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Peter T. Coleman
Morton Deutsch

Morton Deutsch: Major Texts on Peace Psychology



THE MORTON DEUTSCH
INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR COOPERATION AND
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
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*To our great grandchildren,
may they live in a world
that is congenial, sustainable,
and free of war and destructive conflicts.*




Photo of Morton and Lydia Deusch in Thailand (1998). *Source* Morton Deusch's personal photo collection

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New York, December 2014

Morton Deutsch



Morton Deutsch with the President of Teachers College, Larry Cremin, in 1982

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Morton Deutsch with Peter Coleman at the 2013 Morton Deutsch Awards at Teachers College, Columbia University. *Source* From the author's personal photo collection

Chapter 1

Introduction

In this difficult age, in which we all live, with destructive wars, terrorism, climate change, massive poverty, and gross violations of human rights, it is difficult to maintain hope and it is easy to grasp cynicism about the human future. Yet I believe one must maintain hope for a better world and strive to bring it about. The papers in these two volumes reflect this orientation. They also reflect a social psychological approach to issues of war and peace which I believe is important. However these issues require the contributions of many other disciplines as well.

The basic ideas underlying the social psychological orientation of the papers presented in these two volumes involve the following key concepts¹: interdependence, rationality, open-mindedness, time perspective, constructive conflict resolution, and fallibility. Each of these concepts is briefly discussed below.

1.1 Interdependence

In many ways people, as individuals and in groups, in organizations, in nations, and as members of the human species on planet earth are highly interdependent—“we sink or swim together.” Narrowly pursuing one’s own interests, one’s religious interests, one’s national interests—without regard to the interest of others—will often produce mutual harm. This problem is sometimes discussed under the title of “The Commons Dilemma” (Harden 1968). A simple illustration of this dilemma is presented in the figure below.

¹ See Chap. 10 for a fuller discussion.

| | | | |
|------------------------|---|------------------------|--------|
| | | “Y” chooses between | |
| | | A | B |
| “X” chooses between | A | +1, +1 | +1, +2 |
| | B | +2, +1 | -1, -1 |

“X” and “Y” can be individuals, groups, or nations. If each chooses “B” (according to their narrow self-interest), both will end up losing. If both choose “A”, they each will have a positive outcome. However, if they can agree to alternate choices which most benefit the other, they will do even better.

We live in a highly interdependent world. Namely, our decisions are not made in a vacuum, but rather in our local and global contexts, most often impacting others as well as ourselves. If we (as individuals, groups, or nations) act only in terms of narrow self-interest, the damage to our families, communities, organizations, nations, and planet would be great.

1.2 Rationality

Economic rationality is often considered the basic form of rationality. Thus, it is frequently assumed that a nation’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the measure of a nation’s well-being. In recent years, the GDP has been subjected to two main forms of criticism. One is that economic well-being is only one aspect of well-being; it doesn’t include health, happiness, and many other aspects of well-being. Secondly, it doesn’t include the harmful side effects of some aspects of economic production such as air pollution and climate change.

Some scholars have suggested that there are various forms of rationality. As Dising (1962) has indicated, there are five forms of rationality: *technical* (efficient achievement of a single goal); *economic* (efficient achievement of a plurality of goals); *legal* (rules or rule following); *political* (referring to the rationality of decision making structures); and *social* rationality (integrating forces in individuals and social systems which generate meaning and allow action to occur). He defines rationality in terms of effectiveness, and he describes a number of fundamental

kinds of effectiveness in the social world: effectiveness refers to the successful production of any kind of value. A sixth type of rationality has also been added and labeled *ecological* rationality—reasoning that produces, increases or preserves the capacity, resilience and diversity of an ecosystem, or in its largest sense, the biosphere (Bartlett/Robert 1986).

We suggest extending the concept of social rationality to include *community* or *global* rationality. Global rationality could be thought of as decision making that is guided by the effective creation of value for our global community. So, in addition to looking at decisions from technical, economic, legal, political and ecological rationalities, an extension would be to look at decisions in terms of their global rationality, or value in creating or strengthening global community. It is based on the salience of the “interdependence, obligation and solidarity of unique relationships” connecting us to our global identity. An inclusive concept of rationality would go beyond economic rationality. This would require the integration of economic rationality with social (global) rationality and other forms of rationality as is appropriate to the specific situation of decision-making.

We emphasize a broader concept of rationality because a narrow focus on economic rationality as the only form of rationality, encourages an economic orientation to life, material accumulation and greed, and neglects the values inherent in being a member of a lively, meaningful community.

1.3 Open-Mindedness

A major obstacle to overcome in seeking harmonious, peaceful relations is close-mindedness. Close-mindedness is the unwillingness to have contact with, to listen to, to seek out, or to comprehend information that goes against one’s beliefs or positions, and the readiness to discard any evidence that does not support one’s own views or beliefs.

Can we overcome this challenge and promote open minded discussion among people with opposing viewpoints? Tjosvold et al. (2014) define four mutually reinforcing aspects of open minded discussion: developing and expressing one’s own ideas (perspective giving); questioning and understanding other’s views and ideas (perspective taking), integrating and synthesizing to generate new perspectives, and agreeing to implement some kind of solution.

Close-mindedness is often best overcome with the help of a highly respected third party who creates a situation in which opposed parties can meet in a friendly, non-threatening context which enables the opposing parties to see the common ground they share despite their initial opposing viewpoints.

1.4 Time Perspective

An orientation to short-term gratification is often detrimental to long term benefits and to the achievement of important future goals. Thus, the potential future, as well as the current harmful effects of climate change are often denied or ignored for the short-term profits involved in producing and using oil and coal. The research and theorizing on the delay of gratification conducted by Walter Mischel and his colleagues over the last several decades provide some insight and understanding into developing an extended time perspective. Mischel and colleagues have investigated the cognitive processes and conditions involved in why people are able to delay gratification or not. We can link the ideas to the commons dilemma. Mischel et al. (2006) suggested that to successfully enable willpower, one must understand two interacting ‘systems:’ a ‘hot’ or ‘go’ system may be understood as that which is emotional, simple, reflexive and fast. We are often well aware of how particular actions will gratify self-interest. In contrast, they propose a ‘cool’, or ‘know’ system that is complex, contemplative, strategic, reflective and emotionally neutral. It is this system that, in successful instances of self-control, comes into play to balance the actions of the ‘go’ system. Relating this to the commons dilemma suggests that learning of ways to increase the activity of the ‘know’ system can have useful benefits for strengthening decision making that is based on *social rationality* rather than solely on selfish rationality, and it takes the future into account.

Another way of increasing future orientation is to visualize possible futures. Thus, Hershfield et al. (2011) have demonstrated that college students who were shown computer-generated images of themselves as senior citizens had a positive impact on their retirement savings intentions.

1.5 Constructive Conflict Resolution

Conflict has a bad reputation because of its association with such negative effects as violence, war, and destructiveness. However it can have positive effects: improving relations, solving problems, stimulating positive personal and social change and enhancing creativity. Throughout our writings on this we emphasize the imperative to find ways of reducing the over reliance on destructive conflict resolution methods (e.g., use of coercion, violence, power over others, escalation, a win/lose orientation, impoverished communication between parties in conflict, autistic hostility, to name just a few), and of increasing use of constructive conflict techniques. Such techniques as creative problem solving, using active listening methods of communication, reframing the conflict as a joint problem rather than the other’s problem, and so forth are important characteristics of constructive conflict resolution. These and other techniques have a solid history of empirical support in moving conflict in a constructive rather than a destructive direction.

1.6 Fallibility

In a number of our papers, we discuss how misperceptions, prejudices, lack of self-awareness, etc. can lead to destructive conflict. Awareness of one's own fallibility as well as the fallibility of the other reduces the likelihood of the biases and misperceptions that can lead to destructive conflict.

1.7 Brief Description of Book Chapters

All the chapters in this volume were influenced by the theoretical ideas presented in Volume 1, and the concepts summarized above. However, Chaps. 2–4 were specifically written in the context of the Cold War between the opposing nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Chapters 2 and 3, in different ways, present the components of a social psychological approach to preventing war and developing peace between the two superpowers.

Chapter 4 is specifically concerned with undoing the dangers of nuclear war.

Chapter 5 discusses the Arab-Israeli conflict (as it seemed in 1988) from the perspective of how what seems to be a non-negotiable issue can be turned into a negotiable one.

Chapter 6 considers how an adversary might be influenced to change from unwillingness to a willingness to negotiate a conflict.

Chapter 7 outlines a program of what schools can do to encourage the values, attitudes and knowledge that foster constructive rather than destructive relations and which prepare children to live in a peaceful world.

Chapter 8 presents the introduction of the book, *Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace* (edited by P.T. Coleman and M. Deutsch) which contains distinguished contributions by well-known psychologists related to this topic.

Chapter 9 discusses the important contributions of William James to the prevention of war.

Chapter 10 contains my most recent thoughts as it relates to war and peace and other issues of global concern. It focuses on the development of a cooperative, global human community.

Chapter 11 is something I developed at the request of my students, namely, to present a very brief statement of the basic principles of constructive conflict resolution.

1.8 Conclusion

We, the people of Planet Earth, a very distinctive neighborhood in the universe, are members of a human family with a common ancestry. We face serious *problems such as climate change, war, weapons of mass destruction, gross violations of human rights and of human dignity*. Unfortunately, there will be even worse effects on future generations and the eco-system supporting life on our Planet if they are not successfully dealt with. Several of the basic overall psychological characteristics required for a successful effort have been briefly described in this chapter, and a more extensive discussion is presented in Chap. 10. It is my hope that many social scientists and educators will want to focus their efforts on developing the knowledge and skills to foster these psychological characteristics as widely as possible among the people of planet Earth.

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Chapter 2

The Prevention of World War III: A Psychological Perspective

2.1 Introduction

I will start with a Jewish proverb and then will come to a Jewish story.¹ First the proverb: an insincere peace is better than a sincere war.²

I believe that there is currently an insincere peace between the super powers. For good reasons, they do not trust each other, and they are justified in doubting the other's peaceful intentions. There may be a few morally righteous extremists who would prefer the simplicity and clarity of a sincere war to an insincere peace, but most of us are prepared to accept the ambiguity and complexity of an insincere peace. We are aware that a sincere war involving the superpowers is likely to end up as a nuclear holocaust in which the survivors might well envy the dead.

It seems unlikely, however, that an insincere, hostile peace will long endure. To put it bluntly, it seems to be driving the governments of the superpowers 'NUTS'; NUTS is an acronym (Nuclear Utilization Target Selection) used by Keeny and Panofsky "to characterize the various doctrines that seek to use nuclear weapons against specific targets in a complex of nuclear war—fighting situations intended to be limited, as well as the management over an extended period of a general nuclear war between the superpowers" (1981–82: 289). It is crazy for the United States and the USSR each to be spending hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons systems with the illusion that it will be possible to 'prevail' over the other side in a nuclear war.

My Jewish story concerns a rabbi who was asked by a married couple to help resolve a dispute. The rabbi, deciding to see each spouse separately, first saw the wife and, after listening to her for some time, commented to her as she was leaving:

¹ This text was first published as: Deutsch (1983). Permission to republish this text was granted by Mr. Brian Collins, Wiley, UK on 8 October 2014.

² Adapted from "Preventing World War III: A Psychological Perspective," *Political Psychology* 3, no. 1 (1983): 3–31. Those who need to be convinced of the disastrous and horrifying consequences of nuclear war should read Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth* (1982).

“You are right.” Then, he saw the husband, heard his side, and, as he was leaving, told him: “You are right.” The rabbi’s wife, who had secretly been listening in the next room, confronted the rabbi and upbraided him: “How could you tell them both that they are right when they disagree so strongly?” The rabbi shrugged and said to his wife: “You are right, too.”

As the rabbi observed to the married couple, so it can be said of the superpowers: each is correct in thinking that the other is hostile, provocative, and dangerous to peace. The relations between them are pathological, and such malignant relations characteristically enmesh the participants in a web of interactions and defensive maneuvers that, instead of improving their situation, make both feel less secure, more vulnerable, and more burdened.

I believe it is important to recognize that the superpowers are involved in a pernicious social process that, given the existence of nuclear weapons, is too dangerous to continue. Perfectly sane and intelligent people, once caught up in such a process, may engage in actions that would seem to them rational and necessary but would be identified by a detached observer as contributing to the perpetuation and intensification of a vicious cycle.

You have seen this happen among married couples or in parent-adolescent relationships: decent, intelligent, rational people trap themselves in a vicious process that leads to outcomes—hostility, estrangement, violence—no one wants.

Therefore, I also believe that this can happen with nations. Sane, decent, intelligent people—leaders of the superpowers—have allowed their nations to become involved in a pathological process that is relentlessly driving them to actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of a nuclear holocaust—an outcome no one wants. As I have indicated, in such a social process both sides are right in believing the other is hostile, malevolent, and intent on harm. The interactions and attitudes provide ample justification for such a belief.

I call such a social process—which is increasingly dangerous and costly and from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-identities or self-esteems—a malignant one.

In what follows, I want to sketch the general characteristics of such a process to indicate how the superpowers seem enmeshed in one and to suggest some ideas for getting out of it.

2.2 Characteristics of the Malignant Social Process

A number of key elements contribute to the development and perpetuation of a malignant process. They include (1) an anarchic social situation, (2) a win-lose or competitive orientation, (3) inner conflicts (within each of the parties) that express themselves through external conflict, (4) cognitive rigidity, (5) misjudgments and misperceptions, (6) unwitting commitments, (7) self-fulfilling prophecies,

(8) vicious escalating spirals, and (9) a gamesmanship orientation that turns the conflict away from issues of what in real life is being won or lost to an abstract conflict over images of power.

Although this discussion centers on the superpowers, my description of the malignant process can, I believe, be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict and many other protracted, destructive conflicts.

2.2.1 The Anarchic Social Situation

There is a kind of situation that does not allow the possibility of rational behavior so long as the conditions for social order or mutual trust do not exist. I believe the current security dilemmas facing the superpowers partially result from their being in such a situation.

A characteristic symptom of such nonrational situations is that an attempt on the part of an individual or nation to increase its own welfare or security without regard to the security or welfare of others is self-defeating.

Consider for example the United States' decision to develop and test the hydrogen bomb in the effort to maintain military superiority over the USSR rather than to work for an agreement to ban testing of the H-bomb, thus preventing a spiraling arms race involving this monstrous weapon (Bundy 1982). This U.S. decision led the Soviet Union to attempt to catch up. Soon both superpowers were stockpiling H-bombs in a nuclear arms race that still continues in different forms.

U.S. leaders believed that if the Soviets had been the first to develop the H-bomb, they would have tested it and sought to reap the advantages of doing so. They were probably right. Both sides are aware of the temptations for each to increase security "by getting ahead." The fear of "falling behind" as well as the temptation to "get ahead" lead to a pattern of interactions that increases insecurity for both sides. Such situations, which are captured by the Prisoners' Dilemma game, have been extensively studied by myself (Deutsch 1958, 1973) and other social scientists (see Alker/Hurwitz 1981, for a comprehensive discussion).

When confronted with such social dilemmas, the only way an individual or nation can avoid being trapped in mutually reinforcing, self-defeating cycles is to attempt to change the situation so a basis of social order or mutual trust can be developed.

Comprehension of the nature of the situation we are in suggests that *mutual security* rather than national security should be our objective. The basic military axiom for both the East and the West should be that only those *military actions that increase the military security of both sides should be taken; military actions that give military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided*. The military forces of both sides should be viewed as having the common primary aim of preventing either side from starting a deliberate or accidental war.

Awareness of this common aim could be implemented by regular meetings of military leaders from East and West, the establishment of a continuing joint

technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament and inspection plans, the establishment of mixed military units on each other's territory, and so on.

The key point we must recognize is that if military inferiority is dangerous, so is military 'superiority'; it is dangerous for either side to feel *tempted* or *frightened* into military action. Neither the United States nor the USSR should want its weapons *or* those of the other side to be vulnerable to a first strike. Similarly, neither side should want the other side to be in a situation where its command, control, and communications systems have become so ineffective that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be in the hands of individual uncontrolled units.

2.2.2 Competitive Orientations

A malignant social process usually begins with a conflict that leads the parties to perceive their differences as the kind that create a situation in which one side will win and the other will lose. There will be a tendency, then, for perpetuation and escalation of the conflict. These are some of the characteristics of a competitive conflict process (see Chap. 5):

1. Communication between the parties is unreliable and impoverished. Either available communication channels and opportunities are not utilized or are used to try to mislead or intimidate. Little confidence is placed in information obtained directly from the other party; espionage and other circuitous means of obtaining information are relied upon. The poor communication enhances the possibility of error and misinformation of the sort likely to reinforce preexisting orientations and expectations. Thus, the ability of one party to notice and respond to shifts away from a win-lose orientation by the other party becomes impaired.
2. The conflict stimulates the view that the solution can only be imposed by one side or the other through superior force, deceptions, or cleverness. The enhancement of one's own and the minimization of the other's power become objectives. The attempt by each party to create or maintain a power difference favorable to its own side tends to expand the scope of the conflict from a focus on the immediate issue to a conflict over the power to impose one's preference upon the other.
3. The competitive conflict leads to a suspicious, hostile attitude that increases sensitivity to differences and threats while minimizing awareness of similarities. This, in turn, makes the usually accepted norms of conduct and morality less applicable. It permits behavior that would be considered outrageous if directed toward someone like oneself. Since neither side is likely to grant moral superiority to the other, the conflict is likely to escalate as one side or the other engages in behavior morally outrageous to the other.

I have written extensively (Deutsch 1969, 1973, 1980, 1982) about the diverse conditions leading people to define a situation with a mixture of cooperative and competitive features as a win-lose or competitive situation rather than as a cooperative one. Much of this can be summarized by what I have termed Deutsch's crude law of social relations: the characteristic processes and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to induce that type of social relation (if introduced into the social relation before its character has been strongly determined).

In terms of competition, my crude hypothesis would indicate that competition induces and is induced by the use of tactics of coercion, threat, or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of awareness of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of the issues in conflict; and so on.

In contrast, cooperation induces and is induced by perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of opposed interests, orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on.

What is the nature of the conflict between the superpowers? Is it inherently a cutthroat, win-lose struggle? Public statements of the leaders of the two nations define the conflict as a confrontation of mutually irreconcilable ideologies, and it is apparent that basic ideological differences do exist. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neither the United States nor the USSR closely resembles its ideological ideal. Neither Karl Marx nor Adam Smith would recognize his offspring.

Let us examine the central notions of each ideology. The key phrase of the American ethos is "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The vision is of the lone, self-reliant, enterprising individual who has escaped from the restraints of an oppressive community so as to be free to pursue his destiny in an environment that offers ever-expanding opportunity to those who are fittest.

The starting point of the communist ethos is the view that the human being is a social animal whose nature is determined by the way people are related to one another in their productive activities in any given community. The vision is of social beings free to cooperate with one another toward common objectives because they jointly own the means of production and share the rewards of their collective labor.

There is no need to detail here how far short of its ideal each system has fallen, nor to describe the many similarities in values and practices that characterize these complex modern industrialized societies. One might even suggest that many—but certainly not all—of the dissimilarities that strike the casual observer are differences that are due to variations in affluence and national character rather than to ideological distinctiveness.

In fact, neither ideology is more than an emphasis, a partial view of the total picture. Each side looks at the elephant from a different vantage point and, of

course, describes it as two different beasts. However, this much can be said about the beast (the relation of individual to society and between individual liberty and social justice): it is a complex animal that has different needs and characteristics at different stages of its development and in different environments. It is a poorly understood beast, and only careful, objective study from all vantage points will give us insight into its care and nurture.

But it is already evident that the beast needs both of its sides to function effectively. It needs individuals who are free to make their personal views and needs known, people who are neither conforming automatons nor slavish followers, and it also needs a community that enables men to recognize their interrelatedness and to cooperate with one another in producing the social conditions that foster the development of creative, responsible people.

I suggest that neither the Marxist ideology nor the American ideology is consistent enough or operational enough to be proved or disproved by empirical test. Nor is either specific enough to be a guide to action in the day-to-day decisions that shape the course of history.

I have stressed the fact that ideologies are vague. Vagueness permits diverse aspirations and changing practices to be accommodated under the same ideological umbrella. There are two important implications to be drawn. First, it is useless to try to refute an ideology. Moreover, since an ideology often serves important integrative functions, the attempt to refute it is likely to elicit defensiveness and hostility. Like old soldiers, ideologies never die; they are best left to fade away. Second, the vagueness of ideologies permits redefinitions of who is 'friend' or 'foe.' There is ample room in the myth systems of both the United States and the Soviet Union (or China) to find a basis of amicable relations.

The resurgence of the cold war has intensified our perception of ideological differences between East and West. Now, however, in light of internal conflicts within both East and West, (the Sino-Soviet break and the trade disagreements among the nations in the Western Alliance are only the more obvious cases), we have an opportunity to revise our images of the nature of the so-called struggle between communism and freedom. We have more basis for recognizing that the ideological dispute is only the manifest rationalization of other less noble motives on both sides.

As Freud pointed out, the manifest life of the mind—what men know or pretend to know and say about the motives for their behavior—is often merely a socially acceptable rationalization of their unrecognized or latent motives. I suggest that the intensity of the ideological struggle has primarily reflected an anachronistic power struggle between two continental superpowers that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leadership. The emergence of a power struggle between the United States and Russia was predicted by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 and by many others long before Russia adopted a communist ideology. It is much easier for Soviet leaders to rationalize an attempt to control and repress the popularly supported Solidarity movement in Poland by thinking of it and calling it a tool of American imperialism than to admit a crude attempt to maintain Soviet domination. Similarly, it is much easier for the United States to rationalize its support for corrupt dictatorial

governments in Latin America, Africa, and Asia in terms of a defense against communism rather than to consider it an attempt to maintain our world power.

As Milburn et al. (1982: 19) point out, there are curious mirror-image aspects in the views of leading Soviet and American analysts. Pipes (1976) and Conquest (1979) on the American side have positions analogous to those of Suslov and Romanov on the Soviet side:

All believe that the leadership of their major adversary is monolithic and that there are essentially no differences among members of the ruling class of their opponents.... Those on the ideological right in both countries argue for the obstinate, stubborn, immutability of their imperialistic opposite number: you just cannot deal with these people; you cannot influence them or produce change in the way they think and act. Negotiation with them is likely to prove a waste of time and, besides, they cannot be trusted. (Milburn et al. 1982: 19).

As I have suggested earlier, both superpowers are correct in thinking that the other side is attempting to increase its relative power, and it is natural that those on each side most caught up in the competitive power struggle come to have views that are mirror images of one another. This is the inevitable result of a competitive power struggle.

Traditionally, the quest for world power has been closely bound to strivings for national security, economic dominance, and international prestige or influence. The quest has commonly taken the form of an attempt to establish military supremacy over major competitors. It is increasingly recognized that the drive for military dominance in the age of missiles and hydrogen bombs is dangerously anachronistic. So too, crude economic imperialism—Western or Eastern style—no longer provides as much opportunity for economic gain as does a concentration upon scientific research and development. However, the quest for international power and influence is a reasonable one for all societies. In a later section, I shall discuss the development of fair rules for competition for power and influence.

2.2.3 Inner Conflicts

Although competition is a necessary condition for malignant conflict, it is not a sufficient one. Malignant conflict persists because internal needs require the competitive process between the conflicting parties.

There are many kinds of internal needs for which a hostile external relationship can be an outlet.

- It may provide an acceptable excuse for internal problems; the problems can be held out as caused by the adversary or by the need to defend against the adversary.
- It may provide a distraction so internal problems appear less salient.
- It can provide an opportunity to express pent-up hostility arising from internal conflict through combat with the external adversary.

- It may enable one to project disapproved aspects of oneself (which are not consciously recognized) onto the adversary and to attack them through attack on the adversary.
- It may permit important parts of one's self—including attitude, skills, and defenses developed during conflictual relations in one's formative stages—to be expressed and valued because the relations with the present adversary resemble earlier conflictual relations; and so on.

When an external conflict serves internal needs, it may be difficult to give it up until other means of satisfying these needs are developed. There is little doubt that the conflict between the superpowers has served important internal functions for the ruling establishments in the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet establishment has been able to justify the continuation of its autocratic form of government, the Russian domination of the other nationalities in the Soviet Union, the control of the nations of Eastern Europe, and the subordination of Communist parties in other countries—all in terms of its struggle against “the dark forces of imperialism.”

The U.S. establishment has been able to justify intervention in other countries (under the guise of support for anticommunism) to promote the interests of American business, support the continuation and growth of the military-industrial complex, rationalize governmental secrecy so that many important decisions are made without the possibility of informed public discussion of the issues, and inhibit the development of significant and sustained political opposition to the policies of the national security establishment.

It seems clear that an external enemy, or ‘devil,’ has served many useful functions for those in power in both the Soviet Union and the United States. However, there is growing recognition by important elements within each superpower that the increasing dangers and costs of the arms race may begin to dwarf the gains from having a superpower as an external devil.

2.2.4 Cognitive Rigidity

Malignant conflict is fostered by cognitive rigidity, which leads to becoming set in positions because of inability to envisage alternatives. An oversimplified black-and-white view of issues in a dispute contributes to the rigidity. So does the high level of tension that may be generated by an intense conflict. The excessive tension leads to a constriction of thought, impairing capability for conceiving of new alternatives and options. To the extent that parties in a conflict rigidly set themselves in their initial positions, they are unable to explore the range of potentially available solutions, among which might be one that satisfies the interests of both sides. In contrast, cognitive openness and flexibility facilitate a creative search for alternatives that may be mutually satisfying, with the initial opposed positions evaporating as new concordant options emerge.

Although the views of knowledgeable American scholars on the Soviet Union may be sophisticated and the same may also be true for Soviet scholars who specialize in American studies, there is little reason to think this is true of the policymakers of the superpowers. They appear to have developed conceptions of the other power that reflect ideological indoctrinations they were exposed to in their earlier years. They have not traveled to the other superpower nor have they had informal contacts with counterparts in the other nation. In short, they have had little opportunity to learn that the other does not neatly fit the rigid stereotypes developed in their younger years. This is an important defect in the experience of the leaders of the superpowers and should be remedied through systematic attempts to cultivate such experiences.

2.2.5 Misjudgments and Misperceptions

Impoverished communication, hostile attitudes, and oversensitivity to differences—typical effects of competition—lead to distorted views that may intensify and perpetuate conflict; other distortions commonly occur in the course of interaction. Elsewhere (Deutsch 1962b, 1965), I have described some of the common sources of misperception in interactional situations. Many of these misperceptions function to transform a conflict into a competitive struggle—even if the conflict did not emerge from a competitive relationship.

Let me illustrate with the implications of a simple psychological principle. The perception of any act is determined by both the perception of the act itself and the context within which it occurs. The context of a social act often is not obvious, whereupon we tend to assume a familiar context—one that seems likely in terms of our own past experience. Since both the present situation and the past experience of actor and perceiver may be rather different, it is not surprising that the two will interpret the same act quite differently. Misunderstandings of this sort are very likely, of course, when actor and perceiver come from different cultural backgrounds and are not fully informed about these differences. A period of rapid social change also makes such misunderstandings widespread as the gap between past and present widens.

Given the fact that the ability to place oneself in another's shoes is notoriously underemployed by and underdeveloped in most people, and also given the impairment of this ability by stress and inadequate information, it is to be expected that certain typical biases will emerge in the perceptions of actions during conflict.

Thus, since most people are more strongly motivated to hold a positive view of themselves than to hold such a view of others, a bias toward perceiving one's own behavior as being the more benevolent and legitimate is not surprising. This is a simple restatement of a well-demonstrated psychological truth, namely, that the evaluation of an act is affected by the evaluation of its source—and the source is part of the context of behavior. Research has shown, for example, that American students are likely to rate more favorably an action of the United States directed

toward the Soviet Union than the same action directed by the Soviet Union toward the United States. We are likely to view American espionage activities in the Soviet Union as more benevolent than similar activities by Soviet agents in the United States.

If each side in a conflict tends to perceive its own motives and behavior as the more benevolent and legitimate, it is evident that the conflict will intensify. If A perceives its actions as a benevolent, legitimate way of interfering with actions that B has no right to engage in, A will be surprised by the intensity of B's hostile response and will have to escalate its counteraction to negate B's response. But how else is B likely to act if it perceives its own actions as well motivated? And how unlikely is it not to respond to A's escalation with counter escalation if it is capable of doing so?

To the extent that there is a biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy, one could also expect that there will be a parallel bias in what is considered to be an equitable agreement for resolving conflict. Should not differential legitimacy be differentially rewarded? The biased perception of what is a fair compromise makes agreement more difficult and thus extends conflict.

Another consequence of the biased perception of benevolence and legitimacy is reflected in the asymmetries between trust and suspicion and between cooperation and competition. Trust, when violated, is more likely to turn into suspicion than negated suspicion is to turn into trust. Similarly, it is easier to move from cooperation to competition than in the other direction.

There are, of course, other types of processes leading to misperceptions and misjudgments (see Jervis 1976, for an excellent discussion). In addition to distortions arising from pressures for self-consistency and dissonance reduction (which are discussed below), intensification of conflict may induce stress and tension beyond a moderate optimal level, and this over-activation, in turn, may lead to an impairment of perceptual and cognitive processes in several ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alternatives; it may reduce the time perspective in such a way as to cause a focus on the immediate rather than the overall consequences of the perceived alternatives; it may polarize thought so that precepts will tend to take on a simplistic black-or-white, for-or-against, good-or-evil cast; it may lead to stereotyped response; it may increase the susceptibility to fear- or hope-inciting rumors; it may increase defensiveness; it may increase the pressures for social conformity.

In effect, excessive tension reduces the intellectual resources available for discovering new ways of coping with a problem or new ideas for resolving a conflict. Intensification of conflict is the likely result, as simplistic thinking and polarization of thought push the participants to view their alternatives as being limited to victory or defeat.

There are three basic ways to reduce the misjudgments and misperceptions that typically occur during the course of conflict. They are not mutually exclusive, and if possible all should be used.

One method entails making explicit the assumptions and evidence that underlie one's perceptions and judgments. Then one would examine how likely these were to have been influenced by any of the common sources of misperception and

misjudgment and how reliable and valid they would be considered by an objective outsider—as in a court of law, for example.

A second method entails bringing in outsiders to see whether their judgments and perceptions of the situation are in agreement or disagreement with one's own. They may have different vantage points, different sources of information, and more objectivity, which would enable them to recognize errors of judgment and misperceptions developing from enmeshment in the conflict. The outsiders should have the independence to ensure that they are free to form their own views and the stature to be able to communicate them so that they will be heard.

When the nature of the conflict is such that the employment of objective outsiders is not feasible, the use of internal devil's advocates has been recommended (George 1972; Janis 1972) as a way of challenging the assumptions and evidence underlying one's perceptions and judgments. Here, too, it is important that the devil's advocates be sufficiently independent and prestigious to present hard challenges to conventional views in a way that cannot be ignored.

Finally, there are agreements that can be made with one's adversary to reduce the chances of malignant misjudgment and misperceptions during conflict. Such agreements could promote continuing informal contacts among international affairs and military specialists on both sides. They could provide for regular feedback of each side's interpretations of the other's communications. They could enable each side to present its viewpoints on television and in the mass media of the other side on a regular basis. They could provide for role-reversal enactments, where each side is required to state the position of the other side to the other side's complete satisfaction before either side advocates its own position (Rapoport 1960).

None of the foregoing procedures would be certain to eliminate all misperceptions and misjudgments during conflict. Yet, in combination, they might substantially reduce them and, in consequence, decrease the risks that conflict would escalate because of poor communication and misunderstandings. As the superpowers increasingly place themselves in the position where their leaders and strategic advisers may feel they must launch their nuclear-tipped missiles within minutes after being informed that the other side has initiated nuclear attack, the importance of not misinterpreting the other's behaviors and intentions is increasingly urgent.

2.2.6 Unwitting Commitments

In a malignant social process, the parties not only become overcommitted to rigid positions, but also become committed, unwittingly, to the beliefs, defenses, and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities. The conflict, then, is maintained and perpetuated by the commitments and investments given rise to by the malignant conflict process itself.

Consider, for example, the belief by leaders of the American government that the Soviet Union would destroy us militarily if it could. This leads to actions, such as intensifying military buildup, which, in turn, produce an increased psychological

commitment to the belief. For example, with a decision to build the MX missile, doubts about the beliefs that support the decision will be reduced in a psychological process of dissonance reduction. Within limits, the more costly the actions you take based on your beliefs, the greater the need to reduce any prior-to-action doubts that you may have had about your beliefs (Festinger 1957). Jervis has an excellent, detailed discussion with many illustrations from international conflict of how the need to reduce cognitive dissonance will “introduce an unintended and unfortunate continuity in policy” (1976: 405).

One of the characteristics of a pathological defense mechanism is that it is perpetuated by its failures rather than by its successes in protecting security. An individual might, for example, attempt to defend himself from feeling like a failure by not really trying, attributing failure to lack of effort rather than lack of ability. The result is that the person does not succeed and does not quell anxieties and doubts about the ability to succeed. As a consequence, when again faced with a situation of being anxious about failing, the individual will resort to the same defense of not trying; it provides temporary relief of anxiety even as it perpetuates the need for the defense, since the individual has cut himself off from the possibility of success.

So too, the defenses that emerge during the course of conflict can perpetuate themselves and the conflict. Thus, suppose the Soviet Union, because it is suspicious of the United States and its intentions toward the Soviet bloc, defends itself by limiting the amount of dissidence that can be expressed in Poland and other Eastern European nations. The repression of dissidence does not permit grievances to be expressed and makes it less likely that the necessary socioeconomic changes to reduce discontent will occur. As a consequence, discontent and dissidence may grow, and there will be a need for the continued use of the defense of repression.

Parties to a conflict, frequently, get committed to perpetuating the conflict by the investments they have made in conducting the conflict. Thus, for example, in explaining his opposition to an American proposal shortly before Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Tojo said that the demand that Japan withdraw its troops from China was unacceptable (as quoted in Jervis 1976: 398):

We sent a large force of one million men (to China) and it has cost us well over 100,000 dead and wounded, (the grief of) their bereaved families, hardships for four years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. We must by all means get satisfactory results from this.

Similarly, there is considerable evidence to suggest that those who have acquired power, profit, prestige, jobs, knowledge, or skills during the course of conflict may feel threatened by the diminution or ending of conflict. Both the Soviet and the U.S. military-industrial complexes have developed vested interests in the cold war; it justifies large military budgets, gives them positions of power and prestige, and makes their skills and knowledge useful. They have good reason to be apprehensive about an “outbreak of peace” that would make them obsolete, deprive them of power and status, and make them lose financially. Under such conditions, it is quite natural to accentuate those perspectives and aspects of reality that justify the continuation of an arms race.

These understandable fears have to be dealt with constructively, or else they may produce defensive adherence to the views that justify a war. I suggest that we must carefully plan to anticipate the psychological difficulties in the transition to a peaceful world; otherwise the resistance to such a transition may be overwhelming.

As a basic strategy to overcome some of these difficulties, I would recommend that we consider a policy of overcompensating those who otherwise might be adversely affected by the change. We want to alter the nature of their psychological investment from military pursuits to peaceful pursuits.

2.2.7 Self-fulfilling Prophecies

Merton, in his classic paper “The Self-fulfilling Prophecy” (1957), has pointed out that distortions are often perpetuated because they may evoke new behavior that makes the originally *false* conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. The prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning.

The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy help to explain individual pathology—for example, the anxious student who, afraid he might fail, worries so much that he cannot study, with the consequence that he does fail. It also contributes to our understanding of social pathology—for example, how prejudice and discrimination against blacks keep them in a position that seems to justify the prejudice and discrimination.

So, too, in international relations. If the policymakers of East and West believe that war is likely and either side attempts to increase its military security vis-a-vis the other, the other side’s response will justify the initial move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of “*folie a deux*,” wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another. As a result, both sides are right to think that the other is provocative, dangerous, and malevolent. Each side, however, is blind to how its own policies and behavior have contributed to the development of the other’s hostility. If each superpower could recognize its own part in maintaining the malignant relations, it could lead to a reduction of mutual recrimination and an increase in mutual problem solving.

2.2.8 Vicious Escalating Spirals

In recent years, a number of social psychologists have concerned themselves with understanding the conditions under which people become entrapped in a self-perpetuating cycle of escalating commitment (Teger 1980; Rubin 1981; Levi 1981).

Decision makers sometimes face the problem of deciding whether to persist in a failing, costly course of action; they must choose between, on the one hand, changing their course of action so as to cut their losses and, on the other hand, continuing to invest in the hope of reaching their goal.

Ariel Levi (1981) has developed a model of the factors affecting decision making when such a dilemma has to be faced. The model implies that the tendency to escalate commitments after failure should be greatest when the decision maker (1) evaluates his losses thus far as very negative, (2) considers that further losses will not make his position much worse than the losses already suffered, and (3) believes that the previous failures do not reduce the chances of success of an increased commitment of resources.

From Levi's model, it can be predicted that decision makers who see themselves as highly accountable to others for their decisions are likely to be cautious before losses have occurred but increasingly ready to take risks as losses increase. Also, since gains or losses are evaluated from a reference point, the greater the losses are perceived to be from this reference point, the greater will be the decision maker's tendency to escalate his commitment. In addition, if the decision maker attributes the previous losses to changeable factors, escalation of commitments is likely.

Levi's model is based, in part, upon Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, which seeks to explain why decision makers systematically violate the basic tenets of rational, economic decision making. One of their basic assumptions is that people undervalue outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtainable with certainty. This certainty effect means that a gambler facing the prospect of a sure loss of a smaller amount if he stops now and an uncertain loss of a larger amount if he continues to gamble is apt to choose to take the risk of increasing his losses.

The superpowers appear to be trapped in an escalating commitment to an arms race that is rapidly increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war. As Arthur M. Cox has pointed out:

Most of the new nuclear weapons will have a capability for a first strike because they can reach their targets with such speed, accuracy and power. When they are deployed, both sides will be on hair-trigger alert, especially at times of political crisis. These weapons will be able to destroy nuclear command, control and communications systems, both human and mechanical. Those systems are vulnerable and subject to error. The United States in 1979 and 1980 had three nuclear-war alerts caused by false alarms from computer error. Fortunately, for this planet, we could survive such false alarms because there was time to ascertain the error before a command to launch was given.

In the future there will not be time.

In June, 1980, Fred C. Ikle, the present Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote an article in the Washington Post entitled "The Growing Risk of War by Accident." He said: "The more we rely on launch on warning (or, for that matter, the more the Soviets do) the greater the risk of accidental nuclear war.... The crux of the matter is that the more important it becomes to launch on warning, the more dangerous it will be. The tightening noose around our neck is the requirement for speed. The more certain one wants to be that our missile forces (or Soviet missile forces) could be launched within minutes and under all circumstances, the more one has to practice the system and to loosen the safeguards" (New York Times, May 27, 1982).

We are progressively tightening the noose around our necks out of the increasing fears that each side is creating by its development of nuclear weapons that have a first-strike capability. The notion that each side must be prepared to "launch on

warning” is the culmination of the escalating, competitive “game of strategy” being played by the superpowers in which each side has initiated moves to improve its strategic position without adequate recognition of how the other would be forced to respond and without positive concern for what would happen to the strategic position of the other.

2.2.9 Gamesmanship

What is so psychologically seductive about nuclear weapons and hypothetical nuclear war scenarios that strategists and decision makers in both superpowers are drawn to them like moths to a flame? There are so many dimensions of power—economic, political, cultural, scientific, sports, educational, and so on—in which the struggle between the superpowers could be played out. What is the special fascination to playing the international power game with nuclear weapons?

I speculate that two key psychological features make the nuclear game a supergame: it has a tremendous emotional kick for those with strong power drives, and it is a very tidy, abstract game.

It has a tremendous emotional kick for several reasons: the stakes are high (the fate of the earth is at risk), decisions have to be made quickly (there is no time for indecisiveness), and the use of nuclear weapons is inherently an aggressive action.

For those with strong power drives, being in a position of nuclear superiority can be seen as a sure way to dominate and control others, whereas being in a position of nuclear inferiority can be seen as a sure way to be dominated and humiliated by others. In the eyes of those driven by power, nuclear weapons are the purest and most concentrated form of power that exists. As Barnett (1972) has pointed out, the national security managers and our governing class are educated and selected in a way that ensures that many will have strong power drives and a conception of human life that leads them to believe that, unless one controls and dominates, one will be controlled and dominated.

In order to be a competent participant in nuclear war games, one must be steel-like and unflinching in resolve not to allow the other side to prevail no matter how catastrophic the consequences. Maccoby (1976) has suggested that the “gamesman” differs from the “jungle fighter.” The latter’s lust for power is passionate and open, and the domination he seeks is personal and concrete. In contrast, the gamesman’s power drive is more depersonalized. His game of power is played coolly, analytically, and with emotional detachment. As Maccoby says:

He is energized to compete not because he wants to build an empire, not for riches, but rather for fame, glory, the exhilaration of running his team and of gaining victories. His main goal is to be known as a winner, and his deepest fear is to be labeled a loser, (p. 100)

Maccoby further describes gamesmen in these terms:

Imaginative gamesmen tend to create a new reality, less limiting than normal, everyday reality. Like many adolescents, they seem to crave a more romantic, fast-paced, semi

fantasy life, and this need puts them in danger of losing touch with reality and of unconsciously lying. The most successful gamesmen keep this need under control and are able to distinguish between the game and reality, but even so, in boring meetings they sometimes imagine that they are really somewhere else—at a briefing for an air-bombing mission, or in a hideout where the detested manager who is speaking is really a Mafia chieftain whom the gamesman will someday rub out.... At their worst moments gamesmen are unrealistic, manipulative, and compulsive workaholics. Their hyped-up activity hides doubt about who they are and where they are going. Their ability to escape allows them to avoid unpleasant realities. When they let down, they are faced with feelings that make them feel powerless. The most compulsive players must be “turned on,” energized by competitive pressures. Deprived of challenge at work, they are bored and slightly depressed. Life is meaningless outside the game, and they tend to sit around watching TV or drinking too much. But once the game is on, once they feel they are in the Super Bowl or one-on-one against another star, they come to life, think hard, and are cool. (pp. 108–109)

The abstract character of nuclear war scenarios appeals to the talented, imaginative gamesmen, who are the leading strategic analysts in the national security establishments of the United States and the USSR. The game is exciting and competitive, calling for the use of inventive thought, cool, analytic ability, and emotional toughness. It has little of the messiness of war games involving real soldiers, battlefield commanders, rain, mud, and pestilence. It is basically an abstract, impersonal, computerized game, involving nuclear weapons with strategists on each side trying to outsmart the other.

To play the game, each side has to make assumptions about how its own weapons (and its command, control, and communications systems) will operate in various hypothetical future nuclear war scenarios, as well as how the other side's will operate. There is, of course, very little basis in actual experience for making accurate, reliable, or valid assumptions about these matters, since none of these weapons or systems has been tested or employed in circumstances even remotely resembling the situation of any imaginable nuclear war.

However, for the nuclear game to be played and for scenarios to be developed, assumptions about these matters have to be made. Once these assumptions have been made and have, by consensus, been accepted within one side's strategic group, they become psychologically 'real' and are treated as "hard facts" no matter how dubious their grounding in actual realities.

These "psychological realities" and dubious "hard facts" are then used as a basis for further decisions in the strategic game of preparing for the eventuality of nuclear war. The decisions may entail potential expenditures of hundreds of billions of dollars for new nuclear weapons—as, for instance, on the MX missile and the B-1 bomber—which will require the strategic gamesmen on the other side to respond (also based on their "psychological realities" and dubious "hard facts") in a way that will prevent them from 'losing' the nuclear war game.

This alluring, involving, imaginative game is played in an abstracted, unreal world in which the real costs of playing (extravagant damage being done to the economic systems of the superpowers and the world) and the real horrors of nuclear war are not faced. There is a continuing need to make these costs and horrors "psychologically real" to the people and decision makers of the superpowers as well

as a continuing necessity to challenge the dubious “hard facts” underlying the “psychological realities” of the strategic gamesmen on both sides.

Let me summarize my presentation so far. I believe the United States and the Soviet Union are entrapped in a malignant social process giving rise to a web of interactions and defensive maneuvers, which, instead of improving their situations, make them both feel less secure, more vulnerable, more burdened, and a threat to each other and to the world at large. This malignant social process is fostered and maintained by anachronistic competition for world leadership; security dilemmas created for both superpowers by competitive orientations and the lack of a strong world community; cognitive rigidities arising from archaic, oversimplified, black-and-white, mutually antagonistic ideologies; misperceptions, unwitting commitments, self-fulfilling prophecies, and vicious escalating spirals that typically arise during the course of competitive conflict; gamesmanship orientations to security dilemmas, which turn a conflict from what in real life is being won or lost to an abstract conflict over images of power in which nuclear missiles become the pawns for enacting the game of power; and by internal problems and conflicts within each of the superpowers that can be managed more easily because of external conflicts.

2.3 Reducing the Danger

What can be done to reverse this malignant social process? How can we begin to reduce the dangers resulting from the military gamesmanship and security dilemmas of the superpowers? Let me turn to the latter question first.

I shall outline a number of proposals, none original. They are based upon what I consider to be common sense rather than specialized knowledge of military affairs or international relations, although I have informed myself as best I could in these areas. These matters are too important to be considered only by specialists.

1. “The truly revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons as instruments of war” (Keeny and Panofsky 1981–82: 287) suggests that the United States and the USSR should quickly come to an agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons and should, as part of this accord, jointly agree to punitive actions to deter any other nation’s first use of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement between the superpowers should be presented to the United Nations for discussion and ratification.

The United States and the nations in Western Europe appear to be concerned, however, that a no-first-use agreement would place their nonnuclear military forces at a disadvantage in case the military forces of the Soviet bloc were to attack Western Europe (although there is considerable dispute among ‘experts’ as to whether this is the case). Thus, the no-first-use agreement should be preceded by a nonaggression pact between the Soviet bloc and NATO nations (including France) and should come into effect only after five years during

which time unilateral or bilateral changes could be made to bring the opposing conventional military forces into balance.

Almost all experts appear to agree that a limited nuclear war involving the superpowers is very likely to turn into an all-out nuclear war (for example, Bundy et al. 1982). Hence, it is imperative to establish strong barriers against the use of any nuclear weapons by the superpowers. But the Western powers seem reluctant to agree on no first use because of the ‘superiority’ of the conventional forces of the Soviet bloc. A five year period to right the balance of conventional forces either by increasing the strength of the Western forces or by decreasing the military forces of the Soviet bloc, or both, should be sufficient, especially if it is buttressed by a nonaggression pact. Western Europe has more material and population resources than the Soviet bloc. There is no reason why it should feel unable to defend itself against a conventional attack.

As a matter of highest priority, we should not continue to dillydally about a no-first-use agreement. It not only could deter use of nuclear weapons by nations in the second and third worlds but also could pave the way for a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled by the superpowers.

2. Immediately following the signing of a no-first-use agreement, representatives from NATO and the Soviet bloc should meet continuously to seek verifiable agreements that would (a) eliminate all short-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles including all missiles in Western Europe and all missiles in the Soviet bloc that could not reach the United States; (b) reduce conventional armaments in the Soviet bloc and the NATO bloc, particularly those weapons that have little value for defense, and reduce the possibility of surprise attack; (c) create a demilitarized zone in Central Europe that would separate the military forces of the Soviet bloc and NATO by a militarily significant amount of space.
3. The United States and the USSR should each unilaterally and through agreement seek to increase the stability of nuclear deterrence by removing those nuclear weapons from their arsenals that are vulnerable to a first strike, by renouncing use of “launch on warning,” and by agreeing to a verifiable freeze on further deployment, research, development, and testing of nuclear weapons. After the freeze, a verifiable reduction to a small number of strategic weapons on each side should take place; the total of both sides should be significantly less than the number that could trigger a “nuclear winter” if the weapons were used.
4. The United States and the USSR should establish joint working groups that would collaborate (a) to reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war or war due to misunderstanding, and (b) to foster the development of effective defenses against nuclear weapons. Both sides should want to tip the nuclear balance strongly toward defense. This can only be done through cooperative scientific and technological work on defense (so that one side does not acquire the possibility of a successful defense against the other’s nuclear weapons while the other remains vulnerable to an attack) and a drastic elimination of weapons (so that an effective defense becomes feasible). As the nuclear balance shifts strongly toward defense, it should be possible to move toward nuclear disarmament.

5. Since the Middle East is so volatile, the United States should seek to become independent of oil supplied from the Middle East as rapidly as possible. The development of alternative sources of energy—shale oil, coal, solar power, geothermal, and so forth—should be fostered by governmental policy. The United States should not be in the position of having to intervene militarily in the Middle East in order to preserve a supply of energy for itself or its allies.

A bold and courageous American leadership would take a risk for peace.

It would announce its determination to end the crazy arms race. It would offer to agree to a package of no first use of nuclear weapons, a nonaggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, and a substantial reduction and equalization of the opposing conventional forces in Europe.

At the same time, the United States would initiate a “Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction” (GRIT) process (Osgood 1959, 1962). We would state our determination to end the nuclear arms race and would announce an across-the-board unilateral reduction of, for example, 10 % of our existing nuclear weapons, inviting the USSR and other nations to verify that so many nuclear weapons in each category were being destroyed. We would request the USSR to reciprocate in a similar fashion.

I believe our superfluity of nuclear weapons is such that we could afford to make several rounds of unilateral cuts, even if the Soviets did not initially reciprocate, without losing our capacity to retaliate against any nuclear attack so that destruction of the Soviet society would still be assured. Such repeated unilateral initiations, if sincere in intent and execution, would place the Soviet Union under the strongest pressure to reciprocate. We could replace the arms race with a peace race.

2.4 Undoing the Malignant Social Process

Although some of the dangers of living in a mad nuclear world can be controlled by arms control and disarmament agreements, the reality is that we cannot put the genie back into the bottle; the possibility of making hydrogen bombs, nuclear missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction will continue to exist—*forever*. This is why we must seek to remove the malignancy from relations between the superpowers and develop sufficiently cooperative relations among all major powers to make a major war unlikely.

Great Britain and France both possess hydrogen bombs and missiles, and we in the United States are not unduly disturbed by this reality because our relations with these countries are sufficiently cooperative. Also, there are many more nuclear missiles in the western part of the United States than in the eastern part; nevertheless, as an easterner, I am not anxious about this disparity. We are part of one nation and the weapons are not controlled by individual states but by a government representing all states, and there appears to be little likelihood of another Civil War.

How do we undo the malignant social process in which the superpowers are enmeshed? The first step is to heighten everyone’s consciousness of how crazy the

process is and to make people aware of both its very real dangers and enormous economic costs. The people of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world should be encouraged to recognize the craziness of the process and to denounce it as unacceptably dangerous and costly to humanity. It is difficult to induce a therapeutic change in a pathological process until the pathology is recognized as such and seen to be unacceptably harmful.

The second step is to focus on the underlying dynamics that foster and maintain the pathology. In my earlier description of the key features of a malignant social process, I sketched the dynamics in general terms. Here, I want to highlight two features that are central to the pathological relations between the superpowers: the security dilemma and their competitive orientations.

The security dilemma stems from the development of nuclear weapons that have made the world a more uncertain, dangerous, and anxious place and have revolutionized the nature of war. They have outmoded the concepts of “military victory,” “military supremacy,” and “nuclear superiority” as pertinent to the relations between the superpowers and made the anachronistic pursuit of such goals endangering to self as well as to others.

The danger and resulting anxiety push policymakers in the superpowers to use what has been a good defense against danger and anxiety in the past: increase power vis-a-vis the adversary. But this previously successful defense against insecurity now does the opposite: it increases insecurity. Overcoming this underlying pathological dynamic requires the recognition that the old defense is inappropriate to the new, revolutionary situation caused by nuclear weapons.

As I have indicated earlier, the old notion of “national security” must be replaced by the new notion of “mutual security” if the superpowers are to break out of this malignant social process. It is difficult to give up old, well-established beliefs even when they have become dysfunctional until the new beliefs have been implemented and seen to work. We must begin to implement the idea of mutual security and give it a chance to work.

As for competitive orientation, it is evident that the superpowers have such an orientation toward their conflicts, and this makes it difficult for them to handle their security dilemma cooperatively and constructively. But must their conflicts for power and prestige be conducted as cut throat affairs or can fair rules for competition be developed? Is it possible to develop a cooperative framework to support adherence to fair rules?

2.5 Fair Rules for Competition

A contest is considered to be fair if the conditions and rules are such that no contestant is systematically advantaged or disadvantaged in relation to other contestants. All have equal rights and opportunities, and all are in the same category—more or less matched in characteristics relevant to the contest’s outcome.

Thus, it is manifestly unfair if the *rules* are such that the international contest permits noncommunist nations to become converted to communism or to join an alliance with the Soviet Union, but do not permit communist nations or allies to be converted to the noncommunist side.

Similarly, rules that would outlaw the establishment of a communist nation in the Western Hemisphere but not give a parallel right to the Soviet Union in its sphere of control hardly would be fair. Rules that put smaller, weaker nations—Cuba or Hungary—in a one-to-one contest with larger, powerful nations are not likely to lead to outcomes that are viewed as legitimate by the smaller nations.

The major international arena for rivalry between the big powers today is made up of the underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The competition for these ‘prizes’ is mixed with arms and military confrontations. The danger of continued armed sparring in such places as Cuba, South Vietnam, Angola, and the Middle East is that misjudgment or despair may lead to escalation of armed conflict. We have lived through several close calls. It is time to rely on more than nerve and luck to avert disaster. I suggest that we take the initiative to propose fair rules in the competition for the unaligned countries. As Amitai Etzioni (1962) has pointed out, a set of rules would include such principles as the following:

1. No nonaligned country would be allowed to have military ties with other countries, particularly not with any major power.
2. No foreign troops, bases, or arms would be permitted to remain in or to enter the nonaligned country. Foreign arms would be prohibited to rebels and governments alike in nonaligned countries.
3. United Nations observer forces consisting largely of personnel from non-aligned countries and equipped with the necessary scientific equipment and facilities (flashlights, infrared instruments, helicopters, aerial photographs, lie detectors, and the like) to check the borders, ports, airfields, roads, and railroads would be deployed at the request of any of the major powers or by the secretary general of the United Nations. Costs would be allocated so as to reduce the incentive to create repeated false alarms.
4. A United Nations research and development staff would be established to keep informed about the development of new observational techniques and equipment.
5. Violations of the arms embargo—once certified as such by an appropriate U.N. tribunal—would set in motion a cease-and-desist order aimed at the sender of arms or troops and a disarm order aimed at the receiver. Obedience to these orders would be checked by the U.N. observer force. Lack of compliance would result in sanctions appropriate to the nature of the violations—for example, trade and communications embargo, blockade, sending of armed forces into the nonaligned country.

Suppose such rules could be established: what effects might be expected? Clearly, the revolutionary ferment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America would not disappear, nor would communist governments be unlikely to take power in some

countries. These rules would not have prevented Castro from overthrowing Batista in Cuba. However, I suggest that the critical issue is not whether local communists or their sympathizers can achieve power in a given country without external military aid but rather whether, after achieving power, they retain it because of foreign military aid and whether they become a base for military aid to communists in other countries.

Let us look at the issue of communism and the underdeveloped countries more directly. I suggest that a communist government in an underdeveloped country presents no threat to us so long as it remains militarily unaligned. Such a government may be a tragedy to its people, but we would be fulfilling our moral responsibility if we were to develop and enforce rules that could prevent outside military aid from foreclosing the possibility that the people will overthrow a government that is obnoxious to them. A communist government that stays in power with the acquiescence of its people may be distasteful to us, and we may not want to help it stay in power, particularly if it is a terrorist government. But we can hardly claim the right to obliterate it. We do not intervene against such right-wing terrorist governments as those in Haiti, Paraguay, and Guatemala.

The underdeveloped countries face incredibly difficult problems. The revolution of rising expectations has created aspirations that cannot be fulfilled in the foreseeable future without massive aid from the richer nations. Even with massive aid, it will be a long and slow process before most underdeveloped countries reach an economic, educational, and technological level that will put them within reach of standards of living found in modern industrialized nations.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to give massive economic aid to many underdeveloped communist nations. They cannot support many Cubas. Although we can afford to give much more aid than the Soviet Union and, in fact, much more than we do, our own capacities are not limitless. In both cases, capacities could be considerably enhanced, as would those of recipients, if we could agree to keep arms and armed forces outside the reach of underdeveloped areas. Too much of present assistance is in the form of military aid, and too much of the production of underdeveloped countries is being channeled into military expenditure.

How would the United States make out in a competition for the free vote of the underdeveloped countries of the world? Would we do better than the Soviet Union, Communist China, France? I do not know, but if we cannot do well in a free competition, perhaps we might consider the possibility that something is wrong with us and revise many of our conceptions and ways of relating to other nations.

We start off with many advantages. We have unsurpassed and even unused resources to draw upon. We can turn out more food and more material goods than any other nation. We have a democratic tradition and the reputation of being the land of opportunity. The names of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt are revered almost universally.

We also start out with disadvantages. We have identified ourselves with the status quo, with governments that are unwilling to institute economic and political reforms necessary to make them responsive to popular aspirations. Also, populations of most underdeveloped countries are nonwhite, and unfortunately, we have

not yet overcome the pervasive practices of racial discrimination and segregation in our country. We are making progress, but the progress is slow. It seems evident that, unless we can achieve much more rapid and substantial progress in eliminating racism at home, these barriers will obstruct us abroad.

It also seems apparent that if we are going to be effective in the underdeveloped countries, our aid has to be directed toward those governments that are attempting to increase national productivity and improve the lot of their populations. Aid to governments that are ineffective or to tyrannical rulers will not help the position of the United States in the international competition for prestige and influence. Too often our aid has gone to just such countries. Would not our position in Latin America be somewhat better than it is now if Trujillo's accomplices, Stroessner's henchmen, and Batista's militia had not been armed with guns supplied by us?

The proposal I have made for the military neutralization of the underdeveloped countries has many technical problems that I have ignored; for example, the nature and composition of observer forces, the composition and functioning of the tribunal, the kinds of sanctions that might produce effective compliance. I assume that the major technical problems center about the need to reduce the likelihood that the rules can be violated to give any side an insuperable advantage. Without going into this issue in detail, I think it can be seen that any given violation is not likely to have catastrophic consequences for the military security of the superpowers. And even if an underdeveloped country is subverted or taken over as a result of violations, this is hardly likely to be disastrous. Moreover, violations are hardly likely to be undetected; they are apt to become evident before they substantially threaten security.

In other words, an agreement on fair rules for competition does not require a great deal of trust. However, it does require governments peddling arms to other countries to give up this form of trade. Currently, the arms business amounts to about \$25–35 billion a year, of which NATO countries originate somewhere over 50 % of the export volume and the Warsaw Pact countries about 40 % (Sivard 1981). It is a very profitable trade. So is dope peddling. The Western bloc and the Soviet bloc should agree to end arms peddling; it is an even more destructive form of trade than drug peddling.

2.6 Developing a Cooperative Framework

Acceptance of fair rules for competition means an abandonment of cutthroat rivalry. It implies a change in one's conception of the adversary from an enemy to a fellow contestant. Then the conflict changes character. The rules, which limit forms of conflict, bind the contestants together in terms of common interest. However, common interest in the rules is not, by itself, likely to prevail against the debilitating effects of inevitable misunderstandings and disputes associated with any rule system. The tie between the contestants must be strengthened by enhancing their community or cooperative interests.

How can this be done? The key to development of cooperation can be stated very simply. It is *the provision of repeated and varied opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions*. In relation to the Soviet Union, we have done some of this but obviously not enough.

Our reluctance to trade with the Soviets and our unsuccessful attempts to get our allies to limit trade with them indicate an underlying view that hampers attempts to strengthen cooperative bonds: the view that anything that helps them hurts us. Clearly, it helps them if their control over their nuclear missiles is such as to prevent accidental firings. But does this harm us? Clearly, it helps them if their children have available the Sabin polio vaccine. But does this harm us?

George F. Kennan in 1964 stated something that seems just as pertinent today (especially with the prospective change in Soviet leadership):

*It is not too much to say that the entire [Communist] bloc is caught today in a great crisis of indecision over the basic question of the proper attitude of a Communist country toward non-Communist ones. The question is whether to think of the world in terms of an irrec-
oncilable and deadly struggle between all that calls itself Communist and all that does not, a struggle bound to end in the relatively near future with the total destruction of one or both, or to recognize that the world socialist cause can be advanced by more complicated, more gradual, less dramatic, and less immediate forms, not necessitating any effort to destroy all that is not Communist within our time, and even permitting in the meanwhile reasonably extensive and profitable and durable relations with individual non-Communist countries. (1964: 13–14)*

None of us will fail to note that a parallel question tortures public opinion and governments in the West. There can be little doubt that our answer to the question of whether communist and noncommunist countries can exist together peacefully will be an important influence in determining how the communists answer it. If we continue to maintain the quixotic notion that the communist governments of Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, and, for that matter, the Soviet Union are likely to disappear in some violent internal convulsion, will we influence them to choose the less belligerent answer? Or will they be better influenced by a policy that accepts the reality of the communist governments and adopts the view that we are willing to participate in any and all forms of mutually beneficial interactions, including normal diplomatic contacts, cultural and scientific exchanges, trade, and so on.

Which policy provides a more promising prospect of a relaxation of the severity of the communist regimes and a weakening of the barriers that separate their peoples from contact with the outside world? Which policy is more likely to promote the growing individualism and diversity among the communist nations? The answers are obvious. Yet so many seem frightened by the idea of cooperation with the communists; the very phrase sounds subversive.

Many equate appeasement with cooperation. They seem to feel that the only credible stance toward someone who might have hostile intentions is a self-righteous, belligerent counter hostility. There is, of course, an alternative stance: one of firmness and friendliness. It *is* possible to communicate both a firm, unwavering resolve not to allow oneself to be abused, intimidated, or made defenseless *and* a

willingness to get along peacefully and to cooperate for mutual benefit. In other words, willingness to cooperate does not imply willingness to be abused.

Firmness in contrast to belligerence is not provocative, and thus, while aborting development of vicious spirals, it does not abort development of cooperation. It is, of course, difficult to resist the temptation to respond with belligerence to the belligerent provocations of some communist nations. It requires a good deal of self-confidence to feel no need to demonstrate that one is “man enough” to be tough or that one is not ‘chicken.’ It is just this kind of firm, nonbelligerent, self-confident, friendly attitude that appears to be most effective in reforming aggressive delinquents and that our research (Deutsch 1973) suggests is most effective in inducing cooperation.

Can we adopt such an attitude? Our defensiveness is rather high, suggesting that we do not feel confident of ourselves. Our defensiveness comes from two sources. First, we have too high a level of aspiration. Throughout most of our history, we have been in the uniquely fortunate position of having had pretty much our own way in foreign affairs. Initially, this was due to our powerful isolated position in the Americas. Since World War II we have been, moreover, the leading world power. We face a loss of status. It seems evident that we cannot remain in our former unique position. We can no longer be isolated from the physical danger of a major war, nor can we remain the only powerful nation. We have to adjust our aspirations to changing realities or suffer constant frustration.

The second root of our national defensiveness is lack of confidence in our ability to maintain ourselves as a thriving, attractive society that can cope effectively with its own internal problems. The fact is that we have not been coping well with economic growth, unemployment, civil rights, the education of our children, the rebuilding of our cities, and the care of our aged.

Conflict is more likely to take the form of lively controversy rather than deadly quarrel when the disputants respect themselves as well as each other. The process of reforming another, of inducing an opponent to adhere to fair rules of competition, often requires self-reform. The achievement of a sincere peace will require a sincere, sustained effort by both sides.

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Chapter 3

A Psychological Basis for Peace

3.1 Introduction

I shall assume the truth of the following propositions¹:

1. A large-scale nuclear war would achieve a result that no sane man could desire.
2. When a small war occurs, there is a risk that it may turn into a large war; this risk would be considerably increased by the use of nuclear weapons. In the course of many small wars, the probability of a great war would become almost a certainty.
3. The knowledge and capacity to make nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction cannot be destroyed; they will exist as long as mankind exists.
4. Any war in which a nuclear power is faced with the possibility of major defeat or a despairing outcome is likely to turn into a large-scale nuclear war even if nuclear disarmament has previously occurred.
5. A hostile peace will not long endure.

From these propositions it follows that, if mankind is to avoid utter disaster, we must see to it that irrational men are not in a position to initiate nuclear war, we must find alternatives to war for resolving international conflicts, and we must develop the conditions which will lead conflicting nations to select one or another of these alternatives rather than resort to war.

My discussion in this paper centers primarily on the question: How do we take the hostility out of a hostile peace? This question proliferates into other related questions: How do we prevent the misperceptions and misunderstandings in international relations, which foster and perpetuate hostility? How do we move from a delicately 'balanced' peace of mutual terror to a sturdy peace of mutual trust?

¹ This text was first published by Morton (1962). Simon and Schuster no longer holds the rights to this title as they reverted back to the author some time ago. The views expressed in this paper do not represent, nor are they necessarily similar to, the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.

How do we move in the direction of a world community in which law, institutions, obligations, and simple human decencies will enable mankind to enjoy a more amiable life? These are the central questions which must be answered if the world is to avoid disaster. The world will never again be in a position where it cannot destroy itself.

It is well for me to emphasize that opposition to war as a means of conflict resolution does *not* connote an opposition to controversy among nations. Controversy is as desirable as it is inevitable. It prevents stagnation, it is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at; it is the heart of social change. Our objective is not to create a world in which controversy is suppressed but rather a world, in which controversy is civilized, is lively rather than deadly.

I do not pretend to have answers to the difficult questions I have raised. I raise them because I have something relevant to say and because I believe it is important to confront the fundamental questions. Too often we are distracted from them by short-run urgencies. You may well ask what a psychologist can say that is relevant. A wide reading, however, of acknowledged authorities in the study of war and international relations has convinced me that the dominant conceptions of international relations are psychological in nature. Such psychological concepts as 'perception,' 'intention,' 'value,' 'hostility,' 'confidence,' 'trust,' and 'suspicion' recur repeatedly in discussions of war and peace.²

I wish to make it clear that what I have to say in this paper is *not* based upon well-established, scientifically verified, psychological knowledge. As psychologists, we have only meager, fragmentary knowledge of how to prevent or overcome distortions in social perceptions; of how to move from a situation of mutual suspicion to a situation of mutual trust; of how to establish cooperative relationships despite intense competitive orientations; of how to prevent bargaining deadlocks. I take it for granted that we need more and better research before we may claim to speak authoritatively on these matters. However, my intent here is not to outline the research which is needed, but rather to discuss these urgent matters as well as I can.

3.2 Is War Inevitable?

Is it possible that war is inevitable, that the psychological nature of man is such that war is an indispensable outlet for his destructive urges? True, there have been wars throughout human history men have found outlets for psychological drives of all

² Perhaps there has been too much psychologizing about these matters; there are, after all, critical differences between persons and nations. Not the least of these is the fact that in a deadly quarrel between people it is the quarrellers who are most apt to be killed, while in a deadly quarrel among nations, the decision-makers are rarely the ones who have the highest probability of dying. Be that as it may, I shall assume that there is some merit in viewing nations, like persons, as behaving units in an environment, and in conceiving of international relations in terms somewhat analogous to those of interpersonal relations.

kinds in sadistic, masochistic, creative, heroic, altruistic, adventurous, on. Yet, as Jerome Frank³ has pointed out, the historical prevalence of a behavior pattern is not proof of its inevitability. Human sacrifice in religious rites, slavery, sorcery, and certain forms of child labor have largely disappeared in modern industrialized nations, although such practices have existed throughout human history.

William James recognized that war and the military spirit produced certain virtues which are necessary to the survival of any society. However, he went on to point out that militarism and war are not the only means for achieving the virtues of self-discipline and social cohesiveness, that it is possible to find alternative means for achieving the same psychological ends.⁴ (It is of interest to note that James's suggestion for a moral equivalent to war was a "Peace Corps" of youth enlisted in an army against *Nature*.) The view that alternative means for satisfying psychological motives can always be found is, of course, a basic concept in modern psychology. Egon Brunswick went so far as to elevate "vicarious functioning" (i.e., the equivalence and mutual intersubstitutability of different behaviors in relation to goal achievement) to the defining criterion of the subject matter of psychology.⁵

Man's make-up may always contain the psychological characteristics which have found an outlet in militarism and war. There is no reason, however, to doubt that these characteristics can find satisfactory outlets in peaceful pursuits. Aggressiveness, adventurousness, idealism, and bravery will take a peaceful or destructive outlet depending upon the social, cultural, and political conditioning of the individual and upon the behavioral possibilities which exist within his social environment. Some may assert that war provides a more natural, spontaneous, or direct outlet for hostility and aggressiveness than any peaceful alternatives. Such an assertion is based upon a fundamental misconception of war. War is a highly complex, organized social activity in which personal outlets for aggression and hostility are primarily vicarious, symbolic, indirect, and infrequent for most of the participants. This is especially true for the highly mechanized warfare of modern times which largely eliminates the direct physical contact between the aggressor and his victim.⁶ Moreover, it is evident that no matter what his psychological make-up, an individual per se cannot make war. War-making requires the existence of complex social institutions necessary to organize and maintain a "war machine." This is not to say that a war machine cannot be activated by the decisions of strategically placed individuals. Obviously, one of the great dangers of our era is that a small group of men have the power to create a nuclear holocaust. Even a

³ See pp. xxx-xxx of the present volume.

⁴ See James (1911).

⁵ See Brunswick (1952).

⁶ War is vastly overrated as an outlet for direct aggressiveness; it does not compare with the directness of reckless automobile driving, boxing match, or a football game. War is defined to be such a good outlet *only* because of our cultural conditioning: the military toys, children are given to play with; the identification of heroism and bravery with war in so many novels, television dramas, and films that we all are exposed to; the definition of patriotism in military tchH I in so many of our public ceremonials and holidays, and so forth.

strategically placed individual can activate a war machine only if it exists; the mass of people, not being strategically placed, cannot directly activate a war no matter what their psychological predispositions. It is relevant to note here that research by T. Abel⁷ indicates that warlike attitudes in the populace tend to follow rather than precede the outbreak of war.

The impersonal character of modern war, as Erich Fromm has pointed out,⁸ makes it difficult for an individual to comprehend fully the meaning of his actions as he kills. It is easier for most people to kill faceless symbols of human beings at a distance than to kill people with their bare hands. The psychological danger of modern, impersonal war is not that it is a good outlet for aggression but rather, to the contrary, that it does not permit the button-pusher to appreciate fully the destructive nature of his actions. Were he to do so, his destructive actions might be inhibited rather than encouraged.

3.3 Misperceptions Which Lead to War

Neither war nor peace is psychologically inevitable. Exaggeration of the inevitability of war contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy; it makes war more likely. Exaggeration of the inevitability of peace does not stimulate the intense effort necessary to create the conditions for a durable peace, for a stable peace has to be invented and constructed. There is nothing inevitable about it.

A fundamental theorem of the psychological and social sciences is that man's behavior is determined by the world he perceives. Perception is not, however, always veridical to the world which is being perceived. There are a number of reasons why perceptions may be distorted. I would like to consider five common causes of misperception, to illustrate the operation of each in international relations, and to indicate how these misperceptions can be counteracted or prevented.

1. *The perception of any act is determined both by our perception of the act itself and by our perception of the context in which the act occurs.* The contexts of social acts are often not immediately given in perception and often they are not obvious. When the context is not obvious, we tend to assume a familiar context—i.e., a context which is the most likely in terms of our own experience. Since both the present situations and past experiences of the actor and the perceiver may be rather different, it is not surprising that they will supply different contexts and interpret the same act quite differently. Misunderstandings of this sort, of course, are very likely when the actor and the perceiver come from rather different cultural backgrounds and are not fully aware of these differences. The stock conversation of returning tourists consists of amusing or embarrassing anecdotes based upon misunderstandings of this sort.

⁷ Abel is cited in Bernard (1957).

⁸ See pp. xxx–xxx of the present volume.

Urie Bronfenbrenner's first-hand observations⁹ lead him to conclude that the Soviets and Americans have a similar view of one another; each says more or less the same things about the other. For example, each states: "*They* are the aggressors"; "*their* government exploits and deludes the people"; "the mass of *their* people is not really sympathetic to the regime"; "*they* cannot be trusted"; "*their* policy verges on madness"; etc.

It is my contention that mutual distortions such as those described above arise, in part, because of an inadequate understanding of the other's context. Take, for instance, the Soviet Union's reluctance to conclude any disarmament agreement which contains adequate provisions for international inspection and control. We view this as a device to prevent an agreement or to subvert any agreement on disarmament which might be worked out. However, as Joseph Noguee has pointed out:

Under present circumstances, any international control group reflecting the realities of political power would inevitably include a majority of non-Communist nations. Decisions involving actual and potential interests vital to the USSR would have to be made continuously by a control board the majority of whose members would represent social and economic systems the USSR considers inherently hostile. Any conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved by representatives of governments, and it is assumed that on all major decisions the capitalist nations would vote as a bloc... Thus, for the Soviet Union, representation on a control board along the lines proposed by the West would be inherently inequitable.¹⁰

I may assert that one can subjectively test the creditability of the Soviet position by imagining our own reactions if the Soviet bloc could consistently outvote us at the United Nations or on an international disarmament control board. Under such conditions, in the present world situation, would we conclude an agreement which did not give us the security of a veto? I doubt it. Similarly, one can test the credibility of the American position by imagining that the Soviet Union had experienced a Pearl Harbor in a recent war and that it had no open access to information concerning the military preparations of the United States. Under such circumstances, in the present world situation, would it be less concerned about inspection and control than we are? I doubt it.

The distorted view that "the mass of their people are not really sympathetic to the regime" is also based upon an inadequate view of each other's total situation. In effect, we ask ourselves if Soviet citizens had the choice between (a) living in Russia if it were like the United States with its high standard of living and its political system of civil liberties, and (b) living in the present-day Soviet Union, which would they choose? We think the answer is obvious, but isn't it clear that the question is wrong? The relevant comparison for them is between their past and their present or future: their present and future is undoubtedly vastly superior to their past. Similarly, the Soviet view is that a comparison of (a) Soviet society with its

⁹ See Bronfenbrenner (1961).

¹⁰ Noguee (1960).

full employment and expanding economy with (b) capitalism in a permanent depression crisis would favor the Soviet Union. Perhaps it would, but is this the relevant comparison?

How can we prevent and overcome distortions and misunderstandings of this sort? Obviously, more communication, a great increase in interchanges of scholars, artists, politicians, tourists, and the like might be helpful. However, I think we should take cognizance of the findings of the vast body of research on intergroup contact: casual contact of limited duration is more likely to support deeply-rooted distortions than remove them. To have any important effect, contact must be prolonged, functional, and intimate.

I suggest that the most important principle to follow in international communication on issues where there is controversy is one suggested by Anatol Rapoport.¹¹ He advocates that each side be required to state the position of the other side to the other side's complete satisfaction before either side advocates its own position. Certainly the procedure would not eliminate all conflict but it would eliminate those conflicts based upon misunderstanding. It forces one to place the other's action in a context which is acceptable to the other and, as a consequence, prevents one from arbitrarily rejecting the other's position as unreasonable or badly motivated. This is the strategy followed by the good psychotherapist. By communicating to the patient his full understanding of the patient's behavior and by demonstrating the appropriateness of the patient's assumptions to the patient's behavior and past experiences, he creates the conditions under which the current validity of the patient's assumptions can be examined. The attempt to challenge or change the patient's behavior without mutual understanding of its assumptions usually prods only a defensive adherence to the challenged behavior.

2. *Our perceptions of the external world are often determined indirectly by the information we receive from others rather than our direct experiences.* Human communication, like perception is always selective. The perception of an event is usually less detailed, more abstract, and less complex than the event which is perceived; the communication about an event is also likely to be less detailed and less complex than its perception. The more human links in the communication of information about any event, the more simplified and distorted will be the representation of the event. Distortion in communication tends to take characteristic forms: on the one hand, there is a tendency to accentuate the unusual, bizarre, controversial, deviant, violent, and unexpected; on the other hand, there is a tendency for communicators who are communicating to their superiors to communicate only that information which fits the preconceptions of their superiors.

If we examine our sources of information about international affairs, we see that they are particularly vulnerable to distorting influences. There are only a small number of American reporters in any country; they do not necessarily work

¹¹ See pp. xxx-xxx of the present volume.

independently of one another. They are under subtle pressure to report items which will catch the reader's interest and conform to their publisher's viewpoint. In a period of hostility between nations, these conditions are not conducive to getting a clear understanding of how events are perceived by the other side.

I suggest that we should recognize the dangers inherent in not perceiving the other side's point of view on a continuing basis. Recognizing these dangers, shouldn't we offer to make arrangements with the Soviet Union whereby we would each be enabled to present our own point of view over the other's radio and television and in their leading newspapers? Suppose the Soviet leaders are afraid to participate on a reciprocating basis; should we make the offer anyway? My answer is in the form of a question: do we have anything to lose by understanding their viewpoint as well as we can; wouldn't "truth squads" adequately protect us from deliberate attempts to mislead us?

3. *Our perceptions of the world are often very much influenced by the need to conform to and agree with the perceptions of other people.* Thus, in some communities it would be difficult for an individual to survive if he perceived Negroes as his social equals or if he perceived Communist China as having legitimate grievances against the United States. If he acted upon his perceptions he would be ostracized socially; if he conformed to the perceptions of other people without changing his own perceptions, so that they were similar to those prevalent in his community, he might feel little self-respect.

It is my impression that most social and political scientists, most specialists in international relations, most intellectuals who have thought about it, and many of our political leaders personally favor the admission of Communist China into the United Nations and favor our taking the initiative in attempting to normalize our relations with Communist China. Yet conformity pressures silence most of us who favor such a change in policy. The strength of these conformity pressures in the United States on this issue is so great that it is difficult to think of Communist China or to talk about it in any terms except those which connote absolute, incorrigible evil. I believe this is an extremely dangerous situation, because without a fundamental change in United States-Chinese relations the world may be blown up shortly after China has acquired a stockpile of hydrogen bombs; this may take less than a decade.

How can we break through the veil of conformity and its distorting influences? Asch's insightful studies of conformity pressures point the way. His studies reveal that when the monolithic social front of conformity is broken by even one dissenter, other potential dissenters feel freer to break with the majority.¹² The lesson is clear: those who dissent must express their opinions so that they are heard by others. If they do so, they may find more agreement than they anticipate.

¹² See Asch (1965).

4. *A considerable body of psychological research¹³ indicates that an individual attempts to perceive his environment in such a way that it is consistent with his self-perception.* If an individual feels afraid, he tends to perceive his world as frightening; if he feels hostile, he is likely to see it as frustrating or unjust; if he feels weak and vulnerable, he is apt to see it as exploitative and powerful; if he is tom by self-doubt and self-conflict, he will tend to see it as at odds with him. Not only does an individual tend to see the external world in such a way as to justify his feelings and beliefs but also so as to justify his behavior. If an individual is a heavy smoker, he is apt to perceive cigarette smoking as less injurious to health than does a nonsmoker; if he drives a car and injures a pedestrian, he is likely to blame the pedestrian; if he invests in something (e.g., a munitions industry), he will attempt to justify and protect his investment. Moreover, there is much evidence that an individual tends to perceive the different parts of his world as consistent with one another. Thus, if somebody likes you, you expect him to dislike someone who dislikes you. If somebody disagrees with you, you are likely to expect him to agree with someone else who disagrees with you.

The danger of the pressure for consistency is that it often leads to an oversimplified black-white view of the world. Take, for instance, the notions that since the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are opposed in some respects, we must be opposed to or suspicious of anything that the Communists favor and must regard any nation that desires friendly relations with the Soviet Union as opposed to the United States. If the Soviet Union is against colonialism in Africa, must we be for it? If nations in Latin America wish to establish friendly, commercial relations with the Communist nations, must we feel threatened? If Canada helps Communist China by exporting food to it, must we suspect its loyalty to us? Are nations which are not for us necessarily for the Communists? The notions expressed in affirmative answers to these questions are consistent with the view that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union can only be ended by total defeat for one or the other. But is it not possible that the conflict can be resolved so that both sides are better off than they are now? Recognition of this latter possibility may suggest that what benefits the Soviet Union does not necessarily harm us, and that nations with amicable relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union may be an important asset in resolving the cold war before it turns hot.

The pressure for self-consistency often leads to rigid, inflexible positions because it may be difficult to change a position that one has committed oneself to publicly without fear of loss of face. To some extent, I believe this is our situation vis-à-vis the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and with regard to our policies toward Cuba. We are frozen into positions which are unresponsive to changing circumstances because a change in our positions would seem to us to be an admission of mistaken judgment which could lead to a loss of face.

¹³ Much of this research is summarized in various articles in Katz (1960).

What can we do to avoid the “consistency of little minds” and the rigidities of false pride? These dangers to accurate perception are most likely when an individual feels under threat, when his self-esteem is at stake. I think in such circumstances it is prudent to seek the advice and counsel of trusted friends who are not so emotionally involved in the issues. Thus, I think it would be wise to consult with such nations as Canada, France, and Great Britain on our policy toward Cuba and Communist China precisely because they do not have as deep an involvement with these countries as we do. Similarly, consultation with more or less neutral nations such as India, Sweden, Austria, and Nigeria might prevent us from developing an over-simplified view of the nature of our relations with the Soviet Union.

5. Ichheiser has described a mechanism, similar to that of projection, which leads to misunderstandings in human relations: the *mote-beam mechanism*.¹⁴ It consists in perceiving certain characteristics in others which we do not perceive in ourselves. These characteristics are perceived as though they were peculiar traits of the others and, hence, the differences between the others and ourselves are accentuated. Since the traits we are unable or unwilling to recognize in ourselves but are willing to recognize in others are usually traits we consider to be undesirable, the mote-beam mechanism results in a view of the other as peculiarly shameful or evil. Thus, although many of us who live in the North easily recognize the shameful racial discrimination and segregation in the South, we avoid a clear awareness of the pervasive racial discrimination in our own communities.

Similarly, in international relations it is easy to recognize the lack of political liberties in the Soviet Union, their domination of the nations in Eastern Europe, their obstructiveness in the United Nations, etc., but it is difficult for us to recognize similar defects in the United States: e.g., the disenfranchisement of most Negro voters in many states, our domination of Latin America, our unfair treatment of the American Indian, our stubbornness in the United Nations in pretending that the representative from Taiwan is the representative of mainland China. Since the mote-beam mechanism, obviously, works on both sides, there is a tendency for each side to view the other as peculiarly immoral and for the views to mirror one another.

What can be done to make the mote-beam mechanism ineffective? The proposals I have made to counteract the effects of the other type of perceptual distortions are all relevant here. In addition, I would suggest that the mote-beam mechanism breeds on a moral-evaluative approach to behavior, on a readiness to condemn defects rather than to understand the circumstances which produced them. Psychoanalytic work suggests that the capacity to understand rather than to condemn is largely determined by the individual's sense of self-esteem, by his ability to cope with the external problem confronting him, and by his sense of resoluteness in overcoming his own defects. By analogy, I would suggest that we in the United States will have less need to overlook our own shortcomings or to be fascinated

¹⁴ See Ichheiser (1949).

with the defects of others to the extent that we have a thriving society which is resolutely overcoming its own problems of racial prejudice, economic stagnation, and lack of dedication to common public purposes.

While distortions in perception are very common for the reasons I have outlined above, it is also true that in many instances everyday experience provides a corrective to the distortions. When reality is sufficiently compelling, and when the contact with reality occurs with sufficient frequency, the distortions will be challenged and may yield. However, there are circumstances which tend to perpetuate and petrify distortions. Let me briefly describe three major reasons for the perpetuation of distortions:

1. A major psychological investment has been made in the distortion. *As a consequence, the individual may anticipate that giving up the investment will require drastic personal reorganization which might result in personal instability and the loss of social face and might precipitate unknown dangers.*

We have to recognize that a disarmed world, a world without external tensions to justify internal political policies, a world without violence as a means of bringing about changes in the *status quo* would be an unfamiliar world, a world in which some would feel that their vested interests might be destroyed. For example, I am sure that many military men, scientists, industrialists, workers, and investors fear a disarmed world because they anticipate that their skills and knowledge will become obsolete, or they will lose social status, or they will lose financially. These fears have to be dealt with constructively or else they may produce defensive adherence to the views which justify a hostile, armed world. I suggest that we must carefully plan to anticipate the psychological difficulties in the transition to a peaceful, disarmed world. As a basic strategy to overcome some of these difficulties, I would recommend that we consider a policy of *overcompensating* those who might be adversely affected by the change. We want to change the nature of their psychological investment from an investment in military pursuits to one in peaceful pursuits.

2. *Certain distorted perceptions perpetuate themselves because they lead the individual to avoid contact or meaningful communication with the object or person being perceived.* This is especially true when the distortions lead to aversion or hostility toward the object being perceived. Newcomb has used the term "autistic hostility" to label this self-perpetuating process.¹⁵ Autistic hostility in international relations is exemplified in our relations with Communist China. Here, hostile attitudes produce barriers to communication which eliminate the possibility of a change in attitudes. The best antidote would seem to be repeated attempts at communication which followed the rules of procedure suggested by Anatol Rapoport.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Newcomb (1947).

¹⁶ See pp. xxx-xxx of the present volume.

3. Robert Merton has pointed out that distortions are often perpetuated because they may evoke new behavior which makes the originally *false* conception come true.¹⁷ The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. The prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning. The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy help to explain individual pathology—e.g., the anxious student who, afraid he might fail, worries so much that he cannot study, with the consequence that he does fail. It also contributes to our understanding of social pathology—e.g., how prejudice and discrimination against the Negro keeps him in a position which seems to justify the prejudice and discrimination. So too in international relations. If the representatives of East and West believe that war is likely and either side attempts to increase its military security vis-à-vis the other, the other side's response will justify the initial move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of a *folie à deux*, wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another.

3.4 The Conditions for Mutual Trust

In the preceding section, I have attempted to indicate some of the sources of misperception in international relations and some of the conditions which tend to perpetuate the distortions or make them come true. Our present international situation suggests that the distortions have come true. The East and the West are in an arms race and in an ideological conflict in which each side, in reality, threatens and feels threatened by the other. How can we reverse this hostile spiral which is likely to result in mutual annihilation?

As I present some specific proposals, I will indicate the psychological assumptions underlying them, assumptions which come from theoretical and experimental research I have been doing on cooperation and competition, interpersonal trust and suspicion, and interpersonal bargaining.¹⁸

1. *There are social situations which do not allow the possibility of 'rational' behavior so long as the conditions for mutual trust do not exist.* Let me illustrate with a two-person game that I have used in my experimental work on trust and suspicion. In this game, each player has to choose between pressing a red button and a green button: if both players press the red button each loses \$1.00; if both players press the green button, each wins \$1.00; if Player A presses the green button and Player B presses the red button, A loses \$2.00 and B gains \$2.00; and if Player B presses the green button and Player A presses the red button, B loses \$2.00 and A gains \$2.00. A superficial rational calculation of self-interest

¹⁷ See Merton (1957).

¹⁸ See Deutsch (1949a, b, 1958, 1960a, b, 1961), Deutsch/Krauss (1960).

would lead each player to press his red button since he either wins as much as he can or loses as little as he can this way. But if both players consider only their self-interest and press their red buttons, each of them will lose. Players oriented toward defeating the other player or to their self-interest only, when matched with similarly oriented players, do in fact choose the red button and do end up losing consistently.¹⁹

I believe our current international situation is in some respect similar to the game I have described. A characteristic symptom such “nonrational situations” is that any attempt on the part of an individual or nation to increase its own welfare or security without regard to the security or welfare of the others) is self-defeating. In such situations the only way an individual or nation can avoid being trapped in a mutually reinforcing, self-defeating cycle is to attempt to change the situation so that a basis of mutual trust can develop.

Comprehension of the basic nature of the situation we are in suggests that *mutual security* rather than national security should be our objective. The basic military axiom for both the East and West should be that *military actions should only be taken which increase the military security of both sides; military actions which give a military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided*. The military forces of both sides should be viewed as having the *common* primary aim of preventing either side (one’s own or the other) from starting a deliberate or accidental war. Awareness of this common aim could be implemented by such measures as regular meetings of military leaders from East and West, the establishment of a continuing joint technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament and inspection plans, and the establishment of mixed military units on each other’s territory.²⁰ The key point we must recognize is that if military inferiority is dangerous, so is military ‘superiority’; it is dangerous for either side to feel *tempted* or *frightened* into military action.

2. *Our research indicates that mutual trust is most likely to occur when people are positively oriented to each other’s welfare—when each has a stake in the other’s doing well rather than poorly.* Unfortunately, the East and West, at present, appear to have a greater stake in each other’s defects and difficulties than in each other’s welfare. Thus, the Communists gloat over our racial problems and our unemployment and we do likewise over their agricultural failures and their lack of political liberties.

We should, I believe, do everything possible to reverse this unfortunate state of affairs. First of all, we might start by accepting each other’s existence as *legitimate* and by rejecting the view that the existence of the other, per se, is a threat to our own existence. As Talcott Parsons has pointed out,²¹ there is considerable merit in viewing the ideological battle between East and West in the world community as

¹⁹ See Anatol Rapoport’s discussion of games in the present volume, pp. 247–250.

²⁰ See H.C. Kelman’s essay in the present volume, pp. 106–122.

²¹ See pp. xxx–xxx of the present volume.

somewhat akin to our own two-party system at the national level. An ideological conflict presupposes a common frame of reference in terms of which the ideological differences make sense. The ideologies of East and West do share many values in common: technological advance, economic development, universal education, encouragement of science, cultural progress, health advances, peace, national autonomy, and so forth. We must accept the possibility that one side or the other will obtain an advantage on particular issues when there is a conflict about the procedures for attaining these objectives. But this is not catastrophic unless each side views the conflict as an all-or-none conflict of survival.

To establish a basis for mutual trust we, of course, have to go beyond the recognition of each other's legitimacy to a relationship which promotes cooperative bonds. This would be facilitated by recognition of the profound human similarities which link all mankind together. The human situation no longer makes it feasible to view the world in terms of 'we' or 'they'; in the modern era, our destinies are linked objectively; the realistic attitude is 'we' *and* 'they.' More specifically, I think our situation would be improved rather than worsened if the people in the various Communist nations had a high standard of living, were well educated, and were reaping the fruits of the scientific revolution. Similarly, I think we would be better off rather than worse off if the political leaders of the Communist nations felt they were able to provide their citizenry with sufficient current gratifications and signs of progress to have their support, and if they were sufficiently confident of their own society not to fear intensive contacts with different points of view.

The implication of the above calls for a fundamental reorientation of our foreign policy toward the Communist nations. We must initiate cooperative trade policies, cooperative research programs, cooperative cultural exchanges, cooperative loan programs, and cooperative agricultural programs, and we must not be concerned if, at first, they appear to benefit more than we. We are, after all, more affluent than the Communist nations. Our objective should be simply to promote the values of economic well-being, educational attainment, and scientific and industrial development which we share in common and which we believe are necessary to a stable, peaceful world. Let me emphasize here that I think this is especially important in our relations with Communist China. (It amazes me constantly that little public attention is given to the extraordinary dangers involved in allowing our current relations with Communist China to continue in their present form.) The Communist nations (especially China) are likely to be suspicious of our motives, may even our initial attempts to establish cooperative relationships, an undoubtedly not feel grateful for any assistance they may. These reactions are all to be expected because of the presence of international relations. Our policy of cooperation must be a *sustained* policy of *massive reconciliation* which does not reciprocate hostility and which always leaves open the possibility of cooperation despite prior rebuff. In my view, we must sustain a cooperative initiative until it succeeds; in the long run, the alternative to mutual cooperation is mutual doom.

My rationale here is very simple. We have no realistic alternative but to coexist with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Coexistence among nations will be considerably less dangerous if we each recognize that poverty, illiteracy, economic

difficulties, internal strain, and crisis in a nation are likely to produce reckless, belligerent international policies rather than peaceful ones. After all, the delinquents and criminals in our local communities rarely come from those segments of our populace that are successfully dealing with their own internal problems or that are well integrated into and accepted by the broader community.

3. To induce a cooperative orientation in another and to develop adherence to a set of rules or social norms for regulating interaction and for resolving disputes, it is necessary (a) to demonstrate that one's own orientation to the other is cooperative; (b) to articulate fair rules which do not systematically disadvantage the other; (c) to demonstrate one's adherence to these rules; (d) to demonstrate to the other that he has more to gain (or less to lose) in the short and long run by adherence to the rules than by violation of them; and (e) to recognize that misunderstandings and disputes about compliance will inevitably occur and hence are not necessarily tokens of bad faith.

The importance of a cooperative orientation to the development of mutual trust has been discussed above; it is reiterated here to emphasize the significance of a cooperative orientation in the development of any workable system of rules to regulate international relations. In discussion and negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament, there has been much emphasis on developing rules and procedures for inspection and control which do not rely upon cooperative orientations; surveillance of the other's actions is to replace trust in the other's intent. I think it is reasonable to assert that no social order can exist for long without a minimum basis of mutual trust; surveillance cannot do the trick by itself. This is not to deny the necessity of surveillance to buttress trust, to enable one's trustworthiness to be confirmed and one's suspicions to be rejected. However, I would question the view which seems to characterize our approach to arms-control negotiations: namely, the less trust, the more surveillance. A more reasonable view might state that when there is little trust the only kinds of agreements which are feasible are ones which allow for simple, uncomplicated, but highly reliable techniques of surveillance. Lack of trust between equals, paradoxically, calls for but also limits surveillance when the negotiations are not part of an effective community.

The inducing of adherence to rules to establish orderly relations among nations requires fair rules. It is easier to state the characteristics of an unfair than a fair rule: a rule is unfair if the party favoring it would be unwilling to accept it, were he in the situation of the other side. The history of disarmament negotiations suggests that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has been interested in proposing fair rules. Nogee asserts: "Every plan offered by either side has contained a set of proposals calculated to have wide popular appeal. Every set has included at least one feature that the other side could not possibly accept, thus forcing a rejection. Then the proposing side has been able to claim that the rejection is opposed to the idea of disarmament in toto. The objectionable feature may be thought of as the 'joker' in every series." He further points out: "Disarmament negotiations themselves have become a weapon in the cold war. Speeches made in commission,

committee, and Plenary Assembly have more often been designed to influence different segments of opinion than to reach an accommodation with the other nations represented at the conference table.”²²

How can the formulation of fair rules be facilitated? A suggestion by Bertrand Russell is pertinent here.²³ He proposes the formation of a conciliation committee composed of the best minds from the East and West, with some of the leading thinkers from neutral nations also included. Such a committee, meeting together in quiet, unpublicized deliberation, might be given the responsibility of formulating rules which would be acceptable to both sides. The hope is that, with sufficient time, intelligent men of good will whose perspectives reach beyond the cold war may be able to formulate rules that are fair to all mankind.

Fair rules for certain matters, of course, do already exist. Some of these rules are written in the Charter of the United Nations, some in the decisions of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, some in the legal traditions which have governed various aspects of international relations through the centuries (e.g., the international postal system, international trade, “freedom of the seas,” ambassadorial rights). As Arthur Larson has pointed out,²⁴ there is much need for legal research to make the existing body of international rules accessible and up to date and establish a legal machinery which is also accessible and adapted to settling the kinds of disputes that today’s world produces. In addition, there is a need to induce acceptance of the body of law and legal machinery by the persons affected.

How to induce acceptance of such rules once they are formulated?

It seems clear that if we wish to induce others to accept fair rules, our own course of conduct must exemplify supranationalistic or universalistic values; it must constantly indicate our willingness to live up to the values that we expect others to adhere to. We must give up that doctrine of “special privilege” and the “double standard” in judging our own conduct and that of the Communist nations. Can we really convince others that we are for international law when we reserve the right (in the so-called Connally reservation) unilaterally to declare a controversy to be a domestic matter and hence outside the World Court’s jurisdiction? Can we really be persuasive when we reserve the right to intervene unilaterally against the establishment of a Communist nation in the Western hemisphere but deny a similar right to the Soviet Union and China with regard to Western-oriented nations near their borders? Do we promote international order when we use our power in the United Nations to prevent the admission of the most populous nation in the world and, thus, exclude it from discussion of matters which relate to its interests? We only undermine the possibility of establishing a world rule of law by declaring our sovereign interests to be above the law. The deepest legal traditions in all parts of the world rest upon the view that the sovereign is not above the law—he is under the law.

²² Nogee, *op. cit.*, pp. 281 and 282.

²³ See pp. xxx–xxx of the present volume.

²⁴ See pp. xxx–xxx of the present volume.

Would adherence to universalistic values and international law on our part allow a violator of fair rules of international conduct to profit and thus encourage his violation? Certainly it makes no sense to encourage violations. However, an effective system of rules clearly defines what a violation is, specifies the procedure for ascertaining whether an act is a violation, prescribes the sanctions to be invoked against violations, and indicates the rights of self-defense or redress to the aggrieved party. Such a system presumably deters violation by making it unprofitable, but it also limits and controls the response to violation so that it is appropriate and under law. We must, of course, be prepared to discourage violations of fair practices and to defend ourselves against them, but we cannot afford to do so in disregard of the universalistic values we espouse.

I suggest that our *attitude* toward violations should express, simultaneously, firm resistance to violations when they occur and clear receptivity to the possibility of renewing cooperative relations. Recriminations and a punitive, self-righteous attitude toward violations are unlikely to encourage the development of a desire for normal, civilized relations. Retaliation (counter threat in response to threat, counter aggression in response to aggression) tends, rather, to nourish and intensify an existing or incipient hostile spiral. Policy guided by the need to demonstrate that one is “man enough” to be tough, that one isn’t ‘chicken,’ tends to change situations where there is room for negotiation into competitive struggles for ‘face.’ Once this occurs it becomes difficult indeed to make concessions without a severe loss of self-esteem.

4. Mutual trust can occur even under circumstances where the parties involved are unconcerned with each other’s welfare, provided their relations to an outside, third party are such that this trust in him can substitute for their trust in one another. *This indirect or mediated trust is, of course, a most common form of trust in interpersonal relations. Since we exist in a community in which various types of third parties—the law, the police, public opinion, mutual friends can be mobilized to buttress an agreement, we can afford to be trusting even with a stranger in most circumstances. Unfortunately, in a bipolar world community which does not contain powerful “third parties,” it is difficult to substitute mediated trust for direct trust.*

There are two policy implications of this fact which I would like to stress. The first is the importance of encouraging the development of several strong, neutral groups of nations and the development of a strong, neutral United Nations that might mediate in conflicts between East and West. We must, of course, be aware of the dangers of a *tertius gaudens*, in which a third party would attempt to play East and West off against one another to its own advantage. However, what I am suggesting is not a third bloc but rather a group of diverse, independent nations with crisscrossing interests that have the common objective of developing and maintaining an orderly world. In a neutral United Nations,²⁵ with a large group of independent voters, we

²⁵ For a proposal to neutralize the United Nations, see Louis B. Sohn’s essay in the present volume, pp. 355–365.

would sometimes find ourselves on the losing side. But can we afford a United Nations in which the other side has little chance of ever winning a dispute with us?

The second implication follows from the realization that strong, responsible independent nations and a strong neutral United Nations do not yet exist and will take time to develop. Where no strong external community exists, it is important to recognize that bargaining—the attempt to find a mutually satisfactory agreement in circumstances where there is a conflict of interest—cannot be guided by a Machiavellian or “outwitting the other” attitude. Where no external community exists to compel agreement, the critical problem in bargaining is to establish sufficient community between the bargainers so that a mutually satisfactory agreement becomes possible: the question who obtains the minor advantages or disadvantages in negotiation trivial in comparison to the question of whether an agreement can be reached which leaves both parties better off than a lack of agreement. I stress this point because some political scientists and game misled by the fact that bargaining within a strong community/often fruitfully be conducted with a Machiavellian attitude, tingly assume that the same would be true where no real coexists.

In concluding this section, let me quote from a monograph on the *Causes of Industrial Peace* which lists the conditions that have led to peaceful settlement of disputes under collective bargaining:

1. There is full acceptance by management of the collective-bargaining process and of unionism as an institution. The company considers a strong union an asset to management.
2. The union fully accepts private ownership and operation of the industry; it recognizes that the welfare of its members depends upon the successful operation of the business.
3. The union is strong, responsible, and democratic.
4. The company stays out of the union’s internal affairs; it does not seek to alienate the workers’ allegiance to their union.
5. Mutual trust and confidence exist between the parties. There have been no serious ideological incompatibilities.
6. Neither party to bargaining has adopted a legalistic approach to the solution of problems in the relationship.
7. Negotiations are “problem-centered”—more time is spent on day-to-day problems than on defining abstract principles.
8. There is widespread union-management consultation and highly developed information-sharing.
9. Grievances are settled promptly, in the local plant whenever possible. There is flexibility and informality within the procedure.²⁶

This is in accord with our discussion of the basic conditions for world peace: namely, the necessity of developing attitudes which consciously stress mutual acceptance, mutual welfare, mutual strength, mutual interest, and mutual trust and

²⁶ National Planning Association (1953).

the necessity of developing approaches to disputes which consistently emphasize full communication, willingness to negotiate, and specific issues rather than the ideological frame of reference of the parties in dispute.

3.5 The Conflict Between East and West

Underlying my discussion throughout this paper has been the thesis that the conflict between East and West can be resolved peacefully. This thesis grows out of the assumption that the only alternative to peace is mutual catastrophe. The conflict must be resolved peacefully, but can it be?

Public statements of the leaders of the two blocs define the conflict as a confrontation of two mutually irreconcilable ideologies; and we must acknowledge that basic ideological differences do exist. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neither the United States nor the USSR closely resembles its ideological "ideal type." Neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx would recognize his offspring.

But the conflict of the cold war has intensified our perception of ideological differences, while at the same time reducing our ability to perceive similarities. Thus, we in the West see a conflict between "free societies and a totalitarian system that is attempting to dominate the world." At the same time, our counterparts in the East see a conflict between "a system that represents the interests of the masses of the people and the imperialist, capitalist ruling cliques that wish to continue their exploitation of the people." Both descriptions are essentially mirror images of each other, each side claiming that their side stands for just, universalistic values opposed by the other side. We in the West, however, see human justice as being threatened by the expansionist tendencies of the East, while the leaders in the East see human justice being thwarted by the West's attempt to maintain the *status quo* and to stem (what they consider to be) the natural tide of history.

The dominant theme of Freudian psychology is that the manifest life of the mind—what men know or pretend to know about the motives of their behavior—is often merely a socially acceptable rationalization of their unrecognized or latent motives. The difference between the manifest and latent content of behavior results from the need to present one's behavior to one's self, as well as to others, so as not to lose social or self-esteem. This need to "maintain face" can, of course, in turn be a determinant of behavior. I suggest that although there are basic ideological differences between East and West, the intensity of the ideological struggle primarily reflects an anachronistic power struggle between nations that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leadership. The ideological differences within the West (e.g., between the United States and Portugal) or within the East (e.g., between Russia and China) are often as gross as those between East and West.

Traditionally, the quest for world power has been closely bound to strivings for national security, economic dominance, and international prestige or influence. The quest for power has commonly taken the form of the attempt to establish military supremacy. In previous sections of this paper, I have stressed the anachronism of

the drive for military supremacy in the age of missiles and hydrogen bombs. Similarly, I believe the more powerful nations are beginning to recognize that the best opportunities for economic exploitation will arise from scientific research and development rather than colonial domination, Eastern or Western style.

However, the quest for international prestige and influence is, I believe, a reasonable one for all societies. Hence we must find alternative social institutions and processes to militarism and war, by which this quest can be pursued. Amitai Etzioni has suggested a number of criteria which are relevant to the kinds of social institutions which should be created. Namely, the international competition for prestige should involve many different kinds of contests which are repeated at frequent intervals so that defeat is never *total* or irreversible. Moreover, he proposes that there be many different contestants in every contest so that competition is diffuse rather than sharply focused and that competition be centered about achievements which represent genuine accomplishments of which all mankind can be proud.²⁷

More specifically, I suggest that the United Nations (or some other organization which includes Communist China) organize a series of periodic international contests which would enable the different nations of the world to reveal their achievements and progress in such fields as art, music, literature, the various sciences, space exploration, education, economic development, agriculture, sports, ballet, the theater, cooking, architecture, medicine, women's fashions, the domestic arts, children's books, and so on. The contests should be diverse enough to permit each national culture to display its unique attainments. The rules should require that the knowledge, skills, and techniques of the contest winners be made freely available to every nation. Awards might be granted on two separate bases: the relative level of absolute achievement and the relative amount of progress since the last contest. It is assumed that the societies who win many contests will be the ones who are effective in developing a culture that is richly creative and a populace that is educated, talented, and resourceful. There are, of course, difficulties in implementing such a proposal, in developing contests and rules which are not stacked for or against any nations. However, since the kinds of contests I am proposing already exist within many nations, there is a vast body of experience which can be drawn upon to develop workable rules.

I suggest that the United States, with the co-sponsorship of the Soviet Union, take the initiative in submitting such a proposal to the United Nations. If we are to engage in international competition for prestige and influence, let it be in peaceful rather than in militaristic pursuits, let it be in achievements from which all mankind can profit, let it be in activities which promote the recognition of the common values of mankind.

I conclude with an Intellectual's Manifesto: Intellectuals, Scientists, Scholars, and Academicians of the world, unite; we have nothing to lose but our ideological blinders. The problems besetting the world are too serious to permit our work to be beclouded by dogma or narrowly conceived national interest. We cannot afford to

²⁷ See pp. 226–245 of the original volume.

let the slogans and categories of ideological conflict dominate our intellectual analysis. We must be free to view the great problems of our time—the nuclear arms race, the tremendous disparities in standards of living among the nations of the world, racial prejudice, ideological intolerance, and the rapid increase in the world's population—in a way that allows us to take advantage of the explosion in knowledge now taking place. Let us begin to replace dogmatic, ideological assertion with an open-minded, objective, factual test of our theories and hypotheses about economic development, social change, and the development of creative, responsible people. Only by so doing will our common objectives of creating a saner, comelier, and more amicable life be achieved.

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Chapter 4

Undoing Nuclear Insanity: A Psychological Perspective

4.1 Introduction

During the past 25 years, social scientists have been studying conflicts of various sorts.¹ As a result, we are beginning to understand malignant social processes. This understanding can help us to undo the increasingly dangerous and costly nuclear insanity of the world superpowers. In a malignant process, the participants get enmeshed in a web of interactions and defensive-offensive maneuvers which worsen instead of improve their situations, making them more insecure, vulnerable and burdened.

I believe that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are malignant and that it is vital to recognize that their pathological social process is relentlessly pushing us all closer to a nuclear holocaust in which, as someone noted, “the survivors might well envy the dead.” Both the United States and the Soviet Union have spent and plan to continue to spend additional hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapon systems under the illusion that it will be possible to ‘prevail’ over the other in a nuclear war. Each, of course, wants to be in the position to prevail. However, the enormous sums already spent on nuclear weapons have worsened the situations of both sides: the money spent has increased the chances of a nuclear holocaust and has seriously wounded the economies of both nations.

Sane and intelligent people, once they are enmeshed in a pathological social process, engage in actions that seem to them completely rational and necessary but that a detached, objective observer would readily identify as contributing to the perpetuation and intensification of a vicious cycle of interactions. We have all seen this happen within married couples or in parent-adolescent relations whom the individual people are otherwise decent and rational. They trap themselves into a vicious social process that leads to negative outcomes—hostility, estrangement, violence—that no one really wants. So this can happen with nations: otherwise

¹ This unpublished text is based on a speech.

sane, intelligent leaders of the superpowers have allowed their nations to become involved in a malignant process that is driving them to engage in actions and reactions that are steadily increasing the chances of a nuclear war—an outcome no one wants. In such a process, both sides are right in coming to believe that the other is hostile and malevolent: the interactions and attitudes that develop in those involved in this process provide ample justification for such beliefs.

4.1.1 The Characteristics of a Malignant Social Process

Here, I want to describe some insights that social science research is developing about malignant social processes. Furthermore, I want to indicate how the superpowers seem enmeshed in a malignant social process, and finally I will suggest some ideas for getting out of it. A number of key elements that contribute to the development and perpetuation of such processes are depicted below.

4.1.2 Involvement in an Anarchic Social Situation

Here are social situations that do not allow the possibility of ‘rational’ behavior so long as the conditions for social order or mutual trust do not exist. Social scientists have conducted many experiments with such situations.

A typical one that I have used in my research involves two people who play a game, called “The Prisoners Dilemma.” Each player has to choose between pressing a green or red button. If both press their respective green buttons, each will win \$1; if both press their red buttons, each will lose \$1; if one presses red and the other presses green, the one who presses red will win \$2 while the one who presses green will lose \$2. Each player is ‘tempted’ to press his red button: by doing so, he earns the most (\$2 rather than \$1, if the other presses green) or loses the least (\$1 rather than \$2, if the other presses red). Most pairs of players in such situations end up pressing their red buttons and both lose money. Yet they could both win money, if they could have mutual confidence that neither fear nor greed will lead the other to press his red button.

Research by social scientists indicates that when confronted with such social dilemmas, individuals can only avoid being trapped in a mutually reinforcing, self-defeating cycle by attempting to change the situation so that a basis of social order or mutual trust can be developed. Thus, in a Prisoners Dilemma experiment, if a third party is introduced who has the power to enforce agreements that both players make to choose green, then their confidence in the social arrangement of an enforceable contract will enable them to resolve their dilemma. Also, in such a situation, if the players are given information that lead them to believe that they have similar basic values and attitudes, they will usually develop sufficient mutual trust to cooperate in choosing the green button.

The current security dilemmas facing the superpowers result from the kind of situation captured in the Prisoners Dilemma game. A characteristic feature of such ‘nonrational’ situations is that an attempt by any individual or nation to increase its own security (without regard for the security of the others) is self-defeating. For example, consider the United States’ decision to develop and test the hydrogen bomb so as to maintain military superiority over the USSR rather than to seek an agreement to ban its testing and, thus, prevent a spiraling arms race. This decision led the Soviet Union to attempt to catch-up. Soon, both superpowers were stockpiling H-bombs. U.S. leaders believed that if the Soviets had been the first to develop the H-bomb, they would have tested it and sought to reap the advantages from doing so: undoubtedly, they were right. Both sides are aware of the temptations that the other has to increase its security “by getting ahead”. The fear of “falling behind” as well as the temptation to “get ahead” leads to a pattern of interactions that increases insecurity on both sides.

Comprehension of the basic reality that nuclear war would be mutually devastating suggests that *mutual security* rather than national security should be our objective. The basic military axiom for both the East and West should be that *military actions should only be taken that increase the military security of both sides; military actions that give a military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided*. The military forces of both sides should be viewed as having the *common* primary aim of preventing either side (even one’s own) from starting a deliberate or accidental war. How? By regular meetings of military leaders from East and West; by establishing a continuing, joint technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament and inspection plans; by positioning mixed military units on each other’s territory, etc. Crucially, we both must recognize that if military inferiority is dangerous, so is military ‘superiority’; it is dangerous for either to feel *tempted* or *frightened* into military action. Neither the U.S. nor the USSR should want its weapons or the other’s to be vulnerable to a first strike. Similarly, neither side should want the other to have its command, control, and communication systems become so ineffective that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be in the hands of individual, uncontrolled units.

4.2 Competitive Orientation

Using many experimental formats and diverse ways of inducing competition, social psychologists have shown that if the participants in a conflict see it as a win-lose, competitive situation, the resulting malignant social process will tend to perpetuate and, indeed, escalate the conflict. In one series of studies, we employed a two-person bargaining situation in which each person owned a trucking firm and earned \$1 each time his or her truck delivered merchandise to a specified destination. The cost of the truck’s trip was a function of its duration; if it took a good deal of time, the truck could lose money. Each firm had two routes to its destination: a long, two-lane alternate route that took much time and a short, main route. The mid-section of the

main route was only one lane wide. The two trucks went in opposite directions so if both went on the main route, they would meet on the one-lane section. The bargaining problem was “who would back down” and let the other go through first. We stimulated competition by promising a bonus to the bargainer who earned the most money and by other methods as well.

This research has demonstrated that the characteristics of a competitive conflict process are:

- a. Communication between the conflicting parties is unreliable and impoverished. Poor communication enhances the possibility of error and misinformation, reinforcing preexisting stereotypes and expectations toward the other. Most important, there is impaired ability to respond to the other’s shifts away from a win-lose orientation.
- b. The view is stimulated that the solution of the conflict can only be imposed by one side or the other by means of superior force, deception, or cleverness. The attempt by each of the conflicting parties to create or maintain superiority tends to change the focus on the immediate issue in dispute to the more abstract issue of ‘power’ for its own sake.
- c. A suspicious, hostile attitude develops that increases the sensitivity to differences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. Such an attitude permits behavior toward the other that would be considered outrageous if directed toward someone like oneself.

In spite of public statements of the leaders of the two world superpowers that define the conflict as a confrontation of two irreconcilable ideologies, and it is apparent that basic ideological differences do exist, their conflict need not be viewed as inherently a win-lose, cut-throat struggle. Neither the Soviet nor American ideology is consistent nor operational enough to guide action in the day-to-day decisions which shape history. Furthermore, both ideologies are vague. Their vagueness provides ample room for both the United States and the Soviet Union (or China) to find a basis of amicable relations.

The resurgence of the Cold War has intensified our perception of ideological differences, but in light of internal conflicts within both ‘East’ and ‘West’ (the Sino-Soviet break and the trade disputes among the Western nations), we have an opportunity to revise our images of the so-called “struggle between Communism and freedom”. The intensity of the current ideological struggle primarily reflects an outdated power struggle between two continental superpowers that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leadership. The emergence of such a power struggle between the U.S. and Russia was predicted by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 and by others long before Russia adopted a communist ideology.

Historically, the quest for world power has been closely bound to strivings for national security, economic dominance, and international prestige or influence. It has commonly taken the form of the attempt to establish military supremacy over one’s major competitors, but the drive for military dominance in the nuclear age is dangerously anachronistic. Indeed, crude economic imperialism no longer provides as much opportunity for economic gain as does scientific research and

development. However, the quest for international power and influence can be reasonable for all societies. Later, I discuss fair rules for such competition.

4.3 Inner Conflict Within the Parties

Although competitive conflict is necessary for long-lasting malignant conflict, it is not sufficient. The considerable experience of psychotherapists working with troubled couples indicates that malignant conflicts persist because of the internal needs of the conflicting parties. In a vicious circle, the malignant conflict may itself intensify the internal needs that support the conflict. For example, a husband and wife, each of whom has a deep sense of personal failure may each provoke the other to be abusive: the other's abusiveness provides a rationalization for one's failure but being victimized also intensifies one's sense of failure.

There is little doubt that the superpower conflict has served important internal functions for the ruling establishments in the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet establishment has justified the continuation of its autocratic form of government, the Russian domination of the other nationalities in the Soviet Union, its control of the nations of Eastern Europe, and its subordination of communist parties in other countries in terms of its struggle against "capitalist imperialism". Under the guise of anti-communism, the U.S. establishment has justified its intervention in other countries to promote the interests of American business; it has supported the continuation and growth of the military-industrial complex; it has rationalized governmental secrecy so that many important governmental decisions are made without informed public discussion; and it has inhibited the development of significant and sustained political opposition to the policies of the national security establishment.

Hopefully, there is growing recognition within each superpower that the escalating dangers and costs of the arms race are dwarfing the gains from having an external devil. Obviously, many of the internal problems of both superpowers would be lessened if they were not engaged in such extravagantly non-productive expenditures as are involved in their arms race.

4.4 Misjudgment and Misperceptions

Most people and groups have an egoistic bias toward perceiving their behavior toward the other as being more well-intentioned and legitimate than the other's behavior toward them. For example, research has shown that American students view American espionage activities in the Soviet Union as more well-motivated than similar activities by Soviet agents in the United States. If each side in a conflict perceives its own motives and behavior as more benevolent and justified than those of the other side, the conflict is apt to spiral upward in intensity. Such bias leads to a

parallel bias in what is considered to be an equitable agreement for resolving conflict. This makes agreement more difficult and thus extends conflict. Some of the difficulties the United States and the Soviet Union have in reaching agreements on arms control reflect their egoistic biases.

There are, of course, other types of processes leading to misjudgments. The intensification of conflict may induce tension beyond a moderate optimal level. This can impair cognitive processes in several ways. It may reduce the range of perceived alternatives, induce one to focus on the immediate rather than the long-term consequences of one's actions, polarize thought so that percepts take on a simplistic cast of being black or white, for or against, good or evil, increase defensiveness, and enhance the pressures for social conformity. Excessive tension or cognitive rigidity reduces the intellectual resources available for discovering new ways of coping with a problem or resolving a conflict. Intensification of conflict is the likely result as simplistic thinking and the polarization of thought pushes the participants to view their alternatives as being limited to victory or defeat.

There are three basic ways to reduce the misjudgments and misperceptions that typically occur during the course of conflict: (a) Making explicit the assumptions and evidence that underlie them and examining how likely they were to have been influenced by any of the common sources of error; (b) Bringing in friendly, objective outsiders, to see whether their perceptions of the situation are in agreement or disagreement with one's own. The outsiders should have the independence to ensure that they are free to form their own views and the stature to be able to communicate them so that they will be heard. When this is unfeasible, the use of internal "devil's advocates" has been recommended as a way of challenging the assumptions and evidence underlying one's judgments. Here, too, it is important that the devil's advocates be sufficiently independent and prestigious to present hard challenges that cannot be ignored; (c) There are agreements that can be made with one's adversary to reduce the chances of malignant misjudgment of one another during conflict such as promoting continuing informal contact, and providing for regular feedback from the other of the other's interpretations of one's communications.

4.5 Unwitting Commitments

During the course of a malignant social process, the actions that the parties take may strengthen the beliefs that have given rise to the actions, committing the parties to their beliefs unwittingly. This well-investigated psychological process is termed "dissonance reduction". For example, in explaining his opposition to an American proposal made shortly before Pearl Harbor that Japan withdraw its troops from China, Prime Minister Tojo said, "We sent a large force of one million men [to China] and it has cost us well over 100,000 dead and wounded, [the grief of] their bereaved families, hardships for 4 years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. We must: "by all means get satisfactory results from this.

Similarly, the belief by leaders of the American government that the Soviet Union would cause us military harm if it could leads to actions, such as intensifying our military build-up, that will, in turn, produce increased psychological commitment to the belief: after deciding to build the MX missile, doubts about the beliefs that support the decision will be reduced.

4.6 Self-fulfilling Prophecies

Social scientists have identified “self-fulfilling prophecies” as one of the most important mechanisms involved in pathological social processes. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, distortions are perpetuated because they evoke behavior that makes the originally *false* conception come true. You hear the false rumor that a friend is saying nasty things about you, you snub him; he then bad mouths you, confirming your expectation. Similarly, if the policy-makers of East and West believe that war is likely and either attempts to increase its military security vis-a-vis the other, the other’s response will justify the initial move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of a “*folie a deux*”, wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another. As a result, both superpowers are right to think that the other is provocative, dangerous, and malevolent. Each side, however, is blind to how its own policies and behavior have contributed to the development of the other’s hostile attitudes. If each superpower would recognize its own part in maintaining their malignant relations, it could lead to a reduction of mutual blaming and an increase in mutual problem-solving.

4.7 Gamesmanship

What is so seductive about nuclear weapons and the scenarios of nuclear war that the strategists and decision-makers in both of the superpowers seem drawn to them like moths to a flame? There are so many dimensions of power—economic, political, cultural, scientific, sports, educational, etc.—in which the power struggle could be played out. What is the special fascination to playing the international power game with nuclear weapons?

There are two key psychological features that make the power game with nuclear toys a super game. The game is very tidy and abstract; and it has a tremendous emotional kick for those with strong power drives: the stakes are high (the fate of the earth is at risk), decisions have to be made quickly (there is no time for indecisiveness), and nuclear weapons are a highly concentrated power.

To play the game, each side has to make assumptions about how its own weapons (as well as how its command, control, and communication systems) will operate in various hypothetical future nuclear war scenarios as well as how the other side’s will operate. There is, of course, very little basis in actual experience

for making' accurate, reliable, or valid assumptions about these matters since none of these weapons or systems have been tested or employed in circumstances even remotely resembling the situation of any imaginable nuclear war. However, for the nuclear game to be played and for scenarios to be developed, assumptions about these matters have to be made. Once these assumptions have been made and have, by consensus, been accepted within one side's strategic group, they become psychologically 'real' and are treated as "hard facts", no matter how dubious their grounding in actual realities. These "psychological realities" and dubious "hard facts" are then used as a basis for further decisions in the strategic game of preparing for the eventuality of nuclear war. These decisions may entail potential expenditures of hundreds of billions of dollars for new nuclear weapons—as, for instance, on the MX missile and the B-1 bomber—which will require the strategic gamesman on the other side to respond (also based on their "psychological realities" and dubious "hard facts") in a way that will prevent them from 'losing' the nuclear war game. Citizens and elected officials must vigorously challenge the dubious "hard facts" underlying the "psychological realities" of the strategic gamesmen on both sides.

What can be done to reverse the malignant social process I have described, and how can we begin to reduce the dangers resulting from the military gamesmanship and security dilemmas of the superpowers? Let me address the latter question first.

A bold and courageous leadership in the United States would take a risk for peace. It would announce its determination to end the insane arms race. It would offer to agree on a package of "no first use of nuclear weapons," a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a substantial reduction and equalization of the opposing conventional forces in Europe, and a verifiable freeze on further research, development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States would initiate a GRIT process: GRIT stands for "graduated reciprocation in tension reduction", a psychological strategy for reducing international tension articulated by Professor Charles Osgood of the University of Illinois, a former President of the American Psychological Association. We would announce a unilateral reduction of, for example, 10 % of our existing nuclear weapons and would invite the USSR and other nations to verify that they were being destroyed. We would request the USSR to reciprocate. We have such an excess of nuclear weapons that we could afford to make several rounds of unilateral cuts in case the Soviets did not initially reciprocate, without losing our capacity to destroy Soviet society, even if they were to attack us first. Such repeated unilateral initiatives, if sincere in their intent and execution, would place the Soviet Union under the strongest pressure to reciprocate.

President Kennedy in his "Strategy for Peace" address on June 10, 1963 initiated something like a GRIT process by announcing a unilateral halt to all atmospheric nuclear tests, in the context of asking Americans to reexamine their attitudes toward the Cold War. This politically courageous action led the Russians to reciprocate and the superpowers agreed to end their atmospheric nuclear tests permanently. If American leaders could now show similar wisdom and courage, we might replace the arms race with a peace race.

4.8 Undoing the Malignant Social Process

Arms control and disarmament agreement are only a first step: since the ability to make nuclear weapons will continue to exist—*forever*—we must remove the malignancy from the relations between the superpowers and eliminate any possibility that such a condition could develop among other great powers. A major way to do so would be the development of fair rules for international competition.

4.8.1 *Fair Rules*

As Professor Amitai Etzioni, a distinguished political sociologist, has indicated, a set of rules would include such principles as the following: No non-aligned country would be allowed to have military ties with other countries, particularly not with any of the major powers; no foreign troops or foreign bases or foreign arms of any sort would be permitted to remain in or enter the non-aligned country; creation of a United Nations observer force consisting largely of personnel from non-aligned countries and equipped with the necessary scientific equipment and facilities (including satellites) to check the borders, ports, airfields, roads, railroads, etc., would be deployed at the request of any of the major powers or by the Secretary-General of the United Nations; violations of the arms embargo—once certified by an appropriate U.N. Tribunal—would set in motion a cease and desist order aimed at the sender of arms or troops and a disarm order aimed at the receiver. Lack of compliance with such orders would result in appropriate sanctions—e.g., a trade and communications embargo, a blockade, or the use of armed forces. Suppose some such rules could, in fact, be established, what effects might be expected? Clearly, the revolutionary ferment would not disappear. Communist governments might take power in some countries but they would have to obtain and remain in power without foreign military aid and they would not be able to provide military assistance to Communists in other countries. Such a government may be a tragedy to its people but we would fulfill our moral responsibility if we were to develop and enforce rules that could prevent outside military aid from foreclosing the possibility that the people will overthrow a government that is obnoxious to them.

An agreement on fair rules for competition will require the governments that sell arms to other countries to give up this lucrative form of trade. Currently, it amounts to about \$25–\$35 billion a year of which NATO countries disseminate somewhere over half, the Warsaw Pact countries about 40 %. The Western bloc and the Soviet bloc should agree to end the arms peddling business: it is an even more destructive form of trade than drug peddling.

4.9 Developing a Cooperative Framework

A cooperative framework must be developed to resist the debilitating effects of the inevitable disputes associated with any system of rules. How can this be done? The psychological key to the development of cooperation can be stated very simply. It is *the provision of repeated and varied opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions*. One of the most well-established principles in psychology is the tendency for people to seek out and to repeat activities that they find rewarding.

Our reluctance to trade with the Soviet Union and our unsuccessful attempts to get our allies to limit their trade with them are indicators of an underlying view that hampers the attempt to strengthen cooperative bonds and fosters a malignant relation: the notion that anything that helps them hurts us and anything that harms them helps us. Clearly, it helps them if their children have available Sabin polio vaccine. But, does this harm us? Assuredly, it harms them if they are forced into a costly arms race but does this help us? If we were to refuse to sell grain to the Soviet Union, it would be harmful to them but would we gain in any meaningful way?

For many, appeasement and cooperation are equated. They feel that the only credible stance toward an adversary is a self-righteous, belligerent counter-hostility. However, there is a more productive stance: one that combines firmness and cooperativeness. One can communicate both a firm, tough resolve not to allow oneself to be abused, intimidated, or rendered defenseless *and* a willingness to cooperate to mutual benefit.

'Firmness' in contrast to 'belligerence' aborts the development of vicious spirals. It is, of course difficult to resist the temptation to respond with belligerence to provocations; it requires a good deal of self-confidence not to have to demonstrate that one is "man enough" to be tough, that one isn't 'chicken'. It is just this kind of firm, non-belligerent, self-confident, cooperative attitude that our experimental research indicates is most effective in inducing cooperation even when the other is initially hostile and provocative.

Can we adopt such an attitude? Our defensiveness is high. Throughout most of our history, we have been in the uniquely fortunate position of having pretty much our own way in foreign affairs. Initially, this was due to our powerful isolated position in the Americas and since World War II we have been the leading world power. We face a loss of status. We can no longer be isolated from the physical danger of a major war nor can we remain the uniquely, powerful nation. The Soviet Union, the nations of Western Europe, as well as other nations will not continue to grant the United States the uncontested primacy we had for several decades after World War II. We have to adjust our aspirations to the changing realities or suffer a constant frustration.

From what psychology has learned about malignant social processes, we have reason to believe that a nuclear holocaust is not inevitable. Such a process can be reversed if we recognize clearly its underlying irrationality and are willing to make the sincere, sustained effort necessary to substitute more constructive ways of managing our international conflicts.

Chapter 5

Negotiating the Non-negotiable

5.1 Introduction

This paper is divided into two main sections.¹ The first uses the discussion of a case of marital conflict to articulate a framework for thinking about negotiating the non-negotiable. For various parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, many of the issues seem non-negotiable and it may be helpful to consider the general conditions that are relevant to determining whether negotiations are apt to take place and to succeed. The second section addresses the question of what could be done, under present circumstances, to promote constructive negotiations.

5.2 A Framework for Thinking About Negotiating the Non-negotiable

As a psychologist, I have had the opportunity to do therapeutic work with couples who have been involved in bitter conflicts over issues which they considered non-negotiable. Let me briefly describe a young couple who were involved in what I have elsewhere characterized as a “malignant process” of dealing with their conflicts (Deutsch 1985, Chap. 17).

The malignancy was reflected in the tendency for them to escalate a dispute about almost any specific issue (e.g., a household chore, their child’s bedtime) into a power struggle in which each spouse felt that his or her self-esteem or core

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identity was at stake. The malignant process resulted in (as well as resulted from) justified mutual suspicion, correctly perceived mutual hostility, a win-lose orientation to their conflicts, a tendency to act toward the other that would lead the other to respond in a way that would confirm one's worst suspicion of the other, an inability to understand and empathize with the other's needs and vulnerabilities, and a reluctance—based on stubborn pride, nursed grudge, and fear of humiliation—to initiate or respond to a positive generous action to break out of the escalating vicious cycle in which they were entrapped.

Many couples in such conflicts do not seek help: they continue to abuse one another, sometimes violently, or they break-up. The couple that I worked with sought help for several reasons. On the one hand, their conflicts were becoming physically violent: this frightened them and it also ran counter to their strongly-held intellectual values regarding violence.

On the other hand, there were strong constraints making it difficult for them to separate. They felt they would be considerably worse off economically, their child would suffer, and they had mutually congenial intellectual, esthetic, sexual, and recreational interests which would be difficult for them to engage in together if they separated.

5.3 Developing a Readiness to Negotiate

Before I turn to a discussion of the negotiation of a non-negotiable issue, let me briefly discuss the steps involved in getting the couple to the point where they were ready to negotiate. There were two major interrelated steps, each of which involved many sub steps. The first entailed helping each spouse to recognize that the present situation of a bitter, stalemated conflict no longer served his or her real interests. The second step involved aiding the couple to become aware of the possibility that each of them could be better off than they were currently if they recognized that their conflict was a joint problem which required creative, joint efforts in order to improve their individual situations. The two steps do not follow one another in neat order. Progress in either facilitates progress in the other.

5.4 Irrational Deterrents to Negotiation

There are many reasons why otherwise intelligent and sane individuals may persist in engaging in behaviors that perpetuate a destructive conflict that is harmful to their rational interests. Some of the common ones are:

1. It enables one to blame one's own inadequacies, difficulties, and problems on the other so that one can avoid confronting the necessity of changing oneself. Thus, when applied to the couple I treated, the wife perceived herself to be a

victim and she felt that her failure to achieve her professional goals was due to her husband's unfair treatment of her as exemplified by his unwillingness to share the responsibilities for the household and child care. Blaming her husband provided her with a means of avoiding her own apprehensions about whether she personally had the abilities and courage to fulfill her aspirations. Similarly, the husband provoked continuous criticism from his wife for his domineering, imperial behavior employed her criticisms to justify his emotional withdrawal, thus enabling him to avoid dealing with his anxieties about personal intimacy and emotional closeness. Even though the wife's accusations concerning her husband's behavior toward her were largely correct, as were the husband's toward her, each had an investment in maintaining the other's noxious behavior because of the defensive self-justifications such behavior provided.

2. It enables one to maintain and employ skills, attitudes, roles, resources, and investments that one has developed and built up during the course of one's history. The wife's role as 'victim' and the husband's as "unappreciated emperor" had long histories. Each had well-honed skills and attitudes in relation to their respective roles that made their roles very familiar and natural to enact in times of stress. Less familiar roles, in which one's skills and attitudes are not well-developed, are often avoided because of the fear of attempting the unknown. Analogous to similar social institutions, these personality 'institutions' also seek out opportunities for exercise and self-justification and in so doing help to maintain and perpetuate themselves.
3. It enables one to have a sense of excitement, purpose, coherence, and unity that is otherwise lacking in one's life. Some people feel aimless, dissatisfied, at odds with themselves, bored, unfocused, and unenergetic. Conflict, especially if it has dangerous undertones, can serve to counteract these feelings: it can give a heightened sense of purpose as well as unity and also be energizing as one mobilizes oneself for the struggle against the other. For depressed people who lack self-esteem, conflict can be an addictive stimulant that is sought out to mask their underlying depression.
4. It enables one to obtain support and approval from interested third parties. Friends and relatives, on each side, may buttress the opposing positions of the conflicting parties with moral, material, and ideological support for the conflicting parties to change their positions and behaviors may entail the dangers of loss of self-esteem, rejection, and even attack from others who are vitally significant to them.

How does a therapist help the conflicting parties overcome such deterrents to recognizing that their situation of a bitter, stalemated conflict no longer serves their real interests? The general answer, which is often quite difficult to implement in practice, is to help each of the conflicting parties change in such a way that the conflict no longer is maintained by conditions within the parties that are extrinsic to the conflict. In essence, this entails helping each of the conflicting parties to achieve the self-esteem and self-image that would make them no longer need the destructive conflict process as a defense against their sense of personal inadequacy, their fear of

taking on new and unfamiliar roles, their feeling of purposelessness and boredom, and their fears of rejection and attack if they act independently of others. Fortunately, the strength of the irrational factors binding the conflicting parties to a destructive conflict process is often considerably weaker than the motivation arising from the real havoc and distress resulting from the conflict. Emphasis on this reality, if combined with a sense of hope that the situation can be changed for the better, provides a good basis for negotiation.

5.5 Conditions That Foster the Recognition of the Conflict as a Joint Problem Requiring Joint Efforts

What are the conditions that are likely to help conflicting parties become aware of the possibility that each of them could be better off than they are currently? That is, assuming they recognize that their conflict is a joint problem that requires creative, joint efforts in order to improve the individual situations. A number of such conditions are listed below:

1. Crucial to this awareness is the recognition that one cannot impose a solution of the problem, which is acceptable or satisfactory to oneself, upon the other. In other words, there is recognition that a satisfactory solution for oneself requires the other's agreement and this is unlikely unless the other is also satisfied with the solution. Such recognition implies awareness that a mutually acceptable agreement will require at least a minimum degree of cooperation.
2. To believe that the other is ready to engage in a joint problem-solving effort, one must believe that the other has also recognized that it cannot impose a solution, i.e., it has also recognized that a solution has to be mutually acceptable.
3. The conflicting parties must have some hope that a mutually acceptable agreement can be found. This hope may rest upon their own perception of the outlines of a possible fair settlement or it may be based upon their confidence in the expertise of third parties or even upon a generalized optimism.
4. The conflicting parties must have confidence that if a mutually acceptable agreement is concluded that the other will abide by it or those violations will be detected before the losses to the self and the gains to the other become intolerable. If the other is viewed as unstable, lacking self-control, or untrustworthy, it will be difficult to have confidence in the viability of an agreement unless one has confidence in third-parties who are willing and able to guarantee the integrity of the agreement.

The foregoing conditions for establishing a basis for initiating the joint work necessary in serious negotiation are much easier to develop when the conflicting parties are part of a strong community in which there are well developed norms, procedures, professionals, and institution that encourage and facilitate problem-solving negotiations. This is more apt to be the case in interpersonal conflicts than in conflicts between ethnic groups or nations that do not perceive themselves as

members of a common community. When the encouragements to negotiation do not exist as a result of belonging to a common community, the availability of helpful, skilled, prestigious, and powerful third parties who will use their influence to foster problem-solving negotiations between the conflicting parties becomes especially important.

5.6 Negotiating the Non-negotiable

Issues that seem vitally important to a person such as one's identity, security, self-esteem, or reputation often are experienced as being non-negotiable. Thus, consider the husband and wife who viewed themselves in a conflict over a non-negotiable issue. The wife who worked (and wanted to do so) wanted the husband to share equally in the household and child care responsibilities; she considered equality between genders to be one of her core personal values. The husband wanted a traditional marriage with a traditional division of responsibilities in which he would have primary responsibility for income-producing work outside the home, while his wife would have primary responsibility for the work related to the household and child care. The husband considered household work and child care as inconsistent with his deeply rooted image of adult masculinity. The conflict seemed non-negotiable to the couple—for the wife it would be a betrayal of her feminist values to accept her husband's terms; for the husband, it would be a violation of his sense of adult masculinity to become deeply involved in housework and child care.

However, this non-negotiable conflict became negotiable when, with the help of the therapist, the husband and wife were enabled to listen to and really understand the other's feelings and how their respective life experiences had led them to the views they each held. Understanding the other's position fully and the feelings and experiences that were behind them made them each feel less hurt and humiliated by the other's position and more ready to seek solutions that would accommodate the interests of both. They realized that with their joint incomes they could afford to pay for household and child care help that would enable the wife to be considerably less burdened by these responsibilities without increasing the husband's chores in these areas: doing so, of course, lessened the amount of money they had available for other purposes.

This solution was not a perfect one for either. The wife and husband, each, would have preferred that the other share their own view of what a marriage should be like. However, their deeper understanding of the other's position made them feel less humiliated and threatened by it and less defensive toward the other. It also enabled them to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement that lessened the tensions between them despite their continuing differences in basic perspectives.

The general conclusions that I draw from this and other experiences with a 'non-negotiable' issue is that most such issues are negotiable even though the underlying basic differences between the conflicting parties may not be reconcilable. The issues become negotiable when the conflicting parties learn to listen, understand, and

empathize with the other party's position, interests, and feelings—providing they are also able to communicate to the other their understanding and empathy. Even though understanding and empathy do not imply agreement with the other's views, they indicate an openness and responsiveness to the other that reduces hostility and defensiveness and that also allows the other to be more open and responsive. Such understanding and empathy help the conflicting parties to reduce their feelings that their self-esteem, security, or identity will be threatened and endangered by recognizing that the other's feelings and interests, as well as one's own, deserve consideration in dealing with the issues in conflict.

'Non-negotiable' issues also become negotiable when the conflicting parties can be shown that their vital interests will be protected or enhanced by negotiation. It is helpful for negotiators to learn the difference between 'positions' and 'interests.' The positions of the conflicting parties may be irreconcilable but their interests may be concordant. Helping parties in conflict to be fully in touch with their long-term interests may enable them to see beyond their 'non-negotiable' positions to their congruent interests. An atmosphere of mutual understanding and empathy fosters the conditions that permit conflicting parties to get beyond their initial rigid, unnegotiable positions to their underlying interests.

5.7 Breaking Through the Impasse of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Although the Arab-Israeli conflict is vastly more complex, more multilateral, and more difficult than the case I have used for illustrative purposes, I believe the ideas contained in the discussion of the simpler situation are applicable to the more complex situation. From my perspective as a "conflict-resolver," the two key process issues in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict are: (1) creating the conditions in which the various parties to the conflicts are ready to engage in creative joint problem-solving efforts as part of a negotiation to resolve their disputes, and (2) helping the disputants to negotiate the substantive concerns that they consider to be non-negotiable.

I have no special knowledge or expertise relating to the Middle East or of the nations and their leaders so the discussion that follows is speculative. The situation as this is being written has changed in many respects from the circumstances prior to the 1990s. I select two changes for emphasis because I believe that they bear strongly on the likelihood that constructive negotiations can be initiated and conducted. First of all, I believe that a number of factors have contributed to the increased recognition by the leading actors in the multiple Arab-Israeli conflicts that they cannot impose a solution of the problem that is acceptable or satisfactory to them, upon their adversary. Secondly, changes within the former Soviet Union and the United States and in their relations with one another provide new possibilities for developing a constructive context for negotiations.

The increased recognition that one cannot impose a solution upon one's adversary comes from several sources. The repeated Arab-Israeli wars, none of which have enabled the parties involved to achieve their maximalist objective nor even to achieve gains that would not be subject to future challenge, have led the conflicting parties to reduce their aspirations and to have more realistic objectives vis-a-vis one another. Although not pleased by it, most of the Arab nations have come to accept the idea that Israel will continue to exist as a nation: they are only in the beginning stages of coming to terms with the practical implications of this idea. Similarly, most Israelis have come to accept the view that the Palestinian aspirations for autonomy and nationhood cannot be ignored and denied forever: they, too, are only in the early stages of coming to terms with the practical implications of this recognition and of the additional recognition that missiles reduce the value of the occupied territories as a barrier to attack.

The economic situation of all of the nations in the Middle East has worsened considerably in the past decade. For Israel, this was largely due to the costly consequences of the Lebanon invasion and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as well as the large influx of Jews from the former Soviet Union. The oil glut has severely affected the Arab nations as has the Gulf War.

Another factor contributing to the growing acceptance of the fact that neither the Arabs nor the Israelis can impose their 'solutions' on the other is the recognition that the United States and other influential powers will not allow this to happen. The end of the Cold War has also meant that the nations involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict are less likely to be used as pawns in superpower conflict, and hence are less likely to be built-up militarily by outside powers.

Despite the growing awareness that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved by military force and the increasing recognition that the continuing military jousting is debilitating to the economies and to the national well-being of the various nations involved, it is evident that there is considerable resistance to participating in serious negotiations about the issues within each of the parties to the conflict—Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, the Palestinians (and the PLO). I suspect that the internal deterrents to serious negotiations are sufficiently strong at the present time to make it unlikely that a creative initiative that could overcome the obstacles to negotiations will come from the Arab leaders in the Middle East. The results of the recent Israeli election, combined with Israel's current "unprecedented military superiority over its Arab neighbors," suggest that the initiative can come from Israel and can focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Wherever the initiative comes from—the Israelis, the Arabs, or the United States—let me suggest that it should be guided by several basic principles:

1. *It should start the process of building a constructive relationship between the conflicting parties.* The Arabs and Israelis can continue to live in a state of alternating hot and cold wars to their mutual detriment or they can seek to change their relationship so that their inevitable disagreements and conflicts are experienced in the context of their mutual needs for peaceful co-existence and economic development. It is evident that a lasting peace will require a basic

change in relationship. The initiative should be formulated and articulated as an important first step in bringing about this basic change.

2. *The initiative should clearly and openly address the basic anxieties of both sides.* There is considerable reason to believe (see Kaplowitz 1975; Saunders 1985) that the basic anxieties of the Jewish people in Israel center about the images of the Nazi Holocaust and their history of centuries of rejection and traumatic persecution. Given these anxieties, it is not surprising that security and acceptance have become overriding objectives of Israel. Nor is it surprising that being 'strong' and 'tough' have come to be viewed as national virtues. There is also reason to believe that the basic anxieties of the Arab people center about being humiliated and treated as inferiors and about being dominated and exploited by intruders. It is easy to understand the Arab preoccupation with self-determination, with having some of its territories occupied, and with its proud refusal to be treated as a defeated party.

A constructive relationship-building initiative will address the anxieties of both the Israelis and the Arabs, whether it is begun by the Israelis, the Arabs, or a third-party such as the United States. The initiative should affirm and support Israel's realistic needs for security and acceptance as well as the Palestinian needs for independence, dignity, and equality. Any such initiative must be responsive to the needs of both sides.

3. *The initiative should establish informal in addition to the formal dialogues between influential representatives of the Israelis and of the various Arab groups in order to prepare themselves and their constituents for constructive, realistic negotiations about the issues in conflict.* At this informal stage of pre-negotiations, it would be very useful to have impartial discussion facilitators available to help the conflicting parties deal successfully with the difficulties available that are apt to rise in such meetings (See Burton 1969, and Kelman/Cohen 1976, for a description of how such facilitators might function.) Such informal meetings would not only precede substantive negotiations but would continue during and subsequent to such negotiations. They would provide an opportunity to test out proposals, for each of the conflicting parties to communicate their views and feelings fully to the other, for possible agreements to be developed, and to work out some of the underlying emotional concerns that might stand in the way of agreement.

As the Arabs and Israelis are enabled to listen to and to really understand the other's feelings and how their respective experiences have led to the views each side holds, they will become more able to seek solutions that would accommodate the interests of both. This will be true even for issues that are considered non-negotiable. As I have stated earlier in the paper, non-negotiable issues become negotiable (even though underlying basic differences may not be reconcilable) when the conflicting parties learn to listen, understand, and empathize with the other party's position, interests, and feelings: providing they are also able to communicate to the other their understanding and empathy.

4. *Given the lack of trust between Israel and the Arabs, the initiative should initially focus on areas of likely agreement that do not require trust for their successful implementation.* Realistic aspirations would anticipate slow but significant progress in developing the constructive relations that would permit a creative problem-solving orientation to some of the current non-negotiable issues between the Israelis and the Arabs—e.g., the status of Jerusalem.
5. *Given the difficult internal political situation within the various groups and nations involved in the Middle East it is my judgment that the United States will have to play a strong third-party role if constructive negotiations are to take place and succeed.* The U.S. can facilitate constructive negotiations through its role as a mediator, through its use of positive and negative incentives to overcome resistances to constructive negotiations, and through its ability to assist in giving credibility and enforceability to negotiated agreements.

Thomas L. Friedman in his book, *From Beirut to Lebanon* (1990: 523–526), has articulated an initiative regarding the Palestinians that an Israeli Prime Minister could take. Such an initiative addresses Israeli and Arab anxieties clearly, although Arab anxieties are not addressed fully. I believe that Friedman’s statement could easily be modified to be a more generous and fuller response to Arab concerns without weakening the response to Israeli anxieties. Basically, Friedman’s statement calls for the step-by-step creation, over a 5-year period, of an independent, demilitarized Palestinian state in most of the West Bank and Gaza strip that would recognize and be recognized by Israel. Israel would be allowed to maintain early-warning and security systems in this new state as well as observation posts and checkpoints at its various potential entry points. Such an initiative should be placed in a context of Israeli desire to develop constructive relationships with the Palestinians and other Arab nations, accompanied by extensive informal contacts between Israelis and Arabs, and further bolstered by the influence and support of the United States. This initiative could be the start in breaking the impasse between the Arabs and Israelis.

Chapter 6

On Producing Change in an Adversary

6.1 Introduction

Public opinion polls¹ indicate² that “distrust of the Russians among the American people is about as universal as any feeling could be.”³ Our newspapers repeatedly refer to the “Red menace,” “Soviet intransigence,” “Communist trickery and deceit.” Leading Americans warn of the “Soviet threat to the American way of life” and castigate Communist China as an “outlaw among nations.” Many American scholars specializing in the study of Communism hold the view that the Communists are out to impose their system on the rest of the world and will succeed unless we are prepared to face up to a life-and- death competition with them.⁴

¹ This text was first published by Morton Deutsch as “On Producing Change in an Adversary”, In R. Fisher (Ed.), *International Conflict and Behavioral Science*. Basic Books, 145–160. Permission to republish this text was granted on 10 November 2014 by Isabelle Bleecker, Director, International Rights, Perseus Books Group, Boston, MA 02210, USA.

² The views expressed in this paper do not represent, nor are they necessarily similar to, the views of any organization with which the author is affiliated.

³ From Samuel Lubell (well-known public-opinion expert), “Internal Divisions on Disarmament in the U.S.,” unpublished paper.

⁴ See, for instance, Philip E. Moseley (1961).

I shall, for the purpose of this paper, accept the widely held assumption that the Communists have evil designs on us⁵—that they are out to do us in by whatever means they can, fair or foul. According to this view, the Communists are seeking to dominate the world and to undermine the United States and other potential obstacles to their goal of world supremacy. Moreover, since this is their objective, one cannot trust them because they will unscrupulously exploit any opportunity to harm us and advantage themselves.

6.2 Are the Communists Incurable or Corrigible?

If the Communists are, in fact, an unprincipled adversary out to do us in, what then? One possibility is to consider that the Communists are this way and that they are incurable or unchangeable.⁶ The conception of the Communists as *incurably* malevolent leads only to the following policy alternatives:

1. waging a preventive war to destroy them before, presumably, they destroy us;
2. submitting to the Communists to induce them not to destroy us;
3. withdrawing into isolation and disengaging ourselves from the complex problems of international relations;
4. “buying time” through a military policy of stable deterrence and waiting uneasily for doomsday;
5. attempting to achieve such a clear-cut military superiority over the Communists that they would be rationally compelled to refrain from the use of force to attain their objectives.

⁵ In my opinion, this is a partial truth. It is no doubt true that the Communist leaders are hostile to the United States and would be delighted to see our national power and international influence eliminated or reduced. But our views and theirs, in these respects, are mirror images. Americans would not grieve over the demise of Communism. Each side is correct in seeing the other side as hostile and as being willing to indulge in lawless conduct (i.e., “whatever serves the national interest”) to defeat the other. Each side is also notably imperceptive with regard to how its own actions foster and maintain a hostile reaction from the other. Moreover, as a result of the mutual hostility, each side’s view of itself and of the other tends to become rigid and determined by the need to be opposed to the other side. As a result, each side loses its historical perspective and becomes imperceptive; of the reality that ideas, men, and societies change; that Adam Smith would not recognize the American “free enterprise” system as his intellectual offspring; and that Karl Marx would not be able to identify Soviet or Chinese ‘Communism’ as his descendant.

⁶ Psychologists would probably agree that, for most people, it is easier to perceive something by which they feel threatened and that they oppose as *intrinsically* rather than as *conditionally* evil. The perception of intrinsic evil in black and white requires less differentiation and integration of experience, involves less emotional restraint, and permits unequivocal and uniform moral judgment. Psychologists would also probably agree that quick moral judgment, a black-white picture, and an unconditional view of personality and behavior, make it difficult to understand either the determinants of behavior or the conditions for its change.

The last alternative is sometimes broadened to state that we could use a clear-cut military superiority to prevent the Communists from attaining victories of any sort, military or nonmilitary, while we attempt to weaken them by economic warfare, propaganda, and/or subversion.

I suggest that none of the first four alternatives is tolerable and that each for a different reason is likely to result in a nuclear catastrophe. It is now evident that even a surprise attack on the Soviet Union would leave Russia with a sufficient number of multi-megaton weapons to retaliate with a devastating blow. Submission to the Communists would not be psychologically possible for the American people unless we had been hopelessly defeated in a nuclear war. Withdrawal into isolation in the face of an unprincipled adversary is tantamount to surrender; it can only strengthen the adversary and enhance our own sense of desperation.

With regard to the policy of military deterrence, I suggest that a hostile peace will not endure; misunderstanding, insanity, local irresponsibility, or a sense of desperation during a non-nuclear war will ultimately lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in a war will, in turn, make an all-out thermonuclear war more probable. In effect, there is not enough stability in the 'stable' deterrent in a hostile world. However, it is undoubtedly true that the existence of relatively invulnerable nuclear weapons makes war less likely for any specified period of time: it "buys time." But if we "buy time," we must use the time constructively to bring about a change in our adversary before the time runs out. In other words, the policy of military deterrence is not enough in itself; it must be supplemented by a policy which assumes that our adversary is corrigible. Otherwise, we can only uneasily await doomsday.

6.2.1 The Policy of Military Superiority

The fifth alternative—working toward military superiority—is advocated by many influential groups in the United States and it has a surface plausibility. The plausibility, I believe, arises from the reasonable proposition that Western military *inferiority* might tempt the Communists to exploit their military superiority. This proposition, however, does not necessarily imply that the attempt to attain a clear-cut Western military superiority is desirable.⁷ Obviously, if the Communists were unwilling to settle for a position of military inferiority, our attempt to achieve military supremacy would only lead to a continuing intensification of the arms race.

⁷ The balancing of military power is admittedly a very complex problem since military power includes such diverse elements as geography, weaponry, national will, the state of research and development, and economic development. In terms of conventional forces, we wish to have clear military superiority to over to the Soviet Union in Detroit just as they wish to have clear superiority in Magnitogorsk. When I indicate the desirability of equality with regard to military power, I refer to the desirability of both sides being equally capable of preventing the other side from changing the political status quo by the threat or use of military power.

While an arms race is costly to the Soviet Union and undoubtedly interferes with and distorts their domestic economic development, there is no evidence to indicate either that the Soviet system under threat cannot marshal its population and resources to keep up in an arms race despite the resulting privations or that an intensified arms race will not distort the economy and weaken the democratic institutions of the United States. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that without turning ourselves into a garrison state (and hence losing our rationale for the effort necessary to defend our no-longer-existing “way of life”), we would do better in an arms race. Moreover, even if we were able to achieve numerical and technological military superiority, the Russians might still be able to do enough damage to prevent us from intimidating them by superior military force. We may get into the position where we can ‘overkill’ them but, even if they can kill us only once, how much of an advantage is this?

The policy of attempted military superiority also rests upon the assumption that the Communists will rationally accept their inferiority and not do anything that might unleash our military might. If, in fact, we can assume that they will behave rationally in terms of their self-interest when under the threat of our military superiority, can we not assume that they are also rational enough to know that their self-interest would be better served by a peaceful world in which neither side can profit from the use of military force? Evidence and common sense suggest that one acts *less* judiciously rather than more so when an opponent is perceived as trying to attain an intimidating superior force. Would our reaction be one of ‘rational’ acceptance if we believed the Soviet Union was attempting this? Consider only our reaction to the military build-up of Cuba. Would the Soviet Union be more rational than we? Are we to assume that they perceive themselves as villains and perceive us as innocent victims and will then accept that they should be humbled by us?⁸

To argue against the reasonableness of the policy of military supremacy does not imply that we should accept a position of military inferiority. As I shall indicate more fully below, we should neither tempt nor encourage Communist aggressiveness by military (or any other kind of) weakness. On the other hand, we do not wish to stimulate the arms race or provoke fears of our aggressiveness (and thus support the most intransigent, militaristic elements in the Communist bloc) by seeking the elusive and possibly nonexistent goal of military superiority.

The conception of the Communists as incorrigibly evil, even if it were true, is useless; it does not lead to any reasonable course of action. One loses nothing by assuming that the Communists are corrigible. Such a premise does not imply that we must weaken ourselves in order to influence them to cooperate in building a peaceful world. To the contrary, my discussion later in the paper suggests that we will be more likely to influence them if our own society is strong and thriving and if we are resolute in overcoming our own economic and racial problems. From the

⁸ If in fact, the Soviet leaders feel an underlying guilt about their hostility to the West, they would attempt to defend themselves against this feeling by seeking evidence to justify their hostility. A threatening, superior military capability of the United States would provide ample justification.

assumption of corrigibility, it follows that positive inducement to change, and not merely threats, are appropriate in the attempt to influence the Communists. The shift from a primary reliance on threats may have a salutary effect not only on our adversary but also on us and on uncommitted nations.

6.2.2 Can a Nation Change?

The conception of the Communists as incurrigible is not only useless; it also runs counter to the basic intellectual traditions of science which place stress on understanding the conditions which give rise to and which alter phenomena. The scientific tradition insists that evil (if one accepts this view of the Communists) must be understood and not merely condemned. Over and over again, it has been demonstrated that the ability to control and change phenomena which are viewed as intractable depends on the development of understanding. Moreover, history suggests that even aggressor nations may reform.

Americans often forget that as a new nation we were considered bumptious and arrogant by the most established European countries. The United States seized the Florida from Spain, conquered part of the Southwest after an adventurer's war against smaller and weaker Mexico, and obtained the Oregon Territory by threatening action against Britain. We also tend to forget that American expansion drove the Indian tribes ruthlessly and violently from their lands in a series of wars and broken treaties. During this time, we were stridently anticolonial, encouraging the Latin American peoples to win national independence as we established our own economic and military dominance in the resulting power vacuum. And for many years American slave traders raided the coasts of Africa to supply human chattels to do the menial, backbreaking work of American agriculture. The United States has obviously changed; aggressive, expansionist national policies are not necessarily unalterable.

If the Communists are unprincipled adversaries whose orientation we hope to change, we must ask: How did they get that way? What in their past experiences led them to develop as they did? How did their views of the outside world emerge? What gave rise to their conception of themselves? What functions did their developing internal structure serve? What relationship has our own behavior had to the particular way they have developed? What are the assumptions underlying their current behavior? How do they picture our attitude toward them and toward ourselves? I shall not attempt a detailed answer to these questions. However, a reading of many experts on Communism has led me to the following view.

Communism in the Soviet Union is a child of the West, nourished in the repressive, autocratic, cruel and secretive atmosphere of tsarist Russia. Its development reflects the stresses and strains of its formative environment and the problems of its parentage. I have no need to detail the fact that its formative environment was hostile—consider only the invasion of Russia and Siberia by the United States and other Western nations after the Bolshevik Revolution, the long

period of nonrecognition, the initial exclusion from the League of Nations, and the savage destructiveness of the German invasions. It is hardly surprising that they should have developed the motivation to do us in (if, indeed, they have) since their experience led them to believe that this was what we were trying to do to them. Nor is it surprising that they do not agree or adhere to rules of international conduct formulated by us—especially since we, and other nations, have consistently proclaimed and acted on the principle that national interests can never be subordinated to international interests. Is American intervention in Guatemala and Cuba less unprincipled than Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, except in minor degree? It is not surprising that they are unwilling to accept a double standard of international morality that is disadvantageous to them. Nor is it surprising that the Communists, having survived and even thrived in a hostile and unprincipled environment, should be confident of their ability to win a competitive struggle with us. They did well when they were weak. Shouldn't they do even better now that they are strong?

6.3 The Communist Orientation

To state that Russia's hostile, competitive orientation to the West has had realistic defensive functions in terms of past experiences does not, of course, minimize the problem in bringing about a change in this orientation. Let us examine some of its central features so that we may better understand the task confronting us.⁹

1. It is a central Communist belief that Russia's enemies ("the West") strive not merely to contain Communism but to destroy it. Thus, whether the atmosphere of international relations is superficially harmonious or tense, the basic question remains, "Who will destroy whom?"
2. While the goal of Communism is victory over its enemies, the operational tactics of Communism must be flexible and must be rationally responsive to the opportunities and dangers characterizing specific situations—advantages are pushed to their limit, retreat is made when necessary, and adventurist, risky or emotionally-based actions are avoided.

⁹ I draw the following description largely from Leites (1953). Leites's description is, I believe, an excellent depiction of the official American view of the Soviet orientation; it may not be an accurate view of the actual orientation of the leaders of post-Stalin Russia. My own view is that the characterization of only one of the parties in a two-sided conflict, without characterization of the interaction between them, tends to be misleading. It is somewhat like knowing that a wife condemns her husband to neighbors, opens his mail, takes money from his wallet, and does other nasty things. Knowing this about the wife may be misleading unless one also knows whether the husband is a habitual drunkard and adulterer or a generous and reasonable man.

3. The style of Communism is that of rude belligerence and its posture is one of unyielding resistance toward the West. By appearing brazen when they are deeply apprehensive, the Communists attempt to convince the enemy that they expect attacks and are prepared to meet them confidently. A defiant attitude not only hides their sense of inferiority from the enemy, but also protects them from their own fear of helplessness in the face of the enemy. Furthermore, their belligerence and rigid resistance serve to remove any temptation to succumb to the enemy by helping to unmask the hostility that lurks beneath occasional surface friendliness.
4. The Communists attempt to limit contact with the West and to maintain a sharp rather than fuzzy demarcation between themselves and their potential enemies. They do so because they believe their enemies will attempt to use “the smallest crack” for espionage and will use friendly contacts and false promises to subvert and seduce their populace, temporarily undergoing hardships. The limitation of contact and the emphasis on secrecy express their fear of being vulnerable to external enemies who are out to destroy them.
5. The Communists believe that the tide of history is on their side and that their side has a noble, humanistic objective: the creation of a worldwide society in which no man exploits another, in which the fruits of man’s labor are freely available to all according to their need. They see this objective as appealing to all but the exploiting classes and those who are confused and misled by the propaganda of the exploiters. Thus, they perceive a fundamental split between the people and the leaders of the enemy nations. The enemies of Communism are the leaders of the West (the “Wall Street clique”) and not the people.
6. The enemies of Communism are viewed as being highly rational, intelligent, and effective, even though they are fighting a losing battle. Their power is never to be underestimated. Their continuing, basic hostility is always to be taken for granted and, in that sense, their hostility cannot be provoked; they believe the enemy unceasingly aims at the annihilation of Communism. The ruling group of the enemy camp derives its policies from sober calculations of the relationships of forces rather than from feelings or from considerations of prestige. It acts in terms of its own self-interest; agreements are made not to promote friendly feelings but simply to represent the existing balance of forces.

There are several things to be noted in this description of the Communist orientation to the West. First, it is based on an image of a life-and-death struggle: Communists will be annihilated unless they annihilate their opponents. Their image of the enemy is, in a sense, an evil version of themselves. Second, there is the pervasive sense of vulnerability so that they must constantly be on their guard against the enemy. Third, mechanisms built into the orientation make their image partially immune to counterevidence or refuting experience. Also, their behavior, determined by their image of the enemy, is likely to produce reactions from their opponents that will make them feel that the image is true.

6.4 Changing a Hostile Orientation

How can we change such a self-perpetuating, hostile orientation? Obviously, it is a difficult task and, with our present level of knowledge, success is by no means certain. Nevertheless we must try. Drawing on analogies from psychotherapeutic experience, I suggest that there are four critical tasks involved in producing such a change.

First of all, there must be some motivation to change—the gains the Communists derive from a hostile orientation must not be so great as to outweigh the anxieties and difficulties engendered by the present situation.

Second, they must be made aware that the experienced anxieties and difficulties are causally connected with their competitive, hostile orientation.

Third, the current environment must not provide substantial justification and support for the continued maintenance of the defensive, hostile orientation appropriate in the past: new experiences, convincingly different from their past experiences, must indicate a genuine interest in their well-being.

Fourth, they must perceive that they will gain rather than suffer and have less anxiety rather than more if they adopt a new orientation.

I do not list these tasks in order of importance or priority. They are all necessary and they must all be worked on if change is to occur.

6.4.1 *The Motivation to Change*

There is some evidence that progress on the first task—motivation to change—has been made. The leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States are, I believe, deeply anxious about the present world situation; neither group believes that a competitive victory is possible through war. The new doctrine of peaceful coexistence consistently and repeatedly espoused by Khrushchev, despite bitter internal opposition, is a sign of this. Similar statements by Kennedy and Eisenhower, including their denunciations of right-wing extremists, can also be viewed as evidence that our leaders realize that nuclear weapons no longer permit victory through war. The existence of H-bombs is thus, in a perverse way, a force for change. Moreover, the economic burden of ever-increasing armaments, the increasing pressure from neutral nations who feel threatened by the arms race, and the increasing discontent with the arms race within the populations of the superpowers also work in the direction of change.

What are the gains from a competitive, hostile orientation? They are of two types—internal and external. Ample evidence suggests that a hostile, competitive orientation to the outside world fosters internal cohesiveness and permits Soviet leaders to justify and exert repressive controls to inhibit internal dissidence and challenge to their leadership. On the other hand, there is considerable reason to think that the present Soviet leaders believe that many internal stresses and strains

sire the indirect effects of the enormous costs of the arms race and that, without these costs, they could rapidly improve the lot of the Soviet people and could afford to lessen these repressive controls. Moreover, the process of de-Stalinization, initiated by the present leaders of the Soviet Union, indicates their realization that repressive controls have serious limitations as a means of motivating enthusiastic support for the goals set forth by the Communist party. In addition, the denunciation of Stalin and his paranoid despotism constitutes a repudiation of some aspects of the Soviet Union's past. In effect, the present leaders have attempted to dissociate themselves from the irrational suspiciousness and the brutal, homicidal acts connected with Stalin. In so doing, they have made it more difficult to reinstitute such despotic policies. Internally, almost all observers agree, the Soviet people have responded gratefully to the lessening of suspiciousness and tyranny.

Externally, it is apparent that the Soviet Union has made some gains by a competitive, hostile orientation to the West. It has gained political and economic influence in underdeveloped areas by being hostile to the remnants of Western imperialism. However, to the extent that we become more active in helping the peoples in these areas to achieve independence, freedom, and a higher standard of living, and to the extent that we free ourselves of racial prejudice, the Soviet Union will have little to gain from hostility per se to the West. The revolutionary changes that are sweeping through Africa and Asia and that are beginning to be felt in Latin America were not instigated by Communism and cannot be controlled by Soviet military power.¹⁰ Moreover, there is already some indication that the Soviet Union's criticisms of the West are not, in themselves, the Open Sesame to the affections of the newly emerged nations of Africa and Asia.

In effect, the Soviet Union is now faced with the task of offering something positive—something more than the financial aid, technical assistance, etc. being offered by the West—if it wishes to compete for influence among the new nations. It has already entered this competition and has begun to find that it is an expensive competition with no easy and quick gains for the Communist bloc.

Another manifestation of change concerns Soviet military power that has, of course, been used to maintain control over Eastern Europe. A widely held view is that the Soviets will use their military power to gain political control whenever they can get away with it. This conception presupposes that political and economic imperialism would be viewed as a profitable course of action by the Soviet leaders even in a world in which they perceived no military threats to their national security. Or, in other words, that the Soviet leaders would force a nonthreatening, non-Communist nation to become Communist and subservient if they could not

¹⁰ Our military power vis-a-vis most of these areas is considerably greater than that which the Soviet Union can bring to bear. Our tendency to view the Communist threat primarily in military terms has led us to give arms to backward, unpopular governments, enabling the Communists to identify us with reactionary military cliques while they attempt to identify themselves with popular unrest and the groups advocating progressive social change. It is encouraging that the Alliance for Progress places emphasis upon the need to identify with popular aspirations for social reform rather than upon military aid.

convert it to their viewpoint. There is, of course, some evidence to support this view—consider only Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, there is another side to this picture. Despite its military power, the Soviet Union has discovered that it cannot simply impose its will on other Communist nations to obtain unquestioning obedience to orders from Moscow. There is a growing diversity and independence of decision within the Communist group of nations. Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania, China, and Albania diverge in different respects from Soviet doctrine.

The changes that have taken place within the Communist world reflect a growing relativism in the Communist ideology and may contribute to an erosion of the rigidity of the Bolshevik doctrine. The image of the utopian world of Communism has been tarnished by the reality of conflict and diversity within the Communist bloc; the changing image may yet suggest that diversity among nations cannot be abolished by power or by superficial ideological similarity. This realization may weaken the readiness to run risks and to make sacrifices to establish a Communist domination over the world.

However, the erosion of the ideological base for militant Communist expansion has not yet proceeded far enough to warrant a lack of concern about the aggressive potentials of Soviet military power. The fact that Soviet military power has been used to establish and maintain unpopular Communist governments in Eastern Europe suggests that prudence requires the West to develop and maintain military forces sufficient to insure that the Soviet leaders fully understand that military aggression, or the threat of it, will be unrewarding to them. We have to press for agreements that would end the arms race, that would stabilize and reduce the military forces of both sides, and that would eliminate military elements from areas of intense international conflict (Central Europe, Southeast Asia, Middle East).¹¹

Similarly, we must be prepared to deter subversion and indirect aggression against ourselves and other independent nations so that these courses of “unfair competition” become unrewarding to the Communists. On one hand, we do not want to tempt them by indifference and lack of response to violations of civilized standards of international conduct. On the other hand, we do not wish to justify illegal behavior by emulating it. Nor can we reasonably assert the right to use military force (such as extensive military aid and the intervention of American troops) to support unpopular dictators who are threatened by internal revolutionary movements led by Communists. Since we cannot allow the Communists to claim the moral right to overthrow non-Communist nations, we cannot claim the moral right to preserve the status quo simply because it favors us.

¹¹ We should, of course, seek reasonable verification of compliance. However, since the Soviet leaders apparently view secrecy as necessary for their internal security, we should anticipate little immediate progress in obtaining agreements that require the Soviet Union to “open up” its society to external inspection. This is particularly likely to be the case when the agreement offers them no major economic saving. We may be more successful in obtaining disarmament agreements if we concentrate on agreements that do not require open access to Soviet territory by human inspectors—i.e., on agreements that can be monitored by nonhuman sensors or on agreements relating to areas outside of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which are potential areas of military conflict.

6.4.2 *Increasing Their Awareness of the Effects of Their Behavior*

If my analysis is correct, the Soviet Union has made important internal and external gains from a competitive, hostile orientation to the West. But these gains have diminished considerably and are being overshadowed by the anxieties and difficulties associated with the arms race. However, I do not believe they are yet sufficiently aware that the arms race is partly stimulated by our reaction to their orientation toward us. They, of course, see the causal arrow pointed in the opposite direction—their attitude is determined by our hostile, threatening orientation to them, I doubt that the Soviet leaders are sensitive to how we react when they say, “We will outlive you” or “Your grandchildren will live under Communism.” I doubt that they are aware that their own actions and words lead us to react in such a way that their view of a hostile world is confirmed.

How we can help the Russians to become aware of the relationship between their actions and our reactions is a difficult problem for which I have no pat solution. Obviously, encouraging more and more of their leaders to visit the United States and to talk informally with congressmen, administration officials, businessmen, and others, may enable them to realize that many of our most influential citizens do, in fact, perceive our orientation as defensive and determined by their hostile, threatening orientation. We should encourage these visits whether or not they are willing to reciprocate. Philip Moseley¹² has pointed out, “In comparing the 1931 level of [Soviet] knowledge about the West with the level of 1961, I have to say that the 1961 level is about two percent of the 1931 level.” We must change this horrifying situation by providing their leaders with as many opportunities as we can for informing themselves about us. *Note* I place stress on ‘leaders’ because one may suspect that their subordinates here in the United States tend, as do most subordinates, to frame their communications in ways that do not challenge the prejudices and stereotypes of their superiors.

In addition to fostering frequent contacts among leaders, we should attempt to institutionalize a direct process of communicating accurate interpretations of the actions and utterances of each side. We should have some regularized way of holding up a mirror to the Soviet leaders so they can see how they look to us when they act in a certain way, and vice versa. Possibly, alternating every other month, the President might give a talk to and expose himself to questions from the Politburo, and the Soviet Premier might do the same for leading officials in our government. There is no doubt that the technical problems of arranging direct but restricted communication from nation to nation could be solved. I suggest that the communication be restricted to the leaders rather than made available to the public in order to reduce the temptation to propagandize. However, neither side is sufficiently disinterested and free of manipulative desires to be able to portray without

¹² Moseley, loc. cit.

bias their image of the other.¹³ It may well be that we each need a neutral mirror to interpret communications so that they are unlikely to be misinterpreted by either side. It would not, I imagine, be impossible to set up a group of competent statesmen and social scientists from neutral nations that might perform such a function. The record of each side in predicting the reactions of the other side is pitifully poor and suggests the need for some such procedure.

6.4.3 Providing New Experiences to Facilitate Change

While increased social and self-insight is helpful in bringing about change, the most important strategy in inducing it is to act and react in a way that is inconsistent with the other's expectations. One should, of course, anticipate that when this is done the other will be disconcerted and will attempt, initially, to provoke reactions that will justify his original expectations. The great difficulty in executing this strategy is in resisting the trap of being provoked to actions that will confirm his expectations. Thus, if we wish to change a hostile orientation, we must see to it that the current environment does not provide justification and support for its continued maintenance. The Communists must have new experiences with us that are convincingly different from their past experiences—new experiences that, on the one hand, indicate that we have a genuine interest in their well-being and which, on the other hand, indicate self-respect and an unwillingness to be abused.

In the paper "A Psychological Basis for Peace,"¹⁴ I have attempted to spell out some of the policies and actions we could adopt that might lead the Soviet Union to change its orientation. These policies include giving up the quest for military supremacy, establishing continuing joint military and technical groups to lessen the dangers of war and to work for disarmament, showing an active concern with what the Russians regard as important, accepting the viability and legitimacy of their system for them, conforming to the standards of international conduct we wish them to conform to, developing a genuine interest in their internal successes rather than failures, expressing in action and words our desire for a rapid improvement in their standard of living, recognizing and honoring their achievements, welcoming whatever assistance they may be able to give us, expanding mutual trade, fostering cultural and educational exchanges, establishing co-operative programs of research and advanced studies, and institutionalizing international competitive contests in diverse fields to encourage peaceful competition for international prestige.

¹³ Thus, for example, if American leaders interpret Khrushchev's statement headlined as "We will bury you" to mean "We will destroy you" rather than "We will outlive you," the misinterpretation may be a deliberate distortion to make the statement seem more hostile than it was. In Russian, Khrushchev's statement implied that American capitalism would die because of its comparative inefficiency while socialism would continue to flourish.

¹⁴ In Quincy et al. (1962).

6.4.4 Perceiving Gains from a New Orientation

In sum, I suggest that a policy that combines *both* firmness and friendliness. We can think of this as a policy of *friendly strength*. This is the surest way of helping the Russians to perceive the gains they can achieve by a change in orientation. We should attempt to establish an international atmosphere amicable enough to permit nations with diverse internal systems to engage in mutually rewarding, co-operative endeavors.

To create such an atmosphere, we shall have to launch a *sustained* program of *massive reconciliation* in which we try to express and maintain a willingness to co-operate with the Soviet Union when it is to our mutual advantage. We should not expect that our offers of co-operation will be received with gratitude, or will be reciprocated fully, or will be frequently accepted. Even so, we should persist in offering to co-operate whenever we see opportunities that will profit *both* sides. Our underlying attitude must be sufficiently self-confident so that we do not feel threatened by the fact that they, as well as we, will profit from co-operation, or by the possibility that, because of our greater affluence, they may on occasion profit relatively more than we.

Obviously, the Communists will have no incentive to co-operate unless they stand to gain rather than to suffer, unless they become more secure rather than less, as a result of co-operation. It is, of course, these very gains from cooperation that will create a web of interdependencies that give each side a positive interest in the other's wellbeing. However, Russia's legacy of sustained suspicion is such that it will take continuing good will, sustained offers of genuine co-operation, and a persistent readiness to accept their offers of reasonable co-operation on our part, before their underlying image of a competitive struggle for survival is replaced by a sense of interlaced common interests.

6.5 Changing Ourselves

Here, let me turn briefly to the question of how we can influence ourselves to sustain a policy of massive reconciliation. In other words, how can we change our own hostile orientation to the Soviet Union, especially since their actions often provide a justification for our orientation? This is an extraordinarily difficult question and most of us evade it. Many of those trying to change Russia's orientation do not face up to the social and political functions that it serves. The analysis I have sketched above might be politically disastrous unless there was a concurrent change in the American orientation.

6.5.1 Roots of American Defensiveness

In examining the question I have raised, I suggest that we must begin to understand the roots of our own defensiveness. I use the term ‘defensiveness’ to indicate that our conception of the Communists is determined, not only by what they are actually like, but also by our own internally generated needs and anxieties. I would suggest that we must confront three major internal problems—three roots of our defensiveness—before we can lose our obsession with Communism.

First, historically, the United States has been able to have things pretty much its own way. Prior to World War I, our geographical isolation permitted this. After World War I, and especially right after World War II, we were the strongest power on earth. We were not able to remain isolated nor are we likely to remain the supreme power. The future suggests that we will have to accommodate ourselves to the fact that we will be a strong power among other equally strong powers in a highly interdependent world. In a sense, we have to adjust ourselves to a loss of unique power, to a loss of unique status. Loss of status for a proud people is always difficult to accept. We must investigate previous historical examples of such loss—for example, England—to learn as much as we can about coping with this difficult national situation.

A second root of defensiveness lies in the careers, skills, special privileges, jobs, and financial interests that have been developed in relation to a hostile world. These vested interests will naturally feel threatened by a change in our orientation unless they are given the strongest assurance that they will not lose by such a change. I suggest that the president urge Congress to adopt, as a declaration of national policy, a statement to the effect that scientists, the military, employers, industrialists, and investors will be compensated for any losses they suffer as a result of the curtailment of defense activities. This statement must, of course, be buttressed by the development of meaningful and detailed plans, at the local as well as the national level, for enabling the people and industries involved in defense to play a significant and profitable role in a peaceful world.

A third root of defensiveness lies in a lack of confidence in ourselves—a lack of confidence in our ability to maintain a thriving, prosperous, and attractive society that can be morally and intellectually influential among nations without a preponderance of military power. Obviously, we must work to overcome our problems of racial prejudice, economic instability, and lack of dedication to common purposes. To the extent that we have a thriving society coping successfully with its own internal problems, we will have less ground for the fears and less need for the hostilities that interfere with international co-operation. Unless we can make democracy work in Mississippi, what reason is there for believing that we can influence the underdeveloped nations to adopt the social reforms and political practices necessary to prevent international turmoil and strife?

6.5.2 *Speaking to Both Audiences Simultaneously*

My discussion has emphasized the fact that our own defensiveness may make it difficult for us to adopt an orientation toward the Soviet bloc that might lead to the end of the Cold War. Any change will require vigorous political effort by the diverse groups who see the present state of international relations as perilous. In addition, it may require pressure from friendly, influential nations (for example, in Europe and in South America) who are not as obsessed as we with the nightmare of Communism. However, not all courses of constructive international action are likely to provoke equal amounts of defensiveness. It may well be that our most important intellectual task is to uncover courses of action that will be reassuring to the Communists and will also challenge our own defenses least. The problem is to define programs of action sufficiently close to our own national identity that still deal positively with the Communist world. These actions must serve constructive functions for both the internal and external audiences, each of whom is highly defensive.

How do we convince both audiences¹⁵ that their fears are unwarranted? The answer to this dilemma lies, I believe, in the policy of *friendly strength*, which I have described above. Both audiences must be persuaded that the military strength of either side cannot overcome the other and that the resort to military force will be mutually destructive. Public statements of our own military capability should always be accompanied by clear recognition of Soviet military strength. Expression of our own determination to resist military aggression should be coupled with acknowledgment of the Soviet determination to do the same.

Explicit recognition of mutual military power (and, hence, of the impotence of military power to resolve conflicts of interest) should be accompanied by open recognition that the internal achievements of the two societies will not affect the ultimate military balance of power. On the contrary, our public statements to both audiences should demonstrate an awareness that internal difficulties and failures make a nation with nuclear arms more rather than less dangerous. Neither we nor the Soviet Union have any reason to gloat if internal problems or external loss of face strengthen the primitive, repressive, and belligerent elements in the other nation. We would do well to affirm repeatedly our real interest in a prosperous and thriving world, in which all nations (including those in the Communist bloc) are coping successfully with their internal economic, social, and political problems.

The promotion of the positive goal of a peaceful world, composed of thriving, independent, and co-operating nations, rather than the negative goal of containing Communism, provides a potential meeting ground for both audiences and a potential avenue for co-operation. Undoubtedly, the 'meeting' will initially be on

¹⁵ There are, of course, more than two audiences. One has to consider one's allies, the uncommitted nations, and so forth. However, if one can speak constructively to both the Soviet and American power-holders, it seems likely that the difficulties with other audiences can be surmounted.

the safest grounds (for example, the adoption in the United States of ingenious Soviet-developed surgical staplers that join severed blood vessels and nerves, or the widespread use of American- developed polio vaccines in the Soviet Union). When there has been a successful encounter, however, it should be given the widest public recognition.

Even when the grounds for co-operation are least secure, when there is reason to believe that the other side is seeking to obtain a competitive advantage—for example, in attempting to use the vulnerabilities of underdeveloped nations to spread anti-American Communism—there is nothing to be lost by proclaiming and pursuing a positive goal which is not oriented to, or determined by, the Cold War. On the contrary, a policy of aiding underdeveloped nations, which is oriented to their need for prosperity and independence rather than our fear of Communism, is more likely to produce attitudes favorable toward us. Such a policy is not only likely to be more effective in preventing the spread of anti-American Communism but, in addition, it leaves open the continuing possibility of co-operation with the Communists to achieve the mutually acceptable objectives of reducing poverty and instability among nations.

More generally, one can state that the reduction of international tension requires that the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union be constantly aware that their words and actions have implications for the two audiences. Neither audience is likely to attribute evil intentions to itself nor altruistic motives to the other, nor are they likely to accept a position of military inferiority. On one hand, statements or deeds that rest on the claim of moral superiority or of superior power can only incense the external audience, even though they may please the internal audience. On the other hand, the announcement and pursuit of positive goals that can contribute to the welfare of both sides, and to which both may contribute, enhance the possibility that co-operation will occur sooner or later.

For purposes of discussion, throughout this paper I have accepted the widely held assumption that the Soviet Union can be viewed as an unprincipled adversary. A Soviet reader, if he felt this were a more apt characterization of the United States, might apply such reasoning in this paper to the problem of changing the United States.

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Chapter 7

Educating for a Peaceful World

7.1 Introduction

This article outlines a program of what schools can do to encourage the values, attitudes, and knowledge that foster constructive rather than destructive relations, which prepare children to live in a peaceful world.¹ It describes four key components of such programs: cooperative learning, conflict resolution training, the constructive use of controversy in teaching subject matters, and the creation of dispute resolution centers in schools.²

Families and schools are the two most important institutions that influence developing children's predispositions to hate and to love. Although the influence of the family comes earlier and is often more profound, there is good reason to believe that children's subsequent experiences in schools can modify or strengthen their earlier acquired dispositions. In this article, I outline a program that schools can follow to encourage the development of the values, attitudes, and knowledge that foster constructive rather than destructive relations, which prepare children to live in a peaceful world.

Many schools do not provide much constructive social experience for students. Too often, schools are structured in ways that pit students against one another. They compete for teachers' attention, for grades, for status, and for admission to prestigious schools. Being put down and putting others down are pervasive occurrences. Many of us can recall classroom experiences of hoping that another student, who

¹ This text was first published in May 1993 by Morton Deutsch as "Educating for a Peaceful World". In *American Psychologist*, 48, 510–517. Copyright © 1993 by the American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission by Karen Thomas on behalf of the American Psychological Association on 17 November 2014.

² Lewis P. Lipsiti served as action editor for this article. This article was presented as the presidential address to the Division of Peace Psychology at the 99th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in San Francisco on August 8, 1991. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Morton Deutsch, International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

was called on by the teacher instead of us, would give the wrong answer so that we could get called on and give the right answer.

In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that schools have to change in basic ways if we are to educate children so that they are for rather than against one another, so that they develop the ability to resolve their conflicts constructively rather than destructively and are prepared to live in a peaceful world. This recognition has been expressed in a number of interrelated movements: cooperative learning, conflict resolution, and education for peace. In my view, there are four key components in these overlapping movements: cooperative learning, conflict resolution training, the constructive use of controversy in teaching subject matters, and the creation of dispute resolution centers in the schools.³ I discuss each briefly, with more emphasis on cooperative learning and conflict resolution because I have worked more extensively in these two areas and because they provide a valuable base for education in constructive controversy and mediation.

7.2 Cooperative Learning

Although cooperative learning has many ancestors and can be traced back at least 2,000 years, it is only in this century that there has been development of a theoretical base, systematic research, and systematic teaching procedures for cooperative learning. There are five key elements of cooperative learning (Johnson et al. 1986). The most important is *positive interdependence*. Students must perceive that it is to their advantage if other students learn well and that it is to their disadvantage if others do poorly. This can be achieved in many different ways: through mutual goals (goal interdependence); division of labor (task interdependence); dividing resources, materials, or information among group members (resource interdependence); and by giving joint rewards (reward interdependence).

In addition, cooperative learning requires *face-to-face interaction* in which students can express their positive interdependence in behavior. It also requires *individual accountability* of each member of the cooperative learning group to one another for mastering the material to be learned and for providing appropriate support and assistance to each other. Furthermore, it is necessary for the students to

³ There has been little research on factors affecting the acceptance of or resistance to cooperative learning (conflict resolution, constructive controversy, or mediation) programs by teachers, parents, or school systems. My impression is that the interest and demand for such programs have been increasing at an accelerating rate during the past 10 years and that the supply of well-trained teachers and administrators in these areas is insufficient to meet the demand, in the near future, I expect that schools of education will develop educational programs for new teachers and administrators in these areas. Not enough research has been done yet to specify an appropriate balance among the different modes of teaching. It would undoubtedly vary as a function of such factors as the skills of the individual teacher, the type of subject matter to be learned, and the characteristics of the students. Nevertheless, the available research indicates that, in a wide variety of contexts and subject matters with diverse students, the use of cooperative learning is beneficial.

be trained in the *interpersonal and small group skills* needed for effective cooperative work in groups. Finally, cooperative learning also involves providing students with the time and procedures for *processing* or analyzing how well their learning groups are functioning and what can be done to improve how they work together. It is desirable to compose cooperative learning groups that are heterogeneous with regard to gender, academic ability, ethnic background, and physical disability.

Hundreds of research studies have been done on the relative effects of cooperative, competitive, and individualistic learning experiences (see Johnson/Johnson 1983, 1989). The various studies of cooperative learning are quite consistent with one another and with initial⁴ theoretical work and research on the effects of cooperation and competition (Deutsch 1949a, b) in indicating very favorable effects on students. Students develop a considerably greater commitment, helpfulness, and caring for each other regardless of differences in ability level, ethnic background, gender, social class, or physical disability. They develop more skill in taking the perspective of others, emotionally as well as cognitively. They develop greater self-esteem and a greater sense of being valued by their classmates. They develop more positive attitudes toward learning, school, and their teachers. They usually learn more in the subjects they study by cooperative learning, and they acquire more of the skills and attitudes that are conducive to effective collaboration with others.

It is evident that cooperative education fosters constructive relations. Moreover, when used by skillful teachers, it can help children overcome alienated or hostile orientations to others that they have developed from earlier experiences (see Johnson/Johnson 1989, and Deutsch et al. 1992, for a more extensive discussion of mental health effects).

However, it is important to realize that, although the concept of cooperative learning is simple, its practice is not. Changing a classroom and school so that they emphasize cooperative learning requires that teachers learn many new skills—ways of teaching students cooperative skills, ways to monitor and intervene in student work groups to improve students' collaborative skills, methods of composing student groups and structuring cooperative learning goals so that groups are likely to work well together, ways of developing curriculum materials to promote positive interdependence, ways to create constructive academic controversies within the cooperative groups, and ways of integrating the cooperative learning with competitive and individualistic learning activities. It usually takes teachers about 3 or 4 years to become well skilled in the use of cooperative learning.

Sometimes parents and teachers have misconceptions about cooperative learning that make them resistant to it initially.² There are several myths that it is good to

⁴ By this emphasis, I do not mean to imply that students should not also acquire—at the appropriate age level—substantive knowledge in such fields as political science, international relations, arms control and disarmament, economic development, the global environment, and world trade, which are also important to world peace, and other substantive knowledge and skills necessary to function as responsible adults.

confront (see Johnson et al. 1986, for a more extensive discussion). The following are four common myths.

1. Cooperative learning does not prepare students for the adult world, which is highly competitive. There are two points to be made, (a) The ability of people to work cooperatively is crucial to building and maintaining stable marriages, families, communities, friendships, careers, and a peaceful world. Although competition has often been stressed as the key to success in the world of work, the reality is that individual as well as corporate success depends on effective cooperation and teamwork (Kohn 1986). (b) Schools, even those with extensive cooperative learning, would provide much experience with individual and group competition. The issue is not to eliminate competition and individualism from the schools but to provide a more appropriate balance with cooperation.³ Although children are exposed to competition in schools, my impression is that schools rarely teach generalizable skills in a systematic way in order for children to be effective competitors.
2. High-achieving students are penalized by working in heterogeneous cooperative learning groups. Research evidence clearly indicates that high-achieving students learn at least as much in cooperatively structured classrooms as they do in the more traditional ones (Johnson/Johnson 1983, 1989). They frequently learn more in cooperatively structured classrooms: Teaching less able students often solidifies their own learning, they learn how to help others and to work collaboratively, and they learn how to be mutually respecting despite differences in ability. This is not to deny that some high achievers need help from their teachers and their classmates to appreciate the benefits they can obtain from cooperative learning. It should also be recognized that cooperative learning does not imply that high achievers must learn and work at the same pace as low achievers. Nor does it imply that high achievers will lack opportunities to work alone or to work cooperatively with other high achievers.
3. Grading is unfair in cooperative learning. There are many ways of creating positive interdependence in cooperative learning groups; group grading is one way but it is not necessary. Even when group grades are used, individual grades may also be used. Although students sometimes complain about grades, complaints appear to be less frequent in cooperative learning classrooms than in more traditional ones. Students are able to recognize that how well people do in life is affected not only by how well they perform as individuals but also by how well the groups, teams, corporations, and nations of which they are members perform.
4. The good students do all the work; the lazy students get a free ride. A central feature in cooperative learning is individual accountability. If a student is “goofing off,” this becomes a problem for the group that, with encouragement and appropriate help from the teacher, the group can usually solve. In solving the problem, the group learns a great deal and the poorly motivated, alienated, withdrawn, or reclusive student often benefits enormously as he or she becomes an active participant in cooperative learning.

7.3 Conflict Resolution Training

Conflict is an inevitable feature of all social relations. Conflict can take a constructive or destructive course; it can take the form of enlivening controversy or deadly quarrel. There is much to suggest that there is a two-way relation between effective cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. Good cooperative relations facilitate the constructive management of conflict; the ability to handle constructively the inevitable conflicts that occur during cooperation facilitates the survival and deepening of cooperative relations.

In recent years, conflict resolution training programs have sprouted in a number of schools, industries, and community dispute-resolution centers. In this article, I focus on such programs in schools. Although I believe these programs are very promising, they are relatively new and little systematic research on their effectiveness has been done. There are many different programs, and their contents vary with the age and background of the students.

Nevertheless, there are some common elements running through most programs. They derive from the recognition that a constructive process of conflict resolution is similar to an effective, cooperative problem-solving process (in which the conflict is perceived as the mutual problem to be solved) whereas a destructive process is similar to a win-lose, competitive struggle (Deutsch 1973). In effect, most conflict resolution training programs seek to instill attitudes, knowledge, and skills that are conducive to effective, cooperative problem solving and to discourage the attitudes and habitual responses that give rise to win-lose struggles. Below, I list the central elements included in many training programs, but I do not have the space to describe the ingenious techniques that are used in teaching them. The sequence in which they are taught varies as a function of the nature of the group being taught.

1. Know what type of conflict you are involved in. There are three major types of conflict: the zero-sum conflict (a pure win-lose conflict), the mixed-motive (both can win, both can lose, or one can win and the other lose), and the pure cooperative (both can win or both can lose). It is important to know what kind of conflict you are in because the different types require different types of strategies and tactics (see Lewicki/Litterer 1985; Pruitt/Rubin 1986; Walton/McKersie 1965). The common tendency is for inexperienced parties to define their conflicts as win-lose even though it is a mixed-motive conflict. Very few conflicts are intrinsically win-lose conflicts, but if they are misperceived to be such, the parties involved are apt to engage in a competitive, destructive process of conflict resolution. This is so unless there are very strong accepted norms or rules regulating the nature of the competitive interaction (as in competitive games).

The strategies and tactics of the different types of conflict differ. In a zero-sum conflict one seeks to amass, mobilize, and use the various resources of power (Lasswell/Kaplan 1950) in such a way that one can bring to bear on the conflict more effective, relevant power than one's adversary. If this is not possible in the initial area of conflict, one seeks to transform the arena of conflict into one in

which one's effective power is greater than one's adversary's. Thus, if a bully challenges you to a fight because you won't 'lend' him or her money and he or she is stronger than you (and you cannot amass the power to deter, intimidate, or beat the bully), you might arrange to change the conflict from a physical confrontation (that you would lose) to a legal confrontation (that you would win) by involving the police or other legal authority. Other strategies and tactics in win-lose conflicts involve outwitting, misleading, seducing, blackmailing, and the various forms of the black arts that have been discussed by Machiavelli (1513/1950), Potter (1965), Schelling (1960), and Alinsky (1971), among others. The strategy and tactics involved in mixed-motive conflicts are discussed below. My emphasis is on the strategy of cooperative problem solving to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the conflict and on the development and application of mutually acceptable fair principles to handle situations in which the aspirations of both sides cannot be realized equally. The strategy and tactics of the resolution of cooperative conflicts involve primarily cooperative fact-finding and research as well as rational persuasion.

2. Become aware of the causes and consequences of violence and of the alternatives to violence, even when you are very angry. Become realistically aware of how much violence there is. How many young people die from violence, the role of weapons in leading to violence, how frequently homicides are precipitated by arguments, and how alcohol and drugs contribute to violence. Become aware of what makes you very angry: learn the healthy and unhealthy ways you have of expressing anger. Learn how to actively channel your anger in ways that are not violent and are not likely to provoke violence from the other. Understand that violence begets violence and that if you 'win' an argument by violence, the other will try to get even in some other way. Learn alternatives to violence in dealing with conflict. Prothrow-Stith (1987) has developed a very helpful curriculum for adolescents on the prevention of violence.
3. Face conflict rather than avoid it. Recognize that conflict may make you anxious and that you may try to avoid it. Learn the typical defenses that you use to evade conflict (e.g., denial, suppression, becoming overly agreeable, rationalization, postponement, premature conflict resolution). Become aware of the negative consequences of evading a conflict, such as irritability, tension, and persistence of the problem. Learn what kinds of conflicts are best avoided rather than confronted—for example, conflicts that will evaporate shortly, those that are inherently unresolvable, and win-lose conflicts that you are unlikely to win.
4. Respect yourself and your interests, and respect the other and his or her interests. Personal insecurity and a sense of vulnerability often lead people to define conflicts as life or death, win-lose struggles even when they are relatively minor, mixed-motive conflicts. This definition may lead to conflict avoidance, premature conflict resolution, or obsessive involvement in the conflict. Helping students develop respect for themselves and their interests enables them to see their conflicts in reasonable proportion and facilitates their constructive confrontation. Helping students learn to respect the other and the other's

interests inhibits the use of competitive tactics of power, coercion, deprecation, and deception that commonly escalate the issues and often lead to violence.

Valuing oneself and others, as well as respect for the differences between oneself and others, are rooted in the fundamental moral commitment to the principle of universal human dignity. This core value and its derivatives not only should be emphasized in the curricula of many subject matters (e.g. literature, geography, history, social studies) from kindergarten through the 12th grade, in addition to the conflict resolution curricula, but also should be learned by students from their observations of how teachers and school administrators treat students and other people in and around the schools.

5. Avoid ethnocentrism: Understand and accept the reality of cultural difference. Be aware that you live in a community, a nation, and a world with people from many different cultures. People from different cultures may differ from you in their appearance, dress, behavior, perceptions, beliefs, preferences, values, history, and ways of thinking about conflict and negotiation. What you take to be self-evident and right may not seem that way to people from different cultural backgrounds and, conversely, what they take as self-evident and right may not seem that way to you. Learn to understand and accept the reality of cultural differences; try to understand the other's culture and try to help the other to understand yours. Expect cultural misunderstandings, and use them as opportunities for learning rather than as a basis of estrangement.
6. Distinguish clearly between *interests* and *positions*. Positions may be opposed, but interests may not be (Fisher/Ury 1981). The classic example from Follett (1940) is that of a brother and sister, each of whom wanted the only orange available. The sister wanted the peel of the orange to make marmalade; the brother wanted to eat the inner part. Their positions ("I want the orange") were opposed, but their interests were not. Often when conflicting parties reveal their underlying interests, it is possible to find a solution that suits them both.
7. Explore your interests and the other's interests to identify the common and compatible interests that you share. Identifying shared interests makes it easier to deal constructively with the interests that you perceive as being opposed. A full exploration of one another's interests increases empathy and facilitates subsequent problem solving. For an excellent discussion of how to develop empathy and a sense of shared interests, see Schulman/Mekier (1985).
When considerable distrust and hostility have developed between the conflicting parties, it may be useful to have third parties help in this process of exploration.

The third parties may serve one or more functions. They may serve as facilitators or as conciliators (or therapists) who help the parties control and reduce their distrust and hostility enough to permit them to engage in this process themselves. They may serve as mediators who directly assist the parties in this process or even undertake the exploration for the conflicting parties, doing what the parties are unable or unwilling to do. There has been considerable discussion of such third-party intervention (including the selection, training,

and ethical requirements for third parties) in Folberg/Taylor (1984), Kelman (1979), Kressel (1985), Kressel et al. (1989), and Rubin (1980).

8. Define the conflicting interests between yourself and the other as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively. Define the conflict in the smallest terms possible, as a “here-now-this” conflict rather than as a conflict between personalities or general principles—that is, as a conflict about a specific behavior rather than about who is a better person. Diagnose the problem clearly, and then seek creative new options that lead to mutual gain. If no option for mutual gain can be discovered, seek to agree on a fair rule or procedure for deciding how the conflict will be resolved. However, not all conflicts can be solved to mutual satisfaction even with the most creative thinking. In such cases, agreeing on a fair procedure to determine who gets his or her way, or seeking help from neutral third parties when such an agreement cannot be reached, may be the most constructive resolution possible (see Lewicki/Litierer 1985, for an excellent discussion of the strategy and tactics of integrative bargaining). To the extent that the parties see the possibility of a mutually satisfying agreement, they will be more able to listen to one another in an understanding, empathic manner, and, of course, the converse is true too.
9. In communicating with the other, listen attentively and speak so as to be understood. This requires an active effort to take the perspective of the other and to check continually your success in doing so. You should listen to the other’s meaning and emotion in such a way that the other *feels* understood as well as is understood. Similarly, you want to communicate to the other your thoughts and feelings in such a way that you have good evidence that he or she understands the way you think and feel. The feeling of being understood, as well as effective communication, facilitates constructive resolution. Johnson/Johnson (1987a, b), Lewicki/Litierer (1985), Prutzman et al. (1988), and many others have provided excellent discussions and practical exercises for developing effective communicating and listening skills. As a communicator, you want to be skilled in obtaining and holding the other’s attention, in phrasing your communication so that it is readily comprehended and remembered, and in acquiring the credibility that facilitates acceptance of your message. Skills in taking others’ perspectives and obtaining feedback about the effectiveness of your communications are important. Listening actively and effectively entails not only taking the perspective of the other so that you understand the communicator’s ideas and feelings but also communicating your desire to understand the other and indicating, through paraphrasing your understanding or through questions, what you do not understand. Role reversal seems to be helpful in developing an understanding of the other’s perspective and providing checks on how effective the communication process has been.
10. Be alert to the natural tendencies to bias, misperceptions, misjudgments, and stereotyped thinking that commonly occur in yourself and the other during heated conflict. These errors in perception and thought interfere with communication, make empathy difficult, and impair problem solving. Psychologists

can provide a checklist of the common forms of misperception and misjudgment that occur during intense conflict. These include black-white thinking, demonizing the other, shortening your time perspective, narrowing your range of perceived options, and the fundamental attribution error. The fundamental attribution error is illustrated in the tendency to attribute the aggressive actions of the other to the other's personality while attributing your own aggressive actions to external circumstances (such as the other's hostile actions). The ability to recognize and admit your misperceptions and misjudgments clears the air and facilitates similar acknowledgment by the other (see Jervis 1976; Kahneman et al. 1982; Nisbett/Ross 1980).

11. Develop skills for dealing with difficult conflicts so that you are not helpless when confronting those who are more powerful, who do not want to engage in constructive conflict resolution, or who use dirty tricks. Fisher/Ury (1981) have discussed these matters very helpfully in the final three chapters of their well-known book, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In*. I shall not summarize their discussion but rather emphasize several basic principles. First, it is important to recognize that you become less vulnerable to intimidation by a more powerful other, to someone who refuses to cooperate except on his or her terms, or to someone who plays dirty tricks (deceives, welshes on an agreement, personally attacks you, etc.) if you realize that you usually have a choice: You do not have to stay in the relationship with the other. You are more likely to be aware of your freedom to choose between leaving or staying if you feel that there are alternatives to continuing the relationship that you can accept. The alternative may not be great, but it may be better than staying in the relationship. The freedom to choose prevents the other, if he or she benefits from the relationship, from making the relationship unacceptable to you. Second, it is useful to be open and explicit to the other about what he or she is doing that is upsetting you and to indicate the effects that these actions are having on you. If the other asserts that you have misunderstood or denies doing what you have stated, and if you are not persuaded, be forthright in maintaining that this remains a problem for you. Discuss with the other what could be done to remove the problem (your misunderstanding of the other, your need for reassurance, or the other's noxious behavior). Third, it is wise to avoid reciprocating the other's behavior and to avoid attacking the other personally for his or her behavior (i.e., criticize the behavior and not the person); doing so often leads to an escalating vicious spiral. It is helpful to look behind the other's behavior with such questions as, "I wonder what you think my reaction is to what you have said?" or "I am really curious. What do you think this will gain for you?" It is also sometimes useful to suggest to the other more appropriate means for pursuing his or her interests than the ones that he or she is currently using. A phrase that I have found useful in characterizing the stance one should take in difficult (as well as easy) conflicts is to be "firm, fair, and friendly." *Firm* in resisting intimidation, exploitation, and dirty tricks; *fair* in holding to one's

moral principles and not reciprocating the other's immoral behavior despite his or her provocations; and *friendly* in the sense that one is willing to initiate and reciprocate cooperation.

12. Know yourself and how you typically respond in different sorts of conflict situations. As I have suggested earlier, conflict frequently evokes anxiety in clinical work.

I have found that the anxiety is often based on unconscious fantasies of being overwhelmed and helpless in the face of the other's aggression or of being so angry and aggressive that you fear you will destroy the other. Different people deal with their anxieties about conflict in different ways.

I have found it useful to emphasize six different dimensions of dealing with conflict that can be used to characterize a person's predispositions to respond to conflict. Being aware of one's predispositions may allow one to modify them when they are inappropriate in a given conflict. The six dimensions follow.

- (a) *Avoiding conflict/excessively involved in conflict.* Conflict avoidance is expressed in denial, repression, suppression, avoidance, and continuing postponement of facing the conflict. Sometimes it is evidenced in premature conflict resolution, fleeing into an agreement before there is adequate exploration of the conflicting interests and the various options for resolving the conflict. Usually, the conflict that is avoided does not go away; rather, the tension associated with it is expressed in fatigue, irritability, muscular tension, and a sense of malaise. Excessive involvement in conflict is sometimes expressed in a 'macho' attitude, a chip on one's shoulder, a tendency to seek out conflict to demonstrate that one is not afraid of conflict. It is also commonly expressed in a preoccupation with conflict—obsessive thoughts about fights, disputes, and quarrels, with much rehearsing of moves and countermoves between oneself and one's adversaries. Presumably, a healthy predisposition involves the readiness to confront conflict when it arises without needing to seek it out or to be preoccupied with it.
- (b) *Hard/soft.* Some people are prone to take a tough, aggressive, dominating, unyielding response to conflict, fearing that otherwise they will be taken advantage of and be considered soft. Others are afraid that they will be considered mean, hostile, or presumptuous, and as a consequence, they are excessively gentle and unassertive. They often expect the other to read their minds and know what they want even though they are not open in expressing their interests. A more appropriate stance is a firm support of one's own interests combined with a ready responsiveness to the interests of the other.
- (c) *Rigid/loose.* Some people immediately seek to organize and control the situation by setting the agenda and defining the rules. They feel anxious if things threaten to get out of control and feel threatened by the unexpected. As a consequence, they are apt to push for rigid arrangements and rules and get upset by even minor deviations. At the other extreme, there are

some people who are averse to anything that seems formal, limiting, controlling, or constricting. They prefer a loose, improvisational, informal arrangement in which rules and procedures are implicit rather than overt. An approach that allows for both orderliness and flexibility in dealing with the conflict seems more constructive than one that is compulsive either in its organizing or in its rejection of orderliness.

- (d) *Intellectual/emotional*. At one extreme, emotion is repressed, controlled, or isolated so that no relevant emotion is felt or expressed as one communicates one's thoughts. The appearance is of someone who is calm, rational, and detached. Frequently, beneath the calm surface is the fear that if one feels or expresses one's emotions, they will get out of control and one will do something destructive, foolish, or humiliating. However, the lack of appropriate emotional expressiveness may seriously impair communication. Someone else may take your lack of emotion as an indicator that you have no real commitment to your interests and that you lack genuine concern for the other's interests. At the other extreme, there are some people who believe that only feelings are real and that words and ideas are not to be taken seriously unless they are thoroughly soaked in emotion. The emotional intensity of such people also interferes with communication. It impairs the ability to explore ideas mutually and to develop creative solutions to impasses and it also makes it difficult to differentiate the significant from the insignificant, if even the trivial is accompanied with intense emotion. The ideal mode of communication combines thought and affect: The thought is supported by the affect, and the affect is explained by the thought.
- (e) *Escalating/minimizing*. At one extreme, there are people who tend to experience any given conflict in the largest possible terms. The issues are cast so that what is at stake involves one's self, one's family, one's ethnic group, precedence for all time, or the like. The specifics of the conflict get lost as it escalates along the various dimensions of conflict: The size and number of the immediate issues involved; the number of motives and participants implicated on each side of the issue; the size and number of the principles and precedents that are perceived to be at stake; the cost that the participants are willing to bear in relation to the conflict; the number of norms of moral conduct from which behavior toward the other side is exempted; and the intensity of negative attitudes toward the other side. Escalation of the conflict makes the conflict more difficult to resolve constructively except when the escalation proceeds so rapidly that its absurdity becomes even self-apparent. At the other extreme, there are people who tend to minimize their conflicts. They are similar to the conflict avoiders but, unlike the avoiders, they do recognize the existence of the conflict. However, by minimizing the seriousness of the differences between self and other and by not recognizing how important the matter is to self and to the other, one can produce serious misunderstandings. One may also restrict the effort needed to resolve the conflict constructively.

- (f) *Compulsively revealing/compulsively concealing.* At one extreme, there are people who feel a compulsion to reveal whatever they think and feel about the other, including their suspicions, hostilities, and fears, in the most blunt, unrationalized, and unmodulated manner. They may feel they have to communicate every doubt, sense of inadequacy, or weakness they have about themselves. At the other extreme, there are people who feel that they cannot reveal any of their feelings or thoughts without seriously damaging their relationship to the other. Either extreme can impair the development of a constructive relationship. One, in effect, should be open and honest in communication but realistically take into account the consequences of what one says or does not say and the current state of the relationship.
13. Finally, throughout conflict, you should remain a moral person who is caring and just and should consider the other as a member of your moral community, entitled to care and justice. In the heat of conflict, there is often the tendency to shrink one's moral community and to exclude the other from it: This permits behavior toward the other that one would otherwise consider morally reprehensible. Such behavior escalates conflict and turns it in the direction of violence and destruction.

The foregoing elements could provide the basis for many different types of courses and workshops in conflict resolution in schools. My limited experience with such training suggests that, by itself, a simple course or workshop is not usually sufficient to produce lasting effects. Students must have repeated opportunities to practice their skills of constructive conflict resolution in a supportive atmosphere. The use of constructive controversy in teaching could provide such an atmosphere.

7.4 The Use of Constructive Controversy in Teaching Subject Matters

Johnson/Johnson (1987a, b, 1992) at the University of Minnesota have suggested that teachers, no matter what subjects they teach, can stimulate and structure constructive controversy in the classroom that will promote academic learning and the development of conflict resolution skills. A cooperative context is established for a controversy, for example, by assigning students to groups of four, dividing each group into two pairs who are assigned positions on the topics to be discussed, and requiring each group to reach a consensus on the issue and turn in a group report on which all members will be evaluated. There are five phases involved in the structured controversy. First, the paired students learn their respective positions: then each pair presents its position. Next, there is an open discussion in which students argue strongly and persuasively for their positions. After this, there is a perspective reversal, in which each pair presents the opposing pair's position as

sincerely and persuasively as it can. In the last phase, they drop their advocacy of their assigned positions and seek to reach consensus on a position that is supported by the evidence. In this phase, they write a joint statement with the rationale and supporting evidence for the synthesis their group has agreed on.

The discussion rules that the students are instructed to follow during the controversy are as follows:

- (a) Be critical of ideas, not people;
- (b) Focus on making the best possible decision, not on winning;
- (c) Encourage everyone to participate;
- (d) Listen to everyone's ideas, even if you do not agree;
- (e) Restate what someone has said if it is not clear;
- (f) Bring out the ideas and facts supporting both sides and then try to put them together in a way that makes sense;
- (g) Try to understand both sides of the issue; and
- (h) Change your mind if the evidence clearly indicates that you should do so.

After the structured controversy, there is group processing and highlighting of the specific skills required for constructive controversy. There is good reason to believe that such structured controversy not only would make the classroom more interesting but would also promote the development of perspective taking, critical thinking, and other skills involved in constructive conflict resolution. However, as yet there has been little systematic research on structured controversy.

7.5 Mediation in the Schools

There are difficult conflicts that the disputing parties may not be able to resolve constructively without the help of third parties acting as mediators. In schools, such conflicts can occur between students, between students and teachers, between parents and teachers, and between teachers and administrators. To deal with such conflicts, mediation programs have been established in a number of schools. These programs vary, but typically students and teachers are given about 20–30 h of training in the principles of constructive conflict resolution and specific training in how to serve as mediators. They are usually given a set of rules to apply during the mediation process. Students as young as 10 years old as well as high school and college students have been trained. Little systematic research on the effects of such programs has been conducted, but there is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that many student mediators have benefited enormously and that incidents of school violence have decreased.

In selecting to emphasize cooperative learning, conflict resolution, structured controversy, and school mediation as the core of any comprehensive program for a peaceful world, I have been guided by the view that students need to have continuing experiences of constructive conflict resolution as they learn different subjects, as well as an immersion in a school environment that provides daily

experiences (and a model) of cooperative relations and of constructive resolution of conflicts. This pervasive and extended experience, combined with tuition in the concepts and principles of cooperative work and of conflict resolution, should enable the students to develop generalizable attitudes and skills strong enough to resist the countervailing influences that are so prevalent in their non-school environments. It is my hope that, by the time they become adults, they would have developed the altitudes, knowledge, and skills that would enable them to cooperate with others in constructively resolving the inevitable conflicts that will occur among and within nations, ethnic groups, communities, and families.

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Chapter 8

Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace: An Introduction

Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman

Underlying this orientation is our belief that promoting the ideas and actions that can lead to a sustainable, harmonious peace can not only contribute to the prevention of war, but will also lead to more positive, constructive relations among people and nations and to a more sustainable planet. This chapter has three brief sections: (1) Psychological contributions to the prevention of war and violent, destructive conflicts; (2) The nature of a sustainable, harmonious peace; and (3) The psychological components of a sustainable, harmonious peace.¹

8.1 Psychological Contributions to the Prevention of War and Violent, Destructive Conflicts

8.1.1 *Debunking the Inevitability of War*

One of the earliest and most important contributions of psychologists and other social scientists was to debunk the myth that war was inevitable because of mankind's innate aggressiveness. As early as 1945, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues published a book, *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* (Murphy 1945), which included a statement endorsed by the leading psychologists of that time, "If man can live in a society which does not block and thwart him, he does not tend to be aggressive; and if a society of men can live in a world order in which the members of the society are not blocked or thwarted by the world arrangements as a whole, they have no intrinsic tendency to be aggressive" (Murphy 1945: 20).

On May 16, 1986 a multi-national and multi-disciplined group of scientists, organized by David Adams (a psychologist) issued the *Seville Statement on Violence*, which was subsequently adopted by UNESCO on November 16, 1989.

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The statement was designed to refute “the notion that organized human violence is biologically determined”. The statement contains five core ideas. These ideas are:

1. It is scientifically incorrect to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors.
2. It is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent behavior is genetically programmed into our human nature.
3. It is scientifically incorrect to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behavior more than for other kinds of behavior.
4. It is scientifically incorrect to say that humans have a ‘violent brain’.
5. It is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by ‘instinct’ or any single motivation.

The statement concludes: “Just as ‘wars begin in the minds of men’, peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us” (Adams et al. 1990).

Another myth that has been debunked is that there are no peaceful societies. Much work by anthropologists has demonstrated the existence of many peaceful societies, large as well as small. Some excellent books about peaceful societies are: Fry’s (2006), *The Human Potential for Peace: An Anthropological Challenge to Assumptions about War and Peace*, Howell/Willis (1989) *Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspectives*, and Kemp/Fry’s (2004) *Keeping the Peace: Conflict Resolution and Peaceful Societies around the World*.

8.1.2 Psychology and the Prevention of War

After the end of World War II, stimulated by the development of nuclear weapons, the emergence of the United Nations, and the development of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, a significant number of psychologists began to become active in applying psychology to the prevention of war. Such psychologists as Ed Cairns, Leila Dane, Joseph de Rivera, Morton Deutsch, Daniel Druckman, Ronald Fisher, Susan Fiske, Jerome Frank, Irving Janus, Herbert Kelman, Paul Kimmel, Evelin Lindner, Susan McKay, Susan Opatow, Charles Osgood, Dean Pruitt, Ann Sandon, Milton Schwebel, Ervin Staub, Richard Wagner, Michael Wessels, Ralph White, and many others were very active in writing papers, giving talks, participating in conferences with citizen groups as well as with officials from the U.S. State and Defense Departments. They wrote about motivations and misperceptions that led to war; such processes as ‘autistic hostility’; ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’, and ‘unwitting commitments’ that perpetuate destructive conflicts; they analyzed and criticized the psychological assumptions involved in ‘nuclear deterrence’; they considered processes for reducing tension and hostility such as mediation and GRIT (the graduated reduction in tension); they identified ‘group think’ which, in tense situations, limits the alternatives of interpretation and action available to the group; they identified the conditions that give rise to

destructive rather than constructive resolution of conflict; they analyzed current international hostilities such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War in terms of how psychological factors affected their development and course. Scholars from other disciplines (political science, economics, sociology, law, etc.) often participated with psychologists in multidisciplinary books and conferences; most notably Andrea Bartoli, Jacob Bercovitch, Kenneth and Elise Boulding, Roger Fisher, Mary Parker Follett, Johan Galtung, Ted Gurr, Robert Jervis, Debra Kolb, Victor Kremenyuk, Louis Kriesberg, Jean Paul Lederach, Chris Mitchell, Robert Mnookin, Linda Putnam, Anatol Rapaport, David Riesman, Harold Saunders, Thomas Schelling, Gene Sharp, Larry Suskind, William Ury, and William Zartman.

They wrote about such topics as arms control and disarmament; non-physical methods of disarmament; economic steps toward peace; East and West; military Defense; reducing international tensions; building a world society; international cooperation and the rule of law, ethnic conflicts, negotiation and mediation.

8.1.3 Modern Peace Psychology

With the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of the pro-Soviet Eastern Bloc during the 1980s, the attention of Western peace psychology became less focused on preventing war between the United States and the Soviet Union. As Christie et al. (2008) point out:

The focal concerns of post-Cold War peace psychology have become more diverse, global, and shaped by local geohistorical contexts in part because security concerns are no longer organized around the U.S.-Soviet relationship. For example, countries aligned with the Global South and developing parts of the world tend to associate peacebuilding efforts with social justice, in part because political oppression and the unequal distribution of scarce resources diminish human well-being and threaten survival. In geohistorical contexts marked by deeply divisive intractable conflicts and oppositional social identities, such as the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Middle East and parts of Africa, research and practice often focus on the prevention of violent episodes through the promotion of positive intergroup relations. In the West, the research agenda is dominated by efforts to more deeply understand and prevent terrorism.

During the Cold War, but especially afterwards, not only were there many psychological articles and workshops aimed at psychological intervention into specific violent conflicts, whether at the international, intergroup, or interpersonal levels; there was also much psychological work to develop theory that might improve psychologically based interventions. Galtung's (1969) important distinctions between direct and structural violence provides useful distinctions between much of the early and more recent work of psychologists concerned with issues of peace, conflict, and violence. Structural violence is embedded in the values, social norms, laws, social structures, and procedures within a society or community that systematically disadvantage certain individuals and groups so that they are poorer, sicker, less educated, and more harmed than those who are not disadvantaged.

Much of the early work was focused on direct violence; on the causes and conditions that give rise to aggression and physical violence. More recent work has often been concerned with the bidirectional relationship between conflict and social injustice (structural violence).

The literature and contributions to the modern fields of peace psychology and conflict resolution have grown so large that no summary will be presented here. However, in a number of recent books there are excellent presentations and summaries of this work. They include: Christie et al. (2001), Blumberg et al. (2007), Deutsch et al. (2006), Fisher (1990, 1997), Kriesberg (2006), Lederach (1994, 1997), Pruitt/Kim (2004).

8.1.4 The Meaning of a Harmonious, Sustainable Peace

In a book of essays on preventing World War III (Wright et al. 1962), Quincy Wright, a distinguished historian, wrote:

A world society capable of settling international disputes and preventing war is possible, 144 and that without such a society the maintenance of peace in the shrinking world will be increasingly difficult. The basic problem in preventing World War III is, therefore, the building of such a society. Observation of the history of groups merging into supersocieties indicated that such a development normally proceeds through four stages which may considerably overlap. They are (1) the establishment of *communication* and trade among independent groups; (2) the process of *acculturation* through mutual borrowing of technologies and syntheses of values; (3) the emergence of common cultural standards and techniques, inducing *cooperation* to maintain norms, achieve goals, and promote common interests in the developing culture; and (4) the increase of the efficiency of such cooperation by the establishment of a central *organization* with authority to recommend, guide, or even compel appropriate action, at first by the component groups and eventually by individuals.

Similarly, in the forward to the important book, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Lederach 1997), Richard Solomon, President of the United States Institute of Peace, offered this image:

Sustainable peace requires that long-time antagonists not merely lay down their arms but that they achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained by a society-wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before they can regenerate destabilizing tensions (p. ix).

We agree with Wright and Solomon that a sustainable world peace will require the building of such a society imbued with such mechanisms and relationships. Below, we stress what we consider to be the psychological requirements of such a society.

1. A strong sense of positive interdependence among the units composing the greater society. They should feel as well as believe that the units are so linked that they “sink or swim together.” Such common bonds are most prevalent in societies organized around cross-cutting structures, where members of different

ethnic groups play, work, and socialize together (LeVine/Campbell 1972; Varshney 2002).

2. A strong sense of global, as well as local, patriotism and loyalty. Their sense of identity is strongly linked to the global as well as their local community. Such phrases as “Irish American”, “Jewish American”, and “Italian American” indicate the possibility of such dual or multiple identities.
3. The sharing of such basic common values as recognition that all human beings despite differences or disagreements have the right to be treated with respect, dignity, and justice as well as to have their basic needs fulfilled. The United 1 *Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified by on December 10, 1948* is a much fuller statement of these basic values.
4. Mutual understanding, which is fostered by the freedom to be informed as well as the freedom to communicate and by the ability to have the message being communicate expressed or translated so that it is mutually understood by the sender and receiver of the messages. Quick, accurate computer translation of different languages may become a substitute for a common, universal language.
5. A sense of fair recourse. Inevitably, conflicts between people and between groups will occur and experiences of injustices and even oppression will arise. When such problems develop, the presence of fair and efficient means of recourse go a long way in decreasing the probability that they will culminate in either criminal or political forms of violence (Gurr 2000). Of course, history is filled with instances of the opposite, where unmet needs combined with a limited sense of recourse resulted in extraordinary episodes of violence, revolution and human suffering.
6. Social taboos against the use of violence to solve problems. The biggest single predictor of spikes in violence in Western society is the presence of international wars (Gurr 2000). There are similar correlations to be found between incidents of local ethno political violence and the normalization of violence as a legitimate method of communal problem solving, as well as between experiences of domestic abuse as a child and the perpetration of domestic abuse as an adult. In contrast, anthropological research has documented the central importance of social taboos against violence for fostering more internally and externally peaceful societies (Fry 2006).

These six psychological requirements constitute a set of basic building blocks for fostering a harmonious, sustainable peace. No one aspect would be sufficient, nor would the presence of all six necessarily be adequate. However, the more that a society invests in each of these components, the more they will decrease the prevalence of destructive conflict and the more they will increase the probability that peaceful relations will be sustained.

8.2 The Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace

Below, we characterize briefly what we consider to be key psychological components; these were shown to the contributors as we invited their contributions. Individual chapters address these components as the distinguished contributors see fit. The chapters do not exhaust the potential contributions of psychological theory and research to the development of a sustainable peace, nor do they cover what other disciplines (e.g., economics, political science, sociology, international relations, history, the physical and biological sciences) can contribute to the development of a sustainable peace. Their aim is to stimulate other psychologists to make further contributions and to inform educated citizens and public officials as well as other social scientists of existing and potential psychological contributions to this area of knowledge.

The key psychological components discussed in *The Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace* (Coleman/Deutsch 2012) are:

1. *Effective Cooperation*

At the international level, the developmental of harmonious peaceful relations among nations will require effective cooperation in dealing with such issues as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, pandemics of contagious diseases, global economic development, failed states, and so on. Similarly, in interpersonal relations such as marriages, if a couple is unable to cooperate effectively on matters that are central to their identities whether it be religious concerns, sexual relations, political views, economic relations, life styles, child-raising, or in-laws it will be difficult for them to have a harmonious, peaceful marriage. Much research has been done on the conditions that give rise to successful cooperation and to its effects (see Johnson/Johnson 2005; Deutsch 2006, 2011).

2. *Constructive Conflict Resolution*

Among extended relations of all sorts—whether at the interpersonal, intergroup, or international levels—it is inevitable that conflict will arise. Some of the conflicts are not central to the relationship and may persist and may be mainly ignored without harming the relationships. Other conflicts that threaten the wellbeing or identity of one or more of the participants in the relationship cannot be suppressed or ignored without harming the involved parties and their relationship. How such conflicts are resolved—constructively or destructively—are critical in determining whether harmonious, cooperative relationships will persist and be strengthened or will deteriorate into bitter, hostile relations.

During the past several decades, there has been extensive theoretical and research investigation of the effects of constructive and destructive processes of conflict resolution as well as of the conditions that give rise to each process (for summaries see for instance Deutsch et al. 2006; Bercovitch et al. 2009). There is also a growing literature of useful, practical, advice in how to manage conflict (see e.g., Moore 1996; Gottman/Silver 1999; Schneider/Honeyman 2006; Thompson 2008).

3. *Social Justice*

Relationships that are just foster effective cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. Injustice and oppression, on the other hand, foster and are fostered by destructive conflict. Similarly, effective cooperation is inhibited or destroyed by injustice and oppression.

It is useful to make a distinction between *injustice* and *oppression*. Oppression is the experience of repeated, widespread, systemic injustice. It need not be extreme and involve the legal system (as in slavery, apartheid, or the lack of right to vote) nor violent (as in tyrannical societies). Harvey (1999) has used the term ‘civilized oppression’ and Sue et al. (2007) the term ‘micro aggression’ to characterize the everyday processes of oppression in normal life. Civilized oppression.

Is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutions and rules, and the collective consequences of following those rules. It refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions which are supported by the media and cultural stereotypes as well as by the structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms (Young 1990: 41).

There is an extensive literature dealing with overcoming injustice and oppression that is too extensive to present here. The main themes are: *Awakening the Sense of Injustice, Persuasion Strategies for Changing Oppression; Relationships and Power Strategies for Change* (see Deutsch 2006, for more elaboration).

4. *Power and Equality*

The distribution of power, the equality or inequality of the parties involved in any relationship plays a critically important role in determining the characteristics of the relationship. For instance, Curle (1971), a mediator working with ethnic conflicts in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, observed that as conflicts moved from non-peaceful to peaceful relationships, their course could be charted from one of relative inequality between the groups to relative equality. He described this progression toward peace as involving four stages. In the first stage, conflict was ‘hidden’ to the lower-power parties because they remained unaware of the injustices that affected their lives. Here, any activities or events resulting in *conscientization* (erasing ignorance and raising awareness of inequalities and inequities) moved the conflict forward. An increase in awareness of injustice led to the second stage, *confrontation*, when demands for change from the weaker party brought the conflict to the surface. Under some conditions, these confrontations resulted in the stage of *negotiations*, which were aimed at achieving a rebalancing of power in the relationship in order for those in low power to increase their capacities to address their basic needs. Successful negotiations moved the conflicts to the final stage of *sustainable peace*, but only if they led to a restructuring of the relationship that addressed effectively the substantive and procedural concerns of those involved.

5. *Human Needs and Emotions*

Neither effective cooperation, constructive conflict resolution, nor social justice is likely when basic human needs are unsatisfied. Maslow (1954) has identified the basic human needs as physiological, safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and

self-actualization. Frustration of these needs lead to diverse emotional consequences such as apathy, fear, depression, humiliation, rage, and anger. These emotions are not conducive to effective cooperation, constructive conflict resolution, or any other psychological component of a harmonious, sustainable peace. The view that the frustration of one's needs is purposeful and unjust gives rise to intense feelings of humiliation that Lindner (2006) has describes as the 'nuclear bomb of emotions.'

6. *The Psychodynamics of Peace*

From Freud onward, psychodynamic theorists have been interested in how individual and group psychodynamics have contributed to constructive, peaceful, or destructive and violent relationships at the international as well as interpersonal levels. The psychodynamic approach emphasizes the interdependence between internal conflicts and external conflicts. Thus, internal conflict between a socially prohibited desire (e.g., desire for homosexual contact) and guilt feelings may lead to anxiety. Such defense mechanisms protect against anxiety as projection in which the struggle in oneself is denied and is projected onto or attributed to another.

External conflict can also give rise to internal conflict. Psychodynamic approaches also emphasize the importance of understanding how an individual, group, or society's past development play a critical role in forming self-identity as well as the values, symbolic meanings, attitudes, and predispositions to behavior.

7. *Creative Problem Solving*

Betty Reardon, a noted peace educator, once said, "The failure to achieve peace is in essence a failure of imagination" (personal communication). The freedom and ability to imagine new possibilities as well as the capacity to select judiciously from these possibilities what is novel, interesting, and valuable (Simon 2001) are central to creative problem-solving. The conditions that foster the freedom and ability to create novel and valuable solutions not only are conditions in the problem-solver (individual or group), but also are in conditions in the social context, which affects the problem-solver. Creative problem solving is necessary to overcome the obstacles that block effective cooperation and the impasses that hinder constructive conflict resolution.

8. *Complex Thinking*

Simple thinking is directed at the here-and-now and, often, has an 'either or' quality. It does not take into account the future or past or what is occurring in different locales and remote places and that solutions to problems often involve the integration of apparently opposed alternatives and the creation of new alternatives. At the international level such problems as climate change, depletion of basic resources, world-wide economic recession, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction require the ability to think of the future as well as of the past, to think globally as well as locally. Similarly, in married couples such issues as college tuition for one's children, retirement income, care for elderly parents, and maintaining positive marital relations requires complex thinking.

9. *Persuasion and Dialogue*

As Ledgerwood et al. (2006) have pointed out, "Persuasion is distinct from coercion in that persuasion is influence designed to change people's minds, whereas

coercion involves influence designed to change people's behaviors (with little regard for whether they have actually changed their minds)." Lasting change is more likely to result from persuasion than coercion.

Persuasion involves communication by a *source* of a *message*, through a *medium*, designed to *reach* and influence a *recipient*. Whether the recipient will be persuaded by the message is a function of the characteristics of each of the foregoing elements as well as the characteristics of the relationship between the source and the recipient. Sustainable, harmonious peaceful relations require the mutual ability to persuade one another. Without this ability, a convergence of values, information, and actions as well as mutual satisfaction of needs is not likely to occur.

Dialogue, unlike persuasion, is not unilateral. It is a mutual process in which the interaction parties openly communicate and actively listen to one another with mutual respect and a feeling of mutual equality. Each communicates what is important and true for her without derogating what is true and important for others. They seek to learn together and to find common meaning by exploring the assumptions underlying their individual and collective beliefs. Dialogue is a collaborative and creative process in which the participants are open to change as they seek common grounds and mutual understanding.

10. *Reconciliation*

After destructive conflicts in which the conflicting parties have inflicted grievous harm (humiliation, destruction of property, torture, assault, rape, murder) on one another, the conflicting parties may still have to live and work together in the same communities. This is often the case in civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, gang wars and even family disputes that have taken a destructive course. Consider the slaughter that has taken place between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi (Staub 2012); between blacks and whites in South Africa; between the 'Bloods' and 'Crips' of Los Angeles; the Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland; and among Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia. Is it possible for forgiveness and reconciliation to occur under such conditions? If so, what fosters these processes? Recently, a considerable body of psychological literature has emerged in response to this question (see Lederach 1997, 2002, 2003, 2005).

After bitter destructive conflict, it can be expected that reconciliation will be achieved, if at all, after a slow process with many setbacks as well as advances. The continuous and persistent help and encouragement of powerful and respected third parties is often necessary to keep the reconciliation process moving forward and to prevent its derailment by extremists, misunderstandings or harmful actions by either of the conflicting parties. The help and encouragement must be multifaceted. It must deal, not only with the social psychological issues addressed so well in this volume, but also, justly, with such institutions as the economic, political, legal, educational, health care and security, whose effective functioning are necessary for a sustained reconciliation.

11. *Education*

One of the most important things that educators can do to foster each of the psychological components discussed above is to exemplify these components in

their own behavior in and out of the classrooms and also in the pedagogy, curricula, and organizational functioning of the school. To achieve these objectives will require changes in the education and training of school personnel, particularly teachers and administrators, as well as new requirements in the hiring of school personnel.

In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that schools have to change in basic ways if we are to educate children so that they are for rather than against one another, so that they develop the ability to resolve their conflicts constructively rather than destructively and are prepared to live in a peaceful world. This recognition has been expressed in a number of interrelated movements: cooperative learning, conflict resolution, and education for peace. In our view, there are several key components in these overlapping movements: cooperative learning; conflict resolution training; the constructive use of controversy in teacher subject matters; and the creation of dispute resolution centers in the schools; and development of knowledge of and a commitment to human rights and social justice. Students should also acquire—at the appropriate age level—substantive knowledge in such fields as political science, international relations, arms control and disarmament, economic development, the global environment, and world trade, which are also important to world peace, and other substantive knowledge and skills necessary to function as responsible adults. They should also become informed and sensitized to the many injustices that exist globally as well as locally so that they can be intelligently active in bringing about social change.

12. *Norms for Policy*

Psychological principles play a central role in the development of policies and norms that support sustainable peace, in which peace is defined comprehensively to include the prevention and mitigation of episodes both of direct violence and structural violence. Sustainable peace requires changes at the level of norms and policies and psychologically-informed principles and activism have played a role in changing policies and/or norms. Some potential examples can be found in research and activism/practice that created: (a) a climate that made the Oslo Accords possible; (b) a movement that led to the removal of secrecy clauses from the Truth and Reconciliation Act, thereby making some of the testimony public; (c) serial dramas that have been used to change norms in regard to intergroup relations; and (d) emancipatory agendas that have increased voice and representation among the oppressed throughout Latin America.

13. *The Practice of Sustainable Peace*

Peace is never achieved, but rather is a process that is fostered by a variety of cognitive, affective, behavioral, structural, institutional, spiritual, and cultural components. Accordingly, there are wide arrays of ideas and methods that can be learned, practiced and mastered to help bolster and sustain peace. This chapter will detail some of these practices.

The preceding discussion of psychological components of a sustainable, harmonious peace is meant to be an introduction, not a substitute for the excellent chapters that follow. It represents our preliminary thinking that gave rise to *The Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace* (Coleman/Deutsch 2012) and

stimulated our desire to have an expert in each area write each of the various chapters. We have asked the authors of the chapters to describe where possible:

1. The nature of the psychological component that is the focus of this chapter, originally appearing in *The Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace* (Coleman/Deutsch 2012).
2. The conditions that give rise to it (research evidence as well as theory is provided).
3. Its effects, positive and negative (research evidence as well as theory is provided).
4. Generalize the implications of the preceding for the development of a harmonious, sustainable peace at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels.
5. Indicate what further development of theory and research is needed.

We have encouraged the authors to discuss the psychological components, which is the focus of their chapters in *The Psychological Components of a Sustainable Peace* (Coleman/Deutsch 2012) in the interaction of different types of social actors: the interpersonal, intergroup, and international. We believe it is fruitful to take a social psychological approach to all types of social interaction. Several key notions in a social psychological approach are:

1. Each participant in a social interaction responds to the other in terms of his/her perceptions and cognitions of the other; these may or may not correspond to the other's actualities.
2. Each participant in a social interaction, being cognizant of the other's capacity for awareness, is influenced by his/her own expectations concerning the other's actions as well as by his/her perceptions of the other's conduct. These expectations may or may not be accurate; the ability to take the role of the other and to predict the other's behavior is not notable in either interpersonal or international crises.
3. Social interaction is not only initiated by motives but also generates new motives and alters old ones. It is not only determined but also determining. In the process of rationalizing and justifying actions that have been taken and effects that have been produced, new values and motives emerge. Moreover, social interaction exposes one to models and exemplars that may be identified with and imitated. Thus, a child's personality is shaped largely by the interactions he/she has with his parents and peers and by the people with whom he/she identifies. Similarly, a nation's institutions may be considerably influenced by its interrelations with other nations and by the existing models of functioning that other nations provide.
4. Social interaction takes place in a social environment—in a family, a group, a community, a nation, a civilization—that has developed techniques, symbols, categories, rules, and values that are relevant to human interactions. Hence, to understand the events that occur in social interactions one must comprehend the interplay of these events with the broader social context in which they occur.

5. Even though each participant in a social interaction, whether an individual or a group, is a complex unit composed of many interacting subsystems, it can act in a unified way toward some aspect of its environment. Decision-making within the individual as within the nation can entail a struggle among different interests and values for control over action. Internal structure and internal process, while less observable in individuals than in groups, are characteristic of all social units.

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Chapter 9

William James: The First Peace Psychologist

9.1 Introduction

William James,¹ the first peace psychologist, would have felt at home in the Psychologists for Social Responsibility as well as the Division of Peace Psychology.² He was a most distinguished scholar and also an insistent public voice on issues of war and peace. He was deeply opposed to imperialism and the “war fever” with which it was associated. It was the political issue on which he spent most thought and effort. He was at one time Vice President of the Anti-Imperialist League and he published eight or more articles and letters in newspapers as well as making speeches against the Monroe Doctrine, the Spanish-American War, the colonization of the Philippines and Cuba, the Venezuelan incident, etc. (Perry 1948: 245).

A letter published in the *Boston Evening Transcript* on March 1, 1899 provides a good sense of James’s spirited involvement in this issue:

We gave the fighting instinct and the passion of mastery their outing ... because we thought that... We could resume our permanent ideals and the character when the fighting fit was done, we now see how we reckoned without our host. We see ... what an absolute savage ... the passion of military conquest always is, and how the only safeguard against the crimes to which it will infallibly drag the nation that gives way to it is to keep it chained forever... We are now openly engaged in crushing out the scariest thing in this great human world—the attempt of a people long enslaved to attain to the possession of itself, to organize its laws and government, to be free to follow its internal destinies according to its own ideals... Why, then, do we go on? First, the war fever; and then the pride which always refuses to back down when under fire. But these are passions that interfere with the

¹ This text was first published by Deutsch (1995). The permission to republish this article was granted on 9 November 2014 by Prof. Fathali Moghaddam, the editor of the *Peace and Conflict Journal of Peace Psychology*.

² In writing this paper, I have been aided immensely by reading a number of biographies and commentaries about the life and work of William James. I have found Cotkin’s (1990) book, *William James. Public Philosopher*, especially valuable.

reasonable settlement of any affair, and in this affair we have to deal with a factor altogether peculiar with our belief, namely, in a national destiny which must be 'big' at any cost... We are to be missionaries of civilization, and to bear the white man's burden, painful as it often is!... The individual lives are nothing. Our duty and our destiny call, and civilization must go on! Could there be a more damning indictment of that whole bloated idol termed "modern civilization" than this amounts to? Civilization is, then, the big, hollow, resounding, corrupting, sophisticating, confusing torrent of mere brutal momentum and irrationality that brings forth fruits like this! (from Perry 1948: 245–246).

9.2 James and Military Passion

James was drawn to and repelled by military passion. He admired the heroic and courageous actions associated with the military but was horrified by the savagery and destructiveness that can result from military fervor. According to a number of scholars (e.g. Bjork 1988; Cotkin 1990; Feinstein 1984; Perry 1948), much of his writings and his personal, psychological difficulties reflected an ambivalence similar to his feelings about military passion. They also reflected his attempt to resolve this ambivalence. Heroism—characterized by intense, self-willed, freely chosen, courageous, and strenuous purposeful action—was the antidote to boredom, doubt, passivity, depression, pessimism and neurasthenia: the *tedium vitae* of wealthy, intellectual Americans between 1880 and World War I (Cotkin 1990).

As Cotkin (1990: 71) indicates, James pitied individuals trapped in doubt and conducted a moral offensive against lives wasted “in a weltering sea of sensitivity and emotion,” spent without “a manly concrete deed.” In his writings, James repeatedly declared his admiration for the heroic. In the *Principles of Psychology* (James 1890: 1181), he stated:

The world thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and mate; and the effort which he is able to put forth to hold himself erect and keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of worth and function in the game of human life. He can *stand* this Universe.

He can meet it and keep up his faith in it in presence of those same features which lay his weaker brethren low. He can still find a zest in it, not by “ostrich-like forgetfulness” but by pure inward willingness to take the world with those deterrent objects there.

And hereby he becomes one of the masters and the lords of life.

He must be counted with henceforth; he forms a part of human destiny.

According to James, moral energy “is made great by the presence of a great antagonist to overcome ... it is action in the line of greatest resistance” (James in “The Feeling of Effort,” 1880). Wars, earthquakes, shipwrecks, or moral chasms are the great revealers of “what men and women are able to do and bear” (James in “Energies of Men,” p. 134).

What accounts for James's emphasis on the heroic? Two interrelated lines of explanation have been offered by scholars. One emphasizes personal, psychological issues and the other stresses intellectual, philosophical considerations. In both the

personal and philosophic arenas, James's emphasis on the heroic served the function of overcoming dilemmas which James suffered during lengthy periods of doubt, debility and depression. Some scholars trace his psychological difficulties to the complex relations within his family—particularly stressing James's reluctant submission to the benign tyranny of his father who vigorously opposed his ardent desire to be an artist (e.g. Feinstein 1984). In contrast, Cotkin (1990: 21) suggests that the general contours of James's psychological crisis “were the common property of his generational cohort. A problematic relation between fathers and sons, grave uncertainties over vocational direction, and neurasthenic disabilities were the shared inheritance of James's generation—at least among those members from his social class background.”

According to Cotkin, the Civil War was a self-defining event for his cohort as well as for James. Those, such as James, who did not participate in it felt a sense of failure and guilt as well as doubts about their manliness and courage. They were haunted in the post-war years by uncertainties about themselves which were reflected in an inability to make vocational and other decisions. No doubt James's earlier ambivalent relationship with his father (who pressured James not to participate in the war) intensified his post-war emotional crisis.

During James's years of debility and depression, experienced most intensely in the latter part of the 1860s and the earlier part of the 1870s, James not only wrestled with questions of self-identity, he was also pondering the central philosophical issues of the nineteenth century: free will or determinism, idealism or materialism, optimism or pessimism. There was undoubtedly a reciprocal influence: James transformed his own struggle with indecision and melancholia into the text of his psychology and philosophy and his resolution of philosophical issues helped him to confront his own psychological malaise.

There are too many facets to James's rich contributions to psychology for a summary to be presented here. However, I would like to emphasize that the focus on the 'heroic' in “The Moral Equivalent of War” relates to a central theme in his work. James viewed the universe to be uncertain and insecure, but as having endless possibilities rather than as being mechanistically determined. Individuals could act and through their actions transform their world.

As Cotkin (1990) points out: James's philosophical vision featured heroic, directed individuals acting in the face of uncertainty and adversity. Much of James's psychology is an attempt to explicate the conditions which foster or hinder an individual's ability to act purposefully and decisively. He discusses how the stream of consciousness reflects simultaneously the internal and external world; how its focus can be determined by attention, choice, habit, will and the self. He indicates how through exercise of one's will in a systematic manner one can create habits which will enable one to be free of debilitating doubt and also enable one to act decisively and courageously in adverse circumstances.

In James's view, “effort of attention is ... the essential phenomenon of will” (James 1892: 442). Volitional effort is required whenever a rarer and more ideal impulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive and habitual kind; it does so whenever strongly explosive tendencies are checked or strongly obstructive

conditions overcome. The ideal impulse appears as “a still small voice which must be artificially reinforced to prevail.” If that voice is persistent enough one can engage in actions which could lead to intense pain, inquiry, social disapproval, or death. Similarly, it could enable one to resist the strong temptations of sensual pleasure, wealth, or adulation.

It is interesting that, in the same sentence, James refers to the hero and the neurotic subject (p. 443) as people who need much of the ability to reinforce an ideal impulse through volitional effort. It was only through heroic effort that he was able to overcome his own neurotic propensities to doubt and melancholia.

James died in August of 1910. Despite his declining health, “The Moral Equivalent of War” was written and published in February by the Association for International Conciliation (Leaflet No. 27). Perry (1948: 229) indicates that “over 30,000 copies of the leaflet were distributed, and it was republished in popular magazines: *McClure’s Magazine*, August 1910; *The Popular Science Monthly*, October 1910; and *Atlantic Readings*. Letters of approval poured in from all quarters, not only from confirmed pacifists, but from many, including army officers, who were attracted by James’s candid recognition of the psychological and moral claims of war.”

I have not made a systematic survey of the citations and use of “The Moral Equivalent of War” by social scientists. There are undoubtedly more that I can recall from the many years in which I have been involved in peace psychology. I could only identify two references to James’s article by social scientists despite a quick look at the indices of the many books that I have on my shelves in this area.³ One is in a SPSSI book, *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* edited by Gardner Murphy (1945) and the other is in a paper of mine, “Psychological Alternatives to War” (Deutsch 1962). This has been an unfortunate neglect. I am delighted that this first member issue of *Peace Psychology* may stimulate more discussion of the psychological issues raised by the first peace psychologist.

There is no need for me to summarize James’s article since it is reprinted in this Journal. However, I would like to comment on it from the perspective of a current peace psychologist. First a personal reaction. When I read it more than 50 years ago, I was thrilled. I had recently been involved in combat flying with the U.S. Air Force in World War II and was upset by its destructiveness and was thinking of alternative, more constructive ways of managing conflict. Although James repeats some of the psychological nonsense of his time (e.g. in his reference to “innate pugnacity”), basically he was rejecting the fatalistic view that war was inevitable because of human nature. Before World War II, this was a widely espoused foolishness by popularizers of psychology. For James, the appeal of the military and of war did not come primarily from people’s basic negative predispositions (such as innate pugnacity) but from their desire to face challenge and adversity and in so doing fully express and realize their virtuous potentials. In his view, successful

³ Biographers of William James do, of course, refer to and discuss this paper in the context of his life and times.

military action requires such virtues as fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity, heroism, conscience, education, inventiveness, economy, wealth, physical health and vigor.

From my own experience in the military, the day-to-day lives of soldiers as well as their intermittent episodes of combat are not dominated by aggressive thoughts, feelings or actions. They are more dominated by the values and virtues found in most hierarchical, self-contained organizations—civil or military—which require some of the virtues mentioned by James for their effective functioning. However, heroism and courage are rare in the military as well as in civil life. Moreover, those who seem heroic in the military are often not particularly so in civil life.

As an academician, James was a pre-eminent psychologist-philosopher who was profoundly involved with the basic issues in his fields of study. It was heartening to me to know that James felt it was appropriate for him to be both a ‘pure’ scholar and a scholar-citizen who could express vigorously his perspectives on important social issues. It helped reinforce the model that Kurt Lewin had provided for me of the tough-minded and public-spirited scholar. There are subtle pressures on many of us who do theoretical and experimental research to stay out of the arena of public controversy. James provides a model of active, responsible public engagement on controversial issues.

I turn now to consideration of the substance of “The Moral Equivalent of War” from the perspective of a contemporary peace psychologist. My discussion points out some of its limitations but, to begin with I wish to re-emphasize the merits of James’s proposal which still warrant our attention. First, as I pointed out above, it rejects the misguided view—still widely-held and propagated—that war is an inevitable consequence of human nature. Second, it points out that participation in the military and in military actions can serve important and worthwhile psychological functions. The evils of war frequently result from actions which express positive human virtues. James, here, was anticipating Hannah Arendt’s *The Banality of Evil* in his statements that the destructiveness of war results not only from such social virtues as duty, conformity, loyalty, cohesiveness. And, third, it draws the very valuable conclusion that militarism and war are unlikely to disappear until new civic enterprises and institutions are developed which can provide a satisfactory alternative for the psychological dispositions which are fulfilled in the military.

Although I would express James’s last two points somewhat differently, these valuable points are still not sufficiently emphasized in current peace psychology. The political-military-industrial complex does serve important psychological, political, and economic interests and it can only function if these interests of individuals, groups, and organizations are reasonably well satisfied. The interests underlying the continuation of this complex can, naturally, be expected to resist change unless alternative ways of satisfying them are developed and made salient. James’s suggestions for a moral equivalent of war were a good beginning, but few of us have followed his lead by developing suggestions for practical alternative ways for satisfying the interests that perpetuate the political-military-industrial complex which is so conducive to war. Nor have we followed his suggestion that

those who find war to be repugnant ought to enter more deeply into the aesthetical and ethical point of view of their opponents. Unless they do so, they are unlikely to have much influence on them.

There are a number of significant limitations of James's article. These limitations arise primarily out of its narrow focus. It centers on individual, personal traits associated with the manly virtues evoked in confronting the risks of hardships connected with war (as in military combat or, alternatively, a "war against nature"). There is no mention in his paper of women, children or older men; as though, the only ones implicated in the cause or prevention of war are young men from the "luxurious classes" whose masculine identities have not yet been strongly established. This is a very partial perspective which much impairs its relevance to modern life. The relationship among sexism, war, and a patriarchal society are not considered (see Martin 1987, for a feminist perspective on James's paper). James ignores the obvious fact that it is largely middle-aged and older men—the dominant figures in the political-military-industrial complex—who make the decisions leading to war. Rarely, do *they* seek to engage in actions which would expose them to the risks and hardship of personal involvement in combat. They do, however, create the 'hype' which glorifies militarism and produces war fever among susceptible young men.

The paper's individualistic focus on individual personal traits abstracted from their social context is also very limiting. The importance of political, economic, religious, educational and family institutions in shaping character traits and values and in determining war or peace is not discussed. Hence, there is no consideration of the role of conflicts over power, economic interests, and ethnic identity in leading to war. Nor is there any discussion of the possible ways that education might foster more constructive resolution of the conflicts among individuals, groups and nations that are inevitable in life.

The phrasing of the moral equivalent of war as "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army *enlisted against nature*" (italics added) is very unfortunate. It casts nature in the role of an enemy which must be conquered. While this view of nature was common among James's contemporaries, many of us now recognize that if we harm nature, we harm ourselves. From today's perspective, it was quite misguided to associate human virtue with the goal of conquering nature.

Earlier in this paper, I suggested that James's ambivalent relationship with his father and his self-doubts enhanced by not having served in the Civil War led him to overestimate the virtues (e.g. heroism, bravery, loyalty, hardiness) to be found in the military. His glorification of the military inadvertently had the consequence of making his proposed moral equivalent to war very pale and weak as an alternative. This glorification, combined with his muddy and contradictory discussion of the roots of human pugnacity, blunts his own proposal.

Let me conclude by indicating how appropriate it is that "The Moral Equivalent of War" is published in this first issue of the *Journal of Peace Psychology*. It demonstrates that peace psychology has had a long and illustrious history and that, from psychology's earliest days a number of its most eminent and influential

scholars have become publicly engaged with psychological issues related to war and peace.⁴ It also suggests that peace psychology has advanced considerably since its earliest days but that there are important insights still to be harvested from those who have preceded us.

Box 9.1:

Bob Edwards, Host: The South Central Panthers is a special on-call fire-fighting unit, most of whose members were once rival gang members in Los Angeles. After training most of the summer with the U.S. Forest Service, the Panthers have helped put out 42,000 acres of brush and forest fires in California. Forestry officials say members of the rival gangs quickly overcame hostilities and learned to work together on neutral turf. The project has been so successful that the Forest Service now anticipates hiring some of the Panthers full-time.

Commentator Bebe Moore Campbell says the idea of turning gang members into firefighters is a new variation of an old approach.

Bebe Moore Campbell, Commentator: A few decades ago, and even today, when a teenage boy showed signs of juvenile delinquency, old folks would advise, “Send him to the Army. The Army will straighten him out.” The thinking was that, while the macho world of fighting men and machines would entice a would-be trouble-maker, the accompanying aspects of discipline, hard work and a regular paycheck would tame his wayward spirit—or, at least redirect it so that, ultimately, the boy and society benefited. Although the military failed to turn around all boys, a lot of old guys will tell you, “If I hadn’t gone into the Army, I’d a’ wound up in jail.”

Although the U.S. Army of the ‘90s is laying off soldiers, the South Central Panthers seems to be having an impact on the lives of young gang-bangers similar to what old folks had in mind. Trading street Uzis for water hoses isn’t as far-fetched as it sounds. The members of the Panthers are used to—perhaps even addicted to—danger. The violent elements of natural disasters mimic some aspects of gang life. And the violence factor is important, for many fatherless young men, without the role model of a nurturing male, equate being violent with being a man.

⁴ I include a current exemplification of ideas similar to the ones expressed in “The Moral Equivalent of War” from National Public Radio’s “Morning Edition.” October 18, 1993 Segment #14: *Rival Gang Members Learn New Skills as Firefighters.*

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Chapter 10

Developing a Global Community: A Social Psychological Perspective

Morton Deutsch, Eric C. Marcus and Sarah Brazaitis

10.1 Introduction

Consider a group of people who are part of the same family,¹ have common ancestors, live in the same neighborhood and together form an interdependent community.² They face some serious problems that will affect adversely the lives and wellbeing of many of the people in their community, as well as make much of their neighborhood less habitable. This will happen unless they are able to cooperate effectively to manage these problems or solve them. It seems clear that such a group of people are apt to be considerably more successful in dealing with their problems if they are a strong community whose members are very much identified with it and committed to its survival and its effective functioning.

The people who live on planet Earth, a very distinctive neighborhood in the Universe, are members of a human family with a common ancestry. The people of the Earth face serious problems that will affect them and their planet with significant adverse effects unless they are able to organize themselves and cooperate effectively to deal with these problems. They do not, as yet, appear to have developed two of the socio-psychological prerequisites of effective cooperation: a strong community with members who are strongly identified with it and members who are committed to helping the community develop the values, knowledge, and skills to engage in effective cooperative problem-solving.

¹ This text was first published by Morton Deutsch with Eric Marcus/Sarah (2015). This Chapter is a revised version of a chapter entitled “A Framework for Thinking about Developing a Global Community, which appeared in Coleman/Deutsch (2012)”. The permission to include this text here was granted on 11 November 2014 by Rights and Permissions of Springer in Heidelberg.

² The authors have undertaken an initial change effort to inspire people of the world to learn about, take, and act upon this pledge. We are at the beginning of our efforts: gaining prominent and well-known people to endorse and act upon this pledge as a way to influence others to do so. This is one of myriad ways to support the development of a global community.

It is clear that we have not yet developed a global community. Yet, we need a global community in the face of the momentous, common problems that affect all the people of the planet Earth. There are many such problems that could be enumerated. We shall mention a number of the most important: global climate change; weapons of mass destruction; global economic disruptions; disease pandemics; gross inequalities within and among nations; the enormous cost of militarism, wars, and the disastrous consequences of war; the enormous costs of sexism, racism, and other forms of social injustice to the world community; the inadequate education of children to be capable and responsible world citizens, etc. These problems will require effective global cooperation if they are to be managed well.

What is a Global Community? A global community would have five key elements: (1) the diverse people of the planet Earth who strongly identify with the global community; (2) various institutions which help develop, encourage, and support people's identification with the global community; (3) institutions which enable people to cooperate effectively at all levels, from the local to the international, to manage global issues; (4) resources which facilitate effective cooperation at the various levels; and (5) governance structures which support the development and functioning of each of the previous four elements.

In this chapter, we have neither the space nor the competence to discuss the five elements of a global community. This will require much thought and research by many different academic disciplines as well as others. Here, as social psychologists, we will outline what we know about groups and personal identity in part 10.2 as a basis for discussing some important aspects of the development of a global community in part 10.3.

10.2 Groups

10.2.1 What Are Groups?

The term *group* is commonly used when there are two or more people who have: (1) one or more characteristics in common; (2) perceive themselves as a distinguishable entity; (3) are aware of the positive interdependence of some of their values, goals, and interests; (4) interact with one another directly or indirectly; and (5) pursue their positively interdependent values, goals, or interests together. Groups that endure over time typically develop (6) a set of norms that guide member interaction with one another and with their external environment (which may include their habitat as well as other groups, persons, species, and objects); and (7) a set of institutions and roles, each of which has specific activities, obligations, and rights associated with it (see Forsyth 2009; Levi 2011; Wheelan 2004 for numerous citations, definitions and characteristics of groups).

For a group to exist it is not sufficient for people to be aware that they have a common characteristic (e.g., the same gender) nor that they are a distinguishable entity, different from others (they are female, not male); nor that they have some

common interests (e.g., for females to have equality with males and fair, dignified, participation in the various institutions of society). Additionally, they must be able to interact with one another in some way, directly or indirectly.

Many friendships and other sociable groups only require the first four characteristics mentioned above. By interacting with other people who are similar to themselves in some important way, people with similar values and interests may feel more comfortable, less on-guard, more affirmed, and more able to maintain their self-esteem despite differences and derogation from others with other characteristics and values. Although such a social group may contribute to the satisfaction of two important needs described by Maslow (1943), *belongingness* and *self-esteem*, such a group, unless they have the characteristics of (5), (6), and (7), will not contribute much to the fulfillment of Maslow's other three needs: *physiological and physical well-being* (such as for good food, clean water, comfortable and safe shelter, pollution-free air, disease prevention and treatment, and health maintenance), *safety* (protection from dangers that arise from the destructiveness of nature, other living species, other persons, other groups, and other nations), and *self-actualization* (development of one's talents through education and fulfillment of them through meaningful work, by active participation in one's community to create a just, beautiful, joyful habitat which stimulates curiosity and openness to the possibilities in life).

It is well to recognize that to become a member of a group, one doesn't necessarily have to form the group. One is *born into many existing groups that are already formed*: e.g., a family, a religious group, a tribe, a nation. One may be *required to become a member* of an existing group if you are a child in a given community: e.g., to be required to go to school, to be a member of a class or team in the school, to be drafted into the military, and to be assigned as a member of a given unit. To be in good standing in a larger community, the norms and obligations of the larger community may require you to participate in specific institutions and subgroups of the large community. Finally, you may become a member of an existing group by *choice*, if the group is willing to accept you (e.g., when you apply for a job in a company or admission to a college) or if the group is required to accept you by superior authority or power. As we shall see later when we discuss personal and social identities and community, these three different ways of becoming a member of a group (being born into it, required to join it, and choosing to join it) are relevant to the development of personal and social identities as well as to the development of a global community.

10.2.2 Group Formation

To turn back to the question of how does a group get formed, small groups may get formed spontaneously from the interaction of people who discover that they have common interests and values and are compatible. However, it often requires a "change agent" or a collection of change agents who believe that it would be desirable

if a large group is established and acts cooperatively to effectively achieve mutually desired objectives: objectives desired by the change agents, by the group members, and possibly by the larger community within which the group would exist. Other names for the “change agents” are “social entrepreneurs” or “community organizers.”

Social entrepreneurs are a type of change agent who are interested in using their entrepreneurial skills to create organizations whose mission centers around bringing about social change on a critical social issue. Sometimes their work is directed at people in power (CEOs, others with influence) and sometimes with people who have little power as individuals but, collectively, could have much. Some of their characteristics include: flexibility in approach and a willingness to self-correct; a desire to share credit and at the same time work quietly; a willingness to explore beyond established structures, since many such organizations start from scratch rather than within existing ones; freedom to cross disciplinary boundaries; and a strong ethical motivation (Bornstein 2007).

Community organizers are another type of change agent who work collectively with members of a community to solve social problems in that community. They are similarly guided by a strong set of values that include: social and economic justice, equality, democracy, and peace.

Alinsky, in *Rules for Radicals* (1971) suggests that in order to be a good community organizer one needs curiosity, irreverence, imagination, a sense of humor, a bit of blurred vision for a better world, an organized personality, a well-integrated political standard, a free and open mind, and political relativity.

Change agents commonly engage in a series of activities to promote their vision of developing new groups. They may work at the ‘top’ as well as at the ‘bottom.’ These are some of the things that change agents typically do.

1. They identify the individuals or groups that they seek to change.
2. In terms of group formation, they communicate empathetically with other individuals and groups why, and how, their values and interests could be furthered by their participation in the group that is being formed. This requires a clear, attractive, compelling *mission statement* for the group. Here, they must often overcome lack of trust, skepticism, defeatism, or inertia among those they seek to influence. By getting ‘influential’ people who have credibility and influence among those they seek to influence, to support their efforts, those efforts are often much helped. Influential people who are well-known and well-respected in their communities are then well positioned to effect change. Others value their opinions and are motivated to respond to their call to action. Also, having members of their social network, who are favorable to the formation of the group, communicate their support will be an important influence upon those who are initially reluctant to make a commitment. In large communities, there is evidence to indicate that the structure of the communication network which exists among potential members (or which is created by the change agents) will affect the propensity of individuals to join a community and will affect the rapidity of community growth (Westaby 2012).

3. Further, it would be useful for the change agents to provide suggestions for how the group could function to achieve its values and interests: how the group might organize itself and develop the norms, procedures, capabilities, and institutions to cooperate effectively to identify, analyze, and work creatively to deal with the problems, present and future, they face. Although change agents may make useful suggestions with regard to these matters, the ultimate responsibility for their development and implementation rests with the group members.
4. Finally, it would often be helpful for the change agent to suggest clear markers for the group which clearly identify the group and its members and which distinguish it from other groups and from non-members. Here, we refer to such things as songs, flags, clothing items, pins, rings, pledges, rituals, celebrations, etc. Group markers such as these not only make the group more visible to non-members but also to members. When markers are developed and used well, they make a group more cohesive and make its members more strongly identified with it.

10.2.3 Group Development and Functioning

There is considerable literature on group development and functioning (see Tuckman 1965; Tuckman/Jensen 1977; Wheelan 2004; for a comprehensive review, see Wheelan 2005). We shall not attempt to summarize this vast literature. Instead, we shall present our own views that are based on our studies of group dynamics, our participation in various organizations, and our observations of various community groups.

As a group forms, begins to develop, and starts the process of functioning to achieve its objectives, it faces a number of issues that will require attention throughout the group's life. They include:

1. *The development of a clear, attractive, and compelling group mission which is well-publicized.* This is not only important for maintaining, as well as attracting group members, but it is essential for developing well-focused institutions and organizations and for defining the purposes of their activities. The mission may require redefinition from time to time as circumstances change.
2. *Group cohesion.* For a group to function well, its members must have strong motivation to become and remain members, they must be able to have considerable trust and respect for one another as well as honest communication, the ability to work together without unnecessary hassle, treat each other fairly, and demonstrate a readiness to help one another. Those are some of the characteristics of effectively developed and functioning cooperative groups (see Chap. 2 for a more detailed discussion).
3. *Organization.* It must be able to organize itself (or be initially organized by its change agents) so that it can develop the subgroups (the institutions, organizations, and social roles) necessary to achieve its mission. Among its most important are several interrelated roles or functions:

- (a) keeping the mission of the group clear, visible, and highly motivating;
- (b) maintaining group productivity (its effectiveness in achieving the group's goals);
- (c) maintaining group cohesiveness (the dedication and loyalty of its group members);
- (d) maintaining a productive relationship with its external environments;
- (e) evaluating itself (which keep the group aware of how well it is functioning);
- (f) researching new ways and means (which seeks to develop new, improved methods of achieving the group's goals);
- (g) *conflict resolution* and negotiation (which seeks to foster constructive rather than destructive processes and outcomes for the inevitable conflicts that will arise among the different members as they function within their different roles);
- (h) and finally, most importantly, *leading with skill and integrity* (which includes playing a central role in keeping the group's values and goals alive and salient; developing and coordinating the various functions and roles into one well-integrated and well-functioning group; developing the resources which are needed for the group to function well; and providing an inspiration model with which group members can identify and be proud of).

In a small, face-to-face group, each of its members, working together, may be engaged in implementing all of the functions listed above. As the group grows larger, there will be more subdivision with different members composing subgroups that implement different functions and within each subgroup different members may fulfill different roles.

Some of the advantages of increased group size are that as the size of the group increases, it permits opportunities for individuals with different talents to take on different tasks, the human resources available to the group may increase, and as a result larger groups may be able to accomplish more difficult, complicated tasks. However, increases in group size with accompanying role specialization often increases such problems as coordination and communication among group members. Also, with division of responsibilities and role specialization, there is typically the development of special interests and an accompanying desire to further one's own interests over those of others. Additionally, specialized language is often developed in various subgroups which makes intragroup communication more difficult. (Consider how as psychology has grown since World War II into many subspecialties, how difficult it is for any psychologist in any given specialty to know what is going on in all of the specialties and often how difficult it is to communicate with those in other specialties.)

One particular difficulty of the development of special interest in one's own role or subgroup as the size of the group increases has to do with the *role of leadership*. Commonly, this role has unique responsibilities and challenges as well as unique rewards and power associated with it. Unless the group has well-developed democratic procedures for the election of leaders and the limitation of their power, as well as norms to prevent corrupt leadership and make it undesirable, those who

occupy leadership roles often are able to maintain themselves in these roles when they are no longer serving the group's values and purposes well. Although there are exceptions, without the deterring influence of a well-structured democratic group that emphasizes the values of participation, freedom, equality, and justice, those who are advantaged in power and its resources will too often seek to maintain their advantages.

10.2.4 Personal and Social Identities

One's social identities are important components of one's personal identity but they do not completely define any individual's sense of a unique identity. This sense arises from a number of factors including having a memory of experiences that you, and no one else, personally had; and the awareness that one's perceptions, one's thoughts, and one's personality exist in a unique body that is uniquely located in space and time even though others may have similar experiences, perceptions, thoughts, and personality. However, components of one's personal identity are the various social identities that one has acquired. George Herbert Mead, in his classic work *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), pointed out that the individual's self as well as his or her capacity for reflective thought develop in the course of social interaction with the members of his or her family and other groups in the community to which he or she belongs. By taking the role of others and responding to his or her own actions as they would, the individual learns to anticipate the social effects of his or her actions. In addition, he or she learns that he and others are expected to behave toward one another in specified ways as a function of his or her particular personal and social attributes—such as age, gender, social class, race, religion, ethnic background, and nationality.

Thus a 'black' boy learns to behave differently toward 'black' than toward 'white' children, and he learns to expect 'whites' to behave differently toward him than they do toward 'whites'. Similarly, children learn that certain activities are 'feminine' and others are 'masculine' and that disapproval is risked by engaging in behavior that is considered appropriate for the opposite sex but not for one's own. However, each child's experience is in some respects unique, and thus the conceptions among a group of what it is to be a member of that group will not be identical. Moreover, the meaning of any particular sub-identity, such as 'black,' is influenced by the total configuration of social identities of which it is an element. Thus the conception of 'black,' like that of 'Jew,' is affected by the linking of the two attributes in the configurations "black Jew." Adding other elements to the configuration, such as 'rich,' 'young,' 'woman,' and 'Brazilian,' further alters and defines the meaning of the initially specified sub-identity 'black.' (See Turner et al. 1987 for a discussion of these ideas as they relate to self-categorization theory.)

Although the meaning of any personal sub-identity is influenced by the total configuration of sub-identities, it would be a mistake to assume that all elements are equally influential in determining an individual's thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

It is evident that situational factors help determine which sub-identity will be elicited most strongly at a given time: different sub-identities are likely to be most salient and most influential in different social situations (Abrams et al. 2005). The sub-identity of ‘white’ is more likely to be elicited in the presence of ‘blacks’ than in the presence of other ‘whites’—unless the other ‘whites’ are discussing ‘blacks’ or interracial relations. A New Yorker and a Texan are more likely to feel a common identity as Americans in China than in the United States. Thus a sub-identity is made salient in a situation by contrast with the presence of members of other different or antithetical groups that are used to mark off the boundaries of one’s own group (Alderfer/Smith 1982). It is also made salient by the presences of threats, danger, discrimination, or other potential harm to oneself because of membership in a given group. If derogatory comments or discriminatory actions are liable to be directed at you or other members of your group at any time from almost anybody, then you will be continuously aware of your membership in this group. A sub-identity is also made salient by the prospect of reward or other potential gain resulting from membership in a particular group. More generally, the more eliciting stimuli that are present in a situation—whether those stimuli be negative or positive in implication—the more salient will be the identity in that situation.

It is apparent that sub-identities differ in their readiness to be evoked. Some sub-identities are more pervasive than others and are readily aroused in many different types of situations. One’s sub-identity as a member of one’s family group enters into many more situations than one’s sub-identity as a member of one’s tennis club. It connects with more people and with more of one’s other sub-identities, and thus it is a more pervasive influence on one’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior.

Sub-identities also differ in how central or important they are to the individual’s self-esteem; the more central a sub-identity is, the more likely it is to be evoked and the more influential it will be when evoked. One measure of the centrality of the sub-identity is one’s readiness to resist its derogation or elimination. Thus one of the authors is more willing to give up being a squash player than a tennis player, and he would abandon either of these rather than quit his profession. Similarly, he is more ready to resist derogation of his ethnic group than his age group.

The importance of a sub-identity to one’s self-esteem is determined by the strength of the different types of bonds binding one to it. Several different types of bonds can be distinguished (McCall 1970): ascribed bonds, bonds of commitment, bonds due to investment, bonds of attachment, and instrumental bonds. The first three types of bonds (ascription, commitment, and investment) are in large measure “restraining bonds”; they restrain one from leaving a group even if one desires to do so. The latter two (attachment and instrumental) are “attracting bonds,” which pull the individual toward the group.

The strongest restraining bonds are those arising out of certain *ascribed* statuses—such as family, gender, racial, ethnic, and national group membership, many of which one acquires by birth rather than by choice. Such statuses can rarely be changed. It is the combination of their inalterability and their social significance that gives these ascribed statuses their personal importance. One’s handedness, left or right, may be as difficult to alter as one’s race, but it is rarely as socially significant.

Membership in a family, racial, sexual, ethnic, or national group affects one's thoughts and actions in many situations; these effects are pervasive. In addition, by common definition, membership in such groups typically excludes membership in other groups of a similar type. Thus, if you are male, you are not also female; if you are an orthodox Muslim, you are not also an orthodox Christian. Thus being a member is thought to be more or less distinctive, and since membership is linked to experiences from early on in one's life, it is not unusual for one to get emotionally attached to such groups, with the result that these memberships play an important positive role in determining one's sense of identity.

Bonds of *commitment* may also tie one to a group and to the identity connected with it. The commitment may be to other members of the group or to interested outsiders. Thus a woman who is engaged but no longer interested in marrying may be reluctant to break the engagement because of her commitment to her fiancé or because of the expected disappointment of her parents and friends. Similarly, one's *investments* in a given identity—the amount of time, energy, life changes, money, and emotion previously expended in establishing and maintaining the identity—will generally serve to bind one to continue it even when one might not otherwise choose to do so. Nevertheless, it should be noted that people do break up long-standing marriages or change well-established careers if they expect that continued investments will be costly and not worthwhile. This is particularly likely if they are aware of a more rewarding alternative for their future investments. The restraining bonds of commitment and investment are, however, usually easier to break than those of ascription.

Bonds of *attachment* attract one to a group; such bonds develop when significant personal needs for security, acceptance, and meaning have been fulfilled in the group, and the group is thought to be largely irreplaceable or matchless as a source of fulfillment for these needs. A group is likely to be viewed as irreplaceable when no readily available alternatives are perceived (as in the case of the small child in relation to the nuclear family), when the feasibility of leaving the group to go to another one is small (as is the case of the citizens of most nations). Or when, as a result of an extended history of participation in the group, the group has taken on a unique significance (as is the case of family and ethnic groups).

Bonds of attachment provide a diffuse, nonspecific form of attraction to a group and to the idea of expressing one's identity by membership in the group. In contrast, *instrumental* bonds arise from the success of the group in providing dependable rewards for fulfilling one's specific roles or functions within the group and for being identified as a member of the group. Instrumental bonds are linked to the specific success of the group in providing specific satisfactions. However, the more success the group has in doing this and the wider the range of satisfactions it provides, the more likely it is that diffuse bonds of attachment will also be developed.

It is evident that an individual who is getting ample instrumental satisfactions from her group and is deeply attached to it will not find herself in conflict, because her investments and ascription will restrain her from abandoning her identification with the group. To the contrary, the more the individual is attracted to a group, the more willing she will be to make investments in it, to make personal commitments to it, and to bind herself irrevocably to it. Conversely, the less she is attracted to a

group, the less willing she will be to bind herself so tightly that it would be difficult to leave it if she should choose to do so.

Suppose that one is emotionally attached to one's sub-identity as a Jew, woman, or 'black'—and irrevocably bound to it by bonds of ascription, commitment, and investment—but that it places one at a distinct instrumental disadvantage in obtaining many kinds of opportunities and rewards. How one copes with this situation will be largely determined by whether one views the disadvantages to be just or unjust and whether one thinks one can leave the disadvantaged group to join a more advantaged one (as when a 'black' passes as 'white' or a Jew converts to become Christian) (Tajfel 1982). If those who are disadvantaged by their group identity accept their disadvantages as being warranted (and seek to separate themselves from their group by derogating it), they are unlikely to challenge and conflict with those who are profiting from their relatively advantaged positions. The sense of being treated unjustly because of one's membership in a group to which one is strongly attached and bound is the energizer for much intergroup conflict; it often strengthens one's identification with the group (Dietz-Uhler/Murell 1998; Grant 1993). The sense of injustice is felt particularly intensely in interracial, interethnic, and intersex conflicts because of the centrality of these group identities to the individual's self-esteem. When women or blacks or Jews are devalued as a group, those who are identified and identify with the groups also are personally attacked.

The fact that one has many social identities may, of course, lead to internal conflict. Thus, one's obligations to one's work as a psychologist may conflict with one's obligations to spend more time with one's children. However, Lindner's (2012) fascinating discussion of her sunflower identity indicates how the various sub-identities of an individual can be integrated into a coherent whole. As she points out, there can be unity in diversity: one can be an African-American and Irish-American or Italian-American, as well as male or female, a student or professor, and not feel conflict among one's various identities. As Roccas/Brewer (2002) have indicated when one's various social identities are not fully convergent or overlapping, one's social identity structure is more complex. In their research, they found that lower social identity complexity was associated with stress and higher social identity complexity was associated with increased tolerance and positivity toward out-groups. They suggest that "individuals who live in a multi-cultural society that embraces an integrationist ideology are likely to have more complex representations of their multiple identities than individuals who live in a mono-cultural or a stratified society" (Roccas/Brewer 2002: 104). This view is concordant with Lindner's "sunflower identity" model (2012).

10.3 Global Community

In this part, we draw upon the framework presented in Part A to discuss the development of a global community, the identification of its members and its component groups with the global community, and aspects of the functioning of the

global community. A global community is one that necessarily includes all nations and people of the Earth due to their political, social, physical, biological, and economic interdependence. The people and nations of the global community are inextricably bound as they are interrelated and mutually subject to the impact of global forces and events. In this section, we are more tentative and claim no extraordinary skill in how to create a global community beyond our collective expertise in social psychology, conflict resolution, and group dynamics. Yet, our aim is to illustrate how this framework could be used to think about a global community. Our hope is that others who have additional expertise will find this framework useful and that they will use it to develop more detailed ideas and proposals for action.

10.3.1 Development of a Global Community

If you are a change agent and you wish to help develop a global community, the first thing to realize is that there are many other potential change agents who are interested in the same objective. Thus if one ‘Googles’ such terms as “global community” or “global citizen,” one will find many other individuals, groups, NGOs, and other organization that are interested and active in relation to this topic. Thus, one of the first tasks of a change agent would be to identify a small group (30–50 in size) who could initially serve to organize, coordinate, and provide leadership for the larger collection of potential change agents. Once this initial group is organized and functioning, it will be active in recruiting other change agents to contribute to the development of a global community.

Once a group of dedicated and well-organized group of change agents have been developed, it is important that they formulate a strategic plan for action. Such a plan would address the following questions:

1. What are the common values and interests which most of the people in the global community share? What are the common problems they must deal with if they, their children, or grandchildren are to avoid severe harm and to prosper?
2. How can most people on the planet be communicated with so that they become aware that their values, interests, and problems are widely shared, locally and globally?
3. How can guidelines be developed and communicated which will encourage and provide workable models for effective cooperative action, at the local and global levels, to fulfill their values and address their collective problems?

We believe that, it is important to develop strategic planning for two levels: (1) the ‘bottom’, the people of the world and (2) for the ‘top’, the leaders of the existing institutions in the world such as the U.N., nation-states, the global economy, education, healthcare, etc. The strategic planning for the different existing institutions would, undoubtedly, have to vary for each kind of institution. Despite these differences, it seems essential to communicate to those at the ‘top’ as well as at the ‘bottom,’ the common values, interests, and problems that most humans share.

10.3.2 What Are Some of the Common Values of a Global Community?

Below are listed some that were drawn from various sources, mainly from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* adopted by the United Nations in 1948, *The Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Freedoms* (adopted by the General Assembly of the U.N. in December 1998), and Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to Congress on January 6 1941 on *The Four Freedoms*.

Some common values:

1. *Survival of the human species*. This value implies recognition that we all are part of a common human family who originated in common ancestors despite our diversity in wealth, national origin, religion, race, gender, education, etc.
2. *Sustaining the earth as a habitat that is suitable for congenial human living*. This value implies that each generation of humans has a responsibility for doing this not only for themselves but also for future generations.
3. *Freedom to live in dignity, without humiliation*. This value implies that all individuals have the rights described in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.
4. *Freedom from fear*. This value implies that one or one's loved ones would not be the victim of war or violence between groups which lead to harms such as death, injury, loss, or forced displacement from one's home.
5. *Freedom of information, speech, beliefs, and assembly*. This implies access to free sources of information (such as books, the press, media, TV, the Internet); freedom to express one's thoughts publically and through the media, and freedom to assemble with others to exchange information, thoughts, and plans for non-violent action: This also implies freedom of religion, as well as the freedom to reject religion.
6. *Freedom from want*. This implies that one is free of such impoverished circumstances that one and one's loved ones can have adequate care, food, water, shelter, health services, education, and other necessities for physical and emotional well-being as well as a dignified life.
7. Finally, all people should have the *right to be protected from violations of their freedoms* and the *right to seek redress if they are violated*. This implies the responsibility and freedom to protect others whose freedoms and rights are being threatened or violated.

All of the preceding, and more, are included in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *Declaration of the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*. However, we have aimed for some of the brevity and simplicity well-expressed in F.D.R.'s statement of *The Four Freedoms*.

10.3.3 Some Common Problems the Global Community Faces

Undoubtedly, as change agents seek to recruit people to active membership in the world community, initially, they will have to focus on only a few of these important collective problems. Which should be chosen? We shall nominate three. Our choices are:

1. *Climate change.* As a result of recent climate changes there have been extensive droughts, floods, and devastating storms, which have affected world-wide food production and water supplies, killed many people, and made many homeless. As pollutants continue to accumulate in the Earth's atmosphere, it can be expected that such disastrous effects will intensify and, as the seas rise, the land on which hundreds of millions of people live will be flooded and become uninhabitable.

In the Stern Review (2006), a 700-page analysis which was commissioned by the U.K. government and authored by Nicholas Stern, an economic adviser to Prime Minister Tony Blair and a former chief economist of the World Bank, it was estimated that the costs of climate change, if not addressed, will be equivalent to losing 5 % (and potentially as much as 20 %) of the global domestic product (GDP) "each year, now and forever." Hundreds of millions of people could be threatened with hunger, water shortages, and severe economic deprivation. The report concluded that staving off such crises would require immediate investments equivalent to 1 % of global GDP over each of the next 10–20 years, before the window of opportunity to mitigate the biggest impacts of climate change closes.

Although there is increasing political awareness of the importance of addressing climate change, the critical investments needed to stave off an irreversible, catastrophic climate change have not yet been made. This is an issue of much urgency.

2. *Wars, violence, and their disastrous consequences.* To prevent wars, their causes will need to be addressed. There are of course many causes of war that could be identified. Here, we wish to emphasize several socio-psychological causes: (a) the belief that one is in a win-lose (competitive) relation to the other; (b) the view that one can intimidate, coerce, or defeat the other by the threat or use of force; (c) or the belief that the other will seek to win through intimidation, coercion, or defeat of one by the use of force; and (d) the development of a military-industrial complex for the purposes of (b) or (c) which needs to justify its existence and large costs, once established, even if the preceding conditions (a, b, or c) no longer exist. Win-lose relations often develop between individuals, groups, or nations when they believe that what is essential to their well-being (e.g., wealth, scarce natural resources, power) is in scarce supply and cannot be shared at all or fairly. Leaders and the populations of various groups (nations, regions, political factions, etc.) must acquire the values, knowledge, and skills of constructive conflict resolution and integrative negotiation if they are to avoid the disastrous consequences of a win-lose approach to conflict (Deutsch 1994).

3. *Economic disruption and lack of effective economic functioning.* A well-functioning community requires a well-functioning economy that develops the

resources and produces the goods and services which foster individual physical and mental well-being. It enables the support of the various institutions and roles within the community that foster such well-being: the family, education, health providers, government, a legal system, etc. Many factors can contribute to the poor functioning and disruption of an economic system. These include: poor cooperation and coordination among the various components of the system; corruption which siphons off considerable value produced by the economic system from the general population; injustices and social unrest resulting from gross inequality in the distribution of the income and wealth produced by the economic system; a short-term rather than long-term perspective; poor planning and poor regulation of the system so that overconsumption and greed lead to repeated crises and breakdown in the economic system; and the lack of recognition that a well-functioning system requires “social rationality” as well as “economic rationality.”

10.3.4 Some Other Social Psychological Prerequisites for Developing a Global Community

There are several prerequisites to developing a global community in addition to identifying important values in common. They include: *communicating* to the possible members of such a community; helping those potential members *imagine* what it would be like; and helping them become *active*, at their local level as well as global level, in developing such a community. Each of these prerequisites is briefly discussed below in order to provide a context in which more expert knowledge could be presented or developed.

Communication. As events in Tunisia, Egypt, and other nations of the Middle East, known collectively as the Arab Spring, indicate, modern communication technology (e.g., social networks such as Facebook and Twitter) can quickly interconnect large numbers of people, motivate them, and help them coordinate their actions. This did not happen without some pre-planning by a small group of change-agents who were dissatisfied with the autocratic government in their countries and knew how to employ such technology to reach large numbers of people and organize them to demonstrate nonviolently for freedom and the end of autocratic rule.

Similarly, experts in modern communication technology could undoubtedly develop a communication strategy for reaching much of the world’s human population (see Bachstrom et al. 2006; Westaby 2012). Any group of change agents seeking to develop a global community should clearly include experts in modern communication technology who understand how access to such technology could be made available in areas of the world currently devoid of such technology. Such technology would have to include the capacity to communicate in languages and imagery appropriate to the various human populations of our planet. Online activist networks such as change.org and Avaaz are examples of organized change agents using social media to effect change at the global level.

Imagining. The context of the communication, we believe, should be hopeful, interesting, clear, and brief (with the possibility of accessing a fuller statement). It would communicate in shortened form (a) the basic rights and responsibilities, as well as the common problems, facing the members of a global community; (b) seek an affirmation or pledge of their willingness to be a responsible, active member of such a community; and (c) indicate what forms their activity might take. Specialists in public relations or in marketing, in creating illustrative imagery, and in dramatizing, could provide invaluable guidance in developing a well-crafted, interesting message.

A prestigious, well-recognized group or organization should introduce the message in a detailed and compelling manner using a well-recognized, prestigious spokesperson. We are not specialists but let us indicate how we might begin such a message. Our suggested message would begin as below:

Imagine a global human community in which you, your children, and grandchildren as well as all the others in our shared planet and their children and grandchildren:

... Are able to live in dignity and are treated fairly.

... Have freedom from the fear of violence and war and can live in peace.

... Have freedom from want so that you do not ever have to live in such impoverished circumstances where you and your loved ones can not have adequate care, food, water, shelter, health services, education, and other necessities for physical and emotional well-being as well as a dignified life.

... Have freedom of information, publication, speech, beliefs, and assembly so that you can be free to be different and free to express open criticism of those in authority individually or collectively.

... Have the responsibility to promote, protect, and defend such freedoms as those described above for yourself as well as for others when they are denied or under threat.

... Will work together cooperatively to make the world that their grandchildren will inherit free of such problems as war, injustice, climate change, and economic disruption.

Are you willing be a member of such a global human community?

If 'yes', please make the following pledge:

I pledge to promote these rights and responsibilities in my own life, in my community, and in the global community as best I can through constructive nonviolent personal actions and working together with others.

I also pledge to seek a constructive resolution of conflict about implementation of the foregoing values, when it arises, by working cooperatively to resolve the conflict with those with whom I am in conflict.

Now think of an action that you can take by yourself or with others, to implement the pledge and commit yourself to take this action. When you have taken the action let others know that you have done this by using social media or other means, so that you can inspire others to do so also.

Action possibilities. For the global community to maintain the support of its members and to develop and function well, it has to develop a variety of institutions, social norms, and social roles as well as strategies for actions to deal with its collective problems and achieve its various goals. In our current world, some of this already exists but, unfortunately, much of what exists at all levels, (e.g., local, national, global) does not promote well the values described above nor the effective cooperative efforts to deal with the problems that confront us all. Thus, much action

has to be directed at changing and reshaping what exists as well as erecting new institutions, norms, and roles.

The world is complex and multi-faceted. Although “renaissance thinkers” may help provide an integrated overview, many problems at all levels of community also require specialized knowledge for their solution. Thus, we believe that it could be useful for change agents promoting a global community to seek to develop many internationally composed “Specialists Without Borders.” Thus, in addition to Doctors Without Borders, there could be “Engineers Without Borders,” “Business Leaders Without Borders,” “Educators Without Borders,” “Democracy Leaders Without Borders,” “Farmers Without Borders,” “Musicians Without Borders,” “Artists Without Borders,” and “Community Organizers Without Borders.” Many other “specialists without borders” could be listed.

The point is that as members of a community seek to act in an effective way to deal with the problems of their community at whatever level, they may seek guidance in any or all aspects of problem solution: identifying the problem, diagnosing it, developing possible solutions, employing criteria to select the most effective in terms of the criteria, implementing the solution, evaluating its effectiveness, and making changes to improve its effectiveness. Having such help available will affirm values of a global community and stimulate action to deal with global problems and will also increase one’s personal identification with the global community.

10.3.5 Personal Identification with the Global Community

Lindner (2012) has much that is relevant to this topic. Here, we would add that personal identification will grow as: (1) an individual experiences more and more people become so identified; (2) an individual, with others, engages in cooperative actions with others who are so identified; and (3) such actions begin to have some success in achieving goals of the global community.

Personal identification can be enhanced as the members of the global community develop unique indicators of membership such as: rituals (e.g., songs, chants, prayers, pledges, gestures); insignia (e.g., attire, rings, jewelry); displays (e.g., flags, posters, pictures of leaders); space (e.g., special buildings for global community functions, special cemeteries for global heroes, special arenas); celebrations and holidays; media and publications; education; history; and research disciplines. Of course, these would not supplant other important aspects of one’s identity.

Group-as-a-whole theory (Wells 1995) is a useful perspective in thinking about how individuals and groups may identify (or not) with the global community. Group-as-a-whole theory posits that groups have “an élan vital” that binds them together that is more or less than each individual member (Wells 1995: 55). The theory includes the idea that groups engage in defense mechanisms, in particular splitting, to ward off anxiety when under threat (Wells 1995; Brazaitis 2004; McRae/Short 2010). The defense mechanism of splitting in this context refers to

dividing the world, individuals, groups, subgroups, nations, etc. into all good or all bad. When former United States President George Bush made his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002 he identified states that constituted “the axis of evil.” This is an example of the concept of splitting at the international level. If some nations were identified as evil the implication is that others were the opposite. Identification with the global community necessitates working against destructive group dynamics such as splitting whereby other peoples, groups, nations are not seen as ‘other,’ ‘not me,’ or ‘evil’ but rather that each person recognizes their connection to each other person. Thus the individuals in the global community make up the *élan vital* of the global group-as-a-whole. Said more specifically, in order to identify with the global community Americans need to view Middle Easterners not as exotic or foreign, but rather as part of their own group; the French need to see Moroccans as we/us, the Koreans need to see the Chinese as a part of them, rather than ‘other’ and so on.

Indeed, personal identification with the global community can be difficult if it is perceived to be in conflict with one’s other identifications—with, for example, one’s national group or one’s religion. Lindner’s (2012) discussion of ‘subsidiarity’ and “unity in diversity,” as well as her image of a “sunflower identity” is very relevant here. Subsidiarity refers to the idea that local identities are preserved as much as possible (the European Union captures this idea) and building on the common ground that unites us in our commonality while rejecting that which separates groups into enemies or forces us into uniformity. Similarly, the idea of unity in diversity recognizes our commonality and appreciates our uniquenesses without letting those uniquenesses divide us.

Buchan et al. (2011) conducted a highly relevant study that suggested a key aspect in contributing to a global collective is social identification with the world community. Global social identification (GSI) is an inclusive identification with the world community and includes feeling attached to the world as a whole, defining oneself as a member of the world as a whole, and feeling close to other members of the world as a whole. The authors’ study included over 1,000 participants from six countries around the world and their results found that global social identification played a role in motivating cooperation at the global level. Those who strongly identified with the world community made decisions that contributed to the collective good regardless of whether they expected a return on their investment. Further, this identification with the global collective played a role in global cooperation regardless of whether or not the participants thought others would behave cooperatively. The authors posited that self-reported identification with the world as a whole may then generalize to the psychology of in-group behavior. Therefore, what one considers one’s ‘group’ may be as large as the world with the result that those in the world group or global community would exhibit the in-group behaviors of positivity, trust, and cooperation, etc. Just as Wells (1995) suggested a group-as-a-whole mindset, Buchan and her colleagues (2011) suggested there may be a world-as-a-whole identification that could be critical to the development of a global community.

In her review article, Brewer (2007) cites research that suggests that the creation of a superordinate in-group identity need not lead subgroup members to give up

their original group identity. Research supports the idea that dual or even multiple identities can reduce intergroup bias, particularly with a salient, inclusive superordinate identity. This implies that the creation of a strong identification with a broadly inclusive social group such as a global community need not lead one to give up or deny one's ethnic or other important identities.

10.3.6 Facilitating Change to Create a Functioning Global Community

To establish a functioning global community we believe that we have to reform many existing institutions and create new ones, as necessary, so that they support the central values of a global community and contribute to the cooperative efforts to deal with global problems.

There are many different types of institutions and many exist at the international, multinational, national, and local levels. They include governmental, educational, health, economic, scientific, and others. It is clearly beyond the capacity of the authors to indicate how the institutions of the world should be reformed or to indicate what new institutions need to be created. However, we wish to make several points.

Just as change agents will seek to have many individuals in the world embrace active membership in a world community (including acceptance of its basic values and responsibility for engaging in cooperative actions to deal with global problems), so too they should seek to have as many institutions in the world embrace active membership in the world community. These would seek to influence international corporations (such as Microsoft, General Electric, ExxonMobil, and McDonalds) as well as nation states and international organizations (such as The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Global Water Partnership), educational institutions, and so on. The existence of an active world citizen group should be able to help provide incentive and pressure for changes in institutions (and vice versa).

There are, undoubtedly, some institutions such as the United Nations that already embrace the values and responsibilities of active membership in a world community. The United Nations in its *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and its *Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* have articulated the basic values of a global community. And in its many agendas for action, it has articulated meritorious action related to dealing with global problems. Yet despite the many valuable activities of its various agencies (such as UNICEF, U.N. Development Programme), the United Nations has not yet been able to communicate to the world's people the values of its declarations defining human rights, freedoms, and responsibilities. Nor has it had much success in having implemented its agendas of action for global problems. This inability to accomplish these objectives undoubtedly reflects problems in the

way the United Nations is structured and its lack of adequate resources. We shall not attempt to articulate here how the United Nations and other worthwhile global institutions could be changed to become more effective and have more resources. But change agents should have this as an important objective.

We organize the remainder of this section around the ways of thinking about bringing about change to increase the effectiveness of a global community. We address five psychological issues for change agents to address in working to strengthen our global community: First, how do we resolve the dilemma of making decisions that favor individual interests versus those that favor collective or community interests? Here we apply and extend the ideas of Diesing (1962), Hardin (1968), and others around what change agents would need to do in order to address the “commons dilemma,” the tendency to act in *in favor of individual self-interest (of one’s group, community, organization or nation) over common, global interests*. Secondly, what strategies exist to encourage open-minded discussion so that the conflicts inherent in the myriad perspectives of a global community may be worked on constructively? Third, how can we extend individual entities time perspectives so that long-term global issues can be worked on without the constraints of the need for short-term gratification? Fourth, what are some ways to enhance the use of constructive conflict resolution techniques to deal with the inevitable conflicts inherent in this endeavor? And lastly, what kinds of influence strategies would be useful for bringing about change in the status quo between low power and high power groups? A last section offers some well-tested skills and methods for change agents working with large and diverse groups.

We particularly emphasize the commons dilemma as we see this as the central dilemma facing the development of a global community.

10.3.7 The Commons Dilemma and Complete Rationality

In developing a global community it is important to avoid a common social dilemma: “the tragedy of the commons.” Hardin (1968) described *the tragedy of the commons* as arising from the situation in which multiple individuals, acting independently and rationally in terms of their own economic self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource even when it is clear that it’s not to anyone’s long-term interest for this to happen. This dilemma exists not only for interdependent individuals but also for interdependent groups, corporations, and nations. Thus, if individuals, groups, corporations, and nations disregard the costs to the global community of such sources of pollution of the atmosphere as employing coal to produce electricity, gasoline guzzling cars, not keeping habitats and buildings well insulated, the methane gas resulting from certain forms of agriculture, the destruction of forests (which absorb pollutants), etc. global warming will occur with harm to individuals, groups, corporations, and nations. Similar to this dilemma are the variety of public goods dilemmas that we face as an interdependent community: when individuals create a public good, its benefit is

available to all members of that community regardless of contribution. Opposite to this is the idea that when one entity creates a public harm, that harm is able to affect all members of that community even though they did not contribute to its creation. My country's acceptance of high carbon emissions will affect the quality of your air.

Many solutions have been proposed for the tragedy of the commons (See Wikipedia, "The Tragedy of the Commons"). Here, we emphasize a motivational solution: recognition that the promotion of well-being for an individual (group, corporation, or nation) requires the employment of the other forms of rationality as well as economic rationality. As Diesing (1962) has indicated, there are five forms of rationality: *technical* (efficient achievement of a single goal); *economic* (efficient achievement of a plurality of goals); *legal* (rules or rule following); *political* (referring to the rationality of decision-making structures); and *social* rationality (integrating forces in individuals and social systems which generate meaning and allow action to occur). He defines rationality in terms of effectiveness and he describes a number of fundamental kinds of effectiveness in the social world: effectiveness refers to the successful production of any kind of value. A sixth type of rationality has also been added, and labeled *ecological rationality*—reasoning that produces, increases or preserves the capacity, resilience and diversity of an ecosystem, or in its largest sense, the biosphere (Bartlett 1986).

We suggest extending the concept of social rationality and ecological rationality to include community or *global* rationality. Global rationality could be thought of as decision-making that is guided by the effective creation of value for our global community. So, in addition to looking at decisions from technical, economic, legal, political and ecological rationalities, an extension would be to look at decisions in terms of their global rationality, or value in creating or strengthening global community. It is based on the salience of the "interdependence, obligation and solidarity of unique relationships" connecting us to our global identity. *Complete rationality* would go beyond economic rationality and would require the integration of economic rationality with social (global) rationality and other forms of rationality as is appropriate to the specific situation of decision-making.

The limitations of "economic rationality" have been addressed in criticism of the measure of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP is a flawed economic measure of the economic value of the goods produced nationally in a given year (it doesn't include many costs of increased economic production such as the costs produced by environmental pollution) which is often taken as an indicator of the well-being of the nation's citizens, individually and collectively. Thus, Stiglitz et al. (2010) argue, in *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up*, that the GDP is a deeply flawed indicator of well-being. Also, Nussbaum (2011), in her recent book, *Creating Capabilities, The Human Development Approach*, indicates that equating doing well (for a nation) with an increase in GDP per capita, distracts attention from the real problems of creating well-being for all members of a society by suggesting that the right way to improve the quality of life is by economic growth alone (i.e., increased GDP).

A question that arises, then, is how can change agents encourage individuals and organizations to use *complete rationality*, and not simply *economic rationality*, in their long term strategies and day-to-day decisions?

This is a complicated matter that has been looked at from different perspectives. One important way is to redefine national as well as global well-being to include many more indicators than GDP. Thus, at the national levels, one would also include measures related to education, health, longevity, civil rights, income and wealth equality, social mobility, incarceration rate, and so forth. At the global level, one would include not only measures similar to those at the national level, but for the global level such other measures as number of refugees, value of global arms trade, recurrences of violent conflicts within and between nations, global measures of atmospheric pollution, measures of existing natural resources as water, minerals, forests, biodiversity, etc.

It is an important task for scientists from many disciplines, to work together to develop systematic, comprehensive measures of global functioning. Such measures, if taken annually, would help identify problems which need addressing and when addressed, if they are being addressed effectively. Currently, there exist many different measures of various aspects of global functioning. Most of the measures compare the various nations of the world on one or another measures. For example, the Gallup Poll provides polling data in 170 countries on individual well-being (percentage of people thriving): in the United States it was 57 % for 2010, in Denmark, 82 %; The United Nations has also developed many measures: The Human Development Index is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and standards of living worldwide (in 2010 Norway ranked #1, the United States #4); Standard of Living World Statistics provides data on various measures of all the world's nations thus, the U.S. ranks highest among the world's nations in GDP but it has a relatively high measure of income inequality (a Gini index of 45, compared to Sweden's 25). In addition, there exist various global measures such as: the atmospheric buildup of greenhouse gases, the status of various natural resources (such as oil, water, minerals, forests, etc.).

There may be need for additional measures of national and global well-being. However, we suggest that it would be valuable to develop several meaningful indices at the global level which would provide a clear, simple picture to understand the state of our world. We timidly suggest that they might include global indices of the status of: Human Development, the Environment, Natural Resources, Destructive Conflict, and Economic Productivity.

One relevant perspective here is that of the conflict between decision making that maximizes self interest in the short term and decision making that maximizes self and common or global interests in the short *and* long term. Ironically, in terms of global rationality, decisions that maximize self interest in the short term often have a deleterious effect on the long term community interests, which therefore would include oneself in those deleterious effects. For example, your decision to purchase a gas guzzling car rather than a hybrid car might involve a short term gain for you in terms of a lower price, and a long term harm to the larger community (e.g., increased carbon dioxide pollution). When you make decisions, individual [economic]

rationality must be supplanted with a global (social) rationality. Your decision to purchase a gas guzzling car is best considered in light of not only what's best for you now, but what's best for you and your global community now *and later*. Your short term decisions that benefit you, also have long term consequences that harm you along with the larger system of which you are part. Hardin (1968) expresses this dilemma poignantly in the following: "The individual benefits as an individual from his ability to deny the truth even though society as a whole, of which he is a part, suffers" (p. 1245).

This framework can be applied to how we look at some of the world's problems: by expanding our emphasis from individual (group, corporate, or national) harms and benefits to include benefits and harms to our global community. Change agents need to work to change the orientation of nation states, multinational organizations, and other entities that have a significant influence on our global community.

They should be encouraged to recognize, and act to upon their recognition, that they are part of an interdependent global community and that their own welfare is linked to the welfare of the other members of the global community. Here, we again note briefly an interesting research study, "Global Social Identity and Global Cooperation" (Buchan et al. 2011), which employed a typical Commons Dilemma experiential format involving 1,195 participants from six countries. Its results indicate that those subjects who had a global social identification were significantly more likely to overcome the Commons Dilemma.

10.3.8 Developing Open Mindedness

A second obstacle concerns the challenge of overcoming closed mindedness or encouraging open mindedness in embracing divergent viewpoints to address common problems. Open mindedness as defined by Tjosvold and colleagues (2014) is the willingness to seek out evidence that goes against one's own ideas and beliefs and to judge them on their merits, without favor to one's own perspective. Therefore, closed mindedness would be the opposite: the unwillingness to seek out information that goes against one's beliefs or positions or to discard any evidence that does not support one's own views or beliefs. How then can we overcome this challenge and to promote open minded discussion among members of the global community? Tjosvold and colleagues define four mutually reinforcing aspects of open minded discussion: developing and expressing one's own ideas (perspective giving); questioning and understanding other's views and ideas (perspective taking), integrating and synthesizing to generate new perspectives, and agreeing and implementing some kind of solution. The second characteristic, entails the acknowledgement of the other side's perspective. The importance of being heard has been documented in some interesting research by Bruneau/Saxe (2012). The four qualities are presented linearly but parties may move back and forth between them. When this happens interpersonally or across groups, organizations, nations, it promotes constructive conflict resolution. These four qualities are embodied in an

effective and well-tested methodology for addressing complex problems and conflicts: Constructive Controversy (Johnson et al. 2014). This is a methodology used in large and small groups to creatively address controversial and complex conflicts facing the group.

Unlike debate and concurrence seeking, in constructive controversy, different advocacy groups seek out information to support their perspective and present their strongest arguments in favor of those perspectives. This is followed by changing perspectives and now developing their strongest argument supporting the opposite point of view. Upon mutual clarification, group members drop their advocacy and synthesize the best of both perspectives to reach a consensual decision. Once a decision is made, the group reflects on their process and performance and implements their decision.

10.3.9 Encouraging a Long Term Time Perspective

The third issue of importance to change agents is understanding ways to shift the time perspective so that individual decision-making is not constrained in favor of short term gratification to the detriment of long term benefit and goal attainment. In the United States, for example, many public corporations are governed strictly by short term stock price. Executive compensation, stockholder dividends, department budgets are based almost entirely on quarterly earnings.

The short term focus impedes accomplishment of long term, far off goals that have few near term success indicators (such as reducing carbon emissions to slow the rise of sea levels). The research and theorizing on the delay of gratification conducted by Walter Mischel and his colleagues over the last several decades provide some insight and understanding into developing complete rationality. Mischel and colleagues have investigated the cognitive processes and conditions involved in why people are able to delay gratification or not. We can link the ideas to the commons dilemma. Mischel et al. (2006) suggested that to successfully enable willpower, one must understand two interacting ‘systems:’ a ‘hot’ or ‘go’ system may be understood as that which is emotional, simple, reflexive, and fast. We are often well aware of how particular actions will gratify self-interest. In contrast, they propose a cool, or ‘know’ system that is complex, contemplative, strategic, reflective, and emotionally neutral. It is this system that, in successful instances of self-control, comes into play to balance the actions of the ‘go’ system. Relating this to the commons dilemma suggests that learning of ways to increase the activity of the ‘know’ system can have useful benefits for strengthening decision-making that is based on global rationality rather than solely on economic rationality.

Another way to improve our skills at increasing our focus on long term thinking was investigated by researchers interested in ways to minimize excessive discounting of the future. Here the focus of study was on looking at ways to increase retirement savings among college age students. A recent study conducted by

Hershfield et al. (2011) used a creative method for influencing greater retirement savings, a long term goal, for people whose time perspective is far shorter. College age individuals in this study were shown computer-generated images of themselves as senior citizens. These visualizations of self had a positive impact on their retirement savings intentions in the present day. Such reality based visualization is one way of lengthening our time perspective to work towards far off goals that are difficult to see and feel in the near term.

Applying this idea to the development of a global community might lead to developing imagery that connects the physically familiar with the temporally distant. For example, using vignettes that offer visions of communal life in which a cooperative global community has worked to successfully develop a stable and functioning economy, slowed global warming and/or eliminated violence and its aftermath could encourage the longer-term time perspective that is essential.

10.3.10 Use of Constructive Conflict Resolution Techniques

A fourth area of challenge for the change agent is to identify ways to address the inevitable conflicts inherent in the creation of a global community using constructive rather than destructive methods of resolution. In other words, it is imperative to find ways of reducing the over reliance on destructive conflict resolution methods (e.g., use of coercion, violence, power over others, escalation, a win/lose orientation, impoverished communication between parties in conflict, autistic hostility, to name just a few), and increasing use of constructive conflict techniques. Such techniques as creative problem solving, using active listening methods of communication, reframing the conflict as a joint problem rather than the other's problem, and so forth are important characteristics to develop in a cooperative global community. These and other techniques have a solid history of empirical support in moving conflict in a constructive rather than a destructive direction. See Coleman et al. (2014) for a comprehensive discussion of issues related to constructive conflict resolution and negotiation.

10.3.10.1 Influence Strategies

One can anticipate that those with values interested in the existing institutions will often resist change. This is strongly the case when preserving the status quo also preserves one's power over others. Elsewhere Deutsch (2006) has discussed extensively two important strategies for overcoming this kind of injustice: *persuasion strategies* and *nonviolent power strategies*. The essences of these two strategies are briefly summarized below, followed by some implications for their use by change agents to enhance the functioning of a global community.

10.3.10.2 Persuasive Strategies

Persuasive strategies involve three types of appeals:

1. *Moral values*: Appeals to moral values assume that those high power group members are not fully aware of the negative impact of their power on low power group members. For example, one might appeal to values related to justice, to religion, to the welfare of one's grandchildren, to name a few. Engaging high power members to see the discrepancy between their practices and their moral values, or conscience, could move them to take action and change their behavior.
2. *Self-interest*: These kinds of appeals emphasize the gains that can be obtained and losses that can be prevented when the high power group gives up some of its power and cooperates with the request of the low power group. It is important that such messages be carefully constructed to include characteristics as described by Deutsch (2006). Two examples are to clearly state the specific actions and changes requested of the high power group; and to highlight the values and benefits to the high power group by cooperating.
3. *Self-actualization*: Appeals to self-actualization focus on enhancing the sense that one's better self is being actualized, a self that one has wanted to be. In a sense, these are a type of self-interest appeal. The gain for the high power group is the feelings associated with an actualized self. In considering ways that one might give up one's power *over* others, change agents may emphasize the use of one's power to further common interests; the spiritual emptiness of power over others; the fulfillment of creating something that goes well beyond self-benefit. By creating power *with* others rather than maintaining power *over* (Follett 1924), high power groups may actually increase their power. For example, the Gates Foundation acts in ways that are patriotic to a global community (in, for example, their efforts at eradicating certain diseases and thereby increasing the health of the global community). Here, economic power is being used to address one problem in our global community, and by so doing, increasing the power of the global community. Contrast this with the reluctance of Egypt's military leaders to give up some of their control over Egypt's industries. Here, persuasive strategies aimed at self-actualization might emphasize the possibility of increasing the total economic output by engaging a wider sector of the labor force, perhaps with greater skill and qualifications.

Low power groups seeking change in those who have a vested interest in maintaining their power sometimes find it difficult to employ persuasion strategies because of rage or fear. *Rage*, as a result of the injustices they have experienced, may lead them to seek revenge, to harm, or destroy those in power. *Fear* of the power of the powerful to inflict unbearable harm may inhibit efforts to bring about change in the powerful.

Given the possibility of the prevalence of rage or fear among low power groups, it would be the goal of change agents to harness the energy created by feelings of rage and fear and convert it into effective cooperative action (see Gaucher/Jost 2011).

By engaging large numbers of people through social media and other communication methods, the energy generated by feelings of rage or fear can be channeled towards effective action. Here the task of the change agent is to help people realize that they are more likely to achieve their goals through effective action including cooperation with potential allies among members of high power groups. It is important for the change agent to recognize the power of the motivational energy of low power groups, regardless of its source.

A potentially effective strategic starting point using persuasive strategies would be for low power groups to use social influence strategies by seeking out and creating alliances with those members of high power groups, as well as other prestigious and influential people and groups, who are sympathetic to their efforts of building a global community (Deutsch 2006). Developing allies is a key method of increasing a low power group's power and of increasing its influence and credibility with those in power.

It is useful for change agents to understand the psychological implications of appealing to the power needs of members of high power groups: i.e., understanding how to convince those in power that their power needs can be fulfilled through fostering social or 'global' rationality.

10.3.10.3 Nonviolent Power Strategies

Nonviolent power strategies involve enhancing one's own power (by developing the latent power in one's self and one's group, as well as developing allies), employing the power of the powerful against the powerful, and reducing the power of the powerful. Gene Sharp (1971) has elaborated in great detail the many tactics available to those who seek to employ nonviolent power strategies. There are three types of nonviolent actions:

1. Acts of protest such as have been occurring recently in the Middle East;
2. Non-cooperation such as in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* when the women withhold sex from their spouses until war is abolished; and
3. Nonviolent intervention such as general strikes and other methods of disrupting the economy and other components of the status quo.

It is well to recognize that the employment of nonviolent methods against a potentially violent, autocratic, resistant to change power often requires considerable courage, discipline, and stamina, as well as effective pre-planning and organization.

There is a difference between persuasive strategies and non-violent strategies. Nonviolent strategies are often used when persuasion strategies, by themselves are not effective in bringing about change. The aim of nonviolent strategies is to 'open' those in power so that they can be persuaded to change: resistance to and interference with the implementation of the power of the high power group makes its power ineffective and opens it to the possibility of persuasion. Both are useful in altering the status quo in service of strengthening the global community. However, in contrast to violent strategies, neither persuasion nor nonviolence seek to destroy

those in high power: they seek to change the relationship so that power is shared and used to benefit the entire community.

There are two major problems with the use of violence. It commonly leads to increasing destructive cycles of reciprocating violence between the conflicting parties. And, it can transform those using violent methods into mirror images of one another: so, if a low power group employs violence to overthrow a tyrannical high power group, it may become tyrannical itself. The foregoing is not meant to suggest that violence is never necessary to stop unrelenting violence and resistance from a murderous other. However, one should guard against the potential self-transforming effects of engaging in violence.

10.3.11 Change Agent Skills and Methods

Change agents will need to be skilled in facilitating inter-group relations as they work to develop the global community. Ramsey/Latting (2005) offer a set of 14 competencies that can be applied to working across social differences—race, ethnicity, religious identity, nationality, etc. These competencies make up a theoretically and empirically grounded typology that includes both reflection and action at multiple levels of a system (i.e. the individual, the group, the organization, and the environmental context). Their typology looks at skills useful for: self-reflection and action; effective relationships with others; enhancing critical consciousness (e.g., addressing dominant/nondominant group dynamics); and surfacing and working through systemic patterns. The authors delineate and describe such competencies as “reframing mental models,” “empathizing with multiple perspectives,” “connecting the personal to the cultural and social,” and “advocating and engaging in systemic change” all of which are directly relevant to fostering the global community (Ramsey/Latting 2005: 268).

Methods and models for large systems change efforts needed to develop the global community have been created by organizational psychologists with expertise in large-scale group interventions. Bunker/Alban (2005) have compiled numerous examples of successful efforts to engage large groups of people to plan and implement needed change in a special issue of *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* on Large Group Interventions. In that issue Lukensmeyer/Brigham (2005) describe a method for holding Town Meetings with thousands of citizens so as to effect national scale change. Tan/Brown (2005) detail using the technique of The World Café with citizens from all walks of life in Singapore as part of an effort to create a national learning culture and to move from a hierarchical societal structure to a more open and inclusive one. Lent et al. (2005) discuss using the processes of Future Search and Open Space to help a religious community decide and implement its new future directions. Each of these examples provides possible strategies and methods for change agents working to develop a global community.

Negotiators working in the international arena are change agents in this realm.

As such, they would be well served to increase their facility in working in groups, in enhancing their influence skills and in dealing with some of the complex problems arising from the above five areas.

10.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have employed social psychological knowledge about groups and how they form, how they develop, how individuals identify with them—to provide a framework for thinking about some of the issues related to developing a global community. We have considered how ordinary people who live on our planet might be approached to induce them to become members of a global community. We have also considered how those in power who control the existing institutions in the world might be influenced to take a global perspective. Our discussion is only an outline of some of the important social psychological issues involved in developing a global community. Clearly, scholars from many different disciplines have a lot of work to do to build a base of knowledge that would help to foster an effective, sustainable global community. It is our belief that developing such knowledge is an urgent need that should involve more and more scholars and receive encouragement and support from universities, foundations, and governments.

We conclude by borrowing a phrase from a fine novelist, McCann (2009: 366): “It is more difficult to have hope than to embrace cynicism.” Let us maintain hope that we can improve the world and let us act to fulfill that hope.

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Chapter 11

Deutsch's Ten Commandments Regarding Conflict Resolution

1. Know what type of conflict you are involved in.
2. Respect yourself and your interests; respect the other and his or her interests.
3. Distinguish clearly between 'interests' and 'positions'.
4. Explore your interests and the other's interests to identify the common and compatible interests that you both share.
5. Define the conflicting interests between oneself and the other as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively.
6. In communicating with the other, listen attentively and speak so as to be understood; this requires the active attempt to take the perspective of the other and to check one's success in doing so.
7. Be alert, to the natural tendencies to bias, misperceptions, misjudgments, and stereotyped thinking that commonly occur in oneself and the other during heated conflict.
8. Develop skills for dealing with difficult conflicts so that one is not helpless nor hopeless when confronting those who are more powerful, those who don't want to engage in constructive conflict resolution, or those who use dirty tricks.
9. Know oneself and how one typically responds in different sorts of conflict situations.
10. *Throughout conflict, one should remain a moral person who is caring and just and should consider the other as someone who, like yourself, is entitled to care and justice.*

International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution



THE MORTON DEUTSCH
INTERNATIONAL CENTER
FOR COOPERATION AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
TEACHERS COLLEGE | COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The ICCCR was founded at Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1986 under the direction of **Professor Emeritus Morton Deutsch, Ph.D.**, one of the world's most respected scholars of conflict resolution. Professor Deutsch, an eminent social psychologist, has been widely honored for his scientific contributions involving research on cooperation and competition, social justice, group dynamics, and conflict resolution. He has published extensively and is well known for his pioneering studies in intergroup relations, social conformity, and the social psychology of justice. His books include: *Interracial Housing* (1951); *Theories in Social Psychology* (1965); *The Resolution of Conflict* (1973); *Distributive Justice* (1985); and *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (2000).

The Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (MD-ICCCR) is an innovative center committed to developing knowledge and practice to promote constructive conflict resolution, effective cooperation, and social justice. We partner with individuals, groups, organizations, and communities to create tools and environments through which conflicts can be resolved constructively and just and peaceful relationships can thrive. We work with sensitivity to cultural differences and emphasize the links between theory, research, and practice. While many conflict resolution centers provide training and consulting, our practice is rooted in our own original, leading-edge scholarship.

Theory and Research

- Building on the theoretical legacies of Kurt Lewin and Morton Deutsch, we conduct basic and applied research on theory related to conflict, justice, cooperation, and systemic change.
- We work to bridge the gap between theory and practice in these areas.

Education

- We educate future leaders who will further the development of theory and practice in the interrelated areas of conflict resolution, cooperation, and social justice with the ultimate goal of understanding and supporting sustainable peace.
- We seek to increase public awareness of constructive methods for conflict prevention and resolution, of the many forms of oppression, and of strategies for overcoming social injustice in families, organizations, and communities worldwide and for fostering sustainable peace.

Practice

- We work with educational, non-profit, corporate, and governmental organizations to provide culturally sensitive and locally relevant services related to conflict, violence, justice, cooperation, and social change.
- We seek to broaden and enhance our international collaborative network.

Research Overview

Decades of research at the MD-ICCCR has addressed the question: *What determines whether conflicts move in a constructive or destructive direction?* While the answers to such questions are complex, we seek to identify the most fundamental factors that lead to qualitative differences in the dynamics of conflict and peace. Our research employs multiple disciplines, paradigms and methods to investigate the problems and opportunities of conflict in our world with the aim of fostering innovative practice and education.

This research has spawned new insights and new research questions, including:

- Are there **optimal ratios** of different motives that lead to constructive conflict?
- What determines fundamental differences in **mediation** strategies and the constructiveness of mediation?
- How do **power differences** between disputants affect conflicts and how can they be resolved constructively?
- How do **cultural differences** between disputants affect conflicts and how can they be resolved constructively?
- What determines whether conflicts over **injustice and oppression** move in a constructive or destructive direction?
- What are the fundamental dimensions of **sustainable human development**?
- Why do some types of conflicts seem **impossible to resolve** and what can we do to manage or resolve them?
- What determines the **sustainability of peace**?

Building on the foundational scholarship of Kurt Lewin and Morton Deutsch, the Center believes in the power of ideas to improve our world, and in the critical role leading-edge science plays in advancing and refining those ideas. Its approach is to develop conceptual models that address gaps in existing theory and research, often through eliciting insights from informed participants (local stakeholders and practitioners), and then to empirically test and develop the models using a variety of methods. Its scholarship bridges the theory-practice gap in our field by bringing new insights from research to bear on important technical and social problems, and by honoring practical expertise in the development of new theory. Work on such complex problems requires to integrate theory and research from a variety of different disciplines, to employ multiple methods such as case studies, surveys, lab experiments and computer modeling, and to work in multidisciplinary teams. The Center links its research to contemporary social problems, and communicate its findings to both scholarly audiences and the general public.

Education Overview

Situated at Teachers College, a top-ranked graduate school of education, the IC-CCR is recognized for educational excellence. The Center offers a wide range of courses for scholar-practitioners in the areas of cooperation, conflict resolution, dynamical systems, and social justice. It develops and provides state-of-the-art instruction, training, and professional development for students, practitioners, educators, and organizational leaders. It continues to generate additional opportunities for our external educational work with non-profit organizations, agencies, and communities nationally and internationally. The ICCCR is committed to building relationships with a variety of organizations to allow students to gain practical experience. It provides a bridge between the academic community and experienced practitioners as we support and encourage a reflective scholar-practitioner model.

Website: <<http://iccr.tc.columbia.edu/>>

About the Authors



Morton Deutsch (USA) is E.L. Thorndike Professor and director emeritus of the *Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution* (MD-ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University. He studied with Kurt Lewin at MIT's Research Center for Group Dynamics, where he obtained his Ph.D. in 1948. He is well-known for his pioneering studies in intergroup relations, cooperation-competition, conflict resolution, social conformity, and the social psychology of justice. His books include *Inter-racial Housing*, *Research Methods in Social Relations*,

Preventing World War III: Some Proposals, *Theories in Social Psychology*, *The Resolution of Conflict*, *Applying Social Psychology*, and *Distributive Justice*.


His work has been widely honored by the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award, the G.W. Allport Prize, the Carl Hovland Memorial Award, the AAAS Socio-Psychological Prize, APA's Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award, SESP's Distinguished Research Scientist Award, and the Nevitt Sanford Award. He is a William James Fellow of APS. He has also received lifetime achievement awards for his work on conflict management, cooperative learning, peace psychology, and applications of psychology to social issues. In addition, he has received the Teachers College Medal for his contributions to education, the Helsinki University medal for his contributions to psychology, and the doctorate of humane letters from the City University of New York. He has been president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the International Society of Political Psychology, the Eastern Psychological Association, the New York State Psychological Association, and several divisions of the American Psychological Association. It is not widely known, but after postdoctoral training, Deutsch received a certificate in psychoanalysis in 1958 and conducted a limited practice of psychoanalytic psychotherapy for more than twenty-five years.

Address: Prof. Dr. Morton Deutsch, *Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution*. Professor of Psychology and Education. Program in Social-Organizational Psychology, Department of Organization and Leadership, Teachers College, Columbia University, Box 53, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA.

Website: <<http://icccr.tc.columbia.edu/>>.

E-mail: <deutsch@tc.columbia.edu>.

A website with additional information on Morton Deutsch, including links to videos and a selection of his major covers is at: <http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_MortonDeutsch.htm>.



Peter T. Coleman (USA) holds a Ph.D. in Social/Organizational Psychology from Columbia University; Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University with a joint-appointment at Teachers College and The Earth Institute and teaches courses in Conflict Resolution, Social Psychology, and Social Science Research; Director of the *Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution* (MD-ICCCR) at Teachers College, Columbia University; Chair of Columbia University's *Advanced Consortium on Cooperation,*

Conflict, and Complexity (AC4); research affiliate of the *International Center for Complexity and Conflict*; The Warsaw School for Social Psychology in Warsaw, Poland. He currently conducts research on optimality of motivational dynamics in conflict, power asymmetries and conflict, intractable conflict, multicultural conflict, justice and conflict, environmental conflict, mediation dynamics, and sustainable peace. In 2003, he became the first recipient of the Early Career Award from the American Psychological Association, Division 48: Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence. He edited: *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (2000, 2006, 2014); *The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts* (2011); *Conflict, Justice, and Interdependence: The Legacy of Morton Deutsch* (2011); *Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace* (2012); *Attracted to Conflict: Dynamic Foundations of Destructive Social Relations* (2013); *Making Conflict Work: Harnessing the Power of Disagreement* (2014). He has authored over 70 journal articles and chapters, is a member of the United Nation Mediation Support Unit's Academic Advisory Council, a founding board member of the Leymah Gbowee Peace Foundation USA, and a New York State certified mediator and experienced consultant.

Address: Prof. Dr. Peter T. Coleman, Director, *Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution*; Professor of Psychology and Education. Program in Social-Organizational Psychology, Department of Organization and Leadership, Teachers College, Columbia University, Box 53, 525 West 120th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA.

Website: <<http://icccr.tc.columbia.edu/>> and <<http://www.makingconflictwork.com/>>.

E-mail: <coleman@exchange.tc.columbia.edu>.

About this Book

Celebrating the 95th birthday of Morton Deutsch this book presents ten major texts of this much honored social psychologist on war and peace. After serving in the U.S. Air Force during World War II and being awarded two Distinguished Flying Cross medals, he worked as a psychologist for a more peaceful world. Influenced by Kurt Lewin, who believed that nothing was as practical as a good theory, Deutsch did theoretical work on such issues as cooperation-competition, conflict resolution, and social justice relating to war and peace issues. As President of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, and the International Society of Political Psychology, he helped to foster social science efforts to make for a more peaceful world. This second volume presents 10 major texts by Deutsch as a leading social science activist on issues of war and peace—writing papers, making speeches, participating in demonstrations.

Contents

Introduction by Morton Deutsch—The Prevention of World War III: A Psychological Perspective—A Psychological Basis for Peace—Undoing Nuclear Insanity—Negotiating the Non-Negotiable—On Producing Change an Adversary—Educating for a Peaceful World—Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace: An Introduction (with Peter T. Coleman)—William James: The First Peace Psychologist—Developing a Global Community: A Social Psychological Perspective (with Eric C. Marcus and Sarah Brazaitis)—Deutsch’s Ten Commandments Regarding Conflict Resolution.

A website with additional information on Morton Deutsch, including links to videos and a selection of his major covers is at: <http://afes-press-books.de/html/SpringerBriefs_PSP_MortonDeutsch.htm>.