

Managing the Football World Cup

Edited by

Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair



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#39; previous publication, *Managing the Olympics*, in exploring areas often overlooked by project management and business studies researchers. Therefore considering the global impact of the Football World Cup it is time for a detailed examination of the planning, organization, management, implementation and related commercial features of this mega-sport event" – Provided by publisher.

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1

Managing the World Cup: Managerial Dimensions

Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair

The Football World Cup is one of the biggest global sporting events. Along with the Summer Olympic Games, the Football World Cup can be truly called a mega-sport event. Both events attract billions of dollars in broadcast and sponsorship contracts and attract millions of spectators every four years when the events are staged. Nations and cities around the world desperately seek to host both events. By doing so host nations and cities often justify the multi-billion dollar investment required to stage these events on economic development grounds with stated benefits to emerge from urban renewal, transport infrastructure and tourism development (Cashman & Horne, 2013). Given the size of the Football World Cup and its economic impact it is surprising that this book is the first attempt to bring leading international mega-sport event researchers together to examine the management and organizational components of the event. This book follows in the same path as our recent publication, *Managing the Olympics*, in exploring areas often overlooked by project management and business studies researchers (Frawley & Adair, 2013). Therefore, considering the global impact of the Football World Cup, it is time for a detailed examination of the planning, organization, management, implementation and related commercial features of this mega-sport event.

The planning and organization of a mega-sport event, such as the Football World Cup, is an extremely complex activity for even the most skilled and experienced event or project manager. A complicating factor for event organizers is that the Football World Cup is ambulatory in that the event moves from one host nation to another every four years (Van den Hoven et al., 2012). This ongoing movement of the event, as with the Olympic Games, means that there are constant challenges for each new organizing committee in capturing knowledge gained by the

previous event administration (Frawley & Toohey, 2009). The constant movement from nation to nation and often continent to continent as well means that the transfer of knowledge is vital feature of the events planning and organization (Parent & Smith-Swan, 2013).

Given the vast scale and scope of the event management task it is surprising that only a small amount of research has been undertaken and published on the organization, management and operations of the Football World Cup. This is especially the case given that the planning and implementation phase for the World Cup can take more than a decade from start to finish, though the actual event is just a month in length. Furthermore, this research is of vital interest to a range of key stakeholders (such as governments, broadcasters, sponsors) who are heavily invested in the successful staging of the World Cup (Horne, 2012). In addition, research is also of interest to those who analyse mega-events and mega-projects, such as journalists, industry practitioners and independent researchers, as well as those with an interest in learning about how the World Cup is staged, such as lecturers, teachers and students.

While a number of books have been devoted to the Football World Cup there has been very little published that explores the management and commercial characteristics of the event. Many of the books published to date come from a historical and political economy perspective focused on matters such as corruption, hyper-commercialization and event impacts and legacy (Sudgen & Tomlinson, 1998; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2002; Jennings, 2006; Alegi, 2010; Tomlinson, 2014). However as the field of mega-sport event research has evolved (with a greater focus though still on the Olympic Movement in comparison to the Football World Cup) so has the number of researchers studying these events, with mega-sport event research output growing dramatically over the past decade.

Given this growth it has become very difficult for any one individual to stay across the entire production of this research area. This book therefore is not a survey of this large body of literature although the contributing authors are definitely shaped and influenced by it. Instead this edition has a specific goal, that being to critically explore the planning, management and operations of the Football World Cup as a mega-sport event. It is in short a discussion about how event organizers might effectively deliver the World Cup, taking into account what can be learned from previous events as well as the emergence of models of best practice and appropriate exemplars. This is an under-explored aspect of the Football World Cup, so this book is merely a step towards gaining a more sophisticated understanding of what is required to run the event.

While comprehensive, a book such as this is never conclusive, so what we regard as core areas of World Cup organization and delivery are covered: strategies in managing World Cup legacy for host nations and cities; managing fan engagement and new media strategies at the World Cup; managing World Cup stadium development and investment; managing World Cup transport planning and strategy; managing World Cup security strategy; managing the threat of ambush marketing at the World Cup; managing World Cup broadcast strategy; the problem of match-fixing; and managing FIFA governance reform.

While a single volume cannot do justice to the vast operational components required of World Cup organizers, the book is, however, designed to provide key insights as a step towards further theory and practice. In a second volume we would like to cover other important operational aspects of World Cup planning and management: examples include logistics and supply chain management; technology, ranging from results systems technology to event and project management technologies required to manage the event; the management of the accreditation and ticketing programmes; medical management; risk management; accommodation management; doping control protocols and procedures; football participation legacy and sport-for-development initiatives; tourism marketing strategies and impacts; and, last but not least, the place of the Women's Football World Cup. The chapter now concludes by outlining the key themes discussed in each chapter.

Chapter 2 by John Horne examines the issue of legacy and the Football World Cup. Horne suggests that assessing the planning and management of mega-sport event legacy is very much dependent on the perspective of the involved stakeholders. The chapter also argues that FIFA has now recognized the importance of managing this process. Horne outlines the rise of sustainable practices and philosophy to the centre ground of World Cup planning, though often the discourse seems stronger than the implementation. This leads to the argument that a greater emphasis is needed in the development of legacy protocols and guidelines for future World Cup organization.

Chapter 3 by Adam Karg and Daniel Lock examines the growing area of fan engagement. The authors start by defining the place of fan engagement in mega-sport event planning and management and, specifically, related outcomes for World Cup marketing. Karg and Lock present a fan engagement framework for the Football World Cup which includes various stakeholders, content and distribution platforms. Finally, the chapter examines current World Cup fan engagement practices, drawing on recent examples of best practice.

Chapter 4 by Harry Arne Solberg and Chris Gratton examines the development and management of World Cup broadcasting. Drawing on economic theory, the first section of the chapter explores the rise of broadcasting and the Football World Cup. First, the cost structure of broadcasting the event is debated and discussed. The following section explores the role of and behaviour of related broadcast stakeholders that operate in the sport rights market. Finally the role and impact of government regulations are explored in relation to the management and implementation of World Cup broadcasting strategies.

Chapter 5 by Simon Chadwick and colleagues explores the rise of ambush marketing in the context of World Cup organization. The authors examine the innovative and creative elements that shape and influence ambush marketing strategy. They argue that the development of disruptive technologies provides vast opportunities for organizations that wish to engage in ambush marketing while also providing significant challenges for brand protection of legitimate sponsors at the World Cup. The chapter examines how successful ambush marketing campaigns have been developed at recent World Cups and looks at the regulations and legislation that FIFA and event organizers have utilized to minimize and control the practice.

Chapter 6 by Holger Preuss and colleagues examines the economics of staging the World Cup, specifically exploring the financial sustainability of new venue development. The chapter looks at the efficiency of venue development at the three past World Cups – 2002, 2006 and 2010. The authors examine how venue development for these World Cups corresponded with post-event local demand. Through this analysis the chapter explores the factors that influence post-event stadium usage and sustainability.

Chapter 7 by Les Street and colleagues explores the broader features of stadium development at the World Cup. The authors examine the historical development of stadium design and use at the event from the first World Cup held in 1930 through to today. The challenges faced by host nations and event organizers in the context of stadium development are examined in detail. Secondly, the rise of sustainable practices and approaches at the Football World Cup are explored in the context of stadium development.

Chapter 8 by Simone Eisenhauer and colleagues explores spatial brand protection and security strategies employed at the World Cup. Drawing on detailed research investigating the 2010 Football World Cup, the authors analyse how event stakeholders protect critical event spaces, such as the public live sites, to ensure commercial viability.

The chapter highlights the extensive surveillance strategies deployed by FIFA and World Cup organizers to protect the commercial stakeholders who are so heavily invested in the event.

Chapter 9 by Eva Kassens-Noor examines transport management practices at the World Cup. The chapter starts by exploring the fundamental challenges faced by host nations and cities when designing World Cup transport plans and infrastructure development. The chapter shows how transport planning and preparations differ greatly across World Cups depending on factors such as pre-existing infrastructure, current economic development and the size of the land mass covered for the event.

Chapter 10 by Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor examines security management at the Football World Cup. The chapter explores the security planning and management challenges faced by World Cup organizers and the relevant host nations. In the context of ever changing and increased global security challenges the authors explore the impacts and consequences for future World Cup organization.

Chapter 11 by Roger Pielke, Jr examines the issue of FIFA governance reform. FIFA as the owner of the Football World Cup has been heavily criticized for many years for its inability to adequately reform its governance practices. These matters are explored in detail and the chapter also provides specific recommendations for FIFA to consider in relation to institutional and governance reform.

Chapter 12 by Declan Hill examines the consequences of match-fixing at the World Cup. Drawing on detailed investigative research Hill presents a disturbing overview of the match-fixing environment that has developed within international football over the past two decades. Hill suggests one of the key problems with the Football World Cup is that the players are not paid to participate even though the event generates billions in revenue for FIFA through broadcast and sponsorship rights fees.

Chapter 13 by Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair explores future World Cup research opportunities and challenges. Drawing on current issues and debates within the media and in academic circles, the chapter examines a range of research topics and themes that are likely to be considered in the future.

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2

Managing World Cup Legacy

John Horne

Introduction

There is a burgeoning literature about sports mega-events, such as the FIFA Men's Football World Cup Finals (hereafter Football World Cup or World Cup) and the Olympic Games, and the notion of legacy. For the purposes of this chapter I will refer to two distinctions with respect to legacies – that they can be *tangible* and *intangible*, and also *universal* and *selective*. It is well established that legacies can be tangible, that is related to, for example, changes in some way to the material infrastructure or economic performance, and intangible, that is related to, for example, emotional responses to a mega-event whether individual or collective (Preuss, 2007). A second distinction I want to suggest when thinking about legacy is that legacies can be *selective* and *universal*. By this distinction I mean the following. *Selective legacies* are particular, individualist and elitist, and tend to serve the interests of those dominating powerful political and economic positions in society. *Universal legacies* are communal, collectivist and inherently democratic, available to all by virtue of being made freely accessible. A problem for sports mega-events is that they largely generate *tangible legacies* that are *selective* and *intangible legacies* that are *universal*. I will return to this distinction in the conclusion.

Tangible legacies refer to substantial and longstanding changes to the urban infrastructure – the building of iconic stadia being one of the most notable when it comes to the Football World Cup. The intangible legacies of the World Cup refer predominantly to popular memories, evocations and analyses of specific matches and incidents associated with the history of football. As Mason (1995, p. 85) wrote: 'A football tournament is like a story and, like a story, it does not have to be equally good in every part.' A non-systematic sample of such intangibles, drawn

partly from the author's memory and published accounts of the World Cup since 1950 include:

- Brazil 1950 – the trauma for Brazil, the hosts, of being defeated by Uruguay in the final in the Maracanã stadium (Bellos, 2003, pp. 43–76; Mason, 1995, pp. 43–76; Gaffney, 2008, pp. 68–121);
- England 1966 – the North Korean team's performance against Italy and subsequent reception by fans; Eusebio's performance against England in the semi-final (remembered as 'Jogo das Lagrimas', *The game of tears*, in Portuguese football history); the England versus West Germany final, with its disputed goal and Geoff Hurst's hat-trick; White City stadium used for one qualifying match because the owners of Wembley Stadium refused to cancel a regular greyhound racing meeting during the World Cup; marking a period of social and cultural transition in football (Clarke & Critcher, 1986);
- Mexico 1970 – Brazil, playing the best football arguably ever seen, winning the World Cup for the third time and retaining the Jules Rimet Trophy (Lever, 1995, p. xxiv);
- Italy 1990 – 'Italia '90' and the Three Tenors, 'Gazza's tears', and 'professional' fouls (Davies, 1990);
- USA 1994 – staging the World Cup in the United States for the first time also produced the first drawn final, the first no scoring final and the first final to be decided on penalty kicks (Murray, 1996, p. 176–187);
- France 1998 – France winning and being heralded as the embodiment of a socially diverse society (Dauncey & Hare, 1999);
- Korea/Japan 2002 – Asia's first Football World Cup, the first co-hosted World Cup, initial co-host enmities that led to improved cultural exchanges (Horne & Manzenreiter 2002; Manzenreiter & Horne, 2004);
- Germany 2006 – the new re-unified, fun-loving Germany, broadcast to 214 national territories totalling 73,000 hours of broadcasting – five-times the figure for Italia '90 (Tomlinson & Young, 2005);
- South Africa 2010 – Africa's first World Cup and first sports mega-event (Alegi & Bolsmann, 2010).

With Brazil in 2014 as South America's first World Cup and sports mega-event, Russia in 2018, being the first World Cup in Eastern Europe, and Qatar in 2022 being the first World Cup in the Middle East (and at the time of writing possibly the first to be played in the Northern hemisphere's winter), the first 22 years of the 21st century

has seen, and promises to provide, another series of landmarks when it comes to staging the Football World Cup. As these developments have occurred legacy concerns have moved to centre stage in the staging of the two sports mega-events (the World Cup and the Olympic Games) and this has been achieved in a number of ways by the two international organizations involved: FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The following three topics are discussed in this chapter:

- The growth of mega-event legacy discourse;
- Economic, social and environmental legacy issues and challenges for the Football World Cup and local organising committees (LOCs);
- Best practice in managing Football World Cup legacy

It will be shown that even more than Olympic legacy management processes World Cup legacy management is at a very early stage of development (see Cashman & Horne, 2013). A central issue with the Olympic Games, and compounded in the case of the World Cup, is whether legacy management can ever match the often lofty legacy objectives and rhetoric that has become prominent in promotional discourse associated with these sport mega-events. A connected issue is whether legacy management practices in the World Cup can be reformed and improved to deal with various shortcomings without a fundamental reform of FIFA itself. It is useful before discussing the management of legacy issues to identify four important distinctions between the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games.

Just as the Summer Olympic Games were staged and nurtured in their early years by World's Fairs and Expositions (Expos), the Football World Cup developed out of the football competition held at the Summer Olympics. The first two Olympic football championships, held in 1924 and 1928, were won by Uruguay and in 1929 that country was awarded the inaugural World Cup. It was the centenary year of the country's constitution and as Sugden and Tomlinson (1998, p. 101) remark, Uruguay were 'opportunistic hosts with political goals'. So, to state the obvious, the World Cup is a single sport world championship and its international governing body, FIFA, has for much of its existence been mainly interested in expanding, developing and prioritizing the claims of one sport. Professional sport has come to rely more on capitalist management and marketing techniques since the 1970s and international sports organizations, such as FIFA, have increasingly sought to maximize revenues through commercial sponsorship agreements

and enhanced broadcasting rights contracts (Horne, 2006, pp. 27–29). When television executives talk about negotiating sports broadcasting rights (globally) they generally discuss football and then ‘the rest’, meaning all other sports. The fact that it has developed into the ‘global game’ or ‘World game’ places the World Cup into the position of being a sports mega-event alongside and arguably of more significance than the Olympic Games.

Second, again like the Olympics, all the first World Cup matches took place in a single city, Montevideo, in three stadiums. A central difference between the World Cup and the Olympics, ever since 1930, has been that the World Cup is now distributed throughout a host nation rather than concentrated in one city or close to a city. Matches are allocated to a number of different venues throughout the host country. The Olympic Games and Football World Cup still have city-specific and nation-wide impacts respectively as well as both representing and symbolizing the nation rather than a municipality alone, yet in the past three decades the World Cup has also increasingly come to play a major role in the renewal and reimagining strategies of cities, which has consequences for legacy issues as we will see.

The third difference between the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games is that the philosophical underpinning of the Olympic Games, Olympism and associated talk of an Olympic ‘movement’, is absent from FIFA’s discourse. As Hayes and Karamichas (2012, p. 6) noted, ‘compared to the Olympics, the emphasis on the promotion of universal values and liberal social programmes have come late to sports other mega-events’. Instead, FIFA has sought to create a sense of being part of a larger world community or ‘family’ of football. Legacy in connection with the World Cup (as it was in Olympic circles) was a relatively low order issue for much of the 20th century and one that was not seriously entertained, if at all, until after a World Cup had been concluded. The bidding process tended to be ad hoc until the 1970s (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998, p. 104) and as a result little detail was required to be spelled out in advance about how the event might have some lasting legacy. The main ways that legacy was felt in a tangible form were the stadia constructed or refurbished to host matches. It is notable that the Estadio Centenario, the stadium built between 1929 and 1930 to host the 1930 World Cup in Montevideo, as well as to commemorate the centennial of Uruguay’s first constitution, was only declared as one of the football world’s classic stadiums by FIFA, along with the likes of the Maracanã, Wembley Stadium, the San Siro and the Santiago Bernabéu Stadium, in the 1980s.

The fourth major difference between FIFA and the IOC is the way in which the organization is regarded today: while the Olympic Movement has continued to attempt to turn its fortunes and public perceptions 'around' since the late 1990s (Payne, 2012) FIFA has routinely become embroiled in negative publicity over the past two decades. As is explained elsewhere in this book FIFA was founded in 1904 (and only two years later did the England football association join). Without an age limit on membership of the executive or limit on the number of four-year terms permitted it has been possible for it to have only eight presidents since its formation – fairly similar to the IOC with only nine presidents since its inauguration in 1892. The presence of a president from outside of Europe and North America – João Havelange from 1974 to 1998 – distinguishes FIFA from the IOC and the game of football however, where power struggles between Europe and South America have framed the development of the organization globally (Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998, 2003). The chapter will now assess legacy management processes in relation to the Football World Cup in light of these differences.

The growth of mega-event legacy discourse

Covering the Soccerex global business convention in Rio de Janeiro in 2011, BBC business reporter Will Smale (2011) noted: 'listen to any Brazilian official talking about their country hosting the 2014 World Cup and the word they all use is "legacy"'. For many observers of the World Cup, the Olympic Games and other sports mega-events, legacy is an essentially contested concept and practice (MacAloon, 2008; Horne, 2012). It is a political notion through and through, while at the same time appearing simple, common sense, and therefore attractive and seductive. The promise of legacy is that something good, beneficial and welcome will emerge from the undertaking, hosting or staging of a large-scale project or sports mega-event. Hiller quipped that legacy usually came with a 'golden halo' in that it was assumed to invariably be positive (Cashman, 2006, p. 15). Yet this language masks developments associated with sports mega-events affecting, usually poor, less mobile, people most directly involved. This includes the compulsory purchase of homes and property, familial relocation and displacement before an event and through other means such as gentrification after an event has taken place (Lees et al., 2010).

The emergence of the use of the concept in relation to sports mega-events has coincided with the spectacular growth in the size, corporate

connectedness and importance to urban development of the World Cup and the Olympic Games since the 1980s. Legacy discourse has become a necessary corollary to the enormous staging costs, which could not be justified by local organizers or politicians for a four-week spectacular alone. During his FIFA Presidential election campaign in 1974 Jean-Marie Faustin Goedefroid ('João') de Havelange set out a number of ambitions that included expanding the number of national teams at the finals, especially from the 'developing football world'. This enabled him to garner votes in FIFA's 'one association, one vote' organization. Following his successful election in 1974 Havelange oversaw growth at the 1982 World Cup in Spain when the number of teams increased from 16 to 24 (and a total of 52 matches) and then (after another successful re-election in 1994) to 32 teams (64 matches) in France in 1998. The duration of the World Cup since then has remained at one month.

Use of the word legacy has arguably also been stimulated by various scandals that have dogged both FIFA and the IOC since the 1980s, especially around the processes by which host nation and host city decisions have been reached (Jennings, 2006). There was growing awareness in FIFA, Olympic and other circles of the possible negative effects of hosting large-scale sports events, including concern about the impact on the environment. Like a lot of contemporary corporate-speak legacy is a term that incorporates an orientation to the future and implies there will be no turning back ('going forward') whilst at the same time it can be used by promoters to play a part in 'winning consent' from potentially sceptical local populations to developments that are not automatically socially, economically or environmentally acceptable. According to Cohen (2014), 'Legacyspeak is an extreme case of what linguists call *nominalization* in which actions are turned into objects and verbal processes are turned into abstract nouns'. It is a 'language of action without an intentional human subject' (Cohen, 2014).

In Olympic circles formal use of the legacy word is just over 10 years old – the first major legacy conference under the auspices of the IOC took place at the IOC in November 2002 and resulted in the publication, *The Legacy of the Olympic Games 1984–2000* (de Moragas et al., 2003). A written commitment to legacy did not appear in the *IOC Charter*, however, until 2003. Since 2003, legacy has moved from the sidelines to the Olympic centre stage with the IOC proclaiming legacy to be a central part of its vision. In the past decade all bidding cities have been required to document a detailed legacy vision as well as operational plans to implement it.

With FIFA it was 2005 before a corporate social responsibility (CSR) department was established and a third pillar, 'Build a Better Future', added to its existing commitments to 'Develop the Game' and 'Touch the World'. Through its 'Football for Hope' scheme FIFA has attempted to align itself with the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (FIFA, 2014). Additionally FIFA now aligns with improving the planet environmentally:

FIFA is dedicated to taking its environmental responsibility seriously. Issues such as global warming, environmental conservation and sustainable management are a concern for FIFA, not only in regard to FIFA World Cups™, but also in relation to FIFA as an organisation. That is why FIFA has been engaging with its stakeholders and other institutions to find sensible ways of addressing environmental issues and mitigate the negative environmental impacts linked to its activities. (FIFA, 2014)

Just as with the IOC and Olympics there is a difficulty with indiscriminate use of the legacy concept however. It creates a tension between FIFA and the local organizing committee (LOC) of the World Cup over who will be responsible for acknowledging that there can be *negative* legacies emerging from a mega-event. Equally widespread use of the term in bid documents and in publicity for a World Cup can amount to 'overkill' and raise local host and national population expectations too much. In this respect legacy is both a blessing and curse. It is certainly part of the risky nature of hosting a sports mega-event and requires considerable management if expectations are not to be too high. To talk of legacy management in FIFA and the Football World Cup is an even more recent development than in the IOC. Its practices and protocols are still being developed in the context of the substantial economic, social and environmental issues related to the World Cup that are discussed in the next section.

Economic, social and environmental legacy issues

Since the election of Havelange in 1974 FIFA's football 'family' has steadily expanded – to 208 associate members – and as Sugden and Tomlinson (1998, pp. 248–249) acknowledge 'in development terms there can be no doubting the depth of his legacy'. Between 2003 and 2012 FIFA's annual revenue grew from \$575 million to \$1,166 million whilst its reserves grew from \$76 million to a staggering \$1,378 million

(FIFA, 2014). Broadcasting and marketing in association with various exclusive sponsorship partnerships have seen profits regularly top \$200 million and in 2010 TV rights alone were worth \$2,408 million. FIFA has spread globally and secured a massive commercial foundation. However, this growth and increased commercialization has also seen scope for more ‘corruption and graft’ in the development of world football (Tomlinson, 2010, pp. 188–189; also see Jennings, 2006). From 1996 to 2007 FIFA’s motto was ‘For the Good of the Game’. After that it changed to ‘For the Game, For the World’. Whilst FIFA’s mission statement lists commitments to authenticity, unity, performance and integrity, Tomlinson (2010, p. 189) noted:

The history and underlying political dynamic characterizing the growth of FIFA and its relationships with global-regional federations and international associations shed light on the shifting politics of nationalism in the post-colonial period; and reveal opportunistic forms of personal aggrandizement shaping an increasingly media-influenced and globalizing world.

Yet FIFA and football is held up as a force for positive social changes by its current President, and successor to Havelange, Sepp Blatter: “Football has the power to build a better future” (Oxford Union keynote address, October 2013, quoted in Hyde 2013b, p. 46) and FIFA’s job is “helping communities in need through football”. “FIFA exists ... because we love the game, recognise its power and feel a strong duty to society” (ibid.). When public concerns were raised, for example about the conditions of migrant workers in Qatar helping to build the facilities and infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup, the President was less positive that FIFA could or should be involved: “This is not FIFA’s remit” (ibid.). During his presidency accusations of administrative malpractice, financial mismanagement, organizational deception and fraud in FIFA have continued to be made by journalists and academic researchers alike (Jennings, 2006; Sugden & Tomlinson, 2003, p. 12).

A central economic legacy issue for the World Cup thus relates to resource allocation and collective accountability. FIFA is a private, transnational, actor – what some refer to as a ‘BINGO’, or a ‘Business-friendly International Non-Governmental Organization’. It is able to circumvent established collective decision-making structures and processes (at least where they exist in liberal democracies) and gain exemption from national tax regimes (Pollock, 2010). As such FIFA (similar to the IOC) is a ‘sovereignty free’ actor, whilst its events impinge increasingly

heavily on the development of public and social policies – concerning urban planning, transportation, environment, welfare and health – and on the scarce public resources available to achieve these collective goals in sovereign states (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006).

A major problem for the organizers of a Football World Cup therefore is that the main organization responsible for staging the event – FIFA – has a questionable ethical reputation, especially when it comes to financial affairs. In February 2011, for example, FIFA's ethics committee upheld bans imposed upon executive committee members Amos Adamu and Reynald Temarii for breaches of FIFA's code of ethics following a *Sunday Times* investigation (for more details see Daily Mirror, 2011, 'FIFA Corruption Scandal Timeline').

In April 2013 Havelange himself was forced to resign as FIFA's honorary president after an internal report ruled he had taken bribes. The Brazilian was described as 'morally and ethically reproachable' for taking kickbacks from the former World Cup rights marketing agency, International Sport and Leisure (ISL) (BBC, 2013a; 2013b).

Some would argue that the means by which the sport of football has become the 'global game' have paid too high a price in terms of transparency, integrity and accountability. For example journalist Marina Hyde (2013a) refers to FIFA as a 'supranational privateer':

... a parasitic body, which descends on the appropriately named 'host' nation every four years, siphons billions of tax-free profit out of it at the same time as overriding its laws and constitution to suit its needs, before buggering off in search of new blood. What on earth does anyone imagine it wants with democracies?

The increasingly corporate character of the Football World Cup leads to various civic responses to its social impacts and legacies. Whilst security risk management differs between the World Cup and the Olympics (Jennings, 2012), there are considerable opportunities for markets in security to develop around sports mega-events. This can have consequences for civil rights and concerns about the militarization of urban locations (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 15). Hyde (2013a) asks: 'if hosting an Olympics or a World Cup were even remotely likely to advance the cause of human freedom in their countries, does anyone think the likes of China and Qatar would be as keen to host them as they are?' In response to her question she cited FIFA Secretary General, Jérôme Valcke, who commented: "less democracy is sometimes better for organising a World Cup" (Hyde, 2013a).

Sports mega-events also tend to impact negatively on poor people – through pre-event construction and the post-event ‘gentrification’ of locations (Rolnik, 2009; Lees et al., 2010); and the crowding out of other spending on welfare and the general redirection of scarce resources toward the priority of delivering a mega-event. As Desai and Vahed (2010) and Ngonyama (2010) outlined, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa presented several examples where the trade-off between housing projects for people in need and the building of a stadium went in favour of the latter. Profit and event delivery come before democracy and social justice (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 21) leading to a variety of responses and resistances. One of the unintended legacies of hosting a World Cup is that it can lead to social mobilization – and sometimes confrontations, as was witnessed in Brazil in 2013 and 2014. Some organizers have attempted the integration and incorporation of NGOs and protest groups into the planning of events. But the mobilization of people and communities affected remains one of the most unstable and unpredictable of the social legacies of the World Cup.

All sports mega-events carry a carbon cost and create material environmental impacts – including the production of waste, consumption of energy, development and use of transport, communication and leisure infrastructures, national and international travel, and the symbolic promotion of individual mobility and consumption-based lifestyles. At the same time the World Cup and other sports mega-events can potentially create and grow new markets in sustainable goods and services, act as an agent of technology transfer and technical know-how diffusion, extend the use of environmental monitoring and benchmarking and raise expectations that this will be done and in other ways act as a showcase for the wider dissemination of environmental values and norms (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). For there to be a real, as opposed to tokenistic, ‘greening of the games’, however, there is a need for initiatives to minimize the negative environmental impacts; one of these in relation to the World Cup has been a carbon remediation scheme,¹ introduced for the first time in 2006.

The German Football Association (DFB) bid dossier for the 2006 Football World Cup contained an environmental management programme and following the successful bid to host the event, the ‘Green Goal’ scheme was announced (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 10). This involved offsetting the carbon emissions generated by the event by investing in clean-energy projects in poor countries. FIFA has since then encouraged potential future local organizing committees to include environmental protection in their bids (Dolles & Söderman, 2010; Öko-Institut, 2006). But the methodology of carbon remediation adopted in 2006 only addressed superficial carbon use. It only counted

event-time emissions *within* Germany and thus excluded, for example, international travel, which was left to participating countries to offset on a voluntary basis.

Nonetheless, in this way, the 2006 World Cup could claim to have achieved 'climate neutrality' – matching the 92,000 tonnes of CO₂e calculated to have resulted from staging the event. In contrast, when an estimate was made of the total carbon 'cost' of hosting the World Cup in South Africa in 2010 it was estimated to use 2.8 million tonnes of CO₂e (DEAT, SA/ Norwegian Embassy, 2009; Berners-Lee, 2010, pp. 160, 225). This was because international travel was included (and accounted for two thirds of the total). For Brazil 2014 an attempt has been made to harmonize the measurement of the carbon footprint with three previous FIFA events (the 2006 and 2010 World Cups and the 2011 Women's World Cup; see FIFA, 2013).

Hence there remains incoherence and confusion at the global as well as local level about environmental management – since neither FIFA nor the IOC plays a regulatory role in terms of defining standards or methods for carbon remediation schemes related to sports mega-events. 'Low carbon', 'zero net emissions' and 'carbon neutral' all sound like 'green' initiatives, but there is no general public information about carbon mitigation schemes and it is not possible to compare successive mega-events in the absence of reliable and transferable reporting and auditing systems (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 13).

Furthermore, carbon offsetting places a burden on countries in the global South, restricting the scope for developing countries to reduce their own emissions. The 'Green Goal' associated with 2006 World Cup involved investment in two greenhouse gas reduction projects in South Africa. But South Africa could not so easily offset carbon when it acted as World Cup host in 2010. 'Developed countries can offset in the South. Southern countries cannot do the reverse' (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 4). As carbon offsetting for non-German competitors in 2006 was voluntary it also raises questions about what is meant by sustainable development and whether people affected are involved in project definition or just implementation. The trade-offs between growth and social justice, civil rights and security and environmental protection and accountability are some of the central legacy challenges associated with the World Cup.

Best practice in legacy management

Legacy management is far more diffuse and problematic than managing a World Cup (or an Olympic Games – Cashman & Horne, 2013). Legacy management objectives can vary enormously from one location to

another in that they can include the remediation of a degraded urban area, an improvement in one or another aspect of the environment, infrastructure projects including new transportation developments, the creation of sports facilities, increased sports participation as well as increased tourism – to name some of the more prominent potential legacy outcomes. Each objective requires particular management strategies. There can be, as a result, no standardized approach to World Cup legacy management. Each objective has its own separate set of issues, which need to be understood. As a result, the legacy management plans of each host nation for a World Cup pose a fresh set of issues and challenges.

While all hosts had a general legacy vision before, which was set out in bid books, no detailed operational plans were developed before the World Cup about how legacy would be implemented afterwards. Legacy plans were not seriously explored until after the event had been staged, whilst FIFA interest in a World Cup host largely ceased once the finals had been staged so there was no policing or even monitoring of post-World Cup legacy implementation. Identifying best practices is therefore difficult. FIFA did establish a 2010 FIFA World Cup Legacy Trust in 2010 worth US\$100 million to fund a range of ‘public benefit initiatives in the areas of football development, education, health and humanitarian activities in South Africa’ and it has created a similar Trust for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil. Questions will no doubt remain about the integrity of the schemes, the number of initiatives actually started and the difference between the financial returns made by FIFA from the World Cup and its contribution to the host nations through the Trusts (Radnedge, n.d.).

One of the most remarked-upon features of the 2006 World Cup in Germany was the establishment of fan zones or ‘Fanmeile’– the separation, fencing and surveillance of extended parts of German city centres during the 2006 World Cup (Klauser, forthcoming). Some regard this as an example of good practice; however as Eick (2011) points out, this initiative was also accompanied by the largest display of domestic security in Germany since 1945, with 250,000 police officers, 7,000 military guards, 20,000 private security contractors and many intelligence officers working in the 12 host cities. Acting as a ‘neo-communitarian entrepreneur’, Eick argues that FIFA works as an incubator for the ‘sustained securitisation’ of host and post-host cities.

As we have noted, one of the main legacy challenges for Football World Cup organizing committees is to balance sustainable development and environmental management. Long after the IOC’s 1999 inclusion of environmental matters in its Charter, FIFA gave assurance of its

future commitment to the environment by deciding to include environmental protection in its bidding agreements. However, this only came into force with the bidding process for the FIFA World Cups in 2018 and 2022. The information requested from candidates on what plans had been made to avoid, reduce and offset the negative environmental impacts of hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2018 and 2022 included:

- A comprehensive environmental assessment of staging the FIFA World Cup;
- Systematic integration of the environment into management structures;
- Composition and integration of an Environmental Advisory Board;
- Outreach program for stakeholder consultation;
- Measurable objectives in six core topics of: water, waste, energy, transportation, procurement and climate change; and
- Planned activities to minimize the adverse environmental effects of staging the World Cup. (FIFA, n.d.)

FIFA only focuses on reducing the footprint of the event whereas the IOC asks for discussion of sustainable development and assessment of the environmental impacts and legacies. However, compared with the IOC, FIFA appears to expect a higher degree of management participation in regard to environmental action as it requires integration of the environment in management structures, the establishment of an Environmental Advisory Board and stakeholder consultation (Preuss, 2013).

Assessing legacy is a daunting task. While it is not difficult to assess some tangible forms of legacy, such as the use of facilities after the staging of a Football World Cup, the assessment of other forms of legacy present new challenges. Some of the key questions with respect to legacy illustrate this. How does one assess, for instance, the legacy of a newly built or refurbished stadium? How are improvements in the environment assessed? How is a legacy of increased sports participation established? Other issues relate to *when* legacy should be assessed given that there are varying time frames for different forms of legacy. And who is best qualified to assess whether legacy objectives have been met? And to whom should such reports be delivered? Last but by no means least, there is the interesting question of whether there exists a legacy 'sunset clause'. Is there a time when a nation can consider that all of its legacy obligations have been met and it can therefore sign off on legacy management obligations?

The IOC established the Olympic Games Global Impact Project in 2002 to encourage legacy. The objective was to collect and capture the

wider impacts of the Games by collecting data concerning indicators of social, economic and environmental dimensions. The material was to be collected over 11 years; from two years before a city was elected to host a Games until two years after the Games were staged, analysed and then made available to future bid cities. No such initiative currently exists for FIFA or World Cup organizers.

There is a recurring problem that legacy promises made by potential host nations are overly ambitious and difficult if not impossible to realize. A second problem is that it is almost impossible to predict the post-World Cup environment nine years before the event. Legacy plans that may appear to be attractive on paper may need significant adjustment at the implementation stage. The distribution of the benefits compared with the bearing of the costs of hosting the World Cup remains a third underlying issue that local organizing committees have to contend with.

There is no simple solution to the problems of legacy management. There needs to be greater research to explore the best ways of approaching individual aspects of legacy management. There is no simple solution to the issue of legacy enforcement. Some academics have argued that legacy objectives should become incorporated into legislation, thereby ensuring that they be met. This is an interesting idea though it may be more applicable to some forms of legacy than others. The legacy objectives of a national football stadium or an Olympic Park could be enshrined in legislation. However, legislating for other legacy promises, such as increased sports participation, would seem to be more problematic.

Conclusion

The World Cup legacy issue involves defining the event's success, which in this case, has a specific outline for each of the 'players' involved. For the fans, the notion of a successful event is associated with international standard services and with watching the matches and participating in events comfortably, safely and peacefully. For the governments, World Cup success can be measured by increased tax collection and wealth generation as well as by the reputational and visibility gains that can later translate into political capital. For the people, the idea of a successful World Cup is that of an event organized with no waste of public resources, with transparent management and with the ability to leave a legacy that justifies heavy investments, such as the infrastructure that enables holding

other major events and urban equipment renovation. Finally, for the organizers, the World Cup's success will result from successfully achieving the goals of all stakeholders (i.e. fans, society, governments), ensuring full compliance with obligations undertaken and contributing to strengthening the World Cup as one of the world's largest events. (Ernst & Young Terco, 2011, pp. 52–53)

This paragraph from a report produced by Ernst & Young Terco (2011) reminds us that assessment of the legacies of a mega-event such as the World Cup very much depends on the perspective of the 'player' or stakeholder involved. Equally the question of managing the legacy relates to who is deemed responsible for managing the process. FIFA, like the IOC, has recognized the importance of legacy as a means of staging a sustainable sports mega-event and has sought to move it from the periphery to centre stage in the past decade. There have been some welcome new initiatives in the past decade to attempt to monitor and further encourage host nations to take legacy management seriously. However, as we have seen, legacy promises remain one of the most politically charged features of hosting the World Cup or other sports mega-events. The management of legacy is still in its infancy and requires much more research into its protocols, procedures and politics. The task of developing legacy management remains ahead for FIFA and World Cup hosts and organizers and also host nations and municipalities.

To return to the distinction between selective and universal legacies mentioned at the outset, *selective legacies* are of benefit, enjoyed and delivered to specific individuals or interests, rather than all, and exclude those considered not eligible to receive them. As Titmuss (1974, p. 39) suggested with respect to selectivism in social policy, selectivism serves to facilitate the sovereignty of the market. *Universal legacies* on the other hand are those that affect, reach and are shared by all rather than by specific individuals or communities. Legacies established universally to serve everybody might need to be financed by governments, philanthropic organizations or, exceptionally, private enterprises. Prioritizing universal legacies would mean that organizers of sports mega-events would be obligated to deliver them to all without constraints. Rather than vague claims regarding legacy they would have to demonstrate a properly funded legacy management programme that continued for some years after the event. As Titmuss (1974, p. 39) suggested with respect to universalism in social policy, it is a re-distributive institutional approach; it considers welfare (that is, 'positive legacies') as a very important institution of society provided outside the market.

For sports mega-events to live up to the promotional claims made for them the legacies associated with them should follow the principle of universalism and this would require greater control and regulation over FIFA, the IOC and LOCs by non-market actors.

Note

1. The London 2012 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games did seek to calculate emissions from bid to closing ceremonies and this was estimated at 3.4 million tonnes CO₂e. London quietly dropped carbon offsetting in 2009. See www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-31/olympics-drops-carbon-offset-plan-to-focus-on-u-k-benefits.html [accessed 7 January 2014]

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3

Using New Media to Engage Consumers at the Football World Cup

Adam Karg and Daniel Lock

Introduction

For one month, every four years, the FIFA World Cup draws global attention to 32 national teams competing to win the Jules Rimet Trophy. In 2006, the World Cup final attracted a global audience of more than 715 million people; in 2010, expansive television rights deals led to the broadcast of the tournament to 204 countries. The magnitude of the World Cup in terms of global interest and viewership provides clear evidence of consumer interest. However, engaging consumers – as new-media technologies evolve – represents an increasingly complex challenge for FIFA, event organizers, host cities, partners and sponsors. As such, understanding the process of consumer engagement as distinct from other established marketing constructs provides an important basis to introduce strategies to allow audiences to interact with and create content before, during and after the tournament.

In this chapter, we explore how the magnitude of consumer interest develops a requirement for FIFA and World Cup sponsors to go beyond traditional models of strengthening consumer connection, identification or attachment to the event. Considering the continually evolving interactive platforms of Web 2.0, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the role of new-media engagement in the relationship marketing strategies of the World Cup before, during and after the tournament. To this end, during this chapter, we will:

- Define engagement alongside its roles and outcomes in World Cup marketing;
- Present a framework of fan engagement for the World Cup, inclusive of multiple stakeholders, content and distribution platforms and outcomes;

- Provide a classification of content and distribution platforms including examples for the World Cup;
- Develop commentary on fan engagement practice and how engagement is a prominent part of World Cup operations for the sport and related stakeholders.

Consumer engagement

Consumer engagement exists within a broader revolution in the discipline of marketing, shifting the paradigmatic approach from goods-based marketing to service-dominant (S-D) logic (Vargo & Lusch, 2004, 2008). In a broader sense, consumer engagement sits within what Vivek et al. (2010) define as an expanded relationship approach to marketing. In each approach, the consumer, instead of being involved as a member of the exchange process, represents a contributor to interactive relationships with brands, organizations and events. As such, Kumar et al. (2010) emphasized the need for brands to generate effective strategies to reap the benefits of engaged consumers.

Brodie et al. (2011) differentiated consumer engagement from constructs such as commitment, involvement and participation, arguing that it involves a dialogic interaction. This interaction may occur between consumers or the organization and a consumer. In each instance, the consumer does not just act as purchaser, but as a co-creator of value and content (Brodie et al., 2013). Contributing to value creation and content empowers consumers to interact with one another and organizations, which leads to the formation of strong and meaningful brand communities. New media plays a fundamental role in the provision of platforms to facilitate the co-creative production of value and content.

Conceptually, engagement consists of three interrelated dimensions, which influence consumer attitudes and awareness towards focal organizations and stakeholders (Brodie et al., 2011). First, consumers engage in a cognitive sense. This involves the extent that a person actually observes and connects with the content viewed. Second, there is an emotional component, which refers to the extent that a consumer cares about the content and their role in sharing or developing fresh information. Third, there is a behavioural dimension, which encapsulates the frequency of posts, sharing and other new-media behaviours. As consumers' extent of cognition, emotion and behaviour increase so does engagement and, from there, a series of positive outcomes for brands, organizations and events.

Fostering consumer engagement has emerged as a central aspect of marketing activities due to the beneficial outcomes for brands,

organizations and events. Palmatier et al. (2006) argued that consumer engagement increased profit, satisfaction and loyalty. More recently, Brodie et al. (2013) stated that consumer engagement also increased brands' capacity to learn about consumers, enhance trust and strengthen emotional connections if strategies function well. Therefore, marketers increasingly structure activities – especially via new-media platforms – to enhance consumer engagement. Next, we explore the symbiosis between new media and sport, extending the traditional sport – media relationship.

New media and sport: key principles for fan engagement

The World Cup is a mega-sport event generating global consumer attention and, thus, it maintains a symbiotic relationship with the media (Pritchard & Funk, 2006). The sport – media symbiosis now extends to new-media platforms. This allows organizers to enhance event and service delivery in stadiums, venues and localities and, then, amplify and extend tournament reach around the globe. New media has evolved as a complementary, emergent aspect of the communications mix, defined by Shilbury et al. (2014) as: technologically developed digital platforms that are accessed in real time and are 'increasingly participatory, interactive and unregulated' (p. 246).

The emergence of interactive digital communication tools provides rich possibilities for World Cup marketers. Beyond encouraging interactivity and participation, new media also presents conceptual and operational benefits. These include real-time content communication and the capacity to reduce the implications of geographic dislocation through interactive online content (Neuman, 1991). Such tools allow the World Cup and its various stakeholders to develop and implement cost-effective consumer engagement strategies on a large scale that impact a broad-reaching group of tournament consumers.

Central to World Cup engagement strategies is the concept of co-creation and value sharing. Analogous to S-D logic (Vargo & Lusch, 2008) and relationship marketing approaches (Palmatier, 2008), networks and interactions between organizations and consumers facilitate the co-creation of value. Co-creation occurs through initiatives designed to encourage consumers to make choices, learn, share and advocate. Such processes empower consumers to proactively shape their own experience, contribute to the social community around the event and refine product or service offerings through the contribution of feedback and information. In this sense, co-creation strategies capitalize on the willingness of consumers to create content of their own volition.

The unique nature of the World Cup presents challenges and opportunities for consumer engagement via new media. Given the need to intensively leverage the tournament for four years preceding the event, the growth and advantages of new media provide a foundation to significantly enhance the impact and consumption of the event beyond the physical limitations of traditional media outlets. With new media, marketers can create and distribute automated content, measure its efficacy and, then, transfer, store and share the data for broader marketing information purposes (Manovich, 2001; 2003).

Overall, then, new media provides World Cup marketers with the opportunity to capitalize on systems, which allows real-time interactions between organizers, host regions, brands, sponsors and consumers in a flexible manner. This allows World Cup marketers to develop more sophisticated and effective engagement strategies than those available for previous incarnations of the event. This added flexibility, scope, cost benefit and broader content dissemination provokes a need to understand consumer engagement to underpin strategies to meet commercial, communication and engagement goals.

Engagement strategies: who needs to engage and why?

A primary aesthetic dimension of the World Cup emerges from the colour, fanaticism and patriotism displayed at matches during the tournament. This aesthetic, however, captures only a minority of World Cup consumers directly. The average capacity of the 2014 World Cup stadiums is under 54,000, with a total capacity of approximately 644,000 across all stadiums for the tournament. Even taking into account match day attendance and those who engage with physical sites across the host nation[s], this represents a fraction of the total event audience. Thus, there is a need to engage consumers physically at matches, live sites and virtually, using the new-media strategies we define below. An optimized approach for the World Cup necessitates the generation of both physical and digital fan-centric environments (and interactions between them).

Given the open nature of the digital environment (that is, marketers can observe other brands' and organizations' approach) and isomorphic approaches to organizational practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), there is considerable homogeneity in the actions and tools used to foster consumer engagement in sport. There is, however, divergence in terms of strategies and models of consumer engagement for the World Cup due to its global profile and the interaction of the event with multiple stakeholders. Figure 3.1 displays the relationships FIFA shares with the multiple World Cup stakeholders and organizations. The relationships

activate at different times and at various levels before, during and after the tournament. These include: governing bodies, participating nations (and their federal governing bodies), host regions, teams and athletes




Figure 3.1 Fan engagement stakeholders

and World Cup partners such as broadcasters, sponsors and advertisers. While the aim and function of engagement might be broad, each stakeholder undertakes specific activities in line with their objectives, resources and relationships with other organizations. We profile each of the stakeholders defined below.

International governing body/rights owner (FIFA)

In line with their mission and status as an international sport governing body, FIFA has diverse interests in relation to commercial, social and promotional goals. FIFA addresses these interests in conjunction with a complex range of stakeholders (Bayle & Madella, 2002). As the primary rights holder for the event, FIFA has a dual purpose in delivering consumer engagement. First, FIFA needs to engage consumers in terms of its own interests using new media and second, leverage the event as a platform to facilitate desirable outcomes for partner organizations seeking commercial, cultural and social outcomes.

From a marketing perspective, the commercial and promotional outcomes of the World Cup are most relevant to fan engagement. New media is most effective in communicating and generating engagement through behaviours and attitudes that benefit the sport and governing body. While the World Cup is the key point of attraction and interest, there is distinct potential to realize outcomes beyond those associated with the event. For example, the World Cup provides FIFA with a platform to leverage participation in the sport and to emphasize the impact of its various social programs across the globe.

Notably, the commercial success of the World Cup is reliant on various relationships with broadcasters, sponsors and partners who generate revenue for the rights owner of the event (FIFA). Part of FIFA's role through engagement, then, is to maximize opportunities for partners and sponsors to interact with fans and communities. In doing so, FIFA increases the value of partner and sponsor relationships with the event, which provides additional benefits for them as the rights holder.

In summary, FIFA seeks to provide engagement in the lead up to, during and after the event to drive interest, attitudes and behaviours towards their own programs and outcomes. Additionally, FIFA uses new media to amplify the event, thus maximizing the value accrued for partners and rights-holders via access to tournament consumers. In doing so, FIFA seeks to increase consumer trust, involvement, loyalty and contribution of content before, during and after the World Cup (Brodie et al., 2011), whilst also leveraging stronger relationships with key tournament partners and sponsors.

National federations of football

As well as the international governing body, competing nations (and non-competing nations) and their football federations use the World Cup to leverage engagement and interest in domestic markets. Activities designed by national federations include engagement strategies to build awareness, educate, communicate and facilitate support for the national team and athletes. Engagement in these terms provides benefits beyond pure consumption of the World Cup, including game development and nation building. In this sense, competing countries (teams) and consumer bases are properties, which federations use to unify levels of support, promote the event and, in addition, the achievements of the national team and players. For many consumers, their core interest and point of attachment is their national team, rather than the World Cup as an event. Hence, national federations concentrate on promoting nationalistic messages and interactions prior to and during the event to drive consumer engagement beyond the World Cup.

Leveraging the World Cup beyond the event itself provides national federations with a platform for game development, commercialization, promotion and the delivery of key social and cultural messaging in relation to the game's impact. FIFA and national federations share many strategic aims and imperatives. Building or leveraging awareness of the sport under the World Cup spotlight can aid commercial partners at local levels and assist in promoting domestic leagues, participation programs and policy outcomes. Cognizant of the mutual strategic imperatives, there are considerable benefits for FIFA and its national federations designing consumer engagement approaches in tandem.

Host cities and organizing committees

From a new-media perspective, the host organizing body and local authorities obtain significant indirect and direct commercial benefits from effective fan engagement work. Considering the 'on the ground' experience, consumer engagement provides a strategic tool to provide real-time information that host regions and event organizers can use to enhance and expand the experience for patrons. For example, host regions and organizing bodies can activate efforts to improve service, satisfaction levels, ease of access to venues, access to content from facilities and live sites and access to e-commerce platforms for physical attendees. At the same time, host regions and organizing bodies can engage remote consumers using new media to build links between live and virtual environments (such as by posting of live photos, videos and so on). Use of new-media engagement to present content such as

live venue or site tours, promotion of the event and host cities offers multiple benefits to host cities and event organizers. These include city [re]branding, legacy, tourism, and encouraging local visitation to cities and future events.

Brands, sponsors and partners

With brands viewing World Cup (and all sport) assets and partnerships more expansively than naming rights on a shirt or facility, scope exists to leverage rights and assets towards brand-relevant fan-engagement outcomes. Given the exchange and commercial nature of sponsorships, organizations seek to leverage commercial outcomes, such as the equity of the World Cup for brand building, communication and sales. Increasingly, the presence of community agencies or organizations with broader social mandates and partnerships use the World Cup to achieve non-commercial benefits. This duality provides an even broader range of organizations and brands with motivation to associate with the World Cup for a mixture of commercial and social gains. At the same time, this provides FIFA with opportunities to display its branding scope alongside its commitment to social responsibility.

In line with promotional aims to inform, persuade and remind, the growth of new-media platforms allows brands, sponsors and partners to reach, interact and build relationships with fans physically at the event and remotely. This can be activated through traditional or new-media strategies including websites, mobile and digital applications (apps), online or digital advertising, signage or interactivity-driven engagement through social media, customized messaging, direct marketing, content marketing or the use of reward-based tools or games. The aim of such approaches is to engage communities of fans or a particular target market to develop interactive and emotional connections through the event. The value of such relationships relies on the type and quality of involvement and, more importantly, the level of access provided by FIFA to the partner, sponsor or brand through the event (to databases and the like).

Broadcasters and media

Traditional and new forms of broadcasters also have multiple aims and outcomes in relation to consumer engagement. During the 2010 World Cup, online and new media played a role in developed markets. For example, ESPN's broadband network hosted over seven million viewers

and 15.7 million hours of viewing content for the tournament. The complementary ESPN World Cup application (app) attracted over 2.5 million downloads and provided a platform for over one million users per day in the US alone (Feinstein et al., 2010).

In addition to traditional terrestrial or pay television delivery of World Cup content, new-media engagement also occurs through customized extensions of match content that facilitate additional engagement opportunities for broadcasters and the media. Here, broadcast extensions (technologies and platforms) can assist in moving beyond just watching games, to the generation of more meaningful experiences for consumers during the broadcast and event. Such engagement generates greater knowledge, preference, consideration and ultimately ratings and revenue through use of second screen viewing apps with additional content, statistics, customized feeds or information about current, past or future games.

Even without official rights, media bodies around events like the World Cup have much to gain from being a chosen content source for consumers. Broadcasters and media outlets provide a range of news articles, highlights and video packages. As such, there are concentrated efforts by all media bodies to garner traffic to facilitate commercial rewards determined by web traffic and advertiser or subscription revenue models.

In summary, there are a range of World Cup stakeholders that seek to exercise and leverage engagement before, during and after the event. These include governance and delivery organizations for the sport and the event as well as brands, partners and sponsors that pay to associate with the tournament to engage consumers for their own commercial purposes. Next, we provide a classification of consumer engagement tools and, then, delineate the building blocks of fan engagement for a World Cup event.

Tools of engagement – new media

Marketers have evolved practice from traditional promotional or communications mixes inclusive of advertising, publicity, personal selling and sales promotion (Borden, 1964) towards sport specific promotion mixes (Irwin et al., 2008). Such models include a focus on new promotional and communications elements such as licensing, sponsorship, community relations and atmospherics. Recently, further diversification of models broadly includes e-promotions to augment existing direct marketing, interactive marketing, new media and broadcast platforms (Shilbury

et al., 2014). These emergent tools reflect a broader recognition of the role of new media as a core part of the communication mix for organizations, brands, events and sponsors.

New media provides myriad tools that organizations use to foster consumer engagement. Furthermore, the availability of such technologies develops substantially in the four-year cycles between World Cups. Therefore, engagement platforms emerge quickly, providing new tools and strategies to leverage engagement from one tournament to the next. As an example, one micro-blogging platform, Twitter, was nonexistent in 2006 and, in 2010, was relatively new. As of 2014, Twitter has more than half a billion users and is a core platform for the dissemination of information, consumer engagement and broadcasting leveraging through social television engagement. To develop a picture of the tools and vehicles used by various stakeholders, the remainder of this chapter focuses on what fans engage with and the platforms or distribution tools World Cup marketers apply to generate interactive content.

Content and strategy

Consumer engagement strategies align with a broader organizational e-marketing orientation (EMO). EMO is characterized by a multi-stage process commencing with the orientation perspective or philosophy of an organization and concluding with the adoption of e-marketing strategies (Shaltoni & West, 2010). Given the global and digital new-media platforms offered by the World Cup, stakeholders maintain a high level of EMO, with strong commitment to activities leading to planned and implemented consumer involvement and e-marketing actions. Examples include research, implementation and resource commitment through content or platform development, upgrading technologies and employing suitably trained staff (Shaltoni & West, 2010). The core questions concerning consumer engagement content and strategy relate to: 1) determining the content that fans desire and engage with, and 2) deciphering the aim and scope of the consumer engagement strategy. Resources, strategy and the complexity of stakeholder networks influence both question responses. In the case of the World Cup, the organizing body and related stakeholders pool collective resources for on-site and mass-market approaches to increase viability. As such, the range of engagement opportunities is wide and contrasting. As with any modern marketing approach, content is a central ingredient in the consumer engagement process. In basic terms, consumers seek to access, spend time with and share content. Therefore, content drives engagement and related positive outcomes.

Content appears in written, audio or visual formats for mass usage and can span discussions and conversations, new stories, articles, feature pieces or interviews, rankings and statistical content, videos and highlights and sport specific information like scores, team news and match updates. The content we refer to here emerges in digital form and is created, distributed, delivered and consumed online. Although the capabilities of new media go beyond traditional media approaches, many tools used to drive engagement are not new. However, new developments such as statistical content (aside from sports like baseball that maintain a long history of statistical consumer engagement) provide a key platform to engage consumers. Likewise, the integration of social media can 'provide an unparalleled digital platform to unite the hundreds of millions of fans' (FIFA 2013a).

As an extension, content marketing combines marketing and publishing (Clark, 2013), where 'entertainment and engagement are stimulated through the creation and distribution of content such as videos, photo albums, newsletters, e-books and audio material. Such activity aims to stimulate connection with a brand and, ultimately, seeks to encourage feelings of community and foster positive consumer responses' (Shilbury et al., 2014). In the case of the World Cup, stakeholders generate engagement by developing sport or event-specific content. This includes content related to games and events, teams and athletes or more detailed accounts of key stories, the history of the event, the host cities or stories and cultural backgrounds of participating countries. All of these seek to extend the event beyond the four weeks of the tournament.

It is critical for the objectives of FIFA and related national federations that the event extends its impact beyond the four weeks of the tournament. As such, consumer engagement activities need to generate awareness, interest, pre-sale attention, ticket sales, match-day interest and post-event news consumption. Launches and associated content provide important conduits to foster the behaviours listed. For example, during the qualification stages for Brazil 2014, FIFA launched the Official Match Ball, *Brazuca*, and official Mascot, *Fuleco*. The launch of tournament Match Balls and Mascots acted as important milestones building momentum before the tournament. Another example of pre-event strategies involved FIFA and tournament host nations promoting the post-event legacy. This scenario occurs increasingly frequently as a means to appease constituents and taxpayers following the large financial outlay required to host a World Cup. For example, FIFA Explore exists as 'a series of interactive journeys to enable fans to get insights

into FIFA initiatives that support the development of the game and FIFA's mission to use football to build a better future' (FIFA, 2013a).

While much of this chapter has focused on engagement for remote consumers, strategies to engage consumers in the stadium or at the event can increase attendees' spend and improve service and product delivery. Engagement in stadiums allows marketers to create and optimize the consumer environment to increase satisfaction (McDonald, Karg & Vocino, 2013). Salient examples include consumers ordering food (including delivery at times), connecting with friends or family through social networks and sharing photos or videos from the event. Each engagement platform optimizes the digital environment for consumers, thus improving venue and service experiences. Related to service, conversations concerning the service experience act as another form of content. In this sense, to improve the service experience within stadiums and venues, marketers need to respond quickly to queries, questions and complaints.

As well as awareness and communication platforms, engagement with content also drives or is linked to commercial outcomes for both sport and non-sport organizations. New media provides e-commerce-led opportunities to sell tickets, promote products and services and to generate revenue directly for sport organizations through sales of virtual or physical merchandise or products including media or content access. Additionally, the generation of advertising and promotional content by third parties generates additional content fans may engage with. Such material can be planned or reactive, with recent high-profile examples including incidents from major sport events leveraged through reactive and real-time promotional and brand efforts that lead to viral marketing campaigns (whether the brand is a rights holder or not). Here, the importance of creativity is vital to cut through the clutter and noise associated with major events.

Under a broad classification, content can be organization-led or, under the premise of interactivity, extended to co-create concepts through which consumers contribute beyond just consuming and sharing the content. The most engaging content is indeed likely to be that garnering interactivity where the consumer plays an active role in its production (for example, Puma Hard Chorus or Nike Write Your Future). Hence, the imperative for World Cup marketers is to stay abreast of tournament developments and critical discussion topics as the tournament unfolds.

Increasingly the role of the consumer is valued and used to create content, analogous with S-D logic (Vargo & Lusch, 2004). For example,

Coca-Cola used a travelling van as a recording studio in Argentina during the 2014 World Cup qualifying to collect the cheers of one million fans across the country. To generate awareness and associate Coca-Cola with the World Cup, marketers positioned the van in the stadium to bring the cheers of the collective nation to the physical stadium. This provides a pertinent example of reducing the dislocation of consumers not in the stadium and thus engaging remote fans using new-media tools. Fan cams are another example of venues and stadiums seeking to prolong consumer engagement and link the physical and virtual environments. For example, marketers take a 360-degree photo of a stadium and then promote a virtual location to consumers (for example, Facebook) where consumers can go and 'tag' their self in the photo. This drives traffic to a specific site and the sharing of content on social media platforms.

Finding a way to involve and engage influential fans is another key part of consumer engagement strategy. Social suites and fan-led tweet sessions have become a critical part of consumer engagement across the world at sport events. As a World Cup example, Castrol had fans in the US submit self-created application videos, with one fan selected for the US Men's National Team games in 2013 as the fan correspondent. Integrative and innovative campaigns have become a regular approach of major sponsors at global and domestic level where consumers submit videos and content to enter competitions to win rewards and prizes. Specific to the World Cup in 2010, Budweiser placed consumers from each participating country in the same house, while Nike (as mentioned earlier) designed the Write the Future campaign as an ambush marketing strategy to capture attention from World Cup apparel partner Adidas. Nike's multi-platform campaign included interactive elements built around web and marketing content utilizing contracted athletes and teams to engage consumers.

New-media content as a basis for engagement provides a broad range of opportunities for marketers, which can take various forms including the written word, audio or video. Such content can range from a 140-character post, a conversation, a story or a campaign. Content is increasingly cheaper and easier to create and disseminate, can be linked to partners or sponsors and can be delivered to customized audiences in a variety of ways. Therefore, the forms of content span both traditional and emerging forms, and promoted interactive content provides opportunities for a range of revenue and engagement outcomes.

Moving from activity to engagement – unique visits, frequency of visit and time spent on-site are all metrics of engagement – but not

necessarily representative of quality or impact. Importantly, content should seek to move beyond the attraction of eyeballs, web visits and clickthroughs to those activities that generate sharing, learning or advocating behaviours and that can leverage functional and entertainment outcomes and increase the emotional dimension of consumption to foster deeper engagement.

Distribution/communication platforms

Alongside content as the basis for engagement, channels to communicate, distribute, share and converse provide domains for engagement. The core question here is how World Cup marketers and stakeholders can maximize the impact of the event and related campaigns through the balanced, strategic integration of variant new-media platforms.

While an in-depth examination of each stakeholder's specific approach and tools for fan engagement is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following section describes some of the various tools and platforms used in four key groups. This is not an exhaustive description; rather, we seek to articulate and then provide examples of key engagement activities. Tools include adaptations of existing promotional tools such as advertising (that is, print advertising to online advertising which is dynamic and customized to a fan); or new forms of communication designed to complement or disrupt traditional communications approaches and existing strategies. Each group is a discrete activity or set of activities that moves beyond the physical in-ground experience created through new-media and virtual environments. While e-promotion or new-media tools for communication continue to evolve, the groups presented provide a substantial cross-section of the current techniques applicable to the World Cup.

Content platforms

Websites have been the traditional 'one-stop' platform for engagement in previous decades. Such sites in all contexts and industries have developed from static information sources to become interactive, multidimensional platforms. As a key component of World Cup content and engagement, forecasts predict FIFA.com to receive in excess of seven billion page views and 150 million unique visitors during the tournament (FIFA, 2013a). A range of content, spanning news, match information, promotions, games and stories will be distributed through official partners and governing bodies' websites and mini-sites while media organizations and commercial partners will seek to leverage the event for traffic and related commercial outcomes to non-official sites.

While websites have been the traditional means, mobile applications are developing as a complementary consumption platform for content. Globally, apps are a broadcasting or event extension to provide news, scores, features, updates and social media integration. In this sense, apps act as a conduit between the event content and consumer. For the 2014 World Cup, the official app was launched around six months prior to the event and is projected to be the most downloaded sports application ever (FIFA, 2013a).

For match-related content, websites and applications also allow broadcast extensions. Here, broadcasters can integrate extensions to allow consumers to choose cameras of choice, additional camera views, mix-zone footage (after matches) or access match content or statistics to enhance the game consumption experience. Even for non-rights holders, there are opportunities for media bodies in geographic regions who are seeking to drive traffic to their sites to do so through being a source or portal for news, podcasts, content and competitions.

In short, websites and apps provide a base for content to distribute and for consumer engagement. Such platforms are increasingly customizable based on their region or team of support and develop to provide 'anytime, anywhere' or on-demand content for World Cup fans.

Social media platforms

Sport content and consumer interactions have played a core role in the growth of social media, with the impact of the World Cup an example of the global movement fans can create through sport engagement. Social media includes internet-based applications that allow for the creation and exchange of user-generated content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Social networking sites, blogs and microblogs, photo and video-sharing sites are all examples of social media, and are characterized by user creation and sharing of user content. Social media provides organizations with a vehicle to engage and share content, which generally falls into three areas: promotion, information and interactivity. As such, social media plays a crucial role in generating word of mouth, sharing and interaction as a prevalent form of communication, collaboration and community formation (Klososky, 2012).

FIFA, as a central governing body, and related organizing bodies commit increasing attention and resources to social media before, during and after the World Cup. Currently, the most prominent social platforms for the World Cup are Facebook and Twitter. In these areas, governing bodies host distinct pages for the organization (for example, highlighting FIFA work around the globe), the event (charting the

history of the competition and enabling fans to share their special World Cup memories) and specific renditions of the event (2014 World Cup – covering build-up to, and action during) (FIFA, 2013b). Each specific page has various forms of photo, video and news or opinion content, questions and comments pages and tools to promote engagement through raising awareness, consumption of media and interactivity.

Likewise, online communities and fan forums provide avenues for sharing content on firm-oriented and unofficial message boards. Related bodies are also prominent on other platforms, including YouTube. As well as FIFA, stakeholders such as sponsors and national teams and associations have similar pages that seek to generate positive engagement outcomes through content sharing. In considering wider platforms such as video and photo-sharing sites, forums and community pages provide additional opportunities for football fans to interact virtually. Examples include posting news, answering or responding to fan queries, providing match updates, scores or team news. Increasingly, online communities and forums innovate, allowing fans to vote, share opinions, contribute to television broadcasts and contribute to the physical environment (such as by having tweets visible on virtual boards at the ground). As such, the local organizing body can bring the physical event to the virtual community through photos and updates. In this sense, marketers should not ignore the role of social media in engaging with consumers, including through the use of leveraging ‘social television’.

Social media engagement outcomes include leading and generating conversation, content-sharing and learning and, as such, are largely cognitive, intangible and non-revenue-generating. Despite this, they are still important in terms of generating advantages and indirect outcomes for stakeholders. These media serve as a conduit to other areas of the engagement mix, including generating awareness, content-sharing and through directing associated traffic to parts of the organization that directly generate revenue or sales. In this sense, the time spent on social media sites may not directly generate revenue for the World Cup or partners. However, it may create fan movements that lead to greater television or broadcast consumption, advertising clickthrough or assets like databases and sponsor opportunities; all of these present opportunities for tangential commercialization.

CRM and direct marketing

As well as more publicly available engagement platforms like websites and social media, marketers can draw upon more targeted approaches.

Direct marketing is one example, defined as one-to-one communication of a personalized message to a consumer that is data or research-led, measurable and designed to elicit a direct response (Kotler & Armstrong, 2010). It differs from the platforms described above because direct marketing involves private or closed communications that seek to identify the fan as a relevant target market and (particularly in the new-media sense) uses databases and direct strategies to leverage engagement, thus building relationships, loyalty and brand value.

Traditionally, door-to-door or direct mail campaigns represent the dominant forms of direct marketing. Yet new technologies allow for the use of database communications and email marketing, direct-response advertisements, and internet and broadcast platforms such as websites and social media. Such platforms are relevant to the majority of stakeholders seeking engagement around the World Cup that hold databases or CRM platforms housing information on groups or segments of fans. Such examples include 'The Club', FIFA's online community portal or national databases that seek to unite the 'football family' consisting of fan groups or participants within a particular region. While CRM platforms can provide scope to accommodate forums, games, competitions and loyalty programs, they also provide opportunities for customized and measurable marketing efforts and communications.

The opportunity to record, track and communicate with customers, while generating database-led promotions, merges art and science through data and creative communication efforts. Through tracking consumer history, demographics and actions, various useful metrics – purchasing habits, attendance, television consumption and merchandise purchase – can be captured. Such approaches are not channel defined, and are more diverse than in past decades. Therefore, these approaches allow sponsors to communicate information about products and services that may satisfy identified consumer needs.

Such structured communications are a key part of engagement strategies and a strategic approach to CRM advances direct marketing approaches and results for sport properties. The World Cup provides a highly visible platform for both sport brands (FIFA and national football federations) and non-sport brands to connect with consumers. The outcome of this form of engagement aligns with social media, where targeted approaches allow consumers to generate activation or reactivation, retention and promotion. Measureable online engagement behaviours allow for tracking, which in turn develops insights into the learning, advocating and sharing dimensions of engagement.

Games and reward-based interactions

The final category of tools that can be used are games or reward-based initiatives that seek to influence attitudes and consideration while concurrently encouraging and rewarding behaviour. These can span single attempts to engage consumers, such as fan competitions at global, event or country-specific level. For example, Hyundai gives FIFA.com Club members the chance to create a slogan for the team bus of their home nation. Hyundai then paints the winning submission on the official team bus for each nation.

Long-term programs of engagement that seek to integrate and reward also exist. Such engagement forms merge with 'gamification' concepts, where game-based rewards or incentives drive and reinforce positive behaviour. Rewards can include badges, progress bars and leader boards that create opportunities for engagement. For example, consumers might be 'rewarded' for ongoing behaviours or engagement processes with a brand. Similar to this, integrated loyalty programs aggregate and reward consumer activities.

Much as in their use by other sport properties, World Cup fans may be rewarded 'virtually' by consuming games, interacting and sharing content, inviting friends, posting on social media, answering questions and making predictions on game outcomes. Online queues and check-ins and scavenger hunts present other options. Such activities, whether leveraged by FIFA or official or unofficial partners, have scope to increase the amplification of the event. This has obvious benefits for consumer time investment, consideration and, as a result, lifts physical or media consumption of the event.

Variants of fantasy sport where fans can create virtual teams which compete based on actual World Cup games represent another area within this classification. Common across many sports, fantasy sport can increase interest beyond a single team, and create a rational justification for consumers to watch more games and consume more external content, as well as allowing them to learn more about teams, players, game strategy and events (Dwyer & Drayer, 2010; Karg & McDonald, 2011). Adaption to the World Cup, led by official and unofficial media sources, presents options to engage both highly committed and newer fans of the event.

Conclusion

Approaches to fan engagement through new media necessitate consideration and integration of content and platforms as well as an

understanding of the role of data and scope and nature of the audience. Advantages of new-media engagement include ease in creating and transferring content, real-time marketing and interactivity with fans. The open nature of sport content and the social nature of new media allows for learning, sharing, co-developing, socializing and advocating processes and outcomes – elements inherent in engagement consumption practices (Brodie et al., 2013). This sub-process acts as an antecedent to loyalty and satisfaction, empowerment and trust, and commitment towards the World Cup, the sport of football and its supporting or partnering brands and organizations.

While providing opportunities, there are also challenges for World Cup fan engagement, linked to the global nature of the event and the actions of brands seeking to leverage off the profile of the event ('ambushers'). Given the need to present material to international audiences, cultural approaches in activities and diverse languages need to be a part of strategy. New media provides the ability to customize depending on market and to develop strategies that are multifaceted and integrated, but tailored to platform and audience. In this sense, aspects of fan engagement are highly reliant on an understanding of data and the audience. In particular, CRM and game or incentivized programs allow for significant levels of data capture, while other digital aspects allow for customization and tracking, thus personalizing fan interactions. Therefore, fan engagement becomes a combination of science and art in the sense of understanding the fan, their reactions and then leveraging engagement activities creatively and interactively to achieve tangible marketing outcomes.

Protection of rights holders is another prominent issue given the high level of ambush marketing observed at major events (Chadwick & Burton, 2011). The 2012 London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) provided an elevated level of protection to partners, providing restrictions on social media usage and restricting the presence of unofficial brands. The expectation will exist that other major events, such as the World Cup, will create similar barriers. The engagement activities shown above are not restricted to rights holders, with multiple examples of success for other brands. World Cups provide a quadrennial platform for Nike and Adidas – one an official partner, one not – to develop marketing strategies aimed at leveraging teams, athletes and aspects of football for their products and services. Such initiatives often take viral pathways and provide additional challenges for governing bodies and rights owners in terms of managing and executing contractual rights in comparison to traditional partnerships. Additionally, the

need to achieve cut-through in cluttered markets, whilst staying within regulations and contractual guidelines, presents challenges.

In closing, this chapter has shown that fan engagement provides an opportunity to develop and distribute content to enhance and amplify the World Cup to a global, digital audience. Engagement can be critical to many stakeholders of the World Cup, including governing bodies, local organizing bodies, participating teams, sponsors and broadcasters. Given the breadth of stakeholders and their various philosophies and resource commitments to new-media engagement and practices, the range of fan engagement possibilities is broad but driven by central themes of content and use of platforms for distribution and interactivity. Success of engagement can be conceptualized at multiple levels, from awareness, eyeballs, clicks and time spent to more developed metrics relating to sharing, positive attention and effect on behaviours. World Cup partners will seek novel, rich and rewarding experiences that lead to affinity and positive outcome related to reputation, trust and behaviour. Despite the homogenous use of tools across sport fan engagement, the World Cup presents a context which is unique in its scope and profile as the world's largest single sport event. Its challenge is to engage a wide audience with a truly global reach to inspire participation and share the stories of the event, governing organizations and partners.

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4

Broadcasting the World Cup

Harry Arne Solberg and Chris Gratton

Introduction

FIFA's World Cup, and the Olympic Games, are considered the most prestigious and popular global sports events. This is reflected in both the TV viewing figures and the values of the TV rights. Before the 2010 World Cup, FIFA measured the cumulative audience. According to these measurements, the 1994 World Cup in the USA had the all-time high audience of 32.1 billion viewers, followed by the 2002 World Cup in Japan/Korea and the 1990 World Cup in Italy, which attracted respectively 28.8 billion and 26.7 billion viewers. The 2002 figures include 2.5 billion out-of-home viewers.¹ However, because of double counting, cumulative audience is no longer the standard measurement for TV rating figures. Instead, this is now done on the number of unique viewers.

In 2010, 2.2 billion unique viewers spent at least 20 minutes watching the World Cup in South Africa. As Table 4.1 shows, Asia was the dominant market, with about 40 per cent of the total number of viewers. China alone contributed 37 per cent of the audience in the region. China also generated the highest in-home audience of any territory around the globe, with 328.7 million viewers. Note that audience reach here refers to the total unique individuals who watch the event on TV in-home. Public viewing is not included. This ensures audiences are not duplicated while providing a true measure of event penetration.

A total of 620 million watched at least 20 minutes of the 2010 final between Spain and the Netherlands, while the two semi-finals attracted respectively 404 and 398 million viewers. The 2006 World Cup final in Germany, between Italy and France, attracted 592 million.² The 2010 final attracted the highest ever TV audiences in both the home nations of the two finalists. In Spain an audience of 15.6 million watched the

Table 4.1 2010 World Cup – TV audience reach by region (millions)

	Asia	Europe	South America	Africa & Middle East	North & Central America & Caribbean	Oceania	Total
+ 20 min	884.4	557.6	299.8	245.6	215.1	9.2	2,211.7
+ 1 min	1,511.3	734.2	356.8	263.3	323.7	14.5	3,202.8

Source: 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa – Television report (KantarSport, 2010).

Table 4.2 TV audience reach by region – the final (watching 20 minutes or more)

Europe	208 million
Asia	128.2 million
Africa & Middle East	113.6 million
South America	92.3 million
North & Central America & Caribbean	75.5 million
Oceania	2.1 million
Total	619.7 million

Source: Adapted from TV Sports Markets (2014, p. 14).

30 minutes of extra time, including both pay-TV and free-to-air TV. In the Netherlands, it attracted 8.513 million, which was an audience share of 90.6 per cent. However, the TV ratings were also high in other nations. In Germany, the final was watched by 31.1 million viewers, which was an audience share of 83 per cent (TV Sports Markets, 2014, p. 14).

In recent years, technology innovations have altered the viewing patterns of football fans, away from traditional TV-viewing towards the Internet and mobile phones. Measurements of the 2010 World Cup in the US, UK, Brazil and Spain showed that 10–15 per cent of the viewers saw the matches on websites. The BBC had 38.1 million requests to view audio-visual content during the tournament, a substantial increase from the previous record from Euro 2008 of 5.1 million. In Germany, the public service broadcaster ZDF had 35.9 million unique users on its main website during the tournament (almost 50 per cent above its normal traffic). Its website zdf.sport.de had 12.7 million visits, a 381 per cent increase on its average monthly traffic. Live match streams drew an average of 102,000 viewings, peaking at 190,000 for Germany's victory over Argentina. In Italy, RAI's main website, Rai.it, had record traffic levels during the tournament, with 116 million page views and an average of 460,000 unique users daily. In France, TF1, the commercial channel, had 10 million video clips from the tournament viewed on its website (KantarSport, 2010).

More than 15,000 clips of in-match and editorial content in 11 languages were specifically produced for the mobile medium. One million unique viewers used ESPN's mobile TV, registering 93 million minutes of viewing, and setting viewing records on mobile TV platforms MobiTV and FLO TV. In total, World Cup content on ESPN's mobile offerings generated 98 million visits and 520 million page views. ITV reported 800,000 downloads and two million content views of its World Cup iPhone app, while TF1 recorded 250,000 iPhone apps downloaded. In Germany, Telekom Deutschland had almost 1.6 million accesses to their 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa live channels. KT Korea had a total audience of more than 600,000, with close to 80,000 unique viewers (KantarSport, 2010)

Financial impacts

When events attract such a massive global audience, it also has financial consequences. The World Cup is FIFA's number one money machine, accounting for more than 90 per cent of their total event-related revenues. The TV rights from the 2010 World Cup accounted for more than 60 per cent of the total revenues in the period 2007–2010. As seen from Table 4.3, the proportions of FIFA's revenues coming from both the World Cup and TV rights have increased for the last three championships. In addition, the attention the World Cup is given on TV is also an important engine in driving the marketing revenues.

Although Asia has had the largest share of viewers, the European market has traditionally been the most important revenue generator. More than 52 per cent of FIFA's TV rights for the period from 2007 to 2010

Table 4.3 FIFA's event income (US\$ millions)

	1999–2002 ³	2003–2006	2007–2010
World Cup income			
• TV rights	991	1321	2408
• Marketing	545	600	1072
• Other (tickets, hospitality, licensing)	82	277	191
Non World Cup related income	167	186	219
World cup revenues as percentage of total event income	90.6%	92.1%	94.4%
TV rights as percentage of total	55.5%	56.4%	61.9%
Total income	1785	2343	3890

Source: Adapted from FIFA Financial Reports 2002, 2006 and 2010.

were earned in Europe. This pattern is totally different from the Olympics, where the North American market has been the number one revenue generator, accounting for approximately 50 per cent of the total TV rights, with European markets accounting for only 20 per cent. One reason for this is that football traditionally has been significantly less popular in North America than in Europe (Solberg & Gratton, 2013).

A further reason lies in the differences in the history of commercial broadcasting in the two markets. Until late in the 1980s, European broadcasting was dominated by state-owned public service broadcasters. The most popular sports events were acquired by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)⁴ and subsequently distributed to their member channels at prices based on full cost coverage. Hence, the market was characterized by a total lack of competition, despite the fact that some sports programmes attracted very high rating figures. This was also reflected in the values of TV rights for the World Cup. For the three World Cups in 1990s, the total TV rights (world-wide) brought in \$310 million, which was less than one third of what the 2002 World Cup generated alone (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2002). Over the last two decades, however, the supply side in European broadcasting has altered significantly, with a large number of commercial broadcasters entering the market. Therefore, the competition for popular content, which also involves sports rights, has become extremely fierce. As a consequence of this, the rights fees on the most popular products have increased dramatically.

The following sections will analyse the development described above by means of economic theory. First we will focus on the cost structure of sport broadcasting, which is of importance for the issues. Next we analyse the behaviour of the stakeholders operating at the market for TV sports rights, with special attention paid to the broadcasters. Additionally, we also focus on regulations of sport broadcasting and how they affect the trade in World Cup TV rights.

Table 4.4 Geographical distribution of TV rights (US\$ millions)

	1999–2002 ⁵	2003–2006 ⁶	2007–2010
Europe	464	589	1,289
USA/North America ⁷	97	138	211
Rest of world (ex US)	439	575	908
Other FIFA events	97	20	40
Total:	1,097	1,321	2,448

Source: Adapted from FIFA Financial Reports 2002, 2006 and 2010.

The production and transmission of World Cup programmes

The World Cup allows several opportunities to enjoy *economies of scale advantages*. This applies to both the production of the TV programmes, and to the transmission of them to viewers. The average costs decline as more markets and viewers are reached. The joint use of cameras and other equipment opens up opportunities for substantial cost saving compared to the situation if all broadcasters produced the live programmes separately. Indeed, if more than 200 TV stations were to send their own cameras and other equipment to produce TV pictures from all the matches, this would cause chaos. However, this is not necessary since a single producer can do the production, and then distribute the signals to the respective national broadcasters. In recent years, the media industry has gone through a period where various forms of integration have become common. This, in turn, has improved the abilities of utilize *economies of scope advantages*, which particularly apply to the use of labour. As an example, journalists can both operate for TV channels and their respective websites.

In the earlier days, the TV production of the World Cup was usually a job for the broadcaster in the host nation. This was changed in 2002, when Host Broadcasting Service (HBS) took over the job. HBS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Infront Sports & Media. HBS was created as a single-purpose company, which is to be responsible for the host broadcast of the World Cup and the Confederations Cup. This job includes filming and transmitting the signal, and also providing broadcasters with unilateral production, transmission and commentary facilities and services. HBS is also responsible for the building of an International Broadcast Centre (IBC), as well as the multilateral and unilateral broadcast facilities at the IBC and all stadiums where matches are played. The host broadcast contracts for major events, such as the World Cup, include the start to finish project management of these events – a process which can typically involve several years of planning and the provision of tailored facilities and services.

FIFA's TV production costs for the period from 2007 to 2010 amounted to \$214 million.⁸ The specific budget for the 2010 World Cup amounted to \$124 million, which was 5.1 per cent of the World Cup rights. Therefore, TV broadcasting is a main contributor to FIFA's financial surplus. However, FIFA is classified as a non-profit organization in Switzerland, which allows it tax-free status, although it is obliged to spend any surplus on fulfilling football objectives. Therefore, FIFA does not describe the surplus from the World Cup as profit, but as a 'result' to be added to reserves to insulate them from any unexpected events

Table 4.5 Development of FIFA reserves 2003–2010 (US\$ millions)

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
76	208	350	617	643	902	1,061	1,280

Source: Adapted from FIFA Financial Report 2010.

that may arise. As seen from Table 4.5, the reserves have increased from US\$76 million in 2003 to an impressive US\$1.28 billion in 2010.

The organizational behaviour of World Cup broadcasters

To understand the market forces driving up the rights fees, it is necessary to analyse the behaviour of the TV companies involved in broadcasting the World Cup. This involves their source of revenues, but also the regulations on both broadcasting in general as well as on sport broadcasting.

In Europe, *public service broadcasters (PSB)* still hold a strong position in sport broadcasting, particularly for one-off events. This even though independent commercial broadcasters have taken over several sports rights that traditionally were acquired by PSBs. For non-commercial PSBs (such as the BBC and Swedish Television), whose revenues only come from public funding or licence fees, sport broadcasting represents only costs and no revenues. The exceptions are the revenues from short vignettes shown immediately before or after the main programmes. Semi-commercial PSBs, such as, for example, the German broadcasters ARD and ZDF, are allowed to sell some advertising, but not as much as independent fully commercial broadcasters.

The rationale of public service broadcasters is based on elements from welfare economics: they have an obligation to pay special attention on providing programmes that have characteristics of *public goods*, *externalities* and *merit goods*. See Brown (1996) and Gratton & Solberg (2007) for a more thorough discussion of these matters. The limitations of not being able to sell advertising reduce their capacity to compete for sports rights, particularly the non-commercial broadcasters.

In Australia, the main PSB, the ABC, gave up the most popular (and expensive) sports programmes such as the Olympics and other international championships as early as the 1990s. Their European PSB colleagues, however, have been unwilling to adopt this strategy. Instead they have continued to bid for these events, often under the aegis of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). From a welfare economic

perspective, the rationale for such a strategy can be questioned. The Listed Events regulations can prevent these events from migrating to pay TV broadcasters (discussed further in next section⁹). Nowadays, many independent commercial broadcasters reach close to 100 per cent of viewers. Therefore, PSBs are not necessary to guarantee that everybody can watch the programmes free of charge. The only cost the viewers will have to incur is the time lost by having to watch the commercials related to the core programmes. See Solberg (2007; 2008) for a thorough discussion of these matters.

In recent years, the supply side in Europe has become more similar to the rest of the world. *Independent commercial broadcasters* have taken over several sports rights that traditionally were acquired by PSBs. This involves both *advertising broadcasters* and *subscription broadcasters*. If some viewers have very high willingness to pay, it might be profitable to sell the programmes on a pay-per-view basis, instead of financing them by selling advertising, even if the latter alternative attracts significantly larger audiences. Subscription broadcasters have particularly concentrated on team sports, a pattern seen on several continents. In Europe, they have been most successful with acquisitions in club football tournaments. By 2013, the majority of live matches in the European football domestic leagues are broadcast only on subscription broadcasters (including Internet broadcasts).

Market development

Despite the fact that the World Cup attracts large audiences, and thereby generates substantial revenues, several TV rights deals have turned out to be unprofitable when judged on the basis of direct revenues and costs. Such situations reflect the so-called *winner's curse*, a situation where the winner of an auction is worse off as a consequence of overestimating the value of item and thereby bidding too much. The winner's problem is that he or she realizes this too late. Income turns out to be lower than expected, while it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to reduce costs (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).

One major reason for this is the extremely fierce competition to be awarded rights, which that of course has to do with the demand from the viewers, as was illustrated in the introduction. The commercial value of sports rights acquisitions will also be affected by uncertainty factors. In some cases, TV rights are sold before qualification is finished. Hence, while bidding, the TV broadcasters will not know whether their own national team will make it to the tournament.

Table 4.6 Average rating figures ('000s) – World Cup

	2002		2006	
	All matches	National team	All matches	National team
Germany	9,569	18,020	11,740	23,701
Italy	6,380	21,229	11,021	20,299
Netherlands	878	–	2,305	7,130
Spain	5,993	8,226	2,941	10,290
UK	4,389	13,557	6,429	15,383

Source: Adapted from TV Sports Markets (2010, p. 13).

The figures in Table 4.6 show that the gaps in rating figures between the matches involving the national team and the other matches are substantial. As an example, in the UK (2002), Italy and the Netherlands, the matches of the national teams attracted more than three times the viewers than the average for all matches. Hence, if some nations fail to qualify, this reduces the commercial value of the tournament for the national broadcaster. Additionally, this can also reduce the general interest for the tournament. The Netherlands did not qualify for the 2002 tournament in Japan/Korea. Therefore, the average rating figures for this tournament comprised only 38 per cent of the equivalent figures for the 2010 tournament when the Netherlands reached the final.

Additionally, when teams are eliminated, this will also influence the commercial value of the remaining part of the tournament. Commercial broadcasters will always consider the rating figures at World Cup matches against the audience they can attract from other programmes. The rights fees they have paid will be considered as sunk costs. Therefore, a media company which runs several TV channels may decide to put some matches on channels with reduced penetration in circumstances when the interest in the tournament is reduced due to the exit of the national team.

The alternative programmes, and the rating figures they generate, represent the opportunity cost of showing matches from the World Cup. If the World Cup becomes less popular, because the national team are sent home, then it takes less to make alternative programmes more profitable. World Cup matches not only compete with other sports events, but also with other genres of TV programmes.

Moreover, TV viewing always fluctuates during the day. Since the World Cup moves between different continents, the matches will always take place in time zones that are unfavourable for some broadcasters.

When live matches take place at unfavourable points of time, the rating figures will be more vulnerable than during peak time, which usually is in the period between 18.00 and 24.00.

The 2002 World Cup (Japan/Korea) was the first time in France that a single broadcaster, in this case TF1, had a monopoly over such an important event. As winner of the 1998 World Cup and Euro 2000, France was expected to do well in the tournament. However, the expectations were not satisfied and France was eliminated after the first round. Lack of sporting success and unfavourable time zones meant that TF1 lost €20–30 million from broadcasting the tournament (Desbordes, 2006).

TF1 also suffered a deficit (€20 million) on the 2006 World Cup, which was acquired together with the 2002 tournament, despite the fact that France reached the final on this occasion (TV Sports Markets, 2014, p. 11). Indeed, the Italian broadcaster, RAI, considered suing FIFA since TV pictures revealed that Italy was wrongly eliminated from the 2002 World Cup finals due to a mistake by one of the assistant referees.¹⁰ Similar consequences have been documented in connection to other football tournaments involving national teams (Desbordes, 2006; Solberg, 2006).

As a consequence of these incidents, some broadcasters have resold part of the tournaments to other broadcasters. One such example is the French broadcaster, TF1, who sublicensed part of the World Cup tournaments to pay-TV channels as a way of reducing their risk (TV Sports Markets, 2014, p. 14).

Regulations on sport broadcasting

Throughout the 1990s, the growth of pay-TV channels and their acquisitions of football TV rights raised concerns regarding the general public's ability to watch popular sport. European politicians were alarmed in 1996 when News Corporation almost won the Olympic broadcasting rights from the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). Their fear received more fuel when FIFA, the same year, sold the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cup to the German Kirch corporation and the Swiss ISL marketing agency, instead of to the EBU as they had done in the past. Pay-TV broadcasters will base their activity on programmes that a sufficient number of viewers are willing to pay for to watch. These are not necessarily mass audiences. Originally, club tournaments have been the main priority of pay-TV broadcasters, but in recent years they have invested in other events, including matches in the FIFA World Cup.

Where market forces move such events away from free-to-air channels to pay-TV channels this reduces the amount of goods that belong to the

public domain. This represents a cost for society, since welfare is reduced. A consequence of this development is that governments have drawn up regulations that define some sports programmes as a part of the *public domain*. Late in the 1990s *Listed Events regulations* were established in several European countries. The UK was first to pass such legislation, and later the idea was adopted by the European Commission in its 'Television without Frontiers' directive. The principle in the directive is that each member state can draw up a list of events, national or non-national, that it considers being of major importance for the society. The rights to broadcast these events can only be acquired by broadcasters with a minimum set level penetration in the respective nations to allow free access to the maximum number of viewers. Australia has also implemented a similar regulation, *The Anti-Siphoning List*,¹¹ which also includes the FIFA World Cup finals.

Most of the lists include the matches of the respective nations, the finals and in some cases also the semi-finals, quarter-finals and opening matches of tournaments. The UK and Belgium are exceptions to this and have included the entire tournaments.

The welfare economic rationale behind such lists relates to the ability of the broadcasting of such events to create *externalities* and *merit goods*. Externalities are usually referred to as the result of an activity that creates incidental benefits or costs to others with no corresponding compensation provided or paid by those who generate the externality. The costs or benefits are not included in the supply price or the demand price and hence also not in the market price.

Sport broadcasting can generate both direct and indirect externalities. For example, if people are motivated to exercise, this will benefit the whole society if it improves peoples' health conditions, and hence reduces absenteeism from work. In turn, this will increase overall productivity in society and hence make more goods and services available. Boardman and Hargreaves-Heap (1999) identify a different sort of externality, namely that the broadcasting of popular events might stimulate conversation, so that people have a broader platform for initiating conversations with strangers.

Another example is enhanced pride and self-esteem that people enjoy when national competitors have success in international competitions. Common enjoyment of international success in sporting events might strengthen people's feelings of national identity. Such achievements can create a festival atmosphere and a state of celebration, which is a well-known phenomenon across the world. According to anecdotal evidence,

more than one million people lined the route for the celebrations when the Spanish team returned home to Madrid after winning the 2010 World Cup. However, such celebrations are not restricted to the winning teams. When Jamaica qualified for the World Cup finals in France in 1998, the government declared the following day a national day of celebration, and most employees were given a day off from work.

The celebration of successes in international championships is another example of an externality. People in general will regard it as inherently of value to be able to share the pleasure of victory with someone else. Indeed, the 'common sharing' element is usually a core part of the atmosphere of such celebrations. Having a party completely alone is not much fun. National celebration requires that a large number of people will follow the event on TV. Its possibility will be reduced if only a minority of people are able to watch the channels that broadcast a sporting triumph. Furthermore, a state of national celebration also requires that the sport and the event really enjoy a widespread recognition by the general public. Hence, guaranteeing that everybody has access to TV programmes from the event is a prerequisite for such effects to occur. Such impacts also have a momentum dimension. The fact that people enjoy the experience at the same time, for example watching it live on TV, over a concentrated period of time, will strengthen the impacts compared to if people can only read about it in newspapers the day after.

The concept of *merit goods* was first introduced by Musgrave (1958) and has since been developed and interpreted by Head (1974), who defined them as 'goods that individuals would choose to consume too little of due to imperfect knowledge'. Merit goods could be deemed desirable because some individuals have imperfect knowledge and information of the consequences of their actions on their welfare. Pozner (1972) extends Head's definition and also includes 'unaccounted-for externalities' as another feature of merit goods. According to Pozner, the main rationale for providing merit goods could arise because some individuals have imperfect knowledge of and information about the consequences of either of two alternatives:

- a person's actions on his or her welfare
- actions taken by other individuals on his or her own welfare: that is, unaccounted-for externalities.

Since merit goods are beneficial for the entire society, there is also a welfare economic rationale for governments to intervene in the market

and correct a situation so that the consumption and production of merit goods is encouraged. The assumption behind providing such an intervention is that the individual cannot be left alone to judge what is 'good' or 'bad' for him or her. This is based on a paternalistic philosophy, namely that governments know better than the consumer themselves what is best for them. Traditional examples of merit goods include cultural goods such as public sculptures and subsidized opera concerts.

Although associations between physical activity and health are well established, many of us do not take them (sufficiently) into consideration when we decide how much to exercise. This can be due to lack of knowledge about the positive impacts. This creates a rationale for governmental intervention, for instance by subsidizing sporting activities and promoting participation in sports.

Such objectives can also be achieved by sport broadcasting, for example if the broadcasting of sporting events can stimulate people to exercise. There is also a potential learning effect, which can motivate children to take up sport. This creates a rationale for market intervention in broadcasting, firstly, by ensuring that events are broadcast on TV, and secondly, that they are broadcast on channels with the highest possible penetration. As mentioned before, more people may be stimulated or inspired than if the World Cup was only broadcast on pay-TV channels that perhaps only a quarter of the population can watch.

These kinds of externalities and merit goods also fall into the category of *public goods*. It is impossible to exclude someone from feeling pride and enjoying the success of national participants in international competitions. Moreover, the fact that one person is feeling pride does not reduce the possibility of others from enjoying the same (that is the benefit is non-rival).

The migration of popular sporting events to pay-TV channels represents a disadvantage for those who cannot afford to subscribe to these channels. Thus, a concern with equity also provides a reason for government intervention. However, the equity argument is insufficient as a single argument for governmental intervention, since unequal income distribution influences people's ability to purchase all sorts of goods. Important sport programmes should therefore, according to this view, be provided for people who cannot afford to subscribe to channels with restricted penetration.

It would be difficult or impossible, without any market regulation, to achieve the optimal production level of sport programmes that generate externalities and merit goods. Profit-maximizing advertising channels

will always prioritize sports and events that attract interest from the mass audience, and ignore more minority activities. Pay-TV channels will base their activity on programmes that a sufficient number of viewers are willing to pay for watching. Hence, commercial channels of all kinds always have a tendency to militate against the impacts discussed above that relate to merit goods, externalities and public goods.

The comprehensiveness of the Australian Anti-Siphoning list leaves the impression that its major concerns were about the prioritizing of mass entertainment and about the inefficiencies or inequities of charging for public goods. This is underpinned by the following statement of the Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts:

For many Australians, knowing that they can switch on their free-to-air television and watch a football grand final or a Test match is as important as having free access to Australian-made drama or a daily news bulletin.

Hence, preventing efficiency losses that occur from the charging for public goods seems to be a major rationale behind the Australian regulation. This is different from the European Television without Frontiers directive where the guidelines concentrate more on market failures related to externalities and merit goods, and not the efficiency loss from charging for public goods. The legitimizing of the Austrian list uses the phrase: 'event that is an expression of Austria's cultural, artistic or social identity'. Likewise, the Italian list uses the phrase: 'events that have a particular cultural significance and strengthen the Italian cultural identity'. Neither the Listed Events lists nor the Anti-Siphoning List indicates concerns about improving the health conditions of citizens. However, even if such aspects have not been explicitly mentioned in the regulations, they nevertheless represent a rationale for implementing them.

Sport governing bodies, however, have not been happy with these regulations, which reduce their freedom to exploit the commercial value of their product. The ability to effectively orchestrate bidding wars is also reduced since pay-TV channels are prohibited from entering the auctions. Therefore, FIFA and UEFA jointly challenged the European Commission's decision to approve the listed events policies of the UK and Belgian governments, since these regulations involve all matches from tournaments. The governing bodies argued that group stage matches not involving the member state's national teams could not be considered to be of national

importance. The General Court, however, dismissed the challenge and endorsed the European Commission's ruling that the list of protected events complied with the EU Television without Frontiers directive. As a consequence, all matches at World Cups and European Championships will remain on free-to-air television, assuming the respective nations decide to list them (TV Sports Markets, 15:4).

Indeed, this conflict relates to the question of whether such events should be considered to belong to the public domain. As a rule of thumb, the higher degree of public domain character, the lower the commercial value of the ownership. Contrary to this, however, a regime of strict legal protection of the broadcasting rights owners' freedom to sell to any bidder improves the owner's ability to make profit from any product, for example in an auction. This goes a long way to explaining the resistance towards the Listed Events regulations from sport governing bodies.

Conclusions

FIFA's World Cup tournament has become one of the largest televised sports events on the planet. Because of the large global audiences, global corporations have been keen to be sponsors of the tournament. Hence, the broadcasting of the tournaments has not only generated income for FIFA from the sale of the broadcasting rights but also from corporate sponsorship. Therefore, FIFA is now a very rich organization earning a large income from both the sale of television rights and corporate sponsorship of the World Cup. The main reason for this is their success in orchestrating bidding wars between the broadcasters of the tournaments.

As an illustration, FIFA earned a profit of \$2.35 billion from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This exceeded the costs of all the venues that were used during the tournament, which amounted to \$2.07 billion (Audit & Molloy, 2013).

However, FIFA is classified as a non-profit organization in Switzerland, which allows it tax-free status. In economic terms, this is highly unusual situation. FIFA is a monopoly supplier of a product, the World Cup. Demand for it globally has grown exponentially over the last twenty to thirty years, as has income from the tournament. Yet FIFA remains classified as a non-profit organization.

The listed events legislation, however, particularly in the European Union where it is backed up by an EU directive, provides one of the few opportunities for governments to have some control over FIFA.

Notes

1. See www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/ffprojects/ip-401_05a_tvstats_2659.pdf
2. Figures from KantarSport (2010)
3. Exchange rate 01.07.2002: CHF1 = US\$0,6749
4. EBU represents 65 member broadcasting organizations in 49 countries, mainly across Europe, but also in the Middle East and North Africa.
5. Exchange rate 01.07.2002: CHF1 = US\$0,6749
6. Exchange rate from FIFA Financial Report 2006: CHF1 = US\$0,784
7. 1999–2006 = USA, 2007–2010 = North-America
8. Source: FIFA Financial Report 2010
9. http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/implementation/events_list/index_en.htm
10. <http://media.guardian.co.uk/worldcup/story/0,11974,741487,00.html>
11. See www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Broadcast/Television/TV-content-regulation/sport-anti-siphoning-tv-content-regulation-acma

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5

Ambush Marketing and the Football World Cup

Simon Chadwick, Ran Liu and Des Thwaites

Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid growth in commercial sponsorship, accompanied by an increasing prevalence of ambush marketing activities. Worldwide sponsorship spending was US\$53.1 billion in 2013, compared with US\$5.6 billion in 1987. It was projected to be US\$55.3 billion in 2014 with a forecast growth rate of 4.1 per cent (IEG, 2014). Sponsorship, as one of the key marketing communication tools, is widely used by companies to increase brand awareness, improve brand image, reach large numbers of global consumers, generate goodwill and build community relations. Sport is the major category of sponsorship spending, accounting for approximately 70 per cent of global spending. International sporting events, like the Football World Cup and Olympic Games, provide fertile ground for marketing campaigns to achieve worldwide recognition due to the high profile of these events.

However, large sponsorship fees and category exclusive rights significantly limit the number of companies that can be officially involved in official sponsorship activity. As a result, many companies may choose an alternative way to exploit the goodwill associated with events. Ambush marketing occurs when companies who are not official sponsors try to affiliate themselves with an event in order to gain the benefits of being official sponsors. It has the capacity to create consumer confusion regarding who is the official sponsor and therefore weaken a rival's sponsorship (Shani & Sandler, 1998; Tripodi & Sutherland, 2000). Major sporting events are highly reliant on funding from sponsors because of the enormous cost of staging such events. These events cannot be held without the support of their sponsors. For example, sponsorship revenue for the Brazil 2014 FIFA World Cup is estimated to be \$1.4 billion,

according to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) (Penteado, 2013). Any unauthorized association or misuse of official marks will undermine the event integrity and its financial viability. Therefore, ambush marketing has drawn great attention from sports organizers, rights holders and official sponsors due to its distinct threat to sponsorship value. As such, rights holders are understandably anxious to protect their sponsors and make every effort to combat ambush marketing activities.

Evolution of ambush marketing

Ambush marketing first emerged in the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games as a result of the significant changes in sponsorship structure. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) developed different levels of sponsorship providing exclusive rights within each level in order to increase the value of sponsorship in return for higher sponsorship fees (Shani & Sandler, 1998). Since then, the number of companies who can officially connect with the event has been greatly reduced because only one company in each category within each level can be the official sponsor. In turn, this has encouraged some companies to seek alternative ways of associating with major events. The first ambushing attempt occurred in 1984 when Kodak sponsored the USA Track and Field team and television broadcasts in the Los Angeles Olympic Games in order to ambush Fuji's official sponsorship. The ambushing strategies of sponsoring sub-categories and event media broadcasts then became extensively used during the early stages of ambush marketing. For example, Fuji sponsored the US swimming team in the Seoul 1988 Olympics to exact revenge on Kodak. During the 1990 FIFA World Cup, Pepsi sponsored the Brazilian football team to ambush Coca-Cola's worldwide sponsorship. In the 1992 Olympics, while Adidas was the official clothing sponsor, Nike sponsored Michael Jordan and the US basketball team. Jordan draped the American flag over his shoulder during his medal ceremony, thereby covering the Adidas logo. Again, Nike sponsored a number of teams who participated in the 1998 FIFA World Cup to attack Adidas's official sponsorship.

There is no consensus with regard to the definition of ambush marketing, possibly because of different attitudes to it. In some cases, it is seen as an illegal, unauthorized and immoral practice while in other cases it is regarded as legal, imaginative and an associative marketing activity. Sandler & Shani (1989) firstly defined ambush marketing as a planned effort by companies to associate themselves with an event in order to gain benefits of being an official sponsor. Then Meenaghan (1994)

proposed that ambush marketing comprises marketing efforts by competitors trying to intrude upon public attention surrounding the event so as to deflect attention toward themselves and away from the sponsor. In addition, McKelvey (1994) suggested that ambush marketing aims to confuse the public as to who is the official sponsor. According to Payne (1998), ambush marketing occurs when marketing activities suggest or imply a connection with an event that may not actually exist. For example, although Emirates Airlines was the Official Airline of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, South African airline Kulula launched a campaign around the event to offer free flights to anyone named Sepp Blatter (the FIFA president). Then a Boston Terrier dog, Sepp Blatter, appeared and took up Kulula's offer and the company launched an advertisement stating 'It's official. Sepp Blatter flies with us', which explicitly suggested an association with the event. Another notable example is German airline Lufthansa which painted a soccer ball on many of its aircraft and featured advertisements with German and Brazilian players along with a swoosh logo 'LH2006' to coincide with the 2006 FIFA World Cup, despite Emirates' official sponsorship. All of the early ambush definitions, although different, identify various objectives for ambush marketing activities:

- To reach a wide audience at lower cost and increase brand awareness (Shani & Sandler, 1998);
- To create goodwill through event association (O'Sullivan & Murphy, 1998; Brewer, 1993);
- To get maximum returns on marketing efforts;
- To attack and weaken official sponsors by stealing public attention (Bruhn & Ahlers, 2004; Shani & Sandler, 1998; Payne, 1998);
- To increase market clutter and exploit consumers' confusion (Brewer, 1993; Ettorre, 1993).

Ambush marketing, according to some scholars (for example, Payne, 1998; Sandler & Shani, 1989), involves an unauthorized association with an event or property. It represents marketing attempts by companies to reap benefits available to official sponsors without paying any sponsorship fees. In that case, subcategory sponsorship and media sponsorship are not ambushing practices based on their definitions as they involve an authorized association. However, they may still weaken the effectiveness of the official sponsor and create confusion in the consumer's mind as to who the official sponsor is. Therefore, some scholars still incorporate them within the definition of ambush marketing.

During the early years of ambush marketing, most cases involved directly attacking major competitors and undermining their sponsorship value. More recently, ambushing practice has evolved to broad associative marketing in order to capitalize on goodwill, media attention and the market value surrounding an event. Ambushing also has, in some situations, been transformed from an illegal practice, such as copyright or trademark infringement, to an acceptable and imaginative marketing strategy. Thereby, a new broader definition of ambush marketing was brought forward by Chadwick & Burton (2011, p. 714) based on contemporary ambushing practices:

Ambush marketing is a form of associative marketing which is designed by an organization to capitalize on the awareness, attention, goodwill, and other benefits, generated by having an association with an event or property, without the organization having an official or direct connection to that event or property.

This definition includes any forms of associative marketing activities aimed at intentionally or inadvertently capitalizing on benefits of an event through creating a false, or unauthorized or overstated, association with the event. Contemporary ambush marketing is perceived as an opportunity parallel to sponsorship. The boom of Internet technology and the prevalence of social media networks provide considerable opportunities for marketers to develop more creative and innovative ambushing strategies. The increasing popularity of smartphones, PCs, laptops and tablets enables Internet users to share, forward, like and tweet things easily, and an ambush marketing activity can go viral with just a single touch. Nike has been successful in creating effective viral adverts to promote its brand. During the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Nike produced a three-minute video 'Write the Future' campaign featuring famous football stars such as Wayne Rooney and Cristiano Ronaldo playing in the stadium. As a result, nearly one-third of the online buzz around the World Cup in the month of the tournament was related to Nike, which was twice as high as that for the official sponsor, Adidas. Then Nike took over the tallest building in Johannesburg for an interactive LED light show as part of its 'Write the Future' campaign aiming at connecting fans to players. 'Write the Headline' allowed fans around the world to send a short inspirational message through social networks including Facebook, Twitter, MXit and QQ, and choose their favourite football player for the LED screen to display.

Ambush marketing strategies

The opportunities for ambush marketing arise for the following reasons. Firstly, there are multiple entities involved in a sport event, including the event itself, sport organizers, individual countries or teams, athletes, media, audiences, team sponsors, main sponsors and non-sponsor companies. Ambush marketing can take place anywhere by linking to the event or event-related themes or parties. For example, a company may suggest a connection with the event by developing an advertising campaign featuring individual teams or athletes, by using the generic symbols or event themes, by announcing its media sponsorship to broadcast the event or even by intruding upon the audience's attention through creative and attractive marketing campaigns during the event period or around the event venue. Secondly, the media by which consumers watch the event has expanded remarkably due to the significant development of Internet technology. People can watch the event anywhere at any time on split screens through various channels (Crompton, 2012). Consequently, it is much easier for well-planned ambushing efforts to go viral and generate massive online buzz successfully at lower cost, despite legal restrictions and the increasingly tight control of ambush marketing by rights holders.

Researchers identify the ambush strategies that were commonly used during the last two decades. For example, Meenaghan (1994) points out five types of ambush marketing strategies which were popular during the early era of ambushing, namely, sponsorship of the broadcast of the event, sponsorship of subcategories within the event, purchasing advertising time around replays of the event, engaging in major non-sponsorship promotions to coincide with the event, and other creative ambushing strategies, like using photographs of Olympic-looking stadia and offering free trips to the event. However, many of these ambush strategies can no longer be used today due to the determination of event owners to take action against ambush marketing. For example, within the Commercial Restriction Area surrounding each FIFA World Cup stadium, any sales or advertising of non-sponsored products or services will be prohibited to prevent companies taking advantage of the event.

Generally speaking, widely practised ambushing strategies can be divided into two categories, namely, ambush by association and ambush by intrusion. Ambush by association refers to the unofficial use of an event's related symbol, logo, motto, themes, people, or a generic insignia which is similar to the event insignia in a company's marketing

activities to suggest or imply an association with the event. The main purpose of this form of ambushing is to create confusion in consumers' minds as to the official sponsor without committing obvious infringement. For example, use of athletes or teams participating in the event in a company's advertising campaign, or offer of an event ticket as a gift in promotional activities. Nike's latest ambushing attempt tried to circumvent the marketing regulations and legal restrictions of the London 2012 Olympics. The company's new advertising campaign 'Find Your Greatness' on YouTube featured ordinary athletes from places called London located all over the world (except in England) in order to suggest an association with the London Games.

Ambush by intrusion occurs when non-sponsors use event publicity to gain unauthorized brand exposure or attract significant public attention. In such instances, there may be no claim of association. This form of ambushing campaign normally takes place around the time the event takes place or in the vicinity of the event venue, and can include placing advertisements or running a promotional campaign around the stadium, launching creative promotions to attract media attention or attention of event audiences. For example, during the 2006 FIFA World Cup, while Budweiser was an official sponsor, Bavaria, a popular Dutch brewery, distributed lederhosen in the colour (orange) of the Netherlands national football team to fans attending the games. Then FIFA officials required fans to remove the lederhosen before entering the stadium, which attracted massive media attention because they watched the game in their underwear.

By analysing hundreds of ambush marketing cases, Chadwick & Burton (2011) provide an updated and comprehensive understanding of the nature and conceptualization of ambush marketing. A new typology of ambush marketing is brought forward based on different motives, objectives and measures adopted by ambushers. Ambush marketing strategies are classified into three categories, namely, direct ambushing, indirect ambushing and incidental ambushing. The three categories are further divided into 11 types of ambush strategy. The following types are taken directly from Chadwick & Burton (2011, pp. 715–717).

Direct ambushing

Direct ambush marketing occurs when a non-sponsor company directly uses protected intellectual property or directly associates with the event in order to mislead the public into thinking they are the official sponsors. This ambushing form often involves copyright infringement, or explicit and direct attack on official sponsorship. Direct ambushing was

prominent during the early years of ambush marketing. It comprises the following three types of ambushing strategy:

1. **Predatory ambushing:** the deliberate ambushing of a market competitor, intentionally and knowingly attacking a rival's official sponsorship in an effort to gain market share and to confuse consumers as to who is the official sponsor.
2. **Coat-tail ambushing:** the attempt by an organization to directly associate itself with a property for the purpose of ambushing through a legitimate link, such as the sponsoring of participating athletes or of a participating team or association without securing official event sponsor status.
3. **Property infringement ambushing:** the intentional use of protected intellectual property, including trademarked and copyrighted property such as logos, names, words and symbols, or knowingly infringing the rules and regulations of an event in a brand's marketing as a means of attachment to a particular property or event in the eyes of consumers.

Indirect ambushing

Indirect ambushing comprises marketing efforts by a company to link itself with an event through suggestions or indirect reference, for example, by use of the event-related symbols, themes and imagery that are not protected by intellectual property rights, or developing a parallel campaign or promotional activities to attract the public's attention. These are more subtle and less explicit ambushing efforts and do not necessarily breach rights, laws or regulations. As a result, in most of these cases it is difficult to provide evidence of ambushing when seeking legal action. Many contemporary ambush cases focus on the indirect association and overall capitalization of the value of the event. This category includes the following six types of ambush marketing.

1. **Sponsor self-ambushing:** marketing communications activities by an official sponsor above and beyond what has been agreed to in the sponsorship contract, effectively ambushing the property they support and infringing upon other official sponsors.
2. **Associative ambushing:** the use of imagery or terminology to create an illusion that an organization has links to a sporting event or property, without making any specific references or implying an official association with the property.

3. Distractive ambushing: the creation of a presence or disruption at or around an event in order to promote a brand, without specific reference to the event itself and its imagery or themes in order to intrude upon public consciousness and gain awareness from the event's audience.
4. Values ambushing: the use of an event's or property's central value or theme to imply an association in the mind of the consumer.
5. Insurgent ambushing: the use of surprise, aggressively promoted, one-off street-style promotions or giveaways at an event, in order to maximize awareness, while minimizing investment and distracting attention away from official sponsors and the event itself.
6. Parallel property ambushing: the creation of, or sponsorship of, a rival event or property to be run in parallel to the main ambush target, associating the brand with the sport or the industry at the time of the event, thus capitalizing on the main event's goodwill.

Incidental ambushing

Incidental ambushing allows a company to gain the benefits of being associated with the event without intentionally establishing a clear, explicit or intended connection. The presumed association can be suggested by previous event associations, heavy media spend and aggressive marketing campaigns around an event. It consists of the following two types of ambushing:

1. Unintentional ambushing: the incorrect consumer identification of a non-sponsoring company as an official sponsor, unknowingly or inexplicitly, based on a previous or expected association with an event.
2. Saturation ambushing: the strategic increase in the amount of marketing communications around the time of an event by a non-sponsor in order to maximize awareness of the brand during the event, aggressively marketing the brand around an event and maximizing the use of available advertising before, during, and after the broadcast.

This ambushing typology proposed by Chadwick & Burton (2011) not only provides a deep and comprehensive understanding of ambush marketing, but also illustrates the evolution of ambush marketing over time, with ambushers' motivations, objectives and measures clearly explained in each of the definitions. The comprehensive typology

also helps rights holders and sponsors to identify potential ambushing opportunities, so that they can develop a more proactive strategy to leverage their sponsorships and pre-emptively combat ambush marketing activities.

Counter-ambush strategies by FIFA

A large-scale event like the FIFA World Cup relies heavily on the support of its commercial affiliates due to the high cost of staging it. According to IEG (2010), the FIFA World Cup generated \$1.6 billion in sponsorship revenue during the 2007 to 2010 period. FIFA achieved its financial objectives by creating three tiers of sponsorship, namely, FIFA Partners, FIFA World Cup Sponsors and National Supporters. FIFA recently announced a change of sponsorship structure for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups wherein National Supporters will be replaced by Regional Supporters. This tier consists of a total of 20 brands from North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East/Africa and Asia. The changes may lead to considerable increases in sponsorship revenues. In this context ambush marketing has the potential to break the integrity of the FIFA World Cup, devalue official sponsorship and undermine the financial viability of the event. Therefore, it is crucial for FIFA rights holders to protect the exclusive rights of sponsorship. Counter-ambush strategies implemented by FIFA and outlined on their website include:

- **Legislation**

Legislation can be an effective way to prevent certain types of ambush marketing from happening. It also can effectively combat direct ambush marketing which makes an explicit and direct reference to the event. For the 2010 World Cup, the South African Parliament passed anti-ambush marketing legislation to restrict companies' ambushing attempts through inappropriate use of media exposure and publicity around the event. Under this legislation it can be a criminal offence to conduct ambush marketing. For example, in the 2010 World Cup, 36 women turned up at the Netherlands versus Denmark match wearing orange mini-dresses to promote Dutch beer company Bavaria, while the official sponsor is Budweiser. Bavaria Brewery was accused of ambush marketing that violated the Contravention of Merchandise Marks Act, a law passed in South Africa for the World Cup. The women were ejected from the stadium, and two of them were arrested and later released.

FIFA developed and protected a number of logos, words, titles, symbols, and other trademarks related to the 2014 FIFA World Cup, such as terms '2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil', 'Brazil 2014', 'Copa 2014', 'FIFA World Cup Trophy' and the official slogan 'All in one rhythm'. Specific legislation for the Brazil World Cup allows civil and criminal laws to punish the unauthorized use of FIFA trademarks.

- **Communication**

FIFA engages in extensive communication campaigns to increase public awareness regarding the Official Marks and the legal protections and restrictions in relation to commercial association with the FIFA World Cup. As such, unintentional ambushing due to ignorance can be avoided. In addition, once FIFA's brand protection team detect an infringement, they will personally communicate with the ambusher, explain the problem and try to bring the situation to an end without having to resort to legal action.

- **Surveillance**

FIFA's brand protection work aims at identifying intellectual property infringements of FIFA's rights. The specific actions include:

- To work with customs authorities worldwide to identify shipments of counterfeit goods.
- To protect the exclusivity of its brands and marketing assets through the monitoring of intellectual property registers on an international basis.
- The development of Commercial Restriction Areas (CRAs) which limit the marketing opportunities of non-sponsors that could arise from their physical presence at event venues and official sites.

However, for fair play purposes, FIFA allows businesses to take advantage of legitimate business opportunities by using generic reference to football, as FIFA recognizes that football is a worldwide passion and that it has no monopoly on football. However, despite the legal restrictions and increasingly tight controls by event owners, government and sponsors, ambushers are becoming smarter in finding unique and creative ways to associate their brands with an event without breaking the law. There will always be an opportunity for some degree of ambush to occur. Considering most of the contemporary ambushing cases are legitimate, and alleged ambushing often provides no basis for legal action, sponsors cannot rely on FIFA or government bodies to protect their sponsorship. Instead, they should work closely with FIFA to maximize the activation of their sponsorship, and use various promotional tools to effectively leverage and activate the sponsorship.

Effectiveness of ambush marketing

Ambush marketing is triggered either by external factors, such as high sponsorship fees and category exclusive rights, or by internal motives, such as intentions to increase brand awareness and sales and attack major rivals' sponsorship. Ambush marketing, if well-planned and implemented, can achieve impressive outcomes and even upstage competitors' performance derived from official sponsorship.

Many researchers have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of ambush marketing in terms of brand recall and recognition, brand perceptions, purchase intentions and online buzz. Burton & Chadwick (2008) suggest that the majority of ambush marketing efforts prove to be successful in creating consumer confusion and improving brand awareness. A study conducted by Ipsos (2008) during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games found that 63 per cent of consumers confused non-Olympic sponsors with the official sponsors. For example, 82 per cent of respondents regarded the Li Ning brand as an Olympic sponsor, because Li Ning, the founder of Li Ning sportswear company, played a prominent role in the lighting the Olympic Flame during the opening Ceremony. Adidas was the official sponsor in that category. According to Nielsen (2010), Nike achieved great success in linking the company to the 2010 FIFA World Cup by their creative ambush marketing efforts. The global campaign 'Write the Future' allowed Nike to enjoy the highest share of online World Cup buzz. In addition, Carlsberg achieved almost four times more online buzz than official sponsor Budweiser due to its star-studded World Cup advertisement promoting its sponsorship of the England football team. In addition, some scholars found that ambushers may be more effective than official sponsors in generating consumers' purchase intentions (for example, Brownlee et al., 2009; McDaniel & Kinney, 1996).

Consumers largely show apathy or indifference to the practice of ambush marketing (Lyberger & McCarthy, 2001; Shani & Sandler, 1998), express little concern about the ethical issues relating to ambush activity (O'Sullivan & Murphy, 1998; Meenaghan, 1998, Townley et al., 1998, Payne, 1998; Schmitz, 2005) and even perceive ambush marketing as a fair, clever and creative marketing activity. These views may result from a lack of knowledge regarding sponsorship and its role in event viability (Lyberger & McCarthy, 2001). Moreover, consumers' attitudes and reactions to ambush marketing may be determined by their levels of event involvement, prior attitude toward sponsor and ambusher brands, and their attitude toward sponsorship in general.

It is worth mentioning that any marketing outcomes result from a company's integrated and synthesized marketing efforts, which makes it difficult to accurately measure the effectiveness of a single marketing activity, such as a specific ambush marketing or sponsorship campaign. Some companies' ambushing practices prove to be more effective than others' possibly due to the companies' well-planned marketing effort to leverage and activate the campaign. Generally speaking, ambush marketing can succeed and even outperform official sponsorship under the following circumstances:

- Consumers' lack knowledge regarding sponsorship and this provides opportunities for ambushing companies to create confusion (Shani & Sandler, 1998).
- Official sponsors fail to adequately exploit their sponsorship rights through supporting promotions to leverage and activate their sponsorship.
- Media coverage of the event is sponsored by a company that is not the official sponsor of the event (Crimmins & Horn, 1996; Meenaghan, 1998).
- The sponsor's brand image doesn't match the event's image (Gwinner & Eaton, 1999), but there is congruence with the ambusher's brand and the event.
- The sponsor's brand is not a well-known brand and most consumers are not familiar with it (Pham & Johar, 2001).
- Consumers' prior attitude toward the ambushing company is favourable, and the levels of consumers' emotional attachment and their loyalty to the ambusher's brand are high.
- The ambushing company has a well known positive CSR record that can offset ambush negativity.

The ambush marketing debate

Since its emergence in the 1980s ambush marketing has created considerable debate with regard to its moral and legal dimensions. The conflicting views that exist may be caused by the different definitions of ambush marketing and the different kinds of marketing activities included within these definitions. Some popular strategies (like placing advertisements or launch promotions in and around the stadium) during the early era of ambush marketing can no longer be used because anti-ambushing legislation has been invoked in response to these specific ambushing practices. Furthermore, the debate reflects the

self-interest of the different parties. The question of whether ambush marketing is an immoral activity or a creative marketing practice has been argued among event owners, official sponsors and ambushers. Table 5.1 summarizes the key points from the different parties' perspectives.

Table 5.1 Perspectives on ambush marketing

Different Entities	Views on Ambush Marketing
Event owners' perspective	Ambush marketing is immoral and unethical as it: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • devalues official sponsorship • derives benefits from the event without payment • erodes the integrity of the event • threatens the financial viability of the event • breaches the fundamental principle of truth in advertising and business communications • puts the interests of the sport community at stake (such as global football)
Official sponsors' perspective	Ambush marketing is immoral and unethical as it: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • creates consumer confusion and misleads the public as to the official sponsors • devalues their sponsorship and undermines the return on large sponsorship investments • negatively influences future decisions on sponsorship • causes marketing clutter within communication outlets
Ambushing companies' perspective	Ambush marketing is a creative marketing practice and a legitimate alternative to sponsorship: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • major events offer a wide variety of promotional opportunities and all companies have the right to plan legitimate marketing activities around them • neither event owner nor official sponsor has a monopoly on football or sports, and anyone can show their support and enthusiasm for sports or events • it is defensive and competitive behaviour that leads to fair competition as the majority of the companies are excluded from official association • ambush marketing not only creates wealth for their stakeholders, but also promotes competition in the marketplace and drives price down for consumers

(continued)

Table 5.1 Continued

Different Entities	Views on Ambush Marketing
Consumers' perspective	<p data-bbox="359 240 862 293">There are conflicting views on ambush marketing practice from the consumers' perspective.</p> <ul data-bbox="376 302 939 1027" style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="376 302 939 391">• most consumers show indifference and apathy to ambush marketing practice (see, for example, Lyberger & McCarthy, 2001; Meenaghan, 1998) <li data-bbox="376 399 939 586">• ambush marketing negatively influences perceptions of integrity, affective response and purchase intentions among consumers who are highly involved with the event and hold a favourable attitude toward sponsorship (for example, Mazodier & Quester, 2010) <li data-bbox="376 594 939 773">• consumers' attitude toward ambush marketing also depends on their prior relationship with both the ambushers' and sponsors' brands, the perceived fit between ambusher image and event image, and consumers' perception of motives for ambushing practice <li data-bbox="376 781 939 902">• consumers may hold negative attitudes toward ambushing companies as they try to create confusion and mislead consumers to believe they are official sponsors <li data-bbox="376 911 939 1027">• other consumers may think ambush marketing is a healthy and imaginative practice that promotes competition and stimulates sponsors to better leverage their sponsorship

Implications and conclusions

Ambush marketing is innovative and creative in nature. The significant development of technologies and the boom of the Internet provide more opportunities for companies to engage in ambush marketing and at the same time present a greater challenge for event owners to protect their sponsorship from ambushing attack. Inevitably, ambush marketing will continuously be planned and practised in the future. Marketers can always find a way to circumvent the law to ambush, no matter how strict the legislation.

Anti-ambushing legislation has been invoked in response to previous ambushing practices. As a result, many of the original ambushing strategies that were prevalent cannot be used today because of legal restrictions. Event owners and official sponsors can resort to legal action if there is a clear trademark infringement and inappropriate use of event properties. However, most of the contemporary ambushing cases do not actually break the law and make no explicit references to the event. Therefore, it is difficult to provide direct evidence of actual harm caused by ambush marketing and enforce the legislation (Kelly et al., 2012). Moreover, legal action is not effective for most cases in reality due to variations in legislation between countries. Hence, sponsors cannot totally rely on legislation to protect themselves from ambush marketing attack.

Sponsors should adopt a proactive and comprehensive approach to sponsorship planning to maximize their sponsorship value. Proactive measures can effectively limit ambush opportunities by restricting a competitor's capability to gain media and public attention surrounding the event. Sponsors should leverage their affiliation more fully by packaging all the available advertising media surrounding the sponsorship, take advantage of the Internet to launch creative advertising campaigns so as to generate massive online buzz and utilize social media to promote their official relationship with the event. Thoughtful creative leveraging can greatly increase the effectiveness of sponsorship and minimize the damage of ambush marketing. In addition, sponsors can collaborate closely with event owners to activate their sponsorship and make the public aware of the significance of sponsorships. As such, it is less possible for ambushers to create confusion and mislead consumers.

It is important for ambushers or potential ambushers to know that although ambush marketing enables them to gain benefits associated with an event at much lower cost, it also can backfire and prove counter-productive. Ambush marketers should become familiar with the general legislation and that specific to the event, to make sure their marketing activities will not lead to legal action. Moreover, they need to identify their target consumers and understand how they perceive the event and the sponsorship and the strength of the existing relationship between the company and target consumers. Then, based on aspects of their company's performance (such as brand reputation), a comprehensive assessment can be made in terms of the risks and benefits of engaging in ambush marketing. It also helps the company to draw up the most appropriate ambushing plans.

Case Study 5.1: Lederhosen and Dresses as Bavaria Ambushes the FIFA World Cup

Early in 2006, Dutch beer brand Bavaria ran a sales promotion in Holland: buy 12 cans of beer and get a free pair of German lederhosen. In this smart campaign, the brand used images of football and Germans as the basis for selling more beer during the summer's FIFA World Cup (staged in Germany).

The lederhosen proved to be an instant hit with the Dutch, many of them sporting the garment at various fan zones around Germany in the run-up to the start of Holland's first game against Ivory Coast in Stuttgart.

It was very hot on the first Sunday in June 2006, when Dutch fans headed to the Gottlieb-Daimler-Stadion in Stuttgart. Many fans were proudly wearing their Bavaria-branded lederhosen, and some of them wore little else other than their underwear.

Rights protection officers acting on behalf of FIFA and the local organisers stopped these fans from entering the stadium in the lederhosen. After all, Bavaria had no legal right of association with the tournament, the game or the stadium. As such, all fans were asked to remove the garment, otherwise they would be prohibited from entering the venue.

Subsequently, the world's media revelled in the way in which the situation had been dealt with: outlets across the world ran reports about fans watching Holland versus Ivory Coast in their underwear ... and the name 'Bavaria' overwhelmed any mentions of Budweiser (the official beer supplier to the 2006 FIFA World Cup).

Whether intended or not, Bavaria had perpetrated an almost perfect ambush.

No doubt motivated by their success in 2006, Bavaria adopted a rather more strategic and predatory approach to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Launched at a fashion show and worn by Sylvie van der Vaart (at the time, wife of Dutch international Rafael), the orange 'Dutchy Dress' formed the basis for Bavaria's deliberate ambush.

Dressed as Danish football fans, 36 women entered the Soccer City stadium in Cape Town to watch Holland's opening game against Denmark. Part way through the game, the women began to take off their clothes, to reveal their Dutchy Dresses. The women were immediately excluded from the venue, although again the international media pounced upon what appeared to be a very humorous story – Bavaria was global news all over again.

The humour soon disappeared though, and the global media coverage intensified, when the women were detained by South African police. Under a somewhat obscure South African law, ambushing in the country was illegal. So began a protracted episode that resulted in Bavaria enhancing its already satisfactory return on its ambushing investment.

Media attention immediately focused on the detained women (who turned out to be hired models), which intensified as both FIFA and the South African authorities pursued prosecution of the ringleaders.

Concerned about the PR fallout of the case, official beer brand Budweiser issued a public statement to distance itself from what many increasingly saw as draconian action by FIFA.

The South African authorities eventually released 34 of the women, but two were held and were set to be charged and tried when the Dutch government intervened in the matter. Eventually, a deal between the respective governments, FIFA and Bavaria was brokered and the final two women were released.

The deal involved Bavaria agreeing not to ambush future World Cups in return for the release of the women. By the time the deal was announced, though, the world was talking about Bavaria yet few were talking about Budweiser. Ambush accomplished.

Case Study 5.2: Danish Centre-Forward Bendtner Reveals His Lucky Pants

As Danish striker Niklas Bendtner turned away to celebrate the goal he had just scored in a UEFA European Championship game against Portugal in 2012, he lowered his shorts and lifted his shirt to reveal a pair of green underpants. Such behaviour is not necessarily that unusual (though it would usually gain a yellow card) and is something one might normally expect from a player who has just scored for his national team in a major tournament.

This was different to other cases though: Bendtner's pants carried the name of an online betting company – PaddyPower. Bendtner claimed they were his lucky pants, even though he had never revealed them when he had scored any of his previous 64 professional career goals.

When Bendtner was fined £80,000 by UEFA for revealing his underwear, it was perhaps no surprise that a company stepped-in to pay his fine. That company was ... PaddyPower, a company that had no legal right of association with Europe's premier national team football tournament.

A deliberate ambush had been perpetrated by PaddyPower, Niklas Bendtner had played his part in executing the heist, and millions of

people worldwide began talking about the ‘player’s lucky green pants’... and, of course, the name of the company in question: worldwide exposure for the brand at a fraction of the cost of an official sponsorship deal.

Bendtner himself incurred further wrath because, while he was complicit in PaddyPower’s ambushing of the UEFA tournament, he also effectively ambushed his own national football association. The Danish FA at the time was sponsored by rival gambling company Ladbrokes.

Reports suggest the Danish FA reprimanded Bendtner and instructed him never to wear the offending pants again.

Further reading: www.theguardian.com/football/2012/jun/14/euro-2012-nicklas-bendtner-underwear

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6

The Challenge of Utilizing World Cup Venues

Holger Preuss, Harry Arne Solberg and Jens Alm

Introduction

The body of literature analysing the impacts of mega-sport events has grown considerably over recent years. The majority of academic studies have concluded that the tangible revenues generated in the host region tend to be quite moderate compared to the investments (Baade & Matheson, 2002, 2004; Billings & Holladay, 2012; Du Plessis & Manning, 2010; Feddersen & Maennig, 2013; Porter, 1999; Spilling, 1998; Solberg & Preuss, 2007; Teigland, 1999; Tien et al., 2011; Zimbalist, 2011). Although event revenues can be substantial, a large proportion of them are usually transferred back to the governing organizations (such as FIFA): in particular when it comes to FIFA which generated US\$2.35 billion¹ from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This exceeded the costs of all venues, amounting to \$2.07 billion (Audit & Molloy, 2013).

While the literature mainly has focused on revenues, recently the cost side has also received more attention. Flyvbjerg & Stewart (2012) showed that the Olympics from 1968 to 2008 had average cost overruns of 179 per cent in fixed prices and 324 per cent in nominal prices. Andreff (2012) has argued that the auction processes, where the International Olympic Committee (IOC) orchestrates fierce bidding competitions between candidate Olympic cities is the main reason why many previous hosts have suffered the 'winner's curse'. Their Games have finally become significantly more costly than planned. Audit & Molloy (2013) documented massive cost overruns on the stadia that were used for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This corresponds with similar anecdotal evidence, for example, the 2012 London Olympic Games and 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. However, often general infrastructure development

(around the stadium) is included in this bill. This sometimes makes it complicated to identify the direct event-related costs.

Accordingly, this chapter follows up this line of research and will analyse the efficiency of all venues that were constructed or significantly rebuilt for the past three FIFA World Cups in Korea/Japan (2002), Germany (2006) and South Africa (2010). Furthermore, we will address two mutually connected issues. First, we examine to what extent the capacities of the venues correspond with the spectator demand that local tenants attract. Therefore the Stadium Utilisation Index (SUI) was developed. Second, we will explain which factors influence the utilization in general and more specifically those that drive up the construction of higher-seat-capacity World Cup stadia.

The utilization of World Cup venues

The FIFA World Cup is a mega-event that requires substantial investments in both venues and infrastructure. The venue costs of the past three World Cups and the corresponding budget for Brazil 2014 are immense (see Table 6.1). Since the World Cup is only a flash in history that lasts only around one month, it is important to analyse the legacy of these investments. Sport venues fulfil purposes which can be categorized in four dimensions (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 reminds that each decision to invest in a World Cup stadium can have manifold aspects. Our perspective is limited, and focuses only on the seating capacity and utilization rates (see the top two rings on the left side). In some cases, the venues serve other purposes than being a sport stadium. Some of them are iconic buildings, which in turn illustrate and export excellence. Additionally they can be considered as catalysts that can stimulate future, additional impacts.

Table 6.1 Stadia costs and the Football World Cup

	Number of venues/ new venues	Total construction costs (in US\$million)	Average cost per seat (in US\$)
2002 Korea/Japan	20/19	4,627	5,070
2006 Germany	12/0	1,986	3,442
2010 South Africa	10/5	1,794	5,299
2014 Brazil	12/10	3,605	5,514

Sources: Alm (2012); FIFA.com; Connay (2013); Kurscheidt (2009); Audit & Molloy (2013).




Figure 6.1 Potential benefits of World Cup stadia

This, however, is not further considered, even though the expectations of such impacts often are important reasons for why they are built. From a cost-benefit perspective, the capacity utilization reflects to what degree the post-event demand corresponds to the supply. If local tenants cannot afford to rent the venues at prices that cover variable and fixed costs, subsidies are necessary to prevent them from being closed down. In this way, the utilization of the venues is a matter of efficiency.

Two scenarios can create inefficiency. One is a stadium that only hosts few events. The other is that a stadium that hosts many events but only attracts smaller audiences. While the latter example calls for a construction with lower seating capacity by using temporary extensions to meet World Cup requirements, the first scenario is more complex. A city needs a large stadium to be able to attract certain events (such as big concerts or international football matches) that can create valuable signalling effects.

The demand for World Cup tickets is usually much higher than the available supply. FIFA requires one stadium of the capacity of 80,000 for both the opening game and the final. A stadium capacity of 60,000 is required to host a semi-final and 40,000 for the other matches (FIFA 2022 Hosting Agreement, 2012, p. 60). Additionally, FIFA seeks venues to be scattered around the host nation to promote the sport. The applicants for the World Cups for 2018 and 2022 were asked to present at least 16 sites on which 12 stadia could be located (FIFA 2022 Hosting Agreement, 2012, p. 53). Historically the number of stadia has been 10 to 12, with the exception of the World Cup 2002 in Korea/Japan where 20 stadia were offered for political reasons.

Such requirements may correspond with the needs of clubs in heavily populated cities/nations where football is popular. However, smaller football nations where clubs only attract a fraction of World Cup audiences may have a problem utilizing these World Cup venues.

In big football nations (for example, Germany, Italy and France), most of the stadia have been effectively used post-World Cup. The USA were also able to use the 1994 venues for other sports that draw large audiences. However, even in the large football nations, some clubs will find it difficult to fill stadia with World Cup capacities. For example, the clubs in Rio de Janeiro may fill up the Maracanã stadium, while smaller Brazilian cities (such as Manaus) may find this more difficult (Connay, 2013).

Theoretical considerations on newly constructed stadia

From a theoretical perspective, the required number of World Cup stadia and their capacities often does not fit with the long-term development of a host city and the need for future events and tenant teams.

Table 6.2 Average attendance at football matches

	World Cup matches	Elite league World Cup season	Elite league 2012/13 season
1990 Italy	48,388	33,492	23,300
1994 USA	68,991	n.a.	18,606
1998 France	43,517	19,765	19,207
2002 Japan	42,268	16,368	17,534
2002 Korea	42,268	14,600	7,523
2006 Germany	52,491	39,957	42,622
2010 South Africa	49,669	3,829	6,722
2014 Brazil	–	–	13,465
2018 Russia	–	–	12,988
2022 Qatar	–	–	5,073

Sources: www.worldfootball.net/; <http://www.j-league.or.jp/eng/data/2011/01-03.pdf>; www.fifa.com/worldfootball/statisticsandrecords/tournaments/worldcup/organisation/; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011%E2%80%9312_Premier_Soccer_League; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_attendance_figures_at_domestic_professional_sports_leagues All retrieved 20 October 2013.

The left side arrow (Figure 6.2 a)) illustrates the planned future sport development of a city. Irrespective of the World Cup, the city would develop in this way. The arrow becomes slimmer the further the planning looks to the future. Despite an existing number of stadia and respective capacities, an upcoming FIFA World Cup stimulates the construction of additional stadia. These require a huge seat capacity, as stipulated in the Hosting Agreement. The stadium infrastructure needed is illustrated in Figures 6.2 a) and 6.2 b) by the block ('requirements for the event') which is moving in from the right side. This required stadium capacity fits only partly in the planned future development of the host city (Figure 6.2 b) and Figure 6.2 c), Field C). The required World Cup structure can be very different from long-term development plans (so Field C can be larger or smaller). For example, Germany 2006 only extended and renovated existing stadia, while South Africa 2010 constructed new stadia without plans for a legacy. Four ideas can be distinguished regarding the stadium development of the host cities (Figure 6.2 c)):

Field A) represents the non-World Cup-related sport infrastructure development of the host cities and may be affected by investing only in huge football stadia. If that takes away money from the general sport infrastructure development, it creates a negative event legacy.




Figure 6.2 Event-related stadium and capacity planning of a city
 Source: Adapted from Preuss & Solberg (2013).

- Field B) illustrates the stadia constructed and renovated for the World Cup that would have been done anyway, without a World Cup. However the event often develops stadia faster (acceleration effect); politicians reach easier consensus to budget public money into the stadium (political effect); and some parts may be financed by external resources (financial effect).
- Field C) represents those stadia or increased seat capacities that are only needed for the World Cup and not in a long-term perspective. Therefore efficiency considerations are required. If we do not take the other venue benefits (Figure 6.1) into account, the stadium/capacity of Field C should be temporary or, alternatively, existing stadia could be temporarily upgraded. Another alternative may be for FIFA to reduce the required stadia to nine, which is the minimum required for a 32-team tournament. That would decrease the size of Field C.
- Field D) is of minor importance here. It just shows that by analysis of the cities' fit for a World Cup, grievances, shortcomings and deficiencies of the city regarding future needs of stadia and their capacity may become apparent, which can be then embedded in the new development strategy.

Stadium Utilization Index (SUI)

To investigate the utilization of World Cup stadia we developed a 'Stadium Utilization Index' (SUI). The data used for this are sourced from the 'World Stadium Index' (WSI) and Internet research. The WSI (conducted by the Danish Institute for Sports Studies/Play the Game) aims to add to understanding of the sporting legacy and financial sustainability of stadia built/renovated for sport events. Seventy-five venues in 20 countries were analysed using the number of spectators per season/year as the main variable (Alm, 2012). It was important to only collect data on attendances at events after the World Cup.

The data were collected via questionnaire to verify information from desk research. Only 18.6 per cent of those approached responded, which limits the value of the data (see Alm [2012] for a detailed overview of the methodology). Unfortunately, some of the data do not include utilization from non-sport events. Therefore, our indices will conservatively underestimate the utilization. Table 6.6, which has been supplemented with data from Audit & Molloy (2013), only includes football matches in the South African Professional Soccer League (PSL). However, in this

chapter we just want to give an indication of the utilization of stadia based on the best available data. The three case studies presented below show some interesting patterns.

The SUI expresses the aggregated annual demand divided by the capacity:

$$SUI = \frac{\text{number of events} * \text{average attendance}}{\text{capacity}}$$

To illustrate how the index works: imagine that football stadium with a capacity of 50,000 seats hosts 20 events per year. If all seats are sold, the SUI is 20. An average of 25,000 attendees would give an index of 10. If the stadium only hosts three matches per year, and all are sold out, this would give an impressive average of 50,000. Nevertheless, the SUI would only be 3, which indicates an inefficient utilization. The higher the index, the better the venue is utilized.

Case Study 1: 2002 World Cup Korea/Japan

Looking at the SUI for the stadia in Japan, the Sapporo Dome turned out to be the most efficient venue. Indeed, the correct SUI is even higher due to the lack of non-sport events included in the data. It is a multifunction arena and has hosted events such as sprint ski races (2007 FIS Nordic World Ski Championship) and special stages of the Rally Japan 2008 and 2010. In 2010 it hosted 118 events and is the home of two local league teams. The Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters (baseball) played 72 games and Consadole Sapporo (football) used the Dome for 11 games in the J-League. Both teams attracted a cumulative audience of over two million people in 2010 (Alm, 2012).

In Japan, Ooita Bank Dome, Saitama Stadium, Tohodu Denryouku Big Swan Stadium and Kashima Soccer Stadium all had an SUI above 10. However, the figures indicate that the seating capacity could have been significantly lower.

Miyagi Stadium is at the bottom of the Japanese SUI. With a capacity of 49,133 and construction costs of almost \$320 million, it hosted two group matches and one match in the round of the last 16 during the World Cup of 2002. In 2010 nearly 80 events were hosted. However, a total audience of only 73,767 spectators indicates that the current capacity is too high. One reason for this is a missing home team. Both of the big teams in the prefecture (sub-national jurisdiction), Vegalta Sendai and Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, have chosen to play their home games at their long-existing smaller venues. Vegalta Sendai plays

at the Yurtec Stadium Sendai (20,000 seats) with an average attendance of 17,332. The team played only three matches in the J-League at Miyagi Stadium. The baseball team in the prefecture is Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles and plays its home games at Miyagi Baseball Stadium (23,026 seats) with an average attendance of 15,876 in 2010. Despite 72 home matches per season, their total attendance was just over 1.6 million.

This latter example shows the importance of a high-profile anchor tenant. Without such a regular tenant few major sporting events per year do not create a positive sporting legacy for a World Cup stadium. In the cases above the local need was satisfied utilizing the old stadium (Field A, Figure 6.2c).

The overall picture in Table 6.3 is that too many stadia of too large a capacity were built. Five of the Korean stadia had an SUI below 2.3 and only one exceeded 10. In Japan five stadia had an SUI above 10, but two are still below five. This excess capacity could have been avoided. Korea/Japan wanted 20 stadia, with the majority of them being constructed or significantly renovated for the World Cup.

One strategy for reusing stadia is to attract follow-up events. Japan proposed some existing stadia in its application for the 2022 FIFA World Cup.² A successful bid would have filled the stadia again (see the Discussion section and Figure 6.2). An example of a more sustainable and lasting World Cup stadium development can be seen in Germany, which is our next case study.

Case Study 2: 2006 World Cup in Germany

Apart from a few exceptions, stadium construction for football clubs in German's first Bundesliga (highest professional football league in Germany) can fundamentally be divided into the periods leading up to the two World Cups of 1974 and 2006. The projects relating to the 2006 World Cup include all projects since 1998 (Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Rostock, Wolfsburg). In relation to the 1974 World Cup, there were a total of 10 (major) stadia, some newly constructed and others renovated (Feddersen et al., 2006).

Germany's World Cup stadia had by far the highest utilization compared to those in 2002 and 2010. The Allianz Arena in Munich is the most successful venue. With \$472 million it was the most expensive newly constructed World Cup stadium. The clubs FC Bayern Munich and TSV 1860 Munich covered the cost of the stadium with the city paying for the surrounding infrastructure. FC Bayern Munich is the most successful club in Germany, both in terms of records and attendance figures. The other tenant, TSV 1860 Munich, does not have

Table 6.3 Post-event utilization at World Cup 2002 venues

Name/Event	Capacity	Number of events	Owner	Average	Demand	SUI
Sapporo Dome, Sapporo (JPN)	42,328	83	Public	23,686	1965944	46.45
Saitama Stadium (JPN)	63,700	61	Public	14,462	882182	13.85
Tohoku Denryoku Big Swan Stadium (JPN)	42,300	100	Public	5,721	572099	13.52
Oita Bank Dome (JPN)	40,000	23	Public	23,283	535516	13.39
Suwon World Cup Stadium (KOR)	43,188	N/A	Public	N/A	451034	10.44
Kashima Soccer Stadium (JPN)	40,728	48	Public	8,652	415273	10.20
Nissan Stadium, Yokohama (JPN)	73,327	67	Public	8,075	541047	7.38
Misaki Park Stadium, Kobe (JPN)	34,000	88	Public	2761	242979	7.15
Seoul World Cup Stadium (KOR)	66,806	N/A	Public	N/A	467649	7.00
Ulsan Munsu Football Stadium (KOR)	42,638	N/A	Public	N/A	267406	6.27
Jeonju World Cup Stadium (KOR)	41,720	N/A	Public	N/A	258795	6.20
Jeju World Cup Stadium (KOR)	34,000	N/A	Public	N/A	145387	4.28
Ecopa Stadium, Fukuoro City (JPN)	50,889	137	Public	1,345	184296	3.62
Daejeon World Cup Stadium (KOR)	40,535	N/A	Public	N/A	93236	2.30
Daegu Stadium (KOR)	66,433	N/A	Public	N/A	150983	2.27
Gwangju World Cup Stadium (KOR)	38,269	N/A	Public	N/A	63258	1.65
Busan Asiad Stadium (KOR)	53,769	N/A	Public	N/A	88236	1.64
Miyagi Stadium, Rifu (JPN)	49,133	79	Public	934	73767	1.50
Incheon Munsu Stadium (KOR)	47,384	N/A	Public	N/A	7303	0.15

Source: Alm (2012).

Table 6.4 Venues planned for the World Cup 2006 in Germany

Name/Event	Capacity	Number of events	Owner	Average	Demand	SUI
Allianz Arena, Munich	67,812	47	Private	49,972	3187164	34.64
Mercedes-Benz Arena, Stuttgart	55,896	27	Public	48,855	1319094	23.30
AWD-Arena, Hannover	49,000	24	Private	44,920	1078103	22.00
CommerzBank Arena, Frankfurt	51,500	18	Public	48,236	868248	16.86
Fritz Walter Stadion, Kaiserslautern	49,780	17	Public	33,007	846430	11.27
Olympiastadion, Berlin	74,064	18	Public	41,912	754421	10.19
Grundig-Stadion, Nurnberg	46,780	18	Public	41,810	752586	15.36
RheinEnergie Stadion, Cologne	49,968	17	Public	40,688	691696	13.84
Red Bull Arena, Leipzig	44,345	15	Public	7,563	113445	2.56

Sources: www.allianz-arena.de; www.weltfussball.de; www.koelnernsportstaetten.de/index.php?folder=die_sportstaetten&u_folder=rheinenergiestadion&site=rheinenergiestadion; www.olympiastadion-berlin.de; www.commerzbank-arena.de; www.grundig-stadion.de; www.awd-arena.de; www.mercedes-benz-arena.de; www.sportforum-leipzig.com/red-bull-arena/vakalenderredbullarena/veranstaltungen-in-der-red-bull-arena/r-vakalenderredbullarena-a-411.html; www.fck.de/de/1-fc-kaiserslautern/stadion/fritz-walter-stadion.html
All retrieved 19 November 2013.

such a large audience but together the two clubs generate large total attendance figures annually. During the 2009/10 season the stadium was exclusively used for football and hosted 48 matches attracting more than two million spectators. Today, FC Bayern Munich is the only tenant but attracts large audiences and hence has a good SUI. The City of Munich and wider Bavaria is a wealthy and densely populated region with about 12.5 million inhabitants.³

Most of the stadia used for the 2006 World Cup already had a tenant team in the first Bundesliga. If newly constructed/renovated and upgraded stadia are to be economically viable from a business management point of view, this can only be achieved by new ticket categories based on the introduction of business seats and VIP suites (Feddersen

et al., 2006). Therefore, most of the investments and upgrades are in any case necessary (Field B in Figure 6.2) due to the change in demand for professional football. Sixteen cities wanted to stage the World Cup matches and planned investments of \$1.9 billion. Finally, 12 were selected and invested \$1.6 billion (Kurscheidt, 2009). Several of these cities, Kaiserslautern, Frankfurt and Cologne, used the World Cup to rebuild their aged stadia. Berlin is a special case. Here the old Olympic Stadium was renovated (\$285 million) to keep it as it was in 1936 (Kurscheidt, 2009) (see Figure 6.1, national heritage). In 2008 Mario Barth (a German comedian) filled the stadium; it then was used for the 2009 IAAF World Championships and in 2011 Pope Benedict XVI filled the stadium as well. Every year 300,000 tourists visit the stadium and in 2018 the European Athletic Championships will again contribute to cover the investment in its refurbishment.

In Germany, the overall strategy in selecting stadium locations was not as heavily driven by political interest as it was in 2002, 2010 and 2014. The focus was mainly on efficiency. Regional spread was also emphasized, which explains the oversized dimensions of the Red Bull Arena in Leipzig (contributing to its low SUI of 2.56). Much effort was put into the optimal coordination of World Cup capacity requirements and post-event utilization. Additionally, that the Bundesliga in recent years has attracted the highest attendances in European club football has of course made it easier to achieve efficiency.

Case Study 3: 2010 World Cup in South Africa

South Africa hosted the 1995 Rugby World Cup and already had a reasonable number of modern stadia. Nevertheless, the 2010 World Cup contributed to significant overcapacity of football venues. Irrespective of efficiency considerations, South Africa chose to construct five new stadia (\$1.8 billion) and significantly renovate one existing stadium. That is surprising because South Africa won the bid competition with a promise to upgrade ten venues at a cost of only \$171.2 million or construct new stadia to minimum standards. According to FIFA's inspection report from 2004, eight stadia required only partial refurbishment (Audit & Molloy, 2013). During the preparations, however, the plans were changed and all ten stadia's costs increased substantially. The initial plans involved 13 stadia (budgeted at \$253 million). After some negotiation with FIFA, it was decided to build five new and revamp five existing stadia. Step by step, the budget increased and ended up at \$2.646 billion (Audit & Molloy, 2013).

Table 6.5 Post-event utilization at World Cup 2010 venues

Name/Event	Capacity	Number of events	Owner	Average	Demand (only PSL matches 2011/12 season)	SUI
Peter Mokaba Stadium, Polokwane	45,500	N/A	Public	N/A	221,500	4.87
Moses Mabhida, Durban	56,000	N/A	Public	N/A	156,800	2.80
Soccer City, Johannesburg	95,000	N/A	Public	N/A	220,400	2.32
Nelson Mandela Bay, Port Elizabeth	45,940	N/A	Public	N/A	73,500	1.60
Mbombela Stadium, Nelspruit	46,000	N/A	Public	N/A	70,540	1.53
Green Point Stadium, Cape Town	55,000	N/A	Public	N/A	84,300	1.53

Sources: Alm (2012); Audit & Molloy (2013).

The new Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban cost nearly \$380 million and hosted seven matches during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. AmaZulu FC is the stadium's main tenant and had an average attendance of just 3,111 in the 2011/12 season.⁴ Close to Moses Mabhida Stadium is the 55,000-seat Kings Park Stadium, where the local rugby team, Natal Sharks, plays all home games. The stadium was refurbished for the 1995 Rugby World Cup and has hosted the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations. In other words, the situation in Durban is similar to that in Cape Town (see below). Natal Sharks owns and paid off the competing stadium in the city. In early 2011, it came to an agreement with the publicly traded retail company Mr. Price concerning naming rights to the stadium⁵ valid until 2016.⁶ Therefore it must have been clear that Natal Sharks was never keen to move. However, in Durban, football matches only comprised 25 per cent of total revenues (Audit & Molloy, 2013). Hence, if this pattern also applied to utilization so that attendances at football matches only accounted for 25 per cent of the total attendances at all events, the stadium would have a SUI of 11.2.

The majority of the venues for the 2010 World Cup have a football team as their main tenant with the exception of the \$200 million Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium, which is the home of the rugby team Eastern Province. However, the attendance information available shows a low utilization by Eastern Province Kings football team,⁷ underlining that the World Cup capacity is too big for local needs.

Soccer City and Ellis Park Stadium were the World Cup stadia in Johannesburg. The third venue in Johannesburg, the Orlando Stadium (40,000 capacity) was renovated in 2008, but was not used during the World Cup due FIFA's limit of two stadia per city.

The Mbombela Stadium in Nespriut was without a permanent tenant and it was of concern that it would be used only for political meetings.⁸ However, two teams use the stadium. The football team Bidwest Wits, with an average utilization of 9,404 spectators,⁹ and the rugby team Pumas, which uses the venue on only very few occasions (the Pumas use a smaller stadium shared with the football team Mpumalanga Black Aces). In comparison to the tables covering 2002 and 2006, one can see how low the post-Cup utilization is in South Africa.

A particularly stark illustrative case is the Cape Town Stadium (originally called Green Point Stadium) that had a capacity of 68,000 during the World Cup which was reduced to 55,000 afterwards. Planners used temporary extensions of the stands which were removed to reduce the expected post-event overcapacity (Field C in Figure 6.2c).¹⁰ Even this was not enough, as usually South African football clubs do not attract many spectators. For example, Ajax Cape Town only had an average attendance of 4,000 spectators in 2011. Moreover, the local rugby teams, Western Province and The Stormers, continue to play their matches elsewhere in Cape Town at Newlands Stadium, which was planned to be a World Cup venue in the bid book (Davis, 2009). Their choice was not surprising as the Western Province team owns the fully paid off Newlands Stadium and has all stadium rights.¹¹

Cape Town Stadium illustrates the dangers inherent in the dynamic forces at play during the preparation for a World Cup. FIFA's inspection group accepted the existing Newlands Stadium following renovations budgeted at \$2.03 million. However, officials of the city and province preferred Athlone which was a city-owned football stadium located in a black working-class suburb. The idea was to upgrade Athlone as an opportunity to leverage development in this underdeveloped area (see Figure 6.1 and Schoonbee & Brümer, 2009). However, FIFA disagreed with that proposal. According to an anonymous source, one FIFA delegate commented: 'A billion television viewers don't want to see shacks

and poverty on this scale.' Additionally, Athlone would have a high proportion of the 45,000 seats located behind one goal, which may have decreased ticket sales. Therefore, FIFA preferred the construction of a new stadium at Green Point which was originally only planned as a World Cup training venue. But even though Green Point was more expensively budgeted than Newlands or Athlone, it was expected to offer a better legacy. The planners believed it would offer better media exposure, attract additional tourists, access more funding for infrastructure and facilities, facilitate more benefits for local people/firms/communities and contribute significantly more to South Africa's international profile as well as the African continent's image. This was illustrated in an interview with Mike Marsden (Deputy City Manager, Cape Town) in the book *Between the Lines* (Andrag, 2010): 'I believe Green Point will be a landmark in the city and that it will become a symbol of Cape Town like the Opera House is to Sydney and the Golden Gate Bridge to San Francisco.'

Another reason for the construction was that a new stadium promised to add one to three more World Cup matches to Cape Town. These expectations stress some of the other purposes of stadia, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. In addition, there was also hope that a new stadium would help the city to attract additional events, including non-sporting events, as outlined in the Strategic Plan (2007) of Cape Town:

Set in one of the most beautiful cities in the world, the stadium will be proudly owned and regularly used by all the people of Cape Town. Through affordable public and non-motorized transport, it will be accessible to rich and poor, black and white, female and male, locals and visitors. The Green Point Stadium will be the place to meet to cheer their teams, to hear their favourite musicians, to picnic with their families or simply to wander amiably in safe and pleasant surroundings.

These aims were not fully achieved. Kjetil Siem (CEO South African Premier Soccer League 2007–2010 and adviser to the 2010 organizing committee) confirmed in an interview in mid-February 2012 that locals were misguided by unrealistic estimates. However, it needs to be mentioned that the Cape Town stadium developed a flourishing urban park around the stadium that is used daily and on weekends by a large number of residents.

The costs of the stadium became immense. First budgeted at \$169.5 million, which was based on the 2005 Athlone Stadium price-per-seat upgrade, an initial business plan indicating a cost of \$466 million

was presented to the city, province, National Treasury and organizing committee in August 2006. The final outlay ended at \$636.9 million, out of which the city of Cape Town had to pay \$171 million, which was three times more than expected (Alm, 2012).

Discussion

This chapter scrutinized the utilization of stadia based on different experiences of FIFA World Cup events. The SUI figures show that Germany very successfully used the World Cup to upgrade stadia while Japan was less successful but still positive overall. In contrast, Korea and particularly South Africa 2010 were not able to create sport infrastructure that was adequately utilized after the initial event. World Cups often stimulate the construction of overcapacity stadia, which exceed the long-term development plans (Figure 6.2 b)). This creates a 'huge' Field C (Figure 6.2 c)), which questions the efficiency of hosting a World Cup.

Although baseball is a high-profile sport in Japan and rugby has a strong fan base in South Africa, many stadia built for the World Cups 2002 and 2010 have football teams as their anchor tenants. Therefore, the relatively low demand for football among the population should be considered. The 'novelty effect' of new stadia attracts more spectators initially (Feddersen et al. 2006). However, that effect is temporary and of minor relevance. If a city has no major team, the construction of temporary stadium extensions for World Cups should be considered (Field C in Figure 6.2 c)). This avoids post-event economic burdens – an unused stadium is not a good economic catalyst for the region (as indicated in Figure 6.1). From an economic perspective, it is not surprising that smaller football clubs in the cities choose smaller and therefore cheaper venues, which has been the situation in South Africa and Japan. Furthermore, a venue with a capacity of 20,000 that is sold out will create a greater atmosphere than a stadium with a capacity of 75,000 with the same crowd.

One reason why the venues became bigger and more expensive than initially planned is that other aims than the original ones took over during the process. As Laurine Platzky (FIFA World Cup Coordinator for the Western Cape Province) stated in an interview on 12 January 2013:

The original view on the World Cup, which was reflected in the bid book, was anchored in football alone. After the awarding, it turned into something that was completely different from the plans in the bid book.

Following agency theory, the ex-post opportunism of local organizing committees (LOCs) (AGENT, Figure 6.3) can cause the problem of 'moral hazard'. This opportunistic behaviour leads to efficiency losses and agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308; see Figure 6.3). Stakeholders involved in the decision-making process can use the opportunity of an upcoming event to achieve partisan agendas, such as politicians who would like to reconstruct a city or 'bask in [its] reflected glory (BIRGing)' (Cialdini et al., 1976). Platzky also admitted that South Africa's willingness to spend resources on the World Cup was influenced by different motives before and after the award (*ibid.*):

During the bidding phase, the country was competing against Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In the hosting phase, the country competed against previous hosts that had stronger financial muscles than their African rival, such as Germany, France, Korea-Japan and the USA.

These stakeholders are the AGENTS (LOCs, local politicians etc.) that use the lack of transparency (asymmetric information) and the often unrealistic optimism created by pre-event analysis to invest in infrastructure. This infrastructure is often not strictly required for the event itself, but it is certainly supportive for staging an excellent or even extravagant event. Many of these stakeholders stress other benefits of stadia (as shown in Figure 6.1) more than their ex-post utilization.

The rationale behind government intervention in sports events (as PRINCIPAL) is based on aims of preventing market failures. This can be achieved if stadia can create activities that have characteristics of externalities and/or merit goods (also see Gratton & Taylor, 2000).

The AGENTS' opportunistic aims do not correspond with those of government (representing taxpayers), which has to pay for the aftermath. This situation makes it difficult to establish the optimum capacity for venues (see Figure 6.3). The agents prefer stadia of a size where their own marginal benefits equal their own marginal costs. This, however, does not correspond with or lead to economic efficiency, which requires a capacity where the aggregate marginal benefits equal the aggregate marginal costs, no matter who pays and who benefits. Hence, if the future tenants expect to pay only a fraction of the costs, they are likely to prefer venues with capacity beyond the optimal level. In this situation, the event organizers should use temporary extensions such as the ones used and proven at the European Football Championships – Euro 2008 – in Austria/Switzerland and planned for the World Cup in Qatar 2022.




Figure 6.3 The principal-agent relation and opportunistic interests

FIFA, as the owner of the World Cup, contributes to this situation. A large proportion of their revenues come from the sale of media rights and sponsorships. FIFA and the LOCs (AGENTS) fundamentally adopt a short-term perspective, which obviously is to stage a perfect event. It is important to keep in mind that various sports compete fiercely with one another for the attention of fans, where the competition has elements of a 'rat race'. This means that FIFA can demand guarantees such as stadium capacity and location from the bid nation. South Africa wanted to host an event of the same quality as the rest of the world, and through that improve its national confidence and prestige. Moreover, as Platzky notes, 'although it is the first such FIFA event in Africa, the organizers will still demand world-class standards'.

World Cups are one-off events moving from place to place (so called 'footloose industries'). Therefore, LOCs often hire consultants to specialize in World Cup preparations, but also to forecast the economic outcome of the events. It is often in the interest of consultants to be recruited for additional business, which may be an incentive for them to produce optimistic forecasts for stadium capacity. This could align with the interests of the LOC (as AGENT) as the success of the event may well be affected by being able to offer more World Cup tickets in a bigger stadium. In this scenario, it is clear that the government (as PRINCIPAL) should be highly involved in the preparations for a World Cup, in order to reduce asymmetries of information and increase transparency.

However, it is important to keep in mind that a World Cup legacy should not only be measured by the efficiency of seating capacities alone. As former adviser to the 2010 organizing committee Kjetil Siem said in relation to the 2010 World Cup:

The psychological effect cannot be emphasized enough. I have attended many championships in my life, but never seen anyone where the 'nation-building' dimension was as important as in this case ... You can say that South Africa took it further than what was necessary. However, many South Africans think the World Cup was worth the money. What is the value of higher confidence?

Some stadia were therefore a means to build up symbolic capital (Figure 6.1). The 2010 World Cup was hosted some years after the end of the apartheid regime and for the government it became an instrument for 'uniting the nation'. Historically, rugby had been the white people's sport in South Africa, while football was the sport of black people. One of the aims of building new stadia was to integrate fans of the two sports

more closely. Despite the obviously different characters of various FIFA World Cups, nation-building agendas will continue to have an effect on stadium infrastructure in Brazil, Russia and Qatar, in different ways.

Learning from South Africa and Brazil 2014, FIFA should reconsider the idea of the World Cup being scattered all over the host country. This could avoid constructing oversized stadia which are unsustainable from either an economic or a sporting point of view. South Africa had eight venues that would have required only minor renovations to meet FIFA's requirements (Audit & Molloy, 2013). It is a paradox that today the old venues in South Africa have higher attendance figures than the new World Cup stadia. A similar situation seems to have arisen in Brazil, where Manaus (Amazonas) has constructed a \$286 million stadium (capacity 43,500) in a city where Penarol Atlético Clube on average attracts an average 774 spectators per game and in a good season 900 (Flörke, 2013). In this respect, UEFA's decision to host Euro 2020 across 13 countries sounds encouraging from a stadium utilization point of view.

Notes

1. All currencies in this chapter are in US\$; the transformation of local currencies in US\$ was done by oanda.com using an average rate of the time around the main investment.
2. www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/01/33/74/42/b1jpn.pdf, retrieved 20 October 2013.
3. www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_zs01_by.asp, retrieved 20 October 2013.
4. <http://stats.football365.co.za/dom/SAF/PR/attend.html>, retrieved 20 October 2013.
5. www.sharksrugby.co.za/article.aspx?id=394629, retrieved 20 October 2013.
6. www.sharksrugby.co.za/news/general/101119/Sharks_to_Stay_Put, retrieved 20 October 2013.
7. www.nmbstadium.com/earlierevents/4, retrieved 20 October 2013.
8. Ibid.
9. <http://stats.football365.co.za/dom/SAF/PR/attend.html>, retrieved 20 October 2013
10. <http://stats.football365.co.za/dom/SAF/PR/attend.html>, retrieved 20 October 2013
11. www.iol.co.za/sport/demolish-absa-stadium-newlands-jordaan-1.604232, retrieved 20 October 2013.

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7

World Cup Stadium Development and Sustainability

Les Street, Stephen Frawley and Sarah Cobourn

Introduction

As outlined in the first chapter of this book, the Football World Cup is the largest and most important international football tournament (Florek et al., 2008). Whilst it can be claimed the Olympic Games with its Summer and Winter versions, contested over an array of disciplines every two years, is larger and carries greater significance (Frawley & Adair, 2013), it is arguable that no other global sporting event reaches the fervour generated by the World Cup. Football as the global game can elicit high levels of passion and as Sugden and Tomlinson (1998, p. 4) explain, 'football is an emotive form of popular theatre which has proven to be open to the expression of distinct sets of values and ideologies, transcending any meaning which the game itself has'. Put simply, for many people: football is life.

While the World Cup can trigger large scale fan enthusiasm, Lisi (2007) argues it is the world's most popular sporting contest. Football fans can take weeks off work to travel to the event or spend large amount of time watching matches on television at odd hours either at home, in bars or at live sites. Those fortunate enough to gain tickets to World Cup matches can spend thousands of dollars just getting to the host nation which for many is a long-haul flight. Long kept in the sporting shadows by the Olympic Games, football and the World Cup has demonstrated itself to be a global commodity, a paradigm of popular culture worldwide, due to its ever-increasing attractiveness to the commercial trinity of sponsors, advertisers and television (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004).

At the epicentre of all this is the stadium. It is the stage where footballers perform to their optimum and spectators marvel at their feats.

Since the commencement of the World Cup in 1930, the stadium environment has seen marked change. Whilst the main elements of two teams consisting of 11 players, a central referee, a ball and a pitch have remained true, the extraneous environment has evolved to meet the noticeable needs of players, spectators, sponsors and media. This first section of the chapter begins with a review of the history and development of World Cup venues from the inaugural *Copa Mundial* in Uruguay. A summary detailing the events leading up to Montevideo 1930 are briefly discussed, followed by an assessment of World Cup venues. This will be followed by a second section that explores the more recent trend of sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the impact these strategies have had on stadium development and World Cup management.

A key aspect underpinning the discussion in this chapter is stadium change and development over time, describing how host venues have advanced to meet the continual demands and prerequisites outlined for host nations. With an increase since the first ever World Cup in finals qualification slots, the demand for newer and/or renovated facilities to cater for extra matches has grown. Part of this has involved a movement away from multi-sport to football-specific venues. Advancements in technology and spectator comforts have added further to this mix of 'cumulative gigantism' (Preuss, 2007). Given this contextual background, an examination of iconic stadium design throughout the history of the World Cup can be used to gain knowledge on how best to utilize stadiums for post-tournament use (as discussed in detail in the Preuss, Solberg and Alm, Chapter 6 in this book). This is followed by a description of the current technical requirements mandated by FIFA which the LOC must meet in order to qualify to host the World Cup. As a case study, the 2010 World Cup staged in South Africa is examined, along with questions raised by the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. While most of the World Cup literature has focused on the economic and tourism impacts the event generates, it has only been in recent times that the role of stadiums has taken a more central position. The aim of this chapter is therefore to look at the development of World Cup stadiums from the position of a critical asset that, as with the players, must be present for the mega-event to be staged.

Historical development of World Cup stadiums

Football grounds are the lifeblood of the sport, for without a venue no contest can usefully take place. They can shape our communities and

have become an essential component of the urban setting in many countries (Street, 2013). The value of stadiums can be seen in their use in the marketing of cities and regions (John et al., 2013). At a mega-event such as the World Cup the host stadiums are the epicentre of the tournament. With the ever-increasing commodification of football, additional attention has been directed towards the utilized venues in terms of the financial implications concerning construction (or renovation), operation and maintenance, as well as the services supplied to key stakeholders such as sponsors, broadcasters and associated media. Recently staged World Cups and nations that have won future bids to stage the event have witnessed a significant increase in new stadium development in order to cater for the event.

As a consequence of its ambulatory character, the right to host the World Cup is determined by an extensive bidding process (Gold & Gold, 2008). Cook and Ward (2011) explain that this ambulatory design combined with high stakes submissions from potential suitors is indicative of aggressive inter-urban competition amongst future World Cup cities and nations. Because of this movement between host cities and countries, questions have to be asked as to how these facilities can be sustained in the tournament aftermath both physically and financially (points that are discussed in more detail later in the chapter).

Whilst this is the modern context, at the genesis of FIFA and their promotion of the World Cup as its pinnacle product, this was not always the case. Long before FIFA came to have more members than both the United Nations and the International Olympic Committee (Tomlinson et al., 2009), upon establishment in 1904 its original statutes bestowed the exclusive right to organize a worldwide football competition (Shirley & Wight, 2002). In 1924, FIFA agreed to assume responsibility for the Olympic Football Tournament which became the de facto World Championship. The success and resonance of the 1924 and 1928 Olympic Games along with the pressing issue that many of the best players were unavailable because they were professionals meant a key juncture was reached. Thus, a truly representative world competition could no longer be restricted to the Olympic milieu (Robinson, 1998). With the driving force from President Jules Rimet, the 1928 FIFA Congress decided to stage an official FIFA World Championship, which was to be known as the Football World Cup.

After years of wrangling, a competition fashioned in the image of the governing body had been set. However the decision to find a nation willing to stage it was one of many hurdles. Eschewing four European aspirants, Holland, Italy, Spain and Sweden, Uruguay, the Olympic gold

medallist from 1924 and 1928, was selected. Despite being a three-week boat journey to South America from the European heartland, their willingness to stage the tournament and house the competing teams in addition to building a new stadium for the finals at Uruguay's expense swayed FIFA (Robinson, 1998; Shirley & Wight, 2002). It would be a prelude to future dealings in how FIFA selected host nations to stage the event.

Table 7.1 provides details of each World Cup host nation since 1930, with a summary of the number of finalists, cities, the quantity of stadiums used, along with the venue of the final and its capacity. A telling statistic is that even in the formative years of the World Cup new stadiums were constructed to host matches. The most famous two are the Centenario in Uruguay and the much vaunted Maracanã in Brazil. Noteworthy also is the spread of cities vis-à-vis the number of stadiums utilized. As recent as South Africa 2010 and as far back as Uruguay 1930, the tournament has utilized multiple stadiums within the same city. Notwithstanding Montevideo 1930, where all games were played in the Uruguayan capital at three grounds, Spain 1982 is the most prominent example with Madrid, Barcelona and Seville all featuring two venues each.

Another factor to consider when reviewing this material is the types of stadiums used, whether they be football (or rectangular sports)-specific or multi-purpose in design which cater for other athletic activities such as track and field. The most common of these feature a synthetic athletics track. Throughout the history of the World Cup, host stadiums which contain a running track, or have the space and shape for one through an elliptical stadium design, have been a common feature of tournaments. Recent popular trends, however, have seen a reduction in this style of stadium design, in favour of a football-specific ground which is better for viewing due to the spectators being seated closer to the field of play.

Hosting mega-sport events like the World Cup costs a large amount of money (Alm, 2012). Hare (1999) points out that the global growth of FIFA and the World Cup has not come by accident but rather through the business acumen brought to the organization by successive FIFA Presidents. Despite the possibility of financial risk, bidding nations have been willing to take their chance on the World Cup because it is an enormous event that captures the attention of national and international media for the host cities (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004). One of the main economic expenditures associated with the staging of such an event is the investment in new facilities (Szymanski, 2002). As Figure 7.1 shows,

Table 7.1 World Cup Stadiums – 1930 to 2014

	Host	Finalists	Cities	Stadiums	Final Venue	Capacity ¹
2014	Brazil	32	12	12	Rio de Janeiro Estádio do Maracanã (Jornalista Mário Filho)	76,935
2010	South Africa	32	9	10	Johannesburg Soccer City Stadium	84,490
2006	Germany	32	12	12	Berlin Olympiastadion	69,000
2002	Korea/Japan	32	20 (10/10)	20 (10/10)	Yokohama International Stadium Yokohama	69,029
1998	France	32	10	10	St Denis (Paris) Stade de France	80,000
1994	USA	24	9	9	Pasadena (Los Angeles) Rose Bowl	94,194
1990	Italy	24	12	12	Rome Stadio Olimpico	73,603
1986 ²	Mexico	24	9	12	Mexico City Estadio Azteca	114,600
1982	Spain	24	14	17	Madrid Estadio Santiago Bernabéu	90,000
1978	Argentina	16	5	6	Buenos Aires Estadio Monumental (Antonio Vespucio Liberti)	71,483
1974	Germany FR	16	9	9	Munich Olympiastadion	75,200
1970	Mexico	16	5	5	Mexico City Estadio Azteca	107,412

1966	England	16	7	8	London Wembley Stadium	93,000
1962	Chile	16	4	4	Santiago de Chile Estadio Nacional (Julio Martínez Prádanos)	69,000
1958	Sweden	16	12	12	Solna (Stockholm) Råsunda Fotbollstadion	51,800
1954	Switzerland	16	6	6	Berne Wankdorf-Stadion	60,000
1950 ^{3,4,5}	Brazil	13	6	6		
1938	France	15	9	10	Paris	45,000
1934	Italy	16	8	8	Stade Olympique de Colombes (Yves-du-Manoir)	50,000
1930	Uruguay	13	1	3	Rome Stadio Nazionale del PNF Montevideo Estadio Centenario	80,000

Source: Adapted from FIFA (2013a), Hunt (2010) and World Cup Companion (2010).




Figure 7.1 New or major stadium renovations since 1990 due to World Cup
Source: Adapted from Alm (2012).

since Italy 1990, there has been a constant number of new or major stadium renovations for the World Cup. The exception to this was the event held in the United States in 1994. The availability of high-capacity and well-appointed National Football League (NFL) and college football⁶ stadiums, across the country, meant that no significant stadium alterations were needed to meet the then 1994 FIFA standards.

The 1990 World Cup was a pivotal point in venue management as it was the first tournament where FIFA mandated all-seated football stadiums (Alm, 2012). Two new stadiums built for the tournament in Turin and Bari saw action. Removal of terracing and other upgrades were made to satisfy FIFA. In 1998, by contrast, the event witnessed only one new stadium development – the multi-purpose and multi-functional national stadium, the Stade de France. The awarding of the 2002 World Cup to former adversaries Korea⁷ and Japan changed the event in many ways. Horne (2004) remarked that this surprising and unprecedented move forced FIFA to modify its regulations. Moreover, the financial outlay was monumental with at least US\$4.4 billion invested in stadium development (US\$2.9 billion in Japan and US\$1.5 billion in Korea). From the 20 designated World Cup venues (10 each in Korea and Japan), 17 were entirely new and state of the art in terms of their sports-leisure value

(Horne, 2004). In Japan, seven brand new facilities were constructed with three others comprehensively refurbished (Baade & Matheson, 2004) whilst seven in Korea were football-specific (Kim et al., 2006). Included in this figure is the Seoul World Cup Stadium – the largest football-only venue in Asia which, as part of the push for a sustainable and environmentally friendly World Cup, was constructed along with the surrounding World Cup Park on reclaimed land (Kim & Petrick, 2005; Radnedge, 2002).

As an established football country with a strong history of high-performing club teams and a fan culture that ranks as one of the best in Europe, the World Cup stadium demands for Germany 2006 were dissimilar to the previous tournament as large grounds were already available thanks to the German Bundesliga and its lower leagues. However, one aspect which Allmers and Maennig (2009) pointed out was the football grounds constructed or renovated for Germany 1974 did not fulfil the needs of 2006. Whilst not all grounds were used for both World Cups, the update of standards for 2006, such as the removal of athletics tracks in Cologne, Hamburg, Hanover and Stuttgart for a more 'British' feel of being closer to the action and the duality of seating which can transform into safe-standing terraces for non-international matches, suited the updated German stadium experience. Despite these advancements, Ahlfeldt and Maennig (2010) critiqued the venues, stating:

While the German World Cup venues are full of technical innovations and meet stringent requirements for comfort and safety, their design generally remains conventional and 'functional'. In contrast, international examples show how unconventional, sometimes iconic, stadium architecture can be used to create new landmarks and boost successful municipal development policies. (p. 630)

Iconic stadia and legacy

Football stadiums are a highly visible expression of a city. They can be viewed as a window to the outside world for those who wish to understand what a city represents and stands for. Throughout the history of the World Cup some stadiums have been more prominent than others. Rather than just being a place of sport, their position as a cultural and architectural artefact of significance has elevated them to the status of football icons. Sklair (2010) defines iconic architecture in two parts: 'buildings and spaces that (1) are famous for those in and around architecture and/or the public at large, and (2) have special symbolic significance' (p. 138). With increasing regularity cities are building

edifices that utilize iconic architectural principles as a bold statement in positioning their place in the world (Horne, 2011). These include seemingly impracticable and non-functional but unique and highly innovative design cues, which often exhibit particular common characteristics such as placement in walking distance of a city centre and often close to a body of water (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010).

Furthermore, 'the new type of stadium can also be understood against the backdrop of competition among cities and institutions that has materialised in a broader architectural trend for iconic buildings with positive auras and a supra-regional power of attraction' (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010, p. 631). Used as a major medium by territorial elites, architecture is employed to express national ambitions and negotiate national identity (Ren, 2008). This shift has been pronounced since the 1970s, and as Ren (2008) enunciates, cities have transformed from production sites into consumption sites whereby amongst the atmosphere of intense inter-urban competition, governments have increasingly utilized the strategy of hosting mega-events and constructing flagship architectural projects as a means of generating a positive urban image that places their cities 'on the map'. This, conversely, can have costly outcomes. In the book *Managing the Olympics*, Darcy and Taylor (2013) outline that there is a temptation by architects to showcase innovative designs and methods of construction, and this has been a significant factor in the underestimation of costs and 'scope creep'.

Yet some of the most venerated World Cup stadiums of all time are not necessarily aesthetically pleasing from a visual design sense. Rather, their standing as an iconic football venue rests on the importance they hold for particular teams and fans and therefore the game itself. This *genius loci* or 'spirit of place' is character-determining when defining the place of football stadiums. The diversity of 'personality traits' and the subtle nuances of the stadium provide it with an undefinable mystique. Many stadiums allocated to host the final match over the history of the World Cup are stadiums that can be classified as iconic. Wembley in London, Azteca in Mexico City, Bernabéu in Madrid, Olympiastadion in both Munich and Berlin and the Maracanã in Rio de Janeiro are some of the famous venues that it can be argued hold this status.

One venue that also ranks with those just listed is the Centenario in Montevideo. Described by Jules Rimet as a 'temple of football', the Juan Antonio Scasso-designed Estadio Centenario stands as an unmistakable and indelible landmark of football and national identity (FIFA, 2013a). Built especially for Uruguay's hosting of the first World Cup in 1930, which it won by defeating arch-rival and neighbour Argentina in front

of 93,000 spectators, including a number who had come by flotilla across the Río de la Plata (Lisi, 2007), it was named in celebration of the 100th year of independence and as a testimony to the fundamental meaning of sport and football in Uruguayan society (Krotee, 1979). Fashioned in a vast concrete bowl of modernist design, its nine-storey Art Deco tower stands sentry over the stadium which has three of its four stands named in honour of Uruguay's 1924 and 1928 Olympics football achievement: Amsterdam, Colombes (the commune in Paris where the stadium was located) and Olympica, with the last, America, named after their South American Championship (Copa América) titles.

Built in under a year with two independent construction companies erecting each half, the stadium's aesthetic was optimistic in tone considering it was during a period of global economic depression whereby the stimulus was more psychological than fiscal (Jelly-Schapiro, 2012). Giulianotti (1999, p. 138) points out that the gradual transformation of Uruguay from a 'curious melange of disparate ethnic groups to a nation that housed common cultural practices and symbols' was most notably accentuated by its victorious football team. Moreover the 1930 World Cup final, like the stadium in which it was held, continues as a great font of inspiration, a testimonial to national-cultural opportunity (Jelly-Schapiro, 2012). This was observed by former Soccer Australia Chairman, Remo Nogarotto (Street, 2013), who upon visiting the venue for Australia's failed 2002 World Cup qualification, noted: 'history seeped deep into the grey concrete terraces of Estadio Centenario.' Perhaps poignantly, aside from minor additions and the installation of seating, the ground appears the same as it was in 1930, adding to its iconic reverence for *La Celeste* fans and football aficionados worldwide.

This balance between being faithful to the heritage aspects and meeting the needs of modern-day fan requirements can pose problems. Andrew Bell (2014), a football fan who watched the pre-Brazil 2014 international friendly between Uruguay and Northern Ireland at the Centenario in May 2014, noted the condition of the stadium as extremely run down with minimal modifications and a lack of food and beverage concessions, in part due to the stadium being heritage listed. He further added: 'it's lucky to be still standing ... but it's historic and that's the appeal'.

In light of modern-day World Cup organizing committees constructing new venues or totally refurbishing existing facilities, as part of their commitment to hosting the tournament, the notion of legacy has become a 'buzzword' as host nations and cities look at promoting sustainable outcomes for when the event is over. The concept of legacy has been comprehensively examined in the Olympics discourse

(Cashman, 2006; Cashman & Horne, 2013; Davies, 2012; MacAloon, 2008; Mangan & Dyreson, 2010). However, it is somewhat surprising that while South Africa 2010 witnessed an intensification of literature on this topic (Allen et al., 2013; Bob & Swart, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011; Pillay et al., 2009) dedicated research on World Cup stadium legacy has been sparse. Whilst Cashman (2006) adds that the use of the legacy term is problematic and even hazardous when used by event organizing committees as there is the assumption it is entirely positive without negative outcomes. Preuss (2007) takes these factors into account when defining legacy: 'Irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself' (p. 211).

With the exception of the 1994 World Cup held in the USA where there was minimal venue legacy left by the tournament,⁸ since Italy 1990 the aftermath of the World Cup has meant improved and in many cases new stadiums for the host nation. The flipside is that this often leads to a surplus of architecturally sound but large and inadequate stadiums that do not meet the needs of post-tournament life. This is especially so if there is no overlay of post-tournament reduction to cater for projected future use. Consequently this can result in revenue shortfalls and ongoing maintenance problems for operators and taxpayers. It can also lead to venues being described as 'white elephants'. The earliest modern-day example of this in the World Cup environment was the Stadio delle Alpi, in Turin. Built for Italy 1990, it became the home ground of club sides Juventus and Torino. However, poor sightlines in part attributed to a running track which was never used for competition and constant spectator criticism resulting in diminished crowds and a lack of atmosphere saw the unloved public facility bulldozed in 2009 in favour of a Juventus-owned football-only stadium built on the site.

Sparsity of use or the inability to attract large crowds has seen national league teams, especially in the Japanese context, decide to play at more intimate stadiums rather than utilize the oversized World Cup venues, which often are in poor locations without any real connection to their external environment. Horne (2004) remarked that some of these venues have been used by J-League (Japanese national competition) teams but the capacity is rarely, if ever, reached. The exception to this is the Urawa Red Diamonds who regularly draw very large crowds to their football-only Saitama Stadium and Albirex Niigata who have also reached capacity at their Big Swan Stadium even when playing in J-League 2 (second division).⁹ Both venues were constructed for the 2002 World Cup. Research by Alm (2012) (and Chapter 6 in this book) investigated which

mega-event stadiums have been a success and which have stood empty after the event. Their findings indicate that Korea/Japan 2002 and South Africa 2010 venues were less sustainable, especially when compared to Germany 2006. This is principally so for Korea and South Africa which have low average crowd numbers attending their domestic leagues especially when compared to Italian, French, German and Japanese leagues where the numbers, especially for the larger clubs, are very healthy. Germany, which has the best average crowds in Europe, sees attendances commensurate with stadium capacity for all but one World Cup 2006 stadium – Zentralstadion in Leipzig.¹⁰

Technical requirements

FIFA is very specific when it comes to technical requirements for nations, cities and stadiums that host the World Cup. A variety of documents have been published both for public and private consumption which detail the specific components FIFA mandate as essential to hosting the tournament. The most visible of these publications is *Football Stadiums: Technical Recommendations and Requirements*, now in its fifth edition and last published in 2011. As the foreword states: ‘The objective of the book remains the same as ever: to help everyone involved in the design, construction and management of a football stadium to create a facility in which people can watch football in safety and comfort’ (FIFA Working Group, 2011, p. 11).

Presented in 12 chapters, it looks at all aspects of stadium design and operation, including players and match officials, spectators, media, hospitality, lighting, pitch configuration and surface to name a few, from the aspect of what FIFA considers best practice in view of holding the event. It also contains the World Cup space requirements, a complete itemization of the spatial elements for a stadium to meet the stringent criteria. Another pertinent FIFA stadium document is the *FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations*, which divides the stadium space for FIFA events into five distinct perimeters (FIFA, 2012, pp. 98–99):

1. Public zone: This area includes the city and surrounding outskirts of the stadium precinct and is outside of stadium control.
2. Exclusive zone: This is the exclusive commercial zone, which is strictly monitored according to the Rights Protection Programme (RPP) rules and regulations for the FIFA event.
3. Outer perimeter: Visual ticket check. The first visual check of a pass and search are carried out at this perimeter. Access to this area requires a valid accreditation badge or match ticket.

4. Inner perimeter: Electronic access control. This is where the turnstiles are located and also includes the public access areas and hospitality suites.
5. Stands: These are the seating areas and playing field.

A further nine zones are designated for the internal vicinity of the stadium (see Table 7.2). This is devised to limit access to restricted areas and define areas of work for those with official accreditation.

Table 7.2 Football World Cup Stadium Zones

Zones	Area	Description
1	Field of play	Includes the following spaces: the pitch; the substitutes' benches; the fourth official's bench; photographers' positions; and access to the pitch via stadium tunnel.
2	Competition areas	Includes the following spaces: the dressing rooms for the players and the referees; the medical rooms; the FIFA delegation room; the doping control room; corridors that access these areas; the drop-off and pick-up areas for both teams and officials.
3	Public areas	Includes the following spaces: entrance and areas for the general public; toilet facilities, concession stands and first aid facilities for the general public; commercial and host city displays; and spectator accommodation.
4	Operations areas (offices)	Includes the following spaces: the FIFA and LOC offices; the Venue Operations Centre; stadium announcer, giant screen and sound rooms; medical facilities; information technology room; FIFA and LOC storage rooms; police and security facilities.
5	VIP areas	Includes the following spaces: VIP reception; VIP stand; VIP interview area; and VVIP area.
6	Media tribune	Includes the following spaces: seating for the print media; seating for radio and television commentators and staff; the mixed zone; and press conference room.
7	Media centre	Includes the following spaces: media work area; media catering and briefing area; photographers' area; media service centre.
8	Broadcast area	Includes the following spaces: the broadcast compound and television and radio studios.
9	Hospitality area	Includes the following spaces: commercial affiliate village; commercial hospitality spaces; hospitality lounges; and sky boxes.

Source: Adapted from FIFA (2012, pp. 99–100).

At a glance, the stadium bid process for the World Cup post-Brazil 2014 involves the proposal of 16 to 18 venues to be spread across the bidding country to emphasize that the World Cup is a nationwide competition. This figure is then reduced to an expected number of 12 stadiums which must comprise fixed and permanent seating and have a net capacity of 40,000 seats for group matches (except the opening match), round-of-16, quarter-final and third place matches; 60,000 for the semi-finals; and 80,000 for the opening match and final. This net seating capacity takes into account the deduction of seat kills – those deemed unusable or required for another purpose, the media tribune and the VIP hospitality sector, which needs a minimum of five per cent capacity for the lesser matches and eight per cent for the opening, semi-finals and the final (FIFA, 2011). The field of play should have pitch dimensions of 105 metres in length and 68 metres in width. At a minimum the total surface area of the stadium perimeters from fence-to-fence should be 125 metres by 85 metres to allow for warm-up areas, advertising hoardings and pitch-side photographer positions. The pitch shall also be illuminated evenly to the specification of 2000 lux¹¹ to suit the needs of high-definition television (FIFA, 2011).

South Africa 2010: A case study

South Africa 2010 has generated a wide variety of academic work both before and after the World Cup, especially when compared to previous tournaments. The overwhelming feature of South African stadiums for fans in attendance and for those watching worldwide was the Vuvuzela – an elongated plastic horn-like instrument that created incessant noise when blown by the multitude of enthusiastic local fans and those from overseas who partook in the cacophony of sound. As debate raged as to whether they were a gross irritation or a manifestation of South African football culture, other more pertinent stadium issues developed behind the scenes.

Firstly we introduce a brief summary of the South African stadium situation leading into the 2010 World Cup from the initial bid placed by the South African Football Association and the LOC in 2004 as part of the now abandoned FIFA continental rotation policy which saw the 'Rainbow Nation' granted the hosting rights for 2010. The South Africa 2010 World Cup Bid book (2004) that was presented to FIFA in support of South Africa's candidature forwarded 13 stadiums in 11 cities including two stadiums each in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Of these 13 stadiums it was proposed that seven would require minor upgrading, three would need major redevelopment and another three

would be newly constructed. The opening game and World Cup final were planned to be held at Soccer City in Johannesburg with the semi-finals played at Ellis Park, Johannesburg and Kings Park, Durban (South Africa 2010 World Cup Bid, 2004).

After South Africa was awarded the World Cup, the three new planned stadiums: Kimberley Stadium, Kimberley, Oppenheimer Stadium, Orkney, and Rainbow Junction, Pretoria, were all jettisoned whilst Kings Park Stadium in Durban and Cape Town's Newlands – both rugby grounds – would be substituted with new large-capacity and architecturally striking venues. Cape Town would also supersede Johannesburg as a semi-final host city. As Desai and Vahed (2009) noted, FIFA would play a potent role in the decision to select host cities and the location of their stadiums. This would be particularly so in Cape Town¹² where the evolution from stadium concept to creation would see three different venues touted in a highly politicized process where the intervention of FIFA and its corporate backers dictated the terms and conditions to the host city for staging the event (Alegi, 2008).

The shifts in venue – initially from Newlands to Athlone then to Green Point – was not only linked to the spatial and social planning issues faced by the local area, but also to the social topography of football in the Western Cape (Alegi, 2008; Gunter, 2011; Swart & Bob, 2009; Haferburg, 2011). The rejection of Athlone Stadium, located in a suburb noted for its disused power station on the historically marginalized Cape Flats (compared to the more affluent areas of Newlands and Green Point), was largely due to FIFA delegates rejecting the background views of low-cost housing adjoining the stadium, determining them as being unsuitable to a television audience. This contrasted with the prime vista of Green Point, which is framed by Table Mountain and has the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, South Africa's most visited tourist destination, close by (Swart & Bob, 2012).

For the other semi-final host city, Durban, the determination to construct a new stadium was not based on the technical requirements of the tournament, as Kings Park¹³ was deemed adequate with modest upgrades, nor outside pressure from FIFA (Roberts, 2010). Rather, it was driven by the desire of eThekweni Municipality – the local government authority – to build a truly iconic stadium (Bokelman et al., 2011). Aside from some early controversy over its intended name, which changed from King Senzangakhona to Moses Mabhida Stadium, the preparations in Durban were relatively smooth compared to the political divisions experienced in Cape Town (Alegi, 2008). The centrepiece of its construction was a 106-metre-high Y-shaped steel arch which curves over the

stadium bowl to replicate the South African flag to symbolize political unity after a fractured past (Bokelman, et al., 2011; Maennig & du Plessis, 2009). With hosting the World Cup as its launch pad, this would position Durban as a global sporting city with the multi-functional stadium its pivot for future Olympic or Commonwealth Games bids (Maennig & du Plessis, 2009; Roberts, 2010). The stadium also sought to exploit its design and attract adventure tourism. Utilizing the arch as the focal point, three experiences were conceived: the Sky-Car, a funicular which rises to an observation deck at its apex; an adventure walk, which allows participants to climb 500 steps up the arch to the summit; and the Big Rush – a bungee swing which drops those brave enough from an 80-metre platform into the stadium bowl on a 220-metre arc – rated as the tallest of its type in the world (Moses Mabhida Stadium Durban, 2013).

Other South African World Cup stadiums also sought to make their indelible mark by using animal motifs or expressing pan-African themes in what Manzo (2012) describes as a branding exercise which attempted to prove to the world that South Africa is a modern, go-ahead nation. Soccer City was designed to look like an African pot – the calabash – a most recognizable object that embodies Africa and nowhere else (Bokelman et al., 2011). Mbombela Stadium in Nelspruit featured seating in a unique zebra pattern whilst 18 pylons spaced around the perimeter resembled a giraffe with the lower two columns embodying the legs and the upper section above the roofline the head and neck (Bokelman et al., 2011). Another stadium to feature local design cues was Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane which had corner structures made to resemble the baobab tree (Manzo, 2012). While this was done to make the World Cup uniquely South African, Desai and Vaheed (2009) argued that even though it was to be held in Africa, the experience would be Western, in part, due to the lack of home-grown nuances such as the food vending outside the stadiums which is a common feature of the national football competition, otherwise known as the Premier Soccer League (PSL).¹⁴ On the ground during the tournament this assumption was proved correct due to the strict host city and venue licensing provisions enforced by FIFA through the creation of exclusive zones. The only time street traders were visible to the leading author was in the vicinity of the ‘park and ride’ facilities that were often some considerable distance from the stadiums.

Much like what faced the organizers of Brazil 2014, South Africa went through tumult in relation to the construction of stadiums, their perceived necessity and whether they would meet set timeframes imposed

by FIFA. Whilst the 10 stadiums were ready for the tournament and proved to be a great success, rolling strikes did occur during the construction period, largely due to poor working conditions. Nkonyama (2010) stated that low-paid workers were asked to put in long hours in the name of national interest and patriotism. Similarly, questions of stadium legacy and the cost of new stadium construction have been asked, especially given South Africa already had relatively good stadium infrastructure as a consequence of hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Alm (2012), in a critical appraisal, pointed out that three 1995 host venues, Free State Stadium in Bloemfontein, Ellis Park in Johannesburg and Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria, were used in 2010 without any significant renovations. Moreover, he adds that the cost of building five new stadiums and the substantial overhaul of another – all of which are publicly owned – at a cost of US\$1.8 billion¹⁵ has brought about an over-supply and over-capacity. In addition, this expenditure has been borne almost exclusively by the state (Haferburg, 2011). Although five World Cup stadiums were used for the 2013 African Cup of Nations tournament, which on the whole drew large crowds, the lack of popular support for PSL sides when they play at the newly built stadiums¹⁶ has seen poor attendances. The only exception to this usually is when Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates, the ‘big two’ of South African football, play.

The next section of this chapter will address the place of sustainability and CSR strategy in the context of the World Cup and stadium development.

Sustainability and CSR

Sport and non-sport organizations globally over recent years have become more focused on the social and environmental impacts they generate for communities and the planet. Subsequently mega-sport organizations such as the IOC and FIFA have stated that they aspire to be responsible when it comes to managing the potential negative impacts generated by their events (Frawley & Adair, 2013). The place and relevance of environmentally sustainable practices, under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility (CSR), has recently received increased attention in the realm of sport. CSR and sustainability are interchangeable concepts that refer to ‘the manner in which businesses manage their economic, social, and environmental impacts as well as their stakeholder relationships in their key areas of influence: the workplace, the marketplace, the supply chain, the community, and public policy realm’ (John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2008). Another related and growing concept, that of, the

'Green Economy', is said to generate 'improved human well-being and social equality, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities' (UNEP, 2011, p. 16). Green economies are promoted as being typically low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive. This viewpoint parallels closely the management concept of 'triple bottom line' accounting.

The hosting of mega-sport events and all the associated activities that take place before, during and after can cause damage to the local physical environment. This could occur through the development and operations of expensive facilities and venues, the use of non-renewable resources and building materials, or the production and disposal of products consumed as part of the event, to name just a few things (Jaggerman, 2003). Thus for events like the World Cup and the Olympic Games that construct many new facilities and venues, the potential for environmental damage can be far greater than for other sections of the sport industry (Zhang et al., 2013). Reducing the negative impact of these events through sustainable strategies and practices has become an immediate concern not only for many mega-event stakeholders, but also for the major sponsors who often have their own CSR strategies that they pursue and who want to be associated with events that have positive rather than negative impacts (Frawley & Cush, 2011; Frawley & Van den Hoven, 2014; Veal et al., 2012).

Sustainability and mega-sport events

Given the high media profile and coverage of the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games, both events are an obvious target for environmental lobbyists if the event organizers fail to show the necessary sensitivity to managing potentially negative environmental and societal impacts. The catalyst for this environmental focus emerged in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (United Nations, 1992). From this period the push to embrace sustainable practices for large-scale sport events has centred on integrating socially and environmentally responsible decision-making throughout the planning, organization, implementation and operations of such events as the World Cup (City of Cape Town, 2010).

Holistically, sustainability practices involve contributing to greater social integration and the continued development of individuals, communities, and relationships between society and the environment. It includes adopting sustainable principles and practices at all levels of event organization and venue management, in an integrated manner,

and involving all key stakeholders, such as clients, organizers, venues, subcontractors and suppliers (Republic of South Africa, 2011). According to the Sustainability Mega Events report (Republic of South Africa, 2011), sustainability policies and practices in mega-sporting events typically aim to achieve the following:

- To improve the resource efficiency of the entire event and supply chain management;
- To reduce negative environmental impacts, such as carbon emissions and waste;
- To enhance economic impact, such as local investment and long-term viability;
- To strengthen social impact, such as community involvement and fair employment;
- To present opportunities for more efficient planning and use of equipment and infrastructure;
- To reduce the negative impact on local inhabitants;
- To protect the local biodiversity, water and soil resources;
- To apply the principles of eco-procurement of goods and services;
- To raise awareness of sustainability issues.

Similarly, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) adopted criteria stating that economic, social and environmental dimensions must be integrated to meet the challenges of six priority areas: climate change, disasters and conflict, ecosystem management, environmental governance, harmful substances and efficient use of natural resources. UNEP has been an important entity in educating, advocating and promoting the proper use and sustainable development of the global environment and has been working on sports and environment issues since 1994 (UNEP, 2007).

Since this earlier period the sustainable practices adopted by mega-sport event organizers has become more formalized. The IOC moved before FIFA in this regard, taking the lead in 1994 when they recognized the critical role of environmental and sustainable development. In 1996, a clause on environmental protection was added to the Olympic Charter; this stated that the IOC's role was 'to encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly' (IOC, 2013, p. 16).

The massive costs associated with hosting an event like the World Cup has often been justified in the past by the economic and social

benefits the event is forecasted to bring to the host nation (Varrell & Kennedy, 2011). Today environmental sustainable development is also a central pillar in promoting bids for these events. However, while there has been an increase in experience and expertise in environmentally sustainable practices and strategy development, the monitoring of these policies in practice by event-governing bodies such as FIFA and the IOC has been far from comprehensive. Particular criticism, for instance, has been made over how genuinely environmentally friendly past World Cups and Olympics have been and whether it has been rather simply a 'green-washing' exercise (Fitschen, 2006; Dolles & Soderman, 2010).

Sustainability and the Football World Cup

Through its worldwide reach, the FIFA World Cup offers a unique platform to raise awareness and highlight selected social and environmental concerns on a global scale. Sustainability became a major focus for FIFA when Federico Addiechi was appointed as the person in charge of CSR. The first FIFA World Cup with a sustainability agenda was Germany 2006, with the implementation of the Green Goal Programme, aimed at reducing the adverse effects on the environment associated with organizing the World Cup to the greatest possible extent. Green Goal was an integral part of the planning and organizing of the event and made a significant contribution towards the 'sustainable legacy' of that World Cup (FIFA, 2010b, p. 9).

Since then, FIFA has been working towards a plan to achieve its mission of building a better future by challenging the negative environmental and social impact of football (Neirotti et al., 2011). Football for the Planet is the continuation of environmental initiatives that have been implemented for FIFA competitions since the 2006 World Cup. Football for the Planet is the official environmental programme of FIFA and aims to minimize the negative impact of its activities and tournaments on the environment (FIFA, 2014b). The key focus areas of the programme include waste, energy, transportation, procurement and climate change. FIFA has developed a direct and concise strategy divided up into five core areas (FIFA 2014a):

The People: Providing a safe and healthy working environment for all of their people.

The Game: Ensuring that the game of football reflects the highest values of society. Through its regulations and actions on and off the

pitch, FIFA fights negative influences on the game and ensures that the fundamental values are respected.

The Events: Organised tournaments and events act as exceptional platforms to raise awareness, highlight particular issues and implement projects and campaigns on the ground.

The Society: Provides football related resources and engage with its member associations, commercial affiliates, development agencies and others to bring further resources and know-how to the grassroots level.

The Planet: Addressing issues such as global warming, environmental conservation and sustainable management. Engage with stakeholders and other institutions to find sensible ways of addressing environmental issues and mitigate the negative environmental impacts linked to its activities.

In addition to the strategy outlined above further sustainability programs were devised for the 2010 and 2014 World Cups. An overview of these programs is provided below:

Sustainability and the 2010 World Cup

Green Goal: The Green Goal Action Plan was committed to making the 2010 World Cup environmentally and socially sustainable (FIFA, 2010b). The key aspects of the Green Goal Action Plan included the reduction, reuse and recycling of waste, the promotion of energy-efficient and universally accessible mobility with minimal carbon footprint and the promotion of environmental awareness, sustainable lifestyles and environmentally efficient buildings. Unfortunately, the Green Goal programme was a huge disappointment for the 2010 World Cup (Death, 2011). It was the most carbon-intensive World Cup ever and, unfortunately, efforts at mitigation were relatively haphazard. Specifically, the total carbon footprint was 2,753,250 tonnes of CO₂, eight times the carbon footprint of the 2006 World Cup in Germany (Death, 2011; Republic of South Africa, 2011).

Football for Hope: FIFA promotes the use of football as a tool for social change through its Football for Hope initiative (FIFA, 2010a). The Football for Hope Movement was established by FIFA and Streetfootballworld as a key element of their existing alliance to increase the impact of football as a tool for social development, peace and social change. 'Twenty Centres for 2010' was the official campaign of the 2010 World Cup, which aimed to create 20 Football for Hope Centres across Africa to promote public

health, education and football in disadvantaged communities (FIFA, 2010a). In November 2013, with the opening of the Alexandra Football for Hope Centre in South Africa, FIFA is nearing completion of this regional legacy campaign (FIFA, 2013b). The FIFA Football for Hope 20 Centres for 2010 initiative was considered a success on many levels. As a result of the campaign, the centres have been able to improve education and health services for over 70,000 young people in disadvantaged areas across 16 countries in Africa (FIFA, 2013b).

Sustainability and the 2014 World Cup

There were five specific areas of focus for the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil. They include the following (FIFA, 2014c):

Climate Change: Estimation of the carbon footprint of the tournament and the development of measures to avoid, reduce and offset its emissions.

Green Venues: Most of the FIFA World Cup stadiums in Brazil are aiming to achieve LEED certification for green buildings. Many are installing solar panels on the roofs to generate renewable energy. Additionally, FIFA and the LOC have organized certified training courses on sustainable management for stadium operators. This legacy will last beyond the World Cup but also the life of the venue beyond that (ENS, 2013).

Waste Management in stadiums: A new waste law in Brazil aims to better control the handling and destination of waste. FIFA and the LOC are working to ensure that waste management in stadiums and other venues are dealt with according to the new regulations and will promote recycling in collaboration with local organizations. For example, with the support of the 2014 World Cup mascot Fuelco, signage has been developed to inform spectators about how to discard their waste in the two-bin system.

Community Sport: Through FIFA's Football for Hope initiative, FIFA and the LOC support organizations that are tackling social challenges in their communities with the aid of football.

Capacity Development: Also through its Football for Hope initiatives, FIFA is organizing various forums for community-based organizations in Brazil and worldwide to discuss and exchange ideas on the effective use of football as a tool to tackle social challenges.

Issues and considerations of sustainability practices in mega-events

In light of the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, it is relevant to examine sustainable mega-events in developing countries. The hosting of mega-events has a tremendous effect on developing and emerging countries. These can be positive in terms of economic investment, job creation, skill development and international branding but can also be negative in terms of their environmental footprint, for example, via carbon emissions caused by international visitors travelling to the event (Republic of South Africa, 2011).

One challenge facing sustainable practices is the maintenance of these initiatives after the World Cup is complete. The primary reason that CSR programs are unsuccessful after a World Cup is a lack of available funding. Securing long-term sustainable funding is necessary in order to make sure that the programs will have the desired long-term impact on the community.

Preuss (2013) outlines a number of ways to ensure that the environmental sustainability programs and promises of mega-sporting events can be fulfilled:

1. The governments of host nations must take responsibility for controlling the long-term use of venues and all green activities involved in the event. In other words, the responsibility must be moved from the temporary LOC to a permanent government agency.
2. Utilize media 'hype' around the event to increase pressure on the organizers. Frequent media reports on environmental issues can assist in educating the host population to increase their sensitivity towards environmental sustainability initiatives.

Conclusion

In order to realize the potential of mega-sport events, it must be understood that cities, governments and institutions at the state, national and international levels all have important roles to play. Partner and sponsor CSR programs also play an important role in the overall impact of mega-sporting events. Overall, mega-sport events such as the Football World Cup create a significant impact on the environment and it is necessary for organizations that are charged with developing large stadiums address environmental and planning concerns thoroughly. Over the coming years the strategies of organizations like FIFA will not only

guide efforts towards staging more sustainable events but ultimately contribute to building a better future for the nations that are fortunate to host the Football World Cup.

Notes

1. As listed by FIFA (2013). Reported World Cup final attendances have often exceeded these figures.
2. Colombia withdrew as hosts in November 1982.
3. No final was held although the winner of the last pool match between Brazil and Uruguay decided who would win the World Cup. This is often erroneously referred to as the final.
4. Originally slated for 1942, no World Cup took place due to World War Two.
5. Competition originally planned for 1949 however rescheduled to 1950 following an Executive Committee request.
6. Known as gridiron in some countries.
7. South Korea.
8. Rather it could be argued the main beneficiary of USA 94 was the start of Major League Soccer (MLS) in 1996.
9. Japanese second division.
10. Now named Red Bull Arena, the venue has a new team called RB Leipzig which is climbing its way up the German football pyramid and is currently in 2. Bundesliga – the second division – following consecutive promotions. This on-field success has witnessed a massive spike in their crowds.
11. Lux is the unit of illuminance in lumen/ m² 1 lux = 1 lumen/m² Lumen is the spectral power distribution of a lamp weighted by the eye sensitivity curve.
12. For in-depth discussion see Alegi (2008); Swart & Bob (2012); Swart & Bob (2009).
13. The new World Cup stadium is positioned diagonally opposite the Kings Park Stadium with a railway yard as a buffer in between.
14. The top division of South African league football
15. 2010 dollar value.
16. Unlike many other football leagues, PSL sides often play at more than one 'home' ground throughout a season.

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8

Beyond the Stadium: Football World Cup Fan Fests and Global Live Sites

Simone Eisenhauer, Daryl Adair and Tracy Taylor

Introduction

Sport mega-events have involved the transformation and privatization of urban public spaces (for example, along roads, around tourist sites and icons, and the skies above venues), including the creation of so-called 'clean zones' in which the event host is given exclusive use of what was previously public space.¹ Sport mega-events have also involved the creation of temporary spaces – public viewing areas (PVAs) – which are spectator spaces with huge TV screens, targeted towards fans who wish to view an event but who do not have a ticket for stadium entry. PVAs, as open-air spectator events with free admission, have become particularly attractive for the organizers of international football tournaments and their host cities in recent years.

In view of the above, this chapter focuses on the structures, policies and strategic management of PVAs in the urban environment – namely the FIFA Fan Fests (FFFs) in the context of three international football sites: Germany, South Africa and Brazil. In view of the vast urbanization of mega-events (Klauser, 2008a), un-ticketed event spaces are particularly interesting, as they are more difficult to manage – audience numbers are less predictable than at stadia – and, given the emergent nature of these themed spaces, there is a lack of clarity about the protocols used to minimize risk of harm or injury to participants. Moreover, these environments have distinctive security and commercial protocols. Indeed, such spaces have become valuable for event owners and organizers as an extended marketing platform. Therefore, a *combination* of security management policies and commercial protocols in 'open' public spaces has driven the rationale for this research study.

In addition, Matheson and Baade (2003) and Haferburg and Steinbrink (2010), have independently suggested that there is a need to investigate whether the prevailing interpretations of sport mega-events in industrialized nations apply to the same degree to nations in the developing and newly industrialized world. Since both developing and newly industrialized nations (for example, South Africa, Brazil) have started hosting sport mega-events, other event risks and threats may prevail (such as crime or strikes), and therefore security measures and risk priorities are deemed to vary according to nation, geopolitical circumstances and development status (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010). Thus, the following sections reveal the origins of purpose of FFFs in Germany 2006, and their associated security and commercial protocols. Then, the expansion of the FFF concept to 'live sites' during the World Cup in South Africa in 2010 is investigated. Finally, plans for both FFFs and multiple 'lives sites' in Brazil and around the world in 2014 are examined. A key theme hereafter is FIFA's strategies relating to security and commercialization of these spaces.

Origins of FIFA Fan Fest in Germany 2006

PVAs in football are not new. During the mid-1960s, 'in many countries loudspeakers transmitted [football] commentaries into complete suburbs and villages, and television viewers gathered to watch the matches in public squares' (FIFA, 2004, p. 263). However, the heavily commercialized type of themed sport consumption zones that first appeared at the 2002 World Cup in South Korea and Japan constituted a new 'culture of viewing', a combination of the two established types of experience of visiting a stadium and watching TV (Schulke, 2006, p. 20).

During the 2006 World Cup in Germany, public viewing en masse was declared to be an official, integral part of the tournament. People unable to attend the spectacle live were spatially accommodated and provided with a visual spectacle of the direct telecast of games via giant television screens and loudspeakers. The main characteristics were the new, technologically sophisticated LED-walls that are easy to set up and dismantle, and which also transfer something of the stadium atmosphere to a large crowd away from the ground. Public viewing simply means the television broadcasting of sporting events in public places. Giving ticketless fans the chance to watch the matches is, however, only one of the purposes of PVAs. This is also about designing spaces for consumption: inner-city areas and event precincts have been developed and themed to become an important component of World Cup footprints.

The invention of the term PVA goes back to the German sports sociologist and former Coordinator of the Sports Minister Conference of the German Provinces, Hans-Jürgen Schulke (Schulke, 2006). The underlying goal and assumptions of the PVA concept were described as a spatial strategy to control public order, since too many fans would have been left without tickets (there were only three million tickets and 50 million requests). Moreover, German cities realized that they could not gain any positive host image effect through the broadcasting of matches in the stadia alone, due to the sterilization and standardization of design and advertisements within venues (Schulke, 2007).

FIFA was at first uncertain as to whether this concept would appropriately complement the Football World Cup brand (Schulke, 2006). FIFA questioned whether the population would take up these spaces; it also expressed concerns about security issues, the spectre of football hooliganism, and whether broadcasting and loudspeaker technology were adequate for the task at hand (Schulke, 2006). FIFA also questioned the PVA concept as a threat to the image of the whole event – ‘the worst case scenario would be vacant places with FIFA badges, used by some drunks who throw beer bottles at the video screens’ (Schulke, 2007, p. 40). FIFA was also concerned about the commercial exclusivity of official sponsors ‘that needed to be protected at all costs’ [translated by lead author] (Schulke, 2006). Accordingly, FIFA initially had reservations about the PVA concept (Schulke, 2007).

It was only after the idea of the ‘World Cup in the market place’ was clearly outlined by the German cities, and the subsequent offer from ‘Sportfive’ (competing with FIFA partner Infront) to implement and finance PVAs in the host cities, that FIFA became more serious in its negotiations and finally accepted the new football mediating model (Schulke, 2007). In 2004, the FIFA Fan Fest (FFF) concept was jointly developed by FIFA and its partners along with the German host cities. Approximately 9.5 million people visited the ‘FIFA Fan Mile’ in Berlin over the duration of the tournament. This greatly exceeded FIFA’s expectations, with President Blatter praising the PVAs as though they were his own invention (Schulke, 2006).

Although FIFA did not invent the PVA concept per se, it recognized the marketing potential of these themed open spaces (Schulke, 2007). Some commentators have actually been critical of the power that FIFA has been able to wield in PVAs. Eick (2010) has stated that FIFA’s (transient) occupation of public urban space during the 2006 World Cup was an attempt to glean exclusive rights for ground-advertisement space for official sponsors beyond the confines of the stadium. Cornelissen

(2009) concurred, noting that PVAs were a strategic extension of the already extensive tournament, broadening the economic base of FIFA and its sponsors. The event owner, FIFA, profits from the 'fan city' in multiple ways: as a themed extension of the event area, as both stage and backdrop, as experience and consumption area, and also as a result of advertising media and sponsor display (Hagemann, 2008). Indeed, PVAs helped push forward FIFA's power to materially and symbolically produce its own, commercially themed urban environment (Klauser, 2008a).

Schulke (2008, p. 10) has stated that the basic spatial idea of PVAs is the 'market place ... amalgam of education and adventure vacation'. Further, he noted that 2006 was the first time that 'cultural behaviour has interspersed itself in a variety of ways, idea-rich and without resistance' [translated by lead author]. Schulke (2007, p. 15) described public viewing as 'the third dimension of watching sport events beside the stadiums and the TV at home', noting that 'The open area offers chances to organize your own big party outside the every-day-life and the rituals within a stadium' (p. 13). He pointed to a 'symbiosis of fan and flaneur ('Flan'), who is on one hand full of patience and enthusiasm for top-level sport and in the same moment able to find distance to the event and to enjoy it like a gourmet and a global citizen' (p. 14). Unlike the fortified stadium, PVAs are event-specific, temporary locations or mini 'sports cities'. PVAs ultimately gain greater significance as technological developments to make them more economical, flexible, short-term and experience-intensive increase (Schulke, 2007).

Haferburg et al. (2008) have classified four different PVAs in the 2006 World Cup context. First, the FFF occupied the most prominent place next to the stadium: it was in the CBD close to transportation and was an iconic sight. This was one of the few places in which host cities could present their historical and regional profile (Schulke, 2008). Second, the official municipal PVAs are normally in a closed space, such as a (non-playing) stadium or entertainment centre. The third category consists of other formal (local) PVAs, such as commercial events in shopping malls. Finally, the fourth category consists of informal places where public viewing takes place (for example, a spontaneous crowd of people gathered around a TV on the street). In each of these cases, all PVAs were public, meaning there was no general restriction of access. The size of crowd also varied from a handful of spectators in a pub to tens of thousands of fans at bigger outside locations.

While these spaces of 'virtual fandom' (Weed, 2007) can be tailored to specific marketing or tourism planning objectives (Haferburg, 2011;

Hagemann, 2010), they can also encourage a 'feel-good effect' for residents (Allmers & Maennig, 2008, 2009; Du Plessis & Maennig, 2010; Maennig & Du Plessis, 2007; Maennig & Porsche, 2008), contribute to a 'peaceful atmosphere' (Schulke, 2006), and revitalize urban public spaces (Golka & Selter, 2010; Haferburg et al., 2009). So, notwithstanding the critical perspectives of both Eick and Cornelissen (discussed above), some scholars have also pointed to virtues and benefits associated with PVAs.

However, requirements around security, safety and surveillance can become costly for the staging cities, especially in developing countries (Cornelissen, 2009). For example, German hosting cities for the 2006 World Cup were confronted with substantial costs for fencing, CCTV, safety personnel, cleaning and entrance regulation. For the 2011 Women's Football World Cup, Frankfurt poured approximately US\$13 million into PVAs as part of its destination marketing (The Local Europe, 2011).

At the 2006 World Cup, for example, inexpensive, low-key security strategies were devised, founded on the principle of positively engaging those who assemble within public spaces, rather than pathologizing as inherently problematic (Stott & Pearson, 2006). Baasch (2009) has noted that, at the 2006 World Cup, identity checks and public surveillance increased in public spaces, but policing was low-profile and dispersed in order to avoid an impression that authorities were 'in the face' of fans. The overarching philosophy was for police officials to engage with any incidents of public nuisance in a de-escalating manner, and to work closely with fan advisors to avoid serious breaches of the peace (Baasch, 2009). These fan advisors formed part of Germany's 'Nationale Konzept für Sport und Sicherheit' ('National Concept for Sport and Safety/Security'), which combined initiatives at various levels to ensure a common approach to prevent fan violence. As McMichael (2012) has pointed out, policing measures at the 2006 World Cup were constrained by 'proportionality', as planners aimed to keep the spectacle of sport in the spotlight, with security as an assurance (or warning) in the background. It has been argued that this strategy was particularly important in the German World Cup context. There is evidence that 'in your face' anti-hooliganism deterrence measures can be counterproductive, producing the phenomenon known as 'Lüchow-Dannenberg Syndrome', which means military-style policing and resistance to such authority regressing into protracted civil conflict (Giulianotti & Klausner, 2011).

In the 2006 World Cup context, Baasch (2009) observed that prior to the event, both German economic actors and the German Association

of Cities criticized the strict sponsorship rights protection measures planned by FIFA, which banned local products in PVAs. Only after intervention by the German Organising Committee did FIFA eventually allow the sale of non-sponsor products in these spaces. As this chapter will show, this is in contrast to the 2010 World Cup, where there were extensive/significant commercial restrictions within FIFA-accredited PVAs and CRZs (Haferburg et al., 2009).

In view of the above, Eick (2010) has suggested that not only do sponsors have a voice in the matter of how the tournament is portrayed and marketed in the media, but they also directly influence a country's/city's security policies and urban development. Eick (2010) has noted that security officials even policed the food brands sold at the PVAs during the 2006 World Cup. Thus, FIFA and its sponsors have certain powers to influence security operations and policing techniques within the host cities' themed event spaces. Notably, all costs associated with security measures are borne by the LOC and/or the government. Hence, FIFA makes no financial contribution to the securitization efforts that were required to operationalize the event and safeguard the World Cup brand, FIFA's reputation as an event owner, and the sponsors' commercial interests.

Some scholars have critiqued 'risk discourses' propagated by the media, concluding that the media itself has helped to legitimize substantial increases in surveillance, tightened control over public spaces and other precautionary security measures (Baasch, 2009; Yu et al., 2007). For example, at the 2006 World Cup, heightened security measures in PVAs in Hamburg's inner-city area were presented by official organizers to the local and national media with the argument that the additional 'precautions' were necessary in a venue that was not ticketed (Baasch, 2009).

Expansion of the FFF concept to 'live sites' during South Africa 2010

At the 2010 World Cup, the phenomenon of FFFs was not exclusive to the host nation: beyond that, the event was staged simultaneously in 16 venues across five continents. Official FFFs were staged in six international cities: Berlin, Mexico City, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney (FIFA, n.d.). The main criteria to be a 'chosen city', which automatically translated into a 'world-class' status, were the passion for and popularity of football in the country and the demographic characteristics of the population, both of which were expected to underpin the

local assembly of big crowds (FIFA, 2010). Not only did FIFA expand to other live sites internationally but to its official sponsors. For example, Hyundai describe their PVA concept on their website as follows:

Inspired by the previous Hyundai Fan Park staged during the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cups, Hyundai is expanding Hyundai Fan Park beyond the host country shores to major football capitals around the world thus further elevating the fun and Hyundai's visibility. To be staged in the major cities of the qualifying countries, Hyundai Fan Park will convey thrills and excitement to fans worldwide. (Hyundai, n.d.)

In South Africa, FFFs were themed with the FIFA brand and sponsors' commercial messages. In Cape Town, the logos of FIFA's corporate partners adorned the advertising boards surrounding the FFF, which consisted of two main areas: reserved and general. The *reserved area* was exclusively for sponsor advertising and sales of FIFA merchandise, and included the official World Cup shop. It was the prime area around, in front of and behind any giant screen and main stage of the FFF, in particular the main screen, and within line of sight of the screens and stages as determined by FIFA. The *general area* was defined as the remaining area of the FFF. In this space, it was possible for other City of Cape Town (CoCT) entities (third party exhibitors) to establish a modest on-site presence, so long as their products and services did not compromise those of World Cup sponsors (FIFA, 2009). Cape Town also had the opportunity to develop additional on-site branding (that is, promoting tourism), albeit under FIFA's supervision (FIFA, 2009d). Cornelissen (2010) has stated that World Cup branding regulations are rigidly imposed on hosts, determining how far they may go in linking local promotional or community campaigns to the event or FIFA brand. Also, she notes that sponsorship agreements between an association, such as FIFA, and external corporations can further constrict the ability of host cities to present their destination in specific ways or source investments from other corporations. If the host city's interests were to conflict with the interests of the FIFA partner or sponsor the latter would decide.

The FFF could safely host up to 25,000 people (CoCT, 2009; Keepile, 2010; PGWC, 2011). The goal was to enhance fans' experience through the consumption of entertainment, food, beverages and merchandise. This was pursued by offering a range of hybrid consumption activities: watching live match broadcasts, laser light displays, an interactive activity zone, popular local bands, entertainers and DJs, food and

refreshment stalls, art and crafts, and branded merchandise at the official FIFA Fan Store (News24, 2010).

Safety and security in and around the FFF was controlled by many different key stakeholders: CP Event Security, World Sport, SAPS, CoCT Traffic Services, Metro Police Services, CCID-supplied officers, CoCT Disaster Management unit, and other private security companies (Bolt Security, DC Security, Usania Security). Moreover, hot spots, in conjunction with visible policing, were identified as one of the key strategies in this research context, which demonstrated the fragmented security approach.

An event manual compiled and distributed by the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2009) outlined how to run a FFF. For simple crowd management, the location of the FFF had to be 'sufficiently far from the Match Venue' (FIFA, 2009). This was to ensure that the spectators going to the match venue and those to the Fan Park did not merge, thus minimizing 'traffic congestion on match days' (FIFA, 2009d). FIFA also prepared a document entitled General Public Viewing Guidelines, which were underscored by FIFA's Rights Protection Programme (RPP). Special advertising guidelines also applied to a 100-metre radius around the FFF (see FIFA, 2009d). This accords with Nash and Johnstone's (2012) argument that major sponsoring companies' involvement with the World Cup not only deepened the commercial character of the event, but also gave a more prominent role to those corporations in determining aspects such as branding or imaging parameters.

The success of FIFA's RPP depended on two major strategies: first, FIFA attaches importance to sufficient protection from ambush marketing activities being available under the laws of the host country and respective cities. While neither SAFA, the South African government, the host cities nor other third parties were entitled to undertake any marketing program, FIFA required specific legislation to be passed at all relevant governmental levels to protect its brand and its sponsors' rights.

Second, the RPP depended on the implementation of PVAs and clean zones. The spatially based strategies served the event owner and its sponsors as an extended marketing platform. It also meant that not only commercial rules applied to these spaces, but also FIFA's strict security requirements, hence 'ensuring the event footprint was extremely safe' (CTP, 2010a, p. 11). Thus, in order to control and monitor design, public order, nuisance behaviour and social movements more efficiently, and to protect against ambush marketing and unauthorized commercial activities, by-laws were passed in all major South African cities. These by-laws impacted on individuals and entrepreneurs, and included prohibitions or restrictions on advertising and trading.

The media strategy encompassed an over-emphasis on security legacies to the public, an exaggeration of 'fun' security for all 'civilized' patrons in South Africa, implementation of a PR program for media representatives, and introduction of spatial restrictions and other media accreditation restrictions into the 2010 World Cup organization processes. FIFA's media restrictions in particular were meant to enhance FIFA's profit-making mentality, by protecting commercial rights and brand names through extensive coverage of the FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town. Thus, considerable care was taken to ensure that coverage of every feature of the World Cup reflected a positive view of the FIFA brand, its sponsors, Cape Town and South Africa respectively.

Plans for FFF and live sites in Brazil 2014

Brazil and South Africa have broadly similar social and political challenges, including the transitional nature of their societies, rapid rates of socioeconomic change, high levels of crime and associated violence, and a complex securitization terrain (Giulianotti & Klauser, 2010; Gaffney, 2010). For these nations, hosting a mega-event is often first and foremost a political project, undertaken by elites to strengthen the state and to promote societal transformation (Black, 2008; Cornelissen, 2010). After winning the bid for the 2007 Pan American Games in 2002, Rio de Janeiro's state and city governments combined with the Brazilian national government to spend more than 5 billion reals on stadium construction and renovation, transportation, and communications infrastructure modernization (Curi et al., 2011). This vast expenditure excludes a US\$300 million outlay for increased security, including the provision of 18,000 extra police and the installation of 1,700 security cameras around the city (Gaffney, 2010). In a city marked by crime and violence, this measure went towards achieving the image of a world-class city that authorities were attempting to portray, as well as to showcasing Rio's (and Brazil's) ability to host mega-events like the World Cup and the Olympic Games.

Brazil featured three types of PVAs: non-commercial venues (characterized by public displays with televisions or screens installed in public and non-public venues with a capacity of less than 5,000 people); non-commercial special PVAs (venues with greater than a 5,000 person capacity); and commercial PVAs with sponsorship, giveaways, and either direct or indirect entrance fee. While the organizers of the first two types required no registration the third category required payment

of a licence fee (FIFA, n.d.). The locations of the official FFFs in the twelve Host Cities were confirmed in April 2012. The former Brazilian footballer Ronaldo was enthusiastic, believing that:

The FIFA Fan Fest symbolises the most exciting part of football and the FIFA World Cup: thousands of fans gathered to watch a match together and celebrate. The FIFA Fan Fest brings together people from all social backgrounds. As Brazilians, we have always had the custom of cheering for our national team in large popular festivals all over the country, therefore I'm sure that this will be the best FIFA Fan Fest of all time. (FIFA, n.d.)

Nevertheless, in June 2013 during the Confederations Cup more than one million people took to the streets in Brazil's biggest demonstrations for a generation. Police used tear gas and rubber bullets near all six venues in clashes with protesters. Protesters said public funds should be spent on education and health services rather than a sporting event. Some sponsors reduced their visibility during the Confederations Cup (Panja, 2014). For example, Coca-Cola covered up with black plastic a building featuring an oversize bottle of the soft drink. Thus, Jerome Valcke, Secretary General of the International Football Federation, explained that some FFFs are likely to be moved for security reasons: 'Following what has happened last June with all the demonstrations, and for security issues, we are always open to move from the first location to another location which is safer for security' (Panja, 2014). Valcke announced that the FFF in the capital, Brasilia, where some of the most violent clashes occurred during the Confederations Cup, would be moved to a more secure location (Panja, 2014).

In order to implement FIFA's guarantees and conditions, on 6 June 2013 the Brazilian Congress enacted the 'General World Cup Law' (*Lei Geral da Copa*). Since its proposal, this controversial law has generated debate among legal and political scholars. High-profile discussions resulted in a presidential veto regarding the following aspects of the law: relaxation of volunteerism rules, new restrictions for issuing tourist visas and control of ticket sale policies (Barricelli, 2013). It is not surprising that such a challenge was filed amidst the backdrop of a wave of public demonstrations against the estimated \$14 billion spent on developing infrastructure for the World Cup while public services such as hospitals, schools and public transport remained of poor quality. The tournament's unpopularity at this time was exacerbated by additional FIFA requirements. These included, for example, temporarily suspending

the Brazilian ban on the sale of alcohol in stadia, FIFA's opposition to a 50 per cent discount on match tickets to students, pensioners, the disabled and people on social welfare, and FIFA restricting local businesses from trading in spaces around the stadia (radius of 2km). FIFA was accused of a lack of willingness to understand Brazilians' passions and culture. On the other side of the coin, FIFA insisted that such restrictions were necessary to ensure adequate investment from sponsors (Majithia, 2013).

At Brazil 2014, FIFA TV was responsible for the management of the public viewing rights to FIFA events, including the licensing of these events under given guidelines. To protect the rights of the FIFA media rights licensees (MRLs) and Commercial Affiliates, FIFA TV assessed all requests for public viewing. FIFA TV supports the first stage of communication between the requesting exhibitor and the MRL of the relevant country for the provision of the signal and the public viewing licence in accordance with the local laws and regulations (FIFA, n.d.). V Globo, the Official Broadcaster of the 2014 World Cup, is duly authorized by FIFA to issue Public Viewing Event licences in relation to any matches of the 2014 World Cup (FIFA, n.d.).

For live sites in other countries, FIFA put in place a special arrangement with the Official Broadcaster for the 2014 World Cup in the relevant territory. In these countries the request for a licence needs to be submitted to the Official Broadcaster only and no further licence from FIFA is required. In Germany, for instance, ARD and ZDF, Official Broadcasters for the 2014 World Cup, agreed to provide their consent for the use of their TV signal for public viewing events.

Summary

The Football World Cup 'field of play' extends beyond the stadium-based football matches. Hagemann (2008, 2010) has pointed out that fan experiences are increasingly encompassing a range of sites and events within the host city. Inner-city areas and event precincts have been developed and themed and become important components of the World Cup. Since 2002, FIFA has extended its event footprint from the stadia in the host cities to the CRZs that surround them, and, from 2006 onwards, to PVAs. The underlying purpose of the PVA concept was initially a spatial strategy to manage public order, since too many fans would have been left without tickets at the 2006 World Cup in Germany (there were only three million tickets and 50 million requests). Beyond these logistics, though, German cities realized that they could gain positive image effects beyond just the broadcasting of matches in the stadia,

which tend to be constrained by rather sterile designs and standardization of advertising space (Schulke 2007). The off-site concepts have given FIFA, World Cup sponsors and the host country/city a broader platform to display their brands and enhance their commercial footprint. Since 2010, international 'world cities' staged official PVAs and CRZs outside the borders of South Africa, so they have a global imprint beyond the mega-event-hosting nation.

Government policies, decisions and actions associated with staging of the 2006, 2010 and 2014 World Cups reflected new forms of neoliberal urban governance in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitization. FIFA's requirements for the host city facilitated decisions about public and private spaces that redefined public policies and rules. Intensification of spatial and social fragmentation and greater exclusion resulted; in other words, the evidence demonstrates the phenomenon of the 'FIFA-ization' of public space. While this exploratory study has produced sufficient evidence to justify the need for further research in this area of sport mega-events, it also highlights that the interface between security and commercialization is complex and defies easy generalization.

Note

1. Clean zones are subject to a variety of special regulation and policing methods, as competition is restricted to those businesses legally authorized to sell and advertise (e.g., official event sponsors).

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9

Managing Transport at the Football World Cup

Eva Kassens-Noor

Introduction

Nations that host the Football World Cup are confronted with four fundamental planning challenges when managing transport.

1. *FIFA evaluates transportation 10 hours before and 10 hours after the match (Interview FIFA head for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, 2013)*
Preparing for arrival peaks before match kick-off and departure peaks after the final whistle (the first fixed, the latter may vary depending on over time and penalty shoot-outs) requires high-capacity one-way transport options and timing flexibility on the local, intra-city, transport system in all cities that host World Cup fixtures.
2. *World Cups are national events*
Fans need to get out of one and into another host city quickly, in order to follow their favoured national team. Consequently, the success of handling hundreds of thousands of visitors depends not only on good local, intra-city connectivity, but also on regional, inter-city connectivity across a variety of transport modes.
3. *Planning public transportation to the soccer stadia only will not suffice*
As the World Cup has grown in size and scale, cities increasingly have to prepare for fans, who watch the matches in public viewing areas spread across the host cities. For example, in Germany over 27 million people gathered at public viewing sites (Frank & Steets, 2010). Based on the successful German concept ‘World Cup on the Market Square’ (Schulke, 2007), FIFA decided ‘fan fests’ will be part of all future World Cups. Subsequently, over six million people attended the 2010 public viewing events across the world.

4. *Unlike any other sport in the world, football polarizes*

Fiery rivalries require careful planning for safe transportation; poor fan behaviour especially can lead to public disorder on a large scale. Consequently, transport has to be team and opponent-dependent.

World Cup transport statistics

The starting point for transportation planning should be based upon an accurate prediction of local spectators, not ticket holders. While the upper bound for ticketed spectators is fairly easy to estimate (sum of the maximum capacity of all stadiums), the non-ticketed spectators are much harder to predict. While the ticketed spectators have averaged 3.3 million over recent World Cups, non-ticketed spectators may be six times as high (Bovy, 2011). Especially for the knock-out matches, the predictability of attendance decreases dramatically, because opponents remain unknown until a few days beforehand. The key to successful World Cup transport is flexibly streamlining and integrating international, national, regional and local peak travel flows. Figure 9.1 foreshadows the major highlights of this chapter.

Figure 9.1 lays out the major transport concept from international to local. On the international level, most visitors arrive and leave by air during the entirety of the tournament. At the national level, air transport usually remains the predominant mode of travel. Depending on the travel distances between stadia, however, long-distance ground transport can reduce the pressure on air space. At the host city level, multi-modal transportation systems with high-capacity linkages that efficiently link the stadium or stadia (few host cities have more than one) are important – to accommodation, public viewing areas and airports. Locally, a World Cup transport ring, radiating 0–5km around the stadium, emphasizes active transportation modes like walking and biking. What will become evident in this chapter is that transportation concepts and infrastructural needs greatly differ across the selected case studies (see also Haferburg, 2011). Using Germany (2006), South Africa (2010) and Brazil (2014) as examples, this chapter lays out several infrastructure and operational measures for managing transportation for the Football World Cup. Occasionally I will draw on planned concepts for Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022). Furthermore, I will focus on the exceptionality of the presented cases, explaining the differences in preparation efforts and approaches host nations took. The structure of this chapter will broadly follow Figure 9.1.




Figure 9.1 Concept for World Cup transport planning and implementation
 Source: Author.

The World Cup draws millions of visitors to a country, dispersing them across several host cities and regions. Strategically, those cities that can accommodate the largest amount of visitors stage the opening, the semi-final and final matches. When comparing stadia capacities (Figure 9.2), two observations can be made: first, the more new stadia that are required to be constructed, the lesser the average capacity of the stadia. Second, the capacity of the final match stadium has increased over time despite FIFA's minimum requirement of 60,000 seats for final and semi-final matches (FIFA, 2010).

The primary goal of transportation planning for the distinct peaks that transport demands on match days is the enhancement of infrastructural and operational capacity in the nation's and host city's transport systems. Logically, as distances between host cities increase, air travel becomes more important.

From this comparison, it is evident that Brazil faced and Russia will face the highest demand for air transport services, especially as both




Figure 9.2 Seating capacities of stadia

Source: Author, calculated from FIFA (2010) and Bovy (2011).

countries have poorly developed high-speed, long-distance, ground transport systems. South Africa faced some long-distance challenges, yet was able to rely on its ground transportation infrastructure to move fans. As shown in Figure 9.3, Qatar will be one of the most compressed World Cups ever staged, with average distances of 20 kilometres (FIFA, 2010). Qatar is undertaking vast improvements to its infrastructure (air and ground) to cope with the expected travel flows. FIFA evaluated Qatar and Russia as high-risk countries for staging the World Cup due to their poor infrastructure. However, the FIFA Executive Committee selected these two countries because they argued there was enough time to develop infrastructure to the required level (interview with the FIFA head for the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, 2013).

To date, no literature offers detailed insights into successful transport management during the Football World Cup. Researchers in general have agreed that the important requirements for staging the World Cup 'are world-class stadiums, transportation infrastructure, and public transport systems' (Tomlinson & Bass, 2009), as well as detailed planning and modelling (Shoeman, 2009; Zyryanov, 2012). Research has also highlighted transport's importance for the World Cup (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004) and critiqued past (Whitson & Horne, 2006) or




Figure 9.3 Distances between host cities (km)

Source: Author.

expected legacies (Gaffney, 2010; Malhado et al., 2013). Among scholars there is a growing consensus that mega-events need to be planned and evaluated in accordance with the imperative of social, environmental and economic sustainability (Pillay & Bass, 2008; Pillay et al., 2009; Tomlinson, 2009; van der Merwe, 2009; Bob & Kassens-Noor, 2012).

Despite this growing consensus, there is little research into the leverage World Cups can provide to host cities' urban and national development (Cornelissen, 2010, 2011; Bob & Kassens-Noor, 2012). This is striking as infrastructure demands – ranging from transport to high-tech stadia and communications networks – are greater than ever before. The cost of staging the World Cup has risen dramatically over the last 40 years (Horne, 2004; Manzenreiter & Horne, 2004). Indeed, Qatar 2022, with a planned investment estimated to top \$100 billion, is slated to be the most expensive World Cup in history (Kronfol et al., 2013). In contrast, to the World Cup literature on transport, the literature on the Olympic Games transport has significantly evolved over the past decade (Brewer & Hensher, 2001; Hensher & Brewer, 2002; Minis & Tsamboulas, 2008; Kassens-Noor, 2010, 2012, 2013). Given the space requirements of this chapter, I will highlight such literature when appropriate. Furthermore, this chapter is built upon an analysis of primary data sources from interviews with FIFA members, transportation

planning documents of several host cities, best practice strategic papers, official transport plans and post-reports on World Cup performance. Combined, I introduce measures that achieved effective transportation systems. Before diving into these measures, a brief review of the FIFA requirements for transport and the three hosts is useful.

FIFA requirements

'Transport is the lifeblood of the FIFA World Cup. It has always been identified as one of the key areas of the tournament.' Chief Executive Officer of the 2010 Organizing Committee & current president of the South African Football Association.

Any planning processes must factor in FIFA's technical requirements for stadia, media facilities, tourists, athletes and security (Alegi, 2008; Pillay et al., 2009). To help hosts prepare, FIFA has issued several explicit requirements on accommodation, stadia and transportation itself that define the World Cup transport system. First, *World Cups must be national events*. According to FIFA requirements, stadia must be spread across the bidder's national territory to represent a nation-wide event (FIFA, 2012). Stadia shall be linked by high-quality transport connections to maximize the convenience of players and offer visitors high-frequency connections and good travel speeds (interviews with senior FIFA officials, 2012). Second, *World Cup stadia should be easily accessible*. Ideally, World Cup stadia should be located in city-centres with good access to public transport, major roads and motorways and have parking that can be used by others when matches are not being played (FIFA, 2007). Third, *accommodations are served by good public transport options*. FIFA requires a minimum of 60,000 hotel rooms within the bidding country with good access to stadia and airports (FIFA, 2012).

For transportation in particular, FIFA has issued the following guidelines. Transportation is evaluated in the time-frame of ten hours before and ten hours after the match, and must be able to move at least 30,000 fans in a day. Major transport hubs are needed to efficiently move spectators away from the stadium to hotel clusters or airports (interviews with senior FIFA officials, 2012). Therefore, buses and trains must operate for at least four hours after the end of the match, while airports should be open for late night and early morning flight arrivals and departures (FIFA, 2010). Stadium access and parking for FIFA representatives and teams by car, vans and buses has to be separate from the main traffic flows of spectators (FIFA, 2007; FIFA, 2010). FIFA

expects high-quality, reliable and safe mobility and has implemented requirements accordingly, for example, a ten-minute wait-time rule for media representatives for a scheduled bus trip (Davies, 2009). Consequently, FIFA sets out a hierarchy of transport services to ensure the timely arrival of players and essential personnel, such as referees. For example, South Africa implemented a travel demand program to meet the transportation needs of various attendees. A temporary 'servicing system' with three categories was set up to ensure sufficient services. The first was designated transport for teams, VIPs and officials. The second was a premium transportation service for groups such as the media and tour operations. The third was for the general public, such as tourists and fans (Republic of South Africa, 2010).

A brief introduction to transport at the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany

Germany hosted the 18th FIFA World Cup from 9 June to 9 July 2006 in 12 cities: Berlin, Munich, Dortmund, Stuttgart, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern, Cologne, Hanover, Leipzig and Nürnberg (Federal Government Germany, 2006). Germany hosted a very compact tournament in 12 stadia with cities no further than 600 kilometres apart. However, Germany underestimated the number of foreign spectators. While the country expected one million visitors, nearly twice as many used the nation's public transit system (Stahl et al., 2004; Federal Government Germany, 2006). In addition to the match attendees, 27 million fans watched the tournament at public viewing events (Frank & Steets, 2010). But because of the existing comprehensive transport infrastructure and well-planned transit systems, host cities were able to handle the peak demands (Federal Government Germany, 2006).

The transport split between different modes was as follows: 36 per cent of fans travelled by train, 24 per cent by motor coach, 6 per cent by plane, 4 per cent by local public transit, 30 per cent by car and a very few trips made solely on foot and by bicycle. The journeys to stadiums only were conducted by public transport (57 per cent), by car (23 per cent), by coach (11 per cent), on foot and by bicycle (6 per cent), and by taxi (3 per cent). During the event, spectators travelled 1.1 billion person-kilometres. In comparison, during the 64 matches of the 'Erste Bundesliga' in 2005/06 spectators travelled 0.6 billion person-kilometres. The average distance travelled to a World Cup stadium was 160 kilometres, which is 50 kilometres more than the average to a Bundesliga match (Stahl et al. 2004).




Figure 9.4 Map of German host cities and their transport connections
Source: Author.

A brief introduction to transport at the 2010 Football World Cup in South Africa

As the first African nation in history to do so, South Africa staged the 19th FIFA World Cup from 11 June to 11 July 2010. The tournament took place in 10 venues in nine cities: Johannesburg, Cape Town,

Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Polokwane, Nelspruit, Bloemfontein and Rustenburg. Although South Africa had transport systems that were much more developed in comparison to most other African countries, significant improvements were necessary to perform at the World Cup. The 2010 transport projects were funded through the ‘Public Transport Infrastructure and System Grant’ (Republic of South Africa, 2010). In 2008 and 2009 alone, South Africa spent \$1.8 billion on roads and \$241 million on public transport (Department of National Treasury, 2009). Ultimately the country invested R15,228 million¹ in all types of transport infrastructure, while stadium and precinct development cost R9,841 million. Transport has been seen as the foremost legacy of the 2010 Football World Cup (Tomlinson, 2009). Despite rumors of difficulties over funding and timeliness arising as the World Cup approached, the transport operated without any major difficulties (Knott, 2010).

While South Africa had prepared to welcome 700,000 visitors, only 300,000 actually made their way to the nation. Locally, event-goers reported using their own car, minibuses and rented vehicles more than public transport (Izawa, 2012), meaning that public transportation was relatively underused.




Figure 9.5 Map of South African host cities and their transport connections

Source: Author.

A brief introduction to transport at the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil

Brazil hosted the 20th Football World Cup from 12 June to 13 July 2014 in 12 stadia and 12 cities: Brasília, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Cuiabá, Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Salvador and Natal. The 2014 tournament had the greatest territorial spread of the three case studies discussed here. Given that the country has no rail or good motorway coverage, most of the travel took place by plane.

As of January 2014, Brazil expected to welcome 500,000 foreign visitors. Ever since preparations for these travel flows began, Brazil had to face harsh criticisms, such as whether it will be ready to stage the World Cup and that no other host in history had been as far behind in their preparations (Rumsby, 2014). To illustrate: by June 2013, seven planned projects on airports had yet to begin, and 13 of 50 planned projects across Brazil had been cancelled (Kraul, 2013). The original plan called for more than half of all transport projects to be ready by the end of 2013 (Genasci, 2012). These delays caused costs to soar. This was particularly problematic as FIFA had continued to deny such progress delays (FIFA, 2012; Genasci, 2012; Wilson, 2012).

International and national transport systems

International travel and travel within the nation(s) rely primarily upon air transport systems and in a few instances on long-distance ground transport. As this section shows, many hosts do not have the capacity in place to handle World Cup passengers and therefore need to invest in new infrastructure and management techniques. The following section provides a brief overview of the pressures exerted by air and ground transportation requirements and how hosts have found ways to cope with them.

Air transport systems

Historically, most countries' existing air transport systems are unprepared to offer high-capacity connections between 10–12 host cities. Consequently, countries have to significantly upgrade their airports and air traffic management systems to accommodate more frequent arrivals and departures, to service larger aircraft and to handle additional passengers. For example, South Africa, Brazil and Russia had to (and will have to) extensively invest in airport infrastructure. Most international flights




Figure 9.6 Map of Brazilian host cities and their transport connections
 Source: Author.

will arrive at airports that have the largest capacity and most experience in handling international visitors. An exemplary planning procedure for such peak demands is provided by Odoni et al. (2009), who set out a general approach to preparing an Olympic Airport: coordinating major stakeholders, forecasting air traffic and passenger flows, building new

facilities and upgrading existing ones, managing air traffic slots; planning for and modelling flows of athletes through the airport, modifications to the organizational structure, security, and contingency planning. Even though Olympic airport preparations are similar to the ones World Cup airports have to make, the scale of these preparations is far greater. First, for a World Cup, awarded to a country not a city, instead of one, there are nine to 11 airports to prepare nationwide, many of which may not meet international standards. Second, main World Cup airports may serve as hubs for other, smaller, host city airports. Consequently, large amounts of transfer passengers have to be moved through international hubs and efficiently connected via national flights to other host cities.

Germany

During the 1986 tournament, Germany saw a significant increase in air traffic. For the main international airport in Frankfurt, Fraport recorded 360,000 additional passengers and 270 special flights (Federal Government Germany, 2006; Fraport AG, 2007).² Overall, the most extreme pressure airports and airspace experienced was after the final match between Italy and France: Berlin recorded 125 night flights (between 10pm and 6am from 9 July to 10 July) (Federal Government Germany, 2006). The following day (6am and 10pm on 10 July 2006), 525 flights were recorded at Berlin Tempelhof. At Berlin-Tegel Airport there were 546 flights, 25 per cent more traffic than on a normal Monday (Federal Government Germany, 2006).

Frankfurt, as the main entrance gate into Germany, implemented special measures for FIFA 2006 by promising 'World Champion-like services'. Besides introducing significant measure to enhance the fan experience, including shopping miles, additional check-in desks and increased parking, they promised a smooth travel experience and heightened security. Therefore, the airport established its own 'World Cup Terminal' by reactivating the passenger terminal of a former US Air Force base. As a result, 16 out of the 32 national teams travelled via the World Cup Terminal (Fraport AG, 2007). During the Cup, second-tier airports experienced a much higher demand due to their offering cheaper travel alternatives. For example, Frankfurt Hahn (actually about 100km from Frankfurt) had a 20.4 per cent increase in passengers.

This increased frequency of flights occurred despite air space restrictions applied to flights above host cities on match days (7th Federal Progress Report, p. 11): in a radius of three nautical miles (5.4 km) around a stadium, the airspace was closed for three hours before and after a match. In an emergency, this radius could be expanded to 30 nautical miles.

South Africa

Before the World Cup, most of South Africa's international airports could already service large aircraft. However, in order to cope with the increased tourist influx, further infrastructure in and around airports was needed. Consequently, OR Tambo airport in Johannesburg – the largest domestic airport and the international hub for South African Airways – Cape Town, Polokwane and Lanseria were upgraded and a new airport for Durban, the King Shaka International, was built (SRSA, 2013). The country spent R19.5 billion on airport development and R400 million on traffic navigation. Generally, airports around the country also added new access routes, more parking spaces, new technologies, and upgrading of airport terminals funded by the national government through the airport-infrastructure expansion program (Republic of South Africa, 2010).

While air traffic navigation operated according to normal sector practices, 24-hour operations were introduced to accommodate the 1.5 million seats airlines had placed on the market (SRSA, 2013). As an example, international arrivals at Cape Town International Airport (CTIA) went up by 24 per cent, while domestic arrivals rose by 8 per cent (Platzky et al., 2011). On 7 July 2010, 27,000 passengers were processed, while George Airport 420km away from Cape Town saw an average of 18,000 passengers pass through it daily during the tournament (Platzky et al., 2011).

Brazil

When FIFA (2007) evaluated Brazil's urban transport, airport and airspace capacity, the evaluation commission concluded that air and urban transport infrastructure would comfortably meet the demands of the 2014 FIFA World Cup (p. 8). The report continues in its transport section to describe the air transport system thus: 'all 18 prospective host cities have "good" airports ... from the research conducted thus far, the inspection team can confirm with confidence that the airport infrastructure would be able to cope with large numbers of passengers attending matches on day-return trips' (p. 32). This was a surprising assessment. Before any airport investment had been made in preparation for the World Cup, Brazil's transport infrastructure was notoriously poor and inefficient, ranking 'dead last' in airport infrastructure across South America (Kraul, 2013). Given the country lacked a comprehensive and nationwide rail system, pressure was on the air transport system to handle most World Cup traffic (Wilson, 2012). Consequently, Brazil invested extensively in its airports and air transport. Originally, the

country wanted to upgrade 31 airports for R\$5.3 billion (\$2.6 billion) through private investments (Genasci, 2012). However, only 18 of these projects had been started by autumn 2012 (Genasci, 2012) and as of this writing (January 2014) many projects have yet to be completed, while Brazilian airlines intend to handle all domestic traffic. To provide a glimpse into the airport expansion program, the table below sets out the main airport infrastructure upgrades planned for the World Cup.

Officially, these projects are part of a wider Brazilian initiative to expand its air space capacity through adding 800 regional airports, and eight mega airports in five cities, handling 90 per cent of air traffic (Robles 2013). Brazil's busiest airport, Guarulhos (GRU) in São Paulo, is expected to handle most of the visitors coming from abroad. *Forbes* magazine ranked it among the three worst airports in the world: accordingly GRU is undergoing major expansion (see Table 9.1). Overall, nationally, despite the planned renovations, passenger traffic will exceed capacity at six of the 12 airports (Winter, 2013).

Table 9.1 Planned airport infrastructure projects – Brazil 2014

Host City	Airport	Investment	Plans
Brasília	Kubitschek International Airport	R\$744 million	Passenger terminal, taxiing areas and road access
Porto Alegre	Salgado Filho International Airport	R\$346 million	Passenger terminal, expansion of the runway
Recife	Guararapes International Airport	R\$42 million	New control tower. Recife Maritime Terminal is to be improved with the remodelling of warehouses as passenger terminals and the expansion and improvement of road access
Rio de Janeiro	Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport	R\$687 million	Refurbishment of both passenger terminals
	Maritime Terminal	R\$314 million	Three new piers are to be built at Rio de Janeiro Maritime Terminal to accommodate cruise ships, along with improved parking and road access

(continued)

Table 9.1 Continued

Host City	Airport	Investment	Plans
São Paulo	Guarulhos International Airport	R\$717 million	New third passenger terminal
		R\$56 million	Two operational module structures
		R\$427 million	Runways and aprons to be expanded and modernized
		R\$20 million	Taxiways and quick exit tracks
Campinos	Viracopos International Airport	R\$750 million	Modernization of the existing passenger terminal for R\$47 million, an operational module be constructed for R\$5 million, and a new passenger terminal and apron are to be built for R\$690 million
Belo Horizonte	Tancredo Neves International Airport	R\$409 million	Expansion and improvement of the runway, taxi areas and roadways as well as the refurbishment and modernization of the passenger terminal
Fortaleza	Pinto Martins International Airport	R\$298 million	Expanded by 45 per cent, and road access to be modernized
Cuiabá	Marshall Rondon International Airport	R\$88 million	Refurbishment and expansion of the passenger terminal and the parking areas
Curitiba	Alfonso Pena International Airport	R\$72.8 million	Expansion, including the runway and taxiing area
Manaus	Eduardo Gomes International Airport	R\$327	Passenger terminal is to be expanded and road access improved
Natal	New airport	R\$577 million	Runway, passenger and cargo terminals, improved security and access
Salvador	Salvador International Airport	R\$45 million	Modernization of its passenger terminal, new control tower for R\$15 million

Source: Adapted from Gibson (2011) and Wilson (2012).

Ground transportation systems

South Africa and Brazil had to connect vast distances. The exception to the three cases is Germany.

Germany

Before the Cup, Germany already had a well-connected national transit system: all host cities and their airports were well connected to Deutsche Bahn's (DB AG = German Rail) local and inter-regional rail network (Federal Government Germany, 2006). However, Germany made significant investments in its rail network to further reduce inter-regional travel times. Importantly, the transit hubs supporting World Cup operations were up and running on time. For example, Berlin's Hauptbahnhof (main railway station) was fully operational shortly before tournament kick-off, making it Europe's largest junction train station at the time (Federal Government Germany, 2006). Despite the country's excellent national road coverage, the German government invested €3.7 million in traffic infrastructure projects, adding 370km of motorways around host cities (Federal Government Germany, 2006). Based on three pillars, DB implemented a special passenger transport system (Stahl et al., 2004):

- Nationwide, transport capacity was increased during the entire event on long-distance, suburban and urban transport systems. Due to the expected ridership increase, DB added 370 long-distance trains, offering over 300,000 more seats.
- Urban transit service was significantly increased in host cities on match days (explained in city and local transport systems section).
- Charter services were offered for teams and large groups of fans. Brazilian and Mexican fans chartered 13, and the national teams of Costa Rica, Mexico, Croatia and Sweden also chose to use this service.

Overall, DB services carried 15 million additional passengers during the World Cup (Federal Government Germany, 2006).

Speedy, timely and multi-language dissemination of information was another key to maintaining smooth travel flows. DB set up information counters at all rail stations, staffed with multilingual personnel. Public service announcements in trains and stations were made in German, English and both languages of the teams competing in that city (Stahl et al., 2004; Federal Government Germany, 2006). In addition, FIFA's website received over 300,000 inquiries about public transport.

Finally, special ticket policies helped to significantly reduce congestion at bus and rail stations (Stahl et al., 2004). First, each match ticket served as a local free transit pass on game days. Second, according to distance, DB offered a 'World Cup Champion Ticket' for 54, 74 and 90 euros.³ Third, the 'World Champion Pass' was valid on all long-distance and suburban rail for second (€349) and first (€549) class from 7 June to 11 July 2006. Encouraging more commuting by non-match passengers, the DB introduced the 'World Champion BahnCard 25', which was linked to particular match results: with every round the German national team advanced past the group stage, its validity was extended by one month. Thanks to the team's exit in the semi-finals, the card remained valid until October 2006 (Stahl et al., 2004). It offered a 25 per cent discount on normal economy prices for €19.

South Africa

Although the distances were vast, South Africa depended mainly on its roads to move visitors between host cities, although rail played a role as well. To facilitate this, South Africa significantly improved its inter-city transport system for the World Cup. Four long-distance ground-travel options existed: car, bus, taxi and rail – all needed additional capacity to cope with World Cup travellers (Republic of South Africa, 2010). To prepare its infrastructure for the additional demand, the South African government repaired old and built several new roads. Especially around host cities, major highways and interchanges were upgraded to accommodate additional demand and to manage congestion more efficiently. New Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) were implemented to create comprehensive incident response systems (Republic of South Africa, 2010).

Several inter-city passenger trains run across South Africa (South African Consulate General, 2007). Inter-city rail was provided by the Shosholozha Meyl unit of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa. In preparation for the World Cup, tracks were improved and security heightened. Furthermore, Gauteng province built the Gautrain, a high-speed line that links Johannesburg to Pretoria and the OR Tambo airport (Davies, 2009). The line ran six trains per hour per direction at speeds up to 100 mph. For these trains, tunnels, viaducts and bridges were constructed, primarily with governmental funds. According to Gauteng province, the Gautrain offered a way into a sustainable transport future by reducing travel time, congestion and environmental degradation (Gauteng Provincial Government, 2010). The Gautrain proved to be effective and turned out to be successful after the tournament ended as

well. Initially, 3,000 to 6,000 passengers were expected to ride the train daily, in fact the number is now stable at around 13,000 passengers on weekdays and 20,000 on weekends (Saunders, 2011). Finally, along with these infrastructural improvements, the country purchased additional road vehicles, which were handed over to communities post-Cup.

Brazil

Like South Africa, Brazil intended to inaugurate or upgrade some long-distance travel options. However, as the opening match drew closer, many inter-city ground transport projects that had been proposed in the bid had been cancelled. The most well-known example is the high-speed rail link between Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo: originally planned to be operational by the 2014 World Cup, postponed to be launched before the 2016 Olympic Games, it has now (January 2014) been indefinitely postponed. Consequently, the only long-distance transport option for visitors and locals alike is to rent cars or take long-distance buses that run on long stretches of rural roads.

City and local transport systems

City and local transport systems have to undergo vast improvements in preparation for the high-peak travel flows ten hours before and ten hours after the match in each city. By and large, these travel flows have to be managed in a very similar way to those of an Olympic Games. The chapter 'Managing the Transport for the Olympic Games' in Frawley and Adair's (2013) book *Managing the Olympics* covers these measures in great detail. Rather than discussing these measures again in this chapter, I will focus on and highlight the transport measures that are *different* from these and which are of special importance for World Cup cities.

Germany

In Germany one of the greatest challenges for public transit was the increasing popularity of public viewing events; for instance, one million people watched matches on the Fan Mile in Berlin (Federal Government Germany, 2006). In total, 90 per cent of these fans arrived to the public viewing events by public transit, by bicycle and on foot.

One important transport innovation for the 2006 World Cup was the three-part signalling system printed on tickets. Each ticket featured the World Cup logo, a symbol for the arena, and a coloured diagram of

the field to guide spectators to their assigned seats. Relevant routes to stadia were marked, so spectators could get to the match using a range of routes, modes and lines. This served a dual purpose; first it distributed the travel flows evenly across several stadia access options and, second, it separated competing fan groups early on. Therefore, most arrivals and departures of spectators went smoothly and largely without disruption (Federal Government Germany, 2006).

In many cities, designated 'World Cup Routes' accommodated those walking to the stadia (Stahl et al., 2004). For example, in Dortmund and Leipzig between 10,000 and 20,000 fans made their way to the stadium by foot; 10,000 Dutch fans walked 4.9 kilometres from the city centre of Stuttgart to the stadium; 10,000 Swedish fans walked the same distance in Cologne, accidentally, and ironically, causing a large traffic jam. Dortmund declared the distance between stadium and train station (3.5 km) as its 'World Cup Mile', laying out a red carpet and laying on catering services and cultural events.

South Africa

Following Germany, fan fests and fan miles became a fixture during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Access to these fan fests was heavily advertised through pamphlets emphasizing the 'Park and Walk' concept. Fan walks guided fans either to the stadium or to the public viewing areas, while motorized transportation was prohibited. Across South African cities more than 300,000 people gathered at FIFA fan fests, Johannesburg being the most well-attended with 75,000 visitors (SRSA, 2013).

Given the decades of underinvestment in public transportation due to apartheid, infrastructure investments were necessary in most host cities. Johannesburg and Cape Town in particular used the World Cup as an opportunity to begin development of bus rapid transit systems (BRT), which began operations ahead of the World Cup. Table 9.2 provides a list summarizing the 2010 FWC Transport initiatives.

Brazil

Brazil's urban transit will heavily rely on regular buses and on BRTs, which are faster and more efficient than ordinary bus lines. They can carry up to 15,000 passengers per direction, per hour, per lane; BRT systems are already running up to 100 buses per hour. In preparation for the World Cup, Brazil planned more than 300 miles of BRT corridors in all of the host cities. The state of these BRT lines, however, is questionable as they are breaking apart merely six months after their initial construction.

Table 9.2 2010 FIFA World Cup transport initiatives

Transport Initiative	Host Cities
Shuttle services	<p>Cape Town – Shuttle between stadium and main transport hub on match days, two pick-up services on the peninsula route and airport shuttle service.</p> <p>eThekwini – ‘Hub and spoke’ system shuttle for match days.</p> <p>Mbombela – Shuttle with branded buses and minibus taxis.</p> <p>Mangaung – Inner-city shuttle service including a route with 16 stops and specific transport nodes.</p> <p>Port Elizabeth – Shuttle with branded accredited buses.</p> <p>Polokwane – Branded public taxis carried spectators from outlying areas.</p>
Bicycle facilities and cycle network	<p>Cape Town – New bicycle lane along fan walk, upgrades to cycle routes in stadium surrounds and bike hire service.</p> <p>eThekwini – Upgrades to cycling link to beachfront.</p> <p>Tshwane – Installation of three kilometres of cycle paths and walkways, and engagement in the shova Kulula Bicycle Project.</p> <p>Polokwane – Designated cycle networks.</p> <p>Rustenburg – Non-motorized ‘pedi-bikes’.</p>
Pedestrianization	<p>Cape Town – Fan walk and pedestrianization of Somerset Road (main road to stadium). Construction of two pedestrian bridges.</p> <p>eThekwini – Pedestrianization of Isaiah Ntshangase road. Linkages to beachfront including pedestrian bridge over road.</p> <p>Mangaung – Pedestrianization of the stadium precinct and construction of pedestrian bridge.</p> <p>Polokwane – Designated pedestrian network extended beyond stadium surrounds.</p>
‘Park and Ride’ & ‘Park and Walk’	<p>Cape Town – Ten rail stations offering park and ride facilities and two bus park and ride stations setup.</p> <p>eThekwini – ‘Hub and Spoke System’ within three kilometre radius of stadium.</p> <p>Johannesburg – Park and ride and park and walk facilities in place. Complemented by the ‘Rea Vaya’ BRT System.</p> <p>Tshwane – Park and ride and park and walk facilities available.</p>

(continued)

Table 9.2 Continued

Transport Initiative	Host Cities
Eco-driving	Mbombela – Six park and ride points and one park and walk venue. Mangaung – Park and ride and park and walk facilities available. Port Elizabeth – Shuttle service every five minutes on match days. Rustenburg – Two kilometre fan walk. Cape Town – Eco-taxi project. Johannesburg – Eco-driving training.
Improved transport routing and system	eThekweni – People Mover Buses and public transport information system (touch screens). Johannesburg – Rea Vaya, BRT network. Tshwane – BRT system.
New infrastructure	Cape Town – Three integrated rapid bus transport systems and numerous railway-style bus stations. eThekweni – Moses Mabhida railway station; Warwick Junction modal interchange; King Shaka International airport. Mbombela – Northern Ring Road bypass constructed as alternative route. Dedicated HOV lane along the R40. Mangaung – Upgrade of three main inner-city roads and major train station feeding stadium.
Upgraded infrastructure	eThekweni – Upgrades to the beachfront promenade and Western Freeway (public transport lane). Polokwane – Upgrades to existing rail system and Polokwane airport.

Source: Adapted from SRSA (2013).

Gibson (2011) provides a detailed overview of transport projects planned and their stage of implementation by 2011. These urban transport projects were inaugurated through a directive by the cities ministry of the federal government called 'Pro-Transporte' to cover BRT, VLT (light rail/trams), dedicated bus lanes (corridors) and monorail projects. An early official assessment of these projects is that 56 per cent are delayed ('amber' status) with Manaus projects being so far behind schedule that they were marked red.

Conclusions

This chapter started by exploring the four fundamental planning challenges for nations and cities intending to stage the FIFA Football World Cup. As the narratives have shown, preparation of cities greatly differs depending upon their location around the globe, the pre-existing transport infrastructure, their development stage and their national land coverage. This section will draw together best practices based on these cases and provide recommendations for these four challenges.

1. *Recommendation for accommodating peaks ten hours before and after matches*

Locate knock-out matches in host cities that already have the best public transit systems in the country. Because few cities can meet FIFA's high standards for final matches and semi-final matches, these have traditionally been hosted in larger cities. For example, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth hosted these as well as 38 out of the 64 matches.

2. *Recommendation for national transport strategies*

Most of the time, airports will be center-stage when planning for transportation between host cities. Consequently, maximizing the airports' capacities throughout the entire country through temporary parking stands, additional check-in counters and better air traffic management systems is essential. Secondary airports, in particular, have seen a double-digit increase in travel during World Cups. Depending on the country's geography, high-capacity ground transport should be used to the maximum to reduce pressure on the air systems. Several incentives for fan travel and regular commuter travel have been discussed, ranging from ticket pricing strategies to special charter buses and trains. Another strategy hosts should think about is separating team travel from regular fan travel to allow for speedy processing and sufficient relaxation time for players between matches. This separation should start immediately upon arrival.

3. *Walking to public viewing areas*

Locate festival spaces close to hotel clusters and accessible, easily walkable areas. If possible they should also be located close to multiple modes of public transportation. Some of these spaces require a very high public transit supply, as they far exceed the fan demand of a single stadium, for example, the fan mile in Berlin had to handle ten times more demand than the stadium. Controlling the use of cars close to public viewing areas (like banning cars around stadiums) is a must; methods could include driving and parking restrictions,

establishing fan miles for pedestrians only, and temporary delivery times for businesses.

4. *Managing transport for fan rivalries*

Separate travel flows of opposing teams as early and as for as long as possible. Options include pre-arranged charters (train or bus) or assigning different teams separate travel routes through cities, with accommodations located on different bus and metro lines.

No chapter can conclude without a final word on legacy. World Cup hosts have started to identify the opportunities the mega-events have offered for advancing major urban regeneration efforts – some have been more successful than others. Germany, for example, signed off Berlin's major railway junction station, the Hauptbahnhof, before the start of the tournament. On the other hand, even though South Africa has significantly invested in transit, its transportation system is still considered underdeveloped, as only 10 per cent of commuters have a choice of three transport modes (Mokua, 2012). Brazil wants to significantly expand airport space through 800 regional airports using the Cup as an initiator of the process (Robles, 2013). Russia is strategically thinking about how to better connect Moscow to other cities. And Qatar, as the first Arab state to win a bid to host the FIFA World Cup, will invest US\$100 billion, much of which is slated to develop the nation's transport system (Kronfol et al., 2013). As the three case studies, Germany, South Africa and Brazil, have demonstrated, many traffic, transit and activity-based transportation measures are necessary to handle and manage World Cup travel. Transportation planners need to carefully evaluate and implement these measures to best manage the World Cup transport demand and bring to life the country's future plans for transport development.

Notes

1. 1 Rand was US\$0.09 in 2014.
2. Special aircraft are for VIPs, heads of state, team charters and so forth.
3. The prices are in reference to Germany's previous three World Cup wins, in 1954, 1974, and 1990.

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10

Managing Security at the World Cup

Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor

Introduction

In this chapter we discuss the challenges of planning and managing security at recent Football World Cups. In the context of increasing global security challenges and escalating security expectations, we consider why World Cup security transformations have occurred and their consequences. The security approach taken to protect the World Cup differs from standard FIFA football matches as the risks are far higher. As Jennings and Lodge (2009) have noted, the Football World Cups 'represent a site for all kinds of organisational and technical failures, combined with elevation of threat level from terrorist incidents ... due to the global profile of events' (p. 1).

We examine the issues of World Cup security in the post-9/11 environment and particularly the roles of various stakeholders associated with managing terrorism and crowd disorder by drawing together practitioner and academic viewpoints of contemporary major sport event security discourse. Following this we provide two case studies: the 2006 World Cup, held in Germany; and the 2010 World Cup, hosted by South Africa. We conclude the chapter's academic contribution by commenting on the increasing prevalence of a Football World Cup security legacy.

FIFA provides explicit requirements for all aspects of World Cup hosting from commercial and infrastructure conditions through to security-related obligations. Security requirements are detailed in the FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations and specifically developed FIFA World Cup Regulations, the latter determined by each Local Organizing Committee (LOC) under the auspices of FIFA's requirements. The LOC has responsibility for organizing, hosting and staging the final competition, as well as ensuring security for the event's

duration. This management involves the development of safety and security regulations, including counter-terrorism measures, in line with national laws and FIFA regulations. Recent security expectations have been often framed by American military experts (Clavel, 2013). These regulations are overviewed in the following sections.

World Cup Security stakeholders

FIFA security stakeholders come from public, private and voluntary sectors, at local, national and international levels. This includes national and international intelligence services, homeland security departments, event-dedicated intelligence or policing agencies, border and immigration agencies, police forces, military personnel, private military companies, security contractors hired by the event organizers, and public and private think tanks (Taylor & Toohey, 2011).

In terms of delineating World Cup security remits, the host nation's security services and police tend to focus their attention on preventing security breaches such as threats from crime, illegal activities, disorder and domestic or international extremists. There is also an extensive national and international military presence, which has increased in line with the 'war on terror', to the extent that national forces are supplemented in providing protection against this threat. For example, transnational forces can be involved in airspace surveillance. Private security officers are used to supplement the varied public security forces, especially in the stadiums and FanZones. The LOC's security focus covers a wide portfolio of security issues which affect the day-to-day organization and operation of the World Cup. LOCs usually do not assume control the event's security but are required to coordinate it. Understandably, the involvement of a large and varied group of security stakeholders gives rise to vastly different and potentially conflicting interests, approaches and agendas to security planning and operations (Taylor & Toohey, 2011). For example, overzealous policing, or stringent enforcement of overly constraining regulations, can lead to tensions between different stakeholder groups, such as spectators who may feel that some restrictive safety and security measures constrain their enjoyment of the event (Toohey & Taylor, 2012).

Planning World Cup security

The safety and security parameters of the World Cup extend far beyond the geographical boundaries of match stadium and facilities and into

public urban spaces and commercially restricted zones. As McMichael (2012) noted:

The security governance of mega-events is situated in a strange inter-zone between dream and nightmare. On the one hand the wide scale deployment of military and police would seem appropriate for an invasion or an internal state of emergency. Indeed, hosting authorities actively promote their capacity to enforce counter-measures for a number of ghoulish scenarios: stampedes in stadiums, suicide bombers disguised as fans and mass evacuations as a result of nuclear or chemical attacks.

According to the FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations the main security risks at a Football World Cup are:

- Crime
 - Assault – Theft – Robbery – Murder
 - Arson
 - Terrorism
 - British soccer fans
- Infrastructure failures
 - Power failures
 - Water failures
 - Wastewater failures
- Supply chain disruptions
 - Transportation gridlock
 - Disruption of supplies
- Fire

To manage such security risks it is expected that sport mega-event organizers implement a range of systematic and analytical processes that will identify, reduce and manage any threats that could endanger assets, individuals or facilities and mitigate any consequences of financial and personal injury loss (Ammon et al., 2004). These processes have conventionally required making informed choices of ‘which risks to discount, which to monitor, and which risks to mitigate and protect against’ (Jennings & Lodge, 2009, p. 8). However, in the past decade or so, this ‘rational’ approach to security has been replaced with planning for every possible contingency, regardless of how unlikely (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009).

The contingency approach has resulted in a wide range of security consequences. This has meant that World Cup stadium safety and

security management teams must implement basic countermeasures as part of their daily 'housekeeping'. As a minimum, stadiums (including areas within the outer perimeter) must be searched by trained personnel prior to it being handed over for the event. Once a stadium has been searched, it must be suitably guarded by security to prevent unauthorized access. Furthermore, all vehicles and personnel entering a secured stadium must be searched (FIFA, 2013).

These changes to security planning both reflect and shape the increasing prominence of formal risk management controls, practices and requirements now normalized in Western developed nations. Therefore, World Cup risk assessment is wide-ranging and comprehensive, as indicated in the textbox below.

FIFA event risk assessment

FIFA stipulates that risk assessment of its events should include consideration of and the preparation of contingency plans for the following factors (FIFA, 2013, pp. 21–22):

- a) Political tensions at national, local or team supporter level
- b) Terrorist threats – to be identified by national and local authorities
- c) Historical enmity between teams or their supporters
- d) Likelihood of supporters arriving without tickets or expected numbers of counterfeit tickets (FIFA Stadium Safety and Security Regulations)
- e) Crowd control (i) surging or crushing (ii) pitch incursion/invasion (iii) late arrivals or delayed start (iv) lockouts including progressive turnstile closure (v) disorder at the stadium (vi) ticket forgery and illegal ticket touting (vii) overcrowding of the stadium or a section of the stadium
- f) Emergency evacuation (by section or the entire stadium)
- g) Severe adverse weather (such as lightning strikes, flash floods, high winds, hurricanes)
- h) Natural disasters (such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions)
- i) Strategy if a match is abandoned, postponed or delayed

FIFA stadium security

FIFA (2013) requires:

The stadium safety and security management team, in conjunction with relevant expert agencies and organisations, should assess the

risk of any incident occurring at the stadium which might prejudice safety and security or disrupt normal operations. In conjunction with local authorities, contingency plans shall be developed to determine specific actions and/or the mobilization of specialist or additional resources.

Such a contingency-based approach to security planning and operations has been amplified by terrorist bomb attacks in the twenty-first century in a range of locations, including: Bali, Indonesia, in 2002 and 2005; Spain in 2004; London in 2005; and Mumbai in 2008. Although not all were aimed at sport or events per se, these incidents have triggered fundamental changes in how most sport mega-events, including the World Cup, are planned and implemented, especially if the event has global prominence (Zekulin, 2009). The effect of the terrorist bombing in a spectator area at the 2013 Boston Marathon has resulted in even more vigilance.

FIFA's contingency approach means that World Cup security management currently covers a continuum of measures that range from responding to rowdy behaviour of overly excited or alcohol-affected fans to surveillance of hooligans and preventing external terrorist threats (McMichael, 2012). Additionally, FIFA (2013) requires that the LOC must guarantee, in cooperation with the local security authorities, that, in the stadiums and their immediate vicinity, supporters do not act in a provocative or aggressive manner:

This includes, for example: using unacceptable levels of verbal provocation or aggression towards players, match officials or opposing fans; racist behaviour; and banners and flags that bear provocative or aggressive slogans. If such actions arise, the event organiser and/or security forces must intervene over the public address system and immediately remove any offensive material. Stewards must draw the attention of the police to serious acts of misbehaviour, including racist insults, so that offenders may be removed from the stadium. (pp. 80–81)

For its World Cup stadiums FIFA (2013, p. 60) requires that all the event's stadiums be equipped with closed circuit television (CCTV) systems to monitor:

- a. All entry and exit points;
- b. Approaches to the stadium grounds;
- c. Spectator accommodation inside the stadium;

- d. Stairways and passageways;
- e. Concession and refreshment areas;
- f. Broadcast compound;
- g. Player and officials drop-off and pick-up points;
- h. Corridors leading to players' and officials' dressing rooms;
- i. Player entrance onto the field of play;
- j. Other key facilities including on-site power generators.

As part of a global security creep, and the reality of the post-9/11 environment, the prevention of terrorism now plays a major role in FIFA security planning, as can be seen from the above list of contingency projections. As a result, World Cup organizers and host governments have faced significant increases in the costs and complexity of their required security measures. Some examples of these changes include: increased surveillance and other deterrent measures; improved international security collaborations; and testing of new security technologies (Clavel, 2013).

There is also a full set of regulations associated with brand and sponsor security set out in the FIFA Marketing Guidelines. FIFA's Rights Holders are guaranteed exclusive association with the competition, especially the right to use the Official Marks for promotional and advertising purposes. For example, in researching the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, Eisenhauser (2013) noted the intersection of commercial interests with security risk management, particularly in commercial restricted zones. The securitization of public space at a World Cup extends beyond operational risk management objectives (for example, pedestrian decongestion, curtailing disorder, preventing terrorism), as it also involves the protection of stakeholder interests within the spatial confines of a public spectacle (Eisenhauser et al., 2014).

When compared to many other sport mega-events, an additional security complexity for the World Cup is that the matches, especially in the pool games, are spread over a large geographical area and this area may be in more than one country (for example, the 2002 World Cup held in Japan and South Korea) and is staged over a month, which from a security perspective is a relatively long period of time (Jennings & Lodge, 2009). Providing technically compliant stadiums and facilities and adhering to FIFA guidelines for safety and security standards rests fully with the LOC. The escalating security obligations have resulted in the numbers, types, requirements and power of FIFA security stakeholders increasing concomitantly.

The complexity of balancing the safety of World Cup attendees and spectators, as well as the athletes and officials, is based on the host

nation's legislation, contractual stipulations by FIFA, host government regulations and resource considerations. Within this multi-faceted milieu World Cup organizers must take decisions that satisfy various legislated, stipulated and tactical requirements. For instance, as part of its requirements, FIFA stipulates that hosts must create common safety and security regulations including counter-terrorism measures, in line with their national laws and regulations. As part of this there must be 'a spectator safety and security policy document for each stadium to be distributed to all stakeholders. The policy document should clearly state':

- a) The event organiser's and host nation's philosophy on safety and security
- b) With whom ultimate responsibility lies for safety and security at the stadium
- c) To whom responsibility is delegated
- d) The chain of command and lines of reporting
- e) How the safety and security policy is to be implemented and communicated
- f) Who the key stakeholders are (FIFA, 2013, p. 20)

Thus, as a result of the above issues and requirements, World Cup event security has become complex, multilayered, extensive, technologically dependent, anticipatory, sophisticated, and an expensive commodity, to the extent that FIFA requirements for security planning and surveillance have created a range of restrictive practices and legislation that some authors refer to as 'FIFA-isation' (Eisenhauser et al., 2014). This growing security creep is indicative of the risk environment that dominates current major sport event management practices. Given the high media profile of the threat of terrorism acts that have contributed to this creep, we now turn to look specifically at this aspect of security.

Terrorism

The escalated introduction of worldwide post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures has included a focus on the management of events held in public spaces and stadiums. Fussey and Coaffee (2012) have argued that this situation has led to a progressive global standardization of sports mega-event counter-terrorism strategies premised on experiences at both sport and non-sport mega-events. FIFA (2013) has noted that its 'events are exposed to greater threats than may normally be present in the host nation and this includes acts of terrorism. When preparing

plans for FIFA events, specific attention must be given to this threat and the fullest support secured from competent local and national authorities. Expert advice should be provided by the appropriate national authorities and, where required, international agencies' (pp. 80–81).

Tarlow (2002) catalogued a range of potential terror risks areas for sport mega-events. These include: large spectator numbers and flows which make it more difficult to physically identify terrorists; the proximity of events to transportation hubs, allowing terrorists a quick escape route; and the extensive use of event-associated hospitality sectors that are outside of the stadiums (for example, FanZones, hotels and restaurants) that also have the potential to also be affected, spreading the reach and impact of a terrorist incident. To counter these risks outside the stadiums, FIFA (2013) states that: 'The promotion or announcement of political or religious messages or any other political or religious actions, inside or in the immediate vicinity of the stadium, by any means, is strictly prohibited before, during and after matches' (pp. 80–81).

Counter-terrorism efforts, resources, policies and practices from an ever-widening coterie of stakeholders coalesce in the lead-up and delivery of each World Cup. For example Cornelissen (2011) suggested that security for South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup relied on domestic and external actors reflecting the supranational and 'glocal' character of securitization. The accentuated and escalated planning requirements to prevent terrorism attacks and the costs associated with this are well documented. However, critiques of the increased attention paid to terrorism suggest that the global framing of sport mega-events as targets of terrorism has created fabricated zones of risk where the event is an imagined target (Atkinson & Young, 2012).

Crowd disorder

While global terrorism's impact on the World Cup has been fairly recent in nature, the longest standing and greatest security problem for football in general and specifically for World Cup organizers has been crowd disorder, commonly termed 'hooliganism'. FIFA (2013) requires that the LOC

must guarantee in cooperation with the local security authorities that, in the stadium or its immediate vicinity, supporters do not act in a provocative or aggressive manner. This includes, for example, unacceptable levels of verbal provocation or aggression towards players, match officials or opposing fans, racist behaviour and banners and flags that bear provocative or aggressive slogans.

If such actions arise, the event organiser and/or security forces must intervene over the public address system and immediately remove any offensive material. Stewards must draw the attention of the police to serious acts of misbehaviour, including racist insults, so that offenders may be removed from the stadium. (pp. 80–81)

Crowd disorder is a long-standing concern. England has been (dis)credited as originator of football hooliganism with instances of crowd disorder at football games recorded as early as the nineteenth century. Elsewhere in Europe, football hooliganism really only developed as a serious problem after World War Two and its growth has been associated with the English fans who accompanied the English national team in Europe in the 1970s. According to Tasnim (2013), modern English football hooliganism is rooted in geopolitical change:

The English seem to have exported hooliganism much more readily than other countries to countries ... In England, the most serious hooligan problems in the 1980s and 1990s were connected, not to support for particular clubs but to support for the national team ... Hooliganism 'for' England abroad was then, in part, about defensive patriotism in the face of wider national decline.

Given the long-standing issues caused by hooliganism, a wealth of knowledge and experience in crowd disorder security measures has been developed and is available to World Cup organizers. Invaluable lessons can be drawn from the practices of police and civil authorities that have dealt with hooliganism for over fifty years.

Crowd disorder

In relation to preventing crowd disorder in stadiums, FIFA specifies LOCs must make their security plans taking into consideration the following:

- The need for spectator segregation and the numbers of groups requiring segregation
- Supporters using pyrotechnics or dangerous objects, including laser pointers
- The possibility of racist or aggressive language, banners or behaviour
- The layout and size of the stadium including sponsor and concession activities

- The expected attendance
- The familiarity of the spectators with the stadium
- Expected behaviour of spectators, including the likelihood of pitch invasion
- The familiarity of the spectators with the stadium
- Expected flow rate through the controlled points of entry including search requirements
- Auxiliary activities, such as opening, closing or award ceremonies
- Hospitality facilities
- Times and duration of the matches (FIFA, 2013, pp. 18–19)

The following sections illustrate some of the key security considerations presented above with respect to the 2006 and 2010 World Cups. The 2006 German-hosted World Cup case exemplifies the range of security stakeholders and the 2010 South African World Cup case demonstrates how security covers many issues and extends far beyond the geographical areas surrounding stadiums.

Security at the 2006 World Cup

Context

The 2006 World Cup was the second time Germany had hosted the event (the first was in 1974, as West Germany). In total 64 matches were played in 12 stadiums in nine different Federal Länder. Matches were held from 9 June until 9 July 2006. More than 3.2 million tickets were sold and more than 1 million of these were sold to international purchasers. An average of 51,000 spectators attended each match. More than 14 million people attended the numerous public live sites and associated events. On match days, an average of 18,540 police officers and 9,488 security staff were on duty and an average of 1,160 officers on days when no matches were played (Bundersministerium des Innern, 2013, pp. 9–11).

Planning

As part of the bid process FIFA required that the German Federal Government provided an approved security standard

that ensured maximum protection of players, referees, delegations, spectators and all other guests before, during and after the matches,

both inside and outside the stadiums, hotels, training camps, press centres and on their journeys by car, rail or plane. This required a targeted public security structure at federal, Länder and local level, particularly at match venues. The organizer was also required to set up a specific security structure at the national 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee and the local Organizing Committees at the twelve venues to fulfil its security tasks. (Bundersministerium des Innern, 2013, pp. 9–12)

In terms of its international security, Germany built on its existing bilateral agreements with 36 other countries. These agreements had already been utilized in previous football events as well as the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. Thus, the 2006 LOC utilized existing security information and knowledge (Jennings & Lodge, 2009) and involved a range of stakeholders.

The German 2006 World Cup security stakeholders, their different affiliations and their responsibilities were extensive. Examples of these are listed below in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1 2006 World Cup selected security stakeholders and their responsibilities

Stakeholder	Responsibility
1. Federal Chancellery	General guidelines of policy
2. Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth	Employment of volunteers, possible event-related forced prostitution and human trafficking
3. Federal Ministry of Health/ Robert-Koch Institute	Prevention of health risks
4. Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Development	Security-related transport management
5. Federal Länder	Spokesperson on Transport-Security-related transport management
6. Federal Ministry of Defence	Technical assistance, logistics, NATO support
7. Federal Foreign Office	Visa strategy
8. Representatives of the interior ministries/senate departments of the 16 Federal Länder	Representing the Federal Länder in the preparations for the 2006 FIFA World Cup by police forces and other agencies (in particular those responsible for disaster response)

(continued)

Table 10.1 Continued

Stakeholder	Responsibility
9. 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee Germany (OC)	Performing security tasks in stadiums, team hotels, training camps, and in the context of accreditation, ticketing
10. Federal Ministry of the Interior and relevant divisions	Basic policy issues, supervisory control over subordinate authorities
11. Federal Police (BPOL)	Performing with border police, aviation security and railway police tasks during the World Cup, special units, tasks as a central office
12. Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)	Sharing information on politically motivated crime, general and organized crime, threat assessment/level, state guests, tasks as a central office, special units
13. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)	Procuring information within the framework of its legislative tasks
14. Federal Intelligence Service (BND)	Procuring information within the framework of its legislative tasks
15. Unite (ZIS)	Responsible national central office (NFIP: National Football Information Point) for football-related risks and hooliganism
21. Police Academy (PfA)	Advanced training
22. German Association of Cities	Organizing events for World Cup visitors at the local level
23. Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG, German railways)	Security-related transport management
24. Deutsche Lufthansa AG (DLH)	Security-related transport management, aviation security tasks

Source: Adapted from Bundersministerium des Innern (2013, pp. 15–16).

As a specific example, the 2006 LOC established its Security Division in November 2003. The division's brief included planning security strategies for: stadiums and the surrounding area; team hotels; training camps; venue hotels; headquarters and VIP hotels; fan coaching and assistance for guests; the International Media Centre; accreditation and ticketing; as well as comprehensive security coordination of the 2006 World Cup. Additionally, the Security Division contracted the private security services needed for the event (for example, Securitas, the main security services provider at team hotels and training camps) and monitoring security's implementation before and during the event (Bundersministerium des Innern, 2013, p. 18).

The German Ministry of the Interior's civil defence agency, BBK, established analytical task forces to analyse any chemicals released through fires, chemical accidents, terrorist attacks or war during the 2006 World Cup. The BBK developed a 360-degree surveillance remote-sensing system to allow long-distance identification and visualization of hazardous clouds using an interferometer in combination with a telescope and a synchronized scanning mirror. The system was deployed to watch (surveillance) the World Cup stadiums, FanZones and other public viewing areas. Although the system did not detect intentional or accidental releases of hazardous gases in stadiums and in the public viewing areas, the systems identified and located various foreign gases in the air. The 2006 World Cup organizers were well prepared for all security contingencies.

Outcomes

Biometric face recognition cameras were first implemented for the World Cup at its 2006 edition. Increased quantities of intelligence and security data were shared on a transnational basis. These Collaborations were a result of specific international security agencies being created for the World Cup, supplemented by existing international forces such as NATO and Interpol (Clavel, 2013). The legitimization of such increasingly intrusive security measures placed pressure on future World Cup organizers to demonstrate to FIFA officials and a range of national governments that their security measures could meet the ever-increasing public and private expectations.

Security at the 2010 World Cup

Context

The 19th Football World Cup was held in South Africa from 11 June to 11 July 2010. Matches between the 32 national teams took place in 10 cities across the nation. Security issues were at the forefront of planning since 2004 when South Africa won the 2010 bid, thus becoming the first African nation to host the event. National and international media attention in particular was focused on security, due to the country's high crime rate. As a consequence, security for the event received a great deal of regulation, commentary and scrutiny.

Planning

Effectively, the 2010 security planning was largely defined by FIFA's regulations. The host nation, South Africa, was obliged to manage

and subsidize the security arrangements which totalled an estimated US\$250 million:

According to the conditions agreed to in the 2003 Bid Book, the security services were responsible for funding and administering security measures at all designated venues along with providing continuous close protection services for the FIFA 'family'. FIFA was granted legal indemnity from any legal cases arising as a result of the 2010 World Cup ... Moreover, the SAPS [South African Police Service] was signed up to enforce the marketing rights of FIFA and its corporate sponsors. This led to the establishment of special police units under the direction of FIFA officials who during the World Cup patrolled 'commercial exclusion zones' around stadiums for evidence of ambush marketing. In practise, this meant that national security and commercialisation became progressively indistinguishable. For example, according to one internal planning document, restricted flying zones around host cities were necessary countermeasures against 'the possibility of the utilisation of aircraft for ambush marketing and terrorist attacks'. (McMichael, 2012)

The South African Police Service (SAPS) recruited 55,000 new police officers in the five years leading up to the World Cup and also purchased large amounts of security hardware in preparation for security problems, including helicopters, mobile command vehicles, body armour and water cannon. Approximately 8,500 police completed a year-long training program with the French National Gendarmerie, to learn from the latter's experience in crowd management at the 1998 World Cup staged in France (Berrong, 2014). Around the time of the 2006 World Cup a de facto ban was placed on political marches in the event's cities and 10 kilometre security cordons were installed around stadiums to prevent strike action and other forms of 'domestic extremism' (McMichael, 2012).

Interpol was also heavily involved in security arrangements. For example, its Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database, which contained details of 20 million stolen or lost travel documents reported by agencies from 147 member countries, was used by South African border control guards to check the travel documents of international visitors to the event (Berrong, 2014).

One of the greatest security challenges for the 2010 World Cup was coordinating emergency plans between public authorities and the contracted security firms. In addition to its usual jurisdictions, the

South African government assumed control of security and emergency services within the stadium venues. The government worked with FIFA to establish security 'rings of steel' perimeters around the venues. To be allowed to pass through each perimeter to the next required different levels of accreditation. This process was a logistical challenge as accreditation for security and associated personnel, such as drivers, was an area of potential risk. All accredited individuals underwent security checks. This process too was difficult, as personnel came not only from many different parts of South Africa, but also from the rest of the world (Berrong, 2014).

While security is important for the World Cup tournament itself, it is also a factor in the management of preliminary matches. In January 2010 the Togo national team was attacked while travelling to a preliminary match in Angola. While security for the qualifying matches is beyond the remit of the World Cup LOC, it nevertheless created concerns, especially in the mass media, about the South African security preparations.

A more immediate concern for the LOC occurred after the match between England and Algeria, held at Green Point stadium, Cape Town, on 19 June 2010. Soon after Princes William and Harry left the English team dressing room a spectator gained unauthorized access to the room, evading the FIFA-appointed security staff. Disturbing, from an operational perspective, was that security staff released the spectator before he could be handed over to the relevant authorities. The English FA lodged a formal complaint with FIFA and demanded that security for its team be increased (Berrong, 2014).

Cybersecurity was also an issue. The first instance occurred when an internal breach of cybersecurity at FIFA meant that the name, date of birth and passport number details of approximately 7,200 England citizens who had bought tickets to the 2006 World Cup were sold on the black market by an official linked to FIFA. The investigation was prompted by claims in a Norwegian newspaper that the details of 250,000 fans who watched games at the 2006 tournament had been sold to ticket scalpers ahead of the 2010 World Cup, signalling the growth and extent of this type of security threat (Computer Weekly, 2010).

Following this incident there were a number of online traps set by officials to snare cybercriminals seeking to take advantage of the 2010 World Cup. Most attention was focussed on avoiding:

socially-engineered crimes – where users are manipulated into performing certain actions or disclosing confidential information.

The following five online security risks were considered to be the most common: 1. Spam with malicious attachments. 2. Targeted phishing ploys. 3. SEO poisoning. 4. Application downloads. 5. Legitimate sites serving malware (protection of the 2010 World Cup also involved information security). (Computer Weekly, 2010)

An example of the 2010 World Cup anti-hooligan strategy occurred in relation to the prevention of hooligans entering South Africa. Interpol developed a Dangerous and Disruptive Persons list to assist border control authorities recognize travellers with an organized crime record, or who were known hooligans, from entering South Africa. Additionally, the British government introduced internal measures to prevent any of its citizens who were currently barred from football matches from travelling to South Africa. The banning orders had previously prevented the listed hooligans from attending football matches in England and also required them to surrender their passports to police before international football matches. The strategy had been judged to be successful: 'There has been no significant violence at any England match or tournament played overseas since 2000 when the current football disorder strategy was introduced along with very tough banning order legislation' (Guardian, 2010).

Outcomes

Given its success in 2010, the 2014 Brazilian World Cup adopted this same banning strategy. The Brazilian Special Secretariat for Large Events requested information from England, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United States and Argentina to create a blacklist of people considered to be potential security risks, including both known hooligans and terrorists. The Brazilian federal police and the armed forces aimed to prevent their entrance into the country in the lead up to the World Cup. This is not an insignificant task, as Brazil expected some 600,000 international football fans for the 2014 World Cup.

Security costs for the 2010 South African World Cup escalated from an initial projection of 94 million Rand in 2003 to 13 billion in 2010. While this injection of funds was budgeted for World Cup security, it also allowed a range of South African security services to replenish their resources. For example, the increase was a boon for the foreign security firms which won contracts for SAPS procurement to provide: surveillance helicopters linked to mobile command vehicles; water cannon; body armour; and bomb disposal Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs)

(McMichael, 2012). The armed forces also acquired new fighter jets and naval frigates. The South African government claimed that the security expenditure would leave a legacy that would reduce violent crime in the nation. However, most of the security hardware and systems acquired were designed for riot control rather than for detecting individual illegal behaviour (McMichael, 2012).

Under the initial World Cup security agreements, crowd control duties within stadiums were to be privately funded by the LOC. However, after the 2009 Confederations Cup, police were substituted for stadium security, and, during the 2010 World Cup, security costs escalated when police reservists replaced striking private security guards who claimed they were underpaid. Interestingly, according to McMichael (2012), the SAPS later used this problem as an example of its capacity to deliver 'world class security' at short notice rather than acknowledging its security mismanagement.

The City of Cape Town's safety and security plan for the 2010 World Cup meant that more than 440 safety and security staff augmented the municipality's normal capability. Essentially, these extra staff were employed for combatting crime, reducing vehicle accidents, ensuring the free flow of traffic, improving responses to medical and fire-fighting emergencies and enforcing relevant legislation. The city's SAPS and Emergency Medical Services developed a strategy that complied with FIFA and LOC requirements. The city purchased significant security hardware that it too retained after the Games, including: seven new fire engines; a new Hazmat vehicle and a hydraulic platform; a new mobile Incident Command Vehicle for on-site emergencies; five Golf GTi patrol cars; 10 bicycles; protective clothing and equipment as well as 40 motorcycles. Cape Town Metro Police received 16 new Chevrolet Optra sedans and horse-box trailers for its equestrian unit, while the Law Enforcement forces received 19 bicycles, four mini-buses, four Optra sedans, five Segways and a light delivery vehicle (Cape Town Safety and Security Plan, 2010).

As the South African example highlights, mega-event securitization has become a self-reinforcing feedback loop between state and corporate sectors through a shared discourse of 'exceptionalism'. For FIFA the security measures meant the establishment of a state security ring to shield its brand and protect the interests of its corporate partners. In turn, South Africa's security forces used the opportunity to augment their hardware and improve their image. Finally, the national government believed its security investment affirmed its legitimacy in a club of elite nation states capable of such funding (McMichael, 2012).

World Cup Security legacy

Like other aspects of a football World Cup, security planning leaves a legacy, in this case: increased hardware; stadiums designed to maximize security; state-of-the-art technology; production and circulation of sophisticated security knowledge between events and into the wider security communities; and individuals familiarized with security and surveillance to the point where they become normalized (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009).

Since the 2006 World Cup, security has spread its geographical boundaries to include FanZones (see Chapter 8 for a detailed analysis of these), and even host cities, which, unlike stadiums, may have unpredictable spectator numbers. This has added another strain on security, policing and emergency services. As a means to deal with this spread of security zones, CCTV has become increasing ubiquitous for monitoring crowd behaviour both at sporting venues and in surrounding public places. These cameras may also be equipped with facial recognition software. Increasingly, the cameras have remained in place after the World Cup, leading to ongoing surveillance of the general public, raising questions regarding individuals' rights and civil liberties. Thus, temporary security measures 'can have long-term implications through the retrofitting of permanent security features' (Coaffee & Wood, 2006, p. 505) if they become permanent fixtures post the event and are used for general surveillance. This means that public spaces are 'privatized' through World Cup surveillance mechanisms (Gaffney, 2010). This security legacy has, in effect, been driven by a technologically based, social control agenda.

For the 2014 Brazilian World Cup security up-scaling extended even to the draw. The Brazilian government deployed 3,600 of its Army and Navy personnel as well as Federal Intelligence Service (ABIN) agents to Salvador for the World Cup draw because it feared protests (Davutovic, 2013). Salvador had already experienced protests in 2013 against the costs of Brazil's hosting of the World Cup and government corruption during the Confederations Cup. This number of security personnel equated to two guards assigned for every three of the 4,800 accredited people present for the draw. Additionally, FIFA contracted 300 private security agents for the draw event. According to Davutovic (2013): 'FIFA, the justice ministry and the Bahia government have mounted a war plan to protect the World Cup draw'.

Across Brazil demonstrations, which started in 2012, were initially organized to protest against increases in public transport ticket prices, but grew to include concerns about the resources required to host the World

Cup. These demonstrations were Brazil's largest protests since 1992, with more than one million people demonstrating across several Brazilian cities and a range of security incidents, including the stoning of a FIFA bus. FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, indicated that security would be a major issue needing to be addressed by the 2014 LOC (Sportsflash, 2014) .

As part of the solution, a 10,000-strong elite security force was planned to be on standby at the 2014 World Cup to prevent a repeat of the Confederations Cup disorder and the violence of November 2013, when four fans were hurt in running battles between supporters of Atletico Paranaense and Vasco da Gama at a top-flight match (Davutovic, 2013).

The increasing investments required for safety and security infrastructure and service provision, and the associated legislative impositions, for World Cups have been 'sold' in terms of return on investments and long-term benefits for the host community. The question of who benefits is contentious; for example, the expenditure on the security measures for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa was widely criticized by local residents who felt that the safety and security benefitted tourists, participants and FIFA rather than leaving a long-term legacy on fighting domestic crime (Swart et al., 2010). However, in looking at legacy in a study of 2010 World Cup visitors, George and Swart (2012) found that a majority reported that crime-safety concerns would not deter them from returning to South Africa. Thus, World Cup security legacy assessments can vary, depending on which stakeholder is making the assessment and their im/partiality.

Conclusion

It is a matter of judgement whether World Cup security is excessive and control measures are out of proportion to the risks. The verdict on such questions is certainly influenced by the geo-political environment in which each World Cup is located as well as the agenda of those making the assessment. As Jennings and Lodge (2009) note, World Cup security planning requires

intractable trade-offs, blind spots and ambiguities; in the prioritisation of specific risks, in the selection of particular indicators to monitor and evaluate information about risks, and in use of certain policies or organizational instruments to modify behaviour ... mega events exhibit an inherent tension between the politicized, centralizing and high risk characteristics of such events and the claimed

decentralizing, risk-averse and blame-avoiding tendencies said to be widespread across contemporary governance. (pp. 5–6)

Each successive twenty-first century World Cup has amplified expectations of securitization and organizers have had to plan for and find the resources to meet these requirements. In order to deliver on an ever-widening security agenda there has been increasing cooperation between agencies and nations that may have previously not collaborated or may have been competitors (Clavel, 2013).

Security measures are now being utilized to govern the World Cup and to establish and reinforce images of nationalistic prowess and social cohesion. For urban authorities the World Cup offers a platform to show that host cities are modern, attractive and safe. This means that policing measures are constrained by ‘proportionality’ as World Cup LOCs need to keep the media’s and public’s attention on the football, with security awareness being noted only as a contextual assurance (or threat) (McMichael, 2012).

While there is a legitimate and important place for security management and technology, organizers need to understand the range of and reasons for both positive and negative responses by athletes, officials, local communities and spectators to their security solutions. As Durodie (2004) argues, too much reliance on technical solutions can actually heighten a sense of risk.

Yet sport can offer resistance to risk society’s increasing restrictions if organizers strike an acceptable balance between the security necessities created by and through the precautionary principle and the cycle of cynicism and disengagement created by the culture of fear (Toohey & Taylor, 2011). FIFA, future World Cup LOCs and event stakeholders will need to continue to grapple with this dilemma, which presents them with a range of challenges and opportunities.

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11

An Evaluation of the FIFA Governance Reform Process of 2011–2013

Roger Pielke, Jr.

Introduction

At the October 2013 Congress of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in Mauritius, FIFA President Sepp Blatter declared that the governance reform process that he had initiated two years earlier had come to a close: ‘We have been through a difficult time. It has been a test for football and those who lead it. As your captain, I can say we have weathered the storm’ (Robinson, 2013). Blatter used the same nautical metaphor that he had upon launching the reform effort in May 2011: ‘I am the captain, we will weather the storm together’ (Pielke, 2013a).

The ‘storm’ that Blatter referred to involved an accumulation over the previous years of allegations of corruption and mismanagement at FIFA. The allegations which received the most attention involved the process used to select the 2018 and 2022 World Cup venues, chosen as Russia and Qatar respectively. In addition, the 2011 FIFA election, in which Blatter ultimately ran unopposed, was clouded by allegations of bribery and other shenanigans which ultimately led to the suspension of Mohammed bin Hammam, Blatter’s chief rival for the presidency, and his ultimate departure from FIFA altogether.

Of course, allegations of shenanigans and intrigue at FIFA have a rich history. In 1983, upon learning that that the 1986 World Cup was assured to be awarded by FIFA to Mexico even before the process had been completed, Henry Kissinger is reported to have said: ‘The politics of FIFA, they make me nostalgic for the Middle East’ (Hughes, 2011). By 2011 the pressure on FIFA to respond in some manner to the mounting allegations became so great that the organization decided to embark upon institutional reform centered on the creation of what FIFA term an Independent Governance Committee (IGC).

In 2013, as the reform effort was concluding, Mark Pieth, a professor at the Basel Institute of Governance and the man hand-picked by Blatter to lead the FIFA IGC, said of the two-year effort: 'In a relatively short space of time, it's quite spectacular so far what has been achieved' (FIFA Congress, 2013). As we will see, Pieth was not always so charitable in his views of the reform process. Perhaps predictably, FIFA announced that the process had been a resounding success: 'the majority of the reform recommendations by the IGC were implemented' (FIFA, 2013).

Such laudatory comments about the FIFA reform effort are difficult to reconcile with the perspectives of other close observers. One member of the FIFA IGC, Alexandra Wrage, a governance expert and president of TRACE International, resigned from the committee just over a month before the 2013 FIFA Congress in Mauritius, explaining: 'It's been the least productive project I've ever been involved in. There's no doubt about that' (Panja, 2013). Following the Congress, Guido Tognoni, former FIFA Secretary General, told a Swiss television station: 'Mark Pieth has good intentions but to me he's like Sepp Blatter's poodle. He must bark loud but he's not allowed to bite. He had a promising approach but, of course, he's banging his head against a block of granite' (Bradley, 2013).

With such strongly voiced claims and counter-claims flying about, coloured by interests, agendas and personalities, it can be difficult to get a sense of what was actually accomplished in the FIFA reform process in terms of institutional reform towards good governance. In order to provide a somewhat more objective basis for evaluating the process, this chapter conducts a formal evaluation of the FIFA reform effort under its IGC from 2011 to 2013.

The evaluation concludes that while FIFA did make some progress toward improved governance, such progress was limited, leaving considerable further reform necessary to bring the organization up to the standards of good governance that are widely accepted in business, government and non-profit settings. The chapter concludes with recommendations for how a governance reform effort might continue in a positive direction.

A three-part evaluation of FIFA's reform effort

The logical structure of an evaluation necessitates three components (Larason-Schneider, 1986). First, standards of success (or shortfall) are necessary as a basis for determining what goals are to be achieved in a decision process. Second, metrics with respect to the standards allow for

judgements of progress (or lack thereof) with respect to ultimate goals that are sought to be achieved. Third, data with respect to the metrics enable judgements of progress to be made empirically in a particular context. The next two sections provide an overview of the standards, metrics and data which comprise this evaluation of the FIFA reform effort.

Standard and metrics: four ‘measuring sticks’ of good governance reform in FIFA

To evaluate the FIFA reform effort I apply four ‘measuring sticks’ of good governance. The measuring sticks reflect the standards of success and metrics with respect to those standards. It is helpful, but not always necessary, that such metrics be quantitative in order to facilitate an analysis. Such standards should also reflect shared values so as to increase the breadth of relevance of the analysis.

In 2011 and 2012 three significant reports made recommendations to FIFA on how to improve its governance. These reports are complemented in this evaluation by a newly developed scorecard for evaluating international sports organizations.

The three reports are:

1. *Transparency International, Safe Hands: Building Integrity and Transparency at FIFA (Schenk, 2011)*

Transparency International (2013) is a Berlin-based non-profit organization which fights corruption worldwide. The organization focuses on many sectors of society and has given long-standing attention to corruption in sport, notably in football and cricket. The Safe Hands report was issued in 2011, as FIFA was organizing its reform effort. Upon releasing the report, TI’s Sylvia Schenk explained:

FIFA says it wants to reform, but successive bribery scandals have left public trust in it at an all-time low. Working with an oversight group – taking its advice, giving it access, letting it participate in investigations – will show whether there is going to be real change. The process has to start now. When an organization says it wants to change, TI stands ready to provide constructive advice. Now that we have laid out clear, straightforward steps, it’s up to FIFA to prove its commitment to transparency and accountability. (Transparency International, 2011)

FIFA ‘acknowledged’ the report and suggested that it had already adopted some of its recommendations: ‘FIFA is pleased to note that

several of the best practices and recommendations made by the TI report are already being implemented by FIFA, and that others have been approved by the 2011 FIFA Congress for their implementation in the coming months' (FIFA, 2011). As described below, the relationship between FIFA and TI would soon sour, ending in a decision to go their different ways.

2. *FIFA-commissioned report by Mark Pieth, Governing FIFA (Pieth, 2011)*

A report on FIFA governance written by Professor Mark Pieth seemed at first to have been a perfect marriage: FIFA had serious governance problems and Pieth was a widely respected governance expert, having advised leading international organizations, including the United Nations, on governance reform. However, both FIFA and Pieth's credibility took a hit when a Swiss newspaper revealed that Pieth had been paid \$128,000 plus \$5,000 per day to produce the report. That Pieth was paid by FIFA was not necessarily problematic; however, the fact that the payment was not disclosed was widely perceived as troublesome.

In the FIFA report itself Pieth wrote about the importance to FIFA of having a strong conflict of interest policy which includes the disclosure of financial relationships between parties:

[C]onflicts cannot be 'forbidden'; conflicts are a reason to notify and disclose the situation, and to recuse oneself in substantial cases. (2011)

In a 2005 report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme for the United Nations Pieth was even more explicit about the importance of disclosures of actual or perceived conflicts of interest:

In order to safeguard against conflict of interest situations, a robust financial disclosure and conflict of interest regime should include a requirement that all United Nations staff and consultants, including '\$1 dollar a year consultants', disclose in writing to the Ethics Office any financial interest or business relationship of his or her own or of immediate family members that could represent a conflict with his or her responsibilities or that could reflect unfavorably upon the integrity of the Organization. (Independent Inquiry Committee, 2005)

Such thinking was apparently not present in the case of Pieth's relationship with FIFA, and an immediate casualty of the disclosure of the financial arrangement was FIFA's relationship with Transparency

International, which terminated its participation in the FIFA reform effort. Bloomberg reported at the time:

Sylvia Schenk, senior adviser for sport, said the organization turned down an invitation to join FIFA's outside governance committee because its chairman Mark Pieth is being paid by the soccer body and also after Pieth said he wouldn't be looking at allegations of past wrongdoing.

'All members of the commission are supposed to be independent,' Schenk said in a telephone interview. 'You can't be independent if you have a contract with FIFA'. (Panja & Bandel, 2011)

For his part, Pieth (2011) dismissed the concerns: 'I think Mrs. Schenk is playing a turf war here.'

The Pieth report, despite its rocky release, is used in this chapter as the second measuring stick for evaluating governance reform.

3. First report of the FIFA IGC (Independent Governance Committee, 2012)

In the spring of 2012, Pieth's IGC released a first report with reform recommendations for FIFA. That committee, which includes the word 'independent' in its title, was hardly independent of FIFA as that term is conventionally understood. Of the 12 initial members of the IGC and based on public sources, two were independent of FIFA, four appeared independent but had not disclosed whether or not they had any financial ties to FIFA and six were clearly not independent (Pielke, 2011).

Upon releasing the report, which contained 15 total recommendations, Pieth told the media: 'It's possible that some of the issues will not be accepted. I am anticipating that and I have to reserve my judgment over whether it's fundamental stuff or minor stuff' (Panja, 2012a). As the third measuring stick in the evaluation, we are in a position to judge the degree to which FIFA accepted the reform recommendations of its IGC.

4. Chappellet and Mrkonjic (2013)

The fourth measuring stick used in the evaluation comes from an academic paper by two scholars at IDHEAP, Jean-Loup Chappellet and Michaël Mrkonjic. Their paper (Chappellet & Mrkonjic, 2013) proposes a quantitative scorecard for evaluating the governance of international sports organizations (hereafter CM13). They propose that the scorecard can be used to evaluate how well international sports governance bodies conform to norms of good governance as developed in the international

community and applied in the context of sport. The scorecard allows a comparison across organizations and over time. Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) explain their focus:

‘[G]ood governance’ is too context sensitive to be applied universally across all sport organisations, locally, nationally or internationally. What is needed is a way to evaluate the governance of a given sport organisation so that it can improve over the years ... The aim of this working paper is to present a pragmatic tool for assessing the state of governance of ISGBs [International Sports Governance Bodies].

Here I apply the ‘pragmatic tool’ developed by Chappelet and Mrkonjic (2013) to FIFA pre and post reform to provide another perspective on the impact of the reform effort on FIFA governance; it is thus the fourth measuring stick.

Data with respect to the ‘measuring sticks’

Data were gathered for comparison with the measuring sticks in order to assess the FIFA reform effort. To collect the data, I carefully looked through each of the three reports and excerpted the recommendations to FIFA contained in each. These recommendations appear in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

I then evaluated whether FIFA’s reform process has successfully implemented the recommendation, partially followed the recommendation or failed to implement the recommendation. These are of course judgement calls on both what constitutes a recommendation and whether it has been fulfilled, but in the case of FIFA there is not too much ambiguity. In the course of this research, FIFA was provided multiple opportunities to examine the categorization, and acknowledged the analysis, but has raised no objections.

More specifically, the results of an initial ‘scorecard’ were published on the website of Play the Game in 2013, with a request for comments (Pielke, 2013b). Based on comments and suggestions, including a formal response from FIFA (Pielke, 2013c), the scorecard underwent some (minor) revisions with the final results shown below (the specific recommendations from the three reports and their categorization can be seen in the Appendix at the end of this chapter).

Of the 59 total recommendations FIFA is judged to have implemented seven, partially implemented 10 and failed to implement 42. The judgement is unaffected by aggregation, as the reports can be considered independently. Either way, FIFA failed to implement the vast majority

Table 11.1 FIFA Reform Scorecard

Report	Total recommendations	Implemented	Partial	Not implemented
TI 2011	26	1	3	22
Pieth 2011	14	0	2	12
IGC 2012	19	6	5	8

of recommendations offered in the three reports. In a subsequent section I discuss the substance of the recommendations adopted and those which FIFA chose not to adopt.

The fourth measuring stick is the governance scorecard of CM13 which provides seven categories within which they assign one to four points across nine criteria of good governance, resulting in a total possible score of 252 points (that is, the total for an organization which received a perfect score in each of the 63 criteria). CM13 apply their methodology to FIFA (based on FIFA in mid-2012, near the mid-point of the reform effort) and to the International Olympic Committee, which received 70.2 per cent of possible points. In contrast, pre-reform FIFA received 55.2 per cent of possible points (reflecting my application of the CM13 methodology) and 56.3 per cent of possible points after the reform effort. The FIFA reform effort thus was responsible for adding 1.1 per cent to the total points FIFA tallied under the CM13 scorecard.

For its part, FIFA announced at its March 2013 Congress that ‘The majority of the reform recommendations by the IGC were implemented’, a statement which is seemingly in conflict with what is reported here (FIFA, 2013). FIFA provided a presentation which listed a number of reforms accompanied by an image of a glass not half-full but almost filled to the top. How can we square these results with FIFA’s glass-almost-full imagery and their claim to have implemented a ‘majority’ of the recommendations of the IGC?

Of the 19 recommendations that I identify in the FIFA IGC report, 13 overlap with the 24 recommendations that FIFA distilled from the IGC report in its ‘glass full’ presentation. Of those 13 which overlap, I identify six that have been successfully implemented, five partially implemented and two unimplemented. The two recommendations that FIFA admitted to failing to implement are term limits (the IGC did not recommend an age limit) and the appointment of independent members to the Executive Committee. The other 11 recommendations on the FIFA list which do not appear on my list are actually

sub-recommendations of those which do appear on my list, and which I left as components under the main recommendations. So the FIFA summary of recommendations and those summarized here actually match up, that is, FIFA does not present any recommendations in its 'glass full' presentation that do not appear in my tally.

However, FIFA's summary of the IGC ignored seven other recommendations that I identified coming from the IGC. Thus, FIFA's claim to have implemented a majority of the IGC's recommendations depends upon ignoring seven recommendations and elevating several sub-recommendations to a higher level. At a panel session on the FIFA reform effort at Play the Game 2013 in Aarhus, Denmark that I participated in, FIFA spokesman Walter DeGregorio chose not to take issue with the data, but instead commented, perhaps jokingly but certainly unwisely, that 'I only believe in statistics that I doctored myself', falsely attributing the quote to Winston Churchill (Pielke, 2013d) (Though perhaps apocryphal, the quote apparently was manufactured by Goebbels to discredit Churchill.) In any case, there is no substantive inconsistency between my tabulation and that provided by FIFA, and given several opportunities to contest the content of this evaluation, FIFA has chosen not to challenge the analysis.

So how did FIFA do in its reform process?

Overall, as judged against the recommendations made by Transparency International, Mark Pieth (prior to his appointment as IGC chair) and the IGC itself, FIFA adopted a very small number of recommended reforms: seven of 59 total, and partially adopted a few more: 10 of 59, leaving the majority unimplemented: 42 of 59. Of course, none of this considers the substance of the recommendations, which is given a more in-depth treatment below.

A case can be made that FIFA did select the most convenient recommendations to implement, which would not be unexpected. After Mark Pieth accused FIFA of 'cherry picking' among reform proposals, Sepp Blatter agreed, and explained: 'We cannot take all the package now: this is impossible. Even if Professor Pieth says we shall cherry pick, we cannot take the whole tree. It's impossible to take the tree and have all the cherries down' (Panja, 2012b). One could also make the case that the IGC itself cherry picked recommendations more likely to be found acceptable to FIFA, based on internal negotiations – likely a consequence of the IGC being an internal advisory body rather than a truly independent body.

The governance scorecard offered by Chappelet and Mrkonjic offers a consistent basis on which to evaluate the comprehensive effect of the FIFA reforms on governance, based on the 63 criteria that they present. The net effect of the reform effort is positive, but minimal according to CM13.

We might also ask how well the FIFA IGC performed. Many more recommendations of the IGC were adopted than those that were recommended by Transparency International or by Mark Pieth prior to assuming the role as IGC chair. No doubt this outcome resulted from a degree of filtering by the IGC of what recommendations to actually bring forward. As Pieth told the *Financial Times* in March 2012: ‘I didn’t stand up at the beginning and say, “I’m the big clean-up man.” I didn’t intend to raise expectations, because that would have been for myself a way of crashing’ (Kuper, 2012).

Consequently, FIFA was never provided with the opportunity to consider a more aggressive program of reform than that recommended by the IGC. Even if the organization would have ultimately voted against such reforms, bringing them forward would have prevented FIFA from advancing the mistaken notion that its reform process has been a great success. Further, it would have brought into the open FIFA’s position on those reforms considered to be essential to the organization from qualified, external experts. The IGC failed to recognize that the success of an advisory body lies in the quality of the advice, not whether decision makers act on it. By tailoring its advice to what FIFA wanted to hear, the IGC may have actually contributed to FIFA’s continued insularity and resistance to change.

There is a broader lesson here for international sports organizations seeking expert advice, a group which reaches well beyond FIFA to include other international and national sports governance bodies facing reform, crisis or scandal, as well as participating in broad discussions related to match fixing and doping. That lesson centres on the importance of truly independent advice and the importance of cleanly separating advice from decision-making (Pielke, 2007).

FIFA’s Independent Governance Committee was misnamed as it was never truly independent – most of its members had ties to FIFA, and two of its original members are now on the FIFA Executive Committee (Pielke, 2011). There are various plausible mechanisms that might be considered for overseeing and paying for independent advice – there are many successful models to draw upon from outside sport (Pielke, 2007). However, a pre-condition for a successful advisory process is a commitment from the organization receiving the advice to actually hear what

relevant, independent experts have to say. The FIFA reform process was managed from inside the organization, blunting both the advice that was eventually offered and the potential to clearly evaluate the organization's commitment to reform. As a consequence, both FIFA and its IGC did not perform as well as they might have in the reform effort.

Based on the evaluation presented here it is hard to reach any other conclusion than that FIFA's reform process 2011–2013, despite very modest steps forward, has fallen far short of what is needed to achieve what are broadly shared community norms of what constitutes good governance.

Where now for FIFA reform?

The 42 recommendations for FIFA reform from Transparency International, Pieth and the IGC that went unimplemented share three common characteristics. First, the unimplemented recommendations imply the greater sharing of authority and control of FIFA decision-making with outsiders to the organization. Second, the recommendations impose standards of governance on FIFA which have been developed in the international community, and thus outside the closed culture of FIFA and international sports. Third, the recommendations require the opening up of FIFA to greater transparency beyond the disbursements of funds to FIFA member organizations. More specifically the 42 recommendations can be summarized under nine categories:

1. Executive term limits;
2. Establishment of a compensation committee with external membership;
3. Salary disclosure;
4. Non-executive directors on the executive committee;
5. Adoption of best-practice anti-corruption protocols;
6. Adoption of best-practice conflict of interest guidelines;
7. Greater financial disclosure at all levels of FIFA and its member organizations;
8. Greater transparency in anti-corruption investigations, proper due process;
9. Greater adoption of democratic procedures in various FIFA election processes.

It is important to note that there appears to be little debate in the governance community as to what reforms would improve the quality

of FIFA governance. The challenge for FIFA in continuing to reform its governance is not in identifying what needs to be done, but rather in achieving implementation of those steps for which there exists a broad consensus.

One challenge facing FIFA reform is that many observers focus attention on Sepp Blatter, the FIFA president. While Blatter's terms as FIFA president might themselves be evaluated, it is important to recognize that the governance shortfalls identified in this evaluation, that is, those based on Transparency International, Pieth and the IGC, go far beyond the idiosyncrasies of the FIFA leadership. The shortfalls in FIFA governance will not be automatically corrected by change at the top or in its Executive Committee. While such leadership changes might make institutional reform more (or less) likely, they will not in themselves obviate the need for more fundamental institutional reforms.

The strong implication, then, of this evaluation is that continuing reform efforts are needed if FIFA is to improve its governance practices. One way that a reform agenda might be advanced is to empanel a truly independent external committee to recommend a 'platinum standard' agenda for reform.

In many contexts experts with unimpeachable credentials are convened to provide advice to decision-makers. Recent examples include the European Commission's 'High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector' (EU, 2009) and the US government's 'National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform' (US, 2010). For FIFA such a 'platinum standard' committee might focus on identifying those steps necessary to achieve improved governance in a manner consistent with honest brokering (Pielke 2007), which would be characterized by the identification of a range of options and their consequences for reform. FIFA progress with respect to reform could then be tracked in a straightforward manner, along the lines of the evaluation presented here, according to how far along in implementation the organization is with respect to the suite of recommendations.

Such a committee, ideally, would be requested by governmental organizations, for example, the Council of Europe, the G20, UNESCO, and funded by sponsors with a stake in the outcome, giving the effort legitimacy and standing. The product of such an effort would be a blueprint for reform which provides sufficient detail so as to be a guide to implementation. As the committee would be independent of FIFA there would be a clear distinction between the advisory process and the FIFA decision-making process. Such advice would give outsiders leverage for

pressing for continued reform and all observers an unambiguous basis for tracking progress.

Ultimately, for FIFA one question remains: with standards of 'good governance' widely understood and shared, what is the justification for sports federations – and FIFA specifically – to be held to lesser standards than any other legitimate, global organization that operates internationally and turns over billions of dollars every year?

Appendix

Data Appendix Summary of reform recommendations – Adapted from Transparency International (2011), Pieth (2011) and IGC (2012)

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 2011

#	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE?	NOTES
1	FIFA should set up a committee of insiders and outsiders to review its code of ethics for the organization and its officials (be they elected or appointed, paid or unpaid) and employees.	N	
2	Clear conflict of interest policy with a transparent interests register for leaders (published, for example, on the FIFA website).	N	
3	Disclosure of income of leading staff members as well as remuneration of members of the Executive Committee and other key bodies.	N	
4	Guidelines for giving and receiving gifts at all levels of football governing bodies.	N	
5	Special guidelines for high-risk areas.	N	
6	FIFA should establish a help desk to answer questions from anyone to whom the code applies about handling difficult situations (for example, how to deal with a specific invitation, or which gifts might be appropriate in a specific situation), providing anonymity if required.	N	
7	A maximum of two terms for positions including the Executive Committee and the Finance Committee.	N	
8	Transparent and competitive elections and appointment processes.	N	
9	Wider representation of stakeholders and diversity on the Executive Committee and other committees.	P	Earmarked one ExCo spot for a woman

(continued)

Transparency International 2011 Continued

#	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE?	NOTES
10	Presence of non-executive (i.e., external) directors to the Executive Committee, Finance Committee and all major bodies.	N	
11	The general secretary and the directors should be appointed for a set time-limit (for example five years with reappointment).	N	
12	FIFA should identify enhanced anti-bribery measures such as job rotation and involvement of independent external experts in assessed areas of high risk.	P	Garcia
13	We recommend that the multi-stakeholder group assesses the current standards.	N	
14	Setting up a remuneration committee to decide on the remuneration packages, including bonuses, pensions, etc. of all senior FIFA officials. It should be guided by clear criteria, which should be decided by a larger decision-making body. Membership should include both internal FIFA and external (independent) representatives, the chair being one of the independent members. A report by the remuneration committee should be published in FIFA's annual report. (These recommendations parallel good practice in the business world.)	N	
15	Publishing an overview on how much money is paid to each confederation and member federation, including payments from the emergency fund and any other budget line item.	DONE	Overview
16	Publishing the audit reports from the local as well as from central independent auditors to give an account of the financial control system.	N	
17	Establishing an 'Audit from below', i.e., publishing the use of funds in detail per confederation and member federation, so that interested parties can see whether the payments made match the services and/or goods/infrastructure received.	N	
18	Adaptation of the voluntary International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), which FIFA uses, to take into account the special nature of FIFA and the requirements of its different stakeholders.	P	
19	There is a need for additional transparency and more detailed public reporting. Public reporting cannot be limited to financial information; it must also disclose the criteria for, and processes behind, decisions made at the top.	N	

(continued)

Transparency International 2011 Continued

#	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE?	NOTES
20	There should also be formalized and consistent reporting on anti-corruption activities integrated into already established reporting processes (e.g., accounting).	N	
21	FIFA needs clear published guidelines for the initiation and execution of investigations.	N	
22	Whistleblower protection rules and the appointment of an independent ombudsman.	N	
23	Each suspicion has to be investigated professionally, by a body independent of the Executive Committee.	N	
24	Review of composition as well as competences of the Ethics Committee and Appeal Committee. The bodies should be independent with clear appointment criteria, election processes, etc. The Ethics Committee should have the right to start investigations on its own initiative not just to follow up on referrals, whether from the Secretary General, members of the Executive Committee and continental and national federations.	P	New ethics committee
25	Each breach of rules/code of ethics must have consequences. If a list of offences and sanctions is published, no board decisions will be seen as arbitrary.	N	
26	Any breach of criminal law must be referred to the appropriate authorities for prosecution.	N	
27	FIFA, as well as its confederations and national federations using money allocated by FIFA, should report annually on anti-corruption policies and their implementation, as well as on any allegations and the actions taken.	N	
28	The organizing committees for all events under the direct control of FIFA, especially the FIFA World Cup but also FIFA Women's and Youth tournaments, should be obliged to use Integrity Pacts ⁴ (anticorruption contracts) for any construction projects and to publish reports under the new Sector Supplement Events of the Global Reporting Initiative, which provides guidelines for Corporate Social Responsibility.	N	

PIETH 2011

RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE	NOTES
1 FIFA could further upgrade its existing financial governance, in particular by: developing a catalogue of potentially critical payments, and by deciding whether direct controls are warranted or whether indirect controls could be sufficient.	N	
2 Intensifying its specific anti-corruption controls within existing COSO.	N	
3 FIFA should upgrade its compliance system to meet the requirements of a state of the art corporate anticorruption compliance programme (including a review of the Code of Ethics, the risk analysis, the detailed rules on contributions etc. and the hiring of third parties, education and training as well as notification channels). Particular emphasis needs to be placed on the credible implementation of the programme. Member Associations and Confederations should be encouraged to adopt comparable standards.	N	
4 On an organizational level, FIFA should consider electing independent members into the ExCo.	N	
5 The competences of the Financial Committee and the Audit Committee should be clearly distinguished. The Audit Committee, in order to act as a genuine internal control body, needs to be sufficiently independent from the administration (the agenda should be set by the Chair, the Committee should have access to external resources under its own authority, if need be).	P	Partial
6 Likewise, the Ethics Committee and the Disciplinary Committee should obtain clearly distinct tasks. This will require a reform of the underlying Codes (Ethics Code and Disciplinary Code). The Ethics Committee needs to be transformed into an independent body with a mix of external and internal members and the power to initiate investigations based on its own assessment.	P	
7 A Compensation and Benefits Committee should decide over benefits of officials of FIFA bodies and senior staff.	N	
8 Candidates should announce their wish to stand sufficiently ahead of the election.	N	

(continued)

Pieth Continued

	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE	NOTES
9	FIFA should examine a system of campaign financing which provides officially announced candidates with sufficient backing (a certain number of Member Associations) with FIFA funding, ruling out further private campaign contributions.	N	
10	FIFA should consider limiting terms of office of its officials.	N	
11	FIFA should consider introducing regular due diligence checks by the Ethics Committee on elected Members of its bodies. A regulation should specify cases of incompatibility with the FIFA function. The regulation should also define the procedure, and clarify under which circumstances an official would be temporarily suspended from his function.	N	
12	Decisions on hosting and on commercializing would greatly benefit, beyond a review of the actual procedures, from an overall abstract strategy, defined by relevant Committees and ratified by Congress.	N	
12	An institution of the size and significance of FIFA needs a state of the art conflict of interest regulation, indicating cases of conflict and specifying the procedures (up to a possible recusal). While a conflict of interest regulation is a general requirement, it will be particularly useful to prevent abuses and adverse publicity in FIFA's relations to Members.	N	
14	Additional preventive measures ensuring transparency and accountability in its relations with Members should be taken in the area of financial contributions for the development of football in countries and regions.	N	
15	Members should be taken in the area of financial contributions for the development of football in countries and regions. An overall strategy should be adopted for the multitude of historically grown funds. They should be governed in a comparable manner, and expenditure as well as uses audited on the standard of the Goal Programme and FAP.	N	

IGC 2012

RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
1 First and foremost it is fundamental that nominees for senior FIFA positions are vetted by an independent Nominations Committee, to be put in place as soon as possible, in order to ensure that candidates for the next elections fulfill the necessary substantive criteria and ethical requirements and that the selection process is fair and transparent.	N
2 It is recommended that the remit of the Audit Committee be expanded to include the additional roles of a Compliance Committee as well as a Compensation Committee (new name: Audit & Compliance Committee).	Y
3 It is furthermore fundamental that the Chairs of the Nomination Committee and the Audit & Compliance Committee have a seat on the Executive Committee.	N
4 A new Development Committee should see to it that development funding is awarded on a transparent and fair basis and follows a predefined strategy with all procedures fully documented.	P
5 The IGC recommends that the most important proposals made by the Task Force Ethics Committee be implemented as soon as possible: especially the separation of an investigatory and an adjudicatory chamber as well as the right of the investigatory chamber to set procedures in motion proprio motu, i.e., the independent ability of the Ethics Committee to initiate investigations.	Y
6 The IGC strongly recommends that the Chairs and the Deputy Chairs of the judicial bodies be staffed as soon as possible by truly independent persons of high standing and expertise.	P
7 The new Code of Ethics should be put into force by the Executive Committee following Congress 2012, after detailed review by the IGC. Whereas the substantive rules will not be retroactive, procedures and organizational measures will be applicable to past behaviour.	Y
8 The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Investigatory Chamber and the Adjudicatory Chamber should be independent in accordance with the proposed definition to be included in the FIFA Statutes; in addition they should meet the necessary professional requirements applicable to all members of the judicial bodies as set out in the proposed Code of Ethics.	P

(continued)

	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
9	The initial candidates for those positions should be selected and proposed by the IGC.	N
10	The candidates should be elected by the competent FIFA body and start their functions as soon as possible.	Y
11	The Ethics Committee should be given the competences and resources to discharge its purpose. Specifically the investigatory chamber should draw up a budget at its own discretion in order to conduct professional investigations with internal or external resources.	Y
12	The Secretariat of the Ethics Committee should directly report to the Chairs of the investigatory chamber and the adjudicatory chamber respectively and should be independent from management.	N
13	In order to systematically manage complaints and allegations of all kinds, a unified confidential reporting mechanism should be established, which is easily accessible to the public.	Y
14	<p>An Audit & Compliance Committee should be established with the typical supervisory role of an Audit Committee, and the additional responsibilities for a Compliance Program as well as Compensation & Benefits. This includes the following primary steps, which should be implemented as soon as possible:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Audit & Compliance Committee should be independent in accordance with the definition to be included in the FIFA Statutes; in addition they should meet the necessary professional requirements applicable to all members of the Audit & Compliance Committee as set out in the proposed Organization Regulations; • The initial candidates for those positions should be selected and proposed by the IGC; • The candidates should be elected by the competent FIFA body and start their functions as soon as possible; • The Audit & Compliance Committee should be given the competences and resources to discharge its purpose; it should draw up a budget and decide on the support of external advice at its own discretion. The Committee should be responsible for the selection of the external auditors (see subsection 3.3.3) and for examining the annual audit report and recommendations; 	

(continued)

RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the area of Compliance, the Statutes should be amended by the responsibility of the Audit & Compliance Committee to establish and monitor a best practice Compliance Program. The Head of the Compliance Function (Compliance Unit) should have direct access to the Chair of the Audit & Compliance Committee. In addition, the Audit & Compliance Committee should have access to complaints and allegations filed under the confidential reporting mechanism and should receive regular updates; • In the area of Compensation & Benefits, the Audit & Compliance Committee should have the following main responsibilities: • Define the overall Compensation & Benefits strategy of FIFA; • Decide on the Compensation & Benefits of the President, the Executive Committee Members, the Secretary General and the Independent Members of Standing Committees; • Transparency: The Compensation & Benefits (including all elements such as regular & variable compensation components, benefits, pension fund contributions, severance/termination regulation and payments) of the above listed positions should be individually and annually reported to the Congress; • Regulations should be adopted containing the strategy and criteria for Compensation & Benefits. 	P
<p>15 In the area of Compensation & Benefits, the Audit & Compliance Committee should have the following main responsibilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define the overall Compensation & Benefits strategy of FIFA; • Decide on the Compensation & Benefits of the President, the Executive Committee Members, the Secretary General and the Independent Members of Standing Committees; • Transparency: The Compensation & Benefits (including all elements such as regular & variable compensation components, benefits, pension fund contributions, severance/termination regulation and payments) of the above listed positions should be individually and annually reported to the Congress; • Regulations should be adopted containing the strategy and criteria for Compensation & Benefits 	N

(continued)

IGC 2012 Continued

	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
16	In order to support their supervisory function, the Chairs of the Audit & Compliance Committee and the Nomination Committee should participate in the meetings of the Executive Committee; they should therefore have a seat in the Executive Committee.	N
17	<p>Slightly differing from the suggestions of the Task Forces, the IGC proposes the introduction of the following terms of office:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President: 2 terms of 4 years • Executive Committee: 2 terms of 4 years • Judicial bodies: 1 term of 6 years • Chairmen of Standing Committees: 1 term of 8 years • Retroactive effect: The current terms of affected officials should continue; upon expiration of a second 4-year term, only 1 additional 4-year term can be added; • In addition, the Statutes should state the 'staggered board' principle and should lay the foundation for an impeachment procedure by the Nomination Committee (to be further regulated on policy level) in case an official proves to be unfit for office during his/her term of office. <p>Contrary to the Task Forces, the IGC is not proposing an age limit; the proposed terms of office, the impeachment procedure and the integrity checks should serve the purpose of ensuring efficient corporate bodies.</p>	N
18	<p>The Statutes should be amended by the responsibility of the Audit & Compliance Committee to establish and monitor a best practice Compliance Program and to oversee the Compliance function.</p> <p>During 2012, the relating policies and procedures need to be reviewed by the IGC before enactment by the Executive Committee. The policies need to address – inter alia – the following topics in a consistent (i.e. the same rule for officials and employees) and detailed way:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflicts of interest • Gifts & hospitality • Confidential reporting mechanism • Responsibilities and resources 	N

(continued)

	RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
19	<p>In accordance with the proposal of the Task Forces, a Development Committee should be established taking all decisions regarding Development Programs funds and the relating decisions should be properly documented. The use of funds should be tightly controlled (e.g., through audits by FIFA and the requirement for audited final reports by recipients of funds) and publicly disclosed. The FIFA Statutes should be amended accordingly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hosting of the Football World Cup: With regard to the bidding procedure for the hosting of the Football World Cup, Article 79 of the FIFA Statutes should explicitly state the principles of integrity, fairness and equity. In a next step, the bidding procedure should be clearly regulated on policy level, including rules relating to campaigns of bidders. The corresponding policies and procedures should be reviewed by the IGC before enactment. • Commercial contracts (TV rights, Marketing, i.e. licensing & hospitality, Ticketing and Sponsoring) should be put out to tender. The bidding procedures should be transparent and based on objective criteria. The IGC should review the relating policies and procedures in the next phase of the governance reform project. • Financial controls over FIFA Member Associations: The Task Forces have made a number of specific proposals, especially relating to reporting and auditing of FIFA Member Associations. In order to ensure the application of FIFA's values and principles by its Members, the proposals by the Task Forces need to be further discussed and implemented on a policy level. The IGC should review those measures before enactment of the relevant policies and procedures by the Executive Committee. 	P
	<p>In order to emphasize independence from management, the Audit & Compliance Committee should select and propose the statutory auditor of FIFA for election by the Congress. Based on a clearly documented and communicated strategy.</p>	

(continued)

RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
<p>20 In order to ensure the integrity of FIFA's officials and key employees in line with FIFA's values and principles, a Nomination Committee should be established. This includes the following primary steps, which should be implemented as soon as possible:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Nomination Committee should be independent in accordance with the definition to be included in the FIFA Statutes; in addition they should meet the necessary professional requirements applicable to all members of the Nomination Committee as set out in the proposed Organization Regulations. • The initial candidates for those positions should be selected and proposed by the IGC. • The candidates should be elected by the competent FIFA body and start their functions as soon as possible. • The Nomination Committee should be given the competences and resources to discharge its purpose; it should draw up a budget and decide on the support of external advice at its own discretion. It shall also have access to internal investigatory resources of the Ethics Committee. • The Nomination Committee should have access to complaints and allegations filed under the confidential reporting mechanism and should receive regular updates on information relevant for their remit. • The remit of the Nomination Committee should include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Search, selection and proposal of independent members of Standing Committees ○ Checks relating to professional criteria on all officials covered by such requirements ○ Integrity Checks on key officials and employees of FIFA • The cornerstones of the Integrity Check should be regulated in the FIFA Statutes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Personal scope: Key officials, including President, Executive Committee Members, Committee Members to be elected by Congress, Finance Committee Members, Key employees 	N

(continued)

IGC 2012 Continued

RECOMMENDATIONS	DONE NOTES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Temporal scope: Retroactive for all current position holders; upon election/re-election • Detailed regulation of content and process of the Integrity Check should be established by the Nomination Committee during 2012 and a corresponding policy should be adopted. The regulation should be reviewed by the IGC before adoption. • In order to improve transparency and democracy, all open positions covered by the Nomination Committee procedure should be made public and applications can be submitted to the Nomination Committee. 	

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12

Match-fixing at the World Cup – Why Not?

Declan Hill

Introduction

This chapter explores the possibility that matches in the World Cup could be fixed. It argues that the risk that there have been or will be fixed matches at the tournament is very high. This prediction is based on two factors: first, a significant number of players at the World Cup do not receive proper financial reward: and, second, match-fixers have been coming to the tournaments since at least 1994 and approaching players to deliberately lose games.

A point about definition: match-fixing differs fundamentally from other forms of cheating like doping, violent play or faking injuries. These forms of cheating are about athletes using unscrupulous means to *win* a sporting event. Conversely, match-fixing is where an athlete uses unscrupulous means to *lose* or *underperform* at a sporting event. This is part of the reason why many sports fans regard fixing with distaste. By deliberately losing games the athletes are transforming the event from sport into theatre. As one of the players interviewed for this work, who had participated in fixed matches in the Italian Serie A, said, ‘I hate fixing. You know why? Because I am a soccer player, not an actor.’

Methodology

The principal research method for this chapter was interviews with people who are inside the professional sub-culture of football and also have some direct experience in the deviant sub-culture of match-fixing. There were interviews with football officials and police officers who, purportedly, tried to fight against fixing; journalists who were, purportedly, investigating match-fixing; referees who had been bribed or offered

bribes to corrupt games; and players and coaches whose teams, or sections of teams, were fixing games. Most importantly, there were interviews with corruptors who arranged fixed matches and players who took part in these games. Table 12.1 indicates the range of professions of the interview subjects:

In Table 12.1, the first row lists the various professional categories of the interview subjects. Four of the categories are self-explanatory: referees, players, corruptors and journalists. The other four categories consist of the following groups: *gamblers* – any bettors, odd compilers or gambling industry worker from executive to ‘runners’; *officials* – any league or team administrators, including coaches or managers; *law enforcement* – police officers, secret service personnel or state prosecutors; *others* – contains a miscellaneous range of professions.

Most of the interview subjects reported that the topic of match-fixing in football is immensely controversial and that they feared recriminations from either the corruptors or the authorities if they spoke out. Because of the controversial nature of the topic almost all of the interviews were ‘off the record’. Particularly, people who were still serving in the game stressed that if they were to be quoted, either publicly or in such a way as to allow people to guess their identity, they would lose their job or possibly face more severe consequences.

A number of bookies and corruptors were also kind enough to share some of their time and knowledge with me. Their criminal ‘bona fides’ were thoroughly checked, either through law enforcement or criminal sources or by court records, before the interviews to ensure that they were genuine match-fixers. For them, the risk was extremely high, as in many jurisdictions organized gambling, let alone fixing matches, is illegal.

Table 12.1 Interview subjects by profession

Job Title	Gambler	Corruptor	Player	Ref	Sports Official	Law E.	Journo	Other
Code in Text	(B1)	(COR1)	(P1)	(R1)	(SO1)	(LE1)	(J1)	(O1)
Total No.	53	18	49	8	78	61	84	22
	Total subjects = 373		Total interviews = 456					

Accordingly, the following device is used in the text: proper names are changed and all interview subjects are given a specific code. Table 12.1, row 2, lists this code. Each category has a specific code – Players = P, Referees = R, etc. – and each interview subject is given a number depending on the date of the interview. So, the first player interviewed is P1, the first corruptor COR1, and so on. The few interview subjects who did insist on being on the record are identified both by their last name and their profession: for example, Blatter, SO44, 2008 or Hislop P12, 2007.

A cohort of high-profile players and coaches, who played with top-level clubs and national teams at prestigious international tournaments like the World Cup, were also interviewed. The interviews were generally held in a location where the subject felt comfortable speaking. These locations varied from the subject's offices to a favourite restaurant or coffee shop. For some of the more sensitive subjects, the interviews were held in a private and secure location, so that the subject would more freely discuss the issue. All interviews were transcribed and codified. There were also a number of formerly confidential reports written by football officials that gave an added perspective to the issue.

Two further points: I have tried to keep the writing style of the chapter as non-academic as possible. Match-fixing and the destruction of the integrity of the sport is an important subject and it deserves the widest attention possible. Please do not mistake this attempt for clarity as an indication of lack of rigour in either approach or research. Careful readers will also note that nowhere in this chapter do I describe specific World Cup matches as having been fixed. Rather, I am writing of the *possibility* of them being fixed. For details of matches that I believe were fixed please see my earlier work – *The Fix* (2010).

The South African experience

It was a huge match: South Africa versus Denmark on 5 June 2010. It was an international friendly for the South African national team, days before the start of the World Cup in that country. The stadium was jammed with fans. International television teams were there. The two national teams were warming up. The music was ready to play the national anthems. All was ready. All seemed perfect. There was only one problem: the referees had been hired by a group of international match-fixers, including the convicted criminal Wilson Raj Perumal.

In fact, according to a previously secret FIFA investigation report at least five exhibition matches played just before the start of the 2010 World Cup are now suspected by the world footballing organization as

having been arranged by fixers (FIFA Report, 2012; Hill and Longman, 2014; Interviews with officials, fixers, law enforcement officials – 2014; Perumal, 2014).

Will these shocking scenes be repeated at future World Cups? Is there a credible risk of match-fixing at the world's biggest sporting tournament, while billions of people watch?

Yes there is – and here is why.

The players do not get paid

First, if present patterns are followed, there will be players at upcoming World Cups who will not be paid for playing in the tournaments.

To readers unfamiliar with World Cup organization this may sound unbelievable. How can athletes at the world's largest sporting tournament not get paid? After all, the matches in that tournament are watched in almost every country in the world (even fans in television-challenged Bhutan and North Korea can see the games). There are tens of billions of dollars spent in infrastructure money and sponsorship rights. Entire cities across the world grind to a halt when some of the matches are being played (Scott-Clark & Levy, 2003; FIFA Financial Report, 2011; Brzeski, 2014.)

In 2006, when the French captain Zinedine Zidane head-butted the Italian defender Marco Materazzi at the final in Berlin of the German-hosted World Cup, a British academic estimated that five per cent of the people who have *ever lived* watched that incident. This means that from contemporary readers to Julius Caesar to Moses back to Neolithic society, five per cent of all of us saw that game live (Midwinter, 2007).

Yet for all the fans in the stadiums, all the sponsorship deals, all the television broadcasts, there will be players who will run on to the field at FIFAs' World Cup tournaments not having been paid a penny. They will look around the sold-out ground and probably think something like, 'Someone around here is making an awful lot of money, and it ain't me!'

It should not be like this. FIFA, the organizers of the tournament, pay each participating country's national football federation millions of euros to cover the expenses of playing in the tournament and the players' salaries. In many countries there are well-organized agreements between the players and their federation far in advance of the tournament. However, in some of the countries there are long rounds of haggling between the players and their federations.

One of the earliest disputes occurred in 1974 between the relatively rich players of West Germany (who would go on to win the entire tournament) and their local organizers – an agreement was only put in place

before the tournament started when key players met with officials in a Bavarian tavern to hammer out the details (Glanville, 1997).

Yet this is small beer compared to the litany of official corruption that accompanies some of the African teams. In 2010, the World Cup host nation – South Africa – only agreed on players' salaries and bonuses days before they kicked off the opening game (Molefe, 2010).¹

At the end of the tournament, the Nigerian government was so disappointed in its team's performance and the allegations of corruption around it that they launched an official inquiry into the conduct of its football officials. Among numerous other problems, the government discovered that the usual entourage of coaches and physiotherapists who travel with the team had been swollen by dozens of unrelated football hangers-on. The team's hotel was cancelled, their flight plans disrupted and there was, of course, an argument over the players' bonuses (Staff Writer, 2010).

At least the Nigerian and South African players got paid *something* for playing. At the 2006 World Cup in Germany, the entire Togo team went on strike in the middle of the tournament. The players refused to play in their final game because they claimed that their officials were stealing their money. It took a special visit from high-ranking FIFA officials who promised to pay the players directly before the Togo players would take the field (Staff Writer, 2006).

If they were the only team with financial issues between their players and officials it would have been an embarrassment. Yet throughout international football there are a number of cases of badly organized financial scandals relating to player payments. The United States national team players were even locked out by their management in 2005 as part of a negotiation tactic (Mahoney, 2005). The Honduras team of 2010 had a massive months-long argument about the non-payment of a million-dollar-bonus scheme to their players and coach (Staff Writer, 2010).

In the 2006 World Cup tournament in Germany, Ghanaian officials and players had a private meeting that degenerated into a screaming match because of pay issues. One player, reportedly, shouted at the officials,

You are not the people who deserve the money. You cannot play football. You are useless. We are the people who play the game, we deserve the money. (Hill, 2010, 210)

Trinidad and Tobago's team in 2006 was officially run by Jack Warner, a man since under official FIFA investigation for corruption. Warner

offered to pay the players a little more than \$500 for their image rights for the entire tournament – a tiny amount for games watched by billions of people around the world. When the players asked for an independent audit of the financial books, it ended up in an ugly and drawn-out court case (Interview – Hislop, 2007; Scott, 2010).

At the 2014 World Cup, Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria all repeated these administrative embarrassments with players' strikes over unpaid money. In Ghana's case, the President of the country had to intervene and charter a special plane loaded with over 3 million dollars to fly to Brazil to pay the players (Imray, 2014; Laird, 2014; Vertuno, 2014; Staff Writer, 2014).

The fixers at the tournaments

Here is the point that should frighten football fans around the world. There are convicted match-fixers who have gone to many of these big international football tournaments. They have gone to tournaments in Africa, Australia, Asia, North America, Latin America and, of course, Europe. Often they have stayed at the same hotels that some of these dissatisfied players are staying at. This is not to say that any of the players or officials of the teams listed above ever took a bribe, but the fixers have offered money to many teams, players, officials and referees to fix games at the World Cup (FIFA Security Department, 2012; Hill, 2010; Hill, 2013; Perumal, 2014).

The first example was in one of the biggest soccer matches on the planet: the third-place game of the FIFA World Cup of 1994. It took place at the end of a seemingly successful tournament played in the United States. The weather had been mostly hot and sunny; the stadiums largely full. The games were exciting and broadcast to billions of people around the world. There were hundreds of millions of dollars in sponsorship deals. Yet there was a gang of match-fixers at the tournament who targeted the third-place match between Bulgaria and Sweden: they offered hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to players to throw the game. Some of those players suspect they may have succeeded (Högström et al., 2004; Börjesson, 2014).

The fixers linked to the people who targeted the 1994 tournament have returned many times and to almost every international soccer tournament in the last 20 years.

As an investigative academic, I had the good fortune to be able to go to Asia and infiltrate the gang of fixers and hear their stories of fixing top-level matches. I also conducted interviews with players, coaches,

referees, gamblers and some of the highest officials in the soccer world that essentially corroborated the fixers' stories (see Hill, 2010, 2013).

The gang of match-fixers, who successfully fixed soccer leagues around the world, have been at the Under-17 World Cup, the Under-20 World Cup, the Olympic soccer tournament, the women's and men's World Cups (Interview with Sepp Blatter, 2008, Hill, 2010, 2013; Munschke, 2014; Perumal, 2014). The fixers are helped by the dilemma at the heart of international soccer: some of the players at the big tournaments do not get paid.

Match-fixers based in Malaysia and Singapore have been coming to international soccer events for years. The fixers had corrupted international games played in Singapore, including several players on the Canadian national team who threw a game against North Korea in 1986 (Fifth Estate, 1991: Interviews with P3, 2007–10; daCosta, 1994). They have gone to tournaments in Africa, Australia, Asia, North America, Latin America and Europe (Hill, 2010; Perumal, 2014; Williams, 1996).

In the early 1990s, they gathered in the stadiums where illegal bookmakers would take bets on the joint Malaysian and Singaporean soccer league. The fixers destroyed the league. A Royal Malaysian Police Force investigation discovered that were cartels of players fixing almost on every team. One former player said that the corruption was so bad that during one game there was a fight at half-time in the dressing room between players working for different fixers (Hill, 2010, 2013: interviews with Royal Malaysian Police and former players, 2005).

The fixers use associates – called 'runners' – to approach players or referees to get them to fix. The fixers organize the game, and then like brokers, sell the fix to high-level gamblers. Above the fixers are influential businessmen who back the more expensive fixes and pay the muscle to make the network run smoothly (Hill, 2009, 2013).

At the 1994 World Cup, four Swedish players, days before the bronze medal match, were approached by a man who called himself 'Frankie Chung' with a business proposition: lose the tournament's second most-important game and get lots of cash.

Years later, four Swedish star players spoke out about the approach. Tomas Brodin, Lasse Erickson, Klas Ingesson and Anders Limpar say they were too frightened to say anything at the time. To reporters from the Swedish magazine *Offside*, they said that Chung, whose identity has never been confirmed, was staying at the same hotel. He was very confident and friendly. He gave them his business card and invited them to his room. There, Chung pulled out wads of one-hundred-dollar bills and got on a mobile phone to another fixer who was, allegedly, approaching

some of the Bulgarian players (Högström et al., 2004). The Swedes said that they immediately refused and left. Yet, in the *Offside* article, the goalkeeper Lasse Erickson said he had wondered about the game, saying that some of the Bulgarian team appeared listless for long periods at the end of the first half when Sweden scored three unanswered goals (Ibid.).

Wilson Raj Perumal, a convicted Singaporean fixer who has confessed in court to fixing games across the world, writes about 'Frankie Chung', whom he calls 'Uncle Frankie', in his self-published autobiography, *Kelong Kings* [Kelong is a slang Malay word for fixing]:

Guys like Uncle were the bigger crooks: what I do now, they were already doing back then. I grew up watching these big fish fix matches under everybody's noses. I learnt from them: they were my masters ... I thought if they could do it, then so could I. (Perumal, 2014)

Uncle Frankie used the same techniques the next year at the Under-20 World Cup in Qatar. Two Portuguese players were approached by a young woman from Thailand. She invited them to her room with 'an interesting proposition'. There, they discovered a table covered with money, several Cameroonian players and Uncle Frankie. The Portuguese players immediately left and reported the incident. Top Asian soccer officials would later confirm that the fixers had approached players from Cameroon, Portugal, Honduras and Chile (Hill, 2010, p. 223).

Years later, Kwesi Nyantakyi, the president of the Ghana football federation, was unsurprised when it was discovered that there had been an attempt to fix an international match featuring his team. He said in an interview:

In every competition, you find gamblers around. Yes, every competition, every competition, they are there. In all the major tournaments, World Cup, Cup of Nations. The gamblers are not Africans, they are Europeans and Asians. So, they have a lot of money to bet on these things. (Hill, 2010, p. 273)

Ghanaian players, including their former international captains Stephen Appiah and Yussif Chibsah, said in interviews that match-fixers approached their team at the 1997 Under-17 World Cup in Malaysia, the 2004 Olympics in Athens and the 2006 World Cup in Germany. The Ghanaian women's team at the World Cup in China in 2007 were also approached. The players said that they turned down all offers but were never surprised to receive them (Hill, 2010, pp. 252–85).

Unluckiest tourists in the world

FIFA knows about this match-fixing problem. During an interview in February 2008, its president Sepp Blatter began by saying, 'You want to speak to me about the Asian match-fixers? I have known about this problem for years' (Hill, 2010, p. 296).

FIFA's attitude seemed to have been that these fixers were the unluckiest tourists in the world. The fixers went to all these tournaments all around the world, where they approached players, coaches and officials but, FIFA insisted, they never succeeded in bribing anyone. Yet the fixers kept returning.

However, in an interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung* in January 2014, Ralf Mutschke, the head of security for FIFA, had the courage to admit that match-fixers may be at the Brazil World Cup in 2014, they may approach players and teams and that certain key matches (third games in the opening round) would be in serious jeopardy. He spoke about educating the players to the dangers of fixing. However, he did not address – at least, not publicly – the key issue of paying the players (Staff Writer, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 2014).

Let us be clear, match-fixers have *already* succeeded in fixing international matches. In fact, if you listen to the German organized crime task force police in Bochum, they have succeeded over 150 times in three years. According to Friedhelm Althans, one of the unsung heroes of the international fight against match-fixing, a police detective who almost more than anyone else has protected European sport, match-fixers have fixed international matches across Asia, Latin America and Africa. At a Europol press conference last year, Althans spoke out about the fixing of top international matches. He said, 'This is the tip of the iceberg ... It shows the horrifying nature of the problem' (Staff Writer, 2013: Interview, Althans, 2013).

A sceptic might look at his statement and think, 'Well, fair enough, fixers can touch games that do not *matter*: friendly matches, exhibition tournaments, obscure teams in obscure countries playing obscure games. But none of the serious tournaments have been affected by match-fixing'. The problem is that even top international matches in Europe have been fixed. This is not the words of an investigative academic or even a police expert in organized crime, but the statement of a judge at the Sapina Brothers trial. The *second* Sapina Brothers trial was the *first*, real spotlight into the dirty world of match-rigging. The investigation started in October 2008 when German police heard on wiretaps mobsters threatening the life of a daughter of a prominent prosecutor.

There are few things that get law enforcement so riled up as a credible threat against the family of one of their own. The cops moved in hard. They followed up the phone calls and discovered an independent link to a match-fixing network that spread all over the world run out of small Berlin café – Café King.

At the heart of the café and the network were two Croatian brothers: Ante and Milan Sapina. They had been first exposed in 2005, when a young referee, Robert Hoyzer, came forward to tell the world of their activities. Unfortunately, German authorities got it wrong. Rather than focusing on the widespread network of the Sapina brothers, they decided to tar and feather Robert Hoyzer, who had already admitted his guilt and wanted to work to remove the corruption (Kerner, 2005; Interviews Law Enforcement, 2006; 2011, 2012; Sapina, 2007, 2008, 2011; Hoyzer, 2011).

Fast forward six years to the end of the *second* Sapina trial; Ante and Milan admitted in public to fixing at least 47 games, including World Cup qualifying matches and European Nations Championship games (Bennett, 2013; Matic, 2011).

It gets worse. Much worse. According to confidential FIFA documents, the Asian match-fixer Wilson Raj Perumal was not just fixing games in South Africa days before the start of the last World Cup. He had help from some – as yet unknown – South African football official.

In 2012, FIFA security officers went to Johannesburg and interviewed football officials – some the same people who organized the World Cup tournament in South Africa.

All the South African officials admitted that Perumal and his people had been working with the South African Football Association to organize a set of matches that senior football official now think were fixed. The officials admitted that Perumal and his people were walking up and down the hallways of their national football association headquarters organizing the matches. What no one will admit to is *who* invited Perumal and his gang into the South African Football Association (FIFA Report, 2012; Hill and Longman, 2014; Interviews SO 62 – 74, 2014).

However, in March 2014 the South African President announced that his government would not be conducting investigations into the matter and have pushed the issue back to FIFA to investigate: FIFA has no official powers, cannot arrest people, cannot compel anyone to testify, cannot protect witnesses and cannot subpoena documents (Interview with South African Presidential Spokesperson, Mac Maharaj, 2014).²

The confidential report makes it clear that the FIFA officials believe that the at least five games were fixed before the start of the last World

Cup (FIFA Report, 2012). The question is, *how* do fixers succeed in fixing high-level games. The figure below, adapted from *The Insider's Guide to Match-fixing in Football*, shows their essential structure (Hill, 2013, pp. 132–46).

In fixing at a local level – the German leagues: Asian match-fixers – like Wilson Raj Perumal – make alliances with European fixers – like the Sapinas. The deal is that the European fixers will fix the game: bribing players, referees and officials. The Asian fixers will fix the huge multi-billion-dollar sports gambling market (*ibid.*, p. 140).

This market is huge. Patrick Jay, a senior executive for the Hong Kong Jockey Club, one of the most profitable sports gambling companies in the world, said in an interview:

FIFA likes to talk about \$4 billion at the World Cup. We have a word for the day when the Asian sports gambling market clears \$4 billion. We call it ‘Thursday’ (Hill and Longman, 2014).

However, at the international level the key need for fixes is *access* to the teams (Hill, 2009). The simplest way is to form a ‘football agency’.




Figure 12.1 How do fixers succeed?

This is what Perumal did with his gang at the last World Cup. He formed his own agency, *Football 4U International*. They simply went to the South African federation and told them they could fix all the exhibition matches for the organization. Then the match-fixers arranged for other national teams to come to South Africa, took care of their hotels and logistics and then brought in their own referees (FIFA Security Department, 2012; SO 62-67, 2014; Perumal, 2014).

When the referees hired by the fixers attempted to take the field they were stopped by Steven Goddard, then head of refereeing at the South African Football Association. He placed his hand on one of the referees' chest and said, 'You are coming to the stands to watch the game. You are not refereeing' (Interview with Goddard, 2014).

Goddard had seen the fixing going on at other games and had hired other, independent, referees. They went on the field to ref the game. The referees hired by the fixers were asked to leave. As Goddard drove home that night, he received a threat from the fixers for interfering with their plans (Hill and Longman, 2014; Perumal 2014).

Four years later, Goddard and a number of officials who tried to stop the fixers from operating have been fired from their job at the South African Football Association (Hill and Longman, 2014). Further investigations were stopped by an order from the President of South Africa. In circumstances like that, it is difficult to think that the match-fixers will not be back trying their luck to fix the world's biggest sporting tournament.

Conclusion

There is a very simple way of reducing the risk of match-fixing at future World Cup tournaments: pay the players. All players, coaches and match officials performing at the World Cup should be paid an appropriate salary directly into their bank accounts. Every player (and referee) at the World Cup should receive a minimum salary paid directly to their bank accounts by FIFA. Fifty-thousand dollars just for playing. Thirty-five thousand dollars for scoring a goal: twenty-five thousand for setting-up a goal ('an assist'): if a goalkeeper keeps a clean sheet during regulation time he earns \$100,000: his defenders \$25,000 each.

There are critics who say that this would cost a lot of money.

Compared to who? The shady developers and construction companies that cost their own country so much money? FIFA executives? The national football officials who now, some of the time, pocket the players' salaries?

This is the biggest sporting tournament in the world in the year 2014. It is ridiculous that we still have the spectacle of players going on strike or demanding payment in cash. This is the open door for corruption and, until FIFA closes it, expect more controversy.

Notes

1. See also: 'According to one of the Bafana players, speaking on condition of anonymity, they *don't expect any hassles in getting what was promised to them* (emphasis added). "Unlike the previous regime, the current one has been good when it comes to payments. We don't expect any problems getting our money on the 25th." Staff Writer, *Bonus day for Bafana players*, Sport24, 1 July 2010, at: www.sport24.co.za/Soccer/WorldCup/TournamentNews/Bonus-day-for-Bafana-players-20100701: accessed 26 August 2014.
2. Please also see: The Presidency – Republic of South Africa, Update on Soccer Commission of Inquiry request, website, 07 March 2014, at: <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?reid=16993>: accessed 26 August 2014.

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13

Managing the World Cup: Future Research

Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair

The aim of this book was to critically examine the planning, management and implementation of the Football World Cup as a mega-event. It examined how FIFA and World Cup organizing committees produce the event, taking into account the growth of the event over the past century. The express focus of the book was on operational planning and management practices. This area has been an underdeveloped component of Football World Cup research and thus this volume is just a small step towards a more sophisticated understanding of what is needed to effectively manage the sport mega-event. A single book such as this cannot cover all the operational components required of World Cup organizers, so we have concentrated on a selection of key functional areas. There are of course many other areas to be researched; what follows is an overview, though not exhaustive, of potential areas of inquiry into the management and organization of the Football World Cup.

There are a number of operational features of the World Cup that should be considered in a future volume devoted to the organization and implementation practices of the mega-sport event. As outlined earlier in this book, a great deal of World Cup research conducted to date has focused on the economic and social impacts generated by the event. As an example, Table 13.1 below lists some of the most cited peer-reviewed World Cup-related journal articles published over the past 10 years. Drawing on what we feel are some of the main gaps in the World Cup literature we offer a variety of recommendations in no particular sequence that should be considered for future research.

First, preparing to host the World Cup requires a detailed understanding of logistics and procurement practices. The size and scale of the event, as with the Olympic Games, makes these operations especially complex

Table 13.1 Highly cited World Cup journal articles (Google Scholar)

Year	Author/s	Findings
2008	Hagn & Maennig	The authors found that hosting the 1974 Football World Cup in Germany 'was not able to generate any medium to long-term employment effects that were significantly different from zero' (p. 1062)
2006	Ohmann, Jones & Wilkes	The research explored 'the perceived impacts of the 2006 Football World Cup upon residents' based in Munich. The findings 'suggested that the impacts were largely perceived as positive by residents, especially in terms of urban regeneration, increased sense of security, positive fan behaviour and the general atmosphere surrounding the event. Negative impacts, such as increased crime, prostitution, and displacement of local residents were perceived by fewer respondents' (p. 129)
2005	Lee & Taylor	A survey conducted by Lee and Taylor 'established that 57.7% of total tourist arrivals during the period of the event could be classified as either directly and indirectly attracted by the World Cup. Using this data it was calculated that the World Cup generated an economic impact of US\$1.35 billion of output (sales), US\$307 million of income, and US\$713 million of value added for South Korea. The results also showed that foreign World Cup tourists provided a much higher yield compared with foreign leisure tourists, spending an estimated 1.8 times as much' (p. 595)
2005	Kim & Morrison	Tourists travelling to the 2002 World Cup were surveyed before and after the event to gauge changes in destination image. The visitors had a positive image of the host nation, in this case Korea. The analysis varied, however, 'according to nationality, educational level, age and occupation. Collectively, the study suggests that an internationally significant event can change the image of a tourism destination in a short time period' (p. 233)
2004	Baade & Matheson	This research explored the financial consequences of hosting the World Cup. Baade and Matheson found that the hosts of the 2002 World Cup, 'Japan and South Korea, spent a combined US\$4 billion building new facilities or refurbishing old facilities in preparation for the event. An ex post analysis of the 1994 World Cup held in the US suggests that the economic impact of the event cannot justify this magnitude of expenditures and that host cities experienced cumulative losses of \$5.5 to \$9.3 billion as opposed to ex ante estimates of a \$4 billion gain touted by event boosters' (p. 343)

(continued)

Table 13.1 Continued

Year	Author/s	Findings
2004	Garland	The study examined English identity through news coverage of the 2002 World Cup. Garland found that 'much of the coverage of England's matches was flavoured with ... military metaphors and xenophobic cliché (p. 79)
2004	Horne & Manzenreiter	This study examined the 2002 World Cup staged in Japan and Korea. Three central aspects of the event were examined; 'the specific regional political economy of the 2002 World Cup; the role of sports mega-events in identity construction and promotion; and how such events are both constituted by and constitutive of globalization'. The authors found 'the gap between (event) forecast and actual impacts as indicative of the power struggle for determining the meaning of mega-events between different agents'
2004	Kim & Chalip	Members of USA football clubs were surveyed prior to the staging of the 2002 World Cup to understand travel motivation. Kim and Chalip found that interest in the World Cup and 'constraints fully mediated the effects of motives and background on respondents' sense that it was feasible for them to attend. Financial constraint did not affect desire to attend. The desire to learn about the host country had direct effects on interest in the event and the desire to attend the event. Results suggest the value of segmented sport event marketing that appeals to both travel and fan motives' (p. 695)

Note: See References at the end of this chapter for full publication details.

and dynamic. The management and coordination of resources and equipment involve many internal and external stakeholders. Such challenges are shaped by many variables including: the quality and experience of the organizing committee workforce; government regulation and resource commitment; infrastructure quality; and global and national economic conditions. The delivery of the World Cup is therefore heavily reliant on the effective movement of goods and equipment needed to construct stadiums, transport infrastructure and related facilities (Adair & Frawley, 2013).

Second, while FIFA and the World Cup have embraced the latest technology in terms of results systems they have been very slow to adapt to other technologies such as goal-line technology. Detailed analysis is needed exploring the range of technologies that could be adopted

both on-field and off-field, and the impacts these technologies can bring to the World Cup from a positive and negative viewpoint. Any analysis of technology adoption should be careful not only to examine the intended outcomes but also the possible unintended consequences.

Third, questions need to be asked about the place and position of the Women's Football World Cup, moving into the future, given that the main competitor for the male version of the Football World Cup, the Olympic Games, is an event that showcases both genders at the same time. The hosting of both the male and female versions of the World Cup in parallel will need further consideration. The intended and unintended consequences of such a strategic decision and change will need to be explored not only to help the development of women's football but also to maximize commercial returns in the future through broadening the appeal of the event to a wider consumer market.

Fourth, while over the past two decades a number of studies have been conducted that have explored the impact of hosting sport mega-events on sport participation, very little work has been completed in this area examining the Football World Cup (Frawley & Cush, 2011; Frawley, 2013; Frawley et al., 2013; Veal et al., 2012). One of the few studies in this area was recently published in *Soccer and Society*. Unlike most of the research into Olympic sport legacy this study found positive football participation trend data for a nation competing in the 2006 World Cup (Frawley & van den Hoven, 2014). Given the positive benefits often discussed by the promoters of sport mega-events it is therefore surprising that more research has not explored the changes in football participation that may take place in a host nation both post-bid and post-event.

Fifth, an area closely connected to sport participation legacy that has become more popular over the past decade from a research perspective is the area of sport-for-development. Whilst this area itself has many different components, the central theme of sport-for-development as an agent for positive social change has many synergies with the sustainability literature. An interesting development in this space over the past few years has been the creation of the Homeless World Cup (Sherry, 2010). This event has been able to generate a great deal of international publicity in a short period of time and research exploring the event's value has already started. Further research on this event and related programs should be explored from a longitudinal perspective to track and evaluate the impact the event has on its stated constituents.

Sixth, as discussed in Chapter 8, the area of sustainability and corporate social responsibility has grown significantly both in the sport and event management literature and in the general management and

business studies literature. A number of interesting studies explore CSR aspects of the 2010 World Cup (Walker et al., 2013). These studies should where possible be replicated in Brazil 2014 and in future World Cups to determine the impact on consumers and local communities of CSR strategies.

Seventh, another area that requires further research is the field of high-performance management. Very few studies have examined the unique aspects of World Cup preparations for national teams and the impact these decisions have on elite performance. Furthermore, academic research into the role of 'superstar' coaches and national coaches more generally is surprisingly sparse. The role of the coach both from a football leadership and marketing perspective needs to be explored in much greater detail and depth (van den Hoven & Frawley, 2012).

Eighth, match-fixing and its place in sport has been a very big topic for some time now. However, further research is required examining how the World Cup is impacted by match-fixing. Research should explore the effectiveness of current anti-match-fixing regulations and policies as well as investigate proposed regulations and strategies as outlined by the likes of Declan Hill (2009, and Chapter 12). The possible consequences of such initiatives and proposals will need to be thoroughly analysed, taking into account the cultural differences that shape how match-fixing is viewed both locally and globally.

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