Turkish Cultural Policies in a Global World

Edited by
Muriel Girard, Jean-François Polo, Clémence Scalbert-Yücel

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palgrave
macmillan

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Cover credit: david pearson / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

Acknowledgements

This volume would not have been realized without the support of many people and organizations. First and foremost, we thank the research program *Transfaire*/Trans-acting Matters: Areas and Eras of a (Post-) Ottoman Globalization (ref. ANR-12-GLOB-003) (funded through The French National Research Agency) and particularly its team, Marc Aymes (CETOBAC/EHESS), Anouck Côrte-réal (CETOBAC/EHESS/IFEA), and Sümbül Kaya (CETOBAC/EHESS/IFEA), who provided us with continuous encouragement to create this group and initiate this collection of reflections on Turkish cultural policies. The ANR Transfaire helped to finance the workshop on cultural policies that we organized in April 2015 as well as the translation of some chapters of this volume. We are also grateful to all the members of the Transfaire project who discussed our ideas and some of the chapters during research seminars and meetings. The Transfaire project has been a remarkable collective scientific adventure with talented and outstanding people, between Paris and Istanbul.

This volume is based on a workshop organized in Istanbul (16–17 April 2015) at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (IFEA, Istanbul) and the University of Galatasaray (GSÜ, Istanbul). We would like to warmly thank Jean-François Pérouse, the director of the IFEA, and Füsun Üstel, the director of the Department of Political Studies at GSÜ, for their support in hosting this academic event and for their valuable advice. We also express our gratitude to Cilia Martin (IFEA) and Lydia Zeghmar (IFEA) who participated actively at the organization of the workshop as members of the Scientific and Organizing Committee. We also thank the discussants of the workshop for their fruitful comments: Banu Karaca (Sabanci

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Note on Orthography and Pronunciation

This book uses the modern Turkish orthography based on Latin letters. Most of the authors of this volume have used Turkish orthography based on Latin letters. The names of some well-known Turkish cities and authors are presented without diacritics, however.

The following letters differ from the English alphabet and are pronounced as shown below:

Ç, ç—'ch' as in 'Chile'

Ğ, ğ—when before a consonant or at the end of a word, lengthens the preceding vowel; not pronounced when located between two vowels.

I, ı—as the sound of 'a' in 'available'

Ö, ö—the umlauted 'ö' as in German 'Köln'

Ş, ş—'sh' as in 'shepherd'

Ü, ü—the umlauted 'ü' as in German 'München'

Abbreviations

AA   Anadolu Ajansı—Anatolian News Agency
AKM   Atatürk Kültür Merkezi—Atatürk Cultural Center
AKP   Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—Justice and Development Party
ARDOS   Arhavi Doğa Sporları Kulübü—Arhavi Nature Sport Club
ARTUD   Arhavi Turizm Derneği—Arhavi Association for Folklore and Tourism
ARYADER   Arhavi Doğayı Koruma ve Yayla Turizmini Geliştirme Derneği—Arhavi Association for the development of high-land tourism and the protection of nature
BELMEK   Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Meslek Edindirme Kursları—Ankara Municipality Vocational Training Courses
ÇATOM   Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezi—Multi-purpose community centres
ÇEKÜL   Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtıma Vakfı—Foundation for the Protection and Improved Knowledge of Cultural and Environmental Values
CHP—RPP   Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—Republican People's Party
CNC   Centre National du cinéma et de l'image animée—National Centre for Cinema and Animated Picture
CNRS   Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique—The (French) National Center for Scientific Research
DOKA   Doğu Karadeniz Kalkınma Ajansı—Eastern Black Sea Development Agency
DSM   Diyarbakir Sanat Merkezi—Diyarbakir Art Centre

EU	European Union
FRP	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası—Free Republican Party
GAP	Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi—Southeastern Anatolia Project
GSÜ	University of Galatasaray
HEM	Halk Eğitim Merkezi—Centers for Popular Education
HES	*Hidroelektrik Santralı*—hydroelectric plants
İBB	İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi—Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
IBF	International Business Forum
IBU	Istanbul Bilgi University
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IFEA	Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes—French Institute of Anatolian Studies
İKSV	İstanbul Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı—Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Art
IMM	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
İŞKUR	Türkiye İş Kurumu—Turkey Labor Agency
İSMEK	İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi sanat ve meslek eğitimi kursları—Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses
İSTAD	İstanbul Arhavililer Derneği—Association of Arhavi People in Istanbul
KOMEK	Konya Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses
KUDEB	Koruma Uygulama ve Denetim Büroları—Bureau for the supervision and implementation of conservation measures
LIUN	Laureate International Universities Network
MIF	Müsiad International Fair
MOCT	Ministry of Culture and Tourism
MSGSÜ	Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University
MÜSIAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği—Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
NGO	non-governmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PBF	Palestinian Business Forum
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan—Kurdistan Workers Party

PPP	public–private partnership
RP	Refah Partisi—Welfare Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
SCECC	Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation
TCF	the Christensen Fund
THOF	Türkiye Halk Oyunları Federasyonu— Turkish Federation for Popular Dance and Music
TİKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı—Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
TÜBİTAK	Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu—Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
TÜSAK	Türkiye Sanat Kurumu—Art organisation of Turkey
UNDP	United Nation Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
YYF	Kültür, Sanat, ve Çevre Festival Yeşil Yayla Festival—Culture, Art, and Environment Yeşil Yayla Festival

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Introduction: Turkish Cultural Policies in a Global World—Circulations, Territories, and Actors

Muriel Girard, Jean-François Polo,
and Clémence Scalbert-Yücel

1   Past and Present Cultural Policies in Turkey: From Building the Nation State to Disputed Pluralism

Over the course of the 2000s the Turkish artistic scene flourished, with Istanbul emerging as one of the most dynamic cities in the world.[1] This also benefited the rest of the country. It was a decade of thriving artistic creativity. Cultural life was energized by various factors, including local and national cultural policies launched by the political authorities, buoyed up by spectacular economic growth. Cultural foundations established by

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major industrial groups and wealthy families also played a key role, as did a host of cultural associations and private companies (galleries, cultural events companies, performance venues, etc.). Turkey emerged as one of the leading tourist destinations in the world, offering its visitors an outstanding heritage and a plentiful and varied cultural life driven by a calendar of artistic events. Biennales, contemporary art fairs, and cinema and music festivals all helped boost the country's international standing, which received symbolic recognition when Istanbul was named European Capital of Culture in 2010 (Göktürk et al. 2011).

However, over the course of the 2010s, this remarkable dynamic stalled and Turkey now stands at a crossroads. Signs that this dynamism was on the wane could already be seen in April 2015, when the Turkish cultural policy study days from which this volume stems took place.[2] The authorities had run into opposition after the Gezi protests in spring 2013 and the accusations of corruption that came to light at the end of the same year.[3] However, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which had already been in power since 2002, went on to win a series of elections. Many observers had long worried about the authoritarian turn taken by the Turkish government. Subsequent events only reinforced their fears. Violent confrontation flared up once again in summer 2015 between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). Thousands of combatants and civilians were killed, and neighborhoods and entire towns even were destroyed in the south-east of the country. There followed an abortive attempted coup on July 15, 2016, conducted by a few officers, which the authorities blamed on Gulenist sympathizers. A widespread crackdown ensued in which more than 100,000 public employees were fired and about 40,000 people arrested.[4] This targeted mainly members of the police, army, judiciary, and education system, but pressure was also brought to bear on journalists, and to a lesser extent artists, some of whom were arrested. The author Aslı Erdoğan, for instance, was detained in prison for more than four months, accused of supporting the PKK. Artistic circles have been denouncing censorship for several years, criticizing plans to transform Turkish cultural policy, which might lead to even greater government intervention.[5] The approval of a highly controversial project to reform the Turkish constitution involving considerable expansion to the president's powers will only fuel mistrust among cultural and artistic circles. And to make matters worse, the very close result of the constitutional referendum held on April 16, 2017 (with 51.4% voting yes) was

marred by numerous irregularities noted by Council of Europe observers, and for the first time since multiparty elections were held in 1946 there was suspicion of major fraud.[6]

Some chapters in this book mention these recent events in passing. It is still too early to assess their consequences, even though these may be readily imagined given earlier comments about the freedom of expression and action available to artists and cultural actors. However, this book does not set out to analyze how the drift towards authoritarianism in Turkey has impacted on the artistic scene. Instead, it looks at transformations in cultural policies over the past 20 or so years, during which, as just pointed out, there have been phases of cultural thriving, along with a diversification of actors and the missions assigned to cultural policies. That is why cultural policies is referred to here in the plural, for it would be a mistake to examine only cultural actions carried out by the state or local authorities.

Indeed, Turkey has a highly diverse range of cultural actors who do not necessarily share the same value systems or ideological references, and whose presence across the country varies. Secularized cultural circles (Kemalists, Europeanists, and the far left) exist alongside more traditional and conservative circles, often with ties to the AKP. But there are also actors who voice their affiliation to minority identities (Kurds, Armenians, Romas, Alevi, Jews, etc.), migrant communities (Syrians, Africans, Central Asians, Uyghurs, etc.), and territories in present-day Turkey (the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, Thrace, Hatay, Anatolia, etc.) or the Ottoman realm (Caucasia, the Balkans, Aegean and Mediterranean islands, etc.). These circles sometimes act through associations and foundations. They can receive backing from the public authorities, draw on community support, and attract foreign funding (from the European Union [EU], diasporas, non-governmental international cooperation, etc.). In the early 2000s, cultural expression was supported by EU integration policies, particularly the EU Promotion of Cultural Rights in Turkey program. Cultural action by the Kurdish movement also had undeniable knock-on effects, unshackling the cultural and artistic expression of other ethnic groups in the country at a time when cultural diversity was generally being promoted (Scalbert-Yücel 2015). The AKP government clearly played a role in opening up the cultural field (which occurred within the context of Turkey's EU accession negotiations). But mention also needs to be made of other private initiatives—such as the Anadolu Kültür foundation set up in 2002—which have encouraged cultural expressions of diversity, and fostered exchanges within the country and abroad. These myriad of actors vividly convey a

history, a memory, a sensibility, emotions, feelings of belonging, and identity demands expressed in a full range of artistic and cultural forms. They have taken part in producing art objects, festivals, events (of varying scale), and practices that may be traded on the arts and crafts markets. They have also been active in producing knowledge and techniques that may be conserved, transmitted, and taught, drawing on ancient references, inventing tradition, or deliberately exploring contemporary artistic modernity. Particular artistic forms are associated with new identity stances. Leyla Neyzi, for instance, emphasizes how music has played a key role in the re-emergence of Alevi identity (Neyzi 2002: 97). Within this panoply of cultural production, the dominant role of remembrance and heritagization processes needs to be noted, illustrative of the proliferation of heritage. The state plays a central role in the production of heritage, as it does in other forms of cultural production. However, alternative heritagization initiatives have emerged and gathered strength, though struggling in certain cases to win recognition. Such initiatives are also indicative of how heritage may be built by local actors, associations, and transnational actors operating on the margins of the visions promoted by the Turkish state (Girard 2014, 2015).

Mention also needs to be made of the processes of popular creation and consumption. The media and cultural industries have been instrumental in the emergence of "popular" styles rooted to varying degrees in certain areas, communities, and local histories. Examples of this include the popular musical forms of *arabesk* (Stokes 1992; Özgür 2006), *rebetiko* (Koglin 2008), Black Sea music (Elias 2014, 2016), and *halay*, while the booming audiovisual industry has produced very successful television series and films (Carney 2014; Jabbour 2017).

Turkish state intervention in art and culture clearly stretches back a long way, to the beginning of the Republic (Ada and İnce 2009). Like most nation states endeavoring to build and consolidate their country in an environment perceived as hostile, or in opposition to potential enemies, Turkey wove arts, folklore, and heritage into its national narrative. These were taken up in heroic accounts, helping to stage the story of a people united by a shared national belonging in need of protection (Thiesse 1999), and who needed to learn the new values of the secular republic (Öztürkmen 1998; Köksal 2004; Bozdoğan 2008; Öztürkmen 2012). Arts and culture were thus entrusted with the profoundly political mission of regenerating the national community. In addition to this prime objective, the state provided limited support to major cultural institutions for the entertainment

and aesthetic pleasure of the elites. These institutions were often inherited from the former Ottoman Empire (Katoğlu 2009). Numerous studies of cultural policies in the early days of the Turkish Republic have examined the processes of Westernization in establishing Turkish national art and culture in the fields of music, theater (And 1984; Ucan 1987; Araci 2010; Erol 2012), literature (Berk 2004), and fine arts (Altan 2001).

It was only after the second half of the twentieth century that new cultural policies started to emerge in Turkey, based on those being set up in Europe. Vincent Dubois argues that it was only then, in liberal democracies, that cultural policy emerged as a "category of public action", endowed with a specific budget and administration, a coherent doctrine, and the requisite administrative and political management (Dubois 2012).[7]

National cultural policies have thus never been cut off from major debates about the changes affecting the cultural sector worldwide, such as how the state should intervene and finance culture. Other topics include the dynamics of cultural decentralization driven by local authorities, private initiatives by associations and activist networks, and major economic groups in the form of cultural patronage; new ways in which cultural goods are consumed and distributed (particularly over the Internet); and the increasingly diverse missions assigned to cultural policies. Each state implements its cultural policy in the light of choices, debates, and actions by previous governments, even though these may be contested or viewed as an imposition. Cultural policy in Turkey thus needs to be seen within the context of a long history, an aspect explored by several chapters in this work. Categories, ways of doing, and actors circulate. Cultural policy also results from the dissemination of models, especially within the context of globalization. That is why this book focuses on analyzing cultural policies in the light of these circulations, as discussed later.

Over the past 30 years, Turkish cultural policy has undergone changes comparable to those affecting cultural policies in Europe as analyzed by Jean-Pierre and Guy Saez, who highlight the processes of "metropolitanization", Europeanization, and regional dynamics, and those arising from economic (liberalization, creative and cultural industries) and technological (digital industry) change (Saez and Saez 2012).

To better understand these processes and identify some explanatory factors, a historical perspective is needed. This brings out the continuities and shifts in cultural policy, thereby allowing us to distinguish between broad dynamics relating to changes in the cultural sector, and those

resulting from a political project, irrespective of its level of detail, and thus imputable to policy-makers.

However, this work does not set out to provide a complete history of cultural policies in Turkey (a task to be carried out, perhaps in the form of an encyclopedia or dictionary).[8] The reader is referred to the abovementioned major works of scholarship by historians of the late Ottoman Empire and early Republic examining early cultural actions and institutions. Nor is the aim to provide exhaustive, sector-by-sector analysis of cultural policies since Turkey established its Ministry for Culture in 1971. Specialized literature about cultural policies in Turkey tends to be very recent. Though still limited in number, an increasing number of articles have appeared in specialized journals such as *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. These provide relevant knowledge about the various artistic domains (painting, theatre, cinema, music, heritage, etc.) and the various dimensions of cultural action in conjunction with other policy fields (e.g. town planning, education, tourism, the environment, and foreign policy). Furthermore, mention has already been made of the role played by private actors such as cultural foundations (first among which is the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts [İstanbul Kültür Sanat Vakfı, İKSV]), and some of these have published works feeding the debate about cultural action. For instance, following on from the Stockholm United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conference, a symposium was held in October 1998 by the Kültür Girişim initiative, with the backing of the İKSV and the Ministry for Culture, the proceedings of which were published as *Türkiye'de Kültür Politikaları* (Kültür Girişim 2001). And, starting in the 2000s and over the course of the 2010s, culture has become increasingly professionalized and institutionalized. This stems from work by longstanding organizations (the İKSV, founded in 1973, has expanded its range of activities considerably, holding numerous international festivals in the fields of music, cinema, arts, and theatre), as well as by more recent ones such as Anadolu Kültür (2002), SALT (2010), and the Cultural Policy and Management Research Center (Kültür Politikaları ve Yönetimi Araştırma Merkezi) founded in 2010 at the University of Bilgi, which runs a specialized course in cultural management and publishes a collection of works about cultural policies.[9] In this context a growing number of studies have been produced about cultural policies by professionals from various cultural sectors and by academics from various disciplines (sociology, political science, anthropology, urban planning, economics, management, etc.) who specialize in this

subject. There has thus been a large increase in the number of books and articles examining various sectors of cultural policies and the missions assigned to culture, and analyzing how cultural policy is built within the framework of Europeanization and globalization.

This scholarship is part of wider contemporary debates about cultural policies and the relationship between culture and politics, examining such issues as the role of culture in political communication, both locally (Istanbul as a global city) (Polo 2015) and internationally (the Yunus Emre centers) (Kaya and Tecmen 2011), or government interference in the cultural and artistic field (Birkiye 2009; Polo, Üstel 2014; Aksoy, Seyben 2015) and censorship (Siyah bant 2014a, b). As the cultural offering has expanded and become more diverse, many works have looked at the emergence of a national art market and artistic scene (with a growing number of private museums, arts fairs, and biennales; Yardımcı 2005; Molho 2016). Other topics studied include the resurgence of the cultural and audiovisual industries (with the success of the Turkish cinema industry and television series for export), and Turkey's integration into European and international networks (Karaca 2009, 2010), thanks to participation in EU-funded programs (Istanbul European Capital of Culture in 2010) and those financed by the Council of Europe (the Eurimages program). Studies have also looked at how cultural action is assigned ever more varied objectives. These include the democratization of culture, promoting cultural diversity along with regional and "ethnic" cultures, culture as a factor for urban and economic development (boosting the tourist industry), and a way to further Turkey's integration and participation in international networks. Istanbul's year as European Capital of Culture represented a high point in terms of the visibility of culture in urban policy. It also coincided with a peak in scholarship about cultural policies. For instance, the Observatoire Urbain Istanbul at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, IFEA) has published online a large number of research projects by students and conference papers about Istanbul European Capital of Culture, and the role played by culture more generally in transforming the city.[10] Here, once again, work by academics and policy circles has concentrated on Istanbul and its cultural policies. As yet, few studies have looked specifically at cultural policies in the regions (Ertürk 2011).

And so this book does not set out to provide an exhaustive historical overview of cultural policies in Turkey, but rather to encourage debate about the conditions of the production of cultural policies within a context characterized by globalization and circulations of knowledge and practices.

2   CULTURAL POLICIES IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCULATIONS

This work takes a multidisciplinary approach to cultural policies in Turkey, combining political science, anthropology, sociology, geography, and history. The stakes are both empirical and theoretical. The goal is to add to knowledge about cultural policies in Turkey and the post-Ottoman realms by presenting new research and adopting multiple points of view and scales of analysis. In addition, the volume provides a theoretical apparatus based on analyzing circulations occurring at different levels (ranging from the local to the global) and involving both public and private actors, encouraging a different approach to cultural policies.

Comparative analysis of cultural policies has produced abundant scholarship about how models of public cultural action evolve, change, and are produced (Chap. 4). Additionally, there has been an increasing number of policy transfer studies (Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010; Hadjiisky et al. 2017). This book seeks to make room for insights in these two fields of study (without neglecting their blindspots) so as to put forward a new way of thinking about circulations and changes to cultural policies in Turkey. Our aim is to understand how circulations in their various forms are instrumental in building cultural policies. These circulations may be observed between different historical periods and between different geographical spaces. They can give rise to conflict as well as to competition and rival practices (between various models, ideas, and purposes assigned to culture). They occur at the transnational, European, and global scale, as well as in Turkey, throwing up issues relating to influence and centrality.

Our purpose in studying these circulations is to understand policy transfers and cultural policy models in terms of coproduction and synchronicity (Aymes and Gourisse 2012), not as something that is imposed or imported from one place to another, or from one timeframe to another. This enables us to examine the concepts of Europeanization and Westernization, which have often been viewed in terms of European policy models being spread to the rest of the world. This book therefore seeks to take into account the various actors, different phases, and multiple dynamics of cultural policies. These dynamics may stem from a particular time and place; they may or may not operate at the same time; and, depending on the place under study, various phenomena may occur contemporaneously (Aymes and Gourisse 2012). In the research program's seminars from which this work issues, discussion was based on the neologism "transfaire" (suggesting "trans-acting") rather than its homophone

"transfert" (French for transfer).[11] Admittedly, this term was not adopted by all researchers working on this program, or by all the contributors to this book, but the issues raised have influenced all the chapters presented here. So why was this term selected? Whereas "'transfer' and 'connection' presuppose a pre-established locus to the emergence of circulation or contact", our aim is to emphasize "the relational setup itself as a component of action. This establishes 'a world composed of networks'" (Aymes and Gourisse 2012). As Marc Aymes notes, it is a matter of "studying what is (re)produced by the circulation of knowledge and practices, of looking purely at the relationships without prejudging the terms" (2015). Such an approach precludes looking at exchanges in a one-directional way, leading us to focus rather on the idea of "coproduction".

The chapters presented here are all attentive to the ways in which instruments, people, and ideas circulate and manufacture cultural policies. This may involve the local-level circulation of people and musical repertoires, as in the case of the Tire Zeybek studied by Lydia Zeghmar (Chap. 9). It can also take the form of the circulation of cultural policy models, as examined by Jean-François Polo (Chap. 4) and by Julien Boucly in his discussion of UNESCO World Heritage applications (Chap. 10).

The various contributors have paid attention to three dimensions: the actors, the instruments, and the space-times. In their analysis of policy transfer studies, Laurence Dumoulin and Sabine Saurugger (2010) suggest we need to supplement approaches that insufficiently historicize transfers, and which thus exaggerate the role played by Europe, for instance, or adopt an overly exogenous approach. They argue we should explore issues centered on how policy is drawn up and on the instruments it uses, and draw on the sociology of science and techniques, actor network theory, and the sociology of translation (Akrich et al. 2006). The latter provides "possible sources of hybridization for understanding transfer phenomena" (Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010: 24). Following on from this perspective, we wish to examine "forms of hybridity" (Appadurai 1996; Abélès 2008), and movements via which various actors connect and associate (Callon and Latour 1981; Latour 2006), postulating that these phenomena produce original forms of cultural policy. But, equally, we need to examine resistances and places where connections do not occur, where associations do not take place. In seeking to understand these connections and associations, we subscribe to Callon and Latour's postulate in actor network theory that "there is no nature-given difference between actors. All differences of level, size, and scale result from battle or

negotiation" (2006: 12). We have thus been careful to combine articles looking at all the actors involved in implementing cultural action—thus differing in status (public, private, associations, or foundations), size (collective or individual), and geographical presence (based in Turkey or abroad, in Istanbul or little provincial towns such as Arhavi or Tire).

Second, instruments are a good way of interpreting what circulates, and how these circulations manufacture cultural policies and generate modes of coproduction. This book, taking into account the historicity of instruments and the fact that they are not "value-neutral tools" (Dumoulin and Saurugger), opts for a broad definition of them as "technical and social mechanisms instilling specific social relations between public authorities and those targeted, depending upon the representations and meanings of these mechanisms" (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004: 13, quoted by Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010: 18).[12] We view projects, conventions, guides, brochures, forums, courses, and so on as cultural policy instruments, and we examine how they circulate, and how they are used, adapted, and transformed. The history of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Sanat ve Meslek Eğitimi Kursları, İSMEK) brochures, catalogues, and websites about reviving traditional arts and handicrafts (Chap. 6) and the Yeşil Yayla, or Green Mountain Highland Festival (Chap. 8) both show how culture and heritage categories adapt depending on the context and the actors present. While these categories are linked to the national context in the former case, in the latter they operate in a transnational space. Ways of thinking of heritage may also result from integration within an international context, as shown by Julien Boucly (Chap. 10). The international fair examined by Dilek Yankaya (Chap. 7) would appear to be a particularly effective instrument for disseminating a culture borne by the pro-AKP bourgeoisie. Equally, culture continues to be a sector controlled by the state, as shown in the case of the models underpinning cultural policy (Chap. 4), the appropriation of the concepts of humanism and classicism to build a national art in the early days of the Turkish Republic (Chap. 2), and public–private partnerships to renovate and restore buildings (Chap. 5).

Lastly, our interpretative framework pays particular attention to the eras and areas of circulations. To apprehend the coproduction of cultural policies, how they are manufactured through interaction, and what actually happens and what does not, we need to be attentive to where, when, and over what timescale circulations take place. Festivals, professional seminars

and courses, and symposiums—studied by several of the contributors—
strike us as places where cultural policies are built. At a different level,
apprehending the space-times involves studying cultural policies in differ-
ent periods. To understand present-day cultural policies in Turkey we
need to bear in mind its post-Ottoman situation, and shift our gaze
towards the former countries in the Ottoman Empire, as suggested by
Oliver Givre and Pierre Sintès (Chap. 3). The development of commemo-
ration initiatives in Turkey and post-Ottoman spaces corroborates Michel
Rautenberg's observation about heritage, which could be extended to cul-
ture: "heritage, even national heritage, cannot be understood using strictly
internal, endotic observation. Understanding it involves adopting a
broader view which places national heritage in the context of interactions
with other [heritages]" (Rautenberg 2015). Such a decentered approach
is also required to move beyond the monodirectional approach frequently
adopted in transfer studies. This decentering also suggests we need to
examine transfers between Turkey and other countries, such as Arab
countries (Jabbour 2017), and look at "the circulation of influences, refer-
ences, and models with no hegemonic or colonial intent, but which are
voluntarily plural" (Berry-Chikhaoui et al. 2007: 10).

Two questions lie behind our examination of how circulations impact
on the manufacture of cultural policies. The first relates to ways of think-
ing about culture and how these ideas are reconfigured. The second relates
to how these coproduced circulations are involved in constructing locality
and territory.

For this work, we have decided to adopt the definitions of culture and
cultural action put forward by the actors themselves. We thus root our
studies in an endogenous definition. Equally, we move beyond narrow
definitions of cultural policy as referring to fine art. This enables us to
explore various ways of thinking about culture and how it is used, to see
how these conceptions change over time, and to observe how various con-
ceptions can coexist within practices. It is also a matter of enquiring into
how these various ways of thinking about culture can influence each other,
and how partnerships may or may not influence these conceptions.

Thus what role do circulations play in reconfiguring ideas about culture
in cultural action? How does cultural action (re)define and remanufacture
culture and its uses? Dilek Yankaya (Chap. 7) notes that cultural action is
composed of material practices based on moral and symbolic representa-
tions, and that it helps fashion the social imaginary. From the initial use of
culture in nation-building, and the elaboration of a "high culture", culture

has subsequently taken on ever more uses—culture as entertainment, for democratization and diversity, and for local development and tourism, for instance. In what ways do these ways of thinking about culture coexist? How are they hybridified? Where? And over what timescales?

How do conceptions of culture help produce locality and (re)define territories?[13] The aim here is to apprehend how various scales in the manufacture of cultural policy interconnect, and to detect the attendant identity realignments. For example, taking the case of Istanbul, the question is how the production of locality helps produce a national imaginary, which itself is constitutive of the national territory.

From a methodological point of view, the local scale strikes us as useful for observing cultural policies and their attendant cultural and territorial rearrangements. Privileging locality also allows us to explore scales of intervention, and see how national policies are applied locally. It brings out the place occupied by Istanbul in the national landscape. It also shows that transnational actors are particularly active on the local scale. Thinking of locality via this dual conceptual and methodological approach shows how territories—which, irrespective of whether they are institutional or imagined, function as vectors and bearers of identity—are built up in action. It also brings out the effects of association, in which networks of actors, scales of intervention, and social imaginaries all need to be taken into consideration. Our hypothesis is that situated observation (e.g. of a festival, museum, or dance) of connections, hybridizations, and associations can enable us to deconstruct the manufacture of cultural policies in various transnational spheres of circulation.

Furthermore, observing how territories are produced strikes us as essential for exploring how the center–periphery dynamic helps fashion culture and its usages, together with cultural policies. It is part of our intent to decenter towards the "peripheries" (as illustrated Part III). An ancillary objective is to explore the relationship between Istanbul and the national territory, bearing in mind that Istanbul clearly has specific importance for the AKP's national policy. An additional goal is to understand the role played by tourism and the economy in producing the territory. Lastly, local spaces, such as museums, defined in this work by Olivier Givre and Pierre Sintès (Chap. 3) as heterotopias—together with fairs, festivals, and even converted buildings (or ones undergoing conversion)—may be assimilated with or compared to places in which locality is produced and identities are fashioned.

3   Structure of this Book

This book is divided into three parts, combining different periods, exploring different definitions and uses of culture, and enquiring into the production of physical or imagined territories. Most of the chapters examine the contemporary period—that is to say, the 2000s and 2010s when the AKP has been in power. Only one chapter relates directly to a more distant period from the early years of the Republic. We have decided to place this chapter at the beginning of the work to demonstrate that the question of circulations is not specific to the contemporary period. On the contrary, it is crucial for the period when the Turkish nation and state were being built, with borrowings and references to the model being commonplace (and much studied in scholarship about the period). Furthermore, since this was a foundational time, it is also used by certain culture actors to gauge current changes in cultural action, as shown in the chapters about the AKP's cultural policies.

Part I looks at the republican period through two lenses. The first is that of republican policies during the consolidation of the nation state and the cultural engineering carried out at that time. The second is that of how Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of modern Turkey, is commemorated in the post-Ottoman space, and the attendant cultural and tourist productions. Thus Bengü Aydın Dikmen (Chap. 2) explores cultural engineering and the political issues underpinning it. She pays particular attention to circulations and the role played by transmitters, to operations of translation at work in the "Painters Homeland Tour" (1938–1946) and to the promotion of humanism and classicism during the Second World War. The adoption of humanism, particularly in its classical form, was a response to a crisis within cultural policy at that time. Although it marked a new period in Turkish cultural policies, it did not lead away from nationalist principles. The example of these tours clearly illustrates the undertaking to construct a form of national painting representing the country.

The focus on the republican period shifts from examining the cultural policies of the young Turkish Republic to exploring the role played by Kemal Atatürk in contemporary heritage and tourist imaginaries in post-Ottoman nations. Olivier Givre and Pierre Sintès (Chap. 3) study places of remembrance (the house in Thessalonica where Atatürk was born and the "memorial room" in Bitola history museum) and the complex ways in which they are built, as well as examining tourist practices and heritage

transmitters. This reveals the ambiguities in the Ottoman realm about how to commemorate the founding father of the Turkish Republic. Nationalist—hence specific—discourse exists alongside discourse about a common heritage shared by neighbors, and about a great figure of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Commemoration generates a range of practices, from silent recollection to mobilizing memory of Atatürk to promote tourism or urban development. Furthermore, immigration and references to the father of Turkey cannot be understood solely in reference to Turkey, but also to internal dynamics of the Balkans countries.

Part II is about the cultural policies of the AKP government. The chapters all address the issue of policy models, using complementary perspectives to further our understanding of this question. The contributors look at cultural policy models on the national level (Chap. 4), and at the operations of symbolic and ideological translation involved in converting buildings (Chap. 5) and reviving handicrafts (Chap. 6) in Istanbul. They examine these policies on different scales. The chapters about Istanbul (Chaps. 5 and 6) emphasize how great an influence the city has on culture, as shown by AKP policies which aim to place Istanbul on the map of global cities, while also seeking to draw up a national cultural policy. The scales may be seen to be closely interrelated. Muriel Girard's study of İSMEK, for example, shows that a cultural initiative in Istanbul to redefine national handicraft heritage has effects on both the local and the national level.

Jean-François Polo (Chap. 4) enquires into the models underpinning Turkish cultural policy, examining model change and transfer dynamics under the AKP government. He shows that though transformations observable in Turkish cultural policy are in line with sector-specific dynamics that may be detected in European countries (the Europeanization and metropolitization of culture to drive territorial development), they continue to have very strong symbolic and ideological dimensions. Thus references to a change in cultural policy model under the AKP (from a French to a British model) need to be taken not only as a matter of bringing Turkey in line with European and global trends, but also as an alibi for breaking with the republican and Kemalist legacy, thereby delivering greater political control over the artistic scene.

Ayça İnce (Chap. 5) studies cultural policies and their changes by looking at both the (re)conversion and the building of new cultural spaces in Istanbul since the 2000s. She emphasizes how public–private partnerships to convert buildings carry ideological weight, while partaking in the priva-

tization and commodification of culture. Ultimately, these dynamics are imposed top-down. Such transformations limit the number of spaces truly dedicated to independent cultural expression, reinforcing the sway that economic and political powers exert over culture, against the backdrop of a drift towards authoritarianism.

Muriel Girard (Chap. 6) examines the AKP's revival of "traditional arts and handicrafts" through the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Sanat ve Meslek Eğitimi Kursları, İSMEK). She shows that this institution reshapes culture, actors, and usages. Promoting and redefining traditional arts and handicrafts is part and parcel of the promotion of Ottoman heritage, Islam, and Turkishness, and may be viewed in terms of the invention of tradition. İSMEK is run by the Istanbul municipal authorities and acts as a matrix for redefining national identity as a local identity.

Lastly, Dilek Yankaya (Chap. 7) studies the 15th Müsiad International Fair to show how this functioned as a space for building a culture borne by the pro-government Islamic bourgeoisie. She analyses the cultural repertoire exhibited there, which is not only Turkish but that of a transnational Muslim community.

All four of these chapters emphasize the many dynamics at work in building a new cultural policy and vision under the AKP government. Various governmental, economic, local, and national actors are involved, who are at times in sharp conflict with the visions and policies to be found in other ideological spheres.

Part III presents cultural actions in the regions of Turkey (the Black Sea, the Aegean, and Kurdistan) which raise questions about the role these actions play in shaping cultural policies, identity demands, and territorial development. The three chapters in this section emphasize, first, the importance of interactions in codefining cultural policies, and, second, the fact that these actions are not necessarily clearly predefined, predictable, or even coherent.

In her study of the Yeşil Yayla Festival (Green Mountain Highland Festival) held from 2006 to 2015 in Laz areas in the Eastern Black Sea Region, Clémence Scalbert-Yücel (Chap. 8) emphasizes the importance of both national and transnational circulations in producing local cultural action. The festival acted as a time and place for producing and performing identity belonging and locality, as well as for redefining the category of culture. Her study brings out the large number of actors, as well as the mechanisms, adaptations, and contingencies, involved.

Lydia Zeghmar (Chap. 9) describes the stages involved in the folklorization of a village dance as part of the folklore repertoire. She shows how intense exchanges (between associations, universities, sporting federations, authorities, and public institutions) led to the institutionalization and codification of the Zeybek of Eğridere (Tire), even though local values continue to refashion the codified repertoire. This brings out the practices of resistance, redefinition, and appropriation of the national folklore repertoire at the grassroots level.

Lastly, Julien Boucly (Chap. 10) analyzes the emergence of a management policy for Turkish sites that are candidates for, or have been awarded, UNESCO World Heritage status. He stresses the value, in this process, of the role played by UNESCO negotiation arenas. He also underlines the importance of the mobilization of local actors, transnational circulations, and the constitution of national networks of experts in the process. The example of the application process for Diyarbakir Fortress and the Hevsel Gardens (listed in 2015) shows the role of negotiations between the central state and local authorities in coproducing this heritage site.

The chapters in this part examine local action and those involved in the field of culture on a daily basis, revealing that cultural policies are not necessarily imposed from above. They bring out how even in the provinces regions, connections to the national and international level play a key role in producing and redefining culture. Lastly, all these chapters examine actions with a strong heritage dimension. This part therefore emphasizes the importance of heritage productions in manufacturing identity and remembrance, though the actions also follow worldwide economic trends (relating to trade, tourism and development projects).

Over the course of the following nine chapters, this volume reveals the multiple forms taken by Turkish cultural policies, though without laying any claims to exhaustivity. These multiple forms, in which circulations play a central role, expose the many different conceptions of culture at work. This brings into clear focus the reconfigurations currently taking place, which though driven by the ruling party are also the work of civil society actors. This suggests that the current authoritarian turn does not spell the end of the cultural scene, which continues to be dynamic. In addition to control and censorship, and despite increasing concerns, it is possible to detect adaptations, and workaround and resistance strategies. We hope that this book proves how much culture matters in understanding the upheavals affecting Turkish society today.

Notes

1. See cover of *Newsweek*'s international edition August 29, 2005: "Cool Istanbul. Europe's hippest city might not need Europe after all"; "Istanbul rising", *Financial Times*, Surveys ART1, p. 5, Saturday, February 27, 2010; "An art boom energizes Istanbul", *International Herald Tribune*, Saturday, February 11, 2012, p. 18; "The Istanbul Art-Boom Bubble", *New York Times,* p. MM 40, Sunday, February 12, 2012.

2. Workshop "The making of cultural policies in Turkey. Circulations, territories, actors". French institute of Anatolian Studies and Galatasaray University, April 16 and 17, 2015. This workshop was held as part of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) "Matières à transfaire. Espaces-temps d'une globalisation (post-) ottoman" program (ANR-12-GLOB-003). It was jointly organized by the Department of Political Science at Galatasaray University and the French Institute of Anatolian Studies (Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, IFEA).

3. In late spring 2013, Turkey found itself in the international media spotlight after protesters occupied Gezi Park and Taksim Square in Istanbul on May 28, 2013 to demonstrate against a municipal development plan. These protests were violently repressed by the police, sparking demonstrations nationwide.

4. Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Muslim intellectual and preacher and the inspirational figure of the Gülen movement, also called the Hizmet movement (meaning "service"). He has set up a worldwide network of Turkish primary and secondary schools. Members of his movement are discreet and cultivate secrecy, and they have infiltrated the Turkish administration, particularly the police and judiciary. Gülen went into exile in the USA in 1999, and from 2002 to 2010 was an important ally of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government. However, he suddenly started criticizing Erdoğan's choices, in particular policies that were hostile to Israel and negotiations with Kurdish rebels. Relations became strained, and they were broken off in late 2013 in the wake of revelations about cases of corruption involving ministers and AKP officials. The Gülen movement was accused of being behind these revelations and of attempting to destabilize the government. It was declared to be a terrorist organization and the authorities embarked on severe repression of its members, seizing their financial assets and demanding that Fethullah Gülen be extradited from the USA. Gülen and his allies were said to be behind the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, justifying a new wave of arrests and dismissals of public-sector officials. http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2017/05/12/turquie-57-arrestations-au-cours-d-une-operation-contre-la-bourse-d-istanbul_5126597_3218.html?xtmc=turquie_arrestations&xtcr=3.

5. See the *Siyah Bant* (black band) website listing various individual instances of artistic censorship in Turkey (www.siyahbant.org).

6. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, "International Referendum Observation Mission. Republic of Turkey, Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions". Available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/303681.

7. However, it needs to be pointed out that certain states still do not have a national cultural policy, though this does not prevent them from playing a role by providing tax incentives for supporting artists or by enabling other local public actors to do so, as is the case in the USA (see Martel 2006). It was not until the 1990s that all the European states had a culture ministry.

8. See, for example, for the case of France, the *Dictionnaire des politiques culturelles de la France depuis 1959* (de Waresquiel 2001).

9. In this collection, see Katoğlu (2009), Ada and İnce (2009), Ada and İnce (2011), Ünsal (2011), Ertürk (2011), and the *Cultural Policy and Management Yearbook* (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012–2013, and 2014–2015). The Anadolu Kültür foundation has also published a number of works about cultural action (http://www.anadolukultur.org/).

10. See, for instance, http://oui.hypotheses.org/tag/istanbul-2010 and https://www.ifea-istanbul.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=896&Itemid=471&lang=fr.

11. These seminars received support from the French National Research Agency as part of the *Matières à transfaire. Espaces-temps d'une globalisation (post-) ottoman* research program (ANR-12-GLOB-003) [Transacting Matters: Areas and Eras of a (Post-)Ottoman Globalization]. http://transfaire.hypotheses.org/transacting. Accessed on June 1, 2017.

12. See Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007).

13. Arjun Appadurai defines locality in the following terms: "I view locality as primarily relational and contextual rather than as scalar or spatial. I see it as a complex phenomenological quality, constituted by a series of links between the sense of social immediacy, the technologies of interactivity, and the relativity of contexts" (Appadurai 1996: 178).

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The Kemalist Legacy

Circulation of Humanism and Classicism During the Second World War in Turkey: The Case of the Painters' Homeland Tours (1938–1946)

Bengü Aydın Dikmen

1   Introduction

The newspapers of 28 July 1938 announced a decision made by the Republican People's Party (RPP), the political party ruling the one-party regime in Turkey at the time, to initiate the "Painters' Homeland Tours" programme. As part of this project, carried out in coordination with the People's Houses[1] and the Academy of Fine Arts,[2] some 54 painters went to 63 provinces and painted more than 800 paintings (BCA-CHP 490.1.0.0.2016.20 490.1.0.0.2016.21) over a period of eight years (1938–1946).[3] The RPP covered all the costs of the tours, which lasted between one and three months each year. A jury, composed of different people every time, selected paintings produced during the project and handed out awards, and some of the paintings were bought by the RPP to adorn state institutions. It was said that the project aimed "to protect the artists of the country" and "to reflect on the natural and historical beauties

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and local characteristics of the homeland" (Erol 1998). Moreover, the artists were to contribute to increasing the "consciousness of national art" (Anonim 2002a: 306).

In essence, the project undertook to send artists to Turkish provinces and towns—and not big cities—in order to paint. The paintings made there were first exhibited in the capital, Ankara, then in the People's Houses of various provinces in Anatolia (Aydın Dikmen 2016). Given the economic conditions of the time, the programme was both ambitious and comprehensive. Given also the state of artistic patronage at this time, it is clear that this sort of scheme, in which the party-state covered all the artists' costs,[4] could contribute to artistic production. However, the people living in the receiving towns may have shown minimal interest in the project and even have felt totally alienated. So what did the RRP intend by sending artists to these regions? If the purpose was solely arts patronage, why wasn't it enough for the artists to paint where they lived? The answers to these questions are not one dimensional, and the Painters' Homeland Tours shed interesting light on the state's approach to the instrumentalization of an element of high culture—namely painting—in the early republican era.

According to Sibel Bozdoğan, the modernization of art in Turkey can be examined in two periods: while in the first period (1908–1930) one can differentiate the "first moderns" or the emergence of a modern culture of art and architecture, the years between 1931 and 1950 correspond to an era when art and architecture were subjected to a nation-building project and state ideology (Bozdoğan 2008). Even though we benefit from her periodization that situates the artistic field vis-à-vis the course of artistic modernism in Turkey, our analysis here will be structured by another periodization that focuses on the discourses and ideologies that shaped the cultural policies in the early republic. This latter periodization, offered by art critic Orhan Koçak, classifies the era between the foundation of the republic and 1950 into two periods, the first being "the Ziya Gökalp moment" (1923–1938), and the second "humanist culture" (1938–1950) (Koçak 2010: 306). Therefore this chapter will elaborate on the Painters' Homeland Tours (1938–1946) as a moment in Turkish cultural policy according to this latter periodization. The subject will be dealt with in the following order.

First, we will present the general framework of cultural policies in the Ziya Gökalp's formulation and explore how they were related to the

artistic field. This will enable us to contextualize the "humanist culture" debate and policies as alternative readings both to the cultural crisis that Turkish modernization had struggled with and its Gökalpist resolution. The humanist turn in Turkish cultural policy will be discussed with its concomitant movement in art—that is, classicism—which became favoured in Western countries as well, although, we will see that the acceptance of classicism had close relations with rising nationalism. Next, we will evaluate the objectives and repercussions of Painters' Homeland Tours. Finally, we will see that the tours took place at an interesting moment in terms of both Turkish and European history.

This chapter draws largely on my unpublished dissertation (Aydın Dikmen 2016), which refers to a wide range of source material. In addition to extensive and systematic use of the secondary literature available, certain official documents were examined for the first time, bringing new insights. The documents found in the Republican Era catalogues of the State Archives of the Prime Ministry shed light on many aspects of the tours about which the public had hitherto received little or erroneous information. For example, it has been generally accepted (Giray 1995a, b; Yasa Yaman 1996; Edgü 1998; Öndin 2003) that the last of the homeland tours was organized in 1943 (thanks to reference to the 1944 Party Catalogue (CHP 1944)),[5] until my recent work (Aydın Dikmen 2016) proved that the tours continued until 1946. Other important assets found in the archives were the petitions of teachers working in Anatolia, addressed to the general secretariat of the RRP in order to benefit from the state's patronage programmes, the most important of which was the Homeland Tours. Thanks to these, we are now aware of the existence of a group of art teachers who urgently called for arts patronage. Their voices, which we can now hear, tell us that the award mechanism of state patronage was far from an exclusive artistic evaluation; rather, social and political affinities influenced the distribution of patronage. Moreover, the petitions shed light on these painters' view of the state, notwithstanding the state's view of the society and the local branch of People's Houses of those towns they lived in. Overall, this chapter aims to demonstrate a sequence in the history of Turkish cultural life that underlines how culture is always shaped by politics.

2   THE COLOUR OF THE CULTURAL POLICIES
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The Turkish Republic strived to build a modern and secular nation state, and founded itself as a clear breaking point from its Islamic and Ottoman past. As a country of "delayed development" (Matossian 1994), Turkey had two kinds of concern underlying its modernization efforts. First, the founding cadres thought that Turkey had a backward society in terms of Western civilization. Second, and contrarily, it was believed that a Western-style civilization should be achieved by keeping the national identity which would construct the new-born republic as a nation state.

In the 1930s, almost all discussions in the public sphere regarding art engaged with the theme of belatedness. While the general view was that painting in Turkey needed to catch up with modernism in the West, it was also widely held that we had to create an authentic art interchangeably defined as *milli sanat* ("national art") or *yeni sanat* ("the new art") (Bozdoğan 2001; Duben 2007; Shaw 2011). The primary reason for this was the culture–civilization binary which was put together by Ziya Gökalp, the leading ideologue of the founding Kemalist regime. According to the Gökalpist formula, while the national *hars* ("culture") had to be supported and protected with the national consciousness as the requirement of being a nation state, the "civilization" which was perceived as international and inherent in the West was something to be achieved urgently because Turkey lagged behind its Western counterparts.

Although nationalist sentiments started to influence the practice of art from the 1910s onwards, the state became involved in the artistic field more actively in the 1930s when the one-party regime consolidated itself through a number of measures, including censors, closing the old cultural institutions and opening up the new ones that the state could easily control.

In the 1930s, modernization in harmony with the national identity was a desired feature for artists and intellectuals, and this was a common situation in a great number of nation states emerging in the early twentieth century. It was argued that, owing to the populism inherent in authoritarian governments, there were two related expectations from painting which modernist movements in art could not meet (Hobsbawm 1995). While the first was that art should pay attention to the needs and necessities of the regime in terms of its subject/content, the second was that it should be easily classified into academic or realist styles. Thus subject and

style were two features of states' expectations of art. In the early republican era, artistic modernism was supported as the preferred style until, at the end of the 1930s, it was viewed as unacceptable and rejected on the grounds that it accorded too much importance to the subject, which raised concerns that it was not a suitable medium for spreading the regime's message to the masses.

In his speech on 22 January 1923 in Bursa, the founder of the Turkish Republic and the RPP, Mustafa Kemal, stressed that painting, sculpture and science were necessary conditions on the road to progress that he saw in Western civilization (Bayındır Uluşkan 2010: 515). In this way he hinted at what the fine arts could mean for political power. His mention of painting and sculpture, among other kinds of fine art, had a symbolic significance. Notwithstanding the presence of painting in folk culture (Aksel 1960), conservative circles had deemed painting, and especially sculpture, to be sinful and they were in fact prohibited in Islam. For that reason, these arts were mostly appreciated by non-Muslim communities and the Westernized elites of the Ottoman palace. Therefore, when the leader of the republic pointed to these arts as crucial signs of progress, he was giving a clear message that these Western arts were to be seen as important building blocks for secularization (Tunçay 2012: 230).

However, Turkish political elites had further expectations of painting. In 1927 the Minister of National Education,[6] Mustafa Necati, stated that artworks must reflect the ideas of the revolution and that, through such artworks, national history could be preserved in the collective memory for a long time: "The ideals of the nations like us that made revolutions are put forward by means of art works and in this way they are transferred to the future generations" (İnan 1980: 137). Thus the discourses and ideologies of the Kemalist regime generated mechanisms for creating symbolic capital in the field of painting (Aydın Dikmen 2016); and so artists were valued largely according to how they matched these political expectations, especially in the 1930s. Thus judgements in the field of painting were made in terms of both subject and style. On the one hand, "notable" authors and critics interpreted art; and, on the other, they invited the state and the RRP to support the artistic movement and the members they recommended. Therefore it was understood that a "legitimate" understanding of art was recognized (Aydın Dikmen 2016).

The young Turkish Republic put forward its cultural policies programmatically in the 1930s. For the state elites and intellectuals, culture presented the best arena in which to spread Kemalist reforms from the centre

to the periphery through education. That was especially the case when the RRP came to understand that it needed to enlarge its popular support after the unexpected success of two attempts to break with one-party rule (Zürcher 2004: 166–205). In 1925 a Kurdish nationalist uprising with religious overtones, the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, occurred in the south-east of Turkey, and this was when the Progressive Republican Party was established. This rising opposition party soon started to umbrella different segments of opposition to the ruling party in society, including those protesting against the abolition of the caliphate.

In March 1925 the Law of the Maintenance of Order (to be repealed in 1929) entered into force. This aimed to suppress not only the Kurdish rebels but also any kind of potential opposition. The law also targeted the press by closing down important newspapers and periodicals and leaving only the state press. Therefore, with the press out of the way, the Progressive Republican Party was easily shut down by the government because it was alleged that the members of the party supported the rebellion and tried to exploit religion for political purposes. At the 1931 Congress of the RPP, the Turkish political system was officially declared to be that of a one-party state. Except for a "tame" opposition party (the Free Republican Party, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, FRP) in 1930, there was no legal opposition until the end of the Second World War. However, that the FRP won an unexpectedly large number of seats in the local elections surprised and alarmed the ruling RPP.

Consequently, from 1923 to 1931, the RPP consolidated its power and established one-party rule (Tunçay 2012). To secure the cultural domain with the RPP's long-term modernization and nation-building agenda, a number of institutions were either closed down or reshaped, while new ones were established in the 1930s. Among them, Türk Ocakları(the Turkish Hearth movement) was closed down in 1931 and replaced by *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) in 1932.[7] The old Darülfünun (House of Sciences, the university) was reorganized and renamed the University of Istanbul in 1933. Setting up the Society of Studies on Turkish History (1931), the Society of Studies on Turkish Language (1932), and the Faculty of Language, History, Geography at Ankara University (1935), along with Turkish History Congresses, represented other strong steps of the one-party rule that signified a new era was to begin in the cultural field. Owing to the interventionist character of the state in this period in the field of cultural production, there were few autonomous areas in the intellectual and artistic fields. This meant that

the same actors, while working in administrative fields (bureaucracy or different levels of the RPP), also had a say in other fields of cultural production (Aydın Dikmen 2016).

3   Humanism and Classicism in Turkey

Hasan Âli Yücel, an educator and bureaucrat, became the Minister of National Education on 28 December 1938. By interpreting Turkish humanism as the transcendence of nationalism to a universal level, he aspired to bring nationalism and Westernist ideals together under the umbrella of humanism. Humanism was then seen as key to Westernization, the roots of which can also be found in Anatolia. While Yücel contributed to the spread of Kemalist reforms to a wider population thanks to the new cultural moves he initiated, it was claimed that the projects[8] his ministry undertook as part of 1940s humanism conflicted with the nationalism of the 1930s to a certain degree (Kafadar 2002: 365). In the atmosphere of the Second World War, when the power of Nazi nationalism reached horrifying levels, the Turkish state pursued a balancing policy in terms of nationalism. Thus nationalism and humanism balanced each other in the 1940s, which was the underlying reason for Turkey's inward-looking attitude during that period (Kayalı 1997: 13).[9]

In the wake of a world war, the view that Europe was the model for the good and the modern became shaky. In adopting humanism as an alternative to radical nationalism and communism (Ural 1998: 34), the state did not diverge from the goal of Westernization but to a certain extent met nationalist expectations. In addition, certain intellectuals highlighted the need to return to the self by adhering to the national culture more after giving up on the dream of "Western civilization" because of the outbreak of war (Dranas 1941: 20).

Although in 1938 Turkey adopted humanism as a cultural policy, the intellectual discussions as to whether Hellenism might be a good source to trace back the Western civilization began in the last years of the Ottoman Empire with the translation activities. However, it was Yahya Kemal and Yakup Kadri who started systematically examining the tradition of neo-Hellenism (*Nev-Yunanilik*) for the first time in the first quarter of the twentieth century (Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012: 49–66). The aim of this movement was "to establish a solid language and taste of literature by taking the Greek and Latin literatures as models in order to grasp the European civilization fully" (Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012: 53). Yet the discussions

around humanism, except for literary critiques, only attracted a narrow circle of intellectuals from the cultural field. In addition, they generally focused on dichotomies such as East/West, *Alla Turca/Alla Franca*, classical/modern and local/universal (Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012: 279).

In one of his eight consecutive articles on humanism in the daily *Ulus*, Burhan Belge shared his suggestions about how to become Westernized:

> It's already proven well enough by the great nations the fact that the creator of the victorious civilization is the victorious culture and the source of that culture is one and only: Renaissance-Hellenism-Humanism which we try to define by the Greco-Latin axis. And all these are the property of all; they are the property of history. (Belge 1938, quoted by Yıldırım 2013: 749)

The ideas that Burhan Belge came up with would be officially implemented in the following months by Minister Hasan Âli Yücel. Then, in the 1940s, the monthly *Yücel* continued to discuss humanism as a potential source of finding a cultural direction. Although that periodical had started elaborating on the question of humanism when it was first published in 1935, from the 1940s onwards it was directed by Orhan Burian and Vedat Günyol, who announced their artistic and intellectual line as "finding our self through humanism", and paid more attention to local values (Anonim 2002b). One of the reasons why a universalist concept such as humanism came together with a particularist notion like nationalism was that the West as an ideal started to lose its enchantment for a developing country because of the war. However, that did not necessarily mean losing a hold on the modernization project. Rather, returning to basics, humanism was a promising option because it was an inspiring source of Western modernity.

Turkey tried to avoid any involvement in the Second World War by pursuing a balance of power. At the start of the war, Turkey supported the Allies. However, after the Nazis proceeded to the Soviet Union, gained unexpected territorial achievements and came very near to the Turkish border, Turkey became closer to Germany.[10] The Turkish government censored and/or banned the anti-fascist press (Er 2014). A pro-Nazi stance continued to increase among many intellectuals, to the extent that radical nationalist groups called Turkist-Turanists became stronger both in the public sphere and in politics. One balancing stream of thought that offered an alternative to the radicalism of these nationalists was *Anadoluculuk* (Anatolianism).

Anatolianism, a conservative-nationalist ideology that emerged during the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918), saw Anatolia as the source and embodiment of the nation. Even though its followers could not enter politics in the second parliament of the republic, they never fully parted ways with Kemalist ideology despite their differences. Anatolianists in their simplest form were critical of the changes brought about by modernity, industrialization and Westernization. They believed that the essence of the Turkish nation could be found in the culture and people of Anatolia, who they preferred to be predominantly ethnic Turks. The most prominent figure among the Anatolianists was Memduh Şevket Esendal, who was a former member of the Committee of Union and Progress, a bureaucrat and a politician, and who became the secretary-general of the RPP in 1943. As a result of his gaining that position, he helped a considerable number of Anatolianists to obtain deputy positions in the new parliament that same year (Çınar 2013: 219–257). It was largely accepted by scholars that the rise of Anatolianists in the RPP cadres could be explained both by the concern of balance that the president, İsmet İnönü, had and by the emergent nationalism evident in the rising racist line in the political sphere. And this situation was never independent from the fact that an admiration for the Nazi regime grew stronger after the war began.

From the eighteenth century onwards, Hellenism influenced nationalism in Europe. The ideas and gods of Greek civilization were adapted selectively in order to justify nationalism and universalism at the same time. Nations were able to "find or create their diverse identities through Hellenism" (Leoussi and Aberbach 2002: 761). The Germans were no exception. Ancient Greek figural art was taken as inspiration thanks to its notions of simplicity and grandeur. This sort of Hellenism or neoclassicism influenced German art, literature and education so that Greek and Latin were taught in every school (Leoussi and Aberbach 2002: 761).

During the First World War, a revival of classicism was seen in France—a "return to order"—as a result of the political positioning owing to the war (Silver 1989; Cowling and Mundy 1990; Golan 1995). However, it continued to influence the artistic life in Europe, especially in France, Italy and Spain, during the interwar period. Nazi Germany explicitly highlighted its backing for the symbols of classicism in recurring themes such as the cult of fit and beautiful bodies as an embodiment of Aryan race, and an emphasis on motherhood. Thus the Nazi regime supported classicist forms of painting, whereas cubism and other varieties of the avant-garde were rejected and even crushed (Ades et al. 1995; Kellein 2007).

Turkey's strong pro-Nazi stance appeared even before the war and remained in place almost until the last years of combat. Even Germany's Degenerate Art Exhibition, for which the Nazi regime selected avant-garde works to be destroyed, was covered by a number of newspaper articles in Turkey. It was easy to read favourable commentary about the Nazis' actions against such artworks in the daily *Cumhuriyet* (Ötüken 1938; Tan 1938).

Even though the discourse of humanism refers to a universalism in general, with the emphasis on a call for the return to the essence, certain usages of humanism might not be universalistic. As stated, humanism had been circulated for nationalist purposes, as evident in the Turkish case. Turkey's version of humanism came to correspond to a nationalist discourse that relied on historical and territorial emphasis with a wide set of tools being employed, including archaeology, anthropology and language studies. In addition to being in line with the Kemalist modernization that found inspiration in the West, humanism was also useful in underpinning the Turkish History Thesis on Anatolia but with a possibility of omitting its Central Asianist and ethnicist implications (Bilsel 2007; Kavut 2011: iv–v; Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012). In this discourse, unlike the narrative of official historiography, all the cultural heritage of Anatolia, including the classical and Byzantine Ages, was embraced (Kavut 2011: V).

While there was a new approach to the West, the discussion about the sources of national culture was also on the agenda. Some critics, such as Suut Kemal Yetkin, asserted that there was no longer a need to imitate the West because the republic embodied a rupture, thanks to "our revolution that surpassed the time with lightening speed". He noted:

> Today we have many sculptors and painters who animate the national and racial strength and nobility in their works. These artists are the artists who quit a blind academic imitation, take character as holy, return to the self with the strong Western plastic technique, and see the creative power of Sinan [the Architect] … The Tanzimat was the era of turning from the East to the West. There is again a turn today: *the return home from the West*. (Yetkin 1938: 2)

Sabahattin Eyüboğlu, a well-known cultural critic but more importantly one of the chief translators of the translation project of world classics during Yücel's ministry, wrote an article entitled "The New Turkish Artist or the Return from the *Frenk* (i.e. European) to the Turk", which can be evaluated in the same way (Eyüpoğlu 1938). His writings represented the break that

would characterize the cultural policy of Hasan Âli Yücel. First, by arguing against policies such as the purification of the Turkish language or scorning the Ottoman *divan* literature vis-à-vis Turkish folk literature, Eyüboğlu stressed that the cultural accumulation before the Tanzimat—a reform period (1839–1876) in the Ottoman Empire modelling European modernization—had also belonged to "us". He also indicated that his opinions were in line with humanist cultural policies. He claimed that the need to "rejuvenate" was not about breaking free from "our old property" consisting of the pre-Tanzimat world, including folk art, *divan* art and mystic art, but about "instilling a new life to it" (Eyüpoğlu 1938: 32). In other words, he believed that the "return from the Frenk to the Turk" could be realized by appreciating the Turkish values with European knowledge and accumulation. This way of thinking was in harmony with the idea of humanism in Turkey.

Eyüpoğlu mentioned those people who took aesthetic pleasure in Kütahya tiles and Turkish miniatures only after they had seen them via modern European art (Eyüpoğlu 1938: 33). There is a latent Eurocentrism in his viewpoint because, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has shown, the Eurocentric approach claims that Europe is where theory can be found (Chakrabarty 2000). How else can his assertion be explained that only after seeing European art could one enjoy Turkish art? By claiming that "we" had classics as well, he argued, "it does not necessarily mean that our *divan* poets shall not be honoured so as to be called classical, even though they did not resemble their counterparts of European classics" (Eyüpoğlu 1938: 36).

While the discussions about humanism in Turkey largely focused on literature, the implementation of humanism in painting would embody a call to "return to classicism". As I have pointed out, there were striking examples of support for classicism in Europe that had nationalist characteristics. By implication, the Painters' Homeland Tours were in harmony with the general tendency of ascendant nationalism. Before coming to that aspect in more detail, it will be useful to present the objectives and methodology of the tours.

4   Painters Touring the Homeland for the Party

The Academy of Fine Arts was responsible for selecting the artists for the tours, choosing "painters who are either professor in the academy or graduated from academy and whose paintings were previously exhibited" (Anonim 19 August 1938a). The programme was carried out in a highly systematic fashion.

The Painters' Homeland Tours were created in accordance with the state's populist, nationalist and patronizing cultural policies. Oficials, intellectuals and painters by and large welcomed this development and saw it as a good opportunity for artists (Baydar 1938; Suman 1942; Ayvazoğlu 2011: 81). As part of the tours, artists worked away from Istanbul, thus enabling them to develop closer bonds with the rest of the society and be more aware of the realities of the country. In that way it was assumed that they would paint more national works. The people in the countryside, in return, would meet the artists and become acquainted with Western fine arts.

Halkçılık—that is, populism—was an important strategy and one of the six principles of Kemalism that contributed to realizing the Painters' Homeland Tours project.[11] It gave significance to Turkish folk culture and saw the essence and source of the nation in the countryside. The name of this countryside was more often than not "Anatolia", which corresponded to "a historiographic category and an aesthetic ideal" (Bilsel 2007: 224). The other face of populism was related to the role of elites who were believed to possess Western knowledge and had the responsibility of educating the people who were deprived of that knowledge. Official authorities implemented a number of cultural policies with a populist motivation. For example, between 1929 and 1931 the Ministry of National Education published a weekly called *Halk* ("People"). Often using large type and pictures, the journal aimed to address an illiterate readership as well as the literate (Bayındır Uluşkan 2006: 196). The *Yurt Bilgisi* ("Civics") and *Vatanımızı Tanıyalım* ("Let's Know Our Homeland") columns were of particular interest to me. While the former dealt with topics such as the constitution and civic rights, the latter aimed to introduce the people to the provinces of the country they lived in, and to provide information about the mountains, lakes, food or entertainment types across the country (Bayındır Uluşkan 2006: 197). After 1931 when populism became an official principle in the Party Congress, a healthy interest in village life emerged. One of the reasons for this was the RPP's desire to enlarge its popular support.

Furthermore, the RPP considered painting to be an important artistic field, and encouraged us to spot a number of programs before the tours. In 1937 the General Directorate of the Press announced a plan that would remake some works including folk literature and painting so that they would serve the purposes of the civilizing mission of the republic and its propaganda goals (Anonim 1937). In fact, the directorate regarded works appreciated by ordinary people—on the walls of the local coffee houses,

barber shops and so on—as backward and primitive. The Minister of Interior Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, sent invitations to artists but there is no information about the implications. However, this shows a general tendency of early republican cultural policies: on the one hand, there was an effort to collect elements of local culture, while on the other, there was an intent to spread "Western cultural forms" (Öztürkmen 2009: 82). In that regard, the RPP sent a regulation (dated 16 November 1939) to the People's Houses for painting courses and exhibitions (BCA-CHP 490.1.0.0.4.21.32). This document demonstrated the importance given by the RPP to the fine arts and its aim to spread artistic activity throughout the country via the People's Houses.

Nationalism was a crucial driving force behind the tours. Anthony D. Smith asserts that the role of specific places and spaces in the composition of collective memory for nation-building processes are often ignored (1996: 453). For example, sacred rivers, shrines or great mountains may have significance in building a nation's values. According to Smith, the nation's borders may be determined by military, economic or political factors but the joy and the pain its people ascribe to them are not free from a certain *ethnoscape*. Common geographical imaginations that cherish feelings of belonging can turn an ordinary landscape into an ethnoscape (Smith 1996: 455). Thus the Painters' Homeland Tours were an appropriate project to construct a so-called ethnoscape. After the artists had been sent from the big cities to Turkey's diverse provinces and towns to paint, the paintings were first exhibited in the capital, Ankara, and then compilations of the paintings made in the different provinces were circulated and exhibited throughout the branches of the People's Houses of Turkey (BCA-CHP 490.1.0.0.2022.48). Therefore the architects of the project must have intended to create a sense of unity by means of spatial effect through visualizing diverse parts of the country in the minds of people who saw the exhibitions.

In the same vein, the RPP assigned "a national mission" to those painters selected for the tours (Anonim 1941). Although it said that "the painters were independent in their selection of subjects", they were expected to paint the local characteristics of the towns, and in a realist fashion (Anonim 1941). For example, politician and bureaucrat Nasuhi Baydar designated a list of themes for painting that the painters could reflect during their tours, ranging from daily village life, historical structures, archaeological spaces, customs, traditions, myths, and clothing to the implications of Kemalist reforms (1938: 30).

However, I should emphasize that the RPP did not approve the negative framings of the experiences by the painters on the tours. After the first one in 1938, an interview with the painters (Saim Özeren, Feyhaman Duran, Ali Avni Çelebi, Cemal Tollu and Hamit Görele) was published in the daily *Tan* (Sadullah 1938). They shared anecdotes of their interactions with the locals. Although these narratives were delivered in a funny tone, first the local and then the central RPP organization disliked them. As a result, a warning letter was sent to Saim Özeren, who had said that the locals had mistaken him for a tax collector and run away. So it appeared that the RPP was keen to depict the homeland in a good light.

The project also materialized the state's arts patronage, although that should be better seen as a continuation of the state's previous patronage of painting. Between 1933 and 1937 the Turkish state organized Revolution Exhibitions every year,[12] and then bought artworks from the exhibitions. In the absence of a strong bourgeoisie, the state was the sole actor of arts patronage. The artists complained about the situation of art in the country and sought the state's financial support explicitly. Even the most modernist artists, such the Group "d", did not see any problem in eagerly accepting the state's funds. However, the Turkish state and its organic intellectuals expressed the duties of artists to their country. According to them, especially if the artist had benefited from state scholarship for education abroad, they should be willing to paint the Kemalist reforms in a modern fashion. Apparently, the state had some pedagogical expectations of the artists.

Dating back to the pre-republican period,[13] financial support and assistance to the field of art became institutionalized in the republican era. Moreover, the Academy of Fine Arts was in a key position between the political field and the field of art. The academy, despite being an institution for producing art students, established closer relations with the state than with the field of art. Deprived of a society that demanded art, artists asked the state's arts patronage to be more systematic. The dynamics of the discussion are quite striking because the ideas put forward in the debate are an important opportunity to evaluate the opinions of painters with regard to the state and the regime. Plus, during the state-artistic patronage debate initiated after 1937 when the last of Revolution Exhibitions took place, the Kemalist regime's organic intellectuals revealed their view of the artist. They criticized those painters who demanded state patronage while supporting the state's interests (Aydın Dikmen 2016).

The distribution of the state's art patronage during the tours disclosed the powers of two dominant authorities, namely the Academy of Fine Arts and the People's Houses. The artists who wanted to take part in the tours had to deal with the power relations involved, especially when they were left out of the selections. In the first Painters' Homeland Tour in 1938, the RPP authorized the academy to select the painters. Yet, after determining the three prominent artist groups,[14] the academy let them choose two or three painters (according to the number of their members). Then the academy chose another two painters who did not belong to any group. In the first tour, though representing different groups, the majority of painters were the lecturers actively working for the academy.

For the second tour, a new category was added to the selection: the People's Houses in Ankara could also assign painters to the programme. This should be evaluated as part of the republic's willingness to incorporate Ankara into the country's cultural corpus. Moreover, the People's Houses were responsible for the smooth running of the tours both by taking care of the painters hosted in their province and then by reporting back to the RPP about the painters' activities. Furthermore, the local branches worked as connection points between the RPP and the painters: when the painters were unable to secure patronage, the local People's Houses were the only place where they could seek recognition.

The discussions after the selection for the third tour exposed a significant concern affecting the decision of the director of the academy, Burhan Toprak. He explained that a number of the groups' members would no longer be considered because there were non-Muslim and non-Turkish members in one of the groups (Fine Arts Society) (BCA-CHP 490.1.0.0.2014 dated 29 August 1940). This demonstrated that the state's art patronage followed a strict nationalist policy that denied the existence of minority groups.

We should recall that one of the conditions set for the homeland painters was to paint in a "realist" fashion. This condition referred to a much criticized situation. By the end of the 1930s it was obvious that the modernist movements, such as cubism and constructivism, were not approved of by the authorities. Instead, representational or realist art was encouraged. The acceptance of classicism should therefore be read as a consensus that was finally reached, which led prominent supporters of modernist art, such as the Society of Independent Painters and Sculptors and the Group "d", to pursue more realist styles.

Nurullah Berk, who was both a painter and the leading voice of Group "d", wrote an article about the requirements of a classical artwork in 1941. According to him, the classical was a view that did not rely on ephemeral values but instead tried to remain valid for every age even after the passage of centuries (Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012: 276). He noted: "Speculative purposes of marginal minds or their charlatanry of course denies the classical. As we understand the classical it is to rise up from the ground" (Berk, quoted in Çakan Hacıibrahimoğlu 2012: 36). This praise of classicism in painting often accompanied a legitimizing discourse mentioning changes in artistic trends in Europe. It intimated that a true path had been found, which prevented art from being crushed. By taking European development as the model, this discourse implied a latent Occidentalism. Unfortunately, Europe, and Paris specifically, would soon lose its position as the centre of the artistic world to the USA (Guilbaut 1983).

Without mentioning classicism, Malik Aksel, a painter who was not affiliated to any artist group, voiced his opinion about the same discussion:

> In Europe, there have been a lot of professions, schools that end with "ism" for fifty years now. Those extremists who asserted that art cannot be subject to any measure or rule and abolish all kind of artistic rules have seen *at long last* that their dreams could not come true. Art, above all things, is a matter of seriousness and balance. Discipline in art is a must. Eccentricity and snobbery are enemies of art. (Anonim 1938b)

Here, Aksel implied the transformation that cubism underwent by being influenced by classicism and turning into a form called post-cubism in Europe. When he celebrated this development by saying "at long last", he made clear that he favoured order, rule, seriousness, balance and discipline in art, which were keywords for classicism in art as well.

Bedri Rahmi (Eyüboğlu), a painter from Group "d", also scorned art styles such as cubism, which he deemed a contagious fad:

> The fad of cubism animals circulated throughout the world like a flu germ, became a fad like everything that is easy in a lot of places for a temporary period of time, and having lived for almost like women's hats did is about to fade away today. (Eyüboğlu 1938)

Then he noted that the painting that was "really new" was the one that had "never violated the commonsense" and "never denied the value in the ancient". By saying this he revealed his support of classicism.

5   CONCLUSION

In the context of Turkey, the return to classicism, with its emphasis on Anatolia's ancient civilizations, perfectly corresponded to the secularist state's ideology. Classicism was a better match for state expectations than avant-garde styles such as expressionism and cubism. Furthermore, Turkey stopped sending artists to Europe for their education during the war and instead looked inwards for inspiration. Meanwhile, in 1939 the state initiated annual exhibitions of painting and sculpture, which became a crucial artistic venue for artists. Every exhibition brought its own awards and critiques, and in the early 1940s one could detect certain changes in artists' discursive and artistic tendencies. The transformation of one of the modernist artist groups, Group "d", is an example. According to Dıranas, European painting evolved into a new form called neoclassicism "by getting rid of its beastliness and lunacy", and Turkey's painting transformed into "a new classicism by adapting to the latest drift of the West and with the West" (Dıranas 1940: 141). That was also the reason why he appreciated Group "d", which he regarded as the most advanced representative of the modernist movement in Turkey that embraced a new "seriousness" by abandoning its extremism in the exhibition held in March 1939 (Dıranas 1940: 141).

In 1944 the state opened an exhibition in Ankara Exhibition House by collecting all 675 of the paintings painted between 1938 and 1943 as part of the tours. The Painters' Homeland Tours and exhibitions, together with the state's Annual Exhibitions of Painting and Sculpture, brought about an artistic landscape in which stylistic differences between artist groups almost vanished (Yasa Yaman 1996: 49). The projects worked in favour of Turkish classicism and started to resemble one another. Then the prominent intellectuals loyal to the regime celebrated the disappearance of certain styles, such as cubism and expressionism, which they had belittled as "excessive" (Boyar 1933: 35) or "ill" (Tör 1943: 125). Among the paintings featured in these exhibitions, some were credited as good examples of humanism and classicism (Dıranas 1940).

Moreover, by painting mostly landscapes and the village people of Anatolian towns, the painters of this period avoided visualizing the malfunctioning aspects of the Kemalist revolution in the distant regions of Turkey. It can be argued that the artists who participated in the project must have adapted to the canon delineated by the state officials and been aware that painting in a critical fashion would not be well received by the

Kemalist state. Initiating the Painters' Homeland Tours was probably the most important decision for the artistic field during the one-party era of the RPP and could be regarded as a reflection of the nationalist view which ascended dramatically during the Second World War.

It might be claimed that the Painters' Homeland Tours largely resulted from the developments analysed above, but the context in which the Turkish elites adopted different formulas for the resolution of the cultural crisis was also influential. The determination to continue the tours during the Second World War, the awarding mechanism, the policy and discourse of humanism, and finally the domestic and foreign policy choices had considerable effects on the artistic consequences of the tours. Turkey, which had not had any of its young artists educated in Europe, as a result of its wartime policy, resumed its European scholarship programme in 1947, after the war, once again enabling art students to study in Paris (Artun 2007: 269).

In this chapter I have shown that concepts more often than not live a different story after they are transferred to a new social and political context. During the period examined, Turkey manifested a cultural scene in which the Western-born concept of humanism was circulated both at intellectual and official levels so as to acquire a functional, instrumentalized meaning different from the original concept. The Turkish version of humanism was created to present a new perspective on the innate crisis of Turkish modernization and on the Gökalpist formula by proposing to find common features between European modernity and Turkish culture. As cultural matters inevitably impinge on and interact with politics, so, in Turkey's early republican era, culture as a matter of public policy was largely formed through the aspirations of social engineering. With that in mind, the humanist turn of the Turkish government could well be evaluated as an interesting effort to accommodate political needs revealed by the domestic and international atmosphere. In the European landscape where classicism gained support owing to pro-nationalist regimes, the Turkish embrace of classicism accompanied a discourse of national achievement. Accordingly, Turkish artists abandoned modernism at long last, which demonstrates the success of Turkish artists as they caught up with their European counterparts.

NOTES

1. Established in 1932, People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) were social and cultural institutions with branches throughout the country, and though centrally managed they were controlled by the provincial branches of the RPP.

2. The Academy of Fine Arts was opened in Istanbul in 1882 by the renowned painter, archaeologist and bureaucrat Osman Hamdi.

3. In 1944, no tour was organized.

4. At the 1936 Party Congress, Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) announced "the congruency between the state apparatus and the party organization to be official policy" by making the two intermingled, which meant in practice that the governor of a province would be the head of the local branch of the party (Zürcher 2004: 177).

5. According to this catalogue, in the period between 1938 and 1943, 675 paintings were completed. However, the catalogue held a simple registration by not supplying information regarding the type and size of the paintings.

6. Although the name of the ministry changed to the Ministry of Culture for certain periods in Turkish history, the ministry in question is the Ministry of National Education and art was part of its responsibility, similar to those countries that thought of culture and art as part of the nation-building project, such as France. The name of the ministry was Maarif Vekaleti (1923–27 December 1935), Kültür Bakanlığı (28 December 1935–21 September 1941), Maarif Vekilliği (22 September 1941–49 October 1946), Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (10 October 1946–1950), Maarif Vekaleti (1950–27 May 1960) and Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (since 28 May 1960). See the ministry webpage, T.C Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, "Milli Eğitim Bakanlığının Kısa Tarihçesi", http://www.meb.gov.tr/meb/tarihce.html.

7. Established in 1912, *Türk Ocakları* were social and cultural institutions that had a nationwide organization network. Even though they originally aspired to carry out activities on the basis of promoting Turkish culture, they gained a political character after the Balkan Wars and the First World War (Üstel 2010: 72). The main reason for their closure in 1931 was their relative autonomy from the Kemalist government. *Halkevleri* were opened in 1932 by using the organization network of Türk Ocakları.

8. Hasan Âli Yücel implemented a large-scale "humanist" cultural programme during his ministry. It covered courses on Greek and Latin, translation of Western and Eastern sources, state painting and sculpture exhibitions, village institutes and so on.

9. Another example of that was evident in the periodical is *Yeni Adam*. Painter Mahmut Cûda, since he worked for the periodical in 1939, made

drawings in this manner. The periodical's cover of issue 299 had the theme of "Return to Yourself" and featured a drawing by Cûda.

10. They signed a Non-Aggression Pact in 1941. Their relations became so strong that it was not easy to tell whom Turkey sided with during the war.

11. Five other principles of Kemalism are *Milliyetçilik* (nationalism), *Cumhuriyetçilik* (republicanism), *Laiklik* (laicism), Devletçilik (statism/etatism) and *İnkılâpçılık* (reformism/revolutionism).

12. The state started the exhibitions as part of celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic but it didn't continue owing to comments criticizing the disappointing quality of the artworks.

13. Soldier painters who signed their paintings as "servant of the Sultan" are of interest in terms of the relations between power and artistic patronage in the late Ottoman Empire.

14. Namely, Society of Fine Arts, Society of Independent Painters and Sculptors, and the Group "d".

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Post-Ottoman Heritage(s), "Kemalist" Tourism and Cultural Policies in the Balkans

The Visibility and Hybridity of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk's Places of Memory in Greece and the Republic of Macedonia

Olivier Givre and Pierre Sintès

1   INTRODUCTION

This chapter is part of a long line of research on the interconnections between public uses of the past and cultural policies in different societies of South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Greece, the Republic of Macedonia,

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Albania and Turkey; see Givre and Sintès 2013; Sintès 2013; Givre and Sintès 2015; Sintès and Givre 2015). The changes that have occurred in the region since the beginning of the 1990s (the end of the Cold War, opening of borders and new mobilities, "Europeanisation", new regional political economies and dynamics, etc.) have contributed to the re-evaluation of conflicting national narratives forged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Balkan area. Since the early 1990s, stories (and memories) once separated by classic historiographies have been resurfacing and taking on a new life as a result not only of the spatial proximity of neighbourhoods but also of a common cultural history.

Among other narratives, Ottoman heritage plays a key and ambivalent role here as a symbol of the plurisecular presence of a multicultural and multifaith empire. At once "undesired" (Kiel 2005) yet obvious in various features—architectural, urban, cultural, linguistic, for example—it undeniably confers a feeling of common belonging (a cultural *air de famille*) on countries nonetheless quite distinct in their recent histories. One should not underestimate the conflicting visions of such a heritage, and its emergence as a cultural category—seemingly at the turn of the 1980s—deserves wider critical analysis. However, Ottoman heritage now appears to be fully part of a "Balkanscape", understood as a common cultural and historical framework for all Balkan societies, providing, furthermore, a resource for political, cultural and touristic dynamics conceived not merely at the level of neighbouring regions but way beyond—on a European and even global scale.[1] Nonetheless, one can but point out the plural and ambivalent content of a category which may include, over several centuries, architectural or urban elements (be they religious, administrative or commercial, etc.) and monuments—intangible features hardly reducible to a monovalent cultural meaning—as well as somewhat equivocal sites (e.g. mixed or reconverted cult places).

This chapter examines one particular stance of this ambiguous (post-) Ottoman heritage by focusing on two spaces that are emblematic of the presence in the Balkans of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk: his native house in Thessaloniki (Greece) and the "memorial room" dedicated to him in the Museum of History in Bitola, Republic of Macedonia.[2] At once witnesses to a brilliant Ottoman past and the passage to post-Ottoman nationhood, embodied in the figure of the founder of the Turkish Republic, these two places of memory illustrate the changing perceptions and uses of such a heritage, depending on both political contexts and local concerns. Fully renovated in recent years, strongly promoted by Turkey and locally

reappropriated through a tourism economy, these patrimonial and memorial reconstitutions relate not only to the ambivalence but also to current dynamics of Ottoman heritage in the Balkans. Atatürk's places of memory oscillate now between *a priori* nation state, particularistic and non-shareable discourses (those of the founding father of the Turkish Republic) and narratives of a "common heritage" shared by "neighbours", through the figure of a great man, at once "Balkan" and "Turkish". Such re-readings of the past question the ever-changing and contextual perceptions of "Ottoman heritage" (first section). Following a descriptive approach to the material and narrative content of these sites (second section), the chapter examines their place in current touristic and cultural, urban and territorial dynamics (third section), concluding with some reflections concerning post-Ottoman cultural policies seen from the perspective of the Balkan context (fourth section).

2   The Ambivalence and Plurality of Ottoman Heritage(s) in the Balkans

In the Balkans, the term "Ottoman heritage" invokes contradictory perceptions ranging between awareness of a common cultural landscape, embodied in architectural as well as cultural features, and rejection or suspicion of these remnants of the "Turkish yoke", in its religious, administrative or military aspects and also in the wider cultural sense. Many studies thus focus on the historical, cultural and political aspects of Ottoman heritage in the Balkans, particularly in the formation of nation states and the creation of national cultures which imply the selection and promotion of cultural, linguistic and religious features yet, at the same time, forms of "de-Ottomanisation" of these societies-in-the-making (Lory 1985). Representations of this heritage—or rather these heritages, as they span several centuries and take diverse forms—have varied over time, depending on the context: their rejection or disaffection on the grounds of their close association with the former dominant power; their destruction but also reuse in the name of modernisation which might, for example, sanction the replacement of certain elements of the urban fabric deemed old and outdated; and their domestication and progressive integration into the national heritage, like many other architectural treasures which have become national monuments and so forth.

The different fates awaiting this "undesired" heritage (Kiel 2005) exemplify the general ambivalence felt towards the Ottoman past, often overlooked in favour of other periods thought to bear witness to a past glory (to be restored) of the countries concerned. This is particularly the case for antiquity and the Byzantine era, as well as for more or less recent elements thought to belong to "national cultures" while claiming their European and modern filiation.[3] These different uses of the past highlight the ideological work of selection and resymbolisation which these various heritages—frequently interwoven, redeployed, reclaimed or modified— undergo. There are countless examples of Ottoman monuments or buildings—such as the White Tower of Thessaloniki, the *Džumaya* mosque in Plovdiv or even the *ćarçiji* in Skopje and Bitola—which have become local geosymbols. The Ottoman legacy thus pertains to a sort of *patrimoine sol* ("land or soil heritage", Gravari-Barbas 1997), anchoring the past in a much more concrete manner, and also to a palimpsest on which different narratives (denial, invisibility, assimilation) are inscribed.[4]

Between disaffection and reappropriation, the many meanings and perceptions of these Ottoman heritages should be asserted, the content and value of which vary according to the period and the artefacts in question, and which are subject to a heterogeneous range of treatments.[5] As for all patrimonial processes, acknowledgement of these legacies implies complex sequences of selection, certification and legitimation as well as a multiplicity of practices and representations: depending on their status, use value or how they are imagined, these heritages can be considered as either stigma or emblem (Givre and Regnault 2015). On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account, in the perception of Ottoman heritage in the Balkans, the representations of the former European Turkey as "a special place in the Turkish affect" (Copeaux 1997: 278–286),[6] between nostalgia for the Ottoman past and "the pain of phantom limbs" (Vaner 2005: 39–60).[7] Never free from political agenda, many of these present-day heritage processes may also be seen as the manifestation of a post-Ottoman or even a neo-Ottoman context currently put in the spotlight by the dominant Turkish political class, but also widely related to the current transformations of the national narratives through heritage selection, Turkey's growing regional and international role and ambitions, as well as correlated issues such as "minority rights" and multiculturalism, urban development and tourism economy. (For a recent and complete overview, see Girard 2014, 2015.) Whether of the places of memory of Atatürk which we look at here—and which remain under the watchful eye of the Turkish

authorities—or of religious monuments restored with the help of powerful Turkish public and private funding bodies, any analysis of these processes has to be multiscalar in nature when it is not a case of "heritage diplomacy" (Givre and Sintès 2015) as part of regional and international geopolitics.

Indeed, in the context of the radical transformations which have taken place in the Balkans since the early 1990s, (and of the new regional role played and claimed by Turkey), these links with the past and Ottoman heritage undergo varied developments: claims and protests on the one hand, rediscoveries and revaluations on the other. Processes of normalisation of international relations between the relevant countries, new political and economic interactions or even the creation of a variety of institutional tools such as the "framework convention on the value of cultural heritage for society" (Faro Convention 2006), have favoured the emergence at the forefront of the political scene of once-hidden or conflicting heritage issues. In a region historically marked by its passage from an imperial multicultural and multifaith logic to antagonistic national constructions, this new context has seen an unprecedented recognition of multiple "minority" heritages, consecutive to the different displacements of the population and the major upheavals in the Balkans in the twentieth century (Anastassiadou 2015).

It is as though the recent societal transformations in the region had facilitated the rediscovery of their cultural kinship and historic-geographical closeness, even while questioning their respective—and negotiated—will and right to lay claim to the more or less visible traces of the Ottoman period. Though sometimes conflicting, these heritage issues are also embedded in new regional dynamics which one hesitates, nonetheless, to call post-national, so interwoven are they with the political games and stakes inherited from the historical relationships between the concerned countries. The culturally "alien" (in the eyes of classic national historiographies) nature of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans becomes more nuanced and complex with the rediscovery and development of these common heritages. Over and above the obvious "familiarities" of various religious monuments, commercial spaces (*pazar*, *čaršija*) central in urban organisation and a range of shared cultural and linguistic features (Ananiadou-Tzimopoulou et al. 2007), it is often a point of developmental programmes, involving public policies, collaborative projects, and cultural and touristic offers, even as far as integrating elements of architectural and landscape heritage in urban renewal.

3   Bitola and Thessaloniki: The Shadow of Atatürk in the Balkans

In focusing more specifically on the places of memory[8] of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki, Greece), and Bitola, Republic of Macedonia, we want to further explore this ambivalence, strengthened by the nature of the historic character in question, both a subject of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the founder of modern Turkey. Indeed, from his family roots in Macedonia to his political destiny as "Father of the Turks", sealed in Istanbul and Ankara, Atatürk is at the same time a pure product of the Ottoman Balkans and an icon of the nationalist revivals and conflicts affecting the region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This dual status is reflected in the exhibitions displayed at his family home (and presumed birthplace in 1881), situated next to the Turkish Consulate in Thessaloniki, and the former cadet school (where he was trained for a military career from 1896 to 1899), today the historical museum of Bitola.

In this section we describe these exhibitions, from their design (discourse, atmosphere, artefacts, films and testimonies) to their political, cultural and touristic contexts. Through the recurrent mottos "Where it all began" and "A new hope arises", the Atatürk home in Thessaloniki highlights the formative years of the "great man", from family intimacy to political destiny, from the local to the global. With its focus on his military and political actions, the Atatürk Memorial Hall (Spomen soba na Atatürk) in the museum in Bitola takes a more strictly "Kemalist" approach, downplaying the personal aspects of his life or the local (Balkan) set-up. The two exhibitions present artefacts (often copies of objects and documents) imported from Turkey, and they are the result of the strong involvement of Turkish public and private institutions, as well as partnerships with local and national institutions in both Greece and the Republic of Macedonia.

3.1   Thessaloniki: "Where It All Began"

The house in Thessaloniki where Atatürk was born is located in today's Apostolou Pavlou Street, at the foot of the old town, in a neighbourhood known, in the Ottoman era, as Kocakasım. This three-storey courtyard building, typical of urban Ottoman architecture of the nineteenth century (built before 1870), was initially rented by Mustafa's father, Ali Rıza Effendi, himself a native of a village in the *willayet* of Manastir (Bitola), further north. Born in 1881,[9] Mustafa spent part of his childhood there

and returned to live there when he was posted to Thessaloniki in 1907. His mother and sister left the house definitively in 1912, when they fled what had become a Greek town and moved to Istanbul. The house was therefore given to the Greek government and inhabited by a Greek family before being bought by the municipality of Thessaloniki and finally given to the Turkish Consulate in 1937 as a gift for Atatürk.[10] Restored between 1940 and 1950, the house opened to the public on 10 November 1953, on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the death of Atatürk (and also of the transfer of his body to the Anıtkabir mausoleum). The house is thus an integral part of the consulate's territory: until 2012 it was only accessible via the consulate, before a separate entrance was built via the courtyard, in which visitors can see the tree planted by Atatürk's father on the birth of his son.

Carried out by the Turkish government with the help of private sponsors,[11] the new scenography set in 2012 breaks away from the conception of the first exhibition (renovated in 1981),[12] which focused on furniture and objects brought in from Topkapı and Dolmabahçe and took on an almost ethnographic dimension of reconstitution of a domestic space: sofa, divan, satin curtains, armchairs, coffee table, stove, cooking utensils, clothing and decorative objects. According to the terms used during the restoration of the house, "any non-original furniture as well as all additions to the house made by the Greek family" were removed and replaced by a "modern" museology. In the present-day display, elements of daily life have almost disappeared and been replaced by a mixture of texts, photos, films, objects and music, arranged around thematic topics.

The ground floor is devoted to Thessaloniki and Bitola, both associated with the childhood, family life and training of Mustapha Kemal at the military college in Thessaloniki where he graduated in 1896. The texts cover a variety of topics, ranging from the personal life of Atatürk (e.g. his strong attachment to his birthplace and the Macedonian origins of his parents[13]), documents praising his character (e.g. the precocity of his scholarly achievements and military vocation) and the urban context in which he grew up (both multicultural and open to modernity). The second floor is dedicated to Istanbul and Ankara, associated with Atatürk's maturity, political achievements and historic dimension. Here once again the tone embraces both personal memories (biographical and autobiographical) and more factual assertions, arranged chronologically. The last room, situated on the lower ground floor and appearing somewhat peripheral to the main exhibition on the other two floors, is devoted to three themes, the links

between which may seem surprising: the exchange of populations following the Treaty of Lausanne, Atatürk's relations with children and his death.

Apart from a few personal effects and reproductions of documents, the layout of the exhibition is striking: it transforms the house from an object in and of itself into the depository for a historic narrative in which the great man sees himself as intimately associated with the destiny of the Turkish nation. The clarity of the message can be summarised in two key phrases repeated in refrain on all the posters: "Where it all began" and "A new hope arises", meaning that here lie the origins of both an individual and a national if not a universal destiny.[14] The other fundamental element is the quadrilateral Thessaloniki–Bitola–Istanbul–Ankara, repeated from room to room, and representing the gradual reanchoring of a Balkan Ottoman subject in Anatolian Turkey—an ellipse which can be expressed in another way: a son of the Ottoman Empire who became the father of the Turkish Republic.

Closely associated with official Turkish diplomatic representation in Greece, the birthplace of Atatürk thus constitutes one of the nodal points of a human and familial pathway, and an itinerary simultaneously historical and geographical, political and symbolic. The place is ideally suited to the intermingling of Atatürk's and the Turkish nation's lifetimes, from childhood to historical legacy, reinforcing the familial dimension frequently associated with the political destiny of the "Father of the nation". Such a personification may be symbolised by the two wax statues representing him at different life stages (the young man in the kitchen, and the head of state sitting in a leather armchair, in frock-coat and gloves), together with a statue of his mother in the living room and the tree planted by his father.[15] The native house thus evokes and convokes all the symbolic registers of anchoring and becoming, heritage and loss, as suggested on one information board dedicated to the Balkan Wars:

> The Ottoman State lost most of its land in Rumelia during the Balkan War. With loss of land, a huge process of immigration towards Istanbul from these lands occurred. These losses had a great effect on Mustafa Kemal. The pain of the loss of Thessaloniki, no doubt, was the strongest.

3.2   Bitola: Portrait of the National Hero as a Young Man

After birthplace, we turn to career pathway. For Atatürk, the short period (1896–1899) he spent in Bitola was nevertheless a crucial initiation into

the military profession, as well as an intellectual and political education.[16] It was therefore there, in the military academy (built in 1848), that his future status took shape, revealing his true stature and demonstrating qualities deemed exceptional. He was described as one of the most gifted students the academy had known, and he gained the nickname of Kemal ("perfect"), given to him by a teacher in recognition of his intellectual ability. If the historical value of the house in Thessaloniki was quickly established, it took longer for this second place to be transformed into one of memory. After several changes of use (as a school then a store), the building housed the historical museum of Bitola in 1976, displaying a permanent exhibition that was classical in its themes (archeology, history, ethnography).[17] In 1978 a temporary exhibition devoted to Atatürk gathered photos, documents, letters and diverse objects. Although his presence in Bitola was already well known, this was the first official mention of it, and representatives of the Turkish Republic, notably through the embassies, attended the event.

But one had to wait until the 1990s to witness a real institutionalisation (and commemorative exploitation) of this episode of Atatürk's life. In 1994 the renovation began of one of the rooms in the museum, henceforth known as the Atatürk Memorial Room (Spomen soba na Atatürk), in which the actual exhibition—inaugurated in 1998 by presidents Demirel and Gligorov—would be installed. The Turkish government contributed 120 artefacts to get the exposition up and running, supplying the limited local archives and evidences concerning Atatürk. The exhibition was therefore mainly created from Turkey: a "turnkey" place of memory in both its scenographic and financial aspects. Paintings, portraits, photos, artefacts, medals, costumes, figurines, arms and so forth, whose brilliant shine would suggest that they are reproductions, can all be found there. Display panels in Turkish, Macedonian and English evoke Atatürk's biography, glorious moments of his military and political career (e.g. the Battle of Çanakkale) and memorable phrases which bear witness to his wish for peace, brotherhood and unity within the former empire, as in the following extract: "From Diyarbakır, Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, Istanbul, Trakya, Macedonia, we are all the sons of the same gender, we are all the vessels of the same body" [*sic*].

In 2011, on 13 March (the date in 1899 on which he graduated from high school and the symbolic day of his enrolment at the Ottoman Military Academy), a statue of Atatürk at the age when he arrived in Bitola was erected by Turkish military institutions.[18] Like his date of birth (19 May),

13 March has become a key date, celebrated regularly by the arrival of official delegations, notably representatives of the chief of staff of the Turkish army. It was also on 13 March (2013) that a tree was planted in the courtyard of the museum in honour of Turkish–Macedonian cooperation. Again in 2013, the exhibition was renovated for a second time, with the financial support of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA): a DVD and an interactive terminal signalled the arrival of "new technologies". The exhibition was also given its own "visual style"—almost a "signature"—to be found on many different displays and merchandise (magnets, T-shirts, key-rings, etc.), a portrait of Atatürk draped in the Turkish flag, or even the Macedonian flag in locally derived versions. Thus the production of a heritagised (and touristic) image of the great man entails a material culture of memory, which recalls strikingly the intense "commodification of state iconography" around the figure of Atatürk in Turkey (Özyürek 2006: 93–124).

These conditions allow Turkish visitors to discover a set of familiar iconographical elements (from state statuary to artefacts designed for the intimate and domestic space), increasing the feeling of a Turkish projection on what is deemed not only to be a place of memory of the "Father of the nation" but also one of "our" former territories. The presence of both Turkish and Macedonian flags at the entrance to the room materialises this extraterritoriality, and the direct influence of the Turkish government in the production of the exhibition and the renovation of the building, under the care of TIKA, recalled by a plaque.[19] Information leaflets in Turkish, English and Macedonian specially devoted to this "memorial room" indicate the organisers' ambition to reach an international (but also a specifically Turkish) audience. Since the renovations, although no study has been undertaken on the topic, the museum's marketing manager confirms a 20 % per year increase in visitor numbers, 50 % of them being Turkish tourists, most often coming by bus from Turkey with Turkish tour operators, sometimes passing through Thessaloniki and visiting Bitola (the museum and the *çarçija*) before continuing on to Skopje.[20]

The "memorial room" thus constitutes both a projection from outside (Turkey) and a celebration of the tutelary figure of Atatürk, never considered on a par with mere men but for his grand destiny, the seed of which was already sown in Bitola. The only true reference to the personal dimensions of his stay in Bitola is the letter which his (supposed) first love—Eleni Karinte, a young lady from a local (Vlach) good family—is said to have sent him. The parsimonious treatment of this sentimental episode in the

museology contrasts with the local evocations, making of it a kind of Balkan version of Romeo and Juliet, the balcony under which the lovers supposedly met being a spot for tourists to take photographs.[21] The "Kemalist" profile of the exhibition (overpresence of the military domain, classic and solemn statuary recalling in its style the numerous effigies visible in many Turkish towns) tends to erase all that would impinge on the official image of Atatürk's public and private lives, and to overpower other expressions of heritage and memory. Apart from the organised tours centred on the figure of Atatürk, there exists, nonetheless, a more diffuse memorial tourism, made up of visitors who already know the town, or whose ancestors originated from there, many Turks having left Bitola in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (till the 1950s) and moved to Skopje, Izmir or Istanbul.

4   Between Extraterritoriality and Local Reappropriation: Places in (and) Territories

Even though these sites have been valued and visited for many years, we hypothesise that their (almost) simultaneous renewal is indicative of broader trends concerning Turkey's current position vis-à-vis its Balkan neighbours, but equally the local dynamics observable in the countries in question. These sites effectively do seem to incite considerable interest from, as well as diverse investments (in every sense of the word) by, local decision-makers in the two towns. Both the presence of tourists and the image conveyed by the figure of Atatürk contribute to the inclusion of these sites in the urban territories of which they are a part. This not-insignificant resource is worthy of attention in a context marked by new territorial dynamics and by the multiple uncertainties caused by the economic and political crises of the end of the 2000s. However, over and above such research on "attractiveness", one has to question the insertion of these heritage sites into the urban and territorial fabric, which helps to place these histories and memories beyond the mere national frame.

This section examines some of the contemporary challenges of these spaces of memory in the context of the renewal of the Turkish influence in Balkan space through development projects or the tourist economy. In Thessaloniki, reinterpretations of the city's multicultural past and its political opening up to neighbouring regions are both key factors leading to a more positive perception of that Ottoman heritage which has today

become an undeniable cultural and economic asset. In Bitola and the Republic of Macedonia, other projects demonstrate the active presence of Turkish institutions in regional cooperation.[22] Inscribed in these broader spaces and territories, and relevant on different scales and regional levels, Atatürk's places of memory in the Balkans more broadly challenge the ways of coping with a past both shared and contested, at the crossroads of post-Ottoman cultural policies, urban renewal and regional development.

4.1   *From Memorial Particularism to Urban Policies*

In the two cases analysed above there is a tension between the intrinsically Turkish figure of Atatürk (thus of little value in official Greek or Macedonian historical accounts) and its local uses as a cultural resource, making this figure a common and shared one. These places of memory of Atatürk in Bitola and Thessaloniki could be considered to be "heterotopia" in a Foucaldian sense,[23] inasmuch as their main stakeholders are the Turkish government, occasionally the services of the Turkish Ministry of Defence and private foundations, and Turkish tourist agencies.[24] Visitors are reminded of this extraterritoriality by an information board outside the house in Thessaloniki, stating:

> Today, this house is within the area of the Turkish Consulate General, a Turkish property, and is considered the soil of the Republic of Turkey. Even though it is not within Turkish borders, it carries great sentimental value for every Turkish citizen and is the first place of visit for every Turk visiting Thessaloniki.

However, no matter how exogenous they may be, these heritagisations have an undeniable impact locally, as much through the light that they shed on the cities and sites in question as through their cultural, symbolic and narrative significance. In reasserting the figure of this great man, founder of the Turkish Republic, as a native of Thessaloniki and temporary resident of Bitola, these heritagisations are part of a "Balkan" relocalisation of the figure of Atatürk, the symbolic value and political dimensions of which should not be underestimated. Thus in Thessaloniki the recent renovation of the Atatürk house fits perfectly into the context of heritage and memory dynamics occurring since 2011, and the election of the current mayor, Yiannis Boutaris. An iconoclastic candidate in a somewhat conformist and sclerotic Greek political landscape, and a prominent and

controversial media personality when it comes to sensitive chapters in the town's history (notably the deportation of the Jews during the Nazi occupation), Boutaris has made memorial policies one of the spearheads of his activity, based on his multicultural reading of the town's past (Sintès and Givre 2015). The Jewish and Ottoman heritages (closely linked, in fact) make up one strategic element, fed by an important academic research output (Molho 2001; Veinstein 2001; Mazower 2004; Benbassa 2014).

Thus, while the ancient mosques have practically all disappeared from the Salonician landscape (apart from buildings often abandoned and in need of restoration, see note 3) and the practice of Islam is strictly controlled throughout Greece by laws governing the rights of Muslim minorities in the country, Boutaris created a stir when, in 2013, he allowed the town's Muslims to use the Yeni Tzami (or "new mosque") for their celebration of the end of the month of Ramadan. A good example of the religious pluralism of Thessaloniki, this mosque of the *Ma'amin* or *Dönmeh* community—founded in the seventeenth century by Sabbataï Zevi, a Salonician Jewish prophet converted to Islam, and built in 1902 by the Italian architect Vitaliano Poselli—has thus regained, in a somewhat transitory fashion, its religious function, after having served as a storage facility for the town's archaeological museum and a cultural place. On this occasion, the town's mayor did not hesitate to welcome in person the dozens of devout Muslims on the forecourt of the mosque, accompanied by the Turkish consul. This event enabled him to publicly raise the issue of religious pluralism in Thessaloniki (and in Greece). A year later, during a meeting with the Turkish minister for health, Boutaris raised the stakes further by expressing his shame that there was no active mosque in the city,[25] and announced his intention of building a museum of Islamic art in partnership with the Benaki Museum in Athens.[26]

The "renovation" and maintenance of the memorial to Atatürk in Thessaloniki is also an occasion for the mayor to assert his proactive—and often provocative—stance, a good example being his alleged intention to rename one of the streets next to the house after Mustapha Kemal Atatürk. Reactions have been vociferous as public opinion still associates the founder of the Turkish Republic with the "Asia Minor catastrophe" (1922), the collapse of the Greek army after the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) and the expulsion of several hundreds of thousands of Greeks, marking the end of the "Great Idea" whereby a Greek state would extend along both coasts of the Aegean Sea. To his detractors who accused him of forgetting this painful period for Hellenism, Yiannis Boutaris replied that it was the greatest of Greek politicians—Eleftherios Venizelos

himself—who gave the street its name in 1933 (until the violent anti-Greek events in Istanbul in 1955, in which, incidentally, the house had played a central role).[27] However, another compelling argument was conveniently put forward by the mayor, that of allowing "the increase in the tourism our economy so badly needs in this period of crisis"[28]—an argument corroborated by the strong growth in Turkish tourism, partly fostered by the recent introduction of two daily flights by Turkish Airlines between Istanbul and Thessaloniki, and which seemed to endorse not just symbolic sites such as Atatürk's house, the Yeni Tzami and the White Tower but also Salonician cuisine and even shopping.[29]

4.2 Revisiting Ottoman Heritage and Valuing the Multicultural Past

Seemingly, such elements are part of a greater movement aimed at turning these towns into cultural and tourist attractions through the promotion of a heritage linked to the Ottoman past, of which the figure of Atatürk would also be a part (even while signalling its demise). These often stereotypical images are based on key elements such as the historical marketplaces (*çarçija*, bazaar), and the presence of different places of worship (mosques, synagogues)—though disused or in poor condition—scattered around the urban landscape, as well as other architectural elements, oft-neglected or heavily modified, converted to new uses or restored and prepared for their opening to the public. In spite of occasional reluctance to fully admit such heritage as "ours", these elements nonetheless confer a "family resemblance" to different localities throughout the Balkans (Prévélakis 1996: 69–87), and partake of a somewhat outdated and "retro" urban atmosphere, sepia-toned, redolent of a lazy, laid-back pace of life associated with *kief*—unlike the hectic pace to which most modern towns are subjected. Conveyed in Bitola as in Thessaloniki and elsewhere, these stereotypes create a certain Balkan (and not just Greek or Macedonian) image of these cities, where the Ottoman or even the Muslim component has its full place among others. (For the case of Thessaloniki, see Mazower 2004; Zafeiris 2014..

In Bitola, this tendency to glamorise a shared Ottoman or Balkan heritage is at once obvious and to be kept in perspective. If the image of the *Balkanissime* town (Lory 2012) remains powerful, in the context of the national(ist) construction now at the forefront of the political stage, the dominant VMRO-DPMNE[30] party seems more keen to remodel the

urban space in accordance with its own reading of history, through monumental scenography, statues and ideologically overarmed cultural elements,[31] eclipsing an Ottoman period seen as that of the foreign occupation of a currently free national territory. However, the growing presence of Turkish tourists, together with other phenomena such as the filming since 2008 of the Turkish television series *Elveda Rumeli* (Farewell Rumelia) in the old town of Bitola, help to create this nostalgia-filled Ottoman Balkan image. All things being equal, the management and development of a multicultural urban identity in both towns are also evidence of the complex relationships which these ancient major cities of the Ottoman Balkans maintain with their respective capitals, between resentment and the desire for revenge through the assertion of a long-lost (or played down by national ideologies) historic glory.

In Thessaloniki the mayor even went so far as to present (in a major international paper) his urban policy as one of "transformations based on the profound identity of a city with a multicultural past: Byzantine, Jewish, Ottoman, Serbian … whose aim is to encourage tourism".[32] Although already committed since the 1990s to this multicultural transformation, boosted by the title of Cultural Capital of Europe in 1997 (Agelopoulos 2000), this work on the past now fully takes the form of a new politics of communication symbolised since 2012 by the logo and motto "Thessaloniki: many stories, one heart", in explicit reference to the plural past of the town. Here again the cultural diversity of the Salonician (Jewish or Muslim) past acts as a potential vector for its development as a city of tourism, through a brand mark used for a competitive positioning on national as well as international scales.

Without drawing any conclusions, Thessaloniki is the only place in Greece which has seen tourism actually increase during the years of crisis: the number of visitors from Israel has gone up by 333 % since 2011,[33] while Turkish tourism, increasing every year, would have reached 80,000 people in 2013 and more than 100,000 people by 2014 (especially during the last week of Ramadan).[34] From this perspective, Thessaloniki demonstrates, at the level of a metropolis, a trend towards the touristic and heritage development of alternative narratives to the dominant national discourse, in ways comparable to processes occurring elsewhere in Greece (Sintès 2012) and the whole Mediterranean Basin (Crivello et al. 2016). Apart from the major role played by the municipal authorities, such a trend also results from the involvement of private or community actors, both local and external, often based on supranational-scale policies

and institutions: the highlighting of a long-overlooked Ottoman heritage takes place according to multilayered and multiscalar factors, depending on the interests and positions of the stakeholders.

5   SHADOW CAST OR SIGN SHARED?

Examined here through the example of Atatürk's places of memory and their position in the heterogeneous notion of "Ottoman heritage", these new uses of the past at the heart of urban projects inscribed both on local and international agendas reveal wider dynamics which lead us to formulate three hypotheses.

5.1   *International Development and Regional Repositioning Towards Nation-Centred Frames*

The first hypothesis is the integration of this particular(ist) memory into a strategy for the international development and regional repositioning of the cities in question. Obviously, the aim of Thessaloniki's municipal government is for the town to take a leading position in the network of metropolises—both Balkan and Mediterranean—through images and discourses which contribute to the creation of significant and carefully identified narratives, designed to attract activities, investments and cultural/touristic events (no major event stands out since 1997 and the labelling as "European Capital of Culture"). This may appear to be just one of the tools for urban marketing at the disposal of the city authorities, like other actions, such as the renovation of urban wastelands or the promotion of cultural and artistic projects. However, it also implies a self-conscious repositioning towards dominant nation-centred frames henceforth subject to re-examination. This past is thus used (more or less intensely and with more or less success) as a resource with which to encourage a new, more attractive or positive image than that of the capital of Greek nationalism—as Thessaloniki was often referred to in the 1990s as a result of tensions with the neighbouring Republic of Macedonia.

The effects of these regional repositionings are non-negligible, cities like Thessaloniki, and to a lesser extent Bitola, being quite influential in the region, even though eclipsed at the national scale by their respective capitals (Athens and Skopje). Thessaloniki, in fact, is frequently known as the co-capital (*συμπρωτεύουσα*), pitting it in symbolic competition with Athens.[35] The secondary, while strategic, place of these regional poles (of

differing size and status) obliges them an alternative positioning compared with national geographical and political epicentres. In order to stand out and be noticed, they have to be open to the possibilities offered by their particular characteristics, their own histories and their geographical positioning on both national and regional (Balkan) maps. In short, they need to transform secondary (if not peripheral) positions into regional advantages by reinterpreting their own history at some remove from the "straight road" of the dominant nation-state discourse. This they achieve through good use of outlying or even border locations, previously relegated and from now on convertible into strategic assets. Such trends highlight the existence of an actual network of secondary cities (apart from Thessaloniki and Bitola, Korçe in Albania, Plovdiv in Bulgaria, Edirne in Turkey or even Ioannina in Greece spring to mind) which, although inferior in status to their respective political and/or economic capital cities, could again benefit from being part of a "Balkan" scale and history.

5.2   The Emergence of a Nostalgic Discourse (from Afar?)

Like other elements of the Ottoman heritage, the figure of Atatürk presents characteristics compatible with such an objective: his dimension at once Balkan and universal personifies the different scales at which the dynamics described earlier are perceived—between celebration of a singular cultural world and openness to the wide world. Moreover, the iconic dimension of this figure renders it immediately recognisable visually, as well as viable commercially, and touristically. From magnets to T-shirts, via mugs, key-rings and other "goodies" on display in both Bitola and Thessaloniki, and also through the sheer profusion of these representations in Turkey, few historical figures strike such an emblematic image on all scales—national, regional and international. Esra Özyürek (2006) has pointed out that this commodification of a national hero occurs through a whole material culture which is part of the ordinary fabric of political narrative, of the cultural intimacy of citizenship and of the massive consumption of historical and cultural symbols. She analyses the place of this iconic figure in a Turkish society facing large-scale cultural and political change, which is likely to encourage a "nostalgia for the modern", of which Atatürk would be a major symbol. The advent of political Islam on the forefront of the national stage, the social transformations resulting from economic liberalism and the new shifts in the national narrative by the present leading forces, would all contribute—for a great percentage of

the population attached to a republic at once "historic" and secular, and who see themselves as culturally modern and enlightened—to the development of a feeling of nostalgia for an era deemed long gone or undergoing radical transformation.

As such, the symbol that is Atatürk enters a new phase: no longer that of a strict national (or nationalistic) figure to be celebrated, but that of a heritage of a modernity that is personal, familial and generational, endangered by transformations felt by many to be conservative, backward-looking or clearly regressive. This nostalgic dimension could well not be confined to Turkey, but be prevalent throughout the Balkans through the double celebration of a cosmopolitan Ottoman heritage and a (past) "modernity" associated with an era of glorious national constructs. From now on relatively inoffensive with regard to contemporary political configurations, has the figure of Atatürk passed into a common Balkan heritage, as a great Turkish man, certainly, but also as both a local and a universal historic figure? Such a move would reflect the character if not consensual, at least now politically acceptable, of this figure, especially when compared with the common perceptions of present-day Turkey in various Balkan societies: an economic and political power and an Islamic-conservative country suspected of "neo-Ottoman" regional designs embodied by the figure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is thus unsurprising that the reformer who precipitated the end of the Ottoman Empire—henceforth contributing to the rise of national movements—should benefit from an aura unprecedented in public opinion anxious about Turkey's "restorative" ambitions in the region.

5.3   Shared or Plural?

In such a context, the cultural tourism conveyed, inter alia, through the places of memory described above strikingly illustrates the growing visibility of this shared past, reconstructed for the needs of the present day, simultaneously responding to patrimonial (and nostalgic) trends and to renewed political and economic perspectives. When it is a case of targeting global tourism, it would be a shame not to value the richness and plurality of a multicultural and multifaith past—judged therefore fully "Balkan" (though also "Ottoman"). At the heart of this cultural and commercial offering, the image of Atatürk could well be nothing more than an additional "language element", a touristic value enhanced by the sale of souvenirs, among other commercial offers. But it is worth taking seriously such commodification of the great man because it partakes of a plurality of

readings, allowing Atatürk to become a shared figure, after having been an eminently sensitive topic both culturally and politically. If the image of Atatürk still does not have the same meaning in Turkey and in the Balkans, we could posit that today these different interpretations may at least coexist, whether the accent is put on local ownership, national characteristics or universal dimensions.

6   Conclusion

Over and above the stereotype of multiculturalism frequently associated with the Ottoman Balkans, this plurality of ways of reading a shared image questions the hybridity and plasticity of the representations and uses of an Ottoman heritage the more equivocal as it symbolises precisely the passage from the Ottoman Empire to the nation states. As the countries of the region are affected (but also linked) by new, large-scale sweeping changes, confronting simultaneously their immediate vicinity and the global issues they are part of, it is not surprising to see the "narcissism of small differences" being challenged by a search for common and shareable narratives drawn from not merely divisive patrimonies and memories. This is the case for the "new old" Thessaloniki championed by Yiannis Boutaris—a city not just Greek (and Macedonian) but also Romanian, Muslim, Jewish, Slav, French, Dönmeh and Armenian (Zafeiris 2014). Multifaceted and repositioned in its regional environment, Thessaloniki reaffirms a Balkan and Ottoman singularity which may appear rather circumstantial (an urban marketing strategy) but which takes on a particular meaning when the mayor dares to declare that "with Europeans we are collaborators; with Turks we are brothers". With this type of phrase, he would once have signed his own political death warrant: naivety aside, the phrase bears witness to a considerable change in perception of the links and familiarities threaded throughout the histories, the present and the future of the societies in question.

Notes

1. Possibly leading to the political development of "regional nationalisms" (Tétart 2010).
2. Several fieldwork studies have been conducted since 2011 in Thessaloniki and Bitola on the issues developed here, including cultural cross-border cooperation (Givre and Sintès 2015), urban cultural policies (Sintès and Givre 2015), recurrent observations and documentation on the two sites and other post(ottoman) heritage items.

3. As the Renaissance style which, though referring to the fifteenth-century Italian or French Renaissance in Europe, is associated with the 'national awakenings' of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries: for example, the Bulgarian term *Vâzraždane* refers to a collection of cultural and architectural traits deemed typically Bulgarian (Marinov 2010), even if it is often challenging to specify such national contributions in the pan-Balkan (and Ottoman) collective (Lory 1985).

4. Concerning religious heritage, the reassignment and multiple uses of places of worship (notably churches and mosques) constitute a classic expression of the multireligious fabric of the Balkans (Lory 2015), either visible in the landscape or deliberately abandoned. To take one striking example, the minaret on the rotunda of Aghios Georgios in Thessaloniki is both very visible and mostly left to crumble.

5. Even within the same town, as in Thessaloniki, where the situation of many Ottoman buildings along the Via Egnatia (Haman Bey, Yeni Hamam, Hamza Bey mosque), regularly converted, disused or awaiting restoration, contrasts with that of the White Tower, the Dönmeh's (or Ma'min's) Yeni Tzami (Mazower 2004: 75–79), or a number of administrative buildings (old customs houses and port offices, the old military school now the Philosophy Department at the university, etc.), more easily reinvested in than religious spaces.

6. A *lieu particulier dans l'affect turc* (Copeaux 1997: 278–286).

7. The *douleur des membres fantômes* (Vaner 2005: 39–60).

8. Following the famous expression coined by Pierre Nora.

9. If his exact date of birth is still not known, official historiography has fixed it symbolically as 19 May, in reference to the date of the outbreak of the Turkish War of Independence (19 May 1919).

10. In 1933, a memorial plaque in Turkish, Greek and French—still visible today—was installed by the municipal council: 'C'est ici que vit le jour Gazi Moustafa Kemal, le grand rénovateur de la nation turque et champion de l'union balcanique [sic]. Cette plaque a été placée à l'occasion du 10ème anniversaire de la République turque. Salonique, le 29 octobre 1933.'

11. Notably the Bilgili group: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ataturks-house-museum-to-open.aspx?pageID=238&nid=52152.

12. The same year, a replica of the house was built in Ankara.

13. Through his father, Atatürk descended from a Turkoman family established in Macedonia since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. His mother belonged to an old family from Langada, a village to the north of Thessaloniki.

14. It was on his return to Thessaloniki in 1907 that Mustapha Kemal joined the Committee of Union and Progress, an especially active offshoot in Macedonia of the Young Turk Revolution, of which he would become one of the spearheads.

15. Other authors also underlined the role of his wife and his several (adopted) children in the edification of the image of the "Father of Turks" (Calistar 2013).

16. These years in Bitola are described as being fundamental to the intellectual personality of Atatürk, through the discovery of literature and poetry, and of many European (especially French) writers and thinkers from the Age of Enlightenment, deeply influencing his "modernist" political thinking.

17. This museum is run by the Institute for Preservation of Monuments of Culture, Museum Bitola, which was raised to the level of national institution from 2003 for promoting "the protection, systematization, scientific processing and presentation of the cultural legacy of municipality of Bitola" (see http://www.muzejbitola.mk).

18. As explained by a plaque, "The statue of "Mustafa Kemal, cadet at the Manastir Military High School" has been presented to the "Atatürk commemorative room" at the Bitola museum by the General Staff of the Republic of Turkiye. March 13th 2011."

19. "The renovation and refurbishment of the military school building, front facade, entrance, ground and the first floor museum administrative departments and memorial chamber of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was realised by the Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey and the Presidency of Turkish Cooperation Coordination Agency—TIKA, May 2013."

20. A transit tourism owing to the absence of Turkish-speaking guides in Bitola (compared with Skopje, where a large part of the Macedonian Turkish community lives) and to the fact that these Turkish tour operators often work directly with agencies in the capital.

21. The house of this first love is still visible on the main street of Bitola. Similar sentimental stories are to be found in Bulgaria. Displaying the image of a seducer, familiar with the jet set and Balkan bourgeoisies, regardless of religious or national belongings, they stress the cosmopolitan, modern and progressive atmosphere in which Mustafa Kemal lived during his youth, and its influence on his political work. Özyürek underlines how "mundane" representations of Atatürk wearing a dinner jacket, dancing or drinking alcohol have been reappropriated as symbols of a Turkish modernity now challenged by faith- (Muslim-)based values and norms (Özyürek 2006: 93–124).

22. Apart from the restoration of the house of Ali Rıza—father of Kemal—in the village of Kodžadžik (near Debar/Dibër) initiated in 2009, TIKA was still supervising the restoration of ten mosques in the country in 2015. http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/haber/tika_makedonya_da_489_projeyi_hayata_gecirdi-20927.

23. The term "Herotopia" follows Foucault's definition for sites "actually localisable", which are simultaneously mythic and real, and undoes in a way the "usual order of space" (Foucault 1997). This is the case for this

room of the Museum of Bitola which has no direct relation with the space of the surrounding society: it is organised by distant players, acting for their own agenda, and displaying a set of representations that connect this place with a bigger network of places and images. On the other hand, it actually works together with certain layers of Macedonian society or history being physically present in this city.

24. The renovation of the house of Atatürk's father in the village of Kodžadžik (see note 23) is based on a similar logic.

25. This issue even became a bargaining tool between the two countries, since President Erdoğan balanced the reopening of the Orthodox cemetery in Halki, near Istanbul, with the development of a Muslim place of worship in Thessaloniki. http://www.ekathimerini.com/196767/article/ekathi-merini/news/erdogan-says-greek-mosque-would-lead-to-halki-opening.

26. *I Kathimerini*, 'Plan for a Museum of Islamic Art', 25 July 2014.

27. On 5 September 1955 a bomb exploded near the consulate, damaging the house and contributing to the outbreak of the "Istanbul pogrom"—violent anti-Greek riots on 6 and 7 September 1955 (even if this attack had in fact been organised by the Turkish secret services). In April 2015 the building was attacked with Molotov cocktails, this time by activists protesting against the European Union's management of the migration situation in the region and the Turkish government's execution of it.

28. *I Kathimerini*, 2 April 2013.

29. http://www.iefimerida.gr/news/165108/απόβαση-των-τούρκων-στη-θεσσαλονίκη-πόλος-έλξης-το-σπίτι-του-κεμάλ-το-γενί-τζαμί-και-ο-μ: "Απόβαση των Τούρκων στη Θεσσαλονίκη -Πόλος έλξης το σπίτι του Κεμάλ, το Γενί Τζαμί και ο… Μπουτάρης", 30 July 2014.

30. Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity.

31. The ruling power in the Republic of Macedonia has distinguished itself in recent years through its setting in motion of the huge urban renewal scheme, "Skopje 2014", which led to the erection of a number of monuments in the town centre, among which are imposing statues representing different figures of the national narrative now promoted in the country. That of Alexander the Great (nearly 25 m high) provoked the anger of the Greek diplomatic corps, which saw it as an attempt to claim once again this controversial historic symbol. Such a project has also been put forward as a way of repositioning the Macedonian capital city in terms of international visibility and competitiveness, the process of "nation branding" being seen as ideologically sound but also economically efficient (Graan 2013).

32. *The Telegraph*, "Yiannis Boutaris: Greece's Vision of Hope", 19 April 2013.

33. *L'Obs*, « Yiannis Boutaris, le Grec qui plaît aux Allemands », 16 June 2014. http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/economie/la-crise-grecque/20120616.OBS8853/yiannis-boutaris-le-grec-qui-plait-aux-allemands.html.

34. *GRReporter*, « Turkish Tourists Conquer Thessaloniki », 30 July 2014 http://www.grreporter.info/en/turkish_tourists_conquer_thessaloniki/11501.

35. While having no national political or economic function (with the exception of a Ministry for Northern Greece, abolished by the Syriza government).

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Cultural Policy Under the AKP's Leadership

Turkish Cultural Policy: In Search of a New Model?

Jean-François Polo

In 2012 the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government announced it was drafting a new cultural policy better attuned to changes affecting Turkish society and contemporary dynamics within the cultural sector. Policy-makers argued that a new model was needed for cultural policy which would "break with the French model" and be closer to "the English model". The new normative framework was to consolidate shifts in Turkey's cultural policy since the AKP came to power in 2002. However, the succession of serious political events since this announcement, coupled with internal and external tensions, have led this planned overhaul of cultural policy to be deferred until a later date. Nevertheless, the debates triggered by this project and, more generally, shifts in Turkey's cultural policy since 2002, provide sufficient food for thought about the changes affecting cultural policy over the past 15 years. In this chapter I wish to look at changes in Turkish cultural policy by examining the question of the models it is rooted in.[1]

Analyzing this change leads us to examine evolutions in Turkish cultural policy and to detect continuities and changes. Yet it is not obvious what timeframes best apply to the history of Turkish cultural policy. Successive governments have not necessarily introduced major policy

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changes in this domain. Although Turkey's political history has been marked by a series of clear political breaks (with the shift from the Ottoman Empire to the republic in 1923, the advent of pluralism in 1946, the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980, and the AKP victory of 2002) (Kalaycioğlu 2005), these have not necessarily led to any U-turns in cultural policy. Equally, certain changes within the cultural sector have occurred independently of any political permutations, such as the emergence of private actors who started playing an ever greater role in cultural activity from the 1980s onwards. I would argue that there are two significant aspects for assessing changes to cultural policy. The first relates to the meaning and function that the political authorities have attributed to their cultural actions. This calls for cognitive analysis of policy to determine the world of meaning underpinning cultural action, something that may be detected in statements and in the policies actually implemented. The second relates to the means and levels of action, which can involve new actors, such as local authorities and private actors.

Turkish cultural policy can be divided into three major periods. In the first, the state implemented a classical, state-centered cultural policy as part of its nation-building program. This phase ran up until the 1970s, when a modest cultural administration was institutionalized. The second period started in the 1980s, against a backdrop of economic liberalization. It corresponded to a period of progressive partial disengagement from the cultural sector (partial because the public authorities did not disengage from all domains equally—contemporary creation received less and less support, but projects likely to promote national identity or encourage tourism received special attention). It was also characterized by the growing role of private cultural foundations set up by banks, large companies, and leading families of entrepreneurs. Lastly, the third period is that of cultural policy under the AKP. This phase is of particular interest to us here. Areas of continuity may be detected (e.g. liberalism), along with certain shifts in policy direction, at least in terms of symbolism (with "neo-Ottomanism").

To understand changes to Turkish cultural policies since 2002, we need to distinguish between aspects that stem from a political project, with the announced change in model, and those arising more from sectorial changes affecting cultural policy that are observable elsewhere in the world. As a starting point, we need to go over the theoretical models for analyzing cultural policy and change. Several works comparing cultural policy in Western democracies have sought to emphasize the specificity of national

policies (or, in contrast, areas of convergence between them) and to draw up typologies (Dubois and Négrier 1999; Lucier 2009; Gattinger and Saint-Pierre 2011; Menger 2011; Poirrier 2011; Bustamente 2015).[2] Although "the implantation of cultural policy […] is closely linked to the building and consolidation of nation states" (Poirrier 2011: 11), the earliest actions in this field were broadly similar, focusing on heritage, museums, and major performance establishments. It was only really when cultural policies started to be institutionalized after the Second World War that distinct models of action began to emerge, stemming from the national forms taken by policies seeking to democratize access to culture. In broad terms, Gattinger and Saint-Pierre identify three cultural policy models used as a source of inspiration: the French approach, the British approach, and the US approach.

In France there have long been projects of the sort conducted by the Ministry of Culture, even though it was not until 1959 that such a ministry was actually set up, with the mission "of making the great works of humanity, and above all those of France, accessible to as many French people as possible". The culture budget was modest at first, but the arrival in power of the Socialists in 1981 (with Jack Lang appointed culture minister) marked a real shift, with increased funding and a new doctrine of cultural action seeking to bring culture more in line with the market (Urfalino 2011). The growing level of state intervention, with support for artists and the culture industry, occurred in tandem with local cultural actions that were funded by municipalities and other local and regional authorities as part of their local development missions.

In Britain the principle governing cultural policy is that it is conducted at arm's length, with the Arts Council—a partially independent non-departmental public body—interposed between the state and the cultural sphere. The Arts Council, run by unpaid government appointees, is in charge of allocating government arts funding. This form of delegated management is said by its advocates to provide a model of cultural action free of government interference, unlike the French model (Losseley 2011).

Lastly, the US model is characterized by the absence of any federal cultural policy, and consequently any culture ministry. Arts and culture are supported by foundations and the private sector, which benefit from tax credits and exemptions in exchange for donations to non-profit organizations. However, for Tobelem, "although the public authorities do not directly steer the cultural sector, they intervene in three ways, by

encouraging philanthropy and volunteering; by the action of local and federal agencies; and by their preoccupation with external cultural policy, at certain periods at least" (2011: 198).

Although these three ideal-type models are each rooted in historical reality, since the late 1990s there has been a degree of convergence in how they operate. Many scholars have emphasized that processes of convergence and hybridization may be observed, both in these three states and in other countries that have set up cultural policies initially inspired by one of these models. For instance, in 1997 the British government created a culture ministry (the Department for Culture, Media and Sport), while in France, local and regional authorities have become the main source of funding for cultural policy, while at the same time private funding has kept on growing, either to supplement public funding or for independent cultural projects.

So what is needed is to inquire into the factors of change affecting cultural policy models. Policy change studies has built up a valuable conceptual and theoretical apparatus for examining the dynamics at work, together with their causes and effects (Palier and Surel 2010). This apparatus allows us to go beyond simplistic, circumstantial, and politically biased explanations. If we are to arrive at a better understanding of these processes and identify some explanatory factors, then a historical perspective is needed. This brings out the continuities and shifts within cultural policy, allowing us to distinguish between more general dynamics relating to changes in the cultural sector (Saez 2012) from those resulting from a political project, irrespective of its level of detail, and thus imputable to policy-makers. It is also a matter of enquiring whether the changes brought about are attributable to incremental evolution (Lindblom 1959), to a paradigm shift (Hall 1993), or to a change in policy reference framework (Muller 2005)—, that is to say in the model of cultural policy used and the missions assigned to it. This perspective also allows us to examine the relationships between the cultural and political spheres (Dubois 2012), and between cultural content and political projects.

The argument put forward here is that while certain evolutions relate to incremental sector-specific dynamics observable in all European countries (e.g. Europeanization, and the metropolitanization of culture as a factor in local development), other processes may also be detected in Turkey, stemming from the change in reference framework. Turkey is a country marked by deep sociocultural divisions, and cultural policies continue to be regarded by those in power as a major tool for symbolic and

ideological investment. In other words, while Europe is clearly going through a depoliticization of cultural policy (Dubois 2012), the AKP's cultural policy is governed by a desire to display a break with certain parts of the Kemalist reference framework and to promote Ottoman heritage in its stead. This tendency ties in perfectly with the overall direction of government policy since 2002. The clear and explicit desire to change the cultural policy model is thus primarily an ideological marker, even though it is too early to assess its precise form and effects. It is for that matter important to distinguish carefully between the different ways of referring "to a model", and not to conflate the analytical use made by scholars drawing up typologies and ideal-types with that made by political authorities in justifying their changes and projects.

The first section of this chapter briefly presents Turkey's cultural policies prior to the AKP's arrival in power. The second analyses the changes that have occurred, showing how the Turkish authorities have drawn on evolutions in the cultural sector to consolidate their own political project. Against the backdrop of social and political polarization—which has been much emphasized by the authorities—culture has become a powerful policy instrument enabling the government to present its project as a break with the past, thanks to its symbolic dimensions.

1   Cultural Policy as an Instrument for Nation-Building

In the early days of the Turkish Republic, cultural actions were dictated by the need to build the nation while faced with a hostile external environment. But from the 1960s onwards the context of marked polarization and internal political divisions meant that the goal shifted to a concern with internal stability.

1.1   "Culture Lies at the Foundation of the Turkish Republic"—Atatürk

Atatürk's dictum about the role of culture in the newly founded republic was far from being purely rhetorical and may be understood in the light of the Young Turks' desire to forge a national Turkish identity as the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating. The regime was working on building a new republic that was to be a radical break from the imperial and Islamic past.

However, it had also inherited several Ottoman cultural institutions stemming from the modernization of the empire in the nineteenth century. So from 1923 onwards the Kemalist regime carried out a series of radical cultural reforms that transformed the old institutions. For instance, the Imperial Symphonic Orchestra (Muzika-i Hümayun) was transferred to Ankara in 1924 and renamed the President's Philharmonic Orchestra. Despite the very high degree of institutional continuity, this signified a radical break in terms of "content" since it was now allied to Western "civilization" (Woodard 2007). This was indicated by numerous decisions, including the closing of Istanbul Conservatory's traditional Oriental music section in 1926, the founding of Ankara State Conservatory (in 1936), which only taught Western music (Katoğlu 2009), and the 1934 ban on classical Ottoman music radio broadcasts. These radical forms, driven through mainly by the Ministry for Education, led to the institutionalization of cultural and artistic life, inspired by a form of intervention that was traditional in the West. During the 1930s, when the Turkish nation state and republic were being consolidated, the regime launched a process of intensive cultural nationalization/Turkification. Cultural reforms were facilitated by bodies such as the Turkish Institutes, the Turkish History Society (1931), the Turkish Language Society (1932), and the People's Institutes (1932) (Karpat 1963). These institutions disseminated theories at conferences and in official publications for "inventing a tradition" based on the "prehistoric roots" of Turkish identity (Copeaux 1997). The Turkish state also drew on the development of a folklorized popular culture subsumed into an overarching Turkishness. The Painters' Homeland Tours analyzed by Dikmen (Chapter 2) and support for the performing arts (Birkiye 2009) followed the same rationale. Historians of the late Ottoman Empire and early republic have produced major studies of these actions and institutions (Üstel 1997). The Kemalist regime's extensive intervention in the field of culture was part of its project to edify the nation, and to modernize and secularize the country. The process of nationalization/Turkification was thus conducted using an ethnifying concept of culture.

1.2   Restoring the Nation State Through a Cultural Policy Promoting Nationalism and Security

The end of the period of Turkish state-building and single-party rule did not lead to any less attention being paid to cultural policy.[3] Although new

political projects emerged, culture continued to act as a major lever for nation-building that governments used time and again, while also attributing new functions to it.

Thus, as of the 1960s, cultural policy was devised as part of a program for economic growth, in which culture was viewed as the "human" dimension of economic development (Kongar 2006). Hence in 1960 a Sub-secretariat for Culture was established within the Ministry for Education, on the recommendation of the State Planning Organization. The most important result of this "period of planned development" was the creation of a Ministry for Culture in 1971 following on from an army memorandum (the military had overthrown the democratically elected government). However, after a government crisis, the ministry was dissolved a few months later. In the wake of the 1980 coup, the "Turko-Islamic synthesis" was adopted as semi-official ideology. This was based on an alliance between Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism, with major consequences for cultural policy. The earliest of these were the setting up of a Special Commission for National Culture, convened at the instigation of the State Planning Organization, and the holding of the first National Culture Council (1982), organized by the Ministry for Culture. Analysis of official documents (laws, regulations, reports, etc.) from the period of military rule and the civilian governments which came to power after 1983 shows that the cultural policy of the period was underpinned by the dual need for nationalist expression and greater security. The regime took as its starting point the idea that the political instability and deep ideological polarization of the 1970s were attributable to a "cultural depression" in which the new generations had lost their national reference framework. It therefore took up culture as a way to reassert its autonomy. In accordance with the Turko-Islamic synthesis, Turkishness and Islam became the archetypal identity markers, reinforcing an organic vision of the nation.[4] Furthermore, culture as an identity marker was viewed as a key factor for safeguarding a unified and united Turkish nation against the supposed internal and external enemies threatening the country (Girard 2014).

However, in 1983, in parallel with the dissemination of the Turko-Islamic synthesis, the newly elected Özal government undertook major economic reforms aligned with neoliberal policy. The liberalization of the Turkish economy and its integration into global trade saw the emergence of major industrial and banking groups. These were increasingly involved in privately funding culture by setting up cultural foundations based on the cultural philanthropy model found in the USA. Businessmen who had

participated in the industrialization of Turkey in the 1960s started playing a high-profile role in the arts via their philanthropy and cultural patronage. They set up festivals and museums, and fostered exchanges to encourage the circulation of cultural assets and the dissemination of Turkish artistic production abroad, and to help open up Turkey to world culture (Albayrak 2011). One remarkable example is that of the Eczacibasi family. Since the 1970s, they have played an increasingly wide role, mainly via the Istanbul Art and Culture Foundation (İstanbul Kültür ve Sanat Vakif, İKSV) founded in 1973 by Nejat Eczacibasi. The İKSV has held international music festivals in Istanbul (a classical music festival in 1973, a contemporary art biennale in 1987, an international film festival and international theatre festival in 1989, and an international jazz festival in 1994). It has had a sizeable impact on the institutionalization of cultural policy and on the culture market. Other cultural and artistic foundations have been created in turn (e.g. Koç, Sabanci, Kıraç, Borusan, Bank Garanti, and Akbank). Together they have led to a renewal in the culture market, with an offering that differs from the traditional repertoire provided by public cultural institutions, being more internationally minded and targeting the upper social classes.

But the 1990s also saw the rise of political Islam, consecrated by electoral victories. And despite resistance from Kemalist and military forces (with the overthrow of the Islamist Erbakan government in 1997, and the deposal and arrest of Erdoğan in 1998, when he was mayor of Istanbul), political Islam has enjoyed uninterrupted and ever greater power since 2002 (Cheviron and Pérouse 2016).

2   The AKP's Cultural Policy: Affirmed Liberalism and Symbolic "Neo-Ottomanism"

Turkish cultural policy under the AKP has combined actions continuing the cultural policies of earlier governments, together with more situational (and structural) changes arising from the direction and meanings that the authorities wish to stamp on their actions in this field. For Saez (2012), new cultural policy directions in Europe since the 1990s have been characterized by two main features, relating to the phenomena of Europeanization and metropolitization. These changes have been incremental, and linked to changes in the cultural sector, its institutional and international environment, and the ever more diverse missions assigned to

cultural policy. For Menger, there has been a shift from cultural policies seeking to democratize access to cultural productions symbolizing national identity, to actions operating on diverse scales in a process of decentering and decentralization towards local and regional authorities (Menger 2011). Culture has thus been endowed with new functions relating to economic and local development and to supporting creativity so as to boost growth. The evolution of Turkish cultural policy has clearly followed such dynamics.

Equally, however, there have been other changes stemming from the stated wish to transform the policy paradigm. Clearly these processes can affect those mentioned in the previous paragraph. But what are these new paradigms, and does the change result from a radical transformation in policy reference framework (towards a British model), as asserted by the authorities, or from an authoritarian reformulation by the government and state (Yıldızcan and Özpınar 2013)? On taking power, the AKP government reformed policy to meet European Union (EU) demands, seemingly moving towards strengthening democracy. However, over recent years—prior even to the attempted coup of July 15, 2016, previously deemed unlikely since the authorities had apparently made it impossible for the army to interfere in public affairs in any way (Insel 2008)—the AKP has also used instruments of political control inherited from the security state apparatus (Dorronsoro 2005). We shall examine three aspects of the AKP's changes to cultural policy, taking into account shifts both in statements and in forms of action—namely, the attention paid to the European context; the development of local cultural actions as components in urban and tourism-development projects; and a change in direction of cultural policy which, while claiming to refer to the British model, in fact tends to consolidate interventionism as part of a strategy to delegitimize the Kemalist edifice and rehabilitate Ottoman heritage, resulting in greater control over the cultural and artistic field.

2.1   Turkish Cultural Policy in the Context of the EU

A significant amount of scholarship has examined the ties between the EU and culture (Helie 2004; Autissier 2004; Karaca 2010; Saez and Saez 2012). This has focused on the emergence of an EU cultural policy, its impact at the national and local levels, and any effects on identification with Europe and the promotion of cultural diversity. While policy specialists have looked at the transfer of policy models within the context of

globalization and the increasing interdependence of national and supranational political, economic, and social systems, the "Europeanization" approach (Radaelli 2001) has "generally considered that all the transformations observed at the national level are influenced by EU processes. Hence they do not make it possible to hierarchize the national, transnational, and international factors driving changes at the national level" (Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010: 15). In other words, it is hard to distinguish between changes attributable to the effects of the EU and those attributable to other (local, national, international, and sector-specific) dynamics that the EU may support, or on in contrast seek to mitigate or counter. EU cultural policy, despite its modest budget, has had concrete and symbolic effects. It has legitimized public action in cultural affairs, consecrated by the ideas of cultural exception and cultural diversity. Various EU programs have provided support for creators and artists, disseminating sometimes contradictory messages, oscillating from the mantra of an emergent European cultural identity to promoting the cultural diversity and pluralism to be found in Europe.

As an EU accession candidate, Turkey has benefited from these programs and been incorporated into European networks. This has helped its artists and cultural actors. For Karaca, "Turkey's EU candidacy […] inspired a range of expectations and incentives in Istanbul's artworld, particularly with regard to funding, some of which present policy adjustments, that is, they are not policy changes required for accession but adjustments to practices of EU member states" (Karaca 2010: 121). Turkish cultural institutions have run artistic projects partially paid for by EU cultural funding for which they were eligible (at least up until 2013, Turkey not being party to the Creative Europe program for the period 2014–2020). For instance, the Istanbul DEPO center took part alongside other European partners in artistic projects with EU accreditation and funding.[5] The choice of Istanbul as the 2010 European Capital of Culture also represented a highlight in Turkey's new involvement in European cultural projects.

In addition to specifically cultural action, certain reforms carried out as part of Turkey's EU candidacy to bring the country into line with the *acquis communautaire* have impacted on the content of its cultural policy. Thus although some scholars currently analyze the case of the AKP as an extension of authoritarian order (Tayla 2012), Turkey's EU candidacy made it possible to address a certain number of issues relating to freedom of cultural expression, at least during the early stages of negotiations

(2005–2006). The AKP thus introduced a certain number of substantive reforms to respect the Copenhagen criteria, relating in particular to respecting minorities' cultural rights. The development of Kurdish cultural policy is a perfect illustration of this. The government lifted legal restrictions inherited from the 1982 military period which forbade broadcasting in Kurdish. Private and public television channels started airing programs in languages other than Turkish.[6] Although cultural policy only tentatively supports the practices of minority groups, this relaxation has provided a window of opportunity for private associative cultural actors, who have launched many initiatives. There have been an increasing number of cultural centers and activities, often following in the footsteps of organizations close to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK, engaged in armed struggle against the Turkish state). These have been accompanied by independent initiatives that have also attracted support from pro-Kurdish municipalities (e.g.s Diyarbakir) and relays in the Kurdish diaspora across Europe, as well as cultural foundations such as the Anadolu Kültür foundation (Scalbert-Yücel 2015).[7] Although artists on the Kurdish cultural scene are not immune to various forms of pressure and censorship, and have been particularly affected by the resumption of fighting between the PKK and the Turkish authorities in Turkish Kurdistan since 2015, Kurdish cultural production and practice has become a component of the country's cultural diversity, along with that of other minorities in Turkey (e.g. Armenians, Syriacs, and Alevis) (Girard 2014). However, the power and significance of the dominant national discourse means that Turkey does not fit Bonet and Negrier's hypothesis of an "end to national cultures" (2008).

Furthermore, the EU is not the only European organization with which Turkey has participated in cultural projects: Turkey has also taken part in European projects run by the Council of Europe, for example. In particular it undertook to contribute to the Cultural Policy Review Program for which it presented a report drawn up by the Ministry for Culture and Tourism (Council of Europe 2013). This was due to be compared to a report by independent experts and to one by civil society representatives published independently by the University of Bilgi (Ada and Ince 2011), but Ada regrets that the government assessment was not in fact completed (Ada 2013: 136).

Lastly, private and public cultural actors have drawn on their integration into European networks to observe practice elsewhere, and analyze the pertinence and feasibility of adapting certain actions to their own

system. Thus, between 2007 and 2011, several Turkish cinema industry bodies met French representatives from the Centre National du Cinéma et de l'image animée (CNC) to study the possibility of setting up a Turkish CNC based on the French model. This model was not finally transferred (Lecler and Polo 2017). However, thanks to these exchanges—together with those conducted at international gatherings of culture specialists and professionals at festivals, art fairs, and master classes—there has been greater contact, allowing Turkey to take part in the circulation of good practice and artistic styles, boosting the international integration of Turkish artists in Europe, and adding to the attractiveness of Turkey, and especially Istanbul, its cultural capital.[8]

Hence, even if it is not fully accurate to speak of the Europeanization of Turkish cultural policy, the various levels of Turkish integration in Europe have provided significant resources in terms of funding, support for cultural projects and actions, and integration into professional networks and forums. Integration has also led to the dissemination of norms and values that Turkish cultural actors have adopted to develop projects in their country, where the state continues to view culture as having a role in shaping mindsets.

2.2   The Metropolitization of Cultural Policy, the Tourist Industry, and Urban Projects

For Saez (2012), the expansion of local cultural policy in Europe has resulted in a metropolitan shift, whether this is due to the dynamics of decentralization, devolution, or the involvement of longstanding local and regional authorities in the field of culture. This phenomenon has also affected Turkey, especially Istanbul, the country's economic and cultural capital.[9] Thanks to the 1984 municipal law (law no. 3030), mayors have obtained new funding and tax resources for local cultural policy.[10] The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) seized this opportunity, particularly in the late 1990s, launching metropolitan initiatives in the fields of town planning, housing, culture, and heritage. These cultural projects were presented as combining Istanbul's historic heritage, internationalization, and town-planning projects. However, they were also part of a strategy to turn Istanbul into a global brand, drawing on projects devised by renowned architects and town planners, and financed by private investment, with the backing of the IMM and the Turkish government.

Although the question of urban regeneration gives rise to debate in Western countries, "in Turkey it is still fashionable, especially amongst those with access to State power and investment capital [...]. The sheer scale of regeneration proposals, especially in Istanbul, is breathtaking and raises major questions about economic viability, justice, and sustainability". (Lovering and Evren 2011: 2). Urban regeneration in Turkey is overseen by the public authorities, which operate schemes to delegate work to private construction companies. The aim is thus for the state and local authorities, which do not have sufficient financial means, to team up with the private sector to invest in abandoned (or evacuated) buildings and to transfer property, along with the revenue it generates, to the private sector (Pérouse 2014). The authorities mainly target the many abandoned and dilapidated historic buildings, the deprived neighborhoods in the historic center such as Sulukule and Tarlabasi (Dinçer 2011), and former industrial zones now lying abandoned. This has created increasing tension in the property market. The socioeconomic and political and cultural implications of urban regeneration—with urban gentrification and the displacement of the previous populations—are ignored or circumvented despite ever stronger reactions from non-governmental organizations.

Above and beyond the challenges of urban planning for a town undergoing continuous growth, this policy has sought to brand Istanbul as a global town (Pérouse 2016). The emphasis on culture and the arts has turned Istanbul into an international showcase, boosting Turkey's image worldwide against the backdrop of its EU candidacy (Polo 2015a). The city of Istanbul, which has been run by the AKP for the past four terms of office, has pursued this course with Erdoğan's full backing. For Kadir Topbaş, the mayor of Istanbul since 2004, "Istanbul should shed its industrial profile … Istanbul should become a city with a qualified workforce, a city with a different attitude towards the world… Istanbul should, from now on, become a financial centre, a cultural centre, conference tourism centre' (Aksoy 2008: 74).[11] The number of tourists visiting Turkey increased spectacularly between the 1990s (when there were fewer than 10 million visitors per year) and 2010 (with 37 million visitors in 2013). The country has become the sixth most visited tourist destination in the world, and Istanbul the sixth most visited city (with 10 million visitors in 2013).[12] The income from tourism rose to $23 billion (in 2011). This strategy has also served Istanbul's international ambitions, with an increasing number of conferences, diplomatic meetings, fairs, festivals, and exhibitions (Morvan 2013), as well as major sporting events (Polo 2015b).

These two tendencies correspond to shifts in cultural policy observable in other countries where culture is used to drive local development, drawing on new resources of European or more local origin. The expected economic benefits justify public cultural investment. Many cultural projects have been set up in depressed industrial regions in Europe, taking their inspiration from the successful Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao and banking on the economic benefits of regeneration strategies based on culture (Baudelle et al. 2015). However, although the public authorities in Turkey reckon on the economic impact of culture, this has taken the form of promoting and enhancing its archaeological heritage to attract tourists, rather than providing direct support to creators and cultural actors.[13] Erdoğan's opening of the "Istanbul Modern" museum of contemporary art in 2004 with great pomp and circumstance should not obscure the fact that it is an entirely private museum, with the state merely providing a disaffected warehouse in the port of Galata (Polo 2015a).

The Turkish economy went through ten final years of spectacular growth from 2002 to 2012, but public spending on culture did not directly benefit. In the field of arts, performance, and contemporary creation, "the state is moving away from its role of investor and assuming the role of regulator" (Ince 2011: 195). This public disengagement is not new, but the process has accelerated. The government has justified its position by passing tax measures to encourage cultural patronage (laws 5225 and 5228 in 2008). Thus a large number of major private museums were set up in the 2000s by great families of patronage and private cultural foundations. These enjoyed varying degrees of support from the state and municipal authorities.[14] Performance venues and concert halls were also opened, thanks to private investment, especially for tours by major international artists. Culture has thus become a major stake for towns, especially those able to attract tourists. But if towns have eagerly grasped their new spheres of competence, their ability to act depends both on their ties with the state, and on the dynamism and means available to local cultural actors in a country which still has a centralized political system (Ince 2009; Shoup et al. 2014).

2.3   *A New Cultural Policy to Dispose of the Kemalist Reference Framework*

The two trends in Turkish cultural policy presented above ultimately need to be viewed in relation to incremental changes in European cultural policies attributable mainly to sector-specific shifts, the economic context,

the ever expanding missions assigned to cultural policy, and the increasing number of levels of intervention and financing in this field. Clearly, these dynamics occur within specific national contexts, and the forms they take vary, depending particularly on pre-existing forms. In Turkey these run up against a state which, as we have seen, has no intention of relinquishing its prerogatives or endeavoring to profit from change. Still, recent reforms presented by the government, statements by political leaders and their advisers, and a certain number of undertakings have been presented as stemming from a wish to change the model Turkey uses for its cultural policy. Since its early days the AKP has forged its political identity on its attachment to a set of Islam-inspired conservative values, but these had not previously had much impact on cultural policy. The government had mainly worked to encourage cultural patronage and maintain traditional public cultural institutions, while trying to make the country more attractive to tourists. Admittedly it opened an increasing number of cultural centers, particularly with the support of AKP-run municipalities (Ince 2013), and supported traditional arts and crafts (see Chapter 6), but it did not balk at the artistic offerings proposed by secularized cultural milieus and did not seek to shape the content of cultural policy.

The AKP has consolidated its hold on power since the beginning of its third term in office (in 2011)—and no doubt a bit earlier, as indicated by its management of Istanbul's year as European Capital of Culture—thanks to its electoral successes, the booming Turkish economy, and political and institutional reform.[15] Consequently it now enjoys considerable leeway in driving certain projects forward. This is not to suggest that it has some hidden agenda (the Islamization of society) but rather shows how these propitious circumstances have enabled the government to pursue its conquest of the state. Any change in reference framework, however, needs to be viewed in terms of the political authorities' desire to prize cultural policy free of its original Kemalist matrix described in the first section. It is thus more of a negative reference, not some clear, coherent reference plotting out a direction to be taken. For the moment, the government and pro-AKP intellectuals are calling for a cultural policy bedded in the prestige of Ottoman history, traducing a desire to reinvent tradition on the basis of disparate components within Ottoman heritage.[16] They call for an overhaul of cultural policy combining conservative art and aesthetics with a form of modernity as yet to be invented (Aksoy and Seyben 2015). This strategy necessarily involves a break with the Kemalist reference framework that forged the cultural identity of the Turkish Republic up until the

present day on the basis of Western-inspired secular and republican principles. Promoting the Ottoman past in the context of heritage policy and urban planning is no doubt symptomatic of the "culture war" (*Kulturkampf*) between two sets of contradictory cultural values in Turkey—with, on the one hand, Islamic circles (long considered as belonging to the cultural periphery, and, on the other, secular Kemalist forces. And with the increasing role played by conservative elites from the Islamic bourgeoisie, the questioning of references to Kemalism is now explicit (see Chapter 7). Pro-AKP intellectuals and the political authorities—starting with Erdoğan himself—assert they are reflecting the will of the people (i.e. the conservative electorate that has kept the AKP in power since 2002), and denounce public cultural institutions as being in the grip of Kemalist elites. Though they have not really managed to clearly define what a conservative cultural policy might look like, they castigate the actors behind this perceived cultural hegemony, excoriating those said to have laid exclusive claim to the public cultural field ever since the republic was founded while enjoying the support of major industrial groups involved in cultural sponsorship. They denounce the arrogance of these Westernized elites, labeled "them", against the ordinary conservative people of Anatolia, labeled "us" (Ada 2013).

However, above and beyond this caricatural polarization, the government is seeking to put its wishes into action. The project launched in 2012 to reform public opera and theater provides a perfect example. Erdoğan denounced the "obscene" nature of a play performed in a public theatre and criticized the artistic choices, questioning the relevance of public and subsidized theatres given that "there is not a country in the world where the state runs the theaters".[17] These reforms were launched in the name of modernizing public action. In May 2013, the Ministry for Culture and Tourism—without any advance indication, and referring explicitly to the British cultural policy model—presented a draft bill to set up a Turkish Arts Council (Türk Sanat Kurumu, TÜSAK).[18] The creation of an independent arts council was presented as a way of breaking with the cultural clientelism of Westernized elites and thus better serving the cultural democratization needed to satisfy the conservative aspirations of the "new Turkey".

This bill was viewed by representatives of the artistic community and the Kültür Sanat-Sen trade union as signaling the AKP government's intention to push through a radical reform of policy for supporting the arts. They opposed it, voicing their misgivings about the independence of

the council, and fearing a greater reduction in the Ministry for Culture's budget, already one of the smallest in Europe. They declared that the arts council would become "an element of repression and censorship in cultural institutions […] for the government will only support artistic projects that coincide with its political vision".[19] Thus cultural milieus vehemently denounced the financial withdrawal of the state, its interference in defining artistic projects, and arbitrary appointments (Birkiye 2009).[20] The state interventionism that the AKP claims it is combating would, in their eyes, be replaced by greater government control over artistic circles, which are thus worried about their creative freedom.[21] They demonstrated against this bill (as well as against other projects, such as the demolition of the iconic Emek cinema in Istanbul, resulting on April 7, 2013 in violently repressed protests during the Istanbul international film festival). During the Gezi demonstrations against TUSAK's plans to develop Taksim Square (in June 2013), artistic circles roundly denounced the project (Kiger 2013), after which it was suspended. The project was once again under study from early 2014 through to 2016, when Prime Minister Davutoğlu in person revealed that the Ministry for Culture and Tourism was drawing up a sustainable cultural development plan.[22] But the tribulations of political Turkish life—with the resignation of the prime minister, a new government, an attempted coup, and purges of the administration, judiciary, academia, and political parties targeting members of the Gülen brotherhood, followed by constitutional reform—have meant other priorities have come to the fore.

The introduction of a new frame of reference cannot be attributed entirely to a change in policy instruments. It would seem to be as hard to define a conservative form of art that could play a role in the AKP's modernization and development project as it would to find any artists inclined to embody it (other than those who already work with the authorities). Pro-AKP intellectuals have debated what conditions would enable a new category of artists to emerge, who would be both modern and conservative (Aksoy and Seyben 2015). Ultimately, the most concrete actions undertaken by the public authorities to promote Ottoman heritage and the values system imputed to it are to be found mainly in museum policy and in certain urban development schemes at the metropolitan and national level, rather than in the artistic field strictly speaking. Thus the Panorama 1453 History Museum founded in 2000 is devoted to the conquest of Constantinople, for instance, while Miniatürk displays models of the main monuments in Turkey and former Ottoman territories outside

Turkey (Öncü 2007).[23] There is frequent talk of reconverting the museum of Santa Sophia back into a mosque. Urban development projects also provide opportunities to reinvent Ottoman heritage, such as the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's project to rebuild the former Ottoman barracks on Gezi Park Square, or the building of a monumental mosque modeled on the Blue Mosque on the highest hill in the city. This dynamic thereby affects the sector-specific changes presented in the previous paragraph. AKP-run municipalities also pursue their local development goals by drawing on conservative references in tune with government policy lines.

The emphasis placed on Ottoman heritage thus reveals one of the AKP's broader strategies, particularly its geopolitical ambitions and desire to be seen as a dominant regional power. Its new external cultural policy is a case in point, with the setting up of a network of 27 Yunus Emre Institute Turkish cultural centers in 2007 in 18 countries, especially in the former Ottoman lands or those under Ottoman influence. Even though the head of this network states that it is simply a matter of promoting Turkish language and cultures, in a way comparable to the Instituts Français network, this scheme provides a way of relaying cultural diplomacy while picking up on the Ottoman frame of reference.[24] However, this "neo-Ottomanism" is lacking in clarity and struggles to move beyond highly approximate historical references to define any clear framework. This raises the question of whether the strategy is not merely a way of instrumentalizing the past, as incarnated in a few emblematic projects, so as to mark public and media opinion and so further politicize government action.

3   Conclusion

The end goals of cultural policy in Turkey have expanded considerably, as they have in other European states. The objectives of nation-building may no longer be as essential, but promoting and celebrating historic heritage is still a fundamental pillar of cultural policy. Alongside the traditional functions of national integration, cultural policy has been attributed a role in local economic development. These changes have taken place within the context of the globalization of cultural exchanges and national economies, and are thus attributable primarily to sector-specific transformations rather than to policies seeking to support or direct them.

Nonetheless, the Turkish government's explicit desire to question the dominance of the Kemalist heritage is rooted in a political project and overt strategy to transform the system and replace it with a different historical framework of reference. For the time being this change has only had a marginal influence on the contents of cultural policy. However, the AKP's increasing power within the apparatus of state (which has largely retained its authoritarian structures bequeathed by the 1983 constitution) could enable it to place greater pressure on artists and cultural actors, while brandishing the alibi that any changes in its cultural policy model are part of the devolution and modernization of public policy. The cultural offering is presented as being more in tune with the sociological reality of the country, promoted—somewhat paradoxically—by a state said to be less interventionist in defining content. But at its root it is a matter of altering the cultural offering. The state will not stand back from artistic choices, and will instead seek to influence the directions these take. Furthermore, even the British Arts Council—supposedly the inspiration behind this change—has seen its own reach reduced as a result of direct pressure from the British authorities (Losseley 2011: 403).[25] There is little reason to think that the Turkish Arts Council, should it ever see the light of day, would be any more virtuous than its model. One is left with the impression that the Turkish authorities' reference to this model is simply dictated by a desire to assert control over public cultural institutions, while justifying this in the name of cultural democracy.

Numerous scholars have spoken of a convergence in cultural policy models across democratic states. In the case of Turkey, however, one may legitimately wonder whether this process is not more one of confluence with cultural policies implemented by authoritarian states that seek to dominate their societies and artistic circles.

Notes

1. This chapter draws on a study of changes to Turkish cultural policy I conducted with Füsun Üstel (Polo and Üstel 2014) but it broadens the analysis to enquire into the policy model.
2. Outside academia, international organizations have been set up to gather data and statistics about national culture polities, such as that operated under the aegis of the Council of Europe, the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe (http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/compendium.php?language=en), and the International Database of

Cultural Policies (http://www.worldcp.org/index.php). It is worth noting that these databases do not include any studies of Turkey.

3. The Peoples' Institutes were closed in 1951 when the main opposition party (the Democrat Party) came to power. It saw them as a propaganda instrument for the Kemalist Party, which had held power since the founding of the republic.

4. This organic vision of the nation is perhaps even better exemplified by the language laws. The 1983 law, no. 2932, forbade the use of any language other than Turkish in accordance with Article 26 of the constitution, which for decades had made it an offence to use Kurdish.

5. DEPO, housed in a former tobacco warehouse, is a cultural center financed by the Anadolu Kültür (Anatolian culture) foundation. It acts as an exhibition space and forum for exchanges and debates about cultural issues. It works as an artistic operator with countries in Caucasia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Interview with the manager of DEPO, January 2013.

6. In 2009, Turkish public television company TRT6 launched a channel broadcasting in Kurdish around the clock.

7. The Anadolu Kültür foundation was established in Istanbul in 2002. It works to disseminate cultural programs across Turkey in partnership with non-governmental organizations and local institutions so as to develop civil initiatives nationwide. "As soon as it was founded it set up the Diyarbakir Cultural Centre [Diyarbakir Sanat Merkezi, DSM]. Its presence was part of a progressive depolarization of the local public sphere, shared between the Kurdish movement and central state institutions, with the latter conducting a cultural policy that seemed on occasions to be implemented in a sphere parallel to that of the Kurdish movement […]. The DSM's cultural events and training courses have had a fundamental impact on the field of arts and artistic creation in Kurdistan. Anadolu Kültür is also involved in the local literary scene, with readings, a translation fund, and critical reviews. Lastly, the foundation regularly supports independent theater" (Scalbert-Yücel 2015: 54).

8. The specificity of the French system of financing cinema is based on the role played by the CNC, which under the tutelage of the Ministry of Culture administers the audiovisual industry, as well as being a body for representing professional interests. The close ties and mutual goodwill between public agents and those working in the cinema industry have made it possible to establish a generous funding system and consolidate the French audiovisual industry. Although this model has acted as an inspiration for other states, the Turkish cinema industry, despite a very limited public funding system, has preferred to retain its independence and draw on the revenue generated by its highly dynamic, exportable, and profitable audiovisual industry. Furthermore, certain Turkish directors (e.g. Nuri

Bilge Ceylan and Deniz Gamze Ergüven), whose films have won prizes in leading international festivals, have been able to make their films in international coproduction partnerships (which have been directly financed by the French CNC or the Council of Europe's Eurimages program).

9. Although other Turkish towns (the cities and especially those with the capacity to attract tourists) have started operating in the cultural field on varying scales and with varying degrees of success, clearly none of them compares to what has been undertaken in Istanbul.

10. For further discussion of the powers of Turkish municipalities, see Bayraktar (2007).

11. Mr Topbaş was one of Erdoğan's advisers when the latter was mayor of Istanbul (1994–1998). He was also vice-chairman of the Ministry of Culture's first committee for the protection of heritage and historic monuments. From 2010 to 2016 he was chairman of the United Cities and Local Governments network that represents the interests of local and regional governments worldwide. Although the theme of culture is one of the issues examined by this organization, an informed observer states that this involvement stems primarily from a desire to attract foreign tourists and investors rather than any attempt to develop culture. Interview January 2017.

12. World Tourism Organization figures, 2014. http://dtxtq4w60xqpw. cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_highlights14_fr.pdf. Terrorist threats and geopolitical instability over the past two years have resulted in plummeting figures (with a drop of 30% in 2016). http://www.kultur.gov. tr/EN,170247/number-of-arriving-departing-foreigners-and-citizens-no-.html.

13. The Ministry for Culture fused with the Ministry for Tourism in 2003, becoming the Ministry for Culture and Tourism (law no. 4848 of April 16, 2003).

14. The number of private museums rose from 93 in 2002 to 157 in 2011. Over the same period the number of visitors to museums and historic places rose from 7.4 million to 28 million, and the revenue they generated increased by a factor of almost 10 to reach 250 million Turkish lira (US$130 million) (*Türkiye'de Kültür ve Turizm Verileri*, T.C. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Dumat Ofset, 2012, pp. 20–22).

15. The programming and holding of cultural events as part of Istanbul's year as European Capital of Culture in 2010 show the Turkish public authorities' strategy to recuperate a project initially driven by non-governmental cultural actors, especially the IKSV (Maisetti et al. 2012). This provides a good illustration of the ambiguous uses that can be made of Europe. Taking control of the event enabled the political authorities to promote Ottoman heritage (Göktürk et al. 2010). This was emphasized by the

European Commission assessment report, which regretted direct government intervention: "As a result of 2010, there is evidence that culture and art are higher on the agenda of the media and the general public than ever before and that the city's cultural scene will be more vibrant […] But overall, the end of the title year and the demise of the agency represent a 'missed opportunity' in terms of changing the model of cultural governance in the city—though progress has been made, informal networks strengthened and lessons have been learned by all the different actors involved" (Ecorys 2011).

16. Examples of such intellectuals are Mustafa Isen, general secretary to former President Abdulah Gül, and the editors of pro-government conservative newspapers, such as Iskender Pala and Ekrem Dumanli.

17. Serhan Bali, "İngiliz Modeli Nedir ve Türkiye'nin Sanat Dünyasını Nasıl Etkiler?". http://www.andante.com.tr/index.php?page=haberdetay&haberID=1392.

18. Gattinger and Saint Pierre (2008) distinguish between two models of cultural policy: the French model of the cultural state, in which the state plays a major role promoting national culture, and the British model of the patron state, in which arts and culture spring from private initiatives, with the state supporting projects through independent agencies.

    The Turkish Arts Council has 11 members: six artists and specialists in artistic activity, and five representatives of the authorities. They are all appointed by the cabinet on the basis of proposals put forward by the Minister for Culture and Tourism. The council is mainly funded by the National Lottery fund, and its level of support for artistic projects is capped at 50% of their overall cost.

19. http://www.kultursanatsen.org.tr/index.php/1_/genel-merkezden/item/568-the-draft-law-on-promoting-artistic-activities-through-the-turkish-art-concil.html.

20. In addition to setting up an arts council, the reform sought to question the public status of the national theater and opera.

21. See the Siyah Bant (black band) website, which lists various individual cases of artistic censorship in Turkey (www.siyahbant.org). In addition to direct censorship, the artistic heads of major cultural institutions privately financed by leading industrial and financial groups admit "they are careful not to overstep certain limits" so as to avoid upsetting the authorities, which could take retaliatory measures against the economic interests of their patrons when awarding public tenders or major urban development and construction projects.

22. http://t24.com.tr/haber/davutoglu-600-kisiyi-kultur-ve-turizm-bakanliginda-istihdam-edecegiz,337225.

23. The Panorama 1453 History Museum is close to the Edirne Gateway in the Walls of Constantinople (through which Constantinople was conquered), and it houses a 2350 m² circular panoramic pictorial illustration of the fall of the city of Constantinople. Both these museums are spectacularly successful at attracting crowds of ordinary visitors who are not used to attending museums.

24. Speech by Hayati Develi, head of the Yunus Emre Institute, Istanbul Policy Center-Mercator Foundation-Sabanci University, Istanbul, September 4, 2013.

25. For example, advisers to Thatcher and Major criticized the elitism of the British Arts Council so as to promote a cultural policy based more on entertainment, which the market could provide for, and thereby justify reduced public spending on culture.

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Converted Spaces, Converted Meanings: Looking at New Cultural Spaces in Istanbul through a Cultural Policy Lens

Ayça İnce

1   INTRODUCTION

When the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in 2002, it ushered in an era of change in Turkey. Since then, almost everything that defines culture—hierarchies, roles, mechanisms, values, religion, meanings, notions of time, spatial relations—has undergone significant shifts. However, delineating what has changed in terms of cultural policy is very difficult as there is no written document regarding Turkish cultural policy. This tradition of Turkish governments having "a cultural policy without its being written"[1] has also continued throughout the AKP's rule.[2] In other words, the AKP government chooses not to make binding definitions for culture,[3] nor does it set any regulatory framework at different levels (central, local, provincial) of government[4] or parties (public, private, non-governmental organization [NGO], and independent sectors) in the arena of cultural policy.[5] This

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allows it to act in an arbitrary way in terms of its cultural policy-making and related actions. Thus this chapter focuses on case studies of cultural centers to delineate the uses of culture and makes an assessment of cultural policy during 15 years of AKP rule.

The examples are chosen specifically from among the converted[6] cultural centers in Istanbul in order to show that rebuilding cultural centers is a political act. So each of the cases helps to identify the different aims behind the AKP's cultural policy-making, but also illustrates various actors and collaborative actions that have taken place.

This chapter argues that there are three aims underlining the AKP's cultural policy-making:

- neoliberal pragmatism;
- centralization of state powers;
- conservative Islam as an ideology.

2   REBUILDING CULTURAL CENTERS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES

The Turkish Republic has a history of building cultural centers across Turkey. In line with the cultural policies of the early years of the Turkish Republic, attempts to Westernize Turkey and elevate it to the level of contemporary civilizations resulted in the design and implementation of People's Houses in the cities.[7] More than 200 of these were built to cultivate citizens to suit the modern Turkey during the single-party regime (the Republican People's Party [Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP], 1923–1950). However, the People's Houses were closed immediately after Turkey changed to a multiparty regime, following fears that they had become a CHP propaganda tool.

When the AKP came to power in 2002, it had already established a tradition of construction almost as a business within all the municipalities it had been serving since the 1994 local elections. After winning the 2004 local elections, the central–local government alliance was formed and consolidated with the party's growing success. In order to retain its economic development, the AKP designated the construction sector alongside the automotive sector as the dynamo of Turkey's economy (Penpecioğlu 2011). Since then it has been issuing new laws and provisions to boost the construction industry in every field, thus fulfilling its supporters' expectations.[8]

So it is no surprise to see that construction gets the largest share within the very limited budget for arts and culture.[9] It built more than half of the 110 active cultural centers across Turkey today via the budget of the General Directorate of Investment and Business under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MOCT) (Kılıç 2003). The situation was the same at the local government level. For example, the municipalities of Istanbul built more than 69 cultural centers between 2005–2015. Each was built with an investment of between 20 and 25 million TRY.[10]

Building cultural centers has not just been an issue of cultural policy in Turkey; it has also always been a matter of politics. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Ince 2013), the AKP has a new way of cultural policy-making, which I have referred to as the steps of Mehter March[11]—owing to its desynchronization of discourse and practice, sometimes moving forward but often moving backwards. Since its establishment, the AKP has defined its ideology as "conservative democratic". This is a response to the former regime of the founders of the Turkish Republic, and this in spite of the fact that, although conservative democracy "was not meant to be a preservation of culture, tradition, or religion as such. Rather, conservatism was phrased as a form of 'negative philosophy' directed against both the radicalism and the elitism of political projects of social engineering" (Kaya 2015). Accordingly, the AKP has argued that provision of culture should be ideology free; it has concentrated on being a service provider that is keen on building cultural centers. It paid little attention to the democratization of culture and diversity of cultural programs. Instead it facilitated the privatization of culture and its institutions, and attempted to transform its administration via new public management. It is a two-pronged approach towards determining the values of cultural policy-making that resembles the steps of a Mehter March: two steps forward towards values of marketization and new public management, but one step back towards democratic values.

After winning the third consecutive term in 2011, the AKP announced that its "mastership era" had started. This was marked by an authoritarian tone and interventionist policy-making to establish its political domination. In the cultural scene, it announced its desire to terminate state-funded and state-managed performing arts institutions (the State Theatre and the State Opera and Ballet), once more claiming that the government's role is not to produce culture. This time, the AKP government suggested an alternative, the Turkish Art Council, which resembles the Arts Council, but only in terms of structure, since it enables cultural

production but not on an arm's-length basis. It also wanted to open the platform for the production of appropriate culture that would satisfy more conservative tastes. Obviously the AKP has become eligible to reach its goals with the existing number of voters, the so-called 'majority of the population'. For this reason, it acts as if it no longer cares about the needs of the wider cultural audience or minor voices.

Yet it takes another Mehter March performance, which becomes seemingly more and more neoliberal as it takes more steps towards the privatization of the remaining cultural institutions, to set culture free. However, the AKP also took a step backwards at the same time, applying social engineering to cover its insecurity in the cultural field. As conservative intellectuals put it, on the one hand current production of culture by state institutions does not meet the expectations of conservatives, on the other hand, what constitutes conservative aesthetics and conservative art is uncertain. To fill such a gap, the AKP prefers to take control by rejecting the existing contemporary and modernist modes of cultural production. Instead, it wants to "create yet another elitism, based this time on nostalgic and idealized perception of Ottoman and Islamist past and its cultural artistic achievements" (Aksoy and Şeyben 2014: 2010).

Going back to the concept of conversion, converting a building that already exists is an attempt to change the form, function, and character of that space, and it gets more sophisticated when one converts a venue that was built especially for culture or with a cultural/industrial background. Thus, multilayered processes like the conversion projects mentioned above lay out vividly what one can follow only with difficulty in the AKP's cultural policy-making. Examining the multilayered processes involved in the four conversion projects discussed here draws a clearer picture of such fluctuating and pragmatic policy-making. This chapter chooses to focus on four prominent cases (Atatürk, Ayazağa and Sütlüce Cultural Centers, and Santralistanbul), because they all represent an aspect of changing cultural policy and also contradictions of the AKP's policy discourse and practice. Ayazağa and Sütlüce Cultural Centers display how new laws and mechanisms among new partners have paved the road for neoliberal provision of culture, while the cases of Santralistanbul and Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, AKM) prove how much the same liberating voice can become interventionist when it meets a cultural situation or content that contrasts with its ideology. So focusing on cultural centers allows us to uncover this ambivalence and discuss where it leaves the Turkish cultural field.

The empirical data has been collected through my research and involvement in these conversion projects since 2006. The fieldwork included interviews with actors and stakeholders, as well as participant observation of the construction of Santralistanbul and the restructuring of the Atatürk Cultural Center.

The chapter will look at each case in turn, starting with the Ayazağa Cultural Center, then looking at Santralistanbul, the Sütlüce Cultural Center, and the Atatürk Cultural Center. The findings are then drawn together in a conclusion.

3   Failure of Public–NGO Partnership: Ayazağa Cultural Center to Volkswagen Arena

Governments are often looking to spend their budgets more efficiently. In terms of provision of culture, forming partnerships has been one cost-saving measure, especially when it comes to converting the heritage sites that belong to the government but that cannot be sold owing to their heritage status. With its heritage and demanding audience, Istanbul was the best platform for such partnerships.

As the pioneer of cultural philanthropy, Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (Istanbul Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı, IKSV) has always been looking for venues in pursuit of a permanent home where it can hold its festivals and events.[12] In 1990 the MOCT granted it some land in Ayazağa on the condition that it would build a cultural complex. The IKSV laid the foundations for a philharmonic concert hall and cultural center called Ayazağa Cultural Center, aiming for completion with state aid in 1996. However, its construction was put on hold in 2000 as a result of changing governments and unsupplied funds from the new MOCT.

When the AKP came to power it deviated from the previous governments' investment policy because it was easier to find various stakeholders to enter into partnerships with it. So it smoothed the way for private investment in culture and public–private partnerships (PPPs) in 2004 by introducing two new regulations.[13] The aim was also to try new models in the cultural sector, such as build-operate-transfer and buy-build-operate. Increasing numbers of private companies tended to invest in art and culture for promotion and prestige purposes. However, as with their Western counterparts, it also supported art to gain financial advantage and to convey quality (Dervişoğlu 2009).

Nevertheless, throughout the AKP era, such partnerships were developed in favor of private enterprise, mostly excluding third sector organizations, resulting in the formation of PPPs. As a result, in 2006, the Treasury and the MOCT signed a protocol with the IKSV to take over the construction site in order to complete it in 2006.[14] However, in 2008, Multi Turkmall Real Estate Development Company expressed an interest in undertaking the project, which had already been tendered via a build-operate-transfer model by the MOCT a few times.[15] Inconceivably, when Turkmall obtained the lease for a period of 49 years, it decided to demolish the partly constructed concert hall and build a multipurpose events center instead.

Today the construction of the "multi-purpose complex" is finished and is called Uniq Istanbul. So far the black box seems to have succeeded in hosting acclaimed star concerts and basketball games, helping to secure its sponsorship in a few months. It has been renamed the Volkswagen Arena.[16] However, the rest of the facility—offices, exhibition space, conference hall and shopping mall—await its future customers.

Non-governmental cultural organizations or artists' initiatives have often had difficulty finding venues for exhibitions or office space. Over time, they have become quite creative and have often dared to take risks that private enterprises would not attempt. In such cases, the conversion of industrial heritage sites appears to be one of the answers to this problem. Despite the will and creative entrepreneurship of these NGOs, public–NGO partnerships have always reached a deadlock on account of the state's failure to deliver the financial resources promised and because of disputes about management and operation. Floundering projects have been recovered with the withdrawal of the third sector stakeholders and the introduction of a partner from the private sector. The state does not envision a role or a subsidy to support the social and cultural role of NGOs, as it does for private enterprise. As a result, these trial buildings are either in a state of disrepair or they are incompetently used owing to inadequate cultural management to run them.

On the other hand, private entrepreneurs buying property from the state have been successfully continuing their activities as of late 1990's. Examples include Kadir Has University, founded after the old TEKEL Cibali Cigarette Factory was bought from the Treasury, and Rahmi M. Koç Museum and Cultural Foundation, which bought and restored the Hasköy Dockyard. Both not only contributed to the preservation of industrial sites but also transformed them into semipublic spaces through

their newly gained functions. The abovementioned state incentive policies for the private sector, and the state's tendency to be the facilitator, have led to many enterprises investing in this sector for the first time. Numerous private investors participate in tenders for cultural centers with a more "commercial" approach, drawing on an "enterprise mentality".

The case study of Ayazağa Cultural Center shows that one of the unerring characteristics of the AKP's cultural policy is its neoliberal pragmatism. The AKP government has a clear vision of public–private partnerships as being more beneficial than any other form of collaboration. Through these PPPs, the government initially manages the provision of culture without spending any budget, as well as preserving these sites. It transfers them to the private sector and in so doing opens the way for transformations whereby concern for the public good is overpowered by commercial concerns and profitability. It is not realistic to expect any private enterprise to act sensitively or to be accountable to the public for social responsibility. They will determine their ticket prices and content of shows according to their for-profit mission statement. Finally, the content exhibited in such "arts and culture" centers are usually popular events that suit the public taste. It is unlikely to be marginal, sub-cultural or minority-related content that might not fit in with the AKP's ideology. Hence privatized cultural centers fit in exactly with the AKP's neoconservative agenda.

4   Build-Operate/Lease-Transfer Model: From Santralistanbul to Third Campus of Bilgi University

Throughout the time that the AKP government has been in power, the build-operate/lease-transfer model has become the most common way of constructing and rebuilding Turkey. Examples include the Istanbul–Izmir highway, the third bridge over the Bosphorus, two forthcoming nuclear power plants, and city hospitals. However, in the cultural field, examples are rare. The case of Santralistanbul is the first and its conversion is still ongoing.

It was at the beginning of the new millennium when Istanbul Bilgi University (IBU) took the first initiative to convert Silahtarağa Power Station. The first power plant in Istanbul had stopped functioning in 1983 after serving the city for 72 years. In 2004 the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources agreed to allocate the Silahtarağa Power Plant to IBU

for a period of 20 years. In return, IBU agreed to renovate and revitalize it in line with an agreed protocol. According to this protocol, the university was responsible for building a museum of energy as a living memory. IBU envisioned this site as a culture-led regeneration project for the Golden Horn Inlet Area. It was named Santralistanbul in the belief that it would be a "generator" of culture and arts, just as it used to produce and distribute electricity for Istanbul and beyond.

Reassuringly, some of Turkey's star architects carried out the project. Nevertheless, it took more time and the work cost more than originally estimated. IBU was able to complete most of the project with the support of private sponsors and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB). However, the state proudly appropriated the site. It was Prime Minister Erdoğan who first opened the site to the public in July 2007.[17]

The university restored the existing buildings, founded the Museum of Electricity, constructed a contemporary art museum on the remaining traces of a boiler, and also built its third campus, as well as premises for artists, a temporary library, and restaurants. Strategically, IBU placed all related departments on this campus, envisaging that both the educational aspirations of the university and the cultural/artistic activities of Santralistanbul would benefit from each other. Indeed, it created many unforeseen benefits. Most importantly, the female students who were banned from higher education as a result of wearing the Muslim headscarf had an exceptional chance to continue their education. There were no official controls at the entrance of the university campus, which also serves as a museum—in other words, it was an appropriated public space.[18]

Without a doubt, Santralistanbul introduced a new public realm, at least for a while, to its students, visitors, and local people living in surrounding neighborhoods. It may not have been able to form close bonds but at least it built connections to reach out and communicate with them through arts, research, and opening up its space. It also created an unavoidable gentrification effect, which is still music to the ears of the benefiting proprietors.

However, changes began after IBU became a member of the Laureate International Universities Network (LIUN). In 2009, owing to financial difficulties, the founding board had to sell the university to the largest private network of higher education institutions in the world. The university's board of trustees was restructured and the management of the university was changed. After a short while, Santralistanbul—which was

initially planned as an integral part of the university—was made into a separate cultural entity, including everything built or restored other than the educational facilities. The cultural institution tried to sustain itself by hosting commercial launches (e.g. Mercedes, Camper), events (Istanbul Fashion Week), and concerts, or via European Union-supported projects. However, such creative endeavors were not enough to compensate for the requirements of such a site while the pressure of the university to capitalize on the value of the property was increasing. Hence Turkey's first-ever building designed to exhibit works of contemporary art was once again converted for educational purposes.

The last blow to the dream of creating a site for arts and culture was the decision of the new board of trustees, which attempted to disperse the 150 pieces of the modern/contemporary art collection of Santralistanbul. This caused an outrage within the art community, which questioned once more the "public" status of such private museums, as well as their collections. The lack of transparency about the university's decision and the government's apparent approval of such a sale also came under fierce fire.

It is a pity that Santralistanbul missed out on the chance to make heard an alternative voice to the private museums, which are only concerned with exhibiting their own investment/collection. These also lost out to the almost non-existent state museums because of a lack of know-how, vision to build, preserve, and present any contemporary/modern art collection. As a result, the public good was lost. More importantly, though, Santralistanbul, which was established with an overambitious ideal to become a generator of culture and arts that disseminates to all segments of society on the local, city, and even global levels, has failed.

There are just a few years left before the build-operate-transfer protocol is officially over. Under the auspices of LIUN, IBU has continued to invest in the venue by constructing new educational buildings and extending the parking lots, so that almost all faculties are gathered on the same campus. The state allowed this conversion of use, even encouraging the university administration by accepting its proposals for new departments and faculties that will increase the number of students. That said, the state also started to intervene in the management of the campus after the site became purely an education facility alongside the Museum of Energy. In 2012, first the sale of alcoholic beverages at festivals was criticized by the prime minister, who stated that it offended the values of neighboring residents. Then the Higher Education Council sent a memorandum banning the sale of alcoholic beverages on the campus. As a

result, festivals, culture, and entertainment-related events, as well as two restaurants, were removed.

A recent unpleasant act was the suspension of a professor of art history, based on the argument that she had insulted the president in her lecture.[19] This action provoked a severe reaction from academics and the art scene, who questioned the role and independence of the university. It is obvious that the authoritarian pressure on Turkish universities has increased but, as this suspension illustrates, the AKP can easily exceed the limits of neoliberal pragmatism where it has more power. Thus for some universities, like IBU, which depend on governmental sources, additional caution seems to be needed in order to fall in line with the government's current thinking.

The Santralistanbul case illustrates the top-down voice of the AKP, which silences all possible alternatives and results of collaborative actions. Unsuccessful attempts by the IKSV to form a partnership with the state, and the continuing challenge of IBU to gain assurance from the state that it can keep its campus (and Santralistanbul), have shown that NGOs—if not purely private—might have difficulty in working together and collaborating with the state. The Santralistanbul was an idealistic project and bore significant costs for its initiators—the university. The AKP government, when leasing the site, was aware of the artistic and cultural ambitions of IBU. It was Erdoğan himself who opened the site to public review just before the national elections, stating that artistic events at Santralistanbul might not be accepted by the ideology that he represents. Then again, only three years after the opening, he was the one who announced that he had stopped the sale of alcoholic beverages at the festivals organized there. Now Santralistanbul, which was a well-meant visionary project, has almost dropped its artistic venture entirely to become a university campus, which is also still under negotiation with the government to make sure it is sustained for the long term.

As in all games of the market, the former board of IBU took a risk. It lost its utopian project and the control of the university initiating it. Under the ownership of a globally operating private enterprise, IBU became one of those universities that a company owns, at the expense of losing its individual identity and vision of what makes it special. This transformation indicates once more that "content" matters. One cannot help wondering if IBU would have been more successful if it had only restored the energy museum and built a campus instead of investing most of its budget in building a public project around contemporary arts, entertainment, and culture.

5   Wasting Public Funds: Sütlüce Cultural Center

Sütlüce Cultural Center is another industrial heritage site in Istanbul that has been converted for cultural purposes. The Sütlüce Slaughterhouse was one of the first examples of modern Turkish architecture, facing the Golden Horn Inlet. In contrast to the two examples discussed above, it was planned, projected, and constructed by IBB alone. However, it took 14 years and four different mayors until it was completed.

Under AKP control, the municipalities were authorized to act in new areas, such as urban economy, expanding trade, urban transformation, and also the cultural field via numerous legal arrangements.[20] However, Istanbul has a special place in the AKP's neoliberal development strategy. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of IBB, adopted the dream of placing Istanbul on the map of global cities, an ambition that dates back to the 1980s. Under his leadership as prime minister and later as president, he set a division of labor between metropolitan and district municipalities in Istanbul. While IBB undertook to make Istanbul itself the center of attraction, district municipalities kept on providing cultural services to people from Istanbul.

Under such pressure, the construction[21] of the center could not be completed as planned and was even extended to the terms of two more AKP mayors (Ali Müfit Gürtuna and Kadir Topbaş). The construction was finished only in 2009. The cost was originally estimated to be 4 million TRY[22] but it came to a total of 220 million TRY[23] following three more tenders (Kılıç 2007). Several reasons were given for this long and expensive delay, including the failure of the architect, the professor who also served as the president of Istanbul Conservation Commission, in his miscalculations and his decision to demolish a "heritage" building as a way of "restoration", and a lack of architectural programming and management (Gümüş 2007).

Nevertheless, when the Sütlüce Cultural Center opened in 2009 in a rush to host its first worldwide event—the 5th World Water Forum with 25,000 participants—the failures of construction management became more visible. Building works had not been fully completed, even at the press conference, at which the center was introduced as the largest cultural venue in Istanbul. After this event in March 2009, the center was finalized to host the grand opening of European Capital of Culture (ECOC) 2010, and it was renamed by Prime Minister Erdoğan as the International Haliç Fair, Congress and Culture Center, the so-called Haliç Congress Center.

Operations in municipal cultural centers have been carried out via tenders. Two years after the opening of the Haliç Congress Center, IBB chose to lease the management to a private firm for 29 years.[24] Today the center hosts conventions, exhibitions, cocktail parties, wedding receptions, film galas, and theatrical performances, but only a few congresses. Like many other municipal venues, it continues to carry on the same working style despite the new administration, while NGOs still seek venues to exhibit arts and culture.

First and foremost, the case of the Sütlüce Cultural Center illustrates how public funds have been squandered via bidding systems. Most of the government operations were carried out through tendering bids, especially in the construction industry—from buying the material to craftsmanship and services. Moreover, the same system is applied across Turkey to manage cultural centers or to provide arts and cultural services. Unfortunately, neither the bureaucrats who write the bids nor the enterprises applying to them have an arts or cultural background. In the public sector, the same scenario keeps on repeating itself as a result of inadequate capacity to envision a cultural center with a program even before its construction, lack of cooperation with the architect to design a building that covers the preagreed needs of the proposed venue, and inexperienced staff who have limited ideas about arts and culture and how to manage the sector.

The government is also restructuring its institutions under the new public administration domain, where enterprise and competition are imposed as the acclaimed means of development. "Functional efficiency" has become the sole aim. As there is no questioning or monitoring throughout the contracting and construction processes of these cultural centers, few queries are raised about the use of open centers, their occupancy/emptiness rates, or the cultural variety of their programs. The management in municipalities, which are equipped with extended authority in the realm of advancing economy, trade, and urban transformation, focuses on boosting economic capital production instead of providing services. And, unfortunately, favoritism/nepotism has started to prevail in such positions where the AKP tends to favor its own electorate and alliances.

The case of Sütlüce Cultural Center is one of the (misused) opportunities that the AKP used to mark its era by building its own representations of culture. The conversion project was a mistake from the beginning. Instead of demolishing the unwanted project, as in the case of Ayazağa Cultural Center, the AKP preferred to continue this excessive and disproportionate project. The result was far from satisfactory. It neither meets

the needs of artists and cultural organizers, who are always in search of venues, nor satisfies the expectations of the vast Istanbul audience. This project also proved once more that tendering bids does not ensure efficiency by any means. However, the AKP is happy with the result because it erected a monument during its term in office, situated right in the middle of the Golden Horn cultural cluster, which was completed mostly by investments from private enterprises.

6   "Build! Destroy! Build! Destroy! Build! Build! Build More! Build! Destroy! Destroy Them All!! Demolish!! Let's Destroy!"[25] Atatürk Cultural Center: The Only State-Run Cultural Center in Istanbul

Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, AKM) was the first building designed as a "cultural center" in Turkey. It was intended to host performing arts such as opera, ballet, symphonic music, and theatre in support of its aim to stage products of "high culture", fitting into the modernist-educative purposes of its era. It was registered as a cultural heritage building by the Istanbul 1st Cultural and Heritage Preservation Board in 1999.

Examining the AKM's program spanning more than 30 years, it can be seen that the "central/high culture" designed in the republican era has been followed closely and continues to maintain its central significance. However, the symbolic value of the AKM has surpassed the cultural values of the works staged there and has elevated organization to an iconic status that represents the modern culture of a secular Turkish Republic (Baykal Büyüksaraç 2004).

The AKM has always been perceived as a state institution. Since its establishment, it has been administered by the directorates of MOCT. Its premises are owned by the same ministry. In contrast to its counterparts, the AKM continued as governments came and went. However, in 2006, the MOCT, under the AKP, applied to annul its status in order to demolish the AKM and construct "a bigger and better" building that would be fit for "Istanbul's new global identity". The parliament accepted the annulment, and the decision to demolish was left to the MOCT. In 2008 the citizens of Istanbul accidentally found out about this decision when a special clause was added as a last-minute amendment to the law passed to support the cultural and artistic infrastructure work in Istanbul as it became the ECOC 2010 (Law 5706, 2007).[26]

Following that, a strong opposition campaign[27] sprung up to stop the demolition of the building, and many actors from different backgrounds played a pivotal role in negotiating a solution to help improve the AKM's status. The MOCT agreed to a restoration and regeneration process, and the center was closed for restoration. The new project involved restoring the existing building with a few changes in function and adaptations to the market economy, or, as Maral (2014) puts it, "transforming into a 'lucrative' enterprise".[28] The Culture, Art and Tourism Labourers' Union, whose members were the artists and workers of the AKM and moved into other buildings as the center became dysfunctional throughout this process, filed a suit against the MOCT's project in June 2009. They claimed that the so-called renovation process as part of ECOC 2010 preparations had also served as the instrumentalization of neoliberal ideals rather than for the preservation of the building. With the court's order for a stay of execution a month later, the Istanbul ECOC 2010 Agency stopped all work relating to the restoration of the AKM. The minister of culture and tourism, Ertuğrul Günay, said there was once a chance to use those funds but it had been wasted.

Obviously this was not the case because only two years later, in 2012, Sabancı Holding[29] announced that it would support the project to the tune of 30 million TRY.[30] The protocol was signed by Günay, stating that only the necessary precautions would be taken so that the center could be opened as soon as possible. The renovation process resumed in 2012, but later in 2013 the MOCT announced that building work had been stopped again owing to the detection of several risks for the builders. This was just after the Gezi Park incidents in June 2013, and indeed the building was unlocked throughout these events and served as a shelter—and sometimes armor—for the protesters. In the end, the AKM became a symbol of solidarity. The building was taken under the control of the state while crushing the Gezi protestors and the AKM was turned into a police station for more than eight months.

The AKM's current situation is a running sore. "We are in AKM" [#akmdeyiz] was the latest initiative, set up in March 2015, reclaiming the center and demanding the building's restoration. Once more, campaigners called on the government for decisive action. Today the monumental façade of the building serves as an open-air billboard, once more proving that it has no more use than its commercial value in the eyes of the ruling party.

The ongoing story of the AKM under the AKP regime is a continuous effort to convert the center into something new. First it challenges its form—stating that it does not fit in with the desires of a global city. Such a claim was not acceptable considering the symbolic and cultural values of

the AKM, but also not surprising when one remembers the AKP's dependence on construction. The rest of the story seems to be that this was just procrastination by the AKP until it came to gain full decision-making power. And during its third term in office, as Aksoy suggests, the AKP started to mention more about "content"—in other words, what constitutes "cultural identity" (Aksoy 2014: 39).

The case of the AKM should be considered as one of those remaining castles of the modern Turkish Republic, which apparently symbolizes the modernist and Western elitism that the AKP's ideology abhors. Thus the conversion of the AKM has become the ultimate aim, pursued by the AKP and Erdoğan himself. The center was challenged externally and internally by all means. Its form, function, and character have been questioned. Its function has been taken away; it has been emptied; it has become a subject of dispute; and finally it has been left to decay. However, in every AKP attack, the center rises again from its ashes. During the Gezi Park incidents, it gave a platform to the voice of the suppressed once more. The cultural identity of the center has become stronger and diversified. It has become the symbol not just of secular modernists but also of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals, Kurds, Alevis, workers, students, and many activists from many different backgrounds and viewpoints.

7   Conclusion

Converting spaces might be easier compared to converting meanings as many of them have been multilayered and attributed through time and people. The cases presented here give us a chance to make a reading of new cultural spaces in Istanbul through a cultural policy lens. In this respect, Ayazağa Cultural Center demonstrates the easiest and most successful conversion project. PPP presents only win–win conditions after bypassing the third sector that had "high art" ambitions for the conversion. Santralistanbul illustrates an idealistic version of conversion, attempted by a private university. It managed to create a public realm through changing form and function. However, when the partners changed, the equilibrium was upset and compromises over function and character began to arise. On the other hand, Sütlüce Cultural Center demonstrates an exaggerated and failed conversion despite the change in form and function. It depicts inadequate sides of public administration and new public management applications. Finally, the Atatürk Cultural Center stands today as an iconic cultural center with a form, function, and a character. To convert it is already a challenge in itself.

This attempt to describe the changing cultural policy of Turkey with reference to cultural centers may seem overgeneralized. However, establishing places that claim to provide access to culture creates an opportunity not only to watch but also to engage with a variety of social and cultural practices. Thus the form, function, and character of the center all become important, as it presents "the opportunity to transgress social and cultural boundaries" (Grafe 2014: 23). In this respect, all the conversion attempts presented in this chapter have partly failed because they have forgotten along the way that they are dealing with culture (heritage, history, arts, and its people). They fall short in terms of meeting the cultural needs of the public. Instead, neoliberal economic dogma trumps all cultural issues, which exist in an unregulated cultural policy vacuum that happens to suit the AKP.

Under the AKP's totally business-oriented cultural actions, any arts- and culture-related concerns disappear to make way for commercial investment- and entertainment-driven populist programming. It also leads to poor management of facilities by the people who lack the training and competence to operate in culture.

Unfortunately the top-down voice of the state gets louder every day, not only singularizing alternate voices but also centralizing the state's powers. Ironically, this monolithic voice was the driving force behind the progress of the early Turkish Republic, while today it serves to the contrary. In this process, Erdoğan in particular leads the scene, and thwarts all attempts by defenders of artistic and cultural production, which he sees as a disservice to his agenda. His dream to brand Istanbul as a global city with conference venues and activities has become the overarching so-called "cultural project" that only seeks profit and creates speculation.

Recently, we also started hearing more of the cultural content. Erdoğan, during the 2016 Arts and Culture Presidential Grand Awards, stated:

> In fact, it is impossible for a country that fails to develop in culture and arts to be truly independent or to maintain its independence. We have to accept that we, as the country, have fallen short of duly grasping this fact. We have yet to go a long way not only to raise new values, but also to promote our currently available values on a global scale and to introduce them to large masses.[31]

Yet the AKP seems to present no cultural vision other than conservative aesthetics, which are coupled with the marginalization of Atatürk's Westernizing cultural legacy.

The AKP eschews any desire to reach a broader audience or to protect cultural rights, freedoms, and cultural diversity. The conversion projects explored here concentrate almost entirely on the built environment and economic capital, and ignore its main actor—the community.

NOTES

1. As Ada underlines, however, that "does not mean that there is no cultural policy". Written or unwritten, it is obvious that during the foundation period, the new state had a clear vision: it aimed to found a 'national culture'. Serhan Ada, "For a New Cultural Policy", in *Introduction to Cultural Policy in Turkey*, ed. Serhan Ada and Ayça İnce, Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2009, 93–94.

2. In 2013 the Council of Europe's National Cultural Policy Report process almost reached its goal with the completion of the National Report by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. This was a descriptive report of what existed and the laws behind them. Then the *Independent Expert's Report* was completed. For both reports, see http://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/national-reviews. However, the obligatory follow-up actions (e.g. the meeting in which experts and responsible ministers discuss the report, or translation of the report into the language of the state) have never been carried out. See http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/monitoring-coe-cpr.php.

3. *Independent Expert's Report* (2013), Recommendation no. 16. p. 81. See https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806963fe.

4. Ibid., Recommendation no.15 p. 81.

5. Ibid., p. 37.

6. "Conversion" is a very broad term that can be defined as "the act or process of changing from one religion, belief, political party etc., to another", and in architecture as "the adaptation of a building for a new purpose", Waite et al., *Pocket Oxford American Dictionary, and Thesaurus*, 166. Any conversion project therefore has to deal with history, architecture, economy, culture, and cultural policy all at the same time.

7. For detailed information, see Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* [People's Houses: Ideology and Architecture], 72–78, and Toksoy, *Halkevleri: Bir Kültürel Kalkınma Modeli Olarak* [People's Houses: A Cultural Development Model], 63–72.

8. See Çeviker Gürakar, *Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey* for evidence-based analysis of increasing favoritism in public procurement (from tourism, health, energy and transport).

9. Recent research, with the available latest data dating back to 2013, shows that the budget of the MOCT has never been more than 0.5% of the total national budget. This portion most likely amounts to less than half that figure, considering that culture shares the same ministry with tourism. http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/kultur-sanat/594356/ Paramizin_yuzde_ucunu_bile_sanata_harcamiyoruz.html#.

10. Worth approximately $6,756,756–$8,445,945 based on exchange rates as of 23 September 2016.

11. It is the march of the Ottoman janissary band, the Mehter platoon: moving two steps forward, one step back.

12. The IKSV was founded by businessmen and art enthusiasts in 1973. It acted as the sole provider, tastemaker, and trendsetter of the arts and cultural scene until late 2000s. It took a while for private enterprise to discover and invest in the cultural sector. The philanthropic family-owned major holding companies such as Koç, Sabancı and Eczacıbaşı started to found their private museums—Sadberk Hanım Museum (1980), Rahmi Koç Museum (1994), Sabancı Museum (2002), Istanbul Modern (2004), Pera Museum (2005)—by the late 1990s, where they exhibited their family art collections. Their choice of venues was pre-eminent, as they all favored converting cultural heritage sites into museums.

13. Circular no. 5228 on the encouragement of support (sponsorship) activities in the field of culture proposes tax deductions on aids and donations for culture and cultural infrastructure; and Bill no. 5225 offers tax incentives for cultural investments and enterprises.

14. See http://v3.arkitera.com/h14695-maslaktaki-kultur-merkezi-icin-ozel-sektore-cagri.html.

15. Gazetesi, "Ayazaga'nın kaderini Turkmall teslim aldı" [Turkmall will tell the destiny of Ayazga].

16. This is not the first time that Erdoğan has sped up the opening of a cultural site in line with his political purposes. As a result, he opened Istanbul Modern just before 17 December 2004, which was the scheduled date for the commencement of the negotiations concerning Turkey's accession to the European Union. Similarly, Santralistanbul was opened to public just before the 22 July 2007 elections, and then opened again with a full program in October 2007.

17. In 1998 the judges in the Turkish Constitutional Court supported the Muslim headscarf ban, which dates back to 1982, to eliminate the Islamist movements. Throughout the 2002 national election campaign, the lifting of the headscarf ban was the AKP's primary motivation. Even though it won the election, the AKP only proposed changes to the constitution in 2008, stating that "noone shall be deprived of the higher education right". In 2008, IBU was among the many universities to lift the headscarf ban

without waiting for an official decision. Having a liminal campus that houses museums and other facilities eased IBU's ability to let students with headscarves in. Years later, in September 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan officially lifted the headscarf ban in Turkey. Korteweg and Yurdakul, *The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging*, 71–75.

18. See http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/552267/Bilgi_Universitesi__Erdogan_a_elestiriyi_hakaret_sayip_Prof._Balikcioglu_nu_isten_atti.html#.

19. The black box is an architectural term that refers to one-huge open space that can continuously converted to serve to multi-functions of cultural venue.

20. Dated 3 July 2005, numbered 5393 Municipality Act; and dated 10 July 2004, numbered 5216 Metropolitan Municipality Act.

21. The site was fully functioning until its conversion project was commissioned by Nurettin Sözen (the CHP mayor) in 1994. The project was only put out to tender in 1997, when Erdoğan was elected as mayor of Istanbul. The slaughterhouse was demolished in 1998 and its replacement was planned to be completed in 400 days.

22. Worth approximately $1,351,351 based on exchange rates as of 23 September 2016.

23. Worth approximately $74,324,324 based on exchange rates as of 23 September 2016.

24. Later in 2014, another company owned by the same investor won the tender for the Golden Horn Yacht Harbour, which is just next to the Haliç Congress Center.

25. Extract from the text on the AKM by Maral, *From Cultural Hall to Shopping Mall, in Places of Memory*.

26. Law on Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture no. 5706, dated 2 November 2007, Clause 11a.

27. Chamber of Architects' press release, dated 21 February 2007, is notable as a reminder of the values that could be attributed to the AKM: documentary value, cultural heritage value, architectural value, icon and memory value, and originality value. All this contributes to its value as a cultural property.

28. Extract from the text on the AKM by Maral, *From Cultural Hall to Shopping Mall, in Places of Memory,* 83.

29. Sabancı Holdings is one of the leading philanthropic family-owned major holding companies in Turkey.

30. Worth approximately $10,135,135 based on exchange rates as of 23 September 2016.

31. See http://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/69587/it-is-impossible-for-a-country-that-fails-to-develop-in-culture-and-arts-to-be-truly-independent.html.

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Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses: A Matrix for Reviving Arts and Handicrafts, Constructing Local Values, and Reworking National Culture

Muriel Girard

1   Introduction

An information bulletin published in 1996, 20 years after the founding of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Art and Vocational Training Courses (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi sanat ve meslek eğitimi kursları, İSMEK) emphasizes its role in preserving "traditional arts and handicrafts". Though once on the verge of disappearing, these have been taken up again.[1] The narrative provided by this bulletin reveals the mechanisms by which the municipal authority has manufactured heritage.

This is the perspective used in this chapter to study İSMEK, which is rarely analyzed in such terms. Instead it has been viewed through the prism of local government (Alpaydın 2006; Ikizer 2010), educational policy within the context of neoliberalism (Yıldız 2012), and educational

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science (Parlara and Fidan 2014).[2] İSMEK was founded in 1996 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was mayor of Istanbul at the time, and it describes itself as the "largest public university in Turkey". It is part of the general policy of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) (Yıldız 2012), being both a gauge of and actively engaged in shaping the commercial and ideological climate rooted in the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.[3] In 2015, İSMEK had 240 teaching centers across the city, with 220,000 students enrolled in 348 different branches (IT, languages, sport, music, etc.).[4] These included arts and handicrafts courses, which are the focus of this chapter. These courses have given rise to exhibitions, retail outlets, and publications, and have generated a narrative based on the local preservation of national culture.

İSMEK's interest in arts and handicrafts—like that of other actors and institutions—is linked to the resurgence of the Ottoman past since the 1980s. The Turkish Republic had previously defined itself (or at least presented itself) as having operated a clean break with that period. Much has been written over recent years (since the end of 1990s, mainly since the early 2000s and even more since the 2010s) about the use made of Ottoman heritage. Research has shown that the premises of this resurgence may be traced back to before the AKP's arrival in power, and that they were not the sole preserve of this party. The first signs may be found in the 1950s, and over the course of the 1980s, Turgut Özal's center-right government made abundant reference to the Ottoman Empire (Bartu 1999, 2001; Ongur 2015). These need to be put into perspective, being part of the drive to promote the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis", an ideology seeking to bring about the "nationalization of Islam and the Islamization of Turkish history" (Pérouse 2004: 211). Within the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the Ottoman heritage is viewed as a component of "national culture", something which was reinforced in the 1980s and especially the 1990s when state institutions took up this ideology (Copeaux 1997, 1999; Polo and Üstel 2014). Studies have also shown that references to the empire vary depending on the political party, both in terms of the period evoked and the meaning attributed. The literature has also emphasized that references to the Ottoman past are made by private actors too, particularly the tourism sector since the 1980s (Sauner 1998), and more recently the media (Carney 2014; Jabbour 2015). The positive value placed on the Ottoman Empire by the AKP, sometimes described as "neo-Ottomanism", has been analyzed in studies of its cultural policy (Polo and Üstel 2014), issues of collective memory (Maessen 2014), and heritage (see e.g. Girard 2014), the perspective adopted here.

The hypothesis put forward in this chapter is that İSMEK may be seen as a matrix for reviving arts and handicrafts and, above and beyond its cultural reconfigurations, for promoting Ottoman heritage, Islam, and Turkishness.[5] The purpose of this chapter is to show how a local institution—a powerful one admittedly, given the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's preponderance nationwide as the largest city in Turkey—can act as a powerful operator of social and cultural change. İSMEK placed the twin notions of tradition and modernity at the heart of its mechanisms. Its action in the field of arts and handicrafts may thus be seen as a heritage enterprise of "invention of tradition" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Deconstructing this process raises the questions of who invents, and why and how they do so. This leads on to the issues of the reception of these invented traditions and how they are appropriated. By examining the instruments, actors, and narratives, this chapter shows how İSMEK is actively involved in constructing a new heritage sphere, which, I shall argue, feeds into redefinitions of locality.[6]

Analyzing this process entails studying what İSMEK does within the more general context of the arts and handicrafts revival in Istanbul and Turkey, so as to appreciate how the bodies involved compete with and copy one another. İSMEK is not unique in what it does, and other actors have coexisted with and even existed before it, albeit without operating on the same sort of scale. İSMEK's national narrative is confronted with variations depending on the context and the institutions involved. Placing it in this perspective brings out just how forceful its narrative is.

My study is based on interviews and informal discussions with İSMEK students, teachers, and staff, and observations carried out mainly in 2007, complemented by fieldwork in 2010 and 2015. It also draws on analysis of the narratives that İSMEK produces in its brochures, information bulletins, magazines, and books, and the data available online (on its website and social media networks).[7]

This chapter is divided into four sections. It starts by looking at the rise of İSMEK and the issues at stake in reviving arts and handicrafts. It then examines how the heritage categories it produces amount to one construction among others, with which it competes. It then analyses the "coproduction" dimension to İSMEK courses, touching on how cultural action (re)manufactures the national heritage and seeks to build up a feeling of belonging among women, who form the majority of students. Finally, it studies local cultural productions together with how these are transferred

and circulated. Examining İSMEK within the perspective of other projects to revive handicrafts shows that certain issues and instruments recur. Furthermore, it may be hypothesized that İSMEK—like apparently similar institutions in other towns—provides a model for vocational training and for reviving practices associated with a social imaginary of tradition. This model would appear to be a factor in the reworking of national culture and of national community observable in present-day Turkey.

2   İSMEK as a Matrix for Manufacturing Heritage

2.1   *İSMEK's Emergence as a Powerful Municipal Institution*

İSMEK was founded in 1996, when Istanbul was run by the Welfare Party (Refah partisi, RP).[8] It is now a tool in the AKP's municipal policy and part of its more general policy line.[9] It provides teaching, runs seminar, holds exhibitions of students' work, and publishes journals and books about arts and handicrafts. İSMEK dispenses training in accordance with law no. 5216, setting out the responsibilities of metropolitan municipalities with regard to social and cultural services for adults, women, young people, the elderly, and the disabled, in cooperation with universities, faculties, public foundations, and non-governmental organizations. It provides training and awards diploma under the aegis of the Ministry of Education in particular, and in accordance with a protocol agreed on by the Istanbul governor's office and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, İBB).[10] All of its courses are free of charge. They run from October to June and the number of teaching hours varies depending on each course. They are open to everyone over the age of 16, and at the end of the course students receive a certificate endorsed by the Ministry of Education.[11]

According to its official statements, İSMEK was set up to meet several needs: plugging a gap in adult education, creating local educational facilities as part of a decentralization process, increasing women's participation in the production process thanks to vocational training, and the socialization of individuals. Above and beyond this it is associated with the recognized changes in the structure of Istanbul and the idea that migrants there—be they recently arrived or longer established—need help adapting to city life.

İSMEK has continually grown over the course of its 20-year existence, and is now present across the entire metropolitan area. Three centers were

opened in 1996, with courses in three fields of activity attended by 141 students. By 2006 there were 170 teaching centers, 97 courses, and 120,000 people enrolled. In 2015 nearly 228,000 people attended the 348 courses dispensed in 240 teaching centers. Arts and handicrafts courses accounted for 25.57% of students.[12] Three of the centers even specialized in Turkish-Islamic arts (*Türk-Islam Sanatları*), to use the official terminology, bearing in mind that various branches of these arts can also be studied in many other İSMEK centers.[13] According to İSMEK's statistics, 1.8 million people have followed its courses since it was first set up.[14]

Looking back over this 20-year period, it is clear that there was a very marked expansion from 2004 onwards. Whereas 18,800 people followed courses in 2003–2004, this rose to a little over 40,000 people in 2004–2005, then 120,000 the year after. This increase no doubt needs to be seen within the context of adult training being taken up as official AKP policy after the 2004 municipal elections (Yıldız 2012 in reference to Erder and İncioğlu 2008) and the election of Kadir Topbaş as mayor of Istanbul.[15]

İSMEK's increasing power may also be seen in the festivals it holds, such as the Tulip Festival (Lalı festival), which Lepont has argued is indicative of "neo-Ottomanism" (2007). Equally, the opening of stores and temporary exhibition centers is suggestive of İSMEK's reach; the Şişhane underground station store and exhibition on Taksim Square in April 2015, for instance, show how İSMEK is moving into central parts of Istanbul.

Its expansion may also be seen in its online presence via its website and on social networks with a Facebook page (opened in 2010), Twitter account (2013) on which it tweets daily, and Instagram.

Lastly, İSMEK's strength is shown in its publications, an important channel for promoting arts and handicrafts. It publishes various types of material, including annual course guides, and biannual İSMEK information bulletins (in which Kadir Topbaş assumes a prominent role), catalogues of works produced by pupils and sometimes teachers, conference proceedings, and the journal *El Sanatları* [Handicrafts], all of which act as channels for disseminating the heritage narrative it is building.[16]

2.2   *Heritage as a Tool for Identification and Integration*

The revival of arts and handicrafts is part of İSMEK's social policy and its reinterpretation of Turkish national culture. This chapter analyses the

editorials written by Kadir Topbaş in İSMEK publications beetwen 2006 and 2016, as well as drawing on discussions. While some variants may be detected, analysis shows that the revitalization of arts and handicrafts is used to create new local/national values, to adopt a stance towards globalization, and to assert a feeling of shared belonging to the city against a backdrop of social change. The purpose in constructing a Turkish-Islamic identity is to help create a feeling of local belonging in tandem with shared national values. The construction of locality here operates on two scales—a local/global scale in the context of globalization, and a local/national scale in the process of identification with Istanbul. As for the values being promoted, Cheviron and Pérouse have observed that the Refah municipality in Istanbul justified the changes introduced in terms of "an attempt to return to 'local' practices and values, be they Ottoman, Islamic, Turkish, or Anatolian" (Cheviron and Pérouse 2016: 143).

The setting up of İSMEK in 1996 and the explicit desire to revitalize local values in a global world have occurred during a period of ever greater debate about the cultural impact of globalization (Appadurai 1990)—debates which are relayed internationally and reworked locally. When İSMEK was founded, its project to revitalize arts and handicrafts was viewed as an alternative to homogenization and as offering protection from globalization. It is worth noting that the RP, which was behind the setting up of İSMEK, adopted a different stance towards globalization than other political parties.[17] It was the only party to allude to people who felt excluded by the project for a "global town", deploying slogans such as "a fair order" and "a new world". Several researchers have nevertheless suggested that the importance attached to this project be revised downwards, noting how the draw of "world city" status fed into dreams of grandeur and became a component in "Islamic nationalist" rhetoric (Bora 1999; Pérouse 1999; Öncü 2007). Furthermore, the project of the current AKP-led Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality endeavors to promote the internationalization of Istanbul as part of a discourse dominated by urban competitiveness (Pérouse 2016). And in editorials written by Kadir Topbaş, İSMEK has been presented as an instrument to increase Istanbul's global pull, especially since Istanbul's stint as European Capital of Culture in 2010.[18]

Against this backdrop of globalization, tradition is presented both as a unifying factor and as proof of modernity. One of İSMEK's objectives has always been to safeguard local culture and transmit it to future generations. Thus, in 2004, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that one of İSMEK's

missions was to transmit cultural heritage and protect handicrafts and local values, a point taken up by administrators and in official texts (Alpaydın 2006). Analysis of the editorials by Istanbul mayor Kadir Topbaş, and statements by administrators I have met, show that the discourse first focused on the idea of loss and on the fear that the cultural values of the past might disappear. This fear is a classic precursor to all actions to safeguard heritage. The İBB has thus positioned itself as coming to the rescue of cultural and social heritage via İSMEK.

To quote from the preface of Kadir Topbaş in *Hat San'atı. Tarihçe, Malzeme ve Örnekler* [The Art of Calligraphy. History, Materials and Examples] (Berk 2006) as an example,

> The passing of time, developments to technology, and changes to daily life may well wage enormous destruction against the finesse of arts, but our traditional arts are safeguarded by the mediation of institutions such as İSMEK, and transmitted to future generations with meticulous care and abnegation. We are very clearly facing a reality where we need to protect our cultural values. For the future of societies that do not protect their past is not a glorious one, and it is how many societies have been wiped from the face of history.[19]

Furthermore, a dialectic was built up between tradition and modernity, the past and the future. It became a matter of protecting the past so as to safeguard the future. Tradition was thus turned into a factor for modernity and renewed power.[20]

One of İSMEK's, missions is to drive a feeling of belonging to the city and to disseminate a model of urbanity, something it does by promoting (imagined) local values. This is to be associated with İBB action to "urbanize" (*kentlileştirmek*) populations born outside the Istanbul municipality (who account for two-thirds of the city's population according to Pérouse 2007).[21] In 2003 the İBB launched a campaign called "Istanbul, my city" built around three main axes: becoming aware of the city's cultural and historical values; taking part in its transformation; and, having appropriated the city, moving on to protecting it (Pérouse 2007: 56; Öncü 2007). Analysis of İSMEK's, pronouncements shows that arts and handicrafts were conceived as conveying cultural values, and as tools in a larger program to mould people to "metropolitan" and "urban" life. This is still one of İSMEK's, explicit objectives.[22] Revitalizing arts and handicrafts works in two directions: seeking to a certain extent to valorize the Anatolian roots of the population, and encouraging them to adhere to a—necessarily reified—"Istanbul identity".

But whether it is a matter of adopting a position within globalization or creating a feeling of belonging to Istanbul, at issue is protecting not so much local as national culture. Indeed, references to the nation occur more frequently than references to the local in writings and in accounts provided by those met. The local values that were being promoted were thus placed within a national culture.

3   Building Heritage Categories in a Competitive Environment

As Yıldız has observed, "It is worth noting that the courses include Turkish Islamic Arts, such as porcelain, painting, paper marbling, and calligraphy, as well as languages, such as Arabic and Ottoman. These are typically valued by conservatives, and it is obvious that such courses provide Islamic socialization" (Yıldız 2012: 252). Arts and handicrafts are thus conceived of as underpinning tradition.[23] Analysis of statements by actors I met and of writings published by İSMEK about handicrafts (including its brochures, books, and website) show that they are vectors for affirming a Turkish-Islamic identity and testimony to the Ottoman heritage. The desire to build up local values and thereby promote a national culture thus transpires in the revival of arts and handicrafts, the terminology of which makes sense when viewed in this context.

To understand the present-day process by which heritage categories are being built, it needs to be borne in mind that in comparison to dance and music, handicrafts have only played a marginal role in the inventions of tradition associated with the building of a Turkish nation state. One of the main reasons for this is that the purpose was to modernize the state (Girard 2010). Yet as remarked in a newspaper in 2005, "over recent years traditional Turkish handicrafts have become a center of interest once again after long neglect".[24] This renewed interest has taken place within the re-emergence of Ottoman heritage, be it for ideological and/or commercial reasons, particularly in relation to tourism development.

In this context İSMEK, and behind it the İBB, tend to position themselves as championing heritage. Nevertheless, there are other actors in Istanbul, particularly foundations, involved in producing heritage categories relating to arts and handicrafts. Thus categories other than those put forward by İSMEK are in circulation in Turkey, while İSMEK's own categories have been refashioned over time.

3.1   Arts and Handicrafts as Vectors for Turkish-Islamic Identity

In an initial phase, İSMEK's heritage ambitions led to the setting up, revitalization, and promotion of Turkish-Islamic arts (*Türk-Islam sanatları*), on the one hand, and handicrafts (*El sanatları*), on the other. The adjective "traditional" does not appear in the presentation guides for the various courses. However, tradition (*gelenek*) is a central point of reference in the narratives produced, with traditional handicrafts (*geleneksel sanatlar*) also being referred to. As observed by Schick, "the neologism 'traditional art' has emerged as an unchallengeable and unquestionable concept encompassing the diverse fields and endowing them with an inviolability that borders on sacrality. Attitudes toward these arts have become a test of political correctness and even moral rectitude" (Schick 2008: 223). Yet, as we shall see, terminological shifts in categories suggest that a reified vision of tradition is giving way to a more dynamic approach, at least in public statements.

The first category, that of Turkish-Islamic arts, includes calligraphy, miniature painting, illumination, porcelain, *ebru* (paper marbling), and mother-of-pearl marquetry. More generally the Turkish-Islamic arts are symbolic of Ottoman fine arts (Alpaydın 2006: 71). They are envisaged as testimony to the Ottoman past.

Editorials written by Kadir Topbaş take Islam as the prime point of reference for the arts. He makes recurrent use of it, and on several occasions writes that "art follows the traces of the greatest artist". Reference is also made to "the Unique". A book was even published about the names of God (2006).[25] The various Turkish-Islamic arts are all linked to Islam. Within this rhetorical framework, Istanbul becomes the prototypical Islamic city. However, while Istanbul is where these arts are practiced, they are not specific to the city. Indeed, according to a conversation with a member of staff, for İSMEK, it was not about handicrafts typical of Istanbul but about Turkish-Islamic traditional handicrafts. Equally, another member of staff noted that İSMEK tried to protect the cultural heritage of the country and to transmit it in Istanbul.[26]

Furthermore, the Ottoman period is taken as the benchmark period. Hence "the finest examples of the art of calligraphy, which peaked during the Ottoman period, are to be found in nearly all historical works".[27] The dual reference to Islam and the Ottoman Empire reflect the spirit of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

The second category, that of "handicrafts" (*El sanatları*), refers more directly to Anatolia in its heritage constructs. These handicrafts include painting on silk, glass, and wood, machine and hand embroidery, knitting, lacemaking, brocade, patchwork, leather accessories, traditional and costume clothing, pottery, mosaic, drawing, painting, relief painting, wood and metal sculpture, glass decoration, wire work, silver jewelry, filigree work, stained glass, and flower arrangements, making up a fairly mixed bag. Statements by İSMEK say that tradition is to be rediscovered through Anatolian manual handicrafts deemed authentic. In one of his editorials, Kadir Topbaş writes: "our manual arts have changed and developed over time. During periods when people did not create art for the sake of it, it may be said that there was an artist in most households, especially in Anatolia".[28] Reified and idealized in this way, Anatolian rural culture is thus promoted as symbolizing a certain kind of Turkishness.

Furthermore, İSMEK's statements about Anatolian handicrafts, which are taken as "a whole" and not viewed for their regional or cultural specificities, would appear to sit ill with the multiculturalism promoted more generally. This first emerged as a commonplace of political discourse in the 1990s, before being taken up even more widely over the course of the 2000s. While in publications from 2010 there are some references to the cosmopolitanism of Istanbul, it is not as something to be promoted; instead, the idea is that by opening up İSMEK to all of the city's inhabitants, irrespective of origin, sex, or religion, their cosmopolitanism is to be assimilated.

These statements about Anatolian handicrafts also need to be seen as part of İSMEK's drive to democratize culture by making its handicrafts courses, and the purchase of handicraft products, available to the widest possible public. It may also be seen as traducing a desire to involve the popular classes in the appropriation of Ottoman heritage. Taking the example of calligraphy, Schick has shown how a fashion for Ottoman antiques was taken up by the art market in the 1990s and appropriated by the "nouveaux riches" (Schick 2008).

Analysis of İSMEK publications indicates that the names attached to these categories started to change around 2010. Despite this, it may be postulated that the meanings associated with them have continued to hold. Furthermore, the courses on offer have become more diverse. The date of 2010 is in itself significant, since it was the year Istanbul was European Capital of Culture, a common theme in publications as of 2008–2009 and over the course of 2010.

The first category to change was that of the *Türk Islam sanatları*"
which became *Sanat ve Tasarım* (art and design).[29] For the 2006–2007
courses, painting and figurative design courses were added (to those
indicated *supra*). Furthermore, ceramics now counted as a separate branch.
New branches were also opened for precious metal working and
woodwork.[30]

Shortly afterwards, the *El Sanatları* category became *El Sanatları
teknolojisi* (handicraft technology).[31] This branch had 58 courses by
2014–2015, compared with 29 in 2006–2007. It also included manual
activities largely unrelated to Anatolian handicrafts, such as English
lacemaking. It may be supposed that the terms "design" and "technology"
serve to reinforce the links between tradition and modernity and to yoke
tradition to creativity.[32] Nevertheless, the question of the change in
nomenclature requires further exploration, especially as analysis shows that
reference to the Turkish-Islamic arts and the Turkish-Islamic synthesis
figure in all heritage narratives and are frequently mentioned in publications.[33]

3.2   İSMEK: A Key Actor but Not the Only One

While İSMEK and the İBB tend to position themselves as leading a revival
in arts and handicrafts, foundations and district municipalities are also
active in the heritage field. While in no way as powerful as İSMEK, they
indicate that it does not have a monopoly. Mention may be made in
particular of the Touring Club, the Turkish Cultural Service Foundation
(Türk Kültürüne Hizmet Vakfı), and the Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Foundation,
all three of which have an arts and handicraft center in Istanbul. The first
two set up their centers before İSMEK was founded, while the third was
contemporaneous.[34] The case of Istanbul shows how a heritage object can
generate equivocal identity statements rather than circulations. Analysis of
the foundations' discourse shows that they are driven by the desire to
assert a Turkish-Islamic identity (of varying degrees of intensity) and to
project a Turkish self-image for tourists. The first two foundations have
built their action around "traditional Turkish handicrafts", as well as
"Turkish art" in the case of the Touring Club. The third institution refers
to "traditional Turkish arts". The same arts and handicrafts such as
calligraphy, miniature painting, precious metal working, and so on are
taken up as heritage objects, but with varying purposes and in reference to
different—and on occasion contradictory—identities, such as Ottoman,
Turkish, pre-Ottoman, and Islamic.

On a different scale, the Ministry for Culture and Tourism is also involved in promoting "traditional Turkish handicrafts" or "traditional handicrafts" (*Geneleksel El Sanatları*), in which tradition is a central value.[35] The specificity of İSMEK's categories also needs to be examined with regard to other Turkish regions. For instance, the case of the Southeastern Anatolian region has revealed many arts and handicrafts inventions, some of which promote multiculturalism (Girard and Scalbert-Yücel [2015]). Public and private actors involved in these identity constructions therefore copy each other despite the visible differences between them. And while a shared sensitivity to "traditional" values may be detected, it transpires in different lights depending on the context.

Given this, how has İSMEK, as an AKP policy instrument, helped spread an idea of culture based on the Ottoman period, Turkishness, and Islam?

4   "Coproduction": Courses as a Forum for Circulation

The classroom is a good place for observing actions at work and seeing how the inventions of tradition are disseminated and appropriated. I conducted several visits at different times to İSMEK arts and handicrafts courses in conservative and pro-AKP districts. These made clear the high levels of attendance as well as the high proportion of women.[36]

4.1   *Course Instructors as Transmitters of Heritage*

Course instructors are either qualified *usta* (master craftsmen) or else from academia, having trained at art college, such as the teachers of miniature painting and illumination I met .[37] The relationship here is not based on the master transmitting skills to the apprentice via a learning process based on orality and the gradual acquisition of know-how, as in handicraft workshops. Instead, it takes place over limited time periods and is conducted collectively in the classroom, even if teachers also try to to establish contact with each student and offer face-to-face interaction.

The teaching involves a component about the history of these arts and handicrafts.[38] The instructors I encountered indicated that this varies in prominence depending on the course.[39] It may convey a certain stance, focusing on the history of Turkish-Islamic arts and evoking the grandeur

of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, but that depends on the course instructor. One told me, for example, that he had opted to teach the history of art from Ancient Egypt through to the contemporary period.

Furthermore, I observed that the teaching in the Turkish-Islamic arts courses involved (perhaps initially) the reproduction of old works rather than the creation of new ones. This observation would no doubt need to be nuanced for the "design" (*tasarım*) courses, and depending on the activities concerned.

4.2   The Students as Heritage Bearers

Most students are women. During my visits I only met women, most of whom were veiled. There is a gap between discourse about handicrafts, in which women are rarely mentioned, and representations of handicrafts, thought of as a female activity. Women are a privileged target group for İSMEK, though the courses are not reserved exclusively for them.[40] Some 84% of the people attending İSMEK courses in 2006 were women (Alpaydın 2006: 63), while in 2013–2014 they accounted for 78.37%.[41]

The feminization of heritage handicrafts calls into question the representations associated with women, on the one hand, and with handicrafts, on the other. According to Alpaydın, İSMEK has targeted women for its courses from the outset, in tune with its conservative rationale (ibid.). From this traditionalist perspective, women act as the guardians of tradition. However, their involvement cannot be explained solely by the role that conservatives confer on them. First, they may well be involved in a similar function outside İSMEK, and thus independently of its ideological overtones, as shown by examples of women involved in handicraft revival projects run by the Touring Club and the Turkish Cultural Service Foundation in Istanbul in 2005. Second, the preponderance of women may also be explained by the social dimension of these projects, which seek to socialize people deemed to be marginalized and to help them acquire skills of potential economic benefit.[42] Nevertheless, the place women hold in this sort of project cannot be explained solely by top-down objectives. Perhaps women opt to take up a role in safeguarding and transmitting tradition. More pragmatically, women who do not go out to work have more free time to attend this sort of course, and in particular the nature of some of these handicrafts—patchwork, embroidery, beadworking, and so on—is perhaps more slanted towards a female public.

Having attended several courses run by İSMEK, I sought to find out how women had heard about the project, what had motivated them to take part, and what they hoped to gain from the experience. The women I met said they had heard about the project in the press and by word of mouth. The social profile of the women varied, including housewives and also a certain number of young women, many of whom had not received any higher education.[43] Furthermore, in what was perhaps an exceptional case, there was also a foreign woman attending classes during one of my visits in 2015.

The women I met repeated İBB discourse about how local values explained the necessity of the protection and the transmission of what they called the "Turkish", "Ottoman art". This idea of appropriating heritage is not specific to İSMEK. Other women I met in one-off projects to revive handicrafts run by foundations in Istanbul viewed themselves as fulfilling a similar role in heritage preservation.

As for their motivation, it was mainly a combination of an interest in traditional handicraft and the possibility of meeting people. Very few of them hoped to make a living from a handicraft. The majority of women saw it as a hobby.[44]

Only in exceptional cases did these training courses lead to the setting up of workshops, so they do not appear to modify the structure of the pre-existing handicraft world.[45] Equally, this process to revive handicrafts has taken place without any interaction with the handicraft industry as practiced in workshops, and the imaginary it conveys does not reflect the syncretism of handicraft practices.[46] The effects this proactive İBB policy may have on the symbolic representations associated with handicrafts needs further exploration, especially as İSMEK produces a large body of high-profile material to disseminate its vision of culture.

5   The Circulation of Models and Links Between Different Levels

İSMEK presents itself as a model of city government, providing popular education to revive arts and handicrafts. There has been extensive media coverage (since 2010 according to the information provided in the İSMEK information bulletin) of international relations, the welcoming of foreign delegations, exhibitions abroad, and the signing of conventions. Equally, a 2013 UNESCO periodic report states: "Today, İSMEK has become a

model organization both nationwide and worldwide."[47] This leads to the hypothesis that its influence may also be felt outside Turkey. Yet beneath İSMEK's apparent uniformity, circulations may be detected at the level of Istanbul and of the country as a whole.

5.1 İSMEK: An Original Model?

When I met a member of staff in 2007, he noted that İSMEK was a model for other municipalities in Anatolia. The question raised was that of the reproduction and dissemination of this model, particularly with regard to the revival of Turkish-Islamic arts and handicrafts. However, while İSMEK tends to present itself as the biggest operator in its field, it is not the oldest. In 1994, two years before the founding of İSMEK, Ankara Municipality Vocational Training Courses (Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Meslek Edindirme Kursları, BELMEK) was created in Ankara.[48] This targeted women and took as its slogan "Every house would be a workshop"[49] Its handicraft courses sought to boost women's skills and enable them to work at home (Alpaydın 2006). The Ankara municipality website thus indicates:

> In order to publish the culture, art and aesthetic knowledge, we attempt to develop and educate our culture, by educating our women with new expertise; we prepare them for jobs to strengthen the financial condition of the family. We teach them to work by plan and make friendship and increase their self-confidence [*sic*].[50]

Writing about İSMEK and BELMEK, Yıldız notes:

> The emergence of comprehensive educational activities by Metropolitan Municipalities also started with the March 1994 local elections after the victory of the RP, which won the highest number of votes in Ankara and Istanbul, the two largest cities in Turkey, and the educational activities offered by local authorities took on new aspects with the continuing "Islamic municipality tradition" (Doğan 2007), or in other scholars' words the "social municipality tradition". (Erder and İncioglu 2008; Yıldız 2012: 251)[51]

Rather than being seen as specific to the Istanbul municipality, İSMEK's action needs to be placed in a wider perspective linking it to AKP national policy. There have been an increasing number of vocational training centers since they were taken up as official AKP policy in 2004 (ibid.). In

2002, Konya Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses (KOMEK)—were set up, followed in 2004 by KO-MEK in Kocaeli, GASMEK in Gaziantep and ASMEK in Antalya in 2005, BUSMEK in Bursa in 2006, and then GESMEK in Gebze, İNESMEK in İnegöl, and so on. Initial analysis of the available numerical data shows that these bodies would appear to be built along the same model and among their various modules provide courses on arts and handicrafts. It also shows that Metropolitan Municipality Vocational Training Courses are to be found in AKP municipalities, but this model is not systematically rolled out to all of them.

Looking solely at public discourse, it may be hypothesized that these establishments compete to promote national culture at the local level, but also via their local action to reshape ideas about that national culture. This leads us to look in greater detail at the links between AKP policy, lines of action pursued by the state, and the ways in which these are implemented at the local level, in which heritage is used both as a resource and as a tool.

5.2   Heritage as a Resource: A Standard Feature of Female Socialization Projects?

What is original about the AKP model to revive arts and handicrafts by setting up public establishments dispensing vocational training? What circulations and forms of copying may be observed?

It is possible to compare the three projects to revive traditional arts and handicrafts in Istanbul in 2005 run by foundations present at the local level—the "training in traditional handicrafts and decoration" project run by the Touring Club, the "Turkish handicraft and entrepreneurial spirit" project by the Turkish Cultural Service Foundation, and the "Eyüp's toys project" run conjointly by the History Foundation (Tarih Vakfı) and Eyüp municipality. All three projects were financed by the European Union (EU) and received backing from İŞKUR (Türkiye İş Kurumu/Turkish Labor Agency), the body in charge of helping people to find work. My fieldwork indicated that these projects were using fairly similar mechanisms to İSMEK, despite being circumscribed in time. It is true that the purposes could vary, and, depending on the cases, the tourism objective was more significant, and the affirmation of a Turkish-Islamic identity not necessarily explicit. Nevertheless, they all fulfilled a dual social function: first, providing training (accompanied in some cases by the hope that this could be used as a resource), and, second, increasing socialization. They also openly

stated the goal of safeguarding heritage. These projects were also taken up by women. One may furthermore enquire whether the desire to use handicraft heritage to boost women's autonomy, in accordance with the stated objectives of these projects, is not a EU norm, with all three projects taking place in Istanbul at the same time and following relatively similar specifications.

Furthermore, observation of projects carried out either as part of or alongside the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güney Anadolu Projesi, GAP) reveals instances of borrowing.[52] This may be seen between İSMEK projects and others in Istanbul, as well as between İSMEK and the Southeast, and in the Kurdish region. In this latter instance, the projects involved a constellation of actors, both international bodies (the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the EU) and state, municipal, or private organizations, particularly the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce. Once again, these projects targeted women with the purpose of increasing their socialization and autonomy. For example, a social action place and the introduction of a social development program for women with UNICEF backing led to the setting up of the multi-purpose community centers (Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezi, ÇATOM). These were established by the GAP administration in 1995, at more or less the same time as BELMEK and İSMEK were created. In all there are 30 or so centers in the nine provinces in the region. ÇATOM projects have various explicit objectives, including the emancipation of women, combating poverty, citizenship training, and developing urban culture and modernity (understood to mean Turkish modernity).

With more regard to the revival of handicrafts, the GAP institutional actors I interviewed indicated that, in addition to their dimension as a heritage project, handicrafts were also a pretext for encouraging women to follow courses (on literacy, family planning, etc). Any similarities with İSMEK on this point are less obvious. However, analysis I have conducted with Scalbert-Yücel looking at Southeastern Anatolia raises the question of whether the concern with heritage did not emanate primarily from the EU rather than from local institutions. It also indicates that this concern would appear to vary depending on the identified benefits for tourism.

Another difference concerns the way tradition is apprehended. İSMEK's purpose is to promote a Turkish-Islamic identity, something which transpired at least initially in a reified approach towards tradition. This return to the past is also found in some projects in the south east. Yet in other projects there, in particular those with UNDP backing, handicraft revival

has targeted commercial gain, a process which can involve designers being called in to update products in line with current taste.[53] Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether İSMEK's changes in terminology (i.e. *teknoloji* and *tasarım*) are not indicative of its opening up to the idea of creativity as a tool for modernity—or, more modestly, an attempt to signal some such idea.

Thus while in its published material İSMEK tends to position itself as the heritage leader, other actors, foundations, and institutions are also at work in the sector. And it is important not to overlook the significance of university fine arts departments. Thus rather than acting as the matrix, İSMEK would appear to be just one matrix involved in the reconfigurations currently under way. Furthermore, these various cases once again raise the issue of the representations associated with arts and handicrafts, and the ways in which they are seen as tools for driving cultural and social change.

6   Conclusion

Attempts to interpret İSMEK in terms of circulations run into a difficulty. Its role as a matrix, strongly correlated to the AKP, is more clearly visible in its vertical actions than in any porosity or hybridity (Appadurai 1996). Circulations may nevertheless be observed at various stages, when culture is no longer perceived as a rampart against globalization but as a tool for attraction, and when heritage taxonomy is altered. Equally, more in-depth understanding of how the processes of connection and association between various actors (Callon and Latour 1981) generate local cultural action necessarily involves a shift in focus. Observation of the handicraft courses reveals a hierarchical system in which knowledge is diffused top-downwards. However, viewing things from the perspective of administrative departments, observing the links between teaching staff, administrative staff, and academia, and apprehending heritage production on the basis of how it is financed and its state and AKP ramifications would bring out a different picture.

One of the questions raised in the introduction was that of constructing locality, which, as Callon has observed, is both "framed and connected" (Callon 2006: 272). The case of İSMEK suggests that we should incorporate the following points in our analysis. Within the İSMEK matrix, heritage functions as a relational tool, a space for socialization and identification. This gives rise to an urban imaginary—through the combined action of

adding and erasing local cultural traits—which promotes the town as encapsulating and transmitting local values as defined by İSMEK (be they Islamic, Turkish, Ottoman, or Anatolian). Yet the identification with Istanbul is caught up with a conception of national culture. Viewing İSMEK in the light of other projects in Istanbul and Southeastern Anatolia nevertheless shows that this vision of national culture is not unique, but something malleable that is fashioned within the given situation.

Observations conducted in training centers in Istanbul's conservative districts show that the women attending courses adhere to İSMEK's heritage inventions. Nevertheless, the production of locality would need to be tested further across the 240 teaching centers by observing exchanges (of ideas, teachers, and students from one center to another), and their involvement and role in the surrounding neighborhood. The question of territorial anchorage in constructing locality is an ambiguous one. The policy to promote arts and handicrafts does not involve any interaction with craftsmen working in workshops, whose representations draw on collective memory and appear far removed from İSMEK's heritage narrative (Girard 2010). And it needs to be borne in mind that İSMEK's heritage machinery is seeking to bring about cultural change, the effects of which require further study.

Lastly, and at a different level, the role of BUSMEK, BELMEK, GASMEK, and so on in heritage production and the redefining of locality still needs further study. This could show how these municipal institutions, following the example of İSMEK, act as local operators reconfiguring the national culture by producing local values and building up a nationwide network.

Notes

1. İSMEK information bulletin (*İSMEK Haber Bulteni*) 16 (2016).
2. It is, however, discussed in unpublished works by Lepont (2007) and Girard (2010).
3. The AKP, a conservative Islamic party, has been in power since 2002.
4. İSMEK, *Branş rehberi* 2014–2015 [Course guide].
5. The term "matrix" as used here refers to the manufacture of heritage in its ideological and material dimensions. The idea of a matrix, including the processes of conception, reception, and assimilation, provides a way of seeing how İSMEK deliberately acts as a force for cultural change.

6. Drawing on Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004) for study of the instruments, and Appadurai (1996) and Callon (2006) for locality.

7. This study also draws to a lesser extent on field surveys carried out into projects to relaunch handicrafts in Istanbul in 2005 as part of my PhD thesis, and surveys in south-east Anatolia in 2011 with C. Scalbert-Yücel as part of the ANR Transtur research program.

8. This Islamic party was banned in 1998.

9. According to Lepont (2007), İSMEK is a mixed ownership company (being 99 % public and 1 % private). It is financed by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), which contracts out the running of the company to the private sector after a tender process (Alpaydin 2006).

10. İBB, *İçinizdeki yeteneği İSMEK'le fark edin/Explore the ability inside you with İSMEK*, undated: 13.

11. Idem.

12. İSMEK statistical data for the year 2013–2014 and for the categories "Handicraft technology" (18.76 %), "Art and design" (5.56 %), "Ceramic and Glass" (0.49 %), "Wood Technology" (0.29 %), and "Jewelry Technology" (0.47 %).

13. Two of these centers are in the Üsküdar district, and the other in Fatih, both conservative pro-AKP districts.

14. İSMEK, *Branş rehberi/*2014–2015 [Course guide].

15. It is also no doubt needs to be seen within the context of revisions in 2004 to municipal laws on education (Law nos. 5215 and 5393) (on this point see Alpaydın 2006: 12).

16. I have not found any publications prior to 2006. This was the date of my first field visit, and coincided with the launch of the *El sanatları* journal.

17. See Keyder (1999), Bartu (1999, 2001), and Bora (1999).

18. See more specifically *İSMEK Haber Bülteni* [İSMEK information bulletin].

19. This was taken up in 2015, with one of the explicit missions of İSMEK, being to "regenerate the arts that are nearly forgotten" (online pdf presentation of İSMEK,, http://www.etf.europa.eu/eventsmgmt.nsf/(getAttachment)/D83582342D7E5A03C1257CBA00472F0C/$File/İSMEK%20EN.pdf).

20. Issue no. 2 of *El Sanatları* (2006) was thus called *Gelenek ve gelecek* ["Tradition and future"].

21. In the 1990s, "according to a 1993 municipal report, 350,000 migrants arrived in the city each year" (Cheviron and Pérouse 2016: 147). Natural growth has outstripped migration inflows for many years (*Atlas électronique de la croissance d'Istanbul du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours*, 2005).

22. The presentation cited in n. 14 refers to the aim "To make people get the abilities about city culture and living in a city" [*sic*].

23. The actors I met made recurrent reference to tradition, as do publications.
24. Article published in *Zaman* newspaper under the title "Geleneksel sanat-lara AB desteği" [EU support for traditional handicrafts], 4 June 2005.
25. *Esmaü'l-Hüsna. Allah'ın en güzel isimleri.*
26. Conversation with members of staff, İSMEK, January 2007.
27. Preface of Kadir Topbaş in *Hat San'atı. Tarihçe, Malzeme ve Örnekler* [The Art of Calligraphy. History, Materials and Examples] (Berk 2006).
28. *El sanatları* 2 (2006).
29. This new category appeared in the fifth issue of the İSMEK information bulletin, but in reference to an event in June 2010.
30. It is worth noting that a new branch focusing on the contemporary trades of clothing, tailoring, and fashion design also appeared.
31. *İSMEK Haber Bülteni* [İSMEK information bulletin] 7 (2011–2012).
32. These new categories would not appear to be associated with the goal of providing vocational training. cf. Part three.
33. For example, issue 15 of *İSMEK Haber Bülteni* [*İSMEK* information bulletin] (2015) has two articles about Turkish-Islamic arts.
34. The handicraft center of the Touring Club was founded in 1987, that of the Turkish Cultural Service Foundation in 1989, and that of the Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Foundation in 1996. Fieldwork I conducted in 2005 did not establish any affinities with the AKP. The Touring Club handicraft center was involved in the movement to promote heritage as part of the drive to promote tourism by the center-right municipal authorities in Istanbul in the 1980s. Our field research has shown that the references mobilized by the Turkish Cultural Service Foundation handicraft center are more pre-Ottoman and Republican periods rather than Ottoman. The foundation distanced itself from the AKP discourse about the Ottoman Empire. And, the handicraft centre of Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Foundation was promoting a pan-Turkish ideal, according to our research.
35. http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,98709/traditional-arts-and-crafts.html (consulted on 28 May 2017).
36. I observed courses in the central districts of Fatih and Üsküdar. This would need to be systemized to other centers.
37. İSMEK has 2150 teachers in all four its courses. More than 80 % of them are women (Parlara and Fidan 2014).
38. The İSMEK website now contains information about programs and course manuals, some of which go over the history.
39. According to the instructors I met in 2007.
40. One may read, for example: "The target audience of İSMEK being the most popular adult education institution has a great diversity. Among our trainees are housewives, young girls and boys, the unemployed, workers,

illiterate citizens, the disabled, prisoners, the aged and pensioners." İBB, *İçinizdeki yeteneği İSMEK'le fark edin/Explore the ability inside you with İSMEK*, undated: 11.

41. Source: İSMEK. Arts and handicraft courses are followed almost exclusively by women. For a more in-depth study of İSMEK students, teachers, and administrative staff, see Alpaydın (2006). See too Parlara and Fidan (2014) about the teaching staff.

42. The low level of female employment in Turkey also needs to be borne in mind. In 2008 this stood far below the Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development (OECD) average, at 29.3 %, rising to 37.3 % in 2012, as a result of policies to assist hiring, and because the recession meant a second revenue was often necessary (OECD, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/fr/topics/emploi/, accessed on 1 November 2016).

43. According to İSMEK statistics for 2006, 42.97 % were under 25, 54.51 % were single, 44.27 % had completed secondary schooling, 19.64 % had "basic education", and 18.70 % had "primary school" level (Alpaydın 2006: 64–66).

44. The administration mainly views these courses as a hobby. Furthermore, they are not offered at "vocational expertise centers", which provide training for the job market, in fields such as IT, finance, hairdressing, cookery, and health.

45. I do not know if any of the women have become instructors in turn.

46. People of various origins—including Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, and Laz—work in professional workshops. Equally the objects produced are a blend of various cultural influences.

47. UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, *Periodic report no. 00815/ Turkey*, 2013, p. 28 (www.unesco.org/culture/ich/doc/download.php?versionID=26319, accessed 20 March 2017).

48. For discussion of BELMEK, see Alpaydın (2006), Yıldız (2012).

49. Alpaydın notes that there is a division of the sexes. BELTEK, founded in 1999 and focusing on technical training, targets a male public (Alpaydın 2006: 24).

50. https://www.ankara.bel.tr/en/cultural-services/belmek, accessed on 16 March 2016.

51. For analysis of the transformations and rise in adult education under the RP and then the AKP, in tune with OECD and World Bank demands, see Yıldız (2012).

52. See Girard and Scalbert-Yücel (2015).

53. UNDP/GAP administration, "Umbrella Program on GAP Sustainable Development", phase III (2008–2012), "Nine towns, nine designers" project.

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"Cultural Action" as Mode of Domination: Islamic Businessmen's International Trade Fair and Configurations of Turkey's Cultural Model

Dilek Yankaya

1   INTRODUCTION

Since 1980s, public action in Turkey has gone through a major change: it has become a power-oriented coordination of public and private actors. The elaboration of cultural policies has also been subject to this dynamic in line with the country's economic globalization. This chapter questions the diversification of actors and spaces in the development of the government's "cultural action" through the analysis of an international event organized by a category of actor which is not immediately thought of as among the usual producers of culture: businessmen. The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, MÜSIAD), the representative of Turkish Islamic businessmen close to the power elite,[1] organized its 15th International Fair

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(MÜSIAD International Fair, MIF) in November 2014 in Istanbul. This event has taken place every two years since 1993, with visitors from African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Its aim is to promote the association's member companies' access to foreign markets, especially to those of Muslim countries. For this businessmen's association, the fair is an influential tool in developing the export capacities of its community. For scholars, this is a very rich field of investigation, first, to study businessmen as the actors in the production and circulation of cultural models and, second, to reveal that what is cultural cannot be understood outside of political and economic processes of domination.

We define the notion of "cultural action" as the set of material practices, symbolic and moral repertoires relative to the production and circulation of particular representations—imaginaries (Leguil-Bayart 1985)—of a state and society, as well as the relations between various categories of actors involved in these processes.[2] This action is geared to the development of a collective conscience among local, national, and transnational societies concerning the "imaginary constitution of a society" (Castoriadis 1975). If the implementation of cultural policies is closely related to the construction of nation states (Poirrier 2011), the development of these policies and the definition of culture are conflictual issues in the sense that this definition concerns the legitimation of political, economic and social processes of domination. This conflict for power takes place at two levels. First, at the national level, various actors promote divergent cultural models to represent *their* version of the national society. Second, these national models are promoted at the international level in contrast to what is considered to be "outsider" and "foreigner". The definition of culture is therefore inseparable from its links to this "other" and refers to the setting of a country's—material and symbolic—status within the international hierarchy ranking different countries.

The cultural model formulated by this "Islamic bourgeoisie" strongly contrasts with the Kemalist cultural legacy in that the quest for power by these Islamic elites has, since 1970s, has been mobilizing the attachment to Islam both in a dissenting attitude and as an affirmative sign of social distinction. In this militant logic, these groups' activities, whether they be political, economic or cultural, have engendered a common cultural repertoire producing a new sociological feature of "Islamic" distinct from "Muslim" characterizing a repertoire of behavior, thinking and action. In this repertoire, the reference to religion is mobilized by these businessmen in order to legitimize their collective action and to distinguish the MÜSIAD

community from other Turkish business groups. It is possible to seize these references in the way they define their socio-professional group as an assembly of "businessmen with good morality", in the way they justify their choice of standing aloof from those sectors categorized as "illicit" according to "Koranic principles", in the way they organize their working time by respecting religious practices and rituals. Last but not least the religious attachments are observable in the spatial settings of their firms in the form of a prayer room and decorative objects referring to religious symbols.[3] MÜSIAD, as the militant business organization gathering company owners who identify themselves with this Islamic repertoire, has played a structural role in the incorporation of this repertoire into capital accumulation processes in various ways. It contributed to the development of interest-free banking and of the *halal* label. It promoted a moralized representation of business community referring to "Islamic business ethics". It revived Islamic foundations and charity activities as a mode of cooperation between business and associated fields. It engaged in international action aiming to develop transnational Islamic business networks (Yankaya 2013, 2014). Hence, what scholars defined as an "Islamic counter-culture" in the 1970s passed through an embourgeoisement process by the upward social mobility of these classes (Islamic bourgeoisie class) since the 1980s, as well as the clientelistic relations developed with local and central governments, and was redefined as the dominant culture with increasing control of the AKP over public and private spheres, especially since its second mandate in 2007.[4]

Recalling Weber, the symbolic constitution of the society and the state is inherently linked to their economic and material formation: "no imaginary without materiality" (Leguil-Bayart 1994). International trade shows are excellent research fields in which to make tangible a cultural action because they are embedded into economic and political dynamics since they expose their objectified material forms and the social interactions they favor in front of a transnational audience.[5] This chapter proposes to study the international trade fair as an instrument of cultural action understood as a mode of domination.

Even more interesting in MIF's case is the exceptional backing it had from the state. Among the 407 trade fairs organized in 2014, it was the only one to benefit from such a mobilization on behalf of state officials at all ranks of political power, with the participation of Turkey's president, ministers and directors of major economic agencies. This patronage corresponds to a form of appropriation of this event by the political power,

transforming a private trade fair into Turkey's national exhibition. The president inaugurated the MIF by expressing a patriotic pride usually reserved for national celebrations:

> It is an honor and a source of excitement for us to address, from Istanbul, the dearest city of the Ottoman world state, our guests—politicians, administrators, academics, businessmen from around the world. This big organization demonstrates the vitality of the Turkish economy and the opportunities it offers … unparalleled for cooperation and investment.

In 2014, for the first time, MIF was held under the auspices of the president and the prime minister. This change of frame is not without consequence on the material to explore in this chapter: through the state's support, the cultural action engaged by this particular businessmen association is legitimized and instituted as Turkey's official frame of representation both at the national and international spheres. MIF therefore became an event "staging values and political objectives of the ruling classes and a tool to generate a speech on the nation's achievements and its lifestyle" (Gecser and Kitzinger 2010: 147), so an instrument of power.

This study is based on two main types of resource. First, an ethnographic work was conducted during the fair. The field was marked by singular research conditions. The participant observation position favored a data-collection process without any interruption of the event, allowing me, as a visitor-researcher, to observe the interactions between actors rather than between them and myself (Becker 1970). However, this type of field is also a challenge owing to the difficulty in treating the rapid accumulation of interlinked actions, countless and varied actors, as well as a flow of, mostly implicit, information (Chiva 1980). The use of audiovisual recording and the assistance of a research team were useful methodological devices to cover the maximum number of activities and interactions, to follow the conference panels in Turkish, English or Arabic, to conduct interviews with different groups of businessmen—exhibitors, organizers, visitors—and finally to propose a comprehensive survey of the MIF. Second, interviews were conducted with MÜSIAD officials in charge of organizing the event and of international relations, as well as with exhibitors and visitors. The survey was completed with a critical analysis of the documentation produced by the association and by various media in order to cover the nature of networks between different actors who participated in the organization of the fair.

The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the spatial and material layout of the exhibition halls are analyzed in order to shed light on the three main

imaginaries that MIF seeks to circulate about Turkey: the importance of religion, the level of industrial development and the professionalism of Turkish companies. MIF, questioned as a transnational stage for the *mise en scène* of the country's development, provides interesting insights into how economic, political and cultural actions are tangled up with a political project carried jointly by these businessmen and the government seeking to promote Turkey's international influence. Second, the institutional, financial and political aspects of this cultural action are examined through the study of the relational configurations of the mode of domination along two axes: Turkish private business actors' and public authorities' involvement patterns in the production of this event, and the government's strategy to reframe this fair within particular international networks connecting Islamic institutionnal actors. At both stages, attention is paid to the way specific representations about Muslim countries and Islamic international actors are included in the elaboration of the cultural model in order to reveal the external configurations, or "the strategy of extraversion" (Leguil-Bayart 1999), of the Islamic elites' mode of domination.

2   Representations of the Islamic Bourgeoisie as the National Cultural Model: Signs of Islam, Industrial Development and Managerial Professionalism

Each fair communicates a story about the country it refers to: "Visitors, wandering in the halls, will be constantly bombarded with arguments on the functioning of the state and its many institutions and buildings, objects and recreational devices will gradually mix in the minds with messages on them" (Gecser and Kitzinger 2010: 150–151). The exhibition of technical, industrial and artistic goods carries information deliberately developed by the organizers according to the specific representations which they wish to make of the society and the state. Organizing a fair is therefore a political action: the choice of products to expose and the exposition devices and techniques are neither anodyne nor exclusively dedicated to the pursuit of economic interests. This choice stems from political decisions serving a particular logic to attribute a favorable status to a society and its government in the international hierarchy of nations. According to Whitney Walton, who studied the French pavilion at the London World Exhibition in 1851, the exposition techniques involved in an international

event attribute a special place to the concerned national economy in the world. They also show the values of a specific social order which the fair organizers aspire to promote: "[The] French pavilion was as the window displace of France as it was defined by the bourgeoisie of the time, in terms of consumer choices, tastes and practices" (Walton 1992).

Similarly, MIF shows the representations of Turkish economy, society and state as they are defined by the Islamic bourgeoisie according to its values, tastes, social and economic practices, and political orientations. These were studied in previous work as the constituents of the "cultural matrix" (Wuthnow 1994: 640), characterized by an ambition for managerial modernization, flexibility in the production and export processes, an urge to expand one's foreign markets, and the individual and continuous reformulation of a particular "Islamic business mentality" articulating moral questions and a quest for power (Yankaya 2013).

It is interesting to note how this representation was perceived by a South African visitor. This entrepreneur from the Republic of South Africa, president of a businessmen association and member of the International Business Forum (IBF), had been a frequent visitor to Müsiad's fairs since its creation. In the 1990s he used to film the event to show it to his colleagues back home: "The ability of Turks to organize events of this magnitude has always impressed," he said.[6] Today, the story carried by this show is, for him, that of "the Turkish model that combines modernity, professionalism and commitment to Islam". These three elements seem in fact to be at the foundation of the narrative that the fair proposes, a story made in two time-spaces: the official and cultural manifestations taking place in the "MÜSIAD Valley" and the industrial exhibition in the halls.

2.1   Cultural Productions, Socialization Patterns and Objectified Forms of the Attachment to Islam

The congress hall in 2014, a multipurpose room called the "MÜSIAD valley", has hosted sociocultural and professional-type events put in place thanks to different layouts and producing different forms of interaction. This hall hosted the first day in an atmosphere of national celebration. The opening ceremony, with the Turkish flag displayed on a giant screen during President Erdoğan's inaugural talk, included ministerial speeches and was covered by exceptional security measures. There was a change of pace the next day: a large part of the room was this time set up with tables and chairs to accommodate the business-to-business appointments between

foreign buyers and Turkish manufacturers. The rest of the hall was then occupied by MÜSIAD stands, those of the youth committee of the association and of UTESAV (International Foundation for Technical, Economic and Social Research, Uluslarası Teknolojik, Ekonomik, Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı) founded by MÜSIAD to develop and disseminate a set of Islamic economic thinking and practices. The presence of MÜSIAD's official representation gave this hall its official stance. The aim was to receive visitors and inform them about the association by handing out booklets and publications.

MIF was a space of objectification of the elements of religious identification claimed by this business community. These took five main forms: daily islamic prayers, an art exhibition, a concert, stands of *halal* products (permissible in Islam) and conference panels. Four times a day, loudspeakers broadcasted the call to prayer and a part of the "MÜSIAD valley" was separated from the rest of the room by folding screens and covered with carpets to provide a space to observe collective prayer. This part of the hall, as opposed to the other halls, was distinguished by a devotional silence. The prayer time, as with business meetings, commercial negotiations and visiting stands, was a part of the daily experience of MIF. All day long, exhibitors and visitors observed prayers there either collectively or individually.

Second, the exhibition of traditional arts took place in the same room. It was like a small craft market, with glassware, carvings, ceramics and glazed pottery, as well as accessories such as embroidery, jewelry and rosaries, mobilizing references to the Ottoman history and Islam. Thus the international public was invited to take away some traditional Turkish-Ottoman cultural products as souvenirs of their trip to Istanbul. The third event was the concert by Maher Zain, Muslim singer of Swedish nationality and of Lebanese origin. Zain is an internationally known figure of a particular kind of popular music whose texts are strongly imbued with Islamic references. On the third night, the "valley" was transformed into a large concert hall and, apart from the MÜSIAD president and some officials, the public was radically different from the one that frequented the fair during the day: it was young and predominantly Turkish with a significant number of women, mostly veiled. This public, who only attended this event, had a festive experience of MIF, far removed from that of the businessmen.

The attachment to Islam was also observable in stands proposing various categories of Islamic services or products, such as residential projects, hotel deals, clothing and food items, or representations of Islamic associations. Added to this were the stands of Islamic intergovernmental organizations such as the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Corporation

for International Trade and Finance, those of Turkish newspapers advocating Islam and publishing houses exhibiting their publications (novels, essays, children's books) all relating to Islam. Finally, many conference panels, organized by the IBF Congress, took place in the same halls. In these panels issues like "The use of funds in Muslim countries: perspective of efficiency and profitability" and "Halal tourism" were discussed by experts and businessmen from different countries. These were the transnational spaces for the circulation of ideas, norms and practices around one basic issue: the incorporation of Islamic thinking and practices into trade and finance. It was interesting to note that all panelists were practitioners in economy and finance: there were no imams or religious scholars among the speakers. This means that "profane" economic stakeholders, and not men of religion, were given the task of defining the place of Islam in the organization of the contemporary markets. This goes hand in hand with the privileged status that these businessmen attribute to themselves in the reinvention of the *ummah*, the idea(l) of a global Muslim community, as an economic exchange and cooperation framework.

This way of displaying the attachment to religion across many spaces and products reflects the diversity of the economic, aesthetic and literary forms that it can take in contemporary market societies. For the visitor, this display made up the "cultural repertoire" of an Islamic collective identity. This identity was not only the representation of the Turkish national cultural repertoire but also a transnational one, that of the *ummah*. For the researcher, the construction of this Islamic imaginary is where the interlocking of cultural, economic and political dimensions of this cultural action becomes identifiable. The relevance of this Islamic repertoire in contemporary economic contexts could only be underpinned by studying how the materiality on which the ambition for power relies is presented.

2.2   Industrial and Technological Representations of the Idea of "Islamic Civilization's Revival and Turkey's Supremacy"

The exhibited industrial diversity differentiates MIF from other industry-specific international fairs. It is intended to show Turkey's industrial and economic opportunities as its distinguishing mark with respect to other countries in the region. Exhibitors were installed in five sectoral halls: construction companies and furniture supplies; 2) machinery, automotive, IT, electrics and electronics; 3) manufacturing industries and food packaging; 4) textile industry; 5) consumer goods and services, such as logistics, tourism and the health industry. The vast majority were industrial manufacturers. They

exhibited product samples and models as proof of the modernity of manufacturing techniques and the professionalism of their company. The idea about their level of development was magnified through the layouts in two other halls, created for the 2014 fair and serving the ambition to strengthen the representations of Turkey's pretended economic supremacy: "Hightech Port by MÜSIAD" and the Muslim countries' hall.

In 2014, companies producing new technology were gathered by a joint fair called Hightech Port by MÜSIAD, integrated into MIF. The event was set up under the auspices of the president and with the collaboration of many public institutions, ministries, chambers of commerce and industry, as well as the public research agency Tübitak, the National Centre for Scientific and Technical Research. Many authors have stressed that states, particularly those that have adopted an export/foreign direct investment-oriented development strategy, provide financial, technical or political support to tradeshows (Wilkenson and Lance 2000; Mahone 1994). The government's patronage of Hightech Port, as well as MIF, falls clearly within the logic of a developmentalist exporting state. However, the representations made by these elites of technology and sciences in general and those proposed by the Hightech Port in particular suggest that the collaboration of MÜSIAD and the AKP government means, more than a government-business alliance for export-oriented policies. It indicates more a process of redefinition of the Turkish state's national and international ambitions, particularly with respect to these groups' own idea of the "Islamic civilization".

2.2.1   Turkey as the Heir and the Bearer of the "Islamic Civilization", and Trade as the Agent of the Islamic Elites' Geopolitical Ambitions

During the inaugural speeches, MÜSIAD officials talked about the advance of new technologies as a form of "competition between civilizations. The Chinese civilizations, Egyptian, Indian, Roman, Arabic and Turkish, and especially Islamic civilization, have contributed greatly to their advance. Then, Western civilization took over".[7] Echoing these remarks affirming the role of the "Islamic civilization" in scientific progress, the Turkish technology industries were exhibited so as to provide Turkey with a particular historicity linking both to a specific past and to a project with the mission to ensure the future of the "Islamic civilization" in competition with the West. Hightech Port was then supposed to be a testimony to this commitment already adopted by MÜSIAD as a catchword for their business model "High technology, high morality" and carried by the title of MIF's 2014 edition, "Business will change, the world will change."

In these representations, three elements are identifiable to explore the Islamic bourgeoisie's cultural action. First, the mobilization of a vocabulary related to the civilizational categories - West versus Islam - reflects that these elites' political perception of world history has a determinant role in their actions. The prospect of competition between the idea(l) of an "Islamic civilization" and that of a "Western civilization" appears as the foundation for contemporary power conflicts in which they position the Turkish state within the first. Second, the reference to a civilizational competition reveals the structuring role of this rivalry in the definition, legitimation and representation of the national economic development project that this bourgeoisie asserts in favor of the "Islamic civilization" and claims to bear through the control of the political power. Finally, this bourgeoisie has the ambition to modify international power relations in favor of "Islamic civilization" through technological progress and trade between Muslim countries. This aim constitutes a way of redefining the Turkish state's international action according to the AKP's political project.

Such a "civilizational" competitive logic was expressed in President Erdoğan's speech criticizing the "West"s approach to Palestine, Iraq and Syria and advocating further cooperation between Muslim countries.[43] This position clearly corresponded to the ambition carried by both this exhibition and by the AKP's political action. During the 2007 parliamentary election campaign, the AKP set 2023, the centenary of the establishment of the republic, as the deadline for the fulfillment of public and foreign policies. AKP redefined its campaign objectives as an overall project of rebuilding the state and society. The "2023 goals" have been continually mentioned by state officials and businessmen. The officials from the Ministry of Defence, present at Hightech Port, also introduced it as a concrete illustration of the "2023 goals" by exhibiting the development of defense industries and national security. For the direction of Hightech Port, it was "the most visionary project developed within the framework of Turkey's objectives for 2023. We want to make out of Turkish production technology a global brand. We want to introduce our products into new markets, to consolidate the brand image of Turkey and to inspire [Turkish] people['s] self-esteem." MÜSIAD shows great loyalty to this policy, and explicit commitment to the government: "For us, Hightech Port is a part of Müsiad's aspirations for Turkey. So, we position our actions according to the objectives that Turkey has set for 2023" MÜSIAD. 2015. Cerçeve periodical. Issue 23. This exposition therefore becomes a real "show" in the sense that, before the circulation of industrial goods, it aims to circulate the imaginary of Turkey's material, hence political, superiority.

2.2.2   Industrial Exhibition as an Instrument of Power: The Material Show-Off

Taking part in MIF and Hightech Port presents a form of compliance with the policies of AKP government, the patron of the fair. In the current authoritarian and highly polarized political context, MIF provides business owners with access to state and AKP officials openning therefore the way to take their share of public procurement opportunities. For example, the AKP mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek, regularly visits MIF "for shopping"—that is to say, to negotiate with businessmen and possibly agree on the purchase of various goods and services necessary for public projects in Ankara. If businessmen seek to expand their access to public resources in this way, the association succeeds in asserting the extent of its community and in confirming its privileged status in the public market.

The case for Hightech Port exhibitors is different than the MIF in terms of exhbiting conditions. First, MÜSIAD membership was not asked for as a condition to be an Hightech Port exhibitor and MÜSIAD members were a minority among them. It brought together the prominent firms from the national defense (Aselsan, Roketsan, Havelsan, Meteksan), aerospace and marine industries, as well as those in communication technologies (Turkcell, Avea, Türksat, Türk Telekom), energy and environment, computer systems and machinery (Arçelik, Femsan, Sampa). Also present were certain public institutions charged with governing these industries, such as the Undersecretary of Defense, Istanbul Teknopark, TCDD (Railway Directorate) and Tübitak. Second, the decision to exhibit did not come from the business owner, it was the case in MÜSIAD members exhibiting in other halls. On the contrary, these firms and institutions are the instruments of its public and regional policy in defense and security issues and were asked by the government to participate in the fair. It is through the representation of this technology-based national industry that the AKP has made MIF a theater of its power. In fact this fair constituted the materiality intended to consolidate the image of a powerful "new Turkey", which the party aims to establish at the national level and to circulate at the international level.

2.2.3   A Hall for Muslim Countries: Mirror Effect for Turkey's Supremacy

The 2014 edition of MIF assigned a hall to the representation of Muslim countries and Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Libya, Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan, Punjab

and East Kalimantan (Indonesia) were represented by MÜSIAD's partner associations. In the hall adjacent to this one, turkish firms in industries of construction and machine tools were exhibited, and the passage between these two pavilons presented a dramatic gap between the representations proposed of these countries and the ones built for Turkey. In these stands, run by individuals dressed in traditional clothes, were sold handicrafts such as bags and leather shoes, clothing and small accessories as well as specialty foods. Humanitarian NGOs, especially the Syrian ones, presented their activities in the Middle East and Africa. The layout of the hall complemented the decor of a Middle Wastern "authenticity": the major installation was an alley giving way to a small square decorated with a model of a passage and a street in Masjid al-Aqsa.

This hall was characterized by the strong presence of women, often veiled, holding the stands, or children running in the aisles or playing behind the sandpits or playgrounds specially designed for them. This "swarming" was intended to create a family environment, a neighborhood setting that was apt to produce forms of leisurely sociability different from the atmosphere of professional interaction in other halls. This way of staging the "Muslim world" stemmed from a deliberate strategy by MÜSIAD according to which the room offered a recreational space, "a feast for the eyes" and "fun times" (MÜSIAD 2015: 24–25). It was part of the production of the show's narrative about Turkey's national "cultural model". These stands fueled a strong imaginary of exotic fantasy and traditionalism about Muslim countries in contrast to Turkish industrial and technological representations that asserted a concept of economic strength and modernity. This pavilion took visitors to a former Middle East framed permanently in a state of underdevelopment, reducing the credibility of any economic or political pretension of influence that can come from the governors. It then contributed to circulating more boldly the idea of Turkey's supremacy, legitimizing its claim to the status of a regional power at the suggested absence of other convincing candidates for this position. The staging and the circulation of these ideas and imaginaries depended, institutionally and financially, on the construction of specific connections and partnerships: this is the relational configuration of Islamic bourgeoisie's cultural action. The choice of institutional public and private partners and the way they are put together to carry this international fair reveals this event as an instrument of domination, both materially and symbolically.

3   NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL NETWORKS OF DOMINATION

The organization of MIF is a very large operation of mobilization of national and international actors. Since its creation in 1993, its audience has expanded, thanks to the participation of visitors from Muslim countries as MÜSIAD has enlarged its network in Turkey and abroad. In 2014, 7000 businessmen from 102 countries visited. Its exhibition area has been expanded (100,000 m² compared with 45,000 m² in 2012), and the events included in the program have been diversified, as mentioned above. These developments show the increasing capacity of the association to mobilize financial, human and also political resources. The cultural action driven through the 2014 edition of MIF was carried and framed as a power demonstration through an intense mobilization campaign regrouping a specific category of Turkish companies and institutions.

3.1   *The Companies, Institutions and the Media of the Power*

To set up the budget of the 15th edition of the fair, the MÜSIAD's member in charge of institutional relations undertook a fundraising campaign with large companies maintaining close ties with AKP. MIF obtained the support of 18 companies with Cengiz Holding as the main sponsor. This holding, active in many industries such as media and energy, is known to have signed important tenders during the AKP governments. In early 2015 it won the project of the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu (in the southeast of Turkey), provoking strong critics and a controversy because of the company's dominant position in the market as well as of its CEO's insulting speech towards the people.[8] According to media reporting, Cengiz Holding would have assumed the role of the MIF's main sponsor on the suggestion of President Erdoğan to replace its damaged public image with that of a firm supporting Turkey's export policies. Other MIF sponsors are also known to have privileged access to major projects in various fields where privatization is particularly strong and conducive to favoritism because of the new legislation strengthening the central role of the government in defining the terms of public contracts.[9]

Among the public institutions that have supported the fair are the Chamber of Commerce of Istanbul, whose president and board members are affiliated with MÜSIAD, the Turkish Exporters Assembly, a semipublic agency charged with coordinating export-related activities, Turkish

Airlines, the national civil airline company[10], and Istanbul Municipality. The event has enjoyed high visibility in the urban area of Istanbul. Next to the Sabiha Gokcen Airport entrance, MIF was advertised on the giant screen of Viaport shopping mall belonging to Bayraktar Holding, whose owner, Erdoğan Bayraktar, was the director of TOKI (the housing administration group) from 2002 to 2011 and then minister of environment and urban planning from 2011 to 2013, until his indictment for corruption. On the highway leading to the Bosphorus Bridge, taken daily by hundreds of thousands of vehicles, advertising sites owned by Istanbul Municipality were also reserved for announcements about MIF.

The media greatly enhanced the circulation of the fair's news: some television channels broadcasted interviews with MÜSIAD authorities and exhibitors, and transmitted the opening ceremony with the participation of President Erdoğan while some newspapers published supplements dedicated to MIF. These media partners, most of which also had stands at the fair, manifest strong "political parallelism" with the AKP, characterized by forms of connection between the media and politics (Kaya and Cakmur 2010; Uzun 2014). This parallelism takes two main forms, which often overlap: either these media managers have close family relations with Erdoğan; (Saran 2014), or their political orientation is that of his party. The pursuit of economic benefits accompanies this parallelism, and these benefits take the form of public funding, privileged access to information, subscription campaigns among party activists, or the absence of retributive measures heavily applied to the opposition media, such as tax inspections, legal proceedings or repressive action against journalists.

MIF's main media sponsor was the Anatolian News Agency (Anadolu Ajansi, AA). It is a semipublic agency: half of the shares are owned by the state, which also appoints its managers. Under AKP power, AA has been showing strong alliance to AKP, provoking heated public debate about its autonomy as well as the objectivity of its broadcasting. AA's sponsorship ensured to MIF strong public visibility, especially abroad, by providing it with an official distribution channel. Furthermore, Islam Channel, a TV channel based in London covering issues related to Islam, was the only foreign media associated with this event, providing the fair with international coverage relative to the Islamic orientation of the event. Among other media sponsors, personal and family loyalties to President Erdoğan dominate: this is the case with the news channel A Haber and *Para Business* magazine, which belong to Turkuvaz media group whose CEO, Serhat Albayrak, is the brother of Erdoğan's son-in-law; the daily *Yeni Şafak* and

television channel Tvnet, which are the media branches of Albayrak Holding whose CEO is Berat Albayrak, the son-in-law in question and the minister of energy and natural resources since 2015. Partisan affiliations also characterize another sponsor news channel, T24, which belongs to one of the AKP's founders.

Such interweaving links between media and politics, especially notable since 2007, lead businessmen close to the party to invest in the press and audiovisual media. These links are organized around specific methods of favoritism: to swear allegiance to government, to support its policies or simply not to criticize it provide these businessmen economic with favors in other areas. We witness this form of interdependence in the cases of the television channel Atv and the daily *Sabah*, belonging to the Kalyon group which in 2013 won the famous project of the urban transformation of Taksim Square and Gezi Park, as well as in that of the television channel Star, a subsidiary of Doğuş Holding which has consolidated its position in the media sector under the AKP. In addition, TürkMedya, another sponsor of MIF, belongs to the businessman Ethem Sancak, known for his admiration of Erdoğan. Sancak was designated as the Entrepreneur of the Year in 2005 and was attributed the Distinguished Award for Service and Honors for National Sovereignty by the National Assembly. Currently a member of the AKP council, he was also the guest of honor of a conference during MIF as an exemplary entrepreneur. These cases illustrate the existence of networks driving to both economic success and social status.

3.1.1 Building Networks of Domination or Defining Insiders and Outsiders

The mobilization of MIF sponsors relied on three main forms of government intervention: encouragement in the case of private companies, hierarchical demands for public institutions and the selection of media based on political parallelism. These operational patterns witness the way the domination is produced today by this social group in power, which would constitute a "praetorian group which believes itself and behaves as the historical beneficiaries of the state and society" (Insel 2008). MIF unveils the continuity of actions, objectives and domination logics between the economic actors through MÜSIAD, the political elites on behalf of AKP and the public authorities, therefore the state. As the fair is granted the quasi-official status of a national exhibition under the auspices of AKP, private actors who participated in its realization meant to contribute to the legitimation, reinforcement and diffusion of AKP's domination practices.

The relational configurations supporting MIF reveal a technique of domination through the inclusion of certain private actors in power networks while excluding others. In this sense, it is significant to note that no company or media close to the Fethullah Gulen community were among the sponsors. This absence was all the more visible because it is indicative of the current conflictual relations between this community and the party. The previous proximity between these two movements, especially manifest in 2007–2011, strongly favored companies and media organizations related to F. Gülen: while the former were granted semipublic responsibilities in the AKP's public and international activities, the media became faithful transmitters, and hence the agents of legitimation, of the AKP governments' policies. Other financial benefits followed: the vast majority of MÜSIAD members supported the Gülen community through donations to its educational activities and their subscription to *Zaman*, its largest daily. However, the escalating conflict since 2012 between F. Gülen and Erdoğan has had direct implications for the business circles related with Gülen (Marcou 2013), such as the use, by the political power, of tax and legal instruments as disciplinary mechanisms and cooptation against them. For their part, F. Gülen media became critical of the government, following which their journalists have been marginalized or arrested, while many companies, a bank and media channels were put under public supervision. In parallel with the government-led denigration campaign, political oppression and economic penalizing of F. Gülen-related firms and associations, MÜSIAD also stood aloof from this network: its members ended their subscription to *Zaman* as well as their donations to its schools and charity associations. The AKP and MÜSIAD circles have shared cultural and religious codes with the F. Gülen-affiliated actors. However, the exclusion of these from MIF's organization networks shows that religious affinities are not independent from power relations. AKP-affiliated group's cultural action is produced as a mode of domination where all actors' role, religious or not, is renegotiated according to their proximity with the party in power. Now that the borders of the domination networks are explored, we will see how these power groups' claimed national cultural model circulates through international alliance networks.

3.2   The Reinvention of Ummah: *The Institutional Structuring of an Imagined Transnational Cultural Space*

Every year the MÜSIAD administration constitutes a team for the organization of MIF. In 2014 the team worked in conjunction with the Turkish

authorities and with particular Islamic international institutions, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Palestinian Business Forum (PBF), to coordinate the simultaneous realization of three international events alongside MIF in the same hotel and exhibition center in Istanbul: the 18th International Business Forum Congress, the 30th meeting of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (SCECC) of the OIC, and the 4th Congress of PBF. This coordination work had two objectives: to consolidate the international impact of MIF and that of MÜSIAD in trade circuits between Muslim countries, and to promote Turkey as a development model for them.

The city of Istanbul occupied a prominent role in the circulation of this model. The organization of international events is closely linked to the governments' urban policies (Castet 2010: 115). These policies aim, in the case of AKP and MÜSIAD, to magnify the Ottoman past in Istanbul and to make the city the finance capital of the Middle East.[11] The symbolism deployed around Istanbul in conjunction with the claimed historical continuity with the Ottoman Empire, omnipresent in all speaches during MIF, was intended to reframe the mentioned international events with a civilizational mission: President Erdoğan, at the inauguration of MIF, spoke of Istanbul as "the beloved city of the Ottoman world state", and MÜSIAD's president described it as "the city where history is reconciled with the future". To the extent that the exhibitions are the windows of a region or country in a context of exaltation of "urban marketing" (ibid.:116), the coordinated mobilization of public and private actors at these three events aimed to disseminate, in front of an transnational audience, the imaginary of Istanbul as the region's economic and geopolitical center.

The three events have divergent status and mobilize different public and private actors. However, they have institutional connections and their functioning patterns seem to complement each other, providing to the Turkish Islamic elites' cultural action a transnational frame of circulation. Moreover, their claims refer to a common politicocultural repertoire—that of developing economic exchange and cooperation between Muslim countries.

IBF is a transnational businessmen network established in 1995 in Lahore, Pakistan, in collaboration with the main Islamic intergovernmental organizations such as the OIC, the IDB and the Islamic Chamber of Commerce. As the director of IBF, MÜSIAD has enjoyed a privileged

position among Islamically oriented business circles in foreign countries, Muslim or not, to develop its trade as well as its institutional development abroad. In 2014, the 18th IBF Congress was held around the theme of Paradigm Shift: Neo-Financial Drifts, referring to the development of Islamic finance. This structure provided MIF with a network of transnational Islamic economic elite composed of businessmen, experts and managers of international finance institutions, such as Islamic Development Bank, World Bank Global Center for Islamic Finance and various institutions affiliated with the OIC as well as officials of Turkish finance institutions. These actors participated in MIF as speakers on the conference panels, visitors to the exhibition and an international audience of the ceremonial activities.

In 2008, IBF officially assumed the mission of gathering the businessmen of the OIC countries in the name of the SCECC. This transnational business network therefore assumed an intergovernmental responsibility, and assured the official connections between the Islamic business groups and OIC governments. In 2014 the SCECC's annual meeting was programmed alongside MIF and the IBF Congress, and it took place under the chairmanship of the Turkish president. The SCECC is an intergovernmental structure created in 1981 in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, to promote trade relations between Muslim countries, but it truly became active only in 1984, after the election of Turkish President of Republic as its permanent director. The SCECC's annual meeting brings together the ministers of economy and trade of the OIC member countries. Its mission is to monitor the implementation of the OCI's decisions in the field of economy and trade, to take measures to enhance cooperation, and to advise member countries on economic development. The SCECC meetings point out the Muslim states' will to express a collective project of cooperation. Furthermore, they give the Turkish head of state a privileged stage from which to express an official opinion on Islam-related international issues in front of the OCI countries' elites, and therefore to assume a prominent status among them.

Finally, the 4th Congress of the PBF gathered businessmen of Palestinian origin living in the diaspora and Palestinian political elites, following the model of the IBF-MIF, around a set of conference panels and a tradeshow. This congress accompanies MIF every two year and it aims to expand the Palestinian business market by crossing trade and political relations. For instance, in 2014 the PBF signed a partnership agreement with Amal Enterprises, MÜSIAD's partner business association in Morocco. These

business connections favored by the MÜSIAD events aim to support the Turkish state's ambition to be a key player in the regional economy.

Despite the lack of data on their concrete economic results, these international gatherings contribute to the interactions between state and non-state actors concerned with the development of Asian-African-Middle Eastern trade connections. The simultaneity of these events evidences MÜSIAD and AKP's joint ambition to redefine Turkey's international status as an economic power not only in the Middle East region but also in imagined transnational space; the one covering Muslim countries. These actors "make use of religion and politics as two modes of occupation of the same discursive space" (Mandaville 2001: 59) during these events and therefore they participate in the staging of the political representations related to *ummah* reinvented, not as only as a discursive space but as a potential economic space of transnational trade circuits and exchange networks. By the way, these events are not only about official meetings and conferences but also about dinner receptions, touristic visits and informal discussions. This physical reality significantly contributes to the realization of this transnational space through the production of a transnational social capital among many categories of actors. It is this social capital which allows the circulation of, besides material objects and industrial goods, specific ideas and ideals as well as practices and norms, in short cultural models. Since "ideas do not float freely" (Risse-Kappen 1994), these transnational networks seem to be a prerequisite for the Turkish Islamic bourgeoisie's cultural model to be produced and diffused.

4   CONCLUSION

International fairs are complex events whose political configurations count as much as their business objectives. Their study is important to show that international economic action is not politically neutral, neither in relation to its objectives nor to its practices. Strongly backed by the government, MÜSIAD's industrial exposition assumes the role of an actor of deployment of the AKP's power and that of a vector of circulation of the new dominant cultural model of Turkey. Beyond the materiality of a transnational marketplace, this fair is an international stage to deliver strong symbols and images about the national society and the state power in Turkey. It appears as a central event through which this praetorian group's cultural action becomes identifiable as a mode of domination in its symbolic-religious characteristics, capital accumulation processes and

political claims. Therefore, this study concludes that the production of a cultural action goes beyond the dichotomist separations between material and symbolic, private and public, national and international.

MIF is the representation, in a compressed time and space, of the hybrid configurations of networks through which domination is exercised in Turkey. It reveals the process of negotiations and the forms of reciprocity between economic actors and state officials. Its material and financial organization clearly show the tight links between businessmen, media and political circles, which correspond to a restructuring of power networks as well as to the politicization of economic action. This organization then refers to a process of legitimation or delegitimation of private actors depending on the nature of their relationship with the party, and it leads to their inclusion or exclusion from the domination processes. AKP, with its hold on the state apparatus, plays a decisive role in these processes. It attributes a priority status to MÜSIAD business community and includes those who ally with the government, while excluding groups that dissociate themselves from the political orientations of the party and of President Erdoğan, such as the Gülen community. In return, these politicized businesses provide AKP with a social and economic support base that is especially important since its mode of government is heavily criticized for its authoritarian practices since the violent oppression of the popular mobilizations of Gezi Park in 2013.

MIF is a militant event: it is a power demonstration aiming to legitimize the AKP's mode of domination by diffusing these Islamic elites' cultural model for development. This specific model is built on two main components: an imaginary of Turkey's strong industrial modernity and professionalism, on the one hand, and an ethical claim mobilizing Islamic references supposing to favor an alternative international trade and a justice-based understanding of economic progress for Muslim countries, on the other. This study highlights three elements of analysis: the state's cultural action is privatized through the militant mobilization of business actors in complementarity and cooperation with state officials; economic action is politicized as referring to a commitment to the domination techniques of the central government and to the idea(l) of development of *ummah*; the cultural repertoire of a specific Islamic social group is instituted to the level of Turkey's national cultural model. This model attributes a structural role to religion in its community-building, norm-producing and commercialized forms in the redefinition of Turkish society and in the international repositioning of its state.

The international scale is indeed a heuristic level to study Turkish Islamic elites' cultural action. First, this action is produced in front of and circulated within a transnational public formed of businessmen, experts and politicians from Muslim countries. Second, it is characterized by a superiority claim in comparison to other Muslim countries' models. The representations proposed by MIF about Turkey, on the one hand, and about other Muslim countries, supposed to compose the *ummah*, on the other, shows clearly that Turkish Islamic elites perceive a strong hierarchy among them, and aims to convince the others about Turkey's supremacy. Therefore, this cultural action, beyond its rhetoric advocating religious fraternity and economic solidarity, reproduces the existing international hierarchies: it attributes a perpetual state of underdevelopment to Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries to comfort the idea(l) of Turkey's economic superiority and competitiveness.

Finally, this cultural action's symbolic and relational configurations are internationalized with the simultaneous organization of the IBF and PBF congresses and the SCECC meeting. These manifestations mobilized intergovernmental and transnational business actors, presented a common Islamic cultural repertoire and called for more intra-*ummah* cooperation as a remedy to develop Muslim countries' status in the world economy. For Turkish elites, the access to these networks seems fundamental in the sense that they provide them with a large institutional structure, a transnational social capital and a global Islamic symbolic frame to upgrade their cultural model to the level of a universal one for other Muslim countries. However, these international links of cooperation become a "strategy of extraversion"—,that is to say a form of politics of dependency on external dynamics, for the production, the legitimation and the consolidation of these elites' mode of domination. Therefore, paradoxically, this international support becomes a source of constraint for the Islamic bourgeoisie's ambitions because it makes their cultural action dependent on other countries' underdevelopment level and their claim for an economic power status depend upon these other actors' willingness to collaborate with Turkey.

NOTES

1. The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen, founded in 1991 by an economic elite supporter of political Islam. Today it brings together more than 11,000 business owners, mostly small and medium-sized enterprises, heavily involved in foreign markets and referring to Islam

as a mode of social identification and political action. This business community, which expresses various forms of personal political affinities with the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), is organized as a large network in Turkey and abroad with 140 representative points in 60 countries. It is heavily invested in the techniques and networks of government under AKP rule. For a comprehensive analysis of the empowerment of this social group, see Yankaya (2013).

2. The definition of "cultural action" is constructed by analogy to the concept of "public action" (Dubois 2009).

3. For a detailed analysis, see Yankaya (2013).

4. For a study of these clientelistic relationships, see Buğra and Savaskan (2014). See also Aymes et al. (2015).

5. They were first studied as spaces for information exchange and new product launches, therefore as devoid of any relation to politics (Bello and Barksdale 1986; Bello and Barczak 1990; Munuera Aleman and Ruiz De Maya 1999). Seized afterwards as an object of ethnographic study, international marketplaces are explored as concrete spaces where globalization is produced by "real individuals and not by a depersonalized rational action" (Garcia-Papet et al. 2015; Garcia-Papet 2005). In another context, cultural tourism fairs in France are studied as a political space constitutive of a professional community presenting a "performative utopia" (Cousin 2005).

6. Interview during MIF, 27 November 2014, Istanbul.

7. Inaugural speech of the MÜSIAD President, Nail Olpak, 26 November 2014, Istanbul.

8. Haber Rota, 21 November 2014.

9. These are Kümas Manyezit Sanayi, Tosyali, Akdaglar, Cinar Boru (steel and construction industry), IGA et TAV (airport operators), Kalyon (construction, média), MNG Holding (transport, tourism, construction industry, energy, finance and media), Siyah Kalem Mühendislik, Vefa Holding (construction), Kaanlar (food industry), Kiler Holding (supermarkets, tourism, construction, energy), Hamidiye (water distribution, affiliate of Istanbul Municipality), BiaMedia (advertisement agency for many airline companies such as Turkish Airlines), Al Baraka (Islamic bank) and Avea (telecommunications). See also Massicard (2014).

10. I cite Turkish Airlines as a public structure because although only 50% belong to the state, all decisions are taken by public authorities.

11. For instance, see the president's speech of 29 May 2015 during the inauguration of the Islamic window of the public bank Ziraat Bankası, and that of 29 October 2014 on the two new districts in the Istanbul project Kanal Istanbul. "Aiming high: the government works to Develop as a global financial center," Oxford Business Group, 2013. For a discussion of the possibility, rather small, of realizing this objective, see Akyol and Baltacı (2015).

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Territorial Cultural Policies

The Dream of a Village: The Yeşil Yayla Festival and the Making of a World of Culture in the Town of Arhavi

Clémence Scalbert-Yücel

Accompanied by a *tulum* player,[1] wearing a wedding gown and carrying a basket full of fruits, a stilt-walker from Istanbul leads a procession on the main road of the small town of Arhavi. The procession is colourful and diverse, comprising young middle-class Istanbul or Ankara dwellers, including youth and families; foreigners interested in local music and dance; festival workers and volunteers from the region but who have come from Western cities, sometimes accompanied by some family members or friends based locally or spending their summer holidays in their hometown. Passers-by stop to watch the procession that reaches the town square on which are deployed the banners of the 7th edition of the Yeşil Yayla Festival.[2] The organizers' megaphones greet us. The theme of the festival (in 2012 it was local fruits) is presented and thanks expressed to all those who facilitated the organization, including local officials. The festival is opened. Then up to ten minibuses take us all to the village of Lome (Yolgeçen is the Turkish name) where the festival's first day takes place. A long queue of vehicles enters the village. We get out, a bit like

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schoolchildren on a summer camp. The stilt-walker performs a show in a pear tree by a tea garden. We walk, take pictures, look, and peer into old *serender*[3] or *çay alım yeri*[4] until reaching a field in which a small stage has been set up (Fig. 8.1). Music and dance start. Someone from the organization carefully video records everything. A while later, in a corner of the field, women from the village answer the questions of the organizers and explain, through their megaphones, how to cook fruit-based puddings; then university professors from Istanbul talk about the local fruit varieties. Someone takes notes. Village dwellers, local journalists and the Arhavi mayor wander around, as do members of the US organization that helps to finance the festival. Before dusk, young relatives of the festival organizers, together with local theatre actors, perform a kind of pop-dance show. Many musicians and singers are scheduled later, including Laz[5] singers and *horon*[6] leaders, but this evening's star is the Irish Crete-based fiddle player Ross Dally. The night is clear. Clear (and dry) weather is an exception at the end of August in the region. Festival-goers sit quietly on the grass, listening to the concert, while many village dwellers and acquaintances chat and stand on the borders of the field, where a few stands have been erected for the day: one serves the evening dinner cooked by women from the village; another advertises Gola, the association that organizes the festival, and sells CDs; another one presents a local Laz association and sells publications in the Laz language. Once the concerts are over, the minibuses take us back from this pastoral setting to the student dormitory in the neighbouring town, by the Black Sea, where partying continues for many.

The Culture, Art, and Environment Yeşil Yayla Festival (Kültür, Sanat ve Çevre Festival, YYF) took place each summer between 2006 and 2015 in mostly ethnically Laz villages of the Rize and Artvin provinces in the Eastern Black Sea region of Turkey. It was one of numerous festivals that have developed in Turkey—1350 festivals in 2009 (Yolal et al. 2009)—over the last two decades in both rural and urban settings and that have twinned, revived, or replaced traditional celebrations or *şenlik*.[7] In this itinerant festival, organized by the Istanbul-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Gola, festival-goers, while entertaining themselves, discover both new musical sounds, and rural settings and customs, to which they had grown strangers. Indeed, rural migrations have drained these mountainous regions, and villages have often been emptied—sometimes with only a few inhabitants remaining during the winter. Presenting

Fig. 8.1 Arrival at the site of the festival, Yeşil Yayla Festival, 2012

its activities as located at the crossroads of local, national, and universal dynamics,[8] the association, and its festival, is the ideal locus to question the dynamics of elaboration of cultural policies in a context of national and international circulations of people, ideas, images, aesthetics, and modes of action.

Festival studies has grown into a quasi-independent field of study from sociology, anthropology, tourism study, and geography, to name only the main disciplines. They have extensively focused on the roles of festivals and on their impacts on local societies and cultures, as well as, in the field of tourism studies, on their impact on economy (e.g. Getz 2010; Eresi and Kara 2014). Others have focused on the spatial dimension of festivals as, for instance, an indicator of social or ethnic segregation (Rinaudo et al. 2007). This chapter shares some of the questioning of these works, in particular the studies dealing with the role of festivals in cultural life

and in identity politics (Yardımcı 2014; Massicard 2003; Elias 2016 for the case of Turkey). It does not look, however, at the actual impacts of the festival on pre-existing spheres. Rather, it takes the YYF as a locus of observation of the making of the world of culture. Such an approach which is attentive to the assembling and movements of associations on the one hand, and to dynamics of transfer, importation, and circulations of models and ways of doing on the other, allows us to analyse how culture is constituted and defined at a specific point in time. Such an approach enables me to highlight how a conception of culture takes shape and becomes dominant—or stronger, to use Callon and Latour's wording[9]—while underlining the fluctuating and temporary dimensions of the definitions of culture.

I shall show that, in the case studied here, there is no strongly designed and implemented cultural policy. The world of culture is rather constituted through a variety of cultural actions and shaped by interactions, conflicts, or negotiations on the one hand and contingencies on the other hand. I argue that the world of culture coalesces or stabilizes around what can be termed "rural heritage". Such reappraising of the village and of rural life does not only spring out of nostalgia—or if it does spring out of nostalgia, this nostalgia is performative. Although I strongly agree with the idea that processes of heritagization can be powerful dynamics of dispossession, and of commodification and standardization of culture (Taylor 2016; Elias 2016), I also believe, following Rautenberg et al. (2000: § 2), that it can also provide people with meanings. I shall show how the building of heritage here is in tension between these two dynamics of dispossession and commodification on the one hand and reappropriation and attribution of new meanings on the other.

This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted in the Eastern Black Sea region. It is also informed by previous research on the issue of heritage-making in Kurdish and south-eastern cities of Turkey (Scalbert-Yücel 2009; Girard and Scalbert-Yücel 2015). I have attended the YYF's 2012, 2013, and 2015 (final) editions, and also the first and only edition of the Doğa Film Festival (Nature Film Festival) in April 2012, also organized by Gola in Pazar and Fındıklı in the Rize province. I stayed in the area during periods of preparation for the festival in order to meet other actors of culture in the region. Apart from field notes and interviews gathered then, I have also used material produced by the

NGO itself (including a book and a movie produced on the tenth anniversary of Gola). Indeed, the NGO tells a narrative about itself and its work through various media and materials (e.g. websites, social media, leaflets, posters, and festival programmes, including texts and visuals). Such narratives both produce sources and takes their place in the very assemblage of culture. They give culture its materiality. Thus I have opted to use these materials conjointly with the ones collected in the field. The use of these two types of source/material also enables me to identify any potential disjunctions, splits, or gaps between stated goals, intentions, or dreams on the one hand, and actual doing or action, always contingent, on the other.

The chapter is organized into three sections. The first presents the NGO and its evolution, marked by the search for a "middle ground". The second focuses on the actual modes of action of the NGO. It shows that although the NGO presents its action as a model, the festival deploys itself in an unpredictable way of its own. Finally, the third section shows how the action of this NGO is associated with a multiplicity of actions whose joint work gives shape to the world of culture, defined around rural heritage.

1   Gola and the YYF: Search for a Middle Ground

In this section I shall show that the idea of the YYF and of its content and aims emerged from the encounter between some Laz cultural activists and a US fund working in the field of "bio-cultural" diversity that established a kind of middle ground, understood as "the construction of a mutually comprehensible world characterized by new systems of meaning and exchange".[10] The very process of working in the field, in the villages, also altered the stated aims and field of action of the festival and the NGO, sometimes so as to preserve the middle ground or to establish a consensus. Paraphrasing the emic definition provided by the organizers, I will define the organization and the festival as the product of a "collective work" (Çavdar 2016: 17).

1.1   The Coproduction of an Idea

The Gola association emerged from the activities of different actors, coming mainly from the domain of arts and, more specifically, music. One is a

well-known Laz musician, Birol Topaloğlu, whose music is produced by Kalan Müzik, and who is close to the multicultural musical scene in Istanbul and to the then emerging Laz cultural movement in the country (in which he participates).[11] Born and raised in the Eastern Black Sea town of Pazar, active in the field of Laz music and collecting music in Laz villages since the mid-1990s, he has had good family and working relationships in the area. He is also very well received abroad. The current president's family is from Fındıklı (Rize). She was born in İzmit, where she lived until she moved first to Eskişehir to study tourism, and then to Istanbul. She recorded an album of Laz songs in 2011, and she leads a children's Laz choir. She presents herself as an (Laz/woman) *aktivist* or as a *turistçi* (tourism worker).[12] Both individuals settled permanently in the Eastern Black Sea region a few years ago. Another founder of the association is an ethnic or world music professional (he has led the San Francisco World Music festival for a long time and presented some world music programmes on US and Turkish radio stations). Originally from the Black Sea region, he never lived in the Laz country. He settled and worked in San Francisco for many years before recently moving back to Istanbul. One must also mention three siblings of Laz descent, born and raised in Istanbul. They all went to university in Istanbul (one published a book based on her MA dissertation) and ran a Laz restaurant there before one of them also moved to the Eastern Black Sea region.

These founding members of Gola are of Laz descent but mostly grew up outside of the Laz region and were based in Istanbul at the time of the foundation of the NGO. Most had mainly temporary connections (from holidays or family gatherings), except perhaps Birol Topaloğlu, who had a closer relationship with the homeland. The rediscovery of Laz culture in Turkey came as a result of these urban youths looking for their roots (Taşkın 2016). In 2011 the current Gola director expressed herself as follows:

> The villages stayed behind us, the houses, the lives, the scattered stories; the MIGRATION stories nobody wanted to be the actors of. For some it meant civil service, for other migration and estrangement [gurbetlik]. Some had gone to these huge—and a bit scary—cities with enthusiasm, some in bewilderment […] we are the generation with this fearful, this trembling heart. We are the main characters of the stories of no identity, no self, no country. […] I grew up. I saw that before many things I like my grandparents …

I like their nostalgia for the village, their ties to the land, their respect for the RIVER, their love for the houses. I love the way they always speak Laz. I love the fact that they have not become without identity. (Eka 2011)[13]

The festival and the work of the organization are in great part a quest for roots, identity, and even a home for the organizers as well as for some of the festival-goers. The festival became a "school", first and foremost, for themselves. Indeed, tourism-related activities—including festivals—produce narratives that makes sense not only for the visitors and tourists but also for the locals and the organizers (Cousin 2011).

Since their foundation, the festival and the NGO have been financially supported by the Christensen Fund (TCF), a US fund working for the protection and enhancement of "bio-cultural diversity".[14] In 2002, TCF, whose president was very well informed about the Black Sea region, got in touch directly and made himself known to Birol Topaloğlu via the company Kalan Müzik. This is how he recalled their first meeting:

At that time, I was working on epics. I told them that the epics were disappearing and that I wanted to record them. This really struck them; they said: "we don't do CD, concert, or stuff like that, we support work about biodiversity. But do a festival, an event, and we'll help you. In 2002 there were going to be a World Music Festival. They asked me to do a project in the framework of this festival. (Çavdar 2016: 41)

Although it did not happen back then, the idea of a festival had been raised and it was from that encounter that the YYF was born. Gola was founded in 2006 after the first edition of the YYF.[15] Gola was founded in Istanbul before it opened an office in the small town of Arhavi (Artvin department) in the Laz region.

1.2   Moderate Ethnicity, Moderate Environmentalism

It was through the TCF that urban artists and cultural/ethnic activists familiarized themselves with the notions of environment and biodiversity (even "biocultural diversity"). Kutay, one of the founders of the festival, recalled the process:

Ken Wilson [then head of the TCF] had done his fieldwork for his doctorate in the Eastern Black Sea area. He had travelled a lot, and learned about

the flora. We learned from him that the flora of the region was richer than the one in Europe. It is a bit through Ken that we learned about the environment. At the beginning we had proposed a yayla festival (highland pasture festival). We didn't include the environment or bio-cultural diversity. Ken showed us this way. We discussed the possibility of a work on the relationship between nature and human, and we framed it like that. (Çavdar 2016: 44)

Following the TCF's recommendations and constraints, the YYF embraced the term "environment" (*çevre*) along with "art and culture" (*sanat* and *kültür*) in its name and organized environmentally framed activities, such as panels about nature and the environment, cooking local food, activities on ecotourism, nature walks (*doğa yürüşü*), and symbolic litter collection at the festival sites. Over the years, all these activities became clear patterns of the festival. Each year the festival was organized around a main theme, always in reference to the environment or nature, such as "rivers", "stones", "cows", "fruits", "bees", or "recycling". It mixed the abovementioned activities with artistic ones, such as concerts, film screenings, dance workshops, or land art, in which artists (from all over Turkey and abroad) took part. Environmental awareness, raised by the TCF, also matched the reinvented Laz identity well, which had been described by activists as closely connected to its natural environment as early as the 1990s (Koçiva 2000; Scalbert-Yücel 2016). The narrative is not fully imported. Like other Laz activists, Gola's members described Laz culture as being intermingled with nature.[16] Stressing such a relationship also helps the urban activists to (re)connect with some of the (rural) roots which they were looking for.

Environmental and ethnic narratives coexist, though at different times and in different milieus. The ethnic one is present in the NGO's first grant applications.[17] It coexists with a more (multi)cultural, regional, and environmental one that appears in later grant applications. The first grant applications to the TCF (2005, 2007) mentioned the festival as a "foundation for a cultural revival". In the grant description, the festival's name included the ethnonym Laz. Later grant applications mentioned a "festival of local dance, music, drama, folklore and ecological education" (2007). In 2008 the grant was aimed at livelihood development through craft and ecotourism, and in 2011 the stated aim was to "strengthen the cultural, agro-ecological and

economic revival". Although the influence of the US funding body is considerable owing to the similar narrative of "biocultural diversity", the way it influences the framings of the Istanbul organization may be moderated: apart from the obvious element of learning that may affect and modify the stated initial objectives over time, the necessity to work locally, in an environment sometimes perceived as alien and thereby difficult, as well as the need for the organization to survive economically (hence maybe a focus on economic "revival", at least in the grant documents) played a considerable role.

This shift, or adaptation, of the primary stated objectives of Gola (shaped through its encounters with the TCF) is indeed partly related to the necessity for the Istanbul-based NGO to work in the region. For instance, until the 2013 concert of the band Kardeş Türküler, no Kurdish songs had been staged during the festival, despite the organizers' wishes for this to happen sooner, so as to reflect the multicultural vision of the organisation. In 2008 the festival that was to take place in the Hemşin area had to be relocated to another local town because Gola had been accused of supporting Armenian activities with Christian and US money.[18] Since then the association has been presenting ethnicity, cultural dialogue, and multiculturalism with caution (Scalbert-Yücel 2016).

Environmental claims are also often moderated. Indeed, ecological movements are often seen as radical (Toumarkine 2005). A compromise is sought on this ground too. The 2013 edition of the festival took place partly in the Kamilet Valley where hydroelectric plants (*Hidroelektrik Santralı*, HES) were being planned and contested in the sensitive post-Gezi context. Festival-goers kept a low profile walking through the building sites. The dreamt-of village is not a politicized one: environmental awareness and action seem to be limited to an estheticized nature and rural culture, relatively cut off from the political issues related to HES and other ecological predations.[19]

2   Models, Mediatization, and Contingency: The Unpredictable Life of a Festival

Even if the connection between local identities and the environment is not new, the biocultural diversity narrative embraced may enable the building of a kind of middle ground on which to work with local actors and the population. This also implies that the cultural and ethnic activists

at the heart of the association learn and implement new repertoires of action.[20] This is clearly not easy and even sometimes distressing for these urban ethnic activists and artists. Gola and the YYF present themselves as different and as a model to be reproduced in villages. Nevertheless, their repertoires seemed largely imported thanks to constantly renewed connections. How does the transfer work? How are the transfer and the model used?

2.1   *A Different Festival*

The key action of the association for nearly 10 years has been the organization of an itinerant village festival (see Fig. 8.2 for the location of the villages). With an itinerant festival, the organization aimed to spread its 'ideals' (be it ecology, local, rural, ethnic cultures) to different villages and people, as many as possible. It also aimed to ensure that its mission (organizing a festival, economic development), modes, and places of action (*düzlük* or flat festival area, games, food, music, dance, Laz language, etc.) were passed onto and reappropriated by villagers in the future. The association presented itself as a model for others, and to the villagers as experienced professionals who could help them organize their (first) village festival, in the current context when festivals are seen as tools for economic gain. "Canlandırmak" (to revive), "hatırlatmak" (to make oneself remember), and "kurtulmak" (to save) are terms often used. These highlight the fact that one of the key aims of the festival is to save and revive the culture for everyone,[21] including for the organizers, for the inhabitants of the villages, and for the festival-goers. Gola and the festival are portrayed as a school and also as ambassadors (Çavdar 2016: 10, 11). The educative mission is not characteristic only of this festival. On the case of another itinerant festival, the *Gezici Festival*, Odabasi suggested that it "continues the historically close link between mobile exhibition and modernity's (often ideologically informed) march toward rural areas" (Odabasi 2016: 154). Yet the YYF takes a different – if not opposed - direction. It proposes to go back to the rurality, for instance by producing land art (whose raw material comes from the land) or by staging 'folk' music. The case of music is significant: Gola does not only bring to light and to the festival' stages songs from the villages of the Black Sea Region (for instance through the voices of Eka, Birol Topaloğlu, İlknur Yakupoğlu, or Adem Ekiz). It also brings the songs from the rural world to the urban stage (as for instance in May 2016 during the celebration of Gola's 10th anniversary in the trendy Istanbul-based *Babylon*).

Fig. 8.2 The sites of the Yeşil Yayla Festival, 2006–2015

Gola aims to organize a *different* festival—one that would fill a gap within the range of festivals offered in the region. Some of the organizers had even qualified it as "urban", and this because, instead of the cooking competition performed at all festivals of the region, it offers artistic events and workshops. One of the members stated: "For the first time, workshops about Laz language were going to be organized. A more contemporary (*güncel*), more urban (*kentli*) festival was going to take place in Lazona.[22] There were going to be worshops, exhibitions" (in Çavdar 2016: 44). Another one said: "In the region the YYF is probably the only festival where there is no contest of the longest *muhlama*.[23] That is why when we tried to explain ourselves, many time, people found us strange. They were doubtful about us" (In Çavdar 2016: 126).

Elias has successfully shown how the rise of the *festival* participates in the domination of the city over rural areas in the Eastern Black Sea area (Trabzon). The traditional *şenlik*—the calendar of which is based on pastoral and rural life—has been replaced by the *festival*, deconnected from the rural calendar, and in which rural activity (transhumance in particular) is staged and turned into a common heritage for all in the region (Elias 2016). The YYF aims to propose something else again: not another "yayla festival" (despite its name)[24] but a village festival. This may well remind one of old village celebrations, but with a scientific, arty, and cosmopolitan look. The cosmopolitan aesthetics of the village contrast with the yokel vision of modernity spread by small-town festivals.

Gola clearly distinguishes itself—in the Bourdieusian meaning of the distinction (Bourdieu 1979)—by presenting the YYF as an international festival and a village festival at the same time. The estheticization of rural life—as shown in colourful posters picturing cows, fruit, or rural dwellings, and pictures posted on Facebook—are reminders of the urban origins of the organizers. The use of such esthetical forms not only contributes to this dynamic of distinction but also introduces some forms of standardization through the use of a common visual language (Yardımcı 2014). The distinction and the distance is also built and displayed by the scientific outlook that Gola gives to its work. Following such a route also gives some of its members the confidence that they seem to lack sometimes as outsiders (to both the region and ecological or environmental work). The using and transferring of models is thus reassuring: it provides a guarantee of scientificity and professionalism to balance relatively limited (or at least undirect) rooting in local knowledge. The difference is used and performed. The difference is acknowledged by local actors too. Such a method thus provides the NGO with recognition and legitimacy (dynamic of integration), but also reproduces the distance, the strangeness, and the foreignness (dynamic of detachment).

2.2 Models and Replicas

Though Gola presented itself and the festival as a model to be followed and replicated by others, it itself often used models from elsewhere and others' activities as models for its own work. It is significant that the Mott foundation grant received by the organization for 2016–2017, aimed at capacity-building, included an element of learning "from other, prominent, Turkish non-profit organisations active in the field".[25] I show below how transfers take place. Beyond the transfer, circulation of ideas, models, and norms across different spaces (Dumoulin and Saurugger 2010), one can actually talk about *trans-acting* so as to stress the transformation of the models, early stated goals, and dreams through the action itself.[26]

The Black Sea Fruit Heritage and Sustainable Living Project (2011–2012)[27] was a replica of the Traditional Fruits of Muğla: Cultural Heritage, Database and Conservation Project conducted in the Aegean region between 2006 and 2011.[28] Gola's workers explicitly talked about project "transfer" with the word *aktarmak*, while a trainer from the Muğla project talked about handing it over (*el vermek*); and this, with great pleasure, since the Muğla project was thought of as a pilot project, to be implemented later all over the country.[29] The Black Sea Fruits Heritage Project also aimed, along with documenting fruit heritage, to "record" another "model": the Model of Sustainable living of the Laz (*Lazlarda Sürdürülebilir Yaşam Modelinin kayıtaltına alınması*).[30] A chain of models and projects was built throughout the country.

The work conducted within the framework of the Black Sea Fruit Heritage Project is presented and summarized in a 14 minute film that shows the use of specific methods (in particular oral history) recommended by an academic after a workshop organized in Istanbul, the importance given to visual and written records, and the project leaders' participation in the activities related to fruit growing or processing.[31] Such embodiment and performance of the heritage is an attempt to fully make it one's own. Now the project is on hold because there are no funds and no one to run it. The tangible outcomes were a short movie, some grafted trees, plant record forms, and visual recordings, as well as the 2012 edition of the festival on the theme of local fruits. The planned final publication, database, and Gola's conservatory orchard haven't seen the light of day yet. Though the project was halted, its Facebook account was still active in 2015, reproducing beautiful ancient pictures. However, at that time, the lives of the project were the medi-

ated one and the one that had been appropriated by locally based actors. Indeed, in the spring of 2015, members of an Arhavi-based association talked about the conservation of local fruits through their own "fruit heritage project" (*meyve mirası projesi*), a project of "cultural fruits" (*kültürel meyve*), and the establishment of a botanic garden (*botanik bahçe*). Gola's orchard had been taken over. One should also mention the fourth issue of the magazine, *Ora*, published in Trabzon (2015), that dedicated a lengthy article to the fabrication of pear molasses in the village of Ihlamurlu (Fındıklı) where the Nature Film Festival took place in 2012—perhaps another trace of the project's continuation.

In 2012, the second day's programme of the 7th YYF was described as follows: "We will visit Ardos (Arhavi Nature Sport NGO) *carnival* [translation they used for the Turkish word *şenlik*] at this delightful flat within the forest which hosted 6th Green Yayla Festival last year." ARDOS, with the inhabitants of Pilarget, had continued its own celebration there, following the YYF 2011 edition, and had invited Gola to participate and witness the celebration. The big wooden Ferris wheel erected the year before was still there. The visit was carried out in the rain, and the sole possible activity/show was an off-road race. Muddy tracks had been prepared by cutting some trees. The race was noisy and smoky. After eating wet sandwiches and watching the race, we all went back soaked. Following the pastoral idyll on the festival's first day, the scene of the race did not fit the image of the festival—of the colourful and joyful rural life shown on the festival posters, for instance. However, the race has since been repeated every year in the local festivities and it formed part of the 2016 International Arhavi Festival.

2.3   Contingencies: About Tea, Rain, and Electricity

Here I would like to highlight the importance of contingencies in the evolution of the festival. Indeed, although plans were made in advance and models carefully used, the festival seems to have had a life of its own. Both the audience, and the vagaries of the weather and those of technology, affected the evolution of the festival in ways that could not have been predicted. Therefore the use of a model does not mean that it was actually reproduced, as shown in the examples below.

Another case of *aktarma* or transfer is the Doğa Film Festival (Nature Film Festival) organized by Gola in April 2012 over three days in three

different locations, modelled on the travelling YYF. All the foreign movies shown during the festival had previously been dubbed and shown at the Film Festival for Sustainable Living in Istanbul (*Sürdürülebilir Yaşam Film Festivali*, and, even earlier, at a Swedish film festival). The Nature Film Festival was launched in Pazar's Klass Sinema. Among the external audience was a team of local young Lipton employees who were advertising the Lipton Project for Sustainable Tea Growing and offering the sponsor's tea to the festival team. The big advertisement in the room read: "We are working for the future of Turkish tea." On my first visit to the region, this was quite striking: Laz activists had depicted tea to me as a non-endemic species that has led to assimilation and participated in the erasing of Laz culture.[32] The Lipton workers particularly enjoyed *A story of stuff* (by Annie Leonard, USA, 2007), a highly didactic movie denouncing the destruction of the environment caused by frenzied consumption practices. They contemplated the idea of screening it for their project's tea workers. The festival organizers who indeed aimed to communicate environmental messages warmly received the idea. The highlight, according to one of the festival workers, was the movie *Queen of the Sun* (Taggard Siegel, USA, 2010). It was shown each day in three different locations of the festival. The movie highlights the threats faced by bees and provides tips to protect them. Screening the movie was a way to draw attention to beekeeping, considered as a key element of the region's heritage, though in decline. However, when the movie was shown in a hotel in Pazar, some preferred to watch the football next door. And on the last day, it seemed that the talks by local beekeepers in Ihlamurlu village's square received more attention from the festival-goers and organizers than from the villagers. Such an example highlights the construction of a "cultural intimacy" (Herzfeld 2004) of the festival makers and the building of their relatively closed community. Yet, the 2012 Nature film festival was a key step in building networks with local actors - including beekeepers - and preparing the 2014 edition of the YYF on the theme of bees and honey. The following example from that same Sunday shows how the audience and its attitude can affect the shape that the festival takes. Minibuses had brought youth from town to the village. The screening of a highly didactic Australian movie on the techniques of permaculture and compost making (*Permaculture soils*, Geoff Lawton, 2010) quickly bored them. The room was soon emptied and the youth started chatting and dancing *horon* outside, so the organizers decided to modify the screening programme of the day to try to get their attention back.

Technical and weather issues also affected the ways in which the festival evolved. Each year, talks were organized. In general, they took place in an open-air setting or in the small building used to sell tea when it was raining too heavily. However, both inside and outside, the sound was often deficient since the equipment did not always work properly in a humid environment. If the programme leaflets advertised many talks, in practice, it was difficult to hear them if not close to the speaker. The *tulum*, which does not need amplification, would then bring back a sense of pleasure and joy to the evening.

In August 2012, as it was pouring with rain, the last evening's concert, planned in a village as usual, was relocated to the local town of Arhavi, in the newly rebuilt festival hall located by the littoral highway. The organization had so far always preferred rural settings, but that evening the concert took place in town and the following year, the big concert of the Kardeş Türküler was also organized there. Rainy conditions associated with good relationships with the municipality gave the festival an urban dimension. It also opened it up to a wider (town) audience.

In this section I have shown how, despite the many references to models, the festival deployed a life of its own: models are indeed used and transferred but they are rapidly adopted in multiple ways by the actors. Contingent elements transform the actions and sometimes make the actual festival quite different from the one presented on the programme and other materials. The role of the media is key. It contributes to portraying the festival as distinctive. The media is also constitutive of the movement of distinction that, while keeping Gola active in the making of the cultural sphere, somehow keeps it apart.

3   Culture and the Making of Rural Heritage in Arhavi

In this last section I attempt to locate the action of the NGO and the festival in a network of activities. The work of different actors converges to give shape to a local cultural scene characterized by a shared interest in rural heritage. Although the festival has been organized in many districts all over the Laz and Hemşin region (Fındıklı, Hopa, Ardeşen, Pazar, Çamlıhemşin, as shown in the Fig. 8.2), this section focuses in particular on Arhavi town and district. This is where the NGO opened its second office in the early 2010s (the Istanbul office was closed in 2015–2016).

3.1   *A Network of Cultural Activities*

Following the first edition, the YYF was organized with the collaboration of pre-existing actors, including nature sport clubs, cultural centres, local businesses, and restaurants (see Fig. 8.2). Gola first worked in the Arhavi district in 2010, where it collaborated with town-based associations such as ARDOS and the Arhavi Association for Folklore and Tourism (Arhavi Doğa Sporları Derneği, ARTUD), all then recently founded. Some of the members of these associations were area-dwellers and were sometimes considered as "resource persons".[33] Good relationships with them ensured both an entry into villages and the acquisition of knowledge about the environment and rural life. Very importantly, they ensured the actual involvement of local people in the action of the association and thereby the success of its "mission". Festival settings were also often businesses such as rafting places, hotels, and restaurants (see Fig. 8.2). Though open to all, they are closed places, private spaces that ensure a relative intimacy and the security it brings. Choosing a business is also perhaps a way of showing to the local inhabitants that festival, culture, ecotourism, and so on can benefit the area economically.

Other associations dealing with culture and tourism were founded around this time, including Çkuni Berepe Laz Kültür ve Turizm derneği (Our Children—Laz Culture and Tourism Association) in 2010, and the Arhavi Association for the Development of Highland Tourism and the Protection of Nature (Arhavi Doğayı Koruma ve Yayla Turizmini Geliştirme Derneği). The Arhavi hometown association İSTAD (İstanbul Arhavililer Derneği) was created in 2006 in Istanbul, and it is also very active and has strong ties with both the Arhavi-based associations and the municipality.[34] In this small town, the abovementioned institutions often work in collaboration, some members circulating from one association to another, while some in the municipality also belong to an association. The municipality is proud to work with all, and takes into consideration suggestions by them all. Therefore the municipal cultural policy seems to be partly produced through the support of these various suggestions, ideas, and projects. In spring 2015, all went together on a bus hired locally to the Artvin Days in Istanbul and Ankara (Artvin Tanıtım Günleri), an event that promotes the province to investors and tourists, but also to the home-town people (*hemşeri*) themselves. Gola did not share this moment of (performance of) cultural intimacy. Its absence underlines this border between insiders and outsiders, which does not exclude the building of friendship and working relationships.

The YYF connected itself to a network of both pre-existing and more recent cultural and associative events. In Arhavi, a town of roughly 20,000 inhabitants, the cultural life is marked by events throughout the year, including celebrations of public holidays. The highlight is certainly the International Arhavi Culture and Art Festival organized every summer since 1973. Originally the festival featured boxing matches and brass band contests. Today it includes international folkdance competitions, sports matches (tennis, volleyball, swimming, football, etc.), off-road and wood car races (also called *Laz ralli*), cooking competitions (Laz pastry and anchovy bread), craft exhibitions (with the public body of lifelong learning *Halk-Eğitim*), and competitions with roots in agricultural life, such as tea collecting (organized with the state institution for tea production *Çay-Kur*), hazelnut shelling, and log and plank cutting. The current cultural life is also shaped by the memories of old feasts (*şenlik*) that took place at the time of religious celebrations in the villages and that were mentioned to me with nostalgia.

Such *şenlik* were being revived at the time of Gola's work in Arhavi. According to the mayor, Gola has been special and influential in local cultural initiatives. He declared, maybe consciously reproducing the discourse of the organization, for the book Gola prepared about itself:

> They develop awareness about the beauties of the area. They add an important value by bringing them into an international milieu […] We too have learned a lot and we started to do similar things in our own festival […] After the YYF, there is now in our district 5 or 6 little local events that take place every year. (Çavdar 2016: 49)

However, the action is not unidirectional: it does not involve Gola and a locality which it would impact on. Gola may have participated in the recreation of a tradition in Omaxtore—Pilarget where a local *şenlik* had been organized following the 2011 YYF. In Güngören, however, the Feast of Anchovy Bread and Laz Pastry (*Hamsili Ekmek ve Laz Böreği Şenliği*) was organized in 2010 by a group of Arhavi people. The following year, Gola organized its festival in Güngören, working together with village dwellers and members of associations there on its programme, including the preparation of Laz Börek, thereby restaging what had been done the previous year, without them (see also Çavdar 2016: 255). The event was celebrated for the seventh time in 2016, but this time in the village of Dikyamaç. The organizers of this event mentioned the idea of an itinerant

festival, thus recalling the YYF. Influences are multiple and cannot always be disentangled.

3.2   *Nostalgia for the Village*

Common interest in rural heritage is growing in the district, as evidenced by the increasing number of websites, publications, and initiatives. In 2010 the hometown association İSTAD sponsored a project coordinated by the municipality and the district governor, encouraging people to register their ancient houses—for preservation and restoration—with the Directorate of Culture and Tourism. The initiative was presented as an action for tourism: refurbished traditional houses are seen as the ideal setting for bed and breakfast or boutique hotels.[35] Between 2011 and 2015, 44 dwellings were registered (compared with 14 between 2003 and 2010).[36] Many in the region talked about opening a bed and breakfast, but so far little has been done. Another initiative is the opening, in 2012, of the Dikyamaç Village's Way of Life Museum (Dikyamaç Köyü (Kamparna) Yaşam Tarzı Müzesi). Supported by a long-term benefactor from the village, Naim Özkazanç, this museum exhibits handicraft objects, household and rural tools, together with papers, photographs and drawings, documenting the village's history. It is presented as both a way to recreate the connection between the village and its people who have migrated, and a contribution to tourism.[37] In our meeting, a municipality representative noted that this "ethnographic museum" was the first village museum in Artvin province. With its opening, Arhavi innovated.

"Cultural" (or "ethnic", depending on the definition) traits or artefacts (i.e. handicraft, local folk life, food, agricultural skills, languages, songs), "natural" sites (the Mençuna waterfall, the highlands), and "historical" buildings (*çifte köprü* bridge and vernacular rural architecture) somehow only provided limited resources for tourism. And tourism is on many peoples' mind. These resources are framed in different ways: they can be ethnic, cultural, historic, or natural. Nature and ecotourism are not only put forward by an urbanite youth. State development agencies also supported them as early as 2006.[38] In April 2015, many in and around Arhavi were talking about the call for funds (by the Eastern Black Sea Development Agency, Doğu Karadeniz Kalkınma Ajansı (DOKA)) for the protection and valorization of cultural, historical, and natural values and for tourism development. Rural heritage is also perceived as a new source of income

for some town and village dwellers. Thus the opening of Dikyamaç museum by a long-term village benefactor may well be understood as a new way of working for the development of the village, as a natural follow-up to the construction of roads and a water supply network.[39] Such a museum, together with the different *şenlik* and festivals, may well dwell on "mood nostalgia", as feelings of longing for the past, of some urbanites, migrants, and village dwellers. However, it also builds on this "nostalgic mode" (Jameson 1991; Berliner 2012) in which strong personal feelings are not necessarily involved but in which the past or its reconstruction is seen as a resource. This is characteristic not only of the region but of the whole country whose rural life has been profoundly modified by state development policies and by huge migration to the cities. Nostalgia for the rural can be seen everywhere in advertisements, new housing projects, and the like.

Differentiated nostalgias thus merge around these limited resources, and coalesce around rural heritage. It is the nostalgia of the local inhabitants and of the migrants who have first-hand memories of the rural past. It is the nostalgic mode of the business and economic world, backed by developmentalist state policies. It is the nostalgia and the "exo-nostalgia" of some of the festival organizers and festival-goers. As a quest for one's roots, the festival may be driven by "exo-nostalgia", the nostalgia of people who have not actually experienced the very past they are longing for (Berliner 2012: 781–782). Indeed, as a "posture" that "takes on very different forms", nostalgia is plural and does not "necessarily [imply] the experience of first-hand nostalgic memories" (Berliner 2012: 770). The YYF organizers and festival-goers may not all have first-hand nostalgic memories, but this does not mean that this is an "armchair" experience (Appadurai 1996: 78). On the contrary, the nostalgia is performative in the sense that it mobilizes, leads the actions and the practice, and participates in building existential meanings.

4   Conclusion

The YYF produces a platform connecting different regions of the world—Istanbul, the provincial town of Arhavi, and isolated mountain villages—through chains of funding, economic fluxes, circulation of sounds, and movements of people, ideas, images, and practices. The platform lasts temporarily for the duration of the festival while producing longer-term

connections that affect the definition of culture. Its analysis sheds light on the functioning of local cultural action.

This study of the YYF has highlighted the role of the dynamics of transfer in the shaping of cultural action in and around the small town of Arhavi. Music, Laz songs and dances, funding, narratives, images, and imaginary circulate between the Black Sea, San Francisco, and Istanbul; between cities, towns, and villages. These are dynamics of transfer in which the models and plans are largely transformed: they are transformed throughout the course of action as a result of contingent elements, limited tools and resources for the actual implementation, and the reception and appropriation by the audience. The use of models and carefully made plans and designs ahead of the festival has two main effects. First, it participates in the legitimization of an actor who, not fully anchored locally, is somehow "in between" and does not share completely the local cultural intimacy. Second, it creates a sense of community among the festival-goers. These two dynamics of legitimization and of community-building are served by a single tool: the use of a cosmopolitan global urban language, visuals, and aesthetics. That is actually by this movement of detachment and distinction that the YYF creates roots, meanings, and a sense of community for an urban uprooted population. In doing so, the festival articulates culture to rural and ethnic traditions while also reinforcing an artistic and intellectual definition of culture.

Neither the definition of culture nor the policy design are straightforward in the provincial town of Arhavi. Although the national and state ideology may draw some red lines (e.g. regarding the expression of ethnic identities and cultures, and ecological mobilizations), and although funding may be an incentive for specific forms of action, neither the definition of culture nor the policies are defined or imposed in a top-down direction. On the contrary, cultural policies take shape (always temporarily), progressively hosting and accommodating different actors, practices, and ideas around limited local resources. The concept of culture is also plural and can carry different connotations: it can be associated with art, ethnicity, locality, ways of life, and environment, depending not only on the actors but also on their interaction and the levels of their intervention and action. Following a global and powerful dynamic, culture is also blurred with tourism and, in this provincial town, stabilizes around rural heritage. Rural heritage forms a strong consensus because if it embodies roots for many, it also carries prospects of economic gains for all. It can be a consensual

object in which one can also identify and express roots. If the dreamt-of village seems to be attractive for all as a consensual way to mingle quests for roots and economic gain, or at least survival, it remains to be seen how different dreams and realizations of the rurality develops in the region and in the country at large.

NOTES

1. The *tulum* is a bagpipe played in the Eastern Black Sea region.
2. *Yayla* is the highland pasture in the mountain that is/was used for animal husbandry in the summer. It is currently the location of many festivals (see Elias 2016). *Yeşil Yayla* means "green highland pasture".
3. Small wooden building on piles near houses and used to store food.
4. *Çay alım yeri* is a small building found in every tea-growing village of the region in which tea is lightly dried, weighed, and sold.
5. The word Laz is used to refer to the people of the Eastern Black Sea region in general but also to Eastern Black Sea people who call themselves *Lazi*, speak their own language, and are also referred to as Laz by outsiders. The ethnic Laz were originally located in the Eastern Black Sea region between Pazar and Hopa, but the region has experienced strong outbound migration.
6. Horon is "a round danced on the northern slope of the Pontic Montains. A vigorous dance that proceeds anti-clockwise" (Elias 2014: 9). Translation from French is by me unless stated otherwise.
7. On the distinction between festival and *şenlik* and its meanings, see Elias (2016) and below.
8. "A civil society organisation that speaks to Turkey from the Black Sea and from Turkey to the Black Sea [and that] tries to understand, make known and solve local problems with universal concepts" http://www.golader.org/hakkimizda/. Last accessed 15 September 2016.
9. According to Callon and Latour, all actors are at the same level and become stronger through processes of association. They write: "An actor, as we have seen, becomes stronger to the extent that he or she can firmly associate a large number of elements—and, of course, dissociate as speedily as possible elements enrolled by other actors. Strength thus resides in the power to break off and to bind together" (Callon and Latour 1981: 292). Become strong "the one who is able to stabilize a particular state of power relations by associating the largest number of irreversibly linked elements" (Callon and Latour 1981: 293).
10. Beth Conklin and Laura Graham borrow the term coined by Richard White who defined the middle ground as "the construction of a mutually

comprehensible world characterised by new systems of meaning and exchanged". The new middle ground they study is "a political space, an arena of intercultural communication, exchange, and joint political action" (Conklin and Graham 1995: 696).

11. On this movement, see Toumarkine (1995), Beller-Hann and Hann (2001), Scalbert-Yücel (2016) and Taşkın (2016). The role of outsiders of the Laz country in this movement should be highlighted, as should that of circulations and borrowings: the fall of the Soviet Union made possible the discovery of Laz and Mingrelian peoples from Georgia by Laz activists in Turkey. This led to the import of songs and instruments (e.g. the çonguri luth), important in the work of Laz musicians from Turkey (e.g. Ayşenur Kolivar), and has certainly played an important part in the reinvigoration of the region. I should like to thank Nicolas Elias for highlighting this issue.

12. https://m.bianet.org/bianet/kadin/12296-sehirli-bir-genc-kizin-benlik-sevdasi, last assessed 12 May 2017.

13. All translations from Turkish are by me unless stated otherwise.

14. Later the funding became diversified with the Mott Foundation, working more on "capacity building". See http://webapps.foundationcenter.org/rc/grants/html/71744.html; http://www.mott.org/grants/yayla-gola-culture-arts-and-ecology-association-cultural-ecological-and-economic-rejuvenation-of-the-eastern-black-sea-region-201300229-01/; http://www.mott.org/grants/yayla-gola-culture-arts-and-ecology-association-cultural-ecological-and-economic-rejuvenation-of-the-eastern-black-sea-region-201300229/. Last accessed on 26 January 2017.

15. In the first year the festival was organized by Colchis Music and the San Francisco World Music Festival.

16. See for instance http://www.sabitfikir.com/soylesi/refika-kadioglu-ile-soylesi-bir-dil-nasil-yasatilir. Last assessed 25 September 2017.

17. The details of the grants provided by the TCF are available on its website: https://www.christensenfund.org/funding/grants-search/?kwords=gola&f_year=all&gregion=2&theme=all; https://www.christensenfund.org/funding/grants-search/?kwords=doordog&f_year=all&gregion=2&theme=all. Last accessed on 26 August 2016.

18. See, for instance, an article published in a right-wing newspaper: Selda Öztürk Kay, "Festival Maskesiyle Ermenicilik", *Yeniçağ*, 24 July 2008, http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/festival-maskesiyle-ermenicilik-8453h.htm. Last accessed on 30 May 2017. The Hemşin region used to be inhabited by an Armenian population, which has completely disappeared (or has been assimilated) today.

19. This said the HES are discussed in some contexts, for instance during the Nature Film Festival screened in 2012 or in discussion about the right to

water (http://www.bugday.org/portal/haber_detay.php?hid=6646. Last assessed 20 September 2017).

20. See Le Ray (2005) for the case of Dersim.
21. Together with the term *kültür*, the term of *değer* (value) is also used.
22. *Lazona* refers to the Laz country. Note from the author.
23. *Muhlama* is a local dish with an elastic texture made of cheese, butter, and sometimes corn flour. Note from the author.
24. It is interesting to note that the first edition partly took place in the touristic place of Ayder, with a walk in the highlands.
25. http://www.mott.org/grants/yayla-gola-culture-arts-and-ecology-association-cultural-ecological-and-economic-rejuvenation-of-the-eastern-black-sea-region-201300229-01/. Last accessed on 29 August 2016.
26. This notion is the product of a collective and common work in the framework of the research program funded through the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ref. ANR-12-GLOB-003) "Trans-acting Matters: Areas and Eras of a (Post-)Ottoman Globalization" (PI: Marc Aymes). Last accessed on 30 May 2017.
27. Information can be found at http://yaylafest.org/en/eastern-black-sea-shore-fruit-heritage-sustainable-living-project/. Last accessed on 30 May 2017.
28. The project was led by Elizabeth Tüzün, Fusün Ertuğ, Mary Işın, Esin Işın, and Neşe Bilgin. Plant samples are now conserved at the Nezahat Gökyiğit Botanic Garden in Istanbul.
29. "Gola Derneğinde Atölye Çalısması", http://etnofertug.blogspot.co.uk/2011/10/gola-dernegine-atolye-calsmas.html. Last accessed on 30 May 2017.
30. http://yaylafest.org/meyve-mirasi-atolyesi-1-2-ekim-2011-tarihler-inde-gola-derneginde-gerceklesti/. Last accessed on 20 August 2016.
31. The film is available on the Facebook account of the project. https://www.facebook.com/251980458217382/photos/a. 301591863256241. 71509.251980458217382/301597079922386/. Last accessed on 30 May 2017.
32. On the role of the culture of tea in the region and "domestication" by the state, see Hann (1990).
33. *Kaynak kişi* in Turkish. They also use the term "steward" in English, a word used by the TCF.
34. On hometown associations and their roles and functions in Turkey, see Hersant and Toumarkine (2005).
35. The project was called "We protect our culture" (*Kültürümüze sahip çıkıyoruz*). See http://arhavi.bel.tr/arsiv-site/arhavi-haberler/256-arhavideki-tarihi-evler-ve-serenderler-koruma-altina-alinip-restore-edilecek.html (last accessed 30 May 2017) and *ISTAD Nena* 3 winter 2014, 22–24.

36. http://www.arhavi.org/istad/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
    icle&id=1963:tarh-laz-mmars-esk-ta-goez-dolma-evlermz-artik-tescl-
    edlyor&catid=1:stad-haberi. Last accessed on 30 May 2017.
37. *ISTAD Nena* 3 winter 2014, 18–19.
38. One mention of ecotourism is the National Strategy for Rural Development
    designed by the State Administration for Development in 2006 (TC
    Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı 2006).
39. *ISTAD Nena* 3 winter 2014, 18–19. Here, Özkazanç explains that he has
    done much work in the village, including building concrete roads, provid-
    ing water, and refurbishment. And now he creates this museum.

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Tradition Makers. The Recognition Process of a Local Dance: From the Village to the Institutions

Lydia Zeghmar

Since 2012 the village of Eğridere, a hamlet lying in the valley of the Little Meander in south-west Turkey, has become a key destination for *zeybek* lovers in the region. *Zeybek* is a popular musical and choreographic genre whose roots lie in the Turkish Aegean hinterland. The genre is associated with mountain life and an agropastoral social imaginary, as well as with representations of combat. In 2012 a leading figure from the Dance and Music Folklore Section of the Turkish State Music Conservatory at Ege University, Abdullah, unearthed a local dance which had not previously been consigned to the national folklore repertoire—namely, the *zeybek* from the village of Eğridere (Eğridere *zeybeği*).[1]

This chapter takes as its starting point the story of how this dance was discovered and officially recognized in the national folklore repertoire. It sets out to examine the impact that state culture and education policies can have on the structure of the field of local traditional knowledge, and on the transmission of that knowledge.[2] More specifically, it shows how the process by which a village dance is institutionalized and taken up into the national folklore repertoire involves a range of actors, including asso-

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ciations, universities, sporting federations, municipal authorities, and the state. As stated, the project to add the Eğridere village *zeybek* to the repertoire was launched by a leading figure in the field of folklore scholarship. But this led to a series of interactions, debates, and circulations involving representatives from the official world of institutionalized folklore and a whole cluster of local associations made up of amateur or professional dancers, who transpire as leading cultural players given the extent of their involvement. Historically, a large number of amateur troupes were set up in schools and associations across the country prior to the establishment of a state folklore ensemble (Shay 2002). In the case studied here, the intense exchanges triggered by the "discovery" and legitimization of a local dance form part of a larger cultural policy to conserve, transmit, teach, and promote *zeybek* practice. Hence the institutionalization of the Eğridere *zeybek* provides a privileged position from which to observe cultural policy "in the making", and thus a window on to the interactions by which the heritagization dynamic is generated on a daily basis.

Many of the dances in the *zeybek* repertoire seek to express the morality and heroism of the *efe*, resistance fighters fleeing the Ottoman authorities who, together with their bands of irregular soldiers, sometimes rebelled against their "rulers".[3] According to some dance masters, the entire structure of *zeybek* music seeks to represent mountain-climbing. The bodily qualities used in the dance mirror the difficulties of walking in the mountains, in indirect reference to the initiatory value of the *efe*'s exile there.

The figure of the *efe* is still of great significance in popular Aegean culture, embodying a spirit of dissent, with deep roots in the region's social history (Yetkin 1997). The symbolic dimension of this archetypal and honorable Aegean bandit lies at the intersection between local history and peasant popular traditions. It is also a part of the nationalist myth in which the *efe* is a martyr for the nation, a key construct in the social imaginary as stabilized in stage performance folklore.

More generally, Turkish folklore in its current form clearly stems from a historical process in which popular and peasant dance are transformed and their forms are adapted to the stage, along with the values they convey. As shown by extensive scholarship in the anthropology of the body and performance, the transfer of local dances to the stage often involves a process of identity construction (Gibert 2007). In various countries the final stage in this development is the setting up of state-backed folklore ensembles (Shay 2002). Stage performance of *zeybek* is also rooted in the founding and nation-building of the Turkish Republic. The musical and

dance forms of *zeybek* issuing from the oral and peasant tradition were codified by state cultural institutions during the Kemalist period, as were other local repertoires such as *Halay* and *Horon* (Öztürkmen 2003). The history of the *Sarı zeybeği* dance invented by the progressive Selim Sirri Tarcan (1874–1956) provides a good illustration of the debates of the period.[4] Tarcan was a physical education teacher and fervent progressive who wanted to create a unique national dance based on the *zeybek* style to embody the soul of modern Turkey. But Atatürk decided to use the People's Houses (*Halk evleri*) to create a model of unity in diversity, combining regional particularities[5] with a certain horizontal and translocal ideal of the national community.[6] To this effect, and up until the 1950s, the newly formed institutions of the nation state collected and staged traditional oral and peasant repertoires. This contributed to the development of a new style of dance, referred to as *folklor oynama* (literally "folklore play"). In the case of *folklor oynama*, the new bodily technique that emerges was based on expressing national motifs.[7]

Folklore dance was supposed to give concrete form to the ideals of the Kemalist period by endowing them with tangible representation. What mattered for the republican authorities at that time was to forge a stable image of the ideal citizen. This new bodily language broke with traditional modes of transmission and expression, drawing on military inspiration to overthrow the sociological frameworks of community dance practice. The dancers, by learning stage performance folklore, appropriated dances issuing from the popular traditions of regions other than their own. They thus had a weaker affective bond with the dance. In addition to this, as of the earliest public performances of these recomposed dances, the terms traditionally employed by local actors to designate their dances were replaced by indications of the dance's place of origin, thereby revealing the republican authorities' desire to construct a territory.

The proactive, pan-national, state-centric cultural policy procedures conducted since the 1930s by the Turkish state in the field of musical and dance heritage may be described as "state traditionalism" (Trebinjac 2000). The national folklore repertoire, devised to emblematize political values, implicitly endorses marked discrimination.[8] Nowadays the state is routinely involved in the field of folklore practice through regional conservatories and the Centers for Popular Education (*Halk Eğitim Merkezi*, HEM) spread out across the provinces. These two bodies are particularly involved in the process of collecting and codifying traditional dances. The

shift from orality to the stable and extremely normative forms of stage performance is referred to in this chapter as the "folklorization process".

When a local dance such as the Eğridere village *zeybek* is taken up into the national folklore repertoire, this sets in motion a series of operations. This chapter sketches out several stages in this transformation so as to better apprehend the social issues at stake in such a redefinition in the present-day context.[9] In order to do so it examines various sites, figures, and stages in what I call the "folklorization trajectory" of the Eğridere *zeybek*. It focuses on two initiatives viewed as exemplary: the collection of this *zeybek*, and its performance in a sports competition of folkdances. How does the partial redefinition of a traditional repertoire such as *zeybek* as a sport function, and what are the social issues at stake in such a redefinition?

The ground-level description (Revel 1996) offered here seeks to illustrate certain of the processes by which a local dance is taken up into a repertoire. It is a matter of looking at what happens on the margins of a state cultural project so as to throw light on the centre—that is, of examining a folklorization process by focusing on how the dancers themselves, on the local level, actually bring this folklorization about. In Turkey as in France (see Glevarec and Saez 2002), heritage action involves a cluster of associations whose intense involvement tends to exceed what one might suspect if concentrating solely on state folklore policies. This chapter traces how the institutionalization of *zeybek* dances triggered intense circulation between town and village, more specifically between urban actors who had received training in folk dances in state cultural institutions, and representatives of the rural world viewed as the depository of traditional knowledge. It follows the process in which a shared object is formulated in a heterogeneous milieu composed of dancers, historians, folklorists, and teachers of traditional dance.

It looks at a minimum of three phases in the folklorization of the Eğridere *zeybek* to throw light on the dynamics engendered by the heritagization of a traditional dance. It starts by looking at how this village dance was discovered. It then examines the networked world made up of various institutions and individuals involved in promoting the *zeybek* musical genre in the province. It finishes by raising the issue of how this dance was modeled in folk dance competitions. The purpose is to show that the use of a metalanguage organizing social representations shared by diverse actors in these "heritage worlds" lends a transversal dimension to how this dance is practiced.[10]

1   The (Re)Discovery of the Eğridere *Zeybek*

Nearly a century after the nation state was founded, generations of collectors, self-taught researchers, and scholars with academic training dispensed in places such as regional conservatories continue to set off on regular "collecting missions" (*derleme misyonu*) to discover traditional music and dance, and to include them in the repertoire.[11] This chapter takes the example of one of these missions to explore how cultural policies are applied in the present-day context and with what consequences.

1.1   *The Primal Scene: The Reminiscence of the Elderly Mehmet*

There are no fewer than 60 little villages attached to the municipality of Tire, including the village of Eğridere, which has been at the heart of my ethnographic fieldworks over the past two years (2014–2016). It was there, a few years ago, that the elderly Mehmet remembered a dance. He told me about this in person, together with his village companions in various circumstances, but they were unable to pinpoint the exact date and context. They could only state that one evening a series of steps accompanied by a *kaval* flute had come to his mind. Still, this dance had no name that he could think of. Even today, he cannot really remember how he came to know it. Like many of his fellow villagers, Mehmet *Amca* (Uncle Mehmet) is a *tarlacı* (farmer). He is more than 80 years old, and has fields on the land above the village of Eğridere where he has lived all his life. He states that what he knows about dance came from a former soldier who had returned to live in the village when Mehmet was a teenager. But that was a very long while ago, he observes, leaving some degree of doubt about the objective circumstances in which he learnt the dance. However, an old photograph in the association premises confirms his links to this figure shrouded in mystery.

Mehmet Amca transmitted the dance with varying degrees of free interpretation to his favorite village companions, three younger peasants who over recent years have become interested in *zeybek* dance and stories about the *efe*. Forty-six-year-old Serkan is the head of the Gökçen Efe Association. Since the events in question he has acquired a great reputation in the region as a *zeybek* dancer. "Ahmet Kaval", whose nickname comes from his preferred instrument, is a peasant. But above all he is an excellent singer of *türkü*, sung poems from the Anatolian repertoire, and he plays the *kaval* flute, the traditional pastoral instrument found in Anatolia and throughout

Eastern Europe. Lastly, Ender, who is also a peasant and a dancer, is of atypical physique, and the people in the region call him "the tall Efe" (*Uzun efe*) because of his imposing stature. In the intimacy of their little circle, they performed from time to time what subsequently became the "Eğridere *zeybek*", but without paying much attention to it.

1.2   The Recognition Mechanism

While the founding of the Gökçen Efe Association in 2009 shows that the villagers intended to dance *zeybek*, their particular dance did not strike them as being worthy of any particular interest until one day in autumn 2012, when a certain Abdullah, a folklorist by profession, came and met them in the village.[12] Abdullah holds a post at Ege University (in Izmir) in the Turkish Popular Music and Dance Section, though he does not have the university diplomas normally required for this position. He was appointed because of his inexhaustible knowledge of the musical and dance repertoires in Anatolia and the Aegean region. He is recognized as one of the greatest *zeybek* experts and collectors in the region, and probably all Turkey. He has produced cultural documentaries about *zeybek* and other local traditions for Turkish Radio Television, the national channel. This is how he describes discovering the Eğridere *zeybek*:

> One day I went to Tire. For something relating to *zeybek*, another activity. They [those involved in running the Tire association] had invited me. But once there, they said "Go to the village of Tire, there is an association there, the *Gökçen Efe* Association." We went and sat down with them. We talked. I asked them what they expected of me. They wanted me to teach them things about *zeybek* dance. I make documentaries about *zeybek*, that is my way of teaching. They watch them and that is how they learn. So I said: "but what is it you do? They (video) are not for you. They are for folklore people. You are country folk. Do you not have your own dances?" They answered that they were not particularly beautiful. I said to them: "Let's have a look. Dance a bit." It was a 9-beat rhythm, but a bit different. I asked them what this dance was and they told me frankly they didn't have any idea. It was just a *zeybek*. So I said to them 'in that case, it will become the Eğridere *zeybek*!' I was involved from the beginning of this affair. I asked them what instrument they performed it with. It was the *kaval*. Entirely with the *kaval*. I asked them to show me the movements. And I made a video.[13]

This short account brings out the paradoxes underpinning the recognition of a traditional dance by the representative of a major cultural institution in the region.[14] The dance, initially performed without much conviction by the three dancers from the Gökçen Efe Association, was perceived, on the contrary, by this reputed figure from the conservatory as sufficiently "authentic" to be included in the repertoire. His account shows how a comparatively ambiguous process of social interplay came about, made up of shuttling back and forth. The heritage object that issued from their exchanges—the Eğridere *zeybek*—is a jointly constructed form, and the way it is danced has been altered in response to feedback from the institution towards the traditional interpreter. On the one hand are the villagers, who are supposedly the custodians of a "source", while on the other is a collector, who leads them to position themselves as having traditional knowledge whose quality they had hitherto ignored. Hence the heritagization process emerges primarily as an attempt to fashion reflexivity, leading the various participants in this social interaction to define and position themselves within a field. Thus despite Abdullah's reputation as someone with extensive experience out in the field, he presented himself as belonging to the folklore institution sphere, with all the implicit distance that would produce from some supposedly original content. As for the villagers, they were encouraged to become cognizant of the unique and precious nature of their indigenous knowledge. They had certain expectations of the folklorist, who acted as a kind of "tradition maker", while in turn encouraging them to define themselves as country folk and as the legitimate heirs and actors of this heritage.

1.3   The Stabilization of a Dance Form

Shortly after the episode related above, Abdullah returned to the village with one of his best music students from the conservatory. They had produced a stable melodic and choreographic form for the Eğridere *zeybek* and were there to present it to the village actors. In so doing, Abdullah was following the routine procedure of local collectors. First, collectors move along a network of acquaintances until they discover a "resource-person" (*kaynak kişi*), in what is an eminently social process. "Resource-person" is both institutional terminology and a commonly used expression in folklore circles to designate the person who transmits information about traditional knowledge. The collector then conducts a comparatively informal exchange with this person, before filming the performance in what

may be called its "source version". After that, it is a matter of codifying and ordering the melody and dance steps within the folklore institution, before then "reinjecting" the redefined musical and choreographic form into the village.

In short, Abdullah's approach meant that the Eğridere *zeybek* was given an initial stabilized form and a certain visibility. But first he needed to give it a name. To a certain extent it is this act which officially marks the dance being taken up into the field of folklore. For that matter the two parties provided different contradictory accounts of this initiative, with the folklorist and the villagers both saying they were behind the decision to make this *zeybek* the emblem of the village of Eğridere.

In addition to this, it would appear that the encounter between the folklore professional and the villagers resulted in the creation of a traditional dance, both its folklorized form and its "source" or "authentic" version, to use the local terminology. What has since been unanimously referred to as the "Eğridere *zeybek*" is the dance form resulting from the folklorist's intervention. I suggest that the effect of designating and naming an originally volatile form—a sort of "source version" intrinsically linked to the figure of its interpreter in the traditional register—necessarily induces the stabilization of the choreographic content, or in other words generates a folklorized form.[15] Thus if the villagers from the Gökçen Efe Association were to significantly modify the dance steps, the form produced would no longer correspond to the socialized object referred to as the Eğridere *zeybek*. And so if in his brief account the folklorist insists on the naming episode, I would suggest it is precisely because this is intimately bound up with the issue of establishing a fixed form and according it recognition.

2   Intense Circulation between the Village and the Town

The minor event in which an academic folklorist discovered a hitherto unrecorded dance triggered a series of circulations that were a prerequisite for stabilizing the cultural object known as the Eğridere *zeybek*. This intensive socialization is, I believe, one of the most remarkable aspects of how state cultural policy impacts on the field of traditional dance. The events attendant upon the folklorization of the Eğridere *zeybek* paved the way for many exchanges between institutional representatives and those who, the-

oretically at least, were representatives of the traditional order. This process of institutional recognition resulted in a change in the social position and status of certain villagers. They have subsequently become well-known figures in local cultural action and are often approached by cultural entrepreneurs in the region (from associations or municipal cultural departments) to take part in projects. In parallel with their activity as peasants, they have become professionals by joining circuits that train folk dance masters in Tire, and now have official diplomas. The impetus provided by the cultural institution (the university conservatory) encouraged these dance masters to become aware of their knowledge, leading to a series of initiatives and programs endowing them with legitimacy and bringing them symbolic and material recompense.

2.1 Zeybek *Circle Networks*

Since the involvement of Abdullah, the villagers in the Gökçen Efe Association have transmitted the stable and "ordered" (*düzenlendi*) form he initiated to the many *zeybekci* (*zeybek* lovers) who have come to see them in the village. I have witnessed the enthusiasm for their dance on many occasions. First, on December 17, 2014, I accompanied 30-year-old Hasan, a dance master from the region, when he went to the village of Egridere together with ten or so of his pupils, so as to learn the Eğridere *zeybek* "at source"—that is, from the elderly Mehmet Amca. His purpose was to prepare his young team for the regional folk dance competition that was being held the following March. It was the first time in 20 years that a team from Tire was to take part in the competition. He wanted to promote the local heritage—the popular dances from the valley of the Little Meander (Küçük Menderes). According to Hasan, the version recreated by Abdullah at the conservatory had been stabilized in less than two years, during which time Mehmet Amca had become a very popular key figure in *zeybek* circles in the region:

> Mehmet Amca is like that now, you see. Look. The Eğridere (the Eğridere *zeybek*) was collected […] Is there another resource-person in Tire on a level with Mehmet Amca ? No. There's nobody else. Look how he has become famous since the Eğridere *zeybek* was collected. […] Mehmet Amca is an 'amca' I like a lot. He dances really well. I like him and appreciate him, you know. But in any case is there anyone else? We all go to see Mehmet Amca now.[16]

Hasan emphasized the recognition stemming from the visit to the village by the Ege University folklorist, which considerably boosted the renown of the small group of peasant dancers in the Gökçen Efe Association. Furthermore, this resulted in the heritagization of a dance, meaning that the village of Eğridere was taken up in regional representations as a sort of "ecological pocket of authenticity". Thus a predominantly oral and recently heritagized content has come to embody and promote the Eğridere area. There is no doubt, for that matter, that the dance regularly taught to young townsfolk by the villagers from the Gökçen Efe Association has drifted away from the interpretation given during the primal performance when this *dance* was first discovered. Yet urban dancers who have trained in folklore performance at state institutions come to the village to absorb the aura of tradition by learning a *zeybek* directly from an old resource-person (*kaynak kişi*). The reputation of this little group has continued to grow in the region, and elderly Mehmet from the village of Eğridere has become a sort of social phenomenon. In the course of a few months, people who had hitherto been a handful of unknowns from some backwater in the region of Tire became well known the length and breadth of the valley, and even further afield.

It is important to emphasize how intensively people and information circulate within *zeybek* circles. This is a result of the systematic use of social networks, and of the actions of various local institutions which act as networking platforms. In November 2015, I was able to observe the key centralizing role of one local institution, the *Halk Eğitim Merkezi* (HEM) in Tire, at a remembrance ceremony for the father of Ender, one of the dancers from the Gökçen Efe Association. The sad occasion of his passing acted as an opportunity for a sort of gathering of all *zeybek* lovers from the region. On that day, several groups of folk dance masters from the Tire HEM came to the village to offer their condolences in person. And the evening ended with a *sohbet* (conversation) about their favorite topic, *zeybek*, held in the association premises on the village square.

2.2   The Structuring Role Performed by the Tire HEM

The HEMs, centres for popular education run by the Ministry of Education, play a central mediating role in folklore practice and in formalizing networks of actors. More generally these institutions play a key part in providing training and helping people find work, and though intended for all civil society—both young people and adults, the poor and the less

poor—they nevertheless target local youth and people without qualifications looking for work. HEMs provide intensive training sessions together with a range of weekly courses at very competitive rates in comparison to the private sector. All sorts of professional activities are taught (e.g. IT, sewing, and selling craft products), including training to be a folk dance master[17] and tailoring workshops to make stage costumes. The HEM is actively involved in the local network of professional *zeybek* practice, and by acting as an interface it helps weave a dense social network of cultural actors. It also plays a leading part in building up links between actors from the countryside and urban dancers with "folklore performance" (*folklor oynama*) training from state cultural institutions. The HEM sends out dance masters from the town to teach in village schools, and good dancers from the villages regularly come to Tire to teach.

But the HEM also acts as the matrix for numerous conflicts and rivalries within folk dance circles because it employs large numbers of newcomers. The fact that it is comparatively easy to acquire the status of "dance master" leads to a certain dissymmetry in the expertise of practitioners. Qualifying as a dance master, and the institutional legitimization of this status, depend on acquiring a teaching certificate (the *usta öğreticilik belgesi*), delivered after an intensive training course.[18] These last about a month, with five levels of expertise, but the first level allows one to teach. Hence most practitioners stop at this stage of training because it enables them, in the case studied here, to teach in schools and sports centers in the town in partnership with the Tire HEM. Some people have reached a stage of genuine mastery as a result of many years of personal research and work, whereas others only have the skills learnt during their month of training. Furthermore, a certain number of these practitioners only teach as a sideline, having another main job. Given how easy it is to work as an HEM partner, the teaching provided can become fairly routine. Nevertheless, it is the HEMs which play the main role in disseminating the professional practice of folk dance at the local level. For instance, the HEM in Tire employs no fewer than 60 folk dance masters, who each year teach hundreds of pupils from various age groups. In other words the *zeybekci* network in Tire is centered on the HEM's activities.[19] It is the HEM that provides teaching and brings together actors from all over the valley for republican festivities, which always include folk dance displays. The density of the network is then built up on the basis of acquaintanceship.

2.3   The Peasant Dancers from the Gökçen Efe Association as "Boundary-Spanning" Individuals[20]

Ender and Serkan from the village Gökçen Efe Association attended the Tire HEM to learn how to teach *zeybek* dances in the manner of folk dance masters. They have thus recently obtained the first level of certification in the vocational training scheme run by the HEM, though not without expressing a certain lassitude for things academic. They are thus in regular contact with—and trained by—the same people who came to learn from them. A dance master employed by the HEM can earn a stable income of about 500 Turkish lira by giving three two-hour classes per week, or more if he is able to give extra lessons. For the peasant dancers from the Eğridere association, this is significant additional income, and a way of officially joining the fabric of local *zeybek* practitioners. Upstream of the institutional framework, more informal social principles are built up around the exchange and socialization of skills and knowledge. In this way a vast web of acquaintanceship is formed in which each individual contributes to the fluidity of the dancer training system.

The fact that the people in the Gökçen Efe Association come from the countryside endows them with a certain form of legitimacy within *zeybekci* circles. There can be no doubt that they do indeed straddle the two worlds of tradition and the institution, hence acting as boundary-spanners. This suggests that they can embody and play on various supposedly irreconcilable referents, orders of value, and forms of authority. Serkan and Ender, despite having received what is called "folklore education" by people in the milieu, are nevertheless figures of tradition. When the valley's dance masters—that is to say, those who have received '"folklore education" at the HEM—go to see them in the village, it is to learn a supposedly unchanged form. At the same time, they are fully aware that this dance results from the alterations made by the famous figure from the conservatory. This gives rise to a certain paradox. But it would seem that above and beyond who these peasant dancers actually are, what matters is the force of the representations associated with them. It is this which enables them to bring about a form of consensus between spheres of practice embodied by distinct—though, as things stand, profoundly interdependent—social realities.[21]

3   The Force of Myth: The Floating Signifiers of the Cultural and Sporting Institution

The following pages seek to understand the processes by which it is possible to formulate a shared object labeled "traditional". For Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983), the idea of tradition is a social construct. There has been much scholarly debate about the distinction between "invented traditions" and "genuine traditions" that has been imputed rather hastily to these two authors on occasions.[22] The literature has also noted the lack of precision in academic notions of tradition, and in the idea of authenticity as applied to the field of traditional dance (Bakka 2002). However as Muriel Girard points out in relation to craftwork in Morocco under the French protectorate, "above and beyond any unifying discourse about tradition, which presents it as reified, what transpires is the diversity of practice" (2006: 20). Taking this observation as my starting point, I have opted to observe the forms currently taken by tradition in my field of study, along with some of its correlates, such as authenticity.

Further, I hope to ascertain the type of signifying procedures which make it possible to "act together" at the intersection between the cultural institution and the traditional register. The hypothesis put forward here is that these two cultural arenas are built up on the basis of a stabilized social imaginary. This is rooted at least in part in the use of a mythified metalanguage. The material collected encourages the use of powerful anthropological notions, such as myth, to account for the mode of representation operating in the circulation of a practice between separate social realms. At stake here is identifying the figures and the "concrete systems of representation" on the basis of which "collective understanding" acquires concrete form (Lévi-Strauss 1964). And so the terms "mythic" and "mythified" are used here to suggest a relatively specific mode of cognitive function to be found in certain contemporary cultural phenomena, in particular those engendering forms of contradiction irreconcilable within rational thought. In the semiology of modern myth put forward by Roland Barthes, "everything happens as if myth shifted the formal system of first significations sideways" (1970: 218). Hence this section examines how, in the social game built up around the discovery of the Eğridere *zeybek*, Mehmet Amca became a figure (a resource-person) caught up in a metalanguage of practice that resembled mythic discourse.

3.1   The Key Role Played by the Resource-Person
in the Recognition Process

The fixity of the expression "resource-person" in the social and institutional vocabulary arguably indicates this status is fetishized in some way. The resource-person, as a socially constructed figure, acts as a "vehicular figure" (Cauquelin 2000). In this signifying process, they undergo a shift from a physical person providing an account to something altogether vaster, a medium linking up past and present. Caught up in the interplay of circulations between various social realms, the resource-person mediates the transmission process and builds up social links, as well as becoming an object onto which feelings are projected (Heinich 2012). But the resource-person is also caught up in the interplay of significations relating to heritage issues, and accepts to be seen as a proof of authenticity.

As Pascal Boyer points out, "most traditional phenomena are assessed by actors and participants in the light of truths these phenomena bring into play or indirectly engender" (1986: 310). This is what transpires in Hasan's account of a new "reminiscence" of the elderly Mehmet:

> And now yet another *oynama* has since been collected. And there the *oynama* [called] 'seventeen and a half' is being collected and once again who is the resource-person? It is Mehmet Amca […] A new *oynama* is now going to be collected and performed. Lots of people are going to come [to the village]. After the Eğridere *oynama* was collected, he [Mehmet Amca] remembered 'seventeen and a half'. You see? Abdullah came in 2012 and at the time he [Mehmet Amca] did not remember this 'seventeen and a half' *oynama*. So now lots of people are going to come, but say to themselves that Mehmet Amca invented that *oynama*. They are going to wonder 'Where does that come from?" You can be sure of that!

The authenticity of oral phenomena can only be guaranteed by the resource-person themselves, and, as this extract shows, their reliability can be called into question. There are few historiographical archives which can be used to ascertain the "genealogy" of a dance. Consequently, recognizing tradition is an extremely socialized process. In the case of *zeybek*, traditional phenomena are recognized and known primarily via truth procedures similar to those used by historians of antiquity, as described by Paul Veyne. He argues that tradition is a vulgate based on the faith placed in what various people say, and "consecrated by acquiescence over the course of the centuries" (Veyne 1983: 17). In other words, the contours of the tradi-

tional object are continually redefined by what people have to say about it and by the enunciatory positions they hold.

Furthermore, this indeterminacy applies even to the institutionalized aspect of practice. Yet, insofar as the phenomenon of institutionalization implies positive rationalization, it might be supposed that the procedure via which a dance is taken up into the repertoire meets precise evaluation criteria. But this is not in fact the case, and as we shall now see this has major implications for how the knowledge involved is structured.

3.2 Administering Authenticity: The Turkish Federation Criteria for Popular Music and Dance

For a recently collected traditional dance to be recorded by the institution, the reliability of the resource-person has to be assessed in the light of certain criteria. These criteria are laid down by the leading body in the registration of folklore repertoire—namely, the Turkish Federation for Popular Dance and Music (*Türkiye Halk Oyunları Federasyonu*, THOF). A dance that has been registered with the THOF can be performed in competitions. Furthermore, competitions are the pinnacle in the process by which the repertoire is recognized and institutionalized.

If collectors were obliged to provide certain specific pieces of evidence to obtain recognition from the federation, these would be published and become a matter of public knowledge. But there are no such rules, just common sense normative practices that have become stabilized. In fact the entire trajectory of recognition for a local dance is based on identifying a resource-person, who must ultimately be legitimized by the institution on the basis of the following precepts: to act as a resource-person in folk dance circles, they must be very old, *köylü* (a villager), and have had no sporting or "folklore education". Filmed archives of the collection moment are then provided, accompanied by notes made by the collector about the context in which this occurred, indications about the usual performance context and, if possible, musical and choreographic notation. These are viewed by the federation as guaranteeing the reliability of the information provided.

These fairly flexible criteria arguably encourage circulation between what could at first appear to be separate spheres—namely, the institution and the village, between folklorized practice with its sporting competitions and the popular, rural, indigenous cultural context of *zeybek* dance.

3.3   Zeybek *as a Borderline Case?*

I suggest that the *zeybek* genre offers a particularly suitable framework for examining how traditional repertoires are reworked. In the world of *zeybek* the musical and dance performance is referred to as the *oyun* (literally the "game"). It is rooted in the idea of an event, of a performance (hence highly contextualized), of personal interpretation, and of improvisation. It is based primarily on the figure of the male solo dancer, and it emphasizes the expression of his individuality. Owing to these properties, the *zeybek* genre would appear ill suited to collective dance and establishing fixed choreographic gestures. The individual nature of *zeybek* makes it comparatively distinct from other regional dance traditions that tend to be more collective. It may therefore be considered as a borderline case in the field of folklorized dance. Nevertheless, *zeybek* is nowadays performed collectively on stage as a sporting spectacle.

To explore what is at issue in terms of codification and transmission, I shall now look at the collective version of the Eğridere *zeybek* as directed by Hasan for the competition I attended on March 8, 2015. I shall discuss the ambivalent nature of the practices and attitudes underpinned by the processes of normalizing so-called "traditional" cultural objects.

3.4   *Codification of the Eğridere* Zeybek: *From Mehmet Amca's Performance to the Competition on Stage*

The version of the Eğridere *zeybek* proposed by Hasan stands out from its predecessors. By having it performed to the sound of the *kaval*, the instrument that traditionally accompanies it, he sought to remain close to Mehmet Amca's habitual way of performing it. But the fact of producing a collective version also meant that he moved considerably away from it. This tension makes it a particularly interesting case for exploring the issues at stake in codifying a *zeybek* dance for competitive performance on stage.

Beneath their apparent rigidity, folk dance sport competitions involve a certain degree of innovation. Hence within this highly centralized and normative framework, each trainer needs to create space for expressing his creativity. To do so he needs to negotiate a set of rules, which are both "official norms" laid down by the institution in the form of very specific regulations, and "practical norms" (De Sardan 2013) associated with the conservative routines of practitioners in the field.

Hasan told me about the difficulties he had to overcome, such as discerning the deep structure of the dance in the personal style of the resource-person. Ideally, numerous resource-people would be compared, but that is impossible given that the generation of village elders is disappearing, taking the memory they convey with them. There are real difficulties in identifying the rules making up any given dance—that is to say, a rule which is "necessary for the existence of the behaviors and institutions it defines" (Morin 2009: 113). It is thus a process of endogenous distinctions based on identifying a dance's unique skeleton (*iskelet*) and then recomposing it on the folklore stage. But such an attempt to rationalize the structure of a dance implies a relative approach based on deciding what cannot be removed, and which characteristic movements lend this dance its singularity. Peer recognition and validation then institutes the viability of a version in a fairly informal manner.

But can we speak of the transformation of a form which is not stable? The crucial stage in *zeybek* performance is the moment of the *gezinme*, the provocative walk opening the dance. It is on the basis of the *gezinme* that the musician determines the "character" (*karakter*) of the dancer and adjusts his performance accordingly. Hence there is necessarily an individual hallmark and a specific moment in which all production originates. The dance appears and disappears with the dancer. Equally, the elderly Mehmet Amca dances "his way", with his own style. His dance cannot be reproduced.

Staging the Eğridere *zeybek* for a spectacle thus involves following a course running from the person and their uniqueness to a stable and imitable form. The work of the choreographer and competition trainer consists in balancing recognition of the resource-person's style with respect for the normative constraints of the competition and the introduction of innovative elements. But how do *zeybek* practitioners manage to reconcile a certain degree of faithfulness to the codes of the traditional *zeybek* repertoire—thought of in the indigenous register as expressing the soul (*ruh*) and temperament of the dancer—with the relatively restrictive rules of a sport performance on stage? What can we learn about the normative effects of state folklore policies from this tension and the resultant adaptations?

3.5   *The Ambiguous* Zeybek *Categories in Sport Competitions*

As of the 1970s, the "sportified" practice of folk dances started to take on stable form in Turkey (Öztürkmen 2002).[23] It may thus be considered that this is the most extreme form in the process of normalizing traditional dances. Among the consequences of the "sportification" of folklore are a mechanistic approach to dance, and the emergence of forms to rationalize dance movements that are militaristic in inspiration. In sport practice, each gesture is measured proportionally to the music, and the body of the dancer is fragmented into the relevant parts of the body. The desired quality in competition is harmony between all the dancers. Competition judges are unforgiving of any dancer being out of step, and the federation has established extremely detailed rules about the proportionality of movements, such as not even a toe exceeding a given line traced on the ground. In other words the dance performance is tightly controlled and measured.

The teams selected for a *zeybek* dance competition compete in one of two "branches" (*dal*), both coming under the heading of "traditional" (*Geleneksel*). The distinction is based on highly formal constraints. In the "not arranged traditional" branch (*Geleneksel düzenlemesiz*), also described by practitioners as "authentic" (*otantik*), what matters is the "unadorned" nature of the interpretation, and this determines how good a performance is. But competition regulations drawn up in 2015 indicate the existence of an ideal category conveying a sort of "paradoxical injunction" (double bind). The regulations state that to qualify in this category, the traditional form of the *oynama* in its original locality (the *yöresel*) must be scrupulously respected, without superposing any aesthetic or artistic elements not found in the "original" outline, be it in terms of the dance movements, music, or costumes. In other words, the competitors ought to conform to the primal performance of the resource-person. But in practice it means primarily that the dance must be presented in the stabilized form as recognized by the federation when it was included in the repertoire, which in fact differs to some degree from the style of the resource-person. The next constraint is to dance in perfect step and in a circular formation throughout the performance. According to Hasan, what distinguishes the two branches is the circle. Yet, once again, the contradiction with the "source" version is apparent, since in the traditional order *zeybek* is meant to be a solo performance. For the second category, called "arranged traditional" (*Geleneksel Düzenlemeli*), it is the "artification" of the traditional perfor-

mance that is supposed to set it apart from the first category.[24] Practitioners say that these are "decorated" (*süslemeli*) dances in which the dancers are not obliged to perform in homokinesis.

Study of *zeybek* sporting competitions, viewed as the pinnacle in the process of institutionalization, brings out all sorts of semantic slippage between what the groups I studied called "authentic performance" and its practice as a sport. Yet the latter is often viewed by non-participants as a "deformation" or "alteration" of "original" content. Ultimately, the difference between the two categories would appear to be not that pronounced, if only because when observing a competition, even a newcomer can easily spot that the dances are highly "ordered" (*düzenlendi*) and "tidied up" (*temizlendi*) in both branches, and that both follow the same staging principles and draw on the same bodily qualities.

In fact the participants are well aware that it is empirically impossible to perform a dance unless it has been "ordered" (*düzenlendi*). The federation has laid down criteria for determining the type of performance expected in each category, and ultimately the practitioners—unless they contest these criteria—have prescriptions on which to base their performance, enabling them to state that they performed an "arranged" or "not arranged" version. It seems to me that what was primordial, both in the institutional version set down on paper and in the experience of practitioners, was to keep alive the myth of the primitive performance. Using the term "traditional" to refer both to the "source" tradition and to the "traditional" category in the sport competition generates a sort of semantic fuzziness. Arguably, it is the porosity of these categories and the fact they are floating which make it possible for the notion of the "traditional" to circulate between these two worlds.

4 Conclusion

This chapter has set out to examine how cultural institutions reconfigure the popular practice of traditional dance, and to ascertain the extent to which these cultural policies are necessarily altered and reworked by local values, and by principles of transmission and assessment that resist institutional reason. Hence institutionalization produces a form of reflexivity and involves assigning a value to terms such as "traditional" or to specific figures such as the resource-person. To a certain extent the "*zeybek* tradition" may be recognized by its signifying procedures which are akin to those at work in mythic discourse. More specifically, even within the current cir-

cumstances of its normalization within state institutions and as a sport, the *zeybek* tradition continues to be modeled on traditional discourse. It is understood by all those involved using a specific form of narration that is characteristic of oral traditions. It is precisely the ambivalence of certain signifiers which enable its contents to circulate from the indigenous sphere to the sphere of the institutionalized practice of folklore, in the form of a metalanguage of tradition. This semantic configuration makes it possible to hold these two spheres of practice together. But the phenomenon is not restricted to the use of floating categories generating the potential for consensus. It also involves the formation of repertoires of action and routines within the milieu of cultural heritage and tradition entrepreneurs. These floating categories enable an order of practices to stabilize at the intersection of various social worlds, to such an extent that the actors themselves become the sites operating the "trans-acting" that redefines their daily existence and their relationship to tradition.[25]

NOTES

1. "Türk Halk oyunları bölümü", Ege Üniversitesi Devlet Türk müsikisi konservatuvarı.
2. This chapter is based on material from my doctoral research looking more generally at the heroic dimension in the *zeybek* tradition and at how the figure of the *efe* is currently used. It focuses on the processes by which the *zeybek* repertoire is institutionalized, drawing on ethnographic data collected during a field study commencing in June 2014 among *zeybek* dancers in a small town called Tire in the Aegean hinterland.
3. The existence of these bands of rebels is attested by historical sources dating back to the seventeenth century, but they disappeared with the founding of the Turkish Republic (1923).
4. Selim Sirri Tarcan goes over how this dance was devised in a work called "Tarcan zeybeği", published in 1938.
5. Thus, for instance, in the case of the Aegean region, the *zeybek* musical and choreographic repertoire gives indirect expression to the singularity and diversity of the provinces of Izmir, Aydın, and Denizli. Many *zeybek* elements refer to places, and each town and village has its own emblematic *zeybek*.
6. The People's Houses (*Halk evleri*), set up in 1932, acted as local relays for popular education. They were in charge of recording local cultural practices, gathering information about ethnic groups and languages, disseminating modern Turkish, and conducting the new republican celebrations.

They were placed under the supervision of the single party founded by Atatürk (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) and played a leading role in the cultural reforms undertaken by the young nation state.

7. It is hard to translate *oynama* with a single word. It can designate a component in a musical and choreographic repertoire (akin in meaning to a "piece"). It can also designate the highly contextualized idea of a performance, and even certain correlates such as interpretation. Interesting work has been conducted on the polysemy of "play/playing" in different linguistic contexts. As Roberte Hamayon points out, "across the length and breadth of the vast Turkish world, including in Islamicized central Asia, the same root, oy-, 'to play', is used for imitating animals, dancing, fighting, provoking others or taking delight in something, as well as for carrying out a ritualized act" (Hamayon 2012: 18). In this chapter we shall seek to adapt the translation to the varying contexts of reference in which it is used.

8. In the earliest days of the republic the creation of a national imaginary involved rejecting the "garbs of Ottomanness" (Öztürkmen 2003). This continues, and urban Ottoman dances are still not part of the state company's repertoire, or that of the many amateur companies up and down the country (Shay 2002). This corresponds to the desire to ward off all forms of protest against central power, such as ethnic feeling or the religious and cultural originality of minority populations, including Alevis and Bektashis.

9. More generally, for discussion of the history of heritage construction in Turkey and the attendant contemporary issues, see the two volumes of the *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2014, 2015) devoted to these questions.

10. Poulot, taking his inspiration from the expression "art worlds" as used by the sociologist Howard Becker (1988), refers to "heritage worlds", showing how artistic activities are collective and collaborative in nature.

11. The term "mission" is the endogenous term used by collectors to describe what they do. I suggest it covers two distinct dimensions: first, the planned and normative nature of their action, and second, the ethical dimension this task has to their mind—that is to say, their interest in recording and thus safeguarding traditional usages and memories that are under threat from the cultural transformations affecting contemporary society.

12. For a discussion of the profession of "folklorist" and how it relates to politics, see Öztürkmen (2005).

13. Interview, Izmir, September 2016.

14. The drive to legitimize a national culture in Turkey was supported by setting up institutions that worked to maintain and conserve benchmark heritage for transmission to future generations. From the advent of the republic in 1923 through to 1966, state conservatories in Istanbul and Ankara were

in charge of overseeing the collection of popular music. For example, folklorists collected the songs of nomadic populations in Anatolia and took them back to the major urban centers. Nowadays, all scholarship is conducted by the National Bureau for Folklore Research, overseen by the Ministry for Culture and Tourism. While the conservatories now direct virtually all their efforts towards artistic education, it should nevertheless be noted that they have become attached to universities, which consequently now act as the main framework for teaching *Halk müziği* ("popular music"). This establishes a strong link between republican education and the transmission of local heritage.

15. Folklorist Jean-Michel Guilcher argues that the traditional work is dynamic and inseparable from the figure of the traditional interpreter (1963).

16. Interview, March 2015.

17. The Tire HEM has stepped in to replace the cultural action department of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)-run municipality, which should normally be ideologically in favor of this type of activity. According to the chairman of the Tire Kültür (Tire Culture) Association, the only support the cultural action department has provided has been to set up a small municipal company to perform at republican celebrations throughout the year. Furthermore, this company is largely comprised of dancers and musicians trained by the HEM.

18. According to Cenk, an assistant lecturer at Ege University conservatory, the other, harder way of becoming a state-accredited folklore dance instructor is to obtain a diploma from the state conservatory (it is difficult to be admitted to the conservatory). Over the years I have observed that many young dancers from Tire who had trained at the HEM failed the first exam (musical listening) in the yearly selection procedure held by the state conservatory at Ege University. This tended to be because they were ill prepared. They did not have the time or the money to go to the preparatory workshops run by the conservatory ahead of the entrance exams.

19. The positive involvement of the HEM in developing *zeybek* practice at the local level is clearly driven both by a certain enthusiasm among Tire youth for these activities and by the director's involvement.

20. For Crozier and Friedberg (1977), this idea (referred to as "marginal sécant" in their French text) designates individuals who span different "worlds", and who by belonging to both and mastering the potential for zones of uncertainty are able to enjoy greater symbolic or material recompense.

21. For a discussion of the symbolic dimension to peasant identity in Turkish nationalism, see Gokalp (1985).

22. For a clarification of the concept of "invented tradition", see the article by Babadzan (1999).

23. "Sportification" consists in "the process by which a physical activity is transformed into a 'sport' governed by a set of rules and norms, all of which are legitimized by its tutelary institutions" (Lebreton 2010).
24. For a discussion of "artification", see Heinich and Shapiro (2012).
25. For a discussion of the neologism "trans-acting", see Chap. 1.

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World Heritage Manufacture in Turkey and the Introduction of a New Public Policy System

Julien Boucly

1   INTRODUCTION

From the 2000s, Turkey has become increasingly committed to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage program. It has implemented a whole raft of measures, including numerous applications for cultural heritage listing, increased financial contributions, and active participation in UNESCO's functioning, all of which indicate the ambition of the Turkish government to become a key player in UNESCO arenas.[1] Above and beyond foreign policy, a veritable World Heritage management program has been set up by the state in order to promote Turkish cultural heritage sites. Is this a response to new local and national ambitions; a matter of complying with UNESCO recommendations; or are we witnessing the emergence of a

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new administrative management model? This chapter sets out to determine what has motivated Turkey's newly invigorated heritage policy, and to examine its effects.

Over the course of the 45 years since the 1972 World Heritage Convention came into effect (UNESCO 1972, 2015), UNESCO has progressively expanded the scope of its heritage activity.[2] Initially, recognition went to monuments deemed to be essential in the light of predominantly European criteria, but nowadays cultural landscapes and intangible heritage lie at the heart of a "new heritage regime" (Turgeon 2010: 390 quoted in Bortolotto 2013: 65), a phenomenon UNESCO encourages as part of its World Heritage Program (Brumann 2013) and under the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2003). The World Heritage List now numbers 1052 items. But in addition to this, UNESCO's constituent bodies (its secretariat and the World Heritage Committee), together with its consultative organizations (International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) international for aspects relating to cultural heritage), increasingly encourage the introduction of exacting safeguard systems for listed sites. Over the course of the application process, ever more complex demands relating to the demonstrable and effective protection of the sites come into force, with the possibility of downgrading an item to the World Heritage List in Danger theoretically making it possible to sanction management systems found wanting.

This chapter analyses the administrative and political process involved in applying for World Heritage status and managing World Heritage sites, and endeavors to establish whether one may speak of a Turkish UNESCO policy, with a public policy system and World Heritage institutions endowed with predefined, predictable, and coherent procedures. More concretely, it examines how a UNESCO project originates, how it is drawn up, and how it leads to a site being placed on the World Heritage List. I draw on the extensive scholarship on World Heritage procedures (Van Der Aa 2005), distinguishing between local, national, and international levels of action, and identifying the political, administrative, and expert actors (ICOMOS consultants and assessors) involved in each stage of the process running from drawing up a tentative list (amounting to a national selection of potential candidates) through to the final decision by the World Heritage Committee. The chapter "follows the actor" (Turtinen 2000: 9), paying particular attention to the transnational circulations shaping the entire process. To this end it focuses on a site called the Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape, which was successfully listed in July 2015.

Diyarbakır, or *Amed* in Kurdish, is part of the administrative region of South Eastern Anatolia, but it is also known as the "capital of Kurdistan in Turkey", a symbolic identity designation used by activists in the Kurdish movement. The project of applying for the historic town center to be placed on the UNESCO list first emerged in the early 2000s, and it clearly shows the dynamics governing Turkey's participation in the World Heritage Program. This case brings out the specific nature of interactions triggered by the UNESCO project, involving local and central political actors, national and international experts, together with municipal employees and state civil servants. The case of Diyarbakır also reveals just how complex it can be—given the Kurdish conflict that has been central to the sociopolitical phenomena affecting the south east of Turkey over the past 40 or so years—to establish a systematized heritage and cultural policy across the entire national territory. In other words, it is not a matter of thinking in terms of some "Kurdish singularity" (Bozarslan 2006), but rather of examining the roll-out of a national World Heritage management system in Turkey via its deployment in a periphery.

This chapter is based on interpretations of a series of participant observations and interviews conducted in Paris, Istanbul, Ankara, and Diyarbakır between 2013 and 2016. It is by approaching a diverse range of interlocutors (public employees, experts, and politicians) operating in various arenas involved in the UNESCO application process (ministries, municipalities, and UNESCO committees) that we can analyze the dynamics governing how heritage policy is devised. I argue that we should not think in terms of a heritage management "institution" (Peters 1999 quoted in Hassenteufel 2008: 147) that would define behavioral norms, devise rules of procedure, and establish a strict organizational structure, but rather view the Turkish case in terms of "heritage [emerging] as a public policy category" (Girard and Scalbert-Yücel 2015). Given that any such World Heritage management "system" (Crozier and Friedberg 1977) is only in its infancy in Turkey, the circulation of individual actors and their room for maneuver inside and outside state channels would appear to be a key factor in UNESCO projects. I suggest that actors behave differently when operating in UNESCO interaction frameworks (arenas and places specific to the UNESCO program). I endeavor to ascertain what it is about the interaction frameworks in a UNESCO project that encourages individual and collective actors from civil society and the political sphere to work together, often despite profound political differences.

The first section looks at Turkey's involvement in the UNESCO program since it was first set up, and more specifically over the past 10 years during which time it has implemented a genuine national World Heritage policy. I then examine the importance of local dynamics affecting heritage policy, and the involvement of actors from civil society who play a central role in the emergent heritage policy system. Finally, analysis of Diyarbakır's application throws light on the specific characteristics of the UNESCO interaction frameworks that encourage actors to work together.

2   From Adhesion to Full Involvement

Although Turkey signed up to the convention in 1983, the turning point in its commitment to the UNESCO program came in 2009. The Turkish state started setting up an administrative system, with the bodies and instruments needed to develop an ambitious World Heritage policy it would previously have been incapable of. This initiative was conducted in tandem with heritage policies implemented by the national state apparatus: the General Directorate of Cultural Assets and Museums (*Kültür Varlıkları ve Müzeler Genel Müdürlüğü*) in the Ministry for Culture and Tourism, and the General Directorate of Foundations (*Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü*) affiliated to the Prime Minister's Office. It thus suggests that a new heritage institution emerged in Turkey focusing specifically on UNESCO, though it is difficult as yet to ascertain how this relates to the operation to catalogue, classify, and restore heritage.

2.1   1983–2009. Low-Key Participation

Turkey became a party to the 1972 World Heritage Convention in 1983. At the time, adhering to this still sketchy international program did not entail much in the way of obligations. UNESCO's aim was, first, to draw attention to a certain number of endangered heritage sites so as to allocate funds to help safeguard them and, second, to promote sites of outstanding and universal merit recognized as humanity's common heritage as part of a larger plan to promote cultural tourism (Cousin 2008). In an initial phase, running from its joining the program through to the early 2000s, Turkey managed to get key sites placed on the World Heritage List, to attract financial assistance, and it started appropriating the norms, conventions, and organizational structures as defined in international arenas. Nine sites were placed on the World Heritage List over the course of the 1980s and 1990s: the

Great Mosque and Hospital of Divriği, the Historic Areas of Istanbul, and Göreme National Park and the Rock Sites of Cappadocia in 1985; Hattousa: the Hittite Capital in 1986; Nemrut Dağ in 1987; Hierapolis-Pamukkale and Xanthos-Letoon in 1988; the City of Safranbolu in 1994; and the Archaeological Site of Troy in 1998. The projects to get each of these sites listed followed different processes specific to each site, to the actors managing them, and to the context at the time when they were listed. The Safranbolu site, for instance, obtained listing largely because of the municipality's efforts throughout the 1980s and 1990s to promote the city's historic urban heritage so as to develop cultural tourism, while it was regarded as more or less self-evident that Istanbul be granted World Heritage status when Turkey ratified the convention (Nicot and Özdirlik 2008).

Yet up until the late 2000s, none of the sites listed in Turkey had any specific World Heritage site management plan (Somuncu and Yiğit 2010). The setting up of this sort of management system involving strict periodic action plans only started becoming a UNESCO requirement as of 2004 (UNESCO and ICCROM 2004). World heritage management was thus largely governed by national laws on safeguarding heritage, but in Turkey these did not fully integrate with the idea of site management (Yildirim 2016). ICOMOS Turkey, set up under the tutelage of the Ministry for Culture in 1974 ahead of signing up to the World Heritage Convention, worked to have international cultural heritage preservation norms taken up by the Turkish system.[3] However, the large number of criticisms about safeguard procedures for certain World Heritage sites in Turkey indicates that the standards demanded by UNESCO were only partially adopted.

The case of Istanbul sheds light on the shift in Turkey's level of commitment (Marquart 2014). In 1985 a site called Historic Areas of Istanbul was granted World Heritage status. Between 1986 and 2004 it received international aid (nearly US$450,000), particularly for conserving the mosaics in the Basilica of Hagia Sophia and for restoring historic wooden houses around the Zeyrek district. But the quality of the conservation work came in for much criticism as of the late 1990s, as did the management of the historic peninsula. The site was accordingly threatened in 2003 with being downgraded to the List of World Heritage in Danger, a move which could be viewed as a "relegation" (Pérouse 2010: 66). UNESCO experts visited the site over the next 10 years, making criticisms and recommendations. International diplomatic negotiations were conducted during annual World Heritage Committee sessions to avoid relegation. The Istanbul managers attained their objective in 2012, when the

committee ceased suggesting that it might be placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger. To persuade UNESCO of their good faith, representatives of the Turkish state started drawing up a management plan and establishing bodies for decision-making, coordination, and consultation between civil society, local authorities, and the central state.

The experience of Istanbul would thus appear to have triggered the introduction of World Heritage administrative structures in Turkey. There was no explicit link between local efforts by managers of the Istanbul site to avoid it being placed on the List of World Heritage in Danger and the development of a national policy by central state organs. However, it needs to be noted that these two dynamics occurred in tandem during the late 2000s. The central role played by Istanbul in the development of heritage policy in Turkey throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Şahin Güçhan and Kurul 2009) leaves little room for doubt that the Istanbul experience was a factor influencing the drawing up of more recent national policy for the UNESCO program.

2.2   2009–2016: Political and Administrative Involvement in a National Program

The late 2000s marked a political, governmental, and administrative turning point, from which point onwards Turkey became fully involved in the World Heritage Program as indicated by the material and human resources allocated to it. This observation raises various issues, including, first, the setting up of a World Heritage management system at the central state level.

It is hard to ascertain whether the emergence of a state World Heritage policy in Turkey was triggered by a government policy initiative or by suggestions emanating from cultural administrations. The first point made by numerous civil servants I interviewed was the important role played by Ertuğrul Günay, the minister for culture and tourism from 2007 to 2013. A World Heritage sites bureau was set up in the Ministry for Culture and Tourism in 2009, tasked with supporting applications for World Heritage status and implementing management plans as required by UNESCO since 2004. The Turkish National Commission for UNESCO considerably expanded its World Heritage Program activities and initiatives over the course of the decade.[4] In 2013 it got Turkey elected to the World Heritage Committee, and then in 2016 Istanbul hosted its annual gathering.[5] The experts on the National Commission worked to devise a national

strategy to promote UNESCO programs. Mention may be made of the work it has carried out to develop a natural heritage program, an area in which Turkey does not yet have any listed sites (other than the two mixed sites combining natural and cultural aspects). The fact that there is no exclusively natural site is evidence of the priority accorded to cultural heritage in Turkey. Furthermore, Hüseyin Avci Botsali, an experienced diplomat and ambassador, was appointed to head the Turkish delegation to UNESCO based in Paris in 2013. Since the election of Turkey to the World Heritage Committee, the Turkish delegation has numbered at least three experts focusing on World Heritage strategy. Their participation in the committee's debates shows that Turkey is progressively learning the appropriate behavioral procedures and negotiating strategies to adopt within UNESCO.[6]

Concrete evidence of the success of Turkey's involvement in the UNESCO program came when seven new sites were granted World Heritage status between 2011 and 2016, after a 13-year period when no new sites were placed on the list. The seven in question are Selimiye Mosque and its Social Complex in 2011; the Neolithic Site of Çatalhöyük in 2012; Bursa and Cumalıkızık: the Birth of the Ottoman Empire and Pergamon and its Multi-Layered Cultural Landscape in 2014; Ephesus and Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape in 2015; and the Archaeological Site of Ani in 2016. In addition to its efforts in the World Heritage category, the Turkish state has also worked to obtain intangible cultural heritage listing (introduced by UNESCO in 2003) for no fewer than 12 items between 2008 and 2014, from the Mevlevi Sema ceremony to Ebru, Turkish art of marbling.[7] Both programs encourage the development of local initiatives. However, the administrative and political support provided by the new unit in the Ministry for Culture and Tourism proved necessary in successfully carrying out these applications. The ministry checked and corrected the application dossiers and acted as a relay with the national delegation in charge of lobbying UNESCO in Paris.

Furthermore, the number of sites on the national tentative list of candidates for UNESCO listing rose from 23 in 2010 to 60 in 2015, indicating the new degree of enthusiasm among local actors and the central state. Putting a site on the tentative list amounts to central state recognition that it merits a place in Turkey's international UNESCO display case. But there is a significant difference between being put on the tentative list and win-

ning World Heritage status, for it can take a long time for a UNESCO application to be drawn up.

Given this, it is politically significant that the latest Turkish site to be granted World Heritage status, in July 2016, came just 4 years after it was placed on the national tentative list. The site in question is the archaeological site of Ani, a ruined city generally recognized as a mediaeval Armenian capital and historic crossroads on the Silk Road. The Turkish government not only allowed this application to go ahead, but prioritized promoting this site to UNESCO, even though it is a sensitive heritage object since it acts as a focus for the issue of Turkey's Armenian heritage. Given that each state can only present one or two sites per year under the current guidelines, the decision by the Ministry for Culture and Tourism to favor the Ani application is suggestive of a new approach by the Turkish government towards Armenian heritage. This event raises the hypothesis that there has been a break with twentieth-century republican policy, which consisted in abandoning or even vandalizing Armenian monuments which were excluded from the national heritage (Ter Minassian 2015). But its presentation as World Heritage may also be interpreted as a strategy to neutralize a minority group's heritage site by using the diplomatic arena afforded by UNESCO (Van Der Aa 2005).

As things stand, it is difficult to determine whether or not the Turkish government has a strategy or preference guiding its World Heritage policy. Its UNESCO projects display varying ambitions, with the main motivation being to obtain international tourism certification. This economic strategy has been a significant aspect in each application, and particularly so for the archaeological site of Göbeklitepe, to be presented to UNESCO before 2020. In a more political interpretation, an application such as that of the Ani archaeological site may be seen as a strategy to neutralize sensitive heritage issues. Inclusion on the World Heritage List also provides an opportunity to attribute new historical significance to heritage sites previously invested with lesser meaning, as indicated by the way Bursa was presented as the cradle of the Ottoman state in the application submitted to UNESCO in 2014. But rather than seeking the intentions governing heritage policy in government statements, I believe it preferable to enquire into initiatives by actors operating outside and via the state, for these can speak more loudly. Indeed, it would appear that national commitment to the UNESCO program has also originated at the local level and within civil society.

3   The World Heritage System: "Public–Local–Civil–Private" Actions

One of the main characteristics of the World Heritage system in Turkey is the contacts built up between the many interdependent actors circulating within it, with local authorities and civil society actors playing an important role in drawing up heritage policy and actions.

3.1   The Appropriation of Heritage Actions by Local Public Authorities

I wish to start by noting how new responsibilities in heritage management have been progressively handed over to local authorities (especially metropolitan municipalities), both through the transfer of powers from the center to the local level, and through incentives drawing on transnational channels.

The expanding powers and means of metropolitan municipalities over the course of the 2000s has also transpired in heritage actions based in local policy. The biggest scheme is set out in Law no. 2863 on the conservation of cultural and natural property (paragraph 6 amended on 4 February 2009—5835/1 art.), stipulating that municipalities should allocate 10% of their income from land tax to projects to preserve and operate cultural properties. Another notable event was the setting up of bureaus for the supervision and implementation of conservation measures (*Koruma Uygulama ve Denetim Büroları*, KUDEB) in the municipalities, which have been operating since 2006.[8] These bureaus are tasked with encouraging and authorizing minor work to preserve heritage, a prerogative previously monopolized by organs in the Ministry for Culture and Tourism.

Furthermore, European Union (EU) funding and new regional development agencies have generally facilitated access to funding for projects conducted by municipalities and governors' offices to promote heritage and develop tourism.[9] The suggestion that a site should apply for UNESCO listing is a privileged argument in requests for international funding owing to association with a concrete and prestigious program. This was the case for the Mardin Sustainable Development Tourism Project.[10] Local authorities are thus increasingly the driving force behind projects in the field of heritage action, independently of any action by the central state, thanks to new resources obtained via transnational channels (particularly EU financing) and the new opportunities provided by the World Heritage Program.

More specifically for the case studied here, this national dynamic of localized heritage action may be linked to UNESCO recommendations on site management. The "participation of local actors" is a recurrent element in each managerial statement, encouraging municipalities in particular to take over World Heritage management (UNESCO 2010). During the 2000s, successive revisions to the guidelines (UNESCO 2015) and recommendations by UNESCO experts placed the management plan at the heart of site management. The plan became a precondition for UNESCO listing, to be drawn up by local authorities, or at least in coordination with them, and in tandem with representatives from civil society. More generally, UNESCO strongly encourages states to entrust local actors with project initiatives, applications, and choices in defining and delimiting sites. This trend towards handing responsibility to local actors is for that matter common to other countries in the world (be they developed or developing) and other UNESCO conventions (and in particular intangible cultural heritage). Turkey has only partially adopted UNESCO's recommendations in this domain. The municipalities now play a much expanded role in initiating applications for urban sites and cultural landscapes. However, it would appear that the central state still plays a dominant role for archaeological site applications and management. The application processes for the Ani archaeological site and the Göbeklitepe archaeological site clearly show that the Ministry for Culture and Tourism is firmly in control of archaeological site applications. Local managerial staff in national museums have very little room to maneuver and only low-level responsibility in promoting these applications.

The central state also tends to wave through applications to be placed on the national tentative list. All that is needed is for a local actor (an archaeological museum or municipality) to file a brief application dossier. Several employees at the Ministry for Culture and Tourism indicated that this tentative list is thought of primarily as a way of encouraging heritage protection measures at the local level. In the application process, for the latest sites to have been granted World Heritage status (and particularly for the cases of Edirne, Bursa, Pergamon, and Diyarbakır), the municipalities have been granted major responsibilities in drawing up the applications and management plans, and in communicating them to the actors concerned. Each of these experiences indicates that these listings are not solely attributable to action by the Turkish state, but also stem from the mobilization of local actors and interactions between authorities in the center and at the periphery.

3.2   *Working with Civil Society*

Turkey's commitment to the UNESCO program in tandem with these transfers of power from the center to the local level has thus encouraged the emergence of new civil society actors.[11] This sphere is peopled by experts in World Heritage and organizations that work cooperatively, thus standing out from other more dissenting players in contact with the Turkish government. The statutes, contractual relations, and implicit exchanges binding these collective and individual actors to the public authorities mean they have differing levels of independence. These actors, while not part of the state, are often intrinsically bound to it, and their work on World Heritage programs is as beneficial to the administration and central government as it is to local authorities and the public.

ICOMOS Turkey is the main organization to mediate between the state and civil society in the domain of World Heritage management. Its functioning and procedures are determined both by the fundamental statutes of ICOMOS International and by Turkish law. Turkey ICOMOS was initially placed under the tutelage of the Ministry for Culture, but it has enjoyed statutory semi-independence from the public authorities since changes to its regulations in 1992. This precaution does nothing to conceal the fact that it can only act in close cooperation with the state, both when hosting professional and scholarly events and when promoting the World Heritage Program.

The Foundation for the Protection and Improved Knowledge of Cultural and Environmental Values (*Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı*, ÇEKÜL) is more revelatory about the new forms of interdependence between the state and civil society in Turkey. Despite its independent status it is one of the players to "act as relays for the policy lines and expectations handed down by Ankara due to links with public actors issuing from the centre" (Pérouse 2015: 178). ÇEKÜL is headquartered in Istanbul, like ICOMOS Turkey. Its objective is to boost local and national awareness by providing expertise for all sorts of projects to preserve and promote heritage around the country. Its slogan—"public–local–civil–private"—echoes the policy models promoted by UNESCO and the EU, and appropriated by the Turkish state, based on public–private partnerships, local participation, and consulting civil society.[12] ÇEKÜL's inherent purpose is less directly linked than ICOMOS to the UNESCO program, and so its recent uptake of World Heritage was in no way automatic, suggesting rather that it is expanding its activities in the

wake of various successes. ÇEKÜL's participation stems from the attractiveness of the program and the opportunities it provides. Thus the exponential increase in its activities, thanks in particular to the setting up of the Union of Historic Towns in 2000, has progressively encouraged it to promote UNESCO applications.[13] The Union of Historic Towns in 2000 and ÇEKÜL have, for instance, jointly organized professional training workshops in the World Heritage Program, as well as holding symposiums promoting municipalities' application projects. ÇEKÜL has also drawn on the help of volunteers—often working for the municipality or in the public sector—to conduct work promoting local heritage (including inventorying, conservation, and communication) that needs to be conducted prior to drawing up UNESCO applications.

It was also within this sort of organization bringing civil society into contact with public authorities that a group of individual actors—referred to here as World Heritage experts—have made their presence felt. This group, including heritage officers, art historians, architects, archaeologists, and people with a background in political science and public administration, has become more and more involved in the World Heritage Program over the past 15 or so years. Its work in drawing up listing applications and implementing management plans, associated with the position of site manager, and in creating UNESCO university chairs, is testimony to the emergence of a genuine sector of professional activity. One person set up a UNESCO chair devoted to World Heritage in Turkey at the Kadir Has University in Istanbul in 2015; a second successfully oversaw the application to obtain World Heritage status for Pergamon in 2014, after encountering success with the Edirne application in 2011, and is now preparing a new one; while a third regularly carries out consultancies for drawing up management plans at several of the 15 sites to have been granted UNESCO listing since 1985. There are thus 20 or so experts who are closely involved in new training activities, consultancy missions, and coordination for projects stemming from the development of World Heritage.

One of the main characteristics of World Heritage experts is that they occupy multiple positions in public institutions (ministries and municipalities), civil society organizations (professional chambers, ICOMOS Turkey, ÇEKÜL, and other associations), and academia. Several work part time as UNESCO site managers, a role which involves coordinating local and central authorities, thus encouraging them to present themselves as neutral and independent actors. Lastly, they acquire mediation skills over the course of these listing applications that help reach a consensus. They make

up an informal network, circulating between various World Heritage arenas where they encounter each other, such as ICOMOS symposiums (the 50th anniversary of the organization in Istanbul on April 20, 2015, for instance, and the annual meeting of ICOMOS International in Istanbul on October 15–22, 2016), or at annual sessions of the World Heritage Committee (the 40th session was held in Istanbul on July 10–20, 2016). They conduct consultancies and are involved in UNESCO listing applications throughout Turkey, staking out a market in World Heritage expertise that will presumably be progressively less dominated by international consultants. Their continual shuttling between the local, national, and international level lends World Heritage manufacture its transnational character, meaning that the capacity of individual actors to circulate is a key resource.

The determining role played by civil society actors (both collective and individual) and local authorities emphasizes the need to think in terms of an "organized action" system (Crozier and Friedberg 1977: 10) involving interdependent but dispersed actors, rather than in terms of a centralized, structured, and normative World Heritage *institution*. Analysis of the UNESCO program thus provides backing for approaches that seek to deconstruct the dichotomy between national and local policies, to cast light on the porous boundaries between civil society and the state, and to bring out the high levels of circulation between different spheres of public action (Gourisse 2015). It is important to appreciate that the emergence of World Heritage policy in Turkey stems less from some central state program than from the convergence of actors within it. More specifically, these actors meet in World Heritage arenas governed both by state structures and by UNESCO rules of functioning. Lastly, the fact that these actors master norms and are plugged into national and international networks places them at the heart of projects to apply for World Heritage listing.

4   Cooperation and Conflict at the Diyarbakir Site

The case of Diyarbakır is accorded prime importance in this study since the ambient conflict brings out all the complexity and paradoxes of the World Heritage system once applied at the local level. Analysis of the World Heritage application for the Diyarbakır Fortress and Hevsel Gardens Cultural Landscape raises questions about how the Turkish state's World Heritage policy is applied when subjected to regional dynamics relating to

the Kurdish question. This case also throws greater light on the relationship between the central state and local authorities as this transpires in World Heritage arenas and interaction frameworks.

4.1   Cooperation on the Application

First mention of the Diyarbakır UNESCO project dates back to 2000 when the "citadel and city walls of Diyarbakır" were placed on Turkey's national tentative list. This initiative, occurring prior to the period of increased participation in the World Heritage Program, was dependent on the Ministry for Culture and Tourism, which at the time was not actively involved in drawing up UNESCO applications. It was only from 2011 onwards that regular exchanges were established between the Metropolitan Municipality of Diyarbakır and the ministry. The opening of the application process was officially announced on January 3, 2012 at a meeting between Mayor Osman Baydemir and the president of the Turkish Republic, Abdullah Gül. This joint announcement—between, on one hand, the central authority of the Turkish state ruled by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) and, on the other, the Kurdish movement's principal regional political authority—is illustrative of how two fundamentally opposed political forces can, on occasion, come together. The fact that cooperating in this way was envisaged is demonstrative of how Kurdish municipalities are becoming progressively institutionalized within the Turkish political system (Watts 2010), as well as signaling the ephemeral "peace process".[14]

The drawing up of the listing application, conceptual definition of the heritage object, delimitation of the site, and setting up of a management plan were then carried out in a joint local and national effort involving state and civil society actors in the UNESCO project. One of the key stages was work conceptualizing the site using the heritage categories proposed by UNESCO. This phase throws particular light on the dynamics via which international instruments and norms are appropriated by national and local actors. Here it is a matter of ascertaining how the Diyarbakır site became a *cultural landscape*. This category of World Heritage is currently receiving strong backing from UNESCO experts, and is used to identify sites that illustrate harmony between man and nature. The first reference to possibly placing the fortress and Hevsel gardens in this category was made by a foreign expert at the ICOMOS international conference held in Diyarbakır in April 2013. The international

expert in question then acted as a private consultant in the new conceptualization of the site conducted by the municipality. Then, in the final stages of preparing the application, the team behind a UNESCO project in the same category, being drawn up at the same time by the municipality of Pergamon, came and lent its support to those working in Diyarbakır. The emergence of an informal network of World Heritage experts in Turkey— taking on concrete form, in this instance involving two municipalities from opposite ends of the country working together for the first time— was a key factor in the successful outcome to the Diyarbakır metropolitan municipality project.

Furthermore, the project was supported by other World Heritage experts (in particular those involved in the Edirne site application) and by the Union of Historic Towns. They all attended a meeting held in Diyarbakır on February 27, 2015 in the presence of Metin Sözen, the chairman of ÇEKÜL and an influential figure with many municipalities and governors' offices in Turkey. It should also be noted that those involved in drawing up the application, especially the site manager and metropolitan municipality employees, were able to draw on the advice of experts from the World Heritage secretariat during several informal visits to UNESCO headquarters in Paris. The capacity of these actors to circulate and to call on national networks, as well as the assistance of international experts, was of prime importance in the Diyarbakır project being carried through to a successful conclusion.

The Ministry for Culture and Tourism then oversaw finalization of the written application. In the south east of Turkey, urban, cultural, and heritage projects frequently trigger tensions between the central state and local political authorities, promoting a Kurdish identity that runs counter to state-imposed national frameworks (Gambetti 2009). Approval of the Diyarbakır application and its transfer to the World Heritage secretariat thus involved a certain number of compromises and an attempt to find historical narratives that were acceptable to all of the parties involved, despite raising sensitive identity issues. In the UNESCO project, Diyarbakır was not presented as a capital of Kurdistan in Turkey or purely as a heritage object of the Turkish nation state (Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi 2014). Comparison of the applications by Diyarbakır and Ani, and by the "Nevruz" festivities for intangible cultural heritage status in 2009, brings out the rhetorical strategies used to minimize references to the identities of minority groups.[15] What matters in particular is to avoid certain denominations in the applications (e.g. Armenian and Kurdish) and to use the

themes of "multiculturalism" and "cultural diversity" to emphasize that these assets have a place in several cultures, thereby denying the existence of predominant identity characteristics. The World Heritage Program would appear to act here as an interaction framework in which political and ideological conflicts can be neutralized, encouraging conciliatory behavior that is not always found in relations between civil servants and actors in pro-Kurdish cultural policies. Here we may observe a difference between heritage action and cultural action, as well as a specific effect of the World Heritage interaction frameworks.

The underlying state of conflict between the central state and Kurdish political forces in Turkey was also kept in abeyance throughout the UNESCO lobbying period for the Diyarbakır application. The parties to the project presented a common front to their interlocutors at UNESCO in order to promote the application at the 39th session of the World Heritage Committee. Throughout this gathering, World Heritage experts, Diyarbakır metropolitan municipality employees, and other members of the Turkish delegation to UNESCO defended the application in concerted manner before the members of the committee (the delegations from 21 states). Numerous promotional documents were produced by the municipality and by the Ministry for Culture and Tourism that were distributed in the wings of the meeting, indicating a remarkable level of human and financial investment in comparison to the other applications being presented. When its nomination was announced on the seventh day of the session (July 4, 2015), the opportunity was taken to stage an event demonstrating how all the Turkish and Kurdish parties to the project worked effectively together. The Turkish ambassador started by referring to the pacifying spirit of UNESCO before handing the floor to the mayor of Diyarbakır. Images of Gültan Kisanak, an influential figure in the Kurdish movement, delivering a speech in Turkish and Kurdish beneath the flags of the Republic of Turkey, triggered astounded but delighted reactions. Such interactions avoiding any mention of political dissent and conflict can only occur within the neutralizing framework of the international organization in which the art of staging good entente and diplomatic cordiality reigns.

4.2   *World Heritage Interaction Frameworks and Instruments for Neutralizing Conflict*

In the light of the violent events which erupted shortly after Diyarbakır was granted World Heritage status in July 2015 (with the outbreak of

armed conflict in which much of the town center was destroyed), the peaceful collaboration on the UNESCO project would appear to be an anomaly in the course of the relationship between the Turkish state and political authorities from the Kurdish movement. The rekindling of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey in late July 2015 brings out a central characteristic of the World Heritage Program in Turkey—namely, its capacity to conceal or neutralize pre-existing conflicts between actors.[16] The program employed public policy instruments (in this instance the UNESCO site management plan) that encourage actors to seek compromise and come together around the shared objective of winning World Heritage listing.[17] It also entailed setting up a management system, which involved creating a body to coordinate the activities of public administrations, local authorities, and civil society organizations heavily involved in managing the UNESCO site.

The true innovation of the World Heritage Program (in Turkey at least) is that it establishes specific interaction frameworks for public heritage policy. These are arenas or forums in which actors can meet, that are governed by rules and norms established so as to secure the key objective of being granted World Heritage status. These World Heritage interaction frameworks make it possible for actors to temporarily extricate themselves from pre-existing institutional rationales, political oppositions, and rivalry between organizations. They took concrete form in the various arenas referred to above, in the sessions of the World Heritage Committee, and in various meetings and symposiums. Throughout the application process the metropolitan municipality and governor's office in Diyarbakır jointly held exceptional events (the ICOMOS International Conference on April 11–14, 2013, and the reception at the annual meeting of the Union of Historic Towns on February 27 to March 1, 2015). But the World Heritage interaction framework transpired most fully in the meetings to draw up the management plan for the UNESCO site.

UNESCO's recommendations on devising management systems for World Heritage sites regularly refer to the behavioral norms and rules of functioning that apply within these interaction frameworks. These involve seeking compromise, arriving at consensual decisions, and respecting the neutrality of coordinators.

The UNESCO site management system gives rise to an organizational structure which, depending on the local and national contexts, can vary in terms of its originality and smoothness of operation. In the case of Diyarbakır, the application process resulted in the creation of a genuine

institution. In this system a site manager, placed at the head of the UNESCO site management unit, is tasked with ensuring that all the local and national parties work together. At Diyarbakır this unit was attached to the metropolitan municipality, as is the case for most urban sites. The management system is composed of a consultative committee and supervisory committee who see to it that academics, professional organizations, and other local society representatives take part in these committees. They meet frequently to discuss the drawing up of the management plan, and to define the tourism, cultural, and urban action plans for the site. This organizational framework promoted by UNESCO can take on various forms, both in Turkey (Yildirim 2016) and in other states that are party to the convention.

Effective collaboration within these bodies would appear to stem primarily from selecting the right participants in the first place. Reference has already been made to the site manager. This person hails from the group referred to as World Heritage experts who think of themselves as neutral and independent. It can thus be assumed that the manager willingly took on their attributed role as a mediator. It may thus be posited that individuals working in the site management unit were likely to adopt conciliatory behavior towards all of the parties to the UNESCO project, whether they come from the state or the municipality. The site management unit was set up with the specific objective of carrying through the World Heritage application to successful completion, and some of the employees in Diyarbakır were hired especially for the project. Their behavior throughout the UNESCO process was thus determined more by the objective of winning World Heritage status than by any larger rationales operating within the institution they were worked for.

Next, the selection of participants and allocation of roles within the consultative committee were left to the discretion of the management unit, which thus to a certain extent ran the process of identifying the relevant parties to the project. A key stage in the process was thus the decision not to include individuals and organizations who, though active in civil society, were known for their dissenting or confrontational attitude. This ensured that a consensual spirit reigned within the management system. I suggest that the selection of members to sit on the consultative committees for Diyarbakır, or other UNESCO sites in Turkey, is at least partly based on turning away those who are most critical of central state urban policy. In Istanbul the sidelining of certain representatives from chambers of architects involved in numerous protest movements was par-

ticularly indicative of this dynamic to exclude certain people from interinstitutional coordination meetings. More exhaustive research may reveal whether or not similar exclusion occurred in Diyarbakır.

Throughout the application process, meetings to draw up the management plan brought together metropolitan municipality employees and those working in the governor's office in Diyarbakır, as well as staff from ministerial administrations, in a climate that most people interviewed described as fecund and exceptional given the strained context of the Kurdish conflict. Dialogue between the municipality and state administrations (the Ministry for Culture and Tourism and the Ministry for the Environment and Urban Planning) managed to get projects canceled for a hydroelectric dam, and land reserve in the Valley of the Tigris overturned. In the wake of this, other concessions were made by the state and by the metropolitan municipality so as to meet recommendations put forward in the application assessment (ICOMOS 2015), thereby revealing the principles of compromise at work within World Heritage interaction frameworks.

The World Heritage system thus established interaction frameworks throughout the process that provided strong incentives to seek compromise and adopt cooperative behavior independently of any political differences. Given that the Kurdish conflict flared up again just a few weeks after Diyarbakır was placed on the World Heritage List, it may be suggested that it was these interaction frameworks that enabled the application to be carried out successfully, since they prized it free from pre-existing political and institutional rationales that would have otherwise prevailed. The current situation in Diyarbakır shows how fragile these interaction frameworks can be. The Diyarbakır site management system was shattered by armed operations in the historic center between November 2015 and March 2016. The metropolitan municipality has been barred from the devastated zones and excluded from the urban transformation schemes set up by the central state, and it no longer has any real power in running the site. Cooperation between all of the parties to the UNESCO project therefore did not survive the re-emergence of political and military conflict in the Kurdish region.

5   Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to characterize a new form of heritage policy and action in Turkey. It would appear that rather than thinking in terms of a normative, structured, and centralized *institution*, it is more

fruitful to view the situation in Turkey in terms of a World Heritage *management system*. By drawing on the idea of a public action system, I have sought to emphasize the shared roles and dispersed actions of various independent actors from civil society, municipalities, and the state. Turkey's UNESCO policy cannot be reduced to the pursuit of some single, coherent ambition, since it stems from the recent commitment by the central state as well as by experts, civil society organizations, and local authorities. The seven new sites to have obtained listing since 2011 and the 60 sites in Turkey that are currently candidates for World Heritage status are illustrative of the different rationales at work in each application process, making it necessary to examine regional and local contexts. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain principles that are common to these application projects. These include the need for local and civil actors to be involved and to circulate transnationally, without necessarily proceeding via state channels, the setting up of national networks of World Heritage experts, the establishment of specific interaction frameworks, and the fact that seeking UNESCO accreditation has a propensity to generate consensus. I suggest that these interaction frameworks are a key factor shaping the heritage and cultural actions of the UNESCO program. Those promoting World Heritage act in public policy arenas within which compromise, consensus, and cooperation are established as the rules of functioning and behavioral norms, and thereby extricate themselves for the duration of the application process from pre-existing conflictual rationales. However, the experience of Diyarbakır clearly shows how fragile these frameworks can be, thus raising the question of whether the UNESCO program is able to lastingly contain conflicts that are intrinsic to political and social relationships, and thereby play its self-assumed role as a force for peace.

Notes

1. It was during the 40th session of the World Heritage Committee (held in Istanbul on July 10–20, 2016) that Nabi Avci (the Republic of Turkey's minister for culture and tourism) announced that Turkey would be increasing its contribution to the international organization's budget, from 1% of UNESCO's ordinary budget to 2%.
2. While the 1972 convention defines the fundamental bases of the program, the continually evolving guidelines emphasize adaptations to new policy directions, normative requirements, and rules of functioning. For a discussion of the origins of the World Heritage program, see Titchen (1995).

3. The Turkish National Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS Turkey) is the national branch of UNESCO's main consultative organization for cultural World Heritage (ICOMOS International). It focuses specifically on the Turkish system's adherence to the principles set out in the Venice Charter (1964).

4. *The UNESCO Türkiye Millî Komisyonu* is an interministerial body affiliated to the Ministry for Culture and Tourism, the Ministry for Education and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was founded in 1963.

5. The World Heritage Committee has 21 member states who meet each year in ordinary session to discuss policy orientations relating to the World Heritage Convention, applications, and the management of World Heritage sites.

6. These remarks are drawn from observations carried out particularly at the 39th and 40th sessions of the World Heritage Committee in 2015 and 2016.

7. The intangible cultural heritage program has its own committees and modes of functioning, setting it apart from World Heritage. Nevertheless, reciprocal incentive effects are observable between the two conventions (Bortolotto 2011).

8. The prerogatives of the *Koruma, Uygulama ve Denetim Büroları* are set out in regulations on the procedures and principles of establishment no. 25842, published in the official gazette on 11.06.2005, article 7.

9. The *Kalkınma bölge ajansları*, set up after the promulgation of law 5449 in 2006, grant a privileged place to projects to promote tourism in historic urban centers, specifically in the region of south eastern Anatolia.

10. The *Mardin Sürdürülebilir Turizm Projesi* is a project with €2.2 million of EU funding to develop sustainable tourism (covering actions relating to communication, heritage restoration, and training), with the drawing up of a World Heritage application as one of its objectives.

11. "Civil society actors" is used here to refer to individuals and organizations, set up independently of the state and necessarily interacting with it, who act in the public realm and participate in public policy and actions.

12. The expression *Kamu-yerel-sivil-özel* is omnipresent in the foundation's communication material.

13. The *Tarihi kentler birliği*, placed under the authority of the ÇEKÜL secretariat, is a network of local authorities running programs in which municipalities, governors' offices, and heritage experts work together.

14. The years 2009–2015 may be cautiously described in this manner, a period characterized by AKP statements about "democratic openness" and the ceasefire announced by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the main organization in the armed struggle going on since 1984 (Grojean 2014; Joost et al. 2013).

15. Evaluation of the Ani application by ICOMOS international experts mentions in particular that "the official Turkish historiography put forward makes insufficient recognition of Ani's Armenian past and involves historical inaccuracies" (ICOMOS 2016).

   The Nevruz (in Turkish) or Newroz (in Kurdish) festivities are celebrated each year at the beginning of spring. Their meanings differ in the Turkish, Kurdish, and Persian cultural spheres. The intangible cultural heritage application for "Nevruz" did not recognize the Kurdish version of these festivities in Turkey (Aykan 2014).

16. The conflict may be considered to have started again after the Suruç attack, in which 33 people died in a town on the Turkish/Syrian border on July 20, 2015, as a consequence of which the Kurdistan Workers' Party assassinated two police officers. The spiral of violence led to armed operations in numerous towns in the Kurdish region of Turkey, which was placed under a ceasefire (including Diyarbakır).

17. By "public policy instruments" I refer to "technical and social mechanisms organizing specific social relations between public authorities and those targeted" (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004: 13).

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by "n" refers to notes.