
AFTER
THE EMPIRES
THE DISSOLUTION OF
FOREIGN POWERS AND
THE CREATION OF NEW
STATES IN EAST ASIA
P. W. PRESTON

After the Empires

Also by P. W. Preston

BRITAIN AFTER EMPIRE: Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project

After the Empires

The Creation of Novel Political-Cultural Projects in East Asia

P. W. Preston

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

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Contents

Preface

This text is one of a linked pair that address the issue of the downstream consequences of the dissolution of state-empire systems for the ways in which elites and masses within these broad territories have understood the political communities within which they have gone on to make their lives. The substantive focus of these texts has been the sometime British state-empire. The first text, *Britain After Empire: Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project* (2014), looked at the ways in which the British elite responded to what for them was the disaster of the loss of empire, and argued that this response entailed a mix of creative forgetting, that the broad empire territories had constituted the sustaining environment of the elite, and heroic invention, to the effect that the metropolitan core rump of empire was in fact a long-established nation-state, recently victorious in a virtuous war and in all something of a model to which other polities might aspire. The present text, *After the Empires: The Creation of Novel Political-Cultural Projects in East Asia,* offers a complementary discussion on a much broader comparative scale. Where the former text discussed events in one core territory – Britain – this volume turns to the sometime peripheral areas and tracks the dissolution of European state-empires in East Asia, and it looks at the way in which replacement elites seized territory, built states, invented nations, managed the demands of the Cold War bloc system and thereafter pursued national development. The dissolution was routinely violent, confused and drawn out so that the establishment of a replacement set of political structures was an arduous business. Thereafter, as the dust settled, newly secure elites engaged in energetic remembering and forgetting, and forged novel national pasts explaining and legitimating the newly made polities as they pursued their various projects of national development.

The argument made here is constructed by borrowing freely from the often wonderful work of historians, sociologists and political economists, and the intention is quite simple: to achieve a broad comparative understanding of the ways in which structural constraints in the wake of the collapse of the system of foreign state-empires were read by local elites, producing thereby a diversity of post-empire historical development trajectories. The obvious disbenefit of this broad-ranging

comparative approach is the inevitably somewhat cavalier use of the scholarship of others, but it might be recalled that in the real world of political contestation and struggle, academic preoccupations and disciplinary boundaries are of no account at all.

Acknowledgements

Over the years I have been fortunate to be able to live and work in a number of countries in Europe and East Asia, and I have discussed the issues dealt with in this text with many friends and colleagues, and the members of the various university classes which I have given. I have enjoyed their company, learned much from them and, as ever, I am happy to record my thanks to them all.

Prologue

As Europe and East Asia moved into the modern world, the political form constructed and reaching its apogee in the years before the Great War was a system of state-empires. The metropolitan cores of these state-empires were in Europe; the peripheries, in various parts of the world, were drawn into the system at various times and with various levels of integration. Such integration would include economic, social and political practices. More familiar metropolitan treatments that stress the determining role of the core, and equally familiar nationalist treatments which invert the tale, stressing the costs to extant civilizations of the process, under-report the integrated nature of these systems.

Europe-centred state-empire systems in East Asia had a particular character. Integration began early in the period of the shift to the modern world. It linked European polities to sophisticated polities in East Asia, involved shifting varieties of collaboration/cooperation and occasioned extensive social change in both metropolitan and peripheral areas. In all of this there were many contrasts with other areas of state-empire construction – for example, between the earlier creation of state-empire systems in the Americas and the later treatment of sub-Saharan African peoples, or the exchanges with other parts of Asia.

The process of the creation of state-empire systems linking Europe and East Asia had certain definitive characteristics. It was carried upon the restless dynamism of the industrial capitalist system, involved multiple agents and evidenced routine violence. It was also accompanied by extensive commentary: at the core, celebratory, exculpatory and concerned or progressive; and at the peripheries, reactive, accommodative, opportunistic and also progressive. The overall process was marked by contingency; there were no detailed plans, yet it was through the colonial experience that East Asian polities entered the modern world. There were a number of contending powers, competing one with another and together overbearing local polities: the Portuguese, the earliest traders, from the sixteenth century onwards; the Dutch, the key group within Southeast Asia; the British, later arrivals in Southeast Asia, concerned to trade with China; the French, also late arrivals in Southeast Asia, concerned too to trade with China; the Americans, delayed by civil war, active across the Pacific Ocean; the Germans, looking late on for

colonies; the Japanese, learning the lessons of the modern world and joining in by creating an empire in Northeast Asia; and Czarist Russia, expanding overland, reaching areas in Northeast Asia.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, these empires seemed secure, yet the process of collapse was not long delayed. The dissolution of the state-empire systems has been much debated: demographics, with very few colonizers and many local people; Bolshevism, the example of the revolution in then colonial territories; or the destabilizing effects of mid-twentieth-century wars, which undermined metropolitan powers and gave opportunistic nationalists their chance. On a slightly broader canvas, commentators have characterized the twentieth century in terms of the two world wars, or in terms of the rise and fall of communism over the short twentieth century, with, in each case, decolonization as an unintended by-product. But a different perspective can be offered, one that reaffirms the contingency, duration, confusion and violence of these processes – that is, that the collapse of overseas empires was part and parcel of a general crisis of the state-empire system. In Europe the crisis was triggered by state-empire competition within their core territories, in particular, interstate warfare. In East Asia it was triggered by anti-status quo radicals, in particular those looking to learn the lessons of the modern world. The general crisis was characterized by pervasive breakdown: generically, economic, social, political and cultural unclarity in regard to the future, thereafter available in a multiplicity of local mixes. A period of acute crisis between 1931 and 1945 undermined the state-empire system. There were a number of wars. The various conflicts entailed very high casualties, extensive social dislocation, economic loss and political turmoil. The state-empire systems simply dissolved away.

The downstream consequences of the collapse of state-empire systems have been much discussed. A familiar metropolitan view would be cast in terms of the continuity of the core nation-state along with the more or less voluntary acquiescence of core elites in the wishes of peripheral nationalist groupings which, in turn, in general, would cast matters in terms of the overdue achievement of independence, the precondition of the pursuit of development. In place of this familiar tale, an alternative position can be advanced – that is, for the hitherto core areas, the collapse produced an experience of radical political down-sizing, thus post-crisis nation-states were in many respects novel creations, matters which, in respect of Britain, have been discussed in *Britain After Empire*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 and for the hitherto peripheral areas, as events

unfolded, as the territories of empire collapsed, it became clear that the route to the future was via the novel experience of modern statehood.

The disintegration of state-empire systems led to the creation of a number of new or reimagined states in East Asia. They are elite led and these political elites have to respond to both domestic and international demands: the former, the complex play of domestic politics, including cultural traditions, political systems, organizations and social groups, plus the ever-shifting debates within the public sphere (personal, print and digital); the latter, the subtle exchanges between sovereign powers organized around a core trio of concerns common to all elites (state-making, nation-building and national development) as they read and react to enfolding global structural circumstances (production, finance, security and knowledge). As these dynamics have unfolded in the years following Pacific War, elites have constructed many networks – economic, social and political – throughout East Asia, and they have contrived a species of 'soft regionalism'. It may be that this will serve them in the future as it has served them in the past. However, going forward, these countries will have to deal with the inevitable demands of change and the more particular business of well-established success. Schematically, there are three macro-aspects: locating themselves within history (revisiting familiar national pasts), ordering and advancing their domestic forms of life (reforming societies and polities so as to advance local variants of democracy), whilst, finally, managing their position within a global system comprising powerful regions – thus, East Asia, the European Union and North America.

1
State-Empires and the Shift to the Modern World

As Europe and East Asia moved into the modern world, the political form constructed and reaching its apogee in the years before the Great War was a system of state-empires. Each state-empire functioned as a unit; the metropolitan centres[1] of these state-empires were in Europe; the associated territories were in various parts of the world and were drawn into the system at various times and with various levels of integration. The system of state-empires linked two areas in particular – Europe and East Asia – where the former was the accidental originator of industrial capitalism, whilst the latter was the pre-eminent pre-modern economic, political and cultural centre. Asserting the intermingled nature of the process entails reworking familiar metropolitan histories (which typically stress the one-sided nature of the process, stereotypically, 'bringing civilization') and the equally familiar nationalist histories of post-colonial states (which also often stress the one-sided nature of the process, stereotypically, 'repression and exploitation'). Against these interpretations a more plausible story points to the intermingled nature of the process of making and running state-empires in the shift to the modern world, where this includes exploitation, collaboration and learning.[2] Finally, the process of creating and sustaining state-empire systems was attended by violence, both active, in overcoming local rulers,[3] and passive, through maintaining colonial armies and police forces; absent the violence and there would have been no state-empire systems.

Here, first, remarks on running the arguments – that is, the intellectual resources available, both positive (what can be said) and negative (displaying the limits of what can be said). Then, second, an orienting sketch of the still unfolding process of the shift to the modern world. Finally, a note on the agenda for the rest of the text with its concern for

the nature of life in the hitherto peripheries after the empires themselves had faded from view.

Modernity and empire: Running debates

This text will present a substantive treatment of the long historical exchanges of Europe and East Asia. However, as with all interpretive social scientific scholarship, there are parallel intellectual debates running in respect of the business of making the arguments that carry the substantive claims, and in general these have three distinct foci: first, the contexts of theorizing, second, the resources and commitments of the theorists, and third, the audiences to whom their various arguments are addressed. It is the particular mix of these three elements – context, theorist and audience – that shapes the resultant substantive claims.

So, cast in these terms, first, the text is made in the early twenty-first century, and the state-empire systems are long gone, but their legacies remain to be unpacked, and yet such tasks take place in quite new circumstances – the successful recovery of both regions from the disasters of the early part of the twentieth century, in Europe taking the form of the project of the European Union, in East Asia appearing in the guise of great economic success (albeit coupled with unresolved political and security problems). Second, the text rests on definite deep assumptions. It is lodged within the classical European tradition of social theorizing: formally, the tradition is interpretive, critical and oriented towards dialogue,[4] and substantively, the focus of the tradition is upon the ways in which agents make sense of their ever-changing circumstances. This text is concerned with unpacking the legacies of state-empire systems in East Asia whilst a complementary text looks at the legacies of the state-empire system for the metropolitan heartlands of the former British state-empire.[5] And third is the audience: the text is addressed to all those concerned with better reading the received histories of the collapse of the state-empire systems.[6]

Thereafter, more specifically, looking at the concerns of this text, a number of debates run through the materials addressed in this opening chapter (other debates run through the later materials and these are intermingled debates so all of the substantive claims made are carried on a broad raft of debate and assumption): first, the nature of the shift to the modern world; second, the logics of state-empire systems; and third, the use of metaphors to grasp these large-scale historical processes.

The shift to the modern world

The first area of debate concerns the 'shift to the modern world'. It is a debate that has its roots in the response of social theorists to the changes wrought to the European social world from the seventeenth century onwards, and much of the intellectual apparatus deployed today has its occasion in the work of nineteenth-century theorists, as accumulating pressures for change swept through the social world and demanded a response.[7] For the present purposes there are three areas of reflection: the nature of the modern world; the reasons for its emergence in Europe; and the related question for this text of what was going on in East Asia around this time. A number of available positions in these debates can be noted and a variant advanced centred on the idea of contingency.

(i) The modern world

The core of the notion of the modern world points to the world of natural science-based industrial society. It picks up on the ideas of reason and livelihood and the expectation attached is of further advances in respect of both aspects: natural science will accumulate knowledge of the natural world,[8] and such knowledge will inform the pursuit of livelihood.[9] In brief, the modern world is a world of progress,[10] scientific, material and – as an extension to the argument – moral/cultural.

There are a number of related terms: 'modernity', pointing to the general cultural style of the form of life;[11] 'modernism', pointing to an art form exploring and celebrating this form of life;[12] and recently 'modernization', pointing to the acquisition of the traits of the modern world, although unfortunately the term has been rendered unusable as a result of its use in the 1950s and 1960s propaganda by Western governments and Western development theorists[13] such that the end-point of the process of modernization was taken to be exemplified by the contemporary USA.[14] These ideas can be variously deployed and they revolve around theories of change: first, that Europe was the starting point, that the shift to the modern world marked a break with pre-existing forms of life and that the process was in general progressive:[15] second, that the process thus described made being and becoming industrial the key issue for political philosophy and the social sciences;[16] third, that the process thus described combined evident material advance with equally clear moral decay;[17] fourth, that the process thus described is a misdescription and the experience of Europe were far from novel as the rise of 'industriousness' was widespread;[18] and fifth, later, that progress had its counterpart in barbarism made evident in the processes of the

bureaucratic-rational mass production of death seen in particular in the mid-twentieth century.[19] These matters continue to be debated.

(ii) European origins

The shift to the modern world has its origins in Europe from, say, the seventeenth through to the nineteenth centuries, and over this period what had been a poor marginal area within the extant set of economies within the global system became a powerful region, and thereafter the influence of its constituent countries was spread widely, creating, over time, a geographically dispersed system of state-empires. A number of explanations have been offered: first, science/technology (scientific advances triggering wider social change, in particular the familiar tale of the rise of merchants in towns and the equally familiar tale of guns and sails favouring European sailors/traders[20]); second, industry/trade (the familiar tale of aggressive involvement in the then extant Asian networks of trade – part cooperation, part exploitation[21]); third, religion/ethics (the familiar 'protestant ethic' fuelling a restless concern for material success – domestically at the expense of the less energetic and externally at the expense of other cultures where such ideas were absent[22]); and fourth, location/linkages, – thus in the early modern period, Europe made use of links across the Atlantic to bring in Latin American silver (fuelling economic expansion), to import primary products from Central and North America (food and raw materials such as sugar and cotton) and later to export surplus population (which colonized the two continents).

A related debate has been pursued which asks why these changes did not begin in East Asia because, after all, the area was rich, ordered and centred on a long-established sophisticated civilization. Some earlier explanations offered during the high tide of empire expansion, ideas that come down to the present as popular clichés, were cast in terms of race (people lower in the evolutionary given competition of race groups) or culture (Asian peoples as exotics inhabiting moribund forms of life that are now rejected). Newer debates have in common that they reject explanations cast in terms of the putative essential characteristics of Europeans and Americans. First, some argue for European success bleeding resources from the East as they build up their own region;[23] second, some argue for the successful utilization of locally available energy resources plus trade links in Europe, activities which were comparatively less successful in East Asia;[24] third, others argue more directly that the West took cultural resources from the East to inform its rise;[25] and, as

a note, fourth, reconstructed long-run data on these processes has also been presented.[26]

(iii) East Asia

In the years prior to the arrival of the modern world, the region was home to long-established civilizations: Chinese, Korean, Japanese and Malay.[27] The Chinese cultural sphere was central to the region (in the spheres of economy, society, culture and polity): it was an agrarian-based, bureaucratically ordered, hierarchical, conservative form of life (in summary terms, successful, stable and wealthy). Its precise economic condition of sphere on the eve of arrival of Europeans is disputed,[28] although one influential line of argument suggests that the empire had reached an economic ceiling whilst politico-culturally it was unable to generate the necessary internal reforms;[29] that said, it is clear that the Chinese sphere was the most powerful of the contemporary economies. Moreover, the cultural impact of China had spread widely throughout the region and it was particularly influential in Korea, Japan and Vietnam, all places that embraced variants of the Chinese model, each attaining high levels of civilization. And thereafter, Chinese traders carried this influence further afield, in particular along sea-lanes to the south where there were collections of institutionally more fluid predominantly Malay maritime and riverine empires.[30] In all, this broad region was home to forms of life that were long established, sophisticated and successful.

(iv) The idea of contingency

In this text a variant argument will be presented. It can be granted that the modern world began in Europe but thereafter an idea of contingency can be invoked. Available in the work of Richard Rorty,[31] it points to the ineluctably social nature of human being; forms of life are just that and there are no extra-social guarantors. In this present context there are two aspects: modernity and Europe. First, the modern world began as a result of a coincidence of factors – crucially, science and industry – and these combined to put in place a form of life that was very energetic, routinely deepening the demands that it made on its domestic populations and routinely seeking to expand its sphere of operations outside its core territory. Second, these factors became available in Europe as a result of contingent changes or events, including, schematically, the increasing influence of urban merchants in Northwest Europe, shifts in power of extant churches (division between Protestant and Catholic) and accidents of military power relations.

There was nothing essential to the nature of extant Europeans – it was all happenstance or accident, and the shift to the modern world could have happened elsewhere.[32] But it did not, it happened in Europe, and thereafter Europeans exported their form of life around the globe, variously remaking the multiplicity of other cultures with which they became involved.[33] This process had multiple aspects – exploitation, collaboration and learning – and the resultant patterns were contingent, the ever shifting out turn of a multiplicity of social processes. And these dynamics ran down through time. Contemporary populations inherit these processes and they remain contingent, so that what there is, is the world that we have and it has no essences, no guarantees and no unilinear direction of travel, hence, contingent.

State-empire systems

A second area of debate concerns the conceptualization of the systems of empire and here there are two familiar political styles of argument or discourse: first, those made by commentators in the metropolitan territories where, one way or another, claims to the superiority of the central territories are lodged (economic, social, cultural or political), which, thereafter, both explain and justify the extension of these practices to the more outlying areas and where, crucially, a division is asserted between metropolitan centres and associated territories; then, second, those made by commentators in these outlying areas, claims to the exploitation and/or suppression, one way or another, of indigenous forms of life, so, once again, a division is posited between cores and peripheries but now the valuations are reversed and now the metropolitan centres are not bringers of civilization and progress – rather, they despoil and exploit what were otherwise functioning forms of life.

Both lines have been pursued over many years, they run concurrently with the shift to the modern world, from early travellers' tales, through the records of nineteenth-century colonial officials and later colonial administrator-scholars to the work of critics of one sort or another, local nativist traditionalists, religious groups, early nationalists plus metropolitan core dissenters and reformers. And these themes find expression in recent years – that is, after the collapse of these systems, for example, in discourses of globalization or development, or critiques of American aspirations to empire.

This extensive literature and its arguments can be reviewed but, thereafter, against both of these lines, which have in common that they grant that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between core and periphery, this text will argue that state-empire systems were integrated units and are best analysed as such.

(i) So, first, the types of claims to superiority

Claims to superiority could be cast in comparative terms: economic, socio-political and cultural.

There have been many claims in respect of economic systems, typically celebrating the activities found in the core and dismissing other forms of economic activity. It was claimed that European systems were more efficient, innovative, dynamic and so on, and this obtained domestically and via trade was exported around the planet. These arguments took shape in the eighteenth century. Thereafter, in the nineteenth century, an appeal to the positive value of trade was routine. Thus Linda Colley records that positive evaluation of the role of trade figured in the creation of Britain. Following the 1707 Treaty/Act of Union, Britain had a single marketplace. Later the benefits of trade were theorized by David Ricardo and the positive role of trade became a core idea of nineteenth-century political economy, and the idea was readily deployed not just for trade within the domestic sphere but internationally where it offered a justification for one key element of the rise of the British state-empire system in East Asia – that is, the trade in opium. This trade was crucial to funding the empire in the East and the trade was lucrative for the business community, but it had opponents and one defence was the claim to the virtues of free trade.[34]

The package is summed up by Cain and Hopkins:[35]

> Gentlemanly capitalism undoubtedly helped to promote expansionist forces of investment, commerce and migration throughout the world, including Europe and the United States. Its main dynamic was the drive to create an international trading system centred on London and mediated by sterling . . . The whole package was to be tied together by a regime of international free trade, which would encourage specialization, cut transaction costs and create an interlocking system of multilateral payments . . . This vision was not inevitably imperialistic . . . [but] there was a tendency for expansionist impulses to become imperialist, especially where they came up against societies which needed reforming or restructuring before expansionist ambitions could be realized, and which also seemed to be either amenable to change or incapable of resisting it.

Such claims were rehearsed by Marx and Engels:[36]

> The bourgeoisie . . . draws all, even the most barbarian nations, into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down Chinese walls, with which it

> forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production . . . In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

In respect of the Chinese walls, the Opium War was explicitly defended in terms of the beneficent character of trade: proponents claimed that Qing China was closed, the Chinese arrogant, their civilization moribund and drug-addled, and overall the British did them a favour. All false: the empire was open to trade, and locals were familiar through trade with foreigners. Undermining Chinese society did them no favours at all. However, these arguments proved good enough to win their proponents parliamentary and electoral support.[37]

An analogous set of claims could be advanced with regard to social/political arrangements: European societies were more open and later theorists cast this observation in terms of a distinction between achieved and ascribed status; or European polities were more inclusive and later theorists cast this in terms of the notion of the public sphere; and so on. These ideas had numerous sources in travellers' tales[38] or the reflections of philosophers,[39] and, later, colonial expansion was accompanied by anthropological work,[40] with the related traditions of cultural anthropology and social anthropology offering multiple tales and changing their characterizations over time, thus today's work would stress the autonomy of other cultures and their inherent value.

With regard to broader cultural resources, such as the sciences or the arts, European cultures were represented unabashedly as more rational. There was a conceptual family: science, enlightenment and utility, together ideas of progress; potentially contentious domestically, thus, say, Charles Darwin's ideas of evolution, but less so internationally, where a distinction between reason and superstition could be deployed with less chance of local agents offering effective rebuttals.

Claims to superiority could also be cast in reductive or essentialist terms.

A reductive claim could be made to the effect that it was a simple matter of fact that European forms of life were more advanced, and proponents could point to the discoveries of natural science and the outputs of industry. It was taken to a simple matter of logic that other cultures would have to learn and catch up, and so movement into the future was unilinear as the currently more developed merely showed the less developed their upcoming trajectory (ideas recycled in banal form by modernization/globalization theorists). Moreover, this process

of historical emulation was likely to take time (so, in the meantime, colonial rule was not inappropriate) and, further, all aspirant territories would benefit from the paternal guidance of their European or American (or Japanese) colonial masters;[41] thus the system of state-empires was appropriate to the given circumstances.[42]

An essentialist claim could invoke the natural sciences. Thus, as natural science in the guise of nineteenth-century naturalists[43] had uncovered the inherent logics of competition between animal and plant species, it was supposed that it would be foolish to deny that these same logics embraced humankind. On this basis a claim could be made that the evident superiority of European forms of life (science/industry) were a matter of the qualities inherent in these peoples in contrast with other peoples. Thus it was a matter of the inherent logics of race differentiation and evolutionary competition that European forms of life were more advanced or superior. A further line of argument was developed which suggested that as natural scientific knowledge could be deployed in a utilitarian fashion – that is, embodied in useful technologies – so too could the ideas of human race differences and evolutionary pressures. In brief, once the process was understood, human evolution could be managed, and the late nineteenth century saw these ideas embraced in programmes of scientific research – that is, scientific racism, the empirical examination of differences between groups read as discrete races, plus the analogous empirical examination of differences between specimens taken from within one race. These ideas were deployed domestically: they fed into eugenics,[44] where concerns for the overall quality of the race or nation pointed towards state policies in respect of 'social hygiene' (social class inflected programmes of birth control, treatment of variously disabled, plus notions of giftedness and so on); and these ideas also fed into the justifications of colonial rule, where it was a simple logical corollary to the core arguments about competition and naturally given superiority and inferiority, that Europeans should take the lead in determining the development of non-European peoples.

And all of these claims could be assembled in a variety of mix-and-match forms.

(ii) Then, second, the types of claim to exploitation/suppression

Such claims could relate to historical-cultural matters: critics of the construction of state-empire systems called attention to the nature of the long-established civilizations in process of supersession. Such critics replied to the claims made by commentators supportive of

the development of state-empires by highlighting the fact that these sophisticated communities were long established and successful. It was pointed out that these were civilizations which functioned: thus, the multiple princely states of South Asia, the similar country powers of Southeast Asia and the centralized polities of Northeast Asia. More directly, critics could point to the despoliation of cultural resources: hence, say, the racist dismissal of the Chinese as inhabiting a moribund cultural sphere suffused with opium dreams, hence the late nineteenth-century trashing of the Summer Palace, hence, say, the patronizing dismissal of the Malays as child-like[45] – and so on.[46]

Such claims could relate to economic/social matters: critics of the state-empire systems called attention to the damage caused to long-established forms of economic life, where the colonial era saw the destruction of extant patterns of economic activity:[47] introducing new merchants/manufacturers, displacing locals; introducing new migrants, displacing locals; introducing new crops, displacing old ones;[48] and introducing new imports, displacing or suppressing local production.

Such claims could relate to the sphere of political life: critics of state-empire systems called attention to the ways in which existing civilizations were ordered – that is, they were functioning polities. Critics identified various strategies whereby colonial agents undermined extant political arrangements: cooption (thus local elites could be bought off);[49] over-riding/marginalizing (thus European systems of law were put into practice and customary law/authorities could be restricted to narrow areas of operation);[50] substituting (thus European ideas of property introduced to communities that operated differently);[51] and finally, simple violent suppression (gunboats);[52] plus, the cross-cutting objection to the denial to those living within the peripheries of such rights under law as were enjoyed by populations in the metropolitan centres.[53]

And these claims could be assembled in a variety of mix-and-match forms.

(iii) Exploitation, collaboration and learning

However, in this text, an alternative line is taken, already available within scholarly work;[54] thus against the proponents of division, whether read positively or negatively, in this text the position is taken that the state-empire systems were integrated units. They were not simply one-sided impositions, and once up and running they were not simple exercises of rule by distant masters. Rather, they functioned as units and are best addressed from this perspective. And so the materials

offered by those noted above can be reread in these terms, critically taking from both lines of commentary.

The idea can be unpacked in respect of their construction, operation and structure.

The construction of these state-empires involved exploitation, collaboration and learning – in brief a mix of conflict and development – and these are matters widely discussed by historians. First, building a state-empire system did not involve a simple asymmetric relationship between a unitary incoming agent and an equally unitary local agent. Rather, the exchanges were multiple: there were multiple contexts, there were multiple agents and these agents had multiple motives. These exchanges were also shaped by the inherent violence of the process of construction: military alliances involved thoroughly tangled exchanges and military campaigns were similarly tangled.[55] Second, the same arguments obtain in respect of the business of running a state-empire. Conversations amongst metropolitan elites were similarly shot through with tensions, and responses amongst wider populations also varied; plus the learning was not unidirectional for there were enthusiasms for the products and arts of the East; and there were positive responses to Eastern polities, thus South and Southeast Asian rulers came to exemplify the exotic, and late nineteenth-century Japan was welcomed as a new great power,[56] signing treaties of alliance with Britain, albeit later reluctantly repudiated.[57]

In respect of both elements – that is, building and running the system – pro-empire and anti-empire commentators write out the complexity in favour of the simplified tales required by particular political positions. The approach taken in this text seeks to reinstate the detail of these complex exchanges. But this is not a disguised apologia for colonial rule, for judged by today's standards these practices were unconscionable, as more than a few agents at the time recognized, but the stories of colonial rule were never straightforward.

Once the state-empire systems were up and running, they operated as units. They were internally diverse (embracing multiple forms of life)[58] but they were conceived and run as units by the elites, and these were drawn from the elites of the participating forms of life, metropolitan and peripheral, both benefited, a dynamic of access and reward. Each elite would confront its own masses and each would lay claim to legitimate rule over local masses. For elites this could entail a complicated exercise in positioning. For example, Malay sultans received benefits from the British, who came to confirm the role of sultanates as protectors of the Malays; Indian elites received support, similarly buttressing

their positions;[59] whilst Chinese elites in Singapore and Hong Kong received no favours but built their commanding local positions within the framework of order and access[60] offered by foreign rulers. Add to these elite-level processes movements amongst the wider populations, such as migrants, indentured labourers, sojourners, minority groups – both those suppressed and those promoted[61] – and the mix becomes ever more complex.

All of this entails that the simple distinction between core and periphery is misleading: after Susan Strange,[62] there were many differences in power amongst agents; after Anthony Giddens, not every place fitted into the overall global dynamic of structures/agents in the same way – indeed the reverse was the case. Definite groups had definite locations within the overall system and these groups differed in their power. Thus hillside tea planters in Ceylon did not have the power of merchant houses in Hong Kong, or, again, Malay farmers versus indentured labourers migrating from Southern China, and so on, but all were drawn into a single state-empire system.[63]

Further, this also entails that the end of the system of state empires did not see a simple divorce of core and periphery. The interactions within the various discrete elements of the system were complex and so too were the interlinkages between discrete elements in the system. Disentangling and reorienting this dense network of agent relations and agent-carried structures took time, so there was no abrupt change. Rather, decolonization saw a rebalancing of power between the various elements of the hitherto integrated system – economic, social, cultural and political – and it also saw a reimagining of these changing relationships so that new elites sought to secure the machineries of new states, build nations and pursue development, new national pasts were made, and these offered explanations as to the origins of the nation, its present condition and its ideal line of future development.

Metaphors deployed: Grasping the spread of state-empires

The state-empire systems typically covered vast geographical territories. Hence, in respect of the British, the claim that 'the sun never set on the empire' and the relationships (economic, social and political) within these spaces have been variously conceived, which is to say that they have been grasped in their totality in terms of a series of metaphors, subsequently unpacked in more detailed analysis.

The following are readily available: nexus and networks, hub and spoke, central power and associated territories, port cities as links in

a chain holding empire together, and hierarchies of power, again perhaps ordered around cities. And, more familiarly, empires have been discussed in terms of a simple distinction – 'cores' and 'peripheries'[64] – the former being taken to be the point around which the latter is obliged to revolve. The metaphor of core/periphery is now deeply embedded within reflections upon the colonial era, but it has been criticized for being mechanical – that is, the division is too hard and the linkages specified thereafter too crude. Indeed, the relationship of central areas and their associated territories was much more complex. The state-empire systems were integrated units and there would be many different linkages within these units. It would be better to speak of multiple centres and multiple associated territories, or to look for another metaphor altogether. Thus, for example, another terminology could speak of 'metropolitan centres' and 'scattered associated territories'.

For the moment the following points might be made. First, the terminology of core/periphery is not helpful, but it is now routine in social scientific conversation. A better metaphor would be to imagine networks, cross-cutting, with lines going in many directions, but with nodal points (the maps of airline routes in magazines in the seat pockets of aircraft). The nodal points are cores. In a state-empire system there would be many such core nodes. For example, in respect of the British in East Asia there was a network of key trading ports/cities and they linked a wide periphery (with its own domestic forms of life) to the system of empire (thus George Town, Malacca, Singapore, Labuan, Bangkok, Hong Kong and Shanghai). Second, the actual economic, social and political linkages within these state-empire networks were diverse and they created a messy ad hoc pattern. It is a mistake to take the conventional realist model of a state as a coherent entity and then read back to the situation of state-empires, adjusting as necessary. That is, it is a mistake to start with a false premise, for these units were never neat and tidy and coherent. Third, there were a variety of institutional mechanisms ordering state-empire systems. Thus, in regard to the British system, territories could be lodged within the system as dominions, colonies (with various patterns of direct/indirect rule), mandates and so on. Other European state-empire systems had other institutional machineries and all were variations on the theme of foreign control buttressed by the military exercised via local administrations extensively staffed by local people: France (Indo-China as a protectorate); the Netherlands (Dutch East Indies as a colony); and the USA (the Philippines was ruled as an 'insular area'). And, fourth, 'network' is a useful metaphor for the

relationship of core nodes to other core nodes. A metaphor of institutional reach is useful for conceiving the impact of empire on any local form of life; thus how far did empire determine the structural context of the territory in question and how far did demands of empire reach into the lives of ordinary people.[65]

The most plausible metaphors would seem to be 'metropolitan centre' and 'associated territories'. This pairing points to the power relationship; it points to the wide spread of territory drawn into these arrangements; and it does not prejudge how associated territories were lodged in the state-empire system (in practice, there were many strategies as the metropolitan centre dealt with and remade[66] the multiplicity of local forms of life). Yet the problem remains that the terms 'core' and 'periphery' are familiar and easy, so they will be used in the following chapters with the proviso that they always need unpacking to reveal the detail of particular cases.

The substance: The shift to the modern world in East Asia

The substantive history begins with the rise of a natural science-informed commercial capitalism in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. It is a familiar tale: science plus trade plus towns produced an energetic and expansionary form of life – the modern world. The shift to the modern world began in Europe but there were wider linkages in place from the very earliest days.[67] The long history can be unpacked as a series of phases: early contacts with Central, Latin and North America; involvement with the Arab lands of North Africa and the Middle East; then South Asia; thereafter Southeast and East Asia; and then finally sub-Saharan Africa.

In particular, in this phase of European expansion (where the first was essentially pre-modern, centring on the Spanish and involving Central and Latin America), with East Asia at that time the most powerful economic, social and political unit, there was a shift from a modest involvement with individual ships trading with local powers to the construction of a system of formal empires. The project of empire reached its apogee in the years before the Great War, and thereafter the system of state-empires entered a long drawn-out crisis, which culminated in a final episode of rapid collapse. Thereafter hitherto core countries were obliged to downsize and reinvented themselves as nation-states, carefully claiming long histories, whilst formerly peripheral territories, now free of direct foreign overlords, sought to establish states, build nations and pursue development.

Europe: Science, towns and commercial capitalism

The modern world can be understood as a particular form of life,[68] a culture. The roots of the modern world can be found in European history from the seventeenth century through to the nineteenth when, via a complex set of changes, extant forms of life were overturned.[69] Sketched, these changes included agrarian feudal societies giving way to industrial democratic societies; strategies of interpretation cast in theistic terms giving way to strategies cast in materialist terms; the natural world becoming an object of enquiry for the nascent natural sciences; and the social world becoming an object of study for the nascent social sciences. And, in all of this, there were numerous false starts,[70] numerous conflicts[71] and contingent advance.[72]

In Northwest Europe a fruitful exchange between natural science and commerce worked to trigger advances in both areas, as natural scientists found an interested constituency in merchants who in turn found utilitarian benefit in the work of the scientists. The exchange was popularized – that is, discussed in the coffee houses of the time.[73] This benefited the urban areas as power shifted from its old rural/agrarian base (land plus landowner plus peasantry) to a new urban/mercantile base (property plus merchants plus workers), so towns grew, and they accumulated economic, financial and political power. Overall, agrarian feudalism faded as agrarian capitalism took hold (agricultural improvements), supplemented by a commercial capitalism of trade (domestic and international), and in turn these were overshadowed by industrial capitalism, then around the turn of the twentieth century further supplemented by finance capitalism. Over this long period the system sought intensification and expansion: demands on domestic populations increased, whilst the system encouraged the pursuit of new overseas sources of supply and markets.

East Asia – traders and followers

Trading companies such as the Dutch East India Company (VOC), the East India Company (EIC) and the French East India Company (CFI)[74] were early modern organizations: they understood their role in mercantilist terms and sought – successfully – to establish areas of monopoly control over core/periphery trade (trade within an area would be a compound – local level, regional and thereafter the long-distance trade linking cores/peripheries); and such control was buttressed by their role as administrative units, thus they operated as quasi-states.

The Dutch and British competed: manoeuvring for advantage with local country powers, engaging in wars and agreeing spheres of

influence. The Dutch were first on the scene in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. In respect of the former, the Dutch retained control of the largest area in the Malay archipelago. In respect of the latter, the British became the more important players in China. The French concentrated most of their attention on North and West Africa and they established a presence in Indo-China and China somewhat later than other colonial powers.

In general descriptive terms there is a familiar pattern to the extension of foreign influence and the eventual creation of state-empire systems: first, the early moves from European traders operating at the limits of their knowledge (geography/navigation) and technologies (ships) and joining in existing local networks of trade, just one more group; second, over time, an increasing presence with more ships, more people, staying for longer and in time building factories, small permanent settlements; and third, thereafter, as metropolitan interest grew, with goods brought home, profits made and thus registering within metropolitan politics, the flow of people increased, as did the more formal interests of metropolitan powers, hence, more traders, soldiers, administrators, missionaries and family members, an increasingly significant group within local milieu. In all of this there were two features: manoeuvring amongst local country powers and routine recourse to war. In time these local areas of activity plus the linkages to other areas and then to the metropolitan core coalesced into formal state-empire systems.

Making state-empire systems

The shift from trading to colonial rule was made in an ad hoc fashion. First, the pace accelerated, so where Dutch expansion in the archipelago took place over centuries, British expansion in the Malay Peninsula took place over maybe 80 years and the French invasion of Indo-China took rather less time. Second, the nature of the expansion changed as it moved from private companies (VOC, EIC and the CFI) to the formal machineries of the state, and overseas territories were formally incorporated; thus, say, crown colonies, dependencies, dominions and overseas departments. Third, the people involved changed as colonial territories had more settled expatriate populations. Finally, over time these territories reproduced distinctive variants of the forms of life of their respective metropolitan centres.

And the key here is the form of life of the local colonial settlements. As noted, over time, colonial settlements developed distinctive forms of life – part borrowing from metropolitan country, part drawing in

people from surrounding areas, part bringing in migrants – and then the resultant mix had to find a way of living together, thus a local form of life.

Colonial economies were typically narrowly based, thus the specific trade links to the wider state-empire system, and thereafter elements of pre-existing economies, aspects of the core metropolitan economy plus any local novelties. The result was a distinctive local hybrid form of economic life. Colonial economies comprised a series of economies and consequently there was no simple shift from pre-colonial to colonial. The set of economies would include the following. First, pre-existing economic practices, say, subsistence farming/fishing, plus pre-existing trade networks – these would continue save where they inconvenienced the incomers (as with Orang Laut); second, the core economic concerns of the colonial powers, say, primary product export of local agricultural crops, at first extracted from peasant producers, later in the form of plantations, joined later by mineral exports, all supplemented by the means to such trade – that is, transport (roads, railways, dockyards), logistics and finance; third, local variants of core consumer markets serving locally based expatriates (imported consumer goods, health and welfare services, leisure facilities and so on); and fourth, local variants of the consumer markets of those countries supplying inward flows of migrants.[75]

Colonial urban forms (buildings, layouts and facilities) were typically distinctive and, as with the economies, these urban forms were multiple in nature, combining within one area various forms of settlement: first, remnants of pre-existing urban forms (with economic, social, cultural and political meanings enshrined within them) could include official buildings/compounds, religious sites, economic areas (for example, marketplaces) and living areas; second, the urban forms serving core colonial functions, such as dockyards, railways, security structures such as military and police compounds, administrative centres, communications bases and so on; third, urban forms serving locally based expatriate communities, offering consumption, leisure, religious and sporting services of one kind or another; and fourth, settlement areas devoted to inward migrant communities, reproducing culture-specific variants of all of the above. Colonial urban forms also typically included residential segregation. In modern European cities this is typically secured via the market price of housing but in colonial cities it was secured by design, as areas were designated for particular ethnic groups. In East Asia, colonial port cities showed this sort of segregation. For example, in Singapore an early town plan designed-in residential segregation, and in Shanghai

a variant form of segregation was available in the form of concession areas, land given over to foreign occupation and activity.

Colonial urban forms had distinctive social systems comprising pre-contact society, urban commercial society, the wider expatriate community and various migrant groups, each with their own logics and each with their own way of working within the overall colonial scene. Fourth, colonial holdings often had their own political systems and there were various ways of linking the over-riding demands of the metropolitan core with more local wishes, where these included the demands of metropolitan elites, the demands of local expatriate elites, the demands of local expatriate communities, the demands of inward flows of migrants and also the demands of residual representatives of pre-contact communities. Finally, there were distinctive local cultural systems; there was extensive cultural mixing, combining indigenous strands, materials imported from the metropolitan core and the ideas of migrant groups. Add in assorted intermixing and the resultant combination is distinctive. In sum, all of this feeds into the construction and thereafter maintenance of formal colonial systems within the peripheral territories of the state-empire system.

Conclusion: The unfolding shift to the modern world

During the nineteenth century a number of state-empire systems emerged that had their metropolitan cores in Europe and which embraced vast peripheral territories. In the early twentieth century, as the USA and imperial Japan joined the extant state-empire powers, there were relatively few areas of the planet free from their overweening claims. These state-empire systems were underpinned by the dynamism of the industrial capitalist system, itself supported by the successes of the natural sciences, accumulated in an ad hoc contingent fashion, variously ordered and legitimated, and doomed to an historically transient existence. Celebrants of empire cast their explanations in terms of civilization and progress, whilst critics spoke of exploitation and destruction – themes which, in various guises, run on down into the present day. Against these simple claims, the construction and operation of state-empire systems involved exploitation, collaboration and learning. And it was within the context of the experience of membership of these state-empire systems that polities of East Asia underwent in various ways the shift to the modern world.

Familiar positions in respect of the state-empire systems contrive to miss the core of the business – namely, its contingency. The shift to

the modern world revealed no essences, its origins in Europe were fortuitous, its export/embrace around the globe equally ad hoc, and the upshot – the world we inhabit today – is the contingent result of these processes. And these processes of science-based industrial capitalism continue in their restless, energetic and still ad hoc fashion. For the two regions of Europe and East Asia, the past is now available for quiet inspection (maybe more so in Europe than in East Asia) and the intermingled nature of the shift to the modern world can be unpacked (its details spelled out, its phases identified, and the manner in which all of this is remembered and read into contemporary forms of life considered). The tale, in brief, is easy. An initial phase of European irruption into the otherwise settled forms of life of East Asia, a further phase seeing the consolidation of state-empire systems, followed, in historical terms quite quickly, with resistance in the associated peripheral territories, which, as problems multiplied in the metropolitan heartlands, turned into a general crisis of the system of state-empires. A period of catastrophic warfare ensued with multiple arenas of struggle, multiple participants, multiple results (consequences, intended and unintended) and multiple memories, all events feeding into the next phase – that is, the dissolution of state-empires. This was followed by downsizing in the heartlands, the reimaging of now shrunken metropolitan centres as nation-states, and in the hitherto scattered peripheral areas the lengthy processes of state-making, nation-building and development. The long post-Second World War (as Europeans have it) period saw the intermittent but persistent pursuit of unification in Europe, taking the form of the European Union, whereas in East Asia, where interstate and domestic logics worked differently, there was a preference for differentiation, only more recently, and hesitantly, supplemented by a concern for the region, where economic growth has shielded unresolved legacies from open debate.[76] And now, after a hiatus of 50-odd years, the two regions are re-engaged and are linked by trade, travel, investment and, maybe, the mutual recovery of a shared past – a past that shaped both regions.

2
State-Empire Systems: The Players

State-empire systems were political economic units comprising a metropolitan centre and a dispersed associated set of related territories: conventionally, core and periphery. They were assembled over more or less lengthy periods and the process involved various conflicts between the core powers and between core powers and peripheral powers and amongst those peripheral powers themselves. Metropolitan centres supplied elite figures in commerce, finance, the military and government. These centres also provided a range of subaltern players: sailors, soldiers, migrants, those transported and those making settlements. Peripheral areas were also served by a diversity of players: elites, particularly those involved in politics and the economy, early targets for incomers, potential opponents and also potential collaborators. The subaltern classes were often less fortunate, some merchants prospered, lower level workers, the farmers, the petty traders and the like, could find their niche in the extant division of labour swept away. And, predictably, responses could vary as between winners and losers. Add to all this conflicts between incoming powers and various arrangements of local allies, and the picture becomes even less clear. These systems were not neat and tidy; rather, they were highly contingent. Neat stories are made after the event: from the colonizers, stories about bringing civilization; and from the colonized, stories about despoliation or later the business of securing liberation. But it is all better seen as a long drawn-out episode of complex change. It is the historical route taken by the polities in East Asia today – part and parcel of the unfolding shift to the modern world – it is not an episode to be either defended or criticized; rather, it is an episode to be understood.

The state-empire systems were constructed over a lengthy period of time and numerous agents were involved, and these ranged from individual adventurers[1] or officials[2] or soldiers through to quasi-state companies[3]

and states themselves. The project of state-empires were carried by the variously motivated agents involved, the crucial drivers of these processes were commercial interests based in Northwest Europe and the resultant pattern was contingent – networks of trade, accumulations of territories and diverse forms of rule. However, the underlying common theme was the dynamism – domestic and international – of the capitalist form of political economic life. So, at this point, discussion can usefully turn to the issue of the players, the various people who were involved, their identities, their patterns of action, and the ways in which they understood and legitimated their activities.

State-empire systems: Timescales and structural relationships

The process of construction of state-empire systems involved numerous agents with equally diverse motives who proffered an elaborate repertoire of justifications for their behaviours. The historical record reveals great variety in the details of the forms of life drawn into the ambit of state empires and a similar variety in their resultant forms of organization. But, that said, when viewed in general terms, these state-empires exhibited a number of common characteristics and these can be identified in all of the state-empire systems in some guise or other: they revolve around the underlying dynamism of the form of life and the consequent enthusiasm of various agents to spread their networks, celebrate their culture and to remake – more or less knowingly – the lives of others who are thus obliged to adapt to the demands of the incomers.

The relationship was typically asymmetric. European power overwhelmed other cultures, reworking their economies, societies and polities, but as these systems operated as units, the reordering embraced all of the participants. Thus, whilst relations of power were asymmetric – core/periphery – the system remade cores as it remade peripheries because, for all concerned, state-empire systems were part and parcel of the still unfolding shift to the modern world.

The process of creating state-empire systems ran over a lengthy period of time. In East Asia their construction was secured only over several centuries. In the early phases, during the sixteenth century, the incomers simply joined existing networks of trade and politics. In the latter phases, their numbers, and the demands that they made, precipitated sweeping changes in the now peripheral territories. The earliest contacts saw pre-modern European powers establishing trading bases. These were utterly remote from their European homelands,

accessed in the days of sail only with great difficulty and consequently involving only small groups of people. They were dependent upon working relationships with local country powers, operating as one more group of traders within the wider long-established regional networks. Schematically, the Portuguese traded in the area in the sixteenth century (Malacca 1511; Macau 1552); so too Spain (Manila 1571). But it was in the seventeenth century that the more significant movement of European powers into the area began. Europeans sought trade and territory; again schematically, the Dutch became involved (Banten 1603; Deshima 1634); thereafter the British (Penang 1786; Singapore 1819; Hong Kong 1841); and in the later phases the French (Saigon 1859), Germans (Qingdao 1897), the Americans (Philippines 1899) and the Japanese (Korea 1911), and all combined to undermine the Sino-centric system and force the system of treaty ports upon the Qing authorities.

Construction I: Definitive characteristics

The process of the construction of state-empire systems linking Europe and East Asia had certain definitive characteristics: dynamism, violence, multiplicity and commentary.

The construction of empire was carried upon the restless dynamism of the industrial capitalist form of life (or, in brief, system). It did not rest upon the efforts of heroic figures, though many were invented during the latter parts of the nineteenth century. Rather, individual agents inhabited and animated this system. The system was contrived by accident, a fortuitous mixture of scientific advance, commercial innovation and urban elite support, and the heartlands of this novel system were found in Northwest Europe. The inherent dynamism of the system found dual expression in domestic intensification and international expansion: the former produced ever greater social discipline and material advance, complex processes that occasioned the earliest work in the classical European tradition of social theorizing; whilst the latter saw the aggressive expansion of the system through the contemporary pattern of available political-economic forms of life. Trade was the key. European traders sought new materials and products, along with marketplaces for their own trade goods, and early exchanges involved Europeans entering local networks of trade as just one more group. But such exchanges became progressively more asymmetric as the seventeenth century wore on: the vigour of European traders, their material success, their agreements with other polities (treaties) and their effective participation in extant trade relations all meant that European networks of trade grew. And the advance could always be facilitated by the use of violence. Such

advantages overbore other cultures – slowly they were reordered along the lines required by the traders and economies of Europe.

It was a system created in Europe: created, but not designed; created, but expressing no essence; created, in brief, via a set of fortuitous circumstances; created and thereafter exported around the planet where it found multiple expressions, available in different varieties. It might be added that there is no reason to write about widespread 'industriousness' or 'proto-globalization', or indeed about globalization at all; it is enough to acknowledge other cultures and to track their fate in the long process of intermixing with the expansionist dynamic of the system.

The recourse to violence was routine. It was an inherent aspect of the exchange. The expansion of state-empires – their acquisition of peripheral territory – involved extensive violence. The key agents of state-empire creation were traders along with their allies in government, the military and the press, and their celebration of the benefits of trade excused – so far as they were concerned – the use of violence to 'open up' territories otherwise closed to their activities. These agents were ruthless in their expropriation of the lands of others.[4] Their celebration of trade and opening up was routinely accompanied by the characterization of other peoples as of lesser status (race or religion or culture) or they could be simply cast as an inconvenience to those with power.[5] Yet the violence did not meet with unrestricted approval or acquiescence, for there were many protests at the behaviour of traders and their metropolitan supporters. Nonetheless, it was routine. The violence deployed expressed a technological superiority over those with whom they interacted: better ships, better guns, better weapons and better logistics. The violence was centrally utilitarian – opening up areas to trade – but it was also accompanied by claims to racial or cultural superiority, instances of the exculpatory logic of 'blaming the victims'. There were many such victims amongst the peoples overseas with whom the Europeans traded.[6]

Moreover, the violence attending the creation of state-empires was not restricted to the peripheries. The state-empires were units – both core and periphery. And so it might be recalled that their first and most enduring victims were their own populations. Early-modern political communities were ordered via the elite deployment of violence, institutionalized in law and social relations (assorted hierarchies) supplemented as needed by the repression of grass roots protests or political movements – for example, in Britain the suppression of Chartism and the use of transportation, or in Europe the fate of the 1848 'springtime of nations'. And their second long-established victims were their

neighbouring elites along with the populations that they controlled. War between these European powers was routine. Norman Davies lists a 'selection'[7] of these wars. In brief, European elite violence was deployed in a utilitarian fashion to discipline a domestic population or to weaken a neighbour so as to seize an advantage of one sort or another. As Tom Nairn[8] elsewhere remarks, the *ancien regime* in Europe did not leave the historical stage willingly; it fought back, and in the nineteenth century as state-empires were made, it successfully resisted such attacks on its privileges.

In all of this there was an ongoing exchange between the pursuit of trade, the use of violence and the growth of the natural sciences.[9] The habitual use of violence facilitated natural scientific advance: urban fortifications;[10] logistics and maps; instruments of navigation and ship design;[11] firearms (metals, propellants and artillery rounds); and so on. These expressions of both the restless invention of the capitalist system and the habitual violence of elites produced a distinct military advantage for Europeans in respect of all other communities. This unpacked in terms of early trade by the use of violence to overcome local resistance to opening relations on the terms desired by the Europeans. And this advantage unpacked a little later in the ability to overcome local armed resistance as state-empire territories were accumulated. European navies and armies were simply much more powerful than those of any other community, and Europeans put this available violence to work. Its use was pragmatic. Its use was celebrated – politically (claims to success, ideologies affirmed), popularly (media tales of heroic achievement of one sort or another) and in the arts (paintings, statues and literature).[12]

The creation of state-empires involved multiple agents. A simple, descriptive sociology of empire populations would uncover multiple agents, multiple motives and multiple lines of action in both core and periphery. Historians, social scientists and other commentators routinely simplify matters in order to run their various arguments, but the record is one of multiplicity. State-empire systems were the contingent out turn of multiple social processes. Such order as they displayed was itself a contingent achievement. And interpretive coherence was bestowed retrospectively, which, it might be added, does not open the way to claims to either 'absentmindedness' or 'anarchy'; rather, state-empire systems were the result of complex ever-shifting social processes, and perceived coherence was an interpretation which could and did guide action. As John Darwin[13] records, there was an 'empire project', but it was, however, always contested, always provisional, always contingent and, given its fundamental nature – one group deploying force

in order to determine the form of life of another – always likely to be an historically transient episode.

There were multiple European agents involved in building and sustaining state-empire systems: multiple individual personal trajectories,[14] multiple social class trajectories,[15] multiple (changing) understandings and multiple (changing) motives. So, schematically, elites (geo-political motives, including concerns for military positions and market opportunities in respect of competitors, sometimes local country powers, equally often other European powers); traders (profit motive, the early spice trade in Southeast Asia was a high risk venture which if successful could reap very great material rewards, and later more regular colonial trade continued to be lucrative, thus, opium); adventurers (personal motives, money, escape, accident); missionaries (organizational motives, proselytizing comingled with an often laudable humanitarianism); administrators (career motives, advancement or the best move on offer; a productive subcategory would be administrator-scholars);[16] military (career motives, advancement or best move on offer);[17] and settlers (personal motives, oriented towards new material opportunities). And there were multiple local agents involved, again with multiple understandings and motives: elites sought to accommodate the demands of more powerful incomers; merchants sought to profit; and others responded to change as best they could.

The European incursion remade existing communities. As Marx and Engels noted, capitalism was disposed to remake the world in its own image.[18] Many local agents were 'winners' and many were 'losers'.[19] Some took themselves to be winners even as they were losing (samurai in Meiji restoration, where a conservative revolution from above carried by samurai who then found themselves disarmed and redeployed in a civil servant role); and some took themselves to be losers even as they were winning (Malay royals, confronted by incoming British who overbore extant polities, fixed rulers in place and stuffed them with money).

And, finally, extensive commentary attended the expansion of the state-empire system. In Europe, as noted, empire was celebrated in the political sphere, in popular culture and in the arts. First, politically, the state-empires began as machineries for political-economic expansion and consequently expansionary success was celebrated. And as conflict accompanied this expansion, military victories were celebrated. In the latter phases these underlying dispositions were supplemented by metropolitan elite-level competition – colonies-as-bling – and this fed one more strand of celebration into the mix, this time encouraging a competitive nationalist sentiment amongst the general

population. Then, second, more directly popular responses encompassed both political-cultural nationalism (encouraged in speeches, pamphlets, books, magazines and newspapers) and consumption, in the form of ever more widely available imported products (foodstuffs from Latin America and the USA, tropical products from the Caribbean, Africa and Asia, and more exotic imports from East Asia in general and China in particular) and the wealth of stories that went along with empire (available from relatives, friends and the extant mass media). And, third, the arts were also involved, sometimes in a predictable fashion, as with public celebratory monuments (paradigmatically, 'statues in squares' but also implicated in much nineteenth- and early twentieth-century work – architecture, statuary, gardens, houses, paintings), but also a genuine appreciation of arts of other cultures: India, Southeast Asia, Japan and China. And, it might be added, all of these changes in the relationship of core and (newly acquired) periphery were paralleled by the work of natural and social scientists: thus naturalists, geographers and anthropologists. The worlds of the periphery were opened up not merely for commerce but for the imagination. Again, paradigmatically, Charles Darwin formulated the notion of evolution after visiting the Galapagos Islands.

In sum, the construction and maintenance of state-empire systems was accompanied by extensive commentary in both the core and the periphery: in the former, such argument ranged through celebratory, exculpatory and concerned or progressive; whilst in the latter, it encompassed reactive, accommodative, opportunistic and progressive positions. The concerns of the various agents differed sharply, for the system was large-scale and involved many class and ethnic groups scattered over vast distances. In retrospect, it is surprising that these systems held together for as long as they did.

Construction II: Contending powers

There were a number of foreign powers, competing amongst themselves, making various alliances with local country powers, which in their turn were in competition, but together, over the longer run, overbearing local political communities. It was an untidy process, lasting, overall, some 400 years.

The powers included:

- the Spanish/Portuguese, the earliest traders, from the sixteenth century onwards;
- the Dutch, the key group within Southeast Asia;

- the British, later arrivals in Southeast Asia, concerned to trade with China;
- the French, also late arrivals in Southeast Asia, concerned too to trade with China;
- the Germans, late arrivals in East Asia and the wider Pacific Ocean;
- the Americans, delayed by civil war, active across the Pacific Ocean;
- the imperial Japanese, learning the lessons of the modern world and joining in by creating an empire in Northeast Asia;
- plus (two rather different polities):
- the Qing Empire, competing for influence in Manchuria and Korea;
- Czarist Russia, competing for influence in Northeast Asia.

The overall process was marked by contingency; there were no grand plans, state-empire spheres extended their reach in an ad hoc fashion; violence was routine, alliances shifting, justifications were cast in terms of progress, later objections in terms of exploitation, and yet, against both of these familiar readings, it was through the distinctive experience of involvement with colonial powers that East Asian polities entered the modern world.

Construction III: European and East Asian strengths

The modern world revolves around science-based industrial capitalism. Originating in Europe, it has been replicated around the globe. As it was brought into contact with other cultures, it drew them into the system, variously remaking them, and now it touches most parts of the world. The essence of industrial capitalism understood as a form of life, a culture, is change: natural science continually produces new technologies; producers generate new goods; commercial groups prosper or fall by the wayside; and individuals and communities work within these structures to secure their livelihoods. At a macro-scale the system was first configured as a Euro-centric system. Thereafter, from the 1900s onwards, it slowly turned into an US-centred system. Now, in the early twenty-first century, it seems to be a tri-regional system with variant forms located in North America, Europe and East Asia. The system is not static; it continues to change and the relationship of this system to others both historical and contemporary has been subject to much debate. Amongst many questions, two are of present interest: why did the shift to the modern world start in Europe and why did it not start in East Asia?

The East Asian world in the early seventeenth century was rich. It was an object of respectful fascination for European travellers and writers. Around this time, Europeans produced an unusually dynamic form of

life and industrial-capitalism, and a period of domestic intensification and external expansion began. At first, Europeans became regular participants in Asian networks of economic activity and thereafter they slowly came to dominate and remake these networks of activity. The clear political expression of the period of European and US dominance was that of the state-empire system. The period was relatively brief but it was this experience that drew the peoples of East Asia into the modern world (economic, social, political and cultural). In the nineteenth century, Europeans were impressed by their own success, embracing ideas of progress, ideas of science and ideas of the superiority of their own civilization. The last noted ideas have faded for Europeans as a result of disastrous wars, but the earlier pair is still affirmed, so there is curiosity about the history of their own continent and curiosity about the historical trajectory of East Asia.

Formal arguments about Europe invoke familiar themes: the rise of natural science, the shift of economic, financial and finally political power away from key centres in agrarian feudal society (land, landowners' great houses, princes/kings and their greater holdings, plus the Church with its reserves of knowledge and land) towards the towns, their merchants, their financiers, their traders and, in time, their politicians. The system interacted with the rise of natural science such that urban centres encouraged science as a means to production and trade, and then upon the wealth created slowly displaced the landed powers, eventually creating systems of capitalist enterprise. These were very dynamic, leading to domestic intensification, and the system also looked to expand overseas. And this opens up the role of the external contexts of European intensification and expansion – that is, their participation in already existing networks of trade. Overall, this familiar story posits a sequence: first Europe, then, in phases, everywhere else. However, recent discussions offer a much greater role to factors external to Europe, in particular linking the rise of Europe to the circumstances of Asia. Most directly, A.G. Frank[20] argues that before the rise of modern Europe the centre of the global economy was in Asia, where circuits of trade/money linked the countries of South, Southeast and East Asia. Frank argues that these areas were integrated by trade/money flows, and the Europeans joined in these flows, slowly becoming prosperous, then later aggressive and later still colonial powers. The Europeans became rich by participating in these existing Asian flows of trade. Thereafter, Asia entered the modern industrial capitalist world via this exchange with European/US colonialism. In a variant argument, Kenneth Pomeranz[21] claims that the centre of the global

economy was in East Asia before the rise of modern Europe but, from around the seventeenth century, China was less able to exploit its energy resources, in particular coal, used in Europe to fuel the steam engine revolution early in the whole process called the industrial revolution. Nor was it particularly concerned about overseas trade, which provided Europeans with wealth from Central America (silver), cheap food (based on slave labour in sugar) and many opportunities for trade in a range of other goods, which activity provided their entry into Chinese economic spheres. Once the Europeans had an entry point, existing arrangements in China were slowly undermined, leading to the creation of large areas of quasi-colonial territories. Finally, it might be added, in respect of these debates, that reconstructed long-run data on all of this is provided by Angus Maddison,[22] and this broadly seems to support the arguments of Frank and Pomeranz – that is, East Asia was prosperous but from around 1700 started to lose ground against an energetic expansionist Europe.

State-empire systems: Agents, projects, legitimations and records

State-empire systems were not simply willed into being; rather, the agents involved rode on the back of a powerful political-economic system. It was the demands intrinsic to the industrial-capitalist system that provided the impetus to domestic intensification and international expansion, and agents in other places around the global system confronted these demands from structurally weaker positions.

The economics and politics of state-empire expansion

Christopher Bayly,[23] offering a global history, argues that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had seen a general increase in 'industriousness', making the point that there had been energetic economic activity and innovation in many areas of the globe. At this time, political structures differed greatly, very roughly: East Asian dynasties; Southeast Asian maritime empires; South Asian princely kingdoms; African kingdoms; Middle Eastern theocratic/princely; and Latin American landed oligarchy. None of them were democratic. None of them were liberal. Yet most of these political economic forms of life were stable, ordered and prosperous. And, indeed, historians argue that at this time the major political-economic and cultural centre within the global system was East Asia with a dynastic China at the core.

Yet the political-economic system created around this time by Europeans was powerful: the political economy was industrial capitalist,

the polity was liberal. The mixture of natural science, industry and market competition amongst individuals underpinned liberal polities. For the theorists Thomas Hobbes and John Locke,[24] the keys to the polity were individuals, their material interests and the contracts that they made. The state was the necessary minimum rule-setter. Theological explanations about the polity (thus the divine right of kings to rule) were cast aside and the keys to the economy were its role in ordering the satisfaction of individually arising needs and wants. The political-economic system was very dynamic: it continually increased its demands on its domestic population (intensification – efficiency/discipline) and it expanded overseas to find new markets.[25]

This system overwhelmed East Asia: the Spanish/Portuguese; the Dutch; the British; the French; the Americans; the Germans; and the Japanese. The Qing and Czarist elites also asserted themselves against neighbours. All sought to carve out state-empire territories. In general the key motive was economic, and traders were the agents. Initial numbers would be small, to the locals, just one more group of traders. Later their numbers and demands would increase. And thereafter, foreign colonial structures were imposed on local existing structures. The local political structures differed. So too did the superimposed colonial machineries. However, there was a common pattern with a political and trading elite of foreigners, along with complex patterns made up by ethnically diverse local players. All in all it created the distinctive political, economic and social world of the colony.

State-empire systems: The goal of trade; the role of violence

The heart of the enterprise – the driving force – was the desire for trade, driven by the logic of the system, picked up and translated into practice by a variety of agents that were concerned for trade and not averse to the utilitarian deployment of violence.

(i) The goal of trade: Utility and ethics

After the Spanish and Portuguese expansion into Central and Latin America in the sixteenth century, there was more money available in Europe – silver – and it generated an increase in available credit. It funded excess consumption and some investment in Spain and Europe, and it also funded further colonial expansion across the Pacific. The Spanish colonized the Philippines in the sixteenth century and thereby joined the Asian circuits of trade and money. Other European powers slowly joined in these East Asian circuits. The Spanish and Dutch were the early European traders; later the British arrived; and later still

the French. The Europeans sought specialist products, such as silks, ceramics and spices.

It should be noted that the Europeans from very early on enjoyed one advantage in these trading exchanges with local power in Asia – that is, they possessed superior military forces, both technology and organization, and the history of the expansion of state-empire systems is filled with records of wars fought against militarily inferior local powers in order to force upon them conditions of trade that were acceptable to the Europeans. At first the traders came in small numbers and eventually they set up trading bases or factories with a few dozen people.[26] The existing patterns of East Asian trade could accommodate these demands. These people were just one more group of traders within the wider networks of trade centred on China and running through the archipelago of Southeast Asia.

It was the rise of industrial capitalism that caused changes via the demands made upon Asian suppliers and the related search for markets for European goods. First, as their economies developed, Europeans had a wider schedule of demands upon trading partners, and in East Asia there was a broad shift from small-scale output of traditional producers (spices, silks, ceramics and so on) to the large-scale output of mines and plantations. Second, they sought larger markets for their products and this could entail overcoming local resistance to importing goods. As their economic impact deepened, so did their social impact and their political demands: factories turned into treaty ports; seasonal trading (with ships riding the monsoon winds) turned into all-year trading; small-scale settlements grew larger; traders were joined by other groups, administrators, missionaries, family members and the like; and as these settlements developed, they began to change the local economy with new imports, new exports and new trading partners.

All of this spilled over into politics. The European trade was organized principally via two[27] large trading companies: the EIC and the VOC. They established trade, signed treaties and organized armies. The Dutch seized territory in the archipelago, the Dutch East Indies; the British seized territory in the Malay Peninsula, British Malaya. By the mid-nineteenth century they had been superseded by direct British and Dutch state involvement and at this time the French state had also become involved in the mid-century seizure of Vietnam, thereafter Indo-China, and at the turn of the century US involvement began with its seizure of the Philippines.

The patterns of trade and in time associated colonial empires were first established in Southeast Asia but the goal was the core power in East

Asia: China. And, in time, all of these metropolitan powers moved into China, creating spheres of influence around their trading bases on the coast. The first move was the Opium War of 1840–42, which resulted in the establishment of the trading port of Hong Kong, a role supplemented by other bases as a result of the Second Opium or Arrow War of 1856–60.[28]

(ii) The role of violence

At first the incoming traders simply joined the existing networks, which were long established, sophisticated and functional. This participation could be peaceful – that is, they were just one more group. But it could also be eased by the use of violence – that is, local obstacles could, in the right circumstances, be overborne. At first small-scale exchanges, later participation or inauguration of small-scale local wars and then towards the latter part of the process of state-empire expansion, as the trade became more important, the recourse to violence could include unrestricted warfare, hence the British invasions of Burma, the French invasions of Indo-China and the foreigners' collective wars against Qing China.

The metropolitan powers were able to extend their reach: at first, with some difficulty, one more warring power amongst others (that is, indigenous polities fought wars); later with greater ease, as they became more deeply embedded in the local networks of trade and politics (that is, they had more resources, bases and contacts); and later still, in the latter phases of expansion, relatively easily, as their science-based industry provided weapons of much greater utility – that is, killing power – than anything available to indigenous powers.

Organizing colonial territories – from economics to politics

All of this marked the start of formal state-empire systems with metropolitan centres and a spread of associated colonial territories. A core–periphery relationship was established. The economies of newly acquired peripheral territories were organized according to the overall policy decisions of the metropolitan elites. And colonial territories quickly came to evidence an ambiguous mix of exploitation, collaboration, learning and development. The changes were sweeping.[29]

A series of changes took place:

- European commercial law was introduced;
- European-style landownership was introduced;

- European systems of taxation were established to pay for the apparatus of colonial rule;
- commercial agriculture in the form of plantations was established;
- mines were established;
- roads and railways were built;
- colonial port cities were built;
- there was inward migration from other areas;
- there was residential segregation of races.[30]

These changes were neither straightforward nor readily translated into practice by the incoming players. In practice, system demands carried by incoming groups were understood and translated into practice in a variety of ways, where, predictably, they met with a multiplicity of responses from local groups. Such responses were rooted in local practice – economic, social and cultural – and the resultant patterns of intermingled forms of life are subtle so that the detail can only be unpacked at a local level.[31]

Simple stories of energetic Europeans overcoming the passive East, or alternatively of the harmonious stable East being overcome by aggressive outsiders, are false, as the process of state-empire expansion was an exchange involving multiple agents, always lodged in a local environment and always producing winners and losers. In all, it was one more aspect of the complicated business of the shift to the modern world

(i) A case considered: British Malaya

British involvement in the Malay Peninsula can be dated to 1786 when Francis Light created a colonial settlement in Penang. Thereafter Malacca and Singapore were acquired, together with the Straits Settlements. It was only much later in the nineteenth century that the various Malay kingdoms of the peninsula itself were drawn into the state-empire sphere. Under the colonial regime, economic activity came to take the form of discrete economic sectors associated with different ethnic groups:

- British financial institutions;
- British trading houses;
- British-owned plantations;
- Chinese petty traders in towns;
- Chinese tin miners in rural areas;
- Indian plantation labour;
- Malay smallholders in rural areas;

- Chinese merchants and financiers;
- Indian professionals;
- Malay landlords.

Such economic differentiation could provide seeds for social/political conflicts.

The political exchanges were also subtle:

- the British were focused on trade sectors;
- the British used local people as traders and labourers;
- Chinese traders controlled the opium retail trade in colonial Singapore;
- Chinese traders controlled the inflow of labourers from Southern China;
- the Straits Chinese were a privileged group;
- Indians became a privileged group with professional status;
- Eurasians emerged as a distinct group;
- the Malay royals were co-opted into the empire, receiving large pensions;
- the Malay peasantry remained rural.

(ii) A case considered: German Shandong

German imperialism had two phases.[32] The earlier phase under Bismarck viewed extra-European colonies as requiring only modest state support – in other words, they were not so important. The latter phases were understood in more typically European terms – that is, that colonies were a sign of great power status and crucial for economic advance. In Germany, domestic politics in the late nineteenth century drove the acquisition of extra-European possessions, and these pressures intermeshed with inter-imperial rivalry. The rivalry, it might be noted, embraced core and peripheral territories. Thus in the late nineteenth century, German industry and commerce had made the country pre-eminent in mainland Europe, with extensive commercial and cultural influence in Central and Eastern Europe. The rise of German power challenged established state-empires, which resisted easy accommodation, and the competition thus fed core destabilization. And, cast in these terms, German involvement in Shandong around Qingdao can be dated from 1897 to 1914 – the later period of German imperialism.

The territory in Shandong was acquired by the German navy in 1897[33] and a treaty was arranged the following year, which gave a 99-year lease on the territory. The Qing authorities ceded control of Qingdao and

nearby Kiachow. The colony had a governor; a European-style town was built; railways were built into the interior of Shandong; forests were planted; dockyards were constructed; a naval squadron was based there;[34] and also troops. Many Chinese moved into the colony. At that time the local population was around 100,000 and thus much larger than Singapore or Hong Kong at the time of their colonization, more like the establishment of settlements in Shanghai. The occupation followed the episode of the Boxer Rebellion.[35] Consequently, attitudes amongst foreigners were antagonistic towards the Chinese, cast in race terms – that is, irreconcilable, naturally given differences.

The colonial state was the key organization, interlinking the distant metropolitan centre in Berlin with the local scene. A variety of German class groups were involved in colonial expeditions – aristocracy/military, high bourgeoisie/capitalists, and the educated middle classes – and each embodied typical attitudes towards the social world in general and colonial subjects in particular (schematically, discipline, profit and understanding). On the other hand, amongst local Chinese there were a mixture of officials, merchants, small farmers and peasants. Or, in brief, Qingdao evidenced the diversity of population typical of the trading ports of the Europeans in this part of the world. The initial style of colonial state was to stress divisions: urban settlement was divided into European areas and Chinese areas, although these restrictions were eased as wealthy Chinese moved to the city after the 1911 revolution.[36] and law, where locals were subject to harsh punishments. After 1904 this was softened and a measure of cultural intermixing was favoured: the Chinese Committee (1902); a Chinese Chamber of Commerce (1909); and a Chinese-German University (1909). These changes were prompted in part by the shifting international situation where German politicians saw a need for allies, and in part by changes within the colonial state where one aspect of this was that the educated middle classes stressed their grasp of the ethnographic detail of the lives of the colonized, and professionals stressed the role of ethnographic knowledge. It was an intellectual and status claim that fed into policy advice and as the international situation became awkward, their claims were acknowledged rather more.

The colony prospered.[37] And, in the atmosphere of inter-imperial rivalry, the British responded to the development of the port by moving into Weihaiwei, the Russians and French by moving into Port Arthur and then, in 1914, the Japanese authorities honoured their commitments under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and captured the colony after a short military campaign. The German fleet escaped, engaging the Royal Navy in two battles, at Coronel and the Falklands, before

being lost. Imperial Japan occupied the colony until 1922, when it was transferred to the Republic of China (ROC).

Justifying the empires: Claims to superiority, claims of a responsibility

The Europeans and Americans slowly created a series of colonial holdings in East Asia: in Southeast Asia these adopted the guise of systems of formal colonial rule; in China there were informal networks of influence rooted locally in extra-territorial enclaves. Only two countries escaped formal colonization, although they were strongly influenced by outsiders: Siam and Japan. Over a lengthy period, the state-empire systems expanded to embrace most of East Asia. In this protracted process, each colonial regime had to deal with the local polities/cultures. It was inevitably a complex exchange because each colonial sphere developed its own style of colonial polity, but there were common political themes in the guise of the assorted cross-cutting rhetorics of explanation and justification.

There were rhetorics of expansion revolving around the politics of trade and progress. Thus, for example, traders and politicians in nineteenth-century Britain justified the often-violent expansion of their state-empire territories in terms of the putatively unequivocal benefits of free trade.

There were rhetorics of superiority/inferiority as Europeans located themselves vis à vis those peoples whom they absorbed into their colonial holdings. The imagery[38] used amongst European traders, politicians and other commentators in respect of distant lands changes over time. Prior to the nineteenth-century process of state-empire expansion, inhabitants of distant lands could be represented positively, as worthy of admiration, ancient civilizations or alternatively noble savages (innocent of the corruptions of civilized life),[39] but after the expansion began the imagery changes. It becomes negative. Those subject to colonial rule or drawn unwillingly into trading relationships are represented as weak, as members of old declining civilizations or as simple savages – and a new set of stereotypical contrasts with Europeans are deployed: claims about intellects (reason/unreason); claims about behaviour (reliable/unreliable); or claims about social ethics (upright/inconstant). In respect of China, the British, having waged war in order to sell an addictive narcotic – opium – came to characterize the local population as the drug-addled hopeless descendants of what might once have been a great civilization, a classic case of 'blaming the victims'.[40]

There were rhetorics of superiority derived from practice. First, the economic superiority of Europe came to be asserted during the early phase of the shift to the modern world. A key element was trade. The role of trade figured in eighteenth-century debates. The 1707 Treaty/Act of Union created a large common marketplace and trade flourished, and in the nineteenth century, political economists theorized the role of trade, with, famously, David Ricardo's notion of comparative advantage feeding economic specialization and exchange. The idea was available domestically and it was easy to deploy in respect of territories overseas. In brief, trade was central to British elite self-understandings.[41] The package is summed up by Cain and Hopkins[42] as 'gentlemanly capitalism'. It was centred on the trading role of London and helped to spread commerce around the globe. It was not necessarily imperialistic but was content with that approach as a way of expanding the reach of the system. Celebrations of the system were familiar. And such claims were echoed by Marx and Engels,[43] noting that capitalism was disposed to create a world in its own image. Second, analogous claims were advanced in regard to social/political arrangements. European societies were held to be more open and polities more inclusive. The contrasts carried in these ideas had numerous sources: travellers' tales, the reflections of philosophers and anthropological work. And third, these practical comparisons were supplemented by references to the arts and sciences, the battery of ideas comprising the Enlightenment: fine arts, popular arts and the burgeoning presence of the natural sciences, all taken as evidently present in the core and equally evidently not present – or not so unequivocally – in the peripheries, where, in any case, there were fewer chances of local agents offering counterarguments.

There were rhetorics of superiority derived from available theory. One aspect of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the growth of the natural sciences. Nineteenth-century biology advanced in one particular respect: description, classification and the construction of typologies. It was fuelled by the work of naturalists, and their work was intermingled with the expansion of the system of state-empires with the collection and categorization of specimens having become a familiar routine. The practice found its synthesizing theorists in Alfred Russell Wallace and Charles Darwin, who offered the view that the natural world was governed by the demands of competition, natural selection and evolution. These arguments were extended to the human population. Now competition between individuals within a racial group was taken to be inevitable, but it was also in some measure manageable, an idea that opened the way to eugenics, the practical science of improving

the race. And now competition between races was taken to be a natural phenomenon. It was also inevitable that, over time, race groups would fall into a hierarchy, the superior and the lesser. These ideas were deployed domestically and with respect to peripheral areas within the state-empire systems. Europeans could now argue apparently scientifically that they were superior and that consequently it was appropriate for them to manage the less advanced peoples whom they found in the peripheral territories that they acquired.

In respect of empire, it fostered a strategy of reductive argument that had great appeal in the context of state-empire expansion as it justified the expansion: the fact of having expanded established the fact of race superiority, and all the pernicious elements of race theory were then unrolled: claims about race, the establishment of race hierarchies, and the justification of control and violence. It also saw the formation of various distinctive groups, many of which came to perform distinct functions within the colonial sphere

There were rhetorics of responsibility of various types: caring for the people; caring for development; holding the ring between competing local groups; and establishing direct and indirect rule (co-option). One late specimen is offered by J.S. Furnivall,[44] a social-democratic reformer, who identified plural societies where interchanges between ethnic groups with distinct economic spheres were reduced in the marketplace to a simple gain/loss calculation, and on this basis he argued for a role for the detached colonial administration. The argument is not foolish but it was unsustainable as subsequent events showed; yet it reveals the mixed motives of those involved in state-empires, and one group, indicated here with Furnivall, were colonial administrator-scholars.

There were also colonial pilgrimages.[45] The successful colonial citizens travelled to the metropolitan heartlands and they discovered the gap between colonial rhetorics of freedom/development and the reality of discrimination, and the seeds of independence movements were sown. The political rhetorics of rulers were turned back upon them.

And there were also nationalist movements or independence movements, both religious and secular.

State-empire systems: New regional patterns, resistance and collapse

European state-empires were typically trading systems and peripheral territories were remote from core territories, notably so with European

linkages with East Asia, and these peripheral territories were reached along often extended sea routes.[46] Colonial economies served the interests of the metropolitan core and key trading cities served to link local areas to the wider state-empire economic sphere, and these networks of cities served to bind together the overall empire sphere.[47] These state-empire economic spheres also cut across the established economies in Southeast Asia.[48]

Amitav Acharya[49] argues that a regional trade network, which spanned Southeast Asia, drawing the elements together, was disrupted by colonial mercantile spheres of interest: Dutch, British, French and US. These new powers constructed trading networks that were oriented towards their respective metropolitan centres. The impact of these newcomers generated a complex pattern of economic activity within the region. It can be thought of as a series of layers of economic and trade activity. First, the lowest layer would be traditional products for local consumption and this would be the key area of operation for local people – the direct sphere of the social production of their livelihoods. The next layer would be traditional products still traded across colonial boundaries along old established regional trade routes, again part and parcel of long-established linkages serving the livelihoods of the local population. The next layer would bring people and goods into the region from the surrounding areas. Some of this would be long established but perhaps revised as the new powers gained influence – thus the long-established junk trade, in the nineteenth century the vehicle for the export of coolie labour from Southern China to meet the demands of the economies of the incoming Europeans. The next layer would be all of those activities introduced by the outsiders – tropical products (spices) plus the output of mines and plantations. The final layer linked the colonial sphere of new economic activity – imports and exports – via colonial port cities oriented towards the metropolitan core and the wider global system.[50]

Resistance to state-empire systems – local calls for change

In time, the empires came under various sorts of pressure. There were local reformers and there were metropolitan reformers. There was also interstate conflict and this last noted provided local aspirant replacement elites with their opportunity: in the latter phases of the general crisis – the period of multiple wars – they sought to carve out territories, construct new states, make nations and pursue national development.

The general crisis in East Asia, the process of the disintegration of state-empire systems and the outline of their replacement by

nation-states within the international system, can be given various dates. At the outside, say, from the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to the final reunification of Vietnam in 1975. However, other dates might be picked, say 1911–49, marking the reconstruction of China. In other words, the general crisis had multiple participants and there were multiple wars, and these occasioned multiple changes in social and political relationships. In respect of the disintegration of state-empire systems in this part of the world, the most crucial phase of the crisis was the Pacific War of 1941–45. This marked the shift from one historical phase to another. The war was extremely destructive: 20 million killed, millions injured and millions displaced; and infrastructure destroyed. The pre-war political order of the region was overthrown: state-empire systems were untenable – economically, socially and politically. The idea of colonial territories was overthrown: local nationalists opposed it; the military victor in East Asia was the USA and they would not support it; and the formerly core powers were not in a position to effectively re-establish it – indeed domestic politics in respect of colonial territories was unsettled as wartime propaganda had been cast in terms of the Atlantic Charter, a celebration of democracy, and colonial reacquisition did not sit easily with such commitments. Elites were less scrupulous and they sought to recover empire holdings, but one way or another they failed and in time a series of new states emerged and some old polities were reconstituted.

In 1945 the future for peoples in East Asia did not look good. The long drawn-out conflicts had caused massive casualties, extensive destruction and widespread social dislocation. Amongst development experts there was pessimism about the chances of the area advancing, and a future of agriculture plus low-tech manufacture was envisaged. However, this was the starting point for the leaders of the new states. It was the structural pattern that they had to deal with as they took power.

The inevitability of collapse

The expansion of state-empire systems was carried on the back of the dynamism of the industrial capitalist system, which flowered in the nineteenth century in Europe. The agents involved – the traders, soldiers, politicians, scholar-bureaucrats and assorted adventurers – were buoyed up by this dynamism, like corks on an incoming wave, and whatever they might have thought they were up to, the system underwrote their activities and it carried them to what, in their terms, were remarkable successes. But the achievement could only ever be provisional. The industrial capitalist system itself was famously restless, new

centres of power grew quickly, and colonized subjects learned equally quickly and turned the claims of the occupiers back against themselves. And as the numbers of people deployed one way or another from the metropolitan cores to the various scattered peripheries was small,[51] the retreat from empire would be secured, if in no other way, by the logic of demographics. But, in the event, it was the disruption of the general crisis and the interlinked series of catastrophic wars that fatally disturbed the state-empire systems, and as aspirant local elites sought power, the formal empires dissolved away within the space of a few short years.

3
State-Empire Systems: The Logics

State-empire systems functioned as units and their internal dynamics can be unpacked in terms of the key players, their institutional locations, their concerns and the ways in which they legitimated their particular activities. The sum total of their relationships gives us the idea of structure, and the sum total of their activities (agents/structures) gives us the idea of a system. The set of players can be analysed as a whole and in this sense it is possible to speak of traders (inhabiting various locations within economic networks and justifying their activities in terms of ideas of the benefits of trade), soldiers (inhabiting military bases within the territories of empire and obedient to commanders themselves lodged in wider networks and justifying their activities in terms of patriotic service), scholar-bureaucrats (located in the administrative centres of empire and justifying their activities in terms of notions of responsibility both to superiors and locals), missionaries (staffing their churches and justifying their activities in both humanitarian and theological terms), plus assorted adventurers (lodged in the interstices of the system and unconcerned with justifications), and – crucially – the elites and masses of the territories drawn into the system, positioning themselves in a multiplicity of ways, as active supporters, those disengaged and over time an increasing number of opponents. The outcome of the multiple interactions of these players constitutes the structured system of empire.

Each[1] state-empire functioned as a unit with a metropolitan core and peripheral territories: such integration would include economic, social and political practices, although levels of integration would vary. More familiar metropolitan treatments which stress the determining role of the core and equally familiar nationalist treatments which invert the tale, stressing the costs to extant civilizations of the exchange/process,

under-report the integrated nature of these systems. Their integrated nature meant that various agents, variously located, could exert various forms of influence, and so these systems had their own internal economic, social, cultural and political dynamics. Moreover, flows of influence ran both from core to periphery and from periphery to core.

Europe-centred state-empire systems in East Asia had a particular character: integration began early in the period of the shift to the modern world; integration linked European polities to sophisticated polities in East Asia; integration involved shifting varieties of collaboration/cooperation; the exchange occasioned extensive social change in both metropolitan and peripheral areas; and in all this there were contrasts with other areas of state-empire construction – for example, between the earlier creation of state-empire systems in the Americas and the later treatment of sub-Saharan African peoples, or the exchanges with other parts of Asia.

The state-empire systems had a common basic logic as European expansion, grounded in science-based industrial capitalism, variously celebrating trade or enlightenment or progress, interacted with extant forms of life and drew them one way or another into their globe-spanning system. Yet the ways in which this was achieved varied, and so too did the resultant organizational forms.

State-empire system logics I: General

The business of understanding empire has been pursued in both the humanities and the social sciences: in particular, amongst the former, historians, and amongst the latter, political scientists. Disciplinary agendas differ but the common concern is with the fundamental nature of empire: for the one group because empire fills the past (events, periods and memories), for the other because the legacies of the past shape the present (peoples, nations and institutions) plus – as a more local issue – the recent wars prosecuted by the USA has drawn suggestions that the country has become an empire.[2]

The record and character of empires has been the concern of historians, and recently a debate has been pursued between familiar styles of narrative history, tracking, in particular, the intermingled concerns of competing political elites (diplomacy, wars, treaties and the like)[3] and the more recently advanced work of cultural historians, concerned with the broad nature of empire, both in the domestic or core sphere and in its impacts on peripheral territories (ideas, social practices, arts and the like).[4]

The logic of empire has been the concern of political scientists – in particular, the nature of the state, the wider spheres of empire and their manifold interlinkages. A number of terminological distinctions have been made: empire (large, multi-ethnic loosely bounded unit), hegemony (power asserted via culture) and imperialism (the concerns of nineteenth-century thinkers).[5] Thereafter, types of empire have been discussed, strategies of legitimation, conditions of longevity and the like.[6] One recent theme concerns once again the nature of the USA, where the global reach of its armed forces and its recent predilection for overt and covert warfare unconstrained by the available norms of international law have led social theorists to ask whether the country has become an empire, perhaps of a novel kind.[7]

In this text these resources feed into the notion of a 'state-empire' system. Thus empires in the modern era have been built around states and, whilst expansion may have been pursued by other agents,[8] corporate, religious or charitable, the key was the state. The elite managed the project,[9] and the project found expression in the lives of ordinary people, matters of discourse and discipline. The political, social and cultural processes within the core were multifarious, state-empires were not regimented social forms – rather the reverse – and the same point applies to matters in peripheral territories. And to complete the picture, there were extensive exchanges between cores and peripheries. So state-empire systems linked up people in the cores and the peripheries in a coherent single system, but it was an always-changing system, unfinished,[10] ineluctably contingent.[11]

Running debates about these systems: The nature of empire

State-empire systems linked core territories with peripheral areas. The process of crafting these linkages was driven by the more powerful party, and the linkages would include economic, social, cultural and political practices. Levels of integration varied and the resultant units would be internally diverse (the component parts encompassed territories from around the globe), unstable (that is, shot through with fracture lines) and liable to change (that is, notwithstanding the rhetorical claims of elites in the metropolitan core to the enduring character of these systems, they were inherently contingent historical constructions). A number of lines of social scientific commentary are available; indeed, debate in respect of empire began early and it ran through the years of formal empire and it continued in a different guise after the ending of these systems.[12] In recent years some have found substantive occasion to renew the debate in respect of the behaviour of the USA.

(i) The early modern period: Expansion

Over the long period of European expansion there are a number of ways in which the peoples of other lands are understood: discourses, each recording particular claims to knowledge and informing specific schedules of practice. Early discussions offered images of the East and images of the West; these built around the voyages of travellers and debates were variously rehearsed down the subsequent years. Later theorists offered more social scientific statements, complex packages shaped by context, theoretical machineries (theorist) and audience.

Some of the early travellers brought tales of exotic and fabulous realms – Marco Polo's Cathay or Francisco Pizarro's Inca Empire – whilst others reported on the dangers available and the risks of capture and enslavement.[13] And as contacts became better established, and knowledge of other lands increased, further images were produced; the Enlightenment philosopher Rousseau identified the noble savage as an instance of mankind uncorrupted by civilized life,[14] they served as a moral reference point for a political critique of contemporary European life, and then later, as empire territories were accumulated, the imagery shifts once again: now there were varieties of denigration – the others were childish, or corrupt or otherwise unreliable.

As the Europeans assembled their state-empire systems, the imagery began to assume a still familiar form, in claims to the evident superiority of Europeans: matters of practice, ethics and science. So, first, buttressed by practical experience – that is, success in creating trade links, or establishing settlements or more directly, defeating local country powers in military exchanges;[15] then, second, expressed in terms of the ethico-political idea of progress, taken as evident in scientific-industrial practice, identifiable in history and amenable to glossing in terms taken from available ethical traditions (Protestantism or utilitarianism); and theorized conveniently in terms of ideas derived from the work of Charles Darwin.

In the late nineteenth century the evolutionary theory of Darwin was influential. Proponents of 'Darwinism' argued that humankind was characterized by competition between individuals and so evolutionary competition is made key, thus in the world of humankind-in-general, competition between individuals (an idea that feeds into the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer) generates differences which offer adaptive advantages, which processes, if understood and controlled, could be managed to upgrade the population, an idea that feeds into eugenics. The benign expression of these ideas would be, say, birth control, whilst the non-benign expression would be notions of race hygiene and the

appropriate quasi-medical treatment of lesser specimens of humanity and the avoidance of inter-racial reproduction. Alongside these arguments there was a scientific racism, and the package unpacked in terms of ideas of race and race competition. So, in the world of discrete human races, crudely, White, Black and Yellow races, competition generated differences which fitted some races to manage the fates of others. These ideas could be used to justify White rule and to justify colonial policies of segregation. Scientific racism intermingled with assorted schedules of popular prejudice, and from time to time these ides found expression in military-bureaucratic colonial exterminism.[16] Finally, of course, the ideas fed the race-oriented killings undertaken by National Socialists during the Second World War.[17]

(ii) The high tide of empire

Empires operated as units, both core and periphery, and empires also operated within a global system comprising other empires, and so explanatory/justificatory theories had to pay attention to two issues: first, the claims of empire against those made subject to it (both core-oriented and periphery-oriented claims); and, second, the claims of one empire against the claims of another (European state-empires were not stable and nor was the European state-empire system, so there were conflicts internal to empires and conflicts between them).

Claims to the propriety of state-empire systems were routinely cast in terms of the interlinked ideas of trade, progress and civilization. Trade was the key to the present and the route to the future for it linked up economies, it linked up peoples and it linked up cultures, and the resultant exchanges enriched those involved materially and morally in both the core and the periphery. All of this was cast in competitive terms. Claims to the superiority of one European state-empire system in regard to its neighbours were also made. These were issues of comparative status, and such competition attained its apogee in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when state elites sought to buttress claims to the status of great powers by acquiring overseas colonial holdings. There were numerous local clashes – illustratively, in West Africa (around German claims, resisted by existing powers); in East Africa (around French claims, resisted by the British); and in East Asia (around Chinese, Russian and Japanese claims to influence in Korea).

More positively, colonial scholar-bureaucrats offered insights. By way of an example, J.S. Furnivall wrote about plural societies. These had ethnically diverse populations, living somewhat separate lives, and in ordinary routine these groups met only in the marketplace. However,

given these different ethnic identities, the rules of market exchange that each group carried in their minds would be different, yet the only way to interact in the market was via a cash nexus – in other words, simple gain/loss. Within the colonial milieu, ethnicity and economic function could become linked, and this opened up the possibility of interethnic problems, and it also identified a role for a benign colonial overseer, a group detached from the market and able to take an overview, which would serve the collective interests of the participants. Examples of plural societies were available from Burma, Malaya and Indonesia.

(iii) Inherited debates: Formal theories

Down the years a variety of theories have been presented. They provide a rich schedule of domain assumptions[18] for any contemporary interventions. The nineteenth century produced a number of lines of analysis within the then central intellectual territory of political economy. Political economists working in the liberal tradition called attention to the benefits of trade, and free trade was read in terms of ideas of integrated markets, so Ricardo can present the idea of comparative advantage: thus specialization and exchange within a global system ensures that all benefit. All of these claims have continued down to the present and they are core elements of the neo-liberal mainstream.[19] In contrast, political economists working in the Marxist tradition called attention to the expansionary logic of capitalism and to the asymmetric nature of the exchange between modern and pre-modern forms of life. The resultant system did not ensure that all benefited because it was fissured by class divisions, so whilst metropolitan elites prospered, along, perhaps, with peripheral allies, subaltern classes were in structurally weak positions and either benefited less or not at all. All of these debates have continued down to the present day in discussions of the relationships about the rich and the poor within the contemporary global system. Thus development theory[20] or the varieties of capitalism debates[21] or dependency theory[22] or world systems theory[23] or international political economy,[24] or the recent globalization and anti-globalization debate.[25]

The twentieth century produced novel lines of cultural analysis. The idea of orientalism,[26] which opened up the analysis of the cultural logic of empire and called attention to the ways in which subaltern[27] groups were read into metropolitan-centred thinking and thereafter dealt with in those terms. Claims to knowledge were now seen as an adjunct to more familiar forms of imperial power. And, later, the related ideas of post-colonialism, which opened up discussion of the characterizations

offered by metropolitan core intellectuals and the ways in which these were picked up and recycled by figures in the peripheries, so here the concern is with the cultural impacts and legacies of the period of empire.

Contemporary social scientific work is varied and its preoccupations would include the analysis of patterns of power (economic, social and cultural), institutional forms (empires, states and other forms of political organization), types of rule (direct or indirect, law governed or otherwise and so on), distributional consequences (which groups get what from the arrangements) and discourses of legitimation/criticism (how these systems are contested).

(iv) Recent debates: The USA as an empire

The early twenty-first-century spate of wars initiated by the USA has occasioned extensive commentary – as did earlier episodes in the 1960s[28] – and the recent debate has seen the presentation of both sympathetic and hostile arguments: American neo-conservatives celebrated the role of the USA and supported its wars whilst other political groups expressed doubts. Commentators offered many interpretations[29] and amongst all of the commentary a number of social scientists have looked at the idea of empire, asking whether or not the USA had become an empire and if so whether it is a novel type and what might be expected of its future. Here, by way of specimens, are three authors.

Chalmers Johnson[30] has written about this issue and in a noted book entitled *Blowback* he offered an essentially conservative critique, making three main points. First, the Cold War offered a distinctive political environment that provided the permissive conditions for the rise of the East Asian developmental state whilst the US preoccupation with anti-communism meant that East Asian success went unnoticed. And the period saw the rise to power within the US polity of the military, this last noted being Johnson's main preoccupation. Second, the end of the Cold War and the related rise of East Asia provoked a policy rebalancing by the USA and so the idea of globalization was affirmed, looking for free trade, free finance (and in the early 1990s a 'reverse Plaza',[31] which revalued the dollar and helped to precipitate the Asian financial crisis, taken as an opportunity by the USA to attack the developmental state), whilst the military continued to expand its presence within the USA and around the planet. All of which leads Johnson to the conclusion that American policy-makers are blind to their own situation, which is that of a fading empire, and that it is the creation of a quasi-empire military machine which misdirects the entire US polity, pushing it in the direction of empire. Third, like all empires, the US version is likely to

collapse at some point, probably not militarily but maybe through debt and economic decline.

The crucial element of this argument relates to the rise of the military in the USA. Johnson argues that the military is out of control. The constitution and machineries of government have been misdirected and the intimate exchange between political, military and corporate elites has placed the project of building the armed forces at the centre of the US polity. Johnson calls this militarism. The situation has clear historical roots and equally clear contemporary consequences.[32]

US militarism has historical roots – specifically, around the turn of the twentieth century, the interventions in Spanish America and the wider Pacific, in particular Cuba and the Philippines. The seizure of the Philippines precipitated a war (1898–1902) as the locals sought to resist US invasion. In the event they failed. The war cost the lives of around 5,000 American and 25,000 local soldiers,[33] and also around 200,000 civilians.[34] The expansion in the Pacific was supplemented by the 1898 annexation of Hawaii.[35] The familiar justifications for colonial seizures were offered at the time and later puffed up by President Wilson such that hubristic moral posturing became routine. And this process was accelerated by the Cold War. Militarism became the new normal. The key features of this militarism are the formation of a professional military class; the intimate links of army, arms industry and government; and the promotion of war preparedness as a central government policy. Johnson argues that the empire is expanding, evidenced in the institutions, the ideas and the many hundreds of bases scattered around the planet. The consequences are fourfold:[36] the condition of perpetual war, the loss of democracy, the habit of state lying and the risks of state bankruptcy. The only solution, for Johnson, is to re-animate the political centre – that is, congress – and reaffirm the ideals/law of the constitution.

Others have noted the rise of the military but offer a rather less anxious take. Michael Mann[37] tackles the issue around the notion of power. His earlier work identified four types of power – military, political, economic and ideological. Read in these terms, whilst the rise of the neoconservatives in Washington celebrated the unipolar moment, offering their chance to launch wars, the power of the USA is limited. First, their military is undoubtedly powerful but their forces can only be deployed against the global South (a preoccupation seems to be the Middle East as a result of oil/Israel), and these groups in turn can deploy the weapons of the weak. Second, their political power is waning as the global system throws up regional alternatives in East Asia and Europe, and their

failed wars reveal the limits to their reach into those societies. Third, their economic power is great but weakening, tri-regionalism signals new economic power centres, and domestically there are problems of excessive debt and social inequality. And, fourth, their ideological power is waning – partly the rise of other regions and partly the widespread revulsion against US wars/hypocrisy. Mann thinks that the empire lacks balance, and policy is thus incoherent and consequently the future looks unhappy.

Finally, and with a broader canvas, John Dower[38] has looked at the culture of war. There have been many wars in human history and the condition of war is examined via US responses to the attacks of 11 September 2001. The details of the responsible group, Al Qaeda, are not the central issue; rather, it is the way in which the events were read into public debate. The immediate response from both politicians and the media was to compare the attacks to those on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Dower pursues this line, diagnosing hubris, along with intellectual blindness, and organizational group-think occasioned incompetence in the leaders of imperial Japan, and the contemporary USA.

Cores, peripheries and types of rule

Discussions about empire often operate in binary terms: core countries are characterized in terms of reason, industry, secularism and democracy, whereas, in contrast, peripheral countries are characterized in terms of the opposites of these terms – say, superstition plus agrarian economies, plus religious thinking and patterns of authority comprehensively tagged as traditional. But this does not achieve very much because the polities in both cores and peripheries vary significantly. Here this variety can be recalled, albeit in a simplified schematic form: the point is the diversity.

Metropolitan core territories were organized in various ways. There was no single model. Moreover, European polities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries all had colonies or colonial aspirations so the familiar and lazy idea of liberal-democracy needs must be unpacked. Cast in these terms, European polities evidenced republics, affirming a nominal political unit of equal citizens, as in France; constitutional monarchies, affirming a hierarchical status relationship of elements under the Crown, as in Britain; and constitutional monarchies affirming the centrality of the Crown, as in imperial Germany. Other empire powers at the time offered republic, affirming the key legal/political role of the constitution, as in the USA; and a symbolic core monarchy, affirming the leading symbolic/religious role of the emperor, as in pre-war Japan.

Peripheral territories were organized in various ways. Again noted schematically, settler, economic and miscellaneous colonies. Examples of settler colonies, where migrants from the core territories took up residence in acquired peripheral territories with the intention of staying, include the English colonies in North America, Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America, Japanese colonies in Korea and Manchuria, and so on. There were economic colonies, and these would include trading ports or primary product units (mines, plantations). They would be staffed by sojourners from the core territories, who work for a period in the peripheral territories, in port cities or in primary product areas such as agricultural plantations and mines. And there would also be a collection of miscellaneous holdings: concessions, military bases and the like, sites for sojourners, which might be accompanied by related local/migrant settlements.[39]

Types of rule varied greatly, thus direct rule (superior), where metropolitan core government appoints or oversees or staffs the peripheral government machine; direct rule (nominal equality), where peripheral territories send representatives to the core, which in turn rules their areas like other areas in polity; indirect rule, where metropolitan core government rules via co-opted local figures; and varieties of peripheral territory internal rule, where incoming groups interacted with established groups and local area migrants (thus Singapore and Hong Kong had local populations, were secured by colonial authorities and attracted thousands of local area migrants).

Formal institutional machineries

The formal institutional apparatus of the state-empire performed multiple functions: invoking the social sciences, which can be distinguished in terms of linkages (across units) and ordering (within units); in other words the institutional machinery had to hold together a geographically dispersed and substantively disparate collection of territories and thereafter had to ensure that each territory was ordered effectively (that is, could sustain a form of life compatible with the demands made upon it by the wider state-empire system). These institutional machineries took varied (and changing) forms:[40] dominions;[41] crown colonies; presidency; mandate territory; concessions; and assorted military bases.

Informal institutional arrangements

Susan Strange[42] noted four main structures of power within the global system: production, finance, security and culture. Agents, she argued, must work within and with reference to these structures; to which

it might be added that it was within these given structural constraints/opportunities that agents would fashion projects identifying routes to the future: overall, a reiterative dynamic of structures, agents and projects. Strange makes it clear that power (a relationship between agents) can be structural – that is, built into the relationship of the agents and prior to any particular choice or project that they might make or initiate. And so political power is more than the simple deployment of legitimate authority, the promulgation of law or the application of force: it is shaped by structural circumstances.[43] Hence formal organizational machineries of government are not the only form of power. Power can be built into sets of institutional arrangements. All of this means that political power can be asserted informally. And in the case of state-empire systems, formal political power was supported by wider structures of power – productive, financial, security and cultural – thus power could be asserted informally, via economic or financial linkages (what has been tagged 'informal empire').

These were territories bound into the state-empire system by virtue of trading linkages. These might include treaties with local powers ordering economic exchanges (over access or tariffs or law, as with ideas of 'extra-territoriality'); contractual arrangements with local merchants (agreeing and solidifying relationships around buying/selling); and arrangements with local merchants and authorities in respect of introduced migrant workers (their status, pay and repatriation). And these economic-centred links could be supplemented by financial links (providing and ordering the flows of money and credit), and they could also be supplemented by cultural links (patterns of consumption with consumer goods flowing back and forth, and/or cultural ideas flowing back and forth, popular and high cultural aspects). The upshot was the phenomena of informal empire; wide swathes of population whose forms of life came to be associated with those of the state-empire system. By way of examples in East Asia (linked to Britain), members of the Siamese and Malay elites, territories along the Yangtze River or the semi-privately held territories in Sabah and Sarawak (Raja Brooke). Clearly, informal empire is a metaphor.

Another metaphor offers 'links/nodes' in the networks of empire and it points towards communication systems, including shipping routes, airline networks, trading ports and key airport hubs and telephone/digital systems. And, in turn, all of this points to a hierarchy of cities[44] linking peripheral territories to the metropolitan core: primary cities (ports, airports, finance – keys to global trading); secondary cities (domestic centres); and third-level cities (serving a restricted local area).

The hierarchy of cities and other urban forms carries with it structural power – economic, social and cultural – thus, for example, in the colonial era, the buildings along the Bund in the international and French concessions in Shanghai; or today, in Hong Kong, the legacies of empire in the zones around Victoria Harbour: Kowloon, the mid-levels and the peak.[45]

* * * * *

Empires have assumed a variety of forms and there are numerous examples in history.[46] In the modern period they formed around European and thereafter US and Japanese expansion. The drivers for colonial expansion were both systemic (that is, the dynamism of the industrial capitalist system) and agent-centred (that is, the late nineteenth-century hubristic competition between state-empire elites), concerned both to expand further and to do so before or at the expense of other such political units. The upshot was that expansion was ad hoc and so, as territories were accumulated, many by violence, and they adopted various forms of organization and rule, they were sustained for various lengths of time.

State-empire logics II: Europe and East Asia

Europeans established contacts in East Asia during the sixteenth century. These were trading contacts coupled to the establishment of small settlements or factories: the Portuguese in Malacca 1511; the Spanish in Manila 1570; the Dutch in Banten 1603; and the British in Penang 1786.

Later, during the nineteenth century, European state-empire systems were established through much of Southeast Asia and East Asia. The key empire players were the Dutch, British and French, although the French arrived late, so to say, but during the nineteenth century via a series of wars against established rulers seized control of Indochina. In the late nineteenth century these powers were joined by the Americans, Japanese and Germans, and the lessons or models of the earlier empires were available to later aspirant powers. Local reactions varied – accommodation, collaboration and resistance – and whilst this last noted began early, these empire holdings were to endure until the 1950s.

Linkages joined European polities to sophisticated polities in East Asia

Early traders undertook long sea voyages, with small numbers, suffering many deaths amongst crews, as they worked at the edge of the

available technology.[47] Their destination was exotic, ordered, filled with many unknowns and held the potential for very large profits from successful trading voyages.[48] The linkages created by these trading voyages involved shifting varieties of collaboration/cooperation: various agents, various motives, various modalities and various results. As trade links deepened there were more people, more goods and more demands on peripheral territories. Plus there were feedback loops to the core.

These linkages were associated with extensive social change – not merely adjustments to the ever-shifting character of pre-modern forms of life (in both core[49] and periphery) but also the deeper sets of changes associated with the shift to the modern world. These changes remade the core territories. European social theorists from the eighteenth century onwards were centrally concerned with the shift to the modern world (all of the tales, positive and negative, about industrialization and democratization). It also remade the peripheral territories. It was not a one-sided or one-directional process. Europe did not unilaterally remake East Asia; both areas were remade. In time these processes gave rise to the formal system of state-empires. In the case of these European state-empires the key players were the Dutch, British and French.

(i) European state-empire holdings in Southeast and East Asia

The Dutch were the first major European empire builders in Southeast Asia. Competing for trade both with local country powers and the British, they slowly accumulated territory throughout the archipelago and their last series of wars of conquest were in Acheh in the early twentieth century.

Dutch state-empire logic revolved around sea-borne trade. The core territory had shifting borders as the politics of Europe shifted and changed, and a version of the Netherlands emerged in the early nineteenth century. The core was situated in and around Northeast Europe: the rivers and canals, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Overseas the Dutch claimed territory in and around the islands of the Southeast Asian archipelago – the Dutch East Indies. All of this was at first the concern of the VOC of 1602, then later the concern of the Dutch state of 1796.

The peripheral territories were ordered via indirect rule and the key concern of the authorities was with material output: the Cultivation System of 1830–70, thereafter nominally free labour and from 1901 claims about the Ethical Policy. The territories were overtaken by events in the early 1940s. The Japanese rulers followed the lines of the Dutch[50] with an overarching top-down framework run at a local level via available domestic elites. The Japanese encouraged local political groups and

began to speak of independence. These moves came late in the day but they did help to create the political space within which local nationalists could declare independence and move against Dutch opposition towards the creation of an independent state of Indonesia.

The British state-empire system was assembled over some 200 years. The ideas of trade and territorial acquisition are key. The core territory had been unified in 1707 and then defeats at the hands of the USA, and revolutionary France turned the attention of the elite outwards, hence the British Empire.[51] Darwin[52] unpacks its logic at length. Overall, he offers a diplomatic history. He records the simple facts[53] of the history from 1830 to 1970, and he records elite and official thinking during this period. The elite pursued a project. It was contingent. The elite responded to shifting international contexts and thus acquired the empire in a haphazard fashion (haphazard is not the same as absent-minded). There was no master plan but the elite pursued their project with considerable tenacity and the absence of competitors in the early nineteenth century plus the industrial revolution plus the commercial power of London plus the military enabled the elite to pursue an empire project in the form of a global liberal trading sphere. The keys were military/political and industrial/commercial power; and securing trade and territory. Thereafter, through the nineteenth century, as the international environment changed, the elite responded, mostly successfully, until the early years of the twentieth century when events ran out of control as a general crisis unfolded.

One condition of the success of a state-empire with territories and trade scattered across a global network was a balance of power in Europe and a stable quiescent Asia, but after 1914 there was anything but stability in Europe and equally the rise of Japan meant that there was no longer stability in Asia. The system was in crisis in 1942: Europe was in the process of being over-run by National Socialism and Asia was in the process of being subordinated to imperial Japan. However, by early 1942, the USA and the USSR had militarily checked the advance of the fascist powers and thereafter they were militarily defeated. The British elite endeavoured to recover their international position[54] and to reinvigorate their empire project, but India and East Asia had gone and attempts to create an empire in the Middle East foundered in 1956, and a late enthusiasm for federations in Africa was never likely to succeed and it did not.

The system revolved around the military and the economy. The expansion was energetic and violent, and it was understood amongst the elite in terms of the ideology of free trade. Many people were

involved – corporate, missionary and official – and by the late nineteenth century the empire was vast. It was impressive, the elite and mass lent it support, and the future looked optimistic as the empire offered possibilities for progress.[55] Then came the South African War at the turn of the century, then the Edwardian period (1900–14); viewed in retrospect as either the high tide of empire or the moment prior to collapse.[56] Darwin notes that the empire was strong but the Great War made the USA a creditor country and the empire project was fatally weakened, so thereafter the open trading system shifted to blocs and the interwar period saw problems in Europe and Asia. The elite were defensive.[57] They twisted and turned but the project collapsed in 1942 and later attempts at recovery proved untenable. Thereafter the elite were subordinate to the USA.[58] The elite rejected Europe,[59] only later realizing their error.

By the late 1960s the empire project was at an end. Darwin comments:[60]

> When Whitehall rolled up the map of the world in the late 1960s, the substance of world power had already shrivelled up, leaving only the ghost of the British world-system. It only remained to acknowledge its passing.

Darwin's analysis identifies a number of key points: first, the empire was a unit – London was the core, whilst other elements were added piecemeal, so it was never neat and tidy but the elite saw it as a unit and they pursued it as a project; second, domestic elements were crucial – the military and the economy reinforced each other; third, the international context was crucial – facilitating, as in the early nineteenth century, or constraining, as in the early twentieth century, or undermining, as in the mid-twentieth century; and fourth, the world system revolved around London, its money and its military, but it needed a balance of power in Europe, a quiescent Asia and a non-energetic USA.

The peripheral territories were ordered in an ad hoc fashion. Darwin[61] lists a bewildering variety of forms of occupation: colonies of rule, settlement colonies, protectorates, condominiums, mandates, naval and military fortresses, occupations, treaty ports, concessions, informal commercial colonies and spheres of interference. The expansion was chaotic and often driven by commercial interests, but it was a system: driven by a mix of military plus commerce plus demographics (migration). It was open to trade. It was also open culturally. But imperial politics were fraught and shot through with manoeuvring, balancing and fighting. It was turbulent prior to 1900 but worse after 1900.[62]

In East Asia, the Malay country powers experienced indirect rule. The British ruled via local sultans and these were organized into the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States with Singapore, Penang and Malacca making up the Straits Settlements Crown colony. North Borneo had its own sultans, including the Brooke family. And to the north, Hong Kong developed as a Crown colony, Shanghai as a concession area with other parts of China variously secured. The colonial territories of Southeast Asia were ruled via overarching colonial governments answerable to London, plus co-opted local elites, in Malaya, the existing system of sultanates, buttressed by stipends from London, in the Straits Settlements, co-opted local figures of influence, typically successful businessmen, and in the territories of north Borneo, a similar pattern inflected by the odd situation of the figure of the White Raja, Brooke. In contrast, for the colonial power the situations in Hong Kong and Shanghai were much more tenuous. These settlements were focused on trade and had to make their relationships with China work, so the sojourners in both territories were much more attuned to the ebb and flow of politics in China itself. As one historian put it, these settlements existed at the edge of empires.[63]

All of these holdings were sustained until the early 1940s. Thereafter, as the Japanese took control, former colonial arrangements were reworked.[64] In Southeast Asia the overall pattern of colonial top-down rule plus co-opted locals was sustained, but in difficult circumstances given the exigencies of war, the requirements of the war economy plus suspicion of the Chinese residents. One crucial upshot was the reinforcing of existing ethnic divisions. A related issue was the indirect encouragement of ideas of independence. The system was dissolved by the 1960s but with Hong Kong sustained in colonial aspic until the 1990s.

The French were the final major group of Europeans to operate in the area. A series of wars with the British in India meant that they arrived late, but in the nineteenth century they waged a series of wars in Indochina and this became their formal colonial territory, and upon this base they extended informal connections deep into Southern China and went on to press against the nominally independent Siamese polity.

French state-empire logic revolved ambiguously around the ideal of a republic. In the core there had been a revolutionary shift to a republic, continental wars and the slow creation of a sense of nation through the nineteenth century.[65] Overseas expansion was pursued relatively late in the century. Conflicts with the British restricted territorial acquisition and retention to North and West Africa. Territories of Indochina were acquired late in the nineteenth century by means of direct military

invasion. The peripheral territories were ordered nominally in terms of the ideals of the republic. Indochina was organized in a centralized fashion. The territories were nominally understood as parts of an integrated French polity. Indochina was organized in five main units as a top-down system was imposed, as with the other European colonies. However, the people of the region had collective memories of independent statehood and so resistance was routine. So too was violent repression. The Japanese interregnum was distinctive. The Vichy French regime reached a settlement with the Japanese[66] for they had little other choice. But this double occupation created a space for local resistance. Nationalism was interlinked with communism. The leaders of the party sought to secure independence in late 1945 but the French authorities objected and the British helped them to reoccupy the country. Subsequently there was a long running war of independence sustained by US Cold War anxieties. It was not until 1975 that the country finally escaped the impact of invasion and colonization.

(ii) The US empire in Southeast Asia

The USA came into being through a rebellion against the British colonial power. A republic was established and it understood itself as a 'shining city on a hill', a model polity.[67] The American Civil War saw a settlement between the three distinct parts of the country: the agrarian south, the industrial north and the open lands of settlement in the west.[68] The north became the centre of political power and the US economy grew rapidly through the late nineteenth century. It became a competitor to the British Empire, as did imperial Germany.

One aspect of the late nineteenth-century political system was the existence of numerous European state-empires – plus others, of varying character, thus, the Qing, Czarist, Ottoman and Hapsburg – and the political elite of the USA decided to acquire an empire of their own. An unexplained explosion on the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbour provided the pretext for war against Spain, and the USA acquired hitherto Spanish territory in the Caribbean, the southwest of the American continent, the Philippine islands and other islands in the Pacific. In the broad areas of the Pacific, the US invasion of the Philippines was cast in terms of helping the locals to throw off the colonial Spanish. However, local attempts to resist this aid resulted in a short war – some 200,000 locals being killed from a total population of around 8 million.[69]

The logic of the US colonial holdings was fundamentally incoherent. US policy denied colonial intention and specified the political goal of

independence: first, internal self-government was advanced but under US supervision and a variant of the presidential system was created that suited the local elite and the colonial power; and, second, this was coupled to the convenient ideology of free trade which tied the local economy in a subordinate position to that of the USA and it meant that the islands could not develop except as agricultural adjuncts to the US economy.[70] There were calls for independence, and there was some devolution of power, but in practice it was heavily circumscribed by US rights of intervention, plus its economic and military power plus its close links with local elites. The political economy developed around large land holdings coupled to patron/client social and political organization plus the role of the Catholic Church, plus a grafted-on US-style electoral system. The Japanese invasion displaced the US colonial apparatus and during the Japanese occupation the local elite collaborated,[71] but they had little popular support. When the US armed forces retook and occupied the country, they accepted the collaborationist elite,[72] and aspirations amongst the masses for social reform were suppressed.[73] After the Pacific War the country became independent and was a settled part of the US Cold War sphere in Southeast Asia.

(iii) Imperial Japan

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 inaugurated a period of state-sponsored development oriented towards creating a strong economy and a powerful military as the elite were concerned both to avoid the fate of China, the long-term core of the region, now subject to quasi-colonization by Europe and the USA, and to become a power in their own right. To this end, study missions were despatched to Europe and the USA, domestic reforms initiated and various development projects begun. The Japanese elite acquired peripheral territories during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and these acquisitions were made with the agreement of the extant great powers. Japanese rule was extended within what are now regarded as the home islands to include, in the north, Hokkaido and parts of Sakhalin and, to the south, the Ryukyu Island chain. Further expansion moved outside these areas. One aspect of the modern world which the elite sought to join was the political form of state-empires and the Japanese elite looked to their neighbourhood in these terms: as sources of raw materials, markets for manufactured goods, and sites for migration and settlement. In brief, they sought an empire in Northeast Asia.[74] However, Northeast Asia was the site of a number of cross cutting tensions as three powerful political units sought control: Qing China, Czarist Russia and Japan. The first Japanese

colonial territories were established in Northeast Asia following wars against both Qing China and Czarist Russia.

The development trajectory of the country informed the logic of the state-empire. The Meiji Restoration brought to power a conservative modernizing elite and their overarching project was the creation of a rich country along with a strong army, the necessary conditions of resistance to European and US colonial control, the fate of the rest of East Asia, one way or another. The elite inaugurated a sustained domestic programme of national development with a new constitution, a revamped head of state, plus an official ideology centred on the head of state, along with a revised state religion. There were new political and administrative structures, new military forces and sweeping economic changes embracing science-based industry. And all of this, as is often recorded, was a dazzling success. More broadly, internationally, the elite sought to catch up and join in the existing European-centred global system and this was dominated by a number of state-empire systems. In Southeast Asia there were a series of colonial holdings. In China the form of foreign intervention was cast in terms of the treaty port system. The Japanese elite sought to participate in this system in order to construct a self-sufficient colonial sphere built around a Japanese core.[75] The Japanese were careful to manage the concerns of other players in the system, however, as the expansion unfolded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, divisions between the players began to open up.

As Meiji Japan sought to build its empire outside the home islands, the first site of conflict was the Korean peninsula, where Sino-Japanese competition had begun in the late nineteenth century. The competition for influence culminated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, during which the Japanese militarily defeated the Qing forces and secured significant concessions, including Taiwan. The island had been a somewhat obscure part of the Qing Empire with little economic weight, but in the context of the military aspect of empire, it did have some strategic importance. It was ceded to Japan following the war. These conflicts for influence continued and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 saw further Japanese gains, albeit at considerable cost as the country had its first taste of industrialized warfare with its attendant high costs in material and casualties. Japan gained control of Korea, which had been a long-standing area of contestation, as the neighbours of the hermit kingdom sought to drag it unwillingly into the modern world. Japan made Korea a protectorate in 1905. It was formally annexed in 1910, whereupon it

became a colony, subject to inward migration and development, plus repression of local resistance. Imperial Japan now had territories in Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, Korea and Sakhalin, along with influence in Manchuria.

And then the Japanese elite slowly turned their attention to China. Over the period of the nineteenth century, the Qing Empire had slowly declined under the weight of European and US demands such that the country was reduced to the status of a series of quasi-colonies. Following the wars against China and Russia, the Japanese had obtained concessions in Manchuria but their development was a fraught diplomatic issue because the Japanese elite sought to respect the European/American policy of the Open Door in China proper whilst deepening their control of Manchuria. It was a balancing act. The key to their activities was the South Manchurian Railway Company, which, following war against Russia, had been established in 1906, whereupon it quickly became the key to developments in Manchuria. Then, in China, the 1911 revolution brought further upheavals, which were followed by the deeper confusions of the warlord era. In the same period the Great War in Europe distracted Europeans and Americans. In this context, the Japanese elite moved to advance their position in China, strengthening their activities in Manchuria and increasing their role in China.

In the early 1930s, Manchuria was seized. It became a colony. In the later 1930s, incursions were made into Northern China. Slowly the Japanese drifted into all-out war against China. The Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937. The war against China saw extensive tactical success but strategically it quickly became a stalemate, as the Japanese military did not know how to turn tactical victories into a peaceful settlement.[76] The costs to China were severe.[77]

Japanese involvement in China drew the opposition of the USA and the European powers, and in 1941 the exchanges between the USA and Japan reached a nadir as the Pacific War began. At the outset the Japanese made further territorial acquisitions in Southeast Asia.[78] Thus the Japanese acquired most of the foreign state-empire colonial holdings in East Asia and they sought to integrate them into a Japan-centred sphere. The Japanese found an assortment of more or less willing allies in the context of the wartime Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere:[79] sections of the elites in Thailand and the Philippines; Indian nationalists, led by S.C. Bose; in Burma, the independence movement of Aung San; along with elite figures and popular organizations in the Dutch East Indies. In the formerly British territories, Japanese occupation tended

to favour the Malays, encouraging a nascent sense of national identity. In Indochina the Vichy French colonial authorities were obliged to collaborate. Yet the period was unsuccessful, the demands of wartime and the unclarity of elite vision ensured that the stated aims of independence were never met; however, that said, the disturbance to the foreign state-empire holdings proved decisive, and at the end of the Pacific War these empires had been rendered untenable.

As the Japanese elite expanded the war into the Pacific and Southeast Asia, they found themselves involved in three wars:[80] the Chinese civil war (where the two sides manoeuvred around the war with Japan, fighting, collaborating and discussing separate peace settlements); a regional interstate war (the Second Sino-Japanese War); and a global war (the Pacific War and the wider Second World War). The USA participated in all three. It supported the nationalist Chinese government against its domestic enemies as well as Japan, and it launched a double campaign across the Pacific Ocean, towards the Western Pacific and the Philippines, and towards the Central Pacific and the home islands of Japan. These sweeping trans-oceanic campaigns were successful[81] and the military conflict ended with allies racing each other to secure advantage.[82] Japan was occupied by the USA. However, the intervention in the Chinese civil war was not successful. In 1949, Mao declared the inauguration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and shortly thereafter the Cold War in Asia began. It was to endure for 30-plus years. So, in all, the Japanese experiment of an empire in East Asia helped to reorganize the entire region: the USA was drawn in as a military power; the European state-empires were destroyed; China took the first steps towards becoming a state-socialist superpower and Japan was reduced to its home islands, a subordinate in the post-war US liberal trading sphere.

* * * * *

The logic of empire revolves around control. Foreign control of various local peoples aggregated into a loose unit. The pattern is familiar within human history. The nineteenth-century state-empire systems were the recent variant. These displayed an internal structure of cores and peripheries. Economic activity was ordered to the principal benefit of the core. There were complex social and cultural status hierarchies both within the units comprising the empire and between the class inflected core society and those of the associated peripheral units. The politics of empire were similarly tangled but in the end political life revolved around the demands of the empire project.

Contrasts with other areas of state-empire construction

Modern period state-empire systems were built around core states in Europe. The inherent dynamism of the industrial-capitalist system drove intensification in the core and sought expansion in its peripheries. These processes of expansion involved a number of discrete geographical areas. The key empire-states were in Europe and these core territories were primarily sea-based empires where trade was key and accumulating territory was secondary. They had immediate neighbours to the East and southeast, and these were primarily land-based empires: Czarist Russia, covering a vast territory from the borders of Germany to the Bering Strait; the Hapsburg Empire, the legatee of the Holy Roman Empire, located in Central Europe; and the Ottoman Empire, controlling large swathes of the Arab Middle East. These three were involved in European state-empire politics but were swept away by the upheavals associated with the Great War, and in Central Europe, new nation-states emerged, Czarist Russia gave way to the USSR and the Ottoman Empire dissolved into a core state, Turkey, with the Arab lands carved up between the French and British empires.

In North America, indigenous peoples, living at relatively low material levels (and thus with low levels of effective scientific/technical knowledge), were in many cases violently dispossessed through the related mechanisms of war, disease and cultural crisis, with the territories hitherto occupied by them reordered by the incoming groups. Settlement colonies were established. Links across the Atlantic Ocean were strong, with trade and flows of migrants moving from east to west. Residual indigenous peoples became marginal groups. Large flows of inward migration continued through the nineteenth century. There were a number of wars in the latter part of the century and these Indian Wars secured the western parts of the continent for the USA whilst reducing the remaining indigenous people to the status of reservation dwellers. North American polities created variants of European forms of life and the impact of these upon the core territories was muted until the Great War made the USA a creditor nation. The Second World War saw a self-inflicted collapse in the European core, which propelled the hitherto peripheral territories to an unprecedented position of superiority; specifically, the USA.

In Latin America, indigenous peoples, again living at relatively low material levels but with elaborate civilizations extending over large areas, were again, in many cases, violently dispossessed. However, in these areas, settlement colonies functioned somewhat differently. Indigenous peoples were pushed aside but did not become marginal.

They remained as definite, albeit economically and politically weak, groups within a wider population that included incoming Europeans, slave-traded Africans and mixed race peoples. Latin American polities also created variants of European forms of life but with more significant indigenous groupings plus mixed race populations. Their trajectories were different, their impacts on core territories were muted and they remained muted because the Second World War served to reorient their economies/polities away from Europe and towards the USA. Their relationship with the USA has long been a source of unease.[83]

The later treatment of sub-Saharan African peoples saw their communities invaded, over-ridden and reordered. The colonial invasion of sub-Saharan Africa in the late nineteenth century was in some measure motivated by trade, but it was also motivated by status competition amongst state-empires; foreign territory was a mark of empire status. The British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and German elites all pursued these activities. The impact of colonial occupation was severe. There were settlement colonies, but these were unusual and most did not endure. The legacy of the colonial experience is a live issue.

State-empire systems: Logics

The logic of the industrial capitalist system was inclusive. It drew people in. It drew people into an internally differentiated system. State-empire systems were not socially homogenous; it was not the case that all people were equal; the reverse was the case. As people were included, the set of existing societies allocated them to a particular place within the extant set of relationships: powerful metropolitan elites and their local agents read the social world in terms of class, ethnicity, culture, religion and so on and all of these were invoked in an elaborate process of social differentiation. Differences abounded. Nonetheless, these systems worked as systems and, contrary to familiar tales from sometime core players, the peripheries were not easily detached, and contrary to familiar tales from sometime peripheral players, the cores were not simply oppressive. The state-empire unit worked; it had its own distinctive logic.

4
State-Empire Systems: Fracture Lines

The collapse of the state-empire system has been much debated. With attention turned to the peripheral territories, a number of factors have been cited: demographics, with very few colonizers and many local people; Meiji Japan's success; Bolshevism, the example of the revolution in its acknowledgement of nationalities; and the destabilizing effects of mid-twentieth century wars, which undermined metropolitan powers and gave opportunistic nationalist groups their chance. On a slightly broader canvas, commentators have characterized the twentieth century in terms of the two world wars, or in terms of the rise and fall of communism over the short twentieth century, or the irruption and defeat of fascism, or in the related idea of the rise to global pre-eminence of the USA, with, in each case, decolonization as an unintended by-product. In place of these approaches a different perspective can be offered, and one that reaffirms the contingency, duration, confusion and violence of these processes – that is, that the collapse of overseas empires was part and parcel of a general crisis of the state-empire system with disintegration in the cores paralleled by disintegration at the peripheries. The fracture lines within the system can be detailed; these are the particular substantive tensions from which wider collapse developed.

State-empire systems were constructed over a lengthy period of time, mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and they were accumulated in an untidy fashion. None of the elites that made their empires and the system as a whole followed a detailed plan, but all were committed to the project of empire. These were sprawling edifices, covering vast distances, embracing multiple forms of life and held together by the practical business of trade backed up by the equally practical deployment of force. Unsurprisingly, these state-empires were fissured with

lines of tension in cores and peripheries – economic, social, cultural and political – and it was along such lines that problems occasioned by local events would propagate, causing system-level problems; thus complaints, protests, strikes, riots, rebellions and at a maximum amongst peripheral groups, outright organized wars of liberation and, amongst core groups, outright organized civil, revolutionary and interstate wars.

The fracture lines within the system

The particular developmental trajectories taken by core states in Europe, and later the USA and Japan, gave rise to the state-empire systems. Elites in these countries rode on the back of a powerful political-economic system evidencing structurally occasioned pressures for intensification and expansion. The expansion was not organized according to an overall plan; rather, it was an ad hoc process, and the projects of empire unfolded in contingent manner.[1] The logic of the overall system of state-empires can be summarily grasped in terms of the various concerns of the agents involved: those concerns internal to each particular state-empire, British, French, Dutch or whatever; those between specific state-empires, as in conflicts between, say, the British and the French; and those concerns that exercised all of the state-empires – for example, peripheral revolts or irredentist nationalisms or the emergence of new state-empire centres. So the system of state-empires was not static; it was dynamic. Nor was the project of empire ever completed. For core elites, neither the overall system in which they were embedded nor their individual holdings were ever finally stable, for problems were commonplace, and whilst many were managed (the system endured), others were not (and in the end it failed). The instabilities experienced by the system were multiple (rebellions, strikes, protests, religious revivals, millenarian movements, oath-taking societies, migrant flows, local wars, economic depressions, trade wars, rogue officials, elite-level faction fights and so on), and whilst some problems were superficial, the outcome of local contingent circumstances, over time deeper flaws were opened up, problems for which no solution compatible with the continuation of the idea of a state-empire could be found (thus race identities or nationalist programmes or revolutionary ideals or failures of belief or capacity in the cores themselves). In the long run, these deep-seated fracture lines weakened the system to the point that when challenged in war – the Pacific War and the Second World War – it simply disintegrated and, notwithstanding the post-war efforts of sometime core elites, its failure turned out to be permanent.

Multiple fracture lines

The scale of the state-empire holdings and the global sweep of their formal territories meant that there were many quite diverse local forms of life lodged within the boundaries of one organization. As peoples were swept up into these units, so too were lines of division. Fracture lines in the system of state-empires could be found in political-economic structures, social arrangements, political orders and cultural resources. As the problems accumulated, system breakdowns began in both core and peripheral areas.

(i) Political-economic fracture lines

The shift to the modern world was carried on the restless dynamic of the capitalist form of life and from a core area in Northwest Europe it expanded overseas: in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, later Asia and later still Africa. The original invention of the form of life was contingent – that is, it was not made to any design; rather it emerged from a fortuitous concatenation of circumstances. So too its expansion, an energetic and unplanned empire project. The political economic form that the restless expansion came to adopt at its apogee was that of a system of state-empires. The core territories sought expansion and the driver was the pursuit of economic advantage, and so state-empires offered free trade, progress and civilization to those local powers with which they interacted. These were the legitimating schemes, but practice was asymmetric. Core agents drove the process and core agents repeated disproportionate rewards, and arguments for the benefits of trade, and so on, served the interests of core agents rather more than they served those of the inhabitants of peripheral territories.

First, the free trade on offer was often forced upon recipients and cut across existing forms of economic life, and whilst doctrines of free trade affirmed a notion of rational economic man, thus humankind as calculating rational maximizers, the economies with which the incoming powers dealt were as various as their societies. Cast in institutional economics terms,[2] economies are everywhere and always lodged within societies and understood with reference to cultural traditions, and so doctrines of free trade legitimated the behaviour[3] of incoming powers in simply over-riding local economic practices. In this invasive process, some established groups were marginalized, others rewarded and new groups were created or imported.[4]

A recent survey of these sweeping changes was offered by Peter Worsley:[5] in agriculture, peasant farming for local subsistence gave way to plantation economies or state-socialist collectives; and at the same

time, urban settlements grew, industry advanced, traders prospered and service sectors developed, whilst rural-urban migration created informal settlements adjacent or within the new towns and cities. The result did not resemble the neat and tidy models of liberal market theorists; rather, peripheral economies were both sectoral and unequal. Also, economic activity did not build towards an integrated self-regulating machine, as the market ideology proposed; rather, it ran in channels, each with its own concerns, perhaps at variance with those of other sectors.[6] Add to all of this those occasions when external powers over-rode local authorities in order to sell noxious products into local markets, paradigmatically the British launching local wars against the Chinese authorities (or, more precisely, launching attacks aimed at cities on the coast) in order to sell opium into China[7] (but see also, for example, American traders selling weapons into Southeast Asia[8]) and the resultant patterns of economic life are very tangled indeed. In this context, celebrating free trade required great cynicism or equally great optimism or perhaps just a simple convenient stupidity.[9]

State-empire systems were also casual about moving people around: both corporate and state. The corporate world operated for commercial reasons with migration or contract labour. In respect of the former, migration, state-empire authorities were happy to see domestic territories exporting people: some parts of the peripheral territories became settlement colonies and inward migration from non-metropolitan sources was controlled;[10] others were home to sojourners, and in these areas the colonial authorities were content with more or less unregulated inward migration and recipient societies had to deal with the influxes.[11] By way of examples, in East Asia, the British state-empire authorities acquiesced in the movement of South Asians into their militarily conquered Burmese territories; they acquiesced in the movement of Chinese into Singapore and thence into the Malay Peninsula. In respect of the latter, by way of further examples, contract labour brought South Asian labourers to Singapore and Malaya. The migrant flows could cover great distances, thus the sugar industry in Fiji imported labour from South Asia. And, in addition, the state had its own concerns: the resettlement of minority communities, the transportation of prisoners or the banishment of political/social dissidents – for example, the British government's transportation of prisoners to Australia or the similar strategy of the removal of dissidents from one peripheral territory to one remote, thereby disarming critics. Thus, state-empire systems were internally diverse and helped to foster further novel instances of such ethnic diversity. One unintended consequence of these flows of migration was the

creation of linkages between ethnicity and economic role as differences in identity were reinforced, and in turn these could be a source of ethnic conflict; hence, for Southeast Asia, the clichéd colonial stereotypes of the Chinese (grasping) or Malays (lazy) or Indians (argumentative) and so on.

Second, as indicated, trade entailed dramatically remaking recipient societies. State-empires unfolded the demands of the industrial capitalist system within the peripheral territories, and novel demands entailed novel social arrangements, and so inevitably old patterns of economy, society and polity were pushed aside,[12] often involving violence, and once again creating divisions/tensions. As Worsley[13] noted, the shift from varieties of locally focused subsistence-type agriculture to outward focused plantation or collective farming entailed remaking social relationships, and there were multiple aspects to the process. In the former, potentially self-reliant groups are made into contract employees, whilst in the latter, potentially self-reliant groups are drawn into top-down organizations informed by elite-level political projects. Hence personal relationships change and group relationships change. In the new growing urban settlements there were many novel economic niches to fill so that change would be easier, but again changes in personal and group relationships would be extensive. These changes created tensions – for example, in respect of rural areas, large-scale rebellions took place in nineteenth-century China (Taiping or Boxer rebellions) and in the twentieth century the impact of depression turned rural Japan towards a variant of fascism.

State-empire systems were contingent achievements; one expression of the dynamism of industrial capitalist modernity, and the global system was divided into cores and peripheries, each with their own internal patterns of class division. And post-empire problems associated with inequalities remain: thus in post-independence Philippines, change from patrician to commercial management practices fed into the Huk peasant rebellion;[14] in the 1970s, Scott tracked the weapons of the weak in respect of the changing lives of rural farmers in Malaysia;[15] and rightful resistance amongst the less powerful has been identified in contemporary China.[16] The ways in which these fracture lines feed into political life depends upon local circumstances, as before, but now there are no state-empire systems to be confronted.

(ii) Social and cultural fracture lines

The system of state-empires developed on the back of a powerful political-economic form of life, industrial-capitalism, in turn fed by the

novelties of the burgeoning natural sciences, and whilst these ideas and practices originated in Europe, they were not essentially related to Europe and Europeans, there was no cultural essence at work, these relationships were contingent, and the ideas and practices could be exported and could find expression in new locations. Thus the core generated its own competitors, creating further cracks in the state-empire system.

State-empire systems developed as units but did so in terms of the priority of cores. So state-empire systems gave rise to elaborate status distinctions[17] and when colonial subjects turned the intellectual resources of the core back upon the colonizers, arguing, for example, for equality and democracy, they were rebuffed. Here was the matter of 'colonial pilgrimages'[18] as the state-empire units fell into internal cross-elite hostile competition – periphery versus core. The interwar period saw many groups moving from periphery to core in order to discuss political reform – that is, independence – but these approaches were spurned and core strategies could be summed up as 'dilute and delay'.

In the case of Britain, for example, although the independence and development of colonial holdings had been discussed in a desultory fashion in the 1930s, it was not until the Second World War that the issues were addressed, and even then not coherently, so whilst future independence was acknowledged in the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, it was made clear that the 1941 Atlantic Charter statement of war aims did not apply to colonial holdings.

(iii) Political fracture lines

Looking first to core areas, state-empire systems were overall loosely bounded but they were assembled organizationally around their respective metropolitan centres. Core elites were jealous of their positions, core units were nationalist/imperialist and they were reluctant to accommodate further state-empire units. By the late nineteenth century there were a number of such units: British Empire, Dutch Empire, Portuguese Empire and French Empire (long-established, overseas trading empires),[19] plus the Hapsburg Empire, Ottoman Empire and the vast Czarist Empire (long-established, continental territorial empires), plus newer units such as the Belgian Empire or the Italian Empire.[20] All of these units interacted, manoeuvring against each other, accommodating demands as necessary and seeking advantage where possible. So the nineteenth century saw a number of conflicts in peripheral territories as state-empires manoeuvred for advantage, but the European core was comparatively stable. The overall system revolved around the British

Empire and the policy stance of its liberal imperialism, which promised a system of trade around which all could order their activities. But the end of the century saw British primacy challenged as a result of the success of the political-economic development trajectories of the USA and imperial Germany, so the British were no longer secure in their status and the contingent stability of the system as a whole was disturbed.

In respect of relations between core elements, the rise of imperial Germany is often presented as the critical factor in destabilizing the system, hence the familiar schema late development, late militarization and late imperial aspirations. But the core elements of the state-empire system were always manoeuvring against each other.[21] The system was unstable. If the state-empire systems fell into hostile competition at the core, then such competition could be economic (excusive zones of activity, perhaps damaging neighbours or perhaps inhibiting useful common action), such competition could be social (using neighbours as an 'other' against which local elites could define themselves and legitimate their position),[22] or such competition could be political (elite-led state-empire competition along with jingoistic nationalism, military competition and build-up). In 1914 these multiple tensions escaped the political grasp of extant ruling elites. The result was the Great War and the system began to break down in the core.

Turning to the peripheral areas, a parallel process of disintegration was under way and it was signalled by events in China, the historical regional core. Barrington Moore[23] argues that the slow disintegration of the Qing in the late nineteenth century under the unremitting onslaught of foreign traders and states had given rise to various domestic opponents, including a number of critics who had taken foreign ideas and read them into domestic debates.[24] The crucial precursor to revolution had been war. Robert Bickers[25] notes two consequences of the 1894–5 Sino-Japanese War: first, foreigners indulged in an orgy of opportunistic expansion at the expense of the Qing by grabbing territory or expanded rights to settlement and trade; and, second, there were attempts at reform. The Guanxu emperor's 100-day reform, which was suppressed by the Dowager Empress Cixi, had been supported by elite intellectuals. Kang Youwei argued for a constitutional monarchy whilst Liang Qichao argued against the monarchy.[26] There was much cautious critical debate but the suppression of reform moves opened the way for more radical popular voices. Sun Yat Sen looked to a post-Qing future. There were a number of failed insurrections but in 1911 disputes about railway funding led to a cascade of provincial rebellions and the Qing regime was overthrown and a republic declared.

Amongst the revolutionaries in China, the orientation was to the future but the immediate upshot was great instability and a collapse into warlordism.[27] Yet viewed in a slightly larger context, the revolution marked the beginnings of active and finally effective resistance to the depredations of the foreigners. It was a peripheral revolt. And there were others in India, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and French Indo-China, and whilst some were cast in non-violent terms, famously Ghandi, others cast their opposition to peripheral status in more aggressive terms. For most of the groups in these peripheral territories the years between the two world wars saw minor advances and it was not until the upheavals associated with the Second World War and more particularly the Pacific War that the grip of the colonial powers was loosened, allowing local groups to take their chance.

(iv) Exploitation, learning and development

The system of state-empires generated extensive changes in the periphery, schematically, exploitation, learning and development. The pressures for change flowed from core agents, but peripheral agents were not passive and they produced varied responses: economic (local merchants were able to make use of new opportunities and as networks of local business developed their relative power[28] increased);[29] social (as the impact of the modern world remade local forms of life, new social groups emerged, some with interests allied with colonial powers, some opposed, but in all cases the local players were not simply passive); and political (as the process of learning unfolded, local players found new arguments to deploy against their erstwhile colonial rulers; in particular, they picked up and turned around arguments around the notion of democracy). Or, in brief, success opened up the cracks in the system.

Cracks in the system opening

The first cracks appeared in the late nineteenth century. There was competition amongst core players both in the core itself and in peripheral areas, and the early years of the twentieth century saw the system move into general crisis. There were conflicts in both core and periphery as latent tensions found expression and elites were not able to manage these demands. The state-empire system moved into a phase of violent breakdown with multiple overlapping wars, great loss of life and material destruction and, crucially, the overturning of established political structures. State-empires dissolved, giving rise to reinvented states in the core and novel states in the peripheries.

(i) Core area tensions illustrated

A number of cases could be mentioned by way of illustration. Each can be read in relative isolation, but, as historians make clear, they were interlinked as one crisis solution fed into the next crisis, and so on. The first group concerns relations between French, German and British elites, whilst the second looks at early exchanges between the USA and Japan.

There was Anglo-French rivalry around competing empire-territory aspirations and this competition was long-standing as down the years there had been clashes in the Caribbean, North America and India. In the late nineteenth century, with the high tide of state-empire expansion, there were further tensions, such as in East Africa, where British and French forces confronted each other in the Sudan at Fashoda in 1898. The French were looking to create an east to west line of communication; the British were looking to create a north to south line of communication. After a short stand-off a polite settlement was reached and the French withdrew. In the event, the settlement paved the way for the later agreements whereby the two states regulated the exchanges of their empires. However, that agreement had to wait for a related exchange. This time the focus was West Africa. Here there was Franco-German tension. An early crisis surrounded the port of Agadir in Morocco in 1911 where a local conflict drew in the French. They landed troops. The German government took exception and despatched a gunboat, and this in turn drew in the British as they feared that the port could become a naval base for the German navy – a counterpart to Gibraltar. Negotiations followed. The French made Morocco a colony and agreed transfers of territory within Africa as compensation for Germany, and so the crisis faded. The British and French elites formed their alliance, the 1904 Entente Cordial. And this, for the British elite, was informed by anxieties flowing from Anglo-German rivalry around the aspirations of the German elite to acquire colonial territories and a blue water navy, both understood to be signs of a great power. The German elite obtained colonial territories in eastern and southern Africa, in the Pacific and in China, and they began to build a navy of capital ships. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw an Anglo-German naval arms race and industrial production systems, plus new science-based technologies in armaments that enabled participants to build much more powerful navies than had been the case. The build-up of very expensive capital ships on both sides was considerable and given that the British state-empire system revolved around long-distance trade, this naval competition was read as a direct threat.

Tensions between the USA and Japan can be dated to the late nineteenth century. In the last years of the century the US elite decided to acquire colonial territories, in particular in East Asia, and to assert their equality with other state-empires in respect of access to China. In the late nineteenth century the USA secured empire territories in the Caribbean and Pacific during the Spanish-American War of 1898. The USA laid claim to priority in respect of dealings with the countries (independent republics) of Latin America in the Monroe Doctrine/Roosevelt Corollary of 1823/1904. And in respect of China, then the key territory of East Asia, the USA asserted the principle of the Open Door of 1899, which required that all state-empires should allow free access to traders – that is, that there should be no exclusive economic zones and all could trade. In the late nineteenth century the USA was an increasingly important power and the British acquiesced in these claims/demands. And it was around the issue of China that tensions between Tokyo and Washington developed. These centred on Japanese involvement in China. In respect of China, the Americans laid claim to a special relationship.[30] This was underpinned by a mix of missionary and business involvement, plus aspirations to great power status. These tensions also signalled US unease at the apparent growth of a powerful state in Northeast Asia. Later the Americans pressed the British to discontinue the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and later still the Americans and British addressed the issue of naval ship-building programmes, seeking to limit the development of the Japanese navy.

Scholars of international relations have examined these relationships (looking at many other cases from the period) and have found in them the underlying reasons for the Great War. Some have preferred structural explanations, such as economic competition; others have preferred agent-centred explanations, such as elite-level ideologies, thus nationalism, racism or whatever. In this last noted category, Clark finds the proximate occasion of conflict in elite-level errors and misconceptions.[31] But whilst these discussions are not incorrect, and they are variously invoked in this text, they do focus only on core states; that these core states were embedded within empire-states themselves located in a system of multiple state-empires is not pursued; foreign parts appear only as variously exotic backdrops to core agent manoeuvring. Against these schemes a broader understanding is available in the notion of a general crisis; the system of state-empires failed and it did so in the guise of violent collapse in both cores and peripheries.

(ii) Peripheral area tensions illustrated

A number of cases could be mentioned by way of illustration. They could be ordered as two groups, one narrowly focused on Northeast Asia, the other embracing all other parts of the wide territory of East Asia.

There were numerous tensions between Japan and its Northeast Asian neighbours. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Japanese elite expanded their territorial holdings – moving into Hokkaido, the Ryukyu Islands and Sakhalin. These provoked tensions with local inhabitants and larger neighbours. Such exchanges were particularly awkward around the issue of the future of the Korean peninsula. The long-established Korean state was inward-looking, yet its neighbours sought trade and advantage, and Japan, China and Russia competed. As the three large powers manoeuvred for advantage in the Korean peninsula there were two major wars – the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War – and these two wars saw Japan emerge as the major force in Northeast Asia. These military victories, despite their human and material costs, coupled to the uneasy responses of established Western powers, fed into the rise of pan-Asianist sentiment in Japan (and a concomitant decline in relations with China), and later the negative reactions to Western rejection of a race equality clause in the Versailles Treaty further damaged Japanese relations with European powers and the USA.

In China the 1911 revolution overthrew a regime that was viewed locally as both outmoded and unsuited to the modern world, and more particularly as unable to deal with the rapacious demands of foreign powers.[32] Multiple tensions and conflicts followed. The revolution established a republic, but this failed as internal conflict followed, the warlord period. This prefaced civil war. This, in turn, enabled further Japanese advances into the country, culminating in full-scale war. A pause in the civil war followed but it resumed, and thereafter there were further domestic tensions as the new revolutionary communist government established its rule.

Events in China found echoes throughout the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, both celebrating the revolution and later as civil war engulfed the country, dividing opinion as between supporters of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And there were other active political groups throughout the peripheral areas: in the Dutch East Indies, resistance to the status quo was cast in terms of both communism (the Communist Party of Indonesia

(PKI)) and Islam (Serekat Islam); in Indo-China, it was cast in terms of nationalism/communism; in the Philippines, critical voices spoke in terms of the recovery of independence; and in Malaya, doubts about the empire were manifest in interethnic tensions; and so on.

These tensions did not find effective expression until the confusions of the years of general warfare. In the late 1930s the core territories dissolved into interstate war, and shortly thereafter the Japanese expanded their state-empire in open war against the established state-empires. At this point, locally based aspirant replacement elites had their chance and nationalist movements were able to advance their respective causes – ambiguously assisted by the Japanese – and by the time the military campaigns in the region had ended, the possibilities for the resumption of foreign-controlled state-empires were gone. What was left was withdrawal, the processes of decolonization and the parallel business of making new states.

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The shift to the modern world remade established forms of life and the process was suffused with multiple tensions, which were recognized and debated, producing, amongst other things, the nineteenth-century foundational texts of the European tradition of social theorizing. These were typically turned to events in the core. But the shift to the modern world entailed not merely domestic reconstruction but also overseas expansion and analogous processes of reconstructing extant forms of life. Core powers ordered their expansion via a system of state-empires, and multiple tensions were now available, so to say, in both the core and the periphery. Modernity and state-empire logics combined to produce distinctive sets of tensions within peripheral societies – capitalism plus ethnicity plus foreign rule – and these were built into the state-empire system. Change was inevitable, but powerful elites were unable to respond creatively, so confusion reigned and general crisis ensued. The final form of the crisis was extensive violence, the long series of interlinked conflicts that ran in Europe and East Asia through much of the early part of the twentieth century and in places through until late in the century.

Breakdown I: Events at the peripheries

The construction of state-empire systems offered a distinctive trajectory of experience to the newly peripheral territories – conflict, collaboration, exploitation, learning and finally development – as they were drawn

into the modern world. Thereafter, in discussions of the collapse of state-empire systems, attention can be turned towards events in the peripheral territories and a number of arguments can be advanced: demographics, bolshevism and war. There are elements of truth in all of these lines of argument, so criticism cannot be cast in terms of simple error. Rather, it is a matter of perspective, and understood in these terms the problems with these approaches is their restricted and discrete treatments, so the whole is lost, the general crisis.

Demographics: The weight of simple numbers

Geoffrey Barraclough[33] cites demographics and argues that the expansion of European state-empire systems saw a very small number of Europeans ruling a vast number of subject peoples and that this relationship, over time, was unsustainable and therefore bound to come to an end. In the case of the British in Asia, some 300,000 Britons ruled around 334 million local people,[34] so the failure of colonial rule in British Asia was guaranteed by numbers. The position had been accumulated via trade, warfare and assorted expressions of simple opportunism, and it was simply unsustainable. In 1857, British India saw a major rebellion, the Indian Mutiny, and so the writing was already on the wall. The interwar years saw a major nationalist push associated with Congress and even during the Second World War, when an elite-level deal for independence had been struck, and whilst tens of thousands of Indian troops served with the British Army, the British still kept 50 battalions[35] of troops in the country on garrison duties – an insight into the confusions of late empire, with multiple groups, many motives and a pervasive lack of trust amongst contending elites.

Further east, in Malaya, the pattern was repeated but here the business of the end of empire ran differently. In 1942 the British authorities collapsed in the face of Japanese invasion; tens of thousands of commonwealth soldiers were captured, the empire's civilian sojourners hastily fled and, as the colonial organization finally broke down, the locals were left to their own devices. The multiplicity of ethnicities resolved themselves into discrete groupings. Speaking for the foreigners, one senior foreign official, in the face of invasion, reported that Penang had been safely evacuated, but it turned out that this meant the expatriate British, whilst the locals, many of them Chinese, were left to fend for themselves. And as the other foreign state-empires collapsed, similar stories could be told, including the experiences of members of foreign communities who found themselves unexpectedly exposed to events.

Meiji Japan: A successful Asian country

The Meiji Restoration in 1868 saw a reconfigured elite pursue a conservative revolution from above. Invoking the past of a traditional Japan, they sought to move quickly into the modern world. The project was a success. It was also an inspiration for many reform-minded figures throughout East Asia. In Japan, the process of joining in the modern world saw the elite embrace not only late development but also late imperialism;[36] they sought colonial territories in Northeast Asia, in particular in the islands adjacent to the home islands (Ryukyu chain, Hokkaido and Sakhalin), and thereafter in the Korean peninsular and in Manchuria.[37] It was in respect of these last two areas that the Japanese state met competitors in the guise not merely of local powers but also Qing China and Czarist Russia. Two interstate wars ensued: in the first, the forces of Japan defeated those of Qing China, and, in the second, the forces of Japan defeated those of imperial Russia.[38] The former produced shock in East Asia as the hitherto core country of the region suffered military defeat, whilst the latter provoked a shock around the elites and publics of East Asia and amongst other state-empires as it was the first time that an Asian power had defeated a European power. Japanese elites began to entertain ideas of pan-Asianism,[39] and the country became an example for prospective replacement nationalist elites of the efficacy of economic, social and political reform. These in turn found one expression in military power, and relatedly the ability to rework exchanges with the foreign state-empires. The example of the Meiji success contributed thereby to the accumulating fracture lines in the edifices of state-empires.

Qing: 1911 revolutionaries

The 1911 revolution removed a reactionary conservative administration. As Moore[40] has it, by the time the Qing understood what was happening, it was too late for them and attempts at reform found no social base of support. The reform efforts were too little, too late. The republic was intellectually forward-looking but it was overtaken by domestic confusions and a nightmare sequence was to unfold: warlords, civil war, invasion and finally a second revolution (which in its turn had domestic costs).

From 1911 through to 1949, China was engulfed in a series of wars. Yet the objective of both main groupings (the nationalist and the communist) was forward-looking – that is, recovering independence and pursuing renewal. Sun Yat Sen drew inspiration from the record of Meiji Japan and looked forwards with a mix of reworked modern

ideas – roughly, democracy, development and nationalism. These were extensively debated amongst Chinese intellectuals around the turn of the century, and these debates were to feed into the revolution.[41]

The anticolonial aspect of these movements, as noted, spilled over into the communities of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. These communities embraced the cause of renewal for China and these arguments could be deployed in respect of colonial Southeast Asia itself, so, notwithstanding tensions between nationalists and communists, the events in China opened further cracks in the edifice of foreign state-empires.

The Russian Revolution and communism

The Russian Revolution overthrew a despotic, late-feudal absolute monarchy; the revolutionaries celebrated the hitherto oppressed classes of workers and peasants; and the revolutionary leaders also moved to acknowledge and respect the various identifiable groups or nations within the territories of the newly established socialist polity. Commentators suggest that this episode was an optimistic model for those seeking independence from other European state-empires,[42] and communist parties sprang up in numerous colonial territories: in China, with the CCP; in the Philippines; in Malaya; in Indonesia, with the PKI; and in India.

The influence of communism as an example, in the case of the USSR, and as a doctrine celebrating equality, was widespread amongst nationalist groupings. As these groups usually met with repression (as did other local groupings oriented towards independence), the attractiveness of revolution was reinforced, whether or not it was pursued in practice – one more possible crack in the edifice of foreign rule.

The effects of mid-twentieth-century wars

The wars of the middle part of the twentieth century are often treated as separate events. It is true that they took place in different areas, involved different participants and are remembered differently, but it is also the case, as argued here, that they are best treated as symptoms of a wider general crisis – an episode during which governing elites lost understanding and control of economic, social and political events, and where these confusions underlay the slide into extensive violence. That said, if the wars are treated as discrete events, then the wars of the core can be separated from events in the peripheries, thus the coincidence of wars in the core plus the apparently locally occasioned attack of Japan on the USA combined to produce such an upheaval that

minority nationalist groupings in the peripheral colonial territories had the chance to advance their otherwise unsuccessful cause.

In this reading the nationalists were acting opportunistically. Thus the determination of former colonial powers to return to reoccupy their territories, as the wars were not read as symptomatic of general crisis, and the colonial powers took these territories to be theirs, with the nationalists dismissed as unrepresentative ideologically motivated opportunistic minorities, or, more aggressively, as collaborators and traitors. Hence the enmity shown by returning colonial powers to those local nationalists who had sought to use the Japanese period to secure some sort of independence. Examples could include Aung San, Subash Chandra Bose, members of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, Ho Chi Minh, plus Sukarno and Hatta, all of whom the returning colonial powers characterized as disloyal or unreliable or, as noted, worse. And thus the surprise of former colonial powers, when their return was resisted, leading to the British, Dutch and French having recourse to violence in order to secure their temporary return.[43] And, finally, thus down the years, the very different memories of these people, those held in former cores and those held in now independent states.[44]

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The communities making their lives in what had become the peripheral areas of the state-empire systems were not simply the passive recipients of impulses or instructions from their respective metropolitan cores, they were active. Local agents were busy. And local elites were active in their exchanges with respective metropolitan cores: they asserted their own concerns and they lodged their own demands. Local masses were similarly disposed to advance their own interests: collaboration was a part of the game as some groups were advantaged; rebellion was also part of the game as some of those less well served by the state-empire systems did make their voices heard. Some intellectuals and community leaders reacted negatively, and looked back to a past that was unencumbered by the demands or presence of the foreigners. Other intellectuals and community leaders of one sort or another could and did advance arguments designed to learn the lessons of their experience of the modern world in order precisely to lodge their communities more firmly and favourably within its boundaries. As the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth century, these diverse voices were ever more clamorous and the ground was shifting under the feet of the colonial powers, but it would take events in the wider world to precipitate wholesale change.

Breakdowns II: Events at the core

Events at the peripheries are only a part of the overall tale, because they were complemented by events at the core. Indeed, the core is the usual focus in analysis, but fracture lines ran through the system: in its various parts and in general. The resultant tensions found expression in numerous conflicts, many local, but their prevalence meant that the state-empire system was falling into general crisis. And eventually these tensions issued in catastrophic breakdown, elites lost control and the twentieth century saw a number of major wars between core powers.

The Great War, the interwar period and the Second World War

In Europe, it might be suggested, popular opinion and commentary reads the events of the twentieth century in terms of two wars and an intervening period of chaotic uncertainty. It is here that much reflection and research are focused. The crucial events of the twentieth century are cast in terms of the two wars and events in colonial territories are read as secondary, events there did not really matter – they were up-market side-shows.

The Great War of 1914–18 drew in all of the European powers. State-empires went to war: men and material were drawn from core areas, and men and materiel were drawn from peripheral holdings and fed into the battlefields in Europe and the Middle East. They were drawn into a new form of warfare, although it had been anticipated in the American Civil War and the more recent Russo-Japanese War. New for the elites and masses alike in the core territories were the practical implications and application of modern science-based technology to the business of war, because all of these developments significantly enhanced the ability of armies to kill large numbers of enemy soldiers (and, inevitably, to sustain equally large numbers of losses). The result was carnage on a scale not hitherto seen.

The Great War had a number of crucial outcomes. First, it shattered the claims of core states to some sort of civilizational priority, as it was not possible to participate in an extended organized slaughter of (in the main) very young men whilst claiming to be models of civilization and progress. The number of dead was around 8 million. Many more were injured and the longer-term cultural impacts were profound as the elites and masses sought to make sense of the episode. Second, it led to a number of long-established empires collapsing (Hapsburg, Hohenzollern Czarist and Ottoman), and this process ushered in a number of new nation-states in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Third,

it shifted the balance of power amongst the surviving major powers and both Britain and France were weakened, whilst the USA emerged much stronger in terms of industry, finance and the military. So, too, it might be noted did their ally Japan. But the USA, in particular, became a creditor nation, having funded much of the Allied effort. And fourth, it left the core territories poorly organized: fragmented empires, weakened empires and a plethora of new states in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. And post-Versailles borders made new minorities. The attempts at Versailles to create a world body in the League of Nations were only partially successful. The Peace Treaty imposed upon the defeated powers was onerous and resented. All of these tensions were amplified when the US financial system experienced crisis[45] and precipitated a widespread economic depression, which in turn provided a space for the later emergence of fascism in Germany, Spain, Portugal and in many countries in Eastern Europe and East Asia, thus Nationalist China and the military regimes of interwar Japan.

All of these events cut against the maintenance of state-empire systems. Their status claims had failed, a number had collapsed and had been replaced by nation-states, and the newly powerful USA was avowedly anticolonial. Moreover, the troubles amongst the remaining core states continued. The Second World War, now often read as the second part of a long crisis running from 1914 through to 1945, saw further catastrophic violence. Some 50 million died but the bulk of the dead and wounded were not members of the armed forces because the violence was systematically directed towards civilians, and they provided the great mass of the victims. The Second World War encompassed other wars, thus in East Asia the long-running Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931–45 and the Pacific War of 1941–5, and each produced its own schedule of horrors and fed into multiple collective memories and national pasts.

The Second World War and the related wars in East Asia had a number of consequences: first, the last of the state-empires were undermined, European, US and Japanese; and second, the successful revolutions in Russia in 1917 and China in 1949 had both met with the unequivocal hostility of the USA and the elites of Europe, and from 1947 this took the form of the Cold War. As state-empires were consigned to history, new successor elites were subject to the demands of great powers to declare for this or that bloc (at the very least, this did imply acknowledging them as players in world politics, but for many this was not looked for or welcomed, hence the Non-aligned Movement and later

ideas created in context of a United Nations of 'the third world'). All in all, by 1945 the idea of empire was untenable. The formerly core states did not have the military, the economic or the political will or weight to renew former state-empire systems. They adjusted as best they could. Former peripheries attained formal independence and began state-making, nation-building and the pursuit of development.

In the case of the British elite, their response to the loss of empire, which followed the end of the Second World War, was a mixture of denial and invention. In respect of the former, the claim that the colonies were never that important; having been acquired in a fit of absentmindedness and let go in a gentlemanly fashion. In respect of the latter, the claim that the core territory was always a long-established nation-state and thus did not shift into the modern world in the form of a state-empire, the British Empire, now sundered and leaving the elite to seek consolations whilst reorienting their now shrunken state. And in the case of the French there was an analogous experience. After a failed attempt to return to Indo-China, there was a long drawn-out refusal to acknowledge demands for change in French North Africa and a measure of reassuring continuity in French-speaking West Africa. So the French elite, like the British, held on to ideas of greatness. In the case of the Dutch, the rapid loss of colonial holdings in Southeast Asia meant that consoling claims to greatness were too implausible to pursue; Europe was an alternative; arguably, the Dutch recover their political poise more quickly than their neighbours.

Reading the twentieth century in terms of the centrality of the two world wars has the effect of pushing to one side the business of the general crisis and the collapse of the state-empire system.

The short twentieth century

The characterization associated with Eric Hobsbawm.[46] The century starts in 1917 with the revolution and ends in 1989/91 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and this trajectory marks the career of communism; again, attention is drawn to events at the core, and events at the periphery are implicitly downgraded. And in this case further comments can be made, most obviously that there is one key modern state that affirms a state-socialist ideology: China. Thereafter, less obviously but no less true, there is a difference between the career of one state and the use and development over time of a set of ideas, in this case Marxist carried ideas of equality and so on. There is no sign that these have gone away.

Fascism: European and Asian

In Europe, in the years following the Great War, the political right made gains. In Germany there were complex strands of resentment: against the terms of the Versailles Treaty; against domestic political groups, accused of stabbing the army in the back; against the comparatively liberal or left-leaning Weimar Republic. And these, coupled with the impact of the Great Depression, opened up an opportunity for a right-wing political force and the patrician elites stood back as the National Socialists took power. Thereafter the new regime worked quickly to create a species of military dictatorship: their first victims were domestic German opponents; thereafter, irredentist claims led towards further warfare and a slew of further victims. Analogous movements were found in Italy, Spain, where fascists seized power after a military revolt and civil war, Portugal, and in most counties in Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary and Romania. And it might be noted that fascist political parties had supporters in Britain, France, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. These core conflicts further weakened the state-empires as the core drifted towards renewed warfare.

And these events found echoes in East Asia: Nationalist China embraced some of these ideas. And the military regimes in Japan also embraced some of these ideas, so too elites in Thailand. These peripheral confusions also worked to undermine the status quo; again, tensions found expression in widespread violence.

The rise of US power and the creation of a liberal trading sphere

The USA emerged from the chaos of the middle part of the twentieth century with its international position greatly enhanced. It had a powerful economy and a vast military. It was a cultural example to those populations which dwelt within its sphere and it looked set to dominate international politics for years to come.

The key long-term project of the US wartime elite was the creation of a liberal trading sphere. The elite argument was simple: interwar economic problems had led to worldwide protectionism, which in turn had depressed economic activity which in turn had fed social distress which thereafter found expression in violence – domestic and international. The solution was to be found in an organized global economic system – the power of the USA would serve as the core around which a global liberal trading sphere could be constructed. It was very successful.

But it was not entirely stable and events had to be managed, yet the costs of the Cold War-inspired adventure in Vietnam overstressed the

US economy; the Bretton Woods system faded, global economic activity became more unstable but the power of the USA continued, recently celebrated under the rubric of globalization.

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Events in the core regions complemented events at the periphery. The fracture lines within the state-empire system ran through both cores and peripheries, and, whereas prior to the early twentieth century such problems as arose could be dealt with – typically, repression of one sort or another – as the century wore on the utility of state-empire violence faded, tensions remained, their expression became more overt and, in time, a mix of structurally occasioned tensions and contingent political events forced open these fracture lines and the system dissolved first into confusion and then into an interlinked series of wars.

The inevitability of change

The collapse of 1942 had revealed the state-empire holdings in South-east Asia to be 'fundamentally rickety',[47] and after the crisis had passed the state-empire system was gone, nor could it be resuscitated. As the wars in the core territories had comprehensively destroyed pre-war patterns, a novel pattern of states took shape in both Europe and East Asia. All sought stability, order and development: in Europe via ideas of unification and in East Asia via ideas of differentiation. And all sought legitimacy not only in material success but also in claims to national longevity, and these claims were key to new national pasts. That there should be national pasts was inevitable, but that they should ride roughshod over the historical record was maybe not so inevitable. And, in any case, as the two regions at the start of the twenty-first century are now once again linked by trade and are successful, one aspect of success must be acknowledged – that is, that identities are not fixed and sweeping success entails revisiting received identities; a chance, therefore, to construct uprated national pasts, and a chance to write better histories of the routes into the crisis, its scale and the nature of its aftermath.

5
General Crisis: System Failure and the Collapse into Warfare

The system of state-empires began to collapse in the early twentieth century: multiple structural fracture lines weakened both individual state-empires and the system as a whole. Whilst there were multiple responses amongst elite and peripheral agents, both system-supporting and system-critical, the upshot was that the system had become fundamentally unstable. The elite-level political task of reading and reacting to these challenges – managing the demands – escaped the competence of extant elites. A slide towards open conflict was under way and, once the option for war had been selected, events ran out of the control of any one group. The Great War marked the beginning of the collapse in the core territories of Europe. Instability in one part of the core territories, the Balkans, occasioned by irredentist nationalist opportunism in regard to the weakened Ottoman Empire, was propagated via a series of alliances, and general warfare was the result. At more or less the same time, the Chinese Revolution marked the beginning of widespread collapse in the peripheral territories of East Asia as the region was overtaken by civil war, interstate war and later wars of independence, themselves made more difficult by extraregionally sponsored Cold War. Overall, as the crisis ran its course, millions were killed, many more millions displaced or otherwise injured, and as the chaos subsided the state-empire system was gone, replaced by shrunken, reconfigured nation-states at the core and a host of new or reconstituted states in the hitherto peripheral areas of the system.

The shift to the modern world was accompanied by extensive social dislocation as forms of life in the core territories were remade in the guise of industrial-capitalist economies, with bureaucratic-rational states, ordered and disciplined mass societies and the overarching cultural package of modernity. The system was dynamic, encompassing

domestic intensification and external expansion. The latter remade the forms of life of non-core peoples. The same system logics ran through these forms of life and novel hybrid forms were created. But the core territories were the more powerful, and as cores and new peripheries were welded together, state-empire systems took shape. These systems had their own logics, they had their own dynamics and in time this dynamism generated changes (economic, social and political) that opened up inherent flaws in the system and ultimately occasioned its collapse. The collapse took the form of a sequence of interrelated wars. The wars that took place in Europe and East Asia were very damaging, and, as national pasts offered stylized memories, the scale of the violence was often understated,[1] and the wider connections of particular local experiences of violence were similarly under-remarked.

The wars of the period were an expression of system crisis or state-empire collapse, and they should not be read in isolation as just a Sino-Japanese War or just a Chinese Civil War or just a Pacific War, nor should the wars in East Asia be treated as up-market side-shows to events in Europe. The crisis was systemic and whilst it took different forms in different parts of the world, these events were part of the whole, the crisis of the state-empire system.

East Asia: Violence in the state-empire system

The state-empire system rested not only on the inherent dynamism of the industrial-capitalist form of life but also upon the routine use of violence. The expansion of the state-empire system into its East Asian peripheral areas was accompanied by long drawn-out violence in which numerous agents participated: trading company personnel, state-empire armed forces and police forces, the organized armed forces deployed by the Qing, the militias available to country powers in the Malay world along with assorted local peoples offering piecemeal resistance to assorted incomers. And whilst local outcomes were various, the overall pattern was clear, as the mix of trade plus violence deployed by the various agents of the modern world overturned and remade the non-modern cultures with which they engaged.

The varieties of violence

The most unequivocal form of violence relied upon the deployment of military force. First, these forces involved various groups of people: some were pre-modern mercenary armies raised by the European trading companies; some were pre-modern armies raised by European states;

some were irregular forces used by trading companies or states – that is, ad hoc forces using the resources to hand, thus, merchant trading ships would be armed and thus quasi-military, and likewise any available European people could be used to respond to local rebellions; some were pre-modern armies raised by country powers; some were irregulars supported by country- powers, thus the Boxers; and some were irregulars operating semi-independently, as with the Orang Laut[2] around Singapore. Then second, these forces were deployed in various contexts: sometimes company forces were deployed against local forces; sometimes they were deployed with local forces against other local forces; sometimes they were employed as mercenaries by local forces to be used against other local forces; and state forces worked in similarly confused situations; and finally local country powers had their own conflicts and they also had to deal with incoming powers. Third, these incoming foreign forces usually enjoyed superiority in technology: the forces of companies and core states usually had better technology and organization; and the companies and states had better communications and logistics, and so could bring military force to bear upon specific targets.

The military history of the expansion and creation of state-empire systems indicates that the incoming powers secured numerous military victories over much larger numbers of personnel deployed by local powers.[3] And, finally, the violence was read into the popular culture of the participants in various ways: celebratory (hence the high-imperial penchant for monumental architecture, jingoism and the machineries of war-making); accommodative (the defeated embrace the new form of life); and oppositional (the defeated look to resist via various strategies whilst invoking heroic figures, mythic pasts or bright new post-colonial futures to rouse their supporters). However, here, for the moment, a series of lists will suffice; they record in outline the wars of colonial expansion, the rebellions that began almost immediately and which carried in one way or another on through the entire colonial period, and the wars of Qing collapse. In all, these represent the earlier episodes of violence. Later, matters became much more chaotic.

(i) Wars of colonial expansion

A simple list of these wars of colonial expansion shows both their number and their frequency: the recourse to violence by incoming European powers was routine, and the country powers that were attacked equally routinely resisted. These conflicts ranged in scale from relatively minor engagements, so far as the incoming forces were concerned, if not their victims,[4] through to full-scale pitched battles involving tens of

thousands of troops.[5] The expansion of the state-empire systems was neither benign nor secured in a fit of absentmindedness, and whilst the local detail was highly contingent, in the totality it was a considered project in which the incoming powers used force to overturn existing local country powers.

Wars of colonial expansion:[6]

1795–6	British occupation of Malacca
1810–11	Anglo-Dutch Java War
1811	British occupation of Java
1824–6	First Anglo-Burmese War
1825	Dutch conquest of Palembang
1825–30	Great Java War
1837	British campaign against piracy off Malay peninsula
1839–42	First Opium War
1846–9	Dutch expeditions against Bali
1852	Second Anglo-Burmese War
1853–4	Admiral Perry's expedition to Edo
1856–60	Second Opium (Arrow) War
1857–65	Dutch Bandjermasin War
1858–62	French War against Annam
1867	French consolidate Cochin China
1872–96	Dutch Batak War
1873	First Dutch Aceh War
1874	Pangkor Engagement allows British into Malay peninsular
1874–80	Second Dutch Aceh War
1883–5	Sino-French War consolidates control of Indo-China
1884–96	Third Dutch Aceh War
1885–7	Third Anglo-Burmese War
1893	Franco-Siamese War
1897–1900	Boxer Uprising
1898–1900	US invasion of the Philippines
1905–8	Dutch Expedition against Southern Celebes
Casualties	Unknown

Viewed in this fashion, it is clear that the incoming European and US powers spent most of the nineteenth century extending their grip on East Asia, and that they did so by various means, but at the back of these strategies there was the option of using force. It was an option that the European and later US and Japanese state-empire elites were quite content to use, and which they justified by reference to claims

to the over-riding importance of trade and their status as advanced civilizations.

(ii) Early rebellions against colonial rule

Once the territories were formally absorbed into the state-empire system (occupied[7] or conquered or leased or whatever), they had to be secured through the machineries of law, administration, police, education, co-option and all of the routine low-level mechanisms of economic, social and cultural control. And at the back of these strategies lay the armed forces of the state-empire system. These forces were mostly not used and they remained mostly in their army barracks or naval bases, but they were available if and when local people rebelled. And rebellions of one sort or another were familiar, so, where necessary, colonial authorities deployed armed forces (and often these were a mixture of Europeans and various locally recruited people): networks of bases and ports and lines of communication ensured that forces could be concentrated and deployed against more locally organized opponents.

Rebellions against colonial rule:[8]

1850–64	Taiping Rebellion (Overseas Chinese involvement)
1857	Hong Kong bread poisoning (British Hong Kong)
1857–8	Indian Mutiny (British India)
1910/11	Sokehs Rebellion (German Micronesia)
1916	Cochinchina Uprising (French Indo-China)
1926	PKI Revolt (Dutch East Indies)
1930/1	Nge Tinh Revolt (French Indo-China)
Casualties	Unknown

Confronted with these local challenges, the colonial authorities could bring overwhelming force to bear. This ability revealed the crucial technical and logistic advantages of the state-empire systems. These exercises in colonial pacification were usually successful – that is, outbreaks of resistance were contained, albeit at increasing core political costs. Thus there was domestic opposition to the British prosecution of wars in Southern Africa, the Boer War. Likewise around the same time there was pressure on the Dutch who invented 'the ethical policy'[9] for their holdings in the archipelago, the Dutch East Indies, and there were domestic objections to US actions in the Philippines.[10] However, notwithstanding domestic debate and core repression, the incidence of revolts against the metropolitan powers did not subside; instead they continued, until eventually pre-war independence movements found

their moment in the collapse of European and US state-empires during the Pacific War.

(iii) Domestic lines of collapse in Qing China

It might also be added, lest the tale should become one-sided, that the nineteenth century saw extensive domestic violence in the core East Asian power of Qing China. The domestic violence is one point at which arguments to the moribund nature of Chinese civilization get started: the inability of the Qing authorities to maintain order or respond effectively to the demands of the foreigners along with the numerous outbreaks of grass-roots violence in one or other part of the territory. In some respects the argument is thoroughly disingenuous because significant problems were directly occasioned by outsiders, those who demanded trading rights, the main suppliers of opium, but the internal condition of China was far from settled.

Wars of Qing Collapse:[11]

1795–1806	Miao Revolt
1796–1805	White Lotus Rebellion
1813	Eight Trigrams Sect Revolt
1839–42	First Opium War
1850–64	Taiping Rebellion
1856–60	Second Opium (Arrow) War
1853–68	Nian Rebellion
1856–73	Muslim Yunnan Rebellion
1862–73	Tungan Rebellion
1864–85	Muslim Xinjiang Rebellion
1871–5	Czarist Invasion of Xinjiang
1884–5	Sino-French War
1894–5	Sino-Japanese War
1897–1900	Boxer Uprising
1911	Chinese Republic Revolution
Casualties	Estimated in tens of millions[12]

Barrington Moore[13] offers a distinctive line on the collapse. The Qing authorities were initially uncomprehending of the external challenges that they faced,[14] and as they were not inclined to fashion domestic reform they gave ground in an ad hoc fashion. Yet by the late nineteenth century much of China was linked to the modern world via the foreign concessions, networks of trade, out-flows of people and extensive elite learning. And so by the time the dynasty realized that sweeping

reforms were needed they had no social base to address. At the turn of the century domestic revolutionaries had come to the fore and they did not want reforms, they wanted the Qing out of power.

* * * * *

In sum, overall, the state-empire systems were built around the inherent dynamism of the industrial-capitalist form of life. The business was not peaceful. The state-empires were established and sustained using violence: multiple agents, multiple locations and multiple variants on the generic pattern of industrial-capitalist expansion. The depth of the penetration of state-empires into newly acquired territories varied; expansion was ad hoc, not programmatic; and the resultant pattern was the outcome of the interchange between incoming powers and the economic, social and political resources of the targeted territory. But resistance to the processes of absorption into state-empires began early, and it covered a range of activities: at one end of the scale such resistance would be low level, Scott's 'weapons of the weak', whilst at the other it would take the form of outright violence. There were multiple readings of such violence – offered by colonial authorities, metropolitan critics and various local figures – and today there are multiple collective memories and events that are also recalled in quasi-official national pasts.

East Asia: General crisis

The state-empire systems were shaped by the particular developmental trajectories taken by core states in Europe and later the USA and Japan. The elites in these countries rode on the back of a powerful industrial-capitalist political-economic system, with its characteristic drive for intensification and expansion. Yet the system of state-empires was not static; it was dynamic and suffused with tensions in both core and periphery. As noted earlier, there were numerous fracture lines. These problems found their most acute expression in the period 1928–49 when there were a number of interlinked highly destructive wars. The system began to fail and eventually it broke down.[15] The general crisis was only resolved when core powers were reconfigured as nation-states claiming long pedigrees, and peripheral powers emerged as novel or reconstituted nation-states that were committed to national development. All of this was a long drawn-out business, costing many lives, but in East Asia the episode saw the destruction of the European, US and Japanese state-empires.

The core areas of the system comprised competing units, jealous of their positions and reluctant to accommodate further state-empire units. Elites embraced ideologies of nationalism coupled to ideologies of interempire competition. These ideas were widely promulgated amongst core populations and they also found expression in peripheral territories amongst core expatriates and other supporters of empire (recall, these state-empires were units and so supporters could be found in many places (so too opponents)). Amongst core elite players these problems revolved around the economic, military and political rise of Germany and the consequent dilemmas of accommodating or resisting these developments. The various powers in Europe manoeuvred and schemed.[16] In this way the European state-empires fell into hostile competition. In the peripheral areas the tensions found a different expression. At the outset as the peripheral areas of the state-empire system were absorbed, the process was legitimated in terms invoking the benefits of trade, progress and civilization. These claims carried no weight with displaced elites but did offer something to other groups: the promise that over time their circumstances would improve – in brief, the package of 'progress'. The key to this future and the link to the core was trade. But both the argument and the practice had problems. First, the trade was often forced upon recipients and cut across existing forms of economic life with established groups marginalized and new groups imported. Second, the progress entailed dramatically remaking recipient societies, and old patterns of economy, society and polity were pushed aside.[17] Third, claims to civilization over-rode local histories and legacies, ways of local knowing, so once again creating divisions/tensions.

So, in brief, as the state-empire system expanded it developed fissures, which in time ensured its collapse. First, the system developed on the back of a powerful political-economic system, in turn fed by the novelties of the burgeoning natural sciences, and the system developed in terms of a number of state-empires, and these competed and so tensions were built into the system. Second, the system generated extensive changes at the periphery via exploitation, learning and development. The system produced responses: economic (as networks of local business developed their relative power (after Strange)[18] increased[19]); social (as the impact of the modern world remade local forms of life, new social groups emerged, some with interests allied with colonial powers, some opposed); and, finally, political (as the process of learning unfolded, local players found new arguments to deploy against their erstwhile colonial rulers). So success opened up the cracks in the system.

The first cracks appeared in both core and peripheral areas. By way of examples, amongst the core, as noted earlier, Anglo-British rivalry around the aspiration of the new German emperor to acquire colonial territories, thus, for example, in 1911 the exchanges surrounding the port of Agadir; Anglo-French rivalry around competing empire-territory aspirations, thus, for example, in 1898, the stylized exchange at Fashoda; and Anglo-US competition around economic activity and trade, thus the 1899 US promulgation of the policy of 'the open door' in China. And, at the peripheries, the 1911 Chinese Revolution that overthrew a regime viewed locally as both outmoded and unsuited to the modern world;[20] the rise of pan-Asianist sentiment in Japan plus the negative reactions to the Versailles Treaty rejection of a race equality clause; and then rebellions throughout the peripheral areas, as in the Dutch East Indies, cast in terms of both communism (PKI) and Islam (Serekat Islam), or in Indo-China, cast in terms of nationalism/communism, and so on.

All of these tensions were built into the state-empire system and so change was inevitable, but elites were unable to respond creatively so confusion reigned and general crisis ensued. The final form of the crisis was extensive violence; the long series of interlinked wars that ran in Europe and East Asia through much of the middle years of the twentieth century, and in places through until late in the century, and which cost the lives of millions.

East Asia: Phases in the general crisis

The general crisis can be broken down into a number of phases. In the first, problems accumulated, in particular in East Asia, the sometime core territory of the richest area of the global economy. Then in the second phase, these problems unpack as a series of interlinked wars, including local rebellions, civil wars, interstate wars and, in time, inter-regional wars, which, in total, not only have a devastating impact upon populations in both the European core and the East Asian periphery but also serve to fatally undermine the system itself such that after the military campaigns the very idea of state-empire is finished. And, in the third phase, these logics slowly worked themselves out, state-empires were untenable but the process of dissolution was neither simple nor left to run its course as decolonization blended into the Cold War, and both processes saw retreating powers seeking to control the shape of the new settlement, placing allies in power where they could and seeking to block those seen as opponents (often at further cost to local populations). And finally, in the current phase, the countries of East Asia

have secured their place in the modern world and it is a mixed picture (as might be expected), but the region is once again a key element in the global system.

The four phases are as follows:[21]

- Breakdown of regimes, 1911–32[22]
  - 1911–12 Chinese Revolution
  - 1911–26 Warlords
  - 1914–18 Great War
  - 1927–8 Northern Expedition
  - 1931–3 Manchuria
  - 1932 Siamese army coup
- War and collapse in China, 1928–49[23]
  - 1928–37 First Chinese Civil War
  - 1937–45 Sino-Japanese War
  - 1939–45 Second World War
  - 1941–5 Pacific War
  - 1945–9 Second Chinese Civil War
- Decolonization and Cold War, 1948–75[24]
  - 1946–8 Indonesian 'police actions'
  - 1946–58 Malayan 'emergency'
  - 1950–3 Korean War
  - 1946–54 Vietnam War
  - 1955–75 Vietnam War
- Regional success, 1971–2008[25]
  - 1971 Sino-American rapprochement
  - 1985 Plaza Accord
  - 2008 Beijing Olympics

In this discussion it is the episode of war and collapse in East Asia that will be the main concern. However, as will be clear from the names/dates mentioned in these lists, events in Europe and East Asia ran together as symptoms of the same crisis were found in different locations.

What is noticeable when the lists are made in this way is that the crisis of the state-empire systems centred on metropolitan cores in Europe and peripheral territories in East Asia. It is in these two geographical regions that the violence was concentrated. Other parts of the world were impacted in quite different ways. Thus, first, the USA was involved only in a narrow fashion as financier, industrialist and in restricted measure as combatant, where their losses in military personnel were much lower than other participants and their civilian losses minimal,[26] and

the country emerged from the crisis years as a major global power. Second, the countries of Latin America were not directly involved but their long-established links with Europe were disturbed and new links with the USA established, plus, crucially, they created the novel strategy of import substituting industrialization, the first move in subsequently influential structuralist and later dependency economics and policy[27] – that is, these countries experienced the crisis years in terms of relative advance. Then, third, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa were not directly involved but local economies prospered as they supplied materials for war. And, finally, the lands of the Middle East were not involved but they were impacted. There was some military action. More importantly, the area hosted staging points in European empire links to Asia, it was an oil supplier, a route for supplies into southern areas of the USSR and then in 1945 it became a destination for European Jewish refugees.

In all of this there are two issues to keep in view: first, the slow, confused process of state-empire collapse, where elites offered multiple diagnoses leaving the masses subject to assorted exhortations, organizational experiments and, worse, military mobilizations; and second, the scale of the attendant wars, drawing in vast numbers of people across vast areas, occasioning huge casualty lists, great dislocation and loss of material resources, all comprising events subsequently read[28] into a multiplicity of collective memories and national pasts.

East Asia: Crisis and breakdown of 1911–32

In the years before the Great War the European-centred state-empire system, along with its associated powers, USA and Japan, carried by the dynamism of the shift to the modern world,[29] attained an apogee of power and most of the world was one way or another subject to their control/influence. But cracks in the system were apparent. In China and Siam, territories subject to European demands, old regimes that had sought to accommodate the demands of the Europeans failed, and progressive forces attempted to create political space for what might be tagged 'programmes of national development' – hence the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the 1932 Thai Coup.

Breakdown in China, 1911 onwards

Moore[30] analyses the Qing political economy in terms of its main class groups where the emperor provided property rights, the scholar bureaucrats preserved ritual and order, the gentry held land, and beneath the pile the peasantry worked the land. And peasants plus land were the key

economic resources in an agrarian society. In this pattern, merchants, traders and manufacturers were comparatively weak. There was no state-directed push for development but as foreign traders arrived the system came under pressure. Trade links facilitated greater prosperity in the coastal cities but the Qing system as a whole could not fashion a coherent response to either domestic needs for change or external demands for change, so the system drifted, slowly disintegrating.

The 1911 revolution saw the final collapse of the Qing; the flurry of reforms, proposed in 1906, were too little, too late as the system had begun to dissolve away:[31]

> As the possibility of exercising the traditional role of the scholar declined and the power of the central government weakened, the gentry took control of local affairs more and more into their own hands, foreshadowing the long period of chaos and internecine warfare that did not really come to an end until the Communist victory in 1949.

Moore continues:[32]

> The end of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and the proclamation of the Republic in 1912 merely gave oblique constitutional recognition to the fact that real power had passed into the hands of the local satraps where it would remain for at least another decade and half. During this period, important sections of what had been the gentry clung to power either by turning to warlords or by allying themselves with individual militarists. The whole social and cultural apparatus that had given them legitimacy was smashed beyond repair. Their successors were to be landlords pure and simple, gangsters, or a combination of the two, a tendency that lay just below the surface in Imperial times.

The history of the Chinese Revolution is chaotic and violent.[33] The revolution spans a short period of time, 1911–14, during which there was much confusion as the players attempted to set up a republican government that could command the support of the numerous regional groupings that inherited what little authority had remained to the Beijing government of the Qing. Yuan Shikai emerged as leader (1914–16), and there was further confusion as Yuan's aspirations to leadership undermined the republic to the point that he declared himself emperor; but then he died suddenly in 1916. Elite revolutionary

aspirations for a republic dissolved and the long period of warlord rule began. The warlord era, 1916–26, saw the country dissolve into a series of local area powers. The key to the organization of these areas was control of a military machine, and such machines were assembled in realist style – that is, at base they rested upon available violence,[34] hence the tag 'warlord era'. There were numerous groups, they were scattered throughout the country[35] and there were a number of wars between these forces.

Amongst the elite of the reform movement, Sun Yat Sen died in 1925 and Chiang Kai Shek took over. There was extensive and routine manoeuvring amongst elite figures but Chiang managed to stay on top. There was an early alliance with the recently formed CCP and both favoured change, but one was rooted in rural landlords and money-eyed urban groups whilst the other was rooted in rural peasants and the nascent urban working classes. The crucial powers were the warlords. Chiang launched the Northern Expedition in 1926 and a species of unification was secured – that is, fighting plus manoeuvring and warlord cooption led to a kind of political unification and the capital was relocated from Beijing to Nanjing. However, less optimistically, during the course of the Northern Expedition, Chiang's forces in alliance with local business and gangster figures attacked the CCP in Shanghai in April 1927. This marked the start of the civil war. The CCP which had followed a conventional Marxist line – that is, organizing the proletariat – changed tack and looked to the vast numbers of Chinese peasants. After the catastrophe that had befallen their comrades in Shanghai, they retreated to the countryside and began to organize quasi-independent territories or base areas. A series of military encirclement campaigns were launched against the CCP's strongholds and the Jiangxi base area was over-run in late 1934. The remnants of the CCP retreated and the party was marginalized, only surviving in the remote central north of the country. Later this episode of retreat was reimagined and lauded as the foundational 'long march'.[36]

Such was the condition of China in the late 1920s and early 1930s: domestic upheaval, continued foreign settlements plus the increasing attentions of the Japanese. The Japanese became involved quite early in this stage of the tale. Having emerged militarily victorious in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, they had not merely secured Korea and Taiwan but continued to deepen their involvement in China, and in the period 1931/7 there was expansion in Manchuria and in northern areas of China, until finally in 1937/45 there was open invasion, which in time was to sweep through most of China. Thus, by 1931, any optimism

attached to the 1911 revolution had faded and a domestic civil war was under way, and an interstate regional war had begun which in time was to be subsumed within a wider global war.

Breakdowns elsewhere

In this period there were numerous other signs of cracks in the system. In 1911 the Qing dynasty was swept away and in 1932 the Siamese absolute monarchy was pushed aside by reform-minded figures in the military. In the 1920s and 1930s there were other conflicts and signs of doubt: there were independence movements in Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China, and there was rising nationalist sentiment amongst local communities in Malaya. In the core territory of the British Empire in the East, India, there were popular and effective independence movements. And in addition, in the metropolitan cores, there were growing doubts as to the viability of empires and questions about their fundamental propriety. However, these reformers were not influential amongst key policy groups. Little was done. The state-empires did not disappear as a result of rational debate in the public sphere. Over the next phase of the general crisis, warfare would engulf the state-empire systems and two geographical areas would experience the brunt of the violence: the core countries of Europe and the wide peripheral territories of East Asia.

East Asia: Crisis and the wars of collapse of 1928–49

The core of the general crisis was provided by an interrelated sequence of wars. One key centre was the territory of China. First there were a series of interrelated wars within China as KMT, CCP and local warlords manoeuvred for advantage. This was resolved in the period 1945–9 when the conventional armies of the CCP defeated the forces of the KMT in a series of battles from 1947 onwards in northern China, with the rest of the country falling to their forces in short order, and with the remnant warlord forces being absorbed by CCP armies. Then, second, there was a one-sided interstate war between China and Japan. The Nationalist armies did most of the fighting against Japan, with the CCP marginalized until the latter stages of the war, but they were repeatedly outclassed by the Japanese armies. The Japanese forces conquered most of China. However, the country was vast and so Nationalist armies were able to retreat to the far southwest. They made Chongqing their wartime capital and they were able to receive supplies from the USA via Burma, which enabled them to continue to resist the invaders. However, commentators suggest that the Nationalists resisted the Japanese

in the earlier years of the war, during which time they suffered a series of defeats, but from 1941 onwards they were content to wait for what they regarded as the inevitable defeat of Japan by the USA. The CCP was a relatively minor player in the war against Japan.

And third, the Sino-Japanese War overlapped with the Second World War and the Pacific War: again, different players, different places and different memories. The war in Europe meant that European state-empire holdings in Southeast Asia and East Asia were no longer defensible, and, from 1939 until 1941, European countries had to accommodate the demands of the Japanese. In December 1941 the situation changed when the Japanese attacked the USA, which now found itself at war in both the Pacific and Europe, and during the early Japanese military campaigns the Europeans were driven out of the region. The USA engaged the Japanese across the Pacific with some assistance from its allies, and it inflicted a severe military defeat. During this period the USA supported the Nationalists with military aid and diplomatic recognition. In the last weeks of the Pacific War, the USSR in line with Allied agreements engaged Japan, and the end of the Pacific War blurred into the end of the civil war and the start of the Cold War. The period 1945/50 was thus a confused time of shifting alliances, shifting policy stances and continuing warfare. In the final phase of the civil war, the USA supported the Nationalists with arms, money and logistics, whilst the USSR, perhaps somewhat less whole-heartedly, supported the CCP. After 1949 the USA continued to support Taiwan ROC as a part of the Cold War bloc, just as after 1949 the USSR supported the CCP as a neighbour and socialist state, but not as part of a coherent bloc. And finally, these wars overlapped with conflicts ordered around the aspirations of various nationalist movements for independence from state-empire systems, hence nationalist movements in Southeast Asia and Indo-China, and nationalist movements in Korea. The European response in Southeast Asia was to attempt to recover its holdings, and the US response was ambiguous in that it offered no overt support to the recovery or reconstitution of state-empire holdings but it did offer support to anti-communist nationalists in the creation of a bloc system. Local agents had to manoeuvre through these demands and the situation varied country by country (Southeast Asia, Indo-China and Northeast Asia).

In sum, at the start, foreign state-empires were present but, in the end, these foreign state-empires had either retreated or been destroyed, or in the particular case of the USA, extended and rebadged, first in the form of a military plus diplomatic plus economic network, and second as a

Cold War bloc presented as ordered around 'freedom', notwithstanding that almost all of the countries were either military dictatorships or more or less one-party states.[37] And China was both free of the rapacious demands of foreigners – for the first time since the 1840s – and united under the leadership of the CCP.

In all, this was a period of extreme violence, disruption and dramatic change.

The wars in China: Domestic violence in the wake of the collapse of Qing

The immediate result of the collapse of the Qing was not only the declaration of the republic but also the more or less simultaneous emergence of a large number of warlord holdings comprising military leaders, a body of followers and an area of operations. There were hundreds of such units, some of them controlling large territories and equally large armies; and these warlord units manoeuvred for positions against each other and against the demands of the nominal republic government. This situation made state-making very difficult.

Paine characterizes it in this way:[38]

> Warlord rule was not based on institutions that survived beyond the political life span of their leaders. Rather, rule in China was based on personalities and the loyalists such key political leaders could muster, while the loyalists depended on the followers they could muster, and so on, down a long political chain; the longer and broader the chain, the stronger the political personality on top . . . Warlords were uncertain of the strength of the loyalties of their own followers let alone those of the followers of their political rivals. Rule in China was personal

A number of key warlord groupings were identified:[39] northern groups, comprising factions that competed for control of the nominal government in Beijing, including the Anhui Group, Zhili Group and Fengtian Group; and the southern groups, comprising factions that were opposed to nominal government in Beijing, including the Yunnan Group, Guangxi Group, Sichuan Group and KMT. These factions engaged in almost continuous fighting as their numerous alliances shifted and changed. The armies deployed were large, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, and the casualties inflicted upon both armies and peasant communities were correspondingly large.

After Yuan's death in 1916, his subordinates sought advantage and three groups in the north of the country sought power in Beijing. A number of wars followed:

> The North China warlords fought a succession of wars to dominate Beijing and the central government: the July 1920 Zhili-Anhui War, the April-June First Zhili-Fengtian War, and the September-November 1924 Second Zhili-Fengtian War . . . Each involved more than 100,000 combatants, and seven to ten provinces . . . [the] Fengtian-Feng Yuxiang War running from November 1925 to March 1926 . . . [involved] 600,000 thousand combatants . . . effecting eight provinces. The number of belligerents, wars, and affected provinces should convey a picture of national devastation.[40]

After Chiang Kai Shek's Northern Expedition, the northern warlords were displaced, others were co-opted or otherwise disabled, and the capital was moved to Nanjing – the start of the Nanjing Decade. Yet the warlord manoeuvring continued and it ran on through the years of Nationalist China and also through the invasions of the Japanese. Commentators have suggested that Chiang was in fact just one more warlord and it is the case that he was an authoritarian figure, and from 1927 onwards a resolute opponent of the Communist Party.

The first Chinese civil war was a distinctly one-sided affair. In 1934, Chiang Kai Shek's armies following a number of encirclement campaigns drove the CCP out of its Jiangxi base areas and into a remote area in the north of the country. A campaign to defeat these remnants was stopped by a mixture of dissention within the Nationalist ranks plus the emergence of a threat from Japanese forces on a scale larger than anything seen hitherto – that is, all-out invasion.

These early exchanges can be outlined as follows:[41]

- in 1927 the KMT's 'white terror' in Shanghai, a failed military revolt in Nanchang, a failed coup in Canton and a failed Autumn Rising in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi;
- from 1927 to 1934, 'more than a dozen'[42] base areas (including the Jiangxi base area, Mao Zedong's base) were established, mixing revolutionary organization and banditry, and they were suffused with routine violence;
- in the 1930s the Nationalists were at war with their northern opponents and it was an opportunity, but attacks on Nanchang, Wuhan and Changsa all failed;[43]

- in 1930 the Nationalists launched an encirclement campaign against the Jiangxi base area, which failed but triggered a CCP purge, ostensibly against the 'Anti-Bolshevik League' (a phantom), then Mao seized power and the Kuomintang campaign failed;
- in 1931 two further encirclement campaigns were launched, followed by further purges, again the failure of the campaigns and tens of thousands of deaths;
- in 1931, CCP cadres were attacked, with 20,000-plus being killed and further purges in the base areas;[44]
- in 1932 there were further attacks on the base areas;
- in 1934 the fifth encirclement campaign resulted in defeat of the base area, the CCP withdrew, followed by the long march, and the Nationalists staged a campaign against the CCP;
- in 1936 the Nationalists prepared to attack the new base at Yanan, Chiang Kai Shek went to Xian but was seized by warlords and obliged to agree a truce with the CCP, and attacks on the CCP stop but there was little cooperation between the forces, and most of fighting against the imperial Japanese was carried out by Nationalists.

By 1931 the Japanese had moved into Manchuria, looking to protect investments and more ambitiously looking to create a self-sufficient economic zone, building on their empire in Korean/Sakhalin. There were further incursions into China, but it was a confused picture. In the mid-30s the Japanese forces moved piecemeal into Northern China, then in July 1937 there was a relatively small-scale skirmish at the Marco Polo railway bridge on the line that linked Beijing and Tianjin. There had been many exchanges between Chinese troops and those from Japan – all local – but this time the conflict around the bridge escalated as both sides declined any chance to de-escalate. In the event it triggered outright war between Nationalist China and Japan. The invasion provided the opportunity for an uneasy truce amongst contending Chinese forces and the early episode of civil war came to a sort of end.

The Second Sino-Japanese War of 1931–45

The Second Sino-Japanese War ran for some 15 years and the fighting was extensive, the conflict ruinous and the results ambiguous. As the regional war ended, the civil war resumed and as that concluded, matters shifted imperceptibly into the long-running Cold War.

The major episodes of the war can be summarized but the events on the ground – that is, the fighting, the impact upon the elites, the impact upon ordinary soldiers and the impact upon ordinary civilians – are

much more difficult to summarize. In brief, the war caused heavy casualties amongst soldiers and also civilians, great dislocation to economic, social and political life,[45] and extreme damage to infrastructure. It was a disaster.

Events in the Sino-Japanese War:[46]

1931	Manchurian incident
1932	Shanghai 28 February incident
1933	North China Campaigns
1937	Marco Polo Bridge incident
1937	Second Shanghai incident
1941	Gogo Offensive
1944	Ichigo Offensive
Casualties	20,000,000[47]

The Manchurian incident marked the start of the slide into outright warfare. The Japanese had been present since the late nineteenth century, the period of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, both fought for control over Korea, and their subsequent control of the South Manchurian Railway Company had facilitated the extensive development of the region with agriculture, extractive industries and heavy industries. The area had become one of the most productive in China. The political confusions in China, with their attendant violence, threatened these holdings, and Japanese perceptions of the wider international scene, including US hostility, widespread depression and relative diplomatic isolation, all pointed towards the necessity of securing control of Manchuria.

Elite opinion was divided within the two main protagonists. In China, the KMT, the CCP and numerous warlords debated the nature of a correct response (accommodate/resist). In Japan, the main branches of the armed forces (army/navy) and the politicians in Tokyo debated the issue. The goal was to secure their territory in Manchuria, but there was no consensus in Tokyo. In the capital, senior politicians were assassinated. And young army officers staged a revolt in Manchuria. In early 1931 the army organized an attack on a key railway line as a pretext to taking control of the territory, hence the Manchurian incident – conventionally the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. And there was a related exchange in Shanghai in 1932, the January 28 incident. Japanese provocateurs initiated an anti-Japanese riot and the navy landed troops. The fighting lasted until May. There were thousands of casualties and great destruction was wrought on the city of Shanghai.[48] And in the early

1930s there were further exchanges between the two sides as Japanese forces pushed slowly into Northern China.

Paine comments:[49]

> There was no hiatus in military operations between 1931 and 1937. After the conquest of Manchuria, during the supposed period of peace after 1933, Japan occupied China north of the Yellow River, whose valley forms the cradle of Han civilization.

During this period the Nationalist government attempted to come to a settlement with the Japanese. However, in Japan, civilian leaderships were pushed aside as the military came to the fore. Japan became a military dictatorship and it became a mobilized country.[50]

In 1937 there was one more exchange between Chinese and Japanese forces at the Marco Polo Bridge on the railway line linking Beijing and Tianjin. The exchange began as a local affair, one of many similar episodes. But this exchange escalated until a full-scale invasion was launched by the Japanese from their holdings in Manchuria and northern China, and thereafter their armies moved south. Also in 1937 the Japanese attacked Shanghai in the Second Shanghai incident. Chiang Kai Shek debated the issue and decided to resist, and a major battle ensued. In the event, the Japanese prevailed and the Nationalists retreated up river with the Japanese following them, seizing city after city. They took Nanjing in December 1937 and the Chinese government relocated to Wuhan and then to Chongqing. Paine[51] argues that the Nationalists traded space for time, anticipating that the Chinese people would resist and speculating that the Japanese would find that they had neither manpower nor logistics to pacify the country. Paine argues as many have that the Japanese never really had a plan; their initial goal was to protect their possession of Manchuria and the subsequent expansion was without clear objectives. Thereafter the Japanese decision to broaden the war to include Southeast Asia and the USA in an attempt to cut supplies to China and secure their own supplies was a fatal error as they could not match the productive capacity of the US economy. Commentators have noted that after the Pacific War began, both the Nationalists and the CCP were content to await the defeat of the Japanese whilst preparing to resume their civil war.

The final offensives took place late in the Pacific War. In time the fighting enveloped most of China: the Gogo Offensive of 1941–3 seized most of China north of the River Yangtze; and then the Ichigo Offensive of 1944–5 seized most of China south of the river. However, by this time

the US advance across the Pacific Ocean had made the military defeat of Japan certain and the only issue was how the war would be brought to an end. In the event the Japanese surrendered in August 1945.

And in China, after the Japanese surrender, there was a brief lull in fighting but the Second Chinese Civil War commenced in late 1945 and ran until 1949. The decisive fighting took place in Manchuria. The Nationalists received extensive logistic and material help from the Americans whilst the CCP received support from the forces of the USSR. After the Nationalist defeats in the north, the armies moved south. Chiang variously fought the CCP, warlords and the Japanese through until 1949. Jonathan Fenby suggests that he was just another warlord albeit with the backing of the USA.[52] The remnants of the armies of the ROC retreated to Taiwan, the armies of the CCP secured the country and during this process there was further extensive bloodshed.

The Second World War and the Pacific War

The military campaigns in China were one part of a complex set of overlapping wars: the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War and the Second World War. And in the region as a whole, intermingling with these wars were the activities of various nationalist movements. In sum, it was a period of great destruction and loss.

During the early phases of the Second World War from 1939 until late 1941, the state-empire holdings of the Europeans and Americans existed in a kind of limbo; the Japanese were the dominant local power and they were at war with China, the Americans were still neutral and the Europeans were preoccupied with events in their home continent. In other words, state-empire holdings in East Asia were exposed and in the event of any move from Japan they were likely indefensible.

This being the case,

- British Malaya continued as before;
- the Dutch East Indies accommodated the invasion of the Netherlands;
- French Indo-China accommodated the Vichy regime;
- the Philippines continued as before;
- concessions in China continued as before.[53]

In the first few months of the Pacific War, the state-empire systems in East Asia were swept away as the British, French, Dutch and US authorities were dispossessed, their armies defeated, their sojourners evicted or interred, and hitherto subject local populations left to the rule

of the Japanese. Subsequent post-war attempts at their recovery failed and the region was reordered in the form of independent nation-states, which were quickly divided along Cold War lines, in all a new form of political system.

A number of quite familiar elements to the overall tale can be identified. Together they track the main elements of the general crisis.

(i) Background to war

The background can be sketched[54] in terms of a number of elements, some domestic, others international. First, the domestic situation of the Japanese elite changed. The key figures of the Meiji Restoration left the scene and two consequences followed: Firstly, their ideas about the future for Japan ceased to be presented as they were no longer participants in the policy conversation, and, secondly, the nature of the constitution, which allowed the military direct access to the emperor, allowed them to move centre stage in the political debates of the elite. Then second, the general domestic situation in Japan was poor. The impact of the Great Depression had been severe, and there was political instability in Tokyo. And third, there were accumulating diplomatic issues in the early twentieth century. Viewed positively, the country's successful involvement in the Great War via an alliance with Britain, plus a temporary hold of German colonies/concessions, and their subsequent participation in the Versailles Treaty, showed them to be a power to be recognized. However, viewed negatively, in particular, there was the rejection of their proposal for a principle of racial equality to be acknowledged in founding the League of Nations. Shortly thereafter, a related diplomatic debate saw the expiration of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–23), at the behest of the Commonwealth countries, which preferred links with the USA, and which was read by the Japanese elite as undermining their security. Fourth was the concomitant rise of pan-Asianist and nationalist sentiment, which for the Japanese elite became somewhat interchangeable, to the detriment of the wider attraction of the former idea. And finally, fifth, the downward spiral of relations with the USA, including, first, the US elite's suspicious response to the long-term rise of Japan, second, the US response to the Japanese involvement in China, which was seen as a threat to US interests, whilst contrariwise the Japanese saw the Wilson system of liberal trading as a threat to their interests and,[55] third, US diplomatic belligerence in the guise of criticisms and sanctions. All of these played into Japanese elite thinking and their policy-making.[56]

(ii) Choices for war

The choice of war against the Americans and Europeans, viewed in hindsight, with today's easy recognition of US industrial/military power, plus European post-war revulsion against war, plus post-war Japanese official pacifism, seems at the very least to have been ill-advised. However, put in context, it can be read as a species of rational choice. US sanctions (oil, steel) tipped the balance, because without supplies of these materials the Japanese elite could not sustain their war in China, and thereby secure Manchuria, which was, in turn, the key to the Japanese state-empire system in Northeast Asia.

Casting the matter in the narrower terms of military history, Paine[57] argues that explanations for the behaviour of the imperial Japanese must be sought in terms of their key concerns – that is, finding a resolution to their problems in China whilst securing their holdings in Manchuria. From this perspective, the attack on the South and the Pacific were peripheral strategies to secure the central goal.

(iii) Early military campaigns

Japanese armed forces had been engaged in China since the early 1930s. Then in 1941 their theatre of operations was extended. The early campaigns seized US and European holdings throughout East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Western and Southern Pacific. It was a vast area that contained significant resources, and in military terms the campaign was a resounding success, yet it might be noted that in all cases the Japanese were displacing the occupying garrisons of state-empire regimes. There were only small numbers of US and European regular forces, and local peoples were not in the main involved in organized military units. The Japanese campaigns secured the following:

- the collapse and occupation of British Malaya;
- the collapse and occupation of the American Philippines;
- the collapse and occupation of the Dutch East Indies;
- the occupation of Vichy-oriented French Indo-China.

(iv) Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere alliances/politics

The co-prosperity sphere was an alliance constructed during the war years and it revealed the Japanese elite's view of the nature of global system and the possible role within it of Japan. It was a counterimage to familiar ideas of the future of East Asia that were built around the role of established foreign state-empires. Arguably, the enterprise was simply

legitimating machinery for the Japanese state-empire in Northeast Asia plus accretions secured during the early phase of Pacific War. Nonetheless, the idea was pursued in practice. The alliance offered an organic and technocratic view of the national development of members within a sphere dominated by Japan. Membership included most of the territory controlled by Japan. The key players met in Tokyo in 1943. The organization did not survive the defeat of Japan. Nonetheless, the idea of 'Asia for Asians' has endured and comes around the block from time to time in various guises, recently cast in terms of trade and development.

(v) Later military campaigns

After the start of the Pacific War, the Japanese military continued with extensive operations in China and, on the one hand, it met little effective resistance, whilst, on the other, it was unable to effectively secure their control. These military operations involved the bulk of the Japanese forces. However, opening up new fronts in Southeast Asia and the Pacific against the Europeans and Americans created a new military dynamic. The Europeans became marginal players[58] whilst the USA took centre stage. From mid-1942, US forces, having first checked the Japanese advance,[59] counterattacked along two strategic lines, one in the south towards the Philippines and the other in the north towards the Japanese home islands. The former was of limited utility whereas the latter was crucial. It was organized around the US Navy and had two aspects: first, submarine warfare plus aircraft destroyed the bulk of the Japanese merchant marine and navy; and, second, island-hopping supported by aircraft carriers secured bases for long-range bombing aircraft plus bases for a direct invasion of the home islands.[60]

(vi) Racing the enemy and ending the war

The familiar tale runs as follows. By 1945 the Japanese were militarily defeated, and in August they surrendered unconditionally and the country was occupied by the USA, which then dismantled the Japanese state-empire and initiated a sweeping programme of domestic reforms that in turn laid the groundwork for its subsequently famous post-war recovery.

However, this familiar tale has been challenged. One claim that is central to the standard story is that the use of two atomic bombs persuaded the Japanese to surrender and therefore saved many lives. This is a substantive claim coupled to a species of moral justification. On the substance, a revised tale points to US anxieties about the possible role of

the USSR in post-war Japan and the wider region (the nascent Cold War), a desire amongst military technocrats and industrialists to see if their arduously and expensively created bomb actually worked (bureaucratic inertia) and war-weariness amongst the US public (public pressure). On the moral justification – saving lives, on the face of it a species of utilitarianism – it is clear that the strategic bombing of cities (practised by all sides) targeted civilians and was thus both contrary to international law and in any case morally indefensible.[61] More generally, given that the Japanese state-empire centred on a group of islands and given that by 1945 they had neither merchant marine nor navy, nor air force, their defeat was already accomplished – all that the Americans had to do was wait.[62]

(vii) Attempting the recovery of state-empire holdings

European state-empire elites sought to recover their holdings in East Asia: the British reoccupied Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong; the British assisted the Dutch in their reoccupation of the Dutch East Indies; the British also assisted the return of French forces to Indo-China; and the Americans had already returned to the Philippines. The result was further rounds of confusion: the years of warfare had resulted not merely in loss and damage but also in changes in the thinking of local people and local elites. There were active nationalist parties in all of these territories. Clearly, disabling them and returning to the status quo ante would be a significant undertaking. Nonetheless, this is precisely what the returning state-empire powers sought to do, with predictable results: violent resistance in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Indo-China.

However, the Europeans were unable to sustain their attempts at recovering their former state-empire territories. The failures took rather different forms: the British were able to manage their withdrawal – that is, they successfully suppressed radical nationalists and were able to oversee the installation of replacements to their taste; the Americans were also able to secure successors to their taste and to suppress local opposition; but the Dutch failed in their attempts to deploy violence and they were obliged to withdraw; and the French also failed after a lengthy war, and they too were obliged to withdraw.

In contrast, the Japanese state-empire holdings were simply dissolved: Manchuria was captured by the Soviet Union and control was passed to the CCP, and in time the Japanese forces and civilians were repatriated. Taiwan was transferred to the Nationalist Chinese and at the end of the civil war it became a military dictatorship; Korea was divided, suffered a

catastrophic war (partly an elite-sponsored civil war and partly a proxy Cold War), and North Korea became a one-party socialist state whilst South Korea became a military dictatorship allied to the USA. Japan's various Pacific island holdings passed to the USA.

In all of these cases, replacement elites sought to control territory, created state machineries, invented nations and pursued, one way or another, national development.

(viii) Moves towards the Cold War and the US bloc

The wartime grand alliance of Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union dissolved very quickly. The British and US elites were committed anti-communists; the stance dated from the time of the 1917 revolution when hostility had been the immediate and thereafter sustained response.[63] The wartime alliance was an interregnum. And, contrary to standard Western tales, the key movers in creating the Cold War were the Americans. In East Asia they began by racing the enemy to end the war against Japan, they supported the Nationalists with money and logistics in their restarted civil war, reacting badly to the victory of the CCP, having installed an anti-communist dictator in South Korea they failed to manage his provocations, and when the North invaded they presented the Korean War as a paradigm case of communist aggression and US defensive engagement. The region was divided into blocs: the one nominally liberal democratic, the other a variant state-socialist.

The US bloc became the larger and it became the more prosperous. The Americans were generous and offered aid transfers, technology transfers and access to their home consumer marketplace, but for some the costs of bloc membership were very high as millions were killed in the Korean War, further millions killed during the Vietnam War, whilst dictatorships or military regimes took hold in other places: Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

Later phases: Independence, bloc time and rising success

By the end of the years of warfare, the state-empire systems were unsustainable. European core units were exhausted, the Japanese defeated and the USA concerned with the project of creating a liberal trading area plus hostility towards communism. The following decades were shaped by the structural dynamics of political reconfiguration: decolonization, independence and the pursuit of national development, plus Cold War bloc-competition. And – to the surprise of experts – the countries of the region, both state socialist and nominally liberal-democratic, experienced rapid development: a Japanese miracle was followed by the

efforts of the Four Tigers, in turn followed by the Little Tigers of ASEAN; in China the CCP successfully attended to the ravages of quasi-colonization, civil war and invasion; and by the 1980s, commentators were writing about miracle economies and the rise of a new regional power configuration.

Decolonization was relatively quickly achieved. In some parts of the region, foreign powers had been present for centuries; in other parts, from invasions made only in the nineteenth century. In all cases these foreign holdings were quickly dissolved, not peacefully and not without struggles. In China the civil war ended in 1949 and with it all of the foreign concessions and the like. In the non-communist areas of the region, local replacement elites accommodated themselves to the requirements of the USA.[64]

The reactions of the USA towards communist regimes were hostile and through the late 1940s the apparatus of Cold War was put in place in Europe and in East Asia. US policy unpacked as support for reactionary political groups throughout the area and no distinction was made between post-colonial nationalists and communists, so reformist regimes were viewed with suspicion and an accusation of communism was an available pretext for interference or intervention.

It was within this immediate environment – domestic anxieties and regional tensions – that replacement elites sought to construct political projects. Whilst external circumstances offered models – that is, either state-socialism or effective nation-statehood[65] – the concerns of replacement elites were first with sustaining their power, and thereafter political projects were shaped by the play of local forces, in brief, mostly, one way or another, the pursuit of national development. The region prospered. The trajectories of state-socialist and nominal liberal market countries unfolded in different ways but measured against standard international criteria, exemplified by the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme, the region recorded great success.

General crisis: An overview of war

Yet that success was attained in the wake of considerable violence and at some cost: numerous wars, great destruction, large numbers of casualties and their consequent enduring legacies. These include the social business of collective memories, where recollection is distributed widely amongst the population, and the more political business of national pasts, where the state is involved in the selection and dissemination of ideas in a subtle exchange with popular memories, and where the

resultant sets of statements – provisionally agreed records of events – both contribute to the creation of national identities and feed into current regional relationships, which remain clouded by issues regarded by some as unfinished business.

Wars in East Asia – all phases:

1911–14	Chinese Revolution
1914–16	Yuan Shikai Interval
1916–26	Warlord Era
1918–41	First-phase anti-colonial movements
1926–8	Northern Expedition
1927–37	First Chinese Civil War
1931–4	Jiangxi Soviet
1931–2	Japanese invasion of Manchuria
1932–7	Japanese expansion in Northern China
1937–45	Sino-Japanese War
1941–5	Pacific War
1945–50	Indonesian Revolution
1946–51	Huk Rebellion
1946–9	Second Chinese Civil War
1946–54	First Indo-China War
1948–60	Malayan Emergency
1950–3	Korean War
1965–8	Indonesian Coup
1954–93	Cambodian wars
1954–75	Laos conflicts
1954–75	Second Indo-China War
1978–91	Third Indo-China War.

The casualties:[66]

Warlords and civil war 1916–37	4,000,000
Chinese civil war 1945–9	2,500,000
Sino-Japanese and Pacific War	12,600,000
Southeast Asia Occupations	5,000,000
Korean War 1950–3	2,800,000
First Indo-China War 1945–54	600,000
Second Indo-China War 1960–75	2,700,000
Indonesian Regime Change 1965	500,000
Third Indo-China War 1978–91	1,500,000
Total	31,200,000

The record is horrific. The only other place to suffer in a similar way was Europe: thus both metropolitan and peripheral areas within the state-empire system suffered as that system disintegrated via general crisis.

Violence and the route to the modern world

The state-empire system collapsed in a general crisis, which enveloped both regions and ran for most of the twentieth century. First, in Europe the general crisis was triggered by state-empire competition within its core territories, in particular, interstate warfare. Second, in East Asia, the general crisis was triggered by anti-status quo radicals (in particular, those looking to learn the lessons of the modern world, thus the Chinese revolution and the multiplicity of independence movements). The crisis can be given particular dates for particular regions. The experience of crisis was not uniform – different peoples in different places had different experiences and today remember them differently.[67]

The crisis was characterized by pervasive breakdown – that is, economic, social, political and cultural unclarity in regard to the future, thereafter available in a multiplicity of local mixes. And it was marked by periods of acute crisis in the guise of multiple violent conflicts, including civil conflicts, state-sponsored violence and interstate warfare. The period of acute crisis between 1931 and 1945 undermined the state-empire system. There were multiple conflicts in the metropolitan core countries and there were also problems in the peripheral territories. There were many anti-status-quo movements. They were active throughout the territories of the state-empires. However, most were successfully contained. The pattern shifted as war engulfed the region. There had long been interempire competition for influence within China but in the 1930s the Americans and Japanese clashed over this issue: the Pacific War was the result and, as established relations degenerated into interstate warfare, the extant system in the region collapsed. There was extensive violence. The various conflicts entailed very high casualties, extensive social dislocation, economic loss and political turmoil. The crisis destroyed extant economic, social, political and cultural patterns. And in this situation, established hitherto core elites had to respond: in Europe they appealed to an idea of long-established nation-states and sought unification around the ideal of a united Europe; and in East Asia, as the state-empire systems dissolved away, aspiring replacement elites sought political power in novel or reconstituted states and then sought differentiation in state-making, nation-building and the

pursuit of development. In this way, replacement elites in cores and peripheries ushered in the currently familiar pattern of nation-states.

It is a history littered with violence and such violence was endemic (the recourse to violence was routine), intrinsic to the system (at the time, domestic and international law recognized the use of violence), and sadly extensive and appalling (the lists of the dead).

6
State-Empire Dissolution

The downstream consequences of the collapse of state-empire systems have been much discussed. The familiar metropolitan view is cast in terms of the continuity of the core nation-state along with the more or less voluntary acquiescence of core elites in the wishes of peripheral nationalist groupings, which, in turn, in general, cast matters in terms of the long overdue achievement of independence, the precondition of the pursuit of development. These tales coincide in the view that in the main, state-empire systems faded peacefully and were succeeded by a largely stable system of sovereign states. In place of this familiar tale, an alternative position can be advanced. The state-empire systems were the outcome of the intermingled historical development trajectories of the communities involved, and the relationships between these participating communities were radically unequal. The clearest expression of this situation was the routine recourse to violence by the core powers and the equally familiar resistance of those who were subject to colonial rule. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the dissolution of state-empire systems was fraught, unpredictable and routinely violent. Thereafter, for the hitherto core areas, the collapse produced an experience of radical political down-sizing, thus post-crisis nation-states were in many respects novel creations; and for the hitherto peripheral areas, as events unfolded, as the territories of empire dissolved, it became clear that the route to the future was via the seizure of territory, the prerequisite of the pursuit of the novel experience of statehood, in turn requiring nation-building and thereafter the pursuit of national development.

The general crisis of the state-empire system found expression in numerous interlinked conflicts, both in the metropolitan heartlands of Europe and in the peripheral territories of East Asia. These wars had a catastrophic impact upon those populations that were caught up in the violence: the numbers of dead, injured displaced or otherwise hurt ran

into the tens of millions. The wars also signalled the definitive end of the state-empire system. By 1945 the idea of a state-empire system was untenable as the elites of hitherto core territories could not command the economic, the military, the diplomatic or the politico-psychological power necessary to re-establish these systems in their pre-war form. The hitherto peripheral territories had produced locally based elites that were committed to the pursuit of statehood, and they were not inclined to welcome the return of overseas powers. Indeed, where necessary, and it often was, they offered violent resistance. As the state-empire systems had rested, in particular, upon the confidence of the metropolitan core authorities in regard to the status that their culture and the asymmetries of power lodged in the structures of a globe-spanning industrial capitalist system, the episode of violent general crisis undermined both of these supports, and the system's inherent fragility was made clear to all of the players. It was unsustainable, and over the course of a few years it dissolved away.

The collapse of the state-empires: Downstream consequences

All of those agents involved, both metropolitan and peripheral, were confronted with the task of reading and reacting to the structural changes enfolding their polities. These were changes which they had in part willed, thus the drive for independence in the peripheries; changes which they had not looked for, thus the waves of violence overwhelming otherwise settled communities throughout core and periphery; changes which they had feared and which they resisted, thus core foot-dragging or settler refusals; and changes which they had sought, thus the optimism of reformers in core and periphery. The process of reading and reacting to enfolding change ran on over a lengthy period and, as the state-empire territories were wound down, it was far from clear how they would be replaced or what form the replacements would take. Structural patterns of power along with related patterns of understanding pointed towards statehood and the pursuit of economic growth, and any return to the status quo ante of country powers or pre-modern empires was ruled out automatically, but quite how states would be constructed and function was unclear.

The familiar mainstream argument is confident on these points: first, the core territories returned to their long-established status as nation-states, whilst second, in the former peripheries, the newly established or reconstituted nation-states got on with the business of development.

But these stories obscure as much as they illuminate. The dissolution of state-empire systems was anything but neat and tidy; it was confused, it involved numerous players with numerous understandings and numerous goals, and, as noted earlier, the process was often violent with numerous wars of colonial withdrawal. The whole episode was subject at the time and since to a continuous process of interpretation and reinterpretation, and, as can be seen when the detail is unpacked, it often involved elaborate intellectual invention. But a better tale can be presented, one that notes the severity of the dilemmas faced by the elites of retreating state-empires, whilst also uncovering the difficulties that aspirant replacement elites in the former peripheries faced.

First, in respect of the hitherto core elements of the state-empire systems, as these systems dissolved away, the elites had to reimagine their polities in order to lodge them in the extant global system and identify a route to the future. The obvious strategy was to reach back to pre-empire days and insist on core continuity. Thus it was asserted that the nation-state had existed prior to the empire and that as the period of empire was now ended, amidst various claims to success or conversely recriminations, or rather more creatively to the non-importance of empire, a matter for the British of absentmindedness, the nation-state could once again be made central to the political life of the community in question. Amongst European elites there was one significant concession to the facts – that is, to the metropolitan experience of violence during the general crisis that collapsed these empire systems, the sequence of European wars running from 1914 through to 1945, and it took the form of the resolute, if always circumstance inflected, pursuit of unification, centrally expressed in the political-cultural project of the European Union with its slogan 'ever closer union'.

Then, second, in respect of the hitherto peripheral elements of the state-empire systems, aspirant replacement elites in the confusion of state-empire dissolution took their chance to lodge claims to territory, thereby carving out spaces from the large areas held by the state-empires, and then moving to create states, construct nations and, thereafter, as the basis for their claims to power was an implicit deal with relevant populations, support in exchange for better lives, the energetic pursuit of national development. These projects were cast in nationalist rhetorical terms: thus the nation had recovered, or had emerged, or stood up, some formulation that nodded to pre-empire pasts, which were usually pre-modern and with political systems other than states and patterns of belonging other than national, whilst turning resolutely towards the future. In Southeast and East Asia as these processes

unfolded, coloured as they were by the residual demands of departing, defeated, former core powers, plus the insistent anxieties of the USA expressed in its Cold War in East Asia (thus money, technology transfers, market opening, alliances, assorted covert subversions and two major wars), replacement elites faced the central task of securing their claims to statehood, and this found expression in a prickly concern for sovereignty and non-interference, for, in brief, differentiation.[1]

Familiar metropolitan view: Core continuity

East Asian territories formed important elements of the nineteenth-century state-empires created by Europeans, Americans and Japanese. In the pre-modern era, East Asia had been the core of the global economy and so its attraction as a trading partner was clear, and this trading relationship played a significant role in the development of Europe.[2] The subsequent shift to the modern world in Europe – that is, the rise and institutionalization of a science-based economic form of life – greatly magnified the power of Europe compared with all other polities and the accumulation of overseas territories began. The state-empire systems were assembled and the core elements distinguished themselves from newly peripheral elements in various ways, and one aspect of this was the treatment of the peripheries as colonies – acquired, separate, directed from the core, and in time read as disposable.

In this sense, East Asia was host to a number of colonial empires:

- the British – Malaya, the Straits Settlements, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei;
- the French – Annam, Cochinchina, Tonkin, Laos, Cambodia;
- the Dutch – the Dutch East Indies;
- the Portuguese – West Papua, East Timor;
- the American – the Philippines;
- the Japanese – Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin plus the wider 1931–45 sphere.

The manner in which these geographically sprawling[3] multi-ethnic interlinked colonial territories were acquired varied, both trade and violence were routinely involved, and the manner in which these territories were dissolved also varied. But there was a macro-pattern as fracture lines were built into the systems, and these presented elites with assorted problems with which they had to deal. This, in the main, they accomplished successfully – that is, colonial territorial holdings were sustained, until, that is, the system of state-empires was rendered untenable by the

collapse into general crisis. The overall pattern is common to the whole of the region, with local conflicts, regional conflicts and global conflicts, but the detail is varied – a matter of the precise mix of overlapping wars. The upshot of this violent crisis was the wholesale reordering of the region and the creation of a number of new polities, as newly empowered elites seized territory, created states, built nations and pursued national development. All of this left the now shrunken core powers with the task of reading and reacting to their new and unwished for circumstances. The various groups involved responded in quite different ways: the European powers had to deal with loss, so too the wartime Japanese, but the situation for the USA was somewhat different.

(i) The European players

In the case of the British, the response to the failure of state-empire involved two broad strategies: first, to deny that the empire holdings had ever been that significant, hence the conceit that the empire was a collection of territorial holdings secured in a fit of absentmindedness, and that consequently their loss was of no real significance, or indeed with empire dissolution as an essentially amicable end to duties of care discharged; and, second, to claim for the residual core territory of the now defunct state-empire a spurious longevity as a discrete sovereign nation-state, a unit whose discrete origins reached back into the mists of time, hence the image of a Britain with a long history, reaching back to ancient Britons living before the Roman invasion, where, again, the loss of empire was of no great moment as these now lost territories were never part of the essential core of the nation. This dual strategy was an elite consolation. It obscured an unpalatable truth, thus, in practice, the elite of the now shrunken territorial unit became in significant measure a dependent elite looking to a superior power located in Washington, a situation made unequivocally clear in 1956 at Suez. Obedience to this relationship has endured down to the present day,[4] whilst the elite have consoled themselves in terms of a claim to a special relationship, coupled to the tale of the continuing nation securing an heroic victory in a virtuous war and offering a positive example to others.

In the case of the French, the shift to a post-state-empire settlement was more awkward as the nationalism of General De Gaulle served to bind up the collective political-moral wounds of the polity following the debacles of the Second World War;[5] it crystallized around the idea of French greatness, in part sustained during the occupation of metropolitan France by the continued possession of colonial territories in East Asia (until finally extinguished by Japan late in the Pacific War) and North

and West Africa.[6] Greatness was an equivalent investment in empire to that of the British, but the post-war expression of such sentiments in the context of the issue of colonial territories was deeply problematical. In East Asia, the French elite sought to recover their colonial possessions in Indo-China and, after a lengthy futile war, they failed, the loss was unequivocal and the business was dismissed from consideration.[7] However, the response to the loss of these territories was perhaps muted, as there were other colonial problems much closer to home – that is, Algeria, and a war that spilled over into the territory of metropolitan France. The Algerian war was a catastrophe until it was finally ended by De Gaulle. Thereafter the elite looked to reconstruct French greatness, reaching back beyond serial military defeats to the years prior to 1871 and engineering Franco-German rapprochement in a decisive turn to Europe. The episode of empire was put to the side.[8]

And, then, the Dutch, holders of the largest territorial holding, the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia: their empire had been a symbol of 'Dutch commercial and seafaring glory',[9] and in 1945 it was a valuable economic possession, but the Dutch were unable to recover control. After a period of intermittent low-level warfare, which involved a confusing number of participants, including British, Japanese, Dutch Indonesian nationalists, the PKI, Islamists and numerous local groups,[10] and which cost the lives of several thousand Dutch and many more thousands of local people, the elite bowed to the inevitable and Indonesia was recognized. Long-established settlers returned to the Netherlands bitter, some 300,000,[11] and Judt notes: 'Many ex-colonials and their friends pressed what became known as the "Myth of Good Rule", blaming the Left for the Dutch failure to reassert colonial authority following the interregnum of Japanese occupation'.[12] On the other hand, the soldiers who had been involved in the fighting were glad to be out of an unwinnable conflict. Judt argues that the episode was consigned 'to a national memory hole',[13] but there has been debate looking at whether or not to treat the issue, how to deal with the violence of the period of withdrawal and at what these events say about Dutch self-images as tolerant and moral. But the debates do not seem to have settled matters.[14] For mainstream politics, the turn to Europe was the consolation.[15]

Thereafter, there was one other European country, which had been present in East Asia: Portugal. As with other countries, the historical trajectory of the Portuguese was quite particular. Early modern traders, early modern empire-builders, but later in the modern world they were comparatively less significant. In the early twentieth century their

overseas holdings had dwindled: territories in East and West Africa, fragments of empire in India (Goa), Southeast Asia (East Timor) and East Asia (Macau). In the late1920s the polity embraced fascism and this endured until 1974, when the domestic costs of colonial wars in Africa provoked revolution. The colonial holdings were quickly dissolved but there were some overseas residues, the main one being Macau, which was returned to China in 1999. In general, after the 1974 revolution, the Portuguese polity turned towards Europe.

(ii) Other players

The Americans' story is somewhat different in two obvious aspects. First, US nationalism (the claim to exceptional status) denied that it was or could be an empire or colonial power. Second, the USA emerged from the interlinked Pacific War and Second World War as a major global power and a model for many other countries. Its colonial territory, the Philippines, had secured its independence against the long-standing colonial power of Spain, but the USA, in pursuit of territorial holdings to buttress its status, invaded and seized the islands, announcing that it would support independence. It worked with local elites and grafted onto the political economy that it had inherited a US-style competitive electoral system. The Pacific War saw the islands occupied by Japan. The elites collaborated, some of the masses resisted, but the returning USA worked with the elites, helped to suppress subaltern revolts aimed at social change and the polity continued upon its way. As for the USA, the myth of no colonial territories continued but the country was now a major global power. One aspect of its domestic politics was a resolute anti-communism, and as the CCP secured power in China, the Cold War in East Asia began. The USA assembled a bloc of allies turned toward the country in respect of formal international politics (anti-communist), linked to them through aid and trade, supported by the USA militarily and oriented towards the USA in the public sphere (also an ambiguous element – various groups in the population expressing various sorts of support or hostility). In the context of the Cold War, US nationalism unpacked in terms of the claim to be at the core of what came to be routinely called the free world.

Finally there is Japan, which had its accumulated modern era overseas colonial possessions stripped away.[16] The country was occupied by the USA and its pre-war economy, society and polity were significantly recast by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) authorities, and later, with the establishment of the Cold War, Japan was recast by the USA as its key ally in Northeast Asia. The Japanese elite were

backed by the USA, domestic reforms were curtailed and the country embraced economic nationalism – the past and future were debated. The significant residual nationalist right wing looked back to the days of empire, the left called for the acknowledgement of wartime errors and the mainstream attended to the business of ordinary life.

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For the key European powers – the Dutch, the British and the French – the loss of colonial territories in East Asia were subsumed within the wider context of the general dissolution of state-empire holdings. And notwithstanding that all three sometime state-empire core elites re-emphasized putatively long-established nation-states and thus by implication a clear discrete sovereignty, the British sought consolation in alliance subordination to the USA, whilst the French and Dutch turned to the collective project of Europe. In all of these cases, empire was read out of the experience of newly reimagined nation-states: cores were read as long-standing, the peripheries as somewhat transient acquisitions and thus dispensable. For the British elite, the subordination to Washington has continued, having been sharply underscored during the Suez debacle, and it has served as the key to a claim to status within the international system. For the Dutch and the French elites, the turn towards Europe has proved down the years to be a resounding success as from modest beginnings the systems of cooperation has developed into the European Union, now a recognized, if imperfect, global power.

Familiar peripheral view: Overdue achievement of independence

There is a peripheral counterpart to the familiar metropolitan view of post-empire events. Thus, where the core elites confronted the task of managing territorial down-sizing and did so by embracing a curious reversion to putatively long-established nation-states, newly empowered peripheral elites faced quite different tasks. Out of the great sweep of colonial territories,[17] new elites had to lay claim to a portion of territory, establish an effective state (that is, secure control, externally and internally), legitimate their control (hence nation-building) and thereafter pursue national development (the basic deal between elite and mass: support us and we will make your lives better). So newly empowered elites claimed coherence for their nascent polities, cast this in ethnic/cultural and national terms, and focused their publics on the future-oriented tasks of development whilst paying close attention to the crucial objective of differentiation from other elites seeking to control other parts of the disintegrating state-empire territory. The process

was summarily presented by the elites as the overdue achievement of merited independence. The tale is fine so far as it goes but this way of grasping the past obscures two issues: first, the business of the shift to the modern world; and, second, the utter contingency and striking novelty of the tasks of state-making, nation-building and national development.

So, first, the interlinked nature of the colonial sphere was dismissed – membership of an empire sphere was disregarded or criticized – nationalist themes spoke of repression and exploitation, both true, but they neglected the wider context of the shift to the modern world (with its learning and development). So the nationalist memory is stylized, just as the core elite's is stylized.[18] Casting these complex matters in terms of the overdue achievement of independence misses out far too much. The interchanges of cores and peripheries in the state-empires was richer than simple exploitation (although that was the key for core commercial/military groups): the characterization misses out the learning and the development – that is, the transmission/adoption of the cultural resources of modernity, centrally, the intellectual demands of the natural sciences and their impacts on social life and the arts; and it misses out the extensive development programmes run by core groups, again, oriented towards commercial/military exploitation but securing much more than this, thus drawing the peripheral peoples into the modern world of mass education, medicine and popular culture, along with novel forms of political engagement (a necessary condition of nationalist movements themselves).

Then, second, the dissolution of empire was not neat and tidy, even though replacement elites tell a straightforward story where their coming into power was a species of inheritance, legitimated by culture, ethnicity or struggle against departing powers. Elided in this tale is the complex politics of state-empire retreat. There were many agents and these agents had agendas. Departing powers interacted with local forces in thoroughly tangled ways as they sought to ensure incoming elites who were favourable to their continuing interests, commercial and military. With a few exceptions, departing powers were active players: they asserted where they could their commercial/military interests, and in the context of the Cold War, replacement elites were invited to embrace either the goal of liberal markets or state socialism. And various players made various declarations. But the detail was untidy, contingent, opportunistic: multiple groups typically sought to take power and they had different agendas, but the key aim for all aspirant replacement elites was power over a designated territory and all of the rest was secondary.

The processes of state-empire dissolution issued in the creation of new polities – replacement elites were assembled and the subsequent record shows that these elites pursued various projects, although few ran clearly with either liberal markets or state socialism. Indeed, in East Asia, their post-state-empire records have come to be read in terms of the novel idea of 'developmental states'.

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The overdue achievement of merited independence is the standard nationalist story of the political changes that attended the dissolution of state-empire systems in peripheral areas. This is unsurprising. As state-empire territories dissolved away, replacement elites had to secure their claims: a state had to be made, as no other political form would have been acceptable, and that being so, a nation was required. So elites engaged in nation-building, and histories were prepared which invoked pre-colonial formations and celebrated nascent nationalism during the anticolonial era, and these were easily summed as 'overdue independence for the nation'. But a better tale embraces the detail: the process was not simple; it was highly contested and the outcomes contingent.

An alternative view: Core down-sizing and peripheral novelty

In place of the discourses of nation-state continuity or the overdue establishment of merited independence, it is better to argue that the state-empire systems dissolved during a period of crisis, leaving various elites with the task of reading and reacting to dramatic system changes. The elites in the metropolitan cores inherited the old heartlands of state-empire systems and promptly reimagined them as always existing nation-states with the former peripheries dismissed as transient and of little lasting account, thus the disaster of collapse was read out of history in favour of the consolations of a putative national longevity, plus assorted new external links, either to the USA or Europe. At the same time the elites in formerly peripheral spheres laid claim to patches of territory and declared themselves committed to the future, and whilst claims to pre-existing nation-states were implausible, appeals could be made to ethnicity/culture, or cast in national terms. The elites proceeded to construct novel states, invent nations and pursue development in a forward orientation, which though necessary also served to read out of their experience the episode of colonial days, the very period which had seen their shift to the modern world, a world whose institutions and

ideas (states, nations and development) they proceeded to affirm, and to obscure the difficulties of post-colonial projects.

As the state-empire systems dissolved away, these events had to be imaginatively grasped in order to inform new lines of politics and policy (making new 'projects'), thus the hitherto core units fell back on reimagined pre-empire states and the hitherto peripheral territories made new states (the contrast is between 'shrinking' and 'coalescing'). Elites and masses read and reacted to changing circumstances and fashioned novel national pasts: sets of statements explaining how their polity had emerged, where it was now and how it could most appropriately move into the future. These national pasts were fashioned quickly and helped to shape the subsequent development of Europe and East Asia: post-crisis development trajectories were shaped by memories of conflict, memories of loss and memories of earlier forms of political life, and then by more self-consciously affirmed models; together, mixtures of retrospective and prospective interpretation. In all of this, European and East Asian polities responded differently: in Europe, regret at warfare and a concern for unification within the old core territories, and in East Asia, catastrophic wars had opened up the possibility for political differentiation as local elites worked to build states, create nations and pursue development. In each region, individual national pasts were formulated: characterizing individual polities and neighbouring states, and offering an idea of movement into the future.

Hitherto core regions: Down-size to states with national pasts rewritten

The state-empire systems built by predominantly European polities embraced large areas and multiple ethnic populations, and they operated as units. They were criss-crossed by trading routes, moving goods, money and people along these routes, intermingling local cultures and creating thereby an empire level of action and interaction.[19] When the state-empire systems dissolved away, metropolitan elites in the core areas had perforce to rethink their position within the now dramatically reconfiguring global system and the institutional mechanism that emerged was the nation-state. These were quickly reimagined as the legatees of long-established states and they were reimagined as home to long-established nations. The corollary was clear, the peripheral territories were not vital, they were marginal and they were disposable. It is an elaborate process of reimagining and, whilst the packages created were different, all of the key elites showed some mix of active remembering and forgetting.[20]

In Britain, the elite responded with a mixture of denial and confection: offering the shrunken core of the state-empire as a long-established nation-state, victorious in a virtuous war and a model for others. The polity was now presented as part of the English-speaking peoples;[21] and a bridge between the USA, Europe and the Commonwealth. All of this disguised the process of shrinkage and the loss of empire consequent upon war was thus put to one side. Yet by the early years of the twenty-first century, Britain was semidetached from Europe, increasingly irrelevant to the USA and domestically, it seemed, content with welfare-buttressed consumerism.

Then in France the elite had to manage both the domestic legacies of wartime occupation and collaboration whilst giving practical effect to a concern for the status of a continuing major global role. In general, the elite faced a similar process of dwindling but with a crucial difference: the French elite turned quite early on to the idea of Europe. It now offers them a place in the world as a key player in the European Union. The past is rewritten: France as legatee of the revolution; France as home of culture; France as independent from Washington (unlike the British); hence a claim to centrality within European history, culture and politics. The early post-war aspiration to keep colonial territories – leading to two catastrophic wars – is set to one side, an error, now of less than central concern.

And in the Netherlands, the expulsion from the Dutch East Indies was experienced as a similar dwindling, perhaps more abrupt than others. The residual core unit was relatively small, there were problems in assimilating the numbers of returnees and there seems to have been no great wish to debate all of these matters in the public sphere.[22] The turn to Europe was made quickly and more emphatically than in similar sometime colonial powers; again, this gives the Dutch a place in the world, empire is forgotten.

(i) European drive for unification: Memories of war

The Second World War fatally undermined the system of state-empires. In East Asia, large parts had simply been militarily over-run: Hong Kong, Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, parts of Burma. Plus the jewel in the British Empire crown – India – was threatened and its defence involved not merely armies but political promises of post-war independence. During the period of radical upheaval, local agents sought ways to secure independence. They sought support from local people, their key resource, and made promises of better lives. Metropolitan elites resisted, dragging their heels or using armies: thus

the British reoccupied Burma and Malaya, helped both the Dutch and French to return to their colonies, and were also quick to send warships and troops to Hong Kong. These aspirations to re-establish colonial holdings were not welcomed by aspirant replacement elites, and nor prior to the Cold War were they supported by the USA. The day of state-empire systems was over and inevitable withdrawal dragged on for several years, and the last major withdrawals were in the 1970s as Portugal withdrew from its colonies in Africa; thereafter, only fragments remained.[23]

The Cold War saw the division of Europe. The stopping points of armies in the last phase of the Second World War were fixed in place as the two great powers – the USA and the USSR – organized their territories in the form of blocs, where military division was supplemented by diplomatic, economic and ideological division. The mainstream Western tale was of the containment of an expansionist and maybe militarily adventurist USSR, and this allowed the Western European elites to reconcile themselves and their populations to a situation of deep subordination to the USA. In the East, similar tales were told, although perhaps with less success as the Soviets had much less money to throw around and the East had borne by far the greater burden of war in terms of casualties and material destruction. If these were the negative consequences, the positive, for Western Europeans, was that the post-war bloc system offered them a political space within which they could begin to talk about unification. Prior to the Second World War, this had been mooted by various intellectuals, but the catastrophe of war and the resultant logic of occupation meant that the issue could be addressed in a practical fashion – thus the first moves towards the creation of the European Union, first in the West and then post-1989 drawing in formerly Eastern bloc countries.

The early movement towards a species of unification was not smooth. The economies of the founding countries were successful during the post-war long boom but problems accumulated along with the end of the Bretton Woods system, plus war-related oil shocks introduced inflation. This, plus other problems, such as labour militancy, overseas competition and so on, caused a change in policy, long-sought by some, and the neo-liberal era began. The objectives have been to wind back the role of the state, shrink welfare systems and give the corporate world space within which to act, both manufacturing and finance. In the event, rates of growth turned out to be weaker than the earlier period plus deregulated finance turned out to be a menace, fully realized in the 2008–10 crisis. These problems remain but there is no available route

back to the status quo ante; rather, a core Europe might be expected to solidify around the euro-currency zone. Problems notwithstanding, its economies are increasingly integrated, its diverse cultures intermingle and its people move around the place for jobs and leisure.

Tony Judt[24] has argued that Europeans perhaps underestimate the work that they have done, whereas the European Union has been noted in other parts of the world. The recovery had a number of elements: in Western Europe the creation of a liberal trading area, courtesy of the USA; and the provision of aid monies, again from the USA. The given factor of war damage to repair: the destruction in Europe was extreme, thus, when funded, there was work available for all and the years running up to the end of the system of fixed exchange rates were successful. The institutional counterpart was the creation step by step of what was to become the European Union, and the project has been pursued down the years, recently surviving the 2008/10 financial crisis, albeit not without local difficulties.[25] There was also a similar process of recovery in Eastern Europe,[26] but not identical because the region was much poorer before the Second World War and it suffered much more damage during the fighting. The design and implementation of the liberal trading sphere cut against state-socialist schemes and the Cold War confirmed their exclusion; nonetheless, recovery did proceed.[27] However, for Europe, it was not all plain sailing and there were problems: decolonization, the Cold War, economic shocks and dissenting voices amongst populations in both blocs; in the West, the radical voices of the 1960s, in the East, various civic forum movements.

The disaster of the general crisis robbed core elites of their state-empire systems and they actively forgot and remembered; national pasts were reworked and the elites looked at their record and opted to begin a process of unification. Slowly the European Union took shape, another contingent achievement.

Hitherto peripheral regions: Coalesce into states with national pasts created

In the peripheral territories the logics of situation were different. These territories had never been modern states, they had used a variety of political forms, plus the shift to the modern world had been accomplished in the context of state-empires. The legacies of these historical development trajectories fed into the response of elites to the dissolution of the state-empires: they sought territory, they sought populations; and they looked to create states, they had to invent nations and in

various ways they pursued national development. In brief, replacement elites emerged from the political-cultural melange of state-empire systems, took a restricted territory and remade it in the form of a state, and they sought legitimation in terms of an invented national past and the assiduous pursuit of national development.

(i) Replacing state-empire systems: Making states

The state-empires encompassed huge areas with large populations, complex economic interlinkages and extensive social networks for participating ethnic groups and equally complex political settlements fitting territories into the empire as a whole. It all worked. And it all failed over the period of general crisis. These systems faded as the state-empire system dissolved away, but organizing structures could not simply be discarded, replacements had to be found: first, the international system was organized in terms of states (the United Nations admitted states, not empires or regions or corporations or individuals); second, aspirant replacement elites aspired to that status, and other status positions, such as maintaining some sort of formal link with hitherto cores, were rejected; and third, social reformers, both individual and institutional, spoke in terms of states and nations and development.

In the latter years of the Second World War the allied powers along with numerous other nations met in San Francisco and later at Bretton Woods in order to agree an institutional framework for the post-war world. There were two lines of work. The first, political, saw the construction of the United Nations where membership took the form of nations-states and the body was organized not merely in terms of ideals but also in terms of available power, thus the Security Council and the veto powers of the permanent members. The United Nations embodied the ideal of nation-state membership of an organization that could regulate in some measure international political relations. Then, second, the counterpart to the United Nations was the set of institutions assembled at Bretton Woods – the World Bank, the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (later the World Trade Organization (WTO)). These institutions were oriented towards the construction and management of an international liberal market system and again ideals were mixed with pragmatism – for example, in the voting rights in the IMF, or the scope of GATT/WTO rules, or the behaviour of the World Bank. The two elements of the post-war settlement proved successful. The Western bloc and its allies developed economically and did so without conflicts amongst themselves. But the settlement was also limited. The structure was slanted towards liberal markets and liberal democracy and, as the post-war world unfolded, the Cold War disadvantaged state-socialist

systems within these two organizations. Later decolonization produced numerous new nation-states, which were able to work together under the label of the third world, creating thereby a further line of division within the two organizations.

In East Asia as state-empire systems dissolved, aspirant replacement elites looked to secure their status as leaders of nation-states, recognized players within an international system formally centred on the United Nations. As replacement elites secured domestic power, they typically sought to present their achievement as in some way inevitable and the domestic conflicts, which had attended the process of securing statehood, were brushed aside. New nation-states formed, no other political form was available (no sub-national units, no empires, no regions) and these new states endeavoured to plot their own route to the future via the Non-Aligned Movement, but this faded as the Cold War gathered strength and blocs formed. East Asia was divided into a state-socialist bloc, centred on China, and a nominally liberal market bloc, oriented towards the USA.

Anthony Reid[28] offers a typology of Asian nationalisms. First, ethnic nationalism, understood after the style of A.D. Smith, focusing on culture and language and place and myth (a conservative line, where the distinction between race and nation is not strong, or, put another way, the idea of race is used). Second, state nationalism, understood after the style of Ernest Gellner, and seeing state nationalism in Asia as a post-empire construct replacing not only state-empire offerings but also pre-empire identifications with king or dynasty or territory. Third, anti-imperial nationalism, crucial in turning empire territories into post-empire nations, and where the nation is constructed in opposition to colonial oppression. And, finally, state humiliation nationalism, which looks to reactions to foreign intervention, which reach back to pre-empire political examples and which responses are thereafter maintained as a source of state legitimacy. In such analyses previous foreign presence is entirely negative.

Reid[29] remarks that the pattern in Southeast Asia is very tangled, and five basic identity markers are mentioned: first, language – printing came late to the region and it served state nationalism by supporting an official language, and this continues; second, religion – indigenous religions were tolerant, imports such as Islam or Christianity less so, and religion has created enduring boundaries; third, sovereign space – empires stressed boundaries and these continue; then four/five – census work involved in categorizing and counting people was novel, plus names (that is, insisting upon clear family and personal names also novel and both served to encourage stable/fixed identities). All of these factors

fed into the process of creating post-empire national identities. The experience of colonial rule also inflected this process: in Burma, Vietnam and Siam the ethnic core of the territory was expanded (as colonial powers sought to order their acquisitions, declining to acknowledge the multiplicity of smaller groups); in Malaya, Cambodia and Laos, fragile monarchies were protected (as colonial powers sought local elites with whom to deal); and in the Philippines and Indonesia, diverse populations were moved by trade towards unities (as colonial powers concerned with trade offered a diversity of groups an idea of a common experience, a basis for claims to identity).

The dissolution of state-empires did not come as a particular surprise to observers. The detail of the process was governed by the circumstances of the particular case: the players, their ideas, interests and biases, plus the same set of factors for neighbours and more distant players in the metropolitan centres, or the core countries of the new Cold War blocs or the operatives in newly created and influential international organizations. Amongst these perceptions and the debates that they informed, social reformers had a particular line to contribute. They spoke in terms of states, nations and development, and there was a distinct official line informed by the post-war organizations of the United Nations and Bretton Woods apparatus. It looked to independence as oriented towards the creation of effective nation-states – that is, new nation-states should replicate the model of liberal democratic market-oriented polities found in Europe and in particular as exemplified by the USA. These ideas found expression in the social scientific and political ideological ideas of modernization theory, recently recycled as globalization along with claims to the ethico-political end of history. And whilst there is nothing wrong with the goal per se, save that it is only one goal amongst others (thus, obviously, state socialism, or as events have unfolded, the forms of life associated with the East Asian developmental state), the problem is that the goal was irresistibly imputed to replacement elites and this obscured the goals that they were actually pursuing, ideally national development – that is, the creation of states, economies and societies that served the interests of their citizens (not the same as joining in a Western centred system). But, again, such locally determined goals varied with the elites in question: in Southeast Asia, say, the early project of social-democratically inflected national development pursued by Lee Kuan Yew as against, say, the kleptocracy of Ferdinand Marcos.

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In this way the impulse to reorder the disintegrating state-empires found expression in the creation of states, but the route to statehood could be difficult and the resultant pattern of states often implausible. The state-empire system dissolved in a contingent fashion and it was only afterwards as newly installed replacement elites and newly down-sized core elites took power that the whole enterprise was reimagined as neat and tidy, and planned and inevitable, and it was only afterwards that the ad hoc collections of peoples were reimagined as nations. No surprise, then, that there was plenty of scope for trouble downstream.

(ii) East Asian drive for differentiation

The key to making a new state was carving out a distinct territory from the wider spaces of the former state-empire system, and carving out a territory was done in competition with other aspiring replacement elites (both domestic, so to say, working on the same patch of land, and neighbouring, those elites working the same theme in adjacent territories). Unification was not desired. Indeed, it was a problem because what was desired was differentiation, separating out discrete territories so that replacement elites could make states, invent nations and pursue variously national development.

Amitav Acharya[30] tackles the nature of Asian regionalism (drawing on material dealing with South, Southeast and East Asia). Locating the analysis in constructivist strands of international relations theory, Acharya looks to the ideas that informed the actions of elites in Asia after the end of the Second World War. Against the international relations theorists' habits of thinking in terms of the West and positioning other polities in relation to this presumed core, if local agents are acknowledged then the tale looks quite different. The present pattern of relationships in the region can be seen as the upshot of domestic politics (in local countries), regional politics (between local countries) and global politics (between local powers and large powers). The analysis explains why there is no Asian equivalent of NATO and why Asian regionalism adopts the form of 'soft regionalism' – that is, no formal apparatus. In brief, it is what local nationalist leaders wanted: crucially, sovereignty and non-interference. They were concerned both with the ongoing demands of former colonial powers and the novel demands of the Cold War bloc leaders. They did not seek links with former core powers or the new great powers, and they were nervous of formal organizations based in law that might seek to interfere in domestic matters.

The idea of non-intervention is old. It was developed downstream from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. It was picked up by Latin American states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, concerned with Spanish and later US interference. The idea was written into the post-Second World War institutional apparatus of the United Nations: nation-states joined the organization, which affirmed their sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. This was acceptable to Asian leaders. But then a little later, in the context of decolonization and Cold War, great power organizations were floated, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), but they failed. In contrast the Bandung Conference was influential. It fed into the Non-Aligned Movement, affirming sovereignty and non-interference and developing consultative processes of diplomacy – that is, talks, not formal organizations. In time this fed into the ASEAN Way: security cooperation is favoured, not organizations, so no Asian NATO; similarly, in the economic sphere, a developmental regionalism is favoured, so no Asian European Union. In all, Acharya, points out, this way of working has flowed out of the circumstances of Asian countries and the ideas with which they have worked. It is distinctive; it does not aspire to become a variant of the model of the West.

The global system reconfigures

The resultant patterns in Europe and in East Asia are contingent. They represent the outcome of multiple decisions made by elites in pursuit of their several projects. There is no system in the sense of a single integrated whole. There is what there is: a messy contingent pattern of many relationships. Recently fashionable talk about globalization is neo-liberal propaganda, and when the available messy relationships are aggregated the more plausible macro-scale pattern is one of regions.[31] In Europe this grass-roots process has been acknowledged in the machinery of the European Union where the dissolution of the state-empires has led to a commitment to unification. In East Asia, similar grass-roots processes have not produced the same phenomena, for here elites have been much more concerned about sovereignty and consequently they have been averse to supranational organizations, although in recent years there has been much talk of an East Asian region.

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After the State-Empires: Territories, States, Nations and Development

As the state-empire system dissolved, contending replacement elites sought to secure power and mobilize populations whilst departing colonial powers looked to retain a measure of influence in a region increasingly shaped by Cold War division. The overall process was fraught with difficulties but the direction of travel was clear, metropolitan powers had to relinquish power to local agents and these agents had to seize territory, construct states, build nations and pursue development. The process had its key dynamic in Northeast Asia where the USA forcibly dismantled the Japanese state-empire, reordered its own holdings in the Philippines and thereafter extended its influence during the Cold War into Indo-China, producing a distinctive grouping oriented towards the bloc leader. The process had a second crucial dynamic in China, whose revolution expelled foreign powers, settled the direction of the country as a state-socialist bloc and earned the enduring enmity of the USA. Amongst the sometime territories of the European state-empire systems, the process of dissolution unfolded in a rather different fashion. Initially there were attempts to recreate the state-empires, but these were rebuffed in a series of wars of colonial withdrawal in the Dutch East Indies, the French territories of Indo-China and in the British holdings in the Malay Peninsula. In the wake of these episodes a number of new states took shape, territories which in time ordered their concerns for sovereignty and development via the ASEAN. The overall process of state-empire dissolution was heavily contested, the trajectories subsequently followed by new states were diverse and the contemporary regional pattern was the contingent outcome of these intermingled trajectories. The region is now home to numerous prosperous countries but there is no overarching political framework as the elite focus on differentiation coupled to the divisive logic of Cold War has militated against the creation of such a framework. This has

meant that legacies from the past have not been adequately addressed and the result is a prosperous region shot through with unresolved tensions.

In 1945 the pre-war system of state-empires entered the final stages of collapse, and over the next few years East Asia was radically remade: where, pre-war, the European powers had been pre-eminent, now, in the early years of the post-war era, the region was divided between a cold war mobilized, extraordinarily powerful USA and an autarchic state-socialist bloc centred on China, and it was within this changed environment that a spread of local elites took their chance, laid claim to territory, built states, invented nations and one way or another pursued national development. The dissolution of the various elements of the system of state-empires took diverse forms. Most centrally, the USA forcibly dismantled the Japanese state-empire and its occupation forces reconstructed Japan, whilst sometime colonial holdings became independent states: North and South Korea and Taiwan. The USA also reworked its own colony in the Philippines, intervened extensively in formerly French holdings in Indo-China, became influential in Thailand and operated covertly in parts of Southeast Asia. A distinctive US-oriented bloc emerged. And, running in parallel, China, which had been the pre-empire core of the East Asian region, secured independence from foreign quasi-colonial occupation via revolution, confronted the difficulties of Cold War and inaugurated an autarchic state-socialism, around which a cluster of neighbouring countries were grouped, comprising, in total, a state-socialist bloc. Thereafter, the now weakened European powers saw their hitherto colonial holdings dismantled, but not after attempts had been made to re-establish colonies, rebuffed via a series of wars of colonial withdrawal. In time, after the Dutch, French and British had withdrawn, the new states formed a machinery of regional cooperation in the guise of the ASEAN. Thus, for all replacement elites, it was within this awkward environment of decolonization and Cold War that they pursued national development, evidenced in their subsequent development trajectories.[1]

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As the state-empires faded, in many areas nationalist elites were able to seize power. Their routes into power were not the same. Nor did they come into power at the same time. Nor did they pursue identical projects. The detail shows many variations but the overall pattern is clear: replacement elites laid claim to territories that emerged from the dissolution of former colonial systems, created independent states,

invented nations and variously pursued national development.[2] East Asia was no longer a colonized area; rather, it saw novel states in pursuit of national development. Yet as the Cold War took hold the region was divided into two blocs: one was oriented towards the Soviet model[3] of autarchic state-socialist development; the other was oriented towards the USA and the pursuit of liberal models of modernization via state-sponsored export-oriented development.

The USSR offered support to the newly established PRC and to North Korea, but in the early 1960s the relationship with China soured, as did that with North Korea. Later China would have difficulties with its socialist neighbour Vietnam. In contrast with these somewhat intermittent links, the USA offered extensive aid to the countries falling within its bloc and this included military, financial and technical assistance. These flows of resources were supplemented by the demands of wartime purchases in the region.[4] And as the US involvement in the region deepened in Northeast Asia, Indo-China and Southeast Asia, local elites positioned themselves accordingly: in Japan an elite-level alliance of bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians crystallized, which affirmed an economic nationalism, mobilized its population and looked to rebuild the country; in the different circumstances of South Korea and Taiwan, this model was replicated; later, further variants emerged in Hong Kong and Singapore. The development experience came to be summed up in terms of the idea of 'the developmental state'.[5] The nature of the developmental state, the putative key to success, has been widely debated: mainstream economists have stressed the role of the marketplace along with free trade coupled to the logic of comparative advantage;[6] institutional economists have stressed the accumulation of economic/social institutions conducive to national development; and political-economists have stressed the role of elites committed to national development in planning industrial advance, protecting infant industries and carving out a niche within the global system.[7] Yet, however that debate is resolved, the success of the region could not be denied. It was copied. Thus, much later, following policy changes that moved away from Maoist inflected state-socialism,[8] another variant took shape in China and thereafter throughout other parts of the hitherto state-socialist bloc.[9] By the early years of the twenty-first century, discussion cast in terms of blocs was passé, the distinctions counted for little, and the region was now extensively integrated and home to many diverse generally successful countries.

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Managing this dissolution of state-empires was difficult and it was made more so by the start of the Cold War. Economic, social and political advance was attended by pervasive violence, overt and covert. Some of the political legacies of the period persist in state structures, official ideologies and popular memories, but the present-day outcome of these processes is clear: East Asia is now home to a number of wealthy countries, they enjoy extensive interlinkages and together constitute one of the three major economic/cultural blocs within the contemporary global system.

The collapse of the system of state-empires

By the 1930s, East Asia was changing. However, foreign elites were complacent and they did not expect change. Nonetheless, local people were beginning to look for change: sometimes the impulse to change was expressed in religion, sometimes in everyday resistance[10] and most importantly in growing nationalist sentiments. The nationalism came in varieties: some was backward-looking, invoking an idealized pre-colonial time shaped by religion or community; some was forward-looking, offering an image of settled harmony once free of colonial rule; and some looked to embrace groups based on perceived commonalities of race. In contrast, others were more direct, concerned to be rid of foreign rulers whilst leaving the future to only the most general of sketches. The ideas circulated amongst elites, the results of colonial pilgrimages of one sort or another, and they found increasing resonance amongst colonial subject peoples. However, the environment within which such ideas could finally gain significant purchase was afforded by warfare; as the state-empire system went into crisis in the metropolitan cores, it also did so in the peripheries.

A context: Four wars – civil, regional, global and cold

The general crisis, which engulfed the system of state-empires, took particular form in East Asia as a number of discrete conflicts overlapped: civil, regional and global. However, it was the Pacific War that broke the system of state-empires. After the events of the wartime period, such empires were untenable: militarily, economically, socially and politically. But the end of state-empires in East Asia was never going to be simple. Indeed, the end of the system of state-empires was confused and violent: civil war raged on in China; sometime core countries deployed armies as they tried to recover territories; potential replacement elites vied for position, creating domestic tensions; plus the

conflicts of the great powers spilled over the region as the Cold War was inaugurated.[11]

The business of war attracts many commentators and in respect of the interlinked wars in Europe and East Asia there are many interpretations: diverse agents, diverse wars and diverse memories.[12] Tony Judt[13] remarks that historical memory is the outcome of a complex political-cultural process involving active remembering and equally active forgetting, together creating through the public sphere an agreed story about events. This situation obtains for the Cold War and there is a standard Western position: roughly, the global aspirations of an intrinsically unacceptable communist ideology necessitated containment, which in turn required international alliances to buttress those domestic groups positively disposed towards the standards of liberal democratic freedom whilst at the same time blocking the advances of those opposed to these self-evidently desirable goals.[14] But scholarship has cast doubt on these tales, for the Cold War was confected in the West and it has its roots in the intense hostility of ruling groups to the Russian Revolution. It begins in 1917 and runs on down the decades.[15]

The driving force for Cold War in East Asia was the USA. The construction of the Cold War was a curious business and it had its roots in American anxieties about the shape of the post-war world: first, the wartime alliance of the USA, the USSR and the British was breaking up, fuelled by anti-communists in the nascent Western bloc; second, the USA had lent its support to the Nationalists in China and there were anxieties about the low-level civil war (soon to be an out and out civil war) coupled to an expectation that the Nationalists would win; and third, there was anxiety about the role of the USSR in the post-war region and a strong desire, notwithstanding agreements made at Yalta, to limit this as much as possible.

Elements of the Cold War were put in place quite early. First, the use of the atomic bomb against two Japanese cities was in part determined by the desire of the US administration to demonstrate its military power to the USSR and to stop it from taking territory in Northeast Asia.[16] Second, the division of the Korean peninsula and the introduction of American troops, which involved suppressing a domestic popular rebellion and installing an émigré right-wing dictator, was undertaken for similar reasons.[17] Third, the result of the Chinese civil war provoked outrage in Washington as anti-communists spoke of 'losing China', and from that point onwards Cold War antagonism – matched in Europe – became the default position of the administration, the state machine and thereafter the wider polity. Fourth, the Korean War, part

civil war, part proxy war, reinforced this developing stance. And, fifth, the apparatus of Cold War was thereafter put in place around North-east Asia (South Korea's dictators were at first bankrolled and thereafter supported by the USA, likewise Taiwan's dictatorship, plus following the reverse course, support was provided for the business-dominated conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regime in Japan); and the apparatus was extended to the former territories of the state-empires of the Europeans, where replacement elites (in Southeast Asia) who collaborated with the USA[18] secured mutual benefits; whilst those replacement elites (in Indo-China) which did not found themselves being labelled communist and attacked. Finally, notwithstanding these demands and accommodations, regional elites affirmed sovereignty and non-interference.[19] It might be noted that the apparatus of Cold War remains in place, now directed towards the containment of an increasingly powerful China.

The environment of Cold War directly impacted the activities of replacement elites. Natasha Hamilton-Hart[20] offers a detailed discussion of the collaboration of new elites and the USA, casting matters in terms of hard interests (that is, power), and soft illusions (that is, their acceptance (at least in public) of the Cold War image of the USA as a model to which all could aspire and overall a benign force for progress). After 1945 the USA asserted its primacy amongst non-communist regimes in the region and local elites accommodated themselves to these demands, and domestic repression generally over-rode any pluralist debate. However, there was some debate in the Philippines and Thailand. The reward for obedience was the support of the USA: first, in politics, diplomatic cover for repression along with military aid, which was theorized in terms of the modernizing role of military machines in poor countries; second, in economics, aid, trade and foreign direct investment helped the USA to carve out a US-oriented bloc. Economically it prospered, in time noted in terms of the notion of the East Asian miracle and unpacked in terms of the idea of the developmental state. And success eventually drew in the Chinese, and they in turn helped to make the region something of a competitor, or at least an alternative, to the USA.

States, nations and development

In sum, it was in this radically disturbed context that new elites had to pursue security, order and development. First, security: elites had to make states. Replacement elites faced difficult tasks of defining borders and as the colonial territories dissolved these were contested. Elites had to define citizenship, who was a member of the new state, who was not,

and elites had to reach agreements with minorities. All of this provided the bedrock of the political project of building a new nation-state. Second, order: elites had to make nations. Replacement elites had to organize the territory internally. There had to be effective lines of political control and representation. Newly created citizens had to be brought into effective dialogue with the elite as the whole business of domestic politics (that is, a coherent organized community) had to be created as the colonial system faded into history. Third, development: the pursuit of economic growth and social welfare; the deal made between new elites and the masses they sought to lead involved exchanging political support for the promise of better material lives and so the elite had to deliver on growth and welfare.

These aspects of the situation have been widely discussed. Commentators have reported that establishing states was difficult. In East Asia there were problems of mutual recognition between competing elites. For example, both Indonesia and Malaysia were home to ethnic 'Malays'; both Malaysia and the Philippines laid claim to parts of the territory of the island of Borneo; plus there were conflicts between class groups, those who had prospered during the colonial era and those who had not; and there were many minority groups seeking recognition. The process of securing states often involved violence. Then constructing nations was difficult. As Anderson[21] points out, a nation is an imagined community, limited and sovereign, and embraces an ethic of 'deep, horizontal comradeship'.[22] There is an elite element (official symbols, official ideologies) and a popular element (the ideas of elite promulgated amongst the grass-roots plus ideas from these populations). An official ideology might involve statements about the national identity, national goals and the national past, where this is a formal scheme recording the historical trajectory of the polity. The official ideology might mention famous figures, such as people from history or myth whose actions exemplify the national identity; and popular ideology will use these ideas and it will add its own, maybe popular figures in the arts or sports world or claims to typical practices, such as food or social mores. It was through these official and popular symbols and their routine repetition that national identities were constructed. And, finally, pursuing development was difficult. The ex-colonial powers, the USA and the communist bloc all offered ideas; thus growth, modernization, dependency and so on, the repertoire of ideas summed as development theory;[23] but replacement elites pursued a variety of projects which were contingent, variable, running with the expectations of outsiders in a further contingent manner.[24]

East Asia: The varieties of nationalism

The general crisis did not stop with the end of the Pacific War; rather, it continued and flowed without a break into the wars of colonial withdrawal plus the related conflicts attached to the Cold War. Local elites and peoples sought independence and their struggles were cast in various terms – religion, images of the past and ideal plans for the future – as regards available identity, how people thought of themselves and the state-empires in which they were embedded, the intellectual/moral context from which then sought alternatives. Anthony Reid[25] writes of three elements, simply pre-colonial, colonial era and then post-colonial, and as the cultures of the earlier forms of life have blended into the latter, so today's contemporary forms are layered.

In regard to the pre-colonial era in Northeast Asia, Reid[26] notes that there were bureaucratic states but they never put together ethnic and state nationalisms – that is, there was never a widespread popular nationalism of the sort that is familiar today. In China the unit in mind was an elite construct carried in the routines of the empire (dynasty, bureaucracy, script, examination or, in brief, culture). It was echoed in other parts of Northeast Asia and it feeds into contemporary popular nationalisms. Then, in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, Reid notes that identities were ordered around kinship networks or market cycles or sacred sites or religious/popular performances, adding that these ways of belonging were 'more enduring and concrete than the states which competed over them'.[27]

In the colonial era, new ideas were made available. Colonial powers inserted themselves into these local political worlds in various ways – traders, missionaries, rulers and so on – and European ideas were superimposed on local resources. This process could have various local effects as it was not uniform. Many have pointed out that the colonial powers were concerned to reproduce in their colonies some basic features of core territories – borders, laws, individual names, secular authority and so on – and these served the ambiguous goals of colonial development. They also reworked received ideas of identity, so colonial rule changed who people were.[28] In terms of identity, locals could buy into the ideas and look forwards to a variant modernity, or they could resist the ideas and look back to find alternative models, or alternatively they could retreat into a newly defined ethnic identity. These newly constituted groups engaged with each other and with the various incomers with whom they came into contact, and the result is one of a newly fashioned great diversity of peoples.[29]

Reid presents a typology of currently available nationalisms.[30] First, ethnic nationalism:[31] culture plus language plus place plus myth issues in a claim to the naturalness of a given identity and the distinction between race and nation – routinely made by Europeans – is not strong; or, put another way, the idea of race is still used. Second, state nationalism:[32] it is a modern idea, new in the region. In pre-empire Asia there were identifications with the king or dynasty or territory so contemporary state nationalism in the region was in general post-colonial. Third, anti-imperial nationalism: opposition to foreign rulers has been crucial in turning territories within empires into post-empire nations, thus the ideology constructs nation and these are typically early twentieth-century ideas. Fourth, a nationalism informed by outrage at state humiliation and these comprise reactions to foreign interventions, which invoke a pre-foreigner past to imagine a post-foreigner future: thus the Boxers, thus the 4 May New Culture Movement, which was picked up by Nationalist China's authorities, which regularized 26 national humiliation days into one called National Humiliation Commemoration Day.[33] It was not pursued by Mao but the theme was resurrected by the CCP in the 1990s, appearing in 2001 as National Defence Education Day. There are similar ideas in Korea and some also in Southeast Asia where Islam was thought to have been slighted.

In regard to anti-imperialist nationalism, Reid[34] remarks that it was the product of the specific conditions of the early part of the twentieth century. As state-empires became formally ordered, they looked like states, thereby smoothing the way for nationalist arguments for independence, for realizing what existed in prospect and in colonialist apologias for empire. They were different – shaped by context – but they did exhibit common characteristics involving a mix of negatives, denying colonial era prejudices and positives, borrowing and deploying modern ideas: received racial hierarchies were inverted, the locals placed to the fore; received boundaries were embraced, all local inhabitants were to be members; received ideas of progress were embraced, local inhabitants were to look to the future; received ideas of pre-contact history were embraced, local inhabitants were their inheritors; and received ideas of development were embraced, locals were to become developed.[35]

In the post-colonial period, Reid adds that the circumstances in which modern nationalisms were made were very varied, and so too are the constructs that have been made. He speculates that the onward march of globalization may undermine national identifications (he mentions the

European Union), but this seems optimistic as national identification is still very much with us even as it is supplemented by newer solidarities.

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As the state-empires collapsed, replacement elites took power and made or remade states, the elites made or remade nations and the elites pursued various forms of national development. The political make-up of these countries can be dealt with in two ways: first, political history, asking how they got to be the countries they are now; and, second, domestic political configurations, identifying the elite players, their alliances, their interactions with the masses, and the official ideologies and national pasts that order and legitimate these endeavours. And together these ideas can sketch out the overall development trajectories of the countries. In all of this the crucial overarching division was between the two Cold War blocs and thereafter the intersection of local cultures, regional and global demands and the projects carried in the thinking of elites combined to determine the resultant national trajectories.

The destruction of Japan's state-empire and the creation of a US sphere

During the nineteenth century, the historical trajectories of polities in East Asia were dominated by the machineries and agendas of European state-empires, and domestic politics took place within this frame. The Americans and Japanese were secondary players. However, relationships of power shifted in the early twentieth century: Japan built an empire, the USA became a significant power and Europe entered a phase of domestic warfare. Hitherto peripheral European holdings sought to escape subordinate status and, in time, warfare engulfed the region and extant political relationships were radically reordered: European withdrawal, local independence and great power conflict. During the late twentieth century the historical trajectories of polities in East Asia were dominated either by the machineries of the US Cold War bloc or by those of the state socialist bloc – China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Now, finally, at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century it is possible that a new post-Cold War pattern is emerging: China as a regional power, East Asia as a region, the USA less prominent and Europe re-emerging as a trading partner.

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In the nineteenth century, European and US involvement in East Asia was focused on China, and under pressure the Qing dynasty slowly gave ground to the demands of foreigners; the result was the creation of the treaty port system with defined territorial units (concessions or settlements in major cities) enjoying extra-territorial rights and providing bases for commercial trading activities in many parts of China. But these sea-borne foreign traders were not the only political players in the area. And in Northeast Asia, international politics involved three powers responding to the rise of the modern world through, amongst other things, territorial expansion: Russia, China and Japan all sought influence in Northeast Asia, and the particular territories within which these concerns found expression included Sakhalin, Manchuria and Korea. The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War[36] settled matters broadly in favour of the Japanese and the polity extended its reach from the home islands to encompass Sakhalin, Korea, Taiwan and parts of Manchuria. Later there were further episodes of expansion and at its geographical apogee the Japanese Empire controlled most of East Asia – that is, Korea, China, Indo-China and Southeast Asia. But imperial Japan did not survive. The territories were incoherently ordered – that is, the Japanese authorities never settled on a plan for their future,[37] and the manner of their acquisition had drawn the enmity of the USA.[38] As with other state-empires it was undermined by the events of the Pacific War. The US military destroyed the core of the Japanese state-empire and thereafter its territories were dramatically reconfigured: the home islands were occupied and extensively reordered;[39] China was left to its still continuing civil war, eventually resolved in favour of the CCP, and the subsequent establishment of the People's Republic of China; Korea was divided as a result of great power Cold War completion into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea; Taiwan became home to the Republic of China; and Sakhalin and some small islands were taken over by the USSR. In the hitherto core territory of the Japanese home islands the polity was reconstituted as modern Japan, an ally of the USA.

All of these territories, which had been drawn into the modern world as elements of Japan's empire, were radically reordered over the decades following the end of the Pacific War. Domestic politics were upended. In Japan the 1930s links of military, industry and state were reworked – a limited purge of former state-empire personnel was undertaken – but as the Cold War unfolded the occupation authorities became more concerned with buttressing an ally (a measure of elite continuity), in particular, as Chalmers Johnson[40] argued, in the state bureaucracy.

In Korea the colonial regime relinquished power and a left of centre popular movement hesitantly took power: in the US-controlled south it was suppressed and a right-wing nationalist long resident in the USA was installed as president as the local colonial era elite returned to power; and in the north the same popular movement was slowly subsumed within a state-socialist system inspired by outside powers. And in Taiwan the politics were turned upside down: Japanese colonial rule was ended, Nationalist Party refugees seized power, locals staged a failed rebellion and a dictatorship was installed.

The new states constructed new national pasts. These informed political-cultural projects. In North Korea (the DPRK) the elite looked to Korean history, finding anti-colonialism plus Confucianism. The elite invented the philosophy of self-reliance (Juche) and the policy of the military first, and contrived a species of Stalinist state socialism. All of this produced a strong nationalism. In South Korea (the ROK) the elite embraced anti-colonialism plus Confucianism plus state-sponsored development plus Cold War anti-communism. The elite deployed the ideal of renovation (Yushin system) and the upshot was a strong Korean nationalism plus pride in the post-war national achievement. In Taiwan (ROC) there was an elite affirmation of a traditional Chinese identity in contrast with the communist reconstructions made on the mainland, but there was also an ethnic split in the population – incomers in contrast with indigenous peoples – and this further reinforced an authoritarian politics. In time it gave way to an indigenized variant liberal democracy. In Japan the occupation and reverse course left elements of the old elite in power. Some commentators have bracketed the 1930s as a militaristic error, reading it as an interruption to the processes of modernization evident in the Taisho democracy period, with post-war Japan taken as having resumed its modernizing trajectory. Running somewhat in parallel to this conservative tale, the episode of war has been recalled for the mainstream via the experience of nuclear bombing, the embrace of a unique victim status, the basis for a claim to exemplify the demands of peace.

The US sphere provided the broad structural framework – economic, political and international – and domestic politics worked within this frame. It was a cold war bloc. Within these terms the USA was generous, offering aid, technical advice and technology transfer (famously, Mr Sony 'bought the transistor' for a few thousand dollars)[41] along with easy access to the US domestic marketplace.[42] In addition there were locally purchased war materials and these assisted economic recovery. Yet this did not encompass the totality of US involvement in the region.

There was direct involvement in the Philippines. The territory had been a colony from 1900. Domestically, a Latin American-style landed elite ran a peasant-based primary product economy; the elite collaborated during the occupation years and were helped back into power by the USA, as opposition groups were sidelined and rebellions suppressed.[43] US power also found expression in Thailand, later a base for the USA's wars in Indo-China; and in Indonesia, where there was covert involvement in the 1965 coup. Thereafter, more formally, the USA sought to draw the region into a network of military organizations:[44] SEATO, the counterpart to NATO and CENTO, plus the Five Powers Defence Agreement 1971 which links Singapore and Malaysia to Australia, New Zealand and Britain. And the key to all of this lay in Northeast Asia, with Japan.

Japan: Expansion, collapse and recovery

Geographical and historical good fortune made the Japanese home islands the last to be reached by the aggressively expanding Europeans and Americans. The modern world arrived in Japan in the form of Commodore Perry, and the sophisticated agrarian feudal system of Tokugawa Japan quickly collapsed. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 brought to power a conservative modernizing oligarchy and it embraced the goal of rapidly catching up major powers and joining in the modern world. They were dazzlingly successful.[45] By the early twentieth century, Japan had created a modern industrial economy. Japan became the most powerful country in the region as China drifted into a quasi-colonial status and the elite carved out an empire in Northeast Asia:[46] Hokkaido; Ryukyu Islands, Kurile Islands and Sakhalin; Taiwan; and Korea. However, the circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s worked against their project and Taisho democracy gave way to Showa militarism. Later, expansion occurred in Manchuria, Northern China and Indo-China. In the early part of the Pacific War, there was further expansion in Southeast Asia and amongst the many island groups of the Pacific Ocean. However, the military imbalance between the Japanese and the USA made defeat inevitable. The military defeat meant that the country was subject to externally directed reconstruction and the reforms were both sweeping (in economy, society and politics) and restricted as the demands of the Cold War pointed towards the reconstitution rather than reconstruction of the country. Recovery was a drawn-out process ordered by a business-dominated polity firmly lodged within the US sphere.[47] Japan entered the post-war world as a key regional ally of the USA.

(i) The US occupation, the reverse course and recovery

The occupation authorities were led by General MacArthur (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) and based in Tokyo where several thousand aides mostly worked via the existing Japanese bureaucracy. SCAP was ideologically divided into two groups: optimistic New Deal reformers along with more pessimistic realists; the former group had the upper hand at first and began to reform Japan with the objective of crafting a liberal-democratic Japan. The reforms continued until early 1947 and then slowed: popular politics included an energetic left wing, MacArthur banned a strike, the Cold War began and US policy changed. The period was called the reverse course. The New Deal optimistic idealists were displaced by pessimistic realists and they came into their own with the 1950 start of the Korean War. Any attempt to reform Japan was abandoned, as it became a base for military supplies. Japan became an ally in the anti-communist bloc as a conservative business-dominated elite came to power. The 1952 Peace Treaty ended the formal occupation and established an enduring alliance with the USA.[48]

The SCAP reformers had the upper hand at first and sought to create a liberal-democratic Japan. First, the military machine was dismantled.[49] Its personnel were repatriated, demobilized and disbanded. It was a complex task because the armed forces were scattered around East Asia, plus the returning allied powers found it useful to make use of Japanese troops in policing their re-acquired territories (for example, in Indonesia and Vietnam). There were also significant numbers of non-military Japanese personnel to deal with: thus settlers in Manchuria, Taiwan and Korea. Second, the domestic structure of power was radically reformed with a purge of the higher levels of the bureaucracy and a programme to break up the conglomerates (*zaibatsu*). These actions, together with the action on the military, served to disband the core elements of the state that had waged war, but not, as many advocated at the time (and have retrospectively advocated), the emperor, the head of state in whose name the Japanese had fought their wars.[50] Third, the political system of the family state was remade: a new constitution was promulgated and sovereignty was vested in the people, the emperor renounced his divine status and became a constitutional monarch, the continuing family was abolished, so too was state-Shinto; and a bi-cameral parliament with a cabinet system was established. And, fourth, reforms were instituted in the social realm: a new education system modelled on the US system; new labour laws so that unions are allowed and strikes are allowed; and new land laws so as to redistribute land from landlords to family owner-farmers on the US model, the expectation apparently being that

this would encourage independent-mindedness and thus feed into a process of democratization.

The reforms continued until early 1947 but the start of the Cold War brought significant changes as all attempts to reform Japan were abandoned and the country became an anti-communist ally of the USA. The Korean War of 1950–3 was crucial as the episode was a major help to Japanese recovery: Japan became a key base for US armies; reforms to the economy were stopped as the key expectation now was production; local industry was given a massive injection of cash via war-related orders; labour militancy was repressed; and reforms to the political system were stopped or reversed so as to secure domestic stability. The episode laid the ground for the contemporary Japanese system: a conservative state-centred business-dominated system oriented to production and exports.

The economy recovered rapidly from a low base.[51] The early phase of expansion ran through the 1950/1960s and it was dominated by heavy industry: chemicals, steel and ships. New integrated steel mills were built by the coast and ships were built using the newest US-style mass-production techniques (rather than old-style craft production). The Japanese pioneered very large bulk carriers. Commentators spoke of a miracle economy. A dual economy developed with large conglomerates (high-tech industry, export-oriented, lifetime employment, promotion by age, flat hierarchies, mission statements), plus small firms (family-based, supplying the conglomerates with long-term relationships, and they absorb shocks when conglomerates have problems). Other sectors dominated by small firms included agriculture (protected) and the service sector (protected). In the second phase, in the 1970s, the economy grew around cars, consumer appliances and machinery. There were problems: Nixon's 1971 decision to float the dollar meant variable exchange rates generally and the yen appreciated. The 1973 oil shock also caused economic dislocations. There were also problems of pollution, and problems of low-quality life for the Japanese people. The government responded by encouraging higher incomes. In this period, Japan emerged as a major economy within the global system. In the third phase, in the 1980s, the government encouraged further upgrading and industry moved to higher-value-added activities: electronics, specialist steels, chemicals and new materials: all science-based and high-tech in general. New problems emerged when the Americans accused the Japanese of unfair trading practices, suggesting that they focused on exporting whilst restricting access to their home market. In 1985 the Plaza Accord revalued the yen against the dollar. The revaluation

provided a complex shock to the system as various agents responded to the new circumstances: domestic inflation and speculation in land created a bubble economy; and the external relocation of Japanese productive activity plus aid, trade and foreign direct investment patterns established a production network throughout East Asia.

The domestic bubble burst in 1991 following Japanese government attempts to curb the expansion, and there was a long 'golden recession' with nil or very low economic growth, a high rate of unemployment (for Japan), continued bad loan problems plus continued stability and prosperity. The government has slowly dealt with bad debts and there has been much external pressure for liberalization, which has been resisted in the main; there has been an increase in foreign investment in Japanese companies; and some alterations to employment practices. By the early years of the twenty-first century the economy seemed to have recovered somewhat, but it was not clear whether the old pattern of political economy was intact or had changed,[52] plus there were new anxieties: about an ageing population, domestic debt levels, relations with the USA and the implications of the rise of China.

(ii) The record has been much debated

The post-war recovery was elite-directed. It had a number of key features: it was directed by the civil service; it was business friendly; the politicians were subordinate but active participants; the population was highly disciplined; and the focus of the efforts was to create a first-class economy. Unpacking the details of this success story has proved to be contentious.[53]

Some have focused on the role of the state. One concept has been developed to grasp the logic of this success: the 'developmental state'. It has been argued that the key to the developmental state was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). This is the central preoccupation of the work of Chalmers Johnson.[54] Some have focused on the role of politics. The political system in Japan is dominated by the iron triangle, which links bureaucracy, business and politicians, and together they adopt responsibility for the family of Japanese people who in turn affirm the ideal of harmony. The nature of the state is debated. The issue is the internal coordination of the various key elements: when the system is viewed as an integrated unit, the judgement is that the state is strong; on the other hand, if it is argued that the constituent parts spend most of their time manoeuvring against each other, then the state is characterized as weak.[55] And some have focused on the nature of firms/markets. A dual economy has developed which

has allowed competitive international companies to thrive and it has allowed an inclusive domestic economy to prosper. First, the conglomerates: a network of related companies that support each other. Second, a high-quality small family firm sector: it includes suppliers to the big companies with long-term relationships; and it also includes a large retail sector with many small family-run shops, which are protected by local authorities from open competition. Finally, some have focused on the nature of society arguing that religion/culture fosters harmony and obedience; thus the putative Confucian work ethic mirrors the Western Protestant work ethic. There is an indigenous literature[56] that celebrates the racial/ethnic specialness of the Japanese. However, the relationship between culture and economic activity is not direct, much less causal[57] – in other words, ideas count, but how they count depends on local circumstances.

(iii) Ongoing issues

Commentators offer a number of general lines of criticism:[58] they coincide in a lack of faith in the elite and doubts about the living conditions of the majority. First, it has been said that Japan is a rich country with poor people: the balance of work, consumption and welfare is wrong; it has been said that the balance is tilted too far in favour of work; it is said that the balance of government spending is tilted too far in favour of supporting business; and it has also been suggested that the system needs rebalancing to favour the ordinary Japanese so as to upgrade their overall levels of living through better welfare facilities. Second, it has been argued that the country needs political reform in order to make the system more responsive to ordinary voters. It has been said that the political system is remote from the ordinary population; that decisions are taken within the iron triangle of business, bureaucracy and party, and that narrow sectional interests are preferred to broader citizen participation/welfare. Third, critics have spoken of collusion between politicians, big business and bureaucrats, and it is routinely alleged that money changes hands within the iron triangle to secure favours. In particular, it has been alleged that business directs money to politicians. Fourth, many outside critics have pointed to the issue of the memory of the Pacific War.[59] Domestic critics have alleged that the political elite have ignored Japan's record in East Asia; critics have alleged that right-wing nationalists have distorted the history of aggression and invited foreign criticism of the country. On the other hand, domestic conservative figures have suggested that the issue has been discussed and dealt with, and that the matter should be considered closed. Foreign

critics have also joined in this debate; particular countries in East Asia have made criticisms (opportunistically) whilst some individuals have sought redress (no suggestion of opportunism). The issue is a continuing problem: most Japanese were born long after the Pacific War ended; the generation that followed the war worked hard to rebuild Japan and the younger generations have only known the modern rich consumer Japan and most would like to get on with their lives. However, it is also easy to see why the issue will not go away. Conservative Japan does not seem inclined to acknowledge its role/responsibility, or indeed to take the matter even half-seriously,[60] whilst for some neighbours – China, South Korea – the topic offers an easy way of stoking/placating domestic nationalist sentiment.

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The post-war trajectory has been shaped by unfolding circumstances, including defeat, Cold War and the creation of a US sphere, coupled to the determination of a chastened elite to recover from the debacle of wartime. The key players in the polity have been somewhat wider than the familiar iron triangle and include the monarchy (the emperor and the Imperial Household Agency), the state bureaucracy (ministries), big business, political parties (in particular the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)), Buddhist religious organizations, Shinto religious organizations, the mass media and civil society. The polity is distinctive: in terms of the structure, the population resides within the circle of the Japanese polity that is led by the iron triangle elite concerned with general welfare; and the embedded ideal[61] is of an elite-centred consensus secured via extensive private consultation buttressed by popular approval or acquiescence oriented towards the benefit of the family of the Japanese.[62]

South Korea and Taiwan

Both territories had formed parts of the Japanese state-empire system from around the turn of the twentieth century and both had been developed as adjuncts to the economy of the home islands. In Taiwan, the local population, with no strong memories of earlier civilization, adapted to the situation, but in Korea, where the population did have such memories, there was sharp, sometimes violent, resistance. Nonetheless, by the 1930s as the Japanese elite embarked on their wars in China, these were relatively settled and successful parts of the state-empire system.

As with the rest of the system, forms of life in Korea and Taiwan were overturned in the wake of the end of the Pacific War. Taiwan became a

refuge for the militarily defeated forces of the Nationalist government. Korea was divided and became the site of a catastrophic conflict, part civil war, part proxy war, one that engulfed the peninsula, causing the deaths of some 2 million people whilst laying waste to the country.

In Korea, at the end of the Pacific War, the Japanese authorities handed power to a local nationalist grouping[63] and they established a provisional government. However, the great powers decided to split Korea into two occupation zones divided by the 38th parallel – the USA controlled the south whilst the Soviet Union controlled the north. The USA refused to recognize the local nationalists and, in the face of armed resistance from the local population, imposed their own figure, Syngman Rhee. The USSR was subtler in its support for Kim Il Sung, who emerged as the leader of the north. Thus there were two Koreas by August 1948 – the DPRK and the ROK – then in late 1948 the Soviet Union withdrew its armed forces, whilst the USA delayed removing its troops until June 1949, operating thereafter through a multiplicity of advisors to prop up the southern regime.[64] However, the two Korean leaderships continued their mutual hostile exchanges. Syngman Rhee became the leader of the newly formed ROK in 1948 and proved to be very nationalistic, authoritarian and relentlessly hostile to the North; there were many provocations (numerous localized military exchanges launched from both the South and the North) until in 1950 the exchanges developed into a broad extensive military exchange – that is, the Korean War.[65] The USA returned under the banner of the United Nations, later the Chinese became involved and the war dragged on until 1953, by which time the country – north and south – was in ruins. Then an armistice was agreed and negotiations began at Panmanjun on the 38th parallel.

In South Korea the state[66] has been central to the subsequent development trajectory of the country. In the early years, US assistance provided a very large percentage of state budgets. The set-up encouraged rent-seeking as a business and the various parts of the state machine looked for favours – that is, access to aid flows, and Rhee used control of access to these resources to buttress his position. The economic result was a period of very slow import substituting industrialization. But Rhee was overthrown in 1961 when Park Chung Hee staged a coup. Park embraced the Japanese model of state-led national economic development: the state is in charge and technocrats become influential; the state controls credit and licences for investment offering lots of credit for favoured firms whose performance is monitored; there were many labour and political opponents, all suppressed. The Yushin policy of

national development was authoritarian and it laid the foundations of the contemporary South Korean economy. The economy developed with very large firms with close relations to state and nationalized banks, conglomerates with wide interests and concerned to expand market share. A series of strategic industries were chosen in 1970s – steel, electronics, petrochemicals, ships, machines and metals. There was much success followed by problems of overproduction until the oil shocks precipitated recession. There was a slow recovery, problems accumulated, the system expanded the national economy but provided only low levels of living for the population, plus there was routine student and worker unrest (dual labour market: white collar rather like Japanese firms; blue collar independent and aggressive) and demands for economic and political change persisted.

Park was assassinated in 1979 by the head of the Korean CIA. Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo seized power, inaugurating a further period of military-dominated rule (1979–87). But in the 1980s there were many student demonstrations, both anti-Chun and anti-US, and eventually popular pressure forced Chun from office. Reforms were then inaugurated. First, economic liberalization, with credit made more freely available; conglomerates were targeted for reform (so they look more like 'normal liberal market' conglomerates) and the privileged political/economic position of the conglomerates was weakened, but overall with limited success. Second, political reforms were put in hand and they led to freely elected presidents. In 1987, Roh Tae Woo (1987–92) became the first freely elected president, and then Kim Young Sam (1993–7) became the first non-military elected president. There were further political reforms: multi-party elected president and later parliament. Further elected presidents have followed: Kim Dae Jung (1998–2002), who inaugurated the Sunshine Policy; Roh Moo Hyun (2003–7); and Lee Myun Bak (2008–12). At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, Park Guen Hye became the president. Contemporary South Korea has a very sophisticated modern high-tech economy but commentators point to a number of ongoing issues: solidifying South Korean democracy; managing relations with North Korea; managing relations with Japan; and managing relations with the USA whilst acknowledging the ever-greater importance of China.

In Taiwan, the end of the Pacific War and the collapse of the Japanese state-empire precipitated a similar dramatic reordering of domestic arrangements. The territory had become a Japanese colony in 1895 and was developed by the colonial authorities from 1895 to 1945: there were agricultural improvements and infrastructure producing rice and sugar

exports to Japan, plus small-scale metalworking. The Japanese authorities also provided health and schools. In brief, there was a development process. At the end of the Pacific War the allied powers handed the territory to Nationalist China. The territory was poor and war damaged, and, in the late 1940s, Nationalist forces moved to the island. They proved to be ill-disciplined and they provoked an indigenous Taiwanese rebellion – the 28/2/47 incident. It was violently suppressed and indigenous Taiwanese retreated from political life, so the local population became apolitical. The end of the Chinese Civil War saw further reordering of domestic arrangements. In 1949 the remnants of the Nationalist army retreated to the island and territory was organized as the ROC. The state was controlled by the KMT. The politics were authoritarian with military-dominated rule. The territory was dominated by the mainlanders – 2 million amongst 9 million Taiwanese – and as the Cold War began the Americans extended generous military and civilian aid to the KMT regime.

The state has been central to Taiwan's development. The Taiwanese polity has been dominated by the KMT. Chiang Kai Shek ruled from 1945 to 1975 and was succeeded by his son, Chiang Ching Kuo. The change of leadership produced liberal-democratic-style reforms. In 1986 the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was founded. In 1988, on the death of Chiang Ching Kuo, Lee Teng Hui assumed power and he was elected in the first open election in 1996. After this, further democratic reforms followed. Chen Shui Bian was the first DPP-elected president in 2000 and was re-elected in 2004. In 2008, power then passed to the KMT under the leadership of Ma Ying Jeou. Throughout this long period, ruling elites have encouraged economic growth; the US insistence upon reforms in the early post-war period began the process,[67] and by the 1980s a high-tech economy had taken shape. At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, contemporary Taiwan is a prosperous country with a vigorous domestic political scene and deepening positive relations with the mainland.

Commentators typically draw attention to a number of issues: international and domestic. Internationally, relations with the PRC are important as Beijing claims the territory and engages in elaborate diplomatic games designed to ensure that Taiwan cannot join international organizations. Yet the USA supports Taiwan militarily. This produces diplomatic stalemate. Locally, the population increasingly assert that they are Taiwanese – the issue is important in domestic politics. Both Beijing and Taipei have significant military machines, but around the turn of twenty-first century relations improved. One issue has arisen

where their interests may run in parallel – that is, the control and exploitation of offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea and those located around the Senkoku/Daiyuou Islands. And, domestically, political reforms advance as the KMT and DPP compete for power. They hold sharply divergent views on relations with Beijing but economic linkages with the mainland are increasing – sometimes seen as a problematical entanglement by some sceptical Taiwanese. There are other ongoing issues: ethnicity, identity and diasporic links with the mainland, Southeast Asia and North America.

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These historical trajectories have produced distinctive domestic political scenes. In Korea and Taiwan the bulk of the period following the collapse of the Japanese state-empire and the repositioning of local polities within the US sphere was dominated by military dictatorships. Thus in South Korea the historical trajectory has been quite distinctive: colonial rule, division, civil war, proxy war and widespread ruin were the post-war starting points, and after a false start with the US-imported dictator, a sequence of military rulers oversaw the reconstruction of the country. The key players in the polity include the state machinery, the military, large-scale co-opted business groups and broad civil society groups. And the system is ordered and legitimated in terms of the embedded ideals of Confucian culture, including respect for hierarchy, preference for social harmony, respect for education, reverence of ancestors and a stress on the family. All are oriented towards the elite-specified pursuit of national development. And the contemporary Taiwanese polity has followed something of an analogous trajectory, including colonial rule, the impact of civil war, Cold War and military dictatorship lodged within the US sphere and committed to development. The key players have included the state machinery, the armed forces, political parties, business groups, media and civil society, plus the ever-present external powers of Beijing and Washington. The state machinery lies at the core, surrounded by the military and a factionalized political and business elite; the embedded ideal includes Confucian-derived social ethics affirming family, hierarchy, education, consensus and local (national) development.

The sometime Japanese territories and the wider US sphere

The Meiji oligarchy read and reacted to the world that they inhabited and were anxious to avoid the fate of their neighbour, China. They sought to join in the modern world as quickly as possible. They

pursued late development and coupled it to late imperialism. The imperial Japanese were major contributors to the long period of general crisis in East Asia: they carved out an empire in Northeast Asia and haphazardly invaded China; they seized the territories of Europeans throughout the region; yet the war with the USA and its allies saw the destruction of this empire. Japan was reduced to its home islands and the empire's sometime territorial holdings were remade as sovereign states – the available international political model – within the context of Cold War. Thereafter, unsurprisingly, through the post-war period, the key area of US influence was in Northeast Asia.

The military defeat of Japan was accomplished almost entirely by US force of arms: they set the direction of post-war Japanese development and they shaped the trajectories of those nominally sovereign states that emerged from the former territories of the Japanese empire – in particular, South Korea and Taiwan. They were not successful in China. US intervention in the civil war on the side of the Nationalists did not secure success for the armies of Chiang Kai Shek – the Nationalist armies were defeated in the north and the Nationalist elite retreated to the island of Taiwan and recreated their ROC. These events sharpened extant US hostility towards communism. Their involvement in Korea, securing division, imposing by violence a right-wing regime and then supporting the south in the Korean Civil War, all served to fix these attitudes in place. The Cold War shaped perceptions: it found expression in the reconstruction of their colony in the Philippines, reinserting into power the pre-war elite and helping to suppress popular rebellion; it found expression in their involvement in the French war of colonial withdrawal in Vietnam; it found expression in their support for the South Vietnamese regime; and it found expression in Thailand where they were happy to tolerate a succession of military dictatorships.

The Philippines Islands: Colonization, occupation and independence

The Philippines entered the modern world via a double experience of colonial rule: first, the long-term occupation of the islands by the premodern Spanish empire; and, second, the shorter occupation of the territory during the early twentieth century by the USA. The first experience was characteristically exploitative: the Spanish found a very diverse archipelago, introduced ideas of land tenure, fostered large estates, the model from home, and thereafter concentrated on the entrepot trade with China.[68] Later, the local people experienced the collapse of the Spanish Empire, which was precipitated by nationalist movements in

Latin America. Some remnants of the colonial era fled to the Philippines, and the local elites and traders reoriented themselves to the now burgeoning presence of the British Empire, in particular its trading port of Hong Kong.[69] This experience fed into a local nationalism, which found expression in war against the Spanish followed by war against their erstwhile liberators, the Americans. The Americans inherited a system of landed estates – landowners plus peasants in a patron/client system – and the USA reinforced the pattern. There was little development, save that the USA introduced its style of electoral system. During the second period of overseas empire control the Philippines elite settled into a comfortable relationship with the USA; they became a collaborationist elite, oriented towards the outside world.[70] The territory was seized by the Japanese in 1942 and it was retaken by the Americans in 1944, again at great cost to the locals.[71] After the Pacific War, America relinquished control of the Philippines but the territory was inducted into the Cold War sphere, and the USA kept large military bases and maintained familiar trading linkages.

The Philippines elite has often been characterized as committed to their own interests: economically and politically. The elite inherit the patterns of development established by the Spanish: large agricultural properties, in the past organized as economic and social units – that is, quasi-families. The notion of 'personalism' has been used to grasp the anthropology of ordinary life in the country: kinship networks are the key, either actual or fictive relationships, and this style of interaction runs through all social life – family, community, business and the state (which, therefore, is not a bureaucratic-rational operation; rather, it is both corrupt via personal links and legalistic, bothered about the rules and their manipulation). It has been called neo-colonial; the social world is layered, a pre-modern world with a modern world superimposed.[72] Economically, the elites can look to land and thereafter to other business activities. The country has landed estates and some manufacturing industry: it is a primary product and labour exporter; there are some low-level manufactures, also tourism; much is underdeveloped. The polity is marked by elite pragmatism, it exhibits an overwhelming influence from the long period of colonial rule: the Spanish introduced Catholicism; the Americans introduced a species of competitive party liberal democracy. The US-style electoral competition functions more as a route to office and plunder rather than effective clean government. And, in addition, the local struggle against both episodes of colonial rule has created a local nationalism, albeit one that seems somewhat intermittent in its expression, the consequence of an

ethnically diverse population, a layered social world (elite/mass) and an outward-focused elite.[73]

The wartime occupation by the Japanese saw elite collaboration and popular resistance; the returning US forces backed the elite and together they contrived a variant of the status quo ante. Opposition players were suppressed, the old elite continued, now in the context of independence and Cold War. The latter encouraged a flow of money into the country – as it did with other members of the US sphere – and the economy grew over the period 1946–72. Thereafter, matters took a turn for the worse with the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, who followed the familiar elite-oriented personalist strategy and enriched himself and his actual and fictive family members. The economy declined, as did social order, until his rule was terminated by the early 1986 episode of 'people power' (not 'people's power') and Cory Aquino took office, faced around seven coup attempts and then handed power on to General Ramos, in turn succeeded by Joseph Estrada (and a second people power revolt in 2001), followed by the longer rule of Gloria Arroyo (also accused of elite level corruption). Commentators have noted that the 2008–10 Wall Street/City of London financial crisis had no impact on the Philippines, as the economy was too weak to have much by way of international financial linkages. Benigno Aquino III took power in 2010.

In summary, the Philippines polity is organized around a weak state, which in turn is located within a social world that is diverse and ordered via personal networks. The key players are landed families and associated business groups; the army is influential, so too the Catholic Church. There is a gulf between elite/mass. The US colonial era gave the country a competitive liberal-democratic electoral system but this is superimposed on the deeper patronage (patron/client) system: in rural areas patrons and in urban areas boss-ism, and, whilst the public sphere is superficially vigorous, the masses are effectively demobilized.[74]

Thailand

Siam was never formally colonized and so the manner in which the country shifted into the modern world and the ways in which it managed subsequent demands upon it was distinctive; so too its entry into the post-war world, where, in brief, it left Japanese claims behind as it was drawn into the US sphere. As before, the trajectory of the polity can be unpacked in a number of phases: pre-war domestic development, the coup that created Thailand and post-war developments running into the recent period.

Siam was a long-established polity prior to the intrusions of the Europeans, and in the mid- and late nineteenth century the ruling royal elite effectively managed the demands of the British to the south in the Malay peninsular and the French to the east in Indo-China. It suited both of these state-empire powers not to press the issue of political priority and both were content to leave Siam as a kind of buffer state. The royal elite sought to learn the lessons of the newly available modern world and a programme of conservative reform from above was instigated; they adapted, they modernized and the top-down strategy was borrowed from colonial models, hence Thailand was a colony of the Thai Bangkok elite;[75] there was successful development, continued independence, elite factions, a powerful army and a demobilized mass.

Army reformers removed the absolute monarchy in 1932: they renamed the country and in 1939 it becomes Thailand; they invented a Thai nation, an official nationalism of place, monarchy and Buddhism; during the period 1930–40 the government was corporatist and nationalist; it waged a short war against the French and cooperated with the Japanese (context-bound (gathering war)). Phibun was removed from power in 1945, but the Americans supported the Thai elite in the context of both their new power and nascent Cold War. A brief nominally liberal-democratic interlude ensued. A military coup in 1947 inaugurated a long sequence of elite-dominated governments, a significant measure of continuity with pre-war days – that is, power reserved to the elite, the masses, largely peasant farmers, disregarded. Over the period a measure of import substituting development was achieved. This advanced during the 1980s, supplemented by growth in export-oriented development.

In the 1990s the development strategy was revised as local business plus bureaucrats plus Washington opted for further liberalization and economic activity ran out of control. There was a severe domestic crisis. The trouble was transmitted around East Asia. The financial crisis marked a new phase: another new constitution was prepared; Thaksin was elected in 2001, drawing much support from non-elite groups located outside Bangkok; his government successfully pursued a national development strategy; Thaksin was re-elected in 2005; and opposition from the elite and urban middle classes provided the environment for a further coup in 2006.[76] Thus an old Thai cycle was restarted: constitution, election, corruption, coup and another new constitution. The consequences of this coup ran on into the second decade of the twenty-first century with a further coup staged in 2014.

Thailand has an elite that is quite separate from the majority – it comprises the monarchy, the army, the higher reaches of the Buddhist church and the civil service. The elite project is conservative – great play is made with the status of the monarchy. Contemporary Thai politics involves these elites, recently joined by elements of the business world (it is dominated by assimilated ethnic Chinese and includes Bangkok conglomerates, new regional business groups which emerged in the 1980s and new liberal-minded metropolitan business groups). Thai politics also includes wider social forces including urban masses that are sceptical and demobilized, were rural but are now more urban, with a strong ideology of 'Thai-ness' (which celebrates place, religion and king).

The political system and embedded ideal can be summarized as follows. The key players include the monarchy, the state bureaucracy, the army, Buddhist religious organizations, metropolitan business/party, regional business/party and civil society groups. In terms of structure the monarchy plus state plus powerful metropolitan business constitute the elite, and the rest are non-elite and include the metropolitan middle classes and large rural farming populations. Historically, power and authority have revolved around Bangkok elites and they are oriented towards their monarchy-centred ideal of nation. The masses profess loyalty to the king. Historically they have been shut out of politics, but this changed recently when electoral politics suddenly offered a route towards some influence. There was a sharp negative elite reaction. Within the polity the embedded ideal includes reverence for the monarchy, acceptance of traditional hierarchies and the pre-eminence of Buddhist institutions/ideas.

The waning of the Cold War and the wider role of the USA in the Pacific Rim

As state-empires in East Asia dissolved away, both domestic and international politics were reconfigured: cast in domestic terms, the immediate post-war period saw the creation of a number of new or newly reconstituted states; and cast in international terms the immediate post-war period saw the destruction of Japanese influence, the rapid waning of European involvement and the concomitant rise of US engagement. It is an engagement which endures but is increasingly in question. The post-Pacific War rise to hegemonic status was a consequence of wartime events, changes in relative power, but the subsequently settled pattern is now undergoing subtle changes: the relative position of the USA is in decline, China is a rising power and Southeast Asian countries have

created and sustained the ASEAN. In all, the countries in the region are adjusting as events unfold.

US engagement had two broad elements: first, historical, thus the USA had been involved in the affairs of the Pacific Rim since the mid-nineteenth century (when the USA became an integrated continental power with domestic communications reaching the West Coast, where settlements rapidly developed and reached out with trade to the wider Pacific region; paradigmatically, Commodore Perry); and second, war-related, with the Pacific War, where the dynamics of war placed the USA in Northeast Asia (occupation), in the Central Pacific (occupation), in Australasia (alliances) and in Southeast Asia (occupation-plus-alliances), and the Cold War, whereby the USA effectively divided the region into blocs; nominally, communist and liberal-democratic.

Historically, the US involvement in the Pacific Rim has had a number of strands. First, Japan, where the early role of Commodore Perry in opening Japan is familiar but the subsequent long exchange of Japan and the USA is perhaps less well known. Bruce Cummings[77] examines the relationship, characterizing Japan as 'number two' (that is, long part of a US-dominated trading sphere with the phase of radical nationalist Japan of 1931–45 something of an aberration occasioned in part by the waning of economic links during the depression years). Second, China, which was the subject of the policy of the open door whereby the USA declared that the country should be open to all traders – that is, not carved up into discrete colonial or colonial-style spheres. The policy was aimed at the British, who chose to acquiesce. China was also the recipient of the inward movement of US missionaries. The upshot of these links was the formation of a view amongst sections of the US policy-making elites that they, the Americans, had some sort of special relationship or responsibility towards China. And third, outright colonial conquest – that is, the invasion and seizure of the Philippines,[78] with the result, in brief, often tagged as the maintenance of the system of landed agriculture supplemented by the superimposition of a US-style competitive popular formal political system.

These linkages (in particular, trade and diplomacy) plus associated habits of thought were reworked during the 1930s and 1940s, and these changes were associated with two sets of wars. First, the tangled sequence of exchanges between Japan, China, the European state-empires and the USA which issued in three interrelated conflicts (each with further internal subdivisions): the Second Sino-Japanese War, the exchange between Japan and the USA (the Pacific War) and the wars of colonial independence; and then, second, the exchange between the

USA and the newly established PRC, which fuels the Cold War in East Asia. These interlinked conflicts remade East Asia.

The wars of the 1930s and 1940s were confused episodes. The Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45 had its roots in imperial Japanese perceptions of the decline of China – that is, the quasi-colonial collapse of the hitherto core culture/polity of the wider sphere of East Asia, coupled to notions of pan-Asianism that implied a responsibility for Asia-in-general which segued into justifying nationalism and expansion. As all-out war developed, the war aims of the Japanese were unclear, but the narrowly military exchange was decidedly one-sided, plus efforts on the Chinese side were hampered by the long-running civil war. The Sino-Japanese War attracted the attention of the US government which, prodded in part by those elements of the policy community that took the USA to have some sort of special link with China, took exception to Japanese activities. The diplomatic exchanges spiralled downwards during the early 1930s until eventually, confronted by damaging trade sanctions (iron/steel and oil), the Japanese military elite opted for war, thereby precipitating the conflict which came to be known in the West as the Pacific War. The upshot was unequivocal military defeat for Japan, occupation and the firm location of the polity within the post-war liberal-trading sphere centred on the USA. And, finally, these interlinked conflicts involved the eclipse of state-empires, mostly European-centred but also including the US possession of the Philippines, as local nationalist groups took their chance, organized and lodged claims for independent states. European attempts at recolonization were in the main unsuccessful and so the years of war gave rise to a number of newly fashioned or refashioned states, which then looked to build nations and pursue development. Overall, as a consequence of these wars, by 1945 the territory of East Asia was beginning to assume its contemporary form: Japan had shrunk to its home islands, state-empire systems were beginning to fade and the outlines of a new pattern of states was visible. Thereafter a final element was added in the guise of the impact of the – widely debated – Cold War.[79]

Within its bloc, the USA supported anti-communist political groups with military aid, economic aid, cultural aid (via exchange programmes) and political/diplomatic aid (that is, they treated them as allies). The local elites in receipt of this assistance were able to secure control of their territories. Hamilton-Hart[80] comments that, in respect of Southeast Asia, only Thailand and the Philippines showed any signs of domestic pluralism. Other countries embraced the idea of resisting communism and maintained authoritarian regimes, and similar authoritarian or outright

military dictatorships were found in those Northeast Asian territories linked to the USA – Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.

The bloc system was aimed at containing China, and it sustained a US role in the region, but China followed its own trajectory of unification, state-socialism and recently market-oriented opening up, the idea of peaceful rising or peaceful development. The countries in the Washington-oriented bloc are now rich and prosperous. The region as a whole has recovered and the structures of power that underpin patterns of life in the region are in the process of reconfiguration, but routes to the future are not given, they are contingent, the outcome of exchanges between players and that being so, the nature of the role of the USA in now in question. Peter Katzenstein[81] has addressed this issue, arguing, first, that any particular country or area will exhibit three layers of activity – national, regional and global – each with its own logic, and, second, that looking at the system as a whole, the bloc system of the Cold War era has been replaced by a hub-and-spoke system dominated by the USA. This last noted claim is deeply implausible – the state socialist bloc centred on China has made sweeping changes and it is now integrated into a dense network of interlinkages within East Asia, and China is a great power in the process of construction whose elite are building their own network of linkages throughout the contemporary global system.

State-socialist polities: China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

In the final months of the Pacific War, the USA's armed forces inflicted numerous military defeats upon the forces of Japan:[82] there were major sea-borne landings, notably in the Philippines,[83] and in Okinawa[84] the naval forces of the USA ranged freely in the Pacific Ocean,[85] the US airforce launched devastating attacks on Japanese cities and allied armies advanced in Burma whilst fighting continued throughout China.

In China the Japanese had continued their attacks late into the last year of the war and their armies eventually occupied most of the country, but they could not hold the territories that they seized and consequently they were never secure. At the same time, as soon as Japan launched the Pacific War, both the Nationalists and the CCP had decided that the Americans would defeat the Japanese, and, as the end of the war came in sight, both were content to avoid battles with the Japanese as the crucial conflicts would come later when the civil war was settled.[86] Other forces were also looking to the end of the war: the Soviet Union and the USA both contemplated the possible shape of the

post-war era and how the disposition of their armies – that is, where they were when the fighting finished – could impact future arrangements. Two aspects of these numerous calculations can be noted: the USSR offered support to the CCP, and whilst this was always measured at this time it involved in particular allowing the CCP access to weapons surrendered or captured from the Japanese defeated by the USSR in Manchuria. The USA offered support to the Nationalists with arms and logistics, thus the Americans moved Nationalist armies up to north China. It was here in Manchuria that the armies of the two sides met and the CCP inflicted a severe defeat upon the Nationalists. In 1949 the PRC was established and the remnant forces of the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan, thereafter supported by the USA as the Republic of China.

This established China as a state-socialist state. It drew the immediate enmity of the USA. The division of Korea led to North Korea joining the state-socialist bloc. The Vietnamese and the wider Indo-China War led, over time, to the former colonies of France joining the state-socialist bloc. But the bloc never assumed the form of a complete unit; there were always shifting relationships amongst its putative members. Thus Indo-China was free of Cold War proxy wars only in the late 1970s and by then there had been USA/PRC diplomatic rapprochement whilst there were now tensions between China and Vietnam. Plus, from the late 1970s, China was turning outwards to trade with countries in the wider world. So whilst a cold war bloc did form, it began to change almost as soon as it was completed. Nonetheless, it was via membership of a cold war state-socialist bloc that a number of countries took their place in post-empire East Asia: China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

China and the shift to the modern world

China entered the modern world via an unequal exchange with the expanding European and US powers. Over the course of the nineteenth century, European, US and later Japanese industrial-capitalism undermined the Qing dynasty and the country was turned into a series of quasi-colonies. And in China, reform movements made three attempts to remove the burden of foreign concessions in order to participate independently in the international system of sovereign states. First, the 1911 revolution, which collapsed into multiple conflicts between regional warlords, a long-drawn out civil war ordered around two reform-oriented political parties and an invasion from a neighbouring state. Second, the 1949 revolution of the CCP, which reunified China, expelled foreign powers and directed the country onto the line of state-socialist

national development. Third, the contemporary period, following the overall policy of 'reform and opening' inaugurated in 1978, which, notwithstanding some acute problems, has produced many successes. The trajectory of the country has not been a smooth curve of upward achievement. Nevertheless, it has been an accumulative success and China celebrated its return to recognized global status with the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

(i) The republican revolution (and the civil war)

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were many groups and intellectuals in China looking to learn and apply the lessons of the modern world – Chinese intellectuals stressed Chinese culture whilst looking to borrow Western ideas from Europe and the USA. Around the turn of the twentieth century, Japan provided a model of such learning, and its sweeping reforms and success were viewed positively. Numerous ideas were debated; ideas of the state, nation and progress; doctrines of fascism and communism; and notions of democracy. However, domestic politics were fractured as multiple groups opposed the Qing authorities and the state disintegrated into multiple centres of power/authority. Moore[87] comments that by the early years of the twentieth century, attempts at reform initiated by the Qing authorities were futile, they lacked the social base necessary to carry reforms into practice, and active groups did not want a reformed system; they wanted to remove the Qing authorities. The nationalist revolution of 1911 began as a dispute about funding the development of railways in central China, and these protests spread. The Qing rulers were removed. In Southern China a replacement government was announced and these groups sought to create a modern republic. The key figure was Sun Yat Sen and the arguments that he advanced affirmed the three principles of nationalism, democracy and the people's livelihood. However, in the event, the republic was quickly overtaken by events.

The revolution ran from 1911 to 1913. A government was set up in the south although it never controlled the country. The hitherto central authorities faded away and other parts of the country went their own ways, and many of these local-level polities were organized around officials or soldiers of the now defunct Qing. In the period 1913–16, Yuan Shikai, a key Qing period general, assumed power and also assumed the style of a warlord, and in time he declared himself the new emperor, but he died in 1916. The country then dissolved into great confusion and the period 1916–28 was dominated by the activities of many locally based warlords, and there were many inter-warlord conflicts/wars.

The republic had seen the development of political parties, two in particular: in 1912 the KMT was created from an earlier underground insurrectionist organization; and in 1921 the CCP was founded. Tension ran through their relationship, but the two parties did cooperate in the First United Front of 1924–7, which sought to resist the warlords and advance the ideas of the republic. The successor to Sun Yat Sen, who died in 1925, as leader of the KMT was Chiang Kai Shek, and he sought to resolve the warlord issue in a military-cum-political campaign. The Northern Expedition of 1926–8 saw the republic's armies move northwards, overcoming or co-opting local warlords along the way. The first objective was Shanghai and the advance was successful. However, in Shanghai, in alliance with local business groups and gangsters, he attacked the local Communist Party, effectively destroying it. The episode was symptomatic of the violence of the whole period: elite violence, evidenced in targeted assassinations and wars, along with mass violence, evidenced in protests and social breakdown. The KMT's attack on the Shanghai communists also marked the start of a long-running civil war.

After the campaign, which secured a more or less united China, the KMT established a new capital in Nanjing: hence the Nanjing Decade (1927–37). The politics were authoritarian, government was chaotic and corrupt, but it was also a period of economic growth. Links to the outside world were extensive and as the treaty port settlements remained, foreign influence stayed strong. It might therefore be noted that the KMT government faced extraordinary problems and to these could be added the conflicts with the Communist Party.

The KMT made determined efforts to destroy the Communist Party. After the debacle in Shanghai – where the local leaders had tried to organize the working classes, a numerically tiny group in the wider context of the population, but the groups specified in the classic texts of the Marxist tradition – the leadership of the party now turned to the peasants and sought to re-establish itself in rural areas. The remnants of the leadership along with their supporters retreated to remote rural areas where they formed soviets – that is, territories of nominal socialist democracy. It was these that the KMT armies attacked. There were a number of encirclement campaigns. The key base was the Jiangxi Soviet (1931–4) and, whilst it survived numerous campaigns, it was overwhelmed in 1934 and the Communist Party withdrew. The retreat lasted for months and took them around remote southern and northern areas of the country. It cost them the bulk of their army. A remnant survived to re-establish a base area in the north. Chiang planned a further

attack, but this was thwarted by the actions of members of his own side; one warlord intervened and a truce was arranged, a common enemy identified: the Japanese.

The Second United Front of 1936–45 was directed towards this common enemy and it had its occasion in these military advances. In 1937 the Second Sino-Japanese War began. In the period 1937–41 the Nationalist forces offered the main resistance to the invaders and then, with the start of the Pacific War, both the Nationalists and the CCP preferred to wait for what they took to be the inevitable military defeat of Japan at the hands of the USA; the two parties manoeuvred and the expectation was of renewed conflict.

The immediate post-war years were a period of great confusion and into all of this the two great powers currently active in the region – the USSR and the USA – moved to order the end of the fighting to their advantage; so too did the KMT and the Communist Party. In the period 1945–6 the People's Liberation Army took control of abandoned Japanese weapons – those seized by the Red Army as it swept aside the Japanese forces – whilst the USA made supplies and logistic support available to the armies of the Nationalists. The USA helped to move the Nationalist armies to the north. In 1946–9 the civil war resumed and the Nationalist armies advanced into Manchuria, where they suffered a comprehensive defeat. Mao declared the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. The remnants of the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan where they were protected and funded by the USA. The ROC survived after a fashion, later developing into the success story of contemporary Taiwan.

Nationalist China in the 1930s and 1940s is often written off as authoritarian, corrupt and chaotic, its leader tagged as a self-aggrandizing quasi-fascist, the whole episode little more than an unappealing side-show in contrast to the main drama of Sino-Japanese War and the emergence of communist China. But the republic had notable achievements: development in urban areas (Chinese capitalists and foreign capitalist expansion); recovery of Chinese control of concessions and trade tariffs; some deepening of reach of state (taxing and investing); some stability in rural areas, which remain traditional (peasant farmers, landlords and rural gentry); and resistance to the invading Japanese.

(ii) The peasant revolution of the CCP

The victorious CCP dealt harshly with domestic opponents. As with other replacement elites, their first concern was with securing the

territory and political opponents, including sympathizers, and supporters of the old nationalist regime – landlord classes and capitalist businessmen – were tackled in an episode that produced significant casualty figures. The related task was the construction of a communist state-party system; again, a task of extensive organizational and social effort (that is, establishing the machineries of administration, whilst mobilizing or disciplining the population, drawing them into the new elite's political-cultural project). The new project had a distinctive intellectual-moral character. Mao and his close allies advanced an amalgam of ideas: first, Marxism-Leninism as a framework of ideas, hence class, class conflict and progress; second, Chinese nationalism, where this centred on a celebration of the country, its culture and its people, something affirmed during the long war against the invading Japanese; and, third, peasant vitalism – that is, an affirmation of the value of the human energy of the peasantry. All of this added up to a distinctive set of ideas – that is, a commitment to an activist, peasant-focused egalitarian national development, and the project was translated into practice with schemes of agricultural and industrial collectivization, campaigns of mass mobilization along with Soviet-derived schemes turned to the development of heavy industry, urban reconstruction and so on. The overall history can be grasped as a series of key episodes: popular development, problematical advances and radical experimentation, ending, in all, in a species of failure as the leadership chose a new direction.

In the period 1950–6, rural cooperatives and later urban cooperatives were established. The notion of class struggle is used to remove class enemies, in particular, rural landed elites. It cost great loss of life, but the process was popular with the peasantry who gained land. Then in the period 1957–8 the Communist Party authorities issued an invitation to intellectuals and others to offer criticisms of the record of the revolution, and after a remark from Mao it became known as the One Hundred Flowers. However, the authorities were shocked at the resultant barrage of complaint, much from educated technocrats, and the invitation was withdrawn as critics were attacked as rightists. The response was repression, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, and it reduced intellectuals and professionals to silence. This loss of technical professional advice did not help the authorities with their otherwise progressive development projects. The episode was followed in 1958–60 by an ambitious project, the Great Leap Forward. The CCP invoked the putative energy of the peasantry in order to jump stages of development; the people were mobilized for economic advance and some success was followed by extensive failure and episodes of famine. It was a disaster.[88] Mao was

side-lined in the politics of the Communist Party, becoming a leadership figure, as the technocrats re-emerged to take control.

Mao resisted marginalization. The period 1966–9 saw the episode of the Cultural Revolution during which Mao and his allies invited young people to rebel against the established Communist Party authorities. It was a quasi-coup, producing great chaos and many casualties, and it was only stopped when it threatened to engulf the army and thus the basis of the state. Yet the political confusion continued. Finally, after the death of Mao in 1976, there was a crucial elite power struggle. After a relatively short period his supporters were ousted, elite figures were subjected to a show trial and Deng Xiaoping seized control and quickly took the first tentative steps towards reform.

Against those critics who would dismiss the episode, the period recorded significant achievements: the expulsion of foreign interests; the unification of the country; securing peace (after the 1911–49 crisis period); rural land reform – the dispossession of landlords and land to the peasants; rural political reform – the destruction of the gentry class with power to peasants and workers; agricultural reforms – the construction of infrastructure and agricultural extension services; urban industrial development – the establishment of state-owned enterprises and large cooperatives; and urban political development – the dispossession of capitalist classes and power to peasants and workers. The economic record was reasonable, and there was steady growth until the last phases of the period, but the costs of political turmoil were very high and after the death of Mao the leadership of the party chose to move in a new direction.

(iii) The 1978 reform programme

The leadership looked to the record of neighbouring countries and stressed learning from the West/East; knowledge and technology were embraced and reforms begun to copy the East Asian development model; the programme was technocratic, piecemeal, developmental and national; and the party-state system was maintained along with class demobilization, market mobilization and all of the concomitant stresses and strains of headlong catch-up growth. The new leadership's record can be summarized in terms of a series of phases.

In 1978, Deng took control, rejected the Maoism of the Cultural Revolution with its focus on the ideas of the leader, its concern for political criticism and mass action, and instead opted for pragmatism in economic policy-making. What matters, Deng argued, is whether or not a policy brings the desired results. The new policy entailed the slow

dismantling of the state socialist command economy and reform was pursued step by step.

In the early period of 1978–84, agricultural reforms and special economic zones were established. In agriculture there is a process of decollectivization. The household responsibility system is inaugurated and the process is complemented by the establishment of town and village enterprises. In all, it is a species of rural capitalism. It is successful. The reforms in rural agriculture were successful and production rapidly advanced. In the period 1984–7, industry and finance were reformed but these proved to be more problematical; industrial enterprises were given more autonomy and moved towards commercial market operation, and there were questions of divestiture, questions of finance and questions of performance. Specialist banks were also established and moved towards commercial market operation, although there were questions about their performance. One aspect of these changes was the establishment of special economic zones in five coastal cities. One of these was immediately adjacent to Hong Kong and money from the territory flooded into the new liberal trading area.

The strategy of reform was criticized but Deng's 1992 Southern Tour, which reaffirmed the importance of the reform programme. Shortly thereafter a new policy was adopted that was focused on constructing a socialist market economy. In October 1992 a new policy was accepted – the 'socialist market economy'. Then in 2001, after long negotiations, China joined the WTO. Overall, reform has been headlong and there has been rapid economic growth, but there are major social tensions. Yet there has been thus far on the part of the party-state machinery a firm determination to maintain political control.

(iv) Achievements and problems

The reform programme has been very ambitious; the state socialist system was distinctive as the party state broadly directed all aspects of economy and citizens lives; there was much scope for flexibility in translation of theory into practice and many inefficiencies and resistances; the state was intermingled with the economy and disentangling the two was difficult; it involved creating a marketplace with law, firms and consumers; it involved creating social welfare systems with health, education and housing; it involved reworking the political system in order to legitimate the new arrangements. The economic reforms and consequent social impacts and reforms have continued but the political reforms do not seem to have advanced: there have been reforms to the membership of the Communist Party, now with around 85 million

members; there have been (repeated) drives against problems of corruption, now routinely accepted to be pervasive; there has been a noticeable stress on nationalism, and this finds expression in the official media and in social media, and it is often virulently anti-Japanese and thereafter suspicious of the USA; and it presents itself as an aggressive nationalism, rather than a celebration of the history and present-day situation of the nation.[89]

* * * * *

China is now a major economic power and is rapidly modernizing. It is increasingly influential politically. It has major domestic problems. It has rapidly changing relations with its neighbours, and with the USA and the European Union. The political system includes a number of key players, including the party-state machine, State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers, urban middle classes, migrants, farmers and new business enterprises. Structurally, Beijing is the core (multiple factions) but there are multiple peripheral powers (provincial capitals) and a nascent civil society (including web-based). The country is ordered around a socialist party-state,[90] the official ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics plus the doctrine of peaceful rising/development; there is an energetically promulgated nationalism built around the idea of the distinctiveness of the Han Chinese, the value of its long-established civilization and the business of being recently subject to a period of national humiliation.

China also has neighbours that are nominally socialist – North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia – and each country is pursuing its own trajectory of national development. It is worth noting that all have been subject to US military action and that all have been embroiled in domestic conflicts. The route to the modern world for these countries has thus involved extensive largely, but not exclusively, foreign-inspired violence.

The socialist bloc I: North Korea

Kim Il Sung ruled an autocratic state socialist country until his death in 1994, and he was succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Ill, who, in 2011, was in turn succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Un; the political system has been ironically tagged as family Stalinism. The country has followed an avowed strategy of self-reliance, coupled to an affirmation of the policy of military first – the army is the key institution in the state. North Korea maintains comparatively large armed forces and it is supported by a mobilized population. In respect of the economy, the elite

have pursued a familiar state-socialist strategy focused initially on heavy industry – after experience of war, when the US Air Force destroyed virtually all North Korean urban settlements, much of the plant was built underground – in general, since the Korean War, the country has been largely closed off to the outside world. It has withdrawn into an idiosyncratic variant of state socialism, widely regarded as an historical dead-end. It seems to lack the capacity for domestic reform/advance and so reform does not appear to be imminent. It has one crucial ally in China. The Chinese government, like others in the region, views the regime with some nervousness, fearing that if the state collapses then they will be left with the problems of refugees and the subsequent issue of the future of the territory. Neither the Chinese nor the South Korean governments evidence any present enthusiasm for the reunification of the peninsula.

The country confronts a number of ongoing issues, including poverty and international isolation, relations with China (these are crucial), relations with South Korea (often pursued by means of low-level violence), relations with Japan and relations with the USA – a particular concern for the government, which has been seeking diplomatic recognition from the USA for several years. The USA has made intermittent attempts to work with the DPRK but at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century it seems content to follow a course of considered inactivity.

The socialist bloc II: French Indo-China

The French were late to empire in East Asia and they conquered Indo-China in a series of military campaigns late in the nineteenth century. After the June 1940 military defeat of France by German armies and the establishment of the Vichy regime, the authorities in these colonial territories remained loyal to the Vichy government. These French territories were occupied by Japan – bit by bit – during the Pacific War. After the war the French – in the guise of one of the allies – returned to Indo-China to be greeted by Vietnamese nationalists. The French were anxious to recover their territorial holdings and, after a year of fruitless negotiations, war began, but by the mid-1950s it was clear to the French that they could not win and they withdrew. At which point, in brief, the French Empire had dissolved into Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. But in Vietnam the Americans took over, seeing the war against the nationalists as an element of the wider task of the containment of communist China. Vietnam became the site of a proxy war – one that spilled out over much of Indo-China. The Americans failed in their efforts and withdrew in

1973. Thereafter the war ran on until 1975, when their erstwhile allies, the South Vietnamese, were defeated, at which point the last group of aspirant foreign colonial authorities had been removed from East Asia.

As before, the history can be grasped in terms of a number of phases: pre-contact and conquest; resistance and eventual independence; and the successes and problems of the years of achieved independence.

(i) Vietnam

Vietnam was a long-established polity. It emerged from relations between ancient local civilizations and it became a tributary state of China, a part of the Sino-centric sphere in the region. The country was invaded by France in the nineteenth century when a series of encroachments led to the creation of the colony of Indo-China. The opening exchanges took place in the period of 1858–62 when a number of low-level military campaigns extracted concessions from the Vietnamese government. There were further concessions granted during period of 1862–7. In 1863 Cambodia became a French protectorate. The Sino-French War of 1884–5 extended the colonial territory into northern parts of Vietnam. The Franco-Siamese War of 1993 resulted in the French taking control of Laos.

At that point, French Indo-China was established. The colonial authorities then sought to develop their holdings: modern infrastructure and plantations. Historians record modest success and local opposition. After June 1940 the colonial authorities maintained allegiance to Vichy France. In the next few years the country was occupied piecemeal by Japan and then the local economy went into decline.

As the Pacific War came to an end, local nationalists sought independence and the returning French – now allied with Britain and the USA – resisted. After a period of manoeuvring, the French opted for war and a long campaign ensued, decisively ended in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. The 1954 Geneva Conference divided Indo-China into four countries – North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. A further war began involving North and South Vietnam and the USA (in the context of Cold War anti-communism). In all the country was at war from 1945 to 1975, during which time it suffered extensive losses. It was not until 1975 that Vietnam finally secured its independence.

The Vietnamese elite confronted a country ruined by 30-odd years of warfare. The elite were committed to a state-socialist strategy of national development. A state-socialist economic policy was followed with urban state industry and peasant communes, but it was not successful. However, in the late 1980s the government began market-oriented reforms

and has seen some success. The USA ended its embargo in 1994. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995. The country now faces problems of domestic reform, both economic and political, but commentators nonetheless view the country as an upcoming success. The trajectory is by no means clear and the opening up to the wider global system can be read in two ways: neo-liberal globalization thinkers see inevitable market reforms and anticipate that they will continue, and the implications for the country as 'socialist' are clear, the ideology is outmoded and in decline; on the other hand, developmental state thinkers see the country as joining in the project that has been successful in other parts of East Asia. It is a tale that fits with ideas of the importance of regionalism as opposed to globalization, but the costs of reforms are high, as in, say, China, where the loss of a collective sense of direction coupled with opportunistic activity on the part of state bureaucrats points to an unclear future.[91]

The nature of the contemporary Vietnamese polity[92] is distinctive. The political culture has been shaped by a number of influences: first, long exposure to Confucian ideas taken from China, in particular by the elite, plus Buddhism and the local-level folk religions of a peasant society; second, brief exposure to ideas from the West introduced by French invasion and colonization, influential amongst the elite (as in, say, Republican China) but never much honoured by the colonial power; then, third, war and the valour of ordinary people in the long pursuit of independence. The upshot is a Confucian inflected state-socialism that is in significant measure home-grown (unlike, say, Eastern Europe post-1945) and thus popular, but add to this *doi moi*, the top-down programme of economic reform oriented towards market socialism, and it is rather less clear with all of the problems that are associated with China – that is, corruption, nepotism and unequal development are found in Vietnam.

(ii) Cambodia

In 1863 the formerly long established, agrarian and Buddhist polity was absorbed into the French colonial empire. It was run as a colony. The country became independent from France in 1953 but was engulfed by the Indo-China war in the 1960s and 1970s. The territory was used by North Vietnam to run troops and supplies into the south. These logistic routes were heavily bombed by the Americans. Large amounts of damage were inflicted upon innocent rural people and these attacks helped to pave the way for the overthrow of the government. The Khmer Rouge took power in 1975 and inaugurated a Maoist-style agrarian socialism. It was a disaster. In addition the Khmer Rouge government

launched border attacks on Vietnam. The Vietnamese intervened in 1978/89 and removed the regime. However, China and the West supported the Khmer Rouge with assorted motivations: for the Americans, 'punishing Vietnam'; and for the Chinese, asserting their power against their Vietnamese neighbour; and for the rest of the West, tagging along behind the USA. A United Nations-sponsored peace agreement led to elections in 1993, when Hun Sen took power. In 1999 the country joined ASEAN. After many years of warfare, reconstruction and development have proceeded slowly; the economy remains largely agrarian, with some tourism and some low-end manufactures, but change is very slow and the country remains poor and underdeveloped.

(iii) Laos

The territory was an outlying part of the Siamese kingdom – rural, poor and ruled by a mix of petty kingdoms, which provided the elite families.[93] It was absorbed into the French colonial empire in 1893 and run as a part of the colony of Indo-China – the French favoured these elite families. The country gained independence from France in 1953 through the Royal Lao Government. The elite government was opposed by a communist-style grouping of the poor and marginalized. To make matters worse the Indo-China war spilled over into country, the Americans became involved, so too the Soviet Union. The as the position of the Americans in Vietnam crumbled, the extant Laos government was overthrown and the Pathet Lao took power in 1975. The government established a state-socialist political system. But the country is poor, essentially an agrarian economy. There have been market-oriented reforms since the late 1980s. The country joined ASEAN in 1997.

The socialist bloc III: Changes

The Cold War division of Europe was clearly delineated. There was a Western bloc oriented towards Washington, and an Eastern bloc that looked to Moscow and the borders were drawn early and they were drawn sharply – the famous 'iron curtain'. The end was equally clear as the bloc system dissolved away in the autumn months of 1989. But the situation in East Asia was never so neat and tidy. The bloc oriented towards Washington was not monolithic. Nor was the state-socialist bloc; China was the core, established in 1949. The DPRK was a part of that bloc, supported by its neighbour during the 1950–3 war. North Vietnam was a part of the bloc following the division of the country in 1954. A united Vietnam had to wait until 1975. Laos and Cambodia became elements of the bloc as the war in Vietnam wound

down. So there was no neat and tidy start point nor has there been a neat and tidy end-point: China began reform and opening in 1978 and it is no longer the China of bloc time; Vietnam has followed with reforms; so too Laos and Cambodia. Arguably, only North Korea remains locked into bloc time with its doctrines of self-reliance and the military first, plus its habit of launching pin-prick military attacks on its neighbour to the south – but it is locked in alone.

At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century it no longer helps to speak of blocs. As the Cold War ended (neatly and tidily) in Europe, so it has ended – vaguely and indeterminately – in East Asia. The current regional pattern is thus the contingent outcome of the historical development trajectories of the constituent states.

The collapse of the British and Dutch state-empires in Southeast Asia

In the years before the Pacific War the state-empires of the European powers held a central place in the political economies and international politics of the territories of the region: the Dutch held power throughout the archipelago of Southeast Asia, the British were firmly ensconced in Malaya, the French held Indo-China and all had large interests via the treaty port system in China. The Americans were relatively secondary players. The Japanese were by and large active only in Northeast Asia. But the Pacific War and the related events of the wider Second World War – together with aspects of a general crisis – turned the situation in East Asia upside down. This novel situation presented aspirant replacement elites with their chance. the empires were gone and political relationships were fluid, so this was the environment within which they could pursue national development. After the Pacific War the state-empires of the Europeans in East Asia were no longer tenable, yet at the same time the sometime colonial powers returned. They did so as elements of the allied powers engaging Japan. Southeast Asia was identified as a regional or subregional military command and the British were allocated this area. In August 1945 the armies of the British had begun to reoccupy Burma and plans were in hand to continue these campaigns, but in the event they were not needed and following the Japanese surrender the British moved their forces in the Malay peninsula, into the Dutch East Indies and into Indo-China, and they reoccupied Hong Kong. French and Dutch forces followed them into these areas. In this way the sometime colonial rulers sought to

re-establish these Southeast Asian parts of their state-empire systems, but to no avail – empire was now untenable, and a number of wars of colonial recovery followed, all failed and the Europeans withdrew. Subsequently, down the years, the new states have proved successful, the Cold War bloc system has waned, US predominance has lessened and in the early years of the twenty-first century there are signs of a European return to the region, not as colonial powers but as traders within the extant global system.

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Myanmar: The pursuit of 'Burmese socialism'

Myanmar was an independent kingdom prior to British invasions in the nineteenth century. The British organized three wars against the Burmese kings. During colonial rule the economy prospered and the country became home to multiple groups. One aspect of colonial policy identified and protected peripheral minority ethnic groups and relatedly the authorities tolerated incoming migration from neighbouring provinces in British India. Burmese nationalists had organized prior to the Pacific War. For a period they supported the incoming Japanese but later they switched to the British, their over-riding goal being independence. Following independence there was civil war before Rangoon could assert its authority over the whole territory of the country. Thereafter the elite turned inwards. The political history can be grasped in terms of a number of phases: pre-contact, colonial era and the subsequent period of an inward-looking independence.

In the pre-contact period a core authority – kings – exercised a fluid personal control. This was the Burmese core. In addition there were many ethnic groups on the periphery (Mons, Shan, Kachin, Karen, Chin and Wa). Then the territory was invaded and colonized by the British. It took the British three wars to establish their control and thereafter there was inward migration by Chinese and Indians, and eventually Burma became a prosperous colony.[94] The British superimposed their view of the country upon the country itself: European rules of property, European notions of ethnic identity and a colonial administrative structure; hierarchical – the locals adjusted but the locals also rebelled. The British were relaxed about inward migration from India, treating Burma as a part of British India. The colonial capital city was Rangoon. It functioned as a colonial port and administrative city, linking the Burmese hinterland with empire trading networks – cosmopolitan and

outward oriented. It provided an environment within which progressive nationalists could function. In 1942 the Japanese invaded the territory and there were military campaigns throughout much of the country. The northern areas, the adjacent Yunnan province in China, became an allied supply route servicing the armies of the KMT. During the Japanese occupation, the authorities encouraged nationalist Burmese as the country was slated to become a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The period 1937–47 can be read in terms of limited local government – that is, in the last few years of the colonial holding there was desultory talk about reform and some limited local rule, and during the Japanese occupation the same situation held.[95] The Japanese invasion along with the British scorched-earth retreat devastated the country, resulting in dead, injured and displaced, plus extensive material damage. The Japanese authorities acknowledged local nationalist aspirations but the demands of the war meant that relatively little was accomplished. Aung San established an Independence Army then as the Japanese granted nominal independence in 1943, a National Army. The nationalists' over-riding concern was with independence, and as the military situation turned against the Japanese, Aung San formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and they sought independence as the British returned. A further round of destructive warfare ensued.[96] Rangoon was recaptured in May 1945, there was further fighting in the south and then the surrender in August 1945. Then the post-war drive for independence began. The British were content to leave, but it was not immediately clear how and when. A military administration was imposed. It was not competent. There was then a lengthy political struggle between returning British and local Burmese leaders, in particular Aung San. [97] The independence talks were difficult,[98] and independence began very badly indeed.

Aung San was assassinated in 1947. Formal independence was secured in 1948. At that time the economy was wrecked, local politics was fragmented in the wake of the assassination, the country was awash with weapons, and in this disordered social and political condition there were multiple local-level armed conflicts. Historians record this period as civil war between the forces loyal to the formal state based in Rangoon and various peripheral ethnic states, plus local volunteer militias and local communists. It was a chaotic situation. The replacement elite had to build an army, secure the territory and initiate a socialist project of development. This was not a simple task. The authorities in Rangoon were only able slowly to assert their control. U Nu was leader from 1947 to 1958. A coup placed General Ne Win in

power from 1958 to 1960. An election made U NU leader from 1960 to 1962. A condition of semi-civil war was the normal situation and the army was the key to political life. In 1962, Ne Win again took power. In the period 1962–74 the government ideology/policy was termed the Burmese Way to Socialism: socialism plus Buddhism, anti-Western materialism, extreme nationalism and authoritarian rule. In 1974 there was a new constitution and Ne Win plus army were ruled until 1988. The economy was nationalized, Indian and Chinese business withdrew and the economy declined.

In June 1988 there were riots, Ne Win resigned and elections were announced. Then in September 1988 an army coop established the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and in May 1990 elections were held and Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy secured a large majority but the army ignored the result. SLORC then renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council and the army/party elite continued to control the country. There was ongoing fighting at the borders with refugees moving to Thailand. Ordinary people lived their lives as best they could.

However, there were some reforms. The country joined ASEAN in 1997 although the motivation of existing members was not entirely clear: anti-PRC or completing Southeast Asia or maybe some commercial opportunism. Myanmar has been seen as an embarrassment to the ASEAN. However, in 2012 the new leader General Thien released Aung San Su Chi from house arrest and there are reforms in process. There has been a flood of inward investment, much from other ASEAN members and from China. The contemporary Myanmar polity has key players including the army, Buddhist religious organizations, ethnic minorities and a hitherto suppressed civil society, and the army remains a key institution, and so too the Buddhist church.

Malaysia: The pursuit of an ethnically managed system

In the pre-modern era the peninsula of Malay was home to a number of Malay sultanates, shifting personalized polities, commanding a trading port or river valley. The extant Malay sultanates were drawn into the British Empire in the nineteenth century through trade links and some political manoeuvring and relatively little overt violence. At first the Straits Settlements were established – Penang, Malacca and Singapore – and these were the key trading ports linking the area into the British state-empire system and serving the traffic with distant China. Then in 1874 the Pangkor Engagement saw the British move into the peninsula. The system of FMS/UMS fixed the sultans in place as elements of the

state-empire system. There was large-scale Chinese migration plus some Indian indentured labour, and the territory ended up with a geographical, economic and ethnic divide: the west was more developed than the east and it received more inward migration. The 1930s were the high tide of colonial Malaya. The economy rested on primary product exports – tin, rubber, copra and spices – and manifested social division, nascent nationalism and colonial elite complacency.

The Pacific War destroyed the British state-empire in East Asia. In 1941/2, Japanese armed forces advanced down the peninsula, capturing the key trading port and fortress of Singapore in a short military campaign. The British continued the war from the secure base of British India, and during the war years they supported the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, which was mostly Chinese and mostly communist. The Japanese surrender allowed the British to reoccupy Singapore and the peninsula of Malaya, and then negotiations about independence were started: the situation, like others, was confused, as there were numerous players and they had incompatible agendas. The British had commercial interests which they wished to protect; the Malays saw the territory as their own and sought to avoid any loss of control; settled minority migrant groups sought to protect their positions. The port city of Singapore was separated off as a Crown colony. The first attempt at a constitutional settlement – the Malayan Union – was rejected by the Malays. The second attempt met Malay demands about citizenship – the Malayan Federation.

In 1957 the Federation of Malaya became an independent sovereign state but the pursuit of national development was slow and ethnic divisions remained an issue. The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO (1946)) was the key Malay organization. It formed links with the Malaysian Chinese Association (1949) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (1946) in the Alliance (1951), and its successor the National Front (1973). In 1963–5 the territory was linked with Singapore as Malaysia. It proved to be an unhappy period and there were political clashes, elite-level personality clashes and then a velvet divorce. In 1969 there were serious race riots. In response the government adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1972, whose objective was to upgrade the Malays through programmes of positive discrimination in order to reduce ethnic material inequality and so ameliorate divisions between communities.

The country has had an elite committed to national development but the pursuit of this goal has been constrained by certain aspects of domestic politics: the country is riven by an interlinked set of ethnic,

economic and political divisions (Malay/Chinese/Indian) inherited in part from the colonial era and in part by the events of the Japanese occupation (seen as favouring Malays whilst persecuting the Chinese). After independence in 1958, the state pursued import-substituting industrialization on the basis of a primary product economy (plantations and mines), but there were also programmes to industrialize. But in 1969, interethnic riots made this slow strategy politically unacceptable. The New Economic Policy of 1972 was the response. A development plan was designed to upgrade the economy of the country so as to ameliorate the ethnic divisions. In particular, the intention was to uplift the Malay population so that the country did not have an ethnic, economic and political divide. To this end a series of pro-Malay policies were implemented in education, employment and the economy. The programme enjoyed broad success – along with the problems associated with positive discrimination programmes. In the 1980s, Mahathir Mohammed pursued further development policies – the 'look east' and learn lessons from Japan, and '20–20 vision' looking to become a developed economy by the year 2020.

Mahathir's development policy operated in elite corporatist style: elite deals and rewards to associated groups. Mahathir controlled these processes effectively: co-option and reward coupled to control and suppression (the ISA (1960), inherited from the former colonial power, allowed for detention without trial).[99] However, the 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed elite-level tensions: a Mahathir faction and an Anwar faction, both with networks of corporate friends; Anwar was ambitious, linked to liberalizers and aspired to Mahathir's job; the overt conflict was resolved in Mahathir's favour as his opponent was arrested on what were widely regarded as dubious charges. An alliance of opponents of the National Front combined to fight general elections, but they were unsuccessful.

The pursuit of national development has been broadly successful. The material quality of life has improved for all citizens. The NEP has produced a Malay middle class. The NEP has also attracted criticism from those who are not advantaged by it – non-Malays. The pursuit of material advance has also prompted criticisms from more conservative Malays, thus the dominant element of the National Front, UMNO, has engaged in numerous exchanges with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (1948). The National Front programme has also been criticized on the grounds of its undemocratic nature, thus the Democratic Action Party and recently the political groupings formed around the ex-UMNO figure of Anwar Ibrahim.[100]

The established national development trajectory continues, elite-level political conflicts and interethnic tensions not withstanding. The country has a vigorous political life, an intermittently repressive central government and it has experienced rapid development over last 20 years. The nature of the contemporary Malaysian polity revolves around key players in the National Front alliance, which draws together representatives of the three main ethnic groups in the country. There are a number of opposition political parties but their chances of securing power seem to be poor.

Singapore: The pursuit of national development

Singapore was a key nexus in the British state-empire trading network and it was plugged into the global system.[101] It was a staple port from around 1900.[102] The replacement elite's colonial inheritance was possession of a major trading port. The elite were firmly committed to national development and they used the machineries of the state to mobilize population. The overarching economic policy stance has involved diversification and upgrading. The population has been appropriately disciplined and rewarded. Built around its key port facilities, the territory has become a manufacturing centre, a financial centre and, more recently, a centre for commercially oriented scientific research. Over the last few years it has added the machineries of a commercial leisure centre. The elite target has been for the country to become a regional hub within ASEAN. However, domestic critics have wondered whether these goals do in fact serve the wider interests of the population and in recent elections the long-dominant People's Action Party (PAP) experienced some significant defeats. All that said, today the country is rich and ordered. Its overall historical development trajectory can be unpacked in terms of a number of phases: early contact, formal colonial era and post-colonial trajectory.[103]

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In 1818 the geographical island of Singapore was extracted from Johor-Riau sultanate by the British in order to serve as a trading base. There was some initial elite manoeuvring for power in the period 1823–35, until a Malay/British rapprochement was engineered and the Malay rulers turned to the development of Johor. In the1840s the Malays, British and Chinese shared power. Thereafter there was an inward flow of migrants from around the archipelago and from China. The ethnic Chinese became the largest social grouping. The territory prospered. The opium and spirit tax farms paid for port and settlement.

Commentators argue that local groups regarded the island as just one more Malay-style trading port, hence its early success, but Singapore was a possession of the British East India Company and it was a key trading port within the state-empire system; a transshipment point for goods from the archipelago outward and manufactures inwards, plus the important passing trade with China (often via Hong Kong). The company provided the framework for activity, business serviced the port and the masses provided labour. The politics reflected the situation: power lay with civil servants in India, and within the colony local expatriate business elites manoeuvred for influence, local Chinese businesses grew more important and the masses of migrants organized themselves by themselves and divisions in economic and political life were reflected in spatial divisions within settlement.[104]

In 1867, London took control from the East India Company, a governor was appointed, and civil servants in London, and the island, were key power holders, along with the expatriate business community, soon joined by powerful Chinese businesses. The British encouraged the regularization of aspects of Chinese society: 1877 Chinese Protectorate, 1889 Secret Society Act, and urban planning and hygiene regulations. At the turn of the century the attention of territory turned towards the Malay peninsular as minerals and rubber had become major global industries with the USA as a key trade partner. Singapore was successful: it served a subregional archipelago market, it participated in a regional market and it participated in a global market. The period between the Great War and the Second World War saw local politics influenced not only by London and local business but also by KMT, the CCP, Serekat Islam and Indian nationalism, yet for the colonial expatriate community the period was the high tide of empire.[105] These halcyon days were rudely shattered in 1941–2. Japanese control saw the economy collapse and the population reduced. The late 1940s and early 1950s were a period of recovery from war damage and discussions began about independence.

Internal self-rule was inaugurated in 1959 and, after internal political competition, the PAP came to the fore. The PAP was built around an English-educated elite in opportunistic alliance with the Chinese masses. The leadership of the local political left wing was incarcerated in Operation Cold Store (1963) – a coup in all but name – which effectively destroyed the opposition Barisan Socialis party. The PAP worked for the 1963 merger with Malaysia but it was unable to make the deal work, and in 1965 Singapore attained an unplanned independence. The

PAP co-opted unions, demobilized opponents and began the pursuit of growth and welfare. It invited in multi-national companies, which provided jobs and a deepening role in the global system, whilst local business focused on retail, hotels and small business. Government control was rigid. Top-down politics were justified in terms of an ideology of vulnerability and upgrading. The government supported the business sector and it upgraded people as it upgraded other aspects of economy. The deal for the population was the provision of material welfare: housing, schooling, medicine, pensions (via forced saving schemes that funnelled savings into economic investment) and leisure facilities. The PAP organized an acquiescent population with dissent repressed[106] and secured rapid development. Currently the deal remains in place: the population offers support and the state provides material welfare to what is now an extensively middle-class society. The elite's stated political-economic goals are to create a regional service hub; one critical voice has written of an air-conditioned nation.[107]

Contemporary Singaporean politics is dominated by key groups: in particular, the long-established ruling party and a closely related technocratic state. Economic policy centres on aggressive niche building, and the practice of inviting in the multi-nationals is well established. The country is run in a top-down style: there is extensive welfare provision, a restricted public sphere and an overall public/social ethos that is both corporatist and communitarian.

Brunei: Oil riches and the issue of survival

As the state-empire dissolved there was some debate about the future of the small Brunei sultanate. The departing colonial power pointed to the Federation of Malaysia, the local elite jibbed and a variety of independence followed. Elections saw a radical party elected but it was quickly deposed with these confusions compounded by the Indonesian elite's policy of *konfrontasi*. Brunei was defended by the British military. Today the country is an absolute monarchy, small, oil-rich and prosperous. The elite are extraordinarily wealthy. Key players include the sultan, Islamic religious organizations and a subdued civil society. It is a small state exposed to the possible demands of many powerful neighbours. The oil economy provides large financial flows, which enable it to distribute material benefits to the very small population. There are consequent anxieties in respect of the country's size and wealth. It has been a member of ASEAN since 1984 and sees the organization as some sort of guarantor.

Indonesia: Seizing the archipelago and building a state and a nation

The Dutch began trading in the archipelago in the sixteenth century.[108] They accumulated territory steadily and by the early twentieth century they controlled the largest foreign empire in Southeast Asia, dominating the archipelago. At the start of the Pacific War, as with other European colonialists, they were expelled by the Japanese. Later, with the US defeat of Japan, the Dutch government tried to re-establish its control but it was resisted by Soekarno and Hatta, who declared the existence of an Indonesian republic. The Dutch fought two wars against the Indonesians and although they tried to get US support by characterizing the Indonesian nationalists as communists, they failed and eventually withdrew. Thereafter, Indonesia was established. An early phase of economic and political experimentation (and confusion and violence)[109] gave way in 1965 to an elite-led government firmly committed to the West, funds flowed in, oil reserves were discovered and thereafter for 30-odd years the ruling Javanese elite were able to put into practice a developmental ideology that ran on until the Asian financial crisis put an end to the regime and ushered in a period of economic hardship and democratic reform.

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There were numerous Malay maritime empires[110] scattered throughout the archipelago – fluid, shifting and sophisticated – trading across the region. These territories had enjoyed links with three great neighbouring civilizations – the Chinese to the north, and the lands of Arabia (Islam) and India to the west. Europeans became involved from around the early sixteenth century – Portuguese traders, then Dutch, occasionally English (rebuffed by the Dutch). It was the Dutch who slowly seized control. The Dutch co-opted the local Javanese elite into their colonial state.[111] They also allowed inward migration from China. The colony was developed around tropical agriculture – both small-scale production and large plantations. The colony contributed significantly to the wealth of the Netherlands. Unsurprisingly and like other colonial powers, talk of eventual independence was desultory at best. In the 1920s and 1930s, domestic groups began to work for independence – the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Serekat Islam and some reformers amongst the Dutch (hence the 'ethical policy') – but little of a practical nature was achieved.

The Pacific War broke Dutch control. Japan seized the territory in early 1942. The new authorities represented themselves as Asian

and encouraged Indonesian nationalism. There was some movement towards independence with local organizations and administrations. At the end of the war, with the surrender of the Japanese, local nationalists prevailed on Sukarno and Hatta to declare independence. The Dutch sought to return and they were aided by the British. The upshot was a period of intermittent warfare. The Dutch spoke of police actions and they also sought US support by casting events in Cold War terms, but the Americans would not lend their support, and nor would the Indonesian nationalists settle for some sort of continued link with the Netherlands. Indonesia became an independent sovereign state in 1949. The period 1949–65 was difficult: multiple ethnic groups, divisions between Java and the Outer Islands, and conflicts between the inheritors of the colonial state and the dispersed groups of fighters who had struggled for independence against the Dutch. The multiplicity of ethnic groups scattered across thousands of islands were only very slowly drawn into a sort of unity via the popular memory of the revolution and the ideal expressed in the official ideology of pancasila, which unites God, unity, humanitarianism, people's sovereignty and social justice.

The form of the state, with its Javanese elite ruling a diverse, occasionally rebellious, territory in a fashion resembling that of the Dutch colonial era, has continued. This elite had been influential in the Dutch era, it remained influential during the Japanese occupation and it was available following the end of the war to staff the machineries of the emergent independent state. From 1945 to 1949 the territory was in effect home to two states: Dutch and nationalist.[112] Thereafter, as the conflicts wound down, the Dutch elected to withdraw, having failed to gather international support, much less popular backing. The nationalist state was able to finally secure power. In 1949 the country began the pursuit of national development but suffered from political instability during the early years of Sukarno's rule as the members of the two states sought to build one independent state.[113] The elite was committed to national development but the policy mechanisms were vague.

In 1965, Suharto came to power in a bloody coup. The origins of the coup and its objective are somewhat unclear, but what is not in doubt is that the Javanese elite (army and social/economic elite) took the opportunity to demobilize all local opposition to their rule – opposition that had been rooted in both politics and religion. The Javanese elite, supported by the CIA, blamed the coup on the PKI. Casualties are estimated usually at around 500,000 dead. Recently these massacres have been

the subject of a film treatment, but they remain largely unacknowledged in the country itself. There was a period of elite manoeuvring and Suharto became president in 1968, whilst Sukarno, having been held under house arrest, died in 1970. The country thereafter pursued national development. The coup was read in Cold War terms by outside powers – in particular the Americans and their local ally the Japanese – and aid and investment flowed into the country. The country had a primary product economy, in particular oil, but also plantation crops, and there were attempts to upgrade the economy with labour-intensive manufacturing. The oil price rises of the early 1970s provide significant inflows of money and allow Suharto to dispense patronage amongst the army, the bureaucracy, the business community (Chinese) and civil society groups in a corporatist mobilization for development. This was successful – that is, the arrangement endured and the country developed. But then in 1997 the Asian financial crisis interrupted the flow of money and destroyed the elite balance, the post-65 political settlement was overturned and in 1998 Suharto was removed.

A number of replacement leaders followed,[114] stability returned and a species of liberal democratic politics flourished. In the early years of the twenty-first century the stability endures. The country's continued political stability and economic recovery are significant achievements; payers include the Javanese elite, bureaucracy, army, outer island peoples and civil society; core players affirm Pancasila democracy plus developmentalism.

Ordering Southeast Asia: ASEAN

At the end of the Pacific War the dissolution of the state-empires was rapid, sometimes relatively peaceful, sometimes violent. And aspirant replacement elites faced numerous difficulties, including establishing themselves within their territories, agreeing borders between new countries within the region and securing regional stability within the context of the Cold War. A common preoccupation was with managing the demands of both familiar sometime colonial powers and also the concerns of those newer players embroiled in their own Cold War conflicts. The new elites affirmed the notion of sovereignty and the related idea of non-interference.[115] The key was differentiation. In time, the solution was a regional organization in the guise of the ASEAN. The organization embraced these concerns, affirming sovereignty whilst seeking regional cooperation and adopting a style of consensus-oriented diplomatic interaction, tagged the ASEAN Way. The organization was dedicated to stability and economic growth, and, whilst it has had a mixed record in

respect of growth, it has had an excellent record in respect of stability. ASEAN is now a well-regarded success as a regional organization.

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ASEAN was founded in 1967 as an intergovernmental organization devoted to promoting economic, security, cultural and political cooperation. It has a secretariat. It operates through a series of regular meetings of political leaders and high officials. It has helped the countries of the region to establish themselves in post-colonial period. It has provided a useful mechanism for discussion. And it has adopted a distinctive style: consultative, consensual and non-interfering in domestic affairs – the ASEAN way. The organization has established related discussion mechanisms with other countries in East Asia and it is widely regarded as a success.

A simple list can be assembled recalling the dates when different countries joined ASEAN:

- 1967 ASEAN5 (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore);
- 1984 ASEAN6, plus Brunei;
- 1995 ASEAN7, plus Vietnam;
- 1997 ASEAN9, plus Laos and Myanmar;
- 1999 ASEAN10, plus Cambodia.

The organization has been a vehicle for establishing the identity of the countries and the region; it has pursued policies in regard to security and economic growth; it is widely seen as a successful security organization; and it is widely seen as less successful in regard to economics. The member countries tend to have similar economies with much primary production in largely rural agrarian economies, significant areas of under-development,[116] plus low-tech manufacturing industry, which competes rather than cooperates. There are, in addition, significant investments by multi-national companies in production for export to North America or Europe. The region has been the recipient of inward investment from other parts of East Asia – to produce for export to North America and Europe – and from other regions in the global economy. Looking to the future, the ASEAN elites note that further economic regionalization will create a home market of some 500 million people.

ASEAN continues to develop. Two parallel macro-debates are in process. First, the members are seeking greater integration but the shift from intergovernmental consensus to a law-based supranationalism

(even in highly restricted areas of interaction) is very large. And, second, the long-term direction of an integrated region is in question. In recent years the notion of modernization has been repackaged as globalization, and it has been challenged intellectually by the notion of regionalization, and the two ideas unpack in rather different schedules of policy proposals. These debates have been pursued over the last couple of decades but the 2008–10 financial crisis in the USA has undermined the claims of proponents of globalization – pointing in the direction towards regional strategies of integration. That said, these debates continue.

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Southeast Asia entered the modern world via the intermingled experience of Dutch, British, French and US colonialism. There were earlier colonial powers – Spain and Portugal – but these were essentially premodern trading relationships. Their impacts on present patterns are thus limited. However, as the Europeans and Americans moved in extant patterns of economic, social and political relationships were remade – subordinated to the over-riding demands of these external powers. Acharya[117] argues that the intrinsic regional coherence of precontact days was broken by the colonial division of the region into discrete spheres. By the same token, the removal of these colonial powers opens up new opportunities. ASEAN has functioned as the vehicle for a renewed/reinvented regional coherence, a cooperative Southeast Asia exists in significant measure and an integrated Southeast Asia remains a nominal goal and a work in progress. However, the countries of the region continue to advance.

The end of state-empire systems

As the state-empire systems dissolved, aspirant replacement elites were confronted with difficult circumstances because the process of dissolution was not neat and tidy as it was both occasioned by and accompanied by numerous wars. Elites looking to rule a country had first to seize control of a territory and its people, and this had to be done against the competing claims of other aspirant elites, and against the often violently expressed contrary intentions of sometime colonial powers. And all this was in the context of deepening foreign-sponsored Cold War. Numerous conflicts ensued – overt and covert – but the state-empire system was unsustainable. Sometime core powers relinquished control and replacement elites secured their status, took control of territory

and population, and then built states, invented nations and one way or another looked to the idea of national development.

The overall historical dynamic of the dissolution of systems of state-empires presented successor elites with the task of engineering a replacement political order: in the hitherto metropolitan cores of empire, Europeans embraced the ideal of unification, hence the slogan 'ever closer union'; but in the hitherto peripheral areas of empire, replacement elites had quite different concerns. Local replacement elite concern, in the midst of the task of state-making, was for differentiation: for clarity in respect of the matter of sovereignty. As state-empires dissolved, their territories were reconfigured as local elites sought territories and power, and differentiation from neighbours who were likely preoccupied with the same issues became crucial. In a similar fashion, replacement elites sought freedom from interference from former state-empire masters. Again, a concern for sovereignty was reinforced. These preoccupations were amplified by the associated role of the Cold War. Certain local elites worked in alliance with the USA and declared anti-communism produced material and diplomatic benefits, whilst other elites looked to China and a somewhat shifting and provisional state-socialist bloc took shape. This pattern provided an environment within which replacement elites could pursue various strategies of national development but, at the same time, it also militated against intra-regional conversations. These problems have run on down into the present day. East Asia is prosperous, ordered by elites committed to ideas of sovereignty and non-interference, and divided by significant residual conflicts. And there is no overarching regional machinery which can order present-day exchanges and plot a consensus defined route to the future. Consequently there are few signs that local elites are minded to think of anything other than a soft regionalism.

Yet, that said, it might be noted that some 70 years after the end of the Pacific War – when the whole area was in ruins – East Asia is home to numerous prosperous countries, whose development continues and which, taken together, notwithstanding continuing differences, now constitute one of the major regions within the global system.

8
Powerful Regions and the Surprising Costs of Success

The disintegration of state-empire systems has led to the creation of a number of new or reimagined states in East Asia. They are elite led. These political elites have to respond to both domestic and international demands: the former involves the complex play of domestic politics – cultural traditions, political systems, organizations and social groups, plus the ever-shifting debates within the public sphere (personal, print and digital); and the latter concerns the subtle exchanges between sovereign powers, organized around a core trio of concerns that is common to all elites (state-making, nation-building and national development), as they read and react to enfolding global structural circumstances (production, finance, security and knowledge). In East Asia, as these dynamics have unfolded in the years following the Pacific War, elites have constructed many networks – economic, social and political – and they have contrived a species of soft regionalism. It may be that this will serve them in the future as it has served them in the past. However, in the event of movement towards greater integration, analysis points to a number of lessons for elite policy and two are perhaps crucial: first, the utility of an overarching goal coupled to day-to-day pragmatism and consensus-building in respect of trade; and, second, the importance of paying attention to security and the lessons and legacies of history.

The idea of region is familiar. Indeed, amongst commentators in the public sphere it tends to be taken for granted. It is often read as a simple geographical term, designating a naturally occasioned area or place, and thereafter, in turn, there might be allusions perhaps to race or ethnicity or culture. But this is a mistake. Regions are not simple givens; rather, they are elaborate social constructions and many agents have a hand in their creation; they are ways of interpreting the character of a designated area, and their identification lodges claims to

distinctiveness and typically goes on to make ambitious claims for their posited form of life. The contemporary global system offers a number of areas where local elites lay claim – with more or less concern – to an idea of region, and three have been the focus of particular attention: North America, more specifically the USA; Europe, again, more particularly the European Union, read by many – correctly – as a self-consciously constructed region, the collective creation of sovereign states; and East Asia, where a somewhat disparate set of criteria are invoked, including the phenomenon of historical recovery, the creation of networks and the patterns of political economic activity summed around the notion of the developmental state.

East Asia: Power, linkages, ideas and the role of agents in making regions

Regions are not given by geography or race or ethnicity or culture. They are not given by anything; rather, the idea is a way of grasping sets of relationships between agents. Regions are social constructions: the ways in which agents can make sense of a set of relationships, speaking, for example, of an 'economic region' or a 'political region' or a 'cultural region'.[1] In the context of international politics the relevant agents are to be found amongst the political elites, within the administrative machineries of the state and in the public sphere: debates between these players will produce ideas of regions; such ideas will thereafter be pursued in conversations with other groups of players and in the contest of international politics, those from other states. The social construction of a region is a complex process. In order to grasp these processes, three ideas are routinely distinguished: first, regionalization, which points to the creation of low-level linkages between players within the region; second, regionalism, which points to the self-conscious elite identification of a region and consequent adoption of policy stances; and, third, region, the result of the process of construction, always provisional and always open to revision.

In recent years, discussions of the nature of regions have been linked to the experience of the European Union, often taken as the paradigm case of the elite-led construction of a region, and the ideas of federalism, functionalism, governance and so on have all been extensively debated.[2] But for East Asia, the historical trajectories of the discrete political communities point to the informal nature of regionalism, so caution must be exercised in any arguments about East Asia that references the European Union.[3] Post-war state elites in Europe confronted a largely

self-created disaster, and recognition of this – although perhaps in places partial[4] – provided the moral and political impetus to the pursuit of unification. Post-empire elites in East Asia confronted grave difficulties, but the period created the political chance for statehood and a concern for differentiation. And in all of this the work of scholars offers distinct approaches to the issue of regions, and each has a particular focus: realism on power, liberalism on trade, social constructivism[5] on ideas and political economy on the social pursuit of livelihood.

East Asia: The record

(i) East Asia – power

Schematically, a sequence of historical political forms could be posited: pre-contact dynastic polities, colonial regimes and then sovereign states. Plus, today, at a larger scale, regions as a feature of state-to-state relationships: this produces complex manoeuvring as states seek to balance economic and security interests in the short term with ideas about how the longer term might develop; this also produces much commentary in the form of attempts to interpret the concerns of players and sketch out possible scenarios. Where state-to-state conversations are successful, all of this produces formal organizations, such as ASEAN, ASEAN plus three, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the East Asia Summit.[6] These are inevitably differently constituted[7] and they are always provisional; subject to reform, adjustment and neglect depending on the ever-shifting concerns of the involved players. In respect of the core concerns of realists – industrial/military power – the key organizational expression of power relations is to be found in the links that the USA has with its various allies in the region, pre-eminently Japan, thereafter South Korea and Taiwan, with other countries in Southeast Asia and Australasia also variously linked.[8] At the same time it might be noted that there is no East or Southeast Asian equivalent of NATO – East Asia has taken a quite different route in respect of security to that adopted in the North Atlantic area.

(ii) East Asia – trade

Regions could be thought of as patterns of interlinkages and, whilst such linkages can be formed from various human actions, lately the key has been trade. As above, a sequence of political forms can be recalled, where each had a typical form of economic life: first, pre-contact civilizations oriented towards local trading networks and dynastic China; followed by subordinated peripheral areas within state-empire

systems oriented towards extra-regional core economies; followed by today's economies regulated by sovereign states in turn lodged within global networks. In the recent period, interlinkages have been manifold: informal networks (migrants or informal sector finance or criminal fraternities); corporate networks (regional production and distribution networks); plus state-sponsored links (regional free-trade agreements, regional development bodies such as the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong River Commission, SIJORI or specialist regional agreements such as the Chiang Mai Agreement), and all of these feed into the creation of economic interlinkages. Thus in respect of the core concerns of liberal interdependence theory – acknowledging interlinkages – there are many instances of such linkages dealing with trade, finance, flows of people and the like, and the study of these linkages is intensive amongst policy analysts and scholars.

(iii) East Asia – ideas/cultures

Sets of ideas are carried in tradition. These provide intellectual resources in various forms (great/little traditions, discourses or ideologies), and agents understand their worlds with reference to these resources. It is true of political elites, those in the corporate world, active participants within the public sphere and it is true, most generally, of all those agents within the ordinary social world. In East Asia following the Pacific War, newly established elites, having secured power, had to deal with the demands of the international system and their domestic populations. In this situation they had to think about states, nations and development.

In regard to the idea of states, agents must read and react to ideas that are available within the international community and within their domestic territory. Amitav Acharya[9] has used the idea of 'constitutive localism' to grasp the exchange of elites with external demands. State-making in East Asia stressed non-interference. The legacies of colonialism plus the ideas linked to the Cold War (as in invitations to join great power alliance organizations) underscored the domestic demand for differentiation from neighbours and distance from external great powers.

In regard to the idea of nation/identity, tradition carries the resources and lessons of the past into the present. Here two ideas have picked up this aspect of ideas/cultures: collective memory and the national past. The idea of collective memory points to the multiple ways in which social memory is sustained. Thus in East Asia the history of the twentieth century can be grasped in terms of family memories, community

memory and organizational or institutional memory. The history of the century was filled with the collapse of state-empire systems followed by the coalescence of sovereign states (a process filled with violence), and these episodes have been read into the collective memory of polities in the form of the idea of the national past. The idea of the national past points to the collective memory of a polity. It is a set of ideas that record where the polity came from, what its current status is and where it might ideally go in the future. It maps out the trajectory of a polity over time. The construction is a contested compromise between elite-level ideas and popular ideas. In East Asia the collapse of empires and the coalescence of sovereign states is read in numerous way as different experiences are read into different national pasts. These national pasts record both domestic experiences and exchanges with other polities. These memories are not scholarly records; rather, they are stylized memories.

In respect of the idea of development, agents read the system-generated demand for 'effective nation statehood' (which sketched out a future whereby newly independent states would become liberal democracies, running liberal markets within the overarching frame of Bretton Woods ordered international liberal trading)[10] in various ways around the more local goal of national development (effective in some cases; a thin cover for corruption and cronyism in others).

In terms of the core concerns of social constructivists, it is clear that the development trajectory of post-war East Asia has been shaped by the sets of ideas with which political agents, policy-makers and others have used to make sense of their situations. Some of this finds expression in organizations: domestically, the familiar repertoire of flags, parades and anthems; internationally, a concern for what is now tagged 'soft power' via cultural activities – for example, acknowledged by ASEAN's Socio-Cultural Community, acknowledged by China's Confucius Institutes and so on.

(iv) East Asia – political economy, agents/structures and the pursuit of livelihood

Scholars of political economy argue that elites must read and react to enfolding structural change in order to secure the livelihoods of their polities; some of these responses will be inevitable (as problems are recognized, understood and acted upon), whilst some will be more self-consciously selected (as problems are recognized, understood and then, after reflection, resolved).

In East Asia, elite understandings have been shaped by two contrasting pressures: first, security, where a post-war preoccupation with

state-making has made security an issue for sovereign powers, thus as state-empires dissolved, new sovereign powers were concerned with sovereignty – thus, borders, hence the possibilities for tensions. There are many potential state/state security flashpoints in East Asia. Then, second, trade, where the post-war concern for national development has been widely successful and the countries of the region are prosperous and are closely interlinked. In terms of the core concerns of scholars of political economy, East Asia has shown many of the traits which go to make-up regional linkages. It has also shown some of the traits which go to make-up regionalism in that there are self-conscious organizations devoted to the general interests of region members.

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So, to reiterate, regions are not simple givens; they are made as local elites read and react to enfolding circumstances and international political economy captures this process in the slow creation of dense networks of interlinkages built around the business of livelihood together with the elite concern for ordering these exchanges, thus the slow shift from acknowledging regionalization to embracing regionalism to the collective creation of a region. However, whilst theoretical interpretation can suggest lines of development, as ever such speculations are subject to the vagaries of political life. The key is always the inevitable contingency of political life, for nothing is certain. All of that said, for the moment, two issues must be addressed in any analysis of international politics in East Asia: trade and the business of livelihood, plus security and the business of sustaining peaceful international political relationships.

East Asia region: Trade and the role of overarching goals

As noted, international relations scholarship has produced several approaches to international politics and each can be unpacked in terms of the typical problems that it identifies. Thus realism is concerned with questions of industrial-military power balances; liberalism and interdependence approaches are concerned with production and trade relations; social constructivism is concerned with ideas and patterns of understanding; and, finally, political economy is concerned with the ways in which elite agents read and react to enfolding structural circumstances in order to secure a livelihood for their polities. But amongst international relations scholars and using these resources in various mixes, two particular issues within international politics in East Asia are salient – that is, they are the subject of repeated discussion: trade and

security. An argument can be made, given the trajectories of the polities in the region, that discussion should begin with security, given the general crisis of the collapse of state-empires, the various wars and the deep-seated concern for sovereignty and non-interference, or, in other terms, geo-strategic relations. However, in recent years, as the region has prospered, attention has turned to trade linkages, and historically embedded tensions have been to some extent set to one side as all recognized the dazzling success of the region, or, cast in other terms, geo-economics.

So, first is the business of trade. These concerns produce the task of ordering economic exchanges within the region, and between it and other regions. (This preoccupation unpacks into a long involved agenda of concerns looking at rules in respect not merely of trading in finished goods but also the broader agendas concerned with the rules governing production, finance and systems of regulation.)

Second is the concern for security. Here the focus turns to the maintenance of peaceful international political relations and, as with trade, there are multiple concerns (military forces, technologies, alliances and so on) plus there is one particular problem – that is, the ever-present nature of the remembered past, which in turn points to the task of coming to terms with the lessons and legacies of history, here the violence of the twentieth century, which points to the task of revisiting received national pasts.

Trade relations I: Globalization, regionalization and regional organizations

Recent decades[11] have seen many debates about economic development in East Asia and two ideas have been prominent – globalization and regionalization – whilst at the same time a number of regional organizations have been created. These debates run on and new organizations continue to be suggested.

(i) Globalization and regionalization

Globalization is often presented as an unfolding unilinear and unidirectional process, a mix of scientific advance, economic interchange, plus social, cultural and political convergence; in all, movement towards an integrated global system. Proponents of this view include neoliberal theorists such as Francis Fukuyama,[12] business theorists such as Kenichi Ohmae,[13] influential commentators such as Thomas Friedman[14] and some academic political theorists;[15] modest opponents of this view speak of internationalization and prefer to track the detail of

interlinkages;[16] whilst radical opponents say that globalization is mostly windy rhetoric designed to serve the political project of expanding the reach of the neo-liberal economic system centred on the USA and the European Union.[17]

Regionalization is also seen as a discernible trend as recent years have seen particular areas of the global system develop dense economic linkages and thereafter deepening social linkages and cultural/political linkages. Proponents suggest that whereas globalization is (probably) just hype, regionalization seems to be happening;[18] proponents point to the European Union, ASEAN or groupings such as Mercosur and thereafter to subregional activity (Pearl River Delta, Greater Mekong Sub-Regional System, SIJORI and others); anxious commentators draw a distinction between 'open regionalism' and 'closed regionalism', where the former integrates economies, does not discriminate against outsiders and leads towards globalization, whilst the latter distinguishes members and non-members and does not lead towards globalization.[19]

Regions can be seen as social constructions; thus a further line of commentary suggests starting with regions not as simple givens or accretions of activities but as more or less self-consciously constructed;[20] the results of projects of regionalism. Proponents[21] of this view point to the ways in which economic activities can be gently coordinated (for example, Japanese aid, trade and foreign direct investment in East Asia),[22] building networks of activity that slowly encompass not merely the economic spheres but also social, cultural and finally political as formal institutional mechanisms are established (thus, for example, East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) or ASEAN plus 3 or the East Asian Summit).[23] Doubters respond in several ways: some reject the constructivism as an implausible approach whose results are not worth the effort, others affirm the key role of states in any regional organization, suggesting that what is agreed today can be revised tomorrow, whilst others affirm the over-riding power of liberal market relations, anticipating that regions are merely way-points in the journey towards a global system.[24]

All of this globalization/regionalization debate matters for two broad groupings of agents: political and scholarly. First, political actors in the global community look at East Asia and see a rising regional power, maybe one with a future great power at its centre. Grasping the dynamics of the region is a necessary condition of dealing successfully with it – both in the short term, making deals today, and in the longer term, where the issue of setting global rules becomes an issue. Second, scholars look at East Asia and they see something that is new. In the years since the end of the Pacific War, the region has experienced great upheaval,

including decolonization, civil war and revolution, plus great power proxy wars, and yet it has become rich. Scholars are concerned with understanding this record of achievement and with the ways in which any explanations of the success feeds back into the intellectual traditions that they inhabit, and in terms of Western-type social science, one issue has caught the attention of many analysts – that is, the notion of the developmental state.

(ii) Dynamics at global, regional and local levels

Setting aside these debates about globalization and regionalization, a comprehensive approach to these issues can be found in the tradition of political economy, which looks at the ever-changing interaction between structures and agents as human beings engage in the social production of livelihood.[25] Political economy, which asserts that politics and economics are two sides of the same coin, looks to the activities of identifiable groups: crucially, elite groups must read and react to enfolding structural circumstances and formulate their projects – the economic position/sector they inhabit is the source of their political power, and their political power is used to advance the interests of that economic position/sector.[26] One implication of this approach is that the present structural pattern of the global system is contingent; it is the outcome of multiple interactions pursued over time, and, viewed this way, claims about the inevitability of globalization (or, indeed, regionalization) look far too simple.

Actual patterns of interaction are likely to be very complex: schematically, it is possible to speak of changing structural patterns at global, regional and local levels, and it is the mix of these three particular dynamics of change that will determine the actions of the elite and subsequently the path of any particular country or territory. First, here are global-level dynamics: thus the Bretton Woods machinery (IMF, World Bank, WTO and Wall Street – together making the Washington Consensus) that sets the rules of international trade/finance, plus the existing flows within the global system (goods, people and money). Then, second, there are regional-level dynamics: thus Japanese aid and production networks; Tiger economy cross-regional investments; Chinese cross-regional investments; plus the links making up the production and commercial network of Greater China (Hong Kong, Taiwan and China).[27] And, third, there are local-level dynamics: patterns of sectors/agents within a country, their various responses (including domestic winners and losers) and hence various projects. A political economic analysis would say that it is the mix of these dynamics that shapes the

local situation.[28] One key idea to emerge from the debate has been the idea of the developmental state, which points to complex local alliances oriented towards advancing the national economy.[29] And tracking the unfolding trajectories of countries in East Asia, it is clear that domestic agents (state and corporate) have both adapted the global rules and developed linkages amongst themselves – that is, these agents do not simply join in an otherwise undifferentiated, unitary global system whose rules are set and whose structures are given.

(iii) Regional organizations

The elites of the countries in East Asia must read and react to changing circumstances, and one aspect has been the construction of regional organizations. East Asia is home to a multiplicity of organizations, some involving extra-regional powers, and others informed by local agendas; and here as elsewhere the exchanges between various agents over the design of organizations can be awkward. There are very many organizations: some active, some rather inactive, whilst earlier efforts have failed to sustain any role. There is typically political manoeuvring around their role, and concerns about membership/role have found expression in the distinction between open and closed regionalism. A further anxiety now centres on accommodating an emergent China.[30] Yet these are often the anxieties of outsiders and so another way of coming at the last noted issue is to recall the nature of the pre-colonial Sino-centric tribute system and to ask whether any of these ideas have run through into the present – that is, concerns for culture, hierarchy and reciprocity.[31]

Some early organizations were concerned with security questions[32] (SEATO, the US/Japan Security Agreement, the US/South Korea Security Agreement, the US/Taiwan Security Agreement, USSR/PRC relations and PRC/North Korea links), because in the period of decolonization and Cold War, governments were preoccupied with geo-strategy – that is, the business of securing and maintaining control over a territory. However, as the countries of the region became prosperous, concerns shifted towards economics and so, as decolonization fell into the past and Cold War tensions eased, countries in the region began to focus more on geo-economics and a newer set of regional institutions became important, and whilst most are officially focused on economic issues, some commentators think that they have proved most successful in the political sphere.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis provoked some actions but, in contrast, say, to the European Union, relatively modest advances. Webber[33]

notes that after the 1997 crisis, many commentators spoke of greater integration, but in the event it has not happened. Instead there are lots of bilateral trade deals. In respect of security, ASEAN plus three is the closest to a regional organization and for Webber the region is too dispersed to come together. However, one might add that whilst that could be the case, there is no reason to expect it to replicate the historical experiences of other places.

Amitav Acharya[34] discusses the evolution of regional organizations detailing the subtle exchanges between available ideas (taken from former colonial powers or new international organizations), the concerns of local area neighbours (thus other ex-colonies) and the demands of replacement elites with their own domestic cultures and politics. Acharya criticizes mainstream international relations scholarship for being US/European Union-centric and for looking at East Asian regionalism from the outside, thereby missing the key role of local agents. Instead, ideas are taken from historical and sociological institutionalism and the materials of social constructivism are reworked in order to acknowledge the work of local agents. The approach is labelled 'constitutive localization'. When local agents are put back into the story then Asian regionalism can be seen to be the result of complex exchanges: domestic (within local countries), regional (between local countries) and global (between local countries and the major power centres – in particular the USA and the European Union). The upshot has been a particular concern for sovereignty (in particular, the idea of non-intervention), a preference for consultative and consensus-building exchanges, and a reluctance to go for legally based formal organizations. Acharya argues that when the region is viewed in these terms, it is clear that a distinctive and successful type of regionalism has been developed.

A series of local organizations are noted – formed in the years immediately following decolonization and in the period of the early Cold War. They provided a vehicle for local concerns:

- Asian Relations Conference – in 1947 (New Delhi) and 1949 (New Delhi)
- Colombo Powers Meeting – in 1954 (Colombo)
- Asia-Africa Bandung Conference – in 1955 (Bandung)
- the ASEAN – in 1967 (Bangkok)

Acharya[35] argues that their key preoccupation in respect of international politics was with sovereignty and non-intervention, as this expressed anxieties about former colonial powers, current great powers (with

their Cold War competition) and a looser worry about revolutionary groups (in particular those inspired by or linked to the CCP). They avoided formal bodies, so embraced the idea of process diplomacy; they avoided formal collective defence organizations (such as NATO), so embraced the looser idea of security cooperation; and they turned their thinking to their common problem of development, hence the idea of developmental regionalism.

In respect of Southeast Asia, Acharya argues that the early meetings fed into the construction of ASEAN and the idea of ASEAN Way.[36] ASEAN is the longest-established regional body in Southeast Asia. In addition to its internal consultations it now seeks to engage with other countries, and it has linked with other countries in East Asia. It has sought dialogue partners of a wider international stage and it has also developed the idea of subregional development zones: there are now four, and these are instances of state-led local-level developmental regionalism.[37] It is often criticized for its ineffectiveness but it has nevertheless survived for over 30 years and has helped the countries of the region to solidify their identities and positions within their region and the wider global system. It has accomplished this via the membership of ASEAN – now ten – and there are a number of related organizations which reach out to wider groupings (ASEAN plus three (1997), the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994) and so on).

It might be noted that ASEAN and its affiliates do not exhaust the list of relevant organizations, and both the USA and the European Union have responded to the recent shifts and changes in the global system. Thus APEC (1989) is one of a sequence of trans-Pacific trade organizations that links up the countries of the Pacific Rim. APEC seeks to link up, in particular, the core East Asian countries, and Australia and North America. The objectives are to foster trade and dialogue, and it has a secretariat to coordinate activity but no legally binding agreements. The organization has been criticized for not achieving very much, but it is not clear what it could achieve as East Asia's patterns of development are distinctive, not variants of the model of the USA. These debates are essentially about the character and rules of international trade (and politics) and are currently being recycled around discussions of the TPP (ongoing). And, relatedly, ASEM (1996) links the East Asian countries with the European Union and seeks to foster trade and dialogue. It has been criticized as merely being a talking shop but links between the two regions are deepening.

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By the late 1980s, East Asia was an economically powerful region. Policy analysts and scholars considered its record and endeavoured to unpack its character. Numerous lines of analysis were proposed plus one line of criticism:

- East Asia had got the prices right (the free market line);[38]
- East Asian culture was the key (culturalist line celebrations of Confucianism);[39]
- the US role was crucial (the US hegemonic power line);[40]
- the impact of the Second World War was crucial (historical shocks line);[41]
- the role of crony capitalism (explained failure in 1997);
- East Asia had used the developmental state (the political economy line).[42]

Some lines of argument presented the East Asian experience as a variation of the historical experience of the West (thus East Asia was joining in and catching up). Other lines of argument stressed that something novel had happened in East Asia (thus East Asia was joining in but it was not catching up because it was following its own trajectory). All of these debates have in common that they note that something special is happening in East Asia. Thereafter the problem was to uncover the logic of this success story and sketch out its implications for the development of the region and the wider global system.

Trade relations II: Change and contemporary issues in East Asia

As the global wars of the middle of the twentieth century drew to a close, the USA assumed a dominant position – economically, militarily and (in Europe, certainly) culturally. As regards the economic aspects, the relative positions of East Asia, Europe and the USA can be grasped in terms of a set of circles.[43] In 1945 the USA was the largest circle and it had approximately 50% of global output, whilst Europe and East Asia were much smaller. However, by 2008 (the dates of both the Beijing Olympics and the Lehman Brothers collapse), all three circles had grown much bigger but then the three circles were more or less the same size. The characteristic of these regional economies varies both within and between regions, but, in brief, all three regions now have sophisticated science-based high-tech industrial economic cores. The three regions also have extensive trading linkages, again within and between the regions, and these exchanges are sustained by complex

systems of law and logistics with the fine details ordered via elaborate trade agreements.

(i) The USA's changing economic relations with various parts of East Asia[44]

	Phase I	**Phase II**	**Phase III**
	1945–71	**1971–85**	**1985–2008**
Japan and Tigers	strongly engaged	strongly engaged	strongly engaged
ASEAN	some engagement	some engagement	some engagement
Indo-China	some engagement	not engaged	some engagement
China	not engaged	some engagement	engaged

The USA has been involved in trading with East Asia since the early nineteenth century – symbolically, the trade missions of Admiral Perry to Japan and the declarations of the open door in respect of China, and more prosaically, a long-established whaling industry sourcing materials from around the Pacific. Flows of people might also be recalled as after the Western movement across the Continent was secure, Chinese and Japanese workers plus their families migrated to the USA. These links remained in place up until the disruptions of the Pacific War. After the war years, economic relations were subordinate to the political concerns of Cold War geo-strategy. The USA offered aid, technology and market access to the countries of Northeast Asia, and they prospered until, in phase II, soaring trade imbalances began to hurt domestic US industry. Assorted import curbs were agreed that slowed but did not remove the problems. Matters were addressed with the 1985 Plaza Accords, ostensibly a technical economic discussion, but after the yen revaluation the trade relationship became one of equals. Northeast Asia depends on the USA for a market, and the USA depends on Northeast Asia for supplies of money.

The USA has been involved in Southeast Asia to a somewhat lesser degree. There had been early exchanges so, for example, in the very early days of the colony of Singapore, local officials were complaining of US arms entering the territory, and later, at the turn of the twentieth

century, Singapore was exporting tin and rubber to the US car and canning industries. Later still there was significant Cold War-related activity associated with the wars in Vietnam, plus counterinsurgency activity in other countries. US interest centred on the Philippines and Thailand where there were major military bases. Thereafter, as ASEAN moved forwards, trade with the USA grew with both tropical agricultural products and some manufactured exports.

The USA has growing links with China through trade and finance. The USA is a major destination for Chinese manufactured exports, thus far mainly low- and medium-tech manufactures encompassing a vast range of inexpensive consumer goods, but in the future high-tech exports can be expected (computers, cars, high-speed railways, aircraft and perhaps nuclear power plants).[45] The relationship is awkward. The Beijing government needs continued economic growth to produce jobs, wages and legitimacy for the regime. The USA is wedded to the post-war system of liberal free trade that serves its large corporations well. However, Chinese low-/medium-tech imports mean that domestic US production/jobs are lost and a further area of difficulty lies in high-tech exports from the USA to China, as these are regarded as militarily sensitive. The relationship is clearly two-way: China needs the USA and the USA needs China. A further area of tension relates to finance. China has a large trade surplus and consequently has vast holdings of US dollars, which are invested in the USA. This creates a strange mutual dependency as goods flow one way and money moves in the other direction. China has been variously characterized by political agents in the USA: in the late 1940s as a communist dictatorship, more recently as a currency manipulator, and currently as a strategic competitor. The most recent statements refer to a security pivot towards East Asia, where there are potential flash-points in the South China Sea and the Senkoku/Daiyou Islands,[46] whilst Chinese policy-makers speak in terms of a peaceful rising. It is an uncomfortable relationship.

(ii) Europe's changing economic relations with various parts of East Asia

The countries of Europe have had trade relations with the East Asian region for centuries. The exchanges began as small groups of Europeans operating as traders within the existing networks.[47] At first they were just one more group. Later, as the modern world began to unfold its demands within Europe, these were, inevitably, transmitted to Southeast and East Asia. In time, whole areas were absorbed within European-centred systems of state-empires directly, as formal

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
	1945–71	**1971–85**	**1985–2008**
Japan and Tigers	slight engagement	some engagement	engaged
ASEAN	some engagement	some engagement	engaged
Indo-China	some engagement	slight engagement	some engagement
China	slight engagement	slight engagement	engaged

colonies, or indirectly, as informal empire, thus involving large areas of China.

The Pacific War undermined these empires, formal and informal. After the war years, local elites took their chance and a series of new states were formed. As newly established sovereign regimes began to order their affairs, long-established economic links were reordered, and some severely cut back. In Northeast Asia, countries occupied or supported by the USA reoriented their trade links. China, after the revolution, turned inwards and built links with the USSR. European involvement faded but Europeans retained some links with Southeast Asian countries.

In the 1970s, along with European recovery and East Asian growth, new economic linkages formed as imports/exports resumed. In the 1980s the trade and financial linkages deepened into major links and the European Union became a major trading partner for East Asia. Currently, relations are deepening, and they are apparently unclouded by historical memories and untroubled by security concerns.

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The global system is now extensively interlinked, and these links can be roughly summarized: production networks and flows of finished manufactured goods; financial networks and flows of money (investments, remittances, debt settlements, speculative hot money, illegal monies); social networks (flows of people in state and corporate business, leisure and migration (legal/illegal/voluntary/coerced)); and cultural networks (flows of popular culture and high arts). Given this complexity, the task of managing economic activities and hence the crucial issue of livelihood has become ever more demanding.[48]

Trade relations III: Europe and East Asia – the role of overarching goals

East Asian regionalization and regionalism have often been compared to events in Europe – specifically, the development of the European Union. Commentators note the institutionally elaborate machinery of the European Union and the absence of such arrangements in East Asia. Cast in these terms, East Asian regionalism looks like a weak and underdeveloped enterprise, but there is no reason to cast matters in these terms because the historical trajectories of the two geographical regions are quite different. In Europe, the twentieth century saw the collapse of state-empire systems centred on their metropolitan territories, which thereafter had to acknowledge their contribution to the debacle that had overcome them, reconstruct their polities and seek a better style of interaction. Thus war led to a concern for unification. In East Asia, the twentieth century saw a complex process of exploitation and learning whereby polities shifted into the modern world, produced home-grown nationalisms and independence movements which took their chance as the state-empire system dissolved to create new states, build nations and pursue development, producing a concern for differentiation and distance from great powers. Or, in brief, East Asian elites have read and reacted to enfolding change and thereby created their own historical development trajectory, so there is no reason to suppose that East Asian regionalism should replicate the experience of Europe. That said, it is possible to offer an argument by analogy, which might illuminate something of the problems of contemporary East Asia.

(i) The euro crisis – predictions of collapse not borne out

The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers ushered in a period of crisis for the financial systems of the USA and Europe, and there was extensive debate about the reasons for the crisis, its precise nature and the manner in which it might be resolved.[49] At first, Europeans were rather relaxed about the crisis, viewing it as a largely Anglo-US problem, centred on the two great financial centres of Wall Street and the City of London. However, they have been obliged to change their positions as problems have come to light in commercial banks and state authorities in Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus. The authorities governing the euro currency have had difficulties in responding to the ongoing crisis. In the first place, there are design problems in the institutions of the euro which make responding technically difficult (first, multiple state memberships running their own state budgets, and ordering their local

economies and crucially allowing banks to lend recklessly and build up unsustainable debts; second, a weak central machinery unable to discipline member states' economic governance; and, third, a nominally independent central bank which lacks the necessary powers to intervene in member states and financial markets), and in the second place, these problems are compounded by the difficulties experienced by political elites in coming to a decision as to how to resolve the crisis.

In summary, the crisis in Europe has had a number of features: problems with banks (inter alia, business models, systems of internal rewards, investment decisions, product offerings, and instrumental behaviour in respect of law and regulation); problems with regulators (befuddled by bank manoeuvrings and neo-liberal ideology); problems with sovereign state-financed bank-rescue deals (as sovereign states bailed out banks domiciled within their territories, the credit-worthiness of states in the global money markets came into question, thereby creating further problems); problems with institutional designs inhibiting coordinated action at the European Union level (where crisis responses were slow and reform programmes were also slow); and problems with the overall political response (as failures in the banking sector were relabelled as failures in the state with responsibility for the debacle thus being shifted).

One aspect of these last two noted factors has been particularly interesting, specifically widespread scepticism amongst Anglo-American commentators in respect of the future of the euro currency. Here two lines were identifiable: first, arguments from neo-liberal economic theory to the inevitability of the collapse of the euro; and, second, arguments from neo-liberal political hostility towards the political project of the European Union to the desirability of the collapse of the euro and consequent downgrading of the European Union to a free trade zone.[50] Yet, to date, the euro currency has survived; to date, no members of the currency have withdrawn; and, to date, in those member states which have had to seek help with bank bailouts, and which have been subject to a severe policy regime of state expenditure cuts, wage cuts and programmes of neo-liberal oriented regulatory reform, whilst popular displeasure has been evidenced in elections (as ruling parties have been ejected from power) popular support for membership of the euro continues. In brief, the defence of the euro has been strong (if amenable to all of the criticisms noted earlier). It can be argued that this has been a political and moral decision: in the context of the financial crisis, the overarching project of ever-closer union has found continued purchase not only amongst elites but also amongst the wider general population.

(ii) An overarching goal in East Asia?

In respect of East Asia and arguing by analogy,[51] this experience points to the importance of a general agreement about the future of the region, not a plan or treaty or an organization, but some broad general agreement, which can frame debate about particular issues and problems. Acharya[52] finds the keys to an East Asian regionalism in the history of the area. The immediate post-war period saw elites who were anxious to secure an end to state-empire systems and concerned to escape from entanglements in security organizations dominated by great powers, so state sovereignty was stressed and the international political ethic of non-intervention was embraced, and it was coupled to a style of process diplomacy that issued in a developmental regionalism. But it might be said that the developmental regionalism is somewhat understated or undersold. Commentators,[53] write of a 'frustrated regionalism' where many declarations have not pursued. In these terms, greater visibility to the commitment to developmental regionalism might offer the region a way of replicating the commitments that Europeans find in the idea – also taken from their history – of ever-closer union.

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All of that said, regionalization – the slow mundane business of building practical links – continues, and in recent decades these economic, social and slowly political links have become stronger. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue. However, there may be costs attached to the lack of a clear agreed goal and more awkwardly there are unresolved issues from earlier years, and these are lodged in a system of international political relations that has stressed the distinctiveness and separateness of individual state projects.

East Asia Region: Security and the lessons and legacies of history

East Asia entered the modern world of science-based industrial capitalism via foreign sponsored state-empire systems, European, US and later Japanese. In the early twentieth century this system began to collapse as metropolitan core powers experienced various conflicts, whilst peripheral territories sought to reorder these systems. The process of collapse was attended by extensive violence and the upshot was the creation of much reduced nation-states in the hitherto core areas, along with numerous new polities in the hitherto peripheral territories, where newly empowered elites built states, created nations and sought to

secure development, whilst the routes into the modern world taken by these new states have been captured in various national pasts.

From all of this, two points can be taken: first, the process of dissolution of state-empires was not smooth, and often it was violent; and second, the subsequent creation of clearly delimited states plus the irruption of Cold War concerns made the security of newly established states a central concern. The matter of security remains a concern in East Asia where there are significant tensions – both domestic and international (but where in contrast it does not in Europe, save for invited problems of blowback and periodic ritual pronouncements made by NATO).[54]

Security I: The record noted

The creation of the modern world, and hence the underlying logic of the contemporary pattern of international politics, has its origins in the rise of science-based industrialism in Europe, and whilst the creation of industrial capitalism flowed from contingent circumstances, it was routinely misread in essentialist terms, hence all of the familiar claims to superior status. The pattern of life was exported and the process of fostering the wider shift to the modern world involved both cooperation and coercion. There were numerous wars of colonial expansion. The systems thereafter established in turn had their own logics, shaped by a further round of cooperation and coercion. This time, conflict issued in general system collapse plus a round of catastrophic general warfare. Thereafter, as state-empires dissolved and replacement states formed, a further round of confusion unfolded in the guise of wars of collapse and wars associated with Cold War competition between power blocs. Plus, it might be noted, violence has continued into the present day, albeit of a more 'domestic' type.[55] In all, in East Asia the shift to the modern world has been accompanied by extensive, sustained catastrophic violence.

The shift to the modern world was fuelled by the dynamism of the industrial capitalist system. It involved extensive contacts between incoming traders and local powers. There was much cooperation but the process did entail remaking extant forms of life, and it was accompanied by extensive violence. Thereafter, system maintenance required routine violence: administrative, juridical and police. The system was inherently unstable; there were core tensions, peripheral tensions and general confusion, and in time the system failed. The system breaks down into generalized warfare – hence multiple participants, multiple locations and in time multiple memories. There were numerous conflicts

in the core territories of Europe, and there were also conflicts in the various peripheral holdings of the colonial powers. In time the system was overwhelmed by general crisis. It did not stop in August 1945; it continued, it flowed without a break into the wars of colonial withdrawal plus the related conflicts attached to the Cold War. These last noted took place in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and China/Taiwan, fuelled by routine and extensive US anti-communism.

The wars of colonial withdrawal plus the cross-cutting Cold War created problems for aspirant replacement elites, and the late 1940s and 1950s were disfigured by warfare – in places, of course, this continued long into the following decades as local issues became intermixed with great power conflicts, with the result that proxy wars bore heavily on some unfortunate populations. In general, in sum, the shift to the modern world in East Asia was accompanied by extensive violence, and these experiences have shaped the creation of contemporary national pasts: hence the memories of war held by the Japanese elite (right wing and left wing); hence the memories of war held by the elite and people of China; hence the memories of war held by the elite and peoples of South Korea; and hence the (rather different) memories of war held by the elites and peoples of the countries of Southeast Asia. These memories work both to sustain domestic political cultural identities and to divide contemporary East Asia.

Security II: Change and contemporary issues in East Asia

Currently, in East Asia, there are three key regional players: the USA, Japan and China. There are two significant secondary players in South Korea and Taiwan. And the ASEAN, which draws together ten countries in Southeast Asia and Indo-China, also plays a significant role. There are distinctive contemporary issues, including legacies of collapse of empire, interstate wars, decolonization, Cold War plus the effects of decades of economic success on patterns of relationships within the region and between the region and the wider global system. International relations scholarship uses various approaches[56] and has in recent years paid particular attention to issues of leadership and the notion of security considered in the widest sense. In regard to the former, the region has two contenders for leadership roles: China and Japan. The former is developing rapidly; the latter, currently, remains more advanced and, as commentators note, the two political elites clash repeatedly (ritually, over, say, Yasakuni Shrine; more directly over, say, Senkoku/Daiyou Islands);[57] and in respect of the latter, broad notions of security call attention to all aspects of the vitality of a state.[58]

(i) USA: key power over the last 50 years

The USA was deeply involved in the shift to the modern world in East Asia. It had links throughout the region. After the Pacific War, the USA emerged as the strongest military power in the region and thereafter the Cold War divided the region, with one bloc focused on the USA and the other on China. The Cold War saw two major wars in the region: Korea[59] and Vietnam.[60] It also saw a number of local rebellions, which were read in Cold War terms: the Philippines (Huk Rebellion), Malaysia (Emergency) and Indonesia (1965 Coup). The Cold War also fixed in place a number of these conflicts: North/South Korea, Northern Islands (Japan/USSR), Taiwan (ROC/PRC) plus the USA was not unsympathetic to the Thai military which staged numerous coups.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of China has seen Washington reconsidering its overall stance, and these matters became explicit with the policy of President Obama's administration: the 'pivot' towards East Asia:

- the USA remains the dominant military power in the region;
- the USA is no longer the dominant economy;
- but the US has extensive industrial and financial links to the region;
- Japan is now militarily strong/more independent minded;
- South Korea is less inclined to follow the US line in regard to the Korean peninsular;
- Taiwan is increasingly inclined to assert its status as a country;
- China is the major rising power inclined to assert its position in a range of fora.

Australia, New Zealand and Singapore[61] are regional allies, plus links are being remade with countries otherwise treated rather distantly;[62] and the region is home to significant Muslim populations with some relatively low-level probably locally generated insurgency activity.

With these issues in mind, for the USA the key issues today include, first, the pivot to East Asia – how to reconfigure alliances/forces in order to address the challenge of the rising power of China;[63] second, how to manage the evolving balance of power in Northeast Asia (maintaining relations with South Korea and encouraging a greater role for Japan whilst assisting neighbouring countries in managing North Korea); third, how to manage the slowly evolving Taipei/Beijing issue as their economic relations deepen whilst the politics only reforms slowly; and, fourth, more recently and perhaps transiently, how to combat the radical Islamist networks in the region.[64]

(ii) Japan – established power

The peace constitution and the formal links with the USA are the keys: the constitution was written by the occupation authorities, and the 1951 peace and security treaties bound Japan to the USA. The constitution/treaties gave Japan a low-profile diplomatic role. Politics found expression in economic nationalism. But this is now changing: first, the military relationship had a cold war origin but now this has no clear rationale and, whilst the USA encourages the Japanese military to raise its profile in the region, there are problems with the peace constitution and the business of official historical memory; second, the peace movement in Japan is strong and has a symbolic centre in the city of Hiroshima, the peace movement opposes the use of military forces by Japan, many in the population oppose the military links with the USA, key US military bases are in Okinawa and the locals who distinguish themselves from the Japanese of the main islands oppose them strongly. Some of these mainly domestic arguments attract wide attention: history textbooks are one arena of ritual domestic/international conflict; the visits of senior politicians to the Yasakuni Shrine are also problematical; expenditures on the armed forces are viewed negatively by some in the region; and in the public sphere these issues coalesce around the business of memory where critics (foreign and domestic) claim that the Japanese elite has not acknowledged nor made recompense for the aggressive wars waged in East Asia by earlier generations

But at the same time, Japanese aid has flowed to East Asia in vast quantities, and trade and foreign direct investment have followed and made a major contribution to the present wealth of the entire region. Japanese relationships vary with different parts of East Asia. First, Japan's links with Southeast Asia are relatively good with significant levels of aid, trade and foreign direct investment. After the Asian financial crisis, Japan made further aid available within East Asia and it also organized the Chiang Mai agreement of 1999 for 'currency swop' arrangements as a way of protecting countries against financial market speculators. Second, Japan's links with China are awkward: the history of relationships in the modern period is poor with a series of wars; both are now significant military powers; and both are strong economic powers. Much Japanese aid and foreign direct investment have gone to China, so Japan and China have extensive economic links. However, both Japan and China have a growing military/diplomatic presence in East Asia and as the role of the USA comparatively declines the relationship between these two powers assumes greater prominence. In sum, Japan is a global economic power. Key issues include:

- how to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations security council;
- how to revise the peace constitution;
- whether or not to go nuclear;
- how to manage changing relations with the USA, recently the TPP;[65]
- how to manage relationships with Northeast Asian neighbours;
- how to manage the rise of China where this includes uneasy relations in Northeast Asia, Japanese links with Taiwan and the Senkoku/Daiyou issue;[66]
- how to build wider alliances within Asia.[67]

(iii) China – rising power

Contemporary China was formed in the context of state-empire general crisis, interstate warfare and civil war. The shift to the modern world was secured via a lengthy and difficult exchange with foreign state-empires. The 1911 revolution failed and a long period of confusion followed, including Japanese invasion, civil war and the expulsion of foreign powers. The Pacific War ended in military victory for the USA. Japan was occupied and partially reconstructed. Attention then turned to the Chinese civil war. In 1949 the CCP secured military victory and established the PRC. However, in Washington, which had supported the nationalists, influential commentators spoke of 'the loss of China'. A little later fighting began in Korea and this inaugurated a wider regional Cold War. Nonetheless, the Chinese government's pursuit of an autarchic state socialism meant a low international profile. There was an alliance with the Soviet Union in the period 1950–8. This broke down. There was a rapprochement with the USA, and Nixon visited in 1972. This inaugurated a period of triangular diplomacy. After the death of Mao and a subsequent elite power struggle, Deng initiated reforms in 1978. Domestic stability and rapid economic growth meant that the country became more of a player in global politics. The 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations damaged this process, but thereafter there was a slow recovery. There were further economic advances and in time resumption of diplomatic linkages. The late 1990s and early twenty-first century have seen further economic and political integration within the global system. Beijing 2008 symbolized the recovery of great power status.

China continues to integrate into the international community and confronts a number of issues at the local, subregional, regional and global levels. First, relations with Japan are awkward as there is competition for status within East Asian political networks (leadership);

direct competition over resources within nautical exclusive zones; and the issue of war/memory routinely emerges (Japanese nationalists strike poses and provide an opportunity for the Chinese government to play the nationalist card for the benefit of the domestic audience, which audience is routinely exposed to mass-media carried anti-Japanese propaganda).[68] Second are regional problems, in particular managing relations with Taiwan, where there is much trade plus measured nationalist bluster along with distinctive ritual diplomatic status competition. Third, China has growing links with ASEAN but there are problems in accessing oil in the South China Sea and the status of the ethnic Chinese settled in region is sometimes awkward. Fourth, relations with the USA are uneasy. There is much trade and much mistrust: trade volumes are not in balance and financial flows are problematical. The US military budget is huge and the Chinese military budget is much smaller but growing. Fifth, relations with the European Union are good: there are strong trade links and no diplomatic/military anxieties. Finally, sixth, generally the Chinese elite are nationalist and they read their circumstances in these terms, the recovery of status lost in the shift to the modern world.[69] Key issues include:

- managing links with Japan (history/politics, security and trade);
- deepening links with South Korea (trade);
- managing links with North Korea (alliance, aid, migrants, collapse);[70]
- managing relations with Taiwan;
- upgrading and reorienting the military (from low-tech to modern high-tech and from a multiple role focus (security and nation-building) to a professional focus (security and war-fighting);
- managing the relationship with the USA;
- working with ASEAN;[71]
- deepening positive links with the European Union;
- deepening positive links with Africa (resources/trade/ideology);[72]
- continuing to raise very slowly the profile of the country on the global stage.

(iv) Tiger economies

The international relations of the Taiwanese government are dominated by the legacies of empire, civil war and Cold War. First, the country was transferred to Japan at the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/5 and it was developed as a colonial holding. At the end of the Pacific War the country was transferred to the ROC, whose leaders retreated there at end of the civil war. The KMT suppressed local

Taiwanese political aspirations and the country developed within the US economic/military sphere. It had an elected president in 1990 and there has been a subsequent rise of a clear Taiwanese identity along with improving cross-strait ties. Second, the country's key ally is the USA – economic, military and diplomatic. It is also its military guarantor. Third, the elite's core preoccupation is China. Beijing insists on reunification, although Taiwan has been separated from the mainland for over a century. Additionally, there are diasporic links, thus China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, plus overseas Chinese networks, are referred to as 'Greater China', and this points to strong economic incentives for cooperation.

So, first, South Korea is linked to Japan, the USA and the global marketplace. The relationships with Japan and the USA are awkward. There is residual Korean hostility towards Japan in regard to empire, and there are symbolic issues, such as comfort women. Japan also has resident Korean minorities who in the past have been discriminated against. Yet the trade links are strong. There is popular opposition to the US military but the Cold War has left the country divided and the border is heavily militarized. In recent years, South Korea has attempted intermittently to engage the north in diplomatic dialogue, social welfare confidence-building exchanges and some economic activities. One fear in the South is of the collapse of the North.[73] Then, second, North Korea was devastated by the Korean War, but there is no peace treaty resolving that war, the economy is backward and the people are poor. The regime is inward-looking, the country has few diplomatic friends, and the possession of nuclear weapons plus the potential for domestic collapse make it a problem for its neighbours.

(v) The countries of ASEAN

The organization has been a success and conflicts between members have been largely avoided as it has helped to define countries and locate them within the international community. Acharya[74] argues that the organization was shaped by its environment and the concerns of founding elites, in particular their desire to escape both post-colonial entanglements and those on offer from competing great powers for the region. Acharya reports that the episode shaped their concern for sovereignty, non-interference, process diplomacy, security cooperation and overall developmental regionalism. Today ASEAN comprises an elaborate set of consultative mechanisms and members affirm the ASEAN Way, which means that diplomatic exchanges are governed by a set of informal rules including consensus-seeking, cooperation-seeking

and no involvement in each others' internal affairs. The organization proceeds via numerous meetings.

There are internal issues for ASEAN members. First, there have been discussions over economic development plans where there have been many initiatives but comparatively modest action as the economies are competitive and externally oriented rather than complimentary. However, recent moves point to freeing up trade.[75] Second, there are conflicts over border demarcations (recently Philippines/Malaysia). Third, there are problems with minorities within countries (Muslims in southern Thailand, Muslims in southern Philippines and Chinese minorities in many countries, albeit with differing situations/problems). Fourth, there are problems of minorities in border areas in refugee camps (Thai/Burma border; East/West Timor border). Fifth, there are links of minorities overseas, such as radical Muslim groups that may be linked to the Middle East.[76] Sixth, there are issues with illegal migrant workers (workers accumulate then sometimes get pushed back home), and even legal migrant workers (sometimes treated simply as reserve army, with poor conditions and liable to be sent home). Seventh, there are problems with domestic political advance[77] and human rights.[78] Finally, eighth, there are general issues of reforming the machinery of ASEAN so as to allow one member to comment on the situation in another (the idea of constructive engagement was mooted, initially provoked by the situation in pre-reform Myanmar).

There are external issues because ASEAN has included issues related both to Southeast Asia and to the wider sphere of East Asia. First, the organization continues to be active and to make links with other countries (in this way it serves its members diplomatically). Second, it has sought to engage China,[79] Japan, the USA (they are designated as dialogue partners and this lets ASEAN present itself within the international community) The South China Sea is one particular issue and it involves numerous stands – rising China, US pivot and energy security.[80] Third, ASEAN now sits at the centre of a number of international organizations. Acharya[81] argues that ASEAN can be associated with a distinct East Asian regionalism. The argument is rooted in historical institutionalism. This allows the author to track the social production of ideas about the region and to identify those which proved acceptable (and which perhaps found expression in the architecture of regional organizations) and those that did not (and which fell by the wayside).

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The region is now wealthy. However, all of that said, security remains problematical. There are leftovers from Cold War days and there are contemporary issues, which grow out of 30-plus years of remarkable success. Revisiting these trajectories and detailing the history of evident interlinkages will require some reconsideration of received self-images. Social constructivist analysis plus the argument by analogy point to the reconsideration of inherited national pasts, and this is likely to be awkward because these ideas are not only part and parcel of official national self-images but also run one way or another through the minds of citizens. Nonetheless, revisiting national pasts is the key to upgrading the security of all in the region.

Powerful regions: The surprising costs of success

East Asia and Europe have been successful – that is, after numerous catastrophic conflicts in the early part of the twentieth century, the two regions have recovered and have experienced material, social and cultural/political advance. In both cases the Cold War had the effect of creating dividing lines within the region, thereby creating bloc systems: the liberal market-oriented blocs allied to the crucial post-1945 global power, the USA, prospered, whilst the state-socialist oriented blocs, allied to the less powerful double centre of Beijing and Moscow, had to await reforms before their economies advanced. Today, East Asia and Europe are powerful regions: their records can be investigated, track records considered and finally some of the less obvious costs of success can be noted.

Linkages between Europe and East Asia are rooted in a long shared history and they can be unpacked around ideas of economy (trade links and the like), society (flows and networks of people), culture (the results of intermixing visible in popular and high culture) and politics (legacies, present links and the way in which all of these are read into extant national pasts). Both regions are successful – they have recovered from the general crisis that accompanied the dissolution of the state-empire system, and they now confront the problems of success. Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the record of the two regions implies that received national pasts will have to be revisited. Thus the trajectories inaugurated in the wake of the general crisis have run on for some 50-plus years and individual countries have recovered and advanced, and the two regions have also recovered and advanced. The global system is no longer configured as it was in the wake of the general crisis, and patterns of understanding formulated then are no longer

adequate for today. The surprising cost of success is the requirement to revisit the past, to rework national pasts, because it is only through this process of reflection that routes to the future can be successfully engineered.

Europe was left in ruins by the Second World War. It was also divided, as two Cold War blocs formed. These circumstances shaped the European elite's project of building a united polity, what developed into the European Union. The USA actively encouraged the reconstruction of Western Europe as a liberal free-trading area. The Marshall Plan offered extensive development aid to countries in Europe and they used it to buy materials needed for their reconstruction. The USA was in favour of Western European economic cooperation and it supported early moves to set up the European Coal and Steel Community. On a larger scale, it was a key player in setting up the Bretton Woods system (IMF, World Bank and GATT/WTO), which helped to manage the global trading system, and compared with the pre-war economic situation the post-war period was brilliantly successful. The USA was also the key player in setting up NATO. It was the security counterpart to the economic machineries; the declared purpose of defence was implausible and the actual purpose was probably a mix of domestic West-bloc political discipline, arms/high-tech industry sales and maybe simple inertia, thus the Second World War had created a generation that knew all about war and so they carried on and did what they knew best. The US sphere prospered in the years following the end of the war. And in the second bloc, the USSR, which had been a positive example in pre-war days with domestic economic success and international support for decolonization movements, found that after the war the situation was changing, albeit slowly. State socialist planning systems were imposed in Eastern Europe. There was some justification because there were underdeveloped rural areas and massive war damage, but it was inappropriate in more developed areas. An integrated economic block was formed – Comecon – along with the Warsaw Pact, which was the counterpart to NATO. The Soviet system overall was successful economically in the early post-war years but political resentment developed in Eastern Europe.

The European Union began in this environment and the inspiration was the elite realization that further European wars were unacceptable. Ideas were available from pre-war utopian political programmes of federalism or arguments for functional expert rule, and the Cold War added further impetus to the desire for European recovery. The idea of planning came to play a significant role in post-war Europe. It created a role for elite technocrats. These groups were influential in the

general reconstruction of Europe and the creation of the machinery of the European Union. In 1945 the idea of planning was central. First, it was up and running as there had long been debates provoked by the emergence of USSR. There were debates in the 1930s in regard to the perceived failure of free market liberalism, plus debates about socialism and debates about decolonization and development. Second, it was unavoidable in the context of extensive wartime destruction and the necessity of reconstruction, and the USA Marshall Plan aid programme required recipient governments to have a plan as to how the moneys were going to be used. Third, the idea of planning was contentious, thus the idea had strong critics in particular in the USA, who saw planning as inimical to the liberal free-market system that they espoused. The experience of planning provided a clue, and Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman saw this as a way to present political issues as mundane technical matters. The result has been a success but now further integration requires political commitment, and this in turn requires popular support, which requires a revision to received national pasts – moves towards a European understanding of Europe's history.

East Asia, before the slow rise of the modern world of industrial capitalism, was the centre of the global economy. It was rich and powerful, with Europe and the USA being peripheral and unimportant. But European and US agents slowly joined in existing East Asian systems of social production, and these were slowly remade. In time, East Asia became a subordinate periphery in the modern industrial capitalist system, and this set-up took the political form of a system of state-empires. It was always going to be temporary. The general crisis of 1911–75 saw extensive dislocation, and finally it ended, bit by bit, with the establishment of regimes dedicated to national development. A crucial element was the Pacific War, which was part of the general crisis and destroyed the European, US and Japanese empires. The industrial capitalist system in East Asia was reconfigured as local elites took political power and sought a better position or niche within the global industrial capitalist system. They sought this via projects of national development, and the institutional mechanism for the political and economic project was the developmental state. Thereafter, each elite-ordered trajectory revealed a specific mix of global, regional and local political and economic factors as local actors used the developmental state to pursue their own distinctive projects. Success runs through a sequence: Japan, Tigers, Southeast Asia and China. And success is the major part of the story, but there are two other elements: first, continuing underdevelopment in much of Southeast Asia and inland China; then, second, throughout the region there was a growing environmental catastrophe.

In the years since the Pacific War the area has become rich and it has done so in a distinctive fashion. One aspect of this has been the role of he developmental state. Another has been the outward directed nature of trade. A third has been the development of regional networks. The story of success has been debated: political actors sought to grasp the implications of shifting patterns of political and economic power; policy analysts wondered what procedures might be replicable elsewhere; and scholars sought to understand the reasons for the success. All agreed that the record in East Asia was remarkable and much debate revolved around the nature of the developmental state. The debate was revisited around the time of the Asian financial crisis[82] and it has opened up once again with the issue of the East Asian region. Today it is clear that East Asia has sketched out its own trajectory in the ongoing shift to the modern world of science-based urban industrial society (originating in Europe and the West, and thereafter exported around the planet, but always assuming local forms – that is, the shift to the modern world does not mean 'Westernization'). Scholars ask: So how does it all work? Political actors ask: Is the region a rising power? And thinking about the future of the global system, commentators ask: Who will set the rules?[83]

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In the years following the irreversible collapse of state-empire systems, replacement elites built states, invented nations and pursued national development. Their record is one of broad success where, in terms of trade, East Asia is an increasingly integrated region, but where, in terms of security, there are continuing divisions. Arguing from the experience of Europe, it could be said that (deeper) economic integration would require (deeper) security cooperation – that is, political cooperation – and this would require the creation of an overarching project for the region, and this in turn would require the recognition of mutual interests. Further integration, the advance of 'soft regionalism', will require a reduction of current emphasis on differentiation and rather more concern for the region as a whole, and this in turn will involve revisiting available national pasts, shifting the stories away from discrete national trajectories towards a wider, more encompassing collective memory that details East Asia's route to the still unfolding modern world.

Afterword

This is the second of two discussions ordered around the collapse of the system of state-empires. The first, *Britain After Empire: Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project*, looked at the response of the core elite to the acute challenges presented by the collapse of the empire. The second, this text, *After the Empires: The Creation of Novel Political-Cultural Projects in East Asia*, looks in comparative fashion at the response of peripheral elites to the spread of opportunities offered by that same collapse. Together they track the dissolution of a broad multi-ethnic political organization and its reordering in the guise of a number of discrete nation-states, each with its own logic, its own place in the wider global system, and each ordering its own distinctive historical development trajectory. The collapse has been characterized in terms of the notion of a general crisis, a pervasive system breakdown running through a number of phases and reaching a violent apogee in the middle years of the twentieth century. This period of breakdown was fatal for there was no going back for the state-empire systems and going forwards the question became what would come next: How would economic, social, cultural and political systems be remade? In respect of the territories of the British Empire, two broad answers are available: core down-sizing and peripheral construction.

In the hitherto core areas of the state-empire system, the metropolitan elite reacted to the catastrophe that had overwhelmed the system within which they stood at the heart in a creative fashion. First, they denied the hitherto peripheral territories ever counted for that much, or, in clichéd form, they had been acquired in a fit of absentmindedness and later relinquished with good grace into a well-prepared independence. Second, they claimed that the residual core of the now dissolved state-empire system was in fact a long-established nation-state – continuing Britain – an island people with a long history, currently the legatee of empire, the recent victor in a virtuous war and, modestly enough, something of a model for other countries around the globe. Then, in the hitherto peripheral areas of the state-empire system, aspirant replacement elites have seized territory, constructed states, invented nations and one way and another pursued national development. In East Asia, the focus of this second text, the hitherto economic and cultural centre of the pre-modern global system, British state-empire holdings dissolved into a number of territories, now nation-states: Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and – somewhat more ambiguously – Hong Kong.

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In respect of the territories of the British state-empire, the historical development trajectories of the various parts of the hitherto state-empire system have been distinctive as elites have read and reacted to shifting enfolding circumstances, disciplined their populations and contrived projects oriented towards desired futures. It has been a reiterative process, projects always

in the process of being revised in the hitherto core and in the sometime peripheries.

In the hitherto core territory, Britain, the elite confronted the disaster that had overwhelmed them with a dual strategy of denial and invention: that the peripheral empire had never mattered much; and that the core areas of 'continuing Britain' could move confidently into the future. And within and behind this façade they subordinated themselves to the overall project of the elite of the USA, a mix of liberal trading sphere plus a deep-seated antipathy towards communism that proved flexible enough to encompass any polity that diverged from the path desired by Washington. The British elite became a dependent elite linked in to the US system via finance, security and ideological nostalgia, whilst the local population were demobilized, buying into the tales of 'continuing Britain' and resting content with welfare-buttressed consumerism. This settlement endured for most of the post-war period and for most of that time it seems to have satisfied the elite and the masses. There has been some carping (from those on the right nostalgic for empire, and those on the left, looking to some sort of post-capitalist socialist future); and there has been celebration (on the right for the USA's corporate-dominated competitive capitalism, on the left, for the ideals of citizenship, and from many commentators simple pleasure at the energy and optimism of the USA, often cast as a contrast with the atmosphere in Britain). And, as indirect evidence, the ideal of a united Europe, readily available on the mainland, never caught on in Britain. So 'continuing Britain' moved sedately from its long successful past into a comfortable present. However, now, at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, it may be that the tone has shifted a little: the elite remain wedded to their dependent position, but this is no longer decently veiled, and whilst overt talk of the USA as a model is muted, talk of 'continuing Britain' is fading, thus London, the heartland of the elite, is increasingly represented in more distanced terms as a successful, rich, world city, plugged into global corporate trading networks. And at the same time, the domestic masses look increasingly askance at welfarism plus consumerism, not, it seems, because they have turned to look elsewhere but, rather, because levels of provision are dropping off, so again the mechanisms that decently veiled the condition of continuing Britain are becoming less effective.

The future for 'continuing Britain' seems uncertain. A continuation of subordination to the USA is possible, but this now runs the risk of being routinely publicly tagged as the status of poodle. But this label cannot function as a decent veiling of deeper relationships, consequently they have been opened up for question, so too the future of continuing Britain. So how might these familiar matters be revisited? How might the elite move forwards? A strategy of muddle through is entirely possible: the deep state is secure, the permanent government secure and parliament is decorative, and the ensemble constitutes a soft oligarchy in which the masses have no obvious way of initiating change, but whilst disengagement from problems coupled to populism might be transiently entertaining, they are unlikely to open up a route to the future. And then there is the option of embracing the project of the European Union. It is likely that the future will involve 'more Europe', but trying to sort out just what this might mean is fraught with uncertainty: the 'European motor', the relationship between France and Germany, seems to be

idling, and repeated British elite posturing might just open the route to British withdrawal or relocation to an outer circle of countries concerned only with trade.

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In the hitherto peripheral territories, aspirant replacement elites experienced the collapse of the system of state-empires as an opportunity and they took their chance. The broad, multi-ethnic territories of the sometime state-empires dissolved into a number of geographically more circumscribed territories, and these were the basis for states. There were numerous contending prospective replacement elites and their conflicts could be violent, and these domestic exchanges took place within the context of the routinely self-interested involvement of departing sometime colonial powers and with the developing concerns of the Americans with their disposition towards creating a cold war bloc system. Nonetheless, replacement elites emerged. In time, these replacement elites controlled territories with internationally settled, if not finally agreed, borders. The British sphere resolved into Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the atypical territory of Hong Kong, nominally a colony until 1997, and now perhaps equally nominally a part of the PRC. Thereafter, with statehood settled, replacement elites sought to invent nations and pursue national development.

The historical development trajectories of these polities have been quite different. In Burma a drawn-out post-independence civil war issued in a core elite dominated by the military, whose view on the world was defensive, informed by an ethnic nationalism, inherited religious ideas (Buddhist and folk-religions) and nominally oriented towards an official state-socialism, and for decades the country was poor, inward-looking and somewhat detached from the wider world. But, in recent years, domestic and international reforms have begun and the country has joined ASEAN with the current elite pursuing a broad programme of reforms. In Malaysia, post-war ethnic-inflected conflicts around constitutions issued in a communalist settlement identifying three constituent groups in the polity, the future of which was to be determined in a corporatist fashion, leading, with interethnic tensions along the way, to a situation of modest but real success: rising standards of living along with domestic political vigour and international stability within ASEAN. Then in Singapore, with post-war confusions in respect of relations with the peninsula resolved, probably unhappily, the unexpectedly independent city-state has relentlessly pursued economic upgrading whilst disciplining its population, with the upshot, 40-odd years down the track, that the country is the richest in Southeast Asia. It boasts international recognition even as its resident population voice their discontent by voting out some parliamentary representatives from the long-ruling PAP. And in Brunei, a micro-state, protected by the departing colonial power from the external threat of absorption into a larger neighbour and the internal threat of democracy, an elite built around an absolute monarchy has overseen the use of oil monies to build a stable, prosperous polity. And, finally, in regard to Hong Kong, a vibrant trading city linking Southern China to the wide global system, a recent relationship between the local business-dominated elite and their nominal distant master in London, has been replaced by a new distant master in Beijing – a relationship which is currently not running entirely smoothly but which must be made to work if Hong Kong is to continue its long-established development trajectory.

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And analogous tales could be told for the other sometime European state-empires: the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China or German Shandong. And broadening the listing somewhat, it might be noted that the USA ran its empire in the Philippines; and Japan accumulated an empire in Northeast Asia, including today, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and territories in China, Indo-China and Southeast Asia. The overarching common theme was the creation and later collapse of state-empire systems and the consequent reordering of the global system in terms of nation-states.

* * * * *

Returning to the broad comparative level and the unfolding shift to the modern world, a number of points can be offered in summary:

- the shift to the modern world began in Europe – centred on the dynamism of science-based industrial capitalism;
- the form of life developed along two axes – intensification and expansion;
- domestically, intensification meant ever more discipline and ever more material wealth;
- internationally, expansion entailed drawing the peoples of other cultures and civilizations into the new system of science-based industrial capitalism;
- these other cultures were reconstructed – a process of development, exploitation and learning;
- the form this took was the system of state-empires;
- these state-empires were the outcomes of myriad decisions made by the agents animating the systems – thus contingent;
- the collapse of the system of state-empires was inevitable;
- the general crisis saw collapse in the core and at the periphery;
- there were numerous wars;
- at the end of the process of collapse the hitherto core areas experienced radical down-sizing – the elites reimagined their polities and sought new projects;
- at the end of the process of collapse the hitherto peripheral areas experienced novel statehood plus novel nationhood plus novel national development – they now found locally shaped places within the wider modern world;
- the historical development trajectories of hitherto core units and hitherto peripheral territories have been quite different;
- the historical development trajectories of the two areas – Europe and East Asia – have also been different: in Europe, governed by the political ethic of unification; in East Asia, governed by the preoccupation with differentiation and sovereignty;
- currently, discussions of future trajectories are cast in terms of regions – a projected coherent European Union and a projected ordered East Asia. However, there are dissenting and cross-cutting voices: the celebrants of the liberal trading sphere created post-war by the USA advocate its continuation and expansion – the idea of modernization or globalization; whilst in East Asia the elites accommodate themselves to shifting circumstances, which include, amongst other things, their own power. Some nod towards the Americans and some nod towards China, and in China, historically, the hitherto core

territory of the region, the authorities speak of peaceful rising – a declaration of their pursuit of their own path;

- finally it might be noted that whilst speculation about the future of Europe and East Asia can quickly move from the realms of social science to that of airport novelists, it is the case that Europe has recovered from the general crisis; it is the case that East Asia has recovered from the general crisis; it is the case that both are experiencing the unexpected costs of success; and it is the case that the two regions are recovering linkages which had been lost in the immediate wake of the collapse of the system of state-empires.

Notes

1 State-Empires and the Shift to the Modern World

1. Terminology can quickly capture argument – the terms 'core' and 'periphery' are familiar and will be used throughout this text – but the terms 'metropolitan core' and 'associated territories' are better. These get the ad hoc contingent nature of the expansion, control and collapse of empires
2. These two positions are available within popular thinking in Britain. Historians have debated these matters with great sophistication in recent years and this text borrows freely from their work. One issue to be pursued is the ways in which this familiar distinction works in other cultural/political contexts. Thus a simple popular hostility is readily available in China ('one hundred years of humiliation' and so forth). Heavily edited government-sponsored histories are also available (hence Singapore's official ideology whereby the colonial past is acknowledged but reduced to a mere prologue to the achievements of the post-independence ruling party) and there are also expressions of stylized nostalgia (thus demonstrators in 2013 in Hong Kong waving the colonial era flag in protest against Beijing). So from a simple starting point of stereotypical opposition in this text the historians will be followed in order to tell a more nuanced tale.
3. See below chapter two – wars of colonial expansion. In brief, the Dutch waged a series of wars in order to conquer their territories in the archipelago; the British participated in numerous wars in the Indian subcontinent and then waged three wars in order to overcome the Burmese kingdom; the French waged three wars against the Vietnamese kingdom in order to secure their Indo-China empire; and, thereafter, Europeans, Americans and Japanese variously combined to stage military campaigns in China.
4. P.W. Preston 2009 *Arguments and Actions in Social Theory*, London, Palgrave.
5. P.W. Preston 2014 *Britain After Empire: Constructing a Post-War Political-Cultural Project*, London, Palgrave.
6. An early effort in this regard was P.W. Preston 2010 *National Pasts in Europe and East Asia*, London, Routledge.
7. An argument made in Preston 2009.
8. Expressed simply – for a sketch of debates on nature of natural science, see A.F. Chalmers 1982 *What is this Thing called Science?* 2nd ed. Milton Keynes, Open University Press; for a review of materials of philosophy of social science, see G. Delanty and P. Strydom (eds.) 2003 *Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings*, Maidenhead, Open University Press.
9. Thus the style of the pursuit of livelihood which current rich countries enjoy is simply unimaginable without the products of natural science. On the role of natural science in British twentieth-century industrial and military history, see David Edgerton 2005 *Warfare State: Britain 1920–1970*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

10. Ideas taken from John Passmore 1970 *The Perfectibility of Man*, London, Duckworth; S. Pollard 1971 *The Idea of Progress*, Harmondsworth, Penguin; Roy Porter 2001 *The Enlightenment*, 2nd ed. London, Palgrave; J. Habermas 1971 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Boston, Beacon.
11. Unpacked via contrast between modernity and post-modernity by David Harvey 1989 *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford, Blackwell; F. Jameson 1991 *The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London, Verso.
12. P. Gay 2008 *Modernism: The Lure of Heresy*, New York, Norton.
13. Cold War competition between the Soviet Union and the USA impacted theorizing. Ideas available within the classical European tradition of social theorizing (think of Tonnies, Durkheim and Weber) were turned to the preparation of propaganda. Modernization entailed losing extant social forms in order to acquire those evidenced in 1950s and 1960s USA. See W.W. Rostow 1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge University Press. The 1990s' equivalent term was 'globalization', presented in analogous circumstances of American hubristic self-confidence, and maybe ending in analogous circumstances of financial crisis and war.
14. An idea recycled in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union by F. Fukuyama 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Hamish Hamilton.
15. The arguments of the European classical tradition – Marx, Durkheim and Weber. A noted discussion is available from A. Giddens 1971 *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory*, Cambridge University Press. For an overview stressing the issue of change, see P.W. Preston1996 *Development Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell.
16. E. Gellner 1964 *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld.
17. A. MacIntyre 2007 *After Virtue*: *A Study in Moral Theory*, 3rd ed. University of Notre Dame Press.
18. C. Bayly 2004 *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914*, Oxford, Blackwell.
19. Z. Bauman 1989 *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Oxford, Polity; B. Wasserstein 2009 *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time*, Oxford University Press; Jorg Friedrich 2006 *The Fire: The Bombing of Germany 1940–1945*, New York, Columbia University Press.
20. C. Cipolla 1966 *Guns, Sails and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion 1400–1700*, New York, Pantheon. In hindsight, easily mistaken as an inevitable process. At the time, not so – there were numerous small wars and there were also European anxieties. On these, see Linda Colley 2002 *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600–1850*, London, Jonathan Cape. The edge of empire was ragged. For a detailed case, see J.M. Caroll 2005 *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*, Cambridge University Press.
21. A.G. Frank 1998 *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, University of California Press.
22. M. Weber – thereafter, modernization theorists.
23. Frank 1998.
24. K. Pomeranz 2006 *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton University Press.
25. J. Hobson 2004 *Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*, Cambridge University Press.

26. A. Maddison 2007 *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run 960–2030*, Paris, OECD.
27. For brief overviews, see P.W. Preston 1998 *Pacific Asia in the Global System*, Oxford, Blackwell; M. Borthwick 1992 *Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia*, Boulder, Westview; F. Godement 1997 *The New Asian Renaissance*, London, Routledge.
28. Maddison 2007.
29. B. Moore Jr. 1966 *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston, Beacon.
30. D.G.E. Hall 1981 *A History of South East Asia*, 4th ed. London, Macmillan; A. Acharya 2000 *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press.
31. R. Rorty 1989 *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press.
32. An optimistic humanist assumption – a variant available from those globalization proponents who see proto-globalization in earlier periods and other cultures. However, as a matter of report, it did happen in Europe and it did not happen elsewhere.
33. P. Worsley 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, University of Chicago Press.
34. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins 1993 *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914*, London, Longman, pp. 42–6; L. Colley 1992 *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, Yale University Press; pp. 30–43, 85–98; C.A. Trocki 1999 *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy*, London, Routledge; B. Inglis 1976 *The Opium War*, London, Coronet; J. Lovell 2011 *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*, London, Picador.
35. Cain and Hopkins 1993, pp. 44–5.
36. K. Marx and F. Engels 1848 'The Manifesto of the Communist Party', in *Marx and Engels Selected Works*, 1968, London, Lawrence and Wishart.
37. Lovell 2011. See also note 28 Chapter 2.
38. As modern media began to develop in the nineteenth century, popular magazines and books (travellers tales were one popular genre) were not necessarily reliable.
39. Ideas changed – early reports fed into ideas of 'noble savages' untouched and uncorrupted by modern society. Later ideas saw merely primitives.
40. Anthropology and the colonial encounter has been discussed. See T. Asad 1995 *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, London, Prometheus; A. Kuper 1973 *Anthropology and Anthropologists*, London, Routledge.
41. This last noted could take the form of claims to superiority over childish natives (for example, Rudyard Kipling) or could mix deep knowledge with culturally conservative judgements, as with colonial administrator-scholars. For example, J.S. Furnivall.
42. And maybe also a burden. Thus debates about the financial costs of the apparatus of state-empire holdings (who pays). Thus Kipling inviting the Americans to take over from Britain ('take up the white man's burden' and so on) as they conquered the Philippines.
43. Collecting specimens, describing them and allocating them places in elaborate schemes of classification. Today genetics uncovers the fundamental physics/chemistry of life.

44. These ideas were not restricted to deployment by core in the periphery – they were deployed in the core also. A National Socialist pursuit of empire in Eastern Europe, systematic killing of Jewish people (read as a race group), euthanasia programmes, population planning (anxieties about differential reproduction rates amongst social classes), education planning (IQ tests to identify the genetically given 'bright' children) (or bell curves). On all of this, see the scandal surrounding the work of Cyril Burt.
45. S. Alatas 1977 *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, London, Cass.
46. A paradigm case in Britain could be the Elgin Marbles, which were wrenched from the Parthenon and deposited in the British Museum – an exercise in vandalism legitimated in terms of protecting the relics and making them available for educational purposes. To date the museum refuses to return them. Nonetheless, the empire period theft of cultural materials is now a matter for international discussion.
47. A theme in the work of Peter Worsley (1984).
48. Critics identify British colonial authorities as undermining the Indian cotton industry. In some states, peasant agriculture was displaced by opium poppy production. In the Dutch East Indies, the systems of sugar production were at one point characterized as slavery by the US authorities. In the Philippines, large landed estates were created, binding workers to their landlord/employer, and so on.
49. For example, colonial Malaya. From the plethora of local royals, a restricted number were 'recognized' by the British and given lavish pensions. The resultant construct was then misread by the British population as exemplifying the exotic richness and otherness of the East.
50. Thus the status of Islamic law in colonial Malaya.
51. Anthropologists have unpacked this issue at length.
52. For example, in Singapore, the repression of Orang Laut (Cynthia Chou 2010 *The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia*, London, Routledge, pp. 52–8).
53. Restrictions on access by non-metropolitan people to positions in colonial economy, society and polity were routine – now a cliché.
54. In general, Linda Colley for Hong Kong (J.M. Carroll 2005 *Edge of Empires: Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*, Harvard University Press).
55. One example is the British incursions into India involving multiple wars against multiple local powers organized in various ways. In other words the British forces were one group amongst others. V.G. Kiernan 1982 *European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960*, London, Fontana.
56. E. Wilkinson 1991 *Japan versus the West: Image and Reality*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
57. On the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902–23, see W.G. Beasley 1987 *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945*, Oxford, Clarendon; G.D. Hook et al. 2001 *Japan's International Relations*, London, Routledge. The treaty was not renewed by the British as a result of US business/official pressure, dominion anxieties and Chinese pressure in respect of Japan's involvement in China.
58. Ambiguously grasped at the time, in Southeast Asia, notions of plural societies and dual economies as per J.S. Furnivall and J.H. Boeke – two colonial administrator scholars. P.W. Preston 1987 *Rethinking Development: Essays on Development and Southeast Asia*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

59. M. Mamdani 2012 'What is a Tribe' in *London Review of Books* 17.13.
60. Order meant relative stability in the immediate locale (economic, social and political) whilst access was opened up to international networks of trade. On the role of colonial port cities, see A.D. King 1990 *Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System*, London, Routledge.
61. On the Orang Laut, Chou 2010, pp. 52–8; the promotion of Straits Chinese (C.M. Turnbull 2009 *A History of Modern Singapore 1819–2005*, National University of Singapore Press, pp. 115–19).
62. S. Strange 1988 *States and Markets*, London, Pinter.
63. It is a point that A.G. Frank made in polemical fashion with the notion of 'surplus expropriation chains' – reaching from the poorest third-world day labourer up to the key figures in the cores of the global economy. See, for example, A.G. Frank 1967 *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, New York, Monthly Review Press.
64. Core/periphery – I. Wallerstein 1974 *The Modern World System*, New York, Academic Press.
65. As noted, an issue picked up by A.G. Frank – surplus expropriation chains reached all the way down to ordinary people everywhere.
66. Worsely 1984.
67. Bayly 2004 gets the scope of activity but somewhat apologetically misreads Europe's central role.
68. Worsley 1984.
69. The tale is too complex to do more than sketch. It has been tackled by numerous historians. See Eric Hobsbawm's sequence of books looking at the process.
70. Thus Isaac Newton devoted much time to esoteric enquiries (R. Porter 2000 *Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World*, London, Allen Lane); Joseph Priestley devoted much time to 'phlogiston'; Cyril Burt devoted much time to IQ tests; and so on.
71. In regard to Newton's mechanical universe; in regard to Darwin's evolution by natural selection; and so on.
72. Natural scientific advance is contingent. Formally, all claims are provisional (after Karl Popper, today's theory might be refuted tomorrow). Substantively, natural science is expensive and funding decisions are made by committees (state, corporate and academic).
73. Porter 2000.
74. Trading in India – La Compagnie Francais des Indes Orientales – founded 1664 (note is from Wikipedia 2 July 2013).
75. The resultant mixture is distinctive: theorized by J.H. Boeke in terms of the distinction between economic sectors, hence dual economies; theorized by structuralist Marxists in terms of the articulation of modes of production (see A. Brewer 1980 *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*, London, Routledge); theorized by economic anthropologists in terms of the intermixing of economic forms of life (see S. Gudeman 1986 *Economics as Culture*, London, Routledge).
76. Hence, in 2012, the unexpected and sharp comments from elites and mobilized masses in China directed to the Japanese-in-general over the Senkoku/Daiyu islands.

2 State-Empire Systems: The Players

1. For example, see L. Colley 2007 *The Ordeal of Elizabeth Marsh: A Women in World History*, London, Harper.
2. For example, Commissioner Lin – see Julia Lovell 2011 *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*, London, Picador.
3. EIC, VOC and CFI.
4. In regard to China, R. Bickers 2011 *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire 1832–1914*, London, Allen Lane.
5. Thus, as noted, the Orang Laut – characterized as pirates and attacked – C. Chou 2010 *The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia*, London, Routledge.
6. A list is given by Richard Gott 2011 *Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt*, London, Verso.
7. N. Davis 1997 *Europe: A History*, London, Pimlico.
8. T. Nairn 1988 *The Enchanted Glass,* London, Hutchinson Radius.
9. On this in regard to the British Empire, see D. Edgerton 2006 *Warfare State: Britain 1920–1970*, Cambridge University Press.
10. Commented upon in W.G. Sebald 2011 *Austerlitz*, London, Penguin.
11. C. Cipolla 1965 *Guns and Sails in the Early Phase of European Expansion, 1400–1700*, London, Collins.
12. Familiarly – Kipling celebrating the US invasion of the Philippines.
13. J. Darwin 2009 *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830–1970*, Cambridge University Press.
14. Colley 2007.
15. D. Canadine 2001 *Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire*, London, Penguin.
16. P.W. Preston 1987 *Rethinking Development*, London, Routledge, on this mode of engagement – for example, T.S. Raffles, J.S. Furnivall.
17. Aspects of this might still operate. See F. Ledwidge 2012 *Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Yale University Press.
18. K. Marx and F. Engels 1848 The Manifesto of the Communist Party, reprinted in K. Marx and F. Engels 1968 *Marx and Engels: Selected Works*, London, Lawrence and Wishart.
19. On peasant forms of life, see P. Worsley 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, London, Weidenfeld.
20. A.G. Frank 1998 *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, University of California Press.
21. K. Pomeranz 2000 *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Princeton University Press.
22. Angus Maddison 1998 *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run 960–2030*, Paris, OECD.
23. C. Bayly 2004 *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914*, Oxford, Blackwell.
24. On 'possessive individualism', see C.B. Macpherson 1973 *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieva*l, Oxford University Press.
25. An overview is presented by Worsley 1984.
26. For a novelists' reconstruction of life in a trading factory, see David Mitchell 2011 *The Thousand Autumns of Jacob De Zoet*, London, Hodder.
27. British and Dutch trading groups formed companies early in the seventeenth century. They were successful and they ran on until subsumed within formal

state-centred colonial administrations – the British EIC (1600/1858) after the mid-nineteenth century 'Indian Mutiny' and the Dutch VOC (1602/1800) after it went bankrupt in 1800. The shift can be read at the macro-scale as evidence of the unfolding shift to the modern world – that is, the creation of rational bureaucratic states which superseded earlier organizational forms. Other European countries formed companies There was the CFI (1664/1794) but it was not successful. Later French involvement in Indochina was secured by state invasion.

28. For the details, see Lovell 2011. The first was contrived by the British. The second was simply an unprovoked attack with a pretext so flimsy that it was voted down in the House of Commons, with the defeated government recovering its position via an election, during which it successfully played a jingoistic race card against its domestic opponents.
29. Worsley 1984.
30. A good example, as noted, was the map of Singapore by Lt. Jackson 1823, published in Mary Turnbull 1977 *A History of Singapore 1815–1975*, Oxford University Press (also available at University of Austin Texas library).
31. By way of an example, the colonial authorities in Singapore issued building regulations in regard to hygiene. Closed areas of shop houses were required to open up back roads, but the Chinese occupants of the houses read these changes in terms of security rather than hygiene. See B.S.A. Yeoh 2003 *Contesting Space in Colonial Singapore: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment*, Singapore University Press.
32. Shelley Baranowski 2011 *Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler*, Cambridge University Press, see Chapter 1.
33. Details taken from George Steinmetz 2008 'The Colonial State as a Social Field: Ethnographic Capital and Native Policy in the German Overseas Empire before 1914' *American Sociological Review* 73.4, pp. 589–612.
34. Amongst these vessels, cruiser Emden became a surface raider in the Indian Ocean and was destroyed in battle. The German fleet engaged the British in November at Coronel, destroying them. Later in the Falklands in December it was destroyed in turn, with the total casualties including around 3,000 killed (*Wikipedia* July 2013).
35. In which German armed forces were involved towards the end of the episode. The domestic reporting was positive, with Germany seen as internationally significant. See Lu Yixu 2011 'The War that Scarcely Was: The Beliner Morgenpost and the Boxer Uprising' in M. Perraudin and J. Zimmerer (eds.) *German Colonialism and National Identity*, London, Routledge.
36. George Steinmetz 2003 'The Devils Handwriting: Pre-colonial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity and Cross-identification in German Colonialism' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45.1, p. 68.
37. In addition to the urban remnants, the city boasts a brewery, dating from 1904, which is now one of the largest companies in China and the original buildings are now a popular tourist site. On the city, see the postcards collected and reproduced in David Lu and May Lu 1991 *Historical View of Qingdao 1897–1914*, Qingdao Publishing House.
38. See early development theorist I. Sachs 1976 *The Discovery of the Third World*, London, MIT.

39. An idea available in the work of J.J. Rousseau. See also Steinmetz 2003, who discusses official attitudes towards German Samoa.
40. In respect of the British and opium, see Lovell 2011.
41. The celebration of the virtues of trade came to provide cover for a key activity in sustaining/expanding the state-empire – the East Asian opium trade. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins 1993 *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914*, London, Longman, pp. 42–6; L. Colley 1992 *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, Yale University Press, pp. 30–43, 85–98; C.A. Trocki 1999 *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy*, London, Routledge; B. Inglis 1976 *The Opium War*, London, Coronet; Lovell 2011.
42. Cain and Hopkins 1993, pp. 44–5.
43. K. Marx and F. Engels 1848 *The Manifesto of the Communist Party,* in *Marx and Engels Selected Works*, 1968, London, Lawrence and Wishart.
44. J.S. Furnivall 1939 *Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy*, Cambridge, CUP. On Furnivall, see Julie Pham 2004 'Ghost Hunting in Colonial Burma: Nostalgia, paternalism and the thoughts of J.S. Furnivall' *South East Asia Research* 12.2.
45. B. Anderson 1983 *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso.
46. Hence the merchant marines and hence the elite preoccupation with navies, their relative sizes and dispositions.
47. A.D. King 1990 *Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy*, London, Routledge. Arguments recycled in the 1980s and 1990s era of neo-liberalism in terms of the idea of 'world cities' – an ambiguous term but it points to the same duality of function. In contemporary East Asia, claimants to the title would include Singapore, Hong Kong maybe Shanghai and other lowerlevel players representing themselves as 'hubs' of activity.
48. Amitav Acharya 2000 *The Quest for Identity: The International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press.
49. Ibid.
50. The example of the opium trade illuminates the complexity of the exchanges between the various agents: a valuable crop grown in India, where it displaced peasant food production; exported via Southeast Asia to southern China; a major trade that was good at generating large revenues; a large industry involving many people – producers, transporters, wholesale markets, retail distributors, opium shopkeepers and customers; and the industry was organized, and it provided a key social institution and crucial tax revenues. See Trocki 1999. See also Lovell 2011and Brian Inglis 1979 *The Opium War*, London, Coronet.
51. G. Barraclough 1964 *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

3 State-Empire Systems: The Logics

1. The British Empire, the focus in this text, functioned within a global system ordered in terms of empires – in particular, with an eye on the East Asian, French, Dutch, US and Japanese empires.
2. In particular, Chalmers Johnson 2000 *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*, London, Little Brown; see also Michael Mann 2003 *Incoherent Empire*, London, Verso.

3. For example, John Darwin 2009 *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, who is critical of cultural historians.
4. S. Howe (ed.) 2010 *The New Imperial Studies Reader*, London, Routledge. Howe discusses the division and refers to it as a 'slow-burning civil war' (p. 1).
5. H. Munkler 2007 *Empires*, Cambridge, Polity.
6. Ibid.
7. Johnson and Mann. See also Munkler 2007. On the USA, see T.H. Parsons 2010 *The Rule of Empires*, Oxford University Press, who argues that asking if the USA is an empire distracts attention from the debacle in Iraq. The lesson of past and recent practice is that 'empire methods' are no longer tenable.
8. A point made by Darwin 2009.
9. An idea made central to Darwin 2009, and in the case of the British, the elite were assiduous in seeking to further their 'project'.
10. John Darwin 2012 *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*, London, Allen Lane.
11. Darwin 2012 cast unfinished in practical terms, but the notion of contingency cuts much deeper. See R. Rorty 1989 *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press; see also P.W. Preston 2009 *Arguments and Actions in Social Theory*, London, Palgrave.
12. Focused on legacies, thus post-colonialism and so on.
13. L. Colley 2002 *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600–1850*, London, Jonathan Cape.
14. I. Sachs 1976 *The Discovery of the Third World*, London, MIT Press.
15. V. Keirnan 1982 *European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815–1960*, London, Fontana.
16. Evident not only in some colonial campaigns. Recall, say, Robert Hughes on the extermination of the indigenous population of Tasmania, including a hunting style drive across the island; or the behavior of German colonial authorities in Namibia; or the behavior of Americans in their migration to the West at the expense of native Americans; or, more recently, episodes in the wars of the twentieth century. On these in general, see Z. Bauman 1989 *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, Polity.
17. It can be argued in respect of the general crisis that collapsed the system that these ideas of race competition developed in the core were exported to the periphery and then reimported into the core. Material is now available about German colonies in Southwest Africa. Also, the British invention of concentration camps during the Boer War is noted.
18. M. Polanyi 1958 *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post Critical Philosophy*, London, Routledge.
19. The central ideological claims of free market theorists is that the competitive marketplace maximizes human benefits. These claims are routinely contested. See P.W. Preston 1994 *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury.
20. For a survey, see P.W. Preston 1996 *Development Theory*, Oxford, Blackwell.
21. See P. Hall and D. Soskice 2001 *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, Oxford University Press.
22. A Latin American school. On its work, see A.G. Frank.

23. I. Wallerstein 1974/80 *The Modern World System Vols. I/II*, New York, Academic Press.
24. For an introduction, see M. Watson 2005 *Foundations of International Political Economy*, London, Palgrave.
25. D. Held and A. McGrew 2002 *Globalization/Anti-globalization*, Cambridge, Polity.
26. Key figure, Edward Said 1978 *Orientalism*, New York, Pantheon.
27. An Indian school – subaltern studies – looking at non-elite understandings.
28. The American wars in Southeast Asia and interventions elsewhere in the Third World during the 1960s in particular also provoked a debate. See, for example, Harry Magdoff 1969 *The Age of Imperialism*, New York, Monthly Review Press; George Lichtheim 1971 *Imperialism*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
29. R. Kagan 2003 *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, London, Atlantic; R. Kagan 2008 *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, London, Atlantic; R. Cooper 2003 *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, London, Atlantic.
30. Johnson 2000; C. Johnson 2004 *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic*, London, Verso.
31. Johnson 2000, p. 204.
32. Johnson 2004.
33. Dower, p. 82. Dower gives the same figure as Johnson for civilian deaths.
34. Johnson 2004, p. 43.
35. J. Dower 2010 *Cultures of War*, New York, Norton, p. 45.
36. Johnson 2004, p. 285.
37. Mann 2003.
38. Dower 2010.
39. Thus bases encourage bars and so on. Bases can also generate new settlements over time. Thus Holland Village in Singapore began as a hawker centre by the gates of a military base. See B.S.A. Yeoh and L. Kong (eds.) 1995 *Portraits of Places: History, Community and Identity in Singapore*, Singapore, Times Editions.
40. A list is given by Darwin 2009, p. 1.
41. The British North America Act 1867 establishes the Dominion of Canada; then 1907 sees the Dominion of New Zealand; and 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia Act.
42. S. Strange 1988 *States and Markets*, London, Pinter.
43. One familiar text is S. Lukes 1974 *Power: A Radical View*, London, Macmillan. More recently, work inspired by M. Foucault has unpacked the notion of power in diverse social settings.
44. A.D. King 1990 *Urbanism, Colonialism and the World Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System*, London, Routledge.
45. On Hong Kong, see J.M. Carroll 2005 *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*, Cambridge University Press.
46. Munkler 2007; Parsons 2010.
47. Darwin 2012, see map on p. 37 for journey times by sail.
48. For example, spice islands tales. Giles Milton 1999 *Nathaniel's Nutmeg*, London, Hodder and Stroughton.
49. See, for example, N. Davies 2011 *Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half Forgotten Europe*, London, Allen Lane.

50. N. Tarling 2001 *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia 1941–1945*, Singapore, Horizon.
51. L. Colley 1992 *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, Yale University Press.
52. Darwin 2009.
53. It is cast in naïve realist terms – there are facts in the world and they can be discovered, accurately recorded and transmitted to a reasonable readership. Darwin is at pains to distinguish his work from cultural history, which is represented as unreliable. All that put to one side, the key issue is what work can be done by Darwin's arguments – a lot. It tells us how the elite apprehended their circumstances, hence the 'empire project'.
54. Darwin 2009.
55. Ibid., p. 101.
56. Ibid., p. 255.
57. Ibid., p. 332.
58. Ibid., pp. 492–3.
59. Ibid., p. 586.
60. Ibid., p. 655; on the manner in which this loss was handled, see the companion volume to this text: P.W. Preston 2014 *Britain After Empire*, London, Palgrave.
61. Darwin 2009, p. 1.
62. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
63. J.M. Carroll 2005.
64. Tarling 2001.
65. R. Kedward 2005 *La Vie en Bleu: France and the French Since 1900*, London, Allen Lane – on France, the present identity solidifies in Great War as peasants become soldier/citizens.
66. Tarling 2001.
67. D. Lieven 2004 *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, London, Harper Collins.
68. B. Moore 1966 *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon.
69. Johnson 2004, p. 43.
70. J.M. Pluvier 1977 *Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence*, Oxford University Press.
71. Tarling 2001.
72. Pluvier 1977.
73. B. Kerkvliet 1977 *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*, University of California Press.
74. P.W. Preston 2000 *Understanding Modern Japan: A Political Economy of Development, Culture and Global Power*, London, Sage.
75. W.G. Beasley 1991 *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945*, Oxford, Clarendon.
76. S.C.M. Paine 2012 *The Wars for Asia 1911–1949*, Cambridge University Press.
77. R. Mitter 2013 *China's War with Japan 1937–1945*, London, Allen Lane.
78. Tarling 2001.
79. From the late nineteenth century the Japanese advanced the idea of pan-Asianism, which proposed the overarching idea that East Asia should be governed and developed by and for the peoples of the region, but it was not widely adopted. A further attempt to create such a sphere was made in the 1940s with the ill-fated Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

80. Paine 2012.
81. M. Hastings 2008 *Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944–45*, New York, Alfred Knopf.
82. T. Hasegawa 2005 *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan*, Harvard University Press.
83. In development theory it is the tale of Raul Prebisch, ECLA, structural economics and finally dependency theory, and more recently in the early 2000s, broad success is recorded in the financial press and the idea of BRICs emerges.

4 State-Empire Systems: Fracture Lines

1. On the British Empire, see John Darwin 2009 *The Empire Project*, Cambridge University Press; John Darwin 2012 *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain*, London, Allen Lane.
2. On this, see G. Hodgson 1988 *Economics and Institutions*, Cambridge, Polity; see also the work of Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Streeten and J.K. Galbraith.
3. In respect of China, see R. Bickers 2011 *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire 1832–1914*, London, Allen Lane. In brief, the traders in general were greedy, rapacious and racist.
4. Witness the changes in the Malay peninsula.
5. P. Worsley 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, London, Weidenfeld.
6. Captured in the 1930s by J.H. Boeke and J. Furnivall. For dual economies and plural societies, see P.W. Preston 1985 *New Trends in Development Theory*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
7. Recently discussed by Julia Lovell 2011 *The Opium War*, London, Picador. On the deeper political economy, see C.A. Trocki 1999 *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750–1950*, London, Routledge.
8. Something the British colonial authorities in the early years of Singapore complained about. See M. Turnbull 1977 *A History of Singapore 1819–1976*, Oxford University Press.
9. On the people selling into China, see Bickers 2011. He condemns them.
10. Hence, later, the 'White Australia policy'.
11. As with, say, Singapore or Hong Kong, waves of inward migrants simply arrived and then made their lives amongst their compatriots. These influxes are recorded in the population data for these settlements. They record headlong growth and maybe also, as in the case of Singapore, sharply skewed gender profiles with many more males than females.
12. Worsley 1984.
13. Ibid.
14. On Huks, see B. Kerkvliet 1977 *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*, University of California Press. On the US return to the Philippines, see also A.J. Stockwell 1992 'Southeast Asia in War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires' in N. Tarling (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Vol. 4 From World War II to the Present*, Cambridge University Press.
15. J.C. Scott 1985 *Weapons of the Weak*, Yale University Press.

16. K. O'Brien and L. Li 2006 *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*, Cambridge University Press.
17. D. Canadine 2001 *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw their Empire*, London, Allen Lane.
18. B. Anderson 1983 *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso.
19. H. Munkler 2007 *Empires*, Cambridge, Polity unpacks the logics of various types of empire: core ideas, large size, multi-ethnic, enduring and with core asserting power.
20. The British, Dutch and French were active in East Asia. And, turning directly to East Asia, there were further empires: Qing China, Meiji Japan and the USA.
21. The role of agents and the seemingly chaotic sequence of exchanges between the various relevant agents in the run-up to the Great War is tacked by Christopher Clark 2013 *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, London, Penguin. He points in particular to irredentist nationalisms in the Balkans – as the Ottoman Empire faded and new states took shape, Serbia sought to expand its territories via state action and state-sponsored terrorism.
22. For the British, see the shifting elite and popular representation of Germany and Germans – from a cultured example to a nationalistic threat. For the Americans, see the reimagining around the turn of twentieth century of Chinese and Japanese – from long-established civilizations to the threat of the yellow peril.
23. B. Moore 1966 *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon.
24. On Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth century, see Lovell 2011; G. Davies 2009 *Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Enquiry*, Harvard University Press; S. Zhao 2004 *A Nation State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, Stanford University Press.
25. Bickers 2011, pp. 327–36.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. S. Strange 1988 *State and Markets*, London, Pinter.
29. For example, in Singapore, exports to the USA made the city well connected and relatively prosperous by 1900. Or, again, by 1900 the amount of capital deployed in the Hong Kong economy by local Chinese business was equal to that of the British.
30. B. Cummings 1999 *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*, Duke University Press.
31. Clark 2013.
32. Moore 1966.
33. G. Barraclough 1964 *Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth, Penguin. See Chapter 6 on the revolt against the West.
34. Ibid., p. 166.
35. M. Hastings 2011 *All Hell Let Loose: The World at War 1939–1945*, London, Harper, p. 419.
36. Both as territorial acquisition and as participation in the treaty port system, whereby Qing China was made open for foreign state-empire activities – trade, concessions and so on. In other words, the Japanese were caught up and joined in a system of state-empires that was already up and running.

37. On the history of imperial Japan's expansion and colonies, see W.G. Beasley 1991 *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945*, Oxford, Clarendon.
38. On the cultural/political impact of the Russo-Japanese War, see D. Wells and S. Wilson (eds.) 1999 *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective 1904–05*, London, Macmillan.
39. On pan-Asian ideology, see S. Saaler and J.V. Koschmann (eds.) 2007 *Pan Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, London, Routledge.
40. Moore 1966.
41. R.E. Karl 2002 *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth* Century, Duke University Press.
42. One example – Southern Rhodesia between the two world wars – is discussed in the novels of Doris Lessing.
43. In Surabaya – a monument to the Indonesian dead resisting a British Army.
44. One ecumenical approach to this issue is available on the Padang in Singapore – an area of land that has been given over to monuments – Chook Sing Memorial, Cenotaph and Indian National Army memorial.
45. Hobsbawm criticizes the US authorities – power, but with no great idea of responsibility towards the system as a whole.
46. E. Hobsbawm 1994 *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*, London, Weidenfeld.
47. Stockwell 1992, p. 2.

5 General Crisis: System Failure and the Collapse into Warfare

1. This section is derived from P.W. Preston 2012 'The Enduring Costs of Forgetfulness: Europe, Asia and the Wars of the Twentieth Century' *Public Lecture*, Institute for Chinese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, October 2012; see also P.W. Preston 2011 *National Pasts in Europe and East Asia*, London, Routledge.
2. Characterized by the British as 'sea pirates' and attacked by military units, on these people, see Cynthia Chou 2010 *The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia*, London, Routledge, pp. 52–8.
3. On this, see V.G. Kiernan 1982 *European Empires from Conquest to Collapse*, London, Fontana; Richard Gott 2011 *Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt*, London, Verso.
4. The British move into the so-called New Territories did not cost the British any dead amongst their soldiers but cost the local villagers much more, some 500 or so dead. On this, see Patrick H. Hase 2008 *The Six Day War of 1899: Hong Kong in the Age of Imperialism*, Hong Kong University Press.
5. For example, in Sudan, the Battle of Omdurman.
6. Taken from Preston 2011, the information is culled from web pages. See in particular World History at KMLA http://www.zum.de/whkmla/military.
7. One strategy was to declare territory to be *terra nullis* (empty of people, unclaimed and therefore available), thus the British treatment of Australia (occupation began in 1788 with convicts expelled from Britain – over the period of these expulsions, some 160,000). The local courts invoked the idea

of *terra nullis* some time later, but it was not a settlement of empty lands; it was a process of displacement (or invasion). See Robert Hughes1988 *The Fatal Shore*, London, Pan; Henry Reynolds 1982 *The Other Side of the Frontier*, Penguin Books Australia. The issue continues to be highly controversial as it bears directly on Aboriginal Australian's land rights.

8. A rough partial list, assembled from various sources.
9. M.C. Ricklefs 1993 *A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1300*, London, Macmillan. See Chapter 13.
10. Thus the American Anti-Imperialist League of 1898–1921 (information from Wikipedia, accessed 9 December 2013).
11. The list is taken from the materials in Bruce A. Elleman 2001 *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1975–1989*, London, Routledge.
12. Various sources. See J. Fenby 2009 *The Penguin History of Modern China*, London, Penguin.
13. B. Moore Jr. 1966 *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon.
14. Julia Lovell 2011 *The Opium War*, London, Picador. Lovell adds that for most of the time when the British were a side-show, the Qing were preoccupied with domestic issues.
15. In the sense sketched by Ernest Gellner – unclarity in respect of goals, unclarity in respect of means and unclarity in respect of ways of resolving the confusion – see E. Gellner 1964 *Thought and Change*, London, Weidenfeld.
16. Unpacked by A. Hillgruber 1981 *Germany and the Two World Wars*, Harvard University Press.
17. P. Worsley 1984 *The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development*, London, Weidenfeld.
18. S. Strange 1988 *State and Markets*, London, Pinter.
19. For example, in Singapore, exports to the USA made the city well connected and relatively prosperous by 1900. Again, by 1900 the amount of capital deployed in the Hong Kong economy by local Chinese business was equal to that of the British.
20. Moore 1966.
21. This four-part division is taken from Preston 2011, pp. 134–68. The phases are contestable – like any other exercise in turning history into phases – but these attempt to express the idea that state-empire expansion was always going to have a high water mark after which it would fall back as groups of people successfully shifted into the modern world.
22. Old regimes that had tried to accommodate the demands of the modern world fail – hence the Chinese Revolution and the Siamese Coup.
23. As the collapse gathered pace, the system dissolved into violence. The violence was most evident in the wars that swept through the sometime core of the region, China.
24. Independence followed – first Burma, last Vietnam (excluding the cases of Macau, Hong Kong and East Timor).
25. As independence and success took root, the Cold War faded and China re-emerged as a key power in the region.
26. T. Judt 2008 'What have we learned, if anything?' *New York Review of Books* 55.7, 1 May 2008.

27. P.W. Preston 1982 *Development Theory*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. See discussion of Raul Prebisch et al.
28. Subsequently, collective memory and in particular national pasts are/were subject to editing – that is, memory is a mix of active remembering and equally active forgetting. Contemporaneously, the experience of warfare entails the identification of enemies. One characteristic of the wars of state-empire collapse was the pervasive racism, in which enemies were dehumanized. On this, for East Asia, see Christopher Thorne 1986 *The Far Eastern War: States and Societies 1941–45*, London, Counterpoint.
29. A simple 'survey of empires' would list many more. Thus, for example, the Czarist Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire and so on. However, they were not in the vanguard of the shift to the modern world – they faded whilst the others drove onwards.
30. Moore 1966, see Chapter 4.
31. Ibid., pp. 185–6.
32. Ibid.
33. In China, the violence ran for most of the twentieth century. It took Deng Xiaoping's reforms to initiate peaceful change. For a visual history, see Jonathan Spence and Annping Chin 1996 *The Chinese Century: A Photographic History*, London, Harper Collins.
34. E.L. Dreyer 1995 *China at War 1901–1949*, London, Longman, pp. 74–83.
35. Fenby 2009 offers a useful map of the locations of the 12 main groups. See Fenby 2009, p. xxii.
36. Sun Shuyun 2006 *The Long March*, London, Harper.
37. Hence the work of some American 'modernization theorists' affirming the role of the military in less developed countries as the only effective national institution – a habit that runs down to the present. See US responses to the 2013 Egyptian coup.
38. S.C.M. Paine 2012 *The Wars for Asia 1911–1949*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–5.
39. Derived mostly from Paine 2012.
40. Paine 2012, pp. 112–13.
41. J. Fenby 2009 *The Penguin History of Modern China*, London, Penguin; Dreyer 1995; Paine 2012; Elleman 2001.
42. Fenby 2009 p. 218.
43. Ibid., pp. 221–2.
44. Ibid., p. 227.
45. Paine 2012, p. 137 remarks that in China some 95 million people became refugees.
46. A detailed chronology of civil, regional and global wars is given by Paine 2012, pp. 301–12.
47. A rough estimate, with information mostly from websites, the number gives an idea of the scale of killing.
48. Paine 2012, p. 18.
49. Ibid., p. 34.
50. P.W. Preston 2000 *Understanding Modern Japan*, London, Sage, see chapters 3 and 4.
51. Paine 2012, see Chapter 6.

52. J. Fenby 2005 *Generalissimo: Chiang Kai Shek and the China he Lost*, London, Free Press; discussions of Chiang Kai Shek vary in their estimations. The preponderant view seems to be that he was just another warlord, but others defend the record of Nationalist China in the 1930s. See H.J. van den Ven 2003 *War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945*, London, Routledge Curzon; O.A. Westad 2003 *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War 1946–50*, Stanford University Press; S. Pepper 1999 (ed.) *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle 1945–1949*, 2nd ed. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield; E.L. Dreyer 1995 *China at War 1901–1949*, London, Longman.
53. On Shanghai, see Bernard Wasserstein 1998 *Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion and Collaboration in the Second World War*, London, Profile.
54. Preston 2000; 2010.
55. A. Iriye 1997 *Japan and the Wider World*, London, Longman.
56. A short overview is available in G.D. Hook, J. Gilson, C.W. Hughes and H. Dobson 2001 *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, London, Routledge, pp. 25–9. For more details, see A. Iriye 1987 *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, London, Longman.
57. Paine 2012.
58. India and Burma – both defence and in late stages advances; New Guinea, where Australian forces supported a drive towards the Philippines; plus in late stages naval task forces in the Pacific (blocked by Admiral King for a long time; see Thorne 1978). On the British, see C. Bayly and T. Harper 2007 *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire*, London, Allen Lane.
59. The crucial turning point came quickly, in June 1942 at the Battle of Midway, after which the Japanese navy lost the initiative.
60. See C. Thorne 1978 *Allies of a Kind*, Oxford University Press; Max Hastings 2008 *Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944–45*, New York, Alfred Knopf.
61. On the bureaucratic-rational mass production of death as an aspect of modernity, see Z. Bauman 1989 *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge, Polity. On the disinclination of influential veterans and nationalists to discuss the issue, see the debates around the Smithsonian Institute's display of *Enola Gay*.
62. These events get read into collective memory and national pasts. Bombing allowed the Japanese elite (with the cooperation of their new Cold War allies) to elide the issue of the extent and nature of their responsibility for the wars in East Asia. The elite reconstruct themselves as universal victims – pursuing the detail is therefore unnecessary. Similarly the US decision to leave the emperor in place cut against the chance for the population to reach back beyond the Showa disaster to an earlier version of Japan – manoeuvres that had created problems with neighbouring states and peoples ever since Japan in 1945. See John Dower 1999 *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, London, Allen Lane. See also K. Ishiguro 1987 *An Artist of the Floating World*, London, Faber.
63. See Patrick Wright 2007 *Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War*, Oxford University Press.
64. N. Hamilton-Hart 2012 *Hard Interests, Soft Illusions*, Cornell University Press.
65. Preston 1982. An idea imputed to replacement elites.
66. A rough estimate of the war casualties is around 30 million. This is information taken from the internet so it is only a guide.

67. The dates, in general, for Europe are 1914–89 and for East Asia are 1911–75. Thereafter, the crisis can be given various dates for each of the countries involved – for example, the British Empire, 1914–45, or China, 1911–49.

6 State-Empire Dissolution

1. A. Acharya 2010 *Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Singapore, Institute for Southeast Asian Studies.
2. A.G. Frank 1998 *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, University of California Press.
3. C. Bayly and T. Harper 2007 *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire*, London, Allen Lane get the scale nicely when they refer to the 'arc' of possessions running down from the Bay of Bengal to Singapore. It is a vast territory, and only a part of the empire holdings.
4. T. Judt 2005 *Post War: A History of Europe Since 1945*, London, Allen Lane, pp. 299–302. Issue pursued in P. W. Preston 2014 *Britain After Empire*, London, Palgrave.
5. R. Kedward 2005 *La Vie en Bleu*, London, Allen Lane. See, in particular, Chapter 13.
6. Judt 2005, pp. 282–3.
7. Ibid., p. 285.
8. Robert Gildea 2002 'Myth, Memory and Policy in France Since 1945' in J-W Muller (ed.) *Memory and Power in Post-War Europe*: *Studies of the Presence of the Past*, Cambridge University Press.
9. Judt 2005, p. 280.
10. M.C. Ricklefs 1991 *A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1300*, London, Macmillan, pp. 212–33.
11. V.J.H. Houben 1997 'A Torn Soul: The Dutch Public Discussion of the Colonial Past in 1995' *Indonesia*, 63.
12. Judt 2005, p. 281.
13. Ibid., p. 281.
14. Houben 1997; V.J.H. Houben 2000 'The Unmastered Past: Decolonization and Dutch Collective Memory' *European Review* 8.1.
15. Judt 2005, pp. 280–1.
16. Or, mostly – the issue of the status of Senkoku/Diaoyu Islands has in 2013 resurfaced – they are now subject to claims from Taiwan, China and Japan.
17. Bayly and Harper 2007.
18. An example might be the national past of contemporary Singapore. The contemporary polity is presented as the voluntaristic achievement of the People's Action Party in general and Lee Kuan Yew in particular, neglecting that Singapore by 1900 was a successful part not merely of the British state-empire system but also of the global economy by way of economic links to the USA.
19. It was perhaps predominantly the territory of elites (economic, social and political), as subaltern classes were likely to be more confined to their local places. Thus today, those who speak glibly of 'globalization' are likely to be members of elites or professional classes – those who can and do travel – plus for the global rich, life can be conducted 'off-shore' (an idea mentioned in

Chris Harvie 2010 *Broonland: The Last Days of Gordon Brown*, London, Verso), whereas the subaltern classes remain comparatively tied to place.
20. Judt 2005.
21. After Sowden's 2013 press revelations, this sounds more ironic, thus the 'Five Eyes' digital spying partnership – the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK.
22. Houben 1997.
23. Sometimes a problem (thus British links to the Falklands/Malvinas or Gibraltar) and sometimes a help (thus scattered islands acting as military bases and by virtue of the Law of the Sea gathering around them large economic zones – a point made by Le Monde Diplomatic in respect of the Senkoku/Daiyou Islands dispute).
24. Tony Judt 2010 Interview in *London Review of Books*.
25. Some recent discussions are surveyed by Susan Watkins 'Vanity and Venality' *London Review of Books* 35.16, 29 August 2013.
26. Norman Davies 2007 *Europe: East and West*, London, Pimlico.
27. Judt 2005.
28. A. Reid 2010 *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press.
29. Ibid., see Chapter 2.
30. Acharya 2010. For a discussion of ASRAN, see A. Acharya 2000 *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press.
31. P. Hirst and G. Thompson 1999 (ed.) *Globalization in Question*, 2nd. Cambridge, Polity.

7 After the State-Empires: Territories, States, Nations and Development

1. This chapter in particular covers a vast territory but it is not possible to spell out detail. Its function is to record in a simple fashion (a) the macro-regional shifts in power patterns, from European centrality to US and later Sino-US centrality and (b) the different historical development trajectories followed by the individual post-empire polities in East Asia. These comparisons are the point.
2. J.M. Pluvier 1977 *Southeast Asia from Colonialism to Independence*, Oxford University Press; B.N. Pandy 1980 *South and Southeast Asia: 1945–1979: Problems and Policies*, London, Macmillan; A. Reid 2010 *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press.
3. China was successful – unification, welfare and development – but began extensive reforms in 1978, which looked to the wider East Asian model, which unexpectedly had proved to be very successful.
4. On the contribution of war, see R. Stubbs 2005 *Rethinking Asia's Economic Miracle: The Political Economy of War, Prosperity and Crisis*, London, Palgrave.
5. On the developmental state, see C. Johnson 1995 *Japan Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, New York, Norton; R.P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (eds.) *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*, London, Sage; S. Haggard 1990 *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in*

the Newly Industrializing Countries, Cornell University Press; and Linda Weiss 1998 *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Cornell University Press.

6. An heroic attempt was made by World Bank 1993 *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, Oxford University Press.
7. There is a background to all of this debate. On the pragmatic variety of economics, see P.W. Preston 1994 *Discourses of Development: State, Market and Polity in the Analysis of Complex Change*, Aldershot, Avebury. For a broad professional history, see R. Backhouse 2002 *The Penguin History of Economics*, London, Penguin.
8. Sweeping – Deng Xiaoping's reform programme.
9. Notably, Vietnam. See W.J. Duiker1995 *Vietnam: Revolution in Transition*, Boulder, Westview; G. Kolko1997 *Vietnam: Anatomy of a Peace*, London, Routledge.
10. J.C. Scott 1985 *Weapons of the Weak*, Yale University Press.
11. Standard general treatment from M. Yahuda 2011 *The International Politics of the Asia Pacific*, 3rd ed. London, Routledge. In respect of Southeast Asia detailing the collaborative relationship between pro-US regimes and the USA itself, see N. Hamiton-Hart 2012 *Hard Interests, Soft Illusions*, Cornell University Press. For a critical vision of the Cold War as an inheritor of First World commitments to colonial repression and exploitation, see O. A. Westad 2007 *The Global Cold War*, Cambridge University Press.
12. P.W. Preston 2010 *National Pasts in Europe and East Asia*, London, Routledge.
13. T. Judt 2005 *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, London, Allen Lane.
14. Yahuda 2011 reviews the post-war history of East Asia in these terms. On a wider scale, J.L. Gaddis 2006 *Cold War*, London, Allen Lane reviews the post-war history of a global confrontation.
15. P. Wright 2006 *Iron Curtain*, London, Viking. Arguably, in the case of elements of the British security community, this unreasoning hostility continues down to the present day – today more as a status claim directed towards their American leaders.
16. T. Hasegawa 2005 *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan*, Harvard University Press.
17. B. Cummings 1997 *Korea's Place in the Sun*, New York, Norton.
18. Hamilton-Hart 2012.
19. A. Acharya 2000 *The Quest for Identity: The International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press pursues this point. Replacement elites had to manage the demands of ex-colonial powers, new international organizations and bloc leaders, hence their preoccupation with sovereignty and non-interference. This all feeds into the later ASEAN Way.
20. Hamilton-Hart 2012.
21. B. Anderson 1983 *Imagined Communities*, London, Verso.
22. Anderson 1983, p. 16.
23. Preston 1982.
24. Outside powers were not averse to interference – at the one extreme, backing subversive violence; at the other, supporting aid, trade and foreign direct investment.
25. A. Reid 2010 *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge University Press.
26. Ibid., p. 17.

27. Ibid., p. 115.
28. Ibid., Chapter 2. He notes four impacts: expanding ethnic core (Burma, Vietnam and Siam); protecting fragile monarchies (Malaya, Cambodia and Laos); moving from trade networks to unities (Philippines and Indonesia); and ethnicizing the stateless (marginal groups given an identity and absorbed – for example, Bataks).
29. C. Mackerras (ed.) 2003 *Ethnicity in Asia*, London, Routledge Curzon.
30. Reid 2010, pp. 5–12.
31. Taken from the work of A.D. Smith 1986 *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell; A.D. Smith 1991 *National Identity*, London, Penguin.
32. Taken from the work of Ernest Gellner 1983 *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell.
33. W.A. Callaghan 2006 'History, Identity, Society: Producing and Consuming Nationalism in China' *Critical Asian Studies* 38.2.
34. Reid 2010, pp. 8–12.
35. P.W. Preston 1982 *Theories of Development*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
36. On the popular domestic impact, losses and foreign involvement, see D. Wells and S. Wilson (eds.) 1999 *The Russo Japanese War in Cultural Perspective 1904–05*, London, Macmillan; R. Kowner (ed.) 2007 *The Impact of the Russo Japanese War*, London, Routledge.
37. N. Tarling 2001 *A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia 1941–1945*, Singapore, Horizon; W.G. Beasley 1991 *Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945*, Oxford, Clarendon. Both note that the early model of development in Manchuria was crucial – development plus military – and this idea was used thereafter in other possessions. Plus, in regard to the war years, the policies for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere were never clear and in any case were disrupted by war.
38. B. Cummings 1999 *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*, Duke University Press; A. Iriye 1987 *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, London, Longman.
39. John Dower 1999 *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, London, Allen Lane.
40. C. Johnson 1982 *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Stanford University Press.
41. Japanese players took more, the successful ship-building industry used the technologies of 'liberty ships', the management strategies of just in time and continuous improvement were based on US ideas, and the Japanese company unions, so admired, were helped into being when the occupation authorities helped to break unions/strikes around the time of the reverse course.
42. On the role of war to East Asia's success, see Stubbs 2005.
43. On the Huks, see B. Kerkvliet 1977 *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*, University of California.
44. Acharya 2000.
45. For a good short discussion, see B. Moore Jr. 1966 *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon.
46. R. Bowring and P. Kornicki (eds.) 1993 *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Japan*, Cambridge University Press, p. 92.

47. For an overview, see P.W. Preston 2000 *Understanding Modern Japan: A Political Economy of Development, Culture and Global Power*, London, Sage.
48. Dower 1999.
49. The US naval strategy of island-hopping had effectively destroyed both the imperial Japanese navy and air force, opening the way to the projected invasion of the home islands, but there were still millions of effective soldiers scattered throughout East Asia.
50. H. Bix 2000 *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York, Harper Collins. An alternative position is presented in S.L. Large 1992 *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan*, London, Routledge.
51. The figure is from S. Tsuru 1993 *Japan's Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press.
52. Debate in the financial pages of the British press paints Japan in sombre colours, with low levels of growth, large sovereign debts, no inclination to standard programmes of liberalization, and no inclination to import labour/migrants, against which it can be pointed out that the country is rich. However, some argue that the miracle economy is now over as the politics are no longer stable. See H. Fukui and S.N. Fukai 1997 'The End of the Miracle: Japanese Politics in the Post-Cold War Era' in M.T. Berger and D.A. Borer (eds.) *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*, London, Routledge.
53. C. Johnson 1995 *Japan Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State*, New York, Norton; C. Johnson 1982 *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Stanford University Press; Ron Dore 1986 *Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Political Economy 1970–80*, London, Athlone; R.P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson (eds.) *States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim*, London, Sage; S. Haggard 1990 *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, Cornell University Press; R. Wade 2004 *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia*, Princeton University Press; Linda Weiss 1998 *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Cornell University Press.
54. Johnson 1982.
55. K. van Wolferen 1989 *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, London, Macmillan.
56. See K. Yoshino 1992 *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, London, Routledge.
57. The vulgarization of Max Weber gives us 'Protestantism caused capitalism', which is doubly foolish. It's not what he argued and in any case ideas cannot function as causes.
58. Taken from Kyoko Sheridan 1993 *Governing the Japanese Economy*, Cambridge, Polity.
59. Ian Buruma 1994 *The Wages of Guilt*, London, Cape. See also P.W. Preston 2010 *National Pasts in Europe and East Asia*, London, Routledge.
60. Indeed, they are happy to be aggressively nationalistic, rejecting talk of war guilt, hence the annual parade of witless LDP politicians to the Yasakuni Shrine or the 2012 instrumental/opportunistic provocations of the 80-year-old Shintaro Ishihara in respect of the Senkoku/Daiyu Islands, burnishing his nationalist credentials ahead of a run for a seat in parliament.
61. The core sets of ideas to which the population will give assent – some mix of national past, official ideology and popular opinion. See P.W. Preston

1997 *Political-Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era*, London, Sage.

62. In a similar vein, John Clammer 1997 *Contemporary Urban Japan*, Oxford, Blackwell, suggests that the core ethic amongst the Japanese is 'harmony' – the ideal goal around which social relationships are moderated.
63. Cummings 1997.
64. Ibid., pp. 209, 212, 245.
65. B. Cummings 2010 *The Korean War: A History*, New York, Random House.
66. See K.S. Kim 1997 'From Neo-mercantilism to Globalism: The Changing Role of the State and South Korea's Economic Prowess' in M.T. Berger and D.A. Borer (eds.) *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*, London, Routledge.
67. See S. Haggard 1990 *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*, Cornell University Press.
68. D.J. Steinberg 1994 *The Philippines: A Singular and Plural Place*, Boulder, Westview, p. 58.
69. Ibid., p. 161.
70. Ibid., pp. 65–6.
71. See M. Hastings 2008 *Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944–45*, New York, Alfred Knopf.
72. Steinberg 1994, p. 6.
73. Ibid., pp. 38, 45, 56.
74. W. Case 2002 *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less*, London, Curzon, pp. 210–13.
75. Series of influential kings: Mongkut r1851–68, a reformer; Chulalongkorn r1868–1910, a reformer, creates elite bureaucracy and pursues modernization from above; Vajiravudh r1910–25, creates official nationalism; Prajadhipok r1925–33, removed; Mahidol r1933–46, period of regional conflict; and Bhumibol r1946– reformer.
76. Interestingly, the London-based magazine, *The Economist*, excoriated the coup leaders as in error and thereafter incompetent.
77. B. Cummings 1999 *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century*, Duke University Press.
78. Endorsed by Rudyard Kipling – 'send forth the best ye breed etc'.
79. For example, G. Kolko 1968 *The Politics of War: US Foreign Policy 1943–1945*, New York, Vintage; plus Hasegawa 2005 or Hamilton-Hart 2012. Conventional views are available from Gaddis 2006 plus Yahuda 2011. On Korea, see Cummings 1997.
80. Hamilton-Hart 2012.
81. P. Katzenstein 2005 *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press.
82. Hastings 2008 and C. Thorne 1978 *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan 1941–1945*, Oxford University Press.
83. Hastings 2008, Leyte Gulf, MacArthur 'returns'.
84. Symbolic for both sides, part of national pasts, recent film treatment by Clint Eastwood 2006 *Flags of Our Fathers* (film) and Clint Eastwood 2006 *Letters from Iwo Jima* (film).
85. Thorne 1978 reports that Admiral King made strenuous efforts to keep allies out of the Pacific theatre.

86. P. Short 2004 *Mao: A Life*, London, John Murray; J. Fenby 2005 *Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the China He Los*t, New York, The Free Press.
87. Moore 1966.
88. Short 2004, pp. 476–504 puts the number of deaths at 25 million.
89. C. R. Hughes 2006 *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*, London, Routledge.
90. F. Christiansen and S. Rai 1996 *Chinese Politics and Society: An Introduction*, Hemel Hempstead, Prentice Hall Europe offer the standard labels: totalitarian; factionalism and clientelism; complex bureaucracy; and culturalist approach.
91. Gerard Greenfield 1997 'Fragmented visions of Asia's next Tiger: Vietnam and the Pacific Century' in M.T. Berger and D.A. Borer (eds.) *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*, London, Routledge.
92. Duiker 1995, pp. 81–124.
93. Yong Mun Cheong 1992 'The Political Structures of the Independent States' in N. Tarling (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume Two Part Two: From World War II to the Present*, Cambridge University Press.
94. Romanticized by Rudyard Kipling, criticized by George Orwell and written about by J.S. Furnivall, a colonial administrator-scholar who worked with the independence movement.
95. M.W. Charney 2009 *A History of Modern Burma*, Cambridge University Press.
96. Ibid., p. 58.
97. C. Bayly and T Harper 2007 *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire*, London, Allen Lane, pp. 60–75.
98. Charney 2009, pp. 58–65.
99. Repealed and updated in the Security Offences Act 2012.
100. Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR).
101. Via exports of tin and rubber to the USA and tagged by one commentator as a 'staple port'. See W.G. Huff 1994 *The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press.
102. Exporting tin and rubber to the USA for its canning and car industries. See Huff 1994.
103. This material is derived from P.W. Preston 2007 *Singapore in the Global System*: *Relationship, Structure and Change*, London, RoutledgeCurzon.
104. Organized very early on. See map drawn by Lt. Jackson 1823 in Mary Turnbull 1977 *A History of Singapore 1815–1975*, Oxford University Press, p. xvi.
105. Captured by Somerset Maugham, for the immediate post-war period captured by Anthony Burgess 1964 *The Long Day Wanes: A Malayan Trilogy*, New York, Norton. See also D.J. Enright 1969 *Memoirs of a Mendicant Professor*, London, Chatto.
106. See 'great Marxist conspiracy'. For a memoir, see S.L. Teo 2010 *Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner*, Petaling Jaya, SIRD.
107. G. George 2000 *Singapore the Air Conditioned Nation: Essays on the Politics of Comfort and Control 1990–2000*, Singapore, Landmark.
108. Historians – D.G.E. Hall 1981 *A History of Southeast Asia*, 4th ed. London, Macmillan; D.J.M. Tate 1971/9 *The Making of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press.
109. B. Anderson 1990 *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, pp. 99–109.

110. A number of Malay maritime empires flourished throughout the archipelago. These made up a political/trading region. The colonial systems of the Europeans divided the area. Decolonization produced new nation-states, and later regional reintegration via the ASEAN. See Acharya 2000.
111. M.T. Berger 1997 'Post cold war Indonesia and the revenge of history' in Berger and Borer.
112. Ibid.
113. The twists and turns of these domestic conflicts are pursued by B. Anderson 1990 *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, but see in particular Chapter 3 on state and nation continuities.
114. Habibie, Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Susilo Yudhoyono – not stable but coherent enough to maintain the power and stability of the country.
115. Acharya 2000.
116. J. Rigg 1997 *Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernization and Development*, London, Routledge.
117. Acharya 2000.

8 Powerful Regions and the Surprising Costs of Success

1. On East Asia, see Bernard 1996, see Zysman 1996. On ASEAN, see Amitav Acharya 2000.
2. See Ben Rosamund 2000 *Theories of European Integration*, London, Palgrave.
3. F. Soderbaum 2012 'Theories of Regionalism' in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds) *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism*, London, Routledge.
4. Hence, for example, the British elite's systematic denials. See the companion volume to this text.
5. See Colin Hay 2002 *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction*, London, Palgrave.
6. Gilbert Rozman 2012 'East Asian Regionalism' in M. Beeson and R. Stubbs (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of East Asian Regionalism*, London, Routledge points to the competition between China and the USA, cast in liberal terms: open versus closed regionalism.
7. A. Acharya 2010 *Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in the Asian Region*, Singapore, ISEAS. On this work, see also E. Frost 2009 'Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.3, which reviews Acharya's work and notes the idea of 'constitutive localization' – that is, the local use of ideas, which opens the way to seeing the nature and success of the 'ASEAN way'. See also A. Ba 2009 *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia Region*, Stanford University Press (reviewed by D. Nair 2011 in Contemporary Southeast Asia 33.1).
8. The USA has many overseas military alliances and bases. Critics speak of 'empire'. See C. Johnson 2004 *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic*, London, Verso.
9. Acharya 2010.
10. The error here is in assimilating elite projects to a schematic model constructed by departing colonial powers and Western-oriented development

bodies. See P.W. Preston 1981 *Theories of Development*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

11. The classic text, so to say, comes from the World Bank 1993 *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, Oxford University Press. For a short overview of the history, see F. Godement 1996 *The New Asian Renaissance*, London, Routledge; F. Godement 1998 *The Downsizing of Asia*, London, Routledge.
12. F. Fukuyama 1992 *The End of History and the Last Man*, London, Hamish Hamilton.
13. K. Ohmae 1987 *Beyond National Borders: Reflections on Japan and the World*, Tokyo, Kodansha; K. Ohmae 1990 *A Borderless World*, Tokyo, Kodansha.
14. T. Friedman 1999 *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
15. D. Held and A. McGrew 2002 *Globalization Anti-Globalization*, Cambridge, Polity.
16. P. Hirst and G. Thompson 1992 *Globalization in Question*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Polity.
17. Richard Higgot. See also those development theorists who diagnose recycled modernization/convergence designed to serve the interests of the (mostly Western) global corporate sector (anti-globalization and green activists).
18. Hirst and Thompson 1992.
19. Ross Garnaut 1996 *Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization*, Singapore, ISEAS.
20. P.B. Rana 2013 'Connectivity in Asia: Reviving the Old Silk Road?' *RSIS Commentary* 066/2013 writes about regional and subregional connectivity, noting that there are many proposed plans. These are examples of 'making sense'. The idea of the Silk Road summed a number of trade links in Central Asia. It was never a single link. The idea comes from a late nineteenth-century German geographer on the language of planning – 'ideological willing'. See Raymond Apthorpe 1986 'Development Policy Discourse' *Public Administration and Development* Vol. 6, pp. 377–8.
21. M. Bernard 1996 'Regions in the Global Economy' *New International Political Economy* 1.3; J. Zysman 1996 'The Myth of a Global Economy' *New International Political Economy* 1.2.
22. R.J. Orr 1990 *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power*, New York, Columbia; B.M. Koppel and R.J. Orr (eds.) 1993 *Japan's Foreign Aid: Power and Policy in a New Era*, Boulder, Westview; P. Katzenstein and T. Shirashi (eds.) 1997 *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, New York, Cornell; P. Katzenstein 2005 *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press.
23. A vast literature on ASEAN and its various extensions. For an overview, see A. Acharya 2000 *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press; A. Acharya 2010 *Whose Ideas Matter: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*, Singapore, ISEAS.
24. Perhaps to be found in cosmopolitan globalization. See D. Held 1987 *Models of Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity.
25. S. Strange 1988 *States and Markets*, London, Pinter. See also A. Giddens 1979 *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, Macmillan. At the back of all of this, of course, is the idea of 'historical materialism'.
26. This exchange could take many forms, thus political elites can pursue national development (or serve the interests of their crony friends), and

corporate organizations can pursue legitimate profits (or monopoly or other market-deforming activities).

27. Thus G. Cheng 2012 'The Significance of the Overseas Chinese in East Asia' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012 notes nineteenth-century migrants to Southeast Asia and later to North America, notes also links to the CCP and, lately, post-Deng, the group is read in terms of economic linkages/advantages, but picking them out makes difficulties – nervous hosts and data (p. 78): Oceania 76,000; Americas 6.63m; Europe 1.83m; Asia 28.37m; and Africa 32,000. M. Carney 2012 'What is driving the internationalization of Asia's business groups?' In Beeson and Stubbs 2012 notes that local business groups, perhaps family-centred firms, typically follow state aid packages and so they are essentially conservative in approach. This is true of Japanese and Chinese business groups. S.N. Katada 2012 'Regional Financial Cooperation' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012 reports that pre-1997 crisis there was little regional financial cooperation but subsequently this has grown. ASEAN plus three (APT) organized the 2010 Chiang Mai Agreement and following this there have been further debates about economic/financial regional linkages.
28. For example, (a) Thailand: 'Thaksin-omics', the rise of business – metropolitan and provincial – underpins the rise of new political parties; (b) Malaysia: Mahathir imposed himself on Malaysian politics and used the power of the state to encourage the business community in a corporatists fashion that drew in different ethnic sectors; (c) Japan: economic nationalism – after the Pacific War, strong links with the USA, reparations aid to East Asia, and aid, trade and foreign direct investment fostered a regional production network; or (d) Singapore under the leadership of the PAP, relentlessly pursuing growth and development.
29. A vast literature. For a short review, see Richard Stubbs 2009 'Whatever Happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate' *The Pacific Review* 22.1.
30. Rozman 2012.
31. David Kang 2012 'East Asia When China Was at the Centre' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012.
32. Michael Yahuda 2011 *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, 3rd ed. London, Routledge.
33. D. Webber 2010 'The Regional Integration that didn't Happen: Cooperation Without Integration in Early Twentieth Century East Asia' *The Pacific Review* 23.3.
34. Acharya 2010.
35. Ibid., see chapters 3 and 4.
36. Ibid., p. 79.
37. C. Dent and P. Richter 2011 'Sub-regional Cooperation and Developmental Regionalism' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.1.
38. World Bank 1993 *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, Oxford University Press.
39. At one point picked up by many commentators and explicitly by the government of Singapore. See Chua Beng Huat 1995 *Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore*, London, Routledge, Chapter 7.

40. R. Stubbs 2005 *Rethinking Asia's Economic Miracle: The Political Economy of War, Prosperity and Crisis*, London, Palgrave.
41. P.W. Preston 2010 *National Pasts in Europe and East Asia*, London, Routledge.
42. This line is taken by Stubbs 2005. For links to regionalism, see R. Stubbs 2012 'The Developmental State and Asian Regionalism' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012, who stresses the role of the developmental state.
43. Image taken from E. Wilkinson1990 *Japan Versus the West: Image and Reality*, London, Penguin, p. 8.
44. A very broad overview, which serves only to indicate that relations have shifted and changed over time. The three phases represent the early Bretton Woods era, the post-Bretton Woods to Plaza Accord period and then Plaza to the Beijing Olympics/Lehman collapse.
45. Reports in the *Financial Times* of April 2013 discussed possible Chinese investments in UK nuclear plants.
46. Late November 2013 saw Beijing and Tokyo in disputes over the Senkoku/Daiyou Islands, escalating with claims on responsibility for the air space around the territories. Shortly after, Beijing's claim to authority the USA flew two B52s through the airspace. Commentators noted the risk of an accidental small-scale military exchange.
47. On this, see A.G. Frank 1998 *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, University of California Press.
48. K. Pitakdumrongkit 2013 'Going niche for ASEAN Economic Community' *RSIS Commentary* 086/2013 notes that the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) presents problems for less competitive industries and suggests that one response could be to focus on the growing middle class and produce 'niche products', illustrating thereby how macro-scale structural change can impact local activities but provide new opportunities. Government support via research, tax breaks and so on are suggested in European Union regulative action in respect of the place of origin, thus 'champagne' must come from that region of France.
49. For an overview, see the special edition of *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2009 Vol. 11.3).
50. For its many critics, see the UK-based *Economist* and *Financial Times*. For a clear statement of right-wing neo-liberal hostility, see the *Daily Telegraph* (the down-market version is available in the *Daily Mail*).
51. M. Beeson 2011 'Crisis Dynamics and Regionalism: East Asia in Comparative Perspective' *The Pacific Review* 24.3 compares the 1997 and 2008 crises, noting the implications of the former for East Asia.
52. Acharya 2010.
53. D. Nair 2009 'Regionalism in the Asia Pacific and East Asia: A Frustrated Regionalism' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.1.
54. The one real challenge to European stability came with the post-Cold War collapse of the former state of Yugoslavia – a collapse into warfare – both shameful (disrespecting the dead of Europe's twentieth-century wars) and futile (did not save the federation).
55. On violence, international and domestic, see N. Hamilton-Hart 2013 'The Costs of Coercion: Modern Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective' *The Pacific Review* 26.1, who argues that whilst the former in the post-Cold War period has eased (there is consensus on international rules), the latter has

not (as domestically there are continuing conflicts) For a background survey, see N. Hamilton-Hart 2009 'War and other Insecurities in East Asia: What the Security Studies Field Does and Does Not Tell Us' *The Pacific Review* 22.1. On a related point, the business of counting casualties, see T. Kivimaki 2010 'East Asia Relative Peace – Does It Still Exist? What is It?' *The Pacific Review* 23.4.

56. Soropong Peou 2012 'Perspectives in Asia Pacific Security Studies' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012.
57. C. Dent 2012 'Regional Leadership in East Asia' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012.
58. R. Emmers 2012 'Comprehensive Security in East Asia' in Beeson and Stubbs 2012.
59. B. Cummings.
60. M. Sheehan.
61. Defence links strengthen. See, for example, E. Graham 2013 'Freedom Arrives: What Next for the LCS?' *RSIS Commentaries* 074/2013, who notes the basing in Singapore of a new type of US warship designed for areas such as the South China Sea. Other ASEAN members find these issues awkward, thus Indonesia, see R.A. Supriyanto 2013 'The US Rebalancing to Asia: Indonesia's Maritime Dilemma' *RSIS Commentaries* 073/2013.
62. Such as Myanmar, Indonesia and Vietnam. On this, see S.P. Limaye 2010 'Introduction: America's Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia [Special edition]' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32.3.
63. E. Resnick 2013 'The Perils of Containing China' *RSIS Commentaries* 069/2013 notes that the USA could be tempted into error by thinking in terms of 'containment' – a policy which arguably worked in Europe cannot be readily deployed in East Asia. Diplomacy plus military plus TPP (seemingly designed to exclude China (compare with Marshall Plan in respect of the USA) point towards containment, but the Chinese state's legitimate interests should be acknowledged. The debate has reached the mainstream media. See David Pilling 2013 'It Won't Be Easy to Build an "anyone but China" Club' *Financial Times* 22 May 2013.
64. On the implications of local responses to post-9/11 US anxieties cast in terms of hierarchy or hegemony – that is, the nature/extent of US influence – see C.G. Misalucha 2011 'Southeast Asia – US Relations: Hegemony or Hierarchy' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.2.
65. T. Robles 2013 'Abe's TPP Strategy: Overcoming Domestic Division Through Reform?' *RSIS Commentary* 058/2013 argues that the TPP is not simply about trade but lets the government reposition the country as a major regional power. J. Soble 'Japan's First Quarter Growth Surges on Abe Impact' *Financial Times* 16 May 2013 reported that the economic policy seemed to be having an impact.
66. Not just a Japan/China issue but also a problem for the USA on this, see A. Morris 2013 'The US Pivot to Asia: Will the Senkakus be its First Challenge?' *RSIS Commentaries* 053/2013, who notes that some commentators read the dispute as a Chinese government test of the commitments of the USA.
67. A. Mathur 2013 'Abe's Return: Implications for India-Japan Relations' *RSIS Commentary* 059/2013 noted that links with India could be deepened. India is now a US ally, it is a large marketplace and it could assist in counterbalancing China. Finally, M. Shankar 2013 'India and Southeast Asia:

Building LEP momentum' *RSIS Commentary* 077/2013 notes that the Indian government's 'look east policy' and India's membership of the East Asian Summit in 2005 makes a further link from East/Southeast Asia to South Asia – and, again, trade and security are key concerns.

68. Thus film and television. For a note, see J. Lanhee Lee and D. Lague 2013 'Japanese Soldiers: The Big Screen Bad Guys Audiences Love to Hate' *Bangkok Post* 2 June 2013. The authors report that around 200 anti-Japanese films were produced in the preceding year.
69. Arguments about Chinese nationalism are now familiar. The claim is that the elite read their international political situation at least in part in terms of a recovery of status lost in the shift to the modern world, and have only recovered since 1949. See W. Callaghan and E. Barabantseva 2011 *China Orders the World*, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press; B. Ho 2013 'The Rising Chorus of Chinese Exceptionalism' *RSIS Working Papers* No. 256.
70. S. Yoon 2013 'Rift in China's Relations with North Korea?' *RSIS Commentaries* 087/2013 details the Chinese government's dilemmas – long ideological links, anxieties about state collapse and refugees, and anxieties about provoking deeper US involvement and/or regional nuclearization.
71. ASEAN/China relations are awkward. One issue relates to resources. Li, M. and Zhang, H. 2013 'Restructuring China's Maritime Law Enforcement' *RSIS Commentaries* 050/2013 detail reforms in the organization of the coastal defence force, indicating domestic organizational problems and likely international implications. The Chinese government's stance is tagged 'non-confrontational assertiveness'.
72. Claims to similar status – part of the 'global south' and encouraging 'south-south' cooperation. See Ian Taylor 2004 'The All Weather Friend: Sino-African Interaction in the Twenty-First Century' in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds.) *Africa in International Politics*, London, Routledge.
73. S. Teo 2013 'Tensions in the Korean Peninsula: Will Park's *Trustpolitik* Work?' *RSIS Commentaries* 051/2013 notes the new president's approach – engage/respond – but doubts that it will produce any dramatic changes. M. Raska 2013 'South Korea's Security Predicaments: Preparing for "Hybrid Conflict"' *RSIS Commentaries* 052/2013 notes that war would adopt many forms, making defence awkward for Seoul. On this issue more generally, see LRB review of Victor Chua on North Korea. Its paranoia does have a rational basis in memories of the US war.
74. Acharya 2010.
75. B. Ho et al. 2013 'ASEAN Unity: From Word to Deed' *RSIS Commentaries* 078/2013 note that the 22 April 2013 ASEAN Summit saw positive attitudes towards completing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) whilst noting that the South China Sea issue continued to be unsettling. There were doubts about some member states. J.C.I. Trajano 2013 'Achieving the ASEAN Economic Community: Are the Philippines and Indonesia Ready for 2015?' *RSIS Commentaries* 080/2013 raised doubts – issues of capacity of states to deliver, plus the related issue of continuing/rising economic nationalism.
76. K. Ramakrishna 2013 'From Global to Micro Jihad: Three Trends of Grassroots Terrorism' *RSIS Commentaries* 088/2013 notes changing styles of a low-level continuing issue.
77. Changes are noted in Malaysia and Indonesia – old patterns are changing. Yoes C. Kenawas and Fitriani 2013 'Indonesia's Next Parliament: Celebrities,

Incumbents and Dynastic Members?' *RSIS Commentaries* 089/2013 shows doubts about democracy. Yoes C. Kenawas 2013 'Reconnecting the Missing Link: SYB and the Democratic Party' *RSIS Commentaries* 060/2013 notes similar issues in respect of the upcoming 2014 elections. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman 2013 'Whither Malaysia: Rethinking Ethnic Politics' *RSIS Commentaries* 091/2013 notes the result of the general election in 2013, seeing an easing of the ethnic divide and a clearer urban–rural divide, and perhaps a two-party-style liberal democracy in the offing. Shamsul A.B. 2013 'BN-PR Manifesto War: Different Platforms, Same School' *RSIS Commentaries* 071/2013 notes the general populism of both parties. Yang Razali Kassim 2013 'Post GE13: New Era in Malaysian Politics?' *RSIS Commentaries* 090/2013 also notes the new patterns – the easing of ethnic lines in voting and the rising salience of the urban–rural divide.

78. On this, see S. Narine 2012 'Human Rights Norms and the Evolution of ASEAN' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 34.3, who argues, in brief, that this issue flows from post-Second World War settlement, the role of the United Nations. The issue is noted in the region but not pursued. It was briefly a post-Cold War concern for the USA. Then 9/11 and the issue faded, plus there was the rise of China. The best guess is that human rights will improve slowly in the region but that for the local elites state-making and sovereignty remain crucial.
79. Often cast in terms of bandwagon or balance, it can be cast in terms of hedging. Thus, in economics, links with China but in security links with the USA. See K. Cheng-Chwee 2008 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30.2. This is more subtle in its grasp of the multiple connections within the region and thus the scope for action of agents.
80. A.D. Ba 2011 'Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.3 notes multiple Chinese agents pushing claims, ASEAN members calling for multilateral dialogue and the USA affirming an interest – a confused and fluid situation with the potential for destabilizing local errors. See also M.T. Fravel 2011 'China's Strategy in the South China Sea' *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 33.3, who argues that the strategy is delay, the expectation is that the balance between China and others will tilt towards China, and the problem with the USA's pivot. Again, the situation looks fluid.
81. Acharya 2000, 2010.
82. There are perhaps two aspects to this: political, as Western governments in the post-Cold War era criticized East Asia for what were taken to be authoritarian domestic political systems; and economic, as Western commentators read the Asian financial crisis in terms of cronyism – that is, divergence from a model of liberal markets. In respect of the former, Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohammed presented the idea of 'communitarian' politics, and this distinction between East and West was reworked a little later during the financial crisis. On the politics, see N. Hamilton-Hart 2012 *Hard Interests, Soft Illusions*, Cornell University Press.
83. L. Thurow 1994 *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe and America*, London, Nicholas Brearly.

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Index