TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CRIME CONTROL & SECURITY

Fluid Security in the Asia Pacific

Transnational Lives, Human Rights and State Control

Claudia Tazreiter
Leanne Weber
Sharon Pickering
Marie Segrave
Helen McKernan

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Claudia Tazreiter
University of New South Wales, Australia

Leanne Weber
Monash University, Australia

Sharon Pickering
Monash University, Australia

Marie Segrave
Monash University, Australia

Helen McKernan
Swinburne University of Technology, Australia

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Claudia Tazreiter
University of New South Wales
Australia

Leanne Weber
Monash University
Australia

Sharon Pickering
Monash University
Australia

Marie Segrave
Monash University
Australia

Helen McKernan
Swinburne University of Technology
Australia

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Preface

As this book was being finalised, the Australian government celebrated the establishment of the Australian Border Force on 1 July 2015 with the swearing in of the head of the agency, former Australian Capital Territory chief police officer Roman Quaedvlieg. The Australian Border Force brings together all 'operational border' functions, including customs, border security, investigations, detention, and immigration and citizenship governance and compliance, and has powers outlined in the new Australian Border Force Bill 2015, passed by the Australian Parliament on 15 May 2015. In launching the new entity, Prime Minister Tony Abbott described the force's officers as 'the guardians of Australia's safety, security and prosperity' (ABC, 1 July 2014). One key feature of the Border Force is the secrecy surrounding what are termed 'operational matters', referring primarily to the on-water activities carried out under 'Operation Sovereign Borders' (introduced in September 2013 with the election of the Abbott government) in intercepting and turning back boats carrying asylum seekers before they reach Australian shores. It is yet to be seen what impact the new Border Force will have on the less controversial, perhaps mundane, yet vital aspects of its broad mandate to ensure efficient and just immigration processes and regulations, to foster a holistic understanding of citizenship and access to it, and to work in ways that enhance rather than narrow tolerance and respect for the diversity that is a social fact in multi-ethnic and multicultural Australia.

This book focuses squarely on the experiences of temporary migrants in the Asia-Pacific region while at the same time locating the subject matter within the context of international migration and its global governance. According to the Global Commission on International Migration, the Asia-Pacific region is home to 57.7% of the world's population. Migration patterns within and beyond this region are fluid and complex. These movements involve asylum seekers using Asian nations as 'transit' points on their way to nations such as Australia, economic migrants travelling from rural to urban areas, sex trafficking networks, and temporary labourers. The economic, political, cultural and geographic complexity of the Asia-Pacific region make it impossible to generalise about migration patterns, as does the lack of concrete data on migration flows due to undocumented migration and corrupt official processes.

On his visit to Australia in November 2011, US president Barack Obama addressed the Australian Parliament. In his speech, the president outlined his intention to shift US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, undoubtedly a response to the growth of China as an economic and military superpower. In outlining US aims for the region, Obama focused on 'commerce and freedom of navigation' as hallmarks of development. This economic perspective inextricably couples democracy with financial growth, a prevalent theme of both US and Australian government rhetoric concerning the alleviation of poverty. The sole reference to human rights in the president's speech was to so-called first-generation rights: freedom of speech, association, assembly, religion and freedom of the press, enshrined in the 1966 UN *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*. However, to be effectively realised, these rights ought to be understood in tandem with the rights enshrined in the 1966 UN *Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*.

The Approach of This Book

This book addresses a significant problem for immigrant societies such as Australia, that of balancing national systems of migration control and border management with migrants' rights and the transnational lives and aspirations of individual migrants and their families. A number of variables shape the experiences of those who make the decision to migrate, including (1) levels of education, qualifications and skills; (2) access to and knowledge of regular/legal routes of migration; (3) feelings of cultural affinity and recognition in the host society; and (4) access to and knowledge of residency and membership rights in the host country. These variables interact with the primary decision-making drivers of migration for individuals. In other words, a person's position on a migration continuum relative to the variables outlined above interacts with their decision-making, access to information, entitlements and forms of social recognition.

Drawing on human rights and human security literature, this book explores the above variables within the framework of what we have labelled 'domains of security'—cultural, legal, economic and physical security. These often intersecting domains are defined from the perspective of the individual and are further analysed through the processes that (1) drive mobility, (2) mediate mobility and (3) influence reception and inclusion. The domains of security operationalised within this study are defined in more detail in Chap. 2. Our articulation of these processes as 'fluid security' is conceptualised as a flexible toolkit that can

be deployed by migrants to negotiate their everyday aspirations, needs, realities and self-understanding. Individuals with a temporary status in a receiver society and variable access to rights (even though they may contribute to that society through taxation) utilise adaptive strategies for support, conviviality and survival. In the four case studies explored in this book, we label such circuits of support and survival 'hubs of security'. These hubs of security are conceived of as fluid formations that emerge and dissipate in line with the day-to-day needs of temporary migrants with little or no access to state support.

The Australian Context

In recent years, the Australian government has shifted the priority of its migration programme from permanent toward migration towards temporary employment visas. This shift has provided greater opportunities for workers to enter Australia's employment market, including workers from throughout the Asian region. The *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper* delivered on 28 October 2012 highlights the economically and culturally transformative changes underway in Asia and calls on Australian businesses and governments to take advantage of these changes by forging partnerships in the Asian region. An example of a popular temporary worker visa used to engage Asian employees in Australia is the Business Long Stay—Standard Business Sponsorship (Subclass 457) Visa. There are currently some 620,000 temporary work visa holders in Australia (Ronson 2012). Key to the success of migration management in the twenty-first century will be the strategies adopted to regulate the other side of temporary migrations—unplanned and unauthorised migration. The new knowledge gained in this project will help Australia and other high-immigration countries to develop policies and practices that are more adaptable to the changing patterns of migration as they relate to the labour market, local and transnational cultures and transnational migrant communities.

Temporary employment arrangements for foreign workers are one important facet of an increasingly precarious global labour landscape that affects both migrant and domestic workers. The Australian Council of Trade Unions estimates that 40% of Australia's population is engaged in 'precarious employment' (ACTU 2011; Howe 2012). However, a range of factors, including low levels of education and skills training and limited knowledge of and access to collective bargaining workplace rights, make migrant workers from poor countries of the Global South particularly vulnerable to discrimination and exploitation. The concept of

denizenship describes migrants' experiences of life on the fringes of society, unable to access residency or citizenship rights while often paying taxes and contributing to their host society in other ways. This living of 'shadow lives' is a growing problem in many parts of the world, including Australia. In such a scenario, residents and citizens become 'free riders' of the labour of precarious migrants (Rubio-Marin 2000). While individuals, groups and families seek to use migration as a pathway to fulfilling basic needs through paid work, as well as a means to other imagined futures, states restrict this pathway for some groups of migrants, often in reaction to domestic political currents (Buroway 2014).

States are faced with complex and fast-changing priorities in balancing the rights of temporary workers with the interests of businesses and long-term residents and citizens. The issue of precarious employment and its effects on Australia's migration programme has national as well as global ramifications. Similarly, the treatment of migrant workers, both by their employers and in the process of applying for temporary visas and permanent residency, impacts the conditions of employment for residents and the native-born. Nevertheless, temporary migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

In a recent report, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development found that migrants were more likely than native-born workers to be employed in temporary jobs (OECD 2007). Gender also remains an important factor, with women continuing to dominate domestic and care work. Along with the broader services sector, domestic and care work is characterised by casualisation and the employment of migrants on a temporary basis, with reduced levels of unionisation and bargaining power in demands for better wages and conditions. A pathway to a regular migration status and permanent residency or citizenship is one aspect of basic rights.

Before outlining the substance of the book in Chap. 1, we cite a recent diagnosis of the times by the influential sociologist Saskia Sassen. Her recent work on expulsions (2014) develops an idea of great relevance to the everyday circumstances faced by temporary and particularly irregular migrants. She is interested in identifying the 'systemic edge', or the economic, social and biospheric tipping points which can lead to the expulsion of some populations from meaningful participation in a society. Sassen writes:

> This edge is foundationally different from the geographic border in the interstate system. The focus on the edge comes from the core hypothesis … that the move from Keynesianism to the global era of

> privatizations, deregulation, and open borders for some, entailed a switch from dynamics that brought people in to dynamics that push people out. (p. 211)

Sydney, NSW — Claudia Tazreiter
Melbourne, VIC — Leanne Weber
Melbourne, VIC — Sharon Pickering
Melbourne, VIC — Marie Segrave
Melbourne, VIC — Helen McKernan

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List of Abbreviations

ACTU	Australian Council of Trade Unions
AE	Australian employer
CBD	Central Business District
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DEEWR	Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship
DIBP	Department of Immigration and Border Protection
DIMA	Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFC	Global Financial Crisis
ICCPR	*International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*
ICESCR	*International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*
ICRMW	*International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*
IELTS	International English Language Testing System
ILO	International Labour Organization
NGO	Non-government organisation
NSW	New South Wales
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PR	Permanent residency
PSWP	Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SCV	Special Category Visa
SWP	Seasonal Worker Program
TTTA	Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement
UDHR	*Universal Declaration of Human Rights*
UK	United Kingdom

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
USA	United States of America

1
In Search of 'Fluid Security': The Outline of a Concept

This chapter introduces the key conceptual framework of the book and sets out the problems faced by temporary migrants in Australia that were revealed through the case studies carried out during the course of our research. We consider contemporary migration patterns at both a global and regional level (in the Asia-Pacific region) with reference to key literature on migrant transnationalism, labour mobility and the global market in tertiary education. The discussion explores the tension between mobility and security by considering the nexus of human (in) security, human rights and border control, with reference also to state practices that create insecurity by criminalising some border crossing activities and creating conditions conducive to the exploitation, marginalisation and victimisation of non-citizens.

The chapter ends by considering in broad terms the types of policy approaches made possible by a new ethical framing of borders, citizenship and rights, a framing that enables work towards reconciling national and human security in the context of mobility and that challenges the prioritisation of national security over human security in immigration and border control policies. This reconciliation is what we refer to as 'fluid security'.

Mobility in the Twenty-First Century: New Realities, New Challenges

Patterns of migrant mobility have fundamentally changed in recent decades, particularly affecting countries of immigration such as Australia, also referred to as 'settler' societies (Dauvergne 2015). The critique set forth in this book challenges the longstanding approach to nation-building of predominantly one-way, permanent immigration. In the twenty-first century, migration is organised and experienced in ways

quite distinct from earlier periods, when planned and largely state-led permanent or semi-permanent migration spurred the growth and economic development of large-scale immigration countries like Australia. Contemporary migration is increasingly characterised by multiple movements and circularity rather than one-way mobility. New migration patterns are increasingly fluid and unpredictable: south–south, north–south and south–north. Such changes emerge from a variety of factors, fewer permanent work opportunities; increasingly transnational family and friendship networks and wider social and political networks that open up opportunities for new forms of mobility; and the demand for a highly mobile yet dispensable workforce by neoliberal, globally connected economies. In keeping with neoliberal values, states have increasingly devolved responsibilities to individuals, with the result that wellbeing and life outcomes have become disconnected from broader socio-political processes. As David Harvey affirms, 'Individual success or failure is interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings … rather than being attributed to any systemic property' (2005, pp. 65–6). Economic systems are increasingly globalised and must be highly adaptive and reactive to transnational rather than domestic needs and forces. Similarly, human mobility has become more globalised, with individuals and families reacting and adapting to signals both within and outside their country of birth or residence. These international market forces buffet local and distant economies and individual livelihoods.

Human mobility has been subject to the regulation and indeed re-regulation of borders in recent years, with uneven flows of authorised and unauthorised, planned and spontaneous mobility across national borders (Castles 2011a; Creswell 2010; Dauvergne 2008; Dauvergne and Marsden 2014; Sassen 2006). It is of critical importance to untangle the descriptions of migrant categories: those who enter legally under migrant worker schemes or on student visas (regular or legal migrants) versus smuggled workers and unauthorised entrants, including those on temporary visas who overstay and become classified as 'illegal' (irregular migrants). A qualitative difference in the economic and socio-cultural security experienced by high-skilled migrants in comparison to low-skilled or unskilled migrants has been identified as significant. This contrast is attributable not merely to the relative rewards for different types of work (economic security), but also to the invisibility of the rights deficits that irregular migrants face (cultural [in]security) (Barchiesi 2011; Pickering et al. 2013; Tazreiter 2013a, b). That is, those migrants who cannot fully participate in a society in which they reside, study or work—even if only temporarily—are likely to experience forms of social and cultural exclusion or

discrimination due to their 'in-between' status. In some cases, temporary, and particularly irregular, migrants may also guard themselves from full social immersion in a new society. Although this study focuses on temporary migration that is planned and authorised, the space between legal and illegal, authorised and unauthorised migration is fluid and porous.

Alongside the flow of global migrant labour, training and education are becoming increasingly global commodities, with individuals seeking opportunities outside their countries of citizenship or residence. The recruitment of international students to Australia has only recently evolved into the present business model of the marketisation of education. In earlier eras, the view of education as a form of aid and development in the Asia-Pacific region was promoted through such programmes as the Colombo Plan. Australia was one of seven founding nations of the Colombo Plan, which originated in 1950 to provide opportunities to students in South and South-East Asia to undertake tertiary education in western countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the UK and, later, the USA (Meadows 2011). In 2014, the Australian government announced a new Colombo Plan that seeks to build collaborations within the Asia-Pacific region by funding Australian students to study in the region for up to 1 year, with Indonesia a particular target destination.

The changes in migration patterns and the increase in temporary rather than permanent migration are new phenomena that impact individuals, communities and the governments that regulate the flow of populations. In this increasingly fluid context, temporary migrants are more susceptible to forms of abuse and exploitation because their status as non-citizens and non-permanent residents limits their options for redress in the countries in which they work or study. At the same time, temporary migration movements and the processes of globalisation prompt social change within host societies and neighbouring states, as well as in the migrants' countries of origin, through reappraisal of the fundamental definitions of citizenship, rights and residency. In this book we are particularly interested in understanding the consequences of temporariness for migrants and their families and for the host societies and countries of origin. While migrants are expected to cope with the uncertainties and insecurities that accompany the temporary status into which they have voluntarily entered, these are the very conditions of life that, when experienced by citizens and residents (who are able to access rights), can topple governments. There is an inherent contradiction between the desire for certainty and security among the members of a particular political community, often manifested in border control and restrictions for newcomers, and the reality of neoliberal globalisation

with its devolution of state responsibilities to the individual and the associated de-linking between state and citizen.

Temporary migrants, particularly those whose daily subsistence is precarious, are often invisible to the institutions, citizens and residents in the countries where they live, study and work (Bigo 2002; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Davis 2004; Appadurai 2006; Duffield 2008). The United Nations estimates that more than 214 million migrants, often without residency rights, live and work in a country other than that of their birth or citizenship (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] 2009). The fact that many of these individuals find themselves without adequate protections leads to a central problem with which this book engages: the jurisdictional and theoretical gaps that prevent non-citizen migrants from enjoying a secure life in a host country. The jurisdictional gap arises from nation-state sovereignty and its taken-for-granted logic of how protection is conferred on individuals. The theoretical gap is found between theories of justice and membership that articulate a post-national or supra-national world and the still-dominant, state-centric visions of security. The state-centric view is actualised in migration systems, migration governance and, importantly, in the rhetoric of the politics of migration—how belonging is imagined and communicated.

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990 and entered into force on 1 July 2003, is a significant guide for countries hosting migrant workers, but no western state has as yet ratified the convention. Mindful of the lack of international legal obligations towards migrant workers, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has produced a framework of non-binding principles for a 'rights-based' approach to labour migration. The ILO principles, meant to guide states in national policy and bilateral and multilateral agreements, acknowledge the need for new approaches to rights and entitlements for temporary non-citizens.

The gap in international norms identified by the ILO is most evident at the level of national migration governance, where the state-based model of citizenship and its attendant obligations leave temporary migrant workers in vulnerable circumstances. Irregular or temporary migration status may mean, for example, that individuals have variable access to services such as healthcare, education and housing. Notably, scholars have highlighted a range of bottom-up approaches that promote more democratic, rights-based governance of international migration. In the absence of consistent, rights-oriented action by states, transnational social movements, unions and migrant associations are working towards a rights-producing politics (Piper 2015).

The Role of the Corporatised State in Migration Governance

States remain central to the granting of rights to individuals through formal membership (citizenship), while also extending partial rights to residents and denizens (those inhabiting a middle point between citizenship and illegality). Individuals born in poor or politically and economically fragile states and those who have migrated but retain their unauthorised status are largely excluded from the protections of citizenship. The model of state-based citizenship, with its linked bundles of rights, is increasingly recognised as a key driver of global inequalities and related insecurities. The state-based citizenship model is premised on strong forms of exclusion (Bauböck 2010; Bosniak 2006; Carens 2010; Fraser 2009) and rests on inequalities embedded historically through colonisation and empire (Mignolo 2011).

Recent migration scholarship has challenged the prevailing approaches and methodologies applied to the study of the lives of migrants who live in and between host societies and who often undertake multiple migrations to ensure their basic survival. This challenge arises from both conceptual and practical issues. Conceptually, migration has long been theorised primarily through the prism of the nation-state and its economic and demographic needs, with the nation-state seen as a 'container' of peoples, identities and culture (Amelina et al. 2012a, b; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Over the past decade, migration and legal scholars have increasingly pointed to problems in policy development and sociocultural relations that result from a logic that understands the social realm as co-extensive with the national. This logic has not only dominated theories of migration and belonging, but it has also embedded itself in the administrative and policy-making functions of the state, resulting in tangible and symbolic exclusion of some individuals and groups. Scholars at the cutting edge of research on human migrations, rights and belonging are building an ethical framework that eschews the dominance of methodological nationalism, utilising a body of empirical evidence on the circumstances of populations situated outside of state protections. This new ethical framework has made significant contributions to new theories about the often abject life of populations who are regularly invisible to institutions and have variable access to basic rights (Benhabib 2004; Bigo 2002; McDowell and Wonders 2010; Nyers 2010; Papastergiadis 2010; Tazreiter 2004, 2012, 2013a, b).

Sociological critiques of the state in the era of late capitalism, or what some refer to as third-wave marketisation (Buroway 2014), lead to accounts of globalisation and neoliberalism that focus on unequal inclusion in market society (Polyani 1985; Piketty 2014). The critique

of primary relevance to this study argues that inequalities discourses ought to be central in attempts to understand the root causes of mobility. Capitalism thrives on constant change, chaos and destabilisation—the constant creation of new enterprises and products and markets for them. Political interventions at the national, regional and international level operate to humanise the market (national and transnational consumer protection schemes, attempts to avert multinational corporations avoiding taxation in the countries in which their goods and services are purchased and attempts at a global financial transaction tax for example). While the state plays a central role in such interventions, civil society and methods to monitor and regulate the practices of transnational capital are also critical. Later in this chapter, a brief appraisal of the literature dealing with new forms of citizenship and global justice takes up these debates.

Many recent studies ask us to rethink the nexus of labour, capital and freedom of movement. These studies elaborate a theorisation of precarious populations with thick empirical detail of circumstances and forms of contemporary slavery, establishing indentured and bonded labour as social facts (Standing 2011, 2014; Ness 2011; Castles 2010).

Migration scholars have shown that the specifics of migrant categories (voluntary/forced, legal/illegal, wanted/unwanted) are likely to increase the precarious circumstances of individual migrants (Castles 2011a, b; Hugo 2011). What is less clear is whether different models of governance at the national, regional or international levels would improve the everyday circumstances of precarious migrant workers, or whether migrants' adaptation to changing conditions as they negotiate migration systems is independent of normative architecture. It is also unclear whether the hyper-mobility of precarious migrant workers is a feature of the low-skilled and irregular status more common to this category of migrant worker, or whether hyper-mobility is likely to become a common feature of other categories of more advantaged migrant workers (the high-skilled 'cosmopolitan elite'). It can be hypothesised, for example, that hyper-mobility without commensurate protections may well lead to increased insecurities, driving even relatively advantaged individuals and families into vulnerable circumstances, including illicit border crossings, dependence on smuggling networks to facilitate travel, and working in unsafe or bonded conditions outside national and international labour protections.

The economic and political restructuring that is integral to neoliberal globalisation is also a principal driver of migration, as are entrenched poverty and cycles of violence and conflict (Harvey 2005). As Standing,

Ness and others have identified, the 'global workers' (whom Standing calls the 'dangerous class') are one group of victims of the effects of neoliberal globalisation in that the work they seek is increasingly unstable, poorly paid and mobile (as dictated by the vagaries of where transnational capital wishes to relocate its operations and workers to maximise shareholder profits). As a result, increasing numbers of migrants are pushed to the involuntary end of a migration continuum (from voluntary to involuntary or forced migration), where rights, forms of recognition and other 'goods' associated with citizenship are often unattainable. These patterns are reproduced in all parts of the world with regional and localised differentiation.

Migrant Transnationalism

Migrant transnationalism, and the associated conceptualisation of new social spaces and cross-border communities that nurture social, economic and political ties between and across time, space and territory, encapsulates a key set of articulations (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Faist 2000, 2010; Vertovec et al. 2003). This important field of research, established in the early 1990s, has matured through trajectories of critique and new theorising. Methodological nationalism in both research and policy settings has been highlighted as a dominant, deeply embedded approach that continues to naturalise the sealed nature of the nation-state as a container of identities and peoples, particularly when it comes to the question of immigration (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Further, in considering the roles of the state, the interstate system and migrants' own agency, the 'regimes of mobility' approach, proposed by Nina Glick Schiller and Noel Salazar (2013), offers a framework that addresses not just migration but also its relationship with immobility or stasis, the connections between the local and the transnational, between experiences of migration and ways of imagining it, as well as between rootedness and cosmopolitan possibilities. The regimes of mobility approach seeks to reveal, for instance, the co-dependence between the movement of privileged individuals and the movement of stigmatised, hidden and vulnerable irregular and temporary migrants: 'It is the labour of those whose movements are declared illicit and subversive that makes possible the easy mobility of those who seem to live in a borderless world of wealth and power' (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, p. 188). This approach offers a highly flexible theorisation of intersecting regimes that normalise the mobility of some (travellers) while criminalising and entrapping others. As is discussed further below, the regimes of

mobility approach aligns with an approach taken by other scholars that eschews the naturalised link between mobility and freedom (Standing 2011; Ness 2011).

The Living Border

'The border' is a concept rich with multiple meanings and differentiated utility. In migration studies, the border obviously defines territory, and thereby the gatekeeping of the state, yet the concept simultaneously does the cultural work of sifting and sorting affiliations, loyalties and social ties built across generations and often in defiance of the fixed geography of the nation-state. As Mezzadara and Neilson (2013) argue with great clarity, the polysemy of the very idea of the border mitigates against a linear analysis of migrant experiences. Rather, the border relates as much to markets and human experiences of being in the world, the values and histories carried in the embodied self, as it does to the literal outline of the nation-state. Such analysis, which begins from the embodied reality of human life, acknowledges migrants not merely as border crossers (legal or illegal) but as 'living labor':

> There is also a peculiar tension within the abstract commodity form inherent to labor power that derives from the fact that it is inseparable from living bodies. Unlike the case of a table, for instance, the border between the commodity form of labor power and its 'container' must continuously be reaffirmed and retraced. This is why the political and legal constitution of labor markets necessarily involves shifting regimes for the investment of power in life, which also corresponds to different forms of the production of subjectivity. (Mezzadara and Neilson 2013, p. 19)

Another relevant thread of analysis examines borders as 'paper barriers'. In addition to physical borders, complex layers of law, or paper barriers, mediate the opportunities of potential migrants. While human geography focuses on terrain as a highly contested concept necessary to understand mobility and the desire for migration, sociological authors tend to study terrain as the place where state control is exercised and look at state regulations to understand mobility. Torpey (2000) first used the term 'paper walls' to describe the control of entry, while Vasta (2010) explores a 'paper market'. Rather than focusing on 'walls', Vasta connects the significance of documentation to identity, and how to access cultural markers of identity and entitlements to cultural rights in new locations. Taking the document as the embodiment of state control, Bauböck (2001) compares

territorially bounded policies of migration in Canada, the USA, Israel and the European Union. The result is the delineation of a set of legal measures aimed at denying access to territory and entitlements.

Human Security and Human Rights: Divergences and Overlaps

There is often a gap between the theorisation of a problem and the resolution of the problem in practice. Theorists critique policy-makers for their narrow and often reactive approaches to policy development, and policy-makers in turn critique theorists for operating in a rarefied, ungrounded context. This gap is patently evident in the field of defining, advocating for and implementing the rights and security of persons. Serious consideration of human rights and security in the modern era can be dated to the post-World War II development of international human rights law and the subsequent decades that saw reconfigurations of development as 'human development' and the emergence of the concept of human security.

The topic of human security appears in international debates in the early 1990s in describing generalised risks that could potentially affect everyone—risks such as the effects of climate change, extreme poverty and international terrorism (McAdam 2010; O'Brien et al. 2010; Piguet et al. 2011). As an analytic tool, human security first appears in the UNDP report of 1994, where generalised risks to security are listed as 'unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking, international terrorism' (UNDP 1994, p. 34). The report recognises the insecurity of persons as integral to understanding potential state and international instability. Also fundamental to the use of the concept is the emphasis on the security of persons (the human) as not separate from state security, but embedded within it. That is, insecure people will result in insecure states. Importantly, while traditional membership (citizenship) matters in the human security approach, the insecurity of persons outside national borders also matters. Through the ethic of international governance, governments are asked to participate in the protection of citizens of other states—as a matter of self-interest but also in recognition of the shared responsibilities of states (see, for example, Howard-Hassman 2012, p. 90).

An example of the ethic of international governance is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), first articulated in a report commissioned by the Canadian government as part of a human security initiative. The purpose of the R2P is to shape and legitimise international

interventions in cases where states fail to protect their own citizens, and in this way it aligns with the core concepts of human security. The R2P agenda promotes the 'remedial responsibility' of states to offer effective protection against vulnerabilities to their members and others. The ethical basis of the R2P and the spirit of human security rest on states with the capacities to alleviate the insecurity of persons outside of their own citizens and residents. Some scholars argue that access to immigration regimes such as temporary foreign labour programmes (such as the Seasonal Workers Programme outlined in later chapters) is part of this holistic approach to the protection of those who lack social and economic rights and do not have the benefit of the full protections of their state (Straehle 2012; Vietti and Scribner 2013).

The traditional understanding of human security as synonymous with state security has been challenged [or 'raises difficulties'], as has [does] the approach that aligns state security with territorial sovereignty that actively excludes, deports and criminalises. Over the two decades of the proliferation of the human security agenda, the concept has also arguably been overutilised and thereby stripped of precision. Critics contend that the overuse of the concept of human security has resulted in a hollowing out of related concepts, such as human rights and human development. Amartya Sen argues for the important complementary role human security discourse plays in discussions of human rights and human development and offers clarity on the reach and limitations of the concept of human security:

> The majority of people are concerned with the security of their own lives and of the lives of other people like them. This general concern has to be directly addressed, and any understanding of security in more remote terms (such as military security or so-called national security) can be integrated with it to the extent that this makes human life more secure. (2014, p. 18)

While the policies and associated programmes, initiatives and priorities of national security may well be important for people's lives, it ought also to be remembered that this domain of security is removed from people's daily needs and activities. It is the more mundane issues, events and resources of daily life that shape the quality of people's experiences and interactions.

While recognising the legitimacy of both the narrow and broad interpretations of human security, Taylor Owen acknowledges problems with the definitional hybridity of human security as a concept. In response, he has proposed the use of a threshold in clarifying how

the concept is applied in order to guard against fragmentation and loss of clarity in terms of practical and policy implications. Owen proposes that instead of a definitive set of harms or risks that people may face (physical, health, economic or environmental), a threshold approach of human wellbeing would better serve the complexity of the context. Such an approach would keep the concept 'as open as possible to allow for a diverse range of threats to potentially be included, while remaining focused on those that warrant the security label' (Martin & Owen 2014, p. 60). Further, this would mean that a threshold is reached only when risks and harms reach a level that threatens the very vitality of persons—a 'pervasive risk to the vital core' (Martin & Owen 2014, p. 62). Such an approach has practical merit, yet there are tensions when it is applied in the real world.

The traditional view of human security as aggregate and state-centric is distinct from a more recent interpretation based on a critical security lens that puts individuals at the centre of analysis and aligns more sympathetically with a human rights approach (Burke & McDonald 2007). Looking through a similar critical security lens, Roberts (2006) explores the human security/human insecurity dissonance using capabilities language. He suggests that, far from exhausting itself, the human security paradigm continues to be significant just as the rights-based approach to human development becomes more prominent.

Definitional clarity is required to differentiate the concept of human security from the related concepts of human rights and human development. Such clarity is not solely a theoretical priority to ensure that concepts are not hollowed out of their core meaning; equally important is how concepts are able to be utilised for policy development and in formulating arguments for the 'public will' and the resources necessary to implement programmes of security, rights and development. One of the key criticisms of human security as a concept and as a discourse of human wellbeing within and between states is that it potentially weakens a commitment to human rights through its close alignment to the latter, perhaps even duplicating or subsuming the concept of human rights under a broad human security agenda (see Howard-Hassman 2012). Accordingly, Howard-Hassman calls for the adoption of a narrow view of human security. In such a narrow and deliberately limited setting, human security can offer a valuable contribution to the international normative regime that requires states and the international community to act against threats to persons. Oberleitner draws attention to this problem and labels it a 'convergence', pointing out the possibility that the concept of human security may be no more than a

gap-filler. For Howard-Hassman, another key concern is the role of the state in an era of securitisation, when the tendency for top-down interventions may displace vibrant programmes of support for individuals that emerge from the grassroots. For our study of temporary migrants, we chose to deliberately focus on the security of persons, using the concept of human security as a discourse that challenges the historical alignment of security with state defence of territory and interests.

Human Security and Human Rights in a Migration Context

In the research described in this book, it is critical to consider the intersection of human security and human rights as it relates to the context of migration, while keeping in mind the complexities and debates regarding the human security discourses discussed above. What, for example, are the specificities of the security and rights of persons who are mobile in search of work and other opportunities, such as further study? Do the human security and human rights discourses lend conceptual and practical nuance to the circumstances of mobile individuals and communities, and in particular to the circumstance of temporariness? For us, these questions and debates are fruitful and useful in addressing the tensions that arise in seeking to reconcile the needs and aspirations of individuals with the interests of states. The preceding discussion has outlined how human security principles and plans for action are oriented at the level of the international system and how states ought to work cooperatively towards the security of persons in a holistic and transnational manner, with the understanding that greater everyday security for persons at a distance also secures the lives of those near at hand. Human rights norms and the associated legal framework are at their very core interested in the individual as a 'rights bearer', with states ('duty bearers') required to fulfil duties to those individuals. However, it must not be forgotten that human rights are a value system and that a human rights culture can only ensue when international norms are put into practice at the state and substate levels (Kurasawa 2007; Nash 2009; Turner 2006).

Migration-focused studies have made an important contribution to understanding the complexities and intersections of fields of inquiry into the human condition, including inequalities and human vulnerabilities. To be sure, the unique epistemic edges of migration must be kept in mind when we theorise border crossing and non-membership in political communities; migrants cannot be interchanged with citizens and residents in a straightforward manner, as so many chess pieces on a board. Nevertheless, the core needs for physical and ontological security

and social membership, as well as forms of association and expression, are co-extensive to all humans. And herein lies the conundrum as well as the potential for human security and human rights frameworks in the context of migration. Security and rights for persons are values that predate the nation-state and exist outside of state structures; migration status, such as non-membership, ought not to be as significant to states when dealing with migrants as personhood and associated needs. In terms of the individual's ontological security, a measure of stability and certainty is required in order for persons to develop as individuals, to exercise agency and to flourish in exploring the infinite range of possibilities open to them (Giddens 1991). The state, in fact, often seeks to ensure the ontological security of certain individuals (citizens) as part of the reciprocal relations of loyalty and trust between a political entity and its members.

In exploring the complexity of contextualising human rights alongside security, Didier Bigo connects the securitisation of migration and migration processes to broader social trends (2002, 2008). For example, he argues through a case study of European migration governance that social issues such as crime, terrorism, religious extremism, fear of loss of culture, a shifting economy and reduced economic control are politically and rhetorically utilised by nations in ways that make the migrant come to embody each of those fears. At the same time, the creation of the European Migration Zone[1] and cosmopolitan travel for the privileged few is normalised as unremarkable and not connected to growing inequalities in access to freedom of movement. In an evaluation of EU migration policy, Bigo examines surveillance cultures and the key ideas of risk, while simultaneously demonstrating the influence of sociologists, including Giddens and Foucault, on the theorisation of coercion and the institutional control of bodies through regulation (2008).

An influential field within international relations also addresses the relationship between human rights and notions of security. Huysmans (2006), for example, conceives of security as a goal and insecurity as the norm. When insecurity becomes the norm, the gap widens between a realist perspective of the limited validity and effectiveness of measures to constrain that insecurity, including migration policies, and the liberal perspective of the capacity of cooperation to create more secure migration processes. In a similar vein, Alexandra (2007) connects securitisation to processes of marketisation, such that citizenship becomes a commodity. More than this, restrictive 'im/migration' (p. 33) policies mean that citizenship in traditional terms shrinks and leaves invisible

1 The European Migration Zone also referred to as the Schengen area, is a border free zone for EU citizens.

and vulnerable those individuals who have little connection with or knowledge of the society in which they reside, lacking also security of employment, social welfare and other forms of state recognition.

One key factor that relates to both human security and human rights is freedom of movement (Guild and van Selm 2005). Attention to transnational and post-national forms of organising life as well as questions of access to free movement shifts the debate to a consideration of the de-securitising of national borders for human mobility, including extending free trade agreements to migrant labour rights (Bauböck 2011; Ottonelli and Torresi 2012).

Citizenship and Belonging

Much new human rights scholarship highlights the effects of the contemporary processes of globalisation, considering, among other things, how we *ought* to live, taking into account the transnational realities of increased mobility, shared risks like climate change and the scarcity of life-sustaining resources of water and arable land. While not all of this literature focuses squarely on human migrations, an interdisciplinary scholarship accommodating a rights-based ethic is contributing to a reconfiguration and re-imagining of citizenship that contrasts with the dominant western, state-centric and limited understanding of citizens and rights (Shachar 2009; Bosniak 2006; Carens 2010, 2013). These approaches are yielding rich resources for policy development in diverse, multi-ethnic societies.

Some migration scholars have argued that human rights-based approaches can have blind spots when it comes to migration (Ruhs 2013). That is, such approaches often focus on the protection and promotion of the rights of existing migrants without considering the consequences for potential future migrants (who may still be in their countries of origin and attempting to access labour migration opportunities) (Ruhs 2013, p. 190). Advocacy for equality and justice for some migrants may lead to more restrictive entry policies in the future. Yet, from a global justice perspective, both higher levels of migration and increased rights are desirable (Pogge 2002). Achieving this goal will require an extensive and ongoing theoretical discussion of the challenges of human rights and their realisation.

In the late 1990s, debate emerged on the tensions between human rights and citizenship rights. Jacobson (1996) explores the rise of immigration as a reason for a decline in citizenship, suggesting that citizenship as an enforcement mechanism for human rights is outdated. This is in stark contrast to Bosniak (2006), who argues that the 'citizenship of aliens' does not mean that citizenship is outdated, but

rather that it is a highly prized commodity as one of the few means of legally enforcing rights and entitlements. Human geographers provide additional theorisation that connects borders, territory and mobility to rights and access to entitlements. Up until the 1980s these connections were articulated in terms of the correlation between state and nation. More recently, the focus in human geography has been on rights as attached to territory—how to gain access to territory and whether access to territory necessarily means access to rights. A number of practical challenges emerge from this research, including questions of methodology and whether theorisation adequately accounts for the spatial challenges of the new global order. These are ongoing preoccupations not only for human geographers, but also in interdisciplinary dialogues, which are discussed further in Chap. 2.

Citizenship has also been conceived as de-nationalised or post-national belonging (Shachar 2009; Soysal 1994) in the context of theories of justice and new cosmopolitanism[2] and the related rethinking of sociability and conviviality in multi-ethnic, multicultural societies (Nowicka and Vertovec 2014; Glick Schiller et al. 2011). This rich and varied literature proposes a range of new architectures of socio-cultural as well as politico-legal belonging and rights, much of it immersed in migration studies.

There is a strong legal perspective associated with cosmopolitanism, stemming from the idea of universal justice. In contrast to writers who tend to conceive of cosmopolitanism as a force that affects the individual, Pogge explores cosmopolitanism as an idea that undermines sovereignty and is understood in that way by the individual by virtue of the effect it has on the state (de-nationalisation and loss of loyalty). Kurasawa (2004) focuses on cosmopolitanism from below, with individuals connected through solidarity that transcends the traditional space of the nation-state. In this view, cosmopolitanism relies on human rights as guiding principles and individuals as actors who have the capacity to enact social and political change. This approach is based on Hannah Arendt's suggestion that individuals have the 'right to have rights'. A valuable incarnation of these ideas is seen in the work of Somers and Roberts (2008), who connect the 'right to have rights' with a focus on rights as allocated to persons as individuals rather than as inhabitants of a territory, citizens of a state. Commencing with the understanding that a person has a right to rights,

2 New cosmopolitanism refers to the theoretical realignment of the concept from one originally embedded in European liberal elitist ideas of a world consciousness transplanted to remote locations to one that emerges from a situated, localised reality.

this conceptualisation aims to develop rights as a social good and therefore as an obligation that institutions must uphold.

Migration scholars are also questioning the viability of the historical association of cosmopolitan thought with elite representations of universal ethics and human rights. Instead, they are focusing on the concepts of sociability, conviviality and friendship to capture the social nuances of everyday lived realities—cultural, ethnic, religious and other forms of 'difference' (Braidotti 2013; Glick Schiller et al. 2011).

Culture and Ambivalence

Ambivalence as a response to life's risks and uncertainties has emerged in the present research as a relevant and indeed poignant aspect of the migrant experience. For this study, and, importantly, for the development of the concept of fluid security that forms the foundation of our analysis, we stress the importance of attention to the nuances of action and non-action of temporary migrants. In the transnational processes involved in making a new life while maintaining old ties and values, the flexibility that ambivalence permits may be not only reasonable, but healthy. The rich literature on affect is deeply relevant to ambivalence as a key aspect of the migrant experience. For example, ambivalence is a common feature in the development of the conscience and the opposing forces of repression and domination of impulses and feelings (Freud 1955), for the migrant as a stranger experiencing life as 'matter out of place' (Bauman 1991), and in the dynamics of seemingly oppositional affective orientations beyond the range of consciousness and calculation (rational choice) (Smelser 1998). Geographical mobility through international migration is a form of separation through which loss and grief are experienced both by those migrating and by those left behind. Ambivalence may well appear as an expression of seemingly contradictory or unstable emotions (Smelser 1998, p. 5), yet viewed from the perspective of temporary migrants, expressing emotions of certainty and decisiveness would be illogical in such uncertain circumstances.

A key motif in the migrant literature considers 'old' and 'new' identities in relation to home, homeland and associated plans for settlement, resettlement or return. It is widely accepted, at least in the social sciences, that having multiple emotions about a homeland, even conflicting plans for settlement or return, is not a pathological response but rather a normal reaction to the complexities faced in the contemporary world. In other words, such complex and even contradictory emotions and signals and their articulation in action and life plans may even

be anticipated and mapped onto projects directed at understanding the experiences of people in precarious circumstances of heightened fluidity, such as irregular migrants.

Conclusion

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, this book sets out to take a bottom-up perspective on mobility, borders and rights in its focus on the experiences of temporary migrants. We utilise aspects of human security and human rights discourse critically and apply them to the everyday lives of mobile populations. The literature reviewed in this chapter, while broad and differentiated, highlights the temporary migrant as situated and visible in her individuality and as resilient rather than standardised or hollowed out in the face of the anonymisation and massification that take place in the market. Rather than dehumanised labour power, the migrant is 'living labor' (Mezzadara and Neilson 2013), carrying a fluid security across spatial, temporal and imagined borders. This fluid security emerges, strengthens and disperses in relation *to* the migrant: It is a metaphorical suitcase of tools, strategies and attitudes.

To reiterate, our core purpose in developing and applying the concept of fluid security is to highlight the jurisdictional and theoretical gaps in state practices and theories of justice and membership as they relate to non-citizen migrants and their chances of enjoying a secure life in a host country.

2
Methodology

In order to understand the everyday lives and survival strategies of individuals and families with either regular or irregular migration status in Australia, and to identify the various forms of social isolation and exclusion faced by temporary migrants, our research employed a mixed-method approach as its overarching framework (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007). Büscher and Urry's articulation of 'mobile methods' (2009) and Richter's evocation of a 'transnational space' (2012) also provide configurations important for the present study, where temporariness and permanence, belonging and not belonging sit side by side.

The research is situated within the frame of social change as a deliberate approach to research. Such an approach addresses the well-documented problems with social research as the accumulation of facts and statistics *about* the other (particularly marginal groups) instead of engagement *with* communities and individuals and the building of new knowledge via considered collaborations (Mackenzie et al. 2007; Hyndman 2000). For example, Mackenzie and her co-authors highlight the ethical problems faced by researchers working with vulnerable groups such as refugees and other irregular migrants, emphasising that the usual harm-minimisation approaches that research bodies require are insufficient and that researchers have an obligation to design projects that can benefit participants and communities (2007, p. 301).

The approach taken in this study concurs with those of justice-oriented researchers who stress the vitality of projects generated through the experiences, views and needs of the individuals, groups and communities with whom researchers work. Braidotti, for example, points to important ethical questions at the heart of projects that investigate the processes of

transformation. Importantly, it is those who have experienced extremes, hardships and pain who are likely to be best placed to evaluate these processes. She explains:

> Their 'better quality' consists not in the fact of having been wounded, but of having gone through the pain. Because they are already on the other side of some existential divide, they are anomalous in some way—but in a positive way: they have already endured. They are a site of transposition of values. (2009, p. 53)

Taking up Braidotti's argument, epistemologies frame and condition the way in which research is undertaken, shaping the very questions that come to be asked as well as how methods are chosen. The theoretical and methodological origins of research and the interplay of these two domains remain an ongoing exchange. According to Braidotti, Marxist, post-colonial and feminist epistemologies already 'acknowledge the privileged knowing positing of those in the "margins"' (2009, p. 53). In this regard (that is, with regard to work with people in the margins), interpretation and sensitivity to the nuances of the context in which the research is conducted is needed: A transformative potential, or moment, finds life in ideas and in the method applied to an investigation.

The mixed methods deployed in this project were designed to contribute to social change not just by offering a fresh diagnosis of social problems, but also by providing an informed critique to reverse them; hence the 'transformative' potential of the research (Mertens 2011; Marti and Mertens 2014, p. 209). Aside from questions of value and ideology, a new body of scholarship asks researchers to be mindful of the hidden power of method. For example, the 'transformative paradigm perspective' argues that social good ought to be advanced through the inclusion of marginalised groups in the research process. The voices of marginalised groups are not merely recorded in ad hominem recitations of facts, left to accumulate in virtual knowledge banks removed from society in the dusty archives of universities and governments. Rather, the voiceless are integrated into the research process through 'intersubjective dialogue' (see Flecha 2014). Here we are mindful of the significant literature from migration studies scholars that has made important contributions to understanding of the migrant experience while challenging dominant, paradigmatic approaches to scholarship.

Notably, the conceptualisation of migrant transnationalism and the associated new social spaces and cross-border communities have resulted in nuanced understandings of how social, economic and political ties

are nurtured across time, space and territory (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999; Faist 2000, 2010; Vertovec et al. 2003). As outlined in Chap. 1, this important field of research has continued since its establishment in the early 1990s through trajectories of critique and new theorising, highlighting methodological nationalism in both research and policy settings as a dominant, still-entrenched approach that sees the nation-state as an idealised container of identities and peoples, especially with regard to the question of immigration (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). More recently, migration scholars have questioned the viability of cosmopolitan thought in its historical association with elite representations of universal ethics and human rights, suggesting instead a focus on signifiers such as sociability, conviviality and friendship to capture the social nuances of the everyday experience of the lived realities of cultural, ethnic, religious and other forms of 'difference' (Braidotti 2013; Glick Schiller et al. 2011). This project acknowledges the important legacy of these interrelated fields of scholarship that have their origins and interests in the perspectives and realities of marginality and migration. This body of research has been our reference in developing the approach to the present study.

Case Study Methodology

Case study methodology was used as the researchers sought to understand the complex relationships and lived experiences of insecurity for four groups temporarily resident in Australia, originating from China, Indonesia, Samoa and Tonga. We follow the model of a case study described as

> an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin 2009, p. 18)

The case studies in this project employed predominantly qualitative methods (visual methods, interviews and observations) along with some ranking activities. Case studies, as Mertens (2011, 2007) suggests, support transformative research because their in-depth exploratory nature can reveal inequities, discrimination and other factors leading to marginalisation. The case study approach has enabled a rich and diverse perspective on hardships and hurdles faced by participants and their strategies for survival. This aligns with Gomm et al.'s (2009) argument

that case studies are appropriate for theory building, though this depends on the nature of the inquiry as case studies open up and extend the conceptual field rather than narrow the focus.

Involvement of Participants

The study was theoretically grounded in a human security framework as its focus was on temporary, and sometimes unlawful and vulnerable, migrant populations, which required that ethical issues be central to the study[1] (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010). Given the various vulnerabilities and the temporariness of the immigration status of the case study groups, significant investment was required by the researchers to build trust and rapport in order to obtain support for the study and gain access to community leaders and potential participants. The process of building relationships with individuals and groups and adopting the role of engaged advocate working with local communities was consistent with a transformative paradigm.

Consequently, the study establishment phase was lengthy. Timelines had to be adjusted to fit the needs of each case study group and to enable the engaged advocate role to be a part of the process. This role included reporting to community meetings to provide information on migration rules and expanding to new study locations in response to recommendations from community leaders or friends and family members of temporary migrants. Four different categories of interviews were completed for each of the case study groups: Group 1 (community members interviewed in Australia), Group 2 (family members and others [and the Tongan workers themselves] interviewed in the country of origin), Group 3 (community groups and service providers) and Group 4 (government employees). Community members were initially reluctant to engage with the researchers, which led to reflection by the research team about why the identified groups were not participating and what assumptions had been made in the research design. Ultimately, using snowball sampling, the study commenced locally with community organisations and community leaders and advocates, who then assisted with finding participants. The result was the recruitment of 160 interviewees (39 for the China case study, 44 for the Samoa case study, 32 for the Tonga case study and 45 for the Indonesia case study; see Table 2.1). The interviews were conducted between 1 March 2012 and 30 November 2013.

1 This research was conducted with the approval of the Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee (CSF11/1465-2011000803).

Table 2.1 Number of structured and unstructured interviews for the four case studies

Type of interview	Chinese Case Study	Samoan Case Study	Tongan Case Study	Indonesian Case Study
Group 1 interviews structured	**15**	**15**	**5**	**11**
Group 1 interviews unstructured	*2*	*3*	*0*	*6*
Group 2 interviews structured	**15**	**7**	**7**	**13**
Group 2 interviews unstructured		*2*	*6*	*6*
Group 3 interviews structured	**5**	**4**	**7**	**3**
Group 3 interviews unstructured	*1*	*2*	*4*	*4*
Group 4 interviews structured		**9**	**2**	**1**
Group 4 interviews unstructured	*1*	*2*	*1*	*1*
Total structured	35	35	21	28
Total unstructured	4	9	11	17
Total case study	39	44	32	45
Total all interviews	160			

The study employed a purposive sampling strategy, with essential criteria (not a permanent resident of Australia, born in case study country, holder of relevant visa type) and desired criteria (breadth of ages, both genders, access to work experiences) applied for Group 1 selection. A profile of the sample achieved for Group 1 is shown in Table 2.2. The Chinese sample was composed of young international students living in Melbourne, all without dependants, who had generally been in Australia for less than 5 years at the time the interviews were conducted. Those in the Samoan group were generally older, had dependants and other family members also present in Australia, had acquired New Zealand citizenship that qualified them for entry on Special Category Visas, and had lived in Australia for up to 20 years. The Tongan group were all middle-aged, male seasonal workers who were present in a rural Victorian town for the harvest season only, with dependants remaining at home in Tonga. The Indonesian sample was a mixture of students and temporary workers living in Sydney, generally for 5 years or less, some with dependants.

Table 2.2 Profile of Group 1 (community members) structured interview sample for each case study

	China	Samoa	Tonga	Indonesia
Female	7	8	0	4
Male	8	7	4	6
Age (years)				
Under 20	2	0	0	2
21–30	12	3	0	5
31–40	1	6	3	3
41–50	0	3	1	0
Over 50	0	3	0	0
Mean no. dependants	0	3.2	3.0	.67
Place of residence				
Melbourne	15	5	0	0
Sydney	0	10	0	10
Robinvale	0	0	4	0
Years lived in Australia				
Less than 1	1	0	4	2
1–5	12	5	0	5
6–10	2	3	0	0
More than 10	0	6	0	2
Not known		1	0	1
Total	15	15	4	10

The purposive sampling was initially implemented with the assistance of community organisations and community leaders and advocates, and subsequently some snowball sampling was used to recruit further participants. Also referred to as chain referral sampling, snowball sampling is a convenience sampling method (Cohen and Arieli 2011). It is a common method used by researchers for groups that are difficult to recruit, including those referred to as hard-to-reach closed groups made up of members of often stigmatised or defamed populations, described as 'hidden' by Avelardo and Kaplan (1998, p. 210). Hidden and hard-to-reach populations may impose social sanctions on themselves or have them imposed by others for religious, social, legal, economic or political reasons (Cohen and Arieli 2011, p. 427). The social worlds occupied by temporary or irregular migrants are concealed from the wider population of citizens and residents, with concealment often maintained by 'gatekeepers'. This is especially the case for temporary migrants, who may be reluctant to self-identify or discuss key issues relating to their migration status. When this is the case, researchers must identify a gatekeeper who can not only allow access to group members but also view the research as a legitimate activity.

Because snowball sampling uses social networks for recruitment of participants, the recruits may be from a select or specific part of the group and may consequently be non-representative of the wider group or population. Thus, the inherent selection bias in the 160-member sample may be a limitation of the study for the purposes of generalisation (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). However, the research interest in matching a small, discrete cohort in Australia for each case study by persons or theme to the country of origin was a primary organising principle in the research that to some degree compensated for the purposefully selected sample. In addition, the rich, in-depth data provided insights into local experiences and insecurities that cannot be generalised to wider populations but may inform policy decisions and the work of non government agencies.

Methods and Mobility

Recruitment followed the local and transnational mobility of the participants, with mobility a node of inquiry of the project. For the Chinese students this involved retracing their journey, with the researchers travelling to China to interview the students' parents and then following the path of migration the students undertook in reaching Australia. For the Indonesian temporary migrants, it involved following links to family or key people in their lives in Indonesia. For the Tongan participants, it entailed following harvest workers upon their return home. And for the Samoan migrants, interviewees in Samoa were identified on the basis of the emerging themes of remittances and forced return rather than by following the transnational linkages of those interviewed in Australia. Links evolved from the relations built in the first stage of the research conducted in Australia and offered new possibilities for understanding the locally gathered data from a transnational and deeply connected perspective. Not surprisingly, our approach often posed difficult organisational and cultural challenges, such as working with native speakers during interviews, ensuring that cultural norms were attended to, and being sensitive to the nuances of language and cultural translation of interview schedules for the four distinct national contexts (Fig. 2.1).

Employing the approach of matching travel to four sites—linking the participants' countries of origin and Australia—is an adaptation of Mazzacutto's 'simultaneous matched samples' method (2010, p. 206). The matched samples linked the migrants in Australia to their families and friends and to migration agents in the countries from which they had travelled to Australia (Tonga, China and Indonesia). The research



Fig. 2.1 Transnational case study methodology

incorporated aspects of Richter's 'moving methods' (2012), which itself builds on the 'mobilities paradigm' (Urry 2007; Büscher and Urry 2009), not in directly accompanying the participants or developing simultaneous ethnographies in destination countries, but rather in retracing the journey taken by the temporary migrants.

The Interviews: Visual Methods

In addition to semi-structured interviews, the interview process for Group 1 participants integrated visual methods by using flashcards that included photographs, drawings, symbols and words. Given the cultural and linguistic diversity of the four national groups, the research team felt that the inclusion of visual methods would be likely to engage the participants in subtle, non-confronting ways. This enabled Group 1 participants to speak more openly about their experiences of security and insecurity within the four domains of economic, cultural, legal and personal security (see Fig. 2.2 below) and to identify their most trusted sources of support.

This approach aligns with the visual methods approach adopted by the African Centre for Migration & Society's MoVE project (2014), in which multimedia visual materials were used to build communication bridges with vulnerable migrants, reflecting a project design that emphasised the co-production of knowledge, with participants both generating and responding to the materials. The reason for our decision to use visual methods in the research design was similarly premised on the expectation that it would engage participants on multiple levels and be less confronting for temporary migrants, who were potentially experiencing exclusion and vulnerability. We considered that the co-production of images could generate both a more flexible mode of communication and a potential point of engagement *from* the participants *to* the researchers. In anticipation of this process we discussed options with an artist and a graphic designer, but these plans were abandoned because of production time and costs. Instead, the images were produced by the research team, a decision that had benefits in terms of flexibility but limitations in terms of product quality and visual art expertise.

The decisions about what images to include raised both ontological and epistemological questions. For instance, some questions related to how the researcher influences the visual representation of the data and how the visual image is perceived within the research context. Pink (2003) contends that scholars applying visual methods need to be aware not only of the production challenges but also of the different ways in



Fig. 2.2 Domains of security

which audiences interpret and renegotiate the meaning of images. At times, the researchers' assumptions and perceptions were evident, such as in the decision not to include images that later proved to be of cultural significance to the groups (such as depictions of religious institutions). These omissions came to light during the fieldwork, requiring the addition of new categories of images that were either culturally specific examples or generic symbols. We initially considered the meaning of some of the visuals, such as the representation of police and immigration authorities, to be self-evident, yet during the interviews these were found to be open to interpretation or ambiguous [a phenomenon noted by Lynn and Lea (2005) with regard to visual and textual representations]. However, the multiple interpretations for some visuals provided unexpected insights into how ambiguity is deeply rooted in the everyday experience of temporary migrants.

Through the use of the flashcards (see Fig. 2.3), the research examined the problems experienced by the participants via an invitation to rank

Fig. 2.3 Examples of the flashcards used during the interview process to allow interviewees to rank issues of importance

the options presented. The transition from a reflective, qualitative interview style to a targeted, ranking style was integrated into the interview schedule through lead-in and debriefing commentary and reference to overlapping concepts to assist the move from one mode to the other. The interviewer invited the participants to first peruse the 12 images on the cards in front of them and then to select those that brought to mind personal challenges and experiences. The physical act of sorting the cards in front of the participant for viewing provided them with a quiet time to reflect. In many cases the actions of looking, thinking and reflecting engaged deep unconscious processes, particularly when the images on the cards connected to abstract ideas or emotions such as loneliness or fear.

Two flashcard activities were embedded into the semi-structured interviews. The transition to a more structured approach was not without its challenges and tested experienced interviewers in their ability to maintain a thread between exploration and deep reflection and more fact-finding approaches through targeted questions. In one activity, the participants selected and ranked the three most important issues for them from among the images on the flashcards and the sources of assistance they had accessed to deal with them. Another visual method used a different set of eight images, and the participants were asked to rank the trustworthiness of organisations, groups and people. This ranking activity, designed to complement the qualitative approach, provided some insights into ambiguities related to trust and insecurity. The process of ranking the cards often sparked unsolicited responses and moved an interview in new directions. The visual methods were effective in engaging participants at multiple sites and in various contexts.

Our methodology enabled us to explore participant-defined experiences of human security in the context of migrant transnational activity, transience and mobility. It allowed us to follow threads of inquiry across new social spaces and transnational communities where mobility both enabled and retarded the hopes and day-to-day realities of migrants. The resulting study is an effort at social change as a deliberate approach to research. Cognisant of the concerns with social research as an assemblage of facts and statistics about the migrant as foreigner and 'other', we have instead sought to work with transnational migrant communities in building new knowledge.

3
Chinese Students: Isolated Global Citizens

Introduction

China's rapid development over the past 30 years has underpinned its emergence not only as a key player in the globalised world but arguably also as the engine room of globalisation in regard to the mobility of goods, services and people. Central to China's development and globalisation has been the pipeline of Chinese national students exported in the mass tertiary education market. The efficient and effective transformation of student exports into transnational earning actors serves several purposes at home and abroad in relation to family structure, prestige and overcoming gaps in local education provision. International Chinese students provide a direct match for the market needs of western democracies, who increasingly rely on the income provided by international students to make a significant contribution to the funding of universities. While there has seemingly been an alignment between supply and demand in international education, the transformative possibilities for Chinese international students have proven to be rather complicated and precarious across four crucial domains of security.

Mass Higher Education in China

China's project of modernisation, fuelled by economic growth, includes an imperative goal to lift the country's higher education standards in the shortest possible time. Although massive changes in tertiary education have been implemented in recent decades, the country's gross enrolment levels fall significantly behind those of all other economically developed countries (Trow 2005). The pursuit of mass higher education in China, with the largest population in the world at 1,401,800,500

(Worldometers 2015), calls for the modernisation of the country's education systems and curricula. However, it is overtly clear that the current unprecedented demand for tertiary education cannot be met by the extant education system in mainland China.

Political disruptions coupled with Confucian traditions related to learning have resulted in enormous challenges in education provision in China. In the mid-nineteenth century, China finally moved away from scholarship based entirely on Confucian traditional knowledge towards scholarship that incorporates western science and technology. Under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and until the mid-1950s, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had the major influence on Chinese post-school education, with graduates travelling to the Soviet Union for further studies because of the absence of any post-graduate educational facilities in China (Yang 2004). In 1958, the Great Leap Forward project initiated by the CCP and the State Council aimed to close the gap between education in China and education in the USA and UK. The plan proposed to 'universalize higher education within 15 years' through rapid expansion of the number of higher education institutions and graduates (Yang 2004, pp. 325–6). Moves towards more progressive education were obliterated during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76), a time during which academics and teachers were demoted and humiliated for engaging in bourgeois activities, and higher education institutions that imparted foreign influences were closed. The effects of these setbacks are still evident in the gaps in the Chinese education system (Yang 2004).

In addition to these domestic constraints, Chinese higher education institutions have been historically disadvantaged in western global academic rankings and publications (Altbach 1999). The domination of the USA and other industrialised nations in scientific and information networks and research institutions enables the marginalisation of Chinese scholarship, which is largely unrecognised in English-speaking countries and major European research institutions (Yang 2004; Altbach 1999).

Student Mobility as a Marketable Commodity

To fill the gap between available and desired educational opportunities in mainland China, students have been funded to study overseas through scholarships from China or host countries, employer sponsorships, student exchange programmes or by paying the fees themselves (Li and Bray 2007). Overseas study has also been made possible by the rising numbers of middle-class and wealthy families who can

afford the significant costs. Another factor is that the vast majority of current students from China are the only child in their family—a result of the one-child policy initiated in 1979—enabling a concentration of family resources for the one child (Li and Bray 2007).

Internationalisation is a growing priority in many Australian universities, and full-fee-paying students provide a significant revenue stream for institutions struggling with financial restraints. Globalisation and international competition among universities has fostered student mobility as a marketable commodity, with Australia's main competitors for students in the global market being the USA, Canada, the UK and New Zealand (Knight 2011). Most of the focus of internationalisation in universities is undoubtedly on high-performing and fee-paying mobile students, but Knight (2011) points out that this detracts attention from the lack of access to tertiary education for students in many South-East Asian countries. The fact that the vast majority of students in Asia cannot access tertiary study in their own country, let alone in another country, is, according to Knight (2011), a human rights issue which Australia should be addressing by making an educational contribution.

Australia as a Destination for International Students from China

The number of international Chinese students in Australia has grown substantially since 1985, when a policy change by the Australian government allowed the recruitment of fullfee-paying foreign [*or* international] students by universities. In 2010, there were 243,591 international students in Australian universities (Knight 2011, p. 9). Other education providers followed suit in recruiting from overseas, with a total of 616,266 international students in 2010 enrolled in university courses, vocational education courses, secondary schools or language courses at accredited institutions (Australian Government 2015). The highest proportion of international students in 2010 was from China (167,767 students, or 27 % across educational sectors), followed by India (100,310 students, or 16 % across educational sectors) (Knight 2011, p. 9). The number of new visas granted to students from China was 49,592 in 2011–12 and 54,015 in 2012–13, an increase of 8.9 %. By comparison, new visas for students from India totalled 33,764 in 2011–12 and 24,808 in 2012–13, a decline of 26.5 % (Australian Government 2014, p. 52). By 2014, the total number of international students had diminished to 589,860, mainly due to reduced numbers in the vocational education sector.

In 2008 and 2009, a series of violent racial attacks on Indian tertiary students in Melbourne damaged Australia's reputation as a safe destination for international students. The harmful publicity in India prompted the federal government to intervene to improve the credibility of Australia as safe through direct communication with educational and political leaders in India. At the local level, the Victorian state government, in collaboration with Victoria Police, implemented a number of strategies to reduce the risks posed to students. However, the concerns and fears of parents in India were not placated, and the episodes had far-reaching effects on Australia's reputation as a safe destination for study among potential students and their families in many countries (Knight 2011).

Australia also suffered reputational loss as a reliable education provider through the closure of many vocational education courses and providers in 2009 and 2010. The closures resulted in the displacement of 5795 students and were associated with widespread negative publicity internationally. The loss of credibility arising from the closures and attacks caused a significant decrease in the number of international students in 2010 and 2011, and the number of students in 2014 remains at a lower level (Knight 2011; Australian Government 2015). Other factors that reduced the numbers of international students were higher levels of scrutiny for visa applications, increased rejection rates for some countries, and the Australian government's 50 % increase in the living expenses cash requirement for international students (Weber 2013; Knight 2011). Added to these already significant disincentives was the revoking of the Migration Occupations in Demand List, which effectively closed the door to permanent migration to Australia for many students following completion of their tertiary course (Knight 2011).

Transnationalism and (In)Securities

Transnationalism provides a useful interpretive framework for understanding the cross-border mobility of international students and their multiple relations in different societies (Glick Schiller et al. 2006). Relations in the transnational field encompass political, economic, social and emotional involvements that are directly aligned with the security domains (economic, legal, physical and cultural) explored in this study (Waters 2005). The international student, as a member of a transnational household or transnational family, fulfils the family's

aspirations for increased status and increases the earning potential of the extended family. Waters (2005, p. 363) refers to the international mobile student as playing a focal role in a 'child-centred familial strategy', which increases not only the economic capital of the family but also its social capital through acquired proficiency in the English language and greater sociability and cosmopolitanism. In sharp contrast to the empowerment possibilities provided by a transnational framework, Marginson (2011, p. 1) suggests that international students exist in a 'gray zone', with inherent insecurities and vulnerabilities produced by the absence of citizenship at the overseas study site and incomplete human rights.

Legal Insecurity

Uncertainty Created by Changes in Policies and Visa Conditions

Our research revealed that the threat of changes to visa entitlements was the primary destabilising factor influencing students' insecurity in relation to legal status. Students lived with the uncertainty of not knowing whether they would be able to work in Australia upon completion of their studies or whether they would be able to extend their visa or access permanent residency. These uncertainties disrupted their capacity to make plans for the future, casting a shadow over their future aspirations. Of greatest concern to the students was that their opportunities to work and remain in Australia upon completion of their course could be affected by the government's propensity to change work categories and requirements. Parents and students claimed that the changes to policies and visa conditions were driven by the self-interest of the Australian government. The closure of private colleges in 2008 and 2009 was referred to by a migration agent in China as adversely affecting Chinese vocational education students' confidence in Australia as a study destination.

The government's changes to policies and visa conditions created the perception that Australia had 'rolled up the welcome mat'. Students were keenly aware that visa conditions could change overnight and take immediate effect. Many students, for instance, had selected courses and majors that at the time would enable them to be accepted for permanent residency. An officer at a legal aid centre reported that changes to visa conditions and policies were the most common issue raised by international students:

> The complaint is always [in] Australia, they keep changing: They change the law, they change this, they change that. It used to be very easy and now it's difficult, this job used to be very—this job has a better chance but now the other job had a better chance but then in two years' time, oh, that job has again. (INCG301)

Parents in China were similarly affected by these uncertainties about visa conditions. One parent expressed anger and strongly denounced the Australian government for policy changes that imposed different post-study conditions on students who had already selected, commenced or completed their course of study:

> I heard that, my child also said that, some majors such as medicine, some people have studied for five years, but the major is cancelled [from the list of migration]. I think it is very unfair for these people. … Then it really entrapped people. They have to return their home country. I think if the policy has been made, can it be guaranteed, such as for five years? At least a guarantee for this group of people? They applied for study five years ago, now they graduated, but they cannot apply for migration. I think it is not fair. (INCG205)

The parent who provided the above quote focused on the unfairness of the policies and criticised the government for its lack of commitment to guaranteeing visa conditions, particularly in cases where conditions changed after students had been accepted into courses. Another parent believed that such a cavalier disregard for students' hopes and aspirations would force them to consider more inviting destinations for study:

> If things keep going like this, I think more excellent students or talented people have to choose other country to study. We cannot do anything to deal with policy change. The Department of Migration does not give us visa, what shall we do? We have no idea. (INCG204)

In general, the parents consulted in our research were forthright in expressing criticism of policies and visa conditions that they felt were unfair. One parent was openly angry and accused the Australian government of being untrustworthy. This parent suggested that international Chinese students were victims of unfair government policy:

> If it is right, I think it is kind of cheating for some people. These people go to Australia to study aiming to migrate, but the policies change in the middle of their study and they cannot migrate. You should report this to Australia government. It is kind of untrustworthy of government. (INCG204)

Students felt that they were buyers of education, and for some this position of customer demeaned the student experience. The relationship was transactional; once the purchase was completed they had to leave: 'It's like we are buying the education from them, that's it, we don't—you are not allowed to stay here anymore' (INCG101). A migration agent in China claimed that Australia had a record of constant changes to visa conditions, and current rumours and speculation about future changes led to insecurity and 'nervousness' (INCG301) among students and their families:

> And when they're raising up standard, that highest used to be three and a half and now it has to average five and a half [in the International English Language Testing System (IELTS)]. There's a rumour that they will make it to eight and it gets more difficult yeah, so people are nervous as well about when I finish my study in two years' time, will the migration law change or not, will I be able to stay here or will I have to go back home? (INCG301)

The above quote reveals how speculation about possible increases in required English language standards for international students compounds existing uncertainties and insecurities. A migration agent interpreted the policy changes that led to the closure of vocational studies courses and private institutions as Australia closing its doors to China and suggested that Australia was no longer a welcoming destination. The Australian government's closed-door messages were viewed as harsh and effectively put to an end many students' hopes for future work and residency in the country. Some students experienced this unwelcoming attitude as a personal rejection of them as individuals: 'And it's things like Australian government don't want us to stay here' (INCG101).

Lack of Information and Rights

The international Chinese students in our study had a limited understanding of Australian immigration law and their legal entitlements. Most students were interested in accessing a visa that would enable them to work in Australia on completion of their studies. The stress

resulting from legal insecurities increased as visa expiry dates drew nearer; students were often unaware of their eligibility for visa extensions or other types of visas and were reluctant to contact immigration services directly. Instead, they tended to consult with migration agents, and some sought advice from a legal aid centre. Advisors at a non-government organisation (NGO) found that some students came to them for assistance only once it was too late to resolve the issue. A common question was, 'My visa has expired. What do I do?' (INCG304). On occasion, students worked on farms in rural Australia because this type of work was an option for visitors on tourist visas to extend their stay. However, the NGO advisor claimed that it was often only after completion of farm work that international students discovered that the work had not assisted their case to extend their visa:

> Because I've seen students that have ended up going to work in farms. They come back, their visa can't be extended because they are in the wrong visa, they didn't get enough information for them to go there. (INCG304)

The coordinator of a legal aid centre proposed that international students were disadvantaged in comparison to people on tourist visas, who could extend their visas (INCG304). Parents shared students' concerns about visa extensions. For instance, the parents of a student who had temporarily returned to China were concerned that the Australian immigration service would suspect that their daughter intended to overstay if she returned to Australia. They believed that immigration officers would make inferences about her intentions because the timing of her visit would be close to the expiry date of her student visa:

> What we concern is the next visa she wants to apply for. My daughter's [student] visa will due on 15 March [2014]. We wonder whether she can apply for it [the working visa] earlier. If she can get the visa, then she can continue to stay in Australia. The problem is, my daughter wants to come back to visit us during the Chinese New Year. If she comes back, she needs to go back to Australia in early March. Then there is only half month left before her student visa due. Some country will be strict with that: 'You only have half month; we won't let you go.' … They may ask why you still come back when your visa due shortly; do you intend to smuggle [overstay]? (INCG204)

The fears expressed in the above quote demonstrate a general concern that students could be suspected by immigration officials as having intentions to act illegally and that parents could do nothing to prevent this. With these kinds of threats in parents' minds, it is not surprising that some wanted to accompany their daughters or sons to Australia, although they were unable to get a visa for this purpose. Many lamented their exclusion, with some parents describing it as impinging on their right to provide the duty of care, particularly for high school-aged children.

Parents, students, some migration agents and even the NGOs that provide advice to students often lacked accurate information about visas and students' rights in regard to visa conditions. These problems were exacerbated by Chinese students' limited understanding of Australian immigration law and their legal entitlements. Compounding these information gaps was their disempowerment, as Chinese international students have limited rights as temporary migrants. As non-citizens in Australia and citizens of China, international students do not have the full rights and entitlements of citizens in either country (Marginson 2011). For instance, they had no right of appeal against immigration decisions regarding visa cancellations for not meeting conditions, such as those regarding course completion or not working more than the 20 h/week. Neither did students have the right to appeal decisions made by the immigration department to deport them for visa expiration and overstaying. A legal aid worker at an NGO (INCG303) claimed that there was a general lack of free legal support services to assist international students with visa issues. Many students, according to this worker, were reluctant to seek advice from their educational institution if the problem related to educational compliance because they feared that the information would be communicated to the immigration authorities. Instead, many international students employed private migration agents, reputedly often at exorbitant rates, to assist them with their compliance issues. Within the dual system of monitoring by universities and immigration authorities, visa advice was considered to be a responsibility primarily of immigration. However, the immigration department was deemed unapproachable because it was remote, uninviting, bureaucratic and untrustworthy.

Many of the Chinese families in this study included grandparents and parents who had lived through the sanctions and re-education imposed by Chairman Mao Zedong. For one family, the hardships and loss of status experienced by grandparents in the Cultural Revolution had made

attainment of an education and opportunities for development overseas for their daughter or son of special significance:

> Speaking to my family history, it has some political backgrounds in my family in late Qing Dynasty, with people worked in ministries of government. But my family declined later. It was in Mao times, the nation became … how shall I say? In the generation of my grandfather, our family declined. My grandfather worked in court, but he became of target of correction and was not hired. Since then, my father also was affected and was considered as the level of 'poor peasant', the lowest level. He had no choice in order to survive. … My family was pretty poor then. My father also worked in court, but he was fired, too. … When the Cultural Revolution began, he became a target of correction, not very harsh, but still had some problems. … Actually, we were also affected. Since the Cultural Revolution began, we did not get any good education. … This is my family. (INCG206)

For the families of the international Chinese students in our study, the visa restrictions and compliance monitoring imposed by government departments of employment and immigration were harsh realities because they were seen as threats to the high hopes these families had for the opportunities that might enrich the developmental, educational and occupational experiences of their children.

Economic Insecurity

Full Fees and Upfront Fee Payments

A widely held perception in Australia is that Chinese students generally have wealthy families to support them, but in reality there are many different family circumstances behind the stereotype of the privileged Chinese student. Nyland et al. (2009) found that a third of all international higher education students in Australia had to work to support themselves. For example, one university student who had attended a private high school in Australia said that he had a cleaning job in an Asian shop to assist with covering his living costs (INCG106). The majority of students in our study were supported by their parents, but often this involved contributions from extended family and friends as well. While the majority of the parents interviewed reported that they could afford the fees and living costs of their child's study, there were also families who

experienced financial pressure from sending a daughter or son abroad to study. A parent explained how it was difficult, but that there were rewards: 'We earn money by working hard. Our income is not high so my son really cherishes his opportunity' (INCG211). Another family who had drawn on the financial resources of extended family and friends wanted to protect their daughter from knowing about their difficulties in meeting the costs of her study:

> I have several sisters and brothers, three or four. Actually, for the [conditions of a] family like mine, the whole family is supporting [the expense of] my daughter, including my younger brother and my wife's parents. I have two good friends who said that they have prepared some money for me and I can borrow it any time when I need. I did not take their money, but it made me feel safe. Regarding the financial issue, since we already sent her overseas, no matter how difficult it is, we won't bring difficulty to her. (INCG204).

A parent who was a teacher in China said that his son, an international student in Australia, felt conflicted by the economic burden imposed on his parents by his overseas study. A stress factor for most parents related to their ability to meet the upfront payments required for living costs and fees.

Disadvantages in the Job Market

Many international Chinese students found it difficult to find part-time work. They expressed these challenges through comments such as the following: '[Finding out] how to get a job is hard for my friends; I didn't really know about it because my landlord always told me it's very easy' (INCG103), and 'You spend like half a year looking for a job and get nothing, you really get nothing' (INCG104). Some students felt that there was a bias against them among Australian employers. The easiest way to avoid such prejudice for most students was to find work with a Chinese-Australian employer. These jobs were usually advertised on the internet in Mandarin and usually involved work in Chinese or Asian supermarkets, restaurants or other small businesses. One student said that he worked for a 'Chinese man' and a 'Chinese company' (INCG105) in a furniture removals business. Another student was pleased to find a different kind of employment from the usual restaurant or food store work with a Chinese-Australian boss, which involved working at night as the 'building manager' of his block of apartments: 'I just do something like solve problems for the residents and lease the apartment rooms to

others' (INCG102). However, this positive account of work experiences was the exception rather than the rule among the cohort of students in this study.

An issue that emerged in this study was abuse by employers of female students. The out-of-sight nature of much of the work undertaken by the Chinese students made them vulnerable to bullying, and working for cash made them invisible to work monitoring practices. One student experienced bullying by a Chinese-Australian boss in her work as a cashier in a Chinese supermarket. All the employees in this workplace were Chinese students and some, she thought, were unlawful 'Chinese workers'. The boss intimidated the workers and routinely accused them of stealing:

> You stand in the checkout station and they always suspect you steal money so they were always keeping an eye on you and they want the other workers to keep an eye on you, keep an eye on each other in case you steal money. And they told me every day that you don't have the specific time to leave, just when the boss told you you can leave. … Because the boss will count money at the end of the day, if there is no problem about money you can leave, if there is a problem they will tell you to stay and then they will suspect everyone, to find out who is the [culprit]. (INCG103)

Some extreme cases of worker abuse were reported by a community worker from the legal aid centre. Employers were reported to have blackmailed international students whom they had forced to work for low wages. If students were allowed to work beyond the legal 20 h/week, this was sometimes used as a threat by employers, who said that if the workers complained about their conditions they would report them to immigration for working more than the permitted time:

> Their employer or the college or whatever it may be have reported them for non-attendance or whether it's, as I said, working over their 20 hours a fortnight or whatever it is. (INCG303)

Studies have shown that immigration officers in Australia have searched students' residences after receiving information that the students had failed to comply with the 20-h limit on work. Some students have subsequently been placed in detention and deported (Marginson et al. 2010). Moreover, the restrictions on the number of work hours permitted per week have excluded international students from industry-based learning schemes integrated into undergraduate courses at some

higher education institutions. These opportunities, which usually involve placements of 6–12 months, not only provide salaries to local students, but also give them a competitive edge in the job market:

> But what I do a little bit upset is [they] give much more opportunities to the local students. I don't know other university. I heard a little bit about—not Monash, University of Melbourne, and one of my friends starting accounting, they got a lot of internship opportunity in a bank. But Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology [RMIT], the program director told us there is one opportunity also in a bank, and that is a position only offered to local students, no international students. I asked what else opportunities that we can get from RMIT, and then he told us no, he has no other chances. So especially for people who want to immigrate to Australia, they won't find a good job at least related to your own program or the knowledge you have learnt in uni. And you want that chance, you know, because we know the working experience is more and more important right now. (INCG110)

A student who conducted most of his job searches via websites found that employers generally required 'three or five years' working experience and they require you to have a PR [permanent residency visa]' (INCG106). The student, an engineering graduate at the time of the interview, was trying to access a bridging visa, which would give him more time to find a job. As the students' study period drew to an end, he became acutely aware of the discrimination against him in the workplace. The student lacked a network to help him access employment and found that employers preferred applicants with work experience and permanent residency.

Cultural Insecurity

Loneliness and Cultural Exclusion

One student described an extended period of loneliness that spanned her time studying in Australia as a secondary and later as a tertiary student. A brief account of her journey is documented here because it captures many of the challenges of isolation raised in this study. Her first experience of cultural exclusion occurred after her arrival, when she was living in a homestay accommodation with Chinese-Australians known to her parents. Although she experienced this as a comfortable context for her to be introduced to life in Australia, over time she felt

trapped in cultural separateness. She found that living with Chinese-Australians made it difficult for her to meet non-Chinese co-students. Further factors contributing to this student's isolation were a lack of confidence and lack of proficiency in spoken English and her self-characterised traits of being 'shy' and 'not very assertive' (INCG101). Her second major experience of cultural separation occurred during her final year at a Melbourne girls high school, where she was the only international student. She described the ambiguity of making sincere attempts to connect with the Australian students while at the same time still experiencing feelings of isolation: 'I had to talk to locals, so I feel really isolated, especially that year' (INCG101). Her third experience of cultural exclusion was as a tertiary student, when feelings of isolation were heightened by living alone and her exclusion from social groups of Australian students:

> Even now, I don't have any very close friends. I think that's why I feel isolated most of the time and I do have a boyfriend, but sometimes boyfriend doesn't help. … And the fact that like you are living by yourself alone and you have to go to school alone. (INCG101)

This student found that attending tutorials at university facilitated her inclusion to some degree insofar as they provided a structured context for conversation. These formal settings contrasted with the informal settings she experienced, where conversations among Australian students were usually on unfamiliar topics like unknown cultural social media. Thus, the predominant and persistent experience over the course of this student's secondary and tertiary education was one of loneliness. Taking a philosophical approach to understanding her experiences and reading relevant books assisted the student to make sense of her situation:

> I think it is big for me and I've read some books about being lonely. It's like, usually we all feel lonely more when you are young. You will feel lonely less when you're getting older. So, I reckon it's just a common thing for all the persons in such age. So, I just think I need to learn to be alone and learn to enjoy myself to some degrees.

> Yes, it's insecure and if you're having some problems and you're facing some difficult choices that you've—it's mainly depend on yourself. You don't have anyone else to help you and support you. But I think like it's a problem everyone should go through, no matter you

> are Chinese international student or you are a local students, you have to be on your [own] feet one day, you know. So, I think just why don't you just conquer it now? That's the way I'm thinking. (INCG101)

This student's account mirrored the experiences of other international Chinese students, all of whom commented on their loneliness and cultural exclusion. One student's best friend was her Chinese landlord: 'He is my best friend … because he supports me most, he helps me most' (INCG103). Although the Chinese students found a great deal of support in the companionship of other Chinese students, this did not dissipate their feelings of exclusion and cultural segregation from Australian culture. Moreover, rather than finding inclusion in a multicultural student environment, some students felt intimidated by having to communicate with students from many different countries, including Japan, Korea, Vietnam and India:

> So I feel like it's impossible to approach them. But, later on, once we get more opportunities we get to know each other, I feel like even though we're thinking can be different, but still that if you have to open up your mind and then you feel like—so it is your own thinking that makes you feel intimidated. It is not about they are scary, they're not scary at all, it's just that you're thinking that they're scary. (INCG102)

The above-quoted student interpreted overcoming such fears and insecurities as a personal challenge in the quest to become a 'global citizen'. This student gained a sense of personal security from the opportunity to 'open up your mind' and acquire a 'global perspective' (INCG102).

Communication Barriers

A major concern for students and parents alike was that limited English proficiency would affect students' study outcomes. A parent whose daughter was studying law and struggling with English said that each new subject brought new language challenges, and that his daughter believed that it would take many years for her to become fluent and confident in English, particularly in the legal field: 'She said she might understand English in all areas after she lives in Australia for ten years' (INCG205).

Difficulties with speaking English caused social insecurities for most of the students in this study, many of whom refrained from participating

in social conversations and events as a result. As explained by a parent: 'I heard that some children are reluctant to be involved into local society, perhaps because of their language are not good' (INCG210). A minister at a church, who organised social programmes for international students in Melbourne, reported that international Chinese students would not join the activity and discussion groups because they perceived their English-speaking skills to be inadequate:

> They always think that oh, my English is not good enough so maybe I don't want to join the group yet, but we assure them—I always tell them that when I came here in 2001, my English was much worse than you but I just learn anyway. (INCG301)

Regional Australian accents exacerbated the language problem for international Chinese students: 'People who live in urban areas and rural areas have different accent' (INCG202). Cultural differences in communication styles were also factors that contributed to the non-participation of Chinese students in discussion groups:

> Because of the confidence that the culture projects, sometimes it makes them feel intimidated, if you know what I mean. So that's part of that. They're more to listen, they loathe to speak; they're not necessarily the one who is more outspoken in their culture, in the way that they grow up as well with their parents. (INCG301)

While the parents of Chinese students found security in the fact that there is a significant Chinese-Australian population in Australia, the students felt that they could not relate to Chinese-Australians who were born in Australia. As one student explained: 'They're different because they're born here or they live here for a long time. They already accepted Australian culture. They can't understand what we think' (INCG112).

Students tried different avenues to gain insights into Australian culture. Some students participated in voluntary work, while one student attended meetings at a local church. A parent claimed that their daughter was learning about foreign culture in Australia by watching 'foreign television' (INCG205). Social media provided a non-threatening window for exploration of how Australians communicate and think without the stress of joining a group in person:

> I found social networking like Facebook and Twitter. … I think it's easy way to communicate with other people in Australia, in an Australian

> way; you learn to express things in Australian way. It's just easier, you don't have to make friends, you don't have to face a person.
>
> Australians or westerners, they are willing to express themselves in the YouTube and you get to see their real life and it feels like you're really close to them, but they don't really know you and there's no requirements for you or no enter requirements to be close with them, you know what I mean? (INCG101)

These efforts to bridge the cultural gap reflected the desire of Chinese students to understand Australian culture, whereas Australians, according to the student participants, showed no interest in learning about Chinese culture. One parent questioned whether local Australians *could* understand the cultural background of Chinese students: 'Local people, they cannot understand the background and social relationships in China. After all, we have Chinese mentality; while you have Australian mentality. They are not same' (INCG206). A migration agent in China believed that the exclusion of Chinese students from Australian culture was part of a deeper exclusion born of not having 'the willing[ness] and mentality to absorb east culture' (INCG201). The one-sidedness of the cultural contract was revealed in a parent's description of their son's visit to Australia to take part in a cultural communication exchange:

> This summer my son went to Australia for some culture communication activity. He said: 'Nobody speaks to me.' I said: 'It is understandable, as these local students have been together for long. They have been together for at least one year, but you are only here for one month. It is different. And you cannot speak language so well as them.' He just said: 'Anyway, we cannot play together well.' Certainly, there are nearly no sports activities in Chinese school. My son is rather good at sport among Chinese students. When they get there, local students often play golf, rowing boat, playing bow, and so on. My son never played those in China. But those local students were very familiar with that. Local students rowed the boat very well, but my son and his classmates could not handle it. I think these things are also important. (INCG213)

These findings contrast with the contract of internationalisation to which universities have committed. According to this contract,

both Australian and international students will benefit from the rich exchange of ideas and mix of different cultural perspectives.

Physical Insecurity

Parents in China believed Australia to be a safe study destination for their daughters and sons. Their opinions were based on fragments of information gathered from other parents, friends and migration agents. The concerns that undermined Australia's reputation as a safe destination for international students following the attacks on Indian students in Melbourne in 2008–09 were not mentioned by the parents in our study. The parents' perception of Australia as a safe destination was generally reaffirmed by the first-hand experiences of their daughters and sons. Parents and migration agents alike saw a link between safety in Australia and the country's multiculturalism, which they interpreted as something that makes Australia welcoming for different cultural groups. It was important to parents and migration agents that Australia is home to a significant Chinese population, many of whom were from families who had lived in Australia for two, three or more generations. However, the Chinese students found that Chinese-Australians exhibited a lack of connection with or interest in them. As one student explained: 'They're different because they're born here or they live here for a long time. They already accepted Australian culture. They can't understand what we think' (INCG112). Students' first-hand experiences in Australia caused them to be ambivalent about proclaiming that a multicultural community fosters security; indeed, as mentioned earlier, some found dealing with the different cultural groups of international students overwhelming.

Australia and Canada were considered safer destinations than the USA. Some parents doubted the safety of the USA for their daughter or son because of the country's gun laws, which were perceived as resulting in decreased safety for the public: 'I am now worrying that she wants to go to America. It is not safe there with so many guns' (INCG205). Others were influenced by stereotypes of gangsters predominant in television and film. The USA was described by an agent as less safe for young women, although no specific reason was given for the gender differentiation: 'Generally, if the child is a girl, they will worry more for going to America, as it is more open, so more girls choose Australia. Australia is relatively safer' (INCG202). The parents in our research were primarily interested in English-speaking countries and rarely considered European countries as possible study destinations. One parent referred to 'the pilgrimage to the west' (INCG207). The Netherlands was considered a

possible destination for study by one parent, who later discarded this as an option because of the country's policies on sex work and the decriminalisation of drug use: 'We heard that it is not safe in Holland, especially for drug selling and red-light district. Our child is a girl, which makes us concern a lot' (INCG204). Although many international Chinese students attend university in Paris, one of the students in this study had heard rumours from a French classmate in Australia that Paris is not a safe place: 'There are many Chinese in Paris, but in Paris, some areas is really bad. It's very unsafe, yeah' (INCG110).

Australia's drinking culture was raised as a safety concern by some students, particularly female students. While the students were confident in the capability of the police to maintain law and order, they did not feel safe on the streets or out at night in public spaces where drinking was common. The aggressiveness and unpredictability of Australians under the influence of alcohol intimidated the students: 'So many people get drunk' (INCG112). Apprehension about encountering drunk people on the street confined one Chinese student to her room: 'During the night, most of the time I stay in my bedroom' (INCG108). Public transport was another factor that influenced feelings of safety, particularly in relation to travelling at night. Safety on trains is a community-wide concern in Victoria because of many violent attacks on travellers. A Chinese student explained that she felt vulnerable and unsafe when youth on the train had been drinking and were loud and potentially out of control:

> Sometimes on the train there are some teenagers that are drunk or something like that—they speak loudly—I try to ignore them or move to another part of the train. (INCG112)

The nature and location of students' accommodation directly impacted their feelings of safety: 'When I think about security, the first thing that makes me think about security is when I am looking for accommodation' (INCG112). It was evident that students who lived in the Central Business District (CBD) in Melbourne were more confident about their physical security than those who lived in the suburbs. One student summed up her impression of the CBD as 'very safe' (INCG109). The security of students' dwellings was also linked to their families' socioeconomic circumstances. The CBD in Melbourne, with its large population of international Chinese students, offered security through similarity in micro-culture and language. Students living in shared houses or renting rooms in the suburbs were less confident that their environment was safe perhaps because they felt isolated.

In most cases, students organised their accommodation in advance from China, without knowledge of the safety of different areas. Even after some years of living in Australia, students often remained unaware of local knowledge and crime data on the safety levels of suburbs. A student who found satisfactory accommodation in Footscray subsequently decided that it was unsafe when she observed repeated drug transactions in the area:

> I think the CBD area, or just in current area, I think it's very safe. But actually I ride my bicycle to Footscray and I don't think that is very safe and because I saw many people exchange there and that's a—one day, maybe in the evening I ride my bicycle from Footscray to [name indistinct] and I felt a little scared, yeah. (INCG109)

Home robberies were the only other crime mentioned by students, although most students believed this was a crime mainly experienced by students living in shared rental accommodation. None of the students in the study had personally been robbed, although they had heard of incidents of theft through their networks.

Conclusion

The international Chinese students in our study were inspired by the transformative possibilities of gaining the identity of global scholars. The aspiration of students was not only to study but also to learn about western culture and become more adept at traversing the east–west cultural divide. Parents anticipated and hoped that sending their daughter or son to study in Australia would offer new insights and different life possibilities through immersion in a western culture. The Chinese parents looked to Australia as a developed nation that would share language, culture and lifestyle opportunities that their children could not access in China.

However, the student experience was diminished by a sense of exclusion from Australian culture. This was particularly painful insofar as one of their aims in studying abroad was to learn about the west and the language, work and everyday ways of doing things in the destination country. Such exclusion limited their opportunities for development beyond what was offered by their university courses. Parents, migration and students referred to an entrenched cultural divide that they often

perceived as western culture's disinterest in eastern culture and the latter's subordination to western knowledge systems.

A portion of resources within higher education in Australia is devoted to managing the divide between students and temporary migrants and avoiding visa transgressions. This has partly involved determining who is a 'genuine student' rather than someone studying in Australia with the sole purpose of permanent migration, but in reality the experiences of migrants and students are deeply intertwined. The hopes of the students were shaped by their experiences of studying in Australia. Students had to confront a number of realities as their studies drew to completion. They found very limited options for working or living in Australia either as students or upon completion of their studies. Many experienced legal insecurities because of the unknown direction of future policies and the frequent changes to visa conditions. As their formal studies drew to a close, students' aspirations usually included the hope of professional work in Australia and the longer-term goal of permanent residency. In reality there was little chance of either of these desires being fulfilled, and uncertainty pervaded the final period of study. These conflicts between the Chinese students' aspirations and lived experiences reflect the struggles of universities in addressing internationalisation when different knowledge systems meet and higher education imperatives must respond to global market pressures.

4

Indonesian Temporary Migrants: Australia as First Preference or Last Resort?

A Brief History of Indonesian Geopolitics, Political Culture and Society

Large-scale emigrations do not occur in a vacuum but are related to the social and political contexts of the individuals who leave their country of origin for short or long periods. A decade and a half ago, Indonesia was in the grip of political upheaval and economic crisis that manifested as interreligious violence and social instability in many parts of the Indonesian archipelago. The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s in part precipitated this period of instability and violence, with large numbers of workers losing their jobs and the Chinese minority targeted as a scapegoat in some regions. Aside from the economic crisis, other more deeply rooted factors in Indonesia's history were also contributing influences. The authoritarian oligarchies of Sukarno and General Suharto from 1949 to 1998 continue to have a significant impact on Indonesia's political culture, though in new, moderated forms (Buehler 2014). The transition to democratic governance is evident in political institutions and the rule of law, but the memories of military dictatorship remain potent for many Indonesians. After General Suharto lost power, Indonesia experienced a period of instability marked by sectarian violence and the rise of radical Muslim groups (Ford and Pepinsky 2014). The first direct presidential election was held in 2004, resulting in the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was re-elected in 2009. On 20 October 2014,

President Joko Widodo was sworn in, representing a departure from rule by Indonesia's dynastic elite. In contrast to previous political leaders, Widodo is a provincial businessman who ran a furniture export company until his rise to prominence as mayor of Surakarta (Solo) and, subsequently, governor of Jakarta.

Since the end of the 1990s, Indonesia has undergone vast transformations, including an economic boom supported by greater political stability as well as emerging relationships with the large powers of China and the USA (Ford and Pepinsky 2014; McDonald 2014; Kingsbury 2002). Indonesian society also faces challenges in a number of areas, including national identity and the recognition of minorities; continuing inequalities between the elites who maintain historical privilege, the majority of poor Indonesians and the growing educated 'new' middle class; and the move towards gender equality. A longer historical lens also reveals the legacies of colonial rule by the Dutch from the early seventeenth century until December 1949, when Indonesia became independent. The Dutch East India Company, established in 1602, profited enormously from the spice trade centred in the Maluku Islands of Indonesia.

Geographically, Indonesia comprises 17,000 islands, with Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua being the larger ones, followed by Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Bali. Java remains the dominant political and economic centre, and has seen a continuity of rule since the early Islamic influence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and Dutch colonial rule from the seventeenth century. Indonesia has one of the most diverse populations of any nation-state. There are over 500 ethnic groupings, each with its own distinctive dialect of Bahasa. Indonesia, a self-declared secular state, is the fourth most populous nation in the world (after China, India and the USA) and has the world's largest Muslim population.

Links between Indonesia and Australia are longstanding and existed prior to European settlement. Javanese migrants worked in the North Queensland sugar cane fields and as pearlers and fishermen on the north and north-west coasts of Australia in the late 1800s. However, after the 1901 introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act (the White Australia Policy), which discriminated against all non-whites living in Australia or wishing to migrate, most Indonesians returned home. The socio-cultural traces of institutionalised racism resulting from this first act of Australia's new federation arguably continue into the present despite more than four decades of official multicultural policy.

Internal and Regional Migration Patterns

Similar to migrants from many other developing countries, Indonesians with limited educational and economic resources primarily migrate in search of greater economic security and access to a range of basic rights (such as education, healthcare and adequate housing) to the outskirts or slum regions of large urban centres. Labour migration to countries that actively recruit low-skilled migrants such as domestic workers, construction workers and workers in other labour-intensive industries is also common. The Indonesian state does not have a robust social welfare safety net as does Australia, and therefore individuals and families bear a greater burden in meeting their basic needs. Migration may be the only option for overcoming poverty and unemployment, supporting family members and enabling more robust and predictable futures. Indonesia, with a population of 250 million, occupies an important geopolitical position between Asian countries, Australia and the Pacific, and particularly in relation to its nearest neighbours, Malaysia (with a population of 29.7 million), Singapore (with a population of 5.5 million) and Australia (with a population of 23.7 million). Yet migration between Australia and Indonesia is negligible in light of the geographic and strategic proximity of the two countries. The most significant barriers to migration from Indonesia to Australia are the official forms of mediation, including bureaucracy and its layers of regulation, and the costs associated with obtaining information about migration regulations and negotiating the processes of entry.

The incidence of internal migration is significant in Indonesia, marked particularly by high levels of rural to urban migration. Such migration has a long history. The Suharto regime began a programme of voluntary resettlement from 1967 to 1994, whereby members of some ethnic groups were moved from and moved from more crowded areas to outer islands of the archipelago. The Transmigration Program, as it was called, moved more than 6.4 million people from heavily populated islands like Java, Bali and Madura to less populated islands like Sumatra, Kalimantan and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya). Financially supported by the World Bank, the programme offered landless families incentives to relocate, including the offer of land, housing and farming equipment. The Transmigration Program aimed to assimilate Indonesia's ethnic minorities into the dominant Javanese culture. More recently, the problem of internally displaced persons has grown. A 2002 report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Internally Displaced Persons highlighted religious tensions between Muslims and Christians as a significant cause of internal displacement in Indonesia. In 2002, 1.3 million Indonesians were affected by internal

displacement. In the provinces of Aceh and Papua, displacement is largely due to fighting between Indonesian security forces and separatist rebels (the Free Aceh Movement and the Free Papua Movement) seeking independence from Indonesia.

Perhaps the most significant development in relation to the mobility of Indonesians over the past decade has been the rise of foreign migrant labour, with more than half a million Indonesians travelling to Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and the Middle East on labour contracts. A significant reason for this migration is the need to send remittances home. In early 2012, *The Jakarta Post* reported that Indonesians had sent home US$1.7 billion from Malaysia alone during the previous year (*Jakarta Post* 2012). Many people (primarily female migrants) enter into domestic work in private households and suffer significant rights violations, including unpaid wages, unsafe working conditions, inadequate housing, unreasonable working hours, unreasonable changes in the nature and conditions of work, confiscation of identity documents by the employer, confinement and physical or sexual abuse (Farbenblum et al. 2013, p. 16). In recent years, with the move to more open and democratic forms of governance in the country, Indonesian NGOs and human rights groups have proliferated and taken a leading role in delivering education programmes for migrant workers as well as advocating for legislative reforms. Trade unions have also had an increasingly important role in Indonesian society in recent years in protecting workers' rights (Caraway and Ford 2014). Of particular relevance to our analysis is the strengthening of regulations pertaining to the recruitment and placement of workers overseas to ensure that they have access to justice and forms of redress if their rights are violated. Indonesia began sending migrant labour overseas in 1970 under Suharto's New Order regime, a government-sponsored programme aimed at reducing unemployment and attracting foreign exchange. Indonesia has become the most significant sending country of migrant labour in South-East Asia apart from the Philippines. By May 2012, 2.4 million Indonesians were recorded as migrant workers overseas, with an additional unknown number working unofficially (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia 2012).

In the current phase of democratisation, Indonesia is undergoing profound transformations, in part manifested in increased attention to the indicators of human development that relate to poverty and inequality. The UN Development Indonesia Report 2011–12 revealed that economic progress is uneven in the country's 33 provinces, with some 30 million people living under the national poverty line. Indonesia

also faces significant challenges in relation to the effects of climate change on development. Corruption is also rampant at every level (UN Development Indonesia Report, 2011–2012, p. 8). In Indonesia, as in many other developing societies, core human development efforts remain a priority. Among these efforts are the eight UN Millennium Development Goals:

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

The vast archipelago that constitutes Indonesia's 33 provinces is also highly differentiated in terms of experiences of poverty, inequality and political and religious tensions. There are significant language and ethnic differences across Indonesia, with the Javanese representing the historical and political elite of Indonesian society.

The Indonesia–Australia Relationship

As near neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia and Australia have a contradictory relationship that is borne out in the experiences of Indonesians migrating and wishing to migrate to Australia. Indonesia is the recipient of the largest proportion of Australian foreign aid, yet migration to Australia for the purposes of work and developing skills is difficult for all but a small percentage of Indonesian elites. Indonesian students and temporary migrant workers experience Australia as a place of both great opportunity and cultural exclusion. Religious and ethnic differences within the domain of cultural security figure prominently in the narratives of stigma and exclusion conveyed by Indonesians living in Australia who participated in this research, despite decades of official multiculturalism that replaced assimilationist policies from the early 1970s onwards.

In recent years, the Australian government has shifted its migration programme to prioritise temporary employment visas, with an emphasis on highly skilled workers. This emphasis is replicated in other high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) countries. This policy shift has provided greater opportunities for migrant workers from a range of countries to enter Australia's employment market, including Asian workers, and was reinforced in the *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper* delivered on 28 October 2012. The white paper highlights the economic and cultural transformations underway in Asia and calls on Australian businesses and other stakeholders to take advantage of these changes by forging partnerships in the Asian region. An example of a popular temporary worker visa used to engage Asian employees in Australia is the Business Long Stay—Standard Business Sponsorship (Subclass 457) Visa. There are currently around 620,000 temporary work visa holders in Australia (Ronson 2012).

Temporary employment arrangements for foreign workers are one important facet of an increasingly precarious global labour landscape that impacts both migrant and domestic workers. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) estimates that 40 % of Australia's population is engaged in 'precarious employment' (ACTU 2011; Howe 2012). However, migrant workers from poorer countries of the Global South experience heightened precariousness through forms of discrimination and exploitation due to a range of factors, including low levels of education and skills training and limited knowledge of and access to collective bargaining workplace rights. The phenomenon of denizenship, whereby migrants experience life on the fringes of society, unable to access residency or citizenship rights and living shadow lives, while often paying taxes and contributing to their host society in other ways, is a growing problem in many parts of the world, including Australia. Individuals, groups and families seek to use migration as a pathway to fulfilling basic needs through paid work and as a means to imagined alternative futures. At the same time, states restrict pathways for some groups of migrants, often in reaction to domestic political currents (Buroway 2014).

As outlined in Chap. 2, this book is the result of research that utilised four case studies of temporary migrants from China, Indonesia, Samoa and Tonga in Australia. In Chaps. 3 to 6, these individual case studies are analysed with the use of data from interviews held with temporary migrants in Australia and family members or relevant others in the countries of origin. As detailed in Chap. 2, the research methodology included interviews with migrants for each case study, as well as interviews with members of community organisations, migration agents and government representatives.

Indonesians in Australia

In the financial year 2009–10, there were a total of 123,370 temporary entrants from Indonesia residing in Australia. This total comprised 4711 temporary residents, 19,822 students, 89,884 visitors and 8953 'other' types of temporary entrants (Department of Immigration and Citizenship [DIAC] 2012a).

The 2006 National Census recorded 50,970 Indonesian-born people living in Australia. New South Wales had the largest number with 21,890, followed by Victoria (12,600), Western Australia (7880) and Queensland (530). Interestingly, the major religious affiliations among Indonesian-born people living in Australia were Catholicism (14,510), Islam (8660) and Buddhism (5570). Of the total Indonesian population, 87 % are Muslim, with 2.9 % Catholic and 0.7 % Buddhist. Indonesians living in Australia have a lower rate of acquiring Australian citizenship (47.5 %) compared to the total number of overseas-born migrants, with a rate of 75.6 %.

Given the size of the Indonesian population and the country's proximity to Australia, the relatively modest number of entrants across visa categories warrants attention. The qualitative data provided by the participants in this study—both Indonesians in Australia and those wishing to travel to Australia—suggests some possible barriers to migration. These barriers are discussed in more detail in Chap. 8.

Domains of (In)Security

A number of factors shape the actions of migrants seeking the broad spectrum of securities that enable a more settled, predictable life. Chapter 1 outlined international norms, such as the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* (ICRMW) and International Labour Organization frameworks, which provide states with guiding principles on national policy as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements on labour migration. Yet Australia, similar to other OECD states, has not ratified the ICRMW, and it prioritises its own national interests in its approach to visas, migration numbers and regional agreements on human mobility. The unequal inclusion of persons in market society, characterised most recently by the French writer Piketty (2014), can be seen at the micro level in the human experiences of the temporary migrants in the four case studies explored in this book. Our analysis is guided by the domains of security (economic, legal, cultural and physical) that this project has articulated as a conceptual framework of fluid security in the context of mobile or hyper-mobile populations.

Economic (In)Security

As will be discussed further in the sections on the other domains of security (cultural, legal and personal) below, a high degree of cross-over between these domains is evident in the narratives, stories and experiences of migrants as they talk about the migration process, ongoing negotiations in the receiver society about work and education, and mundane interactions with service providers and encounters with fellow residents and citizens.

The wellbeing of the transnational family is most clearly affected by the economic sphere. Wellbeing in economic terms extends to security in housing and the capacity to obtain the material resources required to support a flourishing life, markers that differ from person to person. In all the spheres of security, the significant use of virtual networks and social media was notable among the Indonesian participants across all age groups, in both Australia and Indonesia.

The participants interviewed in both countries conveyed higher levels of insecurity in relation to three of the domains of security (financial, personal and legal) in Indonesia, while the domain of cultural security was more insecure in Australia. Specific details of these other security domains are discussed below.

In the Indonesian case study, economic insecurity was the primary driver for migration and the desire to migrate. This form of insecurity found expression in a number of ways, discussed in detail below, though of primary importance among all participants was the desire and sense of obligation to send remittances home to help family members survive and have greater opportunities for mobility in the future. It is notable that global remittances from migrant workers to countries of origin totalled US$534 billion in 2012, triple the amount of global development aid (Farbenblum et al. 2013, p. 24). It should also be noted that these global estimates of remittances do not include remittances sent by other types of temporary migrants, such as students or those on tourist visas. This means that the total value of remittances is unknown but can be expected to be significantly higher than the reported figures.

Both the migrants interviewed in Australia and their family members, friends and extended network interviewed in Indonesia ranked financial security as one of the key contributors to migration decisions. Financial security also incorporates the desire for education in a destination country because higher-level qualifications are viewed as enabling more highly paid employment as well as improving opportunities for international mobility.

Indonesians were acutely aware of the higher wages available in Australia, even for unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, compared to Indonesia. Indeed, it is notable that the individuals interviewed for this project, and their families, friends and extended networks, generally had a high level of awareness of Australian society and its legal norms, history and political system.

The majority of those interviewed reported that they were unable to save money and plan for the future in Indonesia because the economic rewards for their work permitted them to live only a subsistence life. There was a stark contrast between what was possible in Australia, even without higher education qualifications and with the significantly higher cost of living, and what was possible in Indonesia. In this regard, the narratives of economic success that circulate through migration networks increase the desire for future migration among friends, family and extended networks.

Indonesians also described high levels of self-sacrifice in the initial stages of migration and settlement in a new country, going without anything but basic necessities in order to be able to send remittances home and make plans for the future that would require savings. For example, a person on a student visa who was studying full time, reflecting on her Australian acquaintances, expressed surprise that she was able not only to survive on the wages from 2 days' work per week but also to send money home and have some savings:

> Well, some people maybe they—[say] that—'How come you go like working only two days only in a week, but you can still cover all your stuff, but you can still send money back home?' I go, 'Well, that's how you—that's what I have to do. So just got to do it.' (INDG107)

For many migrants who were studying or working in Australia, remittances were also linked to their sense of obligation towards family members or friends in Indonesia who had helped them to cover the significant costs related to preparing for and undertaking the migration journey.

Some family members who remained in Indonesia told of the maturing process that migration facilitated. The need for careful planning and financial management was evident in many cases in a willingness to share one's good fortune, even where there was no expectation from family members in Indonesia to do so:

> I think their way of thinking has been a lot more mature. [They] always want to financially help their family back home although

> they themselves might find it uneasy to survive. They're more mature and more caring. Whenever they can, they always want to share their fortune to the family. (INDG201)

As a driver for migration, economic insecurity is also strongly related to social status and the access that status provides to favourable employment opportunities in Indonesia. Among migrants interviewed in both Indonesia and Australia, stories of corruption in relation to employment opportunities in Indonesia were widespread; conversely, the participants expressed a high level of confidence in the rule of law, general freedoms and due process in Australia.

Cultural (In)Security

Forms of discrimination are not always overt but are nonetheless felt by migrants, adding to a generalised cultural insecurity that all of the Indonesian participants referred to as having an important impact on their lives in Australia. Permanent settlement in Australia is not a high priority for Indonesian migrants. Indeed, many spoke of a clear plan to return to Indonesia as their permanent home after a period of work or study in Australia to gain the skills needed for a higher income and higher-status work in Indonesia in the future. Cultural difference, in particular related to language and religion, is a significant hurdle for many Indonesian migrants and their extended networks in Australia. Support from Indonesian community organisations and individuals who have been in Australia for some time is an important resource for newly arrived Indonesian migrants.

In the course of the interviews, the flashcards on cultural difference (explained in detail in Chap. 2) prompted the following reflection on feelings of not belonging from an Indonesian student living in Australia:

> But—if they are friendly they are so friendly—very, very friendly. I like them. I like it here. But for the others they are just so cold like that. It's hard to get close to them. Even in here, like I said, I joined the Indonesian community, I did. And some of them [are] already born here. Their parent in Indonesia, but they're already born here. Even them, it's hard for me to getting close to them. (INDG103)

Two visually structured flashcard activities, outlined in Chap. 2, were embedded into the semi-structured interviews. For one activity

during the interview process, participants selected and ranked the three most important issues for them and the sources of assistance used to deal with these issues. In the other activity, involving a different set of eight images on cards, participants ranked the trustworthiness of organisations, groups and people. This ranking activity was fruitful and provided insight into ambiguities related to trust and insecurity. For example, many Indonesian interviewees did not fear or avoid figures of authority in Australia, such as Department of Immigration officials or police.

The process of ranking the cards often sparked unsolicited responses and moved an interview in new directions. An Indonesian participant's comment on different levels of trust in the police and immigration department in Indonesia and the same organisations in Australia:

> In here [Australia] you break the law, you are going to end up [with a real consequence]. But in my country, if you don't break the law, we are not going to [benefit]. You know what I mean? So in my country, we [almost] need to break the law to get the better life. (INDG102)

The Indonesian participants in Australia displayed ambivalence as a way of coping with feelings of dislocation, loneliness and cultural insecurity caused by experiences of prejudice or rejection. Notably, though, at times ambivalence was also detected in more subtle utterings in the participants' narratives about comfort or discomfort, both physical and cultural—yearning for home, for example, expressed as feeling 'cold' in Australia, and different culinary habits between the two countries. 'I've got a problem in healthiness now; it's a problem with my stomach. Yeah, I think, the habit—eating habit is different', reported one participant (INDG103).

Feelings of physical insecurity were expressed by many of the interview participants in the form of existential angst about general discomfort or unease when living in a suburban context that is 'too quiet' (INDG103), or as anxiety about planning one's future when the coordinates of stability (economic, legal and social) were absent (INDG107).

Notably, one interviewee described feelings of belonging or not belonging as qualitatively distinct from the status of stranger, reflecting on the reality of Australia's multi-ethnic population: 'No, I don't think

I have ever felt like [a] stranger, because people in Australia also come from many places and even you can see yellow skin like me and she is Australian. So in Australia, no, I have never felt like being a stranger' (INDG0108).

Common across the interviews conducted in Australia and Indonesia was the prevalence of laughter as a strategy during the interview process. Laughter in most cases was not nervous laughter to cover gaps in the conversation or lack of language ability. Rather, it emerged as a gentle form of defiance, or perhaps as an attempt to appear less self-aware and critically observant than was actually the case.

Interestingly, family members of Indonesian migrants interviewed in Indonesia expressed largely positive feelings about the migration process—as not only providing economic opportunity, but also as life affirming:

> Indonesian people, in general, regardless [of] their religions or ethnic[ity], want to migrate to other places to try their fortune and to become successful people. … So not only for studying, but also for working, the parents would feel really proud and this is really desired by Indonesian people. … And even in Islamic tradition, if people do not travel, they are like water that stays in one place and therefore it gets dirty, but if it flows, it will stay clean and give benefits to its surrounding. And there's another proverb that encourages people to pursue knowledge even if they have to travel to China. People will not get much if they stay in their hometown, but if they travel overseas, they'll learn a lot more and more life experiences, know other languages, other cultures. So they'll have rich experiences—when they travel overseas they will not only gain formal knowledge but they'll have valuable life experiences from living in different countries. So it's really a proud [thing for] Indonesian families [to] have relatives or children who live overseas. (INDG201)

Another parent expressed similar sentiments:

> There's a teaching in our religion that's called *Hijra* which means [to] move from one place to a different place for a better condition. If someone wants to be successful, the person has to [practise] *Hijra*: Seek knowledge even if you have to come to China. This means that people are instructed to travel far away to seek for a better life and

> meaningful knowledge and skills or good education, don't just stay in [one] place but [practise] *Hijra*. (INDG206)

Through the migrant narratives described above, ambivalence is evident not in the hard-edged, exclusive categories of belonging, loyalty or the desire to leave, but rather in the more subtle interchange and overlap of these categories in the migrant experience. In the case studies explored in this research, the realities of negotiating irregular or temporary migration status further heightened the overlap and combination of feelings of loyalty and ambivalence towards a new society. This created what may on the surface appear to be contradictory, discordant narratives, yet in the context of the transnational lives negotiated by the migrants, such complexities were clearly an integral part of everyday life.

Legal (In)Security

Permanent residency is not as highly desired by Indonesians living in Australia as it is by other national groups. Indeed, even among Indonesian temporary migrants who remain in Australia for significant periods, the acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship does not appear to be highly desirable. Even so, Indonesian community organisations and informal networks of tangible and intangible assistance are key to ensuring a positive early period of settling in for temporary migrants, whether students or workers. There were several examples in the Indonesian case study of individuals and families living shadow lives on temporary or expired visas. Such a life lived in the shadows and the relationship between this precarious existence and the administration of migration in the Australian context were articulated by an Australian migration agent, who acted on behalf of temporary migrants in negotiating the channels of governance in obtaining a visa:

> There's always a combination of factors, and ultimately what drags people to Australia or what pushes them away from the source country are things which are outside, and they're intrinsically unknowable for us. We have to take the evidence that clients give us and we take the evidence that we can obtain independently and we put together a construct and ultimately one of the biggest variables or [a] constant difficulty, if you like, is the fact that the Department of Immigration stands as the gatekeeper, and a large part of our work is understanding the department's received opinions, vulnerabilities, issues, concerns and manipulating those through the case officers who are appointed

> to do that work. So that is one degree removed from the clients. The clients have just expressed a view that they want to come and then we assess with them what possibilities there are for them. Yeah, but it's difficult to say what their motivations are. That's always a construct, on my part, if you like, I'm guilty of orientalism and I impose on them what I think they want.

> Well, when you look at temporary migrants and you see what they're doing for the 457s [Business Short Stay Visa] at the moment, much smarter people than us are manipulating public opinion in ways which show that the public can be persuaded to be infinitely hostile towards them, and I wonder whether publicity about the Indian students last year [2011] and the year before is also related to that, and when you see publicity about crimes being committed, a temporary migrant is always mentioned, isn't it? Whereas it should be irrelevant so, you know, public opinion has the potential to stop it completely, I think, if it's manipulated in that way. I don't know, I mean 457 Visas we can live without them, students can live without them, and at some stage, you know, the economic graduates have to take over and … yeah, command the debate, but it's not going to happen. I mean just that visceral xenophobia is so strong. (INDG303)

Though the above reflections on temporary migrants were made in relation to Australia, the sense of a loss of control and a liminal, in-between existence expressed by this migration agent reflect conditions of temporariness not particular to the Australian case. The actions of the Australian state described in the above extract—of fiendishly detailed gatekeeping and a high volume of rhetoric on migrants designed to steer public opinion—are not dissimilar to the practices of other states in both the Global North and Global South (Standing 2011).

The following extract is taken from an interview with an Indonesian couple with two children. They discussed their temporary migration status in Australia and their circumstances as illegal overstayers since the temporary visa on which they had entered Australia had expired. This couple describes coping with uncertainty and a lack of control over their life course as they moved in and out of regular and irregular visa status. As the male in the couple reported:

> The bridging—they [the Australian authorities] rejected the bridging visa. Then one year. This way, after one year, we become, like, illegal.

> [The situation was] tricky. But, luckily, I got a permanent job when I come here. This way we still keep going. I got the job. This way—it's important. This is important that we are—economically, it's not as bad, you know, because I got, like, a permanent job. Nobody helped us, honestly, because when we are illegal, we keep quiet because [*long pause*]. (INDG101)

The couple recounted a period of time they spent living a shadow life or half-life of hiding. During this period, the husband was employed full time and their two children attended school. They talked of the support they received from a few members of the Indonesian community; otherwise, they lived an isolated existence, afraid of a knock on the door:

> And then until probably—I'm not sure, probably someone reported us about being … illegal. Because the immigration [officials] come to our house. And then my solicitor just told us, 'Yeah, someone has already reported you', because this—this is the only difficult part when we are living in Australia. And then they catch us and .... That's right, when I come in Australia, the luck is I got a permanent job straightaway, that's lucky. *And we still pay the tax*. Pay the tax. I'm not sure because why they didn't ask what's your visa, something like that, because when I'm coming in the job, apply for the job, and then I can—I get this with a job and then the boss is, 'Okay' … *happy*. [The boss says,] 'You've got permanence.' *They don't ask anything*. (INDG101)

In the candid reflections of this couple, a strategy of ambivalence is evident in the multiple layers of their experience, just as it is enacted through semi-official and official regimes. These temporary migrants are perhaps surprisingly aware of the acts of 'turning a blind eye' that occur at the level of neighbourhood, school and everyday activities. The couple also engaged in their own forms of deliberate ignorance in their everyday activities. Even with irregular visa status, the couple went about their lives with neighbours, work colleagues and friends in the same fashion they had while on a valid visa. Only after it became evident that an unknown party had exposed their irregular migration status to the authorities did the couple retreat to a largely hidden life, waiting for an official knock on the door. In this context ambivalence is an aspect of an affective repertoire adopted to cope with uncertainty.

A recurrent theme that emerged in the narratives of these temporary migrants was that of belonging, which relates to the category of cultural security in the host society. Belonging also aligns with the concept of

ambivalence as a response to situations of uncertainty and limited rootedness. The extract below highlights the impact of temporary status on migrants' lives:

> For now, before I feel like this is temporary, in Australia, in Sydney, it's only temporary. But for now I cannot—I cannot do the same like that. I have to follow what people do in here, how they act, how they behave. I have to follow like to adapt with them. So I cannot say, I'm Indonesian, I complain, I just keep complaining like that.
>
> That's what we [are] learning, even in Indonesia we have like a prayers, what is that, set of prayers—wherever you live you have to adapt. Yeah. It is my plan after I finish my study I just enjoy my time in Australia here, and to make—like I said, at the beginning it's hard to adapt. We still keep learning, see—learn how to adapt in Australia. And now we are it's getting better, so we know how to adapt and then just enjoy life. Make—if you feel lonely, yes, make a friend and then make yourself happy. I don't want to be sad. My mind is still in Indonesia now. Before it was like, Indonesia is better like this, like this, like this. Now, I don't want to compare. I like Australia. It makes me happy … so before it's very hard. I just thinking Indonesia is much better. I used to compare but now like the saying, the prayer said, wherever you live you have to adapt, you do like what the people [do]. So just make me happy and enjoy the time in Australia and then go back to my country. (INDG103)

Interviewees who were considering migration to Australia on a temporary basis for work or study (either for the first time or after having returned to Indonesia) were asked about what aspects of their lives or what particular events influenced their decisions:

> To be honest, I really have a dream to go abroad again. Well, my first time travel was not that really abroad—like, I spent a few months there and so I really wanted to go to Australia and I have tried once and, yeah, I think Australia's just the best place to go because [*laughs*] as I arrived on the internet the status they show that Australia is just one of the best places in the world to go for study, and some ranked universities in the world are Australian universities, so that's one of

> my motivations to go to Australia … and probably to the US or the UK. (INDG213)

An advocate for migrant workers in an Indonesian NGO, who herself had been a migrant domestic worker for many years, commented on the ongoing problem of temporariness:

> Is always on a temporary basis. Because for the contracts organisation … because now in the reality, in the now globalisation, all the workers is being contract position. So because of this also we are doing—of course, first we want to be permanent workers. But until now, there's no way about this. So—except you are married with the local, so you can become [regularised]. (INDG401)

Interviewees were also asked about their opinions of the benefits of migrating to Australia for a temporary period for themselves, their family and their community. The response below is from a young woman who had spent a number of years as a temporary worker in neighbouring countries such as Malaysia with the ultimate hope of working in Australia:

> If I go overseas to Aussie, 'cause I can say thanks, God—okay. And then, because my dream come true, and then I can study and then I can take the shorter part-time, and then I can sort my money, everything, and I can send to my mum and everything. And I can sort money for my future. I want to open the business, like that, and finish study. I think I can take the first job in Aussie. If don't have I can come back with this but I have money and before I save. Yeah. But I don't want the shopping, everything that I don't. I just want the focus how my future. I can send money and work and study. And then if I can have my family like my mum's family, like this one, because they also poor but only that my dream. And one, my dream, if I can save my money and I can say to my mum, mum, this is my money. I want to go to you to Bethlehem. Yeah. That's my dream. Because I have only mum. Yeah. I want to make she happy. Yeah. Only that's my dream. Not thinking anything. I'm don't thinking I want a car, I want a house, big house. No, no, no. I'm not thinking like that. I just want thinking I have home, I have food, I have money, and I can study, I can make you happy, all my family. I don't think anything. (INDG209)

A parent of an Indonesian living in Australia on a temporary visa reflected candidly on the impact of migration on family networks, including in terms of keeping in contact with members of the diaspora:

> Indonesian people, in general, regardless [of] their religion or ethnic [background], want to migrate to other places to try their fortune and to become successful people. Even if their children are sent overseas for working after they finish their study, the parents feel really proud of them and this is a pride for the family. So not only for studying, but also for working, the parents would feel really proud and this is really desired by Indonesian people. And even in Islamic tradition, if people do not travel, they are like water that stays in one place and therefore it gets dirty, but if it flows, it will stay clean and give benefits to its surrounding. And there's another proverb that encourages people to pursue knowledge even if they have to travel to China. People will not get much if they stay in their hometown, but if they travel overseas, they'll learn a lot more and more life experiences, know other languages, other cultures. So they'll have rich experiences. Because when they travel overseas, they will not only gain formal knowledge, but they'll have valuable life experiences from living in different countries or different places. So, it's really a pride if Indonesian families have relatives or children who live overseas.

> At first, we felt lonely [when our children emigrated] and we really missed them a lot. But then we started to get used to this distance. The communication technology makes us closer. Because of the internet and the telephone, I feel as if they lived just next door. In fact, even if they didn't live overseas, say they lived in a neighbouring city, [name deleted], for instance, and I live here in [name deleted], still we couldn't meet every day nor every week. In the past, when I decided to leave my parent back home in the village to go to Jakarta, my parents could only send a letter when they were missing me and so could I because there was no telephone. But today, I can even see their faces, we can talk and face each other. That's why I don't really feel lonely now. (INDG201)

In a different vein but continuing with the theme of legal forms of insecurity, Indonesian participants interviewed in Australia—the majority of whom were either on student visas or lapsed short-term travel visas—expressed anxiety over the uncertain nature of their visa status.

Specifically, they were concerned about their access to permanent residency rights (which was limited for most of them) as well as to work and other subsistence rights, including access to healthcare. These concerns were manifest in a focus on self, family and community. It is notable that in the Indonesian case, when faced with having to negotiate the intricacies of everyday survival and the complex institutional rules and points of entry, participants turned to themselves, their family and their ethnic community members for help; blame was not apportioned to the receiver society, Australia, or to its formal institutions. In contrast, the participants interviewed in Indonesia were distrustful towards Indonesian institutions. Participants told of informal barriers and high levels of nepotism impacting all institutional levels and affecting formal applications for work or entry to educational institutions. Such barriers were most acutely felt by poorer Indonesians, who lacked the resources required to 'play the game'. On this point, we can also reflect on the importance of contextual differences, such that students from a country dominated by an authoritarian regime, such as China, appeared confident to criticise a government (in this case, the Australian government) for regulatory failings in its visa regime, as outlined in Chap. 3, whereas migrants from a state that has formally democratic political processes, Indonesia, seemed more likely to internalise strategies of defiance and survival. For example, a young Indonesian interviewed in Jakarta who had family members and friends studying overseas reflected on the problems of a lack of even-handedness on the part of institutions of governance:

> With Indonesian policy … with [the] Indonesian situation, especially with our government policy, the political situation, the corruption … that is really exhaust[ing] to see that the government are not getting a better environment, [an] atmosphere of being a very good government in implementation. So [people] may [make] a decision to leave the country, to stay abroad, to work abroad and they are not coming back to Indonesia someday … I think so. (INDG207)

In view of the rich narratives of the migrants in relation to forms of legal insecurity, the theorisation of 'paper walls' and 'paper markets' discussed in Chap. 1 (Torpey 2000; Vasta 2010) provides a useful analytic guide. For example, Vasta discusses the contemporary acceleration of the processes of bureaucratising identity through a complex paper trail. Those without access to the paper markets are in a vulnerable predicament; the system has the potential to not only strip a person of rights but also render them

effectively invisible to institutions of regulation and social welfare. Working from this basis of the document as the embodiment of state control, Bauböck (2001) compares the territorially bounded policies of migration in Canada, the USA, Israel and the European Union. The result of his analysis reveals the extent of legal measures to deny access to territory. These ideas are explored in more detail in Chap. 1 and in the concluding chapter.

Physical (In)Security

Physical insecurity was more of an issue for the Indonesian participants in Indonesia than for those in Australia. While forms of cultural insecurity were prominent in the narratives of temporary migrants in Australia, they did not translate into manifestations of physical insecurity. Rather, participants interviewed in Australia focused primarily on stories of physical threat, violence and insecurity in Indonesia:

> It is much better in Australia. We feel really, really secure in Australia because, you know, like, we know Australia is like a democratic country or something like that. So we feel everything is look—like, free. So freedom, everything but within the limit, we have to follow the Australian law. But, as I said, we're quite happy because we have no problem with Australian law. If you go back to Indonesia, Australia is much, much better.

> We're talking about the comparison with Indonesian police and immigration [department] and Australia. I think it's much different because of my experience in Indonesia, I lived in Jakarta for 15 years. As for the police and the immigration, it's—you know, difficult. What do I have to say? It's different with Australian police. So, yes, I said that—I see with the Australian police, they're, like, quite polite so, you know. They're quite polite but Indonesia not, you know? It's not really, you know—not as polite as Australian police. And we trust Australian police. (INDG101)

Some participants living in Australia also referenced the ethnic violence that occurred in 1997 and 1998 in Indonesia as a strong memory of physical insecurity, which had no correlative or anchor point in their new life in Australia (INDG101).

It was also common among the Indonesian migrants for stories to circulate through local and community networks so that issues of physical

security and safety became shared concerns among recently arrived individuals, families and groups:

> Okay, the neighbourhood where I lived in Jakarta is actually quite safe, there are some, like, motorbike robberies, but still I found it's quite safe for me to live in. Here also in Randwick and I have got information from Mr [name deleted] and also from my other friend who told me, like, Randwick is safe compared to other suburbs. So you don't have to worry when you live here and because I do my cleaning job very early in the morning, like I start at 4.30, so I have got to leave home, like, 4—at 20 past 4. So when I go by bike and once I met like two drunken people, they just say, 'Hello how are you, can you get a lift?' Just like that. But nothing happened at the time. But, compared with the other one in Kings Cross, just yesterday, just last Sunday my friend was having, like, a stealing in the unit.

> Yeah, because ... there is something wrong in Indonesia where sometimes people just, we cannot trust them too much because of the, what is it, like the police and also the immigration especially with—when people do wrong and they have money, they can pay [their way out of trouble]. (INDG108).

For the Indonesian migrants, feelings of physical insecurity in Australia were primarily related to visa issues, potentially leading to immigration detention and deportation—particularly if a visa was expiring—and also to issues of health:

> [*Laughs*] Yeah, this—I think this issue is because I don't like cold, I think. And I sort of like, in Indonesia, we're used to—for me, I've got a problem in healthiness now; it's a problem with my stomach. Yeah, I think, the habit—eating habit is different.
>
> *Interviewer: Okay. And you notice it in your health?*
>
> Yeah. ... People here [in Australia] they don't have—sometimes they don't have breakfast. Yeah, I just follow them and then I get a problem [*laughs*].
>
> *Interviewer: So you were actually healthier when you were at home?*
>
> And in Indonesia, we have breakfast, lunch and dinner. But here I just eat, even sometimes like so or what—like it's only junk food open, like Mac

Interviewer: Yeah. So you eat badly sometimes, you're saying?
Yeah. That's make me—I've got a problem with my health. (INDG103)

Many interviewees embodied high levels of resilience not uncommon among migrants, often displaying a significant level of adaptability to new circumstances. In this regard, the climate is also part of the physical environment influencing migrant experiences:

So also have different climate. Here is tropical, in Indonesia. So, oh, well, I prepare myself, more in physical, I mean, in physiological and also in physical, rather than finance or—because when you have more stronger physiology or stronger motivation, it will make you stronger to face all the problems coming from—in new atmosphere, in new environment. (INDG207)

Other participants recounted the physical practicalities of the built environment and the difficulties of negotiating everyday encounters with a disability:

So far we have got like a very serious problem, but I think the most challenging condition is because my husband is blind, so I have to like do everything by myself, like going shopping, just like my friend who has got sighted husband, sighted partners they will, they can help.

Yeah, health issues here. In Indonesia, in Jakarta especially, we can get like free medication if we are considered low in terms of income. But sometimes, like people who is in the middle, I mean you are not very rich and you are not really poor, we can like mark up, like, yeah you can be considered as poor income so to get health, to get like free medical. But here in Australia, from what I understand is that we have to pay some money, especially for immigrants who are not yet permanent to pay for the, what is it? (INDG108)

As the father of a sight-impaired student, interviewed in Indonesia, stated:

Probably, one of the challenges was the tough competition for studying overseas. For someone like my son, he might have difficulties to

> compete with his sighted classmates. So I was wondering if he could cope with his impairment and catch up with the others. If he can succeed in his study, this means that he is actually better than the sighted students. Apart from the challenge, one thing that concerns us is his health condition. But it's just a little concern. (INDG206)

This chapter began with a brief overview of the social and political history of Indonesia as the context within which Indonesian citizens make decisions about migration. The political, social and economic transformations that Indonesia has undergone since the early 1990s have had profound effects on the experiences of Indonesian migrants and their decisions to leave families, friends and extended networks in search of greater economic security, educational opportunities and other benefits such as democratic freedoms. The interviews with the Indonesian migrants in this study, as with the other three case studies, are a qualitative snapshot of the migrant experience, revealing rich, layered experiences of human agency and autonomy that defy and surprise the regulating logic of governments and bureaucracies. As the migration scholars Castles, De Haas and Miller note:

> Official policies often fail to achieve their objectives, or even bring about the opposite of what is intended. People as well as governments shape international migration. Decisions made by individuals, families and communities—often with imperfect information and constrained options—play a vital role in determining migration and settlement. The social networks which arise through the migratory process help shape long-term outcomes, and defy attempts by governments to regulate migration. (2014, p. 317)

5
Samoan-Born New Zealanders as Trans-Tasman Denizens

Mobility and Its Governance in the South Pacific

Crossing a Sea of Islands

The traditional Polynesian skill of navigating long sea journeys is legendary. From a Polynesian perspective, the precolonial Pacific was a 'sea of islands' within which people moved freely and maintained active social links and trading networks (Lee 2009, citing Hau'ofa 1993a). In effect, the ocean served to connect, rather than divide, the region's inhabitants. The Samoan word *malaga*, which is usually translated as 'travel' or 'movement', has the connotation of moving back and forth (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a) in a manner that is now recognised in migration scholarship as circular migration. *Malaga* was originally undertaken to fulfil *fa'alavelave* (obligations) to *aiga* (kin groups) in order to obtain resources to use as gifts to be presented at births, marriages and funerals (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a). While the reasons for international travel among Samoans have expanded, contemporary belief systems still embody explicit cultural understandings of the meaning and purpose of mobility that defy neat legal categorisation as either temporary or permanent. As Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009b, p. 64) explains: 'For Samoans, migration and circulation are not the disparate processes that such categorisation implies. They are part of the dialectic and a different conception of place.' This different conception of place conceives of *malaga* in terms of 'reciprocal flows, irrespective of purpose or duration' (2009b, p. 64).

During the colonial period, trans-Pacific mobility continued and diversified because 'concerns about national boundaries were virtually non-existent' (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a, p. 10). Despite the lack of regulation, long-distance travel to the developed nations of the Pacific Rim remained largely the province of island elites. Western Samoa

gained independence from New Zealand in 1962, having previously been the site of colonial struggles between Germany and Britain. Independence marked the beginning of a modern era of mass emigration (Va'a undated). However, trans-Pacific mobility has since been heavily curtailed by immigration controls operating to varying degrees in the major countries of destination. While the USA (which retains control of American Samoa) and New Zealand (as the most recent administrator of Western Samoa) have both opened up pathways for migration, Australia, Britain and Germany have kept the door firmly closed (Lee 2009).

Samoans were not granted automatic New Zealand citizenship as part of the decolonisation process. However, since 1970 Samoan nationals have been allocated a separate permanent entry quota of up to 1100 visas per year, distributed through a ballot system. These visas then open up pathways for onward migration to Australia. This indirect route is open because Samoans, once naturalised as New Zealand citizens, qualify for unrestricted entry to Australia via the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA). Levels of step migration from Samoa to the USA via American Samoa and Hawai'i are also high and are often driven by religious affiliations (Lee 2009). In contrast, opportunities for Samoans to travel directly to Australia have been extremely limited. All but one of the Samoan-born interviewees in our study were New Zealand citizens who had moved to Australia after settling in New Zealand. We were advised by community leaders that, apart from the few who had been able to enter as students or via family reunion provisions, the majority of the Samoan-born population in Australia would have gained access via this island-hopping path. Despite the many barriers erected to prevent their entry, Pacific Island populations have found their way around the 'Polynesian Triangle' defined by Australia, New Zealand and the USA, producing a significant diaspora (Lee 2009). In fact, nearly half the total Samoan population now resides overseas (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b).

Deterring 'Back-Door' Arrivals

In 1973, the TTTA replaced overtly discriminatory policies aimed at preventing non-white immigration from the Asia-Pacific region. It initially allowed for passport-free travel between Australia and New Zealand for citizens of both countries and citizens of other Commonwealth countries who had resident status in either Australia or New Zealand, and it provided the right to live and work indefinitely in either country (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a). A severe economic recession in the 1970s led to crackdowns on visa overstayers in New Zealand and encouraged many Pacific Islanders who

had already acquired New Zealand citizenship to either return home or move on to Australia. Before long, highly racialised concerns were being raised in Australia about the use of acquired New Zealand citizenship for 'back-door' entry to Australia and about imputed links with drug smuggling, terrorism and the displacement of Australian workers (McMillan 2011, 2012).

Despite these reservations, the TTTA was shored up in 1983 as part of an effort to strengthen trade and business links within the region. However, a series of general amnesties for overstayers in the 1980s in New Zealand were viewed by the Australian government as undermining its strict, skills-based entry requirements (Lee 2009). By 1994, a visa requirement was once again imposed by Australia on New Zealanders, associated with the introduction of a universal visa requirement and ending the period of reciprocal arrangements (McMillan 2011, 2012; Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a). Australia also reneged on a provision that allowed entry of non-citizen permanent residents from New Zealand, while New Zealand still allows free entry under the TTTA to permanent residents of Australia, regardless of their citizenship (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a).

Special Category Visas (SCVs) are now issued to New Zealand citizens on arrival, subject only to standard health and character checks. Although they do not impose any time limit, SCVs are nevertheless classed as temporary visas since they expire on departure from Australia and a new visa must be issued on return. This temporary status has significant implications for entitlements. Australia and New Zealand provided unlimited access to all social security payments and public health systems for each other's citizens until 1986. When it emerged that New Zealanders were accessing Australian welfare payments in numbers far exceeding the number of Australians drawing on New Zealand welfare, the Australian government began to restrict access to social security for SCV holders (Lee 2009). These restrictions were not matched by similar reforms in New Zealand. Arrangements for Australian citizens and permanent residents living in New Zealand are said to be 'simple and rarely leave individuals and families without access to a safety net if required' (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a, p. 151).

The most recent and sweeping changes to SCVs came in 2001. Whereas New Zealanders in Australia had enjoyed the same entitlements as permanent Australian residents, after 26 February 2001 SCV holders were required to obtain permanent residency (PR) status in order to access certain benefits, apply for Australian citizenship or sponsor family members for permanent migration. These measures are consistent with the wider

trend towards 'welfare nationalism' noted by Barker (2015). Although they were said to be aimed at reducing misuse of the social security system, the New Zealand Foreign Minister reportedly claimed that the changes were driven more by Australian concerns over the national origin of migrants entering Australia from New Zealand (Faulkner 2013, p. 23; see also Bedford and Hugo 2012).

Since the criteria for PR in Australia are tightly linked to skills shortages in nominated occupations, this move blocked access to key services indefinitely for many SCV holders. The human implications of this policy decision are conveyed concisely in the legal terminology of 'protected' (pre-2001) versus 'unprotected' (post-2001) SCVs. The holders of unprotected SCVs may not vote, hold permanent public sector positions, join the Australian armed forces or access public housing, but they are entitled to certain universal benefits such as Medicare, the low-income healthcare card, family tax benefits and childhood immunisations (see Table 5.1).

In addition, successive changes to citizenship laws have created a patchwork of eligibility criteria that parallels the differential regimes of social, economic and political rights ushered in by the 2001 reforms. Changes to the *Australian Citizenship Act 1948* (*Cwlth*) in 2001 removed automatic citizenship from children born to SCV-holding parents. Since then, only those with at least one parent with PR or Australian citizen-

Table 5.1 Selected entitlements for holders of 'unprotected' SCVs

Eligible	**Not eligible**
Medicare	Vote in Australian elections
Family tax benefit, baby bonus, childcare	Join the Australian Defence Force
Low-income healthcare card	Obtain ongoing work for federal government
Parental leave pay	Social housing assistance
Age pension[a]	Access Austudy, student HELP loans[b]
Disability support pension[a]	Carer allowance
Carer payment[a]	Mobility allowance
Newstart allowance[a]	Parenting payment
Youth allowance[a]	Partner allowance
Sickness allowance[a]	Widow/bereavement allowance
Commonwealth supported place (university)	Special benefit

[a]If resident for required period (usually 10 years) and with certain restrictions

[b]May become eligible for student loans under certain conditions from 2015

ship or who are covered by special transitional arrangements have qualified as citizens by birth. Citizenship is available after 10 years to children born in Australia who do not meet these criteria, but this concession still leaves a considerable period of time in which insecurities experienced by parents and overseas-born siblings due to their lack of access to support services are likely to affect the whole family.

Temporality, Security and Citizenship

The Idea of Denizenship

The legal standing of Samoan-born New Zealanders living in Australia on unprotected SCVs can be understood as a form of denizenship (Weber et al. 2013). This term denotes a middle point within a hierarchy of citizenship statuses that stretches from illegality/insecurity to citizenship/security and reflects a less secure status than citizenship. Castles and Davidson (2000, p. 94) refer to this hybrid legal status simply as 'more than that of a foreigner but less than that of a citizen'. Denizenship generally amounts to having the right to stay indefinitely but with limited access to social, economic and political rights (Hammar 1990). On the other hand, globalisation theorist Saskia Sassen has seen value in promoting denizenship as a solution to the pressures created by cross-border mobility under conditions of globalisation. She observes that some transnational workers value secure mobility rights more highly than formal citizenship and entrenchment in the host society, and concludes that migrants could become 'significant collective actors' were they able to access positive rights without the need to acquire a new citizenship (Sassen 1999, p. 146). However, Sassen's positive assessment requires that denizens have access to the full range of social, cultural and economic rights other than the capacity to vote and stand for public office. This aligns with the status of protected SCV holders who arrived in Australia before the 2001 watershed.

Ottonelli and Torresi (2012) have similarly suggested that migrants who knowingly embark on 'temporary migration projects' may choose to 'trade off' certain benefits or entitlements in return for more sought-after rewards (usually financial). The crucial element in their analysis is the agency exercised by these 'ideal-type' migrants in deciding that their stay will indeed be temporary. One real-world complication is that migration projects that begin as temporary often exhibit 'shifting temporal horizons' (Robertson 2014, p. 1927). Thus, as Bauböck (2011) reminds us, the temporary status of migrants can only ever be assessed

in hindsight. In contrast to the instrumental and actively-choosing workers envisaged by Ottonelli and Torresi, Robertson (2014) notes that temporary migration schemes in Australia impose a state-driven conception of the ideal migrant as temporary, skilled, young, healthy, with high consumption power and no dependants; their exclusion from benefits and political participation is justified by the rigidly enforced temporal limits on their stay.

The SCV holders encountered in our study did not conform to this state-based conception of the perfect temporary migrant, nor can they be thought of as temporary migrants other than on the narrowest of legal technicalities. While contemporary trans-Tasman migration has often been characterised in terms of its circularity, Shankman (1993) found that Samoan return migration was insignificant when compared with movement out of the islands, and he observed that it would create significant problems for Samoa's economy, with its reliance on remittance income, were significant numbers to choose to return (cited in Lee 2009, p. 27). In their study of Pacific Islanders living overseas, Ahlburg and Brown (cited in Lee 2009, p. 27) found that only around 10 % intended to return, and others (23 % for Tongans and 38 % for Samoans) were undecided.

These forces have resulted in the establishment of strong transnational links by Pacific migrants whose original intentions may have been to return to their country of origin but who instead have founded second- and third-generation communities overseas (Lee 2009). Their denizenship status, therefore, is not intentionally embraced and is likely to be protracted. With this in mind, Mares (2012, n.p.) concludes that the SCV regime 'runs the risk of creating another group of long-term residents who are in effect, permanently temporary and whose rights and entitlements are curtailed as a result'.

The Samoan Diaspora in Australia

Traditional expectations of *malaga*, based on reciprocity, freedom of movement and continuing obligation to the family group, do not sit easily with the border control practices of contemporary governments and the categories of temporary/permanent, legal/illegal, desirable/undesirable that they impose. The evidence strongly suggests that the vast majority of Samoan-born New Zealand citizens cross the Tasman Sea in search of work opportunities and improved quality of life, not with the expectation of dependence on social security. In fact, members of this group often lack understanding of their entitlements as SCV holders (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012b).

However, they are almost inevitably confronted with the strictures of the post-2001 regime as they try to navigate the competitive and individualistic environment of neoliberal Australia. As expressed by one research participant: '[We] come to Australia because there were high hopes and things that we were looking ahead, but it's not really fulfilled at the moment. … It's going to be hard. It's going to be hard' (INSG103).

The 2011 National Census recorded 19,092 Samoan-born people living in Australia, an increase of 25 % from 2006 (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2014). New South Wales (NSW) had the largest recorded population of Samoan-born residents at 7877, followed by Queensland (6473) and Victoria (4022). In total, 55,843 participants in the 2011 census indicated that they had Samoan ancestry (Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2014). The Samoan-born population had rates of participation in the labour force that were on a par with the general population, but they had lower educational attainment, lower earnings, and higher unemployment rates and were more likely to be in low-skill employment than the Australian-born population (see Table 5.2). The relatively high level of recorded unemployment alongside average levels of labour force participation aligns with observations from our research that there was a strong desire among both men and women to engage in paid work.

The small number of Samoan nationals who gain direct access to Australia each year through study schemes, skilled employment programmes and family reunion may have good prospects of gaining PR and then citizenship. Several of the community leaders interviewed for this study had arrived in Australia as university students and were able to stay on as skilled professionals. Of the 19,092 Samoan-born residents identified in the 2011 census, about half had become citizens. Since

Table 5.2 Selected socioeconomic indicators from the 2011 Australian Census

	Samoan-born population	**Australian-born population**
15+ years attending educational institution	4.4 %	8.6 %
15+ years with post-secondary qualifications	36 %	56 %
Median individual weekly income for those aged 15+ years	$540	$597
Labour force participation for those aged 15+ years	64 %	65 %
Unemployment rate	10.2 %	5.6 %
Skilled/managerial/professional employment	20 %	48 %

Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2014)

those arriving after 2001 made up 41 % of the Samoan-born population in that year, it seems likely that the majority of those who had not obtained Australian citizenship by 2011 were unprotected SCV holders who arrived after 26 February 2001. According to Mares (2012), fewer than 10 % of New Zealanders who arrived in Australia between 2006 and 2012 have managed to obtain PR.

Those hoping to proceed on a pathway to PR and citizenship need to qualify for settlement under the skilled worker or family entry programmes. The Skilled Independent Migration Visa has stringent eligibility criteria for education, work experience, age and character, which put it out of reach for the majority. Moreover, since Australia's permanent intake is capped while the temporary migration intake is not, SCV holders find themselves in direct competition with a growing number of other temporary visa holders and offshore applicants for inclusion in Australia's permanent intake (Mares 2012). This leaves those who remain in Australia on a long-term basis on unprotected SCVs occupying what McNevin (2011, p. 57) has described as 'sustained temporary status', characterised by a protracted, and structurally produced, state of insecurity.

Domains of (In)Security

Economic (In)Security

All participants in the Samoan case study nominated the prospect of higher earnings as a key reason for moving to Australia, but lack of financial support had severely impaired the ability of some to find the jobs they had dreamed of: 'He's still waiting for somebody to give him a call to go to work. … The problem is we don't have money in our hands at the moment. So we have a car but the problem is it's too hard for us to go and ask them—do you have any job for me today?' (INSG104). Economic security generally depended on all adult family members finding jobs. However, none of the women interviewed, except one with a teaching qualification, had found work in Australia. This may be in part a product of the sample selection process used in our study, since women without paid work may be in closer contact with the community organisations that facilitated the interviews and would be expected to have more time to participate in an interview. One participant who was not working herself but claimed that her husband had not had any trouble finding work considered that success in the job market was primarily due to individual attitude and effort (INSG111). Still, it appeared that jobs were hard to find for many people, especially those without the resources needed to support the job-seeking process.

Interviewees accepted their responsibility to support newly arrived family members as a cultural expectation and as a necessity due to the new arrivals' ineligibility for government assistance. But the sharing of houses and financial resources could lead to problems for all concerned:

> I feel sorry for my brother and for my husband's brother and the wife. So it's ashamed of me to be staying there. Because my husband not working, even my kids we're still waiting for the money. So we can give some of our money to them to buy some food so we can eat together and, like giving them something while we're still waiting for my husband's job to find us a house, our own place to stay. (INSG104)

A Samoan pastor said that up to 15 people might live in a house with only one toilet, with the hosts sometimes going into debt themselves to help newcomers get on their feet; the pastor considered that these cultural commitments were 'crippling people' (UNSG301). Samoan-born residents also retain enduring commitments to support their wider kinship group and church in Samoa. Many participants spoke of the extreme poverty of their families in Samoa and their strong commitment to helping them by providing food, housing and contributions to traditional ceremonies:

> So we have to help out because that was our upbringing, we have to love each other, support each other no matter what, and that's why sometimes it's hard for financial—us here. (INSG112)
>
> The money that we send we need for something. But we never stop doing that because we love the family, we love—especially the parents in Samoa, and that's the other reason why we come over, because we need to serve our family too. (INSG106)

One participant reported finding the financial needs of family at home never-ending, saying that she spent her 'whole life supporting people' (INSG112). Samoans living abroad were even said to fall prey to loan sharks to raise money to send home for ceremonies and other traditional commitments (UNSG102), whereas relatives in Samoa who lived on family land and received funds from overseas were free from the cost-of-living pressures faced by their relatives overseas:

> They live in a very easy life in Samoa. What I mean because they're not paying rent, they're not paying land rent, not at all. They got their own land, they got their own house. So the only thing they need money is something like for the church or for the village or if

> they need to buy some other stuff like food, but that's the only thing they need money, to pay some bills. (INSG106)

An expatriate Samoan interviewed in New Zealand argued that it was crucial for families to learn how to prioritise spending by balancing traditional commitments with the demands of a consumer society (UNSG102). She claimed that her own relatives in Australia were successful because they had decided to focus first on their immediate family before meeting wider obligations. This had been possible, in her view, because traditional ties were not as strong in Australia as in New Zealand. Despite this, many of our Australian-based interviewees continued to maintain intense loyalties to church and *aiga*, along with the related financial and social commitments.

Cultural (In)Security

Traditional Samoan lives are strictly prescribed by the system of cultural obligations known as *fa'a-Samoa*. Pacific Island scholarship points to the transnational nature of mobility within the region, with diaspora communities neither cutting ties to their countries of origin nor fully absorbing the new culture offered by the host nation (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b, p. 59). According to our research participants, this applied particularly in New Zealand. Moving to New Zealand was said to be like moving from one part of Samoa to another, because 'you see Samoan people every day' (INSG114). Auckland was often described as 'just a suburb of Samoa', with South Auckland earning the nickname of 'the Polynesian capital of the world' (INSG204; see also Stahl and Appleyard 2007, p. 43). One participant described New Zealand as a tri-cultural society consisting almost exclusively of Maori, Pakeha (white) and Pacific Islander people (INSG110). The move to multicultural western Sydney was therefore a significant cultural shift, and new arrivals could feel lost amid the mix of cultures. The interviews suggested that crossing the Tasman Sea in search of financial security might sometimes require the sacrifice of aspects of cultural security:

> I never see a downside to living in Australia but definitely in New Zealand they embraced the culture and their traditions. … Australia is a very multicultural country so they can't really put a lot of effort into every single culture, but I guess I miss that aspect of the schooling over in New Zealand. They're very—what is it—invested in the cultures that are in the school. (INSG102)

New Zealand institutions and society were believed to provide cross-cultural understanding and a climate of non-discrimination towards Pacific Islanders. This supportive environment was said to also continue into tertiary education, with Samoans often the beneficiaries of schemes designed to support indigenous Maori populations:

> It's different because we are the indigenous people over there [*laughs*]—you know what I mean? … We were well looked after over there compared to here, and the push for kids to go to university is very big over there now. And I'm only realising that since I've been here, so. … They're going to get this massive student loan but they push our kids, all the Poly kids to go through university. (INSG105)

Participants felt that in Australia there was less acceptance of people from Samoa. Fear of racism and bullying at school was said to be a major reason for Samoan children not wanting to continue their education in Australia. Some recounted how their children had been subjected to hurtful racial taunts:

> My boys were playing rugby and there was some white men that—especially when they were in the other team—and the way they talk and the way, yeah. But the way that we tried to keep the peace is to just ignore them and just try to walk away, and then we just come and sit, and then it's come back to you feel hurt. (INSG103)

Both cultural differences and physical size were thought to contribute to stereotypes about Pacific Islander youths being prone to gang-related violence. As one community leader explained: 'We are family people, we walk around—not by ourselves, we walk around with everybody and yet that can be seen as a gang. … they're stereotyped straight away' (INSG302). Other experiences of cultural insecurity were more subtle. One interviewee believed that her opportunities for promotion were limited by underlying institutional discrimination: 'You can just tell the difference when you apply for a role within the department and you just feel that you're being treated differently when it comes to other opportunities or you're not getting the chance to develop' (INSG111). Some of those interviewed believed that local employers preferentially recruited employees from their own ethnic group, adding to the difficulty of finding work:

> To get a job, because some owners are Italians—hello, they pick their own people themselves. Some owners are Greek people, so they're looking at the difference, and—but you've got to try. I tell people we have to try hard. So that's why our community, we have to be strong to support each other. (INSG112)

It was noted that many Samoan-born residents did not speak English at all or did not have enough confidence to discuss issues with potential employers or government authorities (UNSG101). This could take a heavy personal toll and also have knock-on effects for the whole family's future:

> I guess you don't know what to say because you can't speak English, or you don't understand what people are talking about and you're scared to say something that might not be right for the moment and then you get criticised for—for saying it. So it was a very sad part of my life at the—at the first time when I arrived here. (INSG114)

One community worker spoke of the widespread fear of being labelled stupid and explained how she had to push her own children to be more outgoing at school: 'Well they'll be left behind and that. I think it's our culture. We're very—we—we're very comfortable with our own people and not so much. … We also are not a bunch of people that can open up to anybody' (INSG302). Young people found themselves at the forefront of cultural adaptation, often caught in a tension between traditional practices and expectations and the need to fit in with a very different society. Some parents experienced this as a loss of control that created considerable fear and insecurity about their children's wellbeing:

> Yes, I was—when we first came here, I am a scared mother. Because I don't need trouble, I don't want to cause trouble too. Because I think my kids would go to school, it's very fast life over here. I say, in New Zealand, they listen and they never hide anything. But when they grow up, come over here, going out at night, we don't know anything. (INSG108)

The response of many Samoan parents is to inflict strict physical discipline. A social worker interviewed in Samoa explained why young people were often sent back to Samoa to be re-immersed in culture and traditional discipline: 'Over there [in Australia], the laws are very strict. You don't slap your son. You don't swear at your son. So that's one of the

main reasons they send their kids back here' (INSG201). However, for some Samoans within the diaspora, education beyond the strict dictates of *fa'a-Samoa* is considered central to the success of future generations:

> When I was growing up, they said, 'In the house it's Samoa, outside is the rest of the world.' … So English was our second language in the house and everything had to be spoken in Samoan. So I was glad in a way, because I got to learn the language and I'm very happy I learnt. But is that the way I bring my kids up? No way. (INSG302)

> When my kids come to my parents' house and they're kids being kids, and then they ask, 'Why aren't you smacking your kids? See this is what happen when you don't smack your kids. Look what they'—and I say, 'I don't smack my kids first. If you understand what I do to my kids, I do differently from you, from—from my upbringing.' (INSG114)

Research participants needed to negotiate their own identities within this complex context. For some people, though, Samoa would always remain the one place where they felt entirely at home:

> All the pressure that I have here, the financial situation, a lot of things here, when I'm on that plane, land my feet back home, the stress is out of my shoulders. … Samoa has got a place in my heart to be quite honest, to be honest with you. … They don't think of me any different when I went back. The only different is they think I've got a lot of money. (INSG114)

Legal (In)Security

Most of our research participants expressed the desire to obtain PR in order to attain a more secure legal status but were quite confused about how to go about this. One person, who had entered Australia before 2001, said that he felt secure on his SCV (INSG114). However, a more recent arrival noted that 'it might be tomorrow parliament say [go] back to New Zealand' (INSG109). Researchers were asked repeatedly for information about these matters that they were not equipped to provide. It was clear that the 2001 changes had created considerable uncertainty:

> Because we came out here after a certain year we don't get any entitlements, only a couple of things which most—which New Zealanders used to have access to. So we are here only on the surface I think … so

> that's why I seriously need to figure out or find out what's going on and maybe—and seriously think about citizenship. Even though we might go home, just having that citizenship to come back to. … If I go home and come back … we might not be able to have access to what we have now even so, yeah, that's one of the things I'm unsure about. (INSG105)

Although PR and citizenship were seen as the pathway to legal security, they were not attainable for many people. One community leader believed that loyalty to New Zealand could create reluctance to seek Australian citizenship. Yet this attitude could change when the limitations of SCVs were understood, by which time citizenship might be financially out of reach (INSG302). Several interviewees were in this position, having arrived before 2001 yet having failed to obtain citizenship when it was much cheaper and more accessible (INSG110, INSG112). Even greater barriers were experienced by those on unprotected visas:

> So for [my son] to be here at university—which he will because he is intelligent enough to go to uni—well, I'd have to be a citizen or him. I'm not sure if I can just make him a citizen—I don't know—or me a citizen? I don't know how that would work. But I could just make him a citizen 'cause even that's a lot of money apparently—is that right? To apply for citizenship is a lot of money? (INSG105)

It is also unlikely that many of the interviewees would meet the strict occupation-based requirements that are the most common pathway to PR: 'Anyone can do the job that I'm doing. It's not like nursing, they need nurses from overseas, doctors from overseas to do the job. So in the banking industry, anyone can work in the bank' (INSG111). Misunderstandings over immigration status are also known to generate unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Australian employers are required to check the immigration status of potential employees, and they risk civil penalties and criminal sanctions if they recruit individuals who lack the authorisation to work (Weber et al. 2013). Although SCV holders have unrestricted work entitlements, some participants reported wilful or inadvertent misinterpretation of their status:

> I'll apply for a job and they'll ask me over the phone if I'm a permanent resident or Australian citizen and I will tell them no, that I'm New Zealand-born. But they were like—okay well this job is actually more suited for this. I'm not trying to discriminate but it's just the rules and regulations that they have. (INSG102)

> I feel that they are doing it because it's just a lot easier if they hire someone who is an Australian citizen, and they don't have to go through their rigmaroles and try and find out this, this, this. They know all of that. And I feel that when I go into interviews, I have to sell myself so much more. (INSG101)

Insecure legal status had potentially devastating transgenerational impacts. Lack of access to student loans for tertiary study was one of the most widely reported concerns for holders of unprotected SCVs:

> When my son finished it, the Year 12, and he's got a package from the university, the Catholic university, he's going to go there and we find out it's a lot of money to pay. We can't pay anything at all, got no money. We're not entitled to ask the government for any funding. So that's why he dropped out and do that sort of [factory] job. (INSG108)

> My other two, the eldest ones, those two, they entitled to go to the uni but they need some help for—but I didn't get any help, I just—I just got work. I just say, 'Go look for a job.' (INSG113)

> That's the first question they get, 'Are you a citizen or Australian citizen?' 'No I'm not.' Then—that's the downfall because I know my children would love to study here but I said to them, 'I can't afford it for you to go to school.' (INSG111)

The lack of access to other support services for those living long term on unprotected SCVs can place a significant burden on those responsible for their care. One woman who was supporting a disabled nephew who had no entitlements himself found the application process for carer allowance overwhelming: 'They gave me a form, all these questions, I have to fill out. And I said, "Oh my gosh, it's like I'm sick of filling out these forms and I wish this law wouldn't happen like this"' (INSG112).

Physical (In)Security

Lack of secure legal status, coupled with socioeconomic and cultural pressures, clearly affects physical and emotional wellbeing. A report by Queensland Health (2011) notes that Polynesian communities experience chronic disease, high levels of family stress, interpersonal violence and intergenerational conflict, all of which the report attributes primarily to service access barriers and socioeconomic disadvantage. Participants in this study spoke of the stress they suffered as a result

of multiple factors, which were often manifest in illness, malaise or a general lack of direction. One woman said that she often felt sick but had never seen a doctor (INSG104).

Family violence has also been identified as a significant problem among Pacific Islander communities. Cribb's (1999, p. 53) comparative study of domestic violence among Samoans living in Samoa and New Zealand found widespread cultural legitimisation of violence. Violence against women was raised by only one participant in our study, who claimed that women were much better protected in Australia than in Samoa:

> When I was young I could see a lot of violence back there. … But since we are out here, women are more safer because of the police rules, the government. Especially these guys here, they're lifesaver for women … and that's why I say to myself, thanks God we come in this, we learn more, we live in peace. (INSG112)

But for other participants, physical threats were seen as coming from external sources, and feelings of safety were linked not with cultural change but with cultural security:

> Where I was living in New Zealand, yeah, I felt safe. Yeah, maybe because of that reason, all of them were our … if I am alone in a house and I never mind because my next door can look after me. Even if they were Tongans, they were Fijians, they were still our people. We can still share like back in the islands, yeah. (INSG103)

Our research method, which covered a wide range of topics and involved only a single interview with each participant, was not equipped to fully investigate these sensitive issues. However, research participants were more forthcoming about their concerns for young people becoming involved in antisocial behaviour, violence and criminal offending, which they saw as the greatest threat to their children's physical security:

> I said, 'We can't leave you here, we can't let you stay here because you're going out at night without letting us know. If you die, who is going to get the blame?' … 'We're not going to do it again, mum, we're not going to do it again.' … But we think they're good but they're not. They sneak out in the middle of the night and they give a hiding to other boys. (INSG108)

Another participant explained how she tried to discourage her children from getting involved in violence: 'We're just trying to start there and just trying to tell our kids, "Oh just ignore them". For their safety. Because we know there's crime and violence can happen anywhere, even with the little kids' (INSG103). Some had experienced worse violence in the communities in which they lived in New Zealand. One woman spoke about 'all these gangs who literally roam the streets and big–big Polynesian Maori men or, you know, very threatening and they wear colours. So you see that every day at home, whereas I don't see that here so I'm pretty safe' (INSG105).

Whether or not problems of gang violence and other offending were as prevalent in Australia as in New Zealand, young people being at risk of offending was repeatedly identified as a significant security concern—so much so that one Sydney-based group that supports Pacific Island communities had lobbied successfully for a Pacific liaison officer position to be established within the State Attorney-General's Department (INSG301). According to the interviews, the main factors that were thought to contribute to youth offending were parents' long working hours at poorly paid jobs, cultural tensions and a lack of access to educational and economic pathways. One interviewee noted, 'These parents work, work, work, work. They don't know what's going on with their kids, you know, because they are trying to make a living, you know, factory work, shift work' (INSG105). This analysis was echoed by a community leader:

> The schools provide breakfast for the children because sometimes these parents, they work factory work, they work shift work, you know, and the kids are by themselves. … You just go to work, all your money goes into your mortgage, your kids, your family and all that. … And that's why there's so much problems with conflict. (INSG303)

One community worker attributed much of the pressure leading young people to offend to being 'caught between two cultures' (INSG301). Another participant spoke of parents being as lost and culturally confused as the children:

> How are they going to help their own childrens change their life? They come from a very small island. Everybody know each other. And to put them in a big continent—country of the world. And they've got lost. They're confused. (INSG402)

Some people felt that lack of discipline among young people due to cultural breakdown was at the heart of the problem: 'Honestly you'd never see that in New Zealand no matter what—how bad or how rebellious you want to be you just know your place and that's a general thing in New Zealand' (INSG105). For others, harsh discipline and violence within the home were seen as setting a negative example that created cultural tensions between generations: 'I lived through that all my life—see uncles and aunties fighting, uncles giving aunties a hiding. You get a hiding as kids. You—you get abused as kids. … I don't want my kids to grow up and have a go at each other' (INSG114). The youth support organisation Mission Australia (2009) also observed that young people from Pacific Island backgrounds were more exposed to violence in the home than other young people in their client group, although they were said to be less likely to be perpetrators due to strict hierarchies of authority in Samoan families.

Along with cultural confusion and intergenerational conflict, financial strain and lack of access to services have been repeatedly identified as precursors to offending among Samoan youths. The Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012b, p. 29) express particular concern about young people being sent from Pacific Islands by their parents to stay with relatives:

> As there is no access to benefits for these kids, their Australian caregivers are left to financially support them, a burden they are not generally prepared for. As their vested interest in the child is not a parental one, these kids are often left to their own devices, arriving at school without food, proper uniforms or resources, getting in trouble at school, truanting and progressing to criminal activities.

An Anglicare submission to the Productivity Commission's inquiry noted that a 'typical scenario' for Pacific Island families is that 'they are living in over-crowded houses for example 24 people in a 3 bedroom house depending on 1 income. As a result of the lack of access to payments there is a shift towards anti-social behaviour to gain food, to get access to clothing etc.' (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012b, p. 31). These arguments, which effectively connect cultural, economic, legal and physical sources of insecurity, were supported by a Samoan community worker interviewed in our study:

> They see someone out there with nice shoes and all that, they go and steal. … And then when they don't fit in and then they don't get what they want, they don't get the job that they want, they don't

> get the education, so to speak, they don't because of all these behind-the-scenes or underlying or family problems and structures, they lack the support, they don't want to access services. … Then, yep, the kids end up here. (INSG303)

Reported Sources of Support

Since their legal status is a barrier to accessing many federal government services, Samoans living in Australia on SCVs have found other means of support. When asked to rank who they trusted to provide them with assistance with day-to-day problems, interviewees overwhelmingly identified church and family in Australia as the most trusted, followed by the wider Samoan community, with government institutions such as police and immigration the least trusted from among the options provided. These findings are entirely consistent with the cultural orientations reported in this chapter and echo the observations made by the Pacific Islands Reference Group to the Access and Equity Inquiry: 'Despite apparent high needs in the community, Pacific Islanders and Maori people have largely depended on their families, churches, and community networks for their settlement needs' (personal communication).

Family in Australia

Most, but not all, of the Samoan-born research participants had close family members living in Australia. Some said that they relied entirely on family: 'It's just the family that they help' (INSG106). Family was looked to especially for emotional support:

> Like, if you have a funeral, your grief and loss counselling is through your brothers and sisters; we support each other, we talk about it, discuss it in a family way but we don't go and access any counselling. (INSG303)

Australian-based family were also relied upon for information about life in Australia, while relatives back in Samoa were thought not to 'understand what's going on, what's happening in Australia' (INSG108). However, the heavy reliance on family by new arrivals was sometimes said to be misplaced: 'They would be expecting people to understand the whole system, when those people here don't even know' (INSG401).

This reliance on family networks had implications for those without pre-existing connections: 'If you're coming and you don't have those networks already established … you're consistently put behind the eight ball

and at a disadvantage' (INSG401). At least one participant had been able to adapt and create her own networks: 'Yeah, a lot of my family live in America and Samoa and New Zealand. Not a lot live in Australia, so the friends that I have made, they are my family' (INSG102). However, others with limited family support were likely to look to the church for assistance.

Church

Churches were relied upon by many of these research participants for practical assistance, pastoral support and legal advocacy:

> Even with people that we are not related, but if they are looking for a place to stay, we can invite them in the congregation or we can invite them to members of the congregation homes to stay with them. (INSG110)
>
> I can call a minister that I know and say, 'Look, this family's got no food, they're currently homeless.' They can help them, you know, and support as part of their ministry work. (INSG303)
>
> I—I—I trust the church more—more than—than anybody else because I—I trust the minister here and I—I do more often, when I have something at home, worries and that, I—I—I call the minister. (INSG114)
>
> That's the only help we have, because he's a Justice of the Peace so he knows more about the immigration than anyone, so he always helps us. He's our lifesaver for when it comes to visa problems and things. (INSG112)

But Samoan churches also have their critics. A community leader interviewed in New Zealand expressed her concern that churches set up recently by later arrivals may not have such strong links to Samoa as the original Samoan churches and did not observe traditional responsibilities (UNSG102). This, she claimed, was where complaints arose about too much money being given to the church with little offered in return. Another participant interviewed in Melbourne supported this view:

> The only community we have is churches, and you understand the churches they only preach the Lord [*laughs*]. … They only talk about the Lord and the money to build up that society, you know? But they—they never talk about this thing that you are talking about. (INSG113)

This idea was echoed by a Melbourne-based minister, who described many Samoan churches in Australia as being 'very insular' rather than encouraging Samoans to become more networked into mainstream society, which would help them deal with practical issues such as employment (UNSG301). He claimed that Samoan churches in New Zealand were more political and worked in partnership with social workers to make real differences in people's lives.

Samoan Community

Seeking support from other members of the Samoan community in Australia was the third most common choice overall by research participants. But there were also some expressions of distrust and disunity. Comments included: 'I'm not going to tell the truth if I'm going to say I trust the Samoan community in Australia, because I didn't even communicate with them in any time' (INSG103); 'No, I'd rather have my family than the community' (INSG107); 'We don't have any particular community at the moment' (INSG113); and 'You've got to know the person to trust them, and people in the Samoan community—they're all different people' (INSG111).

However, the value of community within the diaspora was widely recognised: 'It's just very nice to know that you have a community backing you' (INSG102). Some participants contrasted the situation in Australia with that in New Zealand, where they believed the Samoan community was more unified across traditional family divides: 'Over there I think it's more the—not because we're the underdog over there but we—I believe we're more as one over there as different cultures come together' (INSG105). It seemed that making contact was also more difficult in the vast expanse of western Sydney: 'I really didn't quite get any sort of close contact with the community, the Samoan community, or Pacific Islander community when I come here. … But in New Zealand because we'd been there for a little while and we came to know' (INSG103). One interviewee from Melbourne expressed her hope that a stronger Samoan community would develop there: 'I just hope for our people, our community to get stronger and stronger to support each other, especially our children. It's all about the children' (INSG111).

Certainly, the Samoan community leaders who facilitated our interviews in western Sydney were very highly regarded: 'I think if it wasn't for M—seriously in this community—I think half the Polynesians wouldn't be doing what they are doing. … Her and her husband do so much it's not funny … I don't even think they have time for their own family' (INSG105). This pair was sometimes viewed as honorary family:

'My family that I have around me, M and C, they're very successful—not in the sense of money but just the way I see they look at children and they see joy. That's success to me and that's what I want' (INSG102). One participant argued that the hierarchical system of authority based around *matais* (chiefs) was an impediment to community initiative in Australia: 'Well, my understanding of Samoan people, if you're well educated and you start something, yeah, "I think is good 'cause he's clever", you know. But if somebody like—like me come and started this sort of thing, no' (INSG114).

Government Agencies

While some participants reported having good experiences with immigration authorities (INSG12) and police (INSG113), these agencies were given the lowest rating in the interviews as trusted sources of assistance and support. Residents who took part in the interviews generally had little contact with immigration authorities. One person thought immigration should be more proactive in assisting them:

> I haven't dealt with immigration that much but when I make enquiries about the citizenship, I wasn't getting that assistance I was expecting. … You just feel that you don't get that information, whether they want you to live here or want you to apply for citizen. (INSG111)

Another participant was reluctant to make contact because of her low expectations: 'I didn't even have time to ring them up yet, but if I do ring them up and ask them about something that I want to understand, I don't think they can tell me the whole truth and to explain me everything that I calling up to ask for' (INSG103).

Immigration liaison officers interviewed for this study described their role as strategic rather than focused on giving individual advice. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection had provided $50,000 to fund organisations in the Mt Druitt area of Sydney to promote social cohesion following what they described as 'riots' in the local shopping centre between Pacific Islander and African youths (INSG404). Liaison officers interviewed in New Zealand described their role in much more proactive terms, with a focus on settlement rather than post hoc problem-solving:

> My elite piece of work is really making sure the migrants from the Pacific settle well in New Zealand. … So my job is to make sure that

> they are getting all the information they need to settle well and their access to support services that are here once they're here. (INSG406)

This included the provision of predeparture information, indicating the more organised nature of migration from Samoa into New Zealand.

State police forces in Australia also have multicultural liaison officers. In NSW at least one liaison officer is himself a Pacific Islander, but he is expected to work across all communities (INSG402). A major initiative in his area was a community patrol and bus service introduced by Pacific community elders that transported young people away from public places if they were at risk of coming into conflict, coupled with a well-established programme of cultural activities: 'They volunteered themselves to come out and go out to the streets. That's why our night patrol was put in place. … They fear for their safety. They fear of expose to some serious crime' (INSG402). In another part of Sydney, the (non-Pacific Islander) liaison officer reported a similar community programme called Mingle—also aimed at Pacific Islanders and African youths who frequent the major shopping centre—that encouraged involvement in alternative activities:

> And young ones, when they see, before police goes and say, 'Move on' or whatever, I, as an elder, I go and say, 'Hi, how are you doing? How is your evening? What do you do here? You know, there's a soccer game down there. Why you don't go and watch there?' and this kind of thing. (INSG403)

As reported earlier, some research participants expressed positive attitudes towards the police, particularly in relation to responding to family violence. However, others reported negative experiences. One Melbourne resident who had witnessed police brutality towards a family member was adamant that 'Samoans don't trust police' (UNSG101). Another participant interviewed in Melbourne claimed, 'I never dealt with police in New Zealand, but here—yes, and I didn't—I didn't like it. I just don't trust them' (INSG111). A male participant who had experienced racism at the hands of police when he first arrived in Melbourne said that he found police 'very intimidating sometimes' and added, 'I'll never forget that. Never, ever forget that. … It's going to be a while for me to trust the police' (INSG114).

Although interviewees were only prompted to discuss their trust or distrust of the police and immigration, negative experiences with other agencies were also reported. The following comment is illustrative of the unease that several interviewees expressed in relation to the Commonwealth social security agency Centrelink:

> Oh, when they look at me it seems like they don't want to help. They don't even respond in a way that you would expecting them. You feel uncomfortable. … And then sometimes the way they talk to you and the way they respond, it's not the way they, yeah, that makes you feel welcome, and they understand how you feel. (INSG103)

Charitable Groups and State Government Partnerships

While state governments have often stepped in to fill gaps left by the denial of services to SCV holders, federal restrictions have sometimes been emulated at the state level. Faulkner (2013) lists as examples the removal of access to disability services in Queensland in 2005, the exclusion from public housing in that state and later in NSW, and the exclusion of New Zealand citizens from flood relief efforts in Queensland. Lacking access to social security, at least one research participant reported going to the St Vincent de Paul Society when she had no money for food (INSG108). For another interviewee, familiarity with sources of government assistance was so lacking that charitable safety nets were mistaken for government services: 'They can get help from Salvation Army, if that's what you mean by government' (INSG110).

Unlike Commonwealth law, state law tends to prohibit discrimination on the basis of citizenship. According to Faulkner (2013), this has opened the way for some significant partnerships to be formed between state governments and well-organised groups representing the interests of Pacific Islander populations. Examples include the NSW Council for Pacific Communities, which was formed in 2003 with the support of the Premier, in partnership with several state government departments. In terms of organised schemes for Pacific Islanders, charitable groups have featured most prominently in programmes targeted at young people at risk of offending. In NSW these have included the NSW Youth Partnerships with Pacific Communities led by the Premier's Department, with Mission Australia and NSW Police the main providers of at-risk youth programmes (ARTD Consultants 2007); crime prevention projects at Mt Druitt and Canterbury-Bankstown led by the Department for Community Services (ARTD Consultants 2007); the appointment of a Pacific liaison officer within the NSW Attorney-General's Department (INSG401); police–community partnerships in Campbelltown and Blacktown (INSG402, INSG403); voluntary groups such as Pacific Islands Mount Druitt Action Network Inc. (PIMDAN) (INSG303); and a mentoring service run by the Pacific Families and Communities Together Project in partnership with Relationships Australia.

Expatriate Samoans have been actively involved in many of these partnerships with state government departments. As one organiser of a youth programme said:

> You have a look at the volunteers on their list, 95 per cent of them are Samoan—are Pacific people—so they've all come in and been a part of our work and then gone out and actively been involved and engaged in their communities. (INSG302)

Samoan elders have also been active in police-led programmes for young people, as discussed earlier. A representative from the Samoan Council in Sydney argued that the involvement of Samoans was vital to forging links with government services: 'It's mostly because we know that our community—although there's so much help out there, they're very—they're held back … they would not ask an officer of the government' (INSG304).

New Zealand Government

A last resort for Samoan New Zealanders was to return to New Zealand temporarily to access government services that were difficult or impossible to access as non-citizens in Australia. One example was flying back to New Zealand for an operation (INSG406). Another participant who was deterred from trying to gain Australian citizenship by the expense and complexity of the process had reluctantly decided to send her children back to New Zealand to complete their education:

> I love to be here and I love my children to attend university here. It's not my thing to send them away and I love to have my children around, whether they live with me or live with their father, at least I can see them. … I've got no choice. And I feel uncertain about things and that's just the purpose of us moving here to have that extra opportunity and more opportunity here than back home—than back in New Zealand. (INSG111)

Conclusion

Allowing research participants to enunciate their own perceptions and experiences of security highlights the interdependency of the four notional domains of economic, cultural, legal and physical security. A key example is the inextricable connection for Samoan émigrés between

the economic and cultural dimensions of *malaga*. While continuing to be of service to their *aiga* or church may provide a sense of cultural security for migrants and increase economic security for family members in Samoa, excessive demands for resources create high levels of economic insecurity among many Samoan-born people living abroad. Economic insecurity may also be exacerbated by the legal insecurity deliberately introduced as a deterrent into the SCV system.

New Zealanders of Samoan origin can enter Australia readily on SCVs, which enable them to live and work in Australia indefinitely. However, this open access is not matched by basic entitlements that are needed for long-term residence or by opportunities to access pathways to the more secure legal categories of permanent residency and citizenship. Individuals and families who move to Australia in search of economic security may therefore unwittingly sacrifice the cultural and legal security they enjoyed as recognised citizens within the more welcoming environment of New Zealand for expected gains in earnings and life opportunities that may not eventuate. Moreover, the long-term lack of legal security and limitations on entitlements may predispose some, in the worst-case scenario, to criminal offending, leading to the threat of deportation on character grounds. In effect, the same policies that have demonstrably failed to deter the arrival of these trans-Tasman denizens create a protracted condition of structural disadvantage that can eventuate in forced expulsion, while some choose to return to New Zealand to access the services they need.

It would be misleading to imply that Samoan-born residents who have entered Australia on SCVs are lacking in skills or initiative or have expectations of dependency on government resources. Successful strategies for establishing new lives in Australia, organised self-help within the diaspora, and other sources of support are apparent. However, it must be acknowledged that the imposition of long-term denizenship status—in which the right to enter and remain is not accompanied by commensurate rights to public education, housing and income support—has demonstrably deleterious consequences for the human security of this group, and the effects are potentially transgenerational. Bringing the entitlements of SCV holders into line with the positive conception of denizenship status outlined by Sassen (1999)—as was the case before the 2001 reforms—could provide a secure legal foundation from which to build improved human security across a range of dimensions for this presently marginalised group.

6
Tongan Seasonal Workers: Permanent Temporariness

Introduction

Migrant transnationalism has dominated the Tongan national experience since the 1960s, when the Pacific Islanders' long history of inter-island mobility transformed to become more closely tied to the pursuit of individual, familial and national survival and prosperity (see Pyke et al. 2012). An important feature of the Tongan diaspora is that it is largely a 'labour diaspora', with temporary and permanent overseas employment opportunities being the predominant drivers of migration (Pyke et al. 2012, p. 5). However, kinship ties are also important in this diaspora, and they are maintained in part via the financial ties of remittances sent home by permanent and temporary Tongan migrants (see Lee 2007).

This chapter engages directly with temporality and migrant transnationalism. It specifically examines Tongan experiences of security and mobility in relation to the Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Program (SWP), a short-term, highly regulated seasonal work scheme made available to Pacific Island nations via an agreement with the Australian government. The cohort in the Tongan case study differs quite significantly from the Chinese, Indonesian and Samoan cohorts because it comprises a group of people engaged in a process that is highly regulated and finite in nature—there is complete certainty regarding the length of time labourers will work in Australia and the general nature of their employment. Consequently, foremost in this examination of the dimensions of security are the 'temporal dimensions' of this specific migration scheme and how temporality is 'constructed by the state and subsequently experienced by migrants' (Robertson 2014, p. 1916). While some researchers, including Robertson, have undertaken such

analysis in relation to graduate workers and working holiday-makers, this research looked at the far more structured and controlled regime of temporary work.

This chapter outlines the Tongan context from which workers come and the design and implementation of the SWP in Australia. It then analyses the conditions and experiences of security in the four dimensions that are the focus of this study: cultural, legal, physical and economic. While these dimensions intersect, there are some critical and unique components of the Tongan experience that relate to the highly specified regime of the seasonal work visa.

Background: Tonga, the SWP and the Study Cohort

The Kingdom of Tonga consists of 176 islands, of which 36 are inhabited. The main island is Tongatapu, where the majority of the population lives (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT] n.d.). Tonga shares many similarities with the other Pacific Island nation in this study, Samoa, which lies to the north of Tonga. Tonga has a population of approximately 104,000 (DFAT n.d.), but it is estimated that more than double this number live overseas in Australia, New Zealand and the USA (*Jakarta Globe* 2012). The 2009 tsunami and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had a significant impact on Tonga's gross domestic product (GDP), which fell steadily between 2010 and 2012. There have, however, been signs of improvement, and the GDP has grown steadily since 2012 (DFAT n.d.). Similar to Samoa, remittances from Tongans working overseas (including temporary and permanent emigrants) currently constitute over a third of the country's annual GDP (*Jakarta Globe* 2012), with the majority of remittances coming from the USA, New Zealand and Australia (DFAT n.d.). While Tongans constitute over 80 % of participants in Australia's SWP (a reflection of the connection of Australian employers [AEs] with Tonga, particularly in Robinvale), the number of workers on this scheme is relatively small (in the hundreds) in comparison to the thousands of Tongan migrants working internationally (DFAT n.d.).

The SWP: Background and Details

The Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWP) was announced in 2008 and ran until 2012. In total, nine countries were involved in the PSWP. The four countries that initially signed Memoranda of Understanding with the Australian government in 2008 were Kiribati, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Tonga and Vanuatu. These were followed by

Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu in 2011, as well as East Timor, which agreed to 'a small trial of seasonal mobility arrangements in the accommodation sector' (https://employment.gov.au/pacific-seasonal-worker-pilot-scheme: http://docs.employment.gov.au/node/30840). The visa capacity differed for each nation. For example, a total of 800 visas were available for Tonga and Vanuatu, 250 for Kiribati and 650 for PNG (TNS Social Research [TNS] 2011, p. 12). The scheme never reached capacity during the pilot, in part due to the GFC and in part due to the slow uptake of the scheme in the horticulture industry (TNS 2011).

In 2012, the SWP was implemented, building on the pilot scheme with relatively few changes.[1] The scheme requires financial benefits to be delivered to both seasonal workers and AEs and encourages repeat participation to 'minimise risks of overstay and maximise employer productivity gains' (TNS 2011, p. 13). The AEs are generally not growers, but rather they act as contracted companies that provide workers to farms at an agreed cost, and the AE, not the grower, is responsible for meeting the requirements of the scheme. Specifically, AEs are required to guarantee to seasonal workers

- Four to six months' work with specified minimum weekly hours on average across the period of engagement (the longer the period of employment, the fewer hours need to be guaranteed)
- Engagement according to Australian work standards
- Assistance in accessing health care, arranging for personal protective equipment, ensuring access to on-site facilities and on-farm induction, including in occupational health and safety (OH&S) matters
- Appropriate pastoral care
- Support to ensure compliance with all visa conditions
- Cooperation with the Fair Work Ombudsman and state authorities in monitoring the work standards of workers. AEs will pay for
  - A proportion of the return air travel costs for seasonal workers, set at a flat rate of 50 per cent of the return airfare to be paid by employers irrespective of the sending country (under Phase 1)
- Arrangement for seasonal workers (at the cost of the workers) of
  - Private health insurance
  - Accommodation (TNS 2011, p. 13)

1 The scheme was expanded beyond the horticulture industry to include a 3-year trial in the accommodation, aquaculture, cane and cotton sectors (Department of Employment 2014, p. 1).

We do not provide an exhaustive critique or analysis of the scheme or its implementation here or in the later discussion. The SWP has been well canvassed elsewhere (see, for example, Gibson and Mackenzie 2011; Ball et al. 2011) and recently came to the attention of the media via a World Bank report that identified concerns regarding the 'competition' for seasonal labour work among unlawful workers, working holiday-makers (specifically backpackers) and the SWP (see Bennett 2015). However, it is worth noting that the intention of the scheme is to contribute to 'economic development in Pacific countries through seasonal workers' employment experiences, remittances and training', as well as to 'provide benefits to employers and growers in Australia' (Gibson and Mackenzie 2011, p. 361). We note that some of the issues raised in our discussion parallel existing commentary on and analysis of the implementation of this scheme. More pertinent for this analysis, however, is the highly structured nature of the scheme, which results in a mobile, temporary workforce that has a degree of certainty and oversight over when, where and how they will arrive in, live in and leave Australia. This analysis provides an important contribution to the examination of temporality in its contemporary manifestations in the midst of a growing dependence on and desire for temporary migration structures across the Global North.

The Fieldwork: Participants and Research Sites

The research began in Victoria with four workers who were participants in the SWP in Robinvale and with NGOs and AEs in the same area. This fieldwork was followed by a visit to Tonga in November 2013 to meet the same Tongan harvest workers who had been interviewed in Robinvale. On the main island of Tonga we met up on family plantations, in market stalls or during visits to small business ventures. Between the two research sites there was a marked difference among the male participants. Tongan men who had been reluctant to be interviewed while working in Robinvale responded with pride and hospitality when interviewed in their home country. They were keen to demonstrate how their earnings or skills had changed their lives and the lives of their extended families in Tonga. Contact with women was made through the church. We spoke with Tongan women about the effects for them of the men leaving to work in Australia as part of the SWP. The total number of interviews, and indications of whether the interviews were structured (digitally recorded and adopting the interview schedule) or unstructured (not digitally recorded and more conversational in nature), are presented in Chap. 2

Two key elements of this case study distinguish it from the other case studies in this project. First, the participants in the research were predominantly connected to the SWP as workers or spoke directly about the Tongan seasonal workers who joined this scheme. However, as the analysis below reveals, there was also some discussion of Tongans who were first- and second-generation migrants who had become permanent residents and settled in the Robinvale area, but we touch on these experiences only when they have direct relevance to issues pertaining to SWP temporary migrant labourers.

Second, the research is specific to a small regional town in Northern Victoria rather than to a major capital city. Robinvale is a town that has a recorded population of approximately 2500 people (Regional Development Victoria 2014), but this is an official statistic that does not capture the significant stable (that is, permanent) migrant Tongan (and other) population, as many people do not participate in the census or other data-collecting endeavours (as reported in this research and elsewhere). The official statistics also fail to capture the significant fluctuation in population size during harvesting and pruning seasons, when the population may swell to 7000 people, of whom the majority are temporary migrants. The SWP brings approximately 80 Tongan workers to the town each year from February to August, and as discussed in this and other chapters, many of the 80 are repeat participants in the scheme. The numbers fluctuate to a small degree every year, depending on the work available and the success of recruitment in Tonga. While there are also a small number of SWP labourers who come from other Pacific Island nations, the Tongan link, besides reflecting the long history of engagement in harvest work among Tongans, also reflects the presence of a significant private business run by Tongan nationals who have permanent residency in Australia and a large subcontract with MADEC, the government agency with responsibility for the SWP, including the recruitment of Tongan workers. The SWP labourers account for only a small proportion of the total number of people working in seasonal labour in the agriculture industry in the area. Numerous sources indicate that, alongside the harvest workers, a high number of undocumented workers are brought in by contractors to work on local farms or in the larger corporate primary industries (mostly almonds). These workers are from many different nations, including Korea, Vietnam, Hong Kong and China, and a number of stories emerged in this study of unlawful operations and abuse by contractors, adding to the growing documentation of these issues in research and the media. These accounts were not the focus of this research, but they are indicative of the volatile and elusive nature of seasonal work settings in regional

and rural Australia, where the strictures of regulation—be it workplace, immigration or otherwise—are enforced haphazardly at best.

Domains of (In)Security

Cultural Security: Local Acceptance and Diaspora Connections

Four important elements of cultural security for the temporary SWP Tongan population in Robinvale were identified in this research: the predeparture preparations in Tonga and three key elements of the experience in Robinvale relating to the community generally, the Tongan diaspora and kinship ties.

The first significant form of cultural security was provided via participation in the SWP. What makes this journey to and experience in Australia unique compared to other temporary labour migrant experiences is that the group of migrant workers meet before they travel, travel together and go to one location to work for the same employer for the term of their contract. As one participant explained through an interpreter:

> He knew some of them prior to his coming … because … they meet up in Tonga, the whole group … and they go to church together. So they're kind of like already identifying themselves to the group mentality of coming over. (INTG201)

This means that there is an immediate cultural security as a result of travelling with and being a part of a shared circular labour migration process, and there is no competition between labourers to secure work (INTG203).

Upon arrival in Robinvale, cultural security was largely enabled through the belonging and acceptance provided *within* the community of Robinvale. It was agreed by a number of participants that Tongans are an accepted part of this community, enabling temporary migrants to find themselves a part of a diaspora in which there are many Tongans—recognised as 'the dominant Pacific ethnic group here' (INTG105). As one participant observed:

> I think the Tongans and Islanders are accepted more in the community, because they're visibly here longer, and we see them, and we get to know them, and we see them employed in the school, we see them employed in the hospital, and what have you. (INTG305)

Indeed, one participant noted that while the presence of groups of Pacific Islander men may be disconcerting in other settings (see, for

example, the discussion regarding the experience of young Samoan men in suburban locations), it was not perceived as threatening in Robinvale:

> The other day I walked some of the boys to [a shop] and … I thought the ladies would be a bit worried 'cause they're a big bunch of boys and they're walking in and they're pretty loud, getting them to shoosh up is a big problem but no. (INTG105)

However, this did not mean that the community was entirely harmonious. The existence of disputes was acknowledged, but these were largely dismissed as 'media hype' (INTG305). A few participants noted that some of the disputes arising in Robinvale reflected more recent tensions that have arisen as a result of 'too many cultures' being in the one small community (INTG102). And, as these participants reflected in a group interview, some elements of the local Australian community were less welcoming:

INTERVIEWEE C	There is still a redneck element, certainly, in the town.
INTERVIEWEE A	Definitely. 'Go back to where you came from.' (INTG306)

Such attitudes were not, however, seen to reflect general opinions towards Tongan migrants in the community, whether permanent or temporary, and were not perceived or reported to undermine feelings of security (though it is worth noting that this might not be the case if the workers were women). As noted earlier, Robinvale is a place that has a significant transient population of seasonal workers who are part of a broadening multicultural spectrum. Where once it was reported that Pacific Islanders, particularly Tongans, dominated the seasonal work opportunities, there are now people from Korea, China, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia and Vietnam undertaking such work. Some issues of prejudice were raised in relation to seasonal work and the general operation of migrant contractors in the area, rather than being specific to the experience or treatment of Tongans who were part of the SWP (INTG308). Most of the interviews reflected the attitude expressed in the following comment by one participant: 'I think generally people are very accepting of the multicultural situation' (INTG305).

However, it was primarily the Tongan diaspora who played a key role in proactively welcoming and offering support to SWP temporary workers, as this participant explained: 'The community usually comes over

and see how they're doing—the Tongan community … kind of like put themselves around the whole scheme like as being part … theirs' (INTG202). This was partially explained as a reflection of Tongan culture, where there is an emphasis on being welcoming and sharing (INTG101). However, it was also attributed to the role of community and the church, the latter seen as a space of common ground for Tongans where temporary or permanent members of the diaspora could gather together, as the following excerpts convey:

> Generally they're warmly welcomed and very much a part of our community. There's a lot of different Tongan churches here, and the harvest workers come in, and they rotate around the Tongan community. So they participate in each of the fellowship groups that meet. Yes, there's quite a deal of harmony between them. (INTG305)

> So when they get here it's quite easy I think … the community usually comes over and see how they're doing. (INTG201)

> Because every Sunday, we going to church. Yeah, the—most of the church is the Tongan church. … Because you know, Tongans, they are—they're Christian people. Yeah. Everything goes on Sunday … Sunday is the day of going to church, come back and have a rest. (INTG101)

It is worth noting that 'church' is not homogenous. While Tongans are a nation of churchgoers (see United States Department of State 2007), there are variations in denomination, but this was generally seen as a minor point of difference. The overall commitment to a Christian faith translated into a like-mindedness across the community:

> I think we do categorise [Tongans] by the denomination, the church that you belong to. But in saying that, when something happens in town, everybody comes together, and it doesn't matter what denomination you are with. And especially when there's a death, or if there's an accident or something's happened to someone … the community really does come together and we all go and help out where we can. … So I do notice that we are definitely one community when things happen, but when it comes to just everyday living I suppose people are like, oh, that's the girl from the Presbyterian Church. That girl's from the Mormon Church. (INTG304)

Thus, diaspora ties were important and generally resulted in creating a safe, welcoming and familiar setting. But familial ties were revealed to be more

important to the Tongan experience of temporary labour migration and in enabling workers to avoid isolation and dislocation from culture. Many participants explained how Tongan SWP workers would stay with family in Robinvale and travel with family members who were also part of the scheme:

> Most of them that come from Tonga for the harvest season, there is a lot that have families and they come in a group … and they stay with the family or they stay with the accommodation that they are given, and just to go against the agreement that they signed up for, that they have with the contractor. (INTG301)

This comment highlighted the uniqueness of the Tongan experience in the Robinvale area: The community and cultural security engendered by coming to a place where there is already a significant, settled, permanent Tongan migrant population and where the number of workers from Tonga is high creates a specific kind of support network that includes access to homes rather than formal 'accommodation' (INTG306). The role of family as central to cultural security in the migration process, however, was not always consistent, and it was the family in Tonga that was subject to significant insecurity and disruption as a consequence of temporary migration.

Cultural Insecurity: Familial Disruptions

Family and parental leadership is an important aspect of Tongan culture, as one participant explained:

> In the Tongan culture, the parents … earn the big respect. Whatever they say, especially into the household and the family, which is the dad, whatever he says it goes. If he changes the plans, it's changed. In the Tongan culture it's the family that's the majority of things. (INTG301)

The SWP is promoted as providing the opportunity to gain earnings and skills to benefit one's family, community and thereby the nation of Tonga. However, the negative impact on the family is rarely acknowledged or even considered. The absence of the father (it is most often the father rather than the mother) for up to 6 or 7 months of the year can impact the family in a range of ways. Two fathers reflected on this point:

> My oldest son, he's growing up. He's about 18 years now. Because I'm not there … to look after him, because he—he leave from … his school … so he [and his friends] get drunk and they do everything …

> I already … pay the school fees … he [says he is] go[ing but] … the teacher say … he's not there. …. But you know, when I came back, he stay home. He's very good. (INTG102)

> The—my family—they feel, when I'm away, they feel kind of lost, and they don't think—I come—come and work from here, and help them, but they need money to—my kids' school fees and our church. (INTG102)

Participants also acknowledged the impact on the workers—in particular, that they missed their families during their stay in Australia (INTG202). Maintaining communication was possible but it was also reported to be costly (INTG101). In our discussions of this impact on families, the observations and experiences varied. For example, one participant highlighted the need for data on marital breakdown in this context:

> I'd like to see the data. … Just considering seven months away, I mean it's clear you're going to have issues. How you deal with it, I'm not sure. I mean the other thing about it is that you have varying degrees. Obviously, you'll have relationships that are going to be fine and then you have relationships that break. … How do you actually—how do you rank that objectively and what do you do about it? Can you say—are you going to sit and say to somebody well, okay, if you go back next year to make $6500, is losing your wife worth it? I mean it's difficult. (INTG204)

However another participant dismissed both the impact on women and the question of whether women would be concerned or worried about the impact on them or their marriages as a result of their husbands being absent:

> They would think—everybody would be thinking, oh, my gosh, that lady and her children, they're lucky. Her man's over there working and sending money. They would just think they were lucky. Seriously. There would be no consideration with regards to, yes, she's stuck with the kids by herself for all that time, and yes, she doesn't get any time. There's no—they don't think like, women do need a break. That's your role. Why are you complaining? … It's nothing to them. It's, oh, they're fine. I'm sending the money home. I don't understand why they would even complain. … They would just think, oh, I'm lucky.

> My husband's working. He's sending money home. The kids are getting fed. Yeah. (INTG303).

There is limited acknowledgement of such issues in the design of the scheme or in any published analyses of the pilot. For example, there are no options to return to Tonga for short periods, no support to ensure or enable ease of communication (such as enabling access to telephones or computers), nor is there the option for family members to visit SWP workers while they are in Australia—an issue discussed later in relation to restricting mobility and legal security and insecurity. This experience of disconnection from the family embodies what Dauvergne and Marsden (2011) refer to as the 'human' issues that arise when 'labour' is imported.

Significant familial impacts for permanent Tongan migrants and their children were also noted. Many of the Tongans living in the Robinvale community rely heavily on seasonal work, and NGO participants noted that this results in young children being 'fairly unsupervised' in relation to meals, socialising and homework (INTG303). It was also observed that these work commitments and having the extended family and kin staying in the home during the SWP months (often for half of the year) further exacerbated the challenging conditions facing second-generation Tongan migrant children in relation to regular attendance at school and completing homework. As one participant observed, this led to overcrowding in the home that left limited space to undertake studies, and workers often came home late, resulting in disruptions later in the evening and no supervision of homework. These conditions created negative long-term consequences, despite the efforts of schools to address such problems (INTG305).

Legal (In)Security: Mobility Within Australia

The Tongan case study, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, drew on a group of migrants whose mobility is highly regulated and who did not raise the issue of migration-related insecurity as a prominent concern. On the one hand, being part of the SWP provides security and certainty in relation to work, labour conditions and travel. As discussed below, this reflects a security of mobility that is in some ways unique among those who travel from a developing nation to a developed nation. However, there are also elements of this highly

controlled and regulated form of migration that contribute to insecurity, including the insecurity engendered by limitations on mobility in relation to travel and employment.

Discussions about the freedom of movement of SWP workers in Robinvale revealed conflicting views. At times the tight restrictions were explained by the contractor/employer, for example, as a means of fulfilling their duty as a 'protector' of SWP workers during their time in Australia. Thus, such surveillance of workers' movements was situated within the broader remit of providing pastoral care, whereby Tongan workers were 'discouraged' or 'stopped' via a set of rules from going out at night in the largest nearby regional centre, Mildura (INTG202). One participant stated that he took responsibility for taking people to Mildura to go shopping but did not allow them to go to the town for any other reason (INTG202). In other interviews, the limitations placed on travel outside Robinvale were described as far more relaxed, yet even then mobility was highly regulated and monitored:

> When they have a bit of time off … there's nothing to get a request to say, 'Look, we've got friends in Melbourne we'd like to go to.' We've spoken to Alf and he said that's all right because the pressure is off, and they go to Melbourne for a few days. We get contact names and numbers, so if we need to contact them, we know where they are, we notify … DEEWR [Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations] to say so and so, and so and so, and they go to Melbourne, they go to Sydney, they go to Queensland. (INTG302)

The Australian regime was noted as involving far more monitoring than the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme in New Zealand (INTG203), with the main focus in Australia on border security and the possibility of SWP labourers absconding. However, the above participant argued that this surveillance was partly intended to protect SWP labourers, as part of the pastoral care duty (as discussed above):

> We're not there to prevent them from going anywhere, to stop them, as long as we know where they are in case something does happen or if we need to get in touch with them, and I mean, they could be away somewhere and something could happen back … we just like to know where they are and what they're doing and make sure that their host employer is aware that they're going to be missing and it's not going to interfere with their work and they've just gone away to visit friends, and when do you expect

> to be back? … It's not a control freak thing, it's just a matter of knowing where they are in case we need to get in touch with them. (INTG302)

Though this participant did say that there was a concern that people might 'do a runner' (INTG302), he emphasised the pastoral duty and the responsibility of the employer: 'It's not a matter of trust, I mean, it's just a matter of us knowing where they are at all times so if something happens. … They're here under your care'. (INTG302).

It must also be noted, however, that this investment in pastoral care is driven by employers' need to maintain their contracts as providers of seasonal workers, and absconding or overstaying workers would be detrimental to their ongoing business.

These limitations and restrictions on worker mobility can appear neutral (that is, neither a benefit nor a deficit to the SWP worker) and, arguably, they are part of what a worker agrees to when joining the scheme—although they are *not* a formal part of the SWP. However, they also point to what Dauvergne and Marsden have identified as 'appropriate rights restrictions to ensure that workers will in fact depart at the end of their permitted period'—an approach that 'masks the fact … [that] those with lower skills [receive] fewer rights' (Dauvergne and Marsden 2011, p. 12). Such practices can also be considered—in spite of the rhetoric of 'protection'—contrary to basic human rights principles to enable the freedom of movement *within* national borders of anyone lawfully in the country, as articulated within Article 12.1 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*.

Some interviewees discussed the importance of ensuring that individuals do not abscond and the associated loss of mobility among workers and the use of surveillance as a way of protecting the integrity of the scheme:

> I don't think that that's irrelevant. I mean … you've got to maintain the opportunity for everybody else that comes after but I don't think it's the only priority that they should have in terms of how it all works. I think it's, obviously, in the national interest. (INTG204)

Workplace Insecurity

The SWP is promoted as a scheme that does not place labourers in conditions of vulnerability like those often experienced by unlawful work-

ers and other temporary workers (cf. Howells 2010; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 1999). However, the observations of some participants suggest that protection was not always adequate. For example, one participant indicated that over the life of the SWP (including during the pilot), absconding has occurred across Australia and that this is a reflection of a range of issues pertaining to work conditions (including hours and type of work). He explained that most workers absconded in order to stay with extended family in Australia during the time they were legally resident in the country (although they were supposed to be working). What sets SWP labourers apart from other temporary migrant workers is that *any* misbehaviour related to work or unlawful activity (including alleged unlawful activity) can have significant consequences for the community in Tonga. For migrant workers outside the scheme, misbehaviour at work can result in the termination of employment, and breaching visa conditions can result in deportation, but these consequences affect only the individual. In contrast, employers' satisfaction or otherwise with the behaviour and work ethic of SWP workers can impact a whole community or island, who might be banned from accessing the SWP if a worker from that community undertakes any activity deemed inappropriate by AEs. For example, one participant recounted how five Tongans absconded for a short period of time and later returned voluntarily, but the island from which they came was then banned from the scheme (UNTG201). Another participant explained how people absconding or being sent back to Tonga as a consequence of unacceptable or unlawful behaviour may not be 'punished' as such, but they are legally impacted by the removal of their right to reapply for the scheme at any time in the future (and presumably to enter Australia on another visa as a result of the assessment of their flight risk, although this is not specified in policy documentation that is publicly available). They are also required to pay some of the cost of their travel home, a cost otherwise borne by the employer (UNTG206). Critically, absconding has consequences beyond the individual as whole communities are punished through the denial of access to the scheme in future seasons.

It is important to note, as a further dimension to the insecurity of status, that Tongan cultural norms make choosing to leave an unacceptable workplace a more likely event than complaining about one's concerns. It was noted that within Tongan culture it is largely unacceptable and against tradition to name or give voice to grievances, as the following participants conveyed:

INTERVIEWEE C We learned, culturally, they would never complain.

INTERVIEWEE A Never complain, never even asked outright for something.

INTERVIEWEE C And so we asked them a direct question and they responded to it.

Interviewer They wouldn't complain to MADEC who's their official employer?

INTERVIEWEE C No … culturally, they never ever will. (INTG305)

One Tongan participant echoed these observations:

> Sometimes … even a family problem, we don't want the rest of the family to know about it or the community or friends. It's very hard. We just keep it to ourselves. It's more like a cultural feeling. I don't know, but that's our feeling. It's hard for us to let people know what is going on with my life. (INTG405)

Currently the onus is on migrant workers in the SWP to draw attention to any concerns or issues pertaining to unlawful or problematic employer behaviour. Such a system presumes that a grievance process will be followed if concerns arise—that is, that workers will contact the relevant authorities and a process will be followed. Yet it is clear that workers are both unlikely to come forward to make a direct complaint (due to cultural values) and that the desire to participate in the scheme multiple times is strong among the population of migrant workers. These factors together place considerable pressure on workers *not* to report conditions that are challenging, unacceptable or concerning. While the design of the SWP on paper appears to protect workers from the precariousness of unlawful and lawful temporary labour, in practice this is not necessarily true. The observations voiced in this research raise important considerations about how we understand and recognise the concerns of SWP workers, and they challenge the western cultural expectation that those who are being mistreated will automatically and actively inform the appropriate authorities. Clearly, further conversations are needed to identify how best to achieve real legal and other support and move beyond offering SWP workers a list of service providers, a finding that parallels the lack of access to support services reported by Samoan SCV holders (see Chapter 5).

Physical (In)Security: Health and Work

Unlike the situation for temporary workers who may be working irregularly (either without a work visa or for cash rather than as formal employees), it might be assumed that temporary workers on the SWP would experience physical security in the form of medical insurance to cover injury or ill health outside the workplace (where WorkCover, the compulsory employer insurance for employees who are injured or become ill as a result of their work, would apply). However, there were reports of a connection between illness and lack of security of employment, as the following quotes demonstrate:

> I know some of the seasonal workers, they came here, they sick—and when they made the people, they—when I came to visit them and I came—always come there over my health, so if anyone is sick at work, I can come and pick them up and bring them to the doctors, but they—a lot of time they don't—they just push me away because they don't want to encourage them to have a sick day. (INTG401)

> I mean it gets really hot here, like, not every day is 45 but you can have two weeks of 40 plus and they are still out there and that's why they like them, because they will keep going in that heat. They can [get medical help] but you've got to go through—jump through hoops to get medical help for them. They haven't got a Medicare card. … [The] hospital treat them. They are pretty good. … But in terms of going to the doctor and that sort of thing, if you can't pay, that's sort of less extreme where you just need health support, you don't [get it]. (INTG308)

These excerpts highlight the pressure on workers to maintain their contracted hours and the fear and uncertainty they face about what might happen should they be unable to fulfil these obligations due to ill health. However, concerns were also highlighted regarding the cost of medical treatment for non-citizens. Critically, potentially serious health consequences of red tape were identified during the interviews, with alleged failures to undertake thorough medical checks in Tonga resulting in SWP workers being refused access to medical care in Australia because the health insurer deemed their insurance to be redundant, as described below. A few participants raised concerns that medical conditions were sometimes not identified despite purportedly thorough health check by the Tongan Ministry for Internal Affairs (UNTG202). Two deaths of workers in Australia were reported in this

research. One death occurred for unexplained reasons, but the other was detailed by a participant:

> One of the seasonal workers came here and he didn't know that he [had] tongue cancer … because when they did the medical check back home, just blood testing, but it is all small thing. They didn't have a proper check and they—when he came, he was sick here and he was taken to hospital. … [When I found out I went to] talk to the nurses. … And they told me everything and they … said they would run the drip—the IV drip for him to get some—get back some energy, the strength and they said after that, that they would send him home. And I said, 'What?' And they said, 'Because he['s] got no Medicare, he have to pay $700 today for him to stay in the hospital.' And I said, 'You're killing him.' They send him home … [where] the workers live together. No family. No one to look after them … I rang the contractor and said, 'Aren't they covered by the health care—health insurance?' … He told me that they contact[ed] them [the insurer] and they say, 'No', [he wasn't eligible for the insurance cover] because he shouldn't come because he got cancer and that's it [that is, it was deemed to be a prior condition]. (INTG401)

According to this participant, he contacted a social worker to try to rally community support for the man, but his efforts failed; later the head nurse made the executive decision to allow the man to remain in hospital, where he eventually died. This decision was not supported or enabled by the man's health insurer. This episode points again to the ways in which temporary migration regimes can appear to be attentive to the checks and balances of ensuring that health and safety are maintained in the interests of the migrant labourer, but that actual practice may in fact place individuals far from home at great risk and in significant precariousness.

Economic (In)Security

The SWP is predicated upon the promise of increased financial rewards, if not financial security, not only for the individual but also for the community and the nation of Tonga, and indeed all Pacific Islands more generally. These promises of security were in part reflected in participants' descriptions of their motivation for participating in the programme, yet the interviews also revealed that the interaction between mobility and financial security within the Tongan cultural context is complex and at times contradictory. The

Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, was quoted in 2015 as saying, 'Remittances through the program is an important part of the GDP of some Pacific nations' (Bennett 2015, NP); but what this means in terms of short- and long-term security is far from clear, as the findings below demonstrate.

Immediate Security: Beneficiaries of Financial Rewards

Remittances tend to be perceived as *only* positive and as generated by 'wealth' earned in nations outside Tonga; but our findings, echoing research elsewhere, identify certain important nuances to the assumptions about short- and long-term financial security. We know that money is remitted and that this income individually and nationally is critical to the Tongan GDP, but the process of money being remitted, and the impact of this on the individuals working in Australia and receiving it at home, requires closer scrutiny.

Individual and Immediate Family Financial Security

Many participants acknowledged that money was a primary driver (see Chap. 7 for more on drivers of mobility) for seeking to be part of the SWP. However, the specifics of how money was spent and its immediate and long-term impacts varied:

> But it depends on people. Some people are just—they send the money and the family back home just use it all and when they come home, there's [nothing]. (INTG401)

INTERVIEWEE A	One of them mentioned last year that he sent all his money home—and it goes back to what [Respondent C] said earlier, he'd sent all his money home that he possibly could and when he got home, there was none left for him because his wife had spent it all.
INTERVIEWEE C	They get very used to having a lot of money over there but don't know how to handle it.
INTERVIEWEE A	So he had nothing. (INTG306)

Some participants clearly sent money home to cover the household and daily living expenses (INTG201), but it was also used for more significant items, such as the purchase of a home (INTG102, INTG101). A number of participants who were part of the SWP had been employed in previous seasons, which meant that each season was tied to par-

ticular purchases or payments. For example, one participant (INTG101) explained that he had paid for his house over 2 years and was now looking to pay for his son's university education. Another participant, when interviewed in Tonga, explained that 'everything here, everything—the piece of land, [the] house and the … vehicle, from the [money earned on] the scheme' (INTG201). Raised earlier was the issue of the familial disruptions caused by the SWP weighed up against the financial gain. A number of participants argued that the hardship experienced by families was recognised but that the financial gain generally trumped these considerations:

> I would say that their families do miss them, and the six-month period of them leaving their country, but then they would also be happy [with]… the money that they receive when their husbands are sending it to them in Tonga, because they have a lot on their hands and they are able to provide food on the table, because the household is not there, but the mother can buy shopping and that so the kids can live off that as well. (INTG301)

> The reason they come to Australia for the harvest is because they know it's a lot of money. But not only that, they are doing their best to support their family back at home. So that's why a lot of the men come to do the work because they have kids who want to have education, they have kids who want to learn, and they have their wives at home doing the cooking and cleaning and they are here sending the money back to Tonga so that the things that they need for school or their clothes on their back or whatever, the need to pay is being paid by the work out here. (INTG301)

Some participants found the separation from their partners less challenging because they did not have children, enabling the SWP money to be utilised for long-term investments:

> Well, I did encourage him to go while we—right now we don't have kids. So I did encourage him to plan now for our family for the future. If we have kids then he can stay home. Because right now, this is not our house. This is my grandparents' house. We just live here so we can save up, but we know it's not much so it's a good chance for us to save money for all those things. It help us. (INTG203)

On the one hand, the SWP appears to enable financial security for the families of workers, depending on how remittances are budgeted in Tonga, but this was not the entire picture. While the participants working in Robinvale generally had four or fewer dependants, it was clear that remittances were provided to a wide network beyond the immediate family, a reality that has been the subject of much research in relation to the Pacific Islands (cf. Lee 2007; Pyke et al. 2012).

Extended Family: The Reach of Kin Networks

The sense of dependence and expectation produced by the broad reach of remittances weighed heavily on some of the Tongan SWP participants, as has been revealed in other studies on remittances, especially with regard to second-generation, permanent, settled migrants (see Pyke et al. 2012):

> Because some of my relatives, they are poor. Some of the parents doesn't work. … I have to share my things with them. That's why I help my brothers, some of my cousins, my wife relatives because my wife relatives from the other island of Tonga, it's hard to get money there. (INTG104)

As another participant explained, 'everyone' benefits from his work in Australia; 'everyone in the family' included, for example, his nieces whose school fees he had paid. This does not mean that no money is saved, but that only a small proportion can be saved as this participant explained:

> The culture is like … when I'm just going to Australia for work … all my families, my relatives, my wife's relatives … they come and ask my wife, oh, can you get your husband to get some money to pay the school fee of my children or … my electric bill. … So my wife … call me up, 'Can you do such favour?' or my brother just need … money to pay for his children's school fees. 'All right. I just give.' She just call me again, 'Oh, can I have some money for—oh, my sisters just need some money for electric bill.' … That's what we are to do. … At the same time I still do saving, but only for my family. (INTG201)

This point about who gains financially from the SWP work was echoed repeatedly in the interviews, along with the extent to which such gains are indirect and widespread among kin:

> Relatives. … Everyone in the family, especially him, he just [paid] some of the kids' school fee … [for] four … kids from my [sister's] family.
>
> From the village, everyone just look at him. He's going to gain some more money from work and help communities, family, not only for the sake of family. (INTG202)

The participants made clear that refusing requests for assistance and financial support, even from a wide network, was not a culturally appropriate option:

> And some of the people just shy to say no, anyone just come and ask you for something … it's very hard to say no. (INTG202)

> That's a cultural thing anyway. We do look after our own, but it is a huge burden on a lot of the families. And even with the workers that we have that—I don't know if it's a government program or whatever, but you know, the harvest crew that come through? A lot of them are then given to families to look after, and they live with those families, and I hear a lot that those families aren't given any assistance to provide for those people. (INTG304)

These are not unusual findings. Remittances, and the maintenance of a wide kinship network in Tonga that they support, have been the subject of much research and analysis (cf. Pyke et al. 2012). This element is nonetheless important to note here as well because it undermines some of the assumptions underpinning the design of the SWP. While individuals may earn around AU$30,000 for their 6 months in Australia—reported to be more like AU$12–13,000 by Gibson and McKenzie (2011)—this is not how much they have upon their return to Tonga. Thus, the supposed benefit of financial security requires close examination, as per the analysis offered by Gibson and McKenzie (2011), as it is less significant than may be promised and arguably ensures that many SWP workers become part of a *circular* temporary migration process via repeat participation in order to achieve both short- and long-term financial goals.

Village/Community

Remittances must also be considered in terms of the Tongan cultural disposition towards supporting and reinvesting in the community, a characteristic that mirrors the experience of Samoans in many ways. The role of the church and contributions to the church were not as widely or clearly articulated in this research compared to the research undertaken in Samoa, the other Pacific Island nation in this study. One participant said that people do not have to contribute financially to the church and that he only contributes a little each week: 'Well, some of the workers, they contribute, [I do] … but … not much … maybe around $5, like, every Sunday' (INTG101). Other non-Tongan participants made general comments regarding contributions to the church, but no evidence or anecdotes indicated significant amounts.

However, a range of community contributions were reported. For example, one participant explained that he had helped the local village community by using his earnings to buy the diesel required to run the pump: 'The village and the community just benefit from it. Just bought the diesel, running the pump and all the people just get the water from it' (INTG202). Another participant reported that a group of workers from an outer island contributed towards building a kindergarten, and another group donated a significant amount for children with disabilities. In both cases these were community-generated, rather than NGO or government-sought, contributions to community infrastructure (UNTG201).

The Department of Labour representative in Tonga argued that while remittances may not individually result in significant gains over the short or long term, and indeed often do not result in investment in community infrastructure, the SWP still had the support of the department:

> … because of the remittance. [T]he money that goes back through the community [and] … into the infrastructure of some sort; they build houses, they buy things and so it's stimulating the economy and it's putting injections of money into the economy and so the whole island and township and villages all do good out of it. (INTG302)

Long-Term Security: Skills, Opportunities and Dependence

The SWP is predicated on a rationale of development, purportedly achieved via remittances but also by upskilling workers to enable them to improve agricultural practices in Tonga for the long-term

benefit of the nation. However, while the responses varied with regard to the extent to which this occurred, the findings generally do not confirm that such development and upskilling are achieved. Although there were two examples of individuals taking the skills they had learned in Australia and applying them in Tonga—one to purchase more land to farm in a more productive way—these were considered rare cases.

It was argued that while the promise of ongoing opportunities to return to the scheme may be perceived as a positive for Tongan workers and their families (as discussed in more detail in Chap. 7 in relation to mobility drivers), this also has the potential to create dependence on a short- to immediate-term income that does not enable workers to continue developing new skills. A key question thus concerns whose security is being secured or compromised, and both within the literature and in some of the interviews in the present research there is evidence that remittances place substantial pressure on overseas workers and have the impact of encouraging those at home to do less:

> What I'm saying to you is that you're asking about why the general—the average level of income is low and I'm saying because you don't have the people getting out there to work. And they're not getting there because they're getting some money, putting unbelievable stress on the people sending it. (INTG203)

> Your question to me was why don't—why is the average income in Tonga this much. And … my response to you was because you've got too many people out there getting $100, $250 Pa'anga a week from Robinvale, maybe. … Not enough people—I mean, maybe, that's part of our problem. I'm not going to say that they're not families out there [with] challenges. I mean that happens everywhere. What I am saying is there [are] … too many people who don't work because they don't need to [because they receive remittances]. (INTG204)

It was argued that while individuals on the SWP and their families and community may receive financial rewards, the overall impact within the broader culture of Tonga was not to ensure long-term financial security, as remittances create expectation and dependence that drive down rather than fuel productivity, creativity, income generation and investment. One participant said that a challenge for achieving this long-term application of skills and development involves setting clear param-

eters around the SWP so that it is understood to be only a short-term prospect, which in turn might ensure that going to Australia to work does not become the short- and medium-term plan that replaces any longer-term planning:

> Well, it goes back to the point that I was saying in terms of limits is that we would like to see—if you put them on strict term limits, then they're already focused on what is the next phase of my life. If I can only work in Australia earning this type of money between three and six years, we would like to see the best of these guys come back and become growers realising the export proceeds for the country. And based on the NZ$6500 for seven months, the New Zealand average, I'd say that would be a much better outcome for Tonga in general. (INTG204)

The reality, as one participant acknowledged, is that the most-skilled Tongan workers have permanently emigrated and that significant agricultural production is theoretically achievable but largely not seen on the ground (INTG204). In part, this reflects the inability of such a small scheme to result in any significant change in production and capacity in Tonga when the workers return home. It also highlights, as raised by the participant above, the 'permanent temporariness' of being a part of the scheme, which leaves workers with limited time to be with their families and unable to develop any major infrastructure to sustain long-term future employment in Tonga.

Conclusion

The highly regulated SWP reflects developments internationally, as discussed by Dauvergne and Marsden (2011), regarding the reliance upon and appeal of temporary labour schemes that seek to control and limit the migration of less-desired non-citizens (those whose permanent migration is not actively encouraged) and the trend for 'just enough' labour to be imported to meet gaps in the labour market (Dauvergne and Marsden 2011, p. 4). We note, as Dauvergne and Marsden argue, that temporality is not a neutral policy objective: It limits our view of humans as being merely labourers, leading to important consequences that include reducing security across the four domains of cultural, legal, physical and economic security. In part, the findings dovetail with Robertson's analysis of temporary labour in Australia as experienced by working holiday visa holders and student visa holders, which points to

the ways in which temporary status creates 'differential inclusion' for migrants (2014, p. 1925), but the current research also expands these findings to identify the differential experience of security.

Critically, temporary labour migration under the SWP visa framework sometimes *diminishes* security, despite the scheme's intent to support and protect workers. It restricts rights of mobility, delimits accessibility to health care and, while being focused rhetorically on a range of regional development outcomes, is primarily implemented to benefit Australian employers and businesses. This does not mean that Tongans and Tonga as a nation do not benefit from the scheme—they clearly do, particularly in relation to increased financial gain. But the true costs (including social costs) of this 'permanent-temporary' scheme, which appeals to workers largely because of repeat opportunities for participation, are yet to be well documented. The idea that the SWP will enable workers to develop skills that they can harness for entrepreneurial opportunities in Tonga has some potential in theory, but evidence of this goal being realised or of enduring benefits to individuals or the nation is largely absent.

Instead, what is most evident from this chapter's analysis of security is that 'temporariness … embeds and normalizes a directionality in which workers' rights are limited and states' rights (to expel, to control) are expanded' (Dauvergne and Marsden 2011, p. 12). These findings point to some of the potential impacts on security as it is experienced and exercised in a range of settings across cultural, legal, physical and economic domains for Tongan workers in Australia. What sets this analysis about security apart is that long-term migration strategies and security were not the dominant focus of the research; the interviews did not revolve around strategies to seek permanent migration to Australia. This chapter has described some important and distinguishing factors pertaining to mobility and security for those engaged in a very specific and regulated form of circular mobility.

7
The Decision to Leave: Processes That Drive Mobility

In this chapter we use data from all four case studies to discuss the processes that drive mobility between Australia and the case study countries, focusing on factors that relate to the search for human security. The findings are initially presented separately for each case study, and then general themes are drawn together in the conclusion.

Mobility Drivers: A Conceptual Overview

Chapter 1 considered the central role of the state in adjudicating migrants' entry to territory and the terms of their stay. State logic rests firmly on the principle of sovereignty, asserted in the name of protecting material and immaterial resources and 'the people' (citizens and residents). State decision-making on migrant entry does not, however, follow a predictable pattern, but rather varies enormously as it is shaped by historical and cultural contexts as well as economic and political circumstances. The interaction of the life plans and individual agency of temporary migrants with the conditions and administrative framework that constitute the state's migration policy is of key interest in this research, and the migrant experience is analysed through the lenses of the security processes that are at the heart of this study.

Some of the key distinctions made in the migration literature between traditional immigration nations, including Australia, and non-immigrant or emigration nations have been eroded by the forces of economic, or neoliberal, globalisation. These forces are highly contradictory, on the one hand privileging a unitary global perspective aligned with a collapse of the binaries of insider/outsider, us/them, immigrant/citizen, and on the other hand eliciting or aligning with exclusionary tendencies within nation-state structures, such as forms of hard nationalism, racism and

so on (Harvey 2005, 2006; Mignolo 2011). Importantly, scholars have theorised the deep connections between political economy, labour and migration as issues that are co-extensive at the global level (Standing 2011, 2014; Ness 2011). In this regard, the lack of support by western states of the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*, outlined in Chap. 1, is instructive. Poverty, 'underdevelopment', aspirations for educational advancement and the labour needs of transnational capital are factors that induce migration. Critical security studies, in addition to critiquing neoliberal globalisation, connect the securitisation of migration to other key social issues and anxieties that emerge both in the lives of migrants and in host societies, where the anxieties are often directed towards new migrants (Bigo 2002; Bigo et al. 2008).

A holistic approach to migration situates it within a broader context of human needs and desires. Human mobility both within and between states is a regular, arguably fundamental aspect of modern life rather than an unusual, suspect or problematic phenomenon. That is, in the contemporary world, mobility rather than permanence or stasis is the norm (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). In addition, the presence of migrants in a society intersects with issues of access to rights, justice and forms of membership (Pogge 1992, 2002; Carens 2010; Shachar 2009). Migrants are also understood as embodying adaptive capabilities (explored in detail in Chap. 9), perhaps due to the very nature of mobility (Cresswell 2010; Urry 2007). For example, when migrants' prior expectations of a receiver society differ from the reality they face after arrival, a willingness and an ability to adapt to circumstances, to embody a 'new self', is common to the migrant experience.

While economic drivers are often the most visible catalysts of voluntary migration and are measurable through remittances, other factors that may be more difficult to detect are also significant. For example, the range of factors that encompass a sense of ontological security, that demarcate forms of a 'good life' or 'quality of life' (Sen 2014; Nussbaum 1999, 2003, 2011), are examples of socio-cultural norms and expectations that define wellbeing as multilayered and context specific. For example, the political culture of a country and expectations that certain values will be upheld, such as democracy or freedom, may have a priority equal to or higher than economic status as a driver of migration decision-making for some individuals.

Rich sociological and anthropological literature on migration and borders demonstrates the transversal aspects of the migrant experience, often through methods that are focused on migrant narratives

and in-depth interactions with migrants, migrant communities and organisations, and other networks of support. These perspectives and methodologies elucidate, among other things, the highly differentiated motivations and experiences that ultimately lead to a richer and more nuanced understanding of the drivers of migration. Rather than neat, predictable categories and factors, migrant narratives may reveal complex and even counter-intuitive practices and actions.

As Chap. 1 discussed, the polysemy of the very notion of the border as explored through the social sciences (see Mezzadara and Neilson 2013) guards against linear, straightforward analysis of migrant experiences, including questions of motivation and agency. Rather than predictable, visible, utilitarian drivers (such as the desire for economic advancement, professional status or training), affective triggers are also prominent within immigrant narratives and self-understanding of their circumstances.

Importantly, the state's desire for predictability and control of territorial borders and populations mitigates against its agencies' (bureaucracies, front-line services) awareness of and sensitivity to the myriad of motivations for migration, including the more subtle triggers that relate to specific histories, cultural subjectivities and associated emotions and memories (Ahmed 2004).

Processes Driving Mobility Between China and Australia

Among the Chinese cohort in our study, decisions to leave China were primarily driven by a desire (both individual and familial) to gain a foothold in the global market—in short, to exploit educational and employment opportunities that were difficult to access in China. These desires, in turn, directly connected to aspirations for Australian citizenship via residency. Host universities were identified using international university rankings, seen as the trusted mechanism for securing prestigious and marketable outcomes for students, and accessing these internationally recognised universities brought individual and familial prestige.

Reputations and Rankings

Ranking shaped the lives of the Chinese students in our study from their early school days when they were ranked against each other. Competition for a superior education and the best results for their child meant that parents 'must have money and have relations [with the authority] so you may go to the good childcare' (INCG213). The school years entailed 'stressful ranking systems whereby the school

ranked all the study results of students' (INCG213). Students reported that their studies in China involved long hours, often 8–10 h a day, and early starts: 'Study in China is a very stressful thing. … My high school was quite strict and in uni sometime our class starts at 6 o'clock in the morning' (INCG106). Upon completion of schooling, the ranking of each student in the national university entrance exams was a critical factor in determining future employment opportunities. Many parent participants with children studying in Australia explained that the top universities in their province in China were out of reach for their child. A parent described their daughter's disappointment when she only gained acceptance to a university that was ranked 38th in their province (Shanxi), although the parents felt that this was a 'pretty good' ranking. The daughter consequently chose to pursue an education in the more accessible worldwide market.

The reputation of overseas academic institutions was a critical factor shaping the cross-border mobility of the Chinese students. Agents and parents linked the rankings of overseas institutions to the future careers of the students once they returned to China. An agent claimed, 'Because the education quality and the ranking will influence their career once they come back to China people always pay much attention on the ranking and the employment it influenced' (INCG201). Another agent explained how the reputation of foreign universities is a priority among Chinese parents and students:

> In Shanxi region, people are rather conservative. They often pay much attention to the ranking of universities and their social influences. For example, if they choose universities in Australia, they may choose famous universities. (INCG202)

Word-of-mouth communications about preferred destinations travelled quickly through communities. One parent suggested that information on the ranking of a university such as Monash, for instance, would 'affect a lot of potential students'. These insights into how universities are selected by parents emphasised the influence of reputation and rankings as interpreted locally by parents, students and agents.

Quality of Tertiary Institutions

While the good reputation of an overseas university could be expected to imply that the institution offers quality courses, few parents or students commented directly on this aspect. A survey of 879 international students in Australia conducted by Mazzarol and Soutar (2002) found

that both the reputation and the quality of an institution were important, as was the recognition of the institution's qualifications in the students' own countries. Meanwhile, a study by Russell (2005) found that prestige guided prospective students' choices more than did course quality. Some students referred to the 'best' universities, in terms of both reputation and quality, as those in Beijing and Shanghai (INCG101). However, one student studying landscape heritage in an Australian university recognised this field to be more progressive in Australia than in China. This student expressed an atypical belief among participants that China could learn from Australia in certain fields:

> Do you know my research topic is heritage and Australia has a long history? We have many, many heritages in China but it's not protected well. … But when I arrived in Australia I found the protection of the heritage is very good in Australia and sometimes such a young country even do better than China. So that's the main purpose I pursue my study here and there is a very famous national park here, the Uluru-Kata Tjuta—there is a world natural heritage list, national park … so we can learn a lot from Australia … so we can make China better. (INCG109)

Another student at Melbourne University was influenced by the internationally oriented careers of both parents. Students such as this one showed a high level of awareness of their place in a globally competitive market, and this student selected an institution that had a world-class reputation for being at the cutting edge of education in finance:

> I've discovered that, okay, education is my purpose for overseas studying. So the destination is not restricted to only Australia. So it can be somewhere else. I'm studying banking and finance at Monash University. This is my first year. I love the subject, I love this course and then I think that this is going to be the future. … So then both my parents, they're financial workers, my mother is a university financial lecturer, my father is a bank worker, senior bank manager. So they know this financial stuff and then they have inspired me a lot of this, and they told me that, on a general view, that the United States has got the best financial education. (INCG102)

Some students spoke of being global scholars or global citizens, particularly two students with educated parents who wanted their children to gain independence, competencies and confidence by studying

in developed, English-speaking countries. One student described being a global citizen as 'knowing the world from a global perspective' and said that fulfilling one's potential in China required education in one of the world's big global cities:

> So I would really say that Australia and western countries, United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, they're all very—they all have very developed education system and then they educate global citizens. But back in China I still have this feeling that even though we're educated, we're still local. We're still local citizens so we don't have this wide view, we don't have this open mind. (INCG102)

Migration-Related Goals

Chinese parents' primary motivations for enrolling their children in overseas courses were to gain access either to globally recognised study or to migration opportunities. A parent for whom education was the main goal explained that other factors like learning about western culture were also influential:

> We did not have many particular purposes. Our goal is learning something, receiving some western culture. As a mother, I think it is just study. For her dad, he knows more than me. He asks my daughter to work for one or half a year to have some overseas working experiences. Then she will have rich experiences if she returns China to work. We did not think much about migration or staying in Australia. (INCG205)

Parents for whom study was paramount tended to differentiate themselves from parents for whom migration was a primary goal: 'You see, like our friends, they sent their child to study aiming to migration. I think many other parents have clear purpose. They make a lot of preparation' (INCG205). This intention to migrate influenced the choice of country, institution and course. Some of the parent interviewees agreed that the choice of university in Australia was influenced by migration-related factors: 'Considering getting PR, we have more expectation on going to Australia' (INCG208). Another claim from parents was that wealthy Chinese parents of less academically successful students were motivated primarily by migration: 'There are some students who do not study well and their family is rich, then

their family want to send them overseas for living better' (INCG211). One parent believed that their child's working life would be easier overseas because it would be less constrained by the protocols and traditions in China:

> Some people just want their children to stay overseas. Oh, they just think stay there will be great, probably because other countries are more developed. The working environment in China is not as good as that of overseas, as well as people's relationships. In other country, working is just working, no complications. (INCG206)

However, the demarcation between migration-related and education-related goals was not clear-cut. Some parents left this decision open ended: 'We may not migrate, but we can make some efforts on that. For example, one test of her IELTS [International English Language Testing System] result does not reach seven scores; she can do more work on it' (INCG205).

As suggested by this participant, the IELTS exam was one of the most difficult hurdles students faced in meeting the visa and university entry requirements for Australia.

A migration agent commented that, although parents' purpose for sending their child overseas may initially be development and not migration, often 'they would love to if their children can stay in Australia' (INCG202). Another migration agent agreed: 'Usually, parents will support their children's decision on whether [to] stay there or return to China. Current parents often have an open mind' (INCG203). When asked whether they would object if their daughter chose to stay in Australia, one parent replied: 'No, not at all. I am fine where she will stay … .I do not particularly insist that she must stay in Australia or come back to China' (INCG204). Another parent gave a similar response: 'Mmm, we are fine for both choices, no particular purpose. It is up to him. We only have one child. It is okay if he stays in Australia and it is also good if he returns' (INCG209). Parents showed resilience in allowing their only child to sail freely in the world without restraints, something that would be dearly felt as both a loss and a gain. Nonetheless, the experience of one of the agents was that, although parents maintained an 'open mind' (INCG203), many hoped their child would return. The parents' hopes and desires *as parents* thus influenced the mobility and temporary migration status of their children. This factor also accounted for some of the drama

expressed in students' decisions to pursue international study. The students' own imaginings of the potential of cross-border mobility were understood as cultural transformations.

Personal Development

Parents spoke of personal development as an important goal for their child when sent abroad to study. Such development included learning and personal change related to ideology and culture, with one parent using the metaphor of a branching tree to express the expected and unexpected directions of a child's emotional, psychological and spiritual development (wherever is suitable for her development) (INCG204). Parents believed that the pressures on young school children in China prevented them from 'being kids'. Others expressed sadness that children in China did not know happiness as they perceived children did in the main English-speaking countries. One parent described a child's development as built on an 'accumulation of happiness' (INCG213) and said that this was something that had to be attained elsewhere. Another conveyed the wish to foster a more holistic childhood experience and imbue a child's early years with an understanding of 'humanity' (INCG213):

> There are too much external pressures. Children have so many tasks, if they do not take so much time, they cannot finish it. So we cannot control it. Moreover, I think the education in China makes children more utilitarian, which I dislike. It put adult world to children's world too early. (INCG213)

Akin to this idea of the all-rounded person was what the Chinese parents referred to as a more spiritually developed child. In China a parent reflected on how she personally did not feel 'fulfilled in spirit' (INCG213) and was concerned that fulfilment would also not be possible for her child in a country so focused on functionalism. Other parents' hopes were for an easier, healthier life. One parent's aspirations were that his daughter might have 'more holidays and vacations' (INCG212). Being healthy and studying were dual considerations for many parents: 'One purpose is to be healthy, then study well' (INCG211). Others cited the ability to be more relaxed as a reason to stay in Australia: 'I just feel the life in Australia is more relaxed' (INCG208). Some of these dreams became the students' after living for a time in Australia.

Processes Driving Mobility Between Indonesia and Australia

In the Indonesian case study, clear patterns emerged in relation to who made the decision to migrate and why such a decision was reached. These patterns correlated with the findings of other studies on temporary migration and labour migration from Indonesia (Farbenblum et al. 2013).

Patterns of Migration from Indonesia

As in other developing country contexts, many Indonesians enter into labour migration arrangements as an effort to alleviate the poverty of themselves and their families. However, most of the poor, unskilled or semi-skilled Indonesians cannot gain access to Australian labour markets. Rather, the majority of the large outflow of labour migration from Indonesia is low-skilled construction and factory workers and women who enter domestic work in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, often working in exploitative conditions without basic labour and human rights protections. Regional and Indonesian NGOs have lobbied to establish more rigorous monitoring of the conditions of such temporary labour contracts. Chapter 4 explored this issue in more detail. In considering the drivers of migration, what is significant is the relationship between different migration opportunities and the narratives of success, failure and ambivalence that circulate through transnational networks of Indonesians and the impact of such narratives on future decisions. For example, some young Indonesians interviewed in Jakarta indicated that careful planning and preparation and a willingness to wait for long periods of time were required to achieve their desired educational outcomes through migration. The information gained from networks of friends who had already migrated served to consolidate this approach (INDG211).

The haphazard nature of advice given by migration agents emerged as a key problem in labour migration to other countries in the region, a problem pertinent also to Indonesians travelling to Australia. Prior to leaving their home country, Indonesian migrants rely on the advice of migration agents to navigate both Indonesian and Australian regulations. A lack of rigorous training and of monitoring of the sector by the Indonesian government means that many Indonesians face significant hurdles and financial hardship, and they may enter into exploitative arrangements and contracts as a result of engaging ill-informed or corrupt agents.

Imagining a Different Future: Freedom and Equality

Indonesians who contemplate Australia as a potential destination are in the main middle or upper class, an understandable circumstance given the rigorous constraints and costs of the Australian visa system as well as the costs of travel. Educational advancement that leads to higher-status work opportunities and increased economic benefits is the principal motivator of migration to Australia and other western countries, which means that it is primarily people from a younger demographic who seek to migrate. Nevertheless, despite the dominance of materialist motivations for migration, the Indonesian case also reveals narratives of yearning for greater access to freedom of expression, the rule of law and due process. Imagining a future where social status or the 'fate of birth' might not so heavily demarcate the opportunities open to an individual was an important motivator for migration among the participants already in Australia and was expressed in the hopes of their networks in Indonesia. Parents reflecting on the changes they had seen in their children who had migrated noted the value of the experience in broadening their outlook and building a sense of independence, described by these parents as attributes of an adult character and a successful self. Such development of 'character' is highly valued in Indonesian society, and migration to western societies is noted as desirable more for this reason than for the pursuit of economic gain. One parent commented:

> Indonesian people, in general, regardless their religions or ethnics want to migrate to other places to try their fortune and to become successful people. Even if [their] children are sent overseas for working after they finish their study, the parents feel really proud of them and this is a pride for the family. So not only for studying, but also for working, the parents would feel really proud and this is really desired by Indonesian people.
>
> *Interviewer: So, many Indonesians share these values?*
>
> Yes. And even in Islamic tradition, if people do not travel, they are like water that stays in one place and therefore it gets dirty, but if it flows, it will stay clean and give benefits to its surrounding. And there's another proverb that encourages people to pursue knowledge even if they have to travel to [a faraway place like] China. People will not get much if they stay in their hometown, but if they travel overseas, they'll learn a lot more and more life experiences, know other languages, other cultures. So they'll have rich experiences. Because when they travel overseas, they will not only gain formal knowledge, but they'll have valuable life experiences from living in different

> countries or different places. So, it's really a pride if Indonesian families have relatives or children who live overseas. (INDG201)

When employment opportunities and the relatively high level of remuneration offered in Australia compared to Indonesia were referred to as important drivers for migration-related decision-making, they were also aligned with the value of equality. The opportunity to live and work in a context in which an even-handed approach is the norm was highly prized by the participants to this study (INDG102, INDG103, INDG104, INDG106, INDG107, INDG108, INDG109).

Indonesia's political culture and history as well as the rudimentary social welfare system (explored in Chap. 4) mean that a large percentage of the population relies on family, clan and village networks and other forms of informal support in all realms of daily life. In addition, cultural values and ethnic belonging and the differentiated economic opportunities available in the vast Indonesian archipelago are complicating factors that must be kept in mind. This context translates in very particular ways into migration-related decision-making. Social mobility and opportunities to contemplate migration as an aspirational goal to improve economic and educational capabilities remain strongly linked to family networks and ethnic and language groups. Poverty and a lack of access to educational opportunities shape the types of migration journeys Indonesians are able to plan and contemplate, and migration to western countries such as Australia is limited for the majority of Indonesians, as previously discussed.

What emerged strongly in both the Group 1 interviews (Indonesian migrants in Australia) and Group 2 interviews (family members and others in Indonesia) was the role that corruption at all levels of informal and official networks and organisations in Indonesia plays in shaping people's lives, including their decisions to migrate. In particular, the Group 2 interviewees commonly spoke of difficulties in accessing a promotion at work or even gaining work they were qualified to carry out, citing patronage as an often insurmountable hurdle to career progression:

> I can move from one office [job] to another office [job], because Indonesia just have, like, you have a friend and your friend will inform to your boss, to your manager and they will ask for the position. So the company here not make a specification when hire someone to work, so they have specific skills, but it's not in Indonesia. You are graduated from psychology, but you can work in hotel. You are graduated from hotel, but you can work also in psychology, become expert. (INDG204)

Many interviewees reflected that they had heard from friends and family who had migrated to Australia for study or work that opportunities there were open and transparent. They spoke of democratic institutions and freedom as important aspirations and reasons for migration: 'It is much better in Australia. We feel really, really secure in Australia because, you know, like, we know Australia is like a democratic country or something like that. So we feel everything is look—like, free' (INDG101).

Family and Networks

Indonesians' migration-related decisions are complex and multilayered. Instrumental and materialist motivations (based on rationalist logic) for migration are clearly evident, with prominent factors including poverty, the need for economic security, and providing support for family in the form of remittances, along with educational mobility and the desire to build a career. Yet at the same time, decision-making often has a strong emotional element such that the views of family, friends and extended networks run parallel to rationalist logic.

The obligation to continue supporting family members for considerable periods was common in the narratives of Indonesian migrants. In considering whether and why remittances are sent home, one Indonesian participant said:

> Because we have like a strong family and even us, my parent's children, we promise we send this amount every month, minimum [*laugh*s]. That's good, it's not too much, just to make them happy—just to make them happy. Sometimes if we can't we can say, oh, mum, we cannot send this month, maybe, if it's okay. (INDG03)

Such responses were common across the Indonesian case study, with interviewees explaining that the obligation to send remittances is deeply felt and a matter of culture, though some emphasised that they would send remittances whether they were expected to do so or not. Such responsibility towards family was conveyed as a matter of self-conduct, and success for self was automatically shared with family:

> The first thing, of course, because of the financial problem that my parents had before. So when I came here, I did part-time job and I could—I could send money to my parents and something like that when they are sick or whatever, which is until now as well. And

> which is really helpful. And also some of my families who couldn't go to school and stuff like that, well, thank God I could help them. Because that's again the difference of—the differences of the currencies, so—which has been helpful. Yeah. And I still can—well, some people maybe they—the thing that—'How come you go like working only two days only in a week, but you can still cover all your stuff, but you can still send money back home?' I go, 'Well, that's how you—that's what I have to do. So just got to do it.' (INDG107)

Another interviewee observed:

> Yeah, there is no obligation, so when we can save some money and then we send it to Jakarta, it's just because—[you want to]. Yeah we want to and we will at least, I and my husband feel that how can we make them happy? So we did send some money for pilgrimage to Mecca, you know and so, but there is no obligation, it's just we want to. (INDG108)

Within the realm of economic security, all of the participants interviewed in Australia expressed feelings of security in relation to the level of remuneration they received for paid employment, which was far in excess of what they would have received for comparable work in Indonesia. Even after paying for living expenses they were able to prioritise sending money home to families. Interestingly, a strong reciprocal relationship also emerged in terms of migration journeys. For poorer families, in particular, the costs associated with the process of migration, such as visa applications, higher education entry applications and travel costs, were a considerable burden. Often great sacrifices were made to send a family member overseas.[1]

Another factor driving the decision to migrate to Australia was the physical environment; specifically, Indonesia is polluted and overpopulated and Australia is seen as a country that has a 'clean, good environment' (INDG101) and that allows a more 'healthy life' (INDG301). Some of the findings in the Indonesian case study were counter-intuitive in relation to the dominant popular narrative in western countries that those from the Global South are seeking membership in western states. Indonesian participants were more likely to express the desire to return to Indonesia once their education qualifications or economic security

1 Some Indonesians on 457 Long Stay Business Visas were identified during this case study, but they declined to be interviewed.

had been achieved rather than to remain in Australia and acquire permanent residency or citizenship. One young Indonesian participant who attended an Australian university stated:

> I had a plan to find a job in Australia but this opportunity, the job that I got offered to go back to Jakarta, is the dream job I was hoping for. … I decided to come back to Jakarta because maybe in five years this opportunity wouldn't come. So the plan was to stay in Australia because the industry, the sports industry, in Indonesia is not quite potentially good for a career, at the moment, at this present time. … I spent too long going around places and haven't really understood the country where I'm really from, so I needed to come back, just to understand the culture more. (INDG210)

Processes Driving Mobility Between Samoa and Australia

Although the reasons provided by Samoan-born research participants for moving from New Zealand to Australia were overwhelmingly economic, these economic motives were found to be embedded within powerful cultural obligations to serve the needs of the wider kinship group, or *aiga*. There were also some emerging signs of more individualistic patterns as Samoans seek to adapt to the opportunities and challenges of a competitive and globalising world.

The Search for Collective Economic Security

As documented in Chap. 5, participants in the Samoan case study consistently reported moving to Australia in search of higher earnings when the 'big dream of New Zealand being the great place to live' was not realised in practice (INSG406). One participant said that she had struggled to buy groceries in New Zealand even though she and her partner were both professionals (INSG105). Alongside low pay, Pacific Islanders have also borne the brunt of job losses during times of economic recession in New Zealand (Macpherson and Macpherson 2009; Stahl and Appleyard 2007). In such circumstances, family hopes may then be redirected to Australia: 'New Zealand is good, but that's the problem about the job. It's no good the money that we earn there. I think if we're both working in here so we're going to get more money and my family will be successful in here, in Australia' (INSG104). Along these lines, a survey conducted in western Sydney in 1992–93 revealed that 83 % of Samoan-born participants reported that their reasons for onward migration from New Zealand were economic (Va'a n.d.).

True to the collectivist traditions of *fa'a-Samoa*, decisions to migrate are often made not by individuals acting alone but by multiple members of a kinship group. In fact, it has been suggested that 'those who "stay put" have just as much influence on diasporic processes' as do the family members who travel abroad (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b, p. 59). In a similar vein, Lee (2009, p. 17) has observed: 'For most Pacific migrants the very process of migration is motivated in part by a desire—or sense of obligation—to support kin in the homeland'. While global investment has stimulated the development of a cash economy in the Samoan capital, Apia, the majority of Samoans depend on a kinship-based village economy of subsistence and commercial agriculture (Va'a 2006). There is, therefore, both an economic need and an established cultural expectation that Samoans will engage in regional labour mobility. Indeed, travelling overseas to work is traditionally viewed in terms of 'advancing the home site' (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a, p. 15). As Va'a (2006, p. 119) notes: 'The Samoan family is typically a small residential unit but becomes an international corporation when its migrant networks are taken into account'.

Those who migrate may accrue cultural and economic benefits in Samoa even when they are overseas. Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009a, p. 16) notes that Samoans living abroad, by continuing to invest materially and symbolically in the strict system of reciprocity dictated by *fa'a-Samoa*, can command as much 'social power' as those who remain at home to live and work on family land. As explained by Macpherson and Macpherson (2009, p. 74), ongoing service to the *matai*, or chief, whether carried out at home or abroad, provides a degree of psychological and material security underpinned by the belief that 'kinship confers upon one the obligation to give to kin who make legitimate requests, and the right to expect that at some time in the future the goods and services given to others will be returned'. Enhancing one's standing within the *aiga* therefore emerges as a highly culturally specific motivation driving the transnational mobility of Samoans.

The Financial and Cultural Value of Remittances

The potential to send remittances to family members in Samoa was identified as a strong driver of migration among our research participants. In the 1970s, economic anthropologist Paul Shankman (1993, cited in Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a) predicted that the flow of remittances from the Samoan diaspora would recede over time due to transgenerational change. But a survey of Pacific Islanders living in Sydney and rural New South Wales in 2010–11 found high levels of remittances sent to

immediate households, churches and community causes among both recent and earlier arrivals. Lower income Samoans remitted the highest proportion of their income among the groups surveyed (Brown et al. 2012). Conditions in the homeland, stated intentions to return and the location of the migrant's residence (remote or urban) had more influence than household income on the amount remitted, possibly reflecting the importance of cultural factors such as social pressure from co-nationals and the strength of cultural ties.

The continued reliance on remittances among Samoan family groups to meet immediate consumption needs rather than advance development goals has attracted sustained criticism by western commentators (see, for example, Shankman 1976). A non-Samoan employee of an international NGO, whom we interviewed in Samoa, argued that opportunities for broader economic development had been missed because of cultural practices governing the way remittance funds are used:

> Certain people are allowed to bestow the titles and they're the ones that appear to get the money coming in from the *matai* titles. You don't see it going into a community hall or a school bus for the kids or paying the school fees for the village, or something like that (INSG202)

Donations to the church were seen by this informant as equivalent to making a donation to the 'pastor's house and the pastor's car and the pastor's salary and the pastor's children's school fees and the church building', so that remittance money could be 'eaten up' even while immediate family members in Samoa had nothing to eat themselves (INSG202). Some of the Samoans interviewed in Australia agreed with this critical perspective: 'Some families go overboard, which I've seen here—all their income goes to Samoa and their kids don't eat anything, you know, and it goes to their minister. That happens all the time with the Samoan churches' (INSG105).

The continuing importance of remittances as a driver of mobility for Samoans thus can be understood only with reference to the cultural value associated with service to the *aiga*. Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009a, p. 17) argues that western commentators have 'missed the importance Samoans give to meeting the everyday needs of families and to maintaining *vä*'.[2] Definitions of what constitutes human security are

2 The traditional concept of *vä* (spaces between people and places) focuses on the meanings created by people interacting dynamically with their changing environments, including across vast distances.

there-fore highly culturally determined: 'It is readily apparent in Samoa that the social and spiritual security that donors derive from their support for the Church is more important to them than the returns that might be derived from the investment of the same amount of money in, say, a financial institution' (Macpherson and Macpherson 2011, p. 308). Macpherson and Macpherson (2009) even contend that individuals may be chosen for emigration on the basis of their personal allegiance to the kinship group.

Collectivist Culture Meets Neoliberal Individualism

While collectivist motives shaped by economic need and cultural obligations were a significant factor driving mobility decisions among the Samoan-born group, more individualistic drivers were sometimes apparent. One research participant had decided to leave Samoa when he found himself with 'no future' there after the grandparents who had raised him had died, leaving him marginalised within the tightly regulated kinship structure (INSG114). At other times, reasons for migrating involved the deliberate rejection of cultural norms. At least one research participant (INSG113) had left New Zealand in order to escape the heavy obligations of *fa'a-Samoa*, a phenomenon that has been reported by others (Brown et al. 2012; Va'a n.d.). While it is often argued that social or symbolic capital is more highly valued by Samoans than economic gain (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a, p. 16), this balance is reportedly shifting towards a greater focus on the value of cash (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b). This may be another indicator of adaptation to a globalising, market-based economy. A few participants (for example, UNSG102) attributed the financial success of their families in Australia to a strategy of prioritising their own immediate needs ahead of their cultural obligations, suggesting that factors beyond the immediate production of remittances were influencing their mobility decisions.

There were other signs of tension between collectivist and individualistic perspectives. During our overseas fieldwork it became apparent that many people who had not left Samoa had no appreciation of the difficulty migrants faced in balancing traditional obligations with the demands of an individualistic and competitive society. At a seminar given by the researcher, post-graduate students showed little sympathy when confronted with the hardships reported by our research participants, were unmoved by the lack of government support available to them, and noted that stay-at-home Samoans had to make do without government assistance. At the same time, research participants interviewed in Australia often pointed out the advantages in terms of

wellbeing and social support of the communal, subsistence way of life enjoyed by their relatives at home:

> You build a house—that's your house. You don't really pay the land rates or anything, nothing like that. You're only really paying the water rates, so that and electricity is probably the main thing. But other than that, you just have your own plantation at the back, that's how you live. You go fishing. It's a whole different ball game to where the island of Samoa is, to when you come to New Zealand … and then you come to Australia. (INSG302)

While many of the interviewees acknowledged the extreme poverty and hardship faced by their extended families in Samoa, among more financially secure families the tide of remittances was in fact beginning to turn in the opposite direction due to financial pressures experienced within the diaspora. A former academic interviewed in Samoa noted, 'When my wife goes [to New Zealand] she spends all her pocket money on helping her relatives—buying food. Because they have so many obligations—church, business, family, education, and they always run out of cash' (INSG203). A considerable reliance on resources from Samoa was reported by another research participant, which was directly attributable to the lack of government support in Australia:

> My sister back in Samoa … she's paying a house, a flat for her daughter up in Brisbane to study. This is her second year in Brisbane university doing engineering and she supports her from home, from Samoa. Now her second daughter is in Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, and she rented out an apartment for her. … And she lives in Samoa, she works hard. She's got a landscaping business, she works morning, night because of supporting her children. Because you know the kids from Samoa they don't receive anything here. (INSG111)

This points to the growing emphasis on pursuing longer-term security via tertiary education rather than short-term security through remittances. This imperative is beginning to affect flows of people both into and out of Samoa: 'We train a lot of the teachers, nurses, people like them—doctors, and they eventually end up going overseas. But I always say to myself, "It's only karma, because most of our people receive their university education through aid money from New Zealand and Australia, so it's poetic"' (INSG203). Sending children to live with extended family members while pursuing their education was said to be

widespread, and had occurred in the case of at least one of our research participants (INSG112). At a superficial level this mirrors the experience of our Chinese cohort of young people being sent out to make their way in the world. However, for the less-well-educated Samoans in our study, their hopes of accessing a university education for their children in Australia were unlikely to be realised because of the policies (discussed in Chap. 5) that are intended to prevent their arrival.

Processes Driving Mobility Between Tonga and Australia

Economic motives for migration were paramount for the Tongan participants. With some exceptions, the Seasonal Worker Program was found to cater reasonably well for the immediate needs of this group within the workplace. However lack of consideration for family relationships reduced the appeal of the scheme for Tongan women and did not support the circular migration that both workers and employers often desired.

Financial Gain

It was clear in all of the interviews with the Tongan participants that the opportunity of well-paid work in Australia was the primary driver for seeking to participate in the SWP:

> They need the money. They need the money for the family. (INTG203)

> The financial benefits and what they remit back to the country is their main drive and their main thing, and how they can improve their lifestyles and things back home. (INTG302)

> That's the most important things to us, money. (INTG101)

The remuneration opportunities available in Tonga (and in New Zealand, for a few participants) were identified as lacking compared to the money that could be obtained from working in Australia, and this was a significant incentive. For example, one participant commented: '[There are] lots of job [in Tonga], but most is only low paid, low payment' (INTG201).

Importantly, those who were part of or seeking to be part of the scheme were not all low-skilled or unskilled workers who otherwise would be unable to access a consistent or good wage in Tonga. One participant, for example, explained that he was qualified to work as a builder but he was paid more for the labouring work he undertook through the SWP in Australia: 'I save money like better money than staying in Tonga. Tonga

you can't get money like what you get here' (INTG105). Similarly, it was reported that some government employees in Tonga were participating in the SWP because they could earn more money in a finite period of time than they would earn from their government job in Tonga:

> *Interviewer: So some people are working for the government who are here on the harvest?*
>
> Yes … they ask for special leave from their work for about eight/nine months so they can come here and work for bit of money to help them out for the deposit of the house or deposit of a vehicle and then they go back home and continue to work. (INTG401)

While there is a significant Tongan diaspora in New Zealand (Gibson and McKenzie 2011) who have the opportunity to participate in that country's much larger seasonal work scheme, the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme, there was less enthusiasm for New Zealand as a destination because the remuneration was less[3]:

> In New Zealand, the money, it's easy for us just to go to New Zealand but there's no life in there. Lots of job to do there but you know the pay, not good. (INTG104)

The above excerpt is reflective of the main focus of migration from Tonga to Australia: it is driven not by lifestyle, the pursuit of permanent residency, the desire for experience in another country or the attainment of skills, but primarily by the promise of being well paid for labour. Within this context, temporariness does not create uncertainty or ambiguity. Rather, there is a clear understanding of the finite period of labour and remuneration on offer. This temporary mobility offers workers the definite and reliable promise of income and is therefore a desirable form of temporariness (see Robertson 2014, p. 1929, regarding other forms of desirable temporariness).

Critically, a key driver, not unique to those Tongans seeking to be a part of the SWP, was the desire to assist immediate and extended family, a desire informed by cultural expectations and practices that are deeply

3 Gibson and McKenzie's (2011) evaluation of the impact of the RSE found that the programme did increase household incomes, but the extent of this increase compared to the total income generated via the Australian SWP in its pilot phase, according to their earlier analysis of this scheme, appears to be slightly less.

and historically entrenched (Lee 2007). The challenges posed by the transnational kinship connections in the form of remittances (sending both money and goods). But within the context of mobility drivers, the desire to fulfil obligations to kin was a central motivation and, as the following participant explained, has been realised by many of those who have participated in the SWP:

> It's really life changing for some of those guys. We've had guys who say, 'What do you do?' And most of them, the first thing they'll do, a lot of them say, 'Look, we built a house for our family.' So they tend to build a house and mum and dad and all of them come and live there, so I mean, they've got a house, some of them will develop a small business … and … they'll come back the following year and their brother or brother-in-law or someone will run the business, and that might be simply buying a van and using it as a taxi service. And apart from the money, they gain skills so they can actually go back and take those skills back with them. (INTG302)

Material goods rather than skills were the primary driver for participants, shown in the discussion of what they wanted or what they had been able to purchase as a result of their earnings:

> The first year, I bought a house. (INTG101)

> The reason they come to Australia for the harvest is because they know it's a lot of money. … A lot of the men come to do the work because they have kids who want to have education, they have kids who want to learn, and they have their wives at home doing the cooking and cleaning and they are here sending the money back to Tonga so that the things that they need for school or their clothes on their back or whatever, the need to pay is being paid by the work out here. (INTG301)

> We've just brought some vehicles … and things just for the house. (INTG104)

> It's good for the family … the children for their school fees and help for the electricity, water and feed the family. (INTG203)

Thus, financial benefit rather than gaining skills was the predominant driver for this group; though, as noted in Chap. 6, there was some evi-

dence of skills being gained that were applied to new opportunities in Tonga, this was rare. While the Australian government's rhetoric about the value of the SWP for Pacific Islanders is that it offers the opportunity for low-skilled workers to develop new skills or enhance existing skills in agriculture (as discussed in Chap. 6 regarding the scheme and its intentions)—a rhetoric echoed by Tongan government participants—the pursuit of mobility in this cohort was not driven by this possibility.

The Gendered Appeal of the SWP

Much of the discussion in the emerging literature critiquing temporary work schemes such as the SWP focuses on the way in which these schemes limit migrants' rights and protections and on the one-dimensional existence imposed on the individual through inflexible visa and migration regimes (cf. Dauvergne and Marsden 2011). Some commentators, in writing about mobility trends, have sought to make sense of the feminisation of migration that has occurred under conditions of globalisation, a change that reflects the shifting nature of employment opportunities and lifestyles of those in the Global North and Global South. However, it became evident in our research that the SWP regime, although gender-neutral and available to any individual who wishes to undertake seasonal work (and although women are employed in these roles in Australia), was in fact a *gendered driver*. This was not articulated in relation to the work itself, and women share equally the desire for financial remuneration for the benefit of the family. Rather, the requirements of the scheme make it unappealing for women. It was clear that the SWP was more appealing and more easily accessible to men. Some commented that it was easier for men to offset the financial rewards against the impact of their time away on the families. While it was reported at the time of the data collection that three Tongan women had participated in this scheme, a few participants noted that women find the time away more difficult than men because they worry about family at home: '[Men] worry about how to do the job, [women] just worry about the kids' (INTG104). The way in which men responded to the impact of their absence from home was explained in detail by one interviewee:

> A lot of the harvest workers that I have spoken to, they are always saying that my wife misses me and they want them to come back. But the answer they give to the wives is I am here to work for you and for our kids. I am here to help you back at home, that's why I left. And, with them it's more of their faith that they know that God will watch over them, they know the reason why they came to this country and the opportunity is because God has opened the door for

> them to receive this money in their hand and to send it back home. And, here I would say that their families do miss them, and the six-month period of them leaving their country. But then they would also be happy in the money that they receive when their husbands are sending it to them in Tonga, because they have a lot on their hands and they are able to provide food on the table. (INTG301)

It is well documented that women across the globe can and do live lives that are characterised by circular mobility and long absences from their children and families (cf. Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004). The inflexibility of the SWP—in that it does not enable family to accompany migrant workers and is highly restrictive in allowing workers to return home while taking part in the scheme—is not unique when we consider the hundreds of thousands of women who cross the globe for work and return home by irregular means. Thus, we are not suggesting that women *cannot* be engaged in this type of mobility scheme; however, what became clear during our research was that, in the Tongan context, this scheme was gendered in its appeal to men. While it was never articulated that men are prioritised in selection for the scheme (as this was beyond the scope of the study), it could be inferred that the presumed capacity of men to undertake the hard physical labour of the specific seasonal work made them more likely to be selected and also that men predominate in applications for the SWP.

Continuity of Work: Temporary or Long-Term Seasonal Employment

A final driver for many of the Tongan group was the potential for successful participation in the scheme (that is, a positive employer–employee experience), which could result in future participation: 'Yes … [we have] first choice [because we have] … experience to do the job. We just give a chance for them 'cause it's hard work just training people … [to] do the job. It's like just give the first say' (INTG202).

Indeed, all of the workers interviewed in Robinvale were repeat participants in the scheme. While the specific skill set gained was not viewed as a valuable development tool (as discussed in Chap. 6) enabling individuals involved in the scheme to return to Tonga with the capacity (or desire) to drive the agricultural industry into a new era, the likelihood of repeat opportunities to be a part of the scheme was highly valued. Critically, it was very clear that this was also a driver for employers in Australia. Being able to employ a consistent cohort of workers from Tonga reduces training requirements and increases the level of

experience among labourers, enabling a more efficient and better-equipped workforce:

> The beauty of this scheme is that the guys that come out this year can come back next year, they're there for six months, they go to work every morning, and next year [when] they come back, they're already skilled up. … One of the problems is, there's probably a lot of backpackers and a lot of Aussies that will do that work … but it's the turnover that kills them [farmers] a lot as well, because they don't stick to it. You've got to be retraining them and you've got to be re-advertising … so the scheme is very appealing to a lot of people [farmers in Australia] for that continuity of work, and they're skilled and they come back. … These guys, they'll stick to it, they're there for six months … they work and they work as a team. (INTG302)

It is critical to note that a driver for the scheme and for the related mobility is the benefit it offers employers and growers (as noted in Chap. 6, for these participants' employment was exclusively in agriculture). In many ways, the comments above embody what Dauvergne and Marsden refer to as the neutrality of temporary labour policies that 'facilitate just enough labour to meet particular market gaps' (2011, p. 4). However, our findings suggest that these are not *temporary* jobs, but rather *seasonal* jobs. For these workers, it was highly desirable to maintain this repeat employment and the requisite circular mobility over a number of years. This means that employment under the SWP is medium-term rather than temporary employment:

> They've spent six months here and six months at home, sort of thing. But, look, when they go back, their first question, their first year is, 'Are we going to be asked back next year?' So they're all keen to come back and just by what you notice there, some have been back for five years. So, look, they've all got mobile phones these days, so they [*laughs*] ring home and they keep in contact, and it's hard for them but I think the long-term gains is such that they're quite prepared to do it. (INTG302)

However, the nature of the scheme, as discussed in Chap. 9, is such that there are no safety nets to protect workers from unfair treatment or dismissal from work for reasons that may be unrelated to their employment performance, in contrast to the safeguards available to Australian employees.

Despite this, the desire to be a part of the SWP over a number of years generally reflected a willingness on the part of the Tongan participants to engage in circular mobility, spending 6–7 months in Australia and 5–6 months in Tonga. The trend towards this specific form of mobility, focused not on seeking long-term migration but rather on maintaining a number of years of such employment, indicated a desire to seek opportunity through mobility and employment despite the restrictive and highly regulated nature of the process. Largely, this reflected the work ethic, employment opportunities and financial goals of the individuals (and their families). The desire to leave Tonga and seek permanent migration was not at the forefront of any of the interviews.

Conclusion: Processes That Drive Mobility

Who Comes to Australia? Formal and Informal Selection Processes

Individual aspirations, socio-cultural and economic factors at home, and the opportunities available to cross borders all shaped the mobility practices of the research participants. These factors played out differently in the four research groups, so that contrasting profiles emerged in terms of who was 'selected' by these filtering processes for temporary residence in Australia. The Chinese group comprised single young people of both sexes; the Indonesian group included a range of age groups, mostly single people of both sexes, though some were married couples; Tongan seasonal workers were more likely to be middle-aged men supporting families who remained in Tonga; while the Samoan-born New Zealanders arriving in Australia on Special Category Visas generally travelled as family groups.

In the case of the Chinese and Indonesian participants, only those with the resources and educational qualifications to meet the high eligibility criteria for student or skilled working visas could gain entry to Australia. Participants in the Chinese group were likely to be high-achieving students but not those with the very best prospects. Our sample of Indonesian workers tended to be young people from the middle and upper classes who were looking to improve their situation. Despite the relative socioeconomic advantages enjoyed by both these groups, they were motivated to look for opportunities abroad due to significant barriers to success at home, such as the highly competitive education system in China and the endemic patronage within the Indonesian labour market.

Our participants from Tonga and Samoa would not have qualified for these highly selective visa types. The SWP that was the entry route for

our Tongan cohort was a far more accessible and attractive pathway to Australia for men than women due to the practical and emotional implications of long separation from their families. Patterns of travel were very different for Samoan-born New Zealand citizens, who had open access to Australia. Whole families often made the journey, and children were sometimes sent alone to join extended family groups. This group was not subject to any significant screening by either the Australian or New Zealand governments and so had varying levels of education and skills.

In deciding where to look for their education abroad, the families of Chinese students favoured English-speaking countries because of the importance of English language skills in the global labour market, and they relied on the reputations of particular universities to guide their decisions. Rather than Australia being a country of first resort, the Indonesian participants coming to Australia for work were often guided by family networks and considered Northern European countries and North America to be more desirable destinations than Australia. For both the Samoan and Tongan cohort, mobility patterns were focused on the Polynesian Triangle of Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Because of preferential entry schemes to New Zealand, that country was initially the first choice for most of the Samoan participants. Our Tongan participants said they preferred Australia's seasonal workers' scheme over its New Zealand equivalent largely because of the better remuneration available in Australia.

The Apparent Primacy of Economic Drivers

The prospect of higher earnings in Australia was an immediate drawcard for all groups other than the Chinese students, who were focused on longer-term goals. Indonesian skilled workers could expect better remuneration in Australia than at home for similar jobs and might also aspire to educational advancement while in Australia. Samoan families originating from village-based systems with largely subsistence economies sought to access paid employment, along with educational opportunities for their children. The SWP afforded a unique opportunity for Tongan workers to accumulate consumer goods and capital in a relatively short time frame for the benefit of their families and communities at home.

The prospect of sending remittances featured as a motivator for all groups other than the students from China, but there were clear cultural and circumstantial differences. The Indonesian participants remained conscious of the needs of immediate family members back home but considered the sending of remittances to be voluntary, and remittances

tended to be used by receiving families for discretionary spending. For the Samoan participants, remittances were both a long-term cultural obligation and a practical necessity. Extended family groups back home could be reliant on them for both everyday needs and ceremonial purposes. For the Tongan seasonal workers, their short-term employment meant that greater emphasis was placed on taking back consumer goods and other resources for the benefit of their families, sometimes with a view to generating future income. This was a very specific and meaningful driver for this group, since the scheme offers little else other than a way to earn good money.

Other Values That Influence Mobility Decisions

Even when generating remittances was an important objective, focusing solely on this instrumental motivation provides an inadequate analysis of the factors that drove temporary migration for the participants in our study. The prestige of having a family member living abroad was important for the Chinese, Indonesian and Samoan participants as it enhanced the social status of their immediate family (in relation to China and Indonesia) or wider kinship group (in the case of Samoa). The social status associated with studying or working abroad did not necessarily entail a belief that Australian culture or education systems were in any way superior to those at home. However, considerable social capital could be derived from bringing back western knowledge and consumer goods.

The research groups were differently placed within this cultural framing. Among the Chinese student participants, prestige was associated primarily with the international ranking of the university attended. For the Indonesian participants, the personal and familial prestige associated with overseas travel has longstanding cultural roots in Islamic traditions. Both symbolic and economic contributions made by family members who travel abroad are highly regarded within Samoan cultural systems of obligation and reciprocity, particularly the building of international networks. Meanwhile, prestige was not a major consideration for the particular group of Tongans who participated in our study, who concentrated instead on the financial benefits that were on offer through the SWP.

Personal development was a related theme identified by all groups, but particularly by the Indonesian and Chinese groups. With the opening up of China to the outside world still a relatively recent phenomenon, Chinese parents viewed overseas study as an opportunity for their children to broaden their experience and cross-cultural understanding.

Indonesian participants who were disgruntled with the endemic corruption in their country valued the relative freedom and equality they experienced in the Australian workplace and in Australian society as a whole. Among the highly collectivist Samoans, the desire for personal development for themselves and their children was expressed most explicitly by those who sought to move beyond the strictures of *fa'a-Samoa*.

Expectations for the Future

Uncertainty over both the purpose and the duration of migration was a recurring theme in the interviews. Again, this fluidity took different forms in the four case study groups. The parents of the Chinese students were generally prepared to allow their children to decide whether to return home after their graduation or seek to extend their stay and gain work experience. This flexibility, and the capacity to seize the opportunities it entailed, was viewed by the Chinese participants as a project of constructing a global identity. Similarly, Indonesian parents were generally not prescriptive in relation to their children's plans for returning home or settling in Australia on a longer-term basis. Nevertheless, many Indonesian participants intended to return to Indonesia once their educational or career aspirations had been achieved and did not see the acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship in Australia as a highly prized goal.

For the Samoan-born participants, entry on New Zealand passports guaranteed them an indefinite stay, and all of them had arrived intending to make their lives in Australia. However, this opportunity often led to being torn between returning to the cultural security experienced in Samoa or New Zealand and pursuing the economic security they hoped to find in Australia. For the Tongan seasonal workers in our study, their presence in Australia was highly regulated and therefore presented few opportunities to question or determine the duration of their stay. The main source of uncertainty about the duration of their stay arose from the possibility for workers to return in future years under the same scheme—an outcome that was widely sought after.

Mobility, Individualism and Globalisation

The data revealed a tension between the maintenance of traditional social patterns and embracing a future transformed by the processes of globalisation. For students from the emerging economic powerhouse of China, a prominent aspiration was preparing for life as a 'global citizen', a term the students used repeatedly. Education abroad was often

perceived as being more accessible and offering valuable preparation for participation in a globalised labour market, either back home or abroad. Despite the recent history of political collectivism in their homeland, Chinese parents appeared to view their children as autonomous individuals whose futures were in their own hands. While this appears to be an emancipatory narrative, in effect a large burden was being placed on these young people to position themselves at the forefront of major national and global change.

The other groups were meeting the challenges of globalisation in different ways and to varying degrees. Some of the Indonesian participants had made personal decisions to exchange what they saw as the unhealthy and corrupt environment of their homeland for the freedom of a less authoritarian society. This did not generally entail, however, a full embrace of the values of neoliberal individualism, and most participants retained a sense of loyalty towards their own cultural heritage. For the Tongan participants, exposure to an alternative way of life was largely a by-product of their participation in the SWP rather than a positive motivation for their mobility. However, some interviewees identified their inculcation into a cash economy and the western work ethic as a desirable personal goal that also held the promise of wider social impact on their return home to Tonga. For the Samoan participants, long-term residence in Australia could create a conflict between traditional expectations of service to their extended kinship group and the demands of a competitive and individualistic society. Traditional Samoan understandings of transnationalism predate globalisation. However, the increasingly difficult economic and legal environment created by globalising neoliberalism is creating new challenges, including the need for 'reverse remittances' and vulnerability to forced deportation. Many of the Samoan participants and some of the Tongan interviewees believed that western education was the key to traversing this new global terrain, but they had far less capacity to compete for these opportunities than the highly prepared and competitive Chinese group and the well-educated Indonesian group.

Our four groups were therefore very differently positioned in terms of their capacity to utilise opportunities for temporary migration to Australia to advance their individual and collective security goals in a rapidly globalising world. The capacities of all these groups to fulfil their aspirations for human security were significantly shaped by government policies and other mediating factors, to which we turn in the following chapter.

8
Reaching Australia: Processes That Mediate Mobility

In this chapter we combine the research data from all four case studies to consider the processes that facilitate or hinder temporary migration into Australia and the capacity to stay. The chapter will provide rich qualitative data on the impact of Australian immigration policies on mobile populations and the roles played by a range of actors and by systemic factors that translate, facilitate or impede the operation of these policies. Processes that mediate mobility are discussed initially in relation to each of the case studies, and then common themes and contrasts across the case studies are drawn out in the conclusion.

The Mediators of Mobility: A Conceptual Framework

Freedom of movement is a fundamental aspect of international law, enshrined in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR). Yet this freedom is subject to robust challenge when the securitising state asserts sovereignty as a trump card over such international norms. The UDHR, in Articles 13, 14 and 15, codifies freedom of movement, residence, nationality and protections for those who need to leave their country of origin. Article 13 states, 'Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state' (1), and 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country' (2) (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/). The UDHR operates together with the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR; see http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx) and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR; see http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx). Importantly, these rights are understood as inalienable and indivisible. A right may not

be bartered or negotiated for another, and the realisation of each right is dependent on the fulfilment of other rights. What emerges from international human rights norms is a strong vision of human dignity. States are expected not only to uphold international norms and law but also to enshrine these protections into their domestic law. The indivisibility and interdependence of the freedoms and rights codified in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR are strongly related to the hopes and desires of migrants and to the responsibilities of the various individuals, organisations, entities and forces that seek to mediate mobility. As discussed in Chap. 1, the international system of states, intersecting with the ethic of human rights values, has developed an organising framework that substantiates the welfare and protection of humans both within and between states. This organising framework includes the relationships between human security, human rights, human development and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda. Importantly, these frameworks and their intersections hold both theoretical and materialist utility, as clarified in Chap. 1. In the present chapter, we consider the everyday experiences of migrants in accessing information and resources that make journeys possible or not, and the navigating of the multiple necessary interactions before, during and after arrival.

The previous chapter dealt with the drivers of migration and revealed the complex factors at play in the decision-making of individual migrants and their families and communities. The present chapter considers the mediating factors in migration, factors that are overt and visible as well as those that operate in subtle, often hidden ways. Moreover, the design of this project, as outlined in Chap. 2, has deliberately aimed at migrant-led inquiry by using a mixed-method approach to engender social change by working with communities and individuals in building new knowledge and understanding (Mackenzie et al. 2007; Hyndman 2000). Research such as the present project therefore does not aim to gather information and data as an end in itself, but it also seeks to identify and share with participants knowledge that will benefit them and their communities. To this end, temporary migration poses particular challenges. The international system of states relies on arguably outdated systems of administration that privilege permanence or stasis as the norm in relation to populations (including permanent migration). At the same time, transnational capital, often enmeshed within the neoliberal project, feeds off the highly flexible processes of globalisation that appear to flourish from and encourage all forms of mobility (of money,

culture, ideas, goods *and* people). This late capitalist disorder is marked by a frenzy of deregulated or largely unregulated activities, such as the ability of transnational corporations to shift headquarters in order to pay little or no income tax in the countries in which they operate. This flexibility and disorder, meanwhile, have negative human consequences in the form of exclusions and the invisibility of some populations, notably through irregular and temporary forms of internal and cross-border migration. The responsibility to protect individual migrants and migrant populations and grant access to rights is often shifted or even erased in the projects of nation-building. The growing literature on the global worker class (Ness 2011; Standing 2014) intersects with human geography and anthropological literature (Amin 2012; Appadurai 2013) as well as sociological perspectives (Sassen 2014) in providing both empirical and theoretical analysis that assists in identifying the mediating forces in migrant decision-making.

As states have increasingly devolved their responsibilities and bureaucratic infrastructure over several decades of neoliberal 'reform', new 'agents of the state' have emerged as conduits of enforcement. One significant consequence of this process for individuals is a shifting of accountability and lack of even-handedness. In addition, the privatisation of government agencies and services and the devolution to other entities commoditise the relationship between the individual and the state. For example, migration agents are key brokers for negotiating complex visa systems, such as Australia's, via a fee-for-service relationship. While information can be gained from the bureaucracy itself (from the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection [DIBP] website, for example), the nature of immigration law, the visa system and the administrative hurdles are multilayered, complex and subject to regular amendment, therefore requiring interpretation by highly trained specialists. Meanwhile, bureaucracies such as the DIBP keep potential migrants at arm's length, while independent agents are the most common point of direct contact. In a sense, the iron cage of bureaucracy, so well described by the German sociologist Max Weber in the early parts of the last century, has been intensified with the public, including a 'transnational public', caged and constrained by distant and opaque state processes.

The notion of paper barriers is highly relevant in the context of migration (Vasta 2010; Torpey 2000). That is, particularly for the voluntary migrants who are the focus of this study, it is not so much physical barriers such as the territorial border that mediate action and can

make mobility difficult, but rather it is the complex layers of regulation before and after arrival that mediate opportunities as well as daily life. At the same time, as the state distances publics (citizens, residents and potential newcomers) through privatisation and devolution of responsibilities and services, it still requires the loyalty of its members for its own legitimacy. A conundrum for states is that the same migration that is often a source of new potential members, labour power and resources has led to heated public debate in many societies, including Australia, particularly in relation to cultural difference.

It is apparent that mobility mediators (at least official or institutional mediators) work to make migration more insecure for individuals. Whether this is a deliberate strategy or an unintended outcome is likely to vary case by case. The mediators that facilitate migration in the country of origin often include family members and informal networks as well as official brokers such as migration agents. Country-to-country agreements mean that, in many cases, agents from a prospective country of migration may also work in source countries.

In our analysis of the narratives of mobile temporary populations, the concept of 'hubs of security' has emerged. Such hubs are evidenced by migrant actions and reactions, such as the creation of transnational spaces by migrants—spaces of resistance, spaces of information sharing, spaces of networks of support, and spaces of new possibilities for the future. While the following chapter delves in more detail into this emerging concept, it is used as an analytic tool in this chapter to understand the ways in which official and unofficial processes mediate migrants' navigation of migration systems. These spaces, or hubs of security, may also operate through an absence of regulation or by individuals navigating a pathway around existing regulation.

Processes Mediating Mobility Between China and Australia

Processes mediating mobility for the Chinese students in our study largely coalesced around the desire to stabilise their migration status in order to enable the transition from study to ongoing employment in Australia.

Hopes for Permanent Residency

The experience of studying in Australia influenced students to want to stay in Australia and to seek permanent residency. The students

spoke as if their plans to pursue residency were not determined prior to leaving China but emerged over the time of their study. A desire to stay in the country reflected their growth as individuals. Students often spent many years in Australia first as secondary students, then as undergraduate and post-graduate tertiary students, and finally as job-seekers. Over these long time frames parents noticed and commented on the changes in their children. One parent concluded that, despite their daughter's claim that she was undecided about applying for residency in Australia, they believed that she would not return to China: 'My daughter's ideas have been in changing since she went to Australia. At the beginning, she said she would certainly return to China after she graduates. Now when I ask her whether she will return, she says she does not know. I guess she won't return after she graduates' (INCG212).

Migration agents interviewed in China estimated that 'at the beginning, probably only 15 per cent at most' (INCG201) of Chinese students intended to seek residency, but that after they had lived in Australia on temporary student visas 'about 70 or 80 % would like to stay'. Another agent agreed that the students and their aspirations changed markedly through their experiences in Australia: 'With the life experiences on that local environment, the ideas of students will change a lot. It is a process. The ideas they have when they are in China and the ideas after they go to Australia are different' (INCG203).

These hopes contrasted starkly with the actual numbers of students who were successful in obtaining residency. Although no reliable data is available on returns to China, another agent estimated that 80 % returned, mainly because of insufficient credits (points) for migration and low IELTS results: 'Usually, it is difficult for undergraduate students to stay as they may not have enough credits for migration. Some of them may think about their major, city and IELTS results for the aim of migration, like choosing a major which is helpful for migration' (INCG203).

The Chinese students recognised that gaining residency in Australia is difficult: 'I want to get PR or something, but it's hard, now it's hard' (INCG105). A graduate who was unable to get a job upon completion of his degree tried to set up a gift shop business to meet residency requirements (INCG104). Another student directed his future cross-border mobility to countries perceived as more open to offering permanent residency:

> It's all possibilities, because what I know now is that it is so much easier to get the PR in Canada. So compared to UK, the United States, Australia and Canada, Canada is the easiest because you just stay in Canada and then once you get a job you stay there for four years, I think is the current policy, but I'm not quite sure about that. If you stay there for four years and then you have a job or you're studying, so you're legally doing things and living in Canada, you can get this PR. (INCG102)

The students held high hopes for gaining residency earlier in their courses, but these ideals were frequently worn down as they reached the final stages of their study. They found that the multiple hurdles of the IELTS, restrictive access to employment, and visa compliance timelines thwarted their plans to stay in Australia. As in the case quoted above, some students then looked elsewhere for a new study and employment destination.

The Role of Migration and Education Agents in Mediating Mobility

Migration and education agents were frequently consulted by the Chinese parents and students for assistance with many aspects of overseas study and were key mediators of the process. Parents consulted education agents in China and some consulted migration agents registered in Australia to decide on the destination country, the institution and even the course of study. Agents provided services related to visa application procedures and requirements, payments to institutions and travel arrangements: 'It includes inquiry about courses in the earlier stage and the application of universities in the later stage, as well as accommodation organising and picking up at the airport in the foreign countries' (INCG202).

The length of time required for an agent to organise overseas study varied for each case but was usually between 2 and 6 months. The students were sometimes advised by agents to select courses that might lead to better migration opportunities. Some agents were directive, but in the situation described in the following quote it is evident that the parents chose not to follow the agent's advice to select a 'simple major' to improve their chances of accessing PR:

> Then we made contact with the agent. However, the agent said to me: 'Since you have arrived here, why do you study so complicated

> major?' I told them that my son want to learn engineering. If it is business and social science, Chinese universities is better than overseas, why do we go overseas? That was what I thought. They talked to me for a while, with the meaning that my son just needed to learn a simple major and then stay there and get PR. I said my ideas were different. My son went there for study, not just living there. (INCG211)

Agents in China also provided cultural advice on life in Australia, sometimes based on their own visits to the country. At times their impressions were unreliable or included stereotypes, as shown by an agent who said, 'the general impression of Australia is that it is beautiful, great welfare, very simple relationships' (INCG201). Parents' preference to deal with education and migration agents was explained as a privacy issue because they did not want to reveal their plans to the Chinese government, particularly those parents who worked in government departments. An interviewee who had experience as a registered migration agent in Australia and China explained the misunderstandings around the terms 'education agent', 'migration agent' and 'migration lawyer' in China:

> While the term 'education agents', 'migration agents', 'migration lawyers' are clearly defined within Australia, in China, ordinary consumers, parents and students mostly do not understand the difference between each other (they just call them 'agents'), and unscrupulous agents misuse them or deliberately mix them to suit their purpose, or lots of them don't even understand the difference. (INCG305)

Consequently, the quality of the advice in China was often poor as there were few qualified migration agents. In fact, many of the small migration and education agencies were illegal, as explained by this participant:

> Therefore, these agencies what we call as the secondary agency or company branch are not legal. … For example, if Monash University gives an authorisation to an agency, it might find there are 20 authorisations, because this company has 20 branches in China. This company gives the authorisation to all its branches. But in fact, the other 19 are only the secondary agencies, not the official one. They might even does not get the qualification from the Ministry of Education. Many people do not know this. It is kind of mess now. (INCG201)

Moreover, the agent expressed the opinion that because of the utilitarian consumer approach to education in the destination countries and the lack of government regulation of agents in China, the advice given to students was not driven by educational priorities. Agents' services were often skewed by the opportunity to make money, as explained here:

> Because the marketing in China is not that kind of … how shall we say? Not that kind of based on the law of market. For example, if the policies are very loose in America this year, all the thousands of agencies in China will do the marketing of America, then Australia is not competitive. Or if the currency exchange rate is reduced significantly and there are some sale points, all these agencies will do the marketing of Australia. … Therefore, there are many disciplinary flaws because of the unregulated management in this business. (INCG201)

However, other participants claimed that some agents sent staff to Australia to investigate the safety and security and educational quality of Australian universities. Some of the parents in this study had contacted an agent in Australia who was from the same city in China and so was able to offer the cultural, institutional and visa-related knowledge required to transit between the two countries.

Once in Australia, the students often continued this tradition of reliance on migration agents who promoted themselves as providers of a wide range of services. A study of international students in New Zealand found a greater reliance on agents by students at language schools, with about 50 % of all international students engaging an agent (Ward and Masgoret 2004). In our research, the Chinese students in Melbourne preferred to employ Chinese-Australian agents. Although agents in Australia have to be registered and qualified, some Chinese students did not understand the professional requirements and employed unqualified and unscrupulous Chinese-Australian agents. A legal aid centre reputedly found that agents were taking students' money without providing services and that students were disadvantaged by poor advice or exploited by exorbitant fees.

It was apparent that from the start to the end of students' study experience, migration and education agents played key facilitation roles in the mobility of students. A lack of free legal advice and of monitoring of the migration agent sector for international students from China placed some students at risk. At the conclusion of their study, the quality and

degree of professionalism of the advice provided about visa services, employment and study were haphazard and affected some students' capacity to remain in the country.

Monitoring of International Students by the Education and Immigration Departments

The regulatory and management processes for international students in Australia fall under the auspices of two departments: the DIBP and the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR). Tensions within this dual system are evident in how international students are viewed, with the DIBP viewing them as migrants and the DEEWR viewing them as students. A report by Knight (2011), while acknowledging that there is often overlap between the two purposes of study and migration, proposes that the system ought to distinguish the genuine student from the temporary migrant, with the latter presumed to have an unstated agenda to stay in Australia. The closure of a number of private institutions that were rorting the system by offering courses as a front for migration strengthened the perception that there are genuine and non-genuine students (Robertson 2011). For the Chinese students in our study, the consequences were severe when 16 providers closed in 2009, displacing 5795 international students; a further 5891 students were displaced in 2010 when another 33 providers closed (Knight 2011, p. 12). Students had often enrolled in these (questionable) institutions on the advice of migration agents. These students were relocated to other places or returned home, and many lost confidence in the quality of courses in Australia, particularly students who were displaced more than once (Knight 2011, p. 12). These issues continue in Australia, with the quality of many privatised vocational education courses contested in the education and training field.

The monitoring of the educational experience is intricately linked to the monitoring of visa compliance conditions. While breaches of visa conditions in Australia were not raised as an issue for any of the higher education students in our study, a legal advisory unit we consulted found that most compliance issues with Chinese international students related to the quality of their courses. Students in private colleges raised issues of compliance breaches, with some fearful of deportation for failing to meet course requirements. Some breaches reputedly resulted from private colleges deliberately not submitting the results of students who were unhappy with their course and wanted to change. The coordinator of the legal unit explained: 'So they're withholding their grades from the colleges, saying that they didn't attend, they haven't attended when

they have, wanting to change courses, 'cause they don't like it or they think it's no good and they want to go somewhere else and they don't let them' (INC303).

Other Chinese students were reported for working over the maximum number of hours and were in danger of deportation:

> Their employer or the college or whatever it may be have reported them for non-attendance or whether it's, as I said, working over their 20 hours a fortnight or whatever it is. … There are some where they may have appealed the process but it wasn't successful. So we've had a mix. So there have been a couple that have gone back [to China] but for the most part we've been able to assist. (INCG303)

Rather than seeing a clear differentiation between genuine student and migrant, the coordinator found that the typical university student and the typical student in the private colleges often differed in socioeconomic status. University students were more likely to receive financial support from their parents, and 'they don't have to work to support themselves, they don't have to worry about housing' (INC303). Although some international higher education students are supported by their families, many are not. A study of 200 international students enrolled in Australian higher education courses found that one-third required paid employment to support themselves as a student (Nyland et al. 2009). In our research, some of the Chinese students enrolled at private colleges required assistance with issues such as 'this person owes me money, or my stuff's been stolen and they live in a share house or live in a situation where there's six or seven other people in the home', or 'my visa has expired', or 'I'm not attending enough college so this course wrote me this letter, how do I respond to it?' (INC303). Sometimes they sought help with criminal matters that could jeopardise their visa status. Many of the participants' complaints were about the quality of courses in the private colleges, and the lack of processes to protect students' rights was evident. By the time the legal unit received information, the DIBP had often already initiated action on the matter and it was too late to provide help:

> Students will come to us and say, 'Look, they haven't submitted our results therefore we're going to get deported, or they're saying whatever.' But by that time the student's already gone through that whole process of immigration, having to deal with and we're sort of like the last port

> of call. So it's too late, so it sort of needs something in between that point and from the time that the student can actually put in a complaint to then being followed up there's nothing in place. (INCG303)

Marginson et al. (2010) emphasise that visa breaches are dealt with harshly; any breach of a student visa results in mandatory cancellation of the visa unless 'exceptional circumstances beyond the student's control can be taken into consideration' (2010, p. 246). Students' fear of deportation is borne out by the data, which shows an average of 8189 cancellations of international student visas per year over the 3 years from 2002 to 2005. Costly appeals led to one-third subsequently being overruled by the Migration Review Tribunal, Federal and High Courts (Marginson et al. 2010, p. 248). The severity of the consequences of breaches of students' visa conditions and the closely monitored compliance of study and part-time work conditions powerfully reinforced the message to students that their current visa could cease and that staying in the country was not encouraged by the Australian government.Many students who had decided during the course of their studies to pursue employment in Australia had completed the requirements in place at the time they commenced their studies, but most found that gaining another visa would be extremely difficult.

Processes Mediating Mobility Between Indonesia and Australia

Indonesian Migrants: Continuities and New Hopes

Indonesian temporary migrants in Australia are modest in number when compared to other key source countries. As Chap. 4 outlined, Indonesia and Australia not only have longstanding trade links, but they also have migration links going back to the nineteenth century. However, as with other migration movements to Australia from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act in 1901 (the White Australia Policy) meant that non-Anglo, non-white migrants were actively discriminated against in seeking entry and were deported if already in Australia. The socio-cultural legacies of such institutionalised racism have continued to the present day in social attitudes and forms of 'unofficial' discrimination, despite more than four decades of official multicultural policy introduced in the late 1960s. The effects of socio-cultural mediators of mobility are explored in detail in the following chapter. However, in the present chapter we consider the history of immigration and relations between countries as they relate to

the specificities of the migration brokers in migration decision-making and the various factors that facilitate journeys and settlement or return. Given the size of the Indonesian population and its geographic proximity to Australia, the relatively modest number of entrants across visa categories warrants attention. The qualitative data from this study includes some explanations for what are perceived as barriers to migration by Indonesian participants in Australia as well as those wishing to travel to Australia.

For those Indonesians who do manage to navigate the bureaucratic and practical routes to Australia, those who work to support them and advocate on their behalf recognise common patterns in the problems faced both prior to arrival and once settled. A rich example came from an Australia-based migration agent who reflected on a range of national groups and the differences between them in negotiating visa applications:

> I think there are a series of insights that one obtains from groups of individuals from particular countries which is not always devoid of some sort of weirdly racist underpinning in one's own analysis of what one sees and a good example is when we dealt historically with a lot of Russian clients. We found that Russian clients were quite often hostile to being told things which were not consistent with their interests and weirdly I came to the conclusion that a lot of our Russian clients were not dissimilar from American clients who also find it difficult to deal with reality when it's not what they want. Whereas clients from developing countries may have more of an accepting of, okay, that's the rules, I play the game according to those rules. So looking at that and thinking about the people we do work with, we work a lot with English clients, every migration agent works with English clients, because they're articulate and they're easy to get money from and their patterns of eligibility fit within the patterns that immigration officials have constructed. The further away you work from an Australian cultural stereotype, if you're talking, for example, East Asians, Chinese and Japanese have a variety of concerns which come up in the way we process their applications which often raise challenges for immigration. For example, the way Immigration insists on police clearances or identity issues, the actual nature of the documentation they need is different. And so when we deal, for example, with Tongans, because there are a large number of Tongans in the Tongan community in Sydney or if we deal with Indonesians, there are different issues again. Working

> with Indonesians quite often religion becomes important because although modern Indonesia was based in the principle of *Panchsheel*,[1] you do find that Christian Indonesians and Muslim Indonesians are in some ways different, in some ways the same in their outlook, but they're all unified by the fact that you need to have the same documentation. Chinese-Indonesians are another subgroup which are different again and require different documentation. I do think, in fact, that the Chinese-Indonesians are a very active group in Sydney. We do see a lot of Chinese-Indonesians as compared from the, what's the phrase, *pribumi* [sons of the land], is that right? (INDG303)

It is also notable that this migration agent had a long work history in various aspects of Australian and international migration management, having worked for government and intergovernmental organisations prior to working independently as a migration agent. Such a range of experience is of great value to the migrants who happen to engage the services of this migration agent. However, the privatisation and marketisation of migration advice no doubt leaves people open to the vagaries of chance in relation to the quality of advice given by individual agents.

Mediating Influences That Restrict Mobility

The well-developed Australian regulatory systems of border control and management as well as the knowledge and monetary resources needed for migration to Australia for work or study result in a series of barriers to the entry of many Indonesians (see Vasta reference in Chap. 1). As an Australian migration agent who works with Indonesian migrants said:

> Ultimately one of the biggest variables or constant difficulty, if you like, is the fact that the Department of Immigration stands as the gatekeeper and a large part of our work is understanding the department's received opinions, vulnerabilities, issues, concerns and manipulating those through the case officers who are appointed to do that work. So that is one degree removed from the clients. (INDG303)

Tourist visas and student visas are the most common types of visas among Indonesian entrants to Australia. Language and cultural barriers are significant in relation to accessing other visas, such as the Business Long Stay (457) Visa (these factors are explored in more detail in Chap. 9). The case study

1 *Panchsheel* is a term widely used in the Asian region that refers to five principles of peaceful coexistence often in reference to relations between nations.

interviews indicated that some young, well-qualified Indonesians preferred to find well-paid work opportunities in countries such as Singapore, where they felt more culturally at home, rather than attempting to migrate to Australia.

Family and networks of close contacts have perhaps the most significant role as brokers of and influences on migration decision-making for Indonesians. This is a predictable phenomenon given the importance of families and communities in a society that lacks the social welfare infrastructure and long tradition of independent institutions of law and governance that Australians largely take for granted. While family and other close networks facilitate migration through active encouragement and resources, they also often act as a barrier to mobility. Some of these barriers take the form of advice given on decision-making; migration hierarchies within families, often based on gender; and a lack of educational, knowledge and economic resources or supportive networks:

> Sometimes parents usually give you an option, here or here or here, and then the children will—if they have friends that have that experience, whether they studied overseas or not, they will ask what the city is like, what the lifestyle is like, what the university is like. That will be one of the ways. Like where girls, I think, would be advised to go to Melbourne because of the lifestyle, the shopping and everything. I haven't heard any girl in Indonesia that doesn't like Melbourne. (INDG210)

Mediating Factors That Encourage/Assist Migration

A number of factors have been identified through our research as supporting the mobility of Indonesians (though not necessarily only or primarily to Australia). Cultural institutions such as churches may play a role as mediators in decision-making in that the values they encourage include improvement through study, work and travel:

> There's a teaching in our religion that's called *Hijra* which means move from one place to a different place for a better condition. If someone wants to be successful, the person has to *Hijra*. Seek knowledge even if you have to come to China. This means that people are instructed to travel far away to seek for a better life and meaningful knowledge and skills or good education, don't just stay in their place but must *Hijra*. (INDG206)

Interestingly, lack of information did not emerge as a factor influencing mobility. Even though many people found it difficult, time consuming and expensive to gather information related to migration, it was nevertheless possible to obtain information, whether through official or unofficial sources.

Family is a key factor in decision-making, as reflected by a number of Indonesian interviewees in Indonesia:

> My family is really important for me. When I have to decide something I said to my mummy, I need suggestion from my friends. So family is really important, but I think our Indonesia, like, it is Indonesian style. Students—young students studying here are almost but not all—but almost they just ask their parents, but lots of things have—and their parents, this will be [*laughs*], they don't care, they just go and do what they want to do, just do it. (INDG204)

> Yeah, they can miss me. So this way, for example, if I already in Australia for study, so I complete my study, I want to—back to Indonesia for—with them. And they can happy, if I already in Australia, because it means it can make happy, our—my family, it can make them happy, my family. Because you know, so many people in Indonesia, it's really happy if they go to another country. I think it's same with my family. (INDG205)

Everyday life is more difficult with an official temporary status, yet many Indonesian migrants accept such limitations in the hope of a better future. Reflecting on Indonesians on student visas, a migration agent commented:

> The ones that come on student visas all want to stay, irrespective of where they're from. Once the family—like irrespective in the sense that Third World country source people are different to Americans or English, you might have different objectives, but Indonesians, as an example of Third World country source nationality, always hoping to stay and you have this complex interplay between dealing with the issues and going home and sometimes the issues are too difficult. Sometimes when somebody finds, for example, they can't quite pass the IELTS test, they're able to go home. In the clientele that I deal with, which is a small cross-section, whereas, for example, with Indians, that I deal with, it's much harder for those guys to go home, but I've got a couple of cases at the moment when Indonesian

> boys came to Australia, studied, and then when they found that the process was difficult or a hassle, or would be longwinded, they just went home whereas you never see Indians or Chinese go home. So, yeah, that's weird, isn't it?
>
> *Interviewer: Because do you think the circumstances are difficult for them to pass?*
>
> It might be that the boys—these two boys that I'm thinking of were wealthy enough to be able to think, well, I don't need to go to Australia. I don't know what it was 'cause we don't—I mean the relationship that you have with your clients in some ways is monumentally intimate and in some ways it's monumentally remote and in that particular example I'm thinking of these two boys in particular, they just went home, and we got letters from the department saying, 'Your visa is ready to be processed', and we sent them messages and no reply or, you know, not sure or we've got one bloke who's thinking about it at the moment and when he heard that he may have to come back for a couple of months, he thought he might get it in a week, 'Oh, I'm not sure I want to come back.' We're thinking about life-long right that you might have to live in Australia it's not that attractive and I don't know what that is, whereas I'd never see that with an Indian. (INDG303)

And further, in relation to temporary status, the same agent said:

> Well, that's always an issue and that affects lifestyle choices. Often clients accept temporary visas because it's all they've got and they won't complain about the temporary nature of it because they are aiming towards something else. Yeah, I know if you or I were subjected to a temporary visa thing—because we could always come back to Australia it would be okay. (INDG303)

Anecdotally, it also appears that some individuals travel on tourist visas and seek to regularise their stay after arrival. Some of these cases are detailed in Chap. 4. The Indonesian community and churches are key resources for advice, assistance with housing and other practicalities and are important socio-cultural networks for Indonesian migrants. The community leaders interviewed in this study discussed the liaison work they do—both official and unofficial—with workplaces, bureaucracies and other Australian institutions on behalf of migrants.

Australia is, ultimately, not a key destination for Indonesians who have become mobile as a result of the security drivers this research has iden-

tified. Rather, material and immaterial structures (border control, cost, administration and culture) are significant barriers. Even for middle-class and elite Indonesians, who have the cultural competencies, economic resources and networks to negotiate pathways to Australia, other post-industrial western states are often seen as more attractive.

Processes Mediating Mobility Between Samoa and Australia

The capacity of Samoan-born New Zealand citizens to enter Australia is largely dependent on special immigration arrangements operating between these two countries; however, the implications of entry via this relatively open pathway appear to be poorly understood by those who make the journey. Traditional cultural practices and beliefs also assist the realisation of migration plans for this group by supporting the capacity to maintain extended family ties across the diaspora.

Step Migration via New Zealand

Samoans who have acquired New Zealand citizenship are entitled to enter Australia at will on Special Category Visas (SCVs) under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement, as discussed in Chap. 5. In 2008–09, New Zealand citizens constituted 94 % of all arrivals of Samoan-born people in Australia (DIAC, personal communication). This startling statistic reflects the efficiency with which Australia blocks direct inward migration from the Pacific in other visa categories. These movements across the Tasman Sea by individuals with acquired New Zealand citizenship are viewed by the Australian government as a form of back-door entry that evades the country's stringent skills-based entry system.

During the 1980s, New Zealand experimented with visa-free entry from a range of Pacific Islands, but the trial was abandoned due to high levels of take-up (Lee 2009; Stahl and Appleyard 2007). Entry via a lottery-based annual quota system has continued, presenting a barrier to Australia's push for harmonised (and restrictive) policies across the Tasman (So'o 2004). However, New Zealand has gradually adopted a more Australian-style approach by increased targeting of skilled migrants and stipulations that applicants for Samoan Quota visas must have pre-arranged work placements (Stahl and Appleyard 2007). Take-up of these visas dropped to such a low level during the early 2000s that some criteria were relaxed and policies were introduced to assist potential applicants to find employment. Under ongoing pressure from Australia, New Zealand citizenship rules were tightened in 1982 and a

waiting period was mandated in 2001, sparking angry protests in both Samoa and New Zealand (So'o 2004).

While New Zealand immigration policies have been viewed by Australian governments as promoting unwanted mobility from the Pacific, the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions concluded that current policy settings—particularly the restrictions on acquiring New Zealand citizenship—appeared to be 'managing the risk of "back door" migration' to Australia (2012a, p. 157). However, ongoing economic disparity between the two countries continues to encourage westward mobility across the Tasman. In 2006, the number of New Zealand-born individuals living in Australia represented almost 10 % of the New Zealand population (480,000 people), whereas the 65,000 Australians living in New Zealand amounted to only 0.3 % of the Australian population (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a).

Recent research conducted by Immigration New Zealand on the retention and onward migration of immigrants to New Zealand between 1998 and 2011 found no evidence of large-scale or deliberately planned back-door entry to Australia. Rather, it was determined that the waiting period for New Zealand citizenship appeared to disrupt migrants' plans for onward migration, and it was considered far more likely that migration decisions were made in a step-by-step fashion (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2012). Furthermore, the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012a) noted that New Zealand citizens of Pacific origin tend to be more skilled than New Zealand-born emigrants and were less likely, on average, to move to Australia than were the New Zealand-born population. On the other hand, although one-third of New Zealanders were found to return home within 4 years, Samoan-born New Zealanders stood out as the group that spends the longest time away when they do make a move overseas (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 2012).

The Samoan-born participants in our study became aware of opportunities in Australia only after spending time in New Zealand: 'I didn't know much about Australia until I was learning from New Zealand … when they get there they think, "Well, there's more opportunity outside New Zealand"' (INSG110). As reported in Chap. 5, the families in our Samoan cohort continued to struggle economically after moving to New Zealand, which drove the next stage of migration, and some interviewees said that they would gladly return to New Zealand if their financial position allowed it: 'I wanted to go back. I just love New Zealand. … I

went and stayed for a year and we tried to make it work again, but with the way the economy is … it's just about 20 steps back from how we are living over here' (INSG302).

Contrary to the scenario commonly promulgated in Australia of back-door entry by unskilled people, we were told by a New Zealand government interviewee that Australian employers often poach skilled workers from the Pacific region as they are completing their trades training in New Zealand (INSG406). A former academic interviewed in Samoa confirmed that this trend was also emerging in Samoa, saying that 'a lot of our export are our people—trained people', a development that he associated with a globalising world (INSG203). Beneath the overall statistics showing the high numbers of New Zealand citizens crossing the Tasman for work, more nuanced and circular patterns are also discernible:

> So not only do you have people who are coming from Samoa to New Zealand and then New Zealand to Australia, you've also got Samoans that had studied in New Zealand, worked overseas, come back only to go back to Australia. So there's a fair bit of that happening. (INSG406)

Information About Conditions in Australia

New Zealand citizens continued to arrive in Australia in large numbers in the decade following the 2001 legislation that removed many entitlements from SCV holders (Kearney 2012). Lack of knowledge about the restrictions is often cited as the key reason for the failure of this policy to deter (see, for example, Access and Equity Inquiry Panel 2012). However, this view assumes that access to benefits is a major driver for this group. The Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012a) attributed the continuing arrivals to other factors, such as the higher wages available in Australia—a conclusion that is supported by our research—but also noted anecdotal evidence of very limited premigration knowledge about the social security limitations in Australia. For our Samoan-born research participants, stories promulgated through transnational kinship networks generated the perception of easy access to jobs, opportunities for higher earnings, and education for their children in Australia. The limited entitlements actually on offer did not appear to have been considered in migration decisions but did have significant implications after arrival:

> [My husband] was interviewed by Housing Commission, then they found out that he was not an Australian citizen. He couldn't even get it 'cause apparently—see I don't even know this—government jobs like that you have to be a citizen. It doesn't matter if you are a permanent resident or something. … So, yeah, so that fell through so then he just had to get any job … and he ended up just doing—driving truck—rubbish truck, you know. (INSG105)

An Immigration New Zealand employee who worked with Pacific communities in Auckland argued that failing to secure a job in Australia before moving there was 'a big mistake' made by many Samoans, and that a lack of regulation of trans-Tasman travel contributed to this information deficit:

> Australia, there's not that predeparture information is my impression. And there's also not really any active settlement process because they go on those very open Pacific Special Category Visas as New Zealand citizens. So I can understand them missing out on the information in that leg of the journey. But it seems like there's an attempt to inform people if they're coming from the islands to New Zealand. (INSG406)

Some of our Samoan-born research participants had transferred their jobs within a trans-Tasman company and had experienced a relatively easy transition as a result (INSG103, INSG111). However, for others, the understandings mediating trans-Tasman travel did not align with either the legal restrictions or economic challenges they would face in Australia: 'They know they have to work or they have to have some special skill to come across but some—a lot of them don't know that. They come across thinking: "Oh opportunities, opportunities, job, job, job" ' (INSG302).

Culturally Mediated Migrant Transnationalism

While the ability to gain entry to New Zealand is the main institutional mediator for onward mobility to Australia, transnational kinship networks and cultural understandings provide the social framework to support these movements among the Samoan-born cohort. A former academic interviewed in Samoa claimed that 'networks are an essential part of the Samoan persona' (INSG203). Macpherson and Macpherson (2009, p. 73) explain that kinship 'defines the matrix within which people, capital, ideas and technologies move between the nodes of "transnational

Samoa"', with the exchange of gifts, visits and participation in ceremony serving to maintain an 'active transnationalism'. True to this cultural blueprint, the Samoan-born participants in our study often described their own family networks in terms of continued, but purposive, mobility: 'They go back and forth every time. So probably twice a year, same thing with them. If money was good [in Samoa], they would just live there and wouldn't come back' (INSG302).

Samoan transnationalism is culturally mediated through the idea of *vä*, (see footnote 2 in Chap. 7), and through *malaga* (loosely translated as 'mobility'), which originated with mass visits from one village to another during times of famine and has now developed a transnational dimension that is well suited to a globalising age (Va'a 2006). Rather than loosening family ties, overseas connections in fact 'reproduce the power of Samoa as a place' (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b, p. 65). Samoan cultural understandings therefore provide frameworks through which individuals can negotiate their transnationalism: 'Irrespective of location, those who move are not perceived as "people of two worlds or people of no worlds" ... but as being simultaneously involved both *i'inei* (home, local) and *fafo* (overseas, abroad)' (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009a, p. 12). The opposing view has also been argued, namely that Pacific migrants may 'find it difficult to feel completely "at home" in any one place, which in turn can provoke identity crises and lead to an ongoing sense of being unsettled' (Lee 2009, p. 14).

The sense of having multiple homes came through clearly in our interviews: 'I mean, opportunities, everything is here. But then you're always thinking of the other countries. I'm more thinking of New Zealand more than Samoa. My parents are more thinking of Samoa because that's where they grew up and that's their life, their memories are there' (INSG302). For younger generations, Samoa was often just a place to visit: 'Like, I wouldn't be able to live there [*laughs*]. It's just too hot for my liking, but I love it and I know that's where my parents came from, and their parents came from' (INSG102). Against this background of transnational but still tightly knit families, some Samoans were beginning to forge less traditional types of networks within the diaspora: 'Not a lot live in Australia, so the friends that I have made, they are my family' (INSG102).

While the emotional toll on individuals of living transnational lives could be heavy, kinship networks appear to be the scaffolding on which Samoan transnationalism is built. One woman from a very large family recounted having two siblings in Samoa, three in Australia and the

remainder in New Zealand, with children often sent to stay with relatives in other countries (INSG111). Allegiances within a single family could become quite complex as a result: 'Yes, I got a really, really good family. … the eldest is born in New Zealand and the two middle ones is in Australia and the younger one in New Zealand' (INSG113). However, kinship networks did not always operate smoothly. One participant, after being sent to New Zealand at the age of 14 to live with an older brother who had previously been absent from her life and therefore was a stranger to her, decided to escape the 'awkward situation' by making a further move to Australia (INSG102).

Impact of Border Controls on the Maintenance of Transnational Links

The historical embrace of regional mobility within Samoan culture has been neatly encapsulated by the term 'border-irrelevance' (Lee 2009, p. 15). Hau'ofa has described historical mobility patterns as 'informal movement along ancient routes drawn in bloodlines invisible to the enforcers of the laws of confinement and regulated mobility' (1993a, p. 11, cited in Lee 2009). Under contemporary conditions, however, regional mobility takes place in a transnational social space that is heavily controlled by nation-states (Merla 2012). Among our Samoan-born cohort, SCV holders enjoyed unparalleled freedom of movement into Australia. However, this did not apply to their family members back home who did not hold New Zealand citizenship.

With permanent family reunion an impossibility for those without PR or Australian citizenship, we were told that older relatives living in Samoa sought to make extended visits to family members living abroad. However, Australia's strict and expensive visa system presents a significant barrier to their mobility, with sureties of between AUD 2000 and AUD 10,000 required to guarantee the visitor's return: 'It's sometimes heartbreaking. … They can't afford to pay all their money just to come to Australia for a visit just for two months or one month's holiday or just to visit the family function or a funeral' (INSG402). A young woman awaiting a spousal visa so that her husband could join her was said to have lost her job in the interim due to childcare problems: 'By the time he land here to look after the baby so the wife can go to work, the bank said, "Go, no more work"' (INSG402).

There was widespread awareness in the Samoan-born cohort that visa breaches by Samoan nationals could jeopardise future visits by other Samoans because of the role played by aggregate measures of 'immigration risk' in the allocation of visitor visas. Overstaying was widely

considered to be a 'shameful thing' because of the financial strain it could place on the host family and the implications for future access to Australia: 'There is not a lot of overstayers here, or if there are, I don't imagine a lot of people saying, "Yeah, that's fine, just keep on overstaying", because obviously it's taking a toll on everyone' (INSG101). According to the immigration liaison officers interviewed for this study, some Samoan expatriate community leaders had even instigated processes of self-policing as a result of these concerns about the collective impact of individual breaches:

> I've had community leaders approach us to say, 'Look, we want to do something about this issue. It's embarrassing for us to have so many people overstaying their visa.' … This particular group here actually requested if we could give them lists of names of people who were currently in the community without visas. And they wanted to go and encourage them to depart … which obviously we can't do. (INSG404)

SCV holders are relatively immune from the threat of deportation because of the lack of conditions placed on their stay. However, while this group is able to largely bypass official scrutiny at the time of entry, their protracted temporary status exposes them to ongoing forms of post-entry control. Criminal deportation was not explicitly identified as a human security concern by our Samoan-born research participants. However, youth offending did emerge as a significant problem, as reported in Chap. 5. The imprisonment rate for the Samoan-born adult population in Australia was 501 per 100,000 as of 30 June 2013, the second-highest rate for an identifiable group after Sudanese-born residents (ABS 2015). High imprisonment rates coupled with a lack of access to the protections of citizenship that could extend across generations leave this group particularly exposed to the threat of deportation, which confirms that the temporary nature of their visas is more than a mere technicality (Weber et al. 2013).

Considering the culturally mediated understandings of regional mobility outlined above, it is likely that criminal deportees will be doubly punished for their misdemeanours, since they may be subject to community opprobrium for failing to support the reputation and advancement of their *aiga* and may find themselves without the security of family support. As a result, some families made pre-emptive decisions to send young people at risk of offending back to their homeland in order to inculcate them in *fa'a-Samoa* before circumstances arose that could have led to their forced, and permanent, expulsion (INSG206).

Processes Mediating Mobility Between Tonga and Australia

Mediators at the Individual Level

As for Samoans, migrant transnationalism is a historical pattern for Tongans that predates European contact (Lee 2007). Ties established with other Pacific Island nations, notably Fiji and Samoa, have enabled short- and long-term migration and flows of goods, ideas and cultural practices between these nations (Lee 2007). However, the post-1960s era of transnationalism looks very different from the earlier transnational period, and migration to (and, importantly, remittances from) the USA, New Zealand and Australia is critical to maintaining livelihoods in Tonga. As such, transnational migration—both permanent and temporary—is culturally accepted and expected. This enables ease of mobility, including mobility within Tonga from one island to another in search of opportunities as well as increased accessibility to the Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Program (see Chap. 7). In considering mediators, however, the interviews revealed that despite the commitment to contribute to family savings, reduce debt and enable the purchase of land and housing—all noted as drivers in Chap. 7—the experience of temporary absence from the family for at least half of the year was not always experienced as a *benefit*. While there is an expectation of support and, arguably in a country such as Tonga, a dependence on remittances, this was not the complete story. Two other issues of concern arose: The first, resistance, points to individual mediators, and the second, resentment, points to community mediators.

First, interviews undertaken in Tonga revealed that the wives of men who had been a part of the SWP in Australia were opposed to their husbands returning to the scheme in future. As one participant acknowledged, 'Seven months is a long—that's a lot of time' (INTG204). We noted in Chap. 7 the gendered differences regarding the appeal of the work and the acceptance of absence from the family, with men identified as better able to take up the opportunities offered by the SWP and largely dismissive of the impact of their absence, but the interviews also pointed to some of the unrest associated with their absence. For a range of reasons, families may struggle with the absence of the father for long stretches of time, and tension may arise between the family's financial goals and the needs of the extended family and community, who often put pressure on the father to provide support. The interview process was not sufficient to clearly explain the impact of these concerns or the extent to which women who are unhappy with the absence are able to influence the decision for men not to go abroad.

However, an important point was raised, particularly in relation to factors that mediate temporary mobility of the sort that excludes family connection and reunification during the labour and migration period. In Chap. 6, the dismissal of some of the concerns of wives and families remaining at home was reported, but family needs and the decisions made within each family were clearly, as with any migration decision, influential not only in the choice to apply for the SWP but also to seek opportunities to return.

Mediators at the Community Level: Accessing the SWP

While the SWP, as a scheme established via a Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and Tonga, may arguably fit within the boundaries of an institutional mediator (as discussed below), because it is formalised and bureaucratic in relation to meeting the requirements to access a visa, it also clearly operates at a community level in relation to the selection of applicants.

Important elements of the scheme and its operation were raised during the course of the interviews in relation to access. While the Australian government provides guidelines pertaining to visa regulations (as described in regard to the Special Program Visa (Subclass 416) for the SWP; see DIAC 2015), and while it has been noted that countries such as Tonga have 'systems and protocols to facilitate the movement of workers' based on their longstanding relationship with the New Zealand Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme (see Ball et al. 2011, p. 4), the scheme's application and selection processes were described in ways that suggest that they are very much driven by community connections.

In one group interview a number of participants referred to the process of seeking employment on the scheme as being biased, explaining that decision-makers 'first … select family, then friends' (UNTG203). Indeed, another participant argued that the direct recruiting method should be reviewed because of what she saw as favouritism that disadvantaged the most deserving or suitable candidates (UNTG202). This was not an isolated report. Another participant explained his understanding of the process:

> I've got no idea in terms of how they're selected. I understand that it's something on a village basis and people register and then I don't know whether there's an interview or, maybe, the town officer have got a description as to who gets picked. … There's not a lot of rigour in terms of the process. [It's about] who I know and whether they're my fourth cousin twice removed. (INTG204)

The process of selection is thus largely, and arguably deliberately, ambiguous. As the Australian based participant quoted below explained, there is a formal process followed by Australian employers for requesting workers and a clear preference for those who have been on the scheme previously, but the specifics of what drives decision-making in Tonga about who will be put forward is managed in Tonga:

> Look, basically, where it starts is we'll have a request or someone will want some workers and we discuss a price and length of the time, and … everyone agrees on what they want and the requirements, we then make an application to DEEWR and say we want to recruit X amount of people from this nation and so then it just snowballs from there. … Once everything is sorted out with our government, then the request goes to, say, Tonga, and they will source out some people for us and then we deal with visas and the health checks, we coordinate that in conjunction with their government bodies over there. … I mean, it's all structured and done through the government, so through DEEWR and then their Ministry of Labour or equivalent, whatever it is over there. (INTG302)

It was explained that screening and selection in Tonga was a community-based process that differed in each place. On some islands, town officers and district officers were involved in the process, while in one community the group selection was managed by pastors and town officers (UNTG201, UNTG206). Importantly, one participant (UNTG206) pointed out that while the decision immediately impacts individuals it also impacts the whole community because everyone is hoping to benefit from that person going to work in Australia, and the level of expectation and pressure is even greater when only one or two people from a community are selected for the scheme.

It was reported that approximately 1000 people in Tonga wanted to join the scheme, but the opportunity to access the scheme only arises when new Australian employers join the SWP or when a return employee decides to cease their involvement. But even then selection tends to be biased towards family and friends rather than towards a 'work-ready pool' or a list or ranking of the most appropriately skilled applicants (UNTG201). It was also indicated that there is a preference for selecting from across different villages and islands within Tonga to ensure the spread of benefits (INTG201). For some, the desire to be a part of the scheme and the lack of direct access to any individuals involved in decision-making had resulted in internal mobility; one

interviewee had moved to the main island and another had moved away from the main island to a more remote location to attempt to increase their chances of successful selection. Yet, as the discussion above demonstrates, the process is a community-mediated one that is entrenched within local hierarchies and relationships, which the institutional formalities of visa selection do not override.

Mediators at the Institutional Level: The Operation of the SWP

The SWP enables individuals to migrate and work for a finite time during which much of the administrative burden is removed, in contrast to those who travel on working holiday visas, for example, who must find work and accommodation. SWP workers have employment conditions that are in accordance with Australian workplace standards, they are guaranteed a minimum of 30 h per week of work for at least 14 weeks (and up to 6 months), their return airfare is paid for in full, transport and accommodation are organised for them (but they are free to select their own if they prefer) and they have welfare and other supports in place during their time in Australia (Department of Employment 2014). In addition, this scheme is overseen by the Department of Employment to ensure that employers uphold their responsibilities to workers.

However, a range of issues were raised pertaining to the scheme's design and implementation that highlight the Australian-centric focus on labour at the cost of recognising the personhood of the Tongan (or other-nationality) labourer, with resultant impacts on experiences of mobility and how it is enabled or limited. The first issue pertained to the individualistic approach to mobility. While the scheme is designed to allow workers to come for a finite time to Australia, their mobility is very restricted, and their family members are not able to access visas in order to visit and support them while they work. As a consequence, many of the Tongan participants questioned the scheme's broader commitment to the welfare of its workers and their families (as evidenced by the pastoral care provision) as there is no recognition of the significant impact of such long absences on families and relationships. In short, there is no ease of mobility between Tonga and Australia for workers on the scheme.

A further issue that arose related to the management of workers, specifically the nature of the punishment of workers for non-compliance. Data on non-compliance among SWP workers is difficult to locate (for example, the review of the pilot scheme did not report on numbers of absconding or deported workers; TNS 2011). However, it was reported during the fieldwork that non-compliance most often related to fighting or drinking excessively. Participants reported that the consequence

of an individual or individuals being deported for not complying with the conditions of the SWP was that the whole island or area of Tonga from which they came would be banned from joining the scheme. One participant explained that this was a discipline and not a punishment, but this participant did highlight the impact of indiscretions not only on the individual but also on a whole community:

> It's more like a discipline … because—just like myself, if I'm from that community, if I'm doing [the scheme]—because I'm the ambassador for that community, if I do something that's very bad … [then we've] got to punish the whole community. … [And I think] that's fair. … [This only lasts for] one year, two years [of the scheme]. (INTG201)

He explained further that good behaviour was also rewarded: 'And if the—someone who's going the next turn, do the right job … there should be another two more people that [next time.] But [that is] depending [on availability of positions etc.]' (INTG201).

The research findings thus elucidate the institutional drivers that mediate mobility from Tonga to Australia. The broader national focus in Australia on economic prosperity and fulfilling labour demands is foremost. This is evident, for example, in the employer's ability to decide whether a worker is suitable for rehiring. There is no opportunity for workers to indicate that the work is not suitable for them and no provision for offers of alternative work if they prove inefficient or unsuitable to a task. The power remains with employers. That the scheme has no relationship to any long-term settlement options and that it provides no 'stepping stone to Australia' (INTG301) for long-term migration (as exists with other temporary schemes such as the 457 Business Long Term Visa) reflects the focus on gaining labour and maintaining that labour over a number of years according to the needs of employers (as discussed in Chap. 6 regarding the permanency of the SWP). Within the broader language describing the scheme and its contributions, the focus on employer needs is couched in commitments to further development in the region and upskill workers, but this focus remains a factor that contains and restrains mobility in very specific ways.

Conclusion: Processes That Mediate Mobility

Factors that mediate mobility operate primarily at the individual level and through both formal and informal institutions. Institutional mediators such as government policies, migration agents, families and communities

have the potential to facilitate or hinder mobility. Where institutional mediators were at odds with the mobility projects devised by individuals, this impacted on the autonomy of individual decision-making and experiences of everyday security.

Government Regulation and Border Control Policies

The control of state borders significantly shapes mobility processes by affecting migrant decision-making on destination countries and duration of stay and the migrants' experiences after arrival. Temporary status, and the emphasis on control over the individual that accompanies it, generally works to create forms of everyday insecurity in relation to legal status and other dimensions of human security.

Australia's costly and complex 'paper barriers' screen out many potential Indonesian immigrants, especially those unable to meet the stringent language requirements. As a result, both temporary and permanent migration from Indonesia to Australia occurs at a much lower rate than might be expected given the geopolitical proximity of the two nations. Chinese students are also required to satisfy rigorous language and financial criteria for entry and must meet the academic entry requirements of their targeted institution. In contrast, both Tongan seasonal workers and Samoan SCV holders are able to evade skills-based requirements on entry, but they are subject in very different ways to highly restrictive conditions after entry (discussed further below).

For the majority of research participants across all four case studies, Australia's stringent requirements for permanent entry present an insurmountable barrier. Seasonal workers from Tonga are the most temporary of our temporary migrant groups. This group was more concerned with accessing repeat visits through the SWP than embarking on an unrealistic quest to negotiate a more permanent legal status. For the Chinese students, hopes of extending their stay tended to arise only after they had spent some time in Australia. The highly prescriptive points system introduces pressures to make strategic decisions on the grounds of migration-related, rather than educational, objectives, and is known to encourage unscrupulous practices among education providers and their agents.

The Indonesian participants were prepared to accept temporary status in return for the prospect of a better life. However, coping with temporary status could become a strain, and those with relatively good prospects in Indonesia could afford to be ambivalent about the outcome of their stay in Australia. Migration agents reported less perseverance among this group in terms of efforts to obtain PR than among other national

groups, such as Indian or Chinese students. Of the four research groups, it was the Samoan-born SCV holders who had the strongest expectation of a long future in Australia. Perversely, they were far less likely than the Indonesian or Chinese groups to qualify for the secure legal status of PR, despite their open-ended entry into the country.

Border controls also mediated the security experiences of temporary migrants in the form of visa compliance monitoring. Tongans participating in the SWP were subject to stringent visa conditions over the fixed period of their employment as the scheme is predominantly aimed at meeting national labour market needs. While aspects of this regulation are advantageous to workers in securing good working conditions and relations with employers, the more restrictive provisions were found to limit personal freedom and hinder the maintenance of family relationships. In the rare cases of non-compliance that resulted in deportation, whole island communities could be impacted in terms of future access to the scheme. Our Samoan-born participants were invariably shocked to learn after arrival that, as SCV holders, they faced major restrictions in their access to jobs and services; these restrictions jeopardised their immediate security and, in some cases, the feasibility of their migration plans. Prolonged disadvantage then increased the risk of criminal offending and subsequent deportation, even after long periods of residence. In addition, both the Tongan and Samoan-born groups were hampered in their attempts at maintaining transnational contact with their families by barriers to accessing spousal and visitor visas.

While the Samoan-born SCV holders found themselves straddling the legal categories of temporary and permanent migrant, Chinese students had to negotiate a compliance system directed towards distinguishing genuine from non-genuine students. In practice, the boundary between these categories is a fluid one, with individual objectives in relation to study and access to the labour market often changing over time. While university students such as our research participants enjoy substantial parental support, for many struggling international students the threat of visa cancellation and deportation constitutes a considerable source of insecurity.

Migration Agents

The complexity of Australian migration management has created a demand for information that has, in turn, given rise to a burgeoning transnational industry. The prominence of paid migration agents at various stages in the mobility projects of the Chinese students and Indonesian

students and workers in our research reflects the approach to migration that has emerged alongside neoliberal forms of governance, whereby students become consumers and skills are a commodity to be traded in a global market. The education and migration agent industries have grown at a pace that has outstripped the development of regulatory frameworks past initial qualification requirements, and the services offered were experienced as varying significantly in terms of quality and integrity by the participants in all case studies. A lack of free legal advice for international students from China placed some students at risk and affected their capacity to remain in Australia after the completion of their studies.

Professional agents were also involved as mediators in the case of Tongan SWP workers, but they were focused on the procurement of labour for employers through the scheme rather than acting as legal advisors to prospective workers. The one agent encountered in our research was himself an expatriate Tongan who resided in the study area and provided a considerable amount of ad hoc support for the workers. However, as with the quality of service provided by education and migration agents, this kind of support was likely to be hit and miss. With respect to the Samoan group, the seemingly uncomplicated nature of the SCV scheme meant that paid advisors were completely absent from this context. However, this left SCV holders ill-informed about the legal restrictions they would face after entry to Australia.

Families and Close Networks

Families and networks of close contacts in countries of origin were highly influential in shaping mobility decisions and experiences. They could help to create transnational hubs of security through the provision of support and information, but they could also be adversely impacted by the experiences of their mobile relatives.

The Chinese parents in our study, most of whom had only one child, tended to be open to, or at least resigned to, the possibility that their child might live abroad after finishing his or her studies. Parents had to endure uncertainty over the future of their family life for the duration of their child's study abroad. Middle-class Indonesian families encountered in this study seemed also to be resigned to long absences of family members and often played a major role in mobility decisions through the construction of migration hierarchies within the family.

For Samoan and Tongan families, the mobility of family members affected a wide range of relationships. The SWP caters for individual workers through the provision of labour rights and basic welfare, but it

includes little regard for family members remaining behind in Tonga. A lack of travel rights during the course of employment led to relatively long periods of separation from spouses and children at home, which sometimes caused resentment within the family and had possible implications for future circular migration. The Samoan-born participants were generally living in Australia with members of their immediate or extended families, but step migration from New Zealand meant that families could become highly fragmented. As noted above, limited access to family reunion and visitor visas severely restricts the operation of these potentially supportive transnational networks.

Culture and Communities

Communities were found to be influential mediators of mobility, particularly among the Tongan and Samoan participants. The communal way of life of these groups and the structure of the mobility schemes that were open to them created space for communities to operate as mediators. While the selection of workers for entry to the SWP was mediated at the Australian end by paid agents who worked closely with employers, the selection process in Tonga was far more informal and ambiguous. Participants described the selection process as being driven by community connections, giving rise to allegations of favouritism. In the case of the Samoan-born participants, access to special Samoan Quota visas that provide the first step towards migration to Australia operates at the New Zealand end via a strict lottery system. However, it is quite likely that individuals are selectively channelled into the lottery in the first place, given the role that *matais* are known to play in decision-making.

Hubs of security can also be created through cultural understandings that promote mobility and assist in managing separation. The Islamic tradition of *Hijra* and the Samoan practice of *malaga* are examples of the former. Polynesian cultures also have sophisticated understandings about maintaining social connectedness across distance, framed by the idea of *vä*. These traditions constitute powerful cultural mediators of mobility through their evocation of a transnational space that is nevertheless integrated into systems of social support and cultural security.

Individual Agency and External Constraints

A primary challenge for potentially mobile individuals is successful navigation of the complex Australian visa system, with information a key resource. The Chinese and Indonesian groups had the individual capacity to navigate the bureaucratic information available online about eligibility

for educational and skills-based visas as well as the financial resources to engage the services of agents when required. For the Tongan and Samoan-born participants, although their pathways to entry were very different, families and communities were the main sources of information, and sometimes misinformation. Among the Tongans, the organised nature of the SWP alleviated the personal burden somewhat. However, workers could be highly dependent on communities at home and on employers in Australia for access to the scheme and support after arrival. The Samoan-born SCV holders appeared to exercise the most autonomy over their mobility decisions because they faced no barriers to entry. Yet this illusion of freedom was shattered when individuals realised the barriers they faced after arrival.

While all of the participants were affected to some degree in their choice of destination country by the visa options open to them, cultural and historical factors also influenced their choices. For the Indonesian workers, more culturally accepting locations within the Asia-Pacific region were often more appealing destinations than Australia. The Chinese students who had the resources and educational achievements to exercise choice were guided by the prestige of particular universities more than by visa requirements, although visa opportunities and restrictions were far more influential in regard to considering options for post-study employment. For historical reasons, the Samoan-born participants looked to New Zealand as their first point of entry to a developed economy and also found a degree of cultural acceptance there; for the Tongan seasonal workers, however, the chance of gaining higher earnings during short-term, structured visits made Australia the preferred choice.

The governmental, commercial and social institutions discussed in this chapter provide the framework within which individuals negotiate transnational spaces. While Australian immigration policies have facilitated the temporary mobility of our research participants, they have also ruled out migration for many others and created post-arrival circumstances that can produce insecurity and frustrate changing mobility plans. In each case, however, when mobility is enabled, terms of inclusion in the host society still need to be negotiated. We found many examples in our research data of mismatches between knowledge, aspirations and available legal avenues before and after arrival that affected the capacity of individuals to pursue their human security goals. In the next chapter we explore in more detail the processes of reception and inclusion that influence the security experiences of our mobile subjects after arrival in Australia.

9
Processes of Reception and Inclusion in Australia

In this chapter we focus on the themes that emerged from our interviews with mobile communities about their experiences after arrival in Australia, particularly processes of reception and inclusion. The findings are initially discussed within each of the case studies. The chapter concludes with an overview that identifies common themes and contrasts between the groups.

Experiences of Reception and Inclusion: Key Concepts

Feeling welcome in a society often takes time and depends on more than just the functional aspects of establishing life in a host society, such as securing accommodation and work and becoming familiar with the practical aspects of daily life. In focusing on the processes and experiences of reception and inclusion in a receiver society, the present chapter maps formal and informal settlement processes. These include both state-sanctioned and subaltern processes that create and recreate meaning and reciprocity. The Australian context is a multiethnic, multicultural society, built through high levels of immigration in the decades since the end of World War II. At the same time, the longer history of exclusion and segregation from the period of the White Australia Policy, previously discussed in this book, leaves traces in collective memory, in social attitudes and, arguably, in some institutional mortar.

As outlined in Chap. 1, migration scholars characterise the profoundly new aspects of human mobility empirically and offer innovative theoretical insights into the possibilities and hurdles facing individuals, nations and the international community. While the nation-state has suffered a crisis of legitimacy and loyalty in the face of transnational economic,

cultural and political activities, human migration is one area in which the nation-state has reasserted itself. Aside from war, the securitisation of transnational human migration is the one phenomenon that states regularly utilise, at times perniciously, to protect territory and assert rights and belonging through demarcations of ethnic, racial and cultural exclusion.

As the previous chapter indicated, international human rights norms require states to act in an even-handed way, including towards migrants in their territory. Literature on global justice and post-national citizenship suggests new ways of belonging and of ascribing rights that ought to include carrying bundles of rights across borders in recognition of the injustice of the 'fate of birth' (Carens 2010; Bauböck 2010, 2011; Shachar 2009). Scholars such as Ottonelli and Torresi (2012) evaluate temporariness not as an exceptional state of being but as integral to contemporary economic and political systems. From this perspective, the complexities surrounding migration flows must be accompanied not only by new systems of rights allocation and protections but also by renewed attention to forms of belonging.

The rich literature on the role of emotions has in recent years expanded to include migration studies (Svasek and Skribis 2007; Vukov 2003; Volpp 2013). Further, the concept of liminality as the spaces in between lived or imagined states of being captures the experience of many temporary migrants caught between official and unofficial forms of recognition and status in a society. The receiver society plays a key role in facilitating the reception and settlement of new migrants. As has been discussed in earlier chapters, Australia, as a classic country of immigration, has longstanding practices of recruiting immigrants, accompanied in the past four decades by official multicultural policies. However, the legacy of the White Australia Policy continues into the present in sociocultural terms in the attitudes and the subtle emotional responses to non-English-speaking, Asian and other non-white immigrants. The heated debates around terrorism, Islam and the arrival of asylum seekers by boat have also shaped attitudes and social norms towards immigrants (Hage 1998; Tabar et al. 2010), as has a sceptical turn by political leaders towards multicultural policies. In this context, an attitude of ambivalence may well be a common and even rational response on the part of temporary migrants (Kivisto and La Vecchi-Mikkola 2014).

Social trust is the glue that binds members of a society in reciprocal relations built over time and across generations (Misztal 2005). Beyond the performative, symbolic and formal aspects of membership in a society, trust is also a facilitating lubricant, part of the transmission

belt necessary to enable the intersecting, horizontal and vertical relations between people and the institutions, rules and cultural codes that serve them. Moreover, trust as a socially located phenomenon is configured, understood and interpreted in various ways by different societies and cultures, evolving over time to reflect the social transformations of particular societies. As with other aspects of social relations, though, trust is ephemeral, an intangible set of attitudes and attenuations that may congeal into a spatially and temporally specific and substantive form—a 'located' trust. But it is also a precious commodity that cannot be taken for granted, and once lost it is difficult to retrieve. I trust the (Australian) bus driver until such time as she drives recklessly and endangers her passengers, I trust the (Australian) baker to bake nutritious bread until such time as he bakes a poisonous loaf, I trust the (Australian) migration agent until such time as she gives me the wrong advice, and so on. Migrants entering such a specific and located space of social trust, a space likely to be embedded in cultural norms expressed in the vernacular, are entering a phase of adaptability. Importantly, migration literature, such as the burgeoning migrant transnationalism literature discussed in Chap. 1, has contributed to theorising migrant experience in the early stages of arrival in a new society as adaptation, as well as employing critical reflexivity to explicate the change and adaptation of the sedentary population made up of citizens and long-term residents. In other words, it is not only nor always the migrant who adapts to change (through mobility), but also the sedentary population (though it often resists change).

The availability of new technologies such as social media, Skype callingand mobile technologies means that geographic space has shrunk, allowing a greater mediation of the difficult processes of negotiating new cultural space and the making of place/home. Rather than the notion of diaspora communities living permanently in 'other lands' and establishing networks of communication and meaning with their country of origin, temporary and circular migrations require new conceptual tools and grammar to capture the modes of belonging that are creatively imagined and exercised in transnational border scapes, in subaltern as well as transversal ways. This project has revealed various forms of security discernible in the everyday reality of temporary migrants. In the uneven, lumpy manifestations of security and insecurity, migrants' actions, plans and even yearnings are hubs of security. These hubs pop up in unpredictable sites, nourished by circuits of everyday survival that link temporary migrants through ethnic and community networks. They are nourished also by the circulation of narratives about navigating

official and unofficial barriers, and they emerge and dissipate in the lives of mobile populations. Building on the domains of security outlined in Chap. 1 (cultural, legal, economic and physical), the notion of a 'hub' denotes the mobile and fluid interactions that occur in the lives of temporary migrants in encounters with material and immaterial barriers, challenges and forces. The materiality of such hubs of security is likely to be as temporary as the migrants they serve, emerging to sustain temporary mobile populations where other forms of official support are absent or inaccessible and dissipating as temporary status is left behind or another migration journey is undertaken.

Many societies are undergoing profound transformations that include new mobile populations of workers, students and family members that, by their mere presence, create a space of negotiation with the society they live in for short or long periods. Increasingly, mobile and temporary populations are one part of new futures. Their presence causes social change and transformation in the flows between the migrant and receiver society. How these processes occur and are negotiated is likely to be conditioned by the ways in which migrants are perceived socially, represented symbolically in the media and in other forms of communication, and embraced through formal and informal channels of reception and inclusion.

Processes of Reception and Inclusion Affecting Chinese Students

For the Chinese cohort, processes of reception and inclusion coalesced around personal and cultural insecurity often experienced through prejudice and ongoing cultural dislocation.

Language Problems

All of the international Chinese student interviewees reported difficulties with English. A number of parents and students said that this resulted from traditional and ineffective approaches to teaching English in China. A student from a northern province in China claimed that it is more difficult for students in the north to learn to speak English than for students in southern provinces because northern students have less contact with English speakers. While there may be regional differences, studies show that English competence is a major issue for international students not only from China but also from South-East Asia and East Asia more generally (Marginson 2011). A student claimed that oral communication was difficult for them

because they were taught entirely out of a textbook. An agent lamented the standard of teaching English in China, commenting that there was no sequential learning as part of children's schooling:

> I feel it is the same to young kids. They learn 'What is your name?' in childcare and they still learn 'What is your name?' in university; no any progress. They still learn English from the beginning after they learn it for ten years. It is really sad. Our Chinese has spent so much money and time, people and materials, but we still have not trained enough children. The reason is that what we did is useless. It is really sad. (INCG201)

Some students were disadvantaged when they arrived in Australia because they could not understand their university lectures. Everyday life skills were difficult to master without English competency, and even simple application processes for cards or forms were challenging. Rather than arriving as competent English speakers, these students expected to achieve such competency only after some months in the country. This expectation caused many parents to send their child to study overseas during their secondary schooling so that they would be fluent in English before commencing tertiary studies. Another factor that parents and students keenly considered was the chance of success in reaching the required standard in the IELTS exam to enable migration. Nonetheless, it was apparent that some students who had been in Australia for several years still struggled to gain a qualifying score in the IELTS. One parent organised homestay with an English-speaking proprietor to improve her daughter's English rather than allowing her to live with other Chinese students. The mother explained the personal trauma she had experienced as a result of sending her child overseas to Australia when she was not yet competent in speaking English.

> During the beginning when she left, I really felt my heart was seized. Oh, I really understand the meaning of 'heart seized'. I could not relieve, because she had many difficulties there. … Oh, my God, what should she do if she cannot understand? The agent said: 'Do not worry. She will be better.' I said: 'If you say so, I will wait with patience.' (INCG205)

Feelings of inadequacy in English restrained some students from participating in groups. However, a minister at an international church that encouraged the participation of international students in their activities

found that it was not only language skills that held these students back, but also cultural preferences and lack of confidence.

Prejudice and Racism

One student who was living in Melbourne proclaimed that there was no prejudice against people of Chinese heritage, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, a period he had read about during which Chinese people who grew up in Australia struggled with the question, 'Am I really Australian or I'm Chinese?' Other students disagreed with this assessment, although there was a general reticence to explicitly discuss racism. One student recounted how racism was experienced vicariously through reading about an incident in which Chinese students were targeted on the internet. The student did not think this was a common occurrence in Australia but nonetheless felt fearful and angry: 'I began to fear about this, maybe one month or two months after I arrived. I feel really sorry and angry about it' (INC114). Other students claimed that they were laughed at for their poor English when they first arrived in Australia. A community worker's experience was that international Chinese students were more willing to share experiences of racism in more confidential settings. The Chinese students we interviewed also openly expressed surprise that racism existed in Australia because they had believed it was 'a developed country' (INCG301). The community worker claimed that racist remarks were especially hurtful to Chinese people because of the cultural propensity to not express their thoughts openly:

> Which can be very hurtful especially back home, it's not a very verbal culture, you don't necessarily say it when you don't like someone and when you say it, that means it's already severe and they get it that way. They say it that means wow. Has a bigger impact, yes. Back home we are trying to if you don't like someone, just keep quiet so when you have to say it, that means you can't hold it anymore and that can be hurtful. But not done many, it's only a few cases. (INCG301)

Students experienced racism as cultural incompatibility demonstrated not by direct acts of hostility but rather through more covert comments relating to alien cultural values and forms of nationalism that seek to define who is and is not an Australian (Babacan and Babacan 2007). A community worker saw this kind of racial prejudice in the expectation placed on international Chinese students to acculturate and adopt the local drinking culture:

> They go, 'No, we do different things.' Then there's always the topic of alcohol as the connecting spectrum, if you drink and you like to drink you bond better. I know it's horrible to say that but in reality I find that those who do drink and go to these things integrate better because then you connect with an Aussie; they drink, you drink, you're a bit more relaxed. So a lot of students will say, 'But I don't drink.' So I'm not saying that you have to drink to integrate but it makes a big—a huge difference. Australia is a drinking country so everything is alcohol, everywhere you go is alcohol related. Even at the hairdressers now, you can have alcohol. So again, it's about educating students. (INCG302)

A female international Chinese student talked about the impact of cultural symbols that typified being Australian. She described posters on display in the student union depicting blonde females on water skis. She contrasted this with her experience of a general lack of social activities of interest to Chinese students. Meanwhile, concerns about racism were apparent from a parent in China who expressed a hope for change in government policies that discriminated against international students' access to work and permanent residency (PR) in Australia:

> Another issue is that Australia seems to have some discrimination about the employment for international students. Report this to government, please. Please make some more generous policies in this issue. Especially for new graduated students who are in working visa and have not get PR. I think the government should provide an environment to make them survive. You cannot just let them go away after such long study. (INCG204)

Racism and prejudice interacted to isolate and exclude the Chinese students, who often found it easier and less threatening to communicate with their co-national students. The students rarely reported contacting support agencies. However, a Salvation Army drop-in centre that offers services to all international students had over time built trust with a cohort of Chinese students who came together as a group to the centre.

Worldviews, Liminality and Openness to Cosmopolitanism

Almost every student to some extent manifested a global identification expressed as being a global scholar or exhibiting an everyday cosmopolitan outlook (Vertovec and Cohen 2002). This was most often expressed

as a quest to learn the language, experience the culture, and ultimately to understand through scholarship and work the socioeconomic underpinnings of the west. Constructions of the world as divided into east and west determined for parents the need to learn of the 'other'. They believed that in transiting these worlds, there would ultimately be benefits for their daughters and sons that would be well worth their financial commitments.

The international Chinese students and their parents envisioned this journey as a shift from an eastern worldview to a western worldview and believed that this transition was a necessary formative experience for adopting a cosmopolitan outlook. However, in contrast to the Chinese students' initial enthusiasm for studying abroad, their lived experiences in Melbourne were often disappointing. Many found the transitional liminal space to be profoundly isolating because they could not join networks of local Australian students: 'I have no one to talk to because I have no relatives here, no friends here, nothing' (INCG102). They were participants in an Australian way of life but had no feelings of *being* Australian. Their feelings and experiences of alterity did not match their expectations of a country that defined itself as being multicultural and had a long history of Chinese migration.

The students' responses were polarised: Some networked exclusively with other international Chinese students and others lived by themselves. They did not see themselves as having anything in common with Chinese-Australians and none sought them out except when prearranged as a contact via family in China. Nor did any of the Chinese-Australian NGOs in Melbourne provide any assistance or show any interest in the international students, as they were busy ensuring Chinese traditions were kept alive. Our research participants found Australian students to be disinterested in their cosmopolitan aspirations or experiences in China and to expect international students to participate in the dialogue of the local and the particular. A few students reflected on the paradox of the attraction of western culture and the anticlimax of a culture that appeared superficial, all about fun and lacking in historical depth and social complexity: 'They're extremely interested in having fun … so you have to be a fun person to integrate' (INCG102).

Nonetheless, the students in our Chinese cohort did not suggest that alienation was a reason for them to return to China; on the contrary, most harboured desires to stay in Australia or to study and work in the USA or other developed countries. Some students approached aloneness as a challenge to be overcome, which they saw as consistent with the cosmopolitan mindset (Vertovec and Cohen 2002). As the majority of the

Chinese students did not have siblings and they had already embarked on this study journey alone, some during their teenage years, independence was a resource upon which they had already drawn. One student embraced the challenge as something everyone should experience and overcome: 'It's a problem everyone should go through, no matter you are Chinese international student or you are a local students, you have to be on your feet one day, you know. So, I think just why don't you just conquer it now?' (INCG101).

Processes of Reception and Inclusion Affecting Indonesian Workers and Students

Indonesian Experiences in Australia and Imaginings from and About 'Home'

As was already explored in Chap. 4, the experiences of Indonesians in Australia and Indonesians seeking to travel and migrate to Australia are contradictory and fluid, as is the general context of reception and inclusion. Indonesian temporary migrants anticipate Australia as offering opportunities for work and educational advancement. Those who manage to navigate the complex Australian migration system and have financial and knowledge-related resources do benefit from the work and educational experiences they gather. Yet various factors that constitute *cultural* security appear to figure just as prominently, if not more prominently, in shaping feelings of ease and belonging or feelings and experiences of exclusion.

Several of the interviewees for the Indonesian case study indicated that return to Indonesia was a high priority once sufficient economic, educational or professional resources and achievements had been accumulated. Cultural difference, feelings of social isolation and exclusion, and incidents of racial or other forms of discrimination dominated the primary narratives expressing feelings of unease or dissonance with life in Australia. Later in the chapter, this dissonance is explored in relation to the concept of liminal spaces and ambivalence as an emotional response, both of which are aspects of the migrant experience, perhaps particularly so in temporary or irregular migration circumstances.

Cultural insecurity is reinforced first by insufficient English language skills, which proves in many cases to be a significant barrier for Indonesians to both entry to educational institutions and attainment of skilled visas such as Business Long Stay (457) Visa. Other barriers include racial and

other forms of discrimination, access to technologies that facilitate connections with home, social isolation and exclusion, loneliness, cultural differences and issues of belonging. The issue of trust is a coordinating concept that weaves through and across official sources of security/insecurity (police, immigration bureaucracy and other services such as healthcare and housing) as well as social sources of security/insecurity (neighbourhoods, communities, work, friends and church).

In terms of English language skills, new technologies are important to migrants in easing gaps in knowledge:

> He's got a word convertor in his phone where you convert English to Indonesian or whatever; vice versa. But yeah, I feel a lot better before than [at the] beginning I am in Australia; I can't speak nothing. People talk to me and I don't understand what they're talking. (INDG104)

Further, the use of technology-enabled social networking proved important not only for staying in touch with family in Indonesia and gaining social and emotional support, but also for sourcing information about Australian society, institutional access, jobs, accommodation and other issues related to everyday security:

> When I have a problem before—the example, finding a job, you can find the job … you have the—a connection with the, example, the community. The community they have the Facebook, and then they also do the same thing with the Indonesian Student Association. They post in the Facebook, the example … job, and something like that, the job. But the job is never give the opportunity for non-experienced people. (INDG109)

And the following excerpt conveys the perspective of an Indonesian living in Jakarta, who had left a remote village in pursuit of work and with hopes of migrating to Australia in the future:

> At first, we felt lonely and we really missed them a lot. But then we started to get used to this distance. The communication technology makes us closer. Because of the internet and the telephone, I feel as if they lived just next door. In fact, even if they didn't live overseas, say they lived in a neighbouring city, Bogor for instance and I live here in Rawamangun, still we couldn't meet every day nor every week. In the past, when I decided to leave my parent back home in the village to go to Jakarta, my parents could only send a letter when they were

> missing me and so could I because there was no telephone. But today, I can even see their faces, we can talk and face each other. That's why I don't really feel lonely now. (INDG201)

Those who have migrated to Australia provide their Indonesian family members, friends and extended networks with advice, contacts and rich descriptions of life in Australia, which become an integral part of the decision-making for future migrants. Official sources of information are at times not trusted. Rather, the reflections and advice of friends are taken more seriously:

> And then people, I say, oh, no, it's so difficult for going to Aussie now. You cannot because Indonesia, people in Australia can go out from Australia, say like that. And then, and Malaysia are impossible. Impossible. I will not. Yes, sometimes I show from the brochure, if you want to study in Aussies, so easy. You can just only take the money but there's two months, like. Yeah. Experience on my—I take information from youth, from my friend, and everything I can share in internet, like this. But I'm only believe to my friend, because they have stayed in Aussie, in UK and everything, and they can get the information, like the true information. Yeah. I don't reason about this one told, this one, this one said this one; I do not believe. (INDG209)

These views were reiterated and expanded upon by another interviewee in Indonesia wishing to migrate to Australia, who spoke of her expectations of life in Australia based on information gathered from Indonesian friends and family:

> If I go to Australia for study, probably the very first thing that I would like to search for is how I'm going to live there, and I will search the information on the internet, learning about some explaining about Australia and how they lived there and that's all I can do.
>
> Maybe I can go to a site on the internet that offers me that kind of information, probably they have a list of people that let us rent a place or a room and try to contact them by email or the most easiest thing is just to contact Indonesian friends. Usually in a country there is a lot of Indonesian people, for example, and they are gathered in one community …
>
> Yeah, or in an Indonesian community, so I can just contact them or just contact … who's studied at university to provide me that infor-

> mation. Yeah, probably because she asked me to make her a blog, an online blog, so she shared about what she has written so far and I think I can read from her writings that she has gained a lot of experiences and these things really surprised me because how she writes is just very different from what she wrote in the past, and especially about the content. (INDG213)

Economic circumstances also play a role in the level of involvement possible in Australian society and various cultural activities, many of which involve economic resources. Due to the high level of commitment among Indonesian migrants to sending remittances to family members in Indonesia, subsistence in Australia is often quite basic. Once necessary payments such as housing, food and other essentials are made, the balance may well be sent to family.

While the Indonesian community and religious networks in Australia are a key resource for new migrants, other networks that provide support far beyond the initial period of arrival and settlement are also important for easing cultural and social integration. These networks include friends, work colleagues, flatmates and those met through other more arbitrary encounters. Indonesian community, friendship and extended family networks are the major sources of support for temporary Indonesian migrants in Australia.

Forms of social exclusion, mistrust and direct discrimination were commonly reported by Indonesian migrants. Some feelings of non-belonging may result from cultural difference rather than from overt actions of exclusion by agencies of the state or in social interactions, as one participant described:

> Yeah, for me it's, maybe, they call it like soft culture, maybe. I don't know what they call it. But for me, it's—I don't feel really happy, life in Australia, living in Australia, because I think people in Australia they are too individual, I mean, they're not social, they …
>
> Yes. In Indonesia I know some of my friend, Australian, like come here, they are friendly, but it's not like what I expect here. Sometime they, I don't know, maybe it's the culture, I think. I don't blame them. I think it's the culture. (INDG103)

However, some narratives indicated more subtle forms of cultural difference that were not experienced as forms of inequality or exclusion but rather as part of the intricacies of everyday life. Even for those who

gained permanent residency, attaining feelings of acceptance could take a long time:

> It's just maybe like try to be—what we said—try to be friendly. … And then trying to be close. … Maybe for first, it's hard, right?
>
> *Interviewer: So your friends have found that it takes some time?*
>
> Yeah. … Because not even my friends—even my uncle too. … He got permanent resident already, like one or two years ago. And then he worked in a restaurant cook in Albury. And only him, I think, is Asian. But the status is same, like permanent resident have to present.
>
> Yeah. But still, he sometimes he got bullied, he got harassment, and then he got—I forget another word. It's like I'm not doing this, but someone tells to the manager I do this. What we call?
>
> *Interviewer: They dob them in?*
>
> Yeah, something like that. Yeah, something like that. It's because he is Asian.
>
> Well, but he's still working there. He needs money [*laughs*]. (INDG102)

Some interviewees were reluctant to identify direct forms of discrimination, or they were ambivalent about naming their experiences as such, rather preferring more open-ended, amorphous descriptions such as cultural difference.

Interestingly, some participants also spoke of a reciprocal responsibility for the processes of inclusion and belonging, asserting that migrants ought to display a willingness to adapt to a host society and culture:

> And that's what my opinion is—just I don't say that, go back to your country, and things like that. But I think they should be given a chance to live here, to know—the only thing is just—it's very difficult because they came here, obviously their education is very low, their English is not really good, and to set themselves up like that is very difficult. I mean, I got—in one thing I got really cranky with these people, because they're not willing, how to become this culture, the Australian culture. They hold in to themselves. And that is my opinion. Because if we give the chance for them, I like them to be Australian as well, to know what
>
> *Interviewer: So it's like a two-way process?*
>
> Yeah, two-way process. But I think it's going to take time for them to understand that, too. Like, they need education, and need thinking. Yeah. (INDG301)

Social trust is a lubricant necessary for complex and highly differentiated societies to function. Yet in the context of temporary migration, generalised trust—of institutions and their agents, of due process and rule of law—may well take some time to be established. It can be anticipated that face to face relations and reliance on ethnic community networks are favoured by new migrants. The Indonesian participants in this study reported high levels of interaction with Indonesian community members and religious institutions for the purpose of receiving advice and assistance in the early stages of their settlement in Australia:

> When I have a problem before—the example, finding a job, you can't find the job you have a connection with the community. The community they have the Facebook, and then they also do the same thing with the Indonesian Student Association. They post in the Facebook, the example, a job. (INDG109)

Migrant Adaptive Capacities: Emotions, Liminality and Ambivalence

As detailed in Chap. 4, the Indonesian participants in Australia displayed an ambivalent attitude as a way of coping with feelings of dislocation, loneliness and cultural insecurity. One interviewee, an Indonesian student on a temporary visa, reflected on how belonging is experienced in the Australian context:

> Sometimes when I go to the local students, they are sort of like—they look at me weird. So I'm like, I'm not—I [don't] belong with them. … The worst part was when I was in uni actually, because yeah, it was really hard for me. Because—first because of the language barrier, right, and then second, because I didn't get the chance to talk much with my colleagues, with my friends at uni. So, because they studied in groups, so I'm, sort of like … an outsider. (INDG107)

An Indonesian-Australian, now a permanent resident for many years, who had taken an extremely difficult road to achieving that status (spending some time in immigration detention after a temporary visa had expired and subsequently spending vast economic resources to secure permanent residency for himself and his family) commented: 'Probably we feel—half-Australian against full. … Yes, hybrid, yeah. I can't say if I'm Australian or not because—yeah, I still—identity, probably just kind of in the middle for me' (INDG101).

As with social trust, the ambivalence displayed by temporary migrants is itself an unpredictable, fluid process that responds to and engages with signals from the state as well as signals in everyday interactions in the social world. In the social engagements of everyday life, the delineations and categorisations so desired by the control-focused state are not obvious or even necessarily important. For example, a number of Indonesian participants noted the multi-ethnic, multicultural make-up of Australian society and felt that being of Asian appearance was unproblematic and not likely to be a source of exclusion (INDG102, INDG104, INDG105). In contrast, the distinction of religious affiliation, particularly Islam, was noted as a source of discrimination.

Similarly, participants were nuanced in their recognition of the sources of discrimination. For example, a level of distrust of immigration officials was reported; however, this was clarified as not relating to the wider Australian society: 'I don't trust them [immigration] because the way they treat me but I [am not] judgemental—of a whole people. I'm sure there are a lot of nice people' (INDG105).

Processes of Reception and Inclusion Affecting Samoan-Born SCV Holders

The restricted entitlements introduced in 2001 for Special Category Visa (SCV) holders have produced structural discrimination and transgenerational disadvantage for Samoan-born New Zealanders living in Australia. Samoans are adapting to transnationalism by extending the reach of traditional social structures, while the less traditionally minded appear to be embracing aspects of western individualism.

Structural Discrimination as Policy

On 30 June 2011, there were around 240,000 New Zealand citizens in Australia who had arrived after the 2001 watershed (when SCV holders were required to obtain PR in order to access certain benefits; see Chap. 5). It was estimated that 40–60 % of them might qualify for PR on the basis of their job skills (Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions 2012a). The remaining 100,000 or more SCV holders were entitled to live and work in Australia indefinitely, but without access to many important services and benefits (see Chap. 5). Discrimination and long-term social problems arising from denial of essential services were noted in many submissions to the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012b, p. 31), as in the following statement from the Australian Multicultural Council:

> The emergence in Australia of an economically disadvantaged group, which also identifies as socially marginalised, appears not to have been considered or addressed. The fact that a number of these individuals are of Maori, Samoan, Tahitian or other Pacific Islander heritage can contribute to a sense of exclusion based on cultural identity.

Vasta (2004, p. 210) has similarly characterised Pacific Islanders living in Australia as 'a group which has been marginalised from the necessary resources for social integration and inclusion' and must continually 'prove they are "deserving citizens"'.

Our research revealed strains created by excessive reliance on family members and uncovered considerable concern about lack of access to entitlements, particularly university study: 'I don't want my kids to know I spend all this time suffering from this time and by the end of the day I see them working in a factory' (INSG112). Because of these systemic restrictions, one submission to the Access and Equity Inquiry argued that the Australian government was 'creating an underclass of people unable to access pathways to better their lives' (Vicky Va'a, Chairperson of PINN Gold Coast, personal communication). Other commentators have also linked criminal offending and the concomitant risk of deportation to transgenerational disadvantage mandated by government policy:

> It is hardly surprising to hear reports of spiralling youth crime amongst Maori and Pacific Islanders given that many of them are effectively denied access to higher education. Unemployable and with no social security support, it is little wonder that these young people turn to crime. In this light, the unequal treatment could be viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy. (Faulkner 2013, p. 31)

These impediments significantly undermine the prospects for a better future among this group of technically temporary migrants who have committed to making their lives in Australia:

> The reason we come here, we had hopes of having better life. … We want to live in Australia and have Australia as our home, yeah, and serve Australia as best as we can … so we will try our best to live as how Australian people live. … But the government and immigration were putting their policies harder so it's really hard for us. (INSG103)

Nakhid (2009, p. 226) has noted that services are often denied by governments to 'persons defined as transnationals' since they are regarded

as 'de facto citizens of more than one nation-state rather than de jure citizens of the one in which they reside'. However, it has been suggested that legal categories are not central to the Samoan outlook: 'Such a division as non-citizens versus citizens is artificial because Pacific Islander groups don't organise themselves like that' (submission to the Access and Equity Inquiry by the Pacific Islands Reference Group Inc., personal communication). But for most of our research participants, gaining citizenship stood out as the only solution to the barriers they faced: 'It's a bit uncertain of where we stand or what we might be able to be entitled to … that's why I seriously have to look at citizenship' (INSG105); 'We need to get Australian citizenship too, that's the only main reason we want to, because we're going to be here forever' (INSG106).

The research therefore revealed a serious misalignment between the subordinate legal status assigned to unprotected SCV holders and the long-term aspirations and needs of the people concerned. Unlike the intentional 'temporary migration projects' discussed in Chap. 5 (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012), participants in the Samoan case study did not knowingly sacrifice certain of their rights in return for short-term economic gain. Instead, in return for uncertain economic gains many of them faced an unexpected loss of social, cultural and legal security that could be experienced across generations. The impact for some participants was to feel that they were 'here only on the surface' (INSG105).

Systemic Discrimination and Prejudice

The Samoan participants also reported systemic discrimination that could be attributed indirectly to migration control policies. One interviewee said that she had experienced discrimination 'not so much because of my culture but definitely because of my status, because I'm not a permanent resident' (INSG102). Although New Zealand citizens have an unfettered right to work in Australia, employers may still favour applicants who hold permanent residency or citizenship. Even state government departments have reportedly refused to take on New Zealanders in some roles, solely on the basis of their immigration status (Faulkner 2013, p. 32).

The participants also reported experiences of overt prejudice such as being told 'You are just a typical Islander' (INSG102), 'Why don't you go back to your island' (INSG106), and 'You people [should] go back where you come from' (INSG108). This hostility was not confined to encounters with other members of the public. One interviewee who had been detected on a train without a ticket soon after arriving in Australia was shocked when the police officer who had driven him home called him a

'black bastard' (INSG114). Racism and intolerance were also frequently encountered in schools and sporting settings: 'There's a lot of people they're so racist at school at the moment. Very bullying, the kids are bullying each other and they call each other stuff' (INSG111).

One participant believed that Samoans could reinforce negative stereotypes by overemphasising their own culture: 'Don't try and use your culture because when something bad goes wrong, people reflect on your culture and that's not your culture, that was you and you alone' (INSG102). A government liaison officer believed that there needed to be education in both directions: 'It needs to be a coordinated effort from government and NGOs to educate communities alike, that they shouldn't be stereotyping any particular community and also at the same time educating people from my own Pacific communities to understand the perception from other communities, especially when they hang around together' (INSG401).

Lack of Information, Language and Settlement Support

English language skills were a critical factor for this group in negotiating cultural inclusion. However, SCV holders in Australia do not have access to English language support services since New Zealand citizens are presumed to be proficient in English (submission to Access and Equity Inquiry by Pacific Islands Reference Group Inc., personal communication). The participants said that they received far more cultural support in New Zealand, both formally and informally, because of a more culturally homogeneous environment: 'They don't speak English properly so they can't find a job. It's hard for them because here in Australia it's got different nationalities, not like in New Zealand' (INSG111).

A lack of confidence or know-how also created barriers to seeking help: 'Not knowing, being afraid to ask. It might be labelled stigma as being stupid or being, "Oh my gosh, I can't believe you've been in Australia [but] you still don't know where to go"' (INSG303). A submission to the Access and Equity Inquiry noted that even longstanding residents 'can still face difficulty in accessing services because of language barriers, feelings of shame and inadequacy in requesting assistance and help' (Pacific Islands Reference Group, personal communication). One community worker said that Samoans are culturally disinclined to assert individual rights, and many will only make enquiries or access services if they know there is 'a Samoan there that understands' (INSG303).

Immigration liaison officers interviewed for this study, whose job descriptions involve working with both African and Pacific Island

communities, reported that the vast majority of their time was spent with African groups who are perceived by them to be more needy (INSG404). Pacific Islanders were said to find support within their own communities and were considered to have sufficient English language skills and support networks to negotiate the immigration and welfare systems:

> And so, really, there shouldn't be a lack of knowledge, I don't think, in particularly the Pacific communities. I know that we talk to them about going to see your Migrant Resource Centres all the time … for the meeting I had with one group, they were pretty much requesting that the department provide that one-on-one free migration advice/counselling for individuals, which we can't—I mean we wouldn't. (INSG404)

But members of Samoan-born communities did expect the immigration authorities to provide this advice: 'There are people out there who are still struggling to get their visas … they actually want information from immigration, rather than from migration agents or anything like that' (INSG301). General community advice sessions about pathways to PR and citizenship were thought to be of limited value to Samoan-born New Zealanders, who were unlikely to meet the criteria. Moreover, immigration liaison officers saw it as no part of their role to give advice about eligibility for government services, which was the responsibility of individual service providers (INSG404). Consequently, confusion was rife: 'They end up homeless because Housing was tell them, "You're not entitled for housing." And they're not entitled for payment in Centrelink or something. I'm not sure if they're telling me the truth or not' (INSG402).

Community leaders often saw access to comprehensive settlement services as the answer: 'They really find it difficult to settle … I really see that as a need; a settlement [scheme] for the Samoan community' (INSG301). Another interviewee lamented: 'There's no such things unless they themselves personally seek the service or they have somebody who knows about what services are there and lead them toward that' (INSG403). A lone settlement officer, who had previously been employed to work with Samoans, had long since been defunded. In New Zealand, the cultural preference for reliance on church and community among Pacific Islanders was well understood by the authorities, but this was interpreted as increasing the need for formal settlement services rather than diminishing it:

> So traditionally when Pacific people come to New Zealand, they'll come and stay with family first and that's always been their number one source of information. But sometimes families provide information that's out of date or sometimes not quite accurate. … And even the sort of information that goes to people from churches might not be correct all the time and, again, out of date. (INSG406)

Cultural Adaptation and Personal Identity

Samoan-born people living in Australia are forced to navigate between their collectivist Samoan identity and the demands of a competitive and individualistic society. Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009b, p. 66) describes this as the 'balancing act of being Samoan'. At the same time, Va'a (2006, p. 113) notes that the Samoan communities abroad 'are more Samoan than those in Samoa' in terms of participation in church and ceremonial activities. Diaspora communities have therefore sought to adapt to the circumstances of transnationalism and globalisation by finding 'Samoan solutions to new social, economic and political realities' (Macpherson and Macpherson 2009, p. 87). In the face of mobility, Samoan cultural institutions have expanded into transnational spaces, notably through conferment of *matai* titles to those living abroad (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b, p. 60). Macpherson and Macpherson (2009) argue that this has maintained the preference for reliance on family among populations living abroad while reducing the need to return to Samoa for ceremonies.

Cultural commentators hold different views about the extent to which the proliferation of Samoan churches in the diaspora supports or subverts Samoan tradition. Nakhid (2009, p. 226) argues that 'church communities for Pacific transnationals, though not an exact replication of a village, provide the space and place where Samoan customs are enacted and their values reinforced'. The participants in our research claimed that non-attenders were viewed as 'black sheep' (INSG303), and some believed that church demands on their time and resources were well rewarded: 'Whatever they got, they give to the priest. That's why I go up there. And the priest like me—that I do all the work for him around the house, cook the thing, after school. Then they teach me from there—from the church' (INSG109).

On the other hand, Macpherson and Macpherson (2009, p. 85) contend that the growth of new religious denominations, such as the Mormons and Seventh Day Adventists, is promoting a decline in

fa'a-Samoa because followers are encouraged to focus on supporting the church and their immediate families. In light of this, Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009b, p. 62) proposes that the transnationalisation of the *matai* system may serve as a culture-preserving counterweight to the increasing authority of religious leaders whose influence within the diaspora is 'becoming quite hegemonic'. However, one research participant—a non-Samoan—believed that the *matai* system was also becoming corrupt: 'You have to pay for the titles now … I think there's definitely a financial motivation behind this. … And all of the *matais* don't contribute to the community equally I don't think, because there's all these absentee ones' (INSG202).

Whatever the outcome may be, these cultural changes are subverting the established relationship between 'here' and 'there', so that '[p]laces of the "periphery" including Auckland, Los Angeles and Sydney are increasingly becoming "cores"' (Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009b, p. 67). Nakhid (2009, p. 223) interprets these trends as signalling a diminishing commitment to *fa'a-Samoa* among overseas-born Samoans as diaspora populations become more self-sufficient, with information being shared in reciprocal exchanges between earlier and later arrivals. This process of 'intra-diasporic transnationalism' enables transnational ties to be maintained even if links to the homeland begin to diminish (Lee 2009, p. 17). Some community leaders saw signs of an emerging 'pan-Pacific' solidarity that could be a variant of this trend: 'I notice with the younger generation, it's changing. It's about being inclusive of other ethnic groups … it's about holding festivals and things that include the Pacific community' (INSG301).

Both physical mobility and cultural fluidity pose challenges for the forging of secure personal identities. Lilomaiava-Doktor (2009a, p. 7) argues that transnational Samoans 'remain firmly rooted in their identification with their place of origin'. This personal strategy was evident for at least one research participant, who dreamed of returning to life on the family plantation in Samoa now that her children were grown (UNSG101). Nevertheless, other participants appeared able to maintain flexible, transnational identities: 'If I go island or Tonga whatever, I'm from Samoa. … If I'm going to Europe, like America, I'm from Aussie' (INSG109); 'I would say I'm a Samoan New Zealand at the moment. … But I want to—as soon as I get an Australian citizen I will say I'm a Samoan-Australian' (INSG110); 'But if I can get a citizenship, I love to say Australia straight away' (INSG107). For others, being settled in

Australia was enough to confer a new sense of identity: 'At the moment, I feel more Australian than Samoan, yes. … I think 'cause I live here and I got everything 'cause of here. I think that's why I feel that way' (INSG113).

The situation becomes more complex for generations born or raised within the diaspora. One parent noted: 'If he says, "Dad, I'm an Australian, I'm not a Samoan" I've got nothing wrong with it. But it's different because I was born in Samoa' (INSG110). Other parents were more apprehensive about transgenerational change: 'My kids [have been] raised up by the Samoan culture but I'm worried for them to grow up and change' (INSG107). Another woman equated the loss of respect for elders among young people with a loss of culture (INSG105).

There were also signs from our interview data that the more educated Samoan parents in particular were seeking to equip their children to be successful in an individualistic and globalised world: 'My kids are really good though, they are different because of my background and my husband, and they will survive anywhere they go because we have taught them' (INSG105). One community leader explained that a new generation of Samoan-born parents was trying to raise their children differently: 'We don't want that structure, you know. … Because that's the other reason why I moved from the islands, because I didn't want to stay in the kitchen' (INSG303).

Processes of Reception and Inclusion Affecting Tongan Seasonal Workers

Community Inclusion and Points of Tension

The presence of a permanent resident population of Tongans in Robinvale and the arrival of between 30 and 40 workers annually from Tonga as part of the Seasonal Worker Program raise questions of inclusion that are distinct from those that arise for our other categories of temporary workers. Both groups come with and become connected to an immediate network, as discussed in Chap. 6. What is also unique for the Tongan case study—in addition to this ready-made network of co-workers and the Tongan diaspora in the town of Robinvale—is this community's location in a regional setting. Broader community inclusion is a reflection not only of the permanent Tongan population in the area, but also of local awareness and acceptance of seasonal Pacific Islander workers. There were reports of active efforts to enable inclusion. For example, one employer explained how he was able to alert the local community of the imminent arrival of a large

cohort of temporary workers to ensure that the community was prepared for this change in their local population:

> You always let the police know they're going to be in the area. We let the doctor's surgery [know] too, because this is not the … big city. So you do your rounds and you say, 'Look, if you're going find all these guys wandering around and they might be a bit lost or something, or you're wondering who they are and what they are, and we're going to have'—particularly if it's a big group, so you let your community people know so … it has been noted, it's been brought to their attention. (INTG302)

This statement was unique in evidencing how potential prejudice could be proactively reduced and how inclusion of this transnational community, who become a part of the local community for up to half the year, could be maximised. Generally it was noted by the participants that the local community, including the local Tongan population, were welcoming and engaged positively with the workers:

> Generally they're warmly welcomed and very much a part of our community. There's a lot of different Tongan churches here, and the harvest workers come in, and they rotate around the Tongan community. So they participate in each of the fellowship groups that meet. Yes, there's quite a deal of harmony between them, and they see the need for this kind of work, because there's a need for extra labour in short-term, over the harvest with the almonds and the grapes and so on. (INTG305)

As discussed in Chap. 6, reports regarding community interaction varied, but the experience of both the local, permanent Tongan community and the SWP worker temporary population generally pointed to patterns of community inclusion: 'So they'll all go and have a little concert or something, and if there's something happening somewhere, they'll participate … they integrate into the community as much as they can' (INTG302).

One important factor driving integration in Robinvale has been the presence of a Tongan-born Australian employer (AE) who has long enabled circular and permanent mobility to Australia from Tonga by providing work opportunities. This AE's work has enabled some Tongans

to settle permanently in Australia and has led to Tongans constituting the majority of those sought out for seasonal work, including as part of the SWP. More broadly, however, it was noted that there had been a considerable shift in community attitudes, including among growers, away from prejudice to a more inclusive and respectful outlook towards all nationalities of migrant workers:

> I mean going back 15 years, you would have every grower nearly in this area saying, 'I'm not having bloody Chinese on my property.' Like they might have been Vietnamese but they were all Chinese. They didn't know Chinese from Vietnamese from Cambodian. Anyway, not only are they on their properties now, they are going on holidays with them. They are eating with them and that's how true integration works. (INTG308)

However, while the interview discussions primarily focused on positive interactions, points of tension were raised, primarily by non-Tongan participants who worked as AEs or with NGOs in the area. As discussed in Chap. 6, the extent of community disharmony was reported differentially, and it was largely said to be a historical rather than a current issue of concern. However, there was some indication of community tensions based on resentments regarding work, upon which a number of participants touched:

> The local [Tongan] workers don't like it because … this is probably one of the few times in the year where there is no work but they are out there looking for work and there is no work but these overseas workers are working. (INTG308)

> I know when they first came, and even now maybe, [but] not so much to the extreme. … I think the people that took them on to give them jobs did feel a bit of pressure to have them always working, and so they did have to make choices around letting local people not work and putting these people in, which of course upset the local people, because they also need to survive and have bills to pay and mouths to feed. So it did cause a little bit of an upset at first. (INTG304)

Yet reports of tensions were not consistent across the interviews, and some participants downplayed the extent to which the temporary SWP workers were 'taking' the work of locals, especially given the relatively low numbers of people employed on the scheme:

> Some people say they are [a threat to the local Tongan and other workforce]. But I really don't see it as a threat, because the contractors, I'm sure, would welcome anyone who is here permanently and locally first, into work generally. That's been my impression. Now as other nationalities have gone into this field, I'm not real sure that that's the same, you know? Of employing locals, it's pretty much all people from away. (INTG305)

As this participant explained, these tensions are not necessarily creating frictions that make people feel unwelcome or excluded. Indeed, church attendance has been one key way in which the local and temporary community regularly come together in a positive way, as described in Chap. 6. The findings thus reveal a more complex dynamic between points of inclusion and exclusion—a dynamic that connects labour, money and culture in myriad ways.

A final point to note is the importance of considering how we create expectations around inclusion and engagement. It may be argued that there are opportunities for positive, inclusive engagement, but for those who come to Australia on a temporary basis and work long hours, there are limits to the extent to which they wish to engage in activities with their new community when they have time off work, as one participant noted:

> But a lot of them, you find that because of the work that they have, when they've got a day off, they want to stay home and do things, but every time they go somewhere, it's costing them money too, and they're very, very conscious of that fact, so they're very conscious of how much they spend while they're here and how they spend it. But they go to church, they go to different barbeques. (INTG302)

Comments such as this one raise the importance of attending to the migrant experience of inclusion and what migrants may be seeking in relation to inclusion, if anything at all. This comment also highlights the limits, financial or otherwise, on their desire or ability to actively participate in activities that support inclusion. Given the very clear parameters of the SWP and the focused goal of earning money, processes of reception may not be the foremost priority.

The Desired Workforce and Desired Work

Tongan SWP workers are a *desired* workforce; they require greater investment of time and funds on the part of employers than other migrant workers and, given this investment, are not seen as a disposable

workforce (in contrast to reports in this research and elsewhere regarding the treatment of unlawful temporary migrants working in the agriculture industry; cf. Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). While being desired does not guarantee that every component of the experience, especially for those migrating for work within a regulated temporary labour scheme, is positive and inclusive (as discussed further below) or that protection from exploitative and abusive conditions is ensured, it does increase the likelihood of an experience that is generally inclusive and supportive. SWP workers are not easily replaceable, and growers are in need of a reliable workforce to fill gaps every season:

> If you had enough locals to do it, he [the employer] wouldn't probably go for the scheme, other than for them to help their own country with some finances, because there is a lot involved in it with their pastoral care and the money upfront, there's a lot there. So if you had all your locals that were there and just rocked up every day and did the work, you probably wouldn't do this, but as I say, it's not his entire work force, and when these jobs come up, we actually advertise the jobs to make sure that Australian workers and local workers don't get disadvantaged, so they can put in for those. (INTG302)

Locals and other temporary labourers are, by contrast, difficult to find and train:

> Out at the vegie farm he's begging for a tractor driver now. … He's advertised, and he's gone on the net to try and find someone. And he can only find backpackers who are prepared to come and do it. [And backpackers are] … a problem, because the government have got that in, that you can only employ a backpacker for six months, I think it is. And so that creates difficulty with continuity of supply of labour. And … if you've got to train someone to do something, it makes it difficult for them to train them, because they're going to be there short-term. (INTG305)

The SWP, then, primarily offers workers the promise of financial gain for their intensive labour, but it also enables the employer and nation to effectively classify manual work as low-skilled, seasonal and therefore temporary. The ideal outcome for employers would be a consistent workforce that comes to Australia only while the season requires it and with a level of skill that reduces training and support needs. Yet this would be beneficial only for growers and would demonstrate no

commitment to the ongoing skill development of SWP workers coming from conditions of developmental and economic hardship.

However, while reliance upon and desire for the Tongan workforce to return was evident, it was also evident that the 'protections' built into the scheme did not always translate into inclusive and supportive workplaces, revealing the vulnerability imposed upon SWP workers. While the scheme promises consistency of employment and, presumably, of pay, the experiences of workers interviewed for our research were not always reflective of this, although the data suggested that this issue was more prominent early in the life of the scheme. For example, two NGO participants recounted their intervention in a situation when they found workers who had not been able to work for a period of time and consequently had no financial means of survival in Robinvale:

> So we put in a bit of a complaint to MADEC and they sent them up to. … Griffith. And they were earning $60 a week there and they came back here absolutely battle-scarred. … They were doing oranges. … But they were picking the second crop … the first pickers were the ones that were important and they were getting all the bins and they were being looked after. And if the farmers had time to give the second pickers a bin, they would take a bin. So they might sit there for an hour or two, waiting … for a bin [so they weren't picking much]. (INTG306)

The story recounted above was the only such story we heard, and it is important to note that it occurred early in the pilot scheme before certain provisions were implemented to guarantee workers a set amount of hours per week. However, this story and other accounts of problems in relation to the scheme reveal that identifying issues of concern with employment and life generally in Robinvale while on the SWP was not easily achieved because 'culturally they never, ever will [complain]' (INTG306). While safeguards may be created through having bodies that can oversee employment practices and respond to employee complaints, it can be argued that a system that puts the onus of raising issues on the employee is inappropriate and inefficient in a context where complaints may jeopardise workers' ability to access the scheme in the future (thereby jeopardising their ongoing financial security).

Pastoral Support

As detailed in Chap. 6, the SWP requires the provision of pastoral support, although the specifics of what is to be delivered and who

should deliver it are not always clear, particularly in terms of determining what is appropriate or adequate support. Some of the issues raised above point to areas in which support has been furnished by external providers to workers, but here we focus in particular on the provision of broader welfare and educational support as well as on situations where it has been lacking. It became evident from our research that despite the commitment to provide support, the assistance offered to workers (such as transporting them from the airport and collecting groceries for them when they first arrive) could be easily compromised. The ability of local services to extend aid to include SWP workers was thus identified as important. During their time in Robinvale SWP labourers have access to local services, yet these services are generally not funded to support temporary workers. However, it was clear that these services have proven invaluable in providing support to a number of workers who, despite claims regarding the amount of money they earn, often have very little disposable income once bills and remittances are paid, as the following examples demonstrate:

> PARTICIPANT C One of the things they'd really like is socks. Respondent A had already taken around a heap of bits and pieces, but I brought it up at Monday night's Vinnies [St Vincent de Paul Society] meeting. And so Vinnies raced out and bought thick, warm socks. I said, 'They'll have to be large ones, they've got fairly large feet', and those were delivered Tuesday night. (INTG306)

Other provisions included food (INTG306) and blankets, as the following excerpt from a group discussion details:

> PARTICIPANT C [It was] the middle of winter … and [Respondent A] texted me … and she said, 'I think they're cold' … and I said, 'Right, I'll be around there first thing in the morning, I've got some blankets.' She said, 'I'll be in later, behind you with blankets for them. How long has this been going on, fellas? Oh, we were cold last year and'
>
> PARTICIPANT A [They told me] 'We slept in our clothes and we put our hoods up', and I said, 'Are you kidding, no one gave you any blankets?' No.
>
> PARTICIPANT C No. I rang the then Harvest Labour Manager in Mildura—he's no longer there. … I said, 'And you can count your lucky stars I didn't ring Channel 9, *Herald Sun* and *The Age*, in relation to this matter', I said, 'because this is a disgrace. They're cold.' This is

> what we've done, so MADEC came and saw us at the beginning of this year, and we were very clear, one of the things they had to make sure about was that these people being [from] tropical climates … would not be cold this winter. (INTG306)

These participants highlighted the importance of locally based support, observing that when the Commonwealth took over pastoral care early in the life of the scheme (the original SWP had charged AEs with the provision of pastoral care) there was little interest in monitoring what was happening in these small communities (INTG306). For example, while it may be a requirement to provide transportation and accommodation, in rural locations such as Robinvale this can mean workers are without easy access to transport to anywhere other than their place of employment. The local NGO participants explained how they were the point of call for temporary workers seeking assistance:

> PARTICIPANT A Because we have the relationship … they'll ring or text, any time of the day or night, and [say] 'How are you?' And every so often I'll get a message from one of them. And it'll be, 'Good morning, [Respondent A] how are you?' and I'm thinking, right, what do you want? 'It's raining today, do you need a lift to town? … Blah, blah, blah, what is it that you actually want?' So we have this message go backwards and forwards, and finally he'll say, 'Well, we think we might come into town today.' … [So I ask again], 'Do you need a lift?' 'Yes', well, [I'm thinking] five messages ago you're better to have asked. … So we go out there and pick them up, bring them back into town. (INTG306)

The example recounted by this participant echoes the discussion in Chap. 6 regarding what sorts of communication are deemed culturally appropriate and how the need for support and concerns are communicated, if at all. While it may be expected that the request for assistance should come directly from workers and should be directed to their AE, this is clearly not the approach of the Tongan SWP employees, which highlights the importance of processes of inclusion that are culturally appropriate for the temporary migrant group rather than for the country of destination.

Conclusion: Processes of Reception and Inclusion

Although most research participants arrived in Australia expecting to have a relatively short stay, all were affected to varying degrees by processes of reception and inclusion that impacted on their human security.

Their experiences of social exclusion and inclusion were shaped by both formal and informal processes. Formal processes included practical matters such as access to services, particularly English language support. Informal processes included systemic prejudice, overt racism and interactions with government officials and the wider community that could contribute to feelings of not belonging, alongside more positive processes of community building and cultural adaptation that took place within the liminal spaces occupied by these transnationally mobile groups.

Access to Services

By virtue of their temporary legal status, none of the research groups was eligible for formal settlement services. Numerous commentators have noted that temporary migrants and their needs are often invisible to the institutions and populations in the countries in which they reside (Bigo 2002; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Davis 2004; Appadurai 2006; Duffield 2008). This invisibility was perhaps most keenly felt by the Samoan participants, who had committed to making their lives in Australia and yet were expected to be self-supporting in the face of considerable socioeconomic deprivation and cultural stress. The strategy that was intended to deter their arrival has instead created a marginalised population facing serious transgenerational disadvantage and pervasive insecurity. Poor access to services due to lack of knowledge, cultural reticence and structural discrimination emerged as a serious human security problem for this group.

In contrast, our Tongan participants were present in Australia on a highly structured programme that included the provision of key services such as short-term housing (if desired) and transport, with local agencies and community networks helping to make up any shortfall. This arrangement has many benefits, and it is likely that temporary workers not on the SWP, especially if unlawfully present, experience much greater hardships. However, the services are aimed at supporting workers in the workplace, while the need for occasional flexibility and for support of family life is largely ignored. This is consistent with an economic rationalist outlook that sees labour migration primarily as the importing of job skills and labour rather than as the relocation of socially contextualised human beings (Standing 2011).

Both the Chinese and Indonesian students in Australia expressed ambivalence towards visions of collective security enacted through, for example, principles such as the rule of law, and they were reluctant to make direct contact with immigration or other authorities

because of suspicions that such contact could disadvantage them. The Chinese students did not want the 'system' to accrue knowledge about them and preferred to deal with Chinese-speaking agents as intermediaries in their dealings with authorities, although this did not always lead to a successful outcome. The Indonesian students reflected positively on the ideal of democracy and the rule of law yet were hesitant to engage individually with authority figures such as the police or immigration authorities.

Language Proficiency and Communication

Language operates as a key cultural transmitter, but it is also fundamental across other security domains as a gateway to secure employment, acceptance and belonging. The ability to communicate effectively was crucial for all of the groups for practical reasons and was also central to developing a sense of inclusion. Despite its official multicultural policies, Australia is an extraordinarily monolingual society in which communicating in English remains hegemonic. This dominance is experienced as political and social disempowerment for individuals without advanced language competency. While the Chinese and Indonesian groups were required to pass English competency tests to qualify for student or temporary worker visas, this did not necessarily translate into an experience of inclusion once they were in Australia.

Both the Chinese and Indonesian participants reported that subtle communication difficulties exacerbated feelings of social isolation. The Indonesian participants reported using technology to plug information gaps and also to reduce feelings of isolation through connection with co-nationals both inside and outside Australia. The Chinese parents often blamed their children's communication problems on outdated approaches to teaching English in China, and some had chosen to send their children to English-speaking countries for secondary schooling in order to overcome these limitations. The Chinese students reported feeling a sense of security when hearing Mandarin spoken in busy pockets of the Melbourne Central Business District. For both groups, demonstrating proficiency in English was a requirement for extending their stay.

The Samoan participants who had limited English on arrival also described feeling isolated, humiliated and disempowered. English skills had not been so critical in New Zealand, where they had lived largely within Samoan cultural enclaves. They were unprepared for the implications of having poor language skills in the multicultural environment of Australian cities, and this contributed to a lack of confidence

in negotiating bureaucracy. Moreover, since their visas were nominally temporary, they were excluded from the language support available to permanently settled migrants. Our Tongan participants shared with the Samoan group a cultural reluctance to ask for government services, particularly as such assistance is traditionally provided by family and village in their home country; but the effects of this convention were mitigated to some extent by the existence of a resident Tongan community in the study location, which was able to advocate on their behalf.

Racism, Discrimination and Cultural Insecurity

Both the Chinese and Indonesian participants were reluctant to discuss overt racism. However, they reported experiences of more subtle forms of rejection, discomfort and discrimination that they sometimes attributed to differences in cultural expectations. For our Indonesian participants, religious difference was a more salient marker of outsider status than ethnicity or outward appearance. These experiences often generated ambivalence about pursuing long-term goals in Australia and caused migrants to consider returning home once their economic and educational goals were achieved. The Chinese students identified experiences of discrimination primarily in relation to access to employment, but cultural insecurity was amplified for this tech-savvy group through vicarious experiences of racism directed against their compatriots via the internet.

The Samoan participants had lived with their families in working-class areas of Sydney and Melbourne for up to 20 years. They reported overt racism and hostility they had experienced at school, during sporting events and from authorities such as police, along with more subtle forms of discrimination such as being overlooked at work or being made to feel unwelcome and undeserving when attempting to access services such as Centrelink. Some reported discrimination on the basis of immigration status within the workplace, which was at odds with their legal entitlement to live and work indefinitely in Australia. In effect, many from this group had swapped the cultural security they had enjoyed in New Zealand for uncertain economic gains that were further threatened by both systemic and ad hoc discrimination. The Tongan research participants were highly valued as a deliberately recruited workforce and so were likely to experience less discrimination and exploitation than other temporary migrants. They reported some resentment over competition for work with other Islander populations not on the scheme, but attitudes within the small rural community in which these seasonal workers lived and worked were reportedly changing for the better.

Cultural Adaptation, Liminality and Belonging

Many temporary migrants find themselves falling between official and unofficial forms of recognition and status and therefore occupying an insecure place in their host society. They could be said to be caught in the space between the states of belonging and non-belonging. This was expressed by one Indonesian participant in terms of feeling 'half-Australian'. Faced with experiences of prejudice or social marginalisation, the Indonesian group tended to respond by adopting an ambivalent attitude towards their stay in Australia, with returning home seen as the ultimate solution. Discomfort with the hyper-individualism of Australian society (a response expressed to varying extents within all the research groups) could add to the sense of cultural alienation. For the Chinese students, a tendency to be culturally reserved, including a lack of affinity with perceived aspects of the host society such as Australia's drinking culture, could lead to social isolation. Such examples were often given during discussions of the loneliness experienced during their time as students in Australia, as connections to fellow Chinese students and especially local students were considered difficult to form and sustain. Feelings of isolation seemed to be compounded as time passed and uncertainty about obtaining PR became apparent.

The tradition of *vä* seems to prepare Samoans to some extent for life in the liminal spaces between home and abroad. Some participants appeared able to maintain a remarkably fluid sense of personal identity, identifying as Samoan, Australian, Samoan-Australian or Australian-Samoan, depending on the context. For the Samoan participants, returning home (which could mean either Samoa or New Zealand) was unlikely to be contemplated while economic conditions were relatively favourable in Australia. Instead, strategies for avoiding cultural conflict were developed, such as encouraging children to walk away from racist taunts in order to avert trouble. Feelings of liminality were expressed in terms of being present in Australia 'only on the surface', a comment that also related to the legal insecurity arising from a lack of access to citizenship.

Experiences of cultural security and belonging were found to be temporally and geographically specific. The Chinese students said that they felt at home in the busy centre of Melbourne where other Chinese-born young people gathered. The Indonesian participants felt culturally secure when living with or near members of their own community and sought regular cultural reassurance through the long-distance networks mediated by technology. The Tongan seasonal workers reported that the small rural town in which they lived and worked was 'just like home'

because of the remote agricultural setting and the presence of a resident Tongan-born community. By contrast, the Samoan families, as just one ethnic minority living in the vast working-class suburbs of Melbourne and Sydney, were relatively isolated.

Cultural adaptation is one way in which a sense of belonging may be cultivated. Some of the Samoan-born participants questioned the primacy accorded to traditional commitments to the church and *aiga* over meeting the basic needs of their own families and rejected traditional approaches to childrearing in order to enhance their children's prospects of acceptance and belonging. Transgenerational adaption of this scale requires time, which was one resource that was available to the Samoan SCV holders but was either lacking or uncertain for the other research groups. Their quest for generic 'western' knowledge meant that the Chinese participants, even if unable to deeply immerse themselves in Australian student culture, were developing the cultural competency to survive anywhere in the English-speaking world. While some of the Indonesian participants argued that temporary migrants needed to make a greater effort to connect with the wider community and adapt to different social expectations, uncertainty over the length of their stay worked against this level of cultural adaption. Despite their tightly time-delimited stay, some members of the Tongan group nevertheless sought to adapt to the norms of wage labour that were of most relevance to them, such as saving and budgeting.

Building Local and Transnational Community

Among all of the research groups, adaptation to a new environment did not occur merely at the individual level, but also involved the building of collective sources of support to varying degrees. Efforts to build community and develop interpersonal connections via new technologies and more traditional means were apparent at both the local and transnational levels. The capacity to build community links and the motivation to do so were tempered by the degree of commitment the participants had already made to their futures in Australia and the position within the liminal space of temporary migration that was available to them.

The Tongan seasonal workers were invested to some degree in the rural community in which they worked because of their desire to return on the SWP, and they were assisted in making links in the wider community by long-term Tongan residents operating through local churches and community groups. The Chinese students had made a significant investment in their education, were attracted to a future spent in one or more of the world's global cities, and might commit to extending their

stay in Australia depending on their experiences and the opportunities that presented themselves. The Indonesian participants were perhaps the most ambivalent about establishing deep connections within Australian communities, possibly because of the prospects they had for a rewarding life back home. Of the study groups, it was the Samoans who had made the most definite commitment by bringing their families to Australia and had the most to lose if their lives in their new home did not work out.

The Samoan participants were most likely to rely on church and kinship networks in Australia for support and information. However, the limitations of these institutions were becoming apparent, not least because they often did not hold the answers to the complex legal and social challenges faced by unprotected SCV holders. Highly dedicated Samoan community workers acted as cultural intermediaries, transferring important government information to the Samoan-born populations, and doing much of the work of building an expatriate community to unite Samoan-born residents beyond the confines of kinship and church affiliations. Some interviewees even saw the early signs of pan-Pacific solidarity developing.

Ultimately, a sense of belonging within community involves developing a sense of trust, which then begets loyalty to the group. Our research participants all reported low levels of trust in government agencies, with those who could afford it preferring to deal indirectly with government via intermediaries. It would be easy to assume that temporary migrants have high levels of trust within their own co-national communities, but this did not prove to be the case for all of our participants. The Chinese students found little in common with resident Chinese-Australian communities, tensions were apparent between Tongan SWP workers and other Tongan residents, but the Indonesian participants were well connected with Indonesian-Australians with long-term residence in Australia. The Samoan participants related closely to their kinship and church groups, emulating the social bonds that nurtured them at home, but there was little evidence of the sort of expatriate community that is imagined by Australia's multicultural policies.

Multicultural policies also do not necessarily anticipate the new modes of interconnectivity that are emerging in the face of increased population mobility. Communication technologies open up new productive spaces for interpersonal interactions in ways that collapse geographical boundaries. These possibilities for intense connectivity between mobile and sedentary populations challenge outdated ideas of dislocated diaspora communities evolving in relative isolation from their home base.

Some of the Indonesian participants noted that new technologies enabled them to maintain closer contact with family back home than was previously possible when families were geographically separated within Indonesia, indicating that emerging forms of belonging and inclusion are no longer territorially bound. Opportunities for electronic communication with their children also ameliorated the loss experienced by the parents of Chinese students studying and working abroad.

In the case of the SWP, the structure of the scheme itself, or rather the dynamic relationship between the scheme and its various participants, is generating new possibilities for transnational connectivity between specific communities in Australia and Tonga. The stated preference by many of the employers and workers for return migration, while contrary to the underlying principles of the scheme that favour the spreading of its benefits across diverse individuals and communities, will have the effect of deepening transnational links if patterns of regular circular mobility do eventuate in practice.

There is also evidence that more traditional cultural institutions are adapting to conditions of protracted transnationalism among longstanding diaspora communities. For example, the seemingly rigid structures underpinning *fa'a-Samoa* are transnationalising through the establishment of Samoan churches and the granting of *matai* status to Samoans living abroad so that ceremonial and spiritual obligations can be more easily satisfied within the transnationally connected diaspora. Although there is room for debate over who is benefiting from these developments, the expansion of the Samoan *matai* system is a good example of both cultural adaptation and the creation of hubs of security capable of spanning transnational spaces.

Our research data suggests that temporariness is a testing ground for global connectivity and reveals the capacity of mobile groups to adapt in a variety of individual and collective ways to the complexities and uncertainties of seeking human security in a rapidly changing social world.

10
Conclusion

The Challenge of Temporary Migration

Temporary migration in its many forms is one of the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The conditions of globalisation unsettle orthodox conceptions of migration and border control, as migrants increasingly operate through transnational networks in which identities and loyalties to nations are more fluid than when people migrate for life (Sassen 2006). New conceptual tools based on *regions*, *networks* and *fluidity* are being adopted to describe these emerging social forms that are constituted through mobility (Urry 2007). These trends are mirrored by fluidity in legal status, so that mobile individuals may move between legality and illegality as well as between temporary and permanent categories (Schuster 2005). While the adage that 'there is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers' (Bauböck 2011, p. 671) may reflect the concerns of states anxious to limit permanent migration, the contemporary reality falls somewhere between this sedentary vision and the hyper-mobility suggested by the idea of a 'world in motion' (Aas 2007). Under the flexible, often chaotic conditions of globalisation, a stark dichotomy between temporary and permanent is no longer sustainable or reflective of human experience and expectations. Rather, mobility patterns are diversifying at a rate that far outstrips the capacity of governments to adapt in order to meet the emerging human security needs of mobile populations.

Viewed from the perspective of the neoliberal state, temporary migration is primarily a short-term expedient to plug labour gaps and feed international markets for tertiary education. Even so, tensions often emerge between these market-driven goals and the politically driven logic of border control (Nyers 2010; Ruhs 2013; Ronson 2012). From the

point of view of temporary migrants, contradictions are also apparent between individual aspirations and actual experiences in host countries. While global citizenship may be held up as an ideal for a globalising world through which access to rights is not an arbitrary lottery (Shachar 2009), the ideal remains far from reality for the majority of migrants, who are excluded from the migratory flows engaged in almost at will by global elites. The deliberate withholding of access to rights on the basis of temporary worker status amounts to 'the shoving about of labour' by states (Hansen 2011), rather than acceptance of temporary workers into society as human beings with complex life plans and aspirations. As Castles (2012, p. 194) puts it, these schemes 'bring in workers but not people'. Temporary mobility is therefore revealed to be a set of fluid, dynamic and risky processes that offer the promise of human security but at the same time demand the negotiation of unfamiliar cultural, economic and legal terrain.

As in other settler societies, temporary migration to Australia has exceeded the levels of permanent migration over the past decade (Australian Productivity Commission 2015). In November 2013, more than half a million people were present in Australia on temporary visas.[1] This level of temporary migration raises fundamental questions about human security, citizenship and human rights, demanding a reappraisal of the relationships between physical presence, legal entitlement and the security claims made by and of the state. At a social level, new understandings of the nature of belonging are demanded, along with a more nuanced appreciation of the means by which individuals negotiate transnational spaces and form networks and communities in both real and virtual space.

Through our case studies we have sought to illuminate the dynamics of temporary migration between Australia and several of its regional neighbours: China, Indonesia, Samoa and Tonga. We have used qualitative, transnational methods to identify the self-understandings of the human security of temporary migrants and those affected by their absence from home communities. The countries included in the study all have a historical record of migration and travel to Australia, which includes, in some cases, known contacts prior to European settlement. Similarly, they all share a history of having their mobility restricted by the Australian state during the era of the White Australia Policy. Nowadays, citizens from

1 Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/6250.0).

all the case study countries are able to enter Australia, but only under strictly controlled conditions. Long-term migration of these populations has been considered a threat to the Australian nation, while their temporary migration provides a solution to labour gaps and shortfalls in the funding of Australian universities.

Although limited in number, our interviews provide insights into the experiences and aspirations of temporary migrants and build on other research and commentary on the growing prevalence of temporary migration. In this concluding chapter we return to our original research questions to discuss the relationship between temporary migration and human security as it emerged in our interviews, to consider the determinants and dynamics of the dimensions of human security explored in this study, and to identify some broad policy pathways that might cut through the oppositional positioning of state and human security that characterises much of contemporary migration policy, in the interests of what we call 'fluid security'.

Connecting Mobility and Human (In)Security

Our conception of fluid security applies a 'mobilities lens' (Urry 2008) to human security in order to take into account the aspirations and needs of mobile populations in ways that are appropriate for a globalising world. In this book we bring to light the diverse experiences of mobility and the multiple vulnerabilities experienced by individuals, which then intersect with, and sometimes challenge, national security domains. As noted in the opening chapter, detailed accounts of human experience have been largely absent from traditional conceptions of state interest and national security. The rhetoric of human security has often been applied narrowly from within a realist tradition that adopts a state perspective (Burke and McDonald 2007; Altman et al. 2012), ignores social relationships, and has been criticised for failing to consider and promote human rights (Howard-Hassman 2012). Mobile populations occupy little space in such accounts, and their needs are given scant attention. Indeed, the duties that states owe these mobile populations remain unclear because they fall between the established categories of governance (Bauböck 2011).

Castles (2014, p. 191) points out that migration policies can exacerbate human insecurity: 'Even legal migrants may have an insecure residence status and be vulnerable to economic exploitation, discrimination and racist violence.' But highly restrictive migration control policies that are justified as being in the national interest are likely to fail, even on their

own terms. For example, the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012a, b) have argued that undesirable social outcomes experienced by New Zealand citizens who live in Australia on Special Category Visas (SCVs) as 'indefinite temporaries' may develop into a 'point of irritation' within the trans-Tasman relationship. Even the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), in its most recent threat assessment on transnational organised crime in the Asia-Pacific region, recommended increasing opportunities for safe, legal and accessible migration, including temporary migration schemes and regularisation, as a measure to reduce the threat of organised crime in the region. On the basis of our own study, we conclude that denial of essential services to Samoan-born SCV holders, particularly support for tertiary education, is implicated in high levels of criminal offending, imprisonment and deportation (see Chaps. 5 and 8), which have counterproductive security implications for both Australian communities and the region.

From the perspective of mobile individuals, crossing borders can be seen as a security-seeking strategy. In Chaps. 7 and 8 we examined the security-related factors that drove and mediated temporary migration among our research participants. As our participants were not selected from humanitarian or forced migration categories, their reasons for coming to Australia generally focused on the economic and socio-cultural security domains. But differences were apparent between the groups, and between individuals within the groups, in their security-seeking strategies. For the Chinese students interviewed in our study, gaining an education at a reputable tertiary institution in Australia was part of a longer-term plan in which marketable skills, western cultural competence and increased skill in the English language were seen as the keys to future success in a competitive global market. For some of these students, the driver to seeking study abroad was competition to access high-ranking universities in China. All of the Chinese students envisaged studying abroad as opening doors to global learning and employment in western countries. For the Indonesian participants, cross-border mobility was largely about the experience of self-development and democratic freedom, with the prospect of better earnings also a drawcard. Despite being their country's nearest neighbour, Australia was not the first choice of temporary home for many Indonesians, and cultural differences were largely seen by this group not as an opportunity to acquire new competencies but as a barrier and disincentive to an extended stay. The Indonesian participants described the need for adaptive cultural capabilities as primarily a one-way process in their experience of Australian society, with newcomers having to adapt

culturally while the receiver society presented a rather fixed picture of itself to them. This is perhaps antithetical to what would be expected in a multi-ethnic, multicultural society, yet it accords with what Hage calls a 'White nation fantasy' (1998). Both the Tongan and Samoan-born workers interviewed in our study were focused on achieving immediate economic security for themselves and their extended families in making their mobility decisions; but for the Samoan-born group, in particular, it was apparent that the cultural security that many had experienced during their residence in New Zealand was sacrificed when they moved across the Tasman.

While cross-border mobility may be a security-seeking strategy, it can also generate a new set of insecurities. This is particularly the case where certain mobilities are perceived by governments as threats to social stability, economic wellbeing or community cohesion and are therefore met with policies aimed at deterring arrival or ensuring timely departure. The Samoan-born New Zealand citizens in our study experienced no legal barriers at all to their entry to Australia, but they suffered significant systemic discrimination after their arrival that was intended to deter them from exercising their mobility rights. The Indonesian and Chinese participants, on the other hand, were subjected to rigorous pre-entry selection processes. Their success in overcoming these legal barriers was sometimes overshadowed by ongoing legal insecurity concerning compliance with their current visas and limited opportunities for obtaining extensions to their stay. Tongan participants in Australia's tightly regulated Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) enjoyed a level of workplace security in Australia that compares favourably with the unsafe and exploitative conditions experienced by many other foreign workers.[2] However, this security was accompanied by restrictions on post-arrival mobility between employers and locations and between Tonga and Australia for family visits.

State controls on mobility are often experienced by temporary migrants as contradictory and unpredictable. For example, the unlimited stay allowed on SCVs held by New Zealand citizens contradicts their legal designation as temporary and the restrictions associated with that status. Unpredictability can arise through changes to already complex migration rules, such as when pathways to permanent residency change;

2 ABC Four Corners, 'Slaving away: The dirty secrets behind Australia's fresh food', 4 May 2015 (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2015/05/04/4227055.htm).

this affected each of the groups in varying ways. While uncertainty can be problematic for individuals, it can also be counterproductive from a state perspective as it overlooks the economic benefits of secure and productive populations. While neoliberal states seek to marketise mobility—focusing on the short-term value of mobility to the domestic economy and selling opportunities for temporary migration and citizenship to the highest bidder[3]—better opportunities may be opening up for prospective migrants elsewhere.

The mobility engaged in by the individuals who participated in this study had potential human security benefits for whole families and communities in countries of origin. For the Indonesian participants, the sending of remittances was considered voluntary rather than obligatory; obligations to send remittances rested most heavily on the Samoan-born participants, who were expected to contribute indefinitely to the advancement of their extended family and village. While Tongans are subject to similar cultural expectations, the shorter stays of our Tongan research participants shifted the focus to amassing consumer goods and savings to take with them on return. Development analysts have long criticised the failure of home communities to invest remittances in infrastructure projects. That debate was referred to briefly in Chap. 8 and cannot be fully elaborated here. In any case, the dynamic was reported to be changing in favour of resources moving *from* Pacific Islands *to* developed nations such as Australia, often in order to fund education for future generations forced to compete within a globalising market economy. The wider human security benefits of temporary migration are therefore no longer adequately addressed by analyses that focus only on one-way flows of resources or short-term economic gain.

The recent Inquiry into Multiculturalism and Migration in Australia noted the particular financial burden placed on Pacific Islanders living on SCVs and described the disregard for their circumstances as a lost opportunity to promote local community cohesion and economic development (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2013, p. 139). It is clear from our research that temporary migrants find themselves differently situated from the 'settled' or 'diaspora' communities that are visible to the established policies and institutions of multiculturalism. The report produced from this inquiry discussed temporary migration in chapters separate from the sections on multiculturalism. This would

3 Available from https://newmatilda.com/2015/05/04/abbott-distances-coalition-pay-enter-migration-system

seem to indicate that policies aimed at promoting social cohesion are out of step with the growing diversity in legal status among the immigrant population. However, the Joint Standing Committee did support (at para 7.26) the recommendation of the Access and Equity Inquiry (2012) that further research be conducted into the access and equity needs of temporary migrants.

The inquiry also acknowledged that diaspora communities have a significant role to play in Australia's international relations (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2013). This was also the view of the House of Lords Select Committee that was tasked with reviewing the operation of 'soft power' in the United Kingdom under geopolitical conditions of 'hyper-connectivity'. The committee concluded that diaspora communities living in the UK 'can contribute to British soft power', while overzealous restrictions on entry for the purposes of business, study or visits were counterproductive in terms of international relations and influence (House of Lords Select Committee 2014). Closer to home, Eckersley (2012, p. 197) has argued that 'the concept of human security has the potential to inaugurate a sea change in Australia's foreign policy away from the traditional notion of the Australian island continent as a fortress to be defended, and towards a deeper acknowledgement of the inextricable interdependencies between the security of Australia, the region and the rest of the world'. In fact, the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration, promulgated by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat,[4] lists an 'expanded focus' on (unspecified) human security issues as a priority for implementation from 2006 to 2008. Regional labour mobility, however, is designated as a 'long-term goal' requiring further analysis.

It is becoming increasingly unviable for states to operate as if they were closed systems in which temporary migrants are viewed solely as consumers or workers rather than as full human beings whose complex security needs matter. In gathering the narratives and self-understanding of migrants, we learn what it means to belong, to be a citizen in the context of temporariness and socio-cultural change. This perspective leads us towards a more holistic and fluid approach to human security that transcends the fixed, unresponsive legal and administrative categories that governments use to control, sort and punish some populations. States will continue to get it wrong if they persist in seeing the desires

4 Available from http://www.theprif.org/components/com_jomcomdev/files/2014/11/45/27-Pacific_Plan_Nov_2007.pdf

of migrants as necessarily antithetical to state self-interest, and they will be condemned to playing catch-up to fundamental changes occurring in the world.

Dynamics and Determinants of (In)Security

In our study we set out to provide a thick description of human security that was sensitive to the everyday experiences of temporary migrants through four interrelated security domains—legal, physical, economic and socio-cultural—while also remaining sensitive to the dynamic interrelationships between these dimensions. Furthermore, as Camilleri (2012, p. 15) has noted: 'Human security must necessarily entail a complex reconciliation of the security needs of persons understood not as atomised individuals but as members of diverse and interacting communities, including the international community—a category that has steadily grown in importance as a consequence of globalising currents that show no signs of abating' (see also Michalowski 2015). We dealt with this in our study by exploring the ways in which individuals formed relationships of trust with official and unofficial networks both in their country of origin and country of temporary residence, and we reported their experiences of acceptance and inclusion or otherwise within Australian society (see Chap. 9 in particular).

The search for economic security was a powerful driver of mobility for most participants. However, it was clear that a range of complex socio-cultural factors interacting with socioeconomic factors shaped the pursuit of economic security in powerful ways. Of the four groups, the Samoan and Tongan participants appeared objectively to be the most economically insecure, being suspended between a subsistence society and the allure, as well as the demands, of global capitalism. While the access of seasonal workers to the Australian labour market is heavily restricted, the working conditions of our Tongan participants in Australia were reasonably well regulated. Although they worked extremely long hours, often in harsh environmental conditions, their economic goals were largely met, at least in the short term. The Samoan-born SCV holders, on the other hand, enjoyed unrestricted cross-border mobility but experienced high levels of insecurity within the Australian job market. Cultural factors also influenced the experience of security and insecurity in this domain. For example, while aspects of Samoan culture facilitate and support transnationalism, the heavy burden of obligatory remittances contributed to the economic insecurity experienced by most of our Samoan-born participants.

It has been noted that 'time and temporality have a particular kind of salience for migrants who enter the host state with a temporary legal status, with everyday lives and labour market opportunities and vulnerabilities intimately affected by "being temporary"' (see Mountz 2011; Goldring and Landolt 2012). Legal insecurity was widely experienced by the research participants in circumstances where their personal needs and aspirations were at odds with their visa status. This applied even to the least temporary group in our study, the Samoan-born SCV holders; while having no time limit imposed on their stay, they were placed at a competitive disadvantage in the job market. Although these participants had committed to making Australia their home, they had very poor prospects of finding legal pathways to permanence and citizenship, the only means available to alleviate the legally imposed disadvantages they faced. Moreover, both the Tongan and Samoan-born participants reported accepting work that was not commensurate with their skill level because of the limited employment options imposed by their visa types.

Although the students and workers from Indonesia and China entered on a temporary basis, they were likely to experience 'shifting temporal horizons' (Robertson 2014, p. 1927) once in Australia. This pool of talented prospective settlers has been described as 'designer migrants' because their time spent in Australia as students or temporary workers can be seen as a trial period beneficial both to the incomers and to states (Hugo 2011, p. 55). However, our participants were forced into negotiations with state agencies that were experienced as complex and stressful. The uncertainty arising from the temporary nature of their visas was at times further exacerbated by the emphasis placed on visa compliance. The Indonesian participants often responded to this tension with an attitude of ambivalence about extending their stay, while the Chinese students needed to decide between being strategic in their choice of study in order to open up pathways to permanence or seeking entry to another developed country if they wished to obtain professional experience before returning to China. The highly regulated SWP minimised the need for the Tongan seasonal workers in our study to deal directly with the Australian state as long as arrangements went as planned. But this group could still experience legal uncertainty and dependence on employers if they wished to take part in regular return visits.

None of our research groups had left their countries of origin due to discrimination or other forms of culturally mediated insecurity in their homeland. Instead, cultural insecurity emerged as a strong theme after arrival in Australia. Feelings of cultural insecurity arose from overt racism, more subtle indications of non-belonging, and difficulties in communication. The Samoan-born participants were the most likely to

report overt experiences of racism and prejudice, which they contrasted with the social acceptance and strong cultural support they found in New Zealand. The hyper-individualism of Australian society also generated cultural insecurity across all our research groups, which was experienced as isolation and alienation, particularly among the Chinese and Indonesian participants.

The more collectivist culture in their countries of origin also influenced how individuals positioned themselves relative to the Australian state. Our research participants did not necessarily look to government as their main provider of security. The students in our study tended to use intermediaries, such as migration agents, to ascertain their legal entitlements and avoided direct dealings with the state. Most of the Chinese students struggled with vernacular English and received little post-arrival support with language skills, but some parents attributed these difficulties to the inadequacies of the Chinese education system. The Indonesian participants had moved directly from a religiously observant oligarchy to a society predominantly based on neoliberal individualism. This group did not take for granted that they would be provided for by a welfare state and tended to internalise their concerns about lack of rights. The Samoan participants were also thrust into a competitive, multicultural environment where the traditional reliance on extended family for support was proving inadequate to meet human security needs. However, much-needed state services were often inaccessible to them because of a lack of knowledge, language skills or confidence to deal with government authorities and policies that deliberately limited their eligibility. While coming from a similar cultural background, the Tongan seasonal workers were buffered to a considerable extent from Australia's individualistic society and the rigours of the market-driven economy by the tightly regulated nature of the SWP and its rural setting.

All groups expressed relatively low levels of trust in government officials, often preferring to turn to family and friends for support. Co-nationals were not necessarily a source of support for temporary migrants, because long-term resident populations could have very different concerns and interests from their temporarily present compatriots. This was particularly evident in the case of the Chinese students who participated in our study, who found no point of connection with Chinese diaspora communities in Melbourne. In the case of Tongan seasonal workers, on the other hand, although they competed for jobs with the local Tongan residents, supportive relationships had been established between the two groups. Other sources of information and support included family members in Australia (particularly for the Samoan-born

group), the internet (especially for the Chinese and Indonesian participants) and churches (notably for the Samoan and Tongan participants). While uncertainty about the duration of residence could be a barrier to community engagement for other groups, social entrepreneurs in the more long-term Samoan diaspora were working hard to build a sense of local Samoan and *Pasifika* community.

It has been suggested that the relationship that diaspora communities have with the homeland is symbolic, whereas for actively transnational communities the relationship is real (Nakhid 2009, p. 220). While it is true that improved communications 'make it easier for people to live in expanded social and cultural spaces, which have little to do with the borders of nation-states' (Castles 2014, p. 203), these relationships, in order to flourish, need to be supported by government policy that recognises the reality of lives lived in transnational space. Among our research participants, attempts at maintaining supportive transnational networks by maintaining physical contact were liable to be thwarted by state intervention. The families of Tongan seasonal workers with whom we spoke found that separation could place a considerable strain on family life. However, the SWP made no provision for family visits in either direction. The Samoan-born New Zealand citizens, some of whom had been resident in Australia for 20 years, were able to move freely within the region but encountered both financial and legal barriers when trying to arrange for relatives or even spouses to visit or join them. Those in Samoan-born communities were also aware that visa compliance breaches could jeopardise the access to future visas for the whole national group as a result of visa allocation policies based on measures of aggregate risk.

The temporary migrants in our study were also forming local and transnational hubs of security through the creation of virtual social networks. Both the Chinese and Indonesian groups turned readily to the internet for information, to maintain links with existing family and friends, and to connect with other mobile individuals. This security-seeking device has the benefit of being largely outside the control of the host government. However, internet-based networking could also produce insecurity, for example when reports of racism and intolerance towards co-nationals were encountered online. The formation of virtual networks by expatriate populations is also being recognised from a state perspective as a means of returning skills to the source country, even in the face of ongoing migrant transnationalism. Chinese government policy towards China's skilled overseas populations is said to have changed from '*huiuo fuwu* (return and serve the motherland) to *weiguo fuwu*

(serve the motherland) in recognition of the increasing ability of the diaspora to deliver benefits to the homeland while abroad' (Hugo 2011, p. 68).

Towards Fluid Security

In order to conceive of a condition of fluid security for temporary migrants, it is necessary to transcend the statist framing in which border control and human mobility are pitted against each other in a zero sum game. Actual neoliberal mobility regimes (which do not, at present, enact the 'pure' neoliberal value of free population movement) typically marketise mobility, sorting potentially mobile subjects according to the resources and skills they can bring to the host economy.[5] Temporary migration schemes in Australia have been seen to impose a state-driven conception of the ideal migrant as temporary, skilled, young, healthy, with high consumption power and no dependants, and whose exclusion from benefits and political participation is justified by the rigidly enforced temporal limits on their stay (Robertson 2014). This economic rationalist outlook is accompanied by a relative disregard for supporting family life and meeting wider human needs among these migrants. Indeed, these goals are often sidelined in policies targeted at resident populations as well. However, empirical research shows that family considerations are highly significant alongside economic calculations as determinants of migration. Hugo (2011, p. 55) concludes by stating that 'we may need in the future to reassess the significance of family in contemporary global migration, especially that of skilled individuals'. Hugo also recommends expanding the definition of 'skilled' beyond those with formal qualifications to include those with other talents (such as risk taking) that are likely to facilitate their social and economic success.

Against this backdrop of neoliberal governments seeking to 'govern through migration control' (Bosworth and Guild 2008), legal scholars are developing arguments for mobility to be conceived as a human right predicated on the right to work (Juss 2004). Other commentators argue for regimes that enable freer circulation in ways that allow more focus on human needs without totally disregarding the ongoing

5 It is instructive to note that the educational profile of temporary migrants in Australia was almost identical to the profile of permanent residents at November 2013, according to Australian Bureau of Statistics data presented by the Australian Productivity Commission (2015).

regulatory role of the state (Bauböck 2009; Castles 2014; Weber 2015). At the same time, citizenship scholars and policy-makers are conceptualising a range of new approaches to guarantee human rights protection for mobile populations. For example, the Australian and New Zealand Productivity Commissions (2012a, b) have suggested that countries of origin should retain responsibility for the welfare of their own citizens when populations move in either direction across the Tasman Sea. Others propose the introduction of special rights regimes, claimable from the host state, for those who are temporarily resident (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012). However, Sassen (1999) has argued that such restrictions should be limited to withholding the right to vote from mobile non-citizens. And Bauböck (2011) has proposed that a system of 'residential citizenship' such as that now practised in major cities with large 'floating populations' could be scaled up to the level of states in order to provide human rights protections in a more dynamic and appropriate way. Regardless of the manner in which these new mobility regimes are imagined, the goal is to ensure that individuals can avail themselves of genuinely *human* rights that are 'accessible on the borders, carried across borders' (Gready 2004, p. 352). The effect of guaranteeing human rights protections for mobile populations would be to normalise temporary mobility within a broader framework that aspires to universal human security and fundamentally alters the present relationship between citizens, non-citizens and states. Castles (2014, p. 203) notes that 'elements of an international framework already exist' in various International Labour Organization conventions[6]; yet 'relatively few countries have ratified these instruments, and there is little effective cooperation' (see also Bauböck 2011 on the limitations of current human rights frameworks). However, transformations in global governance are beginning to be imagined by transnational bodies such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR):

> While human mobility has become more global and frequent, traditional distinctions between voluntary, forced, regular or irregular, temporary, seasonal or long-term and permanent migration have become less clear-cut. This leads to an increasingly compelling argument to address the rights of all migrants in a holistic way, regardless of their motives for migrating and their legal status. (2013, p. 16)

6 International Labour Organization Conventions No. 97 of 1949 and No. 143 of 1975 and the 1990 UN *Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*.

Alongside these top-down developments, new forms of resistance and subaltern politics are being enacted in everyday life. Hoffstaedter and Roche (2012, p. 149) believe that it is problematic to assume that states alone can determine security requirements, and they advocate 'security from below' that is 'grounded more firmly in the lived experiences of those who are insecure'. Security theorists grappling with questions of responsibility for the provision of security in a globalising world are looking beyond state sovereignty to incorporate a plurality of actors, including markets, civil society, and states operating at differing geopolitical levels (Camilleri 2012). In the context of mobility, this diffusion of responsibility for security entails a growing recognition of the power of mobile populations to redefine the meaning of borders and migration controls (Wonders 2015; see also Soğuk and Whitehall 1999 on 'transversal borders') in pursuit of their own fluid security. While the mobile groups in our study were all legally present in Australia, our research identified resistance and forms of ambivalence in the face of unwelcome state imposts, and instances where individuals found pathways of resilience and formed new networks of support *despite* the interventions of the state. For example, government documents obtained under Australia's freedom of information legislation described New Zealanders on unprotected SCVs as an 'underclass' and as 'people who don't have rights' (Burton-Bradley 2013). But there are also signs that SCV holders are mobilising for recognition of their rights through political processes such as submissions to the Access and Equity Inquiry[7] and a grassroots campaign aimed at restoring full entitlements.[8]

Rather than being perceived as a threat to an existing social order, these examples of migrant agency may also mark a lost opportunity for the state and the receiver society more broadly. The temporary migrants in this study were individuals who contributed to the host society yet largely remained effective outsiders: physically present, yet absent in the bureaucratic calculus of a system operating with a closed conception of membership and rights. The creative vitality and entrepreneurship evident in the everyday strategies of temporary migrants are exemplars of the adaptive capabilities sought after by liberal, marketised societies.

7 The inquiry, which reported in July 2012, recommended that clear and coordinated advice about entitlements should be given to 'long-term temporary entrants to Australia, particularly New Zealand citizens', both before and after their arrival (www.mhima.org.au/pdfs/Access_EquityreportDIAC.pdf).

8 See the Fair Go for NZ Citizens Living in Australia petition site, available at www.thepetitionsite.com/1/fair-go-nz-citizens-in-oz/ (accessed 31 July 2013).

Our case studies thus lead to the conclusion that migration policy in Australia is effectively antithetical to the core values of a liberal, market-oriented society.

While it might be thought unrealistic to expect that migration policy can be shaped according to the needs and desires of mobile populations, policies that are excessively slanted towards deterrence, restriction and control are proving to be ineffective and unproductive, even from a state perspective. Restrictive policies that tighten criteria for permanent residency, loosen the link between study and employment or restrict entitlements for certain visa classes may merely ensure that individuals who are not deterred from pursuing their migration goals experience heightened insecurity along the way. As De Haas (2005) has noted, the tightening of border controls in its many forms does not necessarily deter 'aspirational migration'. Policies intended to deter mobility through the provision of negative information are particularly likely to fail, since research indicates that individuals tend to selectively filter information and judge that their own migration outcomes will be positive (Wright 2011).

Examples of failed deterrence and counterproductive controls abound in our study. Measures intended to deter New Zealand citizens from exercising their right to live in Australia have failed to stem the trans-Tasman flow and have instead created human misery and a raft of social problems arising from transgenerational disadvantage. Prohibitive 'paper barriers' impinge on the mobility decisions of international students and skilled professionals from China and Indonesia, who are not without other prospects and often come to realise that pastures are greener elsewhere. More relaxed and welcoming mobility regimes, on the other hand, might have considerable national benefits in promoting positive relations with our closest neighbours through enhanced economic, cultural and social exchange.

The complexity and expense of Australia's visa system has spawned a new transnational industry of intermediaries in the form of labour brokers and migration and education agents (see Castles 2014). Our research participants from China and Indonesia had mixed experiences with these agents, indicating a need for better regulation or, preferably, simplification of the system.[9] In its assessment of regional criminal threats, the UNODC (2013) notes that even legal migrants could

9 The Senate inquiry into temporary work visas has also been tasked with investigating the role of recruitment agents for seasonal and other temporary labour (see http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/temporary_work_visa/Terms_of_Reference).

be open to exploitation by unscrupulous mobility brokers and employers, a situation that was exacerbated where channels for legal migration were unduly complex, expensive and inaccessible. On the other hand, the Samoan SCV holders in our study, whose entry to Australia could not have been simpler, had major unmet needs for information and advocacy to help them navigate the bureaucratic hurdles that had been erected to obstruct their access to essential services. Again, an approach based on simplicity and openness would protect migrants and reduce the burdens on government to regulate and advise.

Moving beyond unproductive restrictions towards conditions of fluid security requires the dismantling of many myths and fixed dichotomies that have hitherto driven migration and border control policies. One of these is the view of migration as structurally determined by fixed relations between the core and the periphery, as explained by Hugo (2011, p. 52):

> Clearly the south-north dichotomy commonly employed in discussions about immigration that puts Asia, Africa and Latin America in the former as 'origin countries' and Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania in the latter as 'destination countries' is a false one now and will become even more so over the next two decades. … The increased competition from within and outside the region for skilled workers means that there will be a continuing challenge for Australia to attract the 'brightest and the best'.

A comprehensive analysis of Australian migration data by Hugo (2011, p. 40) shows that movements within the Asia-Pacific region—albeit far from 'free'—also challenge the myth of uni-directional flows from less prosperous nations to Australia, with significant proportions of permanent settlers returning to their countries of origin or departing for other destinations:

> The Australian international migration flow data analysed here have demonstrated conclusively that the Asia-Pacific/Australia migration system is characterised by a high degree of complexity and circularity. This stands in sharp distinction to the conventional depiction of this system being seen largely as 'south-north migration' where, at least implicitly, it is assumed that the overwhelming dominant pattern is of permanent redistribution of highly skilled people from poorer countries of Asia and the Pacific to better-off Australia.

Deconstructing the myth that 'there is nothing more permanent than a temporary foreign worker', Bauböck (2011, p. 671) concludes that, ironically, tight controls can encourage overstaying and stasis, whereas relaxed controls can promote mobility:

> It is therefore much more likely that more migrants will stay only temporarily where such legal conditions and constraints are largely absent and migrants can freely enter, take up jobs and remain indefinitely. Under these conditions, even subjectively intended long-term stay may result in de facto temporary migration if the economic opportunities in the host country decline or those in the country of origin improve. This has been, by and large, the experience with free movement of workers from other member states in the European Union.

Contemporary systems of governance also falsely align security with permanence, but the distinction between temporary and permanent begins to break down when people are allowed the autonomy to determine how long they will stay. As Hugo (2011, p. 41) notes: 'It has long been the case that this dimension of mobility is more appropriately conceptualised as a continuum than as a binary dichotomy but the overlap has increased in recent times.' Evidence suggests that mobile individuals can generate their own security when they have agency and the ability to plan, that experiences of security are not necessarily tied to permanence, and that fluid security is enhanced when individuals are able to carry a bundle of rights with them.

With respect to its handling of temporary migration from Indonesia and China, the Australian government is missing the message about what the real drivers and mediators of this mobility are. Believing Australia to be a uniquely desirable destination, governments have erected high barriers to control migratory flows. The number of visas explicitly allocated for Indonesians through intergovernmental agreements is very small, while Chinese students are viewed as transient consumers of a discrete education 'product'. But Indonesia and China are growing economic giants and important strategic, trade and security partners for Australia. Australia is not always the preferred destination for their citizens, and encouraging population exchange is likely to have positive returns for Australia in terms of international relations. And these exchanges need not be conceived as one-way. Bauböck (2015) has argued that reciprocal agreements between states in which governments recognise the benefits to their *own* citizens of liberal opportunities to relocate are the most

promising prospect for the promotion of mutual cross-border mobility (see also Castles 2014 on this point). This would seem to be a fruitful avenue to pursue in relation to Australia's migratory relationships with these two rapidly developing neighbours.

Australia perceives its relationship to the Pacific region primarily from the perspective of a regional power with an interest in trade and development[10] and a concern to limit unwanted migration. This concern is likely to intensify as the Pacific nations continue to experience a demographic 'youth bulge' over the coming decades (Hugo 2011), so that migratory relationships based on reciprocity would appear less achievable in this case. An appreciation of the culturally and historically informed understandings of regional mobility among Pacific Island nations would enhance the relationship between Australia and its Pacific neighbours. Policies that promote fluid security in this context would need to acknowledge the importance of migrant transnationalism to the wellbeing of Pacific populations and to regional security as a whole, as espoused by Lee (2009, p. 30):

> Pacific transnationalism is a topic of growing importance, tied as it is to the very future of Pacific countries. Early in the 21st century many of those countries face an uncertain future, with growing economic woes, political tensions, the impact of climate change, continuing depopulation in some cases and shifts in international relations, including changes to immigration policies in destination countries. Any issues facing Pacific peoples must be discussed in the context of both the islands and their diasporas, taking the processes of 'world enlargement' and transnationalism into account.

When viewed from the perspective of individual migrants, the official category of temporary migration is revealed to be extremely fluid. Even strictly time-delimited undertakings, such as entry by our Tongan participants via the SWP, may nurture desires for repeat or circular migration. Our Samoan-born SCV holders who understood their migration to Australia to be a life-long commitment soon discovered that their visa status did not support this goal. And it is hardly surprising that success in gaining access to competitive skills-based visas for work and study engendered a desire for a more secure, long-term legal status among

10 Although Australia is rapidly being supplanted in this role by China, which is beginning to invest heavily in Pacific nations.

many of our Chinese and Indonesian participants. Australia's inflexible migration controls militate against, rather than nourish, this fluidity, and the emphasis on control and compliance generates legal insecurity, which in turn undermines other dimensions of human security. This is short-sighted, as Castles (2014, p. 204) explains:

> It will become crucial to re-conceptualize migration not as a problem to be solved through strict control, but as a normal part of global change and development, in which decision-makers should aim to minimize potential negative effects and to help realize the potential benefits for the migrants as well as for the economies and the societies involved.

On the basis of the results of this study, we conclude that changes to Australian migration policy are possible that would support this vision, which we think of as fluid security. One example of such a policy change is improved access to visitor visas and family reunion for individuals who have been accepted into Australia on a temporary basis, in order to facilitate and sustain transnational support networks. Better pathways to attaining the certainties and benefits associated with permanent residency for those who have already jumped the hurdle of skills requirements would enhance their human security, and possibly their productivity, while not necessarily discouraging future outward migration. A relaxation and rethinking of skills criteria could allow for self-selection of highly motivated short- and long-term settlers, while the contributions of New Zealand citizens who take up the opportunity to relocate to Australia could be tapped by ending the systemic and pervasive discrimination they face as SCV holders. Finally, a refocusing of compliance monitoring away from temporary visa holders themselves would free resources that could be better directed towards enhanced regulation of workplace conditions, education providers and intermediaries who benefit from mobile populations. Such a change would produce a fairer and more self-sustaining mobility regime.

Conclusion

Temporariness can be viewed as a testing ground for global connectivity. Moreover, the experience of mobile populations can, in some ways, be seen as a template for contemporary human experience more broadly. In a world already made more insecure by the neoliberal emphasis on competitive individualism and hostility towards robust social protections,

security thinking has become 'part of everyday politics, not just the politics of the exceptional' (James 2012). Those who uproot themselves from familiar surroundings and networks are confronting that insecurity head-on.

In our research, we have applied the human security concept at a very personal level, allowing the temporary migrants who participated in the study to identify the factors that made their lives more or less secure. At the same time, they illustrated for us the complexity of interconnectedness that makes human security a fundamentally collective phenomenon. Their experience shines a spotlight on the deteriorating protections of citizenship and highlights the need for a reappraisal of how human rights protections can be made more meaningful within an increasingly mobile, individualised and yet interconnected world.

Temporary migrants are at the forefront of these social transformations—transformations that Sassen (2014) has importantly noted are at the 'systemic edge' of the current order (or disorder) that is taken for granted, particularly by those privileged by historical structures and inequalities. Yet the transformations that occur at a pace and at multiple sites for mere survival or as reactions or resistance to such seemingly fixed orders and structures are accompanied by tipping points to a new reality and future. For example, the young Chinese students in our study were eager to build transcultural competence and find a place for themselves within a competitive globalising world (see also Forbes-Mewett et al. 2015; Marginson et al. 2010; Robinson 2014). The Tongan seasonal workers were forced to trade off the comforts of family life to engage in short-term 'temporary migration projects' (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012) for the benefit of themselves and their wider communities. The Samoan-born New Zealand citizens made long-term commitments to relocate their families and livelihoods to Australia, yet found themselves shackled with limited opportunities, like the marginalised 'global workers' described by Standing (2011, 2014; Ness 2011). Meanwhile, the Indonesian students and workers interviewed for this study experienced cultural and legal insecurity in Australia, which left them ambivalent about whether or not to return to their relatively comfortable lives back home. These and other temporary migrants should be viewed as positive figures of our times rather than as mere commodities, dispensable labour, or as threats to be deterred or controlled.

At a national and social level, Australia is yet to develop an image of itself as an Asian nation (Hage 2000). Altman (2012, p. 3) argues that enhanced relations with the diverse nations of the Asia-Pacific region means engaging with the full gamut of the challenges summed up in

the term 'human security', which he identifies as an area of neglect in Australian politics. Such a shift in the national imaginary would support, and could be supported by, enhanced regional mobility. As the image of states as closed containers becomes obsolete, we are moving towards a world where cross-border fluidity will become the norm (Weber 2015). This does not prevent states and fearful populations from retreating to an idealised notion of the countries in which they live as homogeneous and closed to global flows of people, information, ideas and goods. As Altman (2012, p. 6) reminds us: 'There is a deep tension in Australia between a cosmopolitan and parochial view of the world, which results from the ways a settler society planted so far from its historical roots has engaged with the larger world.' Despite this, the flows continue and are beginning to diversify and move in unpredictable directions, such as the reverse flows of cash remittances and skilled professionals from Samoa to Australia and New Zealand that were identified in our study. It is the role of government to prepare proactively for the more flexible styles of governance that will be necessary in an emerging space of flows. Skills-based selection, strict quotas and other mechanisms of selective control are not proving to be effective or sustainable. State-determined criteria are destined to remain out of step with market forces and are antithetical to the neoliberal value of a free market in labour. Decentring both the state and the market means starting from the needs of people. Allowing more freedom in terms of entry and conditions has as much chance of aligning with the needs of populations and markets as unsuccessful efforts at planning and control. On the other hand, the neoliberal preference for radical deregulation and hyper-individualism is not commensurate with the values of fluid security we espouse; we do not advocate fluidity at the expense of security.

Dealing with the human security needs of mobile populations therefore tests the limits of established modes of governance and demands the breaking down of the outdated migration myths and dualities discussed in the previous section. New thinking by Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) on 'regimes of mobility' looks beyond migration as an aberration and challenges the sharp distinction between immobility and stasis that currently forms the basis for social organisation and planning. The regimes of mobility approach seeks to reveal, for instance, the co-dependence between privileged movement and the movement of stigmatised, hidden and vulnerable irregular and temporary migrants: 'It is the labour of those whose movements are declared illicit and subversive that makes possible the easy mobility of those who seem to live in a borderless world of wealth and power' (Glick Schiller and Salazar

2013, p. 188). This idea stresses that tackling global inequality at a structural level is central to any meaningful pursuit of human security. As noted by Castles (2014, p. 192): 'It is important to see migration not as a threat to state security, but as a result of the human insecurity that arises through global inequality.'

We have advocated a critical approach to human security that is supportive of human rights while recognising the challenges of bringing human rights and human mobility into alignment. The lack of enforceable human rights legislation has been identified as a practical barrier to eliminating the structural discrimination directed at present towards New Zealand citizens residing in Australia (Faulkner 2013).[11] In fact, the entire Asia-Pacific region is behind the game in this respect. Some steps have been taken towards strengthening human rights structures and other forms of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, but these institutions generally have limited authority and membership.[12] However, some migration scholars have pointed to the inadequacies of conventional human rights approaches when it comes to migration (Ruhs 2013), highlighting the danger that rights protection for existing migrants might lead to restricted access for potential future migrants. This scenario depends, of course, on framing freedom (in this case, openness of access) and security (in the form of rights protections) as antithetical to one another. From a global justice perspective, increased capacity for mobility and enhanced rights are both desirable (see Pogge 1992, for example). This combination of mobility and human rights protection is also the essence of fluid security.

Challenging the dichotomy of freedom and security in relation to mobility is not as idealistic as it may seem. Security theorist Anthony

11 At the time of writing, a Senate inquiry into temporary work visas, which was not supported by government, had been launched to examine inter alia whether temporary work visa holders had access to the same benefits and entitlements as citizens and permanent residents and whether any differences were consistent with international conventions (see http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Education_and_Employment/temporary_work_visa/Terms_of_Reference).

12 For example, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (http://aichr.org/), a largely governmental body of which Australia is not a member; the Asia Pacific Forum (http://www.asiapacificforum.net/), a network of non-government organisations with the support of the Australian government; and the intergovernmental Pacific Islands Forum (http://www.forumsec.org/). See also Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2010) and Frost (2009).

Burke has noted that 'no state or community can achieve enduring security by depriving others of it' (2012, p. 90), and he argues that attending to human security within the region would enhance Australia's national security. In relation to mobile populations more specifically, the UNODC—the foremost crime and security organisation at the international level—has advocated both increased openness to labour and humanitarian migration *and* strict labour protections for all categories of migrants, *including* irregular migrants (UNODC 2013). Furthermore, the UNOHCHR (2013, p. 8) has argued that the protection of human rights for migrants is in the interest of host communities: 'If migrants lack access to human rights their ability to benefit from migration is compromised, as is their potential contribution to the development of the societies in which they live.'

Mobile populations are also contributing to global transformation by creating and populating transnational spaces that may not be strictly geographical and are often not governed by states. Our Indonesian and Chinese research participants did this by establishing digital networks with friends, family and other migrants. We found that Samoan kinship traditions were adapting by extending the institutions of cultural authority to reach into transnational communities. These practices have created hubs of security (and sometimes insecurity) that sustain mobile populations in a way that is relatively independent of government policy and control. They are challenging the notion that inclusion relates only to physical space and creating new forms of belonging. These new kinds of communities are out of alignment with government multicultural policies that imagine diasporic communities in ways that do not reflect how many people, particularly mobile populations, actually relate.

Just as the lives of individuals are becoming more transnational, institutions that support them, such as NGOs and unions, are also transnationalising in order to provide advocacy and support in appropriate ways. Organisations at the forefront of these changes recognise that the transition to a new global order is creating the need for a new compact, not merely between governments and citizens and not solely to ameliorate the conditions of the global poor, but rather to aspire to the achievement of universal human security in a space of flows. Everything we have seen suggests that these flows are likely to become more fluid and more rapid. We are at a time when states and non-state actors can engage to make them more or less prosperous, more or less inclusive, more or less sustainable. To work towards prosperous, inclusive and sustainable flows will generate return tides of wellbeing for states, host communities, diasporas and all those souls who endeavour to live in between.

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