Managing the Olympics

Edited by Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair

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Contents

Tables and Figures

Tables

Figures

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1

The Olympic Games: Managerial and Strategic Dimensions

Stephen Frawley and Daryl Adair

The Olympics are, without doubt, the largest and most significant mega-event in the world, taking in a multitude of sports at both Summer and Winter Games every two years. Planning for and staging the Olympics is one of the most complex tasks that event organizers and project management teams will ever undertake. The ambulatory nature of the Games, moving from one Olympic city to another every four years, means that there are context-specific challenges for hosts, as well as start-up knowledge required for each event. Given the scale, scope and complexity of all this, it is surprising that relatively little research has been published about the underlying logistics, organization and operation of the Olympic Games from event and project management perspectives. The planning and delivery of such a massive enterprise, several years in the making but only two weeks by way of performance, is of substantial interest to those vested with the responsibility of Olympic hosts. Beyond that, the planning and management of the Games is also important to those who analyse the Olympics, such as academics and journalists, as well as those with an interest in learning about how they are staged, such as teachers and students.

There are now numerous academic texts devoted to the Olympic Games. Recent topical issues include the political machinations underlying bids to host the Games (including examples of corrupt practices), governance challenges and reforms within the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the growing power of multinational sponsors and their indelible role in the hypercommercialization of the Games, the question of what the Olympics bring to a host city and country in terms of legacies (and indeed whether the cost benefit ratio is positive or negative), and so on. The broad genre of 'Olympic Studies' now involves

hundreds of academics around the world, and the volume of outputs is so vast that it is probably beyond the scope of one individual to stay abreast of all that is being produced.

This book is not a survey or critique of that vast body of scholarship, although the contributing authors are certainly influenced by it. Instead the volume has a defined goal: to critically examine the planning, management and operation of the Olympics as a mega-event. It is, in short, a discussion about how organisers might effectively deliver the Games, taking into account what can be learned from previous Olympics, as well as the emergence of models of best practice. This is an under-explored aspect of the Games, and so the book is merely a step towards gaining a more sophisticated understanding of what is required to run an Olympic mega-event. It is comprehensive, but by nature not conclusive. A selection of what we regard as core areas of Olympic programme delivery are covered: strategising and managing the legacy of an Olympic Games, planning for and delivering sport participation legacies; managing the goals of Olympic stakeholders and negotiating effective outcomes; gathering and archiving mega-event operational information and knowledge management (IKM) transfer from the Olympic Games; transport planning and management during the Games and legacies thereafter; best practice management of the Olympic sport programme and competition venues; broadcast revenues, programming and provisions for media at the Games; the logistics of marketing and sponsorship leading into and during the Olympics; and protocols associated with staging Olympic ceremonies.

A single volume cannot do justice to the vast operational repertoire required of Olympic Games organizers, but this book is designed to provide key insights as a step towards further research. In a further volume we would like to cover other important operational aspects of Olympic Games planning and delivery: examples include logistics and supply chain management, technology and new media, accreditation and ticketing management, medical risk and response protocols, safety and security management, the design and function of the athletes' village, as well as provision for drug testing and storage of samples.

This opening chapter now provides some background discussion about the characteristics of the Olympic Games as both a mega-sport event and a mega-project. In doing so, it briefly surveys literature devoted to an understanding of how the Olympic Games are organized and managed. The chapter concludes by providing a succinct overview of the book structure, outlining the key themes discussed in each chapter.

The Olympic Games as a mega-sport event/mega-project

Mega-sport events, such as the Olympic Games and the Football World Cup, can be understood as comprising two essential characteristics (Malfas, Theodoraki and Houlihan, 2004). The first relates to the external organizing features of such events. These include aspects such as the level and intensity of media coverage generated by the event, the attractiveness of the event to international tourists and the types of impacts derived from the hosting of an event (Jones, 2001; Parent, 2005). The second characteristic relates to the internal organizing features. These encompass the elements that influence the overall complexity of the event: organizational aspects such as the size and scale of the event, its timeline and duration and the number of athletes and fans in attendance (Chappelet and Bayle, 2005).

Other mega-sport event research has also highlighted the influence of internal and external characteristics that influence the organization of such events (Frawley and Toohey, 2005, 2009; Frawley, 2010). Horne and Manzenreiter (2006), for instance, describe mega-sport events as occasions that are large enough in size and scale to impact national economies, as well as having the capability to generate significant international media coverage. Likewise, Roche (2000) has argued that mega-sport events have 'a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance' (p. 1). In a similar vein, Waitt (2001) has stated that mega-sport events like 'the Olympics . . . generate a euphoric mass consciousness through the excitement, civic achievement and party syndrome associated with the occasion' (p. 251).

The Olympic Games can be considered not only a mega-sport event but also a mega-project. This stems from Leonardsen (2007), who has asserted that 'the modern Olympic Games have become an illustrative case for what have become known as the terms "mega-event" or "mega-project" ' (p. 11). While project management literature and event management literature have evolved as separate and distinct academic fields, each with their own professional journals and theories, in recent years they have increasingly informed each other (Gold and Gold, 2008).

A mega-event project can be described in the following manner: it is an organizational activity that has 'a specific finite task' (Meredith and Mantel, 1989, p. 4); it is a 'once only' activity established to achieve a clearly defined temporally bound set of goals and objectives; projects are often 'divided into subtasks that must be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals' (p. 4). Lowendahl (1995) has averred

that projects 'are typically time constrained, resource constrained, oriented towards a specific and predefined goal, and involve a complex or interdependent set of activities' (p. 347). From this perspective, the organization of an Olympic Games can be considered a 'typical project, in the sense that it is time-constrained (with an absolute and non-negotiable delivery date), resource constrained as to both total budget and number of employees, goal oriented, highly complex and cross functional' (p. 348).

Successful project organization is highlighted by a number of management characteristics. These include clarity of direction and leadership provided by project managers; the establishment of performance measures and indicators; effective management that ensures the established measures are achieved; and, that the coordination of the project achieves central indicators of timing, cost and quality (Lowendahl, 1995). In relation to timing, projects often operate in an organizational life cycle that is shaped by their time-dependent characteristics. Most projects, for instance, have a starting phase, a growing phase, a declining phase and a termination phase (Meredith and Mantel, 1989). This is true of staging the Olympic Games.

In addition to the internal-management characteristics of projects, it is also important to note that their organizational life cycle often unfolds interdependently with other organizations or institutions, many of whom continue to operate post-project completion (Lesjo, 2000; Dopson, 2005). For example, projects are often completed and managed under the auspices of a parent organization, which may be responsible for managing a number of projects simultaneously (Meredith and Mantel, 1989). For instance, the IOC, as the parent and governing body of the Olympic Movement (OM), is permanently responsible for overseeing the organization of multiple Olympic Games, even though it outsources stage management to host cities. The complexity and challenges of managing multiple projects at any one point in time is often fertile ground for the development of organizational tensions (Flyvbjerg, 1998). As Lowendahl (1995) has put it, projects are often characterized by 'conflict over project resources and leadership roles when it comes to solving project problems' (p. 348).

In synthesizing the mega-sport event and the project management literature, the organization of an event the size of the Olympic Games is shaped and impacted by both internal and external organizational characteristics. These include external elements such as the global economy, media exposure, tourism attractiveness and event impacts and legacies (i.e. social, economic and environmental). Internal organizational

features include the size and scale of the event (i.e. number of athletes, fans, employees, etc.), the event duration, the available event resources, the goals and objectives of the event, the effectiveness and leadership of the event management team and the interdependence of the event organizers on other stakeholders (Malfas et al., 2004). These features and their relevance to the management and organization of the Olympic Games are explored throughout this book.

The growth of the Olympic Games: From event to mega-sport event

A key feature of the modern Olympic Games, since it was first staged in Athens in 1896, is that it has been held in many different cities and nations worldwide. While the early Summer Olympic Games were staged between the continents of Europe and North America, the event has rarely been staged in the same continent consecutively (Toohey and Veal, 2007). This sharing of the Games across continents, especially over the past 50 years, is a key reason why the Games have become highly popular (Preuss, 2007). The Summer Olympics of 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, for example, were staged in different continents. The Olympic Games are therefore an ambulatory mega-sport event, continually moving from one location and cultural context to another (Roche, 2000).

The work of historian Alan Guttmann suggests that the transformation of the Olympic Games from a humble sport event into a mega-styled project did not occur overnight. Rather, the event developed and changed at various speeds over time. The early organizers of the Olympic Games, for instance, did not have access to substantial financial resources. Consequently, a number of the early Games utilized existing stadia and infrastructure and in many cases were held in conjunction with other events, such as the World Fairs (Guttmann, 2002). In recent times, however, the Games have grown so much in size and scale that the task of managing them has become highly complex and challenging (Chappelet, 2002).

The past 30 years have also witnessed an increase in the number of sports contested at the Games, and consequently the number of participating athletes. The organizers of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games provided facilities and services for nearly 11,000 athletes and 5000 team officials, competing across 28 sports for 300 gold medals (SOCOG, 2000). By comparison, the 1896 Athens Olympic Games consisted of 241 (male) athletes who competed across nine sports for 43 Gold Medals (IOC, 2008). Table 1.1 shows the rate of growth of the Olympics between

Table 1.1 The growth of the Summer Olympic Games (1984–2000)

Olympics games	Countries	Athletes	Sports	Medal events
1984	140	6797	23	221
1988	159	8465	25	237
1992	169	9367	28	257
1996	197	10,320	26	271
2000	199	10,651	28	300
2004	201	10,625	28	301
2008	204	11,028	28	302

Source: Adapted from the IOC (2012).

the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

A more recent factor that has influenced the size and scale of organizing and hosting the Games, as well as the increasing complexity of the task faced by Olympic host cities, is the responsibility for staging both the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Since 1988, the Olympic Games and the Paralympic Games have been staged alongside one another, with the Paralympics starting approximately two weeks after the Olympic Closing Ceremony. This dual mega-sport event organization has been strengthened in recent years, with the IOC and the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) signing an agreement to continue their strategic alliance and event cooperation (Cashman and Darcy, 2008).

As a consequence of staging the two events, Olympic organizers now provide facilities and venues that are designed to service both Games. The organizers are required to provide competition venues for 26 Olympic sports, while also ensuring that 20 Paralympic sports can be staged either in the venues built for the Olympics or in additional and specifically designed Paralympic facilities (IOC, 2012). Apart from the sport competition venues, a range of non-sport facilities need to be provided for both Games, including infrastructure like the Athletes Village, the Officials Village, the Media Village, the Main Press Centre and the International Broadcasting Centre (Toohey, 2001).

Another concomitant feature that highlights the growth of the Olympic Games and mega-sport events is media coverage. In recent years, this feature of the Games has been researched by the likes of Rowe (1999) and Whannel (2005). Evidence of the 'mass' global interest in an event like the Olympic Games is highlighted by the size of

the international television audiences that consume the fortnight of sport competition. The Athens Olympic Games, for example, attracted a television audience of approximately 3.9 billion people, making it the largest sport or non-sport event watched anywhere in the world in 2004 (IOC, 2008). In addition to the Olympic Games, other mega-sport events that have attracted large media audiences include the Football World Cup, the Rugby Union World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, the World Championships of Athletics, the World Swimming Championships and larger regional competitions such as the Pan-American Games, the European Football Championships, the Asian Games and the Commonwealth Games (Horne and Manrenreiter, 2006).

With the increase in media interest in mega-sport events over the past 30 years, largely as a consequence of the development and availability of new broadcast technologies, the flow of capital invested in such events, via sponsorship and media rights fees, has risen markedly (Morgan and Frawley 2011; Solberg, 2007). Due to this investment and the corresponding media exposure, the 'owners' of mega-sport events, such as the IOC, have been placed under pressure to ensure that the events are organized and delivered in a very professional manner (Cashman, 2006). As Leonardsen (2007) has put it, 'the amount of investment as well as the international media focus devoted to the Games has risen dramatically during the last 15–20 years, which, in turn, has generated a need for increased professionalisation' (p. 11).

As outlined above, the history of the modern Olympic Games, unlike that of the Ancient Olympic Games, highlights the unique fact that no one country has ever had the sole right to stage the event consecutively for a period of time. Newly established international sport events such as the Rugby Union World Cup and the Cricket World Cup have followed the Olympic Games and Football World Cup model and instituted ambulatory hosting arrangements (Preuss and Solberg, 2006). Gold and Gold (2008) have argued that it is important for those with the organizational responsibility for these events to understand the consequences of ambulatory movement. While the regular geographic movement of such events is likely to present different challenges to different host cities, Halbwirth and Toohey (2001) have contended that key organizational lessons and management knowledge can be transferred from one Olympic organizer to the next. Gold and Gold (2008) have nonetheless pointed out that those with the management responsibility for the Olympic Games 'inevitably face a steep learning curve by virtue of having to assemble from scratch the teams required to bring the Games to fruition' (p. 303).

Hence, from an organizational perspective, the ambulatory nature of mega-sport events means that the majority of the personnel responsible for their management change from event to event (Cashman, 2006). This is in contrast to other international events, such as the Wimbledon Tennis Championships, which are staged in the same location year upon year. Sport events that have a stable geographic home have an organizational advantage by comparison to ambulatory events, in that they are managed by a core group of employees and contractors, which enables event organizers to 'utilise well-established sets of practices' (Gold and Gold, 2008, p. 302). As a result, over time the event organizers build organizational capacity and effective processes and methods of operation, as well as establish a knowledgeable workforce and a volunteer network.

Hosting the Olympic Games

Due to the international popularity of many ambulatory mega-sport events, the governing bodies who 'own' these events usually require nations or cities to bid in order to gain the rights to host (Theodoraki, 2007). The IOC, as the governing body with authority for the Olympic Games, has the responsibility for awarding the right to stage the Games to bidding cities (IOC, 1997). After the IOC has awarded the hosting rights, ostensibly the 'primary responsibility for financing and organising the event rests with the host' (Gold and Gold, 2008, p. 302).

The notion of bidding to stage a mega-sport event is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the staging of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the term 'bidding' was rarely used by the IOC or other event-governing bodies (Masterman, 2004). Today, however, the global competition to stage these events has become intense and highly political (Emery, 2002). Toohey and Veal (2007) have suggested that the emergence of this competitive intensity can be traced back to the very successful staging of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. These Games were the first to generate a 'mega' profit of more than US$225 million. The financial success was achieved through sound management and a low-cost business model combined with the sale of significant sponsorship and television broadcast rights (Preuss, 2000). However, it must be conceded that Los Angeles was unusual; since then the staging of the Games has typically involved vast expenditure – overwhelmingly by governments – to pay for the staging of an Olympic mega-event (i.e. infrastructure, facilities and security).

The global interest in hosting the Olympic Games is evidenced by the cities that have placed bids to stage the event since 1984. For example, Athens, Atlanta, Beijing, London, Rio de Janeiro, Sydney and Vancouver have all submitted and won bids to host the Olympic Games. Conversely, cities such as Madrid, New York, Paris, Toronto and Chicago have presented Olympic bids that were unsuccessful. Waitt (2001) has argued that in order to understand the increasing interest shown by governments and corporations in mega-sport events, it is important to examine the wider and interdependent global context. From this perspective, it is worthwhile noting that since the 1980s global capitalism has gathered speed, bringing about dramatic change throughout the world, especially in Asia (Maguire, 1999). Entwined in this commercial growth has been the emergence of mass information and communication technologies. These new technologies have enabled global corporations to utilize sport sponsorship and advertising to expand their businesses into many growing international marketplaces (Rowe, 1999).

Due to this media interest, Booth (2005) has argued that one of the central political responses governments seek from hosting mega-sport events is national and international recognition. Governments can use these events to generate publicity as a method of reinforcing their political values and ambitions, whether the motivation is domestic or international (Cashman and Hughes, 1999). It is also worth noting that the social benefits often sought from hosting a mega-sport event can be difficult to untangle from the broader political motivations of the host government (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2002). For instance, the social benefits regularly noted by the promoters of mega-sport events state that they have the ability to boost civic pride and increase sport-participation opportunities (Cashman, 2006). Researchers are now engaged in assessing the degree to which these expectations hold true.

The benefits sought by those bidding to stage mega-sport events more often also include an economic development approach, emphasizing employment creation and the exporting of goods and services, such as international tourism (Ingerson, 2001). Progressively, the economic rationale provided by governments for investing in such mega-sport events has centred more heavily on the concept of destination marketing (Funk, Toohey and Bruun, 2007; Waitt, 1999). Roche (1994, 1999) in particular has contended that many governments attempt to utilize these occasions to drive a variety of local infrastructure developments, predominantly in order to increase tourism arrivals and thus tourism

revenues, but in the process creating projects such as the construction or upgrade of new airports and transit systems that have a post-event legacy. This is two-fold: new facilities for communities, but also public debt to service them (which must be paid for).

Book structure

This volume consists of 12 chapters. Chapters 2–5 deal with broader strategic matters, such as managing Olympic stakeholder relations and legacy management, while Chapters 6–11 are concerned with operational components of the Games.

In Chapter 2, Milena Parent describes and analyses the role of key Olympic stakeholders in the management of the Games. These include internal organizing committee staff and volunteers, various levels of government in the host country, the general community, the media, local and international sponsors, international sport federations, the national Olympic committees and the IOC itself. Parent explains how the relationship between the Olympic organizing committee and the main stakeholders can generate tensions and conflicts if not adequately managed.

In Chapter 3, Sue Halbwirth and Kristine Toohey examine the value of implementing an IKM programme from the inception of an Olympic organizing committee through to its dissolution. The authors demonstrate the benefits for the OM of creating an IKM programme. They argue that the knowledge that emerges from this process can be very valuable from a strategic management perspective for future host organizing committees.

In Chapter 4, Richard Cashman and John Horne argue that the IOC now recognizes the importance of staging Olympic Games that have the attribute of sustainability for hosts (i.e. sport facilities as public resources, or urban renewal as an outcome of mega-event development). However, the promise of Olympic legacy is often politically charged and dependent on the will of host organizers and host governments. Cashman and Horne conclude that the management of Olympic legacy is still a relatively new concept that requires the development of well-considered protocols and procedures.

In Chapter 5, Stephen Frawley, Kristine Toohey and Tony Veal suggest that in the past, government investment in the Olympic Games has been justified in part on the foundation that these events can boost sport-participation levels in the host community. However, a stream of research has provided little evidence to support that proposition (Weed,

Coren and Fiore, 2009). It is argued that in order to sustain sport-participation growth over the longer term more emphasis is required by Olympic organizing committees to leverage Olympic sport to the host community and especially to younger constituents both pre- and post-Games.

In Chapter 6, Stephen Frawley, Kristine Toohey, Tracy Taylor and Dwight Zakus outline how the task of managing sport at an Olympic Games has become increasingly complex as the event has grown and become more interdependent in respect of technology and media. Surprisingly, to date very little research has been conducted that examines how sport is organized at the Olympic Games (or at any mega-sport event for that matter). This chapter starts to address this gap by examining how sport is planned and organized at the Games.

In Chapter 7, Simon Darcy and Tracy Taylor review the central management issues that impact the design and development of Olympic venues. The chapter examines the historical context of venues and Olympic cities and the financing of this infrastructure. Venue life cycle and Olympic life cycle planning are examined, followed by an analysis of iconic designs that represent the best of what the host city wants to showcase to the world. The authors also examine the importance of sustainability within Olympic venues, considering the potential value of using temporary, rather than permanent venues.

In Chapter 8, Eva Kassens-Noor examines infrastructure and operational measures implemented to accommodate peak transport demand at the Games. The author examines Olympic transportation planning documents, strategic papers, official transport plans, post-Olympic reports on transport performance and archival documents related to the management of the Sydney 2000, Athens 2004 and London 2012. Combined, the analysis of these documents shows various measures intended to achieve effective transportation systems and smooth operating traffic and transit conditions during the Olympic Games.

In Chapter 9, Harry-Arne Solberg and Chris Gratton explore the management and economics of broadcasting the Olympics. The authors analyse the cost structure of broadcasting the Games. The chapter also discusses the sale processes employed by Olympic organizing committees to maximize broadcast revenue generation. Finally, the authors examine the sport-broadcasting regulations that have impacted the way that Olympic broadcasting rights are sold.

In Chapter 10, Rick Burton examines the marketing of the Olympic Games, focusing on how corporate partners of the OM leverage and activate sponsorship agreements they have with the IOC. The chapter

provides two detailed case studies of large international organizations, Visa and General Electric, both of which sponsor the IOC, and the strategies they have employed to leverage their association with the OM over recent years.

In Chapter 11, Daryl Adair evaluates the management of Olympic ceremonial and the protocol expectations established by the IOC to operationalize four key rituals: the lighting of the Olympic flame and the torch relay, the opening ceremony, the awarding of medals and the closing ceremony. Adair notes that the Games are not only a multi-sport competition, they also serve to commemorate the aspirations of the OM, and that formal ceremony and prescribed symbolism are intended to publicly demonstrate and validate Olympics ideals. He concludes that Olympic ritual has remained buoyant, and, if anything, received increased exposure from television and emergent forms of media. Indeed, for athletes the biggest stage of all is the medal podium. This is where ceremony shines a spotlight on performance.

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2
Olympic Games Stakeholder Governance and Management

Milena M. Parent

Introduction

Organizing committees are outsourcing entities, meaning that they need others (stakeholders) to do most of the work regarding the preparation for an Olympic Games while they focus on Games-time associated tasks as well as coordinating all stakeholders' efforts. The Olympic Games is a complex undertaking requiring a high variety and amount of resources, as well as a variety of stakeholders to bid for, plan and host the Games. Stakeholders are all those individuals, groups and/or organizations that influence or are influenced by the actions of the focal organization (Freeman, 1984), here the bid/organizing committee.

Managing the Olympic Games is context dependent, as well as stakeholder dependent. The number of stakeholders and their needs and wants will vary between the bid phase, the planning mode, the implementation and execution of the event and the wrap-up (Parent, 2008). But who are the different stakeholders? What do they do, and what are their responsibilities? What do they want, and what do they need? How might they be managed if you are a member of an organizing committee? These are the questions this chapter pursues.

Olympic Games stakeholders

The rights to the Olympic Games and all 'things' Olympic are owned by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – they own the event – likewise for the Paralympic Games and the International Paralympic Committee. The rights of a given edition of the Games are given (in essence loaned) to a chosen candidate city. Once the event is hosted, the rights revert to the IOC. The IOC retains final approval for all

Olympic Games decisions by organizing committees, even if organizing committees (and/or their the host governments) are the ones who are financially, operationally and legally liable.

For an Olympic Games, the bid phase can last up to three years as (for countries and cities with an interest) there is typically a national bid competition, followed by an international bid competition. During this time, the bid committee will have to deal with the IOC and its country's National Olympic Committee (NOC), national and international sport federations (NFs and IFs, respectively), regional and national governments, the media, sponsors, the community (e.g. residents, tourism organizations, commerce/business bureaus, activist groups and potential venue owners) and other candidate cities (Hautbois et al., 2012; Parent, 2008; Turner and Westerbeek, 2004).

If the bid is successful, the bid committee is transformed into the Organizing Committee of an Olympic Games (OCOG). Examples of OCOGs include VANOC (Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games), LOCOG (London 2012 Olympic Games), IYOGOC (2012 Innsbruck Winter Youth Olympic Games) and Rio 2016 (Rio 2016 Olympic Games). During the planning and implementation period, jointly lasting about seven years, OCOGs will deal with the IOC, NFs and IFs, non-governmental bodies or NGOs, such as the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), regional and national governments, the media, national and international sponsors, the community (e.g. residents, tourism organizations, activist groups, local businesses, schools, commerce/business bureaus and venue owners), international delegations (athletes, coaches, support staff, etc.) and other OCOGs (Chappelet and Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Parent, 2008). Internally, the OCOG's top managers will deal with the lower-level employees, as well as the volunteers (Parent, 2008).

During the wrap-up mode, OCOGs will deal with the IOC and other OCOGs for final report writing and knowledge-transfer requirements; governments and media for reporting on the final accounts; venue owners, sport organizations/federations and the community for venue decommissioning, transformation (if needed) and handing over to the community for legacy purposes; and OCOG lower-level employees and volunteers for closing the books, managing any legal issues/challenges (e.g. ambush marketing situations), recognition of work done and assistance (if needed) in job searches. Within a year of hosting the Games, the OCOG ceases to exist.

As can be seen, there are many different stakeholders to consider, and there are changes when one moves from the bid to the planning/

implementation and then to the wrap-up periods. Moreover, there are other stakeholders to consider if we look at the broader Olympic Movement. These other stakeholders interact with the IOC, NOCs, OCOGs and/or sponsors for different programs and activities and include (but are not limited to) international NGOs (e.g. United Nations, United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Committee of the Red Cross, World Health Organization), the youth of the world, teachers and parents, SportAccord (the association of IFs), professional sports leagues, clubs and the scientific and academic communities.

So where does the OCOG actually fit in within this web or network of stakeholders? Following stakeholder theory, the bid/organizing committee should be placed at the centre of its network of stakeholders, presented in a hub-and-spoke manner. That is if we take the perspective that the OCOG is the main body responsible for planning and hosting a given edition of the Olympic Games. However, the IOC has presented the Olympic Movement's stakeholders – which are wider reaching than those of an OCOG – in different ways over the years, from concentric circles to inverted pyramids. Figure 2.1 presents generic examples of these various types of stakeholder maps; for details of the different stakeholder maps and Olympic Movement stakeholders, see Chappelet (2012).

Of the various stakeholders mentioned, those stakeholder groups that are important for an OCOG to plan for and host the Olympic Games include:

– **OCOG staff and volunteers** (the internal stakeholder group): these include paid short- and long-term employees, contractors, consultants, secondees and the unpaid volunteers. The staff (employees, consultants, secondees and contractors) are responsible for the day-to-day planning for the Games, coordinating with other internal groups or departments (called functional areas), as well as with the different stakeholders associated to their specific functional area. They can be supported by pre-Games volunteers for certain tasks (e.g. stuffing envelopes, manning the phones to provide information to Games-time volunteers). Certain functional areas, like security or event services, will hire contractors for highly trained jobs or, on the contrary, mundane tasks that the volunteers would likely not want to do. Most volunteers will work during the Games-time period, which can be as early as a month before the opening ceremonies when the media centres and athletes' village become operational. Games-time volunteers are the face of the event; they interact with the public and



Figure 2.1 Different approaches to mapping Olympic stakeholders

other stakeholder groups, often more so than the paid staff during Games-time; and they are the key group to actually deliver the Games as they are the ones providing the services (previously planned by the paid staff) to the various clients or stakeholders. Typically, the staff plan the Games and the volunteers deliver them, supervised by paid staff (usually only 1 or 2 paid staff per functional area per venue).

- **Governments**: these include the local/regional and national/federal levels of government. The governments' roles and responsibilities include funding a part – sometimes a large part, depending on the political/governance structure of the country – of the Games. This is especially true for venue building and other major infrastructure projects like constructing roads, new transportation services (underground, light rail, etc.), bridges and airports. These venues and infrastructure projects fall under the OCOG's capital budget – not to be confused with the operational budget. National/federal level governments also have other responsibilities, such as ensuring health safety standards, public health procedures, immigration/visa/boarder services, security (with military or other law enforcement agencies), economic development and international trade, promotion of the host country, etc. As we move towards the local level, there are still some security (with local/regional law enforcement agencies) and economic/tourism promotion/visibility aspects, but there are also local jurisdictional services at play, such as garbage pick-up, transit system use, snow removal from the streets, etc. So, while upper-government levels may provide much in terms of funding, the local levels provide much in terms of in-kind contributions to the OCOG.
- **Community**: these include the residents, spectators (visitors/tourists and locals), schools/academic institutions and researchers, community groups, activists, tourism and event organizations, business bureaus, sport commissions, conference boards and other local economic organizations. The community is the main source of support for tickets/spectators and for creating positive atmosphere and pride within the host region and country. The OCOG must think of the sport competitions but also peripheral activities (e.g. cultural programmes, live sites) to engage the general public and help foster a positive atmosphere. The local, regional and national tourism, event, business and economic organizations can work together with the OCOG to leverage the event for the benefit of their organization and community (see Chalip, 2004, 2006; Chalip and Leyns, 2002; O'Brien, 2007 for more information on the leveraging of events to benefit the community). The community is also the key source for where the

OCOG will find its volunteers, as well as where any groups opposing these events (i.e. activists) are likely to be found. Thus, the OCOG needs to build and maintain a collaborative partnership with the community, ensuring that proper communication and information regularly flows between the OCOG and the community.

- **Sponsors**: these include the national and international (i.e. The Olympic Partners or TOP) sponsors. Sponsors are the main source of funding for the operational budget of an OCOG. Through sponsorship activation and their presence and affiliation with the event, they promote it, increasing its visibility. OCOGs know in advance, in theory, how much funding they will receive from the TOP sponsors, as well as from the broadcasters, making it easier to plan their budget. The more uncertain funding comes from the national sponsors the OCOGs must sign. The tricky part is to ensure that national sponsors do not infringe on the sponsorship categories of the TOP sponsors. For example, as McDonald's is the TOP sponsor for the retail food services product category, no other retail food service provider (e.g. Tim Horton's in Canada) can be a major sponsor of the OCOG. Likewise, Samsung is the wireless communications equipment TOP sponsor, making other wireless communications companies (e.g. Apple) unable to be a sponsor in this particular category.
- **Media**: these include the accredited press (written, radio and photographic media), broadcasters (i.e. television rights holders) and the non-accredited press and television organizations. The worldwide broadcasters pay significant sums of money to be allowed to transmit images from the Olympic Games to their respective regions, thereby being an important source of funding for the OCOGs. For example, the organizing committees of the 2008 Olympic Games and 2010 Olympic Winter Games received respectively US$851 million and US$414 million from the IOC's broadcast revenues (IOC, 2012). For the 2010 Olympic Winter Games, this represented 25 per cent of the organizing committee's operational budget (The Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, 2010). More generally, however, the media's role is to report on the Games. By doing so, they increase its visibility and promote it, whether positively or negatively, as well as provide a degree of transparency and accountability – the degree to which depends on the information they can garner/obtain and the host country's political system. The difficulty lies in the OCOG, like other organizations, not (usually) being able to 'control' the messages sent by the media

to their audiences; the OCOG can only control, and only to a certain degree, the messages it provides to the media. As such, the OCOG spends much time, money and other resources (informational, human resources and material) on communications before and during Games-time. OCOGs must make every effort to facilitate the media representatives' job by providing proper accommodations, effective and efficient transportation, access to the necessary technology, a variety of dining options and other peripheral (e.g. dry cleaning) services. They should also provide access to athletes and 'positive' Games information/stories. Successful public relations management efforts allow the OCOGs to highlight, promote and reinforce positive stories.

- **Sport federations**: these include the local/regional, national, continental and international sport federations, as well as the organizing committees of other events. Aside from the IOC as the key sport organization and event owner, the sport federations have an important role in preparing and hosting the sport competitions. The international federations (IFs) set the standards and qualification requirements, provide the officials and referees and sanction (i.e. approve) the venue and overall sport competition. The technical official provided by the IF is also the person responsible during Games-time to approve the schedule and give the daily go-ahead for the event. For example, if it is windy, the ski jumping technical official will determine whether the day's competitions will go ahead, and if not, then when to reschedule them (in consultation with the OCOG). The national and regional/local sport federations help with the technical aspects and expertise, and often provide key, experienced volunteers for the event. They also stand to benefit from potential legacies (e.g. new venue, promotion of the sport and its athletes).
- **International delegations**: these include the NOCs, which are responsible for each nation's athletes, along with the coaches, trainers and other support staff, as well as parents. The delegations' key contribution is the athletes who will compete during the Games. The NOCs will provide the necessary information to the OCOG to help in its preparation such as providing the number of athletes, coaches and other support staff (press relations, medical, etc.) to the OCOG for accommodation, accreditation, food, cleaning and waste, and transportation planning, among others. The Chef de Mission, the head of the NOC's team during the Games, is the overall boss and helps to coordinate communication and issue resolution between the OCOG and the national team.

A final responsibility shared by the external stakeholders is the conferring of a positive or negative reputation on the given edition of the Olympic Games. As the OCOG ceases to exist within a year post-event, while its external stakeholders endure, it is these stakeholders who shape the OCOG's reputation and how it will evolve (if at all). For example, the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games are seen as the commercial games because of their perceived over-commercialization. It is unlikely that the organizing committee had planned to have its reputation be such; it is, instead, the collective perception of members of the Olympic Movement (e.g. the IOC), the media and other stakeholders who shaped this reputation. Not being in existence anymore means that the Atlanta organizing committee cannot change this reputation.

All these stakeholder groups are important in the planning and hosting of an Olympic Games. However, the relative importance of the different stakeholder groups depends on the exact issue at hand and managerial perspectives (Parent, 2008). For example, the marketing functional area manager will find sponsors and the media to be at the top of their list, whereas human resources or workforce managers will see the community and OCOG staff/volunteers as more important. As well, different hierarchical management levels will perceive stakeholder salience (importance) differently (Parent, 2008).

While the above stakeholder groups are central to an OCOG's efforts to plan for and host the Games, the emergence of the Youth Olympic Games (see International Olympic Committee, 2009) has placed a new emphasis on additional stakeholders: young elite athletes (aged 15–18 years old), their parents and entourage. The Youth Olympic Games organizers have to tailor not only the sport competition to the young athletes' level but they also have to consider the parents' access to their child, which is an important part of a young person's life. Given that the athletes are to be present for the full 10 days of the event, attendance at the Culture and Education Programme (CEP) is a requirement for them. The CEP is to be built with the youth in mind, with such activities as drumming, learning about (anti-)doping, learning to create media content, learning to cook and meeting role models (Olympic champions in the various sports). Moreover, while making the look and feel of the event Olympic, the service levels are not necessarily the same as we would see at the Olympic Games. For example, the transportation system can be a shared shuttle bus system for all clients instead of the segregated transportation systems for athletes, media and Olympic Family, which we find at the Olympic Games.

Thus, the type of event and the nature of its key clients/stakeholders have an impact on the OCOGs' decisions. However, these decisions are not always easy and must balance numerous stakeholder demands and requirements, which often provide challenges for the OCOG and tensions between the OCOG and its stakeholders, as we examine below.

Stakeholder challenges and tensions

Generally, stakeholders want a return on their investment (ROI). This ROI can take many forms, both tangible and intangible (see also Parent, 2008):

- OCOG staff and volunteers may want to increase their skills, grow their personal network, gain experience/become part of the Olympic Games caravan by working for other Games and make new friends.
- Governments will generally want the Games to provide economic benefits (e.g. through increased tourism revenues or new international economic trade partnerships), to increase the visibility of the local host region and host country and to provide physical/tangible (e.g. venue) and intangible (e.g. national pride) legacies.
- Community members and organizations will generally want to see some sort of legacy emerge from the event, such as new venues, new infrastructure. However, they are also interested in the event experience: having fun, feeling like they are a part of it and networking (for business and personal reasons).
- Sponsors are mainly interested in visibility. Olympic sponsors can spend upwards of 3–5 times when activating their sponsorship compared to what they spent on obtaining the sponsorship rights in the first place. This activation increases their visibility – along with the promotional activities of the OCOG for its sponsors – which, it is hoped, turns into increased sales. The continual renewal of TOP sponsor contracts (e.g. Coca-Cola, McDonald's) can only mean that the ROI they garner from the Olympic Games is worth the money they spend on the sponsorship and its renewal.
- Media want to sell their products, whether via newspapers or the Internet. So, they look for the sensational (read usually negative) stories, and the kinks and cracks in the OCOG's armour. However, they typically also celebrate the successes of their country's athletes which helps the athletes', sports' and the media's own visibility. As well, the media's coverage of the Games and the OCOGs allows for stakeholder

discourse to occur (and hopefully more stories written by the media, and more media products sold).
- Sport federations want to see their sports and athletes promoted, to increase their visibility and popularity. Thus, the quality of the field-of-play, the service levels (e.g. quality and scope of services, 'beauty' of venue) and size (e.g. numbers) in terms of accommodations, transportation and accreditation, for the athletes, coaches, officials and federation office holders is of prime importance.
- The athletes of the international delegations want to win, therefore the quality of the services provided to them and their entourage, as well as the support they receive from their entourage, is of prime importance in order for the athletes to have the best possible experience.

As we can see, these stakeholder groups have varying ROI desires and needs. All stakeholder groups have some sort of material or informational interest, and most have a symbolic (i.e. image/visibility) interest in the Games (Parent, 2008). It is important to note, however, that we cannot assume that all levels of governments, for example, want the same thing. There is heterogeneity not only between stakeholder groups but also within stakeholder groups. To use the government example, the desires of the local government – one which is focused more on the needs of its citizens and on operational requirements (e.g. garbage services) – differs from those of the national government – which operates at a more strategic level.

These differences create challenges and tensions between stakeholders and with the OCOG. Parent (2008) has identified 13 types of issue affecting OCOG–stakeholders relationships, which are described in Table 2.1. Across the board, the main concern is financial, followed closely by participation, relationships and visibility. While these types of issues focus on the OCOG–stakeholder relationship, each stakeholder/stakeholder group has their own set of internal issues to deal with when planning their efforts for an Olympic Games. Research is only beginning in this area.

Parent, Rouillard and Leopkey (2011) examined the Canadian governments' coordination and management efforts for the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games. They found five contextual factors affecting governments' efforts: time (or lack thereof, unmovable timelines, etc.), geography (e.g. dealing with a large country and multiple time zones), funding, the need for other resources (e.g. material, information and human resources) and the political situation in the region/country.

Table 2.1 OCOG–stakeholder relationship issues

Type of issue	Examples	External stakeholder group					
		Governments	**Community**	**Sponsors**	**Media**	**Sport federations**	**International delegations**
Financial	Budget, marketing and sponsorship, merchandizing and licensing, ticket sales	X	X	X	X	X	X
Human resources	Leadership, staff/volunteer management and roles, motivation, teamwork, turnover						
Infrastructure	Municipal services, traffic management, city/public transportation and facilities	X	X				
Interdependence	Communication and coordination, divisional and hierarchical linkages	X			X		X
Legacy	New facilities, know-how and experience, trade opportunities, pride, networking	X	X			X	
Media	Broadcasting rights and media coverage				X		
Operations	Accreditation, accommodation venues, security, technology, food, ceremonies/cultural events, medical, logistics, Games transportation				X	X	X

Table 2.1 (Continued)

Type of issue	Examples	External stakeholder group					
		Governments	Community	Sponsors	Media	Sport federations	International delegations
Organizing	Planning and decision-making, structure, timelines, effectiveness	X				X	
Participation	Involvement and recognition, fun, excitement, ticket availability	X	X	X		X	X
Politics	Power, politics, government support, egos, protocol	X				X	
Relationships	Building and maintaining relationships, managing expectations, accountability, authority	X	X	X	X	X	
Sport	Delegation size, qualification standards and sanctions, field-of-play, officials, event quality, resources and equipment		X		X	X	X
Visibility	Reputation, image, public/corporate support	X	X	X	X	X	

Source: Adapted from Parent (2008) and Parent et al. (2011).

There were also 11 types of issues found to be associated with the governments' efforts for an Olympic Games: accountability and authority, activation and leveraging, employee turnover, knowledge management, legal aspects, operational concerns, planning, power, relationships, social issues and structure (Parent et al., 2011). While many of these issues are similar to those noted previously by Parent (2008), there are some differences (e.g. legal aspects, social issues). It would be worthwhile, in future studies, to examine other stakeholder groups to determine whether within-stakeholder group-specific issues exist as well. Nevertheless, one of the important messages seems to be that relationship-based issues – such as interdependence, coordination and communication, accountability and authority, knowledge management, relationships and structure – are a central concern for both the OCOG and its stakeholders.

Managing Olympic stakeholder relations

Knowing that OCOGs have so many issues to deal with – as do their stakeholders – and that relationship-based concerns are so central to the process of planning and hosting Olympic Games, how can the OCOG–stakeholder relationships be managed to facilitate the success of an Olympic Games? According to the issues-management literature, problems arise when there is

> (a) a controversial inconsistency based on one or more expectational gaps (b) involving management perceptions of changing legitimacy and other stakeholder perceptions of changing cost/benefit positions (c) that occur within or between views of what is and/or what ought to be corporate performance or stakeholder perceptions of corporate performance and (d) imply an actual or anticipated resolution that creates significant, identifiable present or future impact on the organization.
>
> (Wartick and Mahon, 1994, p. 306)

Therefore, the key to managing OCOG–stakeholder relations is to establish expectations from the outset. This involves all key stakeholders, even the possibility of co-opting stakeholders who are perceived as 'problematic' or adversarial from the outset, for example, by making them official partners of the Games. For example, Sydney co-opted Greenpeace to help with the 'greening' of the 2000 Olympic Games, thereby making it hard for Greenpeace to critique the organizing

committee's efforts, while Vancouver made the four aboriginal groups on whose lands the 2010 Olympic Winter Games would take place partners of the Games (i.e. the Four Host First Nations) in part to facilitate cooperation and overall relationships during the planning and hosting of the 2010 Games (and therefore decrease chances of protests occurring).

Furthermore, these partnerships can be formalized, which will help in clarifying expectations, understanding how the relationship should be managed and in conflict resolution. This formalization can occur through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) or Multi-Party Agreements (MPAs). The key partners in Vancouver's bid for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games signed an MPA in 2002 (the decision being made on 2 July 2003). This MPA essentially outlined the roles and responsibilities of each partner, the expectations from the partners for the future OCOG (which would become VANOC) and how conflicts would be resolved. Parent and her colleagues (2011) queried the Canadian government partners associated with the 2010 Vancouver Games; these partners repeatedly mentioned the MPA as an important document, one which often clarified potential relationship-management issues with other partners and ways to proceed.

Formalizing relationships and partnerships is but one best practice. Another important practice is to focus on the process of relationship building and management. There are different interaction methods that can be used for different types of stakeholders. While internal and external stakeholders were noted above (as one way to categorize the stakeholder groups), Ponsford and Williams (2010) classify stakeholders according to whether they are passive or active. Each type of stakeholder has suggested ways of effective communication based on the stakeholder's degree of interest. Table 2.2 provides a description of passive and active stakeholders, as well as how the OCOG should/can interact with them. A critical component of building and maintaining positive working relationships with stakeholders is open, constant, two-way communication (Parent, 2010). If the stakeholder feels a part of the process (assuming they want to be more than just made aware of what the OCOG is doing), then the OCOG's job will be made easier.

Other strategies an OCOG can employ to build and manage stakeholder relationships effectively include principles associated with instrumental stakeholder management (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), strategic management (i.e. creating a mission, goals, benchmarks and control systems) and relationship marketing, which is marketing based on interactions within a network of stakeholder relations (Ferrand

Table 2.2 Passive and active stakeholder relationship management strategies

Stakeholder	description	Relationship management strategies
Passive	A stakeholder who wants to obtain information on the planning, construction and/or operation (of a site or the Games for example)	Signs or posters in public spaces, presentations to stakeholders, open forums, comments cards
Active	A stakeholder who wants to be engaged to a greater degree regarding the planning, construction and/or operational activities	In addition to strategies listed for passive stakeholders, public meetings, formal and informal meetings with specific individuals or organizations, open communication policies, formal liaison committee and/or person, site tours led by the OCOG and property owner, formal involvement of the stakeholder in the evaluation process

Source: Based on information in Ponsford and Williams (2010).

and McCarthy, 2008; Ferrand and Robin, 2009; Gummerson, 2006). OCOGs should not only understand the needs and wants of the stakeholders when dealing with them, but also how to create value for the stakeholder – that is, understanding the desired benefits or ROI sought after by those stakeholders (see earlier discussion on ROI). Value comes in part from the relationship and therefore the association (Ferrand and McCarthy, 2008). Issues are time and stakeholder dependent (Parent, 2008); decisions are time, resource and context dependent (Parent, 2010).

Finally, for certain stakeholder groups, especially dignitaries (both within sport and outside sport), following a certain degree of protocol helps to establish relationships in a diplomatic manner. While protocol may be thought of as only for royal dignitaries or as being outmoded and unnecessarily traditional, knowing how to properly address individuals with rank and position can go a long way to forming respectful relationships and smoothing out issues as it demonstrates a degree of consideration for the status of the other party, be they a head of state or government, TOP sponsor, president or secretary general of a sport federation or NOC, etc. Protocol aspects touch Olympic Games relationships, appearances and processes. To illustrate, the opening ceremonies of

Olympic Games are full of protocol, such as where people sit, who speaks when, what the Head of State can say to open the Games, which flag goes where, how flags are presented, etc. These protocol decisions, regulations and traditions help to avoid misunderstandings and potential conflicts.

Thus, managing stakeholder relationships is a constantly evolving and changing process requiring direct involvement of the stakeholders, cooperation and respect and consideration, with an answer-driven process that leads to a win-win situation for all parties (Parent, 2008, 2010).

Conclusion

In summary, the main stakeholders for an OCOG's efforts to plan and host an Olympic Games include the internal OCOG staff and volunteers, the various levels of governments in the host country, the community members and groups, the media, the various levels of sport federations, the national and international sponsors and the international delegations. The OCOG's relationship with its stakeholders can be a challenge, causing tensions and conflicts if expectations are not managed. Key issues include financial concerns, participation, relationships and visibility.

To manage the stakeholders' expectations – and hopefully facilitate relationships by decreasing the potential for tensions and conflicts – OCOGs can resort to formalizing partnerships through MOUs or MPAs. They should also consider the degree to which stakeholders want to be involved (e.g. active or passive). This degree of involvement will determine some of the communication and relationship management strategies the OCOG should use. Nevertheless, open communication, direct involvement and engagement of stakeholders, cooperation and a win-win attitude are critical to positive OCOG–stakeholder relationships. Focusing on managing expectations, creating value and ROI for stakeholders, as well as using an appropriate degree of protocol will assist in developing and maintaining positive relationships with the OCOG's stakeholders.

There is still much to learn about the network of Olympic Games stakeholders. A greater understanding of the overall Olympic Games stakeholder network, its characteristics, how information flows, communication channels, who holds power, what kind of resources are important in the network, etc. are avenues for future research. Understanding specific issues for stakeholder groups other than governments is another avenue for future research. Finally, while the

OCOG can rely on the IOC's Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM) process to learn how to go about planning for and hosting an Olympic Games, other stakeholder groups are often left to their own devices. Thus, they must proactively search for knowledge from past events (sport or other) in their region as well as past Olympic Games around the world. Understanding knowledge management and transfer issues for the whole stakeholder network, as well as specific stakeholders, should be of interest to sport event-management researchers.

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3

Information, Knowledge and the Organization of the Olympic Games

Sue Halbwirth and Kristine Toohey

Introduction

In recent years the Olympic Games have become larger, more technically complex and with increased stakeholder accountability. To deal with these transformations, their organization has become more professional. Consequently, many aspects of the Games are now being managed far more strategically than in the past. While the management of human and infrastructure resources is a 'given', resources considered to be less tangible but nevertheless mission critical, such as information and knowledge, are essential to this progress. There is now a somewhat belated but accepted realization that the corporate information and knowledge of an Olympic Games are valuable assets that should be effectively captured, shared, managed, transferred, utilized and exploited for the benefit of subsequent hosts (Halbwirth and Toohey, 2004). To achieve such outcomes involves instigating complex information processes and encouraging staff to effectively share and use knowledge. The Olympic Movement is not alone in valuing knowledge as an asset. Wenger, McDermott and Synder (2002) have contended that the twenty-first century 'knowledge has become the key to success [for] it is simply too valuable a resource to be left to chance' (p. 6).

The management of Games' information and knowledge involves Olympic event organizers (such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs), government agencies, sponsors and the other stakeholder organizations) that comprise the Olympic Movement. At the centre of these organizations are the staff who create, store, access and use information. As the amount and complexity of Olympic information increases, this

necessitates bringing together information technology, content and processes in an organizational culture that supports staff to be as effective as possible. An ongoing challenge for the Olympic Movement is to ensure that its information and knowledge is coordinated both within and between its member organizations to facilitate informed decision making, become learning organizations and minimize risk.

This chapter will introduce information and knowledge management (IKM) concepts and their possible implementation strategies within an Olympic Games, specifically in an OCOG context. It thus has a strong contextual and applied focus. Specifically it will describe and analyse:

- IKM;
- The OCOG business environment from an information and knowledge perspective;
- The IOC mandate for IKM;
- IKM as an OCOG functional area;
- IKM and its use in the different stages of the Olympic Games life cycle.

Understanding information and knowledge

Snowden has stated that 'knowledge is seen paradoxically, as both a thing and a flow requiring diverse management approaches' (2002, p. 100). Defining and describing the concepts of information and knowledge has changed as our understanding of how they can be used for organizational outcomes has increased. Similarly, how they are managed has changed, especially as technology has progressed and become essential to operations in many facets of business. Figure 3.1 describes the concept of an information/knowledge continuum.

Information management (IM) is an established discipline that focuses on the strategic information needs of an organization. It involves designing and coordinating systems, processes and structures to manage the life cycle of the creation, use, dissemination, protection and disposition of corporate information in different formats. IM facilitates access to internal and external sources of information, structuring and integration of information and the development of corporate information policies (Halbwirth, 2011).

The concept of knowledge management (KM) has grown in response to complex management challenges that most organizations face in the twenty-first century (Prusak, 2001; Dalkir, 2011; Lambe, 2011). KM



Figure 3.1 Characteristics of information and knowledge continuum
Source: Adapted from Polanyi (1966), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Machlup (1962) and Botha and Kourie and Snyman (2008).

is transdisciplinary in nature and cross-functional in practice. Current researchers conceive of KM as an approach that blends technical, human resource, procedural and strategic management issues. Despite the common understanding of its practice, there is no universally accepted definition of KM. Standards Australia developed the first national standard in KM (*Knowledge Management AS 5037–2005*) and this has been widely accepted. It describes KM as

> a trans-disciplinary approach to improving organizational outcomes and learning, through maximising the use of knowledge. It involves the design, implementation and review of social and technological activities and processes to improve the creating, sharing, and applying or using of knowledge.
>
> (Standards Australia International, 2005, p. 2)

Knowledge and information management have a synergistic relationship, thus a new term, IKM, has recently been coined to describe their

combined application in organizations. There is not one single correct way to implement IKM. It is a contextual function that must reflect each organization, and account for its cultural, national, regulatory, political and legislative environments. However, two common themes in IKM are balance and context (Halbwirth 2002; Standards Australia International, 2005). For IKM to be successful it needs to balance 'energy' in terms of four elements:

- People. Staff need to become capable in accessing and creating information and willing to share knowledge.
- Process. These need to be integrated, driven by business need and, reflect organizational policy.
- Content. Must be accessible, 'trusted', appropriate and organized.
- Technology. Should be integrated, user centred and easy to use.

Since 2000, the IOC has recognized the mission critical need to effectively and purposefully coordinate its information and knowledge. To this end the IOC has developed programmes, provided resources and appointed staff to improve IKM across the Olympic Movement. For example, it has produced the *Technical Manual on Information and Knowledge Management* (IOC, 2011b) as a guide for OCOGs and other Games organizers. This is one of a suite of more than 30 technical manuals the IOC has produced to provide operational guidelines for the many different functions required for bidding and hosting the Games. This manual, which will be continually updated after every Games edition, highlights the importance of IKM and the need for its implementation throughout the whole of the OCOG's life cycle – over its 12-year existence from the bidding process to the post-Games phase.

The IKM environment of an OCOG

Each OCOG is a high-profile project organization operating under significant external pressures, such as constant change, multiple stakeholders, governance/legacy requirements and immovable deadlines. Internally, the exponential growth in the scope and scale of the organization, the size of the workforce and task diversity result in another set of difficulties for successful IKM. Therefore, it is essential that IKM practices reflect the short, intensive nature and legacy opportunities of the Olympic Games. The challenge for each OCOG is to define and implement IKM within its specific organizational context, and in a way that delivers its strategic goals. Table 3.1 highlights some of the

Table 3.1 OCOG information and knowledge environment

OCOG 'business' environment	**Implications for IKM**
Project based/transient in nature 9–12 year project	Implement fast tracked, 'simple' and targeted systems and processes for growth Build and prepare for obsolescence and dissolution
Exponential growth in staff/stakeholders	Train and educate new staff in information systems and procedures Building flexible and scalable systems and processes
Diversity of staff – disciplines, experiences and skills	Design information processes that are simple and user centred so that they are easy to use by all staff and stakeholders
Number of different stakeholder groups	Coordination of information across stakeholder groups such as partner agencies, government/local agencies, sponsors, etc. Resolve potential conflicts in information rules, policies and access in partner agencies
Quantity of information need/created	Define the scope of the information being managed and understand what content is to be shared and/or protected
Multiplicity of information tasks Diversity of formats and channels	Manage information with differing sets of attributes such as social media, multimedia, images, geographic information, statistical data, computer-assisted designs, artefacts and objects Control distribution of content via multiple channels Ensure the consistency and accuracy of information and content Integrate and coordinate information stores Provide research services across the OCOG to limit duplication of effort in information seeking
Potential for confusion in use of terminology, names and language	Control and make consistent terminology used in the planning process and therefore the information systems Promote effective use of common terminology sets
Need for governance and reporting Information security	Requirements re: accountability, reporting and compliance to national and international agencies Need to ensure accuracy of public information Confidentiality and security of information
Knowledge as an asset Leaving a legacy	Processes, systems and culture to support the collection and sharing of information and knowledge Transfer know-how and intellectual legacy to stakeholders Legacy of building host city capability in event bidding and delivery Dissolution planning and archiving

Source: Halbwirth (2001), Halbwirth (2002) and Halbwirth and Toohey (2001).

contextual features of the OCOG environment that have implications for IKM planning and operations.

In addition to its own internal pressures, each OCOG must also fulfil IKM contractual obligations and requirements imposed by the IOC. In recent years, in keeping with the growing acceptance of IKM, these expectations have grown and their accountability is now explicitly detailed.

The IOC mandate

Until the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, there was restricted transfer of information passed from one OCOG to the next. The first example of this transfer as a formal IKM practice occurred in 1998, when a multi-million dollar commercial agreement was signed between the IOC and Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG). This began the Transfer of Knowledge/Know-How (TOK) Programme and firmly established Olympic knowledge as a corporate asset (Halbwirth and Toohey, 2001). It was a recognition that the IOC needed to coordinate and purposefully manage Olympic information and knowledge to improve operational excellence and efficiency, build Olympic organizational know-how and leave an intellectual legacy (Toohey, 2008).

The IOC built on this foundation and, in 2002, formed Olympic Games Knowledge Services (an IOC joint venture company) to facilitate the ongoing development of the TOK processes across future OCOGs. In 2005, the IOC brought this function back inside the organization and created a new IOC functional area called the Olympic Games Knowledge Management (OGKM) programme.

The OGKM vision is 'to contribute to maintaining the unique value of success of the Games product and experience through transferring knowledge and expertise from one edition of the Games to the next, making sure that the contextual elements are properly taken into account' (IOC, 2010, p. 2). The OGKM programme has developed a wide reaching range of activities to fulfil its objectives. These include:

- Services. A network of advisors and customized workshops to support OCOGs with specific requirements;
- Experiences. Observer and secondment programmes across OCOGs, substantive Games debriefing after every Games edition;
- Information. Technical manuals (collections of better practice guidelines), extranet available to OCOGs and candidature cities giving

them access to the extensive content collected through the range of OGKM activities, research services, Games evaluation;
– Capabilities. Integrated activities that occur throughout the entire life cycle of the OCOG to 'capture' and build knowledge capabilities by linking concepts, insights and facts in a manner, so that they can be readily absorbed and auctioned (Clarke, 2011; IOC, 2010).

This range of activities reflects the IOC's understanding of how IKM is fundamental to improving the management of an Olympic Games. According to Gilbert Felli, IOC Executive Director for the Olympic Games (quoted in Clarke, 2011), 'managing knowledge is at the core of our mission . . . carefully documenting what Games organizers do, sharing best practices and making available everything we've learnt from the recent past has become an invaluable support to the OCOGs and their partners' (p. 62).

Reflecting the IOC's growing understanding of the centrality of IKM, recent and future Host City contracts that mandate Games organization now include information- and knowledge-related obligations. These include:

– The OCOG's partnership with the IOC to participate in the OGKM programme, support knowledge transfer and 'building knowledge capabilities';
– Establishment of a legacy plan for the long-term preservation of the Olympic records (documentation) and archives following the dissolution of the OCOG;
– Production of an Official Report;
– Intellectual property rights assignment and clearance;
– Olympic Games Impact (OGI) Study 'proposes a set of indicators to measure the potential impacts of the Games' (IOC, 2011a, p. 10). It is an IOC requirement undertaken by the Host City, the OCOG and partner agencies over a 12-year period (two years before and three years after the staging of the Games). This longitudinal study has significant requirements for data collection and management.

The IOC and the OCOGs are using IKM to support and deliver effective Games-wide planning, management and reporting. This enhances their business efficiency by minimizing risk and duplication of effort. It aids informed decision making, learning and continuous improvement. Additionally, it facilitates effective connectivity between Games organizers and stakeholders. Finally, it allows information and knowledge to

be organized, disseminated and protected for immediate and future use (IOC, 2011b). The IOC obligations and internal benefits promote the concept of IKM as an OCOG function.

IKM as an OCOG functional area

The inclusion of IKM as a functional unit does not automatically guarantee its productive use. Effective coordination, management and retention of knowledge do not just happen. For this to occur, an OCOG must value IKM, understand its mandate and relate this to the event business environment. Thus, there are decisions that an OCOG needs to make as it implements a knowledge-based approach across the event life cycle. Planned and coordinated streams of IKM activities that integrate people and their behaviours, technology, content and processes are essential.

Potentially there are several different structural models for implementing an IKM function within an OCOG. Within recent and current OCOGs there has been a trend to engage a small core unit of staff with formal IKM qualifications and experience as a consolidated organizational unit to lead the planning and delivery of coordinated and integrated information and knowledge services, processes and systems (Halbwirth, 2008). This centralized coordination is supported by a network of 'champions' across other OCOG functional areas and potentially also across partner agencies. This is in line with Jones, Herschel and Moesel's (2003) statement that an IKM core team has a role in facilitating and building the champions' network, while the champions take on IKM tasks within their specific work units. This model ensures that strong IKM core systems and processes are implemented throughout the OCOG, and that its staff share responsibility and behaviour for IKM. The challenge of this approach in the pressure-charged OCOG environment is to encourage and enable all staff to actively comply and voluntarily participate in an information and knowledge culture as part of their day-to-day expectations.

During the growth phases of the OCOG this 'champions' network extends the reach of the IKM function. The cross-functional nature of IKM means that the core team has both planning and strategy functions. Its implementation requires strong relationships and interactions across the OCOG, especially functional areas with responsibility for communications, technology and new media, Games operations, project management, workforce and legal. Table 3.2 outlines some of the potential activity streams that could be implemented as IKM functions in an OCOG.

Table 3.2 IKM activity streams

Focus	Indicative activities
Analysis, strategy and policy (coordination and integration)	Leadership and coordination of IKM activities across event organizers Analysis and mapping of the information environment Information governance and policies Information coordination across stakeholder agencies Support for project management and integration Liaison with the IOC OGKM programme
Business information management (structure and governance)	Enterprise content and document management; stakeholder relationship management systems Information systems design; information architecture Information process improvement Information tools such as classification schemes; terminology Information security and recordkeeping Collaboration systems for the development of shared content
Information services (content and support)	Research and business intelligence Content management Library and data collections Support web and public information content production Advisory and consulting services across OCOG functions Multimedia asset management
Working with knowledge (collaboration and insights)	Training and performance support for information systems and processes Facilitating the network of 'information champions' Creating linkages via tools such as collaborative workspaces, social networking, corporate directory and expertise locators Knowledge harvesting and synthesis processes to 'capture' lessons learnt and facilitate organizational learning Supporting innovation via business intelligence, modelling and decision support applications Coordinating use and planning of IOC OGKM services and activities

Table 3.2 (Continued)

Legacy and reporting	Intellectual legacies – establish relationships with legacy agencies (such as museums, national archives) and stakeholders (such as government and city authorities and National Olympic Committee) Capture where possible know-how Support reporting and review activities, including Official Report and Olympic Games impact study planning and delivery

Table 3.2 highlights the centrality of IKM for strategic Games management and demonstrates the need for IKM to work across the OCOG and its stakeholders. External relationships with partner agencies are also crucial for the coordination of IKM activities. Differing Games' organizational contexts means that an OCOG may have to work with one or more Games' agencies. Typically, partner agencies are those with responsibility for venue construction, transport and security. The OCOG has a responsibility for ensuring that these partner agencies are active participants in the IOC OGKM programme. IKM has a core role in coordinating the OCOG and the partner agencies' delivery, use and contribution to the IOC OGKM programme at all stages of the OCOG's existence.

IKM and the event life cycle

Like other OCOG functions, IKM has a changing set of foci and activities during the organization's life cycle. A Games organization has four broad stages: a bidding/application phase, a preparation phase, a performing phase and a closing post-Games phase (Halbwirth and Toohey, 2004). The IOC describes these phases in detail in its Games Readiness Integrated Plan (c.f. IOC, 2011).

IKM must continually morph and adapt to the OCOG's life cycle stage and its strategic and operational needs. While, as previously discussed, the speed and nature of this change and its corresponding focus depends to a large extent on the context of the specific OCOG, a review of IKM across Games editions indicates some trends at different times within the OCOG's life cycle.

Acquiring hosting rights – Applicant, candidature and bid

From the commencement of the bidding feasibility phase, IKM is an enabling function and as such has a significant role to play. Unlike

functions such as venue operations, marketing and sport that grow iteratively over time, IKM needs to be immediately fully operational. The focus during the bid phase is on acquiring, consolidating and producing information to support the planning of the event and ultimately the success of the bid.

Indicative IKM activities during the bid phase are to

- Design and implement centralized coordinated IM system/s and processes to store, secure and share content;
- Coordinate flows of information to and from stakeholders and stakeholder systems and channels such as websites, as required;
- Support marketing, communications and lobbying with accurate, timely and insightful research and competitive intelligence;
- Manage records of business activities such as transactions and agreements;
- Coordinate and effectively leverage the lessons learnt, insights and knowledge available from external 'experts', IOC OGKM programmes, bid staff and stakeholders;
- Promote a culture of positive IKM behaviours and use by training and supporting bid staff in the use of information systems and processes;
- Capture the 'story' and corporate memory of the bid phase as input for Volume One of the Official Report (or if not successful to build candidate city capability in bidding for future international events).

Once the city is awarded the Games by the IOC these activities can provide an established information and knowledge infrastructure, experienced staff, organized content and formal records, that can be immediately activated within the new event organizer.

Establishing the foundations – Games minus 7 to minus 2 years

During this OCOG phase, the focus of IKM switches to implementing flexible and robust information infrastructures, policies and services to enable informed planning and decision making. At this stage the OCOG is small in size and scale, but IKM needs to plan for upcoming growth of the OCOG, its increases in scope, staffing and an 'explosion' of content.

During this establishment phase, when functional areas are being established, there is a need to gather information from external sources, including the knowledge and lessons learnt from previous Games available via IOC OGKM. An established practice to achieve this is via learning and observing activities. During this phase the OCOG staff experience two other Games editions. The IKM function has potentially

a major role in supporting the collection and consolidation of observations and lessons learnt from these Games and their debriefing workshops. This also cements IKM as a valuable and integral component of collecting, developing and disseminating a Games legacy.

During these years the OCOG's organizational culture is forming, and to ensure that IKM is a valued part of this culture it is important to facilitate a shared understanding among all OCOG staff of valuable IKM behaviours, such as knowledge sharing, information protection, collaboration and compliance with IKM practices.

Indicative IKM activities during this phase are to

- Enterprise content management (including intra/extranets, records, document, multimedia assets and geospatial information);
- Provide research services, gathering and collating information for use across operational planning;
- Develop and implement IM tools (such as information audits, mapping and architecture, terminology management (i.e. Games Codes), classification/metadata schedules and information security models);
- Coordinate research and OGKM activities;
- Support the growing functional areas via an internal consultancy service to coordinate information solutions and processes;
- Collaborate on scoping and planning for growing public information requirements;
- Commence planning for intellectual legacy and Games reporting.

Operational readiness – Games minus 2 years to games time

The third stage of an OCOG involves it moving from planning to operational readiness. During this third phase OCOG staff numbers grow substantially and the emphasis of the IKM functional area is to ensure the flow of appropriate and consistent information within the organization and with its growing number of stakeholders. Management of records and capturing lessons learnt is important as the OCOG is now a major contributor to the OGKM programme. OCOG documents and content need to be created, managed and made accessible to staff as needed. Content needs to be consistent and accurate. Challenges for IKM include ensuring that the systems and processes that support it are iteratively developed to meet the OCOG's changing needs and that all users are trained and able to contribute and leverage the information available to them.

In the lead up to the Games, the demand for public information grows exponentially and so the OCOG requires streamlined systems and processes to create, manage and control distribution of public content. IKM staff work with the communications, media, new media and marketing departments to ensure consistency of content across various channels, media and publications. IKM may also support supplementary initiatives such as public information coordination strategies.

Exercises and testing of whole of Games' systems, facilities and staff in this phase can be supported by IKM supporting knowledge capture, learning and continuous improvement. IKM is also actively involved in assessing and planning the flows of information that will be utilized during Games time operations. IKM supports the Games time command, control and communications function. Planning for legacy, including arrangements with successor agencies such as national libraries and archives are required to satisfy Host City contractual requirements. Indicative IKM activities during this phase are to

- Continue relationship management with partner agencies in order to facilitate information flows and governance support of Games time information and stakeholder information.
- Review and rescope information training and performance-support activities to cater for the growth in numbers of staff and system users.
- Develop and implement processes for capturing and disseminating knowledge and learning from test events.
- Iterative enhancement of systems and processes for venue operations and Games time.
- Support the planning of the Official Report and Film.
- Finalize dissolution and legacy planning.

Games time

During Games time, IKM has multiple roles in activities related to the flow, capture and processing of information from the Main Operations Centre to public information platforms. There is also a significant role in coordinating the OGKM activities, such as the OGKM Observer Programme, and the capture and collation of Games time knowledge for future reporting, debriefing and legacy obligations. Some indicative IKM activities used in Games delivery have been the

- Design and coordination of information services for athletes, officials and the media at Media Press Centre, broadcasting centre/s and Olympic Village

- Management of public information channels and contact centres
- Development of volunteer and spectator services information
- Support command, control and communication processes such as incident tracking and reporting
- Gathering and collection know-how, data and artefacts for reporting and legacy.

While some functional areas cease their operations in the days and weeks that follow the Games this is not the case for the IKM functional area.

Delivering a legacy post Games

Once the Games are completed IKM has a pivotal ongoing role in the dissolution of the OCOG, dispersal of OCOG information and knowledge assets and supporting final reporting, debriefings and through transferring the OCOG's knowledge contribution through the OGKM activities. As the OCOG must be dissolved within two years of the Games, IKM as a functional unit may be transferred to a successor agency with an ongoing role in legacy matters.

Some indicative activities are to

- Finalize records management and archives administration (i.e. decisions about the disposal and retention of content).
- Finalize the OCOG's contribution to IOC OGKM programme through the production of the final reports and transfer of documentation and data.
- Support preparation for the formal IOC Games debrief meeting.
- Support post-Games data management (i.e. the volunteers list).
- Implement legacy and dissolution plans including transfer of records and archives and other legacy assets to successor agency and/or to permanent legacy institutions.
- Develop legacy-information products (i.e. permanent web site for Olympic and Paralympic Games).
- Support the production of the Official Report, the Official Film and Olympic Games Impact Study (OGI).
- Transfer intellectual assets to national authorities such as libraries, archives and museums.

As an outcome of the IOC's acceptance of IKM, specifically through OGKM, host cities are attaching importance to the potential of

knowledge and know-how as lasting legacies of the successful hosting of an Olympic Games. For example, London 2012 organizers have established the 'Learning Legacy' project to 'share the knowledge and lessons learnt from the London 2012 construction project to raise the bar within the construction sector and to act as a showcase for UK [companies]' (London 2012, 2011, para.3). The Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) has worked with other Games' stakeholders to capture lessons, document best practice and innovations and establish an online resource base. In 2011 and 2012, the project is conducting workshops to disseminate knowledge. As an intellectual legacy, KM is so integral to the 2012 Games that the organizers believe that 'without information, without documents, without photographs or moving images, without physical objects and virtual memories, there will be no "legacy" ' (Smith, 2009, p. 1). To facilitate the intellectual legacy, a programme known as 'The Record' has been established in the UK to link the various rich and diverse collections that will be the 'the collective memory of 2012: how it was conceived, delivered and received' (Smith, 2009, p. 2). The project extends the concept of a single Games legacy, as there will also be links to content and information relating to the London 1908 and London 1948 Olympiads. According to the United Kingdom National Archives website: 'the National Archives is working to ensure that records created before, during and after the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and the Cultural Olympiad are well managed, permanently preserved and appropriately shared' (National Archives, 2012, para.1).

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that IKM as a function has a central role to play during all phases of the Olympic Games life cycle and contributes to the vision and outcomes of the OCOG. IKM centralizes the responsibility for various streams of enterprise-wide information and knowledge activity, providing infrastructure (via systems, policies and processes) and expertise (via services and organizational support).

If IKM is not established and supported in an OCOG, information activity will no doubt still occur but would not be strategic, and there is an associated high likelihood of significant risks to the OCOG. These risks include:

- Disjointed, inconsistent and 'siloed' systems and processes;
- Duplication of efforts and resources;

- Insecure and inappropriate treatment of sensitive/confidential information;
- Unsynchronized/inaccurate/inconsistent content in communications and media messages and channels;
- Political and national embarrassment;
- Slow response to changes in the external environment;
- Deficiencies in relationship management with external partners, stakeholders and decision makers;
- Inefficient reporting processes;
- Unrealized intellectual legacy (Halbwirth, 2001; Toohey, 2008).

Minimizing these risks through the implementation of a robust IKM programme requires a significant and sustained commitment of resources by the OCOG from its inception to its dissolution. However, given the potential benefits that flow from staging a successful Games (c.f. Toohey and Veal, 2007), the benefits outweigh the risks of undervaluing IKM and underestimating its centrality to an OCOG's strategic management.

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4
Managing Legacy

Richard Cashman and John Horne

Introduction

This chapter will review legacy-management processes that have emerged in the last decade and comment on their effectiveness. Because legacy-management processes are still evolving and there remain gaps, loose ends and shortcomings in protocols and procedures, it will be argued that legacy management is still evolving. Indeed, it is a more difficult exercise than the management of the Games as an event. The following issues will be considered:

- The diffuse character and variety of legacy objectives;
- The problem of legacy assessment and its time frame;
- Legacy governance;
- The monitoring of legacy by an Olympic city and the IOC;
- The policing of legacy;
- Research into legacy management.

A central issue is whether legacy management can ever match the lofty legacy objectives and rhetoric that has become prominent in Olympic discourse. A related issue is whether legacy-management practices can be reformed and improved to deal with various shortcomings in legacy practice. Before addressing these themes we discuss the emergence of legacy as discourse in Olympics and other sport-event circles.

Legacy discourse

The 'legacy imperative' is a relatively new scholarly concern added to discussions about the impacts of sports mega-events.[1] For many

observers of the Olympic Games and other sports mega-events, legacy is an essentially contested concept and practice (MacAloon, 2008; Horne and Whannel, 2012; Miah and Garcia, 2012). It is a political notion through and through, while appearing simple, this makes it attractive and seductive. The promise of legacy is that something good, beneficial and welcome will emerge from the undertaking, hosting or staging of a large-scale project or sports mega-event. Harry Hiller quipped that legacy usually came with a 'golden halo' in that it was assumed to invariably be positive (Cashman, 2006, p. 15). Yet this language can mask developments on the ground affecting those people most directly involved – including the compulsory purchase of homes and property, and familial relocation – and so render invisible the impact of staging large-scale events on other people's lives.

The emergence of the use of the concept in relation to sports mega-events coincided with the spectacular growth in the size of the Olympic Games in the Samaranch era which generated a fear of gigantism and an increasing number of white elephants. It was also fuelled by the corruption scandals that dogged the International Olympic Committee in the 1990s, especially around the process by which Salt Lake City was elected as host city for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. There was growing awareness in Olympic and other circles of the possible negative effects of hosting large-scale sports events. Coupled with this was concern about the impact on the local environment (Miah and Garcia 2012, p. 141).

The first major legacy conference under the auspices of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) took place at the IOC in November 2002 and resulted in a seminal publication, *The Legacy of the Olympic Games 1984–2000* (Moragas et al., 2003). A written commitment to legacy did not appear in the *IOC Charter* until 2003. Paragraph 13, in the Mission and Role of the IOC, specified that it 'takes measures to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host city, including a reasonable control of the size and cost of the Olympic Games (OCOGs), public authorities in the host country and the persons or organizations belong to the Olympic Movement to act accordingly'. This objective was simplified in 2004 when there was a commitment 'to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries' (paragraph 14). The IOC had earlier implemented the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program from 2001, passing on information about economic, environmental and social impacts for future Games cities. The IOC published its *Guide on Olympic Legacy* in 2009, which has been subsequently updated, and has introduced other initiatives to promote legacy (International Olympic Committee, 2011).

In recent years, it has become mandatory for a city to articulate at the bid stage both a vision of how the host city and country would benefit from the staging of the Games and its operational plans about how the realization of legacy will be implemented. It has been suggested that one of the reasons why London won its 2005 bid to stage the 2012 Olympic Games was that it had attractive legacy plans in key areas: sport, youth and the regeneration of a part of east London. As former Minister for the Olympics Tessa Jowell (2011, p. 204) stated: 'London's promise to host a Games that would create a lasting legacy of benefits for the whole of the UK was what set our bid apart'.

Nonetheless, there is a difficulty within the Olympic movement owing to indiscriminate use of the legacy concept. On the one hand, it creates a tension between the IOC and the Organising Committee of an Olympic Games (OCOG) over who will be responsible for acknowledging that there can be negative legacies (although somewhat oxymoronic) emerging from a Games (Miah and Garcia, 2012, p. 143). On the other hand, widespread use of the term in bid documents and in publicity for an Olympic Games can amount to 'overkill' and raise local host and national population expectations too much. In this respect legacy is both a blessing and curse. It is certainly part of the risky nature of hosting a sports mega-event and requires considerable management if expectations are not to be too high.

Talk of legacy management is an even more recent development, and its practices and protocols are still being developed. The IOC *Guide on Olympic Legacy* contains a brief six-page section on 'Managing Legacy'. There are many issues yet to be fully explored about what constitutes legacy management, the appropriate forms of legacy governance, how and when legacy should be monitored and assessed, and even policed.

Past legacy practices

Legacy in the twentieth century was a relatively low order issue and not seriously entertained until after an Olympic Games had been concluded. While all cities had a general legacy vision, which was set out in bid books, no detailed operational plans were developed before the Games about how legacy would be implemented afterwards. Legacy plans were not seriously explored until after the Games had been staged, when there was a diminished interest in Olympic matters. The IOC interest in an Olympic city largely ceased once the Games had been staged, so there was no regulating or even monitoring of post-Games legacy implementation.

If we take just the experience of London and Sydney as previous Olympic Games hosts for example we can illustrate this. In 1908, the first London Olympic Games had close links with and shared a site with the Franco-British Exhibition (or Trade Fair) in Shepherds Bush, west London. The Games of 1908 were hastily arranged after Rome withdrew in 1906, and so a temporary stadium was erected, but it remained standing until 1985 (Polley, 2011). A few years later, the 1924 British Empire Exhibition shunned the option of the White City site left from 1908, and established itself at Wembley Park, focussed on the Empire Stadium in northwest London. In 1948, another hastily arranged and financially pressed London Olympic Games did utilize the Wembley site originally constructed for the Empire Exhibition of 1924, but this was born out of expediency and post-war austerity rather than through design (Hampton, 2008).

More recently Sydney's legacy approach in relation to the 2000 Olympic Games reflected normal practice at that time. Sydney did not spell out in detail its legacy plans. There was no separate discussion of legacy as such in the three-volume bid books nor was there any reflection on the long-term benefits of Sydney Olympic Park. Legacy was only discussed in very general terms: it was asserted, for instance, that the bid was 'making an already environmentally aware population even more conscious of the vital principles of preservation and enhancement' (Sydney 2000 Bid Limited, *Bid Book,* vol. 1, 1991, p. 72). The *Post-Games Report* devoted only three pages to 'Legacies and Opportunities', discussing them in very general terms. The report concluded that 'legacies both physical and emotional were left for the people of New South Wales' and added that 'because of the images broadcast to millions around the world, tourism is expected to rise significantly over the years' (p. 72). There was no mention of any specific plans to enhance positive legacy outcomes and to minimize negative outcomes.

Legacy moves to centre stage

Since 2003, legacy has moved from the sidelines to the Olympic centre stage with the IOC proclaiming legacy to be a central part of its vision. IOC President Jacques Rogge stated in 2008 that: 'Legacies are the lasting outcomes of our efforts. They bring to life the Olympic values of excellence, friendship and respect . . . Creating sustainable legacies is a fundamental commitment of the Olympic Movement. It is an obligation'. He added that each host city 'creates a unique sense of environmental, social and economic legacies that can change a community,

a region, and a nation forever' (IOC, *Guide on Olympic Legacy*, 2009, p. 134). In 2008, President Rogge had made another comment on legacy when addressing the Chicago Council on Global Affairs: 'Legacy is our *raison d'être*. It ensures that the Olympic Games are more than metres and medals . . . Values, partnership and legacy are all required to turn the Olympic Games into an enduring celebration of the human spirit' (Ieromonachou et al., 2010, p. 335).

In the last decade all bidding cities have been required to spell out a detailed legacy vision with operational plans for their implementation. There could be no more striking illustration of the advance of legacy management than the contrast of legacy governance at Sydney 2000 and London 2012.

After the Games in 2000, Sydney had to deal with some legacy governance issues, particularly in regard to management of Sydney Olympic Park. A governing authority, the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA), was not created until 1 July 2001 – nine months after the Games had been staged. David Richmond, director-general of the Olympic Co-ordination Authority (OCA) from 1995 until 2001 and first chairman of the SOPA Board from 2001 to 2007, explained why there were no detailed legacy plans drawn up before the Games. He noted that OCA had 'commissioned some preliminary studies on post-Games planning' in 1999 but because of the demands of planning for the Games 'he could not divert staff from live Olympic tasks to work on post-Games projects' (*Australian Financial Review*, 2001). Michael Knight, who headed Sydney's Olympic team, noted that many of the state's leading bureaucrats were enlisted to assist in the staging of the Games, this being regarded a top priority. He added that after the Games had been staged this 'A team' moved on leaving a 'B team' of lower-level bureaucrats in charge of post-Olympic issues (Cashman, 2011, p. 75).

For London, by contrast, specific legacy plans were incorporated into the city's bid, and an ambitious range of objectives was identified. The United Kingdom Government also committed to the five, and then six, legacy outcomes for the 2012 Games that collectively are referred to as the 'London 2012 Legacy Promises' (University of East London, 2010, p. 15):

1. To make the UK a world-class sports nation: elite success, mass participation and school sport.
2. To transform the heart of East London.
3. To inspire a new generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity.

4. To make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living.
5. To demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, to visit and for business.
6. To develop the opportunities and choices for disabled people.

In December 2009, mindful perhaps that 'London 2012' refers to both the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the sixth legacy promise was added. These echoed the potential Games legacies identified by Moragas et al. (2003) following the IOC legacy conference: urban and environmental, sporting, economic and tourism related, political, cultural, social, and communication related and educational. Broadly speaking, London included an increase in grassroots sports participation, particularly of the young, the development of the London Olympic Park that would be the driver in the regeneration of East London, promoting community engagement with the Games and using the Games to promote economic growth.

The London Olympic organizers set specific targets for its legacy of increased sports participation aiming to get 'one million people more active and one million people doing more sport' as a result of the Games. After the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government came to power in 2010, however, both commitments were dropped (Hughes, 2012).[2] Neither Sydney nor the Australian Government, by contrast, had any specific legacy targets for the 2000 Games. There was simply the hope that an increase in sports facilities and the inspiration of Games stars would result in greater sports participation across the board as a matter of course.

Legacy governance in London, by contrast to Sydney, was therefore initiated well before the Games. The Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) in London, for example, was established in 2009, three years before the 2012 Games. Lord Sebastian Coe, chair of the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG), stated in July 2007 that '50 per cent of the organising team are working on making sure that the Games are working functionally at Games time and the other 50 per cent spend every working hour worrying about what it is we are going to do with these facilities afterwards. They of course have to be returned to the communities' (Shirai, 2008, p. 70).

Despite this comment, the legacy is not a matter for LOCOG, which like all other OCOGs has a short life and will cease to exist soon after the Games have finished. Additionally, while this may have been an admirable aim, there is evidence that legacy planning lagged well behind Games planning. Kate Hughes (2012) in her Doctoral thesis on

the legacy of sports participation at the London 2012 has noted that there was urgency in the planning to deliver the Games with a 'detailed Gannt chart constructed to ensure [that] the Games would be delivered on time'. The Olympic Bill, passed by the UK government, gave 'legal support to the operations of organisations charged with the delivery of the Games'. There was less urgency, by contrast, in the development of legacy plans. Hughes added that

> it was two years after the announcement of London's successful bid to host the 2012 Games, that the first report was published into the development of the London 2012 Games legacy. The report raised concerns as to the slow progress of legacy plans, specifically, that of an increase in mass sport participation, a proposal that had been central to the London 2012 Games' bid.
>
> (Hughes, 2012)

The variety of legacy objectives

Legacy management is far more diffuse and even problematic than staging an Olympic Games where targets, timetables and assessment hurdles have been established and understood. Legacy management objectives, by contrast, necessarily vary enormously from one city to another in that they can include the remediation of a degraded precinct, an improvement in one or another aspect of the environment, infrastructure projects including new developments and transport improvements, the creation of an Olympic park, increased sports participation as well as increased tourism – to name some of the more prominent potential legacy outcomes. Each objective requires particular management strategies. There can be, as a result, no standardized approach to legacy management. Each objective has its own separate set of issues, which need to be understood. As a result, the legacy-management plans of each host city pose a fresh set of issues and challenges.

Legacy assessment and its time frame

Assessing legacy is a daunting task. While it is not difficult to assess some tangible forms of legacy, such as the use of facilities after the staging of a Games, the assessment of other forms of legacy present new challenges. To identify some of the key questions illustrates this. How does one assess, for instance, the legacy of an Olympic Park? How

are improvements in the environment assessed? How is a legacy of increased sports participation established? Other issues relate to how and when legacy should be assessed given that there are varying time frames for different forms of legacy. And who is best qualified to assess whether legacy objectives have been met? And to whom should such reports be delivered? Finally, but by no means least, there is the interesting question of whether there exists a legacy 'sunset clause'. Is there a time when a city can consider that all of its legacy obligations have been met and it can therefore sign off on legacy management obligations? Baroness Margaret Ford, chair of the OPLC, considered the true legacy of the London 2012 Olympic Games would be seen over a 20–25-year timescale as the (newly named) Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and surrounding infrastructural changes mature (Ford, 2010, 2011).

Legacy governance

Legacy governance is a complex undertaking because there are two separate issues: a city's governance of legacy as a whole and then the governance of particular aspects and institutions. There was no official body in Sydney to manage the legacy of the Games as a whole, though an authority was established to manage Sydney Olympic Park nine months after the Games. By contrast, legacy governance by the time of London 2012 involved – at some stages – at least 11 different organizations and hence a somewhat bewildering alphabet soup of acronyms. These included:

1. The Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) – leading the construction of the Olympic venues, gaining planning permissions and the physical development and regeneration of the Olympic Park.
2. The Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC)/London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) – responsible for the long-term planning, development, management and maintenance of the Olympic Park and its facilities. The LLDC, a new statutory body or Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC), assumed the role of the OPLC in April 2012.
3. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)/Government Olympic Executive (GOE) – the UK Government department accountable for the Olympic Games; GOE is the unit in the DCMS that oversees the London 2012 project on behalf of the government.

4. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) – the primary UK Government department funding the 2012 games.
5. Mayor of London/Greater London Authority (GLA) – the Mayor leads on delivering the legacy of the 2012 games for London; hence the establishment of the LLDC in April 2012. While the Mayor and the London Assembly are elected by Londoners, the GLA is a permanent body that provides continuity in the development and delivery of strategies for London.
6. Host Boroughs – the five London boroughs of Newham, Waltham Forest, Tower Hamlets, Greenwich and Hackney will host the 2012 games. A sixth neighbouring borough, Barking and Dagenham, was granted Olympic Borough status in 2010, although it will not host any of the Games.
7. Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group (OPRSG) – provides direction for the 2012 legacy for East London and oversees the East London Legacy Group (ELLG).
8. London Development Agency (LDA) – the LDA originally purchased the Olympic Park and assembled the land. The functions of the LDA were folded into the Greater London Authority (GLA) along with its assets and liabilities at the end of March 2012.
9. Lee Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) – the LVRPA manages the Lee Valley Regional Park and owned 20 per cent of the Olympic Park. Its assets are to be transferred to the LLDC.
10. The London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC) – the government's lead regeneration agency for East London, especially the Lower Lee Valley and London Riverside.

(*Source*: Adapted from Davies 2012)

In short, London 'legacy promises' for the 2012 Games were being delivered and driven by an extremely wide range of organizations and stakeholders representing many different levels of governance, including national, regional and local level agencies. One might ask, with so many different remits and practices were the chances of success for any one of them made more challenging?

For instance, while much of the construction work on the Olympic site has been seen as a triumph of engineering and organization, questions have been raised about some of the planning for the post-Games legacy given the failure to secure a tenant for the Olympic Stadium. First, the Olympic Stadium's future was to be as a scaled-down athletics venue. When that was judged economically uncertain, bids were invited from football clubs. West Ham United emerged as the preferred bidder,

but both Tottenham Hotspur and Leyton Orient challenged the decision. With the legacy of London's Olympic stadium heading for the law courts, the government decided to intervene, retain the stadium in public ownership and lease the stadium to a bidder. The decision could leave taxpayers to cover stadium-running costs after the Games, and, according to the London Mayor's Office, with an extra £20 million bill towards its conversion for football use. Conservative London Assembly member Andrew Boff told the BBC in November 2011: 'The fact that we have been able to go from 2004 through to 2011 and we still don't know what the Olympic Stadium's going to be used for, that's shocking, absolutely shocking. Seven years and we still don't know who's going to be the tenant' (quoted in Denwood, 2011).

The LLDC, a new type of statutory body and Britain's first Mayoral Development Corporation (MDC), assumed the role of the OPLC in April 2012 with Baroness Margaret Ford appointed as the Corporation's interim chair until the Games were over. Like traditional Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), they are set up to promote regeneration and economic development and have planning powers and compulsory purchase powers. Unlike UDCs, however, MDCs are directly accountable to the Mayor, rather than the central government. The LLDC will continue the work of the OPLC as well as managing some of the assets and responsibilities of existing regeneration agencies in the area, such as the Thames Gateway Development Corporation. The new LLDC will have greater powers over the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and the wider area, which includes control of planning and development. Given the resources the MDC provides for him, the incumbent Conservative Mayor Boris Johnson received a major boost, in 2012, ahead of the London Mayoral elections through the formation of the LLDC.

Monitoring legacy

The IOC's first initiative to encourage legacy was the establishment of the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) Project in 2002. The objective of OGGI (later reduced to OGI) was to collect and capture the wider impacts of the Games by collecting data concerning 120 categories/indicators of social, economic and environmental dimensions of which 73 were deemed mandatory and 47 optional (University of East London, 2010, p. 7). The material was to be collected over 11 years; from 2 years before a city was elected to host a Games until 2 years after the Games were staged and then analysed by the Académie International des Sciences et Techniques du Sport in conjunction with a research

institution in the host city. This material was then to be made available to future bid cities. Prior to the London Games in 2010 a pre-Games report was published studying 56 indicators – 11 environmental indicators, 23 sociocultural indicators and 22 economic indicators (University of East London, 2010, p. 10).

Recognizing the many problems in encouraging and implementing legacy, the IOC has introduced a number of innovative initiatives to encourage legacy compliance. Since 2007, there have been three new programmes to further monitor and encourage legacy best practice: these include case studies, the publication of the *Guide on Olympic Legacy* and the staging of conferences for bidding cities.

Some initial case studies were undertaken in 2007, one on Sydney Olympic Park and another two on the transformation of the Athens badminton venue and Hellenic Olympic Properties. However, following a request from the newly established LOCOG in 2006, a more ambitious programme of case studies was initiated so that around 20 have been completed by 2011 (Communication Michelle Lemaitre, IOC).

The IOC has commissioned 'independent people' to write these case studies, such as academics and journalists. The studies have become available to the OGKM extranet so that they are available to 'candidate cities and OCOGS'. Hence the emphasis is on future Olympic cities rather than the past ones. It appears that the case studies are not directed towards the respective cities, which are the subject of case studies since they will no longer have OCOGs, nor will they have cause to consult the extranet. The case studies are 'made available to academics upon request' (communication Michelle Lemaitre, IOC).

The *Guide on Olympic Legacy* was first published in 2009 and by the end of 2011 it had reached its second edition. The *Guide* focuses primarily on five forms of legacy: sporting; cultural, social and political; environmental; urban; and economic. It is updated regularly to provide many examples of legacy practices from recent and even future Games cities.

In November 2011 the IOC staged a new type of conference, 'Bidding for the Games', which targeted representatives from future bid cities. The objective was to convey to this audience the IOC's commitment to legacy, thereby to encourage future bidding cities to develop best legacy practice.

The problem of enforcing legacy

While the IOC encourages cities to implement best legacy practice, it lacks a legacy 'big stick' to enforce planned-for objectives and even to

punish those who do not deliver on their promises. While President Rogge has declared that legacy management is an obligation, Philippe Furrer, Head of Olympic Games Knowledge Management, believes that there is now a strong moral imperative to deliver in terms of legacy – making it in a sense mandatory. However, there exists to date no way of regulating legacy and of punishment in cases of legacy defalcation (notes from Philippe Furrer).

It is also true that Olympic guides, including that of legacy, do not have the standing of IOC technical manuals. Meeting the requirements of the latter is mandatory, whereas IOC guides do not have this status. They are produced for educational purposes to provide reasons why bid cities should take legacy seriously.

Limitations

There is a recurring problem that legacy promises, presumably made in good faith but with an eye to winning an Olympic bid, are overly ambitious and difficult – if not impossible – to realize. Kate Hughes has noted that there are limits to what can be achieved by Olympic authorities in terms of enhancing sports participation. She has argued that the London Olympic authorities cannot themselves deliver the sports-participation promises. Such an undertaking could only be achieved by a nationally coordinated effort involving all levels of government and the sports industry as a whole (Hughes, 2012).

A second problem is that it is almost impossible to predict the post-Games environment nine years before an Olympic Games. The changing post-Games plans for the London Olympic Stadium have already changed more than once, and its future as a venue remains problematic. Legacy plans that may appear to be attractive on paper may need significant adjustment at the implementation stage.

At the Closing Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Olympic Flag was passed from the Mayor of Beijing to the Mayor of London, and thus London moved fully into the spotlight. The world financial crisis then began to unfold, and the impact of incalculable levels of toxic debt forced national Governments around the world to allocate unprecedented sums to prop up the global banking system. Although the recession clearly created additional problems for the London Games, it also had some positive aspects in presentational terms. The recession presented a scapegoat. Any further cost overruns or cuts in the scope of legacy plans could be blamed on the unpredicted financial crisis. In 2007, nearly £9.3 billion appeared to the public a

huge sum, but once the governments of the world had found it necessary to commit hundreds of times as much to bail out the banks it seemed a relatively trivial sum by comparison. The major negative impact was associated with private sector involvement in the Games. The last remaining hope that the company Lend Lease would fund the costs of constructing the Olympic Village collapsed, as did the original optimism regarding viable tenants for the Media centres after the Games. The government had to intervene, allowing the contingency fund to be utilized.

The distribution of the benefits compared with the bearing of the costs of hosting the Olympic remains an underlying issue that Games Organizers have to contend with. Since 2008, though, the news has been largely good – the Olympic Park and its facilities have taken visible shape on time and to budget. The volunteer (now called 'Games Makers') recruit programme has been launched, the online ticketing system was initially criticized but has secured the interest in millions of people and leaders have been recruited to direct the ceremonies. In 2010, the UK General election resulted in the defeat of the Labour Party and the establishment of a Conservative-led coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party. The coalition immediately implemented a programme of massive cuts in public expenditure, but of course it was largely too late for any significant sums to be saved by cutting the Olympic programme. The cuts to local authority expenditure and to sport budgets will inevitably have an impact on support for the legacy of the 2012 Games. However, if the economies of the world are emerging from recession, the London Olympic Games may be perfectly timed to contribute to a feel-good factor, possibly to the benefit of the current British Government and to whoever is the Mayor of London in August 2012.

Solutions and issues

There is no simple solution to the problems of legacy management given the problems noted above. There needs to be greater research to explore the best ways of approaching individual aspects of legacy management. More partnerships, including those with people outside the Olympic movement, might also be beneficial. Research into Sydney Olympic Park illustrates the value of further study on legacy management issues. A consideration of Sydney Olympic Park from 2000 to 2010 indicates the following (Cashman, 2011):

- The SOPA Act of 2001 set out a continuing commitment to legacy but did not define what constituted the legacy objectives.

- SOPA did not subsequently define specific legacy objectives although David Richmond when interviewed suggested that there were three main legacy objectives: the legacy of the sports venues, the Parklands (the environment) and a general legacy of the Park as an events centre. The legacy objectives were more implicit than explicit and most of them have not been assessed.
- However, specific objectives and targets were established in terms of annual visitor numbers. The aim was that visitation should reach 10 million by 2010, about double what it was in 2002. So there was the idea that the Park should be measured quantitatively in this respect after ten years.
- It can be deduced that SOPA officials did not regard the legacy of the Park as complete in 2010 as legacy also featured in the 2030 Master Plan. Furthermore, it is likely that the post 2000 Olympic Games legacy momentum will diminish over the next two decades. From 2001 to 2010 there were three anniversary events, plaques and paths unveiled and various other Olympic commemorations. It is not sure that further events will be used to commemorate 2000 in the same way.

There is no simple solution to the issue of legacy enforcement. Some academics have argued that legacy objectives should become incorporated into legislation, thereby ensuring that they be met. This is an interesting idea, though it may be more applicable to some forms of legacy than others. The legacy objectives of, say an Olympic Park, can be enshrined in legislation, and this occurred at Sydney Olympic Park. Such legislation has ensured that the Park's environment continues to be monitored, that a sports legacy continues to be prominent, and all developments at the Park continue to be in accord with the Olympic Environmental Guidelines. However, legislating other legacy promises such as increased sports participation would seem to be more problematic.

Conclusion

The IOC has recognized the importance of legacy as a means of staging a sustainable Olympic Games and has sought to move it from the periphery to centre stage in the past decade. There have been some welcome initiatives in the past decade to attempt to monitor and further encourage Olympic cities to take legacy management seriously. However, as we have seen, legacy promises remain one of the most politically charged features of hosting an Olympic Games or other sports mega-event. The

management of legacy is still in its infancy and requires much more research into its protocols, procedures and politics. Recruiting independent researchers to conduct case studies may be a welcome development given the complexity of legacy issues. However, the task of legacy management remains ahead for the IOC, Olympic cities and other sports mega-event hosts.

Notes

1. John Horne would like to acknowledge Peter Donnelly for introducing this phrase to him.
2. Richard Cashman would like to thank Kate Hughes for permission to make reference to a draft of her PhD thesis.

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5

Managing Sport Participation Legacy at the Olympic Games

Stephen Frawley, Kristine Toohey and A. J. Veal

Introduction

One particular strategy employed by governments and government agencies to promote sport participation has been to support the hosting of international sport events. Governments and their agencies are increasingly identifying the promotion of grassroots-sport participation as one of the opportunities, and anticipated outcomes, of hosting a mega-sport event such as the Olympic Games. For example, in regard to the London 2012 Olympic Games, UK Sport (2005) has stated that 'a comprehensive development strategy will encourage participation and boost all levels of a sport – everything from assisting potential medal winners to inspiring children to take up sport' (p. 74). Given the considerable amounts of public funds that are spent in the staging of mega-sport events, it is inevitable that there will be calls for evidence of the effectiveness of such events in delivering the promised outcomes, including sport-participation outcomes.

While sport-funding agencies and governments have, in recent years, become more active in planning event legacies, including increased sport participation, research has demonstrated that there is little empirical data to show that the strategies employed to date have been successful. An extensive review of the literature has found little evidence that international sport events have a positive impact on stimulating physical activity and sport participation (Weed, Coren and Fiore, 2009). With this context in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact that hosting the Olympic Games has on sport participation. The chapter starts by reviewing the research published to date in this area, and then presents a case study focused on the Sydney

2000 Olympic Games. Quantitative and qualitative data obtained from national and state sport federations, whose sports were played at the Sydney Olympics, is analysed and discussed.

The trickle-down effect

The term commonly used to describe the process by which members of the general public are inspired to participate in sport as a result of being inspired by elite performers is known as the 'trickle-down' effect (Hogan and Norton, 2000; Payne et al., 2002). Australian sport policy has been influenced by this concept for the past 30 years. For example, in an Australian federal government report published in 1973, Bloomfield stated: 'the focus should not be on the number of gold medals our competitors can win, but rather on the inspiration and impetus their success gives to the citizens of our nation for mass participation in physical activity in all age groups and at all levels of ability' (Bloomfield, 1973, pp. 3–4).

Two years later, another Australian federal government report outlined the related concept of a 'sporting pyramid'. The pyramid shape, argued Coles, 'demonstrates that the high-performance apex expands as the base broadens; and it allows for the view that the better the standard of performance at the top, the more it can serve to inspire and encourage participation at lower levels' (Coles, 1975, p. 14). The Australian federal government has since concentrated its sport expenditure on the elite end of the sporting pyramid, partly because, in a federal system, it might be expected that lower levels would be catered to by lower levels of government, but also because of belief in the 'trickle down' and 'pyramid' ideas. The typical justification for this policy position has been that it is a 'powerful and appealing argument in political circles that increasing the resources for elite level sport will eventually trickle down to the grass roots levels' (Olds et al., 2004, p. 109).

Hogan and Norton (2000), however, showed that the Australian federal government's rhetoric was not supported by the available evidence. They demonstrated that, between 1976 and 2000, the Australian federal government spent A$1.4 billion on sport and recreation, of which 85 per cent was devoted to elite sport funding while the remaining 15 per cent was spent on community level sport. Between 1980 and 1996, while Australia won a total of 173 Olympic medals, sedentary levels (i.e. non-participation in sport and physical activity) across the Australian adult population actually increased. Hogan and Norton (2000) concluded by stating: 'it is time to revisit the notion that

elite sporting success leads to greater mass participation as a result of the so called trickle-down effect' (p. 203).

In addition to the work of Hogan and Norton, the past decade has seen a small but growing number of studies that have investigated the overall impact that international sport events have had on host countries (Cashman, 2006). However, there has been very little research exploring the impact of major sport events on generating sport participation (Weed et al., 2009). The lack of engagement with this research area is reflected by the fact that at the first ever Olympic legacy conference – organized by the IOC in 2002 – only four of the 55 papers presented were concerned with mass sport participation (De Moragas et al., 2002). The studies that have explored this area of research are identified and discussed below:

- A study by Itoh (1988) revealed that following the staging of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, sport facilities located in the host city extended their opening hours to cope with increased demand.
- Research by Sust (1994) examined the impact of a junior sport development programme that was implemented in conjunction with the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. The study found that the programme had a positive impact on sport participation. However, due to the small sample size the validity of the findings are limited.
- Hindson, Gidlow and Peebles (1994) explored the impact that media coverage of the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games had on sport participation in New Zealand. A survey of sport clubs in the Canterbury region and a survey of national sport federations indicated that the participation levels remained largely the same. Furthermore, the researchers found that few New Zealand sporting organizations introduced sport development strategies to leverage the mass awareness generated by the Olympics.
- In 2001, a report from the Australian Sport Commission (ASC) examined the available data on the impact to national sport participation of hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The research explored sport participation research previously published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the ASC across the years 1998 to 2000. The study concluded that participation levels for the majority of the period examined were in decline and that there was little evidence to suggest that a trickle-down effect was in operation following the staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.
- ABS researchers Vanden Heuval and Conolly (2001) reviewed quarterly ABS sport participation statistics for the same period as the ASC

study. They argued that the long-term decline that occurred in sport participation between 1998 and the middle of 2000 started to reverse across August–November 2000, suggesting that a trickle-down effect may have taken place.

- Van Den Hoven (2006) examined the impact of Australia's qualification for the 2006 FIFA World Cup on football registrations in Australia. The research found that over the period, 2003 to 2006, football registrations in Australia increased by 12.6 per cent. The research showed, however, that while registrations increased across Australia in the first year post World Cup qualification (4.8% for the 2005 to 2006 period) this increase was less than what occurred two years prior to World Cup qualification (5.1% for the 2003 to 2004 period).
- Frawley and Cush (2011) explored the impact of hosting the 2003 Rugby World Cup on rugby participation in Australia, using rugby registration data across the years 2000–8. The research found that rugby participation in Australia increased following the hosting of the 2003 World Cup. Over the 2003 to 2004, junior registrations went up by 20 per cent while senior registrations grew by 5 per cent. Over the long-term (2000–8), junior rugby registrations also outperformed senior registrations increasing respectively by 68 per cent and 11 per cent. Interview data collected from senior rugby union officials from across Australia stated that a core factor underpinning this growth in registrations was the large investment made by the Australian Rugby Union in development programmes that started in the late 1990s.
- Veal, Toohey and Frawley (2012) examined Australian sport participation data collected before and after the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The research offers mixed conclusions about the relationship between the staging of mega-sport events and sport participation growth in a host nation. The study found that there appeared to be a positive effect on adult sport participation, but with non-Olympic sports witnessing stronger growth than Olympic sports. Conversely, in the case of junior sport (under 15) sport participants, Olympic sports witnessed greater growth than non-Olympic sports. Examination of data on the 2003 Rugby World Cup, hosted in Australia, showed a clearer relationship between hosting of the event and increased grassroots participation, albeit in the context of earlier growth. The study also explored the hosting of the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games, but found no post-event increase in adult sport participation in Australia or in the host state of Victoria. On the

other hand, however, some evidence was presented that showed junior sport participation grew at a modest level.

These studies indicate that the evidence on relationships between sport-event hosting and grassroots participation is at best mixed. While some of the studies provide evidence of increases in participation – among certain demographic categories (i.e. juniors) – the overwhelming picture suggests that the hosting of international sport events does not automatically lead to any identifiable growth in sport participation in the host community. While the above studies have added a great deal to our knowledge base and our general understanding of how the hosting of major events can impact on sport participation, substantial research gaps still need to be addressed.

First, broad-based participation surveys are only one way of measuring involvement in sport. Like any single research method, they have limitations, particularly when these surveys rely on recall accuracy of respondents (Cushman et al., 2005). Furthermore, a great deal of the survey research discussed above covers only people aged 15 years and over. With the exception of Hindson et al. (1994), Van Den Hoven (2006) and Frawley and Cush (2011), little work has utilized national and state sport federation player registration data. By examining this type of data, changes in the whole population of organized sport participants can be examined, rather than a survey sample of the general population. By adopting this approach and comparing the results from federation registration data with survey-based data, some of the limitations mentioned above may be addressed.

Furthermore, while the concentration on the 'outcomes' measure of participation is understandable, there has been little consideration of the additional organizational 'inputs' that might be required to turn inspiration into participation. For example, we know very little about how the managers of national and state sport federations view the hosting of international sport events from a sport participation legacy perspective. Little is known about the extent to which governing bodies seek to leverage the staging of these events in order to boost their membership base and which strategies have been successful or failed. As outlined by Chalip (2004, 2006), few empirical studies have provided knowledge about the most effective ways to leverage mega-sport events. Chalip (2006) argues that examination of how mega-sport events, such as the Olympic Games, are managed (prior to, during and post event) may provide the basis for devising future optimal strategies and tactics to achieve legacy outcomes: 'the outcomes themselves are not important

in-and-of themselves . . . but are instead pertinent to the degree that they provide information about which particular strategies and tactics have been effective' (Chalip, 2006, p. 113).

The next section of this chapter seeks to fill some of the research gaps outlined above through the analysis of data collected over the past decade, using the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games as a case study. Both quantitative (registration) and qualitative (interview) data was collected. The methodology employed in collecting the registration data is discussed, followed by the qualitative approach in obtaining the interview data.

Case study: Organized sport legacy and Sydney 2000

This case study addresses the following question: Was there evidence of an increase in registrations in Olympic sports following the hosting of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games?

Data collection

In 2005, 28 national sport federations in Australia whose sports were represented at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games were asked to provide their national membership registration data for the period 1996 to 2004. Ten federations responded to this request; however, only five provided sufficient and adequate data for the purposes of the study. In 2009, a second round of registration data was collected from the national sport federations. On this occasion, registration data was collected from annual reports; that data was not accessible in 2005. Additional data was collected from annual reports, a process that was aided by the digitization of national sport federation annual reports by the ASC library. Federations who did not have registration data available for at least one year prior to the staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games were excluded. Because the main objective of this study was the exploration of organized sport participation trends, specifically in relation to the hosting of the Sydney Olympics, pre- and post-event registration data was utilized. The remaining 19 Olympic sports were excluded because their data was either unavailable or incomplete. Further details on how the registration data was collected for the study are provided in Table 5.1.

There are some limitations with the registration data collected. First, few details were provided in many of the annual reports stating specifically how the member registration data was compiled and/or the methodology used in constructing the data sets. Discussions with the

Table 5.1 Registration data collection

Olympic sport	Year of data collection	Data period	Area	Source	Comments
Athletics	2005 and 2009	1998–2004 (Little Athletics 2008 only)	National + NSW	Annual reports	National Little Athletics data unobtainable
Cycling	2009	1999–2008	National + NSW	Annual reports	
Fencing	2009	1997–2007	National + NSW	Annual reports	
Gymnastics	2005	1997–2004	National + NSW	Annual reports	
Sailing	2009	1997–2008	National	Annual reports	
Softball	2009	1991–2009	National + NSW	Annual reports	
Swimming	2005	1993–2004	National + NSW	Annual reports	
Table Tennis	2005 and 2009	1995–2004	National + NSW	Directly and from annual reports	
Tennis	2005 and 2009	1997–2004	National + NSW	Directly and from annual reports	

federations indicated that they typically obtained the registration data from their affiliated state and territory federations. However, it is unclear in most instances whether the data was compiled through manual or automated processes. Second, the available data does not indicate the frequency of participation – only the number of people registered for a sport. Thus, some individuals might be registered with a sport federation who did not actually participate in a given year owing to injury or because of a change in personal circumstances. Third, the level of detail regarding age categories and national- and state-level information varied between sports.

In addition to the registration data, qualitative data was collected for this study. In 2005, the 28 national sport federations and the associated NSW state sport federations were asked to participate in a semi-structured interview about their perceptions of the impact to player registration numbers of the hosting of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games

(NSW was selected because it was the host state for the 2000 Games, with Sydney comprising 80% of its population). Twenty-one individuals, representing senior management of the sport federations, agreed to be interviewed – with most exchanges conducted via telephone and taking about 30 minutes to complete. The interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed textually and then analysed manually, with the lead researcher coding the data into emergent themes. It is important to note that the interview sample is different from the registration sample. This was not determined by choice but rather through access. For example, some of the federations that agreed to be interviewed could not supply pre-2000 registration data for the study and, as outlined above, this data was excluded from the analysis. Thus, the overall emphasis for the analysis of the interview data is centred on the overall figures rather than at the sport-specific level.

Registration data

The trickle-down effect would lead us to expect that Olympic sports would experience an increase in registrations following the hosting of the Olympic Games, and that it would be reasonable to expect that the effect would be most pronounced in the host state, in this case NSW. Regarding medium-term change, Table 5.2 indicates that of the nine sports included, four (fencing, gymnastics, sailing and tennis) increased their member registrations, both nationally and in NSW, post-Sydney 2000, while four sports (cycling, softball, swimming and table tennis) witnessed a decline, both nationally and in NSW. One sport, athletics, a sport with one of the highest profiles in the Olympics, increased registrations nationally in all age categories. However, there was also unevenness: in NSW there was an increase for the under-20s but a decrease for the over-20s.

For those activities that did not achieve an increase in participation over the medium term, the question arises as to whether there was a short-term gain, notably in the immediate post-Games period, which was not sustained. Table 5.3 indicates that this was not the case nationally, but may have been the case for two activities at state level, namely swimming and table tennis. Curiously, sailing appears to have experienced a decline in the short-term, despite its medium-term growth. For the first sporting season contested in Australia and NSW after the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, 12 of the listed sport registration categories increased while the remaining 10 categories decreased. From the 11 national registration categories, 5 increased while 7 decreased. These figures were reversed for NSW, with 7 of the 11 categories increasing

Table 5.2 Medium-term impact post-2000: National and NSW sport registrations

Sport	Period	Age category	Gender	National	NSW	Participation increase/ decrease (%)
Athletics	1999–2004	Over 20	Male and Female	National		−7
	1998–2004	Over 20	Male and Female		NSW	+17
	1999–2004	U16, U18 and U20	Male and Female	National		+14
	1998–2004	U16, U18 and U20	Male and Female		NSW	+10
	1993–2008	U5–U15	Male and Female		NSW	+10
Cycling	1999–2008	Over 19	Male and Female	National		−30
	1999–2008	Over 19	Male and Female		NSW	−39
	1999–2008	U11–U19	Male and Female	National		−19
	1999–2008	U11–U19	Male and Female		NSW	−26
Fencing	1997–2007	All ages	Male and Female	National		+49
	1997–2007	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+8
Gymnastics	1997–2004	All ages	Male and Female	National		+26
	1997–2004	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+40
Sailing	1997–2008	All ages	Male and Female	National		+18
Softball	1991–2009	All ages	Male and Female	National		−46
	1993–2008	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	−46
Swimming	1993–2004	All ages	Male and Female	National		−5
	1993–2004	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	−8
Table Tennis	1995–2008	All ages	Male and Female	National		−15
	1995–2008	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	−12
Tennis	1997–2005	All ages	Male and Female	National		+22
	1997–2005	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+92

Table 5.3 Short-term impact post-2000: National and NSW sport registrations

Sport	Period	Age category	Gender	National	NSW	Participation increase/ decrease (%)
Athletics	2000–2001	Over 20	Male and Female	National		+25
	2000–2001	Over 20	Male and Female		NSW	+7
	2000–2001	U16, U18 and U20	Male and Female	National		+14
	2000–2001	U16, U18 and U20	Male and Female		NSW	−10
	2000–2001	U5–U15	Male and Female		NSW	+10
Cycling	2000–2001	Over 19	Male and Female	National		−2
	2000–2001	Over 19	Male and Female		NSW	−4
	2000–2001	U11–U19	Male and Female	National		−1
	2000–2001	U11-U19	Male and Female		NSW	−19
Fencing	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		+21
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+13
Gymnastics	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		+14
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+16
Sailing	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		−23
Softball	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		−10
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	−10
Swimming	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		−3
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+0.38
Table Tennis	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		−4
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+27
Tennis	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female	National		+4
	2000–2001	All ages	Male and Female		NSW	+17

while the remaining 5 declined. Thus, the short-term impact on registrations was marginally better in NSW in comparison to the national categories.

Interview data

This section presents findings from the interviews with senior managers representing national and NSW sport federations for the sports of athletics, basketball, canoeing, cycling, equestrian, football, softball, swimming and volleyball.

The managers were asked to indicate the medium-term impact, if any, hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games had on their sport's registrations. Five of the seven sports stated that there had been no impact on their registrations, while the other two sports claimed that there had been a moderate impact, as indicated in Table 5.4.

When asked about the short-term impact that hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games had on sport registrations (for the first season post Games), managers from four federations stated there had been no impact. However, managers from two sports indicated that there was a moderate impact, while a manager from a single sport suggested they had witnessed a strong impact, as indicated in Table 5.5.

Those who had experienced registration growth were then asked to explain what the main drivers were behind this growth. A number of themes emerged including the impact of medal success; the impact of media exposure; sport development initiatives; volunteer development; and venue legacy.

Medal success was mentioned as an important factor in the growth of national and NSW athletics registrations. For example, a senior manager from Athletics Australia, the sports national governing body stated that 'after the Sydney Olympics we saw a big interest in the events where athletes won a medal. Athletics Victoria had 50 phone calls from girls who wanted to learn the pole vault after Tatiana Grigoriava, won a silver medal. This event is still strong, as is the men's long jump which saw Jai Taurima winning a medal' (Respondent 1).

Media exposure was mentioned by some managers as an important characteristic that helped their sports boost registrations. This was particularly the case for short-term registration growth. For example, a senior manager from the governing body responsible for junior athletics in NSW stated the sport had an immediate increase in registrations post Sydney 2000 'due to the increased exposure' of the sport created by the Games (Respondent 12). Media exposure was also mentioned by other respondents, who stated that the increased coverage of sport

Table 5.4 Medium-term impact post-2000: Sample interview data

Sport	Medium-term impact on registrations
Athletics	No impact on registrations. 'Hosting the Sydney Olympics has not had a big impact on registration numbers for the sport' (Respondent 1). At the junior level 'there does not appear to be any long-term impact' (Respondent 12).
Basketball	No impact on registrations. 'I don't think there has been much impact on participation levels as a result of the Games (Respondent 2).
Canoeing	Moderate impact on registrations: while did benefit from the construction of a permanent white-water facility in Western Sydney, the growth in participants at the junior or senior level post-Sydney was 'minor' (Respondent 18).
Cycling	Moderate impact on registrations. Respondent 3 stated, that 'in 2000, we were in the process of putting a halt to a decline in members. In more recent years we returned to a stable growth trend'. Likewise, In NSW 'numbers increased, then dropped back' (Respondent 11).
Football	No impact on registrations. A respondent from the Football Federation of Australia stated that the impact on football participation from hosting the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games was 'nothing obvious' (Respondent 5).
Softball	No impact on registrations. There was 'no great impact' on registration numbers as a result of hosting the Sydney Olympics (Respondent 6). In NSW there was also 'very little or no impact' on registrations (Respondent 14). Between 2000 and 2005, softball registrations across Australia were in decline (Respondents 6 and 14).
Swimming	No impact on registrations. Respondent 7, from Swimming Australia, stated 'there was no impact on numbers . . . there was a small decrease of 5 per cent'. An official from Swimming NSW outlined a similar view. He noted that the Games 'had a negative impact. Membership numbers went down. We expected it would go the other way. The same applied with Athens, no impact' (Respondent 15).

by the free-to-air television networks in Australia helped promote their sports to a wider audience (Respondents 3 and 11).

Sport development initiatives were cited as having a positive influence on growing registrations. For the sport of basketball, 'since 2000, registrations on a national basis have increased, but it has been small . . . One of the main reasons for the increase . . . has been the introduction of our national Aussie Hoops program, which is aimed at primary school

Table 5.5 Short-term impact post-2000: Sample interview data

Sport	Short-term (immediate) impact on registrations
Athletics	Moderate impact on registrations: Registrations do lift 'slightly during a 'big event' year but mainly at the Little Athletics level [junior athletes, 5–15 years]' (Respondent 1). At the junior level, in NSW: 'there was an immediate impact on [junior] participation levels' (Respondent 12).
Basketball	No impact on registrations. Respondent 2 stated that there was no immediate impact or trickle-down effect due to the staging of the Sydney Olympics.
Canoeing	Strong impact at the senior level: the increase in registrations was due to the 'growth in adventure racing and personal participation in recreational marathon racing in an aging population looking for non-team competitive activities' (Respondent 18).
Cycling	Moderate impact on registrations. Respondent 3 stated 'there was a positive effect immediately after the Sydney Olympics, but it was relatively minor' (Respondent 3).
Football	No impact on registrations. It was noted the difficulty in attributing participation trends with the hosting of major sport events, especially, for a sport like football that not only participates in the Olympics but also in the Football World Cup (Respondent 5).
Softball	No impact on registrations (Respondents 6 and 14).
Swimming	No impact on registrations (Respondents 7 and 15).

aged kids. Good numbers of registrations have come through this program . . . The program is designed to be fun and hopefully when the kids do settle upon a sport basketball is one that ranks highly in their experiences' (Respondent 2). Respondents from other sports stated that a range of sport-development initiatives assisted them to grow their sport, especially at the junior level. These included the creation of a national recruitment programme (Respondent 3) and in NSW various 'junior development initiatives were introduced' leading to registration growth (Respondent 11).

A positive consequence of hosting the Games for some sports was the opportunity it provided to grow and develop the volunteer pool. For example, a senior manager from Basketball Australia stated that the Games helped them to recruit and retain volunteers and that the 'volunteers (i.e. statisticians, managers and score-table officials) were reinvigorated by participation in the Games' (Respondent 2). In addition, for some sports, venue legacy was mentioned as a positive factor

that influenced sport participation post Sydney 2000. For example, the sport of canoeing was the recipient of a brand new A$6 million white-water facility as a result of the staging of the Sydney Olympics. This venue has hosted international and national events in addition to being a canoeing training venue for the Australian Institute of Sport and visiting Olympians.

The managers from national and NSW sport federations who witnessed a decline in registrations, post 2000, were asked to suggest reasons for this demise. Four main themes emerged from the interview data. These included reduced media exposure; increased competition; cost and time; and, sport structure and development.

Reduced media coverage of Olympic sports, post Sydney, was said to have impacted the sport's ability to generate registrations. A respondent involved with the sport of athletics stated that the sport 'has not received great media coverage since [Sydney] . . . the interest generated has not been maintained' (Respondent 1). A reason mentioned for the reduced media coverage, post Sydney, was the strong competition for media time from the major professional sports, particularly the football codes. Softball, for example, found it 'extremely difficult to attract media coverage' after the Sydney Games were staged. It was noted that as a female sport and historically 'not a professional men's sports', it has been difficult to get the media attention the sport needs (Respondent 6). Likewise, a respondent from swimming stated that to get a positive impact on registrations 'you must promote through the media' (Respondent 7).

Increased competition from other sports looking to secure participants was a strong theme mentioned by the respondents. A number of the managers interviewed mentioned the term 'sport sampling' when referring to this form of competition. Respondent 6, for instance, stated that today there are more 'sports to choose from', while Respondent 14 outlined the wide 'variety of sports now on offer'. In addition, a respondent involved in the sport of swimming stated that 'parenting has changed . . . parents allow their children to try a range of sports without the pressure of completing a season . . . the range of leisure options available today makes for a competitive sporting and recreation environment'.

Time and cost issues were factors that resonated with some respondents. For example, Respondent 6 stated that 'the cost of sporting activities i.e. to purchase uniforms and equipment' and 'time factors' associated with working parents shape how they commit to weekend sport. Furthermore, in terms of time, points were made by the

respondents about modifying how their sport is presented and played to make it more attractive to parents. This point is addressed further in the next theme.

How some sports were structured was presented as a reason for the decline in registrations, post-Sydney. A respondent from softball stated that the decline in their registrations can be attributed to how 'the product [the sport] is delivered at the grassroots'. While elite performance at the Olympics may inspire talented athletes to continue playing, it might not have a great deal of impact on the social player (Respondent 14). In relation to the sport of swimming, because it is primarily an individual sport, it can be difficult to maintain the interest of young people in its competitive format and structure (Respondent 19). Respondent 15 stated that 'swimming has difficulties because it is not a team sport. Being an individual sport makes it a bit harder. We probably need to increase the fun and social elements of the sport. Sports like surf-lifesaving have probably increased their numbers because of the social component'. Respondent 7 also argued that greater focus was needed on the social aspects of swimming: 'we need to emphasize the social side of the sport'. Being more creative and developing better swimming 'programs and programming can make the sport more attractive' (Respondent 7).

Discussion and conclusion

This case study demonstrates that organized sport participation in Australia did not receive a significant boost in national or NSW registrations following the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. Of the nine sports that supplied registration data, five experienced an increase in their national and NSW member registrations over the medium-term period (athletics, fencing, gymnastics, sailing and tennis). While, fencing, gymnastics, sailing and tennis increased their registrations across all categories, the sport of athletics increased it registrations across four of the five categories examined in this study. By contrast, the remaining four sports (cycling, softball, swimming and table tennis) suffered a decline in national and NSW registrations.

The short-term impact of hosting the Games on sport registrations was also mixed, with 55 per cent of the 22 categories examined increasing the first year post-Sydney, while the remaining 45 per cent (10 categories) declined. Interestingly, the sport of swimming witnessed registration declines across all categories even though it was the most successful Australian sport in terms of gold medals won at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The Australian Swimming Team won 5 gold

medals at Sydney 2000 from an overall total of 16 gold medals. Despite this success, there was no immediate or longer-term impact on swimming registrations across Australia or in NSW, the host state.

The interview data presented a number of suggestions and explanations for the decline in registrations suffered by sports such as swimming. It was argued by the senior federation managers that registrations were negatively impacted because of four key characteristics: reduced media exposure post 2000; increased competition from other sports; cost and time factors; and, how sports were structured and developed pre- and post-2000. It was commonly argued that registrations decreased partly due to reduced media coverage of Olympic sports post Sydney 2000. The respondents felt that media coverage shifted back strongly to the professional sports (i.e. the football codes in winter and cricket in summer). Competition for playing talent was also stated as a reason for registration decline. The professional sports have been very aggressive in Australia over the past 10–15 years, investing and developing their sports through the implementation of junior and school-based sport programmes. Cost and time were mentioned as important factors that impacted on registrations, especially in the context of fast changing social and economic pressures faced by families and individuals today. Lastly, the way sports were structured and how they developed junior athletes and participants was stated as a crucial factor in the decline of several sports. Some respondents suggested that greater emphasis needed to be given to making sport more fun and more socially orientated.

The hosting of an Olympic Games provides stakeholder organizations, such as national and state sport federations, with the opportunity to leverage their association with an event such as the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (O'Brien and Chalip, 2008; Frawley and Cush, 2011). To maximize their association, the research literature suggests that the event stakeholders need to implement leveraging strategies not just prior to and during the event but also post-event to generate longer-term gains (O'Brien, 2007). Based on the collected data it is difficult to argue that a trickle-down effect was experienced for Australian and NSW sport federations as a result of the staging of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. For sports to achieve a sport participation legacy it could be expected, based on this evidence, that significant investment in leveraging strategies is a necessary requirement (Frawley and Cush, 2011). The interview data collected showed that most of the sport federations were passive in developing leveraging strategies and those who did had few resources to fully maximize their specifically designed sport development programmes.

Large government investment in the staging of the Olympic Games in the past has been justified in part on the basis that these events can, in and of themselves, increase sport participation and physical activity in host communities (Coalter, 2007; Hogan and Norton, 2000). A steady stream of research conducted over the past decade shows that this proposition has little basis of support (Weed et al., 2009). However, researchers have demonstrated that when sporting organizations invest significant levels of resources carefully into sport development alongside the staging of a mega-sport event, promising registration increases can occur, especially at the junior level (Chalip, 2004; Frawley and Cush, 2011). To maintain this registration growth, though, development spending needs to be considered over the longer term. The more difficult question, then, is how do sporting organizations with access to few resources best leverage their involvement in an Olympic Games? While much more research is required to adequately address the sport-legacy challenge, it is hoped that this chapter has contributed to the conversation.

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6

Managing Sport at the Olympic Games

Stephen Frawley, Kristine Toohey, Tracy Taylor and Dwight Zakus

Introduction

This chapter outlines how the task of managing sport at an Olympic Games has become increasingly more complex as the Games have grown in size as well as becoming more technologically and media interdependent. To provide contextual background, a brief review of this growth is discussed together with data on the event's scale and dimensionality, indicated by the changing number of events, athletes and spectators, and, by association, sports-related managerial and operational planning.

Although the 16 days of sport competition is the most obvious manifestation of the Olympic movement, to date there has been surprisingly little published in academic literature specifically about sport-programme management and organization unlike other aspects of the Olympics, such as sponsorship (Barney, Wenn and Martyn, 2002), legacy (Cashman, 2006; Veal, Toohey and Frawley, 2012), security (Taylor and Toohey, 2007), economics (Preuss, 2000, 2007) and politics (Kidd and Donnelly, 2000). This chapter aims to redress this gap in scholarship by examining how sport is planned and organized at the Olympic Games. It begins by introducing principles of the *Olympic Charter* that guide the management of Olympic sport. As the organization of sport at each edition of the Games involves a range of stakeholders, all with diverse agendas, these differing stakeholders' roles are discussed. Following this, an in-depth case study of a successful model for sport-programme organization, that of the Sydney 2000 Olympics, is presented. To finish the chapter and provide alternative approaches to sport-programme management, descriptions of sport organization at subsequent Olympic Games to Sydney are provided.

The *Olympic Charter* and sport

The *Olympic Charter* is 'the codification of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, Rules and Bye-Laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It governs the organization, action and operation of the Olympic movement and sets forth the conditions for the celebration of the Olympic Games' (IOC, 2011, p. 5). In particular, the *Olympic Charter* defines 'the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main constituents of the Olympic movement, namely the International Olympic Committee, the International Federations and the National Olympic Committees, as well as the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games' (IOC, 2011, p. 8).

While the IOC is the peak organization in the Olympic movement it acknowledges that as 'sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organizations within the Olympic movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport' (IOC, 2011, p. 8). Nevertheless, the IOC, especially its executive board, controls many aspects of sport organization at an Olympic Games. For example, in terms of the location of sport events 'all sports competition must take place in the host city of the Olympic Games, unless the IOC Executive Board authorises the organization of certain events in other cities, sites or venues situated in the same country . . . . The location, sites and venues for any sports or other events of any kind must all be approved by the IOC Executive Board' (IOC, 2011, p. 58). Additional powers of the IOC Executive Board that relate specifically to the management of Olympic sport competition include the determination of the number of Games' participants, the inclusion of disciplines or events in the programme; the schedule and daily timetable of events; and the number of athletes competing in each sport (IOC, 2011). The latter decisions are made in consultation with sports' relevant International Federations. The IOC Session determines which sports will be included in each Olympic sport completion programme. These can only include sports that that have implemented and adhere to the World Anti-Doping Code. This code was established by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) of which the IOC is a key supporter.

International Federations

Sports' International Federations (IFs) obviously have a role to play in the management of Olympic sport. As Olympic stakeholders, the IFs

need to balance the importance of the Olympic Games with their own, separately held, world championships. It is important that IFs have a degree of autonomy that they find acceptable in terms of their role in managing Olympic sport competition; however, this must suit the requirements of the IOC and the needs and resources of the relevant the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG). Currently, each IF establishes its sport's eligibility criteria in accordance with the *Olympic Charter* and then submits this to the IOC Executive Board for approval (IOC, 2011, p. 75). The IFs assume

> responsibility for the technical control and direction of their sports at the Olympic Games; all elements of the competitions, including the schedule, field of play, training sites and all equipment must comply with its rules. For all these technical arrangements, the OCOG must consult the relevant IFs. The holding of all events in each sport is placed under the direct responsibility of the IF concerned.
>
> (IOC, 2011, p. 84)

Specifically, the IFs

> establish the technical rules of their own sports, disciplines and events, including, but not limited to, results standards, technical specifications of equipment, installations and facilities, rules of technical movements, exercises or games, rules of technical disqualification and rules of judging and timing . . . . Subject to the IOC's authority, to exercise technical jurisdiction over the competition and training venues of their respective sports during the competition and training sessions at the Olympic Games . . . to select judges, referees and other technical officials from the host country and from abroad.
>
> (IOC, 2011, p. 85)

National Olympic Committees

A further group of stakeholders that has had varied involvement in organizing Olympic sport are the National Olympic Committees. According to the *Olympic Charter*, National Olympic Committees (NOCs) do not have a direct role in organizing sport at an Olympic Games. However, 'the NOCs have the exclusive authority to select and designate the city which may apply to organize Olympic Games in their respective countries' (IOC, 2011, p. 56). Moreover, the host NOC is responsible for the formation of the OCOG. Therefore, instead of direct participation in the

management of sport, the *Olympic Charter* specifies that the NOC's role in organizing sport at a Games is to 'have the exclusive authority for the representation of their respective countries at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world multi-sports competitions patronised by the IOC. In addition, each NOC is obliged to participate in the Games of the Olympiad by sending athletes' (IOC, 2011, p. 52).

At the Olympic Games, competitors, officials and other workforce personnel of each NOC are under the responsibility of the 'chef de mission' appointed by his or her NOC. During the Games the 'chef de mission' is the chief point of liaison with the IOC, the IFs and the OCOG regarding sport competition and other aspects of the Games (IOC, 2011, p. 71). NOCs are responsible for entering their team's competitors, but they are expected to do so based on recommendations made by their relevant national sport federations (NFs). Once an NOC makes the decision regarding its team's composition it notifies the OCOG of these entries. The IOC Charter specifies that the NOC cannot exclude athletes from its team based on racial, religious or political reasons or any other form of discrimination and that the practice of sport is a human right (IOC, 2011). In order to ensure the quality of the competition is of a sufficiently high standard, especially after athletes such as 'Eddie the Eagle' (Michael Edwards) and 'Eric the Eel' (Eric Moussambani Malonga) gained much media coverage for their substandard performances, the *Olympic Charter* specifies that NOCs must only send 'competitors adequately prepared for high level international competition' (IOC, 2011, p. 78).

The OCOG sport functional area

The size and global scope of the Olympic Games have grown at an exponential rate since a modest beginning in the early twentieth century. The largest Games to date is the Beijing 2008 Olympics with 11,028 competitors in 302 events across 28 sports, staged at 37 venues. When compared with the Games of the first Olympiad in Athens in 1896, with 241 athletes, 43 events and nine sports, the growth of the Games is very apparent. At present the Summer Olympics consists of 26 sports and 301 events, while the Winter Olympics comprises seven sports and 86 events. While the essential institutional structures that support the delivery of the Olympic movement's goals, powers and responsibilities have been relatively unchanged, the increasing size, scope and diversity of the Games' sporting programme has heightened the technical logistics and operational demands of organizing sport at the Games.

All functional areas of the Olympic programme are interdependent and growth in the number of sports, competitors and associated officials, facilities and services 'directly impact the workforce requirements, complexity and costs in other related functions' (Olympic Games Study Commission, 2003, p. 11).

The sport functional area within an OCOG is responsible for a number of different planning and organizational activities. These can be broadly separated into sport-specific and sport-related actions (Frawley, 2010). Sport-specific organizational activities refer to tasks completed predominantly by the sport functional area over which they have control and authority (SOCOG, 2000). Sport-related organizational activities refer to tasks completed by non-sport functional areas, within an organizing committee, that are critical to the sport functional area in delivering its programme of work (for example, transport, venues and accommodation). While the sport functional area may not be directly in control of these functional areas it often works with them to provide advice and data that assists the Games coordination and decision making (Frawley, 2010).

Sport-specific organizational activities at an Olympic Games typically include the following areas: development of the sport competition schedule; planning and management of test events; development of sport policies and operating procedures (i.e. sport medical policies and procedures); the management of the sport entries process including the tracking of athlete qualification; development and management of sport-results systems and sport-related technology; sport presentation (i.e. lighting, sound and announcements at competition venues); scoping and development of training venues; procurement of sports equipment; development and creation of sport publications; doping control; sport medical; liaison with the IFs; NOC relations; IOC relations; WADA; and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (SOCOG, 2000; Toohey, 2001).

In recent Games the accepted practice is that many OCOG sport staff are also integrally involved in the organization of the Paralympic Games. This is in line with the development of a closer strategic alignment between the IOC and International Paralympic Committee (IPC). As the Paralympic Games are held after the Olympic Games, this means that many staff do not complete their tenure at the conclusion of the 16 days of Olympic sport competition. Instead they need to refocus operationally to manage a second mega-sport event. While this is a physically and mentally demanding task, the economies of scale and transfer of skill realized through this process are obvious. The end of the

Paralympic Games essentially signals the conclusion of Olympic work for most OCOG staff in a sport division. While a few staff (especially those at a senior level) are required to remain for input into the Olympic Transfer of Knowledge Programme, with relevant personnel from the IOC and the next OCOG, most sport programme staff quickly leave the OCOG. Many may take tacit knowledge gained through their Olympic involvement into future employment in other event or sport organizations, as do the many thousands of volunteers who have worked in sport-related tasks at the Games. The Games' sport equipment is either donated to sport clubs or sold. The physical bump-out of venues returns them to their pre-Olympic state.

What happens, then, in terms of the management of Olympic sport is not the responsibility of the OCOG sport division but rests with any legacy organization in the host city. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, the Olympic Games do not appear to positively impact upon sport participation, and providing a sport legacy is not presently the purview of an OCOG's sport programme. Consideration could be given to greater involvement in legacy planning by an OCOG's sport functional area in the seven years leading up to the Games with respect to recreational as well as Olympic sport outcomes. This could result in the sport programme leaving a greater mark on the host community's sporting endeavours.

Managing sport at Sydney 2000: The role of the host NOC

Research by Frawley (2010) has showed that there was a key difference in how the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games were organized in comparison to other Olympics staged pre and post Sydney. The main difference was that the Sydney Games had, in effect, two separate boards of directors. Typically, an OCOG is governed by a single board, the make-up of which is stipulated in the *Olympic Charter*. However, in 1996, as a result of a contractual resolution between two Olympic stakeholders, the Australian Olympic Committee (as the host NOC) and the New South Wales (NSW) State Government (as the financial underwriter for the Games), a dual governance structure was established.

This meant that two boards controlled and managed the Sydney Games. One had authority for the sport functional area and the other with the remaining OCOG responsibilities. The entity created with authority for the management of sport at the Sydney Games was called the SOCOG Sports Commission (SSC). The SSC consisted of six members. The Australian Olympic Committee (AOC) was given the power

to appoint four of the members while the NSW Government appointed the other two (Frawley, 2010). The president of the AOC and SOCOG vice-president, John Coates, was appointed as the SSC chairperson.

Frawley (2010) interviewed 35 Olympic officials involved in the organization of the Sydney Games. This included people involved at the highest level of Games management within SOCOG, the NSW Government and the AOC. Other representatives were interviewed who also held senior positions with the IOC and the IFs. Using a critical management perspective, drawing on the power and organizations literature (Clegg, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Newton, 2001; Dopson, 2005), the study highlighted the importance of examining both power and knowledge when attempting to understand the development and management of an OCOG.

The research found that an OCOG cannot be viewed as self-contained or a timeless entity (Frawley, 2010). The management of the Olympic Games, however, was shaped by the interconnected development over time of institutional and structural arrangements (i.e. the *Host City Contract*) and through the action of individual agents, especially those whose roles involved power and who represented stakeholder groups (i.e. the president of a host NOC). The organizing structures of an Olympic Games are therefore never totally fixed with any single agent or stakeholder group having total power or control, but they remain fluid and dynamic entities, continually changing. The organization of an Olympic Games can be viewed as a 'shifting figuration', where individual agents and organizational structures constantly evolve together as a 'product of interwoven interdependency ties' (Dopson, 2005, p. 1141).

The management of an Olympic Games is influenced by the experience and knowledge of the event's leadership. The *habitus* (socially learnt disposition) of individual office holders and their interdependence to the stakeholder organizations they represent shape the management of an Olympic Games. The evidence presented by Frawley (2010) showed that the experience and knowledge retained by the AOC leadership and its SSC representatives did not develop in isolation but was influenced by the longer-term development of the AOC and its membership of the Olympic movement. Importantly, therefore, the management of an Olympic Games is not only formed by the experience and knowledge of individuals and the stakeholder groups they represent but also by their interdependence on one another.

This interdependence occurs because the development of a mega-sport event organization does not take place independently; rather, it evolves through the patterning of interactions of people situated within

and outside of its organizational boundaries (Stacey, 2003). When considering the organization of the sport functional area, in SOCOG, it must be noted that the individuals who represented the interests of the AOC not only had a lengthy history of involvement in the Olympic movement but they were also highly experienced in the administration of IFs and NFs. This Olympic and sport administration experience provided legitimacy and was viewed as a crucial point of difference by those who worked in the SOCOG sport functional area. In a number of cases the relationships that were maintained by the senior officials involved with the AOC, the SSC and the SOCOG sport functional area spanned two decades. The development of these relations resulted in the formation of an Olympic network figuration that was deeply tied and formed.

A host NOC that has strong organizational power relations within an OCOG can therefore maximize its experience and knowledge in order to leverage its own position and to gain a competitive advantage. For instance, the AOC believed the organization of the Sydney Olympics needed to be athlete centred and it was ultimately able to achieve this goal (Gordon, 2003). For the AOC, having people who believed strongly in the organization's vision resulted in its goals and objectives being driven by both knowledge and enthusiasm.

The knowledge and experience of members of the host NOC interdependently shaped power relations with the central stakeholders involved in the Games organization. As stated by Flyvbjerg (1998) who drew upon Foucault (1977), the concepts of 'power and knowledge directly imply one another'; in other words, they are interdependent concepts (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 27). For the AOC, their knowledge and experience they maintained of the Olympic movement and international sport were combined to be a central feature of its power relations. The AOC's experience in Olympic bidding, for example, enabled it to successfully leverage its contractual position with the NSW Government (Gordon, 2003). Apart from assisting SOCOG to organize a highly successful Olympics, the AOC also secured a financial legacy for itself of approximately A$90 million (Frawley and Toohey, 2005, 2009).

In addition to the development of knowledge and experience, organizers of mega-sport events need to be aware of the importance of cultivating internal and external organizational trust. As outlined above, mega-sport event organization will be shaped by a range of stakeholder relations, some of which are long-term and enduring, while others will be new and undeveloped. It is critical, therefore, that central stakeholders place importance on developing strong relations and trust with an event-organizing committee, for trust is such a critical variable

in explaining organizational effectiveness (Lane and Bachmann, 1996; Smith, 2002). Indeed, higher levels of organizational trust are widely thought to lead to greater cooperation, increased flow of information and the development of more evenly balanced organizational power relations (Bachmann, 2001).

Frawley's (2010) study also outlined that future host NOCs and OCOGs organizers should consider the value of establishing a dedicated sport-related commission or agency, similar to the SSC, with decision-making authority and financial autonomy. The advantages of establishing an autonomous sport-dedicated commission within an OCOG include providing budget certainty and the capacity for prompt decision making. The protection of a sport functional area budget, early in the preparations for an Olympic Games, is useful, as the sport functional area is traditionally staffed later in the Olympic-planning cycle, in comparison to other large functional areas such as marketing and venue management. This means that a substantial amount of sport functional area expenditure occurs in the last two years of Games preparations, which is at a time when Olympic budgets often face cuts due to lower than expected revenue generation from sponsorship and/or ticket sales. Host NOCs, that embrace the 'Sydney model' of establishing an SSC-styled agency, with financial autonomy, can protect their budget to ensure that an OCOG delivers agreed athlete services.

The implementation of an SSC-type agency can provide the sport functional area of an Olympic Games with the autonomy to make prompt sport-related decisions. This is especially important when considering the number of stakeholders involved in the staging and production of an Olympic Games. A sport commission with representatives appointed by a host NOC, who are experienced in the organization of Olympic and international sport, can provide the host NOC with a forum that ensures sport planning is a central rather than a secondary consideration for the OCOG board. This is vital because the implementation of an SSC-type agency means that decisions that impact a sport functional area are made in a timely manner rather than being delayed until the OCOG board meets (or conversely where decisions are not considered at all by an OCOG board).

A structure such as the 'Sydney model' gives a host NOC a position in the Games-management structure, allowing it the opportunity to provide strong leadership across sport and non-sport OCOG programme areas. The establishment of a sport-specific agency with decision-making powers and financial autonomy also results in the OCOG board having fewer decisions to make and gives it more time to spend on areas that

traditionally take up a great deal of effort, such as revenue raising and cost cutting. For instance, between 1996 and 2000, the SSC made 540 sport decisions (Frawley, 2010). Many of these had a direct and positive impact on the quality and standard of services provided to athletes and their NOCs, both at the sport competition venues and the Olympic Village.

In sum, the organization of a sport functional area at an Olympic Games or other mega-sport event can benefit from a host NOC's pre-existing organizational power and knowledge. The establishment of a dedicated SSC agency can provide a sport functional area with decision-making authority and financial autonomy. It also benefits the host NOC to implement an Olympics that is focused on the athletes.

Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008

While it can be argued that Sydney set a benchmark in how sport was organized and operated at an Olympics, it is interesting to see what has happened since 2000. This section looks at how ATHOC, the organizing committee for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games, and BOCOG, the organizing committee for Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, managed and organized. This material draws on the official post-Games reports published by ATHOC and BOCOG.

While each OCOG is structured based upon its own cultural and national features, such organizing committees are heavily influenced by the Games that have gone before them. For instance, since the staging of the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games, OCOGs have been structured around a functional area model, where sport is viewed as a functional area rather than the central and core product feature of the Games organizers. As outlined above, while sport was also viewed as a functional area within SOCOG, it reported to the SSC rather than the SOCOG board. In the case of ATHOC and BOCOG, we observe that there were similarities and differences in how they were managed by comparison to SOCOG.

ATHOC and Athens 2004 – 'Athens for the Athletes'

As an OCOG establishes it organizational structure and operations, or as it morphs out of the bid committee, there are many options it can take. ATHOC began its organizational life in 1998. At that time sport was one of six divisions. This later grew to eight divisions, following an external consultants report, and stayed this way until 2000. Sport was

initially included in the Games organization division which consisted of the following departments: Sport, Olympic Village, Games Sites, Games Services and Paralympic Games. Following the restructure a General Manager Sports position was created with the following programme areas: Sport Policy, Competition Organization, Competition Support and NOC and IF Liaison.

In May 2000, the Greek government appointed a new ATHOC president and another round of restructuring took place. Sport was placed as part of a portfolio under the executive director that included: General Manger Sports, Manager Games Planning, and Manager Competition. This division included two other strands, one being a General Manager Games Services, the other a General Manger Venue Operations. In July 2001, a further restructure was conducted which identified and inserted an 'Olympic Operations' layer into the ATHOC structure. Sport remained under the same division but now it included three other departments: Games Planning, Competitions and Sports Services. Not unlike SOCOG, Venue Management remained separate from the sport functional area, but under the new management arrangement a greater emphasis on the integration of Games operations was proposed.

Between February 2002 and April 2002, another restructure occurred. This fourth reshuffle focused on developing a 'Games command structure' (ATHOC, 2005, p. 107). However, this approach only lasted until June 2002, when a fifth restructure was conducted. In this fifth organizational rearrangement the Games Operations Division was abolished while the Sport Division remained. In June 2004, a transition to a 'Games command' structure was finally made. Under this command structure a new executive director managed the Sport Division. This division comprised five areas: Games Planning, Sport Competition, Sport Services, Football and Paralympic Games. Interestingly, and unlike Sydney 2000, the Competition Venue Operations functional area was placed within the same division as sport. The ATHOC post-Games report does not explain how this complicated organizational structure performed given the many lines of management communication that developed from all this restructuring.

While the Sport Division was established in 1998 it was not actually staffed until early 1999. The key early role for this division was similar to SOCOG in that it was to establish working relations with the Olympic sports and their 28 governing bodies. At this point the division had eight responsibilities: developing the competition scheduling, training schedules for each phase leading into and during the Games, managing sports entries, managing technical official requirements, managing the

technical aspects of the 'field of play', the publication of technical publications and forms, participation in the Olympic results and information services (ORIS), training volunteers for competition-management tasks and collaboration with meteorological agencies. These responsibilities were arranged in a matrix structure to service each sport (ATHOC, 2005).

As the ATHOC structure changed, so did the responsibilities of the Sport Division, as noted above. It is worth noting that after the 2001–2 restructure, the Sports Division managed five departments, each with a wide range of activities. This structure remained until the Olympic venue teams were placed into the division in 2003. With this seemingly ongoing rearranging of ATHOC it is little wonder that the IOC was concerned with the preparations for these Games. Comparing Athens with Sydney indicates how unstable and convoluted the management of sport was at Athens 2004. While ATHOC eventually managed to deliver the Olympic sport programme, it is unclear (without further research) whether a more coherent organizational structure would have made a significant difference to how these Games were prepared and delivered.

BOCOG and Beijing 2008

Organizing the Olympics in Beijing was quite different from the preceding Games. The first major difference was the nature of China as a country and its state structures. The second was the wider and deeper inclusion of civil society organizations which encouraged the broader society to feel part of the Olympic project. The transition from the bid organization to BOCOG was seemingly smoother, which attests to a single-party state structure and the internal agreements reached between these levels of the state and civil society.

In the first organizational structure, BOCOG had 13 departments of which Sport was one. Games Services and Venue Management, however, were separate entities. The only restructure noted in the post-Games report occurred in January 2008, seven months prior to the Olympics staged in August. In this pre-Games restructure Sport remained unchained. There were, however, minor adjustments made to the operations of the BOCOG structure. In late 2003, a Competition Organization Leading Group was appointed under the executive leadership of the BOCOG Sport Department. This group 'supervised and coordinated the organization of all sport competitions, and assisted the Leading Group with management of individual Competition Organization Working Groups and coordinated their relationships with all

the functional departments of BOCOG and with the IFs and with all national sport federations in China' (BOCOG, 2009, p. 51).

From 2004, the 28 Competition Organization Working Groups 'were responsible for organizing specific sports competitions regarding sports equipment, technical support, media coverage, security, TV broadcast protocol, international relations, doping control, medical services, logistics, financial auditing, etc.' (p. 51). The manager for each Group also liaised with their respective IF. It was not until March 2007 that these groups moved into their respective sport venue teams, and thus ensured that the venues were operationally tested and ready for the Games. Finally, during the actual Games a two-tier Games-time Command Centre was established. This command centre acted as a 'communication link between the IOC Sport Department, the IFs, and the Main Operation Centre of the Beijing Olympic Games' (p. 55) among other coordination and service activities. Overall, there were many parallels between the BOCOG structure and operations and those of SOCOG. The main difference though was that BOCOG managed to stage the 2008 Games successfully without an SSC-styled agency.

Conclusion

The organization of sport at the Olympic Games is a complex task involving a range of different stakeholder groups. OCOGs, host governments, host NOCs, IFs and the IOC, all have competing interests and agendas that influence the way sport is managed and delivered at an Olympics. One of the few studies to examine this theme has shown the value in separating sport-related decision-making from typical OCOG responsibilities (Frawley, 2010). Arguably, the Olympic movement and future OCOGs should recognize the value in the approach adopted by Sydney 2000. The decision to create an autonomous and powerful SSC within SOCOG demonstrated that Sydney 2000 viewed sport and the athletes as a high priority, something that has not always been the case with the management of the Games.

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7
Managing Olympic Venues

Simon Darcy and Tracy Taylor

Introduction

Olympic sport venues are the stage upon which Olympic athletes perform and are a critical component for both athletes and spectators at Olympic Games. Venues built or modified specifically to host the Olympic Games have become a focus of international media attention in the years leading up to these events for a combination of their design, aesthetic impact, construction time frames, operational logistics, cost and questions regarding longer-term use and sustainability. Venues are sport specific, multi-sport and also include support venues such as the athlete village. The venues that have been able to reflect the local historic cultural context and aspirations of the host nation in their design, such as Barcelona's swimming pool (Piscina Municipal de Montjuïc) with its panoramic views over Barcelona, or Beijing's 'Bird's Nest' National Stadium, have achieved iconic status and represent a strong architectural and cultural signature.

This chapter begins by reviewing the history and development of Olympic Games venues and then focuses on the key contemporary issues in managing Olympic venues. In doing so, venue management considerations for bidding and host cities are outlined. Historical documents from host cities, academic and social critiques of Olympic city venue management and other source documentation provide the basis for these discussions. The chapter first reviews the historical context of venues and Olympic cities before investigating the costs of infrastructure investment. With this background, venue life cycle and Olympic life cycle planning are examined. This is followed by an examination of iconic design that represents the best of what the host city wants to showcase to the world. Since the Barcelona Games, both the Olympics

and the Paralympics have become synonymous with bidding cities, and so the role of accessibility within venues is necessarily discussed. As host cities have come to examine ways to reduce costs to the city state, public–private partnerships (PPP) have become an important consideration. Finally the chapter examines the importance of sustainability within venues through considering the use of temporary venues and the reuse of venues.

Historical context of venues and Olympic cities

As both cost concerns and stakeholder expectations intensify, there is increasing attention paid to contemporary Olympic Games venues. Venues have become more expensive to build, as city after city attempts to outdo the previous Games' buildings, and as hosts strive to deliver an iconic edifice that not only allows athletes to perform to the best of their ability, but can be effectively used post Games. While the attributes of the host city dominated the discourse of media attention at early Games, the focus has shifted more recently to the structures that stage athletic performances. In recent times, both the Olympics and the Paralympics have become means for many host cities to reconstruct their industrial and dockland areas, or to relocate public housing residents and redevelop low-income neighbourhoods. In many instances the developments associated with individual venues have sparked controversy, with Olympic Villages and precincts becoming the focus of international attention from the moment the bidding cities express their interest (Scherer, 2011).

As noted throughout this book, cities and nation states vigorously compete against each other for the right to host the Olympic Games, and each bid city expends tens of millions of dollars[1] in this process. Being selected by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to host an Olympic Games means raised stakes from tens of millions of dollars for the Olympic bids to billions of dollars to stage an Olympic Games. A large portion of the costs of hosting the Olympics are related to the construction of new venues and refurbishment of older venues necessary to host this multi-sport event (Gold and Gold, 2010). The inclusion of football (soccer) further increased the need to refurbish venues needed to host the significant number of football matches, which tend to be held in outside the main host city, in areas across the country. Summer Olympic venues will host some 10,000 Olympic athletes, and since 1988 the Games host approximately 5000 Paralympic athletes, as well as accompanying officials and spectators during Games

time. Additionally, the Olympic and Paralympic Games are both held in conjunction with the cultural Olympiad, which draws on venues within the host cities that often require construction or refurbishment. Table 7.1 provides a chronological summary of the modern Olympic cities for comparative purposes based on number of athletes, number of sports, number of venues and venues broken down into permanent, temporary and those based on natural landscapes.

The bidding frenzy that accompanies the prospective host cities' fight to win the right to host the Games is a relatively modern phenomenon. As recently as the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games there was an absence of any competition. A series of political and financial considerations together with what is known as the 'White Elephant'[2] syndrome meant that the perceived benefits of hosting were carefully weighed against the costs. In a market economy, a new stadium or purpose-built sport venue may not be a profitable venture for the private sector to take on as a going concern. For example, in the US only a small number of major public assembly venues that include sports stadiums are owned and operated by the private sector (Russo et al., 2009). From a government perspective, the development cost and ongoing maintenance together with the social surplus (trickle-down effect, social capital, psychic benefit etc.) that it creates are not enough to overcome the excessive financial costs (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). As Barclay (2009) and others have argued, the ex-ante economic impact studies typically overestimate the benefits and gains from hosting the Games and underestimate the costs to the extent that it is hard to understand the intensely competitive nature of the bidding processes. Nowhere is this more evident than the venue-building programmes that accompany Olympic Games.

Gold and Gold (2011, p. 28) found evidence dating as far back as the London 1908 Games of venues regarded as having little post-Olympic use and creating ongoing financing problems. The White City Stadium was regarded as a 'less desirable physical legacy of a huge and largely unwanted stadium'. Mangan's (2008) description builds upon the white elephant analogy by suggesting that the White City Stadium was a limping white elephant of the Olympic Games, and the Olympics generally have produced too many limping white elephants. The White City Stadium is a good example of the ongoing management issues that eventuate when a venue is built without due consideration for its position within the sporting or cultural context of the region, city or nation. Not long after the London 1908 Olympic Games the White City Stadium was expected to be demolished, but nonetheless lay dormant with

Table 7.1 Venue classification by permanent, temporary and natural of the modern Olympics

Host city	Year	No. of athletes	No. of sports	No. of sport events	No. of venues	Permanent	Temporary	Natural
Athens	1896	295	9	43	7	6	1	3
Paris	1900	1 077	20	95	16	16	0	8
St Louis^	1904	630	16	94	5	4	0	1
London	1908	2 666	24	109	13	12	1	5
Stockholm	1912	2 504	16	102	16	16	0	7
Not celebrated	*1916*	*Not celebrated*						
Antwerp^	1920	2 591	24	154	17	16	1	4
Paris	1924	3 075	19	126	19	19	0	7
Amsterdam	1928	2 971	16	109	11	9	2	7
Los Angeles	1932	1 331	16	117	13	13	0	7
Berlin	1936	3 980	19	129	21	21	0	8
Tokyo	*1940*	*Not celebrated*						
Not celebrated	*1944*	*Not celebrated*						
London	1948	4 062	17	136	26	26	0	8
Helsinki	1952	5 867	17	149	21	20	1	8
Melbourne	1956	3 342	17	145	24	24	0	8
Rome	1960	5 396	18	150	24	24	0	7
Tokyo	1964	5 586	19	163	30	27	3	8
Mexico City	1968	6 626	18	172	22	22	0	7
Munich	1972	7 830	21	195	25	24	1	9
Montreal	1976	6 189	21	198	27	27	0	8
Moscow	1980	5 923	21	203	25	25	0	8
Los Angeles	1984	7 055	23	224	30	24	6	8
Seoul	1988	9 417	23	237	34	34	0	8
Barcelona	1992	9 356	25	257	43	42	1	10
Atlanta	1996	10 705	26	271	31	25	6	10
Sydney	2000	10 651	28	300	39	38	1	10
Athens	2004	10 882	28	301	36	35	1	9
Beijing	2008	10 942	28	302	37	23	8	10
London	2012	10 500	26	*n/a*	37	29	8	11

Sources: Official Olympic post-games reports http://www.la84foundation.org/5va/reports_frmst.htm except those noted by ^ which are unverified by official sources.

sporadic use until the mid-1920s. In 1926 the stadium was passed to the Greyhound Racing Association and renovated for its purposes (Gold and Gold, 2011). In 1932 the running track was redeveloped and became host to athletics events once more, and to some other large-scale sporting events. Athletic events were moved in 1971 to Crystal Palace, and the stadium struggled once more, and was subsequently demolished in 1985. Once a venue has been constructed it is very difficult for the 'owner' to admit that the decision was not a good one and to put an end to its existence. What can be evidenced from the White City Stadium case was that a series of ad hoc decisions were made in the hope that the venue would be fit for purpose (particular activity) and fit for all community stakeholders.

Of all Olympic white elephants, the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games is the most infamous due to the financial debt that the city carried for almost 30 years, a problem that was exacerbated by the lack of post-Games planning for the Olympic venues (Gold and Gold, 2010). Largely brought about by technical, construction and labour relations difficulties, along with the worsening economic situation and global inflation of the time, the venue was built during a period of financial difficulty for the city. The Olympic Stadium Pool Velodrome complex became a symbol of the problems facing Montreal, as the complexity of the facilities' design and the use of pioneering construction techniques for the Olympic Park installations, together with increases in the price of steel bought from US producers, contributed to a US$1.5 billion deficit (Chalkley and Essex, 1999b). The stadium became known locally as the 'Big Owe', with its debt funded through a tobacco tax. The debt was cleared some 30 years later in November 2006 (Kent, 2006). Ironically, the debt would have been paid off sooner if the Canadian government had not implemented smoking reforms which decreased the associated tax revenue.

The white elephant syndrome is not restricted to the accumulated debt of hosting an Olympic Games. The Summer Olympic hosting cities in 2000, 2004 and 2008 illustrate three separate white elephant syndrome issues. With the 2000 Sydney Olympic and Paralympic Games a significant number of controversies surrounding the overall cost, disenfranchised groups and questions over the overall worth of hosting the games arose (Cashman, 2006; Cashman and Darcy, 2008). Yet, Sydney was publically regarded as a success operationally and well managed from a debt perspective with the Games costing the host government US$1.5 billion. However, the subsequent underutilization of the Sydney Olympic Park venues (the main precinct) generated questions about its

long-term viability (Cashman and Richmond, 2011; Toohey, 2008). Stadium Australia (rebranded Telstra Stadium and then ANZ stadium in line with sponsorship arrangements) and the Superdome (rebranded Acer Arena and currently called Allphones Arena), operated at a loss for the five years post Games (Gold and Gold, 2011). Searle (2002) attributed this partly to capacity of existing facilities available in Sydney's east, while others have suggested it was a failure of legacy planning for post-Olympic use (Cashman, 2006). It was not until a more concerted strategic planning approach was developed to master plan the precinct, together with a change in management for both Stadium Australia and Superdome that the precinct and its venues began to increase utilization and profitability. Allphones Arena has evolved to be internationally ranked in the top five venues globally for both use and profitability (AAP, 2010).

The Athens 2004 Olympic Games may end up, with the benefit of hindsight, as a symbol of a mismanaged economy in the wake of the global financial crisis and Greek debt in particular. While the Greek economic situation has not been directly attributed wholly to the 2004 Olympic Games, there are obvious parallels. ATHOC was responsible for construction of the Olympic Village and some of the sports venues. It abandoned plans for tendering to PPP for projects where private investment opportunities were identified. All of the remaining sports venues were constructed or upgraded under a government agency (the General Secretariat of Sports).While there was a great deal of concern about the timelines for venue completion prior to the Games, the facilities were generally regarded as sound structures that were considered to be architecturally complex. As Gold and Gold (2001) suggested, 'Despite its architecturally sophisticated buildings being intended as a symbol of the new Athens, the Olympic Sports Complex at Maroussi remains heavily underused, with the stadium only open to the public when concerts or soccer matches are being staged. The Faliro and Helleniki complexes have also struggled to find alternative uses. All have continued to lose money as borrowing and maintenance costs have still to be met' (p. 51). Many Greek venues meet the criteria to be regarded as white elephants. A number of Greek venues had strategies in place for post-Games use, for example the Aghios Kosmos Sailing Centre had licence approval as a shopping and recreational complex, and the canoe-kayak slalom centre was intended to become a water park (Gold and Gold, 2010; Mangan, 2008). However, these have not been sustainable. The major Beijing venues of the main stadium and aquatic centre have proven successful post Games (in terms of tourism use of

the former and activity use of the latter). However, there is concern that once other facilities in Olympic Park are demolished what remains will be only available to the wealthy. Gold and Gold (2011, p. 356) noted that the Beijing Olympics were staged at a great cost to the general public; however, it seems likely that some venues become 'leisure enclaves for the rich'. Similarly, there is limited benefit of the US$10 billion transport and infrastructure investment by the Beijing municipal government. Even in a country with a controlled economy and political environment as China, the white elephant syndrome has been a challenge to manage with significant issues still remaining to be addressed (De Yong, 2008).

With this background, the remainder of the chapter examines a series of issues related to better venue planning, design, construction and operations.

Infrastructure investment

In addition to venues, cities that host the Olympic and Paralympic Games face major infrastructure investment across the Olympic precinct/s, athlete's village, transport and security. Depending upon the number of venues required, typically billions of dollars are allocated to building new venues and in most cases upgrading older venues to Olympic standard. Yet, most bidding cities become so focused on the Olympic and Paralympic Games period that they fail to have in place a wider conceptualization of venue life cycle or precinct master plan in making their decisions. For example, in the case of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the main Olympic precinct at Homebush did not have a site master plan for some ten years after the event (Cashman and Richmond, 2011).

It is important for host cities to consider the standard life cycle stages of venue management when considering the Olympic venue-building programmes (International Facility Management Association, 2005). Westerbeek et al. (2005) have stated that there are three major stages within the life cycle on venues, which on average is about 30 years: concept and development, operation and termination. As most Olympic venues have a significant infrastructure investment, each host city organizing committee must ask itself a number of important questions with respect to the level of investment, whether venues are to be permanent or temporary, and how the venues are going to be managed into the future (Westerbeek et al., 2005). For what may have been normally conceived as a longer-term building programme for new venues within

a city, the Olympics can precipitate a seven-year building programme with normal processes of feasibility, business planning, master plan and operational management accelerated for the Olympic dream.

Until the Beijing 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Vancouver 2010 and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, legacy planning was almost all post hoc, with little evidence of strategic master planning. Standard practices within recreation planning calculate the need for venues through examination of catchment areas or demographic analysis. However, with the Olympic demand for venues, long-term strategic planning circumvention is often overridden by the management considerations of staging a mega-event. The result for some host cities, such as Montreal, is a tenuous financial outcome.

It has been well documented that while most Olympic bids include economic impact studies that estimate the likely increase in economic activity due to construction, tourism and the like, few undertake broader cost/benefit analysis of Games development processes (Andranovich et al., 2001; Barclay, 2009; Chalkley and Essex, 1999b; Long, 2005). Venue life cycle costing and asset-management approaches to venue management can provide a realistic understanding of the likely life cycle cost of the venue for what is an average 30-year lifespan. Life cycle costing is a venue-specific technique that provides a reality check against the boosterism of economic-impact assessment. As Horne et al. (2009) have demonstrated, the ongoing asset maintenance of stadiums has a significant impact on the financial bottom line of any corporate-owned stadiums or a significant ongoing cost implication for triple bottom line approaches used within government ownership structures. Quite simply, life cycle costing should be built into an understanding of Olympic city bidding, to ensure realistic long-term sustainability of the city-state, the individual venues and the broader community.

Venue life cycle and Olympic life cycle planning

There is a fundamental difference between host city and the Olympic life cycle considerations for venue management. What is a 30-year framework for host cities is a 9-year race for the IOC in which to stage a 2-week event. The IOC takes the integrity of venues seriously as the stadiums and facilities that stage the Olympic Games need to be first-rate and, more recently, display contemporary edge of both architectural design and social practice. The Olympic Games Study Commission (OGSC) was established as a response to the organizational scale and scope of Summer and Winter Olympic Games in order to better manage

the cost, size and complexity of staging future events (International Olympic Committee, 2003). It was hoped that the OGSC would create a more effective, efficient and streamlined Games-management process. While the OGSC was formally established in 2001, as early as 1911 the founder of the modern Olympics Pierre de Coubertin had the following to say in respect of recent Games in his era:

> It would be very unfortunate, if the often exaggerated expenses incurred for the most recent Olympiads, a sizeable part of which represented the construction of permanent buildings, which were moreover unnecessary – temporary structures would fully suffice, and the only consequence is to then encourage use of these permanent buildings by increasing the number of occasions to draw in the crowds – it would be very unfortunate if these expenses were to deter (small) countries from putting themselves forward to host the Olympic Games in the future.
>
> (Pierre de Coubertin, 1911, pp. 59–62)

The process for selecting the host city from the bidding cities remains a combination of technical assessment and voting by members of the IOC, but there are guiding documents for the role of venues within the bidding process and the ultimate selection of the host city. The document that outlines the requirements for the bidding cities is the Candidate Acceptance Procedure document (International Olympic Committee, 2011). It clearly outlines the importance of the venues, what is required of bidding cities in documenting the venue provision and costing. For the life cycle assessment of new stadiums, the costing assessment substantially downgrades likely profit forecasts over the life of the venue and makes feasibility of stadiums closely associated with the likely seating capacity and market dynamics of the host community (Figure 7.1; Major Stadia Task Force, 2007).

One of the few examples of life cycle costing assessment was carried out for Olympic stadiums was conducted on the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games where life cycle costing was employed on Stadium Australia (Myer and Chaffee, 1997). The resulting assessment showed that over the life of the venue, for both basic and enhanced cases, there would have been significant reductions in energy, water, greenhouse gas emissions, as well as lower rates of air and water pollution. These principles are firmly established within the mainstream construction industry (Horne et al., 2009), but it is unclear how life cycle costing is specifically evaluated within the selection of host city bids.

Projected Venue Profit and Loss Statement – Average Year	Please say that again					
	Option 1 60,000 seats	**Option 2a 60,000 seats**	**Option 2b 60,000 seats**	**Option 3 35,000 seats**	**Option 4 35,000 seats**	**Option 5 25,000 seats**
Total revenue	$17.37m	$15.02m	$13.08m	$4.73m	$3.21m	$1.17m
Total expenses	−$7.74m	−$7.54m	−$752m	−$5.89m	−$4.73m	−$2.84m
Net stadium operating result	$9.63m	$7.48m	$5.56m	−$1.16m	−$1.51m	−$1.67m
Potential overhead savings from joint management of 2 venues	$0.85m	$1.05m	$1.05m	$0.64m	$0.64m	$0.31m
Net stadium operating result incl. potential overhead savings	$10.48m	$8.62m	$6.61m	−$0.52m	−$0.88m	−$1.36m

All values are stated in $million rounded (2006)

Source: Perth Stadium Consulting Team

Projected Venue Profit & Loss Statement including Lifecycle Maintenance Costs Average Year						
	Option 1 60,000 seats	**Option 2a 60,000 seats**	**Option 2b 60,000 seats**	**Option 3 35,000 seats**	**Option 4 35,000 seats**	**Option 5 25,000 seats**
Projected net stadium operating result including potential overhead savings (2006)	$10.48m	$8.52m	$6.61m	−$0.52m	−$0.88m	−$1.36m
Net stadium operating result (2011) including potential overhead savings	$12.15m	$9.88m	$7.66m	−$0.61m	−$1.02m	−$1.57m
Lifecycle maintenance costs – 1.5% of stadium development costs (2011) excluding external site costs, transport infrastructure and consultant fees	$8.37m	$8.00m	$8.00m	$5.33m	[1]$4.62m	[2]$3.30m
Projected net stadium operating result after life cycle maintenance costs (2011)	$3.78m	$1.88m	−$0.33m	−$5.93m	−$5.64m	−$4.87m

[1,2]These figures are based on the estimated stadium development costs developed by the consultants. It should be noted that alternative stadium solutions have been developed by the Town of Vincent which do not meet the sport requirements as noted during the brief workshop and/or do not include escalation costs to completion.

Source: Perth Stadium Consulting Team & WT Partnership

Figure 7.1 Venue profit and loss statements before and after incorporating life cycle maintenance cost
Source: Major Stadia Task Force (2007).

Asset management is an important consideration for any venue where ongoing maintenance is essential in maintaining the integrity of the venue over its life cycle. This includes broader strategic asset management in terms of the overall presentation of the venue, upkeep of the seating, field of play, corporate boxes, electronic security, ticketing and lighting to name a few. As important is the day-to-day maintenance of the venue, including cleaning, catering, security, transport and traffic, staff training and recruitment. Such a contract and clause ensure the venue has proper maintenance incorporated into the overall asset-management plan and budgeting. The Candidate Acceptance Procedure document lists some 39 supplementary documents to assist bid cities in preparing their bid (International Olympic Committee, 2011). Many of the technical documents have direct and indirect relevance for venue planning and management. However, not all technical manuals are publicly available due to IOC commercial in confidence agreements. These include the *Technical Manual on Design Standards for Competition Venues, the Technical Manual on Venues, and the Guide on Environmental Management*. The remainder of the chapter draws on the available documents and other pertinent sources.

A related element is the planning around the Olympic Games edict that all venues must operate under a 'clean venue' policy (International Olympic Committee, 1999). From Rule 61 in the *Olympic Charter*:

> No kind of demonstration or political, religious, or racial propaganda is permitted in the Olympic areas. No form of publicity shall be allowed in and above the stadiums and other competition areas which are considered as part of the Olympic sites. Commercial installations and advertising signs shall not be allowed in the stadiums, nor in the other sports grounds.

The Olympic movement's mandate states that clean venues are necessary to

(a) preserve the integrity and image of the Olympic Games;
(b) maintain an environment that is focused on sport competition;
(c) ensure that the Olympic Games spectacle remains true to the philosophy of Olympism and to the Olympic spirit;
(d) ensure that the core presentation of the Games is not tarnished by ancillary messages of any kind;
(e) enhance the value of Olympic association;

(f) help to protect the exclusive marketing rights of official Olympic partners.

(International Olympic Committee, 2005, p. 6)

This means that all venues used during the Games must be free of any advertising. Venues with existing sponsors must be cleaned of any reference to these and the potential loss of revenue for those sponsors cannot be recouped from Olympic sponsors who are likewise not allowed to advertise in the venue. This policy protects the contractual rights of broadcast and marketing partners, and is monitored through scrutiny of global television broadcasts and the Internet for various infringements of clean venue regulations. Clean venues are an economic consideration that all major event host cities must grapple with (Scherer et al., 2005).

The venue as the epitome of iconic design

Most Olympic cities have sought to use venues to express some aspect of the city as an innovator, or as having a creative nature. While the early Olympics were relatively small in scale compared to the associated fairs and exhibitions, the modern Olympics has seen a growing pressure for each subsequent Games to outdo its predecessors and deliver long-standing edifices. The first modern Olympic Games, staged in Athens in 1896, heralded the restoration of the ancient Panathenaic Stadium. The subsequent organizing model was to run the Olympics in conjunction with the World's Fair, and in the three successive Olympics after Athens, this occurred with the Paris 1900 Olympics part of the Exposition Universelle, the St. Louis 1904 Olympics held as part of the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, and the London 1908 Olympics with the Franco-British Exhibition. These large public exhibitions provided various resources including the use of venues and facilities for the Olympics. More recent Olympics have used combinations of existing and new purpose-built venues.

The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games innovative and architecturally inspiring venues were designed to be iconic and part of a strategic effort create a new 'Brand China' (Berkowitzc et al., 2007). Inextricably linked to innovative technologies in construction techniques and materials used to enhance sustainability efforts, the Bird's Nest Olympic Stadium cost 3.5 billion yuan (approximately US$427 million) and the maintenance is estimated to be 170 million yuan annually. To date, tourism activities such as summer cultural events and visitor entry fees (50 yuan) generate the main post-Games use and revenues, with the

plans for integration of shopping and entertainment complexes (Gold and Gold, 2011). Demand for the 'Water Cube', the Beijing National Aquatic Centre, on the other hand has been assessed as 'limited need for a public swimming facility of this kind and it is more likely to be used in the long term as a venue for the elite aquatic sports' (p. 355).

'New China' venues used architects and engineers from around the globe. The Water Cube was designed by an Australian company (PTW Architects), Arup international engineering group, CSCEC (China State Construction Engineering Corporation) and CCDI (China Construction Design International) of Shanghai. The Beijing National Stadium (BNS) was a joint venture among architects and artists. These buildings demonstrated a willingness for China to go beyond its own borders to achieve excellence in design innovation. While the International Olympic Committee encourages bids from emerging nations, a great deal of the international mega-event knowledge base still comes from Western-based corporations. Zou and Leslie-Carter (2010) noted that work on the Beijing National Swimming Aquatic Centre raised contractor–government issues in two major areas: international partnership and managing cultural differences and risks in terms of dealing with intellectual property and ownership of design. The international partnerships with Western architectural and engineering firms, working together with Chinese firms, revealed regional differences between Beijing's regulatory transparency and standard Western practices creating a challenging project environment. The cultural understandings and relationship (guanxi) building in the areas of shared ownership of intellectual property and design innovation required a careful consideration and resolution within the short time frames of Olympic venue development. As has been found elsewhere in the world, foreign architectural and engineering teams need to be actively involved in ensuring that the design vision is realized during the construction phase.

Iconic designs can be costly. The 'iconic' designs originally planned for the aquatics centre for the London 2012 Olympics were scaled down after the projected cost doubled from £75 million to £150 million in a short period soon after London had been awarded the Games, although this failed to prevent continued growth in costs to around £240 million (Kelso, 2008). The temptation of architects to showcase innovative designs and construction methods has been a noteworthy factor in scope creep and the under-estimation of venue costs. Added to this is decision makers 'monument complex' (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) as grand designs emerge from the heightened excitement of politicians and organizers. From a public policy viewpoint this has been described as

hallmark decision making, where the stature and grand gesture override rational decision-making processes (Veal, 2011, p. 138).

Accessibility, Olympics and Paralympics

Accessibility considerations at the Olympics and Paralympics have only recently become paramount for Olympic host bidding cities. The Paralympics developed from the Stoke Mandeville Games that was first held in 1948, the same time as the second London Olympics. It was not until the 1960 Rome Olympic Games that the two events were held in the one city and shared some of the same venues. While this event has become known as the first Paralympics, it was still called the Ninth International Stoke Mandeville Games and there was no connection between the organizing committees of either organization (Cashman and Darcy, 2008). In 1988 Seoul Olympics the Paralympics were again held in the same city, and this time they used the same venues and there was cooperation between the two organizing committees (Cashman and Darcy, 2008). However, at the 1996 Atlanta Olympic and Paralympic Games a series of well-documented problems in Atlanta, including the Athlete's Village and the venues being left in a state of operational chaos, pointed to the need for greater integration between the organisers of the two Games (Appleby, 2007; Heath, 1996).

As Darcy and Appleby (2011) have noted, the success of the Sydney 2000 Paralympic Games can in part be attributed to the operational partnership between SOCOG and SPOC to deliver the three-month festival of the Olympics, Paralympics and cultural Olympiad (Darcy, 2003). The importance of this partnership is that those responsible for delivering the Olympic Games were largely those responsible for delivering the Paralympic Games (Darcy, 2001, 2003, 2008a, 2008b; Darcy and Cashman, 2008) and organizational continuity in understanding Paralympic, disability and access issues across the organizational culture of SOCOG/SPOC. However, as discussed later, there were tensions between the organizing committees and other host city bodies responsible for the long-term planning, organization and management of facilities and operations. The Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) had an important legacy role and was in charge of the access issues for perpetuity. The OCA did this through the production of *Access Guidelines*, produced an access guide for the Games and wrote a critical review of Games access operations (Olympic Co-ordination Authority, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001). The OCA still plays a fundamental, albeit reduced role, in the NSW Government through its successor the Sydney

Olympic Park Authority (SOPA), which recently released its master plan of the site to 2030 (Sydney Olympic Park Authority, 2009).

The knowledge-management processes that became part of the transfer arrangements from Sydney onwards between Olympic cities included the importance of accessibility at venues. The IPC has since been proactive in liaising with the IOC to ensure that bid cities have an understanding of what is required to create an accessible Olympic and Paralympic experience (International Paralympic Commitee, 2012). The IPC developed a set of accessibility guidelines, in consultation with a disability access expert to develop the guidelines over the course of planning for the 2008 Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games (International Paralympic Commitee, 2009). Critically, the guidelines recognize the importance of host cities creating an accessible experience for not only athletes and officials but also for spectators and tourists attending the Olympic experience. As Figure 7.2 shows, these inclusions are as simple as integrated seating for wheelchair users and tactile ground surface indicators for people who are blind or vision impaired; these were

Figure 7.2 Integrated wheelchair seating and tactile ground surface indicators at Stadium Australia, the main stadium for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Stadium
Source: © Fiona Darcy 2000.

included as part of Stadium Australia, which was the main stadium at Sydney 2000.

Role of public–private partnerships

There has been a global increase in the development of PPP between OCOGs and private sector stakeholders. Olympic stadiums are one type of venue where PPP have been instigated. While the premise of a PPP is to bring public and private money together for an infrastructure project that benefits both sectors, these arrangements have a cultural context. For example, this was evident in the development of the Beijing Olympic Stadium, the Bird's Nest, with a complex combination of public, blended public–private and some fully private sector organizations involvement (Liu et al., 2010).

Stadium Australia, the main stadium of the Sydney 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, was one of the first major Olympic stadiums where a PPP organized between the NSW Government (Sydney was the bid city but the NSW Government was the bidding organization) and Stadium Australia Ltd (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, ND; Jefferies et al., 2002; Shirbin, 1999). The PPP took the form of a build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT) arrangement with the NSW Government, and approximately a A$600 million build was funded with A$100 million from the government together with private sector capital raised through Stadium Australia Group, its partners and a loan of approximately A$125 million (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, ND) that subsequently increased to over A$200 million (due to a shortfall in membership sales). The land was provided free of charge to the corporation for the building of the venue on which Stadium Australia built. They were given a 30-year lease, after which time the ownership transfers back to the NSW Government. The contracted arrangement (there were some 90 contracts identifying array of management issues) between the parties included an ongoing maintenance agreement of A$143 million for continual asset management over the 30-year life of the lease (Shirbin, 1999).

Private-sector propensity to commit capital to either the venue or infrastructure of an Olympic Games is not strong if the recent examples of the Vancouver 2010 and London 2012 Olympic Villages are any indication. The global banking crisis put a halt to attempts to privately fund the £1 billion Olympic Village, and prompted a fundamental review of its scale and design. Both Vancouver 2010 and

London 2012 had to scrap their plans for private investment in the Olympic Village development in the wake of the global financial crisis. In the case of the latter, the British government had planned for the private sector to raise the majority of the £1bn needed to build the Olympic Village. However, when global markets collapsed, Lend Lease indicated it could not raise the necessary funds to build the Village, and the government took over. It was then sold to the private sector investor Qatari Diar and the British company Delancey, who will take it over after the Games. At Vancouver, the 2010 Winter Olympic Village ultimately left taxpayers responsible for the entire construction cost. The local council had anticipated a rising real estate market when it bid for the Olympics, but the 2008 market crash led to the US hedge fund that had backed the developer demanding a payment guarantee of US$190 million on its US$750 million loan (Scherer, 2011). Vancouver City then provided the hedge fund with a completion guarantee, thereby placing Vancouver residents at risk of the full cost of the development. The city is still paying off the Village debt and the original plans for a state-of-the art, green, housing complex were not realized (Scherer, 2011).

Sustainability and the Green Games philosophy

Sydney 2000 became the first Games to publically and officially recognize the importance of sustainability issues. The 'Green Games' predominantly sought to bring environmental sustainability to the Games planning processes (Kearins and Pavlovich, 2002). However, this was not without controversy, for many critics suggested that this initiative was more about managing perceptions of having a Green Games than developing relevant practices (Beder, 2002). A commitment to sustainability issues, with a focus on environmental sustainability in particular, has been taken up to varying degrees at the Summer Games in Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 (Beyer, 2006). Beyer (2006) suggests that Beijing 2008 may have had a significant effect on China's attitude towards environmental issues and ongoing development of sustainable technologies but this is yet to be proven.

Given the globalized nature of Games bidding, sustainable development principles must be negotiated within political and economic contexts. As Briese (2001) has suggested, the Sydney experience provided the opportunity for new environmental benchmarks, broaching changed business attitudes, exposure of the community to these ideas

and the bringing together of Olympic stakeholders with environmental NGOs. In the Sydney experience, the environment at the Sydney Olympic Park site prior to the Games was regarded as one of the most toxic sites in the southern hemisphere (Chalkley and Essex, 1999a), thus the environmental remediation alone could be argued to be a lasting green legacy. The importance of Olympic, green and corporate stakeholders understanding each other's perspectives cannot be underestimated (Kearins and Pavlovich, 2002). Yet, global economies can put pressure on the host cities that may constrain the implementation of the green agendas beyond tokenistic inclusions.

Additionally, the IOC now notes that Games should 'support the concept of sustainable development as it applies to the Olympic Games in general, and to venues specifically' (International Olympic Committee, 2004, p. 132). New venues should only be constructed if there is a long-term need within the host community. This acknowledges that the Games legacy should deliver economic, environmental and socially sustainable outcomes.

In relation to legacy, the IOC initiated a collaborative project to develop a holistic framework for information-gathering and analysis from future Olympics to enable the benchmarking of Games impacts against a range of economic, social and environmental indicators (International Olympic Committee, 2006, p. 1). The Olympic Games Impact study (OGI) covers effects, including direct and indirect consequences of the Games, on the host city, region or county. The indicators are intended to provide 'concrete measurement tools' (International Olympic Committee, 2006, p. 2) against which to measure the impact of the Games. The 'event indicators' are variables directly affected by staging of the Games, such as venue construction, and the 'context indicators' assess indirect impacts, such as greenhouse gas emissions. The OGI is a formal requirement for cities to complete as part of the host city contract, with measurement in four stages over an 11-year event life cycle, commencing 2 years before election of the host city and ending two post Games: baseline (G–4 years), pre-Games (G–1 years), Games-time (G + 1 years) and post-Games (G + 3 years). Beijing was the first host city to complete the OGI study, with Vancouver and London then complying with impact assessments under the OGI framework.

The baseline report for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics identified 146 indicators (VANOC, 2007, p. 8). Venue-related assessments post Games of sociocultural (So), Economic (Ec) and Environmental impacts (En) reported:

- VANOC provided for accessibility in the venues (So47);
- the largest share of expenditures was for venue operations and information systems (Ec34); the cost of operating the 2010 Winter Games was over three times the cost of capital investment on venue development (Ec40);
- significantly more was spent on major venue-construction projects than on renovations; with all venues planned as permanent legacies (Ec40);
- Olympic venues were either upgrades to pre-existing event venues or were constructed on previously harvested or industrial lands (En21);
- less than half the venues were in or near protected sites (En22);
- venue construction and upgrades led to an increase in the seating capacity of venues during the Games (En26), while land use for the construction of the Olympic and Paralympic Villages increased the floor area of housing (En24);
- Olympic-related energy consumption during the Games was almost an equal share between fossil fuels and renewable sources (En31). Most of the energy (80%) was used for venues and facilities, especially during the Games.

(VanWynsberghe et al., 2011)

Sustainability is firmly embedded in venue development in terms of life cycle cost perspective across energy, water and customer comfort, as outlined earlier in the chapter. London has been planning a sustainable Games from the outset, professing a commitment to:

- use venues already existing in the UK where possible;
- only make permanent structures that will have a long-term use after the Games; and
- build temporary structures for everything else. (http://www.london2012.com/sustainability]

The London 2012 Sustainability Plan: Towards a One Planet 2012, focuses on five key themes:

1. Climate change: Minimizing greenhouse gas emissions and ensuring legacy facilities are able to cope with the impacts of climate change.
2. Waste: Minimizing waste, ensuring no waste is sent to landfill during Games time, and encouraging the development of new waste-processing infrastructure in East London.

3. Biodiversity: Minimizing the impact of the Games on wildlife and their habitats in and around Games venues.
4. Inclusion: Promoting access for all and celebrating the diversity of London and the UK, creating new employment, training and business opportunities.
5. Healthy living: Inspiring people across the country to take up sport and develop active, healthy and sustainable lifestyles.

Progress to date is reported annually (see London 2012 Sustainability Report: A blueprint for change (2011)), and an independent body, the Commission for a Sustainable London 2012, was established to monitor and report to the public. London has also indicated that undertaking innovations in procurement and supply chain management in the construction of venues, the Athletes' Village and the Olympic Park.

With regard to the sustainability of post-Olympic venue use, one argument is that improved sport infrastructure contributes to increased sport participation and spectator attendance for host cities and thus the venues will be well used. The notion that the Olympics 'naturally' increase sport participation through the 'trickle-down effect' (Toohey, 2008), where the inspiration of national heroes create a ground swell of grassroots participation has been increasingly challenged in the literature (Hindson et al., 1994; Hogan and Norton, 2000; Weed et al., 2008). The picture is not so clear with regard to a legacy of increased spectator attendance at professional sports that use new venues post Games as there is very little research that has been done on this effect. Research from the US, albeit in a different context (Clapp and Hakes, 2005), has examined the spectator effect of new venues within American major league baseball (MLB) and sought to determine the 'honeymoon' effect of a new stadium. To do so, Clapp and Hakes used MLB team attendance data from 1950 to 2002; where they estimated that the 'honeymoon' effect increases attendance by 32 per cent to 37 per cent in the opening year of a new stadium.

Temporary venues

Given the problematic 'legacy' of venues that have been 'white elephants' and the increasing focus on sustainability, an emerging issue has been the increasing use of temporary venues to both reduce the overall cost of development to a city and reduce the likelihood of the non-use

of venues after the Games. Table 7.1 shows the number of venues at each Olympics by permanent, temporary and natural setting venues over the modern Olympics. Temporary venues have developed from a negligible base to having an increasing prominence. A temporary venue was constructed for the first time in Winter Olympic history, for the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley, California, United States. This hosted the biathlon, cross-country skiing and Nordic combined events. Notably, the only venue still in operation from the 1960 Games is the ski resort.

Increasingly, venue designers are considering how to create permanent venues to have 'overlays' that allow an increased capacity during Games time, but can be removed for permanent use. This is far more efficient operationally, as it reduces ongoing maintenance for the extra areas and it is substantially cheaper to put in temporary overlays than to build permanent venues that rarely reach capacity. For example, the 110,000 seat capacity Olympic Stadium Australia was constructed with North and South stands seating 30,000 people for Games time to capitalize on ticket demand for blue-ribbon events. Upon completion of the Games these temporary overlays were taken down to give the Olympic Stadium a more manageable capacity of 80,000. Venue overlays provide for increased capacity during recognized periods of high demand, such as for short-term national and international tournaments that only require temporary increases. Table 7.2 presents the capacity of Olympic stadiums over the course of the modern Olympics and where available includes post-Olympic capacity.

Of the post-World War II Olympics, the Tokyo 1964 Games was the first Summer event to use temporary venues for the sports of equestrian and the modern pentathlon. (Although in 1956 the equestrian competition was not held in Australia due to quarantine regulations and were held five months earlier in Stockholm, Sweden.) The Atlanta 1996 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the next to use a temporary structure, this time for the 50-metre warm-up pool used to complement Georgia Tech's Olympic pool. This temporary pool was mounted and deployed for reuse. London 2012 has taken the use of temporary facilities to a new level, where it formed an integral part of the overall venue strategy (Nimmo et al., 2011). Yet, there is a series of challenges in having high-quality temporary venues that need to meet the rigours of sport competition and customer service while at the same addressing sustainability, accessibility, technical, security and budgetary measures.

Table 7.2 Venue capacity of the modern Olympic stadiums in pre- and post-Olympic configuration

Host city	Year	Original capacity	post-Games capacity
Athens	1896	47 000	45 000
Paris	1900	50 000	
St Louis	1904	19 000	4 000
London	1908	93 000	93 000
Stockholm	1912	22 000	18 950
Berlin	*1916*	*Not celebrated*	
Antwerp	1920	30 000	12 771
Paris	1924	60 000	14 000
Amsterdam	1928	40 000	22 288
Los Angeles	1932	105 000	93 607
Berlin	1936	110000	74 244
Toyko	*1940*	*Not celebrated*	
	1944	*Not celebrated*	
London	1948	127 000	90 000
Helsinki	1952	70 000	50 000
Melbourne	1956	104 000	100 000
Rome	1960	90 000	82 307
Tokyo	1964	71 556	57 363
Mexico City	1968	83 700	63 186
Munich	1972	80 000	69 250
Montreal	1976	72 406	56 000
Moscow	1980	100 000	78 360
Los Angeles	1984	92 516	73 929
Seoul	1988	100 000	100 000
Barcelona	1992	60 000	60 000
Atlanta	1996	85 600	45 000
Sydney	2000	115 000	80 000
Athens	2004	68 079	68 079
Beijing	2008	91 000	80 000
London	2012	80 000	25 000

Sources: Official Games reports http://www.la84foundation.org/5va/reports_frmst.htm; Gold and Gold 2011; a variety of stadium websites. Detailed sources can be provided on request.

Conclusion

The current global economic situation, the increasing costs of hosting Games and the escalation of insurance and risk minimization expenses associated with safety and security, have combined to accentuate calls for greater public accountability. Facilities and venues need to be planned and designed to able to deliver economic, environment and socially sustainable outcomes for the host community. The expenditure

required to build new venues, adapt existing venues, dismantle and/or convert venues for post-Games use taken together with ongoing venue-related maintenance costs, has always presented a challenge for Games' hosts and will continue do so for the foreseeable future. Sporting venues for forthcoming Games will no doubt continue to push the boundaries of design, incorporate increasingly complex technologies and address key legacy expectations. Sustainability matters will continue to grow in importance in venue design, with environmental, social and financial sustainability being critical considerations for every Games host. Yet, even with the best planning put in place, consideration of legacy and the lessons of the global financial crunch, London 2012 has had major cost blowouts. Whether this is the nature of the venue-construction industry, a product of the pressure to create iconic innovation in venues or an underestimation of host city budgets, it continues to be of significant ongoing concern for venue management of Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Notes

1. US Dollars is used generically for all currencies around the world, including Euros.
2. The 'White Elephant' syndrome has been long synonymous with Olympic venues. The term 'white elephant' draws its origins from the sacred white elephants kept by traditional Southeast Asian monarchs in Burma, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia (The Elephant Conservation Centre, 2010) where such care and extravagance was lavished on the animals that it was to the detriment of the kingdom. As it translates, a white elephant is used to describe a high status or valuable possession whose cost and ongoing maintenance makes it a liability.

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8

Managing Transport during the Olympic Games

Eva Kassens-Noor

Introduction

The Olympic Games draw millions of visitors to a metropolitan area. The primary goal of transportation planning in the context of hosting the Games is for preparations to meet peak travel demands. This often involves enhancements to transport infrastructure and innovations in respect of the operational capacity to move people into and out of Olympic precincts. To achieve this new capacity, the application of best practices for Olympic transport, prior mega-event experience and test events are crucial elements in successfully handling peak demands. A frequently used proxy for the Olympic transport task is the number of tickets sold in comparison to the residential population. Figure 8.1 compares the population of multiple metropolitan areas at the time of the Olympic Games with the tickets sold for events. Taking an upper bound estimation of the number of people that had to be moved, Atlanta's transit riders were to quadruple, Barcelona's and Sydney's were to triple, London's and Athens' were to double and Beijing's were to increase by 30 per cent due to the Olympic Games.

From this comparison, it is evident that Atlanta had to face the highest demand for transport services and potentially see the highest increase in Olympic travellers on the city's transport system. However, compared to the other cities mentioned above, it had the least equipped public transport system, as shown in Figure 8.2. Instead of significantly increasing available services for public transport during the Games, Atlanta offered the lowest capacity to accommodate prospective Olympic commuters (Figure 8.3). Given that the subsequent two Olympic hosts, Sydney and Athens, had mainly car-oriented transport



Figure 8.1 Tickets sold and residential population
Source: The author, calculated from (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1992; Beijing, 2003, 2008; Bovy, 2008; Currie, 2007; ODA, 2011).



Figure 8.2 Capacity of the transit systems

systems, both strategically added targeted rail and bus capacity through extensive Olympic fleets.

Beijing was an exception to the rule on every possible scale: the city greatly exceeded the previous volume of residents for an Olympic city, the infrastructural investments easily surpassed those of former hosts and the operational coordination was of unprecedented complexity in this highly congested city. For example, major expansion of Beijing's subway rail system nearly doubled the existing capacity (seven lines were added to the existing four). For the Olympics the subway system was supported by an extensive bus service of more than 7000 coaches on 38 routes. London, similarly, improved a multitude of pre-existing transport resources for Olympic passengers and London's residents.



Figure 8.3 Olympic fleet
Source: The author, calculated from (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1992; Booz•Allen and Hamilton, 1997, 2001; Bovy, 2008; Currie, 2007; ODA, 2009).

London's transport legacy involves significant investments into the Underground, in specific the Jubilee and Central lines, into the rail systems, in specific nine Dockland Light Rail (DLR) projects and the whole of the Overground North London Line and into roads for walking and cycling (ODA, 2011, pp. 229–331). In addition, 10 per cent of spectators are expected to take buses and coaches for their Olympic journeys.

Researchers have offered key insights into transportation management during mega-events. Primarily, transport has been a crucial supporting service to the Games' overall operations (ECMT, 2003; Hall, 1996; Preuss, 2004). The challenge that the Olympics pose for transport is moving short-term peak demands of millions of visitors across the city securely, safely and in a reliable manner (ECMT, 2003; Hensher and Brewer, 2002; Minis and Tsamboulas, 2008). In particular, athletes and Games officials need reliable transport services so the sport programme can run on time. Over the years, a range of best practice standards have been developed to manage Olympic transport passenger demands. For example, close to 100 per cent of spectators and visitors should take transit to the venues while active transport modes such as walking and biking should be used to connect adjacent competition venues. In recent years, a debate on the importance of a positive urban legacy and how to plan for it has evolved (Cashman, 2011; Chalkley and Essex, 1999; Coaffee, 2007; Gold and Gold, 2011). While the Olympic Games can act as a powerful catalyst to develop and sustain carefully planned transport

measures in host cities, the Games can also be an agent of urban change, where Olympic transport applied during the three weeks directed the long-term development of the host cities (Kassens-Noor, 2012).

Focusing on Sydney (2000), Athens (2004) and London (2012), this chapter discusses various infrastructure and operational measures implemented to accommodate Olympic peak demands. The primary sources include Olympic Games transportation planning documents, strategic papers, official transport plans, post-Olympic reports on transport performance and archival documents related to the above host cities. Combined, these documents allow for the discussion of various measures intended to achieve effective transportation systems and smooth operating traffic and transit conditions during the Olympics.

Traffic-based transportation systems

Traffic-based transportation systems are essential in managing Olympic peak demands for athletes and Olympic VIPs (ORTA, 2001). On the one hand, host cities need to significantly reduce automobile trips of residents and regular commuters during the three event weeks; on the other hand road capacity has to be increased to an extent that special Olympic bus networks and a private car fleet for Olympic officials have guaranteed free-flow traffic conditions. In the following sections, the traffic-based transport systems of Sydney, Athens and London are discussed, focusing on infrastructure, facilities and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications, as well as temporary operational measures to handle the Olympic commuter demand.

Sydney

In preparation for the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Sydney undertook only a few road projects that would expand its road capacity. The Olympic Roads and Traffic Authority (ORTA) was responsible for planning Olympic routes for cars and buses on Sydney's street network (ORTA, 2001; Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). One of the few roadwork projects realized in the run-up to the Games was the Eastern Distributor. Post-Olympics, this highway was to become the main link between downtown Sydney and the International airport. The only other major road-construction project constituted the widening of Homebush Bay Drive, the access road to Homebush and Olympic Park, where 80 per cent of the Olympic events were staged. Throughout the city, many minor road improvements increased traffic flow capacity: in essence ORTA identified intersections critical for Olympic movements

and implemented slight modifications, including nearly 40,000 signs, so as to minimize traffic delays (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001).

A further distinct infrastructural traffic-management feature was the new transport-management centre. Located outside of central Sydney, this facility was designed to manage traffic in the city and region throughout the Games and beyond. Supervised by ORTA, the major goal of the centre was to maintain a coordinated traffic system and respond to road incidents immediately. Three hundred and fifty closed circuit television cameras, 150 variable message signs and 42 variable speed limit signs monitored real-time traffic conditions and rerouted traffic when necessary. A fleet of traffic patrols and tow trucks allowed for quick response to road incidents and the removal of illegally parked or broken-down vehicles (ORTA, 2001; Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001).

In addition to these infrastructural changes, multiple operational measures were implemented to handle Olympic passengers. In particular, parking controls, Olympic bus networks and the reduction of commuter trips by encouraging drivers to take public transport, to take holidays or work from home, were important tactics to manage Olympic transportation demands. Because traffic flows were a major focus of Olympic transport planners, parking was one of the most important concerns during the Games. To alleviate potential traffic hotspots, Sydney's Games organizers banned street parking around Olympic stadia and along important Olympic routes. Park and ride centres throughout Sydney encouraged the use of collective transit options, further reducing the number of cars on the streets, and just as importantly eliminating the need for parking near event facilities (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001).

ORTA also implemented various traffic rerouting and priority strategies (ORTA, 1999) to ensure that athletes, Games officials and Olympic Committee members had secure rights of way. By determining the roads that would best be suited to carry Olympic traffic, ORTA organized the streets of Sydney into four major categories: primary, spectator, strategic and all others. The primary routes carried buses with Olympic athletes and Games' officials, the spectator routes or secondary Olympic bus networks were organized to efficiently move ticketed event spectators, the strategic routes constituted important roads for non-Olympic travel and all others were side roads of no major importance to Olympic or main non-Olympic activities during Games time. As part of ORTA's transportation strategy, the primary and spectator bus networks ran on Olympic lanes, thereby excluding access for private vehicles (ORTA,

2001). In general, routes were prioritized according to significance for the Olympics, for example, commuter transport had a lower priority than athlete transportation (ORTA, 2001). In order to efficiently implement these bus networks, regular traffic movements had to be modified. Some rerouting examples included a ban on left turns at specific intersections and prohibiting right turns to create through lanes in order to facilitate efficient commuter and Olympic movements. Also, complete road closures near to certain venues were mandated during event hours, in order to ensure maximum pedestrian flow and public safety (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001).

The Sydney Olympics saw an average 15–20 per cent decrease in overall traffic volume. An important aspect to such success was transportation-management strategies that decreased trips in and out of the city. Restrictions were imposed on heavy vehicles and trucks: freight vehicles could only deliver during specific times during the day or night according to the weight and size of the vehicles; dedicated delivery load zones were established throughout the city. In order to further reduce private vehicle traffic, school vacations were extended and employees were encouraged to take holidays. Working from home, car-pooling, alternative modes of employee travel and flexible work hours during the Games, along with communicating poor traffic conditions to discourage trips, were additional strategies (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). Sydney's traffic preparations for the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games were successful as the measures efficiently limited automobile access and traffic movements within the city to allow free-flow conditions for Olympic travellers.

Athens

Similar to Sydney, Athens – known for its congested city centre and illegally parked vehicles – implemented similar, but more stringent traffic measures. In particular, what distinguished Sydney's preparations from those of Athens were multiple road projects to accommodate the traffic flows during the 2004 Olympic events and to become an important legacy for Attica's residents. A new Attica Tollway was built, stretching over 65 km to the north of Athens. It connected 30 municipalities to downtown Athens and the airport, while linking important Olympic stadia. Upon its inauguration, a flat toll rate was introduced to regulate traffic post Olympics (Halkias et al., 2004). A further essential construction project was the capacity increase of the 'Olympic Ring', a virtual quadrant made up of four main roadways within the centre of Athens that connected two Olympic agglomerations in the inner city.

Multiple lanes were added to these four roads to allow for efficient automobile movements in between the Olympic facilities. Other significant road projects included the extension of Kimis Avenue, the construction of the Pallinis–Rafinas Highway and expansion of Trochiodromon and Drapesona Avenues. These roads connected Athens and its suburbs, while providing essential access to Games venues during the Olympics (Theofilis et al., 2004).

A new traffic monitoring and control centre was also built in downtown Athens in the run-up to the Olympics (ATHOC, 2004). Athens' traffic system received 150 extra intersection monitors, 75 'machine' vision and 208 'supervision' cameras, 2000 sensors and 24 variable message signs to collect real-time data and to direct traffic based on current road conditions (Theofilis et al., 2004).

Like Sydney, Athens implemented temporary operational measures through various modifications of traffic movements, such as banning left turns, converting two-way streets into one-way streets and changing the direction of certain one-way streets. The strategic implementation of Parking Control Zones (ZES) significantly reduced the number of illegally parked vehicles, the most severe traffic concern pre-Olympics (Delis and Frantzeskakis, 2004). Besides rerouting tactics and parking restrictions, road closures prohibited car traffic in certain Olympic areas and instead allowed authorized Olympic cars unhindered travel. These Olympic lanes were only for Olympic members and spectator buses and ran across the Attica region (Delis and Frantzeskakis, 2004). In order to further reduce private vehicle trips, Athens' traffic authority restricted vehicle usage during even and odd days based on the last digit of licence plates. Finally, trucks were banned during certain time periods to reduce congestion (Frantzeskakis and Frantzeskakis, 2004). Athens' traffic preparations for the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games turned the heavily congested metropolis into a well-functioning city for three weeks, where public transit received consistent priority over the automobile.

London

In contrast to Athens, London already possessed one of the most sophisticated transport systems in the world. With an extensive public transport system in place – most notably the Underground subway, Games organizers restricted car use in and around the Olympic precinct. Therefore, London needed to undertake comparatively few construction projects to make the roads suitable for high-capacity Olympic demands in planning for the 2012 Games. The infrastructural road modifications

were limited to Olympic Park access roads in Stratford, the widening of major sections of M25 and improving the A35 in order to shorten journey times to Weymouth and Portland. Like Sydney and Athens, London's transport authority, Transport for London (TfL), implemented further variable message signs. Most innovative, though, were signal upgrades in and around London, which remotely controlled traffic flows on the Olympic road networks. Traffic management was centralized at London's Streets Traffic Control Centre and the Transport Coordination Centre. While the former controlled over 1200 cameras to monitor traffic, the Surface Transport and Traffic Operations Centre (STTOC) supervised traffic, including the bus control emergency centre and the police command unit (ODA, 2011).

In addition to the aforementioned fixed installations, various rerouting measures and driving restrictions ensured the mobility of athletes and Olympic officials during the Games. Indeed, in key Olympic areas, non-Olympic traffic was diverted. Numerous minor road measures, such as restricted turns along with curb realignments and other junction improvements, were used to ease traffic flows. As a common feature of Olympic transport systems, the athletes, national Olympic committees (NOCs) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) members travelled in cars, vans and buses on designated lanes of the primary road network. In specific areas, part-time or side road closures gave priority to Olympic vehicles, while ensuring access for local residents and to smaller businesses. Like in previous host cities, dedicated Olympic lanes allowed free-flow traffic conditions for athletes, Olympic officials and spectators via restricted access and exclusion of non-Olympic travellers.

Before and during the Games, a ban on road works was issued to minimize unexpected delays. To further reduce trips, park and ride zones throughout the city encouraged drivers to use public transport. A public campaign also encouraged commuters to plan their trips, travel less and change routes to avoid Olympic areas when possible. For spectators, a special journey planner became available online in the summer of 2011 to help spectators plan their Olympic trips well in advance of Games time. London's traffic preparations, for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, focused on providing access to and mobility within the Olympic Park for the Olympic Family and spectators.

Transit-based transportation systems

Transit-based transportation systems are vital in moving spectators, the workforce and regular commuters during the Olympic Games. Over

time it has become evident that rail networks hold the most promise in efficiently meeting the expected peak passenger demands of moving large volumes of people to primary and secondary Olympic centres. As touched upon in previous sections, rail is usually supported by extensive bus operations on dedicated Olympic bus networks. In the following sections, the transit-based transport systems of Sydney, Athens and London are discussed, focusing on infrastructure, facilities and temporary operational measures to handle Olympic passenger demands.

Sydney

After complaints about Atlanta's overcrowded two-line rail network during the 1996 Olympics, one of Sydney's bid strengths for the millennium Games was its extensive City Rail network. Consisting of over 2000 km of track, the network comprehensively covered Sydney's geographic region and linked important employment centres (ORTA, 2001). To ensure the Games could be 'transport only', an additional A$94 million was spent on extending the rail network (Palese et al., 2000). This included building a new rail link from downtown Sydney to the airport and the Olympic Park line, a rail loop connecting Homebush Bay (Olympic Park) with the main railway network to allow access to the main Olympic venues (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd., 1996; Palese et al., 2000). Trains running on this Olympic Park lane brought spectators directly to the centre of Olympic facilities, reaching 80 per cent of the events within a few walking minutes. Rail services ran 24 hours a day and trains arrived every two minutes at Homebush during the Games (ORTA, 1999).

As a planned post-Olympics legacy, the Homebush Railway Station was also established to accommodate light rail services to the Olympic Village and eventually, the residential suburb of Newington that replaced it. Downtown, Sydney already operated a light rail service between the Central Railway Station and Darling Harbour. This service connected spectators from venues at Darling Harbour to Sydney's more extensive rail network. An exclusive ferry service along the Parramatta River accommodated athletes and officials between Homebush Bay Wharf, outlying venues, such as sailing, and other primary athlete destinations (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd., 1996).

In order to encourage public transport–oriented Olympic movements, event tickets included free spectator travel passes for all transit modes. Besides rail, Olympic travellers had multiple travel options. In particular, bus networks moved hundreds of thousands of athletes, judges, media, sponsors, spectators, the Games' workforce and the general

public around Sydney and its region (ORTA, 2001). The Sydney Transportation Authority (STA) managed these bus operations with over 3350 vehicles, including 1700 spectator buses and shuttles to and from park and ride centres (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). To prevent traffic delays for Olympic services, these buses were given the right of way on special road lanes along the Olympic primary and secondary routes. Transport to and from venues was provided via Olympic buses on the primary lane network. Along these lanes and downtown, street parking was prohibited.

Whereas there were strict prohibitions on car usage for the general public and spectators, the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) provided an extensive fleet of private cars to the 'top 3 tiers' of the Olympic Family: chiefs, officials, directors, members of NOCs and the IOC (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). These private vehicles also received priority on Olympic lanes, and they were extensive, totalling 2200 vehicles (ORTA, 1999). Some private transportation was also available for national teams during special occasions such as meetings with public officials. As the only option for private transport, spectators could use taxi services. Like private Olympic vehicles, taxis were allowed on Olympic lanes (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). Overall, Sydney's transit preparations for the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games allowed all spectators fast and convenient access to the Olympic sites.

Athens

As with road-construction projects, Athens again far exceeded Sydney in building new public transport options and adding capacity to meet the Olympic demands, with the intent of creating a strong legacy beyond the Games. According to the Athens Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (ATHOC), the improvements to the city's public transportation system satisfied 90 per cent of the Olympic transportation requirements (ATHOC, 2005). In particular, rail systems received a construction boost because they carried the majority of Olympic travellers. In preparation for the Games, Athens introduced a new suburban rail line. This railway connected central Athens with northern suburbs and the city's new international airport (Zekkos, 2004). The completed railway line stretched over 32 km and serviced 5000 people an hour during the Olympics (ATHOC, 2004a).

Connected to the suburban rail were three metro lines; two were newly constructed and the other received a complete overhaul in preparation for the Games. The two new metro lines were part of the official

feeder network to Line 1, which was part of the main 'Olympic Network' (ATHOC, 2004b). These massive expansions became one of the most significant legacies for the city as the rail lines connected central Athens to its suburbs and the airport.

Finally, Athens introduced a new 24 km long tram route, running along the sea front (ATHOC, 2004a). The entire tram network provided service for about 150,000 people between Nea Smyrni, Paleo Faliro, Hellinikon and downtown Athens. Along the coastal tram stretch were many Olympic venues and facilities. The post-Olympic purpose of the tram was to support revitalization efforts of the Athens' seafront (Pyrgidis and Stathopoulo, 2004).

Operationally, Athens managed most of the Olympic spectator traffic via a well-coordinated public transit system. Like Sydney, Athens ran multiple bus system operations for different client groups, for example, team officials, media transport, sponsors (ATHOC 2001, 2004b). The Olympic contingent alone needed a fleet of 3640 cars and mini vans (ATHOC, 2005). The entire Olympic transportation network consisted of the main Olympic network, which were Metro line 1, tramway, suburban rail and the Olympic Bus Network, and its feeder systems, namely Metro lines 2 and 3, trolley lines and Athens' existing bus networks (ATHOC, 2004b). As in Sydney, the special Olympic bus routes serviced competition venues throughout Athens (ATHOC, 2001). All buses were given priority on the Olympic road network (ATHOC, 2004b). For spectators, shuttle services were implemented when walking distances between venues and rail service or to park and ride areas were too far (ATHOC, 2001). Furthermore, express bus service during peak hours and 24-hour operation on specific bus routes helped Athens meet Olympic peak demands (ATHOC, 2004b). Athens' transit preparations for the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games strongly encouraged Olympic travellers to ride trains, metros and buses during the mega-event and left a strong transport legacy for daily commuters post Games.

London

In contrast to Athens, much of London's transit-based infrastructure was already in place for the Games. However, to accommodate the additional Olympic visitors to London and in particular the Olympic Park in Stratford, many further improvements were made to the existing transit system (Department for Transport, 2010). Because spectators were predicted to make 80 per cent of their trips by rail, many investments flowed into London's multiple rail systems.

The London Overground services stretch over central London and connect the suburbs to the inner city. To accommodate extra Olympic travellers, regular services were significantly increased by doubling the number of trains per hour. Converting an underground station for overground service, upgrading several rail stations including Stratford at the Olympic Park, expanding multiple rail lines to the north and south of the city and extending late night transit services further increased London's transport system capacity for Game-time operations. Improvements to London's underground, in particular to the East London and Jubilee lines were also necessary for the Games. Furthermore, a temporary overlay rail service, called the Javelin, provided frequent services from King's Cross to the Olympic Park throughout the Games. The Docklands Light Rail (DLR) is an above ground tram service in East London. For the Games, additional stations were built and others were upgraded. These enhancements serviced the Park and River zone venues. Improvements that involved the London underground included extension of service, such as more cars per train, as well as increased operating hours during off-peak times during mornings and weekends. In addition, the national rail witnessed temporary capacity-enhancement schemes to accommodate peak Olympic movements. International high-speed rail increased services between St. Pancras, Stratford and Ebbsfleet International stations across Europe (ODA, 2011).

Though most Olympic travel was facilitated by rail, buses served as feeders and ran 24 hours a day on the main Olympic routes. A 1500-vehicle strong private bus and coach fleet was reserved for the Olympic Family. Shuttle bus services form park and ride centres, taxis and other private hire vehicles were available when public transport could not provide individuals with adequate services. Legislation allowed for-hire vehicles to use Olympic bus lanes. To ease traffic flows, some regular bus stops were suspended or relocated (ODA, 2011).

Like Sydney, London served some of the Games' capacity via waterborne transport. Playing only a small role during the Olympics, water services on the River Thames experienced a small increase in frequency. Unlike Sydney's exclusive athlete water transport scheme, London used water transport for spectators as a scheduled passenger service to access river zone venues including Horse Guards Parade, the Mall and the Olympic Park. River bus services provided express service from the 'London Eye Millennium Pier' to Greenwich Park, London Bridge and the North Greenwich Arena. London's transit preparations for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games comprehensively provided

high-capacity access to the Olympic Park from international, national and local destinations.

Active-based transportation systems

Active-based transportation systems are non-motorized means of transport. In particular, walking and cycling are important modes that have become a core part of Olympic transportation over the years.

Sydney

Sydney's residents like other Australians have long embraced active transport modes. In particular for the Olympics, active-based transportation systems received a boost and new pedestrian and cycling paths were built in and around many of the Olympic venues to appeal to Olympic travellers and residents alike (Palese et al., 2000). Specifically, Sydney implemented cycling paths on many of the main avenues and along the Olympic Boulevard. Also, the Meadowbank Rail Bridge was converted into a bike path allowing cyclists easy access from the north (Jacana Consulting Pty Ltd., 1996). Several other bike paths, such as the Parramatta Valley Cycleway, were added off suburban roads, including those from Botany Bay to Ryde. Though many paths were created for cycling, Olympic venues had only a limited number of facilities for bicycle storage.

In order to ensure pedestrian safety and avoid congestion or delays for Olympic buses during the Games, many of the sports venues enforced strict day- and night-time road closures (Traffic and Transport Directorate, 2001). With this regulation in place, large numbers of pedestrians and cyclists were able to safely travel to the competitions. Special advertising to employees to encourage walking and cycling as a means of travel to Olympic events was also an important tool to reduce congestion. Overall, Sydney's investments into active transportation options for the 2000 Olympic and Paralympic Games allowed many spectators to enjoy nature's beauty in and around Homebush Bay, as the bike and walking paths proved to be a frequently used option to travel between stadia and spend leisure time in between competitions.

Athens

Compared to Sydney, active-based transportation systems were of minor priority to Athens' Olympic planners because the three main Olympic sites were too far apart to provide convenient access by bike let alone lay within walking distance of each other. All main Olympic sites had

high-capacity public transport access, while safe walking routes were created primarily around competition venues at those sites.

London

In contrast to Athens, London's transit-friendly policies went hand in hand in fostering walking and biking options across the city (Greater London Authority, 2011). For all Olympic venues, special walking routes were identified and marked. While some existing routes were closed due to security concerns, others were designated as high-volume walking access. These paths were patrolled by route marshals, a sophisticated crowd-management system and safety barriers to guide walkers. Signage across the Olympic Park guided pedestrians to competition venues. Furthermore, various cycle routes on and off road were promoted during the 2012 Olympic Games, and displayed in the London cycle guide. In particular, the London 2012 Greenways played a major role in bicycle access to the Olympic park and river zone venues, including dedicated bike crossings across the Thames and special river transport for cyclists. Safe and accessible bike parking close to the Olympic venues was also provided (ODA, 2011).

In preparation for the Games, the Active Travel Programme (ATP) promoted the options of walking and cycling to Olympic venues. A parallel movement-management scheme had been implemented to reduce pedestrian vehicle conflict hotspots. In addition, traffic signals were coordinated adjacent to pedestrian crossings to maximize travel flow of the active travel modes close to Olympic venues. However, a small number of crossings, for example, blind bends, were closed for safety. According to plan, closed intersections had a nearby alternative crossing (ODA, 2011). In sum, London's preparations for bikers and walkers during the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games attempted to connect Olympic travellers to and in between competition sites, while leaving an active transport legacy for London's resident beyond the Games.

Discussion

Mega-events such as the Olympic Games may be viewed as watershed opportunities to implement operational transport measures through economic incentives, prohibitive regulations and informative actions. The interim measures the Games provide can, if leveraged effectively, enhance the management of transit and traffic operations, as well as transport needs beyond a single event. The key is to implement new

transport measures at Games time with a long-term perspective for the city's future mobility needs. The key question each Olympic transport agency should consider is which transport operations necessary for the Olympics can improve metropolitan mobility permanently?

The Olympics can bring significant improvements not only to a city's transport infrastructure but also to operational practices beyond the Games. Switching car commuters to mass transit users, better integrated transport systems and the introduction of new ticketing systems are said to be common improvements. Former host cities, however, provide divergent evidence for this (Giuliano, 1992; Kassens-Noor, 2010). With regard to the management of transit operations, new interregional bus lines in Sydney and express buses in Athens were inaugurated. Concerning management of traffic operations, state-of-the-art traffic management centres, upgrades in incident management systems and citywide information and communication systems are a few examples. For the management of transport demand, flexible working hours and fixed freight delivery times exemplify measures that could potentially ease congestion permanently.

However, two Olympic myths – widely advertised prior to Games time – but never sustained in the long term have remained. First, Olympic ticketed residents barely switched their commutes to public transit post Games. Sydney's and Athens' organizers and city officials wanted spectators to take public transport during the Olympic Games in the hope that a positive experience would lead to permanent transit usage by local residents. Therefore, most Olympic host cities implemented extensive measures in public and private transport. To mention a few outlined previously: park-and-ride facilities with access to follow on public transport, shuttle buses, extended operating hours for trains and buses (24 hours a day) and free public transport was provided to spectators holding an entrance ticket to Olympic competitions. The combination of transit and traffic operations induced frequent car commuters to switch to public transport during Games time. After the Games in Sydney and Athens, commuters frequently reverted to their old driving habits, despite transport planners' hopes of having enticed drivers to take public transport permanently. Granted many transit and traffic alterations to manage Olympic transport are temporary, for example, Olympic road lanes, closure of certain crossings, no parking on streets and the like cannot be part of a post-Olympic traffic and transit scenario. However, few event-specific measures hold considerable potential to remain as a lasting legacy in host cities. For example,

roads designated for Olympic travellers have to be equipped with Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), in order to ensure the IOC-required free-flow travel conditions for athletes and to provide real-time traffic advisories. Post Games, these ITS installations remain along such roads and could be used to more efficiently move commuters if the Olympic road lanes are carefully planned to relieve the most travelled paths of residents post event. What can change travel behaviour is infrastructure and physical instalments for transport operations. Realistic expectations to use the Olympics to permanently change travel behaviour in host cities entail a tendency of residents to take public transport during other special events and a more efficient travel flow on selected routes.

Second, features of Olympic transport organizations have never transitioned into permanent institutional changes, even though local transport agencies acknowledge the superior, more efficient and more centralized Olympic structure. Institutional change comprises altered responsibilities, structure and coordination of local transport agencies during the Games, their relationship to each other and their impact on each other. Comparing the cities and their institutional changes, a transition towards a centralized command, control and communication structure occurred during Olympic preparations at recent Games. London, Sydney and Athens opted for a single Olympic transport entity. This entity was a special body comprised of various individuals from transport agencies that catalysed exceptional governmental power for action, spanning across jurisdictions and all agencies present in the city. Planning for transport became more sophisticated, more detailed and more complex through the Olympic preparation years. By 2012, it has become common knowledge for hosting cities that the success of transport requires a highly coordinated approach from all planning and transport agencies (Bovy, 2006). Even though transport agencies and planners confirmed a positive experience during the event and expressed the desire to continue such collaboration thereafter, regular institutional changes for better coordination among transport providers were not implemented. The attempts to implement these more coordinated institutional changes failed early because some institutions and individuals would have had to give up power over their jurisdictions. Furthermore, expertise was frequently hired from all across the country, where individuals had applied for temporary leave of absences to help out with Olympic demands. Upon closure of the event, they had to return to their permanent jobs. Therefore, institutional changes, even though cities would have benefited from a more

centralized and coordinated institutional transport organization, were never implemented post Games.

Conclusions

Mega-events such as the Olympic Games bring the potential to move cities towards sustainable transport practices. Permanent modifications to the transportation system, such as new transit and road infrastructure can permanently improve commutes and move the city's transport development plan significantly further. In contrast, temporary transport measures that foster public transport are primarily implemented to achieve the IOC's goal of moving millions of spectators in a short period of time. Only few of these can enhance long-term urban transport efficiency for the city, if properly planned and implemented. For example, installations for traffic and transit operations, such as signalling systems or Olympic lanes turned high-occupancy vehicle lanes, have the potential to decrease commuters' travel time post Games.

For future host cities, some IOC preferences and known best practices on spectator and athlete transport, collected through experiences in host cities through the IOC's transfer of knowledge programme, seem to be immutable: use of cars will be heavily constricted (100% public transport for spectators), an integrated transport management scheme with one central coordination authority is required, exclusive lines for Olympic bus travel are required, the presence of an Olympic ring containing a majority of venues is preferred and locations of venues should be chosen close to public mass transport systems (or more specifically, along one major subway line connecting as many stadiums as possible). Because the IOC has topical experts, evaluating the bids on specific features, compliance by host cities to these preferences and known best practices is almost guaranteed. With the recent bid addition of legacy questions to inquire about how Olympic legacies fit or even advance local urban plans, the IOC will be getting more and more involved in shaping urban forms and their transport systems.

As the three case studies, Sydney, Athens and London, have demonstrated, a myriad of traffic, transit and active-based transportation measures are necessary to handle and manage Olympic peak demands. Based on host city's individual transport system characteristics and land-use choices for venues, transportation planners need to carefully evaluate and implement these measures to best suit their Olympic transport network and to best foster the city's future plans for transport development.

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9
Broadcasting the Olympics

Harry-Arne Solberg and Chris Gratton

The history of Olympic broadcasting

Over the past three decades, television has become the engine that has driven the financial growth of the Olympic Movement and raised its profile exponentially (Preuss, 2006). At the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century, communication broadcast rights and sponsorship revenues account for 85 per cent of the Olympic Movement's total income, most of which is distributed among the international sport federations (IFs), national Olympic committees (NOCs) and Olympic Solidarity (Peña, 2009). Of this total financial pool broadcast revenues have become the single largest source.

The situation today, however, is very different from half a century ago. For instance, the 1936 Berlin Games were the first ever Olympic Games to be televised. This viewing only occurred in and around Berlin, with a total of 138 viewing hours and 162,000 viewers. Twelve years later, the 1948 London Olympics were the first to attract Games broadcast rights, with the BBC paying a fee of US$3000. This broadcast offered 64 total hours of programming and attracted more than 500,000 viewers, all residing within a 50-mile radius of London (Olympic Marketing Fact File, 2008).

Since then, we have seen rapid development. In 1956 the Olympic Winter Games (from Cortina, Italy) were broadcast live for the first time. Two years later, television rights issues were incorporated into the Olympic Charter. The current Olympic Charter (IOC, 2011, p. 90) covers media coverage of the Olympic Games in Rule 48 with the sentence: 'All decisions concerning the coverage of the Olympic Games by the media rest within the competence of the IOC.' In 1964, satellite broadcast coverage was used for the first time to relay images overseas. In 1972,

the Japanese network NHK provided the television feed for broadcasters to choose the coverage they wanted, which represents the model for today's host broadcast organization.

From 1972 to the present, the Olympics has seen continual growth in its television audience to make it one of the most watched television events on the planet today. At the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the IOC introduced Total Viewer Hours (TVH), a new method to measure Olympic television audiences. This was mainly because this approach was similar to the way television audiences for the other international sports events, such as the Football World Cup, were measured. The broadcast of the Sydney Games generated 36.1 billion TVH and reached 3.7 billion viewers in 220 countries.

The quantity of programming has increased substantially over the years, as seen in Table 9.1. This table also shows that the Summer Games receive substantially more broadcast hours and more viewers than the winter Games. Table 9.2 indicates that worldwide coverage of the Olympics expanded greatly throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a period in which many sports featured more prominently on television.

In this day and age, however, Olympic broadcasters not only offer programmes on traditional television but have also taken up opportunities created by new media technology, such as offering live programmes through the Internet, mobile phones and multiple television channels. This process started during the first decade of the twenty-first century and developed rapidly. The IOC launched its own Internet channel in 2008, which was available on the YouTube platform for 77 countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, where the Olympic Games Internet rights had not been sold.

During the 2008 Beijing Games, the IOC's official website and other related websites drew 105 million unique viewers, while there were more

Table 9.1 Host broadcast hours of coverage

Olympic Games		**Olympic Winter Games**	
1988 Seoul	2,572	1992 Albertville	350
1992 Barcelona	2,800	1994 Lillehammer	331
1996 Atlanta	3,000	1998 Nagano	600
2000 Sydney	3,500	2002 Salt Lake City	900
2004 Athens	3,800	2006 Turin	1,000
2008 Beijing	5,000	2010 Vancouver	1,000

Source: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/OLYMPIC_MARKETING_FACT_FILE_2011.pdf.

Table 9.2 Countries broadcasting the Olympics

Olympic Summer Games		**Olympic Winter Games**	
1936 Berlin	1		
1948 London	1		
1952 Helsinki	2		
1956 Melbourne	1	1956 Cortina	22
1960 Rome	21	1960 Squaw Valley	27
1964 Tokyo	40	1964 Innsbruck	30
1968 Mexico City	n/a	1968 Grenoble	32
1972 Münich	98	1972 Sapporo	41
1976 Montreal	124	1976 Innsbruck	38
1980 Moscow	111	1980 Lace Placid	40
1984 Los Angeles	156	1984 Sarajevo	100
1988 Seoul	160	1988 Calgary	64
1992 Barcelona	193	1992 Albertville	86
1996 Atlanta	214	1994 Lillehammer	120
2000 Sydney	220	1998 Nagano	160
2004 Athens	220	2002 Salt Lake City	160
2008 Beijing	220	2006 Turin	200
		2010 Vancouver	220

Source: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/OLYMPIC_MARKETING_FACT_FILE_2011.pdf.

than 21 million views on the IOC digital channel. Globally, the Beijing Games attracted more than 265 million video views and in excess of 1.2 billion page views on official rights holding Internet and mobile phone platforms. During the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games, total global output across traditional media, free-to-air and pay television, reached 24,000 hours. Internet and mobile communications reached 26,000 hours, which was at least a 100-fold increase from the 2006 Turin Games, when new media rights were exploited in only 23 countries. Mobile video downloads at Vancouver reached two million, more than six times the 301,000 for the 2008 Beijing Games (Pickles, 2010). This underscores the global growth of new media and social media, and successful utilization of these platforms by the IOC and Olympic Games organizers.

The website of the American broadcaster NBC attracted 46 million unique users during the 2010 Winter Games, an increase of 33 million compared with the 2006 Turin Games. The NBC's mobile platform attracted 87.1 million page views, 52 million more than during the Beijing 2008 Games, and provided two million mobile video streams, which was a six-fold increase on the Beijing Games (Pickles, 2010).

In the UK, the BBC delivered 50 million video streams from the 2008 Games, compared to just 2.4 million during Athens 2004. Forty-five per cent of the BBC's online audience engaged with video from its Olympic site. Around 13 per cent of the UK adult population watched video content from the Beijing Games on the Internet, while about 1–2 per cent did it during the 2004 Games.[1]

These figures illustrate that Olympic broadcasting is not only a matter of traditional television broadcasting. Consequently, the figures presented in the tables also involve new media, such as Internet and mobile platforms. Another key factor to consider is that the proportion of people with access to the Internet increased significantly each year, as broadband was made more readily available, and as people accessed online material not only using computer but also via so-called smart phones and tablets.

Table 9.3 shows the Olympic broadcasting rights, while Table 9.4 shows the distribution of the revenues. These figures clearly show that the US market has been the major source of revenue. For many years, NBC has been the main US Olympic network. Since 1976, it has broadcast 50 per cent of the Olympic Games, and in 2009 it acquired the American rights until 2020. Despite this dominance, NBC has fought tough competition from other bidders, which on several occasions has been very fierce. This explains why the rights fees have been substantially more expensive than in other continents. The fact that most of the broadcasting revenues have come from the US market has prompted

Table 9.3 Olympic TV rights fees (US$ millions)

1960 Rome	1.2	1960 Squaw Valley	0.05
1964 Tokyo	1.6	1964 Innsbruck	0.94
1968 Mexico City	9.8	1968 Grenoble	2.60
1972 Münich	17.8	1972 Sapporo	8.50
1976 Montreal	34.9	1976 Innsbruck	11.60
1980 Moscow	88.0	1980 Lake Placid	20.70
1984 Los Angeles	286.9	1984 Sarajevo	102.70
1988 Seoul	402.6	1988 Calgary	324.90
1992 Barcelona	636.1	1992 Albertville	291.90
1996 Atlanta	898.3	1994 Lillehammer	352.90
2000 Sydney	1,331.6	1998 Nagano	513.50
2004 Athens	1,494.0	2002 Salt Lake	738.00
2008 Beijing	1,739.0	2006 Turin	831.00
		2010 Vancouver	1,280.00

Source: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/OLYMPIC_MARKETING_FACT_FILE_2011.pdf.

Table 9.4 Origin of Olympic broadcast rights fees

	North America	Europe	Asia	Oceania	Other
1998–2000	60.9%	22.9%	11.2%	3.5%	1.5%
2002–2004	62.6%	23.0%	10.4%	2.4%	1.6%
2006–2008	61.4%	22.5%	10.7%	3.1%	2.3%

Note: Others refer to Central America, South America, Caribbean, Middle East and Africa except from North territories. North African territories and Central Asian territories are included as part of the EBU (European Broadcasting Union) agreement.
Source: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/OLYMPIC_MARKETING_FACT_FILE_2011.pdf.

speculation that American candidate cities, or cities on the same time zone, have an advantage when it comes to being chosen to host the Olympic Games (Peña, 2009).

To understand the dynamic forces behind these developments, we now focus on salient elements from economic theory. First, we concentrate on the cost structure of sport broadcasting. Second, we analyse the sale processes, which have predominantly been auctions. Third, we examine the regulations of sport broadcasting that also have affected the sale of the Olympic rights.

The cost structure of sport broadcasting

The production of TV programmes, as well as their transmission to viewers has *economies of scale advantages* (Gratton and Solberg, 2007). This means that the average cost declines over the entire range of outputs. In general, such advantages apply to processes characterized by *high fixed costs* and relatively *low variable costs*.

These characteristics also apply to Olympic broadcasting. Although TV stations may have to pay expensive fees to receive the signals from the host broadcaster, the most likely reason for this is that the distribution of market power is favourable for the transmission companies and not because of expensive variable costs related to the transmission. Due to the extremely expensive investments, very few companies can afford to establish themselves in these markets. This, however, represents an advantage for those few that can by allowing them to charge prices on their services that are higher than if they operated in a market that was characterized by fierce competition.

The production of live programmes from the sport competitions also involves *economies of scope advantages* (Gratton and Solberg, 2007), which refer to advantages from using the same input in more than one

production process. The joint use of cameras and other equipment open up opportunities for substantial cost saving compared to the situation if all broadcasters produced the live programmes separately. Indeed, if more than 200 TV stations were to send their own cameras and other equipment to produce TV pictures from all the Olympic competition venues, this would be unworkable. However, this is not necessary since a single producer can do the production, and then distribute the signals to the respective national broadcasters.

Originally, the IOC hired a television company within the host nation to do the production. Steps towards changing this procedure were taken in 2001, when the IOC established the Olympic Broadcasting Service (OBS). Its purpose has been to serve as a permanent host broadcast organization for both the summer and winter Games. OBS is now responsible for providing the international television and radio signals from the Games to all rights-holding broadcasters around the world. This eliminated the need to rebuild the broadcast organization for each edition of the Games. This procedure, with OBS operating as the producer of the core programmes, makes it possible to utilize substantial economies of scope advantages. The 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics were the first Games where the host broadcast was solely an OBS operation.

Auctioning the Olympic rights

In recent times, the auction method has become the most common sale procedure of Olympic broadcast rights. The Oxford Dictionary defines an auction as a 'public sale in which articles are sold to the maker of the highest bid'.

The direct profit from broadcasting the Olympics depends on the gap between the revenues of the programmes, from viewers and advertisers, and the costs of producing and transmitting the programmes to the viewers. In this context, we only refer to revenues and costs related to the broadcasting itself, but not including the rights fees. The reason for this is that rights fees do not necessarily reflect any costs of using inputs. The distribution of this profit, however, can be greatly affected by the sale procedures. Effective auctions can increase rights fees significantly (Solberg, 2006). The best case for the IOC is achieved when bidding wars among television networks develop. The higher the fees, the larger the proportion of profit that falls to the IOC. Additionally, there is also a positive correlation between revenues from sponsors and TV coverage. Sponsors support the Olympics to obtain publicity for themselves and

their products. Hence, the more the viewers that are watching the TV programmes the more the sponsors are willing to pay.

As for rights fees, the most important factor is competition. This becomes evident if we compare the values of Olympic rights in the US and Europe. The US rights have been considerably more expensive, particularly in the years before the 1990s. The main reason for this was differences in the competition level between the two continents. Several networks have submitted bids for the US rights since the 1970s. One episode that illustrated an effective auction was the sale of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics rights for the US market, as described by McMillan (1991). At that time, the rights were sold by the Local Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) and not by the IOC as is the current procedure. The Moscow organizing committee was very effective in orchestrating a bidding war between the three main networks – ABC, CBS and NBC. The LOCOG first asked for US$210 million, which it later admitted was 300 per cent of what they expected. Then the networks were urged to compete in an unending series of bids. At some stage, new sealed bids were submitted every 24 hours. The networks made every effort to keep their bids secret, but without success since the LOCOG leaked details to their rivals. At some stage the networks threatened to boycott the process completely in protest against the broken promises. This, however, did not have any effect, since the LOCOG succeeded in playing one off against the other. In the end, the rights ended up at US$88 million, which was more than 250 per cent of the value of those at the 1976 Montreal Games.

The approach was different in Europe, where the most popular (and expensive) sports rights were acquired by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU)[2] and distributed subsequently to their member channels at prices based on full cost coverage. Hence, the demand side was characterized by a total lack of competition, despite the fact that some sports programmes attracted very high-rating figures. Signs of a change in this pattern were first observed in connection to the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, where some private channels submitted bids that involved more money than the EBU bid. Despite this, the IOC preferred to sell the rights to the EBU because of its ability to reach more people across Europe (Moragas, Rivenburgh and Larson, 1995). A more serious threat to the EBU's role came four years later, when Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation submitted a bid of $2 billion for the entire games from 1996 to 2008. Thus, the EBU was forced to increase its bid dramatically compared to what they paid in the past. EBU submitted a bid of $1.44 billion, which was 0.6 billion less than News Corporation. However, also on

this occasion, the IOC decided to continue with the EBU, for the same reason as four years earlier. These two incidents, and particularly the last one, illustrate how much competition can influence prices. For the Games staged in 1980, 1984 and 1988, when the EBU had no rival, the European rights accounted for 8 per cent, 8 per cent and 10 per cent of the US fees, respectively. For the period from 1996 to 2008, however, the European fees accounted for 50 per cent. If the IOC had accepted Murdoch's bid, the European rights would have cost 93 per cent of the US rights (Solberg, 2002).

This pattern came to an end in 2009, when the IOC rejected the EBU's bid and instead sold the 2014 and 2016 rights for 40 European markets to Sportfive (an international sports rights marketing agency) at a price of $315 million. This sale did not include Germany, the UK, France, Spain, Italy and Turkey. In these markets, the IOC decided to sell the rights directly to the countries' broadcasters (Pickles, 2009a). For the 2010 and 2012 Games, the total European rights amounted to $780 million (including value-in-kind services of $69 million). This was 39 per cent of the value of the US rights. By January 2012, the IOC had secured $1025 billion for the combined 2014 and 2016 Games from the European market. This, however, did not include the UK rights, which (at the time of writing) had yet to be sold. According to informal sources, the BBC paid $100 million for the combined 2010 and 2012 Games.[3] If they pay the same for the 2014 and 2016 Games, the total European rights will amount to $1125 billion. The fact that this accounts for 56 per cent of the US value (up from 39%) indicates that the IOC's strategy, which ended their 56 years relationship with the EBU, was financially successful. The deal with Sportfive requires that a minimum of 200 hours from the Summer Games and 100 hours from the Winter Games must be shown free-to-air in each market. Additionally, several European nation have implemented the Listed Events regulation (see next section), and in these countries the entire Games has to be shown on free-to-air channels.

Auction theory

The television channels that bid for sports rights do not have the precise information about the demand for these programmes at the time of the bidding. Therefore, they have to estimate how much time and money viewers are willing to spend on watching such programmes. They also have to estimate how much advertisers will spend for advertising slots during Olympic broadcasts. The revenues from advertising

are affected by the penetration of the television channels. Additionally, some of them will be subject to regulations. This particularly applies to public service broadcasters. Some of them are non-commercial and do not generate any revenue from sport broadcasts. Others are allowed to sell advertising, but in general they earn less than independent commercial channels (see Gratton and Solberg (2007) for a thorough discussion of this matter).

The procedures that have been most commonly used to sell sports rights are the English auction and Sealed auction (first bid). In an English auction, the process starts with a (low) bid, which is then raised successively until one bid remains. The winner is the one with the highest bid, and who then pays the price for the winning bid. A player's strategy in the series of bids will be a function of their own evaluation of the item, their prior estimate of other bidders' valuations and the past bids of all the players (Rasmussen, 2001). The dominant strategy in this procedure will be to keep bidding just small amounts more than the previous bid until it reaches one's own valuation and then to stop. The bidding process ends when the price reaches just above the valuation of the player with the second-highest valuation.

The IOC, as any other sellers of sports rights, will try to exploit as much as possible of the highest bidder's real evaluation: its reservation price. What is important in an English auction is the gap between the two bidders that have the highest reservation prices. The narrower the gap, the higher the price will be. For any bidders, the dominant strategy will always be to bid slightly above the rival's bid.

Several factors will make the demand, and hence the revenues, uncertain at the time of the bidding. The broadcasters will compete with each other for the attention of the viewers. Nowadays, television viewers are offered a large number of programmes, and this pattern seems likely to continue. The Olympics not only compete with other sports events but also with other genres of television programming. Furthermore, the Games can be hosted in unfavourable time zones, which can reduce audience size. This, in turn, will affect the revenues from advertisers. This has been a particular complaint by the NBC in relation to US television audiences, which as a result has resulted in the rescheduling of some events such as the swimming finals in Beijing. Despite such concerns, some rights, such as the 2018 and 2020 Olympic Games have been sold to US and French networks, even before the host destination has been decided.

These factors illustrate some of the problems of estimating the value of the rights at the time of the bidding. They can also explain why several

sports rights deals have turned out to be unprofitable. NBC is reported to have lost $223 million on the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games, despite the favourable time zone, and they are also expected to lose money on the 2012 London Games (Horlock, 2011). Such situations refer to the so-called winner's curse, which is a situation where the winner of an auction is worse off as a consequence of overestimating the value of the item and bidding too much. The winner's problem is that they realize this too late. Income turns out to be lower than expected, while it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to reduce costs (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).

In a s*ealed auction – first bid*, each bidder submits one bid without having any information on the rivals' bids. The highest bidder acquires the rights. A company's bid will be a function of their own valuation and their prior beliefs about the rivals' valuations (Rasmussen, 2001). Since the bids are kept secret risk-averse bidders are not provided with the same information that would enable them to predict the value as in an English auction. For the seller, this can be a major disadvantage if the bidders are risk averse. Nevertheless, the fact that information about the rivals' bids is kept secret can also work to the seller's advantage, given the right circumstances. This is particularly so if there is a wide gap between the highest and the second-highest bid. In that case, the seller will benefit from persuading the bidder with the highest evaluation to believe that the second-highest bidder values the item higher than they actually do.

A bidding channel can make two key mistakes in the case of a *sealed auction – first bid*. First, by being too greedy and bidding too low; the risk is losing out on deals that may have been profitable. Second, by bidding too much it can leave money on the table, that is, paying more than necessary.

One such example occurred when NBCUniversal recently acquired the US rights for the 2014–20 Games at a price of $4.38 billion. This turned out to be about $1 billion more than the second-highest bid, which was from Rupert Murdoch's Fox Sports (Horlock, 2011). Hence, NBCUniversal[4] could have won the bid by paying about $1 billion less. Another example occurred in connection to the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, which were also acquired by NBC. On that occasion, the second-highest bid was $300 million less than the NBC bid.

Although the main purpose of bidding at auctions is to win, some bidders may enter in order to push up prices. The rationale behind this strategy is to weaken the ability of the winner to submit future bids when sports rights are being auctioned. As a consequence of strong price

growth on the most popular sports rights there have also been incidents where former rival television channels have colluded instead of competing. This can strengthen their position against the sellers of sports rights, such as the IOC, and also against other rival channels. The channels can agree to distribute the events between themselves in order to avoid a bidding war. Such collaboration can be regarded as cartel behaviour.

However, even if the collaboration is successful, this does not guarantee that the agreements will last forever. Cartels are inherently unstable because there is often an incentive for at least one of the members to maximize its own benefits by leaving the cartel. The cartel members will balance out the potential advantages and disadvantages against each other when they decide whether to uphold the collusion or not.

According to informal sources, members of the EBU's panel agreed not to offer the IOC more for the 2014 and 2016 rights than they paid for the 2010 and 2012 rights. This was a reaction against the IOC's decision of selling the rights to Sportfive. If so, the Spanish public service broadcaster, RTVW, did not keep its promise and instead agreed to pay at least $100 million. This figure could further rise to $107 million because of an agreement to share revenues through sublicensing deals. RTVE first submitted a bid in the region of $86–90 million, which was the same as they paid for the 2010 and 2012 Games (Pickles, 2009b).

In Austria, the public service broadcaster, ORF, acquired the rights, but at a price more than 50 per cent higher than they paid for the 2010 and 2012 Games. The reason for this was the competition it faced from a rival broadcaster, namely ATV. In Sweden, the Modern Times Group (MTG) acquired the 2014 and 2016 Games at a price that was 70 per cent higher than the public service broadcasters paid for the 2010 and 2012 Games. A similar development occurred in Norway, where TV2, a commercial public service broadcaster, acquired the 2014 and 2016 rights at a price that was significantly higher than what the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation paid for the same two Olympic Games (McCullah, 2011). This was different in Germany, where the two public service broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, acquired the 2014 and 2016 Games at a price of $187 million, which was $16 million less than the price paid for the 2010 and 2012 Games (Dunne and McCullah, 2011).

These incidents illustrate the problems of upholding collusion agreements where competition is fierce. When a rival channel enters the contest, the alternative to increasing one's bid can be to lose the rights. The IOC will do anything to prevent buyers from colluding. Whether they succeed is influenced by the auction procedure they select. In an English auction, all information about the bids is immediately released.

Hence, if one cartel member breaks from the agreement, the others will discover it immediately. This also creates a disciplinary effect on the bid members.

If the bidders are risk averse, the IOC might benefit from accepting deals where it shares the risk with the winning bidder. One alternative is to agree to a *royalty fee* that ties the price (partly or totally) to the income from broadcasting the programmes. Such clauses were agreed for some of the US Olympic deals late in the 1980s and the 1990s (McMillan, 1991), and also on more recent deals. When NBC sold more than $615 million in advertising for the 1996 Atlanta Games, a 50–50 revenue-sharing arrangement automatically kicked in, netting the IOC an additional $36 million (Slater, 1998).

If sports rights buyers are extremely risk averse, this is an argument for increasing the proportion of royalty fees. Risk-averse bidders are willing to bid more in return for being sheltered from the risk, in effect incorporating an insurance premium in their bids. Royalty fees also reduce the inherent differences among the bidders. In that way it strengthens the competitive pressure that bidders with relatively low estimates of the value of winning can put on bidders with high estimates of the value of winning. This can increase the total payments by the winning bidder. The smaller the differences in the valuations of winning between the bidders, the more aggressive the bidding will be. These two effects can work to the IOC's advantage because they raise their share of the revenue. As a rule of thumb, the more risk averse the bidders are, relative to the seller, the higher the optimal royalty rate (McAfee and McMillan, 1987).

On the other hand, revenue-sharing agreements can also cause situations of *asymmetric information*, which in these cases are *moral hazard problems* where the seller cannot control all the actions of the winning bidder afterwards. If the sharing parameter increases, it reduces the channel's motives for any ex-post sales efforts, for example, increasing sales and marketing efforts. In that way, royalty fees can diminish the total income to be shared between the IOC and the winning channel (Solberg, 2006).

A further example of a moral hazard effect relates to the measurement of the fee. Normally, television channels will have more accurate information on these variables than the IOC. This can allow them to manipulate information to their own advantage by under-reporting the income and exaggerating the costs. Although some information will be available to the general public, for instance, rating figures, this does not apply to all of the variables. Information on discounts and special

agreements with advertisers are usually treated with confidentiality. The optimal revenue-sharing rate from the seller's point of view is determined by balancing these three factors, namely increased competition, reduced risk and weakened incentives that revenue-sharing induces.

Market interventions

Olympic broadcasting can generate *positive externalities*, for example, by generating national pride from the national competitors' successes in international sport competitions. Such externalities, which also have *pure public good* elements, represent a rationale for showing the Olympics on a channel which will maximize the television audience.

Throughout the 1990s, the growth of subscription television channels raised concerns regarding access to watching popular sport for the general public. European politicians were alarmed in 1996, when News Corporation almost won the Olympic rights from the EBU. Their fear received more fuel when FIFA, the same year, sold the 2002 and 2006 World Cup Soccer finals to the German Kirch corporation and the Swiss marketing agency ISL instead of to the EBU as they had done in the past. As outlined earlier, in 2009, the IOC sold the rights for 2012 and 2014 Olympic Games to Sportfive instead of to EBU.[5]

Subscription television broadcasters focus their activity on programmes that attract sufficient viewers willing to pay to watch. This does not necessarily correspond with mass audiences. If some viewers have a very high willingness to pay, it might be profitable to sell programmes on a pay-per-view basis, instead of financing them by selling advertising, even if the latter alternative attracts significantly larger audiences. Subscription television reduces positive externalities.

The development where market forces move such events away from free-to-air to subscription television channels reduces the amount of goods that belong to the *public domain* (Gaustad, 2000). In that way, it represents a cost for society, since welfare is reduced. A consequence of this development is that governments have created regulations that define sports programmes as a part of the public domain. Late in the 1990s, the so-called *Listed Events regulations* were established in several European countries. The UK was first to introduce such legislation and then later the idea was adopted by the European Commission in the 'Television Without Frontiers Directive 97/36'. The principle in the directive is that each member state can draw up a list of events, national or non-national, that it considers to be of major importance for the society. The rights to broadcast these events can only be acquired

by broadcasters with a minimum penetration decided in the respective nations. In addition, Australia, India and South Africa have also implemented similar regulations.

The objective of such regulations is to move sporting events back to the sphere of the public domain. Such policies affect rights fees and hence the owner's ability to make a profit from selling them. A high degree of public domain reduces sellers' freedom to exploit the commercial value of the product. As a rule of thumb, the higher thedegree of public domain, the lower the commercial value of the ownership. Contrary to this, a regime of strict legal protection of the broadcasting rights owner's freedom to sell to any bidder improves the owner's ability to make profit from the product, for example, in an auction. This also explains the resistance towards the Listed Events regulations from many sport-governing bodies.

In 1971, the IOC added a paragraph to the Olympic Charter, Article 21, which stipulated that only the IOC could negotiate with television operators, and that it would be this body that decided on the distribution of broadcast rights (Moragas et al., 1995, p.10). The broadcasters acquiring European rights are obliged to show a minimum of 200 hours from the Summer Olympic Games and 100 hours from the Winter Olympic on free-to-air channels. Additionally, nine countries have the Olympic Games on their respective Listed Events, which means that they are allowed only to be broadcast on channels with a minimum penetration, ranging from 75 per cent in Germany to 95 per cent in the UK.

In 2009, the UK government set up an independent review panel to consider the list of events that was included on the UK list. The IOC appeared before the panel and submitted written evidence since the Summer Olympic Games is listed in the UK and is generally shown on the state-owned BBC. The evidence from the IOC provides a clear guide to the current thinking it has with regard to broadcasting the Olympics. The IOC argued that it had always tried to achieve the widest possible dissemination of images of the Olympic Games in line with the Olympic Charter, which requires that the IOC take 'all necessary steps in order to ensure the fullest coverage by the different media and the widest possible audience in the world for the Olympic Games' (IOC written evidence to Panel, June 2009 (DCMS, 2009)).

In general then, this requires the IOC to sell the broadcasting rights to free-to-air broadcasters as it did in 1992, and in the sale of the 1996–2008 rights in Europe as described above. However, although the IOC indicated to the review panel that it was happy for all those parts of

the Olympics to be shown on terrestrial television and even be listed, it objected to the whole of the Olympic Games being given that status. The IOC argument was quite straightforward. At the Beijing Olympics, live Olympic Games content amounted to 5000 hours covering 28 sports. To broadcast all 5000 hours live would require at least 26 channels broadcasting 12 hours a day for the 16 days of the Olympics. In fact the BBC broadcasted 240 hours of live content from Beijing, or just 4.8 per cent of the total. That is, 95 per cent of the Olympic Games content was not broadcast live to the UK viewing public. The IOC argued that the current UK listing arrangements, where the whole of the Olympic Games is listed, is detrimental to many Olympic sports, some of which get no coverage at all by the BBC, and to the host cities and the NOCs. Quite simply, the IOC would like a form of listing that allows the BBC, or any other terrestrial broadcaster, to telecast the content most demanded by the UK viewers, but preserve the right of the IOC to market the remaining live content to other broadcasters. In this way the IOC would get the widest possible coverage but would also allow it to increase its overall income from a diversified sale of the broadcasting rights (see Gratton and Solberg, 2012).

Table 9.5 shows how the broadcasting rights have been distributed between the IOC and the local organizing committees. As the table shows, the IOC has, over the years, increased its slice of total revenues quite dramatically. In 1972, when the summer Olympics were held in Munich, the IOC took only 10 per cent of the broadcasting rights income, with the rest going to the host city. By 2008, in Beijing, the IOC was taking 51 per cent of the broadcasting rights fees with the remaining 49 per cent going to the host city. However, the 90 per cent going to the host city in 1972 would be 90 per cent of $17.8 million, which was the rights fee for the Munich Summer Olympics, or $16 million. In 2008,

Table 9.5 Distribution of revenues from broadcasting rights

	IOC	**LOOC**
1948–1968	1–4%	99–96%
1972–1980	10%	90%
1984–1992	33%	67%
1996–2004	40%	60%
2006–2010	51%	49%
2010	LOOC receives a guaranteed amount	

Source: Peña (2009) and Preuss (2006).

the broadcasting rights fee income was estimated at $1.74 billion (Peña, 2009). The 49 per cent of this received by Beijing would be $853 million, or over 53 times the amount received by Munich in 1972. Although the absolute amount of income received by the host city from broadcasting rights has continued to rise, it is clearly the case that the IOC has benefited most from the exponential growth in broadcasting income over the last 20–30 years. If we take the example above, in 1972 the IOC's share of the broadcasting rights fee was $1.78 million. In 2008 it was $0.89 billion or 500 times the amount they received in 1972.

Conclusions

The summer Olympics has become the largest televised event on the planet and it continues to grow. The Beijing Olympics, in total, attracted about 4.7 billion TV viewers worldwide, which equates to over two-thirds of the world's population, surpassing the 3.9 billion who watched the 2004 Athens Games and the 3.7 billion who watched the 2000 Sydney Games. Over recent years the IOC has become much more professional in maximizing the income it earns from the sale of Games broadcasting rights and as a result that income has grown dramatically. Because of the size of the global television audience, sponsors are keen to be associated with events with such global reach. Hence sponsorship income has grown alongside the growth of broadcasting rights fees. The broadcasting of the Olympic Games is now a massive global business.

The commercialization of the Olympic Games has had a dramatic effect on the way the IOC operates. Up until the early 1980s, the IOC made every effort to prevent the games from commercialization. However, in 1983 the IOC voted to accept corporate sponsorship for the first time. The following year the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics produced the first financial surplus in the post-war period. The broadcasting rights for these Games were sold for an unprecedented $286 million. Corporate sponsorship generated a further $127 million. The Los Angeles Olympics became the financial model for the future.

As we have seen earlier in this chapter, as the fee for the sale of broadcasting rights continued to rise, the IOC took a greater part in handling the negotiations for the fee and taking a greater part in the management of the broadcasting of the Olympics. Once the IOC had realized the value of their property they maximized the rate of return on that property. As a result, the IOC is now one of the richest international sport organizations in the world and some commentators have criticized it for losing the ideals of the original Olympic Movement in pursuit of financial profit, as the quote below illustrates:

> My critical position . . . is rooted in the distinction between the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Sports Industry (OSI). The latter can be thought of as Olympic sport without Olympism, or stated more precisely, the OSI, as an ideal type, reverses the means/ends relationship between sport and the intercultural, diplomatic and educational meanings characteristic of the Olympic Movement. For the OSI, Olympic symbols, values, social projects and histories are mere instrumentalities available for the expansion of Olympic-style competitions, for the 'growth of the brand' as many of its paid professionals like to put it . . . my decades of Olympic research had led me to the conviction that the Olympic Movement was in ever-increasing danger of being swallowed up by the OSI.
>
> (MacAloon, 2011)

Notes

1. http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_1428.pdf
2. EBU represents 65 member broadcasting organizations in 49 countries, mainly across Europe, but also in the Middle East and North Africa.
3. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/8430637/London-2012-BBC-cutbacks-cause-alarm-at-the-IOC-over-future-Games-coverage.html; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/8951142/IOC-hopes-London-2012-Olympics-will-force-BBCs-hand-over-television-rights-for-future-Games.html.
4. NBCUniversal was formed in 2004 by a merger between NBC and Vivendi.
5. http://mail.newtimes.co.rw/news/index.php?i=13813anda=13544

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10

Investigating Olympic Sponsorship: A Contemporary Review of Selected Activation and Achievement

Rick Burton

Introduction

During the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing, China, I had the good fortune of serving the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) as their Chief Marketing Officer. In this position I found myself working with some of the world's largest sports sponsors including Coca-Cola, Visa, McDonald's, General Electric (GE), Johnson & Johnson, AT&T, Anheuser-Busch (makers of Budweiser), The Home Depot and Samsung. Each organization listed above was aggressive in activating its Olympic sponsorships IOC) or domestically oriented through the USOC.

The IOC sponsorship scheme is called The Olympic Programme (TOP). TOP sponsors like Coca-Cola, McDonald's and Visa rights. These rights were either global in nature through the International Olympic Committee (hold global Olympic sponsorship rights. This is different from domestic or national Olympic committee (NOC) sponsorship where sponsors can only use Olympic trademarks or imagery in a selected country. Both of those rights (or protocols) are different from sponsorship of an international sports federation (known in the Olympic community as IFs), a national sports federation for a particular sport or an elite athlete who might compete in competitions like the Olympics, a world championship or a national championship.

My familiarity with Olympic sponsorships led to the creation of this chapter, with a series of research questions producing the opportunity to share selected examples of post-sponsorship review from some of the greatest Olympic sponsors of all time. For the purposes of this chapter and ease of reading for students or practitioners, we will concentrate on two companies that were TOP sponsors for two of the most recent Olympics (Beijing 2008 and Vancouver 2010).

The first company, Visa, is a consumer-facing organization that is known worldwide for its credit and debit cards. It has been a major sponsor of the Olympic Games since 1988 and is often remembered in the sports marketing world for creating an advertising campaign that alerted customers to the dictum that if they were going to the Olympics they should leave their American Express cards at home, because only Visa would be accepted at the Games. When this advertising campaign was introduced, Visa was on an equal footing with brands like Master Card and American Express, but following their proclamation of exclusivity with the Olympics, their market share and brand awareness soared.

The second company, GE, used to own US broadcasting giant NBC (the television broadcast rights holder for the Beijing, Vancouver and London 2012 Olympics), but it is also known for its lighting and household appliances. However, during the last decade GE activated and leveraged its sponsorship principally for business-to-business purposes across far more industrial or non-consumer sectors (i.e. turbines for hydroelectric dams, jet engines, hospital equipment and other infrastructure applications).

For the purposes of this chapter, both companies present a rare opportunity for readers to gain a better understanding of Olympic sponsorship.

Overview

As most readers may know, the choice to sponsor a sporting event as large as the Olympic Games, a national Olympic team (i.e. the USOC or Australian Olympic Committee), a national sport federation (i.e. USA Swimming or Basketball Australia) or a particular athlete (i.e. Usain Bolt or Sally Pearson etc.) is not an easy or cheap decision. Sponsorship and endorsements require not only a fee to the rights holder (a group or individual that traditionally wants to charge a premium for exclusivity) but also investments in ancillary costs, which can include buying media (to activate the sponsorship); production costs to create stadium signage, television advertising or point-of-purchase materials; on-site hospitality; internal sales incentives; travel-related costs; and numerous other expenses that align with the prestige of that sponsorship or endorsement (Shilbury et al., 2009).

Is it worth it? Well, many scholarly articles have been written explaining sponsorship's role in the marketing mix, but more often than not data analysis and research suggest that sponsorship produces results different from traditional advertising (Amis, Slack and Berret, 1999;

Cornwell and Maignan, 1998; Meenaghan, 1991). There are many reasons for this including the fact that sponsorship generally creates an alignment between a brand and a customer's interest (Speed and Thompson, 2000). If a consumer considers the Olympics an important sporting event and enjoys the high-level competition between representatives from 200 or so countries and McDonald's sponsors the Olympics, researchers suggest a transfer of appreciation can take place. For instance, if I like the Olympics and McDonald's helps bring the Olympics to me then ergo I may like McDonald's more than I already do or I may think differently about McDonald's and ultimately sample a new McDonald's product.

The process is never quite as easy simple as that, but as a simplified way of explaining why a company might choose to sponsor a sporting event that logic can serve us. Sponsorship, in conjunction with advertising, retail promotion, public relations, sales incentives, customer word-of-mouth and social media efforts can increase sales and other valuable performance indicators (such as market share or shelf volume).

The big question for sponsors, which they are constantly wrestling with, is whether their sponsorship (or endorsement of an individual) actually worked. Did their massive investment increase awareness, trial or most often usage of their products or services? Did their sponsorship help the firm broker a key sales deal that could influence entry into a new region or country? Did the sponsoring firm's integrated and collective efforts lead to an increase in market share and stock valuation?

Historically speaking, Olympic sponsorship has existed since 1928, when 1000 cases of Coca-Cola were shipped (along with the United States Olympic team) by freighter to Amsterdam (site of the 1928 Summer Games). Coke's presence at these Games, at kiosks near the main stadium and rowing course (from which Coke was sold) was limited, but evidence suggests that Coke was also allowed to place customized promotional signage over all the entrances to the main stadium (Coca-Cola Conversations, 2008). In the years to come, companies like film-supplier Eastman-Kodak and official timer Omega (joined the Olympic movement for the 1932 Games in Los Angeles) would begin to more formally associate with the Olympics.

In 1983, however, after years of local, national and international disputes by sponsors at various Olympic sites, Horst Dassler, sometimes known as 'the father of sports sponsorship' and the son of Adidas founder, Adi Dassler, approached the IOC with a concept to internationalize the role of sponsorship for the Olympics. The idea, in its simplest

form, was for the IOC to sell global sponsorships to the biggest firms and have those bundled rights recognized and protected in all countries that opted into what would soon be called TOP. IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch assigned this marketing-related project to Canadian IOC member Dick Pound and, by 1988, in time for the Olympic Games in Calgary and Seoul, TOP was launched (Payne, 2006).

Initially, TOP produced less than US$100 million for the IOC (Burton and O'Reilly, 2012). However, by 1993 the revenue from marketing relationships exceeded US$250 million and, more importantly, that of US television rights. When global technology firm IBM signed on with the IOC in 1992 for eight years, covering four Olympic Games, its US$200 million plus sponsorship deal was believed to be largest sponsorship of all time (although much of IBM's pledge included a blend of cash, product and services). This 'in-kind' agreement allowed sponsors the ability to not only declare themselves 'official' sponsors of the Olympics but also to see their products visibly used during the most-watched sports spectacle of any year (Miller, 2008).

As David Miller pointed out in his exhaustive 2008 text *The Official History of the Olympic Games and the IOC*, what makes an Olympic sponsorship unique is the knowledge by sponsors that there will be no signage or advertising allowed in the Olympic venues (p. 293). This is unique to sport and forces Olympic sponsors to spend aggressively in 'activating' their sponsorship (via television commercials, in-store displays, websites and social media) if they want consumers, vendors or business-to-business targets to see their engagement with the Games. Still, as of 2012, the IOC was reaping more than US$1 billion from 11 worldwide sponsors that included Acer, Atos, Coca-Cola, Dow, GE, McDonald's, Omega, Panasonic, P&G, Samsung and Visa.

Readers should note that while Olympic sponsorships are thought to provide numerous benefits, one aspect of exclusivity is the possibility that a sponsor's competitor may choose to 'ambush' the Olympic rights-holder. In most categories this does not happen, but McDonald's has seen various ambush campaigns over the years by challengers such as Wendy's and Subway whereby the non-official brand utilized sports-themed imagery to create potential confusion among consumers. In Subway's case, their use of Olympic swimmer Michael Phelps and speed skater Anton Apolo Ohno between 2010 (Vancouver) and 2012 (London) created significant controversy (Burton, 2012) for the IOC and the USOC.

As mentioned previously, many research papers have looked at this marketing exercise and reported various findings. One study that

catches the eye was the work of Jensen and Hsu (2011), who analysed 50 major US corporations, including Nike, AT&T, Coca-Cola, Visa, McDonald's and Ford, over a five-year period. This research analysed key performance indicators such as stock price appreciation, total revenue, net income and earnings per share. To adjust for company size, annual compound growth rates (CAGR) and percentage changes for stock price were also factored.

So again, we should ask, does sponsorship pay off? According to Jensen and Hsu (2011, p. 352) it does. They note: 'An examination of the relationship between investment in sponsorship and business performance showed that sponsors who spend at above average rates on sponsorship (so-called super sponsors) outperform those that spend at below average rates'. During the five-year period (2005–9), the super sponsors outperformed other companies listed on the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 index in three of the four key performance indicators. The super sponsors who had the highest net income growth over the five-year period were General Motors (107.9%), Anheuser-Busch (35.0%), Ford (26.0%), AT&T (19.7%) and Procter & Gamble (13.5%). All but three of the super sponsors (Bank of America, Verizon and FedEx) posted higher net income growth than the average of the S&P 500 index (6.50%).

The leading super sponsors in terms of growth in earnings per share were General Motors (111.8%), McDonald's (16.8%), AT&T (10.9%) and Nike (10.2%). All but two of the companies (Anheuser-Busch and Verizon) posted earnings per share growth rates that exceeded the S&P 500 index average of 6.97 per cent. In terms of stock price appreciation, the super sponsors declined by an average of 0.64 per cent, compared to a decrease of 7.94 per cent for the S&P 500 index. The super sponsors who realized the highest percentage increase in stock price were McDonald's (96.2%), Visa (66.7%), Nike (45.7%) and Coca-Cola (37.2%). The assumption herein is that Olympic sponsorship has contributed towards this rise in earnings and share prices.

As always, the decision to sponsor an event brings with it the realization that corporate competitors may attempt to attack the exclusive relationship set up between the event organizer and the sponsoring brand. A classic example of this can be recalled from the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, when Ansett signed on as the official airline partner of the Sydney Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG) only to watch rival Qantas buy a significant amount of television advertising in and around the Games and then to unleash a brilliant advertising campaign featuring young children shown in settings from

around the world singing 'I still call Australia home' (a virtual Australian national anthem). Nowhere in the Qantas advertisements was there any reference made to the Olympic Games or a major event taking place in Sydney. However, the advertising campaign was so powerful and frequent that many Australians and visitors presumed that Qantas was the official sponsor.

As discussed earlier, a more aggressive ambush situation took place ten years later when Subway created advertisements showing Beijing Olympic gold medalist Michael Phelps swimming in a pool and then streaking through the pool wall in a direction (through use of a graphic map that showed the Northwest corner of the US) that suggested Phelps was swimming to Vancouver. Even though there was not a swimming competition at the Vancouver Winter Olympics, the use of Phelps (who won a record eight gold medals in Beijing) in the advertisement suggested he was endorsing an official Olympic sponsor. Unfortunately for McDonald's, the true restaurant sponsor of the IOC and the Vancouver Games, many people were fooled into believing that Subway had some type of relationship with the 2010 Games.

To combat ambushing, official Olympic sponsors are encouraged to deliver this message often and with officially approved Olympic imagery. This benefits the IOC in that the sponsor becomes a de-facto marketing arm of the Olympics (at no cost to the IOC), and because the advertising is frequently conducted via the official television network, this activation has the capacity to help the network recoup its investment to the IOC. This synergy is critical since all parties (the IOC, the sponsor and the television network) are seeking to maximize revenue and return on investment (known as ROI).

During the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, Coca-Cola was so concerned about Pepsi possibly ambushing Coke in their headquarters' home town that it was reported to hold intentions of spending US$300–500 million on activation and leveraging activities (i.e. promotion, public relations and advertising), an amount that would have approached ten times the cost of their Olympic investment of US$40 million (Farrell and Frame, 1997).

Thus, readers should know that sponsorship of major events like the Olympic Games is obviously massive in scope, requires years of planning (note: the sponsorship of the Olympic Games are awarded seven years in advance – the 2020 Summer Olympics will be awarded in July 2013) and many millions of dollars, pounds or Euros. This is sport sponsorship at the highest level and thus arguably with the most risk.

With that in mind, a series of questions is presented here (twice) to two of the leading sponsorship practitioners in the world. Peter Foss

of GE and Michael Lynch of Visa have steered their companies through numerous sponsorship arrangements, but most notably as TOP sponsors of the IOC. Remember that TOP stands for The Olympic Programme and gives exclusive global sponsorship rights to select brands. Said another way, it provides the Olympic trademarks (the words Summer Olympics or Winter Olympics and the five interlocking Olympic rings) for usage in nearly every country where an Olympic team exists, and this is relevant because more countries marched in the Opening Ceremony for the 2008 Beijing Olympics (205) than the number of countries recognized by the United Nations.

Readers are encouraged to consider the questions asked and the responses provided by these esteemed sponsorship leaders.

Visa – Michael Lynch, Vice President, event marketing: Reflecting on Vancouver 2010

Question #1: Many brands have been involved with Olympic sponsorship for the last 30 years but certain brands continually emerge as having performed particularly well in achieving their company's objectives at a particular Olympic Games. Why were the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games of special importance for Visa?

Over the past 12 Summer and Winter Olympic Games, Olympic sponsorship has provided Visa with a global platform to amplify its brand message and drive transactions among an engaged global fan base. The sponsorship platform drives high-level brand goals, promotes specific product attributes and facilitates the development and advancement of the payment infrastructure in Olympic host cities. Visa's Olympic partnership enhances preference for its products and services and extends value to its stakeholders. The sponsorship enhances Visa's global image, heightens brand awareness and increases product usage. The sponsorship provides for marketing and advertising opportunities on a worldwide basis. Visa's unique marketing programmes raise awareness, drive transactions and make the property more valuable to our clients and merchants.

The Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games were important to Visa because it marked the occasion of Visa's first-ever global Olympic-themed marketing campaign. *Go World*, which was originally introduced to US audiences during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and extended to global audiences for the Vancouver Olympic Games,

included television commercials, online advertising, social media executions, regional websites featuring Team Visa athletes, usage promotions, Olympic-themed merchant offers and a global roster of Visa-sponsored athlete (Team Visa). Utilizing the flexibility of the 'More people go with Visa' global advertising campaign, elements of the *Go World* campaign were localized in the US, Canada, Russia, Japan, Korea, China and Latin America to strengthen the campaign's relevance in those markets.

Additionally, as part of *Go World*, Visa heavily utilized popular social media channels – YouTube and Facebook – to place a spotlight on Team Visa athletes, helping bring cardholders and Olympic and Paralympic fans closer to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games and their favourite athletes. Visa also premiered six new Go World commercials via its YouTube *Go World* channel before they aired on network television in the US. And, we invited fans to vote on a *Go World* 'fan favourite' commercial via YouTube that aired during the closing ceremonies.

Go World was also one of the first instances of Visa implementing its innovative 'Audience First' approach to marketing, by which consumer-centric media planning is step one in the creative process. The model is based on understanding the consumer behaviour and media consumption patterns that shape a consumer's buying decision. This serves as the road map for all communications decisions, content generation and strategic focus. The result is more persuasive and relevant creative delivered through channels that amplify messaging and deliver innovation across emerging and traditional outlets.

'Audience First' was instrumental in enabling us to deliver innovative, fresh and nimble thinking that led to breakthrough ideas during our Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games programme – the kind of ideas that could deliver consumer engagement and brand equity and drive transactions on Visa-branded products. For example, we developed a global campaign framework that each of our regions could customize for their local markets, utilized digital channels like YouTube and Facebook to engage with fans, created relevant merchant tie-ins in physical and virtual environments to connect with consumers at the point of transactions and we brought our campaign to life by showing our ads in 3-D within Grand Central Station in New York City leading up to the Games.

Question #2: Visa would have considered many different strategies and tactics to maximize the organization's sponsorship investment in the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games but can you list the key reasons why your company got it 'right' in Vancouver.

There are a number of reasons, but these five are probably the most relevant:

1. The global execution of *Go World* provided Visa with a platform to amplify its brand message and drive transactions among an engaged global fan base. Brand awareness helped result in a 93 per cent increase of international Visa cardholder spending during the Vancouver 2010 when compared to the same 17-day period in 2009.
2. Visa's ability to localize this global campaign across all mediums – from television commercials to on-site activation – to maximize its relevance in different markets led to the activation of more than 300 Visa clients in more than 20 markets around the world against our Olympic Games marketing campaign.
3. Visa showcased innovative marketing executions using 3D video to bring its *Go World* advertising campaign to life in February with a month-long presence in New York City's Grand Central Terminal. The immersive advertising extension featured more than 100 media elements, the most notable being a 3D video projection screen with audio that broadcasted two commercials from the *Go World* campaign – 'Anthem' and 'Trip for Life.'
4. Visa also flexed its marketing muscle and 'moved at the speed of culture', creating a series of special-edition congratulatory television advertisements celebrating the achievements of Team Visa athletes during the Games and airing them immediately following their medal performances on NBC's broadcast. The ads also provoked various commentary discussing Visa's innovative marketing techniques surrounding its sponsorship and athlete relationships.
5. As the exclusive payment services sponsor and the only card accepted at the Olympic Games, Visa is in a unique position to extend the value of its sponsorship to cardholders, business partners, merchants and Olympic host cities. At the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games, Visa installed a special Games ATM network and 800 of point-of-sale acceptance devices at competition and non-competition venues, thereby promoting our products and facilitating the development and advancement of the payment infrastructure in Olympic host cities. *Go World* was prominent on the interior (register branding, point-of-sale) and exterior (banners) of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Superstore (Hudson Bay Company) in downtown Vancouver. Finally, *Go World* was featured throughout Visa's presence programme, including point-of-sale materials at more than 3500 merchants around Vancouver and Whistler.

Question #3: Great activation usually is built around an integrated concept or theme. Please discuss the concept that carried your company's holistic approach to the Olympics. While a brand's marketing tagline most often sums up the brand's positioning, sponsorship activation is often times built around a different catch phrase (e.g. the integration of the company's total effort sometimes wears a promotional phrase or an internal 'call to arms'). Where possible, give details about how your activation plan came together.

In 2009, we aligned our global advertising under a single global theme – 'More people go with Visa' – which gave us for the first time a single global marketing message. This single global theme also provided Visa a flexible platform to create a global campaign in support of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games – *Go World*, elements of which were then localized to create relevance in individual markets across the globe.

With *Go World*, Visa sought to remind viewers of global commonalities and the power of the Olympic Spirit as we celebrated athleticism and human triumph together. *Go World*, like 'More people go with Visa', is also a simple and universal assertion that works across all geographic regions and demographics.

Question #4: Please comment on how your organization's effective efforts in Vancouver allowed Visa to not only achieve category goals (i.e. to deal with your category competitors) but also to stand out against a backdrop of great international and regional brands that were officially involved with the Olympic Games of 2010.

Visa's *Go World* campaign was recognized for its ability to help cut through the noise and solidify Visa's standing as a leading sponsor of the Olympic Games. According to a Turnkey Intelligence study in February 2010, Visa was one of the 'big winners in the contest for recognition among US fans of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.'

Question #5: Visa has been involved with a number of Olympic Games, but what do you personally remember most about the marketing and sponsorship effort going into Vancouver 2010 and what were your thoughts about the company's performance? What were you worried about going into the Games and what pleasantly surprised you as they ended?

In approaching the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games, Visa had a few notable opportunities. First was the opportunity to activate its

sponsorship on a global level, with *Go World.* By doing so, we were able to connect with cardholders and Olympic fans to drive preference for and usage of Visa products worldwide. Second, we had the opportunity to leverage this global campaign to drive high-level brand goals, strengthening relationships with clients and merchants. We were successful in doing so, with 300 Visa clients in more than 20 markets around the world activating against our Olympic Games marketing campaign.

Question #6: What honours or recognition did your brand or company receive for your sponsorship efforts at the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games?

In recognition of Visa's activation around the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games and its broader sports sponsorship portfolio, Visa was named the Sports Sponsor of the Year in 2010 as part of the Sports Business Awards programme, presented by Street & Smith's *Sports Business Journal* and *Sports Business Daily*, the two leading publications on the business of sports. The Sports Business Awards recognize excellence and outstanding achievement in the sports industry.

Perhaps most indicative of the success of Visa's efforts around the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games were media commentary and third-party data endorsements of our sponsorship and marketing campaign (*Go World)*. For example: 'Respondents found Visa to be the most "intelligent" Olympic Sponsor' (Turnkey Intelligence, 4 March 2010); 'Visa produced the most liked ad in the first week of Olympic prime-time coverage' (The Nielsen Company, Viewers Give High Marks to Ads Featuring Olympic Themes, 25 February 2010); 'Visa is getting a bigger boost in pre-Olympic buzz online than any sponsor, reports LBi, an interactive ad agency' (USA TODAY, Bruce Horovitz, 12 February 2010); 'Who would have thought that the most sophisticated message coming out of NBC's coverage would be the Visa commercials with their simple slogan – "Go World" (Boston Globe, Ed Siegel, 25 February 2010); "Go World" programme is the game-changer for global sponsorship. How do you create a global campaign around the Olympics and organize all your agencies and go for it? I've never seen anything like that' (Sports Business Daily, 21 Marketing founder/President Rob Prazmark, 26 February 2010); 'Gold Medal' for Go World advertising campaign' (New York Times, Stuart Elliott, 2 March 2010).

Question #7: While specific dollars are unlikely to be revealed by your groups, trade publications will probably have reported what your organization spent

for its sponsorship and what it spent on activation. Any specificity here would be welcome (such as approximate ratio of activation to sponsorship cost, amount spent on television advertising, market share gain in the year of the Games or years to follow, etc.).

We can conclusively say the Olympic Games have had a positive impact on our brand and our clients' and partners' businesses over the past 20 years. Over the past 12 Olympic Summer Games and Winter Olympic Games, Visa research proves that our Olympics-related marketing programmes are an efficient way to increase brand preference among an engaged fan base and, importantly, the transaction volume that accompanies it while extending our global reach, and local relevance. For example, since 1986, approximately 21 million Visa cards bearing the exclusive Olympic rings have been issued. Additionally, according to the US Sponsorship Tracker, a Visa-commissioned study conducted by Performance Research (an independent research company) consumers who were aware of our Olympic Games sponsorship claimed a 13 per cent increase in Visa card usage. The same report found Visa's brand equity as 25 per cent higher among consumers who are aware of our sponsorship.

GE – Peter Foss, President, Olympic sponsorship, GE: Reflecting on Beijing 2008

Question #1

As a Worldwide Sponsor of the Olympic Games, GE provides a wide range of products and services that are integral to the success of the Games. The 2008 Beijing Games specifically provided us with a launch pad to truly showcase our products through commercial opportunities. With significant growth tied to the 400 projects GE won in and around Beijing, we were able to fully integrate our products or services across the entire Games infrastructure.

From a brand perspective, Beijing proved to significantly support brand exposure. Prior to 2008, GE was a relatively unknown brand in China, and, if known, most thought of us for our legacy businesses of Lighting and Appliances – people just simply were not aware of the broader offerings of our company. The Beijing Games provided that platform which allowed us to tell our story, and from that we saw brand awareness and favourability increase quite significantly between 2004 and 2008.

With Beijing being such a large-scale commercial opportunity, it also highlighted a deficiency on how to address large-scale projects and

positioned GE to be able to handle projects of this magnitude moving forward. And, while China was the main focus for overall growth connected to the Games, we saw the opportunity to truly leverage our Olympic association to enhance the GE brand globally, immersing our global business units into the Games beyond just the local market.

Question #2

Key to GE's success was the fact that we started early. Dedicated resources were put in place to focus solely on commercial opportunities connected to the Beijing Games and building relationships with the city, government and the OCOG. In addition, there was broader integration from a central resource standpoint, with global and domestic teams set up to focus specifically on the Games – whether that be sales, marketing or communications teams – the approach to the Beijing Games truly embodied the 'one GE' mindset.

Question #3

GE's Beijing activation focused on a number of technology solutions. Our 400 infrastructure projects covered 37 official competition venues and 168 commercial buildings in and around Beijing. From a rainwater recycling system at the National Stadium to 73 electrical substations providing power at more than 50 Olympic venues, GE was able to showcase real and tangible contributions that highlighted our infrastructure contributions critical to the host city and the Games.

Ecomagination, the company-wide initiative to develop and market technologies that address environmental challenges, was a focus when providing solutions for multiple clean energy projects in and around Beijing, including a wind farm north of Beijing, which supplied sustainable energy for a number of areas, as well as advanced water treatment systems supplying clean drinking water for the people of China. GE's Ecomagination and sustainability messages were further underscored with advertising campaigns by (our ad agency) BBDO which brought to life various project wins supporting broader Olympic ideals.

On the marketing side, we had tremendous success with our sales incentives and promotional programmes aimed at extending a broader Olympic offering to each of our business units. These initiatives allowed global business units to customize Olympic-themed sales incentive programmes to their set goals and objectives while leveraging trips to the Games and other Olympic-themed prize offerings, extending our Olympic association directly to employees and distributors.

Question #4

With such a wide range of businesses under our Olympic sponsorship umbrella, GE is unique by definition. We have the benefit of truly integrating ourselves into the overall infrastructure and operation of the Games, which not many other sponsors can do. From security systems and electrical distribution, to appliances and medical equipment, GE was able to touch every area of the Beijing Games, which proved to be a success not only in staging the Games themselves but in transforming the host city as well.

Increases in brand awareness, favourability and affinity, specifically in China, were directly attributed to our overall Olympic sponsorship. We saw 31 per cent higher brand favourability among executives aware of GE's Olympic sponsorship. We saw the GE brand become stronger among those who were aware of our Olympic sponsorship, thinking of us as a company who is 'at the forefront of technology, exciting, creative and successful'. The Olympic sponsorship has helped to improve GE's overall image, portraying GE as a more exciting and dynamic company and communicating GE's commitment to the environment.

Question #5

The overall scale and magnitude of the Beijing Games was something that I do not think any of us really realized until it all took place. Just watching the national sense of pride from the Chinese people and the dedication that their government put forth to ensure the Games were a success was something to be commended. The uniqueness of these Games, not only within the country, but also throughout the world, waiting to see how spectacular China would make them, was something I was tremendously proud to be attached to.

Question #6

For Beijing, GE participated in over 400 infrastructure projects that resulted in over US$700 million in revenues.

Analysis

There are obvious differences in the two cases outlined above, not the least of which is how both organizations sought to leverage their sponsorship. In Visa's case, management of their brand exists at both a national level via customers who consider applying for credit or

debit cards (or already exist as Visa cardholders), but also regionally as Visa works with the world's leading banking institutions. These banks ultimately issue Visa cards and high-profile Visa sponsorships of properties like the National Football League (NFL), the Olympics, the FIFA Football World Cup and NASCAR (motor racing) provide numerous opportunities for Visa to engage 'customers' at various levels.

On the other hand, GE, with discounting its then ownership of NBC Television (and NBC Sports) and its consumer sales of light bulbs and other electrical appliances, was looking to use the Beijing Olympic Games to position its international and massive brand (GE) to a large country (China). The reality was that while Americans might see some GE advertising during the actual Games, GE's true objective was not to sell more light bulbs in New York or California. It was to aggressively enter the Chinese market and be seen immediately as a viable company that could produce sustainable benefits for Chinese consumers.

That both companies came away from these Olympic efforts with significant benefits speaks also to the creative process in which these firms approached an Olympic sponsorship. Virtually no company in the twenty-first century buys an expensive sponsorship and does nothing with it. On the contrary, the commitment to an Olympic sponsorship routinely requires that advertising agencies, sports marketing firms, hospitality coordinators and public relations agencies must be employed to optimize a range of challenges.

From a results standpoint, both companies (not surprisingly) reported that they had been hugely successful, but where Visa measured success in new credit cards issued and increased card usage, GE quantified their success in revenues, long-term infrastructure projects and, ultimately, a new frontier successfully entered.

Can sponsorship alone be given the credit both brands claim as part of their involvement with the 2008 and 2010 Olympic Games? This is almost a trick question because most business executives will suggest that any organizational success is rarely the function of one specific tactic or strategy. Usually hundreds, if not thousands of employees are needed to do their jobs in order for each business 'plank' to fall into place.

What is more likely is that Visa and GE's integrated sales and marketing plans both incorporated sponsorship as a key communications platform or vehicle. And, given the notable cost of an IOC TOP sponsorship and concurrent activation costs – amounts that almost certainly required the approval of the organization's CEO (and possibly that of its Board of Directors) – it is obvious that all departments would

have been made aware that a major investment was 'in play' and every employee needed to perform like an Olympian to ensure the company achieved its revenue, ROI or market share goals.

Conclusion

Obviously, no two sponsors are ever alike, nor do they share the same objectives, market conditions, investment budgets or senior leadership. Hopefully, though, in this chapter, we have been able to give readers some insight in how major sponsors like Visa and GE think about their involvement with the Olympics, one of the world's biggest sporting events. From these observations, we can also extrapolate a broader understanding of how sponsors engage properties like FIFA's Football World Cup, the NFL's Super Bowl or the Rugby World Cup.

Each of these major events requires prolific sponsors that are sophisticated in their knowledge of sponsor activation, brand integration, budget management and environmental conditions, such as government authority or competitor ambush. They must also handle time-frame management (sometimes working as much as seven years in advance of an event), cultural nuance (one country's way of conducting business will vary greatly from another's) and changes in executive overview (since leadership in an organization is traditionally fluid with positional changes occurring frequently).

Much can be learnt from the world's biggest sponsors, but sponsorship also works on a smaller local scale as well. Not every firm can consider becoming a TOP partner or even a national Olympic committee sponsor (for domestic Olympic rights), but through the above questions, students and business executives may potentially gleam kernels of insight on how to think about sponsorship.

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11
Olympic Ceremonial, Protocol and Symbolism

Daryl Adair

Olympic ceremony, protocol and symbolism

The Olympic Games are not only a multi-sport competition, they also serve to commemorate the aspirations of the Olympic Movement (OM) by way of ceremony and symbolism. Indeed, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has established protocols for Games organizers, who are expected to effectively manage officially sanctioned rituals and conventions that aim to publicly demonstrate and validate Olympic ideals. This chapter, therefore, focuses on what is expected of Games organizers in terms of ceremony and symbolism, keeping in mind that these aspects of the Olympics have a variety of purposes – pedagogical, ideological and aesthetic. Four of the most prominent Olympic rituals are examined: the lighting of the Olympic flame and the torch relay, the opening ceremony, the awarding of medals and the closing ceremony. The chapter does not deal in any detail with the artistic programmes at the Games, nor the Cultural Olympiad; it is concerned with ceremonial practices that are prescribed by the Olympic Charter and, therefore, the responsibility of an OCOG to address.[1]

Invented traditions: Past and present

The creation of ceremonial practices and symbolic icons for the Olympic Games can be understood as examples of 'invented tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). In terms of the Games of 1896 and beyond, there were efforts to draw upon some of the mythology and romance of the ancient Games, but then create a modern sport event and ceremonial customs relevant to a twentieth-century context. Indeed, although the ancient Olympics were an inspiration for Pierre

de Coubertin and others who advocated the renovation of the Games (Redmond, 1988; Driega, 1997), the modern Olympics were dissimilar to their pre-modern forebears in fundamental ways (Young, 1984). There were both commonalities and differences in the sports and associated athletic events, but more critical here is the social values underpinning the respective Olympics – ancient and modern – and indeed the cultural meanings attributed to their performance. An appreciation of three of these variations helps us to understand the nature of the Olympic value system today.

First, in the ancient Games the concept of amateurism was unknown and so successful athletes could earn lavish rewards for winning, yet the nineteenth century (English invented) amateur code (developed to combat professionalism in sport) was central to Coubertin's vision for what the modern Games were all about (Coubertin, 1900, p. 808; Young, 1984). By the late twentieth century, though, the Olympics had spurned the amateur ethos and, ironically enough, moved closer to the Ancient Games by embracing professional athletes. The modern Games have gone well beyond that, of course, by embracing commercial sponsorship and a raft of revenue-raising strategies to sustain the OM. A goal of this chapter, therefore, is to evaluate Olympic ceremony, symbolism and cultural performance in the context of a post-amateur, neo-liberal IOC.

Second, the Ancient Olympics were avowedly religious, being staged in honour of the Greek god Zeus, for whom a hundred oxen were sacrificed during the Games. Athletes competed to please the Greek gods, with the Olympics thus being a sacred event (Papantoniou, 2008). The modern Games are not part of a supernatural belief system, but can be understood as a civil religion (Crowther, 2004, p. 446; Bellah, 2005). However, there have been religious connotations in the modern Olympics, such as with de Coubertin's notion of consecration (bearing solemn witness) during 'sacred' Olympic ceremonial and his use of the term 'priests' when describing members of the IOC (Rothenbuhler, 1989, p. 142; Crowther, 2004, p. 446). Notwithstanding the secular nature of the Olympics today, the associated ceremonial remains imbued with rites and symbolism that, depending on one's perspective, might be construed as venerable and noble or mythopoeic and archaic (MacAloon, 1981; Adair, 2012). A second goal of this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the ideals of the modern Olympic value system as represented in civic ceremony, symbol and cultural performance.

Third, the ancient Olympics were staged in an avowedly patriarchal Greek society. Women were not only excluded from Olympic athletic events, they were also prevented from watching them – under a penalty

of death (being thrown from the cliffs of Mount Typiaion). Coubertin, while not taking misogyny that far, contended that 'the goals . . . to be achieved by the athletes through participation in the [modern] Olympic Games were not appropriate for women' (Schneider, 2010, p. 40). Coubertin failed in his bid to exclude women from the Olympics, but they were restricted or constrained as participants in many events for much of the twentieth century.[2] A third goal of this chapter, therefore, is to consider how women have participated in Olympic ritual given that men have consistently dominated the IOC and the organization of various Games in the modern era.

In summary, the Olympic Games of today are openly professional and avowedly commercial; they are a profane rather than sacred ritual; and they involve people from all over the world, including both genders. Consequently, it is understandable that the IOC has selectively borrowed some of the ceremonies and symbols of the Ancient Games but overlooked the vast majority of the old customs and practices, which are basically unsuited to the modern world. There is not space, in the context of a single chapter, to explain in detail the origins and evolution of the ceremonies, symbols and protocols that emerged under the imprimatur of the IOC.[3] The main focus is instead on what is expected today of Games organizers in terms of the performance of key Olympic rituals and the meanings attributed to these observances.

The Olympic Charter is an important guide because it contains rules that direct an Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) to take responsibility for key elements of the Games programme. Indeed, it can be argued that the IOC in effect 'outsources' Olympic ceremonial – its operation, cost, promotion and security. The OCOGs operate with the imprimatur of the IOC to present the Olympic brand and its value system in a positive light. Risk of failure is borne, perhaps disproportionately, by the host city and its OCOG. The importance of this role in the eyes of the IOC and Olympic enthusiasts should not be underestimated. As Durantez has argued: 'it is the ceremony, ritual and symbolism which set the Olympic Games apart . . . from what might be in the absence of such pageantry mere world championships of sport' (Durantez, 1988, p. 25).

Lighting the flame at Olympia

The Olympic flame first appeared at the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics at the suggestion of Theodore Lewald, a German member of the IOC. Its role there was quite perfunctory. The Official Report of these Games

simply stated that 'a high flame would indicate for miles around where in Amsterdam the Olympic Games were being held' (Netherlands Olympic Committee, 1928, p. 189). Indeed, the flame had no real significance until the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Two years beforehand, Carl Diem (secretary general of the German Organising Committee) had put a proposal to the IOC to sanction a flame-lighting ceremony at Olympia, which was a key site for the Ancient Games, with a torch to then be carried by relay to the Games arena for the purpose of lighting an Olympic cauldron. The IOC viewed this proposal enthusiastically: to Coubertin, the president, this ritual offered the prospect of a sacred ceremony followed by a procession that combined both spectacle with public witness, the culmination of which was the transfer of a revered Olympic flame to the hallowed site of the Olympiad (Durantez, 1985).

The origins and purpose of Diem's proposal are still debated today, largely because of the political context in which the 1936 Olympics were ultimately staged (Borgers, 1996, pp. 13–27; Krüger, 1998, p. 88; Tunckoli and Sahin, 2010). The establishment of a torch relay, which had the purpose, or at the very least the effect, of showcasing the Nazi regime was hardly an edifying beginning for what is now widely regarded by the IOC as a 'transcendent Olympic symbol' (Durantez, 1985, p. 620). Notwithstanding the propaganda value of the flame ceremony and torch relay for the Nazi Games, it was (re)appropriated for the 1948 London Olympics as a symbol of post-war peace (Durantez, 1988, pp. 61–7). This three-stage ritual has grown in scale, scope and stature, so that the journey from Olympia to the lighting of the cauldron at the Olympic venue is now a showcase event, followed avidly by the media. Ceremonial customs have been (re)invented to suit a modern Olympic narrative, and protocols established for managing these proceedings. What follows is a brief overview of symbolism and practice.

As stated in Rule 13 of the Olympic Charter, the torch relay is preceded by the ceremonial lighting of the flame in Olympia. Fire and flame had important religious roles for the Ancient Greeks; however, its use in the Olympics today is not associated with a supernatural presence or particular belief in an afterlife. There is, nonetheless, plenty of theatre associated with the dramaturgic reconstruction of the lighting of the flame at Olympia: it is sourced from the sun's rays using a parabolic mirror and captured by an actor anointed as the 'High Priestess' of Olympia, suitably dressed in flowing costume, accompanied by a retinue of similarly garbed female assistants against the evocative backdrop of the Temple of Hera. A boy and a girl, wearing olive branches (an ancient marker of victory at the Games), then carry the

flame in slow procession to where it is engaged with the torch specially designed for that particular Olympics (Durantez, 1985, 1988). In terms of the management of this ceremony, the IOC has historically devolved responsibility to the Hellenic Olympic Committee (HOC), which 'also organises the transport of the flame by runners to Athens or, more precisely, to the ancient Panathinaiko stadium which was used for the 1896 Games' (International Olympic Committee, 2011).

These formalities obviously require attention to detail in terms of protocol and forward planning in terms of logistics and event security. Adherence to established rules and conventions is therefore critical; departure from such expectations poses risk, as an example from the Sydney 2000 Games will illustrate presently. The HOC selects individuals to carry the torch on the first leg from Olympia to Athens, with the position of the early torchbearers especially prized, since these runners are in proximity to the lighting ceremony and its accompanying media throng. As a matter of custom, the HOC selects participants who are either Greek or have Hellenic heritage for this part of the ceremony. So, for example, at the London 2012 lighting ceremony in Olympia, the first torch bearer was the Greek swimming champion Spyros Gianniotis, followed by 19-year-old Alexandros Loukos, a British boxer with Hellenic ancestry. On other parts of the route local authorities are responsible for the selection of runners, in consultation with the HOC.

In the case of Sydney, though, there were communication breakdowns and, it seems, the allocation of favours in spite of rules and conventions. To cut a very complex story short, Yianna Souleles, a schoolgirl of Australian and Greek heritage, was expecting to be the first Australian to carry the torch in Olympia after the municipal council of that city offered her that role after an approach on the girl's behalf by her school in Sydney. In the meantime, though, the Greek IOC member and president of the HOC, Lambris Nikolai, had offered this place to Sophie Gosper, daughter of the Australian IOC vice president, Kevan Gosper. Sophie did not have any Greek ancestry and she was 11 years old, one year below the limit set for torch relay runners. When these details became public there was a media outcry (McKay, Hutchins and Mikosza, 2000). Such was the consternation that in the Australian parliament 'the Senate passed a solemn motion expressing its "very deep regret" at the treatment accorded Yianna Souleles' (Gordon, 2003, p. 146). Sophie Gosper still assumed the role of the first Australian to carry the Olympic torch for 2000, while Yianna Souleles was given a place further back in the line of runners (BBC, 2000). Kevan Gosper initially failed to appreciate a conflict of interest – either before or during the

ceremony – but apologized to Souleles in the face of a public relations firestorm. In a show of penance, he eventually withdrew from his much-anticipated personal role of carrying the torch around the Melbourne Cricket Ground, a historic site in the Olympic context owing to it to being the main stadium for the 1956 Games (Gordon, 2003, pp. 143–9). Upon reflection Gosper concluded that his acceptance of the invitation to his daughter had 'led to unfair criticism of the IOC, and diverted attention from the [virtues of] the torch relay' (Gordon, 2003, p. 148). While a member of the Gosper family had been the first Australian to carry the venerated Olympic torch out of Olympia in 2000, Kevan Gosper had consented to a break in protocol, which entailed considerable risk, and he was left to bear the consequences. This episode provides a salutary example to Olympic event managers of the importance of observing rules and conventions associated with the flame-lighting ceremony and the need for transparency therein.

Olympic torch relay

As with the flame-lighting ceremony at Olympia, the Olympic torch relay (OTR) is not the IOC's responsibility. Rule 55 of the Olympic Charter outsources that task to 'The Organising committee of the Olympic Games [which] is responsible for bringing the Olympic flame to the Olympic stadium' (International Olympic Committee, 2011). Once the torch moves beyond Athens, the OCOG is at liberty to plan a relay route, devise appropriate means of transportation (i.e. over land, air and water) and a system for reigniting the flame should it be extinguished and select who has the honour of carrying the torch in relay. Durantez (1988) and Borgers (1996) have both produced extensive accounts of the conduct of torch processions over the years. The scale and scope of these performances are intended to impress. These torch-lit displays are more than just a demonstration that the Games are imminent; they are spectacles intended to showcase the cultural importance of the OM and Olympic ideals. Whether through a sense of *communitas*, adulation or mere curiosity, spectators assemble and bear witness along designated routes, and the media narratives surrounding the events have generally portrayed them in glowing fashion. As out-of-the-ordinary, highly publicized, state-sanctioned occasions, OTRs have become high-profile beacons for the OM and the Games host city.

Although the OTR is the responsibility of an OCOG rather than the IOC, the latter still needs to approve the proposed route, the logistics of the procession, the torch design (which is unique to each Olympics),

restoration of the flame (in the case of it going out), safety and security protocols, and – in an era when commercialism dominates the Games – meeting the needs of sponsors who have sought to be OTR 'partners'. Meanwhile, the OCOG puts in place criteria by which people are either selected or invited to apply to be torch bearers. This typically involves 10,000 or so individuals, so it is no small matter. The planning and management of the OTR is, therefore, complex, involving numerous stakeholders. A recent special issue of the journal *Sport in Society* (MacAloon, 2012) is in fact devoted to the organizational politics of the OTR, particularly challenges and problems since Athens 2004. For enthusiasts of Olympic ceremonial, the articles provide intriguing, sobering, and even disturbing insights, which can only be summarized very briefly here.

In terms of event logistics, MacAloon (2012) explains that an OCOG and/or its contractors are expected to supply security personnel under what the IOC describes as a 'world's best practice model'. For example:

> The security envelope around the torchbearer expands or contracts, accordion-style, depending upon crowd and road conditions, but generally is bounded by the media truck in front, motorcyclists on the sides and the command car in the rear, with the torchbearer and one or more accompanying security runners in the middle. In city contexts, it is a space of around 100–200 square metres.
>
> (MacAloon, 2012, p. 592)

There is, in effect, a pre-arranged route to follow and a spatial envelope around which the torch should be made conspicuous to onlookers, but its motion not compromised by overly zealous fans or physically disturbed by what the IOC regards as dissidents with 'extremist' agendas. A tension lies with the OTR needing to be among 'the people' yet sufficiently removed from their intimate grasp. Only the torch bearers are meant to be 'in touch' with the flame; the role of others is to bear witness and, from an OCOG's perspective, provide visible approval.

Since the late-twentieth century, the spirit of capitalism has driven a reconfigured Olympic spirit: IOC-sanctioned sponsors, logos and merchandise are not simply forms of revenue for the OM, they are part of the Olympic brand. Given these relational dynamics, it is no surprise that the OTR has itself been enveloped in commercialization interests and marketing strategies for Olympic sponsors. Indeed, the OTR itself now provides for specific arrangements for sponsor association, not only during the conveying of the torch by relay, but at events to conclude the

day's procession. Here is a glimpse, during Athens 2004, of formalities to complete an OTR day (Spiropoulos, 2012):

- Activation programme/music presentation by Sponsor A (30–50 minutes depending on the time of the flame arrival).
- Activation programme/music presentation by Sponsor B (30–50 minutes depending on the time of the flame arrival).
- ATHOC torch relay show reel and official relay song (30 minutes).
- Arrival of the torchbearer and protocol ceremony (30 minutes).
- Local cultural programme (30 minutes).
- ATHOC music concert (75–120 minutes).
- Sponsors' activation after-party (30–90 minutes).

The torch is, therefore, not only an Olympic symbol; it is a product that sponsors claim for themselves for marketing purposes. This presents promotional opportunities for companies and revenue for the OCOG and the IOC, but it also entails commercial risk (such as ambush marketing strategies by competitors), or operational risk (such as meeting the needs of sponsors while ensuring the integrity of the OTR ritual). MacAloon's *Sport in Society* volume includes several in-depth analyses of the Athens case, which he deftly summarizes here:

> The Athens relay was marked by a daily battle against sponsor activation teams, particularly Samsung's, violating the rules of ritual protocol and good taste, threatening to trivialize the whole phenomenon. The operations management contractor . . . was again placed in the contradictory position of being the chief on-the-ground defender of the rules of sponsor engagement and ritual integrity, while simultaneously being tasked by the OCOG and the IOC with insuring sponsor satisfaction with returns on investments that paid for hiring the operating company in the first place. This fundamental contradiction has grown to be the central fact of contemporary OFR [Olympic Flame Relay] organizational life.
>
> (MacAloon, 2012, p. 579)

A core responsibility for event organizers is risk management. Without analysis of risk and appropriate planning to mitigate against it, as well as professional responses to problems or crises, a public event may prove counterproductive for stakeholders – even disastrous (Leopkey and Parent, 2009; Reid and Ritchie, 2011). An example of very poor risk management is undoubtedly the staging of the international OTR for

the 2008 Beijing Games. To trenchant critics, China ought not to have been granted hosting privileges for the Olympic Games owing to a number of factors, though particularly its colonization of Tibet, the arrest without trial of political prisoners, and the government's lack of tolerance for free speech and dissenting views (Close, Askew and Xu, 2006; Jarvie, Hwang and Brennan, 2008). With this background, the OTR became something of a magnet for human rights protestors (though some, from an anti-globalization perspective, also focused attention on the multinational corporations who sponsored the OTR) (Horne and Whannel, 2010; Papa, 2010; Majumdar and Mehta, 2012; Rowe and McKay, 2012). While private security firms were implemented to safeguard sponsor interests in the OTR (Planet Event Services [2012]), the security of the torch itself was – depending on the country involved – a responsibility for both BOCOG and local authorities. This could lead to tensions. In Australia, for example, the Australian Federal Police insisted that security of the OTR was its responsibility:

> The Chinese relay organizers [were instructed] that 'security would be done "the Australian way" ', and that 'the Federal Government spelt out frequently before the relay that the [Chinese "paramilitary"] flame attendants, who had formed a phalanx around the torch in other countries, were to have nothing to do with security'.
>
> (Rowe, Glmour and Petzold, 2010, p. 1516)

Richard Pound, a senior IOC representative from Canada, argued vociferously at an IOC Session in Beijing on 4 August 2008 that 'the global flame relay for the Beijing Games should never have taken place', and that it 'came very close to being a disaster'. He claimed that 'the risks were obvious and should have been assessed more carefully'. He then 'demanded to know from the IOC leadership, how this global flame relay had ever been approved and its risks so poorly assessed' (MacAloon, 2012, p. 575). The answer to Pound's question is beyond the scope of this chapter, but his complaint underscores the point raised earlier: strategic risk assessment is a vital part of event management and, in a global context like the Olympic Games, imperative (Rowe and McKay, 2012).

This point is especially salient in the case of the OTR, because it is supposed to be a beacon for international goodwill and the (albeit temporary) cessation of acrimony. As the IOC puts it: 'Like the messengers who proclaimed the sacred Olympic truce, the runners who carry the Olympic flame carry a message of peace on their journey' (International

Olympic Committee, 2011). The Olympic Truce (or Ekecheiria), which the IOC claims has a lineage dating back to the ninth century BC, was reinstated in 1992 as part of the IOC's strategy to appear relevant in international relations, particularly as it endeavoured to establish a relationship with the United Nations (International Olympic Committee, 2012). However, Spaaj (2012) has questioned historical claims about the nature and efficacy of Ekecheiria, while Roche has described its current iteration as part of an IOC-UN 'rhetoric-reality gap', with both organizations promoting what is 'arguably [an] unachievable and unenforceable "Olympic Truce"' (Roche, 2002, p. 170). So, with the reinvention of the Olympic Truce, the OTR ritual has an additional layer of symbolism and complexity. All this before the torch has even arrived at the opening ceremony to light the cauldron and allow for the Games to be declared open.

Olympic opening ceremony

The Olympic Charter (Rule 55) establishes that an OCOG must observe key protocols during the ceremonial opening of an Olympic Games. The associated rituals and symbols are prescribed by the IOC; they are intended to provide a combination of authenticity, solemnity and veneration in a public display that covets the bearing of witness. The Olympic opening ceremony (OOC) can be usefully described as having two aspects: it recognizes the contribution of the host city and by extension the nation of which it is part, and it showcases the OM's claims to universality. In terms of the host nation, the head of state is received at the Olympic stadium by the president of the IOC. Subsequently, athletes representing the different nations parade into the arena: the custom is for Greece to lead, this symbolizing the connection between the ancient and modern Olympics, followed by each nation in alphabetical order – the exception being the host nation, which brings up the rear. At this point the OCOG chair and the IOC president offer speeches of welcome, after which the head of state is invited to declare open the Games in accordance with the wording circumscribed by Rule 55 of the Olympic Charter (International Olympic Committee, 2012a). Herein, mutuality is reinforced: the host city/nation affirms that it is staging the Olympic Games under the auspices of the OM; the IOC anoints the hosts and officially sanctions the proceedings.

The OOC is, as already suggested, a platform by which the IOC makes claims to a global audience about the universality of the OM. The message of international peace that had been conveyed via the OTR and the

Olympic Truce is supplemented at the Olympic venue itself by evocative displays and sounds, as well as a reciting of Olympic values. This includes the release of white doves (associated with the wish for peace); the taking of the Olympic oath by an athlete, a coach and a sports official; the raising of the Olympic flag; and the playing of the Olympic anthem (International Olympic Committee, 2012a). The Olympic Oath was first read by an athlete at the 1920 Games in Antwerp, although de Coubertin had conceived the need for an 'oath of fairness and impartiality' as early as 1906 (Wendl, 1995, p. 4). The current iteration of the oath reads:

> In the name of all the competitors I promise that we shall take part in these Olympic Games, respecting and abiding by the rules which govern them, committing ourselves to a sport without doping and without drugs, in the true spirit of sportsmanship, for the glory of sport and the honor of our teams.
>
> (International Olympic Committee, 2012a)

The Olympic hymn has a much longer lineage, being sung and played at the first modern Games in 1896. However, it quickly passed into disuse, with Olympic host cities conceiving their own music and words in lieu of the original. Not until 1960 was the inaugural Greek hymn declared official, though its performance is shaped by the nuances of the host nation (editor, *Olympic Review*, 1969). The IOC prefers the hymn to be sung in either English or Greek, but it has been presented in a variety of languages depending upon the location of the Games. Like the oath, the hymn is replete with virtuous promises of 'purity' and 'truth' and a 'worthy body'; in that sense it reaffirms de Coubertin's 'classical Greek idea that humans are comprised of mind, body, and character' (Beamish and Ritchie, 2004, p. 357), as well as the IOC's stand on ethical performances in the pursuit of victory. While the general public is unlikely to be familiar with the lyrics and sensibilities associated with the hymn, they are more cognizant of the symbol raised during its performance – the Olympic flag – and the five interconnected rings it displays. They are commonly, though mistakenly, assumed to refer to specific continents, though when conceived by de Coubertin in 1913, the idea was that the colours of the rings – blue, yellow, black, green and red – as well as the white background, were cumulatively found on all national flags at the time across five continents (Lennartz, 2002, p. 32). Irrespective of that, the Olympic rings are without doubt one of the most widely recognized logos in the world, and they convey both internationalism

and universalism on the part of the OM (Séguin, 2011). Intriguingly, the Olympic flag can also be used in a transnational sense. For example, when the United Nations Security Council brought sanctions against the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, the IOC allowed athletes from that country to participate as so-called International Olympic Participants, marching into the Barcelona stadium behind the Olympic flag (Lennartz, 2002, p. 59).

A highlight of the OOC is undoubtedly the lighting of the Olympic cauldron, for this completes the flame ritual at Olympia and the OTR, the culmination of which is the symbolic transfer of solar rays to the site of the Olympic host. The style and structure of the cauldrons have been a design feature of each Games, so too the means of ignition. For example, at the 1992 Barcelona Games, Antonio Rebollo, a Spanish Paralympic archer, was given the task of firing a flaming arrow to light the cauldron – surely the most spectacular opening ever. Whether he 'actually' lit the flame or appeared to for aesthetic effect (the cauldron being lit manually) is still debated, but it was certainly imaginative and entertaining (Garcia, 2012, p. 106; London Spy, 2012). Typically, though, the means of igniting the cauldron are more straightforward, and therefore less of a risk in terms of completion. Also, the person anointed to receive the torch and light the cauldron is usually someone of national eminence within the host country. At the 1996 Atlanta Games, for example, the appearance of iconic boxing great Muhammad Ali was especially evocative because he was racked with Parkinson's Disease, making the lighting ceremony all the more poignant. In Ali's case, provision was made for him to light a fuse that was then used to ignite the cauldron. While many people were moved by this, organizers could hardly please everyone. Garcia, who has produced a book on Olympic ceremonial, is scathing, describing Ali as a 'doddering figure' and a 'has been' (Garcia, 2012, p. 108).

For the broadcast media, the most important segment of the opening ceremony is the OCOG's artistic programme – a grand spectacle of light, sound, dance, music, theatre and narrative. These performances are *expected* to be extraordinary, capturing the imagination of both the assembled throng and the two billion or more watching on television. The OOC, therefore, provides a city and nation with a global spotlight upon which to entertain, impress and inform. The key cultural elements and historical characteristics that may be attributed to the host nation are on dramatic display, showcasing to the world its virtues and some of the changes it has undergone (Lattipongpun, 2010). It is, of course, an imagined sense of national cohesion on display, with conflicts and

complexities given short shrift in what is typically a theatrical performance of self-glorification (Tomlinson, 1996). The very fact that a host nation goes to such effort is a boon for the OM: simply by indirect association the IOC basks in the reflected glory of the artistic programme. The greater the performance by the host, the more impressive the Olympic spectacle appears – one feeding into the other. The IOC has in effect outsourced the OOC and its artistic programme, while the cost of the entire operation is borne by the host. That is strategic management indeed.

Olympic medal ceremony

Once the athletic programme begins, performers representing particular countries are in robust competition with each other to win. There are no cash prizes on offer by either the host city or the IOC (although national Olympic committees may decide to do this separately); instead the goal is to claim a medal – preferably gold. There is arguably now a global obsession with winning medals at the Olympics (Adair, 2012a); however, it would be naive to infer that this is a modern phenomenon. Such was the emphasis upon victory at the ancient Olympics that only the winner of an event was recognized (Young, 1984; Crowther, 1996). The notion of place getters, and indeed the awarding of medals, is an invention of the modern Olympics, though the full combination of gold, silver and bronze medals was not introduced until 1904. Intriguingly, the Olympic charter states that the Games are 'competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries'; it also says that 'The IOC and the OCOG shall not draw up any global ranking per country' (International Olympic Committee, 2011a). In practice, though, neither of these mantras holds true: national Olympic committees (NOCs) organize teams to represent their country, while governments and media focus intensely on the medal haul of their nation's athletes (Strenk, 1979). In a globalympic world of sport, where the luminosity of medals is claimed by countries as a symbolic measure of their international status, prowess and prestige, the feats of athletic individuals are unlikely to be disentangled from gilded patriotism (Adair, 2012a).

There are protocols associated with the design and structure of Olympic medals, which OCOGs are required to observe, since they have the responsibility of arranging and paying for the manufacture of these metallic emblems. For the Winter Games it is rather straightforward because there is no standard design requirement, and non-metallic materials can even be used, such as happened at the 1992 Albertville

Olympics, where the medals were made predominantly of glass (International Olympic Committee, 2011a). Curiously, and by contrast, there are strict requirements for the Summer Games, with the medals needing to be composed of defined metallic combinations. For example, the Olympic 'gold' medal is principally made of a silver base (92.5% pure), but must be covered with at least six grams of 24-carat gold (99.9% pure). From a design perspective it has been traditional for medals at the Summer Games to depict Nike, the winged goddess of victory, on the front in artistic impression. However, since 1972, host cities at the Summer Games have been able to create their own design for the reverse of the medal. In 2008, for example, the Beijing Olympic organizers depicted Chinese culture by inserting a ring of jade inlay into medals. Of course, as with so many aspects of planning for the Olympic Games, final approval of OCOG medal design is left with the IOC (International Olympic Committee, 2011b).

Competing to win medals is followed subsequently by their presentation. The vanquished are removed from the proceedings and the reputational spotlight now shines on the three lead performers and the countries they represent. It is the moment when successful athletes bask in Olympic glory, and nation states too, albeit by association. As Barney has put it: 'Fanfares, public announcements, the presence of dignitaries, the presentation of athletes, the bestowing of awards, along with the display of national flags and rendering of anthems all funnel into the mix that make victory ceremonies climactic events' (1998, p. 89). Intriguingly, in the early days of the modern Olympics, from Athens 1896 to Amsterdam 1928, medal presentations traditionally featured during the Games closing ceremonies. They were, in effect, a collective ritual that involved all athletes, whereas the procedure from Los Angeles 1932 onwards focused on medal presentations to teams or individuals in the wake of particular events. It is a procedure well suited to television, though since it began in the 1930s we cannot attribute its innovation to media interests. The change of procedure owes much to the evolution of the podium as the centrepiece of Olympic medal ceremonies. People of rank and status – royalty, statesmen and civic dignitaries – had traditionally stood upon a podium at the closing ceremony, where they were positioned above victorious athletes, both literally and symbolically, when awarding medals. Count Henri de Baillet-Latour, IOC president from 1925–42, issued a protocol directive to the organizers of the Lake Placid Winter Games and the Los Angeles Summer Games. He had witnessed the use of a podium at the 1930 Commonwealth Games in Hamilton, upon which winning athletes were presented to the crowd.

However, Baillet-Latour conceived of a new role for this apparatus at the Olympics – the presentation of medals. In doing so, he also facilitated a transformation in the symbolism of this ritual. As Barney deftly puts it: 'With the evolution of the victory podium, a new order of victory celebration evolved, one in which the role and distinction of the Olympic medal recipient and dignitary medal bestower were reversed; winning athletes ascended, dignitaries were assigned a less honored position' (1989, p. 90).

With the advent of professional athletes at the Olympics from mid-1970s onwards, this altered relationship was accentuated. For example, Athletics fans can surely remember that it was Usain Bolt who won the 100m and 200m at the Beijing and London Olympics; whether any of them can recall who presented him with medals is a moot point.

On the face of it, medal presentations and similar ceremonial occasions at the Olympics seem straightforward from an operational perspective. However, diligence is required on the part of the responsible OCOG, for problems may occur. Over the years, various major sport events have been the scene of public relations disasters, such as football's Euro 2008, when Nazi lyrics were featured as on-screen subtitles to the playing of the German national anthem. Another key example was the 1992 Baseball World Series, when the Canadian flag was flown upside down by a US marine, and the person singing the Canadian anthem muffed several lines – both of which prompted the US President, George H. W. Bush, to issue a public apology (Palmer, 2012). Regrettably, the London Olympic Games organizers, LOCOG, also made serious errors. A women's football match involving the North Korean team was embroiled in controversy before it even started. This was because the players were displayed on the stadium video screen alongside the South Korean flag. The mistake was seen as a huge embarrassment for LOCOG, which offered an apology to North Korea for the mistake. However, as Palmer (2012) has argued: 'Given that North and South Korea are still technically at war, many critics have asked how the person responsible could commit such an obvious error.' There was, it seems, also a communication problem in respect of the playing of the Hungarian national anthem at a fencing medal ceremony. The version played was, according to complainants, too fast, with gold medalist Aron Szilagyi unable to mouth the lyrics fast enough to keep time. Double checking seems to have been lacking because, as the organizers put it, 'all national anthems had been specially commissioned by LOCOG, recorded by the London

Philharmonic Orchestra and approved by each NOC' (Astapkovich, 2012). Clearly, something had gone awry in that process.

Olympic closing ceremony

After about 16 days of competition, the Olympic Games are completed, though the finish is strategically prolonged by pomp and fanfare. The Olympic closing ceremony (OCC), like its opening predecessor, is intended to accentuate the global nature of the Games and the OM's claims to universal appeal (Lattipongpun, 2010). As with the OOC, the most important segment of the OCC for television broadcasters is the OCOG's closing artistic programme. Once again audiences are presented with a spectacle of light, sound, dance, music and choreography, though the convention tends to be that this curtain call does not outshine what was stupendous opening just over two weeks beforehand. Although the IOC outsources the operation of both the OOC and the OCC, it is at pains to ensure that OCOGs operate in accordance with its vision. According to Rule 38 of the Olympic Charter: 'The opening and closing ceremonies shall be held in strict compliance with the IOC protocol guide. The contents and details of all scenarios, schedules and programs of all ceremonies must be submitted to the IOC for its prior approval' (International Olympic Committee, 2007, p. 77).

The closing ceremony features the entry of the three most important dignitaries at the Games: the head of state in the host nation, the president of the IOC, and the head of the OCOG. This is followed by a grand parade of the flags of participating nations, though – as with the parade of athletes in the opening ceremony – custom decrees that the Greek symbol leads all others (International Olympic Committee, 2012b). The athletes themselves used to parade behind flags at the OOC, but this tradition was changed in 1956 after the Melbourne OCOG was suitably inspired by an anonymous letter to a local newspaper by a Chinese-Australian boy (later confirmed to be 14-year-old John Wing). He was disturbed by the raft of conflicts in the world and, moreover, how they played out at the Games. He came up with the concept of Olympic athletes co-mingling on parade rather than them processing behind their country's flag. This would symbolize their essential humanity rather than reinforce national affiliations and the divisions these had created during the war and into the 1950s (Wing, 2008). Given that IOC protocols are established well ahead of an Olympics, the chance of this idea coming to fruition during the Games seemed remote.

However, as the Official Games Report (*XVI Olympiad Melbourne*, 1956) explains:

> The idea caught the imagination of the Hon. W. S. Kent Hughes [Chair of the OCOG] but it was not until lunch-time on Friday, the day before the Closing, that others who had to be consulted had approved and the President of the International Olympic Committee endorsed the innovation. Time was so short that a public announcement was deemed inadvisable and instructions were issued to cancel the parade if the athletes who mustered proved fewer than 400. The spectators were thus taken completely by surprise.

The Melbourne 1956 initiative has since become standard fare at closing ceremonies, though with variations for the Summer and Winter Games. As the IOC explains:

> They [athletes] walk *en masse* and in no particular order during this parade. For the Games of the Olympiad, the athletes enter the stadium after the artistic programme and remain in the centre of the field. For the Winter Games, the athletes march is near the beginning of the Ceremony, and the athletes take seats reserved for them in the audience.
>
> (International Olympic Committee, 2012b)

This closing parade of athletes is one of the few occasions when representative parochialism is broken down to emphasize the common humanity of athletes – taking the participants and audience beyond group depictions of marching for country behind a national flag. From an IOC perspective, it is nonetheless important that the focus remains on the Olympic flag, which must be larger in dimension than any other flag in the main arena, and as Rule 54 of the Olympic Charter puts it, this ensign 'must fly for the entire duration of the Olympic Games' (International Olympic Committee, 2007).

The next protocol element of the Olympic Closing Ceremony is the symbolic induction of new members of the IOC's Athletes' Commission (AC). This organization, which was inaugurated in 1981, 'meets once or twice a year, serves as a consultative body and is the link between active athletes and the IOC' (International Olympic Committee, 2012c). The AC has representatives on various IOC working groups, and the body's chair is a member of the IOC Executive Board. On the face of it, therefore, this public acknowledgement of new members of the AC suggests

that the involvement of athletes in the running of the IOC is significant. Whether that occurs in practice is another story (see Koss, 2011). In any case, one of the AC members has a protocol duty at the closing ceremony: they present a bouquet of flowers to a representative of the hundreds of Games volunteers, this acknowledging their vital work in the running of the Olympic event (International Olympic Committee, 2012b).

As with the opening ceremony, flags and anthems give a ritualized sense of performative order and hierarchy. The Greek national anthem is played, which the IOC describes as 'a symbol of the link between the Games of Antiquity and those of the modern era' (International Olympic Committee, 2012b); this coinciding with the Greek flag being raised alongside the Olympic ensign. That wedding of symbols is immediately followed by more raising of flags; this time 'the flag of the next host country is then raised to the right of the flag of the current host country to the sound of its anthem' (International Olympic Committee, 2012b). This, of course, emphasizes a transfer from the present to the future, and foreshadows the end of the current festivities. But not before the OM is consecrated. As the IOC describes it:

> Then comes a solemn moment as the Olympic flag is lowered to the sound of the Olympic anthem. The mayors of the current host city and next host city join the IOC President. The mayor of the host city hands the flag to the IOC President, who hands it to the mayor of the next host city. This handover is a symbolic highlight.
>
> (International Olympic Committee, 2012b)

Thereafter, the new host city has eight minutes to present an 'artistic segment', which is an opportunity to convey a snapshot of its culture and an invitation to 'the youth of the world to attend the next Games' (International Olympic Committee, 2012b). Garcia (2012, p. 107) contends that the grandeur and complexity of these events has grown in recent years, in part because they provide performative hints about the ceremonial pageantry of the next Games, including the roles of director and choreographer. This underscores how much the Olympics has become much more than simply an athletic event.

The closing ceremony would not be complete without official speeches. The protocol allows for a valedictory address by the OCOG president, who thanks athletes, volunteers and other key stakeholders, followed by the IOC president, who routinely makes comments about the success of that event and hopes for the success of the next Olympiad,

four years hence. The IOC president's speech is of greater interest than would normally be the case for a sports official: this is because their opinion of the event has the potential for significant public relations capital. Florid announcements such as 'the best Games ever' serve as vindications to the host and a 'feel good' moment for the host city and country. It might also be understood as a symbolic form of compensation. After all, the OCOG and its supporting government have put enormous sums of public money, time and effort into running the Games; they have been the outsourcing body for an Olympic product that garners for the IOC significant profit from commercial sponsors and broadcast rights. This is IOC, not OCOG revenue, so the symbolic capital underpinning the congratulatory speeches are consumed with relish by the hosts, who have already paid handsomely – whether in terms of Olympic facilities, infrastructure, promotion, and so on – for the privilege of putting on the Games.

The final protocol element of the event is the extinguishing of the Olympic flame and the handover of the Olympic flag from the mayor of the host city to that of the next Games provider. Intriguingly, the dousing of the flame has little of the ceremony or grandeur associated with its lighting, though an Olympic host venue cannot recreate the historical ambience and romance of ancient Olympia. On the other hand, a visitor to the IOC website can be assured that the Olympic flame blazes away uninterrupted at the home of the OM, which is Lausanne in Switzerland. For visitors to the IOC's Olympic Museum nestled alongside beautiful Lake Geneva, the Olympic Games do not appear to have ceased (Adair, 2004).

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on four key ceremonial aspects of the Olympic Games: the lighting of the flame and torch relay, the opening ceremony, the presentation of medals and the closing ceremony. As was demonstrated, there are important expectations for event managers in terms of IOC protocol: a mix of custom, convention and rule, with the Olympic Charter, the prime procedural guide. By itself, though, the charter cannot anticipate all of the operational and liturgical complexities of a mega-event, such as in the symbolic nuances of national flags, anthems and lyrics, or the challenge of managing an OTR that showcases the Games while, concurrently, satisfying the marketing expectations of torch-relay sponsors.

Today's IOC, while technically not-for-profit, is a neo-liberal transnational organization with vast income and tremendous resources. By

outsourcing the Games to host cities around the world, the IOC basically devolves itself of commercial risk and transitions the operation of the event from one place to another every four years. It is a brilliant business model, for even though staging the Games typically costs the hosts hundreds of millions of dollars, applicants keep queuing up to bask in the reflected glory of what they regard as a once-in-a-lifetime globalympic experience. 'We got the Games' is a common refrain from those who put together successful bids. And once cities 'have' the Olympics, they set up an OCOG in which to plan what is undoubtedly the world's most complex mega-event.

Part of an OCOG's Games preparation involves understanding the IOCs expectations around ceremony and protocol, for this is where the Olympic value system is displayed to the world. The primacy of the Olympic flag, the reciting of the Olympic Oath, the Olympic flame ceremony and torch relay, these and other rituals are what, from an IOC perspective, put the Games on a higher pedestal than other sporting contents. Since the late-nineteenth century the Olympics have been intended to have pedagogical value, however the amateur ethos is no longer a centrepiece of this moral universe, and the Corinthian virtues of participation have been expunged by an ever-increasing obsession with winning (and chronic fear of failure thereof). So while the ceremonial apparatus of the Olympics have remained reasonably consistent, albeit with innovations during the twentieth century, the value system underlying athletic performances at the Games has been transformed.

Importantly, this also includes an increasing capacity for women to compete in all events they wish to at the Olympics. Yet the IOC and indeed most NOCs remain overwhelmingly male dominated (Henry and Robinson, 2010). As is well known, this pattern of patriarchal leadership is typical in a raft of public institutions around the world, and is even reflected in Olympic ceremonial. For example, at the 14 Summer and Winter Olympics over the past 20 years (1992–2012) there has only been one female head of state opening the Games, Queen Elizabeth II at London. More pertinently, there has *never* been a female president of the IOC, so no prospect of a woman presiding as the official voice of the OM at the Games.

Olympic ceremony, protocol and symbolism may seem archaic to some, a relic from a time when the Games were intended for part-time, amateur athletes. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, Olympic ritual has remained buoyant, and, if anything, has received increased exposure from television and emergent forms of media. The Games have been open to full-time and professional athletes since the last quarter of

the twentieth century, and from that time the IOC has deftly reinvented itself as a neo-liberal, commercially strategic, transnational organization. Olympic ceremony, which might be conceived merely as theatrical, has a more profound purpose in providing a cultural framework around which the Games are staged. The messages are rather mixed: the idealism of participation for its own sake remains, but for athletes the biggest stage of all is the medal podium. This is where ceremony shines a spotlight on performance.

Notes

1. The Cultural Olympiad is mentioned briefly in the *Olympic Charter* (Rule 39), but the expectations are very open: 'The OCOG shall organise a programme of cultural events which must cover at least the entire period during which the Olympic Village is open. Such programme shall be submitted to the IOC Executive Board for its prior approval.'
2. Even today there are struggles: women's ski jumping was banned by the IOC at the Vancouver Games in 2010, but will finally be permitted at the 2014 Games in Socchi (Associated Press, 2011).
3. Readers seeking developed accounts are advised to consult the classic study by MacAloon (1981) and the more recent contribution by Horne and Whannel (2012).

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12

Managing the Games: Prospects for the Future

Daryl Adair and Stephen Frawley

> Holding an Olympic Games means evoking history.
> *– Pierre de Coubertin*

This volume had a defined goal: to critically examine the planning, management and delivery of the Olympics as a mega-event. It evaluated how organizers produce the Games, taking into account knowledge from previous Olympics, as well as the emergence of models of best practice. This operational focus is an underexplored aspect of the Games, and so the book is merely a step towards gaining a more sophisticated understanding of what is required to run an Olympic mega-event. A single volume cannot do justice to the vast operational repertoire required of Olympic Games organizers, so the book focused on a selection of key aspects of Olympic programme delivery. There are, of course, further areas to be researched; what follows is a sketch for additional scholarly inquiry.

There are several important operational aspects of the Games that ought to be included in a further volume of essays devoted to the planning and delivery of Olympic mega-events. We offer eight key recommendations, in no particular order. First, preparing for and staging the Games require a sophisticated understanding of both logistics and supply chain management. The global scope and scale of the Olympics makes these operations particularly complex. The movement and co-ordination of equipment and goods involves the interaction of numerous parties and the transaction of associated data. There are logistical challenges in all of this: internal and external variables, government regulations, levels of infrastructure, periods of peak demand and so on. Decisions made at each step of the process are subject to numerous influences, some intended and others unintended, each of which

contribute to supply chain performance. The staging of an Olympic Games is reliant upon the efficient and effective movement of equipment and goods needed to build facilities, update public infrastructure and stage opening and closing ceremonies.

Second, the Olympics have evolved by embracing technological innovations; indeed, it could be argued that the Games now strive to be 'cutting edge' in terms of event programming, adjudication, media production and so on. Technology at the Olympics is not new; photo finishes and electronic timing have featured for many years. However, the degree to which technology shapes the Games is unprecedented; some sports have actually been refashioned to suit Olympic audiences. Fencing's electronic foil, sabre and epee and its computer-generated scoring system is an obvious example of this type of 'technolympic' innovation. This has given fencers greater confidence about the veracity of competition results and improved the visual experience for both television and live audiences. On the other hand, technology has been a source of controversy and dispute at the Olympics. For example, in recent years it has become common for swimmers to wear so-called fastskin suits as an aid to performance, this leading to an unprecedented flurry of world records. Many of these suits have now been either banned or had their scope curtailed, so that swimwear at the London Olympics was fundamentally different to that of the Beijing Olympics. These two examples – equipment and apparel – indicate just how important technology is to Olympic sports programmes. However, there are many more, perhaps less obvious roles for technology at the Games, such as with lighting, sound and announcements at competition venues, as well as fibre-optic cables and wifi access allowing Internet communication for broadcasters and the media. The Olympic Games are, in short, technology dependent.

Third, Games organizers have numerous responsibilities in terms of public safety and security at an Olympic event. Crowd management is a fundamental requirement, taking in the flow of people between venues, movement and seating within venues, deployment of stewards to assist people to find seating, provide support for those with a disability and so on. Crowd managers liaise with programme organizers to minimize surges of people between venues, and they confer with medical staff to provide support for anyone who is unwell. Meanwhile, security managers operationalize both overt and covert mechanisms to surveil both Olympic venues and the surrounding precinct. Terrorism is not new to the Games (i.e. Munich 1972 and Atlanta 1996), but in the wake of 9/11 the perceived risk of violent dissent has been magnified. Consequently,

each of the Olympics from Athens onwards has expended enormous sums of money on security and surveillance equipment, technologies, training programmes and specialist staff. The Olympic Games are, in short, a mega-event that involves some of the world's most advanced (and expensive) security protocols.

Fourth, because the Olympics involve tens of thousands of people in a relatively confined area, planning for and operationalizing medical risk and emergency protocols are essential. Swift access to sick or injured Olympic patrons is vital; so too is the capacity to either treat on site or transport immediately to hospital. There are important efforts to minimize epidemiological risks: the spread of disease in confined spaces can be minimized through adequate provision of public bathroom facilities, regular cleaning, rubbish removal and professional sanitation protocols during the event. This is not only an issue for patrons; rooms in the Athletes' Village ought to be a priority in terms of cleanliness. Performers who are unwell will surely disappoint themselves and audiences.

Fifth, one of the great logistical challenges for Olympic Games organizers is the management of ticketing and its accreditation. Those responsible for ticketing need to formalize a means by which they are made publicly available; this is often very complex and thus susceptible to confusion among consumers. The accumulation and distribution of tickets has often been a source of complaint at the Olympics, so planning to minimize problems and alleviate public concerns is vital. There is also the added problem of deterring black market production and sale of fake tickets, as well as scalpers making profits from the unauthorized sale of tickets.

Sixth, the Athlete's Village has been a cornerstone of the Olympic Games for many years. The intention is to accommodate competitors in an environment with close proximity to Games' venues and to provide for their rest and sustenance between events. It is fair to say that there have been significant variations in the quality of the Athletes' Village at various Games, which has had implications for the comfort and general experience of the Olympians housed therein. Surprisingly little has been written about the environment needs of athletes – who too often seem to be overlooked in debates about venue design and best practice. Indeed, many athletes no longer stay at the designated Athletes' Village, preferring to isolate themselves from the hustle and bustle of Olympic venues. This limits the interaction between athletes, something that used to be a hallmark of Games for the latter half of the twentieth century.

Seventh, drug testing at the Olympic Games harks back to Mexico City, 1968, so it is hardly new. However, the protocols and technologies associated with the collecting and processing of bodily fluids has become extremely technical, and at an event like the Olympics must be managed meticulously. Not only do Games organizers need to follow WADA regulations, they must provide on-site facilities to appropriately house biological samples. There is, of course, an enormous body of literature on drug testing and its veracity, effectiveness or otherwise. There is, by contrast, much less discussion about how best to plan for and operationalize drug-testing procedures and facilities in an Olympic Games setting. If an LOCOG failed in this area, there would be enormous ramifications in respect of the so-called fight against drugs in sport, and indeed questions about confidence in the integrity of sport itself. In short, under the current WADA regime, about which the IOC is a core supporter, drug testing is as important as awarding medals. It is taken very seriously and, from that perspective, sport cannot function without a zero-tolerance mantra underpinned by proscribed performance-enhancing substances and methods.

Eighth, the Olympic Movement has embraced the Internet, such as with its vast website resources and virtual tours of the Olympic Museum. It has also embraced social media, with its own Twitter, Facebook and YouTube accounts with millions of followers. However, while the IOC and various NOCs tweet away and upload photos and videos, athletes at the Olympics have had mixed opportunities and experiences in respect of social media. NOCs from different countries have imposed a raft of rules on athletes, which to critics amounts to suppression of free speech. The key concern seems to have been content rather than lack of access: both the IOC and NOCs are conscious of brand image and wish to have positive stories, rather than criticisms, from athletes. For Olympians who have been given unfettered access to mobile devices, a very different concern has arisen – an overuse of social media to the detriment of their focus on sport performance. Another potential issue is athletes using social media to promote their association with a sponsor, which may amount to ambush marketing. All of this means that in an era of social engagement by mobile devices, the management of new media by Olympic athletes is a complex area in terms of access and operation.

These eight recommendations for further research do not exhaust the range of areas and issues pervading the planning and delivery of the Olympic Games. The operational challenges of this mega-event are in

one way ameliorated by knowledge transfer from previous Games, but in another way the complexity of the Olympics as a globalized performance brings forth new tests for event managers. We trust that this book, together with areas for further research outlined in this chapter, provide a suitable introduction to the challenge that is *Managing the Olympic Games*.

Index