics of its society and culture.

In central and southern Anatolia, the Christian Orthodox presence in modern times was limited in numbers but historically significant and, ethnographically, uniquely interesting.³⁸ If the dense Greek settlements of the western regions of the peninsula had been, by and large, the product of relatively recent immigration, the sparse Orthodox communities of the interior Anatolia, Greek-speaking or Turkish speaking, constituted direct survivals from the medieval Byzantine presence in the region. The most incontrovertible sign of the Byzantine origin of the local population, especially in Cappadocia and Lycaonia, was offered by the highly peculiar Greek idioms spoken in some of those communities. These bore unmistakable resemblance to Medieval Greek, despite the heavy Turkish influence, especially in diction. Geographical isolation and the cutting off of these Christian communities to the east of the confrontation line between Byzantines and Turks in Anatolia during the centuries of Turkish conquest (eleventh to fifteenth) spared them the physical extinction or the cultural absorption through Islamization that had eliminated most of the medieval Christian population of the peninsula.³⁹

In the midst of the Muslim population, Christian subjects constituted a minority, which under the pressure of the conquest and of the exigencies of social survival had substituted Turkish for Greek as its

TABLE VI

Greek Population in Central Anatolia:
Census of 1910-1912

1. VİLÂYET OF KONYA		2. VİLÂYET OF ANKARA	
Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
A. Konya (Ikonio)	7,001	A. Ankara (Angora)	3,318
Akşehir	2,106	Beypazarı	
Beyşehir/Seydişehir	100	Haymana	
Ilgın	691	Nallıhan	
Bozkır	315	Yabanâbâd/Bâlâ	
Karaman	713	Total, Ankara	3,318
Ereğli	504	B. Çoruh	543
Koçhisar	50	İskilip	—
Total, Konya	11,480	Sungurlu	827
B. Burdur/Tefenni	3,105	Osmançık	961
Total, Burdur/Tefenni	3,105	Mecitözü	
C. Isparta (Sparta)	9,020	Total, Çoruh	2,331
Uluborlu	1,494	C. Kırşehir	195
Eğridir (Nēsion)	1,362	Keskin	3,071
Total, Isparta	11,876	Total, Kırşehir	3,266
D. Niğde (Nigdē)*	32,918	D. Yozgat	4,524
Bor (Poros)	1,747	Akdağmadeni	11,145
Total, Niğde	34,665	Boğazlıyan	1,337
E. Antalya (Attaleia)	7,150	Total, Yozgat	17,006
Elmalı	333	E. Kayseri (Caesarea)	18,093
Alanya (Alaia)	1,575	Develi	4,853
Akseki	1,119	İncesu	7,193
Kaş (Myra/Antimyra)		Bünyanihamid	1,114
Manavgat	2,012	Total, Kayseri	31,253
Finike (Phoinix)		F. Nevşehir (Neapolis)	10,200
Kalamaki	1,224	Ürgüp (Prokopi)	8,350
Total, Antalya	13,413	Aksaray	3,525
Total, Vilâyet of Konya	74,539	Ulukışla	5,993
		Total, Nevşehir	28,068
		Total, Vilâyet of Ankara	85,242

*The kazâ of Niğde included twenty-two Greek-Orthodox villages, some of them fairly large, e.g., Pherteki, Tanai, Telmissos, etc.

language. The adoption of the language of their conquerors by the subject people was a mechanism of survival through the partial integration of Turkish-speaking Christians into local society. The collective identity and the cultural particularity of the minority nevertheless was secured and preserved by the Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy became the hallmark of identity and the framework of collective consciousness. In the midst of that Turkophone Christian society there survived a few scattered and isolated linguistic islands, where Greek was preserved in the the local idioms. These islets of Greek language were located in Makrē and Leivision on the Lycian coast, in Syllē near Konya, in Lycaonia, and especially in thirty-two Grecophone out of the eighty-one Orthodox communities in Cappadocia.⁴⁰

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Greek Orthodox of central and southwestern Anatolia were under the civil jurisdiction of Konya and Ankara vilâyets, while ecclesiastically they fell in the administrative jurisdiction of the dioceses of Caesarea, Angora, Ikonio, and Pisidia. Within this large area, there were two Hellenic consulates located in Konya and Antalya. It was these two consulates, in cooperation with the ecclesiastic authorities, that compiled the population data of the region. This was by no means an easy task. As late as March 1912, K. Kypraios, Greek consul in Konya, warned that, due to the vastness of the region he was assigned to cover, population figures were, in many instances, based on data compiled by church authorities in 1909. He also pointed out that his communication with the archbishop of Ikonio was quite difficult since the see of the diocese was at Niğde,⁴¹ where the largest concentration of Greek Orthodox population in central Anatolia was to be found. His colleague at Antalya did not seem to encounter such difficulties, and, by 25 August 1911, he was able to dispatch the figures he compiled, in cooperation with the diocese of Pisidia.⁴² As indicated in Table VI, there were 159,781 Greek Orthodox in the dioceses of Ikonio, Pisidia, Caesarea, and Angora, corresponding roughly to the area under the Ottoman civil jurisdiction of the Konya and Ankara vilâyets.

Northern Anatolia

Pontic Greeks formed the third major ethnographic component of the Hellenic presence in Anatolia. With their vivid recollections of Byzantine splendor and their traditions of resistance, the Greeks of the Pontos occupied the northern region of the peninsula, extending from the mouth of the Sakarya River along the Black Sea coast to the

edge of the Caucasus. Pontic presence further inland in central Anatolia, especially in Cappadocia, was the product of the migration of mining communities from their base in the region of Gümüşhâne to other areas where their skills were in demand. Fortified by geographic isolation, Greek society in the Pontos managed to preserve its social cohesion and ethnic continuity. In the Pontos, the Ottoman conquest came late, and local Greek society remained intact and entrenched in its mountain strongholds. The most convincing evidence of its ethnological vigor was the preservation of its archaic language, a genuinely Greek, though highly idiomatic, dialect. The Pontos was the foremost area in which linguistic continuity uninterruptedly transmitted the ancient Hellenistic and Byzantine cultural heritage to its inhabitants.⁴³ Thus, Pontic Greek society preserved, to an even greater extent, the same features of Byzantine culture as the Greek-speaking villages of Cappadocia.⁴⁴

In its isolation and self-containment, Pontic society constituted a whole Greek world of its own, which, after meeting successfully the challenges of conquest and survival, capitalized on the economic opportunities of the nineteenth century and achieved remarkable material prosperity and cultural progress. The Greek population in the Pontos was primarily rural, living in the highlands, where the structure and cultural traditions of a closed, tightly-knit society sealed it off from the outside world.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the overland trade of the Middle East and Central Asia, which used the Pontic port cities as their terminal points prior to the opening of the Suez Canal, and the exploitation of the natural resources of the area contributed to economic and social changes that resulted in the creation of an important urban stratum in Pontic society, especially in such cities as Trabzon, Samsun, and Giresun. This group provided the leadership, which spearheaded the local nationalist movement and the abortive attempt to create the republic of the Pontos in 1919–22.⁴⁵ By the early 1910s, the main bulk of the Black Sea Orthodox population was concentrated in the Samsun region, with a heavy Greek presence throughout the coastal towns, from Sinop to Trabzon. In the Pontic interior, the mining districts of Gümüşhâne and Karahisar, or tobacco regions such as Bafra, were major Pontic-Greek centers.

Pontos was divided into the following six dioceses: Trebizond, Amaseia, Rodopolis, Chaldea, Neocaesarea, and Kolōnia. This area covered the entire vilâyet of Trabzon and parts of those of Sivas and Kastamonu. During the economic boom of the Black Sea ports during

TABLE VII

**Greek Population in Northern Anatolia:
Census of 1910-1912**

1. VİLÂYET OF TRABZON		2. VİLÂYET OF SİVAS	
Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
A. Trabzon (Trebizond)	25,816	A. Sivas*	
Ordu (Kotyora)	18,933	B. Amasya (Amaseia)**	24,844
Of (Ophi)	1,855	Havza	293
Akçaabat (Platania)	6,327	Köprü (Vezirköprü)	2,425
Tirebolu (Tripolis)	11,875	Gümüşhacıköy	—
Sürmene (Sourmena)	9,715	Mecidözü	—
Giresun (Kerasus)	30,950	Merzifon	675
Maçka (Rodopolis/Matsouka)	12,224	Lâdik	660
Total, Trabzon	117,695	Total, Amasya	28,897
B. Lâzistan (Rizous)	1,424	C. Tokat	10,862
Atina	287	Erbaa	—
Hopa	103	Zile	—
Total, Lazistan	1,814	Niksar (Neocaesarea)	4,901
C. Gümüşhane (Argyroupolis)		Reşadiye	993
Torul	60,529	Total, Tokat	16,756
Şiran		D. Karahisâr-ı Şarkî (Karahisar)	13,856
Kerkit		Alucra	601
Total, Gümüşhane	60,529	Mesudiye	6,984
D. Canik/Samsun (Sampsus/Amissos)	76,379	Suşehri	6,808
Ünye (Oinoë)	6,203	Koyulhisar	730
Bafra (Paphra)	27,414	Total, Karahisar	28,979
Fatsa	2,973	Total, Vilâyet of Sivas	74,632
Çarşamba	4,385		
Terme (Thermai)	791		
Total, Canik/Samsun	118,145		
Total, Vilâyet of Trabzon	298,183		

*Sancak of Sivas is not included in the Greek census.

**Villages of the entire district are given under the kazâ of Amasya. Statistical data collected by Greek vice-consul in Samsun Adamidēs in cooperation with the archdeacon of the Amaseia diocese.

TABLE VII (continued)

Greek Population in Northern Anatolia:
Census of 1910-1912

3. VİLÂYET OF KASTAMONU

Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910-1912
A. Kastamonu	2,009	C. Çankırı	1,003
İnebolu	3,125	Çerkes }	
Safranbolu	3,793	Total, Çankırı	1,003
Cide	233		
Tosya	599	D. Sinop (Sinōpē)	5,238
Total, Kastamonu	9,759	Ayancık	1,050
		Gerze	1,201
		Total, Sinop	7,489
B. Bolu	93	Total, Vilâyet of Kastamonu	24,349
Ereğli (Hērakleia)	3,500		
Düzce	570		
Devrek	235		
Zonguldak	1,700		
Total, Bolu	6,098		

the second half of the nineteenth century most of the inland Orthodox dioceses of Pontos transferred their seats to the flourishing commercial coastal towns. Thus, the diocese of Amaseia was established at Samsun, Neocaesarea moved from its historic see at Niksar to Ordu (Kotyora), Rodopolis from Maçka to Cevizlik, a suburb of Trabzon, while the bishop of Chaldea spent most of his time at his summer residence at Giresun. The metropolitan of Trebizond remained in his historic see, and only the landlocked diocese of Kolōnia continued to be at Şebinkarahisâr. Two Hellenic consulates located in Trabzon and Samsun assumed responsibility for the preparation of the census for the entire Black Sea region. Consul Selēniadēs (Trabzon) collaborated with the Trebizond, Rodopolis, and Kolōnia dioceses, while his colleague at Samsun, P. Adamidēs, prepared the census lists in cooperation with the bishops of Amaseia, Chaldea, and Neocaesarea.⁴⁶

The task of census-taking in the fiercely independent and geographically inaccessible Greek villages of the Pontic Alps presented almost insurmountable obstacles, while the census committees of the archbishopric of Trebizond found it extremely difficult to penetrate

and overcome the suspicions of the crypto-Christian Black Sea vilages. Nor was communication with Athens easy. Statistical data dispatched from Samsun to Greece by the Austrian postal services in January 1911 never reached their destination.⁴⁷ Thanks to the well-organized dioceses of Trebizond and Amaseia, however, the Greek government was able to receive detailed and reliable data on the Pontic Greeks,⁴⁸ though no conclusive figures on the actual crypto-Christian population were ever published.⁴⁹ Likewise, the Greek communities of Kars and Artvin were not included in the census, whereas villages of the interior, especially those of the dioceses of Neocaesarea and Kolōnia, were undercounted. The final figure for the entire Greek population of the Black Sea, according to the census of 1910–12, amounted, as illustrated in Table VII, to 397,164 persons (vilâyets of Trabzon, Sivas, and Kastamonu).

Greater Istanbul

The Greeks are one of the earliest ethnic groups to have inhabited the area of Constantinople. They alone can justifiably claim kinship with the original founders of the great metropolis of the Near East, who, in fact, colonized it as early as 658 B.C.E., when it was known as Byzantium (Vyzantion). Similarly, members of this community are considered as *Rōmioi* (Romans), the direct descendants of the citizens of classical Constantinople (or New Rome), the capital of the Byzantine Empire. With the appearance of the Turkish element, after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, one of history's most intensive cultural symbioses was inaugurated. Under Ottoman rule, Istanbul (Constantinople) became the center of a Muslim-Christian coexistence that lasted for over 500 years.

In accordance with the millet system, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was the center around which the spiritual, political, and social life of Ottoman Greeks converged. The Phanariot clerical and lay leadership set the pace of the highly developed corporate life of the entire Millet-i Rum through the Ottoman realm. A cohesive Greek entrepreneurial class of traders, industrialists, brokers, moneylenders, and commissioners appeared in Istanbul especially with the large influx of foreign capital to the Ottoman Empire during the post-1838 era. Greeks not only staffed the liberal professions but also formed, to a very large extent, the salaried middle class and the skilled urban

working force of the city. Through private donations of wealthy Constantinopolitan Greek philanthropists, a wide educational network was maintained in the Ottoman capital. Thus, by 1912, there were 105 schools (of which 10 offered high school and one higher religious education) with 15,000 students in Greater Istanbul, while the city boasted 26 literary-educational societies or associations (*sylogoi*) and numerous Grecophone newspapers and journals. Benefactors generously contributed to the foundation and maintenance of a sizable number of Greek pious establishments throughout the city, the single most important of which was Balıklı (Valoukli) Hospital, considered to be one of the most advanced hospitals in the Near East until the 1910s.

The impressive socioeconomic progress achieved by Constantinopolitan Greeks during the second half of the nineteenth century should be seen against the background of a steady demographic resurgence. The urbanization following the increase of trade and economic ties with Europe after 1838 produced a population shift from the rural interior towards the coastal towns. The censuses of 1844 and 1857, for instance, indicate that the majority of migrants in the Ottoman capital were non-Muslims. Significant Greek emigration to Istanbul originated not only from the Anatolian interior but also from Epirus, the Aegean Islands and even from the independent Hellenic Kingdom.⁵⁰

The main concentration of Greeks was to be found in the European commercial quarters of the city, namely, Beyoğlu (Pera), Tünel (Staurodromi), and Karaköy (Galata), whereas Greek tradespeople and laborers made up almost the entire population of the Kurtuluş (Tataula) sector. Across the Golden Horn, in the old sections of Istanbul, there was a densely occupied Greek area, the Fener (Phanar), clustered around the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriarchal Greek Lycée, the only educational institution dating back to the Byzantine era. Away on the seaward face there were the crowded districts of Samatya (Hypsomathion) and Kumkapı (Kontoskalion), with large concentrations of Karamanlı (Turkophone) Greeks. Outside the Byzantine walls, down the Marmara shore, through Bakırköy (Makrichōri) and Yeşilköy (San Stefano), to Lake Çekmece and the Çatalca lines, there were sizable Greek communities. Likewise, along the Bosphorus, the four greatest centers of population—Arnavutköy (Mega Reuma), Yeniköy (Neochōrion), Tarabya (Therapia) and Büyükdere (Vathiryax)—were inhabited by Greeks.

With regard to ecclesiastic affairs, the entire area from the Propontis to the Golden Horn, as well as the modern European sectors of the city, were administered by the dioceses of Constantinople (patriarchate) and Derkos. The Greek inhabitants of the Prince's Islands—Büyükađa (Prinkipos), Heybeliada (Chalkē), Burgazada (Antigonē), and Kınalıada (Prōtē)—fell under the jurisdiction of the diocese of Chalcedon, whose seat was at Kadıköy, along the Asiatic coast. But large Greek populations were to be found throughout the Asiatic suburbs as far as Pendik (Panteichion) and Kartal (Chartalimē). Table VIII shows the general picture of the Constantinopolitan Greek population in 1910–12.⁵¹

The population data for Greater Istanbul, compiled by two teams of expert Ottoman Greek civil servants (Skalierēs, Chamoudopoulos, Vaianos), clerics, parish and school board trustees and officials of the

TABLE VIII

Greek Population in the Vilâyet of Istanbul and the Independent Sancak of Çatalca: Census of 1910–1912

Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910–1912
Istanbul	66,443
Beyođlu (Pera-Galata-Tataula)	128,412
Bakırköy (Makrichōri) / Küçük Çekmece	4,870
Total	199,725
Üsküdar (Skoutari)	16,310
Adalar (Prince's Islands)	11,854
Kartal (Chartalimē)	16,600
Beykoz	2,500
Şile	8,500
Gebze	8,200
Total	63,964
Çatalca (Metrai) / Terkos (Derkos)	29,864
Büyük Çekmece	9,005
Silivri (Sylviria)	16,047
Total	54,916
Total, Vilâyet of Istanbul and Sancak of Çatalca	318,605

Greek Embassy, are comprehensive and reliable. Some 65,000 Constantinopolitan Greeks held Hellenic nationality and were registered with Greek consular authorities in Istanbul. The findings of the Greek census are particularly useful, since Istanbul Greeks were notorious for not registering with Ottoman civil authorities in order to avoid paying taxes and escape the Ottoman military service. Because of this nonregistration, many Istanbul Greeks did not possess identity cards and thus were not eligible to vote. Hence, they were able to send only two deputies to the Young Turk parliaments of 1908–14.

Finally, Table VIII comprises the independent Ottoman administrative district of Çatalca, with a Greek population of 54,916 who fell under the ecclesiastical domains of the dioceses of Derkos, Sylviria, and Metrai. This figure includes 10,461 Greek inhabitants of the European suburbs of the Bosphorus belonging to the Derkos diocese whose see was situated at Tarabya (Therapia). According to the census data, the diocese of Metrai had eleven settlements, three of which had mixed populations, including Çatalca, with 1,299 Greeks and 1,350 Turks. Silivri, on the other hand, where the ecclesiastical seat of the diocese of Sylviria was to be found, had a population of 2,239 Greeks, 1,832 Turks, and 2,817 others (mainly Bulgarians). The census mentions another eleven settlements in the same dioceses, nine of which were totally Grecophone and the rest mixed.

Eastern Thrace

Before the Balkan Wars, the population of eastern Thrace was divided by race and creed. It was divided according to ethnoreligious affinities into Muslim Turks, Albanophone Muslims, Gagauzes, Muslim Pomaks, Greek Orthodox, Bulgarian Orthodox, Armenians, Jews, and Gypsies. Roughly speaking, prewar eastern Thrace might be demarcated ethnographically as follows. The triangle of land—the base of which has Istanbul to the east, Silivri on the Marmara Sea to the west and Istranca at its apex—had a population in which the Greek element was predominant. Prosperous Greek villages such as Epivatai, Phanari, Emasterou, and Dellionai belonged to the diocese of Sylviria, whereas Sinekli, Terkos, and Hamidköy also had a relatively substantial Bulgarian Orthodox population.

The coastal regions both on the Black and Marmara seas surrounding this triangle were inhabited largely by Greeks, except in the

kazâ of Tekirdağ (Raidestos), where the seat of the ancient diocese of Hērakleia was to be found. The kazâs of Aktebol (Agathoupolis) and Kıyıköy (Midia) had few, if any, Turks, while the proportion of the Greek population was substantial along the Gallipoli Peninsula. This was particularly so in the dioceses of Ganos (Şarköy) and Myriophyto (Mürefte). Bounded by this coastal Greek layer, the heart of the eastern Thracian plain was mainly Muslim. Yet, by means of occasional Greek pockets, such as Scholario, Tsanto, and Kymvaion, Greek coastal settlements were loosely connected to a Greek population centered around Edirne and Kırklareli, the seats of the Adrianople and Saranta Ekklesiäs dioceses, respectively.

Ethnically, the combined Greek and Bulgarian elements formed a clear majority of the population. Both on the plains of eastern Thrace and in the coastal towns of the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, the Greek element, rural or urban, formed the most lively and productive component of the local population and by all accounts shaped the character of the region.⁵² The economic and demographic upsurge of the eastern Thracian element was reflected in the multiplication of the dioceses of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the region in the early twentieth century.⁵³ Thus, on the eve of the Balkan Wars, there were eleven dioceses in eastern Thrace (Adrianople, Saranta Ekklesiäs, Hērakleia, Ganos, Myriophyto, Tyroloi, Vizya, Ainos, Metrai, Sylivria, and Derkos). Table IX illustrates this vital Greek presence in eastern Thrace.

Concurrently, however, the Muslim population received a significant boost with the settlement in the Thracian interior of Balkan Muslim refugees (*muhâcir*) after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–78. The settlement of such refugees, especially in the kazâs of Keşan, Çorlu, Hayrabolu, Vize, and Lüleburgaz, reinforced significantly the Muslim element at the expense of the indigenous Greek population. This tendency was accelerated by the Balkan Wars. Finally, with the evacuation of the entire local Greek population following the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, eastern Thrace became a homogeneous Turkish region. Yet, some 256,635 eastern Thracian Greeks were to be found in Greece in 1928.⁵⁴ If one takes into account the 1914–18 deportations, natural mortality, and re-migration from Greece between 1922–28, one would get the figure 290,690 cited in the Greek census of 1910–12, reflecting the fact that Thracian Greeks were spared the massacres and violence endured by their brethren in Anatolia.

TABLE IX

Greek Population in the Vilâyet of Edirne:
Census of 1910–1912

Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910–1912	Administrative Districts Sancaks	Greek Census 1910–1912	
A. Edirne (Adrianople)	} 50,067	C. Tekirdağ (Raideostos)	34,310	
Mustafa Paşa		Saray	—	
Seymenli		Çorlu (Tyroloi)	16,782	
Lala Paşa		Malkara	13,563	
Uzunköprü (Makra Gephyra)		Hayrabolu (Charioupolis)	3,972	
Total, Edirne	62,278	Total, Tekirdağ	68,627	
B. Kırkkilise/Kırklareli (Saranta Ekklesiäs)	28,314	D. Gelibolu (Kallipolis)	19,613	
Pınar Hisar	} 91,405	Eceabad (Madytos)	13,212	
Lüleburgaz		9,471	Keşan	15,312
Babaeski		5,270	Şarköy (Ganos)	14,287
Vize (Vizyoi)		15,958	Mürefte (Myriophyton)	18,811
Demirköy (Samakovion)/		} 9,405	İnos (Ainos)	} 10,132
Kıyıköy (Midia)			9,405	
Total, Kırkkilise		68,418	Total, Gelibolu	91,367
		Total, Vilâyet of Edirne	290,690	

Conclusions

The significance of the Greek census of 1910–12 is twofold. First, the census reveals a new demographic perspective on the Millet-i Rum, independent of the official Ottoman population data. In fact the census, entitled the “Greek Patriarchate Statistics of 1912,” was first brought to light in 1919 at the negotiating table of the Paris Peace Conference, when the yields of this census were used and misused by many Greek political figures to promote their foreign policy goals. At the Paris Peace Conference, however, it was common practice to produce statistical data enhancing the demographic presence of one or another ethnic element. This practice was followed not only by Greek Premier Eleutherios Venizelos but also by the representatives of the

Ottoman government, as well as by Armenian, Kurdish, and Arab nationalist organizations at the Paris negotiations.⁵⁵ Nor was this trend of number-boosting limited to the "Eastern Question." It was, in fact, a common phenomenon in all territorial disputes that emerged with the redrawing of the political map of Europe following World War I (Fiume, German-Polish, German-French, Polish-Russian, Serbo-Bulgarian disputes).

Inevitably, therefore, the Greek census of 1910–12 was entangled in political propaganda, and this has led scholars unsympathetic to Greek claims to question its very existence. Yet, this evidence requires that some basic issues in the historical demography of Anatolia and eastern Thrace in the closing decades of the Ottoman Empire be reconsidered. A reevaluation is especially needed to understand the factors that initially led the Greek side to undertake the task of conducting a census. As the Greek Foreign Minister Iōannēs Gryparēs pointed out, Athens wished to obtain as precise and comprehensive a picture as possible on the Ottoman Greek presence since the results of this census were to be taken into account in shaping Greek policy not only in regards to the Young Turk elections but also on the wider issue of Greek-Ottoman relations.⁵⁶ Thus, Greek consuls in Anatolia and Thrace did not have any reason to mislead their government by dispatching inflated or inaccurate figures.

Second, the census brings to light a glaring discrepancy between the yields of 1910–12—when the Greeks were still living peacefully in Anatolia and Thrace—and those of 1924–28, which recorded the refugee population in Greece after the Greek-Turkish War and the Lausanne Convention on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. This issue, however, is the subject of another study, which demonstrates the significant contribution of the Greek census in determining the human cost involved in the Greek-Turkish confrontation of 1912–22.⁵⁷

NOTES

1. R. Clogg, "The Greek *Millet* in the Ottoman Empire," in B. Braude and B. Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), pp. 185–207.

2. For details see P. M. Kitromilides, "The Intellectual Foundations of Asia Minor Studies: The R. W. Dawkins-Melpo Merlier Correspondence,"

Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn 6 (1986–1987): 9–30. The six volumes of the bulletin illustrate the serious scholarly work undertaken by the Centre for Asia Minor Studies since 1977.

3. The major exponent of this thesis is Professor D. Kitsikis; see his *L'Empire Ottoman* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985).

4. See, for instance, D. Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact upon Greece* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), pp. 29–32.

5. J. McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population at the End of the Empire* (New York: New York University Press, 1983); S. J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population," *International Journal for Middle East Studies* 9 (1978): 325–38.

6. See also Kemal Karpat's "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/2–1893," *International Journal for Middle East Studies* 9 (1978): 237–74, and "Population Movements in the Ottoman State in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline," in J-Louis Bacque-Gramont et P. Dumont, eds., *Contributions à l'Histoire Économique et Sociale de l'Empire, Collection Turcica*, vol. 3 (Istanbul, Paris, London: Editions Peeters, 1983).

7. R. Clogg, "Two Accounts of the Academy of Ayvalık (Kydōniai) in 1818–1819," *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 10 (1972): 652.

8. A. Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974*, (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), pp. 112–14.

9. F. Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914," in Braude and Lewis, *Christians and Jews*, vol. 1, p. 407.

10. D. Mauropoulos, *Patriarchikes Selides: To Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio 1878–49* [Patriarchal Pages: The Ecumenical Patriarchate 1878–1949] (Athens: Typois Dion. Petsalē, 1960), pp. 14–22.

11. A copy of the text of the patriarchal encyclical addressed to all its dioceses in 1891 can be found in the Greek Foreign Ministry Archive (AYE) 1892/B50.

12. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records," p. 224.

13. J. McCarthy, "Greek Statistics on the Ottoman Greek Population," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 1 (1980): 66–76.

14. P. Kitromilides and A. Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival, Nationalism and Forced Migration: The Historical Demography of the Greek Community of Asia Minor at the Close of the Ottoman Era," *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn* 5 (1984–5): 9–44.

15. McCarthy, "Greek Statistics," p. 72.

16. G. Tenekidēs, "Plēthysmiakes Parametroi tou Mikrasiatikou Hellenismou. Nea Stoicheia apo ereunes tou Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn" [Demographic Facts Concerning Asia Minor Hellenism: New Evidence from Research of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies], *Praktika tēs Akadēmias Athēnōn* [Proceedings of Academy of Athens] 63 (1988): 57–77.

17. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Domna Dontas, former head of the historical archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, for her valuable

guidance in unearthing the population yields from various files. All relevant documents were collected in separate files entitled "Greek Population Statistics" and are catalogued as AYE/B50 to B55/1910–12.

18. Kallergēs to all Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, no. 1652, 21/4 July 1910–AYE/B50.

19. Kallergēs to Greek Embassy in Istanbul, no. 1652, 21/4 July 1910, AYE/B50. The team of experts comprised Mēnas Chamoudopoulos, a senior official of the Sublime Porte and author of a geographical study on Anatolia; Geōrgios Skalierēs, a member of the Ahrar Party during the Young Turk period and the author of the influential study *La Décentralisation et la Réforme Administrative* (Istanbul, 1911); and the Karamanlı Greek Vaēs Vaianos. G. Skalierēs later published an ethnological study of Anatolia with important population data under the title *Laoi Kai Phylai tēs M. Asias* [Peoples and Races of Asia Minor] (Athens: Typographeion "Typos," 1922).

20. Kallergēs to Patriarch Iōakeim III, no. 14134, 21/4 July 1910, AYE/B50.

21. A copy of the questionnaire was attached by Kallergēs to all Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, no. 1652, 21/4 July 1910, AYE/B50.

22. Gryparēs to all Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, no. 14555, 7/20 June 1911, AYE/B50.

23. Mikes (İzmir) to Gryparēs, no. 450, 14/27 February 1912, AYE/B50.

24. Sgouros (Ayvalık) to Foreign Ministry, no. 350, 2/15 February 1912, AYE/B55.

25. Adamidēs (Samsun) to Foreign Ministry, no. 477, 6/19 December 1910, AYE/B50.

26. Kypraios (Konya) to Foreign Ministry, no. 63, 6/19 March 1912, AYE/B50.

27. Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914*, pp. 170–87.

28. G. Sōteriadēs, *An Ethnological Map Illustrating Hellenism in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor* (London: E. Stanford, 1918).

29. Potheinos (İzmir) to Gryparēs, no. 450, 14/27 February 1912, AYE/B50.

30. Stelakēs (İzmir) to all Ionian dioceses, no. 3075, 8/21 August 1911, AYE/B50.

31. Stelakēs (İzmir) to Foreign Ministry, no. 2240, 8/21 August 1911, AYE/B50.

32. Potheinos (İzmir) to Gryparēs, no. 38, 4/17 January 1912, AYE/B50.

33. Potheinos (İzmir) to Gryparēs, no. 201, 24/6 February 1912, AYE/B50.

34. Potheinos (İzmir) to Gryparēs, no. 5640, 24/7 March 1912, AYE/B50. For the report of vice consul at Urla, no. 21744, 4/17 July 1912, AYE/B50.

35. Sgouros (Ayvalık) to Foreign Ministry, no. 350, 28/11 December 1911, AYE/B55.

36. Kōnstantinidēs (Bursa) to Foreign Ministry, no. 148, 22/4 June 1912, AYE B/50.

37. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Age of Philip II*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) pp. 25–28, 162–67.

38. Kitromilides and Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival," pp. 13–15.
39. See the authoritative study by S. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 459–62.
40. R. M. Dawkins, *Modern Greek Asia Minor* (Cambridge: University Press, 1916), pp. 1–38. Local Greek idioms of Cappadocia constituted the object of systematic linguistic research undertaken by the Centre for Asia Minor Studies in Athens, see Kitromilides and Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival," p. 15.
41. Kypraios (Konya) to Foreign Ministry, n. 63, 6/19 March 1912, AYE/B50.
42. Ananiadēs (Antalya) to Foreign Ministry, no. 256, 25/7 August 1911, AYE/B50.
43. The extent and destiny of Byzantine settlements in the region are now made plain by the evidence presented in A. Bryer and D. Winfield, *The Byzantine Monuments and Topography of the Pontos* (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1985), vol. 1–2. For the post-Byzantine period see the works of Anthony Bryer, "The Turkokratia in the Pontos: Some Problems and Preliminary Conclusions," in *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), p. 11 and "The Pontic Revival and the New Greece," in *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos*, p. 12.
44. Kitromilides and Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival," pp. 13–18.
45. A. Alexandris, "He anaptyxē tou ethnīkou provlēmatos tōn Hellēnōn tou Pontou 1918–1922: Hellēnike exōterikē politikē kai tourkīkē antidrasē" [The Emergence of Ethnic Consciousness among Pontos Greeks 1918–1922: Greek Foreign Policy and Turkish Reaction], in O. Dēmētrakopoulos and T. Veremēs, eds., *Meletēmata Gyrō apo ton Venizelo kai tēn Epochē tou* [Studies on Venizelos and His Time] (Athens: Ekdoseis Philippotē, 1980), pp. 427–74.
46. Adamidēs (Samsun) to Foreign Ministry, no. 282, 8/21 August 1911, AYE/B 5 0 Selēniadēs (Trabzon) to Foreign Ministry, no. 263, 16/29 May 1912, AYE/B50.
47. Narlēs (Samsun) to Foreign Ministry, no. 484, 20/2 January 1912, AYE/B5.
48. Adamidēs (Samsun) to Foreign Ministry, no. 477, 6/19 December 1910; AYE/B5 Selēniadēs (Trabzon) to Foreign Ministry, no. 571, 26/9 December 1911; AYE/B5 Selēniadēs (Trabzon) to Foreign Ministry, no. 572, 26/9 December 1911, AYE/B5.
49. Selēniadēs (Trabzon) to Foreign Ministry, no. 185, 13/26 April 1912, AYE/B55.
50. According to A. W. Kinglake, *Eothen or Traces of Travel Brought Home from the East* (London: John Ollivier, 1844), p. 74, there are indications that such migratory movement was already taking place as early as 1835.
51. For details on Constantinopolitan Greeks, see Alexandris, *Greek Minority of Istanbul*, Chapter 1.
52. For the Greek presence in Eastern Thrace, see A. Antoniadēs, *Le rôle économique des Grecs en Thrace. Rapport soumis à la Conférence de la Paix le 27 février 1919* (Paris: [s.n.], 1919).
53. See Kitromilides and Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival," pp. 31–32.

54. Ibid.

55. PRO (Public Records Office) FO (Foreign Office)/371/5108/E4405, Damad Ferid Pasha's note, Constantinople, April 19, 1920.

56. Gryparēs to all Greek consular authorities in the Ottoman Empire, no. 145557/20 June 1911, AYE/B50.

57. For details see Kitromilides and Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival," pp. 33-34.

III

Economic Foundations of a Civil Society: Greeks in the Trade of Western Anatolia, 1840–1876

REŞAT KASABA

CIVIL SOCIETY” IS ONE of those hotly contested concepts that provoke discussions and arouse passions in the social sciences. There is little agreement regarding its validity, its significance, and its role in the historical transformation of Europe, let alone in the rest of the world. The development of civil society is supposed to define what is unique about the historical transformation of western Europe and thereby serve as a benchmark separating this privileged region from the rest of the world.¹ According to this perspective, the crucial difference between the historical patterns of transformation in Europe and those in Asia and the Near East is that the latter did not culminate in a conceptual or real break between a political and a civil society.²

The idea of civil society grew out of Europe during the Enlightenment. Most often, it is used to refer to autonomous organizations, transformations, and struggles that define and limit the extent and effectiveness of state power in definite historical contexts. Accordingly, the arguments about the uniqueness of Europe contain the assumption that what is missing in the “East” is not merely a civil society but its constitutive forces, processes, and struggles. The main purpose of this paper is to question this assumption by focusing on the western Anatolian region of the Ottoman Empire, an area where civil society was supposed to be conspicuous in its absence.³

Even though our purpose is not to elaborate on the concept of “civil society,” we will need a working definition. The following definition, which was recently used in a Latin American context, will serve our purposes well.⁴ According to Stepan, civil society refers to that arena in which manifold social movements and civic organizations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves as an ensemble, so that they can express themselves and advance their interests. It is the contention of this paper that such an arena developed in the Ottoman Empire during the late eighteenth and first three quarters of the

nineteenth centuries and that the Greek community played a key part in its formation in western Anatolia.

Our working definition specifies three conditions that need to be satisfied before a civil society can be said to exist in a given context. The first of these is the presence of a space in which its constituent forces can be located and take root. "Space" refers not only to an area in the physical sense but also to the presence of an environment that is conducive to the effective organization of these forces. The second condition is that the groups that constitute civil society need to "construct" an image of themselves in social, political, and cultural terms and find means of asserting their existence and interests. The third condition is that the people who are to constitute civil society have access to sources of power that are beyond the immediate reach of state authorities. This is necessary because, no matter how it is defined, the term "civil society" is meaningful only when used in relation to and especially in opposition to the "state."

In the Ottoman Empire, the first of these three conditions we have identified was relatively easy to satisfy. Historically, İzmir and other port cities provided a setting where groups could exist and interact in an environment that was relatively free from close government supervision. This was partly because the Ottoman government had left the administrative status of these places deliberately vague in an effort to encourage the continuation of trade, especially in the Mediterranean basin. İzmir, in particular, had a long history of such close connections with other parts of the Mediterranean. Even though some of these connections predated the Ottoman presence in the area, they remained strong throughout Ottoman rule, earning the city the reputation for being a "liberal" place where people of all nations freely congregated to pursue their interests.⁵

The reform measures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the commercial agreements in which the Ottomans took part provided guarantees for the continuing existence of such places in the dissolving Ottoman Empire. In particular, through a series of international treaties, the Ottoman state explicitly undertook not to interfere arbitrarily with the commercial activities of local and foreign merchants in the Ottoman Empire. Questionnaires conducted by different embassies in the late 1830s and the early 1840s reveal that, except for occasional usurpations by local officials, the provisions of these treaties were followed quite closely by all the parties involved, including the Ottoman government.⁶ Thus, it appears that "space" for the effective organization of civil society existed in the Ottoman

Empire during the latter period of its history, if not earlier. There is, however, a potential problem with defining this space as “nonpolitical” and even “non-” or “antistate” while conceding at the same time that its existence was essentially guaranteed by the Ottoman government. This is why the satisfaction of the other two conditions becomes crucial for the establishment of a civil society—the groups, relations, and arenas that were beyond the strict supervision of the central government.

In the Ottoman Empire, the transformation of commercially active regions from relay points in an imperially controlled trade system to sources of wealth for private entities occurred as a result of the empire joining the capitalist world economy after the middle decades of the eighteenth century.⁷ In addition to linking the Ottoman regions and networks to the circuits of global trade, such a move entailed substantive changes in the organization of production and in regional and social hierarchies.

In western Anatolia, as in other similarly situated regions, the move towards a world economy manifested itself above all in increasing trade. Between 1840 and 1873 alone, the total value of trade conducted at the port of İzmir increased fourfold. In contrast to the Ottoman Empire as a whole, İzmir’s trade balance was generally positive. At the peak of the cotton boom, in 1865, the export surplus reached a high of £3.2 million. In the thirty-six years between 1840 and 1876, İzmir’s trade generated a cumulative surplus of £16.6 million, compared with the total deficit of £69.4 million for the Ottoman Empire in its entirety.⁸

Even though İzmir had a long history of commercial importance that began, according to some accounts, in the sixteenth century, the nineteenth-century boom was qualitatively different. In earlier periods, the port had served rather as a staging point for goods and merchandise in transit from Asia, whereas in the nineteenth century the majority of the goods that were exported from İzmir were locally produced. It was in these years that Bursa’s silk and İzmir’s cotton definitively replaced Persian silk and Ankara mohair as the leading exports shipped from the port of İzmir. The shift in the region’s status from being primarily a transit port to a site of cultivation of cash crops for export is demonstrated by the increase in production of certain kinds of crops around İzmir. It has been calculated that agricultural crops in western Anatolia expanded by about 400 percent between the 1840s and 1870s. In certain types of cash crops, such as cotton and raisins, the rate of increase was even higher.⁹

The expansion of production and trade under conditions of growing demand and increasing prices generated a significant amount of new wealth in western Anatolia. Contrary to common assumptions, it seems that most of this wealth was actually retained in the region of its creation. This money could be channeled out of western Anatolia through several conduits, such as profit transfers, personal savings, import payments, and collection of taxes by the central government—either directly or through contractors. But a close examination reveals that none of these routes served to transfer a significant amount of the newly created wealth out of the region.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, except for railroads, foreign capital had not invested heavily in the region, and railroads did not attain a comfortable level of profitability before the 1870s.¹⁰ There was some movement of personal funds through family relations that extended into distant parts of the globe. But these could not have amounted to much during this period when there was, as yet, no significant wave of emigration; in fact, if anything, the flow of people was in the other direction, as people retreated into the shrinking borders of the empire.¹¹ There was also a net inflow of funds through private channels: Many of the local bankers widely borrowed in European money markets so as to be able to lend to government officials on a short-term basis at attractive rates.¹²

Payments for imports did not constitute a major outflow either. As we have already noted, the port of İzmir enjoyed a consistent surplus in its trade account. Furthermore, while most of the import trade was conducted on credit, the exporters insisted on prompt payment in cash. This was partly due to the length of the chain of intermediaries they had to work with. As goods moved from the interior to coastal cities, they changed hands so many times that the exporting firms could ensure the operation of this vast network only by paying most of the intermediaries promptly and in full. Thus, while it was possible for payments of imports to be frequently in arrears, this was rarely the case in exports. If we take into consideration the actual length of time it took for funds to be transmitted in payment for imports, we can see that, at any point in time, the net gain from export trade might have been even larger than the one suggested by the annual foreign trade figures of İzmir.

As for taxes, western Anatolia continued to be among the highest contributors to the treasury of the central government in the nineteenth century. But during this period, the rate of increase in the revenues generated in western Anatolia does not seem to have been

commensurate with the rate of expansion of commercial activity in the region. To give but one example, in 1872 about 37 million kuruş were collected as tithe in İzmir; and, in 1879, İzmir's contribution was estimated to be about the same. Yet, from 1870 to 1876 alone, the volume of agricultural production in western Anatolia increased by about 20 percent.¹³ The rate of growth of tax collection would appear even further behind if we allow for the probable overestimation of tithe revenues that resulted from inadequate information received from the tax-farmers and their subcontractors.

A growing part of the wealth that was thus retained in western Anatolia fell into private hands because, for the most part, nineteenth-century trade was organized and conducted through private channels. This amounted to a substantial change in trade patterns from earlier periods. With respect to the sites of production, by the 1840s the power of the *â'yân* (local ruling elites) had already waned, and small holdings had become the prevalent form of production in agriculture. While the legal status of these lands was not entirely clear, in practice, they were held and cultivated privately by peasant households. This type of organization was prevalent in the production of major articles of export such as opium, raisins, figs, and natural dyes. The network that connected these sites of production to İzmir was controlled by a succession of private concerns that included tax-farmers, caravan traders, merchants-moneylenders, agents of wholesalers, export firms, government purchasers, and representatives.

In 1853, at its terminus, the culmination of this trade was described as follows:

In the fruit season all is animation and activity at Smyrna, when strings of camels tied head to tail arrive from all parts of Asia Minor. They are generally in lots of five or six, seldom more . . . as string upon string of these singular quadrupeds enter the streets leading to the Bazaar, the whole town is filled with their tinkling noise. Arrived at the merchants yard, the camels kneel down to deposit their loads (which are quickly disposed of)—gangs of men, women, and children being employed the live-long day in packaging the fruits for exportation. The operation in the case of figs is very interesting and full of bustle. The ripe but still green fruit is picked from the branches and leaves and then packed in drums, handful by handful, being arranged in a circular form so as to suit the shape of the drum. . . . The figs being packed, the lids of the drums are nailed down to prevent the fruit from

swelling . . . and are immediately shipped for exportation. They ripen and become coated with saccharine bloom on the voyage. It is said that a prize of £30 is given to the first ship which arrives in London with the new fruit.¹⁴

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the ability of Ottoman authorities to administer the various aspects of this commercial activity had been significantly reduced. This was due in part to material limitations that resulted from the financial difficulties of the Porte. It is well known that, in an effort to alleviate some of these difficulties, the Porte continuously expanded the scope of tax-farming; this move cut further its ability to supervise production and trade. Thus, the circumstances under which commercial activities expanded in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century made it possible for private entities and groups to gain access to independent sources of power, such as sources they could use to enhance and assert their autonomy vis-à-vis the central government.

This brings us to the third condition necessary for the emergence of a civil society. Our main concern at this point is to see who in the "nonstate" sector came to control this wealth and whether and to what extent it was used to defend their interests and to set limits to the sphere of influence of the central government.

Geographically, a disproportionate amount of the newly created wealth was concentrated in coastal cities such as İzmir. This was primarily due to the many key commercial activities carried out in coastal areas, which further heightened their importance. During the second half of the nineteenth century, contemporary observers were describing İzmir as the "queen of the cities of Anatolia, the crown of Ionia, and the gem of Asia."¹⁵ Occasional attacks, robberies, lootings, and kidnappings by bandits was a persistent menace to commercial activity in and around İzmir throughout the nineteenth century. While these were unarguably detrimental to the continuing growth of commerce, they also served a more useful function by helping to redistribute in the interior some of the wealth that concentrated on the coast, because many of these bandits were rural in origin and they based their activities in the hinterland. Nevertheless, the geographical concentration of commercial wealth in port cities such as İzmir was the predominant tendency, and this was an important factor that strengthened the foundations of civil society in the Ottoman Empire during the middle decades of the nineteenth century.

In terms of its effects on social hierarchies, the mid-nineteenth century boom represents the culmination of a process that had begun in the late eighteenth century. In this period, the Ottoman Empire went through extensive social restructuring that had important implications for the relative position of different ethnic groups. To the extent that we can talk about an ethnic hierarchy in the Ottoman Empire, this was the period when a substantial part of the Greek community enhanced its position, primarily at the expense of Jews and to some extent of Muslim peasants who had lost most of the imperial protection that had been so vital to them.

Among the many activities the Greeks were involved in, the one that gave them a controlling power was trade. As members of families with connections abroad, as sailors, itinerant merchants, agents of European houses, and retailers, they served in all branches of commerce.¹⁶ Many of the Greek-owned financial houses of Istanbul and İzmir began as merchant firms and subsequently invested their accumulated resources and activities into banking.¹⁷ Eventually, the Greeks became the perennial intermediaries between the Ottoman Empire and the world economy. More than the Armenians, Jews, Levantines, or European nationals, they dominated the non-state arena that we have shown to have expanded in the mid-nineteenth century.

The origins and growth of the privileged position of the Greeks occurred in a way that was independent not only of the Ottoman government but also of the policies of the European states. The Greeks owed this prominence not so much to the help they received from foreign powers but to the way in which they were situated in the eastern Mediterranean and within the Ottoman Empire. Their presence throughout the area provided them with a vast network of natural conduits and enabled them to take advantage of opportunities in the domestic and world markets. In this sense, the support that the Greeks eventually received from the outside was the result rather than the cause of their prominence.

In fact, when the British were making their initial entry into western Anatolia, they did not perceive a natural ally in the Greek community. On the contrary, their initial design was to undermine the "native merchants" directly and, failing that, to supplant them with members of other, weaker, communities, such as the Jews. For example, in 1809, as a testimony to the independent strength of the Greek community, Sir Alexander Bell, governor of Malta, sought to persuade a group of Greek merchants who had taken refuge on his

island to stay there and turn Malta "into the emporium of Levant."¹⁸ Thus, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Greeks of western Anatolia were well established in an environment that allowed them considerable freedom in acquiring and utilizing wealth.

The movement for Greek independence constitutes the best example of how this wealth became a vehicle for cementing a civil society within the Ottoman Empire. The organized activities of the merchant communities scattered around the Aegean and the Black Sea played a decisive part in determining the outcome of this movement. The well-known result of their activities was the establishment of a new polity, the Kingdom of Greece. The same movement also served to divide the higher echelons of the Orthodox Church and the elite members of the Greek community in Istanbul into different camps. Some supported the idea of maintaining the Ottoman Empire as a unified entity with the hope of one day resurrecting the Byzantine Empire with Istanbul as its capital. Others were drawn to the project of creating and strengthening the independent Kingdom of Greece. This latter policy would gain a growing number of adherents as the nineteenth century progressed. For the Greek community as a whole and especially for its laypeople, however, the status quo (as it existed in the middle of the nineteenth century) was still the most preferable of all options.¹⁹

During the nineteenth century, the activities of the Greeks in western Anatolia exhibited all the elements of civic life. There were newspapers, schools, professional associations, social clubs, and political organizations that addressed the various concerns of their community. Most of these institutions were administered by autonomous local councils. The events of 1819 provide a good example of the divisions within the Greek community and how local councils were used to advance the interests of different sections of this community. During that year, there occurred in İzmir riots organized by the newly rich merchant classes who wanted to break free from the ecclesiastical authority of the local church and its leaders. As riots spread, the merchant community was divided between those who served only the local markets and those who were involved in foreign trade. The former rallied the members of local guilds to their cause and moved closer to the conservative positions advocated by the Church hierarchy, whereas the latter, with the aid of some intellectuals, helped in the creation of a new school, the Gymnase Philologique. This school was to specialize in the instruction of "philosophical modernism," a

curriculum developed as an alternative to the conservative teachings of the church.²⁰ The Gymnase Philologique came to symbolize the growing power of the more cosmopolitan merchants and businessmen in the Greek community.

Various segments of the Greek community fought against each other as they rose against the Ottoman government in Epirus, Thessaly, and western Macedonia during the Crimean War; in Crete from 1866 to 1868; and in Bosnia from 1877 to 1878.²¹ However, these episodes of armed insurrection were exceptional. For the most part, the Greeks adopted a quieter approach in their relationship with the Ottoman government. In large part, this was due to the watchful eye of the Ottoman state, which was suspicious of its Greek subjects, especially after the establishment of independent Greece. Any sign of unrest on the islands or in regions of Greek plurality was used as a pretext for confiscating property or for forcing individuals into exile.²² Under such circumstances, methods such as hoarding money, preemptive purchase of crops, cajoling the peasants into cooperation, circumventing the newly established branch banking, transferring funds within families but across long distances proved to be as, if not more, effective than armed insurrection in defending the newly constituted space against encroachments by the central government.

The growth of a non-state arena with autonomous means of wealth and mobilization, was an important factor that undermined the effectiveness of many of the reform measures that the Ottoman government tried to implement in the nineteenth century. Originally, many of these measures were conceived and enacted by a central bureaucracy that continued to perceive itself as the sole source of power in the empire. But the continuing growth of a non-state arena gradually left its imprint not only by preventing the full realization of some of the Tanzimat reforms, but also by forcing the government to recognize, at least implicitly, that circumstances had changed fundamentally and to alter its policies accordingly. This is reflected in some of the reforms, such as separate constitutions for non-Muslim communities, the law of nationality, the issuing of passports, and most importantly, recognizing and regulating the right of ownership of land.²³ The turning point in the transformation of the Ottoman Empire should be sought not in the institutional changes that affected Ottoman bureaucracy, but in the development of this qualitatively new relationship between the Ottoman state and the non-state arena that can be characterized as a nascent civil society.²⁴

While it is true that non-Muslim communities in general, and Greeks in particular, were the most prominent actors of this newly developing arena, other, less visible constituents of civil society should not be ignored. Among these, two groups were of particular significance. The first were the partially dispossessed temporary migrant workers who became the mainstay of Ottoman agriculture during the nineteenth century; the second were the Sufi brotherhoods who offered people an alternative world-view to the increasingly secular and alien ideology of the reforming bureaucrats.²⁵ In the long run, the activities of these groups were at least as important as the Greek merchant communities in shaping a non-state arena and effectively limiting the power of the central government.

NOTES

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IV

The Development of a Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie: Investment Patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850–1914

HARIS EXERTZOGLU

THE TERM "GREEK OTTOMAN BOURGEOISIE" needs careful definition. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Greek Ottoman business community consisted of various groups, each one with a different occupational orientation and business mentality. Yet, these groups were not isolated from one another, but often had ties of business, marriage, culture, and religion. The development of the Ottoman economy during the same period strengthened these ties and led to the formation of a business community that developed its own social hierarchy based on wealth, status, and business success. The economic activities of this community expanded throughout the empire, from the western shores of Asia Minor, Constantinople and its surroundings, Macedonia and the Aegean Islands, to the northern shores of the Black Sea, eastern and western Thrace, as well as the Danubian principalities and later the Romanian state. The business activities of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie also varied substantially over time, from region to region. Eventually, Greek Ottoman entrepreneurs became involved in almost every sphere of economic activity, from grain to crop cultivation and small-, medium-, and large-scale commerce and shipping, to banking, mining, and industry. These activities, however, were not undertaken simultaneously and not by all groups.

Broadly speaking, commerce was the major, if not exclusive, field for investment of Greek business capital in the first half of the nineteenth century. Although trade remained a priority, Greek entrepreneurs shifted some of their capital to other sectors as well. In the years between 1850 and 1881, Greek capital showed signs of investment diversification, as banking, mining, and industry came to assume

some importance. Following the Crimean War and the first attempts of the Ottoman state to borrow from European money markets, for example, Greek capital, especially that of Constantinople, shifted to banking. In the same period, some industrial and mining investments were made in Smyrna, Constantinople, and elsewhere. The activities of Greek capital entered a new and profoundly different phase in the period that followed the establishment of the Ottoman debt administration in 1881, a turning point that led to increased European financial penetration. We can, therefore, distinguish three periods in the evolution of the activities of Greek capital in the Ottoman Empire:

1. A period of almost exclusive involvement in trade and shipping.
2. A period in which commerce continued to be a first priority, but other activities, banking in particular, were also of importance.
3. A third period in which Greek capital developed a business profile whose main feature was investment diversification, with entrepreneurs getting involved in almost every sector of the Ottoman economy.

Capital accumulation was strongly, if not exclusively, rooted in shipping and commerce.¹ It is unnecessary to repeat here the conclusions of the relevant historiographic literature. One point does require clarification: the importance of commercial organization and the proliferation of trade networks that were by far the most significant factors in the impressive development of Greek trade in the nineteenth century.²

The transition from the status of small merchant who most of the time acted as a representative of foreign houses and who was under European protection, or small shipowner who only partly conducted trade on his own account, to the foundation of large independent houses with their own capital resources, prestige, and credit facilities, was the result of an elaborate organization based on extensive commercial and business networks that provided commercial information, credit facilities, and a climate of mutual trust. This process could also apply to Greek business activities in Egypt, southern Russia, western and central Europe, and the Balkans during the nineteenth century.³ It was the elaborate and sophisticated business network system that allowed Greek mercantile capital to disengage itself from the crumbling Ottoman command economy and escape its final collapse in the first decades of the nineteenth century, enabling it to take advantage of the commercial boom of the mid-nineteenth century.

After the introduction of free trade in the area, the commercial organization of Greek capital expanded substantially, thereby providing Greek merchants with an important advantage in an era when trade was largely affected by increasing competition. Thus, in the era of free trade, *berâts* (permits, licenses) and European protection became, if not useless, unnecessary. If holding a *berât* was an important factor for conducting business under the system of the strictly regulative Ottoman command economy, after the introduction of free trade and the improvement of the position of non-Muslims (initiated in 1839, but taking its final form after the declaration of Hatt-ı Hümayûn in 1856), it was no longer an asset. Credit facilities in Europe and skillful exploitation of trade networks within or outside the empire were far more valuable for the conduct of business than holding a *berât*. We can observe that the large majority of Greek bankers and merchants in Constantinople in the latter part of the nineteenth century never attempted to acquire European passports and place themselves under the protection of European embassies. Many of them did not even seek Greek nationality, which in no way provided the same sort of "protection" afforded by, for example, French or British nationality. Instead, they followed a friendly policy towards the Ottoman state without provoking it and always kept a low political profile even when important issues, such as the Cretan revolt, in 1866, surfaced.⁴ In fact, this attitude allowed them to gain much more prestige and power in the Ottoman capital than if they had sought the protection of one of the European powers.

It is not sufficient to connect the emergence of Greek capital in the Ottoman Empire with trade and increasing commercial opportunities with the West unless the importance of commercial organization is stressed. Availing itself of the increasing economic opportunities in an era of free trade, Greek traders in the Ottoman Empire was in a position to accumulate sufficient capital in a relatively short period of time. It is not an exaggeration to suggest that by the 1840s, Greek merchants had regained much of the ground lost since the Greek War of Independence and the persecutions they suffered at the hands of the Ottoman state.⁵ At that time, it became possible for some Greek capitalists to shift capital resources from trade to other sectors. It was the increasing wealth and the social and political security that stemmed from contacts with the West and the modernization process that encouraged them to do so. Greek banking in Constantinople offers the best example. A shift of capital from trade to banking was the

major feature after the Crimean War. Earlier attempts by Greek merchants to become involved in banking never really succeeded until the 1850s.⁶ This development first took place almost exclusively in Constantinople, but in later years banking came to be a major concern of Greek businessmen in other areas of the empire.⁷

The main aspect of Greek banking in Constantinople was not the financing of trade, as one might expect, but the financing of the Ottoman Treasury, mainly through the floating debt and to a lesser degree through the Ottoman debt. It is impossible to analyze here the policy of Greek banking in Constantinople in great detail. Suffice it to say that through banking, Greek capital soon became an important factor in Ottoman finances and eventually played a major part in the settlement of the Ottoman public debt. Through some of the major banking establishments in Constantinople, such as the *Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman*, the *Banque de Constantinople*, the *Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs*, and a network of large, medium, and small private banking houses, Greek bankers were in a position to improve their financial status immensely.⁸ The mechanism responsible for this was the difference between interest rates of capital borrowed by the bankers from European money markets and those they charged the Ottoman Treasury. Short-term advances to the Ottoman state, with relatively high interest rates, provided enough profits and at the same time secured a substantial circulation of capital, which, in its turn, assured proper conduct of business.⁹

The financial situation in the Constantinopolitan money market was, however, unstable and created serious difficulties for both Greek and non-Greek banking establishments, mainly because of credit restriction from European money markets due to numerous factors—including financial crises, wars, fears of Ottoman insolvency, and the precarious state of Ottoman finances. This unstable situation lasted from the early 1860s to October 1875, when the Ottoman government suspended payments on its public debt. In that period, the development of Greek banking followed the cycles of credit supply and credit restriction from European money markets. As expected, some houses suffered more than others. During the major crises that befell the money market of Constantinople, namely those of 1861, 1866, 1869, 1871, and 1873, a number of commercial and banking houses suffered great losses and some even had to suspend payments.¹⁰ Overall, however, and despite periodic crises that the bankers eventually learned to deal with, Greek banking in Constantinople proved a major success.¹¹

From the Ottoman suspension of payments up to the final settlement of the Ottoman debt in 1881, Greek and other Galata bankers were caught in the vicious circle of lending more money to the government in order to reinforce their position vis-à-vis the other rival group of creditors: the committees of European bondholders. It is important to note that Greek bankers did not suffer great damage from the Ottoman suspension of payments because their main interest concerned the floating debt, the service of which had not been suspended. This proved to be both an advantage and a disadvantage. The bankers suffered relatively little, but at the same time found themselves tied to the Treasury to an extent they did not wish. Their only way out was to keep contact with the government, avoid hasty actions, and renew their credit to the Treasury in order to get better guarantees for their old advances and keep themselves ahead of their European rivals. During this period, the Galata bankers rallied with the Ottoman Bank to protect their common interests against European bondholders. This alignment, however loose, soon proved fruitful, as the Ottoman state in its direst need negotiated a settlement with the bankers, which, in December 1879, led to the establishment of the Direction of the Six Revenues.¹² Two years later, and after increasing European pressure, the Galata bankers and the Ottoman Bank came to an understanding with European bondholders and granted them their privileges, having of course secured their own interests to their satisfaction.¹³

The period following the establishment of the Public Debt Administration (PDA), a turning point in Ottoman economic history in its own right, was one of intense commercial and economic activity. During this period the major features of the Ottoman economy took shape: cash crop cultivation experienced large growth; new trade¹⁴ opportunities emerged (despite the negative effects of the Great Depression in Europe); traditional industry tied to guild practices rapidly lost ground to new types of industrial organization; modern industry, however small, emerged; mining¹⁵ increased considerably; and the empire experienced an impressive development in transport through new railway and shipping lines, roads, and port facilities.¹⁶ Greek capital participated in these developments, considering them both a challenge and an opportunity to enhance its position and economic power.

Following the establishment of the PDA, Greek bankers in Constantinople were faced with the question of how to consolidate their

position. The improvement of Ottoman finances, due to sound management, cut the bankers off from their major source of profits, namely the Ottoman floating debt. In the long run, however, this disadvantage was met with a diversified investment policy that differentiated both risk and profit sources. This becomes clear if one examines the course of business conducted by the major banks in which Greek capital had an interest, namely, the Banque de Constantinople, the Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs, and the Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman. It is also worth mentioning the Banque de Mytilin, which was founded in 1891 by a group of Galata bankers and local entrepreneurs of Mytilēnē.¹⁷ This bank, to the best of my knowledge, did not attempt to undertake contracts with the Treasury, concentrating instead all its efforts on the development of the two companies under its control, namely, the shipping company Aegean Sea and a coal mining company in Hērakleia.¹⁸

The investment policy of the other three banks was mainly concerned with the opening up of new areas of investment in the Ottoman Empire and abroad. It was a policy that intended to counterbalance the sudden and substantial contraction in their affairs with the Treasury. On the one hand, the banks participated in almost every business group that undertook the major enterprises in the country: public works, banks, railways, commerce, mining, industry, etc. On the other, they expanded their affairs in many other countries, mainly in Greece and Egypt, but also in Latin America, the Balkans, Russia, China, France, and Germany. The case of Latin America is particularly interesting because the banks invested comparatively large amounts of capital there (see Appendix II). In addition, all three banks followed an intensive portfolio investment policy, and, as can be seen from their balance sheets and annual reports, for some of these banks such investments achieved special importance (see Appendix II).

These policies enabled the banks to consolidate their position in the market and keep business going. Although investment differentiation was the main feature of their business profile, some banks became involved in new fields of investment more than others. In the case of Greek investments, for example, the Banque de Constantinople had a much greater stake than the other two. This heavy involvement was responsible for the serious damage inflicted on the bank when the Greek suspension of payments was declared in 1893. This, along with the losses suffered from the Barring crisis two years earlier, put

this institution in a critical situation and led its bondholders to decide on its liquidation and its incorporation into the *Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs*.¹⁹

Similar remarks could be made about the private Greek banking houses in Constantinople. That should be expected after all, since most of their owners were also on the boards of directors of the aforementioned major banks and were responsible for their investment policies. Bankers such as Geōrgios and Leonidas Zariphēs, Theodōros Maurogordatos, Ulysses Negreponte, Stephanos Skouloudēs, Eugenio and Dēmostenēs Eugenidēs, Stefanovich-Skilitzi, as well as others, are to be found on the boards of directors of various joint stock companies in the Ottoman Empire. Their presence there usually indicates that they held a good part of the companies/ capital (see Appendices I and III).

In the period following the settlement of the Ottoman debt, Greek banking capital in Constantinople faced a policy dilemma. Instead of following their older practices of short-term advances to the Treasury, which had become more difficult since the Ottoman Bank and the PDA left no room for such activities, the bankers preferred a diversified investment policy that relied upon the opening up of new areas of investment. Undoubtedly, this period was not without problems for the bankers, as increasing European penetration, financial and commercial crises, as well as political turbulence often led to critical situations. In addition, the profits of the banks experienced a substantial, and in some cases sharp, decline (see Appendix IV). This decline can be easily seen by comparing profits in the period 1871 to 1892, for example, with those in the period 1881 to 1892. This is not to say that profits in this latter period were not high. But they were not as substantial as those of the period 1871 to 1875, which of course was by far the most exceptional and highly profitable of the late Ottoman era. Yet, it is not possible to say whether Greek banking capital in Constantinople experienced a serious profit contraction overall, since both the activities and profit sources of the bankers were diversified to a considerable extent. Though not low, declining profits may indicate the problems of banking in an era of increasing European penetration, but cannot provide a full picture of the position of Greek banking capital. For this we need to consider the involvement of Greek bankers in other sectors of the economy, as well as the business performance of private banking houses.

In addition to Greek banking in Constantinople, there are other

examples that illustrate the diversified investment policy of Greek capital. Industry in Smyrna in the years between 1880 and 1912 offers such an example. Here, of course, reference is made to modern industry, namely, the form of productive organization that employs wage labor, as opposed to activities based on guild practices.

Evidence suggests that Greek capital played a vital role in the emergence of modern industry in Smyrna.²⁰ The number of industries there experienced a rapid increase from the 1850s onwards, peaking in the years preceding the Great European War. In the period 1850 to 1910, at least 2,000 industrial plants of various sizes were established by Greek capital, the large majority of them (1,508) in the period 1880 to 1910.²¹ A study prepared by G. Trakakēs in 1920 on behalf of the National Bank of Greece estimates that the number of industrial establishments in 1919 in the vilâyet of Aydın stood at 5,308, including home industry and small manufactures, as well as medium and large industries. Of the total, 4,008 were in the hands of Greeks. In this case, the Greek share is even higher than the proportion of industrial plants held by Greek capital in the same period on a national scale.²² The Ottoman industrial statistics for the years 1913 and 1915²³ indicate an equally high share of Greek-held industries in the Ottoman Empire.²⁴

By contemporary western European standards, industry in Smyrna may appear small in size and limited in capital assets. Trakakēs himself acknowledges that "large-scale industry does not exist in the vilâyet of Aydın . . . however, all the other forms of industrial activity, namely, home industry, small manufacturing, and industry (obviously of small and medium size) are well represented."²⁵ He also deplors the lack of joint-stock industrial companies, of which only a few existed, and the reluctance of Greek industrialists to combine forces. This does not, however, diminish the importance of what already existed. Considering the emergence of modern industry in Smyrna and the relatively short period in which it took place, its general condition in the first decades of the present century is hardly surprising. What is more important is that modern industry, however small and badly organized, made its appearance at the expense of guilds, giving rise to relatively high industrial investments and to an industrial work force. According to the same source, the number of workers in the vilâyet of Aydın stood at 37,185, half of them employed in Smyrna itself. Twenty-nine thousand were working for industries held by Greeks. Only the value of industrial plants was estimated at 3,854,980 gold TL, and some 3,100,000 gold TL were invested by Greeks.²⁶

Trakakēs reports the existence of 48 branches of industry in Smyrna, but he examines in some detail only carpets, cotton, flour, beer, soapmaking, beverages, wine, alcohol, sugar products, and tanning. Some of these industries were dominated by joint-stock companies (Oriental Carpet Co., Ottoman Cloth Co., Compagnie Industrielle de Filature et du Tissage du Levant, Société Anonyme de Manufacture du Coton, Brasseries Bomonti-Nektar, and the Ottoman Oil Co.). The Greek share in these companies—with the exception of the Brasserie Bomonti-Nektar, which was a Swiss-Greek concern, and the Ottoman Oil Co., which was founded by Greek, Armenian, and British capital—appears to have been negligible.

In other industries, however, Greek capital was dominant. The flour industry, for example, was almost entirely in the hands of Greek capitalists. This sector consisted of 15 factories, which represented a value of 1,194,000 paper TL (= 426,000 gold TL). The same appears to be true in the beverage, wine, brandy, and alcohol industries, which represented a value of 400,000 paper TL. The Greek share in the sugar products industry and tanning industries was equally important. In the first case, 8 out of 9 factories belonged to Greeks and, in the second, 4 out of 7. Unfortunately, Trakakēs provides information on only a fraction of the factories that existed in the vilâyet of Aydın, namely those he apparently regarded as more important. Accordingly, although he goes into great detail regarding the number of factories and plants in each of the 48 branches of industry, he provides no information about the name, nationality, or origin of their owners or about their capital resources, apart from the tables that show the total number of each branch in each area.²⁷

It is possible to speculate that local industries in Smyrna were restructured in the face of European competition by eliminating guild organization and recapturing a large part of local consumption. One should not forget that local consumption was also rapidly increasing, due to the large increase in Smyrna's population as well as the increasing wealth of the city and its hinterland. Otherwise, the rapid increase in the number of industrial plants in the region cannot be explained.

With regard to the emergence of modern industry in Smyrna, many questions remain concerning managerial and industrial organization, level of technology used, various labor problems, and, above all, the way these industries were able to secure sufficient capital. Was there any connection between them and the various banks that operated in the region, or was industry in Smyrna essentially self-financed?

These and other questions may arise when one examines the

process of industrialization in the Ottoman Empire. Similar questions may also arise concerning the involvement of Greek capital in the other fast-developing sectors of the Ottoman economy. Most likely, such an investigation will reveal the restructured investment profile of Greek business activities, which was the main feature of Greek capital in this latter period.

The purpose of this essay is not to reiterate the well-known thesis that Greeks and other non-Muslims dominated Ottoman economic life. Rather, it deals with Greek capital and the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie as such and analyzes its activities. The cases presented should illuminate the way some of its segments reacted to existing circumstances.

In the long term, one must recognize that Greek capital did not ignore any possible area of investment. The examples cited in this essay illustrate that some segments of Greek capital showed a good sense of business adaptability. This fact challenges the conventional view that regards Greek capital as part of the "comprador" bourgeoisie which, instead of advancing productive forces, played the part of intermediary for the benefit of European capitalism.²⁸ Drawing upon dependency theory, this view considers the Greek bourgeoisie in the Ottoman Empire as an almost static social stratum with a predefined character, dependent upon European capitalism and serving its interests, without any intention of transforming itself into a "national" bourgeoisie; such a bourgeoisie would have made industrial and other "productive" investments instead of paving the way for the Europeans. This approach, apart from the fact that it is based upon normative rather than historical considerations and that it uses modern instead of contemporary criteria, fails to acknowledge that investments, and industrial investments in particular, are not just the result of entrepreneurial decisions, but depend upon various factors that facilitate or impede certain decisions. Leaving the factor of political stability aside, factors such as levels of profit, cost considerations, existing taxation, credit availability, competition, and market opportunities, along with social and economic structures, were always seriously considered not only by Greek capitalists but by all investors. Thus, any study of investment practices in the Ottoman Empire has to draw on a historical analysis of these factors and the ways in which native and European capitalists reacted to them.

In addition, these factors did not remain static, but underwent rapid and not always predictable change. Accordingly, the investment behavior of Greek capital underwent a similar change. It cannot be maintained that this change applied individually to each member of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie to the same extent. Some changed their attitude towards new types of investment less rapidly than others, and some even did not change their practices at all. Overall, however, a new business mentality took hold of Greek entrepreneurs, whether out of conviction or necessity, with the result that they became involved in areas of investment that would have been unimaginable to them a few years earlier.

One must also remember that we are dealing with people who had a good knowledge of how vulnerable their markets were and who, therefore, almost by nature one might say, tended to be conservative in their business outlook. They attempted to manage their capital resources, their own capital as well as available credit, avoiding unnecessary risks and searching for secure investments, yielding sufficient profits to keep business going. In other words, they reacted, by and large, in the manner any businessman would react under the then existing circumstances. One could also say that these investments were not equally important to Greek capital and that not all sectors of the economy received the same attention. Thus, such sectors as trade or banking were of paramount importance if the activities of Greek capital are considered as a whole. Yet, one ought not to forget that the factors that mainly determine investment priorities are also complex and tend to change continuously. What is important is that Greek capitalists considered these factors and reacted accordingly. Investment diversification reveals their disposition to invest in industry and mining, although, overall, such investments may have represented a small portion of their capital.

In particular cases, such as the Greek banks in Constantinople, the links between Greek capital and European capital were strong. Credit facilities in European money markets, for example, were always important for the bankers in Constantinople in order to conduct business. In addition, collaboration of Greek with European capitalists in the establishment of various joint stock companies was not an exception. Some of the most successful joint stock companies, such as the mining company of Balia Karaidin for example,²⁹ were based upon

similar collaborations. One also finds cases where Greek businessmen participated, to a lesser or greater extent, in companies founded by European capital, and vice versa.

To conclude, some comments on the final decline of the Greek-Ottoman bourgeoisie are in order. It is well-known that the vast majority of Greek enterprises in the Ottoman Empire faced severe difficulties during the second decade of the twentieth century and were eliminated after the end of the bitter Greek-Turkish war in the early 1920s. Yet, was this the result of economic and financial crises, of European competition and conservative investment mentality, that is, the economic collapse of once healthy enterprises? Or was it the result of specific political disturbances in the first decade of the twentieth century? It is my belief that the latter is most definitely the case. Following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, Greek capital in the Ottoman Empire faced an extremely difficult economic and political environment. The anti-Greek boycott that lasted almost two years, from 1909 to 1910,³⁰ the Balkan Wars, the repressive policies of the Young Turk government, which attempted to create a "national" bourgeoisie,³¹ the economic policy followed during the Great War, the massive exodus of Greeks in 1914,³² and finally the bitter outcome of the war between Greece and Turkey—led to the final and irrevocable decline of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie.

In a way, the Greek business community paid the price for not having established adequate political leverage with the Ottoman state except for certain personal, and sometimes intimate, relations that Greek entrepreneurs like Geōrgios Zariphēs and Chrēstakēs Zōgraphos had with Ottoman officials and even with the sultan himself. Similarly, political relations with the Young Turk regime were, due to mutual distrust, limited and deteriorated even further as a result of successive crises in the relations between Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the fate of the Greek Ottoman business community was closely tied to the fate of the Greek Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire and its eventual uprooting in 1922–23.

NOTES

1. There is an extensive literature on these issues. See, for example, T. Stoianovich, "The Conquering Orthodox Balkan Merchant," *Journal of Economic History* 2 (June, 1960); N. Svoronos, *Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956).

2. The history of Greek commercial networks has only lately been undertaken. See E. Frangakis, "Greek Economic Development in the Mediterranean with Particular Reference to the Italian Ports, 1780–1820," paper presented at King's College, London, January, 1986. See also M.-Cr. Chatzioannou: "La casa commerciale Gheroussi," in *Economies méditerranéennes: équilibres et intercommunication, XIII^e siècles. Actes du II^e colloque internationale d'histoire, Athènes, 18–25 Septembre, 1983* (Athens: Centre de Recherches Neohelleniques, Fondation Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985), as well as P. Herlihy, "Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* III/IV, 1979–80 and S. Chapman, "The International Houses: The Continental Contribution to British Commerce 1800–1860," *Journal of European Economic History* 1 (1977).

3. There is interesting literature on aspects of the history of the Greek diaspora. See, for example, Katsiardē-Hering, *Hē Hellēnikē Paroikia tēs Tergestēs 1751–1830* [The Greek Community of Trieste] (Athens: Ethniko kai Kapodistriako Panepistēmio Athēnōn, 1986); V. Karidis, "A Greek Mercantile Paroikia, Odessa 1774–1824," in R. Clogg, ed., *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1981). S. Phōkas, *Hoi Hellēnes eis tēn Potamoploian tou Katō Dounaveōs* [The Greeks in the Shipping Business in the Lower Danube] (Thessaloniki: Hidryma Meletōn tēs Chersonēsou tou Haimou, 1975); D. Mankriōtēs, "He Paroikia tou Londinou" [The (Greek) Community of London], *Ta Historika* 6 (1986).

4. It is worth mentioning that Geōrgios Zariphēs, one of the most influential Greek bankers in Constantinople, refused to undertake the public subscription of the 1867 Greek loan to the Ottoman Empire on the grounds that the loan was destined to cover military expenditures. Apparently, Zariphēs feared that such an act would undermine his excellent relations with the Sublime Porte. Similar indifference towards this loan was shown by most of the important Greek merchants and bankers in Constantinople. See H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking in Constantinople 1850–81," Ph.D. diss., King's College, University of London, 1986, pp. 237–39.

5. M. A. Ubcini, *Letters on Turkey 1856*, vol. II, 217–18 (London: J. Murray, 1856).

6. The first known attempts of Greek capitalists to involve themselves in banking can be traced to the 1840s, when Th. Baltazzi along with L. Alleon, a Jewish financier, were granted permission to establish the Bank of Constantinople for the purpose of regularizing commercial transactions. Due to the strict control of the Ottoman state, this bank failed miserably. Greek merchants also participated in the establishment of the Bank of Smyrna in 1843, an institution that attempted to eliminate commercial abuses and reduce rates of interest. This attempt also failed. In the 1850s, Greek capitalists, among others, presented the government with various projects regarding the establishment of a bank with the purpose of withdrawing paper money and dealing with devalued coinage. Although in one case the government allowed the establishment of a bank (Bank of Turkey) in 1856, this institution was short-lived and was liquidated a few years later. See H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking," pp. 116–30.

7. In the first decade of the twentieth century, many Greek banking houses were in operation in various Ottoman cities. For example, the *List of Greek Commercial Houses* (1912 edition) cites 9 banking houses in Thessaloniki, 3 in Adana, 16 in Smyrna, and 5 in Trabzon. This is a valuable source, published annually by the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople. The 1912 edition includes more than 2,000 Greek business establishments in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, North Africa, and Greece. In my opinion, it includes only a fraction of the Greek houses operating worldwide at the time. See *Deltion tou en Kōnstantinoupolei Hellēnikou Emporikou Epimelētēriou*. [Bulletin of the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople], 1912.

8. Greek capital in Constantinople played an important part in the establishment of these banks. The Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman was founded in 1864 by a group of Greek and other Galata bankers that included G. Zariphēs, G. Zapheiropoulos, Chr. Zōgraphos, K. Karapanos, Cammondo, Stefanovich-Skilitzi, and A. Vlastos and a group of European capitalists, with a nominal capital of 2 million TL. The Ottoman bank had a large share in the company's capital from the start. Although the exact amount of the Greek share cannot be estimated, it seems that it was quite substantial, if we judge from those who constituted the board of directors.

The Banque de Constantinople was founded in 1872 by A. Syngros, E. Skouloudēs, and G. Kōronios, with a capital of 1 million TL. Other Greek bankers must have had a large share in the banks capital. In 1875, the bank was strengthened when G. Zariphēs and his son-in-law, U. Negreponte, joined the board of directors. This institution remained entirely under the control of Greek capital.

The Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs was founded in 1872 by E. Eugenidēs, P. Klados, and the British capitalist A. Barker, with a nominal capital of 660,000 TL. This bank had an important interest in the promotion of merchant banking, although finally it did not avoid the temptation of involving itself deeply in Ottoman finances. Eventually, it proved the most successful of the three, but was liquidated in 1899, when the imperial government refused to renew the bank's permit.

What is interesting is that these banks, apart from an important and in the last two cases dominant Greek share, had a common interest in the Ottoman floating debt and entirely avoided investing in tax-farming, which was the favorite field for investment of the Armenian sarrafs who dominated Ottoman finances up to the 1840s and who were eclipsed after the rise of modern banking. See H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking," pp. 112-15, M. Sturdza, "Haute Banque et Sublime Porte," in P. Dumont, ed., *Contribution a l'histoire economique et sociale de l'empire Ottoman* (Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1983).

In addition to these banks, there were a large number of private Greek banking houses in Constantinople with involvement in Ottoman finances and commerce. According to one source, out of a total number of 47, the number of Greek banking houses in 1868 stood at 16 [see Appendix I]. This account, however, seems to be incomplete as some private bankers, such as Syngros Kamaras, and Klados are not included. See the "Liste des Principaux corps

des banquiers commercants arts et metiers de la ville de Constantinople," *Indicateur Constantinopolitain* 1 (1868). The number of Greek banks and banking houses increased during the early 1870s, when business prospects appeared excellent, and the Constantinople money market experienced an unprecedented influx of capital.

9. See H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking," pp. 132-47.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-77.

11. The combined profits of these banks in the period 1871-75 was as high as 1,500,000 TL [see Appendix IV].

12. The group of Galata bankers was represented by G. Zariphēs, Th. Maurogordatos, Z. Stefanovich, P. Stefanovich-Skilitzi, A. Vlastos, A. Barker, S. Fernandes, B. Tubini, L. Zariphēs, G. Kōronios, and U. Negrepointe. The Ottoman bank was represented by M. Foster, E. Deveaux, and J. Von Haas. The bankers received permission to collect the stamp and spirit taxes of Constantinople and the silk tax of the districts of Constantinople and Edirne, Bursa, and Samsun. In addition, they were given the administration of the salt and tobacco monopolies in the empire for a period of 10 years. The annual revenue deriving from these taxes would be used to pay back the advances made to the government by the bankers in the period 1875-79; see "Convention entered between the Imperial Government and certain Banks" in A & P (1880) 82, Turkey, no. 20, "Correspondence respecting Ottoman loans," pp. 72-75. The convention did not settle the entire debt as it included advances up to 8,725,000 TL. In April 1879, the total amount of money that the Ottoman state owed the bankers was 12,675,259 TL. It is quite unlikely that under the circumstances of extreme financial penury, the Ottoman state was in no position to repay 4 million TL in a period of eight months; see H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking," pp. 187-188. The reason why some bankers preferred not to take part in the convention must lie in the relatively low rate of interest (8 percent), which, it appears, they found insufficient.

13. H. Exertzoglou, "Greek Banking," pp. 306-9.

14. On these issues, see H. Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876-1908," Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1977; J. Thobie, *Interêts et imperialisme français dans l'Empire Ottoman, 1895-1914* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1977); C. Issawi, *An Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980); and R. Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914* (London; New York: Methuen, 1981).

15. Greek investments in mining, which increased rapidly from the 1880s onward, are still under study. Here, I will mention the participation of Greek capital in some of the major joint-stock mining companies in the Ottoman Empire: The Société des Mines d'Heraclée, the Société Balia Karaidin, the Société de Kassandra, and the Société de Karassou. In addition, there was an increasing number of Greek capitalists who acquired and operated mines, especially coal mines, in various areas. In 1909, for example, 30 percent of the coal in the Hērakleia coal fields was produced in mines held by Greeks; see the *Deltion tou en Kōnstantinou-polei Hellēnikou Emporikou Epimelētēriou*, 7 Nov. 1909.

16. Commerce remained a favorite area of investment for Greek entre-

preneurs. Existing mercantile networks and favorable trade opportunities allowed a considerable expansion of Greek-controlled trade in that period. Although it is not possible to estimate the exact Greek share in Ottoman trade, it seems that Greek houses were mainly involved in import rather than export trade. The British Vice Consul wrote, in 1898: "In process of time Armenians and Greeks, previously perhaps in the employ of British merchants here, obtained the agency of British firms and entered into competition with their former employers. They then conceived the idea of establishing themselves in England, or of replacing their correspondents there by agents of their own nationality, and now many of the native houses here are represented by Armenian or Greek houses in the United Kingdom, while British importers here have almost entirely disappeared"; see A&P, "Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series, Turkey, Trade of Constantinople, Scutari and Durazzo" (1893-97) no. 2196. Similar remarks could be found in the following reports: Annual series, no. 2650 (1899-90), p. 39; no. 3776 (1906), p. 26; and no. 5043 (1912), p. 8-9. In this context, it is interesting to mention that in 1912 there were at least 80 Greek business houses in Great Britain, most of them involved in the Levant trade; see *List of the Greek Commercial Houses* (1912 edition), fn. 7 above.

17. The Bank of Mytilēnē was founded by a group of Greek bankers and merchants of Constantinople and Mytilēnē with a capital of 264,000 TL. Among the founders were Leonidas Zariphēs, Vasileios Sgontas, and the influential merchants and industrialists of Mytilēnē, viz., Th. and D. Kourdjis.

18. The shipping company Aegean Sea and the coal mines in Hērakleia represented important shares in the company's capital. In 1892, the value of the shipping company was estimated at 96,936 TL and that of the coal mines at 69,630 TL (see the Annual Report of the board of directors for the year 1892, in *Neologos*, 11 May 1893). In 1899, the share of the shipping company increased to 138,923 TL and that of the coal mines to 80,130 TL (see the Annual Report for the year 1899 in *L'Economiste d' Orient*, June 1, 1899). Even in 1911, when the bank suspended payments, due to the restriction of European credit during the Ottoman-Italian War, the position of the bank had been badly affected by the 1907 Egyptian crisis and the bankruptcy of the House of Zervoudakēs—these two assets representing value of well above 100,000 TL; see *Oikonomikē Hellas*, 26 Nov. 1911 and the A&P Annual Series, no. 4385, 1910-11.

19. For the merging of the Banque de Constantinople into the Société des Changes et Valeurs, see *Neologos*, 19 April 1894; *Oikonomologos*, 16 Sept. 1894; and *Oikonomologos*, 26 April 1895.

20. The main source used in this paper is the unpublished study of G. Trakakēs, *He Viomēchania en Smyrnē kai en tē Hellēnikē Mikra Asia* [Industry in Smyrna and in Greek Asia Minor] prepared in 1920 on behalf of the National Bank of Greece (Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece), file 41 (1486). Trakakēs went to Smyrna himself and completed his research using first-hand information. Also of interest are the following: E. M. Dermizakēs, "Viomechanikē Paragōgē Nomou Aidiniou" [Industrial Production in the

vilâyet of Aydın], *Mikrasiatikâ Chronika* 12–13 (1965); and A. Panayotopoulos, "On the economic activities of the Anatolian Greeks," *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikôn Spoudôn* 4 (1983).

21. G. Trakakēs, *He Viomēchania en Smyrnē*, pp. 7–8. If the total number of industrial plants is considered, including home industries, small workshops, manufacturers, and factories, the total number rises to 5,308. Trakakēs also provided the following information with regard to the distribution of industrial plants according to nationality in 1919:

Greek:	4,008
Turkish:	1,216
Armenian:	28
Jewish:	21
British:	13
French:	8
Austrian:	6
Italian:	3
American:	2
German:	2
Belgian:	1
<hr/>	
Total:	5,308

22. The Greek share in industry and crafts in the Ottoman Empire has been estimated at 49 percent of the total; see C. Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey*, pp. 13–15.

23. This fact has already been pointed out by Turkish historians; see H. Gillow, "Les statistiques Industrielles en Turquie," in *Revue de la Faculté des sciences économiques de l'Université d'Istanbul*, October–July, 1953, no. 1–4, pp. 75–78.

24. See Gündüz Ökçün, *Osmanlı Sanayi İstatistikleri, 1913, 1915* [Ottoman Industrial Statistics, 1913, 1915] (Istanbul: Hil Hayin, 1984). The Greek share in industry can be easily estimated by the identifiable names of industrialists cited in these statistics. See Food industries, 47–48, 58, 61–62, 68, 72, 74; ceramic industries, 84, 87, 91; timber industries, 112, 115, 117; cotton industry, 140–41; cigarette paper industry, 158; printing industry, 161–62; chemical industry, 172, 175, 178; and metal industry, 183–84.

25. Trakakēs, *He Viomēchania*, p. 4.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 282–83.

27. Unfortunately, Trakakēs was not so much interested in presenting a detailed record of industry in Smyrna for the use of future historians. He rather thought it his duty to provide sufficient information about industry in the area for the purpose of helping the National Bank of Greece and Greek authorities in Smyrna with their economic and financial policies. For this reason, general information about industry is much more complete. Although this report is not complete, as far as the detailed record of the Greek share in industry is concerned, it is, to the best of my knowledge, the best available material on this subject.

28. Dependency theories have influenced both Greek and Turkish historians to an extent. See, for example, N. Psyroukēs, *Neoellēniko Paroikiako Phenomeno* [The Diaspora Phenomenon] (Athens: Epikairōtēta, 1974); K. Tsoukalas, *Exartēsē kai Anaparagōgē* [Dependency and Reproduction] (Athens: Ekdoseis Themelio, 1977); K. Vergopoulos, *Kratos kai Oikonomikē Politikē ston 19o Aiōna* [State and Economic Policy in the 19th Century] (Athens: Hexantas, 1977); G. Dertilēs, *Koinōnikos Metaschēmatismos kai Stratiōtikē Epemvasē* [Social Transformation and Military Intervention, 1880–1909] (Athens: Hexantas, 1977); G. Giannouloupoulos, “Beyond the Frontier: the Greek Diaspora,” in R. Browning, ed., *The Greek World* (New York: Portland, 1985); G. Karpat, “The Social and Economic Transformation of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century,” *Istanbul à la jonction des cultures balkaniques méditerranéennes, slaves et orientaux XVI-XIX siècles* (Bucharest: Association internationale d’études du Sud-Est européen, 1977); U. Turgay, “Trade and merchants in 19th century Trabzon,” in B. Lewis and B. Braude, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982); and Doğu Ergil, “A Reassessment: The Young Turks and Their Anticolonial Struggle,” *Balkan Studies* 16 (1975). For a critical review of some of these theories, see P. Pizaniās “‘Kentro kai Periphēria’: Theoria kai Historia” [‘Center and Periphery’: Theory and History], *Mnēmōn* 11 (1987); and the interesting article of Reşat Kasaba, “Was there a Comprador Bourgeoisie in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Western Anatolia?,” *Review* (1988, no. 2). See also my article “Hē Hellēnikē Historiographia kai to Homogeneiako Kephalaio: Provlēmata Methodou kai Hermēneias” [Greek Historiography and the Diaspora Capital; Questions of Method and Interpretation], *Synchrona Themata* 35–37 (Dec. 1988).

I would like to point out here that I deliberately avoid the use of the term “intermediary.” This term, the use of which is so common, seems to me misleading. If by this term we mean merchant, that is, the capitalist who acted as the link between local producers, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and the market, I have no objection to using it. But one has always to keep in mind that being an intermediary was not the privilege of Greek or other non-Muslim entrepreneurs in the Ottoman Empire. The same term could also apply to the British, French, Austrian, and other merchants who conducted trade there. My view, however, is that the term “intermediary” is used to define the subordinate position of the Ottoman bourgeoisie vis-à-vis European capitalism rather than to describe a business occupation. I have already pointed out that the Ottoman bourgeoisie had its own motives and its own diversified economic activities. These were different from and more complicated than those of an “intermediary.”

29. This company was founded in 1892 by a group of Greek bankers and banks (E. Eugenidēs, Th. Maurogordatos, Banque de Constantinople, the Laurium Company) and a group of European, mostly French, financiers, with a capital of 4.5 million fr. In 1904, the company issued 15,000 new shares of 100 fr. each. The company’s profits increased annually and in 1907 reached 165,358 TL. See E. Pech, *Manuel des Sociétés anonymes Fonctionnant en*

Turquie (Constantinople: Impr. Gerard frères, 1906), pp. 135–38; also J. Thobie, *Interêts et impérialisme français dans L'Empire Ottoman, 1895–1914*, pp. 404–5. See also the *Athenian Weekly*, 12 July 1908, 25 Dec. 1908.

30. See the articles published in the journal of the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Constantinople (in Greek): “The Devastating Boycott Against Greeks,” 17 June 1910; “Turkish Hamals and the Anti-Greek boycott,” 6 Nov. 1910, “The Effects of the Anti-Greek Boycott on the Ottoman Economy,” 4 Dec. 1910; “Statistics and the Anti-Greek Boycott,” 29 Jan. 1911. It is interesting that the main argument used in these articles is that the boycott would harm Ottoman more than Greek interests. See also the British report on the trade and commerce of Smyrna for the year 1910 in *Oikonomikē Hellas*, 12 Nov. 1911.

31. See Accountant and Papers, Annual series, Report on the Trade of Constantinople, Scutari and Durazzo,” no. 5043 (1912), pp. 5–6 and no. 5374 (1913), pp. 3–4.

32. See Doğu Ergil, “A Reassessment: The Young Turks,” pp. 61–65.

APPENDIX I

Greek Bankers in Constantinople, 1868

Ath. Adamantidēs
 G. Athēnogenēs
 E. Valtatzēs
 M. Kōnstantinidēs
 Ch. Ēliaskos
 Clavany Sons and Co.
 Icovanomides Bros.
 A. Maurogordatos
 Nahmias and Bajonas Bros.
 N. Nikolaidēs
 E. Papadakēs
 S. Rallēs
 L. Perdikarēs
 J. Thalasso
 D. Theodōridēs
 G. Zariphēs and L. Zariphēs

Source: *Indicateur Constantinopolitain* 1, 1868.

APPENDIX II

Investment Profiles of Constantinopolitan Banks, 1882–1897

Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman

1882

Participations: 1883 Greek loan, 1883 Ottoman Loan, Régie Cointeressée des Tabacs.

Portfolio investments: 450,000 TL.

1883

Participations: none.

Portfolio investments: 434,715 TL.

1884

Participations: 1884 Japanese loan (13,197 TL), 1884 Greek loan (43,233 TL), Volos-Larissa Railways, Piraeus-Patras Railways.

Portfolio investments: 434,825 TL.

1885

Participations: Greek advances (45,981 TL).

Portfolio investments: 466,059 TL.

1886

Participation: Greek short-term advances (46,338TL), 1886 Portugese loan, Société des Eaux de Constantinople (20,594 TL), Thessalian Railways (52,653 TL), Railways of Peloponnese (3,852 TL).

Portfolio investments: 337,953 TL, Egyptian shares and bonds (75,683 TL Greek bonds (38,990 TL), Ottoman bonds and shares (66,787 TL) Société des Tramways (23,219 TL).

1887

Participation: 1887 Greek loan, Greek advances (500,000 fr.).

Portfolio investments: 214,347 TL, Ottoman bonds, Greek bonds, Egyptian values, Laurium shares, Rumelian railway shares.

1888

Participation: 1888 Ottoman loan, Cretan loan, 6 percent Greek loan, Greek advances.

Portfolio investments: 212,250 TL.

1889

Participations: 21,183 TL.

Portfolio investments: 305,240 TL.

1890

Participations: 120,255 TL.

Portfolio investments: 401,382 TL.

1891

Participations: 62,277 TL.

Portfolio investments: 444,382 TL.

Banque de Constantinople

1882

Participations: none.

Portfolio investments: 142,000 TL plus Ottoman bonds of Priority (A series) to the value of 148,850 TL.

1883

Participations: 1883 Greek loan, Régie Cointeressée des Tabacs.

Portfolio investments: 637,283 TL (611,035 TL held by the bank's branches in London, Paris, and Athens).

1884

Participations: 1884 Greek loan.

1885

Participations: 42,063 TL.

Portfolio investments: 260,653 TL.

1886

Participations: 1886 Greek loan.

Portfolio investments: 287,241 TL, Laurium, Banque d'Epiro-Thessalie, Société des Tramways, Land Company of Santa Fe, Nacupai Venezuelan Railways.

1887

Participations: Greek loan of 135 million fr.

Portfolio investments: 633,368 TL.

1888

Participations: Company of the monopolies (Greece 2,500 shares), Greek advances (5,500,000 fr.), Thessalian Railways (9,907 shares), World Bank of Berlin.

1889

Participations: Anatolian Railways, Yedi Küle spinning factory, 1889 Greek loan.

Portfolio investments: 762,714 TL.

1890

Participations: Conversion of the Ottoman Priority bonds, Portugese loan of 5 percent, Serbian loan of 5 percent, 1890 Russian loan, Romanian loan of 4 percent, Mexican loan of 4 percent, loan of the city of Bucharest, Western Brazilian Railways, Athena Insurance Company (Greece).

Portfolio investments: 1,250,382 TL, Argentinian bonds and shares (82,000 TL).

Argentinian advances: 60,000 TL.

1891

Participations: 151,085 TL.

Portfolio investments: 695,665 TL.

1892

Participations: Greek advances (32,000 TL and 7,300,000 fr.), Société des Mines Balia Karaidin, Thessaloniki-Monastir Railways.

Portfolio investments: 955,914 TL.

Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs

1882

Participations: Thessalian Railways (6,000 TL).

Portfolio investments: 211,790 TL.

1883

Portfolio investments: 254,603 TL.

1884

Participations: 1884 Greek loan (597,237 TL), Greek advances (600,000 fr.).

Portfolio investments: 216,723 TL.

1885

Portfolio investments: 261,815 TL.

1886

Participations: Greek advances.

Portfolio investments: 259,159 TL, Ottoman Defense loan, Egyptian Unified Debt, Lottery bonds of the National Bank of Greece, Athens-Piraeus Railways, Ottoman Debt, A, B, and D series.

1887

Participations: Greek loan of 4 percent.

Portfolio investments: 315,212 TL, Ottoman bonds, 1871-77, Ottoman Debt series A, B, and D, Greek lottery bonds, Egyptian Unified Debt, Athens-Piraeus Railways, Laurium, Société des Tramways.

1888

Participations: Greek advances (2,000,000 fr.), Thessalian Railways (6,697 shares), Cretan loan (60,000 TL).

Portfolio investments: 178,440 TL, Egyptian Unified, 1871 Ottoman loan Greek monopoly, Ottoman Unified Debt A, B, and D series, Greek lottery bonds, Société des Tramways, Smyrna-Kasaba Railways.

1889

Participations: Greek advances (40,000 TL), Greek loan of 4 percent, Bulgarian loan of 4 percent, Anatolian Railways, Messolonghi-Agrinio Railways (Greece), Italian Railways, textile factory in Constantinople.

Portfolio investments: 279,408 TL 1871 Ottoman loan, Italian 5 percent, 1884 Greek loan, Thessalian Railways, Greek loan of 4 percent, Athens-Piraeus Railways, Greek company of the monopolies, Régie Cointeressée des Tabacs.

1890

Participations: Argentinian advances (13,000 TL and 100,000 fr.), Egyptian Daira loan, Rumanian 4 percent, Northeastern Argentinian Railways (8,900 shares).

Portfolio investments: 529,250 TL, 1871 Ottoman loan, Thessalian Railways, 1890 Portuguese loan, Greek loan of 4 percent, Régie Cointeressée des Tabacs, Italian 5 percent, Athens-Piraeus Railways, Ottoman Imperial Bank.

1891

Participations: Great Eastern Uruguay Railways, Mexican Pacific railways

(2,250 TL) La Plata and Enseñadas Railways (5,500 TL).

Portfolio investments: 322,800 TL.

1892

Participations: Greek advances (15,000 TL and 2,000,000 fr.), Thessaloniki-Monastir Railways.

Portfolio investments: 212,403 TL.

1893

Participations: Yedi Küle Spinning factory, Société des Mines de Balia Karaidin, Société Générale d'assurances Ottomanes, Turkish Régie Export Co., Salonique Dedeğac Railway.

Portfolio investments:

1894

Participations: Rumanian 4 percent, Norwegian 5 percent, Mexican 3 percent, Russian 6 percent, Extension of the Smyrna-Kasaba line, Metatroph Egyptian.

1895

Participations: Chinese loan (guaranteed by the Russian government), issue of Spanish Treasury Bonds, conversion of the Tramways bonds.

Portfolio investments: 751,281 TL.

1896

Participations: Agrarian Bulgarian loan of 5 percent (135,000 fr.), Kabin Mines (Kingdom of Siam), 1897 Chinese loan, Cuban Bonds (Bons Hypothecaires Cubaines), Lignes de Raccordement de Chemin de Fer Orientaux.

Portfolio investments: 446,036 TL.

APPENDIX III

**Participation of Greek Bankers in Boards
of Directors of Ottoman Joint-Stock Companies, 1906**

E. Eugenidēs:

Société de la Régie Cointeressée des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman, Société du Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie, Société Imperiale Ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, Société Anonyme Ottomane de Balia Karaidin.

L. Zariphēs:

Société des Chemin de Fer Ottoman Salonique Monastir, Deutsche Orientbank Aktiengesellschaft, Banque de Mytilin, Société d'Heraclée, Société Ottomane des Mines de Karassou, Compagnie des Eaux de Constantinople.

Th. Maurogordatos:

Société Anonyme Ottomane de Balia Karaidin, Société des Mines de Kassandra, Société Ottomane des Mines de Karassou.

P. Chatzēlazaros:

Banque de Salonique.

D. Sgoutas:

Banque de Mytilin, Société Anonyme des Mines de Kassandra.

Ch. Ēliaskos:

Sociétés du Port et des Quais de Chio, Société Générale d'Assurance Ottomane.

A. Agelastos:

Compagnie Ottomane du Chemin de Fer Mersin-Tarsus-Adana.

S. Sideridēs:

Société des Tramways de Smyrne-Göztepe Tepe.

Source: Pech, E.: *Manuel des Sociétés Anonymes Fonctionnant en Turquie*, 1906.

Note: This Appendix includes only the better-known Greek bankers and not all Greek capitalists.

APPENDIX IV

Bank Profits in Constantinople, 1871-1898

	Société Générale*	Banque de Constantinople	Société Ottomane†
1871	182,818	—	—
1872	221,780	—	—
1873	216,842	120,848	84,787
1874	162,714	178,207	94,700
1875	94,924	217,126	64,508
1876	(losses)	44,529	27,037
1877	49,275	79,582	49,474
1878	29,319	185,260	45,847
1879	21,175	130,066	37,627
1880	61,364	164,287	29,812
1881	61,120	174,878	25,672
1882	39,457	117,767	31,751
1883	29,565	65,470	20,369
1884	40,017	(losses)	29,346
1885	35,397	52,697	23,766
1886	33,361	53,474	24,484
1887	26,419	122,588	35,390
1888	26,280	106,837	32,268
1889	25,707	81,376	34,580
1890	49,249	54,718	41,729
1891	182	(-71,423)	12,323
1892	—	29,215	28,448
1893	—	(-169,012)	34,083
1894	—	—	70,054
1895	—	—	70,968
1896	—	—	32,082
1897	—	—	23,964‡

*Société Générale de L'Empire Ottoman.

†Société Ottomane des Changes et Valeurs.

‡Up to 23 Oct. 1897.

Source: Annual reports of the Boards of Directors of these banks.

V

A Millet Within a Millet: The Karamanlides*

RICHARD CLOGG

IN JANUARY 1923, "a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory," was signed by Eleutherios Venizelos and İsmet (İnönü), the principal Greek and Turkish negotiators. This exchange was part of the settlement reached at Lausanne following the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922, which had culminated in the catastrophic defeat of the Greek armies in Asia Minor in September 1922. There had been a surprising degree of agreement on the part of the British, Greek, and Turkish representatives at the Lausanne negotiations that the Turkish-speaking Greeks of Asia Minor, the *Karamanlides*,¹ should be exempted from the exchange. Lord Curzon, the British foreign secretary, for instance, after deploring the proposed exchange, was of the opinion that what he termed "the reconciled Ottoman Greeks, numbered at about 50,000 persons," would remain in situ. İsmet Paşa, for his part, spoke approvingly of the case of the "Orthodox Turks who had never asked for treatment differing in any respect from that enjoyed by their Muslim compatriots, and it was most improbable that they would ever make such a request." Venizelos, whose terminology was perhaps the least ambiguous, talked of the "Turkish-speaking persons of the Orthodox faith . . . who would stay in any case."² In the event, however, these Turkish-speaking Greeks, or Orthodox Turks as İsmet Paşa insisted on regarding them, who numbered many more than the 50,000 of Curzon's estimate and perhaps as many as 300,000,³ were included alongside their Greek-speaking co-religionists in the great uprooting of populations that followed the Treaty of Lausanne.

*An earlier version of this paper was published as "Anadolu Hıristiyan Karındaşlarımız: the Turkish-speaking Greeks of Asia Minor" in John Burke and Stathis Gauntlett, eds., *Neohellenism*, Australian National University, Humanities Research Centre Monograph no. 5 (Canberra, 1992), pp. 65–91.

At the outset, it should be clear that I do not intend to debate the ethnic origins of these Karamanlı Christians—whether they were indeed, as Greek scholars declare, Turkicized Greeks, or, as their Turkish counterparts insist, Hellenized Turks.⁴ This debate arouses fierce emotions. Some years ago, in an article on the activities of the British and Foreign Bible Society in distributing Bible translations in *karamanlidika* (*karamanlīca*), that is to say, Turkish written with Greek characters, I stated that the question of the origin of the Karamanlı Christians was a matter of controversy and was likely to remain so. “Greek scholars incline to the view that the karamanlides were of Greek descent and adopted Turkish as their vernacular, either by force or as a result of their isolation from the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians of the coastal regions. Turkish scholars regard them as the descendants of Turks who had migrated to Byzantine territories before the conquest or had served as mercenaries in the Byzantine armies and who had adopted the religion but not the language of their new rulers.”⁵ This seemed, and seems, to me to be a relatively unobjectionable statement, not of opinion, but of fact. Nonetheless, shortly after the publication of my study an (anonymous) article appeared in the refugee newspaper *Prosphygikos Kosmos* [Refugee World], which found a sinister parallel between my views on the origins of the Karamanlı Christians and those of the Yugoslav Communist Party newspaper, *Borba*, which was of the firm opinion that the Karamanlides were of Turkish origin.⁶

While the Greeks seem, at an early stage, to have numbered the Karamanlı Christians among their compatriots, it appears that only at a relatively late stage did Turkish nationalists begin to argue their essential Turkishness.⁷ The controversy as to the ethnic origins of the Karamanlides has some parallels with the furious controversy that dominated the intellectual life of the Greek state during its first decades, arising from the assertion of the Austrian Hellenist Jakob Fallmerayer that not a drop of pure Hellenic blood flowed in the veins of the modern Greeks and that they were in fact Hellenized Slavs.⁸

This debate, by its nature, must necessarily be inconclusive and appears to me ultimately unprofitable. For what is important is that the modern Greeks perceive themselves as the lineal descendants of the ancient Greeks. Whether they are or not is beside the point. Likewise, in the controversy over the origins of the Karamanlides what is important is not so much the reality as how they perceived

themselves. But here I must confess that it is not always clear what the Karamanlides did think themselves to be in terms of ethnicity.

For most, it was clear that the crucial distinction was that they were Orthodox Christians. Iōakeim Valavanēs, writing in his *Mik-rasiatika* [Studies on Asia Minor], published in 1891, at a time when considerable effort had been expended in inculcating in the Orthodox Christians of the interior of Asia Minor an awareness that they were Greeks, records that even the Christian who spoke Greek after a fashion, “is ignorant of the very name of the race to which he belongs. . . . For if today you ask a Christian, even one speaking a corrupted Greek: ‘What are you?’ ‘A Christian (*Christianos*),’ he will unhesitatingly reply. ‘All right but other people are Christians, the Armenians, the Franks, the Russians. . . .’ ‘I don’t know,’ he will answer, ‘yes, these people believe in Christ but I am a Christian.’ ‘Perhaps you’re a Greek?’ ‘No, I’m not anything. I’ve told you that I’m a Christian, and once again I say to you that I am a Christian!’ he will reply to you impatiently.”⁹

It should be kept in mind that not only were many Asia Minor Greeks Turkophones but so, too, were many of the Armenians of the region.¹⁰ Indeed, it is said that when the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions became active in Asia Minor in the later nineteenth century, one might find on one side of a Protestant church Greeks using hymn books printed in Turkish with Greek characters and Armenians on the other, using hymnals likewise printed in Turkish but with Armenian characters, and the same sounds emerging from both sets of congregants. In European Turkey, some of the Slav populations were Turkish-speaking and used Cyrillic characters to write Turkish.¹¹ To compound this linguistic potpourri, one might also mention the small groups of Armenian-speaking Greeks to be found in the eparchies of Nicaea, Nicomedia, and Chalcedon who apparently used Greek characters to write Armenian,¹² or the *Phranko-levantinoi*, the Greek-speaking Levantine Catholics, who wrote Greek in Latin characters and for whom prayer books and catechisms in *Phrankochiōtika*, or Greek written with Latin characters, were being published at least into the fifties of the present century.¹³

Then there were the Greek-speaking Jews of Constantinople who used the Hebrew alphabet to write Greek. Somewhat paradoxically, the first Greek text to be printed in Constantinople was a modern Greek version of the Pentateuch printed with Hebrew characters, as

part of the famous *Soncino Polyglot* of 1547. This version, published by Jewish printers who had been driven out of Spain and Portugal, is of considerable interest to linguists for it was made directly from the Hebrew and not from the Septuagint Greek and reflects the spoken Greek of Constantinople in the mid-fifteenth century.¹⁴ The *Soncino Polyglot* contained, inter alia, a Spanish version of the Pentateuch in Hebrew characters, that is to say in Ladino, the lingua franca of many of the Jews of the Ottoman Empire. In the largely Jewish quarter of Hasköy, in Constantinople, there were also Greeks who customarily spoke Ladino.¹⁵ One could multiply examples of these linguistic curiosities in that extraordinary agglomeration of peoples and faiths, the Ottoman Empire, but I hope that the examples I have adduced will indicate that the phenomenon of karamanlidika was by no means an isolated one. Moreover, it provides further evidence, if such were needed, that language is by no means a necessary criterion of ethnic identity.

The existence of Turkophone Christians in Asia Minor is attested at an early date. One of the earliest written attestations is contained in a document prepared for the Council of Basel (1431–38) and based on a report prepared by three emissaries to the Greek lands. This recorded that it was noteworthy that in many parts of Turkey (i.e., Asia Minor) there were to be found clergy, bishops, and archbishops who wore the clothes of the infidel and spoke their language and “knew how to pronounce in Greek nothing else than to chant the mass and the gospels and epistles. Other prayers they say in the language of the Turks.”¹⁶

By the mid-sixteenth century, communities of these Karamanli Christians are also recorded in Constantinople. By the time of the visit of the German traveler Hans Dernschwam to the city (1553–54), they had established their own distinctive quarter in the Yedikule district: “They are Christians, they have the Greek faith . . . their language is Turkish” (“*seind cristen, haben den krichischen glauben . . . Ir sprach ist türkisch*”).¹⁷ Somewhat later in the sixteenth century, Stefan Gerlach noted the presence in Constantinople of Christians who, like those that he had encountered in the region of Philadelpheia, “all speak, as do all Christians, who live so far into Asia, Turkish” (“*reden/wie alle Christen/so weit in Asien wohnen/alle Türkisch*”). They were apparently well-to-do and numbered among them many goldsmiths.¹⁸ Another sixteenth-century traveler likewise noted that the “Caramanians,” who lived ‘neere unto the 7 towres’ (i.e., Yedikule), were “very ingenious,” “specially in goldsmith’s work.”¹⁹

Manouël Gedeōn, the historian par excellence of "our (Greek) East" (*hē kath' hēmas Anatolē*), has written that in the eighteenth century there were few among the Orthodox Christians of any part of the Ottoman capital who could understand the Holy Scriptures or ecclesiastical encyclicals in Greek. Until the 1830s, the Great Church had to translate ecclesiastical documents into Turkish for the inhabitants of the parish of St. Constantine of Karamania or of the Karamaniots in Yedikule.²⁰ Substantial communities of Karamanlı Christians were to be found in Constantinople throughout the nineteenth century, mainly although not exclusively concentrated in the Yedikule, Samatya, and Narlıkapı quarters. Their favored burial ground was between the Silivrikapı next to the walls of Constantinople and the monastery of the Zōodochos Pēgē at Balıklı, to the courtyard of which a number of gravestones were subsequently moved and where they remain to this day, a mute witness to a centuries-old symbiosis of Greek and Turk in Constantinople that has now all but vanished.²¹

Although substantial communities of Karamanlides were settled in Constantinople throughout the period of the Tourkokratia, many of these were composed, as the epigraphical evidence attests, of migrants from Cappadocia. The regions of Kayseri, Nevşehir, and Niğde, in particular, always appear to have had the largest concentration of Karamanlides, while they were also to be found in substantial numbers in the neighborhood of Konya, Isparta, Burdur, and Antalya. There were also scattered communities in European Turkey and in the Crimea. A representative of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Reverend Robert Pinkerton, for instance, during the course of a visit to the Crimea and the Sea of Azov in the early nineteenth century found the Greeks of Mariupol to be in "a most lamentable state of ignorance; very few of them, comparatively, understand the modern Greek. The Tartar, which they brought with them from the Crimea, is the only language which is generally spoken among them."²² In fact, however, these Karamanlı Greeks of the Crimea, who appear to have migrated to the region, presumably from Asia Minor, in the years between 1775 and 1778, spoke a Crimean variant of Ottoman Turkish,²³ and books printed in Karamanlidika for the Karamanlides of Asia Minor circulated among them.

Although the evidence is somewhat contradictory, it would appear that even where a community was wholly Turkish-speaking, the liturgy would be celebrated largely in Greek, even if the local priest could do no more than chant the text without understanding its meaning. The Gospel and Epistles were read in Turkish as well as Greek

throughout much of Asia Minor, with the local schoolmaster or the priest sometimes translating or explaining the meaning of passages read in Greek.²⁴

During the early part of the present century, R. M. Dawkins, the great authority on the Greek dialects of Asia Minor, heard a sermon in Turkish preached at Fertek, as did Henri Grégoire in Pharasa, although both these villages were Greek-speaking.²⁵ A Russian traveler, P. A. Chikhachev, recorded his astonishment during a visit to Isparta in 1853 at hearing the Gospel read in Turkish, "the language of Mohammed [*sic*] the arch-enemy of Christianity."²⁶ Elsewhere, Chikhachev writing of an earlier visit to Isparta in 1847 recounted that in their church services the Greeks of the town employed exclusively Turkish.²⁷ Such assertions are made by a number of other writers and travelers. That great traveler, geographer, and acute observer of the Greek world, W. M. Leake, writing of his visit to Konya (Ikonio) in 1800, noted that Greek was "not even used in the church-service."²⁸ The Reverend Robert Pinkerton, who, although well informed about the condition of the Karamanlides in the Crimea never, so far as I know, traveled in Asia Minor, claimed that "in a great part of Anatolia even the public worship of the Greeks is now performed in the Turkish tongue."²⁹ A German traveler in Asia Minor during the early years of this century observed that "even Church services were held in Turkish" before a greater awareness of their Greek heritage manifested itself among the Karamanlides in the decades following the Crimean War.³⁰

Two sources attest to the celebration of the Orthodox liturgy in Turkish in the isolated community on an island in the Eğridir gölü (Eğridir Lake). The first is from A. Baumstark, a noted liturgical scholar. He did not visit the island, however, and gives no source for his assertion, which may have been oral information.³¹ The British archaeologist D. G. Hogarth did visit the Eğridir Lake in the early 1890s and noted that the village on the island contained about fifty Greek families with a church and two priests. "No service is held except on the greatest festivals, and then in Turkish, for neither priest nor laity understand a word of Greek." The priests told Hogarth and his companion that the families were becoming fewer and fewer by the year: "The fathers could teach their children nothing about their ancestral faith, for they knew nothing themselves; the Moslems were 'eating them up.'"³²

It could be that these various observers, not being themselves

Greek, may have had difficulty in distinguishing those passages in the liturgy that were undoubtedly celebrated in Turkish and those in a Greek parroted by priests who had no knowledge of its meaning, but even some Greek sources testify to the entire liturgy being celebrated in Turkish. V. A. Mystakidēs, for instance, in the 1890s noted that this had been the practice in the villages of Sapanca and Adapazarı, near Nicomedia (İzmit). Now, however, Greek was used, although the congregation became annoyed if, on Holy Days, the Gospel was not also read in Turkish so that they could understand it.³³ Although Ottoman Turkish was used as a liturgical language among certain of the Jacobite (Monophysite) Christians, and although parts of the Orthodox Liturgy undoubtedly were celebrated in Turkish by the Karamanlides, it seems unlikely that the Liturgy was ever celebrated wholly in Turkish.

It is noteworthy that no manuscript or printed book reproducing the entire liturgy in karamanlidika appears to have survived.³⁴ Certain of the service books, such as the Psalter and the Gospels, were translated into karamanlidika and enjoyed a wide circulation, but it appears unlikely that the whole of the *Euchologion to Mega*, containing the liturgies of St. Chrysostom, St. Basil, and of the Presanctified, ever was. Although no translation of the Liturgy into Turkish, so far as I know, appears to survive, detailed expositions of the meaning of the Liturgy were published. These included the *Leitourgika yâni Şerîf-i Leitourgianin Tefsîri* published in Constantinople in 1898, a translation of Iōannēs E. Mesolōras's *Encheiridion Leitourgikēs tēs Orthodoxou Anatolikēs Ekklēsiās* [Liturgical Manual of the Orthodox Eastern Church] (Athens, 1895).³⁵ Similarly the *Elenchos Diamartyromenōn yâhud Tekzib-ül Protestan* [Rebuttal of the Protestants] contained a brief exegesis of the Liturgy.³⁶ This was published in Athens in 1876 and represented an attempt to bolster the faith of the Orthodox in the face of the proselytizing activities of American Protestant missionaries.

Moreover, just as a number of travelers assert that the Karamanlides celebrated the Liturgy entirely in Turkish, so others maintain that, even in wholly Turkophone communities, the Liturgy was celebrated in Greek, although the priest might not understand a word of it. Richard Chandler, for instance, in his travels in Asia Minor between 1764 and 1765 on behalf of the Society of Dilettanti recorded an encounter with the *prōtopapas* (highest-ranking priest) of Philadelphia, who knew only Turkish. Chandler was assured that "the clergy and laity in general knew as little of Greek as the protopapas; and

yet the liturgies and offices of the church are read as elsewhere, and have undergone no alteration on that account."³⁷ Three quarters of a century later, C. F. M. Texier found that among the Greeks of Ürgüp there was not one who knew Greek and that their priests made use of it only in the Liturgy.³⁸ A number of other sources testify to the fact that even where the priest could not understand what he was chanting, Greek was nonetheless the basic liturgical language.³⁹ Edmund Naumann was assured by Dr. Isaakidēs, a Greek of Kermir, that nowhere in Turkey was the whole Liturgy celebrated in the Turkish language, for it was in the interests of all the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire to employ Greek as widely as possible, even in Turkophone regions.⁴⁰ One British traveler in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, G. T. Keppel, recorded that in the Turkish-speaking Orthodox villages in the region of Sart and Kula prayers were recited "in an odd medley of both languages" so that the beginning of the Lord's prayer ran "*Patir bizim ho en tois ouranois* (our Father who art in heaven)."⁴¹

Even in the darkest years of the Tourkokratia, the Ecumenical Patriarchate seems to have been aware of the need to maintain the liturgical use of Greek among the Karamanlides of Asia Minor. During the patriarchate of Hieremias III (1716–26; 1732–33), for instance, arrangements were made for young Greeks from the Kayseri region to study at the *Megalē tou Genous Scholē* (Great School of the [Greek] Nation) at Kuruçeşme in Constantinople for a period of four to five years so that they could read and understand well and correctly the Holy Scriptures and the various liturgical books.⁴²

Above all, perhaps, there appears to have existed a belief that it was somehow sacrilegious to translate the deepest mysteries of the Orthodox faith into Turkish. A passage in the anonymous *Apanthismatēs Christianikēs Pisteōs yāni Gülzâr-ı İmân-ı Mesihî* [Compendium of the Christian Faith] makes precisely this point: "If you ask why these morning and evening prayers are written solely in Greek, you should know that the mysteries and rites of our religion may not be translated into common Turkish . . . these prayers are written in Greek only, so that the Christian who reads them does not blaspheme against God."⁴³ Although much of the text is given in both Greek and Turkish, this particular passage is printed in Turkish alone. The book, significantly, was reprinted in 1803 at the very fount of Orthodoxy, at the press of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (Âsitânedede Patrikhânedede olan Basma-

hânede), newly reconstituted by the Patriarch Grēgorios V in 1798. The preface states that the book had been prepared for those Christians to be found in the East who had been deprived of the Greek tongue and who found themselves in profound ignorance and precious little understood the true teaching of "our Holy and Orthodox faith."

Just as the Karamanlides during the long centuries between the adoption of Turkish as their vernacular and the exchange of populations (1923–24) seem to have clung tenaciously to a liturgy that was at least in part celebrated in Greek, so they clung equally tenaciously to the Greek alphabet for the writing of Turkish. Although a considerable proportion of the Karamanlides, scattered as they were for the most part in isolated communities in the interior of Asia Minor, must have been illiterate, a substantial printed literature in karamanlidika nonetheless came into existence.⁴⁴ The first work to be published in Turkish with Greek characters was printed in Martin Crusius's *Turco-graecia* in Basel, in 1584. This was a translation made by Ahmet, the qadı of Verroia, of Geōrgios Gennadios Scholarios's *Peri tēs Hodou tēs Sōtērias tōn Anthrōpōn* [Concerning the Road to the Salvation of Men], a declaration of the Orthodox faith presented to Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror in 1455 or 1456 by his new patriarch. But this was more of a scholarly curiosity than a work designed for circulation among the Karamanlides.

Gennadios Scholarios's confession of the Christian faith was, however, included in the book already quoted, the *Apanthisma*, the first book printed in karamanlidika (in 1718) specifically for circulation among the Karamanlides. It is not certain where this crudely printed work was printed, but it appears likely that it was prepared for printing by Neophytos Mauromatēs, the metropolitan of Naupaktos and Arta, and printed at the Armenian press in Constantinople, for, in the early eighteenth century, there was no Greek press in the city.⁴⁵

The *Apanthisma* was representative of what was to follow, for most books printed in karamanlidika were religious or didactic in character and usually consisted of translations or compilations from Greek originals. In the eighteenth century, some 30 books were published; in the nineteenth, some 300. Books in karamanlidika continued to be printed in substantial quantities during the first two decades of the present century. Indeed, publication in karamanlidika continued in Greece for some years after the exchange of populations. The *Aziz*

Alexiosun ve cümle Azizlerin . . . nakliyyâtları ve . . . nasihâtleri [Sermons and Advice of Saint Alexius and all other Saints] was published in Thessaloniki as late as 1929, while the last book in *karamanlidika* appears to have been published in Paphos, Cyprus, in 1935.⁴⁶ Only one of these books, a short history of the monastery of St. John the Forerunner, *Zincidere* (Monē Phlavianōn), actually appears to have been printed in Cappadocia itself, apparently at the press installed in the monastery in 1837 by the Metropolitan Paisios of Kayseri. The rest were printed in Constantinople, Athens, İzmir, and, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, like many Greek books printed for a Greek audience, further afield—in Venice, Vienna, Leipzig, and Bucharest.

The staple of *karamanlidika* literature was made up of prayer-books, the psalms, catechisms, translations of the Bible, hymns, lives of the saints, homilies such as those of St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, and guides to the Holy Land and Mount Sinai and to centers of pilgrimage nearer to hand, such as the monasteries of Athos, Kykkos, and Soumela. Undoubtedly, the largest single publisher, in terms of copies printed, was the British and Foreign Bible Society (İngiliz ve Ecnebi Kitâb-ı Mukaddes Şirketi), much of whose printing was carried out in England.⁴⁷ The Bible Society's edition of the complete New Testament, *Kitâb-ı Şerîf* [Holy Book: Bible] and the *Palaia Diathêkē yâni Eski Vaziyet ki Tevrât-ı Şerîf de denilir* [Old Testament, also known as Holy Talmud], was published in Athens in 1838, in an edition of 2,500 copies, a substantial number for its times.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Bible Society was a prolific publisher of Bible translations in what it termed "Greco-Turkish."⁴⁸ Its activities, and those of Protestant missionaries, latterly principally American, working among the Turkophone Greeks (and indeed Armenians) of Asia Minor, provoked the publication of a number of books compiled to bolster the faith of the Orthodox and to help them resist the proselytizing activity of the missionaries. These included the *Elenchos Diamartyromenōn yâhud Tekzib-ül Protestan* (Athens, 1876) already mentioned; the *Hami-i Ortodoksia* [The Defender of Orthodoxy]; (Constantinople, 1883), and the *Planōntes kai planōmenoi yâni aldatanlar ve aldananlar* [The Leaders Astray and the Led Astray]; (Constantinople, 1898).⁴⁹

While religious literature always predominated, a considerable amount of secular literature was published in *Karamanlidika* during the nineteenth century. One of the most characteristic features of the

intellectual revival that preceded the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence was a revival of a "sense of the past"—of an awareness on the part of the Greeks that they were heirs to a heritage that was universally admired throughout the civilized world. One aspect of this awareness of their heritage was the publication for a Greek readership of a whole stream of works about the history, literature, and language of ancient Greece, many of them translated from Western sources, together with editions of the ancient authors. One such, an edition of the *Physiognōmonika* incorrectly attributed to Aristotle, was translated first from ancient into modern Greek and then into simple Turkish ("eis tēn Tourkikēn haplēn dialektōn") by Anastasios Karakioulaphēs, of Kayseri, and published at the press of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Islambolda) in 1819: *Aristotelesin insan sarraflaması Yunanîden hâliyen ki Yunanîye ve dahî lisân-ı Türkîye tercüme olup. . .* This was intended by Anastasios as a small gift to the "heteroglot sons" of his "most beloved Motherland, Greece," an unusually explicit reference to Greece in a karamanlidika text of this period. Another manifestation of this revived sense of the Hellenic past was the adoption, or the use in baptism, of Ancient Greek names, a practice that scandalized the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church. It is therefore interesting that one of the two copies of the karamanlidika version of "Aristotle's" *Physiognōmonika* formerly in the possession of R. M. Dawkins, and now in the Taylorian Library in Oxford, belonged to one "Dēmostenēs Hacı P. Kemaloğlu Alaşehirli."

This was one of the many karamanlidika editions that, like many other books printed for a Greek readership at this period, was printed by subscription. A total of 319 subscribers bought 851 copies of the book; 22 of the subscribers were from Niğde; others were from Kayseri, Çorlu, Fertek, Bafra, Dilmosun, İncesu, and Isparta, which was described as "the Asiatic Sparta." The systematic study of these subscription lists could shed considerable light on the social, intellectual, and religious history of the Karamanlides.

The Orthodox catechism of the Metropolitan Platon Levshin, of Moscow, first translated into Modern Greek, incidentally, by Adamantios Koraēs in 1782, was printed in Constantinople,⁵⁰ in 1839, in an abridged version as *Doğru Dinin Tâlimi* [Education in the True Religion] by Paisios, the metropolitan of Kayseri. Appended to the book is a list of several hundred subscribers from many of the areas of Asia Minor where the Karamanlides were particularly concentrated. These included Kayseri, Kermir, Tavlusun, Talas, Edirlik,

Zincidere, Stephana, Erkilet, Molu, Nevşehir, Ürgüp, İncesu, Sillē, Karacaören, Pharasa, Vexe, Amasya, Bafra, Tokat, Niksar, and Fındıklı.

Sometimes the costs of publication were undertaken by local notables. An example of this kind of subsidized publication is the *Synaxarion* [Book of Saints] published in Venice in 1818. Translated by Zacharias of İncesu, a monk of the Dionysiou Monastery, on Mount Athos, it was published by Anastasios, the son of Hacı Yanni, head of the guild of barrel makers (*varilci başı*), at the expense of Hacı Savvas and of his brothers Hoca Anton and Dimitri, the son of Nikola, of the guild of moneylenders (*sarrafesnafından*), of the village of Hagios Geörgios in the Eparchy of Theodosiupolis, for the salvation of their father Nikola and their mother Hacı Maria. Whoever read the book was asked to say a prayer for Nikola and Hacı Maria, when they would find the mercy of God (*ve okuyanlar rahmet bulsun Allahdan*).⁵¹

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, translations were made of a number of French novels, including Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo* (Constantinople, 1882) and Xavier de Montepin's *Les filles de bronze* (Tunçdan Kızlar: Constantinople, 1891). Xavier de Montepin was a particular favorite, with three of his novels being translated. Ahmet Midhat's novel *Yeniçeriler* was also published in Constantinople in 1891.⁵² A text on the philosophy of Confucius was published in 1851 and a collection of the stories of Nasrettin Hoca in 1912. Works of more practical use were also published, such as newspapers, dictionaries, grammars, and compendia of laws. Much literature in karamanlidika, of course, never reached printed form, and numerous manuscripts in karamanlidika survive.

Although the Greek alphabet was better suited to reproducing the sounds of Turkish than was the Arabic, it could still not cater for all the sounds of Turkish, and some modification of the Greek characters was found to be necessary in order to produce an accurate phonetic rendition of Turkish. Initially, no special characters were used, but modified characters were used as early as 1784.⁵³ The first serious attempt to represent accurately, through a combination of Greek characters and special diacritical points, the sounds of Turkish came with the British and Foreign Bible Society's 1826 Constantinople edition of the New Testament, *Rabb-i İsa el-Mesihin Ahd-i Cedîdinin Tercümesi*.⁵⁴ The system was continually refined. The Bible Society's 1838 edition of the New Testament contains a key to the special letters

and signs utilized, whereas the most refined phonetic system was that employed in the publications of the American missionary societies towards the end of the nineteenth century.⁵⁵

Few of these karamanlidika texts appear to have had much in the way of literary merit. Their greatest value appears to be for Turkologists, for they give a fairly accurate indication of the way in which Turkish has been pronounced at various stages during the past three centuries.⁵⁶ Most karamanlidika books appear to have been written in a rather unpolished form of Turkish, and Janos Eckmann has cited Chrysanthos Papamichaēloglou of Kermir's *Tefekkür-i Ruhânî* [Spiritual Thoughts] printed in Constantinople in 1836 as a rare example of a karamanlidika book written in a correct and stylish Turkish, devoid of "*sprachlichen Barbarismen*."⁵⁷

An interesting aspect of these Karamanlı texts is that the Karamanlides are seldom referred to as Rumlar ("Greeks"), at least by themselves or those who wrote on their behalf. A characteristic appellation was *Anadolulu Hristiyan karndaşlarımız*, "our Anatolian Christian brethren."⁵⁸ Elsewhere, they are referred to as *Anadolu'dan olan Ortodoks dindar Hristiyanlar* ("pious Orthodox Christians from Anatolia")⁵⁹; *Anadolulu Hristiyanlar* ("Eastern Christians"); *Anadolulu Ortodoks Hristiyanları* ("Eastern Orthodox Christians"); *Yunan lîsânını bilmeyen Doğulu Hristiyanlar* ("Christians from the East who do not know the Greek language"); sometimes as *Anadolulular* ("People from Anatolia").⁶⁰

Interestingly, one of the earliest usages of the term "Orthodox millet" (*Ortodoks milleti*), to describe the gathering of the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire into a single "nation" for the purposes of administration, is to be found in a karamanlidika text. The title page of the *Didaskalia Christianikē tēs Orthodoxou hēmōn Pisteōs . . . Ortodoks imanımızın . . . talim-i mesihi* [Christian Teachings of our Orthodox Faith], published in Bucharest in 1768, records that it was printed "at the new press of the Orthodox millet" (*Ortodoks milletin yeni basmahânesinde*). The Greek title page refers to the press "*tou Orthodoxou Genous ton Rōmaïōn*" [of the Orthodox Nation of the "Rōmaioi" (=Greeks)].

To what extent the Karamanlides looked upon themselves as Greeks and not simply as Orthodox Christians during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is not easy to ascertain. Anastasios Karakioulaphēs's 1819 translation of "Aristotle's" *Physiognōmonika* ap-

pears to have been a rare effort in the years before the establishment of the independent Greek state to instill into the Karamanlides some awareness of their Greek lineage.

Nor is it easy to say what echo the stormy events of the struggle for independence in the 1820s had on the Karamanlides. R. M. Dawkins published a translation of a ballad in thirty-two stanzas on the patriarch and "ethnomartyr" Grēgorios V from a collection of folk songs in karamanlidika made by A. M. Levidēs during the long period in which he was *gymnasiarchēs* (headmaster) of the school at Zincidere.⁶¹ It tells the story of the execution of the patriarch in 1821 in reprisal for the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence. Far from being charged with nationalist emotion, the poem is, as Dawkins pointed out, curiously resigned and submissive: "there is no suggestion of national freedom for Greece and the Greeks." It is the Armenians and Jews who are held responsible for Grēgorios's fate. The sultan throughout is referred to as *pâshşâhumuz* (our sultan) and with the execution of the patriarch is seen as a terrible deed, it is also seen as but part of the immutable order of things, which must be accepted, not challenged.⁶²

But if there was little developed sense of a specifically Greek national consciousness among the Orthodox Christians of Asia Minor at the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom and particularly towards the end of the century, strenuous efforts were made to re-Hellenize these populations. School-teachers, themselves frequently of Anatolian origin, trained at the University of Athens, zealously sought to impart the gospel of Hellenism,⁶³ a task in which they were largely unhindered by Ottoman authorities. Not until 1894, indeed, did the teaching of Turkish in minority schools become a legal requirement of the Ottoman state. To use the graphic words of Charles Tuckerman, the first American minister in Athens and an acute observer of Greek society, the stream of the University of Athens was allowed to meander more or less unimpeded through the Greek provinces of the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁴

Numerous educational, literary, and cultural societies, known as *sylogoi* (societies), were engaged in this effort to inculcate a sense of Greek identity in populations widely scattered through European Turkey and Asia Minor. At the time of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, for instance, there were some twenty such *sylogoi* in the Ottoman capital alone, the most important and wealthy of these being the Greek Literary Society of Constantinople (*Ho en Kōnstantinoupolei Hellēnikos*

Philologikos Syllogos), which founded some two hundred schools throughout the empire.⁶⁵

Particularly active among the Greek populations of Asia Minor was the "Society of Anatolians, the East" (*Ho Syllogos tōn Mikrasiatōn hē Anatolē*). It was founded in 1891 and was supported by banks in Greece, by the municipality of Athens, by the University of Athens, by subsidies from the Greek state, and by the prosperous Greek communities of Egypt, which included many who had migrated from Asia Minor. The basic objective of this society was the education of young Greeks from Asia Minor, either at the University of Athens or in Greek theological colleges, or in one of the numerous Greek schools and colleges of Constantinople and Smyrna. It was intended that, once they had graduated, the holders of scholarships funded by *Hē Anatolē* should return to their native communities in Asia Minor, thereby enabling their fellow villagers both to become superior to those of other races and to retain this superiority.⁶⁶ Among its other activities, *Hē Anatolē* published an excellent journal, *Xenophanēs*, which is a mine of information on the Greek communities of Asia Minor during the later nineteenth century.

The manifold activities of these syllogoi enjoyed the full support, and also the financial backing, of the Kingdom of Greece. Indeed, the prime minister of the day, Alexandros Koumoundouros, spoke of the re-Hellenization of "our brethren" in Asia Minor as being "our chief and most feasible duty" in a circular letter of 22 May 1871, which was addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Greek consuls in the East. "Hellenism," he wrote, whose promotion was the duty of the consuls, was not the exclusive preserve of the Greek kingdom but was the symbol "of the true civilization of the East."

The first duty of the consuls was to set up primary schools, with more advanced schools and gymnasia being established where practicable, with the larger centers employing teachers educated in Greece. The circular called for local notables—the clergy, the overseers of the schools, the various kinds of teachers, "the educated and cultured citizenry" (*ekpaideutoi kai philomousoi politai*)—to rally under the auspices of the school, the church and, above all, the consulate so as to advance the cause of national education. It commended the establishment of libraries, reading rooms, clubs where reading material would be available, and, where this was practicable, a local syllogos. It urged the collection of books, of archaeological works and of objets d'art, vividly calling to mind the image of the motherland. The ministry

had drawn up a list of suitable textbooks, and the careful study of the catalog of these was urged. The ministry had full confidence in the Athens Society for the Propagation of Greek Letters (*Ho en Athēnais pros Diadosin tōn Hellēnikōn Grammatōn Syllogos*), which was to be consulted over the dispatch of teachers and on whose behalf inscriptions, etc. were to be recorded, together with records of local dialects, songs, and folklore.⁶⁷

These efforts directed at the “re-Hellenization” of the unredeemed Greeks of Asia Minor met with mixed success. One British traveler, who traveled shortly after the Koumoundouros circular, found that Greek schools had recently been opened in Isparta to teach “the rising generation their ancestors’ language.” The schools were very well attended, and younger Greeks could now speak Romaic [Greek]; he was told, however, that the bishop of Antalya was opposed to these schools for fear of corrupting the Orthodoxy of his flock.⁶⁸ The spread of educational facilities among the Karamanlides sometimes had the paradoxical result that a Turkish-speaking Greek child would learn French before he learned Greek.⁶⁹ One of these educational propagandists argued that the primary duty of Orthodox parents was to imbue their children with “the divine language of Plato and Aristotle.”⁷⁰ Yet a realistic and careful observer of the Karamanlides could write, in the early 1890s, that the Anatolian Greek had not the least idea of Greece, Athens, or the Parthenon.⁷¹

One major obstacle in the way of inculcating a knowledge of Greek into the Karamanlides was the insistence of almost all these educational missionaries on teaching the katharevousa, or “purified,” form of the language fashionable among the intelligentsia of the kingdom, an insistence that simply compounded the linguistic confusion. A French traveler, Georges Perrot, noted that, in the wake of the Athenian newspapers, books, and schoolteachers that arrived in Capadocia, came

*le pédantisme et le purisme. On abandonnera, comme impropres et bas, les vieux termes locaux, qui, même sous la forme barbare que souvent ils ont prise, ont toujours tant d'intérêt. . . . On cherchera à y substituer. . . cette gauche et plate contrefaçon du grec ancien qui est maintenant de mode à Athènes.*⁷²

One zealous advocate of the purified form of the language enthusiastically recorded at the end of the nineteenth century that the Greek taught in the Kayseri region was mercifully free “of the foreign usages, mutilated words, and barbarous phrases with which the language of

the uneducated free Greeks [of the kingdom] is unfortunately replete."⁷³

These educational endeavors, indeed, not only appear to have met with relatively little success in inculcating a knowledge of Greek among Turkophones, but also to have failed, in many instances, to stem the transition from Greek to Turkish that occurred during the nineteenth century in a number of communities where the Greek language, albeit in a pronounced dialect, had survived. R. M. Dawkins has written that the Greek dialects of Cappadocia were always fighting "a very uphill battle against Turkish on the one hand and the Greek of the schools (i.e., the katharevousa) on the other."⁷⁴ Paulos Karolidēs, writing in the 1880s, noted that, in many formerly Greek-speaking communities, only elderly women or grandmothers spoke Greek and knew no Turkish. He feared that this process would manifest itself sooner or later in all the Greek-speaking communities.⁷⁵ When in 1907 Henri Grégoire visited Pharasa, an ostensibly Greek-speaking village, he noted that all the women spoke Turkish: "*ce qui est mauvaise signe*."⁷⁶ For the women, who had far fewer contacts with Turks, tended to retain the use of Greek longer than the men. N. S. Rizos recorded that, in 1856, Lēmnos, to the west of Suvermez, had contained about one hundred Greek-speaking households,⁷⁷ but, by the early years of the present century, the language was understood only by the aged.⁷⁸

Some foreign travelers, however, took a more optimistic view and argued that education was not only stemming the advance of Turkish but was actually leading to the spread of Greek in communities where previously no word of it had been spoken.⁷⁹ Whether the tendency for Turkish to displace Greek in the interior of Asia Minor would have continued unabated had not the exchange of populations supervened is difficult to say. Moreover, ignorance of Greek was not in itself an obstacle to the emergence of a strongly developed Greek consciousness. Arnold Toynbee, for instance, in the course of his travels in Asia Minor during the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922, heard of a Karamanli Christian from Nazilli who had told a Greek officer, perforce through an interpreter, that "though my tongue is Turkish, my heart is Greek."⁸⁰

A possible solution to the special problems of the Karamanlides emerged during the Greek-Turkish War of 1919–1922 when Papa Eftim (Karachisaridēs, subsequently Hisaroğlu, and latterly Erenerol), an Orthodox priest from the village of Keskin, near Ankara, established his Turkish Orthodox Church. This was intended to provide a spiritual home for the Karamanlides; by identifying them with

the Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), he envisaged that they would be allowed to remain in their ancestral lands.

Some contemporary observers saw in Papa Eftim's movement great potential. The American journalist Clair Price, for instance, regarded "Papa Eftim Efendi," the acting metropolitan of the Turkish Orthodox Church, as "a subject to be approached with all caution for he may yet develop into a phase of the new Turkey, more important for Christendom than Kemal himself."⁸¹ Moreover, the Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV was prepared to meet Eftim's demands to the extent of setting up "a special ecclesiastical province, autonomous but subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, in which the liturgical language would be Turkish."⁸² But Eftim wanted a complete break with the Patriarchate, and his extremism, indeed, proved an embarrassment even to the Ankara government.

The Turkish authorities, nonetheless, continued to tolerate Eftim, who was subsequently to style himself *Türk Ortodoksları Reis-i Rûhânîsi Episkopos* (Bishop Spiritual Leader of the Turkish Orthodox), and from time to time used him as an instrument to harass the Ecumenical Patriarchate. His flock always remained negligible, although he was able to seize two old churches in Galata in the 1960s, one of them the Panagia Kaphatianē, to add to the jurisdiction of his *Türk Ortodoks Patrikhânesi* (Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate), which so far as I know still survives, one of his sons having assumed the title of Turkish Orthodox Patriarch with the title Eftim II.⁸³

The "Turkish Orthodox" solution, if promoted more sensitively, might conceivably have provided an answer to the problem of the Karamanlides. As it was, however, they were included in the exchange of populations, an upheaval whose tragic personal dimensions are not easy for the outsider to comprehend. Few of these displaced people would have had any notion of the Greece to which they were compulsorily moved. Moreover, their reception at the hands of mainland Greeks was not always a happy one. Among other epithets they were derisively referred to as "*giaourtovaptismenoi*," or baptized in yogurt, a reference to their use of yogurt in their cuisine, and there were complaints of the "*ogloukratia*," the predominance of those with names ending in the Turkish suffix *oğlu*.⁸⁴ A nativist reaction of this type was perhaps predictable, and, after the passage of some sixty years, these Karamanlı refugees are well integrated into Greek society. Until recently, however, and perhaps even now, cinemas in predominantly refugee quarters of Athens such as Nea Smyrnē would show Turkish-

language films for the benefit of those who retained a knowledge of Turkish, a poignant reminder of a chapter in the history of the Greek people that is now effectively closed.

NOTES

1. This term was used by Greek writers à propos the Turkish-speaking Greeks of Asia Minor at least as early as the eighteenth century. Kaisarios Dapontes, for instance, wrote of the efforts of Serapheim of Antalya to translate various religious works "eis glössan Tourkikēn me rōmaiika grammata dia tous karamanlides, hōs empeiros eis ta tourkika, ergon kalon . . . ho Theos na ton polyetē" [a fine study in Turkish written in Romaic (i.e., Greek) script (by a man who is) familiar with Turkish . . . may God give him many years] in "Historikos Katalogos Andrōn Episēmōn 1700–1784" [Historical Catalogue of Dignitaries and Officials 1700–1784], in K. Sathas, *Mesaiōnikē Vivliothēkē*, vol. 3 (Venice: Typois tou Chronou, 1872), pp. 109–10.

2. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs. 1922–23*, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. Accounts and Papers, xxvi (1923), 178, 207, and 224, cited in H. J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: the Last Phase. A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), p. 92.

3. Manolēs Triantaphyllidēs, following the 1928 census returns, gave the number of Turkish-speaking Greeks of Anatolian origin settled in Greece in the 1930s as 103,642: *Neoellēnikē Grammatikē. Historikē Eisagōgē* [Modern Greek Grammar. A Historical Introduction] (Athens: Ekdotikos Oikos Dēmētriou Dēmētrakou, 1938), p. 557.

4. On the process of the Islamization of Asia Minor, see the detailed study of Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). On the Karamanlides, see pp. 452–59 particularly.

5. Richard Clogg, "The publication and distribution of Karamanli texts by the British and Foreign Bible Society before 1850," pt. i, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 19 (1968): 57.

6. 15 December 1968. The matter of the ethnic origin of the Karamanli Christians is of some concern to the Yugoslavs, given their claim to an "Aegean Macedonia." In an effort to diminish the Greek presence in "Aegean Macedonia," Yugoslav Macedonian writers have contended that the Karamanlides settled in the region after the exchange of populations were not Greeks at all but pure Turks. Cf. Ch. Antonovski, *Egeska Makedonija* (Skopje: n.d.), p. 42, cited in N. P. Andriōtēs, *The Confederate State of Skopje and Its Language* (Athens, 1957), pp. 43–54. An additional note of linguistic complexity is indicated by the fact that some of the Karamanli Christians settled in Slav-speaking regions of Greek Macedonia apparently acquired not Greek but the dialect of their Slavophone neighbors; N. P. Andriōtēs, *Glōssa kai Ethnos* [Language and Nation] (Thessaloniki, 1963), p. 13.

7. See, for example, Şemseddin Sami, *Kâmus-ül' A'lâm* [Scientific Dictionary] (Istanbul, 1890–1900), vol. 1, pp. 396–97, and his article on “Türk-lük” [“Turkishness”], in *İkdam* (20 March 1899), cited in David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London; Totowa, N.J.: Cass, 1977), pp. 52–53.

8. The controversy has in recent years been revived. See, for example, Romilly Jenkins, *Byzantium and Byzantinism: Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple* (Cincinnati: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Cyril Mango, “Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism,” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 38 (1965): 29–43; and the review article by Speros Vryonis, “Recent scholarship on continuity and discontinuity of culture: Classical Greeks, Byzantines, Modern Greeks” in Speros Vryonis, ed., *The ‘Past’ in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture* (Malibu: Udem Publications, 1978), pp. 236–56.

9. Iōakeim Valavanēs, *Mikrasiatika* [Studies on Asia Minor] (Athens: Ekdoseis Tertios, 1891), pp. 26–27.

10. On the literature of Turkophone Armenians, see H. Berberian, “La littérature arméno-turque,” in J. Deny et al., ed., *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta* 2 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1964), pp. 809–19.

11. See G. Hazai, “Monuments linguistiques osmanlis-turcs en caractères cyrilliques dans les recueils de Bulgarie,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* xi (1960): 221–31, and G. Hazai, “Kiril harfleriyle yazılan Türk metinleri” [Turkish Texts Written in Cyrillic Script], *Türk Dil Kurultayında Okunan Bilimsel Bildiriler 1957* [Proceedings of the Turkish Language Association Conference] (Ankara: 1960), pp. 83–86, *Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınlarından Sayı 179*.

12. S. A. Choudaveroglou-Theodotos, “Hē tourkophonos hellēnikē philologia, 1453–1924” [Turkophone Greek literature, 1453–1924], *Epetēris Hetaireias Vyzantinōn Spoudōn* 7 (1930): 301–2. See also M. Gedeōn, “To kērygma tou Theiou Logou en tē ekklēsia tōn katō chronōn” [The preaching of the Word of God in the Church of the “low” years (i.e., after the fall of Constantinople)], *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* 8, pt. ii (1888): 200. There were also small communities of Orthodox “Armeno-Hellēnes” in the region of Egin and Harput; G. I. Anastasiadēs, “Chai-Chouroum (Armenoglōssoi Hellēnes)” [Armenian-speaking Greeks], *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 4 (1948): 37–46.

13. See, for instance, Philippos K. Phalmpos, “Ho Phrankomachalas tēs Smyrnēs kai ta Phrankochiōtika vivlia” [The Westerners’ section of Smyrna and Greek books written in Latin script], *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 8 (1959): 173–226; Eugène Dalleggio, “Bibliographie analytique d’ouvrages religieux en Grec imprimés avec des caractères latins,” *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 9 (1961): 385–499; Mario Vitti, “Catechismi in ‘francochiotica’ e il Vaticano Greco 1902,” *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 24 (1958): 257–75; and, L. A. M. Missir, “Un problema neogreco,” “Due altre pubblicazioni in ‘Fragochiotika,’” and “Di alcune pubblicazioni in Fragochiotika,” *Bollettino della Badia Greca di Grottaferrata* 12 (1957): 45–61; 13 (1959): 158–9; and 14 (1960): 179–83.

14. For a transliteration of this text, see D. C. Hesseling, *Les cinq livres de la Loi (Le Pentateuque). Traduction en néo-grec publiée en caractères hébraïques à Constantinople en 1547* (Leiden/Leipzig: S. C. van Doesburgh, 1897). It is inter-

esting to note that such apparently was the dissemination of Greek among the substantial Jewish community of İzmir in the later nineteenth century that one member of the Greek intelligentsia in the city could hope, with the promotion of education, for their complete Hellenization; see *Mouseion kai Vivliothēkē tēs Euangelikēs Scholēs. Periodos tritē. Etos proton kai deuteron 1878–9 kai 1879–80* [The Museum and Library of the Evangelical School. Third Period. First and Second Years 1878–9 and 1879–80] (Smyrna): p. 4.

15. M. I. Gedeōn, "Eikasias meta ereunan enoriakōn kōdikōn Kōnstantinoupoleōs" [Speculations following research on codexes of Constantinople], *Mesaiōnika Grammata* 3 (1936), reprinted as a separate pamphlet in Athens in 1936, p. 5. A British traveler, Lady Mary Wortley Montague, observed of eighteenth-century Pera that it "very well represents the tower of Babel: in Pera they speak Turkish, Greek, Hebrew, Armenian, Arabic, Persian, Russian, Slavonian, Walachian, German, Dutch, French, English, Italian, Hungarian; and, what is worse, there are ten of these languages spoken in my own family. My grooms are Arabs, my footmen French, English, and Germans; my nurse an Armenian, my house maids Russians; half a dozen other servants Greeks; my steward an Italian; my janizaries Turks; so that I live in the perpetual hearing of this medley of sounds, which produces a very extraordinary effect upon the people that are born here; for they learn all these languages at the same time, and without knowing any of them well enough to write or read in it. There are very few men, women, or even children here, that have not the same compass of words in five or six of them," *Letters of the Right Honourable Lady M--y W--y M---e: written during her travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa. . . .* (London: M. Cooper, 1777), pp. 160–61.

16. ". . . Et nihil aliud sciunt in greco proferre nisi missam cantare et evangelium et epistolas. Alias autem orationes dicunt in lingua Turcorum," S. P. Lampros, "Hypomnēma peri tōn hellenikōn chōrōn kai ekklēsiōn kata ton dekatan pempton aiōna" [A Note on Greek lands and churches during the fifteenth century], *Neos Hellēnomnēmōn* 7 (1910): 366. This passage is cited, inter alia, in R. M. Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916), and Paul Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentchesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13–15 Jh.* (Istanbul: Universum Druckerei, 1934), p. 114.

17. Franz Babinger, *Hans Dernschwam's Tagebuch einer Reise nach Konstantinopel und Kleinasien (1553–55)* (Munich/Leipzig: Dunckner and Humblot, 1923), p. 52.

18. *Stephan Gerlach des älteren Tage-Buch der . . . an die Ottomanische Pforte zu Constantinopel abgefertigten und durch David Ungnad vollbrachter Gesandtschaft* (Frankfurt: Franckfurth am Mayn. In Verlegung Johann-David Zunners. Getruckt bey Heinrich Friesen Zunner, 1674), pp. 217, 372.

19. Nicholas Nicholay, *The Navigations, Peregrinations and Voyages, made into Turkie . . . with divers, faire, and memorable histories, happened in our time. . . .* (London: Printed by Thomas Dawson, 1585), p. 128.

20. Gedeōn, "To kyrēgma," p. 200. One such encyclical in karamanlidika was circulated in the churches of Samatya in the 1830s, soliciting

contributions for the rebuilding of the “Balıklı ayazmanın ek kilisesi” [Annex-church of the Balıklı “hagiasma”]; Eugenios Hiereus, *Hē Zōodochos Pēgē kai ta Hiera Autēs Prosarēmata* [The Monastery of Zōodochos Pēgē and Its Holy Annexes] (Athens: Typ. Papalexandrē, 1886), p. 100. Cf. the remarks of Alexander Helladius: “cum enim Graecam linguam ignorent, Graecae tamen religioni addictissimi sint, & sacra officia iis & novum Testamentum in Turcica lingua conscriptum, cum in Asia, tum Constantinopoli, in Parochia S. Constantini versus septem turres . . . legi permissum est,” *Status praesens Ecclesiae Graecae* (?Nürnberg/Altdorf, 1714), p. 137.

21. Some of these inscriptions, the latest dating from 1897, have been published in Richard Clogg, “Some karamanlidika inscriptions from the Monastery of the Zoodokhos Pigi, Balıklı, Istanbul,” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 4 (1978): 55–67. Further inscriptions from Balıklı are published in Anastasios Iordanoglou, “Karamanlidikes epigraphes tēs hieras Monēs Zōodochou Pēgēs Valoukli Kōnstantinoupoleōs” [Karamanlidika inscriptions of the Holy Monastery Zōodochos Pēge at Balıklı], in Kōnstantinos Papoulidēs, ed., *Valkanika Symmeikta* 1 (1981): 63–92, and in Erich Prokosch, “Karamanisch-türkische Grabinschriften,” *Jahrbuch des Österreichischen Sankt Georgs-Kollegs in Istanbul* (1988): 200–312. Other inscriptions in karamanlidika are published in I. H. Kalfoglu, *Zincidere karyesinde bulunan İoannēs Prodromos Manastırı yâhud Moni Flavianon* [The İoannēs Prodromos Monastery of Zincidere, or Monē Phlavianōn] (Der Saadet [Istanbul]: Alexandros Nomismatidēs, 1898), p. 437ff; G. Lampakēs, *Hoi Hepta Asteres tēs Apokalypsēs, ētoi Historia, Ereipia, Mnēmeia kai nyn Katastasis tōn Hepta Ekklēsiōn tēs Asias, Ephesou, Smyrnēs, Pergamou, Thyateirōn, Sardeōn, Philadelphias kai Laodikeias, par’ hē Kolossai kai Hierapolis* [The Seven Stars of the Revelation, namely the history, ruins, monuments, and present condition of the Seven Churches of Asia: Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamon, Thyateira, Sardeis, Philadelpheia, and Laodikeia, and nearby Kolossai and Hierapolis] (Athens: Typois Kratous Th. Tzavella, 1909), p. 397ff; E. Rossi, “Tre iscrizioni turche in caratteri greci di Burdur in Anatolia,” *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Rendiconti della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, ser. viii (1953): 69–75; Anastasios Iordanoglou, “A karamanlidic funerary inscription (1841) in Nicaea (İznik) Museum,” *Balkan Studies* 19 (1978): 185–91, and Semavi Eyice, “Anadolu’da ‘Karamanlica’ kitâbeler (Grek harfleriyle Türkçe kitâbeler)” [Karamanlidika Epitaphs in Anatolia (Turkish Epitaphs written in Greek Script)], *Belleten* xxxix (1975): 25–48; xlv (1980): 683–92. The Rev. F. J. V. Arundell, traveling in the early 1830s, observed that in the town of Isparta, “all the gravestones were in Turkish with Greek characters,” *Discoveries in Asia Minor, including a Description of the Ruins of Several Ancient Cities, and especially Antioch of Pisidia*, vol. 1 (London: R. Bentley, 1834), p. 350. A century later, Arnold Toynbee, writing to his wife, Rosalind, from Salihli on 7 February 1920, reported that, in the village of Göldē, near Kula, the inscriptions on the tombstones were in Turkish written with Greek characters; Toynbee Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford. A solitary inscription in karamanlidika is recorded on Mount Athos, outside the monastery of Hagia Laura; see Richard Clogg, “A karamanlidika inscription from Mount Athos (1818),” *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 1 (1975): 207–10.

22. Letter of 8 June 1816, *British and Foreign Bible Society. 13th Report* (1817): 70. Whittington, traveling in the same year, also recorded that the Mariupol Greeks spoke the language of the "Crim Tartars," *Account of a Journey through part of Little Tartary, and of some Armenian, Greek and Tartar Settlements* in Robert Walpole, *Travels in Various Countries of the East. . . .* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820), p. 464.

23. G. Doerfer, "Das Krimosmanische," in J. Deny, et al., ed., *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta* 1 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1959): 272-73. Cf. also O. Blau, "Griechisch-türkische Sprachproben aus Mariupoler Handschriften," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 28 (1874): 562-76.

24. See, for instance, D. Loukopoulos and D. Petropoulos, *Hē Laikē Latreia tōn Pharasōn* [Popular Religious Practices in Pharsa] (Athens: Institut Français d'Athènes, 1949), p. 114; T. Kōstakēs, *Hē Anakou* [Anakou] (Athens: Kentro Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn, 1963), p. 212; and V. A. Mystakidēs, "Kapadokika: perigraphē geōgraphikē, emporikē, ekklesiastikē tēs Mētropoleōs Kaisareōs" [Studies on Cappadocia: Description of the Geography, Commerce, and Churches of the Metropolis of Caesarea], *Parnassos* 15 (1893): 457. I have discussed the use by the Karamanlı Christians of Turkish as a liturgical language in Clogg, "The publication and distribution of Karamanlı texts," p. 64-76.

25. R. M. Dawkins, "The recent study of folklore in Greece," *Papers and Transactions. Jubilee Congress of the Folk-Lore Society* (London: W. Glaisner, Ltd., 1930), p. 132; Henri Grégoire, "Rapport sur un voyage d'exploration dans le Pont et en Cappadoce," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellénique* 33 (1909): 148.

26. P. A. Chikhachev, *Klein-Asien* (Leipzig and Prague: G. Freytag, 1887), p. 179.

27. H. Kiepert, "P. V. Tschihatscheff's Reisen in Kleinasien und Armenien 1847-1863," *Petermann's Mittheilungen*, Ergänzungsheft no. 20 (Gotha: 1867), p. 4.

28. W. M. Leake, *Journals of a Tour in Asia Minor. . . .* (London: John Murray, 1824), p. 46; *Researches in Greece* (London: J. Booth, 1814), p. 87, 228.

29. *British and Foreign Bible Society*, 13th Report (1817): 76-77.

30. H. H. Schweinitz, *In Kleinasien. Ein Reitausflug durch das innere Kleinasien im Jahre 1905* (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1906), p. 110-11.

31. A. Baumstark, *Die Messe im Morgenland* (Kempten, 1906), p. 61, cited in W. Heffening and C. Peters, "Spüren des Diatessaron in liturgischer Überlieferung. Ein türkischer und ein Karsuni Text," *Oriens Christianus*, 3rd ser. 10 (1935): 226.

32. D. G. Hogarth, *A Wandering Scholar in the Levant* (New York: Scribner, 1896), pp. 83-84.

33. Mystakidēs, "Kappadokika," p. 457.

34. O. Blau refers to a karamanlidika manuscript from Mariupol, dating from ca. 1779, which contained the "entire liturgical apparatus" of the Orthodox Church, although this appears not to have been the case; op. cit., p. 571. Elsewhere, he asserts that the Greeks of the Mariupol region used Turkish as a liturgical language, "Über Volksthum und Sprache der Kumanen," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 29 (1875): 568.

35. Sévérien Salaville and Eugène Dalleggio, *Karamanlidika: Bibliographie*

analytique d'ouvrages en langue turque imprimés en caractères grecs, vol. 3 (1866–1900), (Athens: Institut Français d'Athènes, 1974), pp. 297–99.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–91.

(37) Richard Chandler, *Travels in Asia Minor...* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1775), p. 250.

38. Charles F. M. Texier, *Description de l'Asie Mineure faite par ordre du gouvernement français de 1833 à 1837...*, vol. 2 (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1839–49), p. 82.

39. R. Oberhummer and H. Zimmerer, *Durch Syrien und Kleinasien. Reiseschilderungen und Studien*, vol. 1 (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1899), p. 16. During the early years of the present century, an Orthodox priest in Nicaea told a British traveler that, although his flock knew no Greek, “through having heard the liturgy all their lives they knew fairly well what the prayers meant.” Where certain prayers used would have been comparatively unfamiliar to his congregation the priest had himself translated the Greek text into Turkish; see Edwin Pears, *Turkey and its People* (London: Methuen and Co., 1912), p. 132.

40. Edmund Naumann, *Von Goldenen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat* (Munich; Leipzig: R. Oldenbourg, 1893), p. 208.

41. G. T. Keppel, *Narrative of a Journey Across the Balcan... also of a visit to Azari and other newly discovered Ruins in Asia Minor 1829–30* (London: H. Colbourn and R. Bentley, 1831) 2, p. 331.

42. M. Gedēon, *Kanonikai diataxeis: epistolai, lyseis, thespismata tōn Hagiotatōn Patriarchōn Kōnstantinoupolēōs apo Grēgoriou tou Theologou mechri Dionysiou tou apo Adrianoupolēōs*, vol. 1 [Canonical Regulations: letters, decisions, rulings of the Most Holy Patriarchs of Constantinople, from Gregory the Theologian to Dionysius of Adrianople] (Constantinople: Ek tou Patriarchikou Typographieiu, 1888–89), pp. 179–80.

43. Page 81, quoted in Salaville and Dalleggio, *Karamanlidika*, vol. 1, pp. 115–16. There is a copy of this rare book in the Library of the British Museum. It came originally from the library created by the eccentric philhellene and bibliophile Frederick North, the fifth earl of Guilford, for his beloved Ionian Academy in Corfu.

44. For the literature of the Karamanlides, see Janos Eckmann, “Die karamanische Literatur,” in Jean Dénay et al., *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1964), pp. 819–35; the three volumes of Salaville and Dalleggio’s bibliography, vol. 1 (Athens: Institut Français d’Athènes, 1958), vol. 2 (1850–1865) (Athens: Institut Français d’Athènes, 1966), vol. 3 (1866–1900) (Athens: Institut Français d’Athènes, 1974); and Evangelia Balta, *Karamanlidika. Additions (1584–1900). Bibliographie analytique* (Athens: Centre d’Etudes d’Asie Mineure, 1987) and *Karamanlidika XX^e siècle. Bibliographie analytique* (Athens: Centre d’Etudes d’Asie Mineure, 1987). See also, Robert Anhegger, “Hurûfumuz Yunanca: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der karamanisch-türkischen Literatur,” *Anatolica* 7 (1979/80): 157–202; “Nachträge zu Hurufumuz Yunanca: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der karamanisch-türkischen Literatur,” *Anatolica* 10 (1983): 149–64; and Evangelia Balta, “To karamanlidiko entypo” [The Karamanli printed book], *Ta Historika* 9 (1988): 213–28.

45. G. G. Ladas, "Ho Mētopolitēs Naupaktou kai Artēs Neophytos Mauromatēs kai hē symvolē autou eis tēn diadosin tēs thrēskeias kai tou ethnismou tōn Hellenōn tēs M. Asias" [Neophytos Mauromatēs, Metropolitan of Naupaktos and Arta, and his contribution to the spreading of the religion and nationalism of Asia Minor Greeks], *Ho Syllektēs* (1947): 33–44.

46. Eckmann, "Die karamanische Literatur," p. 834.

47. Choudaveroglou-Theodotos, "Hē tourkophōnos hēllēnikē philologia," p. 303.

48. On the publishing activities of the Bible Society during the first half of the nineteenth century, see Clogg, "The publication and distribution of Karamanli texts," pp. 57–81 and 171–93.

49. For a hostile account of the activities of Protestant and Catholic missionaries in Asia Minor, see A. M. Levidēs, "Symvolai eis tēn historian tou prosēlytismou en Mikra Asia. Peri tōn en Kappadokia energeiōn tōn prosēlytistikōn hetaireiōn" [Contributions to the history of missionary activities in Asia Minor. On the activities of missionary societies in Cappadocia], *Xenophanēs* 3 (1905–6): 114–19, 145–50, 248–55, 343–51, 401–10.

50. At the press of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem: *Asitānede Kudūs-ü Şerifin Basmahānesinde*.

51. Salaville and Dalleggio, vol. 1, p. 182.

52. An extract from the karamanlidika version of Midhat's novel and from the Karamanli newspaper *Asia* of 31 July 1910, is published in Wilhelm Prohle, "Zur Frage des Wortakzents im Osmanisch-Türkischen," *Keleti Szemle* 2 (1911): 214–16.

53. Salaville and Dalleggio, vol. 1, p. 88.

54. See J. Eckmann, "Yunan Harfli Karamanli İmlâsı Hakkında" [On Karamanlidika Orthography] in H. Eren and T. Halasi Kun, eds., *Türk Dili ve Tarihi Hakkında Araştırmalar* [Research on Turkish Language and History] (Ankara: 1950), p. 29–30; and idem, "Anadolu Karamanli ağzlarına ait araştırmalar, i Phonetica" [Research on Anatolian Karamanli Dialects], *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 8 (1950): 172.

55. Eckmann, *Die karamanische Literatur*, p. 827.

56. See, for instance, Zeynep Korkmaz, who quotes Papa Georgios Nevşehirli's *Altınoluk* (Constantinople: Erkam Yayın ve San, 1815) as a reflection of contemporary Nevşehir speech, *Nevşehir ve Yöresi Ağzları Ses Bilgisi* [The Dialects of Nevşehir and Its Surrounding Areas], Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları Sayı 142. *Türk Dili ve Edebiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Sayı*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963), p. xii.

57. Eckmann, *Die karamanische Literatur*, p. 827.

58. *İrfannâme* . . . (Constantinople, 1846), p. 3.

59. *Risâle-i . . . Mukaddes Cebel-i Sinânn*. . . (Venice, 1784). Salaville and Dalleggio, p. 82.

60. Eckmann, *Die karamanische Literatur*, p. 820.

61. A. M. Levidēs was the author, inter alia, of *Hai en monolithois monai tēs Kappadokias kai Lykaōnias* [The rock-cut monasteries of Cappadocia and Lykaonia] (Constantinople: Typois Alexandrou Nomismatidou, 1899).

62. R. M. Dawkins, "Turco-Christian Songs from Asia Minor," *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales. Mélanges Bidez*, vol. 2 (Brussels, 1934), p. 199.

63. Sometimes these teachers had studied not only in Greece but also in Europe. E. Naumann, for instance, found a Greek teaching at the *gymnasion* [high school] of Zincidere who had studied in Germany; *op. cit.*, p. 209.

64. Charles K. Tuckerman, *The Greeks of Today* (New York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1878), p. 155.

65. Cf. Tatiana Staurou, *Ho en Kōnstantinoupolei Hellēnikos Philologikos Syllogos: To Hypourgeion tou Alytrōtou Hellēnismou* [The Greek Literary Society of Constantinople: The Ministry of Unredeemed Greeks] (Athens: Typographico A. Philopoulou—K. Alexia Euēnou, 1967). Useful information on this syllogos is also contained in the introduction to Paul Moraux, *Bibliothèque de la Société Turque d'Histoire. Catalogue des Manuscrits Grecs (Fonds du Syllogos). Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından* [Publication of the Turkish History Society] 12, 4th ser. (Ankara, 1964). Two contemporary accounts of the syllogoi are Albert Dumont, "Des syllogues en Turquie," and Queux de Saint-Hilaire, "Des syllogues grecs en Orient et en Europe et du progrès des études littéraires dans la Grèce de nos jours," *Annuaire de l'Association pour l'Encouragement des Etudes Grecques en France* 8 (1874): 572–38; 11 (1877): 288–322. See also S. I. Papadopoulos, "Eisagōgē stēn historia tōn Hellēnikōn Philekpaideutikōn Syllogōn tēs Othōmanikēs Autokratōrias kata ton 19on kai 20on aīona" [An Introduction to the History of Greek Educational Societies in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th and 20th centuries], *Parnassos*, 2nd ser., 4 (1962): 247–58. Three exhaustive recent studies are Kyriakē Mamōnē, "Sōmateiakē Organōsē tou Hellēnismou stē Mikra Asia" [Organizations and Societies of the Greeks of Asia Minor], pts. i, ii, and iii; *Deltion tēs Historikēs kai Ethnologikēs Hetairias tēs Hellados* 26 (1983): 63–114, 28 (1985): 54–166; and *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn* 6 (1986–7): 155–225. One of the more curious manifestations of cultural propaganda was a theatrical performance in 1909 in the only theater in Ankara, owned by a Karamanlı Greek called Kotzamanoglou, under the auspices of the newly founded "Educational Society: Revival" (Philekpaideutikos Syllogos: Hē Anorthōsis), whose specific objective was to further knowledge of Greek among the Turkish-speaking *homogeneia* [Greeks Abroad]. This took the form of a production in Turkish of Racine's *Agamemnon*, an undertaking that, in the words of the journal *Xenophanēs*, gave the lie to the notion held by some that the Karamanlides were "rude Orientals," *Xenophanēs* 6 (1909): 181–82, cited in Mamōnē, "Sōmateiakē organosē, i, p. 107–8.

66. N. E. Mēliōrēs, "Ho Syllogos tōn Mikrasiatōn 'hē Anatolē'" [The Society of Asia Minor Greeks 'hē Anatolē ("The East")], *Mikrasiatika Chronika* 12 (1965): 348. Another such society was the "Society for the Propagation of Greek Letters in Asia Minor" ("Hetairia pros diadosin tōn Hellēnikōn Grammaton en Mikra Asia"), founded in 1879 in Smyrna and associated with the old-established Evangelical School (Euangelikē Scholē) in the city, Mamōnē, "Sōmateiakē organosē," ii, p. 72.

67. *Ho en Athēnais pros diadosin tōn hellēnikon grammatōn Syllogos. Ekthesis tōn pepragmenōn apo tēs systaseōs autou mechri toude 17 Apriliou 1869–31 Dekemvriou 1871*

[Athens Society for the Propagation of Greek Letters, Activities Report from its Founding to the Present, 17 April 1869–31 December 1871], pp. 122–31.

68. E. J. Davies, *Anatolica: or the Journal of a Visit to some of the Ancient Ruined Cities of Caria, Phrygia, Lycia and Pisidia* (London: Grand and Co., 1874), p. 147.

69. E. J. Davies, *Life in Asiatic Turkey. A Journal of Travel in Cilicia, Isauria and parts of Lycaonia and Cappadocia* (London: Edward Stanford, 1879), p. 27.

70. M. Geōrgiadēs, “Anakoinosē peri tēs Kilikias katholou kai Adanōn” [A Study on the region of Kilikia and Adana] *Xenophanēs* 1 (1896): 279.

71. Valavanēs, *Mikrasiatika*, p. 27.

72. Georges Perrot, *Souvenirs d'un voyage en Asie Mineure* (Paris: Michel Levy frères, 1864), pp. 383–4.

73. S. B. Zervoudakēs, “Dianoētikē anagennēsis en Kaisareia Kappadokias” [Intellectual Renaissance in Caesarea of Cappadocia], *Xenophanēs* 1 (1896): 83. There were, however, latterly a scattering of *malliaroi*, “long-haired” champions of the demotic, or spoken Greek, in the depths of Anatolia. They eagerly read their copies of *Noumas*, the demoticist periodical, smuggled past the police spies of Sultan Abdülhamid; Ch. Vaianos, “Ho prōtos malliaros sto esōteriko tēs Mikrasias” [The first ‘malliaros’ in the interior of Asia Minor], *Noumas* 5 (1915): 234–37.

74. Dawkins, “Turco-Christian Songs. . . .” pp. 185–86.

75. Paulos Karolidēs, *Glōssarion Synkritikon Hellēnokappadokikōn Lexeōn, ētoi hē en Kappadokia laloumenē Hellenikē dialektos kai ta en autē sōzomena ichnē tēs archaias Kappadokikēs glōssēs* [Comparative Dictionary of Greek-Cappadocian Words, namely the Greek dialect spoken in Cappadocia and the ancient Cappadocian linguistic traces it preserves] (Smyrna: Typographeion “Ho Typos,” 1885), p. 37.

76. Grégoire, “Rapport sur un voyage d’exploration,” p. 148.

77. N. S. Rizos, *Kappadokika, ētoi dokimion historikēs perigraphēs tēs archaias Kappadokias kai idiōs tōn eparchiōn Kaisareias kai Ikoniou* [On Cappadocia, being a treatise of historical description of ancient Cappadocia and especially the regions of Caesarea and Ikonio] (En Kōnstantinoupolei: ek tou Typographeiou hē Anatolē Euangelinou Misaēlidou, 1856), pp. 99.

78. Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor*, p. 11.

79. “. . . Die Verbreitung der Schulbildung und das wachsende nationale Bewusstsein . . . erhält nicht nur die Sprache, sondern erobert ihr sogar neuen Boden in Gegenden, wo früher kein griechisches Wort vornommen werden durfte,” K. Krumbacher, *Griechische Reise. Blätter aus dem Tagebuch einer Reise in Griechenland und in der Türkei* (Berlin: A. Hettler, 1886), p. 254. The accounts of European travelers as to the language spoken in a particular community need, in some cases, to be treated with caution. For instance, H. J. van Lennep, in the mid-nineteenth century reported that at Kasaba “the Greek language appears to be generally spoken,” *Travels in Little-Known Parts of Asia Minor* (London: J. Murray, 1870), p. 289. Georges Perrot, however, traveling at much the same time, recorded that the Orthodox Christians of the town were Turkish-speaking. See his “Souvenirs d’un voyage,” p. 114.

80. A. J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1922), pp. 123–24.

81. Clair Price, *The Rebirth of Turkey* (New York: T. Seltzer, 1923), p. 148.

82. H. J. Psomiades, "The Oecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: The first ten years," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 6 (1960): 62, and the same author's *The Eastern Question*, pp. 94–96.

83. On the Turkish Orthodox Church, see Gotthard Jäschke, "Die Türkisch-Orthodoxe Kirche," *Der Islam* 39 (1964): 95–129, and Xavier Jacob, "An autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Church," *Eastern Churches Review* 3 (1970/71): 59–67. An apologia, apparently written by Eftim himself, appeared under the name of Teoman Ergene, *İstiklâl Harbinde Türk Ortodoksları* [The Turkish Orthodox during the War of Independence] (Istanbul: I. P. Neşriyat Servisi, 1951). See also *Papa Eftim Efendinin Ortodoksos Ehaliye Müracaatı ve Patrikhâneye Müdafuanâmesi. Ekklēsis pros ton Orthodoxon laon kai apologia Papa Euthymiou* [Pope Eftim Efendi's Call to the Orthodox people and his Written Apology to the Patriarchate] (Istanbul, n.d.). See also the authoritative study of Alexis Alexandris, "Hē apopeira dēmiourgias Tourkorthodoxēs Ekklēσίας stēn Kappadokia, 1921–23" [The attempt to create a Turkish-Orthodox Church in Cappadocia, 1921–23], *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn* 4(1983): 159–99.

84. On this subject see the perceptive observations of George Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece. 1922–1936* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 193ff.

VI

Brigandage and Insurgency in the Greek Domains of the Ottoman Empire, 1853–1908

JOHN KOLIOPOULOS

BRIGANDAGE IN THE AREA considered in this essay, was as old as recorded history. Thucydides believed that, before walled and protected cities were built in Greece, “men plundered one another,” and in their everyday life “they regularly went armed just as the Barbarians did.”¹ The area under discussion is a wide strip of land to the north of the 1830 northern boundary of Greece and to the south of a linguistic and cultural frontier that ran through Epirus in the west and Macedonia in the east. The region is dominated by a number of mountain ranges flanked by lowlands, and was thus suitable for sheep breeding.

The pastoralists of the region practiced the transhumance of sheep and goats, moving large herds of these animals in late April from the lowland pastures to the mountain pastures, returning to the lowlands in October. Their real home was Mount Pindus, easily accessible from the plains and valleys of the region. The mountain ranges and the adjacent lowlands provided the suitable combination of summer and winter pastures for the shepherds, who avoided the summer heat of the lowlands and the winter snow of the highlands and exploited the grass of both plain and mountainside. Some pastoral groups moved their flocks longer distances, sometimes across the Balkans, but most groups practiced a less far-reaching transhumance, a migratory cycle based on the turn of the seasons in more or less the same mountain districts and lowland winter pastures.

This practice contributed to the growth of a relationship of complementarity between large estate owners of the plains and migratory shepherds, but did not reduce the competition, tension, and conflict characterizing pastoralist societies; on the contrary, it accentuated

those features as well as the antagonism between animal husbandry and agriculture—that unmistakable incompatibility of the two modes of rural life, characteristic of the whole Mediterranean region.²

Competition, conflict, sheep stealing, robbing, and arms-bearing, in turn, contributed to the development of a military class with its own ethos. This class grew not outside but within the Ottoman security system. Unable to place this mountainous region under effective state control and station military garrisons at strategic points, the Ottomans licensed bands of Christian irregulars, generally known as *armatoles* (*harmatoloi*), and entrusted them with the task of keeping away brigands, known as *klephts* (*klephtes*), from the villages and vulnerable mountain passes. The klephts and armatoles were the product of a basic insecurity of life and property: conquest and lawlessness in general and brigandage in particular. They were mountaineers, pastoralists most of them, and usually predatory in their habits. The armatoles were former outlaws who had been amnestied and employed to suppress outlawry. They operated in bands and under a captain, who was usually chosen from among the ablest and most dangerous outlaws and received his authority from the Turkish authorities in the presence of Christian notables. The captains and their armatoles were charged with the safety of mountain passes and the maintenance of law and order in the districts of their jurisdiction, the *armatoliks*.³

The klephts were mainly fugitives, debtors, outlaws, misfits, adventurers, and victims of oppression. They were men not attached to the land by property or other obligations who took to the hills. A real or imagined injustice and infraction of the law, or merely family tradition, were enough to send a young man outside the bounds of lawful society. In a world in which the line separating legality from illegality was blurred, crossing that line did not always involve a serious infringement of the law. Klephts, as members of a band of outlaws, were driven by two primary considerations: survival, which was not an easy matter, and amnesty, which often entailed enlistment in a band of armatoles to achieve recognition. Klephts had to prove their worth to the authorities: Through violence and terror they made themselves dangerous and feared, and, at the same time, they discredited their adversaries on the right side of the law. The most enterprising, cunning, and dangerous survived and attained legitimacy as armatoles. Once amnestied and invested with authority, they used all means at their disposal to stay in power; when they were deposed, as most ultimately were, they reverted to brigandage and tried through violence and guile to reemerge as armatoles.

While *armatoles* were officials in the service of the authorities and *klephts* were outlaws, in practice, and in a security system that essentially aimed at relative, not absolute, security, the two elements often colluded and merged. As the former were often engaged in brigandage and extortion or joined the ranks of outlaws they sought to suppress in order to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the authorities, so the outlaws sought to discredit and depose their adversaries or collaborated with them in robbing and plundering defenseless folk with impunity. It was a game that required guile, calculation, acceptance of the rules by everyone concerned, and carefully measured defiance. It also involved, besides *klephts* and *armatoles*, a weak central authority that was obliged to tolerate a measure of lawlessness and a populace at whose expense this lawlessness was practiced, which essentially had no effective means of defense short of taking to the hills. That some *klephts* were crushed when they became more defiant than the system of relative security and lawlessness allowed goes to prove that *klephts* had to operate within the undefined but unmistakable limits of calculated lawlessness at the expense of the weak.

Born into military life and conscious of their power, the *armatoles* and *klephts* represented a potential threat to the security of the state. The vested interest they had in the particular regime and the network of social relationships already described prevented them, however, from aspiring to national leadership. When they actually rose to such leadership in the 1820s, they did so quite reluctantly, in circumstances that favored their involvement in national affairs. The vacuum of power in southern Greece following the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and the slaughter of those Turkish authorities who were slow in withdrawing to places of relative safety was a great temptation for the military of the region. In search of paid military service and booty, and while fighting to secure what they considered their due, captains and their men fought the war to a successful end, undermining all the while, unintentionally but irrevocably, the very foundations of their class in the areas that were eventually included in the first Greek nation state.

Transhumance, brigandage, and a military class were formative legacies in the new Greek national state. Equally formative was a new force—nationalism. In view of the inability of Greece to use her regular armed forces to fulfill her national aspirations on account of British and French opposition to actions directed against the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism favored the employment of irregular forces to stir revolt in the Greek *irredenta*.

Most Greeks viewed the territorial settlement of 1830 as nothing more than a temporary arrangement. Successive Greek territorial gains were expected to keep pace with Ottoman decline, subject of course to the fluctuating interests and influence of the European powers in the Balkans and the Near East. Those, however, were variables that were subject to divergent interpretations and ignored the objectives and requirements of the Greek state, as well as those of the Christians in the sultan's domains. The more sober and responsible social elements in both realms were understandably reluctant to disturb the peace in the area and thus undermine the fragile security in both countries. But there were many others who seemed to thrive on such upheavals. To the captains and their military clientele, who needed suitable occasions to exercise their particular talents, as well as to other parties that derived a political profit from band activity, such disturbances were more than welcome. When disturbances were slow in materializing, they were readily incited in the name of the unredeemed brothers across the border. Ottoman misrule could always provide the necessary occasion for a call to arms, while grievances related to the particular political game that had developed in the Greek state contributed to the outbreak of such disturbances in more than one way.

Iōannēs Kōlettēs, prime minister (1844–47) and recognized patron of the captains, allowed them to pursue their interests relatively freely but mostly across the border. In that way, Kōlettēs satisfied a potentially dangerous social element without burdening state finances, while creating the impression that Greek national aspirations were not being abandoned. Kōlettēs manipulated the traditional military element without precipitating a break with Turkey.⁴

Another major factor was the formation of a sizable and distinct social group of refugees from the neighboring irredenta. Waves of refugees, corresponding to the irredentist upheavals of the period, added to the initial stock of refugees who had settled in the Greek state during the War of Independence. Refugees from Epirus usually settled in western Greece, while those from Thessaly and Macedonia usually settled in eastern Greece. Missolonghi and Karvassara, in western Greece, and Lamia, Atalantē, northern Euboea, Skiathos, and Athens, in the eastern part of the country, received successive waves of refugees who formed, along with their descendants, a powerful social group that could be described as a "refugee interest." Prominent members of that group were to be found in the armed forces, the press, the political world, and the semiclandestine patriotic

societies; that is, in the sectors of public life in which irredentist excursions and risings of the period were hatched. The refugee interest became gradually so influential and powerful that no Greek government dared to curb its activities, which at times amounted to action carried out by an authority independent from, or, in lieu of, state authority.

The political turmoil of the late 1840s was followed by the irredentist upheavals of the mid-1850s occasioned by the Crimean War. Even before the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Turkey in the autumn of 1853, nationalist feeling was rising in Greece, as a result of the celebration of the 400th anniversary of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks in May 1453. There was much talk about the establishment of a "Greek Empire" on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the liberation of their brothers in the irredenta who were expected to rise in arms at the first signal from Greece. By January 1854, Greek nationalists were able to incite revolt in Epirus and Thessaly and to send across the border several thousand volunteers to support the rebels.⁵

In January 1854, the notables of the mountain district of Radovitsi, in Epirus, across the border from western Greece, signed a proclamation by which they solemnly swore to take up arms and fight the Turks until they gained their freedom. Among those who had signed the proclamation were local Greek captains in Turkish employment until the previous autumn, Skaltsogiannēs, Kotsilas, Katsikogiannēs, and Tsigaridas. At the time, Radovitsi was a complex of some sixteen villages hidden away in wild forest, where some 1,500 predatory Christian families lived on the borderland of legality. The district produced wool, cheese, and some cotton, saffron, silk, tobacco, and nuts, but mostly brigands. People usually reared sheep and goats in the rich pastures of the area, or took to robbery and sheep-stealing. Radovitsi, like the neighboring districts of Agrapha on the Turkish side of the border and Valtos and Xeromero on the Greek side, was a haven for brigands and outlaws of every description. Brigandage in this border district was endemic and part of everyday life.⁶

The appointment of a new chief of *armatoles* (*dervenaga*) the previous year had caused great alarm among the captains in the service of the outgoing *dervenaga*. The incoming Albanian chieftain, Süleyman Frasherî, was returning to a familiar post with quite a crowd of clients expecting employment. Another member of the family, İsmail Bey, was also reappointed *dervenaga* of Thessaly. Particularly alarmed were the captains and irregulars of Radovitsi; because, in

addition to the real danger of dismissal and the consequent need for renegotiation of employment, the Radovitsi captains and their men had not been paid for the past several months and had reason to doubt that their claims against the outgoing dervenaga had any chance of being treated favorably by the incoming one.⁷

The most important military families in the district, which were customarily commissioned by the dervenaga to keep the peace, were those of Skaltsogiannēs, Kotsilas, Bakolas, Katsikogiannēs, and Tsigaridas. They constituted a local military aristocracy that lived off revenues derived mainly from flocks of sheep and goats and from quasilegal extortion and plunder. As commissioned captains to keep law and order, they received an agreed number of monthly salaries for the maintenance of an equivalent number of armed men, 40 to 50 or more each. Appropriation of salaries was one source of illegal revenue, but not the most important. Commissioned captains received a share from the booty carried off by brigands in their protection and operating usually on the Greek side of the border to avoid compromising their patrons. Another lucrative practice was sheep-stealing, exercised mainly to the detriment of unfriendly migratory shepherds or rival captains on either side of the border.

Developments on the Radovitsiot uplands acted as a catalyst in a much wider area, which included Souli, Tzoumerka, Agrapha, and other districts of Epirus and western Thessaly. But defiance of established authority was not as widespread as Greek patriots across the border wished to believe. The provocative attitude of the captains, who were in Ottoman service, should not necessarily be interpreted as proof that they espoused the objectives of Greek nationalists, notwithstanding the nationalist rhetoric of revolutionary proclamations, which were supplied from Athens, anyway. Far from being determined to follow the road of war to the end, the captains and their followers perceived the events that led to the outbreak of open hostilities with the Turks in the light of time-honored ways, whereby pressure could be exerted on the authorities to make them less intransigent and agree to share power and the benefits deriving from the exercise of power. Reinstatement in the *kaptanlıks* and eviction of the Albanian antagonists from the coveted posts were weighty considerations; so was the opportunity for legalized plunder offered by the uprising and the attendant relative freedom of action.

The display of national flags and slogans did not really prove very effective in warding off the predators: The enemy was essentially everyone with cash, sheep, or other movable possessions. Moreover,

for the captains of Radovitsi who had been prevented for a while from enjoying the benefits that derived from service in the security system, as well as for the brigands who collaborated with the captains and were left without effective protection, the revolt was useful as a challenge and as an effort to place pressure on local authorities to make the latter conciliatory and amenable to the demands of the former.

In Epirus and Thessaly, not long after the irredentist disturbances, local observers were in a position to follow from close quarters and record a familiar phenomenon: the submission of many outlaws to the Albanian *dervenaga*s and their incorporation in the security forces operating in the frontier zone. By the end of December 1855 some 220 brigands had submitted to a new *dervenaga* of Thessaly, Asim Zavaliani. Around the same time, the captains of Radovitsi were Skaltsogiannēs, Kotsilas, Katsikogiannēs, and several more who had taken part in the events of 1853 to 1854. They had all submitted to the *dervenaga* of Epirus in April 1854, not long after the collapse of the rising they had helped so much to bring about. Among them they had some 150 men under arms, the pick of the local outlaws.⁸

In July 1856, rumor went round that the strength of the new *dervenaga*'s *armatoles* was reduced from 1,500 men to 700 or 500. Soon the captains were informed by the *dervenaga* that they should reduce drastically the strength of their bands. They responded by threatening to bring brigandage to a boil. The *dervenaga* accepted the challenge and sent in a strong detachment of Albanian irregulars, but both sides avoided an open clash. Indeed, the two sides reached an agreement by which the commissions of the captains were renewed. The renewal was agreed upon at a conference at which a representative of the *dervenaga*, the captains themselves, and the notables of Radovitsi were present. It was a regular and solemn investiture held according to custom.

The brigands of the region and their brethren from Greece made their appearance again on the occasion of another irredentist upheaval in the second half of the 1860s. A stillborn uprising in Thessaly in 1867 and an uprising in Crete the previous year provided the armed host of central Greece with an opportunity to exercise their talents and prove once more the dominant role they played in Greece and the Greek domains of the sultan in the southern Balkans. The uprising in Crete in 1866 and the stirring in Agrapha seem to have been related, in the sense that a tense situation in the Radovitsi-Agrapha region similar to that of 1854 began to subside as soon as bands of outlaws were shipped to Crete to help the insurgents on the island. Indeed,

it seems that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the mainland insurrectionary movement was the prospect of better returns for many mountaineer warriors of the region, outlaw or not.

Events on the Ottoman side of the border after late 1866 followed an established pattern: the coalescence of disaffected or threatened local armed elements associated with the security system and insurrectionary tendencies incited by irredentist apostles and bands from Greece. By January 1867, insurgent bands in the two border districts of Radovitsi and Agrapha were strong enough to attract the attention of foreign representatives in the region. A well-informed report from Valtos has as the main reason for the recruitment of outlaws for service away from the region an unusually high brigand activity there. According to the same account, "government officials" contacted the outlaws, who first gathered outside the Greek frontier town of Karvasara and then moved eastward to Eurytania, where more bands converged from other parts. From Eurytania, an unknown number of outlaws moved to Phthiōtis, where they boarded boats that took them to recruiting centers in Attica for transfer to Crete. Others converged on Attica directly, where they drove a hard bargain for their passage to Crete, which George Finlay felt at the time was used by the Greek government as if it were a "penal colony."⁹

Another crisis of the Eastern Question ten years later produced a new wave of irredentism and brigandage. In the beginning of 1878 and as the Russian army headed for Constantinople, the hotheads of the "party of madness," as a Greek deputy called all those clamoring for war against Turkey (against the "party of peace"),¹⁰ had become very influential—too influential for the government to disregard their calls for action. In that state of affairs, the call for "revolutions" in Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia proved a useful safety valve. The Greeks across the border were strongly urged to take up arms against the Turks and thus "prove" that they really wanted to get rid of foreign rule, while their brethren in Greece were advised to prepare for action in support of the "revolutions." Radovitsi was up in arms, and revolts were incited on Mount Olympus, Mount Pelion, and in mountainous southwestern Macedonia.

Officers and their men deserted to join the bands. A good number of deserters came, or their parents had come, from the lands of their destination. According to one report, out of some 300 deserters in February 1878, the overwhelming majority came from Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia. Well-known chiefs were commissioned to recruit large bands of up to 300 men—captains like Lazos, Olympios,

Tzachilas, and Vlachavas, scions of famous klepht families. By 1878, a certain pattern had been established in forming and leading bands of irregulars, and participants played prescribed and expected roles. Recruits were not difficult to come by. Contemporary figures and estimates are scarce; but when available, they explain the influx of volunteers in times of increased political tension. According to such an estimate, Radovitsi alone could put forward no fewer than 1,500 warriors, and nearby Tzoumerka and Souli 2,800 and 2,000, respectively. Refugees were always plentiful and their residence was known. The Macedonians of Atalantē, Lamia, northern Euboea, and Skiathos could put forward several hundred prospective irregulars. There was a report even of a "Macedonian phalanx" of 500 men, which perhaps was no more than a loose collection of men awaiting captains with funds or promises of rich returns. According to another report, a large number of refugees from Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly, who lived temporarily in Patras, "volunteered" to fight for the nation.¹¹

Captains were at hand in the expected places. Mountainous Radovitsi and Agrapha, never really pacified, became once more the meeting ground of numerous bands led by captains with names familiar from the previous rounds of irredentist activity. To the east, on mounts Gkoura and Pelion, other captains, bearing equally familiar names, headed hundreds of irregulars, recruited either in Greece or locally. In southern Thessaly, easily accessible from eastern Greece, a host of captains, local or from Greece, led several hundred irregulars. In more distant southern Macedonia, particularly in the districts of Katerinē and Grevena, captains with similar local attachments took to the field. From February until May 1878, when the leadership of the irregulars agreed, with British mediation, to lead the bands back to Greece, the would-be liberators roamed the mountainous districts of Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia more or less at will and without any central direction or unified command.

The same districts were, in addition, plagued by hordes of Greek and Albanian irregulars, who had fallen on the region since the previous year and could not be easily driven back to their mountain lairs. In western Macedonia alone, according to one estimate, no fewer than 5,000 outlaws, the majority former irregulars of every description, competed with each other to secure what little the peasantry of the region could spare. Grouped in bands of 50 to 80 men and armed with an assortment of weapons, these outlaws imposed various monetary burdens on the peasants and exercised a parallel authority to that of the official masters.¹²

Some of the most active brigand chiefs of the post-1878 period in western Macedonia were Zourkas, Dalipēs, and Kole Ghizas (or Kordistas), who had between them in the spring of 1878 some 300 outlaws and acted like the real authorities in the Korestia group of villages in the district of Kastoria. They had taken part in the rising of 1878, independent of any coordinating effort emanating from Greece and exercising their special skills to their particular ends. Following the collapse of the uprising, they were ready to follow orders from the Greek consul at Monastir, a connection the latter wished to avoid at all costs. Zourkas, Dalipēs, and Ghizas even claimed that their presence in the area was necessary, if only to protect Christians from Albanian predators, particularly from a notorious brigand chief named Abedin, who proved a terrible scourge of the Christians, both as outlaw and as captain in the service of the authorities.

In the same area, as well as in that to the southwest, another set of outlaws operated, most of them also former irregulars. They were led by Leōnidas, Davelēs, and a host of powerful chiefs who terrorized the region for many years. Leōnidas was a Vlach from Samarina. He is said to have taken part in the events of 1878 at the head of a large band of Vlachs sporting a flag and trumpet. Davelēs, the scourge of the Zagori villages for many years, led an equally large band of outlaws and achieved some fame and a considerable sum of money. Another brigand active in the area at the same time was Katarrachias, an associate of Davelēs and compatriot of Leōnidas, but who reportedly recognized no one as his better or equal in the art of robbing. He signed all his demands to his terrified subjects as "Captain Katarrachias" and acted like a monarch conscious of his power. From Monastir to Vlacholivado on Mount Olympus, no village was without a story connected with one of Katarrachias's exploits. He is even reported to have killed three Turks who dared to cross his path while he was visiting a village with a large band of outlaws and some 40 pack animals laden with stolen goods.¹³

Other brigands operated in the area of Mount Olympus, a traditional outlaw preserve. Kalogeros, who plagued the lowlands of Katerinē and northern Thessaly from the adjacent highlands, was a classical example of a brigand joining the national cause to go back to brigandage as soon as the uprising had been suppressed. Also reported in the same area around the same time are Stratsos, leader of an irredentist band in 1878, and Karampatakēs, an associate of Kalogeros who split from him in March 1878 to form a band of his own made up not only of local outlaws but also of a number of

seasoned brigands from Roumelē (Central Greece). Following the suppression of the uprising in Thessaly and Macedonia, Kalogeros was in the company of another brigand chief, Chostevas. Between them, Kalogeros and Chostevas led some 90 outlaws in the Vermion region. The Greek consul at Thessaloniki believed that this band was in fact the nucleus around which an irredentist band had formed in early 1878 and that it was not without some value to local Christians as a counterweight to Albanian irregulars plaguing the region since the beginning of that year.

In the same region operated two more notorious brigand chiefs, Zarkadas and Trompoukēs, who maintained that they had been sent to Macedonia by the Greek government so that local Christians would think of them as “rebels.” They were not brigands, they explained to the Greek consul, who was convinced that they were a worse scourge than common brigands; they remained in Macedonia to keep alive the hope of freedom among Christians. They lacked supplies and went without shoes and shirts, forsaken by those who had sent them across the border as “rebels”; they robbed in order to keep body and soul together.¹⁴

In the early months of 1880, some 150 outlaws in the Olympus-Vermion region formed a loose federation of fifteen bands that refrained from committing sensational robberies so as not to provoke the authorities. The reason for this attitude was that, at the time, they were negotiating with the Turkish authorities at Thessaloniki their submission and appointment to the frontier guards. In a letter to the military governor of Macedonia, the “Olympus captains,” as the chiefs of the outlaws styled themselves, wrote that they agreed to submit to the authorities and give up “that disreputable profession circumstances had forced upon them,” provided that the authorities would be prepared to satisfy certain terms, the most important of which was their appointment to the frontier *armatoliks*. If appointed, the chiefs promised not to allow a single robbery in the region. This and other terms, which the outlaws presented to the Turkish authorities, reflected, more than any Greek consular interpretation of their activities, their real motives and perception of their particular profession and role in society.¹⁵

The new frontier, besides attracting the outlaws of the region, separated the winter from the summer pastures of most Pindus migratory shepherds and dealt their fortunes a heavy blow. Finally, no sooner was the new border drawn and frontier guards posted on both sides of it than new groups of refugees from southern Macedonia

settled on the Greek side. Along with passing migratory shepherds, mobile outlaws, stationary frontier guards, and customs officials, visiting authorities and the fleeing fugitives and draft evaders, shuttling refugees gave new life to the region. But those with most to lose were the migratory shepherds, who saw their flocks become the prey of all those who crossed the border every spring and autumn; and, as might be expected, they were the ones least happy about the cession of Thessaly to Greece.

Equally dispossessed by Turks and Albanians in this case, and more likely to dispossess others rather than lose more themselves, were refugees from Macedonia, precariously settled after 1881 in such Greek border villages as Kazaklar, Kesserli, and Rapsanē, all in the district of Tyrnavos. They were mostly idle and did odd jobs for those few who had jobs to offer, but, occasionally, they went on small-scale raids across the border. Frontier authorities, when not looking the other way, tried to follow their movements, but found it practically impossible.¹⁶

That particular district became a busy recruiting center of bands as soon as another round of irredentist activities broke out on the occasion of the union of eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria in 1885. Bands of "brigand-rebels" were reported in the Olympus region, while other bands crossed from Greece into the same region. Patriotic societies in Athens and their agents in Thessaly were again busy recruiting volunteers for action in Macedonia. Irredentist activities were soon suspended, however, and were not followed by another bout of lawlessness as on previous occasions. Brigands, it seems, were transferring their activities to Macedonia, where they would soon share the field with Bulgarian brigands.

The resurgence of nationalist feelings in 1896, which was fanned by the powerful *Ethnikē Hetairia* (National Society) of Athens and which led a year later to the disastrous and humiliating war with Turkey, revived irredentist pressures. Macedonia, even more than Crete, became the target of irredentist circles associated with the powerful patriotic society and the bands that were called forth by these circles. Throughout the summer of 1896, bands of irregulars in the pay of the *Ethnikē Hetairia* crossed into southern Macedonia to incite revolt against the Turks. The bandsmen were mostly refugees from Macedonia and Epirus, but there were also many Thessalians and Roumeliots.

Most refugees from Macedonia were recruited either in northern Thessaly, where, as already seen, they had been living since 1881, or

in Lamia and Athens, where they were trying to make a living as masons or lived on handouts from irredentist circles. Some of the most active and best-known refugee captains of the time were Athanasios Brouphas, a mason from southwestern Macedonia who lived in Athens less by the tools of his trade than on the returns from an occasional raid; he recruited a large band from among his fellow Macedonian or Epirot refugees settled in Thessaly or attracted there by the prospect of incursions in the neighboring Ottoman domains; Goulas Groutas, who also formed a large band of irregulars from Macedonia and Epirus; Naum Spanos, another adventurer from southwestern Macedonia, an itinerant tailor who made irredentist activities and dealings his second profession; and no less professional irredentist chiefs like Papadēmos, Beloulías, Vrakas, Lachtaras, Alamanos, and Ververas.¹⁷

It is not clear how many bands were formed, and it is almost impossible to arrive at the exact number of bands that actually crossed the border and took the field against the Turks in the summer of 1896. Irregulars were not hard to come by: In the border districts alone upwards of 2,000 refugees from Macedonia provided a ready pool of men from which the agents of the *Ethnikē Hetairia* and the captains in its service recruited bandsmen with little hindrance from the authorities. Rifles and ammunition were also easy to come by. In July 1896, seasonal agricultural laborers from Macedonia working in Thessaly were reported carrying rifles, which they bought in Greece, ostensibly for their safety but really to form bands for an occasional robbery on the way back.¹⁸

The collected bands were the first to cross the border to Macedonia and the first to be repulsed and cross back to Greece. Following the defeat of the army in 1897, irredentist circles in Greece were forced to change tactics with respect to the liberation of Macedonia. The operation of Bulgarian bands, in particular, and their gradual entrenchment in the bilingual zone of the disputed region forced an adjustment of band warfare objectives.

Each of the rival nations counted its captains and its recruits, its heroes and its victims. In this new and final round of irredentist activity in Macedonia, not long after the disastrous war of 1897, the Greeks were faced with the old dilemma of using the regular army and causing perhaps another war with Turkey or allowing instead irregular bands to take the field against the new enemy and reap the usual consequences. The new undertaking was essentially a compromise forced upon Greek irredentists by realities and a tradition

that was dying hard. Like the Bulgarians before them, the Greeks were not slow to realize that local klephts and other freebooters were the sole medium through which to reach the people and make some progress. Much as they disliked associating with these local predators, young Greek officers sought and secured their services even when irregulars from Greece came forward to take their place.¹⁹

Brigands and their special talents did influence the struggle in several ways. For one thing, their sheer numbers always guaranteed a ready supply of armed men to draw from, in order to replenish bands thinned out by death or desertion. Paulos Melas, a young Athenian officer, for example, reported having expressed relief when he was told that his band was followed in March 1904 by no fewer than five brigand bands. Unbending officers made poor captains of irregulars. Ziakas (Phalēreas), for example, resented the reluctance of his brigands to expose themselves in armed encounters, their unwillingness to compromise themselves in the eyes of local men of power and influence, and their refusal to come out in wintertime and keep away from the flocks of sheep. Unlike his brigand associates, he refused to see his mission as a seasonal undertaking, with the result that his band was never anything more than a precarious and loosely held collection of armed men always on the lookout for a more understanding captain.²⁰

Recruitment of outlaws was never meant to be more than an expedient; that is, something everyone condemned in principle, but which almost all resorted to in practice. More than just employing brigands, captains in Macedonia had their men operate like bands of brigands. They slept during the day and marched at night. Likewise, they were obliged to adopt local klephtic dress, which, although less practical than the army uniform, was considered preferable because it was identified by local people with the klephtic tradition. In the same klephtic outfit, Melas felt more comfortable and part of the land, even as he suffered under the heavy shepherd cloak, which was made heavier by the rain, and dragged the heavy local shoes.²¹

More than anyone else, Captain Kotas personified the klephtic tradition of the region and was one of the last of a kind. Much as Greek patriotic officers and other officials resented his opportunism and elusiveness—and some were no doubt more relieved than distressed by his capture and execution by the Turks—captains of every description recognized him to be the undisputed leader of irregulars. Melas was captivated by his personality and could not hide his admiration and respect for the man. The idealistic officer from Athens had

to put aside whatever he had learned about the Greeks of Macedonia and see the problem and his role in the struggle through Kotas's eyes. However, by espousing the Greek national cause to the extent and for the reasons that he did, Kotas placed himself outside the customary lawlessness and world in which he operated. Like scores of military men of his day and the particular region, Kotas admitted, by identifying himself with one cause and one side more than was customarily allowed his class, that it was no longer possible to play the role of the traditional captain. Indeed, his departure from the scene had been long overdue.²²

Less known but equally representative of the vanishing captain class of the region was Naum Spanos. In 1903, he crossed alone to Macedonia, where he collaborated with the Turkish authorities, who allowed him to bear arms. He was also in contact with Karavangelēs, metropolitan of Kastoria, who sympathized with Greek interests. The following year, Captain Vardas (Tsontos) tried to put him under his command, but without success. "After all these years as a captain," he told the committee that advised him to put himself and his followers under the command of the Cretan officer, "I can't possibly become Vardas's *pallikar*. Can I possibly turn a donkey to lead camels? I am a horse, I kick and jump." He then returned to Athens, where he gave up the life of adventure and took up again the tailor's trade.²³

Not so ambitious and mobile as Spanos but no less important to the struggle were some local men of arms. These men operated in the same area and did well by professing a patriotism that only the more naive agents of the Macedonian committees took at face value. Such was Dēmoulios Zēsēs of Lechovo, a village of hellenized Albanians in the Phlōrina district. He had permission from the Turks to bear arms and keep a small band of six men. Zēsēs attached himself and his men to Melas in September 1904, however, because he could no longer operate independently, on account of Bulgarian harassment. Other local captains were Kole Pinas of Negovani (another village of hellenized Albanians in the same district) and Tsaousēs of Belkameni, who became a guide for Vardas. After 1908, Tsaousēs went over to the Turks and again sold his services as a guide. Also from the same district, Dalipēs of Gabresh was a shepherd who attached himself to Kotas in 1903, when he was also sworn in by a Greek agent in the Greek cause.²⁴

No less enterprising and mobile was another captain, Karalivanos, a noncommissioned officer from Thessaly who served in the Greek frontier guards before he took to brigandage in western

Macedonia. In 1900, he was granted amnesty by the Turkish authorities and was asked to join their frontier guards. By the following year, however, he had transferred his services, if not his loyalties, to Karavangelēs. In 1904, he attached himself and his small band to Melas. Karalivanos joined the patriotic officer from Athens in July of that year, along with another brigand chief, Captain Visvikēs, after Melas agreed to secure their families in Thessaly and get them an amnesty if they proved their steel against the Bulgarians. But cooperation with Melas did not materialize. Karalivanos proved more demanding than the officer's funds could permit.²⁵

Equally representative of the local professional men of arms were such captains as Andreas of Kleisoura, a Vlach village in the Kastoria district, who placed himself under various leaders from Greece but who operated rather independently; Antōnēs of Morichovo, who could find no employment that suited his tastes and talents after the end of the struggle and took to drugs; or Groutas, Kordistas, and Mauromatēs, all of whom went back to brigandage when the struggle was over; and Poutetsēs, who operated mainly in Epirus. When asked after 1908 to dissolve his 30-man band with the promise that he and his men would be able to enlist in the Greek army, he found it difficult to give up the life of adventure and freebooty. He continued to go on an occasional raid in Epirus to punish "enemies" and encourage "friends," as he explained his actions to disapproving Greek officers who wanted to end such activities without estranging the proud captain.²⁶

By the time of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, which promised equal treatment to non-Muslims under a constitutional government and essentially put an end to the fighting in Macedonia, Greek bands more than met the Bulgarian challenge, at least in southern Macedonia. This region was eventually won by the Greek regular army in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The wars also removed some of the factors that had sustained the traditional military element of the region. Captains and bandits of all descriptions were at last relegated to the past. Some brigands survived until the end of the 1920s, but they were never more than hunted outlaws, survivors of an era that had come to an end. The growth, around the same time, of a popular literature based on the lives and exploits of brigands was a fitting tribute to an unforgotten national pastime and a nostalgic gesture for a world that had outlived itself by almost a century.

NOTES

1. Thucydides, *Historiae*, pp. i, 5–6.
2. These aspects are discussed by Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame, and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies," *Ethnology* (1971): 1–25; Harold A. Koster and Koster, Joan Bouza, "Competition or Symbiosis? Pastoral Adaptive Strategies in the Southern Argolid, Greece," *Regional Variation in Modern Greece and Cyprus: Toward a Perspective on the Ethnography of Greece* (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 275–85; and K.D. Karavidas, *Agrotika* (Athens: Ekdoseis Papazēsē, 1978), pp. 35–110.
3. See Koliopoulos, *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821–1912* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 26. See also John Christos Alexander, *Brigandage and Public Order in the Morea, 1685–1806* (Athens: 1985).
4. Koliopoulos, *Brigands*, pp. 120–26.
5. See Koliopoulos, *Lēstes: Hē Kentrikē Hellada sta mesa tou 19ou aïōna* [Brigands: Central Greece in the middle of the 19th century] (Athens: Hermēs, 1979), pp. 80–1.
6. For a description of the region, see F. C. H. L. Pouqueville, *Voyage de la Grèce*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Firmin Didot, pere et fils, 1826), p. 301, 306–7. See also K.A. Diamantēs, "Mia Statistikē tou nomou Artēs kata to 1828" [A Census of the Arta district in 1828], *Ho Neos Kowaras* (1961): 93–97; and a report from the Greek consul at Ioannina in the Greek Foreign Ministry Archives (GMFA), Feb. 8, 1851 (o.s.).
7. Koliopoulos, *Lēstes*, p. 63.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 130ff.
9. See Foreign Office FO 32/382, Athens ambassador, 39/2 Feb., 64/23 Feb., 92/23 Mar., and 110/10 Apr. 1867; Andreas Moschonēsios, *To katoptron tēs en Helladi lēsteias* [The mirror of brigandage in Greece] (Hermoupolis: Typographeion "Ethnikou Mellontos," 1869), p. 31; George Finlay Papers (Athens) F E27, Finlay letters to *The Times*, June 20 and Nov. 14, 1867.
10. *Ephēmeris tōn Syzētēseōn tēs Voulēs* [Parliamentary Debates], seventh period, fourth synod, Oct. 3, 1878 (o.s.).
11. Koliopoulos, *Brigands*, p. 199ff.
12. *Pharos tēs Othryos*, 983/29 Mar. and 985/15 Apr. 1878, and *Palingenesia*, 4251/18 Oct. 1878 (o.s.). See also Valentine Chirol, *Twixt Greek and Turk* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood, 1881), p. 81.
13. GFMA, Larissa consul, 9 Mar., 1880 (o.s.) and Monastir consul, 15 June 1880 (o.s.); A.J.B. Wace and M.S. Thompson, *The Nomads of the Balkans* (London: Methuen; New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1972), réissue of 1914 edn., pp. 166–67, GFMA, F1881/4/1, Thessaloniki consul, 31 Mar., 1880 (o.s.).
14. FO 195/1007, Thessaloniki consul, 31/23 June and 55/22 Sept. 1874, and GFMA, F1877/4/1, Larissa consul, 9 Mar., 1877 (o.s.). See also Euangelos Kōphos, *Hē Epanastasē tēs Makedonias kata to 1878* [The Revolt of 1878 in Macedonia] (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia Makedonikōn Spoudōn, 1969), pp. 80, 82, 174.

15. GFMA, F1880/4/1, Thessaloniki consul, 11 Mar., 1880 (o.s.).

16. *Pharos tēs Othryos*, 1060/6 Sept. 1880 (o.s.).

17. See Chr. Lyritzēs, *Hē Ethnikē Hetairia kai hē drasis autēs* [The "National Society" and its activities] (Kozanē: Typographeio Chr. Galanidē, 1979), pp. 28–34, 49–52, 56–58, 66–68. This work is based on the Ethnikē Hetairia papers of the period deposited at the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece (Athens).

18. *Ibid.*, p. 266. See also *Palingenesia*, 9938/1 Aug., 1886.

19. Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897–1913* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966), pp. 62, 187–89.

20. Natalia P. Mela, ed., *Paulos Melas* (Athens: Syllogos pros Diadosin tōn Hellēnikōn Grammatōn, 1964), p. 249; Pēnelopē Delta Papers (Athens), report of 1906 to the Macedonian Committee of Athens by Ziakas.

21. *Paulos Melas*, p. 248, 324, 328, 348.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 241ff. See also Dakin, *Greek Struggle*, pp. 63–65.

23. Naum Spanos, ed. Ch. G. Sakellariadēs, *Anamnēseis ek tou Makedonikou Agōnos* [Reminiscences from the Macedonian Struggle] (Thessaloniki: 1957), pp. 29–30, 47ff.

24. General State Archives (Athens), Vardas Papers, F2, report (undated) from Melas, F3, report from Captain Derleres, 14 Mar., 1909 (o.s.), F6, signed statement by an agent named N. A. Chasiōtēs, 14 June 1930.

25. Germanos Karavangelēs, *Ho Makedonikos Agōn. Apomnēmoneumata* [The Macedonian Struggle. Reminiscences], ed. Vasileios Laourdas (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia Makedonikōn Spoudōn, 1959), p. 31.; *Melas*, p. 294, 307.

26. Panagiōtēs G. Danklēs, *Anamnēseis, Engrapha, Allēlographia* [Recollections, Documents, Correspondence], ed. Ch. Leukoparidēs, vol. 1 (Athens: Vivliopōleion E.G. Vagiōnakē, 1965), pp. 413–14.

VII

Greeks in the Ottoman Administration During the Tanzimat Period

İLBER ORTAYLI

EVEN THOUGH THE GREEK War of Independence was not the first successful national revolution within the empire, it had a shock effect on the Ottomans. The Serbian uprising had paved the way for other Balkan peoples to revolt and had increased their hopes for national revival; but the Greek revolution directly accelerated the Balkan nationalist movements. After the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece, the Greek nation all at once faced organizational problems that elicited both hope and despair. After the Greek revolution, the Ottoman Empire developed a consciousness of decline and immediately tried to change its administrative, educational, and military structures. Even though Austria and Russia had long favored Greek independence, they soon gave up their philhellenic policies out of fear of potential unrest among some of their own national minorities, such as the Hungarians and Poles, who also claimed a glorious past.

One of the most striking consequences of the Greek revolution was that the Ottomans began to eliminate Greeks from important positions in the bureaucratic and social structure of the empire. As is well known, the Phanariot dragomans in the Sublime Porte were replaced either by converted Christians, such as Bulgarzâde Yahyâ Efendi, or by Armenians, such as Sahak Abro Efendi. Some of the Phanariots, however, remained faithful and favored subjects of the empire (with some exceptions, such as Maurogordatos and Hysēlantēs).¹ Musurus Paşa was sent as the first ambassador to Athens in 1840 and was hated intensely by Greek nationalists, who attempted to assassinate him. As a result of this attempt on his life, he suffered permanent injury to his left hand.² Fotiadi Bey, his successor as ambassador to Athens, Kalimaki Bey, the ambassador to Vienna, and Sava Paşa (who compiled a manual of Islamic law) are other promi-

nent figures in the Ottoman administration. But these men are the exceptions. In fact, Greek supremacy in the Ottoman Empire was in decline. The Ottomans took measures in order to prevent further uprisings of Greek subjects in the Balkan Provinces of the empire and the islands.

In the following decades, Ottoman administrative policies towards the Greeks were ambivalent: reforms and grants of concessions to the Greek communities, on the one hand, coexisted with distrust and intervention, on the other. One of the most remarkable cases of countermeasures taken to prevent a nationalist revolt concerned the island of Samos. The Sublime Porte granted autonomy to this island by a special concession decree (*imtiyâz fermân*) issued in 1832 and named it "Sisam Emâreti." The islanders almost gained a constitutional structure. The waves of uprisings had forced the Ottoman administration to create such a special status. A native bey was appointed as the governor of Sisam (Sisam Beyi), and elected representatives from among the notables formed a *meclis* (council), which was responsible for making decisions on matters related to navigation, tax collection,³ public works, school instruction, and even church affairs. The Ottoman army evacuated the island, while public administration and security functions were left to the islanders. Sisam had to pay a certain annual tax to the Sublime Porte.

In 1861, Miltiadi Bey was granted a new *fermân* (imperial decree), which regulated the functions of the *meclis*, defining the legislative period and matters of tax collection and the budget of the *emâret* (autonomous province). The annual tax was set at 400,000 Ottoman qurush and had to be paid to the Sublime Porte in two portions. The Ottomans, however, retained the right to keep a small body of gendarmerie consisting of twenty men with their commander. As jurisdictional authority, a judge had to be appointed by the Sublime Porte, who then would have to work with a court whose members were elected from among local notables. The first provincial newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, *Vilâyet Cerîdesi* [Provincial Journal], was probably published in Samos even earlier than that of the Danubian Principalities. It was probably written in two languages: Greek and Ottoman Turkish. Even though I found an *irâde* (imperial decree) in the archives,⁴ I have not yet been able to locate a copy of this newspaper. The constitutional status of Samos in a way challenged the Ottoman Constitution, since it remained in force even after 1878, together with Mount Lebanon, Crete, and Eastern Rumelia. Yet, fear

of revolutionary activities abroad, as well as in the Kingdom of Greece, caused a certain decline of the Greek element in the bureaucracy and social life of the empire, and Greeks were subjected to greater control than in the past.

The affairs of the patriarchate also became a matter of controversy. Certain circles in the Kingdom of Greece criticized the patriarchate for being too conservative, while the Sublime Porte suspected it of being a spiritual and national center. Russia had an ambivalent attitude towards the patriarchate, supporting it as it did formerly and yet hesitating because of the conflict with the nationalist demands of the Bulgarian Church movement. In spite of this, Russia made a substantial effort to maintain the representative functions and protective role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the empire. For instance, it became customary around this period for members of the Romanov family to visit the Ottoman Empire about every two years, with visits to Constantinople and Jerusalem, kissing the hands of the patriarch in public. Grand Duke Constantine's visit to Jerusalem in 1859 is a striking example of this. Russia continued to sponsor Greek Orthodox schools, defended the rights of Greek subjects, and turned some cases of conversion into a diplomatic issue.⁵

After the draft of the general educational law, Greek schools, like others, were put under the control of the Ottoman Ministry of Education. The books used in these were subject to scrutiny. Occasionally, even some Greek subjects informed the Porte of the "dangerous" contents of these books. Such a case happened in 1860. Some school books brought from foreign countries to be used in these schools were found to contain "harmful" material, and a petition was signed by Ottomans belonging to different millets,⁶ including Greeks. They demanded that these books be rewritten and corrected. The decision of the Sublime Porte was that the history books had to contain the lives of the Apostles. These petitioners, mostly *mu'allims* (school teachers), requested twelve years to rewrite these books. They suggested Biblical history for primary schools, and ancient Greek history, general history, together with Ottoman history and hagiography, for secondary schools.

Others, such as a professor named Filippaki from the Halki Seminary (Heybeliada) informed the Sublime Porte that the professors in the seminary were teaching the students harmful ideas. Filippaki was sent to Europe with a salary of 300 franks.⁷ Also, the newly founded Ottoman high schools, such as *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şâhâne* (Imperial Medi-

cal School), *Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şâhâne* (Imperial School of Administration), veterinary schools, etc. granted a quota of 33 percent to non-Muslim students of Ottoman subjects. That quota caused both unrest and a struggle among different non-Muslim communities. In 1857, the medical school, following a petition from the Armenian community, reduced the number of Greek candidates from 55 to 50, in favor of Armenian candidates. That case indicates a general trend in the Tanzimat Period, when the Greek element in the empire began to lose its former privileged status among the non-Muslim communities.⁸

Certainly the reaction of the elite Ottoman Greeks indicates an attempt to forge an alternative strategy for the Ottoman Empire. Some of the Phanariots during this era tried to impose a confederative administrative structure for the safety of the empire and their own community. One of them, André Coromélas, proposed a Turko-Greek empire and suggested that the "sultan should have the title of Sultan of the Turks and King of Greeks." Another, Stephanos Xenos, emphasized "the common interests of the Turks and Greeks in the empire" during the days of the Bulgarian revolt and anti-Turkish demonstrations in London.⁹ Another, Pitzipios Bey suggested in a book the adoption of Byzantine institutions, equality of two religions, and the coronation of Sultan Abdülmecid as Emperor of the Byzantines. The church had to fight on one side against the secularist tendencies of some modern Greeks and on the other to oppose the demands of Bulgarian nationalists, who sought to have a national independent Bulgarian church.

The Ionian Islands, a joint protectorate of the Ottoman and Russian empires and later Britain, and Crete were strictly controlled by the Ottomans. Whenever the General of the Ionian Islands ("Cezâir-i Sab'a Generali") visited cities like Preveza on the continent, the Sublime Porte was informed by agents.¹⁰ And the missionary activities of British Protestants in the islands were stopped by efforts on the part of the Sublime Porte, the Greek patriarchate, and Russia. An îrade of 1839 is a clear illustration of this policy.¹¹

A report of the Ottoman ambassador Musurus Paşa in London informed the Sublime Porte that the Kingdom of Greece enlisted the local people of Crete for the Greek army (28 March 1861). Musurus Paşa learned about this from his agents in London; he then met with Lord John Russell, and the Sublime Porte pressured Great Britain to prevent the Greeks from implementing this policy. Some Cretans registered in the islands belonging to the Hellenic kingdom had become Greek subjects. Musurus Paşa demanded, however, that they should

not be entitled to claim Greek citizenship if they had migrated to one of the Ottoman Dodecanese Islands or Anatolia.¹² Actually, the small Greek kingdom was in need of population and migration from the Ottoman continent and islands. It was not rare, nevertheless, for many of these immigrants to try to return to the Ottoman Empire in disappointment. The Ottoman government, favoring this movement, exempted them from the capitation tax (*cizye*) for 8 to 10 years, and sometimes subsidized them in agriculture. In May 1850 alone, 90 families came from Greece back to their home.¹³ During these years, even the regulations of the tithe (*a'zâr nizamnâmesi*) had been translated and issued in the Greek language.¹⁴

Armenians, Jews, and Maronites were heavily favored over Greeks in public office. In fact, Greek intellectuals had been suffering from a gradual brain drain, though in certain professional branches of the army, officers and sailors of Greek origin continued to be employed. In the Easter season the navy had to anchor in certain ports because of the Greek crews,¹⁵ while in the naval academy (Mekteb-i Bahriye-i Şâhâne) the Greek language was taught to all the students. In 1858, a certain Kostaki Bey was appointed to the academy as instructor of the Greek language.¹⁶

During these years, it would be hard to claim that the Ottoman political mind could grasp the nature of Greek nationalism. Nationalist movements and the activity of bands are usually cited in contemporary sources as *eşkiyâ* (brigands) and *eterya* (committees), but countermeasures were not taken at the time.¹⁷ Both official documents and Ottoman historiography reveal limited understanding on the part of Ottoman authorities of the political background and character of these movements and their position toward other Balkan nationalist movements.

The activities of Greek nationalist bands spurred Ottoman authorities to take some drastic countermeasures. In Thessaloniki alone, five leaders were arrested in 1852. Thereafter, merchants and priests coming from Greece to Ottoman ports were subjected to investigation. Suspected of subversive activities, some Greek neighborhoods in Istanbul, such as Tatavla and Pangaltı, were subjected to military control in January 1854, and İzzet Paşa was appointed as military commander of Beyoğlu.¹⁸ In the same year, the Greek colony of Beirut was put under strict control. Nationalist ideas spread widely among the Greeks of the empire, leading the authorities to control every publication and newspaper from Greece.

Greeks in the Aegean region and Trebizond were enjoying an economic renaissance. Kydınai (Ayvalık) and Smyrna had been

transformed into cultural centers of Hellenism in Asia Minor, and a rich merchant class as well as one of rich Greek farmers emerged in small towns like Phōkaia (Foça). Greeks were represented in provincial councils (*Meclis-i İdâre-i Vilâyet* and *Meclis-i İdâre-i Liva*), but now they had to share this new privilege with other non-Muslim millets. At times, Muslim members of these councils subjected the Greeks to abuse that was repeatedly protested by the patriarchate.¹⁹

Administrative policies during the Tanzimat Period also had a cultural dimension, especially in the Balkan provinces. A good number of Ottoman officials had a knowledge of Greek and Bulgarian. As Ahmed Midhat Efendi, a noted writer of the Hamidian era, mentions in one of his books, "European children have to learn foreign languages in school, but Ottoman children [Turks], Armenians, and Greeks of Istanbul pick up their languages by playing with others. . . ."²⁰ A book, *Tuhfet'ül Uşşak* [A Present for Children], by Fevzî, teaches Greek vocabulary in verse form to the Turks²¹:

*Nâm-ı Hudâdır Teos, âdeme de antropos
Derviše der asketis, evliyâ adı ayos*

[The name of The God is Theos, and man is anthrōpos
Dervish is askētēs, and evliya is hagios.]

NOTES

1. For the origin of Phanariot families, see M. D. Sturdza, "Grandes Familles de Grece, d' Albanie et de Constantinople" (*Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des grandes. . .*) (Paris: M.D. Sturdza, 1983).

2. Sinan Kunalalp, "Kostaki Muzurus Paşa" in *Bellekten* 3 (1970): 421–35.

3. İsmail Hakki, *Hukuk-u İdâre* (Administrative Law), first publication 1328 H/1910 Konstantiniye, pp. 369–74.

4. B A, *İrâde-Meclis-i Vâlâ*. Nr: 9105, 11 L 1268/February 1852.

5. B A, *İrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 4028, 21 S 1268/December 1851, after the death of a former Christian (named Ali), two of his daughters (who probably kept their faith) took asylum in the Greek consulate in Adrianople.

6. B A, *İrâde-Meclis-i Vâlâ*. Nr: 914. The petition is dated 6 Receb 1288/October 1869 where the corresponding irâde is dated 2 Receb 1288/September 1872. The procedure covered a period of two years.

7. B A, *İrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 10276, 12 Safer 1277/August 1860.

8. B A, *İrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 7140, 12 N 1273/May 1857.

9. *Une Réforme praticable en Turquie* (Athens: Imprimerie d' André Coromélas, 1853), p. 30 and Stephanos Xenos, *Union or Dismemberment of*

Turkey (London: Wertheimer, Lea and Co., 1876), p. 11; and J. G. Pitzipios Bey, *L'Orient-Les Réformes de l'Empire Byzantine* (Paris: E. Dentu, 1858).

10. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 4118, 1268 of H/1852, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr:4697, 6 C 1269/March 1853.

11. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 120,29 Ca 1255/August 1839.

12. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 10214, Musurus to Ali Paşa 28 March 1861.

13. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 4000, selh-i Muh. 1268/October 1851, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 3209, selh-i Receb 1266/ May 1850.

14. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 10308, 25 Zilhicce 1277/July 1861.

15. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 8997 14 R 1264/March 1848.

16. B A, *Îrâde-Dâhiliye*. Nr: 27954, 22 Co. 1275/January 1859.

17. B A, *Îrâde-Hâriciye*. Nr: 3188, 12 Receb 1266/May 1850. *Îrâde-Dâhiliye*. Nr: 18295 selh-i Ca 1270/January 1854. See also in the same archive *Yunan Defteri*. Nr: 236.

18. B A, *Yunan Defteri*. Nr: 238 of the year 1270 H/1854 and *Îrâde Dâhiliye*. Nr: 18295 selh-i Ca 1270/January 1854. For the case of Beirut, see *Îrâde-Dâhiliye*. Nr: 18691, 1270 H/1854.

19. B A, *Îrâde Meclis-i Vâlâ*. Nr: 226, 9 Za 1256/January 1841.

20. Ahmed Midhat, *Ana Babanın Evlâd Üzerindeki Hukuk ve Vezâifi* [The Rights and Duties of Parents Regarding their Children]. Dersaadet 1317/1899, p. 72-4. Ahmed Midhat, *Çocuk Melekât-i Uzviyye ve Ruhîyyesi* [Mental and Physical Faculties of Children], Dersaadet 1317/1899.

21. Fevzî, *Tuhfet'ül Uşşak* [Gift for Children]. See A. S. Levend, *Divan Edebiyatı* (Istanbul: İnkılâp Kitapevi, 1943), p. 637.



VIII

From Tâ'ife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community

PARASKEVAS KONORTAS

THIS ESSAY ATTEMPTS to identify the groups of people that were, according to Ottoman authorities, under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This question is part of a broader juridicopolitical problem: that of the jurisdiction of Orthodox churches under Ottoman rule. Three factors determined this jurisdiction: (a) the enduring Byzantine tradition of the Orthodox Church (fourth to fifteenth centuries), which we know through ecclesiastical canons and Byzantine-Roman law; (b) the Islamic law that was the official juridical system of the Ottoman Empire; and (c) the political decisions taken at specific times by the Ottoman administration concerning the Orthodox Church. Consequently, one must focus on Orthodox or other Christian sources (travelers' journals, archives of the Western powers, etc.), as well as on Ottoman materials. For example, as far as identifying the groups that were under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Ottoman point of view did not always coincide with that of the Orthodox church. Research must address the often conflicting points of view of the sultan and the patriarch. This essay approaches the problem by examining the Ottoman terms concerning the groups that were under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. The terms used by Ottoman rulers very often betray their ideology, as well as their political positions on these matters. My sources include published Ottoman documents, particularly those concerning the Orthodox flock, and especially those concerning the power of the patriarch and the metropolitans. These documents were called by the Czech historian Joseph Kabdra "ecclesiastical" *berâts* or *fermâns*.

Before examining the sources, I want to review briefly the established theory on this subject.² It is usually thought that the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was the chief of all the Orthodox faithful of the Ottoman Empire. These peoples would be organized—as were other non-Muslim subjects of the sultan (Armenians, Jews, etc.)—in their own religious communities, that is, in their respective millets, a Turkish term that actually means “people” or “nation.” The Ecumenical Patriarch was a *milletbaşı*, that is, the head of the Orthodox millet called in Ottoman *Rum milleti* or *millet-i Rum*. The Ottomans used the term Rum (“Romans”) to identify all the Orthodox, Greeks and non-Greeks, of the empire. The patriarch of Constantinople was responsible to the Ottoman administration for all matters concerning the Orthodox religious community. This last point drove Greek scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to name the patriarch *Ethnarchēs*, that is, “nation-leader.” Influenced by the nationalist ideals of the time, they identified the Greek nation with the “Roman” (Orthodox) religious community.³

This view that identifies Orthodoxy with Hellenism has two significant flaws. First, it ignores the historical evolution of the Ottoman Empire (from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries) and the progressive decline in the power of the sultan’s central administration at the end of the sixteenth century and, particularly, the nineteenth-century transformations that the Tanzimat effected over Ottoman state and society. The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s role, of course, did change over time. During the period between 1453 and 1923, the institution of the church changed as much as the Ottoman government did, reflecting the evolution of the sultanate. Furthermore, this conventional view does not answer an essential question: How could the patriarch of Constantinople be the leader of all the Orthodox peoples when the Orthodox Church had been governed for centuries by more than one authority, each independent from one another? In the sixteenth century, there were five patriarchates and five autocephalous archbishoprics. The patriarch of Constantinople, for example, had no authority over the metropolitan of Berat (whose office was actually in Albania), who, in turn, was dependent on the archbishop of Achrīs.⁴ In this case, then, what was the meaning of the term *Rum milleti*?

The commonly accepted view seems to express only the reality, and this only partially, of the second half of the eighteenth century as well as that of the nineteenth century, when the Ecumenical Patriarchate succeeded both in absorbing the independent archbishoprics

of Achris and Ipekion in the Balkans and in controlling de facto the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as the autocephalous archbishoprics of Cyprus and Sinai. Only during this last era of the Ottoman Empire did the Church of Constantinople succeed in exercising authority over the whole Orthodox community of the sultan's empire. To clarify the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople, as it was conceived by the Ottoman administration, it is useful to consider four concentric circles. Beginning from the outermost, the first circle included all the sultan's subjects; the second represented the total non-Muslim population of the empire; the third, the Orthodox subjects; and the fourth, the Orthodox who were under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch. According to the commonly accepted view, non-Muslims were, at least from the period of Mehmed II (1451-1481), divided into different religious communities, the millets. The head of each of these millets, the milletbaşı, was their religious chief. Thus, the head of the Orthodox was the Ecumenical Patriarch and the head of the Armenians (*millet-i Ermeni*), the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, a position that was created ad hoc by Mehmed II. Finally, the head of the Jews (*millet-i Yahudi*) was the Great Rabbi of the Ottoman capital.

Analysis of Ottoman "ecclesiastical" documents shows that the term "millet" was first used at the end of the seventeenth century to refer to non-Muslim religious communities (and did not become prevalent before the beginning of the nineteenth century). Instead, during the first period of Ottoman rule, we find the term "*tâ'ife*" (pl. *tevâ'if*; in Greek sources *taifas*),⁵ which in Ottoman Turkish generally means "group"; "*tâ'ife*" was used not only to refer to religious communities but to groups in general, for instance, the guilds.⁶ The absence during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries of a specific Ottoman term used to refer to a religious community creates additional problems for the historian. According to a patriarch's berât issued in 1525,⁷ the chief of the Orthodox Church of Constantinople seemed to exercise his authority not over one *tâ'ife* but over numerous Orthodox *tevâ'if*. Consequently, we should say that even if fifteenth- and sixteenth-century sources on this matter are scarce, according to the Ottoman point of view, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople would not have extended his authority over a unified Orthodox community. Instead, he was the head of many, different Orthodox groups of the empire.

Thus, we are confronted with a division in the empire's Orthodox

community effected by the Ottoman administration. This seems to have taken place because of three factors. First, prior to the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the patriarchate was not yet under the sultan's authority. In fact, during that period the sultan exercised his authority only over metropolitans and bishops in Asia Minor as well as in the Balkans. Each metropolitan or bishop was the chief of a separate Orthodox group (tâ'ife). Second, the Ottoman administration lacked familiarity with the Orthodox ecclesiastical tradition. Third, the political tendency of the Ottoman central authorities during the sixteenth century was to divide the orthodox subjects in order to exercise a more effective control over all the levels of their ecclesiastical hierarchy. One thing seems certain: During the three centuries that followed 1453, according to ecclesiastical berâts or fermâns, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople was defined neither as ethnarchēs nor as milletbaşı.

Two further questions arise from the above points: First, at what moment did the Ottomans pass from the numerous tevâ'if to one tâ'ife? Second, at what moment was the term "tâ'ife" (group) replaced by "millet" (religious community)? As far as the first question is concerned, it seems that already during the last quarter of the sixteenth century the Ottoman administration recognized a single tâ'ife. The era of Ottoman decline had already begun. As for the second question, the term "millet" does not seem to have prevailed before the nineteenth century: The Tanzimat era paved the way for the triumph of nationalism in the empire.⁸ Only from this moment on can one speak of a "patriarch-head of a religious community" or even a "(Patriarch)-leader of the (Greek) nation."

I turn now to the third circle, that of the empire's Orthodox community. It included a number of ethnic groups: Greeks, Albanians, Wallachians and Moldavians, Slavs, as well as Turkish-speaking (Karamanlı) and Arabic-speaking Orthodox. Even if the heads of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were—with one exception that lasted no more than a year (1475–76)⁹—Greeks or Hellenized subjects of the empire, the Orthodox high clergy, knowing that the church's mission is ecumenical, very rarely used the term "Greek" in its official ecclesiastical documents. In order to define their own flock, patriarchs, metropolitans, and bishops used such terms as "people having the name of Christ," "Christians," "Orthodox," or "Orthodox Christians."¹⁰

Conventional theory, based on the conditions of the nineteenth century, claims that, on the contrary, already in the fifteenth century

the Orthodox community was known as Rum milleti. Thereafter, ecclesiastical berâts and fermâns show that the term "Rum" does not mean Orthodox before the end of the eighteenth century.¹¹ In fifteenth-century Ottoman documents, they are called "*Nasrâni*," that is, "Nazoreans" (Christians).¹² During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the more commonly used term "*kefere*" (pl. of "kafir), meaning "infidel."¹³ It seems that the Orthodox were called "infidels" because they were the most numerous non-Muslims (i.e., infidels) of the empire. The other religious communities were defined by their own names: *Ermeni* (Armenians), *Yahudi* (Jews), *Efrençi* (Franks, i.e., Catholics), etc. The passage from Nasrâni (fifteenth century) to kefere (sixteenth century) could be explained by the increasing attachment of the Ottoman administration to the classical Islamic tradition. This change, already in evolution during Bayezid's II reign (1481–1512), was intensified after the conquest of the Arab Middle East by Selim I (1512–20)¹⁴ and reached its apogee under Süleyman I (1520–66).¹⁵ Yet, the passage from kefere (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) to Rum in the eighteenth century could be explained by three factors: the progressive influence of the Greek element (Phanariots) in the Orthodox church as well as in the Ottoman court during this period; the gradual decline of the central Ottoman administration, which gave the opportunity to the Orthodox high clergy to acquire more political, administrative, judicial, and economic privileges; and the infiltration of nationalist ideas in the empire towards the end of the eighteenth century.

I turn now to the fourth and last circle, that of the Orthodox peoples of the empire who were under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople; in other words, the question of the patriarch's territorial jurisdiction. Initially the Ecumenical Patriarchate's jurisdiction was limited, even during the late Byzantine period, to well-defined areas of the Balkans and Anatolia and to the Ukraine and Russia. Many parts of the Balkans (actually the territories belonging to present-day Albania, Bosnia, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and a large part of Greek Macedonia), Cyprus, Transcaucasia, Cilicia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and many areas of Anatolia lying approximately east of the Adana-Trabzon line, were under the jurisdiction of other Orthodox patriarchs and also under several autocephalous archbishops. The Ottomans preserved the preexisting traditions in many fields of social and institutional organization in order to facilitate the integration of their new subjects. This tendency

is attested by the reconstitution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1454,¹⁶ by the existence of Christian timariots,¹⁷ and even by the revitalization of the activities of the provincial communities. Similarly with the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church: The Ottomans neither abolished its polycephalous system nor modified the traditional territorial jurisdiction of the patriarchates and autocephalous archbishoprics. For example, in the fermâns given in 1544 to the archbishop of Achris, the sultan calls him "Patriarch" (*Ohri Patriği*, that is, "Patriarch of Achris"),¹⁸ a title attributed also to the Ecumenical Patriarch during the same period (*İstanbul Patriği*, that is, "Patriarch of Constantinople").¹⁹ The fact that the Ottomans placed on an equal level the heads of the Church of Constantinople and the Church of Achris suggests that the Ecumenical Patriarch was not yet a milletbaşı, that is, leader of the whole Orthodox community of the empire.

The last point to be made concerns the title of the Ecumenical Patriarch accorded to him by the sultans through ecclesiastical berâts and fermâns and the eventual evolution of that title. The sources provide the following examples: in 1525, "Patriarch of the groups of the infidels" (*"Patrik-i tevâ'îf-i keferenin"*)²⁰; in 1544, "the actual patriarch of the well-guarded Istanbul and of the countries and areas that depend on it, the monk called . . ." ²¹; in 1574, ". . . who is the actual patriarch of the infidels who reside in Istanbul the 'well-guarded' " ²²; in the seventeenth century, "The monk called . . . who is the actual patriarch of the infidels of Istanbul and of its dependencies." ²³; from 1700 to 1750, "the 'Roman' patriarch of Istanbul and its dependencies" ²⁴; from 1750 to the nineteenth century, "the patriarch of the 'Romans' of Istanbul and its dependencies, the example of the heads of the Christian community, let his end be felicitous, the patriarch called. . ." ²⁵

The difference between the conditions of the sixteenth century and those of the nineteenth century is dramatic. After 1750, the title of the Ecumenical Patriarch brings to mind the titles granted by the sultan to the highest dignitaries of the empire.

Also, the "dependencies" or "the countries and areas that depend on the patriarch of Constantinople" coincide with the territorial jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as it is described by ecclesiastical sources, that is, the *notitiae episcopatumum*. Only after the eighteenth century does the order of precedence of the suffragan metropolitans and bishops mentioned in the berâts coincide with official ecclesiastical

precedence.²⁶ Concerning the identity of the Ecumenical Patriarch's flock, according to the Ottoman point of view, as seen through the ecclesiastical *berâts* and *fermâns*, we can observe that the terms used by the sultans in these documents evolved from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries in accordance with the political changes of the times: During the three centuries that followed 1453, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople seems to be neither head of a nation nor head of a religious community. In other words, he exercised his authority over only a part of the Orthodox community of the Ottoman Empire who is not yet defined as "Romans." The members of this community are still "Nazoreans" (fifteenth century) or "infidels" (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).

The powers of this patriarch were exercised only in a well-defined area of the empire, having no national character. The Ecumenical Patriarch, just like other Orthodox patriarchs or the autocephalous archbishops, exercised his authority over many Orthodox linguistic groups: Greeks, Rumanians, Slavs, Arabs, etc. The powers of the patriarch of Constantinople seem to have been progressively extended over the whole Orthodox community of the empire in two ways: *de jure* and *de facto*. It was *de jure*, when the Ecumenical Patriarch succeeded in obtaining Ottoman documents issued in 1766 and 1767 allowing the abolition of the autocephalous archbishoprics of Achris and Ipekion, as well as the incorporation of their suffragan metropolitans to his own jurisdiction. It was *de facto*, as soon as this same patriarch began to interfere in the internal affairs of the three other Orthodox patriarchs residing in the empire, as well as the autocephalous archbishoprics of Cyprus and Sinai.²⁷ This is primarily due to the fact that the Ecumenical Patriarch was seated in Constantinople, where the sultan also resided, and also because according to ecclesiastical tradition dating to the fourth century, the patriarch of Constantinople was *primus inter pares* since he was at that time physically near the *Vasileus*, the sole Christian and Orthodox emperor.

This essay has a two-fold aim: first, to present some hypotheses on the Ottoman point of view concerning the powers of the patriarch of Constantinople over his flock, as well as over the other Orthodox ecclesiastical authorities in the sultan's empire; second, to try to demonstrate the importance of the Ottoman perspective in arriving at a more coherent understanding of this issue. Even though the published sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are scarce, we can

confidently claim that the patriarch of Constantinople (backed by the very powerful Phanariot aristocracy) succeeded in having the Orthodox community of the empire be defined by the Ottomans as Rûm milleti and was able to exercise fully his authority over the whole Orthodox community of the empire only in the eighteenth century. Moreover, we can see that Patriarch Grēgorios V, who was hanged by the Ottomans in 1821 and who suffered martyrdom as a victim of the sultan's reactions to the Greek national revolution, was surely a milletbaşı. This last title seems to have been granted neither to Genadios II, the first Ecumenical Patriarch after 1453, nor to his successors until the second half of the eighteenth century.

NOTES

1. See J. Kabrda, *Le système fiscal de l'Eglise Orthodoxe dans l'Empire Ottoman (d'après les documents turcs)*. (Brno: Universita J. E. Purkyně, 1969), p. 28.
2. See, for example: N. G. Moschovakēs, *To en Helladi Dēmision Dikaion epi Tourkokratias* [Public Law in Greece during the Turkish Occupation] (Athens: Ch. Philadelphēōs, 1882), pp. 46–67; K. Delikanēs, *Ta Dikaia kai Pnomia tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiu en Tourkia* [Rights and Privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey] (Constantinople: Ek tou Patriarchikou Typographeiou, 1909); N. Eleutheriadēs, *Anatolikai Meletai. . .* [Anatolian Studies] (Smyrna, s.n. 1909); C. Papadopoulos, *Les privilèges du Patriarcat Oecuménique* (Paris: thèse, Université de Paris, 1924); Th. Lapadopoulos, *Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People Under Turkish Domination* (Brussels: de Meester, 1952); N. Pantazopoulos, *Church and Law in the Balkan Peninsula During the Ottoman Rule* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1967); S. Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); for a different point of view on this question, see D. Apostolopoulos, *To Mega Nomimon: symvolē stēn ereuna tou metavyzantinou dikaiou* [The 'Mega Nomimon': A contribution to the study of post-Byzantine law] (Athens: D. Apostolopoulos, 1978) and many contributions in B. Braude and B. Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a Plural Society* (New York–London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982).
3. For the different meanings in Greek of the term *Rōmaios*, that is, "Roman" (Roman, Byzantine, Orthodox, Greek), see, among others, M. Mantouvalou, "Rōmaios-Rōmios-Rōmiosynē; la notion de Romain avant et après la chute de Constantinople," in *Epistēmōnikē Epetēris tēs Philosophikēs Scholēs tou Panepistēmiou Athēnōn* 28 (1985): 169–98.
4. See, for example, a notitia episcopatum of the beginning of the sixteenth century in H. Gelzer, *Ungedruckte und ungenügend veröffentlichte Texte der Notitiae Episcopatum* (Munich: Verlag der K. Akademie, 1900), p. 633.
5. See, for example, A. Refik, *On altıncı asırda İstanbul hayâtı (1553–1591)*

[Life in Istanbul in the sixteenth century] (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935), p. 49 (document of 1574); C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine ait Belgeler* [Documents on Ottoman History] *Telhisler* [Abstracts] (1597–1607), Istanbul, Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1970, p. 125 (1597); A. Refik, *Hicri On birinci asırda İstanbul Hayâtı (1000–1100)* [Life in Istanbul in the eleventh century of the Hegira] (Istanbul: Devlet matbaası, 1931), pp. 24–25 (1603); in addition to millet and tâ'ife, there are also many other Ottoman terms meaning a non-Muslim religious community: *mezheb*, *takım*, *cins*, and *cemâ'at*. These last terms don't seem to have been used as often as millet or tâ'ife.

6. See, for example, N. Beldiceanu, *Recherches sur la ville Ottomane au XV^e siècle. Etudes et actes* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1973), p. 47; H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West . . .* vol. 1, pt. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 277. A. Refik, *On altıncı*, pp. 44, 50, 72–76.

7. This document was edited for publication by Elizabeth Zachariadou to whom I am grateful for letting me read it.

8. The only "ecclesiastical" Ottoman document of the fifteenth century we know, which qualifies the Orthodox as Nasârâ, is a nondated berât of the reign of Mehmed II. See infra, footnote 12. The first Ottoman document qualifying the Orthodox flock as "kefere" is, as far as I know, a berât of 1525; see supra, note 7. Finally the term "Rum," meaning Orthodox, seems to appear for the first time in a fermân of 1702: G. Arampatzoglou, *Phōtieios Vivliothēkē* [The Library of Photius], vol. 2 (Constantinople: Typographeion "Phazilet" Tassou Vakalopoulou, 1933–35), p. 113.

9. The sole non-Greek who succeeded in becoming patriarch of Constantinople was Raphael I, who was of Slavic origin: see Sp. Lampros, ed., *Ecthesis chronica and Chronicon Athenarum* (London: Methuen and Co, 1902); E. I. Stamatiadēs. *Ekklesiastika Syllekta* [Collection of Writings on the Church] (Samos: Ek tou Hēgem. Typographeiou, 1891), p. 32.

10. The terms in question appear in ecclesiastical documents from the entire Ottoman period. See, for instance, J. Oudot, *Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani acta selecta* 1 (Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1941), p. 182 (1465); K. Sathas, *Viographikon Schediasma peri tou Patriarchou Hieremiu B'* (1572–1594) [Biographical Note on Patriarch Hieremias II (1572–1594)] (Athens: Typographeion A. Ktena kai S. Oikonomou, 1870), pp. 190, 192 (end of the sixteenth century); F. Miklosich, J. Müller, *Acta et diplomata Graeca medii aevi sacra et profana* 5 (Vindobonae: Carolus Gerold, 1860–90), p. 284 (1480).

11. See supra, footnote 8; see also N. Staurinidēs, *Metaphraseis tourkikōn historikōn engraphōn aphorōntōn eis tēn historian tēs Krētēs* [Translations of Turkish Historical Documents on the History of Crete] (Hērakleion: Vikelaia Dēmōtikē Vivliothēkē, 1975), vol. 3, p. 261 (document of 1701).

12. We know this term appears in the sole ecclesiastical berât of the fifteenth century: F. Babinger, *Sultanische Urkunden zur Geschichte des osmanischen Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung am Ausgang der Herrschaft Mehmeds II des Eroberers* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1956), pp. 230–31. There are also other terms in several nonecclesiastical Ottoman documents, denoting the Orthodox religious community as *mesîhî* (Christian), *dhimmi* (non-Muslim), and *gebr* (infidel).

13. See mainly the documents published by A. Refik, *On altıncı* and *Hicri on birinci*.
14. I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'Empire Ottoman," *Turcica* (1975): 34–48.
15. See, among others: H. İnalçık, "Süleyman the Lawgiver and Ottoman Law," in *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy* (London: Variorum reprints, 1978), VII, pp. 105–37.
16. See L. Petit, X. Sidéridès-M. Jugie, *Oeuvres complètes de Georges Scholarios* (Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse, 1928–36) IV, p. 233.
17. See, among others, H. İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," in *The Ottoman Empire*, 1, pp. 103–29.
18. M. Maxim, "Les relations des pays roumains avec l'archevêché d'Ohrid à la lumière de documents turcs inédits," in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes* (Bucharest) 19 (1981): 655, 658.
19. See *ibid.*, p. 658.
20. See *supra*, footnote 2.
21. "Hâliyen mahrûse-i İstanbul ve âna tâbi' yerlere ve vilâyetlere patrik olan . . . nâm râhib"; see Maxim, *Les relations*, p. 658.
22. "Hâlen mahrûse-i İstanbulda kefereye patrik olan . . ."; see A. Refik, *On altıncı*, p. 49.
23. See, for instance, I. K. Vasdravellēs, *Historika Archeia Makedonias. II Archeion Veroias-Naousēs* (Thessaloniki: Hetairia Makedonikōn Spoudōn, 1954), p. 19–20 (document of 1639), 35–36 (1649); J. Kabdra, *Eglise*, pp. 109. "Hâliyen İstanbul ve tevâbî'-i keferesi patriği . . . râhib (1661), 112–14 (1680); N. Staurinidēs, *Metaphraseis*, II, pp. 227 (1678) and 313–14 (1688).
24. "İstanbul ve tevâbî'-i Rûm patriği . . . nâm patrik (râhib)" or "İstanbulda Rûm patriği olan . . . nâm patrik (râhib)"; see, for instance, A. Refik, *Hicri On birinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1100–1200)* [Life in Istanbul in the Eleventh Century of the Hijra] (Istanbul: Devlet matbaası, 1930), pp. 44 (document of 1710), 139 (1738/9), 140 (1699), 176 (1751/2), etc.
25. "İstanbul ve tevâbî'-i Rûmiyân Patriği, kidvet-i ümera-yi millet ül-mesîhiye . . . patrik, hutimet avakibuhubi al-hayirz": see, among others, P. Chidiroglou, "Soultanika Beratia" [Sultanic berâts], *Epētēris Kentrou Epistēmōnikōn Ereunōn* (Nicosia) 7 (1973/5): 179–80 (berât of 1757).
26. The list of suffragan bishoprics and metropolitanates of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople existing in the patriarchal berât of 1757 coincides with a notitia episcopatum established in 1759 by the patriarchal chancery. See Chidiroglou, "Soultanika Beratia," pp. 182–83 and M. D. Chamalopoulos, "Hē Patriarchikē Megalē tou Genous Scholē" [The Patriarchal 'Great School of the (Greek) Nation'], *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* (Constantinople) 1 (1880/1): 237–38.
27. After 1453, the first Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem who was also of Greek origin was Germanos, elected in 1534, only ten years after the first journey of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the Holy Lands. See A. K. Hypselantēs Komnēnos Athanasios, *Ekklesiastikōn kai politikōn tōn eis dōdeka vivliōn VIII, IX kai X, ētoi ta meta tēn Halōsin (1453–1789)* [On Religious and Political

(Affairs) in Twelve Books VIII, IX, and X, namely (the events) after the Fall (of Constantinople)], ed. Germanos Aphthonidēs (Constantinople: Typ. I.A. Vretou, 1870), pp. 63–64. The Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria was under Greek authority already in the fifteenth century (1487): see Chrysostomos (Archbishop of Athens), “Iōakeim ho ‘pany’ ex Athēnon, Papas kai Patriarchēs Alexandrias (1487–1567)” [Ioakeim of Athens, Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria (1487–1569)], in *Ēpetēris Hetaireias Vyzantinōn Spoudōn* (Athens) 7 (1930): 159–179. Concerning the intervention of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the conflict between the patriarch of Jerusalem and the monks of Sinai, see D. Kampouroglou, *Mnēmeia tēs Historias tōn Athēnaiōn* [Monuments of the History of the Athenians] (Athens: Ek tou Typographeiou P. D. Sakellariou, 1889–92), vol. 2, p. 141.



IX

The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the “Society of Constantinople”

THANOS VEREMIS

THREE YEARS BEFORE the turn of the century, a military defeat at the hands of Ottoman forces in Thessaly discredited the Greek state as the sole champion of the Greek nation. Three years after 1900, the dynamic presence of Bulgarians in Ottoman-held Macedonia convinced the Greeks that the Slavic challenge required a drastic revision of Greek-Turkish relations. These events generated a new outlook among the policymakers of Greece and a new trend in the content of its nationalism.

No individuals better represent the generation that experienced the humiliation of 1897 and the threat of 1903 than Iōn Dragoumēs and Athanasios Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs. These two men, one a diplomat and the other an officer of the army, became the harshest critics of the state and eventually attempted to divorce the fate of their nation from what they considered to be the hopeless incompetence of the Hellenic Kingdom. Seeking an alternative to the irredentist spirit that had created 1897, each one turned to the prosperous Greek millet of the Ottoman realm. Both placed their hopes for Hellenism in a multi-ethnic state in which equal rights would be granted to all citizens irrespective of their creed and race.

Iōn Dragoumēs's idiosyncratic nationalism must be understood in its Western context. The offspring of a prominent family that had produced several public figures, he belonged to a social elite whose hallmark was education rather than wealth. He spoke several languages, traveled in western Europe, and corresponded with some of the luminaries of his time. He was, moreover, an exponent of the Nietzschean revolt against rationalism; in his diaries, he often referred to Hippolyte Taine, Herbert Spencer, and Maurice Barrés. The cult

of the individual, the veneration of will and power, the primeval struggle for survival, and the mystical properties of soil and climate are ideas he borrowed from his Western mentors. Absent from his work, however, are the racial overtones of Barrés and his contemporaries. Instead, Dragoumēs emphasized the force of culture as a primary factor determining communal behavior. He was a critic of Western rationalism; nevertheless, his nationalist reaction to European influences in Greece was indebted to Western ideas.

The Macedonian struggle and nationalist strife inspired him with a sense of mission and became his escape route from the inertia and mediocrity of public employment. He longed for a return to nature in a country that did not suffer from the negative effects of industrialization but rather from rural underdevelopment. He sought to revive traditions of communal life long ago abolished by the centralizing impact of the modern state.

Not unlike the times in which he lived, there is considerable mobility and change in Dragoumēs's convictions. He began his career as an exponent of traditional irredentism but gradually realized that the strength of the nation was not synonymous with the aggrandizement of the state. His term in Macedonia convinced him that the state he represented was incapable of unifying the imperiled nation, and he blamed the "unredeemed" Greeks for expecting everything from Greece. Instead of trying to revive ancient Greece and the Byzantine Empire, he felt that the state ought to frame its boundaries according to the whereabouts of the nation.¹ After 1908, he noted in his diary that "the Great Idea was finally abolished. . . . The political orientation of Hellenism is now the union of the nation in a state more confined than the Byzantine."²

Although it is unclear what Dragoumēs meant by a "more confined" state, it is certain that since his experience in Constantinople, he began to move closer to Souliōtēs's multiethnic Eastern ideal. He was nevertheless concerned that submitting to a multiethnic state would entail the loss of national consciousness, as exemplified by the Levantine inhabitants of Ottoman ports.³

Dragoumēs's flight from state-sponsored irredentism did not lead him to embrace the spiritual authority of the Constantinopolitan patriarch as an alternative source of leadership for the Greeks. His regard for the church was limited to a mere cultural affinity, and his secular nationalism was at odds with the ecumenical spirit of the Orthodox patriarch. "Prelates of the church are not Greeks, they are Christians . . .," he wrote.⁴ Whereas Ioakeim III viewed all Orthodox

people as his flock, Dragoumēs as well as Souliōtēs appeared to believe that the Greeks were more compatible with Muslim Turks than with Orthodox Bulgarians.

Athanasios Souliōtēs, an officer with a romantic inclination for adventure, spent most of his years in active service setting up clandestine organizations, first in Thessaloniki, then in Istanbul.⁵ His main preoccupation was with the Slavic threat to Hellenism, and he believed that Greeks and Turks could collaborate in a multiethnic empire to stem the Slavic tide. He was sent to the Ottoman capital early in 1908 by the Eastern Section of the Macedonian Committee in Athens, to coordinate Greek activities against the Bulgarian Committee in Thrace.⁶ That same year the independent-minded officer, posing as an insurance dealer, founded with the support of Athens, the *Organōsis Kōnstantinoupoleōs* (Society of Constantinople [S.C.]) and gradually developed his own blueprint for action.

Although it is certain that during its initial years the S.C. kept the Eastern Section posted on all its activities, the official Greek view on relations with the Turks remains unclear. According to the Greek Military Attaché in Istanbul, a Greek deputy arrived in 1907, bearing propositions for a Greek-Turkish alliance that proved to be without substance.⁷ There is also evidence that, during 1907, members of the Young Turk movement, as well as officials of the imperial government, approached Greek diplomats and Orthodox prelates in order to secure support against each other. It appears that the Greeks failed to encourage either side and remained neutral in this conflict among Ottomans.⁸

The S.C. was a hybrid of certain official views in Greece and the initiative of individuals whose perceptions had been formed during the Macedonian struggle. Souliōtēs cooperated with Dragoumēs while the latter was serving in the Greek embassy of the Ottoman capital. They discovered that they shared their faith in the individual and a dislike for the leveling effect of socialism. Furthermore, they believed that the nation was a catalyst of all social action and an "instrument for the perfection of the individual."⁹ Their relationship with the Eastern Section (later Pan Hellenic Organization) was smooth. Colonel Danklēs admonished them against the use of violence, and they managed to allay official fears that they were distributing firearms to their members.¹⁰ Yet, they never managed to convince either the Greek Ambassador in Istanbul or the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry that they were not acting on their own initiatives.¹¹

The original mission of the S.C. was to combat the Bulgarian threat in Thracian cities and towns in the Edirne region and diminish

its propaganda in areas devoted to the patriarchate. Souliōtēs's movement towards the "Eastern" ideal was no doubt caused by the festive spirit that prevailed during the first weeks of the Young Turk revolution and the promise of a constitutional regime. "The fact that a promise that was not particularly sincere could cause people of different nations that used to look at each other with suspicion to fill the streets holding hands convinced me that nations with so much in common could find ways to cooperate, join forces, and live in amity."¹²

The differences between Souliōtēs and Dragoumēs over the nature of the future state that would host the Greek nation were less subtle than their friendship allowed them to appear. Souliōtēs clearly favored a merger of Balkan peoples to form a single "Eastern not Turkish state."¹³ He went as far as to profess the assimilation of all nations into a new race of "Eastern" peoples defined by the common features of their cultural backgrounds.¹⁴ Dragoumēs was less enthusiastic about such a prospect. Even when he agreed to consider the possibility of a multiethnic state as one of several alternative solutions,¹⁵ he maintained that Greeks would also offer their culture as the catalyst in a union of peoples and would be the heart of a state that would also include Balkan and Anatolian elements. He insisted that recipients of "Greekness" were all the beneficiaries of the particular culture as well as of the geographic and climatic factors that influenced its development.

According to both men, it would be necessary to persuade the Young Turks to accept the scheme of a state that would guarantee the rights of all ethnicities in the empire. If this failed, Souliōtēs proposed an alignment with other Turks—be they liberal or Muslim in their priorities. Once differences among ethnic communities were resolved, he felt that the states could begin to merge into federal or confederal entities.¹⁶

Shortly after the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution, Dragoumēs and Souliōtēs sent a letter to Greek Foreign Minister G. Baltatzēs urging him to work towards an alliance with the Ottoman state under the following terms. First, Greece would surrender any future claims on Ottoman territory. Second, the Ottoman state would guarantee the rights of Greeks as citizens. Third, the Greeks, as an ethnic community, would be responsible for their own religious practice and education.¹⁷ They received no reply, but official relations between the two states improved dramatically in 1908, with exchanges of official visits and the circulation of Greek newspapers in Istanbul. Yet, this new liberalization was laden with dangers for the Ottoman

Greeks. Once they expressed their sentiments towards Greece openly, they ran the risk of being accused of lack of dedication to their Ottoman fatherland. The Cretan issue, moreover, soon became another cause of friction between Greece and Turkey and exposed the Ottoman Greeks to abuse by the Turkish authorities. Souliōtēs, who had advised his government to maintain the autonomous status of Crete and discourage pleas for unification with Greece, complained that he was being ignored.¹⁸

The Ecumenical Patriarch was traditionally the spiritual leader of all Greeks in the empire and, as milletbaşı, continued to feel responsible for their welfare. The Patriarchate had never viewed the secularizing effect of the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms with favor and on various instances had been at loggerheads with the priorities of the Greek state. Since the influence of the patriarch diminished with every enlargement of Greece, he had little incentive to identify with Hellenic irredentism.

Iōakeim III was no ordinary patriarch. During his first term in office (last quarter of the nineteenth century), he had favored cooperation among the Orthodox people of the Balkans and had opposed Greece's efforts to mend its differences with the Ottoman Empire in order to create a barrier against a Slavic incursion in Macedonia and Thrace. True to his ecumenical mission, Iōakeim strove to bring the Bulgarian Exarchate (which had acquired its independence in 1870) back into the fold of the Great Church. He failed to appreciate the significance of rising Balkan nationalisms and was forced to retire in 1884, after being exposed to official Ottoman displeasure.¹⁹ He ascended the throne again in 1901 and expressed his opposition to the Young Turk revolt in 1908. Given his past history, it was natural that Iōakeim should view any secular intrusion into his authority over his flock with hostility and even more so an intrusion by the S.C., an organization that he considered to be an instrument of the Hellenic Kingdom. Souliōtēs took pains to convince the obstinate prelate that their objectives were complementary and went out of his way to enhance the patriarch's image and even to avert demonstrations by Iōakeim's opponents in the Ottoman Greek community.²⁰ The division of the Ottoman Greek community of Istanbul into supporters and enemies of Iōakeim was significant. The seeds of communal disarray had already been planted in the late nineteenth century. The intrusion of Greece's policy in the Ottoman realm and the armed struggle in Macedonia among peoples of the same religion diminished the conciliatory role of the patriarch and increased the prestige of activist

clergymen who upheld their right to promote Greek nationalism over ecumenical Orthodox values.

The letters of Chrysostomos, metropolitan of Drama, to Iōn Dragoumēs in 1908 exemplify the most open form of rebellion against the patriarch and betray Chrysostomos's willingness to follow instructions from the "national center" rather than the authority of his superiors.²¹ I have been unable to locate any of Dragoumēs's replies, but the metropolitan no doubt assumed that his friend was a loyal servant of the state he represented. Unlike his devotion to the nation, Dragoumēs's loyalty to the state was, at least in philosophical terms, questionable.

Dragoumēs had a keen eye for identifying elements in Iōakeim that defied his own nationalist imperatives and made the following observations about the shepherd of the Greek Orthodox: "He does not identify himself with Hellenism more than is necessary to secure his high office. He has his own grand priorities. He is the patriarch of the Orthodox and claims all the Orthodox flock as his own or would like to dominate it spiritually. He is a Byzantine Greek. In order to maintain himself in his throne he is capable of sacrificing many Greek interests without an afterthought."²²

Thus, we can see that the antagonism between nationalism and the ecumenical spirit embodied in the institution of the patriarchate would have threatened to divide Ottoman Greeks even further if it had not been for the Young Turks themselves, who unwittingly prompted most factions to gradually unite.

It was the intransigence of the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) that was ultimately responsible for the rapprochement between the patriarch and the S.C. In the summer of 1908, the S.C. founded the Greek Political League (*Politikos Syndesmos*) to promote its goals openly and prepare Greeks for the first Ottoman elections in the autumn of that year. The task of the league was to campaign for particular candidates and alert the voters to their rights. Emancipating Ottoman Greeks from the *re'âyâ* (non-Muslim subjects) mentality was no easy task. Moreover, C.U.P. backstage scheming and intimidation, and to a certain degree compliance on the part of the ethnic communities, resulted in a predictable electoral outcome.²³ In the course of the elections, the league succeeded in persuading the Ottoman Greek constituency not to abstain, and Iōakeim declared his detachment and referred representatives of the C.U.P. to the Political League for consultation.²⁴

Out of the 253 deputies in the Ottoman parliament that convened in December 1908, 23 were of Greek ethnic background, and 15 were members of the S.C. They met regularly with Souliōtēs at his office, or at the adjacent offices of the league, and exchanged views with Dragoumēs there until his departure in February 1909. Although both Souliōtēs and Dragoumēs were employed by the Greek state, they could hardly be considered its mouthpiece. The Greek minister's failure to respond to their advice²⁵ and the candidacy of historian Paulos Karolidēs as deputy of Smyrna indicated their loss of favor with the national center. A celebrity of Greek academia, Karolidēs became the choice of the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry to represent its views in the Ottoman parliament. Failing to understand Ottoman reality, the opinionated and self-centered Karolidēs hardly promoted the ministry's objectives and merely obstructed the work of the S.C. At various times, he favored the executive authority of the sultan, a centralized Ottoman state, the C.U.P., a Greek-Bulgarian alliance, the formation of a Greek political party in the Ottoman parliament, and cooperation with the liberals.²⁶

There are no indications that the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry had a clear view of the success of the S.C. with the upper and middle bourgeoisie of Istanbul. During the first years of its operation, the organization made considerable headway in the middle class community of Constantinopolitan Greeks, but there is little evidence of its impact on the lower middle class, the working class, and the population of the countryside. The membership list of the organization (although the professions of more than half of its 370 members are not stated) indicates that the most numerous occupational groups were industrialists and merchants (37), doctors (32), lawyers (21), clergymen (17), and teachers (12). Clerks (10), pharmacists (5), journalists (5), engineers (2), coffee shop owners (3), moneylenders (4), sailors (2), bank employees (3), employees in shipping firms (2), and one tailor are the other occupational groups listed.²⁷

Although Dragoumēs's and Souliōtēs's vision of an Ottoman state in which all ethnic groups would enjoy equal rights was never fully developed in theory, it appeared compatible with Prince Sabaheddin's²⁸ liberal philosophy. In the Congress of Ottoman Liberals held in Paris 4-9 February 1902, he invoked alleged past practices of Ottoman rule to justify his own egalitarian designs,²⁹ but his attachment to decentralization and individualism were clearly based on Western prototypes. Sabaheddin's League of Private Initiative and Decentrali-

zation would promote the kind of regime that would "assure the rights of Muslim and Christian alike to participate in local government."³⁰ The prospect certainly struck a cord with prominent Ottoman Greeks. As the C.U.P. made its intention of opposing the rights of the millets increasingly clear, members of the S.C. and the patriarchate began to close ranks in support of the liberals and Sabaheddin.

Geōrgios Skaliērēs, the son of a prominent banker in Istanbul with contacts in Greece, provides evidence of official Greek preference for the prince. Throughout his correspondence with Stephanos Skouloudēs (former Constantinopolitan banker and later deputy in the Greek parliament and prime minister briefly in 1916), Skaliērēs insisted that the liberals and Sabaheddin constituted Greece's best hope for friendly relations with the Ottomans. Although it is not clear if the Greek government responded to Skaliērēs's pleas for financial support to the liberals, there is little doubt that Skouloudēs shared his views fully.³¹ Furthermore, in a report to Geōrgios Streit, a prominent Greek banker and politician, Skaliērēs pointed out that when the Liberal (Ahrār) Party was founded in 1908, the government of Theotokēs as well as the leaders of the opposition parties, Rallēs, Mauromichalēs, and Stephanos Dragoumēs, all agreed to support it.³²

The patriarch, who had initially failed to see eye to eye with the S.C. on issues that required rallying the Ottoman Greeks, was eventually obliged to seek the S.C.'s support. In July 1910, the Ottoman parliament passed a law concerning the churches of Macedonia, making new concessions to the Bulgarian Exarchate. Iōakeim responded in anger and summoned a national assembly of Ottoman Greeks to decide on the issue.³³ The assembly, lacking official permission, was dissolved by the authorities, but the incident pushed the patriarchate further in the direction of political activism. In 1911, an able priest, Chrysanthos Philippidēs (later metropolitan of Trebizond), was appointed director of the Patriarchal Archives and editor of *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* [Ecclesiastic Truth], a weekly published by the Great Church. Chrysanthos became a close friend of Souliōtēs and a member of the S.C.³⁴ In an editorial in *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* of 10 September 1911, he warned the Ottoman government that the intransigence of the Young Turks and their failure to recognize the rights of Ottoman ethnic communities were driving the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars together. He castigated the C.U.P. for following the German rather than the Austrian example of statecraft and predicted that, like the Germans of Austria, "the Turks under the pressure of the coalesced ethnicities will feel obliged to recognize their rights."³⁵

The mounting nationalism of the C.U.P. became increasingly evident after 1910. According to British Ambassador Sir Gerald Lowther, "that the Committee has given up any idea of 'Ottomanizing' all the non-Turkish elements by sympathetic and constitutional ways has long been manifest. To them 'Ottoman' evidently meant 'Turk' and their policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar. . . ." ³⁶

It is clear from Souliōtēs's papers and correspondence that the plan of cooperating with other Balkan peoples to put pressure on the C.U.P. began to acquire momentum in 1910, but his set of priorities did not change. These priorities can be outlined as follows ³⁷:

1. To persuade the Ottoman Greeks to take full advantage of the constitution in order to achieve equal political rights with the Turks and to strive to attain positions in the administration of the state in accordance with their numbers in the empire.

2. If that failed, the Greeks were to cooperate with other ethnic communities of the empire and strive to convince the Young Turks to accept them as full citizens and acknowledge their rights as ethnic groups. "If either of the above efforts succeed, an alliance between Greece and Turkey would be possible. This alliance would become the nucleus of a Balkan federation." ³⁸

3. If all else failed, the Balkan states should exert pressure on the Young Turks to recognize the rights of their ethnic brethren. War against the empire would be the last resort of the Balkan states with the ultimate aim of including the Ottoman state (as well as Romania) in a Balkan federation.


In another part of this manuscript he noted, "the federation will be to our best advantage if it begins with an alliance between Greece and Turkey. This alliance would be possible if political equality and recognition of their ethnic status is granted to the (Ottoman) Greeks and also if Greece and Turkey truly recognize the autonomous status of Crete." ³⁹

The heyday of Souliōtēs's dream for a multiethnic "Eastern Empire" was brief; it was quickly followed by a period of inflamed and conflicting nationalisms in the Balkans. After the outbreak of the first of a series of wars that would change the political map of the region (18 October 1912), Souliōtēs wrote to his lifelong friend Dragoumēs: "It's a pity and a waste of all that we've done."

NOTES

1. Iōn Dragoumēs, *Ho Hellēnismos mou kai hoi Hellēnes* [My Hellenism and the Greeks] (Athens: Typ. Hestia, 1927), p. 118.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
3. Dragoumēs, *Hosoi Zōntanoi* [Those Alive] (Athens: Typ. Hestia, 1926), p. 48–58.
4. Dragoumēs, *Ho Hellēnismos*, p. 22.
5. A. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *Ho Makedonikos Agōn* [The Macedonian Struggle] (Thessaloniki: Hetaireia Makedonikōn Spoudōn, 1959). “Nikolaidēs” was his assumed name.
6. This was a semiofficial organization that coordinated the Greek bands of the Macedonian struggle. The eastern section was headed by Colonel Panagiōtēs Danklēs. See P. Danklēs, *Anamnēseis, Engrapha, Allēlographia* [Recollections, Documents, Correspondence], vol. 1 (Athens: Vivliopōleion E. G. Vagiōnakē, 1965), pp. 310–11, 328–42.
7. P. Kontogiannēs, *Ho Stratos mas kai hoi Teleutaioi Polemoi* [Our Army and the Recent Wars] (Athens: Typ. A. Phrantzeskakē kai A. Kaitatzē, 1924), p. 149.
8. A.J. Panayotopoulos, “Early Relations between the Greeks and the Young Turks,” *Balkan Studies* 21, no. 1 (1980): 87–95.
9. Dragoumēs, *Hosoi Zōntanoi*, p. 81.
10. Danklēs, pp. 332–36.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 390–94.
12. A. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *He Organōsis Kōnstantinoupoleōs* [The Society of Constantinople], vol. 1 (Athens: Ekdoseis Dōdōne, 1984), p. 62.
13. Dragoumēs, *Ho Hellēnismos*, p. 116. See also A.J. Panayotopoulos, “The Great Idea and the Vision of Eastern Federation: A propos of the Views of I. Dragoumēs and A. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs,” *Balkan Studies* 21, no. 2 (1980): 331–65.
14. *Ibid.*
15. The other two being (i) the expansion of the Greek state and (ii) the continuation of the existing state of affairs. See Dragoumēs, *Ho Hellēnismos*, p. 144.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 272–73.
18. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *He Organōsis*, p. 272.
19. Evangelos Kofos, “Patriarch Joachim III (1878–1884) and the Irreudent Policy of the Greek State,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 4, no. 2 (October, 1986): 115–18.
20. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *He Organōsis*, p. 72. The S.C. included devoted friends of Iōakeim, such as P. Kosmidēs, and opponents, such as Theocharidēs.
21. P. Kitromēlidēs, “To Telos tēs Ethnarchikēs Paradosēs” [The end of the ‘ethnarch’ (i.e., nation-leader) tradition], in *Amētos: Stē Mnēme Phōtē Apostolopoulou* [‘Amētos:’ In Memory of Phōtēs Apostolopoulos] (Athens: Kentro Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn, 1984): 486–507.

22. Dragoumēs, *Ho Hellēnismos*, p. 120.
23. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides, *He Organōsis*, p. 75–80. See also Buxton, Noel, "The Young Turks," *Nineteenth Century* (January 1909).
24. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides, *He Organōsis*, p. 79.
25. *Ibid.*
26. See unpublished paper by Kirkē Geōrgiadou, "Prosengisē stē zōē kai to ergo tou Paulou Karolidē (1849–1939)" [An approach to the life and work of Paulos Karolidēs (1849–1939)] (Thessaloniki, 1985). Also P. Karolidēs, *Logoi kai Hypomnēmata* [Speeches and Memoranda] (Athens, 1913).
27. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides, *He Organōsis*, pp. 219–30.
28. The son of Damat Mahmut Paşa, brother-in-law of Sultan Abdülhamid, who fled the empire after failing to convince the sultan to restore the constitution of 1876.
29. Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1970), pp. 66–67.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
31. Correspondence between Geōrgios Skalierēs and Stephanos Skouloudēs (1908–1917) in Skouloudēs Archive, Gennadius Library, Athens.
32. Skalierēs Report, 14 November 1915 in Skouloudēs papers.
33. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides, *He Organōsis*, p. 19.
34. See Souliōtēs-Nikolaides, *He Organōsis*, for membership list of the S.C., p. 229.
35. "Ekklesiastikē Alētheia," 31, no. 36, (September, 1911).
36. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 218–19.
37. Unpublished manuscript in the Souliōtēs-Nikolaides Archive, dossier No. 5-1, Gennadius Library, Athens.
38. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides Archive, p. 250.
39. Souliōtēs-Nikolaides Archive, p. 249a. Souliōtēs advised that the Cretans should abandon unification with Greece and maintain their autonomous status to avoid inflaming relations with the Ottoman Empire.



X

The Greek Millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament (1908–1918)

CATHERINE BOURA

THE YEARS BETWEEN 1908 and 1918 mark the transition from a multinational Ottoman Empire to a national Turkish state. Characterized by growing national awareness and conflict, those years are of significance as much for the Greeks under Ottoman rule, as for the Turks, who were then undergoing their first constitutional experience.¹

During the years of opposition and exile (1878–1908), the Young Turks were divided between two tendencies: the liberals, who were in favor of some degree of decentralization and cooperation with the religious and national minorities in the Ottoman Empire, and the nationalists, who favored a central authority and Turkish domination. The latter's instrument was the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.). With the proclamation of the constitution in 1908, they became the unchallenged masters of Turkey, and, until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, remained, except for a brief interval, the dominant political group. Between 1908 and 1918, general elections were held in the years 1908, 1912, and 1914. All three parliaments were dominated by the C.U.P.

According to the electoral law of 1908, all male Ottoman citizens who were over 25 years of age were entitled to vote. Suffrage was restricted to taxpayers only. The law provided for a system of indirect, or two-stage, elections in which the electorate would vote for electors (one for every 250 to 750 voters), who, in turn, would elect the deputies for parliament. Each sancak formed a constituency, and each sancak returned a number of deputies according to its population. There was one parliament seat for every 30,000 to 70,000 men.² Residence was no precondition for candidature in a constituency.

Elections took place amidst a climate of tension and confusion.

Neither the Young Turks nor the Ottoman administration had any experience in electoral matters, the electoral law was full of ambiguities, and all parties involved expected to exploit the situation for their own ends. The Young Turks were, at the same time, facing enormous difficulties at home and abroad: the hostility of the supporters of the still-powerful regime coupled with the antagonism between factions within the C.U.P. itself; the declaration of Bulgarian independence, followed by the Cretan decision to unite with Greece; and the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.

The C.U.P. aimed at gaining control over the situation by winning a sufficient number of seats in the chamber of deputies. They were successful in conducting the electoral campaign throughout the empire by setting up a network of committees in the provinces. Candidacies and platforms were determined after negotiations with the C.U.P. To be elected, deputies almost always had to win the approval and support of the C.U.P.⁴

The turn of political developments had found the Greeks unprepared to face the electoral challenge. Before the 1908 Revolution, the Greeks had established connections with Turkish reformists abroad and had considerable contacts with their organizations, particularly in Macedonia.⁵

After elections were proclaimed, the Greeks set the immediate task of securing representation in the assembly that would enable them to demand a proportional number of appointments in the government and provide them with the means to exert some influence on the affairs of the country.

Greeks in the Ottoman Empire constituted a substantial minority⁶ of high economic standing and had a long tradition of municipal politics.⁷ However, achieving electoral agreement with the C.U.P. did not prove to be an easy task: the unionists did not accept Greek demands on proportional representation; they counterproposed that an equal number of Greek and Turkish deputies be elected in constituencies where Greeks formed the clear majority of first degree electors.⁸

The Cretan problem, along with the outburst of nationalism and religious fanaticism incited by the Turkish press, did not bode well for the Greeks in their electoral negotiations.⁹ Furthermore, the conduct of elections on the part of the C.U.P. fell far short of what could be considered as fair. Their electoral strength and influence being so dominant, they could, as a rule, ensure the election of their candidates for all vacancies. They communicated their intention to the com-

munities concerned and exerted their power and influence to secure the election of the names they had put forward.¹⁰

The elections generated controversy throughout the last months of 1908, particularly as the unionists failed to persuade the Greek electors to support candidates among the few Unionist Greeks.¹¹

As a matter of fact, the course of elections disclosed an antagonism between the traditional organization of the Ottoman Empire, based as it was on the millet system, and the new order of things resulting from rising Turkish nationalism. The ideal of "Ottomanism," through which the Young Turks had hoped to inspire a new loyalty from the subject peoples and achieve political unity,¹² was incompatible with the existence of "national centers" in their realm. They were, therefore, reluctant to consent to what seemed only natural in the old regime: the extensive role of consular officers and prelates in the political affairs of the Ottoman Greek communities. The C.U.P. was exasperated when the Greek newspapers in Constantinople wrote that the Greek ambassador, Iōannēs Gryparēs, had visited the patriarchate in order to settle disputes among Greek candidates; in fact, when Greek consuls visited Greek candidates in Samsun and Trabzon the day before the election, their visits served as a pretext for the C.U.P. to withdraw the promised Turkish votes that the Greek candidates needed in order to be elected.¹³

The Greeks, for their part, complained that Ottoman authorities concealed the actual numbers of non-Muslims, consequently reducing the number of their votes.¹⁴ They protested strongly but ineffectively against alleged electoral irregularities at their expense. They even considered abstaining from the elections.¹⁵ Finally, reconciliation between the Greeks and the C.U.P. was achieved through the good offices of the Greek patriarch.¹⁶ So, rather than not being represented at all, the Greeks reached a compromise and agreed to vote into the Ottoman Parliament 24 Greek deputies. Part of the deal was the election of two Greek deputies from Constantinople, proposed by the patriarch and supported by the C.U.P., and the election of Paulos Karolidēs, a professor of history in Athens University, as deputy of İzmir. Although born an Ottoman subject, Karolidēs had acquired Greek citizenship and had been deprived of his civil rights in the Ottoman Empire as a result of his long residence in Greece.

In six constituencies (Iōannina, Kozanē, Lēmnos, Mytilēnē, Chios, and Rhodes), only Greek deputies were elected, as the overwhelming majority of the population was Greek. The Greek deputies were mostly professional men: nine lawyers; five merchants and

businessmen; one doctor; and three senior government officials (see Appendix I).¹⁷

The Young Turks aimed at a constitutional government that would soon remove all elements of internal strife and fuse the various nationalities into an Ottoman nation. Bestowing equal rights to all subject peoples, they expected from them, in return, to abandon their communal traditions, which had flourished within the framework of the millet system, and offer their allegiance to the Ottoman government.

The Ecumenical Patriarch Iōakeim III, a charismatic personality and a champion of the traditional values of the Greek Orthodox Church, had clearly perceived the threat posed by the new regime on the privileges of his community. His fears were soon to prove right.¹⁸ The question of communal privileges became the fundamental issue of many parliamentary debates. After the suppression of the counter-revolution of 1909, the C.U.P. embarked upon a policy that reflected the cultural and political aspirations of Turkish nationalism, with measures and legislation that hindered the opposition and curtailed the political and cultural autonomy of the millets. C.U.P. policies nourished dissension and brought about its alienation from the various ethnic communities of the empire.

Over the years, the power of the C.U.P. became increasingly based on brute force, and opposition to their methods grew steadily. The promises of equal treatment to all subjects of the sultan became an empty letter. The situation was ripe for the opposition to challenge the power monopoly of the C.U.P.¹⁹

Greek deputies tended to form a "national" entity, by voting en bloc in what concerned their constituencies' common interests; on other matters, each one of them decided and voted individually. Aris-tidēs Geōrgantzoglou, deputy for İzmir, was considered the leader of the Greek group.²⁰

Some of the Greek deputies were members of the C.U.P., whereas others were adhering to the decentralization policy of the liberals. Despite their different political affiliations, the body of Greek deputies constituted the first official collective participation of the Greek nation in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It was through this function that political antagonisms, this time within the Greek community itself, assumed a new dimension, reflecting the different perceptions of national policy among Greeks still living in the Ottoman Empire. With the aim of coordinating Greek political activities to meet the challenge of the emerging force of Turkish nationalism, two

chief architects of the Greek Macedonian struggle, Iōn Dragoumēs, a Greek diplomat, and Athanasios Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, a former officer of the Greek army, formed a secret society named the "Society of Constantinople" (S.C.). Exerting some influence through their connections in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Athens, they succeeded in getting involved in matters of policy concerning the Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire. They set up a covert organization called the *Politikos Syndesmos* (Political League), and, through it, they managed to direct the political activities of Ottoman Greeks for about four years.²¹ Their tactics were to challenge the authority of the patriarchate, whose ecumenical tradition could not be accommodated within the values of a national state and secular nationalism, and to generate disruption and disunity among the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. The conflict escalated during the years from 1910 to 1911 and culminated in 1912, when the Greeks contested the elections, themselves divided into two groups representing two contradictory policies.

Towards the end of 1910, at the insistence of the *Politikos Syndesmos*, a Greek political party was organized in the confident anticipation that it would become the pole of attraction of all disillusioned nationalities. The formation of the "Greek Party" (*Hellēnikon Politikon Komma*) divided the Greek parliamentary group, as only 16 out of the 24 Greek deputies agreed to become its members.²² The Greek Party gave its support to the liberals, who, in November 1911 organized themselves into the heterogeneous opposition party of "Freedom and Understanding" (*Eleutheria kai Synennoēsē*).²³ Cooperation between the Political League and the new party reached its peak during the 1912 elections.

The new party was virtually the only credible opposition to the C.U.P. The Unionists were still, however, the undisputable masters of the situation. In January 1912, they hastened to dissolve parliament and proclaim new elections. With their nationwide organization and tight control over the administration, they were in a position to win a comfortable victory that would again permit them to dominate the assembly.

After the dissolution of parliament, the C.U.P. took the initiative to negotiate for Greek support in the forthcoming elections. C.U.P. ministers Tal'at and Halil undertook to visit the patriarch and offered to raise the number of Greek deputies to 45,²⁴ while they also proposed to come to an agreement with the patriarchate on the issue of millet

privileges and promised to appoint a number of Greeks to government positions and the civil service.²⁵

There is no evidence that the C.U.P. intended to fulfill those promises. Neither is there any indication that the patriarch believed those promises when he advocated electoral cooperation with the C.U.P. The fact remains that this cooperation did not materialize, since the Political League eventually enforced cooperation with the liberals. This policy could not be unanimously accepted by the Greek electorate. There were Greek deputies who were already members of the C.U.P. (Narlēs, Orphanidēs, Kophidēs). Others (Karolidēs, Emmanouēlidēs, Savvopoulos) opted for cooperation with the C.U.P. simply because they believed that the Unionist Party, being a solidly organized political force, would use all possible means to secure reelection; cooperation with the opposition would, therefore, only reduce the possibilities for a fair Greek representation in the Ottoman Parliament.²⁶

Disregarding differences of opinion, the Political League undertook to conduct the electoral struggle against the C.U.P. It decided that only the sixteen deputies who were members of the Greek Party should be supported as candidates, excluding from its ballot those who did not adhere to its policies.²⁷ Kophidēs, Narlēs, Michaēlidēs, Savvopoulos, Emmanouēlidēs, Orphanidēs, Artas, and Karolidēs joined the C.U.P. ballot. The electoral campaign did not escape personal antagonisms and individual quarrels. Often contrary to the recommendations of communities and metropolitan bishops, and even of a few consuls, the Political League preferred to jeopardize the election of Greek deputies rather than accept the Greek candidates supported by the C.U.P. The Greek policy was therefore entangled in the priorities set forth by the Society of Constantinople and eventually turned the issue of the election of Greek deputies into a question of antagonism within the Greek community.

The Political League was able to enlist certain Bulgarian and Armenian factions in its electoral campaigns.²⁸ Nevertheless, being the dominant party, the Unionists used every means to succeed in having their candidates elected.

Ultimately, a few opposition members were elected. The Greek party fared worse than in 1908; the overall number of Greek deputies elected was reduced to 16 and almost all of them were elected on the Unionist ballot. Only four candidates of the Political League were elected: two in Iōannina; one in Gelibolu; and one in Serres. By

contrast, the number of government officials among Greek deputies increased: three deputies were employees of the Tobacco Régie; one was a district attorney. The rest came from the class of professionals: five lawyers; one doctor; and one businessman (see Appendix II).

The sweeping victory of the C.U.P., though morally disputed by the opposition, raised many doubts about the effectiveness of the Political League's policy, as it allegedly divided the Greeks and caused a deterioration in intercommunal relations. The elections of 1912 were by all means a futile effort as the parliament of 1912 was only a short-lived one. In August 1912, a few months after the elections, the C.U.P. was temporarily ousted from power. The Balkan Wars that followed a few months later created a new situation of unrest.

Yet, the end of the war called for a return to normal politics. For the Unionists, triumphantly back in power after a few months interval, this meant the restoration of the parliament and a parliamentary regime.

In the midst of a climate of suspicion, elections were held during the winter of 1913-14 with the C.U.P. as the only organized political party to contest them.²⁹ Without having been officially dissolved, the liberal party of Freedom and Understanding had ceased to exist. Opposition groups were persecuted and leaders were exiled. The Society of Constantinople and the Political League, sharing the fate of the opposition, were also dissolved. Its ardent supporters, Bousios and Kosmidēs, deputies that did not return to the 1912 parliament, were deported. They took refuge in Greece, as did the deputy of İzmir, P. Karolidēs, who was reelected despite the polemics of the Society of Constantinople against him. As the Ottoman Empire had lost most of its European provinces, deputies from Macedonia, Epirus, and the islands could no longer serve in the Ottoman Parliament.

It was at that time that the death of the Ecumenical Patriarch Iōakeim III deprived the "unredeemed" Greeks of a leading figure who imposed his authority on Turks and Greeks alike. His successor, Germanos V, was an able man, but lacked his predecessor's political astuteness and qualities of leadership.

Negotiations concerning the Greek deputies in the 1914 elections were held between the patriarchate and the C.U.P. The Greeks sought again to achieve proportional representation, only to have their demands rejected. Considering the situation, however, they thought it best to cooperate with the Unionists. After long and protracted discussions, the C.U.P. accepted that the Greek deputies be persons ap-

proved by the Greek communities provided they were not ardent communalists and were approved by the committee before they stood for election.³⁰ The Greek demand for three deputies from Constantinople was met this time. Election of two Greek deputies from Trabzon was also accepted. Though the matter was resolved behind the scenes, not all the 16 Greek deputies elected were Unionist nominees. The outstanding majority this time were government officials; there were also two lawyers, three businessmen, and one senior official of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (see Appendix III).

The fortunes of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire deteriorated rapidly during the Great War. From 1914 on, the C.U.P. completed and speeded up the process of transforming the multinational empire into a national Turkish state, a process that had started in 1908 with the Young Turk Revolution. Determined to secularize the empire, the Unionists passed a series of laws abolishing the collective national representation of the different ethnic-religious communities. The patriarchate's privileges were severely curtailed.³¹

When Greece threw in its lot with the Entente Powers in 1917, the Istanbul government took draconian measures against the Ottoman Greeks. Massive deportations of Greeks from strategically sensitive areas took place, while a severe commercial boycott was used to destroy the Greek merchant class in Istanbul and İzmir.³² With the outbreak of the war, the Military Service Law providing for conscription of non-Muslims, which the Greek deputies had welcomed in 1909 as a step towards the peaceful association of the peoples of the empire, was turned into another means for their persecution.³³

There was very little the Greek deputies could do to improve Greek fortunes in the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1918. It was only after the armistice of 1918 that they spoke in the assembly, giving details of the persecutions against their community and demanding that those responsible be condemned.³⁴

With the signing of the Mudros Armistice (30 October 1918), the Ottoman Empire, and with it the C.U.P., passed into history. The antagonisms between Greece and Turkey that climaxed in the years between 1919 and 1922 ended with the triumph of Turkish nationalists in Asia Minor. The state that emerged was a modern national state whose foundations had been laid by the C.U.P. during the years between 1908 and 1918.

In the general elections of December 1919, the victors were the two groups that did not officially participate: the C.U.P., which had dissolved itself a year earlier, and the nationalists, who had already

prevailed in Anatolia. The Greeks, too busy with the Peace Conference, did not take part in these elections. Their decision to refrain from participation in the general elections of 1919, coupled with their proclamation of releasing themselves of their Ottoman civic responsibilities, mark, perhaps, the formal demise of the Greek millet.³⁵

The attitude of the Greeks towards Unionist politics was not monolithic. Many of them believed that compromising with the new trends of the C.U.P. would give them a chance to survive and develop within the framework of the political realities offered by the new regime. Others believed that they should struggle to preserve their long-standing communal rights; in their view, these rights could be accommodated only within the politics of decentralization offered by the liberals, who favored the multinational nature of the empire.

The Young Turks' early principles had been those of the French Revolution; they had sought to reconcile the peoples of the empire, aiming at maintaining its integrity. But now, any national ambitions that non-Muslim and non-Turkish peoples might have nourished were incompatible with the new conception of state and had to be abandoned. Similarly, the "national centers" that had developed within the framework of the millet system could not be accommodated within the new nation and were to be destroyed.

NOTES

1. The first constitutional period (December 1876–February 1878) was only a short-lived one with no parties to contest the elections, on the basis of restricted franchise and a system of electoral colleges, held in 1876 and 1877. See R. Devereux, *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period; a Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).

2. *Amaltheia*, 29 July, 1908 and 21 August 1908; A. Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *Hē Organōsis Kōnstantinoupoleōs* [The Society of Constantinople] (Athens: Ek-doseis Dōdōnē, 1984), p. 74, mentions one seat for every 50,000–100,000 inhabitants.

3. F. Ahmad, *The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 18–24.

4. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 27–28; also in Lowther to Grey, 15 December 1908. F.O. 371/546/3725. See also N. Buxton, *Turkey in Revolution* (London: C. Scribner's Sons, 1909), pp. 180–90.

5. D. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897–1913* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966), p. 317–78. Also, A.J. Panayotopoulos, "Early Relations Between Greeks and Turks," *Balkan Studies* 21 (1980).

6. On the historical demography of the Greek community in twentieth-century Asia Minor, see P. Kitromilides and A. Alexandris, "Ethnic Survival,

Nationalism and Forced Migration," *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn* 5 (1984-85).

7. E. Driault and M. Lheritier, "*Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours*," vol. 2 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1926), p. 112; also Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 28, n. 3.

8. C.U.P. meeting with the Patriarch: *Amaltheia*, 4 October 1908.

9. *Amaltheia*, 14 October 1908.

10. "The result of the Turkish polls was agreed beforehand. . ." in N. Buxton, "The Young Turks," *Nineteenth Century*, January 1909, p. 16. Electoral agreements were concluded between Young Turk committees and the patriarchate or metropolitan bishops; the Greeks set up committees to carry out discussions with the C.U.P.; in Lowther to Grey, 1 September 1908, FO 371/546/3725.

11. The Ecumenical Patriarch declined to support candidates like V. Orphanidēs, one of the few Unionist Greeks: F. Ahmad, "Unionist Relations with Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Communities in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914," in B. Braude and B. Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), p. 409.

12. *Memorandum Respecting the New Regime in Turkey*, May 1911, FO 371/1249/5572.

13. P. Karolidēs, *Logoi kai Hypomnēmata* [Speeches and Memoranda], vol. 1 (Athens, 1913), pp. 44-45.

14. The Young Turks were not entirely to blame. Many Christian households had often registered only one male per family for the purpose of avoiding military taxes. In some cases, however, as in Epirus, for example, local authorities allowed only those paying land tax to vote, depriving, therefore, most Greek peasants of their franchise as their villages were *çiftlik*s [fiefdoms] of beys to whom they paid their land tax: in Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens (M.F.A.), AAK, 1908. The electoral districts were arranged so as to produce a maximum of Muslim majorities. Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, p. 391, n. 47. See also *Amaltheia*, 4 October 1908.

15. Lowther to Grey, 16 September 1908, FO 371/559/4446 and FO 371/546/3725, 24 November 1908.

16. Karolidēs, *Logoi*, p. 45-48; also *Amaltheia*, 4 and 18 October 1908.

17. For the list of deputies in the Ottoman parliament, see F. Ahmad and D. A. Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminde Meclisler, 1908-1918" [Parliaments During the Second Constitutional Period, 1908-1918] in *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1976. They wrongfully mention, however, the deputies Chōnaios and Drizas as Slavs and Narlēs as Armenian. Also, in the total number of Greek deputies they count Vamvakas and Emmanouēlidēs who replaced Drizēs and Geōrgantzoglou in 1909 and 1910, respectively.

18. Soon after the July 1908 Revolution, the Patriarch expressed to the Grand Vizir his regrets for the change of regime; the Greeks organized large demonstrations against him in Constantinople and forced him to express his support to the restoration of the constitution. See *Amaltheia*, 19 July 1908 and 22 July 1908.

19. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1968), pp. 217–23. For details see also Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *He Organōsis*.

20. A. Geōrgantzoglou became vice-president of the parliament and senator in 1911.

21. On Souliōtēs's and Dragoumēs's "Eastern Ideal," see D. Xanalatos, "The Greeks and Turks on the Eve of the Balkan Wars; a Frustrated Plan," *Balkan Studies* 3, no. 2 (1962). On the activities of the "Society of Constantinople," see also Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, *He Organōsis*, and A. K. Chamoudopoulos, *Hē neōtera Philikē Hetaireia* [The New "Philikē Hetaireia"] (Athens: Epimeleia-Ekdosis N. Tsaila, 1946). Their policies, however did not represent the official policy of the Greek State; G. K. Skalierēs, *Ta Dikaia tōn Ethnotētōn stēn Tourkia* [The rights of ethnic minorities in Turkey] (Athens: Typois Kimonos I. Theodoropoulou kai Sias, 1922), p. 2 refers to the Society of Constantinople as a "secret center, independent from the Greek embassy (in Constantinople)." The same conclusion is derived from Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs's *He Organōsis*.

22. C. Boura, "Hoi Vouleutikes Ekloges stēn Othōmanikē Autokratoria: Hoi Hellēnes Vouleutes 1908–1919" [General Elections in the Ottoman Empire: the Greek Members of the Ottoman Parliament, 1908–1918], *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikōn Spoudōn* 4 (1983): 77.

23. See Xanalatos, *Greeks and Turks*, p. 287.

24. Figure given by Karolidēs; Chamoudopoulos, *Hē neōtera Philikē Hetaireia*, p. 48, mentions 37.

25. Karolidēs, *Logoi*, pp. 334–35.

26. E. Emmanouēlidēs, *Ta Teleutaia Etē tēs Othōmanikēs Autokratorias* [The last years of the Ottoman Empire] (Athens: Typographeio G. N. Kallergē, 1924), p. 303.

27. Gryparēs to Constantinople, 24 January 1912, M.F.A. C.E. El. 1912 C.

28. Lamb to Lowther, 22 February 1912, FO 371/1487 and Gryparēs to Constantinople, 15 March 1912, M.F.A., C.E., El. 1912. The Bulgarian Exarch and the Dashnak Armenians were, however, in favor of cooperation with the C.U.P. See also Chamoudopoulos, *Hē neōtera Philikē Hetaireia*, pp. 46–47.

29. Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 144.

30. Memorandum of the Greek Deputy T. Dēmētriadēs (1914–1919) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 9 October 1920. M.F.A./1914–1919, AAK. Also Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 155.

31. See A. Alexandris, *The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918–1974* (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), p. 36.

32. This was not the first time that such actions were taken, as shown by the 1909–1911 intermittent anti-Greek boycott.

33. Emmanouēlidēs, *Ta Teleutaia Etē*, pp. 145–80.

34. For the debates in the Ottoman parliament and minutes, see Emmanouēlidēs, *Ta Teleutaia Etē*, pp. 329–91.

35. Alexandris, *The Greek Minority*, p. 57.

APPENDIX I

Greek Deputies (24) in the Ottoman Parliament 1908–1912

Istanbul:	K. Kōnstantinidēs, lawyer P. Kosmidēs, lawyer
Thessaloniki:	G. Artas, lawyer G. Chōnaios, interpreter at the Greek Consulate
Argyrokastro (Dryinoupolis):	I. Mamopoulos, lawyer in Constantinople
Monastir:	Tr. Narlēs, lawyer
Iōannina:	D. Kinkos K. Sourlas
Serres:	D. Dinkas, lawyer at the Greek Consulate in Thessaloniki
Kozanē:	G. Bousios, landowner, merchant K. Drizēs, lawyer (in the summer of 1909, he resigned; Ch. Vamvakas, lawyer, was elected in his place in December 1909)
Gelibolu:	S. Narlēs, physician in Constantinople
Çatalca and Silivri:	D. Zaphiropoulos, merchant
Lēmnos:	M. Stelios, assistant mutessarif of Lemnos
Mytilēnē:	M. Saltas, landowner P. Bostanēs, landowner and merchant
Sporades and the Dodecanese Islands:	Th. Kōnstantinidēs
Chios:	M. Tselempidēs
Smyrna (İzmir):	P. Karolidēs, professor of history, Athens University. A. Geōrgantzoglou, assistant of the vali of Sivas (Sevasteia) Geōrgantzoglou became senator toward the end of 1910. His nephew, E. Emmanouēlidēs, lawyer, was elected in his place.
Ayvalık, Balıkesir:	K. Savvopoulos, employee of the Tobacco Régie
Niğde:	G. Kourtoğlu, merchant
İzmit:	A. Michaēlidēs, merchant
Trabzon:	M. Kophidēs, employee of the Tobacco Régie

APPENDIX II

Greek Deputies (16) in the Ottoman Parliament 1912–1914

Istanbul:	G. Artas, lawyer V. Orphanidēs, employee of the Tobacco Régie
Thessaloniki:	K. Kotsanos
Monastir:	T. Nalēs, lawyer
Iōannina:	D. Kinkos K. Sourlas
Serres:	D. Dinkas, lawyer
Gelibolu:	S. Narlēs, physician in Constantinople
Mytilēnē:	D. Savvas, lawyer
Chios:	Apodiakos*
İzmir:	P. Karolidēs, professor of history E. Emmanouēlidēs, lawyer
Ayvalık, Balıkesir:	K. Savvopoulos, employee of Tobacco Régie
Niğde:	A. Kalinoglou, district attorney
İzmit:	A. Michaēlidēs, merchant
Trabzon:	M. Kōphidēs, employee of Tobacco Régie

*From the list of Ahmad and Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet."

APPENDIX III**Greek Deputies (16) in the Ottoman Parliament 1914–1918**

Istanbul:	V. Orphanidēs, employee of the Tobacco Régie
	V. Tsormpatzoglou, senior government official (administrative)
Gelibolu:	I. Charalampidēs, lawyer
	D. Phytos, senior employee of the Ecumenical Patriarchate
Tekirdağ:	Th. Eukleidēs, public inspector
Çatalca and Silivri:	Th. Dēmētriadēs, senior government official
İzmir:	E. Emmanouēlidēs, lawyer
	S. Symeōnoglou, merchant
	E. Meimaroglou, engineer
Ayvalık, Balıkesir:	K. Savvopoulos, employee of the Tobacco Régie
Niğde:	A. Kalinoglou, district attorney
İzmit:	A. Michaēlidēs, merchant
Trabzon:	M. Kōphidēs, employee of the Tobacco Régie
	G. Iōannidēs, employee of the Tobacco Régie
Samsun:	Th. Arzoglou, merchant
Karahisar:	I. Gevenidēs, senior government official

*From the list of Ahmad and Rustow, "İkinci Meşrutiyet."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
The Program in Hellenic Studies
and
The Department of Near Eastern Studies

Conference on
**The Social and Economic History of
THE GREEKS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE:**
*The Greek Millet from the Tanzimat
to the Young Turks*

Co-sponsored by:
The Council on Regional Studies, The Council of the
Humanities, and the Department of History

FRIDAY, MARCH 31
and
SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1989
at
101 McCormick Hall
Princeton University

FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 1989

10:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

SESSION I

101 McCormick Hall

Opening Remarks:

W. R. Connor, *Princeton University*

B. Lewis, *Princeton University*

Uneasy Entrepreneurs:

Ottoman Greeks of the 19th Century

CHAIR: C. Issawi, *Princeton University*

E. Frangakis-Syrett (*Queens College, CUNY*)

“The Greeks of Smyrna in the 19th Century”

H. Exertzoglou (*Cultural Foundation, National Bank of Greece*)

“Investments and Investment Behavior in the
Ottoman Empire: 1850-1914. Thoughts Concerning
the Development of the Greek Business Community”

R. Kasaba (*University of Washington*)

“Economic Foundations of a Civil Society: Greeks in
the Trade of Western Anatolia, 1840-1876

2:00-5:00 p.m.

SESSION II

101 McCormick Hall

Tanzimat and the Disorganization of Greek Identity

CHAIR: C. Kafadar, *Princeton University*

A. Alexandris (*Hellenic Foundation for Defense and
Foreign Policy, Athens*)

“The Greek Census of Anatolia and Thrace
(1910-1912): A “Contribution to Ottoman Historical
Demography”

R. Clogg (*King's College, London*)

"A Millet within a Millet: The Karamanlides"

P. Dumont (*Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris*)

"Greek Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire"

J. Koliopoulos (*University of Thessaloniki*)

"Brigandage in the European Domains of the Ottoman Empire: The Green Brigands of the Second Half of the 19th Century"

Ş. Mardin (*Bogaziçi Üniversitesi*)

"*Les Mavroyeni*: A Book and the Relation of a Family with the Ottoman Center"

6:00-7:00 p.m.

Reception: Firestone Library Lobby

Exhibition: The Greeks in the Ottoman Empire
1850-1920: A Selection from the Benaki
Museum, Athens

SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1989

9:00 a.m.-12:00 noon

SESSION III

101 McCormick Hall

**From Parishes to Municipalities:
Greek Politics in the Ottoman Empire**

CHAIR: R. Davison, *George Washington University*

İ. Ortaylı (*Free University of Berlin*)

"The Greek and Ottoman Administration During
the *Tanzimat* Period"

K. Kostis (*University of Athens*)

"Communal Administration of the Greek *Millet*
During the Reform Period"

C. Boura (*King's College, London*)

"The Greek *Millet* in Turkish Politics: Greeks
in the Ottoman Parliament 1908-1918"

P. Konortas (*National Research Center, Athens*)

"From *Tâ'ife* Through *Millet* to *Djemaat*:
The Ottoman Terms Concerning the Greek
Orthodox Community in the Ottoman Empire
and their Political Significance"

Th. Veremis (*University of Athens*)

"The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks:
The Experiment of the 'Society of Constantinople'"

Concluding Remarks:

N. Itzkowitz, *Princeton University*

EXHIBITION

**"The Greeks in the Ottoman Empire: 1850-1920
A Selection From the Benaki Museum in Athens"**

March 28-April 4, 1989

Lobby, Firestone Library, Princeton University

*Special thanks to the Benaki Museum, Athens
and the Greek Ministry of Culture.*

INDEX

- Abajoglou, Greek company, 24
Abbott, money lending firm, 29
Abbott's Emery Mines Ltd., 28
Abdülhamid II, sultan, 4, 47
Adamidēs, P., consul at Samsun, 65
Adana, 9
Adrianople, diocese of, 70
Aegean Islands, 17, 27, 32, 54, 67, 89
Aegean Sea, shipping company, 94
Aeolic coast, 9
Agrapha, 150, 151
Agricultural Bank, 31
agriculture, 144
 Armenians in, 9
 commercial, 28
 Greeks in, 9
agriculture inspectors, in Anatolia, 7
Ahmet, qadi of Verroia, 123
Aktebol (Agathoupolis), kazas of, 70
Alamanos, irredentist chief, 155
Albanian irregulars, 153
Albanians, Hellenized, 3
Amalgamated Oriental Carpets Manufacturing Company, Ltd., British trust, 32
Amaseia, diocese of, 65
American Archipelago Steamship Company, Syrian-owned corporation, 26
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 117
American Emery trust, 28
Amira, Greek entrepreneurial family, 28
Anatolia
 central, 57-62
 northern, 62-66
 western, 79, 81, 84
Anatolian market, 20
Andreas, captain, 158
Angora, diocese of, 62
animal husbandry, 144
Ankara vilâyets, 62
Antalya, Hellenic consulates in, 62
Anthopoulos, Kōnstantinos, ambassador, 7
anti-Greek boycott
 of 1909, 28
 of 1911, 26
Antōnēs of Morichovo, captain, 158
Apanthisma, 122, 123
Arabian Peninsula, 11
arbitrage, arbitrageurs, 18, 30
archbishop of Ikonio, 62
archbishopsrics, autocephalous, 170, 171, 174, 175
Argenti family, 19
Aristarchēs, Iōannēs, ambassador to Berlin, 7
Aristotle (*Physiognōmonika*), 125, 127
armatoles, Christian irregulars to protect against brigands, 144-45, 149
armatoliks (districts), 144, 153
Armenian
 agents, 22
 communities, 20
 names, 5
 press in Constantinople, 123
Armenian Agriculture directors, 7
Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, 171
Armenians, 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, 18, 161
 favored in government, 165
 and journalism, 12
 language of, 12
 and music, 12
 rise of, 3-4

- Armenians (*continued*)
 and theatre, 12
 Turkish-speaking, 117
 army, Ottoman, 9
 Arnavutköy (Mega Reuma), 67
 Asia Minor
 Armenians in, 9
 Greeks in, 9
 Atatürk. *See* Kemal, Mustafa.
 Augerinos family, 11
 autocephalous archbishoprics, 170, 171,
 174, 175
 of Achris and Ipekion, 175
 of Cyprus and Sinai, 175
 Aydın, city, Greek traders in, 24
 Aydın, vilâyet of, 96
 Aydın and Kasaba railways, 55
- Baghdad, 11
 Bakırköy (Makrichōri), 67
 Bakolas, family of, 148
 Balia Karaidin, mining company, 99
 Balıklı (Valoukli) Hospital, 67
 Balkan, 165
 nationalism, 165
 nationalist movements, 161
 peoples, 184
 states, 189
 Balkan Wars, 32, 199
 Balkan Wars of 1912–13, 158
 Balta Limanı Trade Agreement (1838),
 55
 Baltatzēs, G., Greek Foreign Minister,
 184
 Baltazzi, banking house of Smyrna and
 Constantinople, 29
 Baltazzi, Greek entrepreneurial family,
 28
 Bank of Athens, 31
 Bank of Mytilēnē, 31. *See also* Banque
 de Mytilin
 Bank of the Orient, 31
- Bank of Piraeus, 31
 bank profits, decline of, 95
 banker, bankers,
 Christian, 9
 in Galata, 93, 94
 Greek, 93
 banking, 90–95 *passim*
 and finance, 28–31
 in Constantinople, 91–92, 99
 houses (Greek), 95
 in İzmir, 30
 large-scale, 10
 networks, 30
 system, 30
 Banque de Constantinople, 92
 Greek suspension of payments to,
 94
 Banque de Mytilin, 94. *See also* Bank of
 Mytilēnē
 barley, 23
 Barrés, Maurice, rationalist writer, 181,
 182
 Barring crisis of 1891, 94
 Barry brothers, 19
 Basra, 11
 Baumstark, A., liturgical scholar, 120
 Bayezid II, 1, 173
 Benaki, 10
 Beyoğlu (Pera), 67
berâts, 91, 169
 Bell, Sir Alexander, governor of Malta,
 83
 Beloulias, irredentist chief, 155
 Bible Society. *See* British and Foreign
 Bible Society
 Biga, city, 9
 Black Sea, 89
 Black Sea Greeks, 53
 Black Sea Orthodox, 63
Borba (Yugoslav Communist newspa-
 per), 116
 Bosnians, 1
 Botzaris, D. N., publicist, 49

- boxes, cardboard and wooden, 33
- Brasseries Bomonti-Nektar, joint stock company, 97
- Braudel, Fernand, 60
- brigandage, 143–58 *passim*
- brigand chiefs, 151–52, 153
- “brigand rebels,” 154
- British, 18, 19
- agents, 22
- goods, imported, 22
- firms, 22, 23
- British and Foreign Bible Society, 119, 124, 126
- British Protestants, missionary activities of, 164
- brokers, 23
- Brouphas, Athanasios, refugee captain, 155
- Bulgaria, union of, with eastern Rume-
lia, 154
- Bulgarian
- bands, 155
- brigands, 154
- church, 164
- language, 161
- nationalists, 164
- threat, 183–84
- Bulgarian Church movement, national demands of, 163
- Bulgarian Committee in Thrace, 183
- Bulgarian Exarchate, 185, 188
- Bulgarians, 13, 181
- Bulgarzâde Yahyâ Efendi, 161
- Bursa, 5, 11, 20, 79
- Büyükdere (Vathiryax), 67
- Byzantine culture, 63
- Byzantine Empire, 84
- Byzantium (Vyzantion), 66
- Caesarea, diocese of, 62
- canalization of rivers, 33
- capital, 89–100 *passim*
- accumulation of, 90
- American, 20
- and banking, 90
- investment behavior of, 93
- periods of activity, 90
- Capitulations, 2
- Cappadocia, Cappadocian, 52, 62, 63
- carpet industry, 32
- cash crops, 8, 9
- cultivation of, 93
- Castel Rosso, 6
- archipelago, 11
- Çatalca, district of, 69
- Cavafy, C. P., poet, 10
- Çavdar, Tevfik (Turkish scholar), 5
- census
- of churches, 53
- of language, dialects, 53
- of 1910–12, 48–50, 54
- of 1913, 5
- of non-Greek populations, 49
- of Ottoman Greek nationals, 49
- of schools, 53
- Center for Asia Minor Studies, in Athens, 45, 48
- Chalcedon, diocese of, 68
- Chaldeia, diocese of, 65
- Chamber of Commerce in Constanti-
nople, 5
- Chandler, Richard, traveler, 121–22
- Chikhachev, P. A., Russian traveler, 120
- Chiot community
- entrepreneurs of, 25
- of İzmir, 19
- Chostevas, brigand chief, 153
- Christians
- Jacobite (Monophysite), 121
- Karamanli, 118, 119
- Turkophone, 117
- “Christians,” as term, 172
- Chrysanthos Philippidēs, metropolitan of Trebizond, 188
- Chrysostomos, metropolitan of Dra-
ma, 186

- Church. *See* Orthodox Church
 Church of Constantinople, 171
 cigarette manufacturing, 10
 cigarette-paper industry
 Armenian names in, 5
 Jewish names in, 5
 "civil society," concept of, 77, 78
 clandestine organizations, 183
 cloth, 19
 British, 20
 in Smyrna, 20
 cloth trade, 19
 in Anatolia, 19
 competition, 19
 in İzmir, 19
 coal, 17
 coastal shipping, 6
 commerce, 2, 89, 90
 of foreign merchants in the Ottoman Empire, 79
 commercial
 boycott, 200
 organization, 19–25, 90
 based on kinship, 19
 privileges, 196
 Commission agents, 6
 Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.), 186, 188, 189, 193, 194–95, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201
 policies, 196, 197
 priorities of, 189
 victory of, 199, 201
 Compagnie Industrielle de Filature et de Tissage du Levant, Belgian firm, 32, 97
 "Comprador" bourgeoisie, 98
 compulsory military service, for non-Muslims, 49
 confectionary industry, 33
 Congress of Berlin, 7
 Congress of Ottoman Liberals, 187
 Constantine, Grand Duke
 visit to Jerusalem (1859), 163
 Constantinople (Istanbul), 10, 11, 89
 as New Rome, 66
 working force of, 67
 Constantinople (Patriarchate), diocese of, 67–68
 Constantinople, Chamber of Commerce of, 5
 Constitution of 1908, 5
 proclamation of, 193
 construction work, 10
 Consulate General of Greece (in İzmir), 55
 Copts, 10
 Coromélas, André, 164
 cotton, 21, 79
 boom, 79
 exporting, 10
 ginning, 10
 cottonseed oil, 9
 Council of Basel (1431–38), 118
 credit, 30, 31
 system, 31
 Creswell. *See* Messrs. Creswell
 Cretan
 issue, 185
 problem, 194
 revolt (1866), 91
 Cretan War of 1897, 20
 Crete, 185
 need of migration, 164
 outlaws moving to, 150
 as "penal colony," 150
 refugees from, 151
 uprising in, 149
 Crimean War, 85, 90, 92, 147
 Cromer, Lord, 10
 Crusius, Martin (*Turcograecia*), 123
 cultivation of cash crops, 8–9
 cereals, 8, 9
 mulberries, 8
 tobacco, 8
 vegetables, 8
 cultivators, small-scale, 31

- C.U.P. *See* Committee of Union and Progress
- Curzon, Lord, British foreign secretary, 115
- customs' revenue, 29
- Dalipēs, of Gabresh, brigand chief, 152, 157
- Damiani family, 19
- D. & E. Paterson, British house, 27
- Danklēs, Colonel, 183
- Danubian principalities, 89
- Davelēs, outlaw, 152
- Dawkins, R. M., authority on Greek dialects, 120, 125, 127, 128, 131
- debt
- floating, 92, 94
 - Ottoman, 92
- Δελτιο* [Bulletin] of the Center for Asia Minor Studies, 48
- demography
- historical, 45
 - of the Ottoman Greek millet, 45
 - of the Near East, 48
 - of recent times, 46
- dependency theory, 98
- deportations of Greeks, 200
- Derkos, diocese of, 68, 69, 70
- Dernschwam, Hans, German traveler, 118
- dervenāga* (chief of *armatoles*), 147
- deserters, 150
- dhimmis* (non-Muslim subjects), 2
- diaspora, Greek, 2
- Direction of the Six Revenues, 93
- Director of Interior Business, 22
- Diyojen* (journal), 12
- doctors, 33
- Dragoman to the Sublime Porte, 3
- dragomans, 12
- Dragoumēs, Iōn, Greek diplomat, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 197
- Dragoumēs, Stephanos, premier, 97
- E. Abbott, British house, 27
- "Eastern Empire," 189
- "Eastern" ideal, 184
- "Eastern" peoples, 184
- Eastern Question, 72, 150
- Eastern Section of the Macedonian Committee in Athens, 183
- "ecclesiastical" *berāts* (*fermāns*), 169
- Eckmann, Janos, writer, 127
- ecumenical, as mission of the Orthodox Church, 172
- Ecumenical Patriarch, 169–76 *passim*, 85
- evolution of title of, 174
 - identity of flock of, 175
- Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, 12, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176
- jurisdiction of, 171
- Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, 47, 48, 49, 50, 66, 67, 68, 70, 122, 125, 132, 169, 170, 172, 200
- affairs of, 163
 - and antagonisms between nationalism and ecumenical spirit, 186
 - archives at the Phanar, 47, 48
 - in 1915 elections, 199
 - jurisdiction of, 173
 - press of, 122–23, 125
 - privileges, 200
 - reconstitution of, in 1454, 174
 - Russia's attitude toward, 163
 - territorial jurisdiction of, 174
- Edirne region, Bulgarian threat to, 183–84
- Efrençi ("Franks"), 173
- Eftim II. *See* Eftim, Papa
- Eftim, Papa, Orthodox priest, 131, 132
- Eğridir gölü (Eğridir Lake), 120
- Egyptian politics, 10
- Ekklesiastikē Alētheia*, newspaper, 188
- elections of 1908, 1912, 1914, 193
- of 1908, 193–95
 - of 1912, 193, 197, 199

- elections (*continued*)
 of 1913–14, 193, 199–200
 of 1919, 200
- electoral challenge to representation in
 the assembly, 194
- electoral law, of 1908, 193, 194
- electricity, 33
- emery mine owners, Greek, 28
- emigration, 3
- Entente Powers in 1917, 200
- entrepreneurs
 British, 32
 Cappadocian Greek, 52
- Epirot refugees, 155
- Epirus, 13, 148, 149, 150, 151
 district of, 151
 refugees from, 151
- Ermeni (Armenians), 173
- Erzurum, 9
- établis* of 1923 and 1924, 46
- ethnic composition, of Foreign Ministry, 7
- ethnicity, 117
- Ethnikē Hetairia (National Society) of
 Athens, 154, 155
- Ethnarchēs (“nation-leader”), 170
- Eugenidēs, Dēmostenēs, banker, 95
- Eugenidēs, Eugenios, banker, 95
- European languages, 7, 12
 French, 7
 translation of, 12
 status, 20
- exchange of populations (1923–24),
 123, 132
- exporters, 6
- exporting houses, Western, 22
- exports, 80
 figs, 6
 raisins, 6
 olive oil, 6
- export surplus, 79
- export trade
 in barley, 23
 in licorice roots, 23
 in madder roots, 23
 in olive oil, 23
 in opium, 23
 in raisins, 23
 in valonia, 23
 in wheat, 23
- evâlets* (provinces), 1
- Fallmerayer, Jakob, Austrian Hellenist,
 116
- Fener (Phanar), 67
- fermâns*. See “ecclesiastical” *berâts*
- figs, 19, 20, 25, 81
- Filippaki, professor, 163
- Finlay, George, ambassador, 150
- firms, from
 Canada, 22
 India, 22
 Russia, 22
 the United States, 22
- floating debt, 94
- food-processing, 32
- foodstuffs, 17
- Foreign Affairs Ministry (Greek), 48,
 57, 187
- Foreign Affairs Ministry (Ottoman), 3, 8
 officials, 7
 ethnic composition of, 7
- Foreign Bible Society, 116
- foreign capital, 80
- Foreign Correspondence Office (Ottoman), 7
- foreign trade
 in Iraq, 11
- Fotiadi Bey, ambassador in Athens, 161
- Frasheri, Süleyman, Albanian chief-
 tain, 147
- “Frankish,” 17
- fraud, 22
- “Freedom and Understanding,” party,
 197, 199

- "free trade," 91
 French, 7, 8, 10, 18
 fruits, 8, 9
- Galata bankers, 4, 93, 94
 Gallipoli Peninsula, 70
 Ganos (Şarköy), diocese of, 70
 Gedeōn, Manouēl, historian, 119
 Gennadios II, first Ecumenical Patriarch, 176
 geography, impact of, 60, 63
 Geōrgantzoglou, Aristidēs, deputy for İzmir, 196
 Gerlach, Stefan, traveler, 118
 Germanos V, Ecumenical Patriarch, 199
 Gianaclis, vine growing, 10
 Gilan, silk trade of, 11
 Giresun, city, 63
 goldsmiths, 118
 Gospels and Liturgy, in Turkish and Greek, 120, 122
 governors of Moldavia and Wallachia, 3
 Great Britain, 18
 Great European War. *See* World War I
 Great Rabbi of the Ottoman capital, 171
 Great War. *See* World War I
 Greater Istanbul, 66–69 *passim*
 Greece, Kingdom of, 8, 12, 13, 84, 163.
 See also Hellenic Kingdom
- Greek
 architects, 6
 armed insurrection, 85
 bankers, 93
 banking, 91–96 *passim*
 banks, 4, 99
 books, 2, 163
 capital, 20, 89–90, 98–99
 characters, 126
 citizenship of Cretans, 164–65
 clergy, 11
 commercial organization, 19–25
 passim
 census of 1910–12, 48, 54
 community conflict, 85
 with Ottoman government, 85
 political antagonisms of, 196
 community in Istanbul, 84
 doctors, 33
 emery trust, 28
 engineers, in 1912, 6
 entrepreneurs, 33
 in mining, 27
 firms, 22
 in Britain, 22
 idioms, 60
 independence movement, 84
 insurance companies, 27
 language, 3, 61, 62, 115, 165, 166
 dialect of, 131
 landownership, 28
 lawyers, in 1912, 6, 33, 34
 as *lingua franca*, 3
 as liturgical language, 122
 merchant class, in Constantinople and Smyrna, 200
 merchants, 6, 11, 19, 22, 23
 millet, 3, 47
 demise of the, 201
 milling industry, 32
 nationalism, 165
 nationalist banks, 165
 nationalists, 148
 pharmacists, in 1912, 6
 physicians, in 1912, 6
 population
 in 1907, 3
 of Ottoman Empire, 47
 printing presses, 2
 professors, 33
 textile centers, 32
 trade, 28
 schools, 2, 8, 163
 "Greek," as term, 132

- Greek College in Rome, 2
 Greek Consulate General of İzmir, 55
 "Greek Empire," establishment of, 147
 Greek Foreign Ministry, 48, 187
 Greek Literary Society of Constantinople, 128
 "Greekness," 184
 Greek Orthodox church(es), 3
 closing of, 47
 dioceses, 48; transfer of, 53
 role of, in Empire, 162
 communities, 62
 ecclesiastical dioceses, boundaries of, 55
 schools, 163
 Russian sponsorship of, 163
 Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie, 100
 economy, 89
 "Greek Party," 197, 198
 "Greek Patriarchate Statistics of 1912," 71
 Greek Revolution of 1821, 12
 Greeks, 1, 2, 7, 10
 as agents and brokers, 23
 Armenian-speaking, 117
 in Asia Minor, 9
 in banking, 30
 Black Sea, Pontus, 53
 demographic advantages of, 33–34
 deportation of, 200
 diaspora of, 2
 in England, 5
 in European commercial quarters, 67
 fortunes of, after the Great War, 200
 French-speaking, 8
 in Iran, 10
 in Istanbul, 30
 in İzmir, 30, 31, 33, 34
 trade, 26
 Karamanlı, 68
 and liberalization in 1908, 184–85
 in London, 5
 in Manchester, 5
 millet system of, 47
 numbers in empire, 3
 in officialdom, 165
 Orthodox, 1
 as Ottomans, 18
 Pontic, 66
 privileged position of, 83
 privileged status of, 164
 professions of, 6, 33
 Smyrniot, 19, 30
 in the Sudan, 10
 Tracian, 70
 and trade, 26, 83
 Turkophone, 52, 53
 Unionist, 195
 in Venice, 2
 in western Anatolia, 9, 26
 Greek-Turkish antagonisms, 45
 Greek-Turkish War of 1919–22, 72, 115, 131
 Greek War of Independence (1821–28), 3, 25, 125, 145, 146, 161
 Grégoire, Henri, writer, 120, 131
 Grēgorios V, Patriarch, 123, 128, 176
 Groutas, Goulas, refugee captain, 155, 158
 Gryparēs, Iōannēs
 as foreign minister, 52, 72
 as Greek ambassador, 195
 guilds, 171
 Gymnase Philologique, 84, 85
 Halil, C.U.P. minister, 197
 Hamidian
 compulsory system of registration, 46
 regime, 47
 Hatt-i Hümayun, declaration of (1856), 91
 Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhâne, proclamation of (1839), 55

- Hayal* (journal), 12
 "Hē Anatolē," society, 129
 Hellas, 3
 Hellenes, 18
 Hellenic
 ideals, 11
 irredentism, 185
 new state, 3
 Hellenic Kingdom, 67, 164, 181, 185.
 See also Greece, Kingdom of
 Hellenism, 181
 in Asia Minor, 60, 166
 Pontic, 62
 Slavic threat to, 183
 Hellenization in Asia Minor, 129–30
 Hērakleia, diocese of, 70
 Hieremias III, 122
 Hogarth, D. G., British archaeologist, 120
 hotels, 10
 Hypsēlantēs, 161

 ice factory, 33
 Ikonio, diocese of, 62
 importers, 5, 6
 Greek, 23
 importing houses, 22
 imports, 80
 India, 10
 industry (types of),
 alcohol, 97
 beverage, 97
 brandy, 97
 flour, 97
 in İzmir, 31–34
 light, 31–33
 sugar, 97
 tanning, 97
 traditional, 97
 wine, 97
 infidels (non-Muslims), 173, 175
 infrastructure, 33

 insurrectionary movement, collapse of, 150
 interpreters (dragomans), 3
 investment, areas of, 95
 investments
 in industry, 90
 in mining, 90
 İōakeim III (Ecumenical Patriarch), 47, 182, 185, 186, 188, 196, 199
 Ionian coast, 9
 Ionian Islands, 3, 164
 Iran, 10
 irredenta, Greek, 145
 irredentism
 Hellenic, 185
 waves of, 150
 irredentist
 activities in Macedonia, 154–55
 bands, 153
 Greek, 155
 revolt, 145
 upheavals, 146, 147
 irregulars
 Albanian, 151, 153
 Greek, 151
 Ismail Bey, chief of armatoles, 147
 İsmet (İnönü) Paşa, 115
 Iraq, Greek firms in, 11
 Isaakidēs, Dr., 122
 İstamatyadi, Alexander (*Gazi Osman*), 12
 Istanbul, Greek-owned financial houses of, 83. *See also* Greater Istanbul
 İzmir (Smyrna), 17–34 *passim*
 agents, 11, 22
 British Chamber of Commerce in, 22
 British consul in, 22
 British firms in, 23
 commercial importance of, 82
 Consulate General of Greece in, 55
 cotton export, 79
 exporters in, 21

İzmir (*continued*)

- financial activities in, 29–31
- Greek capital in, 20
- Greek-owned financial houses of, 83
- importance of, 23
- international trade with, 18
- light-industry in, 31–34
- mining companies in, 27–28
- port of, 78, 79, 82
- riots in (1819), 84
- shipping, 2, 25–27, 90
- trade at, 26, 78, 79
- trade of, 6
- and trade surplus, 80
- İzzet Paşa, 165

Janissaries, 1

Japan, 11

Jewish

- agents, 22
- control of customshouses, 2
- control of the mint, 2
- influence, 2
- millet, 1
- physicians, European-trained, 1
- printers, 1

Jews of Constantinople, Greek-speaking, 117

Jews, 7, 18

- in economic life of Ottoman Empire, 4
- diplomatic missions of, 1
- favoured in government, 165
- in foreign trade, 2
- in Palestine, 9

joint stock companies, 99

journalism, 12

Kabdra, Joseph, Czech historian, 169

“kafir.” See “kefere”

“kefere” (infidels), 173

Kalapothakēs, D., publicist, 49

Kalimaki Bey, ambassador to Vienna, 161

Kallergēs D., foreign minister, 49

Kalogeros, brigand, 152–53

Karakioulaphēs, Anastasios, translator, 125, 127

Karaköy (Galata), 67

Karalivanos, captain, 157, 158

Karampatakēs, outlaw, 152

Karamanlı, 172

refugees, 132

texts, 127

Turkophone villages, 55

Karamanlı Christians, 12, 116, 118, 119, 131

of Anatolia, 12

ethnic origins of, 116, 117

Karamanlı (Turkophone) Greeks, 67

Karamanlides (i.e., Turkish-speaking), 120, 121, 122, 123, 128, 130, 131

communities of, 119

educational facilities among, 130

ethnicity of, 117

Greeks, 115, 116

karamanlidika (Turkish: *karamanlica*), 116, 119, 121, 126

books, literature printed in, 123, 124, 127

editions, 125

Karamanlis, in Greece, 13

Karatheodōrēs, Alexandros, ambassador and minister in Rome, 7

Karavangelēs, metropolitan of Kastoria, 157

Karalivanos, Captain, 157–58

Karolidēs, Paulos

as deputy of Smyrna, 131, 187

as deputy of İzmir, 199

as professor of history, 195

Karpat, Kemal (*Ottoman Population*), 46, 48, 53

Kartal (Chartalimē), 68

- Kasos, 6
 Kassape, Theodore (ed. *Diyojen*), 12
 Katafago, family, 11
 Katarrachias, outlaw, 152
 kathareoussa, "purified" form of language, 130, 131
 Katsikogiannēs, Greek captain in Turkish employment, 147
 family of, 148
 Katzefflis family, 11
 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 131, 132
 Kemal, Namık, 12
 Kemalist revolution, 53
 Keppel, G. T., British traveler, 122
 Kingdom of Greece. *See* Greece, Kingdom of
 Kiyıköy (Midia), kazas of, 70
 klephtic families, 150–51, 156
klephts (brigands), 13, 144, 145
 Kole Ghizas (or Kordistas), brigand chief, 152, 158
 Kōlettēs, Iōannēs, prime minister, 146
 Kolōnia, diocese of, 65
 Kontomichalos, contractor, 10
 Kōnstantinidēs, S., vice-consul of Bursa, 57
 Konya, 52
 Hellenic consulate in, 62
 vilâyets, 62
 Koraēs, Adamantios, 125
 Kordistas. *See* Kole Ghizas
 Kostaki Bey, Greek language instructor, 165
 Kotas, captain, 156–57
 Kotsilas, Greek captain in Turkish employment, 147
 family, 148
 Koumoundouros, Alexandros, prime minister, 129
 Kumkapi (Kontoskalion), 67
 Kurtuluş (Tatavla), 67
 Kypraios, Kōnstantinos, consul general, 49; Greek consul at Konya, 62
 Ladino, 118
 Lachtaras, irredentist chief, 155
 land irrigation, 33
 landownership, large-scale, 28
 land property, Western concepts of, 9
 language, of trade, 21
 Latin America, bank investment in, 94
 Lausanne. *See* Treaty of Lausanne
 Lausanne Convention, on the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, 72
 laws abolishing representation, 200
 lawyers, 33
 Lazos, captain, 150
 League of Private Initiative and Decentralization, 187
 Leake, W. M., traveler, 120
 Leivision, 62
 Leōnidās, outlaw, 152
 Levantine Catholics, 119
 Levantine market, 19, 22
 Levidēs, A. M., headmaster, 128
 liberals, 193
 licorice, 24, 29
 as dues, 30
 roots, 23, 24
 light industry, in İzmir, 31–34 *passim*
 liturgical language, 132
 liquor, 19
 literature, secular, 124
 Liturgy, Orthodox, 121, 122
 Liverpool, 22, 25
 Lloyd's insured steamships, 25
 London, 7, 22
 Lowther, Sir Gerald, British ambassador, 189
 Lycaonia, 62
 MacAndrews Forbes & Co., British company, 23, 24, 29
 Maccas, Leon, publicist, 49
 Macedonia, 89, 150–55, 181, 182, 185, 194

- Macedonia (*continued*)
 irredentist activities in, 154
 kleptic tradition in, 156
 liberation of, 155
 recruiting volunteers for, 154
 refugees from, 154
- Macedonian
 refugees, 155
 struggle, 182
 "Macedonian phalanx," 151
- Macedonians, 151
- madder roots, 23
- Makrē, 62
- Makrichōri, 67
- Manchester, 20, 22
- Manisa, 32
- Manopoulos, Greek entrepreneur, 27
- maritime
 technology, 25
 transportation, 18
- markets, international, 28
- Maronites, 165
 favored, in government, 165
- Marseilles, 165
- Maurogordatos, Theodōros, banker,
 95, 161
- Mauromatēs, captain, 158
- Mauromatēs, Neophytos, metropoli-
 tan of Naupaktos and Arta, 123
- Meander Valley, 24
- Megatē tou Genous Schotē* (Great School
 of the [Greek] Nation), 122
- Mehmed II (1451–81), 171
- Mehmet the Conqueror, sultan, 123
- Mekteb-i Bahriye-i Şâhâne* (Naval Acad-
 emy), 165
- Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şâhâne* (Imperial
 School of Administration), 164
- Mekteb-i Tibbiye Şâhâne* (Imperial
 Medical School), 163–64
- Melas, Athenian officer, 156, 157, 158
- Meletios IV, Ecumenical Patriarch,
 132
- merchant marine, 25
- merchants
 British, 28
 Greek, 19, 21
- Mesolōras, Iōannēs E. (*Encheiridion
 Leitourgikēs tēs Orthodoxou Ana-
 tolikēs Ekklesiās*), 121
- Messrs. Creswell, British firm, 21
- Metrai, diocese of, 69, 70
- migrant workers, 85
- migration, 63
 of Greek settlers, 54–55, 165
- military
 aristocracy, 148
 class, 145
 development of, 144
 element, 146
- Military Service Law, 200
- millet* ("religious community")
 Greek, 47, 181
 Ottoman Greek
 demography of, 45
 system, 47
 Greeks in the, 47
 as term, 67, 171, 172
- milletbaşı*, 170, 172, 174, 176, 185
- millet-i Ermeni*, 171
- Millet-i Rum*, 45, 66, 71, 170. *See also
 Rum milleti*
- millet-i Yahudi*, 171
- millets*, 170, 171
 influence of, 4
 labor force, 5
- milling industry, Greek, 32
- Militiadi Bey, 162
- minerals
 antimony, 27
 lignite, 27
 manganese, 27
 silver lead, 27
 zinc, 27
- mines, co-owned, 27
- mining, 27–28, 93

- cartels, 28
 chrome, 27
 emery, 27, 28
 trusts, 27
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7
 Minister of Public Works, 7
 Ministry of Agriculture, 7
 minorities, clannishness of, 7
 in schools, 8
 Molière (*L'Avare*), 12
 Molon, of the kazâ of Kayseri, 52
 money
 markets in Constantinople, 92
 paper, 30
 money-changers, money changing, 30
 moneylender, moneylending, 4, 29, 30
 Mount Olympus, 152
 Mount Pindus, 143
 Mousouros, Kōnstantinos, ambassador,
 7
 Mousouros, Stephanos, ambassador, 7
 Mudros Armistice (1918), 200
 mulberries, 9
 Murad, sultan, 4
 muscardine blight, 11
 "Mussulmans," 9
 Musurus Paşa, ambassador to Athens,
 161, 164
 Myriophyta (Mürefte), diocese of, 70
 Mystakidēs, V. A., writer, 121
- Napoleonic Wars, 18, 25
 Nasi, Joseph ("Duke of Naxos"), 2
 Nasrâni. *See* "Nazoreans" (Christians)
 National Bank of Greece, 31, 96
 nationalism, 145
 nationalists, 193, 200
 natural dyes, 81
 Naumann, Edmund, 122
 navigation, 6
 steam, 6
 "Nazoreans" (Christians), 173, 175
 Nea Smyrnē, 132
 Negreponte, Ulysses, banker, 95
 Neocaesarea, diocese of, 65
 New Testament, 126
 Nigde (Nigdē), *see* of, 62
 Nile transport, 10
 non-Muslim religious communities,
 171
 non-Muslims, in election of 1908, 195
 non-Muslim students
 Greek element among, 164
 quota, of Ottoman subjects, 164
 non-state arena, 85, 86
- Odessa, 10
 Office of Legal Council, 7
 olive oil, 19, 23, 33
 Olympios, captain, 150
 Olympus captains (chiefs of the out-
 laws), 153
 Olympus region, 154
 Olympus-Vermion region, 153
 opium, 23, 81
 Organōsis Kōnstantinoupoleōs (Society
 of Constantinople [S.C.]), 183,
 186, 187, 188
 Oriental Carpet Cloth Co., 97
 "Orthodox," as term, 172
 Orthodox Christian(s), 60
 populations, 57
 "Orthodox Christians," as term, 172
 Orthodox Church, 84, 169–76
 hierarchy of, 84, 125, 174
 Orthodox churches under Ottoman
 rule, jurisdiction of, 169
 Orthodox community, 172
 Orthodox Liturgy, 121
 Orthodox millet, 2
 "Orthodox millet" (*Ortodoks milleti*),
 127
 Orthodox patriarchs, 175, 182
 Orthodox Turks, 115
 Orthodoxy, 12, 122

- Orthodoxy and Hellenism, 170
- Ottoman
 archives, 46
 army, 9
 Greeks in the, 49
 census, 46
 currency, 30
 debt administration, 93
 demographic studies, 41
 economy, 93
 finances, 28–29
 government rule, 78–79
 Muslim population, 41
 population registers, 46
- Ottoman Bank, 93
- Ottoman Empire, 78–79
 decline of Greek supremacy in, 162
 ethnic hierarchies in, 83
 transformation of, 85
- Ottoman Greek community of Istanbul, division of, 185
- “Ottomanism,” ideal of, 195
- Ottoman Oil Co., 97
- Ottoman Parliament, 49
 Greeks in, 195
- Ottoman parliament of 1908, 187
- Ottoman state, alliance with, 184
- Ottoman Treasury, 95
 financing of, 92
- outlaws, recruitment of, 150, 156
- Paisios, Metropolitan of Kayseri, 124, 125
- Palestine, 9
- Pan Hellenic Organization, 183
- Pantaleon Oriental Navigation Company, Greek shipping company, 6, 26
- Papadēmos, irredentist chief, 155
- Papayanni Brothers, Greek shipping firm, 6, 25
- Paris Peace Conference (1919), 71
- “party of madness,” 150
- “party of peace,” 150
- paşaliks* (provinces), 1
- Paterson, British-based Greek shipping firm, 25–26
- Patriarch. *See* Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.
- patriarchal
 authorities, 47
 encyclical, 48
- Patriarchal Academy (founded 1454), 3
- Patriarchal Greek Lycée, 67
- Patriarchate. *See* Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople
- Patriarchate of Antioch, 53
- patriarchates, 170, 174
- Patriarch of Constantinople. *See* Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople
- patriarchs, Orthodox, 175
- patriotic societies in Athens, 154
- peasant households, 81
- peasants, 31
- Pendik (Panteichion), 68
- Pentateuch, 177–78
- Perrot, Georges, French traveler, 130
- Phanar, 47, 49
 rift with the Porte, 47
- Phanariot
 aristocracy, 176
 dragomans, 161
 leadership, 66
- Phanariots, 3, 7, 161, 164, 173
- “philosophical modernism,” 84
- Phlaviana-Zincidere, 52
- Phrankochiōtika* (Greek in Latin characters), 117
- Phrankolevantinoi* (Greek-speaking Catholics), 117
- physicians
 Armenians, 6
 Greeks, in 1912, 6
 personal, 1
 Turks, 6

- Pilion, cotton variety, 10
 Pinas, Kole, captain, 157
 Pinkerton, Reverend Robert, 119
 piracy, privateering, 18, 23
 Pisidia, diocese of, 62
 Pitzipios Bey, phanariot, 164
 Platon Levshin, Metropolitan, 125
 "Political League," 107, 186, 197-99
 policy, 199
 political views, of Greeks, 13
 Pontic-Greek centers, 63
 Pontic Greek Society, 63
 Pontos
 dioceses of, 63, 65
 Greek society in the, 63
 Pontus Greek communities, 53
 population numbers, of non-Greeks, 52
 population records, 47, 57
 populations, exchange of, 12
 port city, port cities, 78
 development of, 55
 İzmir as, 78, 79, 82
 Pontic, 63
 Porte, 47, 162, 163, 164
 financial difficulties of, 82
 Greek policy toward, 52
 rift with the Phanar, 47
 and tax-farming, 82
 Poutetsēs, captain, 158
 Price, Clair, American journalist, 132
 Prince's Islands, 68
 printers, Jewish, 1
 proclamation of Hatt-i Şerif of Gül-
 hâme (1839), 55
 proportional representation of 1914
 elections, 194
Prospyngikos Kosmos (refugee newspa-
 per), 116
 Psalter and the Gospels, translated into
 karamanlidika, 121
 Public Debt Administration (PDA), 7,
 93, 95
 public utilities, 33
 purchasing agents, for commercial
 houses, 21
qadi courts, 1
 Qurânic schools, 8
 Radovitsi, mountain district, 150
 captains of, 147-49, 151
 notables of, 147
 warriors of, 151
 Radovitsi-Agrapha region, 149-50, 151
 railroads, 80
 railway, 10
 raisins, 19, 23, 79, 81
 Ralli and Agelasto, firm, 10
 Ralli Brothers, 10, 19
 raw materials, 17
re'âyâ mentality, 186
 reconciliation, between Greeks and the
 C.U.P., 195
 "refugee interest," social group, 146,
 147
 refugees, 146, 151
 Balkan Muslims as, 70
 regional culture and politics, 11-13
 registration
 records, 46, 47
 standardized forms, 57
 system, 46, 48
 religious communities, 170
 "revolutions," call for, 150
 Rhodes, 6
 rights of ethnicities in the empire, 184
 Rizos, N. S., writer, 131
 Rodocanachi family, 19
 Rodopolis, diocese of, 65
 Roman (*Rumi*) religious community,
 12
 Romanov family, visit to Ottoman
 Empire, 163
 religion, primacy of, 120
 Rome, 7
Rōmioi ("Romans"), 66

- "Rum," 173
 Rumanian state, 89
 Rumeli, outlaws in, 152
Rum milleti, 170, 173, 176
 Rumelia, eastern
 union of, with Bulgaria, 154
Rumî (Roman), religious community,
 12
 Rumlar ("Greeks"), 127
 Russia, 2
 Russian goods, 5
 Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78), 70
- Sabaheddin, Prince, 187, 188
 Sahak Abro Efendi, 161
 Sakellarides, cotton variety, 10
Sâlnâmes (yearbooks), 48, 49, 50
 Salvago, 10
 Samatya (Hypsomathion), 67
 Samos Island, autonomy of, 162
 Samos Wire Company Limited, 33
 Samsun, 6, 52, 63, 65, 66
 Saranta Ekklēsies, diocese of, 70
sarrafs ("moneylenders"), 4
 Sava Paşa, 161
 S.C. *See* Organōsis Kōnstantinoupoleōs
 Scholarios, Geōrgios Gennadios (*Peri
 tēs Hodou tēs Sōtērias tōn Anthrō-
 pōn*), 123
 Seferiadi, Greek company, 24
 Selim I, 173
 Sevi, Sabbatai, 2
 Serba, 1
 Sgouros, Marinos, consul of Ayvalik,
 57
 Shepherds, migratory, 143
 shipping, 25-27
 Silivri, 69
 silk
 from Bursa, 79
 industry, Armenian names in, 5
 trade of Gilan, 11
 silk-reeling plants, 5
 silk-worm breeding, 9
 Sillē, 62
 Simon & Co., German company, 24
 Sisam Beyi, governor, 162
 "Sisam Emâreti" (1832), 162
 Skalierēs, Geōrgios, 188
 Skaltsogiannēs, Greek captain
 family of, 148
 in Turkish employment, 147
 Skouloudēs, Stephanos, banker and
 deputy, 188. *See also* Skouloudi,
 Ettiene, banker, 95
 Skouloudi, Ettiene, banker, 95. *See also*
 Skouloudēs, Stephanos
 Slav populations, Turkish-speaking, 117
 Slavs, 13
 Smyrna (İzmir), 6, 9, 20, 26-27
 bankers, 31
 industry in, 96, 97-98
 region, 9
 trade at, 81
 Smyrna Fig Packers Ltd., Western
 company, 25
 Smyrna Lightermen's and Barge
 Owners' Company, Ltd., 26
 social hierarchies, 83
 Société Anonyme de Manufacture du
 Coton, 97
 Société Anonyme Ottomane de Manu-
 facture du Coton, Ottoman com-
 pany, 32
 Société Générale de l'Empire Ottoman,
 92, 94
 Société Ottomane des Changes et
 Valeurs, 92, 94
 "Society for the Propagation of Greek
 Letters," 130
 "Society of Anatolians, the East," 129
 "Society of Constantinople" (S.C.), 13,
 183, 186, 187, 188, 197, 198
 Society of Dilettanti, 121
 Söke (Sokia), city, 24
Soncino Polyglot of 1547, 118

- Sōtēriādēs, Geōrgios, publicist, 49, 54
 Souliōtēs-Nikolaidēs, Athanasios, officer, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189
 South African War, 6
 Spanos, Naum, adventurer, 155, 156
 specie shortages, seasonal, 30
 Spencer, Herbert, writer, 181
 spinning and weaving, 9
 sponge fishing, 11
 sponges, 21
 statistical data, consular reports of, 52
 steam navigation, 6
 Stefanovic-Skilitzi, banker, 95
 Stelakēs, Xenophōn, consul general, 55
 Stepan, Alfred, 77
 Stratsos, leader of irredentist band, 152
 Streit, Geōrgios, banker and politician, 188
 strikes, 5
 Sublime Porte. *See* Porte
 Sudan, 10
 suffrage, 193
 Sufi brotherhoods, 86
 Süleyman I, 173
 suspension of payments, 1893, 94
 Sylviria, diocese of, 69, 70
syllogoi ("cultural associations"), 11, 67, 128
 Symi, 6
Symaxarion (Book of Saints), 126
 Syria, non-Greek trading in, 11
 Syrian
 ports, shipping to, 11
 Orthodox Patriarchate, 11
 Syrians, 10
 Tabriz, 10, 11
 Greek firms in, 10, 11
taifas ("group"), 171
tâ'ife, Ottoman term, 171, 172
 Taine, Hippolyte, rationalist writer, 181
 Tal'at, C.U.P. minister, 197
 tannery, 33
 Tanzimat Period, 172
 bureaucracy in, 166
 Greek element in, 164
 Tanzimat reforms, 9, 85
 Tarabya (Therapia), 67
 tax collections, 81
 tax-farming, tax-farmers, tax-farms, 4, 29-30, 82
 Armenian, 30
 Greek, 30
 Tekirdag (Raideostos), 70
 telephones, 33
 Tenekidēs, G., writer, 48
 Texier, C. F. M., writer, 122
 textiles, 32
 Greek centers of, 32
 importers of, 5
 mills, 32
 texts, European language, 1
tezkire ("identity card"), 47
 Thessaly, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152
 cession of, to Greece, 154
 refugees from, 151
 uprising in, 149, 152
 Thrace, 185
 eastern, 69-71 passim, 89
 western, 89
 Thucydides, writer, 143
timariots, 1
 timariots, Christian, 174
 tithes, 29
 Tobacco Régie, 199
Tourkokratia, 1, 122
 Toynbee, Arnold, 131
 Trabzon, 53, 63, 65. *See also* Trebizond
 Thracian cities, Bulgarian threat to, 184
 trade, trading, 4, 89
 cloth, 6, 19
 European protection of, 91
 foreign, 5, 10

- trade, trading (*continued*)
 free, 90–91
 internal, 5
 liquor, 6, 19
 networks, 90
 opportunities, 93
 with the West, 17
 wine, 6, 19
- Trade Convention (1838), 18
- Trakakēs, G., writer, 96, 97
- transhumance, 143, 145
- translations of French novels, 126
- transport development, 93
- Treaty of Lausanne (1923), 47, 70, 100, 115
- Trebizond, 6, 10, 11. *See also* Trabzon
 Greek firms in, 10, 11
- Tripoli, 11
- Trompoukēs, brigand chief, 153
- Tsaousēs, captain, 157
- Tsigaridas, Greek captain in Turkish employment, 147
 family of, 148
- Tuckerman, Charles, American minister in Athens, 128
- Tünel (Staurodromi), 67
- Turkish
 legal requirement of, 128
 nationalists in Asia Minor, 200
 press, 194
 proficiency in, 7
 reformists, 194
 teaching of, in minority schools, 128
- Turkish Orthodox
 Church, 131–32
 nationalists, 131
 Patriarch, 132
 solution, 132
- Turkophone Christians, 118
- Turkophone Greek Orthodox
 migrants, 55
 village, 53
- Turkophone Greeks, 52, 124
- Turkophone Karamanlı villages, 55
- Turkophones, 131
- Turks, 7, 10, 18
- Tyrnavos, district, 154
- Tyrolói, diocese of, 70
- Tzachilas, captain, 150
- unification, 13
- Unionist Greeks, 195
- Unionist Party, 198
- Unionist politics, 200
- Unionists, 197, 198, 199, 200
 Greeks, 195
- United States, migration of divers to, 11
- university education, 8
- valonia, 21, 23
- Valavanēs, Iōakeim (*Mikrasiatika*, 1891), 117
- Vardas (Tsontos), captain, 157
- Variopatis, 24
- Vasileus (Christian and Orthodox emperor), 175
- Venizelos, Eleutherios, premier, 48, 50, 71, 115
- Ververas, irredentist chief, 155
- vessels
 Ottoman, 6
 Greek, 6
- Vilâyet Cerîdesi*, first provincial newspaper in Ottoman Empire, 162
- vine growing (Gianaclis), 10
- Visvikēs, captain, 158
- Vizya, diocese of, 70
- Vlachavas, captain, 150
- Vlach, Vlachs, 152
 Hellenized, 3
- Vrakas, irredentist chief, 155
- War of Independence. *See* Greek War of Independence

- war, wars
 French Revolutionary, 18
 between Greece and Turkey, 13
 Napoleonic, 18
 of 1918–22, 13
- Western
 capital, 19
 capital and technology, 33
 entrepreneurs, 23, 28
 insurance firms, 27
 merchantile communities, 17
 shipping lines, 27
 textiles, 17
 traders, 18
 trading houses, 22
 in Austria, 22
 in France, 22
 in Germany, 22
- western Anatolia. *See also* Anatolia,
 western
 and agricultural production, 83
 British entry into, 83
 divisions within Greek community
 in, 80
 taxes, 80
- Westerners, in mining, 27
- wheat, 23
- wine, 19
 industry, 33
- women
 in labor force, 5
 Turkish, 5
- workers
 Armenian, 5
 Greek, 5
 Jewish, 5
 skilled, 10
 Turks, 5
- world economy
 capitalist, 79
 in trade, 79
- World War I (Great European War or
 Great War), 96
- antagonisms after, 45
 Europe following, 72
 fortunes of Greeks after, 200
- Xenophanēs* (journal), 129
- Xenos, Stephanos, Phanariot, 164
- Yahudi (Jews), 173
- Yannovitch, cotton variety, 10
- Yedikule, 118, 120
- Yeniköy (Neochōrion), 67
- Yeşilköy (San Stefano), 67
- Young Turk
 administration, 47
 cabinets, 7
 elections, 49
 parliament, 47
 parliament of 1908–14, 69
 Revolution (1908), 100, 158, 184,
 185, 200
 regime, 100
- Young Turks, 47, 49, 186, 193, 194,
 195, 196, 201
 nationalism of, 13
 1908 election of, 49
 Parliament of, 47
- zâ'ims*, 1
- Zagora, cotton variety, 10
- Zariphēs, Geōrgios, banker, 4, 95, 100
- Zarkadas, brigand chief, 153
- Zavaliani, Asim, dervenāḡa of Thes-
 saly, 149
- Zēsēs, Dēmoulios, 157
- Ziakas (Phalēreas), 156
- Zincidere (Monē Phlavianōn), history
 of the monastery of St. John the
 Forerunner, 124
- Zōgraphos, Chrēstakēs, banker, 4, 100
- Zōodochos Pēgē, monastery at Balıklı,
 119
- Zourkas, brigand chief, 152